



Juan Rena and the Construction of the Hispanic Monarchy (1500-1540)

Jose Miguel Escribano-Páez

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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Examining Board

Prof. Jorge Flores, European University Institute (supervisor)
Prof. Regina Grafe, European University Institute
Prof. Wolfgang Kaiser, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne (external advisor)
Prof. Pedro Cardim, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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Abstract

This thesis offers an innovative study in the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy during the first half of the sixteenth century. Focusing on a king's man: Juan Rena (Venice, ca. 1480-Toledo 1539); I explore subjects such as the Spanish expansionism in Europe and beyond, the configuration of the empire's frontiers, the shaping of the new imperial administration, and the functioning of Charles V's military machinery in the Mediterranean. In analysing Juan Rena's activity as a crown's servant, this work reveals how the Hispanic Monarchy was constructed from below, out of multiple interactions between a wide array of socio-political actors. Furthermore, and this is one of the main contributions of this research, it will allow us to rethink the role that the myriad of king's men, like Rena, played in the configuration of early modern empires. Hence, this thesis seeks to do more than simply reconstructing the activities of a royal servant, it aims to provide an in-depth study, which will contribute to our historical understanding of the construction of early modern empires.

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Introduction

This thesis focuses on an individual, Juan Rena, but also on one of the first global empires: the Hispanic Monarchy.¹ This vast political entity has attracted the attention of many scholars and, in fact, the way of studying its inner workings has changed completely in recent decades, giving place to a more complex understanding of its functioning. Undoubtedly, the crown's servants like the one here analysed are among the main beneficiaries of this profound renovation. Nevertheless, they continue to appear as "passive" characters as they have mirrored the progressive evolution of a political history that has become more complex and rich. While this study on Juan Rena relies to a great extent in comprehending these characters, it also seeks to reverse this trend by studying a king's man like him as a way to better understand the construction of early modern empires.

The main character on the stage, Juan Rena, was born in Venice around 1480 and was active in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy between 1504 and 1538. Rena's interest for historians does not arise from his celebrity, or from his condition as servant of a world-wide famous character like Charles V. I decided to study him because I consider that using an actor based approach for a case study is a useful research tool for a problem-solving agenda on early modern empires. Rena deserves our attention due to his multiple activities in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy, which throw light on unsolved historical problems relating to the construction of this polity. Described by contemporaries as a king's man his many occupations include: chaplain, merchant, diplomatic agent, royal officer, councillor, and bishop. Despite this astonishing accumulation of offices he was by no means unusual in combining all these activities. In fact, to a great extent if Rena stands out as a unique character it is just because his personal archive has survived in an almost complete form, so unlike many early modern actors, we can learn a good deal about him, the people related to him and, especially, his activities in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy during the first half of the sixteenth century.

¹ In this work I will refer to the Hispanic Monarchy as an empire, even if it is problematic to consider the Iberian monarchies as empires. Nevertheless historians agree in applying that label to this polity during the chronological framework of this work. In fact this period is known as 'the truly 'imperial' period'. C. Hausser and H. Pietschmann, "Empire. The Concept and its Problems in the Historiography on the Iberian Empires in the Early Modern Age," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 3, n° 1 (2014): 8 and 9.

Needless to say, any subject should not be explored only because there are abundant or new sources. Nevertheless, I decided to focus on Rena's case because using his perspective allows us to appreciate the role that people like him had in shaping an early modern empire. The case study will shed light on the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy in a number of ways. The first due to the fact that the study of crown's servants and their influence in the construction of the empire has been focused almost exclusively on the main figures of the court and the imperial administration. However, this is not the main reason that makes Rena's career an excellent case study. The main reason is that focusing on his career we can study the influence of king's men in the empire building process. In fact, as we will see, Rena's diplomatic, political, and administrative activities on the ground, appropriately reflect the different challenges of an empire "under construction".

State of the Art

In a recent survey on comparative rulership Jeroen Duindam, pointed out that more research needs to be done on the imperial agents who were responsible for making the empire work in the peripheries.² Interestingly, in a reflection about the state of the art on the empire of Charles V Wim Blockmans and Nicolette Mout made a similar claim, when they asserted that, even after the massive publications that followed the 500th anniversary of the emperor's birth, new avenues of research still have to be explored. According to them, one of the key aspects to analyse was the men who served the emperor not as subjects but as actors who were actively involved in the imperial administration. Given that there are several excellent works on the emperor's court, would be to study the relationships between the administrative centres and the peripheries.³

² Jeroen Duindam, "Towards a Comparative Understanding of Rulership: Discourses, Practices, Patterns" in *The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces: Agents and Interactions*, ed. J. Duindam and S. Dabringhaus (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 231.

³ Wim Blockmans and Nicolette Mout, "The Harvest of a Celebration: What More Do We Need to Know about Charles V after the Year 2000," in *The World of Emperor Charles V*, ed. W. Blockmans and N. Mout (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2004), 7. The celebration of Charles V's born provoked an astonishing amount of publications on his reign. In order to avoid a long list of works I will quote only two mayor synthesis built on them. Wim Blockmans, *Emperor Charles V, 1550-1558* (London: Arnold, 2002) and Ernest Belenguier Cebrià, *El imperio de Carlos V: las coronas y sus territorios* (Barcelona: Península, 2002). While the first one employs a mayor number of works published in central and northern Europe the latter makes use of most of the Spanish and Italian bibliography.

My decision to bring here their call is in part because all three found the same gap which tells us a lot about the way that historians have analysed early modern empires so far. These authors were asking for more research to be conducted on the upper echelons of the crown's servants as a way to understand the functioning of early modern empires. Blockmans and Mout called for more works on councillors and secretaries, while Duindam was pointing to provincial governors. These calls for more studies on such characters underlines the traditional top-down approach on the study of early modern empires. Saying that, I cannot but agree with these authors' claims, more research has still to be done on the men who made the empire work, but contrary to their opinion I strongly believe that given our current understanding of early modern empires we can learn a lot about how they worked by focusing on a king's man like Rena who was neither a provincial governor nor a royal secretary.

In order to understand the place that Rena could occupy in the current scholarship on early modern empires it is necessary to trace some of the major lines of enquiry in this area of study. In recent decades the way in which we understand early modern monarchies and empires has completely changed, giving place to a new interest on the men who served the crown. Traditionally, early modern monarchies were understood as clear precedent of the modern state due to their centralised character.⁴ Thus, it is not strange to find that the studies on the crown's servants identify these characters as bureaucratic tools that the crown needed to reinforce its power.⁵ Different authors have shown that the Iberian monarchies (frequently considered as emblematic examples of power centralisation) were not a precedent of the modern state because of the plural character of their power.⁶ In fact, in these works royal officers did not fulfill their traditional image as

⁴ The classic are Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990). On our field of study: José Antonio Maravall, *Estado moderno y mentalidad social (siglos XV a XVII)* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1972). For a complete overview on the state-building debate in the Spanish historiography, see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, "Les traditions nationales d'historiographie de l'État: l'Espagne," in *Visions sur le développement des États européens. Théories et historiographies de l'État modern*, eds. W. Blockmans and J-P. Genet (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993), 219-233.

⁵ José María García Marín, *La burocracia castellana bajo los Austrias* (Alcalá de Henares: INAP, 1986). See also Id., "La burocracia de Carlos V," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), 275-291.

⁶ Bartolomé Clavero, *Tantas personas como estados. Por una antropología política de la historia europea* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1986); António M. Hespanha, *As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político Portugal – Séc XVII*, 2nd ed. (Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1994); Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragments de monarchia. Trabajos de historia política* (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1992). For a extense literature review on the matter, see J-F. Schaub, "La Península Iberica nei secoli XVI e XVII: la

tools of political centralization.⁷ In addition, the deep renovation of political history, and its new focus on power relationships, has raised a new understanding of the royal servants in the complex politics of the Iberian monarchies.⁸

Nevertheless, figures like Rena were eclipsed by the rise of a promising field of study: the royal court.⁹ In addition to the studies on the royal court as a political space, historians have approached the court's institutions providing us with new insights which have renewed our understanding of these core institutions of the imperial administration.¹⁰ The rise of court studies showed the important role of courtiers and court factions in early modern politics, and has also provided us with complete surveys of the

questione dello stato," *Quaderni Storici* 36, n° 1 (1995): 9-49; and P. Cardim, "Centralização Política e Estado na Recente Historiografia sobre o Portugal do Antigo Regime," *Nação e Defesa* 87 (1998): 129-158.

⁷ Hespanha, *As Vésperas do Leviathan*, 160-293.

⁸ For a literature review on the impact of this renovation in the study of the Iberian monarchies, see X. Gil Pujol, "Notas sobre el estudio del poder como nueva valoración de la historia política," *Pedralbes, Revista d'història moderna* 3 (1983): 61-88 and P. Cardim, "Politics and Power Relations in Portugal (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," *Parliaments, Estates and Representatives* 13, n° 2 (1993): 95-108.

⁹ There is a huge number of studies on the early modern courts but I will only quote the works related with my field of study. Volker Press, "The Habsburg Court as Center of the Imperial Government," *Journal of modern history* 58, Supplement: Politics and Society in the Holy Roman Empire, 1500-1806 (1986): S23-S45; Id., "The Imperial Court of the Habsburgs: From Maximilian I to Ferdinand III, 1493-1657," in *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: the court at the beginning of the modern age, c. 1450-1650*, ed. R. Asch and A. M. Birke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 289-312; José Martínez Millán, "Para un estudio del imperio de Carlos V a través de la corte," in *El imperio de Carlos V. Procesos de agregación y conflictos*, ed. B. J. García García (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2000), 325-343. An excellent study on Charles V's court can be found in José Martínez Millán ed., *La corte de Carlos V* (Madrid: SECC, 2000). An English reader can consult a brief but complete synthesis on Spanish historiography on this topic in Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, "Court Studies in the Spanish World," in *The Court in Europe*, ed. M. Fantoni (Rome: Boldizzoni, 2012), 135-147. On the relationships between provincial courts and the royal court, see Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, *La República de las Parentelas: el Estado de Milán en la Monarquía de Carlos II* (Mantua: G. Arcari, 2002).

¹⁰ Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "La corte: un espacio abierto para la historia social," en *La historia social en España*, ed. S. Castillo Alonso (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1991), 247-260; José Martínez Millán ed., *Instituciones y élites de poder en la Monarquía Hispana durante el siglo XVI* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1992). For a theoretical reflection on this matter, see J. Martínez Millán, "Las investigaciones sobre patronazgo y clientelismo en la administración de la Monarquía Hispana durante la edad moderna," *Studia historica. Historia moderna* 15 (1996): 83-106. See also the monographs on the main court councils: Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, *El consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602: patronazgo y clientelismo en el gobierno de las finanzas reales durante el siglo XVI* (Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1996); Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia* (Madrid: SECC, 1998); Santiago Fernández Conti, *Los consejos de estado y guerra de la Monarquía Hispana en tiempos de Felipe II (1548-1598)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998); Juan Carlos Domínguez Nafría, "Carlos V y los orígenes de la polisinodia hispánica," in *De la unión de coronas al imperio de Carlos V*, ed. E. Belenguier Cebrià (Madrid: SECC, 2001), vol. 1, 497-531; and René Vermeir, "La construction de l'Empire. L'origine des transformations institutionnelles en Espagne au XVIe siècle," in *Charles V in Context: The Making of a European Identity*, ed. M. Boone (Ghent: Ghent University Press, 2003), 47-60.

men who composed the core institutions of the imperial government.¹¹ In addition, several historians made interesting contributions on the study of the empire's politics by looking at the men composing the inner circle of the emperor.¹² There is little doubt about the important contribution of these studies but, as Michael J. Braddick asserted, the historians' concentration on the institutions of the court and its personnel has contributed to obscuring the fundamental role played by the agents acting in the system's peripheries.¹³ In the case of the Hispanic Monarchy this problem was mitigated to a certain extent thanks to a productive line of research focusing on imperial administration. Different studies focused on the activity of high ranking officers have shown the initiative of magistrates who influenced decision making in Madrid, or who shaped the colonial domains according to their own interests.¹⁴ To a great extent, these works also showed the active role that royal officers had in the empire's political life, and as such these actors and their networks were portrayed as the backbone of the imperial rule.¹⁵

¹¹ Martínez Millán ed., *La Corte de Carlos V*, Vol. III. For instance, there is a monographic study listing all the men serving the Habsburgs in their royal councils. José Antonio Escudero, *Los hombres de la monarquía universal* (Madrid: RAH, 2011).

¹² For instance, the royal secretaries and councillors of Charles V have been extensively studied and continue receiving attention even nowadays. Hayward Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary of the Emperor Charles V* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg, 1960); Daniel Antony, *Nicolas Perrenot de Granvelle. Premier conseiller de Charles Quint*, (Besançon: Les Éditions du Sekoya, 2006). Unfortunately, we do not have a modern work on Cobos' influence in the shaping of Charles V's empire, like the recent work on his counterpart, Kaya Sahin, *Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman. Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). The most evident case at the point is that of Mercurino di Gattinara, the political architect behind Charles V's imperial project, as there are at least three major monographs on him. John M. Headley, *The Emperor and his Chancellor: a Study on the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Manuel Rivero, *Gattinara, Carlos V y el sueño del Imperio* (Madrid: Sílex, 2005); and Rebecca Ard Boone, *Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire*, (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2014).

¹³ Michael J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13.

¹⁴ John Leddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); and Ethelia Ruiz Medrano, *Reshaping New Spain: Government and Private Interests in the Colonial Bureaucracy, 1531-1550* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2006).

¹⁵ Zacarías Moutoukias, "Power, Corruption and Commerce: the Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth Century Buenos Aires," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, n° 4, (1988): 771-801; Id., "Réseaux personnels et autorité coloniale: les négociants de Buenos Aires au XVIIIe siècle," *Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilizations*, 47, n° 4-5 (1992): 889-915; Michel Bertrand, *Grandeur et misère de l'office. Les officiers de finances de Nouvelle Espagne (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999). Two interesting selections of both theoretical essays and case studies in J. L. Castellano Castellano and J. P. Dedieu eds., *Réseaux, familles et pouvoirs dans le Monde Ibérique à la fin de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: CNRS, 1998) and J. L. Castellano Castellano, J. P. Dedieu and M. V. López Cordón Cortezos eds., *La pluma, la mitra y la espada. Estudios de historia institucional en la edad moderna*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000).

Another step forward in our understanding on the functioning of the early modern empires came with the works of historians who studied ‘the practice of empire’ in its different territories.¹⁶ During the last decades many historians have addressed the imperial politics from its practical application in each of the territories composing the empire. This approach was very closely related to Elliott’s model of “composite monarchies”. In this model the crown and the territorial elites of every single territory appear as the protagonists of a political life that was made out of dyadic negotiations between the crown and the different local elites.¹⁷ To a great extent this line of enquiry was simply the outcome of a common assumption that saw the crown and the different elites as the sole actors of the political life in the ancien regime.¹⁸ The concept of “composite monarchy” set the scent to analyse early modern empires, due to the composite character of the monarchies that gave them birth.¹⁹ Elliott’s ideas were also at the base of the “negotiated

¹⁶ The classic work is Helmut G. Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: a Study on the Practice of Empire* (New York: Staple Press, 1951). On the influence of this book on the Spanish historiography, see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo’s epilogue to the Spanish edition. Helmut G. Koenigsberger, *La práctica del imperio* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989), 245-258.

¹⁷ J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past & Present* 137 (1992): 48-71. The concept of Composite Monarchy applied to the reign of Charles V is developed in John Elliott, “Monarquía compuesta y Monarquía Universal en la época de Carlos V,” in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. 5, 699-710. This concept lies also at the base of recent surveys on the entanglements between the Iberian empires, which have been labelled as “composite empires”. S. Subrahmanyam, “Holding the World in Balance: the Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500-1640,” *The American Historical Review* 112, n° 5 (2007): 1359-1385, and Jorge Flores, “The Iberian Empires, 1400 to 1800,” in *The Cambridge World History: The Construction of a Global World, 1400-1800 CE*, ed. J. Benthley, S. Subrahmanyam, and M. E. Wiesner-Hanks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Vol. VI, Part. I, 271-296.

¹⁸ This common assumption is more than obvious in the works on the so-called modern state. Many scholars underlined the central government’s need to use intermediary agents and patronage in the symbiotic relations between centre and peripheries. Wolfgang Reinhard, “Élites du pouvoir, serviteurs de l’État, classes dirigeantes et croissance du pouvoir d’État,” and Gerald E. Aylmer, “Centre et périphérie: définition des élites du pouvoir,” both in *Les Élites du pouvoir et la construction de l’État en Europe*, ed. W. Reinhard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), 7-12 and 77-102; Wim Blockmans, “Patronage, Brokerage and Corruption as Symptoms of Incipient State Formation in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands,” in *Klientensysteme im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. A. Maczak (München: Oldenbourg, 1988), 117-127; James Casey, “Some Considerations on State Formation and Patronage in Early Modern Spain,” in *Patronages et clientélismes 1550-1750 (France, Anglaterrre, Espagne, Italie)* (London: Institute Français du Royaume-Uni, 1995), 103-115. For an interesting study on the patronage mechanics used by the Spanish Crown during the eighteenth century, see Christian Windler, *Élites locales, señores, reformistas. Redes clientelares y Monarquía hacia finales del Antiguo Régimen* (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1997); Id., “Clientèles royales et clientèles seigneuriales vers la fin de l’Ancien Régime: un dossier espagnol,” *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 52, n° 2 (1997): 293-319. See also A. Feros, “Clientelismo y poder monárquico en la España de los Siglos XVI y XVII,” *Relaciones* 19, (1998): 17-49. From a wider perspective, see José María Imízcoz Beuza, “Comunidad, red social y élites. Un análisis de la vertebración social en el Antiguo Régimen,” in *Élites, poder y red social. Las élites del País Vasco y Navarra en la Edad Moderna (Estado de la cuestión y perspectivas)*, ed. J. M. Imízcoz Beuza (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial. Universidad del País Vasco/EHU, 1996), 13-50; Id., “Actores, redes, procesos: reflexiones para una historia más global,” *Revista da Faculdade de Letras. História* 5 (2004): 115-140.

¹⁹ John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

empires”, an interpretation that suggests that early modern empires functioned according to a bargaining process between the imperial centre and the so-called peripheral authorities.²⁰ This approach coincided in time with a more nuanced vision on the active role of regional elites in the shaping of early modern political regimes.²¹ As a result of the emphasis on vertical power relationships between rulers, their agents, and their subjects, the intermediary elites occupied a hegemonic place in the narratives of imperial history.²² In the case of the Iberian Empires this interplay between crown and territorial elites was easy to analyse from the study of a crucial figure in the middle: the viceroy. In fact, due to the central role of these characters nowadays we have excellent works on the viceroys of these extended polities.²³

Needless, to say, in a historiographic landscape dominated by the crown and the elites there was no room for a modest king’s man like Juan Rena. Nevertheless, further advances in our understanding of the early modern empires contributed to change this. For instance, several works on the political history of the Hispanic Monarchy started to include rich descriptions on the characters whose activities showed how much councillors and high ranking officers relied on them to implement the political measures decided at the royal court.²⁴ These examples opened up a window into the crucial role these characters played in the political life. However, the main actors on the stage continued to be the members of the inner court of the imperial government.

One of the main contributions towards a new understanding these figures come with the recent studies on the state building process from below. André Holstein, the

²⁰ Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic world,” in *Negotiated authorities: essays in colonial political and constitutional history*, ed. J. P. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24; and C. Daniels and M. V. Kennedy eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

²¹ Xavier Gil Pujol, “Culturas políticas y clases dirigentes regionales en la formación del estado moderno,” in *Les élites locales et l’État dans l’Espagne moderne du XVIe au XIXe siècle*, ed. M. Lambert-Gorges (Paris: CNRS, 1993), 171-192.

²² Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 13-15.

²³ Carlos José Hernández Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles en el siglo XVI: el virrey Pedro de Toledo: linaje, estado y cultura (1532-1553)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1994); Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *La edad de oro de los virreyes. El virreinato en la Monarquía Hispánica durante los siglos XVI y XVII*, (Madrid: Akal, 2011); and P. Cardim and J-L. Palos eds., *El mundo de los virreyes en las monarquías de España y Portugal* (Frankfurt: Vervuert-Iberoamericana, 2012).

²⁴ Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Le Portugal au temps du Comte-Duc d’Olivares (1621-1640). Le conflit de juridictions comme exercice de la politique* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2001), 222-226 and 335-348.

author of the theoretical framework behind these works, suggested that the state ‘resulted from the initiatives of officeholders and all the other local actors, who were able to instrumentalize it for their interests. This state was the outcome of a multitude of practices, which succeeded in transforming individual and group interests’. In this interpretative framework the state local officeholders were called to play a prominent role in the new research agenda considering that: ‘they –in the true sense of the word– embodied the state.’²⁵ Beyond this theoretical proposition, the authors studying this state building process from below have pointed out the important role that these characters played in the shaping of the state while acting as power brokers mediating in the negotiations between rulers and their subjects.²⁶

Royal officers acting on the ground gained momentum when the common understanding of the Iberian empires as polities in which power was exercised in a center-periphery way started to fall into pieces due to the emergence of a more complex research agenda dominated by a plurality of powers.²⁷ As a result of this change the attention of historians moved beyond the negotiations between the crown and elites, or the vertical relationships connecting the king and the local notables. Hence, for instance, the horizontal linkages between characters from the different territories of the empire were made visible as crucial factors that influenced the operation of these vast polities.²⁸

²⁵ André Holstein, “Empowering Interactions: Looking at Statebuilding from below,” in *Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe, 1300-1900*, ed. W. Blockmans, A. Holstein and J. Mathieu (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 21.

²⁶ Holstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 21; See also Stefan Brakensiek, “Lokale Amtsträger in deutschen Territorien der Frühen Neuzeit. Institutionelle Grundlagen, akzeptanzorientierte Herrschaftspraxis und obrigkeitliche Identität,” in *Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess*, ed. R. G. Asch and D. Freist (Cologne: Böhlhau, 2005), 49-67, and Id., “New Perspectives on State-Building and the Implementation of Rulership in Early Modern European Monarchies,” in *Structures on the Move. Technologies of Governance in Transcultural Encounter*, ed. A. Flütchter and S. Richter (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012), 33.

²⁷ António Manuel Hespanha, “A constituição do Império português. Revisão de alguns enviesamentos correntes,” in *O antigo regime nos trópicos. A dinâmica imperial portuguesa (séculos XVI-XVIII)*, ed. J. Fragoso, M. F. Bicalho and M. Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2010), 163-188. A state of the art on the study of early modern politics in the Portuguese world in Pedro Cardim, “La jurisdicción real y su afirmación en la Corona portuguesa y sus territorios ultramarinos (siglos XVI-XVIII): Reflexiones sobre la historiografía,” in *De Re Publica Hispaniae. Una vindicación de la cultura política en los reinos ibéricos en la primera modernidad*, ed. F. J. Aranda Pérez and J. D. Rodrigues (Madrid: Sílex, 2008), 349-388. On the Spanish case see Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, *Marte contra minerva. El precio del imperio español, c. 1450-1600* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), A. Irigoín and R. Grafe, “Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88, n° 2 (2008): 173-209; and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez, “Les acteurs de l’hégémonie hispanique, du monde à la péninsule Ibérique,” *Annales* 69, n° 4 (2014): 927-954.

²⁸ Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, “Entre el imperio colonial y la monarquía compuesta. Élités y territorios en la Monarquía Hispánica (ss. XVI-XVII),” in *Las redes del imperio. Élités sociales en la articulación de la Monarquía Hispánica, 1492-1714*, ed. B. Yun-Casalilla (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 11-35.

Unsurprisingly, when historians took notice of the importance of the horizontal linkages between the territories royal officers became a group whose extreme geographical mobility influenced the empire's cohesion.²⁹

New changes in our way of understanding the Iberian empires have brought us new ways of approach royal officers. Scholars working on the Portuguese empire have drawn attention to the relational dynamics among a variety of individuals who shaped the empire.³⁰ In this framework, royal officers appear, for instance, as crucial actors who contributed to create the practical knowledge needed to keep the empire working.³¹ Royal servants continued gaining momentum as a subject of study when a group of historians working on the Iberian empires proposed to study these polities as “polycentric monarchies”. This analytical proposition aimed to move beyond a centre-periphery narrative focused mainly on what was happening in the court, in order to show that these extended political entities were built on the local level.³² These new understandings of the Iberian monarchies have raised a renewed interest on the study of royal officers as a

²⁹ Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa, “Guerra, Imperio y Violencia en la Audiencia de Santa Fe, Nuevo Reino de Granada. 1580-1620” (Ph.D. diss., Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2013), 60-119; and Domingo Centenero de Arce, “Una monarquía de lazos débiles. Veteranos, militares y administradores en la Monarquía Católica 1554-1621” (Ph.D. diss., European University Institute, 2009). A brief resume of some of its central ideas in Id., “¿Una monarquía de lazos débiles?,” in *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica (siglos XVI-XVII)*, ed. J. F. Pardo Moleró and M. Lomas Cortés (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2012), 137-161; Yuen-Gen Liang, *Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). An interesting case study in J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez and G. Vallejo Cervantes, “Vivir "sin dexar parte donde las cruces españolas no hayan sido conocidas" Don Diego de Villalobos y Benavides en la administración imperial de la Monarquía Hispánica,” *Historia Mexicana* 61, nº 3 (2012): 1109-1170.

³⁰ João Fragoso and Maria de Fátima Gouvêa: “Desenhando perspectivas e ampliando abordagens – De O Antigo Regime nos trópicos a Na trama das redes,” in *Na trama das redes. Política e negócios no império português, séculos XVI-XVIII*, ed. J. Fragoso and M. de F. Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 2010), 11-40.

³¹ M. Gouvêa, G. Almeida Frazão and M. Nogueira dos Santos, “Redes de poder e conhecimento na governação do Império Português, 1688-1735,” *Topoi* 5, nº 8, (2004): 96-137; Maria de Fátima Silva Gouvêa, “Instruments of Knowledge and Administrative Practices in the Portuguese South Atlantic in the 17th and 18th centuries,” in *Connaissances et pouvoirs les espaces impériaux (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles), France, Espagne, Portugal*, ed. C. de Castelnau-L'Estoile and F. Regour (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2005), 147-166; and Id., “Redes governativas portuguesas e centralidades régias no mundo português, c. 1680-1730,” in *Na trama das redes. Política e negócios no império português, séculos XVI-XVIII*, ed. J. Fragoso and M. Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2010), 155-202.

³² Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, “Polycentric Monarchies. How did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?,” in *Polycentric Monarchies. How did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?*, ed. P. Cardim et al. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 3-8. For a critic towards this proposal see M. Rivero Rodríguez, “La reconstrucción de la Monarquía Hispánica: la nueva relación de los reinos,” *Revista Escuela de Historia* 12, no. 1 (2013): 1-16. For a useful critic on the concepts composing the centre-periphery narrative, see Anne Radeff: “Centres et périphéries ou centralités et décentralités,” in *Per vie di terra. Movimenti di uomini e di cose nelle società di antico regime*, ed. A. Torre (Milan: Francoangeli, 2007), 21-33.

way of analyse the internal politics of these vast polities.³³ If some decades ago the royal officers were just a mere tool in the hands of the crown, nowadays they have become privileged protagonists in the study of early modern politics.

This thesis aims to contribute to this line of enquiry by showing the paramount role that characters like Juan Rena played in the empire building processes.³⁴ As we will see, Rena spent most of his life serving the crown in spaces that we can label as peripheral. Furthermore, he was frequently in a difficult position between the interests of the imperial administration and the notables and the different local communities. Nevertheless, his political influence did not only rely on his capacity to adapt orders coming from the royal court in different local settings, or in his role connecting peripheries. In paying attention to his activity as a royal servant we can see that king's men like him played a key role in shaping the early modern empires from below. I aim to show this by answering two main questions: first, how was Rena able to carry out his multiple tasks in the service of the crown? And second, what were the consequences of his activity in the shaping of the empire building process that he was involved in?

The empire here analysed has been extensively analysed as a political project.³⁵ When the historians have addressed the question of how this project was put into practice they have frequently resorted to narratives in which the crown, the different territorial

³³ Juan Francisco Pardo Molero and Manuel Lomas Cortés eds., *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica (siglos XVI-XVII)* (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2012).

³⁴ In this thesis I will refer frequently to the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy as an empire building process. In so doing I aim to mark a clear distinction towards the term "state building" and its teleological connotations. On the long-lasting tradition pointing at Charles V as the clear counterpoint to the development of the so-called modern state, see Jean-Philippe Genet, "Charles Quint: entre Empire et État moderne, un rêve impossible?," in *Charles V in Context: the Making of a European Identity*, ed. M. Boone (Ghent: Ghent University Press, 2003), 313-330; and P. Fernández Albaladejo, "Imperio e identidad: consideraciones historiográficas sobre el momento español," *Semata* 23 (2011): 131-148.

³⁵ José Antonio Maravall, *Carlos V y el pensamiento político del Renacimiento* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1960); Frances A. Yates, *Astraea: the Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1975), 1-28; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 31-62; Juan Carlos D'Amico, *Charles Quint maître du monde: entre mythe et réalité* (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2004); On the debate on the medieval or modern origins of this imperial project, see the two opposed views in Giuseppe Galasso, "El proyecto imperial de Carlos V," in Id., *Carlos V y la España Imperial. Estudios y ensayos* (Madrid: CEEH, 2011), 35-69; R. Ard Boone, "Empire and Medieval Simulacrum: A Political Project of Mercurino di Gattinara, Grand Chancellor of Charles V," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 42, nº 4 (2011): 1027-1049; See also, Thomas J. Dandele, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 74-134.

elites, the aristocracy, the church, or the cities are the protagonists.³⁶ The general picture emerging from these works is that of an empire that existed only thanks to the support of elites to this political project.³⁷ As a result, little attention has been paid to the crucial question of how this empire came to life beyond the negotiations between the monarch and elites. Needless to say, the collaboration of these actors was more than crucial, but in the end it was just a cog in the imperial machine. Rena's case is useful precisely because it opens a window on to how this ambitious political project came to life, not only beyond the palace gates, but also in the frontiers, the navy, etcetera.

The empire that Rena helped to shape was a human one, that is, an institution that existed only because it was conceived, experienced and practiced by people.³⁸ In adopting this actor-based approach, this thesis connects with the recent interest on the so-called agents of empire.³⁹ Nevertheless, I propose an understanding of these imperial agents much more plural that includes not only diplomats, courtiers or high military officers, but also modest individuals who, like Rena, did not act in the sphere of the high politics. Following Rena as the main actor in this study will show how this empire was constructed

³⁶ Jaime Vicens Vives, "Imperio y administración en tiempo de Carlos V," in *Charles-Quint et son temps* (Paris: CNRS, 1959), 9-21; A critic to Vives' interpretation in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, "Imperio y administración bajo Carlos V: una reevaluación," in *Hernán Cortés y su tiempo* (Mérida: Editora regional de Extremadura, 1987), vol. 2, 520-527. On the multiple negotiations between Charles V and his subjects, see James D. Tracy, *Holland under the Habsburg Rule, 1506-1566: The Formation of a Body Politic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Juan Francisco Pardo Molero, *La defensa del Imperio: Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterráneo* (Madrid: SECC, 2001); Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, *El reino de Nápoles en el Imperio de Carlos V: la consolidación de la conquista* (Madrid: SECC, 2001); Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, "Carlos V y la aristocracia. Poder, crédito y economía en Castilla," in Id., *La gestión del poder. Corona y economías aristocráticas en Castilla (siglos XVI-XVIII)* (Madrid: Akal, 2002), 105-136; Sean T. Perrone, *Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy: Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy* (Leiden: Brill, 2008); and Aurelio Espinosa, *The Empire of the Cities: Emperor Charles V, the Comunero Revolt, and the Transformation of the Spanish System* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

³⁷ Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, "Non sufficit orbis? Las estrategias de la Monarquía de España," in *Historia Militar de España*, ed. H. O'donnell (Madrid: Laberinto, 2013), Vol. 3 T. 2, 33-37, and Rafael Carrasco, *La empresa imperial de Carlos V* (Madrid, Cátedra, 2015), 474-477.

³⁸ This understanding of the empire owes a great deal to Bourdieu's work on the state. Pierre Bourdieu, *Sur l'État: cours au Collège de France, 1989-1992* (Paris: Seuil, 2012). On the usefulness and risks of Bourdieu's theory on the state in the early modern period see J-P. Genet, "À propos de Pierre Bourdieu et de la genèse de l'état modern," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 201-202 (2014): 98-105. A study on the collapse of the Hispanic Monarchy from a similar approach in Jean Perre Dedieu, *Après le roi. Essai sur l'effondrement de la monarchie espagnole* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2010). A similar approach to the construction of the Spanish empire in colonial Mexico, can be found in, R. Jovita Baber, "The Construction of Empire: Politics, Law and Community in Tlaxcala, New Spain, 1521-1640" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2005).

³⁹ Noel Malcolm, *Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Michael J. Levin, *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

on the ground.⁴⁰ While the construction of the Spanish empire is firmly associated with its expansion in the Atlantic world, Rena spent most of his life travelling around Europe and especially the Mediterranean. With his multiple activities serving the crown in: Malaga, Oran, Cartagena, Barcelona, Genoa, Naples, Tunis, and Koroni, Rena contributed to turn the political projects of Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V into a reality in this region.⁴¹ By looking at the rise of the Hispanic Monarchy as an imperial power in the Mediterranean from Rena's perspective we can see it, not as a de-humanised polity (as it has appeared in the narratives on the imperial clashes since Braudel's work on the Mediterranean⁴²) but as a collective construction, one that was created and shaped by the activity of thousands of characters like Rena.

In this study I will use the concept of king's men to refer to Juan Rena and the men like him who played a key role in the construction of the empire. The term is by no means new and actually it has been frequently employed to refer to councillors, secretaries, courtiers, churchmen, or noblemen serving the king in higher offices.⁴³ More recently the term has been used to refer to lower ranking agents closer to our object of study.⁴⁴ However, despite the wide use of the concept a definition is still missing. Without aiming at providing a rigid definition, I use this concept to describe actors whose political agency and place in society was defined by their link to the monarch. This definition may come across as too vague but it allows me to refer to a wide array of people linked to the

⁴⁰ Jacques Revel, "L'histoire au ras du sol," in Giovanni Levi, *Le pouvoir au village. Histoire d'un exorciste dans le Piémont du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), I-XXXIII.

⁴¹ Ferdinand's strategy in the Mediterranean is now understood as an imperial policy closely related with the aspirations to universal monarchy. Andrew Devereux, "Empire in the Old World: Ferdinand the Catholic and His Aspiration to Universal Empire, 1479-1516," in *In and Of the Mediterranean: Medieval and Early Modern Iberian Studies*, eds. M. M. Hamilton and N. Silleras-Fernández (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2015), 119-141. Nevertheless, universal aspiration was a long-lasting common place in the Iberian political culture and is not enough to label Ferdinand's political project as an empire. J. Gil, "A apropriação da ideia de império pelos reinos da Península Ibérica: Castela," *Penélope* 15 (1995): 11-30; Pedro Cardim, "La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa (siglos XVI y XVII)," in *Comprendere le monarchie iberiche: Risorsi materiali e rappresentazioni del potere*, ed. G. Sabatini (Rome: Viella, 2010), 59-62; E. Botella Ordinas, "Exempt from Time and from its Fatal Change: Spanish Imperial Ideology, 1450-1700," *Renaissance Studies* 26, n° 4 (2012): 580-604.

⁴² Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1949) and Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the 16th-century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978).

⁴³ Adolfo Carrasco Martínez, "Los hombres del rey. Letrados, nobles y eclesiásticos al servicio de Felipe II," in *Las tierras y los hombres del rey. Felipe II, un monarca y su época* (Madrid: SECC, 1998), 55-69.

⁴⁴ Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe. Études inédites sur le règne de D. Manuel 1495-1521* (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2006), T. III, 201-212; R. Guerrero Elecalde, "Los hombres del rey. Redes, poder y surgimiento de nuevas elites gobernantes durante la guerra de sucesión española (1700-1714)," *Prohistoria* 13 (2009): 81-101.

monarch through a service relationship.⁴⁵ It also permits me to refer to characters who, like Rena, served the crown for years without being officially appointed for a specific office. Moreover, it allows me to take some distance from the bureaucratic meaning associated to the concept of crown's servants.⁴⁶ Of course Rena can also be defined as a royal officer or as crown's servant (in fact I will refer to him like that when addressing his activity in a specific office) but he was more than that. What made him an outstanding character was his service relationship with King Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V. This relationship is what earned Rena a distinguished place in the Hispanic Monarchy. Furthermore, it was this relationship that allowed him to adopt a prominent role in the construction of this polity.

The case study: a brief presentation

It is difficult to sketch a biography of Juan Rena because of the many gaps in our knowledge of his personal life.⁴⁷ His origin continues to be obscure and most probably we will never know anything about his early life before he entered the service of Ferdinand the Catholic in the opening years of the sixteenth century. He was born around 1480 according to his own references. We know that he came from Venice and in fact he was very proud of his Venetian origins.⁴⁸ We also know that he received a religious ordination during his early years in Venice.⁴⁹ Nevertheless as he did not belong to an important noble family, or to the Venetian elite it is very difficult to grasp his family background. The Venetian state archives hold only some scant sources by members of a

⁴⁵ On the concept of service, see Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "El servicio: paradigma de relación política en los siglos XVI y XVII," in *Servir al Rey en la Monarquía de los Austrias. Medios, Fines y Logros del Servicio al Soberano en los Siglos XVI y XVII*, ed. A. Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 11-45.

⁴⁶ Gerald E. Aylmer, *The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I 1625-1642* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); and Id. *The Crown's Servants: Government and Civil Service under Charles II, 1660-1685* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴⁷ The most complete description on Rena's life is Mercedes Chocarro Huesa and Félix Segurra Urra, *Inventario de la documentación de Juan Rena. Archivo Real y General de Navarra* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2013), 37-68.

⁴⁸ As a matter of fact, he transmitted this feeling to his daughter, Juana Rena, who considered herself Venetian despite having born in Granada and living in Navarre. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 16, nº 13.

⁴⁹ A certain "Johanes Regina" received the general orders in March 1490 in the chapel of Saint Just. Despite this last name looks like a latin version of Rena's last name, I cannot affirm that it was Rena. Most probably Juan Rena could have been one of the many "Jo. Di Venetia" ordering as a priest in these years. ASPVe, Archivo Segreto, Ordinazioni, Lib. 2 fols. 127, 136, 141 and 143; and Lib. 3, fol. 39. Unfortunately, the register of religious ordinances between 1495 and 1509, when Rena most probably received his religious orders, is missing.

Rena family from the middle ages.⁵⁰ For instance, we know that a certain Pietro Rena, a priest, worked as a chancellor of the Venetian bailo in Constantinople during the mid-fourteenth century.⁵¹ Nevertheless, these sources tell us nothing about Rena's close family background.

Rena did not provide us with any information about his family background except for a passing mention of his father, Polo Rena, which he shared with one of his servants.⁵² He did not maintain a close relationship with his relatives living in Venice but, for instance, he did help his nieces to enter in the convent of Saint Joseph paying their dowries and using his contacts within the Venetian church to help them.⁵³ If we know very little about his family background, we know even less about his formation during his early years in Venice. It has been suggested that Juan Rena studied in the school of the prestigious mathematician Luca Pacioli, but this Franciscan friar (considered as the father of modern accounting and book-keeping) was not in Venice during Rena's youth.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, that Rena mastered the modern accounting techniques is out of discussion, and actually this was one of his main assets in his later professional career.

We will never know why Rena moved from Venice to the Iberian Peninsula but most probably Rena arrived on the southern corner of Castile in one of the mercantile convoys connecting Venice, the Maghreb, and the southern coast of Andalusia. Unfortunately, we do not know why he started to serve the Spanish authorities. We can surmise that Rena was one of the scribes of the Venetian galleys impresoed by Cadiz's local authorities between 1502 and 1503.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the first reliable information that we have about him is that shortly after he carried out some diplomatic missions in

⁵⁰ ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, Busta, 75. I would like to thank Francisco Apellániz and Lisa Dallavalle for their guidance in the Venetian archives.

⁵¹ ASVe, Cancellerie Inferiore, n° 12, fols. 1-3.

⁵² Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 18th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, n° 8-3.

⁵³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 10, n° 20.

⁵⁴ Chocarro Huesa and Segura Urra, *Inventario de la documentación*, 68. On Luca Pacioli, see Elisabetta Ulivi, "Luca Pacioli, una biografia scientifica," *Luca Pacioli e la matematica del Rinascimento*, ed. E. Giusti and C. Maccagni (Florence: Giunti, 1994), 21-78.

⁵⁵ ASVe, Senato, Mar, Reg. N° 16, fol. 60. Unfortunately, the diplomatic sources tell us nothing about this incident. M. I. Melero Fernández, "Fondos medievales del Archivo di Stato de Venecia referentes a los reinos españoles. Regestos," *Miscel.lània de textos medievals* 5 (1989): 329-359. We know the case of another priest employed by the Venetian authorities as a notary in the convoy of galleys trading in the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula in the previous years. *Quaderno di Bordo di Giovanni Manzini pretenotario e cancelliere (1471-1484)*, ed. L. Greco (Venice: Comitato per la pubblicazione delle fonti relative alla storia di Venezia, 1997); and A. Ducellier, "Le registre de Giovanni Manzini, notaire de galee (1472-1476)," *Les cahiers de Tunisie* 43, n° 155/156 (1993): 513-534.

1504, as a representative of Ferdinand the Catholic in northern Africa negotiating with the King of Velez de la Gomera, a pirate nest in present-day Morocco. Thereafter the king and Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba (the famous Alcaide de los Donceles) employed him in the conquest and defence of the Spanish strongholds on the Maghrebi coast.

Later, in 1512, Rena became military treasurer in Navarre during the conquest of the kingdom. This office was at the basis for his later accumulation of administrative positions in this kingdom during the years after its conquest. He also took part in the internal government of Navarre, especially in the financial sphere, where he acted as an accounting officer and judge of economic affairs. To these activities we have to add his role as general vicar of the Navarrese see, the most important position in the diocese's government. During the general crisis that inaugurated the reign of Charles V, Rena took part in the organisation of the imperial army against the *Comunero* revolt (the main urban uprising against Habsburg rule) and, after that, in 1521, in the war between Charles V and Francis I. Five years later he came back to the Mediterranean, where he acted as general purveyor of the imperial navy. Following after his services on the Mediterranean coast, Rena became a member of the royal entourage accompanying the emperor on his travels around Europe. As a member of the emperor's entourage Rena worked in the economic government of this travelling court. During the 1530s Juan Rena was employed in the organisation of the emperor's Mediterranean naval forces and in the development of Charles V's major military enterprises, such as, the conquest of Koroni, the first naval campaign against the Ottoman Empire, or the conquest of Tunis. These services allowed him to become a personal councillor to the emperor on military affairs during the last years of his life. At the same time Rena's ecclesiastical career reached its peak. In 1534 he was appointed bishop of Alghero, in Sardinia, and four years later he was given the bishopric of Pamplona. He passed away in Toledo at the beginning of 1539, after almost forty years serving the Spanish crown.

Juan Rena could be characterized as an auxiliary figure in the political landscape of the day and. In fact, his figure has received little, and fragmentary, attention. The first mentions of him appear in the works of Pedro Girón and Lope de Gómara, two

chroniclers, who referred to him (very briefly) as a servant of the emperor.⁵⁶ Before that, his figure appeared in several studies, but only as a passing mention. For instance, Rena's work in Navarre after its conquest called the attention of a local historian who wrote a book on the topic almost a century ago. This work tells us very little about Rena, but it deserves to be mentioned as the first contribution on Rena's personal "black legend". Since then Rena continues to be featured in the works on the conquest, frequently as an emblematic character of the cruelty of that conquest.⁵⁷ Recently Rena has earned fame in Spain due to the ongoing debate on the conquest of Navarre and in fact another local historian has written the only monographic study on Rena. Nevertheless, this work has only served to revive Rena's personal "black legend".⁵⁸

In addition to these glimpses of his activities, the fundamental role he played in the military administration of the Hispanic Monarchy was underlined in a study on the military frontier of Navarre⁵⁹. Rena has also attracted the attention of ecclesiastical scholars working on church history. In fact until recently the most complete work on him was a chapter on his activity as general vicar and bishop of Pamplona in a general history of the bishops of the Navarrese see.⁶⁰ Moreover, another ecclesiastic scholar mentioned Rena's participation in the negotiation between the Navarrese churchmen and the crown on the ecclesiastic taxes.⁶¹ Rena's religious offices outside Navarre also earned him

⁵⁶ Pedro Girón, *Cronica del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. J. Sánchez Montes (Madrid: CSIC, 1964), 48, 84, 96, 147 and 259; Francisco López de Gómara, *Guerras de Mar del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. M. A. de Bunes Ibarra (Madrid: SECC, 2000), 125.

⁵⁷ Miguel de Orreaga, *Amayur, los últimos nabarros* (Tafalla: Txalaparta, 2008 [1923]), 119, 189 and 218; More recently, on the same matter and from a similar point of view, Pedro Esarte, *Navarra, 1512-1530: conquista, ocupación y sometimiento militar, civil y eclesiástica* (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2001), 555. Rena also appears in Peio Monteano Sorbet, *La guerra de Navarra (1512-1529) crónica de la conquista española* (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2010), 85, 111-116, 131-139, 148 and 299-301.

⁵⁸ Pedro Esarte Muniain, *Juan Rena clave en la conquista de Navarra (1512-1538)* (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2009). This short book is the result of a long-lasting trend that points to Rena as an agent of the cruelty of the Navarrese conquest. The brief essay by Peio Monteano is much more useful as a first approach to Rena's contribution to the Navarrese conquest. Peio Joseba Monteano Sorbet, "El pagador real micer Juan Rena (C. 1480-1539). Hombre clave en la conquista de Navarra," in *Tesorereros, arrendadores y financieros en los reinos hispánicos: la Corona de Castilla y el Reino de Navarra (siglos XIV-XVII)*, ed. E. García Fernández (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2012), 123-136.

⁵⁹ Florencio Idoate, *Esfuerzo bélico de Navarra en el siglo XVI* (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1981), 47, 69, 80, 90.

⁶⁰ José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de los obispos de Pamplona* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1985), T. III, 254-289. A previous reference on this matter in Ángel Canellas López, "Contribución a la historiografía de los obispos de Pamplona," in *Estudios dedicados a Menendez Pidal* (Madrid: S. Aguirre, 1950), T. I, 449-450 and 458-459.

⁶¹ T. de Azcona, "El pago del subsidio y del excusado a la corona por la iglesia de Navarra en el siglo XVI," *Príncipe de Viana* annex 9 (1988): 36-37.

allusions as bishop of Alghero or as royal chaplain.⁶² Beyond the church's sphere, Rena's different offices earned him a few passing mentions in different works on the administration of Charles V.⁶³ More recently, Rena has been addressed as a member of the Fernández de Córdoba's network, an important noble lineage in the service of the Spanish crown.⁶⁴ Rena's web of contacts has also earned him a passing mention as a friend of Ignacio de Loyola in a modern biography of the Jesuit.⁶⁵ Finally, the last aspect of Rena's life that has attracted the attention of the historians has been his role as cultural and artistic patron.⁶⁶ As we can see despite the little attention that he received, Rena is far from a complete unknown. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and integrated study on his activity is still missing, mainly because a complete tale of his career serving the Spanish crown has become possible only recently due to the reorganisation of his personal archive.

To a large extent Rena's astonishing career could only have happened during the early years of the new Hispanic Monarchy, as in this environment the Catholic Monarchs paved the way for men like him to prosper. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Rena arrived in the Iberian Peninsula, this polity was already suffering a series of radical transformations. It is worth noting that the reigns of Ferdinand the Catholic, Queen Isabella (1479-1516) and of their grandson, Charles V (1519-1557), started in the same way: with huge internal conflicts.⁶⁷ Ferdinand and Isabella fought a war against the powerful supporters of Isabella's niece, who also aspired to the Castilian crown; and Charles' nomination as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1520) coincided with the

⁶² Pietro Martini, *Storia ecclesiastica di Sardegna* (Cagliari: Stamperia Reale, 1841), 338; and Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *La reina Doña Juana la loca: estudio histórico* (Madrid: M. Murillo, 1892), 353.

⁶³ R. Quatrefages, "La proeeduría des Armadas: de l'expedition de Tunis (1535) à celle d'Alger (1541)," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 41 (1978): 218; and Irving. A. A. Thompson, "Administración y administradores en el reinado de Carlos V," in *En torno a las comunidades de Castilla*, ed. F. Martínez Gil (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla la Mancha, 2002), 105; María Puy Huici Goñi, *La Cámara de Comptos de Navarra en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Pamplona: the author, 1996), 30 and 60-61; and María Isabel Ostolaza Elizondo, "La cámara de comptos de Navarra en la primera mitad del siglo XVI," in *III Congreso General de Historia de Navarra* (Pamplona: Príncipe de Viana, 1998), 6-9. Rena also appears as an accounting officer during the travel of Charles V in Italy in Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *El gran mercader y la corte real del renacimiento la familia genovesa Centurióm (mercaderes, diplomáticos y hombres de armas) al servicio de España 1380-1680* (Huelva: the author, 2004), 97.

⁶⁴ Liang, *Family and empire*, 74-76, 124, 129, 131-132 and 154.

⁶⁵ Enrique García Hernán, *Ignacio de Loyola* (Madrid: Taurus, 2013), 33.

⁶⁶ Juan Vallés, *Regalo de la vida humana*, ed. F. Serrano Larráyo (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2009), 212; On Rena's artistic patronage, see M. Chocarro Huesa, "El obispo Juan Rena, mediador y mecenas artístico de la catedral de Pamplona," *Príncipe de Viana* 256 (2012): 587-601.

⁶⁷ A brief but complete account of the crisis paying special attention to the plurality of powers struggling in it can be found in Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragments de monarquía*, 21-43. A recent synthesis on the evolution from the medieval monarchy to Charles V's empire in Antonio-Miguel Bernal, *Monarquía e Imperio* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007).

revolts of the *comuneros* (commoners) and the *germanías* (brotherhoods), thow urban uprisings in Castile and Aragon. In addition to these major conflicts, each of the monarchs faced fierce opposition by different local oligarchies, and some branches of the nobility. Needless to say, the crown also received and relied on the support of strategic collaborators from the major cities' governments and key figures of the aristocracy. Despite the violent contestation of the crown's policy, it showed that the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy and its political sustem relied on a delicate equilibrium of multiple powers and interests. The outcomes of this profound reorganisation had an immediate echo on the external politics. This was the political chessboard where Rena had to navigate combining interests and collect supporters, while serving the crown.

The career development of someone who spent most of his lige organising armies and navies cannot be fully understood without considering Spanish ambitions in an international context. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Hispanic Monarchy, passed from being a polity that was engaged in the long-lasting struggle afains the Iberian Muslim polities, to fight for the international hegemony both in Europe and the Mediterranean. The Catholic Monarchs adopted a foreign policy, which centred on two main axis': (1) the fight against the French monarchy, and (2) the defence of Aragonese interests in the Mediterranean, became the driving force of an ambitious diplomatic and military agenda that lasted for the next two centuries. This ambitious policy started with the construction of a series of frontiers (a matter in which Rena became an expert) to protect the realm against its external enemies. The Wars of Rousillon (Catalonia) in were the starting point of a series of military campaigns on the northern frontier of the monarchy that ended in 1512 with the conquest of Navarre. Similar expansions occurred in the Italian Peninsula, where the wars against the French monarchy and its allies in 1494, 1499 and 1503, resulted in the conquest of Naples and Sicily, and in 1535 Charles V incorporated the state of Milan after the death of his last ruler (1535). These campaigns were made possible due to the combined effort of Castile and Aragon, as well as to a good deal of support from the Italian ruling elite.⁶⁸ Charles V was able to impose and maintain his imperial authority obly because he led this combined enterprise in an effective way. Nevertheless, the emperor needed a myriad of loyal and efficient servants like Rena to make this shared effort work. The fact that crown servants like Rena were able to

⁶⁸ An accessible account of the Italian Wars can be found in Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw, *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559* (Harlow: Pearson, 2012).

coordinate and mobilise the resources needed to conduct these wars was indeed remarkable, even if they use to be ignored in the great narratives of the empire's glories.

The rise of the Hispanic Monarchy as a political and military imperial power during the early years of the sixteenth century coincided with the rise of two other major powers: the French monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, their mutual rivalry played a rather influential role in their internal politics. The French King, Francis I became the main menace threatening the Iberian and Italian dominions of the Hispanic Monarchy.⁶⁹ At the same time, the Ottoman sultans Bayezid II, Selim I and Süleyman the Magnificent, conducted a series of military campaigns that changed European and Mediterranean geopolitics.⁷⁰ Both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans were embracing an ambitious expansionist project that extended their empires beyond the limits of the ancient world, but still the Mediterranean basin continued to be the main arena of their clash.⁷¹ The participation of Spanish naval forces in the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1499-1503 in the eastern Mediterranean was only the opening scene of a long-lasting naval war in the Mediterranean Sea. Interestingly, in those same years, Juan Rena, an unknown Venetian entered the service of the Hispanic Monarchy in the western corner of the Mediterranean. Two decades later, he became one of the masterminds behind Charles V's naval policy in the Mediterranean Sea. Rena's service in the navy, was closely connected to the imperial struggle for the Mediterranean. As we can see, Rena's path as a king's man, ran parallel to Hispanic Monarchy's ambitions to construct an empire in the first half of the sixteenth century.

⁶⁹ On the rise of French military power, see David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), 15-41. The standard work on Francis I's reign is still, Robert J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁷⁰ On Ottoman military power, see Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (London: University College Library, 1999). On the rise of Ottoman sea power during the opening years of the sixteenth century, see P. Brummett, "Foreign Policy, Naval Strategy, and the Defence of the Ottoman Empire in the Early Sixteenth Century," *The International History Review* 11, n° 4 (1989): 613-627. On the Ottoman conquests on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, see Svat Soucek, "The Ottoman Conquests of Egypt and Algeria," in *Conquête ottoman de l'Égypte (1517). Arrière-plan, impact, échos*, eds. B. Lellouch and N. Michel (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 79-98. A brief and useful survey on the rise and consolidation of the Ottoman empire in this time framework can be found in Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 27-61.

⁷¹ An easy account of the rise of the Spanish Empire as a world power can be found in William S. Maltby, *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009). A complete survey, emphasizing the key role of non-Spaniards to the empire building process in Henry Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763* (London: Penguin, 2002). On the Ottoman see, Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Methodology and Sources

The present study will be carried out with an eclectic methodology that combines different approaches. First of all, this thesis is a case-study. That is, I aim to explore Juan Rena's activity in the service of the crown in order to illuminate fresh conclusions in our general understanding of the Hispanic Monarchy.⁷² More specifically, I will address the agency of the king's men in the empire building process, by focusing on an in-depth description of the activities of one of them. It can be said that I aim to carry out a micro-historical analysis on the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy. In other words, I propose a micro historical examination of this process, by focusing on Rena in order to observe some of the aspects that are otherwise impossible to perceive from a top-down perspective.⁷³

More specifically, I focus on Juan Rena's micro-politics (that is, his use of formal and informal power and the ties to achieve his goals) on the larger canvas of the empire building process.⁷⁴ This focus on Rena's micro-politics will be combined with an in-depth reconstruction of multiple networks like the ones extending from the inner circle of the imperial government, in which Rena was embedded, or those that he constructed around him in different moments. Hence, this study will employ some of the analytical tools developed by historical social network analysis but using a wide or metaphorical concept

⁷² For a deep theoretical reflexion on case studies, see Jean-Claude Passeron and Jacques Revel, "Penser par cas: raisonner à partir de singularités," in *Penser par cas*, ed. J-C. Passeron and J. Revel (Paris: EHESS, 2005), 9-44.

⁷³ For a recent and comprehensive introduction to this historiographical trend, see Sygurdur G. Magnússon and István M. Szigjártó, *What is Microhistory: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2013). See also the classic essay Giovanni Levi, "On microhistory," in *New perspectives on historical writing*, ed. P. Burke (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 93-113. An interesting update of Levi's microanalytical approach in Francesca Trivellato, "Microstoria, storia del mondo e storia globale," in *Microstoria. A venticinque anni da L'eredità immateriale*, ed. P. Lanaro (Milan, Franco Angeli, 2011), 119-131. On the suitability of this approach to study of processes like the one here analysed, see Giovanni Levi, "The Origins of the Modern State and the Microhistorical Perspective," in *Mikrogeschichte, Makrogeschichte: komplementär oder inkommensurabel?*, ed. J. Schlumbohm (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1998), 53-82, especially 59-61.

⁷⁴ I borrow this definition of micropolitics from W. Reinhard, "Amici e creature. Politische Mikrogeschichte der römischen Kurie im 17. Jahrhundert," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 76 (1996): 310-312. The relationship between the micropolitics and macropolitics is explained in Wolfgang Reinhard, "Kommentar: Mikrogeschichte und Makrogeschichte," in *Nähe in der Ferne. Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. H. Von Thiesen and C. Windler (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2005), 135-144. A theoretical reflection on scales and history in Bernard Lepetit, "De l'échelle en histoire," in *Jeux d'échelles: la micro-analyse à l'expérience*, ed. J. Revel (Paris : Gallimard-Le Seuil, 1996), 71-94.

of network.⁷⁵ That is, I will use the concept of network as a heuristic tool, something that has proven to be quite useful in the study of early modern networks.⁷⁶ This network approach will be combined with an eclectic use of Bourdieu's theory of capitals.⁷⁷ Thus, I will examine the internal functioning of Rena's networks giving special attention to the management of the social capital that was embedded in them. Furthermore, I will trace the exchanges of different forms of capital between their different members; two key assets in the micro-politics of characters like Rena.⁷⁸

All this has been possible thanks to an intensive analysis of a wide array of sources. The main core of information has been provided by Rena's personal archive, which opens an unusual window to the world of a king's man.⁷⁹ This extraordinary source of information (that is being systematically analysed for the first time) has allowed me to reconstruct Rena's services to the Spanish crown in detail from the very beginning of the sixteenth century until his death. This personal archive hosts thousands of documents reflecting Rena's works for Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V. More important, it contains hundreds of letters written and received by Juan Rena. Rena's correspondence gives us access to the networks in which he was embedded but it also permits us to reconstruct the multiple networks that Rena created at different times and with different aims. Furthermore, this rich source allows us to analyse Rena's interplay with the galaxy of actors with whom he interacted while in the service of the crown. It goes without

⁷⁵ An attempt to summarize the different contributions of social networks to the domains of Clio in Christoph Boyer, "Netzwerke und Geschichte: Netzwerktheorien und Geschichtswissenschaften," in *Transnationale Netzwerke im 20. Jahrhundert: Historische Erkundungen zu Ideen und Praktiken, Individuen und Organisationen* (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2008), 47-58. See also C. Lemerrier, "Analyse de réseaux et histoire," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 52, n° 2 (2005): 88-112.

⁷⁶ Francesca Trivellato, "Jews of Leghorn, Italians of Lisbon, and Hindus of Goa: Merchant Networks and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period," in *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, ed. D. Ramada Curto and A. Molho (Florence: European University Institute, 2002), 59-89. On the risks of a simplistic or superficial use of social networks analysis see C. Lemerrier, "Formale Methoden der Netzwerkanalyse in den Geschichtswissenschaften: Warum und Wie?," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 23, n° 1 (2012): 16-41.

⁷⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *La distinction: critique sociale du jugement* (Paris : les éditions de minuit, 1979), 128-139.

⁷⁸ P. Bourdieu, "Le capital social," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 31 (1980) : 2-3; and Nan Lin, "Building a Network Theory of Social Capital," in *Social Capital. Theory and Research*, ed. N. Lin, K. Cook and R. S. Burt (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2001), 3-29.

⁷⁹ I like to refer to this personal archive as an 'eccezzionalmente normale' that is, a relevant and unusual source of information. E. Grendi, "Micro-analisi e storia sociale," *Quaderni Storici* 35 (1977): 512. On Rena's archive, see Mercedes Chocarro Huesa and Félix Segurra Urra, *Inventario de la documentación de Juan Rena. Archivo Real y General de Navarra* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2013); and Id., "El reino de Navarra en la Monarquía Hispánica: nuevos enfoques desde la documentación de Juan Rena," *Príncipe de Viana* 261 (2015): 109-136.

saying, that the actor-based approach of this research would have been impossible without this source of information.

When available I have consulted other personal or familiar archives from characters closely related to Juan Rena, such as the royal secretary Hernando de Zafra, the Count of Tendilla (captain-general of Granada), or the Alcaide de los Donceles. The analysis of these complementary sources has allowed me to find wonderful information on Rena's early years in the service of the crown, but they also have contributed to a better understanding of the place that Rena occupied within the network of the king's servants. Moreover, the state archives have provided me with a lot of detail about Rena's activity which I have used extensively through the thesis. The correspondence exchanged among the inner circle of the imperial government as well as the administrative documentation produced by the core institutions of the imperial administration, have allowed me to balance my narrative, placing Rena within the imperial administration without making him a central character. Despite their obvious importance, I try to deal with these sources without falling into what I like to call Simancas' trap. This wonderful archive has attracted several historians who have provided us with excellent studies on the Hispanic Monarchy but always with the royal court and the core institutions of the imperial administration taking centre. Avoiding this trap was crucial for me because one of the main aims of this study is to show the inner workings of the imperial administration not as seen from the court councils, but from the viewpoint of an agent on the ground. In my attempt to "peripherise" the imperial court I have also consulted local sources (mainly from Navarre) to enrich the image provided by Rena's main archive. Finally, I have also included sources from archives beyond the frontiers of the Hispanic Monarchy in order to look at Rena from an external point of view.

Although this thesis is not a biography, there is a biographical dimension in it as I analyse Juan Rena's career in serving the Hispanic Monarchy.⁸⁰ I divide my analysis of

⁸⁰ There is a huge bibliography on biography in a historiographical framework but I will only quote the classical work by Sabina Loriga on the long epistemological evolution of this discipline. Sabina Loriga, "La biographie comme problème," in *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 209-231. For a general overview on biography and historical research, see Hans Renders and Binne de Haan eds., *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013). See also J. C. Davis and Isabel Burdiel, "Introducción," in *El otro, el mismo: biografía y autobiografía en Europa (siglos XVII-XX)*, eds. J. C. Davis and I. Burdiel (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2005), 11-29. For an interesting reflection on the practice of biography writing in our field of study, see J. F. Pardo Molero, "La biografía en la historiografía modernista española.

Rena's activities through a series of case studies that drew attention to the different fields in which he served the crown. With this specific approach, I aim to avoid the traditional way to understand life as a whole coherent thread which can be seen as the expression of a unitary subjective and objective intention of a project.⁸¹ This approach allows us to better understand the activities of an individual serving the crown in the early modern time. In fact, Rena's contemporaries did not know a single Juan Rena but several. Thus, as a manner of instance, during his stay in the Maghreb he was known as "Juan Veneciano" or simply "the Venetian", while in Navarre he was called "Micer Johan" (a local adaptation of his name). In the administrative sphere he passed from being "Juan de Reyna" during his first years as royal chaplain of the queen to be "Juan *el obispo*" (Juan the bishop) during the last years of his life. Furthermore this reconstruction of the same man in different spheres also allows us to better reconstruct the different networks in which he was embedded, as well as the complexity of the challenges that he faced while serving the Hispanic Monarchy.

Structure of the Thesis

The path of Rena's career has influenced the structure of the thesis, that is, in fact, uncomplicated. The chapters are ordered chronologically following Rena's work life in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy. As I already mentioned, Rena's main tasks mirrored the different challenges of an empire "under construction". Hence, each chapter addresses a specific aspect of the empire-building process here analysed. Rena's career allows us to perceive the multiple continuities between the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V and to realise to what extent the empire of the latter relied on developments carried out during the reign of the former. Even if it could be difficult to follow someone like Rena who spent his whole life travelling, I think that addressing consecutively Rena's

De la práctica a la teoría," *Estudis* 28 (2002): 407-420. For a more recent synthesis including the new biographical studies on the early modern Hispanic Monarchy, see M. Á. Pérez Samper, "De historia, de biografías, de validos y de validos de validos," *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna* 36 (2011): 197-205.

⁸¹ Pierre Bourdieu asserted the necessity of avoiding the misconception of the individual as a single rational unity in his inspiring work on "biography. P. Bourdieu, "L'illusion biographique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 62-63 (1986): 69. His idea of the necessity of reconstruct the different fields in which a person were embedded profoundly influenced some theorists of the historical biography writing. See the article of Levi that contains most of the theoretical reflections of his classical study. G. Levi, "Les usages de la biographie," *Annales. Économies, sociétés, civilisations* 44, n° 6 (1989) : 1325-1336.

most important missions allows us to perceive how the empire was constructed through the solutions to different challenges as they were coming along.

Rena's early activities in the service of Ferdinand the Catholic in the Maghreb are the main topic of the first chapter. The conquest of a set of coastal strongholds on the Maghrebi coast was an opening episode in the Spanish expansionism beyond the Old Continent. Rena's participation in this enterprise shows the role of characters like him in the process of extra-European expansion, but also in the definition of the imperial frontiers. When I refer to the definition or construction of an imperial frontier I do not mean the delimitation of a precise line. On the contrary, I use the term frontier with the political and military meaning of the word *frontera* that was widely employed in early modern sources to refer to territories close to enemy's lands and exposed to attack.⁸² Conquering new frontiers was not enough, it was necessary to protect them and Ferdinand the Catholic and Charles V could do that thanks to the collaboration of powerful aristocrats. That noble cooperation was needed to administrate and govern different territories of the empire is very well known. Nevertheless, Rena's activity serving the Alcaide de los Donceles (the nobleman in charge of guarding the new imperial frontier in the Maghreb) allows us to go a step further. As we will see in chapter two, the collaboration between the monarch and the noblemen, but also the activities of characters like Rena, created and shaped a new political space closely associated to the frontier defence.

As both chapters show, one of the main challenges during the initial phase of the empire-building process was to settle its frontiers. If Ferdinand the Catholic protected his southern domains by conquering a set of coastal strongholds in the Maghreb; in the north he conquered a whole kingdom: Navarre. Rena arrived in Navarre a few weeks after its

⁸² Like most of his contemporaries, Rena used to use the word *frontera* to refer to a territory (be it a kingdom, a region, or a stronghold) threatened due to its vicinity to the enemy. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Vargas. 8th May 1521. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 24-12. On the military connotation of the term frontier in the early modern period, see Lucien Febvre, "Frontière: le mot et la notion," in Id., *Pour une histoire à part entière* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1962), 11-24. On the distinction between frontiers and boundaries in historiography see Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 4 and Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession. Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 2-3. On the frontiers as a subject of study to understand the functioning of the Hispanic Monarchy, see José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, "Comprender una Monarquía Policéntrica desde una historiografía posnacional. Retos y realidades del estudio de las fronteras en las Monarquías Ibéricas," in *Fronteras e Historia. Balance y perspectivas de futuro*, eds. M. Á. Melón Jiménez et al. (Badajoz: G. I. Geshomp, 2014), 233-258.

conquest together with a team of royal servants with a long experience in the construction of frontiers. Most of them left this kingdom shortly after but Rena stayed there for almost 13 years (from 1512 to 1525) becoming a key piece in the defence of this territory. Nevertheless, in Navarre the construction of the frontier was only one of the main issues at stake. The other, and the most important one, was the political incorporation of the kingdom into the Hispanic Monarchy. As we will see in chapter three, Rena played an important role in that process. Incorporating polities was one of the most difficult challenges for the authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy. Especially since this political formation was growing to include several territories in Europe. Rena's work in the process of incorporation of the Navarrese kingdom shows that the king's men participated in these processes by helping to re-build the internal cohesion after the conquest and to place the political community into the wider space of the empire.

When Rena was appointed to his first office in the service of the crown, he became part of the new imperial administration and for the rest of his life he made an astonishing career out of it. Juan Rena's career development, analysed in chapter four, permits us to look at the configuration of the new imperial administration focusing on the moral economy shared by the men who served the king far away from the imperial court. The making of an effective administration was another challenge in this empire "under construction". Historians have pointed at the new administrative machinery as one of the main pillars sustaining the empire, nevertheless, their analysis used to focus on the development of different institutions composing this vast administrative system. In this chapter I offer a human view of this administrative machine by looking at how the rules and codes that men like Rena needed to survive and succeed in their administrative career serving the crown were shaped. As this chapter reconstructs Juan Rena's career development it moves back and forward along Rena's career. In so doing it breaks with the strict chronological order of the thesis, but it also helps us to understand Rena's activity in the military administration, the main theme of the following chapters.

In the conflicting Europe of the first half of the sixteenth century, political and military politics were intertwined. Charles V was able to rule over the vast dominions composing his empire because he had a huge military machinery at his disposal. Nevertheless, contrary to what is commonly assumed, the military power that allowed Charles V to maintain his empire was not built on the battlefield. The imperial navy and

army that kept the empire together were organised by a myriad of obscure characters like Rena. Between 1526 and 1529 he worked as general purveyor of the navy and it is precisely the analysis of his activity as purveyor (the main topic of chapter five) that will allow us to better understand how the mobilisation of resources for war functioned on the ground. This approach from below was crucial considering that most of the historical research conducted on this issue focuses on parliaments, financiers, royal councillors, and so on. Rena shows us in this chapter, that Charles V's military power was built on the ground by men who had to interact with a wide array of actors trying to collect and mobilise a vast amount of resources that was needed to organise armies and navies.

Organising a navy was always a demanding task, but it became a major challenge when the enemy was another emperor holding an even bigger military power. Between the last years of the 1520s and the opening ones of the 1530s the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires began a direct struggle for the hegemony in Europe and especially in the Mediterranean. Charles V was able to protect his Italian domains from the Ottoman menace (something that justified his rule over them) because he established a strategical alliance with the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria. Needless to say, compared to them, Juan Rena was a character of little importance, but chapter six argues, however, that he also played a key role in the construction of the imperial navy in the Mediterranean. After his appointment as general commissary of the navy in 1532 Juan Rena had to fit together two different networks: the imperial administration and Doria's military machinery. By analysing Rena's activity as general commissary we will see his role in the shaping of practical conditions that ruled this strategic alliance. Furthermore, in this chapter I will also describe the Rena's role in making possible some of the most evident demonstrations of Charles V imperial power, such as the expedition against Tunis (1535). Finally, in the conclusions, I offer some final remarks on what we can learn from Rena's case about the role of king's men in the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy.

Chapter 1

Defining the Frontier. Juan Rena's network and the Process of Spanish Expansion into the Maghreb

Qui descendunt mare in navibus,
facientes operationem in aquis multis,
ipsi viderunt opera Domini
et mirabilia eius in profundo.
(Psal. 107, 23-24.)

Introduction

On Friday 18th May 1509, the Castilian army lead by the late crusader, Cardinal Francisco de Cisneros, conquered the city of Oran on the Algerian coast. The first eye witness account of the battle noted that God had blessed their victory, first by making a cross and a double rainbow appeared in the sky, then by surrounding the enemy's army in a black fog while vultures circled overhead in anticipation. Better still as the battle progressed towards the end of the day, God rendered the Castilian army additional assistance by preventing the sun from setting.¹ God's support aside, the other decisive element that facilitated a Christian victory was the disastrous retreat of the Muslim troops, who were unable to get back into the city. Even so the first published account of this event

¹ Letter of Juan de Cazalla to Doctor Villalpando. Cartagena, 24th May 1509. Cfr. *Cartas de relación de la conquista de Orán (1509) y textos afines*, ed. M. I. Hernández González (London: Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1997), 30-31. The miracle was represented by the painter Juan de Borgoña in his wonderful frescos of the Mozarab chapel in Toledo's Cathedral. On that matter see Erika Dolphin, "Archbishop Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros and the Decoration of the Chapter Room and Mozarabic Chapel in Toledo Cathedral" (Ph.D. diss., York University, 2008), 259-273. For a general overview on the idea of Crusade and its practical application in this period, see Norman Housey, *The Later Crusades. From Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 291-321.

included the Muslims' inability to enter the city as an additional miracle.² In fact this final point was indeed a real miracle, but to fully appreciate the reality behind it, we first need to examine the psalm quoted above. In so doing we shift our focus to the world of merchants, those who 'went off to sea in ships and plied their trade on the deep waters' because: 'they saw the works of the Lord, and his wonders in the deep.'

The conquest of Oran is maybe the most important episode of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb. A by-product of the Catholic Monarchs' ambitions, the expansion was initially fuelled by religious motivations and later by the dreams of Cardinal Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Castile's premier Church dignitary. Cisneros envisaged a crusade that would start in the Maghreb and lead to the Holy Land.³ Given the religious motivation lying behind these plans it comes as no surprise that many believed that God's support played a decisive role in the battle for Oran.⁴ Nevertheless, as we will see, the groundwork for the conquest of the city was laid long before the Castilian army came on the scene. Prior to the Castilian attack on the city, a series of mediators had been acting there to facilitate discussions between the Spanish authorities and the various inhabitants of the Maghreb. One of them, Juan Rena, mediated for both: the Catholic Monarchs as well as Maghrebi officials and dignitaries during his time in the Maghreb. Using Rena as a starting point, we can reconstruct the complex commercial network of actors that monopolised these political mediations.

Through this focus on Rena and his network, this chapter will shed new light on the role of mediators in the process of European expansion. Recent studies have revealed that those who acted as go-betweens were in fact key figures in this process, especially in

² Martín de Herrera, *Istorias de la divinal vitoria y nueva adquisición de la muy insigne cibdad de Oran hecha por el illustre reverendissimo y muy victorioso dignissimo gran capitan contra los africanos el señor don Fray Francisco Ximenez cardenal de España arçobispo de Toledo* (Logroño: Brocar, 1510), chapter 5.

³ Luis Suárez Fernández, *Los Reyes Católicos, la expansión de la Fe* (Madrid: Rialp, 1990), 197-220; José García Oro, *La cruzada del Cardenal Cisneros: de Granada a Jerusalén* (Madrid: Archivo Ibero-Americano, 1991). The African campaigns as a clear proof of Ferdinand's imperialistic ambitions are analysed in Andrew W. Devereux, "Empire in the Old World: Ferdinand the Catholic and His Aspiration to Universal Empire, 1479-1516," in *In and Of the Mediterranean: Medieval and Early Modern Iberian Studies*, ed. M. H. Hamilton and N. Silleras-Fernández (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2015), 119-141.

⁴ M. A. de Bunes Ibarra, "El marco ideológico de la expansión española por el norte de África," *Aldaba* 26 (1995): 113-134 and Id., "La presencia española en el norte de África: las diversas justificaciones de las conquistas en el Magreb," *Aldaba* 25 (1995): 13-34. On the crown's interest in the Maghreb, see A. W. Devereux, "North Africa in Early Modern Spanish Political Thought," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 12, n° 3 (2011): 275-291.

America.⁵ In this new line of inquiry go-betweens have been depicted as individuals who facilitate encounters between the inhabitants of two different worlds. In this role they were able to influence the outcome of meetings and negotiations, and exploiting their position in this triadic relationship for their own benefit.⁶ Within the field of Mediterranean studies there is a growing momentum to compile an analogous portrait of go-betweens, especially in studies focused on the complex diplomatic relationships between the rival Christian and Muslim polities.⁷ In both cases, the descriptions of these actors and their activities focus on explaining how they profited from bridging wide cultural gaps.

While both lines of inquiry have proved to be fruitful in their respective areas of study, they also present some problems when trying to approach characters, like Rena, who were involved in the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb. In this chapter I first describe the diplomatic negotiations concerning Spanish expansion on the Maghrebi coast. Later I analyse the activity of the mediators who conducted such negotiations. Finally I aim to show that their activity, was in fact not a great source of personal benefit, and nevertheless we shall not dismiss their importance because they helped to shape a new imperial domain resulting from Spanish expansionism.

⁵ Many works have focused on individuals who facilitated transfers and discussions between different cultural groups and, in so doing, bridged the cultural frontiers resulting from the expansion process. B. Ares Queija and S. Gruzinski ed., *Entre dos mundos. Fronteras culturales y agentes mediadores* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1997), and R. M. Loureiro and S. Gruzinski ed., *Passar as Fronteiras. Actas do II colóquio Internacional sobre Mediadores Culturais* (Lagos: Centro de Estudos Gil Eanes, 1999); Serge Gruzinski, *Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d'une mondialisation* (Paris: Éditions de la Martinière, 2004), 146-148 and 289-311.

⁶ Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1550-1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); 2-8; Id. "The Entradas of Bahia of the Sixteenth Century," *The Americas* 61, N° 3 (2005): 373-400; Eve M. Duffy and Alida C. Metcalf, *The Return of Hans Staden: A Go-between in the Atlantic World* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 9-11 and 55-76.

⁷ Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire. Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Tijana Krstic, "Of Translation and Empire: Sixteenth Century Ottoman Imperial Interpreters as Renaissance Go-Betweens," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. C. Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2012), 130-142; M. van Gelder and T. Krstic, "Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2015): 93-105; and E. S. Gürkan, "Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-Betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560-1600," *Journal of Early Modern History* 19 (2005): 107-128.

A negotiated expansion

In the first days of 1492, after years of fierce resistance against the Castilian army, the Nasri kingdom of Granada surrendered.⁸ This capitulation was the last episode of the so-called *Reconquista*, which was the prelude of the world-wide expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy. The most noteworthy outcome of Spanish expansion was the conquest of America, but there was another equally important yet less well known scheme: the Maghreb.⁹ Between 1492 and 1516 different authorities, noblemen and clerics turned their eyes to this region in preparation to conquer it. The final result of their involvement was not spectacular but undoubtedly it can be understood as a key episode in the history of European expansion. In fact, the men who conducted this early form of Spanish expansionism developed and refined some successful formulas of conquest that later proved to be effective in other spaces. One of these formulas was the combined use of armed violence and diplomatic negotiation that characterised the Spanish expansion in the Maghreb.

Between 1497 (the conquest of Melilla) and the summer of 1510 (the conquest of Tripoli) several Maghrebi populations were incorporated into the domains of the Hispanic Monarchy in one way or another. After the first tentative attempts to conquer the coastal populations failed, the Catholic Monarchs tried another way, and sent a seigniorial army to conquer Melilla in 1497. Their next main conquest did not come until the summer of 1505 with the acquisition of Mers el-Kébir (the Great Harbour in Arabic) on the Algerian coast. However, three years later Pedro Navarro failed to conquer Hunain, the second main port in the kingdom of Tlemcen. Despite this failure, the following year an army led and funded by Cardinal Cisneros took Oran, the main coastal city of Tlemcen. As a consequence of this victory many of the coastal towns and villages began to voluntarily surrender to the Spanish authorities. In 1510 Pedro Navarro took Béjaïa, a port city in the Algerian Kabylie. Shortly after, the ruling elite of Algiers signed a pact of vassalage to King Ferdinand the Catholic. That same summer Pedro Navarro continued his career

⁸ On the fall of Granada, see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1967).

⁹ B. Fuchs and Y-G. Liang, "A Forgotten Empire: The Spanish-North African Borderlands," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 12, n° 3 (2012): 261-273. On the Ibero-Maghrebi frontier the classic work is Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). For a recent and complete state of the art on this complex region, see Yuen-Gen Liang et al., "Unity and Disunity across the Strait of Gibraltar," in *Spanning the Strait: Studies in Unity in the Western Mediterranean*, ed. Y-G. Liang et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 1-40.

towards the east and conquered Tripoli. Nevertheless, a failed expedition against the Island of Djerba put an end to this chain of successes.

Securing these acquisitions meant that the Spanish authorities were able to establish a series of garrisoned strongholds (*presidios*) to control the Maghrebi coast.¹⁰ Historians have lauded the military power of the Hispanic Monarchy for its success in this episode of early expansion.¹¹ Needless to say, violence was the main force driving the settlement of Spanish rule in the Maghreb. Nevertheless, the armies and the military-men were not the only actors on the scene. At the same time, there were agents, spies and merchants who played a crucial role in diplomatic negotiations between political actors from both shores. The chronicles of Spanish expansionism in this region frequently allude to previous deals when explaining the conquests. According to Lorenzo de Padilla, the author of one such tale, who was also a spy and a diplomat in North Africa, the conquest of Mers el-Kébir was induced by a previous agreement with the governor of the fortress.¹² Even Alvar Gómez de Castro, the biographer of Cardinal Cisneros, refers to intrigues prior to the conquest of Oran, contradicting the official version. Hence, after relating the miracles, Gómez de Castro describes the negotiations that took place prior to the conquest, quoting the testimony of an eyewitness.¹³

These negotiations were fully legitimate and in line with the political traditions on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. The political culture of the Maghreb allowed for the process of political subjection to a different king. Urban elites, tribal groups, and frontier societies enjoyed a great amount of liberty and autonomy when faced with a weak monarchical power. They were able to withdraw their allegiances and search for another monarch who could offer peace, social stability, and protection for the local communities.¹⁴ In the Iberian Peninsula the imperial project inherited from the *Reconquista* included the possibility of ruling over populations who had voluntarily

¹⁰ Rafael Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del Norte de África en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos* (Melilla: Ciudad autónoma de Melilla, 1997).

¹¹ Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: cruzada, política y arte de la guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2006).

¹² CODOIN, T. VIII, 130-131.

¹³ Alvar Gómez de Castro, *De Rebus gestis a Francisco Ximenio Cisnerio* (Alcalá: Andrea de Angulo, 1569), fol. 114.

¹⁴ Jocelyne Dakhli, *Le divan des rois. Le politique et le religieux dans l'Islam* (Paris: Aubier, 1998), 298-306.

submitted to the sovereignty of the monarch.¹⁵ Furthermore, the negotiations here analysed connect with a long-lasting political culture of making pacts as a means to secure order.¹⁶ Far from being a type of Mediterranean exception, these practices were a clear example of how existing political traditions adapted to new realities during the process of Iberian expansion.

Behind the military campaign there was a dynamic “diplomacy from below”.¹⁷ In fact, only by examining the negotiations held between the “conquerors” and different political actors of the Maghreb can we understand the success of Spanish expansionism in the region.¹⁸ Just ten months after the surrender of Granada two Jews, Abulafia (who already served the monarchs in Granada war¹⁹), and David de Segura, offered to deliver the city and fortress of Mers el-Kebir into the Catholic Monarchs’ hands.²⁰ The following year Fernando de Zafra, the Royal Secretary, and the most enthusiastic protagonist of the African crusade, received a delegation of notables from Tabaharique and Tiguenta, two fortified towns on Tlemcen’s coast. Interestingly, the visit came soon after the royal navy

¹⁵ Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Linda a Velha: Difel, 1994), 165-166. Ladero Quesada pointed in the same direction, underlining the importance of the *mudejar* tradition in Castile. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Granada. Historia de un país islámico (1232-1571)* (Madrid: Gredos, 1989), 262-263. A brief but useful survey on this tradition can be found in Francisco Márquez Villanueva, “On the Concept of Mudejarism,” in *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*, ed. K. Ingram (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 23-47.

¹⁶ For an in-depth study on the importance of these political agreements, see Michael Paul Martoccio: “Trust thy Neighbor: International Cooperation and the Renaissance State” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2015).

¹⁷ I borrowed the concept of diplomacy from below from R. Mourieux, “Diplomacy from Below and Belonging: Fishermen and Cross-Channel Relations in the Eighteenth Century,” *Past & Present* 202 (2009): 83-125.

¹⁸ Far from being an exception this case connects with the increasing interest in diplomatic negotiations and treaty-making as means of imperial expansion. C. Gibson, “Conquest, Capitulation, and Indian Treaties,” *The American Historical Review* 83 (1978): 1-15; Abelardo Levaggi, *Diplomacia hispano-indígena en las fronteras de América. Historia de los tratados entre la monarquía Española y las comunidades aborígenes* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2002); António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *Iustum Imperium. Dos tratados como fundamento do Império dos portugueses no Oriente* (Lisbon: Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 2005); Richard Tuck, “Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion,” in *Empire and Modern Political Thought*, ed. S. Muthu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 61-83; Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession. Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 70-99 and 131-133; and Saliha Belmessous, “The Paradox of an Empire by Treaty,” *Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900*, ed. S. Belmessous (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-18.

¹⁹ Professor Ladero Quesada believed that Abulafia was not from Granada because he does not appear in the list of Jews expelled in 1492. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada: “Melilla en 1494: el primer proyecto de conquista,” in *Hacer historia desde Simancas: homenaje a José Luis Rodríguez de Diego*, ed. A. Marcos Martín (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2011), 448, n. 10. The list in M. A. Ladero Quesada, “De nuevo sobre los judíos granadinos al tiempo de su expulsión,” *En la España medieval* 30 (2007): 281-315. In my opinion, this character was a Jew from Almería who collaborated with the Catholic Monarchs in the war of Granada. AGS, RGS, 148807, n° 246 and Leg. 149102, n° 183.

²⁰ AGS, RGS, Leg. 149210, n° 7 and 8.

had started raiding the region.²¹ After brief negotiations they offered to deliver Tabaharique, Honein or Guardania.²² One of the notables also offered the surrender of Melilla and soon after the royal secretary began negotiations with two representatives from that city. At the same time, however, the rulers of Melilla also approached the Alcaide of Malaga with the same proposal.²³ Two weeks later Zafra wrote to the Catholic Monarchs informing them of yet another offer, this time from a town near Melilla: Cazaza.²⁴

Subsequently, the fear of military intervention drove other still more important towns and cities to consider peaceful surrender to the Catholic Monarchs. The royal servant Luis Peixó, in one of his letters to the monarchs suggested that the Jerusalem Crusade could be furthered by obtaining Tripoli peacefully, as its inhabitants already lived in fear of attack.²⁵ More or less at the same time the viceroy of Mallorca was negotiating with the moors of Dellys, a port town near Algiers, about its surrender.²⁶ In 1499, the authorities of the Canary Islands on the Atlantic coast of northern Africa also obtained the subjection of some local chiefs to the Catholic Monarchs.²⁷ Back in the Algerian coast, the following year a merchant received royal support to initiate negotiations in Annaba, a port-town on the Algerian coast.²⁸ Not far from there, in 1501, similar negotiations took place with the sheikh of Djerba.²⁹ In 1504, Girolamo Vianello

²¹ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 28th July 1493. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 62.

²² Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. [...]. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 67. There are more references of this negotiation in AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 1, n° 57 and Lib. 2-1, n° 31. For further information on these negotiations see Miguel Villalba González, *Los alguaciles de Melilla* (Melilla: Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, 2008). See also Ladero Quesada, "Melilla en 1494".

²³ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 12th February 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 167.

²⁴ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 25th February 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 174. There is more information on Cazaza in E. Gozalbes Cravioto, "Notas sobre Cazaza, Puerto de Fez y fortaleza española (1506-1533)," *Al-Andalus Magreb: Estudios árabes e islámicos* 15 (2008): 135-155.

²⁵ Letter of Luis Peixó to the Catholic Monarchs. [...]. AHN, Universidades, Leg. 713, fol. 180.

²⁶ Letter of King Ferdinand the Catholic to the viceroy of Majorca and to the royal procurator in that kingdom. Granada, 5th August 1499. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, ed. A. de la Torre (Barcelona: CSIC, 1949-1951), Vol. 6, 196.

²⁷ The official agreement with the local chiefs in BRAH, SyC, A-11, fols. 201-205. Further information about this event can be found in Pierre de Cenival and Frédéric de la Chapelle, *Espagnoles sur la Côte d'Afrique au XVe et au XVIe siècles*, (Paris: Librairie Larose, 1935), 37-44 and 49-57.

²⁸ Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba. Seville, 13th May 1500. L. I. Serrano y Pineda, "Correspondencia de los Reyes Católicos con el Gran Capitán durante las campañas de Italia," *Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas y Museos* (1909): 461.

²⁹ Jerónimo Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Católico. De las empresas y ligas de Italia* (Zaragoza: Lorenzo Robles, 1580), T. V, Lib. III, Chapters XIX and XXXV, 189 and 206. This island presented all the factors allowing this kind of unformal diplomacy to happen: presence of foreign merchants, political

(a Venetian in the service of the Catholic Monarchs) tried to arrange an agreement with the fortress of Algiers's governor to hand over the famous Islet of Algiers.³⁰ Whatever happened, those discussions ultimately failed, as did a similar negotiation with a local chief some years later.³¹

According to some sources the expedition to conquer Mers el-Kébir in 1505 was the result of a previous agreement with the governor of the fortress who offered to deliver the city.³² In 1508, similar tactics were employed to obtain Honaine.³³ Different conversations also took place with the elite of Oran, and it seems that the conquest of the city in 1509 was made possible largely due to the group of local notables who collaborated to ensure that the city fell into the hands of the Catholic Monarchs.³⁴ The year after the conquest of Béjaïa, in 1511, Pedro Navarro was approached by the governor of Algiers offering to surrender the city to Ferdinand the Catholic.³⁵ This first attempt did not succeed but shortly after the rulers of Algiers signed a treaty recognising their subjection to this monarch.³⁶ A year later, the inhabitants and rulers of Mazagran and Mostaganem, two port-towns on the Algerian coast did the same.³⁷ All these examples show the

autonomy, and a strategic position in the Mediterranean scenario. Khalifa Chater, "Jerba à l'épreuve du duel Hispano-Ottoman," in *Des Marges aux Frontières. Les puissances et les îles en Méditerranée à l'époque moderne*, ed. A. Brogini and M. Ghazali (Paris: Garnier, 2010), 27-37.

³⁰ The power of attorney of the Count of Tendilla to Jerónimo Vianello to carry out this negotiation on behalf of the monarchs in AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 73. On Vianello, see Vincenzo Bellemo, *Girolamo Vianello e le conquiste degli spagnuoli in Berberia. Capitolo di storia della Spagna sotto il re cattolico 1499-1511* (Chioggia: Ludovico Duse, 1896) and J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Notas y documentos sobre Jerónimo Vianello: un veneciano al servicio de la monarquía española (1504-1511)," in *Medievo hispano: estudios in memoriam del Prof. Derek W. Lomax* (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 1995), 253-265.

³¹ See below note 36.

³² Lorenzo DE Padilla, "Crónica de Felipe 1º llamado el hermoso". Cfr. CODOIN, T. VIII, 179-180.

³³ Already in 1506 a Muslim called Durra Hamet was paid because of his services informing about this enclave. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 187, fol. 61. The reference of Pedro Navarro's plan to get the city in letter of Cardinal Cisneros to Diego López de Ayala. Alcalá de Henares, 15th September 1508. Cfr. *Cartas del cardenal don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros dirigidas a don Diego López de Ayala*, ed. P. Gayangos and V. de la Fuente (Madrid: 1867), 10-11. On this sea port see G. Marçais, "Honaïn," *Revue Africaine* 69, n° 337 (1928): 333-350.

³⁴ I will come back to this issue in the third section of this chapter.

³⁵ Padilla, "Crónica de Felipe 1º,". On the governor who offered the delivery of Algiers see J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Converso, hidalgo, fraile y renegado: don Juan de Granada Abencomixa," *Historia, Instituciones, Documentos* 39 (2012): 129-151.

³⁶ The original treaty is missing but the royal chronicler Jerónimo Zurita included a transcription of it in his work on Ferdinand the Catholic. Jerónimo Zurita, *Los cinco libros postreros de la historia del Rey don Hernando, de las empresas y ligas de Italia* (Zaragoza: Pedro Bermuz, 1562), book IX, chapter 2.

³⁷ "Asiento entre Diego Fernández de Córdoba y la ciudad de Mostagani". AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 11, n° 154.

necessary and vital role that diplomacy played in the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb.³⁸




Image 1. Maghrebi localities engaged in negotiations with the Spanish authorities.

Most of these negotiations failed for different reasons: popular opposition, the violent reaction of local authorities and most frequently: lack of concern from the Spanish crown. The Catholic Monarchs did not pay much attention to the offers that Zafra received.³⁹ Although at times Ferdinand the Catholic showed a certain interest in these agreements, he rarely engaged in these negotiations.⁴⁰ Due to Ferdinand’s indifference, a well reputed expert like Professor Ladero Quesada has suggested that these diplomatic agreements had no impact on the Spanish occupation of these coastal cities, and instead,

³⁸ A state on the art about diplomatic relationships between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Muslim in M. F. Gómez Vozmediano and J. A. Martínez Torres, “Entre dos mundos. Las relaciones diplomáticas hispano-musulmanas durante la Edad Moderna: una breve síntesis,” *Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie IV, Historia Moderna* 21 (2008): 13-26. A useful work on the complexity of this issue in Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, “Entre la paz y la Guerra: tratados de Amistad y treguas entre los austrias españoles y el mundo musulmán en los siglos XVI y XVII,” in *El perfume de la amistad* (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 2009), 69-90.

³⁹ In late March 1494, after months negotiating with different local chiefs, Zafra was still waiting for the king’s response. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 24th March 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 165.

⁴⁰ Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to Hernando de Zafra. Zaragoza, 18th July 1498. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 83.

argues that they were conquered.⁴¹ However, I would contend that these negotiations were of some importance to the expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy in Africa. By examining the contemporary sources alone, it is difficult to determine whether the cities were conquered by the army, or turned over by the local population. Moreover, although most of these negotiations failed, they were nevertheless a legitimate means of facilitating Spanish expansion. Furthermore, I would argue that the men who planned and carried out the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb conceived this enterprise as a complex mixture of violence and diplomacy.

Far from being something new or original, this combination of force and negotiation was also employed in the last phase of the war of Granada.⁴² It seems that the same actors that negotiated the surrender of the southern corner of the Iberian Peninsula adopted the same tactic in the Maghreb. One of these actors was the aforementioned Hernando de Zafra who played a major role in the expanding the Spanish monarchy's political dominion in the Maghreb. Given that he had successfully conducted diplomatic negotiations during the conquest of Granada, Zafra adopted the same interesting mixture of diplomacy and war in this new scenario.⁴³

Already in 1494, Zafra was receiving requests from Maghrebi officials and dignitaries to initiate negotiations for their surrender. With these in hand, Zafra advised the crown to continue using this combined mechanism of violence and diplomacy to secure more key coastal areas of the Maghreb.⁴⁴ By profiting from the fear that dominated the Maghrebian polities, Zafra and those like him saw the opportunity to gain the upper hand when “negotiating” with the local authorities in this region. As a manner of example,

⁴¹ Ladero Quesada, “Melilla en 1494,” 446. This idea could be understood as a frontal contradiction of the thesis of Villalba Gonzalez, who claims that the “peaceful occupation” of Melilla was the product of the negotiations previously quoted. Villalba González, *Los alguaciles de Melilla*.

⁴² For an interesting analysis of these negotiations see Ángel Galán Sánchez, “Cristianos y musulmanes en el reino de Granada: las prácticas de negociación a través de un reexamen de las capitulaciones de la rendición y de la conversión,” in *Negociar en la edad media/Négocier au moyen âge*, ed. M. T. Ferrer Mallol et. al. (Barcelona: CSIC, 2005), 443-472. On the negotiated dimension of the Portuguese expansion, see I. Elbl, “Cross-Cultural Trade and Diplomacy: Portuguese Relations with West Africa, 1441-1521,” *Journal of World History* 3, n° 2 (1992): 165-204.

⁴³ Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Hernando de Zafra. Secretario de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2005), 21-22 and 28-29.

⁴⁴ Letters of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 28th July and 28th August 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 62 and 63. The correspondence of the Royal Secretary is very well known and has been (partially) published several times since the nineteenth century. There is a recent, but uncomplete, edition: *Correspondencia de Hernando de Zafra*, ed. J. M. de la Obra Sierra (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2011).

in one of his letters to the Catholic Monarchs, Zafra suggested using the royal navy to attack some coastal towns and villages. His intent was not to conquer these places but to conduct raids in order to terrify the surrounding areas. By giving the Maghrebi communities reason to fear the Spanish, Zafra hoped to bring the multiple negotiations that he was conducting with local chiefs to a successful conclusion; and in doing so encourage others local chiefs to surrender to the sovereignty of the Catholic Monarchs.⁴⁵

Hernando de Zafra was not alone in adopting this strategy. The other military officers who planned and led campaigns in the Maghreb also saw the virtue of combining violence and negotiation. This was the case, for instance, for Don Íñigo López de Mendoza, II Count of Tendilla. As the captain-general of Granada, the nobleman played a vital role in the African policy of the Hispanic Monarchy. Like Zafra, the Count of Tendilla was well versed in the benefits of using military skill and diplomacy in tandem.⁴⁶ Motivated by simple and pure pragmatism, Tendilla considered that negotiating with the Maghrebi notables was a useful tactic in this expansionist war. In a letter to another royal secretary, Tendilla referred to his negotiations with Abu ‘Ali Mansur, the King of Vélez and wrote: ‘I want peace until it could be possible to make war’.⁴⁷ Beyond his pragmatic attitude, the Count of Tendilla actually considered these diplomatic agreements as fundamental to any African enterprise and for this reason he regarded the offensive against Oran:

The biggest madness I have ever seen, because who goes to conquer, should have some hope of taking something by deal, and here it is missing, that they prefer to be destroyed rather than to surrender to him because of his Christianity. So everything has to be taken by force, and the conquest will not be so flavourful, neither to those who make it, nor to those who suffer it.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 12th February 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n^o 167.

⁴⁶ The role of this nobleman promoting the African campaigns is very well known. E. Meneses García, “Granada y el segundo conde de Tendilla a comienzos del siglo XVI,” *Hispania* 32 (1972): 563-568; *Correspondencia del Conde de Tendilla*, ed. E. Meneses García (Madrid: RAH, 1972), Vol. 1, 234-247; J. Szmolka Clares, “Granada y la política norteafricana de los Reyes Católicos (1492-1516)” *Anuario de historia contemporánea* 8 (1981): 59-60; and Id., *El Conde de Tendilla: primer capitán general de Granada*, Granada, Universidad de Granada, 1985, 291-320.

⁴⁷ ‘Deseo paz hasta que se pueda hacer la guerra’. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Miguel Pérez de Almazán. Granada, 19th August 1504. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, n^o 1, fol. 58.

⁴⁸ ‘Es la mayor locura que se vio, porque los que van a conquistar, alguna esperanza han de tener de tomar algo por trato, aquí es quita, que antes se dejarán hacer pedazos que darse a él por lo de cristiandad. De manera que pues todo se ha de tomar por fuerza no será tan sabrosa la conquista, para los que la hacen ni para los que la padecen’. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Marquis of Denia. Granada, 6th March 1509. BNE, Mss. 10230, fol. 62.

The Count of Tendilla was not the only military commander willing to use diplomacy in order to expand the dominium of the Catholic Monarchs in the Maghreb. Don Diego Fernández de Cordoba, the famous Alcaide de los Donceles was another nobleman who had played vital role in the conquest of Granada. His military success had prepared him for higher honours in the future campaigns of the Maghreb.⁴⁹ In his letters to Ferdinand the Catholic the Alcaide urged the king to take advantage of the ongoing negotiations with the Maghrebi elites willing to enter the sovereignty of the Hispanic Monarchy.⁵⁰ He also took part in some negotiations himself, and was involved in the bargaining with the Oranian urban elite to surrender the city.⁵¹ The Alcaide also wisely combined violence and negotiation during the campaign of Mers el-Kébir. The conquest of this stronghold was planned after its governor had offered to deliver the city. In one of his letters to a courtier the Count of Tendilla showed his optimism about this expedition saying: ‘let us not care about agreements, because the army that we will put ashore, they will achieve any important thing whatsoever by force’.⁵²

Tendilla’s optimism turned out to be justified (Mers el-Kébir was conquered) but nevertheless he was wrong. The fortress’ governor, who negotiated the surrender died when the Castilian army. As a result it was impossible to obtain the immediate surrender of the fortress.⁵³ Actually, the troops led by the Alcaide de los Donceles faced strong resistance in Mers el-Kébir, and they were only able to enter the fortress after negotiating the surrender with the chief of the garrison, who had to be paid accordingly.⁵⁴ This first campaign also showed the obvious shortcomings of the supposed Spanish military supremacy in the Maghreb, especially when an experienced military officer such as

⁴⁹ I will come back to this character in the following chapter.

⁵⁰ Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Ferdinand the Catholic. 24th March 1508. BNE, Mss. 20209/11-2.

⁵¹ Ladero Quesada, *Hernando de Zafra*, 195-197.

⁵² ‘De tratos no curemos que con la gente que ha de saltar en tierra, forzar pueden cualquier cosa de las que son de importancia’. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Alonso Morales. Granada, 9th July 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 187. On the Castilian army deployed in this campaign, see M. A. Ladero Quesada, “La toma de Mazalquivir y el retorno de Nápoles. Julio de 1505-junio de 1506,” *En la España Medieval* 36 (2013): 183-224.

⁵³ Letter of Pedro de Madrid to Ferdinand the Catholic. Mers el-Kébir, 17th September 1505. BNE, Mss, 18547/5/14, fols. 9-10.

⁵⁴ Letter of Gonzalo de Ayora to the Catholic King. Mers el-Kébir. 15th September 1505. BNE, Mss, 10415, fol. 3. The payment to the new governor and other soldiers who collaborated in the surrender of the fortress in AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, Leg. 187, fol. 15.

Gonzalo de Ayora pointed out the multiple problems of the campaign.⁵⁵ Hence, it is not surprising at all that after this first experience, the offers of “peaceful” arrangements were treated more seriously, as it was evident in the long negotiations for the surrender of Oran.

It is important to explain here why this wise combination of violence and negotiation found a fertile ground in the Maghreb. The violent conquest of Granada and the brutality that it unleashed left echoes outside of the Iberian Peninsula. For instance, during the conquest of Malaga (1487), all the inhabitants were enslaved after their city resisted the Castilian army. The process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb was only four years after this brutal conquest. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coastal territories on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea feared the arrival of the Spanish army. This also explains why Zafra received offers of surrender from local elites as early as 1492.⁵⁶ Their fears were accentuated by the arrival of a large number of Andalusian refugees, whose stories diffused fear of Spanish authority throughout northern Africa, as Zafra reported:

Furthermore I know that all the Andalusians and most of the people have fled from Tunis and Bougie without stopping in Alexandria or in Damascus, but instead they all pass through on their way to Mecca, and from there to a great city which is in the middle of Asia called Bohaza, and the fear in them is so great, and the certitude that they will be captured so strong, that they believe in this like they believe in their Muhammad.⁵⁷

The direct connection between this generalised fear and the negotiations was evident when reading the reports of the situation in the Maghreb. Zafra, who was trying to convince the kings to conquer Mers el-Kébir, wrote in the winter of 1494:

⁵⁵ Gonzalo de Ayora, an experienced militaryman, reported Cisneros the many problems to conquer and defend Mers el-Kébir. BNE, Mss. 262, n° 112.

⁵⁶ On Malaga's conquest and the enslavement of its population, see M. A. Ladero Quesada, “La esclavitud por guerra a fines del siglo XV: el caso de Málaga,” *Hispania* 105 (1967): 63-88.

⁵⁷ ‘De Túnez y de Bugía así mismo he sabido que se han ido todos los andaluces y la mayor parte de la gente, y que no paran en Alejandría ni en Damasco, sino que todos pasan dellos a Meca y de ellas a una gran ciudad que está en medio del Asia que se llama Bohaza y que es el temor tan grande que hay en todos y la certeza que tienen de ser prendidos, que así creen en ello como en su Mahoma’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 14th January 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 164. On the Granadine exiles in the Maghreb see José Enrique López de Coca Castañer, “Granada y el Magreb: la emigración andalusí,” in *Relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb, siglos XIII-XVI*, ed. M. García Arenal and M. J. Viguera (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 409-451.

That the whole kingdom [of Tlemcen] is trembling with the keys in their hand [...] because [these people] have neither the force to defend themselves, nor to talk about any other solution, except in coming to the service of Your Highness.⁵⁸

Despite this strong fear of armed intervention, there were other factors that pushed the Maghrebi notables to seek political agreements with the authorities from the Iberian Peninsula. The presence of violent and deep divisions within the different local communities was one such factor. The man who offered the surrender of Tiguenté proposed an interesting plan. According to him, securing the city would be easy but it would require the presence of around 1,000 soldiers, in order to convince the town to surrender, but if in the event that it did not, he, his brothers and relatives ‘with the help of the army would fight with the others who are his enemies’ and secure the surrender of the town.⁵⁹ These words show the internal division present in the city but also that local actors were willing to use the external menace to fight their own enemies. This is crucial because as the experts on early modern warfare have shown, the military success of Europeans fighting outside the old continent depended to a great extent on their ability to find local allies.⁶⁰

Some of the internal features of the region facilitated these negotiations. The whole Maghreb presented a similar political landscape characterised by tribal, political and ethnic divisions. The region was dominated (only in theory, however) by three different opposing dynasties: the Hafsids, the Watasids, and the Marinids. Nevertheless, great parts of it fell outside any formal dominion, and as such the power of these monarchs was more than limited. In the region as a whole, factional and tribal groups were the dominant forces, while state power was rather weak. Indeed, in many areas state authority had lost its previous importance to a great extent, and it was replaced by religious leaders of rural communities.⁶¹ The desire for autonomy in some cities could have motivated

⁵⁸ ‘Que todo el reino [de Tremecén] está temblando y con las llaves en la mano (...) porque [esta gente] ni tienen fuerza para defenderse ni diz que hablan en otro remedio salvo en venir al servicio de Vuestras Altezas’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 14th January 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, fol. 164.

⁵⁹ ‘Con el favor de la armada peleará con los otros que son sus contrarios’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 28th July 1493. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n^o 62.

⁶⁰ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1494-1660* (London: Routledge, 2002), 63-65; and Ross Hassig, “War, Politics, and the Conquest of Mexico,” in *War in Early Modern World*, ed. J. Black (London: University College London Press, 1999), 207-235.

⁶¹ The classic reference is still nowadays Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretative Essay*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 229-242. An approach to the Maghreb’s reality within

some of the offers. Thus, for instance, the inhabitants of Melilla who offered to surrender the city to the Catholic Monarchs did so only after expelling the royal officer who ruled the city on behalf of the King of Fez, a clear act of rebellion against this monarch. In fact, as they admitted in their conversations with Hernando de Zafra, they offered the city to secure Spanish protection because they feared being besieged by the offended king.⁶²

We can conclude at this point that during the African campaigns diplomatic negotiations and the use of force went hand in hand, and that they were used in a complimentary manner rather than as two different and isolated factors. Even in the most conspicuous cases where the predominant element was the use of armed force, negotiations were often necessary. From the viewpoint of the men who designed and conducted the process of Spanish expansionism into the Maghreb, violence and negotiation were two sides of the same coin, and we should not overemphasise one factor by neglecting the other. Thus, diplomacy was crucial in the overseas expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy in the Maghreb and precisely because of this it is necessary to open up the focus of our study to include the agents in charge of conducting these diplomatic negotiations.

A mercantile network in the diplomacy across the Mediterranean Sea

Despite the important role that diplomatic negotiations played in expanding Spanish authority in the Maghreb, there was no administrative institution that oversaw this extra-european diplomacy so diplomatic missions to the Maghreb were entrusted to non-state actors.⁶³ Most of the men who acted on behalf of the Catholic Monarchs, as referred to above were closely interconnected. One of these merchant traders was Juan

a general overview of the Islamic world in Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 319-336. The recent biography of Leo Africanus by Natalie Zemon Davis also offers a colorful description of the Maghreb at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Natalie Z. Davis, *Trickster Travels. A Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 15-54. On the Maghrebi ruling dynasties, see Fernando Rodríguez Mediano, "The Post-Almohad Dynasties in al-Andalus and the Maghrib (Seventh-Ninth/Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries)," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam. The Western Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. M. I. Fierro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106-144.

⁶² Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Catholic Monarchs. Granada, 25th April 1494. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 169.

⁶³ Georg Jostkleigrewe, "Affaires étrangères? Les acteurs français et les réseaux méditerranéens: questions et perspectives de recherche," in *Acteurs des transferts culturels en Méditerranée médiévale*, ed. R. Abdellafit, Y. Benhima, D. König and E. Ruchaud (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 193.

Rena. By focussing on his socio-professional network we can gain further insights into the complex game of Spanish diplomacy and how it developed in the new frontier between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb.⁶⁴

Rena arrived in the Maghreb at the turn of sixteenth century, just when the policy of Spanish expansion was taking form. Over time he began to take on increasing responsibility in performing tasks for the Spanish authorities in the region.⁶⁵ Rena was not the most important merchant involved in this enterprise. Moreover, it seems that he played a more collaborative role in this commercial network.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the evidence that he left behind of his activity makes it possible to reconstruct his network. One of these sources is the *probanza* (a set of affidavits to be used during an administrative or judicial enquiry) that he submitted in order to gain economic compensation from the crown for his services. The document is composed of a set of testimonies justifying Rena's right to get compensation due to his service to the crown during the African conquests. This source is particularly interesting because it permits us to reconstruct Rena's social network in this specific context, firstly, by providing us with references of Rena's activities and that of the people with whom he was in contact; and secondly: because it consisted of testimonies from witnesses selected by Rena, namely, his friends, or at least people with whom he had a close relationship.

The list of witnesses consists of, Gabriel Mas, a merchant from Valencia; Juan Bautista de Arborán, a Genoese trader, Juan Gaitán, the *corregidor* of Malaga; and Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba, the aforementioned Alcaide de los Donceles. As for the people who were simply mentioned in the document, the list is a bit longer. It includes:

⁶⁴ New diplomatic history is paying lot of attention to actors like those here analysed who did not acted as consuls or ambassadors. See for instance Hillard von Thiessen, "Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens," in *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, ed. H. Von Thiessen and C. Windler (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010), 471-503. This approach has already proved to be much more useful to understand the diplomacy between European and Maghrebi polities during the early modern period. Christian Windler, *La diplomatie comme experience de l'autre. Consuls français au Maghreb (1700-1840)* (Geneva: Droz, 2002). The English reader can consult Id., "Representing a State in a Segmentary Society: French Consuls in Tunis from the Ancien Régime to the Restoration," *The Journal of Modern History* 73 (2001): 233-274.

⁶⁵ According to Juan Bautista de Arborán Rena arrived to Orán in 1494. AGN, CO_PS, 1ª S, Leg, 23, nº 23, fol. 8.

⁶⁶ On the role of "lower rank" Venetians in Mediterranean trade, see F. J. Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, "Venetian Trading Networks in the Medieval Mediterranean," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 44, nº 2 (2013): 157-159.

the brothers Nicolao and Franco Cattaneo, two important Genoese businessmen; Gisbert de Santa Fe, also a merchant, the royal secretary Hernando de Zafra, the King of Velez, and Ferdinand the Catholic among others. All these men were part of Rena's social network while he was in serving the Hispanic Monarchy in the Maghreb. The aforementioned document offers us the first insights into Rena's participation in the informal negotiations between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb. For instance in the *probanza*, Juan Bautista de Arboran referred to Rena's activity during the negotiations to surrender Oran to the Alcaide de los Donceles after the conquest of Mers el-Kébir.⁶⁷ Moreover, the *probanza* includes much more information about Rena's previous services as a negotiator in the Maghreb: the discussions with Abu 'Ali Mansur, the King of Velez de la Gomera, who ruled the most dangerous pirate' nest near Granada's coast.⁶⁸




Image 2. Vélez de la Gomera (1522).⁶⁹

⁶⁷ AGN, Comptos, Papeles Suelos, Leg. 23, nº 23, fol. 8.

⁶⁸ Leo Africanus, "Descrittione dell'Africa e delle cose notabili che ivi sono," in Giovanni Battista Ramusio, *Delle navigationi et viaggi* (Venice: Giunti, 1653), fol. 50. Further information about this city and its port in J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Vélez de la Gomera y su puerto durante la primera mitad del siglo XVI," *Historia, instituciones, documentos* 20 (1993): 207-230.

⁶⁹ This drawing, like the following of Castill de Pescadores, were drawn in 1523 by Juan de Guzmán, an inhabitant of Malaga, as part of his plan to take this enclave with the support of the Duke of Arcos. To the

The Spanish authorities tried to put an end to the corsair raids from Velez by diplomatic means when, compelled by fear of attack, some of Abu ‘Ali Mansur’s councillors made the first step towards a diplomatic agreement.⁷⁰ The first official mention of Rena’s involvement in these negotiations was in a letter of the Count of Tendilla dated in October 1504, but according to Rena’s testimony he had already begun to take part in these negotiations in 1503.⁷¹ Unfortunately we do not have any information about how Rena became engaged in this issue, but it did underline that he held prominent position in this diplomatic mission. In August 1504 during one of Rena’s stays at the royal court, King Ferdinand the Catholic placed his servant Diego Canelas under Rena’s command during their upcoming mission to Velez.⁷² Canelas was an expert in rescuing Christian captives and he was frequently employed by the crown to go on different missions to the Maghreb.⁷³ Making him Rena’s subordinate shows the high esteem that the latter held in the negotiations with the Islamic authorities of northern Africa. Juan Rena spent several months negotiating with the King of Velez the suspend of the corsair’s attacks, and to secure the surrender of Castil de Pescadores, a coastal town with a strategic port at the foot of the Rif Mountains under Velez’s domain.

best of my knowledge is the earliest representation of this place. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 1635, n° 73. I will come back to Guzmán’s plan in the next chapter.

⁷⁰ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Royal Secretary Miguel Pérez de Almazán. Granada, 10th August 1504. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 50.

⁷¹ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Juan Gaitán. Granada, 17th October 1504. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, n° 1, fol. 77. Different testimonies of the *probanza* coincide in dating Rena’s first travel to Vélez travel in 1503. AGN, Comptos, Papeles Sueltos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fols. 5 and 8-9. Unfortunately we have no additional sources to confirm this information because the Count of Tendilla’s book of letters for this period has disappeared.

⁷² AGN, Comptos, Papeles Sueltos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 2.

⁷³ For instance, Canelas took part in the rescue of captives in 1498, 1499 and again in 1503. AGS, RGS, Leg. 149806, n° 71; Leg. 149909, n° 462; Leg. 149910, n° 254, Casa y Sitios Reales, Leg. 1, n° 314 and Leg. 3, n° 346. In fact, this royal servant was active in the Mediterranean frontier in other tasks. In 1504, when he was taking part in the organization of the captives rescue, got a royal mercy to organise a private raid in the African coasts. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 9, n° 121, 1. Further information in José Enrique López de Coca Castañer, “Andalucía y el Norte de África: la redención de cautivos a fines de la edad media,” in *Andalucía Medieval: actas del III Congreso de Historia de Andalucía*, (Córdoba: Cajasur, 2003, Vol. 5, 251-292.




Image 3. Castillo de Pescadores (1522).⁷⁴

In 1504 Rena travelled up to six times from the royal court to Velez de la Gomera. Each time he carried correspondence from one king to the other. Despite appearances he was more than just a messenger. As he said in the *probanza*, during all these visits he was actively pursuing negotiations with the King of Velez as ordered by the Catholic Monarchs.⁷⁵ Rena's long stays in Vélez de la Gomera makes it plausible that he was negotiating and not only delivering messages.⁷⁶ Furthermore, sometimes Rena was much more explicit saying that his mission was to go to Velez de la Gomera to negotiate with the king over the signing of a treaty.⁷⁷ According to Gabriel Mas, Rena's servant was known to have said that Juan Rena 'was continuously with the King of Velez'.⁷⁸ It seems that Rena managed to advance the negotiations because on 31st January 1505 Ferdinand the Catholic gave Rena a safe-conduct to bring hostages from Velez to the royal court in order to secure an imminent agreement between the two monarchs.⁷⁹ In fact, in August

⁷⁴ AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 1635, n° 71.

⁷⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 3.

⁷⁶ For instance, during his fifth travel, Rena stayed at least during three weeks there. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 1-3.

⁷⁷ AGN, Comptos, Papeles Sueltos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 2.

⁷⁸ 'Que de continuo estaba con el rey de Vélez'. *Ibid.*, fol. 6.

⁷⁹ AGN, Comptos, Papeles Sueltos, Leg. 23, n° 22.

1505 Hernando de Zafra wrote to the King of Velez to congratulate him on the agreement. Moreover Zafra attributed the success of these negotiations to Rena.⁸⁰

Rena was a single participant of a commercial network whose members were quite active in the informal diplomacy between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb. One of the most interesting members of this network was Gabriel Mas. Since late fifteenth century, this Valencian merchant had specialised in a lucrative commerce in the Barbary Coast.⁸¹ In his affidavit Mas stated that Juan Rena would inform him ‘in great secret’ about his diplomatic missions regarding the agreements involving the King of Velez de la Gomera and Ferdinand the Catholic. He did this at least a couple of times: first in Granada, and again at the royal court.⁸² This reveals the familiarity and the confidence that the two merchants shared but also shows how information was circulated and accumulated inside this close network. During these same years Juan Rena and Gabriel Mas were business partners in Oran.⁸³ In parallel to this commercial partnership they cultivated a close friendship that lasted for years.⁸⁴ Furthermore, like Rena, Mas also acted as a king’s agent in the Maghreb. He learnt the importance of negotiating with Christian and Muslim in 1496, when he was imprisoned and embargoed by the Algerian authorities.⁸⁵ While imprisoned Mas also encountered one of his future partners: Gisbert de Santa Fe, another member of Rena’s network.

Only two years later, Mas started to take on a more active role in the negotiations with African authorities. In 1498, Mas and Pedro de Hozes, a royal servant, carried out a secret mission in the Maghreb in the service of the king.⁸⁶ Some months later Gabriel Mas

⁸⁰ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the King of Velez. Malaga, 7th August 1505. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 134.

⁸¹ Gabriel Mas belonged to a family of Jewish merchants converted to Christianity. J. Guiral Hadziiossif, “Convers à Valence à la fin du XV siècle,” *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 11 (1975): 88. On the commerce between Valencia and the Barbary see Id. “Les relations commerciales du Royaume de Valence avec la Berbérie au XV siècle,” in *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 10 (1974): 99-131. It seems that these converts inherited the role of Valencia’s Jewish community in the trade with Africa. J. Hinojosa Montalvo, “Los judíos del reino de Valencia durante el siglo XV,” *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia medieval* 3 (1984): 171-172.

⁸² AGN, Comptos, Papeles Suelos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 6.

⁸³ Letter of Diego de Córdoba to Gabriel Mas. Oran, 28th April 1503. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-1.

⁸⁴ See letter of Gabriel Mas to Juan Rena. Gran Canaria, 20th November 1512. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-10-1.

⁸⁵ Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to the Almoxarife of Algiers. Barcelona, 8th August 1496. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones*, Vol. 5, 314.

⁸⁶ Letter of passage to Pedro de Hozes and Gabriel Mas. Ocaña, 7th December 1498. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones*, Vol. 6, 159. This mission has been mentioned in Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista*, 119, and Suárez Fernández, *Los Reyes Católicos*, 215.

returned there again, this time in the company with the moors who took part in the negotiations for the deliver of Dellys, a port city on the Algerian coast.⁸⁷ In the following years Gabriel Mas took on even more prominent position in the African policy of the Hispanic Monarchy, especially in diplomatic negotiations with the Muslims authorities. The Count of Tendilla consulted him when negotiating a peace treaty with the King of Velez de la Gomera.⁸⁸ Moreover, in 1505 Tendilla suggested to Hernando de Zafra that he ask Mas' advice about a group Maghrebi notables who were offering their services to the Spanish authorities.⁸⁹ As we can see, Gabriel Mas took part in various negotiations with African notables, and as time passed the Spanish authorities began to treat him as an expert in the field.

One of Gabriel Mas' partners was Gisbert de Santa Fe, a Catalan merchant who had already have business relations with Juan Rena in Oran.⁹⁰ Like Gabriel Mas, this Valencian merchant, belonged to an ancient Jewish family. In fact, he was condemned (twice) by the inquisition of judaizing after his conversion.⁹¹ Santa Fe assumed his diplomatic activities in 1496, when dealing with authorities of Béjaïa in the Algerian region of Kabylie. After the escape of some Christian captives the King of Béjaïa reacted by imprisoning all the Spanish merchants of Algiers due to their supposed implication. Ferdinand the Catholic sent Gisbert de Santa Fe to negotiate for the liberation of the

⁸⁷ Letters of Ferdinand the Catholic to the viceroy of Majorca. Manzanares, 9th June and Granada, 5th August 1499. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones*, Vol. 6, 193 and 196. Ramon Vidal and his son Juan, members of a family of Majorca's Jews, also took part in these negotiations. Zurtia, *Historia del rey Fernando*, Bökk. 6, Cap. XV. They also obtained a safe-conduct, protecting them even from the Inquisition. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1-2-1, fol. 105. Some years later Ferdinand the Catholic order to bring Ramon Vidal to Africa to help Pedro Navaro in the conquest of Béjaïa. As he was condemned by the Inquisition it was necessary to deal the issue with the Majorca's inquisitor. Miguel José Deyá Bauzá, "Entre la toma de Orán y los pactos con Argel: las Baleares y la conquista de Bugía," in *Orán, historia de la corte chica*, ed. B. Alonso Acero and M. A. Bunes Ibarra (Madrid: Polifemo, 2010), 63.

⁸⁸ Letter of Count de Tendilla to Miguel Pérez de Almazán. Granada, 13th November 1504. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 85.

⁸⁹ Letter of Count of Tendilla to Hernando de Zafra. Granada, [...] September 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D.1, fol. 228.

⁹⁰ AGN, Comptos, Papeles Suetos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 2. Gisbert de Santa fe appears here acting with his partner: Alonso de Sevilla. Actually both acted as tax-farmers in Oran after its conquest. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, Leg. 200. Alonso de Sevilla obtained a royal secure in 1504 but unfortunately the secure do not provides us with any information about him. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 9, n° 494.

⁹¹ He was condemned by crypto Judaism first in 1490 and, again, in 1519. AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 5311, exp. 1, fol. 2. On the role of new Christians and crypto-Jews in the Spanish overseas expansion, see Eva Alexandra Uchumany, "The Participation of New Christians and Crypto-Jews in the Conquest, Colonization, and Trade of Spanish America, 1521-1660," in *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West, 1450 to 1800*, ed. P. Bernardini and N. Fiering (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 186-202.

merchants with the King of Béjaïa and his officers in Algiers.⁹² During this mission he met Gabriel Mas, one of the imprisoned merchants, and, there is some proof of his participation in later informal negotiations carried out by Mas. In the following years Santa Fe came to be regarded as an expert in the complex diplomacy of the region. For instance, in 1516 a royal officer defined him as expert in diplomatic agreements in the Maghreb.⁹³

Undoubtedly Rena, Gabriel Mas and Gisbert de Santa Fe were experts in the difficult task of bargaining with the Maghrebi notables.⁹⁴ Nevertheless they were not the most outstanding negotiators in this field; the main protagonists were Genoese merchants, the brothers Nicolao and Franco Cattaneo. Despite the attention that these merchants have attracted, very little is known about their business in the Maghreb beyond the fact they were two leading figures in the region's commerce.⁹⁵ They oversaw a great network that connected the Maghreb ports with Romania, Genoa, Marseille, Mallorca, Andalusia, London, Lisbon and the Portuguese colonies in the Atlantic.⁹⁶ The Cattaneo brothers had an intense commercial relationship with Rena, with whom they dealt together in Oran.⁹⁷ In parallel to this commercial activity they carried out different diplomatic missions in the Maghreb on behalf of the Spanish authorities. For instance, at the beginning of 1506 Nicolao Cattaneo tried to attract the Mizwar of Tlemcen (the highest military authority of the kingdom) and other tribal sheikhs to the service of Ferdinand the Catholic.⁹⁸ They gained greater momentum during the negotiations to deliver Oran as they were in a privileged position to manage their informal contacts in the city. Being able to exercise such influence in Oran had quite a profound effect, as the city operated as an independent

⁹² Letters of Ferdinand the Catholic to the King of Béjaïa, the tax collector and the governor of Algiers. Barcelona, 8th August 1496. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones*, Vol. 5, 311-312 and 314-315. On this polity see Dominique Valérian, *Bougie, port maghrébin, 1067-1510* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2006).

⁹³ 'Plático en cosas de los moros'. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 156, n° 174.

⁹⁴ On the difficulty of the negotiations with the Barbary authorities, see W. Kaiser, "Négociier avec l'ennemi. Le rachat de captifs à Alger au XVI^e siècle," *Siècles* 26 (2008): 43-59.

⁹⁵ The presence of the Cattaneo tradesmen in the Maghreb lasted from the Middle Ages. Laura Balletto, "Famiglie Genovesi nel Nord-Africa," in *Dibattito su Grandi Famiglie del Mondo Genovese fra Mediterraneo ed Atlantico*, ed. G. Pistarino (Genoa: Accademia Ligure di Scienze e lettere, 1997), 55, 58 and 59. These merchants took an important place in the regional commerce with northern Africa, and as a result of it, they have attracted the attention of the expert in the matter long time ago. J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Orán y el comercio genovés en la transición a los tiempos modernos," *Anuario de estudios medievales* 24 (1994): 279-284.

⁹⁶ Domenico Gioffrè, "Il commercio d'importazione genovese alla luce dei registri del dazio (1495-1537)," in *Studio in onore de Amintore Fanfani* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962), Vol. 5, 122, 132, 141, 168 n. 116 170-171 and 204; and *Documentos sobre relaciones*, Vol. 5. 377-378.

⁹⁷ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-1. and Caj. 88, N° 3.

⁹⁸ AGS, GyM, Leg. 1314, n° 76.

merchant republic. Leo Africanus described Oran as an autonomous enclave that acted outside the control of the King of Tlemcen.⁹⁹ Nicolao Cattaneo's report on the city further clarified this point, as it seems that the real authority remained in the hands of the religious elite, and an undefined officer (*catib*) who Cattaneo considered to be the 'natural lord of the city'.

The Cattaneo brothers offered to help the Spanish authorities navigate this complex urban system. Due to their important commercial role in the city their influence extended the upper echelons of Oran's governing body, which even included some of the religious leaders as Nicolao reported in his letter:

My brother has in his hands most of them [the alarabs] for when His Highness would have need of them, and furthermore he wrote in his letter of the fifth of this month, and he told me that he has in his hand a great Faqīh [Muslim jurisconsult], the most important of this kingdom, to whom alarabs, barbans and citizens obey more than they do to the king [...] and he is a great enemy of the Mizwar.¹⁰⁰

These merchants were thus able to efficiently bridge the gap between the Spanish authorities and the different groups that composed this divided local society. Moreover, it shows that the Cattaneo family held influence over a wide range of the local population.¹⁰¹ However, they were not the only merchants acting on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy to secure Oran's surrender. Galcerán de Almenara, another member of Rena's commercial network, performed the same service to the Catholic Monarchs. Galcerán de Almenara was a well-established merchant in the maritime trade of the region. He almost monopolised the external commerce of Almeria.¹⁰² Moreover, his business even earned

⁹⁹ Africanus, "Descriptione dell'Africa," fol. 61. On Oran as an independent merchant republic, see R. Lespes, "Oran, ville et port avant l'occupation française (1831)," *Revue Africaine* 75, n° 360 (1934): 285.

¹⁰⁰ "Mi hermano (...) la mayor parte de ellos [los alárabes] tiene en su mano para cuando Su Alteza se quisiere servir de ellos, y así mismo lo escribe por su carta del cinco de este mes, y me dice que tiene en su mano un grande alfaquí, el mayor de este reino, al que alárabes, bárbaros y ciudadanos más obedecen que al rey (...) y es mucho enemigo del Mizwar". Letter of Nicolao Cattaneo to Hernando de Zafra. Mers el-Kébir, 15th December 1506. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 137.

¹⁰¹ "Conocí, señor, en los dichos moros, que los de Orán son confusos, y cansados, y que desean alguna concordia, la cual confío en Dios que no puede faltar". *Ibíd.*

¹⁰² Alemanara's abuses in this matter provoked the claims of the local merchants. AGS, RGS, Leg. 150010, n° 150.

him a name in Valencia.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, by 1505 his financial situation had become critical due to his activities as a tax farmer.¹⁰⁴

He continued to be quite active in Maghrebi commerce through his brother, Miguel de Almenara, who remained in Oran and as such Galcerán was able to stay in touch with Rena's network. Miguel also took part in negotiations with Muslim cities and like Rena, he belonged to the close circle of servants who composed the Alcaide de los Donceles' household.¹⁰⁵ As many other members of this network Galcerán de Almenara took part in the negotiations to deliver Oran. At the beginning of 1506 the Alcaide de los Donceles wrote to Zafra reporting that Almenara's associates were ready to deliver the two parts of Oran that they controlled. In exchange the Spanish authorities had to send an army to capture and enslave the inhabitants of the other two parts and allow Almenara's associates to remain in the city, 'with their estates, houses and in his law'.¹⁰⁶ We do not know the outcome of this offer, but we do know that Rena was also involved in these negotiations. The members of this commercial network not only shared business ties, they also collaborated in the political sphere acting in a real diplomatic network.

As we have seen Rena's personal network consisted mainly of merchants with a similar profile to his own, and an agenda that combined commerce and royal service in the process of expansion undertaken by the Ferdinand the Catholic. Their profiles were grounded on the social capital that only years of work and experience in this complex society could provide. Rena expressed the importance of these contacts very clearly in one of his letters to the crown when he wrote:

And furthermore because I want to live in this land and serve to Your Highness in the African conquest, in which I have served until now, and hereafter I can serve well thanks to the great knowledge, and friendship, and businesses that I have accumulated

¹⁰³ His name appears time and again in the account books of the Valencian merchants. Enrique Cruselles Gómez, *Los comerciantes valencianos del siglo XV y sus libros de cuentas* (Castellón: Universidad Jaume I, 2007), 297.

¹⁰⁴ AGS, RGS, 150501, n° 354.

¹⁰⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 1-1. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 108.

¹⁰⁶ Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Hernando de Zafra. Mers el-Kébir, 5th January [1506]. Cfr. Ladero Quesada, *Hernando de Zafra*, 195-197.

throughout the Barbary's coast, from Tripoli to the Strait, especially in Oran and in the kingdom of Tlemcen.¹⁰⁷

Rena's words make him appear as an actor with strategic social capital in the Maghreb. He and the other members of his network were able to facilitate negotiations between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula because they were men of credit, that is, individuals with contacts and influences on both sides.¹⁰⁸

On the southern shore Rena and his colleagues knew the Muslim authorities and their officialdom, and as such were able to construct the trust that they needed in order to carry out their diplomatic missions.¹⁰⁹ Thanks to their commercial activity in the region, Venetians like Rena could enjoy direct access to the local authorities because they also took part in international commerce.¹¹⁰ In fact Rena shared businesses with the Mizwar of Tlemcen.¹¹¹ Moreover, Rena enjoyed the trust of the Maghrebi authorities like the Mizwar, as was made clear during the winter of 1505 when he was employed to resolve a commercial dispute concerning the Spanish merchants in Oran. This issue emerged when Miguel de Almenara, a merchant who acted as the Spanish consul in Oran, fled the city and defaulted on his debts.¹¹² The King of Tlemcen ordered the imprisonment of his partners as well as the seizure of their goods, and asked the Ferdinand the Catholic to

¹⁰⁷ 'Así mismo porque deseo de estar en esta tierra e servir a Vuestra Alteza en la conquista de África en la cual hasta ahora he servido, e de aquí adelante puedo bien servir, por el mucho conocimiento, e amistad e trato que he tenido en toda la costa de Berbería, desde Trípoli hasta el estrecho, principalmente en Orán e en el reino de Tremecén.' AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 3.

¹⁰⁸ Wolfgang Kaiser, "Les hommes de crédit dans les rachats des captifs provençaux (XVIe-XVIIe) Siècles," in *Le commerce des captifs: les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, Xve-XVIIIe siècle*, ed. W. Kaiser (Rome, École française de Rome, 2008), 292-319. See also an interesting case study from a completely different context, Jorge Flores, "A 'Man of Great Credit in those Lands': Miguel Ferreira, the 'Mutineers' of the Coromandel Coast and the Estado da Índia," in *From Biography to History: Essays in the History of Portuguese Asia (1500-1800)*, ed. K. McPherson and S. Subrahmanyam (New Delhi: Transbooks and CHAM, 2005), 55-93.

¹⁰⁹Roser Salicrú i Lluch, "Más allá de la mediación de la palabra: negociación con los infieles y mediación cultural en la baja edad media," in *Negociar en la edad media/Négocier au moyen âge*, ed. M. T. Ferrer Mallol et al. (Barcelona: CSIC, 2005), 430-432.

¹¹⁰ On the implication of Maghrebi authorities in commerce, see D. Valérian, "Les elites politiques et l'activité économique des ports maghrébins (XIIe-XVe siècle)," *Histoire Urbaine* 19, n° 2 (2007): 117-128. Venetian merchants were also traditionally engaged in commercial relationships with Ottoman and Maghrebi authorities. E. Dursteler, "Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era," *Turcica* 34 (2002): 105-133 and Id.: *Venetians in Constantinople. Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 62-169; *Itinéraire d'Anselme Adorno en Terre Sainte (1470-1471)*, ed. J. Heers and G. de Groer (Paris: CNRS, 1978), 136-138.

¹¹¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 1-1.

¹¹² He was the brother of the afore mentioned Galcerán de Almenara. See above notes 101-104.

send the consul back to pay his debts.¹¹³ In the meantime, Almenara's accounts were checked in Oran (in an enquiry that Rena took part in) and they discovered that Almenara owed 8,000 doblas. The Mizwar reacted by seizing Almenara's associates as a retribution. They asked him to allow one of them, Gonzalo de Córdoba, to return to Granada in order to collect the money, - a request that the Mizwar only accepted on account of the respect he held for Rena and the latter's pledge to act as his guarantor. Unfortunately, instead of collecting the money and returning to Oran, Gonzalo de Córdoba fled. As a result it was necessary to turn to Rena (once again) to solve the problem, and he was able to secure aid from the Castilian monarchs.¹¹⁴ This anecdote shows how much the Maghrebi authorities trusted Rena, or at least considered him as someone able to mobilise political contacts in the Iberian Peninsula.¹¹⁵ However, it is worth noting that he was not the only merchant in this network to enjoy the trust of the Maghrebi authorities. The Cattaneo brothers were also very well connected with the Maghrebi authorities, as was made clear when the Mizwar of Tlemcen protected Franco Cattaneo during an anti-Christian riot in Oran.¹¹⁶

At the same time, these traders were able to take part in the negotiations because they enjoyed a strategic social capital on the northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. As we have seen, Gabriel Mas, was considered an expert of the Maghrebi political landscape. He advised the Count of Tendilla and the Alcaide de los Donceles, but he was not the only one. Juan Rena and his associates showed a clear interest in maintaining close ties with the Spanish authorities who ruled Granada and managed the African policy. For instance, when Rena was finishing his commission as ambassador in Velez, he approached the captain-general of Granada (the Count of Tendilla) through Malaga's corregidor Juan Gaitán. In order to prove his usefulness, Rena sent him a memorandum with useful advice about the protection of the naval resources, and even more important

¹¹³ Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to Juana of Aragón. Madrid, 20th November 1502. Cfr. *Documentos sobre relaciones*, ed. A. de la Torre, Vol. 5, 316.

¹¹⁴ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150501, n° 99. A long experience trading in the Maghreb reported a useful experience negotiating with the Muslim authorities to solve problems touching commerce as it happened in Maluk Egypt. Francisco J. Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, *Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne: le deuxième état mamelouk et le commerce des épices (1382-1517)* (Barcelona: CSIC, 2009), 159-160, 221-224 and 244-246; and Georg Christ, *Trading Conflicts: Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Officials in Late Medieval Alexandria* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

¹¹⁵ This was the reason behind the appointment of Christian merchants as diplomatic representatives by Maghrebi rulers. D. Valeryan, "Les agents de la diplomatie des souverains maghrébins avec le monde chrétien (XIIe-XVe siècle)," *Anuario de estudios medievales* 38, n°2 (2008): 885-900.

¹¹⁶ Letter of Gonzalo de Ayora to Ferdinand the Catholic. Mers el-Kébir, 15th September 1505. BNE, Mss, 10415, fol. 3.

instructions on how to discover the spies who had coordinated the corsairs' attack on the coast of Granada.¹¹⁷ More or less at the very same time (actually only four days later) Nicolao Cattaneo also approached the Count of Tendilla, offering his services as informant.¹¹⁸ At that moment, the Cattaneo brothers were aware of how important it was to cooperate with the Spanish authorities in the Maghreb. This was highlighted when Nicolao Cattaneo helped to fund the rescue of several Spanish captives by lending money to the royal officer sent there to rescue captives on behalf of the crown.¹¹⁹ What all this tells us is that Rena and the other members of this commercial network enjoyed a good amount of social capital on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, all these examples prove that these merchants were able to offer different services to different characters in order to obtain prominent positions in regional trade.¹²⁰

The mere existence of webs of contacts bridging the Mediterranean divide allows us to reconsider the role of merchants like the ones here analysed as mediators that facilitate contacts between those who were separated by a supposed huge cultural gap. In my view, Rena and the rest of his network were not mediators but characters who embodied the continuities above the political and religious divides of the early modern Mediterranean world.¹²¹ It goes without saying that merchants are frequently understood as the go-betweens *par excellence* due to their supposed skills in mastering different

¹¹⁷ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Juan Gaitán. Granada, 30th May 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 162. It is well known that the frontier between diplomacy and espionage in the early modern era was blurred. In fact, the combination of trade, informal diplomacy and espionage was at the base of some important political careers in Venice. J. C. Davis, "Shipping and Spying in the Early Career of a Venetian Doge, 1496-1502," *Studi Veneziani* 16 (1974): 97-108. The fear to the collaboration between the internal Muslim community and the external Muslim powers was a crucial factor in the policy of the Hispanic Monarchy during all the sixteenth century. A. C. Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain," *American Historical Review* 74, n° 1 (1968): 1-25.

¹¹⁸ Letters of the Count of Tendilla to Nicolao Cattaneo and Ferdinand the Catholic. Granada, 3rd June 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, 3406, D. 1, fol. 163

¹¹⁹ AGS, Casa y Sitios Reales, Leg. 5, n° 5. Interestingly, in this document Nicoalo Cattaneo appears as consul of the Catholic Monarchs in Oran. On the role of consuls as political representatives dealing with captives' ransom see E. Heinsen-Roach, "Consuls-of-State and the Redemption of Slaves: The Dutch Republic and the Western Mediterranean, 1616-1651," *Itinerario* 39, n° 1 (2015): 69-90.

¹²⁰ On the exchange of services and commercial privileges in the Mediterranean trade, see W. Kaiser, "L'économie de la rançon en Méditerranée occidentale (XVIe-XVIIe siècle)," *Hypothèses* 1 (2006): 359-368; and Id., "La excepción permanente. Actores, visibilidad y asimetrías en los intercambios comerciales entre los países europeos y el Magreb (siglos XVI-XVII)," in *Circulación de personas e intercambios comerciales en el Mediterráneo y en el Atlántico (siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII)*, ed. J. A. Martínez Torres (Madrid: CSIC, 2008), 171-189.

¹²¹ In this point I rely on Jocelyne Dakhliya and Wolfgang Kaiser, "Une Méditerranée entre deux mondes ou des mondes continus," in *Les musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe II. Passages et contacts en Méditerranée*, ed. J. Dakhliya and W. Kaiser (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013), 7-31.

languages.¹²² Nevertheless, in contrast with the communication difficulties in other expansion projects, these characters paid no attention to the linguistic differences between the inhabitants from one shore or the other.¹²³ Interestingly, the only reference to a translator was the royal appointment of Miguel de Almenara, who was nominated as an interpreter due to his previous dealings with the Muslim notables. Nevertheless, when he had to quit this office, the title was transferred to a courtier (the royal treasurer Francisco de Vargas) who never actually served in that capacity.¹²⁴ This shows the extent to which the office was considered necessary. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, only one of the messages sent from the Spanish authorities to the Maghreb had to be translated during these negotiations.¹²⁵ It seems that Rena and his friends were able to communicate without necessity of this linguistic assistance. When Juan de Arbona described Rena's participation in the negotiations to deliver Oran he made reference to direct written communication between the different sides:

In Oran this witness saw letters written by the said Juan Reyna and by the Alcaide de los Donceles, which were sent from Mers el-Kébir, and brought by moors who were servants of Micer Franco Cataneo, about negotiations to secure the surrender of Oran.¹²⁶

We do not know whether Rena was able to write in Arabic or not but it seems much more likely that the people who conducted the negotiations shared a common language, which would make sense considering that many of them were traders. This was underscored, when Nicolao Cattaneo wrote to Zafra about his contacts with some merchants from Oran, in which he described a spontaneous conversation among acquaintances.¹²⁷ Furthermore, the ship's pilot who took Rena to Vélez de la Gomera during one of his missions there described that when Rena met with the King of Velez

¹²² R. Salicrú i Lluch, "La diplomacia y las embajadas como expresión de los contactos interculturales en el Mediterráneo occidental durante la baja edad media," *Estudios de Historia de España* 9 (2007): 80-82. As Peter Burke asserted the concept of go-between is expanding to include virtually everyone. This call of attention can be especially applied to tradesmen. Peter Burke, "The Renaissance Translator as Go-Between," in *Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural exchange in Early Modern Europe*, ed. A. Höfele and W. Koppenfler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 18 and 20.

¹²³ J. Hein, "Portuguese Communication with Africans on the Searoute to India," *Terra Incognitae* 25 (1993): 41-52.

¹²⁴ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 100 and 108.

¹²⁵ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Mizwar of the kingdom of Tlemcen. 1st January 1506. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1314, n° 76.

¹²⁶ AGN, Comptos, Papeles Suetos, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 8.

¹²⁷ Letter of Nicolao Cattaneo to Hernando de Zafra. Mers el-Kébir, 15th December 1506. AGS, GYM, Leg. 1315, n° 137.

they talked directly to each other.¹²⁸ Thus, it seems that the linguistic difference was not an issue.¹²⁹

Much more important than a shared language is the fact that these people shared a political culture allowing them to negotiate and reach agreements.¹³⁰ This shared culture evolved from the long tradition of interactions between polities from the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb. During the middle ages, there was a secular propensity for military interventions from one shore to the other in this region.¹³¹ It goes without saying that these interactions were frequently violent (not only during war times) and as a result the inhabitants from both shores shared a common language of violence and its meanings. Interestingly, Rena and his associates were not obliged to translate the violence, as was necessary in other spaces.¹³² For instance, neither Rena, nor the other actors involved in these negotiations had any doubts about how the customary law of sieges and conquests worked. The case of Mers el-Kébir is quite clear in this point because both sides were able to reach (and respect) an agreement in a matter of hours.¹³³ Again, this highly contrasts starkly with the military clashes in other spaces where the two sides did not share a common understanding of siege rituals or surrendering, like in Aztec Mexico or North America.¹³⁴ The negotiations led by Rena and his friends should have been familiar to the Muslims in the Maghreb, because the legal principles that the Spanish employed to negotiate a peaceful surrender were based on principles evolved from

¹²⁸ AGN, Comptos. Papeles Suelos. Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 7.

¹²⁹ On the shared languages in the early modern Mediterranean, see E. C. Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues: Language and Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Past & Present* 217 (2012): 47-77; and Jocelyn Dakhlia, *Lingua franca. Histoire d'une langue métisse en Méditerranée* (Arles: Actes du Sud, 2008).

¹³⁰ On the shared political culture giving place to cross-confessional negotiations, see N. Planas, "Une culture en partage. La communication politique entre Europe et Islam aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles," in *Les musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe II. Passages et contacts en Méditerranée*, ed. J. Dakhlia and W. Kaiser (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013), 273-309.

¹³¹ Rodríguez Mediano, "The post-Almohad dynasties," 107.

¹³² M. Perrault, "To Fear and to Love Us: Intercultural Violence in the English Atlantic," *Journal of World History* 17 (2006): 71-93.

¹³³ Letter of Pedro de Madrid to Ferdinand the Catholic. Mers el-Kébir, 17th September 1505. BNE, Mss, 18547/5/14, fols. 9-10.

¹³⁴ Further information about customary laws on sieges and surrendering in early modern Europe in Simon Pepper, "Siege Law, Siege Ritual, and the Symbolism of City Walls in Renaissance Europe," in *City walls: the urban enceinte in global perspective*, ed. J. D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 573-604. On the complexity of surrendering in intercultural wars, see Ross Hassig, "How Fighting Ended in the Aztec Empire and its Surrender to the Europeans" and William J. Campbell, "Surrender in the Northeastern Borderlands of Native America," in *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender*, ed. H. Afflerbach and H. Strachan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 113-123 and 125-138.

Islamic law.¹³⁵ Hence, more than translating the violence, Rena and his associates were frequently simply transmitting the threats that the Spanish authorities addressed to their counterparts in the Maghreb. This was the case, for instance, of the letter that Hernando de Zafra sent to the King of Velez de la Gomera with Juan Rena. In this letter Zafra kindly reminded him of Ferdinand the Catholic's power.¹³⁶ Zafra sent a similar letter to the Mizwar of the kingdom of Tlemcen with Nicolao Cattaneo.¹³⁷ As both letters show, the merchants were not acting as translators because the message was quite clear. What Zafra expected from them was not to explain what a Spanish intervention could mean. He only employed them as messengers because they enjoyed the trust of the addressees, which helped to transmit the threat in a more efficient way.

All these examples allow us to understand that Rena and his associates acted according to a shared culture, rather than as mediators between two different worlds. In many ways they acted according to common codes, but at the same time they contributed to shape some key aspects in the political culture of this frontier. The most evident case was their role in constructing and diffusing the concept of inter-religious service. Put simply, Rena and his colleagues were giving form to a political culture in which service relationships between individuals from different religious beliefs were possible and necessary. This principle was nothing new, during the war of Granada the Catholic Monarchs gave favour to the Muslims and Jews who served them.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, during the expansion into the Maghreb the number of individuals from other religions serving the king increased. This cross-confessional service culture was favoured by Ferdinand and Isabella as they were willing to admit local notables who offered to deliver their cities, into their royal service.¹³⁹ The most enthusiastic supporter of this idea of inter-religious service was Hernando de Zafra, who used it frequently when approaching Maghrebi

¹³⁵ I. Szásdi León-Borja, "Sobre el origen medieval del Requerimiento Indiano. Apuntes para el Derecho Islámico de Guerra y Paz en la España de la Reconquista y de la Expansión Atlántica," *Iacobus* 13-14 (2002): 111-136.

¹³⁶ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the King of Velez de la Gomera. Malaga, 7th August 1505. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 134.

¹³⁷ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Mizwar of the kingdom of Tlemcen. 1st January 1506. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1314, n° 76.

¹³⁸ This was the case, for instance, of Simuel Abulafia, the Jew who offered the deliver of Mers el-Kébir in 1492. Already in 1488 he received a royal safe conduct thanks to his services to the Catholic Monarchs during the war of Granada. AGS, RGS, Leg. 148807, n° 246. The Muslim merchant Alí Dordux received another royal secure for his many services to the crown. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, 2-2, fol. 49. On this character see M. del C. Pescador del Hoyo, "Alí Dordux, un personaje controvertido," *Anuario de estudios medievales* 17 (1987): 491-500.

¹³⁹ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, 1, n° 57; and 2-1, fol. 2.

authorities. Thus, for instance, in the letter sent to the Mizwar via Nicolao Cattaneo, Zafra tried to attract the Mizwar by saying that ‘coming, as you should, to the service of His Highness, you will have me as a true friend and servant’.¹⁴⁰ A similar offer was made to the sheik Mahamet Aben Zuley by Nicolao Cattaneo. This merchant had also to convince the sheikh of taking ‘the path of His Highness service’.¹⁴¹ Similarly, when Juan Rena took part in the negotiations with the King of Velez de la Gomera he transmitted an interesting message on behalf of Hernando de Zafra. In it, Zafra communicated that Ferdinand the Catholic wanted to have him ‘as his friend and servant’ and expressed his own will to become a servant of the Maghrebi ruler.¹⁴²

The message is also quite illuminating because it shows that, beyond acting as the mere transmitters of this idea, Rena and his friends embodied this inter-religious service due to their active role in these negotiations. Thus, Hernando de Zafra referred to Rena’s crucial role saying: ‘and the truth is lord that Juan Rena has been and is so great a servant to you that your lordship is indebted to him’.¹⁴³ From Zafra’s viewpoint Rena’s services towards the King of Velez had a consequence: the latter’s moral indebtedness towards him. This shows that the royal secretary placed moral obligations and reciprocity above religious differences. Maybe Muslims, Christians, and Jews did not share a religious belief, but they had common codes on the meaning and implications of personal services. As we will see in the following section this shared idea was of a paramount importance in the construction of a new frontier society.

The making of a frontier society: Oran

The strategic position of Rena and his associates in bridging the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea not only allowed them to take part in the process of imperial expansion. They also influenced the shaping of the new Spanish enclaves in the Maghreb,

¹⁴⁰ ‘Y en viniendo, como debéis, al servicio de Su Alteza en mi tendréis un verdadero amigo y servidor. para todo lo que mandarades’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Mizwar of the kingdom of Tlemcen. Malaga, 1st January 1506. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1314, n° 76.

¹⁴¹ ‘El camino del servicio de Su Alteza’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the Sheikh Mahamet Abenzueley. Malaga, 1st January 1506. *Ibíd.*

¹⁴² ‘Vos quiere por su amigo y servidor’. Letter of Hernando de Zafra to the King of Velez de la Gomera. Malaga, 7th August 1505. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 134.

¹⁴³ ‘Y en verdad señor Juanes de Reyna vos ha sido y es tan gran servidor que vuestra señoría le es en mucho cargo’. *Ibíd.*

by defining the common codes of interactions between individuals of different religious beliefs. The most outstanding example of their influence is in the case of Oran. This city has attracted the attention of early modern historians, who believe it to be the most important outpost under Spanish rule in the Maghreb.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Oran was also the perfect example of how characters like Rena influenced the definition of an imperial frontier. Actors like him indirectly contributed to shape the local socio-political reality of this imperial bulwark, by configuring the social fabric of this city, but also by connecting it to the new frontier.

The influence of Rena and his colleagues in Oran was evident from the very beginning of the Spanish ascendancy. They played a crucial role in the conquest of the city. I already described the fall of Oran in the introduction of this chapter but it is necessary to come back to this issue in more detail. The official version emphasised, God's blessing and divine intervention, but the disastrous retreat of the local troops, who were unable to get into the city was what secured a Spanish victory. Different versions of this event exist, but all make reference to the incapacity of the Tlemcen's troops to defend the city. Likewise Marino Sanuto attributed the Spanish conquest of the city to the Muslim troops failure.¹⁴⁵ The next author who described the defeat was Cisneros' biographer: Alvar Gómez de Castro. He went a step further and, despite including the list of miracles from the official version, pointed out the importance of a group of inhabitants who closed the city's doors and in so doing preventing the entrance of the defending troops. Moreover, according to Gómez de Castro the inhabitants did so following a prearranged agreement with the leaders of the Spanish army.¹⁴⁶ His version was followed by authors as Luis del Mármol Carvajal, who wrote a more detailed tale in which some of the city's inhabitants signed a pact with the conquerors.¹⁴⁷ This version is more in line with Oran's political reality, as well as with the previous attempts that the Spanish used to secure the

¹⁴⁴ On the Spanish dominium over Orán, see Paul Ruff, *La domination espagnole à Oran sous le gouvernement du comte d'Alcaudete: 1534-1558* (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 1998); Gregorio Sánchez Doncel, *Presencia de España en Orán (1509-1792)* (Toledo: Instituto Teológico de San Ildefonso, 1991); and Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Orán-Mazalquivir, 1589-1639: una sociedad española en la frontera de Berbería* (Madrid: CSIC, 2000). On Oran's preeminent position in the presidios system, see Id., "Las capitales mediterráneas de la Monarquía: Orán, cabeza de reino del lejano sur," in *Madrid, Felipe II y las ciudades de la monarquía*, ed. E. Martínez Ruiz (Madrid: Actas, 2000), 185-195.

¹⁴⁵ Sanuto, *I diarii di Marino*, Vol. VIII, 401.

¹⁴⁶ Gómez de Castro, *De rebus Gestis*, 114 and ff.

¹⁴⁷ Luis del Mármol Carvajal, *Libro tercero y segundo volumen de la primera parte de la descripción general de Affrica con todos los successos de guerra, y cosas memorables* (Granada: René Rabut, 1573), 195.

surrender of the city. Moreover it was also commonly assumed by many people after the conquest that such an agreement had been arranged, and, as we will see, this agreement influenced the shaping of this frontier's society.

Oran used to be described as an exception in the urban world of the Hispanic Monarchy, and in regards to its social fabric, it was a special case. This city was the only one in the entire Spanish empire that hosted a Jewish community, and was also very closely related to the surrounding Muslim territory.¹⁴⁸ Historians have explained this exceptionalism by showing that the Spanish authorities considered that maintaining a peaceful relationship with their Muslim neighbours, and hosting a Jewish community was a means to an end, one that allowed them to maintain this enclave. In fact the Jews living in Oran carried out important services as spies and suppliers, and the Muslim inhabitants from the surrounding areas allowed the garrison to have access to local trade and foodstuff.¹⁴⁹ These two factors: the allowed presence of local Jews, and the close connection with the Muslim surroundings were the result of a complex interaction taking place in the local arena during the settlement of Spanish rule. Furthermore, and more importantly to us, Rena and his associates played a crucial role in these dynamics as we can observe by examining their local connections.

Among these local connections there is one who deserves special attention: Symuel Zatorra, a Jewish merchant. Zatorra has attracted the attention of the historians since the sixteenth century when Alvar Gómez de Castro referred to him as one of the men involved in the surrender of Oran.¹⁵⁰ Zatorra is frequently portrayed as a reliable broker who facilitated the commerce between Muslims and Christians.¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, he was more than that, as he was also a rabbi, and as such we can consider him as a

¹⁴⁸ Beatriz Alonso Acero, "Judíos y musulmanes en la España de Felipe II: los presidios norteafricanos, paradigma de la sociedad de frontera," in *Felipe II (1527-1598): Europa y la monarquía católica*, ed. J. Martínez Millán (Madrid: Parteluz, 1998), vol. 2, 11-28; and M. A. de Bunes Ibarra, "Oran, un prototype de société de frontière dans l'Espagne moderne," *Insaniyat* 23-24 (2004): 167-178.

¹⁴⁹ Juan Ignacio Pulido Serrano, "Consentir por necesidad. Los judíos de Orán en la Monarquía Católica durante los siglos XVI-XVII" and Beatriz Alonso Acero, "Judíos en un mundo de frontera. Los recelos cristianos hacia la presencia judía en Orán," in *Entre el Islam y Occidente. Los judíos magrebíes en la edad moderna*, ed. M. García Arenal (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003), 201-222 and 224-243.

¹⁵⁰ Gómez de Castro, *De rebus Gestis*, 114.

¹⁵¹ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 39-40 and Eloy Martín Corrales, "Comercio en la frontera. Judíos magrebíes intermediarios en los intercambios mercantiles hispano-norteafricanos (ss. XVI-XVIII)," in *Entre el Islam y Occidente. Los judíos magrebíes en la edad moderna*, ed. M. García Arenal (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003), 264.

leading protagonist in the political life of the Jewish community in Oran.¹⁵² Even more interestingly: Symuel Zatorra was also a member of Rena's commercial network. Unfortunately, we do not know anything about their relationship before the conquest of Oran. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, after the conquest, Rena relied on Zatorra to fulfill part of his commercial activities in the city.¹⁵³ Furthermore, it seems that they were more than commercial associates because they continued acting as friends for years as show by the presents that Rena used to send him.¹⁵⁴ This close connection between Rena and Zatorra points to the latter's involvement in the negotiation to deliver Oran because as we already saw, it was Rena and other members of his network, who conducted these negotiations. In fact, we know that Zatorra took part in the previous negotiations because some local witnesses described him as: 'Zatorra, who is a good servant of the king our Lord, and even who gave the news and advice when this city belonged to the moors.'¹⁵⁵ Given that Zatorra probably took part in the conversations to deliver Oran, we can presume that Zatorra's involvement (together with Rena and his network) in these negotiations gave Zatorra a special status in the new local society that followed.

Zatorra's actions make sense if we view him not only as a merchant but as the head of Oran's Jewish community. The members of this religious minority were obliged to deal with the process of Spanish expansion in the region, a phenomenon that threatened their own presence in the Maghreb. It is worth noting that Symuel Zatorra was not the first, or the only Jew to deal with the Spanish authorities. Quite interestingly the first project to secure the surrender of a city in the Maghreb was planned by two Jews, Symuel Abulafia and David Segura. In 1492 they offered to secure the surrender of Mers el-Kébir to the Catholic Monarchs in exchange for a substantial amount of money and the

¹⁵² The Jewish community in Oran has attracted the attention of several scholars. The most complete work on the matter is Jean Frédéric Schaub, *Les Juifs du Roi d'Espagne* (Paris: Hachette, 1999). Despite that the author pays much more attention to the internal problems of the Jewish community in the seventeenth century, the only ten pages on the Jewish community after the conquest are much more useful than the only article on the matter. J. B. Vilar, "Orígenes de la judería de Orán bajo la dominación española," *Maquen* 24 (1972): 12-13. On the medieval precedents of this community, see Haim Zeev (J. W.) Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), Vol. II, 56-58. On the Jew's role in the Portuguese expansion into the Maghreb, see José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão portuguesa em Marrocos durante o século XVI. Origen e actividades duma comunidade* (Braga: APPACDM distrital de Braga, 1997).

¹⁵³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, N° 3-1 and N° 5-1, fol. 8.

¹⁵⁴ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 39, n° 1. On the interfaith friendship in the Early Modern period, see D. Jütte, "Interfaith Encounters Between Jews and Christians in the Early Modern Period and Beyond: Toward a Framework," *American Historical Review* 118, n° 2 (2013): 378-400.

¹⁵⁵ 'Zatorra, que es muy servidor del rey nuestro señor y aun el que dio avisos desta ciudad cuando era de moros'. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 14, n° 308, s.f.

assurance that the Jewish community would be allowed to remain in this city, as well as the other conquered territories in the kingdom of Tlemcen.¹⁵⁶ Their demands are easy to understand considering that only six months before, Ferdinand and Isabella had expelled the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁵⁷ Taking this meaningful precedent into account, it was likely that Zatorra took part in the negotiations to deliver Oran in order to obtain the same, the official permission for his community in the city.

Zatorra understood that his right to live in Oran as well as his prominent position within the Jewish community was contingent upon his serving the new authorities.¹⁵⁸ As one of the men who enabled the Spanish authorities to conquer the city, Symuel Zatorra played a key role in the settlement of the Spanish rule over Oran. In the years following the conquest his commercial activity became one of the pillars of the city's economy.¹⁵⁹ Zatorra also served the new authorities as an efficient administrator, for example when he worked as paymaster of the fortification.¹⁶⁰ Frequently Zatorra relied on his close connection to Rena as well as the other members of his networks to serve the new authorities. For instance, he loaned money to the military administration through Rena and worked hand in hand with him in overseeing the logistics of Oran's garrison.¹⁶¹ Zatorra was also connected with another member of Rena's network: Gisbert de Santa Fe. Both worked together administrating the *parias* (tribute) paid by the King of Tlemcen, and collected the custom duties on the local trade as well. They also worked together in the diplomatic relationships between Oran and Tlemcen.¹⁶² Considering this we can presume that this network helped to preserve the Jewish community's presence in the

¹⁵⁶ AGS, RGS, Leg. 149210, nº 7 and 8.

¹⁵⁷ Joseph Pérez, *Historia de una tragedia: la expulsión de los judíos de España* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1993).

¹⁵⁸ A similar case, is that of Abraao Benzamerro, a Jew who played a key role in the conquest and government of Safim in Portuguese Morocco, has been analysed in J. A. R. S. Tavim, "Abraao Benzamerro, judeu de sinal, sem sinal, entre o norte de África e o reino de Portugal," *Mare Liberum* 6 (1993): 115-141. Michel Abitol has made use of the same case to explain the socio-political predominance of the Sephardic Jews in Morocco in the day. M. Abitol, "Juifs d'Afrique du nord et expulsés d'Espagne après 1492," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 210, nº 1 (1993) : 71-83. A precedent can be seen in the case of Alí Dordux, the merchant who negotiated the delivery of Malaga in 1487, and became the head of the Muslim community in that city after the conquest. J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Alí Dordux y la morería de Málaga (1487-1501)," in *Homenaje a D. Francisco Bejarano*, ed. R. Camacho Martínez (Malaga: Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Telmo, 1991), 39-56

¹⁵⁹ Zatorra's business became the most important sources of incomes in the collection of custom duties. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232, fols. 44-54.

¹⁶⁰ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 285, fol. 32.

¹⁶¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, nº 5-1 and nº 3-1.

¹⁶² AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 187, s.f.

city, by showing that they played a vital role in serving the Spanish monarchs, and collaborating to the ascension of Spanish rule over the city.

Interestingly, Zatorra's case became an example to follow for other Jews who were willing to offer their services to the Spanish authorities. This can be seen ten years later when two Jews offered to secure the surrender of Vélez de la Gomera. These men proposed to organise a *coup de main* to take Vélez in collaboration with some of the city's inhabitants. In exchange they asked for a royal privilege giving the Jews the right to live in Velez, according to their laws and safe from any religious pressure. Moreover, they asked to be appointed as judges of the Jewish community and to be nominated as tax farmers of customs duties.¹⁶³ Their offer was discussed in the Council of War and their requests accepted but the action against Vélez de la Gomera never took place. What is interesting to us here is that these two Jews were asking for the same conditions and privileges obtained by Zatorra in Oran. This shows that Zatorra, Rena and his colleagues were able to create a model that was adopted by other actors aiming to secure their position under Spanish rule by acting as servants of the Spanish crown.

Rena and his colleagues were not able to authorise the presence of Jews in Oran themselves as it was a prerogative of the crown and so it was Ferdinand the Catholic who sent a royal order allowing the Jews of Oran to reside in the city.¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the king's decision was influenced by the local events taking place in Oran. There, actors like Zatorra and Rena contributed to the construction and spread of this image through the fact that the Jews had been willing to collaborate with the Spanish authorities from the moment that they appeared in the Maghreb.

Rena and his close friends and fellows played a key role in defining the internal social fabric of Oran. However, this was not a simple city, it was a frontier, and as the studies on early modern frontiers have shown, one of the key aspects to analyse when dealing with frontier societies is the relationship of the local community with the other

¹⁶³ AGS, Estado, Leg. 2-2, fol. 338. The influence of Oran's agreement is even clearer considering the differences between the conditions asked by these characters, and those granted by the Portuguese king to the Jews of Safi, from where they came. Letter patent of Dom Manuel to the Jews of Safi. Évora, 4th May 1509. Cfr. M. Newitt, *The Portuguese in West-Africa, 1415-1670. A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 36-37.

¹⁶⁴ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 39.

side.¹⁶⁵ Rena and his network also influenced the external politics of the city that linked it with the surrounding territory. Oran was an almost isolated stronghold in the middle of enemy territory. Even so the prosperity of the city was dependent on the surrounding territories logistically. It was unrealistic that the Spanish authorities would be able to provide Oran with all the goods and necessities it needed, as such Spanish dominium of this enclave was contingent upon maintaining good relationships with notables in the surrounding territories.¹⁶⁶ Historians used to consider the survival of Oran and Mers el-Kébir after they were conquered as the result of the Spanish military supremacy. However, they have overlooked the important role that local actors from the surrounding territories played in the city's preservation.¹⁶⁷ Needless to say, soldiers, artillery, and fortifications defended the *presidios*, but the Spanish authorities did not entrust the defence of the Maghrebi enclaves to the military alone. As we have seen before, the Spanish authorities used diplomacy as a tool to expand the Spanish domains in the Maghreb. Hence, it is not surprising to find that from the very beginning of the process of Spanish expansion, they tried to establish good relations with the surrounding powers in order to protect their new acquisitions. Diplomacy from below made peaceful interactions between the inhabitants of the Spanish strongholds and those from the neighbouring territories possible. These relations were shaped during the period that Rena and his associates were conducting negotiations to incorporate Muslim settlements into the Hispanic Monarchy. Therefore, Rena and his colleagues also took part in establishing the initial contacts between the Spanish outposts and the surrounding territory.

Rena and his network continued playing a crucial role in the diplomatic arrangements that connected Oran to a complex balance of local powers. These merchants had already shown the new Spanish authorities the importance of these connections, but after Oran's conquest they continued to render diplomatic services. For instance, in

¹⁶⁵ Michel Bertrand and Natividad Planas, "Introduction," in *Les sociétés de frontière. De la Méditerranée à l'Atlantique (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)*, ed. M. Bertrand and N. Planas (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2011), 7. See also W. Kaiser, "Penser la frontière, notions et approches," *Histoire des Alpes, Storia delle Alpi, Geschichte der Alpen* 3 (1998): 63-74.

¹⁶⁶ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 47-59. These relationships go against the traditional understanding of the *presidios* as isolated spaces. See the classic R. Ricard, "Le problème de l'occupation restreinte dans l'Afrique du Nord (XVe-XVIIIe siècles)," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* 8, n° 41 (1936): 426-437.

¹⁶⁷ On the importance of the local forces, see Philippe Gourdin, "Pour une réévaluation des phénomènes de colonisation en Méditerranée occidentale et au Maghreb pendant le Moyen Âge et le début des Temps Modernes," in *Chemins d'outre-mer. Études sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. D. Coulon et al. (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), T. I, 411-423.

December 1509, a few months after the fall of Oran, Franco Cattaneo and his Muslim servants informed the Alcaide de los Donceles that an enemy was planning an offensive against this city.¹⁶⁸ Rena's associate, also played a crucial role in the shaping of the new relationships between the Spanish *presidio* and the surrounding territory. A report about Oran's government stressed that Zatorra was vital for the preservation of the city's commercial activity due to his excellent relationships with the surrounding Muslim authorities.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, due to his reputation and expertise, he was the principal figure in the negotiations with the King of Tlemcen, and more importantly he also lent money to fund these diplomatic contacts.¹⁷⁰

Zatorra also worked together with Gisbert de Santa Fe advising the Spanish authorities on the diplomatic negotiations with their Muslim notables of the region. Thus, in 1516, the royal officers that were sent to Oran to renegotiate the peace treaty with the King of Tlemcen wrote to Charles V saying that they were acting on the advice of 'Gisbert de Santa Fe and Rabbí Symuel Zatorra, who are experts in the Moors' issues and servants of Your Highness.'¹⁷¹ Furthermore, thanks to their experiences, the members of Rena's commercial network were able to advise and support the new Spanish actors who took part in establishing these diplomatic relationships between the *presidio* and the surrounding Muslim territories. One of these new actors was fray Jorge de Benavides also known as Fray Jorge de Vera. This Franciscan friar arrived to Oran as one of the *algarabiados* (Christian friars who speak Arabic) that Cisneros sent to the city.¹⁷² He successfully negotiated with the authorities of Mostaganem and Mazagran for the surrender of both cities after the fall of Oran.¹⁷³ Shortly after, Fray Jorge was engaged in a similar negotiation with the King of Ténès, who ruled over a coastal territory near Oran.¹⁷⁴ It seems that Fray Jorge was an efficient negotiator and other friars considered him as the most important diplomatic agent acting on behalf of Cisneros.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁸ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232, s.f.

¹⁶⁹ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Diversos de Castilla, Leg. 6, n° 108.

¹⁷⁰ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, s.f.

¹⁷¹ 'Gisbert de Santa Fe y Rabí Symuel Zatorra, que son pláticos en las cosas de los moros y muy servidores de Vuestras Altezas'. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 156, n° 174, fol. 1.

¹⁷² Letters of the Count of Tendilla to Miguel Pérez de Almazán and Fray Jorge. 17th February and 10th March 1509. BNE, Mss. 10230, fols. 53 and 65.

¹⁷³ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232.

¹⁷⁴ AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Sueldo, Leg. 74, s.f.

¹⁷⁵ Actually, another friar defined fray Jorge as someone "who in these parts of Africa, and even in the Sahara, has credit (...) and the Moors trust him. [With him] you could achieve even the house of Jersusalem". "En estas partes africanas, y hasta la zahara, tiene crédito, (...) y los moros se confían de él,

Obviously, Fray Jorge was able to act as an efficient negotiator thanks to his long experience in dealing with Muslims groups. In fact, he was able to speak Arabic because he had spent years living in the Alpujarras, (the mountains near Granada) among its Muslim inhabitants.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, when working in the Maghreb he relied to a great extent on the support and advice of Rena and his fellows. For instance, Rena's personal accounts shows that he used to provide Fray Jorge with the textiles that he needed in the negotiations with the Muslim rulers.¹⁷⁷ For instance, Rena gave Fray Jorge 'nine pieces of *bordates* for the King of Ténès' ambassador's son and his two servants'.¹⁷⁸ Rena also contributed to fund one of Fray Jorge's missions, paying for the expenses of the different luxury textiles that he distributed as gifts among the many actors involved in these negotiations.¹⁷⁹

Rena's role in supplying these luxury textiles was an important part of the negotiation process as these products helped the Spanish agents to forge political relationships between the Spanish outposts and the surrounding polities. For instance, in 1506, when Hernando de Zafra was notified of an alliance between the King of Tlemcen, the King of Fez and the King of Dudu to attack Mers el-Kébir rather than organising an armed response, he sent Fernando Morales to talk with the kings of Dudu and Fez. Morales (a Muslim merchant who had recently converted to Christianity) brought a substantial amount of silk and French textiles to avoid the attack. This decision proved to be right as the envoy of these gifts 'avoided the offensive and solved everything'.¹⁸⁰ From

[con él] podréis conseguir hasta la casa de Jerusalén". Letter of Fran Diego to Cardinal Cisneros. Oran, 1st July [1510]. AHN, Universidades, Leg. 713, fol. 65.

¹⁷⁶ On his experience working there see María del Carmen Calero Palacios, "Nuevos datos sobre el adoctrinamiento de los moriscos. Actuación de Fray Jorge de Benavides en las Alpujarras," in *L'expulsió dels moriscos: conseqüences en el món islàmic i el món cristià* (Barcelona: Generalitat, 1994), 300-304.

¹⁷⁷ The use of textiles for diplomatic purposes was a long-standing common practice in different parts of the world, but only recently historians have started to pay attention to the characters who shaped this particular language of cross-cultural exchange. C. Anderson, "Material Mediators: Johan Maurits, Textiles and the Art of Diplomatic Exchange," *Journal of Early Modern History* 20 (2016): 63-85.

¹⁷⁸ 'Nueve piezas [de Bordates] para dar al hijo del embajador del rey de Tenes y a los dos sus criados'. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 5-1. On the role of textiles as gifts in the framework of cross-confessional diplomacy see Hedda Reindl-Kiel, "East is East and West is West, and Sometimes the Twain Did Meet Diplomatic Gift Exchange in the Ottoman Empire," in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies*, ed. C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki and R. Murphey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), vol. II, 113-123.

¹⁷⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 4.

¹⁸⁰ 'Con esto se embarazó la ida de los reyes y se remedió todo'. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 139. On Fernando de Morales see Leonard P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 39-41.

this anecdote we can conclude that these products were a sort of payment to the local rulers, who contributed to maintenance of the Spanish outposts. To fully understand the importance of these gifts we need to examine their political value to the Maghrebi rulers. It seems that the textiles distributed by the Spanish authorities had an added political value for them. The case of the King of Ténès underscores this point. When Ténès was attacked by local enemies, the military authorities in Oran sent him an armed contingent and a large amount of textiles ‘to assist, favour, and empower him [the King of Ténès] in the city as well as the kingdom’.¹⁸¹ The significance that these textiles held in the political arena of the Maghreb allow us to reconsider Rena’s role when he provided textiles to Fray Jorge. Rena was not only a mere supplier, he was also an expert who possessed the resources and knowledge that the new authorities needed to establish relationships with the surrounding polities.

The importance of mediators such as Rena again appears clear if we consider that their diplomatic tactics and practices were adopted by the new authorities. After the conquest of the coastal strongholds, textiles became a means of payment for the services that the Muslims from the surrounding areas offered to the new authorities. Thus, for instance, the Alcaide de los Donceles, imitated their procedures by expending large amounts of money on textiles used in these negotiations at the beginning of his rule over Mers el-Kébir, he started to invest large sums of money creating a nexus of local informants and negotiators who worked in the surrounding territory outside the *presidio*. In 1507 alone, Sancho de Contreras, (the Alcaide’s servant in charge of this information service), spent more than 1,375,000 maravedíes paying external collaborators.¹⁸² Interestingly, the book of accounts for the first royal paymaster in Oran starts with a royal order accepting similar diplomatic expenses, which were ordered by the military commanders. The same book of accounts contains a list of payments to ‘Moors and Jews that have come to surrender themselves as servants of His Highness and have come with deals and issues to assist in his service’.¹⁸³ Most of these payments were made with luxury textiles. For instance, according to this source the new authorities spent more than 1,200,000 maravedíes paying ‘Moors, Jews, merchants and other persons for cloth, silks

¹⁸¹ ‘Para lo socorrer [al rey de Tenes], y favorecer y apoderar en la ciudad y reino’. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 187. S.f.

¹⁸² AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 187, fol. 71.

¹⁸³ ‘A moros y judíos que se han venido a dar por servidores de Su Alteza e han venido con tratos e cosas tocantes a su servicio’. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232 and 319 s.f.

and linens and other items, which were given as gifts [in the negotiation for peace with the King of Tlemcen]'.¹⁸⁴ References to similar payments peppered the military administration's official accounts during the following years.¹⁸⁵ The exchange of textiles for services in the surrounding territories quickly became a common transaction. For example, in the months following the conquest of Oran, several notables in the surrounding territories received gifts of textiles from the military administration. The list included religious agents like the marabout Cidi Alhacen or Cidi Buyaya, the main qadi of Tlemcen; local authorities from the surrounding area, agents of the King of Tlemcen; and also tribal sheiks like the so-called Borrocaba who ruled over the nomadic tribes of the region.¹⁸⁶ As we can see, the Alcaide and his fellow military officers adopted a true textile diplomacy.

Such payments forged the alliances needed to secure this *presidio*. For instance, in 1514, when the military authorities of Oran started the fortification works around the city, they were obliged to pay to sheikh Borrocaba, and to others. These tribal leaders received an extraordinary amount of luxury textiles in exchange for their services in securing the territory where the workers collected the materials to construct the new walls.¹⁸⁷ These examples, especially the last two, underline how much the *presidio* depended on the collaboration of notables from the surrounding area.¹⁸⁸ These large sums of textiles that were distributed to the actors from the surrendering polities show the importance that the new authorities placed on maintaining good relations with the external rulers. For them it was a necessary expense, one that was crucial in order to guarantee the survival of the strongholds.

Rena and the merchants who took part in the diplomatic negotiations for the surrender of Oran, contributed to the internal and the external reconfiguration of this Spanish enclave. In the internal sphere they helped to create a space for the Jewish

¹⁸⁴ 'Moros y judíos e a mercaderes e a otras personas por los paños e sedas e lienzos e otras cosas que para esto [la contratación de la paz del rey de Tremecén] se dieron'. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232, fol. 1.

¹⁸⁵ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 200 and 319.

¹⁸⁶ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 232.

¹⁸⁷ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 285, fol. 29.

¹⁸⁸ An interesting view on these relationships from the Muslim sources in Mohamed Mezzine, "Les relations entre les places occupées et les localités de la région de Fes aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles, a partir de documents locaux inédits: les nawāzil," in *Relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb siglos XIII-XVI*, ed. M. Garcí Arenal and M. J. Viguera (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 549-554.

community headed by Symuel Zatorra, who assisted them in this enterprise by offering his services first to secure the surrender of the city as well as after it fell under Spanish rule. These men also influenced the external policy of the *presidio*. By shaping the shared codes in line with the diplomacy from below they allowed the new authorities to establish vital connections with notables from the surroundings. Rena and his associates contributed the creation of a Spanish enclave in the Maghreb that survived to a great extent thanks to its connections within the Muslim territories. In conclusion, both in the internal and external spheres Rena and his colleagues contributed to establish and sustain the supporting pillars of this crucial bulwark of the new Spanish empire.

Conclusion

Rena and his network played a key role in the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb because they were able to offer their services to the Spanish authorities, who incorporated territories not only by armed force, but also through negotiation. Their involvement in the different negotiations that took place in the Maghreb tells us a great deal about the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb. By focusing on the process of expansion, we can establish that the Spanish authorities used a wise combination of violence and negotiation. The activity of Rena's mercantile network becomes more interesting, precisely due to this dual approach of expansion. The fact that Rena and his friends were able to conduct these negotiations was not only because they had contacts on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, but also because they were acting within a common culture. Hence, their activity allows us to understand not only the importance of the links between the two sides; but also to reconsider the cultural gap between both shores of the Mediterranean.

Their case also questions the vision present in previous studies, on the successful go-betweens.¹⁸⁹ Rena and the other members of his mercantile network took part in the

¹⁸⁹ A critic on the “optimistic view” of the go-between can be found in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Three Ways to Be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011), 11 and 21-22; and Id., “Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Some Afterthoughts,” in *The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820*, ed. S. Schafer et al. (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009), 429-440. See also the case studies on Yahya-u-Tacfuft, one of the key characters in the Portuguese expansionism into the Maghreb. M. T. Racine, “Service and Honor in Sixteenth-Century Portuguese North Africa: Yahya-u-Tacfuft and Portuguese Noble Culture,” in *The*

process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb, but they were unable to use their mediations to win a privileged position in the resulting new society. To some extent the most successful member of the group was Juan Rena, but, as we will see in the following chapter, his success was more closely related to his activity serving the Alcaide de los Donceles in the military logistics. Something similar happened with another member of the Alcaide's household, Miguel de Almenara, who was awarded a position in local government.¹⁹⁰ Gabriel Mas moved to the Canary Islands, where he became a land owner and a member of the local elite.¹⁹¹ The Cattaneo brothers simply disappear from Oran after its conquest, showing to the extent to which the conquest disrupted local trade.¹⁹² Gisbert de Santa Fe faced serious problems as he was prosecuted by the inquisition and his goods and possessions in Oran were seized.¹⁹³ Symuel Zatorra suffered fierce opposition from members of Oran's local government and finally he was executed by a later governor of the *presidio*, the Count of Alcaudete (son in-law of the Alcaide de los Donceles) who also competed with him for control over local commerce.¹⁹⁴

Undoubtedly, the main aim of Rena and his friends was to survive and to protect their businesses (not to exploit their position to influence for their own benefit) but they had a hard time in these years. They had very little room for manoeuvre, but they were able to contribute to the development of the political culture of this frontier. Maybe Zatorra paid a high price because of his prominent position in Oran, but he helped to give the Jewish community the right to live in the city. More generally none of the members of Rena's network, or Rena himself, managed to control or profit from the diplomacy from below. Nevertheless, they helped to connect Oran with the surrounding polities. In a broader context, they contributed to the construction of a frontier in which services and collaboration between individuals of different credos were possible. The

Sixteenth Century Journal 32, n° 1 (2001): 67-90 and M. A. Lima Cruz, "Mouro para os cristaos e cristao para os mouros, o caso Bentafufa," *Anais de história de além-mar* 8 (2002): 39-63.

¹⁹⁰ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 108.

¹⁹¹ Letter of Gabriel Mas to Juan Rena. Gran Canaria, 20th November 1512. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 10-1. On Gabriel Mas' later years in the Canary Islands see J. M. Bello León, "Los otros extranjeros: catalanes, flamencos, franceses e ingleses en la sociedad canaria de los siglos XV y XVI (primera parte)," *Revista de historia canaria* 179 (1997): 24 and 38-39.

¹⁹² López de Coca Castañer, "Orán y el comercio genovés," 285.

¹⁹³ P. A. Porras Arboleda, "El juez de los bienes confiscados por la inquisición," *Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Giennenses* 147 (1993): 154.

¹⁹⁴ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Pueblos, Leg. 14, n° 312 and Estado, Leg. 461, n° 9. On Zatorra's death see Jean Frédéric Schaub, "El lado oscuro de la epopeya. La visita al conde de Alcaudete," in *Carlos V europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), vol. 3, 448.

survival practices similar to those used by Rena and his network in this frontier shows how vital their contribution was.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ See for instance Mercedes García Arenal, Fernando Rodríguez Mediano and Rachid El Hour, *Cartas marruecas. Documentos de Marruecos en archivos españoles (siglos XVI-XVII)* (Madrid: CSIC, 2002), 47-134; and N. Planas, "Diplomacy from Below or Cross-Confessional Loyalty? The "Christians of Algiers" between the Lord of Kuko and the King of Spain in the Early 1600s' in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Journal of Early Modern History* 19, (2015): 153-173.

Chapter 2

Constructing a Noble Frontier between Southern Iberia and the Maghreb

Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on Juan Rena's activity, after he entered the service of Ferdinand the Catholic's most trusted servant: the Alcaide de los Donceles, who ruled the new frontier between southern Iberia and northern Africa. In so doing I aim to shed light on the influence of agents like Rena who helped to establish these new political spaces, which were ruled by Spanish nobles who were intent on advancing the development of the Spanish Empire on the ground. The collaboration between the crown and the nobility has proven to be one of the key issues in the construction of early modern polities. In response to the traditional vision that viewed the nobility as one of the main obstacles in the state building process, historians have started to see at them as crucial protagonists of this political process.¹ As a result, we are aware of the prominent role that the nobility

¹ Wolfgang Reinhard, "Élites du pouvoir, serviteurs de l'État, classes dirigeantes et croissance du pouvoir d'État," in *Les Élités du pouvoir et la construction de l'État en Europe*, ed. W. Reinhard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), 1-24. Some scholars also assert that the aristocracy, and not the crown, was the leading actor in the construction of the state in some cases. N. C. Wheeler, "The Noble Enterprise

undertook in the maintaining the different European governments, where noblemen carried out important tasks in the service of the crown according to their rank and their political trajectory.² The literature on this topic shares a common top-down perspective and, as a result, the noblemen and kings remain as the sole protagonists. It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of the noblemen who engaged in imperial government as they were crucial political actors in the construction of the Spanish empire. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the interaction between the king and the noblemen serving him, but keeping in mind that they were not the sole actors on the stage. As I aim to show it is needed to analyse the negotiations that took place between the king and the noblemen, and also the relationships and interactions inside these noblemen's networks. Only in doing so, we can better understand how the alliance between the aristocracy and the crown influenced the construction of the Spanish empire.

Protecting the imperial frontiers in the Mediterranean through armed force was maybe the most important duty of the noblemen involved in process of empire building. It was only through their collaboration in these frontier spaces that they could hope to thrive. In Naples, the territory closest to the Ottoman frontier, noblemen such as the famous Don Pedro de Toledo acted as viceroys.³ On the southern frontier of the realm this collaboration was represented by the Captaincy General of Granada, and the Captaincy General of the Ocean Sea. These two offices oversaw the defence of the eastern and western frontiers of southern Castile. Given the solemn duty that such offices required, they were entrusted to two noble lineages, a branch of the Mendoza family and the powerful dukes of Medina Sidonia.⁴ They were the most outstanding examples of

of State Building: Reconsidering the Rise and Fall of the Modern State in Prussia and Poland," *Comparative Politics* 44 (2011): 21-38.

² On the aristocratic ethic of service to the crown, see Philippe Contamine, "Noblesse et service: l'idée et la réalité dans la France de la fin du Moyen Age," in *Nobilitas. Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteruropa*, ed. O. Gerhard Oexle and W. Paravicini (Göttingen: Max-Planck Institut für Geschichte, 1997), 298-311; and Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 93-123. On the Portuguese case, see N. G. Monteiro, "O "ethos" da aristocracia portuguesa sob a dinastia de Bragança. Algumas notas sobre a casa e o serviço ao rei," *Revista da história das ideias* 19 (1997): 383-402.

³ José María del Moral, *El virrey don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco* (Madrid: CSIC, 1966). and Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles en el siglo XVI. El virrey Pedro de Toledo. Linaje, estado y cultura (1532-1553)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1994), 384-435.

⁴ On the General Captaincy of Granada, see Antonio Jiménez Estrella, "La capitania general del Reino de Granada durante el reinado de Carlos V," in *Carlos V europeoísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. 2, 339-368; Id., *Poder, ejército y gobierno en el siglo XVI. La Capitanía General del reino de Granada y sus agentes* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2004). On the Dukes of Medina Sidonia and the General Captaincy of the Ocean

noblemen who participated in defending a Spanish frontier, but they were not the only ones. The Fernandez de Córdoba also played a key role in the defence of different frontiers of the Spanish empire.⁵ One of the members of this lineage, Don Diego Fernandez de Córdoba, the famous Alcaide de los Donceles, is one of the main protagonists of this chapter as he was appointed as the guardian of the empire's southern frontier. His role as guardian is very well known, but contrary to his noble fellows the Mendoza and the Medina Sidonia, his role in influencing the political landscape of the southern frontier of the realm has received little attention. However, by focusing on the Alcaide and the men, like Rena, who served him and collaborated to defend this frontier, we can learn a lot about how political spaces in the imperial frontiers took form. The *asientos* (formal contracts) between King Ferdinand and the Alcaide concerning the defence of Oran and Mers el-Kébir, gave form to a space that transformed the socio-political arena which spanning both shores of the Mediterranean Sea.⁶ Where different actors contested, adapted, and exploited the new jurisdictional situation that was enacted by the *asientos*. Together, these actors contributed to create what we can define as a frontier, where the political game was subjected to specific rules and practices.⁷

In what follows I will try to analyse how the different actors who were involved in the defence of this new frontier shaped these rules and practices. I will begin by describing the service relationship between Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide de los Donceles. Thereafter, I will focus on the internal dynamics of the machinery that the Alcaide constructed as defendant of this new frontier. Finally, I will analyse how the interaction of these different actors shaped the rules and practices that controlled the socio-political game in this frontier.

Sea, see Luis Salas Almela, *Colaboración y conflicto: la Capitanía General del Mar Océano y Costas de Andalucía, 1588-1660* (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002) and Id., *Medina Sidonia. El poder de la aristocracia. 1580-1670* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009).

⁵ Yuen-Gen Liang, *Family and Empire. The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

⁶ On the military and administrative dimension of these agreements, see Irving A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620* (London: Athlone Press, 1976), 5-6. A brief description of these contracts can be found in María Teresa López Beltrán, "Aportación al estudio de los presidios castellanos: Mazalquivir," in *España y el Norte de África. Bases históricas de una relación fundamental*, ed. Manuel Olmedo Jiménez (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1987), 305-315.

⁷ On the configuration of political spaces in the early modern period, see Antonio Manuel Hespanha, "El espacio político," in Id., *La gracia del derecho. Economía de la cultura en la edad moderna* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993), 85-121.

Ferdinand the Catholic and his Servant in the Southern Frontier

Having conquered a set of important strongholds on the Maghrebi coast King Ferdinand the Catholic faced a more difficult challenge: maintaining them. Keeping these maritime enclaves was crucial to ensure the protection of the new southern frontier of the empire. The Muslim corsairs threatened the sea routes connecting the Iberian and the Italian peninsulas, as well as the hub of Atlantic trade: Seville. The king adopted a defensive strategy focused mainly on fortifying the recently conquered port cities, and in so doing configuring a system of *presidios* to control the Maghrebi coast.⁸ Ferdinand the Catholic decided to entrust the guardianship of his African possessions to different Spanish noblemen. For instance in 1497 the Catholic Monarchs signed an *asiento* with the Duke of Medina Sidonia, giving him guardianship of Melilla, even though they were well aware of the Duke's fraudulent methods of supplying the garrison the monarchs continued entrusted him to defend Melilla.⁹ In many ways the Duke was a necessary evil, as the Spanish administrative structure was unable to securely supply and maintain the African *presidios*; but the Duke could. The existing royal administration in the Mediterranean was more an obstacle than a useful tool. In 1510 Pedro Navarro had to stop his successful campaign in the Maghreb, because the royal officers did not obey the royal orders commanding them to supply Navarro's navy.¹⁰ Even the urban elites of Andalusia obstructed the development of armed operations. For example, in 1516 a revolt in Malaga prevented the crown from sending relief to the besieged garrison in Algiers.¹¹ After these events it became clear that indirect administration was the only way to guarantee the defence of the African *presidios*.

⁸ F. Braudel, "Les Espagnols et l'Afrique du nord de 1492 à 1577," *Revue Africaine* 69 (1928) : 184-233 and 351-428. A complete reconstruction of the *presidios* during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs in Rafael Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del Norte de África en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos* (Melilla: Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, 1997).

⁹ Irving A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620* (London: Athlone Press, 1976), 5. Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to Hernando de Zafra. Zaragoza, 18th July 1498. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, n° 84. Further information on the matter in A. Bravo Nieto, "La ocupación de Melilla en 1497 y las relaciones entre los Reyes Católicos y el Duque de Medina Sidonia," *Aldaba* 15 (1990): 15-37.

¹⁰ Letter of Pedro Navarro to Ferdinand the Catholic. Bougie, 5th May 1510 and letter of Pedro Navarro to Cardinal Cisneros. Pantalleria, 21st December [...]. BRAH, SyC, A-10, fol. 27 and 2/Ms. Caj. 7, n° 43.

¹¹ Letter of Juan del Río to the Royal Secretary Calçena. Cartagena, 1st September 1516. BRAH, SyC, A-16, fol. 179. On this revolt, see F. Bejarano Robles, "El Almirantazgo de Granada y la rebellion de Málaga, en 1516" *Hispania* 58 (1955): 73-109.

The main problem was deciding which nobleman to entrust with the difficult task of defending these new frontier strongholds. Ferdinand the Catholic had to face this difficult decision after the conquest of Oran. Following an intense negotiation between Ferdinand the Catholic and several noblemen, the king named the Alcaide de los Donceles as governor of Oran and Mers el-Kébir. This appointment has been seen as a strategic decision given that the nobleman was an experienced paladin in the war against the Muslims.¹² Nevertheless, Ferdinand's decision needs to be placed in context with the conflicting politics of the day. Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba y Arellano, known as the Alcaide de los Donceles was a nobleman who had achieved fame and royal favour during the war of Granada.¹³ He received the title of "Don", when he inherited his office as the Alcaide de los Donceles, and some economic mercies when he captured the Nasri King Boabdil in 1483 during his offensive against Lucena.¹⁴ Later he became a distinguished leader in the war against the Muslim revolt of Granada in 1500 where he led the troops that conquered Vevefique.¹⁵ As a reward for these services the Catholic Monarchs enlarged the Alcaide's seigniorial estates when they gave him jurisdiction over Sedella, a little village between Malaga and Granada.¹⁶

When the Alcaide was appointed as the head of the expedition to conquer Mers el-Kébir the Count of Tendilla confessed that he was one of the best options for this duty.¹⁷ Despite of his reliable reputation as a military commander, the Alcaide's appointment as guardian of the southern frontier was also politically motivated. The Alcaide's appointment as captain-general of Tlemcen was very close related to the long-lasting struggle between Ferdinand the Catholic and Cordoba's aristocracy. This conflict has been analysed during the debates that examined the role of the Spanish nobility in the

¹² Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: Cruzada, política y arte de la guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de defensa, 2005), 135.

¹³ On the lineage of the Alcaide de los Donceles, see María Concepción Quintanilla Raso, *Nobleza y señorío en el reino de Córdoba: la casa de Aguilar (siglos XIV y XV)* (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y caja de ahorros de Córdoba, 1979), 166-172. On the Comares' marquisate, see Juan Antonio Núñez-Hidalgo, "El Marquesado de Comares: un breve recorrido historiográfico," in *Los señoríos en la Andalucía Moderna. El Marquesado de los Vélez*, ed. F. Andújar and J. P. Díaz López (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 2007), 573-579. For a recent and complete portrait of his contribution to the expansion and administration of the Spanish realm see Liang, *Family and Empire*, 55-79.

¹⁴ AGS, RGS, Leg. 148311, n° 2, 3 and 4; AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 20, n° 20.

¹⁵ Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Granada después de la conquista. Repobladores y mudéjares* (Granada, diputación provincial, 1993), 456-457

¹⁶ AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 37, n° 12.

¹⁷ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Hernando de Zafra. Granada, 9th July 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 187.

state building process. John Edwards described the open revolt of Cordoba's nobility in 1508, as a clear example of the opposition of the local aristocracy to the increasing power of Ferdinand the Catholic.¹⁸ In his study of Cordoba's social conflicts Bartolomé Yun used the Alcaide as an example to refute Edwards' assertion, and show that the nobility were not unanimously opposed to the king. According to Yun the appointment of the Alcaide as captain-general by King Ferdinand was an attempt to fight the increasing influence of the Andalusian nobility and to attract other nobles with the promise of the anticipated rewards from the war in Africa. Moreover, the Alcaide's had been engaged in a long running family feud with senior nobles of his family, and accepting the position gave him the opportunity to reinforce his position through a political alliance with the king.¹⁹ Yun's interpretation was refuted by John Edwards who argued that during the urban revolt of Cordoba in 1508, that the Alcaide 'played so little a part'.²⁰ It is complicated to analyse the Alcaide's behaviour. Nevertheless, from reading the exchange of correspondence between Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide, the latter understood that, defending the frontier, and the fighting against Cordoba's nobility amounted to the point: serving to the king.²¹

The Alcaide was one of Ferdinand the Catholic's most reliable servants, especially during the socio-political crisis that followed Queen Isabella's death.²² The strong political alliance between the nobleman and the king was staged during the meeting of Ferdinand with the new monarchs Juana and Philip, and during his later travel to Aragon after losing his power in Castile.²³ The Alcaide gained political weight after the short

¹⁸ J. Edwards, "La Révolte du Marquis de Priego à Cordoue en 1508, symptôme des tensions d'une société urbaine," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 12 (1976): 165-172.

¹⁹ Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, *Crisis de subsistencias y conflictividad social en Córdoba a principios del siglo XVI. Una ciudad andaluza en los comienzos de la modernidad* (Córdoba: diputación provincial de Córdoba, 1980), 196, 203 and 205. Yuen Gen Liang shares Yun's view in his recent study on the Fernández de Córdoba. Liang, *Family and Empire*, 70-77.

²⁰ John Edwards, *Christian Córdoba: The City and its Region in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 160.

²¹ Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Ferdinand the Catholic. 24th March 1508. BNE, Mss. 20.209/11-2.

²² The crisis provoked by the lack of a real and clear monarchical authority has been analysed in Bethany Aram, *La reina Juana: gobierno, piedad y dinastía* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001), 143-172. On the cultural conflict behind this crisis, see Bethany Aram, "Voyages from Burgundy to Castile: Cultural Conflict and Dynastic Transitions, 1502-06," *Early Modern Dynastic Marriages and Cultural Transfer*, ed. J-L. Palos and M. S. Sánchez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 91-114. The factions struggle around the royal court has been studied in José Martínez Millán: "De la muerte del príncipe Juan al fallecimiento de Felipe el Hermoso (1497-1506)," and "La evolución de la corte castellana durante la segunda regencia de Fernando (1507-1516)," in *La corte de Carlos V*, ed. J. Martínez Millán (Madrid: SECC, 2000), Vol. I, 45-72 and 102-113.

²³ "De lo que sucedió en España en cosas particulares desde la venida de Rey Felipe 1º hasta su muerte", BNE, Mss. 13.127, fosl. 190-191, 193 and 195.

reign of Philip I.²⁴ In October 1506, just a couple of weeks after Philip's death, the Alcaide was at the royal court as a leading figure in the political faction (the so called "*partido fernandino*"²⁵) that claimed for the return of King Ferdinand to the Castilian government.²⁶ According to the Archbishop of Seville, Fray Diego Deza, the Alcaide:

Has always been a true and loyal servant of Your Highness [...] and one of those in whom the faith has truly prevailed, and when I was called from Toro to the court about the issues that should be not referred by letter, he joined me, and accompanied me without embarrassment, something that others would not do.²⁷

This unquestioning loyalty to Ferdinand the Catholic political cause earned him an outstanding position in political life during the following years. In 1507 when Ferdinand the Catholic returned to the Castilian government he faced hostile opposition from the Castilian aristocracy. In Andalusia this opposition was led by important nobles such as the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was supported by a good part of Cordoba's nobility. During this dynastic crisis the Andalusian aristocracy saw an opportunity to create dissent and anarchy.²⁸ To fight the influence of this aristocratic league king Ferdinand relied on the combined action of the Archbishop of Seville, the Count of Tendilla and the Alcaide de los Donceles, who could deal with a divided opposition.²⁹ In helping King Ferdinand to reinforce his position in Castile, the Alcaide fixed his rise to prominence with him. Once again the Count of Tendilla, with his characteristic sense of

²⁴ On his brief reign, see José Manuel Calderón Ortega, *Felipe el hermoso* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2001). And from a broader perspective Jean-Marie Cauchies, "Un príncipe para los Países Bajos, para España, para Europa," in *Felipe I el hermoso. La belleza y la locura*, ed. M. A. Zalama and P. Vandembroeck (Madrid: CEEH, 2006), 71-86.

²⁵ On this political faction in the royal court's struggle, see Martínez Millán, "De la muerte," 50-59 and 63-72.

²⁶ Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Ferdinand the Catholic. Burgos, 10th October 1506. BRAH, SyC, A-12, fols. 77-78.

²⁷ 'Que ha sido siempre y es verdadero y fidelísimo servidor de Vuestra Alteza [...] y que uno de aquellos en que verdaderamente quedó la fe fue el, y que cuando yo fui llamado de Toro a la corte sobre lo que no es para en carta el me iba y me acompañaba sin empacho, lo que otros no hacían.' Letter of Fray Diego Deza to Ferdinand the Catholic. Seville, 11th January 1507. BRAH, SyC, A-12, fols. 116-118.

²⁸ On the aristocratic anarchy in Andalusia during the fifteenth century, see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Andalucía en el siglo XV: estudios de historia política* (Madrid: CSIC, 1973), 98 and 129-148.

²⁹ Yun Casalilla, *Crisis de subsistencias*, 221-224. The correspondence of the Count of Tendilla points in the same direction. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Duchess of Cadiz. Granada, 18th November 1508, and Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Ferdinand the Catholic. Antequera, 15th December 1508. BNE, Mss. 10.230, fols. 35-36 and 38-39. See also J. Cepeda Adán, "Andalucía en 1508. Un aspecto de la correspondencia del virrey Tendilla," *Hispania* 22, n° 85 (1962): 47-56 and 63-80; and J. Szmolka Clares, "Nobleza y autoritarismo en Andalucía. La contribución de Granada a la sumisión del estamento nobiliario," *Cuadernos de estudios medievales* 6-7 (1978): 277-296.

humour, expressed the close (and almost intimate) union between the king and the Alcaide de los Donceles in one of his letters to the latter:

The king, our lord, is the most noble creature in this world and [...] always loves his people very well and he wants to sustain them in their positions and help them to save face in everything, even better if they serve him well. Your Mercy [...] with the king, you have the bed done.³⁰

Beyond the entente between the Alcaide and King Ferdinand the Catholic, serving the king in the defence of the frontier was an attractive option for noblemen. Defending a stronghold on the frontier of the Muslim enemies was considered an outstanding service. This was underlined by the strong competition the Alcaide faced in the summer of 1509 to obtain the governorship of Oran. Just a couple of months after the conquest of this city, different noblemen from Murcia and Andalusia sent letters to King Ferdinand trying to get an *asiento* for the defence of this stronghold.³¹ Their interest in gaining the contract was so high, that rumours about the negotiations became point of gossip in the regional nobility's correspondence.³² However in the end it was the Alcaide de los Donceles who obtained the contract to defend Oran. The Alcaide was already the governor of Mers el-Kébir, and precisely because of this he needed to extend his military authority over the neighbouring city of Oran. Otherwise, the defence of Mers el-Kébir was at risk, as the Count of Tendilla warned him.³³ Thus, to some extent the Alcaide was obliged to become governor of a second frontier city, if he wanted to preserve his reputation and career as one of the most important servants of the crown.

Thanks to his position as defender of the southern frontier, the Alcaide de los Donceles obtained important benefices. First of all he could enhance his prestige as a

³⁰ 'El rey, Nuestro Señor, es la más noble criatura que hay en el mundo y [...] quiere siempre muy bien a los suyos y a gana de sostenerlos en sus cargos y guardarles la cara en todo, y mucho mejor si bien le sirven. Vuestra Merced [...] que con el rey hecha tenéis la cama.' Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Alcaide de los Donceles. Madrid, 17th June 1510. BNE, Mss. 10.230, fol. 171. On the Count of Tendilla and his role in the political life of this period see: Helen Nader, *The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance 1350-1550* (New Jersey: New Jersey University Press, 1979), 150-179.

³¹³¹ The first offer was presented by the Marquis of los Vélez. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Íñigo Manrique. Granada, 22nd June 1509. BNE, Mss. 10.230, fol. 97.

³² Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Alcaide de los Donceles. Granada, 2nd July 1509. *Ibíd.*, fol. 99. The rumours from the court on the issue appeared also in the correspondence of the captain-general of Granada with the Duke of Alburquerque and with the Marquis of Cenete. Granada, 6th and 12th July 1509. *Ibíd.* fols. 100 and 104.

³³ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Alcaide de los Donceles. Granada, 30th July 1509. *Ibíd.* fol. 116.

warrior against the Muslims, and actually his exploits in Africa were celebrated by the Spanish chroniclers.³⁴ Beyond fame and prestige, his services to the crown on the frontier granted him economic benefits. First and foremost were the titles of ‘lieutenant of the fortresses’ of Mers el-Kébir and Oran, which were highly honourable positions with an annual salary of 550,000 maravedíes.³⁵ As a reward for his services the king also granted him the possession and jurisdiction over strategic places in the Maghreb. Interestingly the official title of these mercies made an explicit reference to the Alcaide as a warrior in the war against the Muslims:

Taking into account the good and loyal services that you, Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba, Alcaide de los Donceles and my captain-general in the Kingdom of Tlemcen, have done me and do me every day, especially in the war that I order you to do against the African Moors, enemies of our holy Catholic faith, and in all the previous Moors’ wars in these my kingdoms, and to give you some remuneration because of your services [...].³⁶

On the coast of Tlemcen the Alcaide de los Donceles obtained the jurisdiction as well as the right to collect duties from Canastell and Arzew as well as its port and its saltworks.³⁷ It seems that the Ferdinand the Catholic promised the Alcaide similar concessions in another port city of Tlemcen: Honein.³⁸ The king also gave him two other coastal towns in Tlemcen: Mosteganem and Mazagran.³⁹ All these mercies had an additional value: they placed the Alcaide de los Donceles within a select group of nobles who had *allende* possessions, that is, lands conquered from the enemies of the faith

³⁴ BRAH, SyC, A-12, fol. 91 and ff. His career as warrior against the Muslim, and his charge of conqueror and guardian of the African presidios, was also celebrated by the local historiographers of the following century. BNE, Mss. 3.269, T. I, fols. 410-412. The most outstanding case at this point is that of the Count of Alcaudete, who inherited the Alcaide’s chare as governor of Oran. M. Martínez Góngora, “Between a Frontier Hero and Scipio Africanus: The Caballero Martín de Córdoba y de Velasco in the Renaissance Chronicles of the Maghreb,” *eHumanista* 32 (2016): 413-428.

³⁵ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150804, n° 93 and Leg. 151002, n° 84. On the benefices that this office reported, see the recent in-depth study Antonio Jiménez Estrella, “Linajes y alcaides en el Reino de Granada bajo los Austrias. ¿Servicio militar o fuentes de enriquecimiento y honores?,” in *Los nervios de la guerra. Estudios sociales sobre el ejército de la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI-XVIII): nuevas perspectivas*, ed. A. Jiménez Estrella and F. Andújar Castillo (Granada: Comares, 2007), 89-120.

³⁶ ‘Acatando los muchos e buenos e leales servicios que vos Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba, alcaide de los Donceles e mi capitán general del reino de Tremecén me habéis hecho e hacéis cada día especialmente en la guerra que yo mando hacer a los moros de África enemigos de nuestra santa fe católica e en todas las otras guerras de moros que ha habido en estos mis reinos e porque recibáis alguna remuneración en aquello que habéis servido e servís’. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151206, n° 62.

³⁷ *Ibíd* fols. 62 and 66; AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 37, n° 13 and 14.

³⁸ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151209, n° 510.

³⁹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151212, n° 457; AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 37, n° 15.

beyond the Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁰ His services as guardian of the frontier contributed to reinforce his position in the face of Cordoba's aristocracy. Thus, for instance, he obtained from the crown the formal appointment as heir to some of his father's government offices in Cordoba. This was an important mercy as the Alcaide struggled to control the city's government.⁴¹

The Alcaide de los Donceles, also improved his position in the milieu of the Castilian aristocracy, thanks to his new position as guardian of the frontier. Due to his successful military services, in 1512 he received the land of Comares (near Malaga) together with the title of Marquis.⁴² In addition to this the Alcaide received the privilege to transfer some of his positions and titles to his son Luis.⁴³ Finally his appointment as captain-general of the Kingdom of Tlemcen allowed the Alcaide to jump to the highest tier of the crown service. In fact, in 1512 he was appointed as the first viceroy of Navarre. With this appointment the Alcaide became the highest rank *de facto* of the Castilian aristocracy because with it he became an *alter ego* of the monarch in that kingdom.⁴⁴ Undoubtedly, his duty to defend the double stronghold of Oran and Mers el-Kébir brought the Alcaide important political, social, and economic profits.

At this point we can conclude that the agreement reached between Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide de los Donceles in 1509 was quite profitable for both parties. By relying on the Alcaide's support the king was able to ensure the protection of the realm's southern frontier. Moreover, by trusting this honourable task to the Alcaide, Ferdinand the Catholic was able to strengthen the position of his main ally in Cordoba, which was a crucial step in his struggle to reinforce his authority over the Andalusian nobility. From the Alcaide's perspective taking charge of Oran's *asiento* proved to be a wise decision. With it he consolidated his career as a warrior against the Muslims, which granted him prestige but also a political credit. Defending the southern frontier allowed

⁴⁰ In the whole Hispanic Monarchy only a Grandee, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, enjoyed a similar privilege. Salas Almela, *Colaboración y conflicto*, 26 and 29-32.

⁴¹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150812, n° 544. On the long-lasting aristocratic fights on Cordoba's government see Concepción Quintanilla Raso, "El dominio de las ciudades por la nobleza. El caso de Córdoba en la segunda mitad del siglo XV," in *La Ciudad Hispánica siglos XIII al XVI*, ed. E. Sáez, C. Segura Grañó and C. Cantera Montenegro (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1987), vol. III, 110-123.

⁴² AGS, RGS, Leg. 151212, n° 458. Comares was a key piece of the Alcaide's seigniorial domains. AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 13.

⁴³ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151209, n° 1 and 60 and Leg. 151212 n° 458.

⁴⁴ I will come back to the Alcaide's activity as viceroy of Navarre in chapter three.

the Alcaide to improve his position in Cordoba (one of his main concerns) but also on the chess board of the realm's politics, due to the multiple rewards that he received as a payment for his services. Hence, only by understanding the relationship between Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide can we place the *asiento* in context, but as we will see in the following section, it was just a part of the story.

Inside the *asiento*. The Alcaide de los Donceles and his service networks

The Alcaide's services to the crown on the southern frontier of the realm became an important source of royal mercies. One of these mercies contained an interesting reference to the Alcaide's services on the frontier as a collective effort: 'considering with so much work of your person and losses of your relatives and servants [...] it is my mercy and will that you will be my governor and tenant of the aforementioned city and fortress of Mers el-Kébir'.⁴⁵ In many ways, the *asiento* to defend Oran and Mers el-Kébir should be analysed as a collective effort. The Alcaide was an experienced military officer with a long service record in the struggle against the Muslims, and as such he led an important clientele network. The Alcaide recruited administrative staff from among his kin and clients in order to provide and control the military machinery under his command. As a matter of fact, his mother, Leonor de Arellano, managed the administrative staff of his son's military enterprise on their seigniorial estates.⁴⁶

On the frontier the Alcaide ruled Oran and all the military machinery with the help of efficient experts like his kinsmen, Martín de Argote, or his chamberlain Sancho de Contreras.⁴⁷ The importance of this team was such, that when the justice banished Martín de Argote from Oran, the Alcaide asked for the revocation of his banishment. In his petition he argued that he needed de Argote to manage military affairs on the frontier and that it was advisable to carry with him 'all his clients and servants, especially the ones

⁴⁵ 'Acatando con cuanto trabajo de vuestra persona e perdida de vuestros parientes y criados [...] es mi merced e voluntad que seáis mi alcaide e tenedor de la dicha villa y fortaleza de Mazalquivir'. AGS, RGS, Leg. 150804, nº 93.

⁴⁶ AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 43, nº 53.

⁴⁷ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 81-84 and 104. See also Raúl Molina Recio, "Redes clientelares, redes económicas. Los servidores señoriales como fuente de gestión de las empresas-protocapitalistas de la nobleza," in *Campo y campesinos en la España Moderna: culturas políticas en el mundo hispano*, ed. M. J. Perez Álvarez and A. Martín García (León: FEHM, 2012), 985-997.

that can serve better there [in Oran] than here'.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Alcaide actively tried to incorporate a team of experts in frontier warfare into his household. This was evident in the appointment of Lope de Sosa, a knight from Córdoba who had worked as a spy in the Maghreb for years, as tutor of the Alcaide's son, the future governor of Oran.⁴⁹ Nevertheless when the nobleman took up his role as defender of the new frontier's strongholds in the Maghreb, he required more than clients and servants.

The *asiento* was above all a logistical and financial challenge to its owner. To ensure the correct functioning of the men defending this frontier the Alcaide was obliged to act as the leader of a wide network whose cohesion depended on his capacity to obtain and manage resources. As any other nobleman the Alcaide was obliged to manage his income and expenses according to the codes that legitimised his predominant position over a social network.⁵⁰ The troops employed by the Alcaide were mainly recruited from among his clientele and precisely because of that he was obliged to act as an efficient patron in order to maintain his leadership.⁵¹ In other words, in order to keep his troops in line, he was obliged to act as a military patron.⁵²

Furthermore, the Alcaide was also a military entrepreneur, and as such he needed to see to the welfare of his most valuable resource: his soldiers.⁵³ Both factors compelled him to ensure the correct payment and provisioning of his troops, whose affection towards him was contingent upon them. Gonzalo de Ayora, an experienced military officer, made reference to this "communion" between the troops and the Alcaide in his reports to King Ferdinand after the conquest of Mers el-Kébir. According to him, after the Alcaide's victory against the enemy's first attempt to recover the fortress, the troops loved the Alcaide because of his generosity, paying them additional wages and distributing

⁴⁸ 'Con todos sus deudos y criados en especial los que pueden servir más allá que no acá'. AGS, Camara de Castilla, Leg. 129, nº 103.

⁴⁹ AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 43, nº 52.

⁵⁰ Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, "Consideraciones para el estudio de la renta y las economías señoriales de Castilla (siglos XVI-XVII)," in Id., *La gestión del poder. Corona y economías aristocráticas en Castilla (siglos XVI-XVIII)* (Madrid: Akal, 2002), 13-23.

⁵¹ The payroll of the troops deployed in Oran in 1510 in AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, leg. 200, s.f. Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba employed also troops of the royal army to complete the garrison. AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Sueldo, 1ª serie, leg. 71-1, s. f.

⁵² The Count of Tendilla advised him in that matter after his appointment as governor of Oran. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Alcaide de los Donceles. Madrid, 17th June 1510. BNE, Mss. 10.230, fol. 171.

⁵³ David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 152-156 and 162-165.

abundant food supplies.⁵⁴ To fulfil these obligations was a common duty for all the military commanders, but it was even more advisable to someone like the Alcaide because in doing so he could avoid the soldiers' desertion or their connivance with the enemy. When the Count of Tendilla made reference to the financial risks of the *asiento* he underlined this problem in a meaningful way:

That some soldiers, because they are not respected in regard to their payment, had not kept the faith that they took from the baptismal font, and they have gone to see if Muhammad pays what Christ owes, and they will give advice, and even give way to some bad feat.⁵⁵

The Alcaide needed to correctly pay and supply his garrisons if he intended to maintain command over the frontier's strongholds. However that was all but easy. Once again, the Count of Tendilla was quite explicit in this point. In one of his letters to a noble fellow, Tendilla admitted that he did not take part in the negotiation for the contract of Oran's *asiento*, because the enterprise was a risky prospect logistically, and he feared that the official payment system to sustain this African presidio might fail. The Count of Tendilla confessed that he regretted that the Alcaide decided to take this appointment.⁵⁶ Moreover he underlined this tension between the financial risks of the *asiento* to defend Oran, and its political outcomes in a letter to the Marquis of Cenete. According to Tendilla: 'That charge [the defence of Oran] is something honourable, if the world is always calm, but if it turns, who can sustain a cost of near 30 million [of *maravedíes*] in a place where they can cut the supply by sea?'.⁵⁷ In another letter he was even clearer:

That I consider something severe that a nobleman (even with estate) would sustain a cost that needs 26 millions [of *maravedíes*] of payment. Because if [the payment] fails he is

⁵⁴ Letter of Gonzalo de Ayora to Ferdinand the Catholic. Mers el-Kébir, 18th September 1505. BRAH, 2/Ms. Caj. 5, nº 14. The additional payments in AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, Leg. 187, fol. 15. Similar examples are present in the records of the military administration. See, for instance, AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Sueldo, 1^a serie, Leg. 70, fols. 146-149.

⁵⁵ 'Que algunos soldados, porque no les guardan la fe que les dieron en la paga, no han guardado la que tomaron en la pila, y son idos a probar si Mahomad paga lo que Cristo debe, que aquellos darán avisos, y aún camino a alguna mala hazaña.' Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Archbishop of Seville. Granada, 20th September 1509. BNE, Mss. 10.230, fol. 144. On the desertion of Spanish soldiers deployed in Oran, see Luis Fé Cantó, "El fenómeno de la deserción y las sombras del discurso oficial," in *Orán. Historia de la Corte Chica*, ed. M. A. Bunes Ibarra and B. Alonso Acero (Madrid: Polifemo, 2011), 369-398.

⁵⁶ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Marquis of Denia. Granada, 5th August 1509. *Ibíd.* fol. 120.

⁵⁷ 'Honrada cosa es aquel cargo [Orán] si está siempre el mundo sosegado, más si se revolviere, quien puede sostener costa de cerca de 30 cuentos [de *maravedíes*], y en lugar que le pueden quitar la provision por la mar.' Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Marquis of Cenete. Granada, 12th July 1509. *Ibíd.* fol. 104.

lost and dishonoured, as this noble people (the soldiers) do not care in mutiny if they are not paid.⁵⁸

Tendilla's words should be taken seriously because the threat of the soldier's mutiny was real and the only way to avoid this problem was continue paying their salaries.⁵⁹ In fact, this nobleman was well aware of how dangerous investing in the royal service was, because his expenses as captain-general of Granada almost led him to the edge of ruin.⁶⁰ The Alcaide was thus embracing an ambitious but risky enterprise, because his capability to keep serving the crown by guarding the frontier and, most importantly, to maintain his honour depended to a great extent on his capability to pay the men under his command.

The first *asiento* signed by the Alcaide to defend Mers el-Kébir included an article on how the garrison's salaries and supplies would be funded. It stated that the king was obliged to provide to the Alcaide with 6,340,400 maravedíes from Cordoba's taxes each year to attend to both expenses. Furthermore, the contract also included a mechanism of emergency if the taxes collected were not enough to meet demand.⁶¹ The payment system seemed strong enough, but the Alcaide quickly realised how difficult obtaining the money could be.⁶² The king had the right to order payments from the money that was raised from tax farmers and cities. The procedure went as follows; first the king delegated the right to collect specific taxes to the cities or tax farmers. Then, when the monarch needed to make a payment, such as those agreed with the Alcaide, a *libranza* (payment order) was sent to the local authorities or tax farmers in charge of collecting the money. The payment would

⁵⁸ 'Que yo por recia cosa he que un caballero, aunque tenga estado, tome a sostener costa que ha menester veintiseis cuentos [de maravedíes] de paga, que si un año le yerra es perdido y deshonrado, pues monta que esta gente noble de soldados no están inosados en amotinarse si no les pagan.' Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Marquis of Cenete. Granada, 10th August 1509. *Ibíd.* fol. 121.

⁵⁹ The poor life conditions in these presidios have been described in Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, "La vida en los presidios del Norte de África," in *Relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb (siglos XIII-XVI)*, ed. M. García Arenal and M. J. Viguera (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 560-590. A mutiny in the African presidios has been studied in M. Martínez, "The Spell of National Identity: War and Soldiering on the North African Frontier (1550-1560)," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 12, n° 3 (2011): 298-300. See also the classic article G. Parker, "Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders 1572-1607," *Past and Present* 58 (1973): 38-52.

⁶⁰ In order to maintain the military defence of Granada the Count of Tendilla ate up almost all of his own estate. H. Nader, "Noble Income in Sixteenth Century Castile: The Case of the Marquis of Mondejar, 1480-1580," *Economic History Review* 30, n° 3 (1977): 421-424.

⁶¹ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, leg. 200, fol. 1.

⁶² He was not the only one, the Duke of Medina Sidonia faced similar problems in the maintaining of Melilla. AGS, RGS, Leg. 150408, n° 88.

later be discounted from the money that the collectors had to pay to the king. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the sixteenth century the Castilian fiscal system was dominated by the cities and the tax farmers, and frequently they tried to avoid or postpone the payments as they would damage their interest.⁶³ Funding the *asiento* by this means permitted the royal administration to avoid having to deal with the cities and the tax farmers directly because it was the Alcaide who had to deal with them.

Dealing with the tax farmers in charge of collecting the royal rents in Cordoba, became a difficult task for the Alcaide because they frequently did not accept the payment orders. This was the case, for instance, of Alonso de Alanis.⁶⁴ This tax farmer fled leaving behind his debts with the Alcaide. Alanís' example was followed by other tax farmers fled to different jurisdictions preventing the Alcaide from having them prosecuted.⁶⁵ In light of such obstacle, the nobleman secured the aid of a specially appointed judge to solve this problem.⁶⁶ The judge came into action quickly and ordered the seizure of goods from all these tax farmers in Córdoba, Seville and the Field of Calatrava, in southern Castile. Nevertheless, the court cases that these seizures began lasted for years, due to the sentences being appealed.⁶⁷ As the issue became increasingly complex the judicial manoeuvres of the Alcaide reached León, in northern Castile, following the flight of the fugitive tax farmers.⁶⁸ What made matters worse was that the local justices did not collaborate to alleviate the problem, and, sometimes, they openly hindered the actions of the judges.⁶⁹ A combination of jurisdictional fragmentation, distance, as well as the enormous influence of local authorities over the tax system, made collecting the money a nightmare.

⁶³ J. M. Carretero Zamora, "Los servicios de Cortes y las necesidades financieras de la monarquía castellana (1500-1515)," *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna* 8 (1987): 31-56; Id., "Los arrendadores de la hacienda de Castilla a comienzos del siglo XVI (1517-1525)," *Studia Historica Historia Moderna* 21 (1999): 153-190.

⁶⁴ AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Suelo, 1ª Serie, Leg. 70, fol. 206. Further information on the activity of this important tax farmer in Á. Ortega Cera, "Arrendar el dinero del rey. Fraude y estrategias financieras en el estrado de las rentas en la Castilla del siglo XV," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 40, n° 1 (2010): 223-249.

⁶⁵ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150805, n° 397.

⁶⁶ *Ibíd.* n° 460.

⁶⁷ *Ibíd.* n° 462 and RGS, Leg. 150811, n° 450 and 613. Later, in the trial against the tax farmers of Jaen the things became also quite complicated. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151005, n° 378.

⁶⁸ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150811, n° 243.

⁶⁹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150810, n° 517 and Leg. 150811, n° 680.

If recovering the money from the tax farmers was difficult, recovering it from their pledges was harder as the trials against them showed.⁷⁰ Moreover, sometimes the Alcaide could not obtain the money simply because a natural disaster or an epidemic disease made tax collection in a specific area impossible.⁷¹ If collecting money from the tax system was difficult, the royal administration also failed to provide the commodities that had promised the Alcaide.⁷² According to Oran's *asiento* the amount that the king had to invest was almost 23,000,000 maravedíes. Considering the previous problems this new contract allowed the Alcaide to look for credit on behalf of the king.⁷³ Nevertheless, despite this innovation, this credit method ultimately proved to be useless. As we can see, the Alcaide could not rely on the resources that the monarch promised to pay according to the *asiento*.

This problem pushed the nobleman to look for alternative solutions. The Alcaide de los Donceles used to be understood as the last example of a long-lasting tradition of medieval warriors who served the king by mobilising their retainers.⁷⁴ This interpretation was clearly inherited from the common assumption that associates the mobilisation of resources as a sort of backwardness contrary to “modern” ways of conducting war by state administration.⁷⁵ However, by looking at the internal functioning of the *asiento* we can see that the Alcaide was more than a mere feudal leader leading his vassals into war, he was above all a successful military entrepreneur.⁷⁶ In fact, he proved to be much more efficient than the royal administration in funding the frontier's defence. Due to the funding problems the Alcaide was forced to look for another means of paying for his military enterprise. Most of the African campaigns were funded by private resources such as the loans of Cardinal Cisneros, the bishop of Martos, the Count of Miranda or the Constable of Castile.⁷⁷ Also Hernando de Zafra, the royal secretary in charge of organising the conquest of Mers el-Kébir also had to look for loans to fund this operation.⁷⁸ Conducting

⁷⁰ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151001, nº 710.

⁷¹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150805, nº 461.

⁷² AGS, RGS, Leg. 150703, nº 270.

⁷³ AGS, Contaduría de Mercedes, Tenecias de Fortalezas, Leg. 3, nº 3.

⁷⁴ Liang, *Family and Empire*, 55-60.

⁷⁵ Thompson, *War and Government*, 146-159.

⁷⁶ On the relationships between war entrepreneurs and private financiers, see Parrott, *The Business of War*, 229-232.

⁷⁷ Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista*, 160-162; AGS, RGS, Leg. 151006, nº 65, 90 and 96, and AHN, Nobleza, Frías, C. 363, D. 7-8.

⁷⁸ Letter of Hernando de Zafra to Ferdinand the Catholic. [Málaga, 10th May 1506]. AGS, GyM, Leg. 1315, nº 182. Zafra's debts to sustain the garrison reached more around 500.000 maravedíes. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, leg. 200, fol. 19.

wars on loans from noblemen and churchmen was something that the Spanish monarchs had been doing since the Middle Age.⁷⁹ Nevertheless the case of the Alcaide was different. He went a step further in the search for credit. Even before the expedition to conquer Mers el-Kebir, in the summer of 1505, the Alcaide was looking for loans to fund his own participation in the operation.⁸⁰ After his appointment as captain-general of Tlemcen it was the lack of the official payment agreed in the *asientos* that obliged him to look for credit to pay his garrisons' salaries when the official payment agreed in the *asientos* did not arrive. The Alcaide acknowledged this in his petition to the king asking for compensation.⁸¹ Pushed by financial problems the Alcaide mortgaged some of his patrimonial estates, such as Sedella.⁸² Even so, this measure did not solve the problem and the Alcaide was forced to rely on the collaboration of Genoese merchants to finance the African presidios. Hence, businessmen with an important role in the economy of the region, such as Agustín Italian, Agustín de Grimaldo or Agustín de Bivaldo, loaned money to the Alcaide.⁸³

These activities showed that the Alcaide knew how to handle himself in the financial world. In fact, he not only contracted loans with these Genoese merchants. He also employed them as lobbyists when he made use of their influence in the fiscal apparatus of the monarchy to collect the money that the king gave him according to the *asiento*.⁸⁴ The relationship between the Alcaide and the Genoese merchants, members of the so-called "cosmopolitan capitalism" was not new.⁸⁵ Like many other members of the Andalusian aristocracy, the Alcaide used to employ these Genoese merchants as agents in his mercantile activities. The close interaction between Genoese merchants and

⁷⁹ Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, "Ejército, logística y financiación en la guerra de Granada," in *La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla*, ed. M. A. Ladero Quesada (Granada: Diputación provincial, 1993), 675-708.

⁸⁰ Letter of the Count of Tendilla to the Alcaide de los Donceles. Granada, 21st August 1505. AHN, Nobleza, Osuna, C. 3406, D. 1, fol. 226.

⁸¹ King Ferdinand the Catholic ordered to compensate the Alcaide but his son was still asking for the payment in 1526. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 71, fol. 347.

⁸² AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 14, n° 5.

⁸³ Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 254-255. In a later period many other noblemen were obliged to rely on the loans of professional bankers, especially Italian financiers, as a result of their new obligations as royal servants. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, "Carlos V y la aristocracia. Poder, crédito y economía en Castilla," in Id. *La gestión del poder. Corona y economías aristocráticas en Castilla (siglos XVI-XVIII)* (Madrid: Akala, 2002), 112.

⁸⁴ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151001, n° 711; and, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, fol. 133.

⁸⁵ Carmen Sanz Ayán, "La presencia del capitalismo cosmopolita durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos: claves para una interpretación," in *El tratado de Tordesillas y su época*, ed. L. A. Ribot García, A. Carrasco Martínez and L. Adao de Fonseca (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1995), 467-477.

aristocrats was one of the key factors ruling the politics and economy of the region.⁸⁶ For instance, the Alcaide made use of the Genoese trade networks to obtain the commodities needed to supply his clientele in his dominions in Cordoba during the famines of 1506.⁸⁷ Hence, the problems in funding the defence of the frontier with the king's resources, as well as his previous contacts with the Genoese merchants explain why the Alcaide incorporated the Italian merchants into the *asiento*'s machinery. As we can see, the Alcaide was acting as an efficient military entrepreneur in his search for financial services.

The Alcaide also enhanced the administrative staff of his military enterprise with those experienced in tasks such as maritime travels, logistics and most importantly, 'persons of good trustworthiness and wealthy' able to deal with the local merchants.⁸⁸ The most interesting case is that of Juan Rena. He, as a merchant, was able to help the Alcaide in the difficult task of sustaining Oran and Mers el-Kébir. According to his personal accounts, Rena used to lend money to the soldiers on the orders of the Alcaide, and also to some of the captains under his command.⁸⁹ Rena also used his reputation to obtain loans from other merchants, to lend it to the military officers.⁹⁰ Rena's mediation was also employed by some of the Alcaide's household servants to buy goods during their activity in Oran.⁹¹ Moreover, by using his reputation in the mercantile community, Rena was able to obtain many products using credit, which contributed to sustain Oran's garrison. It is difficult to calculate the volume of these operations, but, for instance, an account drafted by Rena shows that at the beginning of 1512 the Alcaide's debt to Rena reached an amount close to 500,000 maravedies.⁹² Obviously the calculation is far from exact but it indicates the importance of Rena's contribution in supporting the Alcaide's military enterprise. It should also be noted here that when Rena loaned his money and that of his associates, the Alcaide was struggling to sustain the presidios because the Genoese bankers did not trust the financial system sustaining them. The problems to fund Mers el-Kebir started just after its conquest when the Genoese financiers Agustín de

⁸⁶ J. Edwards, "Oligarchy and Merchant Capitalism in Lower Andalusia under the Catholic Kings: the Case of Córdoba and Jerez de la Frontera," *Historia, Instituciones, Documentos* 4 (1977): 21-26.

⁸⁷ AGS, RGS, 150610, n° 296 and Edwards, "Oligarchy and merchant capitalism," 30.

⁸⁸ 'Personas de confianza e de hacienda'. AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Sueldo, 1ª Serie, Leg. 74, s.f.

⁸⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-2, fols. 2 and 20.

⁹⁰ *Ibíd.* fol. 3 and 7.

⁹¹ *Ibíd.* fols. 19, 20 and 25.

⁹² *Ibíd.* fol. 9.

Bivaldo and Agustín de Grimaldo were unwilling did to advance money to the Alcaide in exchange for the royal *libranzas* (orders of payment).⁹³ Already in 1507 the king had personally ensured the payment of the Alcaide's *libranzas* but the problems to fund the presidios continued.⁹⁴ This difficult situation made Rena's services even more helpful for a military entrepreneur like the Alcaide.

Rena's activity in service of the Alcaide went beyond financial assistance. He also had the skills needed to deal with maritime transport and other logistical problems.⁹⁵ One of Juan Rena's first tasks for the Alcaide de los Donceles (when they were still at the royal court) was to negotiate a good price with merchants from Valencia in order to create a supply chain of goods for the Alcaide's garrisons. Frequently the price for this sort of service was not fixed according to a previous contract; instead it was agreed between 'two persons of good consciousness' (one chosen by the nobleman and another one by the ship's owner). Thus, when the Alcaide chose Rena as a person 'of good consciousness' he was not only selecting someone who had a good knowledge of how much goods and maritime transport cost, he was also choosing someone with a well-known reputation among the local commercial community.⁹⁶ This was crucial as one of Rena's main tasks was to deal with the mercantile community of this region.

Rena also worked for the Alcaide de los Donceles as a sort of mercantile broker with the local merchants. After his stay at the royal court with the Alcaide he moved on to Puerto de Santa María, from where he coordinated the logistics of supplying the garrison of Mers el-Kebir.⁹⁷ During the five months that he spent there (from late October 1506 until May 1507) Rena bought large amounts of foodstuffs, but also arms and gunpowder. Once these items were purchased he sent them directly to the Maghrebi

⁹³ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, s.f.

⁹⁴ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 14, nº 33.

⁹⁵ Supplying Oran was always a difficult task. Beatriz Alonso Acero, "Trenes de avituallamiento en las plazas españolas de Berbería," in *Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Política, estrategia y cultura en la Europa Moderna*, ed. E. García Hernán and D. Maffi (Madrid: CSIC, 2006), Vol. 1, 739-766; and Manuel Lomas Cortés, "Las galeras en el aprovisionamiento marítimo de Orán-Mazalquivir, 1599-1621," in *Orán, historia de la corte chica*, ed. B. Alonso Acero and M. A. Bunes Ibarra (Madrid: Polifemo, 2011), 195-222.

⁹⁶ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, fol. 20. This kind of practices were quite common during the African campaigns. Several examples in AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Sueldo, 1ª Serie, Leg. 70.

⁹⁷ El Puerto de Santa María was an important centre in the logistics of the European settlements in northern Africa. See Robert Ricard, "Les facteurs portugais d'Andalusie," in Id., *Études sur l'histoire des Portugaises au Maroc* (Coimbra: Universidade da Coimbra, 1955), 177-192.

strongholds under the Alcaide's command. However, Rena's task was by no means simple, as in 1507 Castille underwent one of the worst agrarian and demographic crises in its history. A witness' tale described an apocalyptic scene with lost harvests, rising prices, and illness that 'spread like a fire' which killed a great part of the population.⁹⁸ Organising the logistics to sustain any military activity was always difficult, but doing it during a period of famine and epidemic disease was much more difficult. Especially since the war effort only exasperated the situation, provoking a violent reaction among the local population.⁹⁹

Nevertheless Rena proved to be an efficient servant for the Alcaide. Not only did he manage to carry out his duties, he was also able to escape death twice: first when he was stabbed, and second when he caught the pestilence that devastated the region in 1507. Rena spent five months fighting for his life but finally he survived. During this time the Alcaide kept paying Rena and paid for his care. This underlined how highly he regarded Rena's services.¹⁰⁰ After his miraculous recovery Rena returned to managing the logistics of the *asiento* in Malaga and its surroundings.¹⁰¹ Shortly after Rena moved to Mers el-Kébir, where he continued working on logistical tasks. He was in charge of receiving the different supplies sent there by the Alcaide's administration and to distribute them among the garrison.¹⁰² The importance of Rena in the administrative apparatus grew during the following years, especially after Oran's conquest. From then onwards, the Alcaide employed Rena as his agent in Malaga (the main platform sustaining the Spanish expansion in the Maghreb) while he was in Oran or negotiating in the royal court.¹⁰³ Thus, the nobleman gave Rena power of attorney, to buy all the commodities needed to maintain the garrison, as well as to receive and manage the money sent by the crown for the military

⁹⁸ Andrés Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel* (Sevilla: José María Geofrin, 1870), T. II, Cap. CCVIII, 291-299.

⁹⁹ Yun Casalilla, *Crisis de subsistencias*, 63-79 and 103-113. To the best of my knowledge a monograph study on the crisis' effects in el Puerto de Santa María is missing, but there is a brief study, following Yun's analysis and pointing in the same direction, on the case of Jerez de la Frontera, a town next to it. Emilio Martín Gutiérrez, "La crisis de 1503-1507 en Andalucía. Reflexiones a partir de Jerez de la Frontera," in *Crisis de subsistencia y crisis agrarias en la Edad Media*, ed. H. R. Oliva Herrero and P. Benito i Monclús (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2007), 281-290.

¹⁰⁰ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 187, fol. 67.

¹⁰¹ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, s.f.

¹⁰² AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200 and 330 s.f.

¹⁰³ Esther Cruces Blanco, "La ciudad de Málaga, base militar para la guerra contra los infieles, 1495-1516," in *El Mediterráneo: hechos de relevancia histórico-militar y sus repercusiones en España*, (Sevilla: Cátedra General Castaños, 1998), 413-429. The English reader can consult the brief synthesis on Malaga as a frontier city in Leonida Tedoldi, "The Sea as a Frontier: the Port City of Malaga in the Ancien Régime. An Approximation", in *Growing in the Shadow of an Empire. How Spanish Colonialism Affected Economic Development in Europe and in the World (XVIIth-XVIIIth cc.)*, ed. G. de Lucca and G. Sabatini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2012), 239-251.

expenses.¹⁰⁴ The different tasks that the Alcaide gave to Rena show that the nobleman trusted him and, furthermore, how much his ability to control and maintain the enclaves depended on Rena's efficient services.

As time passed, Rena's service became much broader and complex. When the Alcaide left Oran and travelled to the royal court, he entrusted Rena to collect his payments in Seville, which required negotiating with the local bankers and tax farmers that managed the royal rents. Once again, Rena was able to make these payments by mobilising his private network of commercial partners and associates.¹⁰⁵ Rena's network of friends and colleagues also became useful in several other tasks. At the same time that Rena was buying supplies for the garrisons, maintaining and repairing the ships used to connect the presidios with the Iberian Peninsula, managing the artillery and the ammunitions. Furthermore, he was responding to the reports sent from the Maghrebi strongholds and supervising the transit of the troops on the road to Malaga where they embarked for Oran.¹⁰⁶ Finally, it is interesting to underline that Rena was able to do all these things 'without a *blanca*' that is, in a moment when the Alcaide's finances were in the red.¹⁰⁷ Thus, Juan Rena was obliged to make use of his economic and social capitals, which made his services even more important to the Alcaide.

Considering that this nobleman's political strategy was based on his capacity to provide military services to the Ferdinand the Catholic we can conclude that the Genoese merchants and Rena were an essential element of his plan. These businessmen played a prominent role in the administrative apparatus that the Alcaide constructed in order to maintain the military machinery and defend the realm's southern frontier. Rena and many other merchants collaborated with the Alcaide by funding and supplying the garrisons of Oran and Mers el-Kébir, and in so doing they became an important part of his military enterprise. It is precisely because of their importance that these actors were able to influence the shaping of the new political space created under the umbrella of the *asiento*.

¹⁰⁴ AGN.AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 2-2.

¹⁰⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-2, fol. 11 and Caj. 88, n° 4-2.

¹⁰⁶ Letter of Diego Fernández de Córdoba to Juan Rena. Oran, 21st August 1511. AGN. AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 3-3.

¹⁰⁷ AGN.AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 4-3. In one of the list of payments Rena referred to the lack of money in a very explicit way. According to him, it was impossible to carry out these tasks in a different way because there was no "blanca" (a coin of very little value) in the Alcaide's coffers. The captain-general had to resort to private loans to supply the periodic shortages of money to maintain the garrisons. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles*, 254-255.

Rena and the construction of the *Asiento*'s political space

When the Alcaide and Ferdinand the Catholic signed their agreement for the defence of Mers el-Kébir they created a new political space based on their common commitment to defend the frontier. What I mean by political space is an area where political activity was subject to specific rules and practices. The area in question was a diffused space between Córdoba, Málaga and Oran. Still it is difficult to define this area geographically as officially it was under the military jurisdiction of the general-captain, the Alcaide but mapping jurisdictions is by no means an easy task.¹⁰⁸ Captain-general were usually given authority over a defined territory, for instance the kingdoms of Navarre or Granada. The Alcaide was named captain-general of the Kingdom of Tlemcen but only some places in that kingdom were part of this military frontier, this included: Oran, Mers el-Kébir, Mostaganem and Mazagran. Nevertheless, the Alcaide's authority influenced politics beyond these cities, particularly in the southern corner of the Iberian Peninsula, where his authority was associated with the military defence of this new frontier. Due to this any single aspect relating to that activity was influenced by the privileges granted to him as captain-general. This new political space was governed according to different rules and practices, but these were shaped by the actors on the ground, and these actors were motivated by their own aims. It was these figures that put these privileges into practice, but once they have been established they were the ones who exploited, contested, and adapted them for their own purposes.

This political space was comprised of three different geographical areas. The first and the most evident were the frontier strongholds and their surroundings in the Maghreb, mainly Oran and Mers-el Kébir but also the coastal towns and cities under the Alcaide's domain like Arzew, Canastell and Mostaganem. The second was the Alcaide's seigniorial domain which included Comares, Espejo, and most importantly: Lucena, all of which were located in lower Andalusia, more specifically in the region between Cordoba and Malaga (see image 4). Last but not least, the third area was the space under the jurisdiction of the Alcaide de los Donceles as captain-general. This space is the most difficult to define because it was associated with a fictional mobile territory (the military

¹⁰⁸ On the diffuse carácter of this military jurisdiction, see Hespanha, "El espacio político," 104.

camp).¹⁰⁹ This jurisdictional space spanned the southern frontier, where the Alcaide acted as a higher political authority, but he was equally influential in Malaga and the other cities that played a key role in supplying the frontier garrisons, as well as the sea routes connecting them.¹¹⁰ Running parallel to the configuration of this political space, the rules that defined how actors in this space dealt with each other took shape. . These rules were defined principally by the king and the Alcaide (as the parts contracting the *asiento*) but particularly by the latter, which gave the actors who collaborated with him in the maintaining the frontier strongholds a strong influence.




Image 4. Map of the Alcaide de los Donceles' dominions.

The first and most evident transformation of this frontier region took place within the Alcaide's seigniorial estates. The nobleman was well aware of how important it was to have a logistical base for his military services to the crown. When he started to ascend

¹⁰⁹ The competencies of this charge were being shaped out of the experiences of the different captains-generals. J. F. Pardo Molero, "Oficio de calidad y de confianza. La condición de la capitania general en la Monarquía Hispánica," *Estudis*, 37 (2011): 361-375.

¹¹⁰ Hespanha, "El espacio político," 104.

in the royal service he transformed his patrimonial domains to support of his military enterprises. For instance, he invested large amounts of money in acquiring lands to improve the agricultural production of his domains, as well as the infrastructure to produce foodstuff, transforming Lucena, the capital of his seigniorial states, into a logistical base for his military enterprises.¹¹¹ This place became a breadbasket feeding the garrisons under his command. For example, in autumn 1511, the Alcaide asked Rena to send 2,000 *fanegas* of wheat from Lucena to supply Oran.¹¹² According to the Alcaide's estimations, Lucena was able to produce enough foodstuffs to supply Oran for three months.¹¹³ The Alcaide's son, the future governor of Oran, profited from the logistical structure that his father constructed in their seigniorial states. For instance, he was able to provide around 9,000 *fanegas* of wheat to Malaga's royal purveyor in order to supply Oran during the long alarm of 1530.¹¹⁴ This material base was improved with the acquisition of urban real estate in Malaga from where the Alcaide could conduct the supply to the Maghrebi strongholds. Soon after signing the *asiento* Ferdinand the Catholic ordered that the Alcaide be given a shipyard in Malaga's port, as well as some houses and warehouses.¹¹⁵ These urban structures together with the Alcaide's seigniorial estates constituted the infrastructure of the *asiento*'s logistics.

In parallel to this physical space there was another even more interesting one: the jurisdictional space of the *asientos*. This jurisdictional space affected all the activities related to the authority of the Alcaide as captain-general of the frontier, but its most interesting effect was the creation of a set of rules relating to military logistics. The contracts signed by the Alcaide and Ferdinand the Catholic contained a set of articles regulating the logistics required to sustain Mers el-Kébir and Oran. According to them the Alcaide was obliged to furnish the presidios with all the goods needed, but all local authorities were obliged to help and favour the Alcaide's staff in their logistical tasks. Moreover, all the goods sent to the frontier were free of taxes, rights or custom duties

¹¹¹ AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 6, nº 4. On Lucena, see Raúl Molina Recio, "El señorío de Lucena y los Fernández de Córdoba: formación y evolución en la Edad Moderna," in *Jornadas de historia de Lucena*, ed. L. F. Palma Robles (Lucena: Ayuntamiento de Lucena, 2009), 267-310.

¹¹² Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Juan Rena. Cartagena, 29th October 1511. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, nº 3-2.

¹¹³ Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Juan Rena. Burgos, 20th December 1511. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, nº 33.

¹¹⁴ AGS, Contaduría del Sueldo, Leg. 160, s.f.

¹¹⁵ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150611, nº 452 and Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 7, nº 129-1.

because these goods were devoted to the defence of the realm.¹¹⁶ Different local authorities tried to avoid the implementation of any measures that reinforced the authority of the Alcaide. Nevertheless, time and again the king supported him sending royal orders that allowed the Alcaide to overcome any legal obstacle or interference in regards to the military logistics.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the crown ordered the local authorities of southern Castile and Andalusia to help and favour the Alcaide's staff in their logistical tasks, a clear expression of the Alcaide's political authority in this region.¹¹⁸

Beyond the *asiento*'s text the contours of this jurisdiction were defined by the support that the king gave to the Alcaide in his struggle against other local actors. As a result of this, authority and jurisdiction merged and were overlapped. The different local authorities (such as urban governments or noblemen) contested the jurisdictional privileges of the captains-generals as a way to undermine the authority of a competing political actor.¹¹⁹ The most interesting and conflicting rule of this new jurisdictional space was the tax exemption on the goods sent to the presidios. Already in 1507, Ferdinand the Catholic compelled Malaga's authorities to respect this article of the *asiento* because they were trying to collect taxes on the goods that the Alcaide wanted to send to Mers el-Kébir.¹²⁰ Just a month later the king had to send a similar order to Malaga's authorities because they were trying to charge taxes on the wheat bought by the Alcaide to supply his garrison.¹²¹ Similar problems happened time and again, and in response the king ordered his subject to respect the *asiento*'s tax exemption.¹²² Thus, the items mentioned in the *asiento* and the subsequent royal orders confirming them against the opposition of the local authorities created a jurisdictional space free from taxes between the south of the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb.

¹¹⁶ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 200, fol. 1 and Contaduría de Mercedes, Tenencias de Fortalezas, Leg. 3, nº 3.

¹¹⁷ This was especially important regarding the restrictive regulation on the grain trade. AGS, RGS, Leg. 150611, nº 297 and 198, and Leg. 150806, nº 263.

¹¹⁸ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150610, nº 785; Leg. 150806, nº 494, and Leg. 150812, nº 544.

¹¹⁹ À. Casals, "Frontera, guerra, jurisdicció i plet: la Capitania General durant la primera meitat del segle XVI," *Manuscrits* 24 (2006): 159-164; and Antonio Jiménez Estrella, "Mondéjar Versus los Vélez: tensiones entre la capitania general y el poder señorial antes de la rebelión morisca," in *Los señoríos en la Andalucía Moderna. El Marquesado de los Vélez*, ed. F. Andújar Castillo and J. P. Díaz López (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 2007), 285-294.

¹²⁰ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150702, nº 320.

¹²¹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150703, nº 270

¹²² The Alcaide was facing this kind of problems still in 1512. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151208, nº 333.

The importance of the negotiation between the nobleman and the king appears clearly. Nevertheless, they were not the only actors involved in defining the new military frontier created by the *asiento*. Many of the Alcaide's men, for instance, Juan Rena, played a crucial role in implementing of the new rules derived from the *asiento*. This was made clear when he defended the privileges of the Alcaide in front of those who contested it. As captain-general of Tlemcen, the Alcaide was one of the main military authorities in the region between southern Iberia and the Maghreb. He owned naval resources and had enormous authority over the sea routes in this region. As a result, the Alcaide became an active figure in the fight against the corso, an activity that gave him important benefits through the commercialisation of goods he seized. Such was the case at the beginning of 1511, when a Muslim corsair's boat was captured and the booty was sold off. Nevertheless, he needed to defend his rights in front of people like Juan de Almenara who tried to obtain a large share of the booty because of his participation in the seizure of the enemy's boat.¹²³ The distribution of booty shares among the people involved in the corso were frequently drawn out into long trials in the local tribunals.¹²⁴ This was the reason why the Alcaide needed to defend his privileges as captain-captain when faced with legal litigation, and a merchant like Rena was a useful ally for that.¹²⁵ When the Alcaide entrusted the defence of his rights over the ship's booty to Juan Rena, he not only showed that he aimed to get the lion's share of the corso's income, he also showed that he believed Rena capable enough to defend the implementation of the new rules in this region.¹²⁶

Rena was a reliable agent of the Alcaide and worked in the defence of his privileges as captain-general. In the winter of 1511 Rena had to buy 1,000 pigs to be converted into salted pork on behalf of the Alcaide who needed to feed Oran's garrison for the whole winter.¹²⁷ The extraordinary size of the operation drew the attention of one local tax farmer, who was in charge of collecting the salt tax. Alleging his right to collect tax on the salt he tried to earn some money by making Rena to pay taxes on the enormous

¹²³ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151103, n° 567.

¹²⁴ David Coleman, "Of Corsairs, Convert and Renegades: Forms and Functions of Coastal Raiding on Both Sides of the Far Western Mediterranean, 1490-1540," in *Spanning the Strait: Studies in Unity in the Western Mediterranean*, ed. Y-G. Liang et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 173-176.

¹²⁵ On the legal and political formation of early modern merchants, see Andrea Caracausi, "Formazione mercantile, conoscenza del diritto e idioma politici," in *Formazione alla politica, politica della formazione a Venezia in Età moderna*, ed. A. Caracausi ad A. Conzato (Rome: Viella, 2013), 141-157.

¹²⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 2-2.

¹²⁷ Letter of Juan Bautista de Arborán a Juan Rena. Oran, 16th November [1511]. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 7-3.

amount of salt needed to conserve the pigs. Rena detected the abuse and refused to pay, which started an argument that resulted in a formal complaint in front of the royal administration. This issue was finally solved by a royal order condemning the tax farmer's attempt to undermine the Alcaide's privileges.¹²⁸ The anecdote shows how important it was to trust the logistical tasks to men like Rena, who were capable of detecting and dealing with the abuses against the Alcaide's privilege. Nevertheless, what is really interesting is that through his actions Rena helped to implement the *asiento's* tax exemption, to put it clearly, Rena helped to establish one of the key rules of this new jurisdictional space.

Considering the crucial services that Rena offered it is not surprising that the Alcaide favoured him. The same sense of reciprocity that ruled the relationship between the king and this nobleman applied to those between the Alcaide and the many merchants who supported his military enterprise. This concept was expressed by Andrea Paravesyn when he wrote to Juan Rena about some of the Alcaide's debts.¹²⁹ In exchange for their services the nobleman was obliged to grant favours and protection for his collaborators. This was evident from the benefices and advantages that Rena got from his relationship with the Alcaide. The first and most important asset that the Alcaide offered Rena in exchange for his crucial services was protection.¹³⁰ In order to understand how important the Alcaide's protection was for Rena it is necessary to look at the situation through his own eyes. The western Mediterranean was a hazardous place for someone like Rena for a variety of reasons, but especially because of his Venetian origin. From September 1507 to December 1508, Venetian state-galleys were obliged to stop trading in the region but thanks to the Alcaide de los Donceles' protection, Juan Rena was able to keep trading without the threat of being attacked by the Castilian Navy.¹³¹ Rena also avoided

¹²⁸ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151203, n° 228.

¹²⁹ Letter of Andrea Paravesyn to Juan Rena. Valladolid, 3rd September 1513. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 5-1, fol. 3.

¹³⁰ On the importance of protection in early modern trade, see the classic works F. C. Lane, "Oceanic Expansion: Force and Enterprise in the Creation of Oceanic Commerce," *Journal of Economic History* 10, n° 1 (1950): 19-31; and Id., "The Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," *Journal of Economic History* 18, n° 4 (1958): 401-417.

¹³¹ Marino Sanuto, *I diarii di Marino Sanuto* (Venice: Deputazione Veneta di Storia Patria, 1879-1902), Vol. VII, 180, 197, 237, 618-619, 621, 640, 671 and 681. The more recent and complete study on the Venetian state galleys is Claire Judde de Larivière, *Naviguer, commercer, gouverner. Économie maritime et pouvoirs à Venise (XVe-XVIIe siècles)* (Leiden: Brill, 2008). On the Venetian trade in the Maghreb, see Bernard Doumerc, *Venise et la Barbarie (de 1230 à 1510)* (Toulouse: Université Toulouse-le Mirail, 1981).

committing acts of the violence against fellow Venetian merchants in the Maghreb.¹³² Since 1509 the Alcaide's protection became even more important when Ferdinand the Catholic joined the League of Cambrai against Venice.¹³³ From that point onwards, the king forbade his subjects to trade with Venetians and allowed them seizure of the latter's goods.¹³⁴ Juan Rena escaped this punishment thanks to the Alcaide's protection something that deeply contrasted with the royal order that prohibited Venetian trade in the whole region.¹³⁵ To put in the words of the Venetian writer Girolamo Priuli, Rena, was able to keep trading in a moment when, 'all these poor unfortunate Venetians were prosecuted all around the world worse than the Jews'.¹³⁶

Beyond the need to obtain protection in such difficult circumstances Rena's close relationship with the Alcaide and the influential people within his circle who managed the African policy of the Hispanic Monarchy offered an obvious attraction.¹³⁷ After the conquest of Mers el-Kébir the Venetians began to envisage a new era in Mediterranean trade marked by the presence of the Castilian army in the Maghreb.¹³⁸ In this new context the Spanish authorities not only dominated Mers el-Kébir (something crucial for the commerce in the region) Venetians also considered the fallen of Oran (the Maghreb's commercial hub *par excellence*) as something imminent. In fact, it was commonly assumed in Venice that in their next expedition the Spanish would conquer most of the Maghreb.¹³⁹ Marino Sanuto pointed in the same direction when he referred to the rumours of a Spanish attack against Tunis, the most important economic and political centre of the Maghreb. When he received the news of Oran's conquest Sanuto noted that some

¹³² Letter of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba to the King. Medina del Campo, 11th June 1512. BRAH, SyC, A-14, fol. 13.

¹³³ Felix Gilbert, "Venice in the Crisis of the League of Cambrai," in *Renaissance Venice*, ed. J. R. Hale (London: Faber, 1973), 274-292; See also R. Finlay, "Crisis and Crusade in the Mediterranean: Venice, Portugal and the Cape Route to India (1498-1509)," *Studi Veneziani* 28 (1994): 45-90.

¹³⁴ BRAH, Mss. 9/629, fols. 271-272.

¹³⁵ Girolamo Priuli, *I diarii di Girolamo Priulii* (Bologna: Nicola Nanichelli, 1875), Vol. IV, 115.

¹³⁶ 'Et questi poveri et sventurati Venetiani heranno perseguitati per tuto il mondo pegio che iudei'. *Ibid.* Vol. IV, 374.

¹³⁷ As a part of their commercial strategy, Venetian merchants used to establish close relationships with the authorities of the territories where they carried out their economic activity as a part of their commercial strategy. Fabien Faugeron, "The Venetian "Nation" in Sicily in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century: The Example of the Valier Brother's Company," in *Union in Separation. Diasporic Groups and Identities in the Eastern Mediterranean (1100-1800)*, ed. G. Christ et al. (Rome: Viella, 2014), 634-636.

¹³⁸ On the impact of the Spanish conquest on the Venetian trade in the Maghreb, see Bernard Doumerc, "Vénetiens et espagnols en Afrique du nord (1492-1535)," in *Le partage du monde. Échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée médiévale*, ed. M. Balard and A. Ducellier (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), 385-397.

¹³⁹ Priuli, *I diarii di Girolamo*, Vol. II, 400 and 392.

Venetian merchants from the Rialto feared that, after this new victory in Africa, Venetian interests would be the next target of the unstoppable Spanish army.¹⁴⁰ As we can see, at a time when the horizon of the Venetian commerce was turning black, Rena was establishing a service relationship with the new owners of the region.

Being close to the political authorities who controlled this area was crucial considering how influential they were in commercial life. The Castilian rule of the strongholds in the Maghreb had terrible effects on the merchants trading there. The economic demands of the garrison frequently obliged the military authorities to seize merchants' money and goods. This happened, for instance, with a group of French merchants who lost their money (400,000 maravedies) when the authorities "loaned" it from them in order to pay the salaries of the Mers el-Kebir's garrison.¹⁴¹ A later inquiry into the activities of the Alcaide revealed that his factors in Mers el-Kébir used to collect duties from the merchants who aimed to trade with the Muslims. Important Genoese merchants such as Benito Negrone, or the Venetian merchants of the state galleys were obliged to pay, but not Rena.¹⁴² Rena did not suffer at the hands of any of the Alcaide's agents. He was fortunate to have such a good patron, the French merchant Esteban de Andrea was not so lucky and, in addition to paying the new duties imposed by the Alcaide, the merchant also lost his money and merchandise notwithstanding his royal safe-conduct.¹⁴³ Rena did not suffer these kinds of disadvantages; in fact it was just the opposite, thanks to his relationship with the Alcaide he got privileged access to the local trade.

The Alcaide needed to obtain alternative sources of funding in order to maintain the two garrisons under his command, and trade was one of them. Oran was an important hub of the commercial trade between the Mediterranean Sea and the Maghreb.¹⁴⁴ In addition to this excellent geographical position we have to add the privileges of the *asiento* which provided an excellent legal regime to conduct trade under the umbrella of

¹⁴⁰ Santo, *I diarii di Marino*, Vol. VII, 180 and 401.

¹⁴¹ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época. Leg. 187, s.f. Apparently, these practices were frequent in the Spanish presidios. BRAH, SyC, A-8, fols. 168-169.

¹⁴² AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, leg. 187, fol. 74.

¹⁴³ AGS, RGS, Leg. 150611, nº 220 and Leg. 150612, nº 137.

¹⁴⁴ A brief overview, mainly focused on the XVIII century can be found, in Eloy Martín Corrales, "Orán. Entre fortaleza y mercado (1509-1792)," in *Andalucía, España, las Indias. Pasión por la historia. Homenaje al profesor Antonio-Miguel Bernal*, eds. C. Martínez Shaw, P. Tedde de Lorca and S. Tinoco Rubiales (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2015), 545-563.

the tax exemption. The merchants who supported the Alcaide by supplying the Maghrebi strongholds were able to profit from the *asiento*'s jurisdiction while conducting their own business.¹⁴⁵ This was confirmed in Juan Rena's private accounts. When he was working for the Alcaide on the logistical tasks to maintain Oran and Mers el-Kébir, Rena sent merchandise together with the supplies needed to feed the garrisons, making use of the Alcaide's ships but also of the tax exemption.¹⁴⁶ Just before a voyage to Mers el-Kébir the *almojarifes* (farmers of the *almojarifazgo* or customs duty) discovered Rena's manoeuvres and proceeded to collect tax on his merchandise. Rena paid the taxes, but since he loaded the merchandise 'in the name of the Alcaide', the tax farmers were obliged to return the money when the king sent a royal order about the tax exemption.¹⁴⁷ Rena's ability to profit from the *asiento*'s jurisdiction grew when he started conducting business in association with the Alcaide. Together their businesses attracted the attention of the *almojarifes*, who protested against the Alcaide's staff's attempts to avoid the paying customs duties through irregular practices.¹⁴⁸ Once again Rena's private accounts confirm these practices. In June 1510 Rena sent to the Alcaide 4,330 pieces of *bordates*.¹⁴⁹ Through their collaboration the Alcaide and Rena were able to transform a bulwark like Oran into an active bazaar.

In order to properly understand the extent to which Rena profited from his relationship with the Alcaide we can compare Rena's position in regional trade with that of other commercial actors such as the brothers Agustian and Pantaleon Italian. The Genoese merchants enjoyed an advantageous position in Iberian trade thanks to the financial services they offered to the Catholic Monarchs which provided them with

¹⁴⁵ The authorities were well aware of the possibilities of smuggling inherent to the *asiento*. In April 1507 an inspection was ordered on the Alcaide's ships. AGS, RGS, Leg. 150704, n° 92. Nevertheless, the measures imposed to avoid it were much more focus on the fight against the commerce of arms and other forbidden merchandises with the Muslim. J. E. López de Coca Castañer, "Relaciones mercantiles entre Granada y Berbería en época de los Reyes Católicos," *Baética* 1 (1978): 305-306 and M. T. López Beltrán, "Corso y piratería en el comercio exterior del reino de Granada en época de los Reyes Católicos," *Baética* 22 (2000): 384-385.

¹⁴⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 2, fol. 32.

¹⁴⁷ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 2, fol. 34. On this customs duties and the agents of its collection, see M. A. Ladero Quesada, "Almojarifazgo sevillano y comercio exterior de Andalucía en el siglo XV," *Anuario de Historia Económica y Social* 2 (1969): 69-155, and J. D. González Arce, "Las rentas del almojarifazgo de Sevilla," *Studia Historica Historia Medieval* 15 (1997): 209-254.

¹⁴⁸ This time the crown ordered an inquiry to shed light on the issue. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151007, n° 297 and Leg. 151010, n° 235.

¹⁴⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 3-1. I will come back to this issue later.

commercial licences to trade in the Maghreb.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, they improved their position by lending money to the Alcaide during the African campaigns. However, when the financial situation of the nobleman became critical, they withdrew their financial support from the Alcaide's military enterprise. In 1507 they refused to pay the Alcaide's bills of exchange provoking the angry reaction from the nobleman. The issue ended in court as both party's blamed each other for not respecting their previous agreements.¹⁵¹ The brothers' struggle against the Alcaide had a painful effect on their business in the Maghreb. In 1511 the Alcaide's tenant in Oran seized the merchandise that Agustín and Pantaleón Italian sent to Africa, violating the royal monopoly on the African trade. The brothers' employed their influence in the royal court to get a royal order to have the goods returned but the Alcaide's tenant ignored the royal order.¹⁵² Maybe the Italians enjoyed royal favour due to the financial services they offered to the Catholic Monarchs, but, as after their incident with the Alcaide's staff showed, the latter held the key to trade in the Maghreb. While the Italian brothers were losing their privileged access to this commerce Juan Rena was able to keep trading in Oran. Thanks to his commercial activities in the service of the Alcaide, Rena could keep trading when other actors, who even enjoyed a better position with the Catholic Monarchs, were not able to. The lesson that we can extract here is that the Alcaide and the local tradesmen were giving form to a code in which the African market could only be accessed by merchants who the Alcaide approve of.

The Alcaide and merchants like Rena were capable of configuring this new political space between both shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Their agency in this process becomes even more evident if we analyse how they were able to counter the crown's plans regarding African trade. In 1510, King Ferdinand the Catholic decided to change the *status quo* of commerce in the Maghreb creating a *casa de contratación* (house of trade) in Oran. This was an attempt to centralise and monopolise the commerce with

¹⁵⁰ BRAH, Mss. 9/629, fol. 54. Their mercantile activities as well as their rise and decline at the service of the Catholic Monarchs have been studied in José Enrique López de Coca Castañer "Genoveses en la corte de los Reyes Católicos: los hermanos Italian," in *Moneda y monedas en la Europa medieval (siglos XII-XV)* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1999), 457-483.

¹⁵¹ ARChGr, Pleitos, Caj. 1312, expediente 1. The trial lasted until 1512 and was matter of discussion in different royal institutions. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 25, nº 355 and AGS, RGS, Leg. 151209, nº 423 and Leg. 151210, nº 128.

¹⁵² AGS, RGS, Leg. 151110, nº 534 and Leg. 151112, nº 307. Their situation turned to worse when the crown got notice of Agustín Italian's travels to the Maghreb violating the royal monopole. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151110, nº 430.

Africa through this city. After the creation of this institution in February 1510, all the merchants aiming to trade in the Kingdom of Tlemcen were obliged to send their merchandise to Oran and, once there, to sell it to Alfonso Sánchez, the king's treasurer, as he was the only person allowed to conduct trade in Tlemcen, by virtue of a royal monopoly.¹⁵³ He and his agents were the only ones able to trade with Jews and Muslims from Tlemcen, which implied that there was a prohibition of direct trade between the Iberian Peninsula and Tlemcen. Furthermore, according to the legal instructions that ruled the institution the Alcaide, as captain-general, had to help Sánchez to make the monopoly effective, principally by prosecuting merchants who conducted trade directly.¹⁵⁴ This new configuration of the African trade went against the Alcaide's economic interest because in that time he was involved a commercial association with Juan Rena. Their aim was to introduce massive amounts of merchandise in the African market via Oran, and make a good profit.¹⁵⁵ An examination Rena's private accounts shows that in November 1510 he sent to the Alcaide 1,200 shoes and almost 200 shirts (goods that could easily be sold to the soldiers) but also luxury goods such as 25 pieces of *cordelates* from Flanders or 104 pieces of *floretes* from Cordoba.¹⁵⁶ The fact that Rena was trading with this merchandise in Oran via the Alcaide was obvious, but what was even more obvious was that their commercial activities went against the new monopoly. The crown was entrusting the implementation of the new monopoly to its most dangerous enemy. The Alcaide not only enjoyed an enormous degree of autonomy in Oran where he was the main authority, he also had the structures and the contacts to conduct trade on a large scale, which could break the monopoly. This was made evident in his next operation with Rena, when both introduced more than 4,000 pieces of *bordates* (a luxury textile highly appreciated in the Maghreb) into the African market via Oran.¹⁵⁷ Interestingly Alfonso Sánchez, the owner of this monopoly, struggled to exploit it but while he sued and prosecuted merchants who

¹⁵³ A. Díaz Borrás, "La casa de contratación de Orán y el cambio en la filosofía de las transacciones entre Berbería y Valencia, 1510-1514," *Sharq Al-Andalus* 9 (1992): 19-27. On Alonso Sánchez, the owner of the privilege, see E. Salvador Esteban, "Un aragonés en la Valencia de Fernando el Católico. Alfonso Sánchez, lugarteniente de tesorero general," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 20 (2008): 709-721.

¹⁵⁴ Díaz Borrás, "La casa de contratación," 23, and López de Coca Castañer, "Relaciones mercantiles," 304-305. The royal order to the Alcaide de los Donceles commanding him to respect the monopole and help the Sanchez's agents in AGS, RGS, Leg. 151002, n° 168.

¹⁵⁵ At this time several nobles were employing commercial activities to improve their incomes, in a moment in which they were facing the necessity of fix their incomes to the new expenses derived to the royal service. Yun Casalilla, "Consideraciones para el estudio," 18-20 and 23.

¹⁵⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105-4.

¹⁵⁷ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 3-1. The commercialization of this product was so profitable that the most important members of the Genoese community fought, unsuccessfully, to control it. López de Coca Castañer, "Genoveses en la corte," 478.

conducted trade outside the monopoly, he did nothing against the Alcaide's businesses. In 1516, Sánchez and Ferdinand the Catholic abandoned the project because of its failure.¹⁵⁸ The enormous volume of trade that Rena and the Alcaide conducted in Oran outside the royal monopoly shows the extent to which these two actors were able to contradict the royal orders in place of their own interests in this space.

The Alcaide de los Donceles tried to enhance his position as military entrepreneur by improving the commercial connections of the militarised bazaar under his command. Thus, in 1512, he asked Ferdinand the Catholic for a commercial licence to send a ship from Oran to Tunis, Annaba, and Algiers. The text of the royal mercy granting this privilege made reference to the Alcaide's aim to 'open up commerce between the aforementioned city of Tunis and the city of Oran'.¹⁵⁹ The licence was quite generous and comprehended 'any merchandise, or merchants, or persons, either Christians or Moors or Jews [...] from whatever kingdom'.¹⁶⁰ More interesting, the royal privilege also included safe-conduct to 'all the merchants, Moors and Jews, from whatever kingdom, neighbourhoods or inhabitants of the city of Tunis or of whatever city of Moors' to come to Oran to trade.¹⁶¹

The generosity of this royal licence shows that the monarch supported the Alcaide's aims. Unfortunately, the new direction of King Ferdinand's foreign policy deprived us from knowing what the effects of this measure were, as the Alcaide and Rena moved to Navarre shortly after. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Alcaide aimed to improve the commercial dimension of the strongholds under his authority. When he moved to Navarre, in 1515, he brought the man who acted as his personal connection with the mercantile milieu: Juan Rena.¹⁶² Nevertheless, the death of Ferdinand the Catholic and the subsequent political crisis cut short their plans as Rena was obliged to stay in Navarre. Due to the new situation of these actors we cannot know how the internal dynamics of the *asiento* functioned from then onward, but the commercial activity did continue. A

¹⁵⁸ Díaz Borrás, "La casa de contratación," 25-28.

¹⁵⁹ 'Porque el trato de la mercadería de la dicha ciudad de Túnez y ciudad de Orán se comunique'. AGS, RGS, Leg. 151206, nº 649.

¹⁶⁰ 'Cualesquier mercaderías e mercaderes e otras personas, cristianos o moros o judíos [...] de cualesquier reinos que sean'. *Ibíd.*

¹⁶¹ 'A todos los mercaderes moros e judíos de cualesquier reinos que sean vecinos e moradores de la dicha ciudad de Túnez e de otras cualesquier ciudades de moros'. *Ibíd.*

¹⁶² Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Juan Rena. Plasencia, 4th December 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 2-4.

report of 1516 denounced the Alcaide's agents for 'sending the soldiers to Mostaganem and Mazagran to deal with traders and others to Habibas to collect orchil'.¹⁶³ The fact that trade was being conducted in the Alcaide's African domains, and that orchil (lichen used to produce dyestuff highly appreciated in Italy) was involved, shows that the Alcaide and his agents continued to make use of their privileged position and conduct trade at an international level.¹⁶⁴

The Alcaide de los Donceles and the merchants orbiting around him were also constructing a space in which the Alcaide was able to impose his will. As I said before he enjoyed a strong position *vis à vis* the merchants because he, as the captain-general, held the key to African trade through Oran. The businessmen who collaborated with him in sustaining the presidios like Rena were able to keep trading there but they had to accept the prominent position of the Alcaide. This was evident in the Alcaide's commercial partnership with Rena; though Rena was in charge of acquiring (on his credit) and transporting all the merchandise he only obtained the 10% of the profits, the rest went into the Alcaide's pockets. This unfair distribution of profit was imposed by the Alcaide to Rena's agent in Oran, Juan Bautista de Arbora, a Genoese merchant who advised Rena to accept the Alcaide's terms without arguing too much.¹⁶⁵ Rena might have felt disappointed by the unfair distribution of the profits, but it was clear that he had already contributed to creating a military frontier, where access to the commercial privileges was very closely related to the collaboration with the Alcaide. This was underscored in a letter that the Genoese merchant Francisco Franco sent to Juan Rena in 1515. Franco told Rena that the Genoese merchants were abandoning Oran, which was quite dangerous for the local economy because 'among the businessmen living there, they had the best houses'. In order to solve the problem Franco offered his services asking to be nominated as collector of the trade customs in Oran:

¹⁶³ 'Envían los soldados a Mostagan y a Mazagran a tratar en sus mercaderías y a otros al Habibas a coger orchilla'. AGS, Estado, Leg. 461, nº 9. The Habibas Islands are a little volcanic archipelago located about 12 kilometres from Oran.

¹⁶⁴ Orchil was highly esteemed product as it shows the struggle between merchants from Genoa or Florence and Spanish political figures on its exportation from the Canary Island. Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Canary Islands after the Conquest: The Making of a Colonial Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 70-74 and 166-169. On the Genoese demand of this product see I. M. Gómez Galtier, "El genovés Francisco Lerca, prestamista y comerciante de Orchilla en Las Palmas de Gran Canaria en el decenio 1517-1526," *Revista de historia canaria* 141-148 (1963-1964): 70-76.

¹⁶⁵ Letter of Juan Bautista de Arbora to Juan Rena. Oran, 16th November. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, nº 7-3.

And to remedy that the marquis, my lord, does not lose in customs it is necessary to place in charge of the rents a wise person who is loved by the Genoese. [...] I really want to go there to that charge [...] because this is something that I would receive great honour from, and the marquis enough profit from, and also because you know my ability and the will that I have always had for benefitting the marquis's treasury [...] I would appreciate grateful if you would talk to the marquis, and explain to him the profit that he could obtain from it. Because if my kin and friends in Genoa know that I am in such a position, lots of them will come with the hope that I could give them favourable trading terms as I would do, and as such the customs would yield a great profit, and that would stoke the trade, that at the moment is almost dead.¹⁶⁶

Franco's offer was attractive as he was offering to use his own social capital to improve the connection between Oran and one of the most important commercial centres in the Mediterranean: Genoa. But what is really interesting to us here is the way that he was selling it, by alleging that it would be convenient for the Alcaide's revenues. In the same letter he tried to show his commitment to the Alcaide's service by expressing his concerns about how the Alcaide's servants would struggle against one another damaging the nobleman's treasury. Furthermore, in his next letter Franco estimated that his offer would give the Alcaide 1,000,000 maravedies per year and referred to his efforts and suffering attempts to solve the problems of the Alcaide's treasury.¹⁶⁷ The fact that Francisco Franco tried to obtain his nomination as a collector customs duties collector in Oran by showing himself as a selfless servant of the Alcaide and underlining the economic benefits that this nomination would bring to the nobleman was quite revealing. This example illustrates that the commercial community of this region were well aware that winning the Alcaide's favour was the safest way to access the African trade through Oran. At the same time this example shows how the Alcaide and Rena, contributed to

¹⁶⁶ 'E porque para remediar que el marqués, mi señor, no perdiese en los derechos es menester que a esas rentas esté persona que sea muy hábil e a quien los genoveses tengan amor. E porque es cosa a donde a mi se seguiría mucha honra e al marqués harto provecho, e también porque conoce el habilidad mía e deseo que he siempre he tenido y tengo de servir e aprovechar a su hacienda mucho quisiera ir allá a ese cargo [...] merced recibiré que platicando con el marqués mi señor le toque en alguna manera sobre ello dándole a entender el provecho que de ello se le seguiría porque sabiendo en Génova mis parientes y amigos que estoy a ese cargo, muchos acudirían con esperanza que yo hubiese de hacerles cortesía en el fuero de sus ropas como lo haría. E a los derechos se seguiría mucho provecho e se avivaría la negociación, la cual está casi muerta'. Letter of Francisco Franco to Juan Rena. Malaga, 18th June 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 5-1.

¹⁶⁷ Letter of Francisco Franco to Juan Rena. Málaga, 26th June 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 5-3.

shape a frontier with its own rules. One of these rules (maybe the golden one) was the necessity of fitting together commercial activities and the Alcaide's interests.

It is difficult to measure the success of their formula because both Rena and the Alcaide abandoned this space as I mentioned before. However, we know that their way of combining royal service, frontier defence and commerce was imitated by others.¹⁶⁸ Thus, for instance, in 1523 Juan de Guzmán, an inhabitant of Malaga and one of Rena's acquaintances, offered Rodrigo Ponce de León, the Duke of Arcos, a plan to take Castil de Pescadores, a coastal town near Vélez de la Gomera.¹⁶⁹ Already in an earlier version of the plan Juan de Guzmán mentioned that conquering and maintaining this enclave the Duke would win lots of honours but also money.¹⁷⁰ The parallelism with Oran's model is even more evident in Guzman's later version. This time Guzmán mentioned that the customs duties from the trade of the enclave would allow the Duke to maintain a garrison while still earning a lot of money. Moreover, Guzmán suggested to the Duke of Arcos that in time Castil de Pescadores could possibly compete with Oran as a hub of the Afro-Mediterranean trade by adopting the commercial status and regulation of this city.¹⁷¹ The nobleman rejected Guzmán's offer but it shows that the formula advanced by the Alcaide de los Donceles and Rena was seen as a successful one. As a result, their method was circulating beyond the limits of the political spa frontier that they had shaped. Whether they had intended to do this or not, the the Alcaide and Rena had provided an example that other actors could followed in any other similar frontier. Needless to say, they did not intentionally set out to create a new political formula as the granting of privileges in exchange of military services was an old procedure. Nevertheless, Rena and the Alcaide adapted this general principle to their ends and to the frontier context. This was crucial not only because other actors could incorporate their procedures, but because in putting their principles into practice they were adapting the system of exchange between the crown and the military aristocracy. Such adaption helped to keep the system alive and gave it the strength to deal with the new challenge of defending the empire's frontiers.

¹⁶⁸ The paralelisms with the strategy adopted by the Duke of Medina Sidonia to maintain and exploit the African presidios under his command in the Seventeenth century are astonishing. Salas Almela, *Colaboración y conflicto*, 214-220, and Id., *El poder de la aristocracia*, 274-289.

¹⁶⁹ AHN-SN, Osuna, Caj. 1635, nº 68. His relationship with Rena lasted at least since 1511. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, nº 2, fol. 1.

¹⁷⁰ AHN-SN, Osuna, Caj. 1635, nº 72.

¹⁷¹ AHN-SN, Osuna, Caj. 1635, nº 76.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have analysed the dynamics that created a new political space during the empire building process. Its configuration was very close related to the construction of the realm's southern frontier, between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb. By focusing on the activity of the Alcaide de los Donceles and the men who he dealt with we can identify some of the key factors that influenced and shaped this process. The first and most important factor was the crown's need to guarantee the protection of the new frontier in an environment where the participation of the local nobility was the only solution. Nevertheless, the alliance between Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide de los Donceles was not restricted to the military sphere. On the contrary their agreement on the defence of the frontier stronghold also had an impact in southern Andalusia, where the Alcaide reinforced his position as a political figure in the face of his fellow nobles.

Beyond the important alliance between King Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide, this case study also allows us to go beyond the dyadic model that has dominated the analysis of the noble participation in the Hispanic Monarchy's government. In the same way that the crown needed the collaboration of its noblemen to guarantee the defence of its frontiers, the nobleman also depended on the collaboration of its servants and agents to carry out these tasks. In this case the merchants who collaborated with the Alcaide, and supported the new military enterprise in the Maghreb were essential to fulfilling the terms of the *asiento* signed between the Ferdinand the Catholic and the Alcaide. Rena's various activities for the Alcaide between 1507 and 1511 shows how much the latter depended on the collaboration of merchants. Without their aid the Alcaide would not have had such a robust administrative apparatus that in the end became the backbone of his political ascension.

The important role that these merchants played in the *asiento*'s execution, also allowed them to shape the political space that was taking form on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea. In return for their service the Alcaide offered these men, protection, support and commercial privileges as he did with Juan Rena. The political authority that the Alcaide gained from his nomination as captain-general was what ultimately allowed him attract men like Juan Rena who had economic, social and cultural capital. Furthermore, we can conclude that although these new frontiers were governed by

noblemen like the Alcaide, the military frontier that took form in them was not solely defined by the relationship between noblemen and the crown. On the contrary, men like Rena who served the Alcaide and collaborated with him in the formation of these noble frontier systems helped to shape the particular space from the ground. Such was the case in Oran, when Rena and the Alcaide converted it from a stronghold to the doorway of the Maghrebi market. This development was quite different to what the crown and the inner circle of the imperial government had intended; as they only thought of Oran as a simple bulwark for defending the southern frontier of the empire.

The collaboration between the Alcaide de los Donceles and Juan Rena was a central element in the development of the new political space born out of the *asiento*. When Rena and the Alcaide exchanged services and favours they also contributed to the creation of a space in which the service relationships between private actors and the Alcaide mattered more than those between these actors and the crown. The example of Rena compared to that of the brothers Pantaleon and Agustin Italian, show that the access to Maghreb's market depended more on the Alcaide's will than on the permissions granted by the crown. The fact that the Alcaide's influence superseded the crown's on this matter shows to the extent to which Oran as well as its commercial routes had become part of a frontier with its own rules and practices. It was precisely the ability of these actors working in tandem that these spaces took shape, and as a consequence made it possible to implement and maintain effective defence mechanisms on the empire frontier. To put it differently, Rena and the Alcaide transformed Oran from a bulwark to a bazaar, but in so doing they preserved a crucial piece of the empire's defence.

Chapter 3

Serving in a Conquered Kingdom: ‘Micer Johan’ and the Incorporation of Navarre into the Hispanic Monarchy

Introduction

In summer 1512, the troops of Ferdinand the Catholic, led by the Duke of Alba, conquered the kingdom of Navarre. While the initial campaign was quite easy (the capital of the kingdom surrendered without resistance only six days after the beginning of the invasion), the situation soon became more problematic. The quick conquest was followed by a counterattack of the Navarrese monarchs and the French army in the autumn of the same year. It was only the resistance of the Duke of Alba in Pamplona, (the capital) that enabled the Castilian authorities to maintain their dominion over Navarre. Four years later, during the dynastic crisis that followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, the Navarrese King Juan of Albret, with the help of a group of Navarrese nobles, again failed in his attempt to recover the kingdom. In 1521, with the crisis of the *Comunero* revolt as backdrop, a French offensive, again with the active participation of many Navarrese notables, conquered the Pyrenean kingdom. The imperial army of Charles V recovered most of these lands quickly, but the frontier did not return to its original position until

1524.¹ All of these events were clear evidence of the difficulty of incorporating a kingdom conquered by arms. In this chapter, I will focus on the role of the king's men like Rena in this difficult challenge.

The activity of Juan Rena in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy is interesting precisely because it reflects some of the most important challenges which this political entity was forced to face during the first half of the sixteenth century. One of these challenges was precisely to incorporate the multiple political communities (Granada, Navarre, Naples, etc.) that were conquered by force of the arms. In all these cases, the military conquest was followed by a much more complex period of political integration.² To put it more simply, conquering a territory was easier than guaranteeing its permanence within the new empire.

Behind the battles, the real issue was to attain the necessary support within the local community, which depended on two important factors: first, to determine the place that the conquered entity would occupy within the wider framework of the multinational monarchy and, second, to construct the internal cohesion of the community after a traumatic period (in the case of Navarre a civil war and a military conquest).³ It is within the framework of these extremely complex processes of socio-political incorporation that the activity of a king's man like Rena becomes meaningful. Regarding the main purpose of this study, I believe that this is especially interesting because it allows us to perceive

¹ The conquest of Navarre was already narrated at the beginning of the sixteenth century by one of its witnesses. Luis Correa: *Historia de la Conquista del Reino de Navarra*, ed. J. Yanguas (Pamplona: Longás y Ripa, 1843). The classic works on the conquest are Prosper Boissonnade, *Histoire de la réunion de la Navarre à la Castille* (Paris : Picard et fils, 1898) and Luis Suárez Fernández, *Fernando el Católico y Navarra. El proceso de incorporación del reino a la Corona de España* (Madrid: Rialp, 1985). A polemical approach to the conquest can be found in Pedro Esarte Muniáin, *Navarra, 1512-1530: conquista, ocupación y sometimiento militar, civil y eclesiástico* (Pamplona, Pamiela, 2001); An accurate reconstruction of the events is Peio Monteano Sorbet, *La guerra de Navarra (1512-1529) crónica de la conquista española*, Pamplona, Pamiela, 2010. A complete collection of sources on the conquest can be found in María Isabel Ostolaza Elizondo, Juan Ignacio Panizo Santos and María Jesús Berzal Tejero, *Fernando el Católico y la empresa de Navarra (1512-1516)* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2012). For a recent overview on Navarre during the early modern period, see Alfredo Floristán Imízcoz, *El reino de Navarra y la conformación política de España (1512-1841)* (Madrid: Akal, 2014).

² The importance of these processes in the configuration of the Hispanic Monarchy has been recently pointed out. J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez and G. Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy," *Journal of Modern History* 81, n° 3 (2009): 501-536. On early modern conquest in general, see Mark Greengrass, "Conquest and Coalescence," in *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe*, ed. M. Greengrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 1-24.

³ Fernando Chavarría Múgica, "Monarquía fronteriza: guerra, linaje y comunidad en la España moderna (Navarra, siglo XVI)" (PhD. diss., European University Institute, 2006).

the complexity of the role played by the king's agents in regard to one of the most important issues in the empire-building process. Different historians have already pointed out the importance of these agents in processes of conquest and incorporation, but they have always restricted this to the role that such men played in the distribution of royal patronage among the local elite.⁴

As I aim to show in this chapter, it is impossible to fully understand the role of the king's men in the incorporation of a political community into an empire if an explanation about how these agents were able to accomplish their tasks is left out. Moreover, to understand how they interacted with the conquered community is of paramount importance for fully understanding their role in these political processes. Thus, in the following pages I will describe how Rena was able to become the key player in the military system of this territory and, in general, a starring actor in the process of political incorporation of the kingdom into the wider entity of the Hispanic Monarchy.⁵ In so doing, I aim to shed some light on the role of king's men like him in processes of incorporating political communities obtained as a result of the expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy.

Becoming crucial in a kingdom 'worse than the land of the Moors'

If Rena played a key role in the process of incorporating Navarre into the new Hispanic Monarchy, it was because he was able to become one of the most prominent figures in the political life of this kingdom after its conquest. At the end of the summer of 1512, Juan Rena arrived in Navarre, a kingdom that had been conquered by Ferdinand the Catholic a few weeks before. He went on to spend more than 13 years there. He arrived

⁴ Maurice Gresset, "Un fidèle de Louis XIV en Franche-Comté: Claude Boisot," in *Hommage a Roland Mousnier. Clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l'Epoque moderne*, ed. Y. Durand (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 169-182; Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 116-118, 131-132, 134, 137, 142 and 234-235; Id. "The Historical Development of Political Clientelism," *Journal of Interdisciplinary history* 18, n° 3 (1988): 427-430. More recently Darryl Dee, *Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV's France. Franche-Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674-1715* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2009), 42-48, 71-75, 97-98, 172-178, 181-183.

⁵ There is a brief monograph on Rena's role in the conquest of Navarre, but it is only the latest example of Rena's black legend. Pedro Esarte Muniain, *Juan Rena, clave en la conquista de Navarra* (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2011). The book contains a lot of mistakes that render it impossible to profit from reading it: its multiple anachronisms make it amusing (the hilarious comparison of Rena with some current politicians on p. 100 is only an example), but useless from a historiographical point of view.

in Pamplona as a mere bureaucrat in the military administration, working specifically on the transportation of money for the payment of the Castilian troops. This was a mission of little importance for a royal chaplain who had enjoyed the king's favour some years before when he had acted as the diplomatic ambassador to the King of Velez de la Gomera in the north of Africa. Nevertheless, when Rena left Navarre in 1525 he was considered one of the most important men in the monarchy's military administration and was well known to be a man of the king. Rena's "Navarrese years" were thus a very important phase in his life.

The years after the conquest were characterised by great instability in the kingdom: it became one of the theatres in which the struggle for European supremacy between the French and the Spanish monarchies took place. This new situation made it necessary to create a new military frontier practically *ex novo*. Furthermore, this military frontier was not only designed to protect the kingdom from the French enemy. As the events of 1512, 1516, and 1521 showed, the domination of the kingdom by the new authorities was also threatened by a large proportion of the native population. In this way, the internal divisions of Navarrese society, which had virtually lived in a state of civil war since the fifteenth century because of the traditional struggle between the *agramonteses* and *beamonteses*, played an important role.⁶

⁶ On the struggle between these factions, see Eloísa Ramírez Vaquero, *Solidaridades nobiliarias y conflictos políticos en Navarra, 1487-1464* (Pamplona: Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1990). On the turbulent politics in Navarre before its conquest, see Álvaro Adot Lerga, *Juan de Albret y Catalina de Foix o la defensa del Estado navarro (1483-1517)*, (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2005), 293-298. An opposed view in Luis Javier Fortún, "Derrumbe de la monarquía y supervivencia del reino: Navarra en torno a 1512," in *1512 Conquista e incorporación de Navarra. Historiografía, derecho y otros procesos de integración en la Europa renacentista*, ed. A. Floristán Imízcoz (Barcelona: Ariel, 2012), 201-298.




Image 5. Map of Navarre

Both the permanent menace of the external enemy, embodied by the powerful French army, and the fear of the internal enemy, personified by a significant proportion of the Navarrese notables, contributed to a perpetual state of alarm in the region. The presence of troops and the effort to build a new belt of modern fortresses were not enough, and their presence implied new kinds of tensions and difficulties. The activity of Juan Rena in Navarre was specially linked to the challenge of creating of a new military frontier during the first years after the conquest. In fact, to a great extent, Rena embodied the administrative apparatus sustaining this new military frontier.

First of all, Rena managed to become a key player in Navarre thanks to his previous experience in the southern frontier of the empire. The settlement of Rena in Navarre may seem totally unplanned, since he was only the substitute of the paymaster (captured by the French); however, it was just the opposite. Rena's presence in Navarre should be understood as a part of the strategy of implanting in the northern frontier of the monarchy a group of people with experience in frontier defence. When Ferdinand the Catholic wrote to his ambassador in the Holy Roman Empire to inform him of the victory against the French army in Navarre, he made reference to his troops defending Pamplona,

underling that, despite their small numbers, ‘the [people] cannot be better’.⁷ The king was right, because the agents deployed in the Pyrenean frontier were the most suitable for the challenge of managing a military defence in a frontier like this one. Juan Rena was a very important member of this group, which was headed by his patron, the Alcaide de los Donceles. The arrival of this nobleman and his men in Navarre meant a transfer of experience to this frontier. In fact, we can observe that the Alcaide’s men undertook the same tasks in Navarre that they had developed some years before in North Africa. For example, both in the Maghreb and in Navarre, the captains leading the troops were the same. Furthermore, in both contexts the same characters took charge of the same tasks. Hence, Sancho de Contreras, chamberlain of the Alcaide, was in charge of espionage and Juan Rena managed the logistics.⁸ Despite the fact that he arrived in Navarre after a brief stay preparing the navy employed for the transport of the English troops employed in the invasion of Guyenne from Vizcaya, his main background was serving the Alcaide de los Donceles in the administrative and logistic tasks of his *asiento*.⁹ There, he showed that he had the necessary skills for the organisation and management of a military system in a hostile context where it was necessary to conduct a defensive war without many resources. Thus, it is not surprising at all that Rena received a position in the military administration of the conquered kingdom. He had the necessary experience as a military bureaucrat managing resources in the frontier.

The functions of Rena as general paymaster of Navarre were, in theory, very limited and simple. He was in charge of receiving the money sent by the General Treasurer from the court and had to use it according to the decisions of the military authorities while always following bureaucratic procedure to show that the money of the king had been spent in a correct way.¹⁰ However, in reality, his responsibilities were much wider. He was the man who managed all the functions required to maintain the defensive system. Thus, Rena became the nerve centre of military logistics in the kingdom. When Emperor Charles V ordered the invasion of French territory from Navarre, Rena created

⁷ ‘Pero la [gente] que era no podía ser mejor’. Letter of Ferdinand the Catholic to Juan de Lanuza. Logroño, December 1512. ADA, Lerín, C. 98, nº 44.

⁸ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 187-2.

⁹ On the English army and the navy transporting it, see Julio César Santoyo, *De crónicas y tiempos británicos. Historia de una expedición militar inglesa en Guipúzcoa (junio-octubre 1512)* (San Sebastián: Grupo Dr. Camino de Historia Donostiarra, 1974).

¹⁰ For further details, see the instructions for Alonso de San Pedro to act as paymaster in the name of Rena. AGN. AP_RENA, Caj. 15, nº 1-16.

and led an efficient network capable of supplying the imperial army.¹¹ Clear proof of Rena's influence in this sphere was the correspondence between Charles V and the Count of Miranda relating to the siege of Fuenterrabía in the winter of 1524. At that moment, Rena was a clear authority in this field; he actually received orders directly from the emperor.¹² Indeed, the royal orders on this matter were inspired by Rena's advice.¹³ Rena's authority was so evident that he managed to contest and correct the orders of the viceroy on this matter.¹⁴ At the end of this campaign, the emperor continued trusting Rena and strictly followed his counsel on economic issues, such as the prices of supplies or when to buy and sell commodities in relation to changes in the region's market.¹⁵ All of this showed the extent to which Rena was the uncontested authority in the military logistics of the Navarrese kingdom at that moment.

The activities of Rena went beyond the sphere of logistics. Thus, for instance, Rena began to take a prominent role in the fortification works. As we saw before, Rena arrived in Navarre just before the siege of Pamplona, so he was able to take part in the defence of the city against the French army. This fact is important because Rena remained associated with the challenge of defending this city - a city conceived in the geopolitical imagination of that time as the 'key and wall that defends the said kingdom [of Navarre] as Spain'.¹⁶ For that reason, the new authorities decided to develop an ambitious programme of fortification renovation in the city. The programme basically consisted of a new fortress and a thorough remodelling of the urban defences according to the new exigencies of modern warfare.¹⁷ In this period, Pamplona remained in a permanent state of alert, under the threat of an enemy attack that could take the city in just a few days, something that needs to be taken into account when considering the complexity and

¹¹ Find an accurate description of the supply network (mainly composed by Rena's servants) in AGN, Tribunales Reales, 26946, fols. 10-12.

¹² Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Vitoria, 1st February 1524. ADA, Montijo, Caj. 50, n° 3, fol. 6.

¹³ Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Vitoria, 7th February 1524. *Ibíd.*, fol. 8.

¹⁴ Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Vitoria, 24th February 1524. *Ibíd.* fol. 9.

¹⁵ Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Burgos, 30th March 1524. *Ibíd.*, fol. 20.

¹⁶ 'Llave y cerca que defiende así al dicho reino [of Navarre] como a España'. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, n° 6 and 7.

¹⁷ F. Idoate, "Las fortificaciones de Pamplona a partir de la conquista de Navarra," *Príncipe de Viana* 54-55 (1954): 57-154 and Víctor Echarri Iribarren, *Las murallas y la ciudadela de Pamplona* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2000), 88-105.

problems (especially in matters of finance) of this kind of fortification work.¹⁸ In the re-organisation of the defence of the city, it thus was necessary to employ a system that allowed for the construction of walls and bulwarks able to resist a siege with modern artillery, while also reducing the normal costs in terms of time and resources. This was made possible by employing a combination of earth works to reinforce the weak points and building rough bulwarks of earth and wood in specific places to guarantee the utility of the defensive artillery for avoiding both assaults and the play of enemy cannons. These kinds of defences were new on the Pyrenean frontier, but were frequently employed in the Italian Wars,¹⁹ especially by the Venetians, who protected their cities in this way to great effect. In Pamplona the works were directed by Pedro de Malpaso, but Rena played an important role in this field.²⁰

Rena not only provided necessary information to the Council of War on this matter: his ideas and opinions were also highly appreciated in the royal court, and even the king changed his fortification plans according to Rena's advice.²¹ So, Juan Rena not only employed skills acquired in the North African campaigns, he also acted as a transmitter of new ideas about the modern form of warfare developed in Italy. His personal archive contains drafts of the bulwarks that needed to be constructed, as well as detailed information on how to fortify Pamplona according to the most up-to-date techniques.²² Furthermore, some of the detailed plans and drafts on Pamplona's defences were drawn by Rena himself (see image 6), something that shows not only his practical skill, but also his direct participation in the design of the new fortifications.

¹⁸ J. Hook, "Fortifications and the end of the Sienese State," *History* 62 (1977): 372-387; and Simon Pepper and Nicolas Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications. Military architecture and siege warfare in sixteenth century Siena* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986).

¹⁹ On the influence of Venetian military architecture in the Hispanic Monarchy, see A. Espino López, "La tratadística militar hispana en la época de Carlos V (1500-1560)," *Revista de Historia Militar* 88 (2000): 76.

²⁰ See, for example, the report sent by Rena in 1515 to the treasurer Vargas. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 43, n° 1-1.

²¹ Letter of Francisco de Vargas to Juan Rena. Burgos, 18th July 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, N. 4-14.

²² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 43, n° 1-2 and Cartografía, n° 303.




Image 6. A drawing of one's of Pamplona's bulwarks with Rena's annotations.²³

Rena also contributed to the fortification of Pamplona with his practical knowledge. Not only was Rena the only one able to plan the funding of this works, as his multiple reports on this matter show,²⁴ he also knew how to manage the large numbers of workers needed to carry out the construction.²⁵ Indeed, it was Rena who kept the fortification works on track thanks to his influence on the workers. This was obvious in November 1515, for instance, when Rena ran out of money to pay them. He offered the workers the opportunity to go home; however, they instead decided to keep working with Rena's promise of future payment.²⁶ The workmen trusted Rena because he had proved to be a reliable ally against the abuses of the masters who owned the contracts to construct the new fortification.²⁷ It is evident that Rena took the fortification of Pamplona as a matter in which he could actively intervene, even if the particular issues in question were beyond his sphere of competence.

²³ AGS, Mapas, Planos y Dibujos, Leg. 13, nº 54.

²⁴ See, for instance, an early example in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 23, nº 12-2.

²⁵ Simon Pepper, "Sword and Spade: Military Construction in Renaissance Italy," in *Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1450-1660*, ed. P. E. Hammer (Aldershot: Hampshire, 2007), 109-128.

²⁶ The negotiation between Rena and the workers was recorded by a notary. AGN, CO_PS, 1ª S. Leg. 23, nº 48.

²⁷ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 42, nº 2.

Rena's most important task in the Navarrese theatre was to maintain the new defensive system. This was usual in a period when the functioning of the military apparatus was linked to the people who personified the administration.²⁸ If, during the first years, this matter was more or less simple (despite all the ordinary problems), it was because the money from the court to make all the payments kept arriving in a timely fashion: however, this situation quickly changed. The death of Ferdinand the Catholic provoked a dynastic crisis, opening a period of political turbulence in all his domains. This period was especially complicated in a kingdom that had been conquered only four years before. Rumours of an attack over Navarre started just after the news of Ferdinand's death, and uncertainty about the future of the kingdom became a preoccupation in high diplomatic circles.²⁹ The future was especially obscure for the people working there, as is shown by the words of Juan de Vergara, Rena's agent in the court, when Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba asked him about Rena:

His Lordship asked me if Your Mercy found wrong his decision of ask for licence to come to his house, and I replied him that Your Mercy had found it so good, that you wanted to do the same, because there you do not serve anyone, and you think that your person is in a great danger, and His Lordship is the cause. That Your Mercy begs His Lordship to rescue him from his captivity because you think that being in the land of the Moors you could be rescued by paying money, but here, you only think to pay with your head.³⁰

This letter eloquently describes Rena's feeling of abandonment and the risks of remaining in a territory under permanent threat. As subsequent events showed, the danger was real, but Rena kept his head; indeed, actually his reputation grew. His role in Navarre not only did not decrease as we might have assumed with the absence of his lord and mentor: in fact, it grew in the following years. When Don Fadrique de Acuña was appointed as the successor of the Alcaide de los Donceles as viceroy of Navarre, the

²⁸ AGS, Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda, Leg. 9, nº 87.

²⁹ Letter of the Bishop of Badajoz to Cardinal Cisneros. 8th March 1516. Cfr. *Cartas de los secretarios del cardenal don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros durante su regencia en los años de 1516 y 1517* (Madrid: imprenta de la señora viuda e hijo de Don Eusebio Aguado, 1886), T. II, 260.

³⁰ 'Su Señoría me preguntó si a Vuestra Merced había parecido mal lo que había hecho en pedir licencia para venir a su casa, y yo le dije que a Vuestra Merced le ha parecido tan bien lo que Su Señoría había hecho que querría haber hecho otro tanto, porque allá no servía a nadie y que su persona de Vuestra Merced estaba a mucho peligro y que de ello Su Señoría era causa. Que Vuestra Merced suplicaba a su señoría le quisiese sacar de cautivo porque creía que si estuviese en tierra de moros que con dineros se rescataría y que así no pensaba pagar sino con la cabeza'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Chillón, 19th February 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 30-1.

Alcaide asked him to protect his friend Rena: the common opinion at court was that the new viceroy would need the help of Rena more than the latter would need his protection.³¹ This opinion clearly shows the extent to which Rena was perceived as the key man in the defence of this frontier. The Duke of Najera, the nobleman who took over from Acuña as viceroy of Navarre, showed this when he asked the governors of Castile to send Rena (who was in Castile) back to Navarre:

According to the news that I have written to Your Lordship that I have from France and Bearn, it is convenient, by all the mediums, to put this kingdom in defence. And because some of it cannot be made without the person of Micer Juan Rena, because of his great experience about it, and because of his good head and industry, I supplicate Your Lordship to order to give him licence to come here right now that, furthermore than it will be a great service for His Majesty, I will receive it as a big mercy from Your Lordship.³²

Why was Rena so important to the viceroys of Navarre? The answer is simple: he was crucial in the military apparatus. Rena's most important ability in terms of royal service was his capacity to keep the military administration in Navarre in working order. To provide the military apparatus with everything it needed was always very difficult, but it became still more complicated without the requisite money, something very common in the early modern period.³³ One of the most important reasons for Rena's success in Navarre was his competence in obtaining loans from the local community.³⁴ This ability was evident from the very beginning, when he was able to obtain enough money to finance the campaign led by the Alcaide de los Donceles to recover the remaining positions under the control of the enemy after the counterattack of 1512. He also was able to obtain a great amount of money to pay to the Navarrese nobility for their military

³¹ Letter of Beltrán del Salto to Juan Rena. Talavera de la Reina, 20th November 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 4-4.

³² 'Según los avisos y nuevas que he escrito a Vuestra Señoría que tengo de Francia y Bearne, razón es que por todas maneras este reino se ponga a recaudo, y porque algunas de ellas no se pueden hacer sin la persona de Micer Juan Rena, por la mucha experiencia que tiene de ellas y por su buen seso e industria suplica a Vuestra Señoría le mande dar licencia para que luego se venga que demás que será servicio de su majestad yo lo recibiré en mucha merced de vuestra señoría.' Letter of the Duke of Najera to Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht. Pamplona, 8th April 1521. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, nº 4-7.

³³ There is a huge literature on the effects of war on the populations involved in military campaigns. For a general overview, see John R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985), 179-208.

³⁴ Obviously Rena's case was far from being unique: similar cases can be found, for instance, in the conquest of Naples. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Ejércitos y armadas de los Reyes Católicos. Nápoles y el Rosellón (1494-1504)* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2010), 433-437.

service and to remunerate the new troops present in the kingdom.³⁵ This first loan was only the beginning of an almost continuous recourse to private credit. In fact, in one of his letters to the General Treasurer, Rena said: ‘My office here has been nothing but to take loaned money to satisfy necessities’.³⁶

His ability in this matter became especially important during the dynastic crisis after the death of the King Ferdinand the Catholic. During this time, the amount of resources sent from court decreased dramatically: this was just at the moment when Castile’s enemies were preparing an offensive to recover Navarre. At that moment, Rena provided the necessary credit to keep the fortification works of Pamplona advancing at a good pace.³⁷ He also obtained from some local merchants the necessary money to pay the troops. Thus, instead of running away, as his friends advised him, Rena sought credit, a very risky course of action in a context of total uncertainty, at least in the opinion of his agent at court.³⁸ As we saw before, Rena had no especial interest in remaining in the Navarrese kingdom, but he was the most necessary man in this difficult situation. With the news about the preparations of the enemy, an inexperienced viceroy who had recently arrived in Navarre, and the local nobility conspiring to defeat the Castilian troops, Rena was more necessary than ever.

The siege of San Juan de Pie de Puerto (the key position on the northern frontier) and the uprising of much of the local nobility under the leadership of the Marshal of Navarre made necessary a quick mobilisation of the Castilian troops and a call to arms of the local citizenry led by the remaining loyal Navarrese nobles. Once again the viceroy came across a difficult obstacle: his total lack of money. The Navarrese refused to move without being paid in advance, and once again the viceroy turned to Rena, asking him to obtain some money using his credit. Rena mobilised his network of friends to collect some money to pay the troops. After these initial problems, these troops, led by Colonel Cristóbal de Villalba, staged a quick counterattack with the help of some local nobles: this not only managed to stop the enemy’s advance, but also ended with the capture of

³⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 64, n° 5-1 fols. 8, 12 and 31.

³⁶ ‘Mi oficio aquí no ha sido sino tomar dineros prestados para suplir necesidades’. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Vargas. 30th September [...] AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 24-23.

³⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Cardinal Cisneros. Pamplona, 20th April 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 24-7.

³⁸ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 20th March 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-5.

the rebel leaders. Rena's work was perceived as a notable contribution to the pacification of the kingdom. According to Ruiz de Enebro, Rena's help was of paramount importance in the development of these good outcomes. Another witness said that 'Micer Johan made a great service to His Majesty in those times because thanks to the capture of the Marshal all the kingdom was pacified'.³⁹ These testimonies allow us to better understand Rena's image in the local context as the man who was able to make military campaigns possible. In fact, all the reports make reference to the character of this 'public and notorious' service, not only in the local context, but also in France.⁴⁰ So, the role of Rena in the socio-political arena of Navarre after the conquest was defined by this ability to mobilise private credit in the service of the monarchy, a fundamental issue for the maintenance of the system of defence. The skill of Rena in this matter was not only known in Navarre: the higher authorities at court were also aware. Previously, Pedro de Malpaso, the royal engineer who directed the fortification works, informed the king directly about the importance of the credit that Rena had obtained to maintain these works, something that the king appreciated considerably.⁴¹

Rena also projected an image as someone capable of funding the defensive system of the kingdom with his credit. In 1521, once again in a moment of political instability, Juan Rena wrote to the Council of War offering his help, and that of his friends, by supplying with their money the needs of the defensive system in the face of the possible lack of resources provoked by the absence of the monarch.⁴² This time his offer was not taken into account, as the Council of War preferred to employ Rena in another scenario: Castile. The crisis of the *Comunero* revolt made it necessary to concentrate the limited military resources in the hands of the governors; for that reason, Rena was ordered to transport the artillery of Pamplona to the imperial army.⁴³ This forced him to leave the Navarrese kingdom just before the French invasion. When he came back after the Castilian victory at Noáin, he resumed his role in the maintenance of the system of defence, but this time the task was rather more difficult. The previous revolt in Castile

³⁹ 'Micer Johan hizo un gran servicio a Su Majestad en aquellos trances y ello porque por el apresamiento del Mariscal todo el reino fue pacificado'. *Ibíd.* fol. 7

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* fols. 19-20.

⁴¹ Letter of Pedro de Malpaso to Juan Rena. Valladolid, 24th January [...]. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 40, n° 18-31.

⁴² It is interesting to note that Rena kept in his personal archive a copy of the minutes of the discussion of the Council of War. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 6-1.

⁴³ I will come back to Rena's participation in the war against the *comunero* revolt in the following chapter.

had almost completely destroyed the fiscal system which sustained the Spanish army. According to the royal treasurer, since the beginning of the troubles it had been impossible to find anyone who wanted to take part in the system of public debt for the payment of the army,⁴⁴ the state of the fiscal system was chaotic, and the situation of the financiers who maintained the system of credit around it was even worse.⁴⁵ In the opinion of the Constable of Castile, the royal treasurer Francisco de Vargas was not able to keep ‘cheating’ in search of loans.⁴⁶

In these circumstances, the troops deployed in Navarre did not receive any payment for months, and Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, one of the governors appointed by the emperor to rule Castile during his absence, wrote to the members of the military administration urging them to seek some money ‘even with usury’ to pay these troops, because, in his opinion, losing the kingdom of Navarre could cause new problems and protests in Castile.⁴⁷ This was the background against which Juan Rena would carry out one of his most important services to the monarchy: the loan of Maya. This was a collective loan negotiated between Rena and his Navarrese friends to finance the military campaign against the fortress of Maya and the north-western region of the kingdom still under enemy control.⁴⁸ The money and commodities collected by Rena was devoted to a brief military campaign which ended with a victory in the siege of Maya.⁴⁹

Rena not only contributed by obtaining money, but also by negotiating with the multiple authorities of the kingdom. As the previous campaigns showed, the security of the whole kingdom depended on the defence of the capital. During the crisis of 1516, when the viceroy tried to concentrate his troops inside Pamplona’s walls, the local government claimed that the privileges of the city required the payment of all the costs

⁴⁴ Letter of Francisco de Vargas to Charles V. Burgos, 22nd September 1520. AGS, Estado, leg. 8, n° 132.

⁴⁵ David Alonso García, *El erario del reino. Fiscalidad en Castilla a principios de la Edad Moderna 1504-1522* (Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y León, 2007), 303-325.

⁴⁶ ‘El licenciado Vargas está aquí de noche y de día sirviendo a Vuestra Majestad con mucho trabajo y necesidad, y hasta aquí ha trampeado lo que ha podido y ahora como se ha de hacer unas trampas para cumplir otras ya no le queda que trampear, digoló porque es hombre para mucho y en su facultad no puede ninguno servir mejor que él’. Letter of Coundestable of Castille to Charles V. Burgos, 4th March [...] AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 1, n° 5, fol. 576.

⁴⁷ Letter of Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht to Charles V. Valladolid, 12th and 23rd August [...]. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 2 n° 1, fols. 26 and 29-30.

⁴⁸ We know the list of contributors thanks to the personal documentation of Rena on this issue. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 29, n° 5-2 and Caj. 35, n° 14-4 fols. 7-11.

⁴⁹ Further information in this critical context in Peio Monteano Sorbet, *De Noáin a Amaiur (1512-1522). El año que decidió el futuro de Navarra* (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2012).

for lodging the troops in the city.⁵⁰ When the viceroy revealed that he did not have enough money, the notables of Pamplona agreed to lodge the troops without the payment, but on one condition: he should designate Juan Rena as a guarantor of the debt.⁵¹ The viceroy accepted the deal and obliged Rena to act as *fiador* (pledge) in the payment of this crucial contribution. This service seems minor, but, sometime later, Alonso Ruiz de Enebro, an expert in the management of troops, recognised that this was crucial because only this made it possible to avoid a violent conflict between the city and the military authorities at a critical moment.⁵²

The authorities took note of Rena's capacity to deal with local actors and employed him in many other difficult negotiations. It seems that Rena's ecclesiastic position was quite useful in this regard, since he was able to negotiate with the members of the powerful Navarrese church. Thus, for instance, in 1516 the Duke of Najera ordered Rena to convince the friars of Saint Francis to abandon their monastery, as it had to be demolished in make space for the new fortress of Pamplona.⁵³ Two years later, after being appointed vicar general of the see of Pamplona, Rena played a crucial role in negotiations with the Navarrese clergy on the payment of the *subsidio* and the *excusado*, the ecclesiastic taxes that churchmen from the Hispanic Monarchy had to pay to Emperor Charles V.⁵⁴ Furthermore, Rena's ecclesiastic position allowed him to act as a sort of judge when investigating the participation of many Navarrese churchmen in the rebellion against the Spanish crown that followed the French invasion of the kingdom in 1521.⁵⁵ As we can see, Juan Rena played a key role in the multiple negotiations with members of the Navarrese church after the conquest of the kingdom.

Rena also proved useful in the negotiations between the new authorities and the assembly of the Navarrese estates.⁵⁶ From the very beginning, Rena showed his

⁵⁰ The negotiation on this privilege was a crucial issue in the process of incorporating Navarre after the conquest. Fernando Chavarría Múgica, "Monarquía fronteriza," 191-235.

⁵¹ These arrangements were frequent, and the local communities used to choose people with obvious political credit. And AGS, Consejo y juntas de Hacienda, Leg. 10, n° 64-89.

⁵² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 13, fol. 9. This information comes from the investigation carried out by the Licenciado Ronquillo of the royal council in 1518 on the legitimacy of these extraordinary expenses.

⁵³ Letter of the Duke of Najera to Juan Rena. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 3-16.

⁵⁴ T. de Azcona, "El pago del subsidio y el excusado a la Corona por la iglesia de Navarra en el siglo XVI," *Príncipe de Viana*, Annex 9 (1988): 36.

⁵⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Pamplona, 25th May 1524. AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n° 152.

⁵⁶ On the Navarrese estates after the conquest, see Rocío García Bourrellier, María Dolores Martínez Arce and Sergio Solbes Ferri, *Las cortes de Navarra desde su incorporación a la Corona de Castilla. Tres siglos*

willingness to facilitate negotiations with this assembly. Thus, in 1516, he asked his agent at court to obtain payment for some royal debts, as such was a crucial obstacle preventing the approval of the economic services that the Navarrese notables granted to the crown.⁵⁷ Later on, Rena continued advising the royal authorities on this kind of issues and how to negotiate with the Navarrese states. Thus, in 1521, he included some references on this matter in the reports about the kingdom of Navarre that he sent to the governors of Castile.⁵⁸ Rena gained momentum in the negotiations with the Navarrese estates after his appointment as general vicar of the see of Pamplona because this charge allowed him to participate as a member of the ecclesiastic branch. In one of the reports that the Count of Miranda sent to the emperor on the Navarrese assembly, the viceroy underlined Rena's active role, saying: 'micer Juan Rena, the vicar general, as a good man takes a position against all the three branches, as a good server and servant of Your Majesty'.⁵⁹ Charles V very much appreciated Rena's services and wrote to thank him for his services 'in that of the estates' and asked him to continue doing good work.⁶⁰ Rena took this commitment seriously: when some members of the aristocratic estate abandoned the sessions of the estates in September 1523 to avoid the conclusion of the negotiations, he tried to solve the situation, something that was very much appreciated by the emperor.⁶¹ The importance of Rena in this sphere continued after his departure from Navarre, as he had direct access to first-hand information about the estates thanks to his close connection with some key characters, like the secretary of the estates Sancho de Estella.⁶² Considering his contacts, his access to direct information, and his experience, it is not strange at all that the regent of the Council of Navarre considered Rena as a necessary person when dealing with the estates.⁶³

de actividad legislativa (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1993), Vol. I, 1-119; see also the brief overview provided by Alfredo Floristán Imízcoz, "Las cortes de Navarra después de la conquista: renovación e innovación institucional en el siglo XVI," in *Les Corts a Catalunya* (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1991), 329-340.

⁵⁷ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 1-2.

⁵⁸ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, nº 1-6.

⁵⁹ 'Micer Juan Rena, vicario general que se pone como hombre de bien contra todos tres brazos como muy buen servidor y criado de Vuestra Majestad.' AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, nº 137.

⁶⁰ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Burgos, 9th September 1523. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 94, nº 2-1.

⁶¹ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Santo Domingo de la Calzada, 19th September 1523, AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 94, nº 2-2.

⁶² Letter of Sancho de Estella to Juan Rena. Granada, 11th September 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, nº 24.

⁶³ Letter of Diego de Avellaneda to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 14th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 19-1.

Thus, we can conclude that Rena became a crucial figure in the government of Navarre after its conquest. Undoubtedly Rena profited from the temporary status of the different viceroys. The lack of a permanent viceroy in the years after the conquest obliged the imperial authorities to rely on someone like Rena, who had long experience living and working in Navarre and an important portfolio of contacts in the local arena. Moreover, Rena had the outstanding skills required to become a reliable king's man in the conquered kingdom. His ecclesiastical status allowed him to occupy a strategic position within the Navarrese church, an important sphere in the kingdom's political life. From this position, he also took part in the Navarrese estates, another arena of paramount importance. Nevertheless, and despite the obvious relevance on Rena's services in both spheres, it was in the field of military administration where Rena became especially important. His services in military affairs went beyond his narrow competence as military treasurer. He commanded military logistics in the kingdom and took part in formulating the strategies to defend this frontier. Moreover, he had an active role in the design and construction of the modern fortifications of Pamplona. Last but not least, Rena stood out due to his capacity to keep the military machinery working and his skill in mobilising private resources to this end. All these factors contributed to make Rena a key man in Navarre's government. It was this paramount position in the socio-political life of the kingdom what allowed Rena to influence the incorporation of the Navarrese kingdom into the Hispanic Monarchy.

Juan Rena and the reconfiguration of Navarrese society after the conquest

As stated in the introduction to the chapter, one of the key aspects of the process of incorporating Navarre into the Hispanic Monarchy was the articulation of a new cohesion within Navarrese society. As we will see in this section, Juan Rena played a prominent role in the construction of this new social order from his privileged position in the socio-political life of the kingdom after its conquest. To a great extent, Rena was able to play this role because he bridged the 'structural hole' between the royal administration and a very important section of this local community.⁶⁴ Rena's placement in the

⁶⁴ By 'structural holes', I mean "empty spaces in social structure." Ronald S. Burt, *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 16. As Gabriella Gribaudo pointed out, these political gaps are normal during conquest and state-building processes. G. Gribaudo, "La metafora della rete. Individuo e contesto sociale," *Meridiana* 15 (1992): 94. In the case of Navarre, an important part of the local nobility was closely connected with the Catholic Monarchs, like the

framework of this society is clear, especially in terms of his capacity to mobilise private capital from local credit networks to fund the military defence of the kingdom.

Rena had access to local credit networks because he enjoyed a notable reputation as a trustable person. The paymaster of the artillery expressed it clearly when he said that Rena was able to obtain loans because he was ‘a person who has a lot of credit in the kingdom of Navarre’.⁶⁵ It is well known that during the early modern period access to credit networks was conditioned by the reputation of the borrowers.⁶⁶ The monarchical authorities used to employ wealthy merchants with good reputations within the mercantile communities as military treasurers.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Rena’s reputation should be not restricted to economic activities. On the contrary, to fully understand Rena’s reputation we have to understand his credit in the political sphere. The loans, and in general the collaboration with the military administration led by Rena, were embedded in the socio-political life of the kingdom after the conquest. The merchant community were important actors in the political arena, where their money was another tool at their disposal.⁶⁸ This must be taken into account in order to better understand the position of Rena in this political scenario. In order to illuminate Rena’s importance as a political mediator, we should focus on his activity during the crisis of 1516. In this difficult situation, the viceroy decided to lodge troops in Pamplona in a desperate attempt to maintain his weak authority

Coundestable of Navarre, leader of the *beamontese* faction. Suárez Fernández, *Fernando el Católico*, 167-172. There was also a long tradition of relationships between the Navarrese nobility and the Castilian aristocracy: both local factions, the *beamonteses* and *agramonteses* were closely connected with the most prestigious lineages of the Castilian nobility. Máximo Diago Hernando, “Política y guerra en la frontera castellano-navarra durante la época Trastámara,” *Príncipe de Viana* 203 (1994): 527-550. These relationships influenced the incorporation of the Navarrese nobility into the Hispanic Monarchy during the sixteenth century. Chavarría Múgica, “Monarquía fronteriza,” 100-189.

⁶⁵ ‘Persona que tiene mucho crédito en el dicho reino de Navarra’. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, nº 13, fols. 7.

⁶⁶ Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

⁶⁷ Alicia Esteban Estríngana, “Le payeur général de l’armée de Flanders (1600-1650): un trésorier incontrôlable?,” in *Les finances royales dans la monarchie espagnole (XVIe-XIXe siècles)*, ed. A. Dubbet (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008), 121-135 ; Raymond Fagel, “Los mercaderes españoles en Flandes y la Corte : poder económico y poder político en dos redes de intermediarios,” in *Espacios de poder: cortes, ciudades y villas*, ed. Jesús Bravo Lozano (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma, 2002), vol. I, 167-168; Marco Ostoni, *Il tesoro del re. Uomini e istituzioni della finanza pubblica milanese fra Cinquecento e Seicento* (Naples: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 2010), 67-143. On the importance of the royal officer’s reputation and their credit, see Anthony Fletcher, “Honour, reputation and local officeholding in Elizabethan and Stuart England,” in *Order and disorder in Early Modern England*, ed. A. Fletcher and J. Stevenson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 92-115.

⁶⁸ Jean-Philippe Priotti, “Uso material e inmaterial del dinero: un análisis social para el estudio de los patrimonios mercantiles, siglos XVI-XVII,” in *Fortuna y negocios: formación y gestión de los grandes patrimonios (siglos XVI-XX)*, ed. R. Robledo Hernández and H. Casado Alonso (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002), 45-72.

over the capital. Nevertheless, the local authorities of the city refused to lodge the troops for free on the basis of a civic privilege. As the viceroy had no money, the authorities proposed an alternative solution: they would house the troops if Rena was appointed as the pledge of this loan.⁶⁹ The local authorities of Pamplona, like the Navarrese capitalists (to a great extent they were the same people), showed considerable confidence in Rena's ability to obtain repayments.

To lend money to crown's servants was always risky, but it was especially dangerous in moments of political crisis like this. In this tricky situation, re-imbusement depended on the ability of the agent to attain a positive response from the central administration which would make the payment. At this time, the Venetian was obliged to employ his social and cultural capital in negotiations with the authorities to obtain the money with which to pay his friends. By choosing a pledge, Rena's lenders not only obtained a surety; they also were choosing a mediator who would be forced to negotiate the payment of the debt with the central administration. At a time when personal connections were the key factor in the functioning of early modern monarchies, the social network of someone like Rena was of paramount importance to evaluate his trustworthiness. His relational capital was important to his role as a useful pledge and his ability to obtain loans. In other words, his web of personal ties conditioned his reputation.

The choice of Rena as guarantor for the aforementioned payment shows us how quickly the Navarrese authorities adapted themselves to the realities of imperial administration. From their perspective in the general framework of the monarchy, Rena's social network was the most suitable way to obtain payment for the lodging. By choosing Rena, they were ensured access to the most important spheres of the economic management of the monarchy. According to a member of the local oligarchy, Rena enjoyed a reputation as someone able to intercede with the famous Francisco de Vargas, the General Treasurer of Castile.⁷⁰ In fact, Rena employed his connection with Vargas to obtain the repayment, and this royal treasurer presented Rena's solicitations to both

⁶⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 83, N° 5, fol. 1. On the negotiation over the urban privilege of this city regarding the lodgement of troops, see Fernando Chavarría Múgica, "La capitulación de la «cabeza del reino» y la cuestión de los alojamientos: disputa y negociación de la condición privilegiada de Pamplona," in *1512 Conquista e incorporación de Navarra. Historiografía, derecho y otros procesos de integración en la Europa renacentista*, ed. A. Floristán Imízcoz (Barcelona: Ariel, 2012), 361-385.

⁷⁰ Letter of Licentiate Jauregui to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 6th February [...] AGN, Archivos Personales, Rena, Caj. 87, n° 3-1.

Cardinal Cisneros and Adrian of Utrecht, the two highest authorities in Castile at that moment.⁷¹ In such a political crisis, Rena was obliged to employ his knowledge of the channels of influence. Aware of his limitations, he also tried to employ the relational capital of others. For example he wrote a letter to Cardinal Cisneros in the name of Colonel Cristóbal de Villalba, trying to make use of Villalba's position as Cisneros' right-hand man in military affairs.⁷² All these actions show that Rena was perfectly aware of the importance of maintaining his reputation as an efficient mediator in front of the imperial administration. To sum up, Rena's image as a man of credit should be understood as a reputation that not only included a purely economic meaning, but also social and political power.⁷³

When considering the political dimension of Rena's image as a man of credit, it is necessary to examine the different type of rewards involved in the system of credit managed by Rena. It is essential to understand the concept of credit in these relationships as a kind of social solvency measured not only by economic or material wealth, but also by immaterial properties.⁷⁴ The loans that Rena received were a favour, and they should be considered in terms of the close connection between economic debts and moral obligations.⁷⁵ Favouring a king's man like Rena was a very interesting option, as the credit of royal officers was very close related with the multiplicity of favours that they could offer.⁷⁶ The network that Rena had around him functioned via the exchange of multiple favours, services, and privileges, that is, by different rewards, some of which were based on the transference and transformation of different resources among the persons who made up the network.⁷⁷ This is crucial for understanding the role of Rena in

⁷¹ Minute of Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Vargas. 8th may [...] AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 24-12.

⁷² See the copy in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, n° 24-18. I will come back to Rena's connection with Cristóbal Villalba in the next chapter.

⁷³ Laurence Fontaine, *L'économie morale. Pauvreté, crédit et confiance dans l'Europe préindustrielle*, (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 20-23.

⁷⁴ Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'état moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris, Fayard, 1989), 65-66. Michel Braddick associates the credit of local office holders with "social fitness". Michel J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 82.

⁷⁵ Bartolomé Clavero, *Antidora. Antropología católica de la economía moderna* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1991), 8-10, 66-67.

⁷⁶ Zacarias Moutoukias, "La notion de réseau en histoire sociale: un instrument d'analyse de l'action collective," in *Réseaux, familles et pouvoirs dans le Monde Ibérique à la fin de l'Ancien Régime*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and J-P. Dedieu (Paris : CNRS, 1998), 243; and Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends. Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 158-159.

⁷⁷ Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, "Reading Sources through P. Bourdieu and Cyert and March. Aristocratic Patrimonies vs. Commercial Enterprises in Europe (c. 1550-1650)," in *Dove va la storia economica? Metodi e prospettive secc. XIII-XVIII*, ed. F. Ammannati (Florence, Firenze University Press, 2011), 332.

the reconfiguration of the Navarrese society, because it influenced the place that many different actors occupied in the social fabric “under construction” during the years after the conquest.

Rena was able to pay his moral and political debts thanks, in part, to his excellent connection with the highest political authority in the kingdom: the viceroy. As we saw earlier, Rena arrived in the kingdom with a complete *resumée* at the service of the first viceroy.⁷⁸ He was the right-hand man of the Alcaide de los Donceles, and one of his most important tasks was to negotiate with the merchant community. This responsibility made him the channel of access to the Alcaide for local tradesmen.⁷⁹ Rena took this function with him and developed an identical activity in his new destination, Navarre. Here his role as intermediary became crucial due to the political ambitions of the local merchants and the great authority of his lord. The Alcaide de los Donceles was the *alter ego* of the king in Navarre and for that reason he enjoyed great political power. These political attributes included, for example, the appointment of some important local authorities. Taking this into account, we can understand the appointment of some of the ‘friends’ of Rena as mayors of Pamplona. In 1515 Pedro Marcilla de Caparroso, a member of an important merchant family, attained this post.⁸⁰ Rena continued to enjoy this excellent position between the local community and the viceroys after the departure of his mentor. For example, another of his closest collaborators, Juan de Redín, was appointed mayor of Pamplona by the Duke of Nájera in 1516, at a moment in which Juan Rena was considered close to this viceroy.⁸¹ So, being a friend of the paymaster was very important in the political arena of the Navarrese kingdom after the conquest.

⁷⁸ On this figure, see Alfredo Floristán Imízcoz, “El virreinato de Navarra. Consideraciones históricas para una reinterpretación institucional,” in *El mundo de los virreyes en las monarquías de España y Portugal*, eds. P. Cardim and J-L. Palos (Frankfurt: Vervuert-Iberoamericana, 2012), 119-147.

⁷⁹ See, for example, letter of Francisco Franco to Juan Rena. Málaga, 18th Juny 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 5-1

⁸⁰ AGN, CO_PS, 1°S, Leg. 2, Carp. 19. On Pamplona’s local government, see Santiago Lasasa Villanúa, *El “regimiento” municipal de Pamplona en el siglo XVI* (Pamplona: Institución Príncipe de Viana-CSIC, 1979).

⁸¹ Juan de Redín was an important member of the local administration and one of Rena’s lenders. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 65, n° 2-3. He also contributed to supplying the garrison of San Juan de Pie de Puerto. AGN, Caj. 64, n° 5-2, fols. 52-53. His appointment in AGN, CO_PS, Caj. 190, n° 10-4. The reference to Rena’s proximity to the viceroy in a letter of Diego de Montoro to Juan Rena. Madrid, 21st July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 22-2.

Moreover, Rena's credit within local society should be related to his capacity to mediate with many different actors beyond the viceroys. As I said before, this network of friends also functioned by interchanging different kinds of capital among the members: the example of the Caparroso family is also useful for demonstrating this. One of Rena's lenders in the loan of Maya was the judge of finances Antón de Caparroso, who provided money along with two other members of his family.⁸² This family had helped Rena to organise and supply the defence of the kingdom in 1516.⁸³ Furthermore, the paymaster had been a client of their family business for years.⁸⁴ The members of this family benefited from Rena's support many times. The Venetian employed his network of contacts to achieve the official transfer of their royal offices to their successors.⁸⁵ Thus, this family profited from the relational capital of Rena. At other times, their own relational capital was improved thanks to their relationship with the paymaster. For example, thanks to the intermediation of Rena, Juan de Caparroso (one of his friends and lenders) made contact with Alonso de Fonseca, the Archbishop of Toledo, a contact that was used later by the family to promote the ecclesiastical career of one of their members.⁸⁶

Despite the obvious importance of all these transfers of capital, the most important asset in Rena's hands was his capacity to confer upon local actors the symbolic capital of the memory of past services to the king. Service to the crown was, according to the political culture of the time, a kind of symbolic capital which provided access to offices and generally determined the social status of someone in a specific society through the expression of royal grace.⁸⁷ In the socio-political context of a post-conquest kingdom, this symbolic capital became even more important because the new political order was based on the loyalty to the new king.⁸⁸ In the specific context of Navarre, this symbolic capital became even more important due to the internal divisions of the society: the obvious support of a very substantial section of it for the dethroned monarchs and the

⁸² On the commercial activity of this character and his family, see Valentín Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros en Europa. Siglo XVI* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2015), 217, 246 and 281.

⁸³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 102, n° 16.

⁸⁴ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 32, n° 24, Caj. 64, n° 5-2, Caj. 105, n° 12-8 and 15-1, 2 and 3.

⁸⁵ Letter of Juan de Salinas to Juan Rena. Madrid, 18th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, n° 5

⁸⁶ Letter of María Sanz de Caparroso to Alonso de Fonseca y Ulloa. Pamplona, 27th February 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 4, n° 13.

⁸⁷ On the importance of the concept of service in the political life of the early modern Hispanic Monarchy, see Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "El servicio: paradigma de relación política en los siglos XVI y XVII," in *Servir al rey en la Monarquía de los Austrias. Medios, fines y logros del servicio al soberano en los siglos XVI y XVII*, ed. A. Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 11-45.

⁸⁸ Ruiz Ibáñez and Sabatini, "Monarchy as conquest," 523.

King of France led to a division of the community into *servidores* and *deservidores* (literally ‘servers’ and ‘non-servers’). This division is present in all the political writings of the day, for instance, when after the recovery of the kingdom in 1522, the Count of Miranda (the new viceroy of Navarre) advised Charles V to carry out to a new distribution of the royal grace within the kingdom according to the services and disservices (*deservicios*) of each individual.⁸⁹

Enjoying this symbolic capital was important to every single member of the political body, but it was especially vital to certain actors like the members of the most important financier families of Navarre. The Navarrese tradesmen knew that financial service to the crown was an important means for winning a privileged position in the kingdom’s economy as well as for obtaining appointments in the local government. For this reason, lending money to the crown and its agents was necessary in order to maintain royal support in their economic activities. As a consequence, Rena’s creditors were frequently members of the most important mercantile lineages of Navarre, such as the Añués, the Cruzat, and the Eguía,⁹⁰ who had provided financial services to the Navarrese crown since the Middle Ages.⁹¹ To illustrate this point, we should focus on Rena’s relationship with the Cruzat family. Rena designed the strategy of the conquest and defence of Navarre after the French invasion.⁹² This mercantile clan played a role in his strategy, as a reference to them in the same documents in which he dealt with strategic issues attests: he included some recommendations in their favour. Thus, he suggested the appointment of one of the members of the Cruzat family for an economic office in the following manner: he ‘begs that this collector could be Martín Cruzat, who, furthermore of being a good servant of His Majesty, is a wealthy person and of credit, that in time of necessity can help with his own’.⁹³ The appointment of Martín Cruzat came shortly after,

⁸⁹ Letter of Count of Miranda to Charles V. Pamplona, 17th August 1522. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, nº 45.

⁹⁰ See, for instance, one of his lists of lenders in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 29, nº 5-2.

⁹¹ On the Cruzat family, see B. Leroy, “Una familia de burgueses de Pamplona en la primera mitad del siglo XIV: los Crozat,” *Príncipe de Viana* 136-137 (1974): 429-448; Alejandro Díez Díez, *Los Cruzat* (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1974); and Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 181-205. On the medieval background of the Eguía family, see A. Castellano Gutiérrez, “Los Echévarri de Estella. Una familia burguesa medieval. Contribución a su estudio,” *Príncipe de Viana* 202 (1994): 305-330, and Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 205-207. On the Añués, see D. Maruri Orrantía, “Añués: noticias histórico-genealógicas,” *Zangotzarra* 1 (1997): 11-112, Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 139-158.

⁹² His reports about this matter are kept in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, nº 1 and AGN, CO_PS, 2^a S. Annex, Leg. 7, nº 50.

⁹³ ‘Suplica que este receptor sea Martín Cruzate que además de ser muy buen servidor de Su Majestad es persona hacendada y de crédito que en tiempo de menester puede socorrer con lo suyo.’ AGN, AP_RENA,

thus making Rena's influence crystal clear.⁹⁴ Martin's appointment was not an isolated incident; on the contrary, it was the beginning of a long list of rewards for the past services of the family. During the visit of Charles V to Pamplona in 1523, different members of this family received a great number of royal favours: it is not coincidental that the payment of the loan of Maya was being negotiated at the same time.⁹⁵ All these economic and symbolic rewards were granted a payment for the financial services of the family to the crown. In fact the family employed the argument of past services 'with his person and estate' in their future petitions.⁹⁶ These services were also a competitive advantage against disloyal merchants who did not show active support for the king's cause.⁹⁷ Obviously the person who had received the loans played a key role as witness and guardian of their symbolic capital in this strategy of obtaining thanks for economic service to the monarchy. When the widow of Martín Cruzat later asked for patronage, she wrote:

My sons and I [...] have served in the name of Your Majesty, to your viceroys, generals-captains, and people of war, lending them large amounts of money without any interest, but only because of our great affection to serve to Your Majesty, as Your Majesty could be informed by your viceroys and by Micer Johan Rena.⁹⁸

Thus, thanks to their relationship with Rena, the members of this family reinforced their symbolic capital as servants of the monarchy, something crucial for a family that were important political actors in the Navarrese kingdom as well as influential tradesmen.

Rena's importance in keeping and transmitting services was also perceived by many members of local society beyond the mercantile milieu. His capacity to intercede with the imperial authorities was also very important for the members of the local

Caj. 35, nº 1-4. fol. 3. On Martín Cruzat's businesses, see Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 183-184, 189-191 and 195-196.

⁹⁴ AGN, Reino, A. Cortes, L. 20, fol. 205.

⁹⁵ Both the payment of the loan and the various concessions were signed on 24 December 1523. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, 247, fols. 142, 145, 150, 151-152 and 167-168. There are more references to favours to members of this family in AGN, CO_PS, 1ªS, Leg. 18, nº 11 and 61.

⁹⁶ 'Con su persona y hacienda'. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 184, nº 18, fol. 3.

⁹⁷ For instance, Diego Cruzat obtained an office as tax collector because the previous owner was "persona desleal a la corona real". AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 132-124. For further information on him, see Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 70 and 297. See also J. M. Zaratigui Labiano, "La propuesta de reforma monetaria del navarro Diego Cruzat (1551)," *Príncipe de Viana* 259 (2014): 180-182.

⁹⁸ 'Yo y mis hijos [...] hemos servido en nombre de Vuestra Majestad a sus visorreyes y capitanes generales y gente de guerra empréstándoles grandes cantidades de dineros sin ningún interés sino sólo por la gran afección de servir a Vuestra Majestad como de ello Vuestra Majestad podrá ser informado de sus visorreyes y capitanes generales y de Micer Juan Rena.' AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 148, nº 199.

administration who needed to maintain their status, like the secretary Martín de Echaide. This Navarrese bureaucrat asked Rena for his help in a conflict over his competence as secretary of state.⁹⁹ In one of the letters that Martín de Echaide addressed to Rena, the secretary explained his problems with the members of the Royal Council of Navarre and the secretary Morriones (his adversary), alleging that ‘most of these lords are new in this kingdom and they do not know me, and do not know my fidelity and my services’. Echaide underlined that his motivation was certainly not economic, as he only earned a few ducats per year from the privileges attached to the position of secretary of state; he asked Rena for his help because ‘as Your Mercy know that my services deserve it’.¹⁰⁰ Echaide’s letter shows that Rena’s role as a guardian of the memory of past services was crucial for determining the place of a bureaucrat like Echaide in the Navarrese society as well as in the local politics.

Rena also played an important role in the distribution of royal grace among the Navarrese aristocracy. Thus, for instance, the Lord of Guendulayn, a member of the kingdom’s middling nobility, asked Rena for help in his attempt to obtain an appointment as tenant of the San Juan del Pie de Puerto fortress.¹⁰¹ Even more interesting was the case of Charles de Artieda, Lord of Orcoyen and husband of Isabel Cruzat. According to Artieda, Rena was a suitable ally in his struggle to obtain the recognition of his symbolic capital as a servant of the crown. In the letter that he sent to Rena, he asked the latter to intercede for him in the recovery of his privileges and salary as *contino real*, an honorific granted to some local elites for their “continuous” services to the crown.¹⁰² The nobleman argued in his petition that Rena was a witness of his past services, which was why he was soliciting for his help in the matter.¹⁰³ The receipt of these privileges implied a special status and opened the door to other kind of honours and privileges, such as the

⁹⁹ Letter of Martín de Echaide to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 10th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 20-1.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Como los más de estos señores son nuevos en este reino no me conocen ni saben mi fidelidad y servicios [...] pues Vuestra Merced sabe si mis servicios merecen esta merced.’ Letter of Martín de Echaide to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 15th October 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 20-3.

¹⁰¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 14.

¹⁰² This position was used by the monarch to create a network of servants closely related to the royal house who acted as their agents in the integration of the different territories of the monarchy. José Martínez Millán and Ignacio Ezquerro Revilla, “Integración de las élites sociales en las monarquías dinásticas. Los Continuos,” in *Espacios de poder: cortes, ciudades y villas*, ed. J. Bravo Lozano (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma, 2002), Vol. 1, 339-380.

¹⁰³ Letter of Carlos de Artieda to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 21st February 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 21. The nobleman was speaking the truth: for example, he took part in the expedition against the rebels organised and funded by Rena in 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 27, n° 11.

participation in the Navarrese estates.¹⁰⁴ Once again, Rena's management of the symbolic capital of members of the local community allowed him to exert an important influence in the kingdom, in this case influencing the position of some noblemen in the social fabric.

Juan Rena and his political influence were also understood as an open door for those of his friends who wanted to enter the privileged order of the nobility. This is clear, for instance, in the case of Jimeno López. This clerk used to act as Rena's agent in Puente La Reina, near Pamplona, and had helped the latter purvey goods for the army since 1515, especially wine.¹⁰⁵ Together with his relatives, he provided the army with large quantities of this drink on credit through the mediation of Rena. Moreover, López's relatives also took part in the famous loan of Maya.¹⁰⁶ Like many others, Jimeno López and his family obtained economic profit from his relationship with Rena, but he also sought other kinds of benefits. For instance, López earned prestige locally because he was the mediator between his neighbours and Rena.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, when López decided to obtain the confirmation of the honourable status of his family, he also turned to Rena. Thus, after some incident concerning his honour, López decided to obtain a legal confirmation of the nobility of his house, and asked Rena for his help.¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, not only did he want to have access to Rena's social capital at the imperial court, but he also sought his advice in editing the formal petition.¹⁰⁹ In other words, López tried to use Rena's cultural capital to remedy his ignorance of some of the political and administrative issues implicit in this process. Thus, the case of Jimeno López shows that collaborating with Rena was crucial for individuals who were struggling to improve their positions in the local sphere.

¹⁰⁴ A. Floristán Imízcoz, "Honor estamental y merced real. La configuración del brazo militar en las cortes de Navarra, 1512-1808," *Príncipe de Viana* 234 (2005), 146.

¹⁰⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 102, nº 16 and AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, leg. 367.

¹⁰⁶ They provided the wine for the fortress of Pamplona. Letter of Martín Jiménez to Juan Rena. Puente La Reina, 25th February 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 23-1. Their participation in the loan in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, nº 14-4, fol. 11.

¹⁰⁷ This family was a channel of access to Rena and his powerful friends. Letters of Jimeno López to Juan Rena. Puente La Reina, 25th February 1527, 16th May 1527 and 19th September 1520. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 5, nº 9-1, 2 and 4. And letter of Martín Jiménez to Juan Rena. Puente La Reina, 25th February 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 23-1. On the importance of such mediations as a source of local influence, see José María Imízcoz Beunza, "Patronos y mediadores. Redes familiares en la Monarquía y patronazgo: aproximación al entramado social de País Vasco y Navarra en el Antiguo Régimen (siglos XV-XIX)," ed. J. M. Imízcoz Beunza (Bilbao: UPV, 2001), 225-261.

¹⁰⁸ Letter of Jimeno López to Juan Rena. Puente La Reina, 18th November 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 5, nº 9-7.

¹⁰⁹ The draft in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 5, nº 32.

With his capacity to show and construct symbolic capital, Rena also contributed to determining the hegemonic position of important collective actors of the kingdom, such as the city of Pamplona. An important asset in the hands of Rena when attempting to obtain the collaboration of the local authorities was precisely his ability to transmit their services to the royal authorities.¹¹⁰ In 1521, the city's authorities asked Rena to obtain a letter from the governors to testify their previous and current services.¹¹¹ Rena took the commitment quite seriously and included it in his list of issues to negotiate with the governors.¹¹² Rena's help to the city's notables went beyond his mediation with the imperial authorities, as he also advised the former how to negotiate with the new power. The letter that the representatives of the city wrote on Rena's advice is valuable testimony of the political negotiations that conditioned the incorporation of the local community into the Hispanic Monarchy.¹¹³ In this document, after the obligatory reference to the singular position of the city ('this city is on the frontier, and so close to the enemies'), the local authorities made a list of supplications (privileges for notable citizens, tax exemptions, etc.) outlining their previous services. It is interesting that they made reference to the enormous expense of the preparations made by the city before the French invasion, for which they thought that the city deserved a prize like a tax exemption.¹¹⁴ Obviously this service merited a reward, but the city authorities were being disingenuous. The only expense made before the French conquest was that by the viceroy prior to his hurried flight to Castile: the city's representatives, rather than serve the king, promoted an insurrection that expelled the last Castilian troops and delivered the city to the French army.¹¹⁵ In taking part in the writing of this letter, Rena was not only helping his friends in their political negotiations, but was also improving their symbolic capital by constructing the memory of their past services. Sometimes, the help of Rena to his friends

¹¹⁰ I will come back to this issue in chapter five.

¹¹¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 35-14, fol. 2.

¹¹² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 1-7.

¹¹³ Other examples can be found in Giorgio Chittolini, "Milan in the Face of the Italian Wars (1494-1535): Between the Crisis of the State and the Affirmation of Urban Autonomy," in *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy 1494-95. Antecedents and Effects*, ed. D. Abulafia (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), 391-404; Christian Windler, "¿De la monarquía compuesta a la monarquía absoluta? El Franco Condado de Borgoña en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII," in *Las monarquías Española y francesa (siglos XVI-XVIII) ¿Dos modelos políticos?*, ed. A. Dubet and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2010), 95-109; and R. Jovita Baber, "Empire, Indians, and the Negotiation for the Status of City in Tlaxcala, 1521-1550," in *Negotiation within Domination: New Spain's Indian Pueblos Confront the Spanish State*, ed. E. Ruiz Medrano and S. Kellogg (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2010), 19-44.

¹¹⁴ 'Que esta ciudad está en frontera y a los enemigos tan cercana'. The draft with Rena's notes, advice, and corrections in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 36-1.

¹¹⁵ AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, n° 107.

was more explicit and simple, like when he added a specific solicitation for grants for the local authorities as a kind of remuneration for their work.¹¹⁶ Rena's intercession in favour of his friends also included a transfer of symbolic capital from the local merchants who lent the money to Rena to the city as a whole. At least this is what Juan de Vergara denounced 30 years later when the local authorities referred to the city's economic services to the crown during the negotiation over the privileged status of Pamplona:

Some money that they say that the city lent to Micer Juan Rena to conquer Maya [...] and in this, the city has no reason, even if they have the royal order by His Majesty to be paid, because the city of Pamplona never gave or lent money to Micer Juan at change or in any other way, but some particular neighbours of it, his friends, lent him without change or interest, and after that they were paid. Hence the city, from what never gave or loaned at interest or at change or any other way, should not ask for, and His Majesty should not pay.¹¹⁷

As Vergara's words clearly show, these transfers of symbolic capital had long-lasting effects on the status of the city and in the political negotiations that shaped the internal political structure of the kingdom.

The aforementioned examples can mislead us to restrict Rena's influence to the placement of good servants in the new political landscape. However, the policy adopted by Charles V regarding Navarre was much more ambitious, as it aimed at the inclusion of the whole political body. He was conscious that his dominion over Navarre was possible only at the price of including both local factions.¹¹⁸ It was easier said than done: the *agramonteses* not only led the revolts against Ferdinand the Catholic (1516) and

¹¹⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 36-2.

¹¹⁷ 'Unos dineros que dicen que la ciudad prestó a Micer Juan Rena para la toma de Maya [...] y para esto la ciudad no tiene razón aunque para ello tengan cédulas de Su Majestad para ser pagados, porque la ciudad de Pamplona nunca dio ni prestó dineros a Micer Juan a cambio ni de otra manera, sino que vecinos particulares de ella amigos suyos se los prestaron sin cambio ni interese que después se les pagaron, y así la ciudad de lo que ella no dio ni prestó a interese ni a cambio ni de otra manera no tiene que pedir ni Su Majestad porque pagar.' AGS, Estado, Leg. 353, n° 218.

¹¹⁸ Chavaría Múgica, "Monarquía fronteriza," 106-122. According to the political culture of the day pardon and forgiveness were two crucial assets in the activity of the monarchs as guarantors of the social cohesion. Pedro Cardim, "O poder dos afectos. Ordem amorosa e dinâmica política no Portugal do Antigo Regime" (Ph.D. diss., Universidad Nova de Lisboa, 2000), 278-288. On the use of the royal pardon as a political tool, see Violet Soen, "La réitération de pardons collectifs à finalités politiques pendant la Révolte des Pays-Bas (1565-1598)," «Préférant miséricorde à riguer de justice». *Pratiques de la grâce (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles)*, eds. B. Dauven and X. Rousseaux (Leuven: Université de Louvain, 2012), 97-123.

Charles V (1521), they were traditionally at loggerheads with the other faction, the *beamonteses*. After the surrender of Fuenterrabia, the frontier fortress where the last *agramonteses* resisted with French help, Charles V granted a royal pardon, forgiving the political sins of the rebels. Nevertheless, forgiveness was not enough, as it was necessary to guarantee the real inclusion of these actors in Navarrese political life. Thus, the emperor ordered the viceroy of Navarre to negotiate with the Constable of Navarre, the leader of the *beamonteses*, in order to gain his consent for the re-incorporation of the opposed faction.¹¹⁹

The issue was a difficult one, so the viceroy entrusted this complicated mission to an expert in negotiating with local actors: Juan Rena. Rena met the Constable of Navarre and transmitted Charles V's orders about the inclusion of the *agramonteses* and the emperor's desire to rule a Navarre that was at peace. After a tough conversation with the Constable, Rena got a promise that he would accept the political re-incorporation of his rivals.¹²⁰ The emperor celebrated Rena's success in the negotiation with the Constable.¹²¹ Sometime later, Rena took part in a homage ceremony that officialised the incorporation of the rebels into Navarre's politics. In fact, the leader of the *agramonteses* faction pledged reverence and submission to Charles V before Rena.¹²² These facts showed Rena's active participation in the reconfiguration of Navarrese society.

Juan Rena also participated in the policy of including the rebels when he took part in the writing of the list of people who were excluded from the royal pardon. It seems that Rena adopted a generous strategy and excluded very few people from the viceroy's point of view.¹²³ Rena had very good reasons to act in this way, as some of his Navarrese friends belonged to the rebel faction. This allowed him to play a prominent role in the day-to-day inclusion of the rebels. Rena's web of contacts included a wide array of Navarrese tradesmen, as we saw when the Cruzat became key supporters of the new authorities.

¹¹⁹ Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Burgos, 23th May 1524. ADA, Montijo, Caj. 50, n° 3, fol. 31.

¹²⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 1-9.

¹²¹ Letter of Charles V to the Count of Miranda. Burgos, 17th June 1524. ADA, Montijo, Caj. 50, n° 3, fol. 36.

¹²² AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n° 161.

¹²³ Letter of Juan Rena to the Count of Miranda. Maya, 9th August 1522. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, n° 43. Rena's attitude connects with the generous policy of the Crown. Interestingly, Charles V was much more clement with the Navarrese rebels than with the Castilian *comuneros*. Alfredo Floristán Imízcoz, "Renovar lealtades colectivas tras una rebelión. Perdones generales en Castilla y en Navarra (1522-1524)," *Decidir la lealtad. Leales y desleales en contexto (siglos XVI-XVIII)*, ed. A. Esteban Estríngana (forthcoming).

However, not all the merchants behaved homogeneously during the years after the conquest. Some of them, like Miguel de Añués, followed a more complex agenda.¹²⁴ His case is especially interesting because he was also a local authority who mediated between the royal power and his city, Sangüesa.¹²⁵ He started to collaborate with Rena quite quickly after the conquest, lending him money.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, this merchant was more than Rena's collaborator. He also played a key role in the organisation and funding of the rebellions against the Castilian rule.¹²⁷ Añués was close to the Marshal of Navarre, the rebel leader for whose liberation he hoped.¹²⁸ After the final recovery of the kingdom, Miguel de Añués was included in the list of royal pardons granted by the emperor: the drafts of these pardons were written according to Rena's advice.¹²⁹ Furthermore, it seems that Rena's relationship with Añués was not affected by the latter's political behaviour during the rebellions. Indeed, Rena helped his friend to maintain his prominent position in Navarre's economy. Thus, in the following years, Miguel de Añués and his son would enjoy the help of Rena in their activity as collectors of ecclesiastical taxes in Navarre.¹³⁰ Juan Rena used his influence on the inner circle of the imperial government to obtain a privileged status for Añués' economic activities. For instance, in one of his reports on the defence of Navarre, Rena asked the governors to obtain a tax exemption for goods from the Valdonsella, a property of Pamplona's bishopric in Aragon. This was a measure intended to benefit Miguel de Añués.¹³¹ Rena also used his strategic contacts within international capitalism to promote Añués' business outside Navarre. Thus, Rena was the main connection between Miguel de Añués and Genoese tradesmen, who included Añués in their credit networks between Italy and the Iberian Peninsula, as we can conclude from

¹²⁴ On Miguel de Añués' commercial activity, see Vázquez de Prada, *Mercaderes navarros*, 139-148.

¹²⁵ AGN, CO_PS, Caj. 168, nº 80, fol. 13 and AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 128, nº 302, fols. 15-17.

¹²⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 66, nº 2-1. Añués collaboration in the supply of the Castilian army in 1512 was very appreciated by the Spanish authorities. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, 247, fols. 369-370 and AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, leg. 250 and ACA, Reg. 3584, fols. 29-30, 117-118 and 172.

¹²⁷ Letter of Martín de Javier to Sancho de Yesa and letter of the Abad de la Oliva to Sancho de Yesa. AGN, CO_PS, 2ªS, Anexo, Leg. 1, nº 34-1 and 35-5. Añués' case is similar to that of the Castilian financiers who obtained interesting benefits from the Habsburg and Trastámara dynasties due to their role in funding the diplomatic service at the beginning of the sixteenth century. David Alonso García, "Ducados entre dos dinastías. La circulación de capital entre Castilla y Flandes a comienzos del siglo XVI," *Banca, crédito y capital. La Monarquía Hispánica y los antiguos Países Bajos (1505-1700)*, eds. C. Sanz Ayán and B. J. García García (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2006), 85-105.

¹²⁸ Letter of Miguel de Añués to Sancho de Yesa. Sangüesa, 20th April 1518. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 103, 9-2.

¹²⁹ The different versions of the pardon in BNM, Mss. 1757, fol. 5 and AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 3, nº 146. On Rena's advice, see the letter of Juan Rena to Conde de Miranda. Maya, 6th August 1522. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, nº 47.

¹³⁰ Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Madrid, 24th March 1525. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, nº 26-2.

¹³¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 43, nº 1.

the letter of Nicolao de Grimaldo criticising Rena because of Añués' misbehaviour.¹³² Something similar happened in the sphere of church finances, where Rena mediated between Añués and the curia's financiers.¹³³ Both examples show that Rena turned Miguel de Añués into the Navarrese connection of the transnational economic circuits around the new Hispanic Monarchy, something that influenced his position in Navarre.

Rena also acted as a channel conducting royal favour towards the churchmen belonging to the rebel faction, as we can see in his intercession for Doctor Goñi, one of the most important members of the Navarrese church and the rebel faction. Goñi's participation in the rebellion against Castilian rule over Navarre was pardoned by Charles V after Fuenterrabia's surrender.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, as Goñi expressed it in a memorandum addressed to the crown, in order to pacify the kingdom it was necessary to distribute appointments in the different spheres of influence (administration, justice, church, etcetera) in an equalitarian way between the *beamonteses* and *agramonteses*.¹³⁵ Goñi was certainly right, as the conflict between both factions was a struggle for local power. Nevertheless, it was quite difficult for members of the *agramonteses* party to access to appointments when they competed with the *beamonteses* because the latter enjoyed a symbolic capital as good servants of the crown, while the memory of the former's political sins was still too strong. This was made crystal clear when Goñi was elected as one of the most important dignitaries of the Navarrese church in 1528. The viceroy blocked the appointment because the importance of this dignity made it necessary to grant it to a servant of the king belonging to the *beamontes* faction.¹³⁶ The *beamontes* candidate, Juan de Beamonte, the Constable of Navarre's son, mobilised his symbolic capital by exposing Goñi of political sins, as Goñi related to Rena:

Don Juan de Beamonte, son of the Constable of Navarre, in front of the viceroy and of the council, canons and many others, said in my presence, that I have been a *deservidor* of His Majesty, and he said it twice. I replied him satisfying my honour.¹³⁷

¹³² Letter of Nicolao de Grimaldo to Juan Rena. Valladolid, 5th November 1524. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 33-2.

¹³³ Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Toledo, 13th May 1525. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, n° 26-7.

¹³⁴ BNE, Mss. 1757, fol. 5.

¹³⁵ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Pueblos, Leg. 14, n° 149.

¹³⁶ Letter of Martín de Ollacarizqueta to Juan Rena. Pamplona, no date. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 31-5.

¹³⁷ Letter of the Doctor Goñi to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 14th April 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 2-2.

Goñi's political sins were an obstacle in his ecclesiastical career. However, even if he could not enjoy a symbolic capital similar to that of his opponent, he had a useful portfolio of contacts to compensate for this disadvantage. Thus, he made a pact with Rena to exchange one of his positions (he was the cathedral's treasurer) for Rena's support in the struggle to achieve the new dignity.¹³⁸ Rena's help was crucial, as Goñi expressed it in his letter, because he was able to obtain the emperor's support. Rena took this issue seriously and used his contacts within the Roman curia to obtain key supporters there.¹³⁹ Rena was a channel able to contribute to the redistribution of positions among members of the *agramontes* faction. In this way, he contributed to the re-incorporation of these characters in to the political life of the kingdom, something crucial in the on-going peace-building process.¹⁴⁰ In an indirect way, Rena was helping to construct the new socio-political order that permitted Charles V to maintain his dominion over Navarre.

Many different actors (from tradesmen to aristocrats, from humble bureaucrats to local oligarchs) addressed Rena in order to obtain his help in their attempt to improve their position during the profound restructuring of the socio-political life of the Navarrese kingdom after its conquest. Despite the differences among them, they all expected the same from Rena: his aid in providing them with the symbolic capital that they needed. Rena was thus as an important political actor due to his capacity to keep, transmit, and create memories of past services rendered to the crown by local actors. Furthermore, Rena, as well as all the local actors who relied on him and his capacity to transmit their past services, contributed to the construction of a new socio-political order in which the place of these actors was determined not only by their services to the crown, but also by their capacity to gain the support of the king's men like Rena, who embodied the channels of information between the inner circle of the imperial government and the local community.

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¹³⁸ Letter of the Doctor Goñi to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 14th April 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 2-1.

¹³⁹ Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Toledo, 29th December 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 32-6.

¹⁴⁰ On early modern peacebuilding, see M. Neufeld, "From Peacemaking to Peacebuilding: The Multiple Endings of England's Long Civil Wars," *American Historical Review* 120, n°5 (2015): 1709-1723.

Rena's influence in the incorporation of Navarre was not restricted to the internal political life of the kingdom. He also contributed to placing Navarre in the imperial structure of the new Hispanic Monarchy. Determining the place which Navarre would occupy in the framework of the empire was crucial. From a mere geographical perspective, Navarre was north of Castile and next to Aragon: there were no doubts about that. However, it was also necessary to determine which place it deserved in relation with the other kingdoms composing the Hispanic Monarchy, that is, determining its place from a political point of view. As we will see in this section, Rena played a key role in influencing the political engagement of the kingdom. At that moment, the imperial system that differentiated between those territories which exported resources to pay for the defence of others and those territories which consumed external resources was being shaped. Thus, one of the most important issues in the imperial agenda was the settlement of financial links (with an important political meaning) between the different polities that made up the empire.¹⁴¹ As we will see, Rena was able to take part in the placement of Navarre into the imperial politico-financial order because he enjoyed a prominent position in the financial administration of the kingdom and as a channel of political information between the kingdom and the inner circle of the imperial government.¹⁴² From this position, Rena played a crucial role in making Navarre a privileged kingdom in this sense.

The privileged position of Navarre in this sphere was based first of all on its image as a territory incapable of paying for its own defence. Rena played a key role in constructing and diffusing Navarre's image as a special political space where special rules applied. As the paymaster in charge of administrating the resources coming from Castile,

¹⁴¹ Bernardo Hernández, "La contribución de los reinos a las finanzas del Imperio. Cataluña, Nápoles y Flandes en el reinado de Carlos V," in *El imperio de Carlos V: procesos de agregación y conflictos*, ed. B. J. García García (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2000), 185, 190 and 203; Juan Francisco Pardo Molero, "El segundo plano del imperio," in *Le forze del Principe. Recursos, instrumentos y límites en la práctica del poder soberano en los territorios de la Monarquía Hispánica*, ed. M. Rizzo, J. J. Ruzi Ibáñez and G. Sabatini (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2003), T. II, 585-606; M. Rizzo, "Porte, chiavi e bastion. Milano, la geopolítica italiana e la strategia asburgica nella seconda metà del XVI secolo," *Quaderni di Mediterranea* 4 (2007): 469-473. On the political dimension of this redistribution of resources between territories, see Irving Anghony A. Thompson, "Public Expenditure and Political Unity: Spanish Monarchy and European Union," in *Dinero, moneda y crédito en la Monarquía Hispánica*, ed. A. M. Bernal (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 879-888.

¹⁴² I already addressed this question in a brief essay analysing Rena's personal insertion into Navarrese society. José Miguel Escribano Páez, "¿De hombre del rey a hombre de la villa? Juan Rena, pagador general de Navarra (1512-1528)," in *Felipe II y Almazarrón: la construcción local de un gobierno global*, ed. J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez and M. Campillo Méndez (Murcia: Editum, 2014), Vol. II, 275-289.

Rena embodied the policy of transferring money from Castile to Navarre. He spread the image of Navarre as an exceptional space in his day-to-day communications with members of the imperial administration. Indeed, he defended the necessity of investing Castilian resources in Navarre, and sometimes even broke the basic rules of administration to do so. We can take the letter that he wrote to justify his position in a conflict between the royal treasurer and the viceroy in 1521 as an example:

Because of two reasons nobody having a financier charge here can do what Your Mercy writes me [...] the first one is because, as Your Mercy knows, we are in a frontier place and things happen every hour as Your Mercy has seen, and see that having no money they look for it loaned, and when it is impossible to find it, as a manner of talking, it would be necessary to take the churches' crosses and candelabras to accomplish the necessities that happen.¹⁴³

With these words, Rena was constructing the image of Navarre as a frontier space in which it was necessary to invest Castilian resources because it was exposed to a permanent threat and because it was impossible to rely on local resources. The reference to taking the church's crosses as a solution of last resort was quite evocative in this respect.

Rena's capacity to influence Navarre's transformation into a privileged territory in the framework of imperial finances grew as he gained political weight. In fact, as we will see, his major contribution came after his appointment as a judge of finances in the Navarrese chamber of accounts (the *Cámara de Comptos*) in 1525.¹⁴⁴ Shortly after his nomination, Rena wrote a report on this financial institution. In it, he demanded a special appointment as the first *oidor de comptos*, or president of the chamber, something that he considered necessary to develop his ambitious programme of reforms in the finances of the kingdom. Even more interestingly, he asked for a special commission from the crown

¹⁴³ 'Por dos causas nadie que tenga cargo de dineros acá puede hacer lo que Vuestra Merced me escribe [...] la una es que como Vuestra Merced sabe estamos en lugar de frontera y ofrecense cada hora cosas, como Vuestra Merced ha bien visto, y vea que no habiendo dineros siempre los buscan prestados y cuando no los hallasen, por manera de hablar, se habría de tomar las cruces de las iglesias y candelas para cumplir las necesidades que se ofrecen'. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Vargas. Pamplona, 8th May 1520. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 24, nº 24-12.

¹⁴⁴ AGN, CO_PS, 1^a S, Leg. 4, nº 14. The *Cámara de Comptos* was a court with competence over the financial matters and fiscal system of the kingdom. María Puy Huici Goñi, *La Cámara de Comptos de Navarra en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Pamplona, the autor, 1996); and more recently M. D. Martínez Arce, "La institución de control de la fiscalidad: la Cámara de Comptos," *Iura Vasconiae* 6 (2009): 329-382.

which would allow him to order payments.¹⁴⁵ This petition received a positive response; in February 1526, only two months after his appointment as a judge, Rena was authorised to control the pay of the kingdom finances.¹⁴⁶ Beyond the official sphere, Rena's influence was even clearer among those people who made up the financial apparatus. As we saw before, Rena was very closely connected to the other judges of accounts,¹⁴⁷ which allowed him to combine leadership (giving orders about the correct governance of the issues of finances)¹⁴⁸ and friendship (intervening for his friends in their aspirations for a bigger salary and status) when operating in the chamber of accounts.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the different tax collectors recognised Rena's authority in the fiscal administration, and followed his payment orders, something crucial to ensure his extended competences.¹⁵⁰ Considering all of this, it is easy to conclude that Rena enjoyed a hegemonic position in the management of Navarrese finances.

Rena's appointment shows the trust that the royal administration placed in him, but it also tells us something about the real aims behind it. The royal authorisation to make payments that Juan Rena received in 1526 linked this appointment to the convocation of the Navarrese estates. For the first time since the conquest of the kingdom, the Navarrese assembly was expected to pay military expenses: in concrete terms, the money was used to pay the two garrisons deployed in Estella and Pamplona.¹⁵¹ Obviously the appointment of Rena and the new use of Navarrese revenues to finance the defensive system were related. In fact, when the crown ordered that the soldiers be paid, the

¹⁴⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 5-1.

¹⁴⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 8.

¹⁴⁷ In that moment the judges of the chamber of accounts were the aforementioned Rena's friends Lope Cruzat, Bernal Cruzat, Bernal de Eguía and the Doctor Goñi. AGN, CO_REG, 2ª S, nº 9, fols. 161-162.

¹⁴⁸ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 5-2.

¹⁴⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, nº 33. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 202, nº 3, fol. 2.

¹⁵⁰ Letter of Rodrigo de Echarri to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 26th January 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 5, nº 7-1.

¹⁵¹ AGN, CO_REG, 2ª S, nº 9, fols. 164-165. On the Navarrese tax system and the expenses paid with these resources, see C. Barolomé Herranz, "Cuarteles y alcabalas en Navarra (1513-1700)," *Príncipe de Viana* 173 (1984): 561-594; Id., "Datos sobre cuarteles y alcabalas en Navarra (1513-1700)," *Príncipe de Viana* 174 (1985): 145-204, and Id., "Aproximación al estudio del gasto de la Hacienda Real de Navarra (1513-1700)," *Príncipe de Viana* 193 (1991): 139-162. See also Mario García Zúñiga: "Gasto y deuda pública en Navarra durante el feudalismo desarrollado," in *Política y Hacienda en el Antiguo Régimen*, ed. J. I. Fortea Pérez and C. M. Cremades Griñán (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1993), 271-299; Id., "El gasto en un reino periférico. Navarra (siglos XVI-XVII)," in *El alimento del estado y la salud de la res publica: Orígenes, estructura y desarrollo del gasto público en Europa*, ed. A. Galán Sánchez y J. M. Carretero Zamora (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2013), 357-379; and the data collected in Mario García Zúñiga, *Hacienda, población y precios (XVI-XVIII)* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1996), 32-33, 52-53, 82-83, 99, 106-107 and 121-123. An English reader can consult, Id., "Taxation in the Kingdom of Navarre (XVIth-XVIIth Centuries)," *Journal of European Economic History* 31 (2002): 531-558.

instruction was addressed to Rena.¹⁵² The main problem was that the money raised by the estates was not enough to pay both the wages of the soldiers and the salaries of the Navarrese elites.¹⁵³ For this reason, the notables of the kingdom tried to recover their share before the payment of the troops. However, this manoeuvre was impossible: when the emperor again ordered the immediate payment of the soldiers, they could not put up any resistance.¹⁵⁴ This local resistance was easily anticipated, and most probably the members of the royal administration took it into account when they decided to apportion special powers to Rena. Not only he was already a reliable man of the king, but he was also well disposed to the new financial policy. Indeed, he exerted some pressure on the court in order to insist that the soldiers had to be paid when their situation became desperate.¹⁵⁵

The payment of garrison wages with Navarrese resources was part of a more general trend aimed at funding the defence of the frontiers with money from different kingdoms. Thus, the troops employed in Valencia to suffocate the Morisco rebellion were paid with money from the Valencian tax system.¹⁵⁶ In 1528, Charles V asked the Catalan states to pay for the defence of the Pyrenean frontier as well as a galley fleet to protect the coast.¹⁵⁷ In Navarre, as usual, things were much more complex. Despite the initial implementation of the new financial system, the issue was far from being solved and was thus the subject of tough negotiations during the following years. In fact, while the payment of the soldiers in 1526 provoked acute tensions, the issue became more problematic during the convocation of the Navarrese estates in 1528. Two years after the initial implementation of the measure, the viceroy of Navarre reported to the imperial court that the members of this assembly refused to officially approve tax collection because they were aware of the fact that paying soldiers with Navarrese resources would mean they would be deprived of their own salaries.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² AGN, CO_PS, 1^a S, Leg. 23, n^o 66.

¹⁵³ The Navarrese elites used to get an important share of the resources collected by the Navarrese system due to their privileges and offices. Barolomé Herranz, "Aproximación al estudio del gasto," 78-80.

¹⁵⁴ AGN, CO_PS, 1^a S, Leg. 23, n^o 57 and 58.

¹⁵⁵ Most probably Rena did this because Miguel de Herrera, the governor of the fortress of Pamplona, asked him for his help to achieve the payment of his soldiers. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n^o 14.

¹⁵⁶ Pardo Molero, "El segundo plano," 604.

¹⁵⁷ Àngel Casals, *L'Emperador i els catalans. Catalunya a l'Imperi de Carles V (1516-1543)* (Granollers: Editorial Granollers, 2000), 180-195 and 210-213.

¹⁵⁸ Letter of the Count of Alcaudete to the Royal Council of Castile. Pamplona, 13th June 1528. AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n^o 150. Further information on the conflictive states of 1528 in José Miguel Escribano

What was the attitude of Rena in the face of this troublesome issue? As we have seen before, he occupied a privileged position in the financial management of the kingdom. When the conflict started, all the eyes turned to Rena, which is proof of his importance in this political sphere. The members of the kingdom's administration considered Rena as the only one capable of solving the problems surrounding Navarrese finances.¹⁵⁹ Already in the summer of 1526 the regent of the Council of Navarre asked Rena to come back to Navarre, as his presence was necessary to solve the financial issues discussed in the Navarrese estates.¹⁶⁰ Even though Rena was outside Navarre near the imperial court of Charles V, the regent of the Council believed that Rena was the key to successfully handling the issue at hand. Thus, at the beginning of 1527, he wrote to Rena informing him about the latest episodes of the conflict and asking him to share the information about Navarrese finances with the key men at the imperial court.¹⁶¹ Shortly afterwards, the regent admitted that the in-depth revision of Navarre's finances was not being carried out because he was awaiting Rena's return to the kingdom. As Rena was not coming back, the regent finished the revision and, most importantly, promised to provide Rena with the resulting information, to follow his orders regarding the payments, and to entrust Rena with the mission of dealing with this issue at the imperial court.¹⁶² As we can see, Rena was an important channel of information about Navarre's finances between the kingdom and the inner circles of the imperial government.

Considering that Rena enjoyed the trust of the imperial and local administrations, it goes without saying that he was called to play an active role in solving the conflict over the use of Navarrese resources to pay for military expenses. Rena, in his privileged position as a judge of finances, but especially as the man with the confidence of the imperial administration, was entrusted to evaluate the real capacity of the Navarrese tax system. He participated in making a report that contained the usual expenses to be paid

Páez, *El coste de la defensa. Administración y financiación militar en Navarra durante la primera mitad del siglo XVI*, (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2015), 204-216.

¹⁵⁹ Letter of Martin de Echaide to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 10th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 20-1.

¹⁶⁰ Letter of Diego de Avellaneda to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 14th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 19-1.

¹⁶¹ Letter of Diego de Avellaneda to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 3rd January 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 19-2.

¹⁶² Letter of Diego de Avellaneda to Juan Rena. Pamplona, 15th February 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, n° 19-3.

with the money coming from the taxes approved by the Navarrese estates. It is difficult to determine if Rena wrote the report alone or not, but he was undoubtedly one of the authors: a draft of the document was kept in his personal archive.¹⁶³ As we saw before, the report was used by the viceroy, the Count of Alcaudete, to justify a position favourable to the interests of the local elites, but what is really interesting to us here is how the report was written.

An in-depth examination of the report shows that the document provided biased information favouring the aims of the Navarrese nobles. According to the report, total Navarrese income was about 6,800,000 *maravedíes*, but the expenses were more than 7,335,361 *maravedíes* per year: thus, the annual deficit was about 500,000 *maravedíes*. The situation of Navarrese finances was obviously alarming and it was impossible to keep paying usual expenses and the garrisons. Nevertheless, if we compare the report with the data provided by the chamber of accounts, we can see that the report was trying to dramatise Navarrese finances.¹⁶⁴ For instance, some of the expenses included were not paid by the Navarrese treasury. This was the case for the 476,000 *maravedíes* assigned to the payment of noble salaries in the *Tierra de Vascos*.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the report also included a reference to a probable decrease in external trade: however, the quantity actually collected was greater than the quantity noted in the document.¹⁶⁶ Despite the unbalanced character of the report, the bureaucrats of the imperial administration were not able to judge its accuracy, as they had no direct access to real information on the Navarrese tax system. This is why it was so important to have reliable collaborators like Rena in strategic positions in the Navarrese administration. Nevertheless, as we can conclude from Rena's example, these characters did not always act as expected, since Rena helped to protect the interests of the local elites.

Rena betrayed the interests of the imperial administration which choose him as their agent, since he helped locals to avoid the first serious attempts to employ resources from the Navarrese tax system to fund the frontier's defence. The report imposed the idea

¹⁶³ Rena's draft of the report in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 70, nº 7.

¹⁶⁴ The real incomes and expenses for these years are recorded in AGN, CO_REG, 2ª S, nº 9.

¹⁶⁵ The *Tierra de Vascos* referred to the Navarrese territory in the north of the Pyrenees abandoned *de facto* by Charles V in those years: this is reason why the salaries of notables from this region were not paid. Floristán Imízcoz, *El reino de Navarra*, 93-95.

¹⁶⁶ The report managed by the royal administration in "Relación del cargo y data de la renta del Reino de Navarra en cada un año así del ordinario como del extraordinario" AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, nº 150.

that it was impossible to pay the garrisons of Pamplona and Estella with money from the Navarrese tax system and helped to convince the imperial administration to abandon the controversial measure.¹⁶⁷ In contributing to write this report, Rena acted to maintain the *status quo* established after the conquest of the kingdom. At more or less the same time, he acted similarly during the negotiations over the Pamplonian privilege regarding troop lodging when he defended the urban privilege.¹⁶⁸

The report was used by the Count of Alcaudete to convince the crown and the inner circles of the imperial government about the risks of the new financial measure and the necessity of abandoning it. Thus, in one of his letters to Charles V about his problems negotiating with the Navarrese estates, the viceroy made explicit reference to the report:

Regarding the complaint of the garrisons' payment, they say that if it is paid from the ordinary incomes of this kingdom, cannot be paid the *juros* (redeemable bonds) and mercies, and as the service that they do cannot give any general or particular benefit to the kingdom's naturals, that they would not do it if is not sworn and promised to them to pay them their consignations, and salaries, and mercies from the service that they would do preferring them to all the other things paid in this kingdom except the council. And as this is impossible paying the fortresses with the kingdom's treasure [...] because it lacks to accomplish the ordinary more than 500,000 *maravedís*, and that they will not give up of this complaint [...] and because the kingdom knows that this has to be paid they will not give the service if is not by force, or are misled with oaths and words that, in the future, would damage more than benefit now.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ On the influence of local interests on political communication between the councils and the local spheres, see Arndt Brendecke, "Informing the Council. Central Institutions and Local Knowledge in the Spanish Empire," in *Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900*, eds. W. Blockmans, A. Holstein and J. Mathieu (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 235-252.

¹⁶⁸ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Pamplona, 29th April 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 45, n° 1-9.

¹⁶⁹ 'En el agravio de la paga de las fortalezas dicen que si se paga de lo ordinario de este reino que no se pueden pagar los juros perpetuos y mercedes de por vida y acostamientos del, y que pues del servicio que ellos hacen no puede redundar ningún provecho general ni particular a los naturales del reino que no le harán si no se les jura y promete de pagarles sus consignaciones y salarios y mercedes del servicio que hicieren prefiriendoles a todas las otras cosas que en este reino se libran, excepto al consejo. Y como esto es imposible pagándose las fortalezas de la hacienda del reino [...] porque falta para cumplir lo ordinario más de quinientos mil maravedís y que no han de desistir de este agravio [...], y si el reino sabe que esto se ha de pagar, así no harán el otorgamiento si no es por fuerza y son engañados con juramentos y palabras que para adelante podrían dañar más que ahora aprovechar.' Letter of the Count of Alcaudete to Charles V. Pamplona, 13th June 1528. AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n° 147. On the government of the count of Alcaudete in Navarre, see Yuen-Gen Liang, *Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 111-138.

It is obvious that the Count of Alcaudete was adopting a position favourable to local elites. In fact, in one of the letters that Alcaudete sent to Empress Isabel of Portugal, regent of Spain during Charles V's absence, he admitted his fears about the disaffection that the measure could provoke among the Navarrese nobility.¹⁷⁰ The Count of Alcaudete was not the only one to think in this way. The other main figure in the kingdom's politics, Diego de Avellaneda, the bishop of Tuy and regent (president or first councillor) of the Council of Navarre, expressed similar concerns about the issue.¹⁷¹

The pressure applied by these actors convinced the emperor and his councillors to stop using Navarrese resources to pay the garrisons. The next assembly of the Navarrese estates was inaugurated with a speech by the viceroy that was clear on this point:

About the payment of the fortress' garrisons His Majesty says that despite that this expense is the one that most fairly should be paid from the service of this kingdom because it is to keep and secure it, that His Majesty will order in the future to pay this people from the budget of the Castilian fortresses.¹⁷²

The shadow of this controversial measure continued to be present during the negotiations between the imperial administration and the Navarrese estates in the following years. The viceroy's speech at the inaugural ceremony of the Navarrese estates in 1530 was even more explicit on the victory of local interests:

All what you would give is for yourselves and for the kingdom's good, and to make you more secure about it, His Majesty has ordered to pay the fortresses' garrisons from the payment of the permanent infantry following what he promised you during the last negotiations on the economic service, so all the from this kingdom will remain in it.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Letter of the Count of Alcaudete to the Empress Isabel. Pamplona, 13th June 1528. AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n^o 150.

¹⁷¹ Letter of Diego de Avellaneda to the Council of Castile. Pamplona, 14th June 1528. AGS, Estado, Leg. 344, n^o 108. On the important role of this institution in Navarrese politics, see: Joaquín José Salcedo Izu, *El Consejo Real de Navarra en el siglo XVI* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1964).

¹⁷² 'De la paga de la gente de las fortalezas dice Su Majestad que no embargante que aquel gasto es el que más justamente se debía pagar del servicio de este reino pues es para la conservación y seguridad de él, que Su Majestad mandará de aquí adelante pagar la dicha gente de las fortalezas de Castilla.' AGN, Reino, A. Cortes, L. 20, fol. 288.

¹⁷³ 'Lo que diéredes es para vosotros mismos y para el bien del reino y porque de esto estéis más asegurados Su Majestad ha mandado que se pague la gente de sus fortalezas de la paga de la infantería ordinaria en

The surrender of the imperial administration could not be more evident: the promise to pay garrisons with Castilian money was the clearest sign of the victory of the local elite in the struggle for the local tax resources.

Rena's participation in this victory had a real impact on Navarre's position as a privileged kingdom in the financial map of the new Hispanic Monarchy. The examination of the financial documentation of the Navarrese chamber of accounts shows that, at least during the next two decades, the local notables continued getting the lion's share from Navarrese tax resources, while the military expenses were paid with money from Castile.¹⁷⁴ Thus, Rena contributed to creating a symbiotic relationship between Navarre and Castile, a relationship in which the latter paid for the expenses of the former because Navarre was a bulwark that defended Castile.¹⁷⁵ In so doing, Rena helped to make Navarre one of the most privileged kingdoms in the framework of the finances of the new Hispanic Monarchy.

Rena's work on reporting the financial reality of the Navarrese kingdom makes full sense in the framework of the establishment of political and financial relationships among the different polities of the empire. From his previous position as paymaster, he assisted in the construction and diffusion of an image of Navarre as a territory where it was necessary to invest external resources in order to fund the frontier's defence. The confidence that the imperial government had in him with his strategic position in the Navarrese financial administration allowed Rena to become a crucial actor in this process. The information on the Navarrese finances that he produced helped local interests to avoid the first attempts to use Navarrese resources to fund the military expenses of the frontier's defence. Thus, Rena participated in making Navarre a privileged kingdom on the political map of imperial finances. We can conclude that Rena not only contributed to the incorporation of Navarre by constructing a new social order inside the kingdom. He also contributed to the incorporation of the Navarrese kingdom by taking part in the settlement

cumplimiento de lo que en el otorgamiento pasado se os prometió de manera que todo lo que el reino le sirviere se queda en él.' AGN, Reino, Cortes, L. 20, fol. 291.

¹⁷⁴ AGN, CO_REG, 2ª S. n° 12, fols. 58-64; n° 14, fols. 44-49; n° 16, fols. 72-83; n° 17, fols. 39-43; n° 19, fols. 39-47 and n° 21, fols. 89-105.

¹⁷⁵ On the financial relationship between Navarre and Castile, see Escribano Páez, *El coste de la defensa*, 169-183.

of a new imperial order, one which was constituted by the political and financial links between the different kingdoms.

Conclusions

This analysis of Rena's activity in the Navarrese kingdom sheds light on the fundamental role of this kind of agent in processes of conquest and incorporation in the early modern period. Rena's case is a useful one for studying the influence of actors like him in relation to the incorporation of a political community into the wider empire. Not only does he perfectly represent the multi-tasking profile of most of the men who made these processes possible, but he also allows us to analyse his sociability within the local community. Only by analysing how Rena's network functioned can we accurately appreciate the role of these agents in the construction of early modern polities as well as their contribution to the definition of the political game within these communities. The functioning of this network shows us how important the capacity of these king's men to manage the interchange of different types of capital was: it was this ability that enabled networks to cohere and be put at the service of the monarchy. Thus, Rena's ability to distribute payments with different kinds of capital among his close friends allowed him to manage an effective network during a critical period, as we can conclude from the fact that he was able to keep on obtaining loans from the local community. This capacity was closely related to Rena's position in the web that composed the new Hispanic Monarchy. To put it simply, he was able to act as an important political actor because he bridged a gap between the royal administration and the local community.

Rena's skill at constructing and managing an efficient network in the service of the crown had important consequences for the incorporation of Navarre into the Hispanic Monarchy. His ability to intercede for members of the local community and distribute favourable treatment among his friends provoked a progressive intermeshing between the Navarrese community and Rena. This influenced Rena's behaviour when he reached the peak of his control over the financial government in Navarre and during the crisis of the last years of the 1520s. In this moment, he discretely acted against the central political decisions with which he was associated. Instead, favouring the interests of his Navarrese friends he influenced the process of incorporating this political community into the new Hispanic Monarchy. By protecting the interest of the local elite, Rena was not only

making friends or winning collaborators, he was also shaping the cohesion of the local community. Something similar happened regarding his activity distributing rewards among the key actors of the Navarrese politics. In both cases he was establishing the rules that regulated the exchange of services and favours between members of the royal administration and the local inhabitants. One of these rules was precisely the central role that the mediators played as communication channels between the local community and the inner circle of the imperial government. Moreover, Rena, and the actors who occupied this privileged position bridging the structural hole between the royal administration and the local community, contributed to the spread of local support for Charles V's imperial project by making participation in this political enterprise more profitable for local actors. At the same time, in a political game where personal connections played a crucial role, these local actors felt themselves to be a part of the new empire because Rena acted as a channel of communication with the inner circle of the imperial government.

Furthermore, Rena also influenced the incorporation of Navarre into the Hispanic Monarchy by helping to determine the place that this political entity occupied within the empire under construction. As we already saw, in the opening decades of the sixteenth century one of the most interesting political developments inside the Hispanic Monarchy was the establishment of durable relationships between those territories that paid for the defence of others and those which consumed external resources to fund its military apparatus. With his actions during the crisis of 1528, Rena helped to impose the image of Navarre as a territory whose defence needed to be funded with resources from other territories, especially Castile. Indeed, Rena contributed to the spread of this image many times beforehand with his arguments about the specific functions of the imperial administration in frontier areas. Thus, we can conclude that Rena played a decisive role in turning Navarre into a territory that consumed external resources, a key issue in the binding of Navarre to the Hispanic Monarchy. In this manner, Rena had an important part to play in the incorporation of this kingdom into the structure of the new empire "under construction".

Chapter 4

A King's man in the Making. The Moral Economy of Royal Service in the Imperial Administration

Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on Rena's successful administrative career in order to shed light on the construction of the administration of the Hispanic Monarchy. More specifically, I aim to analyse the development of the moral economy that governed the members of the new imperial administration. It is well known that royal officers had to behave according to the moral duties embedded in religious thought of the time.¹ Nevertheless, the *ethos* of royal service in the imperial administration was much more complex. It was composed of an array of codes and practices that someone like Rena needed not only to carry out administrative activities in the service of the crown, but also to have a successful career as a king's man.²

¹ Juan Francisco Pardo Molero and Manuel Lomas Cortés, "Ministros idóneos. El marco del servicio al rey en la Monarquía Hispánica," in *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica (siglos XVI-XVII)*, ed. J. F. Pardo Molero and M. Lomas Cortés (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2012), 12; and Antonio Manuel Hespanha, "Paradigmes de légitimation, aires de gouvernement, traitement administratif et agents de l'administration," in *Les figures de l'administrateur: institutions, réseaux, pouvoirs en Espagne, en France et au Portugal 16e-19e siècle*, ed. R. Descimon, J-F. Schaub and B. Vincent (Paris: EHESS, 1997), 19-28.

² By moral economy I mean "a web of affect-saturated values that stand and function in well-defined relationship to one another." L. Daston, "The Moral Economy of Science," *Osiris* 10 (1995): 4.

The values, ideas, and practices that composed this moral economy were shaped by a multiplicity of actors who influenced the selection and promotion of royal officers. The recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats and professional administrative staff used to be seen as an expression of increasing royal authority as the appointments, offices and honours were expressions of the king's symbolic capital, an asset that only he could distribute.³ Only the king had the authority to appoint and promote royal servants, but many other actors also influenced this process. Historians working on the Hispanic Monarchy have paid attention to how families or political factions influenced the distribution of offices and mercies in the imperial administration.⁴

However, Rena's success cannot be explained solely by family support or by the backing of a courtly patron. Instead, he was able to accumulate charges and mercies because he was known to be an efficient and loyal servant to the crown. In other words, he became a reliable king's man because he was perceived as such by different actors who recommended him for positions, provided him with appointments, or underlined his merits to get royal mercies. Analysing how he got such a reputation will allow us to better understand the logics of royal service in the imperial administration. Moreover, this analysis permits us to observe how the variety of actors who provided Rena with such symbolic capital also helped to shape this *ethos*. This makes possible to go beyond the traditional approach to bureaucracy which characterised it either as a tool to reinforce monarchical power, or as an obstacle to it.⁵

³ Pierre Bourdieu, "Esprits d'État. Genèse et structure du champ bureaucratique," in Id., *Raisons pratiques: sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 120-121 and Id., *Sur l'État. Cours du Collège de France* (Paris: Seuil, 2012), 342-347.

⁴ José Martínez Millán, "La investigación sobre las élites de poder," in *Instituciones y élites de poder en la Monarquía Hispana durante el siglo XVI*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1992), 11-24; Michel Bertrand, "Du bon usage des solidarités. Étude du facteur familial dans l'administration des Finances de Nouvelle-Espagne, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle," in *Les figures de l'administrateur. Institutions, réseaux, pouvoirs en Espagne, en France et au Portugal 16e-19e siècle*, ed. R. Descimon, J-F. Schaub and B. Vincent (Paris: EHESS, 1997), 43-58; J-P. Dedieu, "Amistad, familia, patria... y rey. Las bases de la vida política en la Monarquía española de los siglos XVII y XVIII," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 35, n°1 (2005): 27-50; José María Imízcoz Beunza, "Las redes de la monarquía. Familias y redes sociales en la construcción de España," in *Familias: historia de la sociedad española (del final de la Edad Media a nuestros días)*, ed. F. Chacón Jiménez and J. Bestard Comas (Madrid: Cátedra, 2011), 417-474.

⁵ The classic work from a theoretical perspective is still Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 956-1009. The Weberian approach has deeply influenced the study of early modern bureaucracy. See, for instance, I. A. A. Thompson, "War and Institutionalization: the Military-Administrative Bureaucracy of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Id., *Crown and cortes. Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern Castile* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), 1-37; and Id., "Administración y administradores en el reinado de Carlos V," in *En torno a las comunidades de Castilla*, ed. F. Martínez Gil

Serving a Faraway King

Rena's career was a permanent struggle against the adversities that derived from serving a faraway king. Needless to say, Rena was not the only one to face such difficulty. In fact, the distance (geographic but above all political) between the ruler and his officers was a distinctive feature of the new imperial administration. The difference between the new administration and the old was more than evident, for instance, if we compare Rena's career with one of the key servants to the Catholic Monarchs like, Hernando de Zafra or Alonso Sánchez. All three spent most of their adult lives serving the crown in similar tasks but the latter had a permanent base in Valencia, Zafra only moved from Extremadura to Granada, while Rena spent his work life travelling from the Maghreb, to Castile, Navarre, Seville, Granada, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, and Tunis. Zafra, Sánchez and Rena carried out similar tasks relating to the mobilisation of resources for war. When Zafra and Sánchez organised the naval squadron that was used to conquer the Maghrebi outposts in the opening years of the sixteenth century, they relied on vast, but simple networks centred in Málaga or Valencia.⁶ In contrast, the naval squadrons that Rena organised in Genoa and Barcelona to fight the Ottomans and conquer Tunis was composed of a large amount of resources that came from all the spread dominions of Charles V (from Flanders to Naples). All three had to learn how to manage resources, time and space, but Rena had to do it on a larger scale. Beyond these distinctions, the main difference was political distance, as we can see when comparing their different situations, while Zafra was serving the crown in Granada, Rena was in Navarre. Both were acting as a jack of all trades for the monarchs in these conquered kingdoms and both were carrying out similar tasks on behalf of the crown.⁷ Furthermore, they were following

(Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla la Mancha, 2002), 93-107. A more nuanced vision of the bureaucrats as tool and obstacle for royal power in Antonio Manuel Hespanha, *As vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político. Portugal séc. XVII*, 2nd ed. (Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1994), 498-522. It is obligatory to include here the classic works on royal servants from a prosopographic approach. Gerald E. Aylmer, *The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I 1625-1642* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974) and Id. *The Crown's Servants: Government and Civil Service under Charles II, 1660-1685* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). A complete survey on the bureaucrats of the early modern Hispanic Monarchy from a legal approach in José María García Marín, *La burocracia castellana bajo los Austrias* (Alcalá: Instituto nacional de la administración pública, 1986). See also Id., "La burocracia de Carlos V," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), 275-291.

⁶ Jacqueline Guiral Hadziiossif, "Affaires d'état et affaires privées à l'époque des Rois Catholiques," in *Le partage du monde. Échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée Médiévale*, ed. M. Balard and A. Ducellier (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), 411-421.

⁷ On Zafra's activity in Granada after its conquest see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Hernando de Zafra: secretario de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2005), 31-40 and 59-83.

identical administrative procedures.⁸ Nevertheless, while the Zafra and Sánchez had a direct and fluent access to the monarchs, Rena was a peripheral actor with little and indirect access to the king because the new space composed of councils, and viceroys, was taking form and this administrative level insulated the king from his servants. How to navigate this space was a necessary skill that a king's man like Rena had to learn but Zafra or Sánchez did not.

Rena succeeded in surmounting this added difficulty, and in fact he managed to become one of Emperor Charles V's most reliable servants. Nevertheless, his way to the highest tier of the emperor's servants was not at all easy. Rena was appointed to multiple positions and received many royal mercies due to his notable reputation as a royal servant. However, to acquire such a reputation meant that he spent many years accumulating a long list of services to the crown, first to Ferdinand the Catholic, and then to Charles V. The early modern period witnessed the ascension of many personages like Rena by serving powerful actors. Some of them managed to do that only by self-fashioning themselves as reliable servants because they mastered the cultural codes of the political game.⁹ However, this was not the case for Rena. It is true that he used to exaggerate his services in order to receive greater rewards, but it is also true that he showed a real commitment to royal service.

Rena had the opportunity to start forging his reputation as a loyal and unconditional servant of the crown when he was deployed to serve King Ferdinand the Catholic in a difficult setting: Navarre. Rena arrived in the kingdom at a difficult time: just before the French counterattack in the autumn of 1512. Hence, Rena started his stay in Navarre by defending Pamplona against the enemy's siege in the winter of 1512. It was during this siege that Rena received the order to start taking charge of the troops' payment.¹⁰ Navarre was a land full of opportunities for a royal servant like Rena, but also a place full of risks. In fact, Rena's first commitment was a direct consequence of the

⁸ The administrative procedures regarding the management of the crown's resources was inherited from the fifteenth century. Some of the normative texts on this matter have been published in Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada ed., *Legislación hacendística de la Corona de Castilla en la Baja Edad Media* (Madrid: RAH, 1999), 71-79 and 87-91.

⁹ Roberto Zapperi, *Don Scipio di Castro. Storia di un impostore* (Asís-Rome: Beniamino Carucci ed., 1977).

¹⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 20, nº 2-2.

French attack, as Rena replaced the official paymaster Álvaro Vázquez de Nogerol, who was captured by the French army.¹¹

In the years immediately following the conquest, Navarre was a good place for Rena to show his active commitment to the royal service. The new military administration needed experienced men and, most importantly, these men found plenty of opportunities to show that they were ready to take on important risks in the name of the royal service. This was the case for Juan Rena when he was faced with the dynastic transition of 1516.¹² King Ferdinand the Catholic passed away on 23 January 1516, and political stability disappeared with him. In a moment of weak royal authority Rena's patron, the Alcaide de los Donceles, gained momentum once again. Juan de Vergara, Rena's agent at court, wrote to him advising that he leave Navarre and come back to the royal court, not only to escape from the imminent rebellion in Navarre, but also to profit from the strong position of his patron.¹³ Nevertheless Rena decided to stay in Navarre.

The situation there turned from bad to worse in the following months. As we have seen in the previous chapter, an important part of the Navarrese nobility tried to recover the kingdom for its former kings and many towns joined the uprising. In this difficult context the viceroy Don Fadrique de Acuña had to crush the revolt but the local troops refused to act without being paid beforehand and the viceroy had no money. In this situation Rena made another surprising decision. Instead of fleeing from Navarre, as Juan de Vergara (Rena's agent in the royal court) advised him, Rena syndicated a loan to the viceroy. When Rena reported this to Vergara the latter confessed that 'I am amazed that Your Mercy wants to take loaned money at such time'.¹⁴ Nevertheless, what seemed to be a foolish decision turned out to be a complete success as the troops paid with Rena's money pacified the kingdom and captured the rebel leaders. When the news of the victory arrived at the royal court Juan de Vergara wrote to Rena explaining the positive response of the inner circle of the government. Contrary to his previous advice, this time Vergara advised Rena to help fund the army using his own resources, 'because the situation at

¹¹ The official paymaster spent five years imprisoned in France. Letter of Carlos V to Cardinal Cisneros. Brussels, 20th February 1517. AGS, Estado, Leg. 496, n° 55.

¹² A Floristán Imízcoz, "Cambio dinástico y cambio político. De los Trastámara a los Habsburgo en Castilla y en Navarra," *Estudis: Revista de historia moderna* 31 (2005): 7-36.

¹³ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Chillón, 19th February 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-1.

¹⁴ 'Maravillado estoy de Vuestra Merced querer tomar dineros prestados en tal tiempo'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 20th March 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-5.

present is so dire that [these lords] would consider this a great service even though it be a meagre one'.¹⁵

If in 1516 Rena showed that he was ready to risk his money and his credit. The following crisis would allow him to show that he also was ready to risk his life. As in the previous cases the crisis was provoked by the absence of the king but this time the cities, not the noblemen, set Castile alight. The *comunero* revolt was the largest uprising that a Habsburg monarch had to face in the sixteenth century, starting in the spring of 1520 after Charles' departure from Castile. Some of its most important cities rose up against the imperial agenda of Charles V, contesting the authority of Charles V's regents who ruled the kingdom in his absence.¹⁶ The members of this regency (the Constable of Castile, the Admiral of Castile, and Adrien of Utrecht) were forced to face the revolt with scarce resources at their disposal. When they tried to organise an army to fight the rebels they soon realised that they were out gunned as the *comunero* army had more artillery.¹⁷ Due to this they turned their attention to Navarre, as Pamplona held most of the crown's artillery.

It was in this context that Rena was entrusted with the task of transporting the artillery from Navarre.¹⁸ Even so, he not only carried out this difficult task successfully, he also took an important role in the subsequent battle that saw the defeat of the *comunero* army in Tordesillas. This was not the first time that Rena had risked his life in a battle, but this time was different. The battle and victory of Tordesillas held a symbolic value as the regency changed the course of the war, but they liberated the emperor's mother, Queen Joanna 'the mad'.¹⁹ Even more importantly, this time Rena was taking part in a battle not on the faraway African coasts, or on the lost frontier of the Pyrenees. This time he was fighting the King's enemies side by side with the central figures of the government in the heart of Castile.

¹⁵ 'Poner en ello alguna cosa de su casa porque las cosas están en tal estado que de poco harán mucho'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 25 March 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-6.

¹⁶ The key work on this revolt and its deep impact in the empire's politics is still Joseph Pérez, *La revolución de las comunidades de Castilla (1520-1521)* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977).

¹⁷ Letter of the Constable of Castile to Charles V. Burgos, 11th February and 3rd November 1520. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 1, n° 105, fol. 566 and 669.

¹⁸ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 4-1.

¹⁹ Queen Joanna was the last chance of the Comunero movement to gain legitimacy. B. Aram, "Juana "the Mad's" Signature: The Problem of Invoking Royal Authority, 1505-1507," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 29, n° 2 (1998): 334, 350-351.

For the first time in his life Rena's efforts were recognised by these men, which was crucial for Rena's career. Thus, the Constable of Castile wrote to Charles V underlining Rena's contribution to the victory of Tordesillas and the need to compensate his services:

Micer Juan Rena, your royal chaplain, has served Your Highness so well that, without his industry and diligence, on the day of combat at Tordesillas we would have had problems. After that he served us in the fortification of the city, and furthermore he was wounded by a dart shot in the face. Because all of these causes he deserves mercies from Your Majesty.²⁰

Rena's participation in the battle of Tordesillas had long-lasting consequences. From this point onwards, and for the rest of his life, he would have the mark on his face showed his willingness to risk death in the service of the emperor, an important medal of honour in the eyes of his contemporaries. Furthermore, he won the support of important political allies that would later advance his career in the service of the crown. One of them was Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, the former tutor of Charles V and the future Pope Adrian VI. He was part of the emperor's inner circle, and one of the members of the regency council that ruled Castile after his departure.²¹ In one of his letters to his former pupil, Adrian thanked Charles V for accepting his recommendation for Rena saying:

I kiss your hands for what Your Highness has ordered me to reply on the issue of Micer Juan Rena, your chaplain. And I beg Your Highness to remember him and to always gratify him with a good benefice in the church, in truth, the said Juan Rena deserves any mercy, because he served you very well in the conquest of this city and its fortification.²²

²⁰ 'Micer Juan Rena capellán de Vuestra Merced ha servido mucho a Vuestra Aalteza y tan bien que si no fuera por su buena industria y diligencia el día del combate de Tordesillas hubiera algún trabajo. Después ha servido y sirve en los reparos de la dicha villa y fue herido de una saetada en el rostro por cuyas causas es razón que Vuestra Majestad le haga mercedes'. Letter of the Counstable of Castile to Charles V. Burgos, 25th January 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 1, n° 105.

²¹ Michiel Verweij, *Adrianus VI (1459-1523). De tragische paus uit de Nederlanden* (Antwerp: Garant, 2011), 53-59; and Raymon Fagel, "Adriano de Utrecht y la rebelión de la comunidad de Castilla," in *Imperio y tiranía. La dimensión europea de las comunidades de Castilla*, eds. I. Stvan Szásdi León-Borja and M- J. Galende Ruiz (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2013), 259-275.

²² 'Por lo que Vuestra Alteza me ha mandado responder en lo que toca a Micer Juan Rena su capellán le beso las manos, y así suplico a Vuestra Alteza lo tenga siempre en memoria para le gratificar en alguna buena pieza o pensión en la iglesia, que cierto los servicios del dicho Juan Rena son merecedores de toda merced que se le haga, porque asi en la toma de esta villa como en los reparos de ella ha servido y sirve

It seems that Rena was aware of the credit that he earned as a fearless servant of the crown but also as expert in military affairs.²³ Some months later, after retaking Navarre, Adrian of Utrecht wrote to Charles V asking him to grant a mercy to Rena in order to convince him to stay in Navarre where his military expertise was much needed to protect this frontier against the French enemy. However, Rena felt like he was being taken for granted by the regency, and bargaining on their need of him, he threatened to abandon the kingdom. Only the promise of a new mercy by the Constable of Castile, the Admiral, and Adrian managed to calm down Rena.²⁴ The regency's decision shows that Rena was already known to be a reliable servant of the crown, and they were willing to honour him as such.

During the following period Rena continued to promote the image that he was capable and ready to serve the crown on its most dangerous missions. Thus, in the final moments of the crisis, with Charles V again in Castile, and the war against the French king close to its end, Rena took charge of destroying the fortress of Maya on the frontier between France and Navarre. This fortress continued under French control until the summer of 1522 (a year after Navarre's recover). When the army took Maya Charles V ordered his men to destroy it, to prevent any possible counterattack, and the viceroy of Navarre entrusted this difficult task to Rena. The mission in itself was perilous a one, as the French army were positioned nearby Rena took this opportunity to improve his reputation, as we can conclude from one of the letters that he sent to the viceroy describing all the risks of this crucial mission.²⁵ After having taken so many risks for the crown, Rena had learnt how to take credit for it. Nevertheless, despite Rena's exaggerations in his correspondence with his superiors, he remained committed to crown's cause, as a loyal servant.

mucho'. Letter of Adrian of Utrecht to Charles V. Tordesillas, 28th December 1520. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 2, n° 1, fol. 103.

²³ Both features were crucial in the military service to the King in this period. J. F. Pardo Molero, "Hijos del Dios Marte. Historias de soldados y espíritu de cuerpo en los ejércitos de la Monarquía Hispánica," *Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche* 20 (2010): 533-544.

²⁴ Letter of Adrian of Utrecht to Charles V. Logroño, 30th August 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 2, n° 1, fol. 209.

²⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to the Count of Miranda. Maya, 6th August 1522. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, n° 48.

Rena was willing to risk his goods and even his life in the service of the emperor, but not to work without reward. According to him, but also to the political culture of the era, his efforts and sacrifices deserved adequate compensation. However, Rena spent most of his life serving a king from a distance, in faraway posts, and as such gaining recognition was a problem. Prominent careers in the service of the monarchy used to be a sign of the king's favour (especially for the king's most reliable favourites) like those of Cobos or Gattinara.²⁶ But the king's favour was often restricted to those occupying high posts in the different divisions of the imperial government. Francisco de los Cobos and Mercurino Gattinara enjoyed the support and favour of Charles V, but we cannot expect that an emperor who ruled over an immense political community interacted directly with all the royal officers in his service.²⁷ Surmounting the distance to the king was an obsession of many crown's servants, even for those who served in the emperor's court.²⁸ The further the distance away from the monarch the more difficult it became to gain honour and recognition as a king's man.

Rena provides a good example of how troublesome it could be serving a distant king. He started his career in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy and had sporadic access to King Ferdinand the Catholic when he worked for him in the Maghrebi diplomacy.²⁹ However, instead of this being the starting point of a career at the royal court these services resulted in Rena being given a post under the Alcaide de los Donceles on the southern frontier of the realm where Rena spent six years. He returned to the court in 1512 but only for a very brief period before departing to Navarre, where he stayed for the next 13 years. He returned to the royal court again in 1525, where he travelled following the court to Seville and Granada. Over the next few years he combined brief stays at the royal court with long missions away working in different positions of naval administration. In 1529 Rena returned to the imperial court and became one of the many members to follow Emperor Charles V in his journey to Italy and Germany. He stayed at the imperial court until 1532 when he departed to Genoa as commissary of the navy. It

²⁶ Hayward Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary of the Emperor Charles V* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1960); John M. Headley, *The Emperor and His Chancellor: a Study on the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 13, and 33-39.

²⁷ Wim Blockmans, "The Emperor's Subjects," in *Charles V 1500-1558 and his Time*, ed. H. Soly (Antwerp: Mercatorfonds, 1999), 227-284.

²⁸ Fernando Bouza, "Tiempo y espacio en la corte de Carlos V. Vidas de palacio," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. I, 47-55.

²⁹ AGN, CO, PS, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol. 5.

was at this point that Rena shared with Pedro de Zuazola (secretary of the Council of War) the bitter vision of his life serving the crown far away from the court. In his letter to Zuazola, Rena strongly criticised the members of the inner circle of the emperor because they had no idea of how he worked and served the crown, and because: ‘all you are like the cork tree, you only give fruit when you are beaten’.³⁰

Rena’s bitter words underline his frustration about the distribution of royal grace among the crown’s servants. It was only during Rena’s final years that his services became visible to Charles V or, more exactly, when the emperor occasionally witnessed Rena’s activities. In 1533, as a reward for being able to organise the navy for the emperor’s travel to Spain, Rena got the privilege to sit next to the emperor on his way to Genoa.³¹ Zuazola’s instructions show that Rena was not used to having direct access to the Charles V. However, from 1533 onwards Rena had more frequent contact with the emperor. Thus, for instance, in 1535 Charles V personally examined the shipbuilding works directed by Rena in Barcelona before departing for the conquest of Tunis.³² During this campaign Rena was included in the inner circle of military advisors of the emperor.³³ After that, Rena became a permanent member of the imperial court and travelled together with the emperor. In fact, in the winter of 1539, Rena passed away in Toledo while he was attending the Castilian court as a general purveyor of the emperor’s navy.³⁴

Rena’s relative proximity to Emperor Charles V obviously influenced his career. During his years at the imperial court he received more appointments to higher positions than he had before. Furthermore, Rena used this proximity to the emperor in order to obtain more rewards. Hernando de Montoro, Rena’s servant, connected Rena’s proximity to the emperor with his prizes when referring to Rena’s last appointment as bishop of Pamplona. According to Montoro, it was obvious that his master was fighting to obtain

³⁰ ‘No sabéis allá lo que hombre sirve ni hace, y también que sois de casta de alcornoque, que no dais fruta sino a palos’. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 19th July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 3-3, fol. 2.

³¹ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Alessandria, 25th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-12.

³² *Manual de Novells Ardits vulgarment apellat Dietari del Antich Consell Barceloní* (Barcelona: Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 1895), Vol. 4, 23.

³³ AGS, Estado, Leg. 462, n° 41, 44 and 49.

³⁴ Pedro Girón, *Cronica del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. J. Sánchez Montes (Madrid: CSIC, 1964), 147.

that office (despite Rena's denials on the matter) because Rena was going to the palace every day 'where he represents himself in front of his lord'.³⁵

We should not consider Rena's proximity and access to Charles V as the key factor behind his ascension in the hierarchy of the Imperial administration. On the contrary, Rena's closeness to the emperor was an outcome of his ascension. It took Rena almost thirty years of service to obtain a stable place in the courtly galaxy orbiting Charles V. Of course, we should not dismiss the influence of the emperor in the career development of his servants. Nevertheless, the enormous distance existing between the emperor and his royal servants obliged them to depend on the mediation of political characters at court who were capable of bridging this distance. Through their intercession, royal servants stood a greater chance of receiving rewards for their service in the form of mercies and new appointments.

Beyond patrons and clients. Getting and enjoying different supports.

It is easy to fall into the temptation of attributing successful careers as royal servants to the support of a powerful patron.³⁶ It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of patronage in the career trajectory of royal servants, but relying on a powerful patron was not the only way to have a successful career. Frequently a person's success depended more on their receiving support from several actors.³⁷ The career of Juan Rena is a good example of how dangerous it was to rely on a single patron, and how profitable it could be to gain the support of many different people.

³⁵ 'Y se representa delante de su amo'. Letter of Hernando de Montoro to Juan de Alarcón. Barcelona, 17th January 1538. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 77, n° 12-1.

³⁶ A loose definition of patronage applied to the study of career development in the renaissance can be found in Paul D. McLean, *The Art of the Network. Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); On patronage in court studies, see José Martínez Millán, "Introducción. Los estudios sobre la corte. Interpretación de la corte Felipe II," in *La corte de Felipe II*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), 17 and 33. The term "patronage" has become so widely used in the works on early modern administration, that it risks to become meaningless as it happened in other spheres. J. Russel Major, "Vertical Ties through Time," *French Historical Studies* 17, n° 4, (1992): 864.

³⁷ This was the case, for instance, of the famous writer Lope de Vega. Elizabeth R. Wright, *Pilgrimage to Patronage: Lope de Vega and the Court of Philip III, 1598-1621* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001).

The Alcaide de los Donceles was a central figure in Rena's career trajectory. The Alcaide got in contact with Rena when he received a royal order commanding him to reward Rena's services to the crown in the Maghreb. The Alcaide decided to incorporate him as a member of his own administrative apparatus on the southern frontier of the realm.³⁸ Rena enjoyed his support during these years and undoubtedly it was thanks to him that Rena was able to enter the field of the imperial administration. Nevertheless, the Alcaide de los Donceles was not exactly a perfect patron. During the crisis of 1516, the Alcaide resigned his position as viceroy of Navarre, and left Rena behind, which provoked a bitter feeling of abandonment in him.³⁹ This swift departure also left Rena in a difficult economic situation, as the Alcaide was owed him an important amount of money, a debt that the nobleman forgot to include in his last will, which ultimately shows the high esteem that he held for Rena.⁴⁰ However, without the Alcaide's patronage, Rena would never have found himself in Navarre in 1516, and it was there that he was able to serve the crown in a time of great need, which resulted in a great reward.

Once inside the imperial administration it was necessary to have contacts with influential people. From his position as the head of the military administration in Navarre, Rena found in the general treasurer Francisco de Vargas an important supporter.⁴¹ Rena and Vargas were already in contact during the opening years of the century, when Rena supplied the military enterprises in Africa.⁴² In 1512 they met again when Rena participated in preparing the navy to transport the English army to help the Castilian troops in the conquest of Navarre, a task in which Rena acted under the order of the treasurer.⁴³ During the years following the conquest of Navarre, Rena and the treasurer worked together, and very soon it became evident that Rena saw Vargas as the powerful man who protected his interests at the royal court, especially after the retirement of the Alcaide de los Donceles.

³⁸ AGN, CO_PS, Leg. 23, n° 23, fol 9.

³⁹ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Chillón, 19th February 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-1.

⁴⁰ AGA, Medinaceli, Comares, Leg. 6, n° 4. An uncomplete and mistaken copy of the last will in BRAH, SyC, M-103, fols. 186-187.

⁴¹ On this character see Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, *Carlos V y el crédito de Castilla. El tesorero general Francisco de Vargas y la Hacienda Real entre 1516 u 1524* (Madrid: SECC, 2000).

⁴² AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 200, fol. 133.

⁴³ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, Leg. 375 and AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 14, n° 1-3.

The relationship between Rena and Vargas was two-way. The latter used Rena's efficient managing of the military administration of Navarre (an issue which fell under Vargas' supervision) as a way to defend his activity in front of his political enemies.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Vargas found a useful ally in Rena, in his struggle for control of the imperial finances. The royal treasurer used Rena's contacts among the Genoese financiers, in his manoeuvres against Alonso Gutiérrez de Madrid, his main rival in the financial government.⁴⁵ Taking into account these valuable services it is not surprising that Vargas began entrusting Rena with some important missions such as, organising the supplies for the imperial army during the first war between Charles V and Francis I (1521).⁴⁶

Can we consider Francisco de Vargas as Rena's patron? The support of the man in charge of funding the empire was a valuable asset for someone like Rena, but Vargas proved to be less than useful as he passed away. Twice. First he died as a political figure when his activity as royal treasurer fell under investigation. After years navigating through his enemies' treacherous attacks and suspicions towards his management of the crown's treasury Vargas had to face a formal revision of his accounts which revealed his misconduct as royal treasurer. Second, when he actually died during the summer of 1524, when his accounts were still been under revision.⁴⁷ If Vargas was not a good patron then Rena was not good client because at the moment of Vargas' decline he was on very good terms with his patron's enemies: the brothers Juan and Alonso Vozmediano.⁴⁸ Rena's friendship with the Vozmediano brothers was an old one, as they had first met when they worked together for the royal secretary Hernando de Zafra preparing for the African campaigns.⁴⁹ After the conquest of Navarre in 1512, both Juan and Alonso de

⁴⁴ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 25th March 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-6.

⁴⁵ Letter of Francisco de Vargas to Juan Rena. Burgos, 13th March 1520. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 5-8. The hostile attitude of Gutiérrez de Madrid towards Vargas was more than evident according to Adrien of Utrecht. Letter of Adrien of Utrecht to Charles V. Vitoria, 24th October 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 2, n° 1, fol. 226. On the rivalry between Vargas and Gutiérrez de Madrid, see De Carlos Morales, *Carlos V y el crédito*, 33-34 and 38-41, and David Alonso García, *El Erario del Reino. Fiscalidad en Castilla a principios de la Edad Moderna, 1504-1522*, (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2007), 196. An interesting case study on a royal servant in the financial administration can be found in Mathieu Stoll, *Servir le Roi-Soleil: Claude le Peletier (1631-1711) ministre de Louis XIV* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011).

⁴⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, caj. 28, n° 5-2.

⁴⁷ De Carlos Morales, *Carlos V y el crédito*, 77-78.

⁴⁸ Rena's case was far from being unique. See, for instance, M. P. Holt, "Patterns of *Clientèle* and Economic Opportunity at Court during the Wars of Religion: The Household of François, Duke of Anjou," *French Historical Studies* 13, n° 2 (1984): 305-322.

⁴⁹ Ágata Ortega Cera, "De la escribanía mayor de rentas a la nobleza. Hernando de Zafra y el reino de Granada," in *Casas, familias y rentas. La nobleza del Reino de Granada entre los siglos XV-XVIII*, ed. J. P. Díaz López, F. Andújar Castillo and A. Galán Sánchez (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2010), 232.

Vozmediano worked with Rena again in the newly formed military administration.⁵⁰ In 1515 when Rena had to present his accounts for the first time in the *contaduría mayor de cuentas* (the accounting office of expenditures) he addressed Alonso de Vozmediano (who worked in that office) through his brother Juan. At other times, Rena directly asked Alonso de Vozmediano for his support in front of the royal officers in charge of reviewing the accounts, which the latter did. This began a fluid exchange of favours that lasted for years.⁵¹ Alonso de Vozmediano also asked Rena to provide him with information about Vargas' activity in funding the army of Navarre, which he needed to conduct his enquiry into Vargas.⁵² In 1523, when Rena had to present his accounts again, he enjoyed once more the support of Alonso de Vozmediano, who helped him, as the officer responsible for the task.⁵³ In sum, it seems that Rena had a special skill to survive his patrons, and to find new supporters in the higher places of the imperial government. Nevertheless, Rena was not an extremely wise character able to navigate the factional struggles. What these examples show is that men like Rena did not depend on a single patron, instead they needed to combine the support of different allies at the royal court.

Maybe we cannot explain Rena's career from a patron-client approach, but it is undoubtedly true that Rena benefitted from the support of an outstanding patron of the day: Francisco de los Cobos. He was a well-known character as a powerful patron at the court of Charles V and, in fact, he was the mentor of a whole generation of bureaucrats working in the administration of the empire.⁵⁴ Cobos was a permanent presence in Rena's career. Most probably their relationship started during the opening years of the sixteenth century, when they worked for the royal secretary Hernando de Zafra on the southern

The activity of Alonso and Juan de Vozmediano in the military logistics of the African campaigns in AGS, GyM, Leg. 1314, n° 67; Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, Leg. 285, fol. 5. Further information on the Vozmediano family in M. Diago Hernando, "Vecinos de Madrid al servicio de la Real Hacienda durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos: los arrendadores de rentas," *Anales del Instituto de Estudios Madrileños* 47 (2007), 380-381.

⁵⁰ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 25, fol. 322.

⁵¹ See the instructions of Rena to Juan de Vergara in that sense. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 1-1. On the activity of Alonso de Vozmediano see Alonso García, *El Erario del Reino*, 176-182. and letter of Alonso de Vozmediano to Juan Rena. Madrid, 6th March 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 6-1.

⁵² Letter of Alonso de Vozmediano to Juan Rena. Valladolid, 4th July [...]. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 25.

⁵³ Letter of Alonso de Vozmediano to Juan Rena. Madrid, 22th July 1523. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 29-1. See also AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 18, n° 6-1.

⁵⁴ José María Martínez Millán, *La Corte de Carlos V* (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. III, 87-94; Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, *El consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602. Patronazgo y clientelismo en el gobierno de las finanzas reales durante el siglo XVI* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1996), 28 and 30-57; and Santiago Fernández Conti: *Los consejos de estado y de guerra de la Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos de Felipe II (1548-1598)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998), 20 and 26-30.

frontier of the realm. Like Rena, the young Francisco de los Cobos worked in the military administration, but he was Hernando de Zafra's preferred disciple.⁵⁵

While Francisco de los Cobos was climbing in the ladder of royal administration, he kept an eye on Rena's dealings during when he was living and working in Navarre. Thus, their common friend Gabriel Mas affirmed that he got news of Rena's promotion in the monarchical administration by Francisco de los Cobos, who still considered Rena a friend.⁵⁶ By that time, Rena tried to use his previous contacts with Cobos to obtain a nomination for canon in the church of Granada from the king.⁵⁷ Cobos was a crucial contact for obtaining royal mercies because he was the personal secretary of Lope Conchillos, the royal secretary of Ferdinand the Catholic, and the later was therefore in charge of the distribution of the royal grace.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the expected royal mercy in the church of Granada never arrived, not even when Cobos inherited from his patron the function of reminding the king which mercies he had promised to his servants.⁵⁹ Despite this initial failure Cobos continued to be crucial in Rena's manoeuvres to obtain the royal mercies that he needed to climb the ladder of the imperial administration. For instance, in 1524 Cobos was the first person that Rena's agent visited when he arrived to the imperial court. The agent reported his meeting with Cobos saying that the royal secretary replied with a positive response to his request for help to obtain the nomination for a vacant high benefice in the church of Badajoz from the king.⁶⁰ Shortly after, one of Rena's closer friends, Pedro de Zuazola, considered that the benefice was already granted because Cobos had already added it to his memorandum of royal mercies.⁶¹ Nevertheless once again the promised mercy did not arrive.

⁵⁵ AGS, Leg. 1315, n° 269. In his last will Zafra ordered that the King be asked to appoint Cobos as his successor in some of his offices. ARChGr, Pleitos, Caj. 1736, expediente 8, fol. 15. Shortly after Cobos started to receive important royal mercies in Granada. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, Lib. 7, fol. 164, n° 1 and Patronato Real, Leg. 59, n° 101.

⁵⁶ Letters of Gabriel Mas to Juan Rena. Gran Canaria, 20th November and 24th December 1513. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 10-2 and 3.

⁵⁷ Letter of Francisco de los Cobos to Juan Rena. Madrid, 7th July 1513. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 9-1. The church of Granada was an important reserve of rewards at the disposal of the Catholic Monarchs as they owned the right of distributing its dignities and benefices. Jesús Suberbiola Martínez, *Real Patronato de Granada. El arzobispo Talavera, la Iglesia y el Estado Moderno (1486-1516)*. *Estudios y Documentos*, (Granada: Caja General de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad, 1985).

⁵⁸ Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos*, 15.

⁵⁹ AGS, Estado, Leg. 3, fol. 1 and Leg. 13, n° 34-40.

⁶⁰ Letter of Íñigo de Ugarte to Juan Rena. Madrid, 28th November 1524. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 35-1.

⁶¹ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Madrid, 11th December 1524. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 37.

Things seemed to change in the early thirties when Cobos gained momentum in the imperial government. This time it was the royal secretary who directly addressed Rena advising him to ask for a reward for his services, as there were vacant benefices in the Spanish church.⁶² Moreover, according to Zuazola, before writing to Rena, Cobos was already taking the initial steps to obtain Rena's deserved reward.⁶³ At that moment Cobos' career was reaching its peak, his clients were occupying key positions in the imperial administration and were receiving important royal mercies.⁶⁴ It was during this period that Rena became one of the many royal officers working under Cobos' direction. From June 1532 Rena received direct orders from Cobos relating to the organisation of the imperial navy in the Mediterranean Sea.⁶⁵ The correspondence between Rena and the royal secretary is very interesting. Cobos used to send the royal orders to Rena with a personal letter in which he referred to the emperor's satisfaction of Rena's services and underlining his own role in obtaining the mercies that Rena deserved.⁶⁶

These letters show Cobos' role as a link between the emperor and the servants who deserved his royal grace in reward for their services. While working under his orders Rena felt much more confident about being rewarded for his services. Rena's optimism was evident in a letter that he sent to Cobos thanking him for his intercession with the emperor.⁶⁷ In his letters Rena expressed the conviction that Cobos was the only one able to obtain Rena's deserved rewards, but we should not take this as proof of a patron-client relationship between them.⁶⁸ However, Rena did profit from serving the emperor under the supervision of this powerful royal secretary. In fact, Rena's ascension to the church's

⁶² I will come back to this issue later.

⁶³ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Bolonia, 25th December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-5. Despite Cobos' biographer paid no attention to Cobos political ascent in these moments it seems that his influence was growing according to Zuazola's letter. Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos*, 150 and 153-155.

⁶⁴ Letter of Martín de Salinas to the secretary Castillejo. Valladolid, 20th June 1533. Cfr. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *El emperador Carlos V y su corte según las cartas de don Martín de Salinas, embajador del infante don Fernando (1522-1539)* (Madrid: RAH, 1903), 532.

⁶⁵ Letter of Francisco de los Cobos to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 15th June 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 2-1.

⁶⁶ Letter of Francisco de los Cobos to Juan Rena. Lodi, 10th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 2-7.

⁶⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 13th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-2, fol. 5.

⁶⁸ Patron-client language was widely spread in personal and political correspondence during the early modern period. Nicole Reinhardt, "Correspondances, clientèle et culture politique dans l'État ecclésiastique au début du XVII^e siècle," in *La politique par correspondance. Les usages politiques de la lettre en Italie (XIV^e-XVIII^e siècle)*, ed. J. Boutier, S. Landi and O. Rouchon (Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009), 131-151. On the debate about the socio-political meaning of this kind of language, see A. L. Herman, "The Language of Fidelity in Early Modern France," *The Journal of Modern History* 67, n° 1 (1995): 1-24.

hierarchy, and his appointment as bishop, took place after becoming Cobos' close collaborator. Furthermore, even after he became a bishop, Rena still felt like he depended on Cobos.⁶⁹ As we can see the support of this royal secretary was important from Rena's viewpoint.

However, it is important to ask why Cobos' support was so important. Francisco de los Cobos played a crucial role in Rena's career mainly because he provided Rena with a direct line to the emperor. From Rena's letters we can conclude that he only relied on Cobos to obtain official recognition for his services (mainly in the form of royal mercies) and in fact one of Cobos' main functions was helping the emperor in distributing the royal grace. Hence, by sustaining his connection with Cobos even after he acquired the bishopric, Rena was playing a savvy game as his old friend was in charge of distributing royal rewards among royal servants. However, if had Rena not already spent years building up symbolic capital through continuous service to the crown, his relationship with Cobos would have automatically entitled him to any rewards. Therefore, his connection to Cobos was the final link in Rena's pursuit for recognition and reward, as Rena had already accumulated several offices.

The question then becomes: how did Rena get all the offices of his *cursus honorum*? The key man behind Rena's complete résumé was Pedro de Zuazola, the secretary of the Council of War. Rena and Zuazola met when Rena was involved in military administration of Navarre.⁷⁰ Like Rena, in 1512 Zuazola was starting to rise in the administration due to his services for the Council of War and his organisation of armies.⁷¹ In 1516, when this institution started to gain importance Zuazola became an exceptional ally. For instance, when a report criticising Rena's work in Navarre arrived at the Council of War the secretary hid it.⁷² Rena and Zuazola continued working together during the following years and in fact their careers advanced in parallel throughout the rest of their lives. Thus, during the crisis of the *Comunero* revolt, Zuazola acted as a link

⁶⁹ This appears crystal clear, in the letter on the procedure of his appointment as bishop of Tuy, which Rena addressed to Cobos via his nephew, the secretary of the Council of War. Letter of Juan Rena to Juan Vázquez de Molina. Laredo, 25th June 1537. AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s.f.

⁷⁰ A complete survey of his career is still missing but there is a brief overview mainly focused on his last years as Royal Treasurer in Santiago Fernández Conti, "Zuazola, Pedro de," in *Diccionario biográfico español*, (Madrid: RAH, 2010), Vol. L, 885.

⁷¹ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151210, n° 6.

⁷² 'En él tenemos tan buen procurador que tiene la bandera por Vuestra Merced'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 18th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, n° 8-3.

between Rena and the Council of War.⁷³ After which, Rena devised the plans to defend Navarre that Zuazola had discussed with the other councillors.⁷⁴

From his seat as secretary of the Council of War Zuazola promoted Rena's career by granting him appointments to key offices. Thus, the appointment of Rena as Purveyor General in 1526 should be seen as an outcome of this close connection between Rena and Pedro de Zuazola as well as of the latter's importance in the government of military affairs. Actually, shortly after being appointed as general purveyor for the first time, Rena wrote to his patron poking fun at him and talking about his *privanza* with the emperor.⁷⁵ As secretary of the Council of War, Zuazola connected the two spheres of the military administration (1) the experienced military commands composing the Council of War (2) the royal administrators working on the ground.⁷⁶ From this privileged position he was able to grant Rena multiple offices. The secretary advised Rena on how to act in order to obtain new appointments, as he did in 1529 when he wrote Rena to tell him to travel to Zaragoza to join the Royal Court on its journey to Barcelona.⁷⁷ Rena clearly considered Zuazola the source of his offices in the military administration. Thus, when he was finishing a task, he used to write to Zuazola asking him for a new position to keep serving the emperor.⁷⁸

If Zuazola provided Rena with so many charges it was because he trusted him. This was made evident when Pedro de Zuazola had to present the accounts of his activity as royal treasurer.⁷⁹ The Emperor asked him to suggest someone to review his accounts, and the secretary replied that the only 'person of quality' able to do it was Rena.⁸⁰ This anecdote shows how Zuazola's trust in Rena contributed to increase Rena's reputation as

⁷³ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Burgos, 4th June 1521. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 28, n° 6.

⁷⁴ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 1-2.

⁷⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Malaga, 24th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 88.

⁷⁶ It seems that in 1529, when he left the Council of War to follow Charles V in his travels, Zuazola was the only member of the council with an accurate knowledge of the field military administration. José María Burrieza Mateos, "Aportación documental para el estudio del Consejo de Guerra. Una instrucción de 1529," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and f. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. II, 87.

⁷⁷ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Toledo, 14th February 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 6, n° 16.

⁷⁸ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 11th June 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 2-1, fol. 3.

⁷⁹ According to Carlos Javier de Carlos Zuazola's administrative activity as treasurer was restricted to the military issues. De Carlos Morales, *El Consejo de Hacienda*, 46.

⁸⁰ 'Persona de calidad que por si tuviese habilidad no había sino Vuestra Merced [Juan Rena]'. Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Parma, 4th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-8.

a reliable servant of the emperor in two ways. Firstly, because being trusted by a man like Zuazola was an effective way of gaining the emperor's trust. Secondly, because any new mission that Zuazola entrusted to Rena provided him with new merits.

In addition to granting Rena new charges, Zuazola also played a key role in achieving mercies for Rena. He always considered Zuazola as an advisor in the fierce competition for royal grace. Thus, when Rena began to aspire to a bishopric he relied on Zuazola's guidance to achieve that prize.⁸¹ From his privileged position in the imperial court, Zuazola continued advising Rena on how to proceed in his manoeuvres to obtain it.⁸² Rena's trust in Zuazola's ability to secure mercies for him was such that, he practically did not make a single step without asking for Zuazola's advice.⁸³ Undoubtedly Zuazola, like Cobos, was one of Rena's key supporters in the court of Charles V, but despite the prominent role that Cobos and Zuazola had in the construction of Rena's career, we cannot consider them as the only agents behind this process.

Rena's reputation as a reliable servant of the crown was, to a great extent, the result of an accumulation of social capital through his interaction with a multiplicity of actors.⁸⁴ In other words, if Rena was a successful royal officer it was because he received the support of a wide array of actors on a day to day basis. Maybe these actors were not able to grant Rena offices and mercies, but they all contributed to construct and enhance Rena's reputation as a reliable crown's servant. It is impossible to trace every individual who supported Rena throughout his career; this is why I will focus on a specific moment and a restricted group of characters to illustrate my point. In 1516 Rena was in a weak position. When his main protector, the Alcaide de los Donceles, abandoned Navarre and went into retirement Rena lost his main line of access to the monarch. Furthermore, when Ferdinand the Catholic passed away, Rena was obliged to establish a connection with Cardinal Cisneros, the regent appointed by King Ferdinand to govern his dominions until the arrival of his grandson Charles. Fortunately, Rena had other connections at court that

⁸¹ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro Zuazola. 9th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fols. 54-55.

⁸² Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. 12th January 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-6.

⁸³ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro Zuazola. Genoa, 13th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-2, fols. 6-7.

⁸⁴ On the importance of social capital in the administrative career, see José María Imízcoz Beunza, "El capital relacional. Relaciones privilegiadas y redes de influencia en el Estado Español del siglo XVIII," in *Economía doméstica y redes sociales en el Antiguo Régimen*, ed. J. M. Imízcoz Beunza and O. Oliveri Korta (Madrid: Sílex, 2010), 227-281.

he could rely on to surmount the spatial and political barriers to the new ruler. For example, Colonel Cristóbal de Villalba was a trusted member of Cardinal Cisneros' inner circle, who worked in military affairs during the regency.⁸⁵ Rena and this experienced military officer had worked side by side to defend Navarre but it seems that they already knew each other at least as early as, 1511 because Rena's book of accounts includes a loan to Villalba during that year.⁸⁶ Villalba's support became crucial for Rena in 1516 when a rival started to criticise Rena's work in Navarre. When this issue was raised in the Council of War, the Villalba defended Rena. Furthermore, according to Juan de Vergara, Rena was in debt to Villalba because the latter was taking care of Rena's business at the royal court, favouring him and acting on his behalf.⁸⁷

No matter how influential a friend could be, Rena and his agents at the royal court always tried to obtain as much support as possible. Thus, despite enjoying the backing of Villalba Rena and Vergara tried to mobilise more contacts near Cardinal Cisneros during his regency. One of Rena's key contacts was Cristóbal López de Aguilera, the Marshal of Leon. This member of the royal administration belonged to the powerful faction led by Vargas who struggled for the control of the administration of the royal finances.⁸⁸ It seems that during the summer of 1513 Aguilera supervised the military affairs of Navarre, and Rena was asked to liaise with him on their progress in the matter. After his stay in Navarre in 1515, Aguilera returned to the royal court where he was interviewed by the king about the situation in Navarre, and in his report Aguilera spoke highly of Rena's services and merits.⁸⁹ In so doing, Aguilera contributed to the construction of Rena's reputation as a

⁸⁵ According to Cisneros' biographer, the Villalba was the military advisor of Cardinal Cisneros. Alvar Gómez de Castro, *De rebus gestis a Francisco Ximénio Cisnerio* (Alcalá: Andrea de Angulo, 1569), fol. 166. On Villalba's career see V. Galbete, "Vida y andanzas del Coronel D. Cristóbal de Villalba," *Príncipe de Viana* 25 (1946): 695-736; and M. F. Gómez Vozmediano, "Entre Plasencia y Estella: el rastro documental del coronel Cristóbal Villalba en el Archivo de la Nobleza," *Huarte de San Juan. Geografía e Historia* 19 (2012): 187-212. On Cisneros' policy in this troublesome period, see Jerónimo López de Ayala, *El cardenal Cisneros, gobernador del reino* (Madrid: RAH, 1921). On Cisneros contribution to the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy see Bartolomé Escandell Bonet, "Cisneros en la construcción del estado moderno" in Id., *Estudios Cisnerianos* (Alcalá: Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, 1990), 83-99. The English reader can consult Erika Rummel, *Jiménez de Cisneros: On the Threshold of Spain's Golden Age* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1999), 79-94.

⁸⁶ Rena's personal account documentation contains a brief reference of a debt with Villalba before Rena's arrival to Navarre. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, nº 2, fol. 20.

⁸⁷ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 29th June 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 30-17.

⁸⁸ Alonso García, *El erario del reino*, 181-182 and 290-293. On the importance of financial factions in the royal service, see the key work D. Desser and J-L. Journet, "Le lobby Colbert: un royaume ou une affaire de famille?," *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 30, nº 6 (1975): 1303-1336.

⁸⁹ Letter of Cristóbal López de Aguilera to Juan Rena. Calatayud, 2nd October 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, nº 9-2.

good servant. A year later when Rena's work in Navarre began to be criticised at the Council of War, like Villalba, Aguilera also defended Rena.⁹⁰ Indeed he went further, as he helped Rena by mobilising his wide network of friends to promote Rena's image.⁹¹ Furthermore, he offered to help Rena to 'have some intelligence with the Cardinal [Cisneros] or the Bishop of Avila, because now what is tied in the earth is tied in heaven.'⁹² Aguilera's words pointed to the privileged status of the bishop of Avila as Cisneros' right hand man.⁹³ One might think that Aguilera's offer was a mere courtesy without any real significance. Nevertheless he managed to obtain the bishop's support in promoting Rena's image as a reliable servant of the monarchy, and shortly after the bishop of Avila used his direct access to Cisneros to remind him about Rena's valiant services in Navarre.⁹⁴

Aguilera's strategy of promoting Rena's image included notable actors at different levels of Cisneros' entourage. Aguilera not only insisted on reporting Rena's services to Cisneros but also to the bishop of Avila. Furthermore, he introduced Juan de Vergara (Rena's representative) to Cisneros' secret chamberlain (the bachelor of Mora) because, he was his closest friend and for that reason, he was also Rena's friend.⁹⁵ We should not dismiss the importance of these kinds of lower level contacts. According to Juan de Vergara the new channel established between Rena and Cisneros through his chamberlain was crucial due to the latter's influence:

The lord cardinal has a servant [...] called the bachelor of Mora. He has more influence over the cardinal than anybody, even more than the Bishop of Avila, because all things, no matters how big or small, come into his hands [...]. The lord Marshal told me that he spoke with him, and introduced me and recommended me to him.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 29th June 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-17.

⁹¹ Letter of Cristóbal López de Aguilera to Juan Rena. Madrid, 10th June 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 21.

⁹² 'Alguna inteligencia con el cardenal [Cisneros] o el obispo de Ávila pues ahora lo que está ligado en la tierra es en el cielo'. *Ibíd.*

⁹³ AHN, Universidades, Leg. 714, fols. 1-17. Further information about Fray Francisco Ruiz, the bishop of Ávila in the service of Cisneros in Manuel Giménez Fernández, *El plan Cisneros-Las Casas para la reformación de las Indias* (Madrid: CSIC, 1984), 64-68.

⁹⁴ Letter of Fray Francisco Ruiz to Juan Rena. Aranda de Duero, 21st August 1517. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, n° 4.

⁹⁵ Letter of Cristóbal López de Aguilera to Juan Rena. Madrid, 6th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 2, n° 3.

⁹⁶ 'El señor cardenal tiene un criado [...] que se llama el bachiller de Mora, y este tiene más parte con el cardenal que nadie de cuantos hay, y aún más que el obispo de Ávila, porque todas las cosas chicas o grandes que sean, a su mano e poder vienen [...]. El señor mariscal me dijo que él le habló e me encargó a

Cleary Vergara was paying attention to the personal entourage surrounding the cardinal but what I want to underline here is the multi-layered approach that Aguilera's used to promote Rena's reputation as a trustworthy servant of the monarchy. Not only did he approach Cardinal Cisneros directly when reporting on Rena's services, he also helped Rena by making him appear as popular royal officer to the ruler, paying special attention to include the members of Cisneros' entourage whom the cardinal trusted the most. The support of the inner circle continued to be vital even at the final stages of Rena's career. For instance, one of Rena's main supporters in the 1530s was Cardinal García de Loaisa, a key man in the imperial administration. Loaisa was also Charles V's confessor and he used this privileged position to remind the emperor of Rena's services and his obligation to reward him as well as to spread Rena's good reputation throughout the inner circle of the imperial government.⁹⁷

Most of the actors who constructed Rena's reputation as a reliable servant of the crown did so because they were convinced about Rena's skills and merits. Nevertheless, it was also true that in supporting Rena these various actors were giving him important political favours, and as such, Rena owed them the same support in return, which he willingly did by favouring them from his position as a king's man. For instance, Rena rewarded the trust that Zuazola gave him by acting as a perfect servant, which reinforced Zuazola's position on the Council of War, but also acting as his right hand man, for instance, when Zuazola entrusted him with his personal affairs such as collecting money belonging to him in Navarre.⁹⁸ Cristóbal de Aguilera, who helped to construct and spread Rena's reputation during Cisneros' regency, asked Rena to assist one of his relatives when he was deployed in Navarre.⁹⁹ In 1521, when Rena started to organise the defence of the frontier he repaid Aguilera's previous recommendations by suggesting that he was one of the military advisors that the governors should call to their side.¹⁰⁰ García de Loaisa also

él para que me hubiese por encomendado'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 6th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-18.

⁹⁷ Letter of García de Loaisa to Charles V. Rome, 13th August 1530. Cfr. *Briefe an Kaiser Karl V geschrieben von seiner Beichtvater in den Jahren 1530-32*, ed. G. Heine (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Besser, 1848), 381. Letter of Cardinal Loaisa to Francisco de los Cobos. Rome, 8th June 1530. Cfr. CODOIN, T. XIV, 20. On the importance of Loaisa in the imperial court, see Martínez Millán ed. *La Corte de Carlos V*, T. III, 228-238.

⁹⁸ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Madrid, 11th december 1524. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 37.

⁹⁹ Letter of Cristóbal López de Aguilera to Juan Rena. Madrid, 14th July 1520. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 3, n° 10.

¹⁰⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 1-1.

profited from Rena's aid when the latter used his position as commissary of the navy to provide the emperor's confessor with a decent place on the naval vessel carried Charles V back to the Iberian Peninsula in 1533.¹⁰¹

All these favours show that in order to serve the crown well, a king's man, like Rena needed to make use of such reciprocal relations as political favours were an essential element for career advancement. Therefore, frequently when Rena made connections with such actors, he was not just looking to them for support to promote his image of a reliable servant of the monarchy, and these actors were aware of this distinction. Considering that Cisneros maintained his position as regent even after Charles V's arrival in Castile, Juan de Vergara and Cristóbal de Aguilera suggested that Rena try to win the Bachelor of Mora's support. Vergara wrote to him saying 'that you [Rena] beg him [Mora] to have you as his certain servant' and offer to help him in case he should need anything in Navarre.¹⁰² This advice, as well as all the examples quoted above show the extent to which exchanging favours was a usual practice for officers like Rena aiming to keep their

¹⁰¹ Letter of García de Loaisa to Juan Rena. Bolonia, 18th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 16-1. Letter of Juan Rena to García de Loaisa. Genoa, 15th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-3, fol. 10.

¹⁰² 'Le suplica que le tenga por su muy cierto servidor'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Madrid, 6th July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 30-18.

reputation and climb the difficult ladder of the administrative royal service.




Image 7. Rena's main connections within the imperial administration.

Rena's successful career in the imperial administration cannot be explained from a model of patron-client relationships. On the contrary, Rena was able to have such a successful career thanks to the support of a multiplicity of actors. The imperial administration was a space where the social and symbolic capitals were needed in order to advance in the service of the crown; as such capital was not only bestowed by the king himself, but also by higher tiers of his administration. The Alcaide de los Donceles or Francisco de Vargas promoted Rena during the first stage of his career. From the 1530s onwards his relationship with Cobos allowed Rena to have a direct access to the source of royal grace, something crucial to achieve the rewards that his services deserved. Meanwhile, the connection with the secretary of the Council of War allowed Rena to keep accumulating positions and services to the emperor. These supporters were crucial, but they were not in themselves sufficient for a man like Rena. Many other characters contributed to create and spread Rena's positive image. Hence, Rena's career was constructed through a collaborative effort of many influential actors.

These relationships were all based on a reciprocal exchange of favours and support. Being accepted into this milieu, and being able to exchange favours was in itself crucial for a man like Rena. Therefore, it is interesting to focus on the limits that this activity posed on moral economy of the administrative service.

Serving the King or Serving his Superior. Gaining Support and Self-Discipline

The members of the imperial administration frequently worked as servants of the high ranking officials, such as viceroys or captains-generals.¹⁰³ These men often bridged the gap between the king and his lower servants. Not only did they witness the services and merits that these lower rank actors performed, but they also had direct access to the inner circle of the imperial government, and as such they could secure appointments and rewards. Most of these important offices were occupied by noblemen and, in a society characterised by the inequality the support of a great lord was a significant asset. Given the importance of their mediation and intercession it seems justified to ask how Rena profited from their support, and if that influenced his behaviour as a king's man.

Throughout his career Rena enjoyed the support of several aristocrats who occupied high positions in the imperial government. The first and most important one was the Alcaide de los Donceles. Maybe he was not a proper patron but in any case Rena attributed his progress as a crown's servant to the Alcaide, as we can conclude from one of his letters in which he referred to: 'the old Marquis of Comares, may God forgive him, who was my lord, and I can say that he brought me up, and he made me what I am'.¹⁰⁴ Rena's activity serving the nobleman as well as the latter's political influence earned Rena his appointment as royal chaplain in the summer of 1508.¹⁰⁵ Considering that Rena had spent most of his time far away from the royal court, this appointment was just a means of providing Rena with a source of funds that would allow him to continue serving the

¹⁰³ On the patronage exercised by these characters, see Alejandro Cañeque, *The King's Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico* (London: Routledge, 2005), 158, 162-179.

¹⁰⁴ 'El marqués viejo de Comares, que Dios perdone, que fue mi señor y puedo decir que me crio y me puso en lo que soy'. Draft of a letter of Juan Rena to an unknown destinatary. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 93, nº 22-3.

¹⁰⁵ AGS, Casa y Sitios Reales, Leg. 46, nº 119 y AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 85, nº 1. On the importance of the support of powerful allies in the appointment of royal chaplains, see Fernando Negredo del Cerro, "Clientelas y estrategias eclesíásticas en palacio. La capilla real como plataforma de ascenso social en el barroco," in *Iglesia, poder y fortuna. Clero y movilidad social en la España moderna*, ed. E. Soria Mesa and A. J. Díaz Rodríguez (Granada: Comares, 2012), 7-27.

nobleman and sustain Spanish military presence in the Maghreb. Even so, the royal chaplaincy was a political office, and this first appointment was crucial in Rena's later career.¹⁰⁶

If Rena's appointment as royal chaplain allowed him to continue serving the crown, it was the Alcaldes' support that helped Rena to ascend within the royal administration. As long as Rena continued working for the Alcaide in provisioning his African strongholds, he in return would continue promoting Rena's career.¹⁰⁷ At the end of 1511 he called Rena to meet him at the royal court telling him:

Reach me at court because it is necessary for your business as well as for my business [...] because I would like to negotiate with the king, our lord, a mercy for you as a reward for all that you have done, so well and with so much effort, and good head and discretion, of which I am also in charge that, in truth, I have much more care to obtain something for you than for me [...].¹⁰⁸

Following the Alcaide's orders Juan Rena departed to court, his arrival was well timed as the Alcaide's political career was in ascension. King Ferdinand's power was again at its peak after years of decay and his powerful position resulted in important mercies for his loyal noblemen. The monarch's gratitude even reached the men who were part of the Alcaide's clientele, and Rena was entrusted with the organisation of the Spanish naval squadrons that were charged with transporting English troops to Gipuzkoa during the conquest of Navarre.¹⁰⁹ As we have seen in the previous chapter, after the conquest Rena moved to Navarre where the Alcaide had been appointed as viceroy.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ On the political dimension of the royal chapel in the Iberian monarchies, see R. Costa-Gomes, "The Royal Chapel in Iberia: Models, Contacts, and Influences," *The Medieval History Journal* 12, n° 1 (2009): 77-111; and Sara Granda, "La capilla real: la presencia del capellán real en la élite del poder político," in *Evolución y estructura de la casa real de Castilla*, ed. A. Gamba Gutiérrez and F. Labrador Arroyo (Madrid, Polifemo, 2010), Vol. 2, 761-808.

¹⁰⁷ Letter of Diego Fernández de Córdoba to Juan Rena. Cartagena, 29th October 1511. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 3-2.

¹⁰⁸ 'Porque conviene mucho para vuestros negocios y los míos que me toméis en la corte [...] porque yo querría procurar con el rey nuestro señor que se os hiciese alguna merced en pago de lo que tan bien y con tanto trabajo y buen seso y discreción habéis servido en esos negocios de que yo estoy tan encargado, que en verdad más cuidado tengo de procurar alguna cosa para vos que para mí mismo [...].' Letter of Diego Fernández de Córdoba to Juan Rena. Burgos, 3rd January 1512. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 88, n° 3-4.

¹⁰⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 14, n° 1-1.

¹¹⁰ AGS, RGS, Leg. 151212, n° 457 and 458. AGN, A_CORTES, L. 30, fols. 86-87.

Under his rule Rena started a new phase of his career, this time as the visible head of the military administration of Navarre.

During the first years of service to the crown in Navarre, Rena profited from the political support of the Alcaide de los Donceles. He was not only the viceroy of Navarre (the most prominent political figure in the kingdom), but also an influential man at the royal court. When the Alcaide met King Ferdinand the Catholic at court during the winter of 1515 he devoted one of their meetings to present Rena's memorials and merits to the monarch. According to Baltasar de Cuéllar, a member of the Alcaide's household, the latter placed such an emphasis on Rena's political promotion that he 'put the issues of Your Mercy in his business account'.¹¹¹ The Alcaide's influence on Rena's career as a king's man continued long after his death. Rena's connection with the Fernández de Córdoba's lineage was so important to him that even in 1526 he expected the second Duke of Sessa (the Alcaide's brother-in law), ambassador of Charles V in Rome, to help him obtain an ecclesiastical promotion.¹¹² As we can see, for years Rena advanced as a king's man in the shadow of Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba's political influence.

Undoubtedly after the Alcaide's retirement Rena lost a powerful ally, but all viceroy of Navarre who followed the Alcaide promoted Rena's career and contributed to construct and spread his reputation as a trustworthy servant. For instance, Rena's closeness with a later viceroy, the Duke of Najera, was so evident that some of Rena's friends mocked him and called him 'favourite of the Duke'.¹¹³ One of the first things that the Count of Miranda (Nájera's successor as viceroy of Navarre) did after arriving to Navarre was to write a letter to the emperor in which he underlined Rena's services in the defence of Navarre and asked for him to receive a fair reward.¹¹⁴ These characters even supported Rena's career long after their departure from Navarre. For instance when Rena asked for a new royal mercy in 1529 he counted on the support of the two former viceroys

¹¹¹ 'Él ha puesto los negocios de Vuestra Merced en la cuenta de los suyos'. Letter of Baltasar de Cuellar to Juan Rena. Madrid, 5th November 1515. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 4-1.

¹¹² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 93, n° 22. On the activity of the Duke of Sessa as ambassador, see Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, "Nobleza y diplomacia en la Italia de Carlos V: el II duque de Sessa, embajador en Roma," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. III, 205-297.

¹¹³ Letter of Juan de Montoro to Juan Rena. Madrid, 21st July 1516. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 1, n° 22-2.

¹¹⁴ Letter of the Count of Miranda to Charles V. Pamplona, 14th October 1522. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 3, n° 93.

of Navarre (Nájera and Miranda) who spoke directly with Charles V, and reminded him of Rena's past service in Navarre.¹¹⁵

Rena's career as a king's man was also supported by characters who occupied important government posts outside Navarre. For instance, the Constable of Castile wrote to the king asking for a mercy for Rena in payment for his valuable contribution which led to the defeat of the *Comunero* revolt in the winter of 1521.¹¹⁶ Once again, in the summer of that year he asked the emperor to grant Rena a mercy in the church because he really deserved it.¹¹⁷ He also promised Rena to grant him a pension of 1,000 ducats from the vacant ecclesiastic benefices.¹¹⁸ The importance of the Constable's support for a royal servant like Rena was evident. At least an experienced courtier like the royal treasurer Francisco de Vargas considered it so, when he wrote to Rena saying: 'I am so glad that the lord Constable [of Castile] is satisfied with you. You should never depart from his lordship, and obey and do everything he commands of you.'¹¹⁹ Juan Rena had learnt early in his career to try and profit from any opportunity to win the support of the officials close to the emperor. For example, during the summer of 1526 Rena tried to win the favour of the viceroy of Naples: Charles de Lannoy, who was a sort of favourite to Charles V, when he given the responsibility of organising the naval vessels to transport Lannoy and the army under his command to Italy.¹²⁰

Given the important political support that noblemen could offer, it is not unusual to find that the bureaucrats who received their support felt obliged to return the favour when they were in a position to do so. For example, Rena broke the rules of the military administration when he loaned royal money to the Alcaide de los Donceles during his

¹¹⁵ Letter of the Count of Miranda to Juan Rena. Toledo, 14th January 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 6, n° 9.

¹¹⁶ Letter of the Constable of Castile to Charles V. Burgos, 25th January 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 1, n° 105.

¹¹⁷ Letter of the Constable of Castille to Charles V. Ugarte, 3rd July 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. °, n° 105, fol. 727.

¹¹⁸ Letter of the Constable of Castille to Charles V. Burgos, 3rd September 1521. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 151, n° 101, fol. 2.

¹¹⁹ 'Mucho huelgo que el señor Condestable haya habido placer con vos. Nunca os quitéis de con su señoría y haced y cumplid todo lo que él os mandare'. Letter of Francisco de Vargas to Juan Rena. Burgos, 21st June 1521. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 30, n° 10-6.

¹²⁰ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles de Lannoy. 9th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 56. Rena also considered the possibility of asking Lannoy for his help in order to receive further royal rewards. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. 14th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 60. On this important character see Léon-E. Halkin and Georges Dansaert, *Charles de Lannoy, vice-roi de Naples* (Brussels: L'édition Universelle, 1934).

stay in Navarre.¹²¹ Through this act, Rena was behaving more like the Alcaide's personal servant than as a bureaucrat, as these loans were a favour towards the nobleman.¹²² Nevertheless, such practices were frequent in the imperial administration, and by loaning money to the viceroys, Rena was also helping important servants of the emperor, to fund the multiple expenses that they incurred while serving the emperor.¹²³

Such tactics were effective, but problems could occur when an event or circumstance forced these bureaucrats to choose between being a loyal servant of the crown or sustaining their relationship with a powerful patron. Considering that the emperor was a distant figure and that these patrons supported their careers directly, it is easy to imagine that these bureaucrats were tempted to put their loyalty to these intermediaries ahead of the monarch. Nevertheless, Rena had a clear idea of where the limits of his relationship with the Alcaide lay. In order to better understand these limitations we can examine a specific situation when Rena was general purveyor of the navy and he had to negotiate with a special supplier: the son of the Alcaide de los Donceles. In the winter of 1528 Juan Rena was tasked with organising the navy's supplies in the port of Malaga. As the seigniorial domains of the Fernández de Córdoba were not far from there Rena asked the Alcaide's son, the Marquis of Comares, to sell him a large amount of wheat. In doing so Rena understood that he was favouring his patron's son with this business. In fact Rena made this offer to the young aristocrat first, and agreed a deal with him, ignoring better offers from other landowners.¹²⁴

At first glance Rena's behaviour could be interpreted as proof of his willingness to benefit his mentor's son at the crown's expense but this was not the case. Juan Rena took the precaution of gathering information about the marquis' previous mercantile operations and sent it to his agent with strict instructions on the price and the quality of the wheat to buy.¹²⁵ Rena was right in taking this caution as the nobleman tried to sell

¹²¹ According to the power of attorney to collect this debt the Alcaide got more than 500,000 maravedís from Rena. AGN, CO_PS, Caj. 168, n° 71.

¹²² C. Bresnahan Menning, "Loans and favors, kin and clients: Cosimo de' Medici and the Monte di Pieta," *The Journal of Modern History* 61, n° 3 (1989): 487-511.

¹²³ The Count of Miranda also profited from Rena's loans during his stay as viceroy of Navarre. AGN, CO_PS, Leg. 172, n° 11-2, fol. 29.

¹²⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to the Marquis of Comares. Puerto de Santa María, 1st January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 132. Letter of the Marquis of Comares to Juan Rena. Lucena, 3rd January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 100, n° 21-1.

¹²⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Mesa. Puerto de Santa María, 1st January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fols. 131-132.

Rena wheat of bad quality from the harvest of 1525.¹²⁶ The issue developed into a tense negotiation between the nobleman and Rena about the wheat's quality and price. Some days later Rena wrote again to the nobleman rejecting his offer by underlining his need to acquire good quality wheat at a fair price.¹²⁷ Rena's actions show that he was putting the economic interests of the crown ahead of the noble's greediness. Rena was quite explicit in the letter that he sent to his agent when he wrote that he did not want to receive bad quality wheat 'because it is not convenient to His Majesty service, and even less to my honour'.¹²⁸ It clearly appears that Rena had a strong conviction of his duty and in guarding the crown's interests in the military administration. Furthermore, Rena's words show how much this conviction was part of his own self-discipline and underlined that he preferred to keep his reputation as a good servant than give favour to the marquis and build social capital through him.

Rena could have profited from the support of many superiors, but he always had a clear idea of what his duty as a member of the military administration was. In serving the emperor he tried to carry out his tasks and avoid any person or issue that would interfere with his personal loyalties. In fact, when he worked as commissary of the navy between 1532 and 1533 Rena preferred to defend the emperor's interests rather than winning powerful supporters. During this period, Rena had the opportunity to work hand in hand with one of the most powerful men in the Europe, Andrea Doria. Unfortunately, for Rena, he and the Genoese admiral never had a good relationship. Particularly because Rena decided to scrupulously fulfil his obligation as commissary.¹²⁹ After more than thirty years working in the service of the monarchy under the command of these powerful actors Rena was perfectly aware of how useful their support could be in accumulating offices and mercies. The importance of having Doria's backing became even more important during the winter of 1532-1533. When some dioceses became vacant and Pedro de Zuazola started to manoeuvre to obtain one for Rena as a reward for his services. From the very beginning he advised Rena to ask Andrea Doria to write to Charles V in support

¹²⁶ Letter of Alonso de Mesa to Juan Rena. Lucena, 26th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 100, n° 22-1.

¹²⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to the Marquis of Comares. Puerto de Santa Maria, 11th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 141.

¹²⁸ 'Porque ni conviene al servicio de Su Majestad ni menos a mi honra'. Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Mesa. Puerto de Santa María, 19th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 142.

¹²⁹ This is the main topic of chapter six.

of Rena's candidature to one of the vacant bishoprics.¹³⁰ During the following months Zuazola kept advising Rena to obtain Doria's support to get the desired reward for his services.¹³¹ Of course Rena asked Doria for his recommendation but he did not expect to obtain it. When the Genoese admiral promised Rena to write to the emperor in his favour, Rena distrusted his sincerity and asked Zuazola to figure out if it was true.¹³²

Rena's mistrust was right. The Genoese admiral did not support Rena's candidature. The only "favour" that Doria bestowed on Rena was to exclude him from the organisation of Charles V's journey to Spain (one of the main services in Rena's career) alleging the commissary had a weak constitution.¹³³ Obviously Andrea Doria supported his own candidates instead of the meddlesome commissary who spent the whole campaign of 1532 criticising his decisions; but what is interesting here is Rena's attitude. Doria's support was crucial for him to achieve the royal mercy, but he did not try to obtain it by relaxing his critical attitude towards Doria's behaviour. On the contrary, he continued reporting to Doria's abuses against the economic interests of the emperor to the inner circle of the imperial government.¹³⁴ Although Doria was the key to an important promotion as royal servant, it seems that Rena decided to put his service to the emperor, before his personal advancement through a powerful intermediary.

Despite the opportunities for advancement that these important men could offer Rena preferred to keep his reputation as a trusted servant of the emperor rather than use his position to pay for favours or to gain new sources of support. Rena's attitude makes sense considering that ever since his earliest day with the Alcaide, the intercession of powerful men had not secured him his deserved reward. Nevertheless, Rena's unselfish behaviour shows us that there were ethical rules governing the exchange of political favours and that Rena was aware of where these rules could be bent, broken or adhered to. He was willing to favour important supporters as much as he could, but only when that did not threaten the interests of the crown or his own reputation as a king's man.

¹³⁰ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Bolonia, 23rd December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-4.

¹³¹ Letters of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Bolonia, 12th January and 20th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-6 and 7.

¹³² Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 25th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-3.

¹³³ Letter of Andrea Doria to Charles V. Genoa, 6th January 1533. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1366, n° 63.

¹³⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1366, n° 241.

The King's Men and the God's Men

Although Rena initially advanced his administrative career, he was a cleric, and wanted to advance his career in the Church.¹³⁵ Needless to say, Rena's case was far from unique as clerics had participated in government and administrative structures of the European monarchies since the Middle Ages.¹³⁶ The King's men were quite often men of God, which allowed the crown to employ ecclesiastic resources to pay for their services. The Hispanic Monarchy frequently rewarded its royal servants with important promotions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy as the crown nominated them for several posts in the church under the royal *Patronato*.¹³⁷ The presence of bishops and canons in the government as well as in the different spheres of the monarchical administration is very well known.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to how these clerics combined their agenda as royal servants with their obligations as members of the church; could any servant truly serve two masters and remain faithful to both?

The king's servants, like Rena, who depended on him as a source of patronage, as clerics were also part of the church's transnational networks as soon as they received an ecclesiastical benefice they became beholden to both. In theory combining the king's service with the church's service was not a problem as all clerics were obliged to help the

¹³⁵ Rena's ecclesiastical career has been described in José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de los obispos de Pamplona* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1985), T. III, 254-289.

¹³⁶ H  l  ne Millet and Peter Moraw, "Le clerg   dans l'  tat," in *Les   lites du pouvoir et la construction de l'  tat en Europe*, ed. W. Reinhard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), 237-257. To the best of my knowledge a synthesis on the place of the clerics in the Castilian or Aragonese monarchy is missing. On the French case see H  l  ne Millet, "La place des clercs dans l'appareil d'  tat en France    la fin du Moyen Age," in *  tat et   glise dans la gen  se de l'  tat moderne*, J-P. Genet and B. Vincent (Madrid : Casa de Vel  zquez, 1986), 239-248. A comparative survey on late medieval England and France in Benjamin Thompson and Jacques Verger, "Church and State, Clerks and Graduates," in *Government and Political Life in England and France, c. 1300-c.1500*, ed. C. Fletcher, J-P. Genet and J. Watts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 183-216.

¹³⁷ On the *Patronato*, see Christian Hermann, *L'  glise d'Espagne sous le patronage royal (1476-1834). Essai d'eccl  siologie politique* (Madrid: Casa de Vel  zquez, 1988).

¹³⁸ Jean-Louis Gazzaniga, "Les clercs au service de l'  tat dans la France du XVe Si  cle    la lecture de travaux r  cents," in *Droits savants et pratiques fran  aises du pouvoir (XIe-XVe si  cles)*, ed. J. Krynen and A. Rigaudi  re (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1992), 253-278 ; and H  l  ne Millet and Elisabeth Mornet, "Jalons pour une histoire des chanoines au service de l'  tat : resultats de l'exploitation de la base de donn  es commune," in *I canonici al servizio dello Stato in Europa secoli XIII-XVI*, ed. H. Millet, (Modena: Franco Cosimo Panini, 1992), 268-290; Jos   Pedro Paiva, *Os Bispos de Portugal e do Imp  rio, 1495-1777* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2006), 171-288.

civil authorities.¹³⁹ However, in reality, political actors, and church dignitaries frequently opposed each other, and as a result, when clerics who worked as royal officers received mercies in the ecclesiastical benefices they often found themselves in a difficult position. To illustrate how this tension influenced a royal officer's activity we can focus on Rena's ecclesiastical career. The manner in which Rena balanced his service to the emperor with his duty to the church tells us a lot about how the king's men handled such tensions.

Throughout his career Rena received a long list of benefices in the ecclesiastical sphere. In fact, church resources (material and honorific) were Rena's main reward for his service to the crown. His appointment as royal chaplain was only the beginning. Thus, in June 1520, Rena was appointed *cubiculario secreto ac familiari nostro* by Pope Leo X. Shortly after Adrian VI, Leo X's successor, confirmed this appointment. Adrian VI also granted Rena the right to ask for different benefices in the dioceses of Albi, Asti and Padua. In 1523 Rena got the royal chaplaincy of Trani (Apulia). Two years later, in 1525, he obtained a benefice in the bishopric of Ciudad Rodrigo in Castile, and then in the same year was appointed protonotary apostolic. The following year he also received the permission to enjoy more benefices. In addition to all this, Rena accumulated a long list of minor benefices from Navarre.¹⁴⁰ All these combined produced an important sum of money for Rena and were an important source of income to maintain his career in the service of the emperor.

Beyond the material revenues, Rena also got important honours in the ecclesiastical sphere. In November 1534, after years of waiting, Rena ascended to the higher level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy when he was appointed bishop of Alghero in Sardinia.¹⁴¹ This see was not a big reward but as Rena and his friends recognised it was a stepping stone to a better bishopric. One of Rena's friends in Rome expressed this clearly when he wrote to Rena saying: 'The mercy that His Majesty has made to you by nominating you for the church of Alghero, is little for how much have you served,

¹³⁹ Millet, "La place des clercs," 240.

¹⁴⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 86, n° 9; Caj. 87, n° 24; Caj. 99, n° 11 and CO, PS, Caj. 178, n° 9; 17, 15, 16; Caj. 179, n° 27, 49; Caj. 180, n° 4, 7, 6, 5, 11, 12 and 10. On the distribution of benefices in the Spanish church, see Máximiliano Barrio Gozalo, *El sistema benefical de la iglesia española en el Antiguo Régimen (1475-1834)* (San Vicente: Universidad de Alicante, 2010).

¹⁴¹ Conradus Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi* (Monasterii: 1923), vol. III, 104. On this poor Mediterranean see Antonio Nughes, *Alghero: Chiesa e società nel XVI secolo* (Alghero: Edizioni del Sole, 1990), 27-54 and 59. Because of no reason the author considers Rena a prelate from the Roman curia.

although I hope it will serve you to ascend to a better thing'.¹⁴² Atienza was right because just two years later Charles V proposed that Rena become bishop of Tuy, a see in northern Castile.¹⁴³ Finally, on 5th June 1538 Rena was appointed bishop of Navarre.¹⁴⁴ Clearly, ecclesiastical resources (both material and immaterial) played a crucial role as rewards in Rena's career.

Rena's condition as a man of the church was not just a mere source of rewards as it also placed him in a difficult situation between the emperor and several church dignitaries. This was especially true within the Navarrese church. In February 1522, Juan Rena was appointed general vicar of the bishopric of Pamplona by Pope Adrian of Utrecht who, as mentioned above, became acquainted with Rena during the *Comunero* revolt.¹⁴⁵ Shortly after Rena's nomination as vicar general Pope Leo X appointed Cardinal Alessandro Cesarini as bishop of Pamplona.¹⁴⁶ Both nominations fitted perfectly with the emperor's strategy of appointing loyal churchmen in key post of the church's governmental structures as a way to control his recently acquired kingdoms.¹⁴⁷ After his nomination Charles V negotiated an agreement with him allowing him to take charge of the Navarrese see in exchange for some important concessions such as the right to designate a general vicar.¹⁴⁸ Cesarini had no problem in accepting these conditions

¹⁴² 'La merced que Su Majestad le ha hecho en nombrarle para la iglesia de Alguer, que aunque sea pequeña para lo mucho que le ha servido y sirve, todavía espero será escalón para ascender a otra mayor cosa'. Letter of Juan de Atienza to Juan Rena. Rome, 29th April 1534. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 95, n° 9. The same opinion was expressed by the cardinal Marino, bishop of Jaen. Letter of Esteban Gabriel Merino to Juan Rena. Rome, 29th April 1534. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 19, n° 19. The Spanish ambassador in Genoa went even further telling that he expected to see Rena as cardinal. Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Juan Rena. Genoa, 20th April 1534. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 95, n° 15.

¹⁴³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 85, n° 1.

¹⁴⁴ Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica*, vol. III, 268.

¹⁴⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 87, n° 21-2. On this pope see Ludwig von Pastor, *Storia dei papi della fine del Medio Evo* (Rome: Desclee, 1958-1964), Vol. IV, T. II, 3-148. On the political negotiations between Charles V and Adrian VI on the Spanish church, see J. M. Nieto Soria, "Relaciones con el pontificado, iglesia y poder real en Castilla en torno a 1500. Su proyección en los comienzos del reinado de Carlos I," *Studia Historica, Historia Moderna* 21 (1999): 32-43. According to Zuazola Rena's appointment should be understood as a proof of the "great love" of Adrian VI towards him. Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Vitoria, 3rd March 1522. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 87, n° 23-4. The importance and complexity of this charge in the frontier's bishoprics is analysed in Frédéric Meyer, "Grands vicaires et officiaux des diocèses de frontière (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)," in *Les clercs et les princes. Doctrines et pratiques de l'autorité ecclésiastique à l'époque moderne*, eds. P. Arabeyre and B. Basdenant-Gandement (Paris: École des Chartes, 2013), 137-152.

¹⁴⁶ Letter of Don Juan Manuel to Charles V. Rome, 22nd December 1520. BRAH, SyC, A-19, fols. 402-403. Cesarini was an ally of Leo X who promoted him to the cardinalship. Pastor, *Storia dei papi*, Vol. IV, T. I, 130 and 574.

¹⁴⁷ Letter of Charles V to Pope Leo X. Brussels, 13th May 1517. ASV, Segretaria di Stato, Principi, 2, fol. 21.

¹⁴⁸ The negotiations between the pope and the emperor about Cesarini's nomination and royal patronate in the Navarrese church have been reconstructed in T. de Azcona, "Derecho de Patronato y de presentación a

because his main concern regarding his bishopric was to collect its rents.¹⁴⁹ For that reason he delegated oversight to Giovanni Poggio (papal nuncio and collector in Spain) in order to ensure his material interests, and confirmed Juan Rena as vicar general.¹⁵⁰

From this moment Rena became a member of the cardinal's network, which was of paramount importance in the ecclesiastical careers of many early modern clerics.¹⁵¹ He became a friend and ally of Cesarini's agent: Giovanni Poggio.¹⁵² Even more importantly, Rena started to serve another master, which was crucial in his agenda as a king's man, and in fact he became an efficient collaborator with this Roman prelate. Cesarini and his agent needed the help of someone like Rena with a real influence in Navarre to solve their problems there.¹⁵³ Moreover, Cesarini used his influence with Rena to gain access to the inner circle of the imperial government. For instance, Rena managed to obtain from Cobos a positive (and quick) response to Cesarini's demands concerning the interests of his familiars in the Kingdom of Naples.¹⁵⁴

la iglesia de Pamplona. Privilegio de Adriano VI a Carlos V en 1523," *Scripta Theologica* 16 (1984): 499-542.

¹⁴⁹ In fact Cardinal Cesarini has been understood as a clear example of the cardinals' greediness as well as of the fiscal abuses of the Roman curia. Barbara McClungh Hallman, *Italian Cardinals, Reform, and the Church as Property. 1492-1563* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 56-58, 105, 121 and 125. See also Christoph Weber, *Senatus Divinus. Verborgene Strukturen im Kardinalskollegium der frühen Neuzeit (1500-1800)* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996), 39 and 385.

¹⁵⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 94, n° 1-1 to 4. On Giovanni Poggio and his crucial role in the management of the church taxes from Spain, see J. M. Carretero Zamora, "La colectoría de España en época de Carlos V: cuentas del nuncio y collector general Giovanni Poggio (1529-1546)," *Cuadernos de Historia de España* 78, n° 1 (2003), 103-135 and Id., "La Colectoría de España en el siglo XVI: los mecanismos de transferencia monetaria entre España y Roma (cambios y créditos)," *Hispania* 243 (2013): 79-104.

¹⁵¹ V. Julerot, "Juan Simon, évêque de Paris (1492? 1502): les réseaux d'un succès," *Revue historique* 659 (2011): 519-522. The role of cardinals as heads of powerful patronage networks is very well known since the publication of the classic works of Wolfgang Reihard of whom I will only quote Wolfgang Reinhard, "Papal Power and Family Strategy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: the Court at the beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450-1650*, ed. R. Asch and A. M. Birke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 329-356. The literature on the topic is huge but mainly focused on the networks inside Rome and the Italian territories. For a study on the long-distance patronage networks of an outstanding cardinal, see Martin Faber, *Scipione Borghese als Kardinalprotektor. Studien zur römischen Mikropolitik in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2005).

¹⁵² Poggio used to visit Rena's house during his stays in Navarre. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 39, n° 3. Furthermore, Rena lent Poggio important sums of money at his arrival to Pamplona in order to help him to fund his multiple activities at the service of Cardinal Cesarini. AGN, CO, PS, Leg. 172, n° 11-2, fols. 7-8. The close friendship between Rena and Poggio lasted for years and, in fact, the nuncio was one of the persons who accompanied Rena during his last days. Juan Rena also chose him as one of the executors of his last will. AGN, Tribunales Reales, 065185/16014763, s. f.

¹⁵³ Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Sos, 7th January 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 19-2, fols. 1-2.

¹⁵⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. 17th May 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 1-2, fol. 1. Letter of Francisco de Los Cobos to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 15th June 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 2-1.

Despite the importance of such services, it was in dealing with the bishopric's finances where Rena shone. Cesarini employed financial experts like Giovanni Poggio to manage his ecclesiastical rents.¹⁵⁵ Even so, he also relied on people like Rena who had an accurate knowledge of the bishopric's economy. The cardinal entrusted Rena with the difficult task of collecting ecclesiastical rents from the Navarrese tax farmers.¹⁵⁶ Rena was the most suitable person to accomplish such a task as these tax farmers were Rena's friends and fellows in the Navarrese administration, such as the merchant Bernal de Eguía.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, as vicar general Rena had to approve the contract with them which made an essential element of the bishopric's finances. Rena's efficient management of the bishopric's finances was so good that it received praise much further afield. Gasparo Contarini, the Venetian ambassador in the court of Charles V, included in his famous *relazione* a brief reference that the significant increase of the bishopric's rents was, 'because of the diligence employed by the commissioner of the cardinal'.¹⁵⁸ It seems that Rena continued helping Cesarini and Poggio to manage the Church revenues in Navarre. In fact, when Rena passed away they lost a useful collaborator, and collecting money from the local tax farmers again became an issue.¹⁵⁹

In exchange for these services Rena gained an important ally in the Roman curia.¹⁶⁰ This was crucial for his career because in this case royal patronage was not enough. Any appointments or benefices that the emperor issued in the church required the pope's approval, which meant that having contacts within the Roman curia was also useful for an ambitious cleric like Rena.¹⁶¹ Cesarini used his direct access to the pope to

¹⁵⁵ Carretero Zamora, "La Colectoría de España en el siglo XVI," 81 and 84.

¹⁵⁶ Letter of Juan Poggio to Juan Rena. Madrid, 5th April 1525. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, n° 26-3.

¹⁵⁷ Letter of Juan Poggio to Bernal de Eguía. Madrid, 5th April 1525. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, n° 26-4. On the profitable business of collecting church taxes in Navare, see María Concepción Hernández Escayola, *De tributo para la iglesia a negocio de mercaderes: el arrendamiento de las rentas episcopales en la diócesis de Pamplona (siglo XVIII)* (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2000).

¹⁵⁸ 'Per la diligenza che usa il commesso del cardinale'. In "Relazione di Gasparo Contarini ritornato ambasciatore da Carlo V, letta in senato a di 16 novembre 1525". Cfr. *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato*, ed. E. Albèri (Florence: Tipografia e calcografia all'insegna di clio, 1840), Serie I, vol. II, 47. There is no evidence on the relationship between Rena and Contarini, but most probably they met during the autumn of 1523 when the latter stayed in Pamplona following the emperor's entourage. BNM, Mss, It. VII, 1009, fols. 314-328. On Contarini's diplomatic mission in Charles V's court see Elisabeth G. Gleason, *Gasparo Contarini: Venice, Rome, and Reform* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 30-39.

¹⁵⁹ Letter of Cardinal Farnese to Juan Poggio. Rome, 10th November 1539. ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Spagna, IA, fols. 11-12.

¹⁶⁰ Financial services were at the base of many ecclesiastical careers. Helen Hyde, *Cardinal Bendinello Sauli and Church Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2009), 6-12 and 17-31.

¹⁶¹ José Manuel Nieto Soria, "De la grâce papale à l'absolutisme royal. Le roi de Castille suppliant le pape au XVe siècle," in *Le gouvernement par la grâce en Occident, XIIIe-XVe siècle*, ed. H. Millet (Rome: École française de Rome, 2003), 343-356. For instance, when Charles V tried to obtain from Pope Leo X a mercy

secure Rena a pension on the ecclesiastic revenues of a Castilian bishopric, which the emperor had already promised to Rena as a reward for his services.¹⁶² Furthermore, cardinal Cesarini was also a fount of patronage; he had the right, as the bishop of Pamplona, to distribute benefices and charges in the Navarrese church. For instance, in 1527 Rena asked Charles V to intercede on his behalf with Cardinal Cesarini in order to secure the archdeaconry of Usún, one of the most important dignities of the Navarrese bishopric and he got a positive response from the cardinal.¹⁶³

Rena relied on both Cesarini and Charles V to obtain mercies in the ecclesiastical sphere, but when they had opposing interests such with the rents of the Navarrese see, matters became more complicated for Rena. During moments of crisis, the crown made use of the church's material resources to fund its military expenses.¹⁶⁴ As bishop of Navarre, Cesarini was one of the region's most important landowners, and his riches were employed to fund the defence of Navarre in critical situations.¹⁶⁵ When Cesarini asked for a compensation for the requisitioned rents, the emperor did not hesitate to recognise his right to ask for it, and ordered that Cesarini be paid with money from the Navarrese treasury.¹⁶⁶ This procedure was the simplest one for the emperor, but it promised to be problematic as the Navarrese tax system was far from capable of providing enough money to pay Cesarini's debt. However, Cesarini started to receive his money shortly after, which was quite surprising considering that the Navarrese administration was heavily indebted.¹⁶⁷ Unfortunately it is impossible to determine to what role Rena played in

for Rena he wrote at the same time to Cardinal Marco Cornaro asking for his help in achieving this concession from the pope. Letter of Charles V to Cardinal Marco Cornaro. Brussels, September 1520. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 137, n° 40, fol. 2. The mediation of the cardinals was so highly esteemed that some of them developed a profitable business selling it to the churchmen looking for benefices. The issue threatened the royal patronage, the reason why Charles V ordered to his ambassador in Rome to act against it. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, Lib. 72, fols. 299-300.

¹⁶² Letter of the prior of Mur to Juan Rena. Rome, 26th October 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 3-2.

¹⁶³ Letter of Juan Rena to Giovanni Poggio. Valladolid, 5th February 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 19-1, fols. 3-4. Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Rome, 20th March 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 92, n° 19-2.

¹⁶⁴ Pablo Ortego Rico, "Las riquezas de la Iglesia al servicio del poder monárquico: los empréstitos eclesiásticos en la Castilla del siglo XV," *En la España Medieval* 35 (2012): 145-176.

¹⁶⁵ Béatrice Leroy, "Les élites locales et le pouvoir dans le royaume de Navarre à la fin du Moyen Âge," in *Les élites locales et l'État dans l'Espagne moderne, XVIe-XIXe siècles*, ed. M. Lambert-Gorges (Bordeaux: CNRS, 1993), 15. During the crisis of 1521 Juan Rena suggested in a report on the defence of Navarre that it was necessary to take the rents of the bishopric in order to fund the military expenses. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 35, n° 1-3. Again in 1522 the viceroy ordered the requisition of all the bishopric rents to fund the army. AGS, Estado, Leg. 345, n° 45.

¹⁶⁶ AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, 247, ff. 126rv-127rv.

¹⁶⁷ AGN, CO_REG. 2.^a S, n° 10, f. 82rv; n° 12, f. 61; n° 14, f. 49; n° 16, f. 85rv y n° 17, ff. 47-48rv.

facilitating the effectiveness of this payment but considering his influence we can infer that he had a hand in it.¹⁶⁸

Nevertheless, it seems clear that from 1523 onwards, cardinal Cesarini and his agents realised that they needed Rena to defend the Cardinal's material interests in Navarre vis à vis the rapacity of the Castilian military commanders who were always in search of resources to supply the army. Hence, when in 1523 the nuncio Giovanni Poggio suspected a new requisitioning of the bishopric's rents he addressed Rena directly asking him for his help to avoid this measure. According to Poggio it was difficult to believe that Rena could accept an order against the interests of cardinal Cesarini and all the Navarrese clerics, but in the end it was impossible to escape the requisition he asked Rena to take the rents in his name, and more importantly, to be responsible for negotiating the price and the terms of the later payment.¹⁶⁹ Poggio's next letter clearly shows how he and Cesarini depended on Rena to defend their economic interests in Navarre. Not only did Poggio beg Rena to intercede on their behalf before the viceroy, he also asked Rena for his advice on how to conduct a negotiation in case the requisition could not be avoided.¹⁷⁰ Poggio and Cesarini relied on Rena's help in defending their Navarrese incomes for the rest of his life. For example in 1529 when he wrote a report on the defence of Navarre, Rena asked the captain-general not to touch the resources of the bishopric of Pamplona alleging that it belonged to Cesarini, a servant of the emperor, but also underlining that in so doing he would be doing him an important favour.¹⁷¹

Finding himself placed between Charles V and the Church hierarchy influenced Rena's behaviour as a king's servant, which becomes clear after examining his attitude in managing the bishopric's resources. Maybe Rena was leaning toward the using the bishopric's resources for sustaining the defence of the kingdom. In fact, his reports on the defence of Navarre point in that direction. Rena's known willingness to use the church's resources in the defence of Navarre probably influenced his appointment as vicar

¹⁶⁸ He took part in the payment of the requisitioned rents because he headed the military administration in this frontier. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 15, n° 1-1.

¹⁶⁹ Letter of Giovanni Poggio to Juan Rena. Mendavia, 20th September 1523. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, n° 7-2.

¹⁷⁰ Letter of Juan Poggio to Juan Rena. Lodosa, 29th September 1523. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 91, n° 7-3. the feared requisition did not take place as the menace of an enemy's offensive disappeared shortly after.

¹⁷¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 48, n° 8-1.

general.¹⁷² Nevertheless, we should not forget that he was obliged to give an account of his dealings to Cesarini (the owner), who also played a key role in the promotion of his career as he was an important fount of patronage and, at the same time, an important supporter in Rome.

The fact that Rena's career depended on the support of this prelate influenced Rena's complex attitude towards the use of the church resources in defending Navarre. On the one hand Rena was aware of the strategic importance of these resources, but in the other hand he also knew that placing them at the disposal of military officers went against the cardinal's interests. Once again we can see how Rena's career depended on his ability to juggle the interests of two different masters. From Rena's viewpoint using the bishopric's rents to pay the army was a last resort, and when it was impossible to avoid such a measure it was necessary to restrict its possible negative influences on the cardinal's interests. We can consider Rena's actions in this matter as a byproduct of his allegiance to Cesarini. Nevertheless, it is interesting to go a step further and try to understand the consequences of this behaviour in a wider framework. Rena's ability to keep the cardinal's income benefited him as it granted him Cesarini's favour, but it is also true that in combining the interests of the prelate with the necessities of the imperial administration Rena was avoiding the dangerous frictions between the two.¹⁷³ It is worth noting that Rena justified his defence of Cesarini's properties by underlining that the prelate was a real servant of the emperor.¹⁷⁴ Thus, Rena's activity as servant to both the emperor and the cardinal allows us to reconsider the important role they played as members of the imperial administration, in compromising the interests of the emperor with those of his allies.

¹⁷² According to Pedro de Zuazola the members of the Council of War convinced Adrian of Utrecht to achieve Rena's nomination as general vicar. Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Vitoria, 25th February 1522. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 87, n° 23-1.

¹⁷³ It is important to underline here that cardinal Cesarini was one of the most known supporters of Charles V in the Roman Curia. The emperor recognised that he considered Cardinal Cesarini as a loyal servant even in the moments of open hostility between the emperor and the Pope Clement VII. Letter of Charles V to Juan Perez. Granada, 16th November 1526. BRAH, SyC, A-39, fol. 116. On the struggle of Charles V and Clement VII and the role of cardinals as military men, see David S. Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals and War. The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London: Tauris, 2006), 41, 48 and 146-159. An interesting case-study on the paramount role of cardinals as political actors can be found in Katherine. J. P. Lowe, *Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: the Life and Career of Cardinal Francesco Soderini, 1453-1524* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 39-85.

¹⁷⁴ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 48, n° 8-1.

Moreover, through examples such as this we can examine how they shaped a moral guide on how to behave in these difficult situations. The church's resources fuelled the allegiances between the emperor and the members of the Roman curia.¹⁷⁵ Therefore by requesting that Cesarini's incomes not be taken, Rena was not only looking out for his career, he was also protecting the allegiance between the prelate and making the protection of these alliances one of the main principles governing the behaviour of a good king's man.

Conclusions

Juan Rena's astonishing career in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy allows us to better understand the ethos that guided the members of the imperial administration. By analysing his reputation as a trustworthy servant of the monarchy, and its use to accumulate of offices and mercies, we can comprehend the moral economy that governed this enormous human machinery. It included some generic values such as loyalty to the monarch, and the capacity of self-sacrifice. This is evident considering that Rena gained his reputation by showing his commitment to the cause of the royal service by risking his goods, his life, and postponing his personal interests. In so doing he was reinforcing the rules of a professional sphere in which these kinds of actions were understood as a merit that deserved to be rewarded.

Nevertheless, these services were useless *per se* if the king did not witness them or know of them. Therefore, royal servant, who served in faraway posts made them practically invisible. In other words, Rena's services and merits were useless until he found a way to make the right people notice them: the emperor and his inner circle of advisors. In addition to the support and protection of a potential patron, Rena (like many others) had to gain the assistance from many different political actors who could to bridge the gap between him and inner circle surrounding the ruler. The unwritten handbook of these king's men also included rules on how to behave in this environment. However, far away from the imperial court Rena's day to day interactions required something extra to attract attention and his case shows one way that a king's man could shape the codes to do it. This is evident with the forms and expression of gratitude that was expected after

¹⁷⁵ McClungh Hallman, *Italian Cardinals*, 56-58.

an exchange of favours between Rena and those who favoured him and, in so doing, helped to construct and spread his reputation as a trustworthy royal servant.

Gaining support was crucial to the king's men who served the crown in the imperial administration, but there were limits on what they could or should do secure such favour. Rena's procedure in the negotiations with the Marquis of Comares and his attitude towards Andrea Doria are very meaningful in this sense. When Rena placed the interests of the emperor and his own reputation above the son of his former mentor he showed that he was aware of these limits. In the same manner, when he chose to keep working as a strict bureaucrat for Andrea Doria rather than trying to win his support, he showed how he had interiorised the values of a king's man. Finally, the case of Rena's ecclesiastical career allows us to perceive these values at work, when royal officers had to deal with the opposing interests of powerful actors who influenced their careers. Thus, by conciliating the interests of the emperor with that of Cardinal Cesarini Rena showed his prowess as a conciliator, and contributed to make this ability a valuable skill for a king's man. In conclusion, the imperial administration was a field where multiple actors interacted, negotiated and exchanged social and symbolic capitals according to the rules of the *ethos* of royal service. In doing so, they helped to shape and define this important sphere that became an essential component of the new Hispanic Monarchy. Hence, as mentor of Francisco Duarte, a notable royal officer who started a lineage of bureaucrats serving the crown, Rena was helping to reinforce and transmit the codes of the good royal officer.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Francisco Duarte's grandson wrote a wonderful genealogy including the administrative services of his family from the moment when Rena introduced his grandfather in the imperial administration. Francisco Duarte to Mateo Vázquez. Lisbon, 19th January 1583. BL, Additional, Ms. 28344, fol. 2.

Chapter 5

Binding the Sinews of War. Shaping the Military Administration on the Ground

Introduction

In 1525, after having spent 13 years serving the crown in Navarre, Juan Rena abandoned that kingdom. An anonymous spy for the French king understood this event to be a warning alarm. Hence, when the spy wrote one of his reports on Navarre, he included a significant reference to Rena's departure: 'The emperor has given the order to summon a Venetian who lives in Pamplona called Micer Johan Rena. He is the man whom the emperor trusts the most to organise and supply an army by land or by sea.'¹ Of course, it is impossible to know if Charles V did indeed consider Rena the most trustable person to carry out these difficult tasks, as the spy said. Nevertheless, what is obvious is that, considering Rena's reputation as a reliable expert in military logistics, we can learn a lot about how the resources for war were mobilised in the new Hispanic Monarchy by studying his active role in the field of the military administration.

¹ 'El emperador ha enviado a mandar a un veneciano que está en Pamplona que se dice Micer Johan Rena que es hombre de quien mas cuenta se hace y se da fe para dar orden al avituallamiento de una armada de mar o de tierra.' BNF, Manuscrits, Clairambault, 314, fol. 309.

In this chapter, I will analyse the role of Juan Rena in the construction of the supply networks that the authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy needed to implement their imperial agenda in the western Mediterranean. In so doing, I aim to challenge some common assumptions on the relationship between warfare and state development. After more than five decades of debate on the “military revolution”, the important role that war and, more specifically, the mobilisation of resources to carry it out, have on the state-building process is very well known.² Historians and political scientists have explained time and again that during the early modern period, the increasing costs of warfare prompted the European states to construct and develop efficient administrations in order to mobilise resources for war³. The argument is simple and convincing, but it is far from reflecting the whole truth. Authors dealing with these grand theories pay little attention to how early modern monarchies mobilised their resources for war, or how so-called “state administration” really worked.

The most influential contribution on this topic to date is I.A.A. Thompson’s classic work *War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560-1620*. In it, the author concludes that the war effort, far from contributing to the development of state administration, in fact pushed in the opposite direction. According to Thompson, the enormous effort expended by the Hispanic Monarchy on managing different military enterprises led to a change from a system in which war was directly administrated by the state, to one in which private entrepreneurs and local authorities (noblemen, local oligarchies, etc.) played a major role. This indirect administration was, according to the author, a notable step back in the state-building process, as it involved the necessity of negotiating with these socio-political actors over the delegation of some crucial tasks.⁴

² The literature on the matter is huge, so I will quote only the compilation of the classic essays in Clifford Rogers, ed., *The Military Revolutions Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

³ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990). A similar thesis applied on a global scale was employed by Parker to explain European supremacy. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See also: Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860*, (Stockholm, Stockholms Universitet, 1993) and Id., *War and the State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660* (London: Routledge, 2002).

⁴ Irving A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560-1620* (London: Athlone Press, 1976). This thesis is present in other works by the same author dealing with specific aspects such as the administrative apparatus, the mobilisation of resources, or naval warfare. Irving A. A. Thompson, “War and instituzionalization: the military-administrative bureaucracy of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” in Id., *Crown and cortes. Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern Castile* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), 1-37, and Id.: “Administración y administradores en el reinado de Carlos V,”

However, recent studies have suggested the necessity of reviewing the supposed negative effects of this indirect approach to administering war. Carla Rahn Philips asserted that, contrary to Thompson's theory, indirect administration hardly constituted an abrogation of sovereignty.⁵ In addition, David Goodman has outlined the practical advantages of indirect administration.⁶ In his recent book on the business of war, David Parrott has shown that privately funded and organised warfare was the predominant way of conducting war in Europe during the whole early modern period. Furthermore, this way of organising war was far from implied a loss of political power.⁷ More recently, a similar opinion has been expressed by Rafael Torres, who asserts that indirect administration did not imply a reduction of the state's power, since the state used this way of conducting war to reinforce its authority and implement some of its objectives.⁸ Of course, reviewing the effects of indirect administration has proved to be useful. Nevertheless, this should be complemented by an in-depth revision of the effects deriving from the other system of conducting war; that is, direct administration. In so doing, we can obtain a more complete image of the differences and similarities between both systems; something that is of paramount importance in order to obtain accurate information on the effects of the mobilisation of resources for war in the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy.

Addressing this issue with regard to Rena's case allows us to change from the traditional "top-down" approach adopted in studies of military finances, works on

in *En torno a las comunidades de Castilla*, ed. F. Martínez Gil (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla la Mancha, 2002), 93-107; See also Id., "'Money, Money, and yet more money!' Finance, the Fiscal-State, and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500-1650," in *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. C. Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 273-298; Id.: "La movilización de los recursos nacionales y la tesis de Downing. La guerra y el estado en España a mediados del siglo XVII," in *España y Suecia en la época del barroco (1600-1660)*, eds. E. Martínez Ruiz and M. de P. Pi Corrales (Madrid: Actas, 1998), 279-306; Id., "Las galeras en la política militar española en el Mediterráneo durante el siglo XVI," *Manuscripts* 24 (2006): 95-124; and Id., "Navies and State Formation: the Case of Spain (1500-1800)," in *Navies and State Formation. The Schumpeter Hypothesis Revisited and Reflected*, ed. J. G. Backhaus (Vienna, Lit Verlag, 2012), 317-351. Thompson's ideas have been widely accepted among historians. On the impact of this thesis, see the references to Thompson's works in A. Espino López, "La historiografía hispana sobre la Guerra en la época de los Austrias. Un balance, 1991-2000," *Manuscripts* 21 (2003): 161-191.

⁵ Carla R. Philips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 27 and 164, n.7.

⁶ David Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665: Reconstruction and Defeat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31-32.

⁷ David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 95, 197, 220-221 and 308-310. See also Id., "¿Revolución militar o devolución militar? Cambio y continuidad en la edad moderna militar," *Studia Historica, Historia Moderna* 35 (2013): 33-59.

⁸ R. Torres Sánchez, "Administración o asiento. La política estatal de suministros militares en la monarquía española del siglo XVIII," *Studia historica. Historia moderna* 35 (2013): 159-199.

military administration and, generally, the whole debate on the contribution of war to the state development process.⁹ This is why I am adopting a “from the bottom up” perspective, focused on the activities of one of those men who embodied the military administration. In the following pages, I will present Rena’s career as one of the key members of the military administration during the period when this administrative structure was being shaped. Following that, I will analyse in depth the functioning of the networks constructed by Rena in the course of his duties as one of the key members of the military administration. Later, I will derive some conclusions on the role of the king’s men in the construction of this administrative machinery.

Juan Rena’s Career Path in the Military Administration

The first half of the sixteenth century witnessed the configuration of the administrative structure in charge of mobilising resources for war in the Hispanic Monarchy. This military administration encompassed an executive institution, the Council of War, and a field administration composed of a myriad of purveyors, paymasters, commissaries, etcetera.¹⁰ Despite its important role in the mobilisation of resources for war, this field administration has attracted little attention from historians.¹¹ As a result, the prevailing image of this administrative apparatus is one of a chaotic

⁹ Jaime Vicens Vives, “Imperio y administración en tiempo de Carlos V,” in *Charles-Quint et son temps*, (Paris: CNRS, 1959), 9-21, and Id., “Estructura administrativa estatal en los siglos XVI y XVII,” in Id., *Coyuntura económica y reformismo burgués y otros estudios de historia de España* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974), 99-141; Ramón Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros* (Barcelona: Crística, 1987) and James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War. Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002). On the military administration, see I.A.A. Thompson, “The Armada and Administrative Reform: The Spanish Council of War in the Reign of Philip II,” *The English Historical Review* 82, n° 325 (1967): 698-725; Juan Carlos Domínguez Nafría, *El real y supremo consejo de guerra (siglos XVI-XVIII)* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001); and Wim Blockmans, “Logistics of Warfare in Central Italy, 1527-1530,” in *Charles V in Context: the Making of a European Identity* (Ghent, Ghent University Press, 2003), 35-46. A recent overview of this debate in S. Gunn, D. Grummitt and H. Cools, “War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate,” *War in History* 15, n° 4 (2008): 371-388.

¹⁰ Thompson, “War and institutionalization,” 4-5. On the Council of War’s configuration, see Santiago Fernández Conti, “El gobierno de los asuntos de la Guerra en Castilla durante el reinado del emperador Carlos V (1516-1558)” in *Instituciones y élites de poder en la Monarquía Hispana durante el siglo XVI*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma, 1992), 47-105.

¹¹ R. Quatrefages, “La proveduría des Armadas: de l’expédition de Tunis (1535) à celle d’Alger (1541),” *Mélanges de la casa de Velázquez* 14, n° 1 (1978): 215-247; A. Jiménez Estrella, “Los Mendoza y la proveduría general de armadas y presidios norteafricanos: servicio nobiliario y función militar en el marco geopolítico Mediterráneo (1535-1558),” *Revista de Historia Militar* 95 (2004): 123-155; and D. Maffi, “L’amministrazione della finanza militare nella Lombardia spagnola: I *veedores* e I *contadores* dell’essercito (1536-1700),” *Storia Economica* 5, n° 1 (2002): 51-106.

administration, embodied by irregular personnel appointed according to non-bureaucratic criteria.¹² However, a brief overview of Rena's résumé indicates that the men comprising this administrative apparatus were selected due to their expertise and efficiency in the execution of logistical tasks, and served in this sphere on a regular basis.

In late 1525, Juan Rena left Pamplona to join up with the imperial court in Toledo, and from there he followed the emperor on his travels to Seville and Granada.¹³ Rena's journey following the emperor's court was a journey in another sense, from one section of the military administration in charge of defending Navarre, to another sphere of the same administration attached to the imperial navy in the Mediterranean. Charles V's stay in Granada during the summer of 1526 was suddenly interrupted by the diplomatic storm brewing in Italy after the signing of the League of Cognac.¹⁴ This new menace to the monarchical interests in the Italian Peninsula invited a quick response. The monarch decided to send an army to Italy in order to protect his domains and allies. Charles de Lannoy, viceroy of Naples and a hero of the previous campaign in Italy, was appointed as captain-general of this army.¹⁵ At the same time, the logistical challenge of organising a navy in a short space of time was entrusted to Juan Rena. Lannoy did become a hero, while Rena did not, but in order to understand his contribution we only have to consider that during the Italian Wars, transportation of troops and resources was the main issue at stake in naval warfare.¹⁶

As spelled out in his formal appointment as purveyor general of the navy, Rena was nominated for such an undertaking because of his lengthy experience in military logistics.¹⁷ In the instructions to Charles de Lannoy, Rena's authority in the logistical

¹² Thompson, "Administración y administradores," 105.

¹³ On the emperor's journey, see Juan Antonio Vilar Sánchez, *1526. Boda y luna de miel del emperador Carlos V. La visita imperial a Andalucía y al reino de Granada* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000).

¹⁴ On the league of cognac and the following military campaign in Italy, see Michael Mallett and Christine Shaw, *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe* (Harlow: Pearson, 2012), 155-164; On Charles V's political activity during this period, see Bernard Vincent, "Carlos V en Granada," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, eds. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. I, 283-290. Further information on Charles V's stay in Granada in Antonio Gallego Morell, "La corte de Carlos V en la Alhambra en 1526," in *Miscelánea de estudios dedicados al profesor Antonio Marín Ocete* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1974), Vol. 1, 267-294.

¹⁵ Léon-E. Halkin and Georges Dansaert, *Charles de Lannoy, vice-roi de Naples* (Brussels, L'édition Universelle, 1934), 112-113.

¹⁶ Mallett and Shaw, *The Italian Wars*, 193.

¹⁷ AGS, Contaduría del Sueldo, Leg. 104, s.f and AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 44, nº 1, fol. 3.

sphere was justified by his experience.¹⁸ It seems that the men who composed the Council of War perceived Rena as someone capable of facing such logistical challenges. As Pedro de Zuazola wrote in one of his letters to Rena, without his ‘diligence and industry’ to rely on, it would have been impossible to hope for the correct supply of the navy in the expected time.¹⁹ The duties of this role encompassed the acquisition of all the foodstuffs and other products that the navy would need for its travels, their collection, their transport to the points of embarkation and their later redistribution among troops and crews. In short, Rena was responsible for making this operation possible.

Despite all the problems that such a difficult task posed, Juan Rena was able to organise the navy in record time. Rena had reason to be proud; and, writing to his friend the secretary of the Council of War, he boasted: ‘it has been no little service to organise so many provisions and so well, and to purvey 9,000 men in such a brief time’.²⁰ Rena’s words sought recognition for such reliable service, and the following autumn, this recognition arrived in the most obvious way. The enemy’s offensive in Lombardy and Naples warranted a new response.²¹ Once again, the Council of War proceeded to organise an army to protect the Italian possessions threatened by the enemy’s navy, and once again its transportation to the war front was entrusted to Rena, who was nominated purveyor general on November 20th 1527.²² As we can see, Rena was able to jump from an office to other due to his successes.

However, this time, his appointment as purveyor general was augmented with a new task: he was obliged to organise the recruitment and management of the different captaincies comprising this army.²³ Later on, Rena was ordered to organise the transport of part of these troops to Flanders.²⁴ Apparently, the emperor and the men of the inner

¹⁸ ‘Como se acostumbra a hacer en semejantes armadas, lo cual sabe bien el dicho micer Juan Rena, así porque lo ha hecho otras veces, como porque ha andado mucho en mar y tiene experiencia de ello’. AGN, CO_PS, 1^a S. Leg. 168, n° 15, fol. 17.

¹⁹ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Malaga, 28th July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10 fols. 6-7.

²⁰ ‘No ha sido poco servicio en tan breve tiempo haber hecho tanta provisión y buena y proveer 9.000 hombres’. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Cartagena, 6th October 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 117.

²¹ Mallett and Shaw, *The Italian Wars*, 164-172.

²² AGS, Estado, Leg. 269, n° 48.

²³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 72, n° 2-1, fol. 6.

²⁴ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Burgos, 27th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 2-10. On this military route, see Raymond Fagel, “El camino español por mar. Los soldados españoles en los Países Bajos

circle of the imperial government had such trust in Rena's organisational skills that they considered that the navies would be ready as soon as Rena arrived to the meeting point, as attested to by the secretary Pedro de Zuazola in one of his letters.²⁵ In fact, Rena proved to be a highly efficient servant for an emperor like Charles V who needed to respond quickly to the military challenges threatening his distant possessions simultaneously. Clear proof of Rena's success in the different missions entrusted to him by the imperial administration could be seen in his later appointments.

The next tasks entrusted to Rena related to the organisation of the emperor's travel to Italy in 1529.²⁶ This journey was one of the most famous episodes in the empire building process during Charles V's reign. Not only was the monarch travelling to Italy to be crowned as emperor by the pope, but this journey was also a crucial step in the configuration and consolidation of Charles V's dominion over his Italian possessions. According to one of the foremost experts on the political history of early modern Italy, only by journeying to Italy could Emperor Charles V make possible the development of a proper imperial policy there.²⁷ To a great extent, early modern empires were built on exhibitions of power such as this journey; and it was the king's men like Rena who were able to make it possible.

Rena garnered fame thanks to this service. Thus, when the chronicler Francisco López de Gómara made reference to the emperor's journey of 1529, he mentioned Rena as the navy's purveyor.²⁸ However, contrary to Gómara's affirmation, he was not in fact the purveyor of this navy, as the organisation of the navy was already entrusted to the viceroy of Catalonia when Rena tried to obtain the official assignment.²⁹ Nevertheless,

durante la época de Carlos V," in *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán, (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. 1, 363-376.

²⁵ 'Porque ya la tienen por hecha con la llegada de Vuestra Merced'. Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Burgos, 29th December 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 3-5, fol. 1.

²⁶ An account of the journey in Felipe Ruiz Martín, "Carlos V en Italia (1529-1530)," in *De la unión de coronas al Imperio de Carlos V*, ed. E. Belenguier Cebriá, (Madrid, SECC, 2001), Vol. III, 537-565.

²⁷ Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, "La coronación imperial de Bolonia y el final de la «vía flamenca» (1526-1530)," in *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. 1, 150. The importance of this journey in the framework of Charles' imperial politics is widely accepted. Juan Carlos D'Amico, *Charles Quint maître du monde: entre mythe et réalité* (Caen: Presses Universitaires du Caen, 2004), 30-31 and 247; Thomas James Dandele, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 92-98.

²⁸ 'La flota que fue de muchas naos, urcas y carracas, sin los escorchapines y tafurcas, cuyo proveedor fue Micer Juan Regna, que murió obispo de Pamplona'. Francisco López de Gómara: *Guerras de Mar del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. M. A. de Bunes (Madrid: SECC, 2000), 125.

²⁹ Letter of Francisco Duarte to Juan Rena. Toledo, 14th February 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 6, n° 7-1.

Rena took part in the logistical and financial configuring of the navy. Clear evidence of this can be seen in the budgets and other documents that Rena drafted for one of the purveyors, the archbishop of Bari.³⁰ Rena was also appointed as purveyor of an auxiliary navy to transport 2,000 soldiers who would escort the emperor on his journey.³¹ He was able to organise, pay, and supply this navy in record time: just ten days.³² Furthermore, during the court's stay in Barcelona, Rena was appointed purveyor of the court's supply.³³ At the same time, he also organised the delivery of arms and ammunition to the Spanish garrison deployed in the islet of Algiers when it was besieged by the corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa.³⁴

During the next two years, Rena remained in Charles V's travelling court. There he served the emperor in administrative matters closely related to the imperial finances, such as enquiries into the military administration's debts to Milanese financiers.³⁵ In 1532, Rena left the royal court in Regensburg to go to Genoa, where he was required to act as commissary general of the imperial navy. As such, Rena took part in the first episodes of the long naval struggle between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.³⁶ Once again, Rena was helping to reinforce the imperial authority of Charles V, as the fight against the Ottomans and the exhibition of his military power were the two main elements of Charles imperial policy.³⁷ Rena's participation in the conquest of Koroni earned him further fame. The Venetian writer Marino Sanuto noted in his diaries the circulation of rumours about Rena's endeavours in relation to the new naval power of the Hispanic Monarchy. According to Sanuto, Charles V gave the order to prepare an enormous navy in Genoa to transport about 20,000 combatants, a mission that the emperor entrusted to 'the reverend dominos Joanne Reni (*sic*), who use to have this charge'.³⁸ Rena's

³⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 73, n° 5-1.

³¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 73, n° 1.

³² Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan de Alarcón. Barcelona, 3rd July 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 6, n° 2.

³³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 73, n° 5-2.

³⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to the Council of War. 23rd May 1529. AGS, Estado, Leg. 461, n° 22.

³⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 95, n° 1.

³⁶ A brief but useful survey of the naval war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans can be found in Phillip Williams, "War and Peace between the Catholic King and the Caliph: Holy War and Holier Peace in the Mediterranean," in *Mutazioni e permanenze nella storia navale del Mediterraneo*, ed. G. Candiani and L. Lo Basso (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 13-38. I will come back to this issue more in depth in the next chapter.

³⁷ D'Amico, *Charles Quint maître*, 14, 256.

³⁸ 'Il reverendo domino Joanne Reni (*sic*), solito aver tal carico'. Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii di Marino Sanuto* (Venice: Deputazione Veneta di Storia Patria, 1879). vol. 56, col. 16. Other references to Rena in col. 23, 29, 57, 582, and 929. 'Per il che soa Maestá manda a Zenoa al Doria domino Zuan Regina ditto el Venetiano, homo pratico di cose da mar'. *Ibid.* col. 86.

prominent role in the military machinery of the Hispanic Monarchy attracted Sanuto's attention many other times. For instance, in the spring of 1532, Sanuto, made reference to Rena's travel to Genoa, noting that he was a 'Venetian but servant of the Catholic King for a long time', frequently employed in naval enterprises.³⁹ Rena's reputation as an expert in the naval logistics of the Hispanic Monarchy was reaching its peak. He continued to receive new responsibilities in this field; and, after finishing the campaign against the Ottoman navy in the winter of 1532, Rena was ordered to organise the Emperor's journey to Spain the following year.⁴⁰

Rena's career in the service of the monarchy continued to ascend in parallel with the path of the monarchy's Mediterranean strategy. In 1534, with the preparations for the conquest of Tunis as a backdrop, Juan Rena was appointed to direct the construction of a squadron of 20 galleys in the royal shipyards of Barcelona.⁴¹ Once again, Rena was working to bring the empire into reality, as the campaign against Tunis was another key element in the imperial policy of Charles V.⁴² Rena's efficiency in directing the shipbuilding process was very well rewarded, as shortly afterwards he obtained one of the most important honours of his career, the bishopric of Alghero in Sardinia.⁴³ This nomination was an important accolade for a royal servant like Rena who, at that time, was the main organiser of the imperial campaigns in the Mediterranean. In fact, Rena's image was so closely linked to the military logistics of that scenario that his absence was taken to be something worrisome, as Francisco Duarte suggested in one of his letters.⁴⁴

³⁹ 'Et per questo efecto expedi di Ratisbona messer Erasmo Doria et messer Gioan Rena nostro cittadino venetiano ma gran tempo servitor dil re católico e molto adoperato etiam per quello, et li mandò a Genoa con tal ordine'. *Ibíd.* col. 354.

⁴⁰ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Bologna, 24th December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-11.

⁴¹ AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, s.f.

⁴² On this campaign, see H. Duchhardt, "Das Tunisunternehmen Karls V. 1535," *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 37 (1984): 35-72; and Id., "Tunis-Algier-Jerusalem? Zur Mittelmeerpolitik Karls V.," in *Karl V. 1500-1558. Neue Perspektiven seiner Herrschaft in Europa und Übersee*, ed. A. Kohler, B. Haider and C. Ottmer (Vien: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002), 685-690. The conquest of Tunis occupied a privileged place in the imperial propaganda of Charles V. Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, "L'Expédition de Tunis (1535): Images, interprétations, répercussions culturelles," in *Chrétiens et musulmans à la Renaissance*, ed. B. Bennassar and R. Sauzet (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1998), 75-132; and D'Amico, *Charles Quint maître*, 252-253. On Charles V's strategy in the Mediterranean see A. Espinosa, "The Grand Strategy of Charles V (1500-1558): Castile, War, and Dynastic Priority in the Mediterranean," *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, n° 3-4 (2005): 239-283.

⁴³ Conradus Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi*, (Monasterii, 1923), vol. III, 104.

⁴⁴ 'Los de Málaga están tomados del diablo viendo que Su Señoría no baja los puertos ni se le habla en ello y esperan su advenimiento como el mesías'. Letter of Francisco Duarte to Juan Rena. Seville, 7th September 1534. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 10, n° 2-7.

After having directed the construction of the galleys, Rena joined the expedition against Tunis. During the campaign, Juan Rena was included among the inner circle of military councillors who advised Emperor Charles V on the designing and organisation of the campaign. Nevertheless, it seems that Rena was preparing his jump into the higher tier of the imperial service during his stay in Barcelona. In fact, for instance, during the months that he spent working in this city, he tried to collect as much information as he could about Tunis. As a result, he collected detailed reports on the political reality of Tunis, but also some maps of that city and its surroundings (see image 8).⁴⁵ Apparently, Rena's career was reaching its peak with his ascension to the inner circle of the emperor's military councillors.⁴⁶ At the same time, he continued to work for the monarchy in the logistical sphere, and he took charge of organising the journey of the imperial army back to Italy.⁴⁷ Charles V's esteem for Rena at that time was evident, for instance, in the letter that the emperor sent to the viceroy of Naples ordering him to treat Rena 'as is reasonable to be done with him, because he is such a good servant of ours'.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ AGS, Estado, Leg. 462, nº 41, 43, 44 and 46- 50.

⁴⁶ On this personal Council of War travelling with Charles V during his journeys and military campaigns, see Fernández Conti, "El gobierno de los asuntos de la Guerra," 47 and 82. The activity of this Council during the Campaign of Tunis is reported in BNE, Mss. 19441, fols. 63, 70-72, 83-86, 101, 111, 117 and 119.

⁴⁷ Letter of Emperor Charles V to Juan Rena. Trapani, 27th August 1535. AGS, Estado, Leg. 462, nº 81.

⁴⁸ 'Que es razón que se le haga por ser tan buen servidor nuestro'. Letter of Charles V to the viceroy of Naples. Trapani, 27th August 1535. AGS, Estado, Leg. 462, nº 81. I thank Gennaro Varriale for sharing this reference with me.



Image 8. Map of Tunis kept in Rena's archive (1534).⁴⁹

A new war between Francis I and Charles V gave Rena the opportunity to continue to obtain responsibilities in the framework of the military administration. In 1536, Rena was in charge of designing and organising the logistics to supply the royal army in Italy.⁵⁰ After that, he joined the army that invaded Provence, serving as one of the three commissaries generals who faced the difficult challenge of supplying 'such a large army, distributed over various parts, in a strange kingdom, and through mountains', as Francisco Duarte wrote in his account of the journey.⁵¹ At the same time, during the emperor's stay in Genoa after the campaign, Rena began his ascension in the church hierarchy thanks to his military services, when he received the bishopric of Tuy. The royal chronicler Pedro Girón identified a clear connection between Rena's military services and this royal favour when he wrote: 'The bishopric of Tuy was given to Micer Juan Rena, bishop of [Alghero].

⁴⁹ AGN, Cartografía, nº 172.

⁵⁰ "Memoria de lo que se mandó comprar en Nápoles para la provisión de la felicísima armada de Su Majestad para este año de 1536". AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s.f.

⁵¹ 'En reino extraño, y por montañas, y con tan gran ejército y repartido por diversas partes'. "Relación que Francisco Duarte me envió en primero de octubre de 36 años de las cosas de la entrada que Su Majestad hizo en Francia el año de 36" BRAH, Salazar y Castro, N-43, fols. 206-213.

He was born in Florence (*sic*), he had the *naturaleza* (nativeness) of these kingdoms, and he was a wise man in organising navies'.⁵²

Rena's career continued to grow, as the conflict between Emperor Charles V and the French King Francis I continued to provide him with administrative responsibilities. Thus, in the spring of the following year, Juan Rena was nominated as purveyor to organise a new navy, but this time in a different scenario: the *cuatro villas de la costa* (also known as the brotherhood of the four cities), on the northern coast of Castile. Rena's expertise in organising navies, in addition to his previous experience in a poor and mountainous area like Navarre, allowed him to organise a supply network in this adverse terrain. The imperial dimension of this episode was clear, as this navy had initially been designated to transport a new army to help in defending Flanders from a French offensive; but in fact, some rumours suggested that Emperor Charles V himself was planning to join the navy to travel to Flanders seeking a direct confrontation with Francis I. Once again, Rena was entrusted with the mission of putting into effect an enterprise deriving from Charles V's imperial agenda. However, when the French monarch abandoned the offensive, the emperor decided not to send the army, and the organisation of the navy was aborted.⁵³

Rena's reputation as one of the most reliable servants of the monarch was evident during the final years of his life, and it granted him new promotions like his appointment as bishop of Pamplona, maybe the most important award that he received in his whole life. When Rena entered Pamplona on September 18th 1538 (where he was 'received with shows of great happiness,⁵⁴), he was finally occupying one of the most important positions in Navarrese society. Royal favour not only contributed to his ascension within this kingdom; it also granted him a notable ascension in the framework of Spanish politics.⁵⁵

⁵² 'El obispado de Tuy se dió a Micer Juan Reina, Obispo de [Alghero], Era natural de Florencia (*sic*); tenía la naturaleza de estos reinos, era hombre sabio en dar orden en hacer armadas'. Pedro Girón, *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. J. Sánchez Montes, (Madrid: CSIC, 1964), 84.

⁵³ Girón, *Crónica del Emperador*, 96. On the political meanings of the personal duel between Charles V and Francis I see Juan Manuel Cacho Bleuca and María Carmen Marín Pina, "La rivalité chevaleresque entre Charles quint et François I (poésie épique savante et cartels de défi)," in *L'histoire de la France dans la littérature espagnole. Entre francophobie défensive et admiration francophile*, ed. R. Lefere and M. Boixereu Vilaplana (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2011), 221-244.

⁵⁴ 'Fue recibido con muestras de grandísimo gozo'. Prudencio de Sandoval, *Catálogo de los obispos que ha tenido la santa iglesia de Pamplona* (Pamplona: Nicolás de Asiayn, 1614), fol. 127rv. I thank Cloe Cavero de Carondelet for sharing this reference with me.

⁵⁵ Girón, *Crónica del Emperador*, 147.

When the royal chronicler Pedro Girón described the royal entry of Emperor Charles V into Barcelona during his journey to the peace negotiations of Nice in 1538,⁵⁶ after listing all the famous noblemen escorting the emperor, he included a reference to Juan Rena as one of the prominent servants of the emperor; quite an honour, considering the symbolism around this journey.⁵⁷ Finally, after more than two decades working to transform Charles V's imperial ambitions into reality, Rena's many services in the military administration had granted him a place in the first tier of the crown's servants.

Rena was able to accumulate responsibilities and spend years in the crown service because he showed that he had the experience and skills needed to facilitate the running of the empire. As we have seen, Rena's case shows that the military administration was not made up of irregular personnel connected to the Royal Household who were only employed in these tasks for short and intermittent periods.⁵⁸ On the contrary, it was composed of permanent personnel with reliable experience. The example of Rena is very illustrative in that sense; because, by the time he passed away in 1539, he had accumulated almost 30 years of experience in this field, owing to his continued service to the monarchy. Contrary to what Thompson asserts, Rena's connection with the royal household and his ecclesiastical career only came to him as a recompense for that service. Put simply, Rena was first of all a member of the military administration, and it was only thanks to his success in this field that he was allowed to have a prominent career as churchmen.

An Administration Made from Personal Networks. Rena's Connections from the Imperial Court to the Port

The personnel making up the military administration were appointed according to their previous experience and their efficiency in carrying out their duties. Nevertheless, the administrative apparatus that Rena was helping to construct was far from being a

⁵⁶ On these peace negotiations, see H. Keniston, "Peace negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537-1538)," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 102, n° 2 (1958): 142-147. On the symbolic dimension of this meeting see: X. Le Person, "A Moment of 'Reservie': Charles V and Francis I's Encounter at Aigues-Mortes (July 1538)," *French History* 19, n° 1 (2005): 1-27.

⁵⁷ 'Estos señores fueron con Su Majestad, demás del Comendador Mayor de León y de Mosior de Granvela y de don Pedro de la Cueva, Comendador Mayor de Alcántara, y otros muchos caballeros mancebos que sirvieron a Su Majestad en esta jornada. Iba más con Su Majestad micer Juan Reina, Obispo de Pamplona, proveedor general del armada'. Girón, *Crónica del Emperador*, 259.

⁵⁸ Rena appears in this regard as a clear counterpoint to Thompson's view on a military administration composed of irregular personnel. Thompson, "Administración y administradores," 105.

proper bureaucratic administration. On the contrary, as we will see in this section, the correct functioning of the administrative apparatus depended on the personal networks of the king's men like Rena. This is obvious, for instance, in respect of the mobilisation of resources for war. In what follows, I will analyse the way in which Rena was able to succeed in his role as purveyor general of the navy, constructing and managing a personal network. My aim here is not to demonstrate the networked functioning of this administrative structure, but to go a step further and analyse in detail what kind of network this administration was.⁵⁹ In so doing, we can better understand the true functioning of this administrative apparatus.

The importance of Rena's connections is evident, for instance, in his manoeuvres to obtain and manage the money that the imperial administration employed to fund the navy during the Mediterranean campaigns. This aspect is significant, as it serves to challenge the common assumption that points to the necessity of mobilising economic resources as being one of the main forces driving the development of a modern state administration.⁶⁰ As we will see, Rena's case points in a different direction, as the money was not only circulated through official channels, but also through the interpersonal connections of the royal officers who administered it. The importance of the interpersonal

⁵⁹ The literature on the importance of social networks in the administrative building of the Habsburg Empire is huge. Jean-Pierre Dedieu and Zacarias Moutoukias, "L'historien de l'administration et la notion de réseau," in *Réseaux, familles et pouvoirs dans le monde ibérique à la fin de l'Ancien Régime*, ed. J. L. Castellano and J-P. Dedieu (Paris: CNRS, 1998), 247-263; and Jean-Pierre Dedieu: "Procesos y redes. La historia de las instituciones administrativas de la época moderna hoy," in *La pluma, la mitra y la espada. Estudios de historia institucional en la edad moderna*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano, J-P. Dedieu and M. V. López Cordón Cortezo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 13-30. On the court councils, see Caros Javier de Carlos Morales, *El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602: patronazgo y clientelismo en el gobierno de las finanzas reales durante el siglo XVI* (Valladolid: Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1996) and Santiago Fernández Conti, *Los consejos de estado y guerra de la Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos de Felipe II (1548-1598)* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998). As recent studies on modern entrepreneurship show, more than underlining the networked functioning of institutions, it is necessary to go a step further and analyse which kinds of networks these institutions were. Mark Casson, *Entrepreneurship. Theory, Networks, History* (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010), 118.

⁶⁰ The Mediterranean campaigns of the Hispanic Monarchy were also a good example to challenge this assumption regarding the origin of the money. Frequently the war effort has been understood as one of the main forces pushing for a development of the tax system. Nevertheless, as the campaigns of the Mediterranean show, war frequently was funded with money coming from extraordinary sources of revenue. The navy of 1532 was funded with the money paid by the French King Francis I to rescue his sons. Ramón Carande, "Solimán no llega a Viena (1532) y de España sale un tesoro recibido de Francisco I," in *Studi in onore di Amintone Fanfani* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962), Vol. IV, 185-218. The conquest of Tunis was mainly funded with embargoed capitals arriving to Seville from the Atlantic trade. L. J. Ramos Gómez, "El primer gran secuestro de metales, procedentes del Perú, a cambio de juros, para costear la empresa de Túnez," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 32 (1975): 217-278. This procedure was frequently adopted during Charles V's reign. Antonio García Baquero, "Agobios carolinos y tesoros americanos: los secuestros de las remesas de particulares en la época del emperador," in *Carlos V Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez Montes (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. IV, 308-336.

networks of the royal officers in the circulation of economic resources stands out clearly in Rena's management of the money devoted to fund the navy organised in 1528. The records of the purveyor general show what little role was played by the state institutions in this case. The royal treasurer was only required to sign the document transferring the money between tax farmer and financier, in this case the Genoese banker Juan Bautista Grimaldo. The rest of the operation took place through the channels of Rena's private network.⁶¹

When Juan Rena took charge of the organisation of the navy as purveyor general, he could make use of the services of the Genoese bankers belonging to Grimaldo's network, whose head, Juan Bautista, offered their services to Rena.⁶² It is worth noting that there was nothing new in the collaboration between Rena and Grimaldo's network. Rena and these merchants had shared business and connections from the opening years of the century, when both were active in textile commerce in Granada.⁶³ The members of Grimaldo's financier network usually worked with Rena in the funding of the supply of the African strongholds, at the service of the Alcaide de los Donceles, and also in 1523 during the war against France, when Grimaldo played a major role supplying the royal army in Navarre, and Rena worked as purveyor general of the army.⁶⁴ In fact, at the same time that Rena began to work in the military administration serving Francisco de Vargas, Juan Bautista Grimaldo was beginning his services to the crown as part of Vargas' financial network; another point in common between the careers of the financier and the

⁶¹ AGN, Rena, Caj. 72, n° 2-4, fol. 3. The authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy made frequent use of private networks to attend to the multiple financial needs of their imperial policy, and the Genoese became quite successful in offering their services in this regard. A recent and complete case study of one of these private networks very close related to the military administration in C. Álvarez Nogal, L. Lo Basso and C. Marsilio, "La rete finanziaria della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere dei cambi (1610-1656)," *Quaderni Storici* 124 (2007): 97-110.

⁶² Letter of Juan Bautista de Grimaldo to Juan Rena. Burgos, 5th December 1527. AGN, Rena, Caj. 100, n° 16-1.

⁶³ AGN, Rena, Caj. 105, n° 5-2 and n° 11. Juan María de la Obra Sierra, *Mercaderes italianos en Granada (1508-1512)* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1992), 10-11.

⁶⁴ On the first contacts between Rena and Grimaldo AGN, Rena, Caj. 88, n° 4-2. Grimaldo's financier services to the Alcaide de los Donceles are referred to in the correspondence between Rena and his lord. Letter of the Alcaide de los Donceles to Juan Rena. Guadalupe, 18th January 1516. AGN, Rena, Caj. 1, n° 14-2. Rena and Grimaldo's work supplying the imperial army in AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Leg. 166, n° 8. On the activity of Juan Bautista Grimaldo supplying the army those years, see Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros*, T. III, 55-56.

administrator.⁶⁵ The mutual trust engendered by this long-lasting connection allowed Rena to negotiate directly with Grimaldo's bank for loans to fund the army's necessities.⁶⁶

This intense interaction was useful for both parts. Genoese financiers like Grimaldo were able to arrange more credit agreements with the monarchical administration thanks to their connections with officers like Rena. In 1528, Rena negotiated with the secretary of the Council of War to contract a loan of more than 10,000 ducats with Juan Bautista Grimaldo in order to fund the navy.⁶⁷ Rena's manoeuvres within the Council of War were very much appreciated by Grimaldo.⁶⁸ The favours that Juan Rena and Juan Bautista Grimaldo mutually exchanged were of paramount importance to their careers at the service of the monarchy. Obviously, Rena could profit from the financial services of his friend; but Juan Bautista also benefitted from the relationship. If Grimaldo's assistance played some role in the career development of an obscure bureaucrat like Rena, the favours that the latter offered to Grimaldo contributed to his astonishing ascension from being a humble financier to becoming one of Emperor Charles V's favourite bankers.⁶⁹ In both cases, personal connections were at the core of their activities and their successes.

To illustrate the significant extent to which the circulation of money depended on interpersonal connections, it is useful to refer to Rena's manoeuvres in obtaining the money required to fund the navy in 1528. Charles V had ordered that the navy be paid with money from the *Casa de la Contratación*. When Rena arrived to Seville, he visited this institution and showed its officers the royal order commanding them to give Rena 10,000 ducats from the royal revenues. However, they did not deliver the money, claiming

⁶⁵ Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, *Carlos V y el Crédito de Castilla. El tesorero general Francisco de Vargas y la Hacienda Real entre 1516 y 1524* (Madrid: SECC, 2000), 152, 160, 161, 163, 165, 182 and 198-200.

⁶⁶ Letter of Nicolao Grimaldo to Juan Rena. Medina del Campo, 17th December 1522. AGN, Rena, Caj. 3, n° 24-2.

⁶⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Seville, 19th December 1527. AGN, Rena, Caj. 13, n° 2, fols. 28-29.

⁶⁸ Letter of Juan Bautista de Grimaldo to Juan Rena. Burgos, 1st January 1528. AGN, Rena, Caj. 100, n° 16-2.

⁶⁹ Juan Bautista Grimaldo began to serve the crown as one of the financiers who lent money to pay the army in 1519. David Alonso García, *El Erario del Reino. Fiscalidad en Castilla a principios de la Edad Moderna, 1504-1522* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2007), 133. At the end of his career he was, according to Ramón Carande, one of the 'favourite bankers of the emperor'. Carande *Carlos V y sus Banqueros*, T. III, 133. Further information on his financial services to the emperor, in *Ibíd.* T. III, 128, 130, 132, 136, 138, 140, 478 and 484.

that the royal coffer did not contain a sufficient amount; Rena decided not to press the issue, surmising that they were postponing the payment in order to be able to make other payments.⁷⁰ Rena was obliged to leave Seville to continue on his way to Cadiz, and he was unable to deal any further with this problem in person, as he noticed to the treasurer of the *Casa de la Contratación*, Pedro Suárez de Castilla.⁷¹ Rena also commanded one of his agents, Jerónimo del Busto, to transmit his instructions first to Nicolao Cattaneo and his partners Jacobo and Esteban Rizo, and second to Francisco de Santa Cruz.⁷² The former would be able to help Rena by agreeing to advance cash. In contrast, Rena's asking for help from Francisco de Santa Cruz was for a different reason.

Rena considered that Santa Cruz could convince the royal officers to deliver him the money.⁷³ Why? Because, once again, contacts mattered. Rena and Francisco de Santa Cruz were old friends, having met while both were working on the purveying of Oran.⁷⁴ Later, Santa Cruz moved his business to the Atlantic, where he took part, for instance, in the organisation of the Sebastian Cabot's expedition.⁷⁵ Through this activity, he established a close relationship with the key officers of the *Casa de la Contratación*, especially with the treasurer, Pedro Suárez de Castilla.⁷⁶ These notable contacts were the main reason Rena trusted that Francisco de Santa Cruz would be able to obtain the payment from the officers of this institution. Just two weeks later, the treasurer wrote to Rena informing him of the delivery of the money to the Genoese financier who had

⁷⁰ 'Pensando que lo hacían como en tales casos se suele hacer para cumplir con otros a quien suelen tener voluntad'. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Seville, 19th December 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 28. As Rena knew, the private interests of the royal officers were at the base of the functioning of this institution. Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, "Intereses privados en la administración de la monarquía: la Casa de la Contratación," in *La casa de la contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias*, ed. A. Acosta Rodríguez, A. González Rodríguez and E. Vila Vilar (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003), 356-364 and 368.

⁷¹ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro Suárez de Castilla. 3rd January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 67.

⁷² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 60.

⁷³ 'Que pues Vuestra Merced se halla ahí nos hará merced de tomar el trabajo de hacer recibir estos diez mil ducados de los dichos señores de la casa de la contratación'. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Santa Cruz. 3rd January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 68.

⁷⁴ He worked as purveyor of the navy organised to supply the African presidiums in 1511. AGI, Indiferente General, 420, L. 10, fol. 323, and 421, L. 11, fols. 58-59. Rafael Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del Norte de África en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos* (Melilla: Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla, 1997), 220 and 242, n. 980.

⁷⁵ For instance, he was one of the ship-owners who funded the expedition of Sebastian Cabot in 1526. AGI, Patronato Real, 42, N. 1, R. 14, fol. 2 and J. Gil, "Los armadores de Sebastián Caboto: Un inglés entre italianos," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 45 (1988), 12, 49 and 51.

⁷⁶ For instance, Santa Cruz managed his naval business in the house of Pedro Suárez de Castilla. *Ibid.* fol. 3.

Rena's power of attorney.⁷⁷ Rena had tried to solve the problem by making use of the financial services of his Genoese friends, and by lobbying the royal officers of the *Casa de la Contratación*. It is clear that, to a great extent, Rena relied on his personal portfolio of contacts to fund the navy.

The importance of personal connections was crucial, not only in the management of money, but also in the mobilisation of the most important resources: men. The success of any campaign depended on the capacity of the military administration to recruit, supply, and transport as many combatants as possible; something quite difficult in a complex polity like the Hispanic Monarchy, where jurisdictional fragmentation and the plural nature of power made such mobilisation even more complicated than it would otherwise have been.⁷⁸ As purveyor general of the navy, Rena was in charge of coordinating the mobilisation of the troops.⁷⁹ He was able to carry out this difficult task thanks to his personal connections among the men in charge of recruiting and leading the troops: the captains, the most important sinews of the army.⁸⁰ In order to illustrate this point, we may focus on the symbiotic relationship established between Juan Rena and the captain Álvaro del Grado. They had first met during the winter of 1527, when Rena was purveyor general of the navy and Grado one of the captains in charge of recruiting and conducting troops.⁸¹ They continued to be in touch during the campaigns that followed, such as the conquests of Koroni and Tunis, where the latter was appointed chief of the Spanish infantry.⁸² Grado benefitted from Rena's friendship in his military career because, from the very beginning, Rena would refer to his merits and accomplishments in his correspondence with the emperor.⁸³ Later, during the organisation of the campaign of 1532, Rena, as commissary general of the navy, had a hand in the decision to select Álvaro de Grado as one of the chiefs in charge of conducting the Spanish troops;⁸⁴ and after the conquest of Koroni, Rena wrote to Charles V recommending Álvaro de Grado

⁷⁷ Letter of Pedro Juarez de Castilla to Juan Rena. Seville, 16th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 100, n° 19-1.

⁷⁸ Ruth McKay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21-60

⁷⁹ On the difficulties of carrying out this task in the region, see A. Jiménez Estrella, "El problema de los alojamientos de la tropa en el reino de Granada (1503-1568)," *Chronica Nova* 26 (1999), 191-214.

⁸⁰ Thompson, *War and Government*, 107-121.

⁸¹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 72, n° 2-1, fol. 5.

⁸² BNE, Mss. 19441, fol. 43

⁸³ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. 30th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fols. 7-8.

⁸⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Naples, 7th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 4-1, fol. 2.

be appointed chief of the Spanish garrison in this city.⁸⁵ On the other side, Grado acted in the service of Rena, negotiating with local authorities regarding the lodgement of troops, or providing him with the necessary information that the purveyor would need in order to negotiate in the court or to organise the supply of certain products.⁸⁶ He was also one of the captains who would provide Rena with the information that he needed in order to act as an advisor to the central authorities.⁸⁷ As we can see, the interaction between administrators and military men during the different campaigns generated symbiotic relationships between both, something that facilitated the mobilisation of the troops by the members of the military administration.

Personal contacts were also at the core of the internal functioning of this administrative machinery. For instance, the interpersonal connections among the king's men bridged the distance between the Council of War and the field administration.⁸⁸ In the case of Rena, this is obvious in regard to his personal friendship with the secretary Pedro de Zuazola. As we already saw in chapter four, Zuazola was behind Rena's successful career. In the same way, these relationships governed the field administration. The purveyors were not able to carry out all the logistical tasks under their charge, and they were obliged to delegate most of these tasks to people whom they trusted. Here again, interpersonal connections were of paramount importance. For instance, in 1526 Juan Rena employed Alonso de Palma as his agent. Palma was one of his former associates from the years when both had worked together supplying the Maghrebi presidios.⁸⁹ Alonso de Palma enjoyed a privileged position in Rena's web of agents. He was in charge of the efforts to purvey Malaga from different coastal localities.⁹⁰ In 1528, when Rena was appointed purveyor once again, he also employed his contacts among some members of the mercantile community of El Puerto de Santa Maria (where he had worked more than 20 years before) to provide his agent, Alonso de Palma, with useful collaborators. Hence, Rena wrote to his old friend Pedro Alonso, a trader, asking him to help Palma.⁹¹

⁸⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Koroni, 25th September 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 290-291.

⁸⁶ Letters of Álvaro de Grado to Juan Rena. Jerez de la Frontera, 6th and 7th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 11-2 and 3.

⁸⁷ Letter of Luis de Pizaño to Juan Rena. Koroni, 9th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 8-1.

⁸⁸ Taking these relationships into consideration, we can abandon the image of the military administration as the disconnected machinery presented in Thompson, "War and institutionalization," 17 and 31, and Id., "Administración y administradores," 107.

⁸⁹ Sometimes his son, Hernando de Palma, also took part in these labours. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, n° 4 and Caj. 88, n° 5-7.

⁹⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 44, n° 1, fols. 698, 717, 723, 729 and 739.

⁹¹ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro Alonso. Malaga, 2nd August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 44.

Pedro Alonso was a useful aid to Palma, as he provided access to accurate information on the local economy that the purveyor's agent needed in order to conduct the acquisition of resources.⁹² As we can see, Rena depended on his web of friends and associates to organise the navy supply.

The importance of the personal connections between the heads of the field administration appears more than obvious when analysing Rena's relationship with the navy's paymaster, Diego de Cazalla. Both had been part of the group of bureaucrats serving the crown under the command of the royal secretary Hernando de Zafra.⁹³ Later on, Rena and Cazalla concurrently served the royal treasurer Francisco de Vargas.⁹⁴ However, in contrast to Rena's itinerant career, Diego de Cazalla remained in Malaga, where he went on to work as purveyor and paymaster of the navy. There, he constructed his own personal network to carry out his administrative duties. When Rena returned to the Mediterranean scenario, Cazalla was already running a familial enterprise in which each member of his large family specialised in a specific task. His brother Sebastian was in charge of collecting the money from the monarchical administration. One of his servants or clients, Pedro de Baeza, was specialised in buying, collecting and transporting goods in the region around Malaga. In such tasks, Baeza enjoyed the help of other members of Cazalla's network situated in strategic positions, such as Cazalla's son-in-law, who was a notary in Antequera.⁹⁵ Finally, Pedro de Cazalla (Diego's brother) acted as the necessary link in the royal court, from his privileged position in the financial administration of the monarchy.⁹⁶

Undoubtedly, long-lasting relationships served to generate a productive cooperation between both bureaucrats. Thus, for instance, when Rena was appointed as

⁹² Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. Malaga, 2nd August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n^o 10, fols. 38-40.

⁹³ On Rena's formative period in "Zafra's school", see chapter 1. On Cazalla's previous connections with Zafra see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Hernando de Zafra: secretario de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2005), 120.

⁹⁴ It is worth noting that the Count of Tendilla considered Cazalla an agent of Vargas. Letter of the Count of Tendilla to Francisco de Vargas. Grenade, 5th December 1514. Cfr. *Escribir y gobernar: El último registro de correspondencia del Conde de Tendilla (1513-1515)*, ed. M. A. Moreno Trujillo, M. J. Osorio Pérez and J. M. de la Obra sierra (Granda: Universidad de Granada, 2007), 477-478.

⁹⁵ Paula Alfonso Santorio, "El pagador de armadas Diego de Cazalla, origen de un condado malagueño," in *Casas, familias y rentas. La nobleza del Reino de Granada entre los siglos XV y XVIII*, ed. J. P. Díaz López, F. Andújar Castillo and A. Galán Sánchez (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2010), 290-291.

⁹⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n^o 2, fols. 168-169. Alonso García, *El erario del reino*, 164, 165, 184 and 193.

purveyor of the navy in 1527, he did not hesitate to entrust his colleague with the commencement of the logistical tasks while he was still travelling from the court to the coast. Moreover, Rena also relied to a great extent on Cazalla's personal network to carry out his duties in Malaga.⁹⁷ Maybe this was an obvious transgression of the administrative rules, as it implied a dangerous accumulation of tasks on the shoulders of a single officer, but it allowed Rena and Cazalla to save time. Put simply, interpersonal connections allowed Rena and Cazalla to carry out their duties in a more efficient way.

The networks of the field administration worked thanks to the cohesion provided by these interpersonal connections and the trust existing among the men who composed these networks. This remains obvious from their correspondence; for instance, when Rena wrote to Alonso de Palma to communicate an additional commitment, he confessed: 'I was convinced of the need to go myself, in person, but after taking into account that you, Lord, will put in as much diligence and care as I could, I decided to request it to you'.⁹⁸ Shortly after, the purveyor again expressed how much he trusted his agent: 'Because with a person so trustworthy as you are, and who will know how to manage it, it is not necessary to limit you the price, nor to give you a narrow power of attorney for everything'.⁹⁹ The whole system worked thanks to the trust among its members. The secretary of the Council of War expressed his trust in Rena as a person able to manage and conduct the purveying of Malaga, something that the latter very much appreciated,¹⁰⁰ in the same way that his own agents appreciated Rena's trust in them.¹⁰¹ In fact, even the formal nomination of Rena as purveyor made an explicit reference to the necessity of appointing 'a person of great trustworthiness'.¹⁰²

Considering the importance of trust in the functioning of the military administration, it is necessary to try to provide some insights on the matter. As we have

⁹⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Diego de Cazalla. Medina del Campo, 30th November 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 56.

⁹⁸ 'He estado determinado de ir yo allá en persona y después, acordándome que vos, señor, pondréis en ello tanta diligencia y buen recaudo como yo podría poner he acordado de remitíroslo a vos'. Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. 27th July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 30.

⁹⁹ 'Porque para con una persona de tanta confianza como vos sois y que tan bien lo sabrá granjear y despachar no hay necesidad de limitaros el precio ni daros comisión que no sea muy ancha para todo'. Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. 2nd August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fols. 38-40.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibíd.* fols. 6-7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibíd.* fols. 6-7 and Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Malaga, 6th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 23-1.

¹⁰² AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 44, n° 1, fol. 3.

already seen in a previous chapter regarding the relationship between Rena and Zuazola, trust was established through an accumulative process. However, there were many other factors influencing the creation of trust. For instance, sharing certain codes from the mercantile culture was a crucial way to determine if an agent deserved to be trusted or not. Rena expressed this in one of his letters to Alonso de Palma, saying that it was not necessary to give him strict orders, ‘because by your way of writing I know that you are a man of business’.¹⁰³ The illusory sense that they all belonged to the same group was also crucial in establishing trust among its supposed members. The correspondence exchanged between Rena and his agents and colleagues is full of references to common friends and family members, like a certain Isabel Gutiérrez Cabeza de Vaca; a woman who, according to Rena, was a common mother to all of them.¹⁰⁴ Besides this fictive ties, it is important to note that frequently these actors could trust each other because they shared common familiars, associates, friends and interests. Thus, Diego de Cazalla and Hernando de Palma (Rena’s agent and former associate) belonged to the commercial network forged around some prominent local tax farmers.¹⁰⁵ All these shared codes and personal interconnections generated the trust needed to forge the “small world” of this military administration.

At this point, we can conclude that the military agenda of the Hispanic Monarchy did not to any great extent contribute to the creation and development of a modern administration. On the contrary, an analysis of the networks Rena utilised while he worked as purveyor general of the navy shows that the money used to fund war was

¹⁰³ ‘Porque por vuestro escribir conozco que sois hombre de negocios’. Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. Malaga, 2nd August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fols. 38-40. On the importance of these shared codes in the establishing of trust among merchants, see Luuc Kooijmans, “Risk and Reputation: On the Mentality of Merchants in the Early Modern Period,” in *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market*, ed. C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, (The Hague: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995), 25-34; S. Aslanian, “The Salt in a Merchant’s Letter: The Culture of Julfan Correspondence in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean,” *Journal of World History* 19, n° 2 (2008): 127-188; and Francesca Trivellato, “Merchant’s Letters across Geographical and Social Boundaries,” in *Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400-1700*, ed. F. Bethencourt and F. Egmond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80-103. An overview of merchants’ morality can be found in C. Denis-Delacour and B. Salvemini, “Introduction. Moralités marchandes du XVIIIe siècle,” *Rives méditerranéennes* 49 (2014): 5-15.

¹⁰⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Diego de Cazalla. Medina del Campo, 30th November 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 56. This woman also appeared frequently in Rena’s letters to Pedro de Baeza. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Baeza. 12th January 1528 and letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Malaga, 21st January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 56, 119-120 and Caj. 71, n° 23-3.

¹⁰⁵ M. T. López Beltrán, “Redes familiares y movilidad social en el negocio de la renta: el tándem Fernando de Córdoba-Rodrigo Álvarez de Madrid y los judeoconversos de Málaga,” *Revista del CEHGR* 24 (2012): 46.

circulated among the royal officer's network rather than through the official channels of the royal administration. Something similar happened in regard to the mobilisation of manpower, a task in which, again, personal connections among royal officers and captains played a key role. Moreover, interpersonal relationships were also at the core of the internal functioning of the field military administration. Thus, the mobilisation of resources for war by direct administration scarcely pushed towards a modernization of the state administration, since the funding and supply of the navy was carried out not by members of bureaucratic structures, but by personal networks growing in the shadow of the imperial administration.

Buying Collaborations. Rena's Supply Network at Work

Despite the important role that members of the field military administration played in the mobilisation of resources for war, we know very little about their activities and the ways in which they were able to supply the navies and armies of the empire.¹⁰⁶ This gap in our knowledge has been filled by an image of the Hispanic Monarchy's administration as a predatory machine. For instance, Jan Glete (a well-reputed expert on the matter) has asserted that the personnel of the Spanish military administration used to proceed by requisitioning the commodities needed to supply the army.¹⁰⁷ However, as we will see, Rena's procedure had nothing to do with such a discretionary use of political authority.

In order to show the extent to which the personnel of the military administration were unable to supply the navy by requisitions, we may focus on the acquisition and preparation of foodstuffs to supply the navy.¹⁰⁸ This task was especially difficult when it came to the most important commodity needed by the military administration: wheat.¹⁰⁹ Feeding armies was always a difficult task.¹¹⁰ However, the supply of the armies and

¹⁰⁶ Thompson, *War and Government*, 208-215.

¹⁰⁷ Glete, *War and the State*, 135.

¹⁰⁸ Further information on Malaga's supply network in José Miguel Escribano Páez, "When the City Supplied the Navy and the Men Supplied the City: The Proveeduría General de Armadas of Malaga and its Personnel (1500-1528)," in *L'approvisionnement des villes portuaires en Europe du XVIe siècle à nos jours*, ed. C. Le Mao and P. Meyzie (Paris: PUPS, 2015), 333-344.

¹⁰⁹ On the importance of this commodity for the supply and its political dimension, see the classic Steven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics, and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

¹¹⁰ Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "La ejecución del gasto militar y la gestión de los suministros. El abastecimiento de pan de munición en el ejército de Flandes durante la primera mitad del siglo XVII," in

navies during the Hispanic Monarchy's Mediterranean campaigns was much more complicated, as they were organised in a short space of time and in an adverse legal and political context. To fully illustrate the complexity of such logistical operations, it is useful to analyse in depth the acquisition of wheat in one of the localities where this product would have been acquired by the military administration: Antequera.

As a contemporary writer attested, Antequera was the breadbasket of Malaga and of the military administration located in the port of this city.¹¹¹ The agricultural richness of this locality, as well as its position near Malaga, meant that the military administration acquired cereal there frequently.¹¹² Almost 75% of the wheat acquired to prepare biscuit for the navy in 1526 came from this city.¹¹³ Unfortunately, as Rena would soon realise, that year the weather conditions were not the most conducive to guaranteeing the easy supply of wheat. After arriving to Antequera, both Diego de Cazalla and Juan Rena realised that the quantity of wheat available in the town was less than expected. Despite this, they proceeded to collect a great amount of wheat. As the purveyor was aware of the necessity of collecting the wheat without causing a scarcity in the locality, he underlined in his reports to the council of war that he was able to proceed without provoking any complaints. Nevertheless, the purveyor predicted that the lack of wheat and the discontent of some owners would most probably prevent the acquisition of all the cereal needed; and for that reason, he took the precaution of sending agents to other localities to seek it out.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, there was another problem: a "flour crisis". Low waters in the previous months had reduced the capacity of the mills to convert grain into useable foodstuffs. In one of his first reports, Rena recognised this problem: 'the lack of water for the mills is such in all this land that even the villages have had big problems in maintaining

Le forze del principe. Recursos, instrumentos y límites en la práctica del poder soberano en los territorios de la Monarquía Hispánica, ed. M. Rizzo, J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez and G. Sabatini (Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, 2003), T. I, 442-460, and A. José Rodríguez Hernández, "Asientos y asentistas militares en el siglo XVII: el ejemplo del pan y la pólvora," *Studia Historica, Historia Moderna* 35 (2013): 62-86.

¹¹¹ Pedro de Medina, *Libro de grandezas y cosas memorables de España* (Alcalá de Henares: Pedro de Robles y Juan de Villanueva, 1566), Chapter CXLI.

¹¹² "Libro y cuenta del gasto y recibo que es de Hernand Bezerra, contador del armada, ha hecho así en los bizcochos como en la harina [...] para el proveimiento de la armada" AGS, Guerra y Marina, Leg. 1314, n° 80, and Leg. 1315, n° 280.

¹¹³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38 n° 10, fols. 8-13.

¹¹⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Malaga, 21st July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 1.

themselves'.¹¹⁵ This was the difficult context in which Rena and his agent Pedro de Baeza had to carry out the collection of wheat.

As usual, the purveyor addressed the local authorities asking for their help; and, as usual, he obtained a positive response from Antequera's *corregidor*. In fact, as proof of his willingness, he made reference to his previous interventions in favour of Pedro de Baeza in some of his disputes with local inhabitants.¹¹⁶ Baeza had found in the *corregidor* a useful ally. From the very beginning, he commanded the locals to obey Baeza's orders; shortly after, Baeza attested to his helpfulness in this regard.¹¹⁷ As guardian of the crown's interests in the village, the *corregidor* was obliged to collaborate with the military administration.¹¹⁸ However, he was constrained by other tensions at play in the local political arena. This could be clearly seen with regard to the problems deriving from the task of producing flour from wheat. As we have already seen, the low waters of previous months had diminished the capacity of the mills to produce flour. Nevertheless, the members of the military administration paid no attention to the problems of the local inhabitants, and continued to oblige the millers to produce flour exclusively for the navy. The inhabitants of Antequera reacted, asking the local authorities to intervene to allow them to use the local mills as well, because they were 'starving'. The local authorities forwarded the petition to Baeza, who replied by postponing the local necessities in favour of the navy's needs, and reaffirmed his determination to forbid use of the mills for the production of local supply.¹¹⁹

As the institutional procedures of the local polity had failed, the inhabitants of Antequera reacted by making use of informal micro-politics within the local sphere. Thus, by taking advantage of their close relationships in the vicinity and friendships with local authorities and millers, they started to produce their own flour, causing a delay in the supply of flour for the navy. Pedro de Baeza was fully aware of this, but he admitted that

¹¹⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 8. On flour crisis see Kaplan, *Bread, Politics, and Political Economy*, Vol. 1, xvii.

¹¹⁶ Letter of the *Corregidor* of Antequera to Juan Rena. Antequera, 10th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 1-1.

¹¹⁷ Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Antequera, 27th July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-2.

¹¹⁸ The *corregidor* was the representative of the royal jurisdiction over a city and its territory. They were the highest authority in the administrative and jurisdictional spheres of Castilian cities. Benjamín González Alonso, *El corregidor castellano (1384-1808)* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1970). The English reader can consult Marvin Lunenfeld, *Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of Castile (1474-1504)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

¹¹⁹ Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Antequera, 27th July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-3.

he was powerless to avoid it, save for trying to convince the millers to increase their production in order to accelerate the pace of supply.¹²⁰ Juan Rena reacted by addressing some of the *alguaciles* (lower rank officers with police duties), blaming them for having allowed the peasants to produce their own flour. Antonio de la Cava, one of these *alguaciles*, replied to Rena, denying his accusations and maintaining that he was fully aware of his obligation to oversee the correct implementation of Rena's orders.¹²¹ Nevertheless, despite his complains, it was obvious that he had been compelled to protect the interests of the locals in the face of the rapacity of the military administration. Neither Rena nor his agent was able to do anything about it, and the practices in question continued.

The inhabitants of Antequera went a step further in their fight against the military administration. Taking advantage of the proximity of the imperial court, they sent a representative there to formally complain before the Royal Council about Rena's procedure. They alleged that the bad harvest and the rapacity of the military administration had left the peasants without any wheat to consume.¹²² In doing so, the peasants showed that they were fully aware of the tools available to them in their fight against the military administration. In fact, their strategy was so effective that shortly afterwards, the Royal Council sent a royal provision commanding Antequera's *corregidor* to stop the wheat collection and to return to the peasants all the wheat that had already been collected.¹²³ In the end, Baeza had to acquire wheat by negotiating (once again) with local brokers. Thus, two days after receiving the provision from the Royal Council, Baeza wrote to Rena to inform him that the local brokers were willing to sell him more wheat and flour.¹²⁴ The failure of the authoritarian procedures employed by Rena and his agent in Antequera allows us to refute Glete's vision of the military administration as merely a predatory machine because the local actors were able (and willing) to efficiently contest such procedures.

¹²⁰ Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Diego de Cazalla. S.f. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-8.

¹²¹ Letter of Antonio de la Cava to Juan Rena. Antequera, 27th July 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 18-1.

¹²² Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena Antequera, 2nd August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-6.

¹²³ Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Antequera, 5th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-12.

¹²⁴ Letter of Pedro de Baeza to Juan Rena. Antequera, 7th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 2-9.

The initial question of this section still remains unanswered. In a context like the one in which the humble peasants of Antequera were able to succeed in their challenges to the military administration, how then could the members of the military administration achieve their objectives? Obviously, requisitioning was not an option; and, considering the structural lack of money of the military administration, the royal officers were unable to pay for all the products and the collaboration that they needed. As we will see in what follows, Juan Rena secured the collaboration of different actors by mobilising all the resources (both material and immaterial) at his disposal. Analysing how he did so will allow us to better understand the economy of the military administration.

In 1530, a colleague of Rena's who used to work as purveyor for the navy, Juan López de Recalde, wrote a letter to one of the bureaucrats of the Council of War explaining his past adventures and misadventures in that office:

What the office [of purveyor] requires is to spend largely at the table with everyone who comes, especially with the people of the sea, as has always been the custom among those who have had similar charges, [...] because it is needed for the negotiation, and to encourage the people to do what is related to each one's charge.¹²⁵

Rena did not spend too much of his money on paying for meals; but, like Recalde, he was well aware of the necessity of winning the willingness of the different actors with whom he had to interact while acting as purveyor general. The exchange of mercies, favours and services played a key role in the functioning of the network that he constructed to mobilise resources for war. This was obvious, in the first instance, in the case of the relationships between Rena and his agents. Rena's agents received a salary for their work, but frequently they were rewarded in other ways. For example, Juan Rena offered Alonso de Palma the chance to participate in the business of military logistics.¹²⁶ Thanks to his service relationship with the purveyor, Alonso de Palma was able not only to access the business of military supply in an advantageous way, but also to grant this

¹²⁵ 'Lo que requiere el oficio [de proveedor] es gastar el hombre largamente en su mesa con cuantos a ella quisieren venir, especialmente con la gente de mar, como siempre se ha acosumbrado hacer por los proveedores que han tenido semejanate cargo [...] porque así conviene a la negociación para animar a las gentes para que con más voluntad y presteza hagan cada uno lo que a su cargo es de hacer.' Letter of Juan López de Recalde to Andrés Martínez de Ondarza. Seville, 23rd January 1530. AGS, Estado, Leg. 461, n° 47-50. On this personage see J. Garmendia Arruebarrena, "El azcoitiano Juan López de Recalde," *Boletín de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País* 36, n° 1-4 (1980): 402-405.

¹²⁶ Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. 5th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 46.

access to his own friends and associates.¹²⁷ That Rena would reward Alonso in an indirect manner was also evident when the purveyor manoeuvred to protect the business of Hernando de Palma (Alonso's brother) in Oran.¹²⁸ Palma's case demonstrates the extent to which the local merchants profited from their collaborations with the members of the field military administration.

The importance of the many favours that Juan Rena was able to grant to the local merchants working as his agents was even clearer in the case of Francisco de Sbote. This Italian merchant worked for Rena in Cadiz, where he employed his knowledge of the local market to negotiate with other merchants on the acquisition of strategic products such as gunpowder.¹²⁹ Francisco de Sbote only collaborated with Rena sporadically, and he did not receive a salary from the purveyor. Instead, he capitalised on his services to Rena to ask him for some favours in return. Some of these were quite simple, such as when Sbote offered Rena some wine for the soldiers which he had not been able to sell due to its bad quality.¹³⁰ However, other cases were much more noteworthy, such as when Sbote asked Rena for a special favour:

As Your Mercy knows, every foreigner needs the support of the justice in this land, and especially in these times. And because here we expect a forced loan to the emperor very soon, I ask you as a favour in writing to the *corregidor* to say a couple of words in my favour [...].¹³¹

Rena wrote to the *corregidor* shortly afterwards, and it seems that his 'couple of words' had an immediate effect. The very same day, Francisco de Sbote wrote to Rena: 'I kiss your hands for what Your Lordship has written to the *corregidor*. He largely offered me his favour [...] I remain to serve you in anything that you can command

¹²⁷ 'Y esto ha de ser a vuestra complacencia'. Letter of Juan Rena to Alonso de Palma. 5th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 46. These alternative payments were frequent in the activity of early modern agents. Marika Keblusek, "Profiling the Early Modern Agent," in *Your Humble Servant. Agents in Early Modern Europe*, ed. H. Cools, M. Keblusek and B. Noldus (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2006), 12.

¹²⁸ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Baeza. 12th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 119-120.

¹²⁹ Letter of Francisco de Sbote to Juan Rena. Cadis, 16th January 1528 and Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Sbote. Malaga, 29th March 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, 71, n° 7-1 and Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 174.

¹³⁰ Letter of Francisco de Sbote to Juan Rena. Cadis, 16th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 7-1.

¹³¹ 'Como Vuestra Señoría sabe en esta tierra y más en estos tiempos cada uno extranjero ha de menester de la favor de la justicia y porque aquí en esta tierra se espera muy pronto uno empréstamo de lo emperador, por tanto le pido por merced escribiendo al *corregidor* le diga dos palabras en mi favor [...]'. Letter of Francisco de Sbote to Juan Rena. Cadis, 9th February 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n° 7-4.

me'.¹³² As we can see, Rena ensured the collaboration of local merchants by offering them crucial favours like intercessions in front of the local authorities.

Rena had to negotiate with other actors who owned strategic resources such as ships. Privately owned vessels played a major part in Charles V's naval campaigns, and it is difficult to overestimate the importance of these private resources in the organisation of the Mediterranean navies.¹³³ Agents of the crown would seize merchant vessels to make up the imperial navies, but the crown was obliged to pay the owners for this facility. Needless to say, the ship-owners faced several difficulties in being paid.¹³⁴ Aware as they were of the negative effects of these embargoes, the members of the military administration would employ various ancillary payments to compensate the ship-owners. For instance, in 1528, Rena and Monsieur de Beurre granted licences to export wheat to those Basque patrons who had been involved in composing the navy of Flanders.¹³⁵ These side payments were especially advantageous when the owners of the merchant vessels enjoyed the support of important actors. In 1526, Juan Rena signed an agreement with Martín Centurione, the Genoese ambassador, and the Genoese patrons of seized ships, allowing them to export salt to Italy on their journey transporting Lannoy's army.¹³⁶ Aside from just the protection of the ambassador, the Genoese patrons could profit from their connections with the royal officers. When the authorities of Cartagena seized the carrack of Juan Francesco Marengo, Tomás de Fornari, an important Genoese financier, wrote to Rena 'trusting in their old friendship'. In his letter, Tomás de Fornari admitted to being

¹³² 'En cuanto a lo que Vuestra Señoría le ha escrito al corregidor en mi favor, el se me ha ofrecido largamente y a Vuestra Señoría beso las manos, y habiéndole Vuestra Señoría de escribir le dará las gracias, y yo quedo para servir las en todo lo que me mandare y plega a nuestro Señor lo lleve a donde fuere a buen salvamento, y yo siempre que sabré de Vuestra Señoría le daré aviso porque ofreciéndose de mí se sirva [...]'. Letter of Francisco de Sbote to Juan Rena. Cadix, 9th February 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n^o 7-5.

¹³³ Louis Sicking, "Charles V: "Master of the Sea?," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez Montes (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. II, 553-572, and Id., *Neptune and the Netherlands. State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 32-44.

¹³⁴ For instance, Antón de Coscojales, the owner of the ship employed by Lannoy in his journey to Italy in 1526, was still waiting to be paid years later. BRAH, SyC, A-9, fol. 31.

¹³⁵ Letter of Monsieur de Beurre to Juan Rena. Malaga, 2nd March 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 71, n^o 4-1.

¹³⁶ AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Suelo, 1^a S. Leg. 104, s.f.

the real owner of the ship, and asked Rena for his protection and favours.¹³⁷ It goes without saying that Marengo obtained an export licence shortly afterwards.¹³⁸

With the passing of time, Rena grew in importance as an expert in the art of dealing with merchants and fitting their interests with the military necessities of the empire. As a matter of fact, at the end of his career, his manoeuvres in this field were far from marginal or inconsequential, and in fact were officially recognised. That happened, for instance, in the spring of 1537, when he was in charge of organising the transportation of soldiers from Castile to Flanders. Instead of proceeding to seize ships in the Basque ports, Rena negotiated an agreement with the famous *Consulado de Burgos* (the powerful guild controlling the exportation of Castilian wool to northern Europe) to transport the troops in the same ships in which the Castilian merchants were sending their cargoes of wool.¹³⁹ The agreement formulated by Rena may seem a strange case of collaboration between a mercantile institution like the *Consulado* and the military administration, but it was simply a clear demonstration of Rena's conviction regarding the possibility of merchants and military-men work together for their mutual benefit in following the imperial agenda.

Rena also required the cooperation of local authorities, as they were frequently the only ones able to implement the measures needed to ensure the navy's supply. For instance, only local authorities were able to oblige the local craftsmen to work for the military administration. This happened, for example, in August 1526, when Rena's agent in Seville requested the local authorities to send biscuit-makers and coopers to Malaga.¹⁴⁰ The necessity of working together with the local authorities in these tasks was such that, when Rena got notice that the *asistente de Sevilla* (a high ranking local authority similar to the *corregidor*) was lazy and prone to delegating such matters to his lieutenant, he

¹³⁷ 'Con confianza de la antigua amistad y servitud'. Letter of Tomás de Fornari to Juan Rena. Grenade, 17th September 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 101, n° 6. On this Genoese family see David Alonso García, "Between Three Continents: The Fornari Networks and their Businesses at the Beginning of the First Global Age," in *Networks in the First Global Age, 1400-1800*, ed. R. Mukherjee (New Delhi: Primus Books, 2011), 183-204.

¹³⁸ AGS, Contaduría Mayor del Suelo, 1^a S. Leg. 104, s.f.

¹³⁹ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Los Cobos. Burgos, 18th May 1537. AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s. f. On this powerful institution see Manuel Basas Fernández, *El Consulado de Burgos en el siglo XVI*, (Burgos: Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1994).

¹⁴⁰ Letter of Juan Rena to Rodrigo de Gibraleón. 15th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fol. 70

wrote to him to ask him to personally carry out these tasks.¹⁴¹ Rena also needed the local authorities' support to carry out tasks such as the seizure of ships needed for the navy in the ports,¹⁴² the seizure of animals and carriages for inland transport,¹⁴³ and the arranging of the soldiers' lodgings.¹⁴⁴ In short, the members of the military administration depended on the collaboration of the local authorities.

Dealing with members of the military administration was frequently a tough issue for the local authorities, and as a consequence, Rena would encounter problems in obtaining their collaboration. This was the case, for instance, with the *corregidor* of Jerez de la Frontera, who was obliged to facilitate the lodging of troops on their way to Cadiz during the winter of 1528. The *corregidor* claimed the ancient privileges of the city in order to avoid the troops' lodgement, and tried to buy time by arguing that he needed to discuss the lodgement with the rest of the local government. The *corregidor's* attitude provoked Rena's anger, because it had led to a delay in the troops' embarkation.¹⁴⁵ When the *corregidor* stuck to his position, Rena coerced him. As general purveyor, Rena was in charge of the troops' transport and, moreover, was an expert in dealing with this kind of issue, having participated in the negotiation of Pamplona's privilege in this regard.¹⁴⁶ According to Rena, Jerez had recently lodged soldiers, something that constituted a clear precedent. Furthermore, he averred that 'no privilege, no matter how complete it might be, is respected in times of war to avoid the troops' lodgement'.¹⁴⁷ In this way, Rena was taking part in the definition of the juridical reality of the area in regard to the troops' lodgement. Rena did not hesitate to threaten the *corregidor* in order to achieve his objective. He wrote to him informing him that he was sending a messenger to the imperial court to report his misconduct. Rena's forceful missive ended with a meaningful sentence:

¹⁴¹ Letter of Juan Rena to the Assistant of Seville. 15th August 1526. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 38, n° 10, fols. 71-72.

¹⁴² Letter of Charles V to Diego de Cazalla. Burgos, 12th November 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 72, n° 2-1, fol. 3.

¹⁴³ Letter of Juan Rena to Hernán Pérez de Luxán. Puerto de Santa María, 2nd January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 113.

¹⁴⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to the Corregidor of Jerez. 5th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 126.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibíd.*

¹⁴⁶ As Davide Maffi asserts, dealing with the privileges of the cities on the matter of lodging troops was one of the main challenges for early modern states. Davide Maffi, *Il balluardo della corona. Guerra, esercito, finanze e società nella Lombardia seicentesca (1630-1660)* (Florence, Le Monnier, 2007), 280.

¹⁴⁷ 'Ningún privilegio por bastante que sea se guarda que de pasada en tales jornadas de guerra no se aposente la gente'. Letter of Juan Rena to the Corregidor of Jerez. 6th January 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 128.

‘with His Majesty, there is no need of further testimonies other than what I write’.¹⁴⁸ With these strong words, the purveyor was not just trying to threaten the *Corregidor*; he was also highlighting his strategic position between the royal court and the local arena.

It was precisely this privileged position bridging both political arenas that allowed Rena to offer important favours to local authorities. In 1528, Rena sent Pedro de Baeza to Malaga to oversee the organisation of the navy. Rena wrote to Hernán Pérez de Luxán, Malaga’s *corregidor*, Hernán Pérez de Luxán, asking him to help Baeza in his tasks.¹⁴⁹ This help would be, according to Rena’s own words, not only a service to the crown, but also a personal favour to him.¹⁵⁰ Luxán profited the opportunity and replied to Rena, asking for his support in lobbying at the imperial court against one of the main problems in Malaga: wheat exportation. The crown used to grant export licences from this port. This had always been problematic, but it became even more troublesome during the second half of the decade of the 1520s, when the crown had granted an increasing number of licences.¹⁵¹ According to Hernán Pérez, the quantity of wheat to be exported under these licences amounted to nearly 8,000,000 litres, and resulted in ‘great damage to this city and its land’, because the wheat exports caused a rise in its price in Malaga.¹⁵² When Hernán Pérez addressed Rena asking for his help, he showed that one of the main assets in Rena’s hands was his capacity to offer favours before the central authorities. Furthermore, he demonstrated that local authorities were willing to collaborate with Rena in exchange for his help in reinforcing their influence in the local arena by tackling problems such as the wheat exports.

¹⁴⁸ ‘Y no quisiere escribir a Su Majestad cosa de que V M ni a esa ciudad redundara enojo, despacho este correo a Su Majestad no ha otra cosa y va con una carta mía y el traslado de esta que si Vuestra Merced lo hubiera remediado o lo remediare luego que el correo que se vuelva y si no que pase a la corte como dicho tengo, que para esto con Su Majestad no hay necesidad de más testimonio de lo que yo le escribo’. *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ On Malaga’s *corregidores* during the reign of Charles I, see Pilar Ybáñez Worboys: “Los Corregidores malagueños (1517-1556)” in *La Administración Municipal en la Edad Moderna. Actas de la V reunión científica de la asociación española de Historia Moderna*, ed. J. M. de Bernardo Ares and J. M. González Beltrán (Cádiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz, 1999), Vol. II, 179-185.

¹⁵⁰ Letter of Juan Rena to Hernán Pérez de Luxán. Puerto de Santa María, 2nd January 1528. AGN, AP_Rena, Caj. 13, n° 2, fol. 113.

¹⁵¹ A survey of the books of the Cámara de Castilla, the institution in charge of administrating these issues, shows more than 30 licences to export wheat from Malaga’s port. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Lib. 73, fols. 235-6; Lib. 74, fols. 198-199, 201-203, 445-446; Lib. 75, fols. 98-99; Lib. 76, fols. 89-90, 123-125, 163-165, 178-179, 182-183, 186-187, 188-189, 200, 201-202, 249-251, 259-260, 267-269, 272-274, 286-287, 294, 295; Lib. 77, fols. 26, 39; Lib. 78, fols. 215-217, 228-229, 243-244, 257, 311-312, 316-317 and 333-334.

¹⁵² Letter of Hernán Pérez de Luxán to Juan Rena. Malaga, 2nd January 1527. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 100, n° 25-1.

Rena had a further card he could play in the day-to-day negotiations with local authorities: the weight of his influence in reporting their services to the crown. Rena tried to make evident his influence in this sense in front of the local authorities. For instance, in the spring of 1528 he made use of his close connection with Pedro de Zuazola to ask for a royal letter to be sent to Malaga's *corregidor* appreciating his services and, more importantly, underlining that it was Rena who had made the report to the crown.¹⁵³ The secretary of the Council of War granted Rena's petition, and the emperor wrote to Luxán shortly after, following Rena's suggestions.¹⁵⁴ The positive response to Rena's demands shows that he was not the only one who was aware of the importance of these practices to ensure the collaboration of local authorities.

Taking into account Rena's strategic position between the local arena and the inner circle of the imperial administration, it is no surprise that the members of the local oligarchies considered him to be a powerful ally in their own strategies to maintain their positions of power. As previously mentioned, during the summer of 1537, Rena organised a navy to transport troops to Flanders from the port of Laredo (northern Castile).¹⁵⁵ As usual, Rena required the collaboration of the local authorities in this port city. The support of the local government was even more necessary here because, as Rena asserted, Laredo was situated in a poor region, 'and everything that is done and that must be done, has to be done by force'.¹⁵⁶ What makes the case of Laredo interesting to us is the response of the local oligarchy in the face of Rena's needs. Not only did they decide to help. They also took advantage of the opportunity of having one of the king's men at their disposal by utilising him in their struggle to maintain their preeminent position in the urban network on the northern coast of Castile. When Rena arrived to Laredo, its ruling elite were facing a serious challenge from the inhabitants of Ampuero, a little village under Laredo's jurisdiction (see image 9). Motivated by his financial needs, Emperor Charles

¹⁵³ Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Malaga, 6th March 1528. AGN, AP_Rena, Caj. 13, n° 2, fols. 46-47.

¹⁵⁴ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Madrid, 13th March 1528. AGN, AP_Rena, Caj. 71, n° 2-16.

¹⁵⁵ On this port town see David Gabiola Carreira, "Le fonctionnement politique, social et économique de Laredo au XVI^e siècle," in *Les ports du golfe de Gascogne. De Concarneau à La Corogne (XV^e-XXI^e siècles)*, ed. A. Fernandez and B. Marnot (Paris: PUPS, 2013), 149-160.

¹⁵⁶ 'Y todo lo que se hace y ha de hacerse ha de ser a fuerza de brazos'. Letter of Juan Rena to Juan Vázquez de Molina. Laredo, 29th June 1537. AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s.f. Rena was complaining about the difficulties of supplying Laredo, a structural problem in this region. David Gabiola Carreira, "Le problème de l'approvisionnement en blé des ports cantabriques au XVI^e siècle: le cas de Santander et Laredo," in *L'approvisionnement des villes portuaires en Europe du XVI^e siècle à nos jours*, ed. C. Le Mao and P. Meyzie (Paris: PUPS, 2015), 287-299.

V made an offer to the Castilian villages that they could pay for their jurisdictional independence. The inhabitants of Ampuero took advantage of this opportunity and agreed to buy their jurisdiction, thereby escaping from Laredo's dominium. More than being just a simple jurisdictional conflict, what was at the stake here was the distribution of power among the different localities, as cities like Laredo were known to assert their prominent positions by exploiting the villages within their jurisdictions.¹⁵⁷




Image 9. Map of Laredo's jurisdiction (1611).¹⁵⁸

Facing the serious threat of losing their political dominance over the villages under their jurisdiction, Laredo's local elite reacted by using every single measure at their disposal, and Rena became a crucial ally in their struggle to defend their privileged position. They asked Rena to transmit an offer on their behalf to pay the same amount of money offered by Ampuero in return for keeping the village under their jurisdiction. Using his contacts in the imperial administration, Rena asked the secretary Vázquez de Molina to obtain a positive response from the emperor to their petition.¹⁵⁹ The letter that

¹⁵⁷ The Castilian cities reacted to this innovation by complaining against the measure in the Castilian states, and shortly after, they obtained a promise from the emperor to not sell jurisdictional independence to villages. Juan Eloy Gelabert González: "Ciudades, villas y aldeas (1538-1602)," in *Ciudades en conflicto (siglos XVI-XVIII)*, ed. J. I. Fortean and J. E. Gelabert (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2008), 86-91.

¹⁵⁸ ARChV, Planos y Dibujos, Desglosados, 266.

¹⁵⁹ Letter of Juan Rena to Juan Vázquez de Molina. Laredo, 13th August 1537. AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s.f.

Rena sent to Empress Isabel was even more meaningful. In it, he explained that allowing Ampuero to buy its liberty would mean leaving Laredo ‘alone and disavowed’. Rena also reminded the empress of services to the crown that the city had performed in the past, such as during the *comunero* revolt when they had recruited and paid 250 men to fight the rebels.¹⁶⁰ Rena’s manoeuvres seem to have been effective, as Ampuero remained under Laredo’s jurisdiction.¹⁶¹ By backing Laredo’s position, Rena was taking part in a political negotiation with long-lasting effects in the hierarchies of the region’s urban network.¹⁶² Laredo’s authorities were able to maintain their dominium over Ampuero, and in fact, they continued to profit from their position of power over this village, putting it under increased tax pressure.¹⁶³ What I aim to show with this episode is that the local authorities were able to use the military urgencies of the imperial administration to attend to their own political agendas.¹⁶⁴ In this regard, members of the military administration like Rena played a key role because, as we have seen, they were the ones in charge of securing the collaboration of the local elites, and because they were placed in a strategic position between the imperial administration and the local authorities. Laredo’s case also shows us that, not only indirect administration of war had a long impact in the political equilibrium.

As we have already seen, the members of the field military administration used to carry out the mobilisation of resources for war by paying for it rather than by mere coercion. We get a better sense of Rena’s procedure if we use it as a good example for understanding the logics behind the interactions between these monarchical agents and

¹⁶⁰ ‘Sola y desautorizada’. Letter of Juan Rena to the Empress Elisabeth. Laredo, 13th August 1537. AGS, Estado, Leg. 441, s.f.

¹⁶¹ Laredo obtained the confirmation of its fuero and its dominium over Ampuero and other villages just three months later. Agustín Rodríguez Fernández, “El fuero de Laredo y los conflictos jurisdiccionales de la villa (siglos XIII-XVII),” in *El fuero de Laredo en el octavo centenario de su concesión*, eds. M. Serna Vallejo and J. Baro Pazos (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2001), 279.

¹⁶² It is worth noting that in those years the whole fiscal structure of the region was being defined in the framework of the deep configuration of the Castilian tax system. Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora, *La averiguación de la Corona de Castilla, 1525-1540. Los pecheros y el dinero del reino en la época de Carlos V* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2008), T. 1, 121-125.

¹⁶³ At the end of the sixteenth century, when a new tax distribution took place in Castile, the notables of Laredo included Ampuero in their own share to pay, something that provoked the bitter complaints of its inhabitants. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 83, n° 106 and 178. The inhabitants of Ampuero were actually exempted from paying taxes together with Laredo. Carretero Zamora, *La averiguación*, T. II, 545 and T. III, 1008.

¹⁶⁴ It seems that Laredo’s notables learned to sell their collaboration in exchange for political concessions. As an example, in 1543, when they were asked to take part in the defence of the coast, they requested a royal licence in exchange, allowing the local merchants to keep trading with French territories during the periods of war. AGS, Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda, Leg. 16, n° 59-1.

the many actors involved in the mobilisation of resources for war. Some of the payments that Rena employed were financial, but they could also take the form of political favours, both for individuals and for collective actors. By acting in this way, Rena was helping to establish the rules of the economy governing the favour exchanges between political actors like Rena and these local authorities, a crucial aspect to fully understand the mobilisation of resources for war and its deep impact on the shaping of the imperial system.

Conclusions

As we have seen, we can test some common assumptions about the effects of the mobilisation of resources for war on the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy by focusing on the agents acting on the ground. An in-depth analysis of Rena's activities shaping the networks of the military administration allows us to draw some interesting conclusions regarding the effects that the mobilisation of resources for war had on the construction of the early modern Hispanic Monarchy. The big picture emerging from this analysis of Rena's activities is a complex web made up of members of the high administration, financiers, military officers, merchants, local authorities, etc. Interestingly, these networks shared notable similarities with those employed by the private war entrepreneurs who dominated the business of war, as David Parrott has shown in his recent study.¹⁶⁵

This parallelism allows us to question the dichotomy between direct and indirect administration established by I.A.A. Thompson in his classic work on the effects of the demands of war on the state development process.¹⁶⁶ Firstly because, as we have seen, the structures employed to carry out this mobilisation of resources were very similar in the case of campaigns conducted by private entrepreneurs and campaigns in which the war was directly administrated by state actors. Secondly, because an in-depth analysis of the activity within the networks employed by Rena as purveyor reveals the extent to which this mobilisation of resources for war was negotiated at different scales and in different layers. Rena's success as purveyor general was very closely related to his ability

¹⁶⁵ Parrott, *The Business of war*, 196-259.

¹⁶⁶ Thompson, *War and Government*.

to manage multiple negotiations with the actors who made up the supply networks. Hence, regarding the classical opposition between indirect and direct administration established by Thompson, we can conclude that the latter did not imply a reinforcement of state structures. In fact, this way of conducting war contributed to the construction and reinforcement of personal structures such as the networks described here, and not a “modern” state administration.

In a context in which the crown was not strong enough to impose its will on the multiple actors involved in the mobilisation of resources for war, it was crucial to rely on characters like Rena. As we have seen, these agents compensated for this incapability through their ability to construct and mobilise personal networks to supply the military machinery. Through his activities as purveyor general, Juan Rena helped to create an administration in which the personal networks of the king’s men, and their capacity to persuade or buy the collaboration of other actors, were crucial. In so doing he was also helping to shape the logics governing the mobilisation of resources for war. This mobilisation functioned by achieving collaborations, and characters like Rena would always adopt a protagonist role in paying for them.

Chapter 6

Forging Alliances in Mediterranean Imperial Warfare. Juan Rena between Charles V and Andrea Doria

Introduction

On 8th August 1528, Juan Rena wrote a letter to his friend, the Genoese banker Nicolao Cattaneo, sharing with the financier a vague rumour that had reached Pamplona that same day:

I know of no news to write to Your Mercies other than some news that arrived today via Zaragoza, saying that Andrea Doria has come with six galleys to Barcelona, and he says that he has come to serve His Majesty. I cannot confirm this to Your Mercies because, as I said, it is a piece of news that arrived today.¹

Rena's suspicions about the veracity of this news were more than justified, and should be understood as just another expression of the generalised surprise that Doria's switch of allegiances provoked.² Of course, at that moment it was too early to know that

¹ 'Otras nuevas no se escribir a Vuestras Mercedes salvo que hoy vinieron nuevas por vía de Zaragoza que Andrea Doria es venido con seis galeras a Barcelona e diz que viene a Su Majestad para servirle. No lo confirmo a Vuestras Mercedes porque como tengo dicho es nueva que hoy ha venido.' Letter of Juan Rena to Nicola Cattaneo and Company. Pamplona, 8th August 1528. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 72, n° 1-11, fol. 8.

² Francisco López de Gómara, *Guerras de Mar del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. M. A. de Bunes (Madrid: SECC, 2000), 112-113 and 118.

the new alliance between Andrea Doria and Charles V would change the equilibrium of powers in the Mediterranean for the following centuries. Moreover, and of more interest for us here, Rena was in no way able to know that he would be called upon to play a key role in the shaping of this alliance. In the previous chapter we saw how Rena gave form to the military administration, constructing and mobilising his personal networks. Now I will focus on Rena's role in fitting together two different networks: the imperial administration and the war machinery commanded by the most famous military entrepreneur of the sixteenth century: Andrea Doria. In doing this I aim to illustrate the role that he played in the forging and shaping of one of the key alliances that made Charles V's empire possible.

One of the most important features explaining the rise and success of the Hispanic Monarchy was the capacity of its rulers to attract and maintain key allies from outside its frontiers. This ability was especially evident during the last phase of the Italian wars.³ Maybe the most significant case in this respect was the allegiance between Charles V and the Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria. The agreement signed between the two allowed Charles V to repel the French military threat over his Italian domains, as well as to implement an effective and long-lasting dominion over the Italian Peninsula. On the other side, by backing Charles V in his struggle against Francis I for European hegemony, Andrea Doria achieved a prominent role for Genoa in the European political scene, and a privileged position for himself as head of the new Genoese republic.

It goes without saying that this was a major event in European politics. Historians dealing with this allegiance have pointed to the importance of the personal service relationship established between Charles V and Andrea Doria as being at the core of the political alliance between the Republic of Genoa and the Hispanic Monarchy. Furthermore, they all agree in underlining that at the base of this allegiance was the emperor's need to acquire an efficient military machinery to protect and control his dominions spread around the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, the studies dealing with the military services of this war entrepreneur to the emperor have traditionally focused on the *asiento* signed by Doria and Charles V as being the foundational text of this important

³ Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1494-1660* (London: Routledge, 2002), 73. Henry Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763* (London: Penguin, 2002).

allegiance.⁴ Of course, this text is of paramount importance; nevertheless, it did not fully stipulate the conditions of Doria's military services.⁵ On the contrary, most of the conditions of this strategic cooperation between Doria and the emperor were defined according to the problems that emerged when the alliance was put into practice; and, in this definition, different actors were involved: one of whom was Juan Rena.

As we will see in what follows, Rena worked hand in hand with Doria, but also operated with the key men of the imperial administration; and from this privileged position he played a major role in shaping the relationship between the emperor and the war entrepreneur. Thus, by focusing on his activity as commissary of the navy, I will address the question of the agency of the king's men in the configuration of the service relationships between the emperor and the strategic allies in the construction of his empire. In so doing, I aim to shed some light on the important role that lower rank actors like Rena played in the shaping of the external allegiances, which were those that allowed Charles V to exercise his imperial authority. In order to do this, I first analyse the context in which Rena carried out his duty as commissary of the navy, that is, during the naval campaign of 1532, a key episode in the formulation of the Mediterranean military strategy of the Hispanic Monarchy. Then I focus on his activity in the framework of the shaping of the new war machine created by the combination of Doria's galleys and the imperial military administration. Finally, I identify Rena's influence on the empire's naval policy in the Mediterranean after the campaign.

⁴ G. Oreste, "Genova e Andrea Doria nella fase critica del conflitto franco-asburgico," *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 72, n° 3 (1950): 62-63; Vicente de Cadenas y Vicent, *El protectorado de Carlos V en Génova. La "Condotta" de Andrea Doria* (Madrid: Instituto Salazar y Castro, 1977), 77-91; Arturo Pacini, *La Genova di Andrea Doria nell' Impero di Carlo V* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1999), 40, 49-50, 55-57 and 63; Maria Sirago, "I Doria, signori del mare, ed il sistema dell'asiento" nella costituzione della flotta napoletana all'epoca di Carlo V," in *Carlo V, Napoli e il Mediterraneo*, ed. G. Galasso and A. Mussi (Naples: Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, 2001), 665-704; Thomas Allison Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005) 20-22. The only exception is the recent work of Céline Dauverd, who addresses the relationship between the Genoese and the Hispanic Monarchy from the perspective of their common interests in Naples. Céline Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁵ The text was quite vague on this matter and only regulated some practical aspects such as the payment of the galley and the supply of wheat. A copy of the text belonging to the imperial administration is kept in AGS, Estado, Leg. 1362, n° 4.

A Common Enterprise. The Naval Campaign of 1532 and the Shaping of Imperial Warfare in the Mediterranean

In order to fully understand the significance of the campaign, it is necessary to place it in the framework of the naval struggle between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, as this campaign was an opening episode in the conflict between Charles V and Süleyman the Magnificent.⁶ While this episode earned only a passing mention in Glete's study on the effects of maritime warfare on the development of the European states, it constitutes a representative example of early modern Mediterranean warfare.⁷ Furthermore, this expedition played a major role in shaping the Hispanic Monarchy's strategy in this sphere.⁸ In fact, this campaign was the first attempt by the monarchy to confront the Ottoman sea power by making use of the naval forces of the most important *asentista* in its service: Andrea Doria. It is worth noting that the organisation of the navy of 1532 coincided with one of the initial debates on the status of the Genoese as subjects of Charles V.⁹ Taking all this into consideration, it is easy to realise the extent to which this campaign was important, not only in the forging of the alliance between Doria and Emperor Charles V, or in the shaping of tactical plans, but also in the configuration of the Mediterranean policy of the Hispanic Monarchy.

The campaign has been frequently understood as a simple manoeuvre to open a new front in the Ionian Sea in order to oblige the sultan to divert forces from his offensive in Central Europe, where the armies of both emperors, Süleyman I and Charles V, were called upon to battle for Vienna. Nevertheless, from reading Doria's reports, it is obvious that this objective was only one of the motivations.¹⁰ The organisation of the navy mainly

⁶ On the Ottoman navy, see A. C. Hess, "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525," *The American Historical Review* 75, n° 7 (1970), 1892-1919 and C. H. Imber, "The navy of Süleyman the magnificent," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6, (1980), 211-282. On this specific campaign, see Francisco de Laiglesia, *Un establecimiento español en Morea en 1532* (Madrid: Imprenta del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1905). Further information in José María del Moral, *El virrey don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco* (Madrid: CSIC, 1966), 99-108. A recent reconstruction of the campaign in G. Varriale "Nápoles y el azar de Corón (1532-1534)," *Tiempos modernos* 22 (2011) 1-30.

⁷ Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650. Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe* (London, Routledge, 2000), 100.

⁸ The importance of this campaign has been pointed out in Arturo Pacini, *Desde Rosas a Gaeta. La costruzione della rotta spagnola nel Mediterraneo occidentale nel secolo XVI* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2013), 178-195; and Gennaro Varriale, *Arrivano li turchi. Guerra navale e spionaggio nel Mediterraneo (1532-1582)* (Genoa: Città del Silenzio, 2014), 36.

⁹ Matthias Schnettger, *Principe Sovrano oder Civitas Imperialis? Die Republik Genua und das Alte Reich in der Frühen Neuzeit (1566-1797)* (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2006), 67.

¹⁰ AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 120.

fulfilled the necessity to prevent an attack by the Ottoman fleet against the coasts of southern Italy, as some *avici* (news, rumours) coming from Venice suggested.¹¹ The main goal of the navy was to look for the enemy's navy and try to destroy it in order to erase this threat. Nevertheless, its quick retreat made this impossible, obliging Doria to look for another target. The impossibility of accomplishing the expected objectives was a normal part of maritime warfare, as Doria recognised, and for that reason 'it is necessary, most of the time, to make what the opportunity allows, and not the will'.¹² Fortunately, the Genoese admiral had other goals in mind in order to ensure that the enormous investment of resources expended on the navy provided the expected results. As his friend and associate Adam Centurione explained to Francisco de los Cobos, one of Doria's purposes was to destroy the defences of the Gulf of Lepanto, one of the best safeguards for the Ottoman navy on its route to Italy (see image 10).¹³ In fact, when the admiral got notice of the enemy's retreat, he decided to take the opportunity to conquer some coastal cities in southern Greece such as Koroni, and to destroy Lepanto's fortifications.¹⁴ Juan Rena was quite optimistic regarding the possibility of establishing a naval base facing the enemy's land.¹⁵ Hence, despite the impossibility of destroying the enemy's fleet, the

¹¹ On the Ottoman menace over the southern domains of Charles V, see Jean Aubin, "Une frontière face au péril ottoman: la Terre d'Otrante (1529-1532)," in *Soliman le magnifique et son temps*, ed. G. Veinstein (Paris: EHESS-École du Louvre, 1992), 465-484. The image of the Ottoman as the enemy *par excellence* in early modern Italy has been analysed in Giovanni Ricci: "Il nemici ufficiale. Discorsi di crociata nell'Italia moderna," in *L'immagine del nemico. Storia, ideologia e rappresentazione tra età moderna e contemporanea*, ed. F. Cantù, G. di Febo and R. Moro (Rome: Viella, 2009) 41-55. It is interesting to note that these alarming news were reported to the emperor by Doria, who obtained them from one of his spies in Venice. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 214 and 248. On the importance of Venice as a source of information on the Ottoman menace for the authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy, see Giovanni K. Hassiotis, "Venezia e i domini veneziani tramite di informazioni sui turchi per gli spagnoli nel sec. XVI," in *Venezia centro di mediazione tra oriente e occidente (secoli XV-XVI). Aspetti e problemi*, ed. H-G. Beck, M. Manoussacas and A. Pertusi (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1977), Vol. I, 119-136. A case study on this moment in Özlem Kumrular, "Avisos del Turco. El rol del senato y el embajador imperial en un período de crisis. El caso de Rodrigo Niño," in *Escrituras silenciadas en la época de Cervantes*, ed. M. Casado, A. Castillo, P. Numhauser and E. Sola (Alcalá: Universidad de Alcalá, 2006) 57-74. The most recent general overview of the socio-political dimension of the information on the early modern Mediterranean is Jean Petitjean, *L'intelligence des choses. Une histoire de l'information entre Italie et Méditerranée (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2013).

¹² 'Bisognando il piu delle volte fare quello che porta la occasione et non la voluntate'. Letter of Andrea Doria to Charles V. Portofino, 19th July 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 140.

¹³ Letter of Adam Centurione to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 20th August 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1565, n° 81.

¹⁴ The most detailed account of the facts was the letter sent by Rena during Koroni's siege. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 5-1, fols. 1-3. Actually, the letter was copied, translated, and circulated through Italy shortly after, as Adam Centurione reported. Letter of Adam Centurione to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 3rd November 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 289. An Italian copy in *Ibid.* n° 290-291.

¹⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Patras, 11th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-3.

campaign was thought of as a complete success.¹⁶ Why? As the experts have shown, the authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy adopted a defensive strategy in this imperial struggle.¹⁷ More specifically the struggle between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans was fought on the premise that fleets had to capture the enemy's bases in order to obtain decisive results.¹⁸ Indeed, speaking about the conquest of Koroni, the Italian statesman Francesco Guicciardini expressed his hopes about the potentialities of the campaign's outcome because, according to him, establishing a naval base in Koroni would be 'something of great importance' because it would facilitate the attacking of Süleyman 'in his own land'.¹⁹ Considering the objectives and the results, we can understand this campaign as an early example of the predominant strategy of imperial naval warfare in the early modern Mediterranean.

¹⁶ The results were reported to the Spanish court as a complete success. Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to the Empress Isabella. Genoa, 18th November 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1565, n° 69.

¹⁷ I. A. A. Thompson, "Las galeras en la política militar española en el Mediterráneo durante el siglo XVI," *Manuscripts: revista d'història moderna* 24 (2006): 95-124.

¹⁸ John Francis Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys. Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) 57.

¹⁹ 'Pure si se potesi fermare un nidio in quelle bande sarebbe cosa di grande importanza et da desiare e Christiani a non perderé l'occasione di travagliarlo in casa sua'. Letter of Francesco Guicciardini to Bartolomeo Lanfredini. Bologna, 15th October 1532. Cfr. *Carteggi di Francesco Guicciardini*, ed. P. G. Ricci (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea, 1969), vol. 15, 221.





Image 10. Map of the Koroni campaign (1532).

Image 11. Drawing of Koroni with Rena's handwritten annotations.²⁰



The words of Francesco Guicciardini allow us to perceive that, apart from its military utility, the imperial navy organised in 1532 to fight the Ottoman vessels was also a political tool. Guicciardini mentioned in his letter that the campaign was much discussed

²⁰ AGN, Cartografía, 46.

among the Italian politicians and intellectuals. Maybe the struggle against the Ottoman emperor was not the sole priority of Charles V.²¹ Nevertheless, it was one of the main assets in Charles' hands to create the necessary consensus among his subjects.²² To a great extent, Charles V tried to legitimise his dominium over a great part of the Italian Peninsula by acting as the defender of Christendom. Consequently, the emperor was obliged to conduct naval warfare in the Mediterranean as a way to justify and reinforce his prominent position in the field of European politics.²³ By 1532, Charles V and his close servants were still engaged in the process of forming Charles V's image as the powerful emperor capable of opposing the Ottoman menace.²⁴ In the mentality of early modern politics very few things demonstrated the power of a ruler like the exhibition of the military resources at his disposal. In one of his first letters after arriving to Genoa, Juan Rena shared with Francisco de los Cobos his concerns about the initial delay in the organisation of the navy, because apparently this delay provoked the spread of rumours questioning the preparation of the imperial navy: 'and this is not convenient in general to the reputation and service of His Majesty'.²⁵ In the opinion of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, the navy's departure would be a way to bolster his reputation among his enemies and also among his allies.²⁶ The political dimension of the campaign transcended the boundaries of the Italian Peninsula, as the emperor and the men of the inner circle of the imperial government made use of it as a propaganda tool all around Europe. This is obvious, for instance, on reading the correspondence between Emperor Charles V and his allies.²⁷ As we can see, already in the early modern Mediterranean, war was a continuation of politics by other means.

²¹ This is the main thesis in María José Rodríguez Salgado, "¿Carolus Africanus?: el emperador y el turco," in *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa*, ed. J. M. Martínez Millán (Madrid: SECC, 2001), Vol. 1, 489-503.

²² On religious warfare as a mechanism of internal "soft power", see James D. Tracy, "The Background War of the Early Modern Era: Christian and Muslim States in Contest for Dominion, Trade, and Cultural Preeminence," in *Religious Conflict and Accommodation in the Early Modern World*, ed. M. Ragnow and W. D. James (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2011), 9-54.

²³ Phillip Williams, *Empire and Holy War in the Mediterranean: The Galley and Maritime Conflict between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 258, 265 and 267-270.

²⁴ On the importance of symbolic rivalry between Charles V and Süleyman see G. Necipoglu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *The Art Bulletin* 71, (1989): 401-427, and Christine Woodhead, "Perspectives on Süleyman," *Süleyman the Magnificent and his Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. M. Kunt and C. Woodhead (London: Routledge, 1995), 164-190.

²⁵ 'Y esto no conviene en general a la reputación y servicio de Su Majestad'. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 9th May 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 297.

²⁶ Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 3rd June 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 41.

²⁷ See, for instance, the letters sent to his ambassador in Portugal. Letters of Charles V to Lope Hurtado de Mendoza. Regensburg, 11th July 1532. BZ, Altamira, Leg. 133, n° 63. See also *Ibíd.* Docs. 66 and 68.

Naval warfare was part of the crusading discourse of the emperor. For instance, the Spanish ambassador in Genoa reported to Charles V on the happiness of the Genoese due to the Ottomans' retreat, and their hopes for the success of Charles' crusade, an enterprise closely related to the initial success of the navy on the Greek coasts.²⁸ The crusade discourse played a major role in Charles' war finances, because fear of the Ottomans allowed him to mobilise more resources for war, as Juan de Vergara affirmed in one of his letters to Juan Rena: 'they expect to obtain a lot of money from Spain with this news of the Turk.'²⁹ Thus, it is easy to understand the importance of the success of the navy for Charles V's interests; it was not only a way to distract the enemy's forces from the main theatre, but also a tool to legitimise his rule over his Italian dominions as well as his policy regarding the mobilization of resources for war.³⁰ Nevertheless, in the same way, the crusade discourse obliged the emperor to invest enormous amounts of resources in the organisation of the navy; because only by so doing could he impel other potential allies to follow suit, and inspire the adherence of his subjects towards his war projects, as the Spanish ambassador in Genoa expressed in one of his letters to the emperor.³¹

The campaign offered important benefits to Charles V but also to his Genoese admiral. The first and most obvious was the possibility of acquiring a notable prestige as a defender of the Christendom. It is quite meaningful that the same messenger who carried to Genoa the royal instructions on the navy's organisation also transported the Golden Fleece granted by Charles V to Andrea Doria.³² This coincidence was full of symbolism

²⁸ Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 6th October 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 10.

²⁹ 'De España piensan sacar gran dinero con esta nueva del turco'. Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 19th June 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 4-1. This argument was employed also to extract resources from the Kingdom of Naples. Hernando Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles*, 386-396. On the fear of the Ottoman menace see J. Delumeau, *La peur en Occident, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 262-272. See also N. Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 131-137.

³⁰ For instance, when the Catalan authorities complained to Charles V about the management of the military resources, his reply to them made reference to the navy organised in 1532 to defend his Mediterranean strategy. Letter of Charles V to the Deputies of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Mantua, 4th April 1533. ACA, Generalitat, V. 240, n° 114.

³¹ Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 9th May 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 36.

³² Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 23rd July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 3-4, fol. 2. On the political use of the order of the Golden Fleece by Charles V, see Alfonso de Ceballos-Escalera y Gila, *La Insigne Orden del Toisón de Oro* (Madrid: Palafox & Pezuela, 2001), 118-129.

as the Golden Fleece was very closely related to the aims of the Habsburgs' crusade.³³ Furthermore, this was the main demonstration to the local community of Doria's access to the higher rank of the European nobility. Clear proof of the importance of this to the local community was the fact that the Spanish ambassador decided to wait until Doria's return to Genoa (the admiral had been outside the city preparing the navy) in order to grant it to him in the city.³⁴

Beyond the symbolic benefits derived from his recent alliance with the emperor, his participation in the campaign provided Doria with the usual material benefits (mainly plunder) from naval warfare. Moreover, as we will see, the campaign allowed Doria to further reinforce his authority as a military leader.³⁵ Finally, we shall also consider that this campaign represented a qualitative leap forward, as previous to this, when Doria had fought against Barbary corsairs; he had not gained any substantial victories.³⁶ Furthermore, fighting the Ottomans was, by far, considered as a more prestigious and honourable activity than looting Maghrebi ports.³⁷ In short, the campaign of 1532 offered Doria the opportunity of no longer being just another *condottiero* and becoming a real Poseidon, able to challenge and defeat the most important maritime menace threatening Christendom: the Ottoman navy.³⁸

Beyond mutual benefits, the campaign implied common challenges. Charles V needed the port of the *Superba* and the Genoese galleys led by Andrea Doria to protect his Italian dominions from the Ottoman navy; but equally true is that Andrea Doria needed the military and political support of the authorities of Charles V's empire if he

³³ Elena Postigo Castellanos, "«Capturaré una piel de oro que nos volverá a la Edad de Oro». Los duques de Borgoña, la Orden del Toisón y el «Santo Viaje» (La Jornada de Lepanto de 1571)," in *El Legado de Borgoña. Fiesta y Ceremonia Cortesana en la Europa de los Austrias (1454-1648)*, ed. K. de Jonge, B. J. García García and A. Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2010), 399-449.

³⁴ In his letter to Charles V the ambassador justified this decision citing the opinion of Doria's wife who thought that 'the Prince [Andrea Doria] would be happier to receive it here in his homeland than in any other place.' 'Que le parecía que el príncipe [Andrea Doria] sería más contento de recibirlo aquí en su tierra que en otra parte ninguna'. Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 23rd July 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 136.

³⁵ I will come back to both issues later.

³⁶ Previous naval actions of Doria during these years have been described in Bruno Anatra, "Andrea Doria, Genoa e Carlo V. I primi tempi di una stretta alleanza (1528-1532)," in *Genova una "porta" del Mediterraneo*, ed. L. Gallinari (Genova: Brigati, 2005), vol. II, 629-642.

³⁷ An example of this common assumption in "Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la conquista de Jerusalén". BNE, Mss. 19699/60.

³⁸ Doria's palace was decorated with mythological frescoes of the myth of Jason and the quest for the Golden Fleece, and with Doria's represented as Poseidon. L. Stagno, *Palazzo del Principe. Villa di Andrea Doria, Genoa* (Genoa: Sagep Libri & Comunicazione, 2005), 20.

aimed to get the maximum from his war machine. One of Rena's biggest concerns as commissary of the navy was to make both machineries work together in the most efficient manner. A brief look through Rena's documents shows the mixed character of the enterprise. Andrea Doria only owned 15 of the 39 galleys composing the navy (the rest belonged to the Pope, the Knights of Rhodes, the Habsburg viceroalties of Naples and Sicily, etcetera). The rest of the navy was composed of other ships and galleons (only one belonging to Doria).³⁹ More importantly, the navy was manned by crews and soldiers (more than 20,000) coming from the different territories of the Hispanic Monarchy.⁴⁰ Needless to say, coordinating this huge military machinery was all but easy.

Due to the limited operational autonomy of the navy, Doria depended on the supplies provided in the different territories under the domain of Charles V. In theory, Doria would have no problems in organising the supply networks there because he, as captain-general, was able to send orders to the viceroys on this matter.⁴¹ Nevertheless, from the beginning of the campaign, Doria's orders regarding logistics proved insufficient to guarantee the correct victualing of the navy. The gathering of foodstuffs for the navy was carried out in Sardinia, Sicily and Naples, from where the fleet had to load them during its voyage to the Greek coast. In order to guarantee that the supplies would be ready before the navy's arrival, Rena proposed to send agents to oversee the logistic works in the charge of each viceroy. Doria rejected this idea, believing that his orders on the matter were being obeyed and that the information that he was receiving thereon from these kingdoms was true. Nevertheless, when the navy arrived to Naples the supplies were not ready, something that delayed their travel at the precise time when the Ottoman navy (the main target) was only 200 miles away from Brindisi. Rena did not hesitate in pointing to Doria's lack of experience as the main problem behind the delay when he reported the issue to the court: 'this is a negotiation of such sophistication that it requires long experience to understand it'.⁴² Rena's bitter complaints shows how important experience was in order to avoid this kind of problems.

³⁹ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 13-3. On the role of the galleys in the Mediterranean imperial navies, see Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, "La defensa de la cristiandad; las armadas en el Mediterráneo en la Edad Moderna," *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna. Anejos 5* (2006): 77-99.

⁴⁰ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 13-1.

⁴¹ ADP, Scaffale 79, Busta 58, n° 1.

⁴² Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Naples, 7th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 4-1, fol. 2.

Rena was appointed as commissary of the navy with the specific purpose of making use of his valuable experience in organising the military logistics of the navy. The official appointment of Rena as commissary made this point clear in its reference to his duties and competencies.⁴³ Rena was required to help Andrea Doria in the organisation of the navy. He was also in charge of supervising the activities of the other officers of the military administration, who actually were two of his own creatures and men who had his confidence: Francisco Duarte and Juan de Vergara. Thus, Rena's participation in the organisation of the navy was not only a way to incorporate his know-how, but also that of "Rena's school". More interesting than Rena's appointment were the instructions that he received before departing from the imperial court for Genoa. In these instructions, the crown authorised him to intervene and act in any aspect opportune for the good development of the enterprise. He was also commanded to take special care of the accounts and the administration of the money. Finally, Rena was ordered to take charge of the navy's supply (in fact, he made the initial calculations on the matter for the Council of War) according to any change of plans adopted in response to the enemy's movements.⁴⁴

The task was anything but simple as Rena needed to combine, for the first time, supply tasks in Genoa, Milan, Sardinia, Sicily and Naples. In order to give an idea of the scale of such a challenge, it suffices to note that Rena estimated that the navy would need 50,000 quintals of biscuit and at least 6,000 *botas* (pipes) of wine.⁴⁵ An additional instruction ordered Rena to gather information on the ships available in all the ports of Italy. Rena was also asked to pay attention to the volatile political situation of the whole Italian Peninsula in order to avoid the risk of any 'revolt' affecting the correct supply of the navy. The crown granted Rena an enormous degree of autonomy and authority in the organisation of the navy; in fact, these second instructions made specific mention of Rena's obligation to take care of the whole logistical organisation without consulting the crown.⁴⁶ Rena would soon take the initiative in the organisation of the navy, and when he arrived to Genoa he was able to present a memorandum to Andrea Doria with an initial

⁴³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-1.

⁴⁴ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-2, fols. 1-2.

⁴⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-2, fols. 1-2. The *quintal* was a weight measure consisting of 46 kilos, the *bota* (a liquid measure) consisted of 480 liters or 8-10 *quintals*.

⁴⁶ 'Pues Su Majestad en todo y por todo se descuida con su señoría'. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-2, fols. 3-4.

calculation of all the supplies needed and a plan to obtain them in the quickest and cheapest way. The plan apparently convinced Doria to follow Rena's guidelines regarding the navy's supply.⁴⁷ As we can see, Rena proved to master the naval logistics, something that contrasted with Doria's inexperience in this matter.

Even more dangerous than Doria's lack of experience in organising complex supply networks spanning different territories were the tensions between him and the different authorities. Despite the fact that Doria possessed the title of captain-general of the Mediterranean Sea, he faced several difficulties in imposing his authority on men who held the higher ranked positions in the imperial administration of the Italian territories. This was clear, for instance, during the autumn of 1531 when an incident provoked acute tensions between the Genoese admiral and the viceroy of Sicily. Apparently, Doria had mobilised his network of contacts on the island to guarantee the victualing of his galleys while coming back from a raid on the Barbary's coast. He and some merchants had funded and organised the provision of biscuit; however, the viceroy's agents banned them from loading it into the galleys.⁴⁸ The incident prevented the correct victualing of the galley squadron, provoking bitter complaints from Andrea Doria, who thereby lost the opportunity of coming back quickly to Barbary to continue exploiting the initial success of the raid. The episode had a huge political echo, and the Spanish ambassador in Genoa had to manoeuvre over the course of two months to satisfy Doria's claims of compensation, as he considered that the Sicilian viceroy had hindered him.⁴⁹ Episodes like this one were frequent in the world of naval warfare, but they presented a clear threat to the effective functioning of the military machinery.⁵⁰

One of Rena's tasks was to prevent this kind of problems. As captain-general of the navy, Andrea Doria had to be respected by all the viceroys. In fact, the document of his appointment made a specific reference to this.⁵¹ Nevertheless, it seems that the explicit mention made in this regard was not enough, and tension between Doria and the viceroy of Sicily arose again when the navy stopped at that island on its way to the east in the

⁴⁷ AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 44, and letters of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 7th and 9th May 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 297.

⁴⁸ Letter of Andrea Doria to Charles V. Genoa, 5th October 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1363, n° 167.

⁴⁹ Letters of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. 1st October and 22nd November 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1363, n° 58 and 77.

⁵⁰ Pacini, *Desde Rosas*, 296-304.

⁵¹ ADP, Scaffale 79, Busta 58, n° 1.

summer of 1532. Apparently on this occasion, Andrea Doria was angered when the governor of Messina's garrison did not render him a proper salutation according to the protocol and his authority; a clear affront that, according to the Genoese admiral, was ordered by the viceroy. Once again, Rena was obliged to mediate between both parties, and fortunately he managed to calm the situation down.⁵² This incident makes crystal clear that Rena was the right person to act as mediator in charge of allowing the imperial administration and Doria's military machinery to work together. Furthermore, this anecdote shows that, frequently, royal orders were not enough to guarantee the correct functioning of the navy. Precisely because of this reason, Rena's *savoir faire* was more than necessary.

The campaign of 1532 was the first example of the successful collaboration between the imperial administration and Andrea Doria's network that would dominate the western part of the Mediterranean basin. Charles V needed the collaboration of Doria to act as a true defender of his subjects and the whole of Christendom; in short, Charles V needed Doria in order to act as a true and legitimate emperor. In the same way, the Genoese admiral needed the support of the imperial authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy in order to become an efficient leader of the most important naval machinery of the western Mediterranean. Each party possessed different kinds of resources and different kinds of networks, but they were not able to achieve their objectives acting alone. Rena played a key role in ensuring that Doria's military enterprise and the imperial administration worked together in an efficient way; that is, Rena was an important piece of the new machinery emerging from the conjunction of two different networks working together for the first time.

Beyond the *asiento*. Configuring a New Military Machinery in the Mediterranean

Charles V and Andrea Doria were able to do great things acting together, but it was necessary to arrange the terms of their collaboration. As I already noted in the introduction of the chapter, the collaboration between Andrea Doria and Charles V was established by the signing of the famous *asiento* of 1528. However, the text of this

⁵² Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Messina, 26th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 4-4, fol. 33.

agreement was too vague and paid no attention to the practical dimension of the war exercises that Doria would be conducting in the service of the emperor. As we will see in the course of this section, Juan Rena, as the man positioned in between the war entrepreneur and the imperial administration, was able to influence the definition of the norms and practices governing the collaboration between both parties. This was crucial, because at stake was the definition of the framework in which future collaborations between the crown and other private entrepreneurs would be grounded. Not for nothing, Andrea Doria has been defined by Luca Lo Basso, a well-reputed expert in the naval history of early modern Genoa, as ‘the father of all the *asentisti*’.⁵³

The management of the economic resources of the navy, as well as the conflicts between Rena and Doria for its control, will be analysed here as a way to shed light on the shaping of the conditions governing the cooperation between Doria and the imperial administration. Rena’s activity in controlling Doria’s management of the military treasury should also be understood in a wider framework, that of the shaping of the naval military administration. Despite the efforts led by the Catholic Monarchs to establish a permanent royal navy during their reign, the first stage of their grandson’s reign saw the absolute decline of the navy.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, with regard to his external policy, some bitter lessons learned during the last period of the Italian Wars and, above all, the complete destruction of the Spanish galley squadron by the Barbary’s corsairs in 1528, obliged the emperor to construct a new navy.⁵⁵ This restarting plan was furthered by an attempt to establish a specific naval administration. Thus, for instance, just a year before Rena’s mission, the council of war formulated the Galleys Ordinance, a text regulating the functioning and administration of this new military apparatus.⁵⁶ This is the framework in which the activity of Rena as commissary of the navy made sense, and in which he gained momentum.

⁵³ Luca Lo Basso, “Gli *Asentisti* del re. L’essercizio privato della guerra nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi (1528-1716),” in *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII)*, ed. R. Cancilla (Palermo: Quaderni-Mediterranea. Ricerche Storiche, 2007), 399.

⁵⁴ A general survey in Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española. Desde la unión de Castilla y de León* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895), T. I, 123-137 and 142-155. According to Mira Caballos, Charles V’s reign was the formative period in the evolution of the imperial navies. Esteban Mira Caballos, *Las armadas imperiales. La guerra en el mar en tiempos de Carlos V y Felipe II* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005), 173-174.

⁵⁵ López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar*, 111 and 113-115.

⁵⁶ AGS, Contaduría del Sueldo, Leg. 160, s.f.

Rena was able to play a major role in the definition of the rules governing the alliance between Doria and Charles V because he was ordered to join the navy in its travels after the enemy's fleet. This last-minute decision allowed him to directly participate in the campaign, and consequently, to influence in the shaping of the practical issues attached to the day to day functioning of the new military machine. However, when he got notice of the royal order commanding him to embark, Rena bitterly complained that he would rather have occupied any other charge in the service of the emperor.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, some days before, when he was preparing his return to the imperial court, he wrote to his friend and connection in the Council of War, Pedro de Zuazola, underlining the need of appointing someone to take care of the money during the campaign: 'I say that a trustable person should go in this navy, to have reason of everything, and if His Majesty does not order to do this this, [...] everything will disappear like the salt in the water.'⁵⁸ Rena's words were quite eloquent, as he was aware of the importance of ensuring the proper administration of the navy's resources during the campaign, but he would soon regret writing them. When he wrote it, the royal order commanding him to embark with the navy to take care of the royal resources was already written and sent.⁵⁹ Juan de Vergara responded to Rena's bitter complaints about the appointment, telling him that it was his own fault for pointing out the necessity of sending a person to control the navy's administration; but it seems that the decision was taken before Rena's suggestion.⁶⁰ Regardless, what is interesting to note here is that the decision was something improvised on the move.

Despite the improvised nature of the nomination, or precisely because of it, Rena enjoyed an enormous capacity for action in his new mission. Before knowing that he would be obliged to take charge of administrating the resources during the campaign, Rena sent a memorandum to the Council of War trying to solve some problems regarding the competencies of the royal officer in charge of controlling the navy's resources.⁶¹ When he received the order to take care of this task, he asked for a response to his

⁵⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 3rd July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 3-1, fol. 1.

⁵⁸ 'Digo que conviene que con esta armada vaya una persona de recaudo para que tenga razón de todo, y si esto Su Majestad no manda proveer no ha de hacer cuenta de cuanto se cargase en las naos que todo se ha de consumir como la sal en el agua.' Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 23rd June 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 2-3, fol. 2.

⁵⁹ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 21st June 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-6.

⁶⁰ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 10th July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 4-3.

⁶¹ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 3rd July 1532. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 281.

memorandum as he needed specific instructions to carry out this new commitment; however, he received no answer.⁶² Rena insisted and wrote to Francisco de los Cobos asking him for the necessary response.⁶³ The royal secretary replied to him in vague terms, commanding him to do whatever was most opportune for His Majesty's service and the care of his resources, alleging that the rush to deal with the organisation of the land campaign in Austria prevented the Council of War from discussing Rena's petition.⁶⁴ When the response to Rena's demands finally arrived, it was too late. The memorandum with the answers was sent back to Rena more than a month and a half later, when Rena was already travelling with the navy towards southern Italy.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the response was not as expected; actually, it was just a vague extension of the commission that he had received to act as commissary in Genoa during the navy's organization.⁶⁶ Obviously, this response was not enough to provide Rena with clear instructions, and it only underlined the undefined nature of Rena's charge.

This lack of definition in Rena's competencies allowed him to intervene in different aspects of the navy's administration. As I noted before, Rena's activities as commissary of the navy should be understood in the wider framework of the shaping of the administration managing the resources allocated to fund the navy. It seems that Rena was perfectly aware of the moment in which he was living. Clear proof of this was his concern regarding the necessity of implementing innovations in the naval administration. This remains clear when looking, for instance, at his arguments with some of the military men recruited by Doria, like the Count of Sarno. Rena had an argument with him over the payment of his captaincy. In their argument, Rena demonstrated his aim of managing the economic resources of the navy in a different way compared to previous campaigns. In fact, during the quarrel Rena argued that 'this was not a war of the quality of the others, so it should not warrant the generosities given in other previous wars'.⁶⁷

⁶² A memorial's draft in AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-2, fol. 2.

⁶³ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Los Cobos. Genoa, 3rd July 1532.

⁶⁴ Letter of Francisco de Los Cobos to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 16th July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 2-4 and AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 280.

⁶⁵ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Regensburg, 11th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-2, fol. 1.

⁶⁶ AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 138.

⁶⁷ 'Esta no era guerra de la calidad de las otras, así no había de haber en ella las larguezas que ha habido en las otras guerras pasadas'. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Naples, 7th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 4-1, fol. 1.

The aforementioned anecdote not only showed Rena's concerns on the correct administration of the money; it also was one of the first episodes of his struggle against Doria and the members of his military network. We should not understand the relationship between Rena and Doria as only a fractious one. They were able to collaborate in many different aspects. For instance, when the navy arrived at Messina, Doria and Rena agreed on the way to proceed with reviewing and paying the troops and the ships' crews. Furthermore, both Doria and Rena coordinated their efforts to negotiate with the viceroy on the troops' embarkation and other issues such as the loaning of artillery or the acquisition of gunpowder.⁶⁸ In fact, when news of the enemy navy's retreat arrived to Sicily, Rena reported the general disappointment provoked by the news, but made reference to his complete trust in Doria's capacity to lead the navy to victory.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, and despite his words underlining Doria's will towards His Majesty's service, the problems between both began shortly after. Mainly their problems arose because of one thing: Doria, as head of his own military network; and Rena, as representative of the imperial administration, were trying to define the conditions of how war would be conducted and administrated.

Despite the apparent cordiality, the relationship between Rena and Doria was characterised by the suspicions and open criticisms of the former towards the rapacity of the latter. The main issue of discussion among them was the management of the navy's economic resources. During the first stages of the campaign, Rena was able to maintain a certain degree of authority in this sphere; nevertheless, as he recognised in one of the letters he sent to his friend, the secretary of the Council of War, he failed in controlling a crucial the management of the resources obtained from the booty:

From Genoa I wrote to Your Mercy that these people do not like to see order in the treasury, and as there were always alert men about, there had been no way to enter into it. Now that there has been the possibility of entering into other people's properties, [...] things have gone and gotten a bit broken.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 17-1, fol. 4.

⁶⁹ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Messina, 23rd August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 4-4, fols. 1-2.

⁷⁰ 'Desde Génova escribí a Vuestra Merced como no le agradaba a esta gente de ver la orden que se tiene en lo de la hacienda, y como siempre ha andado hombre alerta no ha habido lugar de entrar en ella. Ahora que ha habido disposición de entrar en lo ajeno [...] han ido y andan las cosas algo rotas.' Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Lepanto, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fol. 12.

The management of resources coming from *corso* and booty was anything but a marginal issue.⁷¹ In fact, it became one of the key issues to discuss in the day to day interaction between Rena and Doria in their fight to define the terms of the shared military enterprises. The possibility of practicing *corso* was a crucial factor in making this war profitable for the Genoese admiral's interests, and booty had always played a major role in attracting these private entrepreneurs to the business of war.⁷² Needless to say, Doria was not an exception. At the same time, Rena considered that booty was an important source of income for the coffers of the military administration. It is possible that the total amount of the booty was not high. For instance, the Jews captured in Patras, a fortification in the Gulf of Lepanto, were rescued for 4,000 ducats.⁷³ Nevertheless, booty had a strategic value from Rena's perspective. In one of his letters to Charles V before the attack against Lepanto, Rena wrote:

I would like, because there is no money to pay the soldiers, to try to conquest Lepanto, because the plunder would be good, for I think that the valuables and principal persons of all the region are refuged there, and with this the people will remain content, and with the mouth sweetened, and this sweet would be profitable in the future if we have to make war in these parts.⁷⁴

With these words, Rena expressed the value of booty, and the reasons for obtaining it; as a driving force in the war against the Ottoman Empire, as it was a useful way of incentivising the soldiers. Rena also demonstrated the value that booty had for him and for the soldiers when he tried to regulate its distribution, preventing the uncontrolled pillage of the conquered populations. Thus, in his plan to conquer Lepanto, Rena exposed the need of avoiding its sack in order to control the redistribution of the

⁷¹ Philippe Contamine, "The Growth of State Control. Practices of War, 1300-1800: Ransom and Booty," in *War and Competition between States*, ed. P. Contamine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 163-193.

⁷² Fritz Redlich, *De Praeda Militari. Looting and Booty 1500-1850* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956), see also Parrott, *The Business of War*, 82 and 244.

⁷³ AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, n° 72.

⁷⁴ 'Yo quisiera, pues no hay dineros para pagar la gente de guerra, que se tentara de tomar a Lepanto, que el saco fuera bueno, porque creo se han recogido los bienes y personas principales de toda la comarca, y con esto quedará la gente contenta y con la boca dulce, y esta golosina aprovecharía también para adelante si en estas partes se hubiese de guerrear.' Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fol. 1-5.

booty and supplies obtained there.⁷⁵ Later, he also took some measures to ensure an equal split among the troops.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the booty played also a central role in the plans of Andrea Doria to fund his military enterprise. Rena and Doria were drawn into a clash over this issue as soon as the navy started to produce profits from booty. Analysing their conflicts on this matter helps us to understand how Rena and Doria were involved in the definition of the norms ruling the cooperation between the imperial administration and Doria's military network.

The main cause of the conflict was that both parties needed and competed for the same strategic resources. Doria's rapacity was especially evident when it came to some particularly valuable goods such as artillery and wheat. It is not necessary to stress the importance that artillery had for war entrepreneurs.⁷⁷ Andrea Doria needed to provide the ships with artillery, one of the most expensive investments that a private contractor had to face. At a time when Doria was starting an ambitious shipbuilding programme, a lack of artillery posed a serious problem. Unfortunately, the imperial administration also had a serious problem in this respect. Actually, lack of artillery was one of the most important problems for the emperor's navy during the campaign of 1532. This shortage was quite evident even before the navy's departure, and when Rena took an account of the total amount of pieces embarked, he laconically wrote at the end of the list: 'this is few and poor artillery for such a navy'.⁷⁸ Faced with this lack of artillery, the monarchical authorities only replied by adopting Rena's suggestion to ask for some guns loaned from the authorities of Luca and Leghorn.⁷⁹ This decision made obvious the inability of the Monarchy to satisfy the necessity of artillery in the short term.

While the Habsburg Monarchy was not able to produce enough artillery, the Ottoman Empire was acquiring fame for supplying its fortresses with enormous amounts of it.⁸⁰ When the imperial navy conquered Ottoman strongholds on the Greek coast, Doria

⁷⁵ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 15-1.

⁷⁶ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 17-1, fol. 3.

⁷⁷ Redlich, *De Praeda Militari*, 9-13.

⁷⁸ 'Esta es poca y pobre artillería para tal armada'. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 3-1, fol. 2-3.

⁷⁹ AGS, Estado, Leg. 1365, n° 71.

⁸⁰ The Ottoman authorities were producing monster wrought-iron pieces, but also bronze artillery, that is, highly esteemed pieces from a European viewpoint. Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 64-65. On siege artillery of the Ottoman fortresses see Mark L. Stein, *Guarding the Frontier. Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe* (London: Tauris & Co, 2007), 40-43.

and Rena obtained an enormous amount of artillery. In fact, this booty obtained by Doria became a myth in the history of Mediterranean warfare. When the chronicler Francisco López de Gómara recorded the conquest of the fortification protecting the Gulf of Lepanto, he made reference to the enormous amount of artillery acquired by Doria (up to the value of 60,000 ducats) emphasising that Doria deserved this prize.⁸¹ The problem was to determine precisely who deserved to possess the seized artillery. This was a matter of discussion between Rena and Andrea Doria, and, as usual, the commissary reported the issue to his connections in the imperial entourage of Charles V. According to Rena's testimony, the amount of artillery seized was not as great as Gómara would later write, but it was a valuable spoil. An attempted inventory counted 81 artillery pieces, each one being 80 quintals. According to this inventory, the total monetary value of all the artillery seized in the different Ottoman strongholds reached 20,000 ducats.⁸² In view of these numbers, the distribution of this artillery was a subject to think about.

However, as Rena knew, the fight for the artillery obtained in the booty was not a simple matter of money. The strategic value of these seized goods frequently provoked conflicts between the monarchical authorities and the army's leaders. Rena was aware of this because of his previous experiences in the war against the French, when the dividing up of the artillery among the nobles composing the Royal Army provoked significant criticisms.⁸³ Thus, it is easy to understand why Rena reacted energetically against Doria's determination to take all the seized artillery. Rena explained to Doria that, according to Castilian custom, the captain-general only had the right to choose a piece of artillery; and in Italy, the captain-general had no rights over the seized artillery. Doria reacted in the face of Rena's arguments as only someone aware of his strong position can do: by ignoring them. Furthermore, the admiral prevented Rena and Duarte from taking an inventory of the artillery seized, and ordered his servants to embark it on his ships.⁸⁴

⁸¹ López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar*, 141. The enormous size of the Ottoman artillery has been a long-lasting common place. Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan*, 61.

⁸² Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fol. 1-5. The inventory in n° 15-3.

⁸³ Similar problems over this matter arose during the war against the *Comunero* revolt. Letters of Adriano de Utrecht to Charles V. Logroño, 8th June and 8th August 1521. AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 2, n° 1, fols. 197 and 199.

⁸⁴ Rena was able to obtain sufficient information to write a tentative memorial of the artillery seized, and to inform the crown about the issue. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fols. 2-3.

The artillery was not the only booty fuelling the struggle between Juan Rena and Andrea Doria; for the latter made use of the imperial navy to conduct corsair activities that would allow him to reinforce his political authority. After signing the *asiento* of 1528, Andrea Doria became a prominent political figure as father and protector of the Genoese republic.⁸⁵ As such, he protected the economic interests of the Genoese citizens beyond Genoa.⁸⁶ Thus, he made use of the military machinery under his command to extend the pro-Habsburg network in Genoa. In fact, the campaign of 1532 witnessed some of his first movements in this direction. Doria used his absolute command over the navy of the Hispanic Monarchy to practice *corso* in the Adriatic Sea, capturing vessels, some of them transporting wheat from the collection of the Ottoman taxes.⁸⁷ The Genoese admiral allocated part of this wheat to the supply of the navy, but he also sent a great portion of it to Genoa, an important gesture towards the inhabitants of the *Superba*, especially taking into consideration the political dimension of the city's problem with the supply of this strategic product.⁸⁸ At first glance, this action could seem an innocent act of generosity; but, as Rena reported, this measure had an expensive cost for the imperial administration. In fact, it was a clear transgression of the rules, as Doria prevented Rena from taking an account of the quantity of wheat seized, and as a consequence, prevented him from collecting the *quinto real* (royal fifth – the 20% of the booty belonging to the crown –). Rena was able to make an approximate calculation of the sum belonging to the crown, and offered to communicate it if the members of the inner circle of the imperial government eventually decided to ask for it.⁸⁹ In the end nothing happened; Rena's cautions were useless, once again, but this episode showed Doria's determination to employ the imperial navy to reinforce his own political position, breaking the rules if necessary.

⁸⁵ E. Grendi, "Andrea Doria, uomo del Rinascimento," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria* 19, n° 1 (1979): 103; Pacini, *La Genova di*, 25, 49-51 and 77; Gabriella Airaldi, *Andrea Doria* (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2015), 116-126.

⁸⁶ Julia Zünckel, "Diplomatische Geschäftsleute - geschäftstüchtige »Diplomaten«: Akteure der genuesischen Außenbeziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit zwischen Wirtschaft und Politik," in *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, ed. H. Von Thiessen and C. Windler (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010), 40-41.

⁸⁷ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fol. 1-5.

⁸⁸ On the importance of the wheat supply in the political life of Genoa, see E. Grendi, "Genova alla Metá del cinquecento: una politica del grano?," *Quaderni Sotrici* 5, n° 13 (1970): 106-160, and Pacini, *La Genova di*, 57-61.

⁸⁹ "Relación de una carta de Micer Juan Rena a Su Majestad de 30 de octubre". AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, n° 72.

Rena and Andrea Doria did not only struggle over the seized goods coming from booty. Another conflicted aspect in the relationship between the two was the management of the navy's resources. All the military chiefs of the early modern period were obliged to win the acceptance and obeisance of their subordinates by taking care of their necessities and granting them some favours, and Andrea Doria was not an exception; on the contrary. Due to the innovative nature of this enterprise, he was even more obliged to act as a reliable military patron. Maybe Andrea Doria was an expert in the difficult task of leading his own galley's squadron, but in contrast to previous times, during this campaign Doria conducted a navy composed of lots of units fighting under his command for the first time; and as with all military commanders incorporating new units, he needed to win the acceptance of the units under his command.⁹⁰ Andrea Doria tried to win this acceptance like many other military commanders of that time, by granting favours and side payments to the medium officers under his command; but this provoked the complaints of Rena, as some of these practices implied a clear transgression of the rules of the military administration.

The first frictions between Rena and Doria arose over the distribution of supplies. Before Rena's arrival to Messina, a great amount of biscuit had been distributed among the crews of the Pope's galleys (led by Antonio Doria, a cousin of the Genoese admiral) and many other people who did not receive salaries from the emperor. When Rena got notice of this obvious contravention of the rules, he tried to recover payment for these supplies; but Andrea Doria intervened, claiming that the captain of the Pope's galleys had no money to pay for the supplies received. Rena tried to solve the problem by obtaining a royal order asking for payment for the biscuit, because he was aware of the fact that, if they did not solve the issue immediately, collecting the money later would be impossible.⁹¹ Despite of Rena's protests, Doria's generosity towards his cousin Antonio Doria and his men continued. Thus, when the campaign finished, in order to feed the crews under his command during the winter of 1533, the admiral gave his cousin 400 quintals of biscuit. Rena tried, in vain, to obtain payment for Doria's present, and when he complained about it in front of the admiral, he received the reply that it was not

⁹⁰ The parallelism with the case of Ambrogio Spinola, leading the Spanish army in Flanders, is more than evident. Alicia Esteban Estringana, *Guerra y finanzas en los Países Bajos católicos: De Farnesio a Spínola (1592-1630)* (Madrid: Laberinto, 2002), 146-150.

⁹¹ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Messina, 26th August 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, nº 4-4, fol. 3.

necessary to be so meticulous with such things, ‘especially with a person who had served so well during this journey’.⁹²

Due to the complexity of the issue, Rena asked the emperor what he should do in this case, thus allowing us to ascertain Charles V’s position on this matter. Rena obtained a clear and meaningful response: the monarch considered Doria’s present to be an appropriate reward for the captain’s services.⁹³ In so doing, Charles V was recognising Doria’s legitimacy to exercise a certain military patronage by these means. Rena accepted the crown’s command without reservation, because the royal order freed him from having to justify the expense of these supplies.⁹⁴ The ease with which he accepted this transgression shows that Juan Rena only aimed to be able to justify his activities in respect of subsequent reviews by the central authorities. He was not averse to this kind of conduct per se; and actually, these practices were widespread and accepted, even by the members of the military administration.⁹⁵ In fact, they were crucial to maintaining the solidarities and the patronage ties that the high officers of any army needed to ensure the obedience of their subordinates and. Thus, we can conclude that Rena was much more interested in protecting his credit in the face of any retrospective analysis than in avoiding these practices.

It is worth noting that Rena and Doria did not always disagree on the fraudulent use of the navy’s economic resources. For instance, after the conquest of Koroni, Rena tried to review the nine captaincies deployed there to defend the city. Nevertheless, the captains avoided the revision of the troops because they did not agree with the payment procedure. Rena wanted to pay the soldiers directly, but, in contrast to his plan, the captains aimed to receive and redistribute the soldiers’ salaries. The difference between the two methods was that, while the first one would provide accurate information on the number of soldiers, the second one would allow the number of soldiers to be dissimulated,

⁹² ‘Especialmente con una persona que había servido tan bien en esta jornada’. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 13th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-2, fols. 1-4.

⁹³ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Bologna, 20th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-14.

⁹⁴ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 25th February 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 10-3, fol. 1-2.

⁹⁵ P. Stewart, “The Soldier, the Bureaucrat, and Fiscal Records in the Army of Ferdinand and Isabella,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 49, n° 2 (1969): 281-292. These practices were also present in the Ottoman navy. C. H. Imber, “The Costs of Naval Warfare. The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa's Herceg Novi Campaign in 1539,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 4, (1972): 216.

which would enable the captains to earn extra money for redistribution among their soldiers as succours and mercies in the future.⁹⁶

Rena was well aware of this fraud, as it had been commonplace in the different campaigns in which he had previously participated.⁹⁷ Thus, he was able to detect the ruse (apparently the captains included some sailors from the navy in the troops' review) because the number of soldiers worked out as exactly the same as it had been at the moment when they had embarked, which was impossible due the high numbers of fallen and deserters. Nevertheless, Rena was obliged to accept this way of paying the troops because the captains convinced Andrea Doria to accept their demands. Doria ordered Rena to proceed according to the captains' demands, arguing that 'for such a minor thing, and because of other respects, I do not want the people to rest discontented'⁹⁸. Rena accepted Doria's orders and proceeded with the troops' payment, and only offered to review the troops again after the navy's departure. Once again, it seems that Rena accepted these kinds of practices, and only aimed to show his zeal regarding his duties as commissary. But what is interesting here is that the admiral's words and Rena's resigned acceptance show that both, Rena and Doria, understood the necessity of giving the soldiers and the medium officers some additional gratifications in exchange for their past and future efforts.

Despite his criticisms, Rena was in agreement with Doria on the necessity of dealing with the navy's resources in this way. Why was he complaining about Doria's attitude? As I previously indicated, he was doing this in order to display his vigilant attitude. However, that was not the only reason. He was also taking a position in the definition of the norms governing the collaboration between the imperial administration and the Genoese admiral. Moreover, he was calling on the crown to take a position in this process. In order to illustrate this, we can adduce his words criticising Doria's

⁹⁶ Esteban Estríngana, *Guerra y finanzas*, 154-163 and 246-250. On the importance of the captains' interests in the development of military campaigns, see Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "Cabos de guerra: satisfacción de la oficialidad y eficacia bélica en el ejército de Flandes, entre los siglos XVI y XVII," in *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica*, ed. J. f. Pardo Molero and M. Iomas Cortés (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2012), 265-293.

⁹⁷ For instance, this fraud was already present during the conquest of Oran. Letter of Cardinal Cisneros to Diego López de Ayala. Alcalá de Henares, 12th June 1509. Cfr *Cartas del Cardenal Fray Francisco de Cisneros dirigidas a don Diego López de Ayala*, ed. P. Gayangos and V. de la Fuente (Madrid: 1867), 51.

⁹⁸ 'Por poca cosa y por otros respetos no quería que quedase la gente descontenta'. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Sapienzia, 6th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-2, fols. 1-2.

appropriation of the seized artillery. When Rena informed the emperor about Doria's manoeuvres to take all the seized artillery, he wrote:

I write this to Your Majesty to be forewarned about what the Prince Andrea Doria is considering, and to know what this artillery is and how much may cost, so that, considering both the present and the future, Your Majesty could do what you think is more convenient to your service.⁹⁹

Rena was right in trying to draw the attention of the inner circle of the imperial government. In fact, despite the importance of these issues, the discussion fell off the agenda after the campaign ended, and Rena's claims on the matter were not attended to by his contacts in the emperor's entourage, who were by then focused on the organisation of Charles V's journey to the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, let us analyse Rena's aforementioned words. His complaints about the distribution of the artillery show that he was perfectly aware of the importance of this issue. Moreover, he was aware of its possible long-lasting effects; this is why he asked the emperor to take into consideration 'the present and the future'. Rena knew that the emperor would feel the temptation of acceding to satisfying Doria's aims; but, according to Rena, Charles V should be aware of the effects that decision would have in the future. From Rena's viewpoint, what was at stake was not only the distribution of the seized artillery pieces; the debate was about establishing the basis for future repartitions. Put simply, allowing the Genoese admiral to get all the cannons implied an acceptance that, in the future, all the artillery seized from the enemy would belong to him. This not only suggested that the crown was relinquishing a means of obtaining this strategic product; it also implied an acceptance of conceding to Doria a way for him to increase his own naval power, and, by extension, the crown's dependence on his services. In fact, loaning artillery was one of the services that Doria offered to the emperor.¹⁰¹ Rena aimed to fight Doria's rapacity regarding this issue, and, especially, to not allow a dangerous precedent to be set for the future. This was crucial, because, as Rena knew, the relationship of service between Doria and the emperor was

⁹⁹ 'Escribo esto a Vuestra Majestad para que esté prevenido de lo en que el Príncipe Andrea Doria está puesto, y sepa lo que es la dicha artillería y lo que pueda valer para que, considerado así lo del presente como lo de por venir, Vuestra Majestad haga en ello lo que más viera que a su servicio convenga'. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 6-5, fols. 2-3.

¹⁰⁰ Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Bolonia, 23rd December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-4.

¹⁰¹ AGS, Patronato Real, Leg. 17, n° 25.

being shaped in this moment. For that reason, it was hugely important to be careful with respect to precedents that could become dangerous in the future.

It is also interesting to analyse Rena's attitude regarding the distribution of the incomes from booty as payment for the military men. Initially, he did not disagree with Doria about using these resources to pay the soldiers and captains.¹⁰² When Andrea Doria wrote to Rena giving him instructions to carry out in his name during his absence, one of the main points concerned precisely this redistribution of booty. As per Doria's command, Rena was to proceed with the sale of all the goods. After this, he was to discount the *quinto real* and proceed with the distribution in the following manner: half of the total was apportioned to the infantry's captains, its officers and the soldiers. The money was to be redistributed among the troops according to the number of soldiers of each captaincy, and to the different qualities of the soldiers and officers. Later, Doria also ordered the payment of the gunners who managed the artillery during the sieges. The second half of the booty was to be redistributed among the galleys' captains and other officers of the navy. A final remark ordered Rena to pay Doria 10% of the booty total amount, a right that he claimed as captain-general.¹⁰³ Despite the initial agreement and collaboration, problems arose some time later.¹⁰⁴ Apparently, Doria, in an attempt to benefit the ships' and galleys' captains in the redistribution of the booty, ordered Rena not to discount the *quinto real* from the half allotted to them. This measure would be detrimental to the crown's interests, as it implied a reduction of the royal revenues.¹⁰⁵ Obviously the sum was not high, but the issue was substantially important for Rena for three reasons. Firstly, the admiral did not want to impose the same discount on his own part. As far as Rena was concerned, if Doria wanted to benefit his associates, he should

¹⁰² Administrators like Rena needed to know the moral economy ruling the functioning of early modern armies. On the agency of soldiers in the shaping of their service conditions, see S. Conway, "Moral Economy, Contract, and Negotiated Authority in American, British, and German Militaries, ca. 1740-1783," *The Journal of Modern History* 88 (2016): 34-59. To the best of my knowledge, a study on the agency of the "Spanish" infantry, is missing, but we can rely on the wonderful work on their Italian counterparts. Maurizio Arfaioi, *The Black Bands of Giovanni. Infantry and Diplomacy during the Italian Wars (1526-1528)* (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2005).

¹⁰³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 11-1.

¹⁰⁴ Apparently Rena accepted Doria's command, and actually, during the following months, Doria wrote to Rena to instruct him regarding specific payments to different captains and captaincies. Letters of Andrea Doria to Juan Rena. Gallipoli, 6th and 8th December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 11-3 and 4. Also, some captains approached Rena for this reason. Letter of Alfonso Capano to Juan Rena. Gallipoli, 9th December 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 12-1.

¹⁰⁵ As usual, Doria was not alone in posing these problems. Don Álvaro de Bazán, captain-general of the Spanish galleys, also refused to pay the royal fifth from the booty. AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, Lib. 76, fol. 135, rv.

do it with his own revenues. Secondly, because of the great expense of the campaign, any amount of money (no matter how little it was) would be helpful in meeting these expenses. And last but not least, as Rena asserted, it was of paramount importance to not make this concession because it could set a dangerous precedent for the future.¹⁰⁶ In the face of the calls to take a position in the definition of the norms governing the collaboration between Doria and the imperial administration, what was the stance of the inner circle of the imperial government? Rena's arguments would have appeared logical, but unsurprisingly, in this disagreement like in many others, Charles V took a position supporting Doria.¹⁰⁷ Once again, the emperor recognised the necessity of compromising in respect of Doria's wishes in order to guarantee the correct functioning of the military machinery under his command.

Perhaps the clearest proof of this policy of generosity towards Doria was the attitude of Charles V and his entourage regarding the review of Doria's accounts after the campaign. How to carry out the review of the accounts was another aspect to be defined in the relationship between Doria and Charles V, as it was not included in the text of the *asiento*. The campaign was funded with resources coming from the Castilian treasury, and so it was necessary to present to the *Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas* (the accounting office of expenditure) the official records of how the money had been expended.¹⁰⁸ In fact, according to the royal order sent to Doria announcing Rena's nomination as commissary, the necessity of presenting the accounts 'according to the style of our kingdoms of Castile' was one of the reasons that had moved the crown to appoint Rena.¹⁰⁹

Once again, Rena faced a crucial task in the shaping of the conditions governing the allegiance between the Genoese admiral and the emperor. According to his title as captain-general, Doria enjoyed a great degree of liberty in his management of the king's resources.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, Andrea Doria and Rena were obliged to present their accounts

¹⁰⁶ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de Los Cobos. Genoa, 6th March 1533. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1366, n° 241.

¹⁰⁷ Letter of Charles V to Andrea Doria. Milan, 13th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-16, fol. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, it has been impossible to find the accounting records of this campaign in the section *Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas* of the Archivo General de Simancas, where it should be kept like the rest of the documentation produced by the military administration from this period. Furthermore, the Archive Doria Pamphilj does not host the private records of Andrea Doria from this period.

¹⁰⁹ 'Conforme al estilo de nuestros reinos de Castilla, dónde se ha de dar la cuenta'. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-3.

¹¹⁰ ADP, Scaffale 79, Busta 58, n° 1.

of the campaign. As usual, the complications of the campaign made it difficult to follow the procedures stipulated by Castilian accounting protocol. For instance, Rena and Doria had problems making and keeping all the *recaudos* (documents needed to justify any expense in the accounts). Thus, when the admiral sent Rena his instructions to conduct the navy during his absence, he promised to give him ‘*recaudos* of everything, because it was impossible to do so until now, due to the rush that we have had with other matters’.

¹¹¹ The Genoese admiral also recognised that he had distributed a great amount of supplies without following the administrative procedures; that is, without writing the necessary orders and *recaudos*; but he offered Rena the accounts of his servant, Francisco Ferrari, to calculate them, and he promised to pay for these supplies.¹¹² The main problem arose when Rena and Francisco Duarte began to review the accounts that Doria presented, because many of the data included in the accounts made by Doria’s servant did not meet Rena’s approval. Rena wrote to the emperor asking for specific instructions on how to proceed with the review of Doria’s accounts.¹¹³ As expected, Charles V decided not to take unnecessary risks, and solved the issue by accepting Doria’s private records as a valid form of documentation to justify the administration of the navy’s economic resources during the campaign.¹¹⁴ As usual, Rena accepted the order without complaint, because this royal order in fact freed him from having to review the records of the campaign.¹¹⁵

Perhaps Rena did not agree with this decision, but clearly he was aware of a painful reality: in the definition of the norms and practices of the collaboration between Andrea Doria and the imperial administration, the emperor preferred to satisfy Doria, even if that meant breaking the rules of the administrative procedure. By accepting Doria’s personal accounts as valid, Charles V was showing the extent to which he depended on Doria to carry out his imperial agenda in the Mediterranean Sea. With his vigilant attitude, his multiple complaints and his various reports, Juan Rena was trying to establish a fair set of norms for governing the collaboration between the Genoese admiral

¹¹¹ ‘Y se darán recaudos de todo porque hasta ahora no se ha podido hacer por razón de la prisa que se ha tenido en otras cosas’. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, nº 11-1.

¹¹² *Ibíd.*

¹¹³ ‘Por no estar el Príncipe informado de la manera que se toman las cuentas en Castilla como por ser tan amigo de si mismo, yo soy cierto que en recusándole cualquier partida de las dichas cuentas se desabrirá’. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 8 March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, nº 11-3, fols. 1-2.

¹¹⁴ Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Milan, 13th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, nº 1-16, fols. 1-2.

¹¹⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 19th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, nº 11-5, fol. 1-2.

and the imperial administration. Nevertheless, to a great extent, it was a vain effort, because Andrea Doria was able to offer strategic services that the emperor needed too much. Moreover, what all the aforementioned examples show is that the men who composed the inner circle of the imperial government prioritised the necessity of facing the military challenges ahead of any awareness of the dangerous precedents that they were establishing by accepting Doria's demands.

The Aftermath of the Campaign: A New Naval Policy in the Mediterranean

In analysing Rena's activity during the campaign of 1532, it seems obvious that his capacity to influence the shaping of the imperial alliance between Andrea Doria and Charles V was quite restricted. It goes without saying that Rena was a dwarf between two political giants such as the Genoese admiral and the emperor. Moreover, Rena's position as defender of the interests of the crown in the face of Doria's ambitions was anything but easy. Andrea Doria was the only actor able to carry out the imperial agenda in the Mediterranean, because he was the only one who could offer both the services of a galley's squadron and also the necessary collaboration of the other key ally in the face of this major challenge: the Genoese authorities.¹¹⁶ Not for nothing, Doria was not just a mere *condottiere* or a war entrepreneur, but an important political actor; and, of course, this reinforced his relationship with the imperial administration.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the important role played by Doria in the Mediterranean policy of the monarchy gave rise to a set of specific administrative practices. Thus, for instance, in a period when delays in the payment of any military expense were the rule, Doria would receive the money to fund his galleys on time regularly.¹¹⁸ In fact, when any kind of threat risked the correct

¹¹⁶ On Doria's role as guarantor of the political allegiance between Emperor Charles V and the Genoese ruling elite, see Pacini, *La Genova di*, 25. On the strategical and geopolitical importance of Genoa in the Habsburgs' policy see Id., *Desde Rosas*, 70-91.

¹¹⁷ Paradoxically, both the ancient historiography and the most recent one meet on this point. Édourad. Petit, *André Doria. Un amiral condottiere au XVIe siècle (1446-1560)* (Paris: Maison Quantin, 1887) and Parrot, *The business of war*, 80-83.

¹¹⁸ AGS, Estado, Leg. 268, n° 55. Charles V used to urge the empress to pay Doria punctually and in an advantageous way. Letter of Charles V to the Empress Isabel. Innsbruck, 7th May 1531. The following year the Archbishop of Toledo, president of the Council of Castile, received similar instructions. Letter of Charles V to Juan Pardo de Tavera. Brussels, 9th March 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 496, n° 98 and 152-154. This contrasts with the delay in the payment of the funds of the other galley's squadron. Letter of Francisco de Los Cobos to Juan Vézquez de Molina. Barcelona, 4th December 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 268, n° 44.

payment of the galleys, the monarchical agents reacted to avert such problems.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, as we will see in the present section, Rena influenced the way in which the men of the inner circle of the imperial government dealt with Doria and with the naval policy in the Mediterranean, which was crucial, considering that the naval organization of the Hispanic Monarchy was still in the making.

Rena was also aware of the complexity of the logic governing the allegiance between Charles V and Doria. Thus, for example, he reported the extent to which Doria was conscious of his strong position due to the emperor's necessities, saying: 'because he thinks that he is needed, he is considering getting everything or the biggest part'¹²⁰. Furthermore, the commissary reported how Doria's clients aimed to profit from the necessities of the monarchy in those critical moments, when he said: 'because they know the time, they want to take profit from it'.¹²¹ Moreover, Rena acted carefully in respect of Doria's political weight. Clear proof of this could be seen in the different ways in which Rena would express his concerns about Doria, depending on his interlocutors. Interestingly, Rena only made open criticisms in the letters that he wrote to the royal secretary, and not in the letters sent to the emperor. In fact, he admitted the difference between both correspondences when he said: 'I do not write this as clearly to His Majesty, because I do not know if he would appreciate it, and I believe that I dissimulate what is public'.¹²² Rena's decision here shows that he was aware of the importance of not interfering in the service relationship between Andrea Doria and the emperor. Rena also took the precaution of underlining that, despite his multiple questions to Doria, "neither in his conversation nor in his face, has he showed any discontent"; a clear attempt to show that he was able to proceed without provoking Doria's displeasure.¹²³ Rena's behaviour was more than justified, taking into account that any mistake in that regard could affect the alliance with Charles V, in accordance with the political culture of the time.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ As happened in Barcelona in the summer of 1531, when the members of the Generalitat tried to avoid this payment. Letter of Fadrique de Portugal to Charles V. Barcelona, 21st July 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 268, n^o 54.

¹²⁰ 'Porque le parece que de él hay necesidad, el piensa de quedarse con todo o con la mayor parte'. *Ibíd.*

¹²¹ 'Que como conocen el tiempo se quieren aprovechar de él'. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Lepanto, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n^o 6-5, fol. 12.

¹²² 'No escribo esto tan claro en la carta de Su Majestad por que no se si lo tendrá por bien y crea que lo que es público se disimula'. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Lepanto Gulf, 30th October 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n^o 6-5, fols. 10-11.

¹²³ 'En su habla y en su semblante no mostró descontentamiento'. *Ibíd.*

¹²⁴ According to Doria's biographer, one of the main reasons why the Genoese admiral put an end to his relationship with Francis I was his poor relationships with some French royal officers, as well as his

Rena's influence on the shaping of a specific procedure to deal with Doria did not end there; because, after his experience working with Doria, he was considered an expert in the difficult task of handling him. Rena himself showed his expertise in this matter in March 1533, in the framework of the negotiations between Doria and the emperor to organise the latter's journey to Spain. An enterprise like this one was an important episode in the configuration of the service relationship between the emperor and the Genoese admiral.¹²⁵ Precisely for this reason, the crown needed as much information as possible when approaching the negotiations over it. Thus, when Rena got notice that the Genoese admiral had sent his nephew Erasmo Doria to negotiate some matters pertaining to the royal journey, he ran to write to the emperor and his contacts around him, in order to advise them on the aspects that the Genoese admiral aimed to negotiate. One of these aspects was the journey's schedule. Apparently, the admiral was somewhat upset over the planned departure date, thinking it was too early, taking into consideration all the organisational tasks. However, according to Rena, the admiral was fabricating non-existent problems because his real aim was to delay the emperor's travel in order to have enough time to finish the galley that he was constructing for his transport, and to organise a magnificent reception for Charles V in his own palace; two services weighing on Doria's position in the negotiations with the emperor.¹²⁶ All of this shows that Rena was able to discern and communicate Doria's real aims and goals, something quite useful for the men of the imperial government, as it allowed them to hold accurate information on how to approach the negotiations with the Genoese admiral.

Furthermore, Rena also contributed to shaping the ways in which key members of the imperial government dealt with Doria. This is obvious from reading the

discontent over the delay in the payment of his galleys. Lorenzo Capelloni, *Vita del Prencipe Andrea Doria* (Venice: Gabriel Giolito de Ferrari, 1565), 36-37. See also Petit, *André Doria*, 69-73 and Julien de la Gravière, *Doria et Barberousse* (Paris: Plan, 1886), 158-159.

¹²⁵ On the political dimension of such travels, see Manuel Lomas Cortés, "Renovar el servicio a la Monarquía tras la muerte del rey: Juan Andrea Doria y el pasaje de la reina Margarita (1598-1599)," in *Servir al rey en la Monarquía de los Austrias. Medios, fines y logros del servicio al soberano en los siglos XVI y XVII*, ed. A. Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 193-226.

¹²⁶ Rena was aware of the importance of the issue, and precisely because of that he underlined the importance of not sharing this information with Erasmo Doria or with any other person outside the council. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 8th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 11-3, fols. 1-2. On the stay of Charles V in Doria's palace and its political transcendence, see Laura Stagno, "Sovrani spagnoli a Genova: entrate trionfali e "hospitaggi" in casa Doria," in *Genova e la Spagna: opere, artista, committenti, collezionisti*, ed. P. Boccardo, J. L. Colomer and C. di Fabio (Milan: Silvana, 2002), 72-77.

correspondences between Rena and his friends, the royal secretaries Francisco de los Cobos and Pedro de Zuazola. When Rena wrote to the latter before the beginning of the campaign, he confessed that he was spending sleepless nights in bed thinking about how to carry out his duties, ‘because, as I already said in my other letter, that friend of ours [Doria] is so vitreous that everything has to be done by intelligence, and otherwise nothing would be done’.¹²⁷ Months later, when Rena wrote to Cobos regarding the issue referred to, he advised him to act in accordance with the option most suitable to His Majesty’s service, but: ‘taking care of giving contentment to the Prince [Andrea Doria], and doing that would seem that he has to do everything, and write to him affectionately, as this is very important for him’.¹²⁸ He expressed more or less the same idea in his letter to Zuazola, but, as usual, he was more explicit with him:

It is necessary to know how to manage his tempers, because he is so vitreous that, if this is not done, he would be exasperated, and this would be inconvenient at present; and God knows the lengths to which I have gone to amuse him, to accomplish what His Majesty has commanded me.¹²⁹

The adjective “vitreous” referred to Doria’s difficult character and the necessity of managing his affairs carefully.¹³⁰ Interestingly, it was adopted by Zuazola and Cobos to make reference to Doria’s character and the difficult task of managing his issues without provoking the admiral’s displeasure.

Rena himself played a crucial role in defining the way in which Charles V dealt with Andrea Doria. For instance, when Rena was reviewing Doria’s accounts, he wrote to the emperor suggesting he accept Doria’s private records to validate the navy’s expenses: ‘because the Prince [Andrea Doria] is not acquainted with the way that accounts

¹²⁷ ‘Por ser, como por la otra mi carta tengo dicho, tan vidriado aquel nuestro amigo que todo se ha de hacer con él por magna y de otra manera no se haría nada’. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 3rd July 1532. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 3-1, fol. 6.

¹²⁸ ‘Se tenga forma de dar contentamiento al Príncipe e que parezca que todo lo haya de hacer él, e escribirle amorosamente que en esto le irá mucho’. Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Genoa, 8th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 11-3, fol. 3.

¹²⁹ ‘Es menester saberle guardar los tenores porque el es tan vidriado que si esto no se hiciese así el se exasperaría y sería lo que al presente no conviene, y Dios sabe lo que yo he pasado para entretenerme con él por cumplir lo que Su Majestad me mandó’. Letter of Juan Rena to Pedro de Zuazola. Genoa, 8th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 11-3, fol. 4.

¹³⁰ ‘Hombre vidrioso, el que es de condición delicada, y que se siente de cualquier cosa que le digan’. Sebastián de Covarrubias, *Tesoro de la lengua castellana española* (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1611), 72.

are reviewed in Castile, and because he is so friend of himself, I am sure that by rejecting any data from those accounts he would be annoyed'.¹³¹ Rena's words show that he was aware of Doria's difficult character and how to manage him by taking that into account. Moreover, by alleging Doria's ignorance of Castilian administrative procedures and his vulnerability, Rena was also contributing to shaping the favoured treatment that Doria enjoyed in the administrative framework of the Hispanic Monarchy. Clear proof of this was the response that Rena received from the emperor shortly after:

Regarding the accounts of the expenses of the Koroni navy that you say the Prince's servants and agents did, have great temperance, showing to the Prince [Andrea Doria] how much I trust him, not only on the important things, but also in regard to the treasury, for I believe that he will take care of our funds as well as his own; and in the end, take his accounts only with the Prince's signatures and certifications, in case there are no other *recaudos* needed according to the style of the chamber of accounts; because out of respect towards the Prince, it is mandatory to tolerate, and dispense with the rest.¹³²

Charles' positive response to Rena's suggestion is even more interesting considering that one of the key aspects explaining the success of the alliance between the emperor and the Genoese admiral was the complete trust that the former showed towards the latter.¹³³ By underlining the necessity of handling Doria carefully, Rena contributed towards giving a practical dimension to this trust, something that reinforced the alliance between both political actors.

Rena also contributed towards making and maintaining the image of the relationship between Doria and the emperor as being one based on the trust of the former

¹³¹ 'Por no estar el Príncipe [Andrea Doria] informado de la manera que se toman las cuentas en Castilla como por ser tan amigo de si mismo, yo soy cierto que en recusándole cualquier partida de las dichas cuentas se desabrirá'. Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Genoa, 8th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 75, n° 11-3, fols. 1-2.

¹³² 'En lo de las cuentas de los gastos de la armada de Corón que decís que hicieron los criados y hacedores del dicho Príncipe, tened toda la templanza, dando a entender al dicho Príncipe [Andrea Doria] la mucha confianza que de él tengo, no solamente en las cosas mayores, más en las de hacienda, por lo cual tengo creído que mirará por la nuestra tanto como por la suya propia, y al fin pasad por las dichas cuentas por solas firmas y certificaciones del dicho Príncipe, caso que según estilo de contaduría de cuentas no haya los otros recaudos que al caso convengan, porque por el respeto del dicho Príncipe se ha de tolerar y dispensar lo demás.' Letter of Charles V to Juan Rena. Milan, 13th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 1-16, fols. 1-2.

¹³³ According to Grendi, Charles V never showed any doubts about Doria's behaviour. Grendi, "Andrea Doria", 108.

towards the latter. This happened, for instance, during the spring of 1533, when Francisco de los Cobos and Pedro Zuazola decided to employ Rena as a way of avoiding a possible conflict with the Genoese admiral regarding some key issues in the organising of Charles V's journey to Spain. Apparently, Andrea Doria wanted to recruit 50 additional soldiers for each galley in order to make the journey in a safer way. However, Doria's suggestion was not very well received within the emperor's entourage. In fact, it was Charles V himself who asked his secretary Francisco de los Cobos to discuss and reconsider Doria's idea with Pedro de Zuazola.¹³⁴ Doria's suggestion implied three problems for Cobos and Zuazola: first, it would increase the costs of the travel; second, the Castilians preferred to employ experienced soldiers from the Spanish *tercios* in the galleys; and last but not least, taking on these new recruits would mean increasing Doria's influence on the galleys' troops. These reasons pushed the councillors towards rejecting Doria's idea; but, as Zuazola recognised:

We know Doria's glass, and how one is forced to want what he wants; in conclusion, it seemed to us that, both to find out for sure if what Erasmo [Doria] says comes from the Prince [Andrea Doria] and how he takes it, and to know where we stand and what we have to do, I consult Your Mercy about this [...] continuing the negotiation, tell the Prince that he has to receive these fifty men from His Majesty's soldiers, and see if he wants to bring some of their captains or some belongings, and if there is need for more than these fifty, etc. Because with this, he will show what he does and does not want; and advise me of what happens, in order to inform His Majesty and to know what we have to provide. And as Your Mercy understands the matter, there is nothing more to say on it.¹³⁵

Obviously, what the secretaries wanted was to use Rena as a kind of middleman in order to avoid any possible discontent between the admiral and the emperor.¹³⁶ Of

¹³⁴ The emperor's order shows the extent to which he trusted the Genoese admiral.

¹³⁵ 'Pero por otra conocemos el vidrio del Príncipe, y como es forzado querer lo que el quiere, en conclusión, nos pareció que así para sacar en limpio si esto que dice Erasmo procede del Príncipe [Andrea Doria] y como lo toma, para saber en qué estamos y lo que habemos de hacer, que yo avisase de esto a Vuestra Merced [...] que continuando la negociación, diga al Príncipe que debe recibir estos cincuenta hombres de los soldados de Su Majestad y si querrá que entren con ellos sus capitanes o algunos cabos y que vea si pueden caber más de los cincuenta, etc. Porque con esto el saldrá a mostrar lo que quiere o no y que de lo que en ello pasare me de aviso Vuestra Merced para que lo digamos a Su Majestad y sepamos lo que se deba proveer y pues Vuestra Merced entiende la materia no hay más que decir en ella'. Letter of Pedro de Zuazola to Juan Rena. Milan, 13th March 1533. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 74, n° 3-11.

¹³⁶ This was a permanent worry among the emperor's servants. For instance, the Spanish ambassador in Genoa used to try to get notice of Doria's discontent by sounding out his close friends. Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 5th December 1531. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1364, n° 86.

course, the emperor's servants wanted to keep Doria satisfied; but they also aimed to limit as much as possible his influence over the galleys' troops. In order to do this, they needed to proceed in an appropriate way, and Rena, from his strategic position between the Genoese admiral and the imperial administration, was the necessary tool. Step by step, Rena was becoming a key player in a political game that he had helped create with his multiple reports on how difficult it was to handle Doria.

However, Rena's influence on the naval policy of the Hispanic Monarchy was not restricted to the writing of a protocol on how to deal with the Genoese admiral. He also played a role in devising the strategy to limit its extreme dependence on him. In the previous pages, we have already seen how Rena alerted the members of the inner circle to the dangers arising from Doria's powerful position in the framework of the Mediterranean policy of the empire. It seems that the numerous reports sent by Rena to the key men in the inner circle of government were far from useless after all. They served to make one thing clear: the expensive cost of the absolute dependency of the crown on the military enterprise led by Andrea Doria. The necessity of accepting all his demands and excesses was obvious all throughout the campaign; nevertheless, its eventual success made it unnecessary to carry out any change to the military strategy in the Mediterranean. Moreover, in the months following the Koroni campaign, efforts were focused on organising the journey of Charles V to Spain. It was during the preparations for the next great campaign that some decisions were taken by the men of the inner circle of the imperial government which showed that they were disposed towards reducing their complete dependence on Doria's services. The most evident of these was the decision to relaunch the construction of galleys in the dockyards of Barcelona; and once again, Rena occupied a privileged position in their plans.¹³⁷

The ambitious shipbuilding program was part of a bigger plan: the conquest of Tunis. In 1534, Hayreddin Barbarossa, recently appointed as admiral of the Ottoman navy, completed a successful raid all around the Italian coast, culminating in his conquering of Tunis.¹³⁸ Charles V and his advisors decided to confront Barbarossa's

¹³⁷ Unfortunately, Rena's personal archive contains very little information about his activities directing the shipbuilding process in Barcelona, in comparison with the wonderful personal sources that Venetian shipbuilders produced and kept. F. M. Hocker and J. M. McManamon, "Mediaeval Shipbuilding in the Mediterranean and Written Culture at Venice," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 21, n° 1 (2007): 1-37.

¹³⁸ López de Gómara, *Guerras de mar*, 154-159.

menace by attacking his recent acquisition, in order to prevent him from consolidating his conquest. Thus, the campaign's objectives were twofold: firstly, it sought to take from the enemy an important naval base from which he could attack any point on the western Mediterranean; secondly, it reinforced the image of Charles V as protector of the Italian domains in the face of the Ottoman threat, as Tunis was too close to the Italian Peninsula as a naval base. The emperor hastened to present his active response to Barbarossa's challenge and exhibit his power, thereby communicating his willingness to organise a navy capable of destroying that of the Ottomans. Thus, in a letter to Lope de Soria, one of the main diplomatic agents in his service in the Italian Peninsula, he referred to Barbarossa's raid and said:

We order to put together all our galleys to resist and avoid the damage that [Barbarossa] could inflict on Christendom; to Prince Andrea Doria, to the viceroys of Sicily and Naples, we send an order to construct as many galleys as possible to the Prince Andrea Doria, to the viceroys of Naples and Sicily, and here we give an order to quickly make and arm up to 20 galleys or as many as possible in Barcelona and Tortosa, and likewise to assemble galleons and big ships and all the supplies and things needed to prepare a big navy for next spring, to resist that of the enemies and to destroy it, and expel it from the seas of Christendom; and for our part we will do everything that could be needed to this effect.¹³⁹

In contrast to what had happened during the Koroni campaign in 1532, this time the crown decided not to rely exclusively on Doria's services, and tried to create its own naval resources, ordering the construction of galleys in Barcelona.¹⁴⁰ The Council of War

¹³⁹ 'Para remedio dello [...] proveemos que se junten todas nuestras galeras para hacer la resistencia y escusar los daños que en la cristiandad podría hacer con lo que más pareciere necesario, al Príncipe Andrea Doria enviamos a mandar al visorrey de Nápoles y Sicilia para que en aquellos reinos se hagan todas las más galeras que ser pueda y en estos proveemos que se hagan y armen con diligencia hasta 20 en Barcelona y Tortosa se da orden como se hagan todas las que más ser pudiere y así mismo galeones y navíos gruesos se aderecen las provisiones y otras cosas necesarias para que a la primavera se pueda hacer una armada gruesa para resistir a la de los enemigos y ofenderla y echarla de los mares de la Cristiandad y no faltaremos por nuestra parte a hacer todo lo que para este efecto conviniere.' Letter of Charles V to Lope de Soria. Palencia, 4th September 1534. BRAH, Col. Lope de Soria, 9/1952, nº 74. On the activity of this diplomatic agent, see Henar Pizarro Llorente: "Un embajador de Carlos V en Italia: don Lope de Soria (1528-1532)," in *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa*, ed. J. Martínez Millán (Madrid, SECC, 2001), Vol. 4, 119-156.

¹⁴⁰ There were some failed projects to construct galleys in Barcelona in previous years, but only with the aim of organising a small defensive navy. For that reason, I claim that this was a new project and in relation to the new campaign, and not just a part of the previous one. On the construction of galleys in Barcelona, see A. Casals, *L'Emperador i els Catalans. Catalunya a l'Imperi de Carles V (1516-1543)*, (Granollers: Ed. Granollers, 2000), 210-213 and 305-307. Contrary to what happens regarding the medieval period, we

suggested to build them in Barcelona under the direction of Juan Rena, and shortly afterwards, Charles V wrote to the deputies of the *Generalitat* (the main politico-administrative institution of Catalonia) announcing the arrival of Rena to take care of the project.¹⁴¹ In my opinion, it is quite meaningful that the man in charge of this ambitious shipbuilding program was the very one who knew better than anyone else the effects of Andrea Doria's strong position in the Mediterranean strategy of the emperor.

Juan Rena received the news of his new mission while in Pamplona, where he was overseeing the fortification of the city. Rena had thought he would be able to rest in his house for a while, but his ease lasted only two days, as he bitterly lamented on his way to Barcelona.¹⁴² Despite his initial complaining, an already aged Juan Rena actively embraced the project and quickly started to work. As in previous missions, the first thing he did was to devise a plan to coordinate the different actors taking part in this complex task. He drew up a wide supply network to obtain all the resources needed to construct the galleys. This network spread from Naples to Flanders through Sicily, Sardinia, Genoa, Valencia, Malaga, and Biscay. The royal administration started to work according to Rena's plan, sending orders to the authorities of the different territories to secure the correct supplies for Barcelona's dockyards.¹⁴³ The network drawn up by Rena was much bigger and more efficient than the one deployed by his predecessor, Bartolomé Ferrer, the man who had been in charge of constructing galleys in Barcelona previously, and gave further evidence of the radical changes in comparison to the inactivity of the previous period.¹⁴⁴ Rena's activity directing the shipbuilding process was frenetic. Gil Pérez de Bierlas, his servant in charge of managing the correspondence, was so busy writing to the court and to many other different places that he had no time to write to his

know very little about the shipbuilding in Barcelona's dockyards during the first half of the sixteenth century. A. Riera i Melis, "Les Drassanes Reials de Barcelona a la baixa edat mitjana," *Drassana* 3 (1995): 4-8; Id., "La construcció naval a Catalunya a les vespres del grans descobriments geogràfics (1350-1450)," *Revista d'història medieval* 3 (1992): 55-78; and Albert Estrada-Rius, *La Drasana Reial de Barcelona. Organització institucional i construcció naval a la Corona d'Aragó* (Barcelona: Museu Marítim de Barcelona, 2004).

¹⁴¹ AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, s.f. Letter of Charles V to the Deputies of the Generalitat. Palencia, 28th September 1534. ACA, Generalidad, V. 240, n° 131. Girón, *Cronica del Emperador*, 48.

¹⁴² Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Morillo, 15th October 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 65, n° 183.

¹⁴³ AGS, Estado, Leg. 269, n° 123-125. On the difficulty of the logistics and administration regarding shipbuilding, see Susan Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500* (London: Routledge, 2002), 6-23.

¹⁴⁴ ACA, Real Patrimonio, Maestre Racional, Vols. Serie General, A-520, fols. 27-39. Bartolomé Ferrer was the tenant of the treasurer of Catalonia, a charge that he and his family owned for decades. Pere Molas Ribalta, "Las redes de poder de Carlos I en Cataluña," in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano and F. Sánchez-Montes González (Madrid, SECC, 2001), Vol. II, 401.

family or, even worse, to flirt with women, as he bitterly explained to one of his friends.¹⁴⁵ Rena's stakhanovism had productive results, and only some months after his arrival to Barcelona he was able to announce that five galleys were already able to sail, and work on the rest was advancing quickly.¹⁴⁶ The first results of Rena's shipbuilding project were used by Charles V to reinforce the other galley squadron serving under the command of Álvaro de Bazán, less important than Doria's squadron, but mainly composed of galleys belonging to the crown.¹⁴⁷

Unsurprisingly, the shipbuilding project led by Rena soon met with the opposition of Andrea Doria; and in fact, to some extent it was Rena himself who provoked Doria. As we have seen, Rena knew perfectly well the difficult character of the Genoese admiral, but having spent a long time suffering from being in a weak position with regard to Doria, Rena could not resist the temptation of using his authority to write to the Genoese admiral, requesting his collaboration on the shipbuilding project. Thus, when Rena wrote to Doria and to the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, asking them to send raw materials and workers from the Ligurian territory to Barcelona, Doria reacted by writing to Charles V in the following terms:

A letter has arrived to me from the Bishop of Alguer Micer Joan Reina, of the 3 and 8 of this month, in which he tells me about the orders that he has been given for the expedition of the galleys in Barcelona; and, among other things, he has sent here to the ambassador a list of prices and different provisions that he seeks here to this effect (...) if I were young enough, for I am old, I would not be able to control myself.¹⁴⁸

Doria's furious response contrasts with that of the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, who also wrote to Charles V complaining about the issue, but in a more polite way.¹⁴⁹ Both Doria and Figueroa also argued in their letters that the construction of galleys was

¹⁴⁵ Letters of Gil Pérez de Bierlas to Juan de Alarcón. Barcelona, 12th November and 10th December 1534. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 10, n° 14-1 and 3.

¹⁴⁶ Letter of Juan Rena to Charles V. Barcelona, 28th January 1535. AGS, Estado, Leg. 270, n° 101.

¹⁴⁷ Letter of Charles V to Álvaro de Bazán. 3rd December 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 28, n° 105.

¹⁴⁸ 'Mi é sopravvenuto una lettera del Vescovo di L'Argher micer Joan Reina di III et VIII del presente per la quale mi avisa delli ordine che ha datti per la expeditione delle galler che sono in Barcelona, et fra le altre cose ha inviato qua al'imbassatore una lista de precii et de diverse provisione che ricerca da queste bande per tal efetto [...] se io mi fossi ritrovato cossi giovane, c'oe sonno vecchio, non mi sarei potuto contener'. Andrea Doria to Charles V. Genoa, 14th November 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1367, n° 164.

¹⁴⁹ Letter of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V. Genoa, 11th November 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 1367, n° 20.

a demanding task that could delay the departure of the navy; a dangerous prospect, as the objective was to attack Tunis before Barbarossa could prepare its defences. This violent reaction by Doria was easy to understand, as the ambitious construction of the galleys directed by Rena implied a serious threat to his own interests. For one thing, both of Rena and Doria's supply networks were competing for the same strategic and limited resources needed to build and maintain galleys.¹⁵⁰

Competition for raw materials and skilled workers was an important factor in explaining Doria's opposition to the shipbuilding project. However, even more important was the fact that the business of war offered Doria the opportunity to act as a powerful broker over the merchant elite of Genoa, and to construct an enormous clientele system there.¹⁵¹ Since the rumours about the ambitious naval enterprise planned by Charles V had reached Genoa, Andrea Doria was being approached by several people asking for his intercession in front of the authorities of the Hispanic Monarchy, in order to gain access to the profitable business of war, as he related in one of his letters to the emperor:

Having notice about the preparations of Your Majesty for the navy, some citizens and other persons of this city [Genoa] have come to find me, offering to build and arm galleys if Your Majesty would pay them salary for two years [...]. It seemed to me I should advise Your Majesty that I believe that these deals could be convenient because of the speed of the enterprise, which is what matters the most.¹⁵²

As we can see, the shipbuilding project led by Rena not only threatened Doria's interests because it was consuming the same materials that he needed, but also because it was reducing his opportunities to act as a broker in the local sphere, redistributing the economic and symbolic capital derived from the activity of serving the emperor in the

¹⁵⁰ This was especially true in regard of the skilled shipbuilders from Genoa. Luciana Gatti, "Catene d'oro per il maestro Ambrogio. Costruttori di navi tra medioevo ed età moderna nelle fonti notarili genovesi," in *Sapere fare. Studi di storia delle tecniche in area mediterranea* (Pisa: ETS, 2004), 51-84.

¹⁵¹ Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*, 21 and 45.

¹⁵² 'Sentendossi li apparati di Vostra Maestà circa l'armata sono venuti a ritrovarmi alcuni cittadini et alter persone di questa città offerendossi di far fabricare et armare galere contetandossi Vostra Maestà far li dare soldo per dui anni [...] mi e parso farne noticia a Vostra Maestà con quello che creadere fussero aproposito simili partiti per la celerita de la impresa che sopra tutto importa'. Letter of Andrea Doria to Charles V. Genoa, 2nd November 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, n° 115.

defence of the Mediterranean.¹⁵³ In short, the project led by Rena threatened the pillars of Doria's political influence.

Eventually, the Council of War decided to follow Doria's advice and reduced the number of galleys to be constructed in Barcelona in order to concentrate efforts on accelerating the organisation of the navy. Apparently everybody agreed on the necessity of attacking Barbarossa as soon as possible, and even if the galleys were finished on time, it would take months to train the crews.¹⁵⁴ Even Rena knew that time was running out; but he continued working hard to advance the construction of the galleys as much as possible.¹⁵⁵ Creating a new galley squadron was difficult in the framework of an imperial agenda motivated by short term objectives. Doria was able to defend his strong position in the Mediterranean policy of the Hispanic Monarchy because producing new tools to carry out war in the Mediterranean needed a lot of time. Nevertheless, the decision to attempt an ambitious program of shipbuilding shows that the same men who had been forced to accept Doria's pre-eminence were trying to balance the situation. In order to do that, they had to create an alternative to the extreme dependency on Doria's network. Of course, this was a game of non-excluding options. The main motivation for the imperial administration was not get rid of Doria's services. The *leitmotiv* behind Rena's reports and his activity as a galley constructor was to make them cheaper.¹⁵⁶

All of this demonstrates Rena's complex influence on the naval politics of the Hispanic Monarchy. First of all, he contributed to shaping the way in which the members of the imperial administration handled the issues of the allegiance between Charles V and Andrea Doria. Moreover, he also played a paramount role in promoting the creation of new naval forces to be used in pursuit of the imperial agenda in the Mediterranean. He

¹⁵³ It is worth noting that the shipbuilding industry in Genoa was at a very low ebb in these moments. Luciana Gatti, *L'Arsenale e le Galee. Pratiche di costruzione e linguaggio tecnico a Genova tra medioevo ed età moderna* (Genoa: CNR, 1990), 30-32.

¹⁵⁴ AGS, Estado, Leg. 439, s.f.

¹⁵⁵ Letter of Juan Rena to Francisco de los Cobos. Barcelona, 25th November 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 269, n° 121.

¹⁵⁶ In fact, the men who composed the inner circle of the imperial government tried to do that, creating a new galleys squadron, but also seeking the collaboration of other private actors who could sign new *asientos* to construct and arm more galleys in different territories of the empire. Letter of the Archbishop of Zaragoza to Charles V. AGS, Estado, Leg. 269, n° 108; In Andalusia it was the other great *asentista* who was addressed on the matter. Letter of Álvaro de Bazán to Charles V. Vélez, 7th December 1534. AGS, Estado, Leg. 28, n° 120. An unauthorised plan to build 32 galleys in the different territories of the Monarchy in AGS, Estado, Leg. 440. S.f.

did so because, due to the knowledge and experience he gained working hand in hand with Andrea Doria, he was perfectly aware of how dangerous and expensive it was to rely on a single powerful war entrepreneur like the Genoese admiral. With his many reports and communications, he managed to keep the men from the inner circle of the imperial government informed of the real price of conducting war by almost exclusively using Doria's galleys. Finally, when the crown took the decision to launch an ambitious shipbuilding program, Rena was entrusted with directing it. Maybe the project did not fulfil its objectives in the short term, but Rena contributed to the creation of an imperial naval force that included resources directly produced by the imperial administration, in order to not have to depend too much on those of Doria.

Conclusions

Rena's activities in the service of the crown during the Koroni campaign illustrate the complexity of the roles such agents played in the configuration of the "imperial alliances" that made Charles V's empire possible. By looking at the alliance between Charles V and Andrea Doria from Rena's perspective, we can see that it was far from defined in the text of the *asiento*. On the contrary, the terms of collaboration between these two actors were defined on a day-to-day basis during campaigns like the one here analysed. It is within the framework of this configuration that we have to understand the activities and strategies of all the actors taking part in this complex game, including, of course, Juan Rena. Clear proof of his prominent role in the shaping of the norms governing the functioning of this alliance can be seen in his vigilant attitude towards Doria's manoeuvres. Rena's cautions regarding Doria's misuses of the military treasury should be understood not only as a way of exemplifying his efficient vigilance, but also as an attempt to avoid establishing dangerous precedents for the future. In so doing, he showed that he was well aware of the fact that this campaign would be a turning point in the way in which the monarchy conducted war in the Mediterranean scenario. Hence, the control exercised by Rena was rooted in this process of definition. At first glance, the control exercised by the authorities through Rena may have seemed too lax, as most of his cautions regarding Doria's actions had no immediate effects. Nevertheless, this lack of efficacy should be understood in the context of the internal functioning of the network under Doria's command. Some of the practices denounced by Rena were, in fact,

impossible to eradicate, as they were crucial to the correct functioning of the network mobilised by Doria.

Furthermore, Rena also contributed to the shaping of the military policy in the Mediterranean in a different way: by helping the authorities to estimate the costs of the different measures they chose. The letters sent by Rena to the men in the inner circle of the imperial government did not provoke an immediate change in the relationships between the imperial authorities and Andrea Doria. Nevertheless, the information provided by Rena served to make them aware of the costs of their strategy. Only Rena, who worked hand in hand with Doria during the whole campaign, was able to report on the economic and political costs of depending almost exclusively on Doria to exercise a military dominium over the western Mediterranean. It goes without saying that it is quite meaningful that, when the royal councillors considered the need to counterbalance Doria's strong position, they entrusted Rena with the task of creating new options by which to do this. Thus, the relaunch of the naval construction programme under Rena's command is clear proof of the impact of his previous activity providing accurate information on the costs of relying on a single military entrepreneur. The fact that it was none other than Francisco Duarte, Rena's preferred disciple, who inherited Rena's position as the link between the monarchical administration and Doria's network not only indicates Duarte's experience in naval affairs, but also that Rena was recognised as an efficient servant of the emperor in this field.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Francisco Duarte proved himself to be an expert in the management of the naval policy in the Mediterranean Sea and in dealing with Andrea Doria by advising other royal officers on these matters. Letter of Francisco Duarte to Lope de Soria. S.f. BRAH, Col. Lope de Soria, 9/1954, n° 230. Interestingly, Duarte adopted a completely different attitude to that of Rena and became an intimate and loyal supporter of Andrea Doria. Airaldi, *Andrea Doria*, 138 and 159.

Conclusions

At the end of the sixteenth century one of the collaborators of the royal chronicler Esteban de Garibay visited Pamplona's cathedral taking note of the inscriptions on its walls. Among the many epitaphs that he transcribed one is especially interesting to us, the one placed on a tomb behind the choir of the cathedral. The epitaph said as follows:

Joannes Reyna Illustris Venetus Caroli viro Imperator
a cosim huius Ecclesie antistes, pauperum [r]efugium
exiquo permit lapide. Obit Toleti, anno Domini 1538.
18 Januarii.¹

The note of the inscription was completed with a brief reference to Rena's coat of arms that included an eagle, the emblem of the empire, a rampant lion symbolising bravery, valour and strength; and some waves acknowledging Rena's association with the sea. This austere epitaph and the coat of arms reflected Rena's life in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy, but even if appear interesting to us, they had little impact on the

¹ The original epitaph has disappeared together with Rena's tomb, but the content of this inscription has arrived to us because its transcription was included in one of the notebooks in which Esteban de Garibay collected his materials. BRAH, 9/329, fol. 182. On Garibay's activity as historian in the service of the crown see Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 115-117, 133-135 and 139-144.

royal chronicler who, unsurprisingly, did not make reference to Rena in any of his works. This “Joannes Reyna” could have been a man of Emperor Charles V, but the royal chronicler did not include him in the history books that he had to write. Rena had no part to play in a historic narrative where providence’s will was the main driving force, and the monarchs were its agents.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Rena’s life in the service of the Hispanic Monarchy tells us a lot about the construction of the empire. In fact even after his death, he continued showing how this empire functioned. Juan Rena passed away on 18th January 1539, while he was at the imperial court in Toledo. The news of his death travelled fast. Francisco Duarte organised a commemorative mass for Rena’s soul in the church of Santa Maria la Nuova in Naples.² Only three days after Rena’s death, the Marquis of Cañete (the viceroy of Navarre) wrote to Juan de Alarcón, Rena’s successor as the military paymaster of Navarre, to send his condolences for the death of his mentor. At the end of his letter he wrote: ‘God willing he lingers in memory’.³ These words expressed his sincere conviction about Rena’s exemplary life as a king’s servant. Nevertheless, Rena’s memory as a reliable king’s man soon started to be contested. When Juan de Alarcón was appointed as paymaster of Navarre, he was asked to present Rena’s accounts. After reviewing Rena’s documentation, he suggested that Rena owed a large amount of money to the crown.⁴ Juan de Vergara, Rena’s advanced disciple) reacted by defending Rena’s reputation against Alarcón’s accusations.⁵ Alarcón remained firm in his decision and wrote a memorandum showing that between 1527 and 1528 Rena received more than 10,400,000 maravedíes, but he only spent about 9,000,000 maravedíes.⁶ The bureaucrats of the *contaduría mayor de cuentas* (the accounting office of expenditures) tried to shed light on the matter by reviewing Rena’s accounts kept in this office, but the result of their investigation only confused matters further as they did not concur with either Vergara’s version or with Alarcón’s previous enquiry.⁷ The controversy over Rena’s administrative

² Letter of Antonio Orejón to Juan de Alarcón. Naples, 28th February 1539. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 78, n° 9-2.

³ ‘Plegue a Dios que [Rena] dure en la memoria’. Letter of the Marquis of Cañete to Juan de Alarcón. Cuenca, 21st January 1539. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 50, n° 2-1.

⁴ Letter of the Council of Navarre to Charles V. Pamplona, 2nd February 1539. AGS, Estado, Leg. 348, n° 53.

⁵ AGS, Leg. 349, n° 17 and Letter of Juan de Vergara to Juan de Alarcón. Toledo, 24th April 1539. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 78, n° 12-2.

⁶ AGS, Estado, Leg. 348, n° 174.

⁷ AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, Leg. 1429.

activity moved to the courts where Alarcón and Vergara continued litigating. Nevertheless, the technical difficulty to review Rena's account meant that the trial continued for years without arriving at a clear conclusion.⁸

Outside the courts the controversy over Rena's memory took a different path. After Alarcón's accusations royal orders were sent to Navarre that commanded the seizure of Rena's goods as a way to pay his debt to the crown off.⁹ We will never know why Alarcón decided to question Rena's management of the emperor's resources, but most probably it had something to do with his difficulties in justifying his own activity as paymaster.¹⁰ It is much easier to discern why the authorities decided to accept his version about Rena's debt; because they were useful for them. For the Marquis of Cañete (who considered Rena to be a trustworthy servant) as well as for the members of the central military administration, accepting Alarcón's version instead of that of Vergara was a way to obtain additional funds for the fortification of Pamplona. A year after Rena's death, the viceroy of Navarre advised that Rena's goods be used to fund the fortification of Pamplona.¹¹ Unsurprisingly the inner circle of the imperial administration (always in search of resources to fund the military expenses) agreed. During the summer of 1539, even before the courts had made a decision on Rena's debt, the Council of War sent orders commanding the trustees' of Rena's estate, to sell his goods and to put the proceeds into the fortification of Pamplona.¹² During the following months the Marquis of Cañete and Juan de Alarcón used Rena's estate to fund the works on the city walls.¹³ Next summer, when the emperor considered the possibility of repeating this measure, Francisco de los Cobos replied that the money from Rena's debt was already spent in the fortification of the city.¹⁴ With this last involuntary service Rena contributed to the construction of a frontier even after his death, and it seems that this last service helped to preserve Rena's memory because a part of the defences of Pamplona were called 'Juan Rena's tower'.¹⁵

⁸ AGN, Tribunales Reales, 065185/16014763, fols. 61 and 86.

⁹ AGS, Estado, Leg. 348, n° 167-169.

¹⁰ He had problems to justify his own accounts already before Rena's death, and continued having similar problems during his whole career. Letter of Pedro del Peso to the Empress Isabel. Pamplona, 6th July 1538. AGS, Estado, Leg. 348, n° 122; and Letter of Luis de Velasco to Francisco de Ledesma. Pamplona, 23rd September 1547. AGS, Estado, Leg. 353, n° 184.

¹¹ Letter of the Marquis of Cañete to Charles V. Pamplona, 5th August 1539. AGS, Estado, Leg. 348, n° 27.

¹² AGS, GyM, Leg. 16, n° 6, 8 and 9; and Leg. 1324, n° 54.

¹³ AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 50, n° 2-4 and 5.

¹⁴ Letter of Francisco de los Cobos to Charles V. Madrid, 26th June 1540. AGS, Estado, Leg. 64, n° 188.

¹⁵ F. Idoate, "Las fortificaciones de Pamplona a partir de la conquista de Navarra," *Príncipe de Viana* 54-55 (1954): 71 and 118-119.

Rena also had a voice in the construction of his memory. Like many others he ordered in his will that funerary chapel be built for himself in the cathedral of Pamplona.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the chapel was never constructed because Rena's goods were seized. In addition to the chapel, Rena also wrote a sort of autobiography that he called 'my chronicle'.¹⁷ Unfortunately this text seems to have been lost. Maybe it was one of the writings that Rena had with him when he passed away, that were confiscated by the agents of the Papal Nuncio. However, it was more likely that it disappeared in 1529 when Rena was on a ship bound for Genoa, and got caught in a tempest in which a majority of the ship's contents was swept out to sea.¹⁸ Paradoxically, the enquiry on Rena's activity administrating the crown's resources was at the base of his long-lasting memory. If we the historians can focus on Rena it is mainly because of his wonderful archive, and the archive was only created due to the enquiry on Rena's administration. Juan de Vergara suggested that Rena's archive be kept as a way for knowing the truth about Rena's debts. Only three weeks later Charles V ordered that Rena's documentation be kept in the archive of the *Cámara de Comptos* (Chamber of Accounts) in Pamplona.¹⁹ Considering the archive's content and its order, it is clear that Rena did not compose it with the intention of narrating his life service to the emperor.²⁰ Rena gave form to his archive only as means to justify his professional activity. This is why he accumulated thousands and thousands of documents that allows us to analyse his activity as king's man in-depth.

To a great extent, Rena's participation in the construction of his own memory mirrored his role in helping to shape the Hispanic Monarchy. He constructed his archive on a day to day basis, and through his day to day activities Rena helped to create the

¹⁶ Rena ordered in his last will (written just one day before his death) to use his goods to fund the construction of this chapel that, apparently, was already being constructed. AGN, Tribunales Reales, 065185/16014763, s.f.

¹⁷ It appears in the inventory of things that Rena brought with him to the imperial court in 1525. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 105, nº 14-1

¹⁸ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Francisco de los Cobos. Pamplona, 6th June 1540. AGS, Estado, Leg. 349, nº 20; and letter of Juan Rena to Juan de Alarcón. Genoa, 30th August 1529. AGN, AP_RENA, Caj. 6, nº 1-16.

¹⁹ Letter of Juan de Vergara to Francisco de los Cobos. Pamplona, 6th June 1540. AGS, Estado, Leg. 349, nº 20; and AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, Lib. 251, fol. 80-81.

²⁰ On the rationale behind the ordering of early modern archives, see F. de Vivo, "Ordering the archive in early modern Venice (1400-1650)," *Archival Science* 10 (2010): 231-248; and José Luis Rodríguez de Diego and Julia T. Rodríguez de Diego, "Un archivo no sólo para el rey. Significado social del proyecto simanquino en el siglo XVI," in *Felipe II (1527-1598) Europa y la Monarquía Católica*, ed. J. Martínez Millán (Madrid: Parteluz, 1998), Vol. 4, 463-474.

manner and form of this polity. In both cases Rena was just one actor in a collective process, he had a voice, but not the predominant one. However, his activity serving the crown allows us to see the role that a king's man could take in this collective process. Of course, Rena did not write a single line of Charles V's imperial project (a task reserved for his close councillors) but he played a key role in bringing this project to life. Focusing on Rena's activity as a king's man highlights the need for further study on the architects behind the construction of this empire, but also on the anonymous masons, carpenters and skilled labourers who constructed it in situ, and made the fantasy a reality.

Contrary to what Esteban de Garibay and many others have thought, looking at the empire from Rena's perspective is one of the best ways to understand its construction. The creation and shaping of the empire involved the efforts of thousands of actors. By looking at the empire as a collective construction through Rena's eyes, we can go beyond the long-lasting views of the Hispanic Monarchy (and early modern empires in general) which are based on a centre-periphery approach. Moreover, by examining Rena's activity we can assess the impact that these less important men had in shaping and moulding the empire. In fact by examining the empire building process from Rena's perspective we can see that places such as Oran and Navarre that have been labelled as peripheries were in fact vibrant political spaces. Furthermore, Rena's case has made clear that the so-called centre (the crown and the core institutions of the empire) frequently just confirmed the rules and practices that were already being used among the actors who were shaping the politics in the local arena of these "peripheries".

What I want to underline here are the benefits of taking an actor-based approach. Following Rena's story has allowed us to study the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy in a more precise way than the analytical approaches deriving from a centre-periphery narrative. In fact, by looking at the empire building process through Rena's eyes we have seen how political power was distributed and how power relations were articulated on different scales. Furthermore we have explored how the decision-making process worked and, most importantly, how the different actors implemented, adapted, and contested imperial policy. Most important, we have seen that, characters like Rena who enjoyed a symbolic yet powerful connection with the monarch, were called on to act as crucial imperial agents on the ground.

Of course we should not exaggerate Rena's agency in the empire building process. Rena was able to advance in his career as a king's man because he excelled in most of the tasks entrusted to him, but he was never a lone figure. His early years serving as a diplomat from below made him part of the process of Spanish expansion in to the Maghreb. As a king's man in the Maghreb, Rena was a member of the networks that facilitated the expansion and government of the empire. As his career advanced he also began creating the networks that sustained the territorial expansion of the empire. Hence, during his stay in Navarre, Rena's strategic position between the imperial administration and the local community allowed him to mobilise the local resources needed to ensure the region's military defence. At the same time, he was able to reinforce the political alliance between the king and his Navarrese subjects by bridging the structural gap between the crown and the kingdom. Rena also adopted a protagonist role in the construction of the naval administration during the 1520's and the 1530's. As such, his case provides an example of how important the personal networks of a king's man could be in mobilising resources during wartime. King's men like Rena not only played a crucial role in constructing networks in the service of the crown, they also merged with pre-existing networks in order to fulfil Charles V's demanding military agenda. This was evident when Rena worked as commissary general of the navy and played a key role in shaping the alliance between Charles V and Andrea Doria as well as the emperor's naval policy in the Mediterranean.

Throughout his career serving the monarchy, Rena constructed and articulated different networks. These networks proved useful to advance the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb, the construction of the imperial frontiers, as well as the incorporation of political communities, and the mobilisation of resources for war. The networks that Rena constructed had a clear objective: mobilising the resources that the crown needed in order to carry out his imperial policy. Nevertheless, if Rena's networks functioned well it was because they also served to redistribute different resources among its members. When Rena secured the collaboration of different actors to fund a frontier's defence or to mobilise resources for war, he was contracting debts with them. His activities in Navarre and his work as a general purveyor are good examples of this point. The debts that king's men like Rena contracted while serving the crown also had a political price. As we have seen, a great deal of Rena's success in his various tasks relied on his capacity to pay his debts. By paying this price Rena was helping to shape the rules

that ensured the smooth running of his networks. In other words, service to the crown was a concept with many different practical applications in early modern politics. Rena, and the king's men like him, played a crucial role in defining them.

Although there were many ways to serve the crown, and like multiple forms of reward Rena took a practical approach in his form of service. His way was to follow a common principle: to balance the imperial agenda of Charles V and his councillors with the aims and needs of the many people involved in the empire building process. His own career as a royal servant is an excellent example of this because it shows that this principle was part of the moral economy governing the behaviour of the members of the imperial administration. Beyond the administrative sphere, Rena provided us with many examples of this principle in practice throughout his career. When he helped the Alcaide de los Donceles to convert Oran into a trading hub he was allowing the nobleman to make his military activity a source of benefit that would allow him to keep serving the monarch on the frontier. A similar situation occurred with Doria's network. Rena was perfectly aware of the latter's abuses, but he was willing to compromise them to keep the imperial navy in a working order. As we can see, king's men like Rena played an important role in maintaining this delicate equilibrium of the networks that kept the empire working.

The networks that Rena created and managed were the bedrock of his influence and allowed him to participate in the shaping of the different political spaces that he inhabited. As we have seen, Rena's early service in the process of Spanish expansion into the Maghreb was at the base of the complex local politics in these new Spanish outposts. The social fabric of Oran and the close engagement between this city and the surrounding territories are a good example of how influential men like Rena and his network were. His activities working for the Alcaide de los Donceles are also a good example at this point because it shows that Rena played a crucial role in the configuration of a political space due to the necessity of defending this new frontier. Something similar happened regarding his activity on another frontier: Navarre. During the years that he spent working there Rena became a protagonist in the political life of this kingdom. As such he influenced Navarre's incorporation into the Hispanic Monarchy creating the needed internal consensus, but also helping to delimitate Navarre's place in relation with the other kingdoms that composed the empire. As we can see, Rena's agency in shaping of different political spaces evolved from his ability to influence the social fabric of a frontier

stronghold like Oran, to place an entire kingdom on the financial map of the new empire. His administrative activity is also meaningful at this point. Rena participated in the shaping of the *ethos* that governed the behaviour the new imperial administration. Furthermore, Rena also contributed to the construction of a military administration that mobilised resources for war by paying for this service in many different ways, like granting political support to local authorities. Later as commissary of the navy Rena contributed to shape the practical conditions of the alliance between Andrea Doria and Charles V and he managed to do that by making naval warfare in the Mediterranean a profitable activity for both parties. This major contribution showed that Rena played a defining role in the naval policy of the Hispanic Monarchy throughout the Mediterranean.

Most of Rena's contributions were short lived like his excellent reputation as a king's man. The progressive integration of Navarre into the Hispanic Monarchy left no room for a new outstanding mediator like Rena. The authoritarian rule of the Fernandez de Córdoba over Oran changed the local politics that left out Rena's friends. The strategy adopted to mobilise resources for war completely changed as this task passed to be managed by government authorities. During the years that followed, the men conducting naval warfare in the Mediterranean forgot about Rena and his lessons. Finally, something similar happened regarding Rena's protégées. His advantaged disciples (Juan de Vergara and Francisco Duarte) inherited his offices in the imperial administration. Both learned how to behave as royal officers while serving Rena but they acted in a different way. At a higher level the empire of Charles V continued experiencing deep changes like those during the first half of the sixteenth century.²¹ The empire continued changing and new challenges emerged. Nevertheless, no matter how deep these changes were, it was king's men like Rena who made this polity function, and would always have a paramount place in shaping and re-shaping it.

The changing nature of the empire as well as the dynamism of its internal politics created an environment where actors like Rena could play a decisive role. Characters like him were best equipped to deal with these changes and to play a role in making them possible. At least this is what we can learn from Rena's career, he was a man who began serving the Hispanic Monarchy as an obscure merchant, but succeed to become one of

²¹ Maria José Rodríguez Salgado, *The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

the most reliable servants of a global emperor. From his daily activities in the service of the crown, Rena helped to construct an empire that functioned thanks to the support of many different actors who followed the imperial cause. In so doing he was constructing an empire in which, king's men like him, would always occupy a place of paramount importance because they played a key role in making this collective support and defining its political price. Without a doubt it is with these final words that I can say, Rena's major contribution to the construction of the Hispanic Monarchy turned to be long-lasting.

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