

Turning your back on the EU. The role of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections

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Abstract

This paper analyses how disaffection with the EU influenced individuals' likelihood of turning out to vote and of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party in the 2014 EP elections, and how these relationships were moderated by the Eurosceptic partisan supply of each country. We argue that the degree to which political parties oppose European integration, as well as the ideological leaning of Eurosceptic parties, should influence both the likelihood of disaffected citizens turning out to vote, and their likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. Our empirical findings show that, in the presence of a party that is strongly opposed to European integration, disaffected citizens are more likely to turn out to vote and to vote for a Eurosceptic party provided that this party also shares their ideological leaning in the left-right dimension. These results indicate that Eurosceptic parties are important actors for the politicization of the European integration conflict and for the europeanization of EP elections, but, at the same time, they suggest that opposition to European integration is subordinate to the traditional left-right conflict.

Keywords: Eurosceptic parties, disaffection, euroscepticism, European Parliament Elections, voting behaviour, turnout.

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1. Introduction

The 2014 European elections have seen the spectacular rise of the Eurosceptic vote in France, where the Front National made no less than 24.9 percent and became the strongest party, and in Great Britain, where UKIP did even better obtaining 26.8 percent, which also put it in first place among its competitors. In the other countries, the advances of right-wing Euroceptics were less impressive, but they also gained, for example, in Austria, where the FPÖ obtained 19.7 percent (up from 12.7 percent); or in Sweden, where the Sweden Democrats reached 9.7 percent (up from 3.3 percent). In Southern Europe, new Eurosceptic parties from the populist left made considerable inroads into the electorate of their competitors: Syriza gained 26.6 percent to become the largest party in Greece, the left-leaning M5S obtained 21.2 percent in Italy, and the newly created Podemos made 8.0 percent.

The success of these parties has come as a shock for some observers, and many of them have taken it as an alarm signal that something is amiss with European integration. While not taking issue with the preoccupation of these observers about the state of European integration, we would like to argue that the rise of Eurosceptic parties contributes to the politicization of Europe and to the Europeanization of European elections. The ‘sleeping giant’ finally seems to be waking up – even if not in the way expected by most observers.

In our analysis of the 2014 European elections, we study to what extent the outcome of European elections has been Europeanized, i.e. to what extent it has been driven by attitudes about European integration. More specifically, we ask whether and how such attitudes have influenced participation and the vote choice in this election. With respect to participation, our basic hunch is that Eurosceptic or disaffected voters are fundamentally put off by anything touching on Europe, which means that they are less likely to participate in European elections. With respect to vote choice, we expect disaffection with European integration and its institutions to influence voters’ likelihood of engaging in Eurosceptic

voting. As we shall argue, both expectations are conditioned by the specific Eurosceptic partisan offer of each member-state, which is likely to influence the electoral behaviour of disaffected citizens. The degree to which political parties oppose European integration in a given country as well as their ideological leaning, are expected to influence both the likelihood of disaffected citizens to turn out to vote, and their likelihood to vote for a Eurosceptic party.

To analyse the impact of Eurosceptic parties on turnout and vote choice we proceed in two steps: first, we provide an overview of the partisan supply in the EU member states in terms of two dimensions – the European integration dimension and the conventional left-right dimension. In a second step, we then analyse the impact of attitudes towards the EU on voters' behaviour in the European elections, conditioned by each country's Eurosceptic partisan offer. Before we turn to our empirical analysis based on data from the 2014 European Election Study (EES) and the euandi dataset, we present the theoretical underpinnings for our hypotheses, as well as the details of our data and operationalization.

2. Politicization of European integration and the Eurosceptic demand and supply

Not so long ago, Mair (2000) stressed that 'Europe' neither significantly affected the format nor the mechanics of party systems. With the exception of a few new parties, most parties rarely competed over European issues. In addition, the Eurosceptic parties only gained a small share of the votes. Some years later, under the impact of the rejection of the European Constitution by Dutch and French voters in 2005, Mair (2007) acknowledged that there was 'disparate evidence pointing to the growing opposition to Europe.' In his analysis of this mounting opposition to Europe, however, he suggested that the giant was not only sleeping, but that it had been positively sedated by the political leaders' strategies designed to 'depoliticize' the process of European integration. The impossibility to organize policy-related opposition within the EU had given rise to a lack of opposition altogether, or,

alternatively, to an opposition of principle against the EU, to an intrinsically Eurosceptic opposition. More recent analysis have shown that European integration has become a highly controversial issue in both the electoral and protest arenas (Hutter and Grande, 2014), and that the process of politicization of this conflict has been accentuated by the euro-crisis (Grande and Kriesi, 2015).

To study the role of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European elections context of increasing politicization of European integration, we distinguish between the Eurosceptic political potential on the demand side, and the Eurosceptic partisan offer on the supply side. On the demand side, as Hooghe and Marks (2009) have summarized, individual attitudes towards European integration are rather well structured, affect national voting and are connected to the basic dimensions that structure contestation in European societies. Analyses conducted more than a decade ago concluded that on the citizens side we could already find potential for contestation over European issues (Eijk and Franklin, 2004). In fact, recent studies reveal that the Eurosceptic potential on the demand side has been growing as a result of the euro-crisis (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2014). In line with Mair's suggestion that a polity which does not allow for policy-specific opposition will create principled opposition against the polity itself, we consider individual level Euroscepticism here in terms of disaffection with the EU. In other words, for our purposes, individual level Euroscepticism is conceived as the opposite of diffuse support for the EU.

On the supply side, Hooghe and Marks (2009) have pointed out that there is nothing inevitable about the politicization of European integration. It takes partisan entrepreneurs who are ready, capable and willing of mobilizing the latent structural potentials for Euroscepticism to become politically and electorally relevant. If an issue is not debated in public and is not articulated by political organizations it can only be politicized to a limited extent (Hutter and Grande, 2014). Hence, the Eurosceptic partisan offer plays a crucial role for the politicization

of the European integration conflict, especially since this is a process that until now has been mainly driven by actors who are critical of European integration (Grande and Kriesi, 2015; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The presence or absence of parties that are strongly opposed to European integration is a crucial element for the politicization of this political conflict and the activation of the latent potential of the demand side. Previous studies already pointed to the possibility that the limited choices about different visions of Europe citizens were offered in elections may have limited the realization of the demand side potential for contestation over European issues (Eijk and Franklin, 2004).

As it will become apparent below, however, to analyse the extent to which Eurosceptic parties may activate the demand side latent potential and thus contribute to the politicization of Europe we cannot ignore the fact that domestic political competition has been traditionally dominated by the left-right divide. While different models of political conflict in the EU proposed alternative ways in which the European integration and left-right conflicts might be linked, the dominant view today is that the relationship between the two is best described as an inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al., 2004). One of the implications of this is that Eurosceptic parties can be found on both sides of the left-right dimension. Analyses of the politicization of the European integration conflict have also reached the conclusion that this process does not take place along the left-right dimension (Grande and Kriesi, 2015). This implies that the conflict over European integration cuts across the left-right divide, and thus has the potential to be politicized by either left- or right-wing Eurosceptic parties or by both, depending on the Eurosceptic partisan offer of each country. Hence, in order to fully characterize each country's supply side potential to activate the Eurosceptic demand side we not only distinguish between countries with parties that strongly oppose European integration and countries with parties that do not or only weakly oppose European integration, but we also take into consideration the left-right positioning of the parties that strongly oppose European integration. *Figure 1* summarizes the four possible supply side scenarios. As we

propose next, each of these scenarios carries different implications for the mobilization of Eurosceptic individuals and the politicization of European integration.

<Figure 1 here>

3. Euroscepticism and electoral behaviour in the 2014 EP elections: hypotheses

We begin by considering the direct effect of disaffection with the EU on the likelihood of turning out to vote in EP elections. The relationship between attitudes towards the EU and turnout in European elections is contested. On the one hand, and in line with the notion that EP elections are second order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), studies analysing different EP elections concluded that EU related considerations hardly have an impact on the likelihood of turning out to vote (Schmitt and Eijk, 2007; Schmitt and Mannheimer, 1991). On the other hand, other studies have shown that negative orientations towards the EU are associated with a lower turnout in EP elections (Blondel, 1998; Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Hobolt et al., 2009).

A similar disagreement exists with regard to the relationship between generalized political trust – a close relative of political support – and political participation. There are two competing hypotheses in this respect: one of them claims that the trusting should participate to a greater extent than the distrusting – at least in conventional activities, while the other claims the exact opposite, that the distrusting should participate to a greater extent, especially in unconventional activities. The idea that distrust might discourage participation was inspired by early theorizing about political alienation (Almond and Verba, 1965). The upshot of the results with respect to turnout seems to be that distrust encourages participation only under quite specific circumstances (Levi and Stoker 2000). Therefore, and taking into consideration that participation through conventional channels may be conceived as an expression of tacit support for the political system (Barnes et al., 1979), we generally expect disaffection with the EU to lead to less participation:

H1: the greater the voters' disaffection with the EU, the less likely they will be to turn out to vote in EP elections.

Turning to the question of the vote choice in the 2014 European elections, we focus on a very specific aspect of this choice – the likelihood of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party. Like in the case of turnout the literature has also provided contrasting arguments about the relevance of EU related considerations for the vote choice in European elections. However, although the influential second-order thesis (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) implied that EU concerns should not be determinant for party choice in EP elections, recent studies indicate that EU considerations are increasingly relevant for the voters' choices (Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt et al., 2009). In fact, when focusing on Eurosceptic voting different studies have shown that European considerations constitute a relevant predictor (Spanje and Vreese, 2011; Vreese and Tobiasen, 2007). Therefore, in a context of increasing politicization of European integration our basic expectation is that voters who are disaffected with the EU and turn out to vote will be increasingly likely to cast a vote for a Eurosceptic party as a way of signalling their discontent with the current process of European integration. Hence,

H2: the greater the voters' disaffection with the EU, the more likely they will be to vote for a Eurosceptic party.

Introducing the Eurosceptic partisan offer, however, we need to qualify these two general expectations. As we argue above, the supply side is important for the politicization of the European integration conflict and the activation of the latent potentials on the demand side. As outlined in *Figure 1*, since the European integration dimension cuts across the left-right dimension there are four possible Eurosceptic supply side scenarios. While in 'comprehensive Euroscepticism' contexts citizens are offered a variety of choices in the European integration and left-right dimensions, in the other contexts the choices at the disposal of citizens are more limited. These differences across contexts are likely to influence

disaffected citizens likelihood of turning out to vote and of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party.

As already pointed out, the literature that analyses the negative relationship between political distrust and turnout in national elections, suggests that this relationship involves complex interactions and contingencies (Levi and Stoker, 2000). In particular, when citizens are offered a party choice that clearly addresses the source of their discontent, distrust may no longer discourage turnout (Hernández, 2015). Accordingly, in contexts where there are some parties that strongly oppose European integration the negative effect of disaffection with Europe on voter turnout should be mitigated, because, given their clear critical stance on European integration, these parties should be able to mobilize disaffected citizens.

However, several studies have argued that left-right considerations, which drive electoral behaviour in national elections, also play a critical role in European elections (Brug et al., 2007; Freire et al., 2009). This implies that we have to take into account the positioning of the Eurosceptic parties on the left-right divide as well. Typically these parties are not single-issue parties that exclusively focus on the European integration conflict. As a matter of fact, their identity is usually based on their position on the left-right divide and not on their opposition to European integration. Accordingly, a ‘suitable’ party capable of mobilizing the disaffected voters in EP elections should not only be a party strongly opposed to European integration, but also a party from the voters’ own ideological camp in left-right terms. Thus, in a ‘left biased Euroscepticism’ context, the negative effect of EU disaffection on the likelihood of turning out to vote is expected to be mitigated only for disaffected citizens with a left-wing ideology, and vice-versa in a ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ context. As a consequence,

H1.1: the negative effect of disaffection with the EU on the likelihood of turning out to vote will be weaker in the presence of parties that strongly oppose EU integration, and

at the same time, share the respondent's ideological position on the left-right dimension.

In the case of vote choice, the impact of EU attitudes on voters' choices is also likely to vary as a function of contextual factors. In a context in which parties strongly opposed to the EU are absent ('limited Euroscepticism') it is likely that the European integration conflict will be 'depoliticized', and therefore voters will be less likely to base their vote on EU attitudes. By contrast, in contexts with parties strongly opposed to European integration, this conflict is more likely to be politicized, and disaffected voters are provided with a partisan choice that offers them the proper means to express their disaffection with the EU and they are expected to vote accordingly.

However, as in the case of turnout, we need to take into consideration that both parties and voters also take positions on other important political conflicts that influence political behaviour, mainly the left-right divide. In fact, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) argued that when selecting a party and forced to choose between left-right and EU-integration preferences voters were more likely to prioritize the former over the latter. As a consequence, in the absence of a 'suitable' party, i.e. a party that is strongly opposed to European integration and is at the same time located in the voters' own ideological camp, Eurosceptic voters will not have the proper means to express their disaffection with European integration. Hence, if these voters participate at all under these circumstances, their disaffection with the EU should not substantially increase their likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. While in a 'comprehensive Euroscepticism' context we expect all disaffected citizens to be more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party, in biased contexts we only expect disaffected citizens who ideologically align with the party strongly opposed to European integration to be more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party:

H2.1: the positive effect of disaffection with the EU on the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party will be stronger in the presence of parties that strongly oppose EU

integration, and at the same time, share the respondent ideological position on the left-right dimension.

4. Data and operationalization

The empirical analyses of this paper draw on data from the euandi party level dataset and the EES (Schmitt et al., 2015; Trechsel et al., 2014). To position parties on the EU-integration dimension we rely on six euandi items. These variables capture the parties' position on European integration (whether European integration and the euro are good things), on EU decision making mechanisms (member states veto powers, and the need of referendum for any new EU treaty), and on the need for further integration in defence and foreign policy (strengthen EU defence policy, and one voice for EU foreign policy). Factor analysis confirms that all these items load on a single dimension. The mean of these items is assigned to each party with values lower than 0 indicating a critical stance towards the EU or a Eurosceptic position, and values higher than 0 a Europhile position.^{1 2} To position parties on the left-right dimension we rely on EES respondents' perception of the parties' location on the left-right dimension, with values lower than 0 (6 in the original EES scale) indicating a position on the left and values higher than 0 a position on the right.³

Combining the EU-integration and left-right dimensions allows us to provide a comprehensive picture of the partisan supply of each of the countries under consideration. In order to classify countries in each of the scenarios presented in *Figure 1* we first distinguish

¹ Exploratory factor analysis of these items yielded one dimension with all items loading strongly on this single dimension. All items were recoded so that higher values indicate a Europhile position. A substantial number of parties did not take a position in all items. Therefore, relying on the factor scores to predict parties' positions on this dimension produced a large number of missing values. As a remedy, we computed the mean of the non-missing items for each party.

² Appendix-B provides details about the coding and distribution of the variables of this paper.

³ To assess the considerations that citizens take into account when placing parties on the left-right dimension we analyse the correlation between the placements of parties in this dimension and their position on four conflicts (cultural clash, moral, socioeconomic, EU integration) as measured by Dalton (this issue) using the euandi dataset. Parties' left-right placement reflects their position on the first three conflicts with correlation coefficients as follows: cultural clash 0.56, moral issues 0.44, socio-economic issues 0.73. In contrast, in the case of the EU integration conflict the correlation is negligible (0.03) and not statistically significant.

between Eurosceptic parties that are strongly opposed to European integration (parties with a value equal or lower than -0.5 on the EU-integration dimension), and parties that are only weakly or not at all opposed to European integration (parties with values higher than -0.5). A country is considered to have a strong left- or right-wing Eurosceptic party if there is at least one party strongly opposed to European integration in the corresponding ideological quadrant.

Our first dependent variable (voting) captures whether the respondent turned out to vote (=1) or not (=0) in the 2014 EP elections.⁴ Our second dependent variable captures whether a respondent voted for a Eurosceptic party (=1) or not (=0), based on the position of the party in the EU integration dimension. As a difference from the operationalization of the partisan supply, to operationalize the vote for Eurosceptic parties we do not distinguish between Eurosceptic parties that are strongly and weakly opposed to European integration. Hence, all parties that adopt a critical stance towards the EU (i.e. values lower than 0 in the EU-integration dimension) are considered Eurosceptic. The use of these different cut-offs is fundamental to test whether, as we expect, disaffected voters are more likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties in contexts where we can find Eurosceptic parties strongly opposed to European integration. Adopting the same threshold for the two variables (e.g. -.5) would prevent us from making the critical comparison between the behaviour of the disaffected in 'limited Euroscepticism' and 'comprehensive Euroscepticism' contexts.

The main independent variables of this paper are: the respondents' disaffection with the EU, their self-placement on the left-right dimension, and, at the country level, the type of Eurosceptic partisan supply. With regard to disaffection with the EU our intent is to capture a general feeling of estrangement from Europe and its institutions. Following Weßels (2007) our operationalization of disaffection captures, first, attitudes about the political community (measured by feeling as an EU citizen, and general attachment to Europe), and second,

⁴ Respondents who voted for parties for which EU-integration and left-right positions could not be determined are not included in the analyses. Both euandi and EES include the most relevant parties of each country. The exception is Spain, where Podemos and several regional parties were not coded in the euandi dataset. After combining the data from both datasets our dataset include 182 parties.

support for the political regime (measured by whether one considers EU membership as a bad or a good thing, and by trust in EU institutions). The dimensionality of these four items was assessed by means of exploratory factor analysis, which yielded a one-factor solution. Based on the factor scores the EU-disaffection variable was computed, with higher values indicating higher levels of disaffection. To capture the respondents' ideology we rely on their placement on an 11 points left-right scale. In order to simplify the interpretation of interaction effects this variable is recoded to distinguish between three groups of respondents: those located respectively on the left side, at the centre, and on the right side of the scale.⁵ The different Eurosceptic partisan supply scenarios are measured by a categorical variable with four values that correspond to the four possibilities presented in *Figure 1*.

In order to account for the fact that behaviour in EU elections might be affected by national level considerations all models include controls for trust in national institutions and retrospective economic evaluations. We also include individual level controls for political knowledge, interest in politics, education, and age. To account for the fact that the economic situation may affect the likelihood of voting for Eurosceptic parties, Eurosceptic voting models include a country level variable that captures the level of unemployment of each country. Finally, turnout models include a country-level variable capturing the moment in the national electoral cycle in which EP elections took place, as well as whether or not the country enforces compulsory voting. All non-categorical independent variables have been mean centred and standardized so that numeric inputs represent the effect of the mean ± 1 standard deviation.

5. Mapping the 2014 EP elections political space

⁵ All analyses were replicated using ideology in its continuous form, which produced results that lead to the same conclusions.

An inspection of the partisan offer in the 2014 EP elections reveals that there are 25 left-Eurosceptic parties, 27 right-Eurosceptic parties, 65 left-Europhile parties, and 65 right-Europhile parties. Hence, this classification confirms that pro European integration positions are still the norm across Europe. Figures 2-4 provide a more detailed overview of the partisan offer of each country in the 2014 EP elections. The countries are grouped according to the typology introduced in *Figure 1*. We find great cross-country variation in the type of Eurosceptic parties available in the different EU countries.

There are only six countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden) with parties strongly opposed to European integration on both sides of the ideological spectrum (*Figure 2*). In this context of ‘comprehensive Euroscepticism’ the European integration conflict is likely to be politicized from both sides of the ideological spectrum and disaffected citizens are able to choose between left- and right-wing parties that are strongly opposed to European integration. Conversely, there are eleven countries, summarized in *Figure 3*, with no Eurosceptic parties or parties that are only weakly opposed to European integration. Eastern European countries predominate among these countries with ‘limited Euroscepticism’, although we can also find countries such as Spain, Malta, Austria, Croatia or Luxembourg among them. It is precisely in this context, where we would expect the conflict over European integration to be ‘depoliticized’ to a greater extent. Finally, *Figure 4* shows the remaining eleven countries, which can be classified in one of the two ideologically biased Euroscepticism categories, with parties that are strongly opposed to European integration from either the left or the right. Specifically, seven countries (Hungary, Finland, Belgium, Germany, France, the UK, and Poland) are classified in the ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ category and the remaining four (Portugal, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Ireland) in the ‘left biased Euroscepticism’ category. From this brief analysis of the electoral supply in the 2014 EP elections, it is clear that the Eurosceptic options at the disposal of citizens in the different countries of the EU are substantially different. While in

some countries Eurosceptic citizens might be able to simultaneously maximize their preferences in the EU-integration and left-right dimensions, in some others this does not seem to be case.

<Figures 2, 3, and 4 here>

6. Results

We first analyse turnout in EP elections. The results of the multilevel logistic model presented in *Table 1* provide initial support for the hypothesis that individual level Euroscepticism reduces the likelihood of turning out to vote. That is, citizens with more negative attitudes towards the EU were significantly less likely to turn out to vote in the 2014 EP elections. Moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of EU-disaffection is associated with a 0.14 reduction in the probability of turning out to vote in these elections. Hence, like in national elections it appears that disaffection with the political regime has a substantial impact on turnout.

<Table 1 here>

Abstention in EP elections could be interpreted either as opposition to or alienation from the political system or simply as general indifference towards politics (Schmitt and Eijk, 2007: 147). The individual level analysis suggests that both interpretations may be possible in the case of abstention in EP elections, since both political interest – an indicator that is likely to capture political indifference – and EU-disaffection – an indicator of system support – are relevant predictors of voting in European elections. However, as Schmitt and van der Eijk (2007) argue, it is in the absence of parties allowing the citizens to express their opposition to the political regime that abstention is more likely to imply alienation from the political regime. Hence, in the absence of ‘suitable’ parties that are explicitly opposed to European integration, the abstention of Eurosceptic citizens is more likely to indicate alienation from the political system. As we have shown in the previous section, in several countries

Eurosceptic citizens may not find a 'suitable' party allowing them to express their negative attitudes about the EU.

In order to analyse whether citizens with higher levels of disaffection with the EU are more likely to abstain in the absence of parties that clearly oppose European integration and at the same time share their ideological position on the left-right dimension we specify a random intercepts and random slopes multilevel logistic model in which we introduce a three-way interaction between the citizens' EU-disaffection, their ideology and a their country's Eurosceptic supply. Given the complexities associated with interpreting three-way interactions, and the fact that in non-linear models neither the direction nor the statistical significance of interactive effects can be determined by directly inspecting the coefficients of the product terms (Ai and Norton, 2003), we summarize the results of these models graphically (models can be found in appendix A *table A1*).⁶

Figure 5 summarizes the change in the probability of turning out to vote as a function of EU disaffection and ideology in each of the Eurosceptic supply side scenarios. As one would expect, in a context of 'limited Euroscepticism' EU-disaffection considerably reduces the likelihood of turning out to vote for both left and right wing respondents. In this scenario, a change from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 0.18 reduction in the likelihood of turning out to vote for right-wing respondents and of 0.16 for left-wing respondents.⁷ In the context of 'comprehensive Euroscepticism' EU-disaffection still has a sizable negative impact on the likelihood of turning out to vote, but, in comparison to the 'limited Euroscepticism' context, the size of the negative average marginal effect is 19 percent smaller for right-wing citizens and 30 percent smaller for left-wing citizens. In fact, in this context even the citizens most disaffected with the EU have a probability of turning out to vote of around 0.5, while in the 'limited

⁶ Following Karaca-Mandic et al., (2012) to assess the direction and significance of the interactive terms *table A3* summarizes contrasts of marginal effects and their associated levels of significance.

⁷ *Table A2* summarizes the average marginal effects of EU-disaffection in each context for left- and right-wing respondents

Euroscepticism’ context this probability is of around 0.35. Moreover, as in the ‘limited Euroscepticism’ context, in a context in which there are both left- and right-wing parties that are strongly opposed to European integration there are no statistically significant differences in the marginal effect of EU-disaffection for citizens with different ideological leaning.

<Figure 5 here>

By contrast, in contexts in which parties that strongly oppose European integration are present on only one side of the ideological spectrum, we observe clear differences depending on the ideology of the individual and the ideological bias of the Eurosceptic supply. In ‘left-biased Euroscepticism’ contexts the negative effect of EU-disaffection on the likelihood of turning out to vote is only mitigated for citizens from the left, while in the case of ‘right-biased Euroscepticism’ the effect is only mitigated for citizens from the right. In fact, in ‘left-biased Euroscepticism’ contexts the effect of EU-disaffection for left-wing respondents is of trivial magnitude, and for right wing-respondents the effect is also substantially reduced in ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ contexts. In sum, in contexts of ideologically biased Euroscepticism there are clear differences in the likelihood of turning out to vote of disaffected citizens depending on their left-right orientation.

Overall, these results provide support for the idea that a Eurosceptic party capable of mobilizing disaffected citizens is not only one that strongly opposes European integration, but also one that shares the ideological leaning of disaffected citizens. It appears that in the presence of a ‘suitable’ party individuals’ disaffection with the EU is more likely to be mobilized and channelled into the party system. Therefore, in those cases where a ‘suitable’ party exists, non-voting in EP elections is less likely to indicate alienation from the political system, and more likely to be motivated by general indifference towards politics.

Having shown how EU disaffection affects the likelihood of turning out to vote in EP elections, we now analyse how this attitude might be related to the likelihood of voting for Eurosceptic parties, and how this relationship might be moderated by different types of

Eurosceptic partisan supply.⁸ In line with the findings of van Spanje and de Vreese (2011), the results of the multilevel logistic model of *Table 2* support the hypothesis that disaffection with the EU significantly increases the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. Moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 0.23 increase in the likelihood of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party.

<Table 2 here>

This finding might appear obvious at first. However, if we take into account the second-order thesis, which suggests that EU level considerations should be relatively unimportant in EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), it is relevant that attitudes signalling disaffection with the EU are a significant predictor of voting for a Eurosceptic party. In fact, when comparing the impact of disaffection with the EU and the impact of attitudes about the national level like distrust in national institutions or retrospective evaluations of the economy, it appears that EU disaffection has a substantially stronger impact. For example, a ± 1 standard deviation change in distrust in national institutions is associated with a 0.03 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. Hence, it appears that at least in the choice between voting for a Eurosceptic party or not, attitudes about the EU are one of the most relevant factors.

However, as we have shown in the last section, the Eurosceptic partisan offer is not homogenous across countries, which means that the degree of politicization of European integration is likely to differ across countries and that only in some countries citizens might be able to vote for Eurosceptic parties that are clearly opposed to European integration and that, at the same time, share their ideology. In order to analyse how this might moderate the influence of EU disaffection on the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party we specify a random intercepts and random slopes multilevel logistic model in which we introduce a three-way interaction between the citizens' EU-disaffection, their ideology and their country's

⁸ We exclude respondents from the four countries without Eurosceptic parties from these analyses.

Eurosceptic supply. Again, we present the results of these models graphically (the model can be found in *Table A4* and its associated contrasts of marginal effects can be found in *Table A6*).

Figure 6 summarizes the change in the probability of voting for a Eurosceptic party as a function of EU disaffection and ideology in each of the possible Eurosceptic supply side scenarios. As we argued above, in a ‘limited Euroscepticism’ context it is likely that the European integration conflict gets ‘depoliticized’, and that given their weak opposition to European integration the existing Eurosceptic parties do not represent a very attractive choice for disaffected citizens. The results for the ‘limited Euroscepticism’ context suggest that this might be the case. In this context, EU related considerations are only weakly related to the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. A ± 1 standard deviation change in EU disaffection is associated with a meager 0.05 and 0.08 increase in the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party for, respectively, right- and left-wing respondents.⁹ By contrast, in ‘comprehensive Euroscepticism’ contexts the EU integration conflict is likely to be politicized to a great extent by parties that are strongly opposed to European integration from both the left and the right. In these countries, EU disaffection is closely related to the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. In this context, disaffected citizens located on both sides of the ideological spectrum are very likely to find a ‘suitable’ party, and, as a consequence, they both have a high probability to vote for a Eurosceptic party. In comparison to a context of ‘limited Euroscepticism’ in this context the positive marginal effect of EU-disaffection is more than 4.5 times larger for both left and right-wing respondents. As expected in neither of these two contexts we can find statistically significant differences between left- and right-wing respondents in the marginal effect of EU-disaffection.

<Figure 6 here>

⁹ *Table A5* summarizes the average marginal effects of EU-disaffection in each context for left- and right-wing respondents.

Turning to the contexts in which Eurosceptic parties are only present on one side of the ideological spectrum, we observe clear differences in the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party depending on the ideology of individuals. When parties strongly opposed to European integration can only be found on the left side of the ideological continuum (i.e. ‘left biased Euroscepticism’), only disaffected citizens with left-wing ideology are clearly more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party. This suggests that, in line with previous analyses (e.g. Brug et al., 2007), left-right considerations are dominating party choices in EU elections since even strongly disaffected right-wing citizens are not significantly more likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties if they do not share their ideological position.

By contrast, in ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ contexts, in which parties strongly opposed to European integration can only be found in the right side of the ideological spectrum, right-wing citizens are considerably more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party as they become more disaffected. However, in this case, it appears that disaffected left-wing respondents are also more likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties, even if the effect is significantly weaker than that of right-wing respondents. This unexpected finding with respect to left-wing respondents may be due to the fact that right-wing parties have been portrayed as the main drivers of the politicization of European integration (Grande and Kriesi, 2015; Hutter and Grande, 2014). As a consequence the European integration conflict might generally be more politicized than in left-biased contexts. An alternative explanation derives from the fact that, different from ‘left biased Euroscepticism’ contexts, in some ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ contexts (e.g. France and the UK) there are some weak Eurosceptic parties from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, too. This would explain why the predicted probabilities line is not flat for left-wing respondents in ‘right biased Euroscepticism’ contexts, while at the same time explaining why the effect is substantially stronger for right-wing respondents.

Overall, these results provide support for the idea that a ‘suitable’ Eurosceptic party capable of appealing to disaffected voters is not only that one that strongly opposes European integration but also the one that shares voters’ ideology. First, in contrast to ‘comprehensive Euroscepticism’ contexts, in countries with ‘limited Euroscepticism’ the effects of EU attitudes on the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party are considerably weaker, and in these contexts the effects of EU-disaffection are similar for both left- and right-wing respondents. Second, in ideologically biased contexts, voters who are ideologically aligned with those parties strongly opposed to European integration are much more likely to cast a Eurosceptic vote.

7. Conclusion

This paper has shown that the presence of Eurosceptic parties contributes to the mobilization of Eurosceptic citizens in European elections and to an increase of the Eurosceptic vote, provided that the Eurosceptic party in question is a ‘suitable’ one, i.e. provided that it is strongly opposed to European integration and it also appeals to the voters in terms of its positioning on the conventional left-right dimension. These results have two implications for the way the ‘sleeping giant’ is waking up. First and obviously, our analyses confirm that Eurosceptic parties contribute to the politicization of the EU, and to the Europeanization of European elections. The presence of Eurosceptic parties strongly opposed to European integration increases the impact of EU related considerations on the citizens’ electoral behaviour in EP elections. This makes European elections revolve around Europe to a greater extent, and thus has the potential to reduce their second-order character. Eurosceptic parties are contributing to waking up the ‘sleeping giant’ through the activation of the demand side potential of contestation over European issues. This confirms Leconte’s (2015, p. 256) argument that these parties appear to reintroduce politics into a largely depoliticized polity.

The second implication of our analyses is that opposition to the EU is subordinate to the main ideological perspective that has historically structured domestic political competition in European countries, the left-right divide. This, together with the already observed importance of Eurosceptic parties for the politicization of European integration, introduces the possibility that, in a given country, European integration can be politicized by either left- or right-wing parties, or simultaneously from both sides of the ideological spectrum. As a consequence, it might be more adequate to refer to ‘sleeping giants’ rather than to a single sleeping giant, since we can consider that there is a sleeping giant from the left and one from the right, which will or will not be awakened depending on the presence of parties that strongly oppose European integration on the left and the right side of the ideological spectrum. This will not only have consequence for the types of disaffected citizens who are mobilized in EP elections, but also for the way in which the European integration conflict is politicized, since as noted by Hobolt and de Vries (this issue), the opposition to European integration from the left may have a different character than the one from the right. Hence, given the cross-country differences in the Eurosceptic supply side that we have identified, we may expect the process of politicization of European integration to vary in speed and character across countries, mainly as a function of their Eurosceptic partisan offer.

Finally, all this suggests that there is a third alternative in addition to the ‘depoliticization’ and the ‘principled opposition’ invoked by Mair’s diagnosis of the development of the EU as a ‘polity without politics’: the introduction of politics into the polity. What most observers have not anticipated is that this development will be driven by the Eurosceptics. The fact that the Eurosceptics apparently are of different stripes – a fact which is not only confirmed by our analysis, but which is also reflected by their failure to form a single parliamentary group in the EP – suggests that their opposition may be principled for different reasons, or may even be not so principled after all. Whatsoever, in our view, the conditionality of the Eurosceptic vote opens up the opportunity for politics.

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Figure 1: Eurosceptic supply side scenarios

		Left-wing parties opposition to European integration	
		None/weak	Strong
Right-wing parties opposition to European integration	None/weak	Limited Euroscepticism	Left-biased Euroscepticism
	Strong	Right-biased Euroscepticism	Comprehensive Euroscepticism

Figure 2: Countries with comprehensive Euroscepticism




Figure 3: Countries with limited Euroscepticism




Figure 4: Countries with right and left biased Euroscepticism





Table 1: Multilevel logistic models for voting in 2014 EP elections

	(1)
	Voting in EP elections
Individual level variables	
EU-disaffection	-0.738*** (0.041)
Distrust national institutions	-0.394*** (0.043)
Retrospective economy evaluation	0.006 (0.040)
Ideology (ref = right)	
Left	-0.112*** (0.041)
Center	-0.628*** (0.043)
Political Knowledge	0.309*** (0.040)
Education	0.161*** (0.039)
Interest in politics	1.093*** (0.040)
Age	0.706*** (0.037)
Country level variables	
Electoral cycle	-1.063 (0.979)
Electoral cycle ²	0.831 (0.978)
Compulsory voting	0.809** (0.367)
Random-effects parameters	
SD Intercept	0.644 -0.088
Constant	0.317** (0.135)
Observations	19,525
Number of groups	28
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1	

Figure 5: Probability of turning out to vote as a function of EU disaffection and ideology in each of the possible Eurosceptic supply side scenarios



Note: Based on model 1 *table A1*


Table 2: Multilevel logistic model for Eurosceptic voting in 2014 EP elections

	(1)
	Eurosceptic voting
Individual level variables	
EU disaffection	1.627*** (0.069)
Distrust national institutions	0.369*** (0.069)
Retrospective economy evaluation	-0.237*** (0.066)
Ideology (ref = right)	
Left	0.165*** (0.062)
Center	-0.217*** (0.074)
Political knowledge	-0.115* (0.069)
Education	0.252*** (0.059)
Interest in politics	0.437*** (0.068)
Country level variables	
Unemployment	-0.067 (0.521)
Random-effects parameters	
SD Intercept	1.330 (0.200)
Constant	-1.380*** (0.278)
Observations	10,132
Number of groups	24

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Figure 6: Probability of voting for a Eurosceptic party as a function of EU disaffection and ideology in each of the possible Eurosceptic supply side scenarios



Note: Based on model 1 *table A4*

Online appendix A.

Table A1: Multilevel logistic models for voting in 2014 EP elections

		(1) Eurosceptic vote
Individual level variables		
Main effects	EU disaffection	-0.473** (0.197)
	Distrust national institutions	-0.395*** (0.043)
	Retrospective economy evaluation	0.004 (0.041)
	Ideology (ref = right)	
	Left	-0.233** (0.103)
	Center	-0.596*** (0.090)
	Political Knowledge	0.311*** (0.041)
	Education	0.170*** (0.039)
	Interest in politics	1.081*** (0.040)
	Age	0.717*** (0.038)
Two way interact.	EU attitudes * Ideology (ref = right)	
	Eu attitudes * Left	-0.507*** (0.163)
	EU attitudes * Center	-0.102 (0.162)
Country level variables		
Main effects	Eurosceptic supply (ref = right-biased euroscepticism)	
	Limited euroscepticism	0.119 (0.329)
	Left-biased euroscepticism	0.470 (0.427)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism	0.580 (0.360)
	Electoral cycle	-1.495 (0.990)
	Electoral cycle2	1.140 (0.979)
	Compulsory voting	0.678* (0.347)
Cross-level interactions		
Two way interact.	Eurosceptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * EU-disaffection	
	Limited euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.484* (0.267)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.432 (0.347)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.366

	Eurosceptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * Ideology (ref = right)	(0.290)
	Limited euroscepticism*Left	0.049 (0.140)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Left	0.045 (0.186)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Left	0.388** (0.153)
	Limited euroscepticism*Center	-0.206* (0.125)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Center	-0.039 (0.162)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Center	0.233* (0.138)
Three way interactions	Eurosceptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * Ideology (ref = right) * EU disaffection	
	Limited euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	0.627*** (0.233)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	1.290*** (0.300)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	0.673*** (0.237)
	Limited euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	0.194 (0.238)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	0.532* (0.300)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	0.279 (0.246)
	Random-effects parameters	
Var Intercept	0.341 (0.096)	
Var EU-disaffection	0.190 (0.061)	
Var Ideology	0.003 (0.002)	
Constant	0.086 (0.253)	
Observations	19,525	
Number of groups	28	
Standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Table A2: Average marginal effects of EU-disaffection on the likelihood of turning out to vote in EP elections for left and right wing respondents in different Eurosceptic partisan supply contexts (Based on model 1 table A1)

	Eurosceptic partisan context			
	Limited Euroscepticism	Left-biased Euroscepticism	Right-biased Euroscepticism	Comprehensive Euroscepticism
Right	-0.182	-0.162	-0.095	-0.148
Left	-0.164	-0.024	-0.191	-0.115
Difference	-0.018	-0.139***	0.096***	-0.033

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3: Contrasts of average marginal effects of EU-disaffection on the likelihood of turning out to vote for three-way interaction of model 1 table A1. Redundant categories of comparison (i.e. inverse) of partisan offer omitted. Contrasts of Centre Vs Left and Centre Vs Right omitted.

	(Comprehensive Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Right-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Left-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Right-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Comprehensive Euroscepticism)	(Left biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Comprehensive Euroscepticism)	(Left biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Right-biased Euroscepticism)
Right	0.034	0.087	0.019	0.053	-0.015	-0.067
Left	0.049	-0.027	0.140	-0.076	0.091	0.167
Contrast (Right Vs Left)	-0.015	0.114***	-0.121**	0.129***	-0.106*	-0.235***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 'Contrast (Right Vs Left)' cells correspond to the contrast of the difference in the change of the average marginal effect from one partisan supply context to another (e.g. from a limited Euroscepticism context to a right-biased Euroscepticism context) between right- and left-wing respondents and the statistical significance associated to this difference. In an OLS model with a three-way interaction this figure would be equivalent to the coefficient and statistical significance obtained for the product term of the three-way interaction for different combinations of reference categories of the categorical variables. In non-linear models, though, these figures are not equivalent to the coefficient of the product terms, which imposes the restriction that neither the direction nor the statistical significance of interactive effects can be determined by directly inspecting the coefficients of the product terms and must be assessed by comparing the changes in the associated marginal effects (Ai and Norton, 2003; Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012).

Table A4: Multilevel logistic model for Eurosceptic voting in 2014 EP elections

		(1)
		Eurosceptic vote
Individual level variables		
Main effects	EU disaffection	2.051*** (0.322)
	Distrust national institutions	0.506*** (0.076)
	Retrospective economy evaluation	-0.265*** (0.072)
	Ideology (ref = right)	
	Left	-1.388* (0.795)
	Center	-0.878 (0.542)
	Political Knowledge	-0.075 (0.074)
	Education	0.285*** (0.065)
	Interest in politics	0.442*** (0.074)
Two way interact	EU attitudes * Ideology (ref = right)	
	Eu attitudes * Left	-0.726** (0.310)
	EU attitudes * Center	0.136 (0.336)
Country level variables		
Main effects	Eurosceptic supply (ref = right-biased euroscepticism)	
	Limited euroscepticism	-3.400*** (1.283)
	Left-biased euroscepticism	-3.974*** (1.482)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism	-1.050 (1.279)
	Unemployment	0.690* (0.403)
Cross-level interactions		
Two way interact.	Eurosceptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * EU-disaffection	
	Limited euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.552 (0.536)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.834 (0.690)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*EU-disaffection	-0.407 (0.432)
	Eurosceptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * Ideology (ref = right)	
	Limited euroscepticism*Left	2.378** (1.185)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Left	4.689*** (1.356)
Comprehensive euroscepticism*Left	2.063* (1.165)	

	Limited euroscepticism*Center	1.373 (0.843)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Center	2.490*** (0.950)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Center	1.253 (0.790)
	Euroseptic supply (ref= right biased euroscepticism) * Ideology (ref = right) * EU disaffection	
	Limited euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	0.282 (0.566)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	0.518 (0.676)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Left*EU-disaffection	0.821** (0.384)
	Limited euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	0.203 (0.635)
	Left-biased euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	-0.543 (0.721)
	Comprehensive euroscepticism*Center*EU-disaffection	-0.391 (0.424)
	Random-effects parameters	
	Var Intercept	0.908 (0.290)
	Var EU-disaffection	0.350 (0.140)
	Var Ideology	0.476 (0.164)
	Constant	-0.047 (0.871)
	Observations	10,132
	Number of groups	24
	Standard errors in parentheses	
	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Three way interact.

Table A5: Average marginal effects of EU-disaffection on the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party for left and right wing respondents in different Eurosceptic partisan supply contexts (Based on model 1 table A4)

	Eurosceptic partisan context			
	Limited Euroscepticism	Left biased Euroscepticism	Righ-biased Euroscepticism	Comprehensive Euroscepticism
Right	0.054	0.026	0.387	0.248
Left	0.078	0.190	0.179	0.321
Difference	-0.024	-0.164**	0.209***	-0.072

Table A6: Contrasts of average marginal effects of EU-disaffection on the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party for three-way interaction of model 1 table A4. Redundant categories of comparison (i.e. inverse) of partisan offer omitted. Contrasts of Centre Vs Left and Centre Vs Right omitted.

	(Comprehensive Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Right-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Left-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Limited Euroscepticism)	(Right-biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Comprehensive Euroscepticism)	(Left biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Comprehensive Euroscepticism)	(Left biased Euroscepticism) Vs (Right-biased Euroscepticism)
Right	0.194	0.333	-0.028	0.139	-0.222	-0.361
Left	0.243	0.101	0.112	-0.142	-0.131	0.011
Contrast (Right Vs Left)	-0.049	0.232***	-0.14*	0.281**	-0.091	-0.372***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Online appendix B. Coding of variables and descriptive statistics

Variable	Wording / Coding	Valid N	Mean	SD	min	max
Dependent Variables						
Vote in 2014 EP elections	Coded 1 for those who voted in the 2014 EP elections and 0 otherwise. Respondents who voted for parties for which their position in the EU-integration or left-right dimension could not be coded are declared missing	26,087	0.49	0.49	0	1
Eurosceptic voting	Coded 1 for those who voted a Eurosceptic party (i.e. a party with a value lower than 0 in the EU-integration dimension) and coded 0 for those who voted a non-Eurosceptic or Europhile party (i.e. with a value equal or higher than 0 in the EU-integration dimension). Citizens of countries without Eurosceptic parties are excluded from this part of the analysis	11,651	0.27	0.44	0	1
Independent variables (Individual level)						
EU-disaffection	Variable based on four indicators capturing, first, attitudes about the political community (measured by feeling as an EU citizen, and general attachment to Europe), and second, support for the political regime (measured by whether one considers EU membership as a bad or a good thing, and by trust in EU institutions). The variable is computed based on factor analysis of these 4 indicators. EES questions: qp6_4, qp6_6, qp6_2, qp7	27,712	0.00	1.00	-1.54	2.3
Distrust national institutions	Variable measuring trust in the national parliament. Higher values correspond to higher distrust. EES question qpp9	29,377	2.68	0.92	1	4
Ideology (categorical)	Variable capturing citizens' ideology on left-right scale. EES question: qpp13	24,388				
Left	Respondents placing themselves between the 1 and 5 positions	8,195				
Center	Respondents placing themselves in the 6 position	7,290				
Right	Respondents placing themselves between the 7 and 11 position	8,903				
Political Knowledge	Additive index of four factual questions related to knowledge about national politics and the EU. <i>Don't know</i> answers are treated as incorrect answers. EES questions: qpp23_1, qpp23_2, qpp23_3, qpp23_4	30,065	2.73	1.14	0	4
Education	Age when respondent stopped full time education. The variable takes 4 possible values with higher values indicating having left education at a higher age. Respondents who still were in full time education were assigned to the corresponding age group.	29,511	2.2	0.74	0	3
Interest in politics	Variable capturing how interested the respondent is in politics. Higher values indicate a higher interest in politics. EES question: qp6_9	29,859	2.40	0.98	1	4
Retrospective economy evaluation	Variable capturing what the respondent thinks about the economy with respect to 12 months ago. Higher values indicate that the respondent thinks that the economy has improved to a greater	29,449	2.79	1.01	1	5

extent in the last 12 months

Age	Variable measuring respondent age. Respondents are grouped in 6 groups according to their age. Higher values correspond to higher ages	30,064	4.04	1.65	1	6
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Independent variables (Country level)

Unemployment	Harmonized unemployment rate a year before the election. Source Eurostat. Variable: ei_lmhr_m	30,064	10.30	5.28	4.5	26.9
Electoral cycle	Variable compute following Weber (Time between election the EP election and the preceding national election divided by the overall length of the electoral cycle. If electoral cycle was not over at the time of writing the paper normal duration of the term was assumed (e.g. Spain 4 years)	30,064	0.47	0.26	0	0.92
Compulsory voting	Variable that takes the value 1 if the country enforces compulsory voting and 0 otherwise	30,065	0.11	0.31	0	1
Eurosceptic supply (categorical)	Categorical variable that summarizes the type of Eurosceptic partisan offer of each country as summarized in figure 1 and introduced in pages 9 and 10					
Limited Euroscepticism		10,965				
Left-biased Euroscepticism		3,767				
Right-biased Euroscepticism		8,650				
Comprehensive Euroscepticism		6,683				

Note: All values correspond to the original variables before standardizing