



Voicing outrage, contending with austerity.
Mobilisation in Spain under the Great Recession.

Martín Portos García

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

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European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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I confirm that chapter 6 draws upon an earlier article that was jointly co-authored with Mr. Juan Masullo and I contributed at least 60% of the work. The article has been accepted for publication in *Mobilization* (forthcoming, in press).

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***“A mí me parece que los peces ya no quieren
salir de la pecera,
casi nunca tocan el vidrio con la nariz”.***

Julio Cortázar, *Rayuela*

*[It seems to me that fish do not want to get out of the fish tank anymore;
they rarely touch the glass with their noses.]*

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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the Spanish cycle of protest in the shadow of the Great Recession. It has a twofold aspiration. On the one hand, from a process-based approach, it seeks to unravel the timing of the cycle of contention that evolved in light of the recession scenario between 2007 and 2015. I argue that the peak of protest persisted for a long time (from mid-2011 until 2013) because institutionalisation was postponed and radicalisation contained. Specifically, I focus on three aspects, key to understanding the trajectory of collective actions: 1) issue specialisation of protest after the first triggering points, 2) alliance building between unions and new actors, and 3) the transition process towards more routinised repertoires of action that came about as protests declined. On the other hand, the thesis aims at shedding light on the role that grievances play for mobilisation dynamics in a context of material deprivation. Covering multiple levels of analysis, the main argument developed here is that the effects of objective-material aspects and socioeconomic grievances are mediated by political attitudes, especially political dissatisfaction. To empirically test my arguments, I use qualitative data from semi-structured interviews, which are combined with information from a self-collated protest event analysis and different statistical analyses based on time series, panel data and other survey materials.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It feels strange putting the finishing touches on this doctoral thesis. On the one hand, I am happy to see the product of four years of work coming to an end. On the other hand, it feels like capture-bonding, as I will miss the rewards from struggling every single day on the same (my) project.

I remember coming to Florence in March 2012 for the first time and sitting in front of a panel of professors to defend a PhD project on social movements. At that point, all my background in the field was— literally— a couple of books that I had read a few weeks earlier. I have only now come back to read what my PhD proposal looked like when I applied to the PhD programme in Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. I defended a sketchy, unfocused and empirically underdeveloped thesis proposal. After four years of work, I am not sure whether this contribution will meet the standards of the reader. Some progress has been made during this time, though, and I now have a contribution that I am proud to be defending.

A great part of this evolution owes to my supervisor. Once I was told: “It is important you pick a rock star in your field as supervisor, but it is equally important you have a great person as mentor”. I can hardly imagine a most renowned and better-fitted scholar to have guided my research than Donatella della Porta. By having the chance to closely work with her, I have also gotten to know one of the most empathetic, caring and supportive persons I will ever meet. I am honoured to have Hanspeter Kriesi on my committee. He is a committed and stimulating scholar. I know he was quite sceptical of my work (only at first, I hope). As my second reader, he invited me to have a meeting with him after assessing— and passing— my prospectus in my first year at the EUI. He needed only 30 seconds to smash my (weak) project. I just managed to babble: *“how come you have not made me resubmit*

my prospectus?” From his reply, I learnt a lesson that I will treasure for life: “*this is not about meeting requirements, but about fulfilling standards*”.

I was kindly hosted by Eva Anduiza at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona for a few months as an exchange student. She is not only a highly-skilled political scientist, but is doing great work in leading a world-class team. Robert Fishman’s work has been of utmost importance to me. He is a *must* for anyone interested in Iberian democracy and civil society. I am grateful both to Eva and Robert for accepting to sit on my jury and pushing me to improve the thesis.

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This thesis is not only the product of four years of work. Those who know me, they easily realise how attached I am to my native Galicia. I pursued my undergraduate degree in Santiago de Compostela, where I found a lively environment and made long-lasting friendships. I owe a debt of gratitude to the faculty at the Facultade de CC. Políticas e Sociais, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Although naming names is unfair (where possible, I avoid doing so throughout), I am particularly grateful to Ramón Máiz, my *official* referee and role model. At the University of Westminster (where I was an Erasmus student) and then

at the University of Oxford (where I completed a master's degree before coming to the EUI), I learnt a lot from countless inspiring colleagues, professors and friends.

Since the thesis is a joint endeavour, I should dedicate this thesis to some outstanding faculty, colleagues, administrative staff, secretaries and bar/mensa tenders that make out of the EUI such a unique community. The EUI is a truly multinational and stimulating institution to pursue a PhD. Also, I benefitted enormously from the colleagues at the Centre on Social Movement Studies, COSMOS, which is among the best places to write a thesis on social movements these days—formerly at the EUI, it is now based at the Scuola Normale Superiore. Therefore, this thesis should be dedicated to them. Yet, the thesis should also be dedicated to the many friends I made during these and the preceding years, for the happy moments we spent together and for your support that helped me get through challenging times—I wish I could name you all, but you know well who you are—: my friends in A Coruña, the *Políticas*-crew in Santiago and other close people in Boimorto, London, Oxford, Barcelona, Florence (cannot help naming here Miquel, José and Brais) and elsewhere. Additionally, the thesis should be dedicated to my grandparents and the rest of my big, tight-knit family. However, this thesis is dedicated to the most important people in my life:

Á outra parte de “nós”: papá, mamá e Diego, grazas polo voso exemplo e por estar sempre aí, incondicionalmente, para min.

A ti, Paula, polos aloumiños ausentes, por ser a luz nas tebras. Grazas por elixirme e permitirme ser parte da túa historia; a nosa historia.

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AC: Autocorrelations.
- AIC: Akaike Information Criterion.
- BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
- CCOO: Comisiones Obreras.
- CES: Consejo Económico y Social.
- CGPJ: Consejo General del Poder Judicial.
- CIS: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- CiU: Convergència i Unió.
- C's: Ciudadanos- Partido de la Ciudadanía.
- DF-GLS: modified Dickey-Fuller test (with Generalized Least Squares).
- DRY: ¡Democracia Real Ya!
- EC: European Commission.
- ECB: European Central Bank.
- EMU: European Monetary Union.
- ESS: European Social Survey.
- ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna.
- EU: European Union.
- EU-SILC: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.
- GDELT: Global Database of Events, Language and Tone.
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
- GESOP: Gabinet d'Estudis Socials i Opinió Pública.
- GJM: Global Justice Movement.
- GSEM: Generalised Structural Equation Modelling.

- HICP: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
- ILO: International Labour Organisation.
- ILP: Iniciativa Legislativa Popular.
- IMF: International Monetary Fund.
- INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
- INJUVE: Instituto de la Juventud de España.
- IU: Izquierda Unida.
- JSF: Juventud Sin Futuro.
- KPSS: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test.
- LCA: Latent Class Analysis.
- LIS: Luxembourg Income Study Database.
- LGTBIQ: Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual, Intersexual and Queer.
- LOMCE: Ley Orgánica 8/2013, de 9 de diciembre, para la Mejora de la Calidad Educativa.
- M5S: Movimento 5 Stelle.
- MEP: Member of European Parliament.
- MP: Member of Parliament.
- NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation.
- OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- OWS: Occupy Wall Street.
- PAC: Partial autocorrelations.
- PAH: Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca.
- PEA: Protest Event Analysis.
- PP: Partido Popular.
- PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español.

- PUDUP: Plataforma en Defensa de la Universidad Pública.
- RMSEA: Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation.
- S.E.: Standard Errors.
- SE: Sindicato de Estudiantes.
- SEM: Structural Equation Modelling.
- SEPC: Sindicat d'Estudiants dels Països Catalans.
- STE: Sindicato de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de la Enseñanza.
- UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores.
- USA: United States of America.
- WB: World Bank.
- WVS: World Values Survey.

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CHAPTER 1

Exploring the ground. Grievances and protest

1. INTRODUCTION

Following a demonstration and some encounters with the police, a crowd of around 130,000 people occupied Plaza Puerta del Sol in Madrid on 15 May 2011, in light of coming— local and regional— elections the following week. They protested against policy-making in an austerity-ridden scenario and demanded “real democracy now!”.¹ Given the mainstream media’s initial lack of coverage, information diffused through social media and digital tools. The initial sit-in quickly evolved into an encampment that was replicated in over 130 cities across the country and 60 abroad during the following weeks (Monterde et al. 2015). The 15M campaign became a major turning point in Spanish recent mobilisation history.² It triggered and shaped further contentious activities.³ In fact, these events and subsequent performances are part of a broader cycle of collective action that unfolded in the country between 2007 and 2015.⁴ While focusing on the 15M mobilisations specifically but also taking a longitudinal perspective, this thesis seeks to shed light on the dynamics, trajectory and particularities

¹ Borrowing the definition from Mark Blyth (2013: 2), austerity “is a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits”.

² 15M stands for 15 May 2011, when the mobilisation started. Participants tend to adopt this neutral label to the detriment of other terms to refer to this campaign and its activists (e.g. *indignados*, which stands for “those outraged”)— see Romanos (2013, 2016a). The *indignados* label was initially inspired by the work *Indignez-vous!* (Hessel 2011).

³ Contentious politics involves “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests”, with governments as targets of claims, initiators or third parties (Tilly 2008: 5).

⁴ Note that I will use the concepts “cycle” and “wave” interchangeably throughout the thesis. A protest cycle or wave often consists of a set of interrelated campaigns. A campaign refers to the series of sustained and organised public events— and thematically interconnected interactions— making collective claims of target authorities (della Porta and Diani 2006: 188-189; see also della Porta and Rucht 2002; Tilly 2004, 2008; Tilly and Wood 2013).

of the Spanish wave of contention against austerity and the political status quo in the shadow of the Great Recession.⁵

On the one hand, from a longitudinal perspective, this thesis aims at shedding light on the role that grievances play for (extra-institutional) mobilisation in a context of material deprivation. I will attempt to answer the following questions: how do grievances matter for protest (over time)? Can subjective-attitudinal grievances exist without an objective dimension? When do perceptions follow objective conditions—and when not? Are not these perceptions of grievances shaped by dynamics of protest themselves? What is the interplay between the economic and political dimensions of grievances? Are grievances constant across different frequencies of participation? The main argument developed throughout is that grievances matter for protest behaviour. However, the effect of objective-material aspects is mediated by subjective-attitudinal socioeconomic and political grievances, especially by political dissatisfaction.

On the other hand, from a political process-based approach, the thesis seeks to unravel the timing of the cycle of contention that evolved in light of the recession scenario. Different questions will be addressed: what does explain protest success and decline? How are activists able to keep standards of mobilisation high over time? Does demobilisation come about as a consequence of strategic divisions among protesters? Do protesters radicalise as the cycle unfolds? Why (and when) activists seek alternative channels of participation and embrace more institutional forms of action? Overall, I argue that the peak of protest persisted from mid-2011 until late 2013 because institutionalisation was postponed and radicalisation was contained. I contend that three specific aspects are key to understanding the evolution of the cycle of collective action: 1) issue specialisation of protest after the first triggering points, 2) the role of alliances built between new and traditional actors to determine the trajectory of movements, and 3) the institutionalisation process that came about as protest performances decreased.

⁵ Although “the cycle of collective action against austerity and the political status quo” emphasises the reactive component and “the cycle of collective action against austerity and for real democracy” stresses its proactive nature, I will use these two terms interchangeably throughout the thesis.

Although specific hypotheses are developed and tested in the subsequent chapters, in this first chapter, I review the evolution of grievance theories. I also develop the theoretical framework upon which the bulk of this thesis is built (i.e. chapters 4, 5 and 6), and place my contribution in relation to extant literature. After that, the case selection is justified and the empirical design is introduced. Finally, I present the structure of this thesis and summarise the content of each chapter.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (I): GRIEVANCES

Almost five decades after Albert O. Hirschman (1970) wrote his ground-breaking contribution *Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States*, the approach he developed seems to be gaining momentum again. His core argument was that members of an organisation understood as any form of human grouping (whether a nation, a business, an interest group, a political party, etc.) have two basic alternatives at hand when they perceive a decrease in the quality or benefit to the member within that organisation. Members can either *voice* their discontent (communicating the complaint in order to redress the grievance, introduce a change and improve the relationship with the organisation) or *exit* (withdraw from the relationship). Cost-benefit analyses are, however, affected by *loyalty* dynamics (i.e. how attached and committed agents remain to the organisation, which might make them opt for sticking to the status quo). When their voice is heard and they can reform the organisation, loyal members will be particularly devoted to organisational success.

Applying Hirschman's (1970) theory to a political situation, we find that in a context of generalised discontent (for instance, with the socioeconomic and political status quo), many citizens might choose to voice discontent through formal-institutional mechanisms. If institutional channels for voicing it are malfunctioning or ineffective, this might feed outrage. As a consequence, many might choose to withdraw from the game and disengage from politics. When circumstances are pressing and claims are widely shared, many others are likely to voice discontent through collective action. This framework helps to understand the protest events that unfolded in Spain and elsewhere from May 2011 onwards. However, it falls short of 1) accounting for the exact timing

of action— protest potentials were in the making for a long time, but were mobilised only at a certain point—; 2) accounting for how discontent that drives action comes to being in the first instance. Precisely, I argue that grievance theories might be helpful for addressing these limitations.

Throughout this thesis, I understand *grievances* as exogenous shocks— i.e. objective situations, such as unemployment or income deprivation— and the attitudinal and emotional consequences that these engender (in terms of social discontent, fear or resentment), which might disrupt taken-for-granted routines and act as motivational impulses for mobilisation (Snow et al. 1998; Kriesi 2012; Snow 2013). Hence, troublesome conditions and their associated sentiments and values can be thought of as grievances.

Grievances have been central to collective behaviour models, also known as strain and breakdown theories (for overviews, see McAdam 1982: 5-19; Useem 1998; Büchler 2004, 2013). Besides their specificities, these accounts stress disruptive strain, caused by unmet needs, dashed expectations or relative deprivation, which alter the normal conditions of social order (i.e. that of integration) and boost collective behaviour (e.g. Turner and Killian 1957; Davies 1962; Smelser 1963; Gurr 1970). These contributions from social psychology played a preeminent role in the 1940s' to 1970s' social movement studies. By emphasising the effect that psychological strain has on individuals and their need to manage stressful social situations, scientists have too often conceived collective behaviour as a largely spontaneous, unregulated and unstructured group activity (Blumer 1951; see also McAdam 1982: 8-19). The most extreme versions frame collective behaviour as irrational, disruptive, dangerous or excessive, turning the micro-level focus to the irrational character and social isolation of challengers (see Büchler 2004: 49). For instance, Le Bon (1896) characterised “crowds” as mere “masses without reason”.

It is to a large extent the negative image of collective action that accounts for the decline of the collective behaviour tradition. But these early approaches suffered from a number of additional limitations. As some prominent scholars have pointed out (e.g.

Tilly et al. 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1984), social movements are often better explained by solidarity, their enduring character and organisational patterns rather than by their disorganisation and insufficient integration of their members. Additionally, collective behaviour models struggled to link different levels of analysis in a cogent framework, and interpreted that social movements were essentially psychological— not socio-political— phenomena.

On top of these shortcomings, while the theoretical foundations of grievance theories are sound, they have faced empirical troubles. Students of social movements often assumed grievances as a constant among the disadvantaged. Although there was a generalised agreement that deeply shared grievances were often a necessary precondition for extra-conventional behaviour, they were seldom taken into account in causal accounts, as they were supposed to have little explanatory power (Snow and Soule 2010: 23; see also Tilly 1978; della Porta 2005). That “structural tensions do not directly translate into mobilisation” is a well-established tenet in the literature (della Porta 2008a: 278). Even when protest by politically excluded groups is at issue, grievances tend to be “relatively constant and pervasive” (Jenkins and Perrow 1977: 265) if not rather “secondary” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1215; see Jenkins et al. 2003: 278).

Therefore, the discussion of strain-engendering aspects in the literature was neglected in recent times; dominant approaches gave priority to resource mobilisation, expanding political opportunities and collective action frames (Klandermans 2010).⁶ However, overly severe criticisms towards strain arguments as a whole might have thrown away “the baby with the bath water” (van Dyke and Soule 2002: 513; Büchler 2004: 62).⁷ While privileged attention has been given to the mobilisation of resources

⁶ *Political opportunities* are defined as “consistent— not necessarily formal—, permanent or national signals to social or political actors” that encourage them “to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 2012: 78). By contrast, threats refer to “the costs that a social group will incur from protest or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001: 182-183).

⁷ Note, however, that some scholars contend that grievances were never abandoned by dominant approaches. For example, Büchler (2004) argues that many political process-oriented scholars interpret that grievances might not explain mobilisation dynamics on their own, but they are important as opportunity/threat-generating factors (see section 3, this chapter).

and the fluctuation of political opportunities for the emergence of social movements since the 1970s (i.e. the *supply side* of protest), the importance of strain-engendering and motivational factors was largely downplayed (i.e. the *demand side* of protest behaviour)— see Klandermans (2004, 2013); van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013).

To be fair, even though some scholars have referred to grievances as a largely “forgotten theoretical issue” (Johnston et al. 1994: 10), there have been explicit efforts to theorise and bring grievances back into the study of social mobilisation in the last decades (e.g. Piven and Cloward 1977; Useem 1980, 1998; Klandermans 1997, 2010, 2013; Snow et al. 1998; Jenkins et al. 2003; Brockett 2005; Klandermans et al. 2008; Snow 2013; Simmons 2014, 2016). For instance, Klandermans (1997) argues that grievances— in any of the forms that he distinguishes: *illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, injustice, moral indignation* or *suddenly imposed grievances*— are at the heart of every protest. Also, Snow et al. (1998) emphasise that the link between breakdown and collective action has to do with the disruption of the quotidian, taken-for-granted routines, practices and expectations that comprise habitual social action.

This study joins these efforts in the belief that, as Brockett (2005: 32) put it in his study of political movements in violent Central America, “a full understanding of [...protest dynamics] requires a fuller integration of grievances into our work”. Given that many critiques of grievance-centred accounts were based on studies about left-wing movements in the 1960s to 1970s, when challengers mobilised more successfully with increasing— not declining— economic resources (see Jenkins and Perrow 1977), the pressing anti-austerity and anti-political status quo mobilisations that spread around the world in 2011 urge us to move in this direction.⁸ Harold R. Kerbo’s (1982: 653-654) distinction between “movements of affluence” and “movements of crisis” is helpful to understand mobilisation dynamics in different settings:

⁸ As mobilisations spread around the world amidst a neoliberal critical juncture, some social movement scholars rapidly brought strain theories back to the forefront (e.g. Chabanet and Royall 2014; Giugni and Lorenzini 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015; della Porta 2015a)— see chapter 4, this thesis.

“By movements of crisis, I am referring to collective action brought about by life-disrupting situations, including (but not limited to) widespread unemployment, food shortages, and major social dislocations. Under conditions of extreme social disruption or crisis, daily routines become increasingly impossible. We can assume that some form of discontent and fear would follow these crisis situations, but I am not suggesting that conditions producing some type of deprivation, discontent, or anger are all that is needed to explain the long-term development of this type of social movement, nor am I stressing any specific pattern of discontent such as J curve, decremental deprivation, absolute deprivation, or simply unstable, fluctuating rewards or satisfactions. However, with movements flowing from these extreme conditions, an explanation beginning with an examination of social disruption is especially needed (see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 7-11)”.

A couple of points should be dealt with here, however. First, if grievances-related aspects lie beneath protest dynamics, how— and to what extent— they influence the mobilisation process needs to be disentangled. This would not imply that aspects associated with grievances are the only factors that account for mobilisation in the shadow of the Great Recession, as opportunities and resources still are important nowadays (e.g. Tilly 2008; Tarrow 2011; Hutter 2014a; Caren et al. 2016; Cinalli and Giugni 2016; Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b). Yet, I contend that grievances are relevant explanatory factors both as root causes and variables directly and systematically affecting dynamics of protest participation. Second, it should be noted that Kerbo’s (1982) framework applies to movements that have a different nature relative to those that I am studying. By “movements of crisis”, he refers to weak, marginal, normally violent movements, which are different from the mass, encompassing (yet not driven by resourceless people), pacific mobilisations that I analyse throughout this thesis. Still, I argue that the logic behind mobilisations that take place in the shadow of recession might be different from movements that do not emerge out of (objective and perceived) material scarcity and hardship. While resource mobilisation and political process accounts might be well-suited to account for *movements of affluence*, mobilisation processes in *movements of crisis* require social stress and deprivation to be better integrated.⁹ In the words of Bert Useem (1998: 235):

⁹ In spite of grievance theories’ problematic empirical record across several contexts.

“In my view, efforts to replace breakdown theory with resource mobilisation theory are ill-founded. Both logic and evidence seem to suggest that the breakdown and RM [resource mobilisation] theories explain different kinds of collective action. Each approach deserves recognition. Also, much of interest appears to occur in a middle ground, in some sort of amalgam between breakdown and RM processes”.

In the next section, I move onto developing my theoretical framework, where I try to integrate a political process-resource mobilisation approach with grievance theories, emphasising how the latter matter for mobilisation in a context of recession.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (II): CLEAVAGES, GRIEVANCES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS APPROACH. AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

Although I presented political process-resource mobilisation and strain-breakdown models as rival approaches thus far, there are different views on how the dominant theories in the field have treated grievances. For example, Büchler (2004) argues that in the political process tradition, strain and breakdown have never really disappeared into thin air, but they have often been disguised as opportunities. In other words, there might be much conceptual overlap between the concepts of “strain” and “breakdown” in collective behaviour approaches and “opportunities” in political process and resource mobilisation accounts. “What separates the approaches and obscures this equation is the valuational bias of each set of concepts”, Büchler (2004: 61) contends.

In a similar way, I argue that grievances have never disappeared in social movement literature and that they are reconcilable with political process-resource mobilisation. On the one hand, grievances may have been disguised under the relatively consistent features of the political environment within the political process tradition during the last decades, and especially under the *cleavage* concept. Social and cultural dividing lines might engender strain, and particularly the class cleavage as a consequence of deep capitalist transformations. On the other hand, the concept of *grievances* has been subsumed— and *de facto* restricted to— relative deprivation accounts that stem from

social psychology, zoomed into the individual, not the societal, level of explanation (see Giugni and Grasso 2016a: 451). Next, I elaborate on these two points.

Arguably, Western Europe has undergone profound changes since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) formulated their seminal cleavage theory, but traditional cleavages are still a central concept in the study of social conflict, change and political participation.¹⁰ Cleavages refer to the politicised social and cultural dividing lines (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Social stratification helps to build group identity, necessary for a cleavage to develop, but a cleavage only becomes such once it is politicised. As Kriesi et al. (1995: 3-4) put it, “social change determines structural and cultural potentials for political mobilisation that remain latent as long as they are not politicised. In order for such potentials to become politicised, they have to develop, on the one hand, a collective identity, a sense of solidarity, and political consciousness, and, on the other hand, an organisational infrastructure (Kriesi 1985: 30ff.; Klandermans 1988)”. All in all, following Bartolini and Mair (1990; see also Kriesi et al. 1995), a fully developed cleavage consists of three main elements: empirical, normative and institutional. In other words, it requires a distinctive socio-structural basis, specific political values and a certain political organisation of social groups.

While extant research on cleavage politics has focused on the electoral arena, social movement literature has paid little attention to the structural bases of conflict. In fact, cleavage theory is almost absent in literature on non-institutional political participation (Damen 2013; Hutter 2014a: ix; della Porta 2015a: 11-12). As a consequence, little progress has been made since the work by Kriesi et al. (1995) until recent times. Three recent contributions are noteworthy for contributing to fill in this void, however.

First, Kriesi et al. (2012) develop a dynamic and extended framework for the formation and development of cleavages. They shed light on the emergence and articulation of these conflicts in the shadow of globalisation both at the European and

¹⁰ Note, however, the capacity to structure the electorates of the four traditional cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify (centre vs periphery, rural vs urban, owner vs worker, church vs state) might have decreased over time (Franklin et al. 1992) and new cleavages might have emerged around globalisation (e.g. integration vs demarcation; see Kriesi et al. 2012; Hutter 2014a).

national levels. Also, they explain how parties and electoral strategy mobilise and shape these conflicts and public protest. Second, Hutter (2014a) further updates and expands earlier research by Kriesi et al. (1995; see also Kriesi et al. 2012), delving deeper into the new integration-demarcation cleavage that emerges out of globalisation. He shows how this new cleavage restructured protest and electoral politics from the 1970s to the 1990s in six Western European countries. Last but not least, della Porta (2015a; see also Eggert and Giugni 2015) wonders whether the 2011 global wave of indignation in general and anti-austerity protests in particular emerged as a consequence of traditional dividing lines fading and new ones arising, or from the re-intensification of the traditional class cleavage. With regards to the socio-structural basis of the cleavage, she concludes:

“those who protested against austerity measures included many of those who are directly affected by the crisis of late neoliberalism, such as workers, in full or part-time positions, as well as the unemployed. Rather than pointing at a return of the traditional basis of the labour movement or the emergence of a new ‘precariat’ as dominant social group, the research signals the presence of coalitions of various social actors which tend to identify themselves as belonging to the lower classes. Together with students and precarious workers, industrial workers as well as public employees provide a social basis to the protests” (della Porta 2015a: 23).

This is not to argue that precarious youth do not mobilise, because young and highly-educated people with limited career perspectives on the labour market are overrepresented in most anti-austerity performances (della Porta 2015a). Moreover, this does not contravene the fact that the precariat consists of a new emerging social class, the first mass class in history who has lost rights that citizens built up (Standing 2011). As compared to the proletariat, Guy Standing (2011) points out that the precariat has distinctive class characteristics, namely: it has distinctive relations of production, relations of distribution and relations to the state. First, the precariat has insecure jobs: incomplete jobs, short-term contracts, indirect labour relationships through agencies, etc. Second, in terms of its sources of income, the precariat relies on money wages, and receives neither rights-based state benefits nor enterprise non-wage benefits. Third, it has fewer socioeconomic, civic, cultural and political rights than those who are

wealthier. In sum, even if the emergent precariat might have consolidated as the recession unfolded, siding with della Porta (2015a), it seems too adventurous to conclude that a new cleavage underpins anti-austerity protests, given that the latter's human fabric is not formed by a distinctive group, identifiable on the basis of its socio-structural features. Based on data from over 10,000 protestors in 72 demonstrations in seven Western European countries between 2009 and 2013, Grasso and Giugni (2016a; see also Giugni and Grasso 2015) confirm this finding. Accordingly, interpreting the onset of extra-institutional mobilisations during the Great Recession as the expression of a new *precarious generation* would only provide us a partial account at best (for an analysis of this argument applied to the Spanish context, see Antentas 2015).

As della Porta (2015a: 12) admits, social movement contributions have tended to stress the pacification of the class divide, which might account for the lack of interest in capitalism and economic structures in the sub-field over the last decades. In fact, Hetland and Goodwin (2014) highlighted the “strange disappearance” of capitalism and concepts such as “class” from social movement studies and their vocabulary over the last decades— Eggert and Giugni (2015: 22) also noticed this void in social movement studies.

Although it might not have been the key tenet of the political process tradition, I contend that most scholars from this approach have given some weight to the consistent features of the political environment and socio-economic structural transformations. Among political process theorists there has been a more or less explicit recognition of cleavages (or, at least, “broad socioeconomic processes”— in the words of McAdam 1982: 51-52—) in shaping political conflict and generating opportunities for mobilisation (see McAdam 1982; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 2011; Kriesi 2004; Tilly 2008). Thus, where a political process scholar sees “opportunities”, grievances-centred approaches understand these factors as “strain-engendering” (Büchler 2004, 2013). From a political process perspective, the figure below reflects how cleavages affect the other structural components, actor configurations and the interaction context, while these aspects simultaneously shape the cleavage structure (figure 1.1; for a detailed

analysis of how the framework for the study of the political context operates, see Kriesi 2004):




FIGURE 1.1. Framework for the study of the political context. Source: Kriesi (2004: 70).

To sum up, cleavages (not restricted to, but particularly including the class divide) and broad socioeconomic processes are important within the logic of the political process tradition. Changing cleavage structures might give rise to strain (more accurately, “opportunities”) and unloose mobilisation. However, as one of the features of cleavages in general is that they are consistent and evolve very slowly, they usually add little explanatory power in these accounts. Similar to grievances, cleavages also have a problematic empirical record. As far as it goes, the framework above might not be the most adequate for a moment of recession and deprivation, though, when the salience of the economy might increase quickly and dramatically (see Singer 2011). To account for mobilisation in a context of hardship, I contend that grievances-centred theories need to be taken into account more thoroughly.

Apart from the association between cleavages and grievances, the association between relative deprivation and grievances in social movement literature deserves some attention. Relative deprivation theories are prominent among breakdown and strain models (e.g. Davies 1962; Smelser 1963; Runciman 1966; Gurr 1970; for a review of relative deprivation accounts, see Smith et al. 2014; see also Klandermans

1997, 2013; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). A person is deprived if she feels she is not receiving what she deserves, following the comparison of one's own situation with a benchmark— be it someone else's situation, one's past, anticipated future situations, a cognitive standard (e.g. equity, justice), etc., as Folger (1986) points out. Hence, deprivation is about perceived illegitimate inequality (Klandermans 1997, 2013; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013), and the affective and interpretative dimensions play a central role. People who feel deprived as compared to a standard resort to protest in order to influence the social and political context (Klandermans 2004).

Social psychologists have been among the few who continued to pay attention to grievances in general, and specifically to relative deprivation. Some leading scholars have invested much effort in order to develop a cogent framework that allows us to understand the demand side of protest (understood as strength of individual motivation to participate in collective action), integrating grievances, identities and emotions (e.g. van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009; Klandermans 2013). However, the nexus of grievances with the political process model to grasp mobilisation dynamics in a recession-driven scenario is still missing. While different socio-psychological processes and types of relative deprivation behind mobilisation have been unpacked (e.g. Folger 1986; Klandermans 1997, 2013; Van Zomeren et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2014), we do not know how— and to what extent— individual-level relative deprivation is associated with macro-level strain. Similarly, we ignore whether relative deprivation works across different levels of explanation and in relation to aspects of the broader political context.

In short, relative deprivation accounts, focused on the individual level, have difficulties with establishing a parsimonious framework that bridges the different analytical levels together. In sharp contrast to classic strain and breakdown approaches (including also their relative deprivation theories sub-type), the great analytical advantage of cleavage theory is its ability to link macro-institutional aspects of the political and socioeconomic systems and the micro-level of political behaviour in general— and particularly capitalist transformations and citizens' agency. The

following framework, reliant on the political process tradition, tries to integrate both in a recession-driven scenario (see figure 1.2):




FIGURE 1.2. Integrated framework for the study of the political context in a context of recession. Source: own elaboration, but inspired by Kriesi (2014a).

Although some scholars have questioned the impact that the Great Recession has had for protest activities and for the salience of socioeconomic issues in public debates (e.g. Cinalli and Giugni 2016), I contend that mobilisations are highly conditioned by the overall economic-financial context in which they perform, particularly in times of recession.¹¹ Not in vain, in the Spanish protests, many claims, slogans and proposals were directly addressed to the economic sphere (unemployment levels, labour conditions, the emerging precariat, financial oligarchies, housing, the banking system,

¹¹ Moreover, political contention in Europe seems to have been increasingly oriented towards economic issues since the 1990s (Tilly and Kousis 2005; Kousis 2014).

etc.)— e.g. Nez (2011); Calvo et al. (2011); Castañeda (2012); Martí i Puig (2012); Romanos (2013); Perugorría and Tejerina (2013).

As figure 1.2 shows, the political process approach heavily influences the theoretical framework developed here. Nonetheless, given that this approach is very established in social movement literature (e.g. Tarrow 1989, 2011; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly 2004, 2008; della Porta and Diani 2006: 193-222; Hutter 2014a), the innovative contribution of this thesis consists of bringing grievance theories back into an account of mobilisation dynamics in a recession-driven scenario— not as an alternative, but in complement to the political process logic.

Following the initial definition, grievances refer to, on the one hand, exogenous-structural shocks. Thus, (dramatically) changing economic conditions bring about grievances. People seek to express them, either in the electoral or protest arenas (Kriesi 2012: 518, 2015; see also Hirschman 1970). On the other hand, grievances are also the result of signifying work, as they neither automatically arise from specifiable material conditions nor are naturally occurring sentiments (Simmons 2014, 2016; see also della Porta 2005, 2015a), and they are also shaped by the existing cleavage structure.

We also know the recession and socioeconomic perceptions feed back on political potentials. From a normative perspective, governments should satisfy citizens' preferences within a context of political equality (Dahl 1989). Although most established democracies traditionally “operated effectively in synchronising the wishes of the public and the actions of those in office” (Hayward 1995: 1), many individuals and groups understand that elites “are not performing according to their own declared standards and values” (Alonso et al. 2011: 10). To a large extent, the cycle of mobilisation is fuelled by the inability of elites and institutions to meet citizens' demands and concerns more or less related to crisis management, which engenders a “democratic deficit” in a recession-driven scenario (Norris 2011; see also della Porta 2013). Hence, protests against austerity and the political status quo in Spain originate in the recession and its socioeconomic attitudinal consequences, as well as in malfunctioning representative democracy (Oñate 2013; Castells 2016). When the

recession comes about, it reinforces the pre-existing stock of— and gives rise to new— political grievances (Andretta and della Porta 2015; see also Kriesi 2016). As a matter of fact, the salience of claims directly related to the political sphere was disproportionately high in Spain during this period (Zamponi and Bosi 2016). Thereby, political and socioeconomic crises go in parallel and cannot be addressed in isolation because institutional response to economic challenges underpins political perceptions (Polavieja 2013; Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Zamora-Kapoor and Collier 2014; see also Gunther and Montero 2006).

In the Spanish context, a double (socioeconomic and political) crisis concatenated into a “neoliberal critical juncture” (see della Porta et al. 2017a). Kenneth M. Roberts (2015) argues that Latin American politics and societies faced a neoliberal critical juncture since the late 1980s and through the 1990s. Structural contradictions grew from economic modernisation, class formation and social mobilisation, on the one side, and political and institutional exclusion, on the other side. These two processes led to a profound transformation of the political (and more specifically, the party) systems. Similarly, in the context of the Great Recession (that brought about austerity policies, a push toward proletarianisation, inequality, unemployment, as well as cuts in public spending and social benefits), a crisis of the political dimension also unfolded (crisis of legitimacy of political parties, social democracy, corruption scandals, etc.) across different— particularly Southern European— countries. The multidimensional crisis and its social impacts have stimulated a cycle of protest that was very critical of the established system, which has in turn contributed to change the Spanish political institutions and culture.

Yet, the “turning point” (more accurately, the “neoliberal critical juncture”) that has unfolded does not appear from thin air, as it is highly conditioned by its “critical antecedents” (Pierson 2004; Slater and Simmons 2010). The conditions for the harsh impact of the socioeconomic-financial and political crises in the Spanish scenario have been in the making for a while, and came to a head during the global recession. There are specific moments when the actions of individuals have a heightened impact on institutional outcomes (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Although I will not delve deeper

into the institutional impacts and foundations of the neoliberal critical juncture, I will focus throughout the thesis on one of the key processes associated with it. From a dynamic grievances-centred perspective, I will study how specific structural conditions are transformed into mass mobilisation. Specifically, two dimensions of grievances that underlie mobilisation dynamics are distinguished: objective-material and subjective-ideational grievances. The last two is divided into two subtypes, political and socioeconomic subjective-ideational grievances:

1. *Objective-material grievances* refer to macro-economic structures and contextual conditions, which might impact the timing and willingness to engage in protest, such as inequality and/or unemployment, wealth, public spending and deficit, as well as level of private debt. These indicators have been used in most traditional grievances-centred accounts (e.g. Davies 1962; Jenkins et al. 2003), and have gained momentum in recent times (e.g. Quaranta 2015; Caren et al. 2016; Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b; Galais and Lorenzini 2016).
2. *Subjective-ideational socioeconomic grievances* consist of attitudes, perceptions on the economic situation and expectations about it. Although there is some correspondence between objective indicators and socioeconomic attitudes (Anderson and Hecht 2014), what should matter for protest is the perception that the economy is running badly (Gurr 1970; Kern et al. 2015). Building on economic voting literature (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Polavieja 2013), I distinguish two main sub-types: egotropic and sociotropic perceptions of the economy. While the first concerns financial self-sufficiency (i.e. how well one and/or her household is doing), the second pertains to positioning towards general well-being, at the country level.
3. *Subjective-ideational political grievances* concern what Easton (1975) refers to as “specific support” in a democratic context. Specific support is directed to “the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances or the general style of [...] authorities” (Easton 1975: 437). Specifically, I focus throughout the thesis on political discontent, understood as “peoples’ judgements about the day-to-

day actions of political leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes” (Kornberg and Clarke 1992: 20). Political discontent concerns quality of policy-making formulation and implementation, and it is related to political outcomes, the evaluation and effectiveness of authorities and governments (Farah et al. 1979; Gunther and Montero 2006; Magalhães 2014; see also Andretta and della Porta 2015).

Especially in economically poor-performing contexts, political discontent is likely to be associated with the perceived ability of institutions and elites to cope with the recession and its consequences. Although associated with perceptions about socioeconomic outputs, outcomes and the management of the economy, particularly in a recession-dominated context (see Mattes and Bratton 2007; Gunther et al. 2007; Armingeon and Guthmann 2013; see also Gunther and Montero 2006), specific support is not merely economic performance-driven. As Magalhães (2016) reminds us, the linkage between economic performance and one of the indicators for specific support used throughout, satisfaction with democracy, may be mediated by different mechanisms, such as procedural fairness (i.e. perceived fairness of the decision-making processes). Similarly, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2014) find that procedural characteristics strongly affect democratic evaluations in 21 advanced industrial democracies, net of economic factors. Note that political discontent should be distinguished from— and therefore, does not encompass— aspects such as fundamental adherence to a political community or to regime principles. Regime support and political disaffection, which have remained relatively stable in Spain over the last decades, even after the recession started,¹² will pertain to what Easton refers to as “diffuse support” (see Easton 1975; Gunther and Montero 2006; Sanz et al. 2015; Magalhães 2016).¹³ Note that one of the

¹² Some exceptions notwithstanding, such as trust in some institutions of representation like political parties, which decreased dramatically in the last decade— see Pérez-Nievas et al. (2013); Lobera and Ferrándiz (2013); della Porta (2014a); see chapters 2 and 7, this thesis.

¹³ Following Gunther and Montero (2006: 48; see also Montero et al. 1997), regime support implies believing that “democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government”. Political disaffection is conceptually distinct

indicators used to capture political grievances, *satisfaction with democracy*, might arguably not be so short-term or narrowly focused as support for other indicators used throughout, such as support for particular political institutions— or even satisfaction with the general political situation— (see Norris 1999; Dalton 2004; Magalhães 2016; see also Fuchs et al. 1995; Klingemann 1999). However, satisfaction with democracy taps into a fundamental dimension of specific support: it captures the level of support for the way a democratic regime works “in practice” (Linde and Ekman 2003).

In short, the bulk of this thesis seeks to unravel the interplay of grievances and dynamics of mobilisation in the Spanish austerity-ridden scenario (chapters 4, 5 and 6). Although specific testable hypotheses are developed and refined for each chapter, the overall expectation is that the effect of objective-structural aspects on mobilisation dynamics will be mediated by subjective-attitudinal grievances, especially political dissatisfaction. In order to weigh my argument against rival approaches, I will also take into consideration different sets of potentially explanatory factors.

4. WHY SPAIN? A JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASE SELECTION

As mentioned previously, this thesis deals with the dynamics of contention in the Spanish cycle of protest against austerity and the political status quo. Although a paired comparison with Portugal was originally planned, a number of reasons justify the move from a cross-national approach to a single case study. Three main factors support the (exclusive) focus on the Spanish case: the salience of the object of study, its theoretical relevance and more pragmatic considerations.

First, figures are revealing: the number of Spanish authorised demonstrations tripled in 2012 relative to 2008 (from 16,188 to 43,939; Ministerio del Interior 2008, 2012).

both from regime support and political discontent, as it refers to a certain “estrangement of members of the polity from both its core political institutions and, more generally, from politics” (Gunther and Montero 2006: 49). As for indicators of the latter, we can find “disinterest in politics, a sense of personal inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, low levels of political confidence, and a general sense of detachment from the political system and/or its most relevant institutions” (Gunther and Montero 2006: 49).

According to the European Social Survey (6th round), 34% of Spanish respondents asserted in 2012 that they had participated in at least one lawful demonstration during the 12 preceding months. In order to find year-round precedents with similar levels of contention, we would need to travel back to the *Transición*, in the late 1970s (see chapter 2, this thesis). Specifically, the emergence of the 15M campaign represented a critical moment within the Spanish mobilisation record. In one way or another, 6 to 8 million people got involved in 15M activities (camps, assemblies, demonstrations, etc.), making these the most crowded contentious performances outside the umbrella of traditional unions and political parties in the country's recent democratic history (Feenstra 2015; Monterde et al. 2015). Not only a few million individuals were actively involved in the 15M protests all over the country, but three out of every four Spaniards showed sympathetic feelings towards the claims two years after they took place— also, more than half of the population supported their strategies and tactics (Sampedro and Lobera 2014; Feenstra 2015).¹⁴ The size and popular support of the 15M campaign and broader anti-austerity protests make the Spanish case worth of an in-depth, longitudinal study.

In addition, the Spanish cycle of contention contributed to transform the entire political system and had a transnational impact. On the one hand, social unrest was key for changing patterns of electoral support and voting behaviour in Spain— including the emergence of new electoral alternatives and the transformation of the party systems at the national, and also at the regional and local levels (see e.g. Ramiro and Gómez 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al. 2016; Calvo and Álvarez 2015; see also Lobera and Rogero-García 2016; Miley 2016). Also, high levels of popular contestation contributed to modulate public opinion and arenas of political conflict (e.g. raising awareness of political malpractice among civil society, widespread opposition to cuts in public spending on education and the health system, mortgage foreclosures, etc.). On the other hand, many characteristics of the 15M were borrowed from international precursors

¹⁴ This aspect marks a dramatic contrast with Occupy Wall Street, whose public support dramatically decreased to 15% only a few weeks after the occupations started (Sampedro 2013; Sampedro and Lobera 2014).

such as the Arab Spring countries in 2010-2011 or the Latin American movements of the 1990s. Conversely, these events gave rise to transnational campaigns of insurgency and solidarity across Southern European countries, such as Greece, Italy and Portugal. Also, they contributed to foster innovations in strategies, repertoires of action, organisational settings, demands, frames, etc. that were implemented over the subsequent months. Many of these traits diffused to other cases and contexts such as the Occupy counterparts in the US or the Israeli social justice protests, as different studies have shown (e.g. Grinberg 2013; Romanos 2015, 2016b; Díez García 2017; see also della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Ancelovici et al. 2016).

The second main reason that justifies focusing on the Spanish trajectory of protest concerns its theoretical relevance. The country was particularly punished by the economic crisis and many citizens mobilised in order to counter austerity policies. Given the levels of hardship and deprivation in the depth of the Great Recession, Spain is an appropriate case for keeping grievance theories under close scrutiny and for re-assessing their explanatory power. Similarly, the evolution of protest performances made it a case worth of analysing from the theories of cycles of collective action, which in turn helped to refine them. While these theories help to understand the shape and key phases of the cycle, they also have some limitations. As it will be argued in this thesis, the interplay of processes that drive the trajectories of protest in the Spanish cycle differs from earlier findings in other contexts.

The third set of arguments that support the focus on my case study is more pragmatic. First, there is little systematic testing on the dynamics and evolution of protest under the Great Recession in Spain— especially beyond the 15M campaign. This is a void in the literature, which my thesis aims to fill. Second, the wide array of data sources that became available allowed me to illustrate the main points raised. Moreover, the very rich— and underexploited to date— existing survey materials on the Spanish case allowed me to refine and empirically test the hypotheses developed throughout. Third, as part of the empirical design rests upon quantitative content analysis, working with documents written in my mother tongue made the data collection process more efficient— note that many used databases and referenced scholarly

publications are only available in Spanish. Also, my pre-existing personal networks facilitated the access to activists and conducting fieldwork in order to gain first-hand, qualitative insights on the dynamics of mobilisation.

5. EMPIRICAL DESIGN

A wide range of empirical materials is combined in this thesis. Broadly speaking, I follow a mixed-methods approach. Different databases, sources and methodological techniques are triangulated and complement each other. Although specific empirical designs are elaborated in detail for each chapter, I here introduce the three general bodies of empirical information on which I rely in order to give answers to my research questions.

First, I use an original, self-collated and manually coded dataset based on Protest Event Analysis. Protest Event Analysis (PEA, hereafter) is a type of quantitative content analysis that helps to systematically map, assess the amount, occurrence and features of protests performances cross-spatially, over time and across issues and claims put forward by challengers (for an overview, see Hutter 2014b; see also Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Oliver et al. 2003; Fillieule and Jiménez 2003; Earl et al. 2004; Soule 2013). It has been widely used to study cycles of protest and the rhythms of contentious performances over the last three decades. In fact, most world-leading social movement scholars have used PEA in their inquiries at one point or another (e.g. Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly et al. 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Olzak 1992; Rucht et al. 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995; Francisco 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Beissinger 2002; Earl et al. 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005; della Porta 2014a, 2014b).

Based on an original dataset built with manually coded protest events from the *El País* newspaper between January 2007 and February 2015 (N= 2,002 events), I will illustrate and shed light on the chronology of the Spanish cycle of protest in the shadow of the Great Recession, its phases and key turning points. Specifically, this technique will allow me to make sense of protest persistence, radicalisation and organisational dynamics. Also, my protest event data will allow me to expand on existing datasets in

order to perform more sophisticated analysis. I assemble an original time series dataset with a monthly level of aggregation, which gives 98 time-point observations. This database combines information collected through different sources on the evolution of covariates and controls (e.g. the abovementioned Protest Event Analysis, CIS, OECD, etc.). With a focus on (objective-material and subjective-attitudinal— both socioeconomic and political—) grievances, it allows me to study the longitudinal determinants of participation in protest activities in Spain between January 2007 and February 2015.

Second, using various survey materials, I conducted different statistical analyses in order to delve deeper into the relationship between grievances and protest behaviour at the individual level. The online panel data collected by Anduiza et al. (2015) are useful to unravel the causal chain between the three types of grievances (i.e. objective-material, subjective-attitudinal socioeconomic and political) and the mobilisation of Spaniards for the 2011-2013 period. Conversely, these panel data also allow us to assess to what extent the perceptions of grievances are shaped by participation in protest itself. Prior findings are refined thanks to the INJUVE (2012) survey, which include information both about different frequencies of activism and non-participants. With these data, I can test whether the effects of political grievances hold across frequencies of protesters relative to non-challengers. Additionally, indicators from different sources (e.g. CIS, INE, ESS, Eurobarometer, Eurostat, OECD, etc.) are used to illustrate the main arguments developed in the thesis— not restricted to, but particularly in chapters 2 and 7. These indicators have information on different aspects, such as the evolution of the economic situation, citizen attitudes and voting intention.

Third, information from 25 semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants within the movement networks is used. While the access to field was granted through personal contacts, a snowballing strategy was followed. These interviews allow us to discover the respondent's experience and interpretation of reality, access a wider range of relevant actors than reflected in the media and scrutinise the meanings and semantic context of activists (Blee and Taylor 2002: 92-94). Furthermore, they provide “a longitudinal window on social movement activism” (Blee and Taylor 2002: 95). The

interviews will help us to grasp the timing of contentious performances and diachronic citizen engagement in protest activities, organisational configurations, as well as the motivations, shared identities and the construction of frames for— and around— the mobilisation process. In a non-systematic way, these interviews have been useful for building the arguments developed throughout in general. Chapters 6 and 7 feature some illustrative quotes from different groups of interviewees. They are used, for instance, to help us to understand why— and how— activists might embrace more routinised channels of participation as the cycle unfolds.

All in all, in this thesis, I make use of multiple data sources of both quantitative and qualitative nature and combine different methodological endeavours. By focusing on the Spanish cycle of collective action under the Great Recession, these empirical materials allow me to provide a complementary picture of the complex and multidimensional dynamics of contention. Specifically, they will help me to illustrate my arguments and test the hypothesis developed in the subsequent chapters.

6. THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis consists of two main parts. On the one hand, building on the theoretical framework developed in chapter 1, I shed light on the role that grievances play for mobilisation in a context of material deprivation, covering multiple levels of analysis (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). My overall expectation is that the effect of objective-material aspects is mediated by subjective political and socioeconomic grievances, especially political discontent. This argument is tested, confirmed— and refined— throughout the thesis. On the other hand, from a process-based approach, I unravel the general timing and different stages of the cycle of collective action that unfolded in light of the recession scenario in Spain between 2007 and 2015 (see chapter 3). Also, I study the institutionalisation process during the demobilisation phase of the cycle (see chapter 7). Next, I present an overview of the specific content of each chapter.

In the first chapter, I have introduced the main aspirations and arguments of the thesis. The core theoretical framework focused on grievances was developed and the

case selection was briefly justified. Additionally, the empirical design was briefly presented, as well as the overall structure of the thesis.

In the next chapter (i.e. chapter 2), the main traits of the economic context in which mobilisations took place are sketched out. I succinctly analyse how the recession came about in Spain and survey which were its main social impacts. Also, I provide a general overview of the evolution of social movements and civil society since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s and introduce my case study, the cycle of protest in Spain during the Great Recession.

Based on theories of cycles of collective behaviour, in chapter 3, I establish a periodisation of the Spanish cycle of anti-austerity and against the political status quo protest. I explain why the peak of protests persisted for a long time (from mid-2011 until late 2013): radicalisation was contained, institutionalisation postponed and protesters' divisions avoided. The crucial argument here, an innovation with regards to the classic theories of cycles of collective action, is that the high standards of mobilisation persisted for a long time as a consequence of issue specialisation of a more general anti-austerity fight and the strategic alliances— with varying degrees of formality— that new civil organisations forged with the unions. With a view to illustrate the longitudinal dynamics of the cycle of protest, I use original protest event data.

Subsequently, I analyse the role of grievances-centred theories (considering both their material and ideational aspects) in accounting for the ebbs and flows of protest size in a context of generalised hardship (chapter 4). More specifically, I find that the evolution of political grievances captured through political dissatisfaction is highly and positively correlated with aggregate-level fluctuations of protest participation. The analyses show that political grievances initiate protest, while economic (material and subjective) grievances do not. Also, I control for relational opportunities: while opportunity-generating factors such as the immediate implementation of reforms are related to larger protests, immediate concessions hinder attendance. The major contribution of this chapter is empirical, though: statistical analysis of an original time series dataset systematically associate secondary-source data (not restricted to, but also

including attitudes) with the longitudinal evolution of protest participation in a wave of contention— i.e. not merely with event counts. The possibility of reverse causation is taken into account (i.e. protesting being at the origin of political grievances). Granger causality tests suggest, however, that this is not the case.

In the fifth chapter, based on information from the online panel survey conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), I assess to what extent grievance theories supply an adequate framework to understand individual-level mobilisation dynamics. I test whether the political and socioeconomic attitudinal dimensions mediate the effect of objective-material indicators of grievances on individual protest participation. This argument is confirmed: although some relative losers of the recession are more willing to mobilise,¹⁵ neither objective-material nor socioeconomic values seem to influence protest behaviour on their own— but political grievances do. Yet, further analyses point towards a complex and multidirectional relationship between grievances and protest participation. Even though the impact of material aspects on protest participation might be marginal, they do affect egotropic perceptions of the economy, which boost sociotropic views and deepen political grievances that, at the same time, are associated with protest behaviour. Conversely, I find that contentious performances may also have an eventful character. Participating in protests boosts political grievances that feed back onto sociotropic perceptions of the economy, which in turn have an impact on egotropic views, thus shaping mobilisation potentials.

My previous results are refined in chapter 6. By focusing on the 15M protest campaign, which gave rise to the *indignados* movement,¹⁶ I study whether democratic satisfaction underlies different frequencies of participation. Findings suggest that, relative to those who do not participate, political dissatisfaction is significantly associated with multiple-time participation, but not with one-time participation. Those who participated only once are not substantially more dissatisfied than non-participants.

¹⁵ Individuals who are on a mortgage and those who live in a household that depends on a civil servant or public employee's income makes you more prone to protest (see chapter 5, this thesis).

¹⁶ I argue that the *indignados* movement involves a wider range of protests against austerity and for real democracy than those represented within the boundaries of the 15M campaign.

While the *indignados* label and the slogan “Real Democracy Now!” point to democratic discontent as a central factor uniting 15M challengers, I show that not all *indignados* were that outraged. Relying on a general survey with questions on different frequencies of participation in the 15M, I simultaneously avoid treating participants as a homogenous group, and go beyond those *caught in the act of protest*. Qualitative evidence is used to complement survey data.

Chapter 7 focuses on the institutionalisation process during the declining phase of the Spanish cycle of protest against austerity and for real democracy. From a social movement perspective grounded on the political process approach, it proposes an analytic framework for understanding the shift towards more routinised tactics to the detriment of extra-conventional strategies. It focuses on one specific instance of institutionalisation, the emergence of the new challenger party Podemos. I contend that institutionalisation, understood as the strategic and deliberate shift from extra-conventional towards more institutional forms of action, comes from a concatenation of three mechanisms: 1) *appropriation of political opportunities* via electoral de-alignment, 2) construction of *symbolic leadership*, 3) *cognitive liberation*. Given the absence of facilitation, persisting grievances and exhaustion of extra-conventional repertoires of action, the liberation of some cognitive cues allows some activists to reconsider—and eventually change—the movement strategy as a way to redress those grievances more effectively through coordinated action. Therefore, the same three sets of mechanisms that the political process tradition has identified at the core of the mobilisation process may also be helpful to explain institutionalisation processes that take place during the demobilisation phase of the cycle. Information from twelve semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants and descriptive statistics that come from a number of different sources are used to illustrate the core argument.

In the concluding chapter 8, some of the main contributions of the thesis are underscored. I focus on three dimensions: 1) the importance of grievance theories for mobilisation, 2) the lessons for our understanding of the cycles of collective action, and 3) a meta-theoretical assessment of the implications of this piece of research from a mechanisms-based perspective. Also, some further avenues for inquiry are singled out.

Finally, I briefly speculate about the implications of the main finding for the case under study, Spain.

CHAPTER 2

The context: Spain, protest and the Great Recession

1. INTRODUCTION

Karl Polanyi's (2001) ever-influential contribution *The Great Transformation* is a superb account of the conflicting and contradictory relationships between liberal markets and society's need for protection during the first half of the 20th century, which led to financial recession, mass discontent and the rise of radical nationalism and war. The dialectical process of marketisation and push for social protection as a response to that marketisation is called "double movement". While laissez-faire advocates seek to "disembed" the economy in order to establish a market society based on commodification (including Polanyi's "false commodities", namely labour, land and money), a reactionary "counter-movement" emerges to "re-embed" the economy through social protections (e.g. through labour laws, tariffs)— see Polanyi (2001). As Jonathan Hopkin (forthcoming) suggests, mobilisations across Southern Europe may not have had the strength to qualify as "counter-movements" in Polanyi's (2001) terms, but it is out of question that they have emerged as a consequence of a financial-economic crisis and the (mis-)management of political elites. In fact, the recession has pushed us to question both the legitimacy and the capacity of some regulatory institutions to influence and decide upon macroeconomic policies.

On the one hand, many scholars stress the existing association between the erosion of political legitimacy and the decline in manageability of democratic capitalism and corporations, especially in a scenario dominated by a crisis of redistribution— or lack thereof (e.g. Crouch 2011; Scharpf 2011; Streeck 2011, 2014; Blyth 2013; della Porta 2015a, 2015b; della Porta et al. 2015). Given the need to accommodate financial markets and consolidate budgets, responsiveness of governments to citizens declines (Streeck 2013). In the words of Donatella della Porta (2015b), "the crisis was addressed through the imposition of policy decisions from electorally unaccountable institutions. [...] While formally still in charge of policy making, national governments have lost

the capacity to choose among alternative options and have been forced to implement unpopular austerity measures”. From an initial democratic deficit, this author puts her finger on the move of European institutions towards a crisis of political responsibility as a key factor behind the wave of anti-austerity contestation (della Porta 2015a, 2015b). As she further contends: “the EU reduced electoral accountability by moving power from parliaments to executive and independent authorities. Closed, self-sustained and unchecked decision-makers have been empowered during the crisis. These include bureaucrats in the ECB. [...] The unaccountable ECB holds an increasing amount of autonomous power to decide whether to create money and under which conditions to distribute it, with the potential for manipulating market panic and citizens’ fears in order to impose policy” (della Porta 2015b).

On the other hand, the inability of some of these supranational institutions to implement policies to cope with the recession and its consequences has cast serious doubts on their capacity to regulate the global economy. As even the International Monetary Fund recognises in an internal evaluation report:

“The IMF’s pre-crisis surveillance mostly identified the right issues but did not foresee the magnitude of the risks that would later become paramount. The IMF’s surveillance of the euro area financial regulatory architecture was generally of high quality, but staff, along with most other experts, missed the build-up of banking system risks in some countries. In general, the IMF shared the widely-held “Europe is different” mindset that encouraged the view that large imbalances in national current accounts were little cause for concern and that sudden stops could not happen within the euro area” (IMF 2016: vii).

However, the Great Recession is a multidimensional phenomenon. According to Wolfgang Streeck (2014), the global recession that has hit Southern European countries badly since 2007-2008 is threefold. First, within financialised capitalism, banks extended too much credit, which led to a *banking crisis*. Second, budget deficits and rising government debt contributed to a *fiscal crisis*. Third, high unemployment and stagnation are the manifestations of a *real economy crisis*. These three crises are intertwined through money (that links the banking-fiscal crises), credit (banking-real economy crises) and government spending and revenue (fiscal-real economy crises)—

Streeck (2014). This author further contends that these three interrelated crises are the result of the progressive immunisation of capitalism against democracy (Streeck 2014).

Although shedding light on the role of supranational actors and general macro-processes in shaping mobilisation dynamics across different scenarios facing hard times is important (e.g. Bermeo and Pontusson 2012), I focus here on the Spanish case-specific, domestic circumstances and experiences. Broadly speaking, this chapter aims at providing a brief overview of the context and the cycle of protest that unfolded in Spain in the wake of the Great Recession. I move next to surveying how the economic and financial crises developed *vis à vis* the Spanish case, analysing its specific traits, and the consequences that it had for society at large. Then, I will explore the main features of protest behaviour in the country since its transition to democracy in the 1970s. I will conclude this chapter by introducing the Spanish cycle of collective action between 2007 and 2015, whose evolution and key aspects of its trajectory will be addressed in detail in chapter 3.

2. THE RECESSION HITS SPAIN: THE CHRONICLE OF A FORETOLD DRAMA

Spain's economy grew very fast from the mid-1990s, in what is known as the *miraculous decade*. Following the country's modernisation and integration into the EU in 1986, Spain's GDP per capita grew 20 points in only 20 years, narrowing the gap and reaching 90% of the EU-15 average (Royo 2014a). The Spanish GDP grew on average 1.4 percentage points above the EU average between 1996 and 2008, and total unemployment figures fell from 20% to 8% in the same period (Royo 2013). Between 1997 and 2007, one in each new three jobs in the EU were created in Spain; more than 600,000 new jobs were created per year, which attracted thousands of immigrants. Note that the Spanish GDP grew by 3.8% when the global financial recession was triggered in 2007 (see figure 2.1). Then, how did the crisis come about? Why did it hit Spain so heavily?



FIGURE 2.1. GDP Annual Growth Rate in Spain, 1996-2016. Volume chain-linked reference year 2000. Adjusted data after seasonal and calendar effects. Y-axis= percentage points. X-axis= years, 1996-2016 (termly data, 4 observations per year). Source: INE (retrieved from www.tradingeconomics.com).

Spain became a giant (the eighth economy in the world by 2008) with feet of clay. The foundations of its fast economic growth were weak and presented a number of anomalies. First, labour productivity grew too steadily in the decade preceding the Great Recession (only 0.3% on average; see figure 2.2), one point below the EU-28 average. Hence, the Spanish economic growth from the mid-1990s until the recession hit the country took place without any substantive increase in productivity (see Fishman 2012a). Second, the high levels of GDP growth were largely based on low-intensity sectors, particularly tourism and housing construction. Third, there was a real estate property bubble that burst. There was a long-term overshooting of real estate prices. In spite of the existing stock (more than 20% of houses were empty), housing prices rose by 150% between 1998 and 2006. The level of private debt became hardly affordable (e.g. the ratio of household debt to income was higher than 130% by 2007), and the housing market collapsed (see figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). As Robert M. Fishman (2012a: 70) notes, “the magnitude of the bubble that permitted above-trend growth in these circumstances was quite astonishing: new housing starts reached a peak level higher than the sum of annual starts in the three largest Eurozone economies: Germany, France and Italy (Estrada et al. 2010: 113)”. As a side-effect of the housing bubble, foreclosures peaked during the recession: according to the 2012 Land Registry report, every 15 minutes, a Spanish family was evicted from their home because they were not able to meet their mortgage payments (Romanos 2014: 296). Fourth, policy reaction (or lack thereof) was inadequate. The crisis was not only devastating, but the quick pace was

surprising. Rodríguez Zapatero's social democratic government initially underestimated the impact of the recession due to electoral interests and did not implement structural reforms. However, an €8 billion package in public works and fiscal stimuli was approved in 2009 that, together with a steep fall in revenue, proved to be detrimental for the accounts' balance in the long run (Ortega and Pascual-Ramsay 2013; Royo 2013, 2014a).



FIGURE 2.2. Annual labour productivity growth in Spain, EU-19 and EU-28, 1996-2015. Reference category: 1996= 0. Labour productivity defined as GDP per hour worked (for further information on this indicator, see <https://data.oecd.org/lprdy/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm>). Y-axis= percentage points. X-axis= years, 1996-2015. Source: OECD.




FIGURE 2.3. Evolution of total recurring monthly debt by gross monthly income at the household level in Spain. Y-axis= percentage. X-axis= years, 2000-2014 (annual data). Gross debt-to-income ratio of households is defined as loans, liabilities divided by gross disposable income with the latter being adjusted for the change in pension entitlements. Source: Eurostat (retrieved from www.tradingeconomics.com).




FIGURE 2.4. Evolution of housing price in Spain by areas. Average change of real sale tax relative to a reference point (i.e. 2001= 1000 points). Y-axis= points (Tinsa IMIE index). X-axis= years, 2001-2015. Source: Tinsa IMIE (<https://www.tinsa.es/>).



FIGURE 2.5. Number of new official housing permits in Spain by year. Y-axis= total number. X-axis= years, 2001-2015 (annual data). Source: Ministerio de Fomento (<http://www.fomento.gob.es/BE/?nivel=2&orden=100000000>).

On top of the abovementioned four structural limitations of the Spanish economy in recent times, the country's finance sector has traditionally been poorly suited to the needs of the rest of the economy and has shown oligopolistic traits (Pérez 1997). Moreover, it has undercut the ability of small and medium enterprises to increase employment and invest in innovation by restricting their lending (see Fishman 2010, 2012a). In sharp contrast to the small and medium enterprises, the financial sector allowed housing over-lending, which degenerated into a real estate property bubble and is the main reason for the sudden Spanish collapse (Ortega and Pascual-Ramsay 2013). Therefore, mismanagement in the financial sector that allowed accumulations of huge

levels of private debt and seemingly boundless loans and mortgages that were accepted seem to lie at the core of the crisis. Account imbalances and a lack of competitiveness contributed to worsen the situation.

Some scholars have in turn emphasised the process of European Monetary Union (EMU, hereafter) convergence as key to the origin and intensity of the crisis. The EMU convergence made exchange rate risks disappear, investors accepted lower yields, and facilitated the flow of capital to the Southern European periphery (Scharpf 2011: 16-24; Bermeo and Pontusson 2012; Armingeon and Baccaro 2012). From this perspective, availability of cheap capital with extremely low interest rates fuelled credit-financed domestic demand to the point of allowing reckless account deficits, favouring a real estate bubble. When the global financial crisis hit the country, the bubble burst, uncovering the structural limitations of the economic model. Building on this line of reasoning— and the abovementioned work by Polanyi (2001)—, Hopkin (forthcoming) argues that the process of European integration has been above all a process of market-making. While the EMU introduced rigidities in monetary policy, “decommodifying institutions” emerged in Southern European countries as these modernised. When the crisis came to a head, Southern European governments were forced to “disembody” the economy from those redistributive and regulatory institutions that shielded their societies from the full force of the market economy (Hopkin, forthcoming). The unbalances and crisis management may have had important consequences for the whole EMU. For example, figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the real domestic demand in the Euro area in comparison to other world powers.




FIGURE 2.6. Evolution of Real Domestic Demand of the Euro area, Japan and the US. Reference point: 4Q 2007= 100. Y= per. points. X= years, 2007-2013 (termly data; 4 observations per year). Source: Credit Suisse (2013: 10).

Going beyond financial mismanagement and the consequences of the EMU integration for Southern European countries, Royo (2014b) stresses institutional degeneration in order to account for the impact of the crisis in Spain. A sense of complacency among policy-makers in light of prior economic success, corruption, lack of accountability, together with the (mis-)regulation of the *cajas de ahorros* (“saving banks”) allowed for the development of a whole system of tax incentives that favoured bankers, property owners and promoters around building construction, which degenerated into a form of crony-capitalism.¹⁷ Banks, and especially *cajas*, risked insolvency, which led to the EU’s financial bailout in June 2012. In the summer of 2012, the Spanish risk premium rose to over 600 points (Romanos 2016a).

To sum up, these three aspects together (financial mismanagement, EMU integration and institutional degeneration) converged in the Spanish scenario, which dramatically worsened the three arenas of the recession that were very acute in the Spanish case: fiscal, financial and competitiveness-related (see Royo 2014a). It is worth highlighting that “Spanish housing and banking bubbles did not appear on the radar-screen of the ECB and the Commission, reductively merely taking note of inflation and public debt and deficit” (Hemerijck 2016: 32). Contrary to other countries, however, the Spanish crises were not caused by high levels of public debt (see figure 2.7; see also Streeck 2014). If anything, public debt was the consequence, not the cause of recession in Spain, as Blyth (2013) notes— see also della Porta (2015a); Hemerijck (2016). Private (not public) debt is to blame for this (see figure 2.3). The Spanish public debt to GDP was much lower in 2008 (government debt to GDP: 39.4%, according to Eurostat data) than that of Germany (65%) and France (68.1%). In spite of its dramatic increase, 2012’s public debt was still low in relative terms (government debt to GDP was 69.5% for Spain, 78.4% for Germany and 85.2% for France).

¹⁷ The *cajas* are financial institutions born to hold funds of individual depositors in interest-bearing accounts and to make long-term investments accessible to the broad population.




FIGURE 2.7. Evolution of the Government of Spain's debt as percentage of total GDP. X= percentage. Y= years, 1991-2015 (annual data). Source: Eurostat (retrieved from www.tradingeconomics.com).

The financial turmoil and structural limitations of the economy led to a collapse of the job market. Between mid-2007 and 2008, unemployment in the construction sector rose by 170% (Royo 2014a). By 2012, there were 6 million jobless Spaniards (more than 27% of the total workforce). Unemployment especially hit young people (youth unemployment was above 50% in Spain in 2012-2014, while the EU average was always below 24%), as figure 2.8 shows:



FIGURE 2.8. Evolution of unemployment, 2002-2015. X-axis: years. Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a) without work during the reference week, b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, c) actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later (within a period of, at most, three months). Youth unemployment rate is the percentage of the unemployed in the age group of 15- to 24-year-olds compared to the total labour force in that age group. Dashed line:

youth unemployment, Spain. Dotted line: youth unemployment, EU-28 average. Light continuous line: total unemployed population, Spain. Dark continuous light: total unemployment rate, EU-28 average. Source: Eurostat. Own elaboration.

Very linked to the dynamics of unemployment, there is the evolution of inequality. As different studies show, unemployment accounts for 70% of variation in the inequality indicators (e.g. Bermeo 2012). All sectors of the population improved their financial status by 2006 relative to 1973 in Spain, regardless of their income level,¹⁸ according to INE data (CES 2013: 52; see figure 2.9).¹⁹ Moreover, income inequality dramatically decreased between the 1970s and mid-2000s, just right before the beginning of the Great Recession. While income for those in the bottom decile (i.e. 10% of the population who have the lowest level of income) increased by 3.2 percent on average, it increased only by about 1% on average for those in the top decile (i.e. those among the 10% of the population with the highest level of income).




FIGURE 2.9. Real income change across percentiles of the (equivalised disposable household) income distribution, 1973-2006. Y-axis= percent change. X-axis= income percentiles. Source: Ayala (cited in and retrieved from CES 2013: 52). Data from the INE's Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (1973 and 2006).

However, this trend dramatically reverted during the recession. The level of income across most income segments of the population increased moderately (below 2%) by 2010 relative to 2007 (figure 2.10). While those in the top quintile increased their income by more than 2%, the dramatic change concerns the bottom percentiles: they

¹⁸ Note that the shape of the income distribution did not remain constant during the whole period.

¹⁹ INE stands for *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* ("National Statistics Institute"), which is an autonomous institution assigned to the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness in charge of large-scale statistical operations in various domains (see <http://www.ine.es/en/welcome.shtml>).

lost 2-10% of their income only in these three years.²⁰ The poorest segments of the population were hit the most hardly by the economic crisis, as confirmed by the evolution of income distribution across deciles in the shadow of the Great Recession. One can observe that while the individuals among the poorest 10% of the population had lost more than 20% of their annual net income in 2015 relative to 2008, those in the top deciles were not severely punished in terms of individual income change (figure 2.11). The evolution of inter-decile share ratio confirms a steep increase in inequality in light of the recession. According to OECD data, the interdecile P90/P10 ratio increased by more than 17% between 2007 and 2013 in Spain. That is to say, the income difference between the 10% of the population with the highest income and the 10% with the lowest income grew by 17%.²¹

²⁰ The figures with data from the LIS (2015) are even more revealing. Although they point towards a generalised decline in income for the 2007-2010 period, a wider gap between income deciles is observed (unlike INE, note LIS uses harmonised procedures to calculate income, so these data sources are not directly comparable; for further information, see <http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-database>). According to LIS (2015) data, those in the top quintile lost less than 5% of their income on average between 2007 and 2010 (see figure #fn2.1). Those in the third decile saw their income decrease by 10-15%. More dramatically, those at the bottom income percentile lost 20-40% of their income. Hence, LIS data point to a huge increase in income inequality in 2007-2010. The gap did not narrow in 2010-3. While those at the top 5% increased their income by more than 10% in 2013 relative to 2010, those in the lower decile kept on having a similar level of income on average (see figure #fn2.1):



FIGURE #fn2.1. Growth incidence curve for Spain, 2007-2013 (LIS). Real income change across percentiles of the (equivalised disposable household) income distribution. Orange line: 2007-2010. Blue line: 2010-2013. Y-axis= percent change. X-axis= income percentiles. Source: LIS (2015; retrieved from <http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-database/>).

²¹ The evolution of the Gini coefficient confirms this increase in inequality by 2013 (Gini, disposable income, post-taxes and transfers= 0.346) relative to 2007 (Gini, disposable income, post-taxes and transfers= 0.324), according to the OECD (<http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm>).




FIGURE 2.10. Real income change across percentiles of the (equivalised disposable household) income distribution, 2007-2010. Data from the INE's Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (2007 and 2010). Y-axis= percent change. X-axis= income percentiles. Source: Ayala (cited in and retrieved from CES 2013: 53).




FIGURE 2.11. Percent change of the individual net income distribution across deciles in Spain, 2008-2015. It is measured as the percentage change of the intra-deciles' upper and lower income limits (2015 vs 2008). Data from the INE's Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (2008 and 2015). Y-axis= percent change. X-axis= income deciles. Own collection and elaboration.

Source:

<http://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.htm?padre=1927&capsel=1922>.

Together with Greece, Spain's increase in inequality was the highest among Southern European countries (see figure 2.12). According to EU-SILC data on inter-quintile share ratio (S80/S20), figures for Spain in the 2005-2007 period were similar to those for Italy and the United Kingdom. Based on this indicator, one can conclude that inequality was much lower in Spain at that time than in other countries such as Portugal. The recession scenario dramatically reversed this situation. The same indicator shows that Spain was the most unequal country in the Euro area in 2014, and

only ranked behind non-members of the Eurozone in terms of inter-quintile income inequality (i.e. Serbia, Romania and Macedonia).




FIGURE 2.12. Income inter-quintile share ratio (S80/S20) by year (2004-2014) across Southern European countries. Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income (i.e. “the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members converted into equalised adults”— Eurostat (2014); see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income). Source: EU-SILC.

Also, while 24% of the population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2006, the figure increased steeply during the recession years (the percentage rose up to 29.2% by 2014), according to Eurostat.²² As a consequence, soup kitchens and food banks had to support 1.5 million Spaniards in 2012, twice as many as three years earlier (Romanos 2016a). According to Eurostat data, people living in households with very low work intensity increased from 6.4% in 2006 to 17.1% in 2014.²³ Additionally, it is

²² According to the “people at risk of poverty or social exclusion” indicator. At risk-of-poverty are persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources, and they experience at least 4 out of 9 following deprivation items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone. Source: EU-SILC (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion).

²³ People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) worked 20% or less of their total work potential during the past year. Source: EU-SILC (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion#Work_intensity:_11.0.C2.A0.25_of_the_population_in_the_EU-28_living_in_households_with_very_low_work_intensity).

worth highlighting that the of in-work at-risk-of-poverty percentage increased by more than 20% in the 2006-2014 period.²⁴ As Requena and Picazo (2013, cited in Romanos 2016a) remark, “even among those at work, wage devaluation, rising prices, loss of purchasing power, worsening public services, and precarious labour conditions have contributed to social exclusion and poverty”.

3. MOBILISATION IN SPAIN SINCE THE TRANSITION

Broadly speaking, social movements’ culture in Spain has traditionally featured at least six relevant traits (see Romanos and Aguilar 2016; Ibarra 2005; for a long-term overview of Spanish protest throughout the 20th century, see Cruz 2015).

First, there has been a disdain for parliamentary politics in the labour movement, especially in different anarchist groups since the second half of the 19th century (Romanos and Aguilar 2016; Álvarez Junco 1994). Although this is not a particularity of the Spanish case, the presence and salience of this frame lasted for longer than in most Western countries (Laraña 1999; Álvarez Junco 1994). However, this orientation seems to have faded away in recent times, as Romanos and Aguilar (2016) note.

Second, although civil society was left relatively “intact” and remained considerably autonomous from politics, the authoritarian Francoist regime contributed to weaken it organisationally (Riley and Fernández 2014). As a consequence, organisational models of most social movement actors have been largely decentralised, with little state-level coordination and few large organisations.

Third, the repressive regime led by the dictator Francisco Franco specifically contributed to slowing down and delaying the development of the so-called “new social

²⁴ The in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate (re-standardised into a 0-100 scale) captures the share of persons who are at work and have an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Source: EU-SILC (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tesov110&plugin=1>).

movements”. Spanish feminist, pacifist, ecologist, etc. movements have been relatively weak and atomised (Jiménez 2005; Cruz 2015; Romanos and Aguilar 2016).

Fourth, union and party membership among “subordinate social groups” (e.g. workers) has been very low in the post-Francoist democracy, as compared to other cases and to prior democratic settings within Spain, such as the Second Republic in the 1930s (see Fishman 1990, 2012b).

Fifth, Spanish social movements have tended to resort to non-violent repertoires of action— the exception of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA notwithstanding. In sharp contrast to the repressive strategies that the Francoist regime used to adopt, this trait is probably a cultural legacy of the movements for democratisation during the *Transición* (Jiménez 2005; Sánchez-Cuenca 2014).

Sixth, Franco’s military dictatorship and the transition to democracy had enduring consequences for the protester and power-holder nexus. Robert M. Fishman (2012b) argues that post-Francoist Spanish office-holders have often regarded protests as a threatening and non-legitimate way of doing politics— this marks a dramatic difference with their Portuguese counterparts, who are keener to listen to protesters and their demands (Fishman 2011). At times, “office-holders have even practiced a *politics of denial*, essentially ignoring the numbers and concerns of protestors” (Fishman 2012b: 359). The 1978 constitutional framework reinforced this tendency by setting up an electoral system that favoured large parliamentary majorities (by over-representing the two winning parties), with a prevalence of the executive over the legislative and the limitation of direct democratic mechanisms (Gunther et al. 2004; Jiménez 1999, 2007; Romanos 2016a). In sum, as Eduardo Romanos (2016a: 134) argues, “the political elites designed an institutional framework that isolated representatives from the direct social pressure of protest movements in a political context of social effervescence, the atomisation of parties, and strong resistance from the right and the army to the moves that were being made to leave Franco’s dictatorship behind. The blockages are also related to the sensitivity of the political authorities to the voices of the street. The authorities pay little or no attention to street protests, ignoring the numbers and concerns

of protesters”. Conversely, Spanish activists have often shown disinterest in engaging with power holders and the institutional political sphere (Fishman 2012b: 356-357).

Contrary to the thesis that attributes Spanish democratisation to the moderation of the elites, several bottom-up accounts of the *Transición* have stressed the importance of (student, labour, etc.) mass protest for demising the late Francoist dictatorship and for triggering the democratisation process (e.g. Tarrow 1995; Bermeo 1997; Laraña 1999). However, the design of institutions and the central decisions in the new democracy were undertaken by political elites (Fishman 2012b: 354-355). The high levels of “intraparty discipline” and “interparty consensus”, two aspects that Gunther and Hopkin (2002: 194; see also Gunther et al. 2004) highlight as distinctive features of the Spanish transition, translated into a social consensus over the subsequent years. Guillem Martínez (2012) refers to this consensus as the dominant political “culture of the transition”, focused on avoiding conflict and a dramatic change in the established framework. As a result, “the main characters, the ways of discussion and the level of consensus were converted into a myth” (Sampedro and Lobera 2014: 1). The most controversial issues were taken out of political agendas, which led to polarisation in the last years (Lobera and Ferrándiz 2013) and to “a progressive estrangement between citizens and institutional politics” (Sampedro and Lobera 2014: 2; see Martínez 2012).

It is worth noting that general levels of protest and citizen contestation fell dramatically during the early 1980s. The Spanish labour movement was the weakest across Western European democracies by then (Fishman 1990). Distrust in intermediary institutions of representation, such as unions, decreased sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and remained more or less steady since the mid-1980s (around 50-55% of Spaniards responded that they had “little” or “very little” trust in unions, according to CIS data series) until the recession came about, when confidence in unions fell dramatically.²⁵ In general, Spain has been a country with high levels of political disaffection, political cynicism and anti-party feelings during its— arguably short—

²⁵ The declining trend in popular support for unions became deeper during the Great Recession (from 4.51 in 2005 to 2.51 in 2014 in the 0-10 scale; see CIS data series <http://www.analisis.cis.es/cisdb.jsp>).

democratic record (Torcal and Montero 2006: ch. 7). Moreover, some authors have argued that general political participation and civic engagement in Spain have been relatively low (e.g. Torcal et al. 2006). Whilst true, this point mostly concerns institutional and semi-institutional political behaviour, and especially party membership. However, Spanish society has shown high levels of extra-conventional mobilisation. It ranks among the first democracies on levels of participation in protest activities through the last two decades, particularly in demonstrations (Morales 2005; Fishman 2004, 2012b; Jiménez 2011).²⁶

As Romanos and Aguilar (2016) highlight, once democracy became consolidated, with the social democratic PSOE in office (1982-1996), new opportunities for mobilisation opened up. Government agencies were created to welcome and give voice to emerging movements (e.g. the feminists through the *Instituto de la Mujer*), but disenchantment among a good portion of activists also spread. Gradually, the Spanish realm of collective action became more attuned to that of other Western democracies under the Conservative PP rule (1996-2004) and under the PSOE's first term in office (2004-2008), as the movements by students, for decent housing, against abortion and against gay marriage gained strength (Romanos and Aguilar 2016). Hence, protests spread widely as democracy consolidated in Spain, and the profile of the protesters and the issues covered became more heterogeneous, rendering it in line with the thesis of *normalisation of protest* (Jiménez 2011; see Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Protests were sustained and their discursive horizons shaped in post-Francoist Spain not only by formal and civil society organisations but also by loosely organised movements, informal social ties and cultural frameworks (Fishman 2004). Specifically, Fishman (1990, 2004) stresses the importance of workplace leadership not only for regime transition, but also for assuring the political vibrancy of political discourse under democracy.

²⁶ As Morales (2005) points out, other activities have also increased, such as voluntary association membership.

It has long been recognised that protests are not randomly distributed over time because social turmoil comes in clusters (e.g. Tilly et al. 1975; Traugott 1995; Myers and Oliver 2008; Biggs 2016). Accordingly, three main cycles of mobilisation have taken place in the country since the 1960s (Viejo 2012; see Jiménez 2011): 1) protests during the *Transición* from the Francoist regime to democracy in the 1970s, 2) against the integration of Spain into NATO in the mid-1980s, and 3) against neoliberal globalisation in the 1990s and various campaigns in early 2000s— see chapter 3, this thesis. A fourth major cycle against austerity and the political status quo has developed under the Great Recession, which is introduced next.²⁷

4. MOBILISATION IN SPAIN IN THE SHADOW OF AUSTERITY: AN OVERVIEW

Normally, “common causes” are not enough to account for clusters of mobilisation, although some of these might be explained on the basis of economic cycles and performance (see Frank and Fuentes 1994). The 2007-2009 global financial meltdown was met with a set of austerity policies that several national governments and international institutions implemented. These policies have been both a cause and a consequence of the economic recession (della Porta 2015a), as they often implied cutting public spending and welfare provisions to keep deficit under control, while standards of inequality increased and life conditions worsened for many sectors of the population. On top of material deprivation, Spain faced a political crisis during these years due to crisis management, corruption scandals, unpopular policies, revolving doors between administrations and corporations, etc. (Fernández-Albertos 2015). Large sectors of the population took a critical stance not only against the government, but also against the political situation and establishment. Particularly, discontent toward the two-party system spread, as both PP and PSOE “supported austerity measures and have not

²⁷ For a more detailed overview of the preceding cycles and the precursors of protests against austerity and for real democracy, see chapter 3, this thesis.

taken care of citizen needs in the wake of the crisis, instead using public money to socialise private banking debt” (Flesher Fominaya 2014, cited in Romanos 2016a: 134).

Although both political and socioeconomic dimensions lay at the heart of the intense wave of citizen contestation in the country, two side notes are in order. First, the political crisis has been a long time in the making, but the Great Recession (and its political response) have exacerbated it. Indicators of political support such as confidence in appointed officials, trust in democratic institutions and satisfaction with democracy were heavily eroded between 2008 and 2011 in Spain (Lobera and Ferrándiz 2013: 43-56). Moreover, Sampedro and Lobera (2014; see also Martínez 2012; Antentas 2015) argue that the new wave of contestation has much to do with the erosion of the transition's hegemonic culture and the need to develop new spaces for challenge and reform. In their own words: “polls reflect growing political disaffection in recent decades, but the economic crisis raised a new challenge to the transition culture. [...] In a context of crisis, citizens looked for solutions. In the first place, they looked back to the mythologised transition, but they clashed against immobile institutions and have finally confronted them. Inherited institutional and political culture [...] became no longer functional and questioned while dissenting voices became stronger” (Sampedro and Lobera 2014: 2-3). Delving deeper into this line of reasoning, Jeff Miley (2016: 19) interprets the Spanish wave of contestation in the context of “the economic-cum-political crisis [that] has hit Spain like an earthquake, suddenly exposing underlying structural weaknesses of its constitutional edifice accumulated over the past decades”. By focusing specifically on the 15M events, other authors reach a similar conclusion: “from a historical point of view it was not only the biggest social upheaval since the seventies, but also a movement that called into question the institutional order that had seemed to be firmly in place. From this perspective, the 15M was the first sign of a regime crisis that would deepen thereafter— a definitive break-up of the so-called Transition consensus” (Antentas 2015: 142).

Second, the Great Recession that lies behind the Spanish wave of protest studied here has a generational component. Although the anti-austerity protests did not consist merely of a youth movement, it has been widely acknowledged that the youth— though

not teenagers— were overrepresented in protests in the shadow of austerity (e.g. Martí i Puig 2011; Likki 2012; Antentas 2015). The highly-educated, urban and digital-native “youth that embodies the rising instability of the middle classes and the upper echelons of the working class, and that is facing life prospects that are much more uncertain and fragile than what their parents faced. The indignant generation represented young middle class with uncertain personal biographies and future perspectives” (Antentas 2015: 147). For many, the recession that came about was a reality check; it made patent that hopes for social mobility were unrealistic (see Taibo 2011; Antentas 2015).

In the Spanish context, pro-austerity policies were first adopted in 2010, under Rodríguez Zapatero’s social democratic government— relatively late from a comparative vantage point. These policies meant reforming the pension system, the labour market, slashing salaries and worsening conditions of public employees, etc.²⁸ Most remarkably, the planned Labour Law reform was meant to bring about precariousness and job market instability, facilitate dismissals and weaken the collective bargaining power of employees. The government change in economic policies and its subsequent embracing of neoliberal dictates to the detriment of Keynesian stimuli brought about popular discontent (see Romanos 2016a). The first massive mobilisations against these policies and the economic U-turn of the social democratic PSOE government started in September 2010 with the first general strike called for by the main unions and smaller organisations in eight years. Protesters reacted against the Labour Law reform, freezing pensions and cutting back on public employees’ salaries. Traditional actors of civil society, such as unions, and other well-established social movements organisations played a leading role at organising dissent during this first momentum that can be distinguished in the evolution of protest claims, key actors and core demands under the Great Recession (see table 2.1). Their capacity to keep standards of mobilisation high over time was limited, however.

²⁸ The PSOE government implemented one of the harshest packages of pro-austerity measures in Spain’s democratic history in May 2010. Specifically, this implied cutting child benefits and pensions, slashing salaries of public servants by up to 15%, raising the retirement age from 65 to 67, lifting bans on employing workers indefinitely on temporary labour contracts, etc.

	EVOLUTION OF PROTEST DYNAMICS			
	EARLY RISERS	15-M & PEAK		DEMOBILISATION & ELECTORAL MOBILISATION
Main actors	Trade Unions, "new" social movements (ecologist, feminist, student movement), alternative left.	New anti-austerity and for real democracy organisations (Juventud Sin Futuro, Democracia Real Ya!), territorial assemblies.	a) Anti-austerity and for real democracy, 15-M and offspring	Podemos
			– PAH, 15-M assemblies and its offspring	Ganemos
			b) Traditional actors:	Popular Unity Candidacies (municipal election)
			–Trade Unions	
Main events/ major performances	General strike (29/09/2010)	7/04/2011: Juventud Sin Futuro	Rodea el Congreso (25/09/2012)	European election (25/05/2014)
	Protests against the reform of the pension system (01/2011)	15/05/2011: demonstrations in +50 cities	Citizen tides (2012-2014)	Marcha del Cambio launched by Podemos (31/01/2015)
		Camps in most cities (05-06/2011)	General strikes (29/03/2012 and 14/11/2012)	Local election (24/05/2015)
		19/06/2011: demonstration against Euroagreement (global action)	Marchas Dignidad (22/03/2013)	
		15/10/11: marching against austerity (global action day)	No nos vamos, nos echan (7/04/2013)	
			PAH's ILP, escraches (05-06/ 2013): anti-evictions	
Demands/ claims	Anti-austerity Against unemployment and worsening of working conditions	Anti-austerity	Anti-austerity	Anti-austerity
		Anti-corruption	Anti-corruption	Anti-corruption
		Real Democracy	Real democracy	Participatory democracy
			Alternative public policies	Alternative public policies
			New institutions, Constituent Process	New government to change politics-as-usual

TABLE 2.1. Chronological overview of actors, events and claims related to protest under the Great Recession in Spain, 2007-2015. Adapted from Portos and Fernández (2016).

The 15M campaign triggered in May 2011 was a “historical revolt” (Badiou 2012) not only because of the numbers, visibility, and/or its cross-national impact during the concrete events, but also because it fostered subsequent anti-austerity protests (see Feenstra 2015; Portos 2016a, 2016b). From a general campaign that aimed at changing the political and socioeconomic system, the 15M abandoned the visible occupation of central squares and decentralised through neighbourhood assemblies. The *indignados* specialised and compartmentalised in diverse areas. For instance, the so-called *mareas* (“citizen tides”) emerged with the aim of fighting austerity cuts in specific sectors, such as the *Marea Verde* (“green tide”) against cuts in education. At the same time, new movement actors built alliances for specific purposes with more established actors such as unions, which were crucial to keeping standards of mobilisation high during this peak of protest, as argued in chapter 3.

Finally, the third major momentum concerns extra-conventional demobilisation, which unfolds in parallel to a process of institutionalisation. When the latter is triggered, certain sectors of the movement start to focus on the electoral domain, particularly by creating new forces that embody and channel some of the protesters’ core claims. In the next chapter, using novel empirical materials, I will delve deeper into the trajectory of contention under the Great Recession, and come up with a periodisation of the wave of protest in light of the theories of the cycle of collective action.

CHAPTER 3

Taking to the streets in the shadow of austerity: a periodisation of the cycle of protest in Spain, 2007-2015

1. INTRODUCTION

2011 has been defined as the year of protest. A large and visible number of mobilisations shook the socio-political scenario in many distant parts of the globe: the Arab uprisings in the spring, the anti-austerity demonstrations across Southern European countries in the summer and the Occupy movement in the US during the fall are just a few examples. As mentioned previously, the 15M campaign, which unfolded and gave rise to the *indignados*— “the outraged”—, embodied the most remarkable critical point in the Spanish socio-political mobilisation scene of the last years.

There is already a relatively wide range of studies on the 15M, of both a qualitative and quantitative type (e.g. Romanos 2013; CIS 2011, N° 2921; Calvo et al. 2011; Likki 2012; Calvo 2013; Anduiza et al. 2014a, 2014b; Portos and Masullo 2016). While these studies are undoubtedly useful, what I will argue for in this chapter is that anti-austerity activities went on to transcend what happened across Spanish squares in May to June 2011. Many of these activities had been related to the financial crisis that has affected Spain drastically, represented in the profusion of protests that persisted until late 2013 (e.g. anti-evictions, citizen’s tides, urban movements, etc. that will be analysed later). Reducing anti-austerity protests in Spain to the events represented by 15M would preclude us from seeing what in reality was a much more complex cycle of social confrontation.

In this chapter, I explore and discuss the overall shape of the cycle of contention that Spain has faced since the onset of the recession. Following Sidney Tarrow (2011: 199, 1993, 1995), by a *cycle*, I refer to a phase of heightened conflict across the social system, where collective action spreads rapidly from more to less mobilised sectors, flows of information and interactions between challengers and authorities are intense, and innovations occur in terms of frames, forms of collective action and tactics. My

aims are twofold. First, I assess the development of Spanish protests in the shadow of austerity by providing a periodisation of the wave of contention based on the literature on the cycles of collective action. Second, I nuance the myth of spontaneity that often surrounds the 15M protest events in 2011, and analyse how protesters managed to maintain relatively high standards of mobilisation over time after this climax, until late 2013: radicalisation was contained, institutionalisation postponed and protesters' division avoided. The crucial argument here, an innovation with regards to the classic theories of cycles of contention (e.g. Hirschman 1982; Tarrow 1991, 1993, 1995, 2011), is that the high standards of mobilisation persisted for a long time as the result of the issue specialisation of a more general anti-austerity fight and the strategic alliances—with varying degrees of formality—that new civil organisations forged with the unions.

The time span covered ranges from January 2007 to February 2015. In order to assess protest size dynamics in the shadow of the Great Recession in Spain, I study how contention unfolded from the first symptoms of the crisis in January 2007 until February 2015. In early 2007, the first increasing rates of youth unemployment can be observed, private household debt peaked, and the global financial crisis resulting from the subprime mortgage crisis was triggered. February 2015 is an appropriate moment at which to finish the observation for two main reasons: the first symptoms of an economic recovery and a shift of focus toward the electoral side of political participation can be observed.

First, although it may be argued that the crisis is still unfolding, there has been a change of tendency in the economic cycle when looking at macro-economic indicators. For example, the Spanish risk premium has fallen below 100 points for the first time since 2005 and the employment rate has stayed below the 24% threshold three terms in a row for the first time in the preceding 5-year period.

Second, the timing of political dynamics marks a turning point, with the electoral campaign for the regional election in Andalucía, which began in early March 2015. Symbolically, this meant that there was a shift of focus toward the electoral side of political participation. The Andalusian regional election was the starting point of a year

with a cramped electoral calendar (municipal— and regional elections in 13 autonomous communities— were held in May 2015, the Catalan regional election took place in September 2015 and the general election was held later in December 2015). These events altered the socio-political scenario, as the media, public opinion and organisational-mobilisation foci were oriented to the conventional side of political participation, especially after the irruption of Podemos and various municipal candidacies onto the political scene (e.g. *Barcelona en Comú*, *Ahora Madrid*, etc.).

Moreover, as the PEA data will show, there is some chronological overlap between weakening non-institutional mobilisation and new parties beginning to gain popular support. This might suggest that a substitution effect could be at play: protests decrease and new parties replace them, monopolising mobilisation efforts, as a zero-sum game (see Portos 2016a). This would be consistent with earlier findings, as during the demobilisation phase of the cycle, protests dramatically decrease and social order gradually is restored (e.g. Tarrow 1989; Beissinger 2002). Although the (biographical, cultural, political, socioeconomic) consequences of mobilisation may last for longer (Giugni 2008), early 2015 seems to mark the end of the cycle of collective action.

2. DATA AND METHODS

The graphical representations and figures shown in this chapter come mainly from the original Protest Event Analysis dataset that I collated and briefly introduced in chapter 1. Since PEA data are in general useful for mapping, analysing and interpreting the occurrence and distribution of protest over time (Koopmans and Rucht 2002), I use my PEA data for descriptive purposes in this chapter.

Following Beissinger (2002: 14; see also Tilly 2002, 2008), the units of analysis in my PEA, events, are defined as “contentious and potentially subversive acts that challenge normalised practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority”. As the printed media is a crucial arena for public claims-making, and most actors use it —still nowadays— to make their views public, I used newspaper records (see Earl et al. 2004; Hutter 2014b). Specifically, I collated my PEA dataset from El País through keyword

search from their digitalised printed versions stored in the *El País Archive*.²⁹ The sample size of my PEA is arguably high (N= 2,002 events). I avoided sampling on the dependent variable, as information about size was coded regardless of the kind and size of the event (i.e. I have collected data neither only on the largest events nor only on those strictly associated with the recession, austerity, labour issues and the political status quo).

Every article reported in this newspaper is tagged with a number of keywords, and the system automatically reports only those matching my input for the selected time span.³⁰ Articles that report any protest event performance were manually selected or discarded.³¹ Overall, my PEA data reports information on the context of the event (e.g. location, date, duration), the type of protest (e.g. related to education, nationalism, ecology, housing, etc.), organisers, action repertoires, levels of disruption and violence, claims, targets, purposes, the number of participants, the availability of allies, immediate reforms and concessions on the side of the authorities and institutions. No diachronic sampling techniques were necessary. That is to say, information for everyday issues within the time span was taken into account.³² Following Kriesi et al. (1995), opinion and editorial sections were omitted. For a full description of variables, coding procedures and operationalisation of my PEA dataset, see table 3.1 in the Appendix (see also Portos 2016b).

My codebook structure is heavily influenced by some previous PEA endeavours. More specifically, it rests upon two of the most noteworthy research projects in the subfield. My (up to) 77 variables recoded for every protest are largely based, on the one

²⁹ Records stored in the *El País Archive* were used until 7 February 2012, when the editorial department changed its working system. From then onwards, printed articles are identical to the online versions stored in the periodical's library.

³⁰ I elaborated a full list of keywords. All of them were introduced separately in Spanish (*protesta, manifestación, escrache, 15M, indignados, marea, movilización, marcha, acampada, sentada, boicot*).

³¹ To partially overcome the media bias derived from using one single data source, I ran a mini-test with the Spanish *El Mundo* to control for possible biases in the primary newspaper source comparing 2 months, pre- and post- 15M (April 2009 and November 2013). No substantial differences regarding event coverage were found— overlap between protest events in *El País* and *El Mundo* was higher than 90%.

³² 17 weeks with full time-dedication were invested for PEA data collection.

hand, on the *Dynamics of Collective Action* project's codebook (and the publications stemming from it, e.g. McAdam and Su 2002; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Earl 2005; Martin et al. 2009; Olzak and Soule 2009; Jung et al. 2014).³³ I have used some of their requirements for an event to qualify as such and to be included in the dataset: events should involve several people, be open to the public and articulate some issue claims. I have likewise adapted their possible 28 claim-issue areas (Jung et al. 2014). On the other hand, the data source elaborated by Kriesi et al. (1995; see also Jung 2010), and updated by Hutter (2014a), provided an invaluable source to codify information on the organisers, targets, purpose, etc.³⁴ Note that, based on textual cues, an event can take place in different locations at the same time and have varying duration, but some aspects (i.e. type of actors involved, strategies deployed, claims, targets) need to be consistent in order to qualify as a single event.

Although PEA is a very helpful technique to assess longitudinal trends of protest performances, it suffers from a number of limitations.³⁵ Importantly, there is a media bias in the pool of reported events, as only a fraction of really existing events gets coverage (Hutter 2014b)— however, the importance of this bias is very strongly contested (e.g. Earl et al. 2004). In the words of Donatella della Porta (2014b: 451), “the portion of events which are reported is never a representative (nor a random) sample, but rather it is— *pour cause*— influenced by the logic of the media”. Siding with Jenkins and Maher (2016: 54), “a relativistic approach that recognises the inevitably limited and partial nature of my [PEA] data is a healthier track. [...] While we often tend to fall back into the assumption that there is a single absolute standard for identifying random samples, event data is not a field where this model will apply”.

³³ Coordinated by D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, S. Olzak and S. Soule. For additional information, see: <http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/>.

³⁴ I also incorporated coding procedures from Atak's (2013) protest event analysis on Turkey for some variables related to policing of protests. Beissinger's (2002) study of the nationalist mobilisations across Central and Eastern Europe during the Soviet Union's collapse was helpful for coding information on the event location and duration.

³⁵ As Charles Tilly (2002: 249) observed: “anyone who builds [event catalogues] worries unavoidably about problems of selectivity, reliability, verifiability, comparability, bounding, and inclusiveness. If compilers of event catalogs do not worry about these problems, their critics surely will.”

Given bias concerns, I complement my PEA data in this chapter with information from the *Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio del Interior* (“Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs”) on demonstration occurrence, which is reported when available.³⁶

3. THE CYCLE OF ANTI-AUSTERITY PROTEST IN SPAIN

Data collection with PEA often presents several challenges and must be handled with care (see Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Hutter 2014b). One of the most sensitive issues in this regard is the calculation and estimation of the number of protesters at any given event. For this reason, I combined information from three main sources, whenever these were available (i.e. the police or authorities, the *El País* newspaper and the organisers), used weighting coefficients and extrapolated them to the full sample— see table 3.1, Appendix.³⁷

A very clear pattern can be observed when event-count data are aggregated on an annual basis (see figure 3.1). The number of protest events in the immediate years before the beginning of the recession remained stable. 2007 means the beginning of a steady increase, which moderately fell in 2009-2010, to suddenly reach a climax in 2012. Over the subsequent years, the curve follows a steep descending trajectory.

³⁶ For instance, official estimates of participation are neither systematically reported across time nor disaggregated per event in the Ministry of Home Affairs’ data.

³⁷ For those events which had precise estimates in any of their three sources, the final size of the event was determined simply by taking the arithmetic penalised averages across the sources. When only vague hints and indications on estimated participants are provided, this variable is transformed into a continuous (non-penalised) indicator. For the description of the specific procedures followed, refer to table 3.1 (Appendix) and chapter 4, this thesis.




FIGURE 3.1. Raw number of yearly protest events in Spain. Y= events. X= years (2007-2014). Dashed line: all-type of demonstrations/ 100 (whether communicated or not and banned or not). Source: Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio del Interior (“Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs”), years 2003-2014. Dotted line: all types of protest events. Continuous line: protest events related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo. Dotted and continuous lines: data retrieved from a self-collected Protest Event Analysis, El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration. See Portos (2016a; 2016b).

A more complex picture, characterised by strong fluctuations, can be observed when events are aggregated on a monthly basis. Sharp peaks and dips in the number of protest events and participants characterised the period running from January 2007 to February 2015. This point confirms similar findings in some seminal contributions applied to different contexts, such as Crouch and Pizzorno’s study (1978) on industrial conflict intensity, Shorter and Tilly’s work (1974) on the French strikes in the mid-19th century and Beissinger’s contribution (2002) on nationalist mobilisations and the collapse of the Soviet Union. More recently, Beissinger and Sasse (2014) find similar dynamics for Eastern Europe in the context of the 2008 global financial-economic crisis. As this marked variability precludes us from recognising trends, 5-period moving averages are used to smooth out irregularities (figures 3.2 and 3.3). Generally speaking, few events took place between 2007 and 2010, and massive performances were rare. Despite some preceding peaks, a relatively sudden climax of both events and protest participants in mid-2011 and 2012 can be observed. Protest occurrence remained high until late 2013. Then, the number of— and crowds engaging in— protest performances decreased steadily.




FIGURE 3.2. Number of monthly protest events in Spain, 01/2007- 02/2015. Y= events. X= months (01/2007-02/2015). Dotted line: all-type protest events, 5-period moving average. Continuous line: anti-austerity, labour, economic crisis-centred and anti-political status quo protest events, 5-period moving average. Data retrieved from a self-collected Protest Event Analysis, El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration. See Portos (2016a, 2016b).




FIGURE 3.3. Weighted number of monthly participants in protest events in Spain, 01/2007- 02/2015. Y= participants in protests (in thousands). X= months (01/2007-02/2015). Dotted line: participants in all types of protest events, 5-period moving average. Continuous line: participants in anti-austerity, labour, economic crisis-centred and political status quo events, 5-period moving average. Data retrieved from a self-collected Protest Event Analysis, El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration. See Portos (2016a, 2016b).

The proportion of protest events concerning austerity, the recession, the political status quo and labour issues is high relative to the total number of events— these account for 78.8% of the total events (figure 3.2). The figures of participants in protests related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo relative to the total number of challengers are lower, especially in the early phase of the cycle

(figure 3.3)— events of this kind account for 61% of total participants.³⁸ However, the shares of events and participants did not remain stable over the cycle lifespan. Between mid-2011 and late 2013, more than 70% of protest events involved claims linked to cuts, austerity and the economic situation (figure 3.4). These factors accounted for less than 50% of events taking place in the years preceding the peak of protests. As the total number of participants and events decreases, so does the relative importance of protests directly linked to the crisis, cuts and austerity. Similarly, protests associated both with labour-unemployment and the political status quo (political elites, corruption, public management, specific policies, etc.) feature a declining trend toward the end of the cycle— see figure 3.4.




FIGURE 3.4. Probability of event occurrence per type of claims. Multiple choice allowed, aggregated probability per time point may be larger than 1. Annual level of aggregation. In order to make the figure reader-friendly, the 9 categories are split into two separate graphs. Data retrieved from a self-collected Protest Event Analysis, El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration. See Portos (2016a, 2016b).

In the following sections, I analyse the factors underpinning varying patterns, trends and shares over time of protest events and participants in protest activities against austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo/for real democracy. To make sense of these, I establish a periodisation following the theories of cycles of contention and their three key phases (ascending mobilisation, climax— plus its

³⁸ Note that there is neither a regular distance between the protest peaks (i.e. trends are non-stationary), nor can the intensity of the peaks be forecasted on the basis of previous peaks, as in Shorter and Tilly (1974)— see chapter 4, this thesis.

extension through specialisation— and demobilisation). In so doing, the evolution and configurations of key actors and interactions underpinning the wave of protests are pinned down. Following political process-oriented theorists, along with resource mobilisation and organisational aspects, I consider the conditions and traits related to the political environment that might account for mobilisation dynamics (e.g. McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989, 1991, 1993, 2011; Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans 2004).

3.1. Subtle steps and precursors: cooking something up during the valley

Conflict tends to escalate before reaching its peak, as massive performances and protest campaigns do not appear out of thin air (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tarrow 1991, 1993, 2011). New reasons for voicing discontent are usually added to old ones because grievances are cumulative and often concatenate (Walsh 1981). The ascending phase of the cycle starts when new social movement actors that innovate in terms of mobilisation repertoires emerge, stimulating citizens' propensity to participate. As the cycle evolves, new mobilising agents emulate initiators and compete with them to reach new sectors of the population through more appealing performances, usually from key to peripheral sectors, following a tidal logic, until they reach the climax of protests (Tarrow 1989, 1991, 1993). The Spanish context in light of the Great Recession scenario was no exception.

As mentioned in chapter 2, the ebbs and flows of involvement in protest have been far from constant in Spain (Cruz 2015). Three main historical phases of extra-conventional socio-political mobilisation can be distinguished in the country over the last half-century (Viejo 2012; see also Díez García 2017). The first refers to protests related to the labour movement and the onset of the Francoist regime, for civil liberties and democratisation, especially from 1975 to 1978. In the 1980s, a second major wave of contestation took place. The scope of protests diversified, giving rise to new social movements (feminist, pacifist, etc.). There were three main arenas of conflict: labour struggles, student mobilisations and pacifist protests. The third important phase concerns *anti-globalisation* mobilisations. Since the late 1990s, the Global Justice Movement (hereafter GJM) and its performances left a mark on the Spanish repertoires

of protest, claims, targets and activist networks (Jiménez and Calle 2007; Flesher Fominaya 2015a). A number of organisations in the autonomous political space flourished during this period (social squats, alternative media, forums for debate, publishers, etc.), such as *Rebelión*, *Kaosenlared*, *Catarata* and *La Directa*.

As well as the activities linked to the GJM, some important mobilisations took place across Spain in the early 2000s, such as student mobilisations against new plans to restructure tertiary education, against the war in Iraq and the protests by the ecologists *Nunca Más* (“Never Again”) as a reaction against the sunk Prestige oil tanker near the Galician coast. Once the social democratic PSOE took office in 2004, a number of patterns began to become apparent.

First, left-wing social movement organisations—surprisingly—lost ground. Despite their many activities, non-institutional actors remained invisible to most citizens and largely atomised, as they were loosely interconnected, small and lacked collaborative strategies—see e.g. the study by Aguilar and Fernández (2010) on the movement for decent housing between 2003-2010. Additionally, social movement organisations shared some of the weaknesses that had traditionally hampered inclusiveness on the part of the traditional left: they were fairly impermeable and lacked transversal membership. As a result, they had limited mobilising capacity, protests decreased and were dependent on trade unions to deliver mass performances.

The second identifiable pattern was likewise unexpected. Once the PSOE came to office, windows of political opportunity were supposed to open. It was widely assumed that channels of communication and access to officials and institutions would be built with social movement organisations. However, the regime’s capacity to integrate challengers and ability to accommodate claims decreased compared to previous phases of mobilisation.

The third pattern to emerge was that there was a conservative—arguably reactionary—upsurge and counter-mobilisation campaigns were widely supported. The activity and membership of various right-wing organisations such as *Asociación de Víctimas contra el Terrorismo*, *Hazte Oír*, *Foro Español de la Familia*, etc. rose

dramatically in this period. These groups called for various reactive mobilisations between 2005 and 2010 to oppose the government's progressive policies (same-sex marriage, abortion, terrorism, etc.)— see Aguilar (2013).

Despite all these weaknesses, a multi-organisational field of activist networks proliferated and consolidated between 2003 and 2010. At least seven different movements created a deposit and developed an expertise on which protesters built in the shadow of austerity:

- 1) From the mid-2000s, *V de Vivienda* (“V for Housing”) and other groups demanded better housing conditions, especially for young people. These organisations grew in a context of rising costs and unaffordable mortgages due to financial speculation (Aguilar and Fernández 2010), all of which led to a “housing bubble”.
- 2) In the 1980s, the squatter movement abandoned its “ghetto logic”, especially in Madrid and Barcelona, and created a network of self-managed open social centres (Romanos 2013), which contributed towards reinforcing its grassroots, promoting assembly practices, etc.
- 3) Student mobilisations in the late 2000s were also important. European policies implemented to reform and harmonise university degrees across Europe created resistance among students and educational communities (Fernández 2014). These regarded the reforms as an attempt to privatise and commercialise education. The organisational structure of these protest groups was atomised, reliant upon small, autonomous and loosely interconnected assemblies across the country, very closely linked to grassroots organisations. In addition, the groups adopted assembly practices and adapted innovative strategies, such as symbolic

occupations of public facilities and *escraches*,³⁹ later used by anti-evictions activists.

- 4) Given the housing conditions and high unemployment rates, pessimism increased incrementally among young people, especially among those who had been highly educated and deprived, often with unstable and uncertain employment situations. For the first time in recent history, the prospects of an upcoming generation were worse than those that their parents had faced. The organisation *Juventud sin Futuro* (“Youth without a Future”; hereafter JSF) was created in February 2011 in order to tackle this situation (see Zamponi and Fernández 2016).
- 5) By early 2011, two main platforms, *¡Democracia Real Ya!* (“Real Democracy Now!”) and *No Les Votes* (“Do Not Vote for Them!”), had been set up to gather support against bipartisanship and the majoritarian parties (the PP and PSOE—and CiU in Catalonia), to promote a more proportional electoral system, and to ensure the inclusion of citizens in political processes.
- 6) As Fuster (2012) points out, online activism and the free culture and digital commons movement, created in the face of legislative plans to guarantee copyright and to limit Internet downloads, also had an impact on the protests, in terms of composition, agenda, framing and organisational logic.
- 7) Finally, mobilisations concerning the territorial accommodation of Catalonia, new actors such as the *Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir* (“Platform for the Right to Decide”), non-binding referendums held across hundreds of municipalities between 2008 and 2010 and their framing (democratic-emancipatory, based on the right-to-decide— see della Porta et al. 2017b) contributed to empower Catalan civil society and fostered its will to mobilise.

³⁹ An *escrache*, a form of action originating in the Argentinian Dirty War, consists of a gathering of people next to homes or workplaces to influence decision-makers into taking a certain course of action (Flesher Fominaya and Montañés Jiménez 2014).

In short, after 2003, public contestation and massive collective actions decreased dramatically in Spain. However, a multi-layered network of activists with different trajectories and experiences forged spaces for dissent and encounter besides those of the mainstream channels. In spite of (declining) protest activities, many of these actors managed to build alliances and launch assemblies, cooperatives, solidarity groups, cultural projects, etc. Among these joint endeavours is worth mentioning the citizen initiative *Rompamos el Silencio* (“Let’s Break the Silence”), a key early riser. Based on civil disobedience, direct and non-violent action, horizontally organised, decentralised and assembly-based, this network brought together various collectives and welcomed very different claims (feminist, anti-globalisation, pacifist, etc.). Additionally, the abovementioned seven movements and campaigns cohabitated and developed before and after the crisis started (2003-2010). Most of these events were far from crowded and were not given much media space, thus rendering their impact fairly low. But had this infrastructure not existed, a climate among the public opinion willing to mobilise against the status quo would not have been built.

3.2. The explosion of the 15M: a turning point (May to June 2011)

During the months preceding the onset of the 15M protests, intense network activity unfolded both online and offline (Micó and Casero-Ripollés 2014). *Juventud Sin Futuro*, *Izquierda Anticapitalista*, *No Les Votes* and, more notoriously, *¡Democracia Real Ya!*— DRY, hereafter— are illustrative examples of this activity. These information exchanges, intense debates and collaborative endeavours that preceded the May 2011 mobilisations yielded an unexpected— although not spontaneous— outcome: the 15M mass protests (see Flesher Fominaya 2015b).

On 15 May 2011, the digital meta-organisation DRY managed to gather several thousands of (mostly young) people in a demonstration that made its way through the main arteries of Madrid and other cities under the slogans “They [the current political class] do not represent us!” and “We aren’t merchandise in politicians and bankers’ hands”. Local and regional elections (in 13 out of 17 autonomous communities) were scheduled to take place one week later. As Tarrow (2011) argues, a major change in the

political opportunity structure, such as an election being held, can activate potentials for mobilisation.⁴⁰ Following the demonstration, some (young) people improvised a pacific sit-in on Plaza del Callao (Madrid), which the police repressed, evicting protesters from the square. The demonstrators then converged on Plaza Puerta del Sol, the heart of the Spanish capital, and some protesters created an assembly in the capital “with the main idea of creating and maintaining a permanent camp” on Puerta del Sol (Romanos 2013: 203). The square was occupied, following the *modus operandi* of protesters on Tahrir Square in Cairo. After police action became harsher, the protesters were joined by hundreds of additional sympathisers thanks to the online diffusion of the event (*#SpanishRevolution* became a worldwide trending topic on Twitter). Thus, thanks to diffusion through social networks, the occupations quickly snowballed to other Spanish cities and grew larger in size. Within less than 24 hours, outraged crowds (of varying sizes) occupied the main squares of many Spanish cities.

A non-partisan and heterogeneous campaign gradually took form in non-partisan, horizontal, open, public and transversal assemblies, which set up specific commissions and working groups that ensured grassroots voluntary involvement and horizontal organisation. Within the wide array of appeals and claims emerging from the 15M campaign, Taibo (2011) distinguishes three core mental schemata that brought participants together: a) the first underpinned the push towards changes in the democratic system *sensu stricto* (electoral reform, pro-accountability and anti-corruption measures, remuneration of appointed officials, etc.); b) the second, more generally, framed the demand for solutions to combat the excesses of neoliberalism in the face of pressing financial hardship (e.g. housing speculation); c) the third promoted the need to give continuity to the strategies forwarded by alternative social movements in their opposition to capitalism and its institutions.

⁴⁰ Elections are a classic structural window of opportunity for movements (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Interactive dynamics between movements and parties are patent in moments of heightened social conflict, and have always been present in the cycle. Also, the 15M’s short-term growth is associated with the will to not comply with Junta Electoral Central’s ban on demonstrating on the eve of an election (Viejo 2012).

Moreover, these 15M challengers took a strong position against politics-as-usual, represented in their view by malfunctioning chains of delegation and institutional closure in a supposedly representative democratic regime, the implementation of neoliberal and austerity policies, the corporatist behaviour of political and business elites and the accumulation of power in the hands of the big corporations, among others (Toma la Plaza, n.d.). The 15M brought about two innovations in terms of the frames used to describe this kind of protest. First, outright opposition to austerity was used for the first time by a set of social actors with remarkable media impact. Second, this opposition worked actively at delivering a transversal and massively supported campaign beyond both anti-system small groups and traditional intermediary institutions of representation that, in fact, openly sought to throw out the mainstream parties. As della Porta (2016: 33) highlights, the *indignados* “strove to build a movement of ‘anyone’ based on an extremely inclusive ‘we’ that aimed to go beyond ideological or partisan affiliations and the auto-referential dynamics, organisational forms, discourses, and identities of traditional social movements”.

In general, the 15M was a by-product of socio-political discontent in a context of recession. A political crisis concatenated with material hardship (Oñate 2013). The 15M was one of those mobilisation peaks that come into being through a combination of the abrupt stop in the satisfaction of expectations during the expansion stage of the economic cycle and the accumulation of cultural and political resources before the turning phase, which is where uprisings tend to happen. This point resonates with those in Screpanti (1987) and Cronin’s (1980) inquiries on the historical association between economic cycles and the timing of socio-labour unrest.

A couple of relevant questions remain to be answered, however: first, how were general standards of mobilisation kept high after the first uprisings? And second, how was the 15M able to persist and decisively contribute to subsequent performances? I will attempt to answer these questions in the following sections.

3.3. Perpetuating the peak through specialisation: containing radicalisation, postponing institutionalisation

After several weeks of occupations, with Puerta del Sol (Madrid) and Plaça Catalunya (Barcelona) functioning as neuralgic points, the campaign disaggregated into neighbourhood assemblies in June and July 2011. Once the thrilling atmosphere of the initial occupations was over, many described the 15M performances as one of those quick “moments of madness” (Zolberg 1972), where discrepancies rise and instrumental aims take them over (Tarrow 1991, 1993). Thereby, given internal disagreements and external pressures, activists decided to abandon the Puerta del Sol encampment on June 12 (Romanos 2016a)—most occupations in other cities across the country also came to an end in June 2011.

From this perspective, it seemed as though the 15M campaign was doomed to vanish into thin air, especially after its—arguably small—immediate impact on the election results in May 2011, when the conservative PP won by a large majority in many Spanish municipalities and regions (see Jiménez 2012; Anduiza et al. 2014b). However, against all odds, it did not, and it went on to contribute decisively to the rise of broader and parallel anti-austerity activity via organising events, designing strategies, providing organisational settings, and supporting campaigns.⁴¹ It also played a crucial role in launching some of the most massive events of 2011, such as the marches against the Euro Agreement (19 June 2011), the so-called *columnas de la indignación* (“columns of indignation”) that formed all over Spain and converged in Madrid in July 2011, and the 15-O worldwide mobilisation against austerity policies (15 October 2011). These events gathered tens of thousands of protesters all around the country.

Despite these successes, during the second half of 2011, the 15M underwent a period of transition, and even confusion, as it decentralised and took on a more active role at the local-level. By *going back* to neighbourhoods the 15M lost media visibility and overall participants in the short run, as Perugorria and Tejerina (2013) highlight.

⁴¹ A persistence in protest peaks has been observed in other mobilisation waves, such as in the 1965-1975 Italian cycle (Tarrow 1989).

However, this transformation helped activists reconnect with the everyday problems and pressing needs of citizens, beyond the ideational and pre-figurative type of practices that had been carried out in the big 15M camps. From figures 3.2-3.3, we can see that the peak of protests lasted through 2012-2013 (preliminary findings based on alternative PEA data confirm this point— see Calvo and Garciamarín 2016).⁴² Overall, I argue that the ongoing persistence of anti-austerity mobilisations was related to what can be described as a delayed radicalisation, aimed at avoiding divisions and preventing further campaigns from appealing to broad audiences (see Tarrow 1991, 1993, 2011).

Radicalisation of repertoires of contention refers to certain movement organisations' shift from predominantly nonviolent tactics to predominantly violent tactics (Alimi et al. 2015). This process is understood here in a relational way, as a result of a spiral of negative and unforeseen feedback that comes from the interactions between relevant actors (particularly, challengers and authorities)— see della Porta and Diani (2006: 184-185); Alimi et al. (2015). Accordingly, in order to shed light on radicalisation, not only the protesters' tactics but the dynamics of policing in contentious activities are to be taken into account.

I now go on to analyse how anti-austerity challengers, despite the pacific strategies and the rejection of any violent tactics were one of the mottos and defining features of 15M occupations, coped with some attempts at radicalisation in this period. Some of these attempts came from inside the movement, but they mostly came from outsiders, as some of the satellite organisations sometimes pushed in this direction. The peaks of confrontation often coincided with a rise in the level of police repression and intolerance with respect to the challengers' tactics (see figure 3.5).⁴³

⁴² In many other cases, demobilisation quickly follows after a sharp peak of social confrontation. For example, the urban and mass displays in of the Ukrainian *Orange Revolution* lasted a couple of months (from 21 November 2004 through 10 January 2005), and faded away after protesters abandoned Maidan Square— see Beissinger (2013).

⁴³ The policing of protests remained far from stable over time. Some events (e.g. student protests in Valencia in early 2012, camping on the 15M's first anniversary, and the demonstration that gave rise to the 15M) were met with disproportionately harsh methods of repression on the side of the authorities. The increased public outrage, media monitoring and citizen contestation towards these highly repressive tactics led to a gradual change in the policing of protests. As the cycle unfolded, the authorities opted




FIGURE 3.5. *Repression and violence in protest events in Spain, 01/2007-02/2015.* Coercion refers to the overall degree of coercion, based on the type tactics taken by authorities against demonstrators (dark continuous line). It is captured through a 0-3 scale based on the work by Karapın (2007).⁴⁴ Protesters' violence assesses whether activists used violence at all (light continuous line; dummy variable). Overall violence captures intensity of disorder severity, taking into account human and property damage inflicted by coercion and demonstrators' violence (adapted from Spilerman 1976; measured on a 0-4 scale); dotted line. See table 3.1 (Appendix) for coding and further clarifications. Data from a self-gathered Protest Event Analysis retrieved from *El País* (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration.⁴⁵

Specifically, various peaks of conflict and critical junctures can be observed through the 2007-2015 period. First, the so-called *popular siege* of the Catalan Parliament on 15 June 2011, supported by 15M activists, left dozens of people arrested and injured.⁴⁶ Some regional MPs were attacked and their access to the chamber was blocked in order to stop them from passing budget restrictions. Second, what started as isolated student mobilisation in a secondary school in Valencia in early 2012, led to massive mobilisations and further confrontations with police due to the disproportionately harsh methods of repression that they had used (known as the

for more dissuasive, indirect and less visible tactics, such as fines, to keep insurgency under control rather than using more obvious and disruptive measures, such as police charges (Martín García 2014).

⁴⁴ At the event level, I distinguish among 0) no known coercion; 1) low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or injuries, defined as less than ten); 2) substantial coercion (defined as ten to seventy-five arrests or ten to forty injuries); 3) major violence by authorities (defined as more than seventy-five arrests or more than forty injuries)— see table 3.1 (Appendix).

⁴⁵ The picture for the subsample of anti-political status quo, labour, crisis-related and anti-austerity events do not change substantially (not reported here).

⁴⁶ Given a plenary session was scheduled in order to approve cuts in the regional government budget, thousands gathered on 15 June 2011 in Barcelona in order to stop the voting under the slogan *Aturem el Parlament* ("Let's stop the parliament").

Primavera Valenciana— “Valencian spring”). Student organisations linked to the 15M, such as the *Sindicato de Estudiantes*, were actively involved in these mobilisations. Third, various urban conflicts took place in this period. The two most well-known of these, both for their media impact and the intensity of the encounters, took place in 2014. Local government plans to transform a boulevard for pedestrians into a parking area in the underprivileged Gamonal neighbourhood, Burgos, was met with rage on the part of residents in January. In addition, there were clashes in May when squatters were expelled from the emblematic Can Vies social centre in Barcelona in order to demolish it. These urban conflicts attracted the support of many 15M activists and sympathisers.

Last but not least, the collective *Plataforma ¡en pie!* called on people to “occupy” (formally, in the end, “surround”) the Congress to empower citizens and “bring sovereignty back to the peoples” in September 2012. Thousands participated in a peaceful demonstration, supported by DRY and some 15M local assemblies, but the police broke up a sitting in front of the Congress. The resulting incidents led to 34 arrests and 64 injured people. In April 2013, the same platform called on protesters to “seize” and “siege” the Congress (note the deliberate radicalisation in the framing). Most previously supporting organisations withdrew their support and went out of the call. This event thus failed to mobilise, as only a few thousand joined it. Rioters were met with a strong display of police force— many were injured and arrested. Following this, most anti-austerity organisations (including 15M assemblies, participants in various tides and former supporters of *Plataforma ¡en pie!*) opted to moderate their tone, and started to promote more positive campaigns to “save”, “recover” and “hug” not only political institutions, but other public facilities such as schools and hospitals. These occasional attempts at radicalising (so-called “radical shocks”) as the cycle unfolded can be observed (figure 3.5), to the detriment of any general trend towards radicalisation in protest tactics and repression for the 2007-2015 period in Spain. External sources confirm that levels of coercion were low. According to data from the Ministerio del Interior, police resorted to force in only 0.08 percent of the events staged in the period 2013-2015 (Romanos 2016a: 137).

One aspect that contributed to restrain radicalisation in these anti-austerity performances was strategic, and concerned the relationship of new organisations with the trade unions throughout this process. In a new piece, Michael Biggs (2015) finds that strikes and union-activities have greatly outnumbered demonstrations and other forms of protest in the last decades in Britain.⁴⁷ Although I cannot go that far on the basis of my data about the recent Spanish cycle, it can be safely argued that unions were necessary for multiple mass events to succeed and they were— still are— relevant with regard to event counts— not only in absolute but also in relative terms (figures 3.6 and 3.7). The figures displayed, based on my Protest Event Analysis data for Spain, tend to confirm the findings by Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015) for Portugal: unions are still fundamental actors to understand the dynamics of protest in times of austerity.

Generally speaking, unions have shown in the past their ability to adapt to changing social environments. For instance, they neither expected nor initially led the escalation of labour conflicts across Western Europe in the 1970s, but they quickly recovered, re-took their central position and adapted to new formations that emerged in the cycle (see Klandermans et al. 1988). Similarly, the emergence of new organisations and campaigns beyond the traditional intermediary institutions of representation, such as JSF, DRY, 15M, etc. did not eliminate the mobilisation capacity of these traditional actors. Spanish unions were not replaced by the new organisations that flourished in light of the Great Recession, but cohabitated with these in a complex manner.

⁴⁷ Moreover, he contends that with the decline of the strike activity, the total volume of protest has decreased— not increased— since the 1970s (Biggs 2015).




FIGURE 3.6. Participants and organisers of protest events in Spain (PEA, 01/2007-02/2015). Annual level of aggregation, monthly averages. Y-axis (left): (weighted) number of participants (in thousands, 5-period moving averages, monthly prorated annual data; continuous variable). Y-axis (right): percentage of events. X-axis: time- years. Columns: percentage of events organised by political parties, unions and other civil society organisations. Multiple choices were possible. Data were weighted by the number of events and adjusted to a 0-100 scale. Dotted line: participants in all type of protest events. Dashed line: participants in anti-austerity, labour, crisis-centred and political status quo events. Source: data retrieved from my PEA, *El País* (N= 2,002). Own collection and elaboration.




FIGURE 3.7. Evolution of organisers of demonstrations (Ministry of Home Affairs). Type of organiser by total number of communicated demonstrations,⁴⁸ 2003-2015 (yearly aggregation). Multiple choices were not possible. Source: *Anuarios estadísticos del Ministerio del Interior* ("Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs"). Own elaboration.

⁴⁸ Data about demonstrations by promoters that were not communicated but nevertheless took place are not available for every year in the *Anuarios estadísticos del Ministerio del Interior*, so they are excluded.

On the one hand, most of the new organisations openly criticised the mainstream unions, such as the CCOO and UGT.⁴⁹ At least initially, they regarded the latter as actors belonging to the political status quo, as being rather archaic and impermeable, and as unable to connect with real demands of the worse-off and the underprivileged. On the other hand, the larger major unions have a much better developed infrastructure, with stronger grassroots, and were indispensable to achieving mass participation in public collective performances. Hence, the new civil society-driven organisations often used the infrastructure and expertise of the unions to gain support for events and campaigns, and to appeal to specific professional sectors, such as doctors or teachers. In most campaigns, some forms of action with some degree of “eventfulness” are needed to keep standards of motivation and feelings of solidarity high, to consolidate networks, to boost public outrage and to experiment with new tactics (della Porta 2008b). Indeed, the 15M (and subsequent anti-austerity campaigns that followed) needed these massive performances every now and then for its survival— this is what Casquete (2005) refers to as “regular ceremonies of protest”.

For these eventful performances to take place, coalition building was necessary. A social movement coalition or alliance “exist[s] at any time two or more social movement organisations work together on a common task [...while] partners maintain separate organisational structures” (van Dyke and McCammon 2010: xiv-xv). These alliances may involve varying durations (collaborations may be occasional or persist over time), different interests (pursuing more or less similar goals), degrees of formality (as regards to the nature of the links between organisations), resources, etc. Certainly, not all the campaigns in this cycle emerged out of a collaboration between old and new organisations, but several did. Coalitions require neither a high degree of agreement, nor dense exchanges of information between players. Actions could be very loosely coordinated provided that the ties between them were informal. Furthermore, as van Dyke and McCammon (2010: xv) continue, “groups may, for example, plan a joint protest event together but not pursue further collaboration”. In the Spanish case, old and

⁴⁹ These abbreviations stand for Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores.

new organisations cohabitated amidst tension, performing only intermittent and occasional joint endeavours.

As my data show (figure 3.3), many peaks of participation in public collective performances are associated with specific events that were launched by unions and new organisations together. For instance, one the most crowded countrywide performances took place against the PP government's Labour Law reform (marches gathered approximately 1.5 million participants around the country in February 2012), and was organised by the largest unions in collaboration with organisations fighting the precariat and austerity policies, such as various 15M assemblies and the JSF. Nonetheless, the latter formed a critical sector within the demonstration, carrying banners against the soft positions of the unions and urging them to call for a general strike. Shortly after this, two general strikes were held (March and November 2012), and were complemented with massive demonstrations across the country called for by the main unions and intense involvement of anti-austerity activists. Another symbolic campaign that reflected this strategic alliance was the coal miners' march for hundreds of kilometres from the catchment areas (Asturias and León) to Madrid in July 2012. The marches were jointly organised by the unions and sectorial committees, and were welcomed by thousands of anti-austerity challengers and sympathisers, who contributed to their performances by providing expertise, support, resources, etc. Other obvious— and more formal— stances of collaboration between old and new actors were the (especially green and white) tides, which I will explore in detail below.

In some ways, classic theories of cycles of collective action seem ill-suited to account for this situation. They predict that peaks of mobilisation would lead to the creation of new organisational forms, pushing old organisations towards the social movement sector and bringing about competitiveness (Tarrow 1991, 1993). These entail a radicalisation of tactics and repertoires.⁵⁰ A re-intensification of conflict also reduces the audience to which the movement appeals and leads to a parallel sectarian involution

⁵⁰ Della Porta (2014b; see also della Porta 2014a) does not observe such tendency towards radicalisation in the declining phase of protest waves during democratic transitions across Central and Eastern European countries.

along with a shift of aspirations. However, as in the Spanish case, when some collaboration is in the interest of both unions (i.e. to maintain a preeminent role) and new organisations (i.e. to appeal to broader audiences and deliver mass performances), radicalisation might not so readily follow.

In this section, we have seen thus far how, following the occupations in May to June 2011, the 15M faced a turning point, which led to its decentralisation through local assemblies and reconnection with its grassroots public. Despite several attempts in the opposite direction, the radicalisation of 15M and anti-austerity activities was contained, and any need to resort to unions for strategic purposes (i.e. to deliver mass performances) contributed to hinder radical behaviour—and to facilitate the persistence of the protests. If new organisations had resorted to more confrontational tactics, coalitions between them and old organisations would, in fact, have been impossible. Beyond containing radicalisation, however, another crucial reason for the survival of the mobilisations over such a long time span was, I argue, the specialisation of the anti-austerity movement issue.

The idea of specialisation recalls Tarrow's (1989) "shifting bases of social conflict" in the 1965-1975 Italian cycle of protest. He argues that collective action spread from a few central actors (students and workers) to other sectors (prisoners, public official women, the urban poor, etc.): "rather than rising like a volcano on a plain consent, [protest] was like a rolling tide that engulfed different sectors of society at different times" (Tarrow 1989: 339). In my case, this allowed the 15M, on the one hand, to connect with people's pressing demands, and to join forces and take advantage of the synergies that certain types of mobilisations generated from below, such as the movement for decent housing. On the other hand, by focusing on issue-specific conflicts, often widely supported across society (e.g. against the privatisation of public hospitals' management), anti-austerity activists maintained the focus on more concrete and smaller battles. These battles often had clearer goals (e.g. to stop the partial closure of a public hospital due to efficiency arguments), made potential rewards from sticking to collective action more attainable and favoured alliances with various sector-specific agents.

In addition, this specialisation contributed to developing and adopting distinctive and innovative strategies, such as *escraches*. Likewise, frames and discourses (claims such as “austericide” or “violence is evicting families, not resisting authorities” or “let’s defend what is ours: let’s fight privatisations”) became widely accepted. The generalisation of frames and repertoires thus favoured public acceptance and the social legitimacy of anti-austerity claims. Hence, anti-austerity activists succeeded in generating a space for inclusive conflict (with a modular strategy, open to feedback and negotiation, but pushed by radical formats and rhetoric), while taking advantage of rewards from sticking to pacific tactics— keeping standards of credibility and endorsement high (Sampedro and Lobera 2014). In sum, the 15M was important not only because of its numbers, visibility and media salience, but also because it served as a platform to spur a wider range of subsequent anti-austerity mobilisations in the Spanish cycle of protests. Sánchez (2014:10) describes this metaphorically: “a turmoil on the high seas called 15M has unloosed change in all directions. [...] A strong collective force that, by making concentric circles, reaches the coast by means of tides, which dashes against fortified dykes”.⁵¹ It is to these *tides* that I next turn.

3.3.1. (White and green) tides

By early 2012, approximately one thousand organisations, platforms and assemblies fighting austerity coexisted (Gómez 2013). These shared a common trait: their transversal character. Temporary atomisation and parallel decreasing levels of protest engagement quickly showed the importance of organisation to keep the population mobilised. For this reason, autonomous collectives and assemblies created ties to build networks of activists. As these grew and became stronger, the traditional organisations’ monopoly of the mobilisation arena faded— although union actors are fundamental within tides, as previously argued.

These so-called *mareas* (“tides”) are large citizen movements born out of the 15M, but they are not exactly the same. They are its evolution. Using the 15M expertise and

⁵¹ My own translation from the original in Spanish.

experiences, the *mareas* both structure and mobilise popular outrage on the basis of issue-specific platforms created to defend public services. However, sectorial tides are not corporatist. In their performances, claims for a broader resistance to the implementation of austerity measures can be observed. Furthermore, they are clear attempts to empower people, to make pedagogy with protests, to show that the path undertaken deepens social inequality, and to give voice to the speechless and the marginalised (Gómez 2013; Sampedro 2013). The nexus between *tides* and traditional intermediary institutions of representation is complex: *tides* welcome support from unions and— occasionally— from political parties, but they neither rely on them nor do they delegate representation to them. The two most well-known of these are the *white* and *green tides*. While the first was created to fight against plans for privatisations in the health system and for the defence of good conditions in public hospitals (cutbacks in public spending in the national health service amounted to €10 billion between 2011 and 2013), the second contended education policies through which an additional €10 billion in public investment were to be slashed between 2010 and 2015 (Gómez 2013).

Although tides were not restricted to these two sectors, these were the most rebellious. Other sectors with some level of resilience were the public administration and civil servants (black tide), social care and benefits (orange tide), feminists and LGTBIQ rights (violet tide), or precarious young people and Spanish migrants living abroad (purple tide)— see Sánchez (2013). Exchanges and cross-fertilisation between activists and different sectorial tides were recurrent, while overlapping membership accounted for claims resonance, the adaptation and adoption of strategies and organisational structures between tides.

From the 1980s, an increasing tendency towards privatisations and subcontracts in public hospitals took place across Spain. This led to the private management of public facilities— supposedly— for the sake of efficiency. The *Marea Blanca* (“white tide”) was the response to multiple legislative measures (i.e. not one single package), most of these implemented by regional governments, which tightened access and worsened the quality and conditions of health assistance. This was particularly the case in the region of Madrid, and to a lesser extent in Catalonia and Castile–La Mancha, especially in light

of the privatisations and closures of various public hospitals throughout 2012-2013 (e.g. La Princesa). In addition, some measures adopted by the central ministry, such as the ban on providing health care to illegal immigrants, were heavily contested.

In relation to the protests against these privatisations and subcontracts, action repertoires were wide, ranging from the classic strategies (sitting, striking, demonstrating) to more innovative ones (*escraches*, human chains to “hug” and protect hospitals). Describing organisational dynamics in the *Marea Blanca* is however a challenge, as the constellations of actors changed rapidly. Among the key umbrella platforms in Madrid, which involved activist professionals and patients likewise, the *Plataforma en Defensa de la Sanidad Pública* and *Mesa por la Sanidad Pública* stood out. In addition to unions, some labour organisations were active in the protests, such as the *Asociación de Facultativos de Madrid* and *Movimiento Asambleario de Trabajadores de Sanidad*. In contrast to these, the Catalan *Marea Blanca* was more atomised and fragmented, without any clear central nodes, very closely linked to neighbouring and union *petit fights* (i.e. coping with specific, local problems).

The participants and development of the *Marea Verde* (“green tide”; it was called *Marea Groga*— “yellow tide”— in Catalonia) were similar in some ways. There were two main poles of tension, in Madrid and Barcelona, and although some countryside campaigns were launched, there was no state-level coordination and the organisational settings were different. Two momentums motivated the green tide actions. First, cuts approved by regional governments in 2012-2013 were met with opposition from students, parents and teaching staff. In Madrid, ten general strikes— and demonstrations— were called for in the education sector between September and November 2012 and were massively supported. These were coordinated by the *Red Verde* (“Green Network”) platform, with fluctuating support from the unions. In Catalonia, the universities forwarded these protests, with the PUDUP (*Plataforma Unitària en Defensa de la Universitat Pública*) as coordinator, and supported by some unions such as the SEPC (*Sindicat d'Estudiants dels Països Catalans*). Second, popular contestation against the government’s intention to pass the bill of education (LOMCE) rose since 2011. This bill brought about criticisms related to individual schools’

autonomy, university access, discrimination of minority languages, etc. The mainstream unions in the sector did not show any outright opposition towards the bill and did not fight it (e.g. UGT, CCOO, STE). Indeed, the unions slowed down any collective actions against the LOMCE. The law was finally passed in 2013. However, after their stagnating performance, unions lost the social lead in the education sector in favour of transversal teachers' assemblies (which involved students, parents, smaller unions and other organisations as well). It was the latter which led multiple— although not really mass— performances, which some union actors ended up supporting.

3.3.2. The movement for decent housing and against evictions

Building on such previous experiences in the housing movement, as the aforementioned V de Vivienda, a group of activists set up the PAH (*Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca*, which stands for the “Platform of those Affected by the Mortgages”) in Barcelona in 2009. V de Vivienda and other mobilisation campaigns in the movement for decent housing failed in spite of their broad social base because of the use of radical and exclusive mobilisation frames, which drove away potential allies and sectors of the population, as Aguilar and Fernández (2010) highlight. The PAH, however, switched the focus from difficulties for housing ownership due to rising prices and rents to the consequences of the Spanish housing bubble.⁵² The movement had three aims: to stop evictions, to promote social housing and to guarantee retroactive payments on account. With these aims in mind, the PAH built a network of volunteers and assemblies, with legal advisers to ensure support with individual cases. The organisation consisted of an assembly-based structure, where a balance was enforced between the plural and autonomous grassroots units and the confederation (for a summary of the evolution and tactics of the PAH, see Romanos 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2015b).

⁵² For instance, 500,000 Spanish families faced a mortgage foreclosure between 2008 and 2014 (PAH 2015).

The profile of the activists in the movement was mixed. Among the core groups, there was an overrepresentation of immigrants (mainly Latin Americans and Arabs). Despite the active presence of some radical assemblies, most of the activists were *ex ante* depoliticised. In fact, emotional characteristics drove militancy above ideological features. The movement, its claims and its tactics gained huge legitimacy over the last years (see Flesher Fominaya 2015b). In terms of action repertoires, it resorted to blockades and pacific resistance (chaining, sitting, etc.) in private houses to avoid evictions— 2,500 evictions were stopped by the PAH by the beginning of 2015, according to the organisation (PAH 2015). The movement adopted and introduced *escraches* in Spain. Not only the right to housing, but also the use of this particular controversial tactic against individual politicians was justified on the basis of the discourse of human rights (Flesher Fominaya 2015b; Flesher Fominaya and Montañés Jiménez 2014). The most important campaign of *escraches* sought to put pressure on politicians in order to compel them to support the PAH's Popular Legislative Initiative for legally safeguarding the three abovementioned objectives. This petition gathered 1.4 million signatures, but it did not succeed in parliament. However, the PAH became a hegemonic actor in the housing movement.

3.4. Declining phase: amidst exhaustion and institutionalisation

From late 2013, a clear and generalised sense of exhaustion affected the actions of activists and their repertoires of action. From social movement literature, we know that collective action is costly because the rewards from engaging in action are limited, especially when immediate demands are (partially) satisfied (Tarrow 1991, 1993, 2011). In the Spanish case, many people still joined collective actions, but this was now done with lower intensity. Declining numbers of events and participants capture this (figures 3.1-3.3). Although the movements achieved varying degrees of success, room for attaining further aspirations through the same tactics was limited.

There was no trend towards radicalisation and violence in the declining phase of the cycle (figure 3.5), in contrast with the observations made by Tarrow (1989, 1995, 2011) and Jung (2010) for other cases. As mentioned above, radicalisation was

contained for strategic reasons (i.e. the need for alliances with unions to deliver mass performances) and thanks to the issue specialisation of protests, with more specific goal-oriented actions and attainable rewards. Now that activist strategies and demands were increasingly directed towards the legislative apparatus, they also began to find other forms of participation, such as traditional movements, that were more effective in affecting public policy (e.g. feminist mobilisations contributed to blocking the new abortion law). With a view to running for the 2014 election to the European Parliament,⁵³ new institutional alternatives such as Partido X and Podemos were launched.⁵⁴ Although Podemos and other movement-related parties are neither the 15M nor merely its institutionalisation, these electoral endeavours borrow some core messages, frames, demands and aspirations from the cycle of anti-austerity mobilisations (della Porta et al. 2017a; see chapter 7, this thesis).

Along with the strength and popularity that some new electoral forces, particularly Podemos, gained in the first few months of the year and during the campaign for the European election in 2014, there was a reverse trend in the levels of anti-austerity mobilisation, like a sort of zero-sum game. Only one mass event took place after that, the *Marcha del Cambio* (“Marching for Change”), coordinated by Podemos in January 2015 (which gathered 300,000 participants according to the organisers). The distance between the line of the anti-austerity protests and that of the overall events increased (figures 3.2-3.3) and the share of performances related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and anti-political status quo decreased steeply (figures 3.3-3.4). Importantly, the peak of participants that is observed in late 2014 is mostly influenced by mass contentious performances related to Catalan self-determination and the symbolic, non-

⁵³ European elections present a window of opportunity for nationwide non-majoritarian parties in Spain, as multiple MEPs are chosen in a single (countrywide) district.

⁵⁴ This initiative was linked with the appeal and challenge that counter-movement actors had posed to anti-austerity activists since the emergence of the 15M. For instance, PP sympathisers proclaimed that “This is democracy, not Sol’s” when they were celebrating their good electoral results in May 2011, meaning that in their view, the only democratically legitimate mandate was the one that emerges from the ballot.

binding referendum on independence that was held in November 2014 (figure 3.3; see della Porta et al. 2017b).

4. CONCLUSION

The first objective of this chapter was to establish a periodisation for the cycle of anti-austerity and anti-political status quo protests in the shadow of the Great Recession that Spain faced, in relation to theories of cycles of collective behaviour. The second aspect that I have attempted to clarify is how high standards of extra-conventional mobilisation persisted over the subsequent years, until a declining trend is observed by late 2013.

Building on the theories of cycles of collective action, I argue that the Spanish cycle consists of the three traditional phases: ascending mobilisation, climax and demobilisation. A multi-layered network of activists, who created their own fora and spaces, was created during the low peak phase. Building on the legacy of the three waves of mobilisation (pro-democratisation, the 1980s and anti-globalisation) and the sediment of the seven movements that emerged from 2003 (for decent housing, squatters, students, precarious youth, against bipartisanship, free culture and digital commons and pro-right to decide over Catalan self-determination), the 15M emerged in May 2011. This campaign represented an outburst of popular discontent with politics-as-usual in a scenario of ongoing (and forecasted) financial hardship. The 15M did not break up and vanish into thin air over the subsequent months, however, going against all odds. On the contrary, the high peak of mobilisations persisted through 2012-2013. How was this possible? I have argued that the movement(s) managed to contain radicalisation attempts and postpone institutionalisation. In explaining this, I contend with traditional theories of cycles of collective action, which are limited to accounting for a situation in which new and old organisations are not rivals— as this would supposedly breed radicalisation, reduce audiences and lead to a sectarian involution.

All the same, new (civil society-driven) organisations in the Spanish cycle needed traditional unions to deliver recurrent mass performances, as they could provide the

resources to appeal to broader sections of the population. These recurrent eventful protests enabled the movements to keep the activists together, just as the specialised, fragmented and sectorial fights allowed mobilisations to survive. These were more specifically goal-oriented, with rewards (i.e. victories, concessions) that were more immediately attainable and with strong popular legitimacy. I analysed some of the most successful ones, namely the housing/stop-evictions, and studied two *mareas* in detail (the “green” and “white tides” against cuts in education and the public health system, respectively).

Finally, I studied how the declining phase of the cycle emerged from the combination of two factors. First, the activists and repertoires of action became exhausted, while, second, institutionalised means began to be regarded as more effective and plausible for meeting new expectations, and these were increasingly oriented towards legislation. Thus, contrary to the predictions of theories of cycles of collective action, de-mobilisation did not come in this case from the divisions between challengers deriving from a combination of some degree of radicalisation and— for other factions— the option of institutional progress. Precisely, an additional strand of research could address this transition between demobilisation in the cycle of protest and the institutionalisation process, which implied a strategic change on the side of some movement actors that allowed for new electoral forces such as Podemos to be formed (in fact, this is the aim of chapter 7).

Further analyses should take this work ahead and analyse cycles through comparative lenses to assess whether similar dynamics hold in other Southern European contexts. Some scholars have already emphasised the centrality of the main Greek unions in the Greek cycle of protest (for a detailed overview of the role of unions and the labour mobilisation in the Greek protest under the Great Recession, see Kousis and Karakioulafi 2013; see also Kanellopoulos and Kostopoulos 2013; Kanellopoulos et al. 2016). Moreover, these studies have stressed the importance of strikes and the complementary role of the main unions and new actors to sustain protest over time, which resonate with my findings on Spain. In the words of Diani and Kousis (2014: 401): “we should note the persistent role of union-related events (in particular, general

strikes) in weaving together different phases of contention, and in providing an occasional bridge to the actions promoted by the movement of the squares, despite the latter's principled hostility to established political actors". Similarly, Kanellopoulos and Kostopoulos (2013) contend that "without the sanctioning of GSEE (General Confederation of Greek Workers) is very difficult a general strike to be organised and without general strikes has proved difficult for the anti-austerity LPEs (Large Protest Events) to continue".

In the next chapter, I will focus on the aggregate-level trajectory of contention in Spain by exploring the role that grievances play as determinants of the longitudinal ebbs and flows of participants in protest performances.

CHAPTER 4

The merrier, the fewer? Political dissatisfaction and protest size fluctuations in times of austerity

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims at analysing the trajectory of anti-austerity protests in Spain in the shadow of the Great Recession, 2007-2015. More specifically, it aims at understanding the determinants of the ups and downs of protest attendance at the aggregate level of analysis. Understanding what explains the irregular distribution and clustering of protest participants across time— i.e. the varying size of protest events— is one of the core tasks that social movements scholars face (Biggs 2016). The core argument advanced in this chapter is that neither material-objective nor subjective-attitudinal economic grievances initiate protest. However, shifts in the levels of political grievances underlie the fluctuations in the figures of protest event participants in the Spanish cycle of collective action under the recession between 2007 and 2015.

This chapter offers a twofold relevant and timely contribution. First, it aims at filling a void in social movement literature: empirical studies that systematically analyse the longitudinal aggregate-level determinants of fluctuations in protests' size are scant— *protest size* being understood as the total numbers of protesters in a territory within a given time span. Second, it updates traditional grievance-centred theories by taking into account— and analysing the interplay of— both their material and ideational dimensions, and assessing their impact on ebbs and flows of protest attendance in a context of generalised hardship, an aspect that has been seldom explored. If the association between grievances and size of protests is sound, it should be robust over time (i.e. it should hold in a short-term vein, within the protest cycle) and should hold across different levels of explanation (the aggregate level is precisely the focus now). Both this piece and the original time series dataset it relies on were born first and foremost to address this lacuna. Also, I step away from structural conceptions of

political opportunities for mobilisation and consider the relational interplay between their elements, and the impact they might have in fuelling further protests.

Next, I review the extant literature about grievances for mobilisation and will present the theoretical framework. Then, I move onto the methodological design, delving deeper into the methodological endeavour used, Protest Event Analysis, the time series dataset built and its operationalisation. I analyse the main results in the fourth section and highlight the main findings and implications of this chapter in the concluding section.

2. GRIEVANCES AND THE SIZE OF PROTESTS

Jenkins et al. (2003) find that collective grievances stemming from black/white income inequality, Vietnam War deaths and low-to-middle levels of black unemployment are better predictors of the frequency of African-American protest events for the 1948-1997 period than expanding opportunities. This—and some other—exceptions notwithstanding, grievances played a minor role in the study of social movements over the last decades—as argued in chapter 1, this thesis. The displacement of grievances from most inquiries on contentious politics was linked to the emergence of new social movements (feminist, ecologist, pacifist, etc.), which emphasised cultural and identity conflicts over traditional socio-economic and labour-capital disputes (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995).⁵⁵

Seemingly contradicting this narrative, popular upsurges against austerity and inequality that swept across Western Europe—and beyond—in the last years have pushed social movement scholars to bring back debates about poverty, inequality, distribution of resources and social justice (Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b; see e.g. Ancelovici et al. 2016; Giugni and Grasso 2015; della Porta 2015a; della Porta and Mattoni 2014). For instance, Kawalerowicz and Biggs (2015) find that the 2011 London rioters were most likely to come from economically deprived neighbourhoods—and

⁵⁵ However, some authors contend that the rise of post-materialistic concerns has never fully replaced old socioeconomic issues (e.g. van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 465).

where the police had previously been perceived as disrespectful. In order to measure neighbourhood deprivation, these authors create an index that combines levels of unemployment, educational qualifications, housing conditions and family structure (Kawalerowicz and Biggs 2015). Based on a self-collated dataset with newspaper reports of contentious events across 145 countries during the period 1960-2006, Caren et al. (2016) find that periods of economic decline are associated with an increase in anti-government demonstrations and riots, particularly when the economic decline is severe and in non-democracies.⁵⁶ Also, the negative relationship between economic growth and political action has not significantly changed over time (Caren et al. 2016).

Unlike a wealth of preceding contributions on grievances focused only on the material-objective dimension (e.g. Davies 1962; Jenkins et al. 2003; Caren et al. 2016), as clarified in chapter 1, I define grievances as exogenous shocks— objective situations, such as unemployment or income deprivation— and the subjective-attitudinal consequences these engender in terms of social discontent, psychological strain, alienation, fear or resentment (see Opp 1988; Snow et al. 1998; Kriesi 2012; Snow 2013; Bernburg 2016). They refer to both troublesome conditions, which might disrupt taken-for-granted routines, and their associated meanings and sentiments. Grievances consist of both “objective” (material) and “subjective” (interpretative, socially perceived and constructed) dimensions (Grasso and Giugni 2016a: 37-38, 2016b; see also Gurr 1970; Snow et al. 1998; Büchler 2004). From this perspective, not merely the resourceless people will be more likely to protest, but also those who feel more deprived and discontent with the socioeconomic and political status quo. These perceptions are often best measured through attitudinal indicators such as assessments of the political situation, perceptions of the individual economic well-being, general economic prospects, etc. (Grasso and Giugni 2016a). At the aggregate level, this would imply that the general worsening of material conditions (e.g. increasing poverty, inequality, and

⁵⁶ Note that the effect is not robust for the two other measures of adversity used by Caren et al. (2016), group discrimination and income inequality.

other negative living conditions) as well as general attitudinal shifts (i.e. an increase in perceived grievances) may stimulate contestation.

Some recent contributions have shown the importance of considering both subjective and objective dimensions together. For example, by exploring popular resistance against water privatisation in Bolivia and rising corn prices in Mexico, Simmons (2016) finds that citizens take to the streets when both material and symbolic worlds are at stake— in other words, when market reforms have put not only subsistence, but also their conceptions of community at risk. Based on a comparative longitudinal analysis of 25 European countries between 2000 and 2014, Quaranta (2015) shows that worsening economic performance, measured using a composite index of both objective and subjective indicators, is strongly associated with the evolution of protest event counts.⁵⁷ Similar to this last contribution, in this chapter, I argue that grievances influence the aggregate trajectory of protest participation— i.e. going beyond the number of protest events— in a cycle of protest that unfolds in a recession-driven context.⁵⁸

In the Spanish case, mobilisations in an austerity-ridden context have been related to cuts in public spending, unfavourable economic conditions, current and prospective employment situation, poverty and inequality (Martí i Puig 2011; Romanos 2013; Arribas 2015). Challengers claimed for the re-design and re-orientation of public policies, and a more equal distribution of costs derived from the financial crisis. Accordingly, I will test whether a generalised increase in objective grievances (e.g. unemployment, inequality, wealth decline, etc.) is correlated with higher standards of extra-conventional participation (hypothesis 1). If this hypothesis is confirmed, it will imply that general economic decline and material deprivation are systematically associated with an increase in the size of protest over time within an austerity-ridden scenario. Although I focus specifically on participants' fluctuations, hypothesis 1 would be consistent with the study by Beissinger and Sasse (2014), who have found an

⁵⁷ Quaranta (2015) collects an original cross-country PEA dataset using GDELT.

⁵⁸ Unlike Quaranta (2015), I also consider— and operationalise— the objective and subjective dimensions of grievances separately, as shown below.

association between worsening objective-material grievances in light of the Great Recession and increasing protest event counts in Eastern European countries.

Besides material conditions, we know that protest demand begins with dissatisfaction (Opp 1988; Klandermans 2010, 2013). Specifically, claims against the political establishment, for the implementation of austerity policies and inclusive, deliberative and better-functioning democratic mechanisms were at the core of 15M occupations and the subsequent wave of protests in Spain (see Tormey 2015: ch.5-6). In spite of the sound theoretical association between political discontent and protest likelihood, based on individual-level data, the empirical support for this relationship is mixed and rather weak (see e.g. Norris 2002, 2011; Dalton 2004; Norris et al. 2005; Dalton et al. 2010). Moreover, whether general political discontent is a distinctive feature of anti-austerity protesters— relative to, for instance, old labour and new social movement challengers— is disputable (see e.g. Calvo 2013; Grasso and Giugni 2016a). Yet, I will test if aggregate-level subjective political grievances, and particularly drops in political satisfaction, account for longitudinal increases in protest size (hypothesis 2).

On top of politically subjective grievances, socioeconomic attitudinal grievances might have an impact on mobilisation attendance at the aggregate level. As mentioned in chapter 1, building on economic voting literature, I consider both sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Polavieja 2013). While sociotropic views of the economy concern assessments of the general and country-level economic situation, egotropic perceptions refer to individual-level appraisals of the household and one's own situation. Shifts in the general public opinion's positioning in terms of— both egotropic and sociotropic— perceptions of the economy might affect ebbs and flows of challengers' attendance. I will test whether an aggregate increase in perceived socioeconomic grievances is associated with more protest attendance (hypothesis 3).

As it can be read from my first three hypotheses, the overall rationale is that the more aggrieved the population is, the higher the levels of protest participation should be. Nonetheless, I expect that the direct effect of objective-structural indicators of

grievances to weaken as attitudinal-subjective aspects are taken into account in a context of hardship (hypothesis 4). The recession and its macroeconomic indicators might impact attitudinal configurations (Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Anderson and Hecht 2014; Polavieja 2013). Therefore, both political and socioeconomic interpretative-subjective factors might mediate the direct association between worsening material-objective conditions as a consequence of the recession (e.g. unemployment, inequality, debt, impoverishment, etc.) and protest size.

A criticism one could deal with the formulation of hypothesis 4 is that attitudes do not change immediately following exogenous shocks, as attitudinal configurations tend to be stable and change slowly over time (see e.g. Prior 2009). However, this point should be nuanced. First, as Anderson and Hecht (2014) point out, a distinct long-term downward trend in opinions about the general economic mood that started well before the crisis— and in fact extends over the past 25 years— can be observed in Southern European countries.⁵⁹ To a certain extent, socioeconomic attitudes presaged the unsolved economic challenges that these countries would face in a context driven by fiscal austerity and public spending retrenchment (Anderson and Hecht 2014; Bermeo and Bartels 2014). Second, in the specific case of Spain under the Great Recession, political attitudes were more sensitive than they usually are in other contexts and scenarios, as some relatively dramatic shifts could be observed during the 2007-2015 time span (see Muñoz et al. 2014; Torcal 2014; Polavieja 2013). Although attitudes might not change automatically following structural impulses (e.g. higher levels of unemployment might not immediately make egotropic perceptions of the economy more acute), I argue that changes in interpretative configurations determine the ebbs and flows in the challengers' series (hypotheses 2 and 3), mediating the impact of objective-material indicators (hypothesis 1).

⁵⁹ To empirically pin down the general economic mood, Anderson and Hecht (2014) consider 9 items in 11 countries included in the Joint Harmonised EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys: both prospective and retrospective situation of the national economy and the financial household, current and prospective savings, current and prospective spending in major purchases and unemployment expectations.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND OPERATIONALISATION

3.1. Protest Event Analysis

The evolution from PEA-centred research has followed four distinctive phases, according to Hutter (2014b; see also Koopmans and Rucht 2002). The initiators of PEA, such as Shorter and Tilly (1974) and Tilly et al. (1975), sought to capture the long-term dynamics of social conflict and change. Striving for higher standards of analytical rigor and coding sophistication, a second generation took over (e.g. Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989), and expanded the use of event-count data, even from cross-national lenses (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995). The development of PEA is closely linked to the evolution of the political process approach, in its quest to capture the volatile and dynamic aspects of the political arena and expanding opportunities. Accordingly, priority was given to capturing different aspects of the political structure and process, most of them institutional (e.g. types of governments and regimes, repressive strategies, presence of allies among elites, state strength, etc.).

A third wave of studies emerged when scholars turned their attention to the sources of media bias and selectivity in event records (e.g. Earl et al. 2004). New electronic tools and methodological endeavours have tried— more or less successfully— to make the data-collection process more reliable, and also less demanding of resources and time-intensive (e.g. by developing semi-automated procedures; for an updated overview, see Jenkins and Maher 2016). Most prominent examples are the work by Francisco (1996), Imig and Tarrow (2001), and recent— still ongoing— developments by Hanna (2013), Hanna et al. (2015), Kriesi (2013) and Lorenzini et al. (2016). A final group of PEA-based contributions developed in parallel to this. It sought to delve deeper into the interactive and relational component of contentious performances, with sophisticated procedures, extending and broadening the units of analysis, such as claim-making performances (e.g. Koopmans and Statham 1999; Koopmans et al. 2005).⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Following this push towards capturing the interactive nature of collective action, another stream of research has focused on the interrelationship and interdependency between protest actions and campaigns (e.g. Franzosi 2004; Tilly 2008).

My PEA contribution adds to this effort by aiming at capturing relational opportunities, and incorporating them into our analyses. Yet, the main contribution of this chapter to protest event literature does not lie so much in the data collection tools (e.g. by developing web scrapping and data mining software that would make data collection easier), but rather in the coding features and empirical design. The main ambition of this chapter consists of systematically linking the evolution of secondary-source data with the trajectories of mobilisation, one of the long-standing voids in the literature on collective action— see e.g. Koopmans and Rucht (2002); Biggs (2016).

Note that there are some noteworthy partial exceptions to this gap in the field of study, as various event-centred studies in the past sought to correlate fluctuations of labour conflict intensity, organisational trajectories and political violence with exogenous longitudinal data (e.g. Snyder and Tilly 1972; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975; Hibbs 1976; Muller 1985; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Weede 1987; Hannan and Freeman 1989; for an overview, see Olzak 1989). Thus, Hibbs (1976) finds that the evolution of strike activity in ten advanced democracies in the 1950-1969 period depended both on labour market dynamics and communist party membership. According to Snyder (1975), economic determinants of strikes perform poorly in the pre-war period in the US, Italy and France. In these three cases, union membership as a proxy for organisational capacity contributes to explain the frequency and size of industrial conflict. The author finds, however, a great deal of variation between cases: while political change and/or crisis, as measured by Shorter and Tilly (1974), affect strike activity in France and Italy, political party affiliations of congressional and presidential office holders are important predictors of strike fluctuations in the US (Snyder 1975). Most relevant for my argument, Snyder and Tilly (1972) find that struggles for political power (captured through different indicators for governmental repression and national political activity) are better predictors of collective violence than experiences of hardship for the 1830-1960 period in France. Given these invaluable precedents, why have PEA students pushed to the background the longitudinal and systematic analysis of secondary-source material conditions (and attitudinal

configurations) for the timing and dynamics of contentious activities in the last quarter-century?

The first and main reason is empirical, as most existing large longitudinal surveys do not provide enough time point observations to study the evolution of citizens' attitudes within specific cycles of protest. Some surveys that are often used are conducted every other year (e.g. the European Social Survey) or every five years (e.g. the World Values Survey). Additionally, the approaches, aims, sets of questions and phrasing usually evolve over time in most large-N cross-national endeavours, making it hard to assemble consistent time series databases. Alternatively, extending the time horizon of protest event counts (i.e. collecting PEA data over longer time spans) might be very costly and labour-intensive, and could give rise to additional biases during the data collection process (e.g. derived from the longitudinal evolution of frames for mobilisation, repertoires of action, etc.).

The second factor refers to the mismatch between theory and empirical observations. As mentioned previously, fluctuation of political and socioeconomic attitudes (e.g. political trust, egotropic views of the economy) and material conditions (e.g. inequality, deficit) do not change dramatically within short time spans, as they tend to remain more or less steady over time. Linking these fluctuations systematically to steep and irregular trends on protest occurrence and attendance is difficult, even within long-term time periods (see e.g. Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tarrow 1989; Portos 2016a). Although theoretical foundations point in this direction, it is hard to empirically associate attitudinal flows with the peaks and valleys in protest size.

The third reason for the underdeveloped longitudinal association between material-attitudinal and protest event count fluctuations is more pragmatic. Many variables associated with individual events within a fixed observation period, whether weekly or yearly, are aggregated with no theoretical or methodological guide as to what level of aggregation is more relevant than others. Given small-N concerns, decisions of temporal aggregation too often depend on the length of observation periods that the data covers. However, the choice of a given unit of temporal aggregation with time series

data affects the parameter estimates (Cameron and Trivedi 2013), and therefore the conclusions drawn from them.

The fourth big challenge lies in potential reverse causality. For assessing the aggregate-level effects of exogenous shocks (e.g. higher unemployment rates) on protest trends, either one or multiple lags can be considered, as the effects are presumably non-immediate. However, one might argue that the causation does not flow from attitudes (e.g. political dissatisfaction) to protest event counts, but in the opposite way, from protests to attitudes. Some events or campaigns— understood as sets of events— might have an impact on attitudinal configurations. Protest performances might help to convince and make people more aware of their latent positioning, and sharpen their attitudes when they realise that their claims and understandings are collectively shared— see chapter 5, this thesis.

Last but not least, the fifth justification concerns the research agenda. As most protest events are never reported by the news media, methodological scrutiny has focused on these limitations in recent times. However, giving priority to PEA data reliability over other challenges is disputable— and rather arbitrary. As Earl et al. (2004: 77) argue, “newspaper data does not deviate markedly from accepted standards of quality” of other empirical sources. Furthermore, Biggs (2016) argues that the “debate over sources of data— about reliability rather than validity— has displaced a more fundamental question in PEA-based studies: how should protest be quantified?”.

As a result of these challenges, there are hardly any existing studies based on PEA that systematically account for the timing of protest attendance. Aiming to test and refine the role of grievance theories as determinants of the trajectory of mobilisation, I collated an original time series dataset with information from a Protest Event Analysis on the Spanish 2007-2015 cycle of protest and different additional secondary sources (see tables 3.1 and 4.8, Appendix).

3.2. The dependent variable

In most contributions that use PEA, the dependent variable timing of protest is measured through event-count fluctuations. As Michael Biggs (2016) remarks, however, the fact that the bulk of participation comes from event counts has important implications: to the detriment of large events, the importance of small events is overstated. The correlation between the monthly series of total event frequency and participants is moderate (Pearson's $r = 0.62$) because only a few large events contribute the majority of protesters. Moreover, protest size—to the detriment of protest event counts—is the most appropriate dependent variable if aiming at understanding why the bulk of protests are clustered in certain points across time.

However, the calculation and estimation of the number of protesters in a given event is a sensitive issue. Quality of data reported usually depends on the newspaper source, but they tend to differ dramatically, are scant and partial. To tackle this issue, I have gathered information on the three main sources of information on the size of challengers separately (when available). These three continuous indicators are: the number of participants reported by 1) the police or official authorities, 2) the *El País* newspaper and 3) the organisers. As police records usually underestimate the number of participants and organisers overestimate them, weighting coefficients were used to calculate the three indicators.⁶¹ Also, a fourth variable is used when non-precise data on

⁶¹ For calculating weights, the following procedure was followed. All cases where the three values were reported were considered together (note that they were randomly distributed, $N = 45$). A coefficient that measures average, over or underestimation was calculated for each variable: 1) $\text{Coef_police} = \text{NParticip_police} / \text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$; 2) $\text{Coef_newspaper} = \text{NParticip_newspaper} / \text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$; 3) $\text{Coef_organiser} = \text{NParticip_organiser} / \text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$.

For those events that had precise estimates in various sources (as calculated by the police, newspaper and organisers), the number of participants was determined simply by taking the arithmetic weighted averages across the two or three various sources. If only one of them was available, I used its weighted value. If the number of participants was only estimated ($N = 505$), this was considered the final size, using the average value of the range of the size category (for a further description of these procedures, see table 4.8, Appendix). The variable was weighted by the duration of the event. As for the missing cases ($N = 87$), where no information on participants was available, I checked for online reliable sources (e.g. other newspapers) to codify information on the size figures offered by organisers and authorities. In those cases for which information on the size of an event was still missing ($N = 14$, a small share of the sample), a search was made in the database for the closest similar events in time that occurred in the same city were organised by the same group, and put forward the same demands. The size category of that event was used as the basis for the size category of the demonstration in question.

participants are provided, but only estimations (e.g. a few tens, some hundreds, several thousands, etc.). The estimates were transformed into a continuous variable (for further information on the coding procedures, see table 3.1, Appendix).⁶² A final variable, *particip_final*, which takes the average of the three previous weighted measures is created— when available; otherwise it is equal to the continuous estimated variable. The monthly average of *particip_final*— weighted by the number of events— is used as the dependent variable (see figure 4.1).




FIGURE 4.1. Total participants in protest performances and participants in events strictly related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo. Y-axis (left): figures of participants (in thousands), raw data. Y-axis (right): figures of participants (in thousands), 5- period moving average. X-axis= time (98 month-point observations, Jan 2007- Feb 2015). Source: my PEA.

3.3. Predictors

In order to test H.1, I have collected monthly information about different objective-material indicators of grievances, empirically captured as follows (see table 4.8, Appendix):

Given the size and scope of the database, analogous events were almost always available for comparison. In the very rare cases ($N''' = 3$) when no information whatsoever was available, a size category of “1” was assigned in the interval-level estimated variable, and recoded into a continuous indicator following the already specified guidelines.

⁶² In order to transform the estimates into a continuous variable, I use the same ranges than in the project *Dynamics of Collective Action* (see <http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/>): 1) < 100 participants; 2) 100– 999; 3) 1,000– 4,999; 4) 5,000– 9,999; 5) 10,000– 19,999; 6) 20,000– 49,999; 7) 50,000– 99,999; 8) 100,000– 199,999; 9) 200,000– 499,999 and 10) 500,000 or more participants.

- Unemployment is measured as the percentage of overall unemployment in Spain (= unemployed population/active population*100). This is seasonally adjusted, following ILO guidelines. Source: IMF.
- Inflation is the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising and, subsequently, purchasing power is falling. Thus, inflation is associated with general deprivation, and also with economic instability and uncertainty. Increasing inflation may be positively associated with protest size. It is measured through the harmonised inflation rate, which is based on the Eurostat's harmonised consumer price index (HICP).

Additionally, I have also taken into account private debt, inequality, mortgage foreclosures as well as GDP per capita (see table 4.8, Appendix). Inequality, unemployment, wealth and number of evictions are highly inter-correlated (Pearson's absolute $|r| > 0.8$). Due to multi-collinearity concerns (and the unavailability of monthly records for these indicators), I use inflation and unemployment indicators in the models.

I also incorporate one main indicator to capture subjective political grievances, political satisfaction, which is an assessment of the current political situation in Spain, coded into a 0-100 scale (H.2). Information from the CIS monthly barometer is used.⁶³ I have 11 yearly observations, so there are 8 missing observations for the time series that covers the January 2007-February 2015 period.⁶⁴ To correct for this, I have implemented multiple imputation techniques, following the procedures indicated for imputation of time series data with the programme AMELIA II, as specified by Honaker et al. (2015; see also Honaker and King 2010).⁶⁵

⁶³ CIS stands for *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*. It is an independent entity assigned to the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency which, among other tasks, carries out surveys and barometers (see http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/EN/8_cis/).

⁶⁴ The CIS barometer is not conducted in August.

⁶⁵ Alternatively, the CIS also provides information of political trust, understood as the prospective evolution of the general political situation. Fluctuations in this indicator (that captures the extent of improvement of the political situation over the next 12 months) are correlated with political satisfaction. Due to multicollinearity concerns, I only use it for robustness checks, as an alternative to political satisfaction.

As for subjective socioeconomic grievances (H.3), I use the OECD's monthly consumer opinion surveys. All of them are measured on 5-category scales that range from -100 to 100. They are expressed as the balance of positive over negative results. These capture the retrospective and prospective assessment (always with regards to the last or the next 12 months) of the following aspects:

- Inflation (sociotropic views of the economy): perception of changes in consumer prices.
- General economy (sociotropic views of the economy): how one perceives that the general economic situation in this country is going to develop or has developed.
- Household economy (egotropic perceptions of the economy): how the financial position of one's household has changed or is expected to change.
- Household savings (egotropic perceptions of the economy): how the financial position of one's household accounts in terms of savings is at present or is expected to change.
- Unemployment: how the general evolution unemployment is going to evolve (only prospective).

As some of these predictors for subjective socioeconomic grievances might presumably be inter-correlated, I run a matrix of correlations. All items are moderately to highly correlated (Pearson's absolute $|r| > 0.55$), except for those indicators of (both retrospective and prospective) inflation and current savings. Hence, I create an index that offers a 1-component solution with the 6 remaining variables—the second solution is below 1 (Eigenvalue= 4.58 out of 6 components), which accounts for 76.31% of inter-item variation. Additionally, I include an index of subjective inflation (1-component solution, which accounts for 81.42% of inter-item variation). Based on the statistical tests conducted, I can observe that the fluctuations of the egotropic and sociotropic perceptions of the economy go hand in hand, and thus constitute one single dimension. Both indices created, one for subjective socioeconomic grievances and another one for subjective inflation, meet the reliability threshold (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.90$ and 0.77 ,

respectively). Furthermore, the set of factors included in the index accounted for the vast majority of the variance in the longitudinal series of the latent construct.⁶⁶ Hence, in the statistical models displayed throughout, I use these two indices that capture the general socioeconomic mood. Like Anderson and Hecht (2014), I prefer my own indices to the detriment of the Spanish harmonised consumer confidence indicator elaborated by the OECD (that only takes into account prospective information) or any of the weighted composite indices they elaborate, as none of them involves exactly and exclusively these indicators. As can be seen from the matrix correlations of the main predictors of (subjective socioeconomic and political) grievances reported in table 4.1, they are not highly inter-correlated, and therefore can be introduced separately in the statistical models:

	Unempl_D1	Inflation_D1	Pol satisf_D1	Subj Socioecc Ind_D1	Subj inflation
Unempl_D1	1.00				
Inflation_D1	-.04	1.00			
Political satisf_D1	-.05	-.17	1.00		
Subj Socioecc Ind_D1	-.04	-.22	.25	1.00	
Subj inflation	.09	.25	.19	-.05	1.00

TABLE 4.1. Matrix of correlations between the time series predictors of grievances. Pearson's r values ($N=96$). Source: multiple, as specified in this sub-section.

⁶⁶ Alternatively, I construct my own diachronic summary indicator of political opinions, based on the statistical properties of the different items considered, with the help of Stimson's dyad ratios algorithm (Stimson 1999, 2008). Widely used in public opinion studies, the algorithm was designed to identify and extract the common dynamic elements of public opinion aggregates from multiple indicators across surveys. Instead of looking at absolute values, the Stimson's algorithm focuses on the relative changes within an item. Even though the absolute values of survey marginals are not directly comparable across indicators, the ratios of change between two points in time—within the same indicator—are. Starting with changes over time in the marginal distributions for each survey question, the change scores for each individual survey question series are calculated and the algorithm then extracts the latent dimensions that underlie the shared patterns of variance across these changes (see Stimson 1999; Anderson and Hecht 2014). After this, it produces the relevant number of summary series of public opinion. Hence, Stimson's algorithm is analogous to conducting a factor analysis on aggregate time series data. The number of latent variables obtained is a function of the number of dimensions that the data provide. Note that neither the results nor the reliability threshold of the composite index change in a significant way by using Stimson's algorithm. As they do not improve the models' goodness-of-fit, Stimson's (1999, 2008) procedures are only used for robustness checks and not reported throughout.

3.4. Controls

The evolution of political opportunities, a key concept within the political process tradition, is crucial to understanding mobilisation trajectories (McAdam 1982; Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 2011). As opportunities are often understood as signals that actors get to mobilise resources in order to engage in social movement activity (Tarrow 2012: 78), most existing accounts consider opportunities in a unidirectional way— i.e. causation is interpreted to flow from the political environment to movement activity (Karapın 2011: 65). However, movements do not only “seize opportunities; they make them, both for themselves and for others” (Tarrow 2012: 89). Since contention is a complex web of social relations involving interactions between challengers, authorities, allies and adversaries, we need to systematically assess how contenders' specific actions affect the scenario where further protests occur and, therefore, shape subsequent actions (McAdam et al. 2001: 243-244; Koopmans 2004). In this view, political opportunities for a specific group are not structural variables, but consist of the actions and interactions of relevant actors (Koopmans 2004: 21, 40). This implies assuming that social movements coevolve with regimes and other relevant actors, as interactions are more important in shaping mobilisation trajectories than endogenous aspects (Oliver and Myers 2003).

Building on this line of reasoning, the *positive-feedback spirals* concept developed. These refer to different actors' interactions that are a key condition for mobilisation to take place (Karapın 2011:65), which creates spirals of opportunity, threat or both. These opportunity/threat spirals “operate through sequences of environmental change, interpretation of that change, action, and counteraction, repeated as one actor alters another actor's environment” (McAdam et al. 2001: 243). There are three basic claim-making actors involved in them: challengers, elites and authorities (Karapın 2007, 2011: 67-70; see also Kriesi 2009).⁶⁷ Based on action-reaction-counteraction triplets, opportunity/threat spirals seek to assess the impact of repression, reforms, concessions

⁶⁷ Elites are defined as non-state actors with routine access to state resources and decision-making instances (e.g. parties, interest group leaders, etc.).

and elites' moves— that may come about after challengers perform bold actions— on further protest actions within the cycle (see McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2008; Kriesi 2009, 2012; Karapın 2011). Beyond protesters' bold actions,⁶⁸ the four dimensions considered are operationalised as follows:

1. Policing of protest: it considers both whether the protesters' actions were violent or not and the response on the side of the authorities in terms of repression or inaction. Two measures are used. First, I use a binary variable on whether protesters used violence (1= yes, 0= otherwise; 35 null observations). A second variable captures the overall degree of coercion on a 0-3 scale (no direct coercion, low, substantial or major coercion), according to measures taken by authorities against challengers. It relies on Karapın's (2007) index, but it is adapted to my specific context— for the specific coding procedures, see table 3.1 in the Appendix (45 null observations).⁶⁹
2. Besides violence and repression, other opportunity-generating aspects are immediate concessions by authorities to protesters. By this I refer to claims to incorporate partial or total challengers' demands (policy-making, institutional reform, merely through a supportive discourse to their claims, etc.). This means that authorities (claim to) make concessions to favour the interests of protesters or their constituents and— often because of their timing— appear to be in response to particular protests. The impact on concessions on the mobilisation prospects is however ambiguous. On the one hand, concessions might whet the appetite of some protesters— favouring further mobilisations—, on the other hand, they might signal further chances of success and encourage participation in the movement generally and specifically in the methods that appeared to be successful (McAdam 1982: 743; Tarrow 2011). Building on the *Dynamics of Collective Action* project's codebook, I use a 5-category variable that captures

⁶⁸ These are event performances (i.e. collective actions that may be daring, novel in methods/targets, involve large numbers of participants, etc.)— see Karapın (2007, 2011).

⁶⁹ Events were coded according to the following criteria: 0) no known coercion; 1) low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or injuries, defined as less than 10); 2) substantial coercion (defined as 10-75 arrests or 10-40 injuries); and 3) major coercion (defined as more than 75 arrests or more than 40 injuries).

not only whether any representative of the government (central or local-regional, depending on the target) reacted in any way or took any positioning towards the protest claims but the direction and the strength of the positioning taken (15 observations fall in the null category; the indicator ranges from -1 to 1; see table 3.1, Appendix).

3. Additionally, the implementation of procedural/ad hominem *reforms* by authorities increases protesters'— and normally the general public's— routine access to officials. It may involve creating new institutions and legal frameworks, or merely making existing procedures more inviting to potential participants. Procedural reforms reduce the costs of taking action, which has the effect of promoting participation in the movement (especially routine participation) and providing regular access to elites who may increase their support for protesters (Tarrow 1989: 310-323, 2011; Karapin 2007: 99-103). This also implies dismissals or discharges of officials. Hence, I use a dummy (1= immediate reforms were implemented— or officials claimed they will be implemented shortly—, 0= otherwise; 64 null observations).
4. Finally, a fourth aspect of relational opportunities concerns alliance formation between challengers and the elites, intermediary institutions of representation or other relevant social actors (e.g. political parties, unions, NGO's, professional or other type of foundations and associations, etc.). Having support from additional actors might contribute to putting a movement's demands onto the agenda and gaining media impact, facilitating concessions and reforms. Thereby, having allies might make the movement's prospects more successful, both in terms of mobilisation capacity and outcomes (Karapin 2011; Tarrow 2012). Nevertheless, opposition to the movement and its claims from some of these actors might foster unstable political alignments, breed divisions and, therefore, refrain people from continuing their mobilisation. Accordingly, I collect information on whether there have been reactions by elite actors (i.e. political parties, trade unions, official institutions or authorities), who— which organisation(s)— have exactly reacted and, more importantly, the direction of

the reaction (3-point scale whose categories are -1, 0 and 1; 7 null observations; see table 3.1, Appendix).

All in all, I incorporate a set of controls in my models to control for the evolution of relational opportunities and the impact these might have had for further protest events. In all cases, the average values of the indicators related to the four aspects (coercion/violence, reform, concession and alliance formation) are used at the monthly level, weighted by the number of events for that unit of aggregation. Besides relational opportunities that come from my PEA dataset, I also incorporate in my models some additional control variables that come from different sources. More specifically,

- Ideology: average self-placement on the 1-10 left-right scale. As left-wingers are more prone to protest (Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Torcal et al. 2015), ideological changes may be linked to fluctuations in mobilisation. Source: CIS barometers.⁷⁰
- Organisational features: dummy that captures whether the main organiser has been created since 2003-onwards, when precursors of this cycle of protests started to be born (see Portos 2016a; chapter 3, this thesis), and it is neither a main union nor a party (=1; 0= otherwise). It is weighted by the number of monthly events. Source: my PEA (monthly average).
- Bipartisan vote: joint percent vote estimation for the two main parties, PSOE and PP. Source: monthly average of regular barometers conducted by different pollsters.⁷¹

⁷⁰ As with political satisfaction, there are 8 missing observations. I also used multiple imputation techniques, following the specific guidelines for time series by Honaker et al. (2015) and Honaker and King (2010).

⁷¹ Data come from more than 30 different pollsters. The number of temporal observations vary between pollsters. While the CIS offers 4 time-point observations per year, Metroscopia offers 11 (since May 2009), and the GESOP gives 3. I am grateful to F. Camas and G. Vidal for kindly providing me with the raw data series for this variable.

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The methodological endeavour used to systematically associate ebbs and flows of grievances with shifts in protest size is time series regression analysis. The choice of this specific analytical technique is far from novel in PEA-based studies (e.g. Olzak 1989; Jenkins et al. 2003; Hutter 2014b; Beissinger and Sasse 2014). However, none of these explicitly link (both subjective and objective) grievances from secondary-source data and records of protest participation.

All the variables, both predictors and controls, are aggregated at the same temporal level. As a rule of thumb, the smaller the unit of aggregation, the better, as it will provide a higher number of observations. However, this decision affects the estimates— as previously argued in this chapter, picking a specific level of temporal aggregation is arbitrary and often depends on the data at hand. All reported models are based on monthly level of aggregation.⁷²

First, I perform a set of formal diagnostic tests to investigate whether the series are stationary or have a unit root for the dependent variable, the number of participants. According to the Dickey-Fuller test conducted, the null hypothesis that my continuous dependent variable exhibits a unit root can be rejected, since the p-value is lower than 0.05. As there are no unit roots, I conclude that the participation series is trend-stationary.⁷³ The appropriate multivariate modelling strategy does not involve differencing the dependent variable to make it stationary. Moreover, as the plot of autocorrelations shows, the autocorrelation values fall within the pointwise confidence intervals, hence the series of participants can be considered an independent *white noise* sequence (see figure 4.2).

⁷² Robustness checks are conducted with termly aggregation, with no substantial differences found.

⁷³ DF-GLS (modified Dickey-Fuller t test for a unit root in which the series has been transformed by a generalised least-squares regression) and KPSS tests for unit roots in time series confirmed this finding.




FIGURE 4.2. Correlogram of the monthly series of total participants. Source: my PEA.

Unit root and autocorrelation tests suggest in turn that several core predictors should be differenced by one unit: unemployment, inflation, political satisfaction and the index of general socioeconomic grievances (e.g. see figure 4.3 for the trends of political satisfaction). The mean ideology and majoritarian vote controls are likewise one-unit differenced. The correlograms and tests of autocorrelation report no association between the current t values of any of the variables in the models and their previous values (see figure 4.4 for the correlograms and partial correlograms of political satisfaction). Also, for a basic model that includes total participants and differenced political satisfaction, the residuals scatter around a mean near zero, as they should, with no obvious trends or patterns indicating misspecification or autocorrelation outside of the Bartlett two standard error bands for white noise (see figure 4.5).




FIGURE 4.3. Trends of political satisfaction (left, raw data) and one-unit differenced political satisfaction (right). X-axis= time (98 month-point observations, Jan 2007- Feb 2015). Source: CIS barometers, own collection.




FIGURE 4.4. Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of the political satisfaction predictor. Upper left: AC political satisfaction (40 lags), raw data. Upper right: PAC political satisfaction (40 lags), raw data. Lower left: AC political satisfaction (40 lags), one-unit differenced. Lower right: PAC political satisfaction (40 lags), one-unit differenced. Source: CIS barometers, own collection.




FIGURE 4.5. Autocorrelation of residuals after regressing total participants and differenced political satisfaction (left) and cross-correlogram of these variables (right). Sources: CIS barometers (for political satisfaction) and my PEA (for protest size).

Taking all these aspects together, the modelling strategy that better fits my data is a linear time series regression. Both the BIC and AIC tests agree that the optimal number of lags to be included in the regression models is 0, therefore I

use unlagged predictors and controls— this is unsurprising, given the abovementioned white noise in the dependent variable and the procedures followed to differentiate predictors. I estimated a series of multivariate regressions with participants as the dependent variable and grievances as the main predictors (for a summary of descriptive statistics, see table 4.2). In the first model, I include only the indicators for objective grievances (i.e. unemployment and inflation)— see table 4.3. On top of these, in the second model, I also incorporate political dissatisfaction and socioeconomic subjective grievances. From these results, I can confirm neither a longitudinal association between an increase in material-objective grievances and protest size (H.1) nor between subjective socioeconomic grievances and protest size (H.3). However, there seems to be a negative impact of political satisfaction on the numbers of participants in protest performances at the aggregate level (H.2).

Descriptive statistics (time series)					
	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
Total participants	98	1471.73	2076.97	1.9	8200
Obj. grievances (H.1)					
Unemployment_D1	96	.16	1.48	-9.5	10.1
Inflation_D1	97	-.04	.50	-1.2	2.24
Subj. political grievances (H.2)					
Political satisfaction_D1	97	-.19	1.93	-6.5	5.3
Subj. socioeconomic grievances (H.3)					
Gen. Subj. Socioecc. Index_D1	97	.08	2.93	-9.05	6.27
Subjective inflation	98	-14.46	5.31	-24.2	-4.2
Relational opportunities (controls)					
Violence	97	.07	.08	0	.49
Coercion	98	.09	.12	0	.65
Immed. concessions	98	-.44	.32	-1	.14
Immed. reforms	98	.03	.06	0	.44
Available allies	98	.34	.19	0	.83
Other controls					
New organisations	98	.46	.18	0	.89
Ideology_D1	97	-.00	.08	-.19	.18
Majoritarian vote_D1	97	-.34	2.37	-11.45	8.13

TABLE 4.2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the time series regression models (monthly data). One-unit differenced variables: unemployment, inflation, political satisfaction, subjective socioeconomic index, subjective inflation, ideology, majoritarian vote. Source: multiple (see "Data" subsection for further information). Total participants in thousands.

As for the third model (table 4.3), in addition to the previous indicators, I have incorporated the relational opportunities controls (policing of protest—captured through violence of challengers and level of coercion—, immediate concessions, immediate reforms and availability of allies). While political satisfaction keeps having a negative association with the size of protest,⁷⁴ the effect of inflation is negative. The coefficient for subjective inflation also becomes significant but positive. Although a generalised increase in prices seems to be associated with more protest participation, the general public being aware of inflationary trends decreases protest size. Note that these coefficients are significant only at the 5% level and are not robust across model specifications, though (see e.g. models 1-2, table 4.3). Moreover, the Dickey-Fuller test for unit root conducted for the non-differenced subjective inflation variable was only marginally significant (p-value= 0.045), and the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations suggest that the subjective inflation predictor can be differenced by one unit (see figure 4.6, Appendix). The Dickey-Fuller test for the one unit differenced subjective inflation predictor gives a p-value of 0.000. Table 4.7 in the Appendix replicates models 2-4 in table 4.3, with one-unit differenced subjective inflation. We can observe how the effects of both inflation and subjective inflation on protest behaviour vanish, while that of political dissatisfaction is robust (table 4.7, Appendix).

From table 4.3 we can also observe that while immediate concessions— i.e. elites responding favourably some of the demands that challengers put forward— are negatively associated with more participation in extra-conventional performances, immediate reforms have a positive impact on protest size. Thus (the immediate promise of) concessions seems to satisfy some

⁷⁴ Although including lags is not the optimal solution according to the BIC and AIC criteria, this result holds if including one lag per predictor: a one-unit decrease in satisfaction at time point t_{-1} is associated with a one-unit increase in protesters one time unit later (t_0)— see table 4.6, Appendix.

protesters, refraining them from engaging in further mobilisation, giving rise to divisions among protesters, which hinders further participation (Tarrow 2011, 2012). Conversely, the results in this model specification also support the argument that the immediate promise of reforms points towards an opportunity for influencing decision-making and policy-implementation processes by engaging in additional actions. Also, based on model 3 (table 4.3), I find that having institutional allies is associated with more protest attendance.

In the fourth model, besides the main variables related to the hypotheses and relational opportunities, I control for fluctuations of organisational features, ideological self-placement and majoritarian vote (table 4.3). While the previous results hold— except from the effect of availability of allies, which fades away— out of these new controls, only majoritarian vote is systematically associated with shifts in protest participation. Rather surprisingly, however, the effect has a positive sign: an increase in estimated joint vote of the two major parties would be associated with larger protests.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Only the effects of political satisfaction and concessions are robust to model specifications included in tables 4.6 and 4.7, Appendix. Majoritarian vote is significant in table 4.6 (Appendix) and reforms in some specifications in table 4.7 (Appendix).

Time series regression models								
Variable	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. grievances (H.1)								
Unemployment_D1	−209.51	144.85	−228.58	142.27	−143.98	127.3	−152.20	121.75
Inflation_D1	−341.36	424.13	−514.97	445.17	−827.66*	398.07	−791.26*	380.02
Subj. political grievances (H.2)								
Political satisfaction_D1			−302.69*	115.94	−376.1***	102.87	−385.78***	98.46
Subj. socioeconomic grievances (H.3)								
Gen. Subj. Socioecc. Index_D1			−6.17	74.25	29.73	68.28	14.08	65.46
Subjective inflation			−12.43	42.23	91.04*	42.35	87.75*	40.47
Relational opportunities (controls)								
Violence					2608.39	2686.96	2526.47	2616.59
Coercion					2563.71	1838.29	2334.31	1755.99
Immed. concessions					−2088.29**	674.58	−2374.26***	651.48
Immed. reforms					6577.27*	3214.81	6702.69*	3074.92
Available allies					2311.73*	1073.19	1789.51	1034.94
Other controls								
New organisations							−1434.24	1028.1
Ideology_D1							3918.75	2327.68
Majoritarian vote_D1							211.23**	75.45
Constant	1507.15***	214.85	1258.74	640.4	432.18	631.45	1191.26	741.53
Adj R-squared	.0069		.0600		.2922		.3585	
N	96		96		95		94	

TABLE 4.3. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Time series regressions. DV: total participants (in thousands). Temporal level of aggregation: monthly. "S.E." columns: standard errors. Source: original time series dataset (see "Data" subsection for further information).

To sum up, there does not seem to exist a direct association between objective-material conditions (e.g. unemployment) and aggregate fluctuations in protest size (H.1)—the partial exception of inflation notwithstanding (models 3-4, table 4.3). Also, I cannot confirm H.3, as there is no found association between drops in subjective economic attitudinal configurations and aggregate-level increase in protest participation. Since an increase in political satisfaction is associated with a decrease in protest size, I can conclude that H.2 is confirmed. Given political grievances influence protest size, H.4 is partially confirmed. However, the effect of changes in objective material grievances do not seem to weaken or vanish as we incorporate the attitudinal indicators of grievances, because they do not systematically influence the ebbs and flows of challengers in the first place.

One criticism that could be raised in relation to my findings is that of reverse causality, as causation might flow from participation to satisfaction. A general increase in protest size might bring different consequences. Among these, one might argue, we might find changes in attitudinal configurations. Particularly, large protests could make society as a whole more aware of their general political discontent. In order to exclude the reverse causality hypothesis, I use a Granger causality test. A variable X is said to Granger-cause a variable Y if past values of X are better than past values of Y at predicting the actual value of Y. This allows us to understand the logic and forecast series on the basis of two principles: a) the cause happens prior to its effect, and b) the cause has unique information about the future values of its effect. In order to test for Granger causality, I regress Y on its own lagged values and on lagged values of X and test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on the lagged values of X are jointly zero. Failure to reject the null hypothesis is equivalent to failing to reject the hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y. As it can be seen from the results, the association that flows from past values of X to Y is significant, but not the other way round (table 4.4). Therefore, lagged political dissatisfaction is better at predicting values of protest size than previous values of protest size and, therefore, X Granger-causes Y in this case. Similarly, concessions seem to Granger-cause protest size. Such a causation relationship does not hold for immediate reforms, subjective inflation and availability of allies relative to the level of participation, however.

VAR Granger causality test				
Equation	Excluded	chi2	df	prob>chi2
Total participants	Political satisfaction_D1	11.81	4	*
Total participants	Immed. concessions	10.22	4	*
Total participants	Immed. Reforms	5.35	4	
Total participants	Allies	6.81	4	
Total participants	Majoritarian vote_D1	5.61	4	
Total participants	Subjective inflation	3.11	4	
Total participants	ALL	69.78	24	***
Political satisfaction_D1	Total participants	7.78	4	
Immed. concessions	Total participants	2.62	4	
Immed. Reforms	Total participants	8.02	4	
Allies	Total participants	6.59	4	
Subjective inflation	Total participants	1.50	4	
Majoritarian vote_D1	Total participants	13.53	4	**

TABLE 4.4. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. VAR Granger causality test. Only variables with significant results in the time series regression models are included.

The Granger causality test also helps me to make sense of the significant positive coefficient for majoritarian vote (table 4.4). My results point towards the existence of reverse causality. Past lags of protest participants are better at predicting joint PP and PSOE vote estimations than previous lags of majoritarian vote. A peak of protest participation, even though it might involve many people, represents a relatively small share of the countrywide population. A large amount of protesters may mobilise supporters of PP and PSOE parties as a reaction. Also, in a moment of heightened social conflict, the big bulk of undecided voters and abstainers might move towards favouring the political status quo by voting for the dominant parties. This explanation might be feasible in a context in which the level of electoral de-alignment, volatility and undecided voters is very high, as it has happened in Spain in times of recession (see e.g. Cordero and Montero 2015; Medina 2015; Ramiro and Gómez 2016; see chapter 7, this thesis).

As an additional robustness check, I replicate the main model (model 4, table 4.3) using an alternative dependent variable that results from deducting the aggregate monthly number of participants in events unrelated to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo from the monthly total protest

size.⁷⁶ Some of the main results seem to hold: concessions have a negative impact on protest size, while the effect of majoritarian vote is still positive. Also, drops in democratic satisfaction lead to lower protest participation (this coefficient becomes significant only at the 6% level now, though). There are no more significant coefficients at the 5% level. The VAR Granger tests offer similar results: democratic dissatisfaction Granger causes protest size and there seems to be some reverse causality for majoritarian vote (table 4.5).

VAR Granger causality test				
Equation	Excluded	chi2	df	prob>chi2
Auslabpol participants	Political satisfaction_D1	19.14	4	**
Auslabpol participants	Immed. concessions	4.12	4	
Auslabpol participants	Immed. Reforms	10.04	4	*
Auslabpol participants	Allies	1.34	4	
Auslabpol participants	Majoritarian vote_D1	10.18	4	*
Auslabpol participants	Subjective inflation	9.23	4	
Auslabpol participants	ALL	42.86	24	*
Political satisfaction_D1	Auslabpol participants	9.47	4	
Immed. concessions	Auslabpol participants	7.15	4	
Immed. Reforms	Auslabpol participants	3.61	4	
Allies	Auslabpol participants	.76	4	
Subjective inflation	Auslabpol participants	1.39	4	
Majoritarian vote_D1	Auslabpol participants	20.79	4	***

TABLE 4.5. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. VAR Granger causality test. Only participants in events strictly related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo are considered.

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter is based on analyses conducted with an original time series dataset for Spain between January 2007 and February 2015. On the one hand, it includes data from the self-gathered Protest Event Analysis on all kinds of contentious performances reported in *El País*. On the other hand, it combines

⁷⁶ Similar to the total participants series, formal diagnostic tests implemented show that the series of participants in the subset of events directly associated with austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo is trend-stationary, and the autocorrelation values meet the criteria to consider it as a *white noise* sequence. Also, the optimal number of lags to be included according to both BIC and AIC criteria is 0.

information from different sources on the (monthly) longitudinal evolution of grievances-related covariates and controls. It contributes to extant literature in a number of ways.

First, and most importantly, it innovates at systematically linking secondary-source data on grievances with fluctuations of participants in a cycle of protest. Shedding light on the determinants of longitudinal clusters of protesters is one of the longstanding challenges of studies on the trajectory of mobilisation in general, and PEA-based contributions in particular (Biggs 2016). I do so using a monthly level aggregation, which gives up to 98 time-point observations.

Second, this chapter brings back to the forefront and revisits grievance-based theories, in a context of material hardship such as the one that Spain faced in light of the Great Recession. I show that it is not so much the objective-material socioeconomic aspects (e.g. levels of unemployment) that account for the peaks and valleys of protest participation over time at the aggregate level. What truly matters is (attitudinal and ideational) political grievances. Specifically, drops in political dissatisfaction are highly correlated with the increase of protest size. This refines existing evidence and advises us against merging objective-material and subjective-attitudinal indicators by using composite indexes (unlike e.g. Quaranta 2015). These results are sound: they resist regardless of the number of lags incorporated, the controls included and the level of aggregation used. Findings are likewise robust to whether I take into account all kinds of events or only those strictly related to austerity, the recession, labour issues and the political status quo. Furthermore, Granger causality tests confirmed that causality flows from satisfaction to protest size, going against the reverse causality hypothesis.

Third, relational opportunities are taken seriously. I control for some of the crucial opportunity-threat generating dynamic elements of the political system, actors and their responses to protest (such as repression/violence, reform,

concession and availability of allies). While opportunity-generating factors such as the immediate implementation of reforms seem to be associated with larger protests, the immediate promise of concessions are found to hinder attendance. Whereas protesters might see prospective reforms as windows of opportunity to influence decision-making through the same action repertoires, the positive response on the side of authorities by putting concessions-related claims forward satisfy part of the challengers, contributing to decrease the size of subsequent performances.

Further work is necessary to analyse whether these results hold for similar cases, especially for scenarios— and cycles— other than those driven by austerity policies and the recession. Another stream of research should focus on unravelling the effect that additional aspects might play for the aggregate-level fluctuations of protest size, such as organisational density (e.g. Minkoff 1995). Moreover, in order to avoid dangers related to the ecological fallacy, additional research strands should disentangle whether subjective political grievances-related factors determine only aggregate-level flows of mobilisation, or also underlie micro-decisions of engaging in protest activities. Precisely, based on panel data, the next chapter will shed light on the relationship between individual grievances and mobilisation.

CHAPTER 5

Unpacking the virtuous circle: aggrieved protesters, eventful protests or both at the same time?⁷⁷

1. INTRODUCTION

Certain attitudinal configurations are meant to make individuals more prone to protest. For example, those who report left-wing values, who are politically interested, more informed about politics and have high levels of self-perceived efficacy might be more likely to engage in protest actions (e.g. Gamson 1968; Schussman and Soule 2005; Torcal et al. 2015). These arguments are based on the theoretical assumption that attitudes precede political behaviour (Marsh 1971: 453) and, specifically, contentious performances. At the same time however, it is often acknowledged that protests breed consequences. Among the consequences that direct involvement in protest might engender, there are changes in values and attitudinal configurations (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995: ch.9; Giugni 1998, 2008; della Porta 2008b; Andretta and della Porta 2014; Bosi et al. 2016), which might in turn affect protest potentials. Accordingly, one of the major limitations and recurrent criticisms of attitudes-centred studies on the individual-level determinants of participation consists of determining which direction the association between attitudes and protest behaviour follows: do attitudes lead to protest, protest to attitudes, or is this relationship reciprocal?

In this chapter, I shed light on the attitudes-protest behaviour relationship by focusing, on the one hand, on the role of grievance theories to explain individual participation in a context of material deprivation. On the other hand, I systematically test whether, given the eventful character that some protests have, resorting to protests engenders any attitudinal consequences in terms of

⁷⁷ I am grateful to Eva Anduiza and her team for kindly making the panel dataset used in this chapter available to me.

deepening perceived grievances, which increase the potential for further mobilisations. Overall, I argue that political grievances mediate the effect of material conditions and subjective socioeconomic grievances on individual-level protest participation, and are important determinants of protest engagement in the shadow of austerity. In turn, participating in protest also deepens grievances. Protest events have an eventful character, and they might contribute to a change in (especially political) attitudinal grievances: protest participation signals and makes cognitively available to citizens the weaknesses and pitfalls of the institutional political arena, feeding potentials for engaging in further protest activities. These arguments are tested through panel data with information on protest behaviour during a part of the protest peak of the Spanish cycle and its preceding months (October 2010 to April 2012).

Next, I will move on to the theoretical section, in which I explain the importance of grievances in an austerity-ridden scenario. Conversely, the theoretical foundations of the impact that the eventful character of protests might have on attitudinal configurations will be explored. Subsequently, I introduce the online panel survey that this study relies upon. After this, the variables used, operationalisation strategies adopted and empirical analyses conducted will be presented. The main results will be analysed and the main findings highlighted in the conclusion.

2. GRIEVANCES FOR MOBILISATION UNDER THE RECESSION

As clarified in chapter 1, building on Bert Useem's (1998; see also Useem 1980; Kerbo 1982; Jenkins et al. 2003) argument, I argue that resource mobilisation and civic voluntarism models are necessary to account for the full range of forms of collective action (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Verba et al. 1995), but they do not provide the most adequate framework to understand mobilisation associated with socioeconomic-financial crisis and deprivation. Some existing preliminary evidence points in this direction: based on ESS data, Kern et al. (2015) find a positive relationship between access to material

resources and the level of political activity until 2008 across European countries, thus supporting the key tenet of the civic voluntarism paradigm. However, they find an association in the opposite direction between the rise in unemployment and levels of non-institutionalised political participation from 2008 to 2010, pointing to grievance theories as presenting a more adequate framework to account for non-institutional participation in the shadow of the recession (Kern et al. 2015). Although they emphasise that the increase in unconventional political activities after the beginning of the recession is quite an uneven trend across European countries, Vassallo and Ding (2016) confirm their overall findings.

Even though a minimal level of resources may be necessary to engage in protest actions, I contend with approaches that downplay the role of strain-engendering factors in motivating individual protest behaviour in a context of material hardship. In light of the Great Recession, this argument has offered only mixed empirical evidence, though. While some contributions suggest that it is about time to bring grievances and deprivation back into protest analysis as predictors of individual protest engagement (e.g. Chabanet and Royall 2014; Quaranta 2015; della Porta 2015a; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b), some studies have not found such an association between economic distress and protest likelihood in the shadow of austerity in scenarios such as in Greece or Spain (e.g. Rüdiger and Karyotis 2014; Perugorria et al. 2016).

Focusing on the Spanish case, different contributions have studied the role of grievances in mobilisations that contested the implementation of austerity policies. Specifically, a number of scholars have addressed the determinants of participation in the 15M campaign. For instance, Anduiza et al. (2014b) find that those who had lost their job or had their salary frozen or cut were more prone to protest in the 15M. Likki (2012) suggests that while many 15M challengers considered their current financial situation relatively good, they were worried about their prospective financial situation. Based on Anduiza et al.'s (2015) panel data, which I shall be using throughout, Galais and Lorenzini (2016) find

that both financial deprivation and grievances related to worker-citizens' status and rights encourage protest likelihood. Crisis-related grievances trigger negative emotions, and both anger and anxiety boost protest (Galais and Lorenzini 2016). While these accounts are useful, however they have left some aspects unexplored. For instance, it is unclear which role the subjective attitudinal dimension of grievances has played for extra-institutional mobilisation.

Material issues in general and the experience of unfavourable economic conditions more specifically may push people onto the streets to redress them. Losses are felt more dramatically as disutility than gains are as utility and, consequently, rent-seeking behaviour prevails in contexts of loss (Snow et al. 1998). Spanish challengers react to a large extent against rising poverty, the deterioration of public services, cuts in government spending and increasing levels of unemployment and inequality (see Martí i Puig 2011; Sampedro and Lobera 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015; della Porta 2015a). Accordingly, protesters in the shadow of austerity have demanded more just patterns of wealth distribution, a re-orientation in policy-making and a more even distribution of costs derived from the financial crisis. In line with the understanding of grievances in other parts of this thesis (see chapters 1, 4), I also distinguish at the individual level between the objective-material and subjective-ideational dimensions of grievances. It is important to take into account not only “objective inequality”, but also “its subjective experience” because grievances are also socially constructed (Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 505; see also Kriesi 2012; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013, 2014; Giugni and Lorenzini 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016a). In this study, objective-material aspects concern income, financial situation, occupation and employment status, while subjective-ideational factors emphasise attitudinal configurations and values related to strain both in the socioeconomic and political arenas.

2.1. Objective-material grievances

Some scholarly contributions have recently found that class, income, occupation and labour conditions might be important determinants of protest participation in Europe in times of recession (e.g. Eggert and Giugni 2012, 2015; Bernburg 2015, 2016; Hylmö and Wennerhag 2015; Kern et al. 2015)— and elsewhere (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2003; Brockett 2005). Delving deeper into this line of reasoning, those worse-off and harder hit by the economic crisis (e.g. the unemployed, the low-waged and benefit recipients, etc.) would be more aggrieved and, therefore, more willing to participate in protests.

From the literature on mobilisation of underprivileged groups, we have learnt that certain exclusionary factors, such as being financially or economically disadvantaged (with members lacking money and work, or having precarious, part-time, or unstable jobs) can give way to mobilisation under various circumstances (for an updated analysis of the mobilisation of poorly resourced groups in light of the Great Recession, see Chabanet and Royall 2014; Baglioni and Giugni 2014). In this view, precarious workers and the more deprived would resort to the streets as a— if not the only— way to redress adverse financial and material scarcity.⁷⁸ In the Spanish case, the average annual unemployment rate increased from 8.23% in 2008 to 26.12% in 2013,⁷⁹ while GDP per capita decreased from \$34,675 in 2008 to \$31,681 in 2012.⁸⁰ This might have fuelled grievances, which could lie beneath non-institutional mobilisation. Therefore, I test whether individuals more aggrieved in absolute terms (e.g. the unemployed,

⁷⁸ For an analysis of the frames surrounding the organisation of Italian precarious workers' struggles, see Mattoni (2015). Mattoni and Vogiatzoglou (2014) explore the rise of precarity as a contentious issue and the articulation of precarious workers as a political subject in Italy and Greece from a comparative perspective.

⁷⁹ Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. Source: Eurostat. See figure 2.8.

⁸⁰ The GDP (at purchasing power parity) per capita is obtained by dividing the country's gross domestic product, adjusted by purchasing power parity, by the total population. Source: World Bank (retrieved from <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/gdp-per-capita-ppp>).

recipients of lower incomes) are keener to protest (H.1.1).

However, grievance theories do not necessarily imply that protests are restricted to the most deprived and marginalised groups. Given the fast and dramatic worsening of material conditions during the Great Recession, the crisis might have fuelled “suddenly imposed grievances” (Walsh 1981; Klandermans 1997). By interacting with long-term processes of change, the recession can be regarded as one of those (short-term) exogenous shocks that works as the catalyst for mobilisation of political potentials that have been a long time in the making (see Kriesi 2016). Yet, the crisis has not affected all sectors of society evenly. In the Spanish case, as Martí i Puig (2011) and Muñoz et al. (2014) note, the living standards of some specific groups have worsened dramatically during recession times due to implemented austerity measures. For instance, public sector employees’ salaries had been slashed by around 7% on average and lost about 30% of their purchasing power between 2011 and 2014. Also, the real estate property bubble collapsed and punished those on a mortgage. While “land prices increased 500% in Spain between 1997 and 2007” (Royo 2014a: 15), after the real estate burst it became harder facing payments given decreasing revenues and generalised hardship. Thus, some relative losers of the recession might have been more prone to mobilise. Specifically, I will test whether those who directly depend on public sector wages and are on a mortgage are more prone to engage in protest behaviour (H.1.2).

2.2. Subjective-ideational grievances

As highlighted in chapter 1, the recession and the austerity policies implemented have reduced the living standards of many citizens, who are likely to perceive that they are worse-off as compared to a reference category. This mismatch is likely to breed perceived injustice, which is often accompanied by feelings of resentment and anger. Aggrieved people try to reverse this situation by voicing their discontent through mobilisation. This line of reasoning lies at the core of *relative deprivation* theories (e.g. Davies 1962; Runciman 1966;

Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970; Gurney and Tierney 1982; Finkel and Rule 1986; for overviews, see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009, 2013; Snow 2013; Smith et al. 2014)— see chapter 1, this thesis.

Increasing job insecurity, rising unemployment levels, general material deprivation and the worsening of socioeconomic status might push individuals to voice outrage through protest. However, these aspects could lead to mobilisation, provided that relative deprivation feelings arise. Relative deprivation implies that citizens perceive that they are not getting what they believe they are legitimately entitled to. These feelings can emerge in at least two different ways (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Klandermans et al. 2008; Klandermans 2013; Kern et al. 2015), depending on whether material hardship directly affects them or the group(s) they feel they belong to relative to other groups— or society as a whole relative to a shared standard. While the first case would lead to feelings of *individual relative deprivation*, the second one would foster sentiments associated to *collective relative deprivation*. Note that individual relative deprivation, which could *per se* invite individual strategies to redress the individual's situation, oftentimes cumulates with collective relative deprivation, increasing the impact of grievances on participation (see Runciman 1966; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Walsh 1981; Kern et al. 2015). As in Spain during the Great Recession, many citizens can experience strain following a dramatic worsening of the general economic situation, which may develop either individual or collective relative deprivation feelings— or both—, thus increasing protest likelihood.

Hence, I will test whether there is an association between subjective socioeconomic grievances and the willingness to engage in non-institutional political activities.⁸¹ More specifically, collective relative deprivation sentiments might be associated with becoming more prone to protest (H.2.1). Also, I will

⁸¹ Going beyond protest behaviour, the association between economic interest and electoral support is at the core of economic voting literature (see e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2010; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016).

test whether the association between individual relative deprivation and the likelihood of protest participation holds (H.2.2).

Besides (both absolute and relative) material deprivation and socioeconomic values, subjective grievances may also have a political dimension. As argued elsewhere, the financial crisis and the political-institutional response to economic challenges cannot be addressed in isolation, as they go hand in hand in austerity-ridden scenarios (Polavieja 2013; Zamora-Kapoor and Collier 2014; Miley 2016). Many citizens feel there is a discrepancy between their desired policy orientation and implementation and what they observe (and get), and thus might blame officials because of the mismatch.⁸² Non-institutional participation in times of hardship is likely to be associated with the inability of elites to meet citizens' demands and concerns related to the crisis and the general public management. Moreover, by comparing participants of the *indignados* kick-off event and anti-austerity protests organised by unions, Cristancho (2015) shows in a recent piece how Spanish 15M participants were able to attract protesters on the basis of political rather than economic considerations. While levels of government blame attribution and political dissatisfaction were widely shared among protesters, framings of the economic crisis were not (Cristancho 2015).⁸³ This suggests that political grievances were at the core of 15M occupations and subsequent anti-austerity performances in general, as some of the most widely heard mottos and slogans during the Spanish protest performances also suggest (e.g. "I love you democracy, because you seem missing",⁸⁴ "they call it democracy, but it isn't", "there is not enough bread for so much *chorizo*",⁸⁵ etc.).

⁸² For an updated literature review and discussion on blame attribution and electoral behaviour in the shadow of recession, see Giugni and Lorenzini (2014: 11-13).

⁸³ These differences in perceptions of the crisis are explained to some extent by party cues (Cristancho 2015).

⁸⁴ This slogan is adapted from a famous verse of Pablo Neruda, "*Me gustas cuando callas porque estás como ausente*" ("I like for you to be still: it is as though you were absent").

⁸⁵ In the original Spanish (i.e. "*no hay pan para tanto chorizo*"), this sentence is a play on words. Informally, *chorizo* stands for a thief and corrupt person.

As mentioned in chapter 1, with *political grievances*, I refer to Easton's (1975) "specific support" in democratic contexts, which mostly concerns policy performance and outcomes. However, some political aspects moderate the relationship between economic performance and specific support (see e.g. Magalhães 2016).⁸⁶ Criado and Herreros (2007) find that support for particular institutions, such as the government and parliament, weakens when economic outcomes cannot be clearly attributed to the government. In fact, the blame attribution process is complex, and might be altered by various factors (e.g. globalisation dynamics or multi-level institutional settings). Based on survey evidence from Spain in 2010, Fernández-Albertos et al. (2013) find that blame attribution in times of crisis is conditioned by partisan bias and competing frames, as co-partisans of the incumbent are more likely to divert blame towards international and external institutions (provided that the incumbent does so) and exonerate the government.

Hence, configurations of political attitudes in general and specific support in particular cannot be reduced to economic performance. I contend that the political dimension of grievances should be considered on top of socioeconomic feelings when inquiring about the impact of grievance theories on mobilisation in an austerity-dominated scenario. The overall expectation is that those who are more prone to voicing their discontent (about the recession itself and its management) and to mobilising should be characterised not only by negative socioeconomic attitudes, but also by critical views towards the political establishment and situation. Accordingly, I test whether there is an association between being aggrieved in subjective political terms and protest likelihood (H.3). By no means I contend that this is a specific feature of the Spanish context, though. For instance, using a survey representing the Icelandic population,

⁸⁶ Concretely, Magalhães (2016) finds that satisfaction with democracy, an instance of specific support, is not merely a performance-driven attitude— see chapter 1, this thesis. Some aspects, such as procedural fairness, play a moderating role between the economic evolution and attitudinal configurations (Magalhães 2016).

together with perceived economic loss, Bernburg (2015, 2016) finds that political attitudes were important predictors of protest involvement in 2009.⁸⁷

3. EVENTFUL PROTESTS?

One of the main limitations that studies about the individual-level determinants of protest behaviour face is their inability to account for and measure reverse causality. It is a well-established tenet in social movement literature that some attitudinal variables, such as ideological self-placement, political trust, information, interest and satisfaction are important to determine who engages in protest behaviour (e.g. Schussman and Soule 2005; Verba et al. 1995; Norris 2002, 2011; Norris et al. 2005; Dalton et al. 2010; Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Torcal et al. 2015; Braun and Hutter 2016). However, it has been argued that some protest performances have an “eventful” character (see Sewell 1996; McAdam and Sewell 2001; della Porta 2008b). This implies that protest events must not be regarded merely as an *explanandum*. Events “are also social mechanisms of their own with the capacity to initiate change across multiple registers and levels of explanation” (Meyer and Kimeldorf 2015: 429). In other words, events might become the *explanans*.

New subjectivities might be built through events. These events may also influence social relations by intensifying social interaction in action, forging solidarities and changing available resources. Furthermore, events might contribute to unloosening and shaping different mechanisms that transform social structures. Building on extant literature, della Porta (2008b; see also McAdam et al. 2001) distinguishes between three types of mechanisms that mediate the consequences of protest on protestors: “*cognitive mechanisms*, with protest as an arena of debates; *relational mechanisms*, that bring about protest network [and flows of communication]; and *emotional mechanisms*, with the

⁸⁷ Besides perceived economic loss relative to others, Bernburg (2015, 2016) argues that having a belief in extensive corruption and a leftist ideology were associated with protest participation and support in Iceland.

development of feelings of solidarity ‘in action’” and affective ties (della Porta 2008b: 31-32).

McAdam and Sewell (2001: 102; see also Sewell 1996) emphasise the transformative capacity of some protest events, which become “turning points in structural change, concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity when the logic of historical development is reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished”. By these momentous events, they refer to those moments of concentrated transformations that become identified with and the symbol of the movement, such as the taking of the Bastille during the French Revolution. Sharing Sewell’s (1996; McAdam and Sewell 2001) belief in the transformative capacities of events, della Porta (2008b; see also della Porta and Caiani 2009: 135-137) finds that a broader range of events than McAdam and Sewell’s “transformative protest” have some degree of “eventfulness”. Delving deeper into this line of reasoning, Meyer and Kimeldorf (2015) argue that not only the momentous (and rare) events that engender macro-level social change have an eventful character, but also the more common, smaller-scale events that surround our daily lives. These smaller events, such as protests, can produce micro-level changes in the understanding and visions of activists and society at large (Meyer and Kimeldorf 2015).

Particularly, I am concerned throughout this chapter with the changes that events can engender in grievances-related attitudes. Although attitudes and values are likely to complement explanations of protest likelihood based on situational availability and contextual aspects, and have an impact on protest behaviour (as in H.2.1, H.2.2 and H.3),⁸⁸ the eventful character of protest can in turn shape attitudinal grievances’ configurations. This idea is linked to the socio-psychological aspects that the literature on the cultural consequences of social movements has highlighted (e.g. Earl 2004; Bosi et al. 2016). In fact, Kriesi et

⁸⁸ For an aggregate-level assessment of this argument, see chapter 2, this thesis.

al. (1995: ch.9; see also Giugni 1998, 2008) identify changes in public attitudes as one of the types of plausible impacts that social movements might have.

Based on different case studies, Rochon (1998) analyses the impact of “critical communities” and social movements on changes of opinion, values and beliefs through the diffusion of critical ideas. Giugni and Grasso (2016b) find through panel data on Switzerland that protest affects subsequent standards of political engagement (understood in terms of political interest, ideology, voting and organisational-party membership). According to Dieter Rucht (1999a), the effect of environmental movement pressure on improvement of environmental quality across Western democracies is mediated by the movement’s impact on individual attitudes. The effect of mobilisation and attitudinal-value change might be reciprocal, as some scholars have pointed out, for instance, in relation to the new social movements (Inglehart 1981; Kriesi 1993). Similarly, in their study of sustained commitment among pacifist activists, Downton and Wehr (1997) find that movement activity might strengthen an alternative value system, which feeds back on any further participation prospects.

In a nutshell, as Andretta and della Porta (2014: 387) put it: “protest has indeed an eventful character which cannot be captured by models which neatly distinguish dependent and independent variables: as a passionate and social process, protest might produce relations, emotions, and attitudes rather than follow them. Therefore, in a sort of virtuous circle, participation strengthens the sense of belonging that drives more participation”. A similar pattern might have taken place in the shadow of recession in Spain. I contend that discontent with the political and socioeconomic status quo lie beneath mobilisations in times of austerity, but protests in turn might fuel perceived grievances. Protest events might have signalled to people the sources and motives for feeling outrage. They may have made conditions of individual and general deprivation, weaknesses and malfunctioning aspects of the political system and the political elites’ performance cognitively available to many citizens. This might feed the potential for further extra-institutional actions. Therefore, I will test whether participation

in protests is systematically associated with an increase in political and socioeconomic subjective-ideational grievances (H.4.1 and H.4.2).

4. DATA

Four waves of a unique online panel survey conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015; CIS N° 2825) allow me to test the hypotheses formulated above. The sample consists of Spanish Internet users who are 16 to 44 years old, and was originally designed to analyse attitudinal and value change of youth in the digital age (see Muñoz et al. 2014; Galais and Blais 2016; Galais and Lorenzini 2016). Respondents came from a large pool of users active on main commercial websites, and were selected through active recruitment using quotas to control for the non-probability nature of the sample (Muñoz et al. 2014; Galais and Lorenzini 2016;⁸⁹ for more information on the sampling procedures and reliability, see Anduiza et al. 2015).⁹⁰ Survey waves were conducted every six months (wave 1 in October 2010, N= 2,100; wave 2 in April 2011, N= 1,843; wave 3 in October 2011, N= 1,514; wave 4 in April 2012, N= 1,322).⁹¹

Panel surveys in general have an important advantage, which is central to the aim of this chapter. By providing multiple time-point observations of indicators for a given individual, panel data measures citizens' attitudes more reliably (see Anduiza et al. 2015). It allows us to weight alternative explanations for protest participation, and analyse the evolution of contextual and attitudinal factors in the shadow of recession. Conversely, we can systematically track

⁸⁹ See also http://www.netquest.com/papers/esomar26_en.pdf.

⁹⁰ As an additional robustness check, the PESO2, PESO3 and PESO4 post-stratification alternatives proposed by Anduiza et al. (2015) were used. These involve weighting the data by propensity scores for gender, age, level of studies and Internet skills for 16- to 44-year-olds, taking the INE TICH10 survey as an external reference (see Anduiza et al. 2015). Results do not change substantially.

⁹¹ 620 individuals were added from the refreshment pool in the second wave, 465 extra individuals were freshly recruited in the third wave and 395 additional new cases were incorporated in the fourth wave (Galais and Blais 2016: 217). Following Muñoz et al.'s (2014) procedures, refreshments are excluded from the four-wave analyses reported throughout (if included, results do not change substantially).

down and measure the attitudinal changes that getting involved in protest might entail. Hence panel data is useful to address one specific instance of endogeneity, which is often present in quantitative studies that incorporate attitudinal factors as determinants of participation. Most surveys at hand do not allow us to go beyond correlation in order to adequately distinguish whether— and to what extent— attitudinal and protest behaviour-related variables are the cause and the consequence, given that “there is a time ordering between causes and effects. The cause must precede the effect in time” (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1997: 366). In a non-experimental design, panel data allows us to fulfil the “cause must precede the consequence in time” requirement (Galais and Blais 2016: 216). Precisely, this chapter aims at determining and measuring the association between grievances and participation in an austerity-ridden scenario.

Additionally, the specific online panel used has one unique advantage. 15M mobilisations unfolded during the fieldwork between its second and third rounds, thus two panel waves were conducted before and two after the beginning of the 15M. Therefore, this panel dataset can be regarded as a quasi-experimental asset insofar as the 15M represents an exogenous source of variation to the survey, and represents a unique opportunity to assess the impact of a real-world (and very crowded) protest campaign that happened— and the mobilisation climate that developed— once the panel on citizens’ attitudes had been launched.

4.1. The dependent variable

In order to test H.1-H.3, I use an index of protest participation in the shadow of austerity as the main dependent variable. It is a dummy that includes information on whether the respondent has participated in a strike and/or demonstration in the last 6 months for each of the four waves of the panel. This variable captures whether the individual engaged in extra-institutional actions in the shadow of recession.

Similar to other existing cross-national surveys (e.g. ESS), the panel

conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015) provides yes/no information on participation in other non-electoral activities such as *boycotting*, *petitioning*, *contacting a politician* or *donating money*. Although some of these four activities are often associated with non-institutional behaviour (e.g. Hooghe and Marien 2013; Vráblíková 2014; Torcal et al. 2015; Galais and Lorenzini 2016; Braun and Hutter 2016), a number of reasons justify excluding them from the 2-item index.

First, action repertoires are more one-dimensional among anti-austerity protesters, such as the 15M activists, relative to other types of mobilisation (Giugni and Grasso 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016a). These activists tend to specialise in demonstrations (and occupations) at the expense of other non-institutional activities. In order to provide a broad understanding of the complex development of anti-austerity mobilisations in this period, as well as to consider *indignados*-type activities, other traditional actors and protest actions they carry out need to be taken into account (see e.g. Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015). In particular, general and sectorial strikes were crucial to shaping the trajectory of the Spanish cycle of protest, as they functioned as points of convergence between new and old actors (see Portos 2016a; see also chapter 3, this thesis). In 2012 alone, two general strikes (and their respective demonstrations) were called in Spain by the main trade unions, which involved hundreds of thousands of individuals (see Ministerio del Interior 2012; see also chapter 3, this thesis).

Second, including boycotts, donations, contacts with politicians and petitions overweighs these activities relative to demonstrations, and they introduce noise into the dependent variable. They encompass many disparate actions, campaigns and movements not necessarily related to the austerity context (e.g. boycotting Catalan products as a reaction against the pro-independence turn, anti-abortion petitions, campaigns for bringing former ETA-members jailed across Spain back to the Basque Country, etc.).

Third, the four indicators included in the tetrachoric correlation matrix report only low-to-moderate levels of inter-item correlation (i.e. between 0.29

and 0.41), and a Principal Component Analysis conducted shows that the six items do not load on a common dimension but the 2-items do (see table 5.1).⁹² Additionally, I find that the level of reliability of a 2-item summated rating index is higher than that of the alternative 6-item index (Cronbach's α = 0.65 and 0.62, respectively). In total, I find that 32.86%, 27.58%, 26.48% and 39.14% of respondents per wave got involved in protest actions.

Items	PCA (6-items)		PCA (2-items)
	Load. (C1)	Load. (C2)	Load. (C1)
Demonstrating	.48	-.42	.71
Striking	.42	-.59	.71
Boycotting	.38	.37	
Petitioning	.44	.11	
Contacting politician	.36	.22	
Donating money	.35	.53	
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>2.88</i>	<i>1.01</i>	<i>1.73</i>
<i>Perc. varian. explain.</i>	<i>47.94%</i>	<i>16.79%</i>	<i>86.67%</i>

TABLE 5.1. Principal Component Analysis for non-institutional participation items. Estimates are factor loadings from a principal components analysis on the tetrachoric inter-item correlations. A two-component solution is preferred for the 6-item analysis and a one-component solution is preferred for the 2-item analysis (Eigenvalues ≥ 1). Percentage of the variance explained is non-cumulative. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample (N= 6,749).

4.2. Predictors

In order to measure material-objective economic grievances, I use four different variables (see table 5.2; see also table 5.6, Appendix). A 10-category interval-level indicator accounts for the level of personal income. Also, I have information on the current job status of the individual. This allows me to use current workers and pensioners (i.e. salary or pension wage-recipients) as the reference category of a multinomial variable in comparison to those who are unemployed, students or in other professional situations. Additionally, a dummy variable captures whether the respondent is currently on a mortgage or not.

⁹² Standard methods of performing Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis (i.e. those based on a matrix of Pearson's correlations) assume that the variables are continuous and are normally distributed. Following standard procedures to deal with dichotomous variables, I generate a matrix of tetrachoric correlations (see Vráblíková 2014).

Finally, a dummy predictor captures whether the person with the highest income at the household level is a civil servant or public worker. As previously argued, those on a mortgage and public servants (and their wage-dependents) are among the relative losers of the crisis, so they might be more prone to protest.

	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Freq	Min	Max
DV (H.1-H.3)						
Protest	6749			33	0	1
Obj. Grievances						
Income	6694	3.97	1.88		1	10
Public worker	6749			23	0	1
Mortgage	6749			43	0	1
Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)						
I_Unemployed	6749			17	0	1
I_Student	6749			18	0	1
I_Other	6749			4	0	1
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances						
Personal ecc. Situation	6749	2.28	.67		1	3
Sociotropic index	6749	2.49	.45		1	3
Subj. Political grievances						
Government evaluation	6749	3.89	1.00		1	5
Opposition evaluation	6749	3.96	1.00		1	5
Biographical availability						
Age	6749	31.03	7.19		16	45
Habitat	6733	1.70	.75		1	3
Education	6749	3.29	.82		1	4
Political engag., social capital & networks						
Political interest	6749	2.53	.83		1	4
Lef-right ideology	6734	4.34	1.85		0	10
Political information	6749	3.04	1.11		1	5
Soc. network Internet	6747			81	0	1
Party voted for (ref.: IU)						
I_PSOE	6450			28	0	1
I_PP	6450			22	0	1
I_others	6450			23		
I_none	6450			20		

TABLE 5.2. Descriptive statistics (percent frequencies for dummy variables — mean and standard deviation for the other predictors and controls —, minimum and maximum values) for the full sample. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample (N= 6,749).

In order to empirically pin down the subjective-ideational dimension of grievances, I use attitudinal configurations. On top of the impact that objective-material conditions might have on protest participation (H.1.1 and H.1.2), socioeconomic and political attitudinal grievances may likewise have an impact (H.2.1, H.2.2 and H.3). As in chapter 4 with longitudinal aggregate-level data, I

consider both egotropic and sociotropic perceptions of the economy: depending on whether attitudinal reactions associated with (individual and collective) relative deprivation are triggered by individuals' experiences of economic hardship or by assessments of the general situation (see Duch and Stevenson 2010; Polavieja 2013). In order to capture sociotropic perceptions of the economy (collective relative deprivation; H.2.1), I use an index that combines retrospective, prospective and the current assessment of the country's general economy (i.e. relative to the past and the next 12 months). As the 3 items are measured through 1-3 ordinal scales, a polychoric correlation matrix is run, and the items are found to be moderately-to-highly correlated ($0.37 < \text{polychoric correlation} < 0.61$). Also, the Principal Component Analysis offers a one-item solution (Eigenvalue= 1.36). The 3-item index meets the minimum threshold of reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha \approx 0.65$). Egotropic views of the economy (that refer to individual relative deprivation; H.2.2) are captured through a self-reported measurement of the personal economic situation. This indicator captures the degree of individual deprivation relative to one's own situation one year ago, measured on a 1-3 scale, ranging from "better" to "worse".⁹³

Additionally, I use two main variables to capture political grievances. First, the evaluation of government is measured in a 5-point scale that ranges from "very good" to "very bad". Protest may be regarded as an instrument to voice disconformity with the incumbent. Hence, those who are more critical of the government should be more prone to protest. Second, in order to empirically pin down political grievances, I also take into account the evaluation of the main opposition party, which is measured on the same scale. On the one hand, as non-electoral mobilisation might contribute to destabilising and weakening the positioning of the incumbent, one would expect those more sympathetic towards the opposition party to be more prone to engaging in non-conventional action.

⁹³ The indicator on egotropic perceptions of the economy is not highly correlated with the index that captures the sociotropic views (polychoric correlation matrix < 0.4). Also, if merged into the same scale, it does not meet the minimum threshold of reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.47$).

On the other hand, if people are discontent with the incumbent and feel that there is no satisfying electoral alternative, that options in the institutionalised arenas are unavailable, or that these channels are ineffective, citizens might either withdraw from politics (“exit”) or raise their voice(s) through non-electoral mechanisms (see Hirschman 1970; Kriesi 2016). Hence, a negative association between support for the opposition party and willingness to engage in protest could alternatively be in order. The level of correlation between the variables that capture the approval of the government and the main opposition party is low (polychoric correlation= -0.22).

4.3. Controls

Besides grievances, following literature on the individual determinants of participation, I consider predictors related to biographical availability, network exposure-social capital and political engagement (see Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005; Putnam 2000; Dalton and van Sickle 2005; Dalton et al. 2010; Eggert and Giugni 2015)— see table 5.6, Appendix.⁹⁴

The first group of factors, biographical availability, refers to the “absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation”, such as age, habitat and educational level (McAdam 1986: 70). I include different indicators. A 3-category interval variable accounts for the size of the town in which the respondent was born. Although support for the 15M is stable across levels of urbanisation (Sampedro and Lobera 2014), it has been more or less implicitly assumed that urban challengers were overrepresented in the 15M (Calvo et al. 2011; Romanos 2013). Thus, living in a larger town might make you more prone to resort to protest. A 4-category hierarchical variable captures the educational level of the participant. Also, I control for the age of the

⁹⁴ Although the phrasing of the three factors differs among the cited references, most cases tend to include them. My terminology is similar to that used by Schussman and Soule (2005).

respondent with a continuous indicator, plus its quadratic function.⁹⁵

Besides social capital-network exposure (captured through a dummy that indicates whether the respondent is a frequent user of online social networks), I also take into account political engagement. The latter refers to political attitudes and values that bind challengers together in collective action and distinguish them from non-participants (Beissinger 2013: 575). Since left-wing individuals tend to disproportionately resort to protest (Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Torcal et al. 2015), I control for the left-right ideological self-placement of individuals on a 0-10 scale. An index of political information is created by combining information on the frequency of use of different sources (newspaper, radio-TV and the Internet) to follow political news.⁹⁶ Also, I control for political interest through a 1-4 decreasing scale.

5. OPERATIONALISATION AND RESULTS

My dependent variable protest participation is a dummy. I run different logit panel regression analyses with multiple model specifications and conduct robustness checks to test H.1-H-3 (see table 5.3).⁹⁷ In order to choose the modelling strategy to be followed, I run a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects as opposed to the alternative fixed effects.⁹⁸ For those model specifications whose p-values are lower than 0.01, I can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that fixed effects models are more efficient. This choice allows me to analyse the relationship

⁹⁵ A dummy variable captures the sex of the respondent has been also used in some model specifications. Often considered as a time-invariant covariate, it is not reported here. Its effect on protest behaviour was never significant.

⁹⁶ As these three indicators are moderately correlated ($0.31 < \text{Pearson's } r < 0.51$), I build a scale combining them all (Eigenvalue= 1.87, one-item solution; 62.33% var. explained), which meets the minimum threshold of reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.70$). The scale is decreasing (i.e. from higher to lower frequency of political information).

⁹⁷ I include wave dummies in all models specifications, using the first wave as the reference category in order to avoid the perfect multi-collinearity trap.

⁹⁸ More specifically, Hausman tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressor. The null hypothesis is that they are not (see Greene 2008: ch.9).

between time-variant and outcome variables within an entity (i.e. individuals, in this case). Fixed-effects, which are used for models 1-4, remove the effect of time-invariant aspects within the individual and considers all available within-individual variation. They allow me to assess the net effect of the predictors on the dependent variable.

In the first model, I include the variables related to objective-material grievances and biographical availability. On top of these, I include subjective (both socioeconomic and political) grievances in model 2. In the third model, I bring in factors associated with political engagement and social capital-networks. As a robustness check, model 4 also includes the (one-unit) lagged predictors of political and socioeconomic subjective grievances. If the coefficient for a lagged attitudinal variable is significant, it means that a one-unit change in the individual attitudinal configuration in a given wave is associated with an increase in protest likelihood in the subsequent wave of the panel. In other words, the effect of attitudinal change precedes the increase or decrease in the individual likelihood of engaging in protest behaviour.

As the Hausman test for the specification in model 1 reports only a marginally significant coefficient (p-value \approx 0.05), I replicate it with random effects (model 5, table 5.3). Moreover, as fixed effects models do not consider variation between individuals and models 1-3 exclude a relevant proportion of the sample— due to lack of within-individual variation—, I replicate the full model specification in model 3 with random effects (model 6, table 5.3).⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Fixed effects models assume that the entity's (i.e. the individuals') error term and predictor variables are correlated— for an overview of fixed vs random effects, see Torres-Reyna 2007).

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. Grievances												
Income	.01	.04	.01	.04	.01	.04	-.05	.05	.01	.03	-.00	.03
Public worker	.29	.15	.31*	.15	.30*	.15	.59**	.21	.48***	.11	.38**	.11
Mortgage	.38	.23	.34	.23	.29	.24	.49	.38	.14	.13	.20	.12
Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)												
I_Unemployed	.09	.18	.09	.19	.12	.19	.19	.26	-.02	.14	-.04	.14
I_Student	-.01	.25	-.00	.25	-.01	.25	-.02	.35	-.00	.18	-.12	.18
I_Other	.48	.30	.51	.30	.48	.30	.05	.43	.33	.24	.27	.24
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances												
Personal ecc. Situation			.00	.08	-.00	.08	-.16	.11			.04	.07
Lagged personal ecc. sit.							.02	.11				
Sociotropic index			.15	.14	.15	.14	.24	.20			.05	.11
Lagged sociotropic index							.18	.20				
Subj. Political grievances												
Government evaluation			.20**	.06	.20**	.06	.29***	.09			.15**	.05
Lagged Govt. evaluation							.28*	.13				
Opposition evaluation			-.22***	.06	-.21***	.06	-.20*	.08			-.09	.05
Lagged Oppos. evaluation							-.16	.11				
Biographical availability												
Age	.07	.24	.06	.25	.02	.25	-.72	.43	-.53	.08	-.51***	.08
Age squared	-.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.00	.00	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01***	.00
Habitat	-.14	.36	-.22	.37	-.12	.37	-.14	.54	.25	.08	.21**	.07
Education	-.03	.18	-.05	.18	-.05	.19	-.04	.23	.11	.07	-.10	.07
Pol. engag. social capital&networks												
Political interest					-.14	.10	-.13	.14			-.37***	.07
Lef-right ideology					-.05	.04	-.06	.06			-.36***	.03
Political information					-.29***	.07	-.18	.10			-.39***	.05
Soc. network Internet					.18	.18	.16	.26			.23	.13
Wave dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
N	2852		2852		2845		1641		6678		6665	

TABLE 5.3. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Logit panel regression analyses. Models 1-3: unlagged fixed effects. Model 4: lagged fixed effects. Models 5-6: unlagged random effects. DV: protest. Coefficients: log-likelihood. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample ($N = 6,749$).

Overall, I find there is not an association between objective-material grievances and protest likelihood. There is one single exception, though. In line with some prior findings (e.g. Muñoz et al. 2014), living in a household where a civil servant or public worker is the person who has the highest income increases the likelihood of individual protest. While the empirical evidence does not back the claim that the worse-off are more likely to engage in protest (H.1.1), some groups, relative losers of the Great Recession in Spain such as public workers (plus their household members), seem to be more prone to voice discontent through protest (H.1.2). However, the coefficient for those who are on a

mortgage is not statistically significant. Consistent with the results with aggregate time series data (see chapter 4, this thesis), there is not an individual-level association between subjective socioeconomic grievances and protest likelihood, neither with regards to sociotropic nor egotropic perceptions of the economy. Since the association between (both individual and collective) relative deprivation and protest behaviour is not backed by empirical evidence, H.2.1 and H.2.2 cannot be confirmed.

I can, however, confirm H.3 (again consistent with findings based on aggregate-level time series data; see chapter 4, this thesis). Political grievances are associated with protest participation. On average, a one-unit change in the government support decreasing scale is associated with a 1.34 increase in the odds of protest likelihood (based on model 4, table 5.3). While probabilities of protesting are around 7% for a person who is very happy about the government's performance (i.e. =1), this increases up to almost 11% for an individual who is very critical about the government's action (i.e. =5), keeping the other predictors constant at their means. On the contrary, a one-unit change (towards less support) for the opposition leads to a 0.82 decrease in the odds of protesting (again based on model 4, table 5.3) — *ceteris paribus*, probabilities of protesting increase from 8.2% to 11.5% for someone as disapproval of the opposition increases from 1 to 5. These results are robust to the use of random effects (models 5-6, table 5.3). Also, as we take into account between-individual variation, the effect of many controls become significant: young, urban, left-wing people who are highly interested and informed about politics are more likely to protest (models 5-6, table 5.3)— information was already significant in model 3, though.

In short, from the results reported in table 5.3, I cannot conclude that there is an association between absolute material deprivation and the willingness to resort to the protest arena over time in the shadow of recession. However, some specific groups, losers of the recession in relative terms, seem more prone to protest. Although there does not seem to exist a direct association between subjective socioeconomic grievances and protest likelihood, political grievances

are important predictors of protest participation. Those who are unhappier about the government (and happier about the opposition performance) are more willing to mobilise. However, this interpretation is only partial at best. As previously argued, even if often assumed, there is little empirical testing on the bidirectional relationship between attitudes and protest behaviour. Protests can affect attitudinal configurations, but to what extent?

For illustrative purposes, I take model 3 in table 5.3 as reference, but use the different indicators for subjective grievances as dependent variables in models 1-4 (table 5.4)— i.e. egotropic, sociotropic perceptions of the economy, evaluation of the opposition and the government. Also, the dummy for protest participation is included as a regressor in every model. Given that determinants of protest likelihood and the evaluation of the incumbent might be similar to those already considered for protest participation (i.e. economic performance, interests and preferences— see e.g. Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014), I incorporate the previously used individual-level predictors together with an additional multinomial indicator of partisan voting in the last national election. Conflict expands because discontented citizens appeal to the broad public in order to force concessions from political elites (Schattschneider 1960; Kriesi 2016), thus supporters of certain electoral options might be more prone to resorting to non-institutional behaviour than voters of other parties.

As having participated in protests does seem to affect neither egotropic nor sociotropic perceptions of the economy, reported results do not support H.4.2 (models 1-2, table 5.4). However, in line with H.4.1, I find that protest participation is associated with lower government (and higher opposition) approval (models 3-4, table 5.4). These results not only point towards a bidirectional relationship between political grievances and protest behaviour (as hypothesised in H.4.1 and H.4.2), but also towards a convoluted association between attitudinal grievances and protest behaviour. Egotropic and sociotropic views of the economy, on the one hand, and sociotropic perceptions and political grievances, on the other hand, might reciprocally affect each other (models 1-2

and 2-3-4 in table 5.4, respectively). Also, the higher the values for opposition approval, the lower the approval of government and vice versa (models 3-4, table 5.4). All these results are robust to including lagged values of subjective grievances and protest (see table 5.7, Appendix).

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. Grievances								
Income	-.04***	.01	-.00	.01	-.00	.01	-.01	.01
Public worker	-.02	.03	-.02	.02	.01	.04	-.02	.04
Mortgage	.15**	.04	-.01	.03	-.07	.06	.02	.06
Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)								
I_Unemployed	.48***	.03	-.01	.02	-.03	.05	-.04	.04
I_Student	.42***	.05	-.06**	.03	-.00	.07	.01	.07
I_Other	.26***	.06	-.03	.03	-.04	.08	.02	.07
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances								
Personal ecc. Situation			.12***	.01	.03	.02	.04	.02
Sociotropic index	.32***	.02			-.05	.03	.67***	.04
Subj. Political grievances								
Government evaluation	.02	.01	.14***	.01	-.21***	.02		
Opposition evaluation	-.00	.02	-.01	.01			-.20***	.01
Biographical availability								
Age	-.13	.05	.05	.03	.10	.06	.19	.06
Age squared	.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.00	.00
Habitat	.00	.07	.02	.04	-.03	.09	.12	.08
Education	-.03	.04	.03	.02	-.07	.05	-.01	.04
Pol. engag. social capital&networks								
Political interest	-.02	.02	.01	.01	.05	.02	-.01	.02
Lef-right ideology	.00	.01	-.01	.00	-.04***	.01	-.00	.01
Political information	-.00	.01	-.00	.01	-.04	.02	-.02	.02
Soc. network Internet	.01	.03	.01	.02	.02	.05	.02	.04
Party voted for (ref.: IU)								
I_PSOE	-.01	.04	-.08	.03	.36	.07	-.44	.05
I_PP	.06	.05	-.02	.03	-.54	.07	.61	.06
I_Others	.03	.04	-.02	.02	.03	.07	-.03	.05
I_None	.02	.05	-.04	.03	.06	.08	-.07	.06
Protest	-.00	.02	.01	.01	-.08*	.03	.06*	.03
Constant	3.42***	.79	1.52*	.73	4.13***	1.08	.24	1.05
Wave dummies		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N		6373		6373		6373		6373

TABLE 5.4. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear panel regression analyses, unlagged fixed-effects. DV: egotropic perceptions of the economy (model 1), sociotropic perceptions of the economy (model 2), approval of the opposition (model 3) and approval of government (model 4). Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample (N= 6,749).

In order to further analyse the causal path between grievances and protest behaviour, I use Generalised Structural Equation Modelling (GSEM,

hereafter).¹⁰⁰ Based on a seemingly two-directional association, I specify two GSEM models with 4 equations each. While protest is the dependent variable in model 1, egotropic perceptions of the economy is the outcome variable model 2 (table 5.5).¹⁰¹ The first equation of each model specification replicates model 3 in table 5.3 and model 1 in table 5.4, respectively.¹⁰²

In line with findings from the random-effects panel regression (model 6, table 5.3), GSEM analyses show that urban young left-wingers who are interested and informed about politics are more likely to resort to protest (model 1, table 5.5). Importantly, results confirm the hypotheses. While resourceless people are not keener to protest, some relative losers of the recession seem more prone to engage in action (e.g. those whose household's highest income comes from civil servants or public employees)— thus confirming H.1.2 but not H.1.1 (model 1, table 5.5). The impact of objective-material indicators on protest behaviour is mediated by subjective-attitudinal grievances. Although neither sociotropic nor egotropic views of the economy seem to affect protest participation in a direct way, political grievances do— confirming H.3 but neither H.2.1 nor H.2.2 (model 1, table 5.5). In turn, protest behaviour feeds

¹⁰⁰ GSEM fits generalised structural equation models. While in SEM responses are continuous and models normally are linear regression, GSEM can be used with logit (and other) models as well.

¹⁰¹ I have replicated the models 1-2 in table 5.5 with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM, hereafter). Even though this is not an optimal modelling strategy, it works as a robustness check and provides information on model fit. No substantial differences are found regarding the coefficients' significance. As expected, the goodness-of-fit statistics from the SEM analyses show that the two models do not fit as well as the saturated models ($\chi^2(50) = 1848.78$ for model 1, $\chi^2(39) = 1727.38$ for model 2, both significant at the 0.1% level). On the basis of the RMSEA tests, although the models' fit does not seem close (the RMSEA values are 0.07 and 0.08, both with a significant p-close at the 5% level), we can safely reject the hypothesis that the model fit is poor (i.e. the upper bound of the confidence interval, according to the RMSEA test, is below 0.10 for both models). Additionally, I have run a number of alternative equation models with SEM (and also GSEM), which include all possible causal paths between the grievances-related variables. Neither additional significant effects are reported nor the model fit increases substantially.

¹⁰² The results reported here are robust to running all model specifications in table 5.3 with GSEM. I exclude partisan voting in the last election from model 2 (table 5.5) for the sake of parsimony, as it is not supposed to predict egotropic perceptions of the economy (model 1, table 5.4).

back on political grievance configurations, but neither on sociotropic nor on egotropic views of the economy (confirming H.4.1 but not H.4.2; see model 2, table 5.5).

	MODEL 1 (4 eq.)	
Protest	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. Grievances		
<-Income	-.01	.02
<-Public worker	.27***	.07
<-Mortgage	.14*	.07
<-Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)		
I_Unemployed	-.12	.09
I_Student	-.10	.11
I_Other	.13	.16
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances		
<-Personal ecc. situation	.06	.05
<-Sociotropic index	.04	.08
Subj. Political grievances		
<-Government evaluation	.08*	.03
<-Opposition evaluation	-.02	.03
Biographical availability		
<-Age	-.35***	.04
<-Age squared	.00***	.00
<-Habitat	.15***	.04
<-Education	-.06	.04
<-Political interest	-.28***	.04
<-Lef-right ideology	-.30***	.02
<-Political information	-.27***	.03
<-Soc. network Internet	.15	.08
Constant	7.11***	.71
Wave dummies		Yes
N		6694
Sociotropic index		
<-Personal ecc. Situation	.22***	.01
Constant	1.98***	.02
Government evaluation		
<-Sociotropic index	1.10***	.02
Constant	1.14***	.06
Opposition evaluation		
<-Sociotropic index	-.03	.03
<-Government evaluation	-.18***	.02
Constant	4.75***	.07
var (e.Sociotropic index)	.18	.00
var (e.Government evaluation)	.76	.01
var (e.Opposition evaluation)	.96	.02

	MODEL 2 (4 eq.)	
Personal ecc. situation	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. Grievances		
<-Income	-.03***	.00
<-Public worker	.08***	.02
<-Mortgage	.14***	.02
<-Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)		
I_Unemployed	.39***	.02
I_Student	.32***	.03
I_Other	.20***	.04
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances		
<-Sociotropic index	.42***	.02
Subj. Political grievances		
<-Government evaluation	.02	.01
<-Opposition evaluation	.00	.01
Biographical availability		
<-Age	.01	.01
<-Age squared	.00	.00
<-Habitat	-.01	.01
<-Education	-.04***	.01
<-Political interest	.00	.01
<-Lef-right ideology	.01*	.00
<-Political information	.01	.01
<-Soc. network Internet	-.00	.02
Protest		
<-Protest	.02	.02
Constant	.79***	.19
Wave dummies		Yes
N		6749
Sociotropic index		
<-Government evaluation	.22***	.00
<-Opposition evaluation	-.00	.00
<-Protest	.00	.01
Constant	1.63***	.03
Government evaluation		
<-Protest	-.01	.03
<-Opposition evaluation	-.20***	.01
Constant	4.67***	.05
Opposition evaluation		
<-Protest	.13***	.03
Constant	3.92***	.01
var (e.Personal ecc. Situation)	.36	.01
var (e.Sociotropic index)	.15	.00
var (e.Government evaluation)	.97	.02
var (e.Opposition evaluation)	.99	.02

TABLE 5.5. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. GSEM model estimates and paths. Four equations in each model. Outcome variables in model 1: protest (Bernoulli family), sociotropic index (Gaussian family), government evaluation (Gaussian family) and opposition valuation (Gaussian family). Outcome variables in model 2: egotropic perceptions of the economy (Gaussian family), sociotropic index (Gaussian family), government evaluation (Gaussian family) and opposition valuation (Gaussian family). Unstandardised coefficients. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample (N= 6,749).




FIGURE 5.1. $p^* < 0.05$, $p^{**} < 0.01$, $p^{***} < 0.001$. Analytical model that represents the relationship between grievances and protest participation. Coefficients are based on results from table 5.5. Arrows indicate the direction of the effect. Coefficients are standardised. Groups of variables: objective-material grievances, socioeconomic subjective grievances, political grievances and protest. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample ($N = 6,749$).

All in all, grievances and protest participation influence each other in a dynamic fashion. Based on the results from the GSEM analyses in table 5.5, the analytical model in figure 5.1 illustrates the dynamic causal relationship between grievances and protest participation— with standardised coefficients.¹⁰³ In light of the recession scenario, objective-material grievances emerge and shape protest behaviour. Some relative losers of the recession are more prone to mobilise: depending on a public employee or civil servant's income and being on a mortgage increase protest likelihood (figure 5.1). Together with these two factors (i.e. depending on a public employee or civil servant's income and being on a mortgage), low levels of personal income, as well as being unemployed, being a student or having an “other professional status” (relative to having a job or being a pensioner) increase egotropic views of the economy, which in turn affect sociotropic perceptions of the economy (figure 5.1).¹⁰⁴ Hence, individual relative deprivation fuels feelings of collective relative deprivation, and the latter decreases government (and increases opposition) approval. While having negative views of the government's performance is associated with higher levels of approval of the opposition and more chances of protesting, protest participation decreases approval of the opposition (figure 5.1).

As protest performances often signal incumbents' failures and malfunctioning aspects of policy-making, one might intuitively expect protest participation to negatively affect the approval of government. According to results from GSEM analyses, engaging in protest actions fuel political grievances, but not through support for the incumbent (see model 2, table 5.5; figure 5.1)— in part because reporting very low approval of government favours protest participation in the first place. Not only are protesters dissatisfied about the government, but the nature of (anti-austerity and the political status quo) protest performances in the shadow of the Great Recession increase political grievances by discouraging many challengers' view of the main opposition party as a feasible and satisfactory electoral alternative (figure 5.1). Most protest

¹⁰³ For the sake of clarity, controls and predictors unrelated to grievances that were included in table 5.5 are not graphically represented in figure 5.1.

¹⁰⁴ Note that being on a mortgage and depending on a public employee or civil servant's income also have a positive and direct impact on individual protest likelihood.

activities in Spain did not only signal poor incumbent performance, but also spread discontent with the—institutional—political arena in general. In fact, some of the most used claims concerned the neoliberal hegemony, corruption scandals, revolving doors between business and politics, etc. (see chapter 3, this thesis). In short, protest engagement made political grievances more acute by fostering discontent with electoral actors, reflected in worsened assessments of the main opposition party. In contrast to evaluations of those in office, approval of opposition among challengers was higher—or at least not lower—relative to the overall population.¹⁰⁵ Although the impact of opposition on government approval is negative, approval of the incumbent positively affects sociotropic perceptions of the economy, which in turn trigger egotropic views, thus shaping the potential for further mobilisation (figure 5.1).

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter offers a three-fold contribution. First, it updates and refines grievance theories for explaining mobilisation in light of an austerity-ridden scenario. While there is not a direct association between the absolute level of material deprivation and subjective socioeconomic grievances and protest likelihood, some specific relatively deprived groups seem more prone to protest. Importantly, there is a strong association between the political dimension of grievances and mobilisation. Moreover, the political dimension of grievances is key to accounting for protest given the intertwined political and socioeconomic crises that unfolded in the shadow of the Great Recession in Spain and elsewhere.

Second, it is a widely established tenet in social movement literature that grievances have a problematic empirical record. These conclusions, I contend, have often been drawn from limited, static and partial measurements and analyses. Based on panel data, this chapter moves towards (and provides empirical evidence for) a more nuanced, complex, and dynamic understanding of the causal association between grievances and

¹⁰⁵ According to GSEM results, assessments on the opposition performance do not have an impact on protest behaviour (model 1, table 5.5; figure 5.1). Note, however, that approval of the opposition is negatively associated with protesting in the logit panel regressions (models 3–4, table 5.3).

protest. Besides some specific losers of the recession, (absolute) objective-material grievances have not been found to affect protest behaviour but influence egotropic views of the economy, which in turn affect sociotropic perceptions. The latter have an impact on political grievances, which are key predictors of protest participation during the Great Recession in Spain.

Yet, and this leads us to the third main contribution of this chapter, the relationship between protest participation and grievances is multidirectional, as they feed back on each other. By tackling the issue of reverse causality between attitudinal grievances and protest participation, I have found not only that grievance theories help account for mobilisation in a context of material deprivation, but also that protests have an eventful character, which makes challengers more aggrieved in subjective terms, shaping the mobilisation process.

A limitation of this chapter is that it does not allow me to further specify protesters by type of event across waves and, therefore, the dependent variable might include protest participants of events not necessarily related to austerity, the recession, labour issues or the political status quo (e.g. nationalism, ecologism, pacifism, etc.). Further research should try to overcome this drawback. Like chapter 4 with aggregate-level data, some additional investigation should extend and subject to empirical testing the analytical framework developed here in order to test whether it can be applied to similar austerity-dominated contexts (e.g. other Southern European cases) and to *movements of affluence* to assess whether a nuanced and multidirectional framework of the relationship between grievances and mobilisation dynamics works only for *movements of crisis*, or might hold beyond them. These points notwithstanding, what this chapter has tried to show is that while Spanish challengers in the shadow of austerity might not be those with fewer resources, attitudinal grievances and protest dynamics inter-influence each other. Not only does deprivation lie behind protests, but protest participation also fuels subjective grievances and shapes further mobilisation potentials.

CHAPTER 6

Voicing outrage unevenly. Democratic dissatisfaction, non-participation and frequencies of participation in the 15M campaign

1. INTRODUCTION

As argued in the previous chapters, many Spaniards took to the streets in 2011 in order to counter the austerity measures that the government advanced in response to the economic crisis. Not only were many citizens directly affected by these measures, but they also felt that political decisions on how to deal with the crisis were being made without their consent. They did not, that is, feel represented by the political classes in power. In order to find different ways out of the crisis, they insisted on a better and more encompassing democracy. One of the central slogans of the demonstrations in the spring and summer was “Real Democracy Now!”.

Social movement scholars have long stressed the dangers of oversimplifying the participation process into the participation/non-participation dichotomy (e.g. McAdam 1986; Barkan et al. 1995; Klandermans 1997). Although it is often assumed that the determinants of participation are not constant across different types of challengers in general— and specifically across different frequencies of protest within the same campaign—, this has been seldom explored. Despite a growing body of research on the characteristics of protesters in the shadow of the Great Recession in Spain (e.g. Anduiza et al. 2014a, 2014b; Galais and Lorenzini 2016; Likki 2012, 2014; Calvo et al. 2011; Calvo 2013; chapter 5, this thesis), there is a lack of empirical work that, in examining the profile of protesters, accounts for different intensities of participation and compares these to non-participation.¹⁰⁶ As a result, while we know that not everybody protests

¹⁰⁶ The words “intensity” and “frequency” of participation are used interchangeably throughout.

and that some people protest more frequently than others, we know little about what lies behind this variation.

In this chapter, I aim to fill in this gap by analysing whether and how non-participants differ from one-time participants and multiple-time participants in the 15M campaign. Grounded on available work (e.g. Klandermans 1997; Viterba 2006; Corrigan-Brown et al. 2009), my expectation is that factors accounting for mobilisation into the 15M are not constant across groups exhibiting different frequencies of participation and that these differences are likely to be patterned. Given the plurality and heterogeneity of the actors involved in the 15M, examining this variation in the campaign is especially relevant.

My central argument is that different frequencies of participation in the 15M are explained by the depth of participants' political grievances. As discontent towards the political status quo, the policy outcomes and the type of democratic representation and participation were at the core of the 15M's *raison d'être*, I focus on dissatisfaction with democracy. Following the well-established finding that democratic dissatisfaction might be positively associated with the likelihood of protest involvement, I delve deeper into this association and analyse whether it helps to explain different frequencies of participation in the 15M. In line with my expectations, I find that, relative to those who do not participate, democratic dissatisfaction is significantly associated with multiple-time participation, but not with one-time participation. Those who participated only once are not substantially more dissatisfied than non-participants.

This chapter constitutes an original contribution to both the study of mobilisation in general and the understanding of the 15M campaign in particular in various ways. First, by using a general survey (instead of on-site surveys of protesters), I study different sub-groups of participants and compare them to non-participants. This constitutes an innovation in relation to studies that compare protesters with non-protesters through a dummy variable, as they treat people that participate in a protest as a homogenous group (e.g. Schussman and Soule 2005; Braun and Hutter 2016; chapter 5, this thesis). Second, I push the established positive association between political dissatisfaction and protest

likelihood one step further by analysing how it plays out in explaining different frequencies of participation. My findings in this regard call for a qualification of this relationship, as the association between dissatisfaction and mobilisation only holds for a specific sub-group (i.e. multiple-time challengers). Third, although it is common to take the 15M as an example of “unity within diversity” (Likki 2014), I pin down this diversity empirically in one central dimension, that of democratic discontent. While the *indignados* label and the banner “Real Democracy Now!” suggest that political discontent in general, and democratic dissatisfaction in particular, were the factors uniting the 15M challengers, I show that a good portion of those who participated in the campaign were not substantially more dissatisfied than those who did not engage in action. In other words, my findings show that not all the *indignados* were *that* outraged in terms of their satisfaction with democracy, at least not when compared to those who did not participate.

In the upcoming second section, I introduce my case, review the existing literature and develop the theoretical framework, deriving the two central hypotheses to be tested. In the third section, I briefly discuss available data on this campaign and present a multi-method research design. In the fourth section, the main findings are reported and analysed. Finally, I conclude by highlighting the main implications of this chapter.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. The 15M campaign

This is the first chapter of the thesis specifically focused on the 15M, by which I refer to a specific campaign within the broader *indignados* movement that emerged in May 2011 and remained active, although in different forms, at the local level for many months. As mentioned in chapter 1, the 15M represents the most remarkable turning point in the Spanish socio-political mobilisation scene in recent years. Notwithstanding its exceptionality within the Spanish protest record, I take the 15M as an illustrative example of a broader subset of protest campaigns that, since 2011, have emerged in different parts of the world, especially in the south of Europe, as a response to the

economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures. In this sense, my case is one of what scholars have referred to as “anti-austerity” and “Occupy movements” (della Porta 2015a; Vráblíková 2015).

There is a wide and rich body of work describing and analysing different features and dimensions of the 15M campaign. Most of this work, in particular that of a qualitative nature, has focused on structural and organisational factors and has emphasised the type of claims and frames used, the role of social media as channels for recruitment, organisational strategies, action repertoires, the configuration of networks and patterns of diffusion from/to uprisings happening worldwide, among others (e.g. Monterde et al. 2015; Micó and Casero-Ripollés 2014; Romanos 2013; Castells 2012; Martí i Puig 2011; CIS 2011, N° 2921). Also, quantitative studies have also explored people’s reasons for taking part in the campaign and have given us a good understanding of the profiles of participants. From on-site surveys conducted during the 15M campaign in Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao and Salamanca, we know, for example, that participants were mostly young, well-educated and left-wing (see Calvo et al. 2011; Likki 2012; Arellano et al. 2012; Calvo 2013; Anduiza et al. 2014a). Moreover, studies using general surveys show that those who were affected by the crisis and were socially embedded and politically involved were more likely to have engaged in the 15M (Anduiza et al. 2014a, 2014b); and, more generally, that grievances deriving from the worsening of an individual’s employment conditions fostered the most protest activities in the recent context of general deprivation in Spain (Galais and Lorenzini 2016).¹⁰⁷

With this understanding already available, we can see that the general profile of 15M participants to a considerable extent matches that of the participants involved in other “movements of crisis”, such as that of the 2013 anti-austerity demonstration in Prague known as “The End of Godfathers” (Vráblíková 2015). However, these studies have left deeper attitudinal configurations of protesters largely unexplored. Despite the campaign’s emphasis on democracy, we still know little about the impact of democratic

¹⁰⁷ As mentioned in chapter 5, note that these authors further contend that emotions (e.g. anger and anxiety) mediate the effects of economic and employment-related grievances on protest participation (Galais and Lorenzini 2016).

dissatisfaction on mobilisation into 15M, and whether the impact is even noticeable across different frequencies of participation. With the exception of Likki's (2014) study of the motivational characteristics of activists, these studies have seldom looked into the differences between participants,¹⁰⁸ while, given the use of on-site surveys, 15M participants have not usually been compared to non-participants. By working on these lacunae, this chapter constitutes both an innovation in existing 15M scholarship and a contribution towards a more nuanced understanding of participation in this particular campaign and in similar contemporary anti-austerity and occupy movements.

2.2. Different frequencies of participation

For many years, and since the very first cross-national studies of citizens' attitudes toward unconventional political action (e.g. Barnes and Kaase 1979),¹⁰⁹ many studies of different forms of political action have compared participants and non-participants. However, while major cross-national surveys (e.g. ESS, WVS) have allowed researchers to compare those who have protested with those who have not,¹¹⁰ they have not allowed for the identification of potentially relevant differences among those who participate. While advancing our knowledge on the drivers of participation, most studies have treated protesters largely as a homogenous group, masking potentially important differences among those who participate, and lumping together, for example, those who have done so once and those who do so repeatedly.

In view of these shortcomings, recent studies have examined differences between those who participate in several protests across their lifetime or within a specific

¹⁰⁸ Likki (2014) identifies three subgroups of participants in the 15M through clustering techniques (insecure identifiers, non-identifiers and secure identifiers) and shows that while their levels of subjective grievances and identification with protest varied, their perceptions of social problems and economic disadvantage were strikingly similar.

¹⁰⁹ This work studies "protest potential". In doing so, the authors combine citizen approval of various "unconventional" activities (such petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts and occupations, among others) with their responses to questions as to whether they had done or might do such acts.

¹¹⁰ The European Social Survey (ESS), for example, asks only whether they have participated in a demonstration in the last 12 months, and the World Values Survey (WVS) asks respondents whether they have ever participated in a demonstration.

movement/campaign. For instance, Passy and Giugni (2001) find that the intensity of participation in the Swiss solidarity movement was a function of both the embeddedness of participants in social networks and the individually perceived efficacy of participation.¹¹¹ Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) distinguish first-timers from other protesters in 18 separate demonstrations in eight countries across nine different issues and find that age, motivation and non-organisational mobilisation predict first-timership. Andretta and della Porta (2014) distinguish low, medium and high life-time participation in nine demonstrations across a variety of issues in Italy between 2011 and 2013 and find that social centrality and collective identity formation have higher explanatory power when it comes to examining different degrees of participation. Saunders et al. (2012) and Saunders (2014) distinguish four types of protesters on the basis of short-term frequency (protest participation in the past 12 months) and persistence (protest participation over their lifetimes) of their participation: novices, returners, repeaters and stalwarts. In the first study, using data from seven European countries in 2009-2010, the authors find that while biographical availability and (few indicators of) structural availability distinguish the four groups, emotional factors do not (Saunders et al. 2012). In the second study, the author finds that although protesters from all groups are at least moderately engaged with formal politics, there are significant differences across the four groups in terms of disaffection and disconnection from formal political institutions (Saunders 2014). In a similar vein, Corrigan-Brown (2012) studies long-term trajectories of participation in social movements and finds that while religion, ideology and efficacy might be important to explain initial engagement, these do not affect sustained participation in the USA.¹¹²

To be sure, these studies have substantially advanced our understanding of differential participation and have convincingly made the case that research on the determinants of participation needs to take a more nuanced approach and consider differences between groups of participants. However, with the partial exception of

¹¹¹ In addition to frequency, Passy and Giugni (2001) also consider the “effort” dimension by distinguishing whether activists give money or time.

¹¹² For some additional studies dealing with sustained participation and commitment, see e.g. Andrews (1991); Klandermans (1997); Passy and Giugni (2000).

Saunders (2014),¹¹³ these papers share a common limitation: while identifying and comparing different frequencies of participation, they do not consider non-participants. As I rely on a general survey, my data goes beyond those *caught in the act of protest* and allows me to compare the features of people with different levels of participation with those who do not participate. As Vráblíková and Traunmüller (2015) argue, doing so makes data better suited to test the determinants of activism.

In this sense, this chapter can be closely aligned to Pamela E. Oliver's (1984) study on participation on neighbourhood associations in Detroit. Based on local-level data, she compares the profiles of non-members, token contributors and active members of these associations and finds that active members are more educated and more pessimistic about the prospects of collective action than token contributors. However, my study can be even more closely aligned to Corrigan-Brown et al.'s (2009) study of homelessness in the US. With data derived from 400 structured interviews in various cities, these researchers focus on short-term frequency of participation and compare non-participants, single- and multiple-time participants in an instance of mobilisation. They find that relative strain, social ties and biographical availability affect these groups differently. These similarities aside, my study is still different as, while studying various frequencies of participation, it focuses on the effect of democratic dissatisfaction, a central issue underlying the 15M campaign. Also, it examines one mobilisation campaign in the shadow of recession, which, consistent with the whole approach of the thesis, might challenge existing findings regarding the drivers of mobilisation.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Before moving to the more nuanced dependent variable that takes into account the four types of protesters using the first wave of the European "Caught in the Act of Protest" project, Saunders (2014) uses the 5th wave of the ESS to compare (non-disaggregated) participants and non-participants.

¹¹⁴ This point goes in line with the arguments put forward by e.g. Giugni and Grasso (2015); della Porta (2015a).

2.3. Democratic dissatisfaction and differential participation

Throughout this thesis, I have defined grievances as exogenous shocks and have looked at the (attitudinal, emotional) consequences that they engender, focusing on the affective dimension— i.e. feelings such as indignation and discontent about outcomes (see e.g. Van Zomeren et al. 2008; Kriesi 2012).¹¹⁵ In this chapter, I assess how important deeply felt distress is for different frequencies of participation. Following Dalton (2004) and Dalton et al. (2010), I specifically approach this affective dimension via democratic dissatisfaction, which refers to the gap between real functioning democracies and their governance and the ideal (Fuchs et al. 1995). As policy-performance and outcomes account for variations in democratic satisfaction, this is a good indicator of specific political support (see Gunther and Montero 2006; Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999; Easton 1975). However, by no means do I argue that grievances are all about political attitudes, let alone democratic dissatisfaction— see chapters 1 and 8, this thesis.

Satisfaction with democratic performance in Southern Europe has been rather low over the last few decades (Klingemann 1999; Quaranta and Martini 2016). This holds true for Spain, especially since the onset of the Great Recession (Lobera and Ferrándiz 2013). The 15M originated to a large extent in the inability of elites and institutions to meet citizens' demands and concerns in a recession-dominated scenario (Oñate 2013; Martí i Puig 2011). Consequently, democratic dissatisfaction is likely to be a factor directly underlying participation in the 15M campaign.

As mentioned in chapter 4, research on the relationship between democratic satisfaction (more broadly, political discontent) and political participation has yielded mixed empirical evidence (e.g. Farah et al. 1979; Thomassen 1990; Dalton 1999, 2004;

¹¹⁵ As clarified in the previous chapters, I am not the first to claim that grievances should be addressed beyond material boundaries, and thus not the first to delve deeper into its ideational realm. Not only this idea lies at the core of relative deprivation theories (e.g. Klandermans 1997; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009; Smith et al. 2014), but some recent studies stress the importance of the attitudinal-interpretative dimension. Besides the aforementioned study by Galais and Lorenzini (2016) that shows how emotions mediate the effect of objective grievances (especially employment conditions) in Spanish anti-austerity performances, Simmons (2014) develops a meaning-laden approach to understand grievances, emphasising its interpretative component.

Norris 2002, 2011; Norris et al. 2005; Dalton et al. 2010). According to Norris (2002), while dissatisfaction might be detrimental to institutionalised behaviour (e.g. voting), it makes individuals more likely to resort to protest.¹¹⁶ Building on this work, I expect dissatisfaction with democracy to have pushed people to take to the streets in the 15M campaign.¹¹⁷ However, I further specify my expectation, and argue that variation in the frequency of participation is associated with varying levels of dissatisfaction.

I do not expect political grievances to be constant across protesters who report different frequencies of participation. This expectation is based on both recent findings from similar campaigns and particular features of the 15M campaign. For example, in their account of the drivers of participation in the shadow of the Greek recession, Rüdig and Karyotis (2013) find that new recruits are more similar to the general population than to established protesters. Similarly, I expect one-time participants to be more similar in terms of democratic dissatisfaction to the general population than to multiple-time participants.

The context of material shortage in which the 15M emerged (increasing poverty, growing inequality, high unemployment levels, cuts in public spending and social benefits, etc.) penetrated multiple layers of society (see della Porta 2015a; Anduiza et al. 2014a; Calvo et al. 2011). In this sense, the 15M appealed to many people, including many with no prior records of protest involvement and no links to social movements—i.e. “beyond the usual suspects”, as Rüdig and Karyotis (2013) put it. In a moment of heightened social conflict, democratic dissatisfaction is likely to spread, and more people are willing to protest, at least once. But only those who are relatively more

¹¹⁶ Some recent contributions stress that education mediates the relationship between dissatisfaction and participation (Hernández and Ares 2016)

¹¹⁷ General political discontent was a central topic brought up in almost every interview conducted. Expressions such as “we don’t want more of the same” or “we don’t want to be in their hands [referring to multinationals and international bankers]” and “we need politicians able to stay firm” were recurrent. I also rely on insights from a first round of fieldwork conducted by my colleague Juan Masullo. He has original records and notes—about 30 hours of original conversational interviews with activists during the 15M mobilisations in 2011.

discontent are likely to come back to protest. Those who are no more dissatisfied than non-participants are not likely to engage in any further mobilisations.

This dynamic is especially likely to be at work in a campaign such as that of the 15M, where opportunities to participate (at least once) were large and the costs of doing so were quite low. First, the 15M rapidly gained widespread attention and high salience in both offline and online media, becoming cognitively available to the vast majority of Spaniards. Second, rather than dealing with very specific issues that concerned concrete sectors of society, the 15M challenged general and largely consensual issues and thus appealed to a large and transversal constituency (see Portos 2016a; Shalev 2013; see also chapter 3, this thesis). Third, as the campaign involved a great deal of improvisation and innovation (in terms of performances, for example), it awakened the curiosity of many. Fourth, as it lasted many weeks, it gave enough time to the curious and the hesitant to come and join the campaign. Finally, as it involved low (or no) organisational membership (Anduiza et al. 2014a), it allowed people with absolutely no links to social movements to take part in the protest.

Besides these substantial opportunities for participation, the costs of joining the campaign, at least to gain first-hand insight into what was happening, were very low in terms of both money and time expenditures. In most cities, the activists occupied and camped in central and easily accessible squares. Gathering in a *plaza*, joining a march, taking part in an assembly and camping were open and free to everybody.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, except for a few specific moments in some particular cities, threats of police repression were virtually non-existent. In light of this scenario, I expect many people to have participated at least once in the campaign, even if their levels of dissatisfaction with democracy were not particularly high relative to those who did not

¹¹⁸ It could be reasonably argued that occupying a square and camping out, as some 15M participants did, entails a relatively high cost in terms of time and effort (compared to, for instance, joining a peaceful demonstration for a few hours). However, in order to participate in the 15M, people were not required to occupy a square and camp out. Hanging out on the *plaza* one afternoon or following an assembly that, on average, lasted a couple of hours, is enough for a respondent to report that she has participated in the 15M. As Calvo et al. (2011: 6) notes, the 15M should not be reduced to those who occupied the squares.

participate. In fact, I expect those who participated only once to be more similar to non-participants than to multiple-time challengers. Consequently, I hypothesise that:

- Hypothesis 1: one-time participants in the 15M were no more dissatisfied with democracy than non-participants.
- Hypothesis 2: those individuals who were more dissatisfied with democracy were more prone to becoming multiple-time participants in 15M protests relative to non-participants.

Although I expect one-time participants not to differ from non-participants in terms of democratic dissatisfaction, there must be other variables that can account for the difference between non-participants and one-time participants and thus help to understand why some people participate once and others do not. In my models, I test the effect of other factors that have been found to be relevant for explaining mobilisation in general, and different frequencies of participation in particular, such as objective-material and subjective socioeconomic grievances, structural availability, network availability and political engagement (see e.g. Schussman and Soule 2005; Corrigan-Brown et al. 2009; see also chapter 5, this thesis).

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. Data

In order to compare protesters in the 15M with non-participants, I use a general survey. For my specific purposes, the country-level INJUVE survey (2012, CIS N° 2919),¹¹⁹ which has not yet been exploited, has two main advantages as compared to other available CIS general surveys with information about the 15M, such as the June 2011 barometer (N° 2905)¹²⁰ and the post-election survey (N° 2920). First, I can include

¹¹⁹ This is a representative survey organised by an official public institution, the *Instituto de la Juventud* (INJUVE), and conducted by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS).

¹²⁰ This survey focuses on the public opinion's positioning and feelings towards the 15M and institutionalised political behaviour, without inquiring about participation in protest activities. Something similar holds for some other existing studies, such as *Metroscopia* (2011).

different frequencies of participation in 15M performances over a relatively long time span (May to November 2011).¹²¹ Second, it has information specifically about respondents' levels of democratic dissatisfaction. These two aspects comprise a window of opportunity into understanding the question of whether and how democratic dissatisfaction influences different frequencies of activism relative to non-participants.

Nonetheless, the dataset is not free of drawbacks. First, its sample only consists of people between 15 and 30 years old. This is not so alarming given that most available work shows that young people were overrepresented in the 15M (Taibo 2011; Calvo et al. 2011; Martí i Puig 2011; Perugorría and Tejerina 2013; Anduiza et al. 2014b). Second, it has a relatively small subsample of actual protest participants (N'= 258, which represents 19% of the sample). Hence, the leverage and potential generalisability of my results should be taken with caution. Precisely, in order to give more leverage to my statistical findings, I complement these data with qualitative empirical material collected after the protests via conversational and semi-structured interviews with challengers.

3.2. Methods

This chapter follows a multi-method approach, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative evidence. First, based on the INJUVE (2012) dataset, I use multinomial logit regressions to examine protesters' differential degree of participation (one-time participants and multiple-time participants) compared to the subsample of non-participants.¹²² This allows me to examine whether there is systematic evidence

¹²¹ That the interviews for the INJUVE (2012) survey were conducted between 21 and 30 November 2011 poses a minor drawback. Like any survey with information on retrospective participation, respondents are likely to be conditioned by present circumstances at the moment of responding. By November 2011, the 15M was facing a period of uncertainty, with divides among participants becoming explicit and the campaign itself less popular, so protest participation over-reporting by non-participants is not too likely.

¹²² If I had assumed there was some degree of order or rank among the categories on the basis of protesters' degree of commitment, an ordered probit model would have been used instead. However, this would have implied taking into account the three categories together, and here I am interested in assessing the effects of the two types of participants separately with reference to non-protesters. Furthermore, the parallel regression assumption might be too strong in this case.

pointing to political dissatisfaction at the base of different frequencies for participation in the 15M.

However, as valuable information is likely to hide behind tests of significance, I also conducted a latent class cluster analysis (LCA) for my three groups (non-participants, one-time participants and multiple-time participants) to analyse the relationships among manifest data, when some variables are unobserved and grouped into exclusive and exhaustive subsets named latent classes (Beissinger 2013). This finite-mixture method allows groupings of individuals who share similar interests and values to be identified, as observations with similar sets of responses on the manifest variables tend to cluster within the same latent classes.¹²³ Concretely, LCA helped me to examine whether there was attitudinal heterogeneity across and within different groups of protesters. It also helped me to identify unexpectedly high values of some manifest variables that yielded statistically and substantively significant results (particularly in the multiple-time protesters group), as well as to account for the lack of a significant coefficient in other attitudinal variables.

Finally, qualitative material, besides giving rise to some initial expectations about participation in the 15M, was used to complement and further illustrate my findings. Qualitative evidence, disseminated throughout the chapter, comes from semi-structured interviews. I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews during the summer of 2014 with key informants who participated in the protests back in 2011, in both Madrid and Barcelona. Eight of these interviewees were multiple-time protesters, and four one-time activists (see table 6.1).

¹²³ This method offers a variety of model selection tools to assess probabilities of classification through a posteriori probability of membership. Some diagnostic statistics, like the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), can assist in the determination of the optimal number of clusters underlying a given set of variables specified (Beissinger 2013). There are LCA software programs at hand. I used Mclust, an R package that automatically estimates the best mixture model according to different covariance structures and different numbers of clusters.

N. Interviewee	Participation	Location	Prior org. affiliation?	Activist nowadays?	Age
1	Multiple times	Madrid	Yes	Yes	23
2	Multiple times	Madrid	No	Yes	35
3	Multiple times	Barcelona	Yes	Yes	42
4	Multiple times	Madrid	Yes	Yes	26
5	Multiple times	Barcelona	No	Yes	33
6	Multiple times	Madrid	Yes	Yes	25
7	Multiple times	Santiago	Yes	No	24
8	Multiple times	A Coruña	No	Yes	28
9	One time	Madrid	No	No	29
10	One time	Madrid	Yes	No	22
11	One time	Santiago	Yes	No	24
12	One time	Barcelona	Yes	Yes	29

TABLE 6.1. Description of interviewed activists. Interviewer: Martín Portos, 06/2014-09/2014.

3.3. Operationalisation

3.3.1. The dependent variable

My dependent variable is a three-category index of participation in 15M protests, based on the INJUVE (2012) dataset. Contrary to most general surveys, which are often limited to participation in demonstrations and semi-institutionalised activities, such as boycotting and petitioning (e.g. WVS, ESS), I combine two questions, one inquiring about participation in 15M demonstrations and other gatherings, and the second asking about participation in 15M assemblies. Combining these two questions helped me to overcome one of the concerns that scholars working on the 15M have: that the 15M should not be equated to the occupation of squares in May to June 2011 (Calvo et al. 2011: 6).

If a respondent reports not having participated in any “demonstrations or other gatherings” or “assemblies”, the response is coded as negative (=0). I distinguish affirmative responses in the following way (see table 6.4, Appendix): if an individual participated “more than once” in at least one of these tactical options, the response is recoded as 2 (*multiple-time participant*); whereas if an individual participated only once— but never “more than once”— in either “assemblies” or “demonstrations or other gatherings”, the response is recoded as 1 (*one-time participant*). Overall, 1,095

people in the sample did not participate in the 15M movement (81%), 136 were one-time participants (10%) and 122 were multiple-time participants (9%).

I interpret coming back to the 15M by participating in the same tactic (“demonstrations or other gatherings” or “assemblies”) to be a sign of deeper commitment than participating once in each of the two types of tactics considered. As argued above, with opportunities to participate being large and costs being low, I expect many people to have participated at least once out of curiosity. If a given person participated in an assembly out of curiosity and decided to participate again after learning how it worked and what it was about, I take this as a sign of commitment. In contrast, curiosity might have pushed people to go and check out an assembly after having been in a demonstration and vice versa without this implying any deeper involvement of commitment— unless she came back to the same kind of protest event. Hence, those who participated once in an assembly and once in a demonstration are treated as “one-time protesters”.¹²⁴ To be sure, the distinction between my categories is fairly arbitrary. However, it goes in line with similar work in the field (e.g. Corrigan-Brown et al. 2009) and represents an improvement over past work that lumps participants together.

3.3.2. Explanatory variable and controls

My main explanatory variable, as stated in the hypotheses, takes democratic satisfaction as a way to capture attitudinal political grievances.¹²⁵ This is captured

¹²⁴ Note that this group of participants is very small ($N=34$). As a robustness check, I conducted the same analysis considering those who participated only once both in an “assembly” and a “demonstration or other gatherings” as multiple-time challengers. The regression analyses do not present any substantive differences in the factors that are studied here.

¹²⁵ Trust in intermediary institutions might also capture political attitudinal grievances and, as other authors have shown, it is likely to have an impact on mobilisation (e.g. Dalton 2004; Braun and Hutter 2016). Although not reported in the models, I have also considered the variables trust in parties and the congress (measured in 0-10 scales). These are highly correlated (Pearson’s $r > 0.7$). I test through Principal Component Analysis whether the same variance can be explained with fewer of the aforementioned variables. Items load strongly on one single dimension (Eigenvalue= 1.72), accounting for 85.93% of the variance. The index of political trust created meets the minimum reliability threshold, as the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.84. This is only moderately correlated with my main explanatory variable, democratic satisfaction, but further analyses conducted advise against merging them in a broader index of subjective political grievances, as it this procedure does not fulfil minimum standards of reliability. If political trust is included in my models, it is never statistically significant, it

through a self-reported question on satisfaction with democracy measured on a 0-10 scale (see table 6.4, Appendix). Together with my main independent variable, a number of predictors related to both socioeconomic attitudinal-subjective and material-objective grievances are included (Giugni and Grasso 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016b). Socioeconomic attitudinal indicators of grievances include egotropic and sociotropic perceptions of the economy. I use two dummy variables to capture them (see table 6.4, Appendix). If one of the main two problems for people at the individual level is the “economy”, “crisis”, “access to housing”, “unemployment”, “employment quality”, “difficulty of finding a job”, “low wages” or “precariousness”, the proxy for egotropic perceptions of the economy is recoded as 1 (otherwise= 0). Likewise, if any of the same categories is identified as one of the main problems at the country level, the proxy for sociotropic perceptions of the economy is recoded as 1 (otherwise= 0). I consider income, class and social status as indicators of objective-material grievances. A binary variable captures whether the individual is financially self-sufficient (living only on her income: yes=1; 0= otherwise). A second dummy controls whether the head of household receives a salary wage-pension or not.¹²⁶

Apart from grievances, I incorporate three sets of control variables that have been found relevant in explaining mobilisation (Schussman and Soule 2005; see table 6.2; see also table 6.4, Appendix). Including these allows me to weight my argument against alternative explanations. First, in order to capture structural–biographical availability, I use an ordinal predictor for maximum level of education attained (with 4 hierarchical categories: 1= primary or lower, 2= secondary, 3= A-levels or equivalent, 4= university degree). Also, age (continuous), together with its squared term to control for quadratic effects,¹²⁷ are taken into account.¹²⁸ Second, regarding political engagement, I account

does not change the coefficients, does not improve my models’ goodness-of-fit and raises some concerns of over-specification. Hence, it is not reported throughout.

¹²⁶ I have also controlled for the type of contract the worker has (unlimited or not), in case she is working at all. Non-significant effects were reported in any model specification.

¹²⁷ Despite the small range of respondents (i.e. 16-30 years old), I have logged it in some model specifications (not reported in the table), and discarded possible logarithmic effects.

¹²⁸ Additionally, I considered gender, but it does not increase the model’s goodness-of-fit. No significant effects are found. It is not reported here.

for political (internal and institutional) efficacy through the extent of agreement with the following statement: “one more vote or one less vote does not make any difference” (recoded: 1= agree, 2= neutral, 3= disagree; treated as ordinal). In addition, I control for ideological orientation, captured via self-placement on the 1-10 left-right scale. An index on the frequency of use of different sources to obtain political information (0-4 scale, ranging from “never” to “everyday”)¹²⁹ and interest in politics is taken into account, measured into a 0-3 increasing scale (ranging from “not at all” to “a lot”). Third, in terms of network availability, I look into whether the person has ever attended a meeting of a political party (yes= 1, 0= otherwise) and has participated in some prior demonstrations (also dummy). Likewise, I control for online (weak) ties, which may influence channels for participants’ recruitment (Beissinger 2013), with a question on social networks’ degree of trust. It is also a proxy for interpersonal trust. This is measured on a 1-4 scale, ranging from “a lot” to “not at all”.

¹²⁹ PCA conducted offers a one-component solution (Eigenvalue= 2.22, variance explained: 55%). The political information index meets the minimum threshold of reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.73).

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Variable-centred strategies

In model 1, I include the main predictors together with controls related to objective-material grievances, structural availability and political engagement (table 6.3). Subjective-attitudinal grievances, networks and social capital-related factors are included in models 2 and 3 (table 6.3). An interaction effect found between ideological self-placement and political interest is likewise reported in model 3.¹³⁰ A parallel specification is reported for models 2 and 3 due to endogeneity concerns related to the predictor “participation in previous demonstrations”, as the phrasing in the questionnaire does not explicitly clarify that previous participation implies any protest campaign but the 15M. Whereas in models 2.A and 3.A I assume that this is a contaminated indicator and therefore it is excluded, in models 2.B and 3.B, I assume that protesters have understood that the question was referring to demonstrations other than the 15M. However, doing this does not yield any substantial changes beyond the coefficient for having participated in previous demonstrations.

¹³⁰ I have checked for a number of possible interaction effects on different frequencies of participation without finding any statistically significant results (e.g. democratic satisfaction has been interacted with interest, ideology, education, household financial situation, financial self-sufficiency and the perceptions of the main general/ individual problems).




FIGURE 6.1.A. Predicted probabilities of becoming one-time participant in the 15M (relative to non-protesters) by democratic dissatisfaction, keeping all the other predictors constant at their means. C.I.: 95%. Source: INJUVE (2012).




FIGURE 6.1.B. Predicted probabilities of becoming multiple-time participant in the 15M (relative to non-protesters) by democratic dissatisfaction, keeping all the other predictors constant at their means. C.I.: 95%. Source: INJUVE (2012).

The main finding is that political grievances, measured by democratic dissatisfaction, matter for explaining mobilisation, but only for multiple-time challengers— not for one-time participants— relative to non-participants. In line with the hypotheses, I observe a negative correlation, statistically and substantively significant, between democratic satisfaction and the propensity to become a multiple-time participant in the 15M. While this association is observed for multiple-time participants, it does not hold for one-time participants (taking non-participants as the reference category). In other words, people who have participated more than once were more dissatisfied with the democratic performance than the overall population, but this does not hold for one-timers. The effect of democratic satisfaction on one-time participation is not significant (figure 6.1.A). While the probability of participating multiple times for an individual who reports high levels of democratic satisfaction (i.e. 8) is 2%, someone who is extremely dissatisfied with democracy (i.e. 0) has an 18% chance of participating multiple times relative to non-participants, all else being equal (figure 6.1.B). Confirming the main expectation, this suggests that there are different paths to mobilisation for people with different frequencies of participation in protests.

In addition, my qualitative evidence reflects clearly that democratic dissatisfaction is indeed a factor behind different frequencies of protest. Among the interviewees in Plaça Catalunya (Barcelona) and Puerta del Sol (Madrid), multiple-time activists seemed more dissatisfied than one-time participants. Dissatisfaction was so strong that some interviewees did not want to be identified as political actors. However, the more concrete content of their discourses reveals not only that there is an important political component to what they were doing, but also that they were dissatisfied with “traditional politics”, “politics as usual”, “party politics” and the “functioning of democracy”. As some multiple-time activists stated: “We are not politicians, we are not even political. Politics sucks. We don’t play that game. All of them [referring to political parties and politicians in general] are the same shit” (interview #I4; see table 6.1). “They have kidnapped people’s democracy; we don’t have a say in *their* system” (interview #I6).

In contrast, discourses regarding democratic dissatisfaction among one-time challengers were much softer. While recognising that “politics must change”, they point

towards reforms rather than rupture: “It seems obvious that the system is not performing well, but it might get much worse than this” (interview #I11). In general, interviewees from the one-time participants group pointed at regeneration within the political status quo, rather than at a dramatic change: “Politicians are deaf, they do not listen to us. It is not a matter of (political) colours, we need new flowing sap” (interview #I9). In short, qualitative evidence tends to confirm the overall argument, as dissatisfaction is more strongly felt among multiple-time participants than among one-time participants.

Besides my democratic dissatisfaction-related hypotheses, I also find that reporting high political interest increases the propensity of multiple-time participation in the 15M, although this is not significant for one-time participants (always with reference to non-participants). By contrast, reporting egotropic perceptions of the economy is positively associated with becoming a one-time participant, but not with involvement on multiple occasions. Additionally, some factors, such as ideology and prior involvement in demonstrations, affect participation regardless of its frequency. Left-wing people and previous demonstrators are keener to protest; coefficients are strong and significant both for one-time challengers and multiple-timers. All these results are robust across different model specifications (table 6.3).¹³¹

Despite the fact that the statistical results are significant in substantive and statistical terms, the confidence intervals are large. Moreover, correlation-based techniques are insufficient to analyse similitudes and differences between observations within subsamples. Variable-oriented techniques, such as multinomial logistic regressions, tell us little about the attitudinal grouping of cases. Therefore, I further investigated my findings by making use of a case-centred strategy, LCA.

¹³¹ Also, results are robust to changes in the reference category of the dependent variable (not reported). While multiple-time challengers tend to be highly informed about politics, the evidence for one-time protesters is mixed (table 6.3).




FIGURE 6.2.A. Mean value of attitudinal manifest variables per latent class within the subsample of non-participants in 15M actions. Standardised into 0-10 scales; all variables are treated as continuous. For the sake of clarity, the scale of political information is inverted (maximum= 10). Distribution of cases: 73.7% and 26.3% fall in the 1st and 2nd latent classes, respectively. Optimal BIC solution= -16222 (VEV, 2 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).




FIGURE 6.2.B. Mean value of attitudinal manifest variables per latent class within the subsample of one-time challengers in 15M actions. Standardised into 0-10 scales; all variables are treated as continuous. For the sake of clarity, the scale of political information is inverted (maximum= 10). Distribution of cases: 7.6%, 25.2% and 67.2% fall in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd latent classes, respectively. Optimal BIC solution= -2772.194 (VEL, 3 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).




FIGURE 6.2.C. Mean value of attitudinal manifest variables per latent class within the subsample of recurrent activists in 15M actions. Standardised into 0-10 scales; all variables are treated as continuous. For the sake of clarity, the scale of political information is inverted (maximum= 10). Distribution of cases: 24.3%, 44.2% and 31.5% fall in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd latent classes, respectively. Optimal BIC solution= -2615.849 (VEI, 3 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).

4.2. Case-Centred Strategies

LCA is conducted separately for my three groups. Two latent classes among non-participants are identified, as well as three latent classes both for one-time challengers and multiple-time protesters.¹³² Figure 6.2.A. displays the cluster profile plot for the two optimal clusters of non-participants, each of which constitutes 73.7% and 26.3% of the non-participants (classes 1 and 2, respectively).¹³³ I observe a homogeneous pattern in attitudinal positioning and the range of observations across the two latent classes for non-participants. While medium values are reported for ideology, interpersonal trust and democratic satisfaction, those for political interest and information are intermediate-low. In contrast, standards for grievances associated with egotropic perceptions of the economy are upper-intermediate and for sociotropic views are high. This suggests that non-participants are aggrieved chiefly in socioeconomic subjective terms. The most relevant difference in the grouping of observations concerns voting efficacy: while some non-participants perceive themselves as politically ineffective (class 1), others, along with a typical attitudinal configuration, report intermediate values for efficacy (class 2).

A greater range of variation is observed within and between the two graphs of participants in 15M actions, separated by the frequency of participation. First, the attitudinal clustering of one-time participants (see classes 2 and 3; figure 6.2.B.) is very similar to that of non-participants (figure 6.2.A.). The exception is class 1 (figure 6.2.B.), which comprises stalwarts within one-time challengers:

¹³² The best mixture model is one that maximises the BIC estimator. The maximum BIC reported for non-participants is -16222 (VEV model), with a two-cluster solution and a log-likelihood test = -7781.116—see figure 6.3.A, Appendix. Optimal BIC solution for one-time participants = -2772.194 and for multiple-time participants = -2615.849 (both VEV with 3 latent classes). See figures 6.3.B and 6.3.C, Appendix.

¹³³ All attitudinal manifest variables included are standardised into 0-10 scales. Mclust treats all variables as continuous by default. The other R package suitable for conducting LCA, *poLCA*, is only appropriate when all manifest variables are polytomous, which is not this case.

more trustful, politically interested, satisfied and well-informed cases, strongly aggrieved in socioeconomic terms and with very low perceived efficacy. However, they represent only 7.2% of one-time challengers. Second, the attitudinal configuration of multiple-time participants is the most heterogeneous amongst the three groups considered. Like non-participants and one-time participants, in general, they are socioeconomically aggrieved, show intermediate values for trust and tilt towards the left side of the ideological spectrum. Nonetheless, I can distinguish three broad classes on the basis of their attitudinal clustering. Again, one class is very similar to those with a typical configuration among the three groups: all indicators have intermediate values—except from self-perceived efficacy, which is low (class 2). One set of cases represents a disenchanted profile: aggrieved, relatively informed but disinterested in politics (class 1). One final class is made up of outraged participants, which are extremely aggrieved in subjective political and socioeconomic terms, albeit strongly interested in politics (class 3). Following the main line of reasoning (and as the multinomial logit models show), most cases within multiple-time participants cluster around low levels of democratic satisfaction. However, contrary to the results yielded by my models, individuals who fall into class 2 do not report particularly low values of democratic satisfaction and individuals in class 1 show very low levels of political interest. These account for 44.2% and 24.3% of the multiple-time activists' subsample, respectively (figure 6.2.C.).

The results of the LCA, on the one hand, add a word of caution. Despite the fact that results reported by the previous multinomial logit models are significant and robust, it shows that there is a great deal of variation in some attitudinal patterns within my subgroups, even for those manifest variables that report significant results in the logit models. In other words, only some cases (slightly over 50%) within the subsample of multiple-time protesters are driving the coefficients for democratic satisfaction. On the other hand, they reveal why I do

not find significant results for some predictors in the multinomial logit models. As a rule of thumb, I might suspect that some variables for which the range of responses is very high¹³⁴ and/or that are consistently similar across the three groups will not tend to report any significant effects.¹³⁵

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter sheds light on the determinants of different frequencies of participation and non-participation in the Spanish 15M campaign. I asked whether political grievances (captured through democratic dissatisfaction) helped explain differences in the frequency with which people participated in the 15M campaign. At a moment of heightened social conflict, with democratic dissatisfaction on the rise, more people chose to voice outrage through protest participation. However, my findings show that the effect of dissatisfaction with democracy is not constant across one-time participants and multiple-time participants relative to non-participants. In terms of democratic dissatisfaction, the profile of one-time protesters resembled more closely that of non-participants. In other words, only those who were more democratically dissatisfied came back to protest.

This chapter makes a relevant and innovative contribution to existing work in mobilisation and sustained participation in protest in at least two central ways. First, in terms of design, it takes into account people featuring different

¹³⁴ This point should be nuanced, especially when dealing with variables operationalised as binary that do not have intermediate possible answers. There are some exceptions, such as political interest, with a relatively big range (2.7–6.3), but its effect on protest involvement is nevertheless significant.

¹³⁵ The variable political information provides us with a good example of how the clustering of cases cancel potentially significant coefficients out. Although class 1 of one-time challengers (figure 6.2.B.) and class 1 of multiple-time participants (figure 6.2.C.) are much better informed about politics than non-participants (figure 6.2.A.), the other cases within their subgroups tend to cluster around lower standards of information. Therefore, political information is associated neither with one-time nor with multiple-time participation.

frequencies of participation and includes non-participants. This is important not only because, as shown, different frequencies of participation are patterned, but also because non-participants serve as negative cases, allowing for a more robust examination of the determinants of participation. Second, theoretically speaking, I specify further the well-established positive association between democratic dissatisfaction and willingness to protest by showing how it plays out among different groups of participants.

Finally, in relation to existing work on the 15M, I employ important strategies that are not common in this literature: besides looking at different frequencies of participation and comparing them to non-participation, I explore to a deeper degree and empirically pin down one dimension of grievances that is assumed to be at the core of the *indignados* movement: democratic dissatisfaction. The findings allow me to provide a more nuanced view of the profile of 15M participants that, along with existing studies, contribute to a theoretically rich and empirically informed understanding of individual mobilisation into this campaign.

Given the characteristics of the campaign at hand and of the recession context in which it emerged, the findings are particularly fitting and relevant. Beyond the Spanish case, I contend that this contribution can shed light on other protest campaigns in the so-called anti-austerity and Occupy movements. From existing studies, we already know that 15M participants share important characteristics with protesters in, for example, Greece and the Czech Republic. Although this gives confidence about the generalisability of my results, whether the nuanced association between democratic dissatisfaction and frequencies of participation can be said to hold for these other campaigns remains an empirical question. Thus, further research should try to assess how well the findings can be applied to other similar mobilisation contexts, as well as how other relevant drivers of mobilisation, such as efficacy, also help draw a distinction between people

exhibiting different frequencies of participation in protest.¹³⁶ Also, additional inquiries are necessary to explore reverse causality: as participation in protests feeds back on political grievances (see chapter 5, this thesis), recurrent participation may specifically fuel negative democratic appraisals.

All in all, this contribution aims at motivating a reflection on what is meant by *participation in protest* and on the (often implicit) assumptions that are made in the inquiries in this field. Whilst it is widely accepted among scholars that protesters are rarely a homogeneous group and that mobilisation processes are patterned, research designs do not always reflect these common agreements, let alone explore them in depth. The more nuanced view of participation that I adopted in this chapter allowed me to delve in more detail into one established finding in the literature on mobilisation, and already indicates the need for some qualifications. Specifically, while this study backs the established finding that democratic dissatisfaction is a key determinant of individual protest participation, by looking into different frequencies of participation, I show that this holds only for multiple-time challengers. This was the subset of participants that, in the Spanish context, was in fact *indignado* with the country's democratic performance.

¹³⁶ Thanks to on-site survey data, Andretta et al. (2015) find that the majority of demonstrators across European countries are what they called “critical citizens” (i.e. mixing mistrust and a sense of collective efficacy). However, there were important numbers of “optimistic” (combining high trust and high sense of efficacy) and “pessimistic” activists (who are mistrustful and report low levels of efficacy). Whether this attitudinal heterogeneity translates into different patterns of participation is a question to be explored.

CHAPTER 7

Moving from the squares to the ballot box. Podemos and the institutionalisation of the cycle of anti-austerity protest

Spain. May-June 2011. Thousands of outraged activists demonstrate and occupy squares to protest against austerity policies and the political status quo in light of coming municipal and regional elections— see e.g. chapters 3 and 6, this thesis.

25 May 2014. Podemos, a new party launched from scratch some months before the 2014 European election gathers one million votes and gets 5 MEPs on the basis of some indignados movement's core claims: fighting poverty, inequality, the privileges of large corporations, corruption, and defending public services in the face of austerity policies.

24 May 2015. Local elections shake the political establishment to the core. The two parties that have dominated during the last decades, the conservative People's Party and the social democratic PSOE, together lost more than 3 million votes and almost 4,700 local councillors. Several bottom-up coalitions of anti-austerity forces triumphed in important cities, such as Barcelona, Madrid, Zaragoza, A Coruña, and Cádiz.

20 December 2015. After a tight electoral race, Podemos and the regional coalitions it backs in Galicia, Catalonia and Comunitat Valenciana gather nearly 5 million votes across the country (and gain 69 seats) in the Spanish Parliament. The two major parties lost 83 MPs together. In only four years, their joint relative support decreased from 73.35% of total votes casted to 50.73%.

1. INTRODUCTION

Social movement scholars have devoted uneven attention to different phases of the cycles of protest. With a high proportion of studies focusing on how mobilisation comes into being in the first instance, we know less about the dynamics behind demobilisation. In the words of Ruud Koopmans (2004: 22) “that protest waves come to an end is [...] a seemingly trivial truth, but the reasons for that contraction of contention have commanded little attention in the literature so far”. Rooted in the political process tradition, the dominant tenet in the literature nowadays is that while political opportunities are crucial to accounting for the initial phase of social movement mobilisation, they are much less important throughout the cycle of protest lifespan. In fact, some scholars of the cycle of collective action argue that demobilisation is the

result of two— usually combined— processes, radicalisation and institutionalisation (Tarrow 1989, 1993, 1995; Jung 2010).

By focusing on one of the abovementioned processes, institutionalisation, in this chapter I propose an analytical framework to understand the deliberate and strategic tactical shift on the repertoires of some challengers, pursuing social movements' goals more through formal forms of action. I contend that institutionalisation follows a process that is not-so-different from mobilisation, as it results from the three factors that are at the core of the political process tradition: political opportunities, organisational resources and cognitive liberation. Specifically, three mechanisms concatenate to account for protest institutionalisation in a recession-driven context: 1) *appropriation of political opportunities*, 2) *the symbolic construction of leadership* and 3) *cognitive liberation*, given institutional closure, exhaustion and persisting grievances.

Despite their claims against bipartisanship (e.g. the #Nolesvotes initiative)¹³⁷ and the majoritarian bias of the electoral system,¹³⁸ institutionalisation was not among the top priorities of 2011 *indignados* protesters (Taibo 2011; Tormey 2015: ch.5). As the cycle of contention unfolded, many challengers adopted routinised tactics. Developing a social movement-based account that analyses how the institutionalisation process came about in the demobilisation phase of the protest wave is crucial to understanding the dynamics of movement-related parties' emergence, configuration and success. Although there are well-informed party, voter and attitudes-centred available studies about the emergence of Podemos (e.g. Fernández-Albertos 2015; Torreblanca 2015; Lobera and Rogero-García 2016; Ramiro and Gómez 2016), the nexus between Podemos and the cycle of anti-austerity and for real democracy protest has seldom been explored.

¹³⁷ This was a collective petition launched in early 2011 by people linked to the free culture and digital commons movement. It contributed to the rise of ¡Democracia Real Ya! ('Real Democracy Now!'), a key digital meta-organisation behind the 15M campaign. Signatories proposed an electoral reform, not voting for main parties (PP, PSOE, CiU), a re-generation of the political class, and the implementation of effective measures against corruption.

¹³⁸ Nationwide competing minor parties are especially punished by the Spanish electoral system for national elections (Montero et al. 1997).

To illustrate the main argument (i.e. that the three abovementioned mechanisms drive activists' transition towards institutional tactics), I use information and illustrative quotes from thirteen semi-structured interviews. These were conducted with key informants from Podemos and/or anti-austerity protest in different cities (see table 7.1). As mentioned in chapter 1, semi-structured interviews allow me to discover the respondent's experience and interpretation of reality, access a wider range of relevant actors than reflected in the media, and analyse the semantic context of activists from a longitudinal perspective (Blee and Taylor 2002: 92-94). Descriptive statistics complement qualitative evidence. Some figures come from the original and manually coded Protest Event Analysis dataset used in chapters 3 and 4, which is based on information stored in *El País* Archive between January 2007 and February 2015 (figure 7.1; Portos 2016a, 2016b).¹³⁹ Additionally, survey data from other sources are used (e.g. CIS, OECD, IMF, Eurobarometer, etc.).

In the next section of this chapter, I review relevant literature and develop an analytical framework to understand institutionalisation in the demobilisation phase of a protest cycle. Then, the main case is introduced: the transition towards more formal repertoires in the aftermath of the Spanish anti-austerity and for real democracy cycle. After that, empirical materials illustrate how the three mechanisms concatenated to allow activists to embrace routinised tactics and formal politics. I conclude by underscoring the main findings.

¹³⁹ As mentioned in chapters 3-4, the dataset consists of 2,002 event performances, with up to 77 variables coded per event. For the coding specifications, see table 3.1, Appendix.

CODE	TOWN	DATE	INT.	DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEWEE
1	Madrid	Nov. 2014	JF	Social activist
2	Madrid	Nov. 2014	JF	Social activist, member of local candidacy
3	Madrid	June 2015	JF	Social activist, member of Podemos and local candidacy
4	Madrid	June 2015	JF	Initial promoter of Podemos
5	Madrid	June 2015	JF	Student movement, 15M, member of Izquierda Anticapitalista, initial promoter of Podemos
6	Madrid	June 2014	MP	Member of Juventud sin Futuro, 15M activist, member of local 'círculo'
7	Madrid	Dec. 2014	JF	Member of Podemos
8	Madrid	Nov. 2014	JF	Social activist, member of Podemos
9	Madrid	Dec. 2014	JF	DRY, 15M, member of Podemos
10	Madrid	May 2014	MP	Member of Podemos, former member of Izquierda Unida
11	Barcel.	Mar. 2015	MP	Member of PAH Sabadell (anti-evictions) and local candidacy
12	Barcel.	Feb. 15	MP	Anti-austerity and student movement activist, sympathiser of Podemos, member of a local-level candidacy
13	Bilbao	July 2015	JF	Activist (citizen's tides), member of Podemos

TABLE 7.1. Description of semi-structured interviews. All interviews were conducted in Spanish. Quotes displayed throughout are author's own translation. Interviewers: Joseba Fernández ("JF") and Martín Portos ("MP"). Note that all these interviewees are different from those in chapter 6, this thesis.




FIGURE 7.1. Number of monthly protest events in Spain, 01/2007-02/2015, and demobilisation phase. Continuous line: all protest events, 5-period moving average. Level of aggregation: monthly. Dotted line: labour, economic issues, unemployment, anti-austerity and anti-political status quo protest events, 5-period moving average. Circle: demobilisation phase (approx.). Data retrieved from El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration (self-collected Protest Event Analysis). See Portos (2016a, 2016b); see also figure 3.2, this thesis.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political participation is a continuum, which ranges from the extra-conventional arena to the institutional domain (Kriesi et al. 2012; Hutter 2014a). Over the last decades, “parties and movements have become overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics to the point that long-established political parties welcome social movement support and often rely specifically on their association to win elections” (Goldstone 2003: 4). According to Garner and Zald (1985:137, cited in della Porta et al. 2017a), boundaries between movements and parties are blurring as “movements compete with parties. Movements infiltrate parties... movements become parties”. The case of Podemos and the anti-austerity cycle of protest in Spain is not a unique example.¹⁴⁰ For instance, workers’ parties have emerged from the labour movement since the 19th century, the US Republicans were born as an electoral offshoot of the abolitionist movement in the 1850s, the Green parties arose from new social movements from the 1970s onwards, the Pirate parties, linked to free culture and digital commons activism, have spread since the 2000s, etc. However, these persistent inter-relationships have not been accompanied by parallel theoretical developments. Social movements and electoral studies’ bodies of literature have grown apart, and there has been little cross-fertilisation (McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013; Hutter 2014a; della Porta et al. 2017a). It is however beyond the realistic scope of this piece to reconcile both bodies of literature (for recent contributions in this vein, see Kriesi et al. 2012; Hutter 2014a; della Porta et al. 2017a). I rather intend to develop an interpretative framework to understand institutionalisation from social movement literature.

Unlike extensive research on expansive and diffusion-related processes, such as brokerage or scale shift, that has flourished following the *Dynamics of Contention* agenda (McAdam et al. 2001; see e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Givans et al. 2010), we still know little about what drive activists’ decision to resort to institutionalised channels as the cycle unfolds. Institutionalisation means that

¹⁴⁰ Neither are all anti-austerity and for real democracy actors involved in Podemos nor do they support institutionalisation (Calvo and Álvarez, 2015; Martín 2015).

social movements often traverse “the official terrain of formal politics” and engage “with authoritative institutions” such as political parties in order “to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement’s goals” (Suh 2011: 443).¹⁴¹ There are many forms of electoral participation available for movements; they might create new parties, but also reshape existing ones, and even transform the entire party system (Kriesi 2015, 2016).¹⁴² Moreover, processes such as co-optation, alliance building and facilitation often involve some degree of institutionalisation. While the institutionalisation process lies beneath the emergence of new parties associated with movements, institutionalisation does not imply creating new electoral forces. However, in order to understand how movements may turn into parties, it is crucial to pin down the mechanisms that underlie the movements’ transition towards more routinised tactics.

Theories of protest cycles often contend that a cycle escalates on top of pre-existing movements until reaching its peak, as resources become available and opportunities open (Tarrow 1989, 1993, 2011; Meyer 1993; see chapter 3, this thesis). Given increasing competition between organisations, demobilisation usually comes from the institutionalisation and radicalisation processes, which foster divisions among challengers. On the one hand, increased access to officials and government concessions may whet the appetite of some protesters, making some of these challengers opt for institutionalised routes. On the other hand, some challengers prefer to stick to extra-conventional forms of action, becoming more radical and suffering a sectarian involution (Tarrow 1989, 1993; see chapter 3, this thesis).¹⁴³ Hence, the institutionalisation-radicalisation tandem would explain protest decline (Tarrow 1989, 1995; Jung 2010): people defect either because reforms satisfy them or fear of violence

¹⁴¹ My understanding of institutionalisation privileges repertoires of action and arenas for interaction to the detriment of other aspects amenable to institutionalisation (e.g. ideas, personnel) and other processes that are often equated to this process (e.g. de-radicalisation, bureaucratisation, oligarchisation, etc.) — see Rucht (1999b); Bosi (2016b).

¹⁴² Although I focus on institutionalisation in the electoral domain, there are other spheres where institutionalisation processes may unfold (e.g. the judiciary, legislature, etc.).

¹⁴³ However, in the Spanish case, despite various violent encounters, there is not such trend towards radicalisation for the 2007-2015 period (Portos 2016a; chapter 3, this thesis).

prevents them from engaging in further action.¹⁴⁴ In later contributions, Tarrow (2012, 2011: ch.10) nuances his point by emphasising the contingent nature of protest paths and endings (for similar arguments, see Kriesi et al. 1995: ch.5; McAdam et al. 2001: 66-68; Koopmans 2004; Heaney and Rojas 2015: 90-91).

Accordingly, I contend that institutionalisation might result of various interests, strategies, choices and exchanges between (movement and state) actors; it is not a predestined stage in the movements' trajectories (Bosi 2016a; Pavan 2016). Institutionalisation is "relational by nature, and historically and socially made, not naturally evolving or structurally determined" (Suh 2011: 463). I next propose an analytical framework to understand under which concurrent conditions—and strategic choices—the use of disruptive and not-so-conventional repertoires by some movement strands decreased in favour of more routinised forms of action. Building on political process theory, I argue that its three key components (i.e. political opportunities, organisational resources and cognitive liberation; see McAdam 1982) may also account for institutionalisation during the demobilisation phase of the Spanish protest cycle.

It has already been argued that these three factors shape not only initial mobilisation dynamics, but also trajectories of protest over time and demobilisation processes (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011). However, the conditions under which institutionalisation during the demobilisation phase takes place have seldom been explored, so that we ignore which specific mechanisms drive this process. Specifically, I argue that under a recession-driven scenario, institutionalisation might occur provided that three mechanisms concatenate: appropriation of opportunities, symbolic construction of leadership and cognitive liberation.

Appropriation of political opportunities stresses the need of observing some windows of opportunity—opportunities do not invite shifts in repertoires (towards more institutionalised strategies) unless they are visible and are perceived as such

¹⁴⁴ Note that Tarrow (2011: 207) defines institutionalisation in a broader way than I do, as "a movement away from extreme ideologies and/or the adoption of a more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention".

(McAdam et al. 2001: 43). Also, *appropriation* emphasises the importance of challengers seizing political opportunities and acting upon them (della Porta 2014a: ch.6). Electoral de-alignment is a traditional political opportunity-generating aspect of mobilisation (Tarrow 1989, 2011; Kriesi et al. 1995), but has also been of outmost importance for adopting more routinised tactics during the demobilisation phase. In the Spanish context, the main parties faced a crisis of confidence and support, and many felt that they were orphans of representation in the formal political arena (Tormey 2015). Electoral de-alignment especially hit the social democratic PSOE. Many challengers observed and appropriated the opportunity to mobilise a large constituency on the basis of protests' widely shared claims against austerity policies and the political status quo.

The second mechanism concerns organisational resources. Most anti-austerity performances were organised besides parties and unions in Spain, rooted in the horizontal, assembly-based and cultural practices of the Global Justice Movement (Flesher Fominaya 2015a). Contrary to organisational accounts of social movement studies that emphasise the asymmetric relationship between the leader and its supporters, left-libertarian organisations often portray informal membership and reject authoritative leadership, and even delegation (Brown 1989). However, not even left-libertarian movements are purely horizontal, as some actors act as centres of exchanges of resources between social movement organisations (i.e. the *brokers*), and have more influence than others (Diani 2003). Moreover, certain leadership functions such as coordination and public representation need to be fulfilled in order to forge a social movement community (Melucci 1996: 344-347), and mobilise its resources.

For movements to turn to more routinised practices and deliver their tasks effectively, they need to adapt their organisational settings to the changing environment. As Ganz (2010: 559) notes, “social movement leaders face particular challenges given the decentralised, self-governing, and voluntary mode in which movements operate... while decentralisation has benefits, it too can inhibit learning, constrict resources, and inhibit strategic coordination”. There is a tendency towards more formal leadership and organisational unity (e.g. the authorities and institutions need to exchange information

with formal speakers and representative voices of the movement, it is not always feasible to take decisions through horizontal and consensual mechanisms, some degree of delegation might be more effective in influencing policy-making, etc.). Provided that some actors are able to accumulate social capital and gain legitimacy and recognition, militants may become gradually supportive of performing a tactical change, pushing movements to adopt more institutional repertoires. Note that leadership roles imply neither keeping control over a unified organisation nor domination—understood as the capacity to impose sanctions over others—, but rather having influence given “certain actors’ location at the centre of exchanges of practical and symbolic resources among movement organisations” (Diani 2003: 106), which is often accompanied by some recognition of charisma.¹⁴⁵ Hence, *construction of symbolic leadership* is associated “with actors’ ability promote coalition work among movement organisations” and to establish connections to—and voice the challengers’ claims in—the media and the institutional arena (della Porta and Diani 2006: 143).

Expanding opportunities and existing organisational resources constitute the structural potential; they are necessary but insufficient to trigger institutionalisation. People attach subjective meanings to their situations, and these mediate between opportunity and action (McAdam 1982: 48). *Cognitive liberation*, which is crucial for mobilisation, is the process “by which members of some aggrieved group fashion the specific combination of shared understandings that are thought to undergird changes in collective action” (McAdam 2013). Before collective action can get under way, people must collectively frame their situations as unjust and consider them as amenable to change through group action (McAdam 1982: 51). Therefore, *perceived injustice* and *collective efficacy* determine social movement activity (McAdam 2013), but also the transition toward more routinised tactics. Specifically, two additional mechanisms, *facilitation* and *exhaustion*, mediate the impact of cognitive liberation on

¹⁴⁵ Looking at different dimensions, different leadership styles have been identified in the literature—e.g. *instrumental* or *affective* (Downton 1973); *charismatic*, *administrator* or *intellectual* (Killian 1964).

institutionalisation (Tarrow 2011).¹⁴⁶ As mentioned in chapter 3, collective action is costly because rewards from engaging in action are limited. Upon (at least partial) satisfaction of demands, the appetite of some challengers is whetted, and internal strategic divisions are likely to rise (Tarrow 2011)— see chapter 4, this thesis.¹⁴⁷ As time goes by, those less motivated in the periphery of the movement are more prone to defect; then challengers face a dilemma, they either moderate their strategies to fight defection or keep the most militant members involved (Tarrow 2011: 206).

However, I contend that even if (perceived as substantive) concessions do not follow insurgents' challenges, institutionalisation might still happen. In a context where grievances are pressing, lack of facilitation along with exhaustion might trigger the cognitive liberation mechanism, and the institutionalisation process might then unfold. It could happen when a substantive portion of the population is aggrieved and is mobilising (and many of the challengers' claims are widely shared by most citizens), but they face institutional closure. Absence of facilitation might in this case worsen the feelings of injustice. Thanks to cognitive cues at play, activists become aware that the (extra-conventional) repertoires they have been using are not effective in order to change the situation, and their strength is decreasing as divisions emerge. While protests decrease, and provided political opportunities and organisational resources become available, these cognitive cues might allow a relevant portion of challengers get convinced that redressing grievances collectively is feasible, but through alternative (more formal and routinised, regarded now as more potentially effective) channels of participation.

In a nutshell, building on political process theory, I offer an interpretation of the institutionalisation processes that might develop, neither in a tandem with radicalisation nor as a consequence of concessions, organisational competition and divisions among challengers. The tactical change towards more routinised forms of action, I argue, may

¹⁴⁶ Additionally, Tarrow (2011: ch.10) argues that repression shapes the trajectory of the cycle, but whether there are recurrent cross-case patterns is contested. While repression may bring about polarisation and strategic divisions, it might however reinforce the challenge to the regime.

¹⁴⁷ On the contrary, concessions may increase protesters' appetite (Koopmans 2004: 29), pushing them to stick to extra-conventional repertoires.

come about as the consequence of cognitive liberation cues in a crisis-dominated context, provided that there is exhaustion and lack of facilitation, and where appropriation of political opportunities and symbolic construction of leadership mechanisms are also operating.

3. THE SPANISH CYCLE OF PROTEST: FROM EXTRA-CONVENTIONAL MOBILISATION TO THE ELECTORAL STRATEGY

This piece focuses on the transition between demobilisation via protest during the Spanish cycle of collective action under the Great Recession and institutionalisation through newly created movement-related candidacies, which are one specific instance of electoral participation (see figures 7.1 and 7.2). Following the 2011 15M grassroots campaign, different parties flourished in Spain linked to specific claims (e.g. the ecologist EQUO in 2011, the pro-digital democracy citizen network *Partido X* in 2013)— see Postill (2016); see also chapter 3, this thesis. More remarkably, Podemos and various local-level platforms and parties (e.g. *Barcelona en Comú*, *Ahora Madrid*, *Marea Atlántica*) erupted in early 2014 and subsequent months. In contrast to traditional parties, they built on core demands of precursor protests, as Feenstra (2015: 251) points out. Originally, these consist of citizen groups that take a party form and get involved in formal politics as one— among many— strategies to foster political transformation (Tormey 2015; Subirats 2015a).




FIGURE 7.2. Participants in protest events in Spain, 01/2007- 02/2015, and demobilisation phase. Level of aggregation: monthly. Continuous line: participants in all

demonstration types, 5-period moving average. Orange: participants in anti-austerity, labour, crisis-centred and political status quo events, 5-period moving average. Circle: demobilisation phase (approx.). Data retrieved from El País (N=2,002). Own collection and elaboration (self-collected Protest Event Analysis). See Portos (2016a, 2016b); see also figure 3.3, this thesis.

Note that Podemos and other new electoral endeavours neither officially represent the anti-austerity and real democracy cycle of protest nor are simply the consequence of activists' consensual and unitary decisions. However, while it is only partial (Martín 2015: 109), there is a linkage between mobilisations and parties (Pastor 2013). These new electoral actors are born from the movements, translating some of its core demands into the electoral arena, and reproducing some of its distinctive traits, such as digital participatory tools for organisation (Romanos and Sádaba 2015; see Pavan 2016). Also, membership between these parties and organisations is often overlapping. Della Porta et al. (2017a) single out three distinctive features of new "movement parties", such as Podemos: 1) at the framing level, there is a general tendency towards a re-definition of the constituency through what Laclau (2007) calls the "populist reason", 2) organisational structures tend to be networked, diffuse, taking up the movement's claims for horizontal, rhizomatic structures,¹⁴⁸ and 3) an innovative protest repertoire is a central strategy. These parties not only embrace and collaborate with movements, but often keep resorting to protest performances as a strategic resource to keep their constituencies mobilised, gain visibility and contribute to setting the agenda. However, tensions between militants and opportunities that come from the disappointment of former voters of traditional parties have often created tensions in emerging parties.

All in all, a transformation in the political participation processes has taken place since late 2013 (Feenstra 2015). While protests decrease, institutional alternatives flourish (Subirats 2015b). Podemos and the like are "the answer presented by some 15M activists to find a better incorporation into institutional politics" (Calvo and Álvarez 2015: 120).¹⁴⁹ New parties created are one among several manifestations of an

¹⁴⁸ Decreasing organisational power of these *círculos* (local assemblies) in favour of the leading National Committee has often raised internal conflicts (e.g. during Podemos's foundational assembly in October 2014).

¹⁴⁹ My own translation from the original in Spanish.

institutionalisation process that followed the cycle of anti-austerity and for real democracy protest. I move next onto exploring the mechanisms that drove this institutionalisation process.

4. TAKING (TO) THE INSTITUTIONS

4.1. Appropriation of political opportunities

According to Pitkin (1972: 209), conflict between representatives and citizens should not normally take place, as the former must act in such a way to avoid it and, when it occurs, an explanation is called for. Political parties play a crucial role as intermediary institutions of political representation (della Porta 2009), linking constituencies and elites, channelling citizens' needs and demands, and translating them into policies. However, a political crisis has come to a head due to the inability of political elites to satisfy citizens' basic expectations, which fostered a distrustful view of political life and mechanisms and institutions of representation (see Montero et al. 1997; Gunther and Montero 2006).¹⁵⁰

Empirically, we can observe a steep decline in political trust in political parties across Southern European countries, particularly in Spain (figure 7.3; see also Pérez-Nievas et al. 2013). Spaniards' decreasing lack of trust in parties goes together with weakening party loyalties, a general feature of austerity-ridden scenarios (della Porta 2014a). Many citizens did not perceive that traditional parties were fulfilling their aspirations. Although the relationship between political trust and mobilisation is contested, in general, it is assumed that mistrust favours elite-challenging and extra-conventional participation, but is detrimental to elite-oriented and institutional options (e.g. Andretta et al. 2015; Braun and Hutter 2016). Conversely, the long cycle of anti-austerity protest facilitated the breakdown of bipartisan loyalties. Negative appraisals about parties became stronger following the 15M outburst in 2011. This loss of

¹⁵⁰ Disaffection is different from specific support on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The latter relies on outcomes and specific policy performance, and is empirically captured through political dissatisfaction (Gunther and Montero 2006)— see chapter 1, this thesis.

confidence affected the two major parties, as the trends in vote intention reflect (figure 7.4), but has not resulted in a general process of apathy and alienation from politics—in fact, citizens’ political involvement increased in recent years (Orriols and Rico 2014: 77-78; Lobera and Ferrándiz 2013).




FIGURE 7.3. Evolution of trust in political parties in Spain. Units: 0-100 percentage scale (Y-axis) and years 2001-2014 (X-axis). Question: “do you tend to trust (or not) [political parties]?”. Binary response. Source: Eurobarometer). Own elaboration.




FIGURE 7.4. Aggregated evolution of forecasted vote in the upcoming general election for PSOE, IU and bipartisan vote. Y-axis: 0-100 percentage scale. X-axis: time, 01/2007-02/2015. Continuous line: bipartisan percentage of vote, sum of PP and PSOE votes. Dotted line: PSOE votes. Dashed line: IU votes. Literal phrasing: “if the general election were going to take place tomorrow, for which party would you vote?” Source: CIS. I use estimated figures as corrected by the CIS with their own techniques and procedures to the detriment of direct vote spells, given the high level of uncertain and N/A values.

All in all, major political parties faced a crisis of trust and support in Spain during the recession. Voter de-alignment is a classical window of opportunity for movements

to turn to the electoral domain. One founder of Podemos explains how she perceived that majoritarian parties were not able to represent many voters, and therefore, this political opportunity came about:

“Many sectors of the population that had been well integrated in the social economic and political system fall behind. The two most noteworthy shocks were, on the one hand, a crisis of elite reproduction and middle classes and, on the other hand, the social exclusion of the working classes. This gives rise to groups who do not feel represented anymore under the current framework, the traditional political parties, the political system, etc.” (interview #I4).

While the 15M movement involved horizontal mechanisms and prefigurative dynamics, claiming for direct, inclusive democratic mechanisms, some 15M challengers gradually realised that the logic of political representation was not at stake itself. For many citizens the problem lay in the efficacy and legitimacy of the mechanisms of representation within the current political framework. As one 15M activist, who later became a founder of Podemos puts it:

“[...] more than 70% of people who self-identified as 15M supporters were not against (political) representation, but they refuted bipartisanship and the traditional left. We aimed at taking that empty space with Podemos” (interview #I5).

Specifically, some challengers managed to take advantage of a more general crisis of social democratic parties to advance the institutionalisation process. Following the global financial meltdown, social democratic parties did poorly in various national elections across Europe. Moreover, left-wing incumbents were punished to a greater extent than right-wing governments (Bartels 2014).¹⁵¹ Contrary to what happened in the 1930s, parties did not manage to promote a left-oriented political agenda as a response to the recession (e.g. active fiscal policies, public investment, new pro-welfare state programs)— see Lindvall (2014). After the Spanish centre-left government embraced a

¹⁵¹ Part of this effect is explained by the worsening economic conditions that left-wing governments faced while in office, as compared to their right-wing counterparts (Bartels 2014). Generally speaking, European incumbents— especially those in majoritarian countries— were punished for poor performance (Kriesi 2014b).

neoliberal agenda in May 2010,¹⁵² many PSOE voters felt disappointed with the party's response to the crisis, but no left-wing electoral alternative with the potential for winning was taking full advantage of this situation.¹⁵³

To summarise, political opportunities opened up in Spain as a result a growing electoral de-alignment, given a crisis of trust and support for the main parties, which punished especially the PSOE. Some sectors of the movements were able to observe and appropriate these opportunities and come up with electoral alternatives.

4.2. Symbolic construction of leadership

With reference to the specific case of Podemos, existing contributions underscore three dimensions that give continuity to the protest cycle. First, the party adapted social media strategies and practices from the movements (Romanos and Sádaba 2015). Podemos is a transmedia political party, which “combines logics of older and newer media as its organisational backbone” (Casero-Ripollés et al. 2016: 379; see also Postill 2016) and developed a multi-layered techno-political strategy where both “the front end”—i.e. elites—and “the back end”—i.e. grassroots—play an important role (Toret 2015). Second, there was some biographical continuity between anti-austerity challengers and members and supporters of Podemos (Lobera and Rogero-García 2016; Martín 2015; Fernández-Albertos 2015). Third, the party built on the movements' discursive construction of shared conceptions about democracy, the crisis, and austerity (Subirats 2015a)—what Errejón (2015) names “the re-articulation of an era's common sense”. A whole network of activists was politicised under this specific framework, a constituency the party could recruit from and appeal to. An additional organisational

¹⁵² As della Porta (2015b) remarks, EU institutions contributed to the PSOE government push towards embracing market liberalisation and austerity policies.

¹⁵³ Estimated electoral support for Izquierda Unida doubled. It increased from 4.7% in 2008 (2008 CIS barometers' average) to 10.5% in 2013 (2013 CIS barometers' average). Although it represents a remarkable increase in relative terms, IU was picking a small portion of disenchanted voters. Note that electoral competition and voting dispersion on the left is high in Spain (Lobera and Ferrándiz 2013).

element was key to triggering the institutionalisation process, though: the symbolic construction of leadership.

At the organisational level, electoral and protest arenas imply different logics. Anti-austerity protests were built on grassroots, with segmented and polycentric networks, consisting of diverse groups and leaders. Since institutionalisation is a relational process between social movements and the state, it requires leaders to emerge and represent the movement claims, set public positioning toward salient issues, and interact with institutional actors. The network structure of activists evolved over time in order to “structuring the space in which effective leadership can grow” (Ganz 2010: 559). Key figures became prominent in specific campaigns and organisations (e.g. the anti-evictions leader— and current mayor of Barcelona— Ada Colau). Also, different attempts within the movement avant-garde attempted to explore and advance electoral alternatives. Podemos emerged from these network interactions. The party’s onset was closely tied to the charisma of Pablo Iglesias, whose public speaking skills, critical stance against economic-political elites and austerity policies made him a usual talk show guest at various TV channels during the months prior to and during the party’s launching.¹⁵⁴ Some activists interpreted that they could use Iglesias’s growing popularity to launch a new political force based on some of the movement’s core claims. According to one activist and promoter of Podemos:

“it was pretty obvious that Pablo [Iglesias]’s image worked well on the TV and that he was appealing to different profiles of people, not only the traditional left [...] His popularity was on the rise, and some of us started to think that a political project could be organised with him in the leading role, in order to take advantage of his [Iglesias’s] relevance, and have a big media impact from the very beginning” (interview #15).

Thus, Iglesias gradually became a symbolic leader for many, which was key for the spread of resonating frames and the definition of the Podemos project, as it meant an

¹⁵⁴ He is the current Secretary General of Podemos. Although some members of Iglesias’s closest group quickly made it into the media, such as Íñigo Errejón (Secretary of Politics) and J. Carlos Monedero (ex-Secretary of Constituent Process and Program), the publicly exposed core of Podemos remained small.

opportunity for translating anti-austerity and for real democracy demands into the formal political arena. According to one interviewee:

“I got involved in Podemos because I heard Pablo Iglesias on TV, and I liked what he said. It was common sense [...] This was exactly what I thought about health policies, education, and cuts [...] I saw there was an opportunity to participate in politics and get things changed” (interview #I13).

However, in the transition from protest to more formal tactics, Iglesias’ emerging leadership and the personalisation of Podemos raised internal tensions as entered into conflict with the mobilisations’ *raison d’être*, which strived to fight delegation and representation (Martín 2015).¹⁵⁵ Some parallelisms can be traced between Podemos and other “movement parties”, such as the Italian *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (“Five Star Movement”), whose success is closely associated with the charismatic Beppe Grillo and the “leader as message” logic (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013). However, the wave of contestation that preceded M5S’s emergence in Italy consisted of scattered events, with no campaign comparable to the 15M (della Porta and Andretta 2013; Zamponi 2013).

4.3. Cognitive liberation

Both the appropriation of political opportunities and symbolic construction of leadership were pre-requirements for the institutionalisation process to develop. Also, cognitive liberation was necessary, even in the absence of facilitation, with persisting grievances and challengers’ exhaustion on the rise.

Activism is resource demanding, in terms of time, social and psychological commitment, etc. (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011; Fillieule 2013). From late 2013 onwards, there was a patent and generalised exhaustion of activists and repertoires of action, which led to a progressive decrease of protest performances. Along with the “exhaustion of the rewards of involvement” (Fillieule 2013), the initial euphoria of the *springtime of peoples* seemed to have evaporated. Many people still joined collective

¹⁵⁵ This fits the logic of the growing “personalisation of politics” (Garzia 2011). Contrary to the declining ability of social identities (e.g. class, religion) to predict individual partisan attachment, Garzia (2011, 2013) argues that the influence of voters’ attitudes towards party leaders is increasing.

actions, but with lower intensity. Movements and their repertoires had led to varying degrees of success, but room for attaining further aspirations through the same tactics was limited. In the Spanish cycle, the *Marea Verde* (the “green tide” campaign) against cuts in education gives us a good example— see chapter 3, this thesis. After ten official days of strike and several massive mobilisations between September and November 2011 in Madrid, protests’ size was decreasing. Pessimism spread among activists. Additionally, workers were losing financial resources, as money from the striking days gets discounted from their salaries, and policing of protests contributed to fatigue. Even though physical repression might have not increased over time, other mechanisms (less visible, less socially contested but harming and dissuasive for further mobilisations) were adopted, such as fining activists (Martín García 2014).

Although protests decreased since 2013, grievances persisted, both in material and subjective-attitudinal terms. On the one hand, there were high levels of inequality and unemployment (figure 7.5). On the other hand, most people kept considering that their own households’ financial situation was worse than in the past. Political management did not contribute to ease the situation. Besides continuous cuts in public spending, countless corruption scandals, critiques towards the lack of representativeness and transparency of politicians and institutions, broken manifesto promises and unpopular decisions adopted, contributed to increase political dissatisfaction (figure 7.5).




FIGURE 7.5. Evolution of grievances in Spain, 2007-2015. Purple: total unemployment in Spain. Green: satisfaction with the current political situation. Blue: retrospective financial situation (evolution of the household financial situation in the last 12 months). Sources: CIS barometers (for satisfaction; 1-4 scale re-standardised into 0-100), IMF’ IFS (for unemployment, 0-100) and OECD’s Business Tendency and Consumer Opinion

Surveys (for retrospective financial situation; the 5-category scale is inverted, and ranges from “much worse”= 100 to “much better”= -100). Level of aggregation: monthly.

Notwithstanding the Spanish activists’ efforts and size of protests, their demands were not translated into de facto policies. Both the conservative PP and social democratic PSOE have traditionally agreed on the central economic aspects over the last decades (Sampedro and Lobera 2014). As pointed out in chapter 2, the closed structure of opportunities and dominant culture of the transition have traditionally avoided conflict in the socio-political arena (Martínez 2012; Sampedro and Lobera 2014). Moreover, marginalisation of social protest by office-holders had been a constant in post-Francoist democracy (Fishman 2012). In recent times, pressures from financial markets and international institutions to adopt pro-austerity measures have reinforced the political closure from above, as della Porta (2014a, 2015b) remarks— what Feenstra (2015: 253) refers to as “minimal state permeability”. Generally, elites were impervious to anti-austerity protests and challengers perceived there was a blockage on the side of the Spanish authorities, which made facilitation impossible and, according to an activist, spurred the feeling “if we don’t do it, nobody else will” (interview #11). A promoter of the local candidacies observes a clear connection between non-facilitation and the institutionalisation dynamics, especially by launching new political alternatives:

“Podemos outburst has to do with how rigid the [Spanish] regime is and European politics are, as they react so slowly to social movements. While experiments start to happen all over the place, like in Greece [with Syriza], Podemos in Spain or M5S in Italy, these go beyond their control and social discontent starts to have a political [institutional] expression” (interview #13).

Many activists became aware of the lack of facilitation thanks to the PAH’s ILP experience (“Popular Legislative Initiative for Decent Housing”; see chapter 3, this thesis). The PAH launched this campaign to make legislators discuss a draft law proposal that fought evictions, ensured affordable housing and mortgage payment on account. PAH activists managed to gather 1.5 million signatures endorsing the ILP’s legal processing by February 2013 (Romanos 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2015b). However, the main parties in parliament (including PP, PNV, CIU, and also PSOE) blocked its admission, and approved an alternative law instead, different from the

proposed ILP. Despite the huge support gathered by the campaign, it brought about a dose of reality. Some activists understood that they could not fulfil their aspirations unless they gained access to institutions. According to an activist and member of Ahora Madrid, “movements were capable to build up legitimacy, but not alternative legality” (interview #I2). Protest repertoires seemed stuck due to the absence of facilitation. Protests reached a “glass ceiling”, as an interviewed activist put it (interview #I1). However, as grievances persisted, strategies and repertoires evolved— deliberately, as the same interviewee contends— in order to “democratise institutions to make demands effective” (interview #I1).

Different movement actors started to focus on supporting grassroots and electoral alternatives that were closely related to movements.¹⁵⁶ Throughout the cycle, given non-facilitation, cognitive cues made some activists aware that action repertoires that were already being deployed did little to effectively redress persisting grievances, and exhaustion grew. The cognitive liberation mechanism at play allows some activists become aware of this situation and envision more routinised channels of participation as potentially more effective to advance their claims than sticking to protest. As one 15M activist who is now a member of Podemos put it:

“Mobilisation [via protests] is indispensable, but as this cycle has proved, huge levels of mobilisation do not imply concrete victories [...] that’s why the idea of a new ‘institutionality’ spread among activists, because we cannot change policies only through our micro-politics. We need to get into the institutions, get them democratised and changed” (interview #I9).

While the 15M advanced very general claims, protests specialised as the cycle evolved (Portos 2016a; see chapter 3, this thesis). As many of them perceived that they were not succeeding at influencing policy-making, they gradually resorted to more formal repertoires (specifically, by forming new electoral alternatives that could

¹⁵⁶ Between 2008 and 2015, 1,596 new parties were registered in Spain, according to the Home Ministry (349 in 2008-2010, 577 in 2011-2013, 670 parties in 2014-2015). Note, however, that many of them might decide to run only at specific levels (i.e. local, regional, national, European elections), might not continue their activity over different elections, or— even if formally created— might not run electorally at all.

directly shape policies from the institutions). Accordingly, many movement sectors experienced an evolution in terms of collective consciousness and strategic framing after the 15M turning point. In the words of an activist:

“at the beginning, we claimed ‘they call it democracy, but it isn’t’ (*‘le llaman democracia y no lo es’*). Then, we moved onto a more confrontational tone with ‘we have no fear’ (*‘no tenemos miedo’*) and, finally, onto the ‘yes, we can!’ (*‘¡sí se puede!’*). These three mottos have marked the cycle and now we are in a very ‘yes, we can!’ momentum, we are taking the institutions” (interview #11).

4. CONCLUSION

How come some of the activists that boycotted the formation of new municipal governments in May 2011 have been appointed councillors, and even mayors, only four years later? Why was this change in strategic repertoires of mobilisation brought about?

While we know a great deal about dynamics of mobilisation and the influence that institutionalised social movement actors have on policy-making, little we know about how social movements gain routine access to formal politics. Focusing on a specific instance of institutionalisation (i.e. new party emergence in the aftermath of the cycle of protest under the Great Recession in Spain), I propose an interpretative framework to understand the shift towards more routinised tactics to the detriment of extra-conventional strategies.

In doing so, this chapter offers a three-fold contribution to extant literature. First, the same set of factors (resources, opportunities, cognitive liberation) that have been found to underlie mobilisation could also shape institutionalisation dynamics during the demobilisation phase of the cycle of protest. Even in a context with growing exhaustion on the side of challengers, persisting grievances and non-facilitation, *cognitive liberation* cues may lead to the shift of repertoires towards more routinised strategies. This is feasible provided the *appropriation of political opportunities* (coming from electoral de-alignment) and the *symbolic construction of leadership* (i.e. key actors who embody and translate some of the movements’ claims to the formal political arena) become available.

Second, traditional approaches contend that, as the cycle unfolds, internal divisions between moderate factions and radical strands are supposed to lead to the radicalisation-institutionalisation dichotomy, which make the cycle come to an end. I propose an alternative political process-centred account neither through competition between organisations nor in a tandem with radicalisation. Taking a relational approach to institutionalisation implies assuming that this process neither must take place within a cycle of protest nor can only be triggered during the demobilisation phase—in fact, one interesting avenue of inquiry would consist of testing the explanatory potential of mechanisms identified here for institutionalisation processes triggered at the peak of protest, from a longer-term perspective (e.g. some strands of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement; see Bosi 2016a, 2016b).

Third, by exploring the reasons for a strategic change in activists' repertoires towards more routinised options, this chapter sheds light on the emergence of new electoral endeavours such as Podemos and its relationship to the preceding cycle on which it builds on. Though based on a single case study, similar dynamics that gave rise to different institutionalisation processes during the so-called “neoliberal critical junctures” can be observed in Italy or Greece in organisational, strategic and framing domains (della Porta et al. 2017a). However, discontinuities between these cases in terms of institutionalisation are also noteworthy. Although the traditional factors identified in the literature of mobilisation can help make sense of institutionalisation, as this piece tries to show, it remains an open-ended process, not inevitable, contingent on a complex set of interactions within activist networks and between challengers and state actors.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: movements of crisis?

In the final chapter, I will reflect upon the main contributions of this thesis in relation to four aspects. I have spoken to two distinct— yet complementary— bodies of literature throughout. On the one hand, a part of the thesis has sought to bring back, reformulate and reassess the adequacy of grievance theories to account for mobilisation dynamics in the Spanish austerity-ridden scenario in a compatible way (that is, not as an alternative) to political process accounts (see chapters 1, 4, 5, 6). On the other hand, from a cycle of collective action-centred perspective, I have tried to shed light on and make sense of key turning points, patterns and trajectories of mobilisation in the last years (see chapters 3, 7). Then, I will reflect on how this thesis can be read from a mechanistic point of view and how, through these lenses, the set of middle-range theories developed and refined throughout can contribute to the understanding of grand social phenomena. I will close the conclusion with a brief reflection on the implications of my thesis for the broader Spanish political context.

1. GRIEVANCES FOR MOBILISATION

As a number of contributions have suggested, the global financial recession and the— far from homogeneous— countries' crises and levels of popular contestation have reinforced the need to re-consider, re-conceptualise and subject grievances-associated aspects to empirical scrutiny across different settings (e.g. Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Bernburg 2015; della Porta 2015a; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Quaranta 2015). I have argued throughout that factors related to strain and breakdown might be crucial to account for mobilisation in contexts where deprivation prevails. A part of this thesis makes the case for a nuanced vision of grievances that, not in contrast with but in a complementary way to other approaches— especially political process—, can provide enlightening views on the dynamics of mobilisation (see chapters 1, 4, 5,6). Grievances might matter for protest in times of hardship, but how and to what extent?

I contend— and supply empirical evidence— against a consistent association between material-objective aspects (taken on their own) and protest behaviour in a recession-ridden context. There is neither a systematic and robust relationship between material grievances (e.g. unemployment) and protest size fluctuations at the aggregate level of analysis, as evidenced with time series data in chapter 4,¹⁵⁷ nor a direct association between income-job status and individual protest likelihood, as results based on online panel data show (chapter 5, this thesis). Siding with relative deprivation accounts, determinants of mobilisation are not so much the material conditions that individuals face, but how grievances and reasons for voicing discontent are constructed and perceived by relevant actors. When economic and political crises develop together, as in the Spanish case, I contend, taking into account both the political and socioeconomic subjective-attitudinal dimensions of grievances is crucial to explaining dynamics of protest.

I find a strong association between political grievances and protest size fluctuations, on the one hand, and individual-level protest likelihood, on the other hand.¹⁵⁸ Although reverse causality was not found between aggregate protest size and political discontent, a more complex picture can be observed using panel data. Subjective-attitudinal grievances seem to mediate the effect of objective-material indicators on protest participation. When attitudes are introduced, the effects of some material indicators associated with relative loss on protest likelihood become significant.¹⁵⁹ Importantly, I find that material grievances (level of income, job status, being on a mortgage, depending on a civil servant or public worker's income) lead to egotropic perceptions of the economy that boost sociotropic ones, and these fuel

¹⁵⁷ As discussed in p. 108, note the partial exception of inflation in models 3-4 (table 4.3).

¹⁵⁸ Political grievances are measured by evaluations of the general political situation at the aggregate level of analysis and government/opposition approval at the individual level. Note that only incumbent support affects probabilities of protesting.

¹⁵⁹ Based on the online panel data, I find that some specific groups, which are losers of the recession in relative terms, seem more prone to protest. For instance, the highest income in the household coming from a public worker or civil servant increases protest likelihood, according to panel regressions (table 5.3). This result is robust to GSEM analyses (table 5.5). Also, GSEM analyses suggest that those on a mortgage are more likely to protest (table 5.5)— however, this effect is not robust to panel regression analyses (table 5.3).

political grievances, which in turn have an impact on protest. Conversely, having participated in protest seems to worsen political grievances, which affects sociotropic perceptions of the economy, and these affect egotropic views. In short, not only do subjective grievances mediate the effect of material indicators on protest behaviour, but there also might be a processual-type association between grievances and protest participation, which feed back on each other.

In chapter 6, thanks to additional survey data on the 15M campaign specifically, I both depart from treating participants as a homogeneous whole by considering different frequencies of participation in protest and include non-participants. Consistent with prior findings, there is an association neither between objective-material grievances nor between subjective-attitudinal socioeconomic grievances and different frequencies of participation relative to non-involvement. However, I nuance my prior results by showing that the association between political grievances (measured through dissatisfaction with democracy) holds for multiple-time protesters, but not for one-time challengers relative to non-participants in the 15M campaign. In contrast with what the “*Real Democracy Now!*” and “*They call it democracy but it isn’t*” mottos might have suggested, not all *indignados* were that outraged with democracy, but only a specific subset (i.e. that of multiple-time challengers).

In short, chapters 1, 4, 5 and 6 develop a comprehensive framework— backed by empirical evidence— that sheds light on the complex relationship between grievances and protest behaviour. I have considered different levels of explanation, have taken into account the longitudinal dimension and have deliberately avoided turning a blind eye to common limitations of empirically-oriented contributions within social movement studies. In the research design of the abovementioned chapters, I have specifically given weight to aspects such as relational processes, reverse causality, case-control design and treating protesters as a non-homogeneous whole. Next, some of the limitations this thesis is subject to are discussed in relation to grievance theories, some findings are refined and some avenues for further inquiry are pinpointed.

First, the overall relevance of grievances-centred theories to account for mobilisation dynamics— even in times of hardship— should be nuanced. I argue that, together with other factors (e.g. political opportunities, resources and frames for collective action), the framework developed here contributes to understanding the mobilisation process in a recession-ridden context (see figure 1.2, this thesis). Assumedly, grievances-related factors are neither the only root causes nor the only direct determinants of protest participation. Aspects such as political opportunities, which are crucial to accounting for the evolution of mobilisation and public discourse in scenarios not dominated by a recession, keep playing an important explanatory role also under the Great Recession across different European countries (e.g. Cinalli and Giugni 2016; see also Caren et al. 2016). Although different levels of explanation are considered throughout, one promising avenue of inquiry would consist of bridging these levels of empirical analysis in order to explore the micro-macro linkages between these sets of factors for explaining protest (see Opp 2009). Accordingly, some authors have argued that the impact of individual feelings of relative deprivation on protest engagement is moderated by macroeconomic and political contextual factors (e.g. Giugni and Grasso 2016a; Grasso and Giugni 2016a, 2016b).

Second, the data available and operationalisation leeway are limited. For instance, in chapters 4-6, I could only measure individual relative deprivation as attitudes towards one's own— or one's household's— situation in the past (not as individual losses relative to other members of society). In the Icelandic case, Bernburg (2015) finds that perceived economic loss is associated with increased protest support and participation, provided that citizens perceived that the crisis has harmed them more than others. Assessing the potentially interactive effect of these two dimensions of egotropic perceptions of the economy (i.e. either looking at one's own previous performance or the society as the benchmark) on protest involvement with micro-data would be interesting in the Spanish case. It could potentially complete the analytical framework proposed to understand the relationship between grievances and mobilisation (see figure 5.1, this thesis).

Additionally, different indicators are used to capture political grievances (discontent with the general political situation, government/opposition approval, democratic dissatisfaction). While these specific indicators capture different touches, they all refer to specific support for democracy. Although ultimately influenced by other (both objective-material and subjective-ideational socioeconomic) dimensions of grievances, I have supported the view that these indicators of political grievances are not merely economic performance-driven (siding with e.g. Magalhães 2016). Yet, analysing to what extent the evolution of these indicators is determined by factors such as perceptions of corruption,¹⁶⁰ and whether socioeconomic grievances moderate the specific effect of corruption (i.e. isolated from general political grievances) on protest dynamics presents a promising avenue of inquiry— provided that data are available. As Miley (2016: 4) points out, in Spain “the very same stresses on the social fabric caused by the sharp rises in inequality, high unemployment, cuts in welfare services, and the exposure of systemic corruption has created an ideological climate more propitious for ‘contentious’ brands of politics and even of popular mobilization”.¹⁶¹

Third, an inquiry based on one single case could— in fact, should— raise some generalisability concerns. Specifically, it could be argued that the overall line of reasoning behind my framework is case-driven (i.e. the direct association between material aspects and mobilisation is mediated by political ideational configurations), because the political crisis that unfolded in parallel to the socioeconomic one in Spain was particularly salient, as some evidence indicates. According to Zamponi and Bosi (2016), claims directly addressing the government, public administration and policies in Spain were triple those of Greece and Italy. Therefore, one might contend that even if my results account for mobilisation under the Great Recession in Spain, this case is a

¹⁶⁰ Some studies have shed light on attitudes toward corruption in Spain. For example, based on a survey experiment, Anduiza et al. (2013) find that partisanship may induce tolerance to same-party corruption practices, but the partisan bias fades away as political awareness increases.

¹⁶¹ A series of corruption scandals came into the spotlight under the Great Recession in Spain. Importantly, the ruling conservative Partido Popular and Mariano Rajoy’s government had their credibility undermined with “the exposure of a parallel accounting system and illegal slush fund for prominent party officials” in 2013, following the publication of the “handwritten account ledgers by former party treasurer, Luis Bárcenas” (Miley 2016: 5).

rara avis, an outlier, rendering generalisation problematic. A couple of clarifications are in order, however.

On the one hand, it is never claimed that the proposed framework helps to understand mobilisation dynamics in all movements that have taken place under the Great Recession— not to say that this is an overarching framework to understand all sorts of mobilisation processes. How well this framework allows us to grasp the relationship between grievances and mobilisation in other similar cases, particularly in the other Southern European cases hardly hit by the recession(s), remains an empirical question. Second, although political grievances might have been particularly salient in the Spanish public discourse, a steep increase in political grievances during the recession seems a widespread pattern across Southern Europe, as the trends of satisfaction with democracy in the last three decades in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain show (see figure 8.1).¹⁶²




FIGURE 8.1. Evolution of satisfaction with democracy (measured as the proportion of respondents who are 'fairly' or 'very' satisfied) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the average in other West European countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden), 1985-2013. 95% confidence intervals. Smoothing functions were applied (spline interpolation). Vertical

¹⁶² It is not clear yet whether the fluctuations of predictors associated with political grievances account for the trajectory of protest size in other Southern European cases. It also needs to be disentangled to what extent challengers in these countries are more politically dissatisfied than the average citizen.

dotted lines mark the beginning of the 1990s and late-2000s recessions. Source: Quaranta and Martini (2016), based on Eurobarometer data.

A final remark to be made concerns the argument of political grievances being determinants of protest dynamics, which might resemble that of Pippa Norris's (1999, 2011) *critical citizens* being the core protesters. According to the critical citizens' framework, these individuals would be characterised by an interplay of critical attitudes toward performance in *really-existing democracies*, on the one hand, and a strong support for democratic ideals, on the other hand (e.g. Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999, 2011; Dalton 2004). Hence, they would adhere strongly to democratic values, but not to existing structures of representative government. Although partially overlapping, my argument differs from proponents of the critical citizens' approach and nuances it in a number of ways.

First, deprivation and (specific) political support are not treated as alternative explanations for mobilisation here. When a socioeconomic-cum-political crisis unfolds as in the Spanish context under austerity, the political dimension might mediate the effect of objective-material and subjective-attitudinal socioeconomic grievances on protest involvement, which in turn affect political grievances, thereby feeding back on mobilisation potentials (see e.g. chapter 5, this thesis). Second, not all protesters are critical citizens, because political grievances (captured through democratic dissatisfaction) are not a constant feature of protesters, but of some groups of challengers (see e.g. chapter 6, this thesis). Third, Spanish protesters do not necessarily embrace democratic ideals to a deeper degree than non-participants. In light of the results, I can conclude that Spanish challengers in the shadow of austerity are neither disaffected citizens nor the most democratically committed individuals.¹⁶³ Fourth, being

¹⁶³ Although excluded in most reported models due to over-specification concerns, coefficients for attitudes related to general support for democracy, such as trust in political institutions, are insignificant (e.g. chapter 6, this thesis; see also Gunther and Montero 2006). In order to capture the level of regime support, there is one additional three-category question on the preferred regime type in the INJUVE (2012) survey used in chapter 6 (1= democracy is always the preferred regime type; 2= sometimes another regime type might be preferred over a democracy; 3= all regimes are the same). I re-run the same multivariate analyses in table 3 (chapter 6, this thesis) with a dummy dependent variable on protest participation (thus using logit regressions to the detriment of multinomial logit) and adding the 3-

a critical citizen pre-requires having some minimal resources (in terms of education, income) and featuring some degree of political awareness (interest, efficacy, information). From my results, it can be observed that challengers in the shadow of austerity are neither resourceless people nor those with more resources than the average citizen. In terms of awareness, results are inconsistent and inconclusive. Political efficacy is not found to predict protest involvement. While multiple-time challengers are interested in and informed about politics (chapter 6, this thesis), no robust effects are found with online panel data (chapter 5, this thesis).¹⁶⁴

In short, consistent with my approach and results, I can conclude that protesters in the shadow of austerity are politically aggrieved, but do not seem critical citizens in Norris's (1999, 2002, 2011) sense. To be sure, those who protest are neither more apathetic and disaffected nor the most committed democrats (i.e. those less likely to give up democracy as an ideal). Challengers do not necessarily share specific traits toward fundamental aspects of the political system (what Easton's 1975 would call "diffuse support")— or at least, they do not diverge fundamentally from the average citizen in that regard—, but share more critical evaluations of the authorities' performance and governance (the so-called "specific support"; see Easton 1975; Torcal and Montero 2006: 8-10). Precisely, conceptualising— and showing empirical support for— political grievances as instances of specific support represents an innovation in relation to previous studies, which understand that political grievances include diffuse

category indicator on the preferred regime type as a predictor. The coefficient for the preferred regime type is never significant.

¹⁶⁴ On the basis of logit panel regressions with random effects and the GSEM analyses, both political interest and information seem to account for protest participation (model 6, table 5.3 and model 1, table 5.5). However, the empirical evidence from panel regressions with fixed effects is not consistent. While the coefficient for political interest is never significant with fixed effects, the effect of political information only holds if the grievances-related predictors are unlagged (models 3-4, table 5.3). Additionally, neither political interest nor information predict one-time participation in the 15M campaign in a clear, robust way (table 6.2).

support-oriented indicators, such as institutional confidence (e.g. Dalton et al. 2010; Andretta and della Porta 2015).¹⁶⁵

2. CYCLES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Besides focusing on grievances, this thesis also takes a processes-centred stance. It deals with the dynamics of a cycle of collective action that developed under the Great Recession in Spain. As mentioned in chapter 3, a *cycle* is understood as a period of heightened conflict across the social system that brings about an increase in contentious performances, organisations engaged in collective action and interactions between different actors involved in claim-making activities, such as challengers and authorities (Tarrow 2011: 199; see also Tilly 2008).¹⁶⁶ Waves of contention have been recurrent themes among scholarly debates. They have explicitly placed interactions between multiple contenders unequally distributed across time and space at the core of social movement studies. Different aspects have been studied in detail: mobilisation and demobilisation, strategies, repertoires, identities, frames, etc— see e.g. Tarrow (1989); Kriesi et al. (1995); Traugott (1995); McCarthy et al. (1996); Beissinger (2002); della Porta and Diani (2006: 163-192). While I have focused at length on the expansive part of the cycle (see Koopmans 2004),¹⁶⁷ in order to avoid incorporating only successful instances of mobilisation,¹⁶⁸ I analyse different critical points of the cycle of collective action beyond the peak of protest (e.g. chapters 3, 4, 7) and look not only at participants, but also consider non-participants (e.g. chapters 5, 6).

¹⁶⁵ Note that political grievances are defined in different ways in the literature. For instance, Kawalerowicz and Biggs (2015) consider attitudes over repression and towards the police as political grievances.

¹⁶⁶ Some sections of the thesis are focused on specific campaigns within the protest cycle, though.

¹⁶⁷ Chapters 5 and 6 deal with grievances for mobilisation in a part of the peak period (2010-2012) and the 15M, one specific campaign that acted as the triggering point of an outburst in protest activities. Although chapter 3 does not only cover the peak of the cycle, it aims at making sense of the persistence of protest activities over time.

¹⁶⁸ On the dangers of the tendency among social movement scholars toward sampling on the dependent variable, see McAdam and Boudet (2012); Zamponi (2013).

Although zoomed into a specific country, the salience and level of mobilisations in Spain make it a case worth addressing in detail. Specifically, some sections of this thesis have taken a more dynamic and process-oriented perspective in order to grasp the diachronic trajectory of mobilisations in the shadow of the recession, and to shed light on the different stages in the wave lifespan (see chapters 3, 7).

By accounting for general protest fluctuations, key turning points and phases from the lenses of the classic theory of the cycle of collective action, I find that the peak of protest in the Spanish mobilisation domain, 2007-2015, persisted for a relatively long time— for about a couple of years, from mid-2011 until late 2013. I contend that postponed institutionalisation, together with contained radicalisation attempts, account for the long duration of the peak. Although the trajectory of protest cycles is in general very unpredictable and contingent, I argue that three specific aspects are key to understanding the evolution of the Spanish cycle of protest: 1) issue specialisation of protest after the first triggering points, 2) the role of alliance building between traditional agents (e.g. the main unions) and new actors that emerged during the cycle (e.g. 15M assemblies) in shaping the dynamics of protest, and 3) making sense of how and why the institutionalisation process came about— at the moment it did.

As argued in chapter 3, the peak of protests persisted because the 15M evolved from a general fight against austerity and the political status quo to decentralised neighbourhood assemblies and the specialisation of specific fronts of contention, which allowed to set more easily attainable goals and, therefore, enhance rewards from action involvement. In addition, a general trend towards radicalisation through the cycle was not observed. Radical shocks were contained as activists needed to build strategic alliances with more traditional actors such as unions in order to deliver massive eventful performances and keep general levels of public contestation high. Building some kind of (assumedly informal, unstable and occasional) alliances was in the interest of both new and traditional actors. While unions are losing control over the mobilisation realm due to the outburst and strength of new *indignados*-like actors in the Spanish cycle, new actors do not have the resources that unions do (e.g. money, time, expertise, legitimacy, access to media and officials) to keep broad sectors of the population mobilised.

In order to give leverage to this argument, additional strands of work could aim at tracing comparisons with the Portuguese trajectory of mobilisation under austerity. In contrast with the Spanish case, Carvalho and Portos (2016) argue that Portuguese protest campaigns and organisations that emerged after the *Geração à Rasca* (“Precarious Generation”) events in March 2011 never reached the strength that their Spanish counterparts had, and therefore their bargaining power in front of traditional actors to build alliances, such as the major unions, was limited— see also Baumgarten (2013); Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015). Additionally, overlapping membership contributed to the lack of autonomy of some transversal platform initiatives in Portugal, such as *Que se Lixe a Troika*.¹⁶⁹ This platform, which was largely dominated by second-rank members of the left-wing party *Bloco de Esquerda*,¹⁷⁰ ended up fading away as more institutionalised actors took over the control and organisation of dissent (Carvalho and Portos 2016).

Going beyond radicalisation and alliance-building processes, in chapter 7 I focus on a key process during the demobilisation phase, institutionalisation. Contrary to the dominant view in the literature, I argue that the same three sets of factors that the political process tradition has identified as crucial for accounting for mobilisation (i.e. opening political opportunities, resource mobilisation and cognitive liberation; see McAdam 1982) are helpful for understanding the institutionalisation process in the aftermath of the Spanish cycle of anti-austerity and for real democracy protests. By focusing on one specific instance of institutionalisation (i.e. the emergence of the new challenger party Podemos), I contend that three specific mechanisms concatenated to facilitate the transition from extra-institutional to more routinised forms of action of some movement strands: 1) political opportunities that emerged from electoral de-alignment are appropriated by certain groups of challengers; 2) construction of symbolic leadership takes place; 3) cognitive liberation cues allow some activists to reconsider— and change— the movement strategy as a way to redress more effectively

¹⁶⁹ It stands for the “Fuck the Troika” platform (i.e. referring to the EC, ECB and IMF regulators as “the Troika”).

¹⁷⁰ It stands for the “Left Bloc” party.

pressing grievances through coordinated action, given the absence of facilitation and exhaustion.

All the same, with regards to literature on cycles of collective action, this thesis offers a three-fold contribution:

First, even if the institutionalisation and radicalisation processes might help to understand the trajectory of mobilisation, there is a fundamental stochastic component in the evolution of movement trajectories (i.e. mobilisations are subject to random or probabilistic processes; see Oliver and Myers 2002; Koopmans 2004). How institutionalisation-radicalisation processes come to play, how they interplay and what impact they have on relevant agents and their interactions do not seem to be driven by recurrent patterns. Although we know a great deal about determinants of participation, building a general overarching theory of protest growth and development seems a chimera, as the cycles' unfolding is contingent upon a number of aspects that are random. Yet, the combination of— and potential impact on the overall trajectory of protest of— the two specific mechanisms found behind the non-radicalisation trend in the Spanish case (i.e. decentralisation-specialisation and alliance building) present an interesting avenue of inquiry, which is worth exploring in other cases and contexts.

Second, mobilisation outcomes are unpredictable *ex ante*. However, as the cycle unfolds, relevant actors largely respond to (not only, but also endogenous to the mobilisation process') incentives and stimuli. Particularly in relation to the coalition-building process, it is argued that for two parties to coalesce (in this case, new and old actors in the cycle of protest, such as the 15M assemblies and the main unions), it is fundamental that both perceive that the move is rewarding. If they do not need each other, even precarious and informal alliances are unlikely to be built. Additional strands of research could try to formalise under which specific conditions collaboration pays off.

Third, the study of mobilisation and processes around it requires adopting longitudinal lenses. Following the turning point that the 15M campaign meant, there was a conservative electoral backlash at the regional and local levels only one week

after the events began in May 2011, confirmed at the national level half a year later when the PP won an absolute majority in the December 2011 general election. In spite of the 15M's success in mobilising— and levels of popular support and legitimacy (Sampedro and Lobera 2014)—, protests did not seem to have a dramatic impact in the electoral arena (see Jiménez 2012; Anduiza et al. 2014b). Only at a certain point in time, after the protests had peaked for a long time, some protesters started to look at— and launch initiatives to take to— the institutions. Although the case of Podemos might be a paradigmatic and successful case of institutionalisation through a new party that embodied some claims and encompassed some cadres of the movements, many other attempts did not succeed— or vanished quickly (e.g. Partido X). Hence, taking a longitudinal stance is important to unravel and make sense of the evolution of protest, interactions between relevant actors, patterns and consequences beyond observable short-term dynamics. Also, a longitudinal perspective contributes to understanding momentum. Some processes, such as institutionalisation, unfold because certain mechanisms are operating only at a certain point in time. Hence, not only opportunities, resources, framing or emotions are important to account for the dynamics of the cycle, but timing and path-dependent factors (e.g. previous decisions, interactions, endeavours) also shape the trajectory of protest.

3. THE META-THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Resource mobilisation and political process perspectives are often criticised on the grounds of their structural biases (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Kriesi 2004: 75; Noakes and Johnston 2005: 3). These traditions have nonetheless improved our understanding of how mobilisation occurs *vis à vis* their proximate political context and how movements mobilise resources on behalf of their claims. Their focus has been on the degree of openness or closure of formal institutions, elite divisions, allies, repression-facilitation, organisational strength, etc. (e.g. McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995). Thus, the term *structuralist* concerns the short-term political context and intra-movement factors. While the latter have been reinforced, big macro-structural questions have been eluded in most social movement accounts over the last decades

(Walder 2009; Tarrow 2012: 8)— some remarkable exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. Tilly et al. 1975; Skocpol 1979). Although the endogenous life of social movements is intrinsically important, this “Ptolemaic turn” might exaggerate social movements’ overall importance and distort the causal dynamics around the broader episodes of contention in which they are embedded (McAdam and Boudet 2012: 2-22).

However, (macro-)structural aspects were once at the core of early studies on social mobilisation. According to McAdam et al. (2001:21), structuralist accounts assume that participation in episodes of contention “conforms to decisions of social organisation to which the theories of structure and change [...] assign distinctive interests and capacities”. There are two classic structuralist traditions: *social-classist* and *statist*, depending on whether changes in society or the state fabric are seen as the primary causes for social conflict and contentious actions.¹⁷¹ Whereas the first is Marxist-influenced (e.g. Lenin, Gramsci, world-systems theorists, etc.), the second is more heterogeneous— although non-Marxist— (from Michels and Tocqueville to Furet and Skocpol). However, none of them give a satisfactory account in terms of linking long-term structural changes with shorter-term dynamics of contention. These are still pressing challenges (Tarrow 2012: 8-9, 25). Although it is assumed that explanatory variables may be as much in flux as the movements that they are supposed to explain during intense waves of protest (Koopmans 2004: 21), research connecting broad macro-structural changes with short-term dynamics of contention is still scant (with some noteworthy exceptions; see e.g. Klandermans et al. 1988).

Although structural aspects have been considered throughout (via objective-material grievances, mostly), mine is not a purely structuralist account. Structures’ reproduction is never guaranteed, mainly due to cultural schemas (Sewell 1992). The latter, introduced in social movement studies by framing theorists,¹⁷² refer to expectations about how things do and should work (Polletta 2008). Treating cultures as

¹⁷¹ There have been noteworthy contributions that combine both structuralist logics, like Skocpol’s (1979) study of the French, Russian and Chinese social revolutions.

¹⁷² Framing approaches are rooted in symbolic interactionism-constructivism: meanings arise through interpretative processes/signifying work mediated by culture (for an overview, see Benford and Snow 2000).

schemas has reinforced the interpretive dimension of collective action— how a problem is defined determines whether people will mobilise around it (Polletta 2008: 84). Thereby, schemas help both to capture how culture constrains practical action and culture's variable power relative to structure in constituting interests. I conceive culture as *institutional schemas*, which are the models underpinning sets of routinised practices around culturally defined purposes (Jepperson 1991). Institutional cultural schemas go beyond (and chronologically before) activists' framing of causes for mobilisation, assessing familiar and routinised practices that become problematic and create new actors and interests in contention (Polletta 2008: 85). Thereby, we cannot understand dynamics of protest and the timing of mobilisation by simply capturing instrumental framing efforts of established groups. The larger cultural context in which an idiom of activism made sense should be analysed— i.e. how have given rationales for protest gained currency and succeeded over time? (Polletta 2006: 37). This understanding allows for the incorporation of cultural dynamics, in my case particularly through subjective-attitudinal grievances.

Along with *culturalist* understandings, literature often recognises the importance of a structural base to explain larger campaigns and more enduring social movements (e.g. Klandermans et al. 1988). Nonetheless, it also points out the non-existing direct causal relationship between structural changes and contentious dynamics, as the causal association would be mediated by changing relations of power and alignments (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly et al. 1975). Thereby, if this direct causal association cannot be drawn, how can one account for it?

3.1. The structure vs agency debate, contentious politics and mechanisms

According to Anthony Giddens's (1979) notion of "duality of structures", where structures are both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems, structure is intrinsic to the world of action, and vice versa. However, I do not rely on structuration theory. "By treating structure and agency as fully coterminous [... we] cannot distinguish ontologically and methodologically between the two", destroying their analytical utility (Beissinger 2002: 12; see Archer 1995: 65). *Structure*

is understood throughout as the unevenly articulated network of relatively stable (social, cultural, economic, political) alignments that emerge from and govern social relations (Archer 1995; Sewell 1996). However, narrowly focusing on the actions of structural factors on agents ignores contingency—and the opposite would elevate contingency to the first causes (Tarrow 2012: 72). Thus, contentious politics cannot be “boil[ed] down to structural determinants, nor does it evaporate into the thin ether of agency” (Tarrow 2012: 72). Then, how can one recover the process of contention? It can be done by examining the mechanisms that constitute it.

The push towards the study of contentious politics from a dynamic-interactive mechanisms-based approach that overcomes deterministic neo-positivism has been part of a general trend in the social sciences (McAdam et al. 2001; Mayntz 2004; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Besides controversies beneath their meanings and usages (see Gerring 2008), while mechanisms can be thought of as sequences of causally linked events that lead from the *explanans* to the *explanandum* (Little 1991; Mayntz 2004; Héritier 2008), processes refer to “regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar, generally more complex and contingent, transformations of those elements” (McAdam and Tarrow 2011: 3).

Mechanisms-based explanations are acquiring a primordial ontological status (George and Bennett 2005). They get us beyond correlation and into causation (Hall 2003), as correlation-seeking research do not provide a sound basis for inferring causality (Bennett and George 1997: 2). “Good research generally does try to get at mechanisms” instead of narrowly focusing on X-Y co-variation (Earl 2008: 357; see Mayntz 2004; Gerring 2010). In other words, it should step away from merely describing regularities and try to explain why that co-variation happens (Pawson 2000: 288, cited in Mayntz 2004: 238). Therefore, mechanism-based accounts go beyond general covering laws from the so-called “classic social movement agenda” (McAdam 2003: 128; McAdam et al. 2001). By contrast, mechanisms accounting for relations, dynamics and innovations that characterise contention become protagonists (McAdam et al. 2008: 307-308).

Notwithstanding this, critiques towards mechanisms-oriented approaches in contentious politics and, particularly, its development in— and following— the groundbreaking contribution *Dynamics of Contention* by McAdam et al. (2001) have been salient (see special issues in *Mobilization* 2003, 2011 and *Qualitative Sociology* 2008; see also Norkus 2005; Demetriou 2009). For instance, Rucht (2003: 114) stresses the need of explaining why some mechanisms are prevalent or absent in given contentious episodes in order to avoid the *ad hoc* identification of mechanisms. It is not clear how these mechanisms interact, and what consequences they produce under which circumstances, as neither the same concatenation of mechanisms can explain different outcomes nor the same outcome can be explained by divergent concatenations— in other words, the effects of mechanisms must be predictable (Earl 2008: 357; see also Koopmans 2003: 117; Rucht 2003; Oliver 2003; Norkus 2005). However, mechanisms involve irreducibly stochastic elements relative to their outcomes (Demetriou 2009: 459). To put it another way, mechanisms do not involve deterministic thinking, as they only affect the probability of a given effect (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).

In substantive terms, mechanisms are the intermediate steps through which a certain outcome follows from some initial conditions (Mayntz 2004: 241). To be clear, mechanisms are not intervening variables, as the latter are not process links, unlike mechanisms (Mahoney 2001: 578; Mayntz 2004: 244-245). However, adequate causal explanations usually combine measures of effects on Y with hypothesised and observed causal mechanisms through which that effect is achieved (Bennett and George 1997: 2-3). Not in vain, a causal mechanisms-based argument “without any appeal to covariational patterns between explanans and explanandum would be futile” (Gerring 2008: 166). A causal argument is more convincing when causal mechanisms are specified and covariational patterns consistent with it are identified (Gerring 2008: 175).

Note, however, that there is an ongoing scholarly debate on the relationship between mechanisms and variables. For instance, Mahoney (cited in George and Bennet 2005: 143) understands that “causal mechanisms that become observable because of better measurement start to lose their status as causal mechanisms and become regular variables”. There are two criticisms that should be dealt with here, though. First, even

if mechanisms might be unobservable constructs in the last instance (Little 1991; Bennett and George 1997: 143-145; Elster 1998; Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 13-15; Mahoney 2001, 2004), siding with Gerring (2008: 166), I contend that the observability of mechanisms is a matter of degree, as they might be more or less observable. Second, if variables are derived from mechanisms by measuring the frequency with which certain mechanisms occur, the frequencies—not the mechanisms themselves—become variables (McAdam et al. 2008). The underlying meta-theoretical aspiration of a part of this thesis (chapters 4, 5, 6) precisely consisted of linking frequencies of a specific mechanism (related to grievances, in this case) with given outcomes. It should be noted that the frequencies of some mechanisms' occurrence can be better observed and captured at the aggregate level. Furthermore, some of these mechanisms may operate at the macro or meso levels.

This leads us to the next point. Even though recent developments have pushed towards micro-foundational views of mechanisms where “macro is out, and micro is in” (Gerring 2007: 177), I follow a multi-level mechanisms-based account, which is in line with the mechanistic-realist paradigm that Tilly—and Tilly and his collaborators—developed (see Demetriou 2009; Máiz 2011). I regard mechanisms as an illustration of wide-ranging phenomena, far from approaches based on strict methodological individualism that do not recognise explanatory factors unconnected to individual action (Héritier 2008: 71; see e.g. Gambetta 1998; Jasper 2004). By restricting the use of mechanisms to micro-foundational work, I argue, their utility in different research contexts and levels of explanation is underexploited. Mechanisms can also be useful to account for macro-structural and aggregate-level dynamics (see Hoover 2001a, 2001b; Gerring 2008), as I try to show.

The so-called *Coleman's boat* illustrates the logic behind my contribution from a mechanisms-based standpoint (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Mechanisms that interrelate macro-properties to achieve satisfactory explanations need to be spelled out (figure 8.2, arrow 4). According to Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 59), “the black box to find the causal mechanisms that have generated the macro-level observation” must be opened up. I shall first identify the *situational*

mechanisms by which social structures constrain actors' desires, beliefs and actions (figure 8.2, arrow 1). In a second step, the *action-formation mechanisms* that link actors' motivations to their actions will be specified (figure 2, arrow 2) and, finally, how actors' actions and interactions generate various contingent social outcomes via *transformational mechanisms* will be clarified (figure 8.2, arrow 3).




FIGURE 8.2. Coleman's boat. Illustration of a mechanisms-based explanation. Source: Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 59; see also Hedström and Swedberg 1998).

Applying the mechanistic logic to my model that bridges macro-structural change and dynamics of mobilisation, the causal chain would specifically work as follows: 1) Structural shifts (political, cultural and especially socioeconomic ones in a recession-ridden context) create grievances. Depending on structural dynamics and how they are socially and individually perceived and constructed (through public discourse and socio-psychological processes), specific grievances will be formed— particularly, it has been found that political attitudinal grievances are of outmost importance when it comes to explaining mobilisation patterns (chapters 4, 5, 6). 2) How do aggrieved actors commit to collective action through time? The role and features of organisations, I contend, are still of utmost importance. More remarkably, the ability of old and new organisations to build alliances is crucial for keeping mobilisation underway (see chapter 3, this thesis). 3) Grievances and network-oriented mechanisms would not have led to mobilisation and changes in the movement trajectories without mechanisms related to political opportunities, such as appropriation of opportunities (on the importance of this mechanism for institutionalisation, see chapter 7, this thesis) and opportunity/threat spirals (this mechanism refers to both the ability of challengers to

appropriate opportunities and positive feedback emerging from interactions between relevant actors for fluctuations of protest; see chapter 4, this thesis).

All in all, following claims for more integrative approaches (e.g. McAdam et al. 1996; McAdam et al. 2001), this thesis has tried to bring grievances, organisational resources and— arguably given less weight throughout but equally importantly— opportunities-related mechanisms together to account for mobilisation dynamics in a cycle of collective action that unfolds under a recession-driven context.¹⁷³ Specifically, I have looked at the protest aggregate ebbs and flows in chapter 4, the individual mobilisation process in chapters 5-6 and the subsequent trajectory of protest in chapters 3 and 7. From a mechanistic perspective, this thesis has sought to contribute towards (re-)building integrative and dynamic accounts of how big outcomes unfold by focusing on the whole mobilisation process in a period of heightened social conflict.

4. SPAIN: PROTESTING AND BEYOND

The post-2007 reconfiguration of the political economy in Southern European countries produced a number of widely acknowledged outcomes: harsh austerity programmes imposed by international and European (often unelected) institutions and adopted by domestic governments, plummeting standards of living and a dramatic rise in unemployment. The Spanish case was no exception.

In this last section, I will briefly speculate about the implications of the main findings in this thesis for the case under study. I will explore why, in the depth of the Spanish economic crisis, it was not economic (but rather mostly political) grievances that motivated many Spaniards from different walks of life to participate in protest. Specifically, I will look at the impact this aspect has on two dimensions, which are important for our understanding of the Spanish society and the immediate political context: 1) non-electoral mobilisation and the organisation of civil society, and 2) the

¹⁷³ Given that political process has been the dominant tradition in social movement literature in the last decades, political opportunities already have a privileged position in the subfield.

reconfiguration of political conflict, debate, and the realignment of party systems (along with the emergence of new players in the electoral arena).

While the emergence of new material grievances might be a necessary condition for dissent to be organised, they do not seem sufficient to trigger mobilisation— and to sustain it over time. In the shadow of recession, objective hardship needs to be coupled with other factors, such as political attitudinal configurations (e.g. measured through specific support), in order to trigger action. Many of the claims voiced in the mobilisations were widely shared across society. On top of job instability, low-wages, precariousness and uncertain economic prospects, many Spaniards wanted to take on a more active political role.

For many, the 15M campaign and subsequent protest performances came as a reality check. Levels of popular dissent showed that unrest with politics-as-usual and political discontent were widespread. There was a large dormant mobilisation potential within the Spanish civil society. The organisation of mass dissent was a collective awakening, a process that shaped collective consciousness and identities. The 15M and subsequent campaigns contributed to (re-)politicise and empower different profiles of activists who envisioned— and, to a limited extent, prefigured— more direct, encompassing and horizontal forms of political involvement in the streets and local assemblies. It also allowed them to learn and gain first-hand experience on the mechanisms of open, popular debate and self-organisation.

Although exhaustion and institutionalisation processes came about as the cycle unfolded, mobilisation potentials have also been channelled through alternative (i.e. other than electoral and protest) forms of citizen participation. While massive and confrontational anti-austerity protests that dominated public life were followed by political actors that challenged hegemonic elites, narratives and party systems, a new phase in activism also developed: social, political and economic alternatives were accompanied and promoted by diverse endeavours from below. For instance, many cooperatives, food banks and other solidarity initiatives emerged in the wake of recession to counter the effects of austerity policies, and give response to other pressing

needs and circumstances (e.g. energy poverty, the refugee crisis). In a nutshell, many people mobilised on the basis of political grievances in an austerity-ridden scenario and, as a side effect, have translated their efforts into many different grassroots projects, which try to compensate for cuts in social spending and lack of state intervention to solve some social problems.

As previously argued, the Spanish levels of dissent decisively contributed to reconfiguring the whole domestic political landscape and arenas of debate and conflict (see e.g. Hutter et al. 2016; Zamponi and Bosi 2016). Anti-austerity and for real democracy protests contributed to politicise certain issues, modulate the public discourses and channel citizen outrage and discontent. In general, the levels of citizen contestation and media attention towards their claims have helped challengers to make visible arguments and opposition towards austerity policies. Similarly, social mobilisation and despair might have contributed to make Spaniards more aware of—and critical towards— political corruption. According to 2013 Eurobarometer data, Spaniards are the Europeans who perceive their politicians (72%) and parties (84%) as being the most corrupt— ahead of countries such as Italy (63% and 68%, respectively). Based on CIS barometers, the percentage of Spaniards who believe that corruption is among the top three problems of the country grew from 10% in 2010 to more than 50% in 2014. In addition, popular disapproval of certain practices in the banking sector, which were strongly contested by social movement actors, has been widespread (e.g. convertible stocks, mortgages, government bailout money, etc.).

As for the electoral arena, besides the emergence of Podemos and various movement-related parties at local and regional levels, another challenger party has become a major player in the national sphere, Ciudadanos.¹⁷⁴ While both Podemos and

¹⁷⁴ *Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía* (“Citizens’ party”) was created in Catalonia in 2005, winning three seats in the 2006 regional election, with a strong anti-nationalist discourse. Regarding general elections, while less than 50,000 votes were casted for C’s in 2008, it got more than 3.5 million votes in 2015 (it became the fourth party in the Parliament, with 40 MPs and 13.93% of the valid votes casted). However, only six months later, it lost 8 MPs (and got 13.05% of the total valid votes).

Ciudadanos portray themselves as alternatives to *old politics*, Ciudadanos is a centre-liberal force and Podemos takes a clearer anti-austerity stance.

Notwithstanding the anti-austerity discourse of Podemos and its appeals to the underprivileged and marginalised people, social exclusion and hardship alone do not explain its popular support. Based on the CIS post-electoral survey (N° 3145), we observe that Unidos Podemos was not the electoral force that most deprived people tended to vote for in the 2016 general election:¹⁷⁵ 57% of PSOE voters came from the working classes— in contrast to 37% of Unidos Podemos voters. While 22.4% of PSOE voters came from households whose income was lower than 900€ per month, in the case of Unidos Podemos it was only 13.7%. Additionally, long-term unemployed people (i.e. those who have been unemployed for more than 3 years) are more willing to support PSOE (i.e. 35%) than Podemos and allies (i.e. 23%).

I contend that Podemos— and also Ciudadanos— are not merely by-products of the economic crisis. It is very likely that they have come to stay for two reasons. On the one hand, they are able to appeal to young voters. While 75.7% of the valid votes cast in 2015 by those aged 65+ were for the two main traditional parties (i.e. PP and PSOE), these two parties were supported by 34.2% of those who were 18-44 years-old— see figure 8.3. This is both an opportunity and a threat for challenger parties. Although the traditional parties are pushed to modulate their discourses in order to appeal to a transversal electorate (i.e. beyond the elderly), the youth are more volatile— and thus hard to keep mobilised.

¹⁷⁵ The 2016 Spanish general election was held on Sunday, 26 June 2016. Podemos run in a common platform with IU and other regional- and national-level forces.




FIGURE 8.3. Vote by age group in the 2015 Spanish general election. The election was held on Sunday, 20 December 2015. Y= vote percentage. X= age groups. “Podemos+Co.” includes the coalitions that Podemos run with in Catalonia, Galicia and Comunidad Valenciana. Source: CIS (N° 3126), post-electoral survey. Fieldwork conducted in January-March 2016, N= 6,242.

On the other hand, both Podemos and Ciudadanos have been able to channel demands oriented against the political status quo. Even though these parties are not merely the continuation of the preceding cycle of protest through institutional means, their success can hardly be understood without a popular climate willing to embrace new electoral alternatives. The cycle of mobilisation was key to forging these spaces for dissent. It paved the way for new challenger parties to appeal to broad audiences under the *political regeneration* motto. While Podemos— and its new discourse— quickly polarised the electorate, for many people, Ciudadanos was purportedly a more secure, less rupturist alternative within the political status quo. Besides their performance in office, the consolidation of their own organisational structures and the interactions with other political actors, the electoral prospects of both Podemos and Ciudadanos are likely to depend on whether they are able to portray themselves as an alternative to the— still— dominant forces. Consistent with the overall line of reasoning, Podemos and Ciudadanos might become well-established political players in the long-term provided they are able to keep mobilising on the basis of the political discontent and regeneration that allowed them to succeed in the first place.

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APPENDIX

Chapter 3

	<i>varname</i>	description	measurement
1	<i>newsname</i>	Name of newspaper.	Always entered as EP (that stands for El País)
2	<i>dayre</i>	Day of report.	Range: 1– 31
3	<i>monthre</i>	Month of report.	Range: 1– 12
4	<i>yearre</i>	Year of report.	Range: 06– 14
5	<i>link</i>	Web link of report.	URL.
6	<i>paragraph</i>	A count of the number of paragraphs in the article. When an event is covered in multiple articles, this count is updated to reflect the total coverage across all articles.	Continuous.
7	<i>artev</i>	Number of articles that cover a given event.	Continuous.
8	<i>title</i>	Full title of coded article.	Nominal.
9	<i>austerityeconomicsit</i>	Is this event related to austerity, labour issues, unemployment and against policy-political status quo issues?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
10	<i>policystatusquo</i>	Is this event related to the political status quo or specific policies?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
11	<i>auslabpol</i>	Is this event related to labor issues or unemployment?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
12	<i>terrorism</i>	Is this event related to terrorism or political violence?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
13	<i>minority languages and nat</i>	Is this event related to nationalist issues or minority languages issues?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
14	<i>education</i>	Is this event related to education?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
15	<i>health</i>	Is this event related to health or the health system?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
16	<i>housing</i>	Is this event related to housing?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
17	<i>neighbor-urban-ecologist</i>	Is this event related to neighbour, urban or ecologist issues?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
18	<i>other</i>	Is this event related to other issues?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
19	<i>dayev</i>	Day of event (starting point).	1– 31.
20	<i>monthev</i>	Month of event.	1– 12.
21	<i>yearrev</i>	Year of event.	07– 15.
22	<i>evID</i>	Event ID.	Event ID is set in the form yymmmnn, where yy is the two-digit year, mm is the two-digit month, and nnn is an integer incremented for each event in a given month. For example, 1107001 represents the first event for the month of July, 2011.
23	<i>duration</i>	Number of days event lasted.	Continuous.

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24	<i>initiat</i>	Events are coded as having been initiated by members of identifiable social, racial or ethnic groups.	Categories: 0) undefined-heterogeneous, 1) unemployed/precariat, 2) youngsters and students, 3) women, 4) immigrants, 5) professional groups, 6) medical patients, 7) people living in a specific neighbourhood.
25	<i>who</i>	Which social groups participated in the event (narrative).	Categories: 1) unemployed/precariat, 2) youngsters, 3) women, 4) immigrants.
26	<i>orgcivil</i>	Whether mobilisations were civil society-led or exclusively organised by more or less established intermediary institutions of representations (e.g. political parties, unions). This groups involves: neighbour and ecologist associations, foundations, minority groups.	1= civil society-led, 0= only driven by intermediary institutions.
27	<i>orgunion</i>	Was the event driven by trade union-driven organisations?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no
28	<i>orgparty</i>	Was the event driven by political party-driven organisations?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0= no.
29	<i>orgparticip</i>	Were specific organisations mentioned as participating in the event?	Dummy: whether specific organisations were identified as actually being involved in the event (not observing, not commenting, but participating), regardless their type (i.e. more civil society or intermediary institutions-led).
30	<i>orgname1-orgname3</i>	What is the name of the organiser(s) (I)	Nominal. Examples: DRY, JSF, specific trade unions (e.g. UGT, CCOO), parties (e.g. IU, UPyD, PSOE).
31	<i>what1-what3</i>	What happened at the event (repertoire of actions).	1=human chain, marching and demonstrating; 2=mass meeting or gathering inside or in a public space/square or in front of a public institution or party (involves escraches and caceroladas); 3=gathering inside or in front of a private enterprise or house (involves escraches and caceroladas); 4=occupation/sitting or camping/setting tents in public areas or private facilities, besiege; 5=obstruction of roads-public spaces and infrastructures-transport; 6=rioting/uprising; 7=hunger strike; 8=symbolic/theatrical performance; 9=boycott; 10=strike; 11=petition/letters/lawsuit/self-accusation/leafleting; 12=hanging banners/placards on public or private buildings; 13= hostile confrontations, sabotage, assaulting, beatings, attacking people or facilities; 14= self-harming and chaining; 15= non-binding vote.
32	<i>disrup</i>	Degree of actions' disruptiveness.	Following Karapın (2007), I distinguish among semi-conventional (=1; =11 & 15 in the <i>what</i> variables), mildly disruptive (=2; =1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 & 14 in the <i>what</i> variables — except escraches in 2 & 3), severely disruptive and (=3; =escraches, 4, 5, 6 & 9 in the <i>what</i> variables) militant (=4; =13 in the <i>what</i> variables) strategies. The conventional strategy consists of promoting routine forms of participation, such as petitions, and hearings, with a willingness to bargain and compromise with opponents. The disruptive strategy entails the disruption of political or economic routines in nonviolent ways in order to get public attention, gain public support, influence elites, seize control of important resources, spur broad policy debates and gain policy reforms.
33	<i>where</i>	Exact location of the event.	Categories: 1) square, 2) streets, 3) (inside or in front of) official building/ public infrastructures, 4) (inside or in front of) private company/location, 5) sea/river .
34	<i>town</i>	Town or city where it took place.	Nominal.
35	<i>region</i>	Region of event.	Nominal.
36	<i>townoth0</i>	Whether the event took place in another town or city.	Dummy: 1= yes, 0=no. Note that 589 events (i.e. 29.4% of the total
37	<i>townoth1-townoth2</i>	Another town or city where it took place.	Nominal. If more than 3 locations are reported, "multiple" is introduced plus the categorical information (e.g. "54 towns", "17 regions", "in every province", etc.).
38	<i>popn</i>	The exact population of the city, town or village in which the event occurred.	Data from census.

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39	<i>purpose</i>	Description of the purpose of the event.	Narrative.
40	<i>against</i>	Whether the target (the party against which the event was directed) was clearly identifiable.	Dummy: 1=yes, 0=no.
41	<i>target1-target2</i>	Main target of protests.	1= national government/state/parties; 2= European public institutions; 3= local public institutions/parties; 4= foreign government/state; 5= private/business; 6= university/school; 7= specific politicians; 8= other/unclear.
42	<i>participrep</i>	Whether numbers of event participants is taken from reported figures or not.	1 if exact number of participants is reported or estimated (otherwise= 0).
43	<i>particippol</i>	The exact number of participants reported as taking part in the event, as reported or estimated by the police, government or official authorities.	Continuous.
44	<i>participnews</i>	The exact number of participants reported as taking part in the event, as reported or estimated by the newspaper.	Continuous.
45	<i>participorg</i>	The exact number of participants reported as taking part in the event, as reported or estimated by the organisers.	Continuous.
46	<i>participest</i>	The exact number of participants is inferred from textual clues ("several thousands", "many hundreds", "some dozens", "a few", etc.) or estimated thanks to other sources.	Range:1-11. The following categories were used: 1) <100 participants; 2) 100–999; 3) 1,000–4,999; 4) 5,000–9,999; 5) 10,000–19,999; 6) 20,000–49,999; 7) 50,000–99,999; 8) 100,000–199,999; 9) 200,000–499,999 and 10) 500,000 or more participants. When the cues are too vague to give it a specific category, a range of categories is created (e.g. "hundreds of thousands" would be 9-10, "some" or "a few thousands" would be 4-5; "several thousands" would be 5-7, "many hundreds" would be
47	<i>participest_cont</i>	The variable <i>participest</i> is transformed into a continuous indicator. Average values are assigned within each of the categories, unless more specific clues are provided for specific cases (e.g. "two tens", so a 20 value in <i>participnews</i> is given).	Continuous. Category 1 in <i>participest</i> is translated as 50, 2 as 500, 3 as 2500, 4 as 7500, 5 as 15000, 6 as 35000, 7 as 75000, 8 as 150000, 9 as 350000, 10 as 700000. When hints are ambiguous and various categories are reported simultaneously, the following guidelines are used: 1500 is used when the categories in <i>participest</i> are 2-3, 11250 if 4-5, 19167 if 4-5-6, 25000 if 5-6, 41667 if 5-6-7, 55000 if 6-7, 112500 if 7-8, 250000 if 8-9, 566667 if 8-9-10, 600000 if 9-10. In those cases where estimations of participants were reported along with more specific values for at least one of the categories, only (penalised) values from <i>particippol</i> , <i>participnews</i> and <i>participorg</i> are used, without taking into account (arguably, less reliable) estimates from

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48	<i>particip_final</i>	Range of number of participants.	For those events which had precise estimates in any of their three sources (as calculated by the police, newspaper and organisers), this range was determined simply by taking the arithmetic penalised averages across the two or three various sources. If only one of them was available, I use its penalised value. To calculate the penalised values, a coefficient that measures average over or underestimation was calculated for each variable: $\text{Coef_police} = \text{NParticippol}/\text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$; $\text{Coef_newspaper} = \text{NParticipnews}/\text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$; $\text{Coef_org} = \text{NParticiporg}/\text{NParticipAv}(1-2-3)$. For example, if 100, 500 and 1,000 people are reported to have participated in the event (according to the police, newspaper and the organisers), the penalised coefficients would be $100/500 = 0.5$; $500/500 = 1$; $1,000/500 = 2$, respectively. The average coefficient of cases with full information was calculated and extrapolated to cases with partial data (i.e. with information from- at least- one of the sources: police, newspaper, organisers). If the number of participants was only estimated ($N=505$), this was considered the final size, using the average value of the range of the size category [for a further description of these procedures, see <i>particip</i> variable]. The variable was weighted by the duration of the event. In those cases (a relatively small proportion of the sample) for which information on the size of a demonstration was still missing, a search was made in the database for the closest similar events in time that occurred in the same city, were organised by the same group and put forward the same demands. The size category of that event was used as the basis for the size category of the demonstration in question. Given the size and scope of the database, analogous events were almost always available for comparison. In the very rare cases (only 3) when no information
49	<i>whyclaim1-whyclaim4</i>	The most salient reasons for the event or issues that caused protesters to take part.	These were either voiced in speeches at the event, implicit in the nature of the event itself, listed in a formal list of demands presented by the demonstrators, displayed on placards or banners, or implied by the behaviour of demonstrators at the event. Categories: 1=economic status quo/cuts/austerity/poverty-inequality (gen.); 2= unemployment, dismissals, ERE; 3=privatisation, liberalisation, bad quality of public services; 4=financial/banking system; 5=globalisation/capitalism; 6=housing; 7= deliberative/inclusive democratic measures-reform electoral system system-voting; 8=supranational and foreign instits; 9=political parties and politicians; 10=unions; 11= corruption and clientelism; 12=education/academia/research (policies/services); 13=health (policies/services); 14= LBGT rights; 15= civil rights, non-discrimination and freedom (include prisoners, minorities and linguistic rights); 16= disabled rights; 17=migration/refugee, race and borders' issues; 18 =urban planning/policies.; 19= environment, activists in nature (gen.), animal rights; 20= salaries/payments (decrease), rising costs and working conditions (bad, unequal, precarious, intrusion) 21= specific infrastructures/constructions; 22= specific policies/laws (Citizen security-gag, abortion); 23= terrorism and war; 24= self-determination/independence and minority languages; 25= defaulting, squandering, debts; 26= preferred shares and bonds/financial products' owners; 27= luggage and belongings;
50	<i>val1-val4</i>	Valence of claim, or orientation of protesters to the issue.	Each claim has a valence, or orientation of protesters to the issue. Claim1 corresponds to val1, claim2 to val2, and so on. Coding: 1) Protesters are acting for or in favor of the issue represented by the claim; 2) Protesters are acting against or in opposition to the issue represented by the claim code; 3) The valence of the protesters' relationship to the claim code is unknown or not applicable.

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51	<i>demviol</i>	Did protesters use violence?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0=no.
52	<i>violtype</i>	If protesters were violent, what violent activity they engaged in?	1) weapons (rocks, bombs, guns, firebombs, bricks, stones); 2) physical or hand-to-hand violence; 3) other; 4) weapons and physical violence; 5) weapons and other; 6) physical and other; 7) weapons, physical, and other types of violence.
53	<i>counterdem</i>	Were counterdemonstrators present?	Dummy: 1=yes, 0=no.
54	<i>police</i>	Records whether police were reported to be at the event.	Dummy: 1 if police were present, 0 otherwise.
55	<i>policeact</i>	Whether police directed protesters behind barricades, dispersed protesters, made arrests, confiscated goods or engaged in	Dummy: 1 if police clearly engaged in any activity beyond simply being present, 0 otherwise.
56	<i>overunderreact</i>	Explicit reference to overreaction/underreaction of police.	3-categories: -1= under, 0= neutral, 1=overreaction.
57	<i>policeforce</i>	Whether police engaged in any violent tactics such as attacking protesters, or used equipment such as guns, tear gas, nightsticks or riot control equipment.	Dummy: 1= yes; 0= no.
58	<i>injur</i>	Was anyone injured?	Dummy variable reporting if any injuries are reported to have been incurred in the event; 1= yes; 0= no.
59	<i>nuprotestinj</i>	Number of protesters injured.	Coded if the number of injuries to protesters is known or can be estimated.
60	<i>nubystandinj</i>	Number of bystanders injured.	Coded if the number of injuries to bystanders is known or can be estimated; 1= yes; 0= no.
61	<i>nupoliceinj</i>	Number of policemen injured.	Coded if the number of injuries to police is known or can be estimated.
62	<i>propdam</i>	Was there any property damage reported?	Whether property damage (broken windows, burnt buildings, etc) took place in the course of the event. Coding 1= property damage is reported, 0= otherwise.
63	<i>arrests</i>	Were there any arrests?	Dummy: 1= yes; 0= no.
64	<i>arrpros</i>	How many protester were arrested?	Continuous.
65	<i>nuarrests</i>	Number of arrested people, if reported	Continuous.
66	<i>totalcoerc</i>	Overall degree of coercion (based on measures taken by authorities against demonstrators).	The following coding was used: (0) unknown coercion, 1) low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or injuries, defined as <10), 2) substantial coercion (defined as 10-75 arrests or 10-40 injuries), and 3) major violence by authorities (defined as >75 arrests or >40 injuries).
67	<i>overallvio</i>	Intensity of disorder severity.	A five-point interval scale adapted from the study by Spilerman (1976), which analysed the human and property damage inflicted by mass violence. Coding: 0) no violence. 1) Low intensity-rock and bottle throwing, some fighting, little property damage, crowd size < 125, arrests < 15, injuries < 8; 2) rock and bottle throwing, fighting, looting, serious property damage, some arson, crowd size 75-250, arrests 10-30; injuries 5-15; 3) substantial violence, looting, arson, and property destruction, crowd size 200-500, arrests 25-75, injuries 10-40; 4) High intensity-major violence, bloodshed and destruction, crowd size >400, arrests>65, injuries>35. All data are proportionally calculated.

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68	<i>govtreact</i>	Has any representative of the government (central or local-regional, depending on the target) reacted in any way or taken any official positioning?	Dummy: 1= yes, 0= no.
69	<i>govsupport</i>	Claims (not policy actions—this would be concessions) in support of or against the claims proposed by protesters.	Scale (-1, 0, 1; interval 0,5): 1= clear support, 0= neutral, -1= adverse reaction.
70	<i>conces</i>	Policy substantive concessions to specific claims. This means that authorities make concessions that favor the interests of protesters or their constituents and—often because of their timing—appear to be in response to particular protests. Substantive concessions increase protesters' perceived success chances and hence encourage participation in the movement generally and specifically in the methods that appeared to be successful (McAdam 1983: 743; Tarrow 1994: 156; Kriesberg 2007: 177).	Scale (-1, 0, 1; interval 0,5): 1= major concession; 0,5= partial concession; 0= neutral; -0,5= mild adverse reaction to concession; -1= strong adverse reaction to concession.
71	<i>reform</i>	Implementing procedural/ad hominem reforms. This means that authorities increase protesters' or the public's routine access to officials. This may involve creating new institutions and legal frameworks, or merely making existing procedures more inviting to potential participants. Procedural reforms reduce the costs of taking action, which has the effect of promoting participation in the movement (especially routine participation) and providing regular access to elites who may increase their support for protesters (Tarrow 1989b: 310-23, 1994: 86-87; Karapın 2007: 99-103). This also implies dismissals or discharge of officials.	Dummy: 1= yes; 0= no.
72	<i>elitereact</i>	Has any elite actor reacted in any way or taken any positioning besides the government (e.g. political parties, trade unions, other institutions)?	Dummy: 1= yes; 0= no.
73	<i>whoelite1-whoelite3</i>	Which actor(s) have reacted?	Nominal. Examples: UGT, CCOO, IU, UPyD, PSOE, etc.
74	<i>elitesup1-elitesup3</i>	<i>elitesup1</i> is associated with <i>whoelite1</i> , <i>elitesup2</i> with <i>whoelite2</i> , and so on. Degree of support. Claims and actions in support of or against the claims proposed by protesters.	Scale (-1, 0, 1; interval 0,5): 1= clear support, 0= neutral, -1= adverse reaction.

TABLE 3.1. Codebook of my Protest Event Analysis for Spain, 01/2007-02/2015. Data retrieved from *El País* (N= 2,002 events)— pp. 263-268.

Chapter 4




FIGURE 4.6. Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of the subjective inflation predictor. Upper left: AC subjective inflation (40 lags), raw data. Upper right: PAC subjective inflation (40 lags), raw data. Lower left: AC subjective inflation (40 lags), one-unit differenced. Lower right: PAC subjective inflation (40 lags), one-unit differenced. Source: HICP, Eurostat.

Time-series regression models (with lags of predictors and controls)									
		MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. grievances (H.1)									
	Unemployment_D1	-191.01	164.57	-175.99	141.56	-155.59	137.42	-185.35	137.42
	L_Unemployment_D1	66.06	163.11	-67.79	153.77	-17.94	153.28	-55.17	153.28
	Inflation_D1	-304.33	437.9	-869.99*	404.12	-769.39*	383.38	-779.67*	383.38
	L_Inflation_D1	-150.74	444.65	-736.92	420.21	-694.16	396.64	-802.89	396.64
Subj. political grievances (H.2)									
	Political satisfaction_D1			-382.01**	105.42	-423.5***	101.12	-415.17***	101.12
	L_Political satisfaction_D1			-218.01*	104.44	-226.68*	99.77	-281.37*	99.77
Subj. socioeconomic grievances (H.3)									
	Gen. Subj. Socioecc. Ind_D1			84.19	80.93	72.93	80.85	52.13	80.85
	L_Gen. Subj. Socioecc. Ind_D1			-47.1*	70.6	-23.56	67.5	-20.77	67.5
	Subjective inflation			21.65	80.52	77.55	80.11	84.63	80.11
	L_Subjective inflation			112.72	85.99	66.16	85.58	69.3	85.58
Relational opportunities (controls)									
	Violence			2863.8	2697.21	2365.49	2645.1	2600.29	2645.1
	L_Violence			-2502.75	2770.67	-1488.12	2804.79	-1011.0	2804.79
	Coercion			2912.92	1882.68	3103.97	1791.14	3047.23	1791.14
	L_Coercion			484.33	1940.16	-419.08	1879.85	-223.78	1879.85
	Immed. concessions			-2285.92**	901.26	-2457.89**	874.55	-2467.02**	874.55
	L_Immed. concessions			-732.19	902.43	-942.65	867.79	-1286.1	867.79
	Immed. reforms			7130.4	3249.87	6143.54	3132.3	5619.14	3132.3
	L_Immed. reforms			-1099.85	3382.48	-598.04	3256.07	267.1	3256.07
	Available allies			1610.98	1152.0	1226.22	1100.26	1199.83	1100.26
	L_Available allies			46.39	1109.96	285.2	1073.72	505.32	1073.72
Other controls									
	New organisations					-1065.39	1170.32	-1084.52	1170.32
	L_New organisations					2213.75*	1058.73	2003.53	1058.73
	Ideology_D1					2855.13	2512.0	2608.29	2512.0
	L_Ideology_D1					-1916.96	2597.26	-1196.12	2597.26
	Majoritarian vote_D1					224.39*	84.07	225.98**	84.07
	L_Majoritarian vote_D1					35.42	81.25	70.57	81.25
	L_participants (lag DV)							-.15	.11
	Constant	1505.22***	221.79	852.0	769.16	476.44	919.06	476.44	919.06
	Adj R-squared	-.0122		.3112		.3910		.3980	
	N	95		93		93		93	

TABLE 4.6. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Time series regressions (including lags). DV: total participants (in thousands). Temporal level of aggregation: monthly. "S.E." columns: standard errors. Source: original time series dataset (see "Data" subsection and table 4.8 in the Appendix for further information).

Time series regression models						
Variable	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. grievances (H.1)						
Unemployment_D1	−226.98	141.57	−120.77	130.84	−134.57	121.75
Inflation_D1	−543.06	426.15	−544.0	385.99	−523.84	380.02
Subj. political grievances (H.2)						
Political satisfaction_D1	−301.55**	113.4	−310.11**	102.6	−330.48**	98.46
Subj. socioeconomic grievances (H.3)						
Gen. Subj. Socioecc. Index_D1	15.39	82.66	26.55	77.44	−4.96	65.46
Subjective inflation_D1	−47.48	85.1	−7.5	77.92	28.25	40.47
Relational opportunities (controls)						
Violence			2462.79	2759.82	2393.82	2616.59
Coercion			2397.48	1892.65	2096.28	1755.99
Immed. concessions			−1505.87*	636.72	−1837.87**	651.48
Immed. reforms			5803.48	3283.43	6019.99*	3074.92
Available allies			2180.55	1114.57	1722.26	1034.94
Other controls						
New organisations					−1548.26	1028.1
Ideology_D1					4074.6	2327.68
Majoritarian vote_D1					215.18	75.45
Constant	1431.35	210.63	−530.65	457.81	293.97	741.53
Adj R-squared	.0623		.2533		.3224	
N	96		95		95	

TABLE 4.7. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Time series regressions (unlagged, with one-unit differenced subjective inflation). DV: total participants (in thousands). Temporal level of aggregation: monthly. "S.E." columns: standard errors. Source: original time series dataset (see "Data" subsection and table 4.8 in the Appendix for further information).

varname	concept	grievtype	source	description	measurement	yearlyobs
<i>Gini</i>	inequality	objecc	Eurostat	Gini coefficient, post-taxes and transfers. The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them.	0-1	1
<i>S80S20</i>	inequality	objecc	Eurostat	S80/S20 income quintile share ratio. Measure of the inequality of income distribution. It is calculated as the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income (the bottom quintile). All incomes are compiled as equivalised disposable incomes.		1
<i>riskpov</i>	inequality	objecc	Eurostat	At-risk-of-poverty rate. It is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. This indicator does not measure wealth or poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that country (i.e. relative deprivation), which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living.	0-100	1
<i>Govexpend</i>	welfare	objecc	OECD	The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) has been developed in order to serve a growing need for indicators of social policy. It includes reliable and internationally comparable statistics on public and mandatory and voluntary private social expenditure at programme level. SOCX provides a unique tool for monitoring trends in aggregate social expenditure and analysing changes in its composition. It covers 34 OECD countries for the period 1980-2011 and estimates for aggregates for 2012-14; this version also includes estimates of net total social spending for 2011 for 33 OECD countries. The main social policy areas are as follows: Old age, Survivors, Incapacity-related benefits, Health, Family, Active labor market programmes, Unemployment, Housing, and Other social policy areas. SOCX aggregated data are described in Adema and Ladaique (2009). Units: millions of euros (current prices, as of 2014).	Continuous	1
<i>UnempES_term</i>	employment	objecc	EPA, INE	% overall unemployment in Spain (=unemployed population/active population*100).	0-100	4
<i>UnempES_month</i>	employment	objecc	IFS, IMF	% overall unemployment in Spain (=unemployed population/active population*100). Seasonally adjusted following ILO guidelines.	0-100	12
<i>UnempEU</i>	employment	objecc	IFS, IMF	Seasonally adjusted following ILO guidelines.	0-100	12
<i>UnempESyouth</i>	employment	objecc	EPA, INE	% youth unemployment in Spain (=unemployed population <25 years-old/active population <25 years-old*100).	0-100	4
<i>nini</i>	employment	objecc	Eurostat	Young people (15-29 years old) not in employment and not in any education and training in Spain (all ISCED educational levels).	0-100	1
<i>EU nini</i>	employment	objecc	Eurostat	Young people (15-29 years old) not in employment and not in any education and training in EU-28 (all ISCED educational levels).	0-100	1
<i>GDP</i>	wealth	objecc	IFS, IMF	Real Spanish GDP, expenditure approach. Index 2010=100, seasonally adjusted.	Continuous	12
<i>EUGDP</i>	wealth	objecc	IFS, IMF	Real European aggregate GDP, expenditure approach. Index 2010=100, seasonally adjusted.	Continuous	12
<i>GDPtotal</i>	wealth	objecc	IFS, IMF	Real Spanish GDP, expenditure approach. Billions of euros at 2005 prices, seasonally adjusted.	Continuous	12
<i>EUGDPtotal</i>	wealth	objecc	IFS, IMF	Real European aggregate GDP, expenditure approach. Billions of euros at 2005 prices, seasonally adjusted.	Continuous	12
<i>GDPtotaltoEUGl</i>	wealth	objecc	OECD	GDPtotal/EUGDP*1000.	Continuous	4
<i>GDP growth</i>	wealth	objecc	OECD	Quarterly Growth Rates of real GDP (expenditure approach), change over previous quarter. Seasonally adjusted.	Continuous	4
<i>GDPpc</i>	wealth	objecc	Trading Econ.	GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data: U.S. dollars.	Continuous	1
<i>EUGDPpc</i>	wealth	objecc	World Bank	GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Euro area countries included.	Continuous	1

(CONTINUED)

<i>EUGNIpc</i>	wealth	objecc	OECD	GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Euro area countries included.	Continuous	1
<i>GDP growth</i>	wealth	objecc	World Bank	Real GDP growth. Term percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.	0-100	4
<i>medianincome</i>	wealth	objecc	OECD	Median disposable income. In national currency, at current prices. All income data are equivalised income (by the square root of household size).	Continuous	1
<i>meanincome</i>	wealth	objecc	OECD	Mean disposable income. In national currency, at current prices. All income data are equivalised income (by the square root of household size).	Continuous	1
<i>hhdebttoGDP</i>	debt	objecc	FSI, IMF	Household Debt to GDP for Spain. Annual. The data for hh debt comprise debt incurred by resident households of the economy only. This FSI measures the overall level of hh indebtedness (commonly related to consumer loans and mortgages) as share of GDP. Debt is defined as all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future.	Continuous	1
<i>hhdebttoincome</i>	debt	objecc	Eurostat	Gross debt-to-income ratio of households is defined as loans (ESA95 code: AF4), liabilities divided by gross disposable income (B6G) with the latter being adjusted for the change in the net equity of households in pension funds reserves (D8net). Detailed data and methodology on site http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/sectoraccounts	Continuous	1
<i>Govdebt</i>	debt	objecc	OECD	Total gross debt (Gen. Gov). Percent of GDP, current prices (nat. Curr.). Not seasonally adjusted. Debt is defined as all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future.	Continuous	4
<i>deficit</i>	deficit	objecc	World Bank	Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP). Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. In the 1986 GFS manual nonfinancial assets were included under revenue and expenditure in gross terms. This cash surplus or deficit is closest to the earlier overall budget balance (still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now a financing item under net acquisition of financial assets).	Continuous	1
<i>Inflation</i>	inflation	objecc	inflation.eu	Inflation is the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising, and, subsequently, purchasing power is falling. The harmonised inflation rate is based upon the harmonised consumer price index (HICP, published by Eurostat). The HICP inflation rates are presented on a monthly basis (percent change compared to the same month's during the year before).	Continuous	12
<i>evictions</i>	debt	objecc	CGPJ	Total number of foreclosures officially delivered in one year, as contemplated by the Spanish judiciary.	Continuous	1

(CONTINUED)

<i>prospinflat</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Future tendency of consumer prices (expected inflation). Consumer prices (inflation). The question asked for this indicator is "By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months? They will (++) increase more rapidly (+) increase at the same rate (=) increase at a slower rate (-) stay about the same (--) fall (N) don't know". The indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results.	(-100)-100	12
<i>retroinflat</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Retrospective inflation. The question asked is "How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months? They have (++) risen a lot, (+) risen moderately, (=) stayed about the same, (-) risen slightly, (--) fallenN don't know".	(-100)-100	12
<i>econconf</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	The Spanish harmonised consumer confidence indicator is based on answers to the following four questions with five answer alternatives to each question (a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, a lot worse). (1) Expected change in financial situation of household over the next 12 months; (2) Expected change in general economic situation over next 12 months; (3) Expected change in unemployment over the next 12 months; (4) Expected change in savings of household over next 12 months. The confidence indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results. The confidence indicator published by the EC is constructed with double weights on the extremes. The consumer confidence indicator is the arithmetic average of the balances (in percentage points) of the answers to the four questions. Balances are seasonally adjusted.	(-100)-100	12
<i>prospfinancHH</i>	egotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Economic household situation: future tendency. The question asked is "How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months? It will (++) get a lot better, (+) get a little better, (=) stay the same, (-) get a little worse, (--) get a lot worse, (N) don't know". The indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results.	(-100)-100	12
<i>prospgeneco</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Economic general situation: future tendency. The question asked is "How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months? It will (++) get a lot better (+) get a little better (=) stay the same (-) get a little worse (--) get a lot worse (N) don't know". The indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results.	(-100)-100	12
<i>prospunemp</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Expected change in unemployment over the next 12 months. The question asked is "How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the next 12 months? The number will (++) increase sharply, (+) increase slightly, (=) remain the same, (-) fall slightly, (--) fall sharply, (N) don't know". The indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results.	(-100)-100	12
<i>prospsav</i>	egotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Expected change in household savings over the next 12 months. The question asked is "Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money? (++) very likely, (+) fairly likely, (-) not likely, (--) not at all likely, (N) don't know".	(-100)-100	12
<i>EU econconf</i>	sociotropic and egotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	The EU harmonised consumer confidence indicator is based on answers to the following four questions with five answer alternatives to each question (a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse, a lot worse). (1) Expected change in financial situation of household over the next 12 months; (2) Expected change in general economic situation over next 12 months; (3) Expected change in unemployment over the next 12 months; (4) Expected change in savings of household over next 12 months. The confidence indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results. The confidence indicator published by the EC is constructed with double weights on the extremes. Responses "a lot better" and "a lot worse" get the weight 1 and "a little better" and "a little worse" get the weight 1/2, and "the same" has zero weight.	(-100)-100	12

(CONTINUED)

<i>retrofinancHH</i>	egotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Economic household situation: retrospective. The question asked is "How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? It has (++) got a lot better, (+) got a little better, (=) stayed the same, (-) got a little worse, (—) got a lot worse, (N) don't know.	(-100)-100	12
<i>retrosav</i>	egotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Current household savings. The question is "Which of these statements best describes the current financial situation of your household? (++) we are saving a lot, (+) we are saving a little, (=) we are just managing to make ends meet on our income, (-) we are having to draw on our savings, (—) we are running into debt, (N) don't know.	(-100)-100	12
<i>retrogeneco</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	MEI, Consumer opinions, OECD	Economic general situation: retrospective. The question asked is "How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 months? It has (++) got a lot better, (+) got a little better, (=) stayed the same, (-) got a little worse, (—) got a lot worse, (N) don't know.	(-100)-100	12
<i>currentecon</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	CIS	Assessment current financial situation index. Percentage of responses falling into each of the 5 categories is restandardized into a 0-10 scale, and multiplied by 1, 1/2, 0, -1/2 or -1 depending on the response (very good, good, fair, bad or very bad, respectively).	(-10)-10	11
<i>prob_econ</i>	sociotropic	subjecc	CIS	Three main problems in Spain include economic and crisis-related factors (namely, unemployment, economics-related problems, difficulties associated with employment-quality, cuts, banks, evictions). Percentages of aforementioned factors are summed and divided by the overall percentages (x100).	0-100	11
<i>currentpol_CIS percent</i>	satisfaction	subjpol	CIS	"How is the general Spanish political situation: very good, good, average, bad or very bad?". The SPA indicator (Situación Política General, which stands for General Political Situation) is based on the abovementioned question and constructed as follows: $[SPA = (100 * p1 + 75 * p2 + 50 * p3 + 25 * p4 + 0 * p5) / (p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5)]$, where p1, p2, p3, p4 and p5 are proportions of the responses to the question (very good, good, average, bad and very bad), respectively.	0-100	11
<i>forepol_CIS percent</i>	satisfaction, prospective	subjpol	CIS	"How will the general Spanish political situation be in one year time: very good, good, average, bad, or very bad?". The IEP indicator (Indicador de Expectativas Políticas, which stands for "Indicator of Political Expectations") is based on the abovementioned question and constructed as follows: $[IEP = (100 * p1 + 75 * p2 + 50 * p3 + 25 * p4 + 0 * p5) / (p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5)]$, where p1, p2, p3, p4 and p5 are proportions of the responses to the question (very good, good, average, bad and very bad), respectively.	0-100	11
<i>polconfindex_CIS</i>	trust	subjpol	CIS	The ICP (Indicador de Confianza Política, which stands for "Political Confidence Indicator") is the arithmetic average of SPA and IEP $[ICP = (SPA + IEP) / 2]$.	0-100	11
<i>Trust parties ES (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjpol	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: Spanish political parties.	0-100	2
<i>Trust parties EU-27 (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjpol	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: political parties. EU-27 or EU-28 average.	0-100	2
<i>Trust Parliament ES (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjpol	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the Spanish Parliament.	0-100	2
<i>Trust Parliam EU-27 (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjpol	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the National Parliament. Options: 1=tend to trust it, 0= do not tend to trust it. EU-27 or EU-28 average.	0-100	2

(CONTINUED)

<i>Trust Gov ES (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjp	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the Spanish Government. Options: 1=tend to trust it, 0= do not tend to trust it.	0-100	2
<i>Trust Gov EU-27 (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjp	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the National Government. Options: 1=tend to trust it, 0= do not tend to trust it. EU-27 or EU-28 average.	0-100	2
<i>Trust politicians ES (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjp	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: local and regional politicians. Options: 1=tend to trust it, 0= do not tend to trust it.	0-100	2
<i>Trust politicians EU-27 (Eurob)</i>	trust	subjp	Eurobarometer	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: local and regional politicians. Options: 1=tend to trust it, 0= do not tend to trust it. EU-27 or EU-28 average.	0-100	2
<i>Avg trust</i>	trust	subjp	Eurobarometer	Composite index- 4measures on trust in intermediary institutions for ES. Weighted coefficients calculated for every observation (i.e. one coefficient for every indicator relative to the average of the 4 values, when available). Two global average values (pre- and post- 2011) are calculated, and the same weighted coefficients are used to calculate imputed values for missing observations, pre- and post- 2011.	0-100	2
<i>prob_pol</i>	sociotropic	subjp	CIS	Three main problems in Spain include political status quo (namely, corruption; politicians, political parties and politics; government; quality of public services). Percentages of aforementioned factors are summed and divided by the overall percentages (x100).	0-100	11

TABLE 4.8. Codebook of grievances-related predictors coded for the time series original dataset (name of the variable, concept, type of grievance, source, description, measurement, number of yearly observations)— pp. 272-276, Appendix.

Chapter 5

	Variable	Measurement	Phrasing
DV (H.1-H.3)			
	Protest	Dummy. Recoded: 1= striking or demonstrating, 0= otherwise	In the last 6 months, have you done any of these activities: demonstrating, striking?
Obj. Grievances			
	Income	Interval: 1-10. Categories: 1≤ 300€; 2= 301-600€; 3= 601-900€; 4= 901-1,200€; 5= 1,201-1.800€; 6= 1,801-2,400€; 7= 2,401-3,000€; 8= 3,001-4,500€; 9= 4,501-6,000€; 10≥ 6,000€	Taking all things together, what is your monthly net income?
	Public worker	Dummy. 1= yes; 0= otherwise	
	Mortgage	Dummy. 1= yes; 0= otherwise	Are you currently in any of these situations: are you paying for a mortgage?
	Job status	Multinomial. Recoded into four categories: 1= worker/pensioner; 2= unemployed; 3= student; 4= other	Which is your current situation?
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances			
	Personal ecc. Situation	Ordinal. Recoded into 3 categories: 1= better than one year ago; 2= the same than one year ago; 3= worse than one year ago	How would you consider your personal economic situation is like?
	Sociotropic index	Ordinal index: Recoded into 3 categories: 1= good; 2= the same or average; 3= worse	How do you think the current situation is like/ will be in 12 months time/ is as compared to 12 months ago?
Subj. Political grievances			
	Government evaluation	Ordinal: 1= very good; 2= good; 3= average; 4= bad; 5= very bad	Broadly speaking, how do you think is the performance of the party in office?
	Opposition evaluation	Ordinal: 1= very good; 2= good; 3= average; 4= bad; 5= very bad	Broadly speaking, how do you think is the main opposition party doing?
Biographical availability			
	Age	Continuous: 16-45	How old are you?
	Habitat	Ordinal: 1-3 (1: <50,000 inhabitants; 2: 50,001-500,000 inhabitants; 3> inhabitants)	Size of habitat
	Education	Ordinal: 1= <5 years of formal training; 2= primary educ.; 3= lower secondary educ.; 4= upper secondary educ.	What is the maximum level of education completed?
Political engag., social capital & networks			
	Political interest	Ordinal decreasing scale: 1= a lot; 2= quite; 3= little; 4= nothing	How interested are you in politics?
	Lef-right ideology	Interval: 0 (max. left)-10 (max. right)	When we talk about politics, we normally use the left-right scale. Where would you place yourself?
	Political information	Ordinal index: 1= everyday; 2= 3-4 days per week; 3= 1-2 days per week; 4= less often; 5= never	How often do you watch TV programmes about politics/read the newspaper/use Internet to get informed about politics?
	Soc. network Internet	Dummy. 1= yes; 0= otherwise	Do you often use Internet to get involved in social networks (Facebook, Tuenti)?
	Voting record	Multinomial. Five categories: 1= IU; 2= PSOE; 3= PP; 4= others; 5= none	In the last general election, which party or coalition did you vote for?

TABLE 5.6. Description of variables used in the statistical analyses. Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample (N= 6,749).

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Obj. Grievances								
Income	-.04***	.01	-.00	.01	-.01	.01	-.01	.01
Public worker	-.03	.04	-.02	.02	-.02	.05	-.02	.05
Mortgage	.23***	.06	-.02	.04	-.12	.09	.02	.08
Job status (ref.: worker/pens.)								
I_Unemployed	.49***	.04	-.05	.03	.03	.06	.04	.06
I_Student	.45***	.07	-.11**	.04	.05	.10	.15	.09
I_Other	.31***	.08	-.01	.05	.01	.11	.09	.10
Subj. Socioeconomic grievances								
Personal ecc. Situation			.12***	.01	.04	.03	.04	.03
Lagged personal ecc. sit.			.03**	.01	.02	.03	-.06*	.03
Sociotropic index	.30***	.03			-.05	.05	.76***	.04
Lagged sociotropic index	.03	.03			-.14**	.05	.33***	.05
Subj. Political grievances								
Government evaluation	.03	.01	.14***	.01	-.31***	.02		
Lagged Govt. evaluation	.02	.02	.04**	.01	-.18***	.03		
Opposition evaluation	.02	.01	-.00	.01			-.27***	.02
Lagged Oppos. evaluation	.02	.02	-.00	.01			-.06*	.03
Biographical availability								
Age	-.14	.07	.01	.04	.10	.10	.32	.10
Age squared	.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.00	.00	-.01	.00
Habitat	.02	.09	.05	.05	.05	.12	.02	.12
Education	-.04	.04	.02	.02	-.10	.06	-.02	.05
Pol. engag, social capital&networks								
Political interest	-.02	.02	-.00	.01	.06	.03	-.03	.03
Lef-right ideology	-.00	.01	-.01	.01	-.05**	.02	-.02	.02
Political information	-.01	.02	-.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.02
Soc. network Internet	-.06	.05	.02	.03	-.04	.07	-.02	.07
Party voted for (ref.: IU)								
I_PSOE	.02	.05	-.07	.03	.31	.07	-.44	.07
I_PP	.07	.05	-.04	.03	-.48	.07	.51	.07
I_Others	.06	.05	-.00	.03	.01	.07	-.11	.06
I_None	.01	.05	-.05	.03	.07	.08	-.08	.08
Protest	-.03	.03	.02	.02	-.09*	.04	.11**	.04
Lagged protest	.01	.03	.00	.02	-.00	.04	.09*	.04
Constant	3.38**	1.21	1.52*	.73	5.57**	1.73	-1.82	1.69
Wave dummies		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
N		4403		4403		4403		4403

TABLE 5.7. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear panel regression analyses, lagged fixed-effects. DV: egotropic perceptions of the economy (model 1), sociotropic perceptions of the economy (model 2), approval of the opposition (model 3) and approval of government (model 4). Source: online panel survey for Spain conducted by Anduiza et al. (2015), 4 first waves, full sample ($N = 6,749$).

Chapter 6

Variable	Measurement	Phrasing	Other specifications
Dependent			
Participation 15M	Recoded into 3 categories: 0= no participant; 1= participating once; 2= participating twice or more times	Have you ever participated in any of the 15M demonstrations or gatherings? Have you ever participated in any of the 15M assemblies?	
Hypothesis: subj. political grievances			
Political satisfaction	Interval. 0-10 scale	According to the next scale, where 0 means "very bad" and 10 means "very good", how satisfied are you with the democratic performance in Spain overall?	
Controls (I): structural availability, material and subjective socioeconomic grievances			
Job: unlimited contract	Recoded. Binary: 1= unlimited contract, 0= otherwise	You work/used to work with...	
Financial self-sufficiency	Recoded. Binary: 1= financially self-sufficient, 0= otherwise	Which is your personal financial situation? 1. You live only on of your income. 2. You live on your income plus external aid. 3. You depend on others' aid	Categories 2 and 3 recoded as 0
Situation hh: working/pensioner	Recoded. Binary: 1= working/pensioner (if retired—previously working); 0= otherwise	Which is the current situation of the person with the highest income at the household level?	
Educ. level (ref.: primary or lower)	Recoded into interval. Multinomial (4 categories)	Which is the maximum level of education you have attained?	Categories: 1= "primary or lower", 2= "secondary or vocational training", 3 = "bachillerato or higher vocational training", 4= "university degree or superior"
Age	Continuous	How many years did you celebrate in your last birthday?	Range: 15-30
Main gen. problem (sociotropic)	Binary: 1=yes, otherwise=0	What is the main problem for people in Spain nowadays? And the second one?	Recoded from a multinomial variable (33 categories). "Yes" as long as some of the responses falls in the following categories: economy, crisis, unemployment, precariousness, access to housing, unemployment, employment quality, difficulty of finding a job or low wages.
Main indivl. problem (egotropic)	Binary: 1= yes, 0= no	What is the main problem for you? And the second one?	Recoded from a multinomial variable (33 categories). "Yes" as long as some of the responses falls in the following categories: economy, crisis, unemployment, precariousness, access to housing, unemployment, employment quality, difficulty of finding a job or low wages.

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Controls (II): political engagement, networks and social capital			
Voting efficacy	1-3 scale: agree, neutral, disagree	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "one more vote or one less vote does not make any difference"?	
Left-right scale	1-10 (max.left-max.right) scale	When we speak about politics, we often use the left-right scale, where would you place yourself in this card?	
Political interest	0-3 interval scale, from "not at all" to "very interested"	Overall, how interested you are in politics?	
Political information index	0-4 scale. 0= never; 1= less often [than 1-2 days a week]; 2= 1-2 days a week; 3= 3-4 days a week; 4= everyday	I would like you to tell me how often...	Index. Created from merging average values of a) read politics section in the newspaper, b) watch politics-related news on the TV, c) listen to politics-related news on the radio, 4) search for politics-related news on the Internet". 0.3<Pearson's r<0.58 , Eigenvalue= 2.22 (56% var. explained); Cronbach's α = 0.73
Ever attended to meeting	Recoded. Binary: 1= attended; 0= otherwise	Have you ever attended to any political reunion or meeting?	Category "yes, I have" coded as 1. "I have not, but I might" and "no" coded as 0
Trust info. Soc. networks (ref.:yes)	Interval. 5 categories: strongly agree, agree to some extent, neutral, disagree to some extent, strongly disagree	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: information about politics in social networks is untrustworthy?	
Ever demonstrated	Recoded. Binary: 1= demonstrated; 0= no	Have you ever participated in a demonstration?	Category "yes, I have" coded as 1. "I have not, but I might" and "no" coded as 0. I cannot confirm this variable is not contaminated by the participation in the 15M itself

TABLE 6.4. Description of variables used in the statistical analyses. Source: INJUVE (2012)— pp. 279-280, Appendix.




FIGURE 6.3.A. Alternative BIC computation models by number of latent classes within subsample of non-participants in 15M actions with R Mclust package. Optimal BIC solution= -16222 (VEV, 2 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).




FIGURE 6.3.B. Alternative BIC computation models by number of latent classes within subsample of one-time challengers in 15M actions with R Mclust package. Optimal BIC solution= -2772.194 (VEI, 3 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).




FIGURE 6.3.C. Alternative BIC computation models by number of latent classes within subsample of multiple-time activists in 15M actions with R Mclust package. Optimal BIC solution= -2615.849 (VEI, 3 latent classes). Source: INJUVE (2012).

