Family & Politics

The enduring influence of the parental home in the development and transmission of political ideology

Mathilde M. van Ditmars

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 13 September 2017

European University Institute

Department of Political and Social Sciences

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Abstract

How does the family influence citizens' political ideology, and what role do family dynamics and structure play in this process of political socialization? As society and family forms are changing, this study provides new insights in political socialization research by investigating how gender dynamics in the family, parental separation, and intergenerational social mobility affect the transmission and development of citizens' political ideology in multiparty systems in Europe. The German Socioeconomic Panel and the Swiss Household Panel are the most important data sources. The first empirical chapter provides a descriptive account of the level of transmission of left–right ideology, showing a large and stable influence of the parental on the child's ideology. Especially the similarity of parental ideology favours this process. Chapter 3 addresses gender effects in political socialization, showing that the political ideology of both parents equally influences the ideology of their children, irrespective of their gender. In Switzerland, moderate left-wing effects of the presence of an older sister are found for females, and in families of a centrist ideology. For males, however, having a female eldest sibling has a right-wing effect. Chapter 4 investigates the ideological consequences of parental divorce, showing with pan-European data that adults whose parents separated during childhood hold a more leftist ideology. Longitudinal analysis using Swiss data shows that this is partially caused by the mother becoming more left-wing after separation from the partner. Finally, Chapter 5 addresses how vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility affect the ideological transmission process from parents to children, showing that especially the upwardly mobile are less influenced by the parental ideology. However, it is demonstrated that self-selection into social mobility plays an important role herein. The overall conclusion is that the family is important in shaping voters' political ideology until in adulthood, not only in terms of intergenerational transmission, but also in terms of direct effects of family experiences and structure.

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The data used in this thesis were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) published by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, and accessed via the Library of the European University Institute, Florence.

This study has been realized using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

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1. Introduction: A Study in Political Socialization

1.1 The family as the starting point of political preferences

Family and politics: two things that seem very different at first sight, but are actually connected in many ways. This study takes the family as the starting point of the formation and long-term development of citizens' political ideology. It departs from the classic field of political socialization research, and extends it by specifically focussing on the different family experiences, dynamics, and structures that may impact the transmission of political ideology from parents to children, and also may more directly influence the child's ideology until later in life.

Whatever may happen after the birth of a child, its first introduction to the world is usually through its parents. In many different ways, parents provide the first social context for a child, and the same goes to a large extent for the introduction to the political world. Even before a child goes to school and learns about politics, it can hear its father speaking about his concern about the results of the upcoming elections, or arguing with his wife who does not agree with his voting intention. Consciously or unconsciously, parents provide their child with the first impressions of political life. The imprints they leave on the child can be of enduring influence, and indeed often are. These considerations are the foundations of the field of political socialization, which from roughly the 1950s until now has investigated how parents influence the political ideas, preferences, and behaviour of their children, at different stages of their life. Socialization research has also expanded the focus from the influence of parents to that of other socializing agents, such as social networks and teachers.

This study builds on this elaborate body of research, departing from one of its initial assumptions: namely, that family is important in shaping the political thought of citizens. The topic of parental socialization is still relevant nowadays, as it provides insights into voters' development of political preferences. Elections have become more volatile over time, voters have become more critical and cynical about politics, and turnout rates are declining over Europe (e.g. Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006). Social change is reflected in the higher geographical, social, and educational mobility of citizens, new modes of social interaction and communication,

and changing family forms. In such times of political and social change, the question arises to what extent the classic socialization model is nowadays still valid, providing a stable base for the initial formation of voters' political preferences.

The aim of the study is to provide new information about classic political socialization questions, by investigating the political ideology transmission and development among family members in Western Europe in a comparative manner, in relation to the dynamics at hand in the family. The general research question of this thesis is as follows: *"How does the family influence citizens' political ideology?"* More specifically, the focus is not only on the level of transmission from parents to children, but also what the impact of different individual and family characteristics are on this process, as well as on the long-term development of political ideology. Each chapter provides a more precise research question with a corresponding theoretical framework and investigates the impact of the following different family dynamics on the political socialization process: gender dynamics and the sex composition of the siblings, parental separation, and intergenerational social mobility.

This chapter firstly provides an overview of the field of political socialization research. It departs from its start in the twentieth century, moving through several decades and ending with the most recent developments in today's research. As we are now in an era in which socialization research has been complemented with newer insights regarding genetic preference transmission, it is important to know what foundations have been built and how these can be complemented. Secondly, I set out the research design of the thesis by describing the data that is central to the study, and I elaborate on the meaning of the dependent variable, left–right self-placement, and the implications of applying it to this research. I conclude with an outline of the thesis.

1.2 The field of political socialization: From Jennings & Niemi to Alford, Funk & Hibbing, and back

The first research in the field of political socialization is difficult to pinpoint, but the identification of parents as important socializing agents took already place before the second half of the twentieth century. I identify roughly three waves in the study of political socialization: 1) the first pioneering wave in the US from the 1950s to the

1970s; 2) the revival and expansion wave from roughly the 1980s to the 1990s; and 3) the most recent wave from the twenty-first century until now, in which the focus somehow shifted and the traditional views on political socialization were challenged by new research.

1.2.1 The birth of a new field of studies

In their pioneering study in voting behaviour, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1968 [1944], pp. 56–61) describe the family as one of the most effective external pressures that an American voter faces in the period he is making up his mind about the voting decision, notwithstanding the merely structural approach to voting behaviour that the study provides. The lack of agreement within the family was found to be the most important driver for delay of the time of the voting decision (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968 [1944], pp. 58–61). The study of political behaviour was born with this work, and much research followed since then tracing the roots of voting decisions. In 1959, Hyman already provides one of the first overviews of the studies investigating "the psychology of political behaviour", in which an important role is given to the family: it is described as being the roots of stability in political life (Hyman, 1959, p. 72). However, in this era the focus of political preference transmission was more on party choice rather than political socialization into a specific ideology; and the psychological approach was rather limited (Hyman, 1959, p. 56). Based on the research thus far being done, Hyman identified the family as a factor of enduring influence: political orientation reflected the social milieu of the voter, and mostly of his family. The only possibilities for change were identified in social and geographical mobility and rebellion against parental influence (Hyman, 1959, pp. 85–89), even though rebellion was already found to be very limited.

Another major US study followed suit in 1960. In *The American Voter*, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes changed the way of thinking about political behaviour by introducing the more psychological approach of the Michigan School, rather than the structural approach that was provided by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet in 1944. The concept of party identification (party ID) was introduced, which is different from vote choice and thus from political behaviour. The concept comprises a more psychological type of attachment to a political party, and is used to *"characterize the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment"* (Campbell,

Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, p. 121). However, even strong party identifiers can act in contradiction to their party allegiance, which separates party ID from political behaviour (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 122). For instance, due to a more attractive presidential candidate, a party identifier can cast a vote for another party than the one he identifies with. The concept has been measured to this day by asking people how they classify themselves in terms of partisanship.[1] The two origins of party ID were identified to be early politicization and the persistence of partisanship, i.e. the influence of the first vote (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 146–148). Early politicization was described as the influence of social milieu, particularly family. The scholars show indeed that the intergenerational transmission of party ID is rather large: 79% of the respondents of whom both parents were politically active Democrats, also identify as a Democrat; for Republicans this is respectively 71% (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 147). Also for non-politically active parents, the percentages are still high: 76% of respondents with Democrats as parents identified as a Democrat, for Republicans the share being 68%.

The introduction of party identification was an important trigger for research on political socialization, as it was shown to be something that a young citizen acquires at home. The study of children was now a new object of interest. Greenstein (1965) and Easton and Dennis (1969) found that young children could already express themselves about politics, which was believed to be the basis of their future party ID. An important distinction in the development of this field has to be made here between the focus on micro and macro processes (Conover, 1991). Hyman represents the micro approach, focussing on the question how individuals acquire their political preferences; whereas Easton represents the macro approach, which is more interested in the bigger picture of how the individual socializing processes influence the working of the political system (Easton, 1968, pp. 125–126). Though both strands of research investigate the political learning of young citizens, a distinction is found between the one focussing on political *socialization* whereas the other is merely interested in political *education* (Conover, 1991, p. 133). An overlap is found in civic education studies. It may be clear that the

[1] The original question as used by the Michigan School researcher is as follows: *"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?",* then followed up by questions regarding the intensity of the identification, or, for independents, to which of the two parties they are closer (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, p. 122).

present focus is on political socialization; and that studies on civic and political education are not of key interest here.

Two of the most important scholars in the political socialization field, M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, extended the focus from the transmission of party ID to also that of political values and issue positions (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). Party ID correlation was found to be 0.47, showing 59% similarity. The correlation on issue positions was much lower, especially for less precise and more abstract issues (Jennings & Niemi, 1968, pp. 173–175). They also concluded that the more salient the issue, the larger the level of transmission, a finding confirmed by later studies (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009; Niemi, Ross, & Alexander, 1978; Westholm, 1999). Jennings and Niemi also looked at which characteristics of the family are of importance for the transmission process, and concluded that the level of politicization of the family (in terms of how often parents discuss politics) positively influences the transmission of party ID and political cynicism (1968, pp. 181–183). Their conclusions were relatively modest: the socialization model was only supported for party ID and a lot of room was left for other socializing agents than the family. Shortly afterwards, Connell (1972) published his opinion on a review of the political socialization studies performed so far and came to a different conclusion than Hyman (1959) earlier. Connell was not convinced by previous research regarding family influences social and political beliefs, and claimed that cohorts influence each other more within rather than across groups. Niemi and Hepburn (1995) indeed write in retrospect that the research on political socialization died a premature death in the 1970s, because of *"exaggerated premises and because of misinterpreted and misunderstood research findings"* (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995, p. 7). In fact, a period of relative silence followed, until socialization research began to expand from the US to Europe (Sapiro, 2004).

1.2.2 Revival and expansion

Since most studies were conducted in the US, theorizing on the basis of the characteristics of the US party system, it was not clear whether political socialization in Europe could be regarded the same as in the US. It was not clear whether in multiparty systems – the most common system in Europe – party identification would work the same way as in the US, because of the wider choice in parties. Similarly, it was not clear what the implications were for the transmission process from parents to children.

Budge, Crewe and Farlie (1976) had already devoted the entire edited volume 'Party Identification and Beyond' to the different issues concerning the party ID concept and its wider application outside the US context. They identified several problems concerning party ID and tried to find solutions for it in order to strengthen the concept. Because of these problems of the applicability of this concept to Europe, Percheron and Jennings (1981) investigated whether it was ideology or party ID that is passed on from parents to children in France, in comparison with other countries, using data from the Political Action study. Their findings show that this differs across countries depending on the left–right dimension or party identification being more salient in transmitting preferences from parents to children. In the two-party systems of the UK and the US, and in West Germany, which only during the 1960s became a competitive party system (Partch, 1980), the left–right transmission was very low and party ID transmission was high, whereas in the fragmented multiparty systems of Italy and The Netherlands the transmission rate for both left–right identification as well as party ID[2] was high (Percheron & Jennings, 1981, pp. 425–426). For France, they find high left–right ideology transmission and conclude that it is country-specific whether it is partisanship or left–right ideology (or a different relevant dimension) that is passed on from parents to children.

A replication study by Westholm and Niemi (1992) found somewhat different results and therefore claims that it should not be *either* partisanship *or* left–right ideology, but that both can work reinforcing in the political preference transmission process. They conclude that there is more direct transmission of partisanship than of ideological orientation; that partisanship of parents indirectly influences children's ideology (but *vice versa* not so much); and that due to the strength of direct as well as indirect transmission, left–right ideology will be most effectively transmitted in nations having a stable, multiparty system.

The outcomes of the research based on the Political Action Study, that provided the data used in both of these studies, are among the most important comparative and in-depth

[2] However, party ID in these countries should be interpreted with some caution, as it was found that in Western Europe party ID is less stable than vote choice and that party ID correlated strongly with vote choice (Thomassen 1976; Thomassen & Rosema 2009). Thus, vote choice and party ID cannot be properly distinguished and the party ID question merely measures people's party preference (Thomassen & Rosema 2009:56).

findings regarding political socialization. The most important conclusions that stem from these results are that the rate and type of transmission depend on the type as well as the stability of the party system. Ventura (2001) later confirms these conclusions to a certain extent, claiming that the heuristic cue that is transmitted in political socialization depends on the party system and its characteristics.

Another key study in this second wave of political socialization research did not focus on the type of preference transmission, but on the *mechanism* behind the transmission process. Up until now, the process of social transmission of political preferences was explained by 'direct transmission', which finds its basis in social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; Davies, 1965; Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Percheron & Jennings, 1981; Sigel, 1965). This social or political learning approach[3] entails that children take over the attitudes and values from their parents through *observation and imitation*, because of the key role that parents play in children's lives. Within this theory, a distinction can be made between intentional and unintentional transmission of preferences from parents to children. In the former process, parents engage in 'overt transmission' while in the latter parents merely serve as role models (Jennings & Niemi, 1968, p. 169). In both cases, however, parents *directly* influence the political preferences of their children by passing their own preferences over to them. A second explanation for parent–child similarity in political preferences was now put forward: the inheritance of structural factors such as socioeconomic position and religion, which leads to the same preferences of parents and children (Beck & Jennings, 1982; Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986). The reasoning is that political preferences are still closely connected to these structural positions in society; and therefore parents and children with these shared characteristics result in having the same political preferences. This refers to a different type of intergenerational transmission than in the initial social learning explanation,

[3] In their account of the social transmission of culture, Boyd and Richerson (1985) propose a relatively general mechanism as to how the process of social learning would take place, defined as the *"transmission of stable behavioural dispositions by teaching or imitation"* (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, p. 40). According to this mechanism, children observe the behaviour of their parents; induce rules from these observations; and incorporate these rules (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, p. 79). This reasoning can very well be applied to the practice of political socialization. Children learn (either by observation or because they are explicitly told) what the political preferences of their parents are. Depending on the cues they have received, they possibly develop a more precise set of preferences from these cues, and then incorporate them.

because here the parents merely have an *indirect, structural and impersonal* influence on their children's political preferences.

This more structural approach to preference transmission is strongly related to the body of literature regarding the cleavages in society that align with political differences, of which the class cleavage is one of the most dominant ones. Social class is identified as an important political cleavage in most post-industrial societies, leading to the elaborate field of class voting research (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Evans, 1993; Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992; Knutsen, 2006; Lipset, 1960). A key factor that mediates this structural inheritance mechanism is social mobility of children vis-à-vis their parents' social position. Socialization studies investigating the similarity between parents and children who have experienced social mobility (Clifford & Heath, 1993; De Graaf & Ultee, 1990; Knutsen, 2006; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1993; Wernli, 2010) indeed show that socially mobile voters to a certain extent adapt to the political preferences that are associated with their new social class, leading to their preferences being somewhere in the middle between those of the class of origin and the class of destination. This topic will be taken up extensively in Chapter 5, in which I investigate the effect of social mobility on the transmission of left–right ideology.

1.2.3 Shifting focus & challenging views

By the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, socialization research stagnated to a certain extent, or at least shifted its focus. Socialization questions were no longer taken up in general political surveys (e.g. Dutch Parliamentary Election Study); and not many new research questions were asked regarding the transmission of political preferences in families. At this time, the focus shifted somewhat away from the influence of the family, and towards that of other socializing agents. Research appeared that focused on the influence of individuals' social networks in general; and of schools and friends more specifically (e.g. Beck, Dalton, Greene, Steven, & Huckfeldt, 2002; Dean & Croft, 2001; Levine, 2005; Wittebrood, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005). Discussing politics within social networks, and political communication *per se*, received more attention, although these were not actually new topics. Lazarsfeld et al. (1968[1944]) and Campbell et al. (1960) had already concluded that talking with peers about politics or the political campaign was an important driver of voting decisions. Furthermore, despite the influence of these

other factors of importance to the socialization process, a recent study has shown the powerful and enduring influence of family, also when controlling for other external influences (Jennings et al., 2009).

Recently, a 'revisionist' perspective regarding the intergenerational influence in the family was put forward, suggesting a more active rather than passive role for the children in the household (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). In line with the trend at the beginning of the 2000s, this is grounded in political communication research and as such is more focussed on communication processes within the family (McDevitt, 2006; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). Later studies investigating this type of influence of the child on the parents indeed find that not only parents affect their children's partisan preferences, but also the other way around (Fitzgerald, 2011; Zuckerman, Dasovic, & Fitzgerald, 2007).

In 2005,, political science and especially the political socialization field was shaken up by the publication of the article 'Are political orientations genetically transmitted?' by Alford, Funk and Hibbing in the American Political Science Review (2005). The authors argued that 50% of the transmission of liberal-conservative attitudes goes through genes, based on results of a twin study in which the political preferences of identical and fraternal twins were compared. This publication led to a lot of criticism in political science, and resulted in a lively debate about 'biopolitics' and how twin studies can or cannot be used for making inferences about political preferences. At the same time, many similar studies followed, claiming there is indeed a genetic component to political preferences and behaviour, that cannot and should not be ignored (e.g. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2008; Bell, Schermer, & Vernon, 2009; Fowler, Baker, & Dawes, 2008; Hatemi et al., 2014; Hatemi, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2009; Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2010). In response to that, some scholars seem to make the argument that genes do not belong to the study of political science as an explanation for human behaviour and attitudes, since this *social* science has been dominated by the socialization paradigm since many years (Charney, 2008; Joseph, 2010, 2013). Next to that, the twin study method has been heavily criticised (e.g. Beckwith & Morris, 2008).

A few years afterwards, the field seems to have become more at ease with the idea that social and genetic explanations for human behaviour and preferences are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Recent political socialization and political psychology research acknowledges the need for research that takes both factors and their interaction into account, to obtain more comprehensive explanations of the bases of individuals' political preferences (De Neve, 2015; Jennings et al., 2009; Rico & Jennings, 2016).

1.2.4 Status quo

Although political socialization research is nowadays not as prominent in political science as it once was, in recent years new findings have been published that show that there are still many unanswered questions regarding political socialization in families. For instance, Kroh and Selb (2009) find that party identification acquired by pre-adult socialization is more persistent throughout the life course than a party ID acquired elsewhere, underlining the importance of family socialization once again. At the same time, Dinas (2014) shows how offspring from politicized homes are more likely to abandon the party preference from their parents, as they are more critical towards it and thus more like to question it. Urbatsch (2014) dedicated an entire book to *Families' Values*, exploring new ways in which the family is influencing individuals' political preferences and values, for instance by looking at the influence of siblings or maternal role models. In addition, more attention is given to the impact of family dynamics and transitions directly on citizen's political preferences and attitudes, such as the transition to parenthood or changes in partner status (Banducci, Elder, Greene, & Stevens, 2016; Elder & Greene, 2016; Kaufman, Bernhardt, & Goldscheider, 2016).

Before moving to the research design, an overview is provided of recent figures regarding political preference transmission in families in contemporary Western European party systems. Although they differ in terms of their dependent and independent variables, the findings are comparable to a large extent. In Germany (1985-2001) the mother-child correlation in terms of SPD and CDU/CSU preference was found to be 0.6 for both parties (Zuckerman et al., 2007, p. 93). In The Netherlands (2006), a country with a more fragmented party system, 43% of the adult children vote for the same party as their father and/or mother (Van Houwelingen, De Hart, & Den Ridder,

2010, p. 105). Similar results are found in Belgium (2012): 54% of adolescents has the same voting intention as at least one parent (Hooghe & Boonen, 2015, pp. 141–142). This indicates that even when the choice in parties is large, the similarity between parents and children is found to be high. Looking at similarity in ideological positioning on the left–right scale, findings show also high correlations between children and parents. In Catalonia, Spain (2004-2005), 61% parent–child similarity in terms of left–right self-placement was found (Rico & Jennings, 2016). Italy (2010) shows similar results with 54% mother/father-child similarity in terms of left–right self-placement (Corbetta, Tuorto, & Cavazza, 2013, p. 18). In Switzerland (1999-2006), the percentage of overlap is even higher: 72% of respondents places himself on the same left–right position as his father (Wernli, 2010, p. 25).

These results suggest that also in contemporary Western European multiparty systems a large amount of similarity exists between parents and children in terms of political preferences. However, currently still not that much is known about the *factors* influencing this level of similarity. Recent studies by Rico and Jennings (2016) and Hooghe and Boonen (2015) show that the classic explanations are still used to account for differences in transmission across families, such as the level of politicization of the family (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings & Niemi, 1968); the relationship between parents and children (Jennings & Niemi, 1968); cue consistency (Jennings et al., 2009); and sex combinations of parents and children (Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1994).

1.3 Contribution of the study

This study contributes to this field of literature by taking into account the classic explanations regarding parent–child transmission, while also asking new questions regarding the influence of the family on (young) adults' political ideology, both in terms of transmission and more direct influences of family structure and dynamics. The family is regarded as the starting point of the development of citizens' political ideology. However, the way that the influence of the family is conceptualized differs from earlier studies. This research takes into account recent societal changes that are relevant to processes of political socialization and its underlying mechanisms, and therefore

provides novel insights regarding how family dynamics and structure affect the political socialization process.

Society and family forms have drastically changed during the past decades, in terms of family formation, household structure, kinship relations, and the increase in non-traditional family forms (Eurostat, 2015; OECD, 2011; Wall & Gouveia, 2014). At the same time, most political socialization research has not changed so much, as outlined in the previous section. Furthermore, in most political socialization studies, the family as such has been left out of the equation, in the sense that most research only investigates the influence of one or two parents. The structure of the family is usually left out, and the traditional two-parent family is the main object of study. Moreover, parents are not the only family members that could be of influence in the process of family political socialization. For these reasons, this study takes up new questions regarding the effects of siblings and parental separation on the development of political ideology. These questions are also connected to more classic questions in this field of research regarding same-sex influence patterns in the family, and the (dis)similarity in the political preferences of both parents.

As regards the structural inheritance approach to political socialization, there has been not much recent attempt to update the current state of knowledge. However, due to processes of increased female labour participation and higher levels of education, the social stratification patterns in society have changed importantly (see e.g. Oesch, 2006). Moreover, changes in the occupational structure, such as the decline of the industrial sector and the expansion of the service sector, lead to new forms of intergenerational class mobility and different configurations of parental and offspring class location. These developments have consequences for the inheritance of the parental socioeconomic status, and thus for the structural inheritance mechanism shaping citizens' political preferences and ideology. In addition, most studies investigating how intergenerational social mobility of children affect this mechanism have actually left out the political preferences or ideology of the parents, simply assuming that they align with their socioeconomic position. Therefore, this research takes up a classic question regarding social mobility, but uses a different conceptualization of social class that is more in line with current society, and also includes measures of the parental ideology.

In short, this research provides new insights regarding political socialization in the current society by taking several family dynamics and its structure into account. As such, it provides novel insights regarding formative experiences in the family that affect the transmission and development of political ideology. In terms of family structure, it takes a more comprehensive approach towards the influence of the family by including siblings as well, and by investigating how the non-traditional one-parent family affects the development of political ideology. Moreover, in terms of family dynamics, gendered political socialization processes and intergenerational dynamics regarding social mobility patterns in the family are investigated. The analysis of sibling, gendered socialization and parental separation effects investigate how these early formative processes in the family influence political ideology until later in life. The analysis of social mobility investigates the next step in the life cycle by analysing how enduring the influence of the family socialization still is, when the child moves to a different social class location.

1.4 Research Design

1.4.1 Case selection

The two main countries included in this study are Germany and Switzerland. Both are Western European multiparty systems, but differ in a few important respects. Firstly, Switzerland is characterized much more by party-system fragmentation than Germany, due to the differences in the electoral system. Germany has an election threshold of 5%, ensuring that small parties cannot enter Parliament. Switzerland, on the other hand, has a truly proportional system with a high degree of federalism, showing large differences between cantons (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008, pp. 88–89). This leads to a higher number of political parties in Switzerland, in absolute terms, but also in terms of the effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). A higher number of parties hinders the transmission of an attachment to one specific party from parents to children (Ventura, 2001) and thus makes it more likely that left–right ideology is transmitted in stable multiparty systems (Westholm & Niemi, 1992). Therefore, the transmission of left–right ideology is expected to be higher in Switzerland than in Germany. Furthermore, other pertinent differences between the two countries are the relatively late introduction of women's suffrage; and Switzerland's system of direct democracy (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). Whereas the first factor would impede the transmission between mothers and

children, as women might be less perceived as political role models, the characterization of direct democracy in Switzerland would suggest that politics is more often the object of discussion, which is expected to enhance processes of political socialization.

The external validity of this research, i.e. the extent to which the findings can be generalized to other contexts than the two parties under study, is limited to a certain extent. The general tendencies will most likely be similar to other West European countries, as has been shown by the comparable recent findings presented earlier regarding a wide range of countries. However, regarding the more specific mechanisms under study here the external validity is more limited, as social norms and the implications of structural cleavages can sharply differ across countries, even in Western Europe. For instance, in Italy the divorce rates are very low and therefore any mechanisms regarding the impact of parental separation will play out very differently than in the countries under study here. Additionally, countries differ in the level of gender equality and associated norms regarding gender roles, limiting the external validity of this research.

1.4.2 The German and Swiss household panels

The data demands for this study are high. Not only does it require the political preferences of parents and children, it also asks for many characteristics of the family. Most political and social surveys include only one generation of respondents and are cross-sectional, and do not provide information regarding the composition of the family. Furthermore, in order to test the hypotheses formulated in this study, a relatively large number of respondents is needed to have sufficient observations over different categories. Only very few datasets live up to these requirements, but household studies provide a valuable solution.

Therefore, the two main data sources used in this study are the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). All chapters make use of the G-SOEP and the SHP, and Chapter 4 additionally makes use of the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS data is shortly described in Chapter 4, but the two other, more complex datasets are described more at length here.

The G-SOEP and the SHP are two household panel studies, which means that household members are interviewed repeatedly over time. Additionally, the focus of both these studies is on all individuals in the household, and a member leaving the household, will be followed afterwards as well. Thus, the main advantage of the use of these studies is that they contain direct entries about all household members, even after leaving the household. This implies that I have direct observations of parents and their children, in terms of their political ideology and other characteristics. The household structure of these studies also allows to a large extent to understand the family structure of each of the respondents under investigation, for instance the sibling composition. In the analyses in this research, the primary respondents under investigation are (almost) adult children: in the G-SOEP, political questions are asked to household members from the age of 17 onwards, in the SHP from age 16.

It is possible to link observations of parents and children because the data allows for identifying the respondents' parents in the dataset, using personal identifier numbers. This way, the political ideology and other characteristics of two generations of respondents can be taken into account.

Although each dataset provides representative samples of the German and Swiss populations, respectively, the analytic samples that are used here unfortunately deal with bias towards respondents of which: 1) the parents are known and included in the household study; 2) the political ideology is reported and; 3) the political ideology of one or both parents is reported. Chapter 2 deals with this by comparing the original and analytic samples of both studies.

1.4.2.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (G-SOEP)

The data file used to perform the analyses for Germany find its basis in the BIOPAREN file, which contains information about the parents of all individuals who have been at least once interviewed since the start of the G-SOEP in 1984 (Haisken-DeNew & Frick, 2005, p. 114). This data file contains information on the parents of respondents either obtained by proxy entries on the parents stemming from the Biography Questionnaire of the G-SOEP, or direct entries stemming from the parents, in case they are living in the

same household as the respondent at the time of the survey (Goebel, 2014, pp. 185–186).

A social rather than a biological definition of 'family', 'parents', and 'siblings' is used. The parent identifiers in the BIOPAREN file are generated on the basis of several kinds of parent–child relationships, which are derived from the relationship of the child and the parents to the household head, i.e. the primary respondent. Biological children, foster children, adopted children, and stepchildren (or child of partner) are all regarded as "children" of their respective parents (Goebel, 2014, p. 186). Two persons are defined as siblings when they report the same mother and father, only the same mother, or only the same father (Goebel, 2014, p. 134). The identifiers of both parents and children are used to add information stemming from other files, such as the yearly personal interviews.

1.4.2.2 The Swiss Household Panel (SHP)

The Swiss Household Panel provides very similar information on parents and children as the G-SOEP, but started 15 years later, in 1999. Therefore, the number of parent–child dyads is much smaller than in the G-SOEP. The personal identifier numbers of the parents are provided for each respondent, when available, in the individual master file (Voorpostel et al., 2015, p. 44). It is not specified which type of definition (social or biological) of parents is used in the SHP for identifying family members. It could be the case that both biological and foster parents are regarded as parents. However, the percentage of foster children in the sample is very small, so whether a social or a biological definition is used, should not lead to any large differences. Respondents with the same mother identified in the panel are regarded as siblings.

The 'social origin' file contains information provided retrospectively by respondents about the situation during their childhood, such as the occupation of the parents or the level of education. This information is collected during the first interview of each respondent that enters the panel study. However, respondents who entered the panel before the age of 20, or still live in their parents' household before the age of 20, do not receive these questions. For the majority of this group, direct entries on their parents can be directly observed in the data (Voorpostel et al., 2015, p. 50). Additional

information, such as the respondent's level of education and left–right self-placement, is collected from the yearly personal interviews.

1.4.3 The dependent variable: left–right self-placement

In this section I describe the dependent variable that is used throughout the entire thesis, left–right self-placement, in terms of the meaning of the concept and the applicability to the main countries under study here.

1.4.3.1 The concept of left–right self-placement

This study focuses on the transmission and long-term development of political ideology, operationalized specifically in terms of left–right self-placement, which has been defined as *"a mean for citizens to orient themselves in a complex political world"* (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989, p. 205). As described earlier, contrary to the US, the type of political cue – partisanship or ideology – that is transmitted from parents to children in Europe differs across countries (Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Westholm & Niemi, 1992). In multiparty systems, such as the countries under study here, it is most often ideology rather than a partisan attachment that is transmitted from parents to children, due to the multitude of political parties (Ventura, 2001; Westholm & Niemi, 1992). This applies especially to more fragmented party systems, often with a low or non-existing electoral threshold, which also facilitates the representation of (new) small parties. The reasoning is that when the supply of parties is large, there are several political or ideological blocks of parties to be identified, whereas in systems with only few parties, each block has only one party. Indeed, in fragmented multiparty systems voters have been found to not necessarily change their vote choice *across* – but more often *within* – these ideological blocks of parties (Van der Meer, Van Elsas, Lubbe, & Van der Brug, 2015). Thus, ideology rather than the identification with one specific party provides the cue with the largest heuristic advantage to be passed on (Ventura, 2001), also because new parties more often successfully emerge in multiparty systems. As this study mainly focuses on Germany and Switzerland, which are both multiparty systems, the choice has been made to mainly focus on the transmission of ideology rather than partisanship or party attachment.

Left–right self-placement is used in this study as a summarizing concept of individuals' political ideology. Since Anthony Downs (1957) introduced the left–right scale, it has remained a central concept in political science. Left–right self-placement has been widely used as a 'shortcut' to the ideological beliefs of citizens. Although the meaning of the poles has changed over time, the measure is still found to be an appropriate depiction of individuals' ideological orientations. Furthermore, people with the same left–right positions will overall have comparable party preferences and similar policy preferences (Mair, 2007, pp. 217–218). Albeit with some variation across countries, a large majority of the electorate in Western Europe is able to place oneself on the left–right scale (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Mair, 2007). For these reasons, the left–right scale is often regarded as the "super-issue" (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976) and is still the most widely used short-hand term (Mair, 2007, p. 217).

An advantage of using the left–right scale as a shortcut for ideology is that it is found to adapt its meaning to the salient issues and dimensions in politics at a given time. Recent developments in the dimensionality of the political space of the party systems in Western Europe have led to the identification of two main dimensions of competition: the classic socioeconomic dimension, and the more recently politicised socio-cultural dimension (Kitschelt, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). While the socioeconomic dimension arises around questions of economic redistribution and state intervention in the economy, the socio-cultural dimension deals with *"the governance structure of social life"* (Kitschelt, 2004, p. 2). The latter dimension is also known as the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, opposing those who are more culturally liberal positions against those who defend more traditional values (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 924). Recent studies have found that the left–right self-placement scale does no longer reflect citizens' socioeconomic issue positions only, but the left–right scale also reflects positions on issues of increased salience belonging to the socio-cultural dimension, such as immigration (De Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013; Lachat, 2017).
Another advantage of the use of the left–right scale is the numerical measurement of the ideological position, which provides the opportunity to easily calculate ideological distances from children to their parents.

In the main data sources used in this study, the left–right self-placement variable is measured by asking the following questions: *"In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right" when describing different political views. When you think about your own political views, how would you rate them on the scale below?"* (G-SOEP) and *"When they talk about politics, people mention left and right. Personally, where do you position yourself, 0 means "left" and 10 "right"?"* (SHP). The respondents can then place themselves on a scale ranging from 0, defined as "far left", to 10, defined as "far right".

1.4.3.2 The left–right scale in Germany and Switzerland

The extent to which the left–right self-placement scale is applicable to the context of the two main countries of study here is crucial. In both countries, the concept of left–right ideology has been in use since quite a while.

Despite the relatively recent reunification of former East and West Germany, the concept is by now well applicable in the country. Westholm & Niemi (1992), using data from the Political Action Study (1973-1976), find the transmission of left–right ideology in West Germany to be lower than that of party ID, which may lead to the conclusion that this ideological scale was not salient in political life in former West Germany. However, Fuchs and Klingemann (1989) show with more recent data from 1980 that the left–right scale does work in West Germany: the recognition and understanding of the scale in 1980 was relatively high. Of all respondents, 89% recognised the scale and was able to place him or herself on it, dependent on the level of education – ranging from 87% for the lower educated to 95% for the higher educated (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989, p. 210). However, West Germany as such no longer exists and this study focuses on Germany after reunification. The periodical suspension of democracy during the time of the GDR in East Germany may have possibly led to a different understanding and use of the left–right scale between the former West and East parts of the country. However, based on empirical evidence (Neundorf, 2009) there are no reasons to believe that the left–right scale is not consolidated in former East Germany as well. Neundorf (2009, p. 219) concludes on the basis of 1999 data: *"Nine years of a unified Germany were enough time for East Germans to develop an ideological self-identification on this Western political shortcut."*

In Switzerland, the share of people being able to place themselves on the left–right scale nowadays does not differ much from other countries, but the country used to fall behind in this respect until recently (Geser, 2008). A straightforward explanation would be the relatively late enfranchisement of women, but Inglehart and Sidjanski (1976) show, using data from 1972 from the first Swiss representative nation-wide survey on electoral behaviour, that this is only part of the explanation, as the share of men placing themselves on the scale was also low compared to other countries. Furthermore, the relationship between issue preferences and left–right preferences was weaker than in most other Western countries. However, a recent study (Lachat, 2017) has shown that Swiss voters' ideological bases of left–right self-placement show very similar patterns to those in The Netherlands, France, the UK, and Germany, capturing issue positions from both dimensions in the political space. By now, the left–right self-placement scale in Switzerland is much more salient than before, and even one of the strongest ones in Europe, in terms of ideological meaning (Medina, 2015).

1.5 Outline of the thesis

In this thesis, each chapter has a more specific research question, with a theoretical framework on the basis of which hypotheses are formulated, that are tested using the data at hand. Although every chapter can be regarded as a stand-alone piece of research, they are strongly connected by their foundation in political socialization and the transmission of political ideology. Therefore, the ideological transmission mechanisms as discussed earlier in this chapter are not reviewed once again in the following chapters, but rather shortly referred to whenever necessary. Together, the next four chapters provide each a piece of the puzzle how family influences citizens' political ideology.

Chapter 2 answers the question how much transmission of political ideology takes place, and under which circumstances it is larger or smaller. The chapter provides an overview of the level of transmission of left–right ideology in Germany and Switzerland, as an explorative starting point for more in-depth analyses. The empirical findings are compared with results from recent comparable studies. The similarity of parents and children in their left–right positions is compared across groups according to characteristics at the family, parental, and child level, such as the place of the parent on

the left–right scale; the homogeneity of the parental ideology; socioeconomic status (SES) and level of education; gender; and age. The overall finding is that the level of transmission of political ideology is relatively high, and that it is larger among families in which parents have a similar ideology. In Germany, left and centre ideologies are most successfully transmitted. Furthermore, the results regarding gender effects are not conclusive, but find some support for a larger influence of the mother in Switzerland. These findings are in line with earlier studies regarding the transmission of political preferences, but are now confirmed specifically for the dependent variable used here, left–right ideology.

The subsequent chapters deal more specifically with different family factors that interfere in the process of political socialization of (young) adults, by affecting their political ideology directly and indirectly. Chapter 3 further builds on one of the findings of Chapter 2, by focussing on gender effects in political socialization. In this chapter, the traditional two-parent family is central, as it asks the question to what extent the transmission of ideology is larger between a parent and a child of the same sex, differentiating between families in which the parents have a similar and a dissimilar ideology. Furthermore, the chapter also investigates gender effects of siblings by asking to what extent the gender of the eldest or the next-in-line sibling affects the ideology of the younger siblings. Although no strong gender-specific patterns are found regarding the parent–child transmission of ideology, some effects are found in Switzerland for both the eldest and the next-older sister influencing the younger sibling's ideology, dependent upon the gender of the respondents and the ideology of the mother.

In Chapter 4, mothers and specifically single-mother families are the principal socializing actor of interest. The chapter investigates how parental separation at a young age, which most often implies growing up in a single-mother family, directly and indirectly affects the left–right ideology of the adult children. Pan-European analyses using the European Values Study show that adults who experienced parental divorce during childhood hold more leftist views than those who did not have this experience. This effect partly runs through economic deprivation, but not entirely, leaving room for the mechanisms of single-mother socialization and witnessing the parents breaking social norms. Subsequent analyses using G-SOEP and SHP data show additional support

for the effects of parental separation, and also investigate the development of the mother's ideology together with the change in civil status, indicating a complex interplay of different mechanisms regarding the ideology of both mother and child.

In Chapter 5, the last empirical chapter, the father is the central figure. This chapter refers mainly to the structural inheritance mechanism in political socialization. It asks what the implications are for the transmission of political ideology from parents to children, when the social class of parents, as provided by the father, is not taken over by the child. Taking both horizontal and vertical mobility into account using the Oesch class scheme, this chapter gives particular attention to the self-selection mechanism into social mobility. It concludes that few causal effects of this experience are found on the political socialization process, which has consequences for how social mobility and its effects should be perceived.

The last concluding chapter synthesizes the foregoing four empirical chapters by summarizing the most important findings and reflecting on the question how family influences citizens' political ideology, not only in terms of direct transmission, but also in terms of the dynamics in the family under study here.

2. Intergenerational Transmission of Political Ideology in Germany and Switzerland

2.1 Introduction

This chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent chapters, by providing first insights into the level of intergenerational transmission of political ideology from parents to children, and the key factors in this process. To start with, it provides a mainly descriptive overview of the transmission rates of left–right self-placement. Then, the focus shifts towards the question in which subgroups a higher or lower level of ideological transmission is found. More advanced multivariate analyses are also performed to investigate which factors influence the left–right placement of citizens, and which factors affect the transmission of ideology from parents to children. To this end, characteristics at the family, parental, and child level are taken into account.

The analyses are limited to the two countries of main study in this thesis: Germany and Switzerland. As described in Chapter 1, the level of transmission can be expected to be higher in Switzerland than in Germany, because the left–right ideology may be a more important cue here in the socialization process, due to the fragmentation of the party system (Ventura, 2001; Westholm & Niemi, 1992). Furthermore, the late introduction of universal suffrage in Switzerland is important to keep in mind when comparing the influence of the mother and the father.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with a short theoretical introduction and conceptualization, after which the data is described and the analyses are presented. The chapter concludes by answering the following questions. To what extent is political ideology transmitted in Germany and Switzerland? Which factors are of influence on the level of transmission? And, lastly, which key differences are found between the results for the two countries?

2.2 Family transmission of political ideology

This main objective of this chapter is providing an overview of the transmission of political ideology from parents to children. To this end, for different groups of parents and children the overlap in their political ideology is investigated, operationalized by

left–right self-placement positions. Several characteristics of the family, the individual parents, and the children are of interest here.

Firstly, at the family level, the socioeconomic status (SES) of the family and the similarity of the parental political ideology are considered. The SES of the family relates to the literature on class voting, in which the working classes are the traditional supporters of the left (Lipset, 1960). Although class voting is said to have been declining in recent decades (Evans, 1999; Jansen, Evans, & De Graaf, 2013; Knutsen, 2006), the socioeconomic cleavage still proves to be a relevant factor in voting and political ideology, albeit in a somewhat different manner than before (Evans, 2000; Oesch, 2008). A sense of social class belonging connected to a specific party or ideological preference, can therefore be well transmitted to children (Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1993). Moreover, when parents have the same (or close) political preferences, they are expected to be better able to transmit those to the child, because it receives uniform cues instead of receiving cross-pressures (Bandura, 1977). Generally, partners tend to be highly similar in many respects, a phenomenon called 'assortative mating', which includes not only SES and educational level, but also political traits (Beck & Jennings, 1975; Jennings & Niemi, 1971). A recent study indeed found political preferences of parents to be relatively high (Zuckerman et al., 2007).

Secondly, the influence of individual parental characteristic on preference transmission is studied, specifically gender, political ideology, and the level of education. The difference in transmission rate will be shown respectively for mothers and fathers, and sons and daughters. Previous studies showed different outcomes: some claim the mother is always dominant in transferring her political preferences, while it has also been found that the respective sexes of parent and child do not matter for the transmission process (see e.g. Gniewosz, Noack, & Buhl, 2009; Jennings & Niemi, 1968, p. 180). Furthermore, it has also been hypothesized that same-sex parent–child dyads (mother and daughter; and father and son) are more successful in transmitting the ideology of the parent (Acock & Bengtson, 1978; Jennings & Langton, 1969; Jennings & Niemi, 1971). This topic will be explored in more detail and with more sophisticated analyses in Chapter 3, but this chapter provides the first descriptive account. Next to the homogeneity of parental preferences, as mentioned earlier, the actual position of

parents in the political spectrum and the extremity of this position, is also considered. For instance, it could be argued that parents with more radical positions are more passionate in transmitting their ideology to their children, while at the same time a more extreme ideology is more difficult to pass on, as it could easily deviate more from other environments of the child, e.g. at school or other social environments. These cross-pressures could lead to a lower level of transmission (Bandura, 1977). In addition, the parental level of education is also taken into account, as it could be expected that higher educated parents be more inclined to pass their ideology on to their children, as education is often associated with political interest, participation, and political cognition (Zaller, 1992, p. 21). The reason for using parental education rather than self-reported political interest is that it is deemed less reliable due to the large potential for social desirability bias (Galais, Blais, & Bowler, 2014).

Lastly, overlap in preferences between parents and children are investigated at different ages of the child and for children of different educational levels. It can be expected that at a lower age children's preferences are closer to those of their parents than later in life, when they have been exposed to more different influences and experiences that may impact their preferences as well. Children of a higher educational level may be more critical towards their parent's preferences, resulting in lower transmission rates, but also might enjoy discussing politics more, which may boost the similarity in preferences.

2.3 Data & variables

The analyses are performed using household panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). This section describes the variables used in the analysis, and the differences between the full and the analytic sample.

2.3.1 Variables

The dependent variable in the analyses in this chapter is left–right self-placement (scale 0-10). This variable is only present in two waves of the G-SOEP, 2005 and 2009. The data are pooled without overlap for those two waves, using the entry for 2009 as the baseline entry. If the value for 2009 is missing, the value for 2005 is used. The data pooling is performed in the same manner for the fathers and mothers of the children,

but observations of parents and their children are always from the same wave (year), taking the same approach as a recent study on left–right transmission in Catalonia (Rico & Jennings, 2016). In the SHP, the left–right self-placement is included in every wave. For the analysis in this chapter, the five most recent waves (2010–2014) are pooled together without overlap, using the most recent observations from 2014 as the baseline category, in a similar way as done with the G-SOEP (i.e. in case the value for 2014 is missing, the one of 2013 is added, otherwise the one of 2012, etc.). Five waves are used here to maximize the number of parent–child dyads, as the panel has started much later than the G-SOEP (in 1999) and thus includes a smaller pool of adult respondents and their parents. Descriptive statistics are presented in the Results section regarding the pooling of the variables, and to what extent differences are present across waves.

The following independent variables are included in the analysis. Firstly, the SIOPS (Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale) score is included that serves as a proxy for socioeconomic status (SES), which provided a vertical differentiation in terms of the social prestige score of the parents (Treiman, 1977). This variable is derived from the professional position and occupation of the father when the child had age 15. For this variable either proxies or direct information from the personal data on the parents are used, depending on the fact whether parents and children were living in the same household at the time of the survey (Goebel, 2014; Voorpostel et al., 2015). The variable is recoded into three groups (30th percentile; 31st to 69th percentile; and 70th to 100th percentile) to differentiate between low, medium and high social prestige scores.

The level of education of the parents and children is also included. For children, it is measured in terms of the highest diploma/degree attained in the year of the left–right self-placement, indicated by the ISCED score (The International Standard Classification of Education) in the G-SOEP, and a different, national, typology in the SHP. The additional category 'still in school' is also included. For the parents, either retrospective or prospective information on their educational level is used. For all respondents, this variable is recoded into three categories: lower (inadequately and general elementary), medium (middle vocational and vocational (in G-SOEP also *Abitur*)) and higher education (higher vocational and higher education).

The level of parental similarity in terms of left–right ideology is a dummy variable that is calculated by taking the numerical absolute difference (i.e. distance) in left–right position of both parents. A distance of 0 or 1 on the left–right scale is regarded as a homogeneous ideology, whereas a larger distance is regarded as a heterogeneous ideology. In the analysis by ideological blocks (left, centre, right), the adherence to the same block is used to measure parental similarity in ideology.

Lastly, for the analyses with the G-SOEP regarding the bases of left–right positions, a dummy variable is included that distinguishes between respondents from former East and West Germany, to capture any potential differences in left–right self-placement between respondents stemming from these two areas, and the different regime under which they were politically socialized. The region of residence in 1989 is therefore used, and for younger respondents who were born afterwards the region of residence in the year of the left–right self-placement is used.

2.3.2 Comparing the full and the analytic samples of the G-SOEP and the SHP

The analytic and full samples of both the G-SOEP and the SHP differ in a few important respects, which implies that although both household panels are representative samples of respectively the German and Swiss population, this does not automatically apply to the sample under study here. I recall here from Chapter 1 that the respondents under investigation are (almost) adult children, as political questions are asked to household members from the age of 16 (SHP) and 17 (G-SOEP) onwards. These respondents remain in the panel study also after leaving the parental household (unless they decide to no longer participate). As the most recent observations available are used in the analyses, the age of the child and the probability that the child has moved out of the parental home are maximized.

The analytic sample consists of respondents of whom *at least one parent* is present in the household data and of which their political ideology is provided. This information is directly obtained from the respondents, for parents as well as children. In other words, no proxy information is used for these variables. Unfortunately, this implies that the analytic samples deal with a bias towards respondents of which 1) the parents are known and included in the household panel; 2) the political ideology is known; and 3)

the political ideology of one or both parents is known. Furthermore, key information such as the parental social status of level of education, is not always available either. Due to missing values on these different variables, the number of observations differs per analysis.

Because of these differences between the full and the analytic samples, an analysis is performed on the cases for which there are no observations in the final subsample that is used in the analyses. The comparison focuses on the dependent variable (left–right self-placement) and the most important independent variables under study: the respondent's age, gender, level of education, the parental level of education, and the family's SES (measured by the father's SIOPS score). The full original sample[4] of both household studies is compared with the analytical sample of respondents of whom the political ideology of himself and of *at least of one* of his parents is known. For age, the observations of the pooled waves are taken, and the age is calculated in the most recent year that left–right self-placement was measured. The original sample only provides full information on all respondents on the most basic characteristics, such as gender and age, as for a large share of the respondents no information is available for all variables, especially regarding the retrospective information from the Biography (G-SOEP) or Social Origin (SHP) questionnaires.

The comparison of the full samples and the analytic samples for both datasets shows, as can be expected, some selection bias, but also some inevitable bias, for instance in age. In both datasets, the analytic sample is much younger than the original sample, with a mean age of 50 in both original samples, and respectively 23 (SHP) and 29 (G-SOEP) in the analytic samples. The distributions are found in the Appendix, showing not only the large difference in sample size, but also the age range and distribution. Mostly young respondents, who have recently become old enough to participate in the survey as well as their parents, are present in the analytic samples. However, the age range of the

[4] It is hard to determine what would be the most appropriate original sample for this comparison, as the household panel datasets cover a large number of waves and different types of questionnaires (biographical, yearly personal, household, etc.). Therefore, in the comparison of the original and the analytic sample, all valid cases present in the assembled data file, based on the yearly personal files, are compared to those cases of whom a valid left–right self-placement of themselves and at least of one parent is available. This implies that an as large as possible original sample of respondents is compared to the analytical sample.

analytic sample extends up to 60 in the G-SOEP, and 41 in the SHP. The ratio of males and females slightly differs. In the analytic sample, there is an underrepresentation of women (about 48% in both datasets) compared to the full sample (about 51% in both).

The variable of the father's SES when the child was 15, measured in terms of the SIOPS, shows only small differences across the samples, with a mean of 41 respectively 44 (SD: 13) in the G-SOEP full and analytics samples; and 43 respectively 48 (SD: 13) in the SHP samples. There is thus a slightly higher tendency of higher SES respondents to be in the analytic sample. For the parental level of education, the self-selection bias is much stronger. Lower educated parents are highly underrepresented in the analytic sample (G-SOEP: 18% of mothers, 9% of fathers; SHP: 11% and 4%) compared to the original sample (G-SOEP: 29% of mothers, 17% of fathers; SHP: 36% and 20%). Ergo, higher educated parents are strongly overrepresented, while the share of medium educated parents is about the same. This is most likely a sign of the higher educated being more probable to answer the question regarding left–right placement. This tendency is not to the same extent visible in the figures of the child's education. There is an overrepresentation of lower educated in the analytic sample (SHP: 27% vs. 17%; G-SOEP: 20% vs. 15%), but an underrepresentation of medium educated respondents (SHP: 23% vs. 32%; G-SOEP: 52% vs. 44%). This is probably due to the young age of the children, implying that they have not yet reached their final level of education. The share of respondents being still in school and highly educated is however the same in the SHP, but not in the G-SOEP. In the analytic sample, there is a much larger share of respondents who are still in school, and a smaller share with higher education. This most likely points to the fact that these children will receive higher education at a later stage in life, but are not there yet.

Lastly, focussing on the dependent variable, it is found that children of whom the left–right ideology of at least one parent is known (analytical sample) do not differ in their left–right positions from the whole sample of children of whom the parents are identified (original sample). The graphs in the Appendix show that the left–right placement distributions are indeed very similar. The only difference for the SHP is that the respondents of the original sample have a higher tendency to take the midpoint position on the scale.

Based on the comparison of the key dependent and independent variables in both samples, it can be concluded that the original sample and the analytical sample used in the analysis (comprised of the respondents of whom the left–right ideology is known and the left–right ideology of at least one parent is known) differ in a few respects. The most important differences are found in the level of education of the parents, and to a smaller extent the SES of the family. Inevitable differences are found in terms of age, and correlated with this is the level of education of the children in the sample.

2.4 Results

This section presents the results of the descriptive and multivariate analyses regarding the transmission of left–right ideology from parents to children. Before going into the similarity in ideology between parents and their children, descriptive statistics are presented of the distribution of the respondents on the left–right self-placement scale. The last sections present OLS models seeking firstly to explain the bases of left–right self-placement; and then the factors that influence the ideological closeness of parents and children.

2.4.1 Descriptive statistics: comparing distributions

In Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2, the distributions of the respondents over the left–right self-placement scale are presented for the (adult) children that are investigated here, separately for the years that are later pooled together (G-SOEP: 2005 and 2009; SHP: 2010-2014), and for the pooled data (without overlap). The results for both G-SOEP and SHP show that within each dataset, the distributions are very similar and that the pooling of the data did not cause distortions in the distribution.

In Germany, by far the largest part of the respondents (over 40%) places themselves at the midpoint of the scale, leading to a disproportionate peak in the middle of the scale. The respondents can therefore not be regarded as being normally distributed over the scale. In Switzerland, the peak in the middle is also clearly visible, but not as disproportionate as in Germany. These distributions therefore approach a normal distribution more closely

Figure 2-1. Germany: Distribution over the left–right scale, 2005, 2009, and pooled data



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009
N 2005: 20247. N 2009: 19237. N pooled: 25262

Figure 2-2. Switzerland: Distribution over the left–right scale, 2010-2014, and pooled data



Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014
N 2010: 6358. N 2011: 6494. N 2012: 6462. N 2013: 6097. N 2014: 10198. N pooled: 12855

Lastly, the data (not presented here) also show that in Germany most respondents are willing and able to place themselves on the scale, since there is a non-response of roughly 4% in both years the question was included in the survey. In Switzerland, the non-response is higher: about 15% of the respondents in each wave does not place him or herself on the scale. However, the difference in the percentage of respondents taking the midpoint position in both countries, may point to the fact that German respondents

who do not know their left–right position tend to choose the midpoint (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1984), whereas the Swiss respondents are more likely to not answer when this is the case.

Figure 2-3. Germany: Distribution over the left–right scale of children, mothers and fathers, pooled data



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009
N children: 25262. N mothers: 4934. N fathers: 4169

Figure 2-4. Switzerland: Distribution over the left–right scale of children, mothers and fathers, pooled data



Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014
N children: 12855. N mothers: 2025 N fathers: 1635

In Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4, the distributions over the left–right scale of children, mothers and fathers are compared to each other (pooled data). The figures for both countries show that all patterns are very similar, with all three groups having a large peak in the middle. However, it shows that in both countries, mothers are more likely to place themselves at the midpoint of the scale (G-SOEP: over 45%; SHP: over 35%), whereas fathers are less likely to do so (G-SOEP: almost 40%, SHP: almost 30%). Moreover, it shows that especially in Germany the respondents are somewhat more left

leaning than right leaning. Mothers in both countries are clearly more left leaning compared to the fathers, pointing at the gender gap in ideology (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). The difference is especially large in Switzerland. Lastly, the figures show that in Switzerland respondents are more inclined to take the most extreme positions on the scale than in Germany. Especially the most right-wing pole on the scale is a position that is hardly chosen in the latter country.

Having concluded that there are no problematic differences between the different generations in terms of placement on the left–right scale, nor between the several years in which the variable has been measured, I move to the *similarity* in ideology between parents and their children.

2.4.2 Descriptive statistics: parent–child similarity in ideology

In Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, the percentages are shown per absolute numerical distance on the left–right scale between mothers and their children, and fathers and their children. It shows that the by far largest part of parent–child dyads has a very high overlap in terms of left–right placement.

In Germany, for both mother-child and father-child dyads, around 60% have the same or a very close position: respectively 34% and 30% take the exact same position, and 30% has a 1-point distance in position on the scale. In Switzerland, these two categories together add up to 50%. Especially the percentage that takes the same position is much lower than in Germany, respectively 22% and 21%. This is due to the difference in percentage of both children and parents taking the midpoint on the scale. In both countries, the similarity with the mother's ideology is somewhat larger than with the father's ideology. The mean distance between parent's and child's position is under 2 in both countries, with again slightly lower figures in Switzerland (1.7/1.8) than in Germany (1.3/1.4). The tables furthermore show that only a small percentage of the cases has a large distance of 4 or more points on the 11-point scale, under 10% of all dyads in Germany, and 12 or 13% in Switzerland. Around 30 to 35% of the cases has a distance between parent and child of 2 or 3 points on the left–right scale. Lastly, adding up the first three categories, around 80% (G-SOEP) and 75% (SHP) of the cases has a distance of 2 or less between the child's and the parents' position. It can thus be

concluded that parents and children take very close left–right positions, in both Germany and Switzerland.

Table 2-1.Germany: Distance in left–right self-placement between parents and children, in percentages

	All dyads		Without centre-position parents		Without centre-pos. parents & children	
	Mother-Child	Father-Child	Mother-Child	Father-Child	Mother-Child	Father-Child
Distance 0	34%	30%	18%	15%	28%	25%
Distance 1	30%	30%	36%	35%	29%	30%
Distance 2	18%	21%	22%	24%	17%	18%
Distance 3	10%	11%	13%	14%	12%	13%
Distance ≥ 4	8%	8%	12%	11%	13%	14%
Total N	4934	4169	2568	2533	1617	1560
Mean distance	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.7
SD distance	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

Table 2-2. Switzerland: Distance in left–right self-placement between parents and children, in percentages

	All dyads		Without centre-position parents		Without centre-pos. parents & children	
	Mother-Child	Father-Child	Mother-Child	Father-Child	Mother-Child	Father-Child
Distance 0	22%	21%	19%	18%	23%	23%
Distance 1	32%	31%	33%	31%	30%	29%
Distance 2	22%	23%	21%	23%	20%	20%
Distance 3	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	12%
Distance ≥ 4	12%	13%	14%	15%	14%	16%
Total N	2025	1635	1301	1165	1052	924
Mean distance	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9
SD distance	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014

As the literature on left–right self-placement suggests that people who do not know what their left–right position is, place themselves on the middle of the scale (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1984), one should be careful interpreting the findings for respondents who have placed themselves at the midpoint. Because of the large share of respondents, especially from Germany, here placing themselves at this position on the scale, the same analyses are also performed without the parents with a centre position, and, in a next step, also without the children taking the midpoint. The third and fourth columns of Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 show that the similarity is indeed smaller when the midpoint-position parents are not included in the analysis. The

difference is somewhat larger in Germany, as can be expected based on the larger share of respondents placing themselves on the midpoint compared to Swiss respondents. The fifth and sixth columns of the tables exclude both parents and children taking the midpoint on the scale, showing slightly different results, with especially higher percentages of a distance of 0 on the scale. The similarity in ideology is still considerable with around 50% for both father-child and mother-child dyads with a distance of 1 or 0, when either only mid-point parents or also mid-point children are left out. In the subsequent analyses, all respondents are included again, since it is not possible to distinguish between respondents who have a centre ideology, and respondents who place themselves on the midpoint only because they do not know what their left–right position is, since the considerations for placement on the left–right scale are unknown. However, it is established now that the similarity in ideology is not only due to the relatively high number of voters choosing the centre position on the left–right scale.

Comparing these findings to earlier studies on the transmission of left–right ideology, it can be concluded that the parent–child transmission of ideology in Germany and Switzerland is similar to that in other multiparty systems. The results are similar to those of Corbetta et al. (2013, p. 18) who find a 54% similarity (distance of 0 or 1) in the left–right preferences of parent and children in Italy in 2010; and of Rico and Jennings (2016, p. 6) who find 61% of respondents in Catalonia, Spain, being 0 to 1 position away from their parents on the left–right scale. Using retrospective data from the Swiss Household Panel (no direct entries for parent's position), Wernli (2010, p. 25) finds that 72% of respondents place themselves on the same position as where they would place their father's ideology when the respondent had age 15. However, the resemblance with mothers is much lower in that study, namely 58% overlap. These differences in results are most likely due to the use of the retrospective measures of that study, whereas I take the direct observations of the parental ideology.

2.4.3 Group differences

2.4.3.1 Parental ideology

I now investigate to what extent the similarity in left–right ideology differs for specific subgroups of parents and children, focussing firstly on ideological groups. The foregoing analyses only show the *distance* between parent and child's ideological positioning,

which does not provide information regarding the ideological block with which the individuals identify. For instance, imagine a fictitious parent with position 4 on the scale that identifies as moderate left, with a child taking position 6 on the scale that identifies as right-wing. They are only two points apart on the scale, but most likely feel like they have quite different political ideologies. Vice versa, point 2 and point 4 on the scale both refer to left-wing positions, resulting in a similar distance but perhaps a much closer ideological outlook. For these reasons, in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 the percentage overlap between parents and children is presented for each of the ideological blocks on the left–right scale: left (positions 0-4), centre (5), and right (6-10).

Table 2-3.Germany: Percentage overlap in ideological blocks between parents and children

	MOTHER			FATHER		
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
Left (0-4)	53%	28%	23%	52%	28%	25%
Centre (5)	35%	52%	40%	36%	53%	42%
Right (6-10)	21%	19%	37%	13%	19%	33%
N	1625	2366	943	1386	1636	1147

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

Table 2-4.Switzerland: Percentage overlap in ideological blocks between parents and children

	MOTHER			FATHER		
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
Left (0-4)	64%	32%	18%	67%	33%	24%
Centre (5)	17%	28%	22%	18%	28%	22%
Right (6-10)	19%	39%	60%	14%	39%	54%
N	804	724	497	485	470	680

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014

In the highlighted cells on the diagonals, the percentage of respondents is shown that takes the same ideological side as the parent. The results show that in Germany, left and centre positions are mostly transmitted (52 to 53%), whereas right-wing positions are less taken over by the child (33 and 47%). The off-diagonal cells show the percentages of children taking a position in a different ideological block than the parent. The most striking finding is that children of right-wing parents are slightly more likely to take a centre position (40 and 42%) than a right-wing position (37 and 33%). In Switzerland, the picture looks a bit different. The centre position is not as much transmitted as in Germany (28%), and left- and right-wing positions are more equally transmitted (percentages ranging between 54 and 67%). In both countries, the adherence to the

leftist block is the most successfully transmitted position, with overlap between parents and children ranging between 52 and 67%. Lastly, in Germany there does not seem to be a difference in the transmission of ideology between fathers and mothers, whereas in Switzerland the father seems to be more dominant in transmitting the ideological block he adheres to. These gender differences are further explored in the subsequent analyses.

Moreover, I investigate whether parents of different ideological extremity on the left–right scale differ in terms of their child's closeness to their position. This is similar to the analyses presented in Table 2-3 and 2-4, but these analyses do not only take the ideological block of the parent into account, but also the *extremity* of parental position. Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 show that depending on the ideological position-taking of the mother, the overlap with their children differs accordingly. Results are presented here regarding the mother-child overlap only, but analyses are performed for father-child dyads as well: they show similar patterns and therefore lead to the same conclusions.

Figure 2-5. Germany: Mother-child distance in left–right self-placement by mother's ideology



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. N mother-child dyads: 4934

Mothers with the most extreme positions (0 to 2, or 8 to 10; on the left–right scale) have the smallest share of similarity with their children, in both countries. For these groups of mothers in Germany, respectively 34% (left-wing mothers), and 26% (right-wing mothers) of their children have a similar position (distance of 0 or 1) on the left–right

scale. In Switzerland, the numbers are respectively 37 and 40%, showing in line with the previous results no difference between these left- and right-wing mothers when it comes to the distance to their child's ideology, unlike in Germany. For mothers with more moderate left- and right-wing positions, the overlap is around 60% in both countries (but in Germany only 55% for moderate right-wing mothers). Whereas the overlap is highest for mothers with a centrist position in Germany (75%), this is not the case in Switzerland (57%).

Figure 2-6. Switzerland: Mother-child distance in left–right self-placement by mother's ideology



Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014. N mother-child dyads: 2025

These outcomes show that a moderate ideology is more often transmitted than a more extreme one (or that, especially in Germany, a share of those parents and children both do not know where to place themselves). However, it should also be taken into account that, given the distribution of voters over the scale, the probability of having a child with a similar position is larger for parents with more moderate and centrist positions. Moreover, there are ceiling effects at place here as well: when a parent takes a quite extreme position, the child can only move in one direction away from the parents, which is not the case with more moderate or centrist positions, which allows for more possibilities for the child to move.

2.4.3.2 Similarity of parental ideologies

It should not be forgotten that children always have two parents, so the *similarity* of the ideology of the mother and the father should also be considered. Therefore, similar analyses as the foregoing ones are now presented separately for two different groups: one in which the father has a similar ideology to the mother (distance of 0 or 1 on the left–right scale), and one in which this is not the case.

Figure 2-7. Germany: Mother-child distance in left–right self-placement by mother's ideology and similarity in parents' ideology



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009.
N mother-child dyads: 2696 (similar ideology) and 1184 (different ideology)

Figure 2-7 and Figure 2-8 show indeed that when parents have a similar ideology (the 5 bars at the left-hand side) the distance between mother and child's ideology is smaller in a larger number of cases, than when parents have a different ideology (the 5 bars at the right-hand side). However, the same pattern as found in the previous two figures is apparent in these as well. In both groups the largest similarity between mother and child is found when the mother has a more moderate ideology, regardless of whether the father has a similar or different ideology.

Figure 2-8. Switzerland: Mother-child distance in left–right self-placement by mother's ideology and similarity in parents' ideology



Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014.
N mother-child dyads: 815 (similar ideology) and 558 (different ideology)

In both countries, the differences in overlap between mother and child – depending on whether or not the father has a similar ideology – are striking, especially for mothers with left-wing (position 0-2) positions. The overlap with the child drops from 57% to 31% in Switzerland, and from 48% to 25% in Germany, most likely due to the higher tendency of males (fathers) to be on average more right-wing than females. For right-wing mothers in Switzerland, the difference between the two situations is negligible, whereas in Germany it is very large (38% vs. 17%).

Table 2-5. Percentage points difference in overlap of ideological blocks between mothers and children, when the father is from the same ideological block, compared to when the father is not

	GERMANY			SWITZERLAND		
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
Left (0-4)	+17	-10	-9	+26	-2	-10
Centre (5)	-9	+13	-4	-4	+7	-2
Right (6-10)	-8	-2	+12	-21	-5	+12

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009; Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014.

In Table 2-5, the results of a similar analysis are shown, now regarding the transmission of the ideological block. In this table, the difference in percentage points in overlap of ideological block between parents and children is presented, comparing the situation in which the father is from the same ideological block, to when he is from a different

ideological block than the mother. The results show, in line with the previous findings, that more transmission takes place when parents have a similar ideology, indicated by the positive values in the diagonal cells (highlighted in grey) and the negative values in the off-diagonal cells. The results are more similar than in the previous figures, showing the same pattern in Germany in Switzerland. For instance, the level of transmission of the right-wing position of the mother when the father is also right-wing is 12 percentage points higher in both countries, compared to when the father has a position in a different ideological block. Vice versa, the percentages in the off-diagonal cells – indicating the child taking a different ideological position than the mother – are lower when parents are from the same ideological block, then when they are not. The only apparent difference between the two countries is the large difference in the transmission of the left-wing ideology of the mother, which is 26 percentage points in Switzerland, and 17 in Germany, a difference not so pronounced in the foregoing analysis. Overall, both types of analyses lead to the same conclusions.

2.4.3.3 Gender differences

The previous analyses have suggested equally important roles of mothers and fathers in the transmission of ideology to their child. Now focussing on the sex *composition* of the parent–child dyads, the objective here is to investigate whether there is a larger ideological overlap between parents and children from the same sex to further disentangle potential gendered effects. To this end, the same descriptive statistics as in the previous tables are presented in Table 2-6 to Table 2-9, but now separately for sons and daughters.

Table 2-6. Germany: Distance in left–right self-placement between parents and children, separately for daughters and sons, in percentages

	MOTHER		FATHER	
	Daughter	Son	Daughter	Son
Distance 0-1	65%	63%	61%	60%
Distance 2-3	27%	30%	31%	33%
Distance ≥ 4	7%	8%	8%	8%
N	2344	2590	1949	2220

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

The results in Table 2-6 and 2-7 are quite limited in this respect. In Germany, there is no indication for a gendered political socialization effect for both sexes, but the mother-

daughter overlap does stand out. In Switzerland, there seems to be a moderate same-sex effect going on, especially as mothers have a larger overlap with their daughters, and fathers a slightly larger overlap with their sons. The main conclusion could be here that mothers seem to be the most important socializing agents for their daughters, but the differences are not that large.

Table 2-7. Switzerland: Distance in left–right self-placement between parents and children, separately for daughters and sons, % per group

	MOTHER		FATHER	
	Daughter	Son	Daughter	Son
Distance 0-1	57%	51%	51%	53%
Distance 2-3	34%	35%	35%	36%
Distance ≥ 4	9%	14%	15%	11%
N	982	1043	767	868

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014

Focussing on the transmission of the ideological position in terms of blocks rather than the distance on the scale, Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 tell a somewhat different story. In Germany, there is again no consistent same-sex pattern observed, but now the mother-daughter overlap in terms of ideological block also does not differ from the father-daughter overlap. The previous findings are thus most likely due to the higher tendency of females to take a midpoint position. In Switzerland, there seem to be some gendered effects. First, the father-son transmission of leftist positions clearly stands out (63%, compared to 52% mother-son), together with the mother-daughter transmission of rightist positions (53%, compared to 42% father-daughter). Moreover, daughters are much more likely to take over the leftist position of either parent (74 and 72% for daughters, 49% for sons), whereas sons more often take over their parents' right-wing positions (66 and 63% for sons, 53 and 42% for daughters). This is also related to the contemporary gender gap in political ideology, showing that women are on average more left-wing than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). These findings imply most importantly moderate same-sex patterns on ideological block transmission in Switzerland, but not so much in Germany. However, it should also be noted here that these are simple descriptive analyses, and more advanced multivariate analyses investigating this question are presented in the next chapter.

Table 2-8. Germany: Percentage overlap in ideological blocks between parents and children, separately for sons and daughters

	MOTHER			FATHER		
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
DAUGHTER						
Left (0-4)	57%	32%	26%	55%	33%	29%
Centre (5)	35%	55%	47%	37%	56%	47%
Right (6-10)	7%	13%	28%	8%	11%	24%
SON						
Left (0-4)	49%	24%	20%	49%	24%	21%
Centre (5)	35%	50%	35%	35%	50%	37%
Right (6-10)	16%	26%	45%	16%	26%	42%
N	1625	2366	943	1386	1636	1147

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

Table 2-9. Switzerland: Percentage overlap in ideological blocks between parents and children, separately for sons and daughters

	MOTHER			FATHER		
	Left	Centre	Right	Left	Centre	Right
DAUGHTER						
Left (0-4)	74%	39%	19%	72%	44%	30%
Centre (5)	16%	29%	28%	21%	30%	27%
Right (6-10)	10%	32%	53%	7%	27%	42%
SON						
Left (0-4)	54%	26%	18%	63%	24%	19%
Centre (5)	19%	28%	17%	16%	27%	18%
Right (6-10)	27%	46%	66%	21%	49%	63%
N	804	724	497	485	470	680

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014

In sum, from the analyses in the foregoing sections can be concluded that: 1) the ideological similarity of the parents has a relatively large impact on the transmission of ideology; 2) in Germany, right-wing ideologies are on average less transmitted than left and centre positions; 3) but differences between males and females play a role in these dynamics. Lastly, the analyses suggest a smaller ideological distance between parent and child in case the parent has a more moderate ideology. However, this finding should be interpreted with caution due to the distribution of respondents over the left–right scale and ceiling effects.

2.4.3.4 Additional subgroup differences

Similar figures as the foregoing ones could be drawn for a large number of other subcategories of interest, in order to analyse the differences between them in the

similarity of ideology between parents and children. However, for the sake of parsimony Pearson's correlation coefficients are calculated instead. Firstly, correlations are calculated between all parents and children, and then, for comparison, between several subgroups differing on the following characteristics: age of the child (in groups); the parental socioeconomic status; the level of education of the parents and of the child; and the similarity of parental ideological positions. The findings are presented in Table 2-10, showing the correlation coefficient and the number of observations within each category. The correlations are calculated separately for fathers and mothers.

The table shows a relatively moderate correlation between parents' and children's left–right ideology, especially in Germany, despite the findings that have been shown earlier that the similarity in their ideological position-taking is relatively high. The correlation coefficients (G-SOEP: 0.3; SHP: 0.4) are perhaps not as high as would be expected, because even when parent and child only differ 1 position on the left–right scale, which can be seen as a minor difference on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, this is regarded as a different position. The difference is especially striking as the percentages in overlap were slightly larger in Germany than in Switzerland, but in terms of correlations the case is reverse. Factors of influence here could also be the higher tendency of Swiss respondents to take more extreme positions, and the large share of German respondents at the midpoint of the scale. This is indeed confirmed when looking at the scatterplots that are presented in the Appendix (Figures A 5 to A 8).

Comparing these findings to earlier studies, it can firstly be concluded that left–right transmission in Germany is now higher than before: Westholm & Niemi (1992) found a correlation of 0.20 in West Germany, using the 1970s data from the Political Action Study. After the US, this was the country with lowest correlation between parents and children in terms of left–right ideology. The other findings ranged from correlations of 0.59 (Finland) to 0.31 (Great Britain). Secondly, comparing the current findings with the more recent studies earlier quoted, the patterns are similar. In Catalonia, the correlation is 0.34 (Rico & Jennings, 2016, p. 242). In Switzerland, using the SHP, it was found to be 0.37, using less recent waves of the study and retrospective accounts of the parental ideology (Wernli, 2010, p. 30). The findings here using direct observations are very similar.

Table 2-10. Correlations[5] between parents' and children's left–right position across groups, N in brackets

	Mother-Child dyads		Father-Child dyads	
	DE	CH	DE	CH
All children	0.29	0.41	0.28	0.40
	(4934)	(2025)	(4169)	(1635)
Children age 17-21	0.33	0.42	0.32	0.42
	(1519)	(969)	(1287)	(798)
Children age 22-29	0.29	0.40	0.28	0.34
	(1846)	(765)	(1604)	(627)
Children age ≥30	0.25	0.41	0.24	0.45
	(1569)	(291)	(1278)	(210)
Children with lower edu. parent	0.23	0.29	0.17	Too low N[6]
	(870)	(227)	(367)	
Children with medium edu. parent	0.27	0.39	0.23	0.35
	(2680)	(1387)	(2171)	(1004)
Children with higher edu. parent	0.34	0.48	0.35	0.49
	(1377)	(411)	(1630)	(564)
Children with low SES father	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.28
	(1270)	(187)	(1108)	(196)
Children with medium SES father	0.28	0.48	0.22	0.40
	(1268)	(276)	(1121)	(267)
Children with high SES father	0.33	0.47	0.29	0.46
	(1521)	(618)	(1421)	(618)
Children still in school	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.40
	(520)	(210)	(434)	(170)
Children with lower education	0.28	0.45	0.27	0.41
	(888)	(548)	(731)	(441)
Children with medium education	0.29	0.39	0.27	0.36
	(2361)	(461)	(2008)	(385)
Children with higher education	0.30	0.39	0.33	0.40
	(792)	(806)	(693)	(639)
Parents have same ideology	0.36	0.50	0.35	0.48
	(2696)	(815)	(2696)	(807
Parents have different ideology	0.23	0.42	0.18	0.36
	(1184)	(558)	(1184)	(573)

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009, SHP 2010–2014

Using the baseline coefficients for the correlation between all children's left–right ideology and those of their parents, these can be compared to correlation coefficients for sub-groups of children and parents. Generally speaking, the findings do not reveal very large differences across different groups, although some are noteworthy.

Firstly, the comparison of the correlations between parental and child's ideology does not seem to differ much across three different age groups. However, in Germany there

[5] Pearson's R correlations. All correlations that are presented in the table are statistically significant using Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels.

[6] Only 67 observations were in this category, as the analytic sample suffers from an underrepresentation of the lower educated. This caused the correlation coefficient to be statistically not significant.

seems to be a modest trend of a decreasing correlation by age, whereas in Switzerland there is a slightly lower coefficient for young adults aged 22-29. This last finding could point at some sort of rebellion against the father's ideology. Secondly, I compare the correlations between parents and children by level of the parental education, showing very straightforward results: children from higher educated parents are more likely to take over their parents' preferences. The findings are comparable for both mother-child and father-child dyads, with coefficients going up from 0.23 to 0.34 (G-SOEP) and 0.29 to 0.48 (SHP) for mothers, and from 0.17 to 0.35 (G-SOEP) and 0.35 to 0.49 (SHP) for fathers. Similar results are found for the SES of the family: especially in Switzerland, the correlations are higher in high SES families. The differences are less pronounced for the level of education of the children. Educational mobility of children vis-à-vis their parents could explain these less pronounced differences, but also the fact that many young respondents have not obtained their highest level of education yet. The reason for the differences in correlation for higher SES and higher education parents are most likely because these families are more politically interested and talk more about politics in the family, leading to better conditions for the transmission of ideology.

Moving indeed to political characteristics of the family, the findings confirm expectations and earlier results: the left–right positions of children with parents with similar ideologies correlate more strongly with those of their parents than is the case for children who have parents with dissimilar left–right ideologies. The differences in coefficients are relatively large, both for mother-child and father-child dyads, with larger differences in Germany than in Switzerland (correlations differing from 0.36 to 0.23 (G-SOEP) and 0.50 to 0.42 (SHP) for mothers; and 0.35 to 0.18 (G-SOEP) and 0.48 to 0.36 (SHP) for fathers).

It can be concluded from these results that the SES of the family, the level of education of both parent and child, and the political homogeneity of parents are of highest importance to the transmission of left–right ideology in families in both countries.

2.4.4 Bases of left–right self-placement

In this section I focus on the factors influencing left–right self-placement of the children under investigation here. A simple OLS regression model is estimated, with clustered

standard errors at the original household level (G-SOEP) or at the mother's ID (SHP), which takes into account that there are several siblings of the same family present in the data. In the first model, only the ideology of parents is included. Then, individual control variables for the children are added: gender, age, and father's SES at age 15. This basic multivariate model shows how left–right self-placement of the respondent is influenced by these several factors at the same time, which was not possible in the previous correlational analysis. Positive coefficients are associated with more rightist positions.

Table 2-11. OLS regression model: factors influencing left–right self-placement

	GERMANY		SWITZERLAND	
Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Mother's left–right position	0.238***	0.249***	0.341***	0.337***
	(0.0238)	(0.0235)	(0.0440)	(0.0431)
Father's left–right position	0.155***	0.150***	0.328***	0.313***
	(0.0226)	(0.0224)	(0.0382)	(0.0386)
Female		-0.433***		-0.604***
		(0.0529)		(0.129)
SES (father's SIOPS when 15)				
Medium SES		-0.0688		0.202
Ref. = low SES		(0.0697)		(0.227)
High SES		-0.182***		-0.0519
		(0.0675)		(0.202)
Age		-0.00974**		-0.00246
		(0.00383)		(0.0114)
East Germany		0.256**		
Ref. = Abroad		(0.127)		
West Germany		0.121		
		(0.119)		
Constant	2.787***	3.150***	1.500***	1.925***
	(0.123)	(0.209)	(0.196)	(0.388)
Observations	3,432	3,432	895	895
R-squared	0.115	0.138	0.260	0.281

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009; Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014

The results presented in Table 2-11 show that, in the first model, the left–right position of *both* parents' is of statistically and substantively significant influence on the left–right placement of children. The size of the effects differs across mothers and fathers. In Germany, for each one-point increase in the mother's ideology on the 11-point scale, the position of the child increases by 0.24; for the father, this is 0.16. In Switzerland, the findings are slightly different. Similar to the higher correlations I presented earlier, the regression coefficients are also much larger. In Germany, there is some difference

between the mother's and the father's influence, whereas this is not the case in Switzerland (respectively 0.34 and 0.33). This does not confirm the expectations earlier raised in the univariate analyses that the mother has a more important influence on the child's ideology in Switzerland.

In the second model, sex, age and parental SES are added. In both countries, this does not significantly affect the size of the coefficients of the parents' ideology. Furthermore, the gender gap is clearly visible in these models in both countries: women place themselves 0.4/0.6 points more towards the left than men do. This is in line with the findings of existing studies (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, & Lin, 2004; Edlund & Pande, 2002; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Urbatsch, 2014). Furthermore, the model for Germany also shows that children from a high social status family place themselves at more left-wing position than lower SES children do, whereas this is not the case in Switzerland.

The R-squared of the models differs sharply across the two countries under study. The explained variance is much larger in Switzerland, showing either that people have more structured left–right positions, possibly due to the direct democratic system which makes politics a more daily salient topic, or that the level of transmission is stronger in Switzerland whereas in Germany more other, most likely individual-level factors that are left outside of this analysis, are important for shaping people's left–right positions. Another factor that contributes to this difference is the higher tendency of German respondents to place themselves on the midpoint of the scale, compared to Swiss respondents, leading to a larger amount of variance that can be explained in the latter case. This can also point to the fact that the left–right dimension is a more salient concept in the mind of Swiss voters, as previous research has suggested that those who do not know their left–right position tend to take a centre position on the scale (Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1984).

The results of this analysis can be compared to a similar study on left–right ideology transmission in Catalonia (Rico & Jennings, 2016). They find a coefficient of the parental ideology of around 0.35, but include only one parent in the model (randomly selected, either the father or the mother). The analyses for Switzerland here show very similar results to their model, but the size of the coefficients of the parental ideology in

Germany are smaller. Furthermore, the R-squared in the German model is more similar to the one found in Catalonia (both 0.12) but the one of the Swiss models is much higher (0.26). In Switzerland, a quarter of the variation in left–right ideology can be explained with only the parental ideology in the model.

2.4.5 Multivariate analyses on ideological distance

The previous sections have shown how the similarity in parents' and children's ideology differs across subgroups of parents and their adult children. However, there are two reasons as to why multivariate analyses are needed to more thoroughly investigate these effects. Firstly, all children in the dataset are investigated together in these analyses, whereas some of these children come from the same household and are therefore more similar to each other in many respects. Secondly, multivariate analyses are needed to take several factors of potential influence on parent-child similarity into account simultaneously. For these reasons, OLS models are now estimated in which the dependent variable is the *distance (absolute value of the difference) between parents' and child's ideology.*

Before going into the analysis, I present descriptive statistics of the numerical difference between parent's and child's ideology. In Figure 2-9 and 2-10 the distributions of the difference in parents' and children's left–right ideology are presented. The difference is calculated by subtracting the parent's left–right position from the left–right position of the child. Negative numbers thus signify a parent being more to the right (higher number) of the ideology of the child, whereas positive numbers mean that the parent is more to the left than the child (lower number). In the subsequent regression models the absolute values (distance) are taken into account, because the interest there is not so much in explaining deviation from parent's ideology in a specific direction, but in explaining deviation *per se.*

The presented histograms show that the difference in left–right positions between parents and children are almost normally distributed, except for the high peak in the distribution in Germany. The curves are relatively symmetrical, especially in Switzerland, meaning that the number of cases in which the child is more to the right of

the parent is equal to the number of cases in which the child is more to the left of the parent.

Figure 2-9. Germany: Distribution of difference in left–right self-placement between parents and children, in percentages



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009
N mother-child dyads: 4934. N father-child dyads: 4169.

Figure 2-10. Switzerland: Distribution of difference in left–right self-placement between parents and children, in percentages



Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 2010–2014
N mother-child dyads: 2025. N father-child dyads: 1635

In Table 2-12 and Table 2-13, the results of the regression models are presented. The models are estimated twice, once for mother-child dyads and once for father–child dyads. In the first models (model 1), only parental and family-level characteristics are included. In the second models (model 2), individual characteristics of the children are added to the model. Not all independent variables used in the previous analysis are added in the model, in order not to over-specify the model.

Table 2-12. OLS regression analyses: factors influencing parent–child distance in left–right ideology, Germany

	Mothers		Fathers	
Left–right distance	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Ideology of parent (ref.=centre)				
Left (0-2)	1.392***	1.390***	1.349***	1.348***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Moderate left (3-4)	0.337***	0.338***	0.461***	0.457***
	(0.0549)	(0.0550)	(0.0525)	(0.0526)
Moderate Right (6-7)	0.594***	0.588***	0.768***	0.762***
	(0.0667)	(0.0664)	(0.0667)	(0.0668)
Right (8-10)	1.740***	1.730***	1.818***	1.814***
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.151)	(0.150)
Parents have similar ideology	-0.404***	-0.409***	-0.473***	-0.480***
Ref. = not similar ideology	(0.0565)	(0.0567)	(0.0600)	(0.0602)
Father's SIOPS - med.	-0.0117	-0.0185	0.0990	0.0910
Ref. = low	(0.0608)	(0.0607)	(0.0618)	(0.0619)
Father's SIOPS - high	0.0274	0.0176	0.0511	0.0416
	(0.0583)	(0.0589)	(0.0586)	(0.0596)
Education - low		-0.0683		-0.0975
Ref. = still in school		(0.0840)		(0.0828)
Education - medium		0.0161		-0.0305
		(0.0763)		(0.0741)
Education - high		0.0350		-0.0126
		(0.0986)		(0.0974)
Female		-0.0584		-0.0183
		(0.0448)		(0.0467)
Age		0.00514		0.00688*
		(0.00390)		(0.00416)
Constant	1.201***	1.105***	1.200***	1.080***
	(0.0682)	(0.118)	(0.0728)	(0.124)
Observations	3,172	3,172	3,172	3,172
R-squared	0.178	0.180	0.196	0.198

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

The results show that some of the independent variables that seemed to be important in the previous analyses are no longer significant when considered together with other variables: parental SES does not seem to influence left–right distance between parents and children in this multivariate model. Only in Switzerland in the mother–child models, it shows that high-SES families show a smaller distance between mothers' and children's ideology. Furthermore, the coefficients of the four dummy variables for parental ideology show that, confirming the findings in Figure 2-5 in Germany, the smallest ideological distance is found between children and parents with a centrist ideological position. Furthermore, these coefficients show that more extreme parental positions lead to a larger distance between parent and child, especially for right-wing positions. More moderate ideological positions lead to a smaller parent–child distance, which is

also due to the statistical probability of each child being more likely to take a moderate left–right position, than a more extreme one, given the distribution over the scale.

Table 2-13. OLS regression analyses: factors influencing parent–child distance in left–right ideology, Switzerland

	Mothers		Fathers	
Left–right distance	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Ideology of parent (ref.=centre)				
Left (0-2)	0.777***	0.797***	0.448*	0.444*
	(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.232)	(0.229)
Moderate left (3-4)	0.0618	0.0623	-0.257**	-0.273**
	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.126)
Moderate Right (6-7)	-0.0919	-0.0909	0.132	0.151
	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Right (8-10)	0.551**	0.528**	0.646***	0.656***
	(0.241)	(0.244)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Parents have similar ideology	-0.326***	-0.315***	-0.397***	-0.386***
Ref. = not similar ideology	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Father's SIOPS - med.	-0.194	-0.186	0.0264	0.0201
Ref. = low	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.179)
Father's SIOPS - high	-0.303*	-0.296*	-0.232	-0.254
	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Education - low		-0.0220		-0.196
Ref. = still in school		(0.176)		(0.160)
Education - medium		-0.155		-0.409**
		(0.187)		(0.165)
Education - high		-0.213		-0.278*
		(0.176)		(0.160)
Female		-0.232**		-0.0123
		(0.102)		(0.0945)
Age		0.0143		0.00997
		(0.0102)		(0.0114)
Constant	1.903***	1.803***	1.984***	2.018***
	(0.168)	(0.311)	(0.177)	(0.331)
Observations	917	917	932	932
R-squared	0.060	0.070	0.078	0.084

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: SHP 2010–2014

For Switzerland, the effects are somewhat different. Not all dummy variables for parental ideology have statistically significant effects on the parent–child ideological distance: in the model with mothers, only having an extreme left–right position increases parent–child distance, compared to having a centrist ideology; whereas for fathers also a moderate left-wing ideology has an effect, but decreasing. These results imply that whereas in Germany, all parental ideologies are more difficult to transmit to children than a centrist ideology, this is not the case in Switzerland, where only the most extreme ideologies are more difficult to transmit than a centrist one, and a father's

moderate left-wing ideology is even easier to transmit than a centrist one. As mentioned earlier, this is also due to ceiling effects and the distribution of respondents over the left–right scale. Lastly, in all models, parental ideological homogeneity shows to substantially decrease the parent–child ideological distance, with somewhat larger effects in Germany than in Switzerland.

In the second models, in which the individual characteristics are added, it shows that there is no meaningful age effect, implying that young adults are not found to be closer to their parents' ideology than older children. This is an important finding because it shows the enduring influence of parental ideology on child's ideology, also at later stages in life after young adulthood. This was also recently shown for the US, regarding a wide range of political orientations (Jennings et al., 2009). Furthermore, it shows that the education of the child does not have a consistent effect on the ideological distance with the parents. In Germany, there is no difference in ideological distance by educational level, compared to those being still in school. In Switzerland, medium and highly educated children are found to have a larger ideological distance to their father, compared to children still in school. Lastly, there are no gender effects found except for the mother-child model in Switzerland: it shows that women have a smaller ideological distance to their mother, compared to men, of about a quarter point. This partially confirms the earlier descriptive findings

2.5 Conclusion

The foregoing analyses have shown that a large part of the parents transmit their political ideology to their children, with the rate of transmission being roughly between 50% and 60% in Switzerland and Germany, found for both mothers and fathers. These results show larger rates of ideological transmission than earlier findings for former West Germany (Westholm & Niemi, 1992). These differences might point towards an increase in left–right ideology transmission over time, potentially showing the increased salience of left–right self-placement for German and Swiss voters.

Focussing on the differences between the two countries under study, the most striking ones are the larger linear relation between parents' and children's left–right ideology in Switzerland compared to Germany, even though the overlap in percentages is larger in

Germany. The difference in linearity is due to the lower tendency of the Swiss to place themselves on the midpoint, and a higher tendency to take the more extreme positions on the scale compared to the German respondents. Furthermore, in Germany, parents' left-wing ideology is more often successfully transmitted to the child than a right-wing ideology, whereas in Switzerland both ideological blocks are equally transmitted. Another difference is the higher amount of explained variance in the child's left–right positions by *only* the parental ideology: in Switzerland this was about 25%, whereas in Germany it was only 11%. This shows that, as expected, not only the ideological transmission rate in terms of linearity is higher in Switzerland than in Germany, but also the parental ideology is a much larger part of the story of the bases of the left–right ideology of young adults. This is in line with the expectation that in a more fragmented multiparty system like Switzerland, ideology is an important political cue that is passed on from parents to children.

When controlling also for different characteristics at the child-, parent-, and family-level, the parental ideology remains of substantial and significant influence on that of the adult child. It must be noted here that the ideology of both parents and children were measured at the same point in time, and the child age ranged from 16/17 to late adulthood. Since no age effects were found, it seems that parental ideology is of enduring influence. However, the remark must also be made at this point that there is no information on the parental ideology during the time that the child was very young and still living at home. It could in theory thus be the case that parents have changed their left–right position, and could even have been influenced by their child's ideology, although it is more likely that the direction of the effect runs from parents to children, given their key role in the socialization of the child.

Political characteristics of the parents are found to play an important role in the transmission process, in line with earlier studies in political socialization. The homogeneity of parents' ideology reduces the left–right distance between parents and children significantly, and foster a more successful transmission of the ideological block to which the parents adhere. The correlational analysis seemed to imply that social class and the educational level of the parents plays an important role in ideology

transmission, but these findings were not confirmed in the subsequent multivariate analyses.

Lastly, some gender effects in the transmission of ideology were found. Gender differences take away some of the disparity between the transmission of left- and right-wing ideologies in Germany, as females take more often left-wing positions than men. The multivariate analyses showed, especially in Germany, somewhat higher influences of the mother's than of the father's ideology on the left–right positions of the child. Secondly, focussing on parent-child gender similarity, the analyses showed that especially in Switzerland, daughters were found to have a significantly smaller ideological distance to their mothers than sons, implying a moderate same-sex pattern. Furthermore, in Switzerland sons more often take over the leftist positions from their father, whereas daughters are more likely to maintain the right-wing position of the mother. These findings are further explored in the next chapter by investigating these gender dynamics more in-depth. In addition, not only parents but also siblings are taken into account.

Appendix Chapter 2

Figure A 1. Germany: Frequency distributions of age of children



N original sample (left): 26007. N analytical sample (right): 5223

Figure A 2. Switzerland: Frequency distributions of age of children



N original sample (left): 17550. N analytic sample (right): 2325

Figure A 3. Germany: Frequency distributions of left–right self-placement of children



N original sample (left): 25262. N analytical sample (right): 5223

Figure A 4. Switzerland: Frequency distributions of left–right self-placement of children



N original sample (left): 12855. N analytical sample (right): 2325

Figure A 5. Germany: Scatterplot of child's left–right self-placement by mother's left–right self-placement



N mother-child dyads: 4934

Figure A 6. Germany: Scatterplot of child's left–right self-placement by father's left–right self-placement



N father-child dyads: 4169

Figure A 7. Switzerland: Scatterplot of child's left–right self-placement by mother's left–right self-placement



N mother-child dyads: 2025

Figure A 8. Switzerland: Scatterplot of child's left–right self-placement by father's left–right self-placement



N father-child dyads: 1635

3. The Power of the Sexes. Gendered Political Socialization between Siblings and Parents

3.1 Introduction

Gender is an important characteristic of all family members that is decisive for the type of dynamics present in the household. Fathers interact differently with their sons than they do with their daughters and, vice versa, mothers also interact differently with their children depending on their gender (Conley, 2004; Johnson, Caskey, Rand, Tucker, & Vohr, 2014; Mascaro, Rentscher, Hackett, Mehl, & Rilling, 2017; O'Neal, Plumert, & Peterson, 2016). Although parents are considered to be key socializing agents in the process of development of adolescents' political preferences and behaviour (Jennings & Niemi, 1968, 1974; Percheron & Jennings, 1981; Sigel, 1965), and remain of enduring influence also later in life (Jennings et al., 2009), the picture of a family is incomplete when a child's siblings are not taken into account. The absence or presence of gender roles can importantly shape the processes within a family, depending on the sex-mix composition of the siblings (Blair, 1992; Booth & Amato, 1994). In that light, the interaction between siblings is also importantly shaped by their gender (Dunn, Slomkowski, & Beardsall, 1994).

Considering these family dynamics together with the gender gap in political ideology, this chapter investigates the role that gender plays in the transmission and development of political preferences in the family. Specifically, the socialization process in which parents influence their children's political ideology is investigated in light of same-sex and opposite-sex parent–child dyads. It is expected that more transmission take place between parents and their children of the same sex, than between parents and children of opposite sexes. Furthermore, the gender gap in ideology, in which women are found to have more left-wing/progressive preferences than men, is expected to influence the political orientations of siblings with an older sister, leading to individuals having an older sister compared to those with an older brother to hold more left-wing ideologies. To this end, the influence of female siblings is investigated in terms of having an older sister compared to having an older brother, a natural experiment that specifically focuses on the presence of a next-older sister or an eldest sister. Household data from Germany (G-SOEP) and Switzerland (SHP) are used to investigate these expectations. By

combining insights from studies on gender differences in ideology and recent developments in political socialization research, this study sheds new light on the complexity of reciprocal ideological influence among family members in multiparty systems.

3.2 Intergenerational political socialization: parent–child dynamics dependent upon gender

One of the processes of key interest in this research is the intergenerational transmission of political preferences from parents to children. The question which of both parents is more influential in this process has been asked repeatedly throughout the body of political socialization research, and beyond. In the beginning of the study of electoral behaviour in the 1940s, politics was regarded as "men's business" and therefore the father was regarded as the most important socializing agent in the household (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968[1944]). The seminal study by Jennings and Niemi (1968) also acknowledged this view, but their findings however proved differently:

> Part of the common lore of American political behavior is that the male is more dominant in political matters than the female, in his role both of husband and father. (...) the values of the father are not more likely to be internalized than those of the mother; nor do sons register consistently different rates of agreement than daughters. (Jennings & Niemi, 1968, p. 180)

In subsequent studies, mostly investigating the transmission of partisanship from parents to children, differential findings are put forward. The dominant role of the father as the most important "interpreter" of the world of politics, has been rejected by most of the empirical research, finding a more equal importance of mothers and fathers as sources of politicization and socializing influences in the family (Boonen, 2016; Gniewosz et al., 2009; Jennings & Niemi, 1968, 1971; Ventura, 2001). Some studies find, to the contrary, that the mother is the most important socializing agent in the household, in terms of influencing the children's preferences (Acock & Bengtson, 1978; Zuckerman et al., 2007). This can be explained by the fact that the mother usually spends most time with the children, and is therefore better able to transmit preferences and behaviour to them, relative to the father (Gidengil, Wass, & Valaste, 2016). Another explanation is the difference in communication style between fathers and mothers: the

mother's general greater emphasis on conversation is found to positively influence political similarity between parent and child (Shulman & DeAndrea, 2014).

However, the usefulness of this distinction between fathers and mothers in terms of their socializing influence is questionable when the sex of the children is not taken into account as well, as gender plays an important role in social learning processes (Bussey & Bandura, 1999). To a large extent, the times in which politics was regarded as purely men's business are behind us. Therefore, it is more intuitive to investigate the extent to which both parents have differential influences on their children, depending on their gender. It is likely that gender plays an important role in the political socialization process. Several studies indeed find that already from a very young age onwards there are different dynamics going on between parents and their children depending on the sex-mix of the parent–child dyad, resulting in gendered parenting practices (Conley, 2004; Johnson et al., 2014; Mascaro et al., 2017; O'Neal et al., 2016). Furthermore, in the 1980s, a phenomenon called sex-typing was found to be present in American households: a distinctive treatment of children dependent on their gender, leading in this case to difference household chores for sons and daughters (Blair, 1992). Additional studies showed that regardless of social change, sex-typing in society has remained consistent over time (Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, & Lueptow, 2001). Conley (2004) also describes the differential treatment of children dependent upon their gender. Fathers are especially likely to spend more time with their sons, whereas mothers give more equal attention to children of both sexes. However, a meta-study regarding the differences in mother–daughter, mother–son, father–son, and father–daughter relationships, concluded that these four parent–child dyads do not have distinct relationships (Russell & Saebel, 1997). Nevertheless, there was some evidence showing the difference between same-sex and opposite-sex parent–child dyads.

The mechanism that is expected to underlie a stronger socializing influence of the parent on the child from the same gender is grounded in psychoanalytic theory. It works in two directions. First, the same-sex parent has been found to be essential for child development, as it is imperative for sex-role identification (Chambers, 1984; Lynn, 1966; Powell & Downey, 1997). Social learning theory, forming the most important foundation of political socialization theory and research, also states that same-sex parents form

more important role models for their children (Bozett, 1985; Downey & Powell, 1993). As such, the identification with and the observation of the same-sex parent by the child is crucial to social learning and role modelling, based on processes of sex-linked identification (Powell & Downey, 1997). This mechanism is expected to apply to the political socialization process as well (Acock & Bengtson, 1978), especially as fathers are no longer the only political cue-giver in the family (Jennings & Langton, 1969). Children are thus expected to perceive the same-sex parent as the most important political role model or cue-giver in the family, based on the larger identification with that parent. As such, they are expected to be more likely to develop a similar ideology as that parent. Second, this mechanism is also expected to work the other way around. Parents may also identify more with the same-sex child, and therefore feel as a more competent parent towards the child(ren) of the same sex (Downey & Powell, 1993; Gately & Schwebel, 1991). Furthermore, parents have been found to treat their children differently depending upon their gender, resulting in gendered parenting practices, and parents – especially fathers – spending more time with the same-sex child (Conley, 2004; Johnson et al., 2014; Mascaro et al., 2017; O'Neal et al., 2016). The strengthened relationship between same-sex parent and child, based on a bidirectional pattern of same-sex identification, and on gendered parenting practices, is thus expected to result in a stronger transmission of political preferences between parent and child from the same sex.

Only few studies in political socialization have investigated the influence of this type of gender dynamic between parents and their children, with differing findings. A review of the first studies in political socialization in the US found contradicting results, leading to the conclusion that which parent is more influential varies by study and the specific type of attitudinal transmission under study (Hyman, 1959, p. 63). Jennings and Niemi (1968) at first also found no differences in transmission for parents and children of the same or opposite sexes, but later studies did find (modest) same-sex patterns in terms of party identification, and particularly stronger ties between mothers and daughters (Jennings & Langton, 1969; Jennings & Niemi, 1974, p. 169). Another study in the US found, next to a more influential role of the mother on average, no differences in mother's and father's influence on sons and daughters, respectively (Acock & Bengtson, 1978). A more recent study leads to slightly different conclusions, finding that the

mother's party ID is of influence on both daughters and sons, but that the father is found only to influence the son (Oberle & Valdovinos, 2011).

In Europe, similar patterns have been found. In The Netherlands, the same stronger differential influence of both parents on the child of the same sex was found, regarding party preference (Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1995). More recently, stronger father-son transmission of right-wing extremist attitudes was found in Germany (Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017). A study on turnout in Finland also found that mothers' voting habits were more influential on both daughters and sons, than the fathers' (Gidengil et al., 2016).

Although the evidence is mixed, especially these recent European findings do seem to support the idea that gender differences within the family have an impact on parent–child transmission of political ideology. No study has yet investigated this differential process of political socialization between mothers and daughters, and fathers and sons, for the transmission of left–right ideology. Based on the most recent findings in Europe, it is expected that the mechanism regarding same-sex political socialization patterns apply to this ideological transmission process as well. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: A higher level of ideological transmission is found between parents and children from the same sex (mother and daughters, and fathers and sons), than between parents and children from the opposite sex (mothers and sons, and fathers and daughters).

Table 3-1. Graphical presentation of hypothesis 1

	Mother	**Father**
Daughter	++	+
Son	+	++

This hypothesis is also displayed in Table 3-1, showing a larger level of expected ideological transmission between parents and children from the same sex, highlighted in grey. It does not imply that parents are not expected to ideologically influence their children of the opposite sex at all, only to a lesser extent.

As emphasized in earlier research (Jennings & Langton, 1969), it is in this respect crucial to consider whether parents have similar or dissimilar ideological preferences, since otherwise this differential influence is hard to capture. The previous chapter has already shown that the percentage of ideological transmission is generally higher when the parents have a similar political ideology. However, discussing the differential influence of the father's ideology vis-à-vis the mother's is only adequately possible when their ideology actually differs.

3.3 Intragenerational political socialization: the influence of having an older sister

Apart from the parents, the presence of siblings in a family is also an important source of family influence. Indeed, siblings have been found to influence each other's behaviour and development quite strongly (e.g. Cicirelli, 1995, pp. 16–17; Lamb & Sutton-Smith, 1982). An older sibling often serves as a role model for the younger sibling(s), resulting in the imitation of behaviour patterns (Cicirelli, 1982, 1995), which is less often the case with younger siblings (McHale, Updegraff, & Whiteman, 2013, p. 341). Siblings are also found to influence each other's personality, mainly through their early interaction experiences (McHale et al., 2013, p. 335). Sibling influence is also expected to extend to political preferences, even though this need not be an intentional process. The gender gap in ideology, in which women are found to have more left-wing/progressive preferences than men, is expected to influence the political preferences of siblings with an older sister, leading to individuals having an older sister compared to those with an older brother to hold more left-wing ideologies. Before further going into this mechanism, I elaborate on the political gender gap.

The gender gap in political ideology is a well-known phenomenon. Women tend to have different attitudes and voting preferences than men do (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Conover, 1988; Edlund & Pande, 2002; Funk & Gathmann, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; McCue & Gopoian, 2000). Up until the 1970s, women in Western democracies tended to be more conservative than men, but a process of gender de-alignment has resulted in a radical shift in the gender gap. In a large number of countries, women are now in general more progressive and left-wing than men are (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Cross-national studies consistently find the existence of a gender gap in political behaviour: in a large number of advanced post-

industrial societies, women tend to vote more often for left-wing parties than men; and place themselves also more towards the left on the ideological left–right scale (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2000, pp. 451–452). However, the gender gap differs in size across countries and across issues, and is not found in post-communist societies. Generational effects are still at place as well. The gender gap is larger among younger cohorts, and even reversed in the eldest age group.

According to these findings, the gap in political preferences is mostly influenced by differences in attitudes (such as post-materialism, and support for women's movement), but also by structural factors as religiosity and the generally weaker socioeconomic position of women in society (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Other explanations for the political gender gap are that women are more predisposed than men to display empathy towards others, which leads to being more in favour of policies that are supportive of the disadvantaged in society (Conover, 1988; McCue & Gopoian, 2000).

These differences between men and women in terms of political preferences may have important implications for how the sibling gender composition in families influences the political preferences of the members of the family and how it interferes in the process of political socialization. As women are found to hold more left-wing ideologies, it can be expected that individuals with an older sister are more exposed to these views than those with an older brother, based on the principle of sibling role modelling.

However, recent research in the US (Healy & Malhotra, 2013) finds that males having a larger share of sisters, or a next-younger sister, hold on average more conservative positions on attitudes towards gender roles and are more likely to identify as a Republican, although only the gender-attitude effect persists into adulthood. These findings are explained by the reasoning that a larger share of daughters in the household enforces traditional gender roles, because they are assigned traditionally female household chores, which leads to having more conservative attitudes towards gender-roles and being more likely to identify as a Republican (2013, pp. 1031–1034). Conversely, another recent US study (Urbatsch, 2011) demonstrates that individuals with a next-older sister place themselves more towards the left on the ideological left–right scale, compared to those with a next-older brother, which is in line with the gender

gap in ideology. The author identifies several underlying mechanisms of the ideological influence of an older sister: role modelling shaping risk and other preferences of the younger sibling, leisure activities and peer groups, and socialization into being favourable to policies that are more to the advantage of the older sister.

Other recent studies have investigated the effect of having daughters on the political and gender role dispositions of parents. Effects however differ across studies, and a review of the current state of this field of research concludes that there is a publication bias, and cross-national analyses do not hold up previous findings (Lee & Conley, 2016). The present study wants to add to existing knowledge by replicating the recent study of Urbatsch (2011) in the European context, and by providing additional more in-depth insights, by also taking the parental ideology into account.

Building on previous work, I establish three mechanisms underlying the influence of the gender of the older sibling, identified as either the sibling next in line (next-older sibling), or the firstborn in the family (eldest sibling). First, following the most common explanation of the gender gap, which is differences in attitudes, an older sister can serve as an example for the younger sibling in terms of behaviour and attitudes through role modelling and peer influence. For instance, a sister's more favourable attitude towards women's emancipation can easily make a younger sibling more attentive to this specific issue, which could result into developing or adapting their attitude towards that of the sister. Second, having a sister as an older sibling could make the younger sibling more aware of the often weaker position that women have in society, as the sibling witnesses the experiences of the older sister. This could result in ideological positions that are more in favour of supporting women, or people with a weak position in society in general, leading to more left-wing attitudes. Lastly, based on the notion that women are more left-wing because they are more empathetic than men (McCue & Gopoian, 2000), sisters can socialize their younger siblings into more empathetic predispositions, leading to political preferences that cater more to the needs of the disadvantaged. Having sisters can therefore lead siblings to be more attentive to the needs of the weaker people in society in general, which may result in a more left-wing ideology.

This effect is not expected to be limited to male siblings only, as the socializing influence of having an older sister *compared to having an older brother* affects both females and males (Urbatsch, 2011). In other words, having a brother instead of a sister is expected to be of influence on the socialization of both males and females. In the case of girls, an older sister can reinforce the female traits and attitudes of the younger sister; whereas with boys, the older sister can socialize the younger brother into traits and behaviour that are more typical of women, such as empathy. This is in contrast with the right-wing 'pull' that those individuals with an older brother are exposed to, as they are on average more right-wing than females. However, the dynamics and influence between siblings of the same sex and of opposites sexes are likely to differ. Therefore, it is investigated whether the effect of having an older sister differs between male and female respondents. However, the hypothesis is formulated in a general sense, and the difference in the effect between men and women is regarded as an empirical question.

Moreover, because of the earlier mentioned generational effect in the political gender gap (Inglehart & Norris, 2000, pp. 454–455), sisters in the family are more likely to be left-wing than the mother. This provides grounds for why there should be an effect of a sister, even though every child already has a woman in the household, namely the mother. In addition, the present study also takes parental ideology into account. Keeping parental ideology constant, only the effect of the presence of one or more sisters, compared to brothers, can be isolated, contrary to previous studies.

H2a: On average, individuals with a next-older sister have a political ideology that is more to the left compared to respondents with a next-older brother.

H2b: On average, individuals with an eldest sister have a political ideology that is more to the left compared to respondents with an eldest brother.

The hypothesized mechanisms are formulated regarding the fact that *on average* women are more left-wing than men, and does not exclude the possibility that some individuals have an older sister with a right-wing political ideology or, vice versa, a left-wing brother. Thus, the hypotheses are formulated regarding the *average differences* between individuals with an older sister compared to an older brother.

The mechanisms described earlier are expected to differ depending on the political ideology of the parents. For instance, in a more conservative household, the influence of an older sister is expected to be larger. The hypothesized mechanisms, in which the sister affects the ideology of the younger sibling(s), are expected to counter the effect of the parents' conservatism. The generational gender gap, showing that especially women of younger cohorts hold more progressive/left-wing attitudes than men, is expected to play an important role in this respect. In a similar fashion, stronger effects of the older sister are expected in households where parents hold more centrist views. In a more left-wing household, the progressive effect of an older sister most likely makes a smaller difference, compared to both right-wing and centrist households, in the sense that the parents already transmit their left-wing ideology to the children.[7]

H3a: The left-wing effect of having an older sister, compared to an older brother, is expected to be stronger when parents hold a more conservative (right-wing) political ideology.

H3b: The left-wing effect of having an older sister, compared to an older brother, is expected to be stronger when parents hold a less conservative (left-wing or centrist) political ideology.

3.4 Research design

3.4.1 Data

The countries under investigation are Germany and Switzerland, using pooled waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). Most studies investigating gendered effects in political socialization, and especially the ones investigating sibling gender influences on political preferences and ideology, have been conducted using US data. However, it is important to know how gender differences in political socialization play out in other, European, contexts as well. Moreover, this study seeks to build upon existing findings and expand the current state of the field to Europe, by providing a replication and extension of the work by Urbatsch (2011), using data

[7] At the same time, an opposite reasoning can be put forward: in a more conservative family, there is a higher chance of assigning traditional gender roles to children, in which having a sister performing these traditional roles provides a reinforcement of the political ideology of the parents, rather than a counter-effect. However, considering that the gender gap in ideology is larger among younger cohorts, the sister is on average likely to be more progressive in her attitudes than the parents which makes the counter-effect more probably to occur.

from Germany and Switzerland to investigate the effect of having a next-older sister on left–right positions.

Crucial for the investigation of the effects of an older sister is the existence of the gender gap in ideology, as the theory otherwise does not hold. The gender gap is indeed found in Germany and Switzerland, but results differ across the two former parts of Germany: the gender gap in voting (women voting more for left-wing parties) that is found in 1990 in former East Germany, is much larger than in former West Germany (Inglehart & Norris, 2000, p. 421). Descriptive statistics of the data used in this thesis, are also presented to show the presence of the gender gap in ideology in the countries under study.

3.4.2 Natural experimental design

The advantage of investigating the influence of siblings' gender is that this is something that is assigned at random: parents cannot decide whether they have a boy or a girl, and chances on both outcomes are equally high. Therefore, the abovementioned studies regard this research as natural experiments (Healy & Malhotra, 2013; Urbatsch, 2011). However, even though the sex of children is indeed assigned at random, the choice of parents to have another child is often based on the sex of the children they already have, also called 'stopping rules' (McClelland, 1979; Raley & Bianchi, 2006; Yamaguchi, 1989). For instance, many people want a child of both genders and therefore parents with two children of the same sex, are more likely to have a third child than parents who have two children of opposite sexes. Therefore, this is strictly not an experiment, as parents use this type of stopping rules depending on the gender of the children they already have. Nonetheless, there is large random component to the key feature here: the gender of the older sibling of the respondents under study.

Previous research has investigated the effect of the share of sisters (Healy & Malhotra, 2013) and of having a next-older sister, i.e. the older sibling next in line (Urbatsch, 2011). This chapter attempts to replicate the findings of Urbatsch (2011) and therefore investigates the effect of having a next-older sister, rather than the share of sisters. The reason to do so is that it provides a more clear-cut test of having a sister compared to having a brother. Investigating the share of sisters does not properly take role model

effects into account, and is also confounded by the size of the family. By simply comparing the sex of the next-older sibling, the most equal cases of siblings are compared to each other. Additionally, for the purpose of triangulation, analyses are performed as well investigating the effect of the eldest sibling in the family being female, compared to male. In both cases, it is deemed crucial to control for the age difference between the respondent and respectively the next-older and eldest sibling. The advantage of investigating the eldest sister effect, is that it allows for the influence of the eldest sister on a respondent, when the next-older sibling is male. In this sense, this is a less restrictive test of the sister effect. As the analyses already naturally exclude respondents who are firstborns or only children – i.e. those without older siblings – this allows for a larger group of respondents to be investigated. Furthermore, it may very well be the case that younger siblings are especially affected by the gender of the eldest sibling, as firstborns occupy a special position in the family (Conley, 2004). Indeed, the gender of the eldest sibling has been found to shape the gender roles and division of household labour in the family (McHale, Crouter, & Tucker, 1999), with potential consequences for the ideological development of the siblings. When the firstborn is male, chances are higher that traditional gender roles are enforced, whereas the contrary would be expected when the firstborn is female.

3.4.1 Variables

The dependent variable in this study is left–right ideology, as measured by left–right self-placement. As in the previous chapter, the two G-SOEP waves in which this variable is present are pooled without overlap, using the entry for 2009 as a baseline entry. In the SHP, observations for the last five waves (2014–2010) are pooled using the same logic as for the G-SOEP pooling, using 2014 as a baseline entry. The data pooling is performed in the same manner for the fathers and mothers of the children.

The key independent variables in this study are the left–right self-placement of the parents (measured separately), the similarity of the left–right self-placement of both parents (parental homogeneity), the presence of a next-older sister, and the gender of the respondent. The parental homogeneity variable is a dummy, with 0 for non-homogeneous preferences (a difference of 2 or more on the left–right scale) and 1 for homogeneous preferences (a difference of 1 or less on the left–right scale). The presence

of a next-older or an eldest sister are also dummy variables, with a value 1 for a next-older/eldest sister and 0 for a next-older/eldest brother. Using information regarding the birth order of the respondents, and the gender and birth order of the respondents' siblings, these older sister variables are constructed.

Left–right self-placement, present in all analyses as both dependent (from the children) and independent variables (from fathers and mothers), is regarded as a continuous variable, which is centred around the mean of the analytic sample to improve the interpretability of the constitutive term of this variable when interaction terms are specified. However, for the interaction with the older sister variable, a categorical version of the variable is used to more adequately capture the differences between the effect of an older sister varying by left-wing, right-wing, and centre ideologies of the parents. Five categories are used: left (0-2), moderate left (3-4), centre (5), moderate right (6-7), right (8-10).

Similar control variables as in the previous chapter are included in the analyses that are expected to influence left–right positions and/or its transmission: the SES status as measured by the SIOPS score of the father (in three categories, high, medium low); the level of education (recoded into 'still in school', low, medium, high); age; and gender. In the analysis with the G-SOEP, the variable for former East/West Germany is included as well.

3.4.2 Model strategy

OLS regression analyses are performed to estimate a set of different models, to investigate the different mechanisms described above. Because of the usage of household data, there is often more than one sibling from the same family present in the same analysis. Therefore, OLS models are estimated in which the standard errors are clustered at the family level.

All analyses are restricted to respondents of whom the parental ideology is directly observed, and of whom the sibling structure is known (i.e. birth order of the respondent, and gender and birth order of the other siblings).

Furthermore, I apply additional restriction criteria to ensure comparability and exclude potential outlier influence. Firstly, analyses are restricted to respondents under age 30, to make the SHP and G-SOEP analyses as comparable as possible. The analytic sample in this chapter is smaller and younger than in the previous one, as the sibling information is not available for all respondents. In addition, due to the shorter existence of the SHP, the respondents of whom the parental ideology is known are on average much younger than the ones from the G-SOEP. These two factors lead to a very young SHP sample under study here: 93% of those respondents is under the age of 30. Therefore, the older outliers are not included in the analyses and the age range of the G-SOEP is adapted to that of the SHP. Secondly, analyses are restricted to children with a birth order of smaller than 5, to exclude outlier effects of siblings from very large families in which the hypothesized mechanisms might operate differently. The group of respondents that is therefore excluded from the analyses comprises of less than 1 per cent.

In the OLS models, firstly the gendered socialization effects (H1) are investigated by estimating interaction effects between the father's ideology and gender of the child, and mother's ideology and gender of the child, all in the same model. Then, this model is estimated again only for those households in which the parents actually differ in their political ideology (an absolute difference of 2 or more on the left–right scale).

Secondly, models are estimated in which the next-older/eldest sister dummy is added as a key independent variable, to investigate whether this is of direct influence on the ideology of the respondents (H2). This variable is also interacted with the sex of the respondents, to investigate whether there is a differential next-older sister effect for males and females. Lastly, this variable is interacted with the categorical political ideology of both parents separately, to investigate the differential effect of an older sister depending on parental ideology (H3a, H3b). In these models, only the ideology of one parent (with whom the interaction is performed) is included, but a control for the homogeneity of the parental ideology is added.

Ideally, models would be estimated in which the effect of the older sibling is allowed to differ by gender of the respondent *and* the parental ideology under study. However, due to the relatively low number of respondents in the Swiss data of which the ideology of

themselves and the parents is known, this type of analyses is not deemed appropriate as the inference would be on very small subgroups of respondents.

3.5 Results

This section discusses the findings from the several models that are estimated. Firstly, I provide some descriptive statistics showing the differences in political ideology between the males and females that are under study here. After that, the models investigating the differential effects of mothers' and father's left–right positions on those of their daughters and sons are discussed, and the results are presented regarding the influence of having an older sister compared to an older brother.

3.5.1 The gender gap in ideology between sons and daughters in Germany and Switzerland

Similar to Chapter 2, the following graphs illustrate the differences in the distribution over the left–right scale between the males and females of the analytic sample under study in this thesis, i.e. the adult respondents of whom the political ideology of themselves and of at least one parent is directly observed in the data. To more formally investigate the gender gap, t-tests are performed in which the mean left–right position for females and males are compared.

Figure 3-1. Distribution of analytic sample over the left–right scale, by gender, Germany



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. N total: 5223 N daughters: 2461 N sons: 2762

Table 3-2. Two-sample t-test: adult children's left–right position by gender, Germany

	Child's mean left–right position (SE)	SD	N
Male	4.88 (0.032)	1.67	2762
Female	4.43 (0.031)	1.54	2461
Difference in mean	0.44 (0.045)***		5223
H1: diff > 0 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000			

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

The distribution over the scale in Figure 3-1 indeed shows that in Germany the daughters in the analytic sample are not only more likely to place themselves more often on the midpoint of the scale, they are also more likely to take positions on the left part of the scale, and less likely on the right part of the scale, compared to the sons. The two-sample t-test, in which the mean left–right self-placement of the two groups are compared, confirms this finding. The t-test is statistically significant at p=0.00, showing an average difference in left–right positions of 0.44, which amounts to about half a point on the left–right scale.

Figure 3-2. Distribution of analytic sample over the left–right scale, by gender, Switzerland



Source: SHP 2010–2014. N total: 2324 N daughters: 1114 N sons: 1211

Table 3-3. Two-sample t-test: adult children's left–right position by gender, Switzerland

	Child's mean left–right position (SE)	SD	N
Male	5.23 (0.064)	2.24	1211
Female	4.42 (0.064)	2.12	1114
Difference in mean	0.82 (0.090)***		2324
H1: diff > 0 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000			

Source: SHP 2010-2014

For Switzerland, the results are similar, but show a much larger gap in ideology. Firstly, the differences in the distributions are clearly visible in Figure 3-2. As in the previous figure, women tend to take more often the midpoint and left-wing positions. Moreover, males are significantly more likely to take up right-wing positions, leading to a male distribution over the scale that is slightly skewed to the right, whereas for the females is it skewed to the left. The differences in skewedness are larger than in Germany, and this is also reflected in the results of the t-test. The difference in mean left–right position is again statistically significant at the p=0.00 level, but the substantive gender gap is much larger here, with a size of 0.82, almost twice as large as in Germany.

Compared to previous research on the gender gap, including in these two countries (Inglehart & Norris, 2000), these findings show larger differences between men and women. This could indeed be due to differences in the research design, but more probable is the fact that the gender gap has become larger, and that the generational effect found by Inglehart and Norris (2000) is reflected in these findings using more recent data and a young sample of respondents.

These results imply that the effects that may be found of having an older sister, are more likely to occur in Switzerland rather than in Germany, as the differences between the two gender are larger in the former country.

3.5.2 Gendered parent–child transmission of left–right positions

I now turn to the test of the first hypothesis, which expects higher ideological transmission rates between parents and children of the same gender. Table 3-4 and Table 3-5 show the results of the models investigating the influence of parental ideology on child's ideology, for respectively Germany and Switzerland. High values on the left–right scale indicate right-wing positions. Positive coefficients indicate a positive association between parental and child's positions.

In Germany, the first baseline model shows, similar to the findings in Chapter 2, that on average the mother's ideology has a stronger influence than the father's ideology on the child's left–right self-placement, with an effect size of respectively 0.25 (mother) and 0.18 (father). Substantively, this means that for each increase in the position on the self-

placement scale (moving towards the right-wing end of the scale) of the parent, the child's position is on average 0.25/0.18 points more towards the right on the left–right scale.

Table 3-4. Left–right self-placement of child on parental ideology, by gender of child, Germany

	Full sample		Parents have different ideology	
Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Ideology	0.252***	0.275***	0.242***	0.246***
	(0.0273)	(0.0379)	(0.0350)	(0.0479)
Father's ideology	0.179***	0.196***	0.169***	0.188***
	(0.0240)	(0.0353)	(0.0312)	(0.0452)
Mother's ideology * Female		-0.0498		-0.0113
		(0.0523)		(0.0666)
Father's Ideology * Female		-0.0338		-0.0376
		(0.0470)		(0.0580)
Female	-0.390***	-0.391***	-0.431***	-0.428***
	(0.0637)	(0.0636)	(0.124)	(0.123)
Education (ref. = still in school)				
Low	0.215**	0.219**	0.269	0.271
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.222)	(0.223)
Medium	-0.0243	-0.0236	-0.146	-0.146
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.219)	(0.220)
High	-0.148	-0.150	-0.243	-0.245
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.321)	(0.322)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)				
Low	0.0392	0.0413	0.100	0.103
	(0.0850)	(0.0851)	(0.167)	(0.167)
High	-0.120	-0.118	-0.186	-0.185
	(0.0778)	(0.0780)	(0.141)	(0.143)
Age	0.00659	0.00672	0.0263	0.0269
	(0.0130)	(0.0130)	(0.0257)	(0.0259)
East Germany	0.225	0.226	-0.0422	-0.0417
ref. = Abroad	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.427)	(0.430)
West Germany	0.0401	0.0379	-0.246	-0.247
	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.419)	(0.421)
Constant	4.609***	4.603***	4.587***	4.570***
	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.645)	(0.648)
Observations	2,310	2,310	746	746
R-squared	0.159	0.160	0.147	0.148

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at family level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

An F-test of equality of coefficients (not presented here) has been performed after estimating the OLS model, in order to formally test the extent to which the size of these coefficients significantly differs. The test is significant at the p=0.09 level, implying a modest but statistically significant difference in the size of coefficients.

Table 3-5. Left–right self-placement of child on parental ideology, by gender of child, Switzerland

	Full sample		Parents have different ideology	
Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Ideology	0.333***	0.286***	0.316***	0.252***
	(0.0479)	(0.0717)	(0.0559)	(0.0833)
Father's ideology	0.285***	0.280***	0.236***	0.212***
	(0.0430)	(0.0621)	(0.0494)	(0.0719)
Mother's ideology * Female		0.0950		0.130
		(0.0973)		(0.115)
Father's Ideology * Female		0.00285		0.0355
		(0.0817)		(0.0959)
Female	-0.486***	-0.486***	-0.516**	-0.497**
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.223)	(0.215)
Education (ref. = still in school)				
Low	0.0576	0.0672	0.161	0.145
	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.395)	(0.397)
Medium	0.319	0.338	-0.0362	-0.00823
	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.431)	(0.430)
High	-0.183	-0.180	-0.209	-0.212
	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.409)	(0.411)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)				
Low	-0.342	-0.344	-0.426	-0.411
	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.385)	(0.382)
High	-0.238	-0.239	-0.129	-0.103
	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.285)	(0.279)
Age	0.0554**	0.0541**	0.0946**	0.0910**
	(0.0257)	(0.0257)	(0.0421)	(0.0426)
Constant	4.100***	4.124***	3.400***	3.459***
	(0.541)	(0.543)	(0.920)	(0.924)
Observations	790	790	327	327
R-squared	0.277	0.279	0.242	0.248

Source: SHP 2010–2014
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at family level)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Switzerland, the results presented in Table 3-5 are quite similar, with the mother's ideology showing a slightly larger coefficient (b=0.33) than the father's (b=0.29). However, the F-test showed that the difference in the size of the coefficients is not

statistically significant (p=0.6), implying that the influence of both parents is equally large. In the next model, interaction terms are specified between the parents' ideology and the gender of the respondents (children), showing no significant difference in how sons' and daughters' ideology is influenced by the ideology of the parents, for both Germany and Switzerland. This does not provide support for the first hypothesis, expecting a larger influence between parents and children of the same gender.

In Model 3, the analytic sample is restricted to families of whom the parents actually differ in their ideology, so that a differential influence of both parents also substantively means something. This implies a large reduction in the number of respondents, especially for Germany, showing the large similarity in ideology of most parents. The results of the regression on this sample are similar to the first model estimated, but with the important difference that the F-test of equality of coefficients is no longer significant in the German analysis. So, even though the coefficient of the mother's ideology is larger (b=0.24) than that of the father (b=0.17), this difference is not statistically significant. However, this could also be due to the large reduction in the sample size. For the Swiss analysis, the results do not lead to a different conclusion than based on the first model, although the difference in the size of the coefficients of the mother's and father's ideology is larger, but not statistically different. Model 4, estimating again an interaction between parental ideology and gender of the child, does not sort any effects and shows the same results as the interactions in Model 2, providing no support for the first hypothesis. It can be concluded that both parents equally influence the ideology of the child, regardless of the child's gender and the similarity of ideology of both parents.

Similar as in Chapter 2, the R-squared of the models differs sharply across the two countries under study, showing a larger explained variance in Switzerland.

3.5.3 Natural experiment: the effect of having an older sister

I now turn to investigating how having an older sister, compared to an older brother, affects the political ideology of the respondents. Models are presented using a variable for having a next-older sister. Then, triangulation is performed for having an eldest sister, compared to a brother (models presented in the Appendix). These analyses imply that first-borns and only children are not included, as they do not have an older sibling,

resulting in lower numbers of observations than in the previous analyses. In Table 3-6 and in Table 3-7 the models for Germany respectively Switzerland are presented.[8]

Table 3-6. Left–right self-placement of child on having a next-older sister, Germany

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) + ideology	(3) Int. FEMALE	(4) Int. MOTHER	(5) Int. FATHER
Next-older sister	0.176*	0.187**	0.176	0.140	0.200
ref.= next-older brother	(0.0993)	(0.0929)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.139)
Age diff. next-older sibling	0.0197	0.0250	0.0250	0.0199	0.0274
	(0.0165)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0159)	(0.0168)
Mother's ideology - Left (0-2)		-0.836***	-0.835***	-1.202***	
ref. = centre		(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.295)	
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.432***	-0.431***	-0.553***	
		(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.161)	
Moderate right (6-7)		0.305**	0.305**	0.466**	
		(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.190)	
Right (8-10)		1.038***	1.039***	1.206**	
		(0.293)	(0.294)	(0.488)	
Father's ideology - Left (0-2)		-0.746***	-0.746***		-1.133***
ref. = centre		(0.208)	(0.208)		(0.310)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.197	-0.198		-0.476***
		(0.122)	(0.122)		(0.168)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.129	0.128		0.391*
		(0.140)	(0.140)		(0.208)
Right (8-10)		0.794***	0.796***		1.024***
		(0.217)	(0.216)		(0.316)
Next-older sister * Female			0.0218		
			(0.190)		
Next-older sister * Left parent				0.208	0.0830
				(0.379)	(0.389)
Next-older sister * Mod. Left parent				-0.0235	0.236
				(0.233)	(0.234)
Next-older sister * Mod. Right parent				-0.0163	-0.328
				(0.269)	(0.265)
Next-older sister * Right parent				0.177	0.193
				(0.588)	(0.454)
Parents have same ideology				-0.159	-0.0133
ref.=dissimilar ideology				(0.115)	(0.117)
CONTROLS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	4.776***	4.951***	4.957***	5.125***	4.851***
	(0.506)	(0.472)	(0.478)	(0.489)	(0.508)
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
R-squared	0.042	0.175	0.175	0.146	0.128

SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1.
Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009

In the baseline model, there is no statistically significant effect of having a next-older sister in Switzerland, but in Germany a modest positive effect is found, which is contrary to expectations: respondents with a next-older sister, compared to those with a next-older brother, take slightly more rightist positions on the left–right scale (b=0.18). The coefficient goes slightly up, and reaches a higher level of statistical significance when in

[8] Coefficients for the control variables included in the model are not presented here. Full models are found in the Appendix. Control variables include: education, father's SIOPS, age, female, East/West Germany (for Germany only).

the next model the parental ideology is added. This implies that the effect of a sister is slightly oppressed by the parental ideology. For Switzerland, still no effect is found. The third model investigates whether the effect of having an older sister differs for males and females, but there is no significant interaction effect found in both countries. This means not only that the effect of having a next-older sister compared to a next-older brother does not differ between females and males, but also that the gender gap in ideology between siblings is not larger or smaller for females with a next-older sister compared to a next-older brother. Women's preferences thus are in this sense not affected by the sex of their next-older sibling.

Table 3-7. Left–right self-placement of child on having a next-older sister, Switzerland

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) + ideology	(3) Int. FEMALE	(4) Int. MOTHER	(5) Int. FATHER
Next-older sister	-0.138	0.0240	0.205	-0.718**	-0.524
ref.= next-older brother	(0.192)	(0.180)	(0.265)	(0.314)	(0.400)
Age diff. next-older sibling	-0.00941	-0.00477	-0.00448	-0.0168	0.00812
	(0.0600)	(0.0591)	(0.0590)	(0.0576)	(0.0612)
Mother's ideology - Left (0-2)		-1.017**	-1.020***	-1.996***	
ref. = centre		(0.393)	(0.393)	(0.592)	
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.546**	-0.569**	-1.427***	
		(0.255)	(0.257)	(0.294)	
Moderate right (6-7)		0.377	0.373	-0.106	
		(0.297)	(0.299)	(0.380)	
Right (8-10)		1.325***	1.312***	0.951**	
		(0.343)	(0.345)	(0.427)	
Father's ideology - Left (0-2)		-1.380***	-1.354***		-2.611***
ref. = centre		(0.427)	(0.428)		(0.668)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.761***	-0.759***		-1.259***
		(0.258)	(0.257)		(0.357)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.190	0.179		-0.000894
		(0.267)	(0.264)		(0.349)
Right (8-10)		0.361	0.359		0.634
		(0.359)	(0.361)		(0.485)
Next-older sister * Female			-0.370		
			(0.358)		
Next-older sister * Left parent				0.570	1.152
				(0.751)	(0.825)
Next-older sister * Mod. Left parent				1.073**	0.580
				(0.438)	(0.525)
Next-older sister * Mod. Right parent				1.113**	0.877*
				(0.518)	(0.494)
Next-older sister * Right parent				1.074*	0.370
				(0.610)	(0.779)
Parents have same ideology				-0.403**	-0.0494
ref.=dissimilar ideology				(0.198)	(0.217)
CONTROLS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	5.414***	4.729***	4.665***	5.316***	5.185***
	(0.683)	(0.824)	(0.824)	(0.799)	(0.878)
Observations	471	437	437	437	437
R-squared	0.060	0.250	0.252	0.229	0.197

SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1.
Source: SHP 2010–2014.

In the last two models, interactions are performed with the parental ideology, respectively the mother in the fourth model, and the father in the fifth model. In Germany, this does not sort any noteworthy effects, as none of the interaction terms are close to statistical significance. Moreover, as the constitutive term, i.e. the effect of having a next-older sister when the mother respectively the father has a centrist ideology, is no longer statistically significant (p=0.15 respectively p=0.30), this shows that the previously found right-wing effect is not very robust. In Switzerland, however, the constitutive term reaches statistical significance in the fourth model, which is a strong indicator of the presence of this effect, as the sample size is very small. The coefficient is negative and is quite large with a size of -0.7, which is even larger than the gender gap in the previous tables. Furthermore, almost all interaction terms are statistically significant and show large differences in the effect of a next-older sister, depending on the ideology of the mother.

Figure 3-3. Marginal effects of having a next-older sister, by mother's ideology, Switzerland



Source: SHP 2010–2014. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 4 presented in Table 3-7.

The marginal effect sizes of the next-older sister effect by different categories of the mother's ideology are shown in Figure 3-3. It shows the earlier found significant and large negative next-older sister effect in families with a mother with a centrist ideology, and the large differences in this effect with the other ideological groups. Due to the small

sample size, and the close to normal distribution of respondents over the left–right scale, it is very hard to reach statistical significance for the other groups, as they comprise much less individuals. However, in the plot we see that the estimated effects of having a next-older sister for respondents with a moderate right- or left-wing mother are positive, which is counter to the expectations. Based on these analyses, it can thus be concluded that the hypothesized negative effect of a next-older (H2) sister is not found across all families to an equal extent, and that the expectation that effects would be more pronounced in right-wing (H3a) and left-wing and centrist families (H3b), is only confirmed for centrist families. In this respect, only the mother's ideology was found to be relevant, as the interaction model with the father's ideology did not sort any noteworthy effects.

The models are also run using a slightly different independent variable, in which the gender of the firstborn in the family (the eldest sibling) is considered, instead of the next-older sibling. These analyses investigating the eldest sister effects are not presented here, but can be found in the Appendix. The results for Germany are not in line with any of the hypotheses, as no effects are found for the gender of the eldest sibling, not are any of the interaction effects (with female, mother's ideology, and father's ideology) statistically significant.

Figure 3-4. Marginal effects of having an eldest sister on political ideology, by gender, Switzerland



Source: SHP 2010–2014. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 3 presented in Table A3.

Again, in Switzerland the picture is a bit different. A statistically significant and large interaction term (-0.8) is found with gender, whereas no previous baseline effects were found, and also no significant interaction with parental ideology. The marginal effects are shown in Figure 3-4, showing that a negative (left-leaning) effect is found for females, although not reaching statistical significance, and a positive (right-leaning) effect is found for males. This differential effect between men and women of the firstborn sibling in the family being a sister or a brother, points at crucial differences in the role of the firstborn and the gender roles that it gets assigned. The size of the coefficients is quite large (0.46 and -0.33 respectively), into the direction of the earlier established gender gap.

The other way around, the significant interaction term between having an eldest sister and gender implies that there are also consequences for the gender gap in ideology. The marginal effects plot in Figure 3-5, showing the reverse of the previous plot, depicts the difference in left–right positions between males and females depending on the fact whether their firstborn sibling is male or female. It shows that whereas the differences between females and males with an eldest sister are even larger than the average gender gap (i.e. -0.9 compared to the previously found gender gap of about -0.5), females from families in which the firstborn is a male, are not more left-wing than males who come from a similar family structure.

Figure 3-5. Marginal effects of being female (gender gap) on political ideology, by gender of firstborn sibling



Source: SHP 2010–2014. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 3 presented in Table A3.

These findings provide support for the expectation that having an eldest sister as a role model leads to having a more left-wing ideology, but this only applies to women. Sisters are thus found to empower each other, whereas an adverse effect is found for males: they turn more to the right than males who have a brother as the firstborn in the family. This could be an indication of the importance of the gender roles possibly assigned to the eldest sister.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the role of gender in the processes of political socialization in the nuclear family. Firstly, the transmission between parents and children of the same and of opposites sexes was investigated. Secondly, the influence of having a next-older sister compared to having a next-older brother, and of a firstborn sister compared to a firstborn brother, was studied, a natural experiment. Although only certain of the hypotheses are supported by the findings, the results show consistent patterns in the parent–child transmission of ideology and contribute to a novel field of research in which the natural experimental influence of the sex of siblings is investigated.

As for the level of political ideology transmission by gender, in Germany the mother's ideology showed to have a larger influence on both children, compared to the influence of the father. In Switzerland, such differences were not found, possibly also due to the smaller sample size. However, in both countries no evidence was found for a stronger level of transmission between fathers and sons, and between mothers and daughters. These findings add to the existing body of literature in which no distinct relationships are found between parent–child pairs of the same gender, but the mother takes a slightly more important socializing role (Gidengil et al., 2016; Oberle & Valdovinos, 2011). However, other European studies did find stronger same-sex socialization (Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017; Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1995), which leads to the question under what circumstances such effects are found, and when they are not. The current state of the field does not provide clear-cut answers to this question, and therefore requires additional research into the socialization mechanisms that take place between mothers, fathers, daughters, and sons. However, this study has provided, to the best of my knowledge, a first account of the gendered transmission process of left–right self-placement between parents and children.

Regarding the natural experiment of the ideological effects of having a next-older or firstborn sister (compared to a brother), the hypotheses were partially supported by the analyses for Switzerland. In Germany, however, no such effects were found. On the contrary, limited evidence was found for a converse effect, deeming those with a next-older sister slightly more to the right, but these findings were not robust. In Switzerland, two results stand out. Firstly, differential effects of a next-older sister were found depending on the mother's ideology, and opposite effects of a firstborn sister were found for males (right-wing effect) compared to females (left-wing effect). The latter findings have implications for the gender gap in ideology, showing that females growing up with a firstborn brother are less progressive than those growing up with a firstborn sister. The underlying mechanism is most likely to be found in the older sister serving as a role model, socializing the younger sister into certain (empathetic) predispositions, and making her more aware of women's position in society, which easily leads to a more leftist political ideology. Sisters can thus fulfil an important role, either by being the next sibling or line of another sibling, or by being the firstborn in the family. However, as for males the opposite effect of having a first-born sister is found, these mechanisms operate differently depending upon the sex mix of the siblings. Same-sex identification among siblings might play a role here as well. Moreover, these differences between men and women depending upon the gender of the firstborn sibling most likely imply that gender roles are still present in many household, having implications until later in life for the political ideology of the family members in question. For instance, the firstborn in the household being a male could easily enforce traditional gender roles, which could explain why females with a firstborn brother take more rightist positions than those with a firstborn sister.

However, the fact that these findings were only found in Switzerland, but not in Germany, asks for an explanation. Looking at the gender equality index of the World Economic Forum and the statistics of the UN Gender Indicators,[9] both Germany and Switzerland score very high. In fact, female labour force participation is even higher in Switzerland, and the ratio between the hours that men and women perform unpaid domestic work, is only marginally lower in Germany. The answer is thus not found in

[9] Global Gender Gap Report 2016, accessible through reports.weforum.org; UN Gender Indicators, accessible through genderstats.un.org.

gender *equality*, but more likely in gender *differences*, specifically differences in political preferences and ideology. Supporting the results of this study, in which the ideological gender gap is larger in Switzerland than in Germany, previous research established a much wider gender gap in voting in Switzerland, the second highest of all 25 countries under study, whereas Germany scored among the lowest (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014). Additionally, a recent study argued that even though gender equality has increased to a high level in Switzerland, there is a remaining core of persistent traditionalism found in Swiss families, related to work/life balance and household chores (Levy, Widmer, & Kellerhals, 2002). Taken together, the remaining traditional gender role combined with the larger political gender gap in Switzerland, can especially explain the findings of a left-wing pull of a firstborn sister for females, whereas males with a firstborn sister experience a right-wing effect. A firstborn sibling of the same or a different gender can thus make a larger difference, implying that the gender roles that are assigned in the household, combined with the birth order of the siblings, seem to shape the ideological formation of children in the family. Additional research regarding the division of household labour and the assignment of gender roles, depending on gender and birth order, is however required before being able to make such claims.

In short, the findings of this chapter have shown that gender matters for political ideology. Differences between men and women are not only found in terms of the ideological gender gap, but also in terms of the influence of the gender of the other siblings in the family, although not in both countries under study. Subtle evidence was provided for a more important socializing role for mothers compared to fathers. In the next chapter, mothers will take up a central role as well, investigating the effect of parental separation and single-mother socialization on individuals' political ideology under later in life.

Appendix Chapter 3

Table A 1. Left–right self-placement of child on having a next-older sister, Switzerland

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) Parental ideology	(3) Interact. I FEMALE	(4) Interact. II MOTHERS	(5) Interact. III FATHERS
Next-older sister	-0.138	0.0240	0.205	-0.718**	-0.524
ref. = next-older brother	(0.192)	(0.180)	(0.265)	(0.314)	(0.400)
Age diff. next-older sibling	-0.00941	-0.00477	-0.00448	-0.0168	0.00812
	(0.0600)	(0.0591)	(0.0590)	(0.0576)	(0.0612)
Mother's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-1.017**	-1.020***	-1.996***	
		(0.393)	(0.393)	(0.592)	
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.546**	-0.569**	-1.427***	
		(0.255)	(0.257)	(0.294)	
Moderate right (6-7)		0.377	0.373	-0.106	
		(0.297)	(0.299)	(0.380)	
Right (8-10)		1.325***	1.312***	0.951**	
		(0.343)	(0.345)	(0.427)	
Father's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-1.380***	-1.354***		-2.611***
		(0.427)	(0.428)		(0.668)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.761***	-0.759***		-1.259***
		(0.258)	(0.257)		(0.357)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.190	0.179		-0.000894
		(0.267)	(0.264)		(0.349)
Right (8-10)		0.361	0.359		0.634
		(0.359)	(0.361)		(0.485)
Next-older sister * Female			-0.370		
			(0.358)		
Next-older sister * Left parent				0.570	1.152
				(0.751)	(0.825)
Next-older sister * Mod. Left parent				1.073**	0.580
				(0.438)	(0.525)
Next-older sister * Mod. Right parent				1.113**	0.877*
				(0.518)	(0.494)
Next-older sister * Right parent				1.074*	0.370
				(0.610)	(0.779)
Parents have same ideology				-0.403**	-0.0494
ref.= dissimilar ideology				(0.198)	(0.217)
Education (ref. = still in school)					
Low	-0.0228	0.0196	0.0179	0.00141	-0.0198
	(0.319)	(0.287)	(0.287)	(0.283)	(0.294)
Medium	0.654**	0.302	0.289	0.345	0.405
	(0.330)	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.334)	(0.332)
High	-0.0242	-0.206	-0.206	-0.274	-0.203
	(0.340)	(0.327)	(0.324)	(0.326)	(0.325)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)					
Low	-0.311	-0.256	-0.263	-0.267	-0.340
	(0.339)	(0.333)	(0.334)	(0.337)	(0.349)
High	-0.321	-0.175	-0.188	-0.242	-0.100
	(0.260)	(0.237)	(0.233)	(0.237)	(0.251)
Age	-0.000188	0.0353	0.0355	0.0410	0.0174
	(0.0269)	(0.0361)	(0.0360)	(0.0362)	(0.0368)
Female	-0.780***	-0.460**	-0.279	-0.491***	-0.506***
	(0.191)	(0.182)	(0.230)	(0.183)	(0.183)
Constant	5.414***	4.729***	4.665***	5.316***	5.185***
	(0.683)	(0.824)	(0.824)	(0.799)	(0.878)
Observations	471	437	437	437	437
R-squared	0.060	0.250	0.252	0.229	0.197

Source: SHP 2010–2014. SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1.

Table A 2. Left–right self-placement of child on having a next-older sister, Germany

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) Parental ideology	(3) Interact. I FEMALE	(4) Interact. II MOTHERS	(5) Interact. III FATHERS
Next-older sister	0.176*	0.187**	0.176	0.140	0.200
ref.= next-older brother	(0.0993)	(0.0929)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.139)
Age diff. next-older sibling	0.0197	0.0250	0.0250	0.0199	0.0274
	(0.0165)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0159)	(0.0168)
Mother's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-0.836***	-0.835***	-1.202***	
		(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.295)	
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.432***	-0.431***	-0.553***	
		(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.161)	
Moderate right (6-7)		0.305**	0.305**	0.466**	
		(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.190)	
Right (8-10)		1.038***	1.039***	1.206**	
		(0.293)	(0.294)	(0.488)	
Father's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-0.746***	-0.746***		-1.133***
		(0.208)	(0.208)		(0.310)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.197	-0.198		-0.476***
		(0.122)	(0.122)		(0.168)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.129	0.128		0.391*
		(0.140)	(0.140)		(0.208)
Right (8-10)		0.794***	0.796***		1.024***
		(0.217)	(0.216)		(0.316)
Next-older sister * Female			0.0218		
			(0.190)		
Next-older sister * Left parent				0.208	0.0830
				(0.379)	(0.389)
Next-older sister * Mod. Left parent				-0.0235	0.236
				(0.233)	(0.234)
Next-older sister * Mod. Right parent				-0.0163	-0.328
				(0.269)	(0.265)
Next-older sister * Right parent				0.177	0.193
				(0.588)	(0.454)
Parents have same ideology				-0.159	-0.0133
ref.=dissimilar ideology				(0.115)	(0.117)
Education (ref. = still in school)					
Low	0.269*	0.176	0.176	0.193	0.218
	(0.160)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.153)
Medium	0.0325	-0.0329	-0.0326	-0.0163	-0.00915
	(0.171)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.167)
High	-0.161	-0.149	-0.148	-0.171	-0.115
	(0.287)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.270)	(0.279)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)					
Low	0.0456	0.0399	0.0396	0.0562	0.0203
	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.124)
High	-0.197	-0.112	-0.112	-0.160	-0.120
	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Age	-0.000967	-0.00614	-0.00614	-0.00705	-0.00329
	(0.0217)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)
Female	-0.493***	-0.445***	-0.456***	-0.467***	-0.446***
	(0.100)	(0.0947)	(0.142)	(0.0956)	(0.0968)
East Germany	-0.195	0.0246	0.0239	0.00871	-0.135
ref. = Abroad	(0.228)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.222)	(0.217)
West Germany	-0.0267	-0.0349	-0.0355	-0.0280	-0.0630
	(0.218)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.211)	(0.204)
Constant	4.776***	4.951***	4.957***	5.125***	4.851***
	(0.506)	(0.472)	(0.478)	(0.489)	(0.508)
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
R-squared	0.042	0.175	0.175	0.146	0.128

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1

Table A 3. Left–right self-placement of child on having an eldest sister, Switzerland

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) Parental ideology	(3) Interact. I FEMALE	(4) Interact. II MOTHERS	(5) Interact. III FATHERS
Eldest sister (ref. = eldest brother)	-0.0529	0.0698	0.456	-0.399	-0.331
	(0.220)	(0.194)	(0.277)	(0.349)	(0.415)
Age diff. eldest sibling	0.00943	-0.000109	0.00149	-0.00481	0.00612
	(0.0378)	(0.0389)	(0.0391)	(0.0381)	(0.0399)
Mother's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-1.027***	-1.053***	-1.815***	
		(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.647)	
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.550**	-0.600**	-1.291***	
		(0.254)	(0.249)	(0.333)	
Moderate right (6-7)		0.370	0.347	0.128	
		(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.432)	
Right (8-10)		1.318***	1.264***	1.190***	
		(0.342)	(0.346)	(0.450)	
Father's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-1.381***	-1.331***		-2.762***
		(0.424)	(0.417)		(0.599)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.758***	-0.763***		-1.068***
		(0.257)	(0.252)		(0.381)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.195	0.173		0.0583
		(0.267)	(0.264)		(0.372)
Right (8-10)		0.366	0.395		0.927*
		(0.358)	(0.363)		(0.529)
Eldest sister * Female			-0.788**		
			(0.362)		
Eldest sister * Left parent				0.226	1.324*
				(0.786)	(0.773)
Eldest sister * Mod. Left parent				0.789	0.181
				(0.483)	(0.540)
Eldest sister * Mod. Right parent				0.678	0.785
				(0.579)	(0.536)
Eldest sister * Right parent				0.524	-0.242
				(0.681)	(0.766)
Parents have same ideology (ref.=not)				-0.408**	-0.0340
				(0.195)	(0.216)
Education (ref. = still in school)					
Low	0.0443	0.0285	0.0135	0.0470	0.0259
	(0.318)	(0.286)	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.295)
Medium	0.548	0.312	0.268	0.339	0.445
	(0.343)	(0.328)	(0.325)	(0.332)	(0.328)
High	-0.197	-0.199	-0.187	-0.237	-0.167
	(0.346)	(0.324)	(0.318)	(0.324)	(0.320)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)					
Low	-0.445	-0.247	-0.215	-0.280	-0.324
	(0.364)	(0.334)	(0.333)	(0.344)	(0.352)
High	-0.343	-0.170	-0.176	-0.268	-0.0915
	(0.274)	(0.237)	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.248)
Age	0.0312	0.0351	0.0345	0.0417	0.0201
	(0.0381)	(0.0357)	(0.0353)	(0.0362)	(0.0367)
Female	-0.680***	-0.463**	-0.0785	-0.500***	-0.497***
	(0.199)	(0.186)	(0.244)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Constant	4.717***	4.690***	4.562***	5.117***	4.977***
	(0.847)	(0.812)	(0.807)	(0.820)	(0.862)
Observations	437	437	437	437	437
R-squared	0.057	0.250	0.258	0.222	0.200

Source: SHP 2010–2014. SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1

Table A 4. Left–right self-placement of child on having an eldest sister, Germany

Left–right self-placement	(1) Baseline	(2) Parental ideology	(3) Interact. I FEMALE	(4) Interact. II MOTHERS	(5) Interact. III FATHERS
Eldest sister (ref. = eldest brother)	0.119	0.140	0.0966	0.0900	0.169
	(0.105)	(0.0944)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.141)
Age diff. eldest sibling	0.0113	0.0111	0.0112	0.00864	0.0118
	(0.0135)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0133)
Mother's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-0.837***	-0.835***	-1.045***	-1.005***
		(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.298)	(0.298)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.458***	-0.456***	-0.559***	-0.437**
		(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.165)	(0.173)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.350**	0.349**	0.383**	0.403**
		(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.185)	(0.198)
Right (8-10)		1.050***	1.056***	1.187***	1.003***
		(0.287)	(0.289)	(0.451)	(0.312)
Father's ideology (ref. = centre)					
Left (0-2)		-0.669***	-0.670***		-1.005***
		(0.209)	(0.210)		(0.298)
Moderate left (3-4)		-0.170	-0.173		-0.437**
		(0.122)	(0.122)		(0.173)
Moderate right (6-7)		0.0843	0.0817		0.403**
		(0.140)	(0.140)		(0.198)
Right (8-10)		0.769***	0.771***		1.003***
		(0.217)	(0.217)		(0.312)
Eldest sister * Female			0.0877		
			(0.186)		
Eldest sister * Left parent				-0.0273	0.0151
				(0.416)	(0.414)
Eldest sister * Mod. Left parent				-0.0236	0.199
				(0.233)	(0.241)
Eldest sister * Mod. Right parent				0.224	-0.439
				(0.268)	(0.272)
Eldest sister * Right parent				0.233	0.243
				(0.572)	(0.437)
Parents have same ideology (ref.=not)				-0.122	0.0131
				(0.116)	(0.118)
Education (ref. = still in school)					
Low	0.217	0.128	0.131	0.136	0.163
	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.154)
Medium	-0.00216	-0.0597	-0.0598	-0.0448	-0.0526
	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.167)
High	-0.264	-0.254	-0.249	-0.281	-0.247
	(0.290)	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.279)
Father's SIOPS (ref. = medium)					
Low	0.0105	0.00776	0.00792	0.0189	-0.00786
	(0.128)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.122)
High	-0.228*	-0.143	-0.145	-0.188	-0.155
	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Age	0.00347	-0.000617	-0.000545	-0.00209	0.00294
	(0.0215)	(0.0202)	(0.0202)	(0.0206)	(0.0207)
Female	-0.485***	-0.440***	-0.481***	-0.463***	-0.444***
	(0.0991)	(0.0940)	(0.135)	(0.0946)	(0.0959)
East Germany (1989)	-0.166	0.0598	0.0602	0.0416	-0.0852
Ref. = Abroad (1989)	(0.228)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.222)	(0.215)
West Germany (1989)	-0.00517	-0.0163	-0.0159	-0.0169	-0.0126
	(0.219)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.211)	(0.203)
Constant	4.781***	4.942***	4.960***	5.102***	4.794***
	(0.513)	(0.475)	(0.481)	(0.492)	(0.507)
Observations	1,053	1,053	1,053	1,053	1,053
R-squared	0.039	0.168	0.168	0.143	0.118

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SEs in parentheses clustered at family level. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.1

4. Political Socialization after Parental Separation: Breaking with the Traditional Family Model

4.1 Introduction

Although the two-parent family consisting of a mother and a father remains the standard in current society, this traditional view of the family is increasingly under challenge. Due to the rise in divorce rates, single parent and patchwork families have become more common. In the EU-28 countries, the crude divorce rate has doubled between 1970 and 2013.[10] Whereas divorce used to be something which was 'not done', and single mothers were regarded a disgrace, divorce has become much more socially acceptable in a large and growing number of countries. Furthermore, the number of births outside marriage has been on the rise for decades as well (Eurostat, 2015), which provides a lower threshold to separate for couples with children.

Research has shown that changes in family structure can have far-reaching consequences for the children involved. However, little is known about the 'political' side of divorce, as studies in political socialization have mainly focussed on the traditional two-parent family. How do parental separation and its consequences translate into an impact on political ideology? This chapter attempts to answer this question by placing the single-parent family and its children central. More specifically, the focus is on to what extent the political ideology of (young) adults differs between those who experienced parental separation during childhood and those who did not. Political ideology is operationalized as left–right self-placement. It is expected that adults who have experienced parental separation during childhood show more left-wing ideological positions compared to those who did not have this experience when they were young. I expect that these differences be due to the former having seen their parents breaking social norms; the often-experienced economic deprivation after a parental separation; and being raised and socialized by a single mother. A key question that is addressed as well is whether there is at the same time a self-selection mechanism at place, of more left-wing parents selecting into separation, and transmitting their ideology to their children.

[10] Crude divorce rates for the EU-28 are obtained from Eurostat Demographic data, code "demo_ndivind".

Firstly, pan-European analyses are performed using the European Values Study 2008 to investigate to what extent the left–right positions of adults differ between those who did and did not experience parental separation at a young age. Furthermore, this dataset allows testing the mechanism regarding economic deprivation, and uses religious socialization as a partial indicator of parental ideology. Lastly, a cross-level interaction effect in the multilevel analyses between cohort-specific country divorce rate and parental separation is used to investigate to what extent the prevalence of divorce affects the influence of parental separation on ideology. This is an implicit test of the mechanism regarding the social stigma that is associated with divorce or separation of parents. In a second step, high quality data is used from the German Socioeconomic Panel (G-SOEP) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), in which parental ideology is observed directly and added to the model. This analysis can show whether any effect of parental separation remains after controlling for the self-selection of parents into divorce, as more progressive parents can be expected to be more likely to separate. Lastly, individual fixed effects analysis using longitudinal data from the SHP regarding the mother's ideology shows a move towards the left after having separated from the partner, implying a direct effect of separation on the mother's ideology that is likely to be transmitted to the child.

Theories regarding political socialization and parental separation are combined to identify the mechanisms that are expected to underlie the left-wing effect of parental separation during childhood. After these are addressed, the research design of the study is presented and the results are discussed. In the conclusion, the different findings are brought together to analyse what their implications are. This chapter shows that several mechanisms are at play leading to parental separation having a left-wing influence on individuals' ideology.

4.2 Political Socialization and Parental Separation

The focus of this chapter is not necessarily on the *transmission* of ideology from parents to children, but rather how the disruption of the relationship between the mother and the father has more *direct* consequences for the ideological positions of children, until in adulthood. In this regard, its focus is on political socialization in the sense of the development of ideology, in relation to the outside world. However, it is hardly possible

to perceive this as isolated from the parental influence, especially as the family disruption can also be of influence on the ideology of the mother and the father, who can also transmit this to the child. Moreover, the parental home is the most important starting point of the development of individuals' political preferences.

The two main approaches to parent–child transmission are: 1) social learning theory, based on imitation and observation (Bandura, 1977; Davies, 1965; Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Percheron & Jennings, 1981; Sigel, 1965); and 2) the inheritance of structural factors (Beck & Jennings, 1982; Glass et al., 1986). These are also relevant to the development of individuals' political preferences more generally. Whereas the social learning approach theorizes that children develop their preferences in relationship with the world around them, the structural inheritance mechanism implies that political preferences are aligned along cleavages in society, such as socioeconomic and religious groups. The mechanisms that I identify as to how parental separation affects children's political ideology, which are described in the subsequent paragraphs, correspond with both approaches to political preference transmission and development.

The aforementioned research in political socialization has merely focussed on the traditional two-parent family, without taking into account how family structure interferes in the processes of political socialization and the development of political preferences. However, it is well established in the literature that changes in family structure affect the children involved in several ways. A large body of research has investigated different types of consequences of parents' separation for the children involved (for overviews see Amato & Keith, 1991; Härkönen, Bernardi, & Boertien, 2017; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004). The most robust findings indicate that children from separated parents show lower academic performance, decreased psychological well-being, and worsened parent–child relationships (e.g. Amato, 2000; Astone & McLanahan, 1991; Cunningham & Thornton, 2006; Grätz, 2015; Kalmijn, 2013; McLanahan, Tach, & Schneider, 2013; Steele, Sigle-Rushton, & Kravdal, 2009; Sun & Li, 2009). The consequences of parental separation persist until later in adulthood of the children (Amato & Keith, 1991). Divorce or relationship dissolution usually has economic consequences for both partners involved, but most often leads to women and

their children being economically deprived (Andress, Borgloh, Brockel, Giesselmann, & Hummelsheim, 2006; Andress & Hummelsheim, 2009; Sayer, 2006).

Because these results show large consequences for children of the separation of their parents, it is plausible to expect that the political socialization process in the family would be affected as well. Only a handful of studies have, to the best of my knowledge, addressed this question, but most of them have focussed on civic education rather than political socialization in the sense of transmission of political ideology. Dolan (1995) was the first to raise the question how differences in family structure are relevant to the political socialization process (rather in terms of civic and political education), but only to conclude that there was no relationship found between political efficacy, political knowledge, and political participation on the one hand, and family structure on the other, among a representative sample of college students in the US. A weak relation was found however with political trust: those who grew up with also a father present in the household showed somewhat higher levels of political trust (Dolan, 1995). A later study using British cohort data investigates the influence of the structure and socioeconomic context of the family on adult children's political cynicism and left–right attitudes (Flouri, 2004). The author finds that women who grew up either with both parents or in stepfamilies *and* have experienced socioeconomic disadvantage in childhood, take more left-wing positions on the ideological scale. However, growing up in a single-parent family was not found to affect political cynicism or political ideology in later life. A more recent study (Hener, Rainer, & Siedler, 2016) found strong and robust negative effects of family disruption on civic engagement, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. A study of a similar set-up using the Swiss Household Panel (Voorpostel & Coffé, 2015), found parental separation negatively affecting young adults' political and civic participation, in terms of turnout intention and volunteering, which partly reflects the lower participation levels of their parents, compared to non-separated parents. Lastly, Sandell and Plutzer (2005) found a negative effect of parental separation on turnout in the US, but only for whites, while Prokic and Dronkers (2009) found some evidence in a cross-country study for parental divorce affecting societal attitudes of adolescent children, but results strongly differ across countries and across dependent variables.

In short, only one study to date (Flouri, 2004) has directly investigated the impact of family structure (growing up with a single parent) on political ideology, without any significant findings. However, this is a single-case design, studying one specific cohort (born in 1958) in which single parenthood was rather uncommon. Therefore, the external validity of the study is rather limited.

There are in fact several factors related to parental separation that can be highly relevant to the political socialization process, especially when parents separate in a period when a child is still young, and thus has not been fully politically socialized, and still lives at home. I identify three such factors: 1) the economic deprivation that follows the parental separation; 2) living in a single-mother family; and 3) witnessing parents breaking social norms by the act of divorce or relationship dissolution, and the social stigma that is attributed to this norm-breaking behaviour. The first one can be brought under the political socialization mechanism of the influence and inheritance of structural factors, whereas the latter two relate more to social learning theory in which preferences are developed in relation to influences from the outside world, and transmitted through observation and imitation.

Firstly, the experience of being economically deprived, which is often caused by the divorce or union dissolution of one's parents (Andress et al., 2006; Andress & Hummelsheim, 2009; Bernardi & Boertien, 2016; Sayer, 2006), is expected to drive adult children to be more in favour of welfare state provisions, especially those for single-parent families. This is either because they have benefited from them or, when they did not, they would have been helpful. These attitudes would imply more favourable positions towards redistribution, which tend to go together with more leftist positions on the left–right scale. Flouri (2004) indeed found the experience of economic disadvantage during childhood to result in more left-wing attitudes later in life (age 33). It is an empirical question whether this childhood experience affects political attitudes and ideology directly, as theorized above, or indirectly through the parents' attitudes, which may have changed due to change in economic position followed by the separation of the partner, and are then passed over to the child. In the US, women are indeed found to become more likely to vote for the Democratic party after a divorce, which in most cases coincided with a decrease in income (Edlund & Pande, 2002). Therefore, this

chapter also investigates the mother's ideology in a longitudinal manner to detect changes in ideology after the separation or divorce from the partner (see Research Design, section 4.3).

Secondly, the majority of parental separations result in single mother families, as children usually remain with the mother and not the father, especially in the cohorts under study here.[11] The resulting political socialization experiences of these children differ sharply from those who grow up in two-parent families. In a single-mother family, the child spends the largest part of its time with its mother and is therefore mainly politically socialized by the mother. As women are on average more left-wing and more favourable towards redistribution than men (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Conover, 1988; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; McCue & Gopoian, 2000), single-mother socialization is expected to result in children being on average more left-wing, compared to those who grow up with two parents. Of course, growing up with a single mother does not mean that the child is not exposed to socializing influences of the father as well. In fact, it could be even the case that the child sees the father as the political role model, even though they spend less time with him. However, the fact that the child spends more time with the mother is expected to be key in this respect, as political socialization in terms of social learning (Bandura, 1977; Davies, 1965; Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Percheron & Jennings, 1981; Sigel, 1965) not only occurs through overt transmission of preferences, but also indirectly by the cue taking of the children (Jennings & Niemi, 1968, p. 139). For these reasons, adult children of single mothers are expected to hold on average more left-wing positions than those who grew up with two parents.

Lastly, parental separation is expected to influence children by witnessing this norm-breaking behaviour of their parents. Even though divorce and union dissolution of parents is becoming more and more common, it still goes against the mainstream model of the family. Parents who decide to separate thus break a traditional social norm. However, the extent to which there is a social stigma associated with this behaviour, is highly dependent on the country and social context of the family in question, as the normality and acceptance of parental separation differs across countries and social

[11] For an empirical exploration of the percentage of respondents that lived only with the mother after the parental divorce, see the descriptive results in Table 4-2.

groups (Gelissen, 2003). The experience of having parents who go against the traditional social order is expected to interfere in the political socialization process. In fact, this may be an experience of enduring influence. As the child's prime role models have done something that goes against an existing social norm, this may be an important sign for children to pick up on, resulting in them being less conforming and more lenient towards social norms and holding more liberal attitudes when it comes to behaviour that goes against the established social order. This may be restricted to attitudes towards divorce and related issues (as previously found to be influenced by parental divorce by Amato & Booth, 1991; Sieben & Verbakel, 2013), but can also be translated into a broader liberal outlook on societal and political issues, by being more tolerant towards those who are different or act not in line with other social norms. In terms of political preferences, this would be most applicable to issues belonging to the cultural dimension in the political space, which deals with *"the governance structure of social life"* (Kitschelt, 2004, p. 2). This dimension is also known as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, opposing those who are more culturally liberal positions against those who defend more traditional values (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 924). Policy issues belonging to this dimension include positions towards immigration, law and order, and traditional family forms (Kriesi et al., 2006; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). The common ideological left–right scale, which serves as dependent variable here, has been found to capture issues belonging to the cultural dimension as well (De Vries et al., 2013; Lachat, 2009).

The expectations as described above, result in the following hypothesis:
H1. Parental separation yields more left-wing political positions among adult children.

It is expected that parental separation at a later age of the child be of less influence on its political ideology later in life, for several reasons that correspond with the three mechanisms how parental separation can affect political preferences. Firstly, when parents separate at a stage where the child is about to leave the household or has already done so, the economic deprivation of the child is most likely less severe. Secondly, the later the parents separate, the shorter time the time spends in a single-mother family. Lastly, when parents divorce at a later age of the child, the stigma surrounding this act is most likely smaller because the child is much less dependent on

the parents than at a young age, and therefore less visibly involved in their (social) life. Therefore, the child can perceive the act of breaking the social norm as less severe. In this research, the 16th birthday of the child is regarded as the 'cut-off point' to investigate differences in experiences regarding parental separation. This is partly due to data limitations, but is also believed to be theoretically sound, as it marks the transition from a young teenager to a more mature young adult. In terms of political socialization, 16 marks the age in which children are likely to become more interested in politics and start to develop their political identity more explicitly and consciously as their legal voting age starts to approach, which is 18 in most countries under study her.[12] This expectation is formulated in the following hypothesis:

H2. The effect of parental separation on adult children's political ideology is larger when the parental separation occurred during childhood than when the parental separation occurred later in life of the child.

Another key consideration is the extent to which the effects of parental separation differ across groups. In terms of macro-level characteristics, it is expected that the effects are larger in countries and cohorts in which divorce or union dissolution by parents is less common, and therefore less societally accepted. Previous research making use of an earlier wave of the European Values Study (the same study used in this chapter) found that – controlling for several others factors – the only macro factor of importance to the public acceptance of divorce is the type of welfare state, while the rest of the variation was merely found at the individual level (Gelissen, 2003). However, a more in-depth investigation of the results showed that these differences into public acceptance of divorce are due to differences in the prevalence of divorce, and not because of different welfare state provisions (Gelissen, 2003, p. 368). Religiosity, an intuitive factor of importance, was shown to be only important at the micro level, and not at the country level, as it was found to be a compositional effect (Gelissen, 2003, p. 369). For these reasons, only the divorce rate at the country level is regarded as being of influence on the effect of parental separation on political socialization in the family. The mechanism regarding the norm-breaking example of parents who separate is expected to be of less

[12] In fact, the age of 18 would theoretically be a more ideal cut-off point, but due to data restrictions this is not possible using the G-SOEP. However, EVS analyses using age 18 as a threshold rather than 16, lead to the same conclusions.

relevance in countries with a higher divorce rate, and therefore a more favourable value climate towards divorce.

Related to this, as the divorce rates have been rising over the last decades, as well as the percentages of childbirth out of wedlock, the hypothesized effects of parental separation during childhood could be stronger among older cohorts than among the younger ones, also within the same country. The social norms towards marriage and divorce, although still in place, have become more tolerant over time, and therefore the social stigma associated with parental separation is expected to be smaller in younger cohorts. Furthermore, as single-parent families have become more common, the economic consequences could also have been more severe in older cohorts, leading to stronger effects.

Put together, the country-specific divorce rate and the cohort effects are two sides of the same coin in the sense that both relate to the prevalence of divorce and therefore differentiate in the effect of parental divorce during childhood on political preferences. Furthermore, as the divorce rate in a given country differs across time the prevalence of divorce during the childhood of individuals of different ages does also. Therefore, the most optimal manner to investigate this is to combine the prevalence of divorce across countries and over time. To this end, a cohort-specific country divorce rate is calculated for different birth cohorts, to investigate the differing effects across time and space, which is formulated in the last hypothesis:

H3. The effect of parental separation on adult children's political ideology is larger in countries and among cohorts where divorce is less common, and smaller in countries and among cohorts where divorce is more common.

An important factor that has not been addressed explicitly is the extent to which parents who decide to separate differ from those who do not, even though their circumstances could be very similar. It is known that religiosity – and especially Catholicism – is an important factor in attitudes towards divorce (Gelissen, 2003). Based on the considerations above that children of separated parents become more culturally liberal, one could argue to the same extent that parents who separate are more liberal in the first place. Therefore, the self-selection of parents into separation could be an additional

important explanation as to why children of separated parents would be more left-wing. This study attempts to address this question in the best way possible, by adding parental ideology to the equation and observing the mother's ideology over time.

4.3 Research Design

To test the hypotheses at hand, a three-step analytic strategy is followed. Three different datasets are used to perform three types of analyses investigating the effect of parental separation during childhood on left–right ideology.

4.3.1 Data

The European Values Study 2008 is used for pan-European analyses (EVS 2011), a large-scale, cross-country study on adults' values in Europe and slightly beyond. This dataset is especially suited for testing the hypothesis regarding the country differences, relating to the mechanism regarding social stigma; and the mediating effect of childhood economic deprivation. As left and right mean different things in post-communist Europe than in Western Europe (Tavits & Letki, 2009), and left–right self-placement is also used differently by citizens from post-communist countries (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2010), the analyses are performed without these countries. The fact that more than 30% of respondents in post-communist countries did not provide a valid response to this item indicates indeed that it is not the most reliable measure of ideology in these countries. Furthermore, Malta and Ireland also excluded from the analysis, as in the former divorce was not legal there in the year of the survey, and in the latter divorce is only legal since 1996, thus no respondents could have experienced divorce during childhood. Northern Ireland is also excluded, as most divorce statistics for the United Kingdom did not include Northern Ireland. This results in an analytical sample with respondents from 18 countries.[13]

Subsequently, the household panel studies from Germany (G-SOEP) and Switzerland (SHP) are used here again, in which the ideology of the mother can be directly observed. The choice for investigating the mother's ideology instead of the father's is firstly because most children end up with the mother after a parental separation, and secondly

[13] The following 18 countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain.

because fathers who separated from their children's mother are underrepresented in the sample (the non-resident parent is more likely to show panel attrition after a separation), while this is less the case for mothers.

4.3.1 Inferential strategy

In order to explicitly address the three mechanisms underlying the hypothesized left-wing effect of parental separation, and to account as best as possible for self-selection effects, I make use of the following strategy.

First, regarding the mechanism of economic deprivation, I investigate the extent to which this variable indeed mediates the relationship between parental separation and political ideology. In order to test the mediating role, it first needs to be established whether children of separated parents have indeed been more often economically deprived during childhood, compared to children without separated parents. Then, it needs to be shown that economic deprivation during childhood is related to more left-wing ideological positions. These two relationships are addressed in descriptive and multivariate analyses using the EVS data.

Second, the mechanism of single-mother socialization refers to a direct consequence of parental separation that can only be experienced by those with separated parents. In contrast with the economic deprivation mechanism, there is no mediation here. As such, there is no possibility of comparing children in this respect by their experience of parental separation. Children who have grown up in an intact family cannot experience single-mother socialization. Therefore, it is imperative to show empirically that children of separated parents indeed lived mostly in single-mother families. To this end, descriptive statistics using the EVS data are presented showing the extent to which children of separated parents have lived with either of their parents. The SHP data is also exploited to investigate differences between separated and non-separated mothers, and to observe the mother's ideology over time (see also Section 4.3.3).

Third, the mechanism regarding the social stigma and breaking social norms is similar in nature as the one regarding single-mother socialization, but with the difference that it cannot be empirically observed at the micro-level. To this end, this mechanism is tested

using a macro-level approach, hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. As the social stigma related to divorce is expected to have become smaller over time, and is related to the prevalence of divorce in the country at hand, the cohort-specific country divorce rate is used to compare the effect of parental separation across time and space. This provides an indirect test of the micro-level mechanism regarding norm-breaking behaviour of the parents.

Lastly, it is important to control for the self-selection mechanism regarding parental separation. To this end, religious socialization and the parental ideology are added in the analyses. As discussed earlier, there are reasons to believe that parents who separate are different from those who do not. As religiosity is an important factor in attitudes towards divorce (Gelissen, 2003), and is also related to political conservatism and subsequently to more right-wing positions on the left–right scale (De Vries et al., 2013; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Van der Brug, 2010), religious socialization is included in descriptive and multivariate analyses using the EVS, to investigate and control for this mechanism of self-selection. To provide an even stricter test of the effect of parental separation net of parental ideology, and further control for the self-selection mechanism, the multivariate analyses using the household data include direct observations of the parental ideology. Leaving these covariates out of the equation would most likely lead to inflated effects of parental separation on adult's ideology.

4.3.2 Variables

4.3.2.1 Dependent variable

Left–right self-placement is measured on a 10-point scale in the EVS, ranging from 1 to 10, with the question *"In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale generally speaking?".* In the G-SOEP and the SHP, an 11-point scale is used (ranging from 0 to 10), which means that a neutral midpoint is included, unlike in the EVS variable. The question wording in the G-SOEP and SHP is similar to the one in the EVS.

As this variable is only included in the G-SOEP in 2005 and 2009, as in the foregoing chapters, the observations for 2009 are used as a baseline, and when the response for

2009 is missing, the observations for 2005 are used (i.e. pooled without overlap). The same is done for the mother's ideology.

4.3.2.2 Independent variables

Parental separation is measured in the EVS with a retrospective question: *"Have you ever experienced any of the following events?"* "The divorce of your parents" is one the items listed subsequently. If the answer is yes, a follow-up question is asked regarding at what age you have experienced this for the first time. The information stemming from those two variables is combined into a categorical variable, distinguishing between those: 1) who have never experienced divorce of parents; 2) who have experienced divorce of their parents before the age of 16; and 3) who have experienced divorce of parents at the age of 16 or later.

In the SHP, the same three-categorical variable is constructed using either retrospective or prospective information. A similar retrospective question as the one from the EVS is asked regarding the experience of parental divorce and the age at which this has occurred. This question is not asked to respondents who entered the panel before the age of 20. For those respondents, direct observations regarding the marital status of the mother are used.

In the G-SOEP, parental separation is measured with a retrospective question regarding with whom the respondent lived during the first 15 years of their life. Respondents indicating that they lived for the entire 15 years with both (biological) parents, are coded "0" for parental separation, all respondents indicating a lower number of years living with both parents, are coded "1" as having had an experience with parental separation before the age of 16. Respondents who experienced the death of a parent before this age are excluded from this category. A disadvantage of the use of this variable is that adult children who did not experience parental separation, and those who did at age 16 or later, fall in the same category. However, this is the most reliable source of this type of information available for a large number of respondents in this

dataset, especially because this variable is not describing the marital status of the parents,[14] but the child's experience regarding parental separation.

As divorce often causes economic deprivation, and the left-wing effect of a parental divorce is expected to partially run through this experience of being economically deprived, this variable is also added in the EVS analyses.[15] The following question is used as an indicator for subjective economic deprivation: *"When you think about your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say whether these statements correctly describe your parents?"*, regarding the item: *"My parent(s) had problems making ends meet".* The answer categories are yes; to some extent; a little bit; and no. The variable is used as a categorical variable in the analyses.

Religious socialization is included in the EVS analyses using the question *"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often did you attend religious services when you were 12 years old?".* The seven answer categories range from more than once a week, until practically never, and are recoded into the following four categories: (practically) never; once a month or more; only on specific holy days; and once a year or less often. As the measurement of religiosity is problematic in the G-SOEP, and not included in all waves of the SHP, this variable is not included in the analyses using the household data.

The cohort-specific divorce rate variable is created by using the average crude divorce rate for four different cohorts: 1900–1945; 1946–1960; 1961–1979; 1980–1993. This results in a variable at the country level that is different for the four cohorts within each country, capturing not only country-level differences but also differences in the prevalence of divorce during the time that the respondent was young, as this differs

[14] The parents' marital and couple history is also available in the G-SOEP, for a small group of respondents. However, as legal divorce can take place only after a long time of parental separation, parents' legal marital status is not an adequate depiction of the child's experience with parental separation. The couple history has been recorded only recently (since 2009) and is therefore not available for adult children with parents in the G-SOEP.

[15] Unfortunately, no retrospective question regarding economic deprivation is included in the G-SOEP. Therefore, unemployment of parents is used. Unlike in the EVS analyses, these two variables cannot be used together in the analyses, as unemployed parents did not receive a social prestige score. Therefore, this information is imputed in the SIOPS variable. Unemployment of parents is coded as the 'low' SIOPS category. In the SHP, such a retrospective variable is available but only for respondents who entered the panel after the age of 20. Therefore, as the use would reduce the number of observations quite a lot, it is not included in the analyses.

within countries across cohorts. The largest rise in divorce rate over the EU-28 countries took place between the 1970s and the 1990s. The crude divorce rates are obtained from Eurostat (1960–1993) and the United Nations Demographic Yearbooks[16] (1930–1957). Divorce rates from before 1930 are not available, but only a very small share of respondents has been born in this period. To ease interpretation of the interaction model, this variable has been centred on the mean.

Several control variables are used in the analyses: the usual demographics age, gender, educational level (ISCED, recoded into low/medium/high, household studies also include 'still in school'), and marital status. Parental SES is included by using the SIOPS score (Treiman, 1977) of the father [mother][17] when the respondent was 14 (EVS) or 15 (G-SOEP, SHP) years old. The SIOPS score in the EVS is obtained by recoding the ISCO88 two digits score using the recoding scheme as provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996, Appendix A). In the SHP and G-SOEP, the SIOPS score is readily provided. As in previous chapters, the variable is recoded into three groups (30th percentile; 31st to 69th percentile; and 70th to 100th percentile) to differentiate between low, medium and high social prestige scores.

In the individual fixed effects analysis with the mothers in the SHP, the variable 'occupational status' is used. This is a generated variable from the SHP, which describes the occupational status of the respondent at the time of the survey, into a number of categories. I recoded this variable into six categories: full-time paid work, part-time paid work, woman at home, retired, unemployed, and all other categories (being in school, working in the family company or a protected atelier, and other).

Lastly, in the G-SOEP analyses, a categorical variable is included regarding the location of the respondent in 1989 to distinguish between those socialized in former East and West Germany (a third category 'abroad' is also included). In the EVS analysis for Germany only, weights provided by the EVS are applied for East/West Germany.

[16] Eurostat Demographic data is available at ec.europa.eu/eurostat, code "demo_ndivind". Demographic Yearbooks of the UN are available through unstats.un.org

[17] The question is asked about the parent that it was most applicable to. In Denmark, the question was asked separately about both parents, and in case both questions were answered, the value for the mother was taken when the child was living with the mother at age 14; and the value for the father was taken when the child was living with both parents or only the father at age 14.

4.3.3 Model strategy

Three types of analyses are performed using the different datasets. First, multilevel models are estimated using the EVS 2008 dataset. Multilevel modelling allows for taking the nested structure of the observations into account, in this case individuals are nested[18] in countries (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The models are estimated using random intercept multilevel models using the 'xtreg' (using maximum likelihood estimation) command in Stata version 14. For the analysis investigating the difference in the influence of parental separation dependent on the cohort-specific country divorce rate, a cross-level interaction effect is performed using a random slope model, making use of the 'mixed' command.

In a second step, analyses using the G-SOEP and the SHP are performed. The EVS data is also used to analyse Germany and Switzerland separately, to compare the results with the baseline models using the analytic samples of the G-SOEP and the SHP. After that, the mother's ideology is added to the G-SOEP and SHP models to investigate the remaining effect of parental separation after inclusion of this variable. With the G-SOEP, regular OLS is performed, with clustered standard errors at the family level, using pooled data of two waves of the panel (2005 and 2009). For the SHP, the data at hand is richer, as it includes left–right self-placement in all waves (1999–2014). Unlike in previous chapters, I do not make use from five pooled SHP waves, but use observations from all waves. This is mainly because there is a low-N problem otherwise, as the information regarding the parental divorce is rather limited, and the models are quite demanding regarding the inclusion of both parental and child's ideology together with the parental divorce. The richness of the data is therefore exploited using a multilevel panel model,[19] in which observations are nested within individuals, with a random slope for time (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). This type of model using panel data is also known as a random effects

[18] As the divorce rate variable is at the country-cohort level, models were estimated in which individuals were nested in country-cohorts, but this led to problems regarding model convergence due to the low number of observations in the categories of those who experienced parental separation, especially among older cohorts.

[19] The disadvantage of the use of this model, and the reason that it is only used in this chapter, is that the random effects panel model provides less control over the time of measurement of the ideology of both child and mother, as the model uses all information available. This implies that the ideology of child and mother are not necessarily taken from the same survey wave. In fact, using one survey wave per respondent, taking the most recent wave in which both child's and mother's ideology are available, results in a decrease in N of 50% compared to the analytic sample used now in the analyses. Considering the relatively low number of respondents in the category of parental separation, this is considered too few observations to perform the analysis with.

model, estimated using the 'xtreg' command in Stata. Standard errors are also clustered at the family level.

Lastly, individual fixed effects analysis is performed using the SHP, investigating the effect of separation or divorce from the partner on the mother's political ideology. This subsample is comprised of the mothers of the respondents on which the foregoing analyses are performed with. Because of the longitudinal nature, the SHP dataset is particularly suited for the research question at hand. As the G-SOEP has only included this variable in two waves, this design is not possible to implement using this dataset. The fixed effects model controls for all time-constant heterogeneity (Halaby, 2004), comparing the ideology of the mother before and after the transition from married to separated/divorced. The great advantage of using individual fixed effect models is that each observed person serves as its own control group, as all time-constant factors are not included in the model. Therefore, the inferential power of these models is relatively large and can provide an indication of a causal effect.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Descriptive results

Before going into the multivariate analyses, a range of descriptive results is presented. In Table 4-1, the prevalence of parental divorce in the analytical sample of the EVS 2008 is presented by cohort.

Table 4-1. Prevalence of parental divorce across cohorts in the analytic sample of the EVS

	1900–1945	1946–1960	1961–1979	1980–1993	Total
No divorced parents	97.3%	93.8%	86.1%	81.6%	90.1%
	4166	4335	5235	2269	16020
Divorce of parents – before age 16	1.8%	3.0%	8.4%	13.7%	6.2%
	76	139	512	382	1,109
Divorce of parents – at age 16 or later	0.9%	3.2%	5.5%	4.7%	3.7%
	40	148	333	131	652
Total	4282	4637	6008	2782	17781
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: European Values Study 2008

The figures show that especially among the oldest cohorts, parental divorce is not common at all, which leads to very few observations in these categories. Furthermore, it shows that over time parents not only divorce more often but also at an earlier age of the children.

In Table 4-2, descriptive statistics are presented, regarding economic deprivation, living only with the mother, and religious socialization. The figures indicate statistically significant differences on these variables between individuals who have experienced parental divorce during childhood and those who did not, providing support for the hypothesized mechanisms. As these variables refer to the childhood period, they cannot be affected by the parental divorce when occurring at a later age of the child. Indeed, we observe differences in economic deprivation (16% vs. 21%) and the percentage of those living only with the mother at age 14 (4% vs. 66%) only between the groups of individuals without divorced parents and those who experienced parental divorce during childhood, not for those who experienced parental divorce at a later age. However, regarding religious socialization, sharp differences are observed also for the group experiencing parental divorce at a later age (58% vs. respectively 31% and 38%).

Table 4-2. Descriptive statistics by experience of parental divorce during childhood

	No divorced parents	Divorce of parents – before age 16	Divorce of parents – age 16 or after
Economically deprived (age 14)	16%	21%*	14%
Living only with mother (age 14)	4%	66%*	6%
Religious socialization (age 14): church attendance ≥ once/month	58%	31%*	38%*
N	16,020	1,109	652

Source: European Values Study 2008.
An asterisk indicates a statistically significant difference with the group without divorced parents ($p<0.000$).

These figures provide support for the expected link between parental divorce and economic deprivation, and the hypothesized self-selection into divorce by religiosity of the parents. It also shows that indeed most children of divorced parents end up living with their mother. As this is measured at age 14, but the cut-off score of the parental divorce is set at age 16, the presented percentage is most likely lower than the real percentage of individuals living in a single-mother family *after* the parental divorce (as 22% indicated to live with both parents at age 14).

In order to provide first insights regarding how these variables relate to the political ideology of the respondents, Table 4-3 depicts the mean ideology by categories of these variables and the percentage of respondents within each category taking a leftist position on the left–right scale.[20] These results indicate that individuals who have experienced parental divorce during childhood take more leftist positions, compared to those without divorced parents or parental divorce at a later age. Furthermore, it shows that economic deprivation is related to more leftist positions, providing support for the second link of this mediating mechanism, and that religiously socialized respondents take less leftist positions.

Table 4-3. Political ideology by divorce of parents; economic deprivation; and religious socialization

	Mean Ideology	Percentage taking a leftist position (points 1-4 on the scale)
Divorce of parents		
No	5.3	32%
Yes – before age 16	5*	39%
Yes – age 16 or later	5.2	35%
Economic deprivation		
No	5.3	32%
Yes	5.1*	36%
Strong religious socialization		
No	5.1	29%
Yes	5.4*	36%

Source: European Values Study 2008.
An asterisk indicates a statistically significant difference with the first category of the variable ($p<0.000$).

Taken together, the descriptive results from Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 indicate that economic deprivation can be regarded as a mediating variable between parental divorce and political ideology, while religious socialization shows a mechanism of self-selection. These descriptive analyses have also provided a first indicator of a left-wing effect of parental divorce during childhood. These findings are further analysed in the subsequent multivariate analyses.

4.4.2 Multilevel Models with the European Values Study 2008

The results of the first analyses using the EVS are found in Table 4-4, investigating the effect of the parental separation on left–right ideology.

[20] As the left–right self-placement scale of the EVS ranges from 1 to 10, positions 1-5 can be seen as leftist and 6-10 as rightist. However, most respondents seem to perceive point 5 as the midpoint of the scale, as most respondents are located there. Therefore, positions 1-4 are taken as an indication of leftist positions.

Table 4-4. Multilevel models (EVS): left–right self-placement on parental divorce

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left–right self-placement					RS	RI
Divorce of parents - before 16	-0.249***	-0.237***	-0.182***	-0.150**	-0.155**	-0.195**
Ref. = no divorced parents	(0.0652)	(0.0652)	(0.0652)	(0.0653)	(0.0785)	(0.0804)
Divorce of parents - 16 or later	-0.0782	-0.0569	-0.0228	-0.0108	-0.0708	-0.101
	(0.0824)	(0.0823)	(0.0821)	(0.0820)	(0.0897)	(0.0896)
Cohort-specific country divorce rate					0.00190	-0.154***
					(0.0463)	(0.0364)
Divorce before 16 * Cohort-specific divorce rate					0.0173	0.0449
					(0.103)	(0.104)
Divorce 16 or later * Cohort-specific divorce rate					0.228*	0.254*
					(0.138)	(0.138)
Economic deprivation				-0.249***	-0.249***	-0.220***
				(0.0434)	(0.0435)	(0.0432)
Attending religious services at age 12						
Once a month or more			0.503***	0.505***	0.505***	0.531***
Ref. = (practically) never			(0.0440)	(0.0439)	(0.0439)	(0.0437)
Only specific holy days			0.261***	0.259***	0.260***	0.262***
			(0.0550)	(0.0550)	(0.0550)	(0.0550)
Once a year or less often			0.192***	0.191***	0.191***	0.191***
			(0.0585)	(0.0585)	(0.0585)	(0.0585)
ISCED - low		0.0839**	0.0880**	0.109***	0.107***	0.165***
Ref. = ISCED - medium		(0.0412)	(0.0410)	(0.0412)	(0.0413)	(0.0399)
ICED - high		-0.0979**	-0.104***	-0.109***	-0.108***	-0.106***
		(0.0388)	(0.0386)	(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0387)
Marital status - divorced/separated		-0.269***	-0.245***	-0.242***	-0.241***	-0.244***
Ref. = married		(0.0530)	(0.0529)	(0.0528)	(0.0529)	(0.0529)
Marital status - other		-0.159***	-0.140***	-0.140***	-0.142***	-0.163***
		(0.0346)	(0.0346)	(0.0345)	(0.0348)	(0.0346)
SIOPS parent - low	-0.0564	-0.0547	-0.0488	-0.0429	-0.0430	-0.0433
Ref. = SIOPS parent - medium	(0.0399)	(0.0398)	(0.0397)	(0.0397)	(0.0397)	(0.0397)
SIOPS parent - high	0.201***	0.239***	0.239***	0.220***	0.218***	0.221***
	(0.0361)	(0.0369)	(0.0368)	(0.0369)	(0.0369)	(0.0370)
Female	-0.202***	-0.192***	-0.220***	-0.219***	-0.219***	-0.220***
	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0307)
Age	0.00982***	0.00811***	0.00604***	0.00686***	0.00705***	
	(0.000908)	(0.000990)	(0.00100)	(0.00101)	(0.00130)	
Constant	4.881***	5.032***	4.796***	4.795***	4.787***	5.103***
	(0.0910)	(0.0963)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.105)
σ_u	0.307***	0.315***	0.364***	0.360***	0.358***	0.154***
	(0.0538)	(0.0551)	(0.0634)	(0.0627)	(0.0627)	(0.0534)
σ_e	2.042***	2.039***	2.031***	2.029***	2.029***	4.121***
	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0438)
Variance in Divorce of Parents variable						
Divorce of parents - before 16						0.0052
						(0.024)
Divorce of parents - 16 or later						$6.37*10^{-12}$
						($7.29*10^{-11}$)
N individuals	17,781	17,781	17,781	17,781	17,781	17,781
N countries	18	18	18	18	18	18

Source: European Values Study 2008. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first five models are random intercept models, whereas the last model includes a random slope for parental separation, as it estimates a cross-level interaction (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). For the sake of comparison, the fifth model estimates the same interaction using the random intercept model.

In the first model, the key independent variable divorce of parents is included together with a few control variables. The model shows a statistically and substantially significant left-wing effect of the divorce of parents, which is slightly larger than the gender gap, i.e. the difference between males and females in left–right ideology, shown by the coefficient for 'Female' (coefficients of respectively -0.25 and -0.20). The model also shows that whereas a divorce of parents at a young age (at age 16 or before) has this left-wing effect, this is not found among those respondents of whom the parents divorced at their age of 16 or later. In the second model, when the individual control variables level of education and marital status are added to the model, the coefficient for parental separation before 16 only goes down to a minor extent. In the third model, religious socialization is added, which reduces the coefficient to become slightly smaller than the gender gap. This indicates that the coefficient in the previous model was slightly inflated due to the self-selection of non-religious individuals in parental divorce, for which this variable controls.[21]

In the fourth model, economic deprivation during childhood is added, an expected mediator of the relationship between parental divorce and political ideology. The inclusion of this variable in the model reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of the divorce of parents during childhood to -0.15. In order to investigate whether this is indeed a mediating variable, it needs to established that there is a relation between 1) parental divorce and economic deprivation; and 2) economic deprivation and political ideology. To this end, a linear probability model (results not presented here) is estimated regressing economic deprivation on parental divorce, including the same control variables as in the full model in Table 4-4. In line with the descriptive results, parental divorce during childhood increases the probability of economic deprivation

[21] In line with the descriptive findings presented earlier, multivariate analyses (not presented here) also indicate that adults who have been strongly religiously socialized, are less likely to have experienced parental divorce, and take more rightist ideological positions. These findings lend further support for the self-selection mechanism.

during childhood with 12.5 percentage points. The finding in Table 4-4, model 4, that economic deprivation has a left-wing effect (b=-0.25) on political ideology remains consistent also when this model is estimated without the inclusion of parental divorce. These results show that economic deprivation is a mediating variable in the relation between parental divorce and political ideology. Put shortly, the effect of parental divorce on left–right ideology partly runs through the economic deprivation during childhood, providing support for the first mechanism that was hypothesized regarding how parental separation affects individuals' ideology.

Based on the results of the first four models estimates, support is found for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Parental separation yields a more leftist ideology in adult children, but this is only found for those who have experienced the parental separation before the age of 16. The effect is of a similar magnitude as the gender gap in ideology and is partly mediated by economic deprivation.

In the last models, an interaction term is included between parental divorce and the cohort-specific country divorce rate to test Hypothesis 3. The results of the random slope model (model 6) firstly show that the effect of parental separation on political ideology does not strongly differ across countries, as indicated by the small level of variance in this variable indicated in the random part of the model. The interaction effect between parental separation during childhood and the cohort-specific divorce rate does not prove to be statistically significant, and is also very small. However, for the second category of parental divorce at a later age, the positive interaction term is much larger and statistically significant at the $p<0.1$ level. This indicates that the negative (left-wing) effect of parental separation becomes smaller at higher divorce rates. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution as the number of respondents in this category is particularly small (see Table 4-1). The findings of the interaction model are highly similar across model 5 (random intercept) and model 6 (random slope), with the main difference being the statistically significant negative effect (-0.15) of the constitutive term of the cohort-specific divorce rate in the latter. This indicates more leftist ideologies among respondents from countries and cohorts that are younger and in which divorce rates are more prevalent.

Although these results indicate that divorce of parents has an effect on the left–right ideology of their adult children in a large number of countries, based on these analyses it cannot be concluded that this finding is not due to self-selection effects, i.e. that children from divorced parents are different to begin with, because people who get divorced may have more left-wing orientations, which they pass on to their children. Religious socialization was included in the previous models as it relates to attitudes towards divorce, and to political ideology, but as this is not adequate to fully predict parental political ideology, self-selection of more leftist parents into divorce cannot be ruled out at this stage. The analyses in the next sections therefore further deal with this potential self-selection bias.

4.4.3 OLS and panel models using the G-SOEP and SHP

The analyses using the G-SOEP and SHP are used to further test the findings from the foregoing analyses using the EVS to estimate more advanced models that allow for making better inferences, including direct observations of the mother's ideology. Firstly, a comparison model is run to compare the findings from the EVS, using only German and Swiss observations, with similar models using the G-SOEP and the SHP. These two analytic G-SOEP and SHP samples are comprised of respondents in the household datasets of whom the mother's ideology has been directly observed, that is added in subsequent models. The models are shown in Table 4-5, estimating the effect of parental separation on left–right self-placement. To keep the comparison as clear as possible, only variables that are available in all datasets are used in the models. Although the analyses are attempted to be as similar as possible, a few differences need to be addressed between the variables at hand. Firstly, in the EVS and the SHP, there is a separate category for respondents who have experienced parental divorce at the age of 16 or later, whereas in the G-SOEP those who did not experience parental separation and those who experienced it at a later age, are grouped together in the reference category, due to the question wording in the G-SOEP (see Variable description). In relation to this, the difference between parental divorce (EVS, SHP) and parental separation (G-SOEP) should be emphasized as well: the separation of cohabitating or married parents is not taken into account in the EVS and the SHP analyses, whereas this is the case in the G-SOEP. Only 8% of the EVS respondents have experienced parental divorce, of whom 5% before the age of 16, and 3% at 16 or later, which leads to low

numbers of respondents in these categories. The figures for SHP are similar. In the G-SOEP, 18% of respondents has experienced parental separation before the age of 16 (i.e. grew up at least 1 year without both parents, before the 16th birthday).

Table 4-5. Regression models (Germany and Switzerland): left–right self-placement on parental divorce/separation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left–right self-placement	EVS-DE	G-SOEP 1	G-SOEP 2	EVS-CH	SHP 1	SHP 2
Divorce of parents - before 16	-0.340	-0.189	-0.129	-0.210	-0.613**	-0.471*
Ref. = no divorced parents	(0.237)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.236)	(0.284)	(0.241)
Divorce of parents - 16 or later	-0.159			-0.102	-0.208	-0.161
	(0.267)			(0.307)	(0.199)	(0.177)
Mother's ideology			0.328***			0.240***
			(0.0283)			(0.0287)
ISCED – low *Ref. = medium (EVS), still in school (G-SOEP/SHP)*	0.464***	0.186*	0.0976	-0.303*	-0.0218	-0.00735
	(0.175)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.177)	(0.143)	(0.137)
ISCED - medium		0.0787	-0.0183		-0.172	-0.127
		(0.106)	(0.0987)		(0.190)	(0.180)
ICED - high	-0.361***	-0.0751	-0.201	-0.388***	-0.456***	-0.417**
	(0.129)	(0.204)	(0.196)	(0.134)	(0.175)	(0.173)
Marital status - divorced/separated *Ref. = married*	-0.104	-0.277	-0.168	-0.274	-0.140	-0.185
	(0.159)	(0.334)	(0.306)	(0.169)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Marital status - other	-0.0369	-0.189	-0.187	-0.166	0.00182	-0.217
	(0.116)	(0.245)	(0.232)	(0.126)	(0.422)	(0.333)
SIOPS parent - low	0.284	0.0232	0.0360	-0.173	-0.368	-0.321
Ref. = SIOPS parent - medium	(0.202)	(0.105)	(0.0982)	(0.150)	(0.250)	(0.232)
SIOPS parent - high	-0.195*	-0.272***	-0.197**	0.278**	-0.381**	-0.321*
	(0.105)	(0.0988)	(0.0918)	(0.132)	(0.194)	(0.178)
Female	-0.379***	-0.501***	-0.513***	-0.583***	-0.644***	-0.608***
	(0.102)	(0.0777)	(0.0741)	(0.115)	(0.145)	(0.132)
Age	0.0129***	-0.00124	-0.00155	0.0197***	0.0326***	0.0288**
	(0.00330)	(0.00839)	(0.00805)	(0.00337)	(0.0126)	(0.0119)
Location in 1989 - East DE		-0.0430	0.205			
Ref. = Abroad		(0.193)	(0.186)			
Location in 1989 - West DE		0.102	0.127			
		(0.181)	(0.172)			
Constant	4.815***	5.096***	3.534***	4.728***	4.594***	3.492***
	(0.206)	(0.388)	(0.389)	(0.220)	(0.272)	(0.287)
Observations	1,437	1,754	1,754	951	907	907
R-squared	0.052	0.037	0.131	0.084	0.0397	0.2076

Source: European Values Study 2008; SHP 1999–2014; G-SOEP 2005 and 2009.
Standard errors in parentheses, G-SOEP and SHP: clustered at family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Weights applied for East/West Germany in the EVS-Germany model

The results for the EVS-Germany and EVS-Switzerland models (models 1 and 4) indicate that, contrary to the findings of the full country sample, there is no statistically significant left-wing effect of parental divorce on left–right ideology among the EVS respondents in Germany and Switzerland. The coefficients are in the expected direction, but are not precise estimates as the standard errors are relatively large. This difference with the foregoing analysis is most likely due to the low number of respondents who have experienced parental divorce, which makes it more difficult to reach statistical significance. Other important differences between the analytic samples are the age of the respondents: the mean age in the EVS is 50, whereas the respondents in the SHP and the G-SOEP of whom the mother's ideology has been directly observed, are much younger (mean age respectively 21 and 22).[22] The 95% confidence intervals, for Germany -0.61 to 0.19 and for Switzerland -0.67 to 0.25, point to the direction of a left-wing effect, but the level of uncertainty of the estimation is too high to make strong claims about it. In the G-SOEP and SHP baseline comparison models (respectively models 2 and 4), stronger effects of parental separation are found. In the G-SOEP, the left-wing effect has the magnitude of -0.13, and with a p-value of 0.12 shows a much smaller level of uncertainty (confidence interval ranging from -0.43 to 0.051). In the SHP, the effect is very large with a value of -0.6, statistically significant at the p=0.05 level.

I now focus on the political ideology of the mothers of the adult children under investigation. Especially since most children from separated parents end up living with their mother, her preferences are key in this respect. Not only do mothers take on average more leftist positions than fathers, there are also differences in the ideological positions of separated and non-separated mothers. T-tests making use of the observations regarding the mother's ideology in the G-SOEP and SHP, indicate that divorced and separated mothers take more left-wing positions than the other mothers. The difference in the means between the two groups is respectively 0.2 (G-SOEP) and 0.3 (SHP), both significant differences at the p<0.01 level. The size of the difference is similar to the difference in left–right ideology between respondents of medium and

[22] Making the age range more similar is unfortunately not possible as this would sharply decrease the number of observations in the EVS models. Due to the young mean age in the G-SOEP and SHP, analyses are also performed restricting the sample to respondents aged under 35. These models lead to the same conclusions as the models presented here.

higher SES origins. This finding makes it even more imperative to understand whether an effect of parental separation remains once controlling for the mother's ideology.

In the subsequent models using the G-SOEP and SHP (models 3 and 6), the mother's ideology is therefore added to the equation. The results firstly show that the mother's ideology has a strong and statistically significant influence on the adult child's ideology, as in the previous chapters. Interestingly, in the SHP, a large and statistically significant effect of parental separation remains, even when controlling for the mother's ideology (b=-0.5), showing that the previously found effect of parental separation is not a question of self-selection of more progressive parents into separation. The separation of the parents has an independent left-wing effect on the adult child's ideology. The findings for the G-SOEP are less strong, but in the same direction: the coefficient for parental separation becomes smaller (b=-0.13) and has a p-value of 0.27, not passing the traditional test for statistical significance. However, the 95% confidence interval between -0.36 and 0.1, gives an indication of the remaining effect after the inclusion of the mother's ideology.

Having now concluded that the previously found effects of parental separation are partially – but not entirely – due to the self-selection of more progressive parents into separation, a key question is still to be addressed: *is it the separation from the partner that makes separated mothers more left-wing, or are left-wing (non-religious) women simply more likely to get divorced?* As the ideology of the mother in the previous analyses are observed during the same period as the ideology of the child, additional analyses are needed to address this question. To this end, an individual fixed effects analysis is conducted, in which the mother's ideology is observed over time, and compared before and after the separation from the partner. This type of longitudinal analysis is only possible with the SHP, not the G-SOEP, as the dependent variable is not included in all waves of the G-SOEP.

Table 4-6 presents the results of the individual FE analysis with the SHP data, using an analytic sample of 3572 respondents present in the household study, who are mothers of the respondents from the foregoing analysis. Observations are available for the waves 1999-2014. During this period, 152 mothers have separated from or divorced their

partners while they were observed in the panel. Based on this group of mothers, the causal effect of this separation on their political ideology is calculated. Even though in the table the number of all observations from the analytic sample is presented, the estimation is only based on those 152 mothers who have actually experienced a change in partner status during the participation in the household panel.

Table 4-6. Individual Fixed Effects models for mothers (Switzerland)

Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)
Civil status: divorced/separated	-0.168**	-0.150**
ref. = married/single	(0.0669)	(0.0672)
Age	0.0173***	0.0186***
	(0.00220)	(0.00230)
Frequency participation religious services	0.0270***	0.0268***
	(0.00746)	(0.00746)
Occupation status		
Part-time paid work		0.124**
ref. = full-time paid work		(0.0528)
Woman at home (max. 64/65 yrs. old)		0.200***
		(0.0610)
Retired		0.0931
		(0.0887)
Unemployed		0.500***
		(0.123)
Other		0.192**
		(0.0952)
Constant	3.672***	3.470***
	(0.107)	(0.124)
Observations	24,568	24,568
R-squared	0.004	0.005
N individuals	3,572	3,572

Source: SHP 1999–2014. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results indicate a statistically significant difference in the ideological left–right score of mothers before and after the separation from the partner, of -0.17. This implies that after a divorce or separation, the mothers in this sample take slightly more left-wing positions than they did before. The p-value of this coefficient is smaller than 0.05, which, considering the very small sample size can be taken as an indication of a statistically very strong effect, i.e. there is little uncertainty regarding the estimation of the effect, despite the small sample size. When the occupational status of the mother is included in the second model, the coefficient decreases slightly to -0.15. The finding that the

mother's ideology changes over time due to the change in marital status implies that the previously estimated effect of mother's ideology (in Table 4-5) is also the indirect effect of the separation, because child's and mother's ideology are measured at the same time.

4.5 Conclusion

The different empirical analyses in this chapter have provided relatively consistent findings regarding the influence of parental separation on adult children's left–right ideology. It has become apparent that the political ideology of children of separated parents differs to a certain extent from those without separated parents, but only separation at a relatively young age of the child sorted these effects. Exploiting household panel data for Germany and Switzerland has indicated that these findings are not entirely due to self-selection of more progressive parents into separation, as part of the effect remains after controlling for the ideology of the mother. In subsequent longitudinal analyses has been shown that the mother's ideology also changes as a consequence of the separation from the partner, implying a complex interplay of the development and transmission of ideology of mother and child. Furthermore, the EVS analyses have indicated that the commonality of divorce across countries and cohorts does not sort differences in the size of the effect of parental divorce on adult children's political ideology.

The question as to which of the three hypothesized mechanisms are in fact at play here, has been established to a certain extent. Putting all the pieces together, there seems to be evidence for at least two of the mechanisms at hand. Firstly, in the EVS analyses, childhood economic deprivation is identified as a mediating factor, implying that the effect of parental divorce becomes smaller when this variable is considered. This provides support for the identified mechanism that part of the parental separation effect runs through economic deprivation. Secondly, as these effects only diminish to a limited extent, this means that economic deprivation is only one part of the story. The longitudinal FE analysis on the mother's ideology has shown that women indeed change their ideology as a result of the separation from the partner, confirming that descriptive differences in ideology between separated and married women are not (only) due to self-selection into separation, but that the separation from the partner has actually *caused* the mothers to take slightly more left-wing positions. The factors that are behind

this change in ideology must be explored further, but they could have to do with deterioration of the economic circumstances, even though the results did not change after including the occupational status of the mother. Taken together, as the influence of the mother's ideology on that of the adult child has been shown in the analyses as well, this leads to the conclusion that as the mother's ideology has changed as a consequence of the separation, her influence on the ideology of the child is thus also an indirect effect of the parental separation. Thirdly, even after controlling for the mother's ideology, there is still a remaining effect of parental separation, especially in the Swiss sample, implying that there is still some variation to be explained, which could indeed be the mechanism of social stigma that is attached to parental separation, leading children who have experienced this, to become also more tolerant towards others.

The findings indicate that the mechanisms at play here are complex, and additional research is needed to further disentangle them. Furthermore, the differences between countries and cohorts in term of the prevalence of divorce need to be explored further to explain the findings of this study. Related to that, more evidence is needed to investigate the extent to which social stigma regarding divorce plays a role in the development of ideology of children of separated parents. However, this chapter has provided the first insights into the long-term effect of parental separation on the left–right ideology for adults in 18 European countries. Using the household panels, the self-selection problem could be addressed and provided not only findings regarding the adult children's ideology, but also of the mother. It has become apparent that parental separation does not only have long-term consequences for the ideology of the children involved, but also for the mother separating from the partner.

5. Opposing Forces? Intergenerational Social Mobility and the Transmission of Political Ideology

5.1 Introduction

The "American Dream", the idea that one can be whatever they aspire to be, regardless of one's background, is currently in crisis (Putnam, 2015). The millennial generation is the first one not to earn more than their parents, a phenomenon not only taking place in the US, but also in Europe (Corlett, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014). An important prospect for many past and current generations has been to at least reproduce socioeconomic status of one's parents, or, even better, to move up the ladder to a more advantaged class position. The extent to which this is possible differs largely by country, as some societies are more open than others. The study of social mobility is therefore imperative to the social sciences, as it has important implications for the level of social inequality, and the equality of opportunities in a given society. The connection between social mobility and its consequences for the political behaviour and ideology of citizens, has been studied to a certain extent (Benabou & Ok, 2001; A. E. Clark & D'Angelo, 2013; Clifford & Heath, 1993; De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995; De Graaf & Ultee, 1990; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1993; Turner, 1992). These studies imply that the political preferences of socially mobile citizens are found somewhere between those of the class of origin and the class of destination, and that the longer one spends in the class of destination, the more the impact of the class of origin diminishes (Knutsen, 2006, pp. 1–2).

However, these studies only investigate the importance of the class of origin for the political preferences of socially mobile voters, compared to the socially immobile. The parental political preferences or behaviour are left out of the equation. Not much is thus known about the consequences of intergenerational social mobility for the process of political socialization in families. Therefore, the key question that this chapter attempts to answer is: *what happens to the intergenerational transmission of political ideology, when there is no transmission of class location?* To investigate this, socially mobile citizens are compared to the immobile, regarding the extent to which their political ideology is influenced by the ideology of their parents. Not only vertical social mobility is considered, but also horizontal mobility. Whereas vertical mobility is about the *status* of

a given profession or class location, horizontal mobility regards the *field* of the profession, also called work logic (Oesch, 2006). Individuals' experiences under different work logics are thought to play an important role in shaping one's view of society, and therefore the horizontal differentiation by work logic has been found to have implications for political preferences and ideology as well (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Thus, whereas the vertical class location is connected to political preferences in the traditional class voting perspective, the horizontal class location is a newer conception of the relationship between the work logic and political preferences. As they are jointly under study here, it can be disentangled which one has larger consequences for the intergenerational transmission of political ideology.

I expect that both types of social mobility reduce the long-term political socialization process, and that the political ideology of socially mobile adult children is thus less influenced by their parents' ideology compared to those who remain immobile, i.e. end up in the same class location as their parents. This hypothesis is tested using household panel data from Switzerland (SHP, 1999–2014) and Germany (G-SOEP, 2005 and 2009), by regressing the ideology of adult children on that of their parent, interacted with the different types of social mobility. The analyses are performed separately for respondents with working-class and middle-class origins. To control for self-selection into social mobility, individual fixed effects (FE) analysis is performed as well, which models the change in individuals' political ideology over time, together with the change in class location. These models can help to understand the extent to which a potentially found smaller ideological influence of the parents on a socially mobile child is due to the child changing the ideology as a consequence of the change in social class position vis-à-vis the parent, or not. If the child is not found to change their political ideology after the change in class location, this means there is no causal effect of intergenerational mobility on the transmission of ideology. This is the ultimate test whether the findings of the first analyses are due to causal effects, or rather to self-selection effects, implying that socially mobile children are different from their parents to start with.

Political socialization theory is combined with class voting and social mobility literature and new insights regarding the importance of the work logic for political ideology, to come up with different mechanisms as to how intergenerational social mobility impedes

the transmission of political ideology. Subsequently, the research design is discussed, and after some descriptive results, the outcomes of the hypothesis-testing analyses are presented. Finally, I conclude that both vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility show a smaller transmission of political ideology from parent to adult child, especially for upward vertical mobility. However, this is shown to be a non-causal effect, but rather due to a self-selection into social mobility. Additional results differ for the two countries under study here: limited evidence is found for a causal effect of some types of horizontal mobility, which underlines the importance of additional research regarding the connection between work logic and political preferences and behaviour.

5.2 Vertical and Horizontal Intergenerational Social Mobility

Before setting out the theoretical foundations of this chapter, the concepts of vertical and horizontal intergenerational social mobility are clarified and the class scheme is described.

5.2.1 Use of the Oesch class scheme

When studying social mobility, a specific conceptualization of social class needs to be chosen. The majority of studies regarding class voting and social mobility have made use of the class scheme of Goldthorpe and colleagues, often referred to as the Erikson–Goldthorpe, EGP, or simply Goldthorpe class scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979). This class scheme consists of up to 11 categories, ranging from higher-grade professionals to agricultural workers. Although the schema is not purely hierarchical, it does reflect mainly one dimension. The aim is to differentiate positions within labour markets and production units in terms of the employment relationships that they entail (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992, p. 37), representing the main occupational and class divisions of most Western industrial post-WW-II societies.

In recent years, Oesch (2006) has argued that the Erikson–Goldthorpe class scheme needs to be updated to more adequately reflect the social stratification in contemporary Western Europe. Oesch claims that due to the trends of feminization (increased female labour participation); tertiarization (increased importance of the service sector); and educational upgrading (increased levels of education), there is a decrease in the salience

of the divide between manual and non-manual labour, and a need for additional horizontal differentiation within the middle class (2006, p. 25). Therefore, he proposes a new class scheme, which is not only characterized by a vertical hierarchy reflecting occupational skill requirements and employment relationships (as the Erikson–Goldthorpe scheme does), but also by a horizontal differentiation by the type of work logic. The full class scheme consists of 16 categories. As previous studies have done (Oesch, 2008; Oesch & Rennwald, 2010), also in this research the simplified 8-category version is used, described in Figure 5-1, for the sake of parsimony

Figure 5-1. Oesch class scheme (8 classes), with representative occupations and place of the middle classes within the left–right spectrum

Centre-left ⟷ Centre ⟷ Centre-right

	Interpersonal service work logic	*Technical work logic*	*Organizational work logic*	*Entrepreneurial work logic*
Middle class	Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	Technical (semi-) professionals	(Associate) Managers	Large employers (>9) & self-employed professionals
Middle class	(university) teachers, journalists, social workers, medical doctors	engineers, architects, safety inspectors, computing professionals	public/business administrators, financial managers, tax officials, lawyers	firm owners, lawyers, accountants
Working class	Service workers	Production workers	Office Clerks	Small business owners (<9/no empl.)
Working class	children's nurses, cooks, shop assistants	carpenters, assemblers, machinists, gardeners	secretaries, call centre employees, stock clerks	shop-owners, hairdressers, farmers

In subsequent work, Oesch argues that the horizontal distinctions are vital for the study of political preferences and the connection with class location (Oesch, 2008, p. 336). Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) show, using European-wide data, that the horizontal work logic reveals differences in political preferences within the middle classes, which can be either due to self-selection or socialization in the work logic. The underlying mechanism of the latter is that *"it is the occupational experiences itself that nurtures and reinforces political attitudes"* (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, pp. 9–10). The vast differences in the day-to-day work setting are thus expected to translate into a different vision of society, with

different political priorities associated. For instance, socio-cultural professionals working in the face-to-face logic in the non-market sector, concerned with teaching, caring, or healing, are led to having a more libertarian view of community compared to managers working in the market sector, who are mainly dealing with object-related tasks in a clear-cut command structure, on top of a hierarchy of authority where operative decisions are reached and subordinates made to comply with (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, p. 10; Oesch, 2008, p. 333). Technical professionals are found somewhat in between these two: their work environment is more based on peer review and loose horizontal cooperation structures (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, p. 10).

For these reasons, associate managers are expected to be less in favour of economic redistribution compared to socio-cultural professionals and, to a lesser extent, technical professionals. In terms of cultural preferences, socio-cultural professionals are the most liberal, followed by the technical professionals. Finally, managers hold the least libertarian views. Earlier work had already classified the socio-cultural professionals as an upcoming new class (Kriesi, 1989), with a distinct profile in terms of political preferences (Güveli, Need, & de Graaf, 2007b; Trechsel, 1995) and are by now identified as a new core constituency of the left (Oesch, 2008; Oesch & Rennwald, 2010). More recent work finds that the socio-cultural professionals indeed stand very close to the preferences of production workers in terms of state–market preferences, and that the middle classes are heterogeneous in their positions on the economic dimension (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015; Güveli, Need, & de Graaf, 2007a; Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015).

Translating this to the left–right ideological spectrum, associate managers are found to have centre-right political ideologies, technical professionals are found around the centre, and the socio-cultural professionals are found at the centre-left (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, p. 11). According to the same study there is no political horizontal distinction within the working classes, as the political ideology of all three working classes are found mostly around the centre to the left on the left–right scale. The corresponding left–right positions of the three middle classes are depicted in Figure 5-1.

5.2.2 Vertical and Horizontal Intergenerational Social Mobility

Social mobility refers to the movement of individuals across social strata in society. Therefore, *intergenerational* social mobility implies having a different class location than one's parents, at the moment in which the adult child has arrived at its own class of destination. Young children inevitably have the same class location as their parents. Using the Oesch class scheme, two different types of intergenerational social mobility can be investigated. First, vertical mobility is reached when the adult child ends up in one of the middle classes while the parents are from one of the working classes (upward vertical social mobility), or vice versa, when the child finds itself in one of the working classes whereas the parents are located in one of the middle classes (downward vertical social mobility). Second, horizontal mobility implies not working under the same work logic as the father, and is operationalized in the following way: either a respondent is working in the same work logic as their father (i.e. horizontally immobile), or they moved away from their parent's 1) interpersonal; 2) technical; 3) organizational; or 4) entrepreneurial work logic. The different categories thus represent the parent's work logic and the fact that the adult child is working in a different one.

As the horizontally classified work logic and vertical class location are overlapping in this two-dimensional class scheme, it is possible to experience both vertical and horizontal mobility simultaneously. For instance, the child of an office clerk who becomes a socio-cultural professional experiences vertical mobility (upward, from working to middle class), and horizontal mobility compared to the father's class location (as the father worked in the organizational work logic, whereas the adult child works in the interpersonal logic). In this chapter, vertical and horizontal mobility are also studied separately in order not to conflate different mobility effects, by investigating individuals from middle- and working-class origins not only as a whole but also independently from each other.

5.3 Political Socialization and Intergenerational Social Mobility

As political socialization theory identifies the inheritance of structural factors, such as social class, as one of the two key mechanisms behind the intergenerational transmission of political preferences (Glass et al., 1986), research on the inheritance of these structural factors is crucial to political socialization research, and is strongly

connected to studies in class voting and social mobility. Social mobility is a key mediating factor in the 'structural inheritance' mechanism. In cases where children move away from their parental social class, this means a disruption of this mechanism. It could therefore be argued that children who have become socially mobile vis-à-vis their parents are less likely to take over the political preferences of their parents, because they did not inherit their parental SES in the long run, and thus their class of destination differs from their class of origin.

Before setting out the different mechanisms as to why intergenerational social mobility would impede the transmission of political ideology, I provide a short depiction of the study of social mobility, class voting, and the combination of the two.

Social mobility research is concerned with the question of the extent to which social origin determines an individual's life chances, in terms of occupational and socioeconomic status and class-linked inequalities (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 1986). The level of openness of a society, in terms of equal chances regardless of social origin, is designated by the social fluidity of a society (relative mobility chances). In the early stages of social mobility research, it was hypothesized that social mobility is an integral and continuing aspect of the process of industrialization, and would thus continue to increase over time (Lipset & Bendix, 1959). However, the 'constant flux' thesis that was put forward in the 1990s showed, on the contrary, a constant pattern of social fluidity across a large number of industrialized countries over time, whilst maintaining a strong effect of class inheritance (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). For the countries under study in this chapter, Germany and Switzerland, it has also been shown that levels of social fluidity are stable over time (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Falcon, 2013). Whereas (West) Germany was earlier found to have greater inequality in terms of mobility chances compared to other countries (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992), more recent evidence has shown a small increase in social fluidity. However, the country is still characterized by a relatively high level of immobility (Müller & Pollak, 2004).

Since the beginning of the study of voting behaviour, class cleavages have been shown to be of importance to political behaviour. Structural factors such as social class were

found to form an important political cleavage in most post-industrial societies (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Campbell et al., 1960; Evans, 1993; Lazarsfeld et al., 1968; Lipset, 1960). During later years, class voting became a much-debated topic to which many studies have been devoted. A body of literature emerged that announced the waning influence of social class on political choice and attitudes (Clark, Lipset, & Rempel, 1993; Franklin et al., 1992; for an overview see Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1995). Not all scholars agreed on the existence of this decline, and argue that it is simply a *different type* of class divide in politics (Evans, 2000; Oesch, 2008). However, other recent studies continue to show the decline in class voting (Jansen et al., 2013; Knutsen, 2006; Van der Brug, 2010).

Whereas both class voting and social mobility have been studied extensively in isolation of each other, the combination of the two has only been studied to a limited extent. A number of studies has, mostly during the 1990s, investigated the relationship between social mobility and political attitudes and voting behaviour (Benabou & Ok, 2001; Clark & D'Angelo, 2013; Clifford & Heath, 1993; De Graaf et al., 1995; De Graaf & Ultee, 1990; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1993; Turner, 1992). Although the findings are not entirely uniform, the main conclusions are that the political preferences of socially mobile citizens are found somewhere between the class of origin and the class of destination, and that the longer one spends in the class of destination, the more the impact of the class of origin diminishes (Knutsen, 2006, pp. 1–2). This process of higher adaptation to the class of destination over time is also known as the *acculturation hypothesis* (De Graaf et al., 1995; De Graaf & Ultee, 1990). There are a few limitations to these studies. First, most of them are undertaken with data from before the 1990s and are mostly limited to the US, the UK, and The Netherlands. Additionally, most of them only take the social mobility of males into account. Furthermore, they practically all make use of the Erikson–Goldthorpe class scheme (1992). Most importantly, these studies do not observe the political preferences of the parents, which makes it impossible to study the actual transmission mechanism. Another difference with the present study is that previous research mostly focussed on party choice, whereas political ideology is my dependent variable.

I identify three mechanisms as to how intergenerational social mobility may impede the transmission of political ideology from parents to children. As discussed earlier,

intergenerational social mobility breaks with social status inheritance, identified as a key factor in intergenerational political preference transmission (Glass et al., 1986). This has several implications that affect the possibility for political ideology transmission.

The first mechanism applies to vertical mobility only: experiencing a different position of socioeconomic status in society most often leads to different economic interests. Based on traditional rational choice and class voting theory, this implies that these different interests translate into different political and policy preferences (Downs, 1957; Evans, 1993). An adult child who has a different vertical class location than the father will therefore be likely to not take over the political ideology of the father in the long run. This mechanism is specifically expected to take place for those experiencing upward social mobility, as their economic prospects are better compared to those of their parents. On the other hand, downwardly mobile individuals are more expected to keep identifying with (the class interests of) their class of origin, as they are most likely less satisfied with the experienced mobility than the upwardly mobile are. Indeed, a feeling of frustration has been found among the downwardly mobile (Peugny, 2006).

Second, a mechanism that is less structural in nature refers to the finding that socially mobile persons are found to have different kinship relations, and therefore applies to both vertical and horizontal mobility. They do not have necessarily less, but a different type of contact, as they less often choose their kin as their leisure-time associates. Moreover, their primary social relations groups are very differentiated, leading to a lessened interaction with their kin (Goldthorpe, 1986, pp. 160–169). As a consequence, they are more likely to spend leisure time with those from their destination class (Goldthorpe, 1986, pp. 160–170). This is expected to reduce the political influence of kin, and at the same time to increase the level to which the individuals become re-socialized by the new peers in their destination class (Jackman, 1972; Peugny, 2006), which results in a less enduring influence of the political socialization in the family.

A third mechanism is identified that specifically applies to horizontal mobility, and the relationship between work logic and political preferences. Horizontal intergenerational social mobility means that the adult child is working in a different work logic than the parent. The setting of the work process and the relations of authority are therefore

different, just as the sector of the occupation. As described before, the differences in the day-to-day work can easily translate to contrasting visions of society, and distinct political priorities associated (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014; Oesch, 2008, p. 333). Being re-socialized under a work logic that differs from that of the parent is expected to reduce the parent–child transmission of ideology. However, this expectation is mostly directed to those of middle-class origins, as only there the work logic has been found to translate into differences regarding political ideology (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). However, for individuals from working-class origins, a combination of upward mobility and horizontal mobility can also result in a re-socializing influence of the new work logic in the middle class.

Based on these considerations, the following hypotheses are put forward:

H1a. The political ideology of upwardly vertically mobile individuals is less influenced by the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.

H1b. The political ideology of downwardly vertically mobile individuals is equally influenced by the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.

H2. The political ideology of horizontally mobile individuals, especially those with a middle-class origin, is less influenced by the parental political ideology, compared to the socially immobile.

Lastly, an additional and crucial mechanism is the self-selection of individuals into intergenerational social mobility. This mechanism is explicitly tested in this chapter by the individual fixed effects (FE) analysis (see Model Strategy section). Self-selection into social mobility implies that people who become socially mobile are *from the outset different* from people who have not become socially mobile. Hence, they are not different *as a consequence of* their experience of social mobility. Therefore, they could have been different compared to those who remain immobile, e.g. by having a larger distance from the parental ideology, before any sort of social mobility has taken place. If this is the case, any differences between the mobile and immobile could be not due to the experience of mobility *per se*, but because those who have been become mobile were already different before they underwent social mobility, which is possibly also the reason that they have become mobile in the first place.

An example would be a daughter from a working-class family, who is intelligent and is therefore sent to a good school, there being surrounded by peers who are mostly from a higher social class. The daughter may feel that she better fits in with her peers rather than her family members, and develops a different set of social and political attitudes. This can be caused by peer influence, but also by the fact that her intelligence may lead her to have different interests than her family members, and thus read other books, and consume different types of media. Her high educational performance may lead her to go to university, unlike her family, and end up in a vertically higher social class than her parents. The fact that she underwent vertical intergenerational social mobility does not necessarily mean that this experience *per se* changed her and her political ideology. It can be the case that because of her different interests and social environment, she was already different from her parents before entering university. A similar reasoning can be put forward regarding horizontal mobility, i.e. the child choosing to work under a different work logic than the parent, because this is a better fit with the child's preferences.

H3. The smaller ideological influence of parents on socially mobile children, compared to the parental ideological influence on socially immobile children, is at least partially due to the child's self-selection into social mobility.

5.4 Research Design

In this section, the research design is presented. First the data and variables are described, then the model strategy. However, before doing so, choices regarding the operationalization of the class location and parental ideology are discussed.

5.4.1 Operationalization

The class location of the child is measured from age 30 onwards, in order to capture their class location at the time when they have surely arrived at their class of destination, which is common practice in social mobility research (e.g. Falcon, 2013; Peugny, 2006). The risk of measuring the class location at an earlier age is that the respondent has not finished education yet, or has not yet found the (full-time) employment that will indicate the class location of destination. Therefore, in order to reduce this risk, the analytic sample is restricted to a group of respondents of age 30 and

over. Thus, whereas previous chapters were mostly focussed on young adults, this chapter focuses on individuals who are well settled into their professional life.

To measure intergenerational social mobility, the class location of the child needs to be compared to that of the parents. This research considers the intergenerational social mobility of both males and females, by comparing their individual class location with that of their class of origin. As in previous research in social mobility, the class location of the *father* is taken as an indicator of the class of origin of the respondents (Breen, 2004; Clifford & Heath, 1993; De Graaf et al., 1995). This choice is based on the empirical fact that most fathers were the breadwinner in the childhood household of the generations of the individuals under study.[23] Therefore, his class location provides the best indication of the class of origin of the child.

Relatedly, when measuring the parental political ideology, the father's ideology is used as a proxy for the parental ideology, for several reasons. Firstly, because the class of origin is based on the class location of the father when the child was young, and the existing connection between class location and political ideology that the hypothesized mechanisms build upon, the father's ideology is the most intuitive choice to use for investigating the transmission of political ideology that is partially based on the inheritance of structural factors. Similarly, the mother's political ideology might be more in line with the class location of the father, as her own class location might not be representative of the SES of the household, for example where the mother is a full-time housewife or has a simple part-time job, but identifies with the (higher) class location of her husband. This implies that this chapter relies more on the traditional image of the two-parent family than the previous one, and will not be able to capture the consequences of intergenerational social mobility for children who have grown up in a single-mother family.

[23] The youngest respondents in the sample had age 30 in 2014, and thus born in 1984. OECD statistics and indicators (stats.oecd.org; data.oecd.org) show that during the 1980s, labour force participation was much lower for females (50%) than for males (80%). The female share of part-time employment was respectively 80 and 90%, and about one-third of females in the labour force were working part-time (OECD, 2017a, 2017b). The lower female labour force participation combined with the domination of part-time work by women, are strong indicators of the male breadwinner model. Still, the current situation shows larger shares of women working part-time than men.

5.4.2 Data and variables

As in previous chapters, household panel data from Germany (G-SOEP, 2005 and 2009) and Switzerland (SHP, 1999–2014) are used in the analyses. The dependent variable is left–right self-placement, measured on an 11-point scale from 0 to 10.

The key independent variables are intergenerational social mobility and the father's political ideology. In the G-SOEP, direct observations of the father's ideology are used, from the same year of the survey in which the adult child's ideology is observed. In the SHP, a variable is used for which the respondent retrospectively provides the left–right position of the parent when the respondent was 15 years old. This variable is used instead of direct observations, due to the young sample in the SHP for which direct parental observations are available. There are hardly any respondents that are over 30 of whom the parent is directly observed during the panel. Although direct observations are preferable, previous research has shown that this retrospective SHP variable is reliable (Wernli, 2010).

These differences in the measurement of the father's ideology have consequences for the data structure that is used for the SHP, which differs from that in other chapters.[24] For the G-SOEP, the data is pooled without overlap, like in previous chapters, using the 2009 observations as a baseline category. However, of the SHP, all survey years (1999–2014) are used, but only one wave is used for each respondent: the most recent wave in which

[24] In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, five pooled waves of the SHP are used, in which parents' and child's ideology is directly observed in the same year. The reasons for not choosing the data structure and modelling strategy of this chapter for Chapters 2 and 3 are the following. Firstly, it hardly ensures a larger number of observations when using direct observations of the parental ideology, as these are already maximized by the use of the five most recent waves. The difference in the use of direct and retrospective observations of the parental ideology is crucial here, and the group of which direct observations of the own left–right ideology and of both parents are available, is limited. Secondly, the descriptive analyses used in Chapter 2 do not allow controlling for period-specific differences by including dummy variables for the survey-years. Therefore, pooling more than five waves together is not preferred due to potential fluctuations in left–right ideology that are related to the political context. Lastly, the strategy of pooling waves as is done in Chapters 2 and 3 ensures a higher comparability of the analyses, which is deemed important, as all used variables are similar across the two datasets. In this chapter, the difference between the G-SOEP and the SHP, in terms of the use of direct observations, respectively retrospective observations of the parental ideology, already reduces the comparability and therefore the difference in model strategy is regarded as less problematic. In Chapter 4, all waves of the survey are used in a random effects panel model, to use all possible variance to deal with low-N problems. However, as the use of the retrospective variable for the father's ideology increases the number of cases significantly, there is no need for such an approach and therefore the data structure here is preferred over the random effects model using all waves, as here the number of observations for each respondent is equal (i.e. one wave per respondent), unlike in the random effects model in which the number of observations can differ across respondents, depending on the number of survey waves in which they participated .

they have provided their left–right self-placement. To capture any survey wave-specific differences in the left–right self-placement of the respondents, dummy variables for each survey year are included in the OLS models. The retrospective account of the father's ideology at respondent's age of 15 is measured during the first interview of the respondent.

The class location of the father when the child was young, and of the adult respondents (children) in the year of the survey, are based on the occupation measured by 4-digit ISCO-88 codes. The information regarding the father's occupation when the respondent was 15 years old is retrospectively provided by the respondent, in both the G-SOEP and the SHP. The occupation of both father and child are recoded using the Oesch recoding scheme[25] into the 8-class Oesch scheme. Using this information, the intergenerational social mobility is measured, which is operationalized as follows into two categorical variables. Vertical mobility can take the values immobile, upwardly mobile, and downwardly mobile, which implies having either a similar, lower, or higher vertical class location than the father. Horizontal mobility can take the values immobile, and four subsequent categories for four types of horizontal mobility: having moved away from the father's entrepreneurial, organizational, technical, or interpersonal work logic, which implies that the child works under a different work logic than the father.

For example, the child of a manager who becomes a socio-cultural professional has remained vertically immobile (both class locations are middle class), but has become horizontally mobile compared to the father, as the father worked in the organizational work logic, and the adult child works in the interpersonal logic. This respondent would thus fall in the category "moved away from father's organizational work logic" for horizontal mobility, and "immobile" for vertical mobility.

Control variables, similar as in previous chapters, are included for civil status (married, divorced/separated, other), level of education (still in school, low, medium, high), gender, and age.

[25] Available through http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts/

5.4.3 Model strategy

Before testing the hypotheses, descriptive findings are presented to show the percentages of people in the sample that are socially mobile, and how the different classes are composed in terms of intergenerational continuity. Then, two types of analyses are performed to test the hypotheses and the underlying mechanisms. These are described in the next two subsections.

5.4.3.1 Regression analysis using the G-SOEP and the SHP

To test the hypotheses, OLS regression analysis (standard errors clustered at the family level) is performed using both datasets. In the baseline model, the child's left–right ideology is regressed on the father's left–right ideology, together with the control variables. In subsequent models, the class of the father when the respondent was aged 15 is added. Then, the horizontal and vertical mobility of the respondent is added. To test the hypotheses, both types of mobility are interacted with the influence of the father's ideology on the child's ideology. To disentangle different effects, and adequately test hypothesis 2, which is mostly directed to those with middle-class origins, the models are also estimated when the sample is split up by working and middle-class origins of the respondents.

5.4.3.2 Individual fixed effects analysis using the SHP

To control for self-selection into social mobility, testing hypothesis 3, individual fixed effect (FE) models are estimated using the SHP data longitudinally (1999–2014), as in the previous chapter. In such analysis, the ideological left–right placement of respondents is analysed over time in relation to their change in social class location, compared to the father. As these are "within-person" regressions, an extra baseline category is needed to avoid restricting the analyses to respondents who are intragenerationally mobile as well. Otherwise, the analysis would not include individuals who are socially mobile as soon as they receive their own class location, as there would not be a change in their class location. Therefore, to estimate this model properly, an additional category is added to the previously used variables of horizontal and vertical mobility: a 0-category for when the child has not arrived in the class of destination yet, i.e. before the age of 30. This means that this analysis can capture a change in the respondent's left–right ideology before and after arriving in the class of

destination, differentiating between immobile and mobile respondents. For both socially immobile and mobile respondents, their ideology is compared across the periods before arriving in the class of destination (before the age of 30) and afterwards. For example: the child of a manager becomes a production worker. His class location before age 30 is given the category '0' (as done for all respondents), and after age 30 his class location falls in the category 'vertical downward mobility', as he is now part of the working class whereas his father was middle class. In this analysis, it is possible to compare his political ideology before and after the change in class location compared to the class of origin. Person-years are left out of the analysis in which individuals made an additional transition in which they moved from a position that signified social mobility to a new class location similar to the class of origin (i.e. making the transition back from socially mobile to immobile).

The key question that this analysis addresses is to what extent individuals change their ideology after having become socially mobile compared to the father's class location. This can show whether there is a causal effect of social mobility on ideology, or whether socially mobile individuals have always been "different", and perhaps therefore have become mobile to begin with. For instance, when a socially mobile person does not change their political ideology between the periods before and after arriving in the class of destination, any previously found effects of a larger difference with the father's ideology compared to immobile peers, are because this person already had a larger difference with the father's ideology to start with (i.e. before becoming social mobile). Such an outcome would show that it is rather a self-selection effect than a causal influence of the experience of having become socially mobile.

5.5 Results

5.5.1 Descriptive results

In Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, contingency tables of respondents' class location by their father's class location are presented for respectively Switzerland and Germany. The different class locations are grouped together by horizontal work logic (respectively entrepreneurial, technical, organizational, and interpersonal). The cells highlighted in grey represent *horizontally immobile* individuals, the percentages in bold represent *vertically immobile* individuals. The cells on the diagonal represent the percentage of

respondents within each class of destination that have the *same* class location as the father, and are thus in bold and highlighted in grey, as they are horizontally and vertically immobile. All other cells represent individuals who have a *different* class location than their father, be it in horizontal (not highlighted in grey), vertical (percentage not in bold), or both ways (not highlighted and not in bold).

Table 5-1. Percentages of respondents by own and father's class location, Switzerland

Father's class location	Respondent's class location								
	Large emply.	*Small busin.*	*Techn. profs*	*Prod. workrs*	*Manag.*	*Clerks*	*Socio-cult pr.*	*Service workrs*	*Total*
Large emp.	**7.9**	4.6	**3.1**	1.7	**3.7**	3.9	**4.2**	2.2	3.7
Small bus.	17.3	**31.7**	16.2	**28.8**	18.9	**18.6**	16.7	**25.9**	21.8
Technical prof.	**9.4**	6.0	**11.6**	4.6	**8.7**	6.0	**11.7**	4.7	7.7
Prod. work.	26.4	**31.7**	35.3	**46.3**	32.0	**37.8**	24.3	**42.7**	34.7
Managers	**21.6**	13.5	**14.6**	6.8	**20.3**	15.5	**19.2**	10.6	15.3
Clerks	6.2	**5.6**	7.3	**5.4**	7.0	**9.5**	8.2	**6.4**	7.0
Socio-cult. pr.	**7.1**	4.0	**6.0**	1.9	**5.1**	2.9	**11.7**	3.0	5.2
Service work.	4.0	**2.8**	5.9	**4.5**	4.4	**6.0**	4.1	**4.6**	4.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SHP 1999–2014. N=9584. Respondents aged 30+.
Father's class location is retrospectively provided by the respondents.

Table 5-2. Percentages of respondents by own and father's class location, Germany

Father's class location	Respondent's class location								
	Large emply.	*Small busin.*	*Techn. profs*	*Prod. workrs*	*Manag.*	*Clerks*	*Socio-cult pr.*	*Service workrs*	*Total*
Large emp.	**11.3**	4.9	**2.6**	0.8	**2.4**	1.0	**3.8**	0.8	2.6
Small bus.	6.9	**11.2**	6.5	**6.3**	6.2	**7.6**	6.8	**6.4**	6.9
Technical prof.	**14.1**	10.6	**17.1**	4.3	**13.8**	8.9	**13.1**	5.6	10.6
Prod. work.	22.3	**38.5**	39.0	**65.4**	37.0	**47.2**	34.5	**61.0**	45.4
Managers	**19.9**	16.3	**15.1**	7.6	**20.1**	13.6	**17.3**	8.6	14.5
Clerks	6.9	**5.5**	7.8	**4.9**	8.9	**8.2**	8.3	**5.2**	7.1
Socio-cult. pr.	**13.1**	5.1	**6.7**	1.5	**5.5**	4.6	**10.6**	2.7	5.6
Service work.	5.5	**8.0**	5.3	**9.2**	6.1	**9.0**	5.7	**9.8**	7.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: G-SOEP 2009. N=6050. Respondents aged 30+.
Father's class location is retrospectively provided by the respondents.

The patterns found in both tables are similar. The class location with the highest percentage of class reproduction is formed by the production workers: 46% (Switzerland) and 65% (Germany) of current production workers have a father with the same class location. Overall, the lowest reproduction rates are found for the class

locations in the interpersonal work logic, which are around 10% but for the service workers in Switzerland as low as 5%. This finding is because the interpersonal work logic has largely expanded over recent decades, while the share of production workers has decreased. Therefore, an overwhelming percentage of service workers has a father who was a production worker (respectively 43% and 61%). Another common horizontal move is found for children who are now clerks with fathers who were production workers. A common vertical move is found for technical (semi-) professionals with fathers who were production workers. Lastly, a few instances of a combination of horizontal and vertical upward mobility are quite common as well. A large share of managers and socio-cultural (semi-)professionals has a father who was a production worker.

These descriptive findings for Germany and Switzerland using the Oesch class scheme show that there is both vertical and horizontal social mobility across generations. The subsequent analyses will investigate what consequences these two types of mobility have on the intergenerational transmission of political ideology.

5.5.2 OLS models using the G-SOEP and SHP

In the following tables, the OLS regression models are presented. In Table 5-3 and 5-4, the baseline models are shown for respectively Switzerland and Germany. In subsequent tables, interaction effects are modelled between social mobility and father's ideology to test the hypotheses. Before going into those results, I quickly discuss the baseline models, which serve to understand how much room there is left for political socialization influences, once controlled for the inheritance of structural factors.

In the first model, only the father's ideology and the control variables are included. It is in line with the results of the previous chapters: there is an effect of father's ideology on the adult child's ideology of around 0.25 in both countries. In the second model, the father's class location when the child had age 15 is added, which affects the coefficient only to a minor extent. It does show some differences in political ideology by class of origin: in Germany, there is only a significant difference between children of service workers and the reference category of large employers, but in Switzerland, both

children of production workers and socio-cultural professionals take more leftist positions on the scale than the reference category.

Table 5-3. OLS regressions of child's ideology on father's ideology and social mobility, Germany

Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Father's L/R ideology	0.258***	0.255***	0.255***	0.252***	0.252***
	(0.0372)	(0.0375)	(0.0374)	(0.0373)	(0.0372)
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)					
Downward			-0.0753		-0.0784
			(0.166)		(0.165)
Upward			-0.139		-0.165
			(0.128)		(0.129)
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)					
Move from Entrepreneurial				-0.386	-0.395
				(0.435)	(0.443)
Move from Organizational				-0.182	-0.188
				(0.196)	(0.196)
Move from Technical				0.187	0.208
				(0.136)	(0.136)
Move from Interpersonal				0.543**	0.541**
				(0.252)	(0.252)
Father's class location (ref=Large empl. & Self-empl. prof.)					
Small business owners		0.276	0.298	0.349	0.382
		(0.418)	(0.431)	(0.436)	(0.447)
Technical (semi-)professionals		0.0944	0.0910	-0.317	-0.342
		(0.284)	(0.285)	(0.383)	(0.394)
Production workers		0.171	0.193	-0.216	-0.204
		(0.264)	(0.291)	(0.365)	(0.399)
(Associate) managers		0.412	0.411	0.249	0.245
		(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.394)	(0.406)
Clerks		0.286	0.329	0.107	0.160
		(0.307)	(0.332)	(0.408)	(0.444)
Socio-cultural (semi-)prof.		-0.332	-0.338	-0.922**	-0.935**
		(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.438)	(0.447)
Service workers		0.506*	0.530	-0.150	-0.123
		(0.306)	(0.331)	(0.411)	(0.445)
Civil status (ref=married)					
Divorced/separated	0.250	0.279	0.272	0.249	0.239
	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.215)	(0.218)
Other	-0.0666	-0.0511	-0.0514	-0.0643	-0.0653
	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Level of education (ref=medium)					
Still in school	0.388	0.385	0.358	0.375	0.341
	(0.587)	(0.620)	(0.636)	(0.593)	(0.610)
Low	-0.163	-0.140	-0.128	-0.149	-0.135
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)
High	-0.195	-0.146	-0.117	-0.153	-0.118
	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.170)
Female	-0.491***	-0.492***	-0.475***	-0.532***	-0.518***
	(0.0882)	(0.0885)	(0.0903)	(0.0939)	(0.0951)
Age	0.00202	0.000174	-0.000169	-0.000538	-0.000915
	(0.00764)	(0.00759)	(0.00761)	(0.00765)	(0.00765)
Constant	5.061***	4.874***	4.893***	5.212***	5.238***
	(0.328)	(0.391)	(0.404)	(0.477)	(0.500)
Observations	1,388	1,388	1,388	1,388	1,388
R-squared	0.087	0.098	0.099	0.103	0.105

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5-4. OLS regressions of child's ideology on father's ideology and social mobility, Switzerland

Left–right self-placement	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Father's L/R ideology	0.235***	0.225***	0.226***	0.223***	0.224***
	(0.0132)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)					
Downward			0.0952		0.0990
			(0.105)		(0.105)
Upward			-0.341***		-0.331***
			(0.0770)		(0.0779)
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)					
Move from Entrepreneurial				-0.371***	-0.303**
				(0.131)	(0.132)
Move from Organizational				-0.527***	-0.538***
				(0.112)	(0.112)
Move from Technical				0.0627	0.114
				(0.110)	(0.110)
Move from Interpersonal				0.487***	0.459***
				(0.176)	(0.175)
Father's class location (ref=Large empl. & Self-empl. prof.)					
Small business owners		-0.0252	0.194	0.0133	0.221
		(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.151)
Technical (semi-)professionals		-0.233	-0.233	-0.541***	-0.534***
		(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Production workers		-0.237*	-0.00764	-0.537***	-0.304
		(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.187)	(0.198)
(Associate) managers		-0.121	-0.120	-0.0532	0.000726
		(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Clerks		-0.183	0.0606	-0.115	0.176
		(0.159)	(0.169)	(0.195)	(0.207)
Socio-cultural (semi-)prof.		-0.476***	-0.475***	-1.003***	-0.939***
		(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.205)	(0.206)
Service workers		-0.0417	0.205	-0.655**	-0.347
		(0.186)	(0.196)	(0.256)	(0.267)
Civil status (ref=married)					
Divorced/separated	-0.188**	-0.187**	-0.193**	-0.186**	-0.192**
	(0.0896)	(0.0896)	(0.0900)	(0.0895)	(0.0898)
Other	-0.188**	-0.190**	-0.184**	-0.191**	-0.185**
	(0.0750)	(0.0749)	(0.0750)	(0.0748)	(0.0748)
Level of education (ref=medium)					
Still in school	-1.621**	-1.670**	-1.738**	-1.577**	-1.647**
	(0.702)	(0.701)	(0.701)	(0.696)	(0.697)
Low	0.00468	-0.00135	-0.0320	0.00819	-0.0228
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)
High	-0.485***	-0.468***	-0.379***	-0.454***	-0.369***
	(0.0616)	(0.0631)	(0.0667)	(0.0632)	(0.0667)
Female	-0.545***	-0.545***	-0.559***	-0.516***	-0.540***
	(0.0531)	(0.0532)	(0.0535)	(0.0551)	(0.0557)
Age	0.00725***	0.00689***	0.00667***	0.00683***	0.00662***
	(0.00218)	(0.00219)	(0.00220)	(0.00219)	(0.00220)
Year of interview dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	5.109***	5.244***	5.072***	5.473***	5.270***
	(0.749)	(0.718)	(0.724)	(0.661)	(0.668)
Observations	5,287	5,287	5,287	5,287	5,287
R-squared	0.110	0.113	0.117	0.119	0.123

Source: SHP 1999–2014. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the subsequent models, social mobility of the child compared to the father's position is added (models 3-5). Whereas in Germany (Table 5-4) hardly any mobility effects are found, in Switzerland (Table 5-3) there are quite a few. Firstly, upwardly mobile individuals take more leftist positions compared to the immobile. Secondly, horizontally mobile adult children who have moved away from their father's entrepreneurial or organizational work logic, take also more leftist positions than the immobile. Lastly, in both Germany and Switzerland, children of fathers from the interpersonal logic, but are working in a different logic themselves, take more rightist positions compared to the immobile. If parental influence would mostly run through the inheritance of structural factors, the coefficient for father's ideology should show a sharp decrease when both class of destination and class of origin are added to the model. On the contrary, it shows that throughout all models the influence of father's ideology remains rather stable. Another finding that stands out is that when controlling for both horizontal and vertical mobility, there is a large and statistically significant effect of the father's class location for socio-cultural professionals (compared to the reference category), both in Germany and Switzerland.

I now turn to the interpretation of Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 to test the hypotheses. Firstly, in model 6, the father's ideology is interacted[26] with vertical mobility. The marginal effects based on this interaction are presented in Figure 5-2. The results indicate statistically significant negative interaction effects in both countries, which provides support for hypothesis 1a: a smaller ideological transmission is found among the upwardly mobile, compared to the immobile. In Switzerland, upwardly mobile adults are less influenced by their father's ideology compared to the immobile, with a difference of 0.06 (respective coefficients of 0.24 and 0.18). In line with hypothesis 1b, there are no differences between the downwardly mobile and the immobile. In Germany, the differences are larger and found for both types of vertical mobility, which supports hypothesis 1a but goes against hypothesis 1b, expecting no difference between immobile and downwardly mobile. The immobile are influenced by their father's ideology with a coefficient of 0.32, for the upwardly mobile this goes down to 0.15 and

[26] The variable of father's ideology has been mean-centred to improve the interpretability of the constitutive term of the interaction effects.

for the downwardly mobile to 0.16, indicating a decrease of ideological influence of 50%, a much larger difference than in Switzerland.

Figure 5-2. Marginal Effects of Father's Ideology on Child's Ideology, by Vertical Mobility (interaction)



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SHP 1999–2014. N G-SOEP: 1388. N SHP: 5287.
Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 6 presented in Table 5-5 and 5-6.

Regarding the interactions with horizontal mobility (model 7), the marginal effects are presented in Figure 5-3. For Germany, there are no statistically significant interaction terms, implying that the horizontally mobile are equally influenced by their father's ideology as the horizontally immobile. This does not support the expectation of hypothesis 2. In Switzerland, however, some differences are found. Those who moved away from their father's organizational work logic, are less influenced by the father's ideology (coefficient of 0.23 for the immobile compared to 0.15), whereas those who moved away from the father's interpersonal work logic are more strongly influenced by his ideology (b=0.33).

Figure 5-3. Marginal Effects of Father's Ideology on Child's Ideology, by Horizontal Mobility (interaction)



Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SHP 1999–2014. N G-SOEP: 1388. N SHP: 5287.
Marginal effects calculated on the basis of regression model 7 presented in Table 5-5 and 5-6.

To separate vertical from horizontal mobility, the sample is split up by class origin of the respondents, and the foregoing analyses are performed separately for these two groups. The results are found in the same tables, models 8–11.

In both countries, the splitting up of the sample by class of origin does not substantively change the results regarding the interaction with vertical mobility (models 8 and 9, compared to model 6), but there are some differences regarding horizontal mobility (models 10 and 11, compared to model 7). Firstly, in Germany, there is now a significant negative interaction of -0.4 (both substantively and statistically) among the middle-class origin group for those who move away from the father's entrepreneurial work logic (i.e. fathers who were larger employers/self-employed professionals). This implies much larger differences between child and father's ideology compared to the immobile.

Table 5-5. OLS interaction models: father's ideology and social mobility on child's ideology, Germany

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Left–right self-placement			WC origin	MC origin	WC origin	MC origin
Father's L/R ideology	0.324***	0.235***	0.332***	0.338***	0.242***	0.267**
	(0.0451)	(0.0662)	(0.0631)	(0.0663)	(0.0797)	(0.113)
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)						
Downward	-0.113	-0.0783		-0.0972		-0.0708
	(0.166)	(0.167)		(0.189)		(0.189)
Upward	-0.144	-0.167	-0.0557		-0.0615	
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.134)		(0.136)	
Downward Mobility*Father's L/R	-0.182*			-0.183*		
	(0.0968)			(0.108)		
Upward Mobility*Father's L/R	-0.186**		-0.195**			
	(0.0776)		(0.0870)			
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)						
Move from Entrepreneurial	-0.384	-0.398	0.0555	-0.215	-0.138	-0.00299
	(0.452)	(0.459)	(0.364)	(0.357)	(0.399)	(0.294)
Move from Organizational	-0.162	-0.185	0.363	0.114	0.342	0.116
	(0.193)	(0.196)	(0.226)	(0.190)	(0.222)	(0.193)
Move from Technical	0.203	0.207	0.199	-0.0162	0.207	-0.0490
	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.207)	(0.140)	(0.210)
Move from Interpersonal	0.529**	0.545**	0.467**	-0.0891	0.474**	-0.0725
	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.236)	(0.260)	(0.240)	(0.263)
Move from Entrepr.*Father's L/R		-0.00679			0.227	-0.412*
		(0.195)			(0.215)	(0.242)
Move from Organiz.*Father's L/R		0.0460			-0.145	0.0750
		(0.101)			(0.131)	(0.146)
Move from Techn.*Father's L/R		0.0193			0.0360	-0.0513
		(0.0825)			(0.0964)	(0.150)
Move from Interp.*Father's L/R		0.0435			-0.0331	0.0939
		(0.128)			(0.222)	(0.159)
Father's class location	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Civil status (ref=married)						
Divorced/separated	0.244	0.238	0.520*	-0.130	0.528*	-0.121
	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.301)	(0.329)	(0.301)	(0.307)
Other	-0.0620	-0.0664	0.141	-0.366**	0.117	-0.369**
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.150)	(0.179)	(0.150)	(0.183)
Level of education (ref=medium)						
Still in school	0.288	0.334	0.203	0.589	0.252	0.705*
	(0.603)	(0.616)	(0.790)	(0.381)	(0.788)	(0.391)
Low	-0.149	-0.138	-0.0776	-0.456*	-0.0649	-0.494*
	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.160)	(0.275)	(0.161)	(0.289)
High	-0.134	-0.119	-0.190	-0.339	-0.178	-0.383
	(0.168)	(0.170)	(0.202)	(0.311)	(0.205)	(0.324)
Female	-0.517***	-0.515***	-0.627***	-0.338**	-0.643***	-0.330**
	(0.0946)	(0.0954)	(0.122)	(0.150)	(0.123)	(0.151)
Age	-0.000915	-0.00109	0.0134	-0.0160	0.0121	-0.0176
	(0.00761)	(0.00765)	(0.00961)	(0.0128)	(0.00959)	(0.0128)
Year of interview dummies	5.253***	5.263***	4.469***	5.988***	4.516***	6.079***
Constant	(0.508)	(0.514)	(0.427)	(0.522)	(0.425)	(0.531)
Observations	1,388	1,388	853	535	853	535
R-squared	0.112	0.105	0.106	0.111	0.102	0.113

Source: G-SOEP 2005 and 2009. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5-6. OLS interaction models: social mobility and father's ideology on child's ideology, Switzerland

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Left–right self-placement			WC origin	MC origin	WC origin	MC origin
Father's L/R ideology	0.241***	0.233***	0.283***	0.256***	0.292***	0.265***
	(0.0176)	(0.0252)	(0.0222)	(0.0234)	(0.0314)	(0.0325)
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)						
Downward	0.0965	0.0977		0.166		0.161
	(0.105)	(0.105)		(0.102)		(0.101)
Upward	-0.336***	-0.329***	-0.284***		-0.275***	
	(0.0779)	(0.0779)	(0.0760)		(0.0763)	
Downward Mobility*Father's L/R	0.0119			0.0355		
	(0.0444)			(0.0440)		
Upward Mobility*Father's L/R	-0.0630**		-0.0879***			
	(0.0287)		(0.0310)			
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)						
Move from Entrepreneurial	-0.295**	-0.265*	-0.0395	0.153	-0.0112	0.145
	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.0980)	(0.157)	(0.102)	(0.172)
Move from Organizational	-0.534***	-0.532***	-0.243*	-0.175*	-0.277*	-0.161
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.145)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.104)
Move from Technical	0.106	0.122	-0.114	-0.0495	-0.109	-0.0123
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.0936)	(0.117)	(0.0951)	(0.116)
Move from Interpersonal	0.449**	0.496***	0.183	-0.212	0.216	-0.154
	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.158)
Move from Entrepr.*Father's L/R		-0.0427			-0.0941*	0.00442
		(0.0428)			(0.0480)	(0.0828)
Move from Organiz.*Father's L/R		-0.0866**			-0.120*	-0.102**
		(0.0433)			(0.0671)	(0.0516)
Move from Techn.*Father's L/R		0.0147			-0.0513	0.0964*
		(0.0339)			(0.0407)	(0.0547)
Move from Interp.*Father's L/R		0.0970*			0.0264	0.106*
		(0.0518)			(0.0732)	(0.0628)
Father's class location	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Civil status (ref=married)						
Divorced/separated	-0.189**	-0.194**	-0.248**	-0.107	-0.255**	-0.0848
	(0.0899)	(0.0900)	(0.114)	(0.145)	(0.114)	(0.146)
Other	-0.183**	-0.181**	-0.123	-0.190*	-0.122	-0.185*
	(0.0748)	(0.0748)	(0.0888)	(0.0996)	(0.0892)	(0.0988)
Level of education (ref=medium)						
Still in school	-1.665**	-1.606**	-1.060*	-1.247*	-1.060*	-1.119
	(0.700)	(0.688)	(0.586)	(0.756)	(0.595)	(0.718)
Low	-0.0216	-0.0290	0.0363	-0.292	0.0218	-0.291
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.220)	(0.116)	(0.218)
High	-0.370***	-0.371***	-0.424***	-0.394***	-0.428***	-0.405***
	(0.0668)	(0.0667)	(0.0792)	(0.103)	(0.0793)	(0.103)
Female	-0.537***	-0.537***	-0.474***	-0.658***	-0.477***	-0.653***
	(0.0557)	(0.0557)	(0.0688)	(0.0825)	(0.0690)	(0.0824)
Age	0.00635***	0.00674***	0.00418*	0.00665**	0.00473*	0.00617**
	(0.00220)	(0.00220)	(0.00242)	(0.00302)	(0.00243)	(0.00303)
Year of interview dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	5.247***	5.332***	4.797***	6.180***	4.926***	6.182***
	(0.685)	(0.611)	(0.848)	(0.245)	(0.735)	(0.243)
Observations	5,287	5,287	3,664	2,210	3,664	2,210
R-squared	0.124	0.126	0.121	0.151	0.121	0.158

Source: SHP 1999–2014. SEs in parentheses, clustered at the household.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Furthermore, some important conclusions can be drawn regarding the horizontal mobility interactions for Switzerland. Model 10 shows that for those with working-class origins, there is an additional statistically significant interaction for the horizontally mobile individuals with fathers who were small business owners (entrepreneurial work logic). This group is less influenced by the father's ideology, as shown by the interaction effect of -0.1. This finding shows that the reduction in ideological transmission due to horizontal mobility is not limited to those with middle-class origins only. Moreover, models 10 and 11 show that the previously found interaction effect for horizontal mobility away from the father's interpersonal work logic, is entirely driven by respondents from middle-class origins, i.e. with fathers who were socio-cultural professionals, as the interaction is only statistically significant in the latter model, and with a substantively large interaction term of 0.11. Contrary to hypothesis 2, this group is even more strongly influenced by the father's ideology compared to the immobile, as the interaction effect is positive. This reflects the strong political identity of the socio-cultural professionals, which is apparently robustly transmitted to the children. A similar positive interaction effect is found for the horizontally mobile with fathers who were technical professionals (model 11), which was not found in the previous model in which the sample was not split up by class of origin.

From these findings can be concluded that the influence of the father's ideology is much less resilient to the change in work logic of the child in Germany than in Switzerland. Hypothesis 2 is thus only supported by the findings for Switzerland, but only partially. Whereas for several horizontal moves the influence of working-class fathers' ideology becomes smaller, the contrary is found for the children of middle-class fathers in the technical and interpersonal work logic. Their horizontally mobile children are even closer to their father's ideology, compared to the immobile. However, for those with a father from the organizational logic, mobility does increase the ideological distance. Regarding hypothesis 1, findings are more similar across the two countries. In both Germany and Switzerland, a negative interaction effect is found for the upwardly mobile, as expected in hypothesis 1a. In Germany, a similar effect is also found for the downwardly mobile, whereas in Switzerland, this is not the case (as predicted in H1b).

5.5.3 Individual fixed effect analysis using the SHP

What the foregoing analyses have not been able to address, is to what extent socially mobile people have different political preferences compared to their father *from the outset*, or whether the fact that they have become socially mobile has had a causal influence, and has thus changed their ideology over time, making them move away from the father's ideology. Put simply: are the previous findings due to self-selection into social mobility, or is there a causal effect? Individual fixed effects analysis (FE) can show to what extent individuals' ideology changes after becoming socially mobile. As the father's ideology is observed at one specific point in history, as I am using retrospective information for this variable, the ideology of the child is the dependent variable in this analysis, and not the distance to the father's ideology. As all time-invariant observations will drop out of the fixed effects analysis, and for each respondent the observations over time are de-meaned (Allison, 2009, p. 19), it does not make a difference whether to look at the child's *ideology* or the child's *distance to the father's ideology* in the FE analysis.

In Table 5-7, the effects of respectively vertical and horizontal social mobility on ideology are estimated *within* individuals, over time. In order to properly separate the different types of mobility, analyses are performed separately again for middle and working-class origin. The analyses are performed on the same analytic sample as the previous SHP analyses, but with the only difference that respondents under 30 are also included, but have included in a separate category: 'no class location'. This is done in order to have enough individual change over time, otherwise the analyses would be limited to only those who did not only experience inter- but also intragenerational mobility (see also Research Design section).

Firstly, the first model in Table 5-7 shows that there are no significant effects of downward or upward social mobility on left–right ideology. These findings imply that the previously found larger difference in ideology between vertically upward children and their father, compared to those who are immobile, is not due to the vertical mobility changing the ideology of the children, but to self-selection into social mobility, providing support for Hypothesis 3. Rather than a causal effect, it is a process that most likely started earlier, which might have resulted in the fact that the child has become upwardly

mobile. The results are similar when the sample is split up by class of origin (models 2-3).

Table 5-7. Individual Fixed Effects Analysis: Left–right Ideology on Intergenerational Social Mobility, Switzerland

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left–right self-placement		WC origin	MC origin		WC origin	MC origin
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)						
No class location	-0.0269	0.0107	-0.0614			
	(0.0411)	(0.0610)	(0.0537)			
Downward	-0.0298		-0.0351			
	(0.0465)		(0.0433)			
Upward	-0.00653	0.00260				
	(0.0340)	(0.0369)				
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)						
No class location yet				0.0106	0.0505	-0.0271
				(0.0446)	(0.0640)	(0.0606)
Move from Entrepreneurial work logic				-0.0700	-0.0570	-0.0913
				(0.0484)	(0.0564)	(0.106)
Move from Organizational work logic				-0.00328	0.0998	-0.0444
				(0.0506)	(0.104)	(0.0548)
Move from Technical work logic				0.0758	0.0677	0.110
				(0.0462)	(0.0570)	(0.0812)
Move from Interpersonal work logic				0.246***	0.404***	0.158*
				(0.0761)	(0.136)	(0.0873)
Age in year of interview	0.0163***	0.0158***	0.0170***	0.0163***	0.0159***	0.0169***
	(0.00142)	(0.00187)	(0.00214)	(0.00142)	(0.00188)	(0.00214)
Constant	3.933***	4.010***	3.803***	3.905***	3.974***	3.785***
	(0.0737)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.0758)	(0.103)	(0.110)
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005
N person-years	44,968	27,664	17,304	44,968	27,664	17,304
N individuals	5,871	3,661	2,210	5,871	3,661	2,210

Source: SHP 1999–2014. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For horizontal mobility (models 4-6), the results are less straightforward. The previously found larger distance between horizontally children and their fathers in the organizational and entrepreneurial work logic, is apparently also due to self-selection into mobility, as the FE analyses do not show a change in ideology for these respondents. Horizontally mobile people who moved away from the father's interpersonal work logic, from both working and middle-class origins, are found to move towards the right on the left–right scale, as shown by positive effects. Especially among the working class, the effect size is quite large (0.4). This implies that these individuals have moved away from

their father's most likely more leftist positions. For the horizontally mobile children of technical professionals and production workers (technical work logic), a similar result is found (significant at p=0.1), but is less robust at it loses its statistical power when the sample is split up.

In Table 5-8, the last three FE models (7-8) are presented, in which both types of mobility are jointly included in the analysis. This does not lead to any different conclusions.

Table 5-8. Individual Fixed Effects Analysis (continued): Left–right Ideology on Intergenerational Social Mobility, Switzerland

	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left–right self-placement		WC origin	MC origin
Vertical Mobility (ref=no mobility)			
No class location	0.00616	0.0501	-0.0327
	(0.0457)	(0.0669)	(0.0610)
Downward	-0.0414		-0.0380
	(0.0469)		(0.0437)
Upward	-0.00610	-0.000741	
	(0.0343)	(0.0371)	
Horizontal Mobility (ref= no mobility)			
No class location yet	-	-	-
Move from Entrepreneurial work logic	-0.0705	-0.0569	-0.0959
	(0.0486)	(0.0565)	(0.106)
Move from Organizational work logic	0.00106	0.0998	-0.0393
	(0.0509)	(0.104)	(0.0551)
Move from Technical work logic	0.0758	0.0679	0.108
	(0.0464)	(0.0572)	(0.0812)
Move from Interpersonal work logic	0.251***	0.404***	0.164*
	(0.0763)	(0.136)	(0.0876)
Age in year of interview	0.0163***	0.0159***	0.0169***
	(0.00142)	(0.00188)	(0.00214)
Constant	3.910***	3.974***	3.794***
	(0.0766)	(0.104)	(0.110)
R-squared	0.004	0.004	0.005
N person-years	44,968	27,664	17,304
N individuals	5,871	3,661	2,210

Source: SHP 1999-2014. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the foregoing analysis, I found that horizontally mobile children from socio-cultural and technical professionals are more strongly influenced by their father's ideology than

the immobile of the same origin. Combining this with the fact that they change their ideology after becoming mobile, it most likely implies that this group was even more strongly influenced by their parents to start with, but due to the mobility moved a bit away. However, compared to the immobile, they are still found to have ideological positions closer to that of their father. These findings could imply that the work logic has an important socializing influence on the father, and that this ideology is to a large extent transmitted to the child, but as the child starts working under a different work logic, it gets influenced by the new environment. This is in line with the work of Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) and stresses the importance of the work logic for the differentiation in political orientations, especially among the middle class.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the question how intergenerational social mobility of children affects the transmission of political ideology from parents to these children, taking both vertical and horizontal social mobility into account. Based on the analyses, I firstly conclude that socially mobile individuals are indeed different from their immobile peers. Several groups of socially mobile respondents, both vertically (H1) and horizontally (H2) mobile, have been found to have a larger, but sometimes also smaller, distance to the parental ideology. Generally speaking, socially mobile individuals are less close to the political ideology of their father, except for the horizontally mobile individuals whose fathers were socio-cultural professionals or technical professionals, who take closer positions to the father's ideology. However, these findings regarding horizontal mobility are limited to Switzerland only. The finding that was consistent across both countries under study is the larger difference in the ideology of parents and their vertically upwardly mobile children, providing support for Hypothesis 1a. The differences in findings between Germany and Switzerland can be explained by several factors. First, in the baseline models, it already became apparent that in Switzerland larger differences in political ideology by class location were found than in Germany. This may point to the fact that there is less distinction in political ideology by work logic in Germany compared to Switzerland, as the Oesch class scheme relies not only on vertical but also horizontal differentiation. If horizontal class differences are smaller to begin with, it can indeed be expected that the effects of horizontal social mobility are smaller as well. Furthermore, the fact that both downward and upward social mobility

indicated a smaller ideological influence of the father in Germany (compared to this finding for upward mobility only in Switzerland) may signify that rather vertical differences are more important for ideological differentiation across classes.

The key follow-up question is the extent to which these differences between socially mobile and immobile citizens are due to the actual experience of having become socially mobile, or to the fact that those who became immobile were different from the outset? To test for this self-selection mechanism, as formulated in Hypothesis 3, individual fixed effects analyses were performed using the Swiss panel data. The results revealed that most of the previously found effects were indeed due to self-selection into social mobility, as most respondents did not change their political ideology as a consequence of having become socially mobile. An exception is again found for the horizontally mobile children of fathers from the interpersonal, and, to a lesser extent, also the technical work logic. These findings reveal a complex interplay of the ideology of parents and children and how it relates to the social mobility of the children, as the cross-sectional results imply a smaller difference in political ideology compared to the immobile, but the FE analyses also show that these groups do move away from the parental ideology as a consequence of horizontal mobility. An important conclusion to be drawn from these findings is the re-socializing power of the new work logic in which these horizontally mobile children have started working, which underlines the importance of the setting of the work process for political orientations. Moreover, the impact of new peer groups in the new work logic adds to this process as well.

Additional research is needed to further disentangle the processes that underlie the leverage of the work logic for political ideology, but this study is a first step that shows the importance of the father's work logic combined with the consequences of moving towards a different field than the father. As for vertical mobility and its consequences for political orientations, the question to which more studies have been devoted, this research has presented findings indicating an important self-selection mechanism into vertical social mobility. These results possibly cast doubts on earlier findings regarding the impact of social mobility on political preferences.

6. Conclusion: The Enduring Influence of the Parental Home

6.1 Family influences on political ideology: not limited to transmission

The field of political socialization provides *"a much-needed emphasis on some of the most exciting questions we confront in studying political behavior"* (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995, p. 14). Indeed, such excitement about the questions regarding the impact of family on political ideology that this thesis has addressed is what has motivated this research. Despite the drop in political socialization research in the 1970s because of overly-high expectations that the results failed to meet, the field has been revitalized. To a certain extent, consensus has been reached on the importance of the parental home for citizens' political preferences and behaviour (Jennings, 2007). However, the focus in more recent decades has shifted to socializing forces outside the family, such as social networks, schools, and peers (e.g. Beck et al., 2002; Dean & Croft, 2001; Levine, 2005; Wittebrood, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005). Despite the importance of such socialization influences, many questions regarding family influences are still not addressed. Especially in light of recent insights regarding the genetic component to political preferences and ideology, the role of the family needs to be reassessed in terms of the socializing influence as well. Moreover, developments in society imply manifold changes regarding the family: divorce rates have been on the rise since decades, the number of children per family is decreasing, while children are increasingly born outside marriage, and children are more often higher educated than their parents. Political socialization research however has unfolded regarding the traditional family image and mainly focussed on the influence of the parents, not taking specific dynamics within the family into account. This research has contributed to the field of political socialization by providing a reassessment of the role of the family, taking a few specific family characteristics into account and how they impact the development and transmission of political ideology.

The foregoing chapters have consistently shown the large level of left–right ideology transmission from parents to children, and how different family dynamics and experiences impact this process and the development of ideology in the long run. While recent studies had already shown that left–right ideology is transmitted in Catalonia and Italy in a similar way as party identification and other political orientations (Corbetta et al., 2013; Rico & Jennings, 2016), this thesis adds to this knowledge by providing

insights into the transmission of ideology in Germany and Switzerland. It shows that family provides a starting point into the world of politics, and is of stable and enduring influence until later in life, as was earlier demonstrated for the US (Jennings et al., 2009). Even though times are changing, as shown by increasing levels of electoral volatility and the successful emergence of new parties, the influence of the family has proven to be relatively stable over time, as the findings of this study are comparable to those from the Political Action Study in the 1970s (Percheron & Jennings, 1981; Westholm & Niemi, 1992). However, as this research has focussed on the transmission of left–right ideology in multiparty systems, the variety of parties within these party systems implies that even voters with similar ideologies are well able to cast their votes differently.

Throughout the different chapters of this thesis, it has become clear that parental political ideology has an important influence on that of the child in the two countries central to the study. In Switzerland, a quarter of the variation in left–right ideology is explained by the parental ideology alone. In Germany, the overlap of left–right positions of parents and children in percentages was slightly larger than in Switzerland, but more formal tests showed larger transmission rates in Switzerland. This finding is in line with expectations that due to the larger level of party system fragmentation in Switzerland, ideology is more important in the transmission of political orientations. Moreover, the distribution of citizens over the scale is another explanation for this difference: the large peak on the midpoint in Germany provides less variation to explain than in Switzerland. Additional research regarding the salience of the left–right dimension would be needed to further explain these differences.

Moreover, Chapter 2 has shown that the classic explanations regarding the factors that increase political transmission families are still valid here. A higher level of ideological transmission takes place when parents take similar left–right positions, providing a more consistent heuristic cue to the child, which enhances the socialization process. Moreover, higher transmission rates were found among higher SES families, and for higher educated parents. On average, moderate ideological positions are more often transmitted to children, but in Switzerland parents' moderate left- and right-wing positions were as much taken over by the child as a centrist ideology.

Furthermore, additional insights of this thesis regarding the direct impact of family dynamics and structure on citizens' ideology, cast new light on the different ways in which the family impacts political orientations. Firstly, Chapter 3 has further investigated the gender dynamics regarding the transmission of ideology. Although in Chapter 2 some indications were found for a more important role of the mother, especially in Switzerland, more formal tests in the subsequent chapter did not confirm this. However, some modest support was found for a larger influence of the mother's ideology in Germany, although this finding was not robust either when only parents with different ideological positions were taken into account. Additionally, contrary to expectations no gender-specific pattern was found: fathers do not have a larger impact on their sons, and mothers do not have a larger influence on their daughters. Chapter 3 has also investigated a different type of gender effects: the impact of the gender of an older sister on the ideology of young adults. Depending upon the gender of the respondent and the ideology of the mother, some effects were found in Switzerland. Most importantly, the findings indicate a left-wing impact of having a next-older sister in families with a centrist ideology, and a widening of the gender gap depending on the gender of the eldest sibling. Whereas females with an eldest sister take more leftist positions than females with an eldest brother, for males having an eldest sister compared to an eldest brother has a right-wing effect.

Chapter 4 has investigated the consequences of parental separation – which most often implies growing up in a single-mother family – for the political ideology of adults. Analyses for 18 Western European countries showed that parental separation during childhood indeed has an impact on ideology until later in life. Respondents of whom the parents divorced during childhood take more leftist positions on the left–right scale. This effect partly runs through economic deprivation that is often a consequence of divorce, but also leaves room for additional mechanisms, such as single-mother socialization and witnessing the parents breaking social norms. Additional analyses using the G-SOEP and the SHP confirmed these findings for Germany and especially Switzerland, also after controlling for the ideology of the mother, i.e. controlling for self-selection into divorce. Longitudinal analyses demonstrated a change in the mother's ideology towards the left after the separation from the partner, indicating a complex

interplay of mechanisms. The child's ideology is thus not only directly, but also indirectly, influenced by parental divorce.

The last empirical chapter has investigated the implications for the transmission of political ideology from parents to children when the social class of parents, as provided by the father, is not taken over by the child. This directly taps into the structural inheritance mechanism underlying the similarity in political orientations of parents and children, and the endurance of the socializing influence of the family. Especially vertical mobility is found to decrease the influence of the father's ideology on the child's ideology. However, some findings regarding horizontal mobility stand out, implying a large socializing influence of the parental home, especially for children from socio-cultural professionals. The self-selection into social mobility is explicitly taken into account by estimating longitudinal analyses regarding the child's ideology in relation to the change in class position. These individual fixed analyses for Switzerland show, as hypothesized, that most of these effects are due to self-selection. As children who become socially mobile are different from their parents to start with, they are also less likely to take over their political ideology. As such, these larger differences in political ideology between parents and their socially mobile children, compared to parents and immobile children, are not a causal effect of the experience of mobility but a sign of self-selection of children into social mobility.

Taken together, this thesis has shown the impact of family on political ideology, both in terms of transmission and direct influences of family dynamics and structure. Building on a solid foundation of political socialization research, this study has contributed to the field by showing how the parental influence is important for their adult children's ideology until later in life, and that this influence is not limited to transmission only. The structure of and the dynamics in the family influence children's ideology both directly, as shown by the effects of the gender of an older sibling and parental divorce, and indirectly, as demonstrated by factors impacting the transmission process, such as the similarity in the parental ideology, gender dynamics in the family, and social mobility of the children.

These findings indicate – in line with most studies in political socialization – the parental home as a stable point of departure for the development of citizens' political ideology. The parents are among the first socializing agents, and their influence is enduring until later in life. However, not only the parents as such, but also other aspects of the parental home – in terms of structure and dynamics – have been shown to have lasting effects on citizens' political orientations. This raises the question how these findings should be placed within a wider perspective, in a fast-changing political reality, in which an overload of information is available to citizens at virtually every moment of the day. Moreover, the contemporary political and social change imply rapidly evolving developments throughout Western European democracies, such as the politicization of new lines of conflict, and the successful emergence of new parties, leading to changes in the structure of the political space. At the same time, society is changing in terms of social stratification and occupational structure, and transformations of the family and household.

This thesis has provided an investigation of different political socialization processes that particularly takes these recent social developments into account. Comparing the findings to the lion's share of political socialization research, which was mostly performed more than half a century ago, it shows that even in this changed society the family still provides such an important and stable factor in the development of citizens' political orientation. Some findings even implied a higher level of intergenerational transmission than in earlier studies. Although this may seem a paradox – how can the family still provide such an important function in this respect, when both politics and society have changed so much? – it is not necessarily that antagonistic. Even though parents may have been socialized in a completely different political reality than their children, in order to be able to take part in the prevailing political structure they are required to update their perceptions, preferences, and political behaviour in response to political changes. Of course, their own socialization experiences leave a lasting imprint as well, but this does not necessarily mean that they are stuck in the past. As such, the political experience of parents together with their own way of navigating a newer political reality, provides a solid basis for their children's own political development. Especially in times of a supply of (political) information that can be very overwhelming, this may be even more needed than before. However, this also implies that the way in

which such socialization processes are analysed need to include political cues that are relevant and salient to both parents and children, which is something that may become increasingly complicated.

Furthermore, the findings that specific dynamics and structures of the family leave a lasting imprint on children's political ideology indicate that such formative experiences in the family are also imperative for the political development of individuals, not only their social development. In this sense, the family forms a fundamental starting point in the political socialization process in a different way than theorized before. As such, the family is not only crucial because of parents providing political cues and serving as political role models, but also because of the day-to-day experiences that are implied by the structure of and the dynamics taking place in the family. By such experiences are individuals not only formed as persons, but also as citizens, voters, and political animals.

6.2 Implications of the study and avenues for future research

The findings of this thesis have implications for society and politics on the one hand, and for academia on the other. It has never been the objective of this thesis to come up with policy advice or suggestions, most importantly because the family and its dynamics are mostly regarded as a private affair, especially when it comes to the transmission of political orientations. However, the findings of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have societal implications that I would like to point out here. In terms of research implications, I especially stress the results of Chapter 5 regarding social mobility. After the discussion of the more specific implications of the findings of the different chapters of this thesis, and how additional studies can further build upon them, I discuss avenues for future research and the implications of this study more broadly.

In Chapter 4, investigating the political consequences of parental separation, I have showed that the mothers under study change their ideology after separation, by taking slightly more leftist positions than before separating from the partner. Even when the occupational status (including unemployment) is taken into account, this effect remains and is quite strong. This is in line with literature demonstrating that women are often worse off after a separation (Andress & Hummelsheim, 2009; Sayer, 2006), which has also been found in the US to impact on their political preferences (Edlund & Pande,

2002). The fact that this finding is also true for Swiss mothers and their left–right ideology, as shown in this thesis, raises the question to what extent the welfare provisions for single mothers are adequate. Switzerland is a country marked by a high level of gender equality and a high standard of living, but nevertheless the consequences of a partner separation seem to be large, and most likely more severe for women than for men. These findings deserve attention especially in light of the divorce rates being on the rise throughout the last decades.

Moreover, the findings in Chapter 3 provide reasons to believe that gender roles have a decisive impact in households in Switzerland. The gender of especially the eldest child in the family has opposite effects on the ideology of the younger siblings. Whereas for females, a rather 'empowering' left-wing effect was found (eldest sister makes the younger sister more progressive), males with an eldest sister are more conservative than those with an eldest brother, indicated by more rightist positions on the left–right scale. This seems to indicate an interplay between gender role division in the household depending on the birth order and gender of the siblings, and perhaps shows despite the large gender equality in Switzerland in formal terms a remaining core of persistent traditionalism in Swiss families, as suggested in earlier research (Levy et al., 2002). This does not seem to apply to Germany, where no effects of the gender of an older sister were found. Although this is merely a reasoning to help explain the findings regarding the influence of the gender of an older sibling, the results deserve attention in light of the position of women in the household and in society at large, and provide avenues for future research that I discuss in the next section.

The *academic* implications of this study are largest for Chapter 5, as it relates most strongly to a specific field of research that deals with the political consequences of social mobility. While a body of research in this field has quite consistently shown that socially mobile individuals adapt to a certain extent to the political preferences prevailing in their class of destination, this study has studied their ideology also longitudinally. The results indicate that whereas socially mobile individuals indeed are less influenced by their parent's ideology compared to the immobile, this is not a consequence of the experience of social mobility. The longitudinal analysis, limited to Switzerland, shows that socially mobile individuals do not change their ideology after experiencing mobility.

Despite some limitations of the research, this result has implications for conclusions regarding the political consequences of social mobility that were drawn by earlier studies.

While pursuing this research, it was striking to ascertain how separated the analytic toolkits of sociologists and political scientists are. Most datasets that include family-specific variables such as birth order, sibling composition, and other family structure information, do not include political preferences. Vice versa, most political surveys do not include family characteristics. Furthermore, the analyses in this thesis have shown the importance of using longitudinal models regarding political orientations instead of cross-sectional ones, as the inferential power is much larger and can lead to vastly different conclusions, for instance regarding the consequences of social mobility. However, most longitudinal studies that cover a large time span, include no or limited information regarding political preferences. Taken together, longitudinal data including a wide range of family-specific and political variables, using comparable measures across a number of countries, can help to improve the understanding of the relation between family and political orientations. This field is currently growing, and is extending the focus from political socialization in terms of family transmission, to the influence of family structure and transitions on political preferences and behaviour (Edlund & Pande, 2002; Elder & Greene, 2016; Hener et al., 2016; Kaufman et al., 2016; Sances, 2013; Voorpostel & Coffé, 2015).

For these reasons, the limitations to this thesis mostly concern data availability. All longitudinal analyses are performed for Switzerland only, as the G-SOEP only includes left–right ideology in two waves. However, the choice for using this variable was based on the theoretical ground that ideology is the more important socializing cue in multiparty systems, but most studies continue to focus on party identification. The research could have benefited from the inclusion of additional dependent variables, such as policy preferences regarding different issues. Unfortunately, there were no such variables available that were similar enough across the two household studies employed in this research. Some hypothesized mechanisms were more directed to the influence on socio-cultural rather than socioeconomic preferences. Therefore, additional dependent variables, such as specific positions on policy issues, can help to better disentangle them

and provide more fine-grained insights regarding the relation between political preferences and family dynamics.

Moreover, some of the findings of this thesis point at a complex interplay of mechanisms. For instance, parental separation was shown not only to affect the ideology of the child, but the separation also led to a change in the mother's ideology. Additional research is needed to further disentangle the mechanisms at play here, for instance by providing a more qualitative account of the impact of the separation on both the child and the mother, and by using additional dependent variables than can better capture the type of political orientations that are affected more specifically. For instance, one of the hypothesized mechanisms underlying the left-wing effect of parental separation regards the child witnessing the parents breaking social norms, which is expected to lead to more liberal attitudes of the child. This mechanism thus explicitly addresses implications of parental separation for the children's cultural rather than economic preferences. Even though the left–right self-placement variable captures positions from both the socioeconomic and the cultural dimension (De Vries et al., 2013; Lachat, 2009), additional analyses using respondents' positions on a variety of cultural issues as a dependent variable can help better explain to what extent such a mechanism is indeed observed.

In a similar way, such analyses can also clarify the findings of Chapter 5. The results imply that horizontal mobility has relevant consequences for the transmission and development of political ideology, and differ sharply across different work logic. Not much is known regarding the socializing influence of the work logic. Therefore, the use of additional dependent variables can help to answer the questions that these results raise, such as whether the strong effect for social-cultural professionals have come about because this group so strongly identifies with the left as such, or whether specific attitudes regarding socioeconomic and/or cultural issues are strongly developed within this work logic, and thus transmitted to the children? Moreover, the longitudinal analyses showed no change over time in the ideology for vertically mobile individuals. This raises the question whether there was perhaps a change in specific positions, for instance on economic policy issues, that did not translate in a shift on the left–right scale, or whether the experience of vertical mobility did not affect such positions.

Another type of dependent variable which could help to further explain the findings of this thesis concerns gender role attitudes and behaviour, and its relation to political ideology and policy preferences. As discussed before, Chapter 3 has showed differential effects of the eldest sibling being a female for younger siblings, dependent upon their gender. These findings are puzzling to a certain extent, and could be clarified by investigating how political ideology relates to gender role attitudes, and to what extent the presence of traditional gender roles in the family, e.g. in terms of household chores, is dependent upon the gender composition and birth order of the siblings. Some work has been done on this latter question (McHale et al., 1999), but it has hardly been connected to the political preferences and ideology of the household members. Such analyses can also help explain the contrasting findings of earlier studies. Males with a larger share of sisters or with a next-younger sister are found to be more conservative (Healy & Malhotra, 2013), and at the same time individuals with a next-older sister are found to be more leftist (Urbatsch, 2011).

Even though the mechanisms under study in this thesis have not always been explicitly uncovered and additional analyses would help to clarify some of the findings, it has provided new insights regarding the relation between parents' political ideology and family dynamics on the one hand, and the political ideology of (young) adult children on the other. Taken together, this thesis has shown how family impacts political ideology of children during young and later adulthood, in a variety of ways. In sum: family matters, also for political ideology.

The results of this study imply a complex interplay between processes of ideological and attitudinal development on the one hand, and experiences within and outside the family on the other. As such, I believe that political socialization research should not be an isolated sub-discipline within political science, but should rather be a more integrated subfield that ranges across disciplines. This way, political socialization processes can be studied in a better and more comprehensive way, incorporating expertise, insights, and methods from psychology, sociology, behavioural genetics, and child educational sciences.

Incorporating the expertise of other disciplines is also valuable in order to improve the methods used in political socialization research. As I suggested earlier, applying longitudinal analyses, which is more commonly done in other fields of study, allows for making better inferences. Moreover, making use of natural experiments, for instance exploiting a change in specific family laws or policies, or regarding sex compositions, can also provide solid bases for future research. However, even when causality can be shown based on innovative research designs, it does not necessarily provide an insight regarding the underlying mechanism.

This thesis has made an attempt to open up the black box of political socialization, but the box is large and very black. Although this research has provided important new insights regarding the formative role of family structure and dynamics, there is still a lot of unexplored territory. For instance, what cognitive processes underlie the mechanism of social learning that is seen as key to political socialization, and what kind of family-specific factors are most importantly intervening herein, and how? How do parents translate their personal beliefs and values into practices inside the home, and to what extent does this also reflect their political orientation? How does the style of parenting relate to the development of the child, not in social but also political terms? Which consequences do growing up in new family forms – e.g. same-sex parent families, patchwork families, single-mother families by choice – have for the development of political orientations? Do people have different genetic predispositions that make them more or less open to such formative experiences?

Many of such questions are asked in other disciplines than political science, but regarding different outcomes. As such, there is an important role left for political socialization research, especially as regards uncovering the mechanisms that underlie these key formative processes that start in families. Research that crosses disciplinary boundaries is therefore imperative to really move this field forward, especially in light of the rapidly advancing research in political behaviour, in which individual explanations are mostly put forward as the driver of political behaviour and orientations. Therefore, additional innovative ways need to be found to better disentangle the mechanisms underlying political socialization processes. I believe that taking a truly interdisciplinary approach provides promising avenues to do so.

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