The Rise of Euro-journalism

The Media and the European Communities, 1950s-1970s

Martin Herzer

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization of the European University Institute

Florence, 30 October 2017
European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSA</td>
<td>Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BPA</td>
<td>Bundespresseamt</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>Belgische Radio- en Televisieomroep</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération générale du travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Christiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>dpa</td>
<td>Deutsche Presse Agentur</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>European Broadcasting Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>CECA</td>
<td>Comunità europea del carbone e dell'acciaio</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Foreign Office</td>
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<td>FT</td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWDR</td>
<td>Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORTF</td>
<td>Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti communiste français</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAI</td>
<td>Radiotelevisione Italiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTF</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion-télévision française</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VWD</td>
<td>Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>Westdeutscher Rundfunk</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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1 Introduction

Supporters of the ‘European integration process’ like to complain about the media. Ever since the 1950s, they have been claiming that journalists do not pay enough attention to ‘European integration’, publish only negative news on ‘Europe’ and fail to cover the EU from a ‘European perspective’. In his memoirs, Jean Monnet commented regarding the Schuman declaration that in 1950 few journalists recognised “la signification de la proposition, dont les aspects techniques voilaient à première vue la portée politique.”\(^1\) The European Community spokesperson Marcell von Donat in 1975 was critical of journalists who usually filed negative stories from Brussels while neglecting positive news: “The image is negative.”\(^2\) In 1993, German sociologist Jürgen Gerhards lamented in an influential article that the media were “lagging behind” in ‘Europeanisation’ compared to politics and the economy.\(^3\) EU officials regularly voice outrage over the ‘Euro-bashing’ in British tabloids.\(^4\) A recent study on Euro crisis media coverage found national perspectives and stereotypes dominating.\(^5\) Over the last decades, intellectual debates and scholarly research have been concerned with the ‘obstacles’ nationally organised media pose to ‘European integration’ and how these could be overcome.

This thesis argues that such normative debates and scholarship have missed the fact that postwar Western European media has also made essential ‘contributions’ to the ‘European integration process’. By reconstructing the rise of Euro-journalism in Western European media, the thesis demonstrates how journalists helped create and shape the European Union as the *sui generis* ‘supranational’ polity and incarnation of ‘Europe’ we know today. It argues that the central position of ‘European integration’ and the EU in European public discourse today is not the logical outcome of the union’s ‘singularity’ or the ‘progress’ of the ‘integration process’. Instead, the thesis argues that it results from a miraculous

transformation the European Communities underwent in the Western European media between the 1950s and the 1970s. This transformation was pioneered and led by a group of Euro-journalists supportive of ‘European integration’ through ‘supranationalism’. In the 1950s, the media presented the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM as technocratic international organisations that did not stand out among the many other international organisations promoting Western European cooperation. By the late 1970s, however, Western European media framed the Communities as the sole representative of ‘European integration’ and as the democratic coherent ‘European’ polity which we today know as the EU. The story of this astonishing conversion is the subject of this study.

The pioneers behind the emergence of the European Communities, this thesis argues, were the Euro-journalists. They worked as economic and foreign affairs journalists in the editorial departments of important Western European media outlets. The Euro-journalists embraced ‘European integration’ through ‘supranationalism’ and the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM in the 1950s and early 1960s. They adopted a narrative then developing among advocates of ‘European Integration’ à la EEC in political parties, government administrations, academia, business, civil society and the Community institutions. This sui generis ‘European integration’ narrative framed the European Communities as the only legitimate incarnation of ‘European integration’ and ‘Europe’. Moreover, it argued that ‘supranational’ EEC integration was the precondition for peace, prosperity and the continued relevance of ‘Europe’ on the international scene. Finally, it framed integration as a necessarily forward-moving ‘process’ under constant threat of ‘crises’. The Euro-journalists successfully introduced this sui generis European Communities narrative into the Western European media, where it initially competed with other visions of ‘European unity’.

During the 1960s, the Euro-journalists’ efforts, an expanding EEC and a changing international context led to the rise of the sui generis EEC narrative and Euro-journalism in the Western European media. Starting from the early 1970s, Euro-journalism became the interpretative framework of Western European mainstream journalism for ‘European integration’ coverage. Together with Western European elites, journalists promoted ‘European integration’ and the European Community to the ‘European’ public. They helped inflate the Community with symbolic value and turned it into something bigger than it actually was. Symbolically charged media coverage of the European Council and the first direct European elections in 1979 led to the emergence of the European Community as the
coherent democratic ‘European’ polity in Western European media which we today know as the EU. This marked the final triumph of Euro-journalism in the late 1970s.

**The media and ‘European integration’ in social science and historical research**

This study approaches the relationship between the media, journalism and ‘European integration’ in a different way from most social science scholarship, which has so far dominated research on the issue. Instead of asking how the media and journalists could help construct a democratic and legitimate European Union, the study deconstructs the rise of Euro-journalism and the sui generis ‘European integration’ narrative in Western European media. Contrary to studies making suggestions on how the EU could improve its supposedly deficient communication to the public, this thesis has no proposals for how the EU could ‘communicate better’ to ‘European’ citizens. It also has no interest in and thus no answer to the question of if a ‘European’ journalism or truly ‘European’ media outlets are possible. The following chapters will offer no sweeping theory on the ‘European public sphere’, instead, they will provide simple empirical evidence. Instead of applying elaborate quantitative methods to analyse media content, this study concentrates on people: the biographies, visions and actions of journalists who covered ‘European integration’ starting from the 1950s.

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Much social science scholarship is ahistorical and takes the ‘permissive consensus’\textsuperscript{11} and the non-politicisation\textsuperscript{12} of ‘European integration’ in the postwar decades as a natural starting point. This thesis provides detailed historical research and suggests that never in its history was ‘European integration’ as contested and politicised as in the two immediate postwar decades. Finally, contrary to scholarship claiming that European Community institutions like the European Parliament initially only received ‘second order’ attention in the media,\textsuperscript{13} the thesis will argue that starting from the 1950s and thanks to Euro-journalism, the Community institutions – including the European Parliament – received more and not less media attention than would have been expected.

At the same time, this thesis builds on and contributes to multiple burgeoning fields of historical and sociological research on ‘European integration’ history and journalism history. The thesis follows the suggestion that ‘European integration’ history should not be narrated as a necessarily forward-moving ‘process’.\textsuperscript{14} It is inspired by recent research arguing that the ‘uniqueness’ of the European Communities did not derive from their institutional set-up or exceptional competencies, but from how they were wrapped into ‘European’ symbolism and expectancy.\textsuperscript{15} While such research has concentrated on EC institutional actors\textsuperscript{16} and expert groups like lawyers,\textsuperscript{17} diplomats,\textsuperscript{18} financial experts\textsuperscript{19} or politicians,\textsuperscript{20} this study emphasises the crucial role of journalists in spreading the \textit{sui generis} narrative on the Communities to a

\begin{enumerate}
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broader audience. As with the studies cited above, this thesis concentrates on actors and their networks. As with the studies cited above, this thesis concentrates on actors and their networks. Most research on EU correspondents in Brussels lacks the historical dimension necessary to grasp the rise of Euro-journalism. French sociological research on EU correspondents contains useful historical sections, but remains limited to events and actors in the Brussels news hub. Qualitative and quantitative newspaper content analyses of ‘European integration’ coverage since the 1950s are useful, but miss the story beneath the surface of newspaper articles. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to recent scholarship questioning if public opinion and public discourse on ‘European integration’ in the postwar decades was really characterised by a ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘surpranational’ integration through the European Communities. It also contributes to a revision of the view of the

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British media as having always had a special ‘Eurosceptic’ bias. Finally, the thesis follows scholarship that argues that the history of Western European cooperation and integration can hardly be understood if not linked to broader developments of postwar international and economic history such as the Cold War, decolonisation and the shift from postwar Keynesianism to neoliberalism.

The story of Euro-journalism also contributes to our understanding of the media and journalism in postwar (Western) Europe. Social scientists emphasise the historical development of different national models of media systems in Western Europe. Historians have described a change from 1950s’ conservative ‘consensus journalism’ to 1960s’ and 1970s’ critical journalism that questioned authorities. While such arguments about change and national differences are certainly true, this thesis underlines transnational similarities and long-term continuities in Western European journalism. It suggests that the fundamental feature of Western European journalism between the 1940s and the 1980s was not the emergence of critical journalism, different ‘journalistic cultures’ or various ‘models of media systems’. Instead, it was elite-embeddedness and advocacy journalism. Journalists did not

observe and control elites, they were part of the elites. They largely considered themselves advocates for political and social causes, which they defended in conjunction with other elite actors in politics, business, academia and intellectual life. The following chapters tracing the rise of Euro-journalism will demonstrate the elitism and advocacy-orientation of journalists across Western Europe from the 1950s to the 1980s. ‘Critical’ journalism and diverging models of media systems matter little in this story. With this approach, the thesis takes recent research on the role of journalists as political actors in national and international politics further. This research has shown that journalists were not observers, but actors in political processes. At the same time, this thesis goes beyond most of the growing research on the role of foreign correspondents in international politics. It does not limit itself to investigating the role of correspondents in the bilateral relationship of two countries, like most existing scholarship does. Moreover, it does not merely study foreign correspondents in a single city. While Brussels figured prominently among the places where Euro-journalism was invented, the thesis follows Euro-journalism’s spread into editorial departments across Western Europe.


Although media effects are not its focus, this study provides evidence that the media in postwar Western Europe mattered greatly to elites and decision makers, while media effects on mass public opinion are difficult to identity. Elites used the media both nationally and internationally for mutual observation, exchange of arguments and the sending of open or hidden messages. They also assumed that the media could influence mass opinion. The emerging medium of television in particular was considered a powerful means by which to shape peoples’ views and opinions. The thesis unearthes some evidence that elite ideas about powerful media effects did not correspond to what in reality was a more limited influence. It seems that both postwar Western European elites and early-21st-century ‘European public sphere’ researchers shared an exaggerated belief in the power of the media.

Sources and methodology

This thesis constitutes the first study of postwar Western European journalism based on multiarchival research and multilingual primary and secondary sources from many Western European countries. It is also among the few studies to combine an analysis of media coverage with an investigation into the contemporary actors and production processes behind media content. In contrast with most scholarship on the history of journalism and foreign policy, the study goes beyond elite newspapers and includes television and news agencies. The thesis is based on primary sources from government, media and European Union archives in France, Germany, Italy and Britain. It is also based on an extensive reading of ‘European Integration’ coverage mostly in the French, Italian, West German and British press between the 1950s and the 1970s. Newspapers were analysed using keyword searches in online databases or read on microfilm. They were also read in the original paper version and through newspaper clippings in archives. Moreover, seventeen interviews with former journalists, EEC/EC officials and national diplomats were conducted. Finally, the thesis made extensive use of both recent and contemporary scholarship on the history and sociology of ‘European Integration’ and of journalism.

This study also has limits. First, a complete analysis of ‘European integration’ coverage in all Western European countries between 1950s and the 1980s would have gone beyond the

35 This is in line with recent research by Christian Götter, Die Macht der Wirkungsannahmen. Medienarbeit des britischen und deutschen Militärs in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015); Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit.
capacities of a single researcher. Therefore, the study concentrates on France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Britain. It also focuses on certain media outlets which were either considered influential (such as Le Monde, The Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) or had a wide audience (such as BBC, WDR, ZDF or Reuters). It also singles out individual journalists for meaningful and representative case studies. Second, the availability of sources and archive access set limits to this study. While some newspapers, news agencies and broadcasters give researchers wide-ranging access to their archives, others do not or have no archives. Some of those archives hold rich material on ‘European integration’ media coverage, while others do not. The latter is true also about government and European Union archives. Moreover, while some newspapers provide electronic databases allowing for keyword searches spanning decades and hundreds of thousands of newspaper articles, others needed to be searched with arduous and error-prone scanning of microfilms or old newspapers. Historical audio-visual sources for ‘European integration’ coverage by broadcasters are rare. Therefore, television and radio coverage of ‘European integration’ was mostly reconstructed using printed programme scripts and production lists. All these factors necessarily created gaps in this study. However, based on the combination of sources from multiple archives, electronic databases, interviews and primary and secondary literature, the thesis hopes to offer a comprehensive and convincing reconstruction of the rise of Euro-journalism in Western European media.

**Thesis structure**

The chapters follow the rise of Euro-journalism in chronological order. After the introduction, Chapter 2 shows how in the 1950s and 1960s, the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM did not stand out in Western European media among the many other Western European cooperation projects existing at the time. It gives examples of indifference and resistance towards ‘supranationalism’ and the European Communities among Western European journalists. It also outlines alternative ‘European integration’ projects supported in the media. Chapter 3 describes the creation of a group of Euro-journalists supportive of the Communities in Western European media in the 1950s and early 1960s. It outlines their biographies and explains why they came to support EEC ‘Europe’. Chapter 4 covers the sui generis EEC narrative’s rise from a marginal position in the late 1950s into a mainstream position in Western European media in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It shows how Euro-journalists were instrumental in spreading the sui generis ‘European integration’ narrative, but also
explains how an expanding EEC and a changing international environment made their narrative increasingly appealing. Chapter 5 focuses on the consolidation of the sui generis ‘European integration’ narrative and of Euro-journalism in Western European media in the first half of the 1970s. Chapter 6 closes by outlining the emergence of the EC as the democratic ‘European’ polity which today we know as the EU in the Western European media in the second half of the 1970s. It focuses on the symbolically charged media coverage of the European Council and the first direct European Parliamentary Elections in 1979.

Citations in the German language have been translated into English in the main body of the text. Citations in other languages, mostly French, Italian and Spanish, have been left in their original language. Citations in languages other than English in the footnotes have been left in their original language.
2 The Media and the many ‘Europes’

After 1945, the Cold War, decolonisation, the ‘German question’ and the need for economic reconstruction led to the emergence of Western European cooperation. However, between the 1940s and the 1960s, there was no consensus on the form, scope, finalité and actual desirability of ‘European integration’ in Western European elite circles and the broader public. Imperialism and nationalism lived on after the war as powerful ideologies. Rebuilding formerly occupied nations and preserving imperial power dominated domestic and foreign policy agendas across Western Europe. Western European cooperation projects ranged from the federalist vision of a ‘United States of Europe’, to conservative intergovernmentalism, free trade liberalism, and socialist and communist internationalism. Moreover, Western European cooperation had no institutional centre. There was not one but multiple international organisations promoting economic, political, and military cooperation in Western Europe: The Council of Europe, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the European Payments Union (EPU), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). These different Western European cooperation projects and international organisations were met with greatly varying attention and support in different Western European countries.

Contrary to the sui generis ‘European integration’ narrative, the Europe des Six with ECSC, EEC and EURATOM initially did not stand out among the many Western European cooperation projects as a future ‘European’ polity. While the ‘supranational’ integration project had influential supporters and a remarkable presence in public debates across Western Europe,36 the ‘Six’ faced indifference and resistance both inside and outside France, the Federal Republic, Italy and the Benelux countries.37 The signing of the Treaties of Rome in

36 Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss the various groups promoting the sui generis EEC narrative and Euro-journalism in detail.
37 For an historical overview of the resistance to the supranational ‘European integration’ vision of the ‘Six’ in different Western European countries, see the contributions in Daniele Pasquinucci and Luca Verzichelli, eds., Contro l’Europa? I diversi scetticismi verso l’integrazione europea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015); Maria Găinar and Martial Libera, eds., Contre l’Europe? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la
March 1957, today considered the founding moment of the European Union (EU), was not perceived as such by most contemporaries. First of all, events such as the Suez crisis, the Algerian war, the Berlin crisis or the return to power of Charles de Gaulle overshadowed the negotiations and creation of the EEC. The Treaties of Rome did not differ much from standard international agreements like those underlying other international organisations promoting Western European economic cooperation. While the EEC certainly mattered for Western European cooperation, few people in 1958 believed the Community could or should become the linchpin of ‘European Integration’ or a ‘European’ polity. When the EEC came into existence in early 1958, it seemed likely that it would soon be diluted or replaced by the Western European Free Trade Area. The EEC’s institutional set-up and competencies remained provisional and unclear until the early 1960s. The ‘Six’ and the Community institutions in Luxembourg and Brussels were not synonymous with ‘Europe’. The supporters of ‘supranationalism’ were themselves divided over the Treaties of Rome. Paul Henri Spaak considered them a positive step in the right direction, Altiero Spinelli thought they were a serious setback compared to the ECSC, which had stronger ‘supranational’ elements. In short, the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and 1958 did not create a coherent supranational polity standing at the centre of ‘European Integration’, but an international organisation few people at the time believed stood out among other international organisations promoting Western European cooperation.

This chapter will demonstrate that Western European media coverage between the 1940s and the 1960s reflected the different attitudes towards the multiple existing Western European cooperation projects. It will show that depending on nationality, political orientation and economic policy convictions, Western European journalists could be as divided over ‘European integration’ as politicians, bureaucrats, academics, businesspeople and
intellectuals. Media coverage contained support for, indifference towards and rejection of the different Western European integration visions. The ‘Six’ and the Communities played an important role in media coverage of ‘European integration’, but the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM did not stand out as a future ‘European’ polity. The chapter thus questions if debates on ‘European integration’ in the postwar decades followed a ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘supranational’ integration through the ‘Six’. While a complete survey of Western European media coverage of ‘European integration’ between the 1940s and the 1960s is beyond the scope of this study, the chapter will nevertheless demonstrate that coverage of Western European cooperation was much more controversial, politicised and multifaceted than assumed in much ‘European integration’ scholarship. It will also put media coverage of Western European cooperation into a broader context of postwar Western European media history.

**Western European cooperation and integration in the 1950s**

After the Second World War, imperialism and nationalism, not ‘supranationalism’ dominated European politics. Events such as the Korean War, the Indochina War, the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, the Suez and Berlin crises and the Algerian war of independence were the central issues for European diplomacy. Today’s ‘Europe’ and Britain, France, Germany, Italy or Belgium still awaited invention. British and French identity in the 1950s was global and imperial – not European. The colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s often reinforced imperial identities, from Belgium to Portugal. For most British, the United Kingdom in the 1950s constituted an imperial world power. For most French, Algeria formed a natural part of France. Imperial self-conceptions made participation in any kind of ‘European integration’ difficult to imagine. The Second World War also reinforced nationalism in Western Europe. After years of foreign occupation, the restoration of the

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42 The chapter thereby contributes to and builds on the already mentioned scholarship by Vauchez, *Brokering Europe*; Sternberg, *The Struggle for EU Legitimacy*; Davies, *Resisting the European Court of Justice*.


nation was of imminent importance to elites in France, the Netherlands, and Denmark. It was also central to many in Germany, where resentment against the division of the country, foreign occupation and territorial losses was widespread. The Federal Republic’s founders underlined the provisional character of the West German state. Their objective was to restore the German nation, including the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the lost Eastern territories. The Federal Republic’s declared aim was thus not to cede, but to regain national sovereignty and unity. Westintegration – transatlantic or Western European – was problematic in this regard, as it reinforced the division of Germany. It was only in the 1960s that the narrative of imperial Britain and France was replaced by a narrative framing them as European states. At the same time, the idea that Algeria, Silesia or Eastern Prussia formed an integral part of France or Germany became discursively discredited as fascist or right-wing extremist. In the 1950s, however, imperialism and nationalism defined the imagined communities of Western European nations.

Structural change in the international system constituted the decisive factor behind the emergence of Western European cooperation and integration after 1945. The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers, the Cold War, the crumbling of European empires and the need for economic reconstruction after the devastations of war forced the leaders of diminished Western European countries to search for ways to rebuild and preserve their states, societies and international status. For the Federal Republic, integration promised security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, reintegration into the ‘international community’, and a recovery of sovereignty and economic reconstruction. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium hoped for the containment of the Soviet Union and Germany, preservation of their international status after empire, and economic modernisation. Britain joined continental integration when its economic and political weakness increasingly put into question its status as a global power.

Starting from the late 1940s, a multitude of coexisting, connected and competing projects for political, military and economic Western European integration and cooperation developed. They were mirrored by military and economic integration in Eastern Europe, particularly through the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON. The ‘Congress of Europe’ in The Hague in 1948 led to the creation of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1949. It was comprised of ten Western European countries and sought to promote political and cultural integration in Western Europe, but had no significant powers. In 1948, the Marshall Plan led to the US-inspired creation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). During the 1950s, the OEEC became a driving force behind the liberalisation and integration of the economies of its twenty member states. The European Payments Union created in 1950 played a crucial role in re-connecting Western European national economies by restoring multilateral settlements. The OEEC-sponsored European Monetary Agreement replaced the EPU in 1958 by establishing currency convertibility in Western Europe. Trade liberalisation in Western Europe was also negotiated through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1950, the Schumann declaration laid the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community founded two years later. The ECSC created a common market for coal and steel among its six member states. Western European military integration started with the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties in 1947 and 1948, two pacts directed against Germany. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States pushed for West German remilitarisation and membership in the NATO alliance, founded in 1949. France tried to prevent the creation of a West German army with the Pleven Plan. It proposed a European Defence Union with a ‘European’ army, which would have put West German troops under French control. Britain declined to participate. The EDC – including the project of a European Political Community – failed in 1954, when the French National Assembly rejected its ratification treaty. The Federal Republic thereupon joined NATO in 1955. NATO became the principle means of Western European military integration – despite the launch of the ultimately ineffective Western European Union in 1954. The second half of the 1950s saw the creation of the European Economic Community and EURATOM with the Treaties of Rome in 1957. Only the six ECSC member states participated. Negotiations on a Western European free trade area pushed by Britain which would have marginalised the EEC failed in late 1958 due to French resistance. In reaction, Britain and six other Western European countries founded the European Free Trade Association in 1960. French *Eurafrique* plans contemplating a combination of ‘European integration’ and (neo)imperialism ultimately led nowhere. After the first decade of ‘European integration’, Europe stood politically and economically more
divided than in 1945. The continent had been divided into two militarily (NATO, Warsaw Pact) and economically (Western European economic cooperation, COMECON) competing camps. Moreover, Western Europe had effectively been split into two opposing economic spaces (EEC, EFTA).50

Conflicts over Western European cooperation in the 1950s

Debates over Western European cooperation and integration between the 1940s and the 1960s – just as with Western European politics generally – were multifaceted, contentious and marked by conflicting political ideologies – particularly imperialism, nationalism, socialism/communism, liberalism and conservatism.51 This section will outline indifference and resistance to ‘supranationalism’ and the European Communities and sketch out alternative Western European cooperation projects based on these ideologies.

Many supporters of empire52 rejected ‘European integration’. In Britain, there was a consensus in the first half of the 1950s that the country – an imperial world power – should not participate in continental integration. Starting from the second half of the 1950s, British elites increasingly advocated Western European integration – but through free trade, not through ‘supranationalism’. Attachment in Britain to the Empire and particularly the Commonwealth persisted long into the 1960s.53 Other adherents of European imperialism


52 On the reach of empire into the second half of 20th century European history, see Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. See also Gusejnova, European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957.

tried to fuse ‘European integration’ and imperialism. In France, they came up with Euroafrique plans. The idea aimed at a ‘European’ rescue of the French empire by including a colonial dimension in the European Communities.\textsuperscript{54} This caused conflicts within the ‘Six’ over whether ‘European integration’ should have an African and (neo)imperial dimension, or remain limited to the Western European continent. The Federal Republic in particular resented indirectly subsidising the French presence in Africa through the EEC. Nevertheless, French insistence led to a ‘European’ development policy in the Treaties of Rome.\textsuperscript{55} The subsequently created EEC Directorate-General for development was largely run by former French colonial officials.\textsuperscript{56} Its first major achievement was the Yaoundé Convention signed between the EEC and the AASM (Associated African States and Madagascar) in 1963.

Nationalism stood behind much of the resistance to ‘European integration’ in 1950s Western Europe. In the Federal Republic, nationalists on the political left and right opposed Western European integration as it reinforced the division of Germany.\textsuperscript{57} SPD leader Kurt Schumacher castigated Adenauer’s Westintegration as a sellout of German interests and unity.\textsuperscript{58} In France, ceding French sovereignty to ‘supranationalism’ after the occupation experience was unimaginable, particularly for Communists and Gaullists.\textsuperscript{59} Anti-German voices were numerous and declared cooperation with the Federal Republic undesirable. Many French economists and entrepreneurs warned that the Common Market threatened French economic interests. As French industry was not sufficiently competitive, the EEC would harm the French economy.\textsuperscript{60} It would ultimately put France and Western Europe under West German economic domination.\textsuperscript{61} Similar anxieties existed in Italy.\textsuperscript{62} Nationalists in the

Benelux countries feared that projects such as the EDC or the EEC might lead to Franco-German domination of the small Western European countries.\textsuperscript{63} Scandinavian nationalists also opposed surrendering sovereignty for ‘European unity’.\textsuperscript{64}

Strong opposition to ‘European integration’ came from the political left. Across Western Europe, the left considered organisations such as the OEEC, ECSC and EEC as liberal-capitalist projects serving big business interests while harming the working classes.\textsuperscript{65} Social democratic, socialist and communist parties and unions ranging from West German social democrats\textsuperscript{66} to French communists in the PCF and CGT unanimously rejected the ECSC in 1952. French and Italian communists categorically opposed any form of Western European integration during the 1950s and 1960s. They denounced the ‘Six’ and the Rome Treaties as a US-guided capitalist conspiracy against the European working classes and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{67} They dubbed the ECSC and EEC \textit{l’Europe du patronat} or \textit{l’Europa dei padroni}. They also ridiculed the claim that the ‘Six’ incarnated ‘Europe’ as Western propaganda attempting to discursively exclude socialist Eastern Europe from the continent. The French communists particularly exhibited a virulent anti-German French nationalism. They castigated the Elysée Treaty and Franco-West German reconciliation between de Gaulle and Adenauer as a remake of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century reactionary Holy Alliance and a betrayal of the French national interest.\textsuperscript{68}
This critique was very similar to Soviet and Eastern European views on Western European integration in the 1950s.\(^{69}\) Contrary to the communists,\(^{70}\) the moderate left softened its stance towards the ‘Six’ during the 1950s – but remained sceptical.\(^{71}\) In the 1957 parliamentary vote on the Treaties of Rome, the Italian socialists supported EURATOM, but abstained on the EEC. The West German SPD grudgingly supported the Treaties in the Bundestag,\(^{72}\) but future SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt still voted against.\(^{73}\) British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell opposed British EEC membership between 1955 and his death in 1963.\(^{74}\) Parts of the Norwegian left based their rejection of Norwegian EEC membership on the claim that the Common Market was an excessively liberal capitalist enterprise.\(^{75}\) As alternative integration projects, the Western European left advocated ‘social Europe’, socialist and communist internationalism and friendlier relations across the iron curtain with socialist Eastern Europe – which was after all a part of Europe.\(^{76}\)

Conservatives from Spain\(^{77}\) to the Federal Republic\(^{78}\) envisioned an abendländisch-Catholic-continental model of Western European cooperation. They supported political and

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\(^{71}\) On the developments of attitudes towards Western European integration in the West German and Belgian social democratic parties, see Detlef Rogosch, *Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945-1957* (Hamburg: Reinhold Krämer, 1996).

\(^{72}\) On views of West German and Italian social democrats on Western European integration, see Patrick Bredebach, *Das richtige Europa schaffen: Europa als Konkurrenzhema zwischen Sozial- und Christdemokraten-Deutschland und Italien von 1945 bis 1963 im Vergleich* (Göttingen: V&R unipress GmbH, 2013).

\(^{73}\) The main reason for his rejection was the absence of Britain from the EEC and EURATOM version of integration. See Mathias Haessler, “A ‘Cold War European’? Helmut Schmidt and European Integration, c.1945–1982,” *Cold War History* 15, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 427–47.


\(^{75}\) See Ikonomou, “Europeans.”


economic cooperation in Western Europe to hold the Soviet Union and Communism – but also the United States and Western liberalism\textsuperscript{79} at bay.\textsuperscript{80} The most prominent representative of Western European conservative ‘Europeanism’, Charles de Gaulle\textsuperscript{81} rejected ‘supranationalism’ and opposed the ECSC, the EDC and the EEC in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{82} His vision of ‘European Integration’ through intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign nation states as formulated in the Fouchet Plan suggested a union among the sovereign states of the ‘Six’ cooperating in the fields of foreign and defence policy.\textsuperscript{83} The Fouchet Plan was part of the broader 1960s Gaullist strategy of French \textit{grandeur} through the reestablishing of Western Europe as a \textit{Europe européenne} independent of the United States and the Soviet Union (obviously under French leadership). After the failure of the Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle continued pursuing his goal through a close alliance with the Federal Republic, enshrined in the Elysée Treaty of 1963.\textsuperscript{84} Conservatives across Western Europe sympathised with De Gaulle’s vision of Western European cooperation. In the Federal Republic, the 1960s saw a conflict within the Federal Government and the ruling CDU between \textit{Atlantiker} and


Gaullisten over the country’s foreign policy. The Atlanticists, often Protestants, underlined the centrality of the Atlantic alliance with the US. They supported ‘European unity’, however, only in the framework of the ‘transatlantic partnership’. The Gaullists, often Catholics, in contrast supported the idea of a more independent ‘Europe’ between the USA and the Soviet Union. This did not mean a rejection of the alliance with the US or a complete emulation of the French President’s positions. However, having become wary about US security guarantees the Gaullists argued that West Germany needed a close alliance with de Gaulle’s France and a Western Europe with a stronger voice between the superpowers. This also implied support or acceptance of de Gaulle’s intergovernmental vision of ‘European integration’.85

Finally, many (neo)liberals in Western Europe rejected economic integration through ‘supranational’ institutions, planning and protectionism as practiced in the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM. They saw economic liberalisation, particularly for trade, as the primary means of Western European integration and subsequent global economic integration. Their vision for ‘European Integration’ was open, liberal and transatlantic. ‘European integration’ needed liberalisation of trade and capital movements, no ‘supranational’ institutions. The latter could help enforce ‘European’ competition law – but besides that, they did more harm than good. The six-country little Europe of the ECSC and EEC appalled liberals as inward-looking, protectionist and dirigiste. They criticised the fact that the EEC excluded Britain, the remaining Western European countries, and the rest of the (non-communist) world. In political terms, they saw the division the EEC created between the Six and the rest of Western Europe as a fatal weakening of the West vis-à-vis the Communist camp. Liberals favoured integration through the OEEC. In the late 1950s, they endorsed the British proposal for a Western European free trade area. They hoped the FTA would push the EEC aside, or at least alleviate some of its flaws.86 Liberally minded entrepreneurs in Italy87 and the Federal

Republic were initially very sceptical about ‘supranational’ integration through the ‘Six’. Just as for their British counterparts, a Western European free trade area would have been their preferred integration option. Not all (neo)liberal economists and politicians rejected the European Communities. Luigi Einaudi and Jacques Rueff lauded the Common Market as an – admittedly imperfect – basis from which to liberalise the Italian and French economy. The most prominent Western European liberal critic of ‘supranational’ integration was West German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard. Influenced by German ordoliberalism, he had been sceptical of the ECSC in the early 1950s and subsequently opposed the creation of the EEC and EURATOM in the second half of the 1950s, before being forced by Adenauer to accept the Treaties of Rome.

In sum, ‘European integration’ between the 1940s and the 1960s was a hotly disputed issue both within and between Western European nations. There were multiple integration visions and disagreement on the question as to whether Western European integration was desirable at all. The different visions of and oppositions to ‘European integration’ outlined above obviously overlapped. French communist resistance against Western European cooperation was based both on socialism and nationalism. Similarly, Gaullist thinking on ‘Europe’ was inspired by conservatism as well as nationalism. The section has shown that there was no ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘European integration’. It rather seems that never in its history was ‘European integration’ as disputed and controversial as in the 1950s.

**Western European media in the 1950s**

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89 See Rollings, British Business in the Formative Years of European Integration.


Western European media systems in the 1950s were dominated by radio and newspapers. Already before the war, radio had become the primary source of information and entertainment in Western Europe. In the 1950s, radio sets spread to virtually every Western European household except for in the Iberian Peninsula and the Southern Balkans. As during the interwar years, newsreels screened in cinemas and dedicated newsreel theatres were the primary audio-visual source of information for the millions of postwar moviegoers. Television was gradually introduced in the 1950s, but remained an expensive elite medium few could afford. National, regional and local newspapers developed in great quantity and showcased rising sales during the 1950s. They worked with limited resources in the early 1950s, then gradually diversified their coverage and expanded networks of domestic and foreign correspondents. However, foreign correspondent networks were mostly a prerogative of news agencies, elite newspapers and public broadcasting. Correspondent networks often remained limited to the principal Western capitals and imperial hubs. The 1950s were a

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period of reconstruction and expansion for Western European media, before the audio-visual revolution of television in the 1960s.

Empire, decolonisation and the Cold War dominated foreign affairs media coverage in the 1950s. The orientation of the British and French media was more imperial than European. Broadcasting the Empire remained a central task of the BBC into the 1960s. The BBC kept a large network of correspondents all over the (formerly) British world, while its presence in Western Europe was limited.97 Similarly, the French state broadcaster Radiodiffusion-télévision was more concerned in the 1950s with the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria than with ‘European integration’.98 In 1967, ten years after the signing of the Rome Treaties, the broadcaster, now renamed Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (ORTF), still had more délégations abroad in former colonial territories (Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Beirut, Phnom Penh) than in Western Europe (London, Bonn, Rome).99 Empire and colonial wars repeatedly stood at the top of the news agenda in France and Britain in the 1950s and


99 See the booklet « L’Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision française », section « Les délégations à l’étranger », 1967, Archives Nationales, ORTF, 20060483 Art. 16
1960s. The Cold War was the other dominating theme in Western European foreign reporting. Western European journalists were both observers and actors in the conflict.

Given the postwar struggle over the political, economic and cultural orientation of Western European societies, the journalism of the 1950s was partisan and politicised. Journalists worked in direct or indirect contact with or in proximity to political camps. Journalists defended political, economic and social projects and sought to influence the rebuilding of postwar societies. This led them to both endorse and oppose individual politicians or governments with considerable vigour. Le Monde directeur Hubert Beuve-Méry campaigned for French neutralism, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung founding editor Erich Welter for Freiburg school ordoliberalism, L’Unità direttore Pietro Ingrao for communist internationalism and Daily Express publisher Lord Beaverbrook for British imperialism.

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106 See Galante, Il Partito comunista italiano e l’integrazione europea.
Postwar journalism was dominated by journalists who had already been important in their field during the interwar years. Having developed their intellectual mindset before the war, prominent postwar journalists like Beuve-Méry, Welter, Ingrao and Lord Beaverbrook remained committed to 1920s and 1930s nationalism, (neo)liberalism, communism and imperialism. Western European journalism – just as in other aspects of postwar societies – was shaped by men who saw the restoration of the nation, the maintaining of great power status or the preservation of imperial might as essential for their countries.

Governments exercised considerable influence over Western European media in the 1950s. Newspapers and magazines could report freely (except for in Portugal and Spain), but broadcasting and news agencies were heavily state controlled. Governments owned or (partially) financed broadcasters and news agencies – sometimes indirectly through generous subscriptions – and decided who got into top positions. Postwar state control of broadcasting and news agencies had various origins. First, state control of public broadcasting and agencies had existed before and simply continued after 1945. Second, war propaganda efforts had put broadcasters and news agencies under tight state supervision and influence. This wartime proximity continued after the war. Third, postwar Keynesianism implied state control over the economy and the provision of vital public goods – such as information. The promotion of social progress through schools, universities and the media was considered a public task. State control over broadcasting was a logical step. Fourth, as internal and external challenges seemed to threaten fragile Western European states and societies, elites considered control over broadcasting and news agencies as essential. Domestically, it would help them in their nation (re)building efforts and in fighting off communism. Internationally, control over

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109 Bourdon has analysed this continuity for the case of France. See Bourdon, *Haute fidélité*.


broadcasting seemed necessary to meet the decolonising world’s and the Soviet Union’s propaganda challenge. During the Algerian war, the French government massively censored both broadcasters and the press. In the Federal Republic, the Adenauer government attempted to control the media through a mix of pressure and the distribution of exclusive information to reliable journalists. The Eden government tried a similar mix of persuasion and pressure during the Suez crisis. News agencies across Western Europe were either state owned or under heavy state influence in the 1950s. Foreign correspondents of the French state news agency Agence France-Presse acted as quasi-representatives of the French government and kept close contact with French diplomats. Particularly during the early phase of the Algerian war, AFP functioned as a government mouthpiece. The Spanish state news agency EFE served the Franco government to control the Spanish media system, but also aspired to project hispanidad and anti-communism into Latin America. The state and governments thus played a central role in postwar Western European media. However, this does not mean they exercised total control. Despite their direct and indirect means of influence, Adenauer’s Westintegration, the French government’s actions in the Algerian war and Eden’s Suez policy all received strong media criticism, particularly in the press.

Several characteristics of 1950s’ Western European media and journalism stood in the way of a broad adoption of *sui generis* ‘European integration’ narrative. First, newspapers and broadcasters had no or were only gradually building up networks of foreign correspondents in Western Europe. This limited their capacity to report from other Western European countries. Particularly the developing television networks had very few television correspondents across Western European capitals. Second, Western European journalism was dominated by journalists with a prewar socialisation. Empire, the nation and interwar Europe, not Western European ‘supranational’ integration tended to be their political points of reference. Third, state-and-nation orientation was often reinforced by the influence of national governments over the media. Finally, foreign reporting was dominated by Cold War and decolonisation events, to which ‘European integration’ was secondary.

*Western European media and ‘European integration’ in the 1950s*

Western European media attention towards ‘supranationalism’ and the European Communities in the 1950s was limited. The ECSC never managed to attract much media coverage or a substantial number of correspondents to Luxembourg.¹²⁰ Nor did the gradual establishment of the EEC and EURATOM in Brussels in 1958 lure many journalists to the Belgian capital. Only a few agricultural and economic journalists mostly working for specialised media outlets covered EURATOM and the EEC full-time as correspondents from Brussels. The city remained a place of little relevance to international media in the 1950s and early 1960s. By 1962, around 100 journalists had an accreditation to the EEC.¹²¹ However, this number included many general Brussels correspondents, who mostly covered Belgian or


Benelux national politics. With few journalists interested, the EEC Commission introduced a small official weekly press conference only in 1962. The limited presence of journalists in Luxembourg and Brussels in the 1950s and early 1960s did not necessarily reflect disinterest in Western European integration. Instead, it demonstrated the limited interest of Western European media in the ‘supranational’ integration project carried out by the ‘Six’. In the view of most journalists, the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM did not stand out among other Western European cooperation projects as the incarnation of ‘Europe’ or a future ‘European’ polity.

Western European media coverage of ‘European integration’ between the 1940s and the 1960s comprised the imperialist, nationalist, conservative, liberal and socialist/communist critique of ‘supranational’ ‘European integration’ discussed above. It gave space to their alternative visions of Western European cooperation and the different international organisations representing them. Moreover, propaganda efforts by those organisations and various governments to promote Western European political and economic cooperation focused on a variety of international organisations and integration projects besides the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM, such as the OEEC, the Council of Europe and EFTA.

122 For example, ARD correspondent Dieter Strupp covered Belgian national politics, and the Congo Crisis with its illegal recruitment offices in Brussels that hired Belgian mercenaries to fight in the Republic of the Congo, to which the Belgian government turned a blind eye. See Dieter Strupp, Kühe im EG-Ministerrat: Impressionen und Begegnungen am Rande des Alltags eines Journalisten (Eupen: Grenz-Echo-Verlag GEV, 1996).


As a complete survey of ‘European integration’ media coverage across Western Europe between the 1940s and the 1960s is beyond the scope of this study, this section concentrates on case studies of prominent journalists. It combines those case studies with evidence from content analyses of 1950s’ Western European integration media coverage.

**Empire and Commonwealth**

The most prominent Western European media supporter of Empire who passionately fought ‘European integration’ during the 1950s and 1960 was Lord Beaverbrook, the publisher of the British tabloid *The Daily Express*. In the postwar decades, the *Express* boasted one of the highest circulations among the Western European newspapers. Together with the *Daily Mirror*, the *Daily Express* led the British tabloid press and sold well over four million copies a day in the early 1960s. Born in Canada in 1879 as Max Aitken, Beaverbrook moved to Britain and built a newspaper empire there after the First World War. After serving as Minister of Aircraft Production during World War II under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Beaverbrook returned to running his newspapers after 1945. He described his views on Britain, the Empire and Europe in an article for the *Express* in May 1962 entitled “This is why I believe what I believe”. He declared that “I entered both politics and journalism purely to further the cause of empire. The Empire cause was my life’s call.” His support for the British Empire led Beaverbrook to oppose any British involvement in Western European integration during the 1940s and 1950s. He particularly rejected British membership in the EEC. It was Beaverbrook’s “firm belief that the Common Market will in effect destroy the remnants of the system of Imperial Preference, and on that account the structure of the British Empire or Commonwealth”.

After Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had officially declared his intention to have Britain join the EEC in July 1961, the *Daily Express* under Beaverbrook’s command

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125 See Seymour-Ure, *The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945*, 28 –29. On the role of the popular press in Britain before and after 1945, see Bingham, *Family Newspapers*?


128 Ibid.
embarked on a violent campaign against the Common Market.129 The main elements of the campaign were Empire, anti-Catholicism and Germanophobia. Beaverbrook and Macmillan were friends and stood in permanent contact during the entry negotiations. The publisher wrote Macmillan in November 1962 that his “personal devotion to you remains unchanged” and in January 1962 added: “The newspaper supports you on everything except the Common Market”. However, Beaverbrook warned the Prime Minister that: “If the Common Market comes to pass I will make a new heading for the Express leader column, being the paraphrase of the 84th Psalm, ‘In this land of sin and woe’.”130 Beaverbrook frequently intervened in the editorial department of the Express with suggestions on how to best lead the battle against the Common Market. The editors at the newspaper largely shared Beaverbrook’s views and readily enacted the anti-EEC campaign. In January 1963, when French President de Gaulle rejected the British entry bid, the Daily Express famously titled “Glory, Glory, Hallelujah!”131

Alastair Hetherington, editor of The Guardian between 1956 and 1975 was no imperialist like Lord Beaverbrook, but incarnated British rejection of the EEC rooted in support for the Commonwealth. Hetherington had famously attacked the Eden government’s imperialist Suez intervention in the Guardian in 1956, but remained committed to the Commonwealth. During the 1950s, Hetherington had argued in the Guardian that British participation in continental ‘supranational’ integration was undesirable. In the late 1950s, he supported the British FTA proposal. In April 1960, he complained about simplistic views prevailing in the United States on the EEC and Britain. During a stay in Washington, D.C., Hetherington had been “asked a number of times whether the British really thought they could continue to stand outside the Common Market. The reply that our trading policies could surely not be governed by

129 However, the Daily Express had started voicing opposition to the idea of British EEC membership already in March 1960. See Wilkes, “British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956–63,” 414. The Daily Mirror led a campaign in favour of British EEC membership.
considerations affecting only between fifteen and twenty percent of our total external trade was met with – most commonly – sympathetic disbelief.”

Hetherington became temporarily favourable of British entry into the EEC in late 1960 and 1961. His change of mind reflected political and economic elite thinking in Britain, which in a context of contracting options concluded in 1960 and 1961 that membership in the EEC would serve British strategic, political, and economic interests and outweigh the disadvantages of membership. However, despite his support for membership Hetherington kept a distance from the EEC. He was influenced by debates in the Labour party, where reservations against the EEC were strong. Hetherington underlined that the EEC entry negotiations had no predetermined outcome. He wanted to make sure that the Guardian’s coverage of the negotiations would be as impartial as possible. He chose Canadian journalist Leonard Beaton, who had previously covered defence policy for the Guardian, to cover the Brussels negotiations. Beaton became the Guardian’s Common Market man in the spring of 1962. According to Hetherington, Beaton “was not emotionally committed one way or other: as a Canadian he was more conscious than most people of the Commonwealth dimension, but he was also a supporter of the principle of European union. The neutrality of his reporting could be relied on.” However, in the view of his Guardian colleague Geoffrey Taylor, “it was to be assumed that Beaton’s sympathies would lie with the Commonwealth, and indeed they largely did”. Hence, while declaring general support for joining the EEC, Hetherington’s choice set the Guardian on a path to covering the entry negotiations with a critical attitude.

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Hetherington returned to rejecting EEC entry in the autumn of 1962. He was influenced by his *Guardian* colleague Beaton and his regular meetings with Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, who after some wavering took a clear position against membership of the EEC in the second half of 1962. Asked by Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling in October 1962 why the *Guardian* had “reversed its policy on the Common Market”, Hetherington pointed to a number of economic factors. He told Maudling that Leonard Beaton had “become privately very hostile” to entry, arguing that British chief negotiator Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath had obtained “bad terms for ourselves and for the Commonwealth” in Brussels and was “giving away more than he should”. The negative attitude of the Commonwealth governments regarding the EEC at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in September 1962 in London had also made an impression on Hetherington. He told Maudling that: “We had to take account of the indirect effect on us of possible economic damage to them and of their consequent inability to buy from us. We also had to take account of the economic balance between the loss to us of our advantages in the Commonwealth Market and in the EFTA market against the gain in Europe.” Two weeks earlier, Hetherington had already advised Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell that “he ought to press further the point that by far the largest part of our trade was with outside the EEC countries” when arguing against joining the EEC.

Hetherington’s turnaround also had political motivations. He took federalist thinking in the EEC seriously and feared that Britain would “be in for a lot of trouble once the move towards political union inside the Community began”. Hetherington criticised the Macmillan government for not clearly communicating the political implications of joining the EEC to the British people. He disagreed with Minister of Agriculture Christopher Soames who told Hetherington in November 1962 “that one mustn’t frighten people” and that: “If one talked to the British people now about the nature of the federal or confederal system which might come out, then one might raise unnecessary resistance to British entry into the Common Market.” Finally, the way in which US President Kennedy had ignored Western European leaders during the Cuban missile crisis made Hetherington reconsider his views on the EEC.

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138 Hetherington also lists these factors in his memoirs, but leaves out some of the points. See Hetherington, *Guardian Years*, 177–83.

139 Note of a meeting with Mr. Maudling at Llandudno on October 12, 1962, LSE HETHERINGTON/3/13.

140 Note of a Meeting with Mr. Gaitskell, September 27, 1962, LSE HETHERINGTON/3/14.

141 Note of a meeting with Mr. Maudling at Llandudno on October 12, 1962, LSE HETHERINGTON/3/13.

142 Note of a meeting with Mr Soames on November 6, 1962 (Stanley Baker and Gerald Frey also present), LSE HETHERINGTON/3/8.
Speaking to Soames, Hetherington commented ironically that: “we ought really be applying for membership of the United States and not of Europe. If our reasons for trying to go into Europe were to secure a huge home market and to secure political influence at the centre, then clearly the United States was a better home market than Europe (with more opportunities for the kind of sophisticated goods that the Prime Minister said we wanted to specialise in) while on political consultation it was clear that Kennedy and other American Presidents would talk to those on whom they were politically dependent but in emergencies would quite reasonably not waste time in talking to others.”  

Existing research shows that support of the Empire and the Commonwealth led many British journalists beyond the cases of Lord Beaverbrook and Alastair Hetherington to oppose British involvement in ‘European integration’ in the 1950s. Sven Leif Ragnar de Roode analysed ‘European integration’ related editorials in The Guardian, The Times, the New Statesman and the Spectator during the 1950s. Roode found that the editorials did not treat Britain as ‘European’ in 1952 when the ECSC was created. The publications supported continental ‘European integration’, but agreed that Britain should not be part of it. They framed Britain as closer to the Commonwealth nations than to continental Europe. Only in the second half of the 1950s, Roode saw editorials increasingly referring to Britain as a European country. However, the Treaties of Rome received little attention in the four newspapers and magazines. The four papers agreed that Britain should not be part of the EEC and EURATOM. Jong Hoon Shin came to similar conclusions in his analysis of ‘European integration’ coverage in The Times, The Economist, The Observer and the Manchester Guardian Weekly between 1954 and 1959. Shin found that the four publications supported the EDC – without British membership. Regarding the Treaties of Rome, the Commonwealth took precedence over EEC membership for the four papers and magazines. All British papers supported the British-sponsored free trade area to link Britain with the continental Western European economies. When de Gaulle vetoed the FTA in late 1958, The Times famously titled ‘France the Wrecker’. Only the Economist put forward arguments for EEC membership in

**Note:**

143 Note of a meeting with Mr Soames on November 6, 1962 (Stanley Baker and Gerald Frey also present), LSE HETHERINGTON/3/8. Hetherington made this argument also in his meetings with Hugh Gaitskell: “If therefore one of our major objects in going into the Common Market was to get political influence at the centre of power, then surely we ought to be applying to join the American federation and not the European one. Gaitskell said that there was a good deal in this, but he thought it was the kind of point that would come better in public from me than from him.” Note of a meeting with Mr Gaitskell on November 5, 1962, LSE HETHERINGTON/3/10.

144 See Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation.
1958–1959 after the failure of the FTA negotiations. This finding is further supported by Arian Brill’s analysis of The Times ‘European integration’ coverage in the 1950s and research on the history of individual British newspapers. Tawil and Wilkes have analysed in detail how the British media shifted from an overwhelming rejection of the Treaties of Rome and support for the FTA in the late 1950s to broad support of Common Market membership and the British governments EEC entry bid in the early 1960s (while remaining sceptical about many negative implications of EEC membership).

Nationalism

Rudolf Augstein, editor in chief and founder of Der Spiegel, the leading postwar West German political magazine, exemplifies the rejection of ‘European integration’ by nationalism. Augstein figures among the most famous journalists in 20th century Germany. He played a central role in the 1962 Spiegel Affäre, which is often considered a watershed moment for West German democracy and journalism. In October 1962, Der Spiegel published an article based on confidential Bundeswehr documents claiming that the West German army was not sufficiently ready to fight a Soviet attack. In reaction, CDU Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauß orchestrated a search of Der Spiegel’s editorial department and the detention of Augstein and other senior Spiegel journalists. Strauß’s overreaction backfired, caused a public scandal and ultimately forced him to resign. The episode made Augstein a persona non grata in CDU circles, but rewarded him with a prominent place in liberal narratives on German history lauding his role as a standard bearer of 1960s ‘democratisation’ against

146 She also concluded that the newspaper did not consider British participation in ‘supranational’ continental integration desirable. Brill, Abgrenzung und Hoffnung: „Europa“ in der deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Tagespresse 1945-1980.
149 See the comprehensive biography by Peter Merseburger, Rudolf Augstein: Biographie (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007).
Adenauer conservatism. Less well known are Augstein’s views on ‘European integration’. A fierce German nationalist, Augstein thought German reunification should remain the Federal Republic’s foreign policy priority. During the 1950s, he violently opposed Adenauer’s policy of Westintegration as it cemented the division of Germany. Augstein claimed to support the creation of an integrated Western Europe, however, only if it was independent of the United States and did not compromise German economic and political interests – the most important of which was reunification.

Under Augstein’s command, Der Spiegel oscillated between attacking and ignoring the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM in the 1950s. EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein and Augstein had been enemies ever since Hallstein had become a close collaborator of Adenauer and one of the engineers of Westintegration. Annoyed by the constant assaults in Der Spiegel, Hallstein was known among his collaborators to ignore the magazine’s reporting. Hallstein claimed to have continued doing so also after his move to Brussels. Two days after the signing of the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, Rudolf Augstein launched a ferocious attack against the Treaties and the EEC in an editorial in Der Spiegel. Augstein denounced the Common Market as “The Market of Illusions” and as both “uneconomic and un-European”. The EEC, Augstein wrote, “has surrounded itself with a protectionist tariff wall against the rest of the free world, against the eastern European states fighting for their independence and of course also against the eastern third of our country.” The EEC divided Europe instead of integrating it and harmed German interests. Augstein accused “the integration-professors around Walter Hallstein” to have sacrificed German economic interests to French interests. “The Federal Government has decided to walk along the French path to European unity. The latter can slightly ungalantly be reduced to the following formula: Germany pays, so that France can plug the most serious holes in its permanent deficit.” Augstein denounced the channelling of German money to former French

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152 Moreover, as a member of the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), Augstein endorsed liberal economic policies. The FDP rejected the Treaties of Rome in the Bundestag.
154 The conflict between Der Spiegel and the CDU government peaked in the 1962 Spiegel Affäre, see Schoenbaum, Ein Abgrund von Landesverrat; Schöps, Die Spiegel-Affäre des Franz-Josef Strauß.
colonies through the EEC as a “Sahara-donation”. He rejected claims that the Federal Republic should accept the economic disadvantages implied by the EEC because of German responsibility for the war as a “reparations attitude”. After 1957, Der Spiegel kept its negative attitude towards the EEC and only sent a correspondent to Brussels in the summer of 1963. However, Brussels remained a foreign correspondent position of minor importance for Der Spiegel. With Augstein as editor in chief, the magazine continued the line that the EEC was in conflict with (West) German political and economic interests.

Thus far, scholarship has indicated that resistance against ‘European integration’ based on nationalism was present in news media across Western Europe. With regard to the Federal Republic, Jong Hoon Shin found opposition against the ‘Six’ and ‘supranationalism’ in his analysis of ‘European integration’ coverage in the FAZ, Die Zeit, Rheinischer Merkur and Der Spiegel between 1954 and 1959. He found that the Rheinischer Merkur, Die Zeit and the Atlanticist members of the FAZ’s editorial department supported the EDC, while Der Spiegel and nationalist FAZ star editor Paul Sethe argued that reunification should take precedence over Westintegration. As for the EEC, the Rheinischer Merkur, which was close to CDU government circles, stood alone in unequivocally supporting the Common Market. The FAZ, Der Spiegel and Die Zeit attacked the EEC’s dirigisme and protectionism, which they considered contrary to German economic interests. Bill Davies showed that there was strong criticism against ‘supranationalism’ and the European Court of Justice’s interference in West German law in West German media in the 1950s and 1960s. The resistance resulted from a belief that the West German democratic political system was superior to the ‘European’ one in Brussels. Roode’s analysis of ‘European integration’ coverage in Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit and Rheinischer Merkur in the 1950s found support for the ECSC, EDC and EEC, but also frequent references to the economic ‘sacrifices’ they implied for the Federal Republic. Analysing press coverage on ‘European integration’ in the year 1952 in the Federal Republic and France, Seidendorf found

158 Interview with Peter Merseburger in Berlin, 29.05.2014. Merseburger was the first Spiegel correspondent in Brussels, but soon left the position for a job in public broadcasting. On Merseburger and his role heading the ARD magazine Panorama from 1967 to 1975, see Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit.
160 See Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice.
161 See Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation.
identity discourses dominated by national points of reference. In her analysis of ‘European integration’ and Germany coverage in Le Monde and Le Figaro between 1950 and 1954, König focused on the newspapers’ reactions to the Schuman and Pleven plans and the EDC. She showed how in the querelle de la CED, Le Figaro under Pierre Brisson supported the EDC, while Le Monde under Hubert Beuve-Méry opposed it. Analysing French press coverage on the Treaties of Rome, Gérard Bossuat found many journalists who argued that the EEC was not in the French national economic interest. At the conservative-liberal Le Figaro leading editorialist Raymond Aron in the 1950s voiced scepticism about “l’aventure du marché commun, qui, en lui-même, sur le plan économique, ne s’impose pas avec évidence.” After the failure of the European Defence Community in 1955, Aron concluded that “l’organisation fédérale de l’Europe des Six est une idée morte.” Aron charged the “fanatiques de l’idéal européen” with failing to realise that “les sentiments nationaux semblent malgré tout plus fort que le sentiment européen.” As for the Netherlands, Roode analysed 1950s’ ‘European integration’ coverage in Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (NRC), Telegraaf, De Groene Amsterdammer (GA), Elseviers, Vrij Nederland (VNL) and Haagsche Post. He found that overall the Dutch editorials were positive about the ECSC. They argued that the Community’s political advantages outweighed its economic disadvantages for the Netherlands. Centre-left publications supported the EDC, while the centre-right papers were sceptical about the project due to German rearmament. Roode found that the Treaties of Rome received remarkably negative coverage in the five media outlets. There were comments stating that the Netherlands should not join. The Common Market was framed as protectionist, Franco-German dominated, continental and Catholic – and thus opposed to Dutch national identity which was Protestant, Atlanticist and open.


166 Aron cited in Ibid., 225.

167 Aron cited in Ibid., 239. Aron criticised ‘European’ federalists for despising nationalism. Democracy in Western Europe was closely tied to the nation. And after all, nationalism had proved crucial in resisting first Nazi and now Soviet imperialism. See Ibid., 234 and 240.

168 See Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation.
Socialism and communism

*L’Humanité*, the French Communist Party newspaper, stood out among the Western European media for its fierce resistance against any form of Western European economic and political cooperation. *L’Humanité* reflected the communist and Soviet critique of Western European integration as a capitalist and anti-Soviet project serving big business interests and West German ‘revanchism’. *L’Humanité* sold around 100,000 copies daily between the 1950s and the 1970s. The Soviet Union started supporting *L’Humanité* in 1956 through subscriptions, at a moment when the newspaper’s economic situation was difficult and when it had supported the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Senior PFC members frequently contributed articles and comprised the editorial leadership. Long-time director Étienne Fajon and editors in chief André Stil and René Andrieu were prominent PCF members. The newspaper represented the voice of one of the major political parties in postwar France and thus carried considerable political weight.\(^{169}\)

*L’Humanité* continuously rejected Western European integration throughout the 1950s.\(^{170}\) The newspaper assaulted the Treaties of Rome on the day after their signing on 26 March 1957. It mocked the signing ceremony “à laquelle les « Européens » on voulut donner un grand éclat.” Adenauer and the Foreign Ministers of the EEC and EURATOM member states had “fait l’éloge de la « petite Europe », en s’efforçant de masquer les terribles dangers qu’elle recèle pour notre pays.” *L’Humanité* listed those dangers. First, the Rome Treaties did not unite Europe, but actually led to a “division aggravée de l’Europe veritable”. Second, the Marché commun “permet aux grands capitalistes d’augmenter leurs profits en abaissant le niveau de vie des travailleurs.” Third, the Treaties of Rome created a “bloc politique sous la conduite de l’Allemagne de Bonn” effectively allowing “Adenauer et les maîtres de la Ruhr qu’il représente” to dominate Western Europe. *L’Humanité* underlined that the Vatican had welcomed the EEC and EURATOM, thereby linking the two organisations to a Catholic and

\(^{169}\) *L’Humanité*’s average daily sales started at 423,000 copies in 1945, but soon fell to lower levels. Its print run stabilised at around 150,000 daily copies between the 1950s and the 1970s. However, the newspaper did not sell all those copies. Moreover, the Soviet Union and other socialist ‘brother states’ bought a considerable amount of copies (between 10,000 and 20,000 copies daily), thereby subsidising the newspaper. On the history of *L’Humanité*, see Christian Delporte et al., eds., *L’Humanité de Jaurès à nos jours* (Paris: Nouveau monde éditions, 2014); Roland Leroy, ed., *Un siècle d’Humanité, 1904-2004* (Paris: Le Cherche Midi, 2004).

\(^{170}\) For an overview of *L’Humanité* coverage of Western European integration in the 1950s, see the section Les milieux de la presse in Bossuat, *L’Europe des Français, 1943-1959*. 

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‘reactionary’ ‘Europe’. The newspaper also claimed that the Rome Treaties were largely a product of US pressure on its Western European clients.\textsuperscript{171}

\textit{L’Humanité} rejected the EEC and all other versions of Western European integration.\textsuperscript{172} Based on communist internationalism, support for the Soviet Union and a pronounced nationalism directed against the Federal Republic, \textit{L’Humanité} attacked ‘supranationalism’ as well as conservative projects of Western European cooperation. After Adenauer and de Gaulle met in September 1958 at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, \textit{L’Humanité} commented: “la Sainte Alliance renouée à Colombey”.\textsuperscript{173} De Gaulle’s visit to the Federal Republic in the autumn of 1962 received even harsher criticism. \textit{L’Humanité} referred to “l’axe Paris-Bonn” and denounced “l’alliance antisoviétique de la bourgeoisie française et des marchands de canons de la Ruhr”.\textsuperscript{174} The Elysée Treaty in January 1963 was “une alliance avec une Allemagne militariste ayant des revendications opposées à la paix en Europe”. With the Treaty, France “renonce à toute politique étrangère indépendante” and “se trouve enchaînée aux revanchards de Bonn”.

The attitude of \textit{L’Humanité} towards ‘European integration’ did not change substantially during the 1960s and 1970s. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in 1967, \textit{L’Humanité} declared: “Le Marché commun reste un instrument des trusts et aggrave l’exploitation des travailleurs du fait de la concurrence accrue”.\textsuperscript{175} In the early 1970s, \textit{L’Humanité} downscaled its attacks on the Federal Republic and Western European Integration. The PCF supported rapprochement between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. It also welcomed the growing distance between Western Europe and the United States starting from the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, \textit{L’Humanité} remained opposed to the EEC. “La véritable et grande Europe est bien plus qu’un groupe étiqué de pays revendiquant ce beau nom”, declared Jacques Denis, in charge of international questions at the PCF, in 1971. In the view of the communist journalists at \textit{L’Humanité}, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was an international organisation in a much better position to


\textsuperscript{172} On the coverage of ‘European integration’ in \textit{L’Humanité} in the 1960s, see Laurent Garric, “La presse face à la politique européenne du général de Gaulle (1958-1969)” (Mémoire de recherche en histoire, IEP Lyon, 2005).

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 21.

represent Europe than the European Community, then a club of nine Western European states.176

*L’Humanité* coverage reflected how the communist press across Western and Eastern Europe reported on Western European cooperation and integration. On both sides of the ‘iron curtain’, they attacked the ECSC and EEC with the same arguments.177 The Italian Communist Party newspaper *L’Unità* rejected the Treaties of Rome178 with the same arguments as the East German SED flagship newspaper *Neues Deutschland*.179 Both newspapers argued that EEC and EURATOM divided the European continent into a Western and an Eastern half, thus making true European cooperation impossible. Under direct or indirect Soviet influence, the resistance in Western and Eastern European communist media outlets against the Common Market and Western European integration created a truly trans-European media narrative bridging the ‘iron curtain’.

*(Neo)liberalism*

The most influential liberal EEC enemy in Western European postwar journalism might have been Erich Welter, the founding editor and head of the economic department of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the Federal Republic’s newspaper of reference in the postwar decades. The *FAZ* followed a liberal-conservative standpoint, but kept high standards of neutrality, objectivity, and seriousness in its regular news reporting. While the first edition of the *FAZ* in 1949 sold less than 10,000 copies, the newspaper’s sold print run jumped to over 200,000 in the late 1950s and reached 300,000 in the late 1970s.180 The newspaper had

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the highest foreign circulation of any German newspaper (20,000 copies a day in 1970). Welter and many journalists who built up the newspaper after 1949 had already been senior editors in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. The FAZ was modelled after the Frankfurter Zeitung, which had been the mouthpiece of Germany’s liberal bourgeoisie since its foundation in 1866. In the ‘Third Reich’, the Frankfurter Zeitung escaped closure or total Gleichschaltung by conforming to the official political line, but was ultimately shut down in 1943. Welter’s postwar views on ‘European integration’ were based on his interwar experiences.

Welter perceived ‘European integration’ after 1945 through the lense of ordoliberal thought. He had developed his liberal vision of ‘European integration’ as an economic journalist in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Welter joined the economic department of the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1921 and became department head in 1927. He was promoted to deputy editor in chief in 1934. Welter’s colleague Leonard Miksch – head of the Frankfurter Zeitung’s economic department from 1932 until 1943 – was himself an important member of the Freiburg school of ordoliberal economists. When the Nazis closed the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1943, Welter took a position in Albert Speer’s Ministry of Armament. By then, Welter supported a national socialist vision of European unification and tried to fuse it with liberal economic thought. Welter wrote in 1943 that: “You have to recognise the profound difference existing between the dilettantish and feeblish European plans of the

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181 In June 1970, Newsweek explained to its readers the status of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in the Federal Republic’s media landscape by means of a comparison: “The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is to West Germany what Le Monde is to France and The Times of London is to England.” Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the US news magazine wrote, the FAZ had “not only earned a reputation as the most respected paper in its own country but is often ranked as one of the ten best in the world.” Newsweek, Ferment in Frankfurt, 29 June 1970. On the FAZ in the 1950s, see Payk, Der Geist der Demokratie; Friedemann Siering, “Zeitung für Deutschland. Die Gründergeneration der ‘Frankfurter Allgemeinen’,” in Die Herren Journalisten: Die Elite der deutschen Presse nach 1945, ed. Lutz Hochmeister and Friedemann Siering (München: Beck, 2002); Riedl, Liberale Publizistik für soziale Marktwirtschaft; Kordà, “Für Bürgertum und Business. Die ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.’” There is a research project on the FAZ’s history coordinated by Peter Hoeres at the University of Würzburg, Germany.

182 For a sympathetic account of the Frankfurter Zeitung’s role in the Third Reich, see Günther Gillessen, Auf Verlorenem Posten. Die Frankfurter Zeitung Im Dritten Reich, 2. Auflage (Berlin: Stiedler, 1987). Gillessen was himself an editor in the political department of the FAZ.

Geneva world and the constructive conception of today: there, already the attempt to clarify preliminary questions led nowhere, here, Europe is being weld together by practical work.”

After the war, Welter rejoiced in the idea of a barrier-free European market that could unleash large-scale economic development like the continental market of the United States. Still, his view differed from national socialist *Generalplan Ost* schemes. Welter advised against concentrating industrial development only in Germany. “The need for a wide scattering of industries in Europe follows from simple issues such as resource storing and transport costs.” A fair distribution of economic development would also assure acceptance of German rule. Contrary to the Nazi doctrine of autarky, Welter underlined the merits of global free trade. For the moment, he conceded in 1943, integration needed to concentrate on Europe, and autarky was necessary. However, as a long-term vision he suggested “to develop one day based on a consolidated European platform a global economic exchange outshining in terms of scale, steadiness, and growth anything that had existed before.”

After the war, Welter abandoned the German European economic empire and adopted the ordoliberal vision of Western European cooperation, which was in line with his pre-1945 thinking. He established close contacts with the leading German ordoliberal thinkers such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke. He moulded the *FAZ* into the journalistic avant-garde of ordoliberal economic thinking in the Federal Republic. During the 1950s, the *FAZ* campaigned for Ludwig Erhard’s *soziale Marktwirtschaft* and vehemently opposed any deviation from liberal economic policies. This led to different perspectives on Western European cooperation in the *FAZ*’s political and economic sections.

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185 „Die Notwendigkeit einer weiten Streuung der Industrie in Europa ergibt sich schon durch die Rücksicht auf Rohstofflager und Transportkosten.“ Ibid., 207.

186 „von der gefestigten europäischen Plattform aus eines Tages wieder einen weltwirtschaftlichen Austausch zu entwickeln, der alles Vergangene an Umfang, Stetigkeit und Wachstum in den Schatten stellen könnte.“ Ibid., 198.


While the political section unequivocally supported integration through the ‘Six’ (including ECSC, EDC, EEC, EURATOM) after Paul Sethe had left the newspaper in 1955, the economic section disagreed. It preferred integration through the OEEC and the liberalisation of trade and capital movements.

Having already been sceptical about the ECSC, Erich Welter turned against the EEC in the second half of the 1950s. His rejection of ‘supranationalism’ and the Common Market was inspired by Wilhelm Röpke, one of Welter’s main intellectual guides whom he openly told “I admire you”. Based at the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales in Geneva and a leading member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Röpke was a well-known liberal public intellectual in the postwar Federal Republic. Since the early 1950s, he had advocated a liberal model for Western European integration, for example through the OEEC, while criticising the ECSC as dangerously dirigiste. Röpke observed the negotiations leading to the Treaties of Rome with great unease and subsequently turned into one of the fiercest critics of the EEC in the Federal Republic. Röpke’s EEC criticism was based on three considerations. First, he argued that the EEC did not integrate Western Europe – it actually divided and isolated the continent. The Community led not only to protectionism towards the world outside Europe, but – with the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) sponsored by Britain in 1960 – actually split Europe into economic spaces discriminating against one another. In Röpke’s terms, this Mißintegration or Desintegration was economically wrong and politically dangerous, as it threatened Western unity against the Soviet Union. Röpke considered the EEC’s claim to represent ‘European unity’ “Hallsteinish gamesmanship” and mocked the Community as Kleinsteuropa (‘smallest Europe’) or – with reference to Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister and EEC ‘founding father’ – Spaakistan. Second, Röpke rebelled against what he defined as collectivist-technocratic supranationalism. In Röpkes view, the EEC Commission had too much power and an interventionist agenda directed against the market. ‘Europe’ should not become an altar on which the market economy was sacrificed, he warned. Finally, he claimed that the idea to


politically unite Europe by means of economic integration constituted an excessive overestimation of the economic and the mechanical-rationalist. Political unification should precede economic unification, the attempt to force nations together economically would lead to backlashes against such integration. Switzerland, Röpke liked to point out, had become a political union over centuries in which the Swiss had developed a common identity. Switzerland had not been united by a common market for Swiss cheese.\ref{note:roepke_schweiz}

Inspired by Röpke and ordoliberal thought, the FAZ economic department advocated a liberal path for integration during the 1950s. Welter and his colleagues had elected the nucleus of the future ‘united Europe’ before the EEC actually came into existence. In July 1955, economic department deputy head Hans Roeper explained: “In the OEEC we can already clearly see the contours of the new Europe. Has there ever before been such an institution? Before the war such a voluntary association was unthinkable. Today the united Europe lives not only as an idea, but with the Chateau de la Muette it already has a real economic centre.”\ref{note:roeper_chateau} Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard also praised integration through the OEEC, the EPU and GATT in editorials in the FAZ.\ref{note:erhard_integration} In line with his preference for integration through the OEEC, Welter in 1956 appointed a young member of the economic department, Martin Wiebel, as the newspaper’s ‘European correspondent’. He was to be based alternately in Paris and Bonn, from where he covered the various ‘European’ international organisations.\ref{note:wiebel_appointment} The decision reflected Welter’s lack of interest in the ECSC in Luxembourg.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{note:roeper_chateau} The Château de la Muette was in 1955 and today still is the seat of the OECD. „Im Europäischen Wirtschaftsrat, in der OEEC, zeichnen sich jedenfalls die Konturen des neuen Europas schon deutlich ab. Wann hat es je zuvor eine derartige Einrichtung gegeben? Noch vor dem Kriege war ein solch freiwilliger Zusammenschluss undenkbar. Heute lebt das vereinigte Europa nicht mehr nur in der Idee, sondern es hat im Chateau de la Muette bereits einen realen wirtschaftlichen Mittelpunkt.“ Hans Roeper, Im Chateau de la Muette – Vom Wirken des Europäischen Wirtschaftsrats (OEEC), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9. 7. 1955, p. 5.


\bibitem{note:wiebel_appointment} See Welter to Wiebel, 22. Juni 1957, BArch N 1314/467.

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In the second half of the 1950s, Welter adopted Röpke’s standpoint on the EEC: “You and I follow also on this point the same economic policy line”\textsuperscript{198}, he told the economist. After having read a journal article in which the Geneva-based economist bashed the EEC, Welter told his FAZ colleagues that Röpke “expressed my innermost thoughts.”\textsuperscript{199} First, Welter shared Röpke’s criticism that the EEC divided Western Europe. The journalist particularly lamented the United Kingdom’s exclusion from the Community. “Despite all the EEC-hype, in my view London is for Germany by far the most important European place.”\textsuperscript{200} Second, Welter rejected the EEC’s “interventionist” character. In March 1959, he lamented that a European agricultural policy setting minimum prices for agricultural products would mean “unprecedented dirigisme”.\textsuperscript{201} Third, Welter assumed Röpke’s personal aversion to EEC Commission President Hallstein. In May 1960, Röpke wrote to Welter: “The worst is that I cannot sleep at night because of Hallstein, as I am, as you will remember, responsible for his career. If I had not back then in 1950 recommended him to Adenauer as the head of the German delegation for the Schuman Plan, he would today still be a professor in Frankfurt.”\textsuperscript{202} Welter answered: “Hallstein also keeps me from sleeping, although I have never and would have never recommended him.”\textsuperscript{203} When the Commission President travelled to Frankfurt in July 1963 to meet the FAZ leadership for a working lunch, Welter was the only one among the Herausgeber not to show up.\textsuperscript{204}

Hence, for Welter the creation of the EEC in 1958 by no means determined the future of ‘European Integration’. The Community simply constituted one of many “existing and


\textsuperscript{201} „Von der Öffentlichkeit wenig beachtet, schlittern wir mit dem Mindestpreissystem in einen Dirigismus hinein, der seinesgleichen sucht.“ Welter to Eick, Mainz, den 26. März 1959, BArch N 1314/371.

\textsuperscript{202} „Das Schlimmste ist, dass ich wegen Hallstein nicht schlafen kann, denn ich bin ja, wie sich entsinnen, für seine Karriere verantwortlich. Wenn ich ihn damals 1950 nicht Adenauer als Führer der deutschen Delegation für den Schuman-Plan empfohlen hätte, wäre er heute noch Professor in Frankfurt.“ Röpke to Welter, Genève, den 5. Mai 1960, BArch N 1314/71. In 1950, Chancellor Adenauer had asked Röpke to head the German delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations. He declined, but recommended Hallstein, then a rather unknown professor of international private law at the University of Frankfurt, whom he considered a capable lawyer of ordoliberal conviction. Hallstein got the job, subsequently became Secretary of State in the Auswärtiges Amt, and President of the EEC Commission.


constantly arising new European institutions” working for political and economic unification. Welter worried that the FAZ’s readers would simply not understand this confusing network of ‘European’ organisations. In April 1958, Welter asked his deputy Jürgen Eick: “Do you believe that our readers manage to find their way through this copice of European organisations? I am afraid no. I personally have lost orientation, and I would appreciate if the newspaper would help me to one day see not only single trees, but the whole forest.” Hence, in June 1958, Welter assembled a group of editors to discuss “how we can journalistically master the institutional European monster in our coverage.” Welter told his colleagues that instead of publishing articles on the activities of individual ‘European’ organisations, the FAZ should publish periodical summaries explaining what the various ‘European’ organisations and their combined activities meant for integration as a whole.

Thus, for Welter the direction of Western European integration was open and associated with a broad set of international organisations.

Finally, having placed Martin Wiebel as ‘European correspondent’ in Paris and Bonn in 1956, Welter was in no hurry to send a correspondent to cover the EEC in Brussels. The FAZ established a permanent correspondent in Brussels only in September 1959 – and the EEC was not the primary motivation behind this decision. In the late 1950s, the FAZ generally expanded its network of foreign correspondents due to the stabilisation of its financial situation. Moreover, the future Brussels correspondent was to cover a variety of economic and political topics in the Benelux countries of which the EEC was just one. In his instructions to the new Brussels correspondent, Welter described the position to consist of “60 to 70 percent economic topics and 40 to 30 percent politics and miscellaneous”, without mentioning the EEC. Welter thus rejected the EEC, disliked Walter Hallstein and saw no need to send a

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208 In September 1958, Welter had explained Kobbert that he considered Brussels to be “first and foremost an economic position, I would say 60 to 70 percent economic topics and 40 to 30 percent politics and miscellaneous.” „Brüssel ist allerdings in erster Linie ein wirtschaftlicher Posten, ich möchte sagen 60 bis 70 Prozent Wirtschaft und 40 bis 30 Prozent Politik und Sonstiges.“ Welter to Kobbert, 30. September 1958, BArch N 1314/270.
special correspondent to Brussels to cover the newly-born Communities. Instead, his support for and interest in Western European integration focused on the OEEC and economic liberalisation.

Research thus far has produced evidence for the resistance and scepticism in Western European media against ECSC/EEC ‘supranational’ dirigisme and support for liberal Western European cooperation. Among the four publications in Shin’s analysis, he found that between 1954 and 1959 only the Rheinischer Merkur unreservedly supported the two Communities. The FAZ, Der Spiegel and Die Zeit agreed that the EEC’s dirigisme, protectionism and limitation to only six Western European countries were not in the West German economic interest. The three publications voiced a preference for integration through the OEEC. In 1958, they supported the Western European free trade area to compensate for the EEC’s negative sides. When the free trade area talks broke down in late 1958, FAZ, Der Spiegel and Die Zeit voiced their criticism and disappointment.\(^{209}\) Roode showed that parts of the Dutch press in the late 1950s attacked the EEC as a protectionist entity opposed to free trade.\(^{210}\) In Switzerland, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), the country’s foremost newspaper with a readership reaching beyond the Swiss borders, harshly attacked the EEC in the 1950s and early 1960s. The EEC harmed Swiss economic interests through its external tariff. The EEC also collided with the NZZ economic department’s neoliberal economic policy doctrines. Economic department head Carlo Möttili was a member of the Mont Pèlerin Society and in close contact with the leading neoliberal postwar thinkers.\(^{211}\) While editors in the political department voiced sympathy for the EEC version of ‘European Integration’,\(^{212}\) the NZZ’s economic editors attacked the Treaties of Rome as “divisive”, “discriminating” and “centralist”.\(^{213}\) Together with the FAZ, the NZZ was the primary outlet for Wilhelm Röpke’s attacks on the EEC.\(^{214}\)

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\(^{210}\) See Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation.

\(^{211}\) See Riedl, Liberale Publizistik für soziale Marktwirtschaft; Mirowski and Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pèlerin.

\(^{212}\) Fred Luchsinger, NZZ Bonn correspondent and later NZZ editor in chief, told Walter Hallstein’s spokesman during a meeting in Zurich in December 1964 that he generally supported the EEC. Behm, Vermerk an Herrn Dr. Narjes, Brüssel, den 3. Dezember 1964, BArch N 1266/1302.

\(^{213}\) In January 1957, the NZZ warned of the "aussenpolitischer Graben, der in Westeuropa infolge des Gemeinsamen Marktes entstehen würde". In 1958, articles advocated that the EEC be complemented with a European free trade area because „der Gemeinsame Markt ohne Freihandelszone weder nützlich noch lebensfähig wäre.“ In 1959 and 1960, the NZZ declared that ‘European Integration’ did not need any supranational institutions, but rather free trade. The “keineuropäische Integration” in the EEC framework was “spalterisch” and weakened Western European unity in the fight against communism. Therefore, the NZZ
Harold King, *Reuters* chief correspondent in Paris from 1944 until his retirement in 1967, was one of the most remarkable journalistic supporters of Charles de Gaulle and his ‘Europeanism’. Contrary to most British journalists, King was an ardent follower of de Gaulle. Born in 1898, King went into journalism in the 1920s. He moved to Paris in 1931, where he became a correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Financial Times*. King fled Paris for London in 1940 before the arrival of the *Wehrmacht* in the French capital. In London, he joined *Reuters* and started covering de Gaulle’s exile activities. King travelled to the Soviet Union and reported on the battle of Stalingrad. He then covered the landing of the Free French forces in Southern France in 1944. By then, he had already established a close link to and deep admiration for de Gaulle. In his unpublished memoirs, King confesses to “my unshakable inner conviction of how great a human being Charles de Gaulle was.”

The General, a “human giant”, incarnated the “authentic leader, such as history since antique Greece has only rarely produced.”

During his time as *Reuters* correspondent in Paris, King supported de Gaulle where he could. He established the closest relation of any foreign journalist to de Gaulle. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, King met de Gaulle and his entourage frequently for confidential briefings and conversations. His favourable views on de Gaulle translated into his reporting on French politics. King attacked de Gaulle’s numerous critics arguing that “Great men cannot be judged by small minds”. King admitted that US diplomats in Paris and French opponents of the General frequently accused him of “being a Gaullist” and “unobjective”. King constituted an important ally for de Gaulle, as the *Reuters* chief correspondent had a gatekeeper function for information flowing from Paris into British ministries and media.
Harold King endorsed de Gaulle’s vision for ‘European Integration’. In his memoirs, he boasted of having helped de Gaulle kill the “totally unworkable” European Defence Community plans. King claimed that a Reuters interview he did with de Gaulle criticising the EDC and outlining an alternative proposal “immediately created a political sensation in France” when published in early January 1953. The interview proved instrumental in shifting French public and parliamentary opinion against the EDC, he argued.221 In the 1960s, King shared de Gaulle’s criticism of “the promotor of the Common Market with their foggy notions of ‘supranationalism’”.222 He supported the Fouchet Plans for political cooperation among the ‘Six’, but those were “torpedoed by the Dutch and the Belgians”.223 King approved of de Gaulle’s veto against British EEC membership in 1963. He argued that the British government had remained uncommitted to the EEC. Difficulties in Franco-British relations “cannot in any circumstances be attributed to General de Gaulle.”224 King claimed de Gaulle informed him about the upcoming veto after a ceremonial dinner on 11 January 1963, two days before the famous press conference. The French President told King that the time for Britain to join would “surely come, but later”. The Reuters journalists believed that de Gaulle “had taken me into his confidence as a matter of personal courtesy” and added that “My lips were sealed.” The dinner over, King “walked home after midnight, raising my eyebrows faintly as I passed in front of the British Embassy.”225

Conservative and Gaullist views on ‘European integration’ were supported by many journalists in Western Europe. In France, de Gaulle could rely on faithful supporters across the media landscape226 and his government’s control over public television and radio.227 Prominent foreign affairs journalists like Maurice Ferro, head of the service diplomatique of ORTF’s journal télévisé, whom British diplomats during the second entry bid in 1967 dubbed

221 Ibid., 223-232.
222 Ibid., 274.
223 Ibid., 275.
224 Ibid., 286.
225 Ibid., 279.
“One of the less likeable Gaullist commentators, and an able propagandist”, fervently supported de Gaulle’s views on ‘European unity’ on French state television. Other leading journalists did not belong to the circle of de Gaulle’s close followers, but supported many of his positions. Le Monde director Hubert Beuve-Méry shared de Gaulle’s rejection of the EDC in the 1950s and welcomed the General’s return to power in 1958, while showing little interest in the creation of the EEC and EURATOM in the same year. The most prominent Gaullist in West German journalism was Axel Springer, the equally influential and controversial publisher then in control of the Federal Republic’s largest media empire, comprised of Die Welt and Bild. French diplomats in Bonn held Springer, “dont les journaux nous sont utiles, dont les campagnes ne restent pas sans effet sur le Gouvernement” in high esteem. French diplomats had observed in late 1964 that “Au cours des discussions qui ont récemment mis aux prises les différents clans de la CDU à propos de la politique franco-allemande, le « Bild » a pris position, dans une série d’articles aux titres retentissants et accablants pour les dirigeants fédéraux, en faveur des thèses françaises.” In Spain, the government-controlled media in the 1950s relayed an image of ‘Europe’ and ‘European civilization’ anchored in a conservative vision of the Catholic Occident.

228 See Personality notes on French journalists invited to see the Prime Minister, no date, National Archives, PREM 13/1503.
231 On Springer’s role in the dispute between Gaullists and Atlanticists, see Chapter III. Umstrittener Atlantizismus in Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit, see also Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten, 243 and 303-304.
234 L’Ambassadeur de France près la République Fédérale d’Allemagne to Monsieur M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Bad-Godesberg, le 2 décembre 1964.
Conclusion

Structural change in the international system led to Western European cooperation after 1945. However, between the 1940s and the 1960s, there was no consensus on ‘European integration’ between and within the elites of Western European states. The downfall of the European Great Powers and European empires, the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as Superpowers, the lingering ‘German question’ and postwar reconstruction made many decision makers believe that some form of Western European cooperation was necessary. At the same time, others rejected Western European cooperation based on imperial or nationalist convictions. The European Communities received attention and support across Western Europe. But there was no overarching ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘supranational’ integration, nor were the ‘Six’ and the Communities considered the nucleus of a ‘European’ polity or the incarnation of ‘Europe’.

Western European media coverage reflected the multifaceted and controversial debates among elites in Western Europe on ‘European integration’. While the next two chapters will show that ‘surpranationalism’ and the European Communities received surprising levels of media support, this chapter has emphasised the presence of alternative visions of ‘European integration’ and resistance to ‘supranational’ integration in Western European media. Influential journalists working for renowned media outlets opposed ‘supranational’ integration, supported other forms of Western European cooperation, or simply did not care much about it. They were interested in the big Cold War and decolonisation developments. Western European media coverage of cooperation did not revolve around the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM as the supposed centre of ‘European integration’, but it focused on other international organisations as well. Western European media coverage of ‘European integration’ was thus much more diverse and conflictual than assumed by much ‘European integration’ scholarship.

The set-up of Western European media systems and journalism in the 1950s put structural limits on ‘European integration’ coverage. First, news agencies, broadcasters and newspapers had only small networks of correspondents in Western Europe. Correspondent networks were either still imperial and focused on places outside Europe, or small due to the limited financial means of the postwar media economy. The television foreign correspondent was a profession


236 On this support, see Chapters 3 and 4.
which only developed during the 1950s. Second, Western European journalism was dominated by men with a prewar socialisation. Interwar Europe with its empires and nations had shaped their thinking about foreign policy – and continued to do so after 1945. ‘Supranational’ ‘European integration’ did not fit into their thinking. Third, government control over parts of the national media systems across Western Europe reinforced journalists’ orientation towards the nation.

Given the multitude of conflicting ‘European Integration’ projects connected to an equally diverse set of international organisations in the 1950s, the fact that Western European media in the 1970s came to present the EEC/EC as a unified *sui generis* polity incarnating ‘European Integration’ and even ‘Europe’ seems like a miracle. In 1957 and 1958, nothing indicated that this would happen. The following chapters explore the miraculous emergence of EEC ‘Europe’ to a central position in the ‘European Integration’ coverage of Western European media and the EEC’s transformation from a technocratic international organisation into a ‘European’ polity in the making.
3 The Creation of Euro-journalism

Euro-journalism was born in the 1950s. A group of pro-EEC Western European journalists who began endorsing the EEC and its version of ‘European Integration’ developed during and after the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome. These Euro-journalists adopted the belief that the EEC was not a technocratic international organisation, but the nucleus of a democratic ‘European’ polity. As outlined in the previous chapter, Western European media coverage of the EEC initially reflected the indifference of and opposition to the EEC and its exclusivity claim on ‘European Integration’. In this context, Euro-journalists were instrumental in two ways. First, they put the EEC on the Western European media agenda and reported about its existence, organisation and functioning. They assured the EEC a constant and surprisingly strong presence in Western European media. Second, Euro-journalists shaped a media discourse that presented the EEC as a *sui generis* organisation incarnating ‘European Integration’ and ‘Europe’. They defended the EEC against multiple attacks and competing ‘European Integration’ projects, arguing that the only valid path to integration was through the EEC.

This chapter will demonstrate that Euro-journalists were present in many important editorial departments in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Mostly economic and foreign affairs journalists, Euro-journalists had a keen interest and expertise in economic policy, international political economy, and diplomacy. The chapter will show how their biographies, common generational experiences and socialisation processes turned Euro-journalists into EEC experts and firm supporters of the Community. As pioneer Euro-journalists, they became “European by conviction long before it was fashionable” in Western European journalism.237 The chapter will highlight how Euro-journalists connected in national and transnational pro-EEC networks. It will also show that Euro-journalists shared a common vision for the EEC – transfer of national sovereignty to ‘the European level’, majority voting in the EEC Council, direct elections for the European Parliamentary Assembly, expansion of

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the Assembly’s and the EEC Commission’s competencies. However, at the same time Euro-journalists diverged in their views on the right economic policy they wanted to see implemented through the EEC. Euro-journalists defended competing economic schemes for the EEC ranging from neoliberal to statist. This chapter hence concentrates on the biographies, visions and motives of Euro-journalists. Chapter 4 will in a next step demonstrate how Euro-journalists promoted a media discourse on the *sui generis* character of the EEC which moved from being marginal in the late 1950s to becoming the mainstream media discourse on ‘European Integration’ by the early 1970s.

Euro-journalists were part of a larger group of advocates of ‘European Integration’ à la EEC which formed in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Pro-EEC networks developed in political parties, government administrations, academia, business, civil society and of course in the Community institutions themselves.238 The primary EEC promoters were senior EEC Commission figures like Walter Hallstein, Robert Marjolin and Sicco Mansholt, pro-EEC politicians such as Paul Henri Spaak, Joseph Luns and Emilio Colombo, ‘European’ activists like Jean Monnet as well as numerous other politicians, parliamentarians, public servants, lawyers, intellectuals, academics, business people – and journalists.239 ‘Europeanist’ EEC activism thus constituted a phenomenon shared across different professions and groups. Journalists shared a similar social background and education as well as similar views and convictions as other elite groups in the public and private sector – they were an essential part of the Western European elite. This was particularly true for senior journalists in opinion-leading national newspapers, news agencies and in public broadcasting. Euro-journalists often

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supported the EEC for similar reasons to other EEC adherents in ministries, parties, academia and business.

*Journalism, politics and diplomacy in postwar Western Europe*

Euro-journalist support for the EEC was part of engaged postwar Western European journalism. As indicated in the previous chapter, in the decades after the war, journalists in Western Europe usually defended political, economic and social causes, usually in proximity to political parties, camps, power circles, leaders or ideas. They were part of Western European elites’ efforts to build prosperous and stable societies after the disaster of World War II. The ideal of objective reporting mattered to journalists, but even more so did the wish to influence politics and society. The postwar advocacy journalism supported causes as diverse as social progress and social justice, political, economic and cultural modernisation, democratisation and Westernisation, anti-imperialism, anti-communism and democratic socialism as well as conservatism, religiousness and a stable peaceful social order. Western European leaders from conservative Charles de Gaulle to left-liberal Willy Brandt relied on and cultivated groups of loyal journalistic supporters. Western European postwar journalism was educational in style. As firm believers in the power of the media – particularly in the force of the new medium of television, which spread into Western European households during the 1960s – journalists set out to tutor and enlighten their publics via newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and television reporting. ‘European integration’ and EEC ‘Europe’ were thus only one among several other ‘projects’ defended by journalists. Euro-journalists’ advocacy for ‘European integration’ through the EEC was often embedded in a broader engagement for certain social models, economic policies or foreign policy orientations. The chapter will put Euro-journalism in the broader context of Western European postwar advocacy journalism and its causes.

Euro-journalism mattered as Western European elites cared greatly about the role of the media in ‘European integration’ in the postwar decades. Decision makers and government

240 See Delporte, “Les journalistes gaullistes.”
242 On politicised journalism and advocacy journalism in various Western European countries in the postwar decades, see Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit; Kaciaf, Les pages ‘Politique’; Forno, Informazione e potere; Bingham, Family Newspapers?; Delporte, La France dans les yeux; Hodenberg, Konsens und Krise; Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945.
bureaucracies monitored domestic and foreign media coverage on ‘European integration’ closely and tried to influence it. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan carefully followed the positions taken by the various British media outlets on his effort to bring Britain into the EEC in 1961-1963. He complained to publishers and journalists about what he considered unfair coverage. In conversations with French interlocutors, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer frequently grumbled about “anti-German” articles on ‘European integration’ and Franco-German relations in Le Monde. French President Charles de Gaulle informed the pro-Gaullist British Reuters Paris correspondent Harold King in a confidential meeting about his decision to veto British EEC membership two days ahead of his notorious press conference on 13 January 1963. These actions reflected the critical role politicians, diplomats, ministerial bureaucrats, intellectuals, business people and other elite groups credited the media with in domestic and international politics not only during the postwar decades, but since the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries.

Western European decision makers credited various functions to the elite and mass media in politics generally and ‘European integration’ specifically. First, elite media were believed to reflect official views. This was particularly true for journaux de référence such as The Times, Le Monde and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which were close to government and elite circles. British diplomats read Le Monde to find out about French positions in the

243 There are numerous references to and comments on the British media’s ‘European integration’ coverage in 1961-1963 in Macmillan’s diaries. See Haeussler, “The Popular Press and Ideas of Europe.”
244 See the many examples in Pokorny, “Die französischen Auslandskorrespondenten in Bonn und Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer 1949-1963.”
245 King claims de Gaulle informed him about the upcoming veto after a ceremonial dinner on 11 January 1963, two days before the famous press conference. The French President told King that the time for Britain to join would “surely come, but later”. The Reuters journalist believed that de Gaulle “had taken me into his confidence as a matter of personal courtesy” and added that “My lips were sealed.” The dinner over, King “walked home after midnight, raising my eyebrows faintly as I passed in front of the British Embassy.” Harold King, Chasing the News, 1916-1969, 279, Reuters Archive, 1/911201.
Western European free trade area negotiations in 1957 and 1958. During the British entry negotiations in 1962, EEC diplomats in Brussels scrutinised The Times to find indications for changes in the British negotiation position. At the time of the second British EEC membership bid, French diplomats in Bonn stated in September 1966 that Frankfurter Allgemeine’s articles “sont intéressants dans la mesure où ils traduisent les réactions, quelquefois sommaires, de la bourgeoisie, des milieux d’affaires et des milieux politiques proches du gouvernement.”

Second, politicians and diplomats used journalists to test ideas and collect information. When The Times Diplomatic Correspondent A.M. Rendel met with representatives of the Treasury Department, he was asked “if I had any indication of the attitude of the other Common Market countries” towards the British plans for a Western European free trade area. When President of the Board of Trade Reginald Maulding in a meeting with The Times Industrial Correspondent Duncan Burn in May 1960 expressed interest in the idea of British membership in the ECSC, Burn suspected “it was part of a campaign of kite flying.” Similarly, when an Italian diplomat told Diplomatic Correspondent Rendel in June 1960 that “the British Government had now decided to agree to join a customs union between the Six

247 The British delegation to the OEEC in Paris reported in January 1957 that “we have all been concerned by the increasingly negative attitude adopted by the French press towards the Free Trade Area”. Such attacks in the French press “have been undoubtedly inspired by the Patronat and possibly some sections of the French Administration”. Hugh Ellis-Rees, United Kingdom Delegation to OEEC, Paris to Sir John Coulson, Paymaster General’s Office, January 13, 1957, National Archives, T 337/21.

248 In February 1958, British diplomats took an interest in a Le Monde article by Pierre Drouin on French counterproposals to the British plans for a Western European Free Trade Area. “The Le Monde article is by Pierre Drouin, who has good contacts with the officials of the Quai d’Orsay who were involved in preparing the first draft for the French counterproposals and his article may be assumed to reflect official inspiration.” British Embassy Paris to Foreign Office, February 27, 1958, National Archives, FO 371/134491/611/206.

249 An episode from February 1962 illustrates this. The Times Foreign Editor Iverach McDonald wrote to Editor William Haley on 8 February that “Edward Heath rang up this evening and was put on to me as you were away. Without questioning the accuracy of our reports, he said that three of our Common Market reports in the past eight days, suggesting that there were delays in the negotiations with Britain, had made a number of Ambassadors here and Ministers in Europe think that Britain herself was wanting to go slow. The reasoning was that anything which appeared in The Times, in particular anything from the Diplomatic Correspondent, reflected views of the British Government; therefore, the British Government must be going slow. I said that we published the news from good sources and we could not be responsible for far fetched interpretations. He said he merely wished to call the matter to our attention. I think he felt slightly foolish at the other end of the line.” McDonald to The Editor, February 8, 1962, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Common Market and OEEC.

250 Ambassade de France près la République fédérale d’Allemagne, Etude sur la presse quotidienne allemande, Bonn, le 17 septembre 1966, MAE/Paris Europe RFA 178QO/1424.


and the Seven”, Rendel supposed “he was trying out a theory in order to see what reaction he would get”.253

Third, political leaders used the media to send messages to other governments. When the Free Trade Area talks failed in late 1958, the British government used a Financial Times leader criticising the Federal Government to put pressure on Bonn. The Foreign Office told the West German ambassador in London that the Prime Minister had been “struck” by the leader, which argued that it was “particularly ironic that this [i.e. the F.T.A. trouble] should occur at a time when Dr. Adenauer is relying on British and American troops and diplomatic support to prevent any changes in the status of Berlin.”254 In January 1963, the Italian Government communicated its anger about the Elysée Treaty to Bonn via an interview with Ministro del Bilancio Ugo La Malfa in Der Spiegel. La Malfa told the magazine that the Elysée Treaty was not the kind of ‘European integration’ his government envisioned. La Malfa had chosen Der Spiegel for the interview to snub the West German government: after the Spiegel Affäre in late 1962, CDU government circles considered the magazine a public enemy. The interview had the intended effect of shocking the West German government.255

Fourth, media coverage was believed to influence the government actions. Discussing British EEC membership in September 1962, Albert Robinson, British High Commissioner for Central Africa, argued “that many of the brakes which could be applied on entry into Europe had not yet been applied. One of the most important of these was The Times, which had left itself in a position still to put the brake on if it thought fit.”256 Even if bad press might not cause a government to completely change course, it was seen as limiting its margin of manoeuvre. During the empty chair crisis in early 1966, the French ambassador to Belgium Étienne de Crouy-Chanel warned about the negative image of France in the Belgian media. The ambassador saw this coverage inspired by West German public relations efforts. He

254 The Foreign Office acted on orders by the Prime Minister. “Mr. Bishop at No. 10 told me to-day that the Prime Minister had read with approval to-day’s Leader in the Financial Times. The Prime Minister had thought that this Leader ought to be brought to the attention of the German Ambassador. Mr. Macmillan had particularly agreed with the last sentence which reads “It is particularly ironic that his [i.e. the F.T.A. trouble] should occur at a time when Dr. Adenauer is relying on British and American troops and diplomatic support to prevent any changes in the status of Berlin.” I have accordingly rung up the German Embassy about this article. I have told them (by agreement with Mr. Bishop) that the Prime Minister was “struck” by it.” P.F. Hancock to Mr. Holliday, Free Trade Area, November 28 1958, National Archives, FO 371/134518/611/1069.
256 Memorandum from Oliver Woods to The Editor, Mr. McDonald, Mr. David Wood, Mr. Spanier, Confidential, September 3, 1962, TNL Archive, Confidential Memoranda, Common Market, 1962-1963.
underlined “qu’à côté du jeu qui se livre sur le plan de la négociation, s’engage aussi une bataille sur le plan de la propagande” and that “Nous devons y prendre garde si nous voulons conserver entièrement notre liberté de manœuvre” in the negotiations on the future of the EEC. When Britain put forward its second EEC entry bid, British diplomats decided to invite fifteen senior French journalists to London in October 1967. The journalists would be briefed by leading politicians and government officials. They would subsequently publish reports on their visit in leading French media outlets. British diplomats argued that “Even if the resulting publicity produces no fundamental change in the French attitude to our entry, the results are likely to be valuable in the long term education of French opinion, and, in the short term, may have some restraining effect on the General.”

Finally, media outlets with mass audiences – tabloid newspapers, radio and television – were believed to influence mass public opinion. During a meeting with The Times Editor William Haley in September 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stated that the anti-EEC coverage of The Daily Express harmed his effort to convince the British people of EEC membership. “The Beaverbrook campaign was being quite effective”, Macmillan complained. French diplomats in Bonn thought the tabloid Bild had helped create a positive image of President de Gaulle and his ‘European’ policy among the wider West German public. They underlined the French “intérêt évident à ménager M. Springer, dont les journaux nous sont utiles, dont les campagnes ne restent pas sans effet sur le Gouvernement”. In a confidential meeting between French President George Pompidou and The Times Editor Willam Rees-Mogg in April 1971, Pompidou underlined the power of the mass media. He cited “as an instance the April Fool’s joke broadcast by the French radio the day before yesterday, according to which the Ministers of Transport of the Six had decided by way of meeting the British half way to switch on the Continent to driving on the left. This had provoked a storm of protest from French motorists who had been taken in by the hoax.”

258 N. Statham, Visit of 15 Senior French Journalists, October 10 and 11, 1967, 9 October, 1967, National Archives, PREM 13/1503. The British Embassy in Paris added that “We cannot hope that the press coverage we are getting as a result of this visit will cause de Gaulle to change his course, but it will certainly influence the French public’s reaction to whatever he does.” D.A. Logan British Embassy Paris to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 16 October, 1967, National Archives, FCO 26/98.
261 Hargrove, Memorandum, Personal and Confidential, 3.4.71, National Archives, PREM 15/348.
sum, Western European political leaders used the media for the international monitoring of other governments’ behaviour and to send transnational messages to partners and opponents. They thought the media to have an influence both on elite decision making in governments and on the broader public both at home and abroad.  

Given their belief in the power of the media, Western European governments went to great lengths to influence journalists and the ‘European integration’ coverage they produced. They applied a dual strategy of sticks and carrots to make journalists produce the desired reporting. Governments made various efforts to ensnare journalists. Politicians and senior civil servants frequently met journalists for confidential conversations on ‘European integration’. Governments also invited foreign journalists for information visits to inform them about their positions on ‘European integration’. As stated above, in October 1967 the British Government invited fifteen high-level journalists from France to London in an effort to promote its second entry bid and “to put over as forcefully as possible the British case to counter the one-sided picture presented by General de Gaulle.” British diplomats meticulously planned the visit, during which the journalists met Prime Minister Harold Wilson, other ministers and senior public servants. When the journalists published well-meaning articles upon their return to France, the Foreign Office celebrated the visit as

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262 It is important to keep in mind that the term public opinion could refer to different concepts in postwar Western Europe. It could refer to elite public opinion (similar to the concept of enlightened public opinion), mass public opinion as expressed in public opinion polls (which came into use in Western Europe in the 1950s) or also to aggregate media coverage in a specific country or on a particular issue. In the sources, it is not always clear in which sense decision makers were using the term. For a Begriffsgeschichte of the different meanings of public opinion in international relations, see Stephen Wertheim, “Reading the International Mind: International Public Opinion in Early Twentieth Century Anglo-American Thought,” in The Decisionist Imagination: Sovereignty, Social Science, and Democracy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Nicolas Guilhot and Daniel Bessner (New York; London: Berghahn Books, 2017), forthcoming.

263 Politicians and civil servants considered such information visits as very effective. In October 1968, French diplomats in Bonn cited future editor in chief of Die Welt Herbert Kremp as an example. “Le personnage avait manifesté, après 1963, une évolution qui fut également remarquée. Favorable, jusque là, à l’ »atlantisme », il s’était découvert des sympathies pour l’Europe et n’avait pas caché, dans certains éditoriaux, la déception qui lui inspiraient les États-Unis. Cependant, depuis quelque temps, et à la suite d’un long voyage d’information entrepris aux États- Unis aux frais du gouvernement américain, les Anglo-Saxons paraissent avoir remonté dans son estime, en même temps que sous sa plume la France se voyait de moins en moins bien traitée.” Ambassade de France à Bonn to Direction des Services d’Information et de Presse, a/s. M. Herbert KREMP, nouveau rédacteur en chef de DIE WELT, Bad-Godesberg, le 15 Octobre 1968, MAE/Paris Europe RFA 178QO/1425.

264 Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, Visit of Senior French Journalists, Confidential, 11 July, 1967, National Archives, PREM 13/1503.

265 They grouped the participating journalists into those “actively in sympathy with General de Gaulle” and those who realised “that French Government arguments are not objective.” They also prepared answers to expected questions “recurrent in French propaganda”. N. Statham, Visit of 15 Senior French Journalists, October 10 and 11, 1967, 9 October, 1967, National Archives, PREM 13/1503.
“considerable success”\textsuperscript{266} and “major achievement”.\textsuperscript{267} The British Embassy in Paris reported that “people are talking about ‘l’offensive anglaise’”.\textsuperscript{268} The British Embassy had kept the visit secret from the \textit{Quai d’Orsay}. The French Foreign Ministry only got wind of it a few days in advance. According to the Foreign Office, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville immediately reacted with a “counter-brief” of senior French journalists, but failed to mitigate the visit’s effect.\textsuperscript{269}

Governments also put pressure on journalists through complaints about unwanted coverage. When \textit{The Times} published the leaked opening statement Edward Heath had delivered to the ‘Six’ when entry negotiations started in October 1961, an outraged Heath called up \textit{Times} Editor William Haley claiming the newspaper “had completely sold his negotiation position”.\textsuperscript{270} After the outbreak of the ‘empty chair crisis’ in July 1965, Eberhard Bömcke, West German Deputy Permanent Representative to the EEC in Brussels, wrote a letter to \textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung} Brussels correspondent Thomas Löffelholz. The journalist had claimed in an article that the EEC Council of Ministers was left hamstrung without the participation of France. Bömcke told Löffelholz that this statement had left him “distressed”. He thought it “extraordinarily dangerous in this moment to make the claim that without France the work could not continue here.”\textsuperscript{271} In November 1965, Bömcke complained that an article by Löffelholz had hinted at growing mistrust between the Federal Republic, Italy and the Benelux countries. “The opposite is the case”, Bömcke claimed, “cooperation between the Five has been particularly close in recent times.”\textsuperscript{272} In January 1967, Bömcke wrote directly to the \textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}’s editorial department. He stated he was “impressed by the misjudgement of your correspondent”, who had criticised the passivity of the Council of

\textsuperscript{266} D.L.N. Goochild to Miss Petrie, Mr. Hancock, Sir C. O’Neill, Mr. Morland, Results of the Visit by the 15 French Journalists, 20 October, 1967, National Archives, FCO 26/98.

\textsuperscript{267} Petrie to Fife Clark, Director General, Central Office of Information, 27 October, 1967, National Archives, FCO 26/98.

\textsuperscript{268} The Embassy added that “In these articles our case has been put very fairly and so have our arguments against the French case.” D.A. Logan British Embassy Paris to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 16 October, 1967, National Archives, FCO 26/98.

\textsuperscript{269} The British Embassy in Paris reported that “The French appear not to have found out about it until the weekend before it happened. It was then that M. Couve invited the No. 2’s of most of the papers concerned to lunch with him in Paris on Wednesday, October 11. They produced suitable biased material on Thursday, October 12, but Mr. Logan put an embargo on our Group’s stories until the evening of October 13. The result was that M. Couve was a victim of the old British tactic of “Messieurs les Français, Tirez les Premiers”. D.L.N. Goochild to Miss Petrie, Mr. Hancock, Sir C. O’Neill, Mr. Morland, Results of the Visit by the 15 French Journalists, 20 October, 1967, National Archives, FCO 26/98.

\textsuperscript{270} Heath cited in Tawil, “British Government and Press Perceptions of and Policy Preferences for European Integration during the Macmillan Years,” 103.

\textsuperscript{271} Bömcke to Löffelholz, den 29. Juli 1965, Löffelholz Papers.

\textsuperscript{272} Bömcke to Löffelholz, Brüssel, den 30. November 1965, Löffelholz Papers.
Ministers. “This criticism is wrong”, Bömcke underlined. Roger Massip claims that French President Charles de Gaulle – annoyed by Massip’s criticism of the General’s EEC policy – requested a meeting with the Le Figaro journalist. In May 1975, the Danish Foreign Minister called up the BBC to complain about how a Today programme had covered Danish EC policy. Politicians and diplomats thus applied both positive incentives and negative pressure to make journalists produce the desired coverage of ‘European integration’.

Euro-journalists – economists and cosmopolitans

Who were the Euro-journalists? Euro-journalists worked in the editorial departments of a broad range of media outlets throughout Western Europe. They were particularly well-represented among the first generation of Brussels correspondents who started covering the EEC from the Belgian capital in the late 1950s and early 1960s. There were two ideal types of Euro-journalist – the economist and the cosmopolitan. Economists had started their journalistic career after the war specialising in business and economic journalism. Before becoming interested in the EEC, they had usually covered national economic policy during the 1950s. In their work, they had often been in touch with the ‘European Integration’ projects of the 1950s predating the EEC. Experience in reporting on trade, agriculture or competition policy allowed them to quickly understand and cover the complexities of the EEC. Many economist Euro-journalists became EEC or Brussels correspondents. However, their career paths were national and did not reflect the career paths of foreign correspondents elsewhere. Hans Herbert Götz of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Pierre Drouin of Le Monde exemplify the economist Euro-journalist.

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275 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 2.5.75, 275. E.E.C. Referendum (254), Confidential, BBC WAC, T62/102/1.

63
Hans Herbert Götz was a representative of the strong ordoliberal current in postwar West German economic journalism. Born in 1921, Götz joined the Wehrmacht after graduating from high school in 1939. He left the military in 1941 and after an apprenticeship worked in an industrial firm in Freiburg until the end of the war. Götz joined the FAZ’s economics section after completing a PhD under the supervision of ordoliberal pioneer Walter Eucken at the University of Freiburg in 1949. Eucken had recommended Götz to Frankfurter Allgemeine founding Editor Erich Welter who had been in search of ordoliberal expertise for the build-up of the FAZ’s Wirtschaftsredaktion. Götz thus became a founding member of the FAZ’s then still small editorial department. After four years in the Frankfurt headquarters, he went to Bonn to head the economics section of the FAZ’s Bonn bureau. He developed excellent contacts and spearheaded his newspaper’s support campaign for Ludwig Erhard’s soziale Marktwirtschaft throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Götz took an interest in ‘European Integration’ early on and attended the 1958 Stresa conference on EEC agricultural policy. After the conference, Götz wrote a brochure on ‘European’ agricultural policy for the EEC Commission. Having proven his journalistic skills both in the Frankfurt editorial department and in the Bonn bureau, Welter sent Götz to Brussels in 1963. He was by then one of the leading young economics journalists in the Federal Republic. Götz quickly became a

278 When Götz moved to Berlin to cover East German economic policy, not even the East German Secret Police was able to find out why and how Götz left the military in 1941. See Hauptabteilung II/13 Auskunftsbericht OV „Keil“ zur Person Dr. Goetz, Hans Herbert, Berlin, 16.10.1979 and Hauptabteilung II/3, Einschätzung zur persönlichen Entwicklung von Dr. Goetz, Hans Herbert, Berlin, 25.03.1985, both in MfS AOP 1432/91 Band 1.
280 Götz published a book of praise for the social market economy, summarising his work in Bonn from 1953 to 1963. See Hans Herbert Götz, Weil alle besser leben wollen... Porträt der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik (Düsseldorf; Wien: Econ-Verlag, 1963). On the FAZ’s support for Erhard and the social market economy, see Riedl, Liberale Publizistik für soziale Marktwirtschaft.
282 The EEC Commission had asked Götz to write the brochure. He accepted, as he explained to Erich Welter: “Besides the fact that with such a thing you learn a lot, the offer is also financially very interesting for me.”; „Abgesehen davon, dass man bei einer solchen Sache immer viel lernt, ist auch das Angebot finanziell für mich sehr interessant.” Götz to Welter, Bonn, den 8. August 1958, BArch N 1314/381. The brochure came out in 1959. Hans Herbert Götz, Europäische Agrarpolitik Auf Neuen Wegen (Baden-Baden: Lutzeyer, 1959).
central figure or even “the number one”\textsuperscript{284} in the Brussels press corps. His status was based on the prestige of the newspaper he represented, his economic policy expertise and his journalistic reputation in the Federal Republic. It mattered little that he spoke no French and little English when arriving in Brussels. He could rely on German sources and many German(-speaking) functionaries at the EEC Commission. As will be discussed in more detail below, Götz developed a close relation with EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein. Götz remained in Brussels until 1975. He then moved to West Berlin as economics correspondent covering the German Democratic Republic’s economy.\textsuperscript{285} Götz held this position until his retirement in the 1990s.

Pierre Drouin at \textit{Le Monde} belonged to the ‘modernisers’ in French economic journalism. He was born in 1921 and studied \textit{lettres} and law at the University of Lille. He obtained a doctorate in law in 1943.\textsuperscript{286} Drouin then briefly worked in the \textit{cabinet} of Henri Frenay, Minister of prisoners, refugees and deportees. Freney held moderate left-wing views and opposed communism – positions Drouin would defend throughout his career. Drouin joined \textit{Le Monde} in 1947 as a reporter and specialised in economic policy. In 1959, he became vice head and in 1961 head of the \textit{service économique} of \textit{Le Monde}. In the 1960s, Drouin was “one of France’s leading economic commentators” according to British diplomats.\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Le Monde}’s economic section united journalists with a broader set of views. Left-wing Gilbert Mathieu was a backer of Michel Rocard and the \textit{Parti socialiste unifié} (PSU), while Paul Fabra supported the neoliberal views of Jacques Rueff. Drouin himself held centre-left convictions and was a \textit{moderniste}. The leitmotif of his thinking was the modernization of the French economy through reforms, enhanced competition and state-led planning. The objective of modernisation was to catch up with other Western advanced industrial economies, particularly the USA.\textsuperscript{288} With his centre-left progressive views, Drouin belonged to a group of journalists who protested against the support \textit{Le Monde} director Hubert Beuve-Méry gave to de Gaulle upon his return to power in 1958.\textsuperscript{289} Drouin had followed ‘European Integration’

\textsuperscript{284} “Götz, c’etait le numéro un !” Interview with Paul Collowald in Brussles, 05.02.2015.

\textsuperscript{285} In the late 1980s, Götz published two books on the GDR and its economy. See Hans Herbert Götz, \textit{Manager zwischen Marx und Markt: Generaldirektoren in der DDR} (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1988); Hans Herbert Götz, \textit{Honecker, und was dann: 40 Jahre DDR} (Herford: Busse Seewald, 1989).


\textsuperscript{287} See Personality notes on French journalists invited to see the Prime Minister, no date, National Archives, PREM 13/1503.

\textsuperscript{288} See Thibau, \textit{Le Monde}, 298.

since the 1950s. He never worked permanently in Brussels, but “il venait souvent à Bruxelles prendre le vent, interroger les commissaires.” As will be discussed below, Drouin was well-connected in French pro EEC-circles. Drouin became one of Le Monde’s deputy editors in chief in 1969. In 1979, he became an editorialist and advisor to the direction of Le Monde.

Hans Herbert Götz and Pierre Drouin shared many attributes typical of the economist Euro-journalist. They were both born in 1921. They had a bourgeois background, high academic credentials and significant economic policy expertise. They had started their journalistic careers after the war in the late 1940s, gained experience and standing in the 1950s, and became part of their nation’s leading young economic journalists in the 1960s. They did not, however, belong to the top group of older senior journalists. Götz and Drouin combined their interest in the economy with an equally strong interest in political and social issues. They saw economic progress as a means to create prosperous and non-communist societies in Western Europe. The EEC appealed to them as it combined economic and political issues. Moreover, most economist Euro-journalists like Drouin and Götz had essentially national careers. Both worked for the same leading newspaper, the FAZ and Le Monde, for their entire professional life. They had become interested in the EEC through their interest in national economic policy. They observed ‘European Integration’ through the prism of West German and French economic and political debates.

While Drouin and Götz agreed in interpreting the EEC as the nucleus of a federal ‘Europe’ polity, they disagreed on its concrete future, particularly in the realm of economic policy. Their views reflected French and German debates on ‘European Integration’ in the 1960s. Götz and Drouin laid out their visions for EEC ‘Europe’ in books published in 1963. Götz’s Weil Alle besser leben wollen celebrated the achievements of Ludwig Erhard’s liberal economic policies and contained a part on ‘European Integration’. For ‘Europe’s’ future, Götz saw essentially two options. The ‘European’ economic order could become “an order of cartels, of emasculating protectionism towards the outside, of exaggerated ‘upward-harmonisation’ in social policy, and of constant interventionism”. Such an order would generate inflation, produce no higher standards of living and thus weaken Western Europe in

293 See Götz, Weil alle besser leben wollen...
its struggle against communism. Instead, Götz argued that ‘Europe’ should build an economic order comprised of strict rules on competition, open to international trade, limiting social transfers, preventing state-interventionism, and fighting inflation. In short, the ‘European’ economic order should follow the model of ordoliberalism. With regard to Britain, Götz thought the EEC should welcome the UK for both economic and political reasons. When French President de Gaulle vetoed British entry in January 1963, Götz told his FAZ colleagues that “The development in Brussels is somewhat shocking”.

Pierre Drouin outlined a detailed vision of the EEC and ‘European Integration’ in his 1963 book *L’Europe du Marché Commun*. He agreed that competition within the EEC would help boost the French economy. However, he criticised the “sectarisme du Dr Erhard” and “sa foi aveugle dans les vertus de la libre entreprise livrée à elle-même”. Instead of liberal non-interventionist policies, Drouin envisioned *plannification* at the ‘European level’. “Malgré les combats d’arrière-garde du ministre allemand de l’Economie fédérale, tout porte à croire que la ‘marche du temps’ amènera normalement, sans que l’on soit contraint de prendre des décisions fracassantes, à une prévision à long terme européenne.” Drouin argued for social upwards-harmonisation in the EEC. Already in 1957 he had been optimistic that the EEC would lead France’s partner to adopt French social standards. “L’expérience de la C.E.C.A. prouve que le nivellement des rémunérations et des charges sociales s’opère toujours par le haut.” Moreover, Drouin contemplated an African-‘European’ partnership to put the relationship between the decolonising French empire and newly independent African states on a new basis. “C’est par une ‘fuite en avant’, en prolongeant le couple France-Afrique par celui d’Europe-Afrique, qu’on réussira peut-être le mieux à tisser de nouveaux liens dans ce ‘grand espace’ qui fut celui de l’ère coloniale.” With regard to British EEC membership, Drouin doubted if the 1961 British application had ever been sincere. He feared that British membership would increase US influence in the EEC. Hence, Drouin could live with de

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296 Pierre Drouin, *L’Europe du Marché Commun* (Paris: Julliard, 1963). Drouin indicates that the book was in part based on articles on the EEC published in *Le Monde*, as well as on research he had done for those articles.
299 Ibid., 224.
300 Pierre Drouin, II. - Points sensibles et faux problèmes, *Le Monde*, 29.06.1957.
Gaulle’s veto. “Mieux vaudrait attendre quelques années encore l’arrivée des Anglais, plutôt que de risquer, en facilitant trop vite leur débarquement sur le continent, de voir le Marché commun sombrer dans ce ‘eaux mêlées’ atlantiques dominées par les courants américains.”

Drouin’s views on the EEC reflected widespread French reservation vis-à-vis Britain, Eurafrique plans and a strong belief in state-driven economic modernization through planification, which rose to considerable popularity throughout Western Europe and the US in the early 1960s. Criticism of Ludwig Erhard’s resistance to planification was widespread in France in the first half of the 1960s.

Firmly embedded in their national contexts, economist Euro-journalists had different views on central aspects of the EEC. However, their embeddedness allowed them to connect and introduce the EEC into national economic policy discourses – for example, on the soziale Marktwirtschaft in the Federal Republic or on modernisation in France. They could do so with authority as experts both on national economic policy and on the complexities of the EEC. In many ways, the economist Euro-journalists corresponded to the ideal type journalist who should cover ‘European Integration’ outlined by EEC commission spokesman Giorgio Smoquina in July 1959. Smoquina envisioned a “giornalista competente nello sviluppo parallelo politico e tecnico-economico di una costruzione siffatta: che sa vagliare gli effetti vicini e lontani in campo politico, ma seguire anche, e fin nel dettaglio, il gioco della tecnica”.

Other economist Euro-journalists who became involved in EEC affairs through a national career, worked for prestigious national media outlets and inserted EEC issues into national economic policy debates, had similar career paths to Hans Herbert Götz and Pierre Drouin. Götz himself was part of a group of economist Euro-journalists in the Federal Republic that constituted itself in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. The group would shape ‘European Integration’ coverage in West German media in the following decades. Carl A. Ehrhardt and Rainer Hellmann had both studied economics and obtained PhDs. They covered

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302 Drouin also wrote: “A regarder froidement le bilan des dix-sept sessions ministérielles entre les Six et la Grande-Bretagne qui se sont poursuivies, à Bruxelles, depuis le début du mois de novembre 1962, on ne peut manquer d’être en effet déçu par la lenteur avec laquelle les Anglais ont cheminé en direction du Traité de Rome.” Drouin, L’Europe du Marché Commun, 248.

303 This French criticism in turn made it into the Federal Republic’s media. WDR Radio correspondent Eberhard Schütz in Paris reported about the reserved French reaction to Erhard becoming Federal Chancellor in 1963. One central reason for this reservation was Erhard’s liberal rejection of planning. See Eberhard Schütz, Paris, Echo der Welt, 27.4.63, WDR Archiv 5257.

the ECSC from Luxembourg in the 1950s and followed the EEC to Brussels in the late
1950s. They would spend their entire careers in the Belgian capital. Both developed
extensive contacts and an excellent reputation in EEC circles. Ehrhardt covered the EEC for
Das Handelsblatt, the Federal Republic’s leading business and financial daily. EEC
functionaries in October 1959 underlined that Ehrhardt was “very well-meaning and
helpful“.
West German diplomats in February 1978 reported that “Ehrhardt (Handelsblatt)
is one of the most distinguished German correspondents in Brussels” who “has been
cooperating closely and trustfully with the Representation here for a long time.” Rainer
Hellmann was initially the Brussels correspondent of Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste (VWD),
the foremost financial and economics news agency in the Federal Republic, and Der
Volkswirt, the leading weekly business magazine in the Federal Republic. In July 1963, EEC
functionaries explained to Walter Hallstein that with Hellmann Der Volkswirt had hired “the
best German correspondent present here”. Hellmann was initially alone with a secretary in
the Brussels office of Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste but later came to direct a larger team.
Hellmann published a number of books on ‘European Integration’ and international political
economy. In the 1960s, he dealt with the economic balance between the US and ‘European’
economies as well as with the American economic presence in Western Europe. Hellmann
warned that ‘Europe’ might fall behind the United States, which had massively expanded its
economic presence in the EEC. His views reflected debates about the ‘American challenge’
to Western Europe in EEC circles; they also mirrored the 1960s conflict between Atlanticist
and Gaullist visions of ‘European Integration’. Hellmann argued for a strong ‘European’

305 According to West German diplomats, by November 1959, Ehrhardt was in Brussels, while Hellmann was
about to take over the EEC coverage for VWD in Brussels. See Reuter to Privat, Anhang: Liste der in Brüssel
307 “Ehrhardt (Handelsblatt) ist einer der angesehensten deutschen Korrespondenten in Brüssel.” ; “Ehrhardt
arbeitet seit langem eng und vertrauensvoll mit hiesiger Vertretung zusammen.” Fernschrreiben Brüssel euro to
Bonn AA, Betr.: Reise Brüsseler Journalisten nach Damaskus, Beirut und Amman, 01.02.1978, PA AA
308 Looking back in 1992, Hellmann claimed that “Dal 1958, il servizio VWD-Europa rappresenta l’unico
servizio in lingua tedesca che informa quotidianamente sul processo di integrazione europea”. Rainer Hellmann,
“Germania: molti media e molto libero mercato,” in Europa economia: l’informazione specializzata nei media,
ed. Gerolamo Fiori et al., LACEF Laboratorio per la comunicazione economica e finanziaria dell’Università
Bocconi (Milano: Egea, 1992), 29.
309 “Den besten deutschen Korrespondenten, der hier anwesend ist”. Dem Herrn Präsidenten, Betrifft: Besuch der
Herren vom „Volkswirt“, Herausgeber Dr. F. Reuter und Chefredakteur Dr. W. Trautmann, Brüssel, den 25. Juli
1963, BArch N 1266/1708. Der Volkswirt was renamed into Die Wirtschaftswoche in the 1970s.
310 See Nabokoff, Brief note on the organisation of specialised “Common Market news” agencies in Brussels &
Luxembourg, Brussels, July 24, 1961, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
311 See Rainer Hellmann, Amerika auf dem Europamarkt. US-Direktinvestitionen im Gemeinsamen Markt
(Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1966); Rainer Hellmann, Weltunternehmen nur amerikanisch? Das
Ungleichgewicht der Investitionen zwischen Amerika und Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1970).
economic position vis-à-vis the US. In the 1970s, Hellmann’s focus shifted to international monetary cooperation and the plans for a ‘European monetary union’. He acknowledged that critics in the Federal Republic rightly pointed to the risks of monetary union in the EC framework, but nevertheless demanded bolder moves towards ‘European’ monetary union.

Other West German Euro-journalists with similar biographies joined Ehrhardt and Hellmann in Brussels in the first half of the 1960s. Born in 1932, Thomas Löffelholz had studied law and economics in Frankfurt and Marburg and spent an exchange semester at Wisconsin State University. Upon finishing a PhD in law in 1959, he joined the economics section of the Stuttgarter Zeitung, a well-regarded regional newspaper. Having proved his journalistic skills in Stuttgart, he was sent to Brussels in 1964 and stayed there until 1973. He then headed the Stuttgarter Zeitung’s Bonn bureau until 1983. Theo M. Loch was born in 1921 and rose to first lieutenant in the Waffen-SS during the war. He then studied economics and journalism in Munich and worked for the political magazine Europa throughout the 1950s. He became head of the foreign policy department of the conservative Deutsche Zeitung in 1959, deputy editor in chief of the Handelsblatt in 1964 and deputy editor in chief at the conservative weekly Rheinischer Merkur in 1965. He joined the Westdeutscher Rundundfunk as a commentator and editor in 1969 and headed the WDR’s Bonn bureau between 1975 and 1977. Loch was president of the conservative-federalist Europa-Union

Deutschland between 1973 and 1980. Loch published several books on Walter Hallstein, ‘European Integration’ and the EEC.

Other economist Euro-journalists were Wilhelm Hadler (dpa, Die Welt), Günther Lucas (dpa), Elmar Mundt (ARD-WDR radio), Dieter Strupp (ARD-NRD television) Hans-Josef Strick (Süddeutsche Zeitung), Gerhard Löwenthal (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen) and Erich Hauser (Frankfurter Rundschau). While Ehrhardt, Hellmann, Hadler and Hauser spent their entire careers in Brussels, Lucas, Loch and Löffelholz pursued successful careers in the Federal Republic after their Brussels stays. Lucas came to head the dpa Bonn office, while Loch acted as editor in chief of WDR between 1977 and 1983. Löffelholz ended his career in the 1990s at the very top of German journalism as editor in chief of Die Welt. Except for Hauser, who worked for the left-leaning Frankfurter Rundschau, all West German Euro-journalists tended to support liberal economic policies. Rainer Hellmann claimed German economic journalists concerned with ‘Europe’ tended to endorse the liberally-oriented views of the Federal Government on ‘European Integration’. “L’atteggiamento fondamentale orientato verso l’economia di mercato della schiacciante maggioranza dei giornalisti tedeschi dell’economia ha come corollario il fatto che la stampa di regola condivide, nelle questioni di base controverse rispetto ai partners dell’Europa comunitaria o con Paesi terzi, la posizione espressa dal Governo federale.”

Also in France, a group of economist Euro-journalists with profiles similar to Pierre Drouin formed and grew starting from the late 1950s. Jean Lecerf was the ‘Europeanist’ antagonist to ‘Euro-sceptic’ Raymond Aron in the economics section of Le Figaro during

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316 Hellmann, “Germania: molti media e molto libero mercato,” 45. Hellmann also explained that the position on economic policy of the “giornalismo economico tedesco è fondato sullo stesso consenso attorno al quale si è sviluppato il miracolo economico dell’era post-bellica: la dottrina che risale all’economista di Friburgo Walter Eucken, e che il ministro dell’economia della Repubblica federale, Ludwig Erhard, ha cercato di tradurre in pratica.” While this interpretation oversimplifies matters, it nevertheless provides a good illustration of the self-image of West German economist Euro-journalists. Ibid., 43.
the 1950s. Born in 1918, he had studied economics as well as journalism at the École supérieure de journalisme de Lille and obtained a PhD in economic history. He joined the economic department of Le Figaro in the early 1950s. A book on the development of the French economy since 1945 published in 1963 and prefaced by Aron established Lecerf among the leading French economic journalists. Lecerf had been interested in ‘European Integration’ since the early postwar years and published one of the first histories of ‘European Integration’ at Gallimard in 1965. Jean Monnet contributed the preface to the book, which outlined the federalist narrative of ‘European Integration’ history with the Schuman declaration as the starting point and a ‘European’ political union as the future endpoint. New editions followed in 1975 and 1984. Between 1975 and 1981, Lecerf was Le Figaro’s Brussels correspondent.

Georges Suffert, born in 1927, joined the Commissariat général au Plan in 1953. Among his colleagues were important future EEC figures like Étienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri. His work at the Plan for Jean Monnet as well as contacts with the entourage of Pierre Mendès France and centre-left Catholic circles turned Suffert into a convinced ‘European’. In the 1950s and 1960s, Suffert worked for Témoignage chrétien, Cahiers de la République and France Observateur. He then became editor in chief at Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s L’Express. Servan-Schreiber and Françoise Giroud had launched the weekly political magazine in 1953 for a centre-left, modern, liberal and Atlanticist bourgeois readership. In the 1950s, it supported Pierre Mendès-France; in the 1960s it opposed Charles de Gaulle. Suffert belonged to a group of leading journalists who broke with Servan-Schreiber in 1971 and launched Le Point, which became the conservative competitor to L’Express. In 1969, he co-published a book suggesting 14 points to build ‘Europe’ with The Economist Euro-journalist Christopher Layton. Looking back in 1995, Suffert explained that the 1950 Schuman declaration had caused a “miracle dans les têtes” and stated “l’Europe” constituted “la seule réussite actuelle” of France.

325 Ibid., 272.

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327 In October 1966, Lemaître and de l’Écotais had got hold of a series of confidential letters the presidents of the EEC, EURATOM and the ECSC had exchanged concerning the upcoming fusion of the three European Executives. EEC spokesman Bino Olivi was able to convince the journalists not to publish the letters. See Olivi, Note à l’attention de M. Narjes, Chef de Cabinet du Président Hallstein, SECRET, Bruxelles, le 6 octobre 1966, HAEU EN-313. On confidential information leaked to Lemaître and de l’Écotais, see also de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 121.


329 See de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée.


Philipp Lemaître, born in 1936, graduated from the elite Institut d’Études politiques de Paris and obtained a diplôme d’études supérieures in political economy and economics. After his military service in the Federal Republic, he was offered the task of opening the Brussels office of Agra Presse, a French news agency specialising in agriculture. After his arrival, Lemaître started freelancing for Le Monde and Ouest France. He became Le Monde’s official EEC correspondent in 1966 while continuing his work for Agra Presse (until 1972) and other publications. In contrast with de l’Écotais, Lemaître spent his entire career in Brussels. He retired in 2001. With an extensive knowledge and network, Lemaître was considered the leading French EEC/EC/EU correspondent between the 1970s and the 1990s. West German diplomats in Brussels frowned on the “excellent information Lemaître frequently possesses.”

French economist-Euro journalists had a vision for the EEC that emphasised planning and intervention in the economy. They were critical of the traditionally protectionist French industry and argued that competition resulting from lower barriers to trade within the EEC would reinvigorate the French economy. Mostly left-of-centre in political terms, they emphasised the social dimension in ‘European Integration’. They rejected the liberal economic policy influences emanating from the Federal Republic and feared potential West German economic dominance. Consequently, Yann de l’Écotais provided a severe assessment of the Federal Government’s decision to float the Deutsche Mark in May 1971 in order to stop massive dollar inflows from the United States. Federal Minister of Economics Karl Schiller imposed the market-oriented solution to float thereby defying France and the other EC partners who supported the state-oriented solution of capital controls (after France had rejected Schiller’s proposal of a joint float of all EC currencies). The unilateral float outraged France and the EC Commission as it undercut plans for EMU. According to de l’Écotais, “la volonté de Bonn d’aller, en matière monétaire, à son propre pas, sans se soucier

334 See for example the visions for ‘European Integration’ and the EEC outlined in the books by Pierre Drouin, Yann de l’Écotais and José Alain Fralon. Drouin, L’Europe du Marché Commun; José Alain Fralon, L’Europe c’est fini (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1975); de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée.
de la position de ses partenaires” caused a “rupture d’équilibre” and “mettait en pratique fin à une longue période au cours de laquelle la parité entre Paris et Bonn […] avaient été en quelque sorte le moteur de l’activité de la Communauté.” The incident had “marqué la prééminence de l’Allemagne Fédérale dans le concert économique européen” and consequently “les progrès de l’intégration communautaire ont été considérablement ralentis.”

Italian Euro-journalists were active both in Brussels and in Italy. Ugo Piccione was probably the leading Italian economist Euro-journalist in Brussels between the 1960s and the 1980s. He covered the EEC for *Il Sole 24 Ore*, the leading Italian economic and financial newspaper formed in 1965 by the merger of the two financial dailies *Il Sole* and *24 Ore*. By the late 1960s, Piccione had developed an uncontested expertise and “immense conoscenze tecniche” on the EEC according to then *La Stampa* Brussels correspondent Vittorio Zucconi. Franco Ivaldo, Brussels correspondent for *Il Messaggero*, called Piccione “un vero maestro” and described “la sua impareggiabile competenza in materia di politiche economiche e finanziarie della Cee”. Piccione was a convinced ‘European’. Altiero Spinelli in 1980 suggested him as a candidate for EC Commission spokesman to future Commission President Gaston Thorn. Spinelli explained that Piccione “est un des meilleurs journalistes économiques pour les matières communautaires”. He underlined that Piccione’s “autorité parmi les journalistes de Bruxelles” was further emphasised by the fact that he was then the president of the *Association de la Presse Internationale*, the association of foreign journalists in Brussels. Piccione co-authored a book on the “challenge” the US and Japanese economies posed for the ‘European’ economy in the 1980s. Other important Italian Euro-journalists in Brussels were Gianfranco Ballardin for the *Corriere della Sera* and Sandro

336 *de L’Écotais*, *L’Europe sabotée*, 69.
337 As the only national economic and financial daily, *Il Sole 24 Ore* had no real competitor. It was read by the entire Italian business community and elite groups with an interest in economic issues. The newspaper’s owner was the *Confindustria*, the association representing Italian industry and big business. The *Confindustria* had acquired *Il Sole* in 1952 and *24 Ore* in 1961. It remained the owner of *Il Sole 24 Ore* after the merger of the two newspapers. On the history of *Il Sole* and *24 Ore* and their merger, see Piero Bairati and Salvatore Carrubba, *La trasparenza difficile: Storia di due giornali economici, “Il Sole” e “24 ore”* (Palermo: Sellerio, 1990).
Doglio for *La Stampa*. Both took up their positions in 1962. Doglio left Brussels in 1968 to become the spokesperson of Fiat. He also co-published a book on the EEC in 1968.  

Giovanni Giovannini was a Euro-journalist of the ‘first hour’, but never covered the EEC on a permanent assignment to Brussels. Born in 1920, Giovannini studied international law at the University of Turin. He became a soldier and experienced the end of the war as a prisoner of war and forced labourer in Mannheim, Germany. Giovannini joined *La Stampa* in 1945. He developed a reputation as *La Stampa*’s *inviato speciale* in the 1960s reporting from Africa and Asia. However, after having covered mostly domestic issues in the 1950s, Giovannini had actually started his career as *inviato* in the late 1950s covering the Treaty of Rome negotiations and the first steps of the EEC. Despite his interest in Africa and Asia, he continued following ‘European Integration’ throughout the 1960s. He reported on the British entry negotiations in 1963 and 1967. Giovannini became one of *La Stampa*’s deputy editors in 1968. He switched to the management side of *La Stampa* in 1972 and became president of its board of directors in 1976. In both positions, he supported *La Stampa*’s ‘European’ profile, for example the participation in the magazine *Europa*. Giovannini headed the *Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali* (Fieg) between 1976 and 1996. From 1985 to 1994, he was president of *ANSA*.

The Brussels correspondent of the leading Dutch socialist newspaper *Het Parool*, Louis Metzemaekers was the foremost Dutch Euro-journalist. He had obtained a doctorate from the University of Leiden and in the early 1960s was “le journaliste néerlandais le mieux renseigné sur les Communautés” according to the EEC commission spokesman service. He also worked for the specialised newsletters *Business International* and *Business Europe*. Metzemaekers became the first president of the *Organisation des journalistes européens*, the association of Brussels correspondents covering the Communities founded in 1962. Metzemaekers was close to the leading Dutch EEC personnel in Brussels and pro-EEC circles in the Netherlands.

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345 See Meyers, Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Président, Aperçu de la presse néerlandaise, Bruxelles, le 15 décembre 1961, BArch N 1266/1172.
In a brochure written for the Dutch European Movement in 1970, Metzemaekers praised Alfred Mozer, Sicco Mansholt’s longtime chef de cabinet. Metzemaekers became editor in chief of *Het Financieele Dagblad*, the leading Dutch financial and business newspaper, in 1967, a position he kept until 1977. Another prominent Dutch Euro-journalist was Bas Klaverstijn, Brussels correspondent of the Dutch news agency *Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP)*. The EEC spokesman commented that “Heureusement pour nous, M. Klaverstijn – tout comme le Dr. Metzemaekers – considère L’Europe plutôt comme une passion qu’un devoir.”

The leading Belgian Euro-journalist was Charles Rebuffat at *Le Soir*. He had started covering ‘European Integration’ in the 1950s. In 1959, he allowed EURATOM to publish the brochure *Un journaliste parle d’Euratom* along with a collection of articles he had had written for *Le Soir* on EURATOM. Members of the EEC spokesman group remember him as among the “journalistes de très grande importance” in Brussels. Rebuffat was the president of the *Association des journalistes européens* throughout the 1960s. In 1966, French diplomats in Brussels considered him “l’un des meilleurs rédacteurs européens de la presse belge” and underlined that he “fait autorité aussi bien dans les milieux gouvernementaux que dans l’opinion éclairée”. Similarly, British diplomats called Rebuffat “an expert writer on European affairs who has persistently supported British entry into the EEC in his editorials”. Rebuffat became deputy editor of *Le Soir* in the late 1960s and rose to editor in chief in the 1970s. He was then one of the foremost Belgian journalists, before dying in 1979 at the age of 60. *Le Soir* figured among the leading Belgian newspapers.

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350 See the brochure in HAEU ME/DOC-157.


354 They also underlined his “considerable experience, ability and charm”. See Heath to Keith, Brussels, 20 August 1969, National Archives, FCO 26/389.

in the postwar decades. It sold around 300,000 copies daily in the 1960s. *Le Soir* had no party affiliation and defended centrist and social democratic positions. Its editors stood in close contact to government circles. Paul Henri Spaak launched many of his contributions to the ‘European’ debates of the 1960s in *Le Soir.*\(^{356}\) French diplomats stated that the newspaper “a toujours été la tribune préférée de l’ancien Ministre belge des Affaires Etrangères”.\(^{357}\) Rebuffat’s views reflected many of Spaak’s views.

Groups of economist Euro-journalists formed not only in EEC member states, but also outside the Community. Christopher Layton of *The Economist* pioneered Euro-journalism in Britain. Federalist and pro-‘European’ milieus in Britain had been in close contact with *The Economist* journalists since the late 1940s. Jean Monnet was friends with Geoffrey Crowther, editor of *The Economist* from 1938 to 1956. Christopher Layton himself was the son of Walter Layton, Editor of *The Economist* between 1922 and 1938, member of various Euro-federalist groups in Britain and a Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 1949-1957. The younger Layton joined the *Economist Intelligence Unit* in 1953 and *The Economist* as an editorial writer for ‘European affairs’ in 1958. At the EIU and *The Economist*, Layton worked with other ‘European’ activists such as John Pinder and François Duchêne, who between 1955 and 1958 worked simultaneously as a correspondent for *The Economist* and as adviser to Jean Monnet and the *Comité d’action pour les Etats Unis d’Europe* in Paris.\(^{358}\) In June 1961, EEC spokesman Beniamino Olivi counted Christopher Layton among the small group of journalists who had followed the EEC’s activities since 1958 in detail.\(^{359}\) Layton also published books on ‘European Integration’.\(^{360}\)

Other British economist Euro-journalists joined Layton in his support for the EEC in the early 1960s. David Spanier was *The Times* Common Market Correspondent in Brussels

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359 See Olivio to Kruls, Bruxelles, 19 juin 1961, BArch N 1266/1710.

between 1961 and 1963 and subsequently the newspaper’s EEC expert. Spanier came from a prosperous liberal London Jewish family. He received an elite British education at Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge. He trained on the *Yorkshire Post* and joined *The Times* in 1957. He covered Commonwealth affairs, thereby dealing with both economic and political issues. From Commonwealth affairs, it was a short step for Spanier to be put in charge of covering the British entry negotiations in 1961-1963. Spanier left Brussels after de Gaulle’s veto of British entry in January 1963. However, convinced “that the EEC is here to stay and de Gaulle is not”, Spanier continued following EEC affairs as *The Times*’ ‘European Economic Correspondent’. Spanier covered the 1967 entry negotiations and complained about Harold Wilson’s “[e]ssentially opportunistic” attitude towards the EEC. He then coordinated *The Times* coverage of the eventually successful entry negotiations in the early 1970s. Spanier subsequently became *The Times*’ diplomatic correspondent in 1974. He did not immediately leave *The Times* after the Murdoch takeover but in 1982 became diplomatic correspondent of LBC Radio and Independent Radio News.

A considerable number of Swiss newspapers sent correspondents to Brussels in the first half of the 1960s, because the EEC had a considerable impact on the country’s foreign economic relations. Switzerland was not a member state of the EEC. Nevertheless, many Swiss Brussels correspondents became firm believers in the EEC version of ‘European Integration’. The most important Swiss economist Euro-journalist in Brussels in the 1960s was Willy Zeller, correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. Born in 1929, Zeller studied economics and obtained a PhD from the University of Zurich in 1953. He joined the *NZZ* and became Brussels correspondent in the early 1960s. In June 1961, EEC spokesman

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361 Memorandum from D. Spanier to the Editor, Mr. Wilson and Europe, May 31, 1965, TNL Archive Subject files, Europe, European Free Trade Area – Confidential Memoranda.
362 As ‘European Economic Correspondent’, Spanier was supposed to cover “European economics, finance and industry as a whole not merely the institutionalized parts of it, such as the Common Market”. See The Editor to Mr. Egerton, European Economic Correspondent, June 23, 1964, TNL Archive Subject files, Europe, EEC, 1962-1967. However, he devoted a considerable share of his work to the EEC.
363 See Memorandum from D. Spanier to the Editor, Mr. Wilson and Europe, May 31, 1965, TNL Archive Subject files, Europe, European Free Trade Area – Confidential Memoranda.
364 Switzerland was a member of EFTA, but started negotiating an association agreement with the EEC in 1962. The negotiations became obsolete with de Gaulle’s veto of British membership in 1963. However, the question of finding some kind of economic arrangement with EEC countries remained a central issue in Swiss debates on foreign and economic policy. Interview with Jörg Thalmann in Brussels, 25.06.2014. West German diplomats stated, “dass die Schweizer Presse ihre Leser gut und ausführlich über alle wesentlichen Entwicklungen in der EWG orientiert.” Deutsche Botschaft Bern to Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Zusammenarbeit der Informationsreferenten der EWG-Staaten im Ausland, Bern, den 5. Mai 1965, PA AA, B 20-200, 1141.
Beniamino Olivi counted Zeller among the small group of journalists who had followed the EEC’s early activities in detail. Zeller became the president of the Organisation des journalistes européens, the association of EEC correspondents in Brussels. In 1966, Gerhard Löffenthal and Zeller congratulated Walter Hallstein on his 65th birthday in the name of their association. They wrote to Hallstein that they hoped “noch lange mit Ihnen zum Nutzen der gemeinsamen Sache zusammenwirken zu dürfen.” Zeller had an excellent reputation among his colleagues in Brussels. FAZ correspondent Hans Herbert Götz told the FAZ editorial department that the NZZ EEC coverage was assured by “the very good Brussels correspondent Zeller”. Zeller published short books on the EEC and its relationship with Switzerland. Zeller remained the NZZ’s ‘European Integration’ specialist after his return to Zurich. He was head of the NZZ’s economic department between 1987 and 1994. Between 1991 and 1994, he acted as deputy editor in chief. Another Swiss correspondent who arrived in Brussels in 1964 and became a convinced supporter of EEC ‘Europe’ was Jörg Thalmann. He covered the EEC, Belgium and later NATO for Swiss regional newspapers. His unpublished memoirs contain an introductory chapter explaining “how I became a European”.

The second type of Euro-journalist, the cosmopolitan, usually had an international instead of a national career path. Cosmopolitans often shared a multicultural background and upbringing. In this regard, their profiles resembled those of traditional foreign correspondents. Familiarity with various Western European languages and cultures allowed them to cover EEC affairs from different viewpoints. Therefore, cosmopolitans often worked for news agencies with an international client base. They also worked for media outlets from smaller EEC member states, where EEC coverage required a detailed understanding of the political


369 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Willy Zeller wird 80, 16.03.2009.

situation in the big member states. While there were virtually no women among the economist Euro-journalists, the few female journalists involved in EEC coverage had a cosmopolitan profile. Rare language and intercultural skills gave them access to the male-dominated world of Western European economic and foreign affairs journalism. Robert Mauthner, Reuters correspondent in Brussels from 1961 to 1968, and Nel Slis, Associated Press correspondent in Brussels between 1963 and 1973, represented the cosmopolitan Euro-journalist.

When sending Robert Mauthner to Brussels in 1961, the Reuters management considered him “ideally suited for this job” due to his biography. Mauthner was born in Amsterdam in 1929 to Austrian Jewish parents. He fled the continent to Britain, studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Wadham College, Oxford, and became a British citizen only in 1952. With his multicultural background, “Europe was in his culture and in his blood” and “nothing infuriated him more than Little Englanders.”372 After university and military service, Mauthner worked for the Wakefield Express between 1954 and 1956. He joined Reuters in London in 1956 and worked for a year on the Central and European Desks. In 1957, he left for the English language service of the French Radio in Paris where he became news editor. In Paris, he developed an “affection for and knowledge of France”373 that would stay with him for the rest of his career. Mauthner went to Brussels to take up the newly-created position of Reuters Common Market correspondent in September 1961.374 He worked under the supervision of Brussels bureau chief Serge Nabokoff. Mauthner also edited specialized EEC bulletins for Comtelburo, the Reuters-owned news agency specializing in raw materials and financial information. Mauthner’s language skills played a central role in the decision to send him to Brussels. “Mr. Mauthner’s languages are bilingual German and excellent French and Dutch”, the Reuters management underlined.375 After 1961, Mauthner quickly became “very interested in the Common Market story”376 and established himself as “a first class specialist”377 on the EEC according to his superior Nabokoff. Mauthner left Reuters in 1968 and joined the Financial Times. He held different foreign and diplomatic reporting positions and ended his career as the FT’s diplomatic editor in 1994.

372 Rupert Cornwell, Robert Mauthner, The Independent, 23.05.1994.
375 See Mr. Nelson to The General Manger, Common Market, July 7, 1961, Reuters Archive 1/8981328.
376 Mauthner to The General Manager, Attention to Mr. Doon Campbell, April 4, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
377 Nabokoff to The General Manager, June 28, 1967, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
The fact that Nel Slis spoke all the EEC’s working languages was also crucial in her appointment as *AP* Common Market correspondent in 1963. Slis was born in 1913 into a family of wealthy farmers and landowners in Middelharnis, a town on the Dutch island of Goeree-Overflakkee. Upon graduating from an elite school in the Netherlands and with no financial worries, she spent the 1930s studying and travelling across Western Europe. She did a year of French language and civilisation courses at the Sorbonne in Paris, and read English at Rhodes College, Oxford, before studying German in Munich. Slis then obtained a nursing diploma from an elite nurse school in Lausanne, followed by a year of studying psychiatry in Rome. After the outbreak of the war, she worked as a nurse on a Dutch Red Cross mission to Finland in 1940. From there she left for New York and then England, where she worked as a nurse in a hospital in Wolverhampton. She then got a job with the *BBC* monitoring service in 1942, from where she moved to a similar monitoring job at *Associated Press* in 1944 in London. Slis showed journalistic talent and was asked to join the *AP*’s Amsterdam office in the summer of 1945. She subsequently transferred to The Hague covering the Dutch government, Dutch royalty and the Dutch colonial war in Indonesia. She never considered working for a Dutch newspaper, preferring the reporting with an international outlook at *AP*. Slis stated that “Europe has always impassioned me” and that “I have always thought that a united Europe would come and that it couldn’t be otherwise.” Before her arrival in Brussels, she had contributed to *Agence Europe* from The Hague. She joined the *AP* Brussels office with enthusiasm and took over the EEC coverage. Not a specialist in economic matters, she had to make a considerable effort to understand and report on the complexities of the EEC, but ultimately became a specialist in ‘Community affairs’. Slis left Brussels in 1973 and returned to The Hague before retiring from the *AP* in 1979.

International experience and language skills allowed cosmopolitans like Mauthner and Slis to provide *Reuters* or *Associated Press* with multi-perspective reports that could be sold to the agencies’ domestic and international clients. Stories needed to be written in a way that would make them understandable and appealing in the agency’s home market and potentially around the Western world, where the big US news agencies, *Reuters* and *Agence-France Press* – and

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379 See Ibid., 149–52.
380 See Chapters 1 and 2 in Studdert, *Hellcat of the Hague*.
381 See Chapter 3 in Ibid.
382 Slis quoted in Ibid., 149.
to a lesser degree *dpa* – had their clients. This required including a broader set of views into the reporting. This in turn necessitated an understanding of the various positions of different national governments in Brussels. Such an understanding was based on a multinational set of sources, which required the knowledge of several languages.

There were other cosmopolitan Euro-journalists in Brussels in the 1960s. The Belgian Guido Naets had studied economics and law at the University of Leuven. Starting from 1962, he covered the EEC for Belgian, French, German and American news outlets. Among his employers figured the French agricultural news agency *Agra Europe*, the Belgian public broadcaster *BRT* and the US agricultural magazine *Poultry International*. Naets spent his entire career in Euro-journalism and ultimately became the spokesperson of the European Parliament in the 1980s. Naets was a Belgian born near Brussels in 1932 who spoke fluent Flemish, French and German. He spent his career working at the Brussels office of the West German economic news agency *Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste*, from 1964 to 1997. Peter Dreyer covered the EEC and Belgium for the American *Journal of Commerce*. He was a German emigrant who had returned to Europe after 1945, but was “without any resentment against the Federal Republic”, according to the West German Permanent Representation to the EEC. His language abilities allowed him to keep in close contact with West German journalists and diplomats in Brussels.

The most famous cosmopolitan Euro-journalist in Brussels was Emanuele Gazzo. He was the co-founder of *Agence Europe*, a news agency specialising in ‘European’ affairs. *Agence Europe* published daily bulletins with a comprehensive survey of all EEC activities. The bulletin did not reach the broader public. However, it frequently included scoops and was indispensable for the work of EEC officials, diplomats, journalists and anybody with a deeper

384 Interview with Guido Naets in Brussels, 06.02.2015.
385 See *Le Soir*, Décès d’Henri Deheyn, secrétaire général de l’Association de la Presse internationale, 05.08.2013.
386 See Fernschreiben Harkort, Brüssel (eurogerma) to Auswärtiges Amt, 10. August 1962, PA AA, B 7 38.
interest in the EEC. Agence Europe was an institution in the EEC Brussels world. Gazzo figured among the best-informed journalists in Brussels. His influence within EEC/EC circles between the 1950s and the 1970s cannot be overstated. In December 1977, Gazzo sent a letter to former British EC Commissioner Christopher Soames and complained bitterly about British ‘European’ policy. Soames immediately forwarded Gazzo’s letter to Margaret Thatcher, opposition and Conservative Party leader, and to Michael Palliser, British Permanent Representative to the EC. Soames told Palliser that “You know as well as anyone the influence that Gazzo wields in Brussels, so I thought you would like to see what he is saying.”

Similarly, when Gazzo travelled to the Federal Republic in 1969, the West German Permanent Representation underlined “the significance that Herr Gazzo has for the work of the embassy” and advised the Auswärtiges Amt to “take care of Herr Gazzo with particular attention”. French diplomats in Brussels quoted entire Agence Europe bulletins in their reports to Paris. Agence Europe reporting trickled down into Western European news media as many Euro-journalists used the bulletins as a source of information.

Gazzo was one of the central figures in the Brussels press corps and a prominent ‘European’ federalist. Born in 1908, he grew up in the Italian port city of Genova. He worked as a cabin boy on a ship travelling to South America before studying economics in his

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388 Royal Jenkins in his memoirs calls Gazzo “the remarkable and wise editor of Agence Europe, a cyclostyled sheet which comes out every day in four languages and contains a great deal of detail about what goes on in the Commission, as well as some very sensible leading articles, and has considerable influence in Brussels.” Royal Jenkins, European Diary. 1977-1981 (London: Collins, 1989), 93 (4 May 77, Brussels).
389 After his departure from Brussels in 1977, Soames kept in contact with Gazzo. He continued reading the Agence Europe bulletins. Gazzo gave Soames a free subscription. Soames told Gazzo in November 1977 to send him the “French edition, instead of the English one” and “I do hope that you are keeping well, and that we may meet soon. Do please be sure to let me know if you are ever going to be in London, and I should so much hope that you would be able to have lunche with me.” Soames to Gazzo, 3 November 1977, CAC SOAM/52/2.
394 Many Brussels correspondents had Agence Europe subscriptions. In 1963, Corriere della Sera Brussels correspondent Gianfranco Ballardin told the Corriere administration regarding Agence Europe that “tutti gli altri corrispondenti da Bruxelles vi sono abbonati da anni”. See Ballardin to Direttore Amministrativo, Bruxelles, 16.6.63, ASCdD 3115. One of the first things Brussels correspondents would do in the morning is to have a look at the Agence Europe bulletin. The Corriere della Sera paid 200,000 lire a year for Ballardin’s Agence Europe subscription in 1963. See Direttore Amministrativo Corriere della Sera to Ballardin, 1 giugno 1963, ASCdD 3115.
395 EEC Commission Secretary General Emile Noël accurately described Gazzo as “à la fois un témoin et un acteur remarquable de notre aventure européenne”. See Noel to Collowald, 30 mars 1983, HAEU, EN-1059.
hometown. Gazzo then opened a small publishing house concentrating on American and French authors. Politically, he sympathised with Carlo Rosselli’s *socialismo liberale*. Gazzo served in the Italian army during the war before joining the resistance in 1943. After the war, he worked for different newspapers and magazines. Gazzo then joined *ANSA*, the leading Italian news agency. In 1952, the *ANSA* leadership sent Gazzo to Luxembourg to explore the possibility of setting up a ‘European’ branch of the news agency covering the ECSC. *ANSA* abandoned the plan, but *ANSA* president Lodovico Riccardi and Gazzo decided to create a ‘European’ news agency on their own. Riccardi provided the capital, Gazzo took care of the editorial side. *Agence Europe* published its first bulletin on the ECSC in March 1953. After 1958, the agency established new headquarters in Brussels. In 1961, the *Agence Europe* bureau in Brussels had three staffers, including editor in chief Gazzo. The bureau expanded quickly and by 1963 had eight editors from different EEC countries, thereby boasting the largest staff of any media outlet in Brussels. Gazzo became director general of *Agence Europe* in 1980.

The *Agence Europe* business model relied on the intimate and mutually beneficial relationship Gazzo established with the EEC institutions (and other supporters of the EEC). The latter provided Gazzo with confidential information and substantial amounts of money through subscribing in great numbers to the *Agence*’s bulletin. In return, the EEC institutions could be sure that Gazzo would employ all the information he received for the promotion of the ‘European’ cause of the EEC. Delicate information leaked to *Agence Europe* sometimes caused an uproar in the EEC Commission, but Gazzo published confidential material in a way that served the ‘European’ interest. The existence of *Agence Europe* provided the EEC Commission with a semi-official news agency, just as the French government had *AFP*, the Italian government *ANSA* and the Federal Republic *dpa*. In the view of the Commission, this meant an increase in prestige and media power. EEC circles hailed Gazzo’s *Agence Europe* as a genuinely ‘European’ media outlet. Indeed, Gazzo edited his bulletins with a multinational team in French, while also publishing Italian, German and English translations. The bulletin’s readership was equally multinational. In the early 1960s, *Agence Europe* claimed to have subscribers in 35 countries on all continents. However, the readership was obviously a narrow group of international EEC specialists. In contrast to Euro-journalists working for national media outlets ranging from elite newspapers to public television, Gazzo could not claim to

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touch the broader Western European public directly. While he wielded great authority in Brussels, his influence in national media systems was limited.

**Becoming a Euro-journalist**

The section above has demonstrated that a group of Euro-journalists constituted itself in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Western European journalism. However, how and why did Euro-journalists become supportive and passionate about the EEC and its supposed *sui generis* character as the nucleus of a future ‘united Europe’? The previous section showed that an interest in economic policy attracted economist Euro-journalists to the EEC. The economic issues the EEC dealt with corresponded to the field of topics they had already been working on. Cosmopolitan Euro-journalists were attracted to the EEC as their non-national biographies matched with the EEC’s multinational environment and its ‘supranational’ message. However, more factors played a role in converting Euro-journalists to EEC ‘Europe’. Generational issues in Western European journalism were significant. Beyond the issue of generation, the experience of the Second World War – shared by anyone working in Western European journalism in the 1950s and 1960s – mattered. Most importantly, however, socialisation processes in national or transnational ‘Europeanist’ and pro-EEC networks and environments made the Euro-journalists fervent EEC supporters.

Generation constitutes one factor explaining the support of Euro-journalists for the EEC. Most chief editors and senior journalists in Western European journalism in the 1950s and 1960s had worked in journalism before 1939. The first chapter has shown that after 1945, this generation of senior Western European journalists thought about Europe in terms they had adopted in the interwar period and during the war and occupation. *Le Monde directeur* Hubert Beuve-Méry had spent the 1930s in Prague. After 1945, he was sceptical about a ‘Europe’ limited to six Western European nations and rejected German rearmament through the EDC. Founding *FAZ* editor Erich Welter had developed his vision of a liberal European economic order in the 1930s and did not change it after 1945. Born in 1879, Lord Beaverbrook saw no alternative to the British Empire when directing the *Daily Express*. The generation of prewar journalists often had strong nationalist feelings after 1945 and wanted to see their weakened nations restored and strong again. Trust *vis-à-vis* former war enemies was low, while belief in the centrality of the own nation was high. The declaration “le premier souci du journaliste
diplomatie doit être de servir son pays avec loyauté” of the French Association de la Presse Diplomatique in 1955 reflected this Zeitgeist.\textsuperscript{398}

Contrary to the prewar generation of journalists, most Euro-journalists had started their career after 1945. They had experienced the Second World War in their youth, but lacked interwar working experience. Their generation had a different attitude towards the nation state. Having experienced the horrors of war and the destruction it caused, they saw a need to refashion their countries and ‘Europe’ politically, economically and socially. One had to leave old mind-sets behind and embrace progressive and new ideas. Nationalism, empire or conservative Gaullist ‘Europeanism’ belonged to an old world. The EEC’s ‘supranationalism’, on the contrary, incarnated an innovative endeavour promising a future of peace, progress and prosperity. The Euro-journalist generation believed that it lived in an age in which nation states were bound to lose importance or to disappear. In the conclusion to his 1963 book L’Europe du Marché Commun, Pierre Drouin exemplified this idea, stating that “states take on ridiculous poses by clinging to the attributes of a sovereignty which, by the force of things, is step by step emptied of its content.”\textsuperscript{399}

Journalists in the 1960s attributed importance to the role of generation in ‘European Integration’. In November 1962, Guardian Editor Alistair Hetherington discussed the issue with then Labour Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan. Callaghan told Hetherington that “only a few middle-class intellectuals” in Britain supported EEC membership. Taking on an ambiguous or critical stance on the EEC would have Labour win rather than lose votes. Hetherington told Callaghan that “I thought he could be badly mistaken about this. I thought that there were particularly a lot of young people to whom the European idea was very attractive. Much as I disliked being told about the “tides of history”, I knew that quite a lot of other people held that this was important.” Hetherington argued that for young people it would be attractive “to feel that the Government was moving into a large and vital unit, instead of remaining as an offshore island.” Contemporary public opinion research supported Hetherington’s view.\textsuperscript{400} British media positioning themselves in favour of EEC entry in the 1961-1963 debate did so in part to appeal to a younger readership and audience.\textsuperscript{401}

\textsuperscript{398} Mme Marguerite Chartrette, (Le Progrès de Lyon), Note sur l’Association de la Presse Diplomatique (1955), MAE/Paris 544INVA/16.

\textsuperscript{399} Drouin, L’Europe du Marché Commun, 346.

\textsuperscript{400} Public opinion research by Ronald Inglehart for the 1960s shows that support for the general idea of ‘European Integration’ as well as for concrete ‘steps’ towards ‘integration’ in EEC countries was particularly high among the younger generations, while older people were a lot less enthusiastic about the idea of abandoning
Members of the new generation of postwar Western European journalists became Euro-
journalists and supportive of the EEC as they saw ‘supranational’ ‘European Integration’
linked to other causes they defended. Christina von Hodenberg has argued that the emergence
of a new kind of critical journalism and thus the formation of a critical public sphere in the
Federal Republic in the 1960s resulted from a generational change in West German
journalism. A ‘45er’ generation of journalists who had started their careers after the war
advocated ‘Western’ journalism critical of public authorities. They replaced a generation of
older German journalists who had worked in journalism already in the interwar years and who
represented the authority-abiding tradition in German journalism. They had often aligned
themselves with National Socialism between 1933 and 1945 and after the war resisted Allied
efforts at journalistic re-education. Suspicious of German nationalism, the ‘45er’ journalists
wanted to democratise, ‘Westernise’ and ‘Europeanise’ the Federal Republic. In search of a
new identity for the West German state, they strongly supported the ‘supranational’ EEC and
the ‘European’ identity of the Federal Republic. Gaullists and other EEC enemies in West
German journalism, on the contrary, tended to belong to the older generation of German
journalists.402

In France, many Euro-journalists belonged to a new generation of modernistes economic
journalists emerging after the war. In close cooperation with an equally new generation of
technocrats in French ministries, Philippe Riutort argues, they advocated the economic and
nation states in favour of a ‘European’ union. See Ronald Inglehart, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration,”
International Organization 24, no. 04 (1970): 764–95; Ronald Inglehart, “An End to European Integration?,”
American Political Science Review 61, no. 01 (1967): 91–105. For recent historical research on youth, ‘European
Integration’ and ‘Europe’ in the 1950s, see Christina Norwig, Die erste europäische Generation: Europakonstruktionen in der Europäischen Jugendkampagne, 1951-1958 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016);
Richard Ivan Jobs, “Youth Mobility and the Making of Europe, 1945–60,” in Transnational Histories of Youth
144–66; Christina Norwig, “A First European Generation? The Myth of Youth and European Integration in the

401 See Haeussler, “The Popular Press and Ideas of Europe”; Wilkes, “British Attitudes to the European
402 Hodenberg’s argument on the rise of critical journalism in the Federal Republic is well-founded. However,
her narrative also downplays journalistic opposition to Adenauer in the 1950s, reflects outdated German
Sonderweg thinking and is based on a superficial, normative and biased idea of a superior ‘Western’ and Anglo-
Saxon journalism. See Christina von Hodenberg, “Mass-Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany’s
367; Hodenberg, Konsens und Krise. Hodenberg’s emphasis on generation to explain changes in West German
journalism has been criticised. See the conclusion in Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit; Payk, “…die
Herren fügen sich nicht; sie sind schwierig.’ Gemeinschaftsdenken, Generationenkonflikte und die
Dynamisierung des Politischen in der konservativen Presse der 1950er und 1960er Jahre.” On generational
change in West German journalism and its implications, see also Simone Christine Ehmig, Generationswechsel
im deutschen Journalismus: Zum Einfluss historischer Ereignisse auf das journalistische Selbstverständnis
(Freiburg: K. Alber, 2000).
social modernization of France through macroeconomic government planning.\textsuperscript{403} The moderniser journalists replaced an older generation of journalists representing the notoriously corrupt French financial journalism of the first half of the 20th century. The latter had focused on financial and stock market news and had relied on the private sector as the primary source of information and money.\textsuperscript{404} In the 1950s, the technocrats who took over command of the French economy also took over control of French economic journalism.\textsuperscript{405} The moderniser generation of economic journalists praised the technocrats\textsuperscript{406} and supported a new economic policy based on state planning and on exposing the traditionally protectionist Empire-oriented French industry to Western European and international competition. Imperialism, colonial wars and economic nationalism appeared archaic, Western European economic integration including ‘European’-level planning was modern and progressive. For Jean Boissonnat, head of the \textit{service économique} of the Catholic daily \textit{La Croix} between 1954 and 1967 and subsequently founder of the pioneering economic magazine \textit{L’Expansion}, France in the postwar years faced two options, “[s]’enfoncer dans les guerres coloniales ou construire une nation industrielle.” Moderniser economic journalists thought France – but also Western Europe generally – to have fallen far behind the United States in economic development. Many became convinced that the EEC constituted the framework in which France and ‘Europe’ could catch up with America. Therefore, French Euro-journalists often belonged to the new generation of postwar moderniser economic journalists.\textsuperscript{407}

In Britain, Euro-journalists often figured among a new generation of British journalists less attached to the Empire. In search for a postimperial identity for Britain, they discovered ‘Europe’. George Wilkes argues that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, ‘European Integration’


\textsuperscript{404} See Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer, “Media Manipulation in Interwar France: Evidence from the Archive of Banque de Paris et Des Pays-Bas, 1914–1937,” \textit{Contemporary European History} 25, no. 01 (February 2016): 11–36. However, corruption was widespread in economic and financial journalism in many countries in the interwar years. Ángel Arrese, \textit{Economic and Financial Press. From the Beginnings to the First Oil Crisis} (Navarra: EUNSA, 2001), 87.

\textsuperscript{405} For example, the \textit{Association des journalistes économiques} had its seat in the French Ministry of Economics.


and the EEC found more support among politicians, civil servants, intellectuals, business men and journalists born around 1920. They had often served as soldiers in the war on the European continent. This had brought them into direct contact with Western European countries. Older Britons, in contrast, had been socialised in the Empire-oriented British society of the first half of the 20th century. They had spent the Second World War on the British island experiencing German bombardments. Imperial socialisation and their insular war experience left them sceptical about any kind of association with the Western European continent. British journalists rejecting ‘European Integration’ often belonged to the older generation of Britons, whereas Euro-journalists were often part of the younger generation who entered journalism after 1945.408

However, generation did not determine a journalist’s attitude toward the EEC. Leonard Beaton, the Guardian’s EEC expert in the early 1960s, was born in 1929. He had started his career in journalism after the war. Canadian by birth, he opposed British EEC membership due to his attachment to the Commonwealth. Moreover, some prominent interwar journalists became convinced Euro-journalists after 1945. Roger Massip, born in 1904, headed the service de politique étrangère at Le Figaro between 1947 and 1974. He had been a foreign correspondent and foreign editor in the interwar years. Massip had worked in Budapest for the French state news agency Agence Havas from 1931 to 1934. He then moved to Warsaw where he covered Poland and Eastern Europe for Le Petit Parisien between 1934 and 1937. He subsequently returned to Paris as deputy foreign editor at Le Petit Parisien until 1940. Massip joined the French resistance in London and held several important posts at Libération before joining Le Figaro in 1947. Anti-communist and pro-British, he became a ‘European’ during the immediate postwar years.409 Ferdinand Himpele, the EEC-enthusiast Brussels correspondent of Die Welt throughout the 1960s, was born in 1912 in then German Strasbourg. After studying economics, history and journalism, he joined the regional newspaper Freiburger Zeitung in 1936. He briefly acted as the head of the economics department of the Staßburger Neuesten Nachrichten in 1940 before serving as a soldier in the war. After 1945, he worked for various regional newspapers before joining the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s Bonn bureau in 1957, where his colleague was Hans Herbert Götz. Himpele was hired by Die Welt in 1958 to report on the EEC from Brussels, where he turned into a fervent ‘European’. Himpele was a founding member of the Association des

408 See the conclusion of Wilkes, “British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956–63.”
409 See Massip's and his wife's joint autobiography, Massip and Massip, Les Passants du Siècle.
Finally, Ernst Kobbert, *FAZ* correspondent in Brussels starting from 1959, was a Euro-journalist with a prewar career. Kobbert had obtained a doctorate in economics from the University of Basel in 1935 before joining the economics department of the liberal-bourgeois *Frankfurter Zeitung* (not to be confused with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* founded in 1949) the same year. There, he met Erich Welter, the future founding editor of the *FAZ*. In 1940, Kobbert became the *Frankfurter Zeitung*’s Scandinavia correspondent in Sweden. After military service and war captivity in Russia, Kobbert joined the *Badische Zeitung*, a regional newspaper based in Freiburg. From there, he came to the *FAZ* on Welter’s invitation and arrived in Brussels in September 1959. Hans Herbert Götz took over the EEC coverage from Kobbert in Brussels after his arrival in late 1963. Kobbert then concentrated on the political and economic coverage of the Benelux countries, but continued to write about ‘European Integration’ until the 1980s. The cases of Leonard Beaton, Roger Massip, Ferdinand Himpele and Ernst Kobbert point to additional factors beyond generation in explaining the fervent support for the EEC on the part of Euro-journalists.

Beyond the issue of generation, the experience of the Second World War – shared by anyone working in Western European journalism in the 1950s and 1960s in one form or another – mattered. The destructions of the war and the geopolitical downfall of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union had made a huge impression on the Euro-journalists. The war experience and destruction constituted the starting point for Jean Lecerf’s history of ‘European Integration’. Roger Massip describes a visit in early 1948 to the British occupation zone of Germany as having had a lasting impact on him. Looking at the city of Cologne lying in ruins, Massip remarked “Cologne n’était plus en effet qu’un souvenir. Voilà ce qu’elle était devenue: cet armorcellement de pierres éparpillés sur quelques dizaines de kilomètres carrés.” Gerhard Löwenthal, who was Jewish, had experienced the end of the war in Berlin. Looking back in 1998, he credited the EEC with having prevented another “Versailles” and thus another war. The EEC constituted “the most decisive event for

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413 See Kobbert’s book on Belgium: Ernst Kobbert, 26mal Belgien, 1mal Luxemburg (München; Zürich: Piper, 1988).
414 See Kobbert to Dechamps, Ottenhöfen, 3.XI.1988, BArch N 1426/19.
the world” in the 20th century. After the geopolitical demise of the European powers following World War II, the EEC’s ‘supranational’ model of ‘European’ unity could give ‘Europe’ again a voice on the international scene. Roger Massip described how “la seconde guerre mondiale que s’étaient livrée les hommes du XXe siècle avait transformé profondément la physionomie de l’univers et modifié le rapport de force entre les nations.” The “fait capital de notre époque” was that the European powers “ne disposaient plus du rayonnement qui accompagnait leur ancienne prééminence.” and “ne sont plus à l’échelle du monde nouveau”. Therefore, “Leur union apparaît dès lors comme la seule voie, comme le seul moyen de leur salut collectif et de leur prospérité.” The desire to prevent new wars and to provide the former European Great Powers with a satisfying place in the international order led Euro-journalists to support the EEC.

Most importantly, Euro-journalists became EEC supporters through socialisation within ‘Europeanist’ and pro-EEC milieus and networks, either in a national or transnational context. Brussels as a place for ‘European’ socialising was important, but equally important were national pro-EEC networks. Influential Euro-journalists developed their ‘Europeanist’ convictions through contacts with the leading figures of postwar ‘European’ federalism. Roger Massip at Le Figaro describes his “relation personnelle qui devint peu à peu amicale et confiante” with Jean Monnet. Massip claims to have seen Monnet for the first time on 9 May 1950 when he was one of the journalists who had been invited to attend French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s declaration proposing what was to become the European Coal and

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Steel Community. According to Monnet, the majority of leading French journalists received
the ‘Schuman declaration’ with reservation. Massip, on the contrary, belonged to those who
“n’en doutèrent plus un instant et, dans leurs articles, saluèrent l’événement comme il
convenait”.422 Starting from early 1952, Massip and Monnet met regularly, after 1954 in the
de le voir, et souvent il prenait lui-même l’initiative d’une rencontre.”423 Massip served as a
source of information for Monnet. “Il voulait un avis sur un texte, un commentaire sur un
événement auquel il attachait de l’importance.” Monnet heavily guided Massip’s thinking on
‘European Integration’. He was a “homme qui avait eu raison si souvent qu’on ne pouvait que
s’engager toujours plus avant avec lui.”424 Other journalists close to Monnet were Charles
Ronsac at Franc-Tireur and Jacques Gascuel at France-Soir. Moreover, Monnet was in
contact with Jean Boissonnat, Pierre Drouin, whom he called a “pénétrant observateur”425 of
‘European Integration’, and Jean Lecerf, whom he credited as “l’un de ceux qui ont le plus
constamment et efficacement contribué à aider la France à entrer en Europe”.426 Further
important French contacts for French Euro-journalists were François Fontaine, Pierre Uri and
Guy de Carmoy.427

Similarly, leading German Euro-journalists formed their views on the EEC in a close
relationship with EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein. FAZ correspondent Hans
Herbert Götz became a confidant of Hallstein in Brussels.428 Götz and Hallstein met
frequently for confidential conversations on the present and future of the EEC. “He sees the
situation pretty much like me”, Götz concluded from such a meeting in October 1964.429 In

422 Monnet explains about the Schuman declaration that “je m’employai aussitôt à en persuader les éditorialistes
des grands journaux qui hésitaient encore sur la signification de la proposition, dont les aspects techniques
voilairent à première vue la portée politique. Je savais qu’ils aillaient parler d’un combinat industriel, d’un pool
Ronsac, de France-Tireur, Jacques Gascuel, de France-Soir, Harold Callander, du New York Times, entre autres,
n’en doutèrent plus un instant et, dans leurs articles, saluèrent l’événement comme il convenait.” Monnet,
Mémoires, 359.
423 Massip and Massip, Les Passants du Siècle, 249.
424 Ibid., 251.
425 Monnet, Mémoires, 502.
426 See Monnet’s preface to Lecerf’s 1965 history of ‘European integration’ in Lecerf, Histoire de l’unité
européenne.
427 Interview with Jacqueline Grapin in Paris, 10.02.2016. See also the bibliographical notes mentioning
428 Hallstein and Götz had already met before Götz permanently transferred to Brussels during Hallstein’s visits
to Bonn and Götz’ trips to Brussels. See Behm, Vermerk für Herrn Dr. Narjes, Betrifft: Essen des Präsidenten
mit den Herausgebern und leitenden Redakteuren der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“, Brüssel, den 4. April
1963, BArch N 1266/960.
429 „Er sieht die Lage ziemlich genau so, wie ich”, Götz to Tern, Brüssel, 8.10.1964, BArch N 1314/277.
1966, Hallstein asked the journalist to edit a book collecting the EEC President’s speeches of the last ten years. Götz was interested, but ultimately declined due to time constraints. After Hallstein left the Commission in June 1967, he remained in touch with Götz. When the former EEC President embarked upon writing a book on the Community and ‘European integration’ – and thus on his legacy as Commission President – he asked Götz for help. The journalist ended up writing the book’s core chapter on economic policy, with Hallstein making only slight modifications. Erich Welter calculated that “Your chapter is 100 pages of a total of 250, of which 11 pages of front matter and introduction need to be reduced. That means your part is nearly half the book. Poor Götz!” Hallstein initially planned to publish the book under his name alone, but Götz objected. Der unvollendete Bundesstaat eventually came out in 1969 naming Hallstein as the author and Götz and Karl-Heinz Narjes – Hallstein’s former chef de cabinet who also wrote parts of the book – as ‘collaborators’. Götz also contributed to the second edition of the book. Until his departure from Brussels, he kept the retired Hallstein up to date on EEC Brussels business. When Götz left the Belgian capital in 1975, Hallstein told him: “It will be hard for me to do without you” and “Let me once more thank you with all my heart for the beautiful years of collaboration.” Götz for his part wrote Hallstein that “In my, and maybe also in your life, the Brussels years figure among the important, maybe among the most important.” Götz remained a faithful Hallstein follower until the end of his life and contributed to writing the history of the first EEC Commission President. Hallstein was also close to West German public television Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen Brussels correspondent Gerhard Löwenthal. In 1968, Löwenthal produced a three-part documentary on the former EEC Commission President. Löwenthal and

430 See Götz to Welter, Brüssel, 25.7.1966, BArch N 1314/447.
431 Götz to Welter, Brüssel 27.3.69, BArch N 1314/451.
432 Götz wrote the chapter alongside his regular work for the FAZ and told Welter that “The book cost me a lot of energy”. „Das Buch hat mich viel Kraft gekostet“, Götz to Welter, Brüssel 27.9.69, BArch N 1314/451.
435 See Götz to Welter, Kraainem 5.1.72, BArch N 1314/318.
437 “In meinem, vielleicht auch in Ihrem Leben gehören die Brüsseler Jahre zu den wichtigen, vielleicht zu den Wichtigsten.” Götz to Hallstein, Berlin, 2.5.1979 N 1266/1834.
439 Löwenthal claims he had “a good personal relation” to Hallstein. See Gerhard Löwenthal, Ich bin geblieben: Erinnerungen (München: Herbig, 1987), 256.
Hallstein remained in touch after their Brussels time. Congratulating Löwenthal on his 50th birthday in December 1972, Hallstein used the opportunity to thank the journalist “for the never-clouded professional and personal comradeship and friendly loyalty which you have proved over those so eventful and important years.”

In addition to close contacts with leading ‘Europeanists’, the general Brussels environment of the late 1950s and early 1960s converted many early Brussels correspondents into firm believers in the Community’s mission to unify ‘Europe’. In the early 1960s, enthusiasm reigned in the EEC community in Brussels. After a three-day visit to Brussels in October 1962, The Times Foreign Editor Iverach McDonald described the atmosphere among EEC functionaries and diplomats. “The sense of being carried along on the road of ever greater European unity is as strong as I expected it to be.” Moreover, “there is a sense of moving with history, of really being in the second half of the twentieth century.” McDonald sneered at EEC officials who “tend in a rather sanctimonious way to judge politicians whether or not they are ‘community-minded’.” Three days in Brussels left McDonald unimpressed with the EEC’s integrationist fervency. However, things were different with The Times Common Market correspondent David Spanier. He debarked in Brussels in September 1961 to cover the British entry negotiations. In December 1961, Spanier told his Editor Edward Haley that “Three months in Brussels convinced me that this is a most exciting story to write”. After a conversation with Spanier on his three months in Brussels, Haley noted that his young colleague “bubbled over with enthusiasm and felt he had been at the centre of history in the

440 “Ihnen noch einmal ein summarisches aufrichtiges ‚Dankeschön‘ für die nie getrübte sachliche und persönliche Kameradschaft und freundsschaftliche Anhänglichkeit zu danken, die Sir mir selbst in so ereignisreichen und bedeutsamen Jahren erwiesen haben.” Hallstein to Löwenthal, Bonn, den 7. Dezember 1972, BArch, N 1266/65. Löwenthal describes his support for the EEC and his contacts with Hallstein in his memoirs. See Löwenthal, Ich bin geblieben. On Löwenthal himself, his support for ‘European integration’ and particularly his controversial role moderating the flagship anti-communist political magazine ZDF Magazin on West German public television between 1969 and 1987, see Winckler, Gerhard Löwenthal.


443 D.G. Spanier, Memorandum to the Editor, Future Coverage of the Common Market, December 11, 1961, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Common Market and OEEC.
Similarly, having spent about half a year in Brussels, Robert Mauthner told his superiors at Reuters in April 1962 that “I have become very interested in the Common Market” and that he very much enjoyed working in the Belgian capital. In short, a couple of months in the EEC Brussels environment was sufficient to convert journalists into ‘European’ crusaders.

The EEC Brussels environment easily absorbed journalists for various reasons. As a marginal international organisation among many others promoting Western European integration, the EEC world of the late 1950s and early 1960s was small. Yann de l’Écotais, AFP correspondent in Brussels between 1965 and 1973, called the atmosphere at EEC press conferences in the mid-1960s, which were attended by around forty journalists, “presque familiale”. Very lax entrance rules to the EEC Commission buildings facilitated contacts between journalists and ‘European’ civil servants. After work, EEC personnel, diplomats and Euro-correspondents frequented the same receptions, restaurants and bars. They spent a lot of time together – in their free time and during nightlong Council of Ministers sessions. They also shared the same passion for the EEC, which seemed to them an unprecedented, innovative and exciting project. Intimacy and a multinational environment with multiple loyalties lead to frequent leaks. EEC correspondents were thus always well informed about the latest EEC developments.

Euro-journalists organised in various associations promoting the EEC. Brussels journalists covering the European Communities founded the Organisation des journalistes européens in November 1962. The organisation’s objective was to support correspondents in their daily

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444 Monday, December 11, 1961, CAC, HALY 15/2.
445 See Mauthner to The General Manager, Attention of Mr. Doon Campbell, April 4, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
447 de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 144.
448 During the 1960s and 1970s, any accredited journalists could freely move in the Commission buildings. This practice differed considerably from the strict admission rules of national ministries in the EEC member states. Particularly foreign ministries had very strict rules on access. See De Koster, Note pour M. Noël, Objet : accès des journalistes dans les immeubles de la Commission, Bruxelles, le 27 juin 1978, HAEU, EN-2566.
work, but also to promote ‘European Integration’. The organisation stated that “nous ne sommes pas seulement préoccupés de faciliter notre tâche quotidienne, mais nous désirons également faire possible pour faire comprendre l’œuvre de l’intégration européenne auprès des peuples tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur des pays de la communauté. Nous attachons à cette tâche une importance particulière.”451 In 1966, the organisation congratulated Walter Hallstein on his 65th birthday and expressed its “hope to be able to continue working with you for the benefit of our common cause for a long time into the future.”452 Also in 1962, a group of around sixty journalists founded the Association des journalistes européens. The association united “tous les journalistes convaincus de la nécessité de l’intégration européenne” from the six EEC countries.453 Its members comprised of Brussels correspondents, journalists in editorial departments across EEC member states and ‘European’ activists working as part-time journalists or in media-related jobs. The Association created national sections and organised regular conventions in EEC member states. Le Soir Euro-journalist Charles Rebuffat acted as its president in the 1960s.454 The head of the association’s West German section, Günther Wagenlehner, was a public servant in the Federal Ministry of Defence. The Federal Press Office remarked that the association was less about journalism and more about a commitment to ‘European unity’.455 Therefore, some prominent Euro-journalists who were initially members456 left the association in the course of the 1960s.457 Nevertheless, British diplomats stated in 1969 that many association members

451 The organisation was comprised of journalists covering the EEC, EURATOM and the ECSC from Brussels. Organisation des journalistes européens à Président de la Haute Autorité, Bruxelles, le 2 Décembre ’62, HAEU, BAC-118/1986_1795.
456 Brussels correspondents Ferdinand Himpele, Elmar Mundt, Charles Rebuffat and Louis Metzemaekers were involved in the associations’ founding. See Europa-Union Deutschland, Betriift: Tagung des Organisations-Ausschusses der Europäischen Journalisten vom 20.-22. September 1962 im Haus Lerbach, BArch B 145/5253. Roger Massip was initially a member of the association’s French section. See Association des journalistes européens, Communiqué, no date, HAEU CIFE-99.
457 This had several reasons. First, the association propagated the EEC so aggressively that the journalists worried they might appear too partisan by joining it. Second, the association also admitted part-time journalists and public servants working in media relations. Third, there were many journalists with a low journalistic prestige among the association’s members. See Captuller, Vermerk, Betr.: Jahreskongress 1966 der Vereinigung Europäischer Journalisten in Berlin, Bonn, den 1. April 1966 BArch B 145/5253 and Trout, Head Press and Information Services to Colin Keith, The Hague, 21 August, 1969, National Archives, FCO 26/389.
were “good second line journalists”. Finally, publishers of Western European economic newspapers founded the *Association des Éditeurs des Journaux Économiques européens*. Among its members figured *Handelsblatt* publisher Friedrich Vogel and *La Vie française* director and editor-in-chief René Sédillot. The association met yearly to discuss the development of economic journalism and ‘European integration’ in the EEC. The different official pro-‘European’ associations complemented Euro-journalists’ unofficial networks and facilitated contacts among Western European journalists who were supportive of the EEC.

**Conclusion**

In the late 1950s and early 1960s a group of Western European journalists became convinced of the *sui generis* character of the EEC and its destiny to become a democratic ‘European’ polity. Euro-journalists were present in the editorial departments of important media outlets throughout Western Europe, both in the member states of the ‘European Communities’ and beyond. Euro-journalists may be classified in the ideal type categories of economists and cosmopolitans. They made the EEC and its ‘European Integration’ project an important element of their work and developed significant expertise on the EEC.

Various factors turned journalists into fervent supporters of the EEC. Many Euro-journalists were attracted to the EEC out of an interest in economic policymaking. Journalists with a multinational background felt attracted by the EEC’s multinational environment. Generational changes in Western European journalism played a role as well. Members of a new generation of journalists who started their careers after 1945 were more prone to become Euro-journalists. They connected the EEC’s innovative ‘supranationalism’ to their striving for economic, social and political progress in a postimperial Cold War international order where the former European great powers had been diminished to the second rank. Finally, socialisation processes in national or transnational ‘Europeanist’ networks and environments

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458 The information officer at the British Embassy in Paris gave the following account of the association’s meeting in Bordeaux in September 1969: “As regards the calibre of the Association only a few of those present at Bordeaux could be described as top level commentators but the majority struck me as good second line journalists each of whom was responsible for covering and commenting on European affairs. Those present mostly represented regional papers, but as a national press is rare in Europe, this is not to say they are without influence.” Isolani to Keith, Association of European Journalists, Paris, 26 September 1969, National Archives, FCO 26/389.

mattered. Euro-journalists often picked up the EEC gospel through contacts with pro-EEC networks. Particularly the pioneering spirit of the late 1950s’ and early 1960s’ Brussels ‘European bubble’ had a great impact on the first generation of Brussels correspondents. No single factor, but varying combinations of the factors above explain the conversion of Euro-journalists to ‘European Integration’ à la EEC.

Euro-journalists shared a common vision of the EEC as the nucleus of a future ‘European’ polity. However, they disagreed on other points, particularly economic policy-making in Western Europe. Euro-journalists did not constitute a transnational network of homogeneous members sharing identical views. Particularly economist Euro-journalists were deeply anchored in their national context. They observed and commented on ‘European Integration’ from national points of view. Their views reflected national debates on ‘European Integration’. Hence, some French Euro-journalists were sceptical about British EEC membership, while Dutch, Belgian and West German Euro-journalists wanted Britain to join. Euro-journalists from the Federal Republic envisioned a liberal EEC, while French Euro-journalists supported ‘European’ planning. These differences should not surprise anybody. Rather, it is remarkable that journalists from a broad range of countries developed the same sui generis vision of the EEC as a future ‘European’ polity. They thought the EEC the right vehicle to implement actually contradictory economic policies and argued before their national audiences that political and economic differences between the EEC nations could and should be bridged.
4 The Birth and Rise of the Euro-journalist narrative

The Euro-journalists invented the *sui generis* EEC media narrative in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The narrative then moved from being one among many to a dominant position in Western European media by the early 1970s. The previous chapter focused on the Euro-journalists’ *presence* in important Western European media outlets in the 1950s and 1960s. It outlined their biographies and ideas. This chapter, in a next step, concentrates on the Euro-journalists’ *activities*. It argues that they influenced ‘European Integration’ coverage in Western European media and successfully promoted the *sui generis* EEC media narrative. At the same time, it contextualises Euro-journalists’ activities and the rise of the *sui generis* EEC narrative of political and economic developments in Western Europe in the 1960s.

As stated in the previous chapter, Euro-journalists belonged to a diverse set of pro-EEC actors in and outside EEC institutions who invented the *sui generis* narrative on the EEC and the Treaties of Rome in the 1950s and 1960s. The narrative was comprised of different elements. First, the EEC was not a normal international organisation, but a *sui generis* entity incarnating a ‘European’ polity in the making. Its technocratic activities had a deeper meaning – they constituted the first steps towards the ‘unification of Europe’. The *Europe des Six* of the European Communities incarnated ‘European integration’ and ‘Europe’. ‘European Integration’ outside the Treaty of Rome framework was unthinkable. Alternative forms of Western European cooperation became illegitimate and ‘anti-European’. Second, the EEC would bring economic prosperity and assure ‘Europe’ peace and a strong voice in the international arena. Therefore, ‘European integration’ was a higher objective above everyday political struggles and promised benefits for everyone. A rational assessment of the situation demonstrated that the EEC was in everybody’s interest. Third, ‘European Integration’ through the EEC was a necessarily forward-moving ‘process’ with no way back. Interruption or stagnation of the ‘integration process’ meant ‘crisis’. The ‘integration process’ was under...

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460 See the introduction of Chapter 3.
constant threat of failure, but remained without an alternative. National governments threatened integration with their ‘national egoism’, while the ‘European’ institutions in Brussels as guardians of the ‘European interest’ pushed integration forward. The *sui generis* EEC narrative built on narratives idealising the ‘Europe of the Six’ and the ECSC dating from the early 1950s.\(^{461}\) The narrative of the ‘European integration process’ was complemented by the simultaneous invention of the ‘decolonisation process’. It framed the end of European empires as an irresistible historical process.\(^{462}\) Put together, the ‘European integration process’ and the ‘decolonisation process’ reinvented former global empire states as European nation states to be united by the EEC ‘European’ polity.

*Political and economic change in Western Europe*

The rise of the EEC *sui generis* narrative happened at a time when both the EEC and the global geopolitical and geoeconomic context were undergoing significant change. First, the EEC changed considerably in the course of the late 1950s and 1960s.\(^ {463}\) At the EEC’s birth in the second half of the 1950s, the ‘Europe of the Six’ constituted only one among many ‘European integration’ projects. Until the failure of the Western European free trade area negotiations in late 1958, it seemed likely that the EEC would be superseded by a Western European free trade area. Moreover, in its initial phase the EEC did very little. The situation only changed in the first half of the 1960s, when the EEC’s activities developed a broader relevance and alternative ‘European integration’ projects such as the Council of Europe, OEEC, EFTA and the Fouchet Plans\(^ {464}\) lost momentum or failed.\(^ {465}\) It was in the second half of 1961 and in the first half of 1962 that the EEC for the first time attracted sustained and broader attention. The Federal Foreign Office spoke of a “fundamental change” in the EEC’s position on the international scene. A series of developments had moved the EEC to “the


\(^ {462}\) See Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*.


\(^ {464}\) See Vanke, “An Impossible Union.”

centre of world politics”. The British membership application of July 1961 was a sensation. Prospective British EEC membership, the completion of the first out of three stages in the implementation of the Common Market and the agreement on the contours of a future Common Agricultural Policy in early 1962 foreshadowed potentially wide-ranging political and economic implications both for Western Europe and other parts of the world. ‘Supranational’ integration seemed on track for irresistible progress. Such optimism faded in the following years, but the emerging CAP, the developing customs union, the Community’s role in the GATT negotiations as well as the EEC development policy and association agreements with third countries attracted attention. So did the ‘crises’ caused by the French vetoes of British membership in 1963 and 1967, as well as the ‘empty chair crisis’ in 1965/66. In July 1967, the Merger Treaty entered into force. It combined the executive bodies of the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM into a single Commission and a


467 See Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State; Ludlow, Dealing with Britain; Griffiths and Ward, Courting the Common Market; Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans.

468 Particularly the developing customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy were watched anxiously in places and countries as diverse as Spain, Scandinavia, Latin America, Africa and Japan. For example, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry sent a press officer to its EEC embassy in July 1962. See Ikonomou, “Europeans,” 226.


471 See Dimier, The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy; Garavini, After Empires; Rempe, Entwicklung im Konflikt.


single Council of the European Communities. By the second half of the 1960s, the EEC had become an international organisation of undisputed relevance, while this had not been the case in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{474}

Second, international political and economic change in the 1960s made ‘European Integration’ and the EEC more relevant. Cold War tensions peaked in the early 1960s, followed by moves towards détente. Decolonisation ended European imperialism in most parts of the world. The economic recovery of Western Europe and particularly of the Federal Republic turned the region into an economic and industrial powerhouse. Britain continued its political and economic decline. French President de Gaulle challenged the United States with his \textit{grandeur} foreign policy. All these factors made ‘European Integration’ appear in a different light than in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{475} On the one hand, the economic re-rise of Western Europe triggered a new optimism among Western European elites regarding the potential of a ‘united Europe’ on the international scene – if there was a political will to unite. On the other hand, imperial foreign policies lost their viability for Britain and France. Therefore, starting from the early 1960s, in the context of both imperial decline and economic re-rise, for the first time since the end of the war there seemed to be a realistic potential for a ‘united Europe’ to achieve a more independent position between the United States and the Soviet Union. This could be achieved by replacing nationalism and imperialism with Western European economic and political integration.\textsuperscript{476}

As a consequence of the factors outlined above, ‘European integration’ and the EEC started to matter more not only to the media in the six member states, but also to journalists


across Western Europe and the world. The question of British EEC membership repeatedly agitated journalists around the world. West German diplomats claimed that the prospect of British membership and the EEC’s successes of early 1962 had triggered a campaign against the EEC in the Soviet media. De Gaulle’s veto of British EEC membership in January 1963 was covered extensively in many countries around the globe. According to French diplomats, in Egypt the “journaux annoncent sous grosses manchettes la rupture des négociations entre le Marché Commun Européen et la Grande-Bretagne”. The French Ambassador in Tehran underlined “la place importante qu’ont réservée en fin de mois les journaux locaux à la crise de Bruxelles. D’une façon générale, la rupture des pourparlers a fait sensation.”

French diplomats had also registered high media attention in Canada and Haiti. Non-European media remained interested in the EEC’s future after de Gaulle’s veto. EEC Commission President Hallstein gave interviews to leading Japanese and Indian economic newspapers in the spring of 1963. When Britain started a new attempt to join the Community in 1967, Wilson’s initiative was followed “avec beaucoup d’intérêt et d’espoir” by the Brazilian press,

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477 See Captuller, Aufzeichnung, Betr.: Die sowjetische Kampagne gegen die EWG, Bonn, den 17. September 1962, BArch B 145/2054. However, Western diplomats had observed criticism against the ‘Six’ in the Soviet media starting from the 1950s. British diplomats in Moscow reported in early 1957 that “Soviet dislike of schemes aimed at increasing co-operation among Western European countries is clearly shown by the strongly critical attitude adopted by the Soviet press towards the proposal for a Common Market and ‘Euratom’”. National Archives, FO 371/128335/611/195. West German diplomats came to the same conclusions. See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Moskau zu Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Die sowjetische Fachpresse über die Verschärfung der ökonomischen Gegensätze in Westeuropa, Moskau, den 19.3.1959 and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Moskau zu Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Sowjetische Pressestimmen über die Auswirkungen des westeuropäischen Gemeinsamen Marktes für die Landwirtschaft, Moskau, den 6. Mai 1959, BArch B 20-200 227.

478 Note, la rupture des négociations de Bruxelles, 30/1/63, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.

479 Renaud Sivan, Ambassadeur de France en Iran to Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Services d’Information et de Presse, a/s : la presse iranienne et le Marché Commun, Théhéran, le 2 Février 1963, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.

480 Raymond Bousquet, Ambassadeur de France au Canada to Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Service d’Information et Presse, a/s. orientation de la presse canadienne vis-à-vis de la position française (Générale de Gaulle, Grande-Bretagne, Marché Commun) – Article du Financial Post, Ottawa, le 7 février 1963, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.

481 Charles de Genissel, Ambassadeur de la République en Haiti to Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Services d’Information et de Presse, a/s. la presse haïtienne et le Marché Commun Européen, Port-au-Prince, le 5 févr 1963, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.


483 See Behm, Vermerk für Herrn Dr. Narjes, Brüssel, 20. März 1963, see also List of questions on Dr Hallstein’s trip to New Delhi, submitted by Malcom Subhan, correspondent of “The Economic Times”, Bombay, BArch N 1266/1708.
which favoured British EEC membership according to French diplomats.484 Finally, media in Europe and around the world closely followed the ‘empty chair crisis’. West German diplomats observed “detailed coverage” of the crisis in the Portuguese media.485 French diplomats confirmed that “La portée de la crise survenue au sein de la Communauté Economique Européenne n’a pas échappé à la presse portugaise”.486 They also reported that the Spanish487 and Danish488 press provided detailed coverage. Outside Europe, the ‘crisis’ made it onto US television489 and received a high level of attention in Madagascan media.490 In Australia “La rupture des négociations de Bruxelles, ses conséquences et le rôle qu’y a joué la France, ont fait, depuis le 1er juillet dernier, l’objet de nombreux articles dans l’ensemble de la presse australienne”.491

Media change

Not only the EEC, but also Western European media underwent a profound transformation during the 1960s. Already before the war, radio had become the primary source of information and entertainment for people in Western Europe. By 1960, virtually every family in Western Europe owned a radio, except for the countries of the Iberian Peninsula and the Southern Balkans. During the 1960s, however, television replaced radio as the dominating news source. An expensive and relatively rare elite medium in the 1950s, television spread to practically every Western European household during the 1960s and became a symbol of the

491 Robert Victor, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. de France to Son Excellence Monsieur Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des affaires politiques, Service de Presse et d’Information, La crise européenne et la presse australienne, Canberra, le 2 Août 1965, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.
prosperous postwar consumer societies. In Italy, RAI television was introduced in 1954. There were one million televisions in Italy in 1958. Half of Italian families owned a television by 1965. In France, in the late 1950s only ten percent of households owned a television. There was one channel broadcasting in black and white between 12.00 and 23.30 and receivable only in eight urban centres in the country. Between 1958 and 1968, the number of televisions in France increased tenfold. In Britain, television spread faster. By 1956, television signals were strong enough to reach the whole country. At the BBC, TV expenditure overtook radio expenditure in the late 1950s. There were ten million televisions in Britain already in the late 1950s. By the early 1970s, virtually every household in Western Europe owned a television. Moreover, by that time public and state television foreign correspondent networks had expanded to most Western European capitals, allowing them to cover Western Europe on a regular and extensive basis. Radio and newspapers remained relevant. The booming postwar economies led to rising sales and advertising revenues. For the elite, newspapers remained the principal source of information.

Given the only gradual and unforeseeable development of the EEC into a more important international organisation, how did Euro-journalists manage to influence ‘European Integration’ coverage in the late 1950s and early 1960s? Moreover, how and why did the mainstream of Western European journalism adopt the Euro-journalists’ sui generis EEC narrative over the course of the 1960s? This chapter answers these questions in three sections. The first section shows how Euro-journalists managed to create a space for the EEC on the Western European media agenda in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It illustrates how, by producing a constant stream of reporting about the EEC’s existence, organisation and functioning, Euro-journalists assured the early EEC a surprisingly strong presence in Western European media. The second section explores how Euro-journalists shaped and spread a

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492 In 1960, only one French family in eight owned a television. By 1970, there was on average of one television for every four people in Western Europe. See Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005), 345.
494 See Brizzi, De Gaulle et les médias, 23.
495 Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, 88–90.
media narrative presenting the EEC as a sui generis organisation incarnating ‘European Integration’ and ‘Europe’ that was different from other international organisations. The third section looks at the broader context of the rise of the sui generis EEC media narrative: generational change in Western European journalism, the creation of a Euro-journalist standard of EEC-coverage, EEC-promotion by EEC institutions, national governments and pro-‘European’ lobby groups as well as changing geopolitical circumstances. Finally, a short fourth section looks at the quantity and nature of EEC coverage in Western European media in the 1960s.

Creating a space for the EEC in Western European media

Several factors enabled Euro-journalists to create and shape a space for the EEC in Western European media in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First, Euro-journalists in the 1950s and 1960s mostly occupied positions in the second and third line in the hierarchy of editorial departments in Western Europe. Editors in chief and senior journalists in Western European journalism did not pay much attention to the EEC and instead focused their reporting on the big issues of the time. Their main concern around 1960 was the position of their country in an international order shaped by Cold War superpower antagonism and decolonisation. While ‘European Integration’ had a place in their thinking on the international political and economic order, they often considered the EEC a marginal phenomenon. As shown in Chapter 2, senior Western European journalists often defended visions of ‘European Integration’ for which the EEC was irrelevant or even a problem. Therefore, if senior journalists dealt with the EEC, they did not do so frequently. This left room for the Euro-journalists in the second hierarchy line to offer an everyday, continuous and more detailed EEC coverage.

Second, Euro-journalists benefited from a standing as talented and knowledgeable young economic and foreign affairs journalists, which they had acquired throughout the 1950s. This standing increased their margin of manoeuvre when promoting the EEC. Euro-journalists held considerable expertise on topics such as Commonwealth affairs (David Spanier), economic modernisation (Pierre Drouin) or Freiburg school ordoliberalism (Hans Herbert Götz), which were essential to their newspapers’ work. Drouin and Götz could afford to argue in the editorial departments of Le Monde and the FAZ that the EEC would benefit the French and West German economy as their colleagues considered them knowledgeable economics.
experts. Götz could claim that the EEC held the potential to create an ordoliberal economic order in Western Europe as he was a respected expert on ordoliberalism. Drouin could argue that the EEC served the economic modernisation of France as he was a respected expert on economic modernisation. Not all of Hans Herbert Götz’s colleagues at the FAZ agreed with his views on the EEC, but Götz nevertheless observed that “everything I give you is dutifully put into print”.497

Third, Euro-journalists used the freedom many Western European news outlets left their editors and foreign correspondents. Newspapers and public broadcasters accepted the coexistence of a range of opinions within their editorial departments. They often had a policy of non-interference in the reporting of foreign correspondents.498 As economic editors or Brussels correspondents, Euro-journalists thus had a certain liberty in choosing the topics and events they reported about. They also had a leeway in interpreting and framing those events.

Gerhard Löwenthal went to Brussels in 1963 for ZDF television to cover the EEC and the Benelux countries. However, he de facto devoted most of his time to the EEC, while dedicating “little time to general reports from the Benelux region.” While they were not always happy with his weighting of EEC and Benelux news, Löwenthal’s colleagues accepted his focus on ‘European’ affairs.499

Fourth, Euro-journalists developed expertise on the complex technicalities of the EEC, and based on this expertise they established an authority in their editorial departments when it came to covering or making judgements on the EEC. Their EEC expertise made Euro-journalists increasingly indispensable for coverage of issues directly or indirectly linked to the EEC. When The Times planned its coverage of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in September 1962 which mostly dealt with British EEC membership, Diplomatic Correspondent A.M. Rendel stated that “whoever does the reporting should have most of his information in his head a fortnight at least before the Conference starts and it needs of course

497 “es wird schön brav Alles gedruckt, was ich gebe”; Götz to Welter, Brüssel, 9.12.1964, BArch N 1314/277.
498 Regarding the Dutch socialist newspaper Het Parool, the EEC spokesman service stated in 1961 that the newspaper’s editor in chief left “une grande liberté aux rédacteurs de s’exprimer selon leur propre point de vue”. Het Parool/ Brussels Correspondent Louis Metzemaekers had “une liberté d’expression quasi totale pour ses articles.” See C.C. Meyers, Note à Monsieur le Président, Bruxelles, le 11 septembre 1961, BArch N 1266/1172.
500 EEC diplomats in Brussels in the early 1960s underlined the high quality and level of EEC knowledge of the Brussels press corps. See Brunet to Batault, Bruxelles, le 15 Février 1964, MAE/Paris 544INVA 373.
a lot of preparatory reading which I doubt if anyone in the office except Spanier and Burn are at present likely to have done.  

Hence, due to his EEC expertise, David Spanier, the newspaper’s Common Market Correspondent would play a central role in the *Times* coverage of the conference, an event of crucial importance for the British EEC entry bid. 

Euro-journalists used their standing, expert knowledge and intellectual leeway in debates and conflicts on ‘European Integration’ within editorial departments, where they defended the EEC against alternative visions of ‘European Integration’. Already before arriving in Brussels, Hans Herbert Götz had taken a strong stance against Wilhelm Röpke in the *FAZ*’s internal debates on ‘European Integration’. In July 1962, he told Erich Welte: “I think that Röpke has been wrong with his evaluation of the EEC from the start.” The economist’s view on the Community was one-sided, he claimed. “An objective critic – if such a thing exists – would however make an effort to see the positive and negative sides of the EEC.” 

After having arrived in Brussels, Götz intensified his criticism, suggesting the *FAZ* should stop publishing Röpke’s anti-EEC articles. “Herr R. is a free man and can write what he wants to, but I personally do not understand him anymore regarding these questions. I am in the mood for starting a fight with him [by means of a *FAZ* editorial], but that would be as dubious as Röpke’s a new polemic against the EEC.”

Similarly, David Spanier at *The Times* agitated against Harold Wilson in his newspaper’s editorial department when in 1965 the Labour Prime Minister relaunched the idea of a larger Western European free trade area as a ‘European Integration’ alternative to the Common Market. Spanier told his *Times* colleagues that “The worst mistake was reopening the discredited idea of an enlarged free trade area. It is hard to understand how Wilson’s advisors allowed him to persist in this, which gives all Britain’s friends in Europe the idea that Britain has learned nothing.” Spanier claimed he had recently spoken to SPD leader and West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt who had told him the free trade area idea “could not work on

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504 “Herr R. ist ja ein freier Mann und kann schreiben, was er will, aber ich verstehe ihn in diesen Fragen seit langem nicht mehr. Ich hätte nicht über Lust, mich mit ihm auseinanderzusetzen, aber das wäre ja genau so fragwürdig, wie die neuerliche Polemik von R. gegen die EWG.” Götz to Welte, Brüssel, 13.4.64, BArch N 1314/277.
psychological grounds”. Spanier denounced Wilson’s ‘European’ policy as “Essentially opportunistic” and complained that “Wilson has never shown any sympathy for the unifying political aim of the Common Market. He always describes the situation exclusively in narrow economic terms.”

Euro-journalists also used their standing, expert status and freedom in editorial departments to promote the institutionalisation of EEC coverage. They pushed for the creation of Brussels, EEC or Common Market editor and correspondent positions. The establishment of such positions was crucial, as they created a permanent and institutionalised flow of information on the EEC into Western European newspapers, radio, television and news agency reporting. As described in Chapter 2, after 1958 few editors in chief throughout Western Europe saw a need for permanent EEC or Common Market correspondents. They planned to cover the EEC and EURATOM as they had previously covered the OEEC, the EPU or the ECSC – on an occasional basis, either from the editorial department or with temporarily detached correspondents. However, Euro-journalists argued the EEC needed permanent correspondents. Already in late 1957, Hans Herbert Götz at the FAZ suggested to Herausgeber Erich Welter that Brussels might soon become “the European capital”. Götz warned that the Handelsblatt – the Federal Republic’s leading business newspaper and the FAZ economic department’s main competitor – was about to send a correspondent to the Belgian capital. Götz told Welter that “for competition reasons” the FAZ should follow suit. Partly because of Götz’s intervention, Welter sent Ernst Kobbert as FAZ correspondent to Brussels in September 1959. In the following years, Götz underlined the great potential he saw for the EEC story. In February 1962, he stated that “If the development continues as it becomes apparent now, Brussels will become a central place for economic policy making. This fact will need to flow into the long-term planning of our newspaper. I could imagine that in ten years from now – if one may think so far ahead – we will not have a single correspondent, but a downright bureau in Brussels.”

505 Memorandum from D. Spanier to the Editor, Mr. Wilson and Europe, May 31, 1965, TNL Archive Subject files, Europe, European Free Trade Area – Confidential Memoranda.
507 See Eick to Welter, Frankfurt, den 22.9.1959, BArch N 1314/371; see also Welter to Hallstein, 12. August 1959, BArch N 1314/373.
David Spanier did similar lobbying for the institutionalisation of EEC coverage in the Times editorial department. Spanier’s assignment as Common Market correspondent for The Times in September 1961 was initially only provisional. However, the journalist soon told The Times Editor William Haley that his job should become a permanent position. He wrote in December 1961 that the EEC “is a running story, and although repetitive, it is the sort of story where one needs to be continually in touch. It is no doubt possible to tackle the job on a semi-permanent basis, by flying in for the big meetings, but this is like trying to climb the mountain tops without going up the foothills. The paper risks missing hard news day by day and getting caught off balance; moreover, other papers will surely have stronger coverage. It seems certain that the Common Market will have increasing interest for British readers. I want to suggest, therefore, that The Times should go into this story wholeheartedly.” Spanier subsequently had his stay as The Times Common Market correspondent officialised and prolonged in January 1962. He left Brussels only after de Gaulle’s veto in the spring of 1963. By advocating the creation of EEC correspondent positions, Euro-journalists created an institutionalised place for the EEC in Western European media. Euro-journalists often occupied these positions themselves. Thus, supporting the EEC here also meant supporting one’s own career.

When Western European media created Brussels or EEC correspondent positions, Euro-journalists occupying these positions engaged in extensive claim-making to expand their status and presence in their news outlets. Virtually upon their arrival in Brussels, Euro-journalist correspondents started petitioning their editorial departments and claimed equal or similar treatment to foreign correspondents in London, Paris or New York. Corriere della Sera Brussels correspondent Gianfranco Ballardin demanded an Agence Europe subscription in 1963 in order to keep track of EEC developments. He claimed he needed Agence Europe just as the Corriere’s Paris correspondent needed AFP and its Bonn correspondent dpa. The Corriere administration paid for the subscription.


509 D.G. Spanier, Memorandum to the Editor, Future Coverage of the Common Market, December 11, 1961, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Common Market and OEEC.
510 See Notes from a meeting between the Editor, Mr Oliver Woods, and Mr. W.N. Clarke on Monday, January 8, 1962, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, EEC, 1962-1967.
511 See I. McDonald (Foreign Editor) to The Editor, April 1, 1963, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Memoranda, 1952-1963.
512 Referring to the Corriere’s foreign correspondents in Paris, Bonn, London and Moscow, Ballardin explained that “Sansa è ben abbonato all’ A.F.P., Brunelli alla D.P.A., Pieroni alla Reuter, Roberti alla Tass, e via dicendo.” Ballardin to Direttore Amministrativo, Bruxelles, 16.6.63. See also Direttore Amministrativo Corriere della Sera
in 1963 initially worked with a camera team provisionally detached to Brussels from Bonn. He developed considerable activism in covering the EEC and “pushed through the broadcasting of reports with tenacity.” Löwenthal asked for his provisional camera team to be permanently based in Brussels. The ZDF Administrative Council approved this in 1964. Westdeutscher Rundfunk radio Brussels correspondent Elmard Mundt in late 1964 and early 1965 lobbied his superiors in the WDR headquarters in Cologne to create a fully-fledged radio and television studio in Brussels. He claimed that “a proper WDR bureau in the immediate neighbourhood of the European institutions is becoming more and more necessary every day”. He also provided his superiors with suggestions on the equipment and possible location of the studio. The WDR subsequently inaugurated an integrated radio and television studio in Brussels in May 1966. The Euro-journalists’ claim played a particularly important role for radio and television, as broadcast possibilities depended on the technological facilities available. While not all Euro-journalist demands received a positive answer from their editorial departments, their initiatives often stood behind the expansions of the Brussels media infrastructure.

Euro-journalists also defended EEC correspondent positions vigorously. Robert Mauthner became Common Market correspondent for Reuters and Comtelburo in September 1961. He mostly concentrated on EEC coverage for the more prestigious Reuters news file. By spring 1962, the Reuters management considered one correspondent in Brussels reporting exclusively on the EEC for Reuters “uneconomic”. News Manager Doon Campbell suggested bureau chief Serge Nabokoff could cover the EEC for Reuters in addition to his general to Ballardin, 1 giugno 1963, both in ASCdS 3115. Ballardin, who worked from home, also demanded the Corriere to pay him an office, but the administration declined. See Ballardin to Mapelli, Bruxelles, 16/12/1966, also in ASCdS 3115.

513 “Mit Hartnäckigkeit setzte ich die Sendung von Berichten durch”. Löwenthal, Ich bin geblieben, 258.
515 Mundt to Paul Botta, Chefredakteur Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Brüssel, 30. Jan. 1965, WDR Archiv 12829. In the first half of the 1960s, the WDR radio correspondent in Brussels had to rely to a considerable degree on the facilities of the Belgian radio.
518 Nelson to The General Manager, March 16, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
coverage of Belgian affairs. He planned to transfer Mauthner to Bonn. Mauthner in reaction handed in his resignation. He told the Reuters management that “I personally think the supposition that a Reuter correspondent specialising in Common Market affairs is not justified is a dangerous one. The Times, Financial Times, Guardian and countless Continental newspapers have Common Market correspondents here who file, on the average, much less than the agencies.” Mauthner argued that “With the speeding-up of the British talks, the Danish negotiations, the question of the association of Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Israel, the talks for political union, the monthly session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the frequent meetings of the Council of Ministers in Brussels, not to speak of tariff negotiations with the United States and internal Common Market news, the next few months are likely to produce a heavy news file.” Mauthner withdrew his resignation when the Reuters management agreed not to change the status quo in the Brussels bureau. Having successfully defended his position, Mauthner continued covering the EEC for Reuters.

In sum, Euro-journalists carved out a space for the EEC in the editorial departments of Western European media in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They managed to do so based on editorial freedoms and a reputation as talented young economic and foreign affairs journalists. Mixing economic policy expertise with EEC expertise, they created and subsequently occupied a space in Western European media outlets dedicated to the EEC. Euro-journalists then worked for the institutionalisation of those spaces, advocating the creation of Common Market or EEC correspondent and editor positions. Those specialised correspondents were free to devote their entire work only to the EEC. Once newspapers, broadcasters or news agencies established such positions, they created an institutionalised space in their institutional setup and news coverage that was constantly and continuously to be filled with EEC content. By pushing for the creation of institutionalised spaces of EEC coverage, Euro-journalists sought to further both the cause of ‘Europe’ and their own careers, as they frequently had the opportunity to occupy positions such as EEC correspondent in Brussels.

Informing about the EEC and spreading the sui generis EEC media narrative

519 Campbell proposed to have a trainee journalist take over specialised EEC coverage for Comtelburo, while bureau chief Serge Nabokoff would simply add the EEC to his general task of covering Belgian affairs for Reuters. See Campbell to Mauthner, April 2, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
520 Mauthner to The General Manager, Attention to Mr. Doon Campbell, April 4, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
521 Mauthner to The General Manager, 17th April, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
Euro-journalists used the space they carved out for the EEC in Western European media for two purposes. First, they put the EEC on the Western European media agenda and informed audiences about its existence, organisation and functioning. They assured the early EEC a constant and surprisingly strong presence in Western European media. Second, Euro-journalists promoted the narrative of the EEC as a coherent *sui generis* ‘European’ polity standing at the centre of the ‘European integration process’ and representing ‘Europe’. At the same time, Euro-journalists defended the EEC against competing ‘European Integration’ projects and argued that it was compatible with domestic economic policy preferences.

*Informing about the EEC*

Euro-journalists used the space they created for the EEC in newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and news agency coverage to inform their audiences about the Community’s existence. Indeed, Euro-journalists like Pierre Drouin brought the EEC into existence on 1 January 1958, the day of the coming into force of the Rome Treaties. The date stands today as the moment of birth of the EEC. However, in early January 1958 the EEC was virtually non-existent. The EEC Commissioners held their first meeting only on 16 January. In the following months, they did not have any real capacity to act, as the EEC Commission administration still needed to be set up. The different services and directorate-generals of the Commission grew slowly and remained provisional up until the early 1960s. There were also no specific measures in the Rome Treaties that the EEC was supposed to take during its

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first year of existence. Despite having to admit that “Peu de faits marquants sont inscrits sur le calendrier ‘Marché commun’ de 1958”, Pierre Drouin on 1 January 1958 nevertheless provided Le Monde readers with a detailed account of the EEC programme for 1958. Hence, thanks to Drouin the EEC came to life earlier in Le Monde than in real life.

Euro-journalists informed their audiences in detail about the EEC’s early activities and institutional set-up. Giovanni Giovannini of La Stampa provided comprehensive coverage of the final part of the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome from Brussels and Paris in early 1957. He attended the first meeting of the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC Commission Presidents and the first meeting of the EEC Commission in January 1958. Giovannini then covered the first sessions of the European Parliamentary Assembly in March and June 1958, focussing on the debates on the future “capital of Europe”, the decision on the final seat of the ‘European’ institutions. In December 1958, based on briefings in Brussels, he provided an overview of the EEC’s activities in 1958 and the perspectives for 1959. Pierre Drouin at Le Monde had provided regular surveys of the EEC and EURATOM negotiations in 1956 and early 1957. He travelled to the Italian capital in March 1957 to provide detailed coverage.

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525 His reports were all published on La Stampa’s or Stampa Sera’s front page. See Giovanni Giovannini, Imminente la conclusione del Mercato comune europeo, La Stampa, 24.01.1957, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, E’ già pronto a Bruxelles il patto per la Comunità atomica europea, La Stampa, 25.01.1957, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Raggiunto l'accordo a Bruxelles sul "regime speciale" per l'agricoltura, Stampa Sera, 28.01.1957, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Superati i più grossi ostacoli per il Mercato Comune e l'Euratom, La Stampa, 29.01.1957, p. 1.
526 See Giovanni Giovannini, Oggi riuniti a Parigi i sei Primi Ministri per concludere il trattato del Mercato europeo, La Stampa, 19.02.1957, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Imminente l’accordo a Parigi per il trattato del Mercato europeo, La Stampa, 20.02.1957, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Raggiunto ieri dai “Sei” a Parigi l’accordo per il Mercato comune, La Stampa, 21.02.1957, p. 1.
527 See Giovanni Giovannini, Prima riunione fra i Presidenti della CECA, Euratom, e Mercato comune, La Stampa, 15.01.1958, p. 7.
528 See Giovanni Giovannini, Il primo organo del Mercato comune ha cominciato la sua attività a Bruxelles, La Stampa, 17.01.1958, p. 1.
529 See Giovanni Giovannini, Cinque candidature italiane per la “capitale dell'Europa”, La Stampa, 21.03.1958, p. 1.
530 See Giovanni Giovannini, Oggi a Strasburgo si apre il dibattito per la scelta della capitale europea, La Stampa, 21.06.1958, p. 5; Giovanni Giovannini, Milano ha ottenuto 19 voti e 8 Torino dai delegati italiani, La Stampa, 22.06.1958, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Si vota in segreto per la scelta delle tre città, Stampa Sera, 23.06.1958, p. 8; Giovanni Giovannini, Bruxelles, Strasburgo e Milano ottengono il maggior numero di voti, La Stampa, 24.06.1958, p. 1; Giovanni Giovannini, Improbabile per ora un accordo sulla scelta della capitale europea, La Stampa, 25.06.1958, p. 1.
531 Giovannini had been invited by the EEC Commission to come to Brussels together with a group of eleven other journalists. See Giovanni Giovannini, Che succederà il 1° gennaio negli Stati del Mercato commune, 16.12.1958, p. 5; Giovanni Giovannini, Prossimo dibattuto sulla riforma del Parlamento dei Paesi d'Europa, 24.12.1958, p. 7.
532 See Pierre Drouin, Comment la France entend-elle concilier ses responsabilités outre-mer et l'adhésion au marché commun européen ? Le Monde, 10.10.1956; Pierre Drouin, Les ministres des Six attaquent les "îlots de résistance" contournés par les experts de Bruxelles, Le Monde, 22.10.1956; Pierre Drouin, Des divergences
coverage of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. He also attended the first session of the European Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC, EURATOM and the ECSC in March 1958. From Strasbourg, Drouin reported on the election of Robert Schuman to the presidency and Walter Hallstein’s speech in front of the Assembly, and gave a general summary of the first session. Drouin introduced his readers to the first steps of a ‘European’ agricultural policy, EEC competition law and reviewed the latest academic publications on the EEC. After his arrival in Brussels in 1963, Hans Herbert Götz at the FAZ wrote explanatory pieces on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the procedure at Council meetings, the structure of the EEC Commission administration, the European Parliament, and European Law. Götz also used events like a new year or anniversaries to take stock of EEC activities and to provide an outlook on its future. David Spanier took over the EEC portfolio at The Times in September 1961. Starting from early October 1961, he contributed articles about the EEC and the British membership negotiations.
to The Times virtually every day until his departure from Brussels in February 1963.\textsuperscript{547} Among many other topics, he outlined the procedure for the negotiations between Britain and the EEC countries,\textsuperscript{548} explained the implications of British EEC membership for the Commonwealth,\textsuperscript{549} described the “first steps” of the ‘European Transport Policy’,\textsuperscript{550} covered “African Links With The Six”\textsuperscript{551} and explained the ‘supranational’ institutional framework of the EEC.\textsuperscript{552}

Euro-journalists helped the EEC not only to attain a constant presence in elite newspapers, but also on television. Dieter Strupp arrived in Brussels in 1963 to cover the EEC for the first channel of ARD West German public television.\textsuperscript{553} Fritz Pleitgen, who joined Strupp as a junior colleague in Brussels in 1964, claims that Strupp was behind the massive presence the EEC had in those years in the ARD flagship news programme Tagesschau, airing daily at 20.00.\textsuperscript{554} From Brussels, Pleitgen recalled in 2005, “a colleague named Dieter Strupp unflinchingly flooded the Tagesschau with reports about the European Economic Community.” Looking back at his work with Strupp in Brussels in the 1960s, Pleitgen claimed that “At the time there were only very few reports from around the world and we had little competition, therefore, we could send what we wanted. The audience was at our mercy. […] Today, it is a lot harder for EU news to compete with news from around the world.”\textsuperscript{555}

Production statistics for the year 1964 from the ARD Brussels bureau confirm Pleitgen’s

\textsuperscript{547} The articles were published with the by-line From our Common Market Correspondent and did not mention Spanier’s name. Only during absences from Brussels and during the 1962 summer break did Spanier not publish any articles. According to the The Times Online Archive, between 4 October 1961 and 19 February 1963 (when Spanier left Brussels), 283 articles with the by-line From our Common Market Correspondent were published in The Times.


\textsuperscript{550} From our Common Market Correspondent, European Common Transport Plan, The Times, 30.11.1961, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{552} From our Common Market Correspondent, Supranational Framework Of The Common Market, The Times, 26.01.1962, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{553} Strupp published a short memoir of his time in Brussels. Looking back in 1996 at his work on the EEC, he underlined his ‘Europeanism’ and deplored the fact that “Der europäische Gedanke und die Leistungen der Pioniere eines neuen Europa werden von der Bevölkerung der heutigen Europäischen Union noch viel zu wenig gewürdigt.” Strupp, Kühe im EG-Ministerrat.

\textsuperscript{554} On the history and central position of the Tagesschau in the ARD programme since the 1950s, see Nea Matzen and Christian Radler, eds., Die Tagesschau: Zur Geschichte einer Nachrichtensendung (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009).

memory. On average, the Brussels bureau produced one or two pieces per week on EEC topics for the *Tagesschau* in 1964. While there was no reporting during the EEC summer break, reporting peaked in December 1964 during the wheat price negotiations, with *Tagesschau* contributions almost daily during one week. Strupp covered virtually all EEC Council meetings in 1964. Commission President Hallstein appeared frequently, for example when he met US Secretary of State Dean Rusk or the Israeli Ambassador to discuss the Israel-EEC association agreement. A visit of labour union representatives to the EEC and the EEC new year reception in January 1964 were also covered. Strupp’s colleague, ZDF Brussels correspondent Gerhard Löwenthal, assured a strong EEC presence on the second channel of West German public television. Löwenthal claims that “At the time I was present almost daily in the ZDF programme with my pieces.”

In their coverage, Euro-journalists emphasised the central role of the ‘European founding fathers’ and introduced the central actors of the EEC world to their audiences. *FAZ* correspondent Ernst Kobbert wrote portraits on Sicco Mansholt, Hans von der Groeben, Paul Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet and Carl Friedrich Ophüls, the Federal Republic’s Permanent Representative to the EEC. Jean Lecerf of *Le Figaro* interviewed Walter Hallstein, whom he presented to his readership as “président du Marché Commun”. Ferdinand Himpele interviewed Hallstein for *Die Welt*. The interview covered a full newspaper page. Nel Slis wrote a portrait for *Associated Press* on Sicco Mansholt, the “dynamic, six-foot vice president of the EEC Commission”.

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558 On the ‘founding fathers’ narrative in ‘European integration’ history and political science, see in particular Cohen, “Le père de l’Europe. La construction sociale d’un récit des origines.”.
562 Ernst Kobbert, Jean Monnet, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.11.1963, p. 2.
563 Kobbert wrote the Ophüls portrait when the latter retired. Ernst Kobbert, Diplomat für Europa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22.03.1961, p. 2.
Monnet and the activities of his comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe.\textsuperscript{567} Drouin also helped EEC functionaries publish articles in \textit{Le Monde}.\textsuperscript{568} Finally, he gave space to the leading figures in the European Parliamentary Assembly such as Fernand Dehousse.\textsuperscript{569} ZDF Brussels correspondent Gerhard Löwenthal produced a documentary on Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak in 1966\textsuperscript{570} and a three part documentary on Walter Hallstein and ‘European Integration’ in 1968. One of the parts included interviews with the six EEC foreign ministers. Löwenthal recorded them answering the same questions and arranged the documentary in such a way so that Joseph Luns, Pierre Harmel, Pierre Grégoire, Michel Debré, Emilio Colombo and Willy Brandt appeared one after another answering the same questions. Löwenthal underlined the ‘European’ credentials of Luns and Colombo.\textsuperscript{571} Euro-journalists thus helped EEC actors and promoters to a presence in Western European media, often introducing foreign personalities and voices to national media audiences.

\textit{The sui generis EEC as a ‘European polity in the making}

Euro-journalists introduced the \textit{sui generis} EEC narrative into Western European media and promoted a vision of the Community as a ‘European’ polity in the making. Hans Herbert Götz outlined the EEC ‘European’ polity to \textit{FAZ} readers in an in-depth article covering an entire newspaper page in October 1965. The occasion of the article, which included lengthy


\textsuperscript{569} Reporting from a European Parliamentary Assembly meeting in October 1960, Drouin wrote in \textit{Le Monde}: “Avec la vigueur de ton qu’on lui connaît, M. Dehousse fit le procès de la coopération intergouvernementale : ‘Où sont les miracles de cette coopération, demanda-t-il notamment. Sur une question qui n'était pourtant pas d'une gravité exceptionnelle, celle du siège des institutions européennes, nous attendons toujours la réponse des ministres... On parle maintenant de réunions régulières des chefs de gouvernement. Demandons au moins que les exécutifs européens y assistent... pour limiter les dégâts.’” Pierre Drouin, L'Assemblée parlementaire des 'Six' débat de la relance politique européenne, \textit{Le Monde}, 14.10.1960.

\textsuperscript{570} The documentary had the title \textit{Paul Henri Spaak – Portrait eines Europäers} and was shown to Spaak in the EEC Commission TV studio in the presence of Löwenthal, ZDF Director General Karl Holzamer and senior German diplomats. See Löwenthal to Holzammer, 13. Juni 1966 and Holzammer to Löwenthal, 27. Juni 1966, ZDF-UA 3/0252.

\textsuperscript{571} See the preparatory work for the documentaries in BArch N 1266/2487 and the final scripts in BArch N 1266/1613.
quotes from the EEC Treaty, was the ‘empty chair crisis’. Götz argued that the EEC Treaty represented a “constitution” with a set of rules “not replaceable at will” and with “political aims” – the political unification of ‘Europe’. The EEC, Götz explained, had four “constitutional organs” (“Verfassungsorgane”): the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Assembly and the Court. Götz explained that the Court enjoyed the “classic rights of a supreme court”. He underlined the activist role of the Court. “Next to its controlling function and similar to the Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], the Court has an important role in the development and interpretation of the Treaty text.” With regard to the EEC Commission, Götz claimed that the EEC Treaty made it clear that “the member states, contrary to other international organisations such as the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the United Nations or the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), wanted not simply a secretariat following instructions, but an independent organ”. The Commission was the “guardian of the Treaties” and defended the “‘higher’ interests of the Community”. Therefore, it was “the true European organ”.

Euro-journalists from the start presented the European Parliamentary Assembly as an integral part of the ‘European’ polity, despite its marginal position in the EEC decision-making process. Euro-journalists attended the first Assembly session in March 1958 and advocated enlarged competencies and direct elections for the Assembly. Contemplating the lessons to be drawn from the first meeting of the ‘European’ parliamentarians from the Communities, Pierre Drouin in Le Monde observed progress vis-à-vis the old ECSC Assembly. “Les traités de Rome ont ensuite renforcé les pouvoirs des parlementaires européens, on le sait, non seulement en étendant la matière même soumise à leur contrôle, mais en accentuant celui-ci.” However, while increased powers for the Assembly were welcome, “C’est véritablement le jour où l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne sera élue au

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572 On the empty chair crisis, see Bajon, Europapolitik “am Abgrund”; Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s; Palayret, Wallace, and Winand, Visions, Votes, and Vetoes.
573 See Vauchez, Brokering Europe; Boerger and Rasmussen, “Transforming European Law.” Götz’s article includes numerous references to Euro-lawyer literature, particularly to work by German EEC functionary Erich Wirsing. Wirsing had been Hans von der Groeben’s deputy chef de cabinet between 1958 and 1962.
575 Hans Herbert Götz, Die vaterlandslosen Gesellen von Brüssel, Die politische Willensbildung in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.10.1965, p. 11.
suffrage direct qu’une novation fondamentale sera introduite.” Drouin admitted that it was too early in 1958 to introduce ‘European’ direct elections, but they should take place at a later point in time.576 In a similar vein, Drouin reported on the Assembly’s pronouncements on Commission proposals, even though those had no legally binding effect whatsoever.577 When writing about the Assembly in 1962, David Spanier in The Times underlined that ‘European’ parliamentarians were “grouped not by nationalities but by parties – Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals”. He also emphasised the – at the time purely theoretical – possibility for the Assembly to “dismiss the executives of the communities on a two-thirds vote of censure.”578

Following the logic that the European Communities were more than technocratic international organisations, Euro-journalists inflated technical EEC decisions into bold steps towards the ‘unification of Europe’. Charles Rebuffat announced the signing of the Treaties of Rome in Le Soir in Rome in March 1957 as follows: “les cloches du campanile de l’illustre hôtel de ville se mirent à sonner à toute volée pour annoncer au monde que « l’acte de naissance des Etats-Unis d’Europe », comme disent les commentateurs italiens, était en train d’être dressé.”579 In December 1958, Pierre Drouin reported on the liberalisation of trade quotas and tariffs foreseen in the Treaties of Rome for 1 January 1959. Drouin admitted that the measures and their effects were very limited.580 Nevertheless, Drouin claimed that “le 1er janvier 1959 marquera le début du démantèlement des frontières commerciales entre les Six.” Drouin annouced that “quelque chose va bouger en Europe” and that the small steps of 1 January 1959 were part of “la mise en route de cette gigantesque entreprise à six.”581 Giovanni Giovannini in La Stampa simply ignored the fact that the tariff and quota changes of 1 January 1959 would have little effect and explained that: “A dieci giorni dalle prime misure di attuazione del Mercato Comune, l’attività nei vari uffici della sede provvisoria di Bruxelles

576 Drouin saw public opinion as the main impediment to direct elections. “[L’]opinion publique, il faut bien le dire, ne ” porte ” pas encore cette réforme [direct elections]. Sans doute le Marché commun est plus ” sensible au cœur ” que la C.E.C.A., il touche plus d’intérêts épars, mais il faudra pourtant quelques années avant que le sentiment d’une réelle communauté économique prenne naissance.” Pierre Drouin, La leçon de Strasbourg, Le Monde, 24.03.1958.


580 For example, Drouin explained that the ten percent reduction in tariffs between the ‘Six’ starting from 1 January 1959 would have little actual impact on trade flows between the EEC member states. Moreover, the tariff reduction would have resulted from GATT negotiations anyway.

non conosce più orari né di giorno né di notte: politici e funzionari dei Sei Paesi non conosceranno quest’anno vacanze di Natale, presi come sono dalla necessità di metter a punto gli ultimi particolari della “Operazione Europa”.  

\(^{582}\) Similarly, *FAZ* Brussels correspondent Ernst Kobbert celebrated the ‘progress’ the EEC made in January 1962 regarding the Common Market and the CAP.  

\(^{583}\) Kobbert enthusiastically commented on the agreement on a framework for the CAP in an editorial on the *FAZ*’s front page: “Europe has taken the hurdle” and a “threshold has been crossed from where there is no way back into nation state egoism.”  

\(^{584}\) In December 1964, Sandro Doglio of *La Stampa* acclaimed the wheat and corn price agreements that established a final framework for the CAP as “un grande passo avanti sulla strada dell’integrazione economica del continente”. Doglio underlined that the meaning of the agreement went far beyond agricultural prices – “chi esce vittoriosa dalla estenuante maratona agricola di Bruxelles è proprio l’Europa”.  

As the Treaties of Rome constituted the institutional basis of a ‘European’ polity, Euro-journalists claimed that changes in the institutional set-up of the Rome Treaties were dangerous. During the British entry negotiations in 1962, *WDR* radio Brussels correspondent Elmar Mundt attacked Britain for trying to reverse parts of the Rome Treaty and existing agreements among the ‘Six’. Mundt attributed a constitutional character to those agreements. In August 1962, he criticised British attempts to “call into question the basic law [“Grundgesetz”, meaning the constitution of the Federal Republic] on agricultural policy decided upon on 14 January [1962].”  

\(^{586}\) In September 1962, he underlined that Britain needed to accept all aspects of the Rome Treaties and should not try to modify established rules. “The
Treaties of Rome are the sole benchmark, because the objective is a strengthened and enlarged European Economic Community, and not a loose partnership of convenience that would not be as effective as the existing EEC.\textsuperscript{587} Euro-journalists insisted on the central position of the Commission in the EEC ‘constitutional framework’. They attacked the Commission for what they considered overly conciliatory positions \textit{vis-à-vis} the member states. Writing about the negotiations on the acceleration of tariff reductions and their application to agricultural products in 1961, \textit{Het Parool} Brussels correspondent Louis Metzemaekers criticised a “politique d’abandon” of the EEC Commission. When it was decided to discuss the issue based on a COREPER proposal instead of a Commission proposal, Metzemaekers insisted that the normal procedure “veut que la Commission soumette au Conseil de ministre des propositions sur lesquelles le Conseil se prononce.” Metzemaekers claimed that “la Commission s’est laissé dépouiller de l’initiative. Elle contribue elle même par là à rompre l’équilibre entre les différentes institutions de la Communauté.”\textsuperscript{588}

Euro-journalists declared the ‘Europe’ of the Treaties of Rome to be the only valid path towards ‘European unity’ and tried to delegitimise other visions of ‘European Integration’. The ‘Europe of the Six’ that had been initiated by the ECSC and continued with the Treaties of Rome incarnated the true ‘European’ project. In June 1957, Pierre Drouin in \textit{Le Monde} defended the Treaties against critics denouncing the ‘Six’ as ‘little Europe’. Drouin declared that “Sans le moteur des Six, l’Europe n’est en effet qu’une forme vide, un flatus vocis. L’Europe n’existe que là où il y a une volonté. Or, qu’on le déplore ou non, cette volonté ne se manifeste encore qu’à l’intérieur du périmètre tracé par la C.E.C.A.” The ‘Six’ were the pioneering trailblazers on the path to a united ‘Europe’. Other countries could join later. “Si cet effort de construction aboutit, on verra alors se préciser les pointillés d’une Europe beaucoup plus vaste”. Moreover, Drouin argued that the ‘little Europe’ of the ‘Six’ was not as small as claimed by its opponents. “La " petite Europe " a tout de même autant d’habitants que les États-Unis : 160 millions. Elle produit 249 millions de tonnes de charbon (contre 448

\textsuperscript{587} “Die römischen Verträge bieten allein den Beurteilungsmaßstab, denn das Ziel ist die um England erweiterte und verstärkte Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und nicht ein loserer Zweckverband, der nicht so schlagkräftig wäre wie die bisherige EWG.” Elmar Mundt, Brüssel, Echo der Welt, 29.9.62, WDR Archiv, 5257.

\textsuperscript{588} Metzemaekers also integrated the Assembly into the problem. He underlined that the Commission would have to justify itself in front of the Assembly for its deviation from the rulebook of the Treaties of Rome. “Il appartiendrait à l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne de demander clairement des comptes à la Commission à ce sujet.” Extrait du journal "HET PAROOL" du 31.5.1961, La Commission européenne perd de son prestige, Conflit entre l’Allemagne et les partenaires de la CEE, L’accord sur l’accélération achoppe sur le problème agricole (de notre correspondant), Bruxelles, le 9 juin 1961 (translation), BArch N 1266/1172.
millions de tonnes aux États-Unis et 295 millions en U.R.S.S.), 57 millions de tonnes d'acier 
(États-Unis 106. U.R.S.S. 45), 45 millions de tonnes de ciment (États-Unis 50. U.R.S.S. 23), 
183 milliards de kilowattheures (États-Unis 623, U.R.S.S. 170). Avec 6,1 % de la population 
mondiale, l’Europe des Six dispose environ de 19 % du revenu mondial.”

Euro-journalists defended the Treaties of Rome against critics in the Federal Republic 
attacking them as excessively dirigiste, and critics in France rejecting them as too liberal. In 
June 1957, Pierre Drouin argued in Le Monde that French anti-liberal EEC and EURATOM 
critics were wrong. Drouin claimed that the Rome Treaties were characterised “par l’absence 
de penchant doctrinaire.” In his view, the Treaties balanced liberal and interventionist 
elements. “Les courbes libérales (élimination des droits de douane et des contingents) sautent 
d’abord aux yeux, mais elles ne tardent pas à rencontrer des motifs où domine une volonté 
d’organisation. Des délais, des étapes, viennent canaliser le flux libre-échangiste. 
L’agriculture a droit à un sort spécial qui n’a absolument plus rien à voir avec le " 
laissezpasser ". Des " amortisseurs " et des soupapes de sûreté permettent aux États - et la 
France est gâtée à cet égard - de suspendre pratiquement le jeu du " marché commun " au cas 
 où il troublerait gravement l’économie nationale. Un " Fonds social " et une " Banque 
européenne d’investissement " auront la charge d’aider ceux, travailleurs ou industriels, qui 
auraient à envisager un déplacement d'activité.” Drouin claimed that “Les auteurs du traité ont 
souvent fait du Keynes sans le savoir. Partant de la Weltanschauung économique occidentale, 
conscients que dans le système pratiqué de ce côté-ci du monde - qu’ils ne veulent pas 
remettre en cause - le moteur du progrès est la concurrence, ils ont eu le souci de laisser aux 
chefs d’entreprises le maximum de liberté économique. Celle-ci doit pourtant être compatible 
avec le plein emploi des hommes, des machines, et un développement régional harmonieux.” 

Drouin argued that the Treaties did not impose German liberal economic thinking on 
France; on the contrary, the EEC would serve to export French economic thinking to the 
Federal Republic. “L’expérience de la C.E.C.A. prouve que le nivellement des rémunérations 
et des charges sociales s’opère toujours par le haut. Le traité du marché commun oblige déjà 
nos partenaires à aligner les salaires féminins et masculins. Il imposera peu à peu un tarif 
extérieur commun, qui pèsera sur les prix intérieurs du pays qui prétiquait jusqu’alors des 
droits plus faibles. Des charges nouvelles seront imposées à la République fédérale du fait de 
l’association des T.O.M. [Territoires d’outre-mer]. Et pourquoi les ouvriers allemands et leurs

589 Pierre Drouin, II. - Points sensibles et faux problèmes, Le Monde, 29.06.1957.
patrons ne découvriraient-ils pas peu à peu, au contact des réalités françaises, qu’il est d’autre "philosophies" économiques que celle qui consiste à vivre pour travailler et tenir des normes "inferrnales" ?“ In sum, Drouin turned the critics’ argument around. He presented the EEC not as a threat to French economic doctrines, but as an opportunity to spread them to West Germany and Western Europe.

Hans Herbert Götz applied the same strategy in his dealings with liberal EEC critics in the Federal Republic. A case in point was the debate in the Federal Republic on the Memorandum for an Action Programme on the second stage of the implementation of the Rome Treaties published by the EEC Commission in October 1962. The 125-page memorandum laid out the EEC’s activities for the coming years. It included a chapter on economic ‘programming’ which immediately received sharp criticism from Federal Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard and other liberal economists. Erhard attacked the Action Programme as an attempt to implement a policy of interventionist ‘European’ planning. Erhard clashed with EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein over the memorandum during a session of the European Parliamentary Assembly in November 1962. 590 FAZ journalists like Paris economic correspondent Karl Jetter strongly supported Erhard’s criticisms. Jetter attacked EEC-Vice-President Robert Marjolin, “who has written the Brussels memorandum with the pen of a French planocrat”, 591 and claimed the Action Programme had laid out the basis of a “European planned economy”. 592

Götz defended the EEC Commission against such attacks and tried to paint a more differentiated picture. He argued that, first of all, the memorandum had not been a programme ready for implementation, but rather a “proposal for discussion”. He also argued that most of the memorandum’s content was unproblematic. Only the chapter on “programming” by French Commissioner Marjolin was objectionable. On Marjolin’s chapter, Götz stated that

590 See Wegmann, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische Integration, 469–70; Franz-Ulrich Willeke, “Die europäische Integration aus ordoliberaler Sicht,” Heidelberger Jahrbücher 38 (January 1, 1994): 227–28. The importance of the debate is underlined by the fact that the FAZ reprinted the important parts of the debate between Erhard and Hallstein. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Freiheitliche Wirtschaftspolitik in Europa, Das Rededuell zwischen Erhard und Hallstein im Europäischen Parlament 28.11.1962, p. 11. The clash was widely reported in the West German press and motivated Hallstein to explain his views and to reject the criticism directed against him and the EEC Commission in an interview with dpa. See the dpa questions and the answers drafted by the spokesman service of 1 December 1962 in BArch N 1266/1708.


everything depended on the French Commissioner’s exact interpretation of the term ‘planning’. Planning was not necessarily a bad thing. “Planning in the sense of forecasting and transparency of all data available: yes. Planning in the sense of supposedly harmless sandbox plays resulting in planning quotas: no, and always no.” Götz emphasised the memorandum’s chapter on competition policy written by German Commissioner Hans von der Groeben. He argued that the EEC Commission had here essentially adopted German ordoliberal views. “Whoever cares greatly about the idea of competition, and who has understood competition to be the essential precondition for the functioning of a free economic order, must be satisfied as this idea has come to dominate in the EEC. The Germans know what ‘competition as a piloting instrument’ means. In the Romanic states, those ideas are not yet widely diffused. Who would have dreamed five or ten years ago that those ideas developed in the Federal Republic would become the guideline for a European economic policy.”

Thus, applying a strategy similar to that of Pierre Drouin, Götz suggested to liberal EEC critics in the Federal Republic that they should see the EEC not as a threat, but rather as a tool to implement a liberal economic order based on competition in Western Europe. Götz kept on repeating this argument. When von der Groeben held a speech in the European Parliament in June 1965 underlining the importance of “undistorted, fair competition” in the Common Market, Götz argued that von der Groeben’s comments proved “that in the EEC Commission positions have come to dominate which are based on the idea of entrepreneurial freedom controlled by competition”.


594 “Unverfälschtem, fairem Wettbewerb”; “Um so erfreulicher ist es, daß sich in der EWG-Kommission eine Grundauflassung durchgesetzt hat, die auf der unternehmerischen, durch Wettbewerb kontrollierten Freiheit basiert.” Hans Herbert Götz, „Wettbewerb als Aufgabe“ - auch in der EWG, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.06.1965, p. 25. The headline “Wettbewerb als Aufgabe” (Competition as a task/duty) is a reference to the 1937 seminal ordoliberal book on competition policy by Leonard Miksch. Götz also defended the Community against ordoliberal claims that EEC competition law was toothless despite knowing that much of this criticism was well founded. Götz knew that the business community in the Federal Republic did not take EEC competition rules very seriously. During a confidential meeting between BDI President Fritz Berg and other industrialists with Götz and a small group of journalists in July 1964, Berg joked about “tame” Competition Commissioner Hans von der Groeben and his attempts to do “European competition policy”, “harmless”; “Europäische Wettbewerbspolitik”, Götz to Welter, Aktennotiz, Brüssel, 4.7.64, BArch N1314/277.
Götz also defended the EEC against other liberal criticism, such as that the Commission technocrats had accumulated too much power. “If the Brussels bureaucracy has remained victorious in so many cases it is not because it is more powerful but because it usually has the better arguments”. Moreover: “Contrary to the general wisdom that Brussels is a gigantic bureaucratic hydrocephalus, one might dare to say that the EEC Commission, with regard to the size of its task, is a small administration”. Götz admitted that the Common Agricultural Policy became increasingly problematic in the course of the 1960s. He criticised the CAP as being excessively market distorting from as early as 1966. “The European agricultural policy is going in the wrong direction”, he warned on the FAZ front page in April 1967. There “should be built a common market in the true sense of the term, and no Europe of interventionism.” However, at the same time he claimed “one has to forcefully respond to those – in particular in the Federal Republic – oversimplifying the matter with their criticism”. Agricultural policy in Western Europe could simply not follow pure market considerations and the German government had been instrumental in many of the decisions leading to agricultural overproduction.

In the course of the 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle with his intergovernmental vision of ‘European Integration’ became the Euro-journalists’ foremost enemy. Euro-journalists contributed to shaping the ‘European integration’ narrative framing de Gaulle as an archenemy of the EEC and ‘European integration’. Euro-journalists had watched de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 with considerable concern. But instead of breaking the EEC, de Gaulle rescued the Common Market from being liquidated in a Western European free

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595 “Daß die Brüsseler Bürokratie in so vielen Fällen Sieger geblieben ist, liegt nicht daran, daß sie mächtiger ist, sondern weil sie meist über die besseren Argumente verfügt”; “Entgegen der landläufigen Meinung, Brüssel sei ein gigantischer bürokratischer Wasserkopf, sei hier auch die These gewagt, daß die EWG Kommission, gemessen an der Größe ihrer Aufgabe, eine kleine Behörde ist” Hans Herbert Götz, Der Brüsseler Behördenapparat, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.02.1965, p. 15.
599 “so muß aber doch denen energisch widersprochen werden, vor allem in der Bundesrepublik, die es sich mit ihrer Kritik allzu leicht machen”, Hans Herbert Götz, Die Agrarpolitik als Prügelknabe, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.03.1971, p. 15.
trade area, made France ready for the EEC through tough economic reforms with the Rueff-Pinay Plan, and forced the reluctant Federal Republic into the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy, the central pillar of the early EEC. Only when the General increasingly turned against the EEC’s ‘supranational’ agenda in the early 1960s, did Euro-journalists embark upon a campaign to delegitimise ‘European unity’ à la de Gaulle. Roger Massip, head of the service de politique étrangère at Le Figaro led what he called a “bataille européenne” in his newspaper against the General. Massip accused the de Gaulle of an egoistic, nationalist and anti-‘European’ policy which tried to impose French dominance on Western Europe. “A faithful friend of Britain” according to the British diplomats, Massip in particular resented and attacked de Gaulle’s vetoing of British EEC membership. The journalist detailed his criticism of the French President in his 1963 book De Gaulle et l’Europe. During the ‘empty chair crisis’, Pierre Drouin, Jean Lecerf and Roger Massip defended the EEC Commission against French attacks, emanating particularly from the Gaullist camp. They pointed to the disadvantages of de Gaulle’s ‘boycott’ of the Community institutions, especially for French agriculture.

French Euro-journalists voiced their opposition to de Gaulle not only in newspapers, but also on French state television. In November 1967, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville was the hôte of the ORTF programme En direct avec... moderated by economics

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603 Massip and Massip, Les Passants du Siècle, 259.

604 See Personality notes on French journalists invited to see the Prime Minister, no date, National Archives, PREM 13/1503.


606 The EEC Commission followed French press coverage of the ‘empty chair crisis’ closely and registered any kind of support it received. See Olivi to Membres de la Commission, analyse confidentielle de notre Bureau de Paris concernant les jugements de la presse française sur le rôle de la Commission dans les discussions relatives au Règlement financier, Bruxelles, le 8 juillet 1965 and Olivi to Membres de la Commission, analyse confidentielle de notre Bureau de Paris concernant les jugements de la presse française sur le rôle de la Commission dans les discussions relatives au Règlement financier, Bruxelles, le 15 juillet 1965, both in HAEU, EN-345.
journalist Emmanuel de la Taille. The programme featured the Foreign Minister and three prominent journalists – Pierre Drouin (*Le Monde*), André Guerin (*L’Aurore*) and Yves Moreau (*L’Humanité*). The topic of the broadcast was ‘European Integration’. Pierre Drouin used the occasion for a comprehensive assault on Gaullist policy *vis-à-vis* the EEC and its foremost representative, Couve de Murville. Drouin argued that Gaullist foreign policy was contradictory. It aimed at the creation of a Western Europe independent of the United States, but at the same time worked against such a strong united ‘Europe’. Drouin argued that achieving ‘European’ independence of the US required two things: “on the one hand, to enlarge the dimensions of this Europe so that it really increases its weight facing the Americans; on the other hand, to strengthen it politically, be it at the price of making sacrifices in the field of national independence.” Drouin made the accusation against Couve that “you are rejecting these two measures and you are mostly interested in Europe when it embraces the French viewpoints.” In the course of the broadcast, Drouin confronted Couve with all the EEC *sui generis* narrative claims. ‘European unity’ could only be achieved through the EEC, France should give up its resistance to British entry into the EEC and to majority voting in the Council, and France should stop “defending only and strictly a purely national interest” in Brussels. Couve, increasingly annoyed by Drouin’s questions and attacks, responded that he had heard such criticisms abroad, but so far “never in France”.607


608 Hans Herbert Götz, Die vaterlandslosen Gesellen von Brüssel, Die politische Willensbildung in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.10.1965, p. 11.

Prosperity and peace

Euro-journalists introduced the argument that the EEC created prosperity in the member states to Western European media. Picking up the arguments emanating from pro-EEC groups and the ‘European’ institutions in Brussels, Euro-journalists intertwined their EEC narrative with the narratives on the *Wirtschaftswunder* and the *trente glorieuses*. They created a causal link between postwar economic expansion and EEC ‘European integration’. In May 1961, Pierre Drouin made the case for a nexus between “Expansion française et Marché Commun” in *Le Monde* in two consecutive in-depth articles. He did so in response to critics who in the late 1950s had predicted that the French economy would suffer from EEC membership. Drouin argued that in 1959 and 1960, it was not private consumption but exports that had driven French economic growth. “Si le rôle de la consommation des particuliers a été fort médiocre comme " moteur " de l’expansion en 1959 et même en 1960, en revanche les exportations d’abord, les investissements privés ensuite, ont donné un " coup de fouet " certain à notre production industrielle. Et là l’influence du Marché commun est visible”. The boom in exports had been caused in part by the devaluation of the franc in 1958, but “l’influence du traité de Rome est assez nette, elle aussi : c’est en effet vers les Six que la progression est la plus forte et que les perspectives restent les meilleures”. EEC membership also had incentivised France to fight inflation. “On peut dire que l’aiguillon de la Communauté économique européenne a heureusement remplacé le stimulant malsain de l’inflation.” Moreover, the factor of competition was essential, because “la perspective de devoir affronter une concurrence accrue sur l’aire des Six a fortement incité l’industrie française à ne pas s’endormir.”

Drouin argued that the Rome Treaty had had positive psychological effects on French business. “Avant même de voir le jour, la Communauté économique européenne a fait sentir profondément ses effets sur l’économie française, en modifiant peu à peu la mentalité des chefs d’entreprise”. Drouin also argued “que l’état d’esprit des industriels français a connu depuis la guerre trois révolutions : la première fut celle de la productivité, la seconde celle de

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610 There is little economic research on the actual effects of ‘European Integration’ on economic developments in Western Europe after 1945. Economic historians disagree as to whether the EEC furthered or hindered economic growth in individual EEC member states, within the Communities, or in the world economy. Nevertheless, the assumption that ‘European integration’ spurred the unprecedented postwar economic growth has become essential to the standard narrative of ‘European integration’ history. See Patel, “Provincialising European Union,” 667. On the debate among economic historians on the economic effects of ‘European integration’, see Kiran Klaus Patel, “Europäische Integration,” in *Dimensionen Internationaler Geschichte*, ed. Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), 353–372.

la libéralisation, c'est-à-dire l'acceptation de la disparition du protectionnisme et de ses privilèges. La troisième est celle de l'exportation, du développement de la mentalité commerçante, accomplie déjà dans certains secteurs mais à peine ébauchée dans d'autres. Or l’approche du Marché commun a été décisive pour faire découvrir à un grand nombre de chefs d'entreprise : 1) Que l'exportation était nécessaire. 2) Que l'exportation était possible. La multiplication des études de débouchés, des voyages à l’étranger, les premiers résultats des offensives sur le marché des Six ont convaincu les industriels français que leurs "cartes" étaient excellentes. L’esprit de conquête en a été fortifié.612 There could thus be no doubt that the EEC had greatly boosted economic growth. Drouin even argued that it had played a key role in the positive revolutions of the French postwar economy and in overcoming French structural economic weaknesses.613

Similarly, La Stampa’s Sandro Doglio reproduced the EEC Commission’s narrative linking the impressive postwar expansion of the Italian economy to the creation of the EEC. Referring to an EEC Commission study on wage and productivity growth in the Community member states between 1958 and 1964, Doglio reported “che l’aumento dei salari ha raggiunto il massimo in Italia, con l’80 per cento in confronto al 1958. In Francia è stato del 60 per cento, In Germania del 67, in Belgio del 35, in Olanda del 75.” Choosing 1958 as the – arbitrary – starting point to measure economic developments in Western Europe, he suggested that those developments were linked to or resulted from the creation of the EEC. Doglio also picked up the study’s comparison with economic developments in the US and in Britain. “Negli Stati Uniti, invece, in questi stessi anni il lavoratore ha ottenuto in media un aumento del 27 per cento e in Gran Bretagna del 36 per cento.”614 The comparison implied that EEC membership brought higher wages and higher standards of living for Italy compared to countries outside the EEC.

613 This narrative became so powerful that French Prime Minister George Pompidou felt obliged to reject it in an ORTF interview in October 1965. Pompidou criticised “l’idée que le marché commun est la solution de tous nos problèmes. Il y a des guérisseurs, des charlatans qui recommandent à tous ceux qui viennent les consulter une pommade miraculeuse, qu’il s’agisse d’une jambe cassée ou d’une rhume de cerveau, c’est toujours la même. Eh bien ! Le marché commun tel que certains le dépeignent me paraît ressembler un peu à cette pommade : comme elle, il guérit tout, ce qui veut dire qu’il risque de ne rien guérir, mais de faire simplement illusion. Le marché commun, à lui seul, n’apportera aucun secours à notre industrie”. Georges Pompidou, ORTF Interview, 11 October 1965, cited in Éric Bussière and Emilie Willaert, Un projet pour l’Europe: Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne (Bruxelles ; New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 108.
614 Sandro Doglio, I salari in Italia dal 1958 sono saliti dell’80 per cento, Secondo uno studio della Comunità europea, In Germania l’incremento è stato del 67, in Francia del 60 per cento (Dal nostro corrispondente) Bruxelles, 9 aprile, La Stampa, 10.04.1965, p. 15.
West German television Euro-journalist Gerhard Löwenthal put forward similar arguments. In 1968, ten years after the entry into force of the Rome Treaties, Löwenthal produced a three-part documentary for ZDF on ‘European integration’ featuring Walter Hallstein. Part II of the documentary entitled “Tatsachen” (“facts”) boasted long enumerations of the “undisputed economic successes” of the EEC. “While the volume of world trade has increased by 89% since 1958, the trade volume among the EEC countries increased by 135%.” Moreover, “the following numbers are proof of the rising living standards: in 1958, there were 78 telephones per 1000 inhabitants in the Community. In 1967, there were 145, almost twice as many.” Finally, “Private household income after the deduction of taxes and social charges has increased by no less then 93%. If you take out inflation, the real purchasing power increased by 51%.” Löwenthal commented that those numbers showed “the meaning which the Community has for every single consumer.” Hallstein in the documentary pointed to the downward pressure on prices of tariff reductions, the wider choice of products in the Common Market and rising incomes. “Incomes have, as the statistics show, increased extraordinarily – as a consequence of the creation of the European Economic Community.”

The ‘European integration process’

Finally, Euro-journalists presented ‘European Integration’ through the EEC as a necessarily forward-moving ‘process’ in which ‘stagnation’ or ‘setbacks’ caused constant ‘crises’. At the same time, however, the final goal of ‘European unity’ was without alternative and would be reached sooner or later. As Hans Herbert Götz put it, the EEC was carried by an “integration process continuously advancing, notwithstanding all constraints, breakdowns and crises.” Comparing the ‘Six’ to a group of adventurers on an expedition into unknown territory, Götz claimed that “The expedition has no alternative, it must stay together.”

Commenting on the nascent EEC customs union in 1962, Drouin wrote that it “porte tout naturellement vers l’union économique.” The ‘integration process’ consisted of logical steps, one necessarily following another. With regard to economic integration, “À mesure que

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615 All quotes are taken from the documentary’s transcript. See Europa - Traum oder Wirklichkeit? Eine Sendereihe mit Walter Hallstein. Von Gerhard Löwenthal und Friedrich Mönckmeier Untertitel: II. Tatsachen, BArch N 1266/2487.
619 Pierre Drouin, II. - Les Six à la recherche d'une doctrine, Le Monde, 27.07.1962.
se développe le processus d’intégration européenne, les politiques monétaires des pays de la C.E.E. devront être mieux coordonnées, afin d’éviter les distorsions dans les courants d’échanges. The ‘integration process’ was thus at the same time under a constant threat of failure and destined to move forward and ‘succeed’.

Euro-journalists gave ‘crises’ a central place in their narrative on the ‘European integration process’. The EEC, Pierre Drouin explained, was “vouée aux crises, puisqu’elle heurte des habitudes, remet en cause des situations, voire des croyances”. Marcell von Donat, EEC functionary since the late 1950s and a member of the Commission spokesman group between 1969 and 1976, explained the ‘crises’ media narrative in a book on the European Community he published in 1975. Donat compared EC media coverage to a dish. Euro-journalists tried to make this dish more palatable by adding spices. “[T]he crisis propensity of the Community is certainly the most elaborate spice the press has invented” to sell the Community, von Donat argued. Community work was a process of constant disputes and disagreements. “However, at which point this process adopts the attributes of a crisis is to be determined by the framing of the individual journalist.” Journalists tried to increase the news value of their reporting by constantly inventing new ‘crises’ in Brussels. “If one cannot demonstrate unity straight away, which happens only in rare happy moments, crisis mood is created.” Therefore, the term ‘crisis’ was heavily “overused” in EEC/EC reporting. Donat thought the “crisis shouting” in the media very efficient. “The outcry of the press has been demonstrated to be a powerful force pushing towards action.” Politicians and diplomats had no interest in being blamed for an EEC ‘crisis’ by their national or foreign media.

Based on the ‘crises’ narrative, Euro-journalists created an alarmist EEC coverage characterised by ‘emergencies’, ‘decisive moments’, ‘obstacles’ and ‘threats’ to integration. Either the ‘integration process’ advanced, or disaster loomed. As Hans Herbert Götz put it: “If the Community does not want to get stuck, it continuously needs to move towards perfection and advance.” In December 1960, Pierre Drouin explained in Le Monde that “Une crise

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620 Pierre Drouin, La commission de la C.E.E. adresse aux ministres des Six son plan de coopération monétaire, Le Monde, 02.07.1963.
622 Pierre Drouin, Dans les capitales européennes on refuse de dramatiser les événements de Bruxelles, Une hibernation de l’Europe ?, Le Monde, 03.07.1965.
majeure serait ouverte en effet dans la Communauté économique européenne au cas où les ministres reconnaîtraient l’impossibilité d’appliquer les décisions sur l’accélération prises le 12 mai dernier” and that “Les Six feraient la preuve que dès la première difficulté sérieuse de leur existence la volonté commune n’est pas suffisante pour renverser les obstacles.”

Six months later, in June 1961, Drouin saw the EEC again at a decisive moment. “Après trois ans et demi d’existence, le Marché commun arrive, on le voit, à un âge critique, celui où il faut, pour qu’il avance, " tailler dans la chair ", rompre avec des habitudes, ne plus regarder seulement les boussoles nationales.”

Again six months later, in early 1962, during the negotiations on the contours of a Common Agricultural Policy, the EEC was once more in danger. “On ne saura donc que dans quelques jours seulement, la " couleur " qu’a aura pour le Marché commun l’année 1962, s’il essuie son premier échec grave ou si la détermination communautaire est plus forte que la somme des intérêts nationaux.”

In December 1963, Hans Herbert Götz argued “1963 has so far been the most dangerous year for the EEC.” In May 1964, he called on the national governments to act in order to overcome “The stagnation in Brussels”.

In the run-up to the wheat price negotiations in late 1964, Corriere della Sera correspondent Gianfranco Ballardin framed the issues as a “crisis”. On the same topic, Hans Herbert Götz declared that “A lot more depends on the success of the new series of negotiations, namely the fate of the Community. Everybody knows that it would not break apart if there were no agreement. However, it would lose its dynamism and maybe it would slowly die.”

Euro-journalists framed the entry negotiations between Britain and the EEC between 1961 and 1963 as a chain of ‘crises’, ‘last chances’ and potential ‘breakdowns’. In May 1962, Pierre Drouin argued in Le Monde that Franco-British disagreements on the negotiations constituted an existential threat to the EEC. “La rencontre du général de Gaulle et de M. Macmillan, au début du mois de juin, viendrait alors à point pour remettre la négociation sur

626 Pierre Drouin, Le Marché commun arrive à un âge critique, Le Monde, 08.06.1961.
627 Pierre Drouin, Les ministres du Marché commun tenteront à partir du 4 janvier un ultime effort pour s'entendre sur l'agriculture, Le Monde, 02.01.1962.
629 Hans Herbert Götz, Die Stagnation in Brüssel überwinden, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.05.1964, p. 1.
630 See Gianfranco Ballardin, Si tenta di risolvere la crisi del Mercato Comune, Corriere della Sera, 10.11.1964.
les rails, à moins que l'intransigeance de l'un et de l'autre ne fasse " exploser " la conférence - comme celle de la zone de libre-échange. Mais, cette fois, le Marché commun lui-même ne risquerait-il pas d'éclater ?" In August 1962, Elmar Mundt of WDR radio declared the negotiations had reached a “zenith of crisis” and the “moment of decision” had come. In September, he warned that “In Brussels one feels the centrifugal forces tearing at the not yet consolidated EEC". For Nora Beloff covering the entry negotiations for The Observer, it was “Now or never for Britain” in August 1962, and again “Last chance in Brussels” in January 1963. Hans Herbert Götz explained in November 1962 that “The EEC is and remains the biggest opportunity for Europe. Therefore, a failure of the England-negotiations and a slowdown of the speed of unification would be politically disastrous.” In January 1963, Giovanni Giovannini in La Stampa declared: “È in gioco l’avvenire del Continente europeo”. A failure of the negotiations “sarebbe assurda” and potentially disastrous. After de Gaulle’s veto of British membership in January 1963, Drouin complained that “le Marché commun lui-même, qui avait toujours remarquablement bravé jusqu’ici les vents contraires, est secoué par la tempête justes dans son tréfonds. Les plus pessimistes ne croient pas vraiment à sa dislocation, mais " le cœur n'y est plus " depuis que le général de Gaulle, qui a une conception décidément très particulière de la communauté, a décidé seul, sans consulter ses partenaires du Marché commun, de fermer au moins provisoirement la porte aux Anglais.”

Euro-journalists also helped give the ‘empty chair crisis’ the central position it holds in the ‘European integration’ crises narrative. While some politicians and civil servants played down the French decision to interrupt and withdraw from the negotiations on the financing of the CAP on 30 June 1965, most Euro-journalists immediately framed the incident as a severe ‘crisis’ threatening the EEC’s existence. Sandro Doglio of La Stampa explained on the front
page of the *La Stampa* edition of 1 July 1965 that the “drammatica seduta” of the Council had resulted in “una grave crisi per il Mercato Comune, dalle conseguenze per ora imprevedibili”. Gianfranco Ballardin, also on 1 July, claimed in the *Corriere della Sera* that the “minaccia francese di lasciare il Mec” had caused a “grave crisi” in the Community. Hans Herbert Götz declared the EEC to be in “crisis” on 2 July 1965 on the *FAZ* front page and warned “the project of unification has run into mischief”. The *Times* European Economic Correspondent David Spanier commented that the “Community crisis” would probably be resolved, “but because the reactions from the Elysée can never be predicted it is equally possible that the Community has to be stalled or even broken up.” On a pessimistic note, he predicted that “There will be but little motive for preserving the spirit of cooperation which is the essence of the Common Market.” Charles Rebuffat asked in *Le Soir* “Did the death knell sound for the European Community on 1 July 1965 at 1.55 a.m.?” He argued that “the damage is not irreparable” but “there is a definite risk of rapid deterioration. If harmony is to be restored, the Six do not merely need to reach a compromise; they have to look for one as soon as possible.”

In sum, Euro-journalists promoted a vision of the EEC as a *sui generis* ‘European’ polity in the making. The EEC was not a normal technocratic international organisation – it represented ‘European integration’ and ‘Europe’. Alternative forms of Western European cooperation were illegitimate. The EEC would bring economic prosperity and assure ‘Europe’ peace and a strong voice in the international arena. Finally, ‘European Integration’ through the EEC was a forward-moving ‘process’ continuously interrupted by ‘crises’. The previous sections outlined the elements of the *sui generis* EEC media narrative. They showed how Euro-journalists created a place for the narrative in Western European media in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The following section will explain how the *sui generis* EEC narrative had developed into the dominating vision of ‘European integration’ in Western European media by the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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The sui generis EEC media narrative

The sui generis media narrative on the EEC outlined in the previous section moved from a marginal to a dominant position in Western European media between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. Several factors explain the rise of the EEC media narrative. The first section of this chapter showed that Euro-journalists used their influence to spread the narrative in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, additional factors came into play in the course of the 1960s. First, Euro-journalists moved up the career ladder of Western European journalism in that decade. They replaced older journalists who belonged to a generation less interested in or sceptical about ‘European Integration’ and ‘supranational’ EEC ‘Europe’. Euro-journalists’ arrival in senior positions made it easier for them to push the EEC ‘Europe’ narrative into Western European media. Second, Euro-journalists established a framework of interpretations and working practices that successive cohorts of journalists covering the EEC emulated in order to be able to cope with the EEC’s complexities. Moreover, some Euro-journalists who had started covering the EEC around 1960 remained in control of ‘European integration’ coverage into the 1970s and 1980s. Third, EEC institutions, national governments and pro-‘European’ lobby groups mounted public relations activities during the 1960s urging Western European media to adopt the sui generis EEC narrative. Fourth, political and economic change in the international arena led some older, senior Western European journalists to revise their indifferent or negative views on the EEC.

Generational change and career progress

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a fundamental generational change in Western European journalism. Starting from the mid-1960s, senior journalists with pre-1945 work experience who had marked the postwar moment of Western European journalism started retiring. William Haley left The Times in 1966, where he had been editor since 1952. Hugh Greene left the BBC in 1969 after having been its Director-General since 1960. Giulio De Benedetti retired in 1968 after having headed the editorial department of La Stampa since 1948. The direttore of the Corriere della Sera Alfio Russo quit his position in 1968, having directed the Corriere since 1961. Hubert Beuve-Méry retired from the directorship of Le Monde in 1969 after having founded and directed the newspaper since 1944. At the FAZ, founding editor Erich Welter increasingly handed over the newspaper to younger colleagues in the second half of the 1960s. Hermann Proebst left the Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1970 after ten years as editor in chief. All the journalists just mentioned had started their careers in
journalism before 1945. All their successors lacked pre-1945 work experience. In a few years in the late 1960s and early 1970s, younger journalists with different generational experiences had taken over the leading positions in Western European journalism.

The departure of the old and the arrival of a new generation at the top levels of Western European journalism had consequences for ‘European Integration’ coverage. It removed older journalists with little attachment to the EEC and ‘supranationalism’ and replaced them with younger journalists with more positive attitudes towards the Community. The generational shift for the first time allowed Euro-journalists to take on senior positions in Western European journalism on a broader scale. Euro-journalists often made considerable career progress in the course of the 1960s. Many moved from positions as simple editors at the time of the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 1957 into senior positions of Western European journalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Pierre Drouin was a simple editor in *Le Monde*’s economics section in the 1950s. In 1969, he became one of the newspaper’s deputy editors. Louis Metzemaekers was an editor and correspondent at *Het Parool* during the 1950s. He was appointed editor in chief of *Het Financieele Dagblad* in 1967. Charles Rebuffat started as a simple editor at *Le Soir* in the 1950s. He became deputy editor-in-chief in the late 1960s and rose to editor-in-chief in the 1970s. Giovanni Giovannini worked as a simple member of the editorial department of *La Stampa* during the 1950s. The newspaper named him one of its deputy editors in 1968. Thomas Löffelholz joined the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* in the late 1950s. Starting from 1973, he headed the newspaper’s Bonn bureau. David Spanier joined *The Times* in 1957 as a junior member of the editorial department. He became *The Times* diplomatic correspondent in 1974. In the late 1950s, most senior Western European journalists knew very little about the EEC (Roger Massip could be named as the most prominent exception). By the early 1970s, Euro-journalists with EEC admiration and expertise had risen to the top levels of Western European journalism. They had the authority to make the *sui generis* EEC narrative the dominating discourse of their media outlets on ‘European Integration’.

**Setting a framework for ‘European integration’ coverage**

Euro-journalists pioneering Euro-journalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s designed a framework of interpretation and working practices for ‘European Integration’ coverage. Travelling cohorts of journalists covering the EEC picked up on this framework and thereby the *sui generis* EEC narrative. The early Euro-journalists introduced a number of practices
and made them standards of EEC/EC/EU coverage. For example, they invented the practice of spending nights at Council of Ministers meetings awaiting the proclamation of negotiation results. The nightlong presence of journalists at Council meetings – a natural exercise in EU journalism today – did not automatically derive from the importance of agreements on agricultural prices. Rather, the practice was born out of a conscious choice of Euro-journalists that such agreements mattered and that it was worth spending nights without sleep to anticipate and receive negotiation results as early as possible. Only the presence of journalists transformed technical negotiations on farm prices into events decisive for the future of ‘Europe’.645 Similarly, early Euro-journalists’ decision to travel to Strasbourg to cover the European Parliamentary Assembly646 was far from natural; the Assembly had little to no influence in EEC decision making in the 1960s. However, Euro-journalists started attending the Assembly sessions, thereby bridging the geographical and power gap between the Assembly and the EEC Commission and Council. Attending nightlong Council meetings and European Parliamentary Assembly meetings became the standard practice of journalists covering ‘European integration’.

Moreover, the pioneer Euro-journalists established a Brussels journalism intimately connected to the ‘European’ institutions, diplomats and politicians supportive of the EEC.647 All ‘European’ and national actors in the EEC world of the late 1950s and 1960s shared the wish to further the EEC version of ‘European Integration’. An interview Paul Henri Spaak gave to Philippe Lemaître (Agence Agra), Sandro Doglio (La Stampa) and Gerhard Löwenthal (ZDF) on Belgian public television in November 1965 exemplifies the cooperation between Brussels correspondents and pro-EEC politicians. Spaak and the three EEC correspondents jointly contemplated on Belgian TV how the ‘empty chair crisis’ could be

645 Both journalists and functionaries describe the atmosphere at the 1960s’ and 1970s’ Council meetings in colourful language. See de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 73–74. See the chapter Der Rat. Whisky um halb zwei in Donat, Brüsseler Machenschaften.


overcome. French diplomats in Brussels complained about the EEC press corps being “assez peu favorables à notre politique européenne” and acting as a “caisse de résonance” for politicians like Spaak. Federal Economics Minister Kurt Schmücker wrote to WDR Director-General Klaus von Bismarck in April 1966 about his contacts with WDR correspondents in Brussels that he was always happy “to contribute to informing the German public about European issues together with your correspondents.” In sum, Euro-journalists developed a journalistic model in Brussels that included extensive pro-EEC teamwork with EEC functionaries, diplomats and politicians.

The pioneer Euro-journalists of the late 1950s and early 1960s handed on this journalistic framework to following generations of journalists covering the EEC. Why did those following generations of EEC/EC journalists adopt the practices of the pioneer Euro-journalists? Journalists who were new to ‘European affairs’ or the ‘European’ news hub in Brussels faced virtually insurmountable obstacles. The EEC was too complex to be understood without a template or expert guidance. Therefore, journalists relied on the example and help of already experienced Euro-journalists – the “Vieux routiers des couloirs européens” as AFP Brussels correspondent Yann de l’Écotais called them. Many pioneer Euro-journalists shared their knowledge and practices with journalists who came to Brussels in the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s. Vittorio Zucconi arrived as La Stampa correspondent in Brussels in 1969. Ugo Piccione of Il Sole 24 Ore became his mentor. Zucconi writes that Piccione explained to him the functioning of the EEC. “Lui mi aprì il capitale delle sue immense conoscenze tecniche”. Zucconi states that without Piccione’s help and guidance “sarei sprofondato nella palude della mia ignoranza” and that “[s]enza il suo aiuto, il mio apprendistato a Bruxelles sarebbe stato un tormento e un fiasco.” Euro-journalists offered a framework for EEC coverage that following generations of journalists adopted to deal with the complexity of the EEC story. In adopting this framework, they also picked up the sui generis EEC media narrative.

648 The interview was broadcasted on 3 November 1965 during the programme 9 millions. See Etienne de Crouy Chanel, Ambassadeur de France en Belgique à Monsieur Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Europe, a.s. Interview télévisée de M. Spaak, Bruxelles, le 4 novembre 1965, MAE/Paris FRMAE 22QO/153.
649 See Jean Pierre Brunet, Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes à Claude Lebel, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur du Service de Presse et d’Information, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Bruxelles, le 15 Février 1964, MAE/Paris 544INVA 373.
651 de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 74.
652 Zucconi, Parola di giornalista, 92.
653 Ibid., 93.
Some pioneer Euro-journalists were able to perpetuate the EEC ‘Europe’ narrative emanating from Brussels in the decades after 1958 as they remained permanently implanted as ‘European’ correspondents in the Belgian capital. A number of journalists who had arrived in Brussels in the late 1950s and early 1960s spent their entire career there before retiring in the 1980s and 1990s. This was the case for Carl A. Ehrhardt of the Handelsblatt and Rainer Hellmann of Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste. Among the French journalists, Philippe Lemaître who worked for Agra Europe and then Le Monde stayed in Brussels for his entire career and subsequently also his retirement. Jörg Thalmann who covered the EEC for Swiss regional newspapers as well as Ugo Piccione of Il Sole 24 Ore also worked in Brussels and on ‘European Integration’ for their entire professional lives. Those long-time Brussels Euro-journalists applied the sui generis EEC media narrative they had developed in the early 1960s to their ‘European Integration’ coverage of the following decades. In sum, the passing on of Euro-journalist practices to new generations of journalists as well as personal continuities in the Brussels press corps led to a high interpretative continuity in the ‘European Integration’ coverage flowing from Brussels into Western European media.

**EEC institutions, member state government and civil society public relations activities**

EEC institutions, national governments and pro-‘European’ lobby groups mounted public relations activities promoting the EEC sui generis narrative starting from the 1950s. For a long time, research on the history of the communication and information policies of the ‘European’ institutions mostly argued that Community actors followed the functionalist and technocratic integration strategy supposedly promoted by Jean Monnet. According to this research, public relations were no priority for the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC Executives. Moreover, ‘European’ public relations efforts focused merely on elites and largely ignored the broader public.\(^654\) Recent research has falsified these claims and instead demonstrated that particularly the EEC Commission and its foremost representatives such as Commission President Walter Hallstein\(^655\) made considerable efforts to spread the sui generis narrative of


‘European integration’ both among elite and mass publics.\textsuperscript{656} A supposedly secretive integration project hidden from Western European publics never existed. EEC ‘supranational’ information policy was inspired by and modelled after national information policies. Therefore, the EEC Commission was as open or as secretive as were national governments in their media and public relations work. If anything, in the early years Commission actors were more open as they tried to attract any kind of attention they could get. At the same time, they had fewer resources available than national governments for their information policy.

The EEC Commission went to great lengths to attract and influence media coverage. Walter Hallstein attributed two primary functions to the media. First, the media could help create a ‘European consciousness’ among the Western European peoples, thereby compensating for the EEC’s limited public relations capacities. Second, as long as the EEC had not yet developed into a democratic polity with a directly elected ‘European Parliament’, the media could help democratise the EEC by controlling it and by informing the public about its activities.\textsuperscript{657} When the Commission met for the first time on 16 January 1958 in the


\textsuperscript{657} On 14 April 1967, Walter Hallstein held a press conference for the Brussels press corps on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. He explained that “[l]a presse remplit une tâche absolument indispensable pour l’intégration, en éveillant et en entretenant la conscience de la cause commune européenne. Car la Communauté n’a pas de drapeau, pas d’hymne, pas de ministre de la propagande ; son ‘understatement’ va si loin qu’elle n’accorde à ses services d’information que de très modestes moyens pour présenter son image. Et faute d’un pouvoir de décision quant au fond le Parlement européen n’est guère encore en mesure de dramatiser et de populariser suffisamment les grandes questions de l’unification pour gagner l’opinion publique et la modeler. Ainsi la presse – surtout les journalistes réunis à Bruxelles – a fait ses preuves comme facteur de la formation de l’opinion européenne.” See Allocution du professeur Walter Hallstein, Président de la Commission de la Communauté économique européenne, devant l’organisation des journalistes européens, Bruxelles 14/04/1967, Hôtel Métropole, N 1266/1061. Already in 1959, EEC Commission spokesman Giorgio Smoquina had outlined a similar view on the role of the media in ‘European integration’. In his view, it was self-evident that the media needed to follow the EEC’s activities. “È innegabile che la costruzione dell’edificio europeo […] è una grande e coraggiosa impresa, e, come tale, rifugio con un preciso diritto e un preciso dovere alla stampa: quello di non essere assente. Ne ha il diritto ed il dovere.” Smoquina explained that European integration could not work without a constant contact between the European institutions and the European public. To create this contact was “uno dei maggiori compiti della stampa nel partecipare alla costruzione europea.” He asked the press to be “attenta, consapevole, preparata, e anche, se necessario, dura nella critica, ma presente, per segnalare esigenze, per partecipare all’esame dei problemi, per indicare mancanze e soprattutto per informare e formare.” Particularly the last point was important, Smoquina underlined. The press should explain to the European public that after several disastrous wars the Europeans had finally found a way to peace and prosperity: European integration. Also, it should make clear to Europeans that they formed a historical community. “Scoprire un patrimonio storico europeo è anche un compito di primaria importanza per la stampa.”
château de Val-Duchesse South of Brussels, journalists – together with representatives from member state governments – were invited to attend the séance publique of the meeting. During the session, Commission President Hallstein delivered his inaugural speech and addressed the journalists present: “Nous demandons de tout cœur aux organismes de l’opinion publique de suivre nos travaux avec un intérêt critique et de nous aider à insuffler aux idées nouvelles une vie solide et riche.” Hallstein pushed for the establishment of a press and information service proper for the EEC Commission, thereby defying suggestions to create a joint press and information service with the ECSC and EURATOM Executives. He hired German journalist Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel as spokesman in as early as January 1958. In the following years, the EEC built up a rapidly-growing spokesman service which soon outnumbered the ECSC and EURATOM spokesman services. It also established press and information offices in and outside the member states.
In the early years of the EEC’s existence, Hallstein gave numerous interviews, met journalists for briefings and press conferences, and published articles in various news outlets. Hallstein courted elite media and journalists when he spoke in front of the Foreign Press Association in London in March 1960, at the Association de la presse diplomatique in Paris in June 1962 and when he lunched with the editors of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in July 1963 in Frankfurt. When meeting The Times City editor William Clarke in November 1962, “Hallstein went out of his way to say how much he thought of the new Common Market survey published by The Times. He said that its real use was that it brought together in one place so many of the documents that people wanted to refer to continually.”

Hallstein also reached out to media addressing mass audiences when inviting the editors in chief of the six public broadcasting authorities of the EEC member states to Brussels in June 1962 and in October 1963. In early 1966, Hallstein inaugurated a radio and television studio in the EEC Commission building. The studio was at the disposal of TV journalists in Brussels. Towards the middle of the 1960s – when the EEC seemed more firmly established

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[663] A large amount of press cuttings and transcripts of interviews and articles in Hallstein’s papers illustrate this. From the papers, it becomes evident that Hallstein gave multiple interviews to Western European and international media (such as Indian, Japanese and US media) and contributed many articles to newspapers and news magazines. For interviews and articles in the period between 1959 and 1960, see BArch N 1266/1712. For interviews and articles in the period between 1960 and 1961, see BArch N 1266/1711. For interviews and articles in the period between 1961 and 1962, see BArch N 1266/1709 and N 1266/1710. For interviews and articles in the period between 1962 and 1966, see BArch N 1266/1708.


[667] Clarke reported on his meeting with Hallstein: “I began by asking Hallstein why the Commission had chosen this period to issue its recent Action Programme giving the Commission’s recommendations about future economic and political action. I said that in London the acceleration of many of the Six’s economic programmes was being contrasted with the delays in the negotiations with Britain. He was more than anxious to give me an answer to this because, as he said, both The Times and the Economist had been critical on this point and he wanted to reassure us about the real reasons behind the publication of the Action Programme.” W.M. Clarke, Professor Hallstein, President of the Common Market Commission, 22.11.62, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Common Market and OEEC.


[670] See C. Lebel to Service d’Information, Note, a/s Ouverture d’un studio de radio-télévision, 14 janvier 1966, MAE/Paris 544INV A 373. The EEC Commission had financed and built the TV studio without informing the member state governments, a fact that outraged the French government. In the years after 1966, the TV studio was not used much as it did not match the needs of Brussels TV journalists. See de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 33–34.
– Hallstein became less accessible to journalists. In order to underline the EEC’s international role, the Commission invited Brussels correspondents to cover the signing ceremonies of association agreements with African states. In sum, Hallstein and the EEC Commission made considerable efforts to reach out to the media.

The approach of Hallstein and his collaborators to the media reflected how national politicians, diplomats and civil servants approached the media in the postwar decades. Indeed, ‘supranational’ press and information policies were often modelled after national press and information policies. It was therefore less sui generis than its protagonists claimed. Just

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671 It is thus wrong when some of the ‘pioneer’ civil servants in the EEC spokesman group state that Hallstein had not been “press-minded”. Bino Olivi, Entretien avec Beniamino OLIVI par Michel Dumoulin et Myriam Rancon à Bruxelles le 26 janvier et 9 février 2004; European Oral History Programme “The European Commission 1958-1972. Memories of an institution,” 2004, Historical Archives of the European Union. Hallstein was very accessible to journalists in the early years of his mandate, when he needed media presence to promote a still weak EEC. Once the EEC was established, he became less accessible to journalists.


673 A historical contextualisation of the EEC Commission’s information policy shows it resembled national governments’ domestic and foreign information and propaganda activities. ‘Supranational’ and national press and information policies were often implemented by means of two separate entities: a press department dealing with daily news and contact with journalists, and a communications department dealing with long-term communication and information policy. Both ‘supranational’ and national press departments worked with press conferences, formal and informal briefings, press releases, and press trips for journalists. Both ‘supranational’ and national communication and information departments published information material such as brochures, organised participation in fairs and expositions and were in contact with interest groups such as business associations, trade unions, academia, and others. On ‘supranational’ press and information policies between the 1950s and the 1970s, see Pukallus, Representations of European Citizenship since 1951; Reinfeldt, Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit?; Dacheux, L’impossible défi; Kirsten Hoesch, Kontinuität und Wandel in der Kommunikationsstrategie der EU-Kommission (Osnabrück: Der Andere Verlag, 2003); Meyer, Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Kontrollsphäre; Gramberger, Die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Europäischen Kommission 1952-1996; Georg Kofler, Das Europäische Parlament und die öffentliche Meinung. Politische Kommunikation als demokratischer Auftrag (Wien: Böhlau, 1983); Meinolf E. Sprengelmeier, Public Relations für Europa: Die Beziehungen der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zu den Massenmedien (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1976).


675 Aldrin rightly points to the existence of the ‘hero narrative’ the first generation of EEC Commission press officers invented to frame and laud their work. See Philippe Aldrin, “The World of European Information. An Institutional and Relational Genesis of the EU Public Sphere,” in The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU Actors
as leading national politicians followed closely how the media covered their activities, EEC Commissioners monitored carefully how journalists evaluated their actions. Just as Konrad Adenauer in his foreign policy tried to compensate for the weakness and makeshift character of the West German state by intensively communicating with and through the international press in the late 1940s and early 1950s,676 Walter Hallstein tried to compensate for the weakness and provisional character of the EEC by courting Western European, US and international media in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Just as national politicians sought to harness the power of television to forge modern and coherent national societies in the postwar decades,677 Hallstein sought to employ television to develop a ‘European consciousness’ among the Western European peoples.678 In sum, ‘supranational’ information policy and senior EEC Commission actors cared as much about the media as national actors and went to great lengths – within the boundaries of their limited resources – to influence journalists and their reporting.

In their efforts to spread the *sui generis* EEC narrative into Western European media, ‘supranational’ actors received considerable support from national governments. In an attempt to highlight their achievements, the ‘pioneers’ of ‘supranational’ information policy largely kept quiet about this. They claimed to have set up a ‘European’ press and information policy against national resistance. However, national governments or actors within national governments were themselves often very supportive of the EEC’s public relations activities.

676 Without a proper diplomatic apparatus at his disposal, Adenauer paid great attention to and courted the British and French press in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Once the Federal Republic was more firmly established as a player on the Western European diplomatic scene, Adenauer became less accessible for foreign journalists. See Robrecht, *Diplomaten in Hemdsärmeln?*, Pokorny, “Die französischen Auslandskorrespondenten in Bonn und Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer 1949-1963.”

677 For an overview, see Guazzaloca, *Govermare la televisione?*.

678 The use of movies, newsreels, information films and television to promote ‘European integration’, a ‘European consciousness’ or a ‘European identity’ has been an issue and a practice since the end of World War II. See Clemens, *Werben für Europa*; Pfister, *Europa im Bild. Imaginationen Europas in Wochenschauen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Österreich 1948–1959*; Bruch and Pfister, “‘What Europeans Saw of Europe.’”
and acted as propagators of the *sui generis* EEC narrative. Given their much larger financial and material resources, national governments were able to promote the EEC on a larger scale than ‘supranational’ actors, particularly in the first years of the Community’s existence.679 ‘Supranational’ press and information policy should be seen as embedded in member state government public relations efforts promoting ‘European integration’. Overly ECSC and EEC institutions-centric research on ‘European’ or ‘supranational’ information policy has failed to recognise this. Such research considers EEC Commission information policy in isolation from national information policies on the EEC – a separation which in reality did often not exist.

After the entering into force of the Rome Treaties, the governments of the ‘Six’ began coordinating their information policy on the EEC. The spokespersons of the foreign ministries of the six member states met in June 1960 to discuss their EEC-related press and information policy. The objective of the meeting was to start “une harmonisation des politiques nationales dans le domaine de l’information en vue de contribuer à créer progressivement dans l’opinion publique des six pays cette solidarité européenne qui existe de plus en plus entre les six Gouvernements.” The participants agreed there was a need to better explain the EEC to the broader public and particularly the working classes across EEC countries. Particularly the results of Council meetings needed better explaining to the media and the public. A stronger presence of journalists reporting on the EEC from Brussels was desirable. The spokespersons suggested sending press and information officers to the Permanent Representations of the member states in Brussels (some member states had already done so). The spokespersons also agreed to intensify the promotion of the Common Market in ‘third countries’, meaning European non-EEC member states as well as the decolonising and developing world, where the EEC had a bad press for its protectionism. They suggested regular meetings of press officers of the ‘Six’ in ‘third countries’ around the world. The press officers should coordinate EEC promotion, intervene with joint rectifications after negative media coverage and compose regular joint reports on the Community’s standing in the respective country’s media landscape.680 The foreign ministers of the Six took up the last suggestion. Press officers from


680 The meetings of the government spokespersons from the EEC member states had taken place after a decision by the foreign ministers of the ‘Six’. On the first meeting, see Pressereferat, von Hase, Aufzeichnung, Betr.: Konferenz der Pressechefs der Außenministerien der 6 EWG-Staaten vom 21. Juni 1960 in Brüssel and Rapport des chefs des services de presse des Ministères des Affaires Etrangères des six pays de la Communauté
EEC member countries subsequently started compiling regular joint reports about EEC media coverage and public opinion on the EEC from places as diverse as Caracas, New Delhi, Stockholm or Washington, D.C.681

EEC member-state governments differed in their ambitions to further the sui generis EEC narrative in Western European media. The Federal Government was particularly eager “to spread the European idea in the Federal Republic.”682 Already in January 1958, the Spokesperson of the Federal Government, Felix von Eckhardt, urged the Federal Foreign Office to include press officers in the group of West German public servants to be seconded to the EEC and EURATOM Commissions.683 In March 1959, the Federal Press Office (BPA)684 complained that the Communities did not do enough press and information work.685 It provided the initially poorly-equipped EEC Commission spokesman service with information material.686 In the late 1950s, the Federal Government sent a press officer to its Permanent Representation in Brussels and underlined the “importance of the work” there.687 West German members of the EEC spokesman group travelled to Bonn frequently to discuss the promotion of the EEC in the German media with the BPA or the Foreign Office.688 Commission Spokesman Bino Olivi travelled to Bonn in early 1964 where he and his


684 The Federal Press Office, in German Bundespresseamt (BPA), was and still is the government agency in charge of press and information policy for the Federal Government and the Federal Chancellor in particular. The BPA is headed by the Spokesperson of the Federal Government, who is usually a confidant of the Chancellor. On the BPA’s history, see Buchwald, “Adenauers Informationspolitik und das Bundespresseamt.”


687 The press officer, Graf Reutern, also asked for more money to be at his disposal. See Vermerk, Betr.: Arbeit des Pressereferenten der Ständigen Deutschen Vertretung bei den Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Brüssel, Bonn, den 30. Oktober 1959, BArch B 145/2056.

collaborators met senior officials at the Federal Press Office and other ministries. Walter Hallstein himself apparently interpreted the press and information agencies of the Federal Government to remain at his disposal also after his move to Brussels. In May 1959, several weeks before a visit by Hallstein to the United States, a public servant at the Federal Press Office informed the West German Embassy in Washington, D.C. that “Herr Hallstein just rang me up from Brussels and somewhat complained that the publicity for his visit was unsatisfactory. He quite bluntly requested Herr von Eckardt [Felix von Eckardt, then Spokesman of the Federal Government and head of the Federal Press Office] to write a personal letter to Luce [Henry Luce, then editor-in-chief of US the magazines *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*] in order to have *TIME* or *LIFE* publish a Hallstein cover-story…” The *Bundespresseamt* promoted pro-EEC journalism by supporting the formation and activities of pro-EEC journalist associations. In 1962, the Federal Press Office paid the travel expenses for two journalists to attend the founding meeting of the *Association des journalistes européens*. The Spokesperson of the Federal Government von Eckardt received a delegation of the association when its members travelled to Bonn in the autumn of 1962.

When the association held its annual meeting in Berlin in September 1966, the *BPA* subsidised the event with 10,000 Deutsche Mark.

The French Government insisted on a stronger role for the member states in EEC press and information policy. But at the same time, it gave considerable support to the Community. Pierre Baraduc, head of the *service de presse* in the *Quai d’Orsai* in 1960 lauded the “relations fructueuses qu’il entretient avec le bureau d’information des Communautés à Paris

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690 “Nun folgendes: soeben hat mich Herr Hallstein aus Brüssel angerufen und sich halbwegs darüber beklagt, daß die Publicity für diesen Besuch zu wünschen übrig läßt. Er hat dabei ziemlich unverblümt den Wunsch geäußert, Herr von Eckardt möge doch einen persönlichen Brief an Luce schreiben, um zu erreichen, daß TIME oder LIFE möglichst eine Hallstein-cover-story bringen….” Ultimately, the BPA decided not to write a letter to Luce. See Krueger to Borschardt, 22. Mai 1959, BArch B 145/2930.


et il a insisté sur le fait qu’il est extrêmement important pour tous les pays membres d’avoir sur le plan national un tel bureau travaillant d’une façon active.”

In subsequent years, the French government complained about the EEC Commission’s overly communicative attitude vis-à-vis the media. In February 1964, French Deputy Permanent Representative Jean-Pierre Brunet reported from Brussels to Paris about the “problèmes très particuliers de nos relations avec la Presse qui revêtent une assez grande importance, étant donné le nombre sans cesse croissant de journalistes accrédités auprès de la Communauté Economique Européenne et de la nécessité qu’il y a pour nous de faire contrepoids à la « propagande » (il n’y a pas d’autre terme) de la Commission du Marché Commun.” Nevertheless, Claude Batault, Chef du Service d’Information of the French Foreign Ministry had a friendly meeting in Paris in the same year with Jacques-René Rabier, head of the joint press and information service, in which they discussed and coordinated their work. French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville applied the same arguments as the EEC Commission when arguing for the finalisation of the

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695 In 1962, EEC spokesman Olivi explained that “il se peut très souvent que tel Etat membre ne soit pas d’accord avec le contenu de la proposition, ce qui normalement a pour conséquence une profonde irritation de la part de cet Etat à l’égard du Porte-Parole de la Commission si le Porte-Parole ose donner une certaine publicité ou même simplement révéler les propositions de la Commission. Et puisqu’il arrive souvent que les réactions d’un gouvernement à une proposition de la Commission sont difficilement prévisibles (l’humeur d’un gouvernement est conditionnée souvent par des faits mystérieux), votre Porte-Parole doit toujours faire preuve d’une imagination surhumaine.” See “Le Marché commun et la presse” par Monsieur B. Olivi, Porte-Parole de la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne, in : Bulletin de l’Union de la Presse Périodique Belge, 66e année – N° 4, juillet 1962, HAEU, BO-9. Moreover, In January 1963, Bino Olivi suggested that the media be more quickly provided with the documents the Commission transmitted to the Parliament or the Council. He also proposed that the Commission be more present during Council meetings, either through press briefings during the sessions, or by holding a separate press conference after the meetings. In a note to EEC President Hallstein, Executive Secretary Émile Noël opposed Olivi’s propositions. “Je voudrais appeler votre attention sur le fait que la Commission doit tenir compte, lors qu’elle fixe les délais dans lesquels elle remet à la Presse un document destiné à devenir public, de la susceptibilité légitime de l’Institution qui est le destinataire officiel du document en cause, qu’il s’agisse du Parlement européen ou du Conseil (ou des Gouvernements membres). Chaque fois que la presse a reçu communication d’un document avant qu’il soit parvenu dans les capitales ou qu’il ait été remis au Parlement européen, la Commission a été l’objet de critiques ou de reproches qu’il était souvent difficile d’écarter complètement.” Noël reminded Hallstein of the complications the proactive presence of the EEC Spokesman group had caused during the agricultural policy negotiations in January 1962, when the Council General Secretary and the French delegation had complained about Olivi’s activities. See Noël, Note à l’attention de M. le Président Hallstein, Objet : Communication de M. Olivi en date du 3 janvier 1963 sur les activités du groupe du Porte-Parole en 1962 et les perspectives pour 1963, Bruxelles, 28 janvier 1963, HAEU, EN-241.


CAP on Belgian public television before the crucial negotiations of December 1964. During the ‘empty chair crisis’, in contrast, the French government tried to curtail the EEC Commission’s PR activities. In sum, the French government rejected an overly independent press policy by the EEC Commission; however, it cooperated with ‘supranational’ actors and supported the EEC.

Other national governments undertook efforts to promote the EEC and its sui generis narrative in their national media and to their publics. Norwegian diplomats and civil servants in favour of Norwegian EEC membership staged public relations campaigns arguing that Norway needed to join ‘Europe’ in the 1960s. Similarly, the Macmillan and Wilson governments had their EEC membership applications embedded in public relations campaigns aimed at domestic and foreign audiences and media outlets. Their aim was to convince those disinterested or sceptical of the merits of Britain becoming a member of the Community. The Italian government undertook considerable efforts to transform the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 1957 into a big media event. It did the same for the five-year and ten-year anniversaries of the Treaty signing ceremony.

698 Couve declared that “il ne peut pas y avoir de Marché commun sans politique agricole commune.” Henry Spitzmummer, Ambassadeur de France en Belgique à Son Excellence Monsieur Maurice Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Cabinet du Ministre, a.s. Interview de S.E. M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à la Télévision belge, Texte de l’interview de Monsieur Couve de Murville par Roger Clermont, (lief am) 5 novembre 1964, Bruxelles, le 10 décembre 1964, MAE/Paris FRMAE22QO/142.


Moreover, EEC member-state governments made use of state and public broadcasting organisations to spread the sui generis EEC media narrative. State and public television and radio – under strong state control across Western Europe long into the 1970s and 1980s – were seen by political elites as tools to educate and forge national publics. Promoting ‘European integration’ became part of these educational efforts. Politicians and senior bureaucrats chose reliable journalists, academics and public servants with close government ties and international experience for leading public broadcasting positions. Hugh Green, Director-General of the BBC between 1960 and 1969, had been a correspondent in Berlin for The Daily Telegraph before the war, Head of the BBC German and East European services as well as the Chief Controller of the North West German Broadcasting Service (NWDR) in the late 1940s. Klaus von Bismarck, Director-General of the West German Broadcasting Corporation (WDR) 1961-1976 was well connected among the West German, French and British elites. Karl Holzamer, ZDF Director-General between 1962 and 1977, was an academic close to CDU circles who had studied in Paris before the war. Antonio Carrelli, who became President of the RAI in 1955, moved to Brussels in 1959 as a EURATOM Commission Vice-President. The diplomat Pietro Quaroni, RAI President between 1964 and 1969, had previously been involved in implementing the Italian government’s ‘European integration’ policy when serving as Italian ambassador in Paris, Bonn and London. While they were no Euro-journalists with direct EEC experience and expertise, the leading figures of Western European state and public broadcasting saw it as their task to support their governments’ policies of Western European integration.

703 On public broadcasting in Western Europe in the postwar decades, see Guazzaloca, Governare la televisione? For a comparative analysis of television in France and Germany, see Rother, Kooperation-Kollaboration-Konkurrenz. On the case of France, see Bourdon, Histoire de la télévision sous de Gaulle; Brizzi, De Gaulle et les médias; Brizzi, L’homme dello schermo; Vasallo, La télévision sous de Gaulle, le contrôle gouvernemental de l’information, 1958-1969; Bourdon, Haute fidélité. On the case of Italy, see Monteleone, Storia della radio e della televisione in Italia. Costume, società e politica; Giulia Guazzaloca, Una e divisibile: La Rai e i partiti negli anni del monopolio pubblico, 1954-1975 (Firenze: Le Monnier, 2011).


707 On the role of Carrelli and Quaroni as RAI Presidents, see Guazzaloca, Una e divisibile; Franco Chierenza, Il cavallo morente. Storia della RAI, con un postfazione dalla riforma ad oggi (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2002).
Western European public broadcasters supported ‘European integration’ in several ways. In West Germany, the promotion of ‘European integration’ was written into the ZDF’s official broadcasting guidelines. \(^{708}\) In Italy, the *Radiocorriere*, the *RAI* corporate newsletter, informed the *RAI* staff that “La televisione precorre gli Stati uniti d’Europa”. \(^{709}\) Western European public broadcasters engaged in multiple forms of cooperation. The most prominent among them was the *European Broadcasting Union* (EBU) with its *Eurovision* network. \(^{710}\)

The EEC as a cooperation framework became increasingly important in the early 1960s. The broadcasters started producing a joint series of documentaries on ‘European integration’ in the Community. Delegates from the six broadcasting organisations started meeting in Brussels in 1962 to coordinate the work on a first series, \(^{711}\) which aired in late 1963 and early 1964 in all EEC member states. Each of the six public broadcasters contributed one documentary which was broadcasted in the five other countries. The objective of the documentaries was “to strengthen the European consciousness” of the viewers. \(^{712}\) A second series of EEC documentaries was broadcasted in 1964/65, despite numerous production problems. \(^{713}\)

Moreover, Western European public broadcasters aired broadcasts dealing with ‘European’ history and culture generally and the EEC specifically. As with the overall programme of

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public television and radio in the postwar decades, the broadcasts were educational in type and aimed at convincing audiences of the merits of ‘European integration’. Senior public broadcasting figures directly supported their organisations’ efforts to promote the EEC. When the *WDR* opened a radio and television studio in Brussels in May 1966, Director-General von Bismarck travelled to Brussels for the inauguration. He held meetings with several EEC Commissioners and diplomats from the West German Permanent Representation. He also spoke at a reception in the new studio. *ZDF* Director-General Karl Holzamer travelled to Brussels to watch the screening of a documentary *ZDF* Brussels correspondent Gerhard Löwenthal had produced on Paul Henri Spaak. Holzamer watched the documentary in the EEC television studio in the presence of Spaak, senior West German diplomats and EEC Commission members. In sum, public broadcasters provided considerable support for national governments promoting the EEC.

Associations promoting ‘European integration’ also engaged in public relations activities. Groups like the *European Movement*, the *Union of European Federalists* or Jean Monnet’s *Comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe* all lobbied Western European media to promote the EEC and its vision of ‘European integration’. They provided journalists with information material, invited them to conferences and briefings and published magazines and newsletters on the Community.

* A changing international context

As explained above, the international order generally and the EEC specifically underwent important political and economic changes during the 1960s. These changes led many initially sceptical or disinterested Western European journalists to reconsider their views on ‘European Integration’ and the EEC. In the early 1960s, a new optimism on the international potential of

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714 See Merolla, “Le processus d’intégration européenne à la télévision italienne (1954-1964),”
715 See Vorläufiges Programm Eröffnung WDR-Studio Brüssel, 31.3.66. Hallstein was ill and could therefore not meet with Bismarck. See Mundt to Bismarck, Brüssel, den 29. April 1966, WDR Archiv 12829.
a ‘united Europe’ spread within Western European elites, including senior journalists. The Times foreign affairs editor Iverach McDonald described the new situation in an internal memorandum in May 1963, which summed up discussions among the newspaper’s foreign policy experts. McDonald wrote that a “Shift of economic power to Europe since 1957 means that Europe can do many things, given the united will, that single European countries cannot. This is happening when both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are recognizing that their own power has its limits, and an awareness of strength is shared by all parties in Europe.” The economic re-emergence of Western Europe opened up considerable opportunities for the postimperial ‘Europe’ on the international scene – if there was a political will to unite. “Europe has a capacity at least to equal the Soviet Union or America, given some sort of unity”, McDonald claimed.719 Euro-journalists’ arguments about the power of a ‘united Europe’ had sounded unrealistic to the Western European journalistic mainstream in the 1950s. American and Soviet supremacy was too obvious. At the same time, imperial foreign policies still seemed viable for Britain and France. In the early 1960s, however, in the context of both imperial decline and economic re-rise, for the first time since the end of the war, there seemed to be a realistic potential for a ‘united Europe’ to achieve an independent position between the United States and the Soviet Union.720 While shifts in the international order and an increasingly active EEC were the general context in which senior Western European journalists reconsidered ‘European integration’, there were also specific national reasons why Western European journalists changed their attitudes towards the EEC. Some prominent and emblematic cases will be discussed below.

In France, many senior journalists who had initially rejected or ignored the EEC in 1957 and 1958 came to support the Community in reaction to what they considered a misguided foreign policy by President Charles de Gaulle.721 Their rallying behind the EEC was part of a larger shift in the attitude of the French journalistic elite towards de Gaulle. Many senior

719 See Memorandum from the Foreign Editor, May 1963, TNL Archive, Confidential Memoranda, Foreign Policy & Foreign Secretary, 1962.
720 This potential seemed even stronger in the very late 1960s and early 1970s, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
editors had welcomed the General’s return to power to stabilise France in 1958. However, de Gaulle’s increasingly anti-American course and his confrontations with Western European allies over NATO and the EEC led many to rethink this position. De Gaulle’s outbursts against ‘supranationalism’ seemed exaggerated to many senior French journalists and led them to fear a break between France and its partners. This break would weaken Western European cohesion against the Soviet threat on the one hand and against American economic and political dominance on the other. Ironically, de Gaulle thus pushed journalists who initially had not cared much about or rejected the EEC to rush to the Community’s defence. Two prominent figures in French journalism who changed their mind on the EEC were Raymond Aron and Hubert Beuve-Méry. Their clash in the queriele de la CED had marked French 1950s debates on ‘European integration’. Opposition to de Gaulle’s foreign policy converted both into supporters of the EEC and the Europe des Six during the 1960s.

Raymond Aron had initially rejected the EEC and its ‘supranationalism’. His appreciation of the EEC grew proportionally to his increasing unease with President de Gaulle’s foreign policy. By the early 1960s, Aron had come to believe that NATO and the EEC constituted the framework that assured cooperation in the Western camp. However, he was unenthusiastic about the EEC. He did not believe in the Common Market’s supposedly inherent dynamic to become a ‘European’ polity. Nor did he think that member states had transferred substantial amounts of sovereignty to ‘European’ institutions. From a meeting with Hugh Gaitskell in December 1962 he concluded that Britain was not ready to join the EEC. However, faced with the Gaullist grand dessein and worried about the harm it did to the coherence of the West, Aron in a somewhat Machiavellian move started applying the sui generis EEC narrative to attack de Gaulle’s foreign policy as anti-‘European’. In November 1963, he criticised Michel Debré in Le Figaro: “Sur le plan européen, la France est en train de

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722 Euro-journalists like Roger Massip did not see their fears confirmed that de Gaulle would kill the EEC directly after taking up the presidency and kept a neutral attitude towards the Fouchet Plans. See Massip and Massip, Les Passants du Siècle, 257–58.


724 On Aron’s thinking on Europe and ‘European Integration’ in the 1960s, see Chapter X “« Partie nulle en Europe » et crise politique 1960-1969” in Mouric, Raymond Aron et l’Europe. This paragraph draws from the chapter.

725 In December 1966, Aron wrote to EURATOM Commission President Pierre Chatenet: “Mon idée essentielle n’est pas que l’Europe se confond avec l’Europe des Six, ni que les institutions communautaires sont indispensables à la prospérité et à la paix.” However, he conceded that the EEC had been instrumental in establishing close and trustful relations among the member countries. “Ma conviction centrale, c’est que des relations internationales d’un type relativement nouveau s’étaient progressivement instaurées à l’intérieur du monde occidental, particulièrement entre les Six.” Aron cited in Ibid., 280.
détruire l’esprit communautaire faute duquel la construction européenne est condamnée”.

Aron criticised Gaullist policy in similar terms during the empty chair crisis in 1965/66. When de Gaulle took France out of NATO in 1966, he intensified his pleas for ‘European Integration’ through the EEC. In the summer of 1969, after the departure of de Gaulle, Aron demanded British entry into the Community and further integration. He joined Western European elites in their late 1960s and early 1970s enthusiasm and optimism on ‘European Integration’. He fully adopted the EEC ‘Europe’ narrative and declared in Le Figaro in July 1969 on the issue of monetary union: “L’union douanière appelle logiquement, nécessairement, une harmonisation des politiques économiques et, sinon, une monnaie commune, incompatible avec le maintien des souverainetés, du moins une organisation monétaire des Six, condition et consécration d’une véritable communauté”.

Le Monde director Hubert Beuve-Méry changed his mind about the ‘Europe of Six’ in a similar way. Beuve-Méry had fought against the EDC with all his force in the 1950s. In 1958, he welcomed de Gaulle’s return to power, thereby ignoring the protests of his Le Monde colleagues who considered the General reactionary, authoritarian and anti-‘European’. Beuve-Méry supported the new constitution of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle’s policy in Algeria. However, in the course of the first half of the 1960s, his perception of the president and his vision of ‘Europe’ changed. Beuve-Méry shared de Gaulle’s wish to establish a third force ‘Europe’. Yet, he increasingly got the impression that the President’s foreign policy did not further but threaten the case of a Europe européenne.

Influenced by the perception of a rising potential for a supranationally ‘united Europe’ on the international scene, Beuve-Méry turned against de Gaulle’s ‘European policy’. He criticised the President’s veto against British EEC entry in 1963, arguing that the danger of Atlantic influences on the Community could have been contained. He underlined that the EEC Commission had contributed considerably to the creation of the CAP, which benefited France. Beuve-Méry also claimed

729 A collection of Le Monde articles by Beuve-Méry on ‘Europe’ and ‘European Integration’ can be found in Hubert Beuve-Méry, Onze ans de règne: 1958-1969 (Paris: Flammarion, 1974). They were usually published under the pseudonym Sirius.
that de Gaulle’s fear of losing sovereignty was exaggerated. In November 1964, Beuve-Méry attacked de Gaulle for what he called a nationalistic and egoistic policy vis-à-vis the EEC. He commented that de Gaulle “doit savoir cependant que cette Europe dont nous rêvons avec lui [a third force Europe] ne peut être fondée sur l’hégémonie française et que pour ne pas laisser l’atlantisme la prendre de vitesse elle devrait se donner des institutions communautaires de caractère supranationale.” He even argued that a *Europe européenne* “n’ait perdu sous son règne et en partie par sa faute ses dernières chances”.

In the Federal Republic, some liberal economic journalists reviewed their rejection of the EEC in the first half of the 1960s, mostly for political reasons. Hans Roeper, deputy head of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s* economics department, initially shared the concerns voiced by Ludwig Erhard, Wilhelm Röpke and his Herausgeber Erich Welter regarding the EEC. During the 1950s, he had supported ‘European Integration’ through the OEEC against the ‘Europe of Six’ in the form of the ECSC. However, Roeper increasingly shifted towards supporting the ‘Six’ and hence the EEC in the early 1960s. In April 1960, he wrote a long letter to Erich Welter explaining his thinking on ‘European Integration. “My first impressions as a child in the territories left of the Rhine after the World War – separatist insurgencies, quirt-swinging French officers, the assaults by Moroccans, etc. – nourished in me the ideology of the French hereditary enemy. All the more of course I admired the British.” However, British foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s had made Roeper change his mind about the United Kingdom. “My admiration suffered a first big shock due to the Suez-adventure”. Since then, the British government had repeatedly proven “that England still sticks to its traditional policy preferring the Commonwealth over the European continent.” In Roeper’s view, the biggest foreign policy risk for the Federal Republic in 1960 was “the danger of a renewed political isolation of Germany.” Hence, with Britain uninterested in the continent and the US still more interested in the UK than in the Federal Republic “our best partner currently is France. We also spent a considerable amount of money for that.” Hence, doubts over British foreign policy and fear of West German isolation made the originally Anglophile and Francophobe Roeper embrace a closer relationship with France and

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‘European integration’ through the EEC. 732 At the same time, he obviously supported the British entry bids of 1963 and 1967 as the optimal solution for the Federal Republic lay in close relations both with France and the UK. 733

EEC enemy and FAZ Herausgeber Erich Welter started considering the EEC more relevant in the first half of the 1960s, as the Community now developed more activities. An expert in transport policy, Welter himself made several visits to Brussels to discuss a future ‘European transport policy’ with EEC Commission experts. 734 After the January 1962 completion of the first stage towards the implementation of the Common Market and the agreement on the contours of a future Common Agricultural Policy, members of the economics section influenced Welter with their optimism on the EEC. At this point, British entry into the EEC in the foreseeable future seemed likely, a fact that made many West German liberals more positive about the EEC. 735 In May 1962, Welter told his deputy and economics department head Jürgen Eick that “I am inclined to agree more and more with your forecast concerning the future importance of Brussels. We will have a bureau there like in other capitals”. 736 Ernst Kobbert, then Brussels correspondent, declared happily “that not only from my local point of view Brussels is becoming increasingly important.” 737 However, Welter remained ‘Euro-sceptic’ until his retirement in the 1970s.


In Britain, senior journalists moved to support British entry into the EEC in the early 1960s. The EEC for the first time became an object of interest for a broader set of senior journalists towards the summer of 1961, in the run-up to Harold Macmillan’s official EEC entry bid on 31 July 1961. The Times Editor William Haley came to support EEC entry in the first half of 1961 as he hoped competition in the Common Market could revive the ailing British economy. In May 1961, Haley noted after a meeting with Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd: “He asked me whether I thought Britain should go into the Common Market. I said that from the very beginning, even before, when it was only an idea, The Times had said Britain must be associated with it. My recent visit to Europe had impressed me with how much competition had done for the countries within the Common Market. I felt, as we had said this morning [in a Times editorial], that the greatest benefit to our economy would not be from the markets offered but from the competition which would come into our home markets.”

The Times City editor William Clarke suggested that a Times journalist be sent to Brussels “to cover developments over the next six months” in early June 1961. With the negotiations in Brussels intensifying, Haley gave Spanier a one-year assignment in early January 1962. He explained to the Times management that “We must meet the interest in the Common Market trade and finance at once. Now that the negotiations are on, all the big concerns, and many people in the City, are beginning to study Europe. The Financial Times are going out after this readership in a very big way.”

Similarly, the Reuters management decided to step up its EEC coverage in the weeks before Macmillan’s official entry bid in early July 1961. Given “the current interest in the Common Market”, Reuters and its subsidiary Comtelburo agreed to send a Common Market

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738 Generally, British elites had the feeling of facing rapidly “contracting options” in their foreign and economic policy in the early 1960s. See Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, eds., British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with Institute of Contemporary British History, 2000).

739 On the circumstances of the entry bid and the subsequent negotiations, see Ludlow, Dealing with Britain; Griffiths and Ward, Courting the Common Market.

740 Monday, May 8, 1961, CAC HALY 15/2. In June 1961, Haley lunched with former Economist Editor Geoffrey Crowther. Crowther told Haley that “he had never been in such a despair about the economic future of the country, both long term and short. At the moment he did not see any way out. He agreed with me [Haley] that the shock of real Common Market competition might do it.” Wednesday, June 21, 1961, CAC HALY 15/2.

741 See Memorandum from W.M. Clarke to Oliver Woods, 12th June, 1961, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, EEC, 1962-1967. Clarke had already travelled to the Western European continent in late 1959 and had been impressed by the economic development there. See McDonald, The History of the “Times,” 340.


743 See Notes from a meeting between the Editor, Mr Oliver Woods, and Mr. W.N. Clarke on Monday, January 8, 1962, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, EEC, 1962-1967.

correspondent to Brussels and to launch a Common Market bulletin.\textsuperscript{745} Reuters Brussels bureau chief Serge Nabokoff welcomed this decision and told his superiors in London in July 1961 that “Competent quarters here constantly stress that out of the three main facets of the European integration story – the technical, the diplomatic and the parliamentarian – the technical is fast becoming a specialist’s full-time job.”\textsuperscript{746}

Alistair Hetherington, editor of The Guardian, came to support the British entry into the EEC in 1961, then changed his view and rejected entry in the second half of 1962, before again supporting British EEC membership in 1966/67 and in the early 1970s during the finally successful entry negotiations. Hetherington became a supporter of British membership in the Common Market after 1963 as he thought this was in Britain’s economic and political interest. However, Hetherington supported the EEC \textit{faute de mieux} and had limited attachment to the idea of ‘European unity’. In his memoirs, he stated that “I would have preferred a form of Atlantic union to European union if there had been any practical possibility of it. Since there was no such possibility, I believed that European union should be used as a means of strengthening transatlantic ties - not as a Gaullist or Marxist device for getting the Americans out of Europe. My thinking was in keeping with Kennedy’s”.\textsuperscript{747} This opportunistic attitude towards the EEC was similar to the one voiced by Raymond Aron in France.

The idea that a ‘united Europe’ could and should play an important role on the international scene moved to the mainstream of Western European journalism in the second half of the 1960s. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber canonised the idea in his bestselling 1967 book \textit{Le défi américain}.\textsuperscript{748} Servan-Schreiber, one of the leading journalists and publicists of 1960s France, headed the centre-left liberal weekly news magazine \textit{L’Express}, one of the principal anti-Gaullist media outlets. \textit{Le défi américain} was widely debated when published in 1967. It remains one of the most successful political essays of postwar France, where it sold two million copies. The book also received considerable attention outside France, with

\begin{footnotes}
\item 745 “For several years we have considered the possibility of producing a bulletin on the Common Market but felt that the time was not ripe.” Nelson to The General Manger, Common Market, July 7, 1961, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
\item 746 Nabokoff to The General Manager, Brussels, July 24, 1961, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.
\item 747 Hetherington, \textit{Guardian Years}, 187.
\end{footnotes}
translations appearing in fifteen languages and ten million copies sold. Le défi américain claimed that Western Europe risked falling under US economic domination. Citing multiple statistics on the economic power and increasing presence of US companies in Western Europe, Servan-Schreiber argued that ‘Europe’ needed to act if it did not want to fall behind. It is important to underline that Servan-Schreiber’s essay was not a pessimistic expression of French anti-Americanism, but an optimistic plea for ‘European unity’. He claimed that the American challenge could be met – if Western Europe formed a political and economic union. Servan-Schreiber made it clear that he considered the EEC the nucleus for such a union. The book reflected views discussed in the 1960s in EEC circles. EEC functionaries like Michel Albert had assisted Servan-Schreiber in writing the book. While the exact form and international role of a ‘united Europe’ remained imprecise, the success of Servan-Schreiber’s book and the fact that it had been published by one of the most prominent Western European journalists marked the point when the EEC’s ‘supranational’ integration programme started to become the conventional wisdom in Western European journalism.

Conclusion

In April 1967, EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein invited the Brussels press corps to a reception at the Hotel Métropole in Brussels to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. Hallstein told the assembled journalists that he had recently found two big piles of paper on his desk – newspaper cuttings of all the articles published on the EEC’s tenth anniversary. “In thousands of lines the European Economic Community has been celebrated, received praise and criticism, caused hope and scepticism in the public opinion. This in itself is already a remarkable fact”, Hallstein declared. He continued by saying that the EEC had encountered many problems, but “if integration today is

nevertheless in the public eye, [...] particularly the press and primarily you, the ‘European’ journalists, deserve credit for it.”

This chapter explained how the *sui generis* EEC media narrative moved from a marginal to a mainstream position in Western European media between the late 1950s and the late 1960s. This rise was, as stated by Hallstein in 1967, the result of the Euro-journalists’ EEC advocacy, of their shaping of interpretative schemes later adopted by other journalists, and of their career progress which led them into influential positions in Western European journalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, other factors not directly influenced by Euro-journalists furthered and facilitated the rise of the *sui generis* EEC media narrative. The EEC Commission and EEC member state governments promoted the Community in Western European media. The EEC expanded its activities during the 1960s and geopolitical change made ‘European integration’, the EEC and ‘supranationality’ more attractive in the eyes of Western European elites. Euro-journalists and their allies in government, academia, business and elsewhere did not create structural trends and developments in Western European politics and economics. However, when interest in ‘European integration’, the EEC and ‘supranationalism’ increased, they stood ready with expertise and a ‘European’ master narrative – the *sui generis* EEC narrative – which provided patterns of interpretation to make sense of and give direction to the growing importance of ‘European unity’.

The rise of the Euro-journalist narrative also meant an increasing and surprisingly strong presence of the EEC in Western European media in the 1960s. The EEC as an international organisation obviously received less attention than national governments. Compared to other international organisations, however, it received considerable media attention. This chapter, as well as previous qualitative and quantitative research, has demonstrated that the EEC in the 1960s was on various occasions subject to very high attention in the media of the six member states. At the same time, media attention towards the EEC did not increase steadily, as the teleological idea of the ‘European integration process’ suggests. Instead, media attention developed cyclically and varied according to context and time. The EEC repeatedly shot up

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752 Ansprache des Präsidenten der Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Prof. Dr. iur. Dr. h.c. Walter Hallstein vor der Organisation Europäischer Journalisten, Brüssel, 14. April 1967, Hotel Métropole, BAarch N 1266/1061.

the news agenda and figured among the primary issues senior politicians and journalists dealt with. However, it equally quickly fell to lower places on the news agenda when other events intervened.\textsuperscript{754}

\textsuperscript{754} Two brief episodes illustrate this. First, in one of their regular meetings, \textit{The Times} Editor William Haley asked British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 14 September 1961 “how the French were behaving regarding the Common Market”. The EEC entry negotiations had then just started in Brussels. However, on this day Macmillan was concerned with decolonisation and the rebellious behaviour of former colonial subjects at the United Nations. He told Haley that it was not the EEC, but “the survival of the power of our civilisation in the face of the barbarians that we really ought to be worrying about.” Thursday, September 14, 1961, CAC HALY 15/2. Second, in December 1962, \textit{The Guardian} editor Alastair Hetherington met US President John F. Kennedy in Washington, D.C. Unsurprisingly, their conversation mostly dealt with the recent Cuban missile crisis, arguably one of the crucial events of the Cold War. However, Kennedy and Hetherington also discussed British national politics and prospective British EEC membership. In late 1962 British entry into the EEC seemed so important to the US President and the Guardian editor that it was one of the three issues they spoke about in a 45-minute meeting. A couple of weeks later, after de Gaulle’s veto in January 1963, EEC membership quickly disappeared from the British media agenda. Hetherington claims that “For more than three years the issue lay dormant” and only returned with the second entry bid in 1966. See Hetherington, \textit{Guardian Years}, 184.
5 The Consolidation of the Euro-journalist narrative

After its rise during the 1960s, the *sui generis* EEC narrative became firmly anchored in the mainstream of Western European journalism in the first half of the 1970s. Journalists from Lisbon to Vienna to Oslo gradually considered the EEC to be a democratic ‘European’ polity in the making. They equated the EEC with ‘European integration’ and increasingly called it the ‘European Community’ (EC). More and more, they also equated the Community with ‘Europe’. They believed that ‘Europe’ incarnated by the EC would and should become a powerful international actor. Two reasons stood behind the consolidation of the EEC *sui generis* narrative in Western European media. First, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s made Western European journalists highly interested in and optimistic about the prospects of ‘European integration’. ‘Europe’ would and should move forward towards an ‘ever closer union’ and become an international actor. The ‘European moment’ overwhelmingly convinced Western European journalists of the enormous potential of the EC. Second, after the oil shock and the outbreak of economic turbulences, the highflying objectives formulated in the ‘European moment’ turned out to be unrealistic. But Western European journalists largely refused to accept this. Instead, they reacted with a now-more-than-ever attitude and reinforced their belief in the *sui generis* narrative. The ‘setbacks’ of ‘European integration’ led Western European journalists to make ample use of the crisis discourses invented by the pioneer Euro-journalists of the 1960s. EC coverage in the 1970s oscillated between crisis doom and forced Euro-optimism. It contributed to framing the 1970s as a crisis decade for ‘European integration’. In the 1970s, ‘European integration’ repeatedly

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755 When preparing a meeting between Federal Chancellery officials and Albert Borschette, the EC Commissioner in charge of information policy, in June 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt argued that EC press and information policy should change. Contrary to the 1960s, the Community “does not have to justify its existence anymore”. Therefore, its information policy should now concentrate on the multiple advantages created by integration through the EC. See Verbeek, Koordinierungsgruppe Europa, Dem Parlamentarischen Staatssekretär, Frau Dr. Focke, Bundeskanzleramt, Betr.: Ihr Gespräch mit Herrn Borschette am 24. Juni 1971, hier: Informationspolitik der Gemeinschaft, Bonn, den 11. Juni 1971, BArch B 145/7183.

756 This terminology reflected the fusion of the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC Executives into a single body in January 1967. It also underlined the ‘political character’ of the Community, compared to terms such as ‘European Economic Community’ or ‘Common Market’. However, the terms EEC and Common Market remained heavily in use as well. As ‘European Community’ or ‘European Communities’ became the most widely used term to refer to the EEC/EC in the 1970s, this chapter uses the abbreviation EC.
dominated the news agenda, even more than it had during peaks of interest in the EEC in the 1960s. The 1950s *sui generis* EEC vision of a small circle of Euro-journalists became the dominating ‘European integration’ vision shared in most editorial departments all over Western Europe.

The ‘European moment’ and the 1970s crises of ‘European integration’

The consolidation of the EC *sui generis* narrative in Western European journalism reflected Western European elite debates on ‘European unity’. The ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s enthused Western European elites, including journalists. In the early 1970s, ‘European integration’ optimism reached a new cyclical high, going beyond the level of the early 1960s. The optimism resulted from several factors. By 1970, Western Europe had regained a strong position in the international economy and the international monetary system. The Western European powers had managed a transformation from imperial into industrial nation states with reasonable success. They had built modern industrial societies living in unparalleled wealth. Britain, still powerful despite its economic fragility, finally embraced ‘Europe’. The new leaders George Pompidou, Willy Brandt and Edward Heath brought fresh dynamism to the political scene. The United States, on the contrary, appeared to be in geopolitical, economic and moral decline. The Vietnam War, the dollar’s weakness followed by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the Watergate scandal seemed to indicate US decline. With détente and Ostpolitik, the Soviet Union seemed less and less of a threat to Western Europe. The emerging Global South, for its part, appeared a

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758 Similar levels of optimism would only be reached again in the mid-1980s, before ‘European integration’ optimism entered a new dimension in the early 1990s.
760 On Pompidou’s EC policy, see Bussière and Willaert, *Un projet pour l’Europe*.
765 See Romano and Romero, “European Socialist Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Co-Operation.”
promising partner for the emerging ‘European’ power of the EC. Western European elites perceived their countries as having regained a position that would again allow them to play a world role – if they joined their forces in a ‘united Europe’.

At the same time, Western European elites saw their countries facing unprecedented challenges and threats. Political and economic globalisation and the multiple crises of the 1970s made ‘European integration’ appear more necessary than ever before and a rational imperative. The end of the trente glorieuses with the oil shock, the collapse of Bretton Woods, floating exchange rates, stagflation and soaring unemployment threatened Western European economies. The definite end of empire, demands from the Global South for a new international economic order and intensifying relations with the socialist block questioned existing certainties about the international order. Instability in Southern Europe strongly worried foreign policy experts. Domestically, social change, environmental issues and terrorism posed new challenges to Western European societies. Western European elites concluded that in the face of all these challenges, ‘Europe’ had no choice but to unite. Moreover, the 1970s challenges required independent ‘European’ answers, as American and ‘European’ interests were seen as increasingly divergent. Finally, ‘European integration’

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766 See Garavini, *After Empires*.
would also contain an economically resurgent West Germany pursuing Ostpolitik. The perception of the potential strength of a ‘united Europe’ combined with the observation that unprecedented international challenges could not be met by single Western European nation states led Western European elites to embrace ‘European integration’ with unprecedented enthusiasm. ‘European unity’ would assure ‘Europe’ a prominent place on the international scene in a post-imperial, globalising and unstable world.

In this context, Western European political leaders set out a highly ambitious agenda for ‘European integration’ through the EC at the The Hague Summit in December 1969. It ‘re-launched’ the Community after the perceived standstill of the ‘integration process’ following the ‘empty chair crisis’ and the ‘Luxembourg compromise’. Three initiatives derived from The Hague – completion, enlargement and deepening. Regarding completion, the ‘Six’ agreed on a financial regulation of the Community’s own resources and the CAP. As for enlargement, the ‘Six’ decided on conditions to open entry negotiations with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. With regard to the deepening of the EC, the member state governments set up a plan to establish an economic and monetary union by 1980. They also outlined a path towards a common ‘European’ foreign policy and political


On the summit, see Maria Eleonora Guasconi, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell’Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea (Firenze: Polistampa, 2004).
union. Moreover, in the years after The Hague, EC leaders pursued ‘European’ identity building. In their 1973 Declaration on European Identity, the EC heads of state and government named peace, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and economic prosperity as the pillars of the Community’s existence. Domestically, Western European elites wanted to democratise the EC and bring the future ‘European’ polity closer to ‘European’ citizens. They outlined ambitious plans for a ‘social Europe’ and invented a ‘European’ public opinion, institutionalised in the Eurobarometer opinion polls in 1973.\(^\text{778}\) Internationally, they framed the incarnation of post imperial ‘Europe’, the EC, as a ‘Civilian Power’. The EC would bring democracy to the Southern European periphery and beyond.\(^\text{779}\) In a context of economic and political turmoil, the EC did not manage to implement its ambitious agenda of the early 1970s. The member state governments disagreed in particular on economic and social policy.\(^\text{780}\) Contemporaries therefore perceived the 1970s as a decade of standstill and crisis in the ‘European integration process’.\(^\text{781}\) However, the EC realised a series of remarkable ‘achievements’. Britain, Ireland and Denmark\(^\text{782}\) joined the Community in 1973.\(^\text{783}\) The EC created the European Political Cooperation (EPC),\(^\text{784}\) the European Council\(^\text{785}\) and the


\(^{779}\) Liberal elites in Southern European non-EC member states linked their democratisation agenda to the EC membership they unanimously aspired to, just as elites in EC member states came to believe that ‘European integration’ had triggered the stunning postwar growth of their economies.


European Monetary System (EMS),\textsuperscript{786} helped stabilise Southern Europe through Community enlargement,\textsuperscript{787} and held direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979.\textsuperscript{788} Finally, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the European Community institutions all came to be geographically and architecturally concentrated in Brussels, thereby creating a ‘capital of Europe’.\textsuperscript{789}

\textit{Media change}

Changes in Western European media and journalism favoured more attention being given to the EC. The economic turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s made Western European media strengthen their coverage of the domestic and international economy.\textsuperscript{790} Both elite and mass media beefed up their economic sections in order to better cover the causes and consequences of skyrocketing oil prices, rising unemployment and inflation, which directly affected the daily lives of millions of newspaper readers and television viewers.\textsuperscript{791} More

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\textsuperscript{786} See Mourlon-Druol, \textit{A Europe Made of Money}. On Britain and the EMS, see also Kiyoshi Hirowatari, \textit{Britain and European Monetary Cooperation, 1964-1979} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
\textsuperscript{791} The case of \textit{La Repubblica} in Italy nicely illustrates the importance of economic news in the 1970s. Launched in January 1976, \textit{La Repubblica}’s subsequent success resulted from offering a liberal centre-left alternative to the
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coverage of the economy meant more coverage of the EC, as the Community mostly dealt with economic topics. International monetary cooperation and energy policy, for which the EC was very important, were two central issues of 1970s economic news reporting. Globalisation and growing international economic exchanges led some Western European media to pursue internationalisation strategies. ‘European integration’ coverage often became essential to these strategies. Reuters successfully launched its steep rise from the “poor but proud ward of the British newspaper industry” to “nothing less than the world’s leading supplier of computerized information” and economic news in Western Europe. In the first half of the 1970s, Reuters developed the broadest coverage of ‘European integration’ among all international news agencies. The agency created a German language service in 1971 headquartered in Bonn. Similarly, The Financial Times and The Economist started their transformation from national quality newspapers into publications for globalist elites. They began targeting an emerging international readership of politicians, diplomats, international public servants, intellectuals and particularly businesspeople working in a connected Western European and international economy. Detailed coverage of and strong support for ‘European integration’ became central to their brand essence, as economic globalisation in the 1980s and 1990s supplied them with an ever-growing readership interested in the EC’s economic development. Hence, the 1970s saw the birth and first steps of transnational elite media, centre-right incumbents Corriere della Sera and La Stampa, but also from its extensive coverage of the economy. In its section Economia e Sindacato, La Repubblica dedicated around five pages to economic and financial topics daily. The Corriere della Sera reacted by hiring as head of its economics section Alberto Mucci, the editor in chief of Il Sole 24 Ore, and by launching an economy supplement of eight pages in 1978. See Arrese, “Economía y medios de comunicación en la década de los setenta,” 35.

792 The EC did not build the common energy policy many hoped for. See Alain Beltran, Éric Bussière, and Giuliano Garavini, eds., L’Europe et La Question Énergétique - Les Années 1960/1980 (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2016). However, monetary policy cooperation culminated in the EMS, which was crucial to the international monetary system. See Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money.

793 Forbes magazine, cited in Read, The Power of News. The History of Reuters, 473. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Reuters in 1973 introduced the Reuter Monitor Money Rates service providing the finance industry with real time data on now floating exchange rates. The service provided bankers with arbitrage opportunities and made Reuters rich.

794 See below.


creating what could be qualified as a Western ‘European Public Sphere’ among English-
speaking elites.\textsuperscript{797} It complemented and expanded the much narrower already existing
traditional European diplomatic media sphere created in the 19th century by French, German
and British \textit{journaux de référence}.\textsuperscript{798}

Changes in Western European media systems also fundamentally changed \textit{how} journalists
covered and audiences perceived the EC. For most Western Europeans, by 1970 television
had become by far the dominating news source. An expensive elite medium in the 1950s,
television conquered Western Europe during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{799} State and public broadcasters grew
simultaneously with their audiences during the 1960s, thereby building up the resources –
such as a network of domestic and foreign bureaux – allowing them to comprehensively cover
both national and international events.\textsuperscript{800} By the early 1970s, virtually every Western
European household owned a television and there were television correspondents in all major
Western European cities.\textsuperscript{801} Radio and newspapers remained relevant, but television clearly
was the preeminent source of information for average Western Europeans. Television’s
dominance coincided with a relatively scarce number of channels to choose from.\textsuperscript{802}
Commercial television became relevant on a larger scale only in the 1980s. The combination
of broad diffusion, high ratings and limited choice of content led to a very high potential
affect on viewers – for contemporaries, this was ‘television’s moment’.\textsuperscript{803} In communication
sciences, new theories reversed the post-1945 ‘limited effects’ paradigm and instead

\textsuperscript{797} One could argue that \textit{The Financial Times} and \textit{The Economist} to a certain degree took the place of the \textit{Neue
Zürcher Zeitung}, which until the 1960s played an important role for Western European business elites. However,
its use of the German language put obvious limits to the NZZ’s status as a transnational elite newspaper. On the
NZZ’s history, see Maissen, \textit{Die Geschichte der NZZ, 1780-2005}.
\textsuperscript{798} After 1945, \textit{Le Monde}, \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} and \textit{The Times} dominated this sphere.
\textsuperscript{799} There were ten million televisions in Britain in the late 1950s, while there were only one million televisions
in Italy in 1958. In 1960, only one French family in eight owned a television. By 1970, there was on average one
television for every four people in Western Europe. See Judt, \textit{Postwar}, 345; Ginsborg, \textit{A History of
Contemporary Italy}, 240.
\textsuperscript{800} The huge and partly inefficient bureaucracies of state and public broadcasters built up during this period
would come under attack in the 1980s.
\textsuperscript{801} For example, the ZDF, which started operating in 1963, created thirteen new foreign bureaux between 1963
and 1969, but only four new bureaux between 1970 and 1984. See Der Intendant, Vorlage für den Ausschuß für
Politik und Zeitgeschehen des Fernsehrates, Betr.: Auslandsberichterstattung und Standorte der Auslandsstudios
\textsuperscript{802} However, in the 1970s there were more channels on public and state television than in the 1950s and early
1960s. This created space for coverage of a broader set of issues, including obviously ‘European integration’.
\textsuperscript{803} Christina von Hodenberg pointedly speaks of “television’s power as the unchallenged leading medium” and
“the era of limited choice”. Christina von Hodenberg, \textit{Television’s Moment: Sitcom Audiences and the Sixties
suggested the strong impact of television on viewers.\textsuperscript{804} Control over public broadcasting organisations and television content became a hot topic throughout Western Europe in the 1970s. Such debates intertwined with the intense political conflicts of the 1970s. West German conservatives fulminated against the Rotfunk left-wing bias of public broadcasters.\textsuperscript{805} The Italian left attacked the control the Democrazia Cristiana had been exercising over the RAI since the 1950s.\textsuperscript{806} British EC opponents accused the BBC of a pro-‘European’ bias during the 1975 EC membership referendum.\textsuperscript{807} State and public broadcasting underwent reform and liberalisation in the 1970s, particularly in France and Italy as well as in democratising Spain, Portugal and Greece. However, state control remained strong. Where it receded, elite groups and political parties took its place, as happened with the lottizzazione at the RAI in Italy. Across Western Europe, public and state broadcasters kept their postwar role as educators and missionaries trying to enlighten their audiences. Given the extraordinary role of television during the 1970s, this chapter will place a particular emphasis on TV journalism and coverage of the EC.\textsuperscript{808}


\textsuperscript{805} See Josef Schmid, “Intendant Klaus von Bismarck und die Kampagne gegen den Rotfunk WDR,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, no. 21 (2001): 349–381. The supposed left-wing bias of West German public broadcasters and journalists was an important point of departure for the influential “spiral of silence” mass communication theory developed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in the 1970s. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Die Schweigespireale. Öffentliche Meinung – unsere soziale Haut (München: Langen-Müller, 1980).


This chapter deals with the consolidation of the *sui generis* EC narrative in Western European media in the first half of the 1970s. It will demonstrate that the Western European journalistic mainstream developed a deep conviction in ‘European integration’ through the EC during the ‘European moment’ in the early 1970s. Western European journalists subsequently reinforced their belief in EC ‘Europe’ – not despite, but because of the trouble the ‘integration process’ encountered after the early 1970s moment of optimism. During the first half of the 1970s, Western European journalists repeatedly went to great lengths to inform the public about the merits of ‘European unity’. Their campaigning was part of a general effort by Western European elites to democratise the EC and to make it appeal to ‘the people’, thereby laying the basis for a democratic political system at the ‘European’ level. The first section of the chapter deals with the European moment of the early 1970s and details the degree to which Western European journalists became convinced of the *sui generis* EC narrative. It also outlines the strong presence of the EC in Western European media in the first half of the 1970s. The second section shows how the pioneer Euro-journalists who invented the *sui generis* EEC media narrative in the 1960s used their EEC/EC expertise to play key roles in ‘European integration’ coverage of Western European media in the 1970s. It also outlines how the pioneer Euro-journalists handed on Euro-journalism to a second generation of Euro-journalists starting from the late 1960s. The third section analyses the rise of Brussels in the first half of the 1970s to the first league of Western European news hubs. Brussels became a news centre comparable in importance to Bonn, Paris and London. The fourth section deals with media conflicts over Western European economic integration in the EC.

**The ‘European moment’ and Western European journalism**

After its rise during the 1960s, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s marked the point when the EEC *sui generis* narrative came to be anchored firmly in the mainstream of Western European journalism. Most Western European journalists became convinced that the EC would become a democratic ‘European’ polity of global relevance. The EC’s potential seemed unlimited. “Erano anni nei quali nulla sembrava precluso all’Europa”, *La Stampa* correspondent Vittorio Zucconi commented during his stint in Brussels between 1969 and 1973. Many journalists became enthusiastic about ‘European integration’ through the EC.

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Journalists saw it as their task to inform and educate ‘European’ citizens about the EC and the multiple benefits of ‘European integration’. Western European media therefore expanded their ‘European integration’ coverage. This would help democratise the EC. When economic turmoil increasingly held up the ‘integration process’, Western European media lamented the ‘crisis’ of ‘European integration’ and supported integration with ever more fervency.

**Television**

In the first half of the 1970s, state and public broadcasters eagerly embraced the promotion of the sui generis EC narrative as their public mission. French state television ORTF, which had covered the EEC without a permanent correspondent throughout the 1960s, stepped up its EC coverage and presence in Brussels. In September 1970, its first channel broadcasted a long interview with Jean Monnet. In June 1971, ORTF gave Prime Minister Pompidou a platform to outline his vision for the future of ‘Europe’. Pompidou explained that compared to the United States and the Soviet Union, “Europe est fragile, petite, petite presqu’île menacée, et pourtant, il y a là plus de 300 millions d’habitants, il y a là tous les pays qui, depuis cinq cent ans, ont fait l’histoire de l’Humanité. Il y a là un réservoir de capacités qui est unique au monde, et il y a là une puissance économique qui est supérieure à celle de l’Amérique du Nord.” ‘Europe’ could either accept a status of inferiority vis-à-vis the US and the USSR, “ou bien nous essayons de regrouper ces nations d’Europe occidentale et de mettre ensemble tout ce qu’elles recèlent de virtualités et de possibilités.” Pompidou told the ORTF viewers that “si on veut, on doit pouvoir faire l’Europe”. In September 1971, the first channel of ORTF transmitted its one hour 13.00 *journal télévisé* directly and “entièrement consacré à l’intégration européenne, à partir de Bruxelles, et plus précisément du bâtiment Charlemagne.” This was the first time ORTF shot and transmitted a *journal télévisé* from outside France. In the early 1970s, the presence of ‘European integration’ strongly increased in ORTF’s news broadcasts. ‘European integration’ related topics then appeared on

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810 The EEC had already received considerable support from state and public broadcasters in the EEC member countries in the 1960s. On this, see Chapter 4.


813 ORTF had previously started transmitting news programmes from French cities outside Paris. See Olivi, Note à l’attention de M. E. Noel, Secrétaire Général ; MM. les Chefs de Cabinet de MM. les Membres de la Commission ; MM. les Assistantes des Directeurs Généraux, Bruxelles, le 17 septembre 1971, HAEU, BAC-079/1982_0205.
average once a week in one of the daily journaux télévisés of the two and since 1973 three ORTF channels. In February 1973, ORTF broadcasted an interview by Jacques Alexandre, directeur adjoint de l’information of its first channel, with President Pompidou dedicated exclusively to the Common Agricultural Policy. Also in early 1973, ORTF sent a permanent correspondent to Brussels to cover the EC. By 1974, ORTF had a bureau with two permanent correspondents in the Belgian capital.

The first channel of West German public television ARD also expanded its EC coverage in the first half of the 1970s. The WDR – in charge of covering the EC for ARD – decided to expand its Brussels bureau into a fully-fledged television studio in 1970. Senior WDR journalists and managers contacted the WDR administrative council in October 1970 claiming that “Due to recent events (resignation of de Gaulle, The Hague Conference, entry negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway), the European unity movement has become for all EEC member states and particularly for the Federal Republic a decisive political factor.” In the coming years, Brussels would become “more and more a nerve centre for European and consequently also German politics”. Moreover, “The Europe of the 1970s will be more political than ever before. Economic entanglement will move towards the frontier of complete integration.” The WDR leadership argued that the growing importance of ‘European integration’ created “considerably amplified tasks” for public television. “An upgrade of the WDR representation in Brussels is therefore indispensable.”

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815 See Gilbert Noël and Emilie Willaert, Georges Pompidou, une certaine idée de la modernité agricole et rurale (Bruxelles ; New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 471.

816 See Direction des services d’Information et de Presse to DELFRA Bruxelles, a s/ La Presse française auprès des Communautés européennes, Paris, le 21 février 1973, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.


818 WDR Radio also observed in February 1971 that “Brussels is becoming more and more important for our programme”; “Brüssel wird für unser Programm immer wichtiger”, Soltau to Botta, 2.2.1971, WDR Archiv, 14837.

The administrative council approved the request. The *WRD* subsequently enlarged its bureau by sending a second TV correspondent and further technical staff to Brussels. It also rented another floor in the building where the studio was located. By early 1973, the *WDR* Brussels bureau had become a full television studio with two TV correspondents relying on two film crews, secretaries and further technical staff like cutters and a boom operator. When *WDR* Director-General Klaus von Bismarck inaugurated the refurbished studio in February 1973, he underlined “the fast growing importance of Brussels as a centre of European politics”. Bismarck predicted that “the studio’s production volume will grow even further”. He stressed public television had to contribute to the democratisation of the EC. “I think one has to prevent that the Community – just as with NATO – becomes a confusing, almost abstract structure to which people have no relationship, despite the fact that it takes decisions affecting them.” Public television therefore should “develop new programmes in order to make European politics more transparent and more attractive.”

The upgrade of the *WDR* studio in Brussels went hand in hand with a massive expansion of the *ARD* television EC coverage in the first half of the 1970s. Production statistics for 1970 show that the Brussels studio produced a wide variety of pieces mostly for the *Tagesschau*. Coverage dealt with the arrival in Brussels of new Commission President Franco Maria Malfatti and his first speech in the European Parliament, a strike by Commission officials because of broken air conditioning systems in the *Berlaymont* and the start of the entry negotiations with Britain in the autumn of 1970, including interviews with Commission...
officials, EC ministers and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber. The Brussels studio increased its output in 1971. By the mid-1970s, the Brussels studio produced “by far the highest number of minutes of airtime per year of all ARD-studios”.

According to ARD production statistics, the Brussels studio produced 932,45 minutes of airtime in 1974 – ahead of Paris (886,53 minutes), Washington, D.C. (844,09 minutes), New York (483,06 minutes), Warsaw (339,01 minutes) and Moscow (338,37 minutes). 384,04 minutes of total air time were contributions to the Tagesschau, the ARD’s flagship daily news broadcast. In 1975, total airtime produced by the Brussels studio rose to 958,24 minutes. The Brussels studio also covered the Benelux countries and NATO, but most of its coverage dealt with the EC. Further production statistics show that EC television reports from Brussels covered a wide range of actors and issues. In 1974, the studio produced pieces for various ARD channels and programmes on France taking over the Council Presidency in July 1974, activities by Commissioners Ralf Dahrendorf, Albert Borschette and Pierre Lardinois, Henry Kissinger’s visit to the EC, European Parliament sessions, the CAP and a large number of EC Council meetings, always accompanied by interviews with West German and other EC member state ministers.

The second channel of West German public television ZDF also intensified its promotion of the EC. ZDF Brussels bureau chief Hartmut Stein indicated in 1970 that he and his team dealt almost daily with EC issues. Rudolf Radke, head of the foreign affairs department at

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826 See Produktionsübersicht (Fernsehberichterstattung), Jahr: 1974, WDR Archiv, 11927.
828 See Produktionsübersicht (Fernsehberichterstattung), Juli – Dezember 1974, WDR Archiv, 11927.
ZDF, declared in June 1972 that “the coverage of Western European countries should be intensified given the more independent future role of the continent.” After EC enlargement, the ZDF introduced the TV magazine *Die Neun - Soziale Wirklichkeit in Europa* (“The Nine – social reality in Europe”) in October 1973. The magazine aired four or five times a year with 45-minute features comparing the everyday lives of people across different EC member states. After 1973, the ZDF Brussels studio’s work focused more and more on the EC. Brussels correspondent Stein explained in 1975 that in his work “European issues are taking more and more space. Consequently, it is not always possible to cover important domestic policy developments in the Benelux countries with the thoroughness that is actually necessary.” Summarising ZDF EC coverage in December 1975, Rudolf Radke explained that ‘Europe’ constituted a central topic in ZDF’s programmes. According to Radke, the EC frequently appeared in ZDF’s daily *Heute* newscasts as well as in the popular political magazines *Auslandsjournal* and *Bonner Perspektiven*. When a change of bureau chief occurred in the ZDF Brussels studio in 1975, ZDF Director-General Karl Holzamer, editor in chief Rudolf Woller and other senior ZDF representatives attended departing correspondent

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834 Ingeborg Wurster replaced Hartmut Stein.
Hartmut Stein’s farewell reception. The ZDF leadership thereby underlined the importance it attributed to the Brussels studio. In May 1976, head of foreign affairs Radke stated that the “quantity of coverage” by the ZDF Brussels studio was “so big that it is hardly reached by another European studio.” Therefore, the ZDF sent a second cameraman to Brussels, allowing the two television correspondents there to operate independently with two film crews. By the mid-1970s, the ZDF – just as the ARD – had thus made the EC a central issue in its coverage. Moreover, there was extensive coverage of the political and economic instability in Western and Southern Europe. This coverage emanated both from its headquarters and from large and well-equipped Brussels studios, which had by then reached the same or even higher levels of production (and thus importance) than other European foreign studios.

In Britain, the BBC began attributing the EC a central place in its coverage in 1970. The BBC accompanied the British entry negotiations with a massive information and publicity campaign in favour of British EC membership. “The reporting, the examination, the explanation, the interpretation of the Common Market issues has been perhaps the biggest public service broadcasting task undertaken by the BBC since the war”, read a speech drafted for BBC Director-General Charles Curran in July 1971. BBC television and radio journalists started travelling to Brussels in the summer of 1970 to plan their coverage of the entry negotiations. In October 1970, the BBC opened a Brussels bureau. By 1971, BBC

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836 “Der Umfang der Berichterstattung – das weisen die Zahlen von Frau Wurster nach – ist so groß, daß er kaum von einem anderen europäischen Studio erreicht wird.” However, not all the reporting from Brussels dealt with the EC. The Brussels studio also covered the Benelux states and certain NATO activities. See Rudolf Radke (HR Aussenpolitik) to Beck, Betr.: Team Studio Brüssel, Wiesbaden, den 13. Mai 1976, ZDF-UA, 6/0906.


839 See Your speech to the European Journalists Association, September 17 (27.7.71), BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

840 See Prag to Crawley, May 27, 1970; Crawley to Prag, 7th July 1970; Gerald Slessenger, Chief Assistant to Editor, Television News, to E.N.C.A., Subject: Visit to EEC Brussels, 15/16 July, all in BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
officials considered the EC a central topic for current and future BBC work.842 J.C. Crawley, editor of News and Current Affairs, argued “that one thing was certain. Whether Britain became a member or not, the BBC’s coverage of Common Market affairs was bound to grow.” Clive Small, head of Home and Foreign Correspondents, argued that “Even minor developments inside the Community, such as new regulations on technical matters, will acquire some British news value from the thought: ‘This may affect us eighteen months from now.’” Head of Current Affairs at BBC television John Grist stated in April 1971 that “Brussels was such a good base” that he “seriously wondered whether Paris and Bonn needed to be covered at their present strength, especially if Britain succeeded in her application for membership of the EEC.”843 Arthur Hutchinson, head of Talks and Current Affairs at BBC radio, saw the time coming “when the affairs of Western Europe as a whole would matter more than those of individual European countries. Perhaps one might even envisage appointing a West European correspondent one day.”844

BBC officials considered their EC and entry negotiations coverage of the early 1970s exceptional in both quantity and quality. BBC officials thought that “no one who listened to radio and watched television could possibly complain that the issues had not been aired in advance of the decision on entry.”846 Head of Current Affairs at BBC television John Grist in June 1971 “wondered whether there was any public examination of the European Common Market issue elsewhere which could rival for depth and range that provided by the BBC.”847

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841 The bureau was staffed with a BBC Representative, an assistant and a stringer. The main task of the bureau was to “provide an information service for all Television and Radio News and Current Affairs outlets on what is going on, or is likely to come up, in the Common Market negotiations” and to “provide facilities for visiting Radio and Television Correspondents and Camera crews”. See Note, Peter Watson, Chief Assistant to Head of Home and Foreign Correspondents, Subject: Opening of Brussels Office, 9th October, 1970, BBC WAC, R108/15/1. See also Extract, News & Current Affairs Meetings, Original Filed 16.10.70, The Common Market (345), BBC WAC, T62/102/1.

842 The immediate reasons for this were the accelerating entry British entry negotiations. The BBC’s reporting on the negotiations went hand in hand with a generally increasing coverage of Western Europe. Head of Current Affairs at BBC television John Grist underlined in June 1970 “that besides reporting the actual negotiations, we should also be reporting what happens in European countries.” John Grist, Head of Current Affairs Group, Television to A.H.C.A.G. (1), Subject: European Coverage, 23 June 1970, BBC WAC, T62/102/1.


844 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 30 April 1971, 234. The Common Market (204), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

845 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 7 May 1971, 243. The Common Market (243), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

846 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 18 June 1971, 356. The Common Market (334), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

847 Grist said so when commenting on the BBC TV series The Six and Britain – “in terms of informational broadcasting he thought this series one of the most remarkable for a long time.” Extract, T.V. Weekly
BBC officials lauded BBC programmes on the EC as “absolutely first class”, “one of the best [...] ever seen”\(^848\) and as a “real cracker”.\(^849\) In July 1971, the BBC presented some examples of its EC TV coverage in a special showing to Commission members, diplomats and journalists in Brussels. According to John Crawley, Chief Assistant to BBC Director-General Charles Curran, the event “was evidently an eye-opener to members of the Commission, of the British delegation, and to the broadcasting journalists from Belgium and adjacent countries. They seemed to be struck by the skill shown in making difficult material palatable.” EC coverage was so massive in the summer of 1971 that the BBC “even had complaints from viewers, asking if we can’t let them off Common Market programmes for a bit!”\(^850\) BBC officials admitted that “Looking over all that range of coverage one could have sympathy with the character in a recent newspaper cartoon who turned to his wife and said: ‘At least if we do go in we won’t have any more programmes about whether we should or not.”\(^851\) However, senior BBC personnel like Managing Director Television H.P. Wheldon “said that it was vital that in-depth coverage of the Common Market issues should continue. Current Affairs staff must not lose their nerve; only they saw the coverage as a whole; many individual programmes were missed by members of the public.”\(^852\) At the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972, BBC television went so far as to provide coverage even though this made no sense from a journalistic standpoint. BBC Director-General Charles Curran “acknowledged that the ceremonies would not make compelling television. Indeed it would be a chore to cover them live at any length. But the job had to be done.”\(^853\)

Internal BBC documentation demonstrates the amplitude of BBC EC-related coverage in the early 1970s. Coverage fluctuated with peaks around important decisions and periods in the

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848 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 7 May 1971, 243. The Common Market (243), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
849 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 21 May 1971, 265. The Common Market (252), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
850 John Crawley, Chief Assistant to Director-General to D.G., Subject: Common Market Talk, 4th August 1971, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
851 Your speech to the European Journalists Association, September 17 (27.7.71), BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
853 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 14 January 1972, 7. The Common Market (4), Confidential. However, after the broadcasting of the signing of the treaty, the News and Current Affairs Editor stated that the continuous live coverage of the ceremonies in Brussels had turned out better than he had expected”. Both documents in BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1. The BBC also sent a colour film video print of the signing of the Treaty of Accession to 10 Downing Street. See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 23 June 1972, 374. The Common Market (296), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
entry negotiations process. According to one listing, between the start of the entry negotiations in June 1970 and July 1971, Current Affairs BBC Television had devoted nearly thirty programmes lasting at least fifteen minutes to EC topics. The total amount of broadcasting time of those programmes was over twenty hours. This amount did not include shorter items. It also did not include EC coverage in the entire BBC Television News programmes, where the EC and the entry negotiations featured frequently. Over the same period, BBC Radio broadcasted nearly 350 EC related items, mostly in the news and current affairs sequences on the information channel Radio 4, but also on Radio 1 and Radio 2.854

Highlights of television coverage were the six-part documentary series The Six and Britain airing throughout 1971, an interview with George Pompidou – the French President’s first interview on British television855 – and The Great Debate on 1 October 1971, a televised debate with six prominent politicians, three of whom supported and three who opposed EC entry and including audience participation.856 The BBC also requested that it live broadcast the October 1971 vote on EC membership in parliament. It thereby pursued its longtime objective of obtaining an authorisation for TV reporting from parliament, although the request was denied by parliament. BBC Radio live broadcasted Edward Heath’s world press conference on Britain’s entry into the Common Market on 12 July 1971.857 The BBC was the first on air from parliament after the vote on EC membership on 28 October 1971.858

The BBC made great efforts to include foreign voices in its EC coverage, thereby creating transnational cross-border communication, which ‘European Public Sphere’ research considers an indicator for the ‘Europeanisation’ of national or issue-specific public spheres. In February 1970, 24 Hours invited Charles de Chambrun, Vice-President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French Chamber of Deputies and Fritz von Globig, Foreign Editor of the German Stuttgarter Zeitung to London to attend the Common Market debate in the House of

854 Your speech to the European Journalists Association, September 17 (27.7.71), BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
855 See The British Broadcasting Cooperation, General Advisory Council, Coverage of Common Market issues in BBC programmes, 1. Television (other than in “24 hours”), 13.7.71 and Your speech to the European Journalists Association, September 17 (27.7.71), both in BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
856 The debate involved Christopher Chataway, Harold Lever and David Steele on the pro and Barbara Castle, Peter Shore, Edward Taylor on the anti side. See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 10 September 1971, 557. The Common Market (546), Confidential; Board of Management, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 4th October 1971, 381. (a) “The Great Debate” (BBC-1), Confidential; Board of Management, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 4th October 1971, 381. (a) “The Great Debate” (BBC-1), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1; Extract, T.V. Weekly Programme Review Meeting, Original Filed 6 October 1971, 279. “The Great Debate” (BBC-1), BBC WAC, T62/102/1.
858 See Ian Trethowan, Common Market Vote, 29th October 1971, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
Commons and to discuss it afterwards on the programme, bringing in their French and German views. A list of major EC-related BBC television programmes covering the period of April to mid-July 1971 listed a variety of foreigners from Western Europe who had featured on BBC television. A Panorama programme on 5 April 1971 from Munich on “German attitudes to Britain’s entry into the Common Market” presented a Managing Director at BMW, a journalist from Süddeutsche Zeitung and a Bavarian Parliamentary State Secretary for European Relations. A 24 Hours programme on 28 April on the Irish EC entry debate featured Irish politicians and farmers. A 24 Hours programme on the Common Market on 6 May involved statements by French and West German European Parliament Members Pierre-Bernard Couste and Josef Müller as well as by EC Commission Vice-President Sicco Mansholt and Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns. A Panorama documentary and interview broadcasted on 17 May with George Pompidou featured the French President himself, but also Raymond Aron, Henri Morisette and Christian Chavenon, officers from Pompidou’s former regiment and inhabitants of Pompidou’s birthplace Monboudif. A 24 Hours film on French and English as EC languages on 20 May included interviews with a representative of the Alliance française and a French Professor of Comparative Literature. A documentary from the The Six and Britain series on 11 June “about the rise of the standard of living in the six” featured inhabitants of the city of Toulouse and wine producers from Puglia. The BBC also interviewed West German EC Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf on It’s Your Line in May 1971. In short, BBC EC coverage of the entry negotiations showed a considerable degree of ‘Europeanisation’.

BBC Common Market coverage had a clear bias in favour of British EC membership. In public, the BBC claimed that “In this, as in other matters, the BBC has no editorial opinion.” Internally, John Crawley, BBC Director-General Charles Curran’s Chief Assistant, told his boss that “There was always more danger of the BBC leaning too far to the “pro” than the “anti” side because of two factors. One is that staff dealing with the subject

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859 BBC Director-General Charles Curran expressed his appreciation of this initiative. “D.G. commended “24 Hours” for its initiative in bringing a Frenchman and a German to London so that they could listen to the Common Market Debate in the House of Commons on Wednesday and discuss it on the programme later in the day.” News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 27 February 1970, 105. The Common Market (77), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
860 See Common Market Coverage since 1st April, Major items, 17th June 1971, BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
861 “Arthur Hutchinson reported that “It’s Your Line”, with Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf of the Common Market Commission as a guest, had gone well. “Dr. Dahrendorf’s performance, in perfectly nuanced English, had been a tour de force.” News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 14 May 1971, 252. The Common Market (243), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,813/1.
862 Your speech to the European Journalists Association, September 17 (27.7.71), BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
tended to be foreign correspondents and members of our diplomatic staff, and such a body of people is likely to be rich in “pros". The other factor is that exposition of any subject, whether it is the Common Market or abortion, gives the impression that you are in favour of it – at any rate to those who are hostile."863 Records of internal debates show that BBC officials were concerned by the lack of interest and the high level of resistance against EC entry shown in public opinion polls. In August 1971, BBC journalists developed the idea of a televised debate between pro- and anti-EC politicians during which spectators would be able to intervene with questions via telephone. This became The Great Debate broadcasted in October 1971. The idea behind the programme was that “much of the disaffection to our proposed entry into the EEC is based on the general public’s feeling of being divorced from the arguments and thus the decision making. I would hope that this suggested method of involvement would to some degree answer this frustration.”864 Similarly, a Panorama programme about a British lorry driver’s experiences of working in EC member countries was aimed at making the Community appeal to “ordinary people”.865 Moreover, the BBC tried to counter left-wing arguments against the EC. “To avoid giving the impression that the rich were pro-Market and the poor anti-Market, “24 Hours” had tried to find a trade union leader who wanted Britain to join and an industrialist who did not.” Unfortunately, “it had proved impossible to find speakers of that kind”.866 BBC journalists showed little sympathy for the Labour party, which opposed EC adhesion.867 The BBC happily provided Labour politicians who deviated from the official party line and supported British EC membership with a platform to voice their position. BBC Director-General Charles Curran underlined in August 1971 “that the BBC had an obligation not only to project the Labour Party’s official policy about the Common Market entry but also the views of Labour Party members who dissented from it.”868

863 John Crawley, Chief Assistant to Director-General to D.G., Subject: Common Market Talk, 4th August 1971, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
865 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 16 July 1971, 425. The Common Market (411), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
866 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 27 August 1971, 536. The Common Market (521), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
868 Board of Management, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 2 August 1971, 303. (e) Common Market: Labour Party Representation in Programmes, Confidential. When BBC officials learned that the Labour Party leadership was making plans to complain to the National Union of Journalists about how its positions on
programmes left no doubt about the pro-‘European’ message they conveyed. A documentary in the *The Six and Britain* series featured Walter Hallstein, Guy Mollet and World War I veterans, thereby replicating the narrative of the EC as a peace project. The radio programme *Road to Europe* reflected the vision of the forward-moving ‘integration process’.

The BBC kept up its promotion of the EC during 1972 and after the British entry into the EC in January 1973. In April 1972, Director-General Curran “said that by the time the European Communities Bill became law the BBC would have to consider whether or not it was correct to continue to call the E.E.C. the Common Market, a designation which was beginning to be out of date.” The BBC switched to filing documents on the EC under the heading “European Communities’ instead of “Common Market” in October 1972. The BBC co-produced a film on Jean Monnet together with the EC Commission’s Radio and Television Department. In August 1972, the BBC put together a list of EC programmes for the coming months. It included interviews with leading European industrialists such as Giovanni Agnelli, co-productions with ORTF and a series of short films on “European heritage”. It also started planning a series of documentaries entitled the *The History of Europe* to be finished in 1974, “a major contribution to the understanding of the development of Europe right up to, and including, Britain’s entry into the Common Market”. In February 1973, BBC officials requested a meeting with British EC Commissioner George Thompson and his chef de cabinet. “As you might imagine we are thinking a good deal about our developing coverage of the European scene in terms of news and current affairs and it would be useful for us to

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869 See The Six and Britain – Thursday 10th June, BBC 2, Common Market Coverage since 1st April, Major items, 17th June 1971, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
870 See Common Market Coverage For D.G., June 1971, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
871 See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 28 April 1972, 240. The Common Market, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
872 See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 28 April 1972, 240. The Common Market, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
873 The European Communities (625), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
874 See *BBC* Programmes concerned with entry into the E.E.C., 29.8.72, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
875 Richard Cawston, Head of Documentary Programmes, Television to C.BBC-1, Subject: E.E.C. Programmes, 22nd August, 1972, BBC WAC, T62/102/1.
have a conversation with Mr. Thompson and you”.

The European Parliament also received massive attention. In March 1973, British European Parliament Member Lord O’Hagan stated that “les organes d’information britanniques, audio-visuals comme la presse, s’efforcent de donner la maximum de place aux débats de l’Assemblée des Neuf.”

Newspapers

The Western European press embarked on an extensive coverage of ‘European integration’ and the EC in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The coverage reflected the *sui generis* EC narrative. The existence of a high level of EC coverage, support for ‘European integration’ and the ‘crisis’ narrative in the Western European press in the 1970s has already been established in the existing literature. Elite newspapers in France, Britain, West Germany, Italy and Spain covered the EC extensively. They supported the ambitious plans for ‘European integration’ launched at The Hague. After their failure, they bemoaned the EC’s state of ‘crisis’ in an alarmist coverage, warning against the potential ‘disintegration’ of ‘Europe’. They also supported the democratisation of the EC – and democratisation through the EC in Southern Europe. European Council meetings in particular became media events. The French press, particularly *Le Monde*, argued for building the EC into a strong international actor. The West German press largely agreed. Italian newspapers intensified their EC

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876 Roland Fox, Chief Assistant to Editor, News and Current Affairs to Gwyn Morgan, Chef de Cabinet Commissioner George Thompson, 21st February 1973, BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
coverage. *La Stampa* remained firmly ‘European’ in its editorial line.\(^{881}\) For the *Corriere della Sera*, by the 1970s Brussels had become the “capitale importante per la politica comunitaria”.\(^{882}\) In the 1960s, the Spanish press had framed EC affiliation as a tool for the economic modernisation of Spain. In the 1970s, economic modernisation remained an important media *leitmotif*. However, following the *sui generis* EC narrative, the Spanish press shifted to emphasising the democratising effect of ‘European integration’. It forcefully demanded Spanish EC membership.\(^{883}\) At the same time, Western European foreign correspondents covering the Spanish transition to democracy linked the latter to ‘European integration’ and future Spanish EC membership.\(^{884}\)

Of all Western European print media, however, the British press in the early 1970s was the most pro-‘European’.\(^{885}\) While EC-enthusiasm was a pan-Western European journalism phenomenon, British journalists surpassed their peers in their passionate support of the EC, particularly during and after the negotiations on British EC membership. Therefore, the case of the British press will be discussed more in detail below. The 1967 devaluation of the pound\(^{886}\) and the 1968 decision to retreat from ‘East of Suez’\(^{887}\) had marked the end of Britain’s world role. The departure of French President Charles de Gaulle from office in 1969 removed what the British elite perceived as the major ‘obstacle’ to British EC membership. In June 1970, Edward Heath, a convinced ‘European’ who had led the British delegation during

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\(^{880}\) When Chancellor Willy Brandt underlined the independence of Western Europe during a visit to Washington, D.C. in May 1973, a headline in the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten* read “Willy Brandt is considered a German de Gaulle”. Hans-Peter Schütz, Willy Brandt gilt als deutscher de Gaulle, *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 04.05.1973, cited in Hoeres, *Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit*, 489. For West German press coverage of the EC and the idea of a ‘European Europe’ around 1973, see Hoeres, *Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit*. Chapter V., 15. “Das Jahr Europas.”


\(^{882}\) See Glauco Licata, *Storia del Corriere della Sera* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1976), 496.

\(^{883}\) See Müller, *Von der “Modernisierung” zur “Demokratisierung.”

\(^{884}\) See Guillamet, *Transición*. Guillamet’s analysis covers foreign correspondents and their reporting from France, Italy, West Germany, Britain and the US.


the first EEC entry negotiations between 1961 and 1963, became Prime Minister for the Conservative Party. EC entry negotiations officially started in the same month. Joining the EC quickly turned into the number one priority of British foreign policy. Anglo-French rapprochement culminating in the Heath-Pompidou summit of May 1971 cleared the way for British EC membership. Entry negotiations quickly progressed during 1971 and the Treaty of Accession was signed in January 1972. Britain, together with Ireland and Denmark, joined the EC on 1 January 1973. Britain finally seemed to have embraced its post-Empire ‘European’ identity. During the entry negotiations, the UK Government unleashed what West German Ambassador to Britain Karl-Günther von Hase in July 1971 called “probably the most massive publicity campaign in the history of Great Britain” aimed at convincing a sceptical British public of the merits of EC membership. British mass media supported the government’s publicity effort to bring Britain into the EC “with an overwhelming majority”. The following paragraphs will focus on two newspapers central to British 1970s journalism: The Times, the leading British centre-right newspaper and then still journal de référence and The Guardian, the leading British centre-left newspaper.

The most ‘European’ of all British newspapers was The Times. In July 1969, William Rees-Mogg, Editor of The Times between 1967 and 1981, sent a confidential memorandum to his closest collaborators. The memorandum outlined an ambitious agenda for The Times coverage of the EC and Western Europe. Both topics should become new key areas of The Times coverage. Rees-Mogg declared that “The editorial policy of The Times is favourable to British entry to the E.E.C. and to further developments towards political unity, including

889 The Ambassador added that “This has even led some by all means pro-European journalists to notice that the big debate would be fairer and more balanced if at least one serious news outlet and not only the slightly hysteric Beaverbrook press had taken up the cause of the anti-Europeans.” ; “der in der Geschichte Großbritanniens bisher wohl massivsten Werbekampagne” ; “Dies hat einige durchaus pro-europäische Journalisten sogar veranlasst mit einem gewissen Bedauern festzustellen, daß die große Debatte etwas fairer und ausgeglichener geführt werden würde, wenn zumindest ein seriöses Organ und nicht nur die leicht hysterische Beaverbrook-Presse sich der Sache der Anti-Europäer angenommen hätte.” Besides the Beaverbrook press, only the Communist Morning Star, the left-wing New Statesman and Tribune and the conservative The Spectator opposed EC entry. Deutsche Botschaft London to Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Public relations-Kampagne für britischen Beitritt in Großbritannien, London, den 19. Juli 1971, BArch B 145/7179.
particularly an elected European Parliament.” He added that “From a date in September European news will be grouped in the front end of the paper. This will include European political news, particularly the German election which should be covered in greater detail than any previous European election, and economic news relating to the E.E.C. or E.E.C. negotiations.” In the event of new entry negotiations, The Times would cover them extensively. “It is essential that The Times coverage of European affairs should be strong, well informed and comprehensive during the period of negotiations. From September 1969 onwards this should be the highest of all editorial priorities in its claim on the manpower, space and money that may be needed.” Finally, Rees-Mogg outlined a vision to transform The Times into a ‘European’ newspaper of reference with a pan-Western European audience. “The Times must be the leading English language paper in Europe; this will be even more important if Britain succeeds in joining the E.E.C. At present sales in the E.E.C. area amount to about 15,000, and they should be increased.”

In the following years, Rees-Mogg and his team went to great lengths to turn The Times into the “European paper of record” outlined in the 1969 memorandum. The Times created the ‘European page’ in mid-September 1969. It covered the The Hague summit in December 1969 extensively. The Times celebrated the Heath-Pompidou summit in Paris in May 1971. Rees-Mogg wrote to Heath that “I have never been much given to congratulating Prime Ministers. Perhaps I may be allowed to do so in this case. You will know the overriding importance that we attach to this issue.” In his leaders on the EC, Rees-Mogg applied all elements of Euro-journalist discourse. The EC was built on a common ‘European’ heritage of which Britain was part. “The reason that Europe can hope to work together is that our civilisation is one, though our nations are several. A Europe of Dante, Voltaire and Goethe which is not also the Europe of Shakespeare would be only half made.” In an article entitled “Citizens of Europe” published during the six-day debate in the House of Commons on the Government’s motion to join the EC which The Times covered extensively, he claimed that

892 Rees-Mogg, Draft memorandum to Mr. McDonald and Mr. Hodgkin only, highly confidential, The Times coverage of Europe, July 28 1969, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
893 Rees-Mogg explained his staff: “Starting with the paper of Monday, 15th September, we shall run a European page as part of the overseas news service and from the same date the editorial quota will be raised by two columns. These two extra columns will be given initially to Foreign News for the European page.” Rees-Mogg to Mr. Heritage and Mr. Tetherton, 9th September 1969, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
894 Meyer, The European Public Sphere.
895 Rees-Mogg to Heath, May 21, 1971, cited in Grigg, The History of the Times, 182. The article was part of a five-part series of articles Rees-Mogg published on the EC and British membership.
896 Rees Mogg in The Times, 4 May 1971, cited in Ibid., 183.
the most important objective of ‘Europe’ was not economic or political, but “the creation of a European consciousness” among the citizens of the EC. In one of the crucial phases of the entry negotiations in the summer of 1971, The Times calculated it was providing the fullest EC coverage of all British newspapers. In the week from 13 to 18 June 1971, The Times published 39 articles with 22,500 words on the EC, while its strongest competitor, the Financial Times, published 33 articles with 18,185 words. In an attempt to ‘Europeanise’ The Times coverage, home specialists covering domestic British politics were encouraged “to take as lively an interest in their subjects within the Community as they could.” In September 1971, The Times co-organised a conference on Britain & Europe – What Business must do now. Among the around 400 participants figured senior representatives from British business and government and the EC Commission. The Times dedicated its front page and a full page four to the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972. In the course of 1972, The Times started publishing reports from the European Parliament on the same page as reports from Westminster. It also started publishing reports on important European Court of Justice decisions on the same page where it published its British law reports. Rees-Mogg was convinced that his ‘European’ strategy would also benefit The Times financially – “making people conscious of The Times as the European paper of record has considerable sales potential inside Britain, particularly after the beginning of next year when people will feel that they ought to know more about Europe than they do.” In ten years from 1971, The Times would become “the English language European newspaper of record, just as it was in

897 Ibid., 185.
899 Conclusions of a report on The Times EC coverage of July 1971, cited in Grigg, The History of the Times, 187. For example, Home Affairs Correspondent Peter Evans in July 1971 suggested that “Each of the specialists should deal with his subject on a West European basis”. This meant in his view covering domestic British topics through “comparisons with the situation elsewhere in Europe” Peter Evans, Home Affairs Correspondent to The Editor, July 7, 1971, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
901 Grigg, The History of the Times, 274.
902 Rees-Mogg to J. Hussey, June 2, 1972, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
Britain.\textsuperscript{903} In line with its support for a democratic EC, \textit{The Times} massively covered the first session of the European Parliament after enlargement in January 1973.\textsuperscript{904} Rees-Mogg lauded \textit{the Times} journalists who had covered the session. “I am absolutely delighted with the strength of The Times coverage and with the reception that it received. I think it has been a European first of considerable importance.”\textsuperscript{905}

\textit{The Guardian} also stepped up its coverage\textsuperscript{906} of ‘European integration’.\textsuperscript{907} Guardian Editor Alastair Hetherington saw new hope for British EC membership after the departure of de Gaulle.\textsuperscript{908} In February 1970, he told then Geneva-based European Economic Correspondent Hella Pick to move to Brussels and to focus her work on the EC. “With the Common Market negotiations apparently impending Brussels seems a more logical base than Geneva. Certainly we’ll have to give very close attention to the negotiations and I think that that ought to be your primary (though not your only) commitment once the negotiations begin.” He also requested of his collaborators that they present the EC in an interesting way to the \textit{Guardian}’s readers. “I know there’s a feeling that the Common Market is a bit of a bore and that there is some resistance among subs and others to Common Market stories. It’s up to all of us on the paper, however, to make the subject interesting. It’s also up to us to try to get some exclusive news if possible about the state of the play between Britain and Europe.”\textsuperscript{909} Almost the entire \textit{Guardian} newsroom was in favour of EC membership.\textsuperscript{910} Hetherington stated in April 1970

\textsuperscript{903} Rees-Mogg in July 1971, cited in Grigg, \textit{The History of the Times}, 187.
\textsuperscript{904} See D. Wood and A. Wood to The Editor, Strasbourg: How it went, 22 Jan 73, TNL Archive, Europa, A002/000024/15.
\textsuperscript{905} The Editor to D. Wood and A. Wood, February 9, 1973, TNL Archive, Europa, A002/000024/15.
\textsuperscript{906} The fact that Hella Pick, an experienced diplomatic and foreign affairs journalist who had previously covered the UN and the United States from New York and Washington, D.C., became ‘European Economic Correspondent’ based in Geneva in the summer of 1966 indicated the increasing attractiveness of Western Europe to more experienced journalists. However, Pick was based in Geneva and also covered other international organisations as EFTA, the OECD, the GATT, the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN Trade and Development Board. Pick covered the British entry negotiations of 1966-67. See AH to HJ, 16 June 1966; Guardian Editorial, Editorial News – 62, Staff and Personal, 17 June 1966; Pick to Hetherington, 29th June 1966; Pick to Hetherington, 2nd August; G.D.T. to A.H., 27th March 1967; Pick to Hetherington, 4th November 1967; Hetherington to Pick, 7 November 1967, all in John Rylands Library, Guardian Archive, C1/P5/1-202.
\textsuperscript{907} On the Guardian’s EC coverage in the 1970s, see also Chapter 8: Slow Boat to Europe in Hetherington, \textit{Guardian Years}. See also Taylor, \textit{Changing Faces}, 265–67.
\textsuperscript{908} In March 1969, Hetherington had told Prime Minister Harold Wilson in a meeting that “it was hopeless to expect any headway with Europe in De Gaulle’s lifetime, and that efforts to produce a way round De Gaulle were counter-productive”. Note of a meeting with the Prime Minister at Downing Street on Thursday, March 20, 1969, LSE Hetherington/16/23
\textsuperscript{909} Hetherington to Pick, February 2, 1970, John Rylands Library, Guardian Archive, C1/P5/1-202.
\textsuperscript{910} Hetherington writes in his memoirs that “when Mr Rippon set off for Brussels after the June election in 1970 he carried with him the good wishes of nearly all the British press, including the Guardian’s.” Hetherington, \textit{Guardian Years}, 188.
that “we ought to be prepared – and to be preparing our public” for the upcoming negotiations. 911

Hetherington developed an ambitious agenda for the EC’s future. In December 1970, he travelled to Brussels where he met with EC Commissioners Jean-François Deniau, 912 Ralf Dahrendorf, 913 Sicco Mansholt 914 and other senior Commission officials. 915 Shortly afterwards, the Guardian held a dinner discussion between its senior staff and a group of diplomats, politicians and academics to discuss “the non-economic aspects of the Common Market”. 916 Hetherington prepared a paper outlining a far-reaching vision of the future of the EC for the dinner. The paper was comprised of three main points setting the tone for The Guardian’s EC coverage for the following years. First, Hetherington called for the centralisation of decision-making in the EC to create an effective organisation capable of acting. Second, centralised decision-making required democratic control. Therefore, the EC needed a directly-elected European Parliament to whom the Commission would be accountable. Third, the EC would have to develop a common foreign and defence policy including development aid. Hetherington argued that such a “centralised, democratic structure will be needed within ten years”. 917 The Guardian remained committed to ‘European integration’ after the British entry. During the Watergate scandal in 1973, The Guardian Washington correspondent Peter Jenkins told Hetherington that “This ought to be a great opportunity and challenge to the Europeans to pull themselves together.” 918

Other British print media also supported the EC and adopted the sui generis EC narrative. 919 The Economist had promoted strong pro- ‘European’ views since the 1960s. In the

911 Points from a talk by Christopher Soames at Chatham House on Tuesday, April 28 1970, John Rylands Library, Guardian Archive, C5/427/1-3.
914 See Points from a Meeting with Dr Sicco Mansholt in Brussels on Monday, December 7, 1970 (Harford Thomas, Ian Wright and Hella Pick also present), LSE Hetherington/18/18.
917 Guardian discussion dinner, December 15, 1970, EUROPE – three propositions, LSE Hetherington/18/15. See also Hetherington’s comments on the issue in his memoirs. Hetherington, Guardian Years, 189.
919 Overviews of the coverage of British media of the entry negotiations can be found in Wilkes and Wring, “The British Press and European Integration”; Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion.
early 1970s, however, the EC became central to the elite magazine’s work. The biography of Andrew Knight illustrates this. Knight had joined *The Economist* in 1966. Ambitious, talented and hard-working, the young journalist was posted to the magazine’s prestigious Washington, D.C. office in 1968 – but left in 1970 to take over ‘European integration’ coverage and to subsequently open *The Economist*’s Brussels office in 1973. Knight became Editor of *The Economist* in 1974. EC expertise was a keystone in Knight’s steep career trajectory at *The Economist*. It demonstrates just how important ‘European integration’ and British EC membership was to the magazine in the early 1970s.920

At *The Financial Times*, the EC and ‘European integration’ were “one of the FT’s few ‘causes’”.921 Already in the 1960s, competitors observed that *FT* coverage of Western European economic affairs had been “particularly strong”.922 The *Financial Times* increased the number of correspondents in its Brussels bureau from one to three between 1968 and 1973.923 Together with *The Times*, *The Financial Times* provided the most comprehensive coverage of the entry negotiations. In mid-1972, the *FT* began adding a second page of European news to its foreign pages between Tuesdays and Fridays.924 Max Henry “Fredy” Fisher, a strong supporter of the EC, became *FT* Editor in January 1973. A Jew born in Berlin who fled to Britain in the late 1930s, he served in the British army during the war and worked on Germany at the British Foreign Office before joining the *FT* in 1957. He was convinced of Britain’s ‘European’ identity. In his first leader as editor, he envisioned the EC as evolving into a ‘European’ defence union.925 When the US fell into domestic turmoil after the Watergate scandal, the *FT* wrote “that the case for European unity, especially in the political field, is stronger than ever.”926 During the 1975 debate on the EC referendum, *The Financial Times* declared that “greater European unity must be the objective for which the Community must strive”.927 *The Daily Telegraph* also firmly supported the British EC membership. William F. Deedes, its editor between 1974 and 1986, had run the Macmillan government’s

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922 Rees-Mogg, Draft memorandum to Mr. McDonald and Mr. Hodgkin only, highly confidential, The Times coverage of Europe, July 28 1969, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.

923 Interview with Reginald Dale, 06.05.2014.


925 Ibid., 402.

926 Ibid., 403.

927 Ibid.
PR campaign promoting British entry into the EC as a Minister without Portfolio in charge of Information Services between 1962 and 1964.928

Transnational journalism and the magazine Europa

British newspapers and their Western European peers further supported the ‘European idea’ by launching transnational cooperation projects. Among the most prominent transnational journalism initiatives of the 1970s figured the magazine Europa, launched by Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt.929 The newspapers co-produced the magazine starting from 1973. Europa appeared as a monthly supplement in the four newspapers. There were four national editions with the same layout and the same articles, translated into French, English, Italian and German. Europa was aimed at Western European business people. The four newspapers stopped production in 1981 after the magazine had been an economic disappointment for years. In retrospect, the unfeasibility of the Europa project might seem obvious. However, the following paragraphs will emphasise just how convinced journalists at Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt were in the early 1970s of the need for a publication like Europa. Captivated by the ‘European moment’, they considered the transnational magazine highly innovative journalism, both politically relevant and commercially promising.

The Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt leadership gradually developed the idea for Europa in the early 1970s out of socialisation processes and great optimism for the future of ‘European integration’. Senior representatives of the four newspapers met for first time in Paris in September 1971. They initially agreed to publish joint special reports on ‘European integration’. By pooling their resources, the newspapers “could offer the best editorial treatment of special report subjects to a combined readership of over five million Europeans, and the publishing venture would be supported by the combined strengths of four advertisement sales and marketing teams.”930 The joint special reports, coordinated through

929 There were many rumours about ‘European’ cooperation projects among Western European media in the early 1970s. For example, Reuters in 1970 worried about AFP, dpa and ANSA potentially teaming up to create a ‘European’ news agency. See Europe – European News Agency 1970, Reuters Archive, 55C Europe.
930 Each report would be between eight and twelve pages long. It would be produced by one newspaper, in constant contact with and supported by the others. The principal participants at the meeting were for Le Monde Pierre Drouin, Claude Reinhard (Deputy Director), André Meglin (Commercial Manager Special Reports); for La Stampa Ricardo di Corato (Deputy Manager), Giovanni Giovannini (Deputy Editor); for The Times John Greig (Editor Special Reports), Bryan Todd, (Marketing Manager), Garry Thorne (Commercial Manager Special
monthly meetings in changing Western European cities, proved “difficult to sell” to advertisers, but received a lot of attention in Western European media.

With hopes for ‘European unity’ flying high in the run-up to the 1973 enlargement, Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt expanded their cooperation from joint special reports to a fully-fledged magazine. They “had a prolonged discussion and exchange of views about the possibility of producing a European newspaper” in June 1972. Already at this point, frequent meetings had produced a feeling of mutual trust between the senior journalists and the management of the four newspapers. The Times Special Reports Commercial Manager Garry Thorne described “the astonishingly strong bonds which now appear to exist between our four newspapers”. Apart from the ‘European newspaper’, the newspapers had also discussed the possibility of joint market studies, joint foreign correspondents, and joint purchases of paper. Thorne explained that “Clearly all newspapers involved in the joint Special Reports feel that it has been of benefit to them and the momentum within our group is considerable. The attitude is very much revealed in Mr. Fauvet’s [Jacques Fauvet, director of Le Monde] sentiments expressed at our dinner when he said that we must move forward from our present position if we are not to move backward.” Jacques Fauvet thereby applied the progressive narrative of ‘European integration’ to the cooperation between the four newspapers – it could only move forward. The newspapers’ commercial departments voiced

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931 The problem was “the fact that many advertisers only wanted to be in three of the newspapers, or two of the newspapers and there were comparatively few companies who wanted to be in all four newspapers at the same time.” Minutes of Meetings held in London on 28th and 29th September 1972 between Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times, and Die Welt, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/9.

932 Informaciones, De Standaard and De Telegraaf expressed their interest in joining the collaboration, but the four newspapers declined. See Notes on the Meetings held in Turin on 14 April, 1972 between Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times, and Die Welt, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/9.

933 See John Greig, Minutes of Meetings held in Paris 29th and 30th June 1972, Private & Confidential, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/9.

934 Thorne further reported on the idea of a ‘European newspaper’ “that our three partner newspapers are very interested in doing a European newspaper, inset in our main papers, on a monthly basis.” Thorne wrote that “Mr. Fauvet and Mr. Sauvegeot at Le Monde are both very keen on this project and would like to see it launched next year.” Lothar Ruehl at Die Welt “declared his personal conviction in this project and went so far as to say that, if necessary, he would approach Axel Springer personally to try and see that it reaches fruition.” Giovanni Giovannini at La Stampa “is very keen to move this project forward”. Garry Thorne, European Newspaper, 4th July 1972, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/9.
concerns, but the editorial leaderships went ahead. The first Europa edition appeared in October 1973, accompanied by a considerable PR campaign.

In the following years, Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt would invest considerable resources in Europa, despite the fact that the magazine proved a commercial failure. Each newspaper put one or two senior editors in charge of Europa. Those journalists met at least once a month to coordinate their work. Euro-journalists often volunteered for this job – Pierre Drouin at Le Monde, David Spanier at The Times, Giovanni Giovannini at La Stampa. The editors in chief of the four newspapers met once or twice a year to discuss Europa’s strategic development. The four newspapers unsuccessfully tried to position Europa as an elite magazine for business people working in the integrating Western European economy. Europa should look at ‘European’ economic affairs from a ‘European perspective’, as opposed to the American perspective of the dominant US magazines Fortune, Times and Newsweek. A The Times promotion campaign for Europa in 1974 used slogans like “The Common Market now has a common language. It’s called Europa”, “Europa is a unique newspaper, the first written exclusively by Europeans, for Europeans” and “If you want to keep up with European affairs, read Europa”. The idea was that “On the one hand, the prestige of the national carrier newspaper ensures a readership for Europa, on the other Europa adds a new and important dimension to each of the national newspapers.” However, the newspapers’ commercial executives soon reported that “great disappointment had been expressed by clients and agencies” regarding Europa. Moreover, “It was felt that it was not attractively presented and that the subject matter was not sufficiently topical or dramatic for

935 See Minutes of Meetings held in London on 28th and 29th September 1972 between Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times, and Die Welt, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/9.
937 In 1976, the newspapers made Jacqueline Grapin, a member of Le Monde’s economic section, editor in chief of Europa. She then coordinated the publication. See Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on 14th May, 1976, TNL Archive, Europa, Committee Meeting Minutes, 1975-1976.
938 “Europa was conceived because it was felt that there was, at the time and indeed since, no regular publication dealing with European events of a primary economic nature through European as opposed to American eyes. Magazines like Fortune, Times, Newsweek etc. normally – and quite naturally – relate events in Europe to the U.S. economy and judge their importance accordingly.” John Greig to Giuseppe Grizzaffi, Tuesday Oct 23 1979, TNL Archive, Europa, Miscellaneous Correspondence. In this sense, Europa constituted an attempt to make ‘Europe’ more independent from the US in journalistic terms. This attempt was thus embedded in the early 1970s’ effort to increase Europe’s political, economic and social clout vis-à-vis the US.
939 See the advertising posters in TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
940 Appendix II, Outline – EUROPA Presentation, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
the claim that ‘Europa’ would be essential reading for businessmen.” Market research showed “a lack of awareness about EUROPA, a lack of identity for EUROPA, and an almost total misunderstanding for what EUROPA was and what it was trying to achieve.” State enterprises like Enel jumped in and bought advertising space, thereby underlining the cooperation of journalists with state and private actors to promote ‘European unity.’ However, overall “Commercially, EUROPA had been a debacle.”

Nonetheless, the editorial leadership at Le Monde, The Times, La Stampa and Die Welt defied their commercial departments and instead lauded Europa as a “new and truly European communications vehicle”. Financial issues were secondary to them. The Times journalists in May 1974 floated the idea that after having so far published Europa monthly, “the next step would be to move to weekly frequency” La Stampa editor in chief Arrigo Levi suggested publishing articles in different languages: “For LA STAMPA, French was an acceptable language and it was felt that having articles in EUROPA in more than one language would put the idea of it being a truly multi-lingual publication across very effectively.” When Le Monde published an English article in the French version of Europa, Pierre Drouin reported that this “had been very well received and that he had been invited to

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941 Garry Thorne of The Times said that the reaction to Europa by adversaries “might better be described as a non-reaction.” Minutes of Meetings held in Hamburg between Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times, and Die Welt on 15th and 16th November, 1973, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
942 Minutes of Europa Meeting held in Venice on 16th 6 17th May 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
943 Minutes of Europa Editorial Meeting held in Milan on Thursday & Friday, January 16/17, 1975, TNL Archive, Europa, Committee Meeting Minutes, 1975-1976.
944 Minutes of Europa Meeting held in Venice on 16th 6 17th May 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
945 Appendix II, Outline – EUROPA Presentation, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
946 The journalists argued in 1974 that “one must not lose sight of the fact that EUROPA had survived during a most difficult time for Europe. European itself had been having serious difficulties and we had not, therefore, been operating in an ideal climate.” Minutes of Europa Meeting held in Venice on 16th 6 17th May 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10. Moreover, “It was felt that comparisons with the Economist, Time Magazine and the like did EUROPA no good”. Europa was just a different kind of publication. Minutes of Meetings held in London between the editorial executives of Le Monde, La Stampa, The Times, and Die Welt on December 13 and 14, 1973, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10. Le Monde director Jacques Fauvet argued that “we should continue to improve Europa in whatever way we felt best and not worry too much at this stage about readers’ reactions or lack of them.” Minutes of EUROPA meeting held in Paris on Thursday, June 20, 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10. The Times journalists claimed Europa had indirect benefits for the newspaper: “The promotional spin-off for The Times from EUROPA is unquantifiable but it undoubtedly exists in supporting the international image of The Times and an increased awareness of The Times by European advertising agencies and potential clients. Even at the present level of losses, The Times would find it difficult to promote itself in Europe in an alternative way at this cost.” Briefing for Mr. J. Hussey and W. Rees Mogg, Private and Confidential, no date, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
947 Minutes of Europa Meeting held in Venice on 16th 6 17th May 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
make two broadcasts on French radio to explain this new development.”⁹⁴⁹ The more ‘European integration’ seemed in crisis in the mid-1970s, the less inclined the four newspapers were to drop Europa. The Times Editor William Rees-Mogg explained in April 1975 that “Europa is in some ways increasingly important now that Europe itself is at a standstill.” Pierre Drouin claimed that in this moment of crisis “it was Europa’s role to advance ideas for the future of Europe.” Ernst-Dietrich Adler, publishing manager of Die Welt, explained that “we were fighting for the European idea and the future of Europe”. This, and the prestige that publishing a ‘European’ magazine brought the four newspapers, was more important than Europa’s commercial success.⁹⁵⁰

Moreover, the frequent meetings and exchanges had created a bond between the four newspapers that their leading journalists did not want to break. After a Europa meeting in Britain in May 1977, Le Monde director Jacques Fauvet wrote to The Times Editor William Rees-Mogg that the visit “nous a fait, me semble-t-il, davantage aimer l’Angleterre. Nous savons ce que nous lui devons ; ma génération jamais ne l’oublier a. A la reconnaissance et au respect que nous éprouvons s’ajoute aujourd’hui un sentiment de profonde amitié. ‘Europa’ est une occasion d’entretenir cette amitié et je me félicite que nos deux journaux s’entendent si bien et en assurent le leadership.”⁹⁵¹ La Stampa editor in chief Arrigo Levi told Rees-Mogg how much he enjoyed the yearly “Europa-meeting, which takes increasingly every year the character of a family reunion.”⁹⁵² The four newspapers continued Europa until 1981, when The Times announced it would have to stop the cooperation due to severe financial problems.⁹⁵³ The Europa project failed, but it demonstrates several important points. First, in the early 1970s the leadership of some of the most important Western European newspapers believed in the potential economic success of a transnationally produced ‘European’ newspaper. Second, when the project proved a commercial failure, their commitment to ‘European integration’ was so strong that they continued Europa despite the losses it produced. Third, the EC became the starting point for extensive cooperation and exchanges between leading Western European journalists.

⁹⁴⁹ Minutes of EUROPA Meeting held in Berlin on October 17th & 18th 1974, TNL Archive, Europa, A123/000547/10.
⁹⁵⁰ Minutes of Meetings held in St. Paul de Vence on the 17th and 18th April, 1975, TNL Archive, TT/ED/WRM/2.
⁹⁵³ Gerald Long, then managing director of Times Newspapers, explained that “Europa was a worthy enterprise, inspired by the highest motives, and it is a matter of great regret to all of us here that we must abandon it.” See Gerald Long to Dr Herbert Kremp, 15 June 1981, TNL Archive, Europa, Miscellaneous Correspondence.
News agencies

News agencies played a crucial role in spreading information about the EC. Reuters, AFP, dpa, ANSA and specialised agencies such as VWD, Agence Europe and Agra Europe exercised an important indirect influence on domestic and international EC coverage. First, national, regional and local newspapers without a permanent correspondent in Brussels relied on news agencies for their EC coverage. Moreover, some newspaper and particularly television correspondents in Brussels used the agencies for their work. Agency coverage could therefore influence or set the agenda for subsequent TV coverage. Finally, media outlets around the world used Reuters and AFP and, to a lesser degree, dpa and ANSA to cover ‘European integration’. According to Western European diplomats, the big Western European agencies shaped EC coverage in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The biggest Western European news agency in the 1970s was Reuters. As part of its 1970s internationalisation strategy, the agency became the leader in EC coverage among the other big Western agencies by the mid-1970s. Reuters set itself the goal of producing news from a

954 There is surprisingly little research on news agency coverage of ‘European integration’, and no historical research on EC coverage by news agencies.

955 In October 1972, representatives of regional and local British newspapers urged Reuters to provide a broad coverage of ‘European integration’. The newspapers largely relied on Reuters for their EC coverage. See Nick Carter, Note for the record, Conference of the Guild of British newspaper editors, Southport, October 6-8, 10 October 1972, Reuters Archive, 55C Europe. Pio Mastrobuoni underlines the importance of ANSA for the EC coverage in the Italian media. He claims that in the early 1970s, about five Italian newspapers had a permanent correspondent in Brussels. “E gli altri giornali italiani, ottanta, si servivano esclusivamente di quello che io scrivevo.” Interview with Pio Mastrobuoni in Rome, 11.06.2014.

956 The big agencies had bureaux of at least three correspondents in Brussels and could therefore provide a very broad coverage of EC affairs that was of great use to the individual newspaper or television correspondents. ZDF television Brussels correspondent Ingeborg Wurster underlined in 1975 that she needed both the services of dpa and VWD for her work in Brussels. See Wurster to Beck, Bruessel, 18.7.75, ZDF-UA, 6/0906. See also Beck to Wurster, Wiesbaden, den 12. Oktober 1976/Kn, ZDF-UA, 6/0906 and Beck to Wiedemann, Betr.: Agenturversorgung Brüssel, Wiesbaden, den 1. Juli 1976, ZDF-UA, 094218.

957 EC coverage in African media was often based on Reuters and AFP material. West German diplomats in Dakar reported that “Die hiesige Presse berichtet aufgrund von AFP- und Reutermeldungen ausführlich über die für Senegal wichtigen Ratsbeschlüsse”. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Dakar (Senegal), Betr.: Informationspolitik der EG; hier: Unterrichtung der Botschaften in Drittländern über wichtige Ratsbeschlüsse, Dakar, den 28.07.1977, PA AA, B 200 114389.


960 West German diplomats in Tokyo stated that “In Japan jedenfalls wird die Nachrichtenübermittlung von der englischen Nachrichtenagentur Reuters bestimmt, Reuters hat einen Vertrag über Zusammenarbeit mit der japanischen Nachrichtenagentur Kyodo.” Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Tokyo to Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Informationspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Tokyo, 05. März 1979, PA AA, B 200, 121823.
non-national point of view. Given the central importance of Reuters in the Western European media system and its aspiration to ‘supranational’ journalism, the following paragraphs will focus on how the agency came to make the EC a central topic of its news file in the first half of the 1970s.

Reuters intensified its EC coverage starting from the late 1960s. The news agency’s great financial resources and international staff had allowed it to constantly cover the EEC throughout the 1960s with journalists in Brussels and in the London headquarters specialising in Community affairs. However, by the late 1960s the agency’s leadership wanted to go further. Reuters mobilised five journalists for the The Hague summit in December 1969. The Bonn, Paris, Brussels and The Hague bureaux supplied a correspondent each; one reporter was sent from London. This allowed Reuters to comprehensively cover all aspects of the conference and the participating delegations. The correspondents were told their reports should contain “a deeper look at the Common Market”, “analyse the chances of enlarging the Community”, “deal with the achievements of the Community thus far”, discuss “chances for political integration” and summarise “the benefits the Community has provided for the-man-in-the-street”. According to Reuters Brussels bureau chief Robert S. Taylor, the agency’s competitors were stunned by the degree of attention Reuters started paying to the EC. Taylor wrote to London in January 1970 that “our AFP colleagues here say their head office is impressed by the amount of Common Market coverage carried by Reuters’ French Service. In fact, the AFP office here has received a memo from Paris recently telling them Reuters has begun an offensive to step up Common Market coverage.”

 Reuters General Manager Gerald Long strongly supported British entry into the EC. Long had worked both in France and Germany. He saw Britain’s future inside the EC. In May 1971, he told Donald Maitland, Edward Heath’s spokesman in 10 Downing Street that: “Two powerful lobbies, one which would tie us to a non-existent Commonwealth and the other which would hand us over

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960 Reuters historian Donald Read argues that the agency – particularly during the two world wars – traditionally functioned as a tool of the British government but started developing a “supranational perspective” detached from the views of the government after the 1956 Suez crisis. See Read, The Power of News. The History of Reuters, 474.

961 Reuters General Manager Gerald Long had boasted at the time of the first entry negotiations between Britain and the EEC, that “We are the only world agency to have a Common Market Correspondent”. Long to Underhill and Campbell, Common Market Correspondent, January 22, 1962, Reuters Archive, 1/8981328.

962 M. Charvet, Regional Editor to Western European bureaux, Common Market Summit Meeting, The Hague, 5 November 1969, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe. The box also contains individual letters to the different bureaux describing their tasks during the conference.

963 Robert S. Taylor to The General Manager, 23 January 1970, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.

to the United States, attempt to deny our European character.” 965 Britain should join the EC and then build it into a powerful international actor: “the British and the French acting together can lay the foundations of a real European community to replace the poor little seedy Europe of the Six.” 966 Long remained an EC supporter also after British membership ran into trouble after 1973. When Maitland became British Permanent Representative to the EC in 1975, Long congratulated him on “a post which many people in this country, me among them, regard as one of the most important for this country’s future.” 967

In the early 1970s, the EC and British entry negotiations became a primary topic in Reuters reporting. Three senior correspondents worked in the Brussels bureau. EEC reports amounted to about two-thirds of its file total. 968 When Britain joined the EC, the number of senior correspondents in the Brussels bureau rose to four. 969 EC coverage in the weeks after British EC entry was so intensive that Brussels bureau chief Taylor joked about “Reuters post-adhesion obsession with the EEC”. 970 Other Western European bureaux contributed to EC and entry negotiation coverage. Correspondents from Paris, Bonn, Rome and London supported their Brussels colleagues during important EC summits. 971 All this taken together made Reuters the Western European media organisation that was putting the greatest human and financial resources into EC coverage. In late 1973, Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall stated “We dominate agency play on the EEC in terms of accuracy, speed, and comprehensiveness.” He also claimed Reuters EC reporting was widely used in the UK and on the European continent. 972 In early 1975, Macdowall boasted that “Reuters, as the leading news agency in Europe, has unrivalled experience of reporting EEC affairs and its Common Market file is recognised by the press and the Government departments of the member States as the most authoritative one provided by any news agency.” 973 In short, after 1970 the EC became a

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965 Long to Maitland, Private and Confidential, May 7 1971, Reuters Archive, 1/990448.
967 Long to Maitland, 16 July 1975, Reuters Archive, 1/990448.
969 See BRH, Editor-in-Chief to General Manager, EEC Coverage to meet UK Requirements, 9 November 1972, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
970 Taylor to The General Manager, 25 January 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
971 For example, Reuters covered the European Council meeting in Dublin in March 1975 with five senior correspondents from the Brussels and other Western European bureaux. The journalists followed different topics or delegations. See the planning of the coverage: Ian Macdowall, Chief News Editor to John Swift, Head of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 1975, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
972 See Macdowall to Taylor, 27 December 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
973 Ian Macdowall, Chief News Editor to John Swift, Head of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 1975, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
primary topic for Reuters and the agency’s EC cover “one of the high points of the Reuter file”. 974

Reuters EC coverage addressed a broad audience, as most of the agency’s clients targeted mass publics. Therefore, senior editors insisted that the Reuters Brussels office avoided “Common Market stories with their hermetic language” 975 and instead always explained what EC developments “could mean for the man in the street”. 976 Brussels correspondents should master the “difficult art of presenting complicated problems in a way that the ordinary newspaper reader can understand” 977 and write stories that could “be read at breakfast tables the next morning.” 978 The London office therefore requested a portrait of EC Commission President Franco Maria Malfatti “preferably including some colourful anecdotes – he is a bachelor, so this might provide an angle.” 979 Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall praised “admirable stories from the Brussels office in which the complexities of the EEC have been crisply and lucidly explained to the average reader.” However, he also did not hesitate to criticise it for inflicting “Whitehallese on our readers”. When the Brussels bureau sent a report on the reform of the CAP to London in 1976, Macdowall answered with a word-by-word and paragraph-by-paragraph correction. He told his Brussels colleagues to use “to end” instead of “to eliminate”. Moreover, he wrote that “In the fourth para[graph] the bonus ‘for the non-delivery of milk to dairies’ would puzzle anyone but an agrobusinessman.” Instead, Reuters stories should “say what is meant in human terms”. In this case “what we seem to be saying is no more than that the proposals are designed to end EEC overproduction of milk, butter, and cheese.” 980 In sum, despite the fact that “a good deal of EEC news is highly technical and dry as dust for the general reader”, Reuters made considerable efforts to write about the EC in a way that was understandable to ordinary people. 981

974 Fenby to Taylor, 9 May 1974, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
975 J. Edinger to CNE, Common Market Translations, Febr 4th 1970, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
976 Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall called this the “vexed question of whether an EEC story can be both technically precise and of general interest”. On a Council meeting of Agricultural Ministers in early 1973, he stated that “everybody eats beef, bread, and butter and the Farm Ministers’ talks should be reported in a fashion that will give the average reader some idea of what is going on.” Macdowall to Taylor, 22 January 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
977 Charvet to Taylor, 17 March 1971, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
978 Carter to Taylor, Appendix 1, 16 July 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
979 Michael Charvet, Chief News Editor to A Chancellor, Rome, June 5, 1970, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
980 Macdowall to Taylor, 7 July 1976, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
981 Macdowall to Taylor, 5 January 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
*Reuters* aimed at covering the EC from a non-national point of view. *Reuters* EC stories needed to be usable beyond the UK market, by the agency’s subscribers in Western Europe and around the world. Production Editor Nick Carter explained in July 1973 that “the ideal in reporting Common Market activities is a trunk story with a solid world angle equally acceptable to all parts of the world, or a good European angle acceptable to all nine member nations.”  

*Reuters* tried to produce multi-perspective reporting by assigning multiple correspondents to summits and conferences. Each correspondent followed the activities of one delegation. The results were reports comprising different national viewpoints contributed by different journalists. Another strategy was to fuse contributions sent in from different Western European offices into one article at the London headquarters. In the same way, *Reuters* produced article series with each Western European bureau contributing an article on a certain topic. *Reuters* did such “a co-ordinated file of features” for the 1973 EC enlargement. The series started with “contributions from the capitals of the three candidate countries explaining what their Governments and peoples hope to gain from Market entry”. Further topics were the European Parliament, the ‘Eurocrats’ and a glossary of the EC institutions. As a result reports offered multiple perspectives on the EC – a practice one might call ‘Europeanisation’ of coverage.

Linked to the idea of non-national reporting was the aspiration to eradicate ‘British biases’ from *Reuters* EC coverage. In October 1971, *Reuters* Brussels correspondent Christopher Matthews received criticism for having written in a report that “the French then improved their proposal”. The sentence showed a pro-British-anti-French bias, the London office claimed. In January 1973, Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall complained about “the partisan element” in a report on the CAP by Brussels Correspondent Brian Childs quoting from “informed sources” that the grain price situation in the EC was “inadmissible politically and in principle”. Macdowall advised that “If sources are making tendentious statements of this kind, we must make clear the viewpoint from which they are speaking. I presume from the context that the sources are British. If so, we should have said so, or else deleted the phrase altogether. To use it in this form is to appear to be uncritically propagating a British

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982 Carter to Taylor, Appendix 1, 16 July 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
983 See the examples mentioned in the previous paragraphs.
985 See Mel Baiser to MEN, 19-10-71, Reuters Archive, 1/8981318.
In July 1976, the Reuters Brussels office corrected a report after it became clear that it had a British bias. “The problem with the story was that the British sources, which we quoted, oversold the agreement initially as being more than it was. Immediately the situation became clearer, we clarified” using EC Commission and other national sources, bureau chief Taylor explained. Debates about whether certain reports had British biases repeatedly popped up in Reuters newsrooms in the 1970s. In December 1973, there were complaints the Reuters London office had not properly handled the information that Hans Apel, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Foreign Office, had sharply criticised Anglo-French contacts with Arab countries at the European Summit in Copenhagen because it had been overly “British-minded”. At an editorial conference in Bonn in February 1976, “some members of the German Desk commented that our EEC file was too British oriented, with developments being analysed from a British viewpoint and quotes from British spokesmen taking up a disproportionate share of the file.” The question whether Reuters EC coverage had a British bias cannot be answered here. However, the objective of providing multiperspective and non-national EC coverage and the efforts Reuters editors undertook to avoid British biases are in themselves remarkable.

Reuters EC coverage in the 1970s reproduced the sui generis EC narrative, but less so than other Western European media. In a process of editorial refinement and control, Reuters copy flowed through several hands before being transmitted to clients. Moreover, the self-conception of Reuters as a supplier of objective information collided with crusading Euro-journalism. Self-conception and copyediting acted as filters on Euro-journalism, just as they did on overly pro-British views. Records from the Reuters archive show that on several occasions Euro-journalism got stuck in editorial control processes. Against the narrative equating the EC with ‘Europe’, Production Editor Nick Carter complained in October 1972 that “We occasionally fall into the trap of using the word ‘Europe’ to mean the European

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986 Macdowall to Taylor, January 19, 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
987 See Taylor to The Managing Director, 23 July 1976. However, the first version of the story had been sent over the wires based only on British sources and hence with a British bias, a fact that angered Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall. See Macdowall to Taylor, 11 August 1976, both in Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
988 See Macdowall to Fenby, 2 January 1974, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
989 Macdowall to Taylor, 3 February 1976, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
990 West German diplomats thought that Reuters EC coverage from Brussels in the 1970s was “kräftig von der britischen Interessenlage gefärbt”. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Tokyo to Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Informationspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Tokyo, 05. März 1979, PA AA, B 200, 121823. French AFP Brussels correspondent Yann de L’Écotais joked about British EC media coverage and “la presse britannique qui, pour être une des meilleures presse du monde a fortement tendance à confondre l’objectivité et la ‘vérité britannique’”: de L’Écotais, L’Europe sabotée, 66.
Common Market – e.g. referring to ‘Britain’s relations with Europe’ and to people being pro or anti-Europe. Such phrases are not self-explanatory in many parts of the world and it is best to refer to the Common Market when the Common Market is what we mean.”\(^{991}\) In April 1973, Chief News Editor Macdowall intervened in coverage by Robert S. Taylor and his Brussels office on the European Parliament. “Nowhere in the day’s coverage as far as I can see was the point made that the European Parliament does not make binding decisions and that its role is purely advisory”, Macdowall complained. “I was also unhappy about the use of the expression ‘failed to approve’”. The London desk converted this into “rejected” - “The word failed smacks of partiality”. Finally, Taylor’s team had omitted the fact that “by the time the vote was taken the number of members present had dwindled quite considerably”. Objective coverage would have mentioned that the European Parliamentarians had not dared to stay for voting.\(^{992}\) In May 1973, the London headquarters barred Reuters Brussels correspondents from making extra money by contributing articles to the magazine European Community published by the EC Commission.\(^{993}\) Thus, senior editors intervened in Euro-journalist working practices when they deemed them incompatible with the agency’s editorial standards.

Nevertheless, Euro-journalism and the sui generis EC narrative had a strong presence in Reuters newsrooms and coverage. Reuters published a background portrait presenting Jean Monnet as “the Father of Europe” in February 1972.\(^{994}\) On 31 December 1972, Brussels bureau chief Robert S. Taylor announced via Reuters that “A potential superpower, possibly one day rivalling the United States and the Soviet Union, comes into being at midnight tonight (2300 GMT) with the formal enlargement of the European Common Market.” The enlarged EC was “The world’s largest trading power”, the “second richest economy after the United States” and the “third most populous unit after China and India”.\(^{995}\) Reuters adopted the idea that the European Parliament was central to the EC. The agency covered the first

\(^{991}\) Carter to All Desks and Correspondents, European Common Market, 9 October 1972, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.

\(^{992}\) See Macdowall to Taylor, 6 April 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.

\(^{993}\) This had previously been a common practice among the correspondents in the Reuters Brussels office. See Macdowall to Taylor, 30 May 1973 and Maclurkin to Taylor, 8 March 1973 in Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.

\(^{994}\) See Profile Jean Monnet, 25 Feb 1972, Reuters Archive, EEC Background 25.3.71-3.10.84.

\(^{995}\) Market-Enlargement, By Robert Taylor, Brussels, Dec 31, Reuter, 1972, Reuters Archive, EEC Background 25.3.71-3.10.84.
session of the enlarged assembly in January 1973 extensively.\textsuperscript{996} Chief News Editor Macdowall wrote that “Qualitatively it has been an encouraging start. Quantitatively it has been impressive.”\textsuperscript{997} Reuters editors agreed that interest in the Parliament would not remain at this level. However, Anthony Winning of the Reuters Paris bureau argued that “it will still produce plenty of good target copy for Britain and elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{998} Chief News Editor Macdowall estimated covering future Strasbourg sessions would produce a daily average of 2,000 words. “This would justify economically the decision to install our own line and would mean that staffing of the European Parliament must be a two-man operation.”\textsuperscript{999} When West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt criticised the EC Commission as too bureaucratic in September 1974, Reuters journalists defended it. Reuters reproduced the Commission defence line that an administration of “just over 10,000 ‘Eurocrats’ from Commissioners down to security guards, working to service the requirements of a community of nations with a population in excess of 250 million” could not be called too bureaucratic. Schmidt used the Commission “as a scapegoat at a time when things are going badly in the nine-nation European Community.”\textsuperscript{1000}

\textit{First-generation and second-generation Euro-journalists}

The first-generation Euro-journalists played key roles in the Western European media campaigns promoting the \textit{sui generis} vision of ‘European integration’ in the 1970s. Contrary to the 1950s and early 1960s, their \textit{sui generis} view on the EC was now mainstream. The number of journalists working on the EC had multiplied compared to 1958. Nevertheless, due to several factors explained in the previous chapter, the influence of first-generation Euro-journalists on EC reporting in Western European media during the 1970s remained

\textsuperscript{996} Already in November 1972, senior Reuters editors stated that “Britain’s entry will involve more detailed reporting of the European Parliament meetings in Strasbourg and Luxembourg”. BRH, Editor-in-Chief to General Manager, EEC Coverage to meet UK Requirements, 9 November 1972, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
\textsuperscript{997} The Reuters team in Strasbourg “filed a total of 17,390 words between the Monday and the Friday, which was about six times the average volume of the 1972 sessions of the old six-nation assembly.” Macdowall to Taylor, 23 January 1973. The team had worked with a direct telex link between Strasbourg and the Reuters Paris bureau. See Anthony Winning, The General Manager, January 23, 1973, both in Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
\textsuperscript{998} Anthony Winning, The General Manager, January 23, 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
\textsuperscript{999} Macdowall to Taylor, 23 January 1973, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55C Europe.
\textsuperscript{1000} Commission (news focus), by Anthony Winning, 12 Sep 1974, Reuters Archive, EEC Commission, 12.9.1973-1.7.67.
considerable. First, by the late 1960s and early 1970s some pioneer Euro-journalists had reached senior positions of Western European journalism, which gave them the influence to direct ‘European integration’ coverage. Second, during the 1960s they had taken control of important gatekeeper positions of ‘European integration’ coverage and retained that control throughout the 1970s – particularly the Brussels correspondent positions. Third, when the EC became a pivotal topic in Western European media in the early 1970s, Euro-journalists stood ready with their ‘European integration’ expertise. They promoted themselves as the natural candidates to assure their news outlets’ EC coverage. Finally, first-generation Euro-journalists handed on their EC coverage toolbox of working habits and interpretation patterns to a second generation of Euro-journalists who discovered the EC in the late 1960s and early 1970s and who quickly became absorbed by the Euro-enthusiasm of the ‘European moment’.

In Britain, the career development of David Spanier at The Times illustrates first-generation Euro-journalists’ influence on ‘European integration’ coverage.1001 When The Times in 1969 decided “to concentrate more of our fire on Europe for some time ahead” managing editor Iverach McDonald concluded that “David Spanier is the man to do it by reason of both experience and ability.”1002 The Times Editor Rees-Mogg agreed and put Spanier in charge of directing The Times coverage of the British entry negotiations. Spanier oversaw and coordinated the EC-related work of The Times Brussels and other Western European correspondents.1003 The position allowed Spanier to shape The Times EC coverage in many ways. Spanier wrote most of the Times leaders dealing with the EC.1004 He undertook repeated initiatives to improve and expand The Times ‘European integration’ coverage. In January 1971, he underlined “a clear need to widen and deepen the European coverage in

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1001 As explained above, Spanier had covered the British entry negotiations in 1961-1963 and subsequently became The Times ‘European Economic Correspondent’. Already during Britain’s second attempt to join the EEC in 1967, Spanier had argued he should lead the entry negotiations coverage. Spanier told The Times Editor William Rees-Mogg: “I want to suggest, as a principle in reporting this news, that I should have a primary responsibility for covering all such events directly touching in the central negotiations. The advantages of having one man follow the European side of the negotiations, as a single and developing story, are evident. Naturally this coverage will be a cooperative undertaking with our own correspondents in European capitals, who will be reporting continuously on the state of play as seen in their countries.” Memorandum from David Spanier to The Editor, Common Market Negotiations, April 30, 1967, TNL Archive, Confidential Memoranda, Common Market, 1966-1970.

1002 McDonald to Rees-Mogg, The Times Coverage of Europe, 30th July 1969, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.

1003 See Rees-Mogg, Draft memorandum to Mr. McDonald and Mr. Hodgkin only, highly confidential, The Times coverage of Europe, July 28 1969 and Hodgkin to Rees-Mogg, July 29, 1969, both in TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe. While the The Times Brussels office covered the immediate negotiations, Spanier was in charge of the overall coordination of the coverage of the entry negotiations process.

general. This is both to make our reporting more authoritative and to bring the Common Market idea alive.” Spanier argued home specialists covering domestic politics should contribute to EC reporting by putting their topics into a ‘European’ context. “It should be as natural for a home specialist to go over to Brussels or Paris as it is now to attend a party conference at Brighton or Blackpool.”1005 In June 1971, Spanier advocated sending more Times correspondents to Brussels, Bonn, Paris and Rome: “I feel that only if we approach the staffing of these four posts on a dual basis can we keep the kind of coverage, in extent and in depth, that we shall need.” Therefore, “the minimum requirement is for a full time number two in Brussels. This is indispensable.”1006 By the time Britain joined the EC in January 1973, The Times had two permanent correspondents in Brussels.1007 A Spanier initiative also stood behind the Law Reports The Times started publishing on judgments by the European Court of Justice in 1972.1008 Finally, Spanier represented The Times in the editorial committees of Europa and coordinated or produced the content his newspaper contributed to the magazine.1009 On The Times contributions to Europa, Spanier explained that “what we were seeking to achieve in all articles was a truly European perspective”.1010 Based on his successful work covering the EC entry negotiations, Spanier obtained the prestigious Diplomatic Correspondent position at The Times in 1974.

In France, Pierre Drouin became one of Le Monde’s deputy editors in chief in 1969. He continued covering and promoting the sui generis EC narrative, now from a much more prominent position than in the 1950s, when he had been a simple editor in the service économique. In frequent editorials, Drouin put the ‘relance’ of ‘European integration’ after 19691011 in the continuity of the “‘déclaration du 9 mai’ 1950 par laquelle Robert Schuman, au

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1005 Spanier to The Editor, European Coverage in 1971, 5/1/71, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
1006 Spanier warned The Times might fall behind its competitors if it did not expand its presence in Brussels. “I learn, for instance, that the F.T. intends to increase its European staff by 50 per cent as a minimum expansion i.e. even if we do not join the Common Market”. David Spanier to The Editor, Future Coverage of Europe, June 18, 1971, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers A003/000037 Europe.
1008 See Spanier to The Editor, February 14, 1972, TNL Archive, Rees-Mogg Papers, A003/000037 Europe.
1009 See the the records on The Times’ participation in Europa in TNL Archive, Europa Magazine 1973-1980, A002/000024/15.
salon de l’Horloge du Quai d’Orsay, donna le coup d’envoi à l’Europe communautaire”. 1012

Commenting on the signing of the Accession Treaty in January 1972, Drouin underlined the potential of the EC “dont la population dépassera celle de l’U.R.S.S. ainsi que celle des États-Unis (respectivement 256, 242 et 205 millions d’habitants), dont la production d’acier l’emportera également sur celle des Deux Grands, qui sera le plus gros partenaire commercial du monde et dont le produit brut approchera environ les deux tiers de celui des États-Unis”. It was now up to the member state governments to build the EC into a powerful international player by creating a political union. “Les gouvernements auront-ils enfin une meilleure conscience de la chance qui passe sous leur nez et de ce que peut être cet extraordinaire tremplin pour la propagation de leurs idées dans le monde, ou s’empêtreront-ils dans plus de contradictions ? Aujourd’hui, on peut le dire en anglais : That is the question.” 1013 When Britain joined the EC in January 1973, Drouin called for a Europe closer to the people : “une autre Europe ce n’est pas seulement une Europe plus grosse mais une Europe plus proche des hommes qui y vivent”.1014 Drouin reiterated his support for a Europe européenne spearheaded by the EC. “Jamais peut-être, dans son histoire d’après guerre, il n’a été donné au Vieux Monde de manifester aussi clairement son choix. Veut-il se déterminer lui-même, ou bien entend-il continuer d’être à la remorque des États-Unis ?”1015 Drouin was the driving force behind Le Monde’s participation in the Europa magazine,1016 where he insisted that “articles must also be written from a European viewpoint” 1017 and “should be European at heart”.1018

Hans Herbert Götz at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung heavily influenced the newspaper’s ‘European integration’ coverage during the first half of the 1970s. Contrary to Drouin or Spanier, Götz had not risen through the FAZ’s editorial department hierarchy. After his arrival in Brussels in 1963, he remained EC correspondent in the Belgian capital until 1975. However, his status as an experienced correspondent with wide ranging expertise in economic policy and EC matters gave an authoritative character to his reporting on ‘European

1013 Pierre Drouin, Gare au dinosaure !... , Le Monde, 24.01.1972.
1015 Pierre Drouin, Mettre le paquet, Le Monde, 09.03.1973.
1016 The minutes covering Europa editorial meetings throughout the 1970s show that Drouin was present at virtually all meetings. See TNL Archive, Europa Magazine 1973-1980, A002/000024/15.
integration'. Götz’s role was particularly important with regard to FAZ coverage of the plans for economic and monetary union and monetary policy cooperation in the EC framework. While the FAZ’s political section forcefully supported ‘European unity’, the ordoliberal-minded economics section – already annoyed by the wasteful CAP – supported the EC, but observed EMU with scepticism. FAZ editor Erich Welter declared in October 1970 that he considered plans for monetary union or merely the fixation of currency exchange rates in the EC as “the big disaster for stability in our country”. FAZ monetary policy expert Hans Roeper voiced general support for EMU. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s currency crises, Roeper advocated floating the DM instead of imposing capital controls in response to massive dollar inflows from the United States – a move diametrically opposed to monetary union. When the Federal Government changed strategy and imposed several minor capital controls in the summer of 1972, Roeper called this “an alarming departure from the path of the market economy”. Paris correspondent Karl Jetter rejected EMU in 1972. A common ‘European’ currency “would not bring a return to stable money. The national forces of inflation currently affecting national central banks would then inevitably concentrate on a

1019 Götz in 1972 summarised his position in Brussels as follows: “I am happy and the newspaper, as far as I can see, is happy with Götz in Brussels. I am versatile, I provide the business section and the political section with all they need, editorials, features, the daily reports, etc. The editorial department prints what I write. The newspaper and its coverage have a good reputation here, elsewhere, in Bonn, etc. The position with its mix of economic and political topics is as though made for me, the political topic Europe remains important, [...] I compete successfully against other news outlets like Die Welt.”; “Ich bin zufrieden und die Zeitung ist, soweit ich das zu übersehen vermag, mit dem Götz in Brüssel zufrieden. Ich bin vielseitig, bediene Wirtschaft und Politik mit allem, was sie brauchen, Leitartikel, Reportagen, das tägliche Nachrichtenbrot usw. Die Redaktion druckt, was ich schreibe. Die Zeitung hat mit ihrer Berichterstattung hier und sonstwo, in Bonn etc., einen guten Ruf. Der Posten mit seiner Mischung von Wirtschaft und Politik ist mir fast wie auf den Leib geschrieben, das politische Thema, Europa, bleibt wichtig. [...] ich konkurriere erfolgreich gegen Redaktionen wie die „Welt“. Götz to Welter, Kraainem 7.4.72, BArch N 1314/318.

1020 “das große Unheil für die Stabilität in unserem Land.” Welter to Eick, Frankfurt, den 12. Oktober 1970, BArch N 1314/317. Welter’s view reflected calls by neoliberal economists to abandon fixed exchange rates and their according criticism of the EMU plans. Throughout the 1970s, Welter had an exchange with German-speaking neoliberal thinkers in the US such as the Austrian-American economists Fritz Machlup at Princeton and Gottfried Haberler at Harvard. The FAZ reported on their visits to Europe and Germany, where Machlup commented in 1974 that “it is superstition to believe that fixed exchange rates are important for trade and integration.” Instead of building a monetary union, the EC countries should rather reform the CAP and cut down the external tariff. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, „Zölle und Grenzkontrollen abbauen”. Haberler and Machlup with the Harm’s-Preis ausgezeichnet, 18.06.1974, p. 15. Another point of reference for Welter was Hans Willgerodt, nephew of Wilhelm Röpke and professor at the University of Cologne, where he had taken over Alfred Müller-Armack’s chair in Wirtschaftliche Staatswissenschaften in 1963. In the FAZ, he insisted on being a “convinced European”, but rejected EMU plans as “Brussels fiction” and the “wrong way” for integration. In Willgerodt’s view, freedom of capital movements and payments would contribute more to ‘European integration’ than fixing exchange rates. See Professor Dr. Hans Willgerodt, Köln, Kölner Beobachter und Brüsseler Fiktionen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.02.1973, p. 9.

European central bank. That German desires for stability would then prevail is unlikely.” The result would be a “European inflation community”.1022

With his colleagues sceptical, Hans Herbert Götz became the FAZ economics section’s unwavering supporter of EMU and all other EC initiatives of the early 1970s. First, Götz propagated the EC within the FAZ economics section. He lobbied his colleagues for more ‘European integration’ and EMU – “like a ‘Jehovah’s Witness’ standing around with the ‘European Watchtower’”, 1023 as he himself ironically admitted. Götz told his colleagues that the EC and EMU was “the biggest adventure of European politics to be started since the end of the last war, an adventure of the dimensions of the Social Market Economy.” It was also “the minimum of what is demanded from this generation if it wants to pass on a somewhat safe existence to its children.” 1024 When Erich Welter in 1971 offered Götz the opportunity to become one of the FAZ’s economics correspondents in London, he rejected the offer. Götz thereby made sure he continued covering the EC from Brussels, which he stated he enjoyed very much.1025 Second, Götz led a fierce campaign in the FAZ advocating a leap forward in ‘European integration’. Götz’s coverage alternated between crisis doom and Euro-optimism. It reflected his own fluctuating state of mind. “[D]epressed” 1026 after the ‘empty chair crisis’, Götz found new hope with the Summit in The Hague, after which he told Walter Hallstein that “The European cause can just not be broken.” 1027 However, Götz soon returned to a crisis state of mind, warning Hallstein in March 1970 with regard to the EC that “The danger of a break down is real”.1028 In his reporting, Götz applied a dual strategy. On the one hand, he


1024 „das grösste „Abenteuer“, das die europäische Politik nach dem Ende des letzten Krieges beginnen will, ein Abenteuer von der Kategorie der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft.” ; “das Minimum dessen, was von dieser Generation abverlangt werden muss, wenn sie ihren Kindern eine auch nur einigermassen gesicherte Existenz vermachten will.” Götz to Welter, Kraainem 23.11.70, BArch N 1314/495.


1026 „deprimiert”, Götz to Welter, Brüssel 28.2.69 BArch N 1314/451.


1028 “Die Gefahr des Scheiterns ist real”, Götz to Hallstein, 25.3.70, BArch 1266/2424. He also explained to Hallstein “that the EEC is more and more associated with senseless butter mountains is politically virtually fatal,
tried to demonstrate that despite its ‘crisis’, the ‘integration process’ was not dead. In November 1970, when the EEC for the first time held official talks with the neutral states Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden, he stated that “the pull of European unity has captured the neutrals as well”. In December 1972, Götz commented on the British enlargement on the FAZ’s front page: “In a period in which the powers in world politics reconfigure, Europe does the right thing: it moves together.” On the other hand, he underlined the severity of the ‘crisis’ of ‘European integration’ to demand urgent action from the EC member state governments. In October 1969, he warned that “The Community has only a very limited period of time left within which either the coordination of economic and monetary policies will be achieved, or the process of breakup will begin.” Already in December 1968, Götz had urged national governments not to let EURATOM “die”.

After the 1969 Hague Summit, Götz embraced EMU. In early 1970, he supported demands by the Federal Republic’s Minister of Finance Karl Schiller and the Bundesbank for a currency union to first require a convergence of economic policies in the EC. However, countering German liberal criticism that monetary union would threaten stability, he claimed that “stability policy can be practiced more efficiently in a larger space than only on the national level.” In 1971, he opposed the Federal Government’s unilateral floating of the DM, which went against EMU plans requiring a progressive fixation of exchange rates. Götz was furious about the Federal Government. When taking the decision to float the DM, it had
“not contacted the competent institutions at the Commission”, Götz complained on the 
*FAZ* front-page. Götz calmed down with the creation of the ‘snake’ in early 1972. “The 

bonds which had been torn with the transition to a flexible DM-rate last May after the 

outbreak of the currency crisis are newly tied. The abruptly interrupted work towards the 

development of the EEC into an economic and monetary union have resumed.”

The cases of David Spanier, Pierre Drouin and Hans Herbert Götz are emblematic of a 
larger group of first-generation Euro-journalists who gave shape to 1970s’ Western European 
media coverage of the EC. Similarly to Hans Herbert Götz, Carl A. Ehrhardt of the 

*Handelsblatt*, Rainer Hellmann of *Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste*, Philippe Lemaître of *Le 

Monde* and Ugo Piccione of *Il Sole 24 Ore* had come to Brussels in the late 1950s or early 

1960s. Those longtime Brussels Euro-journalists applied the *sui generis* EEC media 
narrative they had developed in the early 1960s to their ‘European Integration’ coverage of 

the 1970s. Other first generation Euro-journalists like David Spanier left Brussels in the 1960s 
or 1970s and took up positions from which they continued or even increased their influence 
on ‘European integration’ coverage of important Western European media outlets. They 
brought EC expertise home to their editorial departments in national capitals. *AFP* Brussels 
correspondent Yann de L’Écotais joined *Le Figaro* in 1973, where he became head of the 

*service économique et social* in 1975. Giovanni Giovannini became one of *La Stampa*’s 
deputy editors in 1968, where he was a driving force behind the newspaper’s participation in 

the *Europa* project. *ZDF* Brussels correspondent Gerhard Löwenthal left Brussels in 1969 and 
henceforth presented the prominent television magazine *ZDF-Magazin*. Finally, some 
Euro-journalists became correspondents in other Western European capitals. Robert

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1034 “keine Kontakte mit den zuständigen Stellen der Kommission gesucht”, Hans Herbert Götz, Verbitterung bei 

1035 He also wrote to his boss Welter: “For 25 years the Germans kept calm, now they again start going crazy and 
show the world to destroy institutions in the 20th century? What the Germans go about, as is well-known, 
they usually do it thoroughly!” ; “25 Jahre blieben die Deutschen „auf dem Teppich“, fangen sie nun wieder an 
verrückt zu spielen, der Welt mal zu zeigen, wie man im 20. Jahrhundert Institutionen kaputt macht? Was die 
Deutschen anpacken, das machen sie ja bekanntlich gründlich!”, Götz to Welter, Kraainem 5.1.72, BArch N 
1314/318. 

1036 “Die Fäden, die im Mai vorigen Jahres nach dem Ausbruch der Währungskrise und mit dem Übergang zu 
einem flexiblen DM-Kurs zerrissen, sind neu geknüpft. Die jäh abgebrochenen Arbeiten an der Entwicklung der 
EWG zu einer Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion werden wieder aufgenommen.”; Hans Herbert Götz, Westeuropa 
der EWG auf dem Weg zur Währungsunion. Die Potenz der erweiterten EWG ist sichtbar geworden, Frankfurter 
Allemeine Zeitung, 09.03.1972, p. 2. 

1037 Under Löwenthal’s direction, the *ZDF-Magazin* frequently dealt with EC topics in the early 1970s. See 
Mauthner, Reuters Common Market correspondent in the 1960s, headed the FT’s Paris office in the 1970s. Stuttgarter Zeitung Brussels correspondent Thomas Löffelholz moved to Bonn in 1973 and headed the newspaper’s Bonn bureau until 1983. Mauthner and Löffelholz perceived national political events in Paris and Bonn based on their Brussels experience and EC knowledge. Occupying EC news gatekeeper positions and other important positions in Western European journalism allowed first-generation Euro-journalists to exercise considerable influence on 1970s EC coverage in Western European media.

Second-generation Euro-journalism

Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a second generation of Euro-journalists joined first-generation Euro-journalists in their EC activism. As Western European journalists overwhelmingly applied the sui generis EC narrative when covering ‘European integration’ in the 1970s, they might all be termed Euro-journalists. However, second-generation Euro-journalist here refers to journalists who specialised in EC affairs beyond occasional or general coverage of ‘European integration’. The great optimism of the ‘European moment’ in the early 1970s attracted second-generation Euro-journalists to ‘European integration’ and the EC – just as the EEC optimism of 1961-1962 had ensnared many first-generation Euro-journalists. With the EC after the The Hague conference bound for political and economic union and about to take on a world role, a new cohort of journalists picked up the EC’s ‘European integration’ narrative. They learned Euro-journalism from the first-generation Euro-journalists. Through socialisation in Brussels and in ‘Europeanist’ circles elsewhere, they quickly adopted the sui generis EC narrative and helped promote it during the 1970s. The following paragraphs will present some of the most prominent second-generation Euro-journalists and their influence on 1970s ‘European integration’ coverage in Western European media.

The Times journalists observed already in the late 1960s that FT correspondents both in Paris and Bonn had previously worked in Brussels covering the EC. They saw this as an explanation behind the good quality of FT EC coverage. In a conversation with the Foreign Editor in August 1969, The Times Brussels correspondent Peter Strafford “agreed that the Financial Times coverage of Europe is very good and the competition that has to be matched. He pointed out that the Financial Times have two people in Brussels, and that their Paris and Bonn correspondents have both worked there and know the form.” Memorandum from the Foreign Editor to Mr. Rees-Mogg, Talk with Peter Strafford – Brussels, August 19, August 20, 1969, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Common Market and OEEC.
BBC Brussels Representative Paul C. Hodgson shaped BBC coverage of the EC in the early 1970s. Born in 1923, Hodgson had a continental background and was bilingual in English and French. He joined the BBC as a foreign language monitor at the end of the war. Hodgson subsequently became a producer at Panorama, the BBC television flagship current affairs documentary programme. Due to his knowledge of French, at Panorama he specialised in European affairs and frequently travelled to France. Hodgson co-founded the British section of the Association of European Journalists in the late 1960s. Hodgson led the British delegation at the Association of European Journalists’ meeting in Bordeaux in 1969. He had very good contacts with senior pro-EC diplomats at the Foreign Office. Before going to Bordeaux, Hodgson coordinated with the FCO and received a briefing by Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State responsible for European matters. In the summer of 1970, the BBC decided to open a bureau in Brussels in view of the upcoming entry negotiations. Hodgson was involved in the planning and was finally himself chosen to build up and head the bureau in August 1970.

After his arrival in Brussels in October 1970, Hodgson supported the British government’s efforts to join the EC where he could, with the agreement of his superiors in London. By April 1971, head of current affairs John Grist declared after a visit to Brussels “that the BBC could congratulate itself on its foresight in appointing Paul Hodgson as its

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1039 His superiors underlined the “key role of Paul Hodgson in the BBC’s coverage of the Common Market negotiations”. News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 7 May 1971, 243. The Common Market (243), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
1043 See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 26 June 1970, 257. The Common Market (105), Confidential and News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 3 July 1970, 267. Common Market (257), Confidential, both in BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1. See also Paul Hodgson, ‘Panorama’ to A.H.C.A.G.Tel. (II), Subject: News and Current Affairs Coverage of the Brussels negotiations, 10th June 1970, BBC WAC, R108/15/1. A.H.C.A.G.Tel. (II) refers to David J. Webster, then Assistant Head of Current Affairs Group, Television II.
1044 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 21 August 1970, 336. The Common Market (328), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
1045 See Peter Watson, Chief Assistant to Head of Home and Foreign Correspondents, Subject: Opening of Brussels Office, 9th October, 1970, BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
representative in Brussels. Since taking up his post less than a year ago he had built up excellent contacts and a powerful position among his fellow journalists.” As BBC Representative, Hodgson did not produce any content, but he coordinated all BBC radio and television coverage taking place in Brussels. Hodgson was on best terms with the British delegation negotiating EC entry. In February 1972, after the conclusion of the entry negotiations, British chief negotiator Geoffrey Rippon wrote to BBC Director-General Charles Curran: “Now that the negotiations for our entry into the European Community are over and the Treaty of Accession signed, I wanted to let you know how much I valued the energetic contribution made by Paul Hodgson in Brussels to what was after all our common interest – keeping the British people up to date and informed of the progress of the negotiations. It was of the greatest help to our team – and particularly those on the information and public relations side – to have someone as tireless and experienced as Paul. I am sure the BBC found his presence in Brussels equally invaluable, and I hope you will think it worthwhile to keep your office in Brussels well staffed, as we join the Community.”

Curran replied that he was “quite sure that our coverage would have been inadequate without his [Hodgson’s] presence in Brussels, and I hold him in high regard for the level of performance which he has shown.”

After the conclusion of the entry negotiations, Hodgson coordinated BBC coverage of the British EC entry. In late 1972, BBC officials discussed how to refer to the European Parliamentary Assembly after Britain would have officially become part of the Community. Was it an assembly or a parliament? After having consulted with Hodgson, John Crawley, Chief Assistant to the Director-General, “said that Paul Hodgson (Brussels Representative)

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1047 News and Current Affairs Meeting. Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 30 April 1971, 234. The Common Market (204), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
1048 More precisely, as BBC Brussels Representative, Hodgson’s task was to “provide an information service for all Television and Radio News and Current Affairs outlets on what is going on, or is likely to come up, in the Common Market negotiations” and to “provide facilities for visiting Radio and Television Correspondents and Camera crews”: He also liaised with all relevant EC actors in Brussels. In short, “To sum up Mr. Hodgson’s function: he will be a “Mr. Fix-It” for all coverage in sound and vision of Common Market affairs.” Hodgson was supported by an assistant and young journalist, Richard Norton Taylor. See Peter Watson, Chief Assistant to Head of Home and Foreign Correspondents, Subject: Opening of Brussels Office, 9th October, 1970, BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
1049 Rippon to Curran, London, 21 February 1972, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1. British diplomats generally considered Hodgson “to be a reliable correspondent who would be likely to put the right questions” to representatives of the British government. See Miss E M Brooker, News Department to Mr McLaren, WOD, Sir E. Peck: BBC Radio Interview, 5 July 1973, National Archive, FCO 26/1337.
1050 Curran added that “you may be sure that whatever happens in Brussels the BBC is fully aware of the need to maintain adequate coverage of what is bound to be an important centre of policy, and therefore news developments.” Curran to Rippon, 23rd February 1972, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
had given the coup de grâce to the use of the word “Assembly” to describe the EEC’s Parliament. The official title was “European Parliament”, and that was how the BBC should refer to it.” Hodgson’s status as expert on EC affairs thus allowed him to influence the BBC’s use of language on the EC. Hodgson stayed in Brussels after 1973 and subsequently became BBC Paris Representative. In Paris, he was involved in the BBC’s initiative of developing a “European radio service” in cooperation with French state radio. Hodgson later became Editor of News and Publications, before heading the French Language Services.


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1051 See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 15th December 1972, 775. The European Communities (743), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
1052 See Alexander Lieven, Controller, European Services to H.H.D. Lancashire, Guidance & Information Policy Department, 8th February 1977; Hodgson Paris Representative to Sir Charles Curran, 1.4.77 in National Archives, FCO 26/1803.
1054 Dale explains that “I always felt very European, I first went to another European country when I was ten years old. I come from the South of England which is very close to France. As long as I can remember I have been a francophone and I went to a French university and I speak French and I just naturally felt very European. And I was fascinated by the subject because it involved my own country and I covered the British entry negotiations from 71 to 73, or 72 rather.” Interview with Reginald Dale, 06.05.2014.
1057 Hetherington told Norton-Taylor: “We shall be very happy to see you as one of the full time Guardian people. You have been of very great value to us already.” Hetherington to Norton-Taylor, 21 December, 1972, John Rylands Library, Guardian Archive, C1/N2/1. Hetherington was happy with Norton-Taylor and “the
Brussels in 1975. Palmer, a graduate of the London School of Economics, had become interested in ‘European integration’ as a leader writer on economic policy at the *Guardian* in the late 1960s. He became the newspaper’s European editor based in Brussels after the British referendum on EC membership and remained in this position until 1997. According to Commission President Roy Jenkins, Palmer “was much the best informed of the British correspondents in Brussels.” Palmer held left-wing views, but remained a fervent supporter of the EC, also when the Labour Party turned against Community membership in 1980. Finally, Alan Watson was an important BBC Euro-journalist not based in Brussels. Watson joined the BBC after graduating from the University of Cambridge in 1963. He became a regular presenter for *The Money Programme* on BBC2 and *Panorama* on BBC1. Watson played a key role in the BBC’s EC coverage in the early 1970s. Watson and Keith Kyle were the commentators during the BBC’s continuous live coverage of the signing of the Treaty of Accession ceremonies in February 1972. Watson was also one of the initiators of the six-part documentary series *The Six and Britain* airing throughout 1971. He made suggestions how the BBC could improve its EC coverage. Convinced that television should be used to promote ‘European unity’ throughout Western Europe, Watson joined the EC Commission Press and Information Directorate-General X in early 1976. He became the head of the DG’s broadcasting, film and television division, which aimed at harnessing broadcasting and film to promote the EC’s cause. Watson had a German wife and spoke fluent German. Hence, family links or university stays on the Western European continent played a role in triggering British second-generation Euro-journalists’ interest in ‘European integration’.

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1055 Interview with John Palmer, 16.06.2014.
1060 The general line of *The Guardian* was to oppose the Labour Party’s demand to take Britain out of the EC. See Taylor, *Changing Faces*, 317.
1061 See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 28 February 1972, 49. The Common Market (26), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
1062 See Common Market Coverage since 1st April, Major items, 17th June 1971, BBC WAC, R108/15/1.
1063 “Too much coverage of the C.M. treats the communities from a legalistic and constitutional viewpoint, rather than from a political one.” Alan Watson, Notes on the C.A.G. Coverage of European Affairs, no date, BBC WAC, T62/102/1.
1064 See Lambsdorff to Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 410/013, Betr.: Besuch von Mr. Alan Watson in Bonn, Brüssel, den 26.2.1976, PA AA, B 200, 114342. Watson remained at the EC Commission until 1980. He then went into politics and became President of the Liberal Party. He also worked as a communications consultant.
Martin Schulze became the leading Euro-journalist on West German public television in the 1970s – “the voice of Europe in the ARD”. ¹⁰⁶⁶ Schulze headed the ARD Brussels bureau, which came to be referred to as the Europa Studio in the early 1970s, between 1970 and 1983. Born in 1937, Schulze studied physics and philosophy in Tübingen, Bonn and Berlin. He started his career in newspaper journalism, but moved to television in 1963. He worked for the ARD magazines Report, Weltspiegel and Monitor. Ambitious and talented, Schulze became head of the WDR Brussels studio in 1970 (WDR was in charge of covering the EC and the Benelux for the ARD). After his arrival in Brussels, Schulze immediately started lobbying for an expansion of the studio. In September 1970, he sent his superiors in Cologne a detailed letter outlining his vision for the Brussels studio. He claimed that: “In the coming years not only the economic but also the political importance of the European community will grow fast. From many conversations I have had with German politicians (Federal Chancellor Brandt, Foreign Minister Scheel, Federal Minister Ehmke, Minister of the Interior Genscher, Agricultural Minister Ertl, etc.) on how they see the political perspectives, it became clear that they all consider Brussels the decisive nerve centre of European politics in the coming years.” Schulze suggested an upgrade of the studio’s technical facilities and advocated hiring new collaborators. He also suggested renting new office space to enlarge the studio. ¹⁰⁶⁷ As described above, by 1973 the WDR had expanded its Brussels bureau into a fully-fledged television studio.

Schulze came to incarnate ARD EC coverage in the 1970s, but he built on the work of Dieter Strupp, who had been an ARD correspondent in Brussels for the Tagesschau since the early 1960s. Schulze was studio head and Strupp his collaborator. ¹⁰⁶⁸ However, Schulze claims to have benefited enormously from Strupp’s EC expertise after his arrival in Brussels. Schulze declared that “If Strupp did not exist, one would have to invent him!” They termed

¹⁰⁶⁸ Schulze was named studio head and thus Strupp’s superior. However, in order not to have Stupp lose face, this hierarchical arrangement was not communicated publicly. See Aktennotiz, Vertraulich!, Herr Hübner, Herr Lehndorff, Herrn Heuft, Köln, den 23.2.1970, WDR Archiv, 11816.
themselves “lone warriors for Europe”. After having been introduced to the EC, the then 34-year-old Schulze attempted to go beyond Strupp’s traditional factual Tagesschau news reporting. He tried to “make political television an event” so that viewers’ interest in the EC would increase. Schulze also built up excellent contacts in the EC world. He explained to his superiors that he organised dinners for around thirty people twice a month in his home. “I dare to claim that thanks to my networking, the WDR Brussels studio is among the best informed foreign bureaux in Europe.” Schulze left Brussels in 1983 and subsequently became one of the Federal Republic’s most prominent journalists. He was named ARD coordinator for politics, society and culture, before becoming ARD editor in chief in 1989. Before retiring, he also headed the ARD studio Bonn, where he oversaw ARD coverage on the Federal Government from the Federal Republic’s capital. Another prominent second-generation Euro-journalist was Henry Schavoir. He headed the Deutsche Presseagentur dpa Brussels bureau. Born in Brussels to a French mother and a German father, Schavoir was bilingual in German and French. He was the president of the Association de la Presse internationale in the second half of the 1970s.

Franco Papitto, one of Italy’s leading Euro-journalists and for three decades La Repubblica Brussels correspondent, arrived in the Belgian capital in 1973. Papitto was born in 1943. A specialist in economic policy, he came to Brussels to cover the EC for the Italian financial newspaper Il Fiorino. Papitto also worked for specialised news agencies and quickly developed considerable EC expertise. After its launch in January 1976, Papitto started cooperating with La Repubblica. The newspaper officially named him Brussels correspondent in 1980 – a position Papitto would keep until his retirement in 2006. After his arrival in Brussels, Papitto socialised with many French and Italian first-generation Euro-journalists, such as Philippe Lemaître. Starting in 1980 and for a couple of years, Papitto published La Lettre européenne together with Philippe Lemaître and José-Alain Fralon. La Lettre européenne was a specialised newsletter providing clients with detailed information on the

1070 „Ich wage ferner zu behaupten, daß das WRD Studio Brüssel durch die Pflege meiner Beziehungen zu den bestinformierten Korrespondenzen in Europa gehört.“ Schulze to Sell, 10. April 1976, WDR Archiv, 15309.
developments in certain sectors of the EC. Just as did Paul Hodgson at the BBC, Papitto developed close relations with leading Italian ‘Europeans’. Papitto became friends with longtime Italian EC Commissioner Lorenzo Natali, who arrived in Brussels in 1977. Papitto explains that “Io chiamavo per nome e ci davamo del tu” and underlined “quanto importante fosse stata la presenza di Natali nelle riunioni europee.” When Natali left Brussels in 1989, “furono lacrime a fiumi quando salutai Natali in occasione dell’ultima cena brussellese nella sua bella casa ai limiti del Bois de la Cambre. Lacrime e singhiozzi senza freni, una scena sicuramente imbarazzante.” Papitto would apply the *sui generis* ‘European integration’ narrative he had picked up in Brussels in the early 1970s in his coverage for *La Repubblica* until his retirement.

Apart from Papitto, there were other prominent Italian second-generation Euro-journalists in Brussels in the 1970s. Pio Mastrobuoni played a key role as the head of the *ANSA* Brussels bureau between 1967 and 1974. As *ANSA* correspondent, Mastrobuoni had access to the most senior representatives of the Italian government; during Council meetings, he went on “lunghe passeggiate” with then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro and received exclusive briefings on the negotiations. Mastrobuoni became friends with first-generation Euro-journalists like Yann de l’Ecotais. He oversaw the expansion of the *ANSA* Brussels bureau from one to three correspondents by 1974. Arturo Guatelli became the Brussels correspondent for the *Corriere della Sera* in 1973 and remained there for twelve years before he was named Paris correspondent in 1985. Guatelli quickly became an “interprete appassionato della Comunità” and an “europeo al limite del tifo” always “coerente con le idee...  

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1075 Born in 1935, Mastrobuoni joined *ANSA* in the early 1960s. After having proven able, he was sent to Brussels on his first posting as a foreign correspondent. Interview with Pio Mastrobuoni in Rome, 11.06.2014.
1078 Based on his successful coverage from Brussels, Mastrobuoini became head of *ANSA’s* diplomatic service and subsequently *inviaio speciale* covering important international events. He ended his career as spokesperson of the Italian Government under Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti between 1989 and 1992.
1079 See Ottone to Olivi, Milano, 10 aprile 1973, ASCdS 6855.
1080 See *Corriere della Sera* to Secrétariat général du Conseil des Communautés européennes, Service de Presse, Milano 20-11-1985, ASCdS 6490.
di Spinelli, di Monnet e di Schuman”. He unsuccessfully ran for the *Democrazia Cristiana* at the European Parliament elections in 1984. Other prominent Italian second generation Euro-journalists were *RAI* Brussels correspondent Francesco Mattioli and *Il Messaggero* Brussels correspondent Ivaldo Franco. Vera Vegetti, *L’Unità*’s first Brussels correspondent starting from late 1974, played a key role in reconciling the *PCI* newspaper with the EC. Following Altiero Spinelli, Vegetti claimed the Western European left needed to contribute to Western European unity. In her reporting, she integrated Altiero’s Ventotene Manifesto into the *sui generis* EC narrative. By the early 1980s, Vegetti declared the reconciliation process between ‘Europe’ and the Italian left to be accomplished. “L’appoggio della sinistra all’idea dell’Europa è ora convinto, dopo anni di obiettive difficoltà, di incomprensioni, di difficile maturazione.” Following Spinelli, Vegetti demanded “il passaggio dalla Comunità economica alla federazione europea, attraverso un radicale mutamento delle istituzioni.”

Ramon Vilaró Giralt became the most prominent Spanish journalist in Brussels in the 1970s. Born in 1945, he arrived in Brussels in 1968 and worked as a freelancer for various Spanish newspapers such as *Madrid*, *El Correo Catalán*, *Ya* and *El Correo Español-Pueblo Vasco*. He also edited *INFORMEUROPA*, a newsletter providing specialist information on different sectors of EC activity. When *El País* launched in 1976, it hired Vilaró Giralt as Brussels correspondent. The main article on the front page of the first edition of *El País* on 4

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1082 Guatelli used the *Corriere della Sera* logo on his election posters. The *Corriere* asked him to refrain from doing this. See Micconi to Ilba, Milano, 17 maggio 1984, ASCdS 6490 and Pulitano to Guatelli, 1/6/1984 ASCdS 8610.


May 1976 was a report by Vilaró Giralt on relations between Spain and the EC.¹⁰⁸⁷ Vilaró Giralt soon rose to become one of the newspaper’s leading foreign correspondents. Based on his performance in Brussels, *El País* sent him to Washington, D.C. between 1980 and 1984 and to Tokyo between 1985 and 1989.

In sum, second-generation Euro-journalists converted to Euro-journalism for similar reasons as first-generation Euro-journalists had done in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First, they often came from multinational families or had lived abroad in other Western European countries. Second, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s captured their imagination. Moreover, young journalists calculated that expertise on the increasingly important EC would further their careers. Third, the socialisation power of the Brussels news hub and ‘European’ networks played a key role in convincing second-generation Euro-journalists of the *sui generis* EC narrative.

**Building a ‘European’ news hub**

In the first half of the 1970s, as Euro-journalism established itself in the mainstream of Western European journalism, Brussels developed from a minor into a major Western European news hub comparable in importance to Bonn, Paris and London. Several factors indicate this rise in journalistic relevance and prestige. First, the number of correspondents accredited to the EC Commission more than doubled and surpassed 300 in the late 1970s. The composition of the EC press corps diversified beyond journalists from the Community. There were more visits from journalists around the world to Brussels. Second, the Brussels foreign press corps organised into an association comparable in size to foreign correspondents associations in other Western capitals. Brussels obtained an *International Press Centre* modelled after those in other Western European capitals. Third, the EC Commission and member states expanded their media relations activities in Brussels. In short, as the *sui generis* EC media narrative moved into the mainstream of Western European journalism, Brussels moved into a first-row position among Western European media capitals. In EC member countries, the ‘European’ correspondent position in Brussels became as prestigious,

¹⁰⁸⁷ See Ramón Vilaró, *El reconocimiento de los partidos políticos, condición esencial para la integración en Europa*, *El País*, 04.05.1976, p. 1. Putting a leader article on the EC on its first front page underlined that the Community and Spanish EC membership was an issue of highest importance to the *El País* leadership. See López Gómez, “Europe as a Symbol,” 83.
or even more prestigious than foreign correspondent positions in other Western capitals.\textsuperscript{1088} The ‘European’ news hub existing in Brussels today, with its features such as the daily midday press briefing, is essentially a product of these 1970s developments.

After 1970, the number of journalists in Brussels increased sharply.\textsuperscript{1089} In 1968, the EEC Commission counted around 150 accredited journalists. They mostly came from EEC member states. Many worked for publications specialising in economic or agricultural affairs.\textsuperscript{1090} After 1970, the situation changed. During and after the EC enlargement negotiations, the number of accredited journalists quickly reached 250, then stagnated, but jumped to over 300 by the late 1970s in the run-up to the European Parliament direct elections.\textsuperscript{1091} Immediately after enlargement in January 1973, the EC Commission Spokesman group counted 218 accredited journalists. Belgium and West Germany led with 36 and 34 journalists respectively. Next in line came the British media with 27 accredited journalists. While only a few British correspondents had remained in Brussels after the failure of the entry negotiations in 1963, British journalists in the early 1970s quickly outnumbered their colleagues from the


\textsuperscript{1089} The transfer of the NATO headquarters to Brussels in 1967 did not lead to a great increase in the number of journalists in Brussels. While Brussels correspondents often also covered NATO issues, in the late 1960s and early 1970s they were mostly concerned with the EEC. Many journalists covered security policy from national capitals and occasionally went to Brussels to cover important NATO meetings and to network. On NATO information policy, see Linda Risso, Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War. The NATO Information Service (London: Routledge, 2014).

\textsuperscript{1090} Some countries such as the Netherlands and West Germany were well represented in the Brussels press corps already in the 1960s. Other media from France and non-EEC member countries sent only a few or no permanent correspondents to Brussels. In 1964, the French EEC Ambassador Jean-Pierre Brunet explained the media situation in Brussels to the head of the Quai d’Orsay's Service de Presse: ”Notre pays y est assez peu représenté, pour les raisons que vous savez (nos meilleurs journalistes économiques viennent, pour les sessions importantes du Conseil, de Paris, mais aucun quotidien n’a de correspondant particulier de réelle qualité dans la capitale du Marché Commun). Par contre, la presse allemande, celle des Pays-Bas, et, à un moindre degré, de l’Italie, prennent cette affaire très au sérieux et entretiennent ici un corps important de gens, souvent très capables et qui ne sont pas sans influence.” Jean Pierre Brunet, Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes à Claude Lebel, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur du Service de Presse et d’Information, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Bruxelles, le 15 Février 1964, MAE/Paris 544INVA 373.

remaining member states in the EC press corps. There were twelve Dutch, eleven French, eleven Italian, five Danish and three Irish journalists. With the increase in the number of journalists in Brussels at the moment of Euro-optimism in the early 1970s, virtually all major newspapers, leading news agencies as well as state and public broadcasters from the nine member states had permanent correspondents reporting on the EC in Brussels by around 1973.

After 1970, media from Western European non-EC member states, socialist countries and other parts of the world also augmented their presence in Brussels. In the early 1970s, numbers rose to eight Spanish, four Swiss, four Swedish, two Austrian, two Turkish and one journalist from Norway and Portugal. Four Greek correspondents joined in the late 1970s during the enlargement negotiations. The 24 US correspondents in 1973 mostly worked for the big news agencies AP and UPI as well as for specialist publications. Japanese news agencies and leading Japanese newspapers sent between three and four correspondents to Brussels during the 1970s. There were three Taiwanese and one South Korean news agency correspondent. Socialist countries from Eastern Europe sent journalists to Brussels in the early 1970s. During the 1960s, most Western European governments had given working

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1092 BBC Brussels Representative Paul C. Hodgson stated in October 1972 that “Most British newspapers now had their own correspondents on Community affairs, either resident in or frequently visiting Brussels.” News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 27 October 1972, 636. The European Communities (625), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

1093 For the numbers, see Commission des Communautés européennes, Groupe du Porte-Parole, Répertoire de la presse, Bruxelles, 18 janvier '73, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.


permits and accreditations only to Soviet correspondents. This changed with détente in the early 1970s. By 1973, Czechoslovakian, Polish, East German and Yugoslav state news agencies had requested and received an EC Commission accreditation for their Brussels correspondents.\footnote{See Commission des Communautés européennes, Groupe du Porte-Parole, Répertoire de la presse, Bruxelles, 18 janvier ’73, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66. This does not mean, however, that covering the EC was their only task. They also followed Belgian domestic politics and covered NATO. Therefore, many Western colleagues – often correctly – assumed them to be linked to Eastern intelligence services. Interview with Reginald Dale, 06.05.2014.} The Chinese state news agency followed suit.\footnote{Interview with Reginald Dale, 06.05.2014.} A visit in 1974 to the EC Commission by Nikolai Pollack-Polianov, deputy editor in chief of the leading newspaper \textit{Izvestia}, underlined Soviet media interest in the EC. By 1978, there were four Soviet EC Commission accredited correspondents in Brussels.\footnote{In 1978, two correspondents worked for \textit{TASS}, the remaining two for \textit{Izvestia} and \textit{Novosti}. See Europäische Gemeinschaften, Der Rat, Entwurf einer Antwort auf den 2. Bericht der Informationsreferenten der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Moskau, Brüssel, den 28. April 1978, PA AA, B 200, 114386.} Media from the Global South remained little represented in Brussels. The EC Spokesman group in early 1973 counted one correspondent from Egypt and India each and two from Zaire.\footnote{See Commission des Communautés européennes, Groupe du Porte-Parole, Répertoire de la presse, Bruxelles, 18 janvier ’73, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.} In sum, after 1973 Brussels reached about the same level as London, Paris or Bonn in terms of numbers of accredited correspondents and, albeit to a lesser degree, national diversity.\footnote{As traditional Western European news hubs and former imperial metropoles, London and Paris remained more diverse regarding the nationality of foreign correspondents working there. African, Asian and Latin American correspondents covering Western Europe worked from London or Paris. West German diplomats in New Delhi stated in 1973 that “Das Bild in der indischen Presse über die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft wird wesentlich durch die in London akkreditierten Korrespondenten der grossen indischen Tageszeitungen und Nachrichtenagenturen bestimmt.” They therefore suggested inviting some of the Indian correspondents in London to Brussels for an information visit. See Pfeiffer, Deutsche Botschaft Indien zu Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Informationspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaften; hier: Belieferung der Auslandsvertretungen mit Informations- und Dokumentationsmaterial der EG, New Delhi, den 17. August 1973, PA AA, B 200, 101243. The same was true for Argentinian correspondents. See Europäische Gemeinschaften, Der Rat, Entwurf einer Antwort auf den 1. Bericht der Informationsreferenten der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Argentinien, Brüssel, den 8. Januar 1974, PA AA, B 6, 101189.}

In 1975, Brussels foreign journalists organised into an association comparable in size to foreign correspondents associations in other Western capitals. On 27 June 1975, they founded the \textit{Association de la Presse Internationale (API)} by merging the \textit{Union de la presse étrangère de Belgique} and the \textit{Organisation des journalistes européens}. The \textit{Union} had been founded by foreign correspondents in Brussels in the 1920s, the \textit{Organisation} by EEC correspondents in 1962. The new \textit{Association} was dominated by EC-correspondents – a fact indicating that being a foreign correspondent in Brussels now primarily meant being an EC correspondents.
correspondent. West German Euro-journalist and dpa Brussels bureau chief Henry Schavoir became the association’s president. He boasted in 1975 that “We have in Brussels almost 280 members and with this we are the biggest foreign press association after Washington.”

Schavoir’s assertion that the API competed with the foreign press association in Washington, D.C. was an exaggeration. However, the claim reflected the self-confidence of EC correspondents in the mid-1970s. They had created an association playing in the first league of foreign correspondents associations in other Western European capitals.

The construction of the International Press Centre (IPC) in 1973-1974 further underlined the new importance of the Brussels news hub. It provided Brussels with a foreign press office building similar to or even outshining those already existing in other Western European capitals. The idea for the IPC arose in the Euro-euphoric moment of 1972 in the run-up to the first enlargement. EC governments and media saw a need “to meet the increasing importance of the ‘capital of Europe’ also in the field of the media.”

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1106 In the early 1970s, foreign correspondents associations in Western Europe had clubrooms and offices of different sizes and with varying facilities. While some associations self-financed their rooms and offices, others got them for free or could afford them due to generous financial support by ‘host governments’. See André Arnaud, Sous-Directeur chargé de la Presse, Direction des Services de l’Information et de la Presse à Monsieur Roger Vaurs, Conseiller Technique auprès du Premier Ministre, Hôtel Matignon, Note concernant l’Association de la Presse Etrangère à Paris, Paris, 12 Octobre 1969 ; Courcel, Ambassade de France à Londres à Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Objet : Association de la Presse Étrangère à Londres, Londres, le 21 février 1972 ; Ambassade de France à Rome à Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rome, le 26 février 1972 ; Sauvagnargues, Ambassade de France à Bonn à Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Objet : Correspondants de Presse Etrangères, Bonn, le 19 février 1972, all in MAE/Paris 544INVA/16.

the Belgian government and with additional support from the EC Commission, construction works started in 1973. The centre was inaugurated with great pomp in May 1974.\textsuperscript{1108} The seven-floor state-of-the-art office building stood right opposite the Berlaymont. Its administrative council included \textit{dpa} EC-correspondent and foreign press representative Henry Schvoir, the head of the press section of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, EC Commission Spokesman Bino Olivi and the president of the union of Belgian journalists. The \textit{IPC} boasted 8,901 square meters of modern office space for dozens of journalists, the latest communication technology, a parking garage, a restaurant, a bar as well as conference and reception rooms. There was also a bank and a post office.\textsuperscript{1109} Around forty media outlets moved their Brussels bureaux to the \textit{IPC} after its opening. Agency correspondents particularly appreciated the proximity to the Commission building. The \textit{IPC} offered office space at below market rates thanks to Belgian government subsidies.\textsuperscript{1110} The \textit{IPC} was a common project by Euro-journalists, the EC Commission and the Belgian government. It helped upgrade the Brussels news hub to the standard of other big Western European capitals. By the mid-1970s, Brussels thus had a large foreign press association and an international press centre providing cutting-edge working facilities to correspondents. In terms of international media presence and media infrastructure, the Belgian capital could claim to have reached or surpassed the level of Rome, Bonn, Paris and London.

The EC Commission intensified its media relations work in the expanding 1970s Brussels news hub. The Commission Spokesman group grew from around thirty members in the 1960s to forty-six members in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{1111} When increasing numbers of correspondents arrived in Brussels to cover the upcoming enlargement negotiations, the Spokesman group in early 1971 introduced daily press conferences at noon, called \textit{rendez-vous de midi}.

\textsuperscript{1108} The centre was inaugurated with a conference on the media and international relations featuring leading Western European journalists such as Theo Sommer, editor in chief of \textit{Die Zeit}, and Piero Ottone, editor in chief of \textit{Corriere della Sera}. King Baudouin of Belgium also paid the \textit{IPC} a visit. See Mastrobuoni, \textit{Diario minimo di Pio Mastrobuoni. Cento colpi di spillo. Storie buffe dei potenti del mondo. Con una prefazione di Giulio Andreotti}, 120.


\textsuperscript{1110} See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Brüssel to Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Eröffnung des Internationalen Presse-Zentrums (IPC) in Brüssel, Brüssel, den 6. Mai 1974, PA AA, B 6, 101177.

Previously, there had been only weekly press conferences. Initially, between thirty and forty journalists attended the rendez-vous de midi held in a large press room in the Berlaymont.1112 Still existing today, the midday briefing came to structure EC correspondents’ daily work routine. The meeting itself did not provide the correspondents with crucial information. However, they attended to get a feeling of the Commission’s general mood and to chat with their colleagues and EC officials after the meeting.1113 The Commission generally expanded its communication and media relations activities, publishing more and more information material. In the year 1979, the Commission held a total of 288 press conferences and briefings and published 450 press releases.1114 Finally, the EC Commission of the early 1970s had very media-prone members. Sicco Mansholt, Ralf Dahrendorf and Altiero Spinelli communicated to and through the media of different EC member states.

The EC Commission paid particular attention to television and radio. In 1971, the Commission invited a West German, a French and a Belgian TV journalist to work in its press and information department. Paid by the Commission during one year, the three journalists advised the Commission on its television strategy and promoted the EC in the state and public broadcasting organisation which had detached them to Brussels.1115 The EC Commission also hired the above-mentioned renowned BBC journalist Alan Watson to head the broadcasting, film and television division in the Press and Information Directorate-General X. West German diplomats in Brussels were impressed by Watson and stated that “the Commission can count itself lucky to have won a man of his calibre as staff member”. Watson’s colleagues

1113 Henry Schavoir, Deutsche Presse Agentur correspondent in Brussels stated quite bluntly in 1975 that “wir haben ein ziemlich weites Feld von Informationsquellen. Wir haben die Sprechergruppe, die jeden Mittag um 12 Uhr ihr Briefing veranstaltet. Da gehen wir alle hin und hören uns an, was Herr Olivi zu sagen hat. Aber das ist natürlich nicht unsere wichtigste Arbeit. Das wichtigste ist der Kontakt mit Leuten, die Bescheid wissen.” “We have a large variety of sources of information. We have the Spokesman group which organises its briefing every day at noon. We all go there and listen to what Mr. Olivi has to say. However, this is of course not the most important part of our work. What matters is the contact with people who really know what is going on.” Interview with Henry Schavoir by Franz Schnell, Personalkurier der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, No. 361, 19. Jg./Nr.9, 1975, S. 15-18, reproduced in Sprengelmeier, Public Relations für Europa, 244-45. Previous research has overstated the importance of the midday briefing and the EC Commission accreditation necessary to attend the meeting. See Baisnée, “La production de l’actualité communautaire. Éléments d’une sociologie comparée du corps de presse accrédité auprès de l’Union européenne”; Bastin, “Les professionnels de l’information européenne à Bruxelles : Sociologie d’un monde de l’information (territoires, carrières, dispositifs).”
1115 The West German journalist came from ZDF, the French from ORTF and the Belgian from RTB. See the documentation and correspondence on the initiative between the Commission and the ZDF, particularly Dr. Arbo von Roeder, Bericht über die Abordnung zu EG-Kommission, Wiesbaden, den 1.3.1973 in ZDF-UA, 6/0096.
in the DG X considered him a “first-class ‘professional’”. Watson made his debut at the Commission by organising a one-hour radio debate with two researchers from the Brookings Institution and Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, which was broadcasted by US public radio and the BBC World Service.\footnote{Lambsdorff to Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 410/013, Betr.: Besuch von Mr. Alan Watson in Bonn, Brüssel, den 26.2.1976, PA AA, B 200, 114342.} Watson became the interlocutor for television journalists in Brussels.\footnote{De Koster, Note pour M. Noël, Objet : accès des journalistes dans les immeubles de la Commission, Bruxelles, le 27 juin 1978, HAEU, EN-2566.} He would also play an important role in the coordination of the coverage by Western European state and public broadcasters of the first direct European Parliament elections. The Commission expanded the facilities at its inhouse radio and television studio. By 1978, the studio boasted a film and a photo library, cutting rooms and a team providing assistance to visiting TV crews.\footnote{The Commission provided an entire film crew to journalists producing films for non-commercial purposes. See Directorat-General „Information“, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, TV, Radio and Audiovisual Facilities and Services, 1978, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.}

National governments perceived that the Brussels news hub was becoming more important hence and increased their media relations efforts. In the early 1970s, Federal Minister of Agriculture Josef Ertl repeatedly complained to Federal Foreign Minister Walter Scheel about the “bad press policy of the Federal Republic of Germany at the seat of the European Communities”. He suggested the creation of a \textit{German Information Centre} in Brussels complementing the information activities of the Permanent Representation.\footnote{Ertl an Scheel, Bonn-Duisdorf, den 24.3.1971, PA AA, B 20-200 1956.} Ertl insisted that immediate action to build up a “counterweight to the intensive press policy by the Commission in Brussels” was needed.\footnote{Ertl an Scheel, Bonn-Duisdorf, 30.4.1970, PA AA, B 20-200 1956.} At some point, the Ministry of Agriculture contemplated sending its own press officer to Brussels.\footnote{The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} obviously did not like this idea. Moreover, West German diplomats in Brussels claimed that it was not their fault when Minister Ertl received bad press: “Wenn Herr BM Ertl nicht immer so ankommt, wie er es wünscht, liegt das nicht am Mangel an Information, sondern oft an Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den sehr sachkundigen Pressevertretern und dem BML.” Moreover, “Es wäre jedoch sehr zu begrüßen, wenn die leitenden Herren des BML auch einmal ausserhalb des Gedränges der Ratstagungen Zeit für hochrangige Journalisten aufbrächten.” Poensgen, G1 III E, Vermerk, Betr.: Bestrebungen des BML, eine eigene Pressestelle in Brüssel einzurichten, Bonn, den 1. September 1971, PA AA, B 20-200 1956.} In self-defence, West German Permanent Representative Hans-Georg Sachs underlined that press relations were central to his job in Brussels. Sachs personally briefed West German correspondents before Council meetings. He also invited them to his home twice a year for a general discussion of EC affairs. During Council meetings, the West German delegation was in constant contact with
the West German journalists present. After 1973, the Federal Government indicated the growing importance of the Brussels press corps by inviting West German Brussels correspondents to Bonn once a year. During the visits, the correspondents met senior civil servants, several Federal Ministers and sometimes the Federal Chancellor. During their Bonn visit in November 1974, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the journalists they were the first group of German foreign correspondents he had met – a sign of how important he considered their work to be. Auswärtiges Amt Minister of State Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski praised the Brussels correspondents as those who keep Europe alive among the German public. West German Ministers frequently met the West German Brussels press corps at press conferences or for background briefings in Brussels. Non-German Brussels correspondents received invitations to Bonn in the second half of the 1970s. In sum, the Federal Government intensified the efforts promoting Euro-journalism it had already started in the 1960s and lifted them to new levels.

The French government also helped to establish Brussels as a first-row Western European news hub. After the British EC entry in 1973, French diplomats in Brussels took action

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against what they considered French under-representation in the Brussels press corps. In February 1973, French EC Ambassador Etienne Burin des Roziers sent a report to Paris warning about “les conséquences que pourrait avoir, à brève échéance, l’insuffisance de la représentation de la presse française auprès des Communautés européennes.” Particularly the absence of the ORTF in Brussels worried Burin des Roziers. “Alors que toutes les chaines de télévision des états-membres de la communauté sont représentées à Bruxelles, l’O.R.T.F ne dispose ici d’aucun correspondant permanent.” The diplomat warned that the weak French media presence combined with the mass arrival of British journalists in Brussels might harm the status of French as the central EC working language. Burin des Roziers concluded “qu’une intervention appuyée auprès de l’O.R.T.F. et une action à l’égard de grands quotidiens nationaux et régionaux s’impose en vue de rétablir, au sein de la presse européenne, un équilibre plus conforme à l’influence de notre pays dans les affaires communautaires et plus favorable à la défense de nos intérêts linguistiques.”

Burin des Roziers’s colleagues in Paris declared they had previously raised the issue with senior French journalists and publishers. A week after the Ambassador’s warning cry, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann sent a letter to ORTF Director-General Arthur Conte asking him to consider sending a permanent correspondent to Brussels and reminding him of “l’influence que nous pouvons exercer notamment sur le plan linguistique par une présence plus soutenue”

1128 Burin des Roziers explained in detail : “L’installation récente à Bruxelles de nombreux correspondants de presse des nouveaux états membres, et en particulier des britanniques, rend plus précaire notre position, déjà mal assurée, au sein de la presse internationale. Pour la presse écrite, seuls l’A.F.P, Le Monde, La Croix et, tout récemment, La Voix du Nord, entretiennent des correspondants permanents à Bruxelles, auxquels il convient d’ajouter deux ou trois représentants d’organes très spécialisés, notamment agricoles. Bien que, du fait de leurs capacités et de leur ancienneté, Philippe Lemaitre (Le Monde) et Yann de l’Ecotais (A.F.P.) bénéficient de la part de leurs confrères d’une considération particulière, la presse britannique avec 28 correspondants et celle de la République fédérale d’Allemagne avec 34, occupent une position privilégiée. Que dire de la presse filmée et parlée ? Alors que toutes les chaines de télévision des états-membres de la communauté sont représentées à Bruxelles, l’O.R.T.F ne dispose ici d’aucun correspondant permanent. Cette situation en elle-même difficilement explicable serait de nature, si elle devait se prolonger, à nous porter préjudice. S’il est vrai qu’en dépit de notre faible représentation de la forte implantation allemande, le travail des journalistes dans les salles de presse du conseil et des conférences quotidiennes du porte-parole de la Commission se font encore en français, la présence d’un nombre important de journalistes britanniques risque d’avoir pour effet que l’anglais devienne bientôt la langue usuelle entre les journalistes. J’ajoute que, du fait de leur nombre et de leur qualité, les britanniques tendent tout naturellement à gagner les faveurs des milieux communautaires et à devenir pour de nombreux journalistes moins bien introduits des intermédiaires pour l’accès aux sources d’information.”


1129 The ORTF correspondent’s name was Jean-François Dumont. Regarding the French press, the Quai d’Orsay’s press department told Burin des Roziers: “D’ores et déjà je peux vous indiquer que notre absence à Bruxelles avait été signalée aux rédacteurs en chef des principaux quotidiens : leur réponses étaient toujours inspirées de considérations financières. La presse française connaît des moments difficiles.” Direction des services d’Information et de Presse to DELFRA Bruxelles, a/s La Presse française auprès des Communautés européennes, Paris, le 21 février 1973, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.
in the Brussels press corps. However, the ORTF was at this point already about to accredit a permanent correspondent to the EC. The episode shows that by 1973 senior members of the French government considered the Brussels news hub as so important that they actively promoted a strong French media presence to cover the EC.

**Conflict**

In the first half of the 1970s, the *sui generis* EC narrative moved into a dominant position in Western European journalism, but journalists often clashed on the exact shape ‘European unity’ should take within the EC framework. They disagreed on the degree of independence ‘Europe’ should pursue *vis-à-vis* the United States and the Global South. More importantly, they clashed on the right path for ‘European’ economic integration. This was true even for the most passionate Euro-journalists in Brussels and elsewhere. The disagreements reflected the divergent views which had already existed among Euro-journalists in the 1950s and 1960s. The dispute about the right economic model for the EC marked 1970s ‘European integration’ media coverage and was integrated in the general crisis narrative applied by Western European media when dealing with the European Community. In the late 1970s, the EC Commission became the subject of prolonged media criticism after *The Economist* in January 1978 published an article unveiling Commission Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp’s excessive expenses for travel and flowers to decorate his office.

The increasing dominance of the left in public discourse across Western Europe, and particularly in Southern Europe, France and Britain, mattered greatly to the media controversies over economic integration. Starting from the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the ‘golden age’ of social democracy experienced its apogee, with leftwing political, economic and cultural views becoming dominant in Western European societies. Elections swept social democratic governments into power from Sweden to the Federal Republic to Austria and Britain. The Communist Parties in Italy and France exerted more power than ever.

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1131 The ORTF correspondent’s name was Jean-François Dumont. See Direction des services d’Information et de Presse to DELFRA Bruxelles, a/s La Presse française auprès des Communautés européennes, Paris, le 21 février 1973, MAE/Paris 505/DI 66.

1132 See Chapter 3.

1133 See the many references to the affair in Jenkins, *European Diary.*
Democracy replaced conservative dictatorships in Portugal, Spain and Greece. Welfare states expanded and Keynesian economic policy prescriptions dominated the responses to the outbreaking economic crisis. Culturally, in the wake of the ‘1968 revolution’ liberalism and secularism pushed traditional values and authorities even further back than they already had in the 1960s. The dominance of the left translated into Western European journalism. Liberal-leftwing media took over opinion leadership from conservative publications. Launched in 1976, La Repubblica and El País broke the dominance of the conservative La Stampa, Corriere della Sera and ABC in respectively Italy and Spain. In Britain, the conservative Times gradually lost its special status as *journal de référence*. In France, the 1970s *gauchisme* of *Le Monde* became a much debated issue. The shift to the left was less pronounced in the Federal Republic, but the liberal centre-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the weekly *Die Zeit* dethroned the FAZ as the leading opinion makers. The 1975 *RAI* reform and the breaking up of *ORTF* in 1974 brought the left institutionalised influence over public and state broadcasting in Italy and France. In the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU complained about journalists at public broadcasters sympathising with the SPD. In short, Western European journalism in the early 1970s overwhelmingly moved leftwards politically, economically and socially, thus changing the prism through which journalists perceived the EC.

Moreover, the 1970s economic and political resurgence and dominance of the Federal Republic in Western Europe influenced EC media conflicts. They led to multiple confrontations between West German and Southern European media in the 1970s. Repeatedly...

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1134 See the chapter “The Social Democratic Moment” in Judt, *Postwar*.
1137 For example, the Foreign Office ended the practice of giving individual briefings to *The Times*’s diplomatic correspondent in 1974. See Grigg, *The History of the Times*.
1138 According to Thibau, *Le Monde* produced a series of leftist *dérapages* in the 1970s, such as voicing sympathy for Mao Zedong, Muammar Gaddafi, the Khmer Rouge and the communists in Portugal. Moreover, the newspaper was very critical of Israel and snubbed Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn by wrongly reporting in 1975 that the Russian writer had accepted an invitation to Chile by Augusto Pinochet. *Le Monde* published a correction, but Solzhenitsyn remained outraged. See Thibau, *Le Monde*, 421–26. In terms of domestic politics, *Le Monde* was firmly anti-Giscard. See Raphaëlle Bacqué, *Le jour où... « Le Monde » choisit de torpiller Giscard*, *Le Monde*, 09.10.2014.
1140 See Guazzaloca, *Una e divisibile*.
1141 Schmid, “Intendant Klaus von Bismarck und die Kampagne gegen den Rotfunk WDR.”
waves of anti-German sentiment swept through French and Italian media in particular. They were triggered by West German Ostpolitik, the Federal Republic’s economic power and orthodox economic policy, the handling by West German society of the Nazi past, and the Federal Government’s acting against left extremism and terrorism. Many French and Italian journalists criticised the Federal Republic as socially conservative, economically domineering and politically reactionary. Tensions peaked in 1977, when the Federal Government pursued a tough line against Rote Armee Fraktion terrorism during the Deutscher Herbst and Herbert Kappler, the former SD officer responsible for the Ardeatine massacre, fled from Italy to the Federal Republic. Important voices in Italian and French journalism voiced concern about the Federal Republic becoming a reactionary policy state apologetic

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1143 In an internal report on the public mood in Italy in 1976, *ZDF* Rome studio head Karl Günther Renz explained that “The pride of the Italians is more and more hurt by the criticism from abroad and by the bitter realisation that without the injections from the USA, Brussels and Bonn they could not survive. The remarks from the Palais Schaumburg [location of the Federal Chancellery in Bonn], the hardness of the D-Mark and the buying power of our fellow countrymen have created here a dangerous mix of inferiority complex, envy, resentment and desperation, which increasingly weights on Italo-German relations.” “Der Stolz der Italiener leidet zunehmend unter der Kritik aus dem Ausland und an der bitteren Erkenntnis, ohne Spritzen aus den USA, aus Brüssel und aus Bonn nicht mehr leben zu können. Die Bemerkungen aus dem Palais Schaumburg, die Härte der D-Mark und die Kauflust unserer Landsleute haben hier eine gefährliche Mischung aus Minderwertigkeitskomplex, aus Neid, Mißgunst und aus Hoffnungslosigkeit erstehen lassen, die das deutsch-italienische Verhältnis zusehends belastet.” Berichte der Auslandskorrespondenten, 1976, Bericht Karl Günther Renz, Studio Rom, Stand 25.4.1976, ZDF-UA, 6/0890.


about the National Socialist past. At Le Monde, some journalists and in particular a controversial essay by Jean Genet blamed an excessively orderly and disproportionately capitalist West German society and “la brutalité du système” for the development of left terrorism. Media conflicts over Western European economic integration were intertwined with many of these conflicts. In simplified terms, 1970s media debates on ‘European economic integration’ were dominated by the confrontation between West German stability-oriented and French/Southern European Keynesian-oriented positions. The economic power of the Federal Republic and the economic fragility of the Southern member states constituted the broader framework for those debates.

Facing economic crisis, rising unemployment and stagflation, EC member state governments agreed that only a ‘European solution’ could solve problems. However, they diverged on what the right solution looked like. The Federal Government, emboldened by the relative success of its stability policy, tended to argue for a convergence towards anti-inflationist policies. It also criticised the CAP. France and Italy in particular, driven by the general leftward shift in public discourse, the vision of a ‘Social Europe’ and fear of German economic domination, advocated Keynesian economics, ‘European’ upwards-harmonisation of social standards and Bundesbank support for their ailing currencies. Particularly the idea of a ‘Social Europe’ gained considerable momentum – not least because Communists in Italy and (to a lesser degree) France made peace with the EC, but at the same time brought their leftist positions to EC debates. According to the ‘Social Europe’ vision, the Community

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1150 The French public and media were alienated in particular by Helmut Schmidt’s strong criticism of the CAP. See Petter, *Auf dem Weg zur Normalität*, 131–43. West German media coverage of the CAP turned extremely negative starting from the late 1960s. See Patel, *Europäisierung wider Willen*, 395, 499, 507.
1151 On the Western European left and ‘European integration’ in the 1970s, see Alan Granadino, “Democratic Socialism or Social Democracy?: The Influence of the British Labour Party and the Parti Socialiste Français in the Ideological Transformation of the Partido Socialista Português and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español in the Mid-1970s” (European University Institute, 2016); Lucia Bonfreschi, Giovanni Orsina, and Antonio Varsori, eds., *European Parties and the European Integration Process, 1945–1992* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2015);
should work not only for economic, but also social progress. It envisioned the Common Market complemented by extensive social provisions and transnational financial redistribution, thus creating a ‘European’ welfare state. In the debate on EMU, West German journalists tended to agree with the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance. They argued that EMU was desirable, but needed to be preceded by a convergence of monetary, fiscal, and economic policies (towards West German standards). Journalists in France and Italy took the ‘monetarist’ view that monetary union was a first step to a subsequent economic and political unification of ‘Europe’. The conflict only abated when the ‘Social Europe’ idea lost dynamism and expert views converged towards the Federal Republic’s stability policy in the late 1970s.

Even the most convinced Euro-journalists fiercely clashed over economic integration during the 1970s. Particularly British, French and Italian Euro-journalists defended a leftist vision of ‘European integration’ and supported ‘Social Europe’. They were critical of the Federal Republic’s economic policies, which in turn received support from liberal West German Euro-journalists. Yann de l’Ecotais at Le Figaro attacked the Federal Government’s decision to float the Deutsche Mark in May 1971 as an egoistic measure undermining EMU. Le Matin journalist José-Alain Fralon published a book in 1975 in which he fiercely criticised the overly market-oriented character of the EC. John Lambert, who had freelanced from Brussels for various British newspapers since the late 1960s, combined journalism and political activism. He co-founded Agenor, a Brussels-based...
‘European’ socialist network, and worked for the network’s journal *Agenor*.\textsuperscript{1157} *L’Unità* Brussels correspondent Vera Vegetti insisted the Community needed a leftward reorientation.\textsuperscript{1158} The *Guardian* Brussels correspondent John Palmer had a reputation in his newspapers for his leftist activism.\textsuperscript{1159} RAI correspondent Francesco Mattioli sympathised with the *PCI*. West German diplomats characterised both as “critical towards the Federal Republic of Germany”.\textsuperscript{1160} AFP Brussels correspondent Anne Vahl was “very critical” of the Federal Republic in their view.\textsuperscript{1161} In the late 1970s, West German diplomats in Brussels worried greatly about the Federal Republic’s negative image among Brussels correspondents. They reacted by inviting groups of non-German correspondents to a “culture tour” in the Federal Republic “in order to present the Federal Republic not only as an economic power in the EC, but to also highlight it as a main culture bearer in the EC.”\textsuperscript{1162}

Tensions among Euro-journalists peaked in 1977, when the general climate between West German and French media hit an all-time low.\textsuperscript{1163} In June 1977, *dpa* Brussels correspondent Henri Schavoir stepped down as president of the *Association de la press internationale*. *Le Monde* correspondent Philippe Lemaître and *Il Sole 24 Ore* correspondent Ugo Piccione had proposed a petition by the *API* to the new Commission President Roy Jenkins. The petition, opposed by Schavoir but ultimately adopted by the *API*’s general assembly, criticised a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1158} Reporting on a Western European Communist Party meeting in February 1975 in Strasbourg, Vegetti supported the view that the EC needed “una politica sociale di grande respiro, che conquisti i giovani, i lavoratori, le forze democratiche della cultura. La comunità ha lasciato finora mano libera alle multinazionali, che non hanno mancato di fare la loro ‘politica sociale’: quella della disoccupazione, del rialzo dei prezzi, dell’inflazione.” Vera Vegetti, I comunisti chiedono a Strasburgo una concreta politica per l’Europa, *L’Unità*, 21.02.1975, p. 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{1159} See Taylor, *Changing Faces*, 80.
  \item \textsuperscript{1160} “Britischer Korrespondent (Palmer) und italienischer Korrespondent (Mattioli) sind der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegenüber kritisch eingestellt”, Fernschreiben Brüssel euro to Bonn AA, Betr.: Reise Brüsseler Journalisten nach Damaskus, Beirut und Amman, 01.02.1978, PA AA, B 200 114386.
  \item \textsuperscript{1161} “Bei Frl. Vahl handelt es sich um eine der Bundesrepublik gegenüber sehr kritisch eingestellte Journalistin.” Fernschreiben Brüssel euro to Bonn AA, Betr.: Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit Ausland, hier: Einladung von Journalistinnen in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Besucherprogramm 1980, 01.06.1979, PA AA, B 200, 121823.
  \item \textsuperscript{1162} “um die Bundesrepublik nicht nur als Wirtschaftsmacht in der EG zu präsentieren, sondern sie auch als einen Hauptkulturtraeger innerhalb der EG herauszustellen.” The diplomats planned a visit to Berlin, including a “Besuch einer typisch berliner Kuenstlerkneipe”, Fernschreiben Brüssel euro to Bonn AA, Betr.: Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit Ausland, hier: Einladung von Journalisten in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Besucherprogramm 1980, 01.06.1979, PA AA, B 200, 121823.
  \item \textsuperscript{1163} See above.
\end{itemize}
reform by Jenkins of the Commission spokesman service. After having taken office in January 1977, Jenkins had reorganised the Commission’s communication policy and dismissed longtime Commission spokesman Bino Olivi, replacing him with the Italian diplomat and EC official Renato Ruggiero.\textsuperscript{1164} West German diplomats commented on the petition that “its background is the dissatisfaction of Italian and French correspondents that Ruggiero does not anymore give them preferential treatment in passing on information as Olivi did.” Schavoir had rejected the petition “not least because DPA had suffered from the preferential treatment of AFP” under Olivi.\textsuperscript{1165} According to the Federal Republic’s Permanent Representation press officer, Schavoir withdrew his resignation after Lemaître and Piccone had expressed regret for the turbulence their petition had caused. Moreover, Ruggiero, other members of the spokesman service and fellow correspondents had urged Schavoir not to step down. “As Schavoir told my collaborator, a relevant factor was that his likely successor as president, Francesco Mattioli (RAI) was considered too leftwing even by his fellow countrymen. Several Italian correspondents had for this reason urged Schavoir to keep his position.”\textsuperscript{1166} The dispute demonstrates that national and political divisions played an important role in 1970s Brussels Euro-journalism.

A second incident involved \textit{Le Monde} and \textit{EG-Magazin}, the Commission’s official German language publication produced in Bonn. In October 1977, \textit{EG-Magazin} published an opinion article by Alfred Frisch, a Paris-based German journalist. In the article, Frisch fiercely attacked “anti-German” and “left extremist and nihilist” coverage in \textit{Le Monde}. Frisch claimed that a “core group of left extremists and communists” and “political agitators” in the editorial department published “objectively incorrect information” on Germany in \textit{Le Monde}.\textsuperscript{1167} \textit{Le Monde} protested against such “affabulations, aussi imbéciles que


Another line of conflict opened up between British media and continental media after the United Kingdom had joined the EC. As demonstrated above, British journalists strongly supported the EC and ‘European unity’. But they also supported demands by the British government to overhaul the CAP and the Community’s financing, which heavily disadvantaged Britain. Particularly French Euro-journalists reacted in an annoyed manner to “la presse britannique qui, pour être une des meilleures presses du monde a fortement tendance à confondre l’objectivité et la ‘vérité britannique’.”\footnote{de L’Écotais, \textit{L’Europe sabotée}, 66.} Media from the EEC founding member countries reacted to British demands with the narrative of the UK as the ‘bad European’,\footnote{See Brill, Abgrenzung und Hoffnung: „Europa“ in der deutschen, britischen und amerikanischen Tagespresse 1945-1980, 151.} which Euro-journalists had developed in the 1950s when Britain had stayed away from the Rome Treaties. In such a context, Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s EC
renegotiation and the 1975 referendum on British Community membership became a public
disaster for Britain’s media image in ‘Europe’.\footnote{On the damage the renegotiation and the referendum caused to relations between Britain and the Federal Republic, see Mathias Haussler, “A Pyrrhic Victory: Harold Wilson, Helmut Schmidt, and the British Renegotiation of EC Membership, 1974–5,” The International History Review 37, no. 4 (n.d.): 768–89.} The British Embassy in Bonn
warned in January 1975 about West German media coverage that the “Recourse to a
referendum is described as “opportunististic”, “constitutionally dubious” and “potentially
dangerous”.\footnote{Henderson, FM Bonn 2816452 to FCO, Referendum: German press reactions, 28 January 1975, National Archives, FCO 26/1712.} Britain remained in the EC, but after the referendum British diplomats saw
the need for an “information campaign to help restore Britain’s prestige, especially in Western
Europe and North America.” They added that “a study of the European Press over the last
several months demonstrated that much leeway needed making up in the presentation of
Britain abroad.”\footnote{Post-Referendum Information Work, Meeting on 3 June between media-representatives from the COI and representatives from EID and GIPD, Restricted, National Archives, FCO 26/1711.} In July 1975, senior FCO officials met the correspondents representing
continental media in London to reassure them about Britain’s commitment to the EC. The
meeting did not go very well. Particularly “The Germans had […] expected a greater degree
of commitment on our part to the ideal of European Union and were frankly disappointed”.\footnote{J S Wall, News Department to Cambridge, GIPD, Briefings for the European press by Mr Hattersley, 15 July 1975, National Archives, FCO 26/1712.} Emanuele Gazzo of 
Agence Europe warned Christopher Soames in December 1977 that in
Brussels “un sentiment d’anglophobie se développe”.\footnote{Gazzo to Soames, Bruxelles, le 28 décembre 1977, CAC SOAM 52/2.} The conflict between British and
continental journalists over the EC would then escalate in the 1980s under Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher.

Resistance against the EC sui generis narrative

Western European media overwhelmingly propagated the sui generis EC narrative starting
from the early 1970s. However, resistance against the narrative persisted at the margins of
Western European journalism. Contrary to the Italian Communist Party, the French
Communist Party did not reconcile with ‘European integration’ à la EC in the course of the
1970s. During détente in the early 1970s, L’Humanité downscaled its attacks on Western
European Integration, but remained opposed to the EEC. “La véritable et grande Europe est
bien plus qu’un groupe étriqué de pays revendiquant ce beau nom”, wrote Jacques Denis, in
charge of international questions at the PCF, in 1971 in L’Humanité. In the newspaper’s
view, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was in a much better position to
represent ‘Europe’. In the late 1970s, French Communists and Gaullists led by Georges Marchais and Jacques Chirac respectively waged a campaign against the EMS and the first direct European Parliament elections. Their remarkably congruent views built on anti-liberalism and French nationalism. L’Humanité denounces the EC as “l’Europe d’Helmut Schmidt”. Yves Moreau, chef du service étranger at L’Humanité, claimed in February 1979 that “La politique européenne giscardienne voue notre pays au déclin. C’est une politique anti-française”. The EMS constituted a “politique de capitulation devant le mark”. Moreau stated that “Même si le monde n’est plus celui des années 1930 et si l’Allemagne est effectivement bien différente de cette époque, n’est-ce pas dans la tradition de Munich et de Vichy que s’inscrit la politique giscardienne de collaboration avec les Konzerns d’outre-Rhin, les plus puissants d’Europe occidentale ?”

The Gaullists Jacques Chirac and Michel Debré put forward similar arguments. In his Appel de Cochin published in December 1978, Chirac called Giscard’s UDF the “parti de l’étranger”. The French President, his government and the French media overwhelmingly denounced the Gaullist and Communist positions as anti-German, xenophobic, nationalist and ‘anti-European’. Euro-journalists took leading roles in striking down Communist and Gaullist arguments. In response to Chirac’s EC-criticism, Pierre Drouin attacked the then mayor of Paris and his Gaullist RPR as the “parti de la ‘ligne Maginot’” on Le Monde’s front page. Drouin argued that instead of fretting at the Federal Republic, France should develop a strategy to improve its economic weakness.

In the Federal Republic, EC media coverage was critical of the CAP, Brussels technocrats and EMU plans, but West German journalist nevertheless wanted ‘more Europe’. Sceptical voices on ‘European’ monetary cooperation calmed down when the EMS’s final set-up reflected West German stability policy. A rare exception was the FAZ economics correspondent in Paris, Karl Jetter. In the early 1970s, Jetter had been very critical of EMU. In the second half of the 1970s, the massive Communist and Gaullist denunciation

1179 See Rucker, “L’Humanité et la détente.”
1181 Yves Moreau in L’Humanité cited in Ibid., 102. See also Ménudier’s general analysis of L’Humanité coverage of ‘European integration’ in the late 1970s in the article.
1183 See Pierre Drouin, Le parti de la " ligne Maginot ", Le Monde, 03.03.1979.
1184 In 1972, Jetter explained his scepticism towards EMU. “A common European currency in its final stage would undoubtedly have the advantage of making intra-European exchange rate changes irrelevant. However, it would not bring a return to stable money. The national forces of inflation currently affecting national central banks would then inevitably concentrate on a European central bank. That German desires for stability would
of the emerging EMS deeply impressed Jetter. He thought most French workers and many patrons shared the rejection of Federal Republic-style economic policies imposed on France through the EMS. “France’s secular inflation and its political fragility cannot be healed from outside by a hard Mark. Such attempts would only reinforce the new complex against the Teutons and make Europe unpopular. France will for a long time remain unripe to re-join a new European zone of monetary stability”, Jetter warned in November 1978.1185 He underlined that the EMS “to many French means the beginning of the end of national sovereignty in monetary policy”. The EMS would thus bring tensions instead of positive spirit to Franco-German relations and the EC.1186 Jetter predicted that Giscard’s and Barre’s ‘German model’ stabilisation policy would remain unsuccessful as “the French give hardly any support to the government’s policy.”1187

British media supported the EC sui generis narrative almost without exception. The British public’s resistance against EC membership was not reflected in the British media. After the affirmative vote on EC membership by the British Parliament in 1971,1188 The Daily Express gave up its opposition to ‘European integration’, which had been one of its core features in the 1960s. Only the leftist New Statesman and the conservative Spectator remained

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‘Eurosceptic’. When the Labour Party turned against the EC, it faced stiff criticism from the British media. In the run up to the 1975 EC membership referendum, virtually all British media supported ‘remain’ – a fact that outraged the ‘leave’ camp. Journalists opposing British EC membership became rare. At the *Guardian*, Political Editor Ian Aitken opposed the EC. At the *FT*, C. Gordon Tether frequently expressed rejection of British EC membership in his column. The *FT* dismissed him in 1976, partly due to his ‘Euro-scepticism’. In 1969, *The Times* Deputy Editor E. C. Hodgkin was sceptical about editor William Rees-Mogg’s enthusiasm for ‘European integration’. Hodgkin warned Rees-Mogg that “Greater concentration on west Europe is going to make our coverage of the other half look thin. We don’t want to exaggerate the distinction, because The Times is European in a wider sense.” Hodgkin retired in 1972, and *The Times*’ conception of ‘Europe’ increasingly narrowed, equalising ‘Europe’ with the EC. However, Peter Jay, *The Times* economics editor between 1967 and 1977, one of the pioneers of neoliberal economics in Britain, figured among the first liberal critics of British EC membership. He stated in 1975 “that men like Chancellor Schmidt are a great improvement on the previous generation of Euro-visionaries”, but nevertheless increasingly argued that Britain should leave the EC.

**Conclusion**

The *sui generis* EC narrative consolidated its dominance and rose to unprecedented prominence in Western European media coverage of ‘European integration’ in the first half of the 1970s. In the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s, ‘European unity’ through the EC

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1192 On Tether, see Kynaston, *The Financial Times*, 389, 419.
1196 For an overview of Jay’s views on economic policy at the time, see Peter Jay, *The Crisis for Western Political Economy: And Other Essays* (London: Deutsch, 1984).
took centre stage in the Weltanschauung of most important Western European journalists. The potential power of a united ‘Europe’ on the international scene combined with the perception that single Western European countries alone could not confront the unprecedented crises of the 1970s convinced Western European elites – including journalists – that ‘European integration’ through the EC constituted a rational imperative. It would also contain the resurgent Federal Republic. Journalists saw their task as educating their audiences about the merits of the EC. When the end of postwar growth smashed the unlimited optimism of the ‘European moment’, Western European journalists did not drop their support of ‘European unity’. Instead, they reinforced their EC advocacy. Following the sui generis EC narrative, they framed the 1970s as a period of multiple ‘crises’ of ‘European integration’. They thereby shaped contemporary perceptions and later historical scholarship which saw the 1970s as a period of ‘crises’ for ‘Europe’. Both during and after the ‘European moment’, the sui generis EC narrative had a strong presence in both elite and mass media and ‘European integration’ repeatedly dominated the Western European news agenda.

The pioneer Euro-journalist who invented the sui generis EEC media narrative in the 1960s played key roles in ‘European integration’ coverage of Western European media in the 1970s. Their influence derived from several factors. First, pioneer Euro-journalists’ career progression lifted them into influential or leading positions in Western European journalism. As section heads or even editors in chief, they had the power to install the sui generis EC narrative as the right way to cover ‘European integration’. Second, pioneer Euro-journalists remained in control of important gatekeeper positions of ‘European integration’ coverage they had come to occupy in the 1960s. For example, there was considerable personnel continuity in the EC Brussels press corps between the 1960s and the 1970s. Third, when senior journalists wanted to increase their EC coverage in the early 1970s, they turned to the pioneer Euro-journalists who had already developed considerable expertise on the Community’s complexity. Finally, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s, interest in foreign cultures and socialisation processes led to the emergence of a second generation of Euro-journalists in the 1970s. They perpetuated the 1960s model of Euro-journalism into the 1970s and the following decades.

Simultaneously with the consolidation of the sui generis EC narrative in Western European journalism, Brussels became a news hub on the same level as the big Western European news centres like Rome, Bonn, Paris and London. The number of correspondents accredited to the
EC Commission grew. The EC press corps diversified with journalists from non-EC countries coming to Brussels to cover ‘European integration’. The EC press corps organised in a foreign correspondents association comparable in size to the foreign press clubs in other Western capitals. By 1974, Brussels correspondents could work from a state-of-the-art international press centre erected right next to the Berlaymont. Brussels Euro-journalists, the EC Commission and member state governments all supported the transformation of Brussels into a first-rate news centre with measures ranging from financial support to receiving delegations of EC correspondents for high profile visits in national capitals. It was in the first half of the 1970s that the Brussels news hub took the form it has kept until today.

Finally, the consolidation of the *sui generis* EC media narrative did not mean that conflicts over ‘European integration’ ended. Indeed, the confrontation particularly between French and West German visions of ‘European’ economic integration intensified and played out frequently in Western European media during the 1970s. Conflicts over EC economic integrations grew due to three factors. First, French and Southern European journalists feared the Federal Republic’s increasing economic domination of Western Europe. Second, the economic crises of the 1970s put West-German stability policies and ‘Romanic’ Keynesian dogmas on a collision course. Third, the sharp leftward shift of public discourse and journalism particularly in France and Italy made journalists there rally against what they perceived as excessive liberalism and conservatism in the Federal Republic. There was a consensus in Western European media on ‘European integration’ through the EC, however, conflicts over economic integration *within* the EC framework actually intensified. Resistance to the *sui generis* EC narrative remained present only at the margins of Western European journalism.
In the mid-1970s, Euro-journalism had consolidated into the standard way of covering ‘European integration’ in the Western European media. In the second half of the 1970s, the EC emerged in the Western European media as the democratic ‘European’ polity which journalists today cover as the EU. Committed to Euro-journalism and ‘European’ identity building, journalists mounted repeated media campaigns promoting ‘European unity’. They framed the EC as an increasingly fully-fledged ‘European’ political system boasting the same democratic qualities as national political systems. Reflecting on the ZDF Brussels studio in 1977, ZDF head of foreign affairs Rudolf Radke expressed this way of thinking as follows: “I am stating that our Brussels representation is a studio sui generis. Its strong focus on the EC’s community function justifies ranking it on the same level as the Bonn studio, as if it were standing at the centre of European domestic politics”. This chapter analyses the EC’s ‘going public’ as the democratic supranational polity we know today in Western European media in the second half of the 1970s. This process marked the final transformation of the EC from a technocratic international organisation into a democratic ‘European’ polity – and thus the definite victory of the *sui generis* EC media narrative.

Western European media campaigns portraying the EC as a wholesale democratic ‘European’ polity resulted from two factors. On the one hand, the EC actually expanded and changed, particularly with the European Council and the first direct elections to the European Parliament. By the end of the 1970s, the EC polity was comprised of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and a directly elected European Parliament – all core institutions of today’s EU. On the other hand, the media heavily inflated this ‘European
political system’ with *sui generis* symbolism. Western European journalists heavily campaigned for the ‘European polity’ for two main reasons. First, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s had transformed them into committed believers in the need for more ‘European integration’. Second, in the mid-1970s they perceived ‘European integration’ to be in the deepest ‘crisis’ of its history.\(^{1198}\) In their desperation, they were eager to support any means to relaunch the ‘integration process’. Besides EC southern enlargement, monetary cooperation with the European Monetary System and CAP reform, Western European journalists focused in particular on two developments. They supported the European Council as the entity providing the EC with new impetus and direction, albeit acknowledging that its intergovernmental character was not entirely in line with the *méthode communautaire*. Moreover, they embraced the first direct European Parliamentary elections as a cure-all remedy against the lack of involvement by ‘ordinary citizens’ in the ‘European project’. Western European journalists in the second half of the 1970s thereby mounted an unprecedented campaign for the first direct European Parliamentary elections and staged European Council meetings as huge media events. These two operations were key to the public emergence of the EC as today’s supranational polity.\(^{1199}\)

EC media coverage in the late 1970s took place during and contributed to a temporary wave of new ‘European integration’ optimism. This optimism, although not as strong as in the early 1970s, derived from several developments. Most importantly, the member states’ economic situation had improved and triggered hopes that the 1970s economic turmoil was ending. The EMS created in March 1979 constituted a ‘European’ solution to monetary and economic instability.\(^{1200}\) Entry negotiations with Greece unexpectedly rebounded and came to a successful conclusion with the signing of the accession treaty in May 1979. Greece joined the EC in January 1981.\(^{1201}\) The first direct European Parliamentary elections seemed to constitute a leap forward towards a democratic ‘Europe’. The arrival of prominent British Labour politician Roy Jenkins as Commission President had given new dynamism to the

\(^{1198}\) As described in the previous chapter, economic instability, international threats, sceptical public opinion, halted enlargement negotiations with Greece and ferocious disputes among EC member-state governments over political and particularly economic integration seemed to threaten the European Community’s very existence – just a few years after the ‘relaunch’ in The Hague.

\(^{1199}\) As this study concentrates on the media emergence of the EC as today’s supranational polity, the chapter focuses on the European Council and the European Parliament and leaves coverage of the EMS, EC enlargement, the CAP and other issues aside.

\(^{1200}\) See Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money*.

\(^{1201}\) See Karamouzi, *Greece*. 
Commission already in 1977. Integration optimism led to an increase in the number of journalists accredited to the EC institutions in Brussels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the optimism withered away with the second oil shock and the ensuing recession in 1979 and 1980. It gave way to the perception of the first half of the 1980s as another period of crisis and ‘Eurosclerosis’. Internationally, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the NATO Double-Track Decision and the introduction of martial law in Poland reinforced the crises sentiment. The superpowers moved from détente to the Second Cold War. After having improved during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford, transatlantic relations again turned sour under President Jimmy Carter. Despite all this, the EC’s media status as a democratic ‘European’ polity became stronger than ever – in times of crisis the success of ‘European integration’ seemed again more necessary than ever.

European Parliament and European Council

In the 1970s, direct European Parliamentary elections became the cornerstone of the ‘European’ identity building campaign Western European elites unleashed on their citizens. Direct elections would democratise and popularise the EC and thus give a future to ‘European integration’. The pioneers of the sui generis EC narrative had invented the idea that the Communities, as the future ‘European’ polity, needed democratisation in the 1950s and 1960s. They had demanded a directly elected European Parliament from the start. What

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1207 See Wiegrefe, *Das Zerwürfnis*.
1208 On the invention of the sui generis narrative, see Chapter 4. The sui generis EC narrative gave a central position to the European Parliament in the ‘European’ polity, elevating it vis-à-vis other international organisations’ assemblies such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. On early debates on democracy, parliamentarism and ‘European integration’, see Eric O’Connor, “Democracy in the Dark: The Origins of Popular Political Participation in the European Union, 1949-1975” (Ph.D. in European History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2014); Guido Thiemeyer, “Die Debatten um die Versammlungen: Parlementarismus und
had been a marginal position in the 1950s became a mainstream view among Western European elites in the 1970s. There were several reasons for this. First, direct European Parliamentary elections would provide member state governments quarrelling over economic cooperation with a common political project to move ‘European integration’ forward. Democratising the EC was central to both the Hallstein Christian Democratic vision of a ‘European’ Bundesstaat and the spinelliano socialist scheme for a ‘Social Europe’, which regarded welfarism and democracy as two sides of the same coin. Elites believed the elections would trigger a democratic sursaut européen reinvigorating the ‘integration process’, beyond national and left-right divides. Second, direct elections would improve the EC’s legitimacy in the eyes of ‘European’ citizens, who in opinion polls showed continuing disinterest and increasing scepticism towards the EC. Western European elites attributed diminishing public support for the EC to its ‘democratic deficit’, not to generally shrinking public support for governments and international organisations in the 1970s economic crises. In their view, it was essential to get ‘European’ citizens involved in ‘European’ politics, just as they were involved in national politics. Third, Western European elites hoped direct European Parliamentary elections would establish the EC as a powerful international actor – a ‘civilian power’ promoting democracy. European Parliamentary elections here went hand in hand with the EC’s 1970s and 1980s efforts to spread democracy in its Southern European periphery via Community enlargement. In short, direct elections to the European Parliament were seen as essential to overcoming the 1970s crises and conflicts in the EC. They would help build a democratic ‘European’ polity and identity, relevant to and shared by all ‘Europeans’. Finally, they would increase the Community’s international stature.

Western European elites framed resistance against direct European Parliamentary elections...
– voiced in particular by parts of the British Labour Party and French Communists and Gaullists – as ‘anti-European’ and backward.\textsuperscript{1214}

EC member states gradually implemented direct elections to the European Parliament during the 1970s. At the same time, the assembly kept its purely advisory role in the EC legislative process. At the Summit of Heads of State or Government in Paris (the future European Council) in December 1974, EC leaders decided that direct elections should take place as soon as possible, preferably in 1978. The Council of Ministers adopted the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage in September 1976. Working out the elections’ modalities took longer than planned. They were thus postponed from 1978 to 1979. Elections finally took place from 7 to 10 June 1979. Around 185 million voters cast their ballots across the nine EC member states and elected 410 members of parliament. Voter turnout averaged at approximately 63 percent. Apart from Belgium and Luxembourg – where there was compulsory voting – turnout was highest in Italy (around 85 percent) and the Federal Republic (around 66 percent). It was lowest in Denmark (around 48 percent) and Britain (around 32 percent).\textsuperscript{1215} Following the logic according to which the EC was a democratic polity in the making modelled after national democracies, Western European elites compared the ‘European’ elections to national elections, where turnout rates were higher. They concluded that the assembly’s marginal place in the EC decision-making process stood behind voters’ supposedly weak interest in the elections. The European Parliamentary elections had been and would remain ‘second-order elections’ until there was an extension of the assembly’s competencies in line with the democratic standards of national parliaments.\textsuperscript{1216} Western European elites did not pay much attention to the remarkable fact that 185 million Western Europeans had cast their vote for a parliament without any influence on their lives. They also did not consider the possibility that disinterest in the European elections could have resulted from limited interest in their ‘European’ identity building – independently of the European Parliament’s formal democratic credentials.


\textsuperscript{1215} Voter turnout was around 61 percent in France, around 64 percent in Ireland and around 58 percent in Denmark. See CVCE, Rates of participation in European elections (1979-2014), available at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/rates_of_participation_in_european_elections_1979_2009-en-7dc3c1c-13f3-43a6-865f-8f17cf307ef7.html [27.12.2016].

\textsuperscript{1216} The now widely used term ‘second-order election’ was coined by Reif and Schmitt. See Reif and Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results.”
The emergence of the European Council in 1974 and 1975 transformed the institutional dynamics of the EC. Based on an initiative by French President Giscard d’Estaing, EC Heads of State and Government decided to create the European Council at the Paris Summit in December 1974. With ‘European integration’ being perceived as in a deep crisis, the European Council’s primary purpose was to provide the EC with stronger leadership and new dynamism. Institutionalised meetings would allow EC leaders to socialise and to concentrate on the ‘big picture’ EC issues.1217 There had been only six EEC summit meetings between 1957 and 1974. Starting from 1975, EC Heads of State or Government gathered two or three times a year. The adherents of the méthode communautaire complained about the European Council’s ‘intergovernmental’ character. However, the institution quickly turned into the central actor in the EC system of governance. The European Council’s primary task became to give direction to ‘European integration’. It dealt with all EC-related topics and settled disputes between EC institutions.1218 The European Council and the G7 were the central pillars in the system of institutionalised summitry for international governance that the leading Western countries developed in response to the multiple crises and challenges of the 1970s.1219 International and ‘European’ summitry marked ‘global governance’ and ‘European integration’ in the following decades.

This chapter rebuts the view that starting from the mid-1970s, European Council meetings became the primary subject of ‘European integration’ media coverage, while other aspects of the EC and particularly the European Parliament remained marginal.1220 Instead, the chapter argues that Western European journalists undertook considerable and similar efforts to cover both the European Council and the directly elected European Parliament. In their view, the assembly was a central pillar of the emerging democratic ‘European’ polity and needed as

1218 Mourlon-Druol argues that four factors led to the rise of the European Council. First, the challenges posed by globalisation made the regular meetings necessary. Second, the European Council created an institutional balance satisfactory to all EC actors. Third, the EC benefited from the public and symbolic value of the summits. Fourth, EC leaders used the meetings to re-politicise the EC in the context of debates on its legitimacy. See Mourlon-Druol, “Steering Europe.”.
much journalistic attention as the European Council. To provide evidence for this claim, in
the following sections European Parliament media coverage will be discussed at greater
length than European Council coverage.

Promoting the European Council

In the second half of the 1970s, the European Council emerged as the central actor in the
European Community polity in the Western European media in the same way in which it
functions in today’s European Union. While European Council meetings served to
confidentially discuss important EC and international issues in an informal and small circle,
their symbolic value was equally important. The summits showcased unity among EC leaders
and a European Community capable of acting in times of crisis. European Council
meetings became huge media events. “Experience has shown that around 400 journalists
travel to European Council meetings. They need to be added to the local journalists also
attending. […] Moreover, there are the assistants and technicians. For the European Council
in Rome the RAI, which provided auxiliary services to the other television organisations,
accredited 150 technicians alone”, West German diplomats observed in July 1977. Preparing
the West German Council Presidency in the second half of 1978 – with two Councils of
Ministers, an informal Gymnich meeting and a European Council – the Auswärtige Amt stated
that “The quantity and quality of press coverage of these events will largely determine the
impression our presidency makes […] among the public.” Therefore, national
governments carefully staged European Councils and supported media coverage where they
could.

Governments and the Council Secretariat made great efforts to facilitate the work of
journalists at European Councils. When planning the 1978 European Council press centre in
Bremen, Hagen Graf Lambsdorff, press officer at the Federal Republic’s Permanent

1221 See Mourlon-Druol and Romero, International Summitry and Global Governance. Bonhomme has already
described the dual purpose of G7 summits, which served for secret talks and public showcasing of Western
unity. See Bonhomme, “Between Political Messages and Public Expectations: G7 Summits in French and US
Public Opinion (1975-1985).” See also Mathias Haeussler, “Zwischen Weltwirtschaftsopern und Kamingespräch:
Helmut Schmidt und die Gipfeldiplomatie am Beispiel der deutsch-britischen Beziehungen, 1974-82,” in Medien
der Außenbeziehungen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Anuschka Tischer and Peter Hoeres (Köln,
1222 “Vom Presseecho auf diese Veranstaltungen hängt weitgehend das Bild unserer Präsidentschaft (die sich im
Bereich der EPZ ja sonst im Verborgenen abspielt) in der Öffentlichkeit ab.” Von der Gablentz to Referat 013,
Representation to the EC, stated that “the preceding Dutch, British and Belgian presidencies could rely on a generously endowed press centre in direct proximity to the conference venue.” Lambsdorff described how journalists “needed a lot of space”. He further underlined “that the path between the venue and the press centre should be short.” Governments and the Council Secretariat kept accreditation procedures as simple as possible. All journalists received a “press kit” with conference documents. At the European Council summits in Rome (1975) and The Hague (1976), there were central information desks helping journalists with any questions and problems. The Council Secretariat’s press service provided a similar “secrétariat technique” for the European Council in Brussels in July 1976. A system of loudspeakers and television screens in the press centre announced important information. European Council venues usually had several small briefing rooms and one big room for general and final press conferences. The big room had seats for around 300 of journalists, half of which were with headphones for simultaneous interpreting. European Council press centres further offered copy machines and a bar with coffee and drinks. A selection of international newspaper and Reuters, AFP, dpa and AP agency tickers were also available. For print journalists, press centres provided 200 to 250 working spaces. Those were equipped with typewriters with German, English, French, Italian and Scandinavian keyboards. There were also dozens of telephone booths and twenty to thirty Telex machines, which journalists used to transmit their reports to their editorial departments. Radio journalists needed five to eight cabins to record and transmit their reports. The EBU usually provided video transmission facilities for TV journalists. According to the Council Secretariat, the facilities outlined above constituted the “installations techniques habituelles” for a European Council summit. National governments and the Council Secretariat thus went to great lengths to provide hundreds of journalists with all they needed for smooth summit coverage.

Governments paid considerable attention to the staging of the summits to generate the desired media coverage. Press officer Lambsdorff suggested “an electronic standing camera
close to the exit of the conference room in a silent spot, so that the heads of the delegation can come as quickly as possible from the conference room to in front of the camera.” Lambsdorff also gave advice on how to produce the desired photographs depicting the EC leaders during and after the summit. “As experience has shown, the multiplicity of photographers at European Councils creates problems.” However, despite being difficult to handle, Lambsdorff suggested “to allow all photographers and camera people into the conference room for a short period of time at the beginning of the conference”. This would make sure newspapers and television were supplied with the necessary pictures and video material. Regarding the “traditional ‘family photo’”, a “suitable place needs to be chosen in advance” and should be “communicated to the photographers with a specific time”. During the discussions and the dinner, an official government photographer took pictures. These photos “must be made available quickly, in an appropriate quantity and without costs” to the journalists present.1227 The final press conference was filmed and the video material made available to all interested broadcasting stations.1228 In view of the “considerable additional press work” the Auswärtiges Amt reinforced its press department with additional staff for the time of its 1978 Council Presidency.1229 EC Permanent Representation press officer Lambsdorff travelled from Brussels to Bonn to brief his colleagues on the Council of Ministers and European Council press work.1230 A member of the press department was sent to London to consult with the British Government on how they had handled media relations during their presidency and the London European Council in June 1977.1231 In the Federal Republic and France, staging European Councils intertwined with the staging of the couple franco-allemand relationship between Giscard and Schmidt.1232 In sum, governments did their utmost to make sure European Councils produced the desired media message of unity and action by EC leaders.

Governments closely monitored media coverage during and after European Council meetings. At the European Council summit in Brussels in July 1976, the AFP supplied French
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his team three times a day with a service spécial Président containing mostly political news. The transmission went through the French Embassy in Brussels. Giscard also received a selection of the agency’s service Europe and a morning and evening press review. At the European Council in Brussels in 1978, French diplomats had orders to place “réactions au conseil européen” on top of French, European and international news in the folder containing the revues de presse for the president and his collaborators.

Media coverage

European Councils became an essential part of the work of Western European journalists covering ‘European integration’ in the second half of the 1970s. The ‘European’ summits became part of the framework of the already existing patterns for the coverage of Council of Ministers meetings. Three types of journalists attended the European Council meetings. First, local journalists working in the country where the ‘European’ summit took place. Second, leading international affairs and economic journalists who also covered the G7 summits. They were the pioneers of the emerging ‘summit journalism’ – in German Gipfeljournalismus – developing around 1970s international summitry. Third, ‘European integration’ specialists from all EC member states and the EC Brussels press corps. Brussels correspondents in charge of covering the EC took on the task of covering the new European Council, which quickly became central to their work. In short, the European Council became an important recurring theme in ‘European’ and international affairs journalism attracting hundreds of journalists each time.

The centrality of the European Council to EC journalism is nicely illustrated by the 1980 British Granada Television film production Mrs. Thatcher’s billion. The film replayed the 1979 Dublin European Council in which British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher demanded a renegotiation of the British contribution to the EC budget. Granada TV casted leading Brussels correspondents and prominent journalists as actors to star as the summit’s

1235 See Donat, Brüsseler Machenschaften, 156.
protagonists. According to EC Commission President Roy Jenkins, *The Economist* journalist Sarah Hogg “played Mrs Thatcher in a way almost worthy of Sarah Bernhardt”. *WDR* Brussels correspondent Martin Schulze played Helmut Schmidt and Paul Fabra of *Le Monde* incarnated Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Both performed “brilliantly” in Jenkins’s view. Arrigo Levi of *La Stampa* acted as Francesco Cossiga and *The Economist* EC correspondent Stephen Milligan played Commission President Jenkins – “accurately in substance, but I thought without style.” The film was broadcasted on television and screened in the Commission’s *salle de presse* in March 1980. Jenkins thought it noticeable “that the highly informed, blasé audience of about 150 assembled in the salle de presse broke into spontaneous applause when the film was over. It was a remarkable tour de force.”\(^{1237}\) The film illustrated the degree to which the implicated journalists had become familiar with the European Council and its protagonists by 1980. It also underlined a general appreciation of the journalists’ central role in the summits.\(^{1238}\)

European Council meetings became huge media events in Western European media. Media attention could vary according to the relevance of the issues debated during the summits. However, the presence of nine and after 1981 ten heads of state and government assured the meetings constantly high levels of media coverage.\(^{1239}\) Broadcasters from the nine EC member states flocked to the ‘European’ summits and developed the choreography of television coverage still in use today. The heads of state and government were displayed arriving at the conference venue and before the discussions started. They gave interviews on arrival and during the concluding press conference. Production statistics for the year 1977 show that the *ZDF* Brussels studio produced several contributions for each of the European Council meetings in Rome, London and Brussels.\(^{1240}\) The same applied for the European Councils in Luxembourg and Venice in 1980.\(^{1241}\) The *BBC* also covered the European Council. Particularly the 1979 Dublin summit with Margaret Thatcher demanding a renegotiation of the EC budget was reported in extenso. *BBC* Director-General Ian Trethowan


\(^{1238}\) Commenting on Martin Schulze in 1981, British EC diplomats in Brussels underlined: “He is also an important figure here who was chosen by Helmut Schmidt to impersonate him in the Granada TV reconstruction of the Bremen European Council of July 1978.” See Colvin to Rogers, Cat 1 sponsored visit: foreign Brussels-based journalists: 15 to 17 July 1981, 2 July 1981, National Archives, FCO 30/4761.

\(^{1239}\) The summits’ locations might also have played a role. In 1980, *Guardian* Deputy Editor David MaKie joked about the European Summit due to take place in Venice that “Given the mouth-watering nature of this venue, it can be taken for granted that at least half the office will try to wangle its way there.” David MaKie, March 5 1980, Guardian News & Media Archive, GUA/6/1/2/1/1/20.

\(^{1240}\) See Produktionsstatistik 1977, Studio Brüssel, ZDF-UA, 6/0906.

\(^{1241}\) See Produktionsergebnisse, Studio Brüssel 1980, ZDF-UA, 6/0946.
“ascertained that Board of Management agreed with him in judging that BBC coverage of Mrs. Thatcher’s negotiations with fellow EEC leaders in Dublin had been well done.” Other editors “said that the BBC had stopped a long way short of the exaggerations of Fleet Street’s coverage of that story.”

It was in the second half of the 1970s that European Council meetings started appearing on television in the form we still see them in today.

Leading Western European newspapers also covered the Council meetings extensively. Meyer showed that quality newspapers in France, Britain and the Federal Republic offered in-depth reporting on European Council meetings. He analysed coverage in Le Monde and Le Figaro, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph on the summits of The Hague (1969), Paris (1974), Brussels (1978), Luxembourg (1985) and Maastricht (1991). Meyer’s normative approach failed to produce evidence for the progressive formation of a ‘European public sphere’ or a linear ‘Europeanisation’ of media coverage. But he showed that long before the Maastricht summit launching the European Union, European Council meetings in the 1970s were important reference points for the six newspapers. They generated dozens of articles in the six newspapers in the weeks around the summits. Particularly the 1978 Brussels summit attracted high levels of media attention. Moreover, Meyer showed that there was high synchronism in the newspaper’s summit coverage. He also found frequent transnational references and elements in the coverage. The newspapers generally assessed the ‘success’ of the summits by asking if they had managed to remove obstacles, launch initiatives or take decisions that pushed integration forward.

For Italy, Spalla found that European Councils marked peaks in ‘European integration’ coverage in the Communist Party newspaper L’Unità, the Socialist Party newspaper Avanti!, the Christian Democratic Party newspaper Il Popolo and the conservative Corriere della Sera. The European Council hence became a central element in the EC coverage of most leading Western European newspapers.

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1242 Board of Management, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 3 Dec. 1979, 836. Programme Matters, (f) Mrs. Thatcher in Dublin, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1. Economics Editor Dominick Harrod was asked to explain Thatcher’s demands and their prospects of success. “Harrod said that he thought that the Government’s case had been given a very good run in BBC programmes”, while others “wondered if, as well as reporting current problems within the EEC the BBC was adequately reflecting the perspectives of our European partners”. News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 4. Dec. 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 626. The EEC “Summit” in Dublin, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.

1243 See Meyer, The European Public Sphere.

1244 Spalla, La stampa quotidiana e l’integrazione europea.
Reuters also used the European Council to underline its status as the leading provider of EC news among the primary Western news agencies. The agency developed a summit coverage template for the first formal European Council in Dublin in 1975 to which it would stick in the following years. Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall explained that “Reuters will send a team of five senior correspondents to the meeting” – the Diplomatic Editor, the Economic Affairs Editor, the Brussels bureau chief, the World Services Editor and a representative from the Paris bureau. There would also be two teleprinter operators. Reuters leased a teleprinter circuit from the conference venue in Dublin to its message-switching computer in London. “This means that the Dublin team will be able to send their copy direct to Reuters subscribers throughout Europe and the world.” Reuters installed all these facilities in a separate section in the Dublin summit press centre. Depending on language, country and thematic expertise, the Reuters journalists covered different delegation or aspects of the summit. The agency made sure that journalists covering a certain delegation would be accommodated in the hotel of that delegation. In the following years, Reuters stuck to this set-up, which assured fast, comprehensive and multi-perspective coverage of the summits.

In sum, starting from the second half of the 1970s, hundreds of journalists regularly gathering for European Council meetings transformed the ‘European’ summits into reoccurring simultaneous ‘European’ media events. European Councils became central elements of ‘European integration’ coverage in Western European media. They also became part of the work routine of journalists covering ‘European integration’. Journalists at European Council meetings acted in direct or indirect cooperation with national governments and the Council Secretariat which staged summits carefully. Journalists played an important role in the summit choreography. They evaluated if Western European leaders failed or succeeded in taking the ‘integration process’ forward. European Council press and television coverage as invented in the 1970s – with elements such as the ‘family picture’ and the final press conference – has shaped how ‘European’ summits appear in the media today.

1245 On Reuters coverage of the EC in the 1970s, see the section on news agencies in Chapter 5.
1246 See Ian Macdowall, Chief News Editor to John Swift, Head of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 1975, Reuters Archive, 55C Europe.
1247 See the arrangements for other summits: Chief News Editor, EEC Summit – Bremen – July 6/7, 4 July 1978; Sidney Weiland to Graham Williams, Summit Meetings, 6 August 1981; GM Williams, Not for the record, Athens European Community Summit meeting December 4-6, 12 December 1983; R Hart, Assistant News Editor to R Evans, Paris, Fontainebleau Summit, 29 June 1984, all in Reuters Archive, 55CC Europe.
Promoting the first direct European Parliamentary elections

In the late 1970s, Western European elites undertook a massive effort to popularise the first direct elections to the European Parliament among the citizens of the nine EC member states. In the run-up to the elections, politicians and parties, civil servants, academics, intellectuals, businesspeople, ‘European’ activists and journalists tried to mobilise the ‘European’ electorate. In line with the sui generis EC narrative, they framed the elections as a ‘historic moment’ and a great ‘step forward’ towards a ‘European democracy’. Heads of State and Government, ministers, deputies and political parties across the nine member states campaigned through public speeches and media appearances. French President Giscard d’Estaing and his Prime Minister Raymond Barre, facing Gaullist and Communist opposition to the elections, in particular used their control over French state television to have their views broadcasted to French citizens. Western European parties organised in transnational networks and coordinated their campaigning. Prominent politicians such as Willy Brandt, Emilio Colombo, Jacques Delors, Altiero Spinelli, Simone Weil or Leo Tindemans stood as candidates and became European Parliament members. Governments, the EC Commission and the European Parliament launched public relations campaigns and generously funded election-related activities of ‘European’ activist groups like the European Movement or the Europa-Union. They printed information brochures and leaflets, organised conferences and public debates and shot information movies. Scholars – with plentiful public and private funding – embarked on social science, legal and philosophical research on the ‘European’

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1248 According to Seiler, Gaullist and Communists “dénoncèrent l’omniprésence de Giscard et de Barre sur les trois chaînes de télévision. Tant le président que son lieutenant ne participaient pas à la campagne, mais leur soudaine activité ne pouvait que favoriser l’UDF. Il était normal que la gauche dénonçât semblables pratiques, mais de voir les gaullistes s’y associer, eux qui jadis usèrent et abusèrent de la défunte ORTF, porte à sourire.” See Daniel Seiler, “Ombres et lumières sur les élections européennes des 7 et 10 juin 1979: Ébavuche d’une première analyse des résultats,” *Etudes internationales* 10, no. 3 (1979): 586.


elections. They produced studies on the organisation and implications of the elections – often comparative and transnational in scope.\textsuperscript{1251} Western European journalists joined in these elite efforts to promote the elections, making the European Parliament as present as never before in Western European media. Many Europeanist voices retrospectively branded the election campaign as ‘low-key’ and ‘second-order’.\textsuperscript{1252} This claim – based on the questionable comparison with national election campaigns – distorts the picture. This section proposes to look instead at the massive European Parliamentary elections media campaign independently of normative points of reference.

Western European elites attributed a key role to the media and particularly broadcasting in the European election campaign.\textsuperscript{1253} As outlined above, in the 1970s the role of television in politics had become a widely discussed issue in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{1254} From interviews with politicians in all nine member states in the run-up to the direct elections, Noël-Aranda concluded that “many politicians considered it important to collaborate with television, a medium that they believed had great influence on the public.”\textsuperscript{1255} George Thomson of Monifieth, former EC Commissioner and then Chairman of the British Council of the European Movement, told BBC journalists in January 1979 “that the success of the direct election, to be judged principally by the size of the turn-out, would largely depend on the attitude between now and then of the media, and especially of broadcasting.” Thomson gave three reasons for this. First, European election constituencies were very big and direct campaigning without the media as intermediary was therefore impossible. Candidates would have to rely on radio and television to reach the electorate. Second, Thomson complained that political leaders in Britain were more concerned with the 1979 general election and kept a low profile on the European elections. Third, many ‘European’ candidates were unknown to the electorate and needed to be made known through the media. Thomson argued that the “BBC had a responsibility to tackle the special problems of the Euro-Election; it should create a


\textsuperscript{1252} See in particular the already cited article by Reif and Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results.”

\textsuperscript{1253} This reflected postwar Western European elite beliefs in the power of the media and their important role in politics and society, as presented in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{1254} See Chapter 5.

conscience of European citizenship.”1256 Similarly, CDU General-Secretary Heiner Geißler in May 1979 urged ZDF Director-General Karl-Günther von Hase that public television should do more “promotion of Europe”. He claimed that if in the future ‘Europe’ wanted to play an international role “in line with its history and the intellectual power of its peoples, then we all need to advertise this Europe more.”1257 Already in December 1977, the Fernsehrat – a council of state, party and civil society representatives setting the general guidelines for ZDF programmes – had discussed television’s potential to counter “the underdeveloped formation of a European consciousness in the population.”1258 Pro-EC organisations were equally interested in the role of television in the elections. The Italian section of the European Movement organised a two-day conference in Rome on broadcasting and the elections in November 1978.1259 The EC Commission itself stated in March 1977 that “Without the help of mass media like the press, radio and television, it is of course impossible to reach 180 million voters”.1260 Alan Watson, the former BBC journalist turned head of the Commission’s audiovisual division, claimed in March 1978 that radio and television would act as “Europe’s campaign workers”.1261

1256 In the meeting, Thomson faced criticism by BBC journalists pointing to “an inherent contradiction between pressure on people to vote in the Election and the statement that the power of the European Parliament would not be increased.” In reaction, “Lord Thomson accepted that the BBC could only reflect, not create, public opinion. He was not asking the BBC to “go federalist” but to try to ensure that the case for making Britain a success in Europe was heard, through a fair presentation of issues and of the choice of speakers.” News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 9. Jan. 1979, Part II, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.

1257 Television could help explain to “the German people the significance of this election for the future of our country.” Geissler claimed that “die Gefahr besteht, dass ein grosser Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung die Bedeutung dieser Wahl für die Zukunft unseres Landes noch nicht erkannt hat.” He added that “Wenn Europa, wie es alle demokratischen Kräfte in unserem Lande wünschen, in einer Welt von Gegensätzen und unterschiedlichen Gruppierungen eine wichtige Rolle spielen soll, die seiner Geschichte und der geistigen Kraft seiner Völker entspricht, dann müssen wir alle für dieses Europa mehr werben.” Geißler to von Hase, 23.05.1979, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.


Social scientists shared politicians’ and bureaucrats’ belief in the central role broadcasting– and particularly television – could play in the European elections.\footnote{Discussing the prospects of direct European Parliament elections and a ‘European’ election campaign, prominent political scientist and election expert Michael Steed argued as early as 1971 that it would be mostly “in the hands of the television and radio to determine whether the campaign acquires a European coherence”. Michael Steed, “The European Parliament: The Significance of Direct Election,” Government and Opposition 6, no. 4 (1971): 462–76.} The 1970s – ‘television’s moment’ – had seen exponentially growing scholarly interest in the role of television in politics and society. The direct European Parliamentary elections became the object of an unprecedented transnational and comparative research effort on television’s influence. Coordinated by prominent British communication scientist Jay G. Blumler, a team of mass communication scholars from all nine EC member states investigated the role of television in the European elections.\footnote{See Jay G. Blumler, ed., Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections (London ; Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1983).} The group studied how and why television journalists in the nine Community countries covered the elections, how politicians and parties viewed the role of television and interacted with journalists and what impact television coverage had on voters’ knowledge, interest and attitudes towards the elections. To that end, they interviewed television journalists and representatives of political parties in all EC countries. They conducted a standardised quantitative content analysis of election TV coverage across the nine EC member states. They also did comparative surveys of public opinion on the elections, following the Eurobarometer example.\footnote{On the study’s research design, see Jay G. Blumler, “Key Features of Research Design,” in Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections, ed. Jay G. Blumler (London ; Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1983), 25–37. According to data by the Audio-Visual Division of the European Parliament, the number of television reports per European Parliament session in 1979 increased by 250 percent compared to the average number of reports per session in 1978. See Lodge and Herman, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 223–25.} Blumer and his colleagues formulated research questions reflecting the \textit{sui generis} view of the EC as an emerging democratic ‘European’ polity. They used national elections as a benchmark and asked if the “extraordinary, novel, unprecedented” European Parliamentary elections received similar levels of media attention. They also searched for “European dimensions” in the election coverage and asked if there had been “one campaign or nine”. Finally, they investigated if television had helped foster a “European awareness” among television viewers.\footnote{On the study’s central research questions, see Gabriel Thoveron and Jay G. Blumler, “Analysing a Unique Election: Themes and Concepts,” in Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections, ed. Jay G. Blumler (London ; Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1983), 3–24.} The research project was generously funded by the European Parliament, the EC Commission, various national research organisations and private supporters such as the \textit{Volkswagen Stiftung} and the \textit{Shell Grants}.
Committee. Recent social science research on the role of the media in ‘European integration’ makes no or only superficial reference to the study. In sum, Western European politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, intellectuals and journalists attributed a central role to broadcasting as capable of reaching and influencing ‘European’ voters. Accordingly, this section will concentrate on the role of television and radio in the European Parliamentary election campaign. The role of print media and news agencies will be discussed in less detail.

Broadcasting

Public and state broadcasters in the nine EC member states mounted an unprecedented television and radio campaign for the direct elections, leading to an “explosion” of EC coverage. By comparing television coverage before and during the official election campaigns, Blumler and his colleagues found a strong increase in EC coverage in the weeks before the elections. Television election coverage in Demark, Germany and France was the most intense, with broadcasters producing the highest quantity of coverage

1268 The official campaigns were governed by national legal frameworks. National law defined the starting point and the end point of the campaign and provided a framework for the form and content of the coverage. The takeoff of the campaigns was often marked by the start of party broadcasts. Most countries model their European election rules following those governing national elections. See Mary Kelly, “Influences on Broadcasting Policies for Election Coverage,” in Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections, ed. Jay G. Blumler (London: Sage, 1983), 65–82.
1269 Blumler and his team created a run-up sample for the period February to April 1979. The sample showed that television networks across the nine member states broadcasted around 100 minutes of EC-related content per country in a period of three weeks – with the exception of Ireland, where coverage levels were very low, and Italy, where coverage exceeded 300 minutes. The run-up samples spanned two full weeks (12-18 February and 23-29 April 1979) and one intervening constructed week (seven dates spaced out at eight-day intervals from 25 February to 14 April). See Kelly and Siune, “Television Campaign Structures,” 41–43.
1270 Research by Soulages on the presence of ‘European integration’ related sujets in the journaux télévisés of the three French public TV channels confirms a strong increase in the coverage of ‘Europe’ in the second half of the 1970s on French state television. Soulage found that the number of ‘European’ sujets in the JT increased from sixty in 1976 and 112 in 1977 to 199 in 1978 and 322 in 1979, the year of the European elections. Coverage levels subsequently fell from 286 sujets in 1980 to 265 in 1981 and 207 in 1982, before rising again to 251 in 1983 and 578 sujets in 1984, the year of the second direct European Parliamentary elections. For the following decades until 2009, Soulage found ‘European integration’ coverage in the journaux télévisés to be characterised by peaks around European Parliamentary election years and the years of the Maastricht referendum (1992) and the referendum on the European Constitution (2005). Between the peaks, coverage fell to lower levels. The highest level of coverage was reached in 1992 with 1661 ‘European’ sujets in the various journaux télévisés. See Soulages, “Les contours d’une communauté imaginée. Le thème-événement Europe à l’intérieur des journaux télévisés français (1951-2009),” 550–51. Soulages’s findings should be read bearing in mind that the number of channels and journaux télévisés on French television changed over time. However, his findings provide a good measure of general levels of ‘European’ coverage.
and airing it mostly during peak-time hours. In the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland followed, with lower or less prominently placed election coverage. In Britain, Italy and Luxembourg, national general elections interfered with the European parliamentary elections, leading to adapted and shortened, but not necessarily less intense coverage. According to Siune, direct content relating to elections television coverage was generally positive and

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1271 On Danish public television, EC and election coverage amounted to 1059 minutes in a period of five weeks. Following the model of national election coverage, coverage was dominated by twelve ten-minute party broadcasts followed by half-hour ‘press conferences’, where journalists questioned party representatives. In the week before the elections, the television campaign peaked with a three-hour debate programme featuring representatives of all parties. The election campaign appeared before Danish television viewers in a very concentrated form, as Danish public television had only one channel. German public television broadcasted 1034 minutes of election coverage on two channels in a period of six weeks. The six-week campaign followed the model of national election coverage. There were two-and-a-half minute party political broadcasts after the evening news on both ARD and ZDF. Both channels also broadcasted many special programmes and documentaries on the election. France also applied national election campaign rules to the European parliamentary elections. Those rules restricted current affairs and discussion programmes controlled by journalists to the first two weeks of the campaign. The last two weeks were dominated by party broadcasts and standard news coverage. Election coverage therefore peaked three weeks before the election. In total, French broadcasters aired 990 minutes of EC and election coverage in four weeks, distributed over three channels. See Kelly and Siune, “Television Campaign Structures,” 49–50.

1272 In the Netherlands, total election coverage on public television amounted to 1059 minutes over a period of six weeks – a very high number on the level of Denmark, the Federal Republic and France. However, over two thirds of it was broadcasted outside peak-time. News coverage and party broadcasts played less of a role in Dutch television, while about two thirds of coverage consisted of current affairs programmes and documentaries. In Belgium, there was a three-week campaign which used the national election coverage legal framework. Coverage built up gradually and peaked in the last week of the campaign with 382 minutes of coverage, more than half of the total three-week coverage of 683 minutes. Five one-hour programmes in which the five parties in the Belgian Parliament responded to journalists’ questions marked the television campaign’s climax. Irish television broadcasted the second-lowest absolute amount of election coverage – 401 minutes in four weeks, however, all of it aired during peak-time. Irish coverage largely followed the framework for coverage of national elections, with party broadcasts for the three main parties and an election news desk. Ibid., 50–52.

1273 In Italy, national elections took place a week before direct elections. Politicians and the RAI decided that in the four weeks before the European elections, television would cover both European and national elections in the first two weeks, the national elections only in the third week and the European elections in the fourth week. European direct election coverage consequently peaked after the national elections in the fourth week with 538 minutes of coverage, thus more than nine hours of coverage in seven days. More than a third of RAI election coverage consisted of party broadcasts. In total, Italian television broadcasted 808 minutes of direct election and EC-related content in the six weeks before the European elections. Thirty-five percent of it aired during peak hours. In Britain, the national general election took place a month before the direct elections. The British television campaign therefore lasted four weeks. About sixty percent of BBC and ITV election coverage consisted of current affairs programmes. The election was less present in news programmes. There were relatively few party broadcasts. British television broadcasted a total of 660 minutes of European election coverage over four weeks. Sixty-two percent of the coverage aired at peak-time. It was distributed over three channels, ITV, BBC1 and BBC2. In Luxembourg, the European election coincided with national general elections. Television therefore integrated ‘European’ election coverage into national election coverage. For example, some party broadcasts were dedicated not to national but EC issues. RTL as a commercial station with mostly French and Belgian viewers tried to provide ‘European’ coverage to its multinational audience. According to RTL, this meant looking at the EC not from a Luxembourghish, but from a French, British, Belgian or EC perspective. More than forty percent of RTL coverage was composed of documentaries. Thirty percent consisted of news coverage. Absolute election coverage levels with 371 minutes in five weeks were the lowest compared to the eight other EC countries. Ibid., 52–54.
similar across the nine member states. Besides EC topics and the election campaigns, television across the member states devoted about a third of the coverage to ‘ideological themes’ such as the purposes of ‘European unity’ and the functioning of the EC political system. According to findings by Schulz, television coverage contained all ingredients of the sui generis EC narrative. Television framed ‘European unity’ as a positive peace project, claimed that ‘European integration’ was necessary to preserve ‘European’ influence in world politics, argued for a ‘democratisation of Europe’ and favoured an institutional reform of the EC. Television underlined the economic benefits of integration, but also pointed to the costs the participating countries had to accept. At the same time, different specific national issues and views, for example on unemployment and inflation, also figured in the election coverage. The coverage thus matched the pattern of coverage outlined in the previous chapter: while there was strong support for the sui generis narrative, economic integration remained a disputed issue.

From interviews with party representatives and television journalists across the nine EC member states, Blumler and his colleagues concluded that both politicians and journalists had been committed to promoting the European Parliamentary elections via television. Both assumed television viewers to be less interested in a ‘European’ election than in a national election. Therefore, most party representatives and broadcasters saw a shared responsibility to awake a stronger public interest in the European election. About two thirds of respondents agreed that politicians and television should foster a ‘European consciousness’. Particularly West German, Italian and Luxembourgish interviewees supported the claim, much less so interviewees from Britain, Denmark and France. Of the broadcasters interviewed, eighteen percent said they had more interest in the European elections than in national elections.


1275 Thirty-eight percent dealt with EC issues and policies such as the economy, agriculture and energy. Twenty-seven percent dealt with the election campaigns and party matters. Seventeen percent of coverage dealt with ‘European ideological themes’ such as ‘United Europe’ or ‘Democratisation of Europe’. Thirteen percent described and explained the European Parliament and the other EC institutions. Thus, television accorded almost a third of coverage to descriptive and normatively charged programmes on ‘European integration’ and the EC polity. Kelly and Siune, “Television Campaign Structures,” 58. Coverage content varied from country to country, but had the same overall tendency. See Winfried Schulz, “Conceptions of Europe,” in Communicating to Voters. Television in the First European Parliamentary Elections, ed. Jay G. Blumler (London: Sage, 1983), 241–57.

1276 See Schulz, “Conceptions of Europe,” 244–51.

1277 The interview results based on a non-representative sample of party representatives and broadcasters should be read with caution.

1278 See Noël-Aranda, “Projecting a European Election: The Challenges Faced by the Communicators”.

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Twenty-four percent had the same interest, while fifty percent were less interested in European elections than in national elections. Twenty percent of the interviewees claimed television should pay more attention, forty-five percent the same attention and thirty-one percent less attention to the European elections compared to national elections. Italian and West German respondents tended to be more interested in the elections and more supportive of strong coverage than their British colleagues. As for general attitudes to ‘European unity’, overwhelming majorities of broadcasters agreed that ‘European integration’ should either speed up or continue at present speed. A majority of Italian, West German and French respondents supported a speed up, while Dutch, British and Irish interviewees preferred to continue at the present speed. Thus, according to the research by Blumler and his colleagues, journalists in self-attributions overwhelmingly supported integration and the European elections, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm depending on nationality.

Broadcasters engaged in unprecedented transnational cooperation to cover the elections. They produced documentaries on EC topics which they subsequently exchanged and broadcasted to their domestic audiences. Some broadcasters detached journalists to a ‘supranational’ editorial department coordinated by British Granada TV, which produced three documentaries on ‘European’ topics. However, the most important cooperation happened in the framework of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Between 1976 and 1979, EBU broadcasting organisations worked together extensively. Their cooperation

1282 The ‘supranational’ editorial department was created based on a proposal by British Granada Television. Apart from ZDF, Belgian, Dutch and Swedish public television as well as the American WGBH participated. The three documentaries dealt with decision making in the European Council, the crisis of the Western European textile industries and F-16 fighter jets. See Rudolf Radke, HR Aussenpolitik, Zur Lage der ZDF-Auslandsberichterstattung 1979, Wiesbaden 5. November 1979 and Europa 79, Europa im ZDF-Programm, Berichte-Analysen-Reportagen in ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
1283 On the EBU’s role in the election, see Chapter 10, “The Role of the European Broadcasting Union” in Lodge and Herman, Direct Elections to the European Parliament. See also Jay G. Blumler and Vibeke Petersen, “An
culminated in an effort to provide EBU content and technological infrastructure for the election night and vote count coverage on 10 and 11 June 1979. Despite complicated coordination and technical issues, the EBU managed to build a system making election data and video material from all nine EC countries available to EBU members. In each of the nine EC states one broadcaster was responsible for inputting national forecasts and results into a central EBU computer. On election night, it provided EBU members with a centralised database with forecasts and results from all EC member states. According to Lodge and Herman, this “represented the biggest and most complex venture in Euro-TV’s history and one that, in technical terms, outstripped the coverage of the Olympic Games, the World Cup and the Eurovision Song Contest.”\textsuperscript{1284} Member organisations coordinated in working groups with national experts to set up the system starting from 1977. The audio-visual departments of the EC Commission and Parliament attended the working group meetings as permanent observers. The EBU produced a detailed Election Factbook widely used by anybody interested in the elections.

The most remarkable achievement of the EBU broadcasters was the relative simultaneity of the voting and counting process across the nine EC member states. The EBU, supported by the Commission and the European Parliament, heavily lobbied member-state governments to harmonise initially diverging national election schemes. It was largely due to EBU broadcasters’ insistence on simultaneity that voting, vote counting and the proclamation of results took place in relatively parallel and similar fashion, allowing for a Community-wide media event.\textsuperscript{1285} Voting started on 7 June in some countries, but counting and the publication of results was delayed to 10 and 11 June. On the evening of 10 June, broadcasting stations in all EC member states broadcasted hours of election night coverage on the incoming polls and results. They switched live between their correspondents in EC capitals and Brussels. On 11 June, they discussed the election results in equal detail.\textsuperscript{1286} In sum, the set-up of European Parliamentary elections still existing today was considerably shaped by the lobbying of Western European broadcasters. Due to their insistence on simultaneity, the elections could take place as a ‘European’ media event. The following paragraphs will discuss in more detail

\textsuperscript{1284} Lodge and Herman, \textit{Direct Elections to the European Parliament}, 213.
\textsuperscript{1285} On the EBU’s campaign for simultaneity, see Ibid., 218–23.
\textsuperscript{1286} Their coverage was based on national and EBU infrastructure and material. Part of the EBU material could not be used due to technical problems. Ibid., 227–28.
the European Parliamentary election campaigns of West German and British public broadcasters to broaden the evidence outlined above with material from the archives of the biggest public broadcasting organisations in Western Europe.

Direct elections to the European Parliament became a central topic in the BBC in the second half of the 1970s and led to unprecedented coverage levels in the run up to and after the elections in 1979. This happened despite the British general election being held a month earlier on 3 May 1979. Initially assuming that the elections would take place in 1978,1287 BBC officials in June 1977 stated that “the subject of direct elections to the E.E.C. would shortly become an important news story”.1288 Interest in the elections was high among BBC journalists. When the EBU organised a meeting on the elections in Strasbourg in November 1977, “BBC nominations for attendance at the briefing exceeded the number of places that had been offered.”1289 In January 1978, BBC officials discussed “various recent briefings and discussions in Strasbourg and elsewhere, involving senior staff who were planning the BBC’s coverage of the first European Direct Elections.” At this point, “discussions had been arranged already between the BBC, IBA and the Home Office on the question of simultaneity of counting.” The journalists also worried about the British Government’s idea of combining the European Parliament elections with the 1979 General Election. They “reacted with some alarm to that suggestion, on practical grounds. It would diminish the importance of the European Election, which would be overshadowed by interest in the domestic one.”1290

The BBC News & Current Affairs staff planned to divide its coverage into different phases. There should be “special background programmes” in the run up to the elections, followed by the coverage of the campaign itself. “Then there would be polling day and the period prior to the start of the count.” Finally, there would be the count and the coverage of the results. In the weeks before election day, parties would outline their election programmes in Party Political Broadcasts.1291 In September 1978, BBC officials considered themselves “deeply involved in

1287 See also News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 2 Sep 1977, 719. Elections to the European Parliament, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1288 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 10th June 1977, 516. Britain and the E.E.C, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1290 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 24 Jan 1978, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1291 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 24 Jan 1978, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
the arrangements for the coverage of the first elections to the European Assembly.”

Moreover, the BBC lobbied the British government to organise voting simultaneously with the voting in the other EC countries and cooperated with Jay G. Blumber and his research team. In March 1979, BBC Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis travelled to Brussels for a meeting with his peers from other broadcasting organisations and Commission President Roy Jenkins. By then, the BBC’s Brussels bureau suffered from “problems of congestion as the Election story built up.” The BBC therefore decided “the acquisition of an extra office for visiting BBC Teams (Room 615 at the IPC) if only to ensure that the Correspondent’s office did not get over-run.” The TV News Correspondent for European Elections Gavin Hewitt and BBC correspondents in the capitals of the nine EC member states compiled a European Direct Elections Newsbrief in May 1979 containing detailed information on the campaigns, candidates, party positions and voting procedures.

BBC television election coverage peaked in the months before the elections. Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis in late May 1979 called BBC election coverage so far “quite extensive”. An internal BBC research study stated that the elections took place “in a climate of exceptionally high political activity in Britain and at a time of intense media coverage of political affairs, coming just one month after the British General Election which had an unusually high turn-out of almost 80% of the electorate”. In the first months of 1979, the BBC obviously devoted a lot of attention to the British general elections of 3 May 1979. Nevertheless, the study found that in the three months March, April and May 1979, BBC1 and BBC2 broadcasted four hours and twenty minutes of special European election programmes. This number did not include mentions of the elections in regular news programmes. In the week before the elections in June, the study concluded that BBC television devoted three hours of special programmes to the election (again not counting news coverage). The election night special programme Decision for Europe on 10/11 June consisting of about four hours

1292 Wilkinson to Farrington, 5th September 1978, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1293 The BBC’s efforts here complemented the EBU’s lobbying for simultaneous voting procedures. See Tam Frey to Director General, Euro Direct Elections – Simultaneity, July 10th 1978, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1295 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 20. Mar 1979, 143. Euro-Election (106), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
1297 News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 22. May 1979, 304. The European Elections, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
and thirty minutes of news, comment and discussion.\textsuperscript{1298} Another \textit{BBC} study counted 275 minutes of \textit{BBC1} and \textit{BBC2} television special election coverage in five programmes between Sunday 27 May and Friday 1 June. For the period 2 June to 6 June – the week before the vote – the study counted 70 minutes of election coverage in five programmes on \textit{BBC1}, \textit{BBC2} and \textit{ITV}.\textsuperscript{1299} Again these numbers do not include news coverage. \textit{BBC} television coverage was thus extensive in the months and particularly weeks before the vote.

\textit{BBC} Radio coverage was equally broad and wide-ranging. In early May 1979, Managing Editor Current Affairs Radio Anthony Rendell listed the programmes scheduled by the \textit{BBC} Radio Current Affairs team. Rendell pointed to the programmes \textit{European Election Platform} and \textit{European Election Call}, which were to be broadcast respectively in the morning and in the evening virtually every day in the week before the election. Two \textit{Talking Politics} broadcasts in early June would be devoted to the elections. There would also be three \textit{One Man, One Voice} episodes from Brussels, Strasbourg and Birmingham throughout May. Finally, \textit{Today} would be presented from various “capitals in Europe”, such as Brussels, Bonn and Paris. Rendell’s list did not include election coverage in the \textit{BBC} Radio daily news programmes.\textsuperscript{1300} In June 1979, Rendell claimed that “the radio sequences had been devoting considerable time to the subject ever since the start of the year.”\textsuperscript{1301} Debating \textit{BBC} Radio election night coverage, Foreign News Editor Radio Ian Mitchel reported that “Radio 4, to his knowledge, had been widely listened to by members of the Commission.” Moreover, the \textit{BBC}’s radio coverage “had also had a significant European dimension, with correspondents and European politicians reporting from the eight capitals.”\textsuperscript{1302} \textit{BBC} Radio thus devoted considerable attention to the European elections.

Internal debates show that \textit{BBC} journalists aspired to unbiased reporting on the elections. Demands for regular coverage emanating from governments and ‘European’ institutions met


\textsuperscript{1300} See Anthony Rendell, Managing Editor, Current Affairs Radio, Subject: European Elections Campaign, date: 3.5.79, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.

\textsuperscript{1301} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 5 Jun 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 320. The European Elections, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.

\textsuperscript{1302} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 12 Jun. 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 3242. The European Elections: “…..A Very Proper Apathy?”, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
with resistance. In January 1978, BBC officials stated in internal debates that “There was general agreement that the BBC should resist attempts to formalise its coverage of the campaign.”\textsuperscript{1303} In April 1978, “D.N.C.A. gave a warning about the extent of propaganda emanating from Strasbourg about the public interest in the elections. This line appeared to have been swallowed uncritically by some of the European broadcasting organisations.”\textsuperscript{1304} After an EBU meeting in the same month, BBC officials underlined that “The broadcasters had agreed that decisions on what parts of the campaign deserved European coverage must remain their decisions on the basis of news judgements. The pressure from Brussels and Strasbourg for guaranteed coverage was being resisted, although some of the poorer broadcasting organisations were slightly tempted by the cash that was available in Brussels for spending on the campaign.”\textsuperscript{1305} BBC officials voiced particular concern about broadcasters from ‘Latin Europe’. At an EBU symposium for chief editors of television news, “There had been much pressure from the ‘Latin countries’ for news to be reported from a pan-European point of view. However, in the discussion, ‘Anglo-Saxon news values’ had been strongly supported by the Nordic countries”, a BBC official reported.\textsuperscript{1306}

However, despite claims of impartiality the BBC’s election coverage was deeply committed to the \textit{sui generis} EC narrative and promoted the elections as an important step forward for ‘European integration’. BBC journalists thought their coverage to reach considerable degrees of ‘Europeanization’. Discussing a \textit{Panorama} programme, Chief Assistant to the Director-General Peter Hardiman Scott considered it “most noteworthy that programmes such as that were now reflecting the policies and problems of other EEC countries and treating Britain as a European country”.\textsuperscript{1307} During the election coverage planning process, the BBC was in frequent contact with leading British supporters of ‘European integration’. In June 1978, the BBC invited the Labour Member of the European Parliament Mark Hughes to attend a News and Current Affairs meeting and advise the BBC on its European election coverage. Hughes “hoped that the broadcasters would do the same

\textsuperscript{1303} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 24 Jan 1978, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
\textsuperscript{1304} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 18. Apr 1978, 194. Direct Elections to the European Parliament (Part II, 24/1/78) Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
\textsuperscript{1305} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 25. Apr 1978, 202. Direct Elections to the European Parliament (194), Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
\textsuperscript{1306} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 9. May 1978, 209. Broadcast Coverage of The European Community, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
\textsuperscript{1307} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 5 Jun 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 320. The European Elections, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
sort of educational job for their audiences as they had performed in the months and years prior to the EEC Referendum."1308 European Movement Chairman and former EC Commissioner George Thomson of Monifieth met BBC journalists in January 1979.1309 Such meetings did not take place with opponents of British EC membership or the direct elections. In March 1979, Nigel Spearing, a leading Labour anti-marketeer and critic of the elections, attacked the BBC for its promotion of the European Parliament. The BBC leadership responded that Spearing’s “view would not be ignored, but the fact remained that the battle against holding direct elections to Europe had been fought and lost and Parliament had decided on a free vote that the elections should go on.”1310 BBC Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis in May 1979 “said the BCC had a positive duty to continue to inform the public. It could not be neutral in the choice between voting and abstaining.”1311 In short, it was the BBC’s declared objective to make the European elections a success by contributing to a high election turnout.

Public opinion polls indicating low interest and knowledge levels in the British public vis-à-vis the European election triggered a debate about the failure and the supposed low-key character of the British election campaign in the days before the vote. The BBC argued it had done what it could to promote the elections. On 4 June, BBC Director-General Charles Curran “said that on the whole he thought no one could accuse the BBC of underplaying the European Election.” Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis “agreed with D.G. that the BBC had done its best to inform the public, given that interest was lukewarm because no Government was being elected. The BBC had been making bricks without very much
straw.”^{1312} BBC journalists had “a general impression that BBC programmes had done well” and “had done what they could to inform the public”. They argued that “unhelpful attitudes by the politicians” and “the main parties were generally to blame for any lack of public interest”.^{1313} BBC journalists were thus frustrated by the British people’s limited interest in the elections and blamed British politicians for not having been more active in the election campaign.

When the election produced a voter turnout of around 32 percent in Britain, most BBC journalists joined the British and Western European elite in interpreting this as a serious setback. Voicing disappointment with the turnout in a News and Current Affairs meeting on 12 June 1979, Chief Assistant to the Director-General Peter Hardiman Scott nevertheless “thought that the broadcasters had done an astonishingly good job. Press coverage had on the whole been poor, and without the contribution of Radio and Television (including ITV) he would have not been surprised if the turn-out had been as low as 10 per cent.” Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis reported that he had spoken to EC Commission President Roy Jenkins and prominent pro-EC Labour politician Lord Harris of Greenwich. Both had confirmed to him that the BBC was certainly not to blame for the low turnout. A minority of second-row journalists criticised the BBC for having gone too far in its promotion of the elections. Television News editor Alan Protheroe “was concerned that, at the end of the results programme, on both Radio and Television, the BBC had appeared to strike a “tut-tut” attitude over the 30 per cent poll. It had been left to Mrs. Barbara Castle, Professor Ralf Dahrendorf and others to make the counter-point that apathy was just as valid a reaction as enthusiasm.” Deputy Radio News editor John Wilson “thought it […] right in principle to question whether the European Parliament was a significant body. To the extent that this had not been done, he supported Alan Protheroe’s argument. The BBC had effectively pretended that the Parliament was more important than it was, and had thereby done the public a disservice. More attention had been given to the European Elections than was ordinarily given to the County Council elections which had a much greater effect on people’s lives.” Most journalists present at the meeting rejected these views. Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis thought “it had been right to ask why the poll had been low.” He argued that “Whether the BBC had been wrong to attempt to stimulate public interest was another matter.

^{1312} Board of Management, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 4. Jun 1979, 400. Programme Matters (h) Coverage of European Election Campaign, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
^{1313} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 5 Jun 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 320. The European Elections, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
He believed not. Coverage of the elections had necessarily involved acceptance of the institutions with which they were concerned. It would not have been right to treat the event as a re-run of the referendum by questioning their validity.\textsuperscript{1314} In short, the BBC massively promoted the European Parliamentary elections in 1979, causing some journalists to argue it had gone too far in its effort to motivate the British electorate. The European Parliament remained an important issue on the BBC after the elections. During the EC budget negotiations in late 1979, Radio News editor John Wilson stated BBC Radio ran “daily reports from Strasbourg”.\textsuperscript{1315}

Public broadcasters in the Federal Republic mounted an equally large campaign to promote the European elections. The West German public broadcasting leadership showed deep commitment to ‘European integration’. Karl-Günther von Hase, ZDF Director-General between 1977 and 1982, was a diplomat and had served as the Federal Republic’s ambassador to Britain from 1970 to 1977. Facilitating British entry into ‘Europe’ had been one of his primary tasks in London, where he also had developed a “gratifying friendship” with future EC Commission President Roy Jenkins. In July 1977, von Hase told Jenkins that there was “no doubt in my mind that I would continue to further the cause of European unity, also in my new capacity as director-general of ZDF.”\textsuperscript{1316} Public television and radio broadcasters in the ARD network were equally supportive of ‘European integration’. In view of the upcoming European elections and the perceived rising importance of ‘European integration’, radio and television editors in chief of all ARD networks convened in Brussels in March 1977. The directors-general of WDR and ARD also attended. The broadcasters met with EC Commissioners and senior diplomats. The WDR organised a reception in its Brussels studio – then termed Europastudio. Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemanns, the EC Commissioners Haferkamp, Brunner and Vredeling and other senior Commission and member state representatives attended the gathering. WDR Director-general Friedrich-Wilhelm von Sell explained his guests that “We are convinced that in the run up to the direct European

\textsuperscript{1314} See News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 12 Jun. 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 3242. The European Elections: “…..A Very Proper Apathy?”, Confidential, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
\textsuperscript{1315} News and Current Affairs Meeting, Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting held on 4. Dec. 1979, Current Editorial Issues, 626. The EEC “Summit” in Dublin, BBC WAC, R78/1,813/1.
\textsuperscript{1316} Von Hase to Jenkins, July 12th, 1977, ZDF-UA, 6/0890.
Parliamentary Elections the need for information and opinion on Europe will grow. We are determined to respond to this with dedication.”

ARD and ZDF officials started systematic planning of the European election coverage in early 1977, as they assumed elections would take place in 1978. A group of senior ZDF editors worked out an election coverage concept under the coordination of foreign affairs head Rudolf Radke. At WDR, the largest regional broadcaster and the Rundfunkanstalt in charge of EC coverage in Brussels for ARD, a similar “Projektgruppe Europa-Wahlen” started meeting from May 1977. ZDF introduced a new monthly programme called Europa-Journal in 1977. Each broadcast was dedicated to a European country and shot and moderated from this country’s capital. WDR had launched the biweekly radio programme Europa-Report already in the fall of 1976. Produced by the WDR Radio Brussels correspondent, the ten-minute programmes detailed the latest EC developments in Brussels. In December 1977, ZDF officials claimed that in view of the European elections ‘European integration’ coverage had been substantial throughout 1977. ZDF Editor in chief Reinhard Appel reported to the ZDF Fernsehrat that in the period from January to early December 1977, ‘European integration’ related topics had appeared 105 times in the various daily Heute news broadcasts and thirteen times in the weekly Ausländsjournal. ZDF had live broadcasted Roy Jenkin’s first speech to the European Parliament in January and covered the 20th anniversary celebrations of the signing of the Rome Treaties from Rome in March 1977 with a special programme. The WDR Brussels studio had produced a first seventeen-minute documentary on the European Parliamentary elections in December 1977, broadcasted

1319 See Botta to Jenke, Betr.: Europa-Wahlen, 6.5.1977, WDR Archiv, 11719.
1320 ZDF head of foreign affairs Rudolf Radke claimed that Europa-Journal was part of the ZDF effort to prepare future direct European elections and to fight negative perceptions of the EC: “Mir liegt deshalb auch so viel daran, weil Europa tatsächlich mehr bietet als mancher glaubt, und weil die Europa-Szene trotz berechtigtem Pessimismus grenzüberschreitende Blicke verdient. Keiner weiß, wann die Direktwahl kommt, vorsichtshalber aber haben wir ein Konzept dafür entwickelt.” Rudolf Radke to Leiter der Auslandsstudios, Wiesbaden, den 4. Juli 1977, ZDF-UA, 6/0386.
in early February 1978.\(^{1324}\) The elections were subsequently postponed to 1979 and broadcasters shifted their preparation efforts to 1978.

\(\text{ZDF} \) and \(\text{ARD} \) electoral coverage was built up in the second half of 1978, intensified in early 1979\(^{1325}\) and peaked in the weeks before the vote. By mid 1978, \(\text{ARD} \) and \(\text{ZDF} \) had their general European election coverage plans ready.\(^{1326}\) The plans stipulated that election coverage should consist of regular news coverage, EC and election related pieces in already existing programmes and new special ‘European’ programmes.\(^{1327}\) The \(\text{ARD} \) presented its election coverage preparations in a press conference in November 1978.\(^{1328}\) In December 1978, Radke told the \(\text{ZDF} \) foreign bureaux heads that “in the run up to the European elections we are pouring an abundance of information over the television viewer.”\(^{1329}\) In January 1979, the \(\text{Frankfurter Rundschau} \) commented that ‘Europe’ had become a “publizistikisches Dauerthema” in public broadcasting. \(\text{ARD} \) and \(\text{ZDF} \) demonstrated the ambition “Europa bis in den entferntesten Winkel auszuleuchten und auszuloten”. The newspaper argued “stellt sich die Frage, ob da nicht des Guten ein wenig zu viel verabreicht wird.”\(^{1330}\) According to an internal count, \(\text{ZDF} \) television broadcasted twenty-four documentaries,\(^{1331}\) features and debates on ‘Europe’ with a length of forty to eighty minutes between January to early June. During the same period, seven ‘Europe’-related programmes with a length of twenty to thirty minutes had appeared in the framework of existing formats like \(\text{Europa-aktuell} \) and \(\text{Bonner Perspektiven} \). The list further included twenty-four magazine pieces between three and ten

\(^{1324}\) The documentary was shot in December 1977. See Produktionsübersicht (Fernsehberichterstattung), Studio Brüssel, Dezember 1977, WDR Archiv, 11927.

\(^{1325}\) The \(\text{Saarbrücker Zeitung} \) commented in January 1979 that \(\text{ZDF} \) was “taking an energetically European course” with its special election programmes. See \(\text{Saarbrücker Zeitung} \), TV-Anstalten auf europäischem Kurs, 05.01.1979.

\(^{1326}\) \(\text{WDR} \) Brussels studio head Martin Schulze submitted a detailed list of planned contributions from the Brussels studio in September 1978. See Martin Schulze to Chefradaktion Fernsehen, Herrn Theo M. Loch, Herrn Rainer Hoffmann, Europa vor der Wahl, 7.9.1978, WDR Archiv, 11927.

\(^{1327}\) \(\text{ZDF} \) editor in chief Reinhard Appel held a press conference in July 1978 outlining the coverage \(\text{ZDF} \) planned for the elections. The press conference was covered in the West German press. See Walter Löckel, Auch der Bildschirm gibt sich europäisch, \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung}, 28.07.1978 and \textit{Mannheimer Morgen}, \textit{dpa}, Europawahlen werfen ihre Schatten deutlich voraus, 05.08.1978. See also the booklet \textit{Europa 79} summing up \(\text{ZDF} \) election coverage: \textit{Europa 79, Europa im ZDF-Programm, Berichte-Analysen-Reportagen} in \(\text{ZDF-UA}, 6/0654.\)

\(^{1328}\) Brigitte Desalm, \textit{Aufklärung steht im Vordergrund. ARD -Berichterstattung über die Europawahlen / Heute Start einer ARD-Reihe, Frankfurter Rundschau}, 05.01.1979.

\(^{1329}\) “daß wir im Vorfeld der Europawahlen eine Fülle von Informationen über den Zuschauer ausschütten.” Radke to the Leiter der Auslandstudios, Wiesbaden, den 29.12.1978, \(\text{ZDF-UA}, 6/0886.\)

\(^{1330}\) Hans Vetter, Die heiße Phase beginnt erst im Mai. Wie Funk und Fernsehen über die Europawahl berichten / Heute Start einer ARD-Reihe, \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, 05.01.1979.

\(^{1331}\) Commenting on \(\text{ZDF} \) coverage of foreign affairs in late 1979, Rudolf Radke noted that „Im Dokumentarbereich wurden die zahlreichen Sendungen im Umfeld der Europawahl zum herausragenden Schwerpunkt der letzten Jahre." Rudolf Radke, HR Aussenpolitik, Zur Lage der ZDF-Auslandsberichterstattung 1979, Wiesbaden, 5. November 1979, \(\text{ZDF-UA}, 6/0977.\)
minutes long which aired in the magazines Auslandsjournal, Bilanz, Kennzeichen D, Länderspiegel and Fragen zur Zeit. ‘Europe’ had been covered seventy-two times in the daily Heute newscasts broadcasted at 5pm, 7pm and late at night. The daily thirty-minute news magazine Heute Journal broadcasted around 10 pm covered ‘Europe’ fifteen times with contributions between three and five minutes long. Finally, Die Drehscheibe, a daily late afternoon society magazine, covered ‘Europe’ seventeen times in two- to five-minute broadcasts.\textsuperscript{1332} ZDF EC coverage was thus exceptionally high in the months leading up to the European elections.

\textit{ARD} European election coverage followed similar patterns. In addition to regular news coverage on the EC, ‘European’ programmes mushroomed on the nationally broadcasted \textit{ARD} channel and the regional channels. Starting from September 1978, Westdeutscher Rundfunk and Norddeutscher Rundfunk produced the monthly fifteen-minute EUROPA-PARLAMENT. The radio programme aired on Fridays between 22.10 and 22.25 on WDR1 and NDR – at the end of the monthly one-week sessions the European Parliament held in Strasbourg. It was produced by WDR Radio Brussels correspondent Walter Hahn.\textsuperscript{1333} The Bayrischer Rundfunk introduced Europa nebenan – Bilder und Meinungen von unseren Nachbarn. The monthly magazine programme focused on the daily live broadcasts in other EC countries. The Hessische Rundfunk broadcasted a similar monthly magazine called Notizen vom Nachbarn – ein europäisches Journal. The Südwestfunk’s monthly ‘European’ magazine was entitled Europa 2000. In the north, the Sender Freies Berlin, Radio Bremen and the Norddeutscher Rundfunk jointly set up the monthly programme Euro-Zeit in January 1979.\textsuperscript{1334} WDR produced the four-part documentary series Europa vor der Wahl broadcasted between January and June 1979. Part one explained the relevance of ‘European integration’ for ordinary citizens in an average West German mid-sized city – Castrop Rauxel in the Ruhr area. Part two presented the transnational party platforms forming for the elections. Part three covered

\textsuperscript{1332} See Sprechzettel für Herrn Appel, für FSRat am 8.6.79, Sendungen zum Thema „Europa“ seit Anfang dieses Jahres, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.

\textsuperscript{1333} “The most important discussion points and results of the parliamentary work will be presented in short reports, interviews and commentaries, thereby examining their relevance for the citizens of the Community”, WDR declared when launching EUROPA-PARLAMENT. The full title of the programme was EUROPAPARLAMENT, Berichte und Kommentare über die Sitzungswoche. See Kawohl zu Alle ARD-Anstalten Programmaustausch, 26. Juli 1978, WDR Archiv, 14847.

“campaigning without borders” in the border area between the Netherlands, Belgium and the Federal Republic.\(^{1335}\)

\(\text{ZDF and ARD election coverage included many transnational elements. In August and September 1978, ZDF broadcasted a six-part documentary series on France. Its episodes presented the French language, French food, French high culture and the French province. They were shot in France and featured many French protagonists.}^{1336}\) Hans-Jürgen Purkarthofer, a \textit{Saarländischer Rundfunk} radio journalist, hiked through all nine EC member states. He interviewed politicians and ‘ordinary’ citizens and reported about his experiences in all countries.\(^{1337}\) The highlights of ZDF election coverage were ‘Europeanised’ versions of the interactive talkshow \textit{Bürger fragen – Politiker antworten} moderated by ZDF editor in chief Reinhard Appel.\(^{1338}\) In the programme, well-known politicians answered questions from a studio audience composed of citizens from different social backgrounds. Appel devised four programmes specifically for the European elections. In February and May 1979, he produced four ‘European’ versions of \textit{Bürger fragen – Politiker antworten} – in Paris with Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt answering questions from a French studio audience, in The Hague with opposition leader Helmut Kohl interviewed by a Dutch audience, in Rome with CSU leader Franz Josef Strauß with an Italian studio audience and with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher answering questions from a Spanish audience in Madrid.\(^{1339}\) The broadcast with Kohl infuriated the CDU, as the Dutch audience proved to be mostly composed of leftist students who teased the conservative Kohl with critical questions.\(^{1340}\) Finally, ZDF aired two ‘Europe’-related documentaries produced by other EC broadcasters and three documentaries produced by the ‘supranational’ editorial department coordinated by

\(^{1335}\) See Notizen zum ARD-Programm, Die Europa-Wahlen im Deutschen Fernsehen/ARD, 21/78, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
\(^{1336}\) See Programmvorhaben der HR Kultur, ZDF Information und Presse, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
\(^{1338}\) Appel started planning the programmes in late 1978. See Zusammenfassung der Redaktionskonferenz der HR Außenpolitik vom 29.11.78, ZDF-UA, 6/0387.
Granada TV. Hence, ARD and ZDF election coverage offered transnational and also politicised content.

Television and radio coverage of the European elections reached its peak in the week before and on the election days. Pro-‘European’ politicians like the already mentioned Heiner Geissler\textsuperscript{1342} and West German European Movement chairman Horst Seefeld urged the broadcasters to further increase their election coverage in late May 1979. ZDF Director-General von Hase responded that coverage was already extensive and in his view on the verge of becoming “obtrusive”. “However, as I share your worry that many citizens are still not sufficiently motivated to make use of their right to vote, I have arranged so […] that during the last eight days before the election there will again be many indications in the programme regarding the participation in the European election.”\textsuperscript{1343} On 10 June and 11 June, ARD and ZDF both broadcasted several hours of election and vote counting coverage during prime time. ZDF broadcasted from an election studio with two moderators. The election broadcast involved live switches with correspondents in Paris, London, Rome, Brussels and Scandinavia and with reporters in the headquarters of the four main political parties. Two moderators in a data processing centre in Mannheim presented incoming forecasts and results.\textsuperscript{1344} After meeting Walter Hallstein in Brussels in mid-June, ZDF Director-General von Hase told his staff that the former EC Commission President had been delighted with ZDF election coverage. “Herr Hallstein strongly praised special programmes focussing on the topic [e.g. the European elections], the programmes during the election weekend and particularly the programme “Europe has voted” on 11 June.”\textsuperscript{1345} The ZDF remained strongly interested in the European Parliament after the election. In September 1979, Brussels studio head Lothar Rühl declared that his studio had started “a coverage focus on the European Parliament.”\textsuperscript{1346}

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\textsuperscript{1341} See Europa 79, Europa im ZDF-Programm, Berichte-Analysen-Reportagen in ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
\textsuperscript{1342} See Heiner Geissler to von Hase, 23.05.1979, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
\textsuperscript{1344} See Pressemitteilung ZDF, Europa-Wahl ’79 im ZDF-Programm, ZDF-UA, 6/0654.
\textsuperscript{1346} “Das Studio Brüssel, das auch früher schon für das Europaparlament mit seinen beiden Tagungsstätten Luxemburg und Strassburg und den Ausschusssitzungen in Brüssel zuständig war, hat mit der Bildung eines neuen Berichterstattungsschwerpunktes Europaparlament begonnen.” Bericht des Studio Brüssel, Dr. Lothar
\end{flushleft}
Print media across the nine EC member states made an equally big effort to promote the first direct European Parliamentary elections. The following section will not attempt to provide a survey of the entire election press coverage across all nine EC member states. Instead, it will highlight several important cases based on existing research and archival material. Jürgen Wilke and his fellow researchers examined European election coverage between 1979 and 2004/09 in the four leading (West) German quality newspapers through quantitative content analysis. They found that in the four weeks before election day in June 1979, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* published 266 articles on EC matters, of which 197 related to the elections. Thus, the four newspapers published on average more than eight EC-related articles a day during the four weeks – making ‘European integration’ an omnipresent issue for an educated and elite readership comprised nevertheless of several million people. Regarding the following decades, Wilke and Reinemann found that in the four weeks before European elections the amount of general EC/EU-related coverage increased starting from the 1990s, before dropping again in the 2000s. However, the amount of coverage related directly to the European elections remained stable between 1979 and 2004. Wilke and Reinemann concluded from this that “the amount of EP campaign coverage does not seem to have reflected the rising importance of the EU, the growing number of EU member states, or the
growing influence of the EP on EU policy-making.” This interpretation reflects *sui generis* EC teleological thinking, which expects a positive correlation between the ‘growing importance’ of the European Parliament and the amount of European election coverage. Wilke’s and Reinemann’s findings should be read differently. They show that the four newspapers covered European Parliamentary elections extensively *already* in 1979, when the parliament had no or little formal competencies. The subsequently growing role of the Parliament in the EC/EU legislative process had little influence on European election coverage in the following decades, as media attention was already pegged at a very high level. In short, the four newspapers considered European elections to be important in 1979 even *before* Treaty changes established the European Parliament as an important player in the EC/EU’s institutional structure and legislative processes.

Wilke and Reinemann further found that starting from 1979, the four newspapers devoted considerably less attention to European Parliamentary elections than to national *Bundestag* elections. They showed that *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* published 197 European election related articles in the four weeks before the European election of 1979, while the newspapers had published 882 such articles in the four weeks before the 1980 *Bundestagswahl*. Comparisons between European and national election coverage in the following decades showed similar patterns. This led Wilke and Reinemann to “conclude that EP elections have been second-order elections even in the German quality newspapers since 1979.” However, this interpretation again reflects the *sui generis* EC narrative, which takes national elections as the – unrealistic – benchmark to assess the quantity of European election coverage. Leaving the normative national election benchmark aside, the numbers show a remarkable amount of coverage for the election of a parliament with little to no influence on political decisions of relevance for the citizens in the Federal Republic. Even if one does compare, 882 to 197 articles still constitutes an extraordinary ratio, with European election coverage amounting to more than a fifth of national election coverage – despite the fact that the *Bundestagswahl* determined the future

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1349 Ibid., 317.
1350 Analysing European and national election coverage in the four weeks before election day, Wilke and Reinemann came to the following results: Bundestagswahl 1983: 702 articles; European election 1984: 133 articles; Bundestagswahl 1987: 466 articles; European election 1989: 186 articles; Bundestagswahl 1990: 464 articles; European election 1994: 159 articles; Bundestagswahl 1994: 506 articles; Bundestagswahl 1998: 786 articles; European elections 1999: 222 articles; Bundestagswahl 2002: 1188 articles; European election 2004: 167 articles. National election coverage thus varied considerably, while European election coverage was stable on a lower level. See Ibid., 308.
1351 Ibid., 319.
Federal Government, while the European elections determined the composition of a powerless parliament.

Regarding the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ of the European Parliamentary election campaign coverage, Wilke and Reinemann concluded that “In all six European election campaigns, the four German newspapers reported more from a national perspective than from a European perspective.”1352 While this is true, their findings nevertheless show a substantial ‘Europeanisation’ of European election coverage in 1979 and thereafter. According to Wilke and Reinemann, sixty-three percent of European election coverage in the four weeks before election day in 1979 dealt with “German national political institutions, processes, and policy issues”. ‘Only’ thirty percent covered “EU and European political institutions, processes, and policy issues”, while seven percent dealt with “other member states’ national political institutions, processes, and policy issues”.1353 However, given the set-up of the elections it should come as no surprise that issues relating to national institutions and policy dominated over ‘European’ institutions and issues. Interpreted outside the *sui generis* EC framework which assumes European election campaigns should be dominated by ‘European’ issues, the numbers show a remarkable presence of EC institutions and issues and other EC member states in the newspapers’ election coverage. Wilke and Reinemann further showed that while forty-two percent of the articles published in the run-up to the 1979 European election mentioned the Federal Republic, a remarkable forty-three percent mentioned other EC member countries.1354 In sum, 1979 European election coverage in *Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* showed a remarkable degree of ‘Europeanisation’, with a strong presence of EC institutions and other EC member states.

Opinion-leading newspapers in other Western European EC member states were equally supportive of the direct European Parliamentary elections. *The Times* Editor William Rees-Mogg had already underlined in 1977 that “it would be important to give our readers a European feeling about the elections”.1355 Members of *The Times*’s editorial department and foreign correspondents in EC capital member states coordinated to build a comprehensive

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1352 Ibid., 311.
1353 Ibid., 312.
1354 Ibid., 314.
1355 Minutes of the Europa annual general meeting held at the Bear Hotel Woodstock on 21st May 1977, TNL Archive, Europa Minutes, 1977.
election coverage emanating from Brussels and different EC member states. The Guardian with editor Peter Preston – a journalist “very European, well-informed, and sensible on practically everything” according to EC Commission President Roy Jenkins – “was concerned about the weakness of the European Parliament” and thus supported direct elections. As discussed above, the remainder of the British press was decidedly pro-European in the 1970s and into the 1980s and thus supported the European elections. Le Monde declared the European elections incarnated “L’espoir européen”. The newspaper launched repeated attacks against Communist and Gaullist election opponents. “Défendre avec obstination notre existence française sans admettre la nécessité d’un transfert de souveraineté, aujourd’hui minime, tient du ridicule.” The ‘anti-Europeans’ made France look “comme un pays complexé, peu sûr de lui et qui cherche refuge dans le repli sur soi.” Le Monde director Jacques Fauvet criticised politicians who allegedly always praised themselves for successes while blaming failures on ‘Europe’: “A elle, les défaites ; à la nation, les victoires ! A l’Europe, les échecs ; à la France, les réussites !” Le Monde also published a detailed selection of foreign press commentaries on the election results. The leading Italian dailies fervently promoted the European elections. 

\[1356\] See Louis Heren (Deputy editor) to Charles Douglas-Home (Foreign Editor), March 13th, 1979, TNL Archive, Subject files, Europe, Times policy on coverage, etc, 1963-1979. 
\[1357\] Jenkins after a meeting with Preston on 8 May 1978 in London. See Jenkins, European Diary, 260. According to Taylor, “Under Peter Preston the paper did not, throughout the 1970s and 80s, have any serious hesitations about Britain's belonging to Europe, though he did not carry the whole staff with him.” Taylor, Changing Faces, 265. 
\[1358\] Taylor, Changing Faces, 265. 
\[1360\] As explained in the previous chapter, Le Monde during the 1970s strongly supported the EC. See Thibau, Le Monde, 408–10. 
\[1361\] Patrice Halary, L’espoir européen, 12.05.1979. According to the Le Monde online archive, the newspaper published forty-nine articles containing the term “élection européenne” and forty-two including the term “parlement européen” in the month before election day in France on 10 June 1979 (period 10 May - 10 June 1979). 
\[1362\] Attacking Communists and Gaullists, Henri Reynaud stated: “Si les hommes politiques français savaient quel spectacle ils sont en train d’offrir à nos voisins européens ! Car, enfin, le débat ne tourne même plus à l’empoignade de politique intérieure, mais à la farce.” Henri Reynaud, Vu d’outre-Rhin..., Le Monde, 06.06.1979. 
\[1363\] Jacques Fauvet, Quelle Europe ?, Le Monde, 07.06.1979. 
\[1364\] Le Monde, Dans la passe européenne, 13.06.1979. 
explain the EC’s functioning with a “quiz europeo”.

It explained the election modalities in detail and printed a timeline recapitulating the *sui generis* narrative on the history of ‘European integration’, beginning with the Schuman declaration in 1950.

*La Stampa direttore* Arrigo Levi called for a ‘European Foreign Policy’ and stated that “Non è escluso che proprio il Parlamento europeo possa prendere utilmente delle iniziative in questo campo.”

*Corriere della Sera* demanded “Un ruolo politico per il parlamento europeo”. The newspaper called on its readers to go and cast their ballots.

After the election, the *Corriere* subsequently presented the Italian female European Parliament Members and reported extensively about the assembly’s rejection of the EC budget in late 1979 – the parliament’s first bold move to expand its powers.

In sum, the leading dailies in the principal EC member states devoted considerable efforts to promoting the first direct European Parliamentary elections. Coverage continued after the elections, with the first session of the directly elected parliament in July 1979 receiving “uncommonly generous treatment in the press”.

**News agencies**

In line with its claim to be the leading Western European news agency providing information from a non-national viewpoint, *Reuters* mobilised massive resources to cover the first direct European Parliamentary elections. The European Parliament had become a *Reuters* subscriber in 1974 at a rate of 197,000 Belgian Francs per month – an

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1366 See Stampa Sera, Quiz europeo, 07.06.1979, p. 1. According to the La Stampa online archive, the various editions of *La Stampa* and *Stampa Sera* published 368 articles containing the term “parlamento europeo” and 192 articles containing the term “elezioni europee” between 10 May 1979 and election day on 10 June 1979. See http://www.archiviolastampa.it.

1367 See Pierdomenico Clemente, Come si voterà per le elezioni europee, Stampa Sera, 06.06.1979, p. 3.

1368 Arrigo Levi, Dolce gollismo del presidente Giscard, La Stampa, 10.04.1979, p. 3.

1369 According to the *Corriere*’s online archive, the newspaper published 209 articles containing the term “parlamento europeo” and 143 articles containing the term “elezioni europee” between 10 May 1979 and election day on 10 June 1979. See http://archivio.corriere.it.

1369 See Giorgio Sacerdoti, Un ruolo politico per il parlamento europeo, Corriere della Sera, 06.03.1979, p. 3.

1370 See Dino Frescobaldi, E adesso si vota per il parlamento europeo, Corriere della Sera, 07.06.1979, p. 4.

1371 See Corriere della Sera, Ecco le nostre ‘euro lady’ per Strasburgo, 13.06.1979, p. 2.


1373 Reuters Chief News Editor Ian Macdowall underlined the “uncommonly generous treatment in the press” of the directly elected parliament’s first session. See Macdowall to Waller, 9 August 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.

1374 See the section on news agencies and *Reuters* in Chapter 5.

1375 See Kellett-Long to Villeneuve, 16 March 1976, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
“achievement which though modest in terms of financial return provides us with most welcome exposure in the important European forum”,

Reuters officials declared. In December 1978, the agency arranged for chief news editor Ian Macdowall, “to visit Brussels and probably Luxembourg in late February to discuss with European parliamentary officials the press coverage plans for the European elections in the summer.”

In January, Reuters Brussels bureau chief Andrew H. Waller argued that: “With the first direct elections to the European Parliament taking place in June, coverage of this assembly is going to become more important and more demanding of our resources. Our present communications form the Palais de l’Europe are inadequate and I propose that we take steps to improve them.”

The bureau suggested an upgrade of Reuters communication and text transmission facilities in the Palais de l’Europe.

Upon returning from his Brussels visit in late February 1979, chief news editor Ian Macdowall sent out a letter to all Reuters bureaux in EC member states asking for coverage on the election preparations. He also requested a detailed report on electoral preparations in each country for internal use. “Since there is no precedent for elections of this kind, London and Brussels would appreciate maximum information” on voting procedure, parties, candidates and forecasts.

In the months before 10 June, Reuters ran “a series of features on various aspects of the elections” emanating from its bureaux in all member states. The Brussels bureau provided “regular overall surveys of the campaign on a community-wide basis.”

Hence, Reuters produced sustained European Parliamentary election coverage in the months before the election days.

Reuters laid particular emphasis on its comprehensive and international election night coverage. Chief news editor Ian Macdowall decided to subscribe to the EBU’s computerised service for election results. This would allow Reuters to quickly inform its international client base on the election outcome in all nine member countries on election night.

Macdowall outlined the Reuters election coverage strategy for 10 June to his collaborators in late March

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1378 H J Henry to M Reupke, 12 December 1978, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1379 Andrew H. Waller to The Managing Director, Strasbourg Communications, 23 January 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1380 See Andrew H. Waller, Proposal on Strasbourg Communications, Brussels, 23 January 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1381 See Macdowall to Broad, 27 February 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1382 See Macdowall to Chadwick (Bonn), Dallas (Rome), Follett (Copenhagen), Organ (London), Thornton (The Hague), Walsh (Paris), 1 March 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1383 See Macdowall to Reupke, European Direct Elections, 30 March 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1384 See Macdowall to Chadwick, 26 March 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1979. Based on the EBU system, Reuters would send “the state of the parties for each country and for the EEC as a whole every hour and send separate urgents on the first forecasts of the result for each country and for the result itself.” Reuters bureaux in the nine member states would file reports on the national meaning of the elections, while the Brussels bureau would comment on the elections’ significance “in community terms”. On 10 June, the four correspondents in the agency’s Brussels office were supported by three journalists from other bureaux. The EBU computer system did not function properly, but the Reuters Brussels bureau nevertheless produced a constant stream of election coverage into the night and during 11 June. Chief news editor Macdowall praised the Brussels office for its election reporting – they had done well in “covering the detailed results and in analysing the community-wide trends in the voting.” A “study of the logs for the five-day period of the voting and counting showed that we had an excellent file.”

Reuters continued its extensive coverage of the European Parliament after the election. Macdowall underlined “the essential difference between the old and new Parliaments – that the new one has a moral authority lacking in the old.” In July 1979, Reuters covered the first session of the newly elected assembly in detail. Macdowall requested detailed coverage also for following sessions as “future Parliamentary debates will attract a good deal more interest in the European press than did those of the old assembly.” Reuters thus used the first direct European Parliamentary elections to reinforce its claim to provide the agency’s international clients with supranational journalistic products. Making use of its wide network of foreign bureaux across EC member states, its large Brussels bureau and EBU technology, Reuters offered multiperspective and detailed coverage. Its Brussels correspondents were explicitly asked to cover the campaign from a ‘Community perspective’. In the late 1970s, Western Europe’s biggest news agency – with subscribers across all EC member states and around the world – made the European Parliament a central topic of its already extensive ‘European integration’ coverage.

In sum, broadcasters and leading newspapers across all EC member states and Western Europe’s foremost news agency made a considerable effort to promote the first direct European Parliamentary elections. In Western European media, the elections were no ‘second

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1385 See Macdowall to Reupke, European Direct Elections, 30 March 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1386 See Waller to The Managing Director, 13 July 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1387 Macdowall to Waller, 14 June 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
1388 Macdowall to Waller, 9 August 1979, Reuters Archive, Central Registry Files, 55R Europe.
order’ affair – they became subject to massive media coverage. What was remarkable about the elections was not that they received lower levels of media attention than national elections. Instead, the high levels of media attention the elections received – despite the European Parliament’s marginal place in the EC architecture – was remarkable. While the European Parliament had previously been the subject of substantial media coverage, it was during the election campaign in the late 1970s that the ‘European’ assembly became as present as never before in Western European media. Through the media, the European Parliament went public as a central pillar of a democratic ‘European’ polity. The elections became a trans-Western European media event. Had public broadcasters not lobbied for some form of simultaneity in voting and vote counting, the elections would have taken another and less ‘European’ shape. By presenting forecasts and results in single election programmes on 10 and 11 June, broadcasters ‘Europeanised’ what were actually nine national voting and counting processes. They compensated for the absence of a centralised ‘European’ counting system. Multiple exchanges of information and material – particularly in the EBU framework – inserted many transnational elements in the election coverage. Journalists in 1979 set a European election media event template which would be applied to election coverage in the following decades, making the European Parliamentary elections the subject of repeated extensive media coverage. Western European journalists saw it as their task to help make the first direct European Parliamentary elections a success. Following the Euro-journalist playbook, their coverage aimed at educating citizens about the functions and merits of the European Parliament and the EC. They believed that media reporting could and should increase voter turnout and thereby make the elections a success on the way towards a ‘united Europe’. Journalists cooperated with national and ‘European’ actors to promote the elections. National political and media cultures played a role in the election coverage. West German journalists proved more eager than British journalists to promote the elections. BBC journalists stated they wanted to cover the elections ‘objectively’. However, just as their West German colleagues they produced coverage in line with the sui generis EC narrative placing the European Parliament in a central position in the emerging ‘European’ polity of the European Community.
**Conclusion**

In the second half of the 1970s, the EC emerged in Western European media as the democratic ‘European’ polity we know from today’s EU media coverage. This development marked the definite victory of the *sui generis* EC narrative as the prism through which Western European media reported ‘European integration’. On the one hand, the EC did indeed change and grow institutionally, with the creation of the European Council and the directly elected European Parliament. On the other hand, the symbolically supercharged media coverage of the two new institutions was instrumental in creating the public image of the EC as a political system increasingly boasting the same democratic characteristics as national political systems in the member states. Journalists’ actions were part of a broader ‘European’ identity building campaign by Western European elites.

Western European media covered all aspects of the EC ranging from the EMS to the CAP, but the European Parliament and the European Council played the central role in the EC’s ‘going public’ as today’s ‘European’ polity towards the late 1970s. This chapter has demonstrated that both the European Council and the first directly elected European Parliament became the subjects of sustained and massive media campaigns reflecting the *sui generis* narrative on ‘European integration’. Carefully staged by governments and Council Secretariat, the ‘European’ summits attracted hundreds of journalists. Media coverage helped frame the summits as crossroads events, where national leaders could fail or succeed in acting boldly to overcome the ‘crises’ of integration. The European Council rose in the media into the position of the driving force towards ‘European unity’. ‘European’ summit journalism as practised today has its roots in these 1970s developments.

The directly elected European Parliament became the subject of immense media promotion in the late 1970s. Coverage built up in the months before the election and peaked in the weeks before election day. The media created transnational election day and results coverage on 10 and 11 June, thereby compensating for the absence of a centralised supranational election system. The media shaped European election procedures to a remarkable degree – without their lobbying for some form of simultaneity in voting and counting, the elections would have looked a lot less ‘European’. The media tried to mobilise the ‘European’ electorate to achieve a high voter turnout. The chapter has demonstrated that the media did not attribute more attention to the European Council while neglecting the European Parliament. With their election campaign, journalists heavily overplayed the importance of the first direct European
Parliamentary elections – the European Parliament had no real role in the EC legislative process and little relevance for the daily lives of Western Europeans. The characterisation of the first direct European Parliamentary elections as ‘second-order’ elections is hence misleading. Considered outside the normative comparison with national elections, the European election media campaign was remarkable – it did not neglect, but overemphasised the elections’ relevance.
7 Conclusion

The rise of *Euro-journalism* helped create the European Union as the *sui generis* 'supranational' polity and incarnation of 'Europe' we know today. Euro-journalism contributed to moving the 'European integration process' into the central position it today holds in European public discourse. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the European Communities were miraculously transformed in Western European media. They morphed from a technocratic international organisation into the democratic 'European' polity we today see as the EU. In the 1950s, Western European journalists overwhelmingly treated the European Communities as one among many international organisations working for Western European cooperation. The ECSC, EEC and 'supranationalism' did not stand out among a multitude of 'European integration' projects ranging from neoliberal to Gaullist to communist. By the 1970s, however, the media framed the Communities as a *sui generis* 'European' polity incarnating 'European integration' and 'Europe'. They also massively promoted the Communities and 'supranationalism' to the Western European publics. The purpose of this study was to explain this astonishing transformation.

This thesis argued that the *Euro-journalists* pioneered the European Communities’ rise and symbolic magnification in Western European media. Euro-journalists worked as economic and foreign affairs journalists in the editorial departments of important Western European media outlets. Often members of a new generation who had entered journalism after 1945, they envisioned modern, prosperous and democratic Western European societies for a postimperial Cold War world. The World War II experience, interest in the interaction of economics and politics and socialisation in ‘Europeanist’ circles led them to embrace ‘European integration’ and ‘supranationalism’. They perceived both as genuinely new alternatives to ‘outdated’ nationalism and imperialism. However, Euro-journalists followed ‘European Integration’ mostly from national points of view. While agreeing on the EEC’s destiny as a ‘European’ polity, they could disagree sharply on the right economic path towards ‘European unity’. Euro-journalists belonged to a larger group of advocates of ‘European Integration’ *à la* EEC emerging in the 1950s and 1960s in political parties,
government administrations, academia, business, civil society and the Community institutions.

The EEC *sui generis* narrative the Euro-journalists promoted had three elements. First, the EEC was not a normal international organisation, but a *sui generis* entity incarnating a democratic ‘European’ polity in the making. Its technocratic activities had a deeper meaning as the led to ‘European unity’. The *Europe des Six* of the European Communities incarnated ‘European integration’ and ‘Europe’. Alternative forms of Western European cooperation were illegitimate and ‘anti-European’. Second, the EEC was a precondition for economic prosperity, peace and the preservation of a strong ‘European’ role on the international scene. Without the EEC, on the contrary, ‘Europe’ risked economic stagnation, war and geopolitical decline. ‘European integration’ was thus a rational imperative, beneficial for everyone and without any alternative. Third, ‘European Integration’ through the EEC was a forward-moving ‘process’. Interruption or stagnation in the ‘integration process’ meant ‘crisis’. National governments threatened integration with their ‘national egoism’, while the ‘European’ institutions in Brussels as guardians of the ‘European interest’ pushed integration forward. In short, the Euro-journalists developed an interpretative framework for the EEC through which most European journalists today perceive the EU.

However, ‘supranationalism’ and the EEC initially mattered little in 1950s Western European journalism. The Cold War and decolonisation stood in the centre of media attention. Men with pre-war socialisation shaped postwar Western European journalism – just as they did in politics, business, academia and other fields of society. They mostly perceived the world through the lenses of interwar or even pre-World War I nationalism, imperialism, socialism-communism, liberalism and conservatism. Based on these ideologies, ‘prewar journalists’ had little interest in ‘European integration’ or rejected the idea of ‘European unity’. They could also defend alternative (Western) European cooperation projects based on communist internationalism, neo-liberalism or conservative-*Abendland* Catholicism. Western European media coverage reflected the fact that there was no ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘European integration’ through ‘supranationalism’ in the Western European elite. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, ‘European integration’ coverage remained multifaceted and conflictual.

Starting from the late 1950s and early 1960s, Euro-journalists gradually introduced the EEC *sui generis* ‘European integration’ narrative into Western European media. They did so
using editorial freedoms, their expertise for economic policy and EEC technicalities and their reputation as talented young journalists. Euro-journalists advocated the institutionalisation of ‘European integration’ coverage. They furthered the creation of Common Market or EEC correspondent and editor positions, which they subsequently often occupied themselves. They thereby became gatekeepers for the selection and framing of ‘European integration’ news. As a consequence, the EEC received surprisingly high levels of media attention from the late 1950s onwards. Euro-journalists’ promotion of ‘European integration’ reflected postwar Western European advocacy journalism. At the same time, other factors not directly influenced by Euro-journalists furthered and facilitated the rise of the *sui generis* EEC media narrative during the 1960s. The EEC Commission and EEC member state governments promoted the Community in Western European media. The EEC expanded its activities. Geopolitical change increased the attractiveness of ‘European integration’ and the Communities. The economic re-emergence of Western Europe and the demise of European imperialism made Western European integration appear more and more reasonable. Euro-journalists and their allies in government, academia, business and elsewhere did not cause such structural trends and developments in Western European politics and economics. However, when interest in ‘European integration’ grew, the Euro-journalists stood ready with the *sui generis* EEC narrative to make sense of and give direction to the debate about ‘European unity’. In sum, the Euro-journalists’ advocacy, an expanding EEC and geopolitical shifts led to the rise of Euro-journalism in Western European media during the 1960s.

In the first half of the 1970s, Euro-journalism was consolidated as the standard way of covering ‘European integration’ in Western European media. Deteriorating relations with the United States, *détente* with the Soviet Union, continued decolonisation, a resurgent West Germany and a further economic strengthening of Western Europe convinced Western European elites – including journalists – that ‘Europe’ would and should move forward towards an ‘ever closer union’ and become a powerful international actor. The solution was a leap forward in ‘European integration’, launched at the 1969 The Hague summit. The economic crises following the collapse of Bretton Woods and the first oil shock destroyed the unprecedented optimism of the early 1970s ‘European moment’. Fierce disputes broke out between the EC member governments regarding the right ‘European’ economic policy to alleviate the crisis. Journalists from different member states clashed over economic integration. However, this did not affect their support for the EC – on the contrary, they became ever more convinced that Western European states could master the 1970s economic
and political challenges only through ‘European integration’. Following the *sui generis* EC narrative, journalists framed the 1970s as a period of alarming ‘crises’ for ‘European integration’. The EC and its ‘crises’ obtained a prominent place on the Western European news agenda. Brussels became a news centre with similar importance as Bonn, Paris or London. By the mid-1970s, the Euro-narrative of the pioneering Euro-journalists became the interpretative framework for ‘European integration’ reporting in Western European mainstream journalism.

The Euro-journalists who had invented the *sui generis* EEC media narrative in the 1950s and 1960s played key roles in the 1970s’ ‘European integration’ coverage. First, career progress lifted them into influential or leading positions in Western European journalism, where they established the *sui generis* EC narrative as the benchmark for ‘European integration’ coverage. They also retained control of the important gatekeeper positions of ‘European integration’ reporting they had come to occupy in the 1960s, for example as Brussels correspondents. Second, they were relied upon for EC coverage by colleagues because of their longtime expertise on the Community’s complexities. Finally, the ‘European moment’ of the early 1970s saw the emergence of a second generation of Euro-journalists in the 1970s who continued the 1960s model of Euro-journalism.

In the second half of the 1970s, the EC emerged in Western European media as the coherent democratic ‘European’ polity which journalists today cover as the EU. The EC did indeed expand and change, particularly with the European Council and the first direct elections to the European Parliament. By the end of the 1970s, the EC comprised all core institutions of today’s EU. At the same time, Western European journalists who were committed to ‘European’ identity building inflated the EC with ‘European’ symbolism. They framed the EC as a political system increasingly boasting the same democratic characteristics as national political systems in the member states. Western European elites undertook massive efforts to promote the EC and to get ‘European’ citizens involved in ‘European integration’. In these campaigns, the media were attributed a key role. Particularly television – which by the 1970s had reached virtually every Western European household – was believed to strongly influence peoples’ thinking. Media coverage helped frame European Councils as crossroads events where national leaders could fail or succeed in pushing integration forward. The first direct European Parliamentary elections became a huge media event. They were by no means a ‘second-order election’. By successfully advocating simultaneity in the vote
count, Western European broadcasters contributed to giving the elections a trans-European character. The late 1970s marked the definitive rise of Euro-journalism and the victory of the EC *sui generis* narrative as the prism through which Western European media reported on ‘European integration’.

**The media and politics**

This thesis has emphasised elite-embeddedness and advocacy-intentions as key features of Western European journalism between the 1950s and the 1970s. First, contrary to previous research, the thesis did not focus on a supposed shift from ‘consensus’ to ‘critical’ journalism. Instead, it highlighted the continued elite orientation of Western European journalism in the three postwar decades. The dominant political thinking in journalism changed from conservative to liberal. But the case of Euro-journalism demonstrates that journalists continued acting as advocates embedded in elite groups. Second, the thesis did not identify different national models of journalism developed by social scientists. Instead, the example of Euro-journalism showed that journalists from London to Rome constituted not so much a ‘fourth estate’, but were part of elite groups promoting political causes. There was an ethos of objective news journalism particularly in news agencies. However, Euro-journalism illustrates that being a journalist in the three postwar decades in Western Europe meant participating in elite efforts to shape politics and society. As indicated throughout the thesis, Euro-journalists were just one group of journalists among others supporting political causes. Other causes supported by journalists were imperialism, modernisation, socialism, neoliberalism, Gaullism, *apertura a sinistra*, the West, Catholicism, *Neue Ostpolitik*, democracy or social liberalisation. In short, journalists were elite actors who saw themselves as influencers and educators giving a service to the public.

The thesis leads to three conclusions about postwar Western European journalism. First, it questions the liberal narrative on a supposed shift from a state-abiding ‘consensus journalism’ in the 1950s to a critical journalism questioning authorities in the 1960s and 1970s.\(^{1389}\) The supposedly ‘critical’ liberal-social democratic journalism – to which Euro-journalism was linked – that came to dominance in the 1960s and 1970s was as much an elitist advocacy

\(^{1389}\) See Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise*. 
journalism as the conservative ‘consensus journalism’ of the 1940s and 1950s. While the latter lauded Konrad Adenauer, the former celebrated Willy Brandt in equally uncritical ways. Both conservative and liberal politicians could rely on and cultivated groups of loyal journalistic followers throughout the postwar decades. Second, the thesis relativizes social scientists’ typologies on different media models and cultures of journalism in Western Europe. It contributes to the critique against the argument that Anglo-Saxon journalism held higher standards of objectivity and detachment from power than other Western European communications. As demonstrated above, 1970s’ British journalists acted as loyal propagandists of the British government’s effort to enter the EC – just as Italian or West German journalists propagated their government’s ‘European policy’. Third, the thesis makes an argument about state control of media linked to the previous two points. Direct or indirect control of the state and politicians over the media was a trans-Western European phenomenon lasting into the 1970s and 1980s. French President Giscard d’Estaing intervened in state media just as much as his predecessor Charles de Gaulle did. Contrary to Sonderweg narratives on German journalism history, postwar media freedom in the Federal Republic did not lag behind ‘Western’ standards – the media in 1960s’ West Germany were freer than in 1960s’ France. While politicians and the state exercised formal control over the media in France, Italy and obviously Spain and Portugal, control in Britain functioned through informal channels outlined in this study. Finally, state control over the media was not only a leftover of pre-1945 authoritarianism, but also a product of the postwar social democratic consensus which saw the state as the promoter of economic and social progress – also through

1390 On leading Western European politicians cultivating groups of journalistic followers, see Thomas Birkner, Mann des gedruckten Wortes - Helmut Schmidt und die Medien (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2014); Delporte, “Les journalistes gaullistes”; Münkel, “Konrad Adenauer und Willy Brandt: Zwei Medienkanzler? Politik, Medien und Demokratie”; Daniela Münkel and Lu Seegers, eds., Medien und Imagepolitik im 20. Jahrhundert: Deutschland, Europa, USA (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2008); Münkel, Willy Brandt und die “Vierte Gewalt”; Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945; Riedl, Liberale Publizistik für soziale Marktwirtschaft. 1391 See Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems. 1392 On the origins of the debate, see the influential work by See Jean K. Chalaby, “Journalism as an Anglo-American Invention. A Comparison of the Development of French and Anglo-American Journalism, 1830s-1920s,” European Journal of Communication 11, no. 3 (1996): 303–326; Renate Köcher, “Spürhund und Missionar: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung über Berufsethik und Aufgabenverständnis britischer und deutscher Journalisten” (Dissertation, Universität München, 1985). 1393 See Hodenberg, Konsens und Krise. 1394 This reflected older patterns of media control. Geppert has shown that before World War I, politicians and the state in Britain controlled the media through informal means, while in Germany there was a system of formal state control over the media. See Geppert, Pressekreie. The study confirms Seymour-Ure’s interpretation of the BBC as a “quintessential institution of British government” controlled by politicians through “informal, tacit habits and understandings, rooted in the shared values and experiences of an educated class, more than on legal forms and niceties.” Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, 61.
the media. It was probably not so much the supposed 1960s’ emancipation of Western European journalism, but rather the 1980s’ rise of neoliberalism which forcefully introduced a market logic and stronger independence from the state into Western European journalism. Governments then reduced – but not abandon – their control of and direct or indirect subsidies to public broadcasters, national news agencies, and the media generally. Journalism became in part a business to make money like others, while journalists also retained their self-conception as educators and improvers of society.1395

Ultimately, the media played a double role in postwar ‘European integration’ politics. First, they served as an arena for elite deliberations on ‘European unity’. Decision makers and their affiliated journalists used the media to launch and test ideas and initiatives, send messages and monitor the intentions of partners and opponents at home and abroad. Journalists were no mere independent observers, but largely part of elite groups feuding over ‘European integration’. Consequently, EEC/EC media coverage reflected elite debates on ‘European integration’. There was no media consensus on ‘European integration’ between the 1940s and the 1960s as there was no elite consensus on integration. Each faction in the debate on ‘European unity’ from Gaullist to neoliberal to Euro-federalist could count on loyal journalistic supporters. Only in the 1970s did the elite consensus on ‘European unity’ through the ‘supranational’ EC translate into almost unanimous Western European media support for the EC version of ‘European integration’. Second, elites including journalists themselves saw the media as a tool to educate the public about ‘European integration’. Politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals and journalists deemed the media crucial to their efforts of ‘European’ identity building. However, if the media actually had the power to influence the public to the degree assumed by elites is not clear.1396

The media and ‘Europeanisation’

The rise of Euro-journalism and of the EEC/EC sui generis media narrative constitutes a remarkable ‘Europeanisation’ of Western European journalism so far overseen by

1396 These findings are in line with other recent research on the role of the media in 20th-century national and international politics. See Götter, Die Macht der Wirkungsannahmen. Medienarbeit des britischen und deutschen Militärs in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts; Hoeres, Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit.
‘Europeanisation’ scholars. Western European journalism did not ‘lag behind’ integration – at least since the 1970s’ journalists in cooperation with other elite groups acted as promotors and forerunners who together were educating the Western European publics on the need for ‘European unity’. Moreover, the rise of Euro-journalism fits into a ‘Europeanisation’ of Western European societies which EU-centric ‘Europeanisation’ research often ignores. As European empires retreated and the European-dominated global order gave way to decolonisation and the Cold War superpower antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union, Western European political thinking, economic activities, legal norms and intellectual and public discourse shifted from Empire to ‘Europe’. Western European economies diverted the movement of goods and capital from imperial spaces to Western Europe and the North Atlantic. European militaries retreated from Asia and Africa, and were now defending ‘Europe’ against the Soviet Union. Law that had previously regulated imperial holdings disappeared, while new ‘European’ legal norms governing the European Communities arose. The free movement of French, British, Belgian and Dutch citizens in empires was replaced by the free movement of ‘European’ citizens in the ‘European’ Common Market. Colonial administrators disappeared, while the new profession of ‘European’ civil servant developed. Empire gave way to ‘Europe’, which as a ‘civilian power’ continued the – now peaceful – ‘civilising mission’ of the continent.

Western European journalism went through the same process of ‘Europeanisation’ and switched from “broadcasting Empire” to promoting ‘Europe’. Media attention shifted from places which still occupied a central place in Western European media in the 1950s and 1960s – say Rhodesia in Britain and Algeria in France – to Western European countries and the emerging EC polity in Brussels. Media content and networks of foreign correspondents relocated from Africa, the Middle East and Asia towards ‘Europe’. Thus, ‘Europeanisation’ of Western European media did not necessarily imply an opening up from inward-looking national perspectives, but also a narrowing down of global and imperial perspectives to more limited ‘European’ outlooks. Journalists played their part in the reinvention of Western European empire states as very different imagined communities – the European countries we


\[1398\] Potter, *Broadcasting Empire.*
know today. In debates about a ‘European journalism’, this ‘contribution’ to and ‘Europeanisation’ of Western European journalism has been overlooked.1399

The media and ‘permissive consensus’

This study adds to a body of research questioning the concept of ‘permissive consensus’ on ‘European integration’ in postwar Western Europe.1400 The thesis could not provide a complete analysis of ‘European integration’ media coverage across Western Europe from the 1950s to the 1970s. Nevertheless, it produced multiple pieces of evidence that showed postwar media debates on Western European integration were both conflictual and politicised. The EEC/EC and ‘supranationalism’ – not least due to the support of the Euro-journalists – received surprising levels of positive media attention starting from the late 1950s. However, there was also indifference, resistance and support for other visions of ‘European unity’. ‘European integration’ media coverage was embedded in the postwar conflicts over the future of Western European societies. Finally, when Western European journalism adopted Euro-journalism in the early 1970s, this did not dissolve journalists’ conflicting views on the right path of economic integration in the EC. On the contrary, media disputes over EC economic policy intensified in the 1970s economic crises.

The fundamental shift in Western European EEC/EC/EU media coverage does not seem to have been a recent swing from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’,1401 but rather the move from multiple ‘European integration’ visions in the 1950s to what could be called a ‘permissive consensus’ on the EC as a ‘European’ polity in the 1970s. This trans-Western European change seems more essential than the embrace of ‘Euro sceptic’ positions in the 1980s and 1990s by some media outlets in individual member states like Britain.1402 What could be called a ‘European’ consensus journalism has largely dominated ‘European

1399 For a longue durée perspective on the issue of ‘European journalism’, see the short but insightful essay by Delporte, “A la recherche d’un « journalism européen ». Les journalistes au cœur de la construction européenne (XIXe-XXe siècles).”
1400 See the already cited works by Pasquinucci and Verzichelli, Contro l’Europa?; Găinar and Libera, Contre l’Europe?; Sternberg, The Struggle for EU Legitimacy; Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice; Wassenberg, Clavert, and Hamman, Contre l’Europe?; IRICE, “Anti-européens, eurosceptiques et souverainistes.”
1401 See Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration.”
integration’ coverage since the 1970s. Journalists framed the EC/EU as a democratic ‘European’ polity to be completed through ‘progress’ in the ‘integration process’. However, this consensus did not cover economic policy, which remained conflictual. This reporting pattern developed in the 1970s ‘crises’ of the EC, and it remained the pattern for EU coverage in the recent Euro crisis, when journalists overwhelmingly supported further integration as the solution, while disagreeing fundamentally on the economic policies to solve the crisis.\footnote{See Picard, The Euro Crisis in the Media; Steve Schifferes and Richard Roberts, eds., The Media and Financial Crises: Comparative and Historical Perspectives (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015).} Since the 1960s and 1970s, ‘Euro-sceptics’ like British anti-marketeers and French Gaullists and Communists have frequently complained about ‘pro-European’ biases in opinion-making media. At the same time, the EC/EU received strong media criticism for issues ranging from butter mountains to the 1999 Santer Commission scandal. But during four decades, Euro-journalism remained largely unchallenged in mainstream (Western) European media discourse. This might be changing now. Public outrage over the European elite’s handling of the Euro crisis and the recent migration crisis led to a backlash also against the ‘mainstream media’\footnote{See Uwe Krüger, Mainstream: Warum wir den Medien nicht mehr trauen (München: C.H. Beck, 2016).}, which following the guidelines of Euro-journalism had supported ‘European’ solutions to deal with the ailing currency union and uncontrolled migration.

In a longue durée perspective, current resistances against the EU are no new phenomena, but rather represent decades-old ‘Euro-scepticisms’ based on, for example, Italian anti-liberalism, French nationalism and German ordoliberalism. These ‘Euro-scepticisms’ seem to have persisted despite sixty years of ‘progress’ in the ‘integration process’. While politicians, EU representatives, intellectuals, scholars and journalists have framed the current contestation of the EU as unprecedented, it should not be forgotten that in the 1950s and 1960s, the ECSC and EEC faced much more serious resistance and criticism from Italian and French communists, British imperialists and West German neoliberals (not to mention the critique from socialist Eastern Europe and the Global South).

The ‘permissive consensus’ hypothesis is based on early public opinion research on ‘European integration’ dating from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This study did not focus on public opinion polls, but future research should critically re-examine and historically contextualise these pioneering studies and point out their ideological biases and methodological shortcomings. Such research could focus on two points. First, the pioneers of

\textbf{The media and ‘European’ identity building}

Both EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein in the 1960s and social scientists researching the European Union in the 2000s shared a common conviction: they believed in the power of the media to change people. The media, they alleged, could help give rise to a ‘European identity’ linked to the ‘European’ political system of the EEC/EC/EU. The efforts of postwar Western European elites to foster a ‘European consciousness’ through the
media and the early 21st-century research on a ‘European’ or ‘Europeanised’ public spheres reflect three elite beliefs on the media’s role in domestic and international politics. First, since the outgoing 19th century, elites have considered modern mass media essential to their efforts of imperial, national or ‘supranational’ identity building. Second, from a liberal Habermasian point of view, the media and the public sphere they create are crucial to develop functioning democracies with involved citizens. Third, at least since the end of World War I, liberal internationalism in the Wilsonian tradition has proclaimed that transparent and efficient international communication will lead to international understanding.

The case of Euro-journalism raises questions about these three assumptions regarding the transformative power of the media. This study did not specifically focus on the effects of ‘European integration’ media coverage on public opinion. However, it unearthed evidence that (Western) European elites overestimated the influence of the media. Ronald Inglehart in his 1960s’ research on public opinion and ‘European integration’ found that exposure to print media and television only made “relatively modest contributions to pro-Europeanism”. A study by the BBC Audience Research Department in early 1972 on “public knowledge about the Common Market” at “a time when [Common Market] coverage in newspapers and broadcasting had been at a high level for some time” found that only half of the respondents knew how many countries there were in the Community, less than forty percent could name Britain’s chief negotiator Geoffrey Rippon and almost a third wrongly believed Britain was scheduled to join the EC in 1972. Despite the unanimous support in Britain of public broadcasting and virtually all newspapers – including tabloids – for British EC membership during the 1970s, an important minority of Britons continued to reject British Community

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1408 Particularly with the help of television in the 1970s, as analysed in Chapter 5.
1409 See Risse-Kappen, European Public Spheres; Risse, A Community of Europeans?
1410 Moreover, scholars trying to deconstruct such efforts at building ‘imagined communities’ have also attributed high importance to the media. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition (London, New York: Verso, 2006).
Jay G. Blumler’s multi-country study on the role of television in the 1979 first direct European Parliamentary elections concluded that television had “contributed to increased awareness and indeed interest” towards the election, while at the same time there were “also clear limits” to television’s power. For example, despite the pro-EC bias of French state television under President Giscard, more than a third of the French electorate in 1979 voted for the anti-EC Communist and Gaullist parties. Another BBC study on the effects of television coverage in the 1984 European elections found that a considerable share of respondents had little knowledge and wrong beliefs about the EC. However, “frequent viewing of television news had little or no effect on correcting these misconceptions.” The study concluded that: “Attitudes towards the EC were well established before the election campaign, and did not change as a result of the campaign.”

As for the situation today, a comprehensive review by Sara Hobolt of the recent social science literature on public opinion, the media and ‘European integration’ admits that it remains “notoriously difficult to clearly identify media effects”. Hobolt cites several recent studies as having demonstrated that the way in which the media framed the European Union had an effect on support for ‘European Integration’ – however, these effects were only “modest”. In sum, past and current research suggests that the influence of media coverage on the attitude of the public towards ‘European integration’ was and is not as straightforward as elites believe.

Instead of ‘Europeanising’ media audiences, the rise of Euro-journalism seems to have contributed to a divide between elite discourse and the views of the broader public on ‘European integration’. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, many ‘European integration’ visions existed and competed among the broader public and in elite circles. By the 1970s, an elite consensus on ‘European integration’ though the EC and ‘supranationalism’ had emerged. In Western European journalism, this consensus translated into the rise of Euro-journalism as the paradigm for ‘European integration’ coverage. However, the EC elite consensus did not necessarily trickle down into the broader public. While there was support for the EC, substantial levels of scepticism and resistance against the Community persisted in Western

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1416 See Blumler, Communicating to Voters, iii.
1417 British Television Coverage of the 1984 European Elections, Preliminary Results of a Study of Audiences and Their Opinions, Researched by Barrie Gunter, IBA, Michael Svennevig, August 1984, BBC WAC, R78/3,150/1.
European publics. This became evident early on. In 1972, Norwegian electors rejected EC membership and one million out of three million Danish voters opposed EC membership in a referendum. Britain held a referendum on EC membership in 1975. French Communists and Gaullists drew remarkable public support through their campaign against the EMS and European direct elections in 1979. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty passed only narrowly in referenda in France and Denmark. Resentment against the Euro currency union was widespread in the 1990s in the Federal Republic. In 2005, the EU Constitution was rejected in the Netherlands and France. Finally, in 2016, a majority of British voters voted to leave the EU. Through the mainstreaming of Euro-journalism, (Western) European journalism since the 1970s has failed to give a voice to the persisting plurality of views on ‘European integration’ outside the elite consensus on ‘ever closer union’. Instead, journalists worked their audiences with educational content on the merits of ‘European unity’. These efforts seem to have had restricted effects on the public. The case of Euro-journalism thus points to a fact ‘European’ elites seem to have ignored for too long: the limits of ‘European’ elite identity building.
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