Imagining Europe

Identities, Geography, and Method

Jeroen Moes

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 24 November 2017

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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Abstract

This study takes an interpretative approach to the question of European identity. Based on 95 mixed-type interviews in three country cases (Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands), it aims to answer the question what 'Europe' *means* to different groups of people (in a maximum variation sample), and how those meanings relate to their identities, their imagined geographies, and to political institutions and political narrative.

The methodological approach centres around qualitative, semi-structured, and in-depth interviews of around two hours each. Within that, certain visual methods (photo elicitation and map drawing) are employed in order to develop a better understanding of meanings associated with Europe from the perspective of the interviewee. After that, a short questionnaire including a social network name generator was given to the interviewee. This study is presented as a methodological 'experiment' that attempts to explore alternative empirical avenues for approaching this subject, and what this means for its analysis and presentation.

The analysis centres around three core themes: (i) a typology of perspectives on Europe, (ii) the imagined geographies within Europe, and (iii) the interplay between meanings of Europe and meanings of the EU. The first empirical chapter employs a typology approach to distinguish between three main types of narratives on Europe: *Nationals*, *Situational Europeans*, and *Cosmopolitan Europeans*. These three main types are further disentangled to ultimately range from *cisnational* to *the European cosmopolitan tribe*. The second empirical chapter draws on the data that was gathered by having interviewees express their views visually on a blank map of Europe, and examines the various *Euroscapes* that result from that analysis. Finally, the third empirical chapter looks at the relationship between meanings of 'Europe' and the EU. In doing so, it examines what Euroscepticism means in that context, and how political discourse may affect these meanings. In addition, it considers some of the ways in which European identity is measured in large-scale surveys, and how interviewees interpret such questions.

For Inge, and for Jonah, Saar, and Koos.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

At the start of this project, I had just graduated from a university where I initially started studying cultural anthropology. In my second year I became somewhat frustrated by what I then saw as anthropology's tendency (at least at my department, as seen through the eyes of a first year BA student) to limit its analyses to the particularistic, idiographic level, despite the fact that to me, its name suggested that it should also seek out the broader, more universal things that make up human societies. As a result, I decided to take up sociology as a second study programme as well. At my university, sociology was taught as an exclusively quantitative, and nomothetic endeavour. At first, this seemed like a breath of fresh air to me compared to what I then perceived as the almost nihilistic particularism and relativism of anthropology. It didn't take long though, of course, before I also grew frustrated by the lack of precisely such perspectives in that particular flavour of sociology. As a bachelor student, and later as a master student at the same university, it remained difficult for me to see where these twains could meet at a place where faculty between the departments was known to slam (metaphorical, and so I hear, literal) doors in anger over what was essentially epistemology and method.

And so, when I arrived at the European University Institute (EUI), I felt somewhat liberated by its more interdisciplinary and in many ways more agnostic research culture, and was determined to find a middle ground between the two perspectives. Inspired by the trend of 'interdisciplinary' and 'mixed methods' research, I started off in my first year foolishly drawing elaborate schematics and writing whole chapters on epistemology and ontology until I was wisely advised to focus on the actual content first. If there are two things I have learned doing this PhD, they are (in this order) a little more humility, and that mixing and matching epistemologies, methods, and approaches is not as straightforward as I had made it out to be. In several ways, however, this thesis is still an experiment in that direction. Executing it has taken longer than I, or anyone around me, had hoped, and at times it has been a difficult path.

For that reason, I would like to start off by expressing my profound gratitude to my supervisor at the EUI, Martin Kohli. He has provided me with his unwavering support and continued advice throughout

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My time at the EUI would not have been the same without the countless friends I have made there along the way, and the many stimulating discussions we had over coffee or lunch on the beautiful terrace of the Badia, or over a beer in Bar Fiasco. In particular, I would like to thank Kevin Kohler, Kivanç Atak, Emre Bayram, Alexi Gugushvili, Pedrito Riera, Sophie Besancenot, Gemma Scalise, Teije Hidde Donker, Theresa Kuhn, Johan Christensen, Leila Hadj-Abdou, Wim Muller, Lorenzo Cecchi, Volker Prott, and the many more that I cannot all list here. At the EUI I have also enjoyed an overwhelming degree of support from many of the non-academic staff members. Especially Gabriella Unger, Fatma Sayed, and Monika Rzemieniecka deserve special thanks for never once failing to support me during long and difficult periods.

At the start of the empirical phase of this project, Anu Masso, Peeter Vihalem, and several of their close colleagues at Tartu University have made invaluable comments on the progress of my work. Instrumental in this endeavour were of course the many students and researchers all over Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands who collaborated with me on the data collection. Their curiosity, eagerness to learn, and willingness to experiment were fundamental to how this project has functioned. Of course, endless thanks go to the many interviewees who volunteered to participate in this project.

At Maastricht University, and in particular at University College Maastricht (UCM), I have enjoyed a very warm welcome and consistent support throughout the process. Special thanks go to Harm Hospers, Mahieu Segers, and Teun Dekker for creating space and time when I needed it the most, and to Anouk Cuijpers for recognizing when I needed a little help. A big thanks also to EdLab and UNU-MERIT for providing a quiet working space during the evenings, early mornings, and weekends. Kai Heidemann, thank you for stimulating sociological discussions, and for your constant push for me to finish my writing, and thanks to Tom Quist and Julia 'Lucifer' König for relentlessly supporting my

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Then, as the first member of my family to attend university, it wasn't always easy to explain what I was doing with these valuable years of my life, or indeed how this thing called a 'PhD' was supposedly different from my bachelor degrees that they thought I had already finished years ago. More than anything, this was a very welcome break from my university life, and often academically revealing of some of the phenomena I was grappling with. I am deeply grateful to have had many of my extended family members close by for significant parts of this process. This 'extended family' obviously includes Tommy Hameleers, Joey Kuijpers, Florian Muris, Simon Jansen, Jasper Slangen, Tjores Maes, Kasper van der Gugten, and Nardy Waajen. It also includes my 'family-in-law'; Paul, Marlou, René, Stefan, and Mark. Thank you all. In particular, of course, I am forever indebted to my parents, Johan Moes and Marij Moes-Broux, for raising me to be curious and not afraid to take some risks in life. Similarly, my sister Rachelle Holthuysen-Moes, has continued to support me both emotionally and by regularly watching over our children. I believe that in many ways, she may know me better than I know myself.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to the members of my own little family, for their unwavering, complete and unconditional support, and the sacrifices they have made to that end. My wife Inge Melchior has not only discussed my writing and thinking with me on numerous occasions, but she has believed in me even when my own belief was faltering. Throughout the writing process, she has seemingly effortlessly kept our family sane, despite many sleepless nights with our young children. My loving thanks to my three children, Jonah (4), Saar (2), and Koos (0). Thank you, Koos, for your

unreserved and unconditional smiles. Thank you, Saar, for wrapping my heart around your little fingers, and thank you Jonah, for your relentless curiosity.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

After over 60 years of European integration, European citizens' social and cultural life is less and less tied to a specific place for many groups of people. The European project as well as more general processes of globalisation have increased cross-border flows of goods, capital, people, culture, and ideas (Appadurai, 1996). Online and/or mobile communication technologies are increasingly ubiquitous. Individual mobility has never been more widespread in terms of speed, distance travelled, and access in terms of costs across different social groups (Urry, 2007, pp. 3-6). Within the European Union, national borders have become largely irrelevant as obstacles to mobility for most of its population.[1] All of this occurred over the course of one or two generations. Moreover, it arguably is the only place in the world where this 'post-national' condition (Blokker, 2008; Habermas, 2001) has been institutionalised politically, economically, and socially to such a great extent (Recchi & Favell, 2009, p. 1).

Despite all of these changes, and their likely consequences for people's relation to geographical space, empirical studies repeatedly show that the large majority of Europeans say they feel 'national' before anything else (Bruter, 2005a; Citrin & Sides, 2004; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Kuhn, 2012a, 2015; L. McLaren, 2006; Moes, 2009a). Nevertheless, 'Europe' is rarely fundamentally contested as a relevant frame of reference, and most of the same studies have found evidence that a relatively large and growing percentage of Europe's population would call themselves 'European' in certain circumstances or contexts. However, comparatively little attention has thus far been paid to what it actually *means* to identify with Europe and what the social consequences are of this 'post-national' condition. This study focuses on European identity, and what Europe means to different people based on qualitative research conducted in three European countries: Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands. For some groups in each of the three countries, national identity and territoriality matter a great deal. The national context is therefore important to take into account in the analysis. Within other groups, this is not the case to the same extent. For the latter (e.g. those who Favell (2008) would call 'Eurostars'), territory and geographic

[1] Though European integration has arguably led to an intensification of borders as obstacles at many of its external borders.

space have taken on a different meaning. Identification with Europe as such, I will argue, is not primarily a territorial identity for most people. Paradoxically, the geographic imagination of Europe is a decisive component of European identity.

If this is indeed the case, it may obscure discussions on European identity in general because collective identification as a concept has *itself* come to be associated with territorial identities (i.e. nation-states, see also Eder, 2009). The conceptual and methodological issue with 'measuring' (European) identity could therefore be that people associate the concept 'identity' *itself* with nationality (Bruter, 2005a, pp. 101-102). In other words, when asked whether they have a 'European identity', people may indiscriminately take 'national identity' as a frame of reference for defining what it means to 'identify' in general. European identity may turn out to be a different kind of beast altogether (see also Guibernau, 2011) and could well be a social category based on other markers than (just) territory. What is more, the question of whether people identify with Europe and whether they do so at the expense of their national identification has convincingly been settled in earlier studies, using a wide range of approaches (See Bruter, 2005a; Díez Medrano, 2003a; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004; L. Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Karolewski, 2010; L. McLaren, 2006; Moes, 2009a; Recchi & Favell, 2009; Robyn, 2005a; Shore, 2000). There is no European identity singular, but there may be European identities, plural. For many people, there is no salient, *explicit* identification with Europe, singular *or* plural. Therefore, this project aims to find an answer to the multi-dimensional question of how individuals relate to the concept of Europe (what it 'means') rather than the one-dimensional question of whether they identify with it or not (or to what extent). Because of the potential confusion over the definition and interpretation of identity, this problem is approached from an *etic* rather than an *emic* perspective (see Chapter 3).

'Europe' can mean something entirely different not only in different contexts and circumstances, but also according to individual characteristics and experiences. For example, for some people, in certain contexts, 'Europe' may represent an image of modernity. For others in other contexts, it is an expression of cosmopolitan ideals. For others still, it symbolizes all that is wrong with globalisation. Additionally, in some cases, 'Europe' may feel practically synonymous with the EU while in other instances these may be perceived to be two radically different concepts (Eder, 2009, p. 435). The question that remains is

who conceptualizes Europe in which way, and under what circumstances? If a transnational public sphere is emerging in Europe (Mau, 2010; Risse, 2010a, 2010b), then how has this changed the way ideas on Europe spread within this sphere? Which ideas are spread rather than others, and among whom? What does the 'Europeanized Europe' look like for different groups within different European societies? How are these narratives embedded in processes of identification with the nation-state and with Europe (cf. Díez Medrano, 2003; Risse, 2010)? These are the broad questions that will be addressed in this study. They are further operationalized in the next section.

Methodologically, this project deliberately and explicitly attempts to experiment with an atypical combination of approaches. At its core, this is an interpretative, qualitative study, but in terms of its empirical strategy and aims for the analysis and writing, some less orthodox choices have been made. It primarily seeks description and classification, and to "link narrative, numbers, and images" (Savage & Burrows, 2007, p. 896), and intentionally emphasizes an *etic* (see Chapter 3) perspective.

This 'methodological experiment' in many ways is one attempt to strike a balance between what is typically considered a qualitative approach and a quantitative one. This has had repercussions not only for the empirical strategy, but also for the analysis, the use of theory and earlier empirical work I referred to, and the style of writing. I argue that experimentation in this way is necessary, particularly in a field like the social dimensions of European integration. Qualitative research on this topic is often (although certainly not in all cases) limited by its inherent focus on particularistic cases, and on emic experiences. Both of those aspects are potentially serious drawbacks for studying European identity. Firstly, a particularistic thick description of a specific case is deeply valuable, but without comparison to other cases in the same research framework may not say much about common perspectives across different parts of Europe and diverse social groups. Secondly, emphasizing emic expressions in research writing is highly revealing, but as I will argue, the notion of 'identity' has itself taken on particular meanings in popular discourse, which may not necessarily align with how the concept can be defined productively and accurately in social science. Quantitative research in this field, on the other hand, is very well suited to trace and examine generalizable patterns across a wide range of cases, but is inherently limited by the phrasing of the questions in surveys. It is also largely blind to emic experiences and local contexts and interpretations of those questions. This is particularly problematic considering that the phrasing of those

questions are in the context of large scale research projects and surveys that are generally funded, initiated, and likely influenced by European institutions. The methodological choices that this experimental 'middle ground' has entailed are detailed in Chapter 3.

As a whole, the objective of this project is to provide a contribution to sociological theory-building and conceptualization on European identity (Duchesne, 2008). The focus is especially on Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands, where in total 95 in-depth interviews were conducted as particular case-studies of Europeanization. Throughout the book, the aim is to approach the central questions from a transnational, or European perspective, instead of a per-country examination. In other words, these countries are considered as local instances of European integration; not as necessarily wholly separate contexts. More than in many other research topics, an analysis of European identity should try to avoid the trap of methodological nationalism (Beck, 2007; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). While local contexts will matter a great deal in the results, this project is a partial attempt at doing so, at least at the point of analysis. This consisted predominantly of initially trying to look at people's responses in the interviews in their own right, without classifying them into national cases beforehand. If there are imaginations that span country cases (or, for that matter, different social groups), then those would easily remain hidden if national differences would be assumed even before the start of the analysis.

Research Questions

Political and public debate concerning European integration often focuses on the perceived homogenization of cultures and conceptualizes Europe as an entity to which national identities can be 'lost'. However, throughout the history of the continent, tribes, empires, and later, nation-states have been engaged in constant cultural exchange. Isolated and singular 'national cultures' never existed to begin with, even though the historical relevance and impact of nation-states on political, cultural, and social life cannot be overstated and has significantly increased in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. In this sense, one should rather pose the question to what extent European integration causes nation-states and their citizens to become culturally intertwined even further. Yet, such a question problematically presupposes that nation-states *themselves* are homogenous cultural entities. In addition to sub-national identities that can be found all over Europe, societies are stratified with each 'layer' and

group presumably having its own values, norms, and cultural codes. The question that remains, therefore, is *who* is 'Europeanizing', and in which way? What does Europe mean to whom?

Assuming, then, that there is a potentially infinite range of variations in ways of imagining Europe, this range needs to be described, and its patterns systematically analysed. Therefore, the central question that will be addressed in this project can be formulated as follows:

> *What does Europe mean to different groups of people, and how does this relate to their identities, geographical imaginations, and political institutions?*

As this question indicates, this study is concerned with three central elements that are related to the imagination of Europe: identities, geographical imaginations, and political institutions. Identities include both the territorial (such as local, national, and in particular European identities) and other types (such as political, educational, and class identities). The geographical imagination is not necessarily the same as geography and territory itself. Rather, it refers to how the imagination of geography and space can play a symbolic role in how Europe is imagined. Political institutions, finally, can have a major impact on how Europe is imagined through the influence of the European Union itself, but also as a result of rhetoric from specific political parties, national institutions, or debates in the public sphere.

Each of these three aspects is examined in a separate sub-question, which will be addressed in three chapters. Chapter 4 offers a typology (Favell & Recchi, 2011, p. 68; Psathas, 2005; Załęski, 2010) of different ways in which people relate to, and understand Europe, and what this means for their regional, national, and European identifications:

> **Question Chapter 4:** *What are meanings attributed to Europe, and how do such meanings relate to different people's worldviews and identities?*

Meanings of Europe vary according to different views that people have on their own place in the world, the chapter shows, but also relates to their experiences and their social and national contexts. Taken as a whole, this relates to the question to what extent Europe is seen as a relevant frame of reference (or as

an 'interpretative scheme', see De Vreese, 2003; Van Gorp, 2007), and for which people. In this way, Chapter 4 constructs and describes different typologies of understanding Europe. It does this from a transnational perspective, meaning that the typologies are described across the three country cases rather than on a country-by-country basis.

That is not to say that such national contexts do not matter. Different historical trajectories have constructed the imagination of Europe in different ways (M. Lauristin, 2007). Chapter 5 argues that this has had an impact not only on how people from different places understand Europe differently, but also on how various parts of Europe are imagined themselves (Hagen, 2003; Paasi, 2001; Adrian Smith, 2002). Chapter 5 describes and examines these imagined geographies further, and asks:

Question Chapter 5: *What is the relationship between meanings of Europe, European identity and people's imagination of geographic space and territory?*

European identity can, for some people (see Chapter 4), be a 'deterritorialized' identity (Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Scholte, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999). This does not mean that territory and geography as such have become irrelevant in how Europe is imagined. In fact, as Chapter 5 will argue, different geographic areas have come to symbolize different aspects of Europeanness.

Finally, one major influence on how people understand Europe is the European Union, both as a socially imagined concept as well as the real institutions themselves through policies. It shapes how people see Europe more broadly through active and explicit policies aimed at fostering a sense of Europeanness (Meinhof & Triandafyllidou, 2006; Sassatelli, 2002, 2009a; Shore, 2000; Shore & Black, 1992, 1994), as well as through policies that may or may not have that explicit goal (such as open borders (Kuhn, 2012a; Stoeckel, 2016), the Euro (Buscha, Muller, & Page, 2017; Risse, 2003), or the Erasmus programme (Kuhn, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Sigalas, 2010; Wilson, 2011)). Beyond the direct or indirect impact of the institutions and policies, the EU shapes people's understanding of the concept of Europe simply by being the most important political representative of that notion. As Chapter 6 will argue, while the difference between Europe and the EU is often emphasized in academic writing, the two

concepts are often symbolically intertwined (or sometimes even conflated) in the imagination of Europe amongst the citizens of the EU. Specifically, the chapter examines:

Question Chapter 6: *How are Europe and the European Union imagined, respectively, and in which ways are these two concepts intertwined in the worldviews of individuals? How can identification with Europe and support for the European Union be disentangled analytically?*

Here, the focus is on how Europe and the EU are understood and imbued with meaning. The meaning of Europe and meaning of the EU forms a dual relationship. The way people understand and evaluate (i.e. support)[2] the EU shapes their perspective on Europe, but the reverse also holds. People's understanding and evaluation (i.e. affect) of Europe as a cultural notion also shapes how they regard (and potentially support) the EU.

Setting the Scene

As mentioned above, the qualitative interviews for this project were conducted in three different European countries: Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands. The aim of the book is to take a transnational, or European approach to the analysis of these interviews, but national contexts nevertheless matter (and this is part of the rationale for choosing these three country cases, as will be explained below). The way 'Europe' is conceptualized is heavily influenced by national political and public debate. These political forces are differently aligned in each country, and these alignments more often than not have their roots in a deeper historic development. In the paragraphs below, these specificities of the three countries are briefly examined. Doing this is necessary because it will make clear how the meaning of Europe is constructed in public discourse, and why in this way specifically. It also argues why these three countries

[2] Several earlier studies have examined the question of which individual characteristics determine political attitudes towards Europe or more specifically the EU (e.g. Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Gabel, 1998; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; L. McLaren, 2006).

in particular were selected, and how this particular comparison adds to the understanding of identification with, or more broadly, conceptualization of Europe.

One substantive element that has been overwhelmingly present in all of the fieldwork sites is the on-going political and economic crisis in Europe. This crisis has clearly had an impact in every country in Europe. Particularly when discussing the Euro (as one potential symbol of Europe), this often came up in interviews. Moreover, during more specific periods, and to varying degrees between the countries, other major issues greatly influenced how interviewees talked about Europe. Rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which eventually culminated in late 2013 and early 2014 with the Russian occupation of Crimea on 18 March of 2014 were a major talking point in many interviews. Particularly in Estonia, this Russian threat was regularly presented as evidence that 'Western Europe' had been underestimating Russia for a long time. To some, this was also proof that the Baltic states themselves were no more safe from Russian occupation than Ukraine was, and that 'Europe' was not mindful enough of that danger. A final 'European' issue that came up in many of the interviews was the influx of refugees from the Middle East. This was much more prevalent in Italy and the Netherlands than it was in Estonia (and in different ways). Later on during the fieldwork, the number of refugees reaching Europe started to increase rapidly, ultimately escalating into what is now called the European refugee crisis from 2015 onwards. Immigration was also a topic of concern for many of the interviewees in earlier interviews, but current events did appear to fuel these associations with Europe. Italy is one of the countries where many refugees initially reach the shores of Europe, of course. The Netherlands ultimately received a certain number of those refugees, within the context of a political climate that had already partially shifted towards an anti-immigrant rhetoric. The interviews in both of these countries tended to reflect these differences.

The following paragraph details the rationale for selecting Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands for the data collection. After that, the political context of each country is briefly discussed. How the data was collected, and in which locations within these countries is explained in Chapter 3.

Case selection

Methodologically, the three country cases were selected based on a 'method of agreement', or 'most different cases' design (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 51). The three cases diverge especially in terms of three contextual aspects that are I argue are relevant for perspectives on:

- *Historical backgrounds* (World War II, post-socialist / capitalist (M. Lauristin, 2007; Mach, 1993; Melchior, 2015; Rausing, 2004))*;*
- *Their (imagined) geographical locations within the context of Europe* (Eder & Spohn, 2005, pp. 199-205; Favell & Hansen, 2002; Hagen, 2003; Henderson, 1999; Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2002; Kürti & Langman, 1997; Kuus, 2004; Neumann, 1999; Stirk, 1994)*, and;*
- *Their internal divisions according to:*
    - *Ethnicity or language* (Cheskin, 2015; Feldman, 2008; Marju Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002; Trimbach & O'Lear, 2015);
    - *Regional dialects and identities* (Cornips & De Rooij, 2015; Gorter et al., 1987; van der Plank, 1987; Thissen, 2013)*, and;*
    - *Religion* (Nelsen, Guth, & Fraser, 2001).

In terms of meanings attributed to Europe and their relation to contextual change, Estonia was moreover selected because it adopted the Euro in 2011, which coincided with the first interviews conducted in that country (see also Buscha et al., 2017; Risse, 2003 on the Euro and identity). This provided a natural stimulus during interviews to engage with the topic of Europe more deeply, and public debate on European integration during the fieldwork period was especially salient.

The table below shows an overview of these three countries' basic statistics, in order to offer a general overview of how they differ in quantitative terms. Within the context of all EU member states, these three countries vary widely in terms of population size, GDP, type and size of minority population, and religion. The main similarity is that both Italy and the Netherlands are founding members of what is now the European Union. As will be argued in Chapter 5, this does not have the same influence on what Europe means, however.

Table 1 – Most different cases rationale (data for 2012).

	Estonia	***The Netherlands***	***Italy***
Population (millions)	1.3	16.85	60.7
GDP per capita	16,636	50,355	36,267
Independence (year)	1991	1581	1861
EU/Euro membership	2004/2011	1957/2002	1957/2002
Minority population (%)	31%	19.3%	7.5%
Largest minorities (%)	Russian (25.5), Ukrainian (2)	EU (5), Indonesian (2.4), Turkish (2.2), Surinamese (2), Moroccan (2)	Romanian (2), North African (1), Albanian (0.8)
Largest religions (%)	Luth. (14), Ortho. (13)	Cath. (27), Prot. (18), Islam (6)	Catholic (88), Other Christ. (4), Islam (2)
No religious affiliation	76% (Eesti Statistika)	42.7% (SCP)	5.8% (EB63.1)

Estonia

Chronologically, the first steps of the fieldwork started in Estonia. The upheaval around the 'Euro crisis' was both a blessing and a curse with regard to this research project (obviously, it was rather the latter for the rest of Europe). While nobody really could have predicted the turmoil that ensued, let alone how it would play out politically and in public debate in any given national context, it had at least put things onto the political agenda, and into the minds of the citizens. In fact, in terms of considering socio-political change as a catalyst for sociological research, one of the main reasons for picking Estonia as a case study instead of any of the other Central / Eastern European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland, was that the Euro currency was set to be introduced around the start of the interviews there (in early 2011). As expected, this heated up the public debate around Europe in Estonia during the fieldwork period. My hope was also that I would be able to catch at least a glimpse of European identity 'in the making' – as influenced by political developments at least. In this sense, I explicitly chose a moment of 'crisis' (in the 'old Greek' sense; see Chapter 3) in order to understand at least a part of such 'decisive moments'.

Estonia is a country largely divided along linguistic/'ethnic' lines (i.e. Estonians and Russian speakers, or 'Russophones' (Kalmus, Lauristin, & Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, 2004; Marju Lauristin &

Heidmets, 2002)). This presents a big political, cultural, and economic challenge. Politically, Estonia has a unicameral parliament (*'Riigikogu'*) with 101 members. At the time of data collection, four major political parties were represented. The country also had six minor parties that did not have any seats in parliament. The four major parties in 2011 were, ordered by number of MPs, the Reform Party (*'Reformierakond'*; 33 seats; liberal), Centre Party (*'Keskerakond'*; 26; centrist, social-liberal, populist), Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (IRL: *'Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit'*; 23; conservative), and the Social Democratic Party (*'Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond'*; 19; social-democrat). The 2011 government is formed through a coalition of the Reform Party (which also provides the prime minister) and IRL. Elections were again held in 2015 (after data collection), in which the Reform Party (in coalition) received 30 seats, the Centre Party 27, IRL 14 (in coalition), and the Social Democrats 15 (in coalition). The newly formed Conservative People's Party (EKRE: *'Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond'*), which is a national conservative party, received 7 seats during these elections, and another new party, the centre-right Estonian Free Party (*'Eesti Vabaerakond'*) won 8 seats. These developments correspond to developments in other European countries where national conservative and right wing parties have been steadily increasing in popularity.

Italy

The second country in which interviews were conducted was Italy. During the period of fieldwork, there were significant political shifts on-going. Refugees arriving on Italian shores by boat, or sadly perishing in its Mediterranean waters, as well as the ensuing Eurozone crisis continually emphasized the European dimension of Italian politics and public debate. While Greece was obviously in the eye of the storm during the debt crisis, Italy was also partly in the centre of attention across Europe. In 2009, Italy had one of the highest percentages of public sector debt (together with Greece) at over 100% of GDP. European media at the time often reported on the crisis using the rather derogatory acronym 'PIIGS', made up out of the first letters of the European countries with the highest debt.

Italy has two houses in politics: the Chamber of Deputies (*'deputati'*, 630 members), and the Senate of the Republic (*'senatori'*, 315 members). The latter is normally considered the upper house because it becomes the Head of State when the president needs to be replaced. In the course of this research project, Italy has had one general election and no less than four cabinets. In the general elections

of 2008, focusing on the Chamber of Deputies, the four largest parties were, in descending order: Berlusconi's The People of Freedom (PdL, *'Il Popolo della Libertà'*; 344 out of 630 seats; centre-right), Democratic Party (PD, *'Partito Democratico'*; 217; social-democrat), *Lega Nord* (LN; 60; regionalist, right-wing, anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic), and Union of the Centre (UdC, *'Unione di Centro'*; 36; Christian democrat). PdL, LN, and Movement for the Autonomies (MpA, *'Movimento per le Autonomie'*; 8; regionalist) ran as a centre-right coalition, while PD and Italy of Values (IdV, *'Italia dei Valori'*; 29; centre-left) ran as a centre-left coalition.

At the start of the first interviews, the fourth Berlusconi cabinet (PdL, LN, MpA) based on these elections was still in place. After a tumultuous period in 2011 following Berlusconi's trials on fraud and sex scandals as well a loss of confidence in him within the Chamber of Deputies (primarily over a budget law / austerity package), he resigned on 12 November 2011. Following Berlusconi's resignation, president Napolitano requested Mario Monti to form a technocratic Experts' cabinet. This cabinet's task was primarily to implement austerity measures in Italy in the midst of the European debt crisis. Monti's cabinet ran the country between Berlusconi's resignation in November 2011 until the next cabinet's announcement on 27 April 2013. The Letta government was formed after the general elections in February 2013. The three largest parties in these elections were: PD (292 seats), Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement (M5S, *'Movimento 5 Stelle'*; 108; populist, anti-establishment, anti-globalist, Eurosceptic), and Berlusconi's PdL (97). The lead-up to these elections and their aftermath was more tumultuous than this single paragraph can express, but eventually these results led to the formation of the Letta cabinet (PD, 5 other parties, and 3 independents) on the 27th of April 2013. However, on 22 February 2014, it was supplanted by a new cabinet lead by Matteo Renzi (PD, 2 other parties, and 2 independents). This was following a proposal to the PD leadership by Renzi to form a new government, which passed and led to Letta's resignation.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands was chosen as one of the founding members of the EU and as belonging – in people's imagination – to the core of modern Europe (see Chapter 5), For Dutch people, as will be shown in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, belonging to Europe is a given, and as a result, perhaps more 'banal' and invisible (Billig, 1995; Cram, 2001, 2009, 2012; Trenz, 2006). This is different from the relationships many

Estonians have towards European integration as a merit, and to Italian views towards their position within modern Europe as compared to a more classical conceptualization of European culture.

In recent years, immigration – especially from Muslim countries – has been the key topic of debate in Dutch politics, following the xenophobic far right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV, '*Partij voor de Vrijheid*') of Geert Wilders rising to power in a 'semi-government' position in 2010. After the 2010 elections, just before the start of the fieldwork period for this project, the formation of a coalition between the leading conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, '*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*') and several other parties eventually failed, and the VVD forged a minority coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA, '*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*') officially supported by Wilders' PVV through the drafting of a so-called 'support agreement'. A particularly Dutch word was consistently used to describe this peculiar model of government: '*gedogen*'. This translates into English as 'to tolerate', or 'to permit'.[3] It was stated by the prime minister that the PVV was in fact *not* officially part of the government, and that this was simply a minority coalition. In practice, however, the three parties involved drafted and approved most policy proposals together, and negotiations about the government course were generally taken together.

This rather unusual form of political cooperation followed several years in which the public debate had already been increasingly divided along sharp lines, especially with regard to immigration and integration policies, minority rights, and European integration. It is fair to say that a large portion of this polarization in society was caused, or at the very least amplified by the populist politics of Geert Wilders. His participation in government therefore further aggravated this division; in politics, public debate, media, and in society generally. This discussion was often framed in terms of right-wing politics versus left-wing politics when it came to immigration policies. With regard to the issue of European integration, the left also saw an increase in popularity of the Socialist Party (SP, '*Socialistische Partij*') which ran on a Eurosceptic platform (see also van Elsas, Hakhverdian, & van der Brug, 2016). The rather right-leaning coalition between VVD and CDA supported by PVV, in the face of the economic crisis led to relatively firm austerity measures which were seen as being especially aimed against 'left-wing hobbies' ('*linkse hobby's*'; i.e. arts, higher education, minority integration, etc.).

[3] It is the same word used to describe the Dutch soft drugs policy: '*gedoogbeleid*'.

The Netherlands have a bicameral parliament, with the main chamber being the '*Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*', or House of Representatives. It has 150 seats, and at the start of the fieldwork, 10 political parties were represented. Following the 2010 elections, the six largest parties in parliament were (in descending order): VVD (31 out of 150 seats), the Labour Party (PvdA, 'Partij van de Arbeid'; 30; social-democratic), PVV (24), CDA (21), SP (15), Democrats 66 (D66, 'Politieke Partij Democraten 66'; 10; social-liberal, progressive), and *GroenLinks* (GL; 10; green, left-wing). This was a highly fractured election outcome (with a very narrow victory of the right-wing VVD over the left-wing PvdA), and the dividing lines ran clearly along immigration, austerity, and European integration as policy domains. On the European question, D66 and GL ran on a pro-European platform, while PVV ran on a highly Eurosceptic one. The VVD, CDA, and PvdA had a status-quo approach to European integration, with the latter being somewhat more pro-European on many issues than the former two.

After weeks of rather secretive deliberations in April 2012 among the three 'coalition' parties on further austerity measures, in a surprise move, Wilders officially withdrew his support for the minority coalition. In doing this, he immediately started framing the austerity measures[4] as "dictates from Brussels", and proclaimed that, as far as he is concerned, the upcoming election campaign should be regarded as a "referendum on Europe", shifting (or perhaps widening) the focus of his populism from Islam and immigration more explicitly to European integration. These elections took place on 12 September 2012, with the following outcome (six largest parties, in descending order): VVD (41), PvdA (38), PVV (15), SP (15), CDA (13), D66 (12). Considering that 'Europe' was a decisive point of political and public debate in this period, it is noteworthy that the Eurosceptic PVV lost 9 seats compared to the previous elections, but the SP, which also ran on a Eurosceptic platform for these elections (but advocated 'another Europe' instead) received the same number of seats as they had before (which was a historically high number of seats). Both PVV and CDA suffered electorally from the collapse of the previous government, but the VVD instead benefited tremendously with an increase of 10 seats. For

[4] Which to some extent were rather broadly supported in parliament, as would become apparent in the weeks following the government's collapse, when 5 parties reached an agreement on further austerity measures in just a couple of days (VVD, CDA, D66, GL, and the Christian Union (CU, '*ChristenUnie*'; centre-left Christian democrats)).

these elections, the VVD ran on a mildly Eurosceptic platform, and emphasized their supposed expertise in economic matters. The PvdA ran on a more pro-European platform instead, and also gained 8 seats.[5] This led to the formation of the second Rutte (VVD) cabinet together with PvdA.

Plan of the Book

This book is structured in two main parts. The first part explains the background and approach of the study. Chapter 2 provides a review and synthesis of the current theorizing on social aspects of Europeanization, and what empirical materials and findings are already available. Its aim is to achieve a thorough understanding of various aspects of this domain of study by not only going into the specificities of Europe's social constructions and the particular framings and meanings attributed to it, but also to discuss concepts such as identity/identification, space, place, territory, and post-nationalism more fundamentally. The goal of Chapter 2 is to provide a theoretical background that serves as a starting point for the analyses in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Additional theory and earlier empirical research is discussed in those analytical chapters instead of Chapter 2, where it is relevant to the particular themes discussed there. This reflects the exploratory attempt to contribute to theory-building and conceptualizing on European identity in this study.

Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach and data collection for this project. It explains the distinction between emic and etic perspectives on Europe and identity that is used throughout the book, and answers more fundamental questions on the interpretivist approach that is taken. Additionally, Chapter 3 addresses the issue of the 'voice' of interviewees and offers a brief reflexive section on the researcher. It then discusses which types of data were collected (semi-structured in-depth interviews, visual data, questionnaire, and social network data), where, and how (sampling, data collection strategy, interview process). Finally, the chapter explains how these data were analysed.

In the second part of the book, the findings from these analyses are presented along the three sub-questions that are described above. As mentioned earlier, these chapters do not follow a country-case logic, but instead attempt to take a transnational, or European perspective. Chapter 4 examines the

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[5] Polls leading up to the elections consistently showed the SP ahead of the PvdA,. On election day, however, many voters appeared to have voted strategically in a failed attempt to keep the VVD out of government.

diversity of views and frames of reference in relation to Europe from a typology approach. It categorizes such views into three main ways in which people relate to Europe, and describes these typologies of people as *(Cis-)Nationals*, *Situational Europeans*, and *Cosmopolitan Europeans*. These perspectives are not always mutually exclusive in practice, and individuals can shift outlooks in different contexts and over time. Each of the three main types can be subdivided further into sub-types, and Chapter 4 does that to some extent. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of all *possible* ways of seeing Europe, but rather to build an empirically grounded conceptual framework.

Chapter 5 examines the imagined geographies (Said, 1979) of Europe. It looks at the relationship between European identity and territory, and how this ties in with ideas on European*ness*. Through the concept of *Euroscapes*, it offers an analysis of people's spatial and territorial imaginings of Europe, and how European identity itself is constituted through space as a symbolic marker of identity rather than a definition of boundaries. Here, the study will particularly go into the concepts of space and place. It will also describe which territorial subdivisions (e.g. 'Mediterranean', 'Baltic', 'Western', etc.) people tend to make, for which reasons, and what social relevance such concepts have. The chapter is largely based on the results of using geographic maps as a visual interview technique for understanding conceptualizations of space and place (see Chapter 3).

The third, and final empirical chapter of the book, Chapter 6, looks at the relationship between interpretations and meanings of Europe and the EU, respectively, and how these two notions intersect in the imagination of the interviewees. It takes this as a starting point to examine how *identification as* European, *identification with* the EU, and *support for* the EU (Cram, 2012) are related, and what this means for the dual relationship between what the EU and Europe mean to people. The chapter also looks at some of the main survey questions that have been used to study European identity in the past, and describes the interpretation of the interviewees of these questions. Here, the aim is to work towards a better understanding of the validity of such questions, and to find avenues for measuring European identity sociologically. Finally, Chapter 7 synthesizes the main findings of this study, and offers some concluding remarks and pathways to follow-up research.

Chapter 2 – Theory

Earlier research and theory on dispositions towards 'Europe' can be subdivided into two broad categories (Duchesne, 2008; White, 2011). The first category of research in this domain focuses on the role and image of EU institutions. The second type of studies concerns itself with people's identifications and attitudes towards Europe, the EU, and other Europeans.[6] The former category has a longer history than the latter. It focuses on the EU (and its predecessors) as a set of institutions and on how its citizens assess their country's membership of those institutions. It addresses *support for* (Cram, 2012) the European integration process in general, its institutions in particular (i.e. *diffuse* versus *specific* support (Easton, 1965; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002)), and what the determinants for such support are (Anderson, 1998; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Franklin, Marsh, & McLaren, 1994; Gabel, 1998; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Janssen, 1991; McLaren, 2002). This strand of research also includes studies on people's knowledge of the EU's institutions, and – often as a covariate – the extent to which they trust those institutions (Thomassen, 2009; see also White, 2011) or the influence of national politics (Helbling, Hoeglinger, & Wüest, 2010; Kriesi, 2007). A lack of knowledge about the European institutions has been correlated to low public support in the studies mentioned above, as opposed to the consistent support for European integration among people in higher socio-economic strata, or 'elites' (Duchesne, 2008). This gap between social strata (or 'permissive consensus', cf. Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) grew deeper according to studies conducted on or during the 1990's, when researchers found a growing opposition between nationalist attitudes and support for European integration[7] (Blondel, Sinnott, & Svensson, 1998; Dupoirier, Roy, & Lecerf, 2000).

The second type of research has a less pronounced focus on people's perceptions of the EU institutions as such, and instead concentrates on the extent to which people explicitly (i.e. from their

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[6] For a recent quantitative comparison of the impact on European identity of trust in other Europeans or trust in European institutions, see Hooghe & Verhaegen (2015). According to their findings, both have a positive impact, though trust in institutions has a stronger effect.

[7] Such findings are often contradictory to other, later studies, however (Duchesne & Frognier, 2008).

emic perspective)[8] or implicitly (*etic*) assert that they have a European identity, or what such an identity looks like. This includes questions as to whether people feel that they are 'similar' to other Europeans, whether they trust them (Niedermayer, 1995), whether they feel that they 'belong to Europe', and what the relationship between such dispositions towards 'Europe' and national identity is (Bruter, 2005a; Carey, 2002a; Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995, 2008; Haller, 1999; Herrmann & Brewer, 2004). Here too, a gap has been identified between higher socio-economic strata and/or people with transnational behaviours on the one hand (Favell & Recchi, 2009; Favell, Recchi, Kuhn, Solgaard Jensen, & Klein, 2011), and middle and lower strata with more local behaviours on the other (Fligstein, 2008; Kuhn, 2011, 2015; , see also Mau, 2010, part 4 of the book).

These two directions of research on the broader topic of dispositions towards Europe have developed in different avenues, but are not necessarily incompatible with each other or always as distinct as this classification might suggest (see, for example L. Hooghe & Marks, 2006; L. M. McLaren, 2006). Nevertheless, this characterisation is useful because a focus on EU institutions and the evaluation of those institutions by the EU's citizens accentuates the 'evaluative' component of attitudes towards the EU (L. Hooghe & Marks, 2004a; L. M. McLaren, 2006), perhaps best exemplified by one of the standard Eurobarometer questions that asks "*Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?*". By comparison, the second type of research concentrates more explicitly on the affective dimension of attitudes towards Europe, regardless of whether those are considered to be a direct result of EU integration efforts or not. Here, an emerging affective 'identity' relationship is suggested between citizens of Europe amongst each other, or between citizens and Europe as a social construct (Bruter, 2004a, 2005a; Díez Medrano, 2003; Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004a; Risse, 2003; Robyn, 2005; Schild, 2001).

Conceptualizing identification with Europe in these two opposing terms is somewhat misleading, however. Evaluative, interest focused components and affective dimensions of attitudes towards Europe are two sides of the same coin, and both facets reinforce each other (Almond & Verba, 1963; Cram, 2012; Cram & Patrikios, 2015; Kohli, 2000). Still, this study is primarily concerned with the broader 'identification' question, as that allows for analysing imaginations of 'Europe' that can entail

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[8] See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the concepts *emic* and *etic*.

more than the comparatively narrowly defined issue of what the determinants are for support for the political integration project. Considering also the historical juncture during which this study was conducted – in the midst of the financial and political crises after 2008 – it is pertinent to also document these types of attachment to this diffuse notion of 'Europe'. Nevertheless, evaluative attitudes towards the EU are crucial for understanding affective attitudes towards the EU and its institutions, but especially also towards 'Europe' as a social construct more broadly (see also Moes, 2009). It should be recognized that the EU and its institutions have a major impact on how people conceptualize the more abstract and indefinite idea of 'Europe' (and vice versa; see Chapter 6). Imagining a 'Europe' without the EU is certainly possible, and even European integration without the current institutional setup of the EU is conceivable, and for some of Europe's citizens this would actually be preferable (as will be addressed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6). This study aims to analyse *how* 'Europe' as an identity marker and frame of reference is constructed, and to a lesser degree, what role the EU plays in that imagination.

'Identity' is a highly contested notion in sociology and many of the other social sciences. It is seen by some as encompassing too much, or (therefore) nothing at all, and for those reasons it has been discarded as a useful empirical or even theoretical construct by some (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Niethammer, 2000). It is true that the precise definition of what is meant by 'identity' or 'identification' is often unclear and very difficult if not impossible to conclusively settle. Even so, it represents a phenomenon that is at the core of the human experience and it has a tremendous impact on how societies are organized. Despite its messiness, therefore, it is a concept worth pursuing (for an extended discussion, see also Duchesne, 2008; Kohli, 2000; Tilly, 2003).

The objective of this project is to contribute to sociological concepts and theory on European identity through an interpretative, and mostly descriptive approach (see Chapter 3). Sociological theory on identification with Europe has thus far largely been inspired by theories derived from political science and (social) psychology (Duchesne, 2012, p. 53; Kohli, 2000, pp. 115-117), and existing empirical analyses have often been based on these theories and assumptions. I argue that it is worthwhile to expand the sociological research agenda on European identity by building theory based on exploratory, inductive empirical research. There have been several pivotal earlier studies that have contributed in similar ways; by approaching the topic inductively, and using in-depth qualitative research to expose perspectives on

Europe 'from the bottom-up' (Díez Medrano, 2003; Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Favell, 2008; Gaxie, Hubé, & Rowell, 2011; Meinhof, 2004; Sassatelli, 2009a; White, 2010, 2011), or by approaching a similar subject with a multi-method approach, such as the excellent study by Van Ingelgom (2014). This book aims to add to this strand of research by focusing on *meanings* associated with Europe, people's *individual* frames of reference and identities (i.e. how they position themselves in relation to Europe), and the role of *imagined geography* within these meanings. However, in doing so it attempts to engage with much of the literature that is somewhat outside of this general approach, as discussed in the second and third paragraphs of this chapter, in an attempt to bridge these differing perspectives. The project employs a most different cases design (expanding on Gaxie et al., 2011), including one post-socialist European country, and through maximum variation sampling (based on a logic akin to Díez Medrano, 2003) within those countries (see Chapter 3 on methodology).

While the goal is to contribute theoretically and conceptually based on my interpretative analysis of the interviews and other types of data collected in this project, the existing concepts and theories on European identity as they are used in sociology, political science, psychology and other fields are discussed below as a backdrop for the theoretical framework. For the sake of transparency as to what my own frame of thinking was at the outset of the rather atypical empirical approach in this study (see Chapter 3), the discussion below is also a reflection of the theoretical framework at the beginning of this study. For the same reason, more specific theories that relate to one of the sub-questions (see Chapter 1) are discussed in greater detail in the three analytical chapters themselves. This should relate the empirical materials more closely to these specific concepts and theories. The discussion below moves from theories on individual identity, to collective identities, and finally imagined communities and cosmopolitanism. It further addresses ideas of boundary-making, Othering, and power relations.

Theorizing Identity

Starting with individual identity, one of the earliest systematic uses of the concept in the social sciences was by the developmental psychologist Erik Erikson (1956, 1959, 1968), who in turn was influenced by earlier work by Freud (1949). Erikson's writings theorized the concept of identity with regard to the development of the self over the course of one's lifetime, particularly among children growing up. Freud

primarily emphasized the conflict between one's *id* (or 'it') – an individual's instinctual drives – and one's *super-ego* (or 'above I') – the cultured, learned behaviours that ought to control certain instinctual tendencies, largely mediated through the *ego* (the 'I') (Freud, 1949). Erikson instead stressed the importance of society and culture in individual identity development. Though he placed significant importance on adolescence in particular, Erikson's eight psychosocial stages in principle concern one's entire lifespan (Erikson, 1959). For identity formation, the fifth stage of development (at age 12-18) in Erikson's epigenic principle is decisive (Erikson, 1968). This stage involves a crisis (as is the case for all other stages) of identity versus role confusion. The outcome of this particular crisis, associated with adolescence, is considered to be constitutive of the individual's identity in his/her further life. Erikson additionally emphasized a need for a sense of continuity in order to formulate a coherent identity (Douvan, 1997; Erikson, 1959, 1968).

Erikson considered socialization in specific stages (or 'crises') to be crucial for how one sees him/herself, as well as how others are perceived. In addition to this chronological perspective, others have emphasized that identity is not only dependent on one's developmental stages, but also on the context in which that identity is expressed (Mead, 1934a; Simmel, 1955). This entails that identities should necessarily be taken to be plural and contextual, but also that different 'roles' can come into conflict in certain social situations (Simmel, 1955). Moreover, it implies that identity is necessarily performative and processual. In other words, identity refers to social interaction and the process of negotiation; to the verb (to identify) rather than the noun (Jenkins, 2004). This leads the discussion from individual identity to collective identification.

Abram de Swaan conceptualized a duality between what he called 'identification and disidentification' (De Swaan, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003). De Swaan defined 'identification' as the process in which people experience a sense of 'similarity' with other people, while 'disidentification' implies the opposite; a sense of 'dissimilarity' (De Swaan, 2003, p. 31). For this general principle of asserting similarity and difference it needs to be stressed that both are in fact part of *the same* social process (as De Swaan recognised as well). Identification and disidentification are two sides of the same coin. Identification with an in-group occurs *through* disidentification with a significant out-group. The adage goes that in order to know who 'we' are, we should first determine who we are not. As De Swaan phrases

it: "along with the expansion and reinforcement of mutual identifications, the extent of *dis*identification with the excluded expands as well" (De Swaan, 2003, p. 31, my translation, original emphasis).

But *when* and *why* exactly does this process of identification/disidentification occur? Among the many social scientists that have attempted to give an answer to this question, it is fruitful to single out Anton Blok and Norbert Elias. These scholars were certainly not the first to study such types of identity (see, for example Freud, 1922; Mead, 1934b), but their approaches touch upon the basic elements that are present in most discussions on the subject. Blok's theory of the *narcissism of minor differences* states that "[s]ocial identity lies in difference, and difference is established, reinforced, and defended against what is closest – and what is closest [...] represents the greatest threat" (Blok, 2000, p. 51; see also Ignatieff, 1997; Strating, 2000). In other words, according to Blok, the smaller the (perceived) differences between social identities, the more aggressively these differences are asserted. A central aspect of Blok's *narcissism of minor differences* is that these small distinctions become problematic, or sufficiently small to cause conflict, when social categories are perceived to be unclear. It is the ambiguity of 'who's in and who's out' that leads to small differences and the need for distinction.

While formulating his theoretical framework, Blok predominantly builds on Bourdieu and Freud, but also on Girard, Simmel and Elias. Blok considers Freud to be the first to have mentioned the *narcissism of minor differences* in his scholarly work, but expands on those earlier ideas because Freud himself did not pursue the idea any further (Blok, 2000, p. 29). Blok claims that Freud "even manages to reduce the heuristic value of the narcissism of minor differences", by saying that "greater differences should lead to an almost insuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic people feel for the German, the Aryan for the Semite, and the white races for the coloured" (Freud, in Blok, 2000, p. 29). However, this statement also illustrates an aspect of Blok's theory that might simultaneously be a strong and a weak point. On the one hand, Blok's theory does not exclude differences at the scale that Freud mentions. It could well be argued that the dislike that Freud supposes is actually based on *minor* differences rather than *greater* ones. When evaluating the same examples provided in Freud's statement on a more global

scale, one could conclude that the 'objective', or rather, *etic* (see Chapter 3) differences between these groups are not that great.[9]

On the other hand, this also exposes an analytical weakness in Blok's *narcissism of minor differences*. It lays bare that almost any example can be *made* to fit the model, as long as the appropriate context of what constitutes a 'minor' or a 'major' difference is defined accordingly. As De Swaan criticizes, Blok himself seems to decide which differences are to be seen as 'minor' or 'major' in the examples that he provides, and the social groups involved (i.e. from an *emic* perspective) might not always agree with these verdicts (De Swaan, 2000, p. 28; see also Goudsblom, 2000, pp. 24-25). The extent to which Blok's theory provides insight into relations between social groups and the way in which individuals identify with these groups therefore depends on which social categories are relevant given a particular context, and even then some 'minor differences' appear significant while other, equally 'minor' differences, do not (Strating, 2000, pp. 18-22). In addition, De Swaan later stresses that it is important to recognise that it is the *decreasing differences* rather than assumed 'fixed' minor differences that lead to ambiguity and thus to conflict (De Swaan, 2000, p. 31).

Power and a positive self-image

Questions that remain unanswered in Blok's discourse are *which* types of differences are being amplified in the process of identification and 'othering', and *why* these types and not others (Goudsblom, 2000, p. 25). Part of that missing link is *power*. Blok contends that difference is asserted against that which is closest (2000, p. 51), but the *threat* that the author mentions in his definition of this process does not sufficiently take into account the unbalanced power relations that can exist between social groups. Norbert Elias and John Scotson, in a study of a suburban British community, examined which differences were amplified in order to prevent ambiguity as to who (was to be) identified with whom, and how exactly this happened (Elias, 1976; Elias & Scotson, 1994). They studied three different neighbourhoods ('Zones 1, 2 and 3') in the fictitiously named suburban area 'Winston Parva'. Zone 1 was a "middle-class residential area", while Zones 2 and 3 were "working-class areas" that did not seem

[9] The discussion as to what extent a 'global consciousness' of these peoples would have been necessary for them to feel 'too close' to each other is an entirely different discussion.

"markedly different" from each other with regard to income, occupation and social class (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. 1). Yet, a preliminary survey showed that not only the inhabitants of Zone 1, but also those of Zone 2 "regarded themselves and their neighbourhood as superior in social status to those of Zone 3" (Elias & Scotson, 1994, pp. 1-2). In fact, social boundaries between Zone 2 and 3 seemed stronger than those between Zone 1 and 3 or between Zone 1 and 2. Moreover, "[T]he residents of Zone 3 themselves seemed to accept the status of inferiority [...]" (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. 2).

After learning that Zone 2 was actually an older neighbourhood than Zone 3, which had been recently built, Elias and Scotson came to the provisional conclusion that residents of Zone 2 presented themselves as the *established* citizens of Winston Parva, while the 'newcomers' living in Zone 3 were depicted as *outsiders* (Elias & Scotson, 1994, pp. 3-4). Attached to these category labels, they found a clear normative aspect. To be a member of the established group was held to be synonymous with being superior over the members of the outside group. In such a status-based power relation (Elias & Scotson, 1994, pp. xviii-xxii), Elias argues, the more powerful group (in this case residents from Zone 2) consider themselves to be "better human beings, gifted with a kind of group charisma, with certain virtues that all [in-group] members possess and [out-group] others lack" (Elias, 1976, p. 8, my translation). What is more, the more powerful even succeed in convincing the less powerful that they are, indeed, inferior (ibid.).

How do the powerful assert and maintain this social superiority? The Winston Parva study mentions several instruments employed by the residents of Zone 2. First, they refuse any unnecessary contact with the Zone 3 inhabitants, dismissing them as ill-bred people. All of these 'newcomers' are treated by the established as 'outsiders' (which has the aforementioned negative connotations), eventually resulting in the latter resigning into the belief that they actually *do* exhibit less decency and virtue (Elias, 1976, pp. 8-9).[10] Second, as Elias maintains, a strong sense of internal cohesion and a high level of social control can be decisive for making one group more powerful than another (1976, p. 10). In this regard, Zone 2 residents in Winston Parva managed to reserve key functions in all sorts of

[10] Elias found that there was only a small minority for whom this difference in decency or virtue could be observed in actual behaviour (Elias, 1976, p. 8).

organisations for their own group, mainly through their high degree of internal cohesion (1976, pp. 10-11).

A more recent study on similar cases found contrasting results to what Elias & Scotson argued, however. Savage, Bagnall, & Longhurst (2005), examining the English middle class in four cities around Manchester, investigate the relationships between locality, place, nation, Europe, and the globe. Instead of what Elias called the 'established' citizens claiming supremacy over the outsiders, they found that the "[…] moral right of residence had given way to nostalgia" (Savage et al., 2005, p. 44). In their analysis, the notion of 'elective belonging' is central. They argue that people's feeling of belonging is not (necessarily) linked to their personal or family histories in those places. Conversely, they found that people who have such deep ties to an area often felt out of place to a certain extent. At the same time, such people were often highly critical of others who they saw as more temporary residents, without any historical ties to the area. Further in the book, they conclude that through this elective belonging, these middle class residents were strongly attached to their area, and that globalisation might be a catalyst for an increase in such attachments.

A structural feature that Elias suggested for configurations of established versus outsiders, is that the image of all members of the outsiders' group was modelled after the 'bad' characteristics of the 'worst' members of that group, while the self-image of the established group was based on its 'best' members and traits (Elias, 1976, pp. 11-12). This strategy for asserting and maintaining a sufficient social distance is also a key element of *social identity theory* (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which was originally conceived in social psychology, but has found applications in many other disciplines as well. According to Tajfel and Turner, individuals have a fundamental need to think of their own in-group as superior to many out-groups in order to obtain a positive image of their individual identity (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987, p. 60). Social identity as Tajfel and Turner see it, is "… that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1979, p. 63). They derive this identity by applying positive characteristics to themselves that they perceive in their in-group through the process of 'social identification', while "they value out-groups negatively via mechanisms of 'social contra-identification'" (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, p. 645).

The process of asserting similarity and difference in the framework of social identity theory has been widely discussed and applied (see, for example, Adorno, Aron, Levinson, & Morrow, 1982; Brewer, 1986; Levine & Campbell, 1972). In social identity theory, but also in Elias's established (in-group) versus outsider (out-group) mechanism, and De Swaan's identification versus 'disidentification' ('social contra-identification'), collective identities are seen to be driven by interactional, individual desires (see also Cohen, 1994) for a positive self-evaluation. They explain how individuals construct and defend social boundaries against (imagined or real) other social collectives, *through* a concept of collective identity.

Many studies on European identity and support for the EU, including those outside of social psychology itself, have drawn on social identity theory (Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Carey, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2004a; L. Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Lubbers, 2008; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf, & Roscher, 1999; McLaren, 2002; Risse, 2010a). However, its use for this domain has been criticized. Duchesne, for example, sees the influence of social identity theory as one of the reasons for the "relative unsuitability of the present understanding of European identity" (2008, p. 400; see also Duchesne, 2012). She notes that "The concept of collective identity was developed for groups such as gender, race and class […]. These are quite different from the political community that we are interested in". Similarly, Billig, when discussing identity and categories in relation to nations, warns "against the temptation to explain nationalist consciousness in terms of 'identity', as if 'identity' were a psychological state, which exists apart from forms of life" (Billig, 1995, p. 65). Beyond a feeling of identity, or an interpretation of the world, he says, "it is also a way of being within the world of nations" (p. 65). He then points out that social identity theory "is not primarily a theory of nationalism", but "a general theory of group identity, exploring universal psychological principles, which are presumed to lie behind all forms of group identity" (Billig, 1995, pp. 65-66). This is problematic, according to Billig, because social identity theory therefore neglects "the specific meaning of social categories" (p. 66). Moreover, the focus on individual categorization in social identity theory neglects "the ways in which national identity becomes enhabited" (pp. 66-67). These are distinguishing features of Billig's (1995)banal nationalism, and they are crucial insights for studying European 'identity' as well (Cram,

2001, 2009; Cram & Patrikios, 2015). Chapter 4 examines what Billig (1995, p. 65) calls the 'ways of being in the world' in relation to the concept of Europe.

Boundaries

Chapter 5 looks at how groups are asserted within Europe in relation to imagined geographies,[11] and how these boundaries are maintained. In popular discourse, nation-states are often thought of as containers of 'national' language and culture. However, it is not the cultural specificities (an identity's 'contents') that create similarity and difference in national identities, but rather the maintenance of boundaries between groups. Elias mentions that the two working-class neighbourhoods (Zone 2 and 3) seem to differ *only* with regard to the seemingly arbitrary characteristic of how long people have lived in the area (1976, p. 10). In fact, for the formulation of social identity theory, Tajfel conducted 'minimal group experiments', which showed how insignificant the *characteristics* of a given group can be in asserting difference (consider Blok's 'minor differences'). These experiments showed that, even when the only difference between groups is the nominal difference itself, the dynamics of identification come into force. This suggests that the focus should not primarily be on *which* in-group and out-group characteristics are similar and different from an observer's point of view, but mainly on the process of boundary- and (thus) group-making itself.

The anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1969b), writing on a similar subject around the same time as Tajfel and Turner, recognised that identities are "situationally contingent, and the perpetual subject and object of negotiation" (as described by Jenkins, 2004, p. 22; see also Krappmann, 1969). Barth has as his central, well-known proposition that "[t]he critical focus of investigation [should be] the ethnic *boundary* that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses" (1969b, p. 15, original italics). As summarized by Jenkins (2004), Barth's model says that "the interactional construction of (external) difference generates (internal) similarity, rather than *vice versa*" (p. 97, original italics). This has a number of consequences. First, it places the emphasis of research on how individuals construct the *boundaries* of

[11] Theories on imagined geography, and notions of space and place are discussed in Chapter 5 itself.

their in-group *vis-à-vis* other individuals (or groups), regardless of what kind of cultural, linguistic or historical traits they ascribe to themselves.[12]

Barth additionally emphasized that collective identities can change through time (Jenkins, 2004, p. 97). For example, being Estonian, (or Italian, Dutch, or European) in 2016 is radically different with regard to boundary maintenance ('othering') than it would have been, say, during World War II or the successive communist era (cf. Mach, 1997, 2001). Estonia's most important socio-political Others have changed in both significance and meaning. In addition, not only do these characteristics of collective identity change through time; they also vary according to context. To continue on the same example, for an Estonian person to maintain a sense of 'Estonianness' in an interaction with a Russian individual in Estonia requires a different set of responses than when this same Estonian person is interacting with, say, an Iranian person in Iran (cf. Jenkins, 2004, pp. 97-98). To conclude, it should be added that different individuals experience and maintain their collective identity in a different way.[13] A frequently travelling businessperson, operating in an international environment on a daily basis, for instance, is likely to construct his or her national identity in an entirely different way than a local mail carrier who has never left his or her town in their life. They both possibly use completely different boundary markers in the process, while neither of them feels, or can be said to 'be' more national than the other.

Cosmopolitanism

'Cosmopolitanism' as a social analytical concept has been used in many different ways in the course of history and within the social sciences, and it has existed much longer than its contemporary usage might suggest (for a detailed discussion, see Beck, 2006). Beck & Grande state that "Cosmopolitanism combines appreciation of difference and alterity with attempts to conceive of new democratic forms of political rule beyond the nation-state" (2007, p. 12). The authors maintain that "The *principle* of cosmopolitanism [...] can be located and applied everywhere, and hence also to regional geographical units such as Europe" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 12, original italics; see also Delanty, 2009; chapters 8

[12] Although it is precisely these kinds of characteristics that *can* become instrumental in asserting difference.

[13] Jenkins (2004, p. 22) makes a similar point, distinguishing between *virtual* and *nominal* identity.

and 9). Beck's cosmopolitanism closely resembles the connotations that respondents from Bruter's (2004b) research on European identity mention, as well as the image that Europe's institutions intend to construct (see the section below for an elaboration on Bruter's research and the institutional construction of European identity). Elements described to be part of a cosmopolitan outlook are the appreciation of otherness and democratic transcendence of the nation-state, but also ideals such as education, culture, openness, peace and co-operation (Beck & Grande, 2007, pp. 59-60, 102-109, 224-225). Moreover, as Beck & Grande also stress, a cosmopolitan Europe should *not* be seen as the antithesis of a Europe of nations. The national and the cosmopolitan are not to be conceptualized as two opposing or even distinct levels of identification. As they put it: "[...] cosmopolitanism must not only integrate different national traditions and norms, it must at the same time balance various modern ways of dealing with difference [and this is] determined not by the either/or principle but by the both/and principle" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 16).

They illustrate this principle with many examples throughout their book (see especially Beck & Grande, 2007, chapter four). One of such examples is language. Not only is language one of the most important characteristics by which people define identity, and perhaps *the* central instrument that was used in the construction of national identities (cf. Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992), it is also one of the biggest perceived obstacles to European integration (cf. Beck & Grande, 2007, pp. 99-100). The authors suggest that this heterogeneity of language enables the cosmopolitanization of Europe. They clarify their point by comparing language as an identity marker with religion. They state that whereas "[r]eligion raises a claim to absoluteness, language does not" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 100). An individual can nominally belong to only one religion,[14] while "[o]ne can speak several languages, and thus continually traverse the boundaries between cultures and nations [...]" (ibid.).

In contemporary Europe, spatial mobility practices have increased (Kuhn, 2011, 2015), and multilingualism has risen as well, which may increase people's cosmopolitan attitudes (Gustafson, 2009; Mau, Mewes, & Zimmermann, 2008). In a survey held in 2006, 56% of EU citizens reported that they are able to have a conversation in a language other than their mother tongue, while 28% of all Europeans

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[14] This assumes the particular European experience of religion. There are many counter-examples of 'multi-religious' individuals in various societies, and religious syncretism, but these are typically found outside of Europe.

reported that they mastered two languages, and about one in ten (11%) said they master three languages (European Commission, 2006b, p. 8). This is an increase of 9, 2, and 3 percentage points, respectively, since the survey had been conducted before in 2001. According to Rifkin, "living with hybrid identities[15] and multiple cultural affiliations breeds a bottom-up cosmopolitanism and empathic extension. By incorporating diverse cultures, individuals become multicultural in their own identity, and therefore more tolerant and open to the diversity around them" (Rifkin, 2009, p. 438), which is in line with what Beck and Grande argue, although they explicitly distinguish conceptually between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.

Through this increased mobility and multilingualism, according to Beck & Grande, European *otherness*, rather than a monolingual European supranational 'nation-state', is embraced and even a *necessary component* of a common cosmopolitan European identity (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 100; for further discussion, see Fine, 2007, pp. 48-52; Habermas, 2001; Scott, Bee, & Scartezzini, 2008, p. 146; Shore, 2000, pp. 16-17; A. D. Smith, 1991, pp. 145-146). Conceptualizing identification with Europe in such a way opens up pathways to look beyond the federal or nation-state model for a European identity. National cultures and identities, and the boundaries that delimit them may well be the very fabric of which European identity is constructed, instead of its antithesis.

Europeanization in Theory

Europe can be defined quite simply as a geographic space, or very elaborately as a constantly changing concept. Geographically, it is most commonly marked out as the terrain between the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Ural Mountains. These geographic boundaries are often contested. Even though "all the continents are conceptual constructs", it is only Europe that was "not first perceived and named by outsiders" (East & Poulsen, 2008). This

[15] Hybrid identities are seemingly contradictory and idiosyncratic (re-)combinations of identifications that make previous identity boundaries more fuzzy and as a result, potentially more permeable (which is why Rifkin points towards bottom-up cosmopolitanism and an extension of empathy). Kohli (2000, p. 131) writes that "Hybridity means that contradictory meanings or logics of action linked to separate practices are recombined in new patterns in which the contradictory referents remain visible and powerful". Hybrid identities are therefore not a new, clearly defined mix of older identities, but instead rather a liminal, contradictory state.

especially makes Europe's Eastern boundaries the object of much discussion, because part of its definition is dependent on its historical, cultural roots and linkages. The 'Turkish dilemma' of recent years within the EU is one such contemporary example (see, for example Muftuler-Bac, 2000; Strasser, 2008); and in many ways, so is the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe (Moes, 2009a; Schilde, 2014). The geographic definition alone, while relevant (see Chapter 5), therefore seems limited for understanding a potential European identification processes.

If Europe should be understood as a dynamic idea rather than a fixed geographic space, where does this idea come from and how is it constructed? It is not entirely clear when exactly 'Europe' as an idea and/or an identity made its entrance into general public discourse (for a discussion, see Davies, 1997; Delanty, 1995; Rodríguez-Salgado, 1992; Stråth, 2002). The word itself derives from the classical legend of *Europa*, a Phoenician princess who was seduced and abducted to Crete by Zeus under the guise of a white bull (Davies, 1997, pp. xvii-xix). The name's reinvention as a geographical label is much more recent. Historians generally date the beginning of the usage of 'Europe' to indicate a certain space to the period starting from the 15th and 16th centuries leading up to the 18th century, gradually replacing the concept of 'Christendom' (Davies, 1997, p. 7; Delanty, 1995; Mikkeli, 1998). Stark divisions between the nations of Europe became an embarrassment in the light of their common Christian identity, and so the concept of 'Europe' provided a more neutral term (Davies, 1997, p. 7).

Throughout the ages following its conception, 'Europe' has meant many different things. Discussing all of them would be beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter (for an in-depth analysis of the concept's history, see Davies, 1997; Delanty, 1995; Heffernan, 1998; see also Ifversen, 2002; Jenkins, 2008). Nowadays, the label 'Europe' is often (incorrectly) used as a synonym for the European Union, or European integration in general. The very existence of a term for 'Europe' (whether referring to geography, politics, or culture) in this debate implies that it is a socially relevant category at the very least for the people discussing it. This labelling of 'Europe' is a process of continuous construction that is not only sustained by Europe's citizens, but is also a political project, actively being advanced from an institutional level. This is not a one-directional development, as "this process is being resisted just as it is being pushed forward" (McNeill, 2004, p. 9).

The construction of Europe as an institutional process of invention has been widely examined. One such study is Cris Shore's book *Building Europe* (2000). Adopting an anthropological perspective, he charts out several instruments and symbols employed by the EU institutions to actively create 'Europeans' (see also Bee, 2008). Shore and many others draw attention to apparently functional, rational, and therefore seemingly 'innocent' elements of Europe's construction such as the European flag and anthem (Bruter, 2003, 2004b; Cram, 2012), but also to maps of Europe (Aase, 1994; Hagen, 2003; Jensen & Richardson, 2003, 2004; Paasi, 2001; Zeigler, 2002), quite literally 'bounding' Europe (Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Sparke, 2000). Moreover, the EU has audio-visual, cultural, educational and (labour) mobility (e.g. Erasmus/Socrates) programmes in place (Bakir, 1996; King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Kuhn, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Murphy-Lejeune, 2002; Recchi, 2008; Sigalas, 2010; Wilson, 2011), and it designates European 'cities of culture' and heritage projects on a yearly basis (Sassatelli, 2002, 2008). There have been attempts at creating a "new ritual calendar" (Shore & Black, 1992, p. 11) by assigning 'European Weeks' and European thematic years (e.g. 'European Year of Cinema'), and the creation of European holidays such as 'Europe Day' (9 May). The EU also launched its own 'country code top-level-domain' (ccTLD), meaning that European businesses and individuals can now register internet domains ending with '.eu'. Several official EU publications referred to this action with headlines such as "European identity on the internet", and slogans saying that: "With '.eu', you can show that you are a European, too!" (European Commission, 2007, p. 11). The citizens of all EU member states are 'European citizens', holding a standardized EU passport and driver's license following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The Schengen Treaty physically and symbolically erases national borders and homogenizes symbolism at border posts and airports (Markusse, 2004; Strüver, 2005; Walters, 2002a), there is a centralized European statistics office (Eurostat), creating statistics on 'Europe' and 'Europeans', thereby constituting them as numeric and therefore 'real' entities (Shore, 2000; Walters, 2002b), a European Space Agency (Zabusky, 2011), and many Europeans pay with the same coins and bills: the Euro (Risse, 2003; Schmid, 2001). Finally, the Eurobarometer survey, used by many researchers who are interested in studying European identity, can itself be seen as one such tool for actually *constructing* it. Taken as a whole, it is exactly these kinds of symbols and instruments that constitute 'Europe' as a symbolic (and political) reality in the everyday life of its citizens.

However, also *without* any EU symbols, rituals, and policies 'designed' to make Europe's inhabitants feel European, Europe is continuously being reproduced by people within and outside of Europe; 'Europhiles' and 'Eurosceptics' alike. It is recreated on a daily basis in speech and thought, and in this way it has a degree of entitativity. Even though what is conventionally called Europe is geographically little more than an 'Asian' peninsula, it seems to feel only natural to add the adjective 'European' to such things as language, culture, history, sporting events, tourism, types of food, and brands of cars (see, for example Blain, Boyle, & O'Donnell, 1993; Crolley & Hand, 2002; Delamont, 1995; Edensor, 2002; McNeill, 2004; Van Houtum & Van Dam, 2002). Referring to something as 'European' or being 'in' Europe has become so commonplace that it is easy to forget that many contemporary newspapers and television newscasts in Europe have a regular section with 'European news'. Even when critics of European integration use the term rather negatively, denouncing their country's further engagement with 'Europe' or depicting 'Europe' as a threat to national identity, its very existence is reinforced by making 'Europe' a socially relevant category (even if it is a category of *disidentification*). 'Europe', in other words, is thereby constructed as a socially real place (Graham, 1998; Paasi, 2001).

Europe's Others

The social reality of Europe does not in and of itself inherently imply any form of European *identification*. Previous work on European identity has taken on various perspectives to trace European identity. The theoretical starting point is often identification with the nation-state. Crucial to such an approach, is that identification as a process always requires a significant Other for subsequent self-definition (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). For nation-states, these significant Others have traditionally been other nation-states. The Others for an emerging European identity that are most commonly suggested are the United States, Russia, and Islam and/or the Middle East (see Adamson, 2004; Balch, 2005; Benthall, 2004; Diez, 2004; Grillo, 2004; Neumann, 1993, 1998a, 1998b; Said, 1979; Strasser, 2008). Beyond external Others, it has been proposed that Eastern and Western Europe can be seen as each other's Others (cf. Kuus, 2004; Lindstrom, 2003; Melchior, 2010; Neumann, 1999). A perspective

that is also regularly put forward is that European nation-states are socially constructed partly in opposition to Europe, and vice versa; Europe in opposition to nationalities (cf. Carey, 2002).[16]

Particularly this last perspective aligns with much of the public debate surrounding Europeanization, in that it suggests a kind of either-or mechanism between Europe and the state. As McNeill observes, this makes the debate about Europe's territorial future often overly simplistic, "assuming either the continuing existence of a nation-state led form of European integration [...] or a federalisation model that simultaneously enhances the power of the regions and the EU at the expense of national autonomy" (2004, p. 36). If a competition between national and European identifications is at hand, it would be relatively straightforward to determine which people identify themselves with Europe. When asked in any recent *Eurobarometer* whether they expect to feel citizens of their country and/or of Europe in the near future,[17] an overwhelming majority of the respondents still reported a preference for their nationality, while only a small minority (under 10%) preferred to place feeling European over feeling national (European Commission, 2006a, p. 45).[18] On the other hand, roughly half of the people in the same surveys occasionally think of themselves "not only as nationality, but also European", and a comparable percentage felt "proud to be European".

Many have argued for studying Europeanization as an entirely new form of social organisation or at least as different from the nation-state (Borneman & Fowler, 1997; Kohli, 2000). Some have shown positive correlations between nation-state and European identifications (Bruter, 2003, p. 1154, see also; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; see McLaren, 2002a; McLaren, 2004 for a quantitative analysis of this nation-Europe duality). In fact, as Hutchinson argues, " [...] many, if not most, European national identities have been developed either alongside or in relation to a sense of Europeanness [...]" (2003, p. 37). So, instead of looking at Europeanization as the inevitable demise of European nation-states, the

[16] Though other authors have found contradictory results (Duchesne, 2012; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008)

[17] The exact question wording in *Eurobarometer* is: "In the near future, do you see yourself as being (nationality) only, (nationality) <u>and</u> European, European <u>and</u> (nationality) or just European?" (cf. European Communities, 2005, p. 31).

[18] Combining the categories "European and nationality" (7%) and "European only" (2%).

focus should be on the "more complex political process of repositioning, remapping, and rebranding of the nation-state" (McNeill, 2004, pp. 36-37).

What is Europe?

This dialectic between national identities and Europe, demands an extended analysis of what is meant by 'Europeanness'. The definition of Europe has attracted a lot of attention in various academic fields (Bruter, 2003, p. 1153; , see also Habermas, 1992). Through which means is Europe socially constructed? What are its key 'components'? Which images of Europe are being construed? In other words: what do people *mean* when they say that they feel European? The answer to this question can be divided into two parts; as seen from a top-down, or from a bottom-up perspective.

First, Europe can be understood as a set of values, underlined in the texts of many of Europe's international agreements (for a 'cultural' analysis, see Joas & Wiegandt, 2008). As Shore points out, the preambles to several European treaties drawn up in the 1950s – the period in which many of the EU's institutions were founded – embody a "supranational and federalist logic" (2000, p. 15). And even though "[s]ubsequent treaties may have removed or disguised the emotive word 'federalism' from their final texts [...] a federalist vision of Europe has been implicit in the ethos and organisational structures of the European Community ever since its creation" (Shore, 2000, p. 15). Shore argues that according to EU policy-makers, the EU has created a political architecture that is intended to eventually transcend the international order based on the nation-state (Shore, 2000, p. 16). As the EU and its national governments communicate an image of what is 'European' in official publications, public information bulletins, and information brochures, it should be stressed that such images are never neutral (see also Bruter, 2005b). Instead, it is often an active attempt to generate a European mass political identity (Bruter, 2003, p. 1149; Shore, 2000, pp. 15-21).

But *which* image of Europe is being promoted? To begin with, the Constitutional Treaty[19] that, following the Dutch and French rejection, was later amended by the Lisbon Treaty, provides the following:

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[19] The 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity puts forward similar rhetoric.

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
>
> (European Communities, 2007, p. 11)

Furthermore, the Treaty places these values in a historical framework, rooting it in a shared past, and suggests a morally upward trend by stating that:

> [...] Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, [...] wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world [...]
>
> (European Communities, 2004, p. 3)

After these statements, the Treaty text continues to broadly define the intended future for European national identities:

> [...] while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny [...]. [T]hus 'United in diversity', Europe offers them the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth, the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope [...]
>
> (European Communities, 2004, p. 3)

Broadly speaking, the Treaty text alone suggests that EU official publications present an image of a 'Europe' that is diverse yet united in its destiny, democratic, open, peaceful, prosperous, culturally and

historically rich, and positive towards equality between the sexes and different ethnic groups. In less juridical publications of the EU, these values are regularly condensed into even more sweeping statements.[20] The construction of a European identity through EU policy is by no means a secret in these kinds of publications either (Bruter, 2003, p. 1152), as the following striking excerpt discussing the Schengen agreement shows: "The increased flow of people, and the mutual understanding that travel provides, can only help foster a sense of European identity" (European Commission, 2007, p. 14).

Beside a focus on institutions and official attempts at defining European values and identity, a second approach, and the main emphasis of this study, is to look at what perceptions 'ordinary' European citizens have regarding what the concepts 'Europe' and 'European' mean. "EU citizens are clearly *numerically* identifiable from the perspective of a neutral observer: everybody who holds citizenship status in any member state is a member" (Kantner, 2006, p. 509, my emphasis), but this does not necessarily mean that those citizens also consider themselves EU citizens on a more symbolic level. Nevertheless, these symbolic images do partly overlap with what is being promoted from an institutional perspective, which arguably shows the effectiveness of these kinds of publications and symbols (Bruter, 2003, 2004b; Cram & Patrikios, 2015). Michael Bruter (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b) discusses citizens' perceptions of news, symbols and "borderless-ness" with regard to their identification with Europe. In his analyses, he makes the distinction between a *civic* and a *cultural* component of European political identity. By civic identity, Bruter means "the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life" (2003, p. 1155). In anthropological terms, civic identification with Europe can be seen as the extent to which people feel that 'Europe' is part of their political 'segmentary lineage'. As Bruter also notes, this component of identity is conceptually close to Habermas's "constitutional patriotism" (1992).

Cultural identity, on the other hand, refers to the perceived level of sameness with other Europeans. Bruter defines it as "individuals' perception that fellow Europeans are closer to them than

[20] See, for two interesting examples of this rhetoric, the *Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome*, signed by Hans-Gert Pöttering, Angela Merkel and José Manuel Barroso and available at http://bookshop.europa.eu, or *50 Ways Forward: Europe's best successes* (European Commission, 2007, also available from http://bookshop.europa.eu)

non-Europeans [...] regardless of the nature of the political system" (2003, pp. 1155-1156). Such a definition might be too indiscriminate, because it *requires* Europeans to feel closer to other Europeans than to people from other continents. It is conceivable that there are people who might feel closer to, say, Americans than to other Europeans. Even so, that does not necessarily mean that these individuals do not experience *any* kind of (cultural) connectedness to other Europeans (or Europe as a more abstract notion).

Bruter argues that what is most often pursued both theoretically and empirically in academic literature dealing with the emergence of European identification, is actually only the *civic* component (2003, pp. 1167-1171; see also Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2008, paragraph 2.3). A central conclusion that Bruter proposes is that, while the civic component appeals to citizens' reason to a larger extent, the cultural component is more substantially driven by collective symbols (i.e. European flag, anthem, currency, etc.) and images of Europe (ibid.). The answer to the question *which* specific features are thought of by citizens as 'European' with regard to cultural European identity, is very likely to vary across countries, regions, and even individuals. For some, what binds Europeans may be an ideal of peace and openness, while for others, it may be Europe's 'Christian heritage' (see also Chapters 4 and 5). Bruter acknowledges this, and examines these differences in a qualitative comparison of focus groups run in France, the UK, and the Netherlands (Bruter, 2004b). Members of his focus groups expressed an image of Europe that emphasizes peacefulness, prosperity, co-operation, harmony, and educational and cultural initiatives (Bruter, 2004b, pp. 28, 30). Note that his focus groups consisted mainly of higher educated people, which may heavily influence the perceived image of Europe. Still, it is remarkable that these connotations were not only reported for positive news regarding the EU,[21] but also for the (official) symbols like the European flag.

In order to make his distinction between civic and cultural political identities more clear, Bruter asked his respondents whether, in their view, "[...] European identity and being 'for' [in favour of] Europe were the same thing" (2004b, p. 34). None of the participants in the focus groups agreed to this proposition. They clearly differentiated between "support for a project", Bruter's civic identity, and "the

[21] Negative news connotations were mainly "heavy bureaucracy, focus on tiny questions, internal dissent between member-states, obscure negotiations, unsatisfactory compromises, etc." (Bruter, 2004b, p. 28).

emergence of a new identity", the cultural dimension. It would have been interesting in this regard to know more about the differences in meanings associated with 'Europe' and the EU, respectively. However, such a differentiation might not be that salient in the minds of his respondents in the first place (see Chapter 6). One could argue that in this way, the EU's policies in this field are shaping an identity that stretches further than its territorial limits.

When it comes to defining European identity, Bruter finds two sets of descriptions among his respondents. Some define it in a similar fashion as they would have described their national identity, referring to a sense of being in the same society, regardless of local differences. This definition seems best compatible with Bruter's civic political identity. Others described feeling European because of certain values like cross-national/cultural mixing, cosmopolitanism, and, again, cooperation. This type concurs with the cultural political identity component. According to Bruter, respondents were divided on "[...] whether Europe is an anti-national or a meta-national construct [...] as much as it divides political scientists" (2004b, p. 34).

Looking Ahead

This chapter discussed identification as seen from a general, theoretical perspective, as well as how European identity in particular has been approached. It represents the groundwork and frame of reference for going into the analysis; not its conclusions. For that reason, more specific theories are introduced and discussed in the empirical chapters themselves. The way European identity should be understood and studied is contested in the literature, and has been approached from different conceptual angles. While some consider European identity a 'nested identity' (Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Herb & Kaplan, 1999), others conceptualize it as a 'marble cake' (Risse, 2003, 2004, 2010a). It can be understood as an 'entangled' (Ichijo & Spohn, 2005), 'layered' (Laitin, 1998) or 'hybrid' (Citrin & Sides, 2004) identity.

In order to arrive at better indicators of European social integration, others have argued that instead of focusing on identity, researchers should emphasize analysing behaviours (Favell & Guiraudon, 2009, pp. 559-560), including political behaviour (or its absence) that would suggest increased social cohesion across nations in Europe. Other researchers, most notably Duchesne and Van Ingelgom

(Duchesne, Frazer, Haegel, & Van Ingelgom, 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014), have emphasized European citizens' indifference (that Europe is seen as an irrelevant level of action in a global context) or ambivalence (that European integration is seen to have both positive and negative aspects) towards European integration when examining affective and evaluative attitudes. Instead, I argue that 'European identity' should not be thrown out as a meaningful object of study just yet, and that it should not be conceptualized (or measured) solely in terms of behaviours or (political) attitudes, or the lack thereof. Instead, as I have attempted in this project, it should be reconceptualised to reflect how individuals identify themselves in relation to, and within Europe; how they imagine the European space around them. While attitudes and behaviours (and the absence of either) are comparatively concrete and more straightforward to measure, 'identity' is a nebulous and often implicit concept. To make matters worse, the word itself has not only become controversial in social science, but has also acquired strong connotations in popular discourse in many European societies (and beyond). Moreover, many of the standard large scale surveys, and researchers who use these for their analyses continue to rely on existing question phrasings, often largely uncritical of which connotations might be evoked in the imaginations of their respondents. This issue with existing large scale surveys is exacerbated by the fact that they are often instruments funded by European institutions (Duchesne et al., 2013, p. 7).

I argue that no matter its inherent empirical elusiveness, identity is essential to how people regard themselves, and how they understand the world around them, even if the phenomenon under investigation is not always labelled 'identity' by the subjects of investigation themselves. This potential disparity between what identity means as a relevant notion to 'ordinary citizens' and how it is conceptualized when studying identity in Europe from an academic perspective I consider to be crucial for a re-imagination of how research on this topic could proceed. To that end, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 take on a descriptive and conceptual approach in an attempt to contribute an understanding of this complexity.

Chapter 3: Data & Methodology

This research project is based on 95 qualitative[22] interviews across three European countries[23] that ranged in length between less than an hour to over three hours each. This chapter expands on the approach and methodology involved in this. First, the rather 'experimental' choice of methodology will be described, as well as the overall approach for the data collection. After that, the next section goes into the sample itself, the context in which this data was collected, and the practical aspects of this process. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief description of how the data was subsequently processed and analysed.

Methodological Approach

The approach for this study is in principle inductive, and can be positioned within the general framework of interpretivism. It is inductive because rather than looking for operationalization and subsequent confirmation of patterns that earlier theory suggests (i.e. deductive), it aims to first explore and understand the worldview of the interviewees themselves with few prior assumptions about what can be expected or what aspects may be relevant. Through those understandings, it then aims to formulate common patterns found in the data. The main aim therefore, is not to operationalize and test any one particular theory or hypothesis, but rather to offer a descriptive and conceptual account of the empirical materials. The way the empirical strategy was set up is rather atypical, and purposely intended to be a methodological 'experiment' of sorts, in an attempt to bridge the diverging approaches that currently exist in the literature by offering description, classification (Savage & Burrows, 2007, p. 896), conceptualization, and an empirical critique.

The study intends to understand and situate different meanings that individuals have about 'Europe'. Such meanings are inherently subjective and dependent on local and social context. The aim

[22] The interviews centred around a qualitative, semi-structured (based on an evolving interview guide), in-depth (questions were progressively based on the responses the interviewees gave) interview at their core, but involved a minor quantitative component as well. This is elaborated on further down in this chapter.

[23] Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands – see Chapter 1 on the rationale for country case selection.

here is to uncover these "culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world" (Crotty, 1998, p. 67), and interpret them from a sociological perspective. In doing so, a crucial distinction between an *emic* and an *etic* understanding is made throughout this study. These two concepts, borrowed from anthropology, indicate the difference in perspective on a phenomenon according to how the members of a social group *themselves* interpret it (emic), versus how social scientists *studying* that group interpret it (etic). Both terms were originally coined in linguistics (Pike, 1967) and etymologically emic is derived from *phonemic* (essentially, sounds produced in words that are distinguishable by native speakers), while etic is derived from *phonetic* (the acoustic and physiological properties of speech universally across all languages). The distinction between emic and etic was later broadly adopted by anthropologists through the work of most notably Marvin Harris (1976; see also Headland, 1990), who was later widely criticized for his particular use of the concepts (Goodenough, 1970). An emic and an etic understanding of a certain phenomenon should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary. An emic account can by definition only be fully given by an insider, local, or 'native' to a given culture[24]. An etic account can be given by either an insider or an outsider depending on the extent to which their description draws upon concepts and theories that can be applied across different cultures and perspectives. The research presented here aims to be inductive, and represent interviewees' perspectives, yet explicitly aims to present an etic perspective *on* these views (more on this in the next section).

The approach furthermore borrows some of the assumptions underpinning symbolic interactionism in the way research subjects (i.e. the interviewees) were interviewed, but not necessarily with regard to the focus of the later analysis. Specifically, a starting point was the notion that people have their own interpretations of places, actors, activities (the three components of analysis of a social situation in Spradley, 1980), and artefacts. Such interpretations and meanings (in this case, of Europe) in turn inform how people act and think towards these things – in other words, "if men [*sic*] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572). In practical terms of data collection, this point of departure meant that during interviews the focus was first on

[24] Though anthropologists often attempt to approximate an emic account in their writing through the use of participant-observation in ethnography.

establishing the interviewee's meanings associated with Europe, their nation and other relevant 'objects' in their 'life-world'. This was done by attempting to provide starting points to the conversation that could lead to the topics that are under examination in this study, but initially avoiding questions and topics that were directly about Europe or the EU. For example, interviewees were asked about their travel experiences, the interviewer made a comment about a local landmark or language, or the interviewee was shown photographs, geographic maps, or objects, and then asked to talk about their interpretations, opinions, and meanings. Once a vocabulary was established for the interview by the interviewee, more concrete and direct questions were asked. A second premise of symbolic interactionism is that meanings arise through social interaction, either with other people or with society in broader terms. Beyond what is mentioned above, this was further examined through the inclusion of a number of questions about their social networks.

Overall, this is not a symbolic interactionist study, however, and these assumptions were merely borrowed to conceptualize the data collection and formulate a strategy for the interviews. The focus is not on the interactions themselves, but rather on the information that was ultimately produced through the interactions within the interviews. One important priority that was facilitated through this approach was that interviewees remained in charge of the vocabulary, and that concepts and interpretations were allowed to emerge inductively. In the analysis, the approach also departs somewhat from typical conventions in symbolic interactionism (but not interpretivism more broadly). Instead, an attempt was made to interpret the emic meanings as expressed by interviewees, and translate that interpretation to an etic understanding of identification with Europe. In any qualitative study that relies on interview data;

> There is a responsibility to hear what informants are saying about their lives and the meaning of their experiences, and a responsibility to construct interpretations that may or may not conform to what informants have told us… (Kidder & Fine, 1997, p. 48)

In this study, the emphasis is distinctly on the latter – that is, on constructing interpretations rather than expressing the emic views on identification with and meanings of Europe as a first priority. This implies

that the way interviewees are represented in this study is not primarily to give them a 'voice' (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006).

Interviewee Voice & Interpretation

This choice on interviewee voice is because of two main reasons. First is a methodological concern; it would be impossible to do justice to the voice of 95 different interviews within the confines of this text. This is not primarily because of the number of interviews, but because of the sampling approach. By contrast, for example, Adrian Favell's seminal *Eurostars and Eurocities* (2008) is similarly based on a relatively high number of in-depth interviews (60), but he does give a very clear and present voice to his interviewees. However, the research question for his research was concerned with a very particular, 'natural' group of people, and as a result his sampling approach was different from the one in this project. A related example is Monica Sassatelli's (2009a) *Becoming Europeans*, which is based on nearly 60 formal interviews as well. She focuses not primarily on one specific type of 'demographic' group, but instead on two cases based on specific EU cultural policies (see also Sassatelli, 2002, 2009b, 2010). Beyond these studies, there has been qualitative research that focuses specifically on the EU institutions themselves and the people who work there (Bellier & Wilson, 2000; McDonald, 1996; Shore, 2000; Zabusky, 2011).

By contrast, the logic here was maximum variation sampling (see the section below), and so the voices that could be shown based on these data are varied and sometimes far apart. As a whole, they would not represent any social group in particular because this research does not aim at representing any one such group, as reflected in the sampling approach. An approach that emphasizes the voice and presence of the interviewees would lead to narratives and biographies that would detract from the main points that the empirical chapters are trying to make. Giving sufficient space for the voice of particular interviewees to take centre stage would have meant that the biographies of very different individuals would have had to be explained and contrasted. As an example, within Estonia I conducted an interview with a patriotic nationalist[25] in his 80s who is generally seen as a 'freedom fighter', and had been a political prisoner in a Soviet Gulag. In Italy, I interviewed a university student in her early 20s with strong cosmopolitan convictions and a wide network of international contacts. In the Netherlands, one

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[25] 'Nationalist' as meant in the context of Chapter 4.

interviewee was a truck driver in his late 40s, who spoke several languages and travelled across Europe routinely, but still felt Dutch, and Dutch alone.

Giving sufficient voice to all of these very different interviewees and their biographies would have meant that each of their individual trajectories would have needed describing and contextualizing. Considering the importance of the national, local, and individual histories in doing so, this would have exacerbated the issue of methodological nationalism (Beck, 2007; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002) because in many comparisons it would have become a comparison of national contexts and meanings.[26] Instead, the goal was to consider the three countries in this study as strategically selected 'sub-samples' of the case under examination – that is, Europe and European society (see also Chapter 1). If the problem of methodological nationalism is taken seriously, and the topic of research is the social dimensions of European integration and European identity, then it is imperative that this is also taken into account in how the methodology and analysis of such a project is approached (Favell & Recchi, 2011, pp. 57-60).[27] While national contexts are certainly very important (particularly from an emic perspective), and do factor into the findings in this study, they are not taken as *a priori* defining elements of how people see Europe. Similarly, the 'natural' groups that people consider themselves a member of are relevant for their perception of their identities. Chapter 4 attempts to reconstruct what might have been typical 'social groups', but from an etic perspective – not necessarily how interviewees themselves saw it.

The second reason why the interviewee's voice is not emphasized as a matter of priority is more theoretical. Part of the argument in this study is that the voice of those interviewed, or the emic perspective, is not always evidence for the presence or absence of a 'European identity' from a social scientific, etic perspective. In essence (this argument is expanded on in the next chapters), I argue that

[26] Alternatively, other categories (e.g. gender, occupation) could have been the main focal point. Even in that scenario, however, the specificities of what it means to be a woman, or to be a factory worker could be radically different between countries and regions, which would detract from the central aims of this study.

[27] Consider, for example, an analogous study on identities across social groups in a single nation-state. In such a project, regional territorial identities may certainly be taken into account. Beyond that, however, assumptions that those identifying with the nation in any way would do so differently according to – for example – social class or political affiliation are at least as likely as assumptions that ways of identifying would differ according to geography within the nation-state.

in public discourse and the mind of the general population, the notion of 'identity' has come to be associated with territorial entities, and particularly with nation-states. The social scientific definition of what identity is, or what it means to identify, can be broader than this public interpretation (see Chapter 2). Worldviews, or frames of reference that people have, and the opinions, attitudes, meanings, and behaviours that flow from this can, and often do, point to what might be legitimately called identity from a social science perspective. Other researchers have made parallel arguments on occasion. For example, Theresa Kuhn (2015, p. 5) writes about the "discrepancy between being and feeling European", which she takes as one of her central questions. Looking at transnational behaviours (such as contacts and information flows; see also Mau, 2010), she examines the puzzle that (as a collective) people have become more European in terms of some of their behaviours, yet identification with the EU[28] has not proportionally risen.[29]

Quantitative discrepancies like these may indicate that the relationship between people's worldviews, attitudes, and behaviours are not directly related to identification with Europe, or that this relationship is more complex. While that may still be the case, my argument goes in a somewhat different direction. Regardless of their reported behaviours and explicit attitudes, people's worldviews and frames of reference may have shifted towards something that, from an etic perspective, social scientists might call a European identity, regardless of whether people themselves explicitly label it as such. European identity may never be a 'hot', explicit identity, but that does not mean it is not identity at all in theoretical terms. Such emic (implicit)[30] identities still matter also for support for the EU, and are not just a figment of people's imagination. If their frame of reference is European, they are much more likely to also have a sense of solidarity and empathy for other areas of Europe. They are also more likely to exhibit transnational behaviours such as travelling, shopping, living and doing business abroad elsewhere in Europe. In other words, again, the Thomas Theorem still applies.

The above means that in the analyses offered in the next chapters, the literal and emic voice of interviewees is largely subordinate to the argument based on the etic interpretation of the topic that is

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[28] She measures identification with the EU partly in terms of support for the EU. I will examine this in more detail in Chapter 6.

[29] But see Immerfall, Boehnke, & Baier (2009).

[30] See Chapter 6 for a discussion on implicit versus explicit identifications with Europe.

put forward. Differently put, the emphasis is on the interpretation and translation of social realities to social scientific understandings – not on the 'translated' materials themselves. In the next empirical chapters, quotes from interviews will be used primarily for illustration of the point, and in part to deepen the understanding of how interviewees talked about the topics at hand (Corden & Sainsbury, 2006). A final, related note to this section is that the participants in this research will be referred to as 'interviewees'. This is to reflect the methodological position outlined above. Quantitative research tends to speak of 'respondents', and much of the interpretative qualitative research of 'informants' in order to reflect the position of the research subjects within the research. I have chosen to use the relatively neutral 'interviewee'. The interviewees in this project informed the research on a much more fundamental level than they would have had they filled in a quantitative survey. Their views and meanings are taken as 'real' social realities, and an attempt was made to deeply understand their worldview. They were not informants in a more ethnographic sense, because in most cases, the vast majority of information that was conveyed from them to the research was concentrated in a single interview.

Reflexivity

> In our profession there is a lack of awareness even today that, in searching for truth, the student, like all human beings whatever they try to accomplish, is influenced by tradition, by his environment, and by his personality. Further, there is an irrational taboo against discussing this lack of awareness. It is astonishing that this taboo is commonly respected leaving the social scientist in naiveté about what he is doing.
>
> (Myrdal, 1953, p. 4)

The dual interpretation involved in an interpretivist approach implies not only that interviewees interpret their world, but also that the researcher is not a neutral agent in the production of data and the analysis (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 25). For that reason, in the interest of transparency and reflexivity (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003), it is necessary to offer a brief reflection on the background and perspective of the researcher. To that end, the paragraph below details some of the aspects of my own background and context that may be relevant to my interpretation of the topics in this study. After that, I will concisely address how this may have shaped my research. This is not meant

to be self-indulgent or to attempt to provide (or undermine) credibility to the perspective in this study, but rather to reveal any blind spots and specific perspectives that may exist in this work. For this particular approach, this is slightly more complicated with regard to data collection, as locally trained interviewers were used in part of the data collection (see below). The interview guide was standardized across all of the interviews, but nonetheless the topics that different interviewers picked up on and probed further during their conversations are likely to have been different. The processing and analysis of the data is entirely my own, and at least for that some reflection may be helpful.

I grew up acutely aware of identities and of European integration. I was born and raised in Maastricht in the 1980s, where matters of identity, language, and European integration are an almost daily recurring theme because of a number of factors. First, many people speak the local dialect, and it is still very much embedded in local culture, daily exchanges, and even local politics. It is seen as very distinct from standard Dutch, and as a result is experienced as a strong identity marker for locals. This local language as well as specific customs are generally seen as demarcating a particular identity that is separate from the Netherlands, and there is a degree of disidentification and contempt for the 'Dutch' amongst certain parts of the population. This identity is embedded not only in language, but also in an imagined closeness to French culture, and a local ritual calendar in which this culture is celebrated. Historically, this distinction partly stems from the 19th and early 20th century pillarization (Dutch: *"verzuiling"*) of Dutch society along Protestant, Catholic, and Social-Democratic pillars, where the south of the country was (and still is) largely Catholic. These divisions were rooted in different historical trajectories even before that, however, and currently Catholicism in and of itself does not appear to be a prevalent identity marker against other parts of the now largely secular Netherlands for most people.

Second, Maastricht is at the border between the Netherlands and Belgium, and a short bus ride away from Germany. I myself grew up at less than a kilometre distance to Belgium (although the impact of this on European identity is doubtful, see Kuhn, 2012a; Meinhof, 2004). Besides dialects, the wider region has three national languages (Dutch, French, and German), and with Maastricht in the centre of that region, it is very common for people in shops and cafés to speak multiple languages depending on who their customers are. Finally, and perhaps obviously, the Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty was signed there in 1992, when I was about to turn nine. In the years after that, 'Europe' has been

very present in the city both through official visits and events, as well as through political collaboration in the 'Euroregion' with neighbouring cities in Belgium and Germany.

This context and specific history undoubtedly shaped the way I think about European integration and identities. Around the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed, I remember having a fairly large EU flag hanging in my teenage bedroom, and I recall telling my sister that I wanted to get involved in European politics when I was around ten years old (I have since somewhat recovered from that ambition). A couple of years later, when I became more politically aware, my orientation was decidedly left-wing, which over time added some much-needed nuance to my unreserved pro-Europeanness (for a discussion on the way in which such attitudes may introduce bias in this field of research, see the excellent points made by Duchesne, 2017; Duchesne et al., 2013). By the time this research project started some twenty years later, I had studied anthropology and sociology, and had gone on my own Erasmus exchange to Poland. My own relationship to Europe had become one that Bruter (2004a, 2005a) might call cultural, but not necessarily civic. I identified as European, and felt that Europeans ought to have a shared sense of solidarity and empathy, but my views on the EU as a polity were more ambivalent. Despite these personal views (or perhaps because I was aware of them), I feel that the interviews were conducted in a way that did not favour similar perspectives to my own. Several of my interviews were with people who had radically opposing views to mine, and those conversations were as pleasant and informative as those where I shared the interviewee's worldview. In order to approach the latter equally critical, I tried to incorporate the talking points of earlier interviews with people who were more different from myself into new interviews as the data collection progressed. In addition, the interview guides were constructed also on the basis of input from the local interviewers, who each had their own perspectives on European integration and identity.

Empirical Design

> Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied. By whatever methods, we choose to study the case. We could study it analytically or holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by mixed methods - but we concentrate, at least for the time being, on the case.
>
> (Stake, 2000, p. 435)

The three country cases, Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands, were chosen to attain another dimension of the maximum variation sample (in addition to individual characteristics such as age and education, as detailed below). Moreover, the geographic spread was expected to be essential for alleviating the risk of methodological nationalism when studying Europe as a whole. The rationale for selecting these three countries is further addressed in Chapter 1. The 'case' for this project, however, is primarily meant to be Europe and its inhabitants. In this sense, the three countries have particular historical and social contexts that are taken into account in the analysis, but in first instance serve as a sampling tool. This ties in with the discussion on emic and etic perspectives in the section above.

Sample

Several earlier studies on European identity have relied on purposive samples (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 186). Many of those analyses focus on extreme or outlier cases that specifically target the likely 'carrier groups' (Kohli, 2000, p. 131) or 'natural groups' (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, pp. 176-177) of identification with Europe (Favell, 2008; Kuhn, 2012a, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Moes, 2008, 2009a; Recchi & Favell, 2009; Sigalas, 2010; Stoeckel, 2016; Wilson, 2011). The sampling approach for this study was different, and employed a maximum variation sample (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, pp. 187-188). The reason for this is that the central questions that drive this project are exploratory, and aim to uncover different ways of seeing and relating to Europe. It does so without predefining the social groups that may have particular interpretations of Europe, and aims to be open to cross-connections in these views across social groups and (national, regional, social) contexts.

The maximum variation logic varied particularly on four aspects: age, education, region, and – where applicable – minority status in the national context.[31] In other words, the spread within the sample was maximized along variables that have been identified as strong predictors for identification with Europe in earlier research and theory (see Chapter 2). This argumentation is somewhat similar to Díez Medrano's (2003) approach, who similarly varied his sample along three predefined age groups and two education groups across six cities in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany (Díez Medrano, 2003, pp. 263-264). By contrast, his emphasis was mainly on examining the *differences* between these three countries. In terms of sampling, he "relied on systematic [stratified random] sampling of entries in the cities' telephone books" (Díez Medrano, 2003, p. 263), through which he aimed to achieve a degree of representativeness for those cases. My own approach does not claim to be representative of the three countries, and obviously does not intend to be generalizable in a statistical sense. Instead, it offers a more exploratory approach that considers the case to be European society more broadly. The aim is principally to contribute to theory building on, and conceptualization of European identity and its components. In this sense, it *is* meant to be representative of the different narratives that are put forward, and to some extent potentially generalizable (in a non-statistical sense) to social groups and geographic areas that were not part of the study itself. For example, some meanings associated with Europe amongst specific social groups may transcend nation-state boundaries, and be similar across Europe from an etic perspective (see Chapter 4). Other meanings are more particular to specific contexts, but may nonetheless be shared within a wider geographic and historical area (e.g. a shared Eastern European interpretation of Europe – see Chapter 5).

In order to construct the maximum variation sample, three broadly defined 'regions' within each country were selected based on size, regional identity and context, and/or 'ethnic' composition. Within these regions, people were contacted through local organizations such as schools, companies, universities, labour unions, elderly homes, and the different interviewer's (see below) social networks. From there, the sample was often expanded through snowball sampling. In total, around 10 people with a wide range of social backgrounds per region were interviewed. For all three countries combined, this

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[31] See the next section on how the maximum variation sample was achieved in the data collection.

approach eventually summed up to 95 in-depth interviews.[32] The age of interviewees ranged from 20 to 89, with an average age of 38. Gender was approximately evenly divided in the sample. Overall, when compared to population averages, the level of education is somewhat skewed in the sample in favour of a higher education. This is no doubt due to the empirical strategy used in gathering the data, as randomness in the selection of interviewees was not prioritized. Moreover, a starting point for the snowball sampling was regularly through the social networks of academics. Nevertheless, a sizable portion of the interviewees were not academically schooled, with several people having stopped their education after secondary school. I believe this to be sufficient to be able to compare varying backgrounds systematically, and where appropriate, the interviewee's educational background will be mentioned when presenting the analyses in the following chapters. For an overview of interviewees by location, please see the table below. A full list of interviewees along with basic demographic characteristics is provided in the appendix.

Table 2 - Overview of interviews by country and region (full list of interviewees in the appendix).

Estonia		**Italy**		**Netherlands**	
North-West	10	North	12	West	10
South	11	South	7	South	14
North-East	8	Centre	11	Centre & North	12
Total	**29**	**Total**	**30**	**Total**	**36**

[32] More interviews were conducted, but after evaluation of the quality of the report and transcript some of those were excluded from the data used for the analysis. Additionally, some interviews were conducted with multiple interviewees at the same time. In the overview below, these are counted as a single interviews, except when the interviewees were interviewed more or less after one another, but with the other interviewee present.

Figure 1 - Regional divisions within country cases.

The figure above shows the broadly defined regions in which interviews were conducted. Chapter 1 further details the relevance of selecting these countries and their political context during the period of data collection. The regions largely reflect not only geography, but in particular also regional identities and peculiarities. Estonia's North-East has a very high proportion of Russian speakers. Ida-Viru county, with its capital Narva has the highest proportion of Russophones: over 70% of the population.[33] It is located at the Russian border, and in the wider region a fairly high number of people are still stateless[34] following Estonia's independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This context has a large impact on local culture and the way Russian speakers are integrated in Estonian society (Marju Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002). Estonia's North-West, which includes the capital Tallinn, has a sizeable minority of Russophones as well, but it is economically much more developed. In the count above, the western islands Saaremaa and Hiiumaa are included in this group, although they are seen as culturally quite distinct from the mainland (and in particular from Tallinn). The South is often seen as Estonia's cultural heart, with the country's oldest university in Tartu and a major centre of folk events in Viljandi. Italy's North is economically the most developed region of the country, and it has a strong presence of the far-right and secessionist Lega Nord party. Moreover, in part of Italy's north, people speak minority languages and/or German instead of, or in addition to Italian. The Centre is seen by many as Italy's national core in terms of politics and culture. It includes Italy's capital Rome, and historically culturally

[33] Source: Statistics Estonia, retrieved from http://www.stat.ee/.

[34] Amnesty International reports the percentage of stateless people in Estonia at 6% of the population (source: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/estonia/report-estonia/).

influential cities like Florence. The South[35] has a degree of regional identity as well, and is economically weaker than its northern counterparts. In the Netherlands, finally, the West concentrates all major media, the country's main economic hub, and the centre of politics. It is also home to the majority of all inhabitants, who mostly live in the agglomeration of cities called the 'Randstad' which incorporates Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague, and more cities into a continuous urban area. The South is fairly populous as well, but is economically less developed. Here, local dialects and regional identities are seen as very important, and collaboration with Belgium and Germany is relevant due to the shape of its geography. Finally, the Centre & North area is less densely populated with more rural areas. In the north of that area, Frisian is an important local minority language.

Within each of the three countries, the sample consists of a wide variety of individuals in terms of age, education, and profession. There are several academics from each of the regions, as well as students, government employees, a number of truck drivers, some local politicians, veterans, stay-at-home mothers and fathers, unemployed people, high school teachers, and many others. They were mostly interviewed in Estonian, Italian, Dutch, and English, but a smaller number of interviews also took place in Russian, German, and local dialects.

Data Collection

Chronologically, the first interviews took place in Estonia (starting in early 2010), after that in Italy, and finally in the Netherlands (ending around mid-2014).[36] Estonia was chronologically the first field site, because the first phase of my data collection coincided with the introduction of the Euro in that country (the Euro went into circulation in Estonia on 1 January 2011), which seemed like an especially opportune moment to interview people about Europe and European integration.[37] Between all three of these data collection periods, there was a degree of overlap (i.e. the first Italian interviews were done before the last Estonian ones, and the last Italian ones after the first Dutch). The interviews were

[35] It should be noted that unfortunately, no interviews were conducted in Sardinia.

[36] A few additional interviews were conducted after this time.

[37] Before starting my fieldwork, I had read about controversy not only about the introduction of the Euro itself, but also its design (which is why it is included in the interview guide), which according to some groups in society (particularly ethnic Setos, but also some non-Seto Estonians) featured the incorrect borders of the Estonian state. This ultimately did not seem to be a significant issue for many of the interviewees.

conducted by myself and a fairly large team of local native speakers, all of whom were later-stage university students with an interest in the topic.[38] These interviewers volunteered to interview for the project, and (for lack of funding) were unpaid, in exchange for training and experience in doing qualitative in-depth interviews. That also means that some of the interviewers only did one or two interviews and then left the project. In total, 19 interviewers (excluding myself) collaborated on the project across the three countries. In all cases, I always conducted the first interviews in order to formulate and fine-tune the interview guide as best as possible. This instrument was then continuously refined through regular meetings with teams of interviewers and post-discussions about each individual interview in which we allowed the interview guide to evolve.

This rather experimental strategy was chosen in order to address the linguistic issue in doing qualitative research across multiple country cases. My own knowledge of Estonian and Italian (as well as Russian and German) was too limited to be able to sustain long, in-depth interviews. Considering the multiple languages involved in this project, even investing heavily in learning one of these languages to the point that complex, in-depth conversations could be had would only solve the problem partially (and would likely have taken more time than the project allowed). Methodologically, this strategy was a trade-off that to some extent sacrificed being able to personally delve deeper into individual interviews and contexts, for being able to cover a much wider range of cases, languages, and geography. For qualitative research, it is important to understand local contexts and cultures. Often, such an understanding builds through learning local languages, observations, and in interviews themselves. In the case of this study, I did not have the same opportunity to the same degree because of this methodological choice. This was a consciously weighed choice; realistically I could have learned at best one language sufficiently to conduct extended, qualitative interviews. Even if I had chosen that strategy, however, my understanding of those conversations (as a new, non-native speaker) would not have been on par with the understanding that trained interviewers who are native speakers would have. Differently put, some things may have gotten lost in translation due to the transcription and translation from the original languages into English, but in the alternative, more conventional strategy other information

[38] The interviewers are all mentioned by their full names in the preface.

would likely have been lost in translation at the point of data collection itself. In the current strategy, at least there was an opportunity to check my interpretation of the interviews with the interviewers themselves. For all interviews, this sort of 'post-discussion' was done with groups of interviewers and myself.

Moreover, in a more conservative strategy of thoroughly learning one language instead of collaborating for some of the interviews, a much narrower range of interviewees could have been included. This would have been problematic in Estonia, where a significant portion of the population speaks Russian, and to a lesser extent in the north of Italy, where some interviewees spoke German (or a regional language). Any comparison between cases, then, would have been one between the Netherlands and either Estonian-speaking Estonians or Italian-speaking Italians. I felt that this would misrepresent both of these countries in a European context where particularly those 'minority' language groups may have differing perspectives. This is particularly true for Estonia, where language and history intersect to form a deep and persistent rift within that society.

I did personally invest in learning some basic Italian and Estonian (if only to understand some key concepts and their contexts), but more importantly I consciously tried to compensate for this issue (1) by reading English language publications on the history, politics, and cultures of these countries, (2) by having extended conversations about these countries with local academics and other experts working on related issues, (3) by having informal conversations of varying lengths with local residents with whom I could speak English, (4) by attending various commemorative ceremonies and celebrations, and (5) by living in both countries for extended periods of time. Beyond this, I always conducted the first interviews in each country, in which I explicitly attempted to use those exchanges to also broaden my understanding of the local context. For Estonia and Italy, these interviews were in English, and usually with higher educated interviewees (because that demographic is more likely to be able to sustain a long interview in a foreign language). While this does not offer an unbiased perspective on the country case in question (higher educated people may have a particular worldview), I feel it did offer a sufficient basis for understanding that could then be complemented with the information retrieved through the other interviews conducted by student interviewers, and my efforts outlined above.

Moreover, mobilizing local students for interviewing was not just an effective solution to the language problem, but it also opened other doors for being sensitive to local context in the methodology in this research in at least three ways. First, these interviewers provided invaluable feedback and insights into the development of the interview guides, and they contributed greatly to my understanding of local contexts. In this way, they performed the role of 'key informants' (Tremblay, 1957). In some instances, they also helped with the translation of documents and interview guide elements. Second, they were excellently equipped to be sensitive to local contexts *during* interviews, which meant that, arguably, they may have picked up on certain aspects that might have been missed otherwise. Third, these interviewers were often instrumental in finding interviewees in order to balance the sample. They were asked to help out with reaching out to organizations and individuals to request interviews, and their own social networks were activated in order to find interviewees. In the latter case, if the interviewee and interviewer knew each other, we often decided to swap interviewees between different interviewers. To this end, local 'teams' were formed in various cities within which they could exchange leads on interviews. There was a local team of interviewers in (or centred around) Tartu, Narva, Trento, Florence, and so forth.

Organisationally, a website and email lists were set up specifically for this purpose. Through a secured member area on the website www.imagining.eu[39] all interviewers had access to information about the project, training materials, interview materials (the interview guide, closed questions, maps, and images), a pool where they could share leads on interviewees, a list of completed interviews within the project, and a form through which they could register potential and finished interviews.[40] The continuous registration of interviews through the website was important, because this served as a tool

[39] Alternatively through www.imaginingeurope.eu. Both have been taken offline by the web host at the time of writing due to a virus infection on the server (after data collection had finished). The data was unaffected by this as it was hosted elsewhere as well as stored locally and as a hardcopy.

[40] Technically, the systems that dealt with the data behind the scenes were Google docs for business (now rebranded as 'G Suite'), which was used for sharing documents, transcripts, and other files, and for exchanging messages, keeping track of interviews, and for setting up the individual email addresses and local and national email lists. Later in the data collection phase, the registration of interviews as well as recording some of the closed questions sections was transitioned to Qualtrics. All of these things were made accessible in a single place on the now defunct website at www.imagining.eu.

to have a running count of specific categories of interviewees in order to ensure the maximum variation sample. In this way, interviewers could see which 'kinds' of interviewees were most desirable (e.g. if most interviews were conducted with young people, they would try to find older interviewees), and I could directly approach the interviewers to ask them to conduct particular interviews. This approach ensured that the maximum variation sample was achieved.

Besides this website, all of the interviewers were provided with a complete package of interview materials and an email address (name.lastname@imagining.eu). This not only imbued them with a sense of professionalism, but particularly the email address was helpful in setting up email lists for all interviewees in each particular city, region, country, and across all three cases (I was a member of all email lists). Finally, regular collective and individual meetings were organized between the interviewers and myself (see above). Usually, these meeting were face-to-face, but on occasion also through video chat. During these meetings, experiences and findings were shared, and where necessary the interview guide was amended to reflect new insights. Questions and problems that arose during the fieldwork were also addressed in these gatherings.

Interviewers all had some background in topics related to the subject of this research project, but their experiences with doing (qualitative) research and interview techniques varied widely. For that reason, all interviewers were trained in small groups in each of the cities where a team was formed. These trainings involved at least two extensive meetings in all cases. The first meeting introduced the topic, the central research questions, and the methodological approach. Here, the interview guide was discussed and critiqued, and ideas and experiences between interviewers were exchanged. The second meeting centred on interviewing techniques. The goal of that meeting was to train the interviewers to be competent, independent interviewers who were familiar with techniques that can be applied during an interview to moderate the exchange and stimulate the interviewee. After this workshop, we reviewed the interview guide for this project again, and examined whether they were comfortable with the approach. Interviewers were encouraged to first 'practice' doing parts of the interview on a friend or family member, so that they would become more acquainted with the structure and aims of the interviews.

Looking back on this somewhat unusual strategy of collaborating with trained student interviewers, if I were to do a similar project again, depending on the exact research question, I might opt for a strategy where I indeed invest in learning one language in detail, and comparing only two specific (language) cases, or offer a thick description of one single case. While that would both narrow the possibilities for cross-case comparisons, and come with different risks for data quality as explained above, it would likely offer more opportunities for a more in-depth and detailed comparison. Here, the intentional strategy was favouring width of comparison over depth, which is equally atypical for most qualitative work, and because of this I risked experimenting with the empirical approach as well. As a result, the study is perhaps not a typical qualitative work in the tradition of mainstream qualitative social sciences, but should epistemologically rather be positioned in-between 'classical' qualitative and quantitative approaches (on a similar note, see the discussion on emic and etic perspectives above). As explained earlier, this is by definition a trade-off, and one that is bound to be uncomfortable for both qualitative and quantitative sociologists. At the outset of the project, however, my goals were explicitly to attempt an analysis on the level of individual interviewees; not *a priori* bounded together under the assumption of language or nation groups (even though the emic lived experiences of interviewees in many cases ultimately did follow such logics). Those goals, I felt, warranted this experimentation with the data collection approach. If one were to conduct a similar future study with the aim of covering both width as well as more depth in each particular case, the strategy would benefit further from immersing oneself even more in the local languages and cultures, and / or from collaborating in a team of senior (and funded) researchers working on the same topic in different country / language cases. Such a project would be able to aim at a similar or wider scope, but could address each of the cases in more depth. This project lacked the funding for such an endeavour, however, and as such I decided to emphasize a wider sample through this somewhat experimental empirical approach over a thicker description because of the reasons described above, and because earlier collaborative studies have already undertaken such comparisons (see, for example, Robyn (2005), Herrmann, Risse & Brewer (2004) or as a somewhat less direct comparison Bellier & Wilson (2000)).

Interview Guide

All of the interview were done on the basis of the same interview guide. The very first draft of this interview guide was informed by my earlier research on a similar topic in Poland (Moes, 2008, 2009a), but was changed to fit the current project better. Once the data collection phase started, I always conducted the first interviews in each case myself in order to become more familiar with the local context and with what appeared to be relevant topics. Once the local interviewers had started doing interviews, I met up regularly with each local team and individual interviewers, in which we examined not only the results of the interviews themselves, but also the interview guide as such. Each individual interview was followed up by a post-discussion between the interviewer and myself for the same two purposes. As a result, several additions and amendments were made during the period of data collection as interviewers and myself gained more insight into the topic, although the over-arching structure has remained the same throughout. In this way, the interview guide was allowed to evolve as it would in a scenario with a single principal investigator. Again, there is a trade-off in this approach, as I could not personally experience each interview (and therefore could not record more nuanced things such as body language, particular linguistic or facial expressions, etc., and ask follow-up questions as I might have done myself). In exchange, however, the pre-existing local knowledge of the interviewers, as well as their fluency in the language yielded insights that I might not have noticed myself. The post-discussions with the interviewers (in groups and as individuals) were also invaluable to 'test' my own interpretations against the understanding of people who had lived in those societies for all of their lives.

In addition to the training that interviewers received before starting their work, the interview guide itself repeats many of the most essential instructions as a kind of instruction manual. Besides this, interviewers were provided with several documents that outlined the project, the methodological approach, and included some instructions and tips for conducting interviews. Four main phases can be distinguished in the interview process (see the figure below): the introduction of the interview, the opening question, the core element of semi-structured, in-depth interviewing, and finally a closed questions section.

Figure 2 - Interview process.



Interviewers were instructed how they should perform the introduction, to make sure that interviewees were aware of the aims and objectives of the interview, and how their answers would be used. After that, they were advised on which kinds of questions would work well as opening questions. Such questions were meant to serve as a warming up, but also to immediately start talking about a topic that would be relevant to the topic at hand. The specific question was in principle left up to the interviewer to decide based on context and the interviewee's individual social position, but in many cases, the opening question had to do with travel behaviour of the interviewee. After this, the core element of the interviews commenced, which is the semi-structured interview. The interview guide for this (see Appendix A) is very structured, and includes many examples and suggestions for question phrasing. However, interviewers were actively encouraged to deviate from this, both in terms of literal phrasing as well as the linear structure in the guide. They were additionally urged to ask probing questions that were not in the interview guide. The structure and examples are in the guide primarily in order to give starting interviewers a sense of security and something to fall back on if they would lose track of the flow of the interview. According to their reports, this rarely happened, however, and their interviews generally flowed naturally in a semi-structured, conversational style. Once they got familiar with the interview

guide, they would often use the table of contents of the guide on its last page instead of the contents themselves.

As a result, the interview guide as shown in the appendix is much more expansive and structured than the actual practice of most interviews that were conducted. This is because interviewers were trained and instructed to follow the interviewees' responses through probing questions rather than to follow the script as shown in the guide itself. The guide is more detailed than this, however, to serve not only as a checklist of topics to address, but also so that it could be used as a training tool and a fall-back document in case interviewers would get 'stuck' during an interview. In my evaluations of the interviews with the interviewers, they reported back that they had very rarely actually used the document for this reason, however, but that it had given them more confidence and security knowing that it was there in case it would be necessary. Furthermore, several sections of the interview guide involved items relating to national identities. This was intentional, for two main reasons. First, I wanted to leave as much opportunity for interviewees to refer to Europe spontaneously (or not at all), without steering them too forcefully in that direction through the instrument itself. Second, Europe was often defined in relation to, or in terms of national identities, and vice versa.

The interview guide is reproduced in full in Appendix A.[41] Its contents came about based on my own literature review on the topic of European identity (see Chapter 2), as well as some of the questions that are asked in large-scale surveys such as Eurobarometer and the European Values Survey (see Chapter 6). It is also inspired by a smaller, earlier study I conducted amongst Polish higher educated youth (Moes, 2008, 2009a). After constructing the initial version of the interview guide, I discussed it with the interviewers and asked them for contextualized feedback. The resulting version was translated into the local languages (initially to Estonian), which was checked by a native speaker. After this, a first couple of interviews were conducted, after which the interview guide was amended to incorporate new insights from the field. This version was then used as the final version for that country.

The in-depth interview part also included a number of non-verbal probes in the form of various visual methods (see Banks, 2007; Frith, Riley, Archer, & Gleeson, 2005). This was an attempt to provoke

[41] Only one of the country's interview guides is represented, and in English. The versions in the local languages are very similar to the one in Appendix A.

responses that were less influenced by the phrasing of a verbal question. The aim was to let interviewees speak freely about their meanings associated with symbols and markers of identity without verbally predefining the framework within which the interviewee would have to answer (Bagnoli, 2009; Cram & Patrikios, 2015; White, 2009, 2010, 2011). In this way, some meanings of Europe and related concepts could be exposed that otherwise would have been difficult to express or even reveal in the first place. These visual cues consisted of photographs ('photo-elicitation', or 'photo-interviewing', Clark-Ibáñez, 2004; Harper, 1998, 2002; Vila, 2013), symbols, and occasionally tangible objects (old and new currencies, particularly in Estonia where the Euro had recently been introduced). Another visual approach to data collection that was employed in this study was a map drawing exercise that interviewees were asked to do (see also Copeland & Agosto, 2012; Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Wood, 2010; Zeigler, 2002). The interviewer brought with them a number of blank maps of Europe and a set of coloured pencils. After the interviewee had been warmed up in the interview, they would be asked to draw areas on the map as they saw fit. While they were doing so, and afterwards, they were probed as to why they drew certain lines in that way, and whether they thought that they would have drawn them differently under other circumstances (e.g. in the future, in the past).

Not all of these visual cues can be reproduced here without issue due to potential copyright claims. One example is shown below. This photograph (taken by me[42] in Riga, Latvia in 2007) shows a billboard with a tilted yellow Euro symbol on an otherwise red background. To illustrate, my interpretation of this image would be that it is a comment on the similarity between the Soviet Union and the European Union. When this image was shown to Estonians, older people would usually immediately recognize it as such as well, and would from there on out either agree or disagree with the sentiment. It was not uncommon for younger Estonians, however, to be somewhat puzzled by this image. In such cases, they would often look at it for a while, and then conclude that it resembles the Chinese flag (in which case the Euro sign remains puzzling, of course). Besides this and the maps described above (see Chapter 5 for an analysis of these maps), photographs of national and European flags were

[42] "A shocking thing happens in this interview format; the photographer, who knows his or her photograph as its maker [...] suddenly confronts the realization that she or he knows little or nothing about the cultural information contained in the image." (Harper, 1998, p. 35)

shown, images of symbolically loaded monuments and statues (i.e. ‘memory spaces’, or *lieux de mémoire* (Nora, 1989) such as the Estonian Bronze Soldier (Melchior, 2010; Melchior & Visser, 2011)), historical symbols (such as the logo of the Italian *Brigate Rosse*), and stills of specific videos were included.



Figure 3 – One of the visual cues used in all Estonian interviews, and in some Italian and Dutch interviews. Source: my photograph.

After the semi-structured interview had runs its course, and all of the core topics had been addressed, that part of the interview was closed, and interviewees were asked to answer a set of closed questions. Not all of the 95 interviews had enough time left to execute this step, and interviewers were instructed to prioritize the qualitative section over the closed questions if necessary. For the majority of interviews, however, the questionnaire was conducted. The goal of this addition to the interview was not to produce generalizable statistics. The sampling approach would not allow for this, and it is not the aim of this study. Instead, the questions were initially included with two goals in mind. First, they were meant to be used as individual data that would allow the interviewees to be placed in the context of existing large-scale survey data. This goal was later largely abandoned, because (A) the qualitative analysis developed in such a way that this expansion would detract from the main arguments more than it would add (see also Bryman, 2007). More importantly, (B) I would argue that the responses to these questions cannot

be directly correlated to statistics based on existing datasets, because it became clear that interviewees were primed differently for the closed questions in this study when compared to the original context of surveys like Eurobarometer. That is not to say that their responses to the questions are any less reliable, valid, or true, but the context within which questions are posed matters for what they answer (even within quantitative surveys, the order and mode of questioning has significant effects (Bowling, 2005; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000)). The second reason that these survey questions were included as part of the interview, was to have interviewees explicitly reflect on them, and to observe their reactions qualitatively. The analysis of this aspect is discussed in Chapter 6.

The closed questions section is reproduced in Appendix B. This is an English version that was used as a source document for translations into Estonian, Italian, and Dutch. For the translation of this part, a mixed approach was used. For the questions that were based on existing large-scale surveys such as Eurobarometer, such translations already exist. In those cases, the translated original was used. For other question, the phrasing was first translated from English to the local language, and then back to English by someone else. There was one question drawn from an Estonian survey, which was included as-is in the Estonian questionnaire, but translated twice in order to be included in the Italian and Dutch interviews.

There were 26 questions in the closed questions section (followed by a brief registration form to be filled out by the interviewer). Questions 1-8 all measure the support for the EU, identification with Europe / as European, and meanings associated with Europe. These questions in particular are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. Question 9 was about globalisation, and questions 10-12 inquired about the interviewee's political orientation (left-right, progressive-conservative, party preference specific to country). After those questions on identity and politics followed a section intended to measure interviewee's social networks. They were first asked to list up to five of their contacts with whom they talked about Europe (cf. Burt, 1984), or could imagine doing so in a name generator (Bidart & Charbonneau, 2011; Wellman, 1979). Basic characteristics of these alters were recorded (question 13), how the interviewee thought these alters felt about Europe, and whether this was the same as their own perspective (question 14) (cf. Killworth & Bernard, 1978), and finally which of these alters also know each other (question 15). This social network analysis (SNA) section was included as a fairly

experimental approach. The idea was to pay special attention to which effect the composition of the social network has on the conceptualization of Europe in terms of having 'non-national' contacts, languages used, and the nature of the tie (e.g. academic, professional, personal). While an SNA approach can certainly be promising in the study of European identity, this part of the data was later relegated to the background of the analysis in this study. The reasons for that are similar as those already outlined above. The main qualitative analysis eventually took precedence over this approach. More importantly, for a meaningful and reliable analysis of SNA data, this approach would need to be expanded along with a different approach to sampling.[43] This may be one fruitful avenue for future research on European identity, but in the current study this data serves as background data that occasionally informed some of the analysis, but never took centre stage. Finally, the closed questions section ended with questions 16 to 26, which all measured background characteristics of the interviewee (specifically: year of birth, gender, place of birth, place of birth parents, citizenship, nationality,[44] years of education, highest educational degree, current and past occupation, and language proficiency).

In sum, this empirical design yielded 95 interviews, each including an in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interview component, a qualitative visual approach (maps, images, symbols), a social networks component, and a set of quantitative questionnaire data. In hindsight, a less ambitious and narrower approach may have been a better strategy for the purposes of this study, because as the project progressed (and my naivety somewhat abided), it became clear that this was too much data to properly process within the confines of a single project of this scope. This meant that the hard decision had to be made to leave aside parts of the data that was collected for a potential future analysis (as described above), and to focus my attention on two of the four types of data. I considered the qualitative semi-structured interview data and the visual methods components to be the richest data, as well as the strongest contribution to existing research on this topic. This means that in the current text, the social network data and the quantitative questionnaire data only serve as context for the analyses of the two qualitative

[43] In the original plan for this study, such an expansion was indeed planned, where academics would be asked about their extended international networks, and those alters would be interviewed as well. This turned out to be too ambitious and outside of the core scope of this project.

[44] The distinction between citizenship and nationality was particularly relevant in Estonia, as explained earlier.

types of data. Based on the remaining qualitative data (semi-structured interviews and visual methods) from 95 interviews, the empirical chapters attempt to achieve a balance between over-arching analyses that prioritize general patterns on the one hand, and a degree of 'thick' detail where appropriate on the other.

Context

Before proceeding to a description of how the data was processed and analysed, a brief note on the context in which the data was collected is in order. During the course of the fieldwork, the European integration project entered a deep crisis. As a result of the intense media coverage in this period, the word 'crisis' has gotten very much entangled with economic and financial woes, but the crisis that is meant here goes much deeper. Between 2008 and around 2012, papers and television broadcasts were often mainly concerned with what is now called the 'Euro crisis', the austerity measures being put in place across the continent (especially in Greece), credit ratings, and new political and financial measures to keep the Euro as a currency intact. These issues took a different turn almost every other day, and their end result is still anyone's guess at the moment of writing. This project is concerned with the social dimension of all this turmoil. When trying to understand what 'Europe' means to people in a time like this, it is nigh on impossible to paint a static picture because the social impact of this turbulence may well be even more volatile than the markets and politics influencing it. Then again, social life is of course always dynamic, and perhaps in a sense, always in 'crisis'.

The etymology of the word 'crisis' lies in ancient Greek, where it comes from "to separate, to distinguish, to decide, to determine, to judge". As pointed out by Boldt, Stenius & Stråth (2012, p. 2), "[…] the Greek physician Hippokrates referred to the crises, which occur in diseases in exactly the moment when the disease either increases in intensity or begins to abate". This older connotation of 'crisis' is thus a tipping point rather than a necessarily negative and "[…] temporary malfunction of a perfectly well-balanced economic, social and political order" (Boldt et al., 2012, p. 3). Using that conceptualization of 'crisis', we should consider present-day Europe to be at a tipping point rather than at a temporary 'glitch' in an otherwise unchangeable political and social order. 'Crisis' as an openness to the future, rather than as a temporary disruption of the contemporary status quo. The current time is seen by some as a potential historic moment where European integration increases, or alternatively as

the point where its failure commenced. This applies to economy, politics, but especially also social life. The most recent event in this saga, the UK vote for 'Brexit' is a poignant reminder of that, and the precariousness of the European project continues into the foreseeable future.

Analysis

Out of the 95 interviews in this study, 80 were done by the 19 interviewers, and 15 by myself. The ones that I conducted were all done in English, Dutch, or Limburg dialect. The interviews were almost always recorded in full (depending on the interviewer and the willingness of the interviewee to be recorded), and transcribed. In the cases of Estonian, Russian, Italian, or German language interviews, the transcription was translated into English by the interviewers, and where relevant I have asked colleagues and friends in Estonia and Italy to translate and/or explain specific sections to me, which often provided additional context to the information. In addition, I met several times with academics in both countries who I felt would be able to shape my interpretation and understanding of the materials because they were natives to or experts on those countries and working on related topics.[45] Similarly, as described above, I organised very regular group meeting with the teams of local interviewers for this purpose, and I had post-discussions with each individual interviewer after every interview.

The interviewers were instructed to translate the transcription as closely as possible to the original language, and to include relevant original language quotations where appropriate (e.g. particular expressions) or when they were unsure how to translate something. Despite taking care in the translation process, such an approach remains a compromise. Each interview went through one or several steps of translation and, therefore, interpretation. Very few of the interviewees were native English speakers themselves (some were bilingual), and none of the interviewers (myself included) were. At the very least, therefore, 'translation' happened during the interview itself.[46] In most cases, additional layers of translation were added to this. In such a process, it needs to be mentioned that some aspects of the

[45] In particular, special thanks for this go out to Gemma Scalise, Anu Masso, Inge Melchior, Peeter Vihalemm, and Marju Lauristin for making time to discuss my ideas with them.

[46] It should be noted that alternatively, in a more conventional strategy, where the principal investigator learns the local language and conducts all of the interviews him/herself, information is likely often lost in translation due to an incomplete understanding of the deep cultural meanings of certain words or expressions.

original meaning may get lost in translation (Temple, 1997, 2005; Temple & Young, 2004). Moreover, despite training, coaching, and examples, the transcripts produced by interviewers occasionally varied quite a bit in terms of quality, scope, depth, and language interpretation/translation (and the extent to which they included excerpts in the original language where applicable). As mentioned earlier, some interviews were removed from the final analysis because of such issues.

The qualitative[47] data was entered into Atlas.ti in the form of interview transcripts and image files from the map drawing exercise. The analysis itself drew inspiration from the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), but was certainly not a full-fledged grounded theory study. Generally following Strauss' schematic for coding, the steps in this process were *open, axial,* and *selective* coding. Glaser and Strauss defined the procedure for coding in grounded theory in slightly different ways. For Glaser, the coding process involves two main procedures: *substantive* and *theoretical* coding, where substantive coding consists of two sub-phases: *open* and *selective* coding. The two definitions are not the same (for an extensive comparison, see Walker & Myrick, 2006), but for the sake of simplicity, I have distinguished the different phases in my analysis according to Strauss' open, axial, and selective coding schematic.

In practical terms, this meant that in the first step, or open coding, I first read all of the transcripts and assigned codes as they emerged from the data. On some occasions (when available), this included *in-vivo* quotes and codes in the original language. I approached the visual data (i.e. the drawn maps) in a similar way, adding codes when certain patterns and peculiarities emerged – both in the images themselves, and in the ways interviewees talked about them in the transcripts. Second, I arranged the codes that emerged from the data along 'axes of meaning' in the second step (axial coding). This meant that I looked for connections between codes, both from an emic (did interviewees suggest connections between certain topics?) and an etic (are there theoretical or conceptual connections between codes?) perspective. For this, I constructed and used 'supercodes' (as Atlas.ti calls them) to group and relate different codes into a relational hierarchy. Third, and finally, during the selective coding phase I approached the transcripts and maps again, but from a more theoretical and conceptual

[47] The quantitative data that was gathered was entered into a database using Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) as a tool for data entry.

perspective. Now, the coding did not emerge *from* the data itself, but rather theoretical codes were selectively found *in* the data.

The selective coding centred around a limited number of core concepts and themes, which form the basis for the three empirical chapters that follow, and the theoretical concepts that are introduced there. Chapter 4 looks at different typologies of Europeans (Favell & Recchi, 2011, p. 68) that I distinguished in the data, in terms of the different relationships that interviewees had towards Europe. Chapter 5 examines people's geographic imaginations (Aase, 1994; Monnet, 2011; Adrian Smith, 2002), and the subdivisions that exist within European space (or 'Euroscapes'). To a large extent, this chapter is based on the maps exercise, but also on related codes that emerge from the interview transcripts. Chapter 6, finally, examines how 'Europe' and the EU are conceptually related. It does so by looking at what interviewees meant by both notions, and by examining the way the closed questions were interpreted, and what such questions might actually measure. Where interviewees are directly quoted, their names are pseudonyms.

Chapter 4 – Imagining Europe: A Typology

Europe can be described as being in a 'post-national' condition (Blokker, 2008; Calhoun, 2004; Deflem & Pampel, 1996; Habermas, 2001; Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002). This is not to say that national identities or nation-states have become wholly irrelevant – quite the contrary. National identity is still reported as the most dominant collective identity by a sizeable majority of Europeans (e.g. Citrin & Sides, 2004; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Dupoirier et al., 2000), public political debate takes place at the level of the nation-states or below (van Elsas et al., 2016; Helbling et al., 2010; Kriesi, 2007; Taggart, 1998; Trenz, 2006), and public spheres very rarely truly transcend the borders of the European states (Díez Medrano & Gray, 2010; Risse, 2010a, 2010b). In all of these important aspects of social and political organization, the nation staunchly remains the dominant frame of reference for most.

Historically, there have long existed specific groups who did not share a more local frame of reference, and instead subscribed to a wider conception of 'their' world. Such cosmopolitan dispositions can be traced back to ancient Europe, as Mathisen (2006, p. 1012) points out:

> The Cynic Diogenes, […] stated that he was "a cosmopolite": "a citizen of the world." The Stoics believed that the whole world constituted the only true city, whose citizens were of necessity "good" people. In the Roman Empire, […] the Stoic philosopher Epictetus likewise spoke of being a "citizen of the world." Even the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius (161–180) called himself a "citizen of the world-city," opining that "under its laws equal treatment is meted out to all."

Similarly, nobility and (upper-class) scholars from the late middle ages onwards would undertake a 'Grand Tour' across Europe, which was seen as an educational rite of passage. This tradition continued until the introduction of railroads and mass tourism. Such a democratization of European and

cosmopolitan experiences has continued since through mass media, the European welfare state, growing economies, and indeed the advent of nation-states themselves. In the past decades, rapid globalisation, decreasing costs of travel, and the internet have pushed the accessibility of such experiences even further.

In parallel, the way people imagine their world, and their emphatic circles have continuously expanded (Rifkin, 2004, 2009). While a worldview that transcended the family was offered by the tribe, one that transcended the tribe was offered by fiefdoms, kingdoms, and later culminating in nations and the nation-state. Political and economic European integration has potentially brought about another step in this development. That is not to say that the EU is necessarily the first of its kind to offer the potential for a democratized 'post-national' frame of reference.[48] More importantly, 'Europe' is not necessarily the next step in an evolutionary and teleological path towards a global identity of all people, leaving behind all previous allegiances. Reality is more complex than that. First, previous worldviews and identifications are not abandoned, but instead complemented. National identities did not eliminate the earlier local identities completely (though they did change them significantly, and changed their relevance and salience in many – though not all – cases). Second, any such expansion of human frames of reference is only relevant given specific contexts. Regional identities are often irrelevant within a city or within a family. National identities are usually not salient or explicit within the nation (Billig, 1995). Similarly, the European frame of reference is only a factor within the appropriate context, and, like national identities, may normally be implicit and banal (Cram, 2001, 2009). A straightforward example of such a context in which 'being European' can become relevant is an individual travelling outside of Europe. Beyond that, it can also become relevant and salient when distinguishing between groups within one's own social network or society, or in politics.

The social dimensions of European integration fit into a larger globalisation of identities and worldviews, and as such they are not clearly bounded by the EU or even geographic Europe itself. Changes in global communication technologies and particular platforms within that (such as Youtube or Facebook) facilitate these transitions and act as a catalyst for young people to learn one or more linguae francae (usually English, in the case of Europe), to consume global cultural products (mostly

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[48] The Soviet Union can be considered as another such experiment, for example, though it had a very different historical development and was more explicitly based on the model of the nation-state and centralized power

western in the case of Europe), and to connect to other individuals who are like them, or like whom they aspire to be. Such perceived similarities may or may not align with pre-existing identities, borders, and political allegiances. In the case of Europe, this can mean that people who connect with others in this way indeed do connect to other Europeans. They are seen to share certain hard to describe values, norms, and ways of thinking. These perceived similarities are not limited to exclusively fellow Europeans, and may include people from very different corners of the world. Moreover, the types of networks these people form are not uniform in that some will prefer to form ties to other people who are in the same nation-state, or even region as them, while others have a strong preference for people from more remote locations (or location becomes wholly irrelevant).

With each of these expansions of people's frame of reference in Europe, new positions within pre-existing identity dimensions emerged. Considering that previous allegiances and worldviews were not supplanted but instead amended by these extensions of consciousness, different people would inhabit different stances within the new social realities. As an example, in the Renaissance, Florentine banking families such as the Medici may have entertained social ties to others well outside of their realm, and the way in which they conducted their business and exerted their power suggests a frame of reference that was not constricted to the Florence city walls (Padgett & Ansell, 1993). However, if we imagine what life was like for their local servants, or the Florentine manual workers of the time, we would expect a much more geographically bounded imagination of the world. Different views on the social horizons implied different ways of seeing the world, and indeed different ways of identifying with collectives.

In present-day Europe, relative economic inequality is still very much present, but access to experiences that may inform such a worldview has been democratized significantly due to absolute increases in income (and decreasing prices for transport), quick and easy access to information from all around the world, widespread knowledge of the dominant lingua franca (English) across social classes, the possibility for political participation, and open borders. Most of these changes occurred very rapidly, over the course of a few generations or less. As a result, the positions that people take on in terms of their worldviews have not yet crystallized completely. While it may be tempting to think of this social history as static, shifts in such frames of reference cannot have been instantaneous at any point in history. Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1976), for example, details the gradual change in 19th and early

20th century France from local languages and identities towards a greater emphasis on French national language and culture. Today, France is considered a textbook example of the construction of national identity by many, but there have been many generations since these political and territorial changes, and there remain significant and salient elements of local identity nonetheless.

Similarly, on a European level, changes in communication technology, politics (European integration), and territory (Schengen), have not immediately created Europeans with a European frame of reference and identity. Instead, different people inhabit varying positions in terms of their "being within the world" (Billig, 1995, p. 65), and these differences depend on many factors. Power and social class have an influence, but so do family customs, politics, language, labour, and travel experiences. In parallel to the various identity and worldview positions that were born out of earlier shifts in politics and territory, such stances have not yet fully crystallized with the arrival of a democratized potential for a European (or perhaps cosmopolitan) frame of reference. They may in fact never fully crystallize, as many local identities (of regions, cities, etc.) still hold varying degrees of potential for salience today, be that in conjunction with other identities, or in opposition to them. These different ways of crosscutting identifications and worldviews vary not only by region or nation, but also across social groups within such regions. In the same way, European identity, or at the very least a degree of having 'Europe' as one's frame of reference varies not only by nation or by whether or not one supports political projects for European integration, but also along other axes.

In the sections below, a typology (Favell & Recchi, 2011, pp. 67-68; Hopf, 1991; Psathas, 2005; Załęski, 2010) of ways in which Europe has become – or is in the process of becoming – part of people's frames of reference is offered. While an attempt is made to provide as many different perspectives as possible based on the empirical data in this project, this cannot be considered an exhaustive classification of all *possible* ways in which Europe has or has not become part of people's worldviews. Moreover, the importance of 'Europe' in the way people imagine their place in the world is subject to constant change, as has been argued above. By its very definition, therefore, this analysis is very much an overview of *contemporary* worldviews in Europe from the perspective of the people who were interviewed for this study. The political and social realities of Europe change every day, and the European integration project itself – which has a significant impact on how people see Europe more broadly (see Chapter 6) – is

continuously going through its own crises. From the global recession during the late 2000's, the ensuing Greek debt crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the rise of populist right-wing movements across the continent, several terrorist attacks, and the Brexit referendum, all of such events can have a major impact on how people see their own place in the world, and what position Europe or the EU takes within that. Regardless of these limitations, the analysis below aims to map the landscape of ways in which people relate to this notion of 'Europe', and what it means to them. It attempts to contribute to an understanding of how such meanings are embedded in wider worldviews, and what the most important dissimilarities between types are. It is imperative to note that these are not intended to represent types of individuals, but rather types of discursive practices and symbols that people resort to when trying to express the nuances of their relationship towards Europe. This means that typically, no individual interviewee can neatly be confined to any singular 'typology' below. Instead, these are the discourses they may appeal to under various circumstances, and that collectively make up the ways in which Europe can be imagined in their exchanges about the subject. Differently put, the discussion below is intended as a typology of 'ideal type' imaginations of Europe; not a typology of empirically real citizens of Europe. Nonetheless, in my presentation below, I will describe 'ideal type' individuals that represent such imaginations.

A Typology of Worldviews: Axes of Meaning

The typology provided below can be simplified along two main axes in order to make it clearer how different worldviews compare to each other (see the figure below). Here, the horizontal axis is arranged according to the extent to which one's worldview takes on a more cosmopolitan perspective – at the extreme end *instead* of national frames of reference[49] – versus an *exclusively* national frame of reference. The vertical axis represents people's *diffuse* (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002) attitudes towards European integration. Support for European integration can also take forms that do not support the European

[49] Note that Beck's view on cosmopolitanism explicitly does not disqualify national identities (Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007). The focus here, however, is on people's frame of reference, or their sense of "being within the world" (Billig, 1995, p. 65).

Union as it stands, but instead would prefer to see alternative forms of European integration (i.e. *diffuse* support for integration, but *specific* opposition to the EU (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002)).

Figure 4 - Axes of Meaning



The four extremes in the figure above represent the theoretical ideal types at the end of the spectrum, and how they are understood here is described in the following section. The types in the figure are not the most *common* types, however. In this chapter, three main types are discussed: *Nationals*, *Situational Europeans*, and *Cosmopolitan Europeans*. These three types are schematically indicated in the figure above to reflect their typical position along the axes. Between these, the Situational Europeans' imaginations are likely dominant in most European countries. In the figure above, the diverse spectrum within that category inhabits the space in-between the four extremes.

The typology described below emerged from the analysis of the data as different frames of reference in relation to the nation and Europe (see Chapter 3). All three of the main types are themselves very diverse in reality, and any name used to describe them as a group will be somewhat of a misnomer for some people within that type. Nevertheless, the sub-types in each of the three main categories share at least some characteristics that make their grouping analytically useful. The first type is labelled the 'Nationals'. This category can include some frames of reference that focus on the sub-national level, as

well as alternative views that extend towards regions outside of the nation-state that are perceived as culturally similar. In all cases, these sub-categories share that the nation is a dominant concept in how people construct their world. The second type is in many ways at the polar opposite of such worldviews and is referred to as the 'Cosmopolitan Europeans' below. Here too, there are varying sub-categories that range from people with a clearly European frame of reference to those with a global frame of reference or no territorially defined frame at all. Finally, the third type characterizes all people who are more nationally oriented on some issues or in some contexts, but more European in other scenarios. Considering that the nation is almost always more salient than Europe in these worldviews, but Europe is nonetheless an integral part at least some of the time, we might call this category the 'Situational Europeans' (Fligstein, 2008, 2009).[50] They share that Europe is always present as some factor in people's worldview, but is not usually the dominant force. For some, Europe can be a positive marker of their identities (affective), while for others they accept Europe's relevance to them more reservedly (instrumental). Statistically, surveys suggest that this category is perhaps the most populous in most European countries, although such survey data can be problematic as a direct comparison here due to the way the underlying questions were posed (see Chapter 6). Fligstein, looking at Eurobarometer data, argues that "if the right issue comes along, 56% of people will favor a European solution to a problem. If all of the situational Europeans remain true to their national identity, 87.3% of people will be anti-European" (2009, p. 140). Risse sees these figures as evidence that European identity is not very deeply ingrained for this group of people, but that it is widespread (Risse, 2010a, pp. 61-62). Still, "almost half of people who live in Europe never think of themselves as Europeans" (Fligstein, Polyakova, & Sandholtz, 2012, p. 110), and the economic crisis of the late 2000s has tipped this balance to over 50% of the population (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016).

The Eurobarometer question[51] that these numbers are based on may not reveal the full picture, however, because questions like these "do not tell us much about the content of people's European identity but rather the extent to which they have integrated the European idea in their biography, thus

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[50] Or, as Risse (2010a) calls them, "European lite".

[51] *"In the near future, do you see yourself as… / Nationality only / Nationality and European / European and nationality / European only"*.

ignoring the complexity of the concept of European identity" (Hanquinet & Savage, 2011, p. 8). While I agree with this criticism (see Chapter 6), it is nevertheless helpful to show the most recent development of the Eurobarometer question that Risse (2010a, pp. 40-41) and Fligstein (2008, pp. 140-143; 2009, pp. 139-140; Fligstein et al., 2012, pp. 109-111; Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016) base their 'European identity lite' and 'Situational Europeans' on. This should provide some context for the ensuing discussion of the different types in this chapter. The figure below shows these figures for the period between 1992, when this question was first introduced, until the most recent Eurobarometer (85.2) data from May 2016 (European Commission, 2016b).[52]

Figure 5 - National and European identities, EU, 1992-2016. "In the near future, do you see yourself as…? Source: Eurobarometer.



While the general patterns in this chart are generally fairly stable, it is worth noting that since 2011 the number of people who say that they see themselves as 'national and European' in the near future has

[52] The data for 1992-2014 was retrieved from the European Commission's website: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/41/groupKy/206, and then combined with the latest GESIS data repository data for 2015 and 2016 (European Commission, 2016b).

overtaken the number of people who say that they will feel 'national only'. The fieldwork for this study took place between 2010 and 2014, and in three particular country cases. Those three countries show a somewhat different pattern on how people answered this question, as is shown in the figures below.

Figure 6 - National and European identities, Estonia, 2005-2016. "In the near future, do you see yourself as...? Source: Eurobarometer.



Figure 7 - National and European identities, Italy, 1992-2016. "In the near future, do you see yourself as...? Source: Eurobarometer.



Figure 8 - National and European identities, Netherlands, 1992-2016. "In the near future, do you see yourself as...? Source: Eurobarometer.



In Estonia (note that its horizontal axis ranges from 2005-2016 instead of 1992-2006), people who call themselves 'national and European' have only recently outnumbered those who call themselves 'national only.' In the most recent surveys, this trend appears to reverse. For Italy, the two largest categories fluctuated more during the same period. This may be reflective of a turbulent political period and the aftermath of the economic crisis (see Chapters 1 and 3). The Netherlands, finally, have been relatively stable since 2004, though the widening gap between 'national only' and 'national and European' may echo an increased political entrenchment of those who are against European integration, and those who oppose it (see Chapter 1). At the end of the interview, after first having discussed the topic in a semi-structured interview phase (see Chapter 3), the interviewees in this study were also asked the same question, along with several other often-used survey questions (see Chapter 6 and Appendix B). It should be stressed that this phase of the interview was not the basis for the current chapter. Instead, the qualitative interview phase that preceded it forms the empirical material here. Consequently, the structure used in this chapter was not determined by the closed questions at the end of my interviews or in the Eurobarometer surveys, but instead emerged as a classification based on the qualitative interview materials.

As discussed in Chapter 2, identification always takes place in relation to something else, and it is therefore contextual. Moreover, collective identities are often ambivalent and can be hybrid. This complexity means that none of the categories that are proposed below are inhabited by the same groups of people all of the time. Similarly, most single individuals will not fall neatly and continuously within any of these categories, and even in the context of one interview, several of these perspectives were sometimes invoked. The process of identification is by definition dynamic and dialectical, and so an individual who is 'doing' the identifying will travel between generally adjacent categories in the overview below. In addition, considering that identification happens in context, the contexts evoked during an interview tend to be varied (depending not only who the interviewer is perceived to be in relation to the interviewer, but also on the topics and specific questions that are being discussed), so within a single

interview, people may switch between different aspects of their sometimes seemingly incoherent narratives and identities.

Below, the three main types are described as ranges running along their constituent sub-types. The section starts with the Nationals, moves on to Situational Europeans, and ends with Cosmopolitan Europeans. Within each type, the elements of that narrative that are especially salient or relevant are discussed. More space is devoted to describing the Nationals than the other two types. This is because for European identity, this particular group is comparatively under-examined. In many studies on this topic, the focus is naturally on who identifies with Europe; where it *is*. It is equally valuable, however to draw attention to where it *is not*.

Nationals

The Nationals type ranges from what I label *cisnationals* through the *regionalists*, to the *open nationals*. Both the regionalists and the open nationals share much of the core narrative of the cisnationals, but with usually small amendments. By using the term cisnationals, I refer to those individuals who *only* have the nation-state as their frame of reference and nothing else. By simple analogy, in the 'marble cake' model for European identity (Herrmann et al., 2004a; Risse, 2010a, see also Chapter 5), the cisnationals would be those people on the ends of the cake, where one of the flavours has not set in, and the entire slice is chocolate (or vanilla). It is doubtful how prevalent such a view still is in contemporary Europe, but as a reference category it serves as a logical starting point. The term *cis*nationals is used here as opposed to the more broadly used concept of *trans*national. The prefix *cis*-, or 'on this side of', is the Latin antonym for *trans*-, and is used here in a similar way as the word pair cisgender and transgender and the ancient Roman Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine Gaul.[53] Where a transnational perspective looks across borders, a cisnational view considers only 'this side of the border' (from the perspective of the bearer of such a worldview). By limiting descriptions to using words like *trans*national, *multi*national, and *inter*national, an implied assumption is that 'national' is the default baseline, and the starting point for identifications of this order. This in itself is a form of methodological (or rather, conceptual) nationalism, and may conceal part of the ways in which people construct their identities and imagined

[53] 'Gaul on this side of the Alps' and 'Gaul across / on the other side of the Alps.'

communities in their day-to-day life. By instead using *cis*national to describe those individuals who *only* see the nation-state they were born in (or got citizenship from at birth) as their way of being in the world (Billig, 1995), it becomes possible to emphasize the fact that this is one particular way of shaping one's identity.

In the European context, a majority of people consistently state that they identify with more than one of these social constructs (e.g. both Europe *and* their nation-state; or both their nation-state *and* their local region). The 'only-nationals', or cisnationals are in fact likely a statistical minority.[54] By using 'national' as the root for words like international, multinational and transnational when discussing collective identities that transcend the nation-state, a problematic assumption is made that those who are *not* inter-, multi-, or transnational are uniformly 'national'. In terms of identities and worldviews, this is not necessarily the case. There can be a wide gap between those who consider their nation to be the only relevant context, but are nevertheless open to collaboration with, and empathy towards external 'Others', and those who are *only* concerned with their national context. Ignoring such nuances can lead to focusing on the same questions and groups of people when it comes to European identity. A lot of attention has rightly been paid to the likely carrier groups (Kohli, 2000) of European identity (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Kuhn, 2011, 2012b, 2015; Mau et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2015; Moes, 2009; Sigalas, 2010; Wilson, 2011). Such studies are indeed essential for understanding what a European identity may look like, but conclusions on these groups do not necessarily translate to the numerically largest group of Europeans: those with a *predominantly* national outlook.

Incidentally, using cisnational as a distinct category from national (which for all intents and purposes is for many people and contexts in Europe closer to state citizenship) makes it possible to include in the discussion the differences in identification between what is conventionally called 'native' populations in Europe versus the experiences that people of migrant descent have. This is not to say that cisnational identities are therefore the exclusive domain of stereotypical 'natives' of a nation-state, or that it is in any way an ethnic description. People of migrant descent, but with the national citizenship

[54] The answer to the Eurobarometer question *"in the near future, do you see yourself as…?"* as described above, is interpreted here to be a question on explicit, conscious identification; not their frame of reference, or 'being in the world'. Such frames of reference can be wider than identities, though logically not narrower.

they also identify with (e.g. a German-born German with parents of Turkish descent who identifies as a German and *only* a German) can also express a cisnational identity. The *contents* of cisnationality do not have to be the same for each individual identifying in this way – similar to how transnational identities do not have to mean the same to each individual who expresses a transnational identity (see also Mau, 2010).

To illustrate the cisnational perspective, in the interviews, those who followed such a narrative, particularly emphasized their desire to preserve and protect national culture and language. Europe, along with globalization, to them presented a threat to that, and led to considerable frustration about being unable to stop this tide of changes to what was seen as 'authentic' national culture. To these interviewees, this was not only a matter of national pride, but also a culturally pragmatic concern. Often, this was expressed in a fear for losing one's language. As Rasmus, one of the Estonian interviewees said:

> My mother-tongue is Estonian. I'm only able to think in Estonian and I can understand specific linguistic nuances only in Estonian. Nothing satisfies me as much as reading Estonian literature. Not because it would be good [literature], but because I'm able to move along with the vibes ['*ma olen võimeline nende võngetega kaasa minema*'] and I don't want to live in constant translation ['*pidevalt tõlkes elada*'] – in an intermediate identity. As somehow incomplete.

National language and culture was presented as an endangered species in these narratives, which if left unprotected from European integration and globalization would go extinct. This was also the phrasing used by Luuk, a Dutch truck driver, who felt that the Dutch way of doing his job was going extinct due to Polish truck drivers 'taking over the business', and doing the work in a less authentic way. This truck driver, and several of his colleagues, felt largely powerless against these changes. One strategy that often came up in Estonia, was that people would make a point of only buying nationally produced products, if they had the choice. Interestingly, during my period of fieldwork in Estonia, it was common for such products to be clearly marked with a small Estonian flag on the packaging. Some supermarkets in Tartu at the time had aisles organized by where they were produced. While many Estonian interviewees stated

that they would "definitely" prefer Estonian-made products, most were pragmatic. When asked whether they looked for Estonian products in supermarkets, one interviewee said: "Yes, but in some cases I would prefer a product from some other country. For example, I would be rather sceptical if I would see an Estonian flag on an orange". Given the choice, Estonian products were seen as healthier and more natural: "I like national, home products. I buy Estonian products, because they are natural". Dutch interviewees never raised a similar point, but one Italian interviewee did feel that "I want my products to be genuine. I would always buy an Italian product. If there is none, I would avoid buying one from Eastern Europe.[55] Maybe I would buy from Germany, France. Spain would be ok." For most other Italian interviewees, buying products from particular places was not a matter of national pride or protection. Food was always a particular concern, and many preferred Italian food produce, but not because of explicit national attachment.

Luuk, the Dutch truck driver above – as well as his co-workers – often referred to immigration from Eastern Europe. This was a recurring theme in the cisnational perspective in the Netherlands. Here, views on immigration fell into two broad categories, depending on where migrants came from and how they were seen to relate to the nation. While immigration from 'Islamic countries' was seen as a threat to culture, language, and religion within the cisnational narrative, 'Eastern Europeans' were generally not. In the Netherlands, the populist, xenophobic, and (since 2012 at least) Eurosceptic PVV (see Chapter 3) was often (but not always) the political party that they said they would vote for. In the interviews, if they stated their political orientations to begin with, they would often refer to the rhetoric of this party and its leader, Geert Wilders. This party has long had an anti-establishment, and particularly anti-Islam agenda (Kemmers, van der Waal, & Aupers, 2016), but since around 2012 their focus has expanded to a more explicitly anti-European platform. This shift went hand in hand with a negative portrayal of Eastern Europeans, who were seen as emblematic for the trouble that the EU had caused the nation. However, in the interviews, this type of immigration was usually not seen as very problematic, mostly because the stereotypical 'Polish plumber' was not considered an interference of

[55] Asked why he would not buy Eastern European products, he answered *"Non mi ispira"* ('that does not inspire me' / doesn't do anything to me).

national culture and language, and they 'kept to themselves'. When asked about Eastern European immigrants, Thomas, a Dutch interviewee, said:

> No, I don't know of any. I have heard stories, but that's just stories, right. You see, we once had a refurbishment of our home, and those [construction workers] were people from Poland. But yeah, those worked from early morning until late in the evening half past nine, and they would go back home [to Poland] on Friday night. Those were just hard workers.

The perceived transitory presence, and thus the non-interference of 'Polish' people in the Netherlands was key to the cisnationals' acceptance; not their Europeanness (see Chapter 5). As another interviewee said: "But Polish people don't come here to stay, I think. They come and spend the night, for a job, and then they leave again." In Estonia, cisnational discussions on immigration were usually directed at Russians, but the presence of the Russian minority in Estonia has different historical complexities associated with it (Kalmus et al., 2004; Marju Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002; Melchior, 2010, 2015; Melchior & Visser, 2011; Rausing, 2004; Trimbach & O'Lear, 2015; Wulf, 2016). Or rather, *minorities,* plural, as the 'Old Believers' – a community of Russian Orthodox along Lake Peipsi – are seen as a distinct Russophone community from the Russian-speakers who migrated to the area during the Soviet Union period. These are typically seen as a peculiar part of the Estonian nation: "for them the ethnicity [*sic*] doesn't seem to matter. They speak Estonian well.", as one interviewee phrases it, highlighting language again as something that is not threatened by this particular group. Sofia, a 25-year-old from Tallinn, mentions the Old Believers' isolated presence:

> It's a community very much based on tradition. They have been there, it's a close community. While in Narva, it's actually, it's a town. But this [Old Believers] is like a fairy-tale town to me. […] It's not connected to anything else in Estonia.

For Estonian cisnationals, the Russophones in Estonia who arrived during the Soviet period and their descendants *were* seen as a potential threat to national culture and language, unless they would assimilate

into Estonian national culture. As Oskar, a 51-year-old real-estate agent from one of Estonia's islands said:

> If a person really wants to live here, then he is able to integrate [into Estonian society]. […] They have to acknowledge that we have the Estonian state here and if they don't like it – though it's cruel to say it like that – they can go back. If they think that it's Russia here. Because it is not Russia here. But the people who have acknowledged that they live in the state of Estonia can do really well. And the people who don't want to live here... Well, they don't want to live anywhere.

In a similar vein, Reeta, an Estonian woman in her late 30s that was born in the South of the country, but now lived in Russophone-dominated Narva, had decided to take up this issue herself:

> I was born in South Estonia, and now I live in Narva. I feel very proud living in Estonia. I have never been ashamed of it. This is a great country, I feel good here. I am a citizen of Estonia and I don't have any other citizenships. I am Estonian by nationality.[56] I also feel good living in Narva. I'm on a mission here. I know I can bring Estonia closer to local people who don't always feel the connection with Estonia.

Cisnationals demanded full cultural assimilation into 'their' nation in terms of culture, language, and politics – or complete non-interference. While Eastern Europeans fell into the latter category for the Dutch cisnationals, this was seen as very different for immigrants from outside of Europe, particularly from 'Islamic countries'. Amongst cisnationals, this was universally seen as a negative phenomenon, and as a threat to national culture. As one Northern-Italian interviewee said: "for religion mainly. Honestly I don't see how Muslims could integrate in our lifestyle. There is this barrier. We could of course say the

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[56] In Estonia, citizenship and nationality are expressed through a variety of concepts with different connotations. *Eestimaalane* technically refers to everyone who resides in Estonia, *Eesti kodanikud* refers to Estonian citizens, and *Eestlane* refers more generically to Estonians. These terms are often loaded with connotations in the debate around the Russian minority in the East.

same thing about northern Africans." In Italy, but even more pronounced in the Dutch interviews, such narratives were almost always directed against immigrants from what they saw as 'Muslim' countries (in line with the longer-term PVV rhetoric). As Thomas said:

> And what made me afraid, or, well, afraid… This happened to me recently. I was in [a multi-ethnic, low socio-economic neighbourhood of the city], and I had to leave my bike there. And [neighbourhood] is of course one of the *Vogelaarwijken*[57]. Then you have to consider whether you can park your bike there safely. And then I heard youth talking behind me. And then I thought, ah, Moroccans. And then I looked, and they were just normal Dutch, but they spoke like Moroccans. That truncated [type of speaking]. And I think that is scary, or I don't think that is normal. But the boy next door to us, he also speaks like that, and he is just a normal Dutch boy. Then I say, how is that possible? Is that an influence from school, from television?

Here, language and cultural threat intersect. Thomas' view shows that the perceived cultural threat is not merely one of presence of such Others, but more importantly the impact that this presence is seen to have on national culture. This national culture, in the cisnational view, ought to remain authentic and unchangeable. Like language, religion was a cultural marker that was consider to be under threat of such change, even for those who considered themselves non-religious.[58] These fears were expressed in reference to a deeper cultural change of the presumed 'Christian foundations' of the nation, but also in terms of the urban landscape (see also Delanty & Jones, 2002 on the relationship between architecture and (European) identity), as another Dutch interviewee expressed:

> **Interviewee:** Yesterday I noticed that they are building another mosque. All of the churches are being shut down, every church is turned into a sports venue or library. And maybe it will pass

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[57] One of 40 neighbourhoods identified by minister Ella Vogelaar in 2007 as problem areas, and listed for urban renewal programmes, but now a term synonymous with lower-class, multi-ethnic neighbourhoods.

[58] In a 2010 Eurobarometer survey, 30% of Dutch, 29% of Estonians, and 6% of Italians said that they "don't believe in any sort of spirit, God, or life force". Respectively, 28%, 18%, and 74% said that they "believe there is a God" (source: Special Eurobarometer 341 / Wave 73.1).

someday for these people [Muslims], but they are a lot more fanatical about their beliefs, of course. Earlier, when I was on my way here, I saw one of those women in a burqa. Well, I cannot imagine.

Interviewer: Do you believe that this changes the Netherlands?

Interviewee: Yes, It scares me when I see white girls suddenly walking around in one of those veil things [*'sluierding'*].

Similarly, a Dutch public servant in his 50s felt that the government and public places facilitated or even promoted these cultural changes by catering too much to 'alternative' cultural expressions and language:

> I can see that back at my parents' place. My mother has a laptop, but for that generation… But, then you often hear that, when one of those foreigners [people of non-European descent] comes to a helpdesk [at the municipality's offices], that they *are* getting assistance. More help. [Sarcastically:] For that they have institutions. And also the informational leaflets they have. [Sarcastically:] Those *have* to be in all of those [non-European] languages. And I wonder, if I would go to other countries, I don't think it would be that way over there. The best example, because I regularly go to the swimming pool, is that they have burqa swimming one evening per week. So they organize something especially for Muslims. Then they have to darken the whole place with black plastic, and they can only have female staff members.

Europe, and European integration represented a similar cultural threat to the nation in the cisnational view. While this influence was seen as less direct and immediate, here too, this was seen as an unnecessary influence that would eat away at the authentic and unchangeable culture of the nation over time. European integration, to them, was a force of homogenization, and they did not see any value in such cultural exchange or cultural blending. According to Estonia's Oskar: "I think the differences should be accepted. Not everything can be blended together [*'kõik ei saa päris ühenäoliseks minna'*]." This included political changes that may otherwise serve an instrumental value: "open borders are easier, I

suppose. But there is also a risk involved, of course. I feel that ever since the Euro was introduced, this has taken away the appeal of travelling."

The relationship between the notion of Europe and otherwise cisnational narratives is complex, however. While in terms of politics, institutions, and their frame of reference for social organization and empathy, Europe was a threat, they simultaneously used a notion of 'European culture' as a narrative device to argue that their national culture is a European *type* culture, and is therefore fundamentally different (or threatened by) Russia and particularly Muslims or Islamic countries. This doesn't necessarily mean that there is such a thing as Europeanness or European culture as a thing upon itself for these cisnationals, however. To them, European culture is a *category* without much content of its own. For that reason, it is not something that is seen as a thing that Europeans share, but rather a way to more emphatically distinguish against more relevant Others. In that sense, the narrative is rather that 'We' find 'ourselves' in the same boat by historical circumstance. There is an instrumental 'We' to some extent, but it has little to no affection. At best, this view on Europe is similar to what Kathleen Kantner calls the $We_{2/commercium}$, where "everybody [in this case, nations] follows only his or her own idiosyncratic desires and purposes" (Kantner, 2006, pp. 511-512). Such a narrative is not unlike that of Eurosceptic, xenophobic political parties in Europe. During the time of the Dutch fieldwork, Geert Wilders, for example regularly argued against European integration while in the same breath using the idea of the *category* of European culture as an argument against immigration from beyond Europe. In another rhetorical turn, the EU (or 'Europe') was then blamed for 'allowing' such immigrants to enter the nation in the first place.

Furthermore, the EU took up a very different position in the narrative of cisnationals in the three country cases. In the Dutch cisnational narrative, the EU was often seen as something that should be prevented from going too far, so as not to threaten national sovereignty and culture. Simultaneously, there was a sense of 'ownership' of the EU. In this sense, Europe was seen as an *extension* of the nation, and other countries who wished to be a part of it would need to adapt to the way Europe is set up in the image of the own nation-state. In Estonian cisnational discourse, the EU would take two symbolic positions. More often than not, it was seen as a threat to national independence, reminiscent of how the Soviet Union ruled over the country in recent history. For other interviewees, the EU was seen as

evidence that Estonia is a European *type* nation and culture; not a Russian or Eastern European *type* culture (see Chapter 5). Again, this is not the same as identifying *as* European (Cram, 2012). In this instance, the EU was presented as something that represents modernity, the rule of law, and economic development. This chimes with the idea that the Soviet Union was a historical disruption of the 'true path' that Estonia ought to have taken (cf. Kürti & Skalník, 2009; Lindstrom, 2003; Alan Smith, 2000), and the EU is their nation's sailing ship to get back on route to become the *nation* that they would have been. Finally, in Italy, the current financial crisis fuelled some of the cisnational narrative, and in that light the EU was seen as a foreign intervention in the way that issues would need to be dealt with from a national perspective. Overall, however, I encountered much fewer truly cisnational views in Italy than in Estonia or the Netherlands. There, a recognition of a more fragmented national identity was much more prevalent than in the other two countries.

Within the 'nationals' main typology, much of the cisnational narrative was dominant. It is nonetheless worthwhile to briefly address two variations on this view. The first sub-type are the so-called regionalists. The regionalist typology places a lot of emphasis on the idea of authenticity and roots within a particular region within a country. They share similar fears as expressed by the cisnationals above, but authenticity is placed not primarily at the level of the nation, but at the regional, local level. This means that the Others who were seen as most threatening to the local culture and identity were not always from other countries or religions, but could also be people and institutions that represented the nation-state itself.

All three of the country cases in this research project have specific regions that are well known to be more susceptible to this type of perspective. In the Netherlands, there is Frisia in the north (Gorter et al., 1987; van der Plank, 1987) and Limburg in the south (Cornips & De Rooij, 2015; Knippenberg, 1999; Thissen, 2013). In Estonia, there is the large Russophone area in the east with Narva as its most important city (Cheskin, 2015; Trimbach & O'Lear, 2015), and Võru language speakers in the south (Valk & Särg, 2015). Finally, in Italy, regional identities in general tend to be more important than in the other two cases, also in real political terms. Especially regions like Südtirol, Friuli, and Sardinia are well-known examples, as are the efforts made by Lega Nord to construct Padania (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2001; McDonnell, 2006). Virtually every state in Europe has within it regions such as the

ones above, and each of them has very different political, historical, cultural, and linguistic characteristics, and varying degrees of salience. Eurobarometer has included questions about 'attachment' to various territorial entities, including the region and the city/town. Recent average percentages are shown in the figures below. These numbers are very likely to be different for different regions within these countries, of course, but even as an average, the percentage of people who feel 'very' or 'fairly' attached to their region or city / town are an overwhelming majority.

Figure 9 - Regional attachment in the EU, Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands. Source: Eurobarometer (2006).



Figure 10 - City / town / village attachment in the EU, Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands. Source: Eurobarometer (2015).



For part of the data collection, it was possible to make some observations on the social environment of the interviewee. This was particularly interesting in some of the cases where the regionalist perspective was especially salient. One such observation was in Maastricht. In the centre of this city, Dutch or English[59] were assumed as the language of exchange in shops and grocery stores, and German and French are two additional languages that were spoken quite a lot in bars and on the streets.[60] By contrast, in the areas of the city where the interviewees with a predominantly regionalist outlook lived (which in all cases in this city was in the suburbs of Maastricht), the assumed language of exchange was more

[59] Maastricht has a fairly large student population relative to its number of inhabitants (about 13%). The university has an active policy of using English as its language of instruction which attracts a lot of international students particularly from Germany and the UK, who mostly live and spend their time in the city centre.

[60] Inside office buildings and other places of work outside of the service industry this is likely different. Maastrichtian dialect still has a fairly high social status amongst its speakers, and it is spoken also on many formal occasions and in the workplace (Gussenhoven & Aarts, 1999; Münstermann, 1989).

often than not the local dialect.[61] As a rule, conversations overheard in the streets there tended to be in the dialect as well.

This observation was explored a little further through the use of a few very small breaching experiments (Garfinkel, 1984; Goffman, 1963, 1971). Besides the more anecdotal overheard conversations on the streets, I would go to branches of the same or similar stores in both of these areas and initiate small conversations around my purchase with store employees that I overheard speaking the dialect earlier. During these bits of conversation (always small and necessary exchanges about payment method, small questions, and so on) I spoke either the dialect, Dutch, or English. In the centre, when I spoke the dialect, it would often occur that the employee would respond in Dutch or even English. By contrast, when I spoke Dutch in the suburban area, the response was often in the dialect, and when I initiated in the dialect there was never a switching to Dutch (or English). When initiating or responding in English, employees in both cases would respond in English, but this was met with noticeably more surprise in the suburban area. For the dialect in particular, Maastrichtian has two main recognizable sociolects: the 'short Maastrichtian' and the 'stretched Maastrichtian'. The former is typically associated with a higher social status and level of education, while the latter is seen as a more working class pronunciation (see Gussenhoven & Aarts, 1999; Münstermann, 1989). These sociolects appear to be spatially divided as well within the city, so even the *type* of dialect that one speaks may trigger feelings of similarity and difference across various sites.

Figure 11 - A house flying the city flag in the suburbs of Maastricht.

This small experiment is not intended to serve as hard evidence for linguistic spatial divides in Maastricht, but it does illustrate the lived environment of the people who have their homes and daily existence there. In the centre, it would be easy to live one's daily life without speaking the dialect or

[61] The dialect spoken in Maastricht (Maastrichtian, or *Mestreechs*) is a variety of the Limburgian regional language.

Dutch (and many expats and international students do), and this contributes to a more 'worldly' or 'cosmopolitan atmosphere', as some interviewees described it. In the suburb that is mentioned above, by contrast, one could get by without speaking the dialect and only Dutch, but they would likely be somewhat isolated from many daily exchanges (and for a non-Dutch/non-dialect speaker this would be even more the case).

More importantly, this shows what the social norms and discursive expectations tend to be in these two areas, and how linguistically those can be quite different. For the interviewees who expressed this regionalist outlook, their daily life is exactly this very local, linguistically bounded experience. That is not to say that they are unable or unwilling to speak Dutch, English, or other languages. In several cases quite the contrary is true, and they have warm feelings about those other languages and cultures – although those were typically seen as distinctly 'Other.' Some even expressed some degree of pride in how 'cosmopolitan' the city centre feels to them. Nevertheless, this outside world is seen as outside of their own lived experience; outside of their frame of reference when considering their own place in the world. This applies to the places of origin of those other languages and cultures (including Dutch, in the case of regionalist Maastrichtians), but even the city centre of Maastricht itself is often seen as not fully authentic.[62]

The illustration above, while particular to the local identity context in Maastricht, is meant to illustrate the regionalist 'lifeworld' in general. Similar dynamics were observed in the other two countries. This was sometimes expressed in language and dialect, and other times by referencing local customs, places, food, and the landscape. Francesco, a Tuscan interviewee in his late 20s, for example, said:

> I have a very strong sense of belonging to Tuscany,[63] much more than to my town or my country, because I'm in love with this region. About Italy, I think there is a sense of national identity

[62] Though this relationship is often more complex than this. While the presence of foreign languages and Dutch in the centre was often seen as 'un-local' and inauthentic, this does not apply to the perception of history and architecture in the centre, where the reverse is true. Combined with the presence of relatively many 'foreign Others', visiting the city centre made for a complex social experience for some of the interviewees.

[63] When asked by the interviewer whether he felt 'Florentine' as well, Francesco answered: "when I'm abroad I feel Florentine, not when I'm here. But I think it's because I'm not from Florence as the city, I just live in a village

> that only wakes up for particular events. It is not continuous. [...] Italians can have a great sense of solidarity, but it comes up only for some episodes. [...] Only when something bad happens [*'quando ci scappa il morto'* – 'when somebody dies'] we are all united.

Several interviewees, particularly in rural Estonia and Southern Italy, emphasized their relationship to the land itself. Giulia, from a town nearby Naples, for example: "Campania is very important for me. My parents came from the countryside, I have worked a little bit everywhere in the region, and so I have a connection with this land." Such connections to the land came up a lot particularly also for Southern Estonians, and Estonians living on the Western islands. A secondary school teacher in the South of Estonia, for example felt that she was Southern Estonian above anything else. She was born there, studied, there, and had lived her entire life in the area. She said that before the interview, she had never really considered that aspect of her life, and living in these lands was the only way she had ever known. Similarly, Markus, an Estonian fisherman from one of Estonia's larger Western islands,

> I was born in Western Estonian islands. All the places in Estonia are worth visiting and I have been almost everywhere, but it's a lot better [*'hoopis teine'*] on the islands. Near the sea. It is very important to me [that he grew up on the island]. Maybe on the mainland [*'manner'* – a Western Estonian islands term for mainland Estonia] I would have become a scamp [jokingly], my habits and customs would have been different. There was more freedom [on the islands], there was more Russia on the mainland.

For Markus, Estonia's Soviet past and local identities seem to intersect here. While the mainland had become corrupted by this historical experience and its aftermath, the islands had remained more 'purely' Estonian. This now formed the foundation for his convinced *local* identity. When asked whether he considered himself Estonian as well: "well, who else can I be? [laughs] Sometimes I don't want to be,

twenty kilometres from Florence." His identification is with the region, but abroad, the major city in the area serves as a shorthand.

but what can I do? I must be. During the Russian times [the Soviet period] I was more Estonian, at least I felt more that way."

Later, when discussing the peculiarities of island identity, Markus kept referring to the importance of the Baltic Sea. When asked why, he said: "Because the sea connects." This was meant as a metaphor for connections between local identities, but also towards other, similar identities outside of Estonia. Regarding such connections towards areas outside of the context of the nation-state, including Europe itself, regionalist narratives can broadly be split in two types. One that indeed followed a 'nested' (Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Herb & Kaplan, 1999) or 'layered' (Laitin, 1998) logic, and another that might be better described by the 'marble cake' model (Risse, 2003, 2004, 2010a).

Regarding the latter, there were many interviewees who expressed a regionalist perspective while disidentifying (De Swaan, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003) with the nation-state. Sophie, a Dutch woman in her mid-20s from Maastricht, for example, identified with her region, and particularly with her city. At the same time, she vehemently disidentified with what she derogatorily called "Holland." However, she considered Europe as something very positive, although usually irrelevant to her personally. When asked whether she would call herself European, she thought that she might, but only if she would travel outside of Europe (which she had not yet done). When she travelled within Europe, she said she identified with others from her city and region when she met them abroad. In those situations, she would have a strong sense of Otherness towards "*Hollènders*" (Dutch people), she said, and it annoyed her that other people might think she is in the same group as them. Another Maastricht local, with an extensive circle of friends in Spain, used a similar narrative, when talking about how much he liked the Spanish people:

> Yes, I like the Spanish people better [than the Dutch], but I feel that they are more like people from my city than Dutch people are. [...] Particularly the Catalan people, with their independence. That appeals to me, that resembles the way we feel here in Limburg versus the rest of the Netherlands.

For many regionalists, Europe represented a space in which their regional and local identities had more breathing space than within the confines of the nation-state. In the process, they would disidentify to

varying degrees with the nation, but to them, the relationship between the region and Europe was one that was often seen as separate from the one between the nation and Europe. Such identities are more in line with the marble cake model then they would be with the notion of nested identities.

Others put forward a conceptualization of their place in the world that did indeed show such nesting or layering of identities. A local government worker in Southern Estonia, for example,

felt very proud of being an Estonian, but particularly also of her South-Estonian heritage (*'Võrukas'*). According to her, this *'Võru'* identity had a very positive image in Estonia and therefore people belonging to this group were treated very warmly in her experience. She felt proud that people from Tallinn wanted to hear what her *'Wõro'* language sounds like. For her, being Võru was a sub-type of being Estonian: "in the European context I feel I'm Estonian, in the Estonian context I feel I'm Võru." This nested dynamic extended to the European level as well, but rather dispassionately. When asked whether she considered herself European, she framed it by matter of exclusion: "Well I don't feel like I'm Asian or American for example."

This brings me to the final nuance within the nationals typology, which I would call an 'open national' perspective (Dogan, 1997). This category subscribes to much of the narrative of the cisnationals as described above, but their lifeworld is somewhat broader when it comes to European cooperation. While they still regard it as a potential threat to national culture, they do support the idea of the EU as long as it is beneficial in instrumental terms. Differently put, in political terms, their frame of reference is European when they see a need for it, but in terms of culture and language, their worldview is much closer to the cisnationals. One way that this nuance was exposed in Estonia, was through photo elicitation during the interviews (see Chapter 3). Interviewees were first shown an image of an Estonian flag and an EU flag flying side by side. Liisa, an Estonian woman in her late 60s, responded:

> Seeing both the Estonian flag and the EU flag together brings up bad memories. [They] should not be shown together on national holidays. During Soviet times the Soviet flag and Estonian-Soviet [ESSR] flag were always shown together. […] These Soviet times bring up mostly bad

memories, except for my own family memories. Everything associated with the Soviet Union brings up bad memories. Everything was forced on people, nowadays people are free and can choose.

After this, Estonian interviewees were shown a photograph of a billboard showing a yellow tilted Euro sign on a red background (see figure below; see also Chapter 3 for a further description and a larger image). Liisa's response to this was as follows:

The European Union and Soviet Union are in no way comparable. […] The form is the same – a union. Everything else inside is different, although I don't know much about the bureaucracy in the EU. People often say that Estonia has no say, and that the EU forces things on us but I do not know any directly.

In Estonian, as in English, the word 'Union' in both 'European Union' and 'Soviet Union' is the same: *Euroopa Liit* / *Nõukogude Liit*, and some use this as a rhetorical argument against the European Union based on negative historical experiences with the Soviet Union. Linguistically, it makes it easier for those who are so inclined to argue for the idea of national sovereignty in discursive opposition to a transnational union that dominates and rules the nation. Other Eastern-European countries use notably different words to indicate the two (Polish: *Związek* vs *Unia*, Czech: *Svaz* vs *Unie*, Slovakian: *Zveza* vs *Unija*), while the two other Baltic states (and Russian) have the same words for the two unions as well (Latvian: *Savienība*, Lithuanian: *Sąjunga*, Russian: *Союз/Soyuz*). These are likely nothing more than linguistic differences in connotations to specific words, and it is unlikely that there have been explicit policy decisions on this terminology in the past.[64] Nevertheless, the political repercussions in daily

[64] Note that Estonian is a very different language from Lithuanian and Latvian. The latter two are Baltic languages which are part of the Balto-Slavic language group; an Indo-European group of languages along with most other European languages. Estonian, on the other hand, is a Finnic language, which is part of the Uralic primary language family. Its closest linguistic sibling is Finnish, which actually uses two different words instead: *Liito* for the Soviet Union (similar to Estonian), and *Unioni* for the European Union (different from Estonian).

discourse can be relevant, as it gives opponents to the European Union access to an effective rhetorical device that directly mobilizes strong emotions on Estonia's (and probably other country's) Soviet past using only one word. The Soviet Union is almost universally seen as the Soviet *occupation* by Estonian speakers in Estonia, which indicates how strongly this past is seen as being in opposition to the idea of national independence, sovereignty and autonomy (see also Melchior, 2015; Wulf, 2016). For open nationals such as Liisa, as illustrated above, the European Union did not represent the same threat, however. Instead, the EU was instrumental in safeguarding national identity from outside influences:

> The EU and NATO have been very good and unavoidable for Estonia. A small country cannot cope on its own, especially when having Russia as a neighbour. Nothing much has changed after 2004 [EU accession]. Mostly economic issues. Being an Estonian has not changed.

To conclude, the National typology is a lifeworld in which the nation constitutes the dominant space in which social life is seen to exist, or where it should exist if they consider it to be disrupted by migration. Regionalist perspectives in particular modulate this view, but they are grouped under National here nonetheless, because (A) they shared a large part of the National type narrative, and (B) the nation was always a dominant space in relation to which more local identities existed. The open nationals, finally, stepped outside of the more confined cisnational narrative by considering some instrumental matters in a broader frame of reference. This was still in opposition to more significant Others (e.g. Russia, Islam), which emphasizes the logic that the nation still comes first, but is a European *type* of nation. To protect it from change, therefore, is to collaborate on a European level. It should be mentioned that none of these sub-types are necessarily the same as a primordialist (Özkirimli, 2010, pp. 55-56) interpretation of the nation. The interviewees did not usually present their nation as ancient or universal, and they typically recognized that it had changed over the course of history. Nonetheless, what they share is that this identity and culture ought to be unchangeable *now*. External pressures, be that immigrants, minorities, Europe, or the nation itself (in the case of the regionalists), were always seen as suspect and a potential threat to authenticity.

Situational Europeans

The open nationals' perspectives often flow into one end of the spectrum of Situational Europeans (Fligstein, 2008, 2009). Statistically, this is often the largest group of people (see longitudinal figures above); those who see themselves as national first, but also European second given the appropriate context. This is (therefore) also the arena of most of the national political debates on European integration. Politically, it matters how Europe is portrayed on any particular issue. If it is framed as a neoliberal project that serves primarily the interests of large businesses and banks, then the left-leaning individuals amongst these Situational Europeans may favour the national option instead. If instead Europe is framed as a threat to national identity or sovereignty (on *specific* issues, rather than *diffusely* (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002), as for Nationals above), or as an academic, elitist project, then the right-leaning people in this category will gravitate towards national identity instead (Díez Medrano, 2003; Fligstein, 2008, pp. 4-5). For the democratic legitimacy of the EU in the future, a lot hinges on how this large group is swayed. Discussing the significance of this group, Fligstein et al. (2012, p. 110) argue that "these distributions imply that if a political issue comes along that brings people to see themselves as Europeans, 54 per cent of people[65] will favour a European solution to a problem."

As can be expected, the discourses that could predominantly be categorized as Situational European were a very diverse group of people and stories within the sample for this study. What these discourses shared, however, was that they would emphasize the contextuality of their frame of reference and, sometimes, identification. In a global context (travelling outside of Europe, following American politics, extra-European immigration, etc.), they would often feel European, and consider that a relevant framework for action. In a European context (travelling within Europe, friends in other European countries, Erasmus experiences, etc.), they would find their nationality the most relevant descriptor. Within the nation, finally, this would sometimes be their city or region (see above), or nothing in particular (bar individual or social group or class identities). As Lotte, a Dutch interviewee from Utrecht phrased it:

[65] Based on Eurobarometer data from 2010.

> If you're in India, then you can suddenly feel European, but if you're in France, then you'll feel Dutch. And in Utrecht, you'll feel *Utrechter*, and not Dutch anymore. It depends on the context.[66] I think that we can feel as one in Europe when Russia becomes a real threat.

Perspectives like these are neatly in line with theories on the contextuality of identities, as well as with the idea that an external significant Other creates cohesion within (i.e. Russia, in this example). However, as Lotte continued:

> On the other hand, if a group of Polish workers bankrupts your company, then it's hard to feel European. That's on a different level. So the question is always on what level you feel European. […] Not everyone is happy with those Polish employees. So that openness creates closedness [*'geslotenheid'*].

What Lotte meant by 'openness' creating 'closedness', was that on the one hand, she felt it was a good thing that European integration facilitated open societies in terms of labour, travel, and cooperation, but also cultural exchange and enrichment. On the other hand, she saw closedness in terms of the resistance and backlash such mobilities and exchanges fuelled (i.e. amongst the Nationals above). While she said that she felt very European herself, she understood and empathized with those backlashes.

Related to this, but not phrased as backlashes, or as a problem to begin with, one Estonian interviewee saw European integration and globalization on the one hand, and national identity on the other as mutually reinforcing influences (which is reminiscent of Savage et al., 2005, see Chapter 2):

> Estonians stick together. The bigger our world gets with globalization and such, the more Estonians tend to stick together. Multicultural society means a stronger Estonian identity. Nowadays people are putting much more emphasis on Estonian historical symbols, our folk traditions, and so on, than they used to do ten years ago.

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[66] When asked whether it is possible to feel all of these things simultaneously, Lotte responded: "yes, of course. Exactly *because* it depends on the context."

Amongst the Situational Europeans, Europe always had a degree of entitativity, and European integration was a natural part of their lifeworld. That is not to say that they had no reservations on how much influence the EU should have, or that they were all happy with how influential it was now. Particularly in Italy, as might be expected considering the economic context at the time of the fieldwork, many interviewees were critical of austerity policies and the way the EU was enforcing economic rules in especially the Mediterranean. Those who can be categorized as Situational Europeans (which in Italy, was a much more dominant perspective than the National one for this sample) did support the idea of European integration, if not always its execution. Interestingly, when compared to the Dutch and Estonian interviewees, this often resulted in Italian interviewees regarding the question of European integration as something that is open for debate, and that should be renegotiated. Such a framing of the EU was not very prevalent in the Netherlands. Instead, people there saw the EU as a natural extension of 'their' way of doing things. For Estonians, the EU was seen as a different way of organizing things to their own, but amongst Situational Europeans it was generally seen as a positive path forward (away from their Soviet past).

A Northern Italian interviewee from Trento, who felt that regional identity was important to him said the following:

> If you are asking me if I can support Lega Nord while I have a positive approach to Europe, I can't answer because I do not support Lega Nord or these kinds of parties. It is important to preserve our regional identity. But to preserve our identity doesn't mean at all that you have to be against Europe. It means that you are looking for a balance. Because year after year Europe is becoming a more important institution, in some cases it is difficult to accept it. But it is not a rivalry, I think this [Lega Nord's strategy] is not the right approach to the problem.

As in this quote, for most – especially younger – people, Europe and some degree of European integration had become self-evident – as a natural, given circumstance. While the Situational Europeans valued national identities and peculiarities (their own *and* others), they felt that Europe was a logical common future for these nations. Only very few of them expected that this would one day erase all

national distinctions, but almost all did express a certain teleology in the way they thought this would develop. They themselves may not be fully European, but surely their children would be more European. Salvatore, an Italian interviewee in his late 50s from Naples: "I think that there are currently some differences between Italians and others [European nationalities]. These are related to historical reasons, but nowadays the social challenges and problems are creating an homogenous [European] society." For Salvatore, and many others, this teleological shift towards a more homogenous European society was not equally distributed across European geographical space and social groups. This is further examined in Chapter 5. For many Situational Europeans, Europe was first and foremost being shaped through an instrumental need to work together based on a set of shared values. As another Italian interviewee phrased it: "why should Italians be different from others? We are similar to other European people. The most important thing is that we share values, besides the Euro and laws."

In sum, the Situational European discourse showed at least four defining dimensions. First, a spatial/cultural dimension, which is invoked best by the quote by Lotte above. If one travels to a place outside of Europe, then Europe may be relevant, outside of the nation, the nation would be relevant, and so forth. This can also imply a cultural dimension, however, where different cultural spheres in the same shared area invoke different associations. A student studying in an international environment by day who goes out to a local bar in the same city by night might experience a radical shift in context, even though the change in geography is highly limited. Second, and often intersecting with the first dimension, there is an interactional dimension, which varies along the specific social groups that people engage with. This can mean their own social networks of friends, family, colleagues, and acquaintances, or more happenstance encounters that shift their perceptions and imaginations of culture and space. Third, interviewees highlighted a temporal and events dimension, where their moods may simply vary from one moment to the next, often provoked by external happenings and events such as national celebrations or the prospect of a potential (at that time) Brexit vote. Fourth, and finally, there is a political dimension that in turn often partly intersects with the third dimension. Here, the subject at hand shapes their views and imaginations of Europe. When discussing the migrant crisis, this regularly created a situation in which people would imagine their space more European than, say, when discussing

mortgage rates or tax policies. Similarly, issues such as climate change, sustainable energy, and nuclear power would evoke a European frame of reference.

Cosmopolitan Europeans

Research on an emerging European identity has often sought to track it down in the places where it is most expected. The argument for this is often that there are some social groups in Europe that are more likely than others to develop an affective attitude towards Europe. Typically, these will be the people that are anticipated to have benefited most from European integration, or who have the most potential to do so in their lifetimes. This includes people who are young, higher educated (Moes, 2009), mobile (Favell, 2008; Favell & Recchi, 2011), live close to or commute across national borders (Kuhn, 2012a, 2015), and who have a relatively high number of international contacts (Sigalas, 2010; Stoeckel, 2016). Some natural cases that fit this description are a popular subject of study, in particular Erasmus students (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Kuhn, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Sigalas, 2010; Stoeckel, 2016; Wilson, 2011) and European bureaucrats (Shore & Black, 1992, 1994; Zabusky, 2011). Considering that a widely shared, explicit collective identity has not yet emerged on a large societal scale, this strategy is very effective in some cases. If, for example, the objective is to assess what the effect of European integration and EU policies is on how the people who are affected by those changes identify with Europe, then it makes sense to look at such groups. Similarly, in order to understand what European identity may look like, a closer look at these carrier groups (Kohli, 2000) can reveal a lot of rich information.

There is often a hidden teleology in this line of reasoning. These 'usual suspects' for high levels of identification with Europe are often too easily implicitly or explicitly seen as the avant-garde of a changing continent where in the future a larger proportion of the population will expand their identities and solidarity. Understanding how European identities work for these groups now can inform where and how they may be expected amongst other groups in the future, the thinking goes. One can only speculate whether or not a positive affective disposition towards Europe will indeed spread further across the wider population of Europe. If it does, however, it is highly doubtful that the way in which this identification will manifest itself will be qualitatively similar to the identifications that are described amongst these present-day carrier groups.

This critique does not disqualify the types of identification that these particular, often elite groups exhibit. A lot of the current existing research on European identity is informed by such groups, and for that reason researchers need to be careful not to take these distinct views as a template for a European identity at large. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, these perspectives are very particular to the lived experience of only certain groups of people. Some components of how they see their place in the world may 'trickle down' to other groups in European society in the future, but other aspects are likely to remain unique to the experiences they have had in their lifetimes.

This is in part because of the privileged position that these individuals typically inhabit, but also because identification is contextual. The contemporary context for the Cosmopolitan Europeans is a Europe that is predominantly defined not by these cosmopolitan worldviews, but by politics and social Others who see the world quite differently, and usually ordered in terms of nation-states first, and Europe only in second (or lower) place. This means that the process of establishing their cosmopolitan identities vis-à-vis relevant Others currently usually happens in opposition to the Nationals or (to a lesser degree) Situational Europeans. If the future Europe more broadly were to become defined by cosmopolitan ideals (as Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007 would argue in favour of), their identities would have to be established in another way. "Cosmopolitanism combines appreciation of difference and alterity with attempts to conceive of new democratic forms of political rule beyond the nation-state" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 12; see also Brennan, 1997) and "It neither orders differences hierarchically nor dissolves them, but accepts them as such, indeed invests them with a positive value" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 13). If those social goals would ever become a reality on a societal level in the future of Europe and galvanised in political processes, then the context for identifications that rely on Othering against particularly the Nationals as described above will have changed significantly.

There is little point in speculating what future identification contexts will emerge. Nevertheless, if Cosmopolitan Europe *would* be a valid template to understand a potential broad European identity, this would lead to an inevitable change in identification dynamics. Cosmopolitan Europe is ironically defined in opposition to National views of Europe if only because it favours democratic rule beyond the

nation-state.[67] This is therefore another argument against seeing Cosmopolitan Europeans as a blueprint for a future collectively shared European identity; by the time construction would be done, the blueprint will have changed.

Within the Cosmopolitan European type, there was a conceptual distinction between two distinct notions that emerged from the analysis; that of the 'Rooted Cosmopolitans' (Beck, 2003), and that of the 'European Cosmopolitan Tribe'. While the latter fits a more stereotypical image of cosmopolitanism that is largely detached from strong national or regional sentiments, the former has more distinctive roots in specific European places, cultures, or languages. From the perspective of the European Cosmopolitan Tribe, *place* (as understood in the human geography definition; see Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1974. See also Chapter 5) can be imbued with rich and deep meanings, but not as a marker for a strong *place identity* (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Proshansky, Fabian, & Kaminoff, 1983). The Rooted Cosmopolitan perspective, by contrast, *does* have such strong attachments to specific place(s) – be that particular cities, regions, or nations. Where the European Cosmopolitan Tribe values cultural diversity from an outsiders' perspective that could be seen as a form of post-national identity, the Rooted Cosmopolitan appreciates diversity from within; as part and parcel of one or multiple cultures. It takes on a worldview that is inclusive, and has Europe (or beyond) as its frame of reference, but recognizes that this view is anchored in one or more particular places within that space.

The Rooted Cosmopolitans often remained tied to their geographies of origin through family, friends, work, or local identities. They were often still very much engaged with the national politics and culture of their country of origin (which may or may not be the country they currently lived in), but engaged that from a Europeanized or cosmopolitan frame of reference. A common struggle for this group of people was that after having experienced upward social mobility themselves (which several of them seemed to have), this left them with friends and families who did not always share their frame of reference, and who were often geographically concentrated in one country of origin.

[67] I refer here to how Othering in cosmopolitan European identities is performed, as well as to its narrow theoretical definition as proposed by Beck & Grande (2007, pp. 11-16). On a more abstract level, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not necessarily at odds, and historically these perspectives have complemented each other (see Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007 for a discussion on this).

The European Cosmopolitan Tribe, on the other hand could be characterized as follows. They have geographically scattered social networks, without much or any focus on any particular geographic location that falls back on their country of origin. Often, these people are second generation cosmopolitans or (transnational) Europeans, and they usually grew up in families where a national frame of reference was not the default. They were often born into families with high cultural capital, and many of them grew up in several different countries (within our outside of Europe). Their social networks largely consisted of people who also belong to the Cosmopolitan Tribe. Europe, for them, was a singular entity based on common values with usually fuzzy borders. It is rather a concept and an ideal; not a territory (see Chapter 5). They perceived and valued the cultural diversity within Europe, but generally as a construction for light engagement, tourism, or as minor regional temperaments; not as an authentic, fixed cultural difference. For some of them, cultural difference did exist towards more remote areas in the world, such as parts of Africa, Asia, and in some instances towards other parts of the 'West' like the US.

One of the interviewees, Bram, was a student in his early 20s from the Eastern Dutch city Arnhem. He was now studying at an international university programme, and had done secondary education in English as well. His perspective lends itself well to illustrating both the narrative of Rooted Cosmopolitanism and the European Cosmopolitan Tribe, because he touched upon several of the relevant markers. His experience seemed to indicate that he was currently somewhere in-between Rooted Cosmopolitanism and the European Cosmopolitan Tribe; he felt a mix between attachment and disidentification towards his national roots, while at the same time aspiring to a further ‘cosmopolitanization’ of his life. During his interview, he would often use English expressions, and after he told the interviewer that he did not feel close to other Dutch people, he said:

> I don’t have a language barrier but it’s just like, I don’t know. I really don’t feel very closely connected to the Dutch people. I sometimes think they are quite stupid in a sense. They’re not seeing the bigger picture. I mean I like the Dutch people that sort of look at the bigger picture. But Dutch people can be really selfish, and be really self-centred because they think the Dutch

> country is a thing, while it's only 16 million people and one language that's about to die out, so that to me sort of… I don't really identify with that. But I do identify with the Netherlands in that's it's a really good system.

Bram disidentified with Dutch, as imagined in a National sense. To him, those narratives represented Dutch society, which itself was culturally and linguistically a relic of the past to him. He did, however, express a degree of civic identification, in that he felt that "it's a really good system." When the interviewer probed further on that statement, he said:

> I do, I identify with the system or with the country because, uh, on King's Day I feel closely connected to my country and I participate in all the national holidays. I think the Dutch people are very proud and I'm proud of that history as a country and that's why I feel closely connected with it. But then the mentality of my people… […] I think my own thoughts [about Dutch people] in a sense are really not very positive.

Here, Bram expresses a narrative that is much more in line with what I referred to as Rooted Cosmopolitan above, which is one example of how the same individuals may switch between different narratives, and inhabit a space that is in-between somewhat different lifeworlds. Because of his disidentification with Dutch Nationals, Bram enjoyed his daily life where he was surrounded by international students with similar worldviews to his own, and the fact that he could speak English instead of Dutch. Speaking English, to him, represented his cosmopolitanism: "social groups that speak English as their main language and might not even be English, as you might call them maybe world citizens." English explicitly symbolized a lingua franca that was not tied to any English-speaking country:

> That is not to say that I would identify more with British or American people because they speak English, no it's definitely something I identify with like, something bigger, not with any particular country.

In fact, Bram questioned the concept of identification itself, as something that was applicable to him. He felt that identification, understood here as national identity, was something that clouded people's judgement on what was important in the world:

> Yeah, I don't know if identification is that important to me. Maybe because I've been doing so much, like [international university programme] and international school, where it's about the world. I think I would rather, if there was like a goal, I would rather pursue something for every person on the face of this earth, or at least something that makes it more equal for them, for everyone on the face of this earth. Rather than do it for Dutch people or do it for Europe and that is exactly why, I sort of, am different from my parents or from a lot of Dutch people I know who are like 'yeah, the Netherlands are very important, if you choose [to help] Ukraine you are negating the, the, beliefs and also the benefits for the Dutch society.' And I'm like, 'Why do you think you can supersede your own country to anyone else's?' I think that's really something I've learned.

The people he felt most comfortable with at this point in his life, fit into the notion of this Cosmopolitan Tribe. When the interviewer asked Bram why he liked to hang out with these people in particular, he answered:

> I think everyone that I know doesn't really, um, look or has a sense of duty, almost, to their own country. They identify with something more than their own country and therefore the things we talk about are much more related to, um, maybe things that affect the global community rather than their own. And I think an example maybe is that after bilingual education, I moved on to do [a programme that is taught in] English for university. Some other people, who are also doing my [educational] focus, do it in Dutch and they for example operate their political beliefs on the basis of Dutch, um, preconceptions. […] I think to me it's interesting because they're doing the same thing as me, just in another language, and without an international

> community, but Dutch communities instead and it, the outcome is way different in what we believe is good.

This perceived shared ethical self-understanding (Kantner, 2006) amongst other Cosmopolitans was what distinguished Bram and his friends from the Nationals, in his view. While national identity is still valuable to Bram, the way that is understood and used is what makes up his identification with other Cosmopolitans and his disidentification towards Nationals. If cosmopolitanism aims not to erase national identities, but rather to acknowledge cultural differences and imbue them with value (Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007), then this implies two things. First, the two identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive (except perhaps if national identity takes the form of exclusionist nationalism), and the cosmopolitan in fact to some extent *needs* the national in order for it to value its contribution to cultural diversity. "The cosmopolitan changes and preserves, it *opens* the past, the present and the future of particular national societies and the relations among national societies" (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 16, original emphasis). Finally, regarding what role Europe played in this worldview, Bram's perspective remains illustrative for the dynamics within Cosmopolitan narratives:

> Yeah, the thing with Europe is that for me it's like, basically, I see it's important, from like the standpoint that I want it to be, I want there to be European integration for safety reasons, as in a saw the reasoning of there to be harmony after the second world war which I still think is very important now. But I don't feel connected to Europe in any sense because I feel we have so many different cultures, um, that to me I don't think there is any Europe. Then again, I haven't really been in close contact with, let's, like I've been to Africa one time before, never to Asia, never to South or North America, so what I describe as worldly, or world culture might also just be European culture. Do you see what I, what I'm like… This is my framework. What I see as world might also be Europe, in that sense. But then what I see as Europe is nothing that I would connect with.

Here, Bram's response is largely in line with how Beck (2006; Beck & Grande, 2007) imagines European cosmopolitanism. An appreciation and acceptance of a diversity of cultures, combined with universalistic ideals. He largely supports the European project based on similar values, but does not feel an explicit affective relationship towards the notion of Europe itself. Bram himself moreover already reflects on a further point, which is that he considers his own (emic) view non-European, but that it may very well be typically European from an observer's (etic) perspective. Bram's cosmopolitanism serves as a fruitful illustration of the relevant markers of the European Cosmopolitans, and his views were echoed in both Italy and Estonia as well. Some interviewees would label their perspective European, while others (like Bram) would not. As one Italian interviewee phrased it: "I think that European people, and extra-European people, share the structures of imagination, and the imagination itself [*'le strutture dell'immaginazione e l'immaginazione'*].

Concluding Remarks

This chapter described the different narratives and typologies that emerged from the analysis in terms of how different interviewees situated themselves in the world. The nation and Europe were relevant actors in this play to most of the interviewees, but the role that either played was seen as very different. For the Nationals, Europe was often a suspicious influence that may just change the national culture, but at the same time it could serve as a bulwark to ward off some of the more relevant Others that might threaten the nation (Russia, Islam, and in some cases, globalization). The Situational Europeans usually had a pragmatic and somewhat teleological view on Europe and the EU. Generally, it was seen as a force for the better, but one that should only be present given the right circumstances, contexts, and needs. They themselves felt somewhat European, sometimes, but surely the next generation would nudge ever so slightly further in this direction. The Cosmopolitans, finally, often saw the Nationals as the problem (not usually the nations as such). Their frame of reference was at least European, but sometimes would leapfrog that notion altogether by proclaiming an identity as a world citizen.

For Cosmopolitans, their most significant Others were not territorially defined states and nations, but rather the Nationals who lived next door. This difference in perspective between the Nationals and Cosmopolitans is increasingly played out in the political arena in all three countries,

where populist and Eurosceptic parties attempt to tap into the narrative of the Nationals,[68] and the Cosmopolitans sway more to parties that are pro-European and concerned with international instead of domestic issues. These debates often centre around the theme of European integration, which to many therefore has become a symbol that represents this rift between worldviews. This 'European gap' appears to grow wider in each of these countries and indeed several others. The Situational Europeans – for the democratic legitimacy of the EU perhaps the most numerous and therefore relevant category – are caught in the middle of this gap.

To draw the discussion back to its conceptual start, despite my presentation in terms of ideal types and 'their' views, this chapter is intended not primarily as a typology of people, but rather a typology of discourses through which people relate to Europe. That means that while different people certainly had different inclinations, any single individual will often appeal to several of these imaginations according to context. Specifically, there are at least four dimensions that will impact this choice: a spatial/cultural context dimension (when people travel or various places that pose different contexts), an interactional dimension (social groups they socialize with, their social networks), a temporal or 'events' dimension (moods that vary according to specific situations, or as a result of certain events such as national celebrations), and a political dimension (electoral, or domain-specific such as climate change versus tax policies). The diversity and volatility of these contexts is especially relevant for the section where I discuss Situational Europeans, which in this way comes close to what Duchesne and colleagues have referred to as 'ambivalence' (Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). While Europe was rarely ever the interviewees' main concern, very few of them actually presented views that would align with what these authors have called 'indifference', however.

The aim for this chapter was to provide a qualitative context for the numerical categories as found in surveys like Eurobarometer, and to lay a conceptual foundation for the further discussions. To that end, it is an explicitly descriptive text. The next chapter looks at how conceptualizations of geographic space intersect with identities, and at how the notion of European*ness* ties in with power relations based on these imagined geographies.

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[68] Please note that Nationals in this chapter does not necessarily mean that these people are also national*ists* in a more conventional sense. Their frame of reference, or lifeworld is national, as illustrated above.

Chapter 5 – Imagined Geographies of Europe

During an early morning coffee break in the Netherlands I ran into my friends Anna, from Sweden, and Ewa, from Poland. Both have young children, and both had just come back from a short vacation with their families back home. To them, it was important that their children also learnt some of 'their' culture in addition to what they were exposed to here. They were talking about what they had been up to while they were visiting. Anna had gone berry and mushroom picking in the North of Sweden, which was a cultural activity she was largely unable to do with her son in the Netherlands.[69] "Typically Swedish." But then Ewa remarked that this was "typically Polish." During the fieldwork period in Estonia, I had regularly joined people there who did the same, and who considered it "typically Estonian." In all three cases, this was a practice that was considered as very much embedded into what it uniquely means to be from that nation. It tied national identity to the land,[70] to cultural practices, and to family life.[71] And yet, their experiences of this practice were very similar. In fact, the cultural significance of berry and mushroom picking spreads across large parts of Europe. This is particularly the case in most of Northern and Eastern Europe (Konijnendijk, 2008, p. 62), and in some parts of the Mediterranean. Still, despite its prevalence, this was not seen as a shared European practice by anyone. Conversely, many Estonian interviewees, and some Italian interviewees, considered certain things 'typically European' that they did not associate with their own nation. Instead, as they themselves often also recognized, these were Western European ideals, practices, and ways of organizing society. This observation ties in with how Europeanness and geography are imagined, and how power relations play

[69] Mushroom picking is generally forbidden in the Netherlands, which sometimes leads to some frustration amongst particularly Eastern Europeans living in the country (cf. Siegel & Bovenkerk, 2000)

[70] For a discussion on Estonian's relation to their 'soil' and some of the practices involved in this, see Melchior (2015).

[71] See Caldwell (2007) for a related exploration of the relationship between food practices like these and national identity in post-Soviet Russia.

into that dynamic. This chapter aims to understand this relationship between these imagined geographies (Aase, 1994; Bassin, 1991; Hagen, 2003; Harvey, 1990; Said, 1979; Adrian Smith, 2002), and how this relates to meanings of, and identifications with Europe.

An early and persistent question in the study of European identity has been whether or not European and national identities are mutually exclusive or antagonistic towards one another. There has been (often quantitative) evidence to support both sides of this argument, with some claiming that more European often means *less* national identity (Carey, 2002; L. Hooghe & Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2002; L. M. McLaren, 2006), and others claiming more European typically means *more* national (Citrin & Sides, 2004). Most recent work on European identity tends to take as a starting point that the two are not antagonistic, or at least not necessarily so.[72] As is discussed in Chapter 4, while the Nationals are more likely to regard Europe and the nation as being at odds (see also Carey, 2002), the Situational Europeans and Cosmopolitan Europeans do not see it the same way, and may in fact consider one a prerequisite or a catalyst for the other. This relationship therefore depends both on how Europe is conceptualized, and how the nation is conceptualized.

The central question on the relationship between national and European identity should consequently not be merely correlational, but rather go into *how* the two interplay, and within which contexts. This is indeed what most researchers in this domain focus on in more recent studies, and as a result various models have been proposed to understand this relationship better. With regard to form, some have attempted to understand European identity though social psychological theories on identity. As discussed in Chapter 2, such studies have often been based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1970, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). This suggests that European identity, unlike national identity, cannot be studied only as a territorial identification, but should especially also be conceptualized as an individual worldview.

With regard to substance, there have been propositions that put national and the European identities at different structural relationships to each other. One such model is that of 'nested identities',

[72] Already in the late 1950s, Ernst B. Haas (1958) argued that European integration would lead to *multiple* identities.

where, for example, identification with a neighbourhood exists 'within' identification within a city, which exists in a regional identity, which exists in a national identity, which in turn exists in European identity (Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Herb & Kaplan, 1999; Herrmann & Brewer, 2004). This conceptualization suggests a hierarchy between the different layers of identity, where the 'core' (which may typically be local or national identity) is more important to the individual than the outside layer (which may be European identity). Another much-cited model for understanding the relationship between different territorial identifications is the 'marble cake' model (Risse, 2004, 2010a). In this view, national and European (or local, gender, and so on) identities are not clearly defined and bounded entities. Instead, these different points "influence each other, mesh and blend into each other" (Risse, 2004, p. 252). That is to say, one's identification with Italy can modulate one's identification with Europe (and vice versa). Beyond the *nested* (and Risse's *marble cake*) model, Herrmann & Brewer (2004) suggest that identities can *be cross-cutting* (some members of a group have overlapping secondary identities while others do not) or *separate* ("different groups that a person belongs to are distinct from one another" (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004, p. 8)).[73]

Where these models have been applied to study European identity, however, those two points of reference (i.e. national and European identity) are usually taken as a given. Particularly in the nested, cross-cutting, and separate identities (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004, p. 8), there is a degree of entitativity (Campbell, 1958) ascribed to the various identities. Only if national identity is a distinct category, it can be wholly embedded within, cross-cut with, or be separate from another identity, after all. By comparison, in the marble cake model there is more room for permeable boundaries of such identity categories, although it too tends to take the nation and Europe as somewhat fixed points of reference. There is a space where the two (or more) 'flavours' of the metaphorical cake blend into each other. If one were to slice the cake thin enough and take a sample of that space 'in-between', this would make it possible to qualitatively describe its flavour in its own right. It is fairly limiting, then, to only describe that space in terms of its two or more main constituents. If national identity and European identity are social constructs, then any reference point in that ambiguous space is arbitrary from an etic (Pike, 1967, see Chapter 3) perspective. Assuming otherwise would be a form of methodological nationalism (or

[73] See Chapters 2 and 4 for a broader discussion on the relationship between national and European identity.

'methodological institutionalism')[74] that may make it harder to describe and understand that particular domain of identification in its own right.

From an emic perspective, the nation and Europe *are* often used to attempt to describe this space. The interviewees in this study were asked to describe that aspect of their identities, and the way in which they see their nation(s) and Europe. In doing so, vocabulary and language was often the limiting factor, in the sense that concepts like nation, state, and Europe were easily invoked (though not necessarily unambiguous in what they mean exactly), but the spaces in-between did not have words. Language shapes the way people see the world (Sapir, 1929; Whorf, 2012), and the interviewees indeed often struggled to describe the relationship between the ways in which they saw their nation(s) and Europe, and how they themselves identified within all of this. That is not to say that they felt that this space was irrelevant or non-existent. There are two central mechanics through which they attempted to approximate their views. First, for almost all interviewees, there were other cultures that were more similar to themselves, and cultures that were more dissimilar, within the context of being European. That is not to say that either category is necessarily 'more' or 'less' European than the other in the interviewees' perspectives, but members of each category can be seen as being European in the same way. Second, these categories were habitually imbued with varying 'degrees' of being European. Differently put, the first mechanic indicates different 'cultural areas' within Europe in the minds of these interviewees. The second mechanic indicates the relationships between those areas and the perceived centre-periphery dynamics and power relations. Both of these are fluid, as the 'contents' of these groups as well as their Europeanness were seen as changeable over time.

The concept 'cultural area' can be a loaded term in the social sciences, bringing with it a host of connotations. The idea of cultural areas has historically been used as an *etic* term by anthropologists and geographers to indicate a geographic space in which similar cultural practices exist (Kroeber, 1931; Sauer, 1952; Wissler, 1975). It has since been criticized for necessarily using arbitrary and essentializing markers of culture, which brings with it "orientalist logics" and power dynamics (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997, p. 247). In this chapter, it is taken as an *emic* concept, however, and as such it examines such orientalist logics and power dynamics as an object of study instead of (re)producing it. Nonetheless, the

[74] See Kirdina (2015) for a discussion on the concept of methodological institutionalism.

central concept under consideration needs to be broadened beyond cultural areas. The concepts that interviewees referred to were informed by culture, history, and customs, but within that dynamic, territory and geography played an important *symbolic* role. The way interviewees identified and positioned themselves in relation to Europe was not defined by territory as such, however.

For Appadurai, 'deterritorialization', as a general process of detachment from territory, applies specifically to certain social groups such as transnational migrants (Appadurai, 1996, p.49). I argue that, with regard to Europe, this concept not only applies to specific actors, but also to the idea *itself*. While it can be defined in territorial terms, 'to be European' refers to a social classification rather than a territorial entity. Urry (2007, pp. 262-263) makes a similar point about nationality: "Once nationality was based upon a homogenous and mapped national territory [...]. But now frontiers are permeable and much cultural life is interchangeable across the globe". Then, paraphrasing Maier (1994, p. 149), he contends that nowadays, "territory is less central to national self-definition" than it used to be (Urry, 2007, p. 263). This does not mean that territory *as such* has become irrelevant. Some have suggested that identification with Europe may be more salient in situations such as those in border regions (Kohli, 2000, p. 132; Kuhn, 2012a). Beyond a literal impact of territory and geography, territory serves as an important communicative device when referring to Europe or when differentiating within Europe (e.g. 'Eastern', 'Central', 'Western', 'Northern').

While there exists a notion of broadly homogenous transnational but sub-European areas in the minds of the people in this study, these areas are not exclusively defined by culture, as would be presumed by the notion of a 'cultural area'. Particularly politics and economy turned out to be important elements of those definitions, and it is precisely these aspects that reinforce the temporal fluidity of these areas. To name these folk taxonomies 'cultural areas' is therefore too limiting. Instead, drawing inspiration from Appadurai's (1996) five '-scapes',[75] I will refer to the complex of economic, linguistic, political, and cultural flows and imaginaries as *Euroscapes*. As a concept, Euroscapes potentially draw on all five of Appadurai's -scapes, and indeed interviewees pointed to aspects that could be attributed to all of these five domains. The focus of this study, however, is how such flows play out in the European

[75] Ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (see Appadurai, 1996)

context in particular, possibly as an instance of globalization (which was Appadurai's main concern).[76] Moreover, considering my emphasis on identities and the social dimension of European integration, Appadurai's ethnoscapes and ideoscapes come across much more prominently in this discussion than the mediascapes, technoscapes, and financescapes. In sum, Euroscapes in this chapter is an *etic* construct that refers to the *emic* notion of cultural areas constructed on the basis of perceived ethnoscapes and ideoscapes. While Appadurai's -scapes open up the analysis for deterritorialized (Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Scholte, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999) 'flows' and perspectives, I argue that European identity, and the Euroscapes that often negotiate it vis-à-vis national identities, can be simultaneously partly deterritorialized and partly rooted in territorial notions, if only on a symbolic level. This definition of Euroscapes therefore allows for an examination of the relevance of territoriality of Euroscapes, but at the same time its deterritorialization and geography as a symbolic identity marker (Aase, 1994; Harvey, 1990; Monnet, 2011; Said, 1979).

Considering the marble cake analogy (Risse, 2004, 2010a), this chapter looks at how the interviewees in this study negotiate the space in-between the 'flavours' through these Euroscapes. While city and local identities do come into play sometimes, when it comes to European identity, the two most relevant identity markers for most interviewees were the nation and Europe. The section below describes the Euroscapes within, and at the perceived boundaries of Europe in the minds of the interviewees. It is argued that these are important vehicles for establishing and communicating different kinds and layers of identification with Europe and the power relations at play within that space. After that, the place of the nation and national histories within and between these cultural areas are discussed.

Euroscapes

As part of the semi-structured interview, all interviewees were asked to draw any and all subdivisions that they themselves thought relevant within Europe on a map (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this approach). While they were doing so, and immediately afterwards, their choices were discussed. The

[76] Or, as Scholte (2000, p. 46) puts it, "Globalization as deterritorialization or [. . .] the growth of 'supraterritorial' relations between people."

primary goal here was not so much to get a complete overview of all transnational areas that interviewees considered, but especially to understand their motivations for seeing the European geographic space in this way. Nevertheless, it was striking to see how much homogeneity there appeared to be *within* each country case. This was fairly unexpected, considering the semi-structured and therefore fairly informal style of interviewing and the range of interviewees in terms of age, education, and experience with travel and social contacts. In fact, even *between* the three countries, there were striking similarities. Nonetheless, there were some particular dissimilarities as well, which will be addressed below.

Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the complexity and ambiguity of the notion of identity (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Duchesne, 2008), many of the questions interviewees were asked were things that they felt were important to them but at the same time largely implicit or lacking socially established language and narrative. Identity as an often implicit and elusive concept can make it hard for people to formulate their feelings and views precisely, and so the map drawing exercise served as one of the tools used to allow them to express their worldview using a wider 'bandwidth' of communication (Burgoon, 1995; Burgoon & Miller, 1985). This approach inherently yields a potentially unlimited range of variations between interviewees due to the theoretically infinite points on a map (and thus drawings that can be made on it), as opposed to the intentional partial absence of (naturally finite and defined) words, metaphors, and expressions that one might normally use in verbal exchange alone. The focus during the interview and for the analysis was not primarily the drawings themselves, however. Rather, this visual tool (and in some cases, performative tool – i.e. *how*[77] people drew on maps / the act itself) was harnessed to explore and construct language that interviewees might use to describe their views. As such, the starting point that these people chose for that discussion was often language that was more universal, and would begin with the cardinal directions on a map. In order to systematize the analysis, this is therefore the descriptive starting point for the structure of the discussion here as well. Before addressing 'North', 'South', 'East', and 'West', it is helpful to briefly examine the combined map that resulted from all of the interviews in this research

[77] For example, some interviewees drew in a fast, deliberate fashion versus a more contemplative and hesitant approach, which varied not only between interviewees but also between different areas for the same interviewees. These sorts of cues were taken up by the interviewer to inquire further about the hesitation or fervour that was experienced.

collectively. The aim here is not to put forward a quantitative argument of sorts, but rather to offer a summary of responses to serve as context for the more detailed and qualitative discussions that follow.

Figure 12 - Overlay of all maps across all interviews in the Netherlands, Estonia, and Italy.



At first glance, the map above looks very cluttered and disorganized, which illustrates the variety of perspectives that interviewees expressed, and the relative freedom they had to draw symbolic boundaries that would have been more difficult to communicate using language alone. This makes it very hard to reliably deduce the various Euroscapes that interviewees collectively saw based on this overlay alone. Moreover, the variation in which colour(s) of pencil they chose, how thick they drew certain lines (or whether they used lines at all), and whether they made any annotations or not obfuscates how dominant certain perspectives were compared to others. This map is therefore not very helpful to see where there

are lines and areas (this is discussed in more detail below), but it does a much better job at showing where there are *not*, and where overarching patterns exist.

Between Norway, Sweden, and Finland, there were almost no divisions made by any of the interviewees, and very few between that area and Denmark. Similarly, Portugal, Spain, and Italy were rarely divided from one another, with only a handful of lines separating Greece from that area. There was more contention around the eastern border of Europe, with a fair number of people placing such boundaries somewhere in Russia, but the vast majority drawing that line more to the west (this boundary and the discussion around it is expanded upon below). The real battlegrounds of defining Euroscapes is in the large centre of Europe, however. In the east, there are few divisions between Belarus and Ukraine, few between Romania and Bulgaria, and even relatively few between these two spaces. Similarly, the Baltic countries are rarely divided, except for Estonia (which is wholly caused by the Estonian interviewees themselves; not by the Italian or Dutch ones). In the centre-west, Germany was cause for a lot of disagreement, with some interviewees grouping it into a Central European Euroscape, others into Western Europe, and others still saw it as a space onto itself (sometimes including Austria). Interestingly, Germany was never split up into an eastern and a western part, while interviewees *did* intentionally split up other areas, such as Ukraine, Poland, Italy, Estonia, Turkey, and France.

When asked about why they would or would not split up certain areas, interviewees would often respond by saying that they were drawing a map that they saw as representing the *current* state of European society, and its contemporary, on-going transitions. At the same time, several of the Euroscapes they described were at least rhetorically partially based on historical experiences and path-dependencies according to the same people. The superimposed map above also reveals that in most cases, people neatly followed the state boundaries to draw boundaries between Euroscapes.[78] This partly had reasons similar to the historical experience argument for defining Euroscapes themselves: historical narratives were usually seen as being situated within nation-states. There was no such thing as a unified

[78] Interviewees were explicitly instructed that they did not need to follow state borders in their expression. These borders *were* however printed on the otherwise blank map after the first couple of pilot interviews revealed that people often struggled to identify particular geographic spaces without those reference points. This may have steered some to follow those lines intuitively, but this methodological compromise against more precision was made in order to instead favour a degree of validity within interviews and reliability across interviews.

European historical narrative according to most interviewees, although they often did see somewhat collective and transnational views on history within Euroscapes (particularly in Estonian interviews). In fact, some aspects of historiography were seen as being at odds or in competition within Europe (Melchior, 2015). In the same vein, most interviewees considered the areas that they drew as culturally similar because the nations they encompassed were akin (historically, but also culturally and institutionally). Those nations, in turn, for the most part coincided with the state boundaries, and as such, nation-states seemed like sensible 'natural' boundaries for these Euroscapes for many interviewees.[79]

After this summative description of the general tendencies across all interviews, looking particularly at where divisions were notably absent, the sections below will describe and discuss the data in more detail. The attention will shift towards where boundaries *were* drawn, constructed, and negotiated. It will focus in particular on the "*boundary* that defines the group" (Barth, 1969a, p. 15), both literally and figuratively. At the same time, this approach cannot escape also discussing some of the "cultural stuff that it encloses" (Barth, 1969a, p. 15) where this "stuff" is seen as defining that boundary from an emic perspective. To that end, the following paragraphs will first describe the main Euroscapes as defined by the interviewees. After that, a more analytical section follows, that examines how interviewees see these Euroscapes in relation to each other, and what they 'do', followed by a section that explores how this intersects with European political integration, Europeanness, and power.

North

The four Euroscapes that will be discussed here are simply labelled 'North', 'South', 'East', and 'West'. This is of course a simplification of a more complex variation in the interview transcripts, but from an etic standpoint these categories do typically fit with how interviewees saw Europe's subdivisions. Though their *in vivo* labels may have been different, the geographies and meanings associated with them were similar. In other words, this is an attempt to translate an emic understanding of Europe and its

[79] Not all interviewees saw it this way, however. To illustrate, before the interviewer had a chance to instruct her, Sandra, from South Estonia asked: "Can I cross the lines, can one country be in multiple circles and can one part of the country be in one and the other in another group?", and Vittoria, an interviewee from near Genoa, was also very explicit on this point: "I believe that national frontiers do not reflect macro-regions."

subdivisions into an etic understanding (see Chapter 3 for more on this point). This is because social scientific analysis necessarily involves such an interpretation, but also because for the further analysis it is helpful to be able to compare and contrast these interpretations of the perceived Euroscapes without getting bogged down in potentially endless complexity. This on occasion necessarily favours a degree of generalisation where a more particularistic approach may have been possible as well. My interest in this chapter is therefore not primarily to offer a thick description (Geertz, 1973, Chapter 1) of each particular (emic) imagination of geography and identity, but rather to uncover, describe, an analyse the (etic) over-arching narratives that negotiate the space in-between national and European identities. To be sure, further subdivisions within and across these main Euroscapes can be made, and were indeed put forward by interviewees. These will be discussed when relevant to the argument, but only when examining what these Euroscapes 'do', after first establishing the overarching landscape.

The 'North' Euroscape was the easiest to define geographically for most interviewees, and was often their starting point when beginning this exercise. It consisted of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and usually Denmark and (often as an afterthought) Iceland. In addition to "Northern", other common labels to describe it were "Nordic" and "Scandinavian". This space was seen as geographically, culturally, and economically distinct from other parts mostly due to its advanced economy and progressive politics (see also Browning, 2007). This Dutch interviewee's response after being asked what makes the North distinct from other parts is emblematic of how most interviewees saw this:

> Well, because Scandinavia is of course very prosperous, and it has its own system indeed with free education and an extremely good social safety net. It is a very different kind of system, I think. Yes, an extremely high degree of prosperity. And extremely few issues with refugees, that probably plays into it.

Northern Europe was seen as well-organised, 'finished', and sometimes a little boring. By some it was put forward as a model towards which Europe as a whole should be aspiring, as Rasmus, an Estonian interviewee said:

> I would say Scandinavia is European [*'Euroopalik'*, which connotes European*ness*] [...] To me [it] is ready-made and at the same time if we take a look into the future, it represents to me the future Europe. Maybe even more than some of the older, more central European states.

Estonia (but not the other two Baltic countries) was almost always tentatively included in this category, but only by the Estonians themselves and one Italian interviewee (Eleonora, from an area north of Venice) for whom the 'Baltics' was a subcategory of 'Scandinavia', and so "[...] the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries represent one macro-region". There were always some qualifications to Estonia *currently* being seen as belonging to the same cultural area as the other 'Northern' cultures, and usually this grouping was described as a shift that was currently on-going, or would happen in the future. For some Estonian interviewees, their Northernness was due to historical ties to the Nordic countries (particularly Sweden[80]), but more often than not this connection was argued via Finland: "The most similar to us is Finland. Mainly because we both are *ugri-mugri* [sharing the Finno-Ugric language family]. Also we are close geographically and have been connected in many ways" (Reeta, a womand in her late 30s living in Narva). This inclusion of Estonia already points to how such Euroscapes are employed in the negotiation of Europeanness. This is not just 'wishful thinking' or without contemporary political warrant, as there have been clear efforts from 'traditionally' Nordic countries to include the Baltic states into a "Nordic-Baltic sphere of community", and vice versa (Bergman, 2006; Lagerspetz, 2003).

South

The Southern European Euroscape – often labelled as Mediterranean Europe – was also fairly consistent across interviewees and between the three country cases in terms of its geography. It always included Italy and (at least parts of) Spain, and for most people also encompassed Greece, Malta, and Cyprus (though the latter two were often disregarded entirely). To a somewhat lesser degree, (the south of) France was included as well. This depended largely on how influential the interviewee felt that France was within the broader context of Europe. If France was seen as a core European power, it was usually

[80] Estonia was under varying degrees of Swedish control during the 16th to 18th century, which is seen as a positive influence on Estonian culture by many present-day Estonians.

excluded from this imagination of Southern Europe, or split up in a northern and southern part. A similar dynamic sometimes happened for the decision to include Greece into Mediterranean / Southern Europe or not. Where Southern Europe was seen by the interviewee as being defined by relatively lagging behind Western Europe in terms of economic development or political development, then those people would typically also include Greece into that imagination. If, on the other hand, Southern Europe was not seen as economically or democratically weaker, Greece would sometimes be excluded precisely to make this distinction. In other imaginations, Southern Europe was primarily defined based on cultural and historical terms, which would then typically include Greece, and in fact would often extend further to the far west of Turkey (its Marmara and Aegean regions at most, but usually only including Eastern Thrace, which for many would also be where they would place the boundary of Europe generally). A number of Italian interviewees included some of the northern African states as well, but interestingly these people would exclude those same areas from their definition of Europe. For them, the Mediterranean area constituted a space that straddles Europe and northern Africa. "We share a sea with North Africa. We are so close to them, we cannot forget them, even though we are European" (Benedetta from Northern Italy), or as another Italian interviewee, Eleonora, remarked:

> The Mediterranean I think is divided in Europe, Africa, and Middle Orient. There are differences, I think they are clear. But there are some similarities. Sicily, south of Spain, Naples, Athens, Istanbul, Beirut and the African cities are not so different. I think because of the common history, the common sea.

This quote also reveals another particularity about how people would see the Southern European Euroscape, which is that it was generally seen as a gradient between Western Europe and non-European Africa and Asia. This not only meant that many interviewees saw the west of Turkey and some parts of northern Africa as somewhat 'more European' than further east or south, but also that those areas on the border of their imagined Europe were seen as 'more African' and therefore 'less European'. This went

beyond mere stereotyping or attempts at ridiculing[81] southern areas of countries like Italy (where this north/south divide within the country was seen as very real by many interviewees). In fact, at least one South-Italian interviewee in his twenties described himself as having a very strong Italian identity, a very weak European identity, and asserted that he felt closer to northern Africa than to northern Europeans. Francesco, from Central Italy, who was not so convinced about grouping northern Africa into his definition of Southern / Mediterranean Europe, nevertheless expressed this permeability of the southern boundary of Europe, and the negotiation of Europeanness that occurs in this Euroscape:

> There are differences between South Italy and North Italy, and those differences make North Italy more European than the South. I feel that the South is more African, without being racist. Being European for me means being more open... Let's say, to be mentally open, having no problems in relating to other people. So, even though in the north of Europe people are sometimes difficult and not too open, in South Italy they are still too attached to the traditions of the past, which are important, but they don't have the innovation that we can find in North Italy. I mean, innovation of thoughts.

This gradient was particularly pronounced for Southern Europe, when compared to the other main areas described here. Other Euroscapes had particular parts that were seen by some as more determinative for that space than other parts (for example, Sweden in Northern Europe, or Germany in Western Europe), but this was a reflection of political and cultural dominance rather than a generalized pattern for the entire area. This "play of similarity and difference" within Southern Europe / the Mediterranean area (Herzfeld, 2001, p. 663) was one of the defining characteristics of this Euroscape, which makes it

[81] To be sure, some Italian interviewees *would* make derogatory remarks about the south of the country being similar to Africa instead of Europe. They were meant to be belittling remarks because the connotation they intended was that the south would be poor, crime-ridden, corrupt, and disorganised. The comparison to Africa was not always meant in this way, however, and those who did make this connection in order to communicate their perceived cultural differences would often be hesitant and feel bad about using this analogy because they were well aware of the connotations that some others have with this comparison.

particularly important to stress that this area should not be reified as a monocultural area from an etic perspective (Argyrou, 1996, pp. 153-168; Herzfeld, 2001).

The quote by Francesco above also points out how Southern Europe was often defined in opposition to Northern Europe (and vice versa). The North was usually described as well-organised, politically stable, progressive, atheist, prosperous, but also as socially cold and distant. By contrast, the South was described as somewhat disorganised, politically corrupt, conservative, religious, and with financial woes, but also as socially warm and kind-hearted. These rather long strings of adjectives are Barth's (1969a) "cultural stuff" that interviewees employed in constructing the boundaries[82] between the North and South Euroscapes. In this way, Northern and Southern Europe are seen as each other's polar opposites within the context of Europe. When asked to describe what 'Northern' means, Estonians, who as mentioned above, often considered themselves to be aspiring Northern Europeans, would contrast it to Southern Europeans by means of mentality, climate, politics, culture, and food. Italians, who typically considered themselves Southern Europeans, would follow a virtually identical description in Othering Southern Europe versus Northern Europe. The perspective between both is different, of course, and they valued different things more positively, but the associations, narratives, and stereotypes were very much the same. The Dutch, finally, would make similar distinctions, but did not consider themselves a part of either. Italians sometimes considered the Mediterranean as 'more European' than the North on the basis of European cultural history and influence on European culture more broadly. Usually, though, both the Estonian and the Italian interviewees saw the North as being more European in many respects, mostly on the basis of economic development and progressive politics. For most, both the North and the South were not as 'core' to Europeanness than Western and Central Europe (if the latter included Germany). This was true for most people in all three countries, and there was some agreement on the idea that the core of Europeanness is to be found in Western Europe, even though they did note that Scandinavia was both more wealthy and progressive. These observations have implications for the meanings and teleology associated with this notion of European*ness*, as will be addressed later in this chapter.

[82] Boundaries in terms of what these Euroscapes *mean*, not in a more literal, geographic sense. None of the interviewees drew a map where these two areas bordered each other geographically.

There were two main narratives put forward to define Europeanness when it comes to Southern Europe in particular. One builds on a more classical, cultural-historical notion, in which the Mediterranean area is of central importance both historically and today. This legacy was seen by several Dutch and Italian interviewees as being at the core of what Europeans share in terms of culture and values today. As Salvatore put it:

> Europe has got a part of Italy. The Italian culture is part of the European one, a huge part. And also the idea of society is related to the Italian classic one. I do not know if this a good thing or not, but you cannot think about Europe if you do not accept that the classical Italian culture is a big part of it. If we consider law, or art, or music or many other fields, our Italian culture is there.

For Italians who subscribed to this view, it was clear how European culture and society aligned with classical 'Italian' influences. As such, Italy itself necessarily was at the heart of what it meant to be European. For Justin, a Dutch 18-year-old, this cultural notion of Europeanness was something that he felt he identified with as well:

> Well, I like its culture, it's somewhat special and, and all the history that you see around Italy that's amazing. That actually started when I was taught Latin in high school, you get some kind of connection with those ancient Romans […] Um, so yeah, that's that makes me somewhat connected.

This was also expressed in terms of urban landscapes and architecture (Delanty & Jones, 2002; Adrian Smith, 2002) by several Dutch interviewees. As Lars and Marie, a Dutch couple in their 50s who were interviewed together saw it:

> **Lars:** You know, that Roman thing [*'dat Romeinse'*]. You can see those influences all over the place in Europe. And outside of Europe that is very different.

> **Marie:** Right, countries like India, that is really incomparable.
>
> **Lars:** Indeed. Europe really has a lot of influences from history, for a large part from the Roman era, of course. And you just see that in cities, but also in the people. And you certainly don't have that in the Asian countries. Nor in Africa.

For Estonians, Europe's classical cultural heritage did not come up as often. When it did, it was used to illustrate the peripheral position of Estonia within the larger context of Europe. As Oliver, a history student from Tartu saw it:

> Geographically Estonia does not belong to the core, where maybe the most important historical developments have taken place. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, all the cultural life of Europe took, to a large extent, place in the Western European monasteries and so on. Estonia was a province, a periphery at that time, as it actually is also nowadays.

A second imagination of the Europeanness of the South comes not so much from history and classical culture, but rather from a vision of modernity. This view presents Europeanness as a more civic ideal of peace, good governance, democracy, and economic prosperity. Here, Italy did not fulfil those requirements to be considered European according to many of the interviewees. This is where the European economic crisis at the time of interviewing had a major impact on how the interviewees saw this. As Eleonora summarized this: "due to the recent political events in our country, being Italian causes hilarity [*'suscita ilarità'*] abroad." This dynamic is explored further below.

East

> Three fundamental situations developed in Europe after the war: that of Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated, that of the part of Europe situated geographically in the center – culturally in the West and politically in the East.
>
> (Kundera, 1984)

Out of the four organising cardinal directions presented here, the Eastern Euroscape was the most contested in terms of its geography. It was also seen as the most malleable and transitory category. As a rule, the interviewees in this study[83] would always include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into this grouping, which was sometimes referred to as 'Central Europe'. Those who considered Belarus and (parts of) Ukraine as being 'in Europe' in the first place would also include those areas. The Balkan countries (particularly referring to former Yugoslavia, but sometimes including Bulgaria) were mostly seen as a category onto themselves, but were occasionally included as well. The argumentations for excluding them were political (i.e. that they were not in the EU)[84] and historical (e.g. the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s). For many Dutch and Italian interviewees, but very few of the Estonians (see below), the Baltic countries were also part of Eastern Europe. Some additionally stretched the notion of Eastern Europe to include the western part of Russia. To be sure, countries like Greece, Turkey, Austria and Finland were never included by any of the interviewees, despite being on a similar longitude.

It is important to note that none of the interviewees in this research felt that 'their' nation was *really* part of the East Euroscape. Perhaps obviously, none of the Italian and Dutch interviewees considered this at all.[85] In Estonian interviews, the Eastern Europeanness of Estonia usually was a more extensive talking point. Most of the Estonians felt that this was how Estonia was *seen* externally,[86] but not what it *actually* was. This alleged clash of understanding was part of a larger perceived fundamental

[83] An earlier, more limited exploration of these Euroscapes focused on Polish higher educated youth, who often placed the notion of Eastern Europe further eastwards than most interviewees in the current analysis. They considered most of the areas that are in the 'East' category here (particularly Poland itself, but also the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) into what they called Central Europe, which was seen as intrinsically different (see Moes, 2008, 2009).

[84] Croatia and Slovenia are in fact EU members, but these were nonetheless largely grouped into the same sub-category with the other Balkan countries. Other studies have described these two countries' "exit from the Balkans" (Lindstrom, 2003). Several Italians included these two countries into the Southern European Euroscape, however.

[85] Although some Italians used their view of what Eastern Europe meant to them to communicate their concerns about Italy's financial trouble at the time of interviewing: "If Italy will not succeed with all its policies to provide its citizens with a good standard of living I would consider it Eastern European, and then Mediterranean" (Camilla, a manager in her late 30s from Central Italy). This is discussed in more detail towards the end of this chapter.

[86] 'Externally' was sometimes the indeterminate outside world, but usually meant Western Europe in particular.

misunderstanding, which is the Western European view on history (seen as dominant in Europe) and the Eastern European one (seen as relatively peripheral). Many of the differences in views on history that emerged in these interviews related to the (Western) European lack of understanding of the Soviet occupation and its severity. Related to this, the central place that the Second World War and in particular the incomparability of the Holocaust takes in what they saw as the dominant shared European historical narrative was considered problematic (Melchior, 2010, 2015; Melchior & Visser, 2011; Wulf, 2016). Historically, European political integration finds its roots and early narrative in World War II. With the inclusion of states that were once territories of the Soviet Union, or under its influence, there has also emerged a battle of historiographies, which is being played out on both a cultural and political level (Melchior, 2015). In this sense, many Estonians conceded that they shared this historical fate and contemporary struggle for recognition with the area that they described as Eastern Europe. Jaanika, a retiree in her mid-70s from Central Estonia, said:

> It makes it easier to understand [others in Eastern Europe]. Where you come from, why things are like they are […] And for Western-European nations it is difficult to understand what it meant to be in Soviet Union. They have not experienced it.

An important quality that applied to the East much more profoundly than to North, South, and West, was that people would often see rather clear subdivisions within this Euroscape. When included, the Balkan constituted a particular area, as mentioned above. The same applies to the Baltic states, as will be discussed below. Besides these two groupings, there was a perceived division between the current EU members within this space and the non-EU members (i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, and – when included – Russia). This last division is emblematic of the influence that institutions (i.e. the EU in this case) have on identities and the geographic imagination. More interestingly, these various sub-categories reveal something about the meaning behind this notion of Eastern Europe. For most interviewees, across all three country cases (though for different reasons), Eastern Europe was presented as an inherently temporary condition; a category that states and nations were expected to leave at one point in the future. Within it, different states were seen as being at different stages of this process. This is the reason why

countries like Poland, Ukraine, and Estonia were often split up between Eastern Europe and one of the other main Euroscapes. and in that sense the sub-categories represented such different pathways. The Baltics were en route to become part of the Northern Euroscape, while Belarus and (the east of) Ukraine[87] were 'stuck' under the Russian sphere of influence and therefore outside of the general conception of Europe. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary were usually seen as on the way to become part of Western Europe, often by invoking the notion of Central Europe[88] as an intermediary category (see also Moes, 2008, 2009). Bulgaria and Romania were sometimes part of this last perceived dynamic as well, but less frequently for Dutch and Italian interviewees than the Estonian ones, and typically with less conviction in all three countries. The Balkan states, finally, prompted more varied responses, with some considering them as another comparatively 'stuck' and liminal region (see also Lindstrom, 2003), and others seeing them as potentially becoming part of the Southern Euroscape in the future.

All of these general descriptions point to Eastern Europe as a transient condition between a disrupted history that has caused contemporary delay in the development of economy (Adrian Smith, 2002), democracy, and bureaucracy relative to the end-goals of their respective teleological pathways. Seen from another angle, the Eastern Euroscape and its constituent parts are the vessels of change (Hagen, 2003; Moes, 2008, pp. 101-103) that take these territories from a past under Soviet domination 'back' towards a future that is European. A defining characteristic of Eastern Europe, therefore, was post-socialism, or post-Soviet, which in itself was seen as a temporary condition, as Paavo, a man in his 40s from Tallinn illustrates:

[87] And Moldavia, when it was mentioned at all.

[88] Central Europe, and its more loaded and historical term *Mitteleuropa*, is a much-discussed term in and of itself, with a long history in both imagined geography and academic writing (Blokker, 2008; Garton Ash, 1989; Hagen, 2003; Henderson, 1999; Judt, 1990; Katzenstein, 1997; Kuus, 2004; Rupnik, 1990; Stirk, 1994). The area that this notion typically refers to is geographically similar to (parts of) what is here discussed under the Eastern Euroscape. Like the Baltics and Balkan, it can be considered one of Eastern Europe's constituent parts, with its own perceived trajectory. This trajectory is sometimes seen to be embedded inside a larger European experience, but is more often than not used to indicate its difference from (Western) Europe.

> At the moment we are living in the post-Soviet era which is the era of growth and modernization. So yes, I think the concept post-Soviet is compatible with the concept of Europe, however [Europe is] not [compatible] with the Soviet concept.

Particularly amongst Estonian interviewees, 'Sovietness' as a collective historical burden was seen as "not normal" (Rausing, 2004, p. 150) versus a 'normal' European future. As two Estonian interviewees described this opposition: "Well, Sovietness [*"Nõukogude-liidulikkus"*] is not Europeanness in my opinion. Europeanness means openness, openness to changes" (Rasmus), and "being European is a very natural thing, the Soviet past is so negative that it shows in many topics" (Reeta). Russia was often seen as the bulwark of contemporary Sovietness, which placed it squarely outside of, or in opposition to Europe for many interviewees. In Estonia, people routinely refer to the Soviet period as the 'Russian time' or 'Russian era' [*"Vene ajal"*], connecting this historical burden to present-day imaginations of geography and geopolitics.

Within Estonia, the carrier groups of Sovietness and Europeanness were respectively considered to be the older, conservative, and rural people, particularly the Russophone minority versus the younger, higher educated, and urban individuals, such as Sandra and Rasmus (in separate interviews):

> **Sandra**
>
> Russians who live in Estonia are not European. Maybe the younger generation is different but the people who are from the Soviet times are exactly the same as the people living in Russia nowadays [whom she considered very different from Europeans]. The Soviet heritage is very much stuck in them and they are not able to adapt to the European mentality.
>
> **Rasmus** *(when asked who carries this Sovietness)*
>
> For instance, I imagine that... The older generation... How would I say it politely? The working class of the older generation... And let's say also from the periphery not from the cities. There's an important difference compared to the young university students or cosmopolitan careerists.

This also illustrates that these shifts from Eastern Europe as liminal Europeanness towards Northern or Western Europe where they would be 'full-fledged Europeans' were not only seen as a matter of implementing the right policies at the state level, but particularly also as a generational shift in mentalities. This notion of carrier groups of Sovietness and Europeanness was especially prevalent amongst Estonian interviewees. Similarly, the subdivision of Eastern Europe into sub-regions with different trajectories was particularly dominant in that country case, also because many Estonian interviewees used this rhetoric to distance their own area from Eastern Europe. The Eastern Euroscape as a transient condition as a whole was the dominant perspective in all three country cases.[89] Dutch and Italian interviewees defined Eastern Europe predominantly based on relatively underdeveloped economy and democracy. This was seen as something that would probably be overcome in the future, but "they still have to deal with the Soviet heritage" (Vincenzo, South Italian in his 20s). For them too, the current Eastern European predicament was due to history – not an inherent cultural difference, as Camilla (Italian) and Sam (Dutch) relayed in separate interviews:

> **Camilla**
> It only means that they had a different economic history. Eastern Europe under Russia for instance had more problems from an economic point of view. If Eastern Europe would have had another history, we would not speak about Eastern Europe in this sense today. […] The Eastern Europeans are lagging only a tiny bit behind the other people. […] The cities did not develop, modernise, the people have been educated in a different way, they are more rigid-minded [*"rigidi"*] than us. But this is all a question of financial and intellectual investment. If it is invested there, then they can flourish and grow and they can become more Western than you would ever imagine. […] In the end everything is very similar. The differences come from the different histories the places had. Their history creates differences, not so much the people.

[89] As it was for higher educated Polish youth in an earlier study as well (Moes, 2008, 2009), for whom both Eastern and Central Europe were seen as temporary categories (see also Hagen, 2003; Henderson, 1999; Judt, 1990; Lindstrom, 2003; Adrian Smith, 2002; Zeigler, 2002).

Sam

> It is all about history. With the Iron Curtain… That things have been set up very differently at that time. At some point, they removed the fence, and we had two cultures. With Soviets in the Eastern Block, and the prosperous West, which was sponsored by America. That is where two cultures arose. […] Yes, I believe that if the Iron Curtain had not been there, and one of the powers had control over all of Europe, we would have had more in common today.

This 'return to Europe' (Garton Ash, 1989, p. 179; Henderson, 1999; Judt, 1990; Mach, 1997, 2000; Alan Smith, 2000) was thus seen as an inherent quality of what it means to be Eastern European, mobilized through its constituent parts. This presents the geographical dimension of the process of Europeanisation, and places the perceived core of this aspect[90] of Europeanness distinctly in the West or North Euroscapes. Consequently, much like the North and South were often seen as each other's defining polar opposites, a similar dynamic was true for the East versus the West. Here, however, this usually emerged as a one-way mirror: Western Europe was often presented as Eastern Europe's Other, but not as clearly the other way around.

Where this *was* the case, was for a few Dutch interviewees who were aligned with the Nationals typology from Chapter 4. As an example, some of the truck drivers who were interviewed in the Netherlands would habitually alternate between referring to the East with either the relatively neutral term 'Eastern Europe' on the one hand, and the 'Eastern Block' on the other. 'Eastern Block' (*"Oostblok"*) was additionally used as a demonym (*"Oostblokker(s)"*). In recent years, populist anti-European and anti-immigrant politicians in the Netherlands have fuelled a rhetoric that is unfavourable towards immigrants from – amongst several other areas – Eastern Europe (or as Pieter, a Dutch truck driver described this: the "Eastern Block invasion [*'Oostblok-invasie'*]". Words like *"Oostblokker"* have a rather negative connotation in public discourse for that reason. Interestingly, the anachronism of still referring to the East as the Eastern Block does align with the notion of Eastern Europe existing as a 'historical anomaly' as expressed above, except that there is no teleological component to this perceived difference.

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[90] The dynamic described here implicitly assumes a 'modern' conception of Europeanness – that is, economic development and democratic values as defining qualities. An alternative, but not necessarily mutually exclusive perspective on Europeanness is the more cultural, 'classical' conception, as described under the Southern Euroscape above.

To these interviewees, the distinction between Eastern Europe and all the rest was seen as more permanent and fundamental.[91]

West

The West Euroscape, finally, always included the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany (unless the latter was in an alternative view of Central Europe, as discussed above) across the three country cases. In most cases, (the north of) France, Austria and Switzerland were included as well, and more infrequently the north of Italy and Denmark. The occasional liminality of states like Poland and the Czech Republic is examined above. Lastly, the United Kingdom and Ireland were usually included in this notion of Western Europe as well, but were heavily debated. Only some Italian interviewees were unequivocal about their country also belonging to the category of Western Europe, though this was a fairly uncommon view. As Salvatore saw it, however, invoking the classical influence on Europeanness:

> I have already told you about South Europe. We share history, culture, economic aspects, perhaps the idea of doing politics, and yes, Italy is in the South, we are a Mediterranean country. We are a Mediterranean country, and we are part of Europe, as a Southern country. Of course we are west-Europe, just look to our economy!

Considering the economic crisis at the time, and how to many this constituted a matter of Europeanness in terms of economic development, it should be pointed out that this last statement in Salvatore's view was not meant sarcastically, but instead pointed at the significance of Italy's large economy.

Overall, the most remarkable thing to note about Western Europe in the imagination of the interviewees, was how unremarkable it seemed to be. Out of all descriptions of the various Euroscapes, the Western European one was mentioned the least. This is not because it was irrelevant to interviewees, but rather because it was the reference category for all other areas. In other words, the West was where

[91] In fact, as one interviewee from the North of the Netherlands remarked: "The North and South of Europe are not really distinct areas anymore. Those refer rather to the beginnings of the European Union. I think that difference between North and South has become smaller now that Eastern Europe has joined as well."

a modern (as opposed to classical, cultural) view of Europeanness was situated to most interviewees. Lars' view on this illustrates this by saying:

> Well, you know, we belong to Western Europe. So if you, indeed, for yourself… Then you are talking about Germany, Belgium England. Those are the Europeans. And then it's easy to forget about Eastern Europe. Europe, to me is actually really this piece [points to his drawing of Western Europe on the map]. Eastern Europe is easily forgotten, I think. […] I think they are less European. They do have a different culture. It's not the West European culture. And it is also different in the South and East. There is just a lot of differences. I think it's because those countries have known poverty for a long time, that's the main difference. And it's also of course… It's really the Eastern Europeanness [*'dat Oost Europese'*], that has stuck with them for a longer time. So then you have a different culture. But it does belong to Europe, as we learnt in topography class when I was young. Even so, when I think about Europe, then I think more about these countries [points to Western Europe again] then about… If someone were to tell me, 'list all of the countries in Europe', then I would start with Germany, Sweden, Norway, France… And only afterwards I would come up with the countries in the East.

The way Lars presented it above is similar to how many interviewees in the Netherlands would portray Europeanness. For them, Europeanness was often a logical extension of areas like their own. For most Italian and Estonian interviewees, Western Europe was similarly seen as 'default Europe', but as something that was external to their own national cultures to varying degrees.

This dynamic can be partly understood through the interplay of power and politics. For some, their geographical imagination of Europe was clearly influenced by the political integration of the continent over time instead of geography itself, perceived national 'mentalities', or longer-term historical developments. This was particularly true in the Netherlands, where the old 'EU12'[92] would often be seen as a singular area, even though Greece was sometimes somewhat outside of this imagination due to

[92] Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.

either simple geography on the map (i.e. Greece was more to the East), or the impact on this imagination from the economic crisis.

Similarly, the current EU of 28 states was sometimes seen as a singular area, but this was the case only for a few interviewees, all of whom were relatively young, higher educated, had a more cosmopolitan outlook on other aspects (see Chapter 4), and had a strong interest in politics more broadly. Moreover, when pushed further, they too recognized regional differences within the EU28, but considered them a quality *of* that single space by framing it as a sort of diversity that makes this wider Euroscape unique. This view is perhaps the closest to the intent of the EU's official motto, *united in diversity / in varietate concordia*, which similarly frames this diversity as an asset of Europeans who "have come together" and are "enriched" by this diversity (European Commission).[93]

In sum, from the maximum variation sample of 95 interviews across all three country cases, strikingly similar Euroscapes emerge in terms of geographical descriptions and meanings. Clearly, many minor differences can and should be noted, but considering the diversity of the sample of interviewees in terms of context (the country cases) and individual characteristics (maximum variation within those country cases), it appears that these views on subdivisions within Europe are remarkably alike, and part of a larger narrative. Certainly the value judgements about these Euroscapes were different according to different types of interviewees and country cases. For those who identified with the Euroscape they considered their own,[94] this largely followed the pattern one might expect based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Italians who fall in this category would often emphasize the value of what they described as 'warm' and big-hearted cultural traits in the South while downplaying the value of economic prosperity and progressiveness associated with the North, and disidentifying (De Swaan, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003) with what they saw as 'cold' and detached ways of life. Estonians who identified with the North would employ a similar dialectic, but value it inversely (where 'cold and detached versus warm and big-hearted' would become 'rational and well-organised

[93] "It signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent's many different cultures, traditions and languages."

[94] Following the terminology from Chapter 4, this would apply to most Nationals and Situational Europeans, but not typically for the Cosmopolitan Europeans.

versus irrational and chaotic', for example). In the grand scheme of European identity, nonetheless, such distinctions may be a variation on the narcissism of minor differences (Blok, 2000; De Swaan, 2000; Ignatieff, 1997; Strating, 2000), because the interviewees who expressed such views would usually simultaneously feel that the differences between these Euroscapes are indeed smaller than those between Europe and non-Europe (particularly Russia, Asia, Africa, and sometimes the United States). For the Cosmopolitan Europeans in Chapter 4, finally, this diversity within Europe was often presented as precisely one of the defining characteristics of what Europeanness means in the first place.

Boundaries of Europe

The Euroscapes described above are neither neatly bounded nor permanent in the imaginations of most interviewees. As such, the states and geographies that were grouped within any of these regions have their own perceived trajectories within and across areas over time and according to context. For the political conceptualization (i.e. EU12 / EU28), this is rather obvious: when states enter (or (Br)exit)[95] the EU they become part of that imagination (or leave it).[96] More interestingly, the much more prevalent cultural imaginations into North, South, East, West, and Central (and their respective cross/sub-regions) are also fluid based on political, cultural, historical, and economic shifts. This dynamic led interviewees to group some states into multiple areas, or to describe how they would 'move' in the future or had done so in the past. The fluidity of Euroscapes and the place of nation-states within those spaces and Europe more broadly soon became a common theme and talking point during all of the interviews. It revealed how these supranational, but sub-European geographical imaginations can play a negotiating

[95] 'Brexit' happened only after data collection had finished for this project, but the UK was already seen as inhabiting a particular position within Europe and its perceived Euroscapes by many interviewees. This was motivated by saying that European identity is often a function of people simply wanting to be European (Liina, from South-Eastern Estonia: "It just comes down to what people believe and want to be. If someone is for some part associated with Europe, Europeans, or anything European at all, then he or she can be called European – it does not even matter where this person lives. It depends on what these people want to be associated with."), and that people in the UK did not appear to 'want to be' in Europe.

[96] Chapter 6 deals with the relationship between the European Union as a political process and Europe as a cultural identity marker in greater detail.

role in the Europeanization of certain parts of Europe, as well as how people imagine Europe's future trajectories.

Divided Nations

Analogous to how Europe was seen in terms of different Euroscapes, states themselves were also geographically split by the interviewees between different areas. They did this either to symbolically represent cultural and political shifts, or to indicate actually perceived geographic differences within countries. Examples of the first type are Estonia being split between East/Baltic and North, or Poland being split between East/Central and West. Here, states are implicitly taken as broadly indivisible units where parts of that state are seen as belonging to different areas. This does not refer to a geographic definition, but rather to more intangible aspects such as the age/generation, income or social class of groups of individuals, or to different characteristics of the state as a whole that are associated with different Euroscapes (e.g. Estonia's language and culture was seen as Northern, while its economy was still 'stuck' in Eastern/Baltic). The second type of splitting up states between Euroscapes *did* refer to a 'real' geographical division. These typically include such cases as Ukraine with a perceived Eastern European west and a non-European or 'Russian' east, Italy or France with a Western European north and a Southern European/Mediterranean south, or Estonia with an Eastern/non-European east and a Baltic/North European west. These divisions tended to be rooted in perceived linguistic, ethnic, or historical differences within those countries that were seen to correlate differently with the broader European Euroscapes.

To be sure, exactly how individual interviewees would conceptualize such splits precisely depended on two factors. First, some countries were consistently split up with similar argumentations across all three country cases. This includes particularly Ukraine: as tensions between Russia and Ukraine were rising during the period of fieldwork (culminating in the 2014 Russian military incursion into Ukraine), the 'real' geographic split between Ukraine's east and west became especially salient. Other such often split up states include Italy (particularly by Northern Italians) into a geographically and culturally distinct northern and southern part, and Turkey along the Bosporus following a more formal geographic division. For the boundaries of Europe as a whole, Russia was sometimes similarly split up along the Ural mountain range. The division of the latter two states, Turkey and Russia, were typically

motivated by what interviewees had been taught as the geographic definition of Europe, although they did often also perceive some cultural distinctions between the European and Asian parts of those countries nonetheless, and sometimes included those European parts in the Euroscapes. Second, the way individual interviewees would split up states (or whether they would do so in the first place) depended on their political views and worldview more broadly. Those with a National (Chapter 4) outlook were much less keen on splitting up nation-states either symbolically or geographically, while conversely the Cosmopolitan Europeans often used this possibility to communicate their political convictions on the outdatedness of (national) borders.

For Estonians in particular, Euroscapes and the geographic imaginaries within them, presented a narrative through which they often expressed the societal shift they perceived Estonia to be experiencing. Rasmus describes that change as follows:

> Compared to the early 90s… If we take for example what is described in the '*Piiririik*' ['Border State', a novel[97]], how Estonia is situated in the intermediate space, what it means to us and how we come from Eastern-Europe. From somewhere behind the woodpile ['*kuskilt puuriida tagant*' , a derogatory term to describe something folksy, rural, and backward]. That kind of perception is something that I feel is fading away by now and I feel it only rarely occurring.

The concept 'Baltic' did not mean much for most Estonian interviewees, other than that it was the category that the now belonged to as a result of the cards they had been dealt by history. In this way, 'Baltic' was used as a narrative tool to distinguish Estonia from the rather negatively perceived Eastern Europe. To most, this was only a transitory state; their vessel upon which they would transition from post-Socialism and Eastern Europeanness towards being Baltic, and ultimately arriving at their destiny, to be Nordic. This was often visualized by drawing overlapping circles and arrows, as shown in the two cut-outs below.

[97] (Tode, 1993)

Figure 13 - Two cut-outs from Estonian interviewees' maps showing Baltic as a vessel of change.



A few Italian interviewees decided to split Italy into a Northern and a Southern part. Others did not, but often referred to the narrative of seeing Italy divided while largely disagreeing with it. For those who did divide the country, the North of Italy was always seen as more European than the South, and the South associated with African culture. Some intended for this to be derogatory (as mentioned above), but this was not always the case.

Finally, in each of the three countries, many interviewees felt that there was an urban / rural divide in terms of degrees of Europeanness. As one Estonian interviewee remarked: "Estonian culture is kept in villages and smaller towns. Bigger towns like Tallinn are not Estonian any more, they are normal European towns. National culture is kept in smaller places." Similarly, or sometimes alternatively (as below), Europeanness was attributed to different degrees to different 'types' of people (Salvatore):

> I think that in Italy there are people who are more European than others. It could depend on the cultural level of these people. The higher their culture, the higher their Europeanness. I do not think that it depends on where they live. It is not a question of city versus countryside, it is a matter of culture ['*è una questione culturale*'].

For some, to be European was an aspirational identity to an extent. Several interviewees mentioned that they saw themselves as European, but that they knew of other people who were even 'more European', such as Francesco: "I feel European but I know other people are more European than me." Those 'other

people' who are more European, were particularly seen as those who were spatially mobile, as Liisa explains: "When people travel more in Europe they do not become more European [*'Eurooplane'*] but more like Europeans [*'Euroopalikum'*]." In this quote, *'Eurooplane'* simply means 'European', while *'Euroopalikum'* means 'more European', indicating a *degree* of being European, or European*ness*.

Europeanness

During the interviews, while interviewees were drawing their Euroscapes on a blank map,[98] they were also asked where the boundaries of Europe as a whole were according to them, if such boundaries existed to them in the first place. To answer this question, some fell back to what they remembered from their high school geography classes, which would typically place the border of Europe along the Ural mountain range and the Bosporus in the east, on the Mediterranean Sea in the south, and would include Iceland in the west.[99] The Caucasus countries,[100] Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan did not always come up naturally during the interviews. When they did, or when the interviewer inquired about them explicitly, they were often cause for confusion and ambiguity. Italian and Dutch interviewees were not always familiar with these countries at all, but Estonian interviewees usually did include them in their broader conception of Europe based on a perceived shared history with these countries as post-Soviet states. For them, they were often seen as 'more European' than Russia, but this notion already moves beyond a purely geographic definition.

This geographic definition was always a very unemotional description, and those who defined Europe as such did not see any form of cohesion that would span this entire territory. Much more often, however, the boundaries of Europe were placed significantly further west. This was not because people were trying to remember their geography classes and failed, or had been taught differently in the first place. They made a clear distinction between what the 'official' geography would say according to them, and how they experienced it themselves: "I don't consider Russia to be Europe although geographically

[98] The maps that they were provided were 'blank' other than state borders and the names of those countries.

[99] Greenland was never included (most geographers would exclude this as well), but this was also absent from the map itself.

[100] The current dominant geographic definition of Europe excludes most of the Caucasus, as it takes the Kura river or alternatively the crest of the Caucasus mountain range as its boundary, which would only include small slivers of land in Georgia and Azerbaijan into Europe.

part of it is", (Reeta). This view on the boundaries of Europe was of course much more varied across all interviews, but still shows some striking similarities across most interviews in all three cases. The most common pattern would start the eastern boundary of Europe along the border of Russia to Finland, Estonia, and Latvia in the north-east (Kaliningrad was usually disregarded entirely). Going south from there, the boundary of Europe became more ambiguous, but usually excluded Belarus. Ukraine was one of the most contentious states, and how interviewees dealt with it when thinking about the boundary of Europe was either to exclude it entirely, to include it entirely, or – most commonly – to split the country in two parts roughly along the middle.[101] One interviewee (Margriet, Northern Dutch, in her 50s), who coincidentally also included Belarus into her view on Europe, expressed that Ukraine was *neither* Europe, *nor* 'Russian', but instead *both* European *and* Russian, pointing to the permeability of what it means to be considered part of Europe. An excerpt from her map that represents this is shown below.

Figure 14 - Ukraine as both European and Russian.

While her visual inclusion of Ukraine into both areas was atypical, her argumentation for it was not. Many of the interviewees viewed particularly Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as being a little bit of both, and for the Italian and Dutch interviewees the Baltic states also fit this description (and to a lesser

[101] This actually reflects the Ukrainian linguistic divide with Russian being spoken more in the east and Ukrainian in the west of the country.

degree also countries like Poland). This identifies a larger point, which is that the boundaries between different Euroscapes (i.e. areas within Europe) as well as between Europe and non-Europe were not usually very clear-cut. Instead, they were seen as membranes through which Europeanness is negotiated. Within that dynamic, the concept of Eastern Europe *as a whole* often acted as what was seen as a temporary mediator between an area that has not been 'Europe-proper' in recent history due to Soviet occupation or sphere of influence, and what could (or perhaps *ought to*) become Europe-proper in the indefinite future. Countries currently in the EU (such as the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania) were generally seen as being part of this transition *because* of their membership, and were rarely ever excluded from the interviewees' definition of Europe. This extension from institutional membership into their assessment on an area's Europeanness was evident in statements like the one by this Dutch interviewee: "I have been to Hungary and Poland, and there I felt that this is Europe, yes. But Romania, I don't know. I can't really say, because I haven't been there. But it is a part of the European Union, after all, so…" (Adam) When made explicit, however, interviewees were very divided on the notion that being an EU member state would make any state 'more European'. Particularly many Dutch interviewees saw Europeanness in this way, because they framed 'becoming more European' largely as adopting Western European (i.e. 'their') values and political traditions. For most Estonians this was very different, and they emphasized the role of the EU in this boundary making as a means to an end (the end being overcoming the Soviet past and the current Russian influence in the area, and 'returning' to their European 'destiny'). All non-EU countries in the east of Europe except for Russia existed in a more liminal state for most interviewees, which is what made the eastern boundary of Europe as a whole more permeable and unresolved.[102]

For the most part, this section of the interview revealed Russia as Europe's Other in the east in the minds of the interviewees, particularly for Estonians.[103] Russia's perceived influence on different parts of Eastern Europe was then often decisive also for assessing how European those areas were seen.

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[102] Ukraine tended to lean more towards being seen as Eastern European (and thus European), while Belarus was typically seen in the opposite way.

[103] Estonia has a very different historical relationship with Russia, of course, and even their current domestic demographics emphasize this (see Cheskin, 2015 for an analysis of what impact the presence of the Russian minority in Estonia has on domestic politics and their relationship to Russia; Trimbach & O'Lear, 2015)

This is illustrated by an exchange with an interviewee who felt particularly strongly that the non-EU countries in the east of the continent were under Russian influence (Oskar, Estonia):

> **Interviewer**: How about Ukraine, Belarus and Russia [after not including these countries in the drawing]? Do they form a separate group or are they European at all in your opinion?
> **Oskar**: I think they aren't.
> **Interviewer**: And why?
> **Oskar**: Well, they have more in common with Russia.
> **Interviewer**: And Russia isn't in Europe?
> **Oskar**: [firmly] No.

This non-Europeanness of Russia was also seen as a source of cohesion within Europe by some interviewees, which also cemented the Europeanness of Eastern Europe while at other times during the interview Eastern Europe was often seen as being somewhat 'less European'. As one Dutch interviewee (Adam) was asked about Russia after he had claimed that countries outside of Europe are "different":

> **Interviewer**: Do you feel that the fact that you see other countries outside of Europe as different also makes the European countries more close?
> **Adam**: Yes, I do think so. I think it is very relative how connected you feel to another country. And that includes ourselves versus others. For example, the border to Russia is now much more Europe against Russia. I do feel that way, and that does create some sort of unity I think.
> **Interviewer**: Do you feel the difference is really so large between Russia and Europe?
> **Adam**: No, I think the media… Well, yes, I do think so, but I also think the media create an us versus them image ['een wij-zij beeld']. I have never been to Russia, so I have no choice but to believe what the media says. And that does create a feeling of us versus them.
> **Interviewer**: Can you elaborate on that us versus them feeling?
> **Adam**: I see it in everything. It's just, the West, and that includes the United States a little bit, also how they deal with Ukraine and Syria. Uhm, yes, I don't know, that is just based on […]

> the image of Russia, because tensions are emphasized to some extent. […] That makes you notice, there are certain tensions [between Russia and Europe], and Russia is not European. It just isn't.

The point here is not to emphasize Russia as Europe's Other. This has been discussed at great length in earlier publications (Diez, 2004; Neumann, 1993, 1998b, 1999). At the current state of academic research, if Europe is assumed to need Others for its own identity construction in the first place, and if that Othering takes place vis-à-vis a territorial or geopolitical Other (as opposed to its own past, for example, see Diez, 2004; and in more general terms: Fabian, 1985; 2014), then Russia has become somewhat of an obvious candidate for that position. Instead, the above shows how the image of Russia as non-European and as Europe's most significant Other in the east plays into how Eastern Europe is constructed as moving from a history of non-Europeanness (i.e. Soviet domination) towards a more European present and future. As one interviewee concisely phrased it (Rasmus): "Sovietness *['Nõukogude-liidulikkus'*] is not Europeanness in my opinion. Europeanness means openness; openness to changes." The boundary making of Europe as a whole is instrumental in this, because that is where non-Europe is differentiated from (potential) Europeanness (see also Neumann, 1993; Neumann, 1999).

Similarly, though much less universally and much more nuanced, Southern Europe or the Mediterranean (depending on how interviewees labelled this area) was sometimes presented as a similar liminal stage. However, while Eastern Europe was seen as a vessel from less European to more European, Southern Europe was interestingly often presented as a category that could move in the opposite direction. As one Italian interviewee (Camilla) expressed her doubt while she was drawing what she felt was Western Europe:

> [Western Europe includes] Germany, France, Spain, Denmark, Benelux – so that is those old ones who founded the European Union. […] Italy, the poor one [*'poverina'*]. Because she is now transforming to become a Mediterranean country as well. […] If it will become richer, nothing will change. If it will become poorer [makes a wry, tragicomic laugh] … Of course. If Italy will

not succeed with all its policies to provide its citizens with a good standard of living I would consider it Eastern European, and then Mediterranean.

The interviewee above considered Italy to be Western European[104] due to its central historical role in European integration, but now felt that it was perhaps 'regressing' into being Mediterranean, which was not a positive development in her mind. This view of what the Southern European Euroscape represents is much more open-ended than the view on the Eastern European one. While Eastern Europe had a clear teleology for most interviewees, and had in it the promise to deliver the states and cultures in the east of the continent from history into Europeanness, this view of Southern Europe was undecided and could move either closer or further away from an abstract idea of 'core Europe'.

Economic developments were clearly the driving force of this uncertainty, and in that sense two interpretations of 'crisis' intersect here. First, the backdrop against which these interviews took place were some of the highpoints of the European debt crisis that started at the end of 2009. Southern European states were at the core of these financial woes, most notably Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, and to some extent Italy.[105] This context led many of the interviewees in all three of the country cases to conflate terms like Mediterranean or Southern Europe with being economically weaker, and as a consequence, with not living up to an ideal type of Europeanness. To be sure, this was not the only narrative on Southern Europe, as I have shown in the paragraph on this Euroscape earlier in this chapter. For several interviewees, Southern Europe's rich cultural history and influence on European societies was seen as a quality that made it *more* central to what it means to be European than any other part of Europe. Paradoxically, though, these two views were not necessarily mutually exclusive because to be 'European' can mean several different things at the same time to the same people (i.e. in this case economic development *and* certain cultural traits). This dynamic between economy and cultural

[104] She actually described it as "Central Europe" to reflect its 'centrality' in terms of power and culture within Europe, but it fits more closely with what most others labelled as Western Europe both geographically and in terms of its connotations. She did not have a Central Europe category like some others did in her perspective; only 'Central', East, Mediterranean, and Nordic.

[105] In addition, Ireland was considered as the only non-Southern European state of the rather derogatory acronym 'PIIGS' (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain).

influence was illustrated, for example, when discussing the European debt crisis with this Estonian interviewee (Rasmus): "In terms of culture, the countries of the Mediterranean region should be the most European [smiles], but nowadays/currently *['praegusel hetkel'*] that shine has faded [*'sära on tuhmunud'*] [laughs]."

The second meaning of crisis that intersects with the former in this view of Southern Europe lies in the etymology of the word itself. 'Crisis' has its root in the ancient Greek *krínō* (to decide) and *krísis* (a decision, or to separate) – which it shares with the word 'critical'. This connotation of 'crisis' is thus an open end rather than a "temporary malfunction of a perfectly well-balanced economic, social and political order" (Boldt, Stenius, & Stråth, 2012, p. 3). Where these two understandings of 'crisis' intersected in particular was that the financial crisis threatened the status of Southern Europe as an integral historical element of Europeanness through the ideal of economic prosperity as a core element of what Europeanness also meant to most interviewees. Conversely, 'crisis' in a broader sense (as an open point of decision) suggested that for some people there is an alternate vision or future path of Europeanness that may compete with the more established one. A Europeanness that is less reliant on economic development and opening up of markets (as has arguably been the focus of the EU), but instead emphasizes more human-centric ideals such as solidarity, human rights, and democracy. In this sense, the people who saw Europeanness in this way were contesting the more dominant notion of what defines Europe on the point of economy-first.

Amongst the interviewees in this study, such a view on Europe and Europeanness was a vocal, though minority position, while most people would see economy as a major defining element both in how they imagined Europe as well as the various Euroscapes described above. It is important to point out that those who did do so represented a very particular group of people. They were the ones who most enthusiastically declared themselves European above anything else (the Cosmopolitan Europeans from Chapter 4) or at least saw it as a very defining part of who they are in addition to other identities (some amongst the Situational Europeans). They were typically young, higher educated, politically left-wing, both geographically and socially mobile, and wanted 'another Europe'.[106] As Rasmus continued:

[106] The idea of 'another Europe' was especially put forward in the European Social Forum (see Bieler & Morton, 2004; Della Porta, 2009), and has often been propagated in the media during the late 2000's and early 2010's by

> Well, to me predatory capitalism [*'röövkapitalism'*] isn't European. [...] There definitely are some core elements of Europeanness, but I cannot name them out of blue... [...] I'm thinking of a Europe that includes a lot of diversity that shapes the individual: cultural diversity, egalitarianism, all sorts of social-democratic ideas... [Northern Europe is] predicting the things that are going to happen with [Europe] in the future... Sweden is exceptional with its liberality.

This also points to the decoupling of Europeanness and European identity from the institutional integration of Europe through the EU. For many interviewees the distinction between Europe as a cultural and societal notion on the one hand and Europe as an institutional structure through the EU on the other was not always clear-cut or relevant. Those who argued that this crisis should be seen as a breaking point that could (or ought to) lead to an alternative vision of what it means to be European often also saw the EU and Europe as clearly different entities, in much the same way as one would distinguish between a nation (i.e. a society) and a state (i.e. a government). This also reveals the limits and one-dimensionality of the concept of Euroscepticism, because the people who would espouse such views on what Europe or Europeanness is or ought to be were very critical of the EU as an institution (i.e. high Euroscepticism in a traditional sense), but felt very strongly about being European themselves.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter offered an analysis of how European geographic space was imagined by the interviewees in this study, and examined how such imaginations are related to people's identities. By using the concept of Euroscapes to take apart the different areas that interviewees considered within Europe, it was possible to expose issues of centre-periphery relations and power within the European cultural sphere. Particular conceptualizations of Europeanness and what it means to be European are part and parcel of

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usually politically left-wing and anti-capitalist politicians and campaigners, particularly after the Greek debt crisis of 2009 and the years thereafter. It is loosely taken as a battle cry to argue in favour of European integration, but not based – as is assumed to be the case for the EU's status quo – on neoliberal policies that emphasize opening up of markets and austerity measures.

those dynamics. Within those forces, (perceptions of) history and economy are of vital importance to how people imagine different Euroscapes and Europe as a whole.

The chapter first introduced the framework of Euroscapes that is used here. After that, these Euroscapes were introduced and described along a simplified categorization of North, South, East, and West. The North was often seen in a very positive light, and for some interviewees it was the epitome of Europeanness. For many others, this relationship was more complex, and the North represented a notion of Europeanness, but was not necessarily its (historical, cultural) core. For Estonians, it was often their dreamed destiny after a liminal phase of being Baltic. The South was seen as both at the centre of Europeanness in a classical historical, cultural sense, but more at the periphery in a modern European understanding. Eastern Europe was generally seen as 'less European' than any of the other areas, but this was mostly due to its Soviet / socialist past, and as a temporary state in the long run (after which the notion of 'Eastern Europe' might cease to exist altogether). Western Europe, finally, was mentioned and described the least of the four cardinal directions. This was not due to irrelevance, but paradoxically due to its centrality in defining what modern Europeanness represented to the interviewees. An important component of this was the institutional history of the European Union, which was seen by many as representative of modern Europeanness.

In a future follow-up study, it would be worthwhile to investigate in which ways these geographic imaginations vary not only by country cases (or are similar across such cases), but also how sociological and demographic characteristics factor into this. However, to do this systematically it may be necessary to collect more data, or to collect it using a different approach that would allow for more robust generalization. In order to really be able to generalize such imaginings to social groups or cases, a quantitative logic would be necessary. Based on this particular sample I cannot claim any of these narratives to be truly representative of a social group as a whole. Instead, I have attempted to map out and conceptualize the landscape of different relationships people have towards Europe and their (spatial) identities.

The next chapter looks at how ideas on the European Union and Europe more broadly were related to each other in the minds of the interviewees. In doing so, it aims to disentangle Euroscepticism, understood as negative attitudes towards the EU, from people's imagination of Europe. Differently put,

its goal is to separate the frames of reference as detailed in Chapter 4 from people's political ideas on Europe.

Chapter 6 – Europe, the EU, and Euroscepticism

Somewhere in the northern Estonian countryside, where presumably the 'real' Estonia is (see Chapter 5), we were staying with a family in their wooden house surrounded by their barns and a sauna (an integral component of any Estonian countryside home). Around the house, there were sprawling agricultural lands and a dense forest. The family consisted of a father, mother, three children, and a talkative and outspoken grandmother. One evening, over dinner, we got to talking about what exactly had brought us to Estonia, and I explained my research on Europe. The grandmother, who only spoke Estonian and Russian, started talking peevishly upon recognizing the word 'Europe' in my otherwise English sentence. The others tried to translate to me what I did not understand from what she was saying, and I explained again that I was interested in what people thought about Europe and that I was not there representing the EU in some way. The grandmother mustered all the English language that she knew to convey her message directly to me, and said "you know what we think of Europe? It's all bullshit." The others nodded in agreement.

This was a family who had lived a very local life for generations on this farm deep in rural Estonia. They remembered the Soviet occupation as a very dark page in the country's history, even though it also coincided with nostalgic memories of their childhood and young adult lives. Estonia was now a free nation once again, free to follow its own path. If one were to ask them about it, they would say that Estonia is an intrinsically European nation, and as such, the Soviet occupation was a departure from Estonia's 'true' identity. They would certainly locate Estonia in Europe more broadly, if only to emphasize the distinction from Russia. In this context, Europe is what *defined* Estonia from a historical perspective. From an *etic* perspective at the very least, Europe was therefore a core element of how the members of this family defined their identities. And yet, upon hearing the word 'Europe', they vehemently declared it "bullshit".

While this expression was particularly strong and colourful, a similar relationship to the notion of 'Europe' emerged for many other interviewees. Clearly, this family had an unfavourable view of the EU, but more importantly, the EU and 'Europe' had become conflated. At the start of each interview, the exact definition of what exactly is meant by 'Europe' was intentionally left up to the interviewee (see Chapter 3). When left unexamined, most would implicitly or explicitly use the EU and a broader understanding of Europe interchangeably.[107] When asked about this, interviewees would often explicitly say that they consider both of these concepts as more or less the same: "Um, yes, I think they [the EU and Europe] are actually about the same thing. Of course not all countries in Europe have joined the European Union, but when I think about Europe, I do immediately think about the European Union" (Adam, Netherlands). Likewise, as Luisa, an Italian translator for a Roman embassy in her 30s puts it: "I consider them the same thing, probably it is a similar thing. I consider them to be the same because most European countries are […] part of the European Union. I do not see big differences between the two concepts."

This view points to how the EU as an institution shapes citizens' imaginations of Europe more broadly (Bee, 2008; Delanty, 2005; Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Sassatelli, 2002; Shore, 2000; Shore & Black, 1992, 1994). Political institutions as a major force in shaping identities is not a new phenomenon, of course, and it has been a driving force and central object of study in the construction of national identities in nation-states. In the case of the EU, the active efforts undertaken by its institutions to engender a European identity amongst its citizens have been examined in earlier studies (Bruter, 2003, 2005b; Shore, 2000; Shore & Black, 1992, 1994). The effectiveness of these efforts has also been investigated in these studies, but so far research has mostly focused on the effects of explicit actions undertaken by the institutions of the EU,[108] and on indicators of *overt* expressions of identification with the EU. This chapter argues that with regard to European identity, (A) special attention needs to be paid not only to the effects of explicit EU policies, but also to unintended, more diffuse relationships that

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[107] Interviewees were instructed in advance that the subject of the interview would be how they see Europe broadly, explicitly saying that it would not necessarily be only about the EU.

[108] For example, in relation to things like the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity of 1973, or the introduction of the Schengen treaty, the Euro, Erasmus, and other EU policies that may engender a European identity.

exist between how people see Europe as a result of the EU as well as vice versa: how people see the EU as a result of how they imagine Europe. This circular logic demands that support for the EU and identification as European be disentangled. Related to this point, the current chapter argues (B) that for research to talk of European identity, *overt* expressions of such an identification need not necessarily be articulated by those interviewed (i.e. etic interpretations of emic dispositions). The discussion below assumes and builds on the descriptions and analyses offered in the previous chapters.

In earlier studies, explicit identifications with Europe have often been found to be expressed by particular carrier groups (specifically younger, higher educated, transnational elites), but not to the same degree by the general European population at large (e.g. Inglehart, 1970; McLaren, 2001, p. 90). This pattern is sometimes interpreted as the failure of a mass European identity to emerge, or taken to indicate a strong persistence of resistance to European integration in general. When identification with Europe is compared to the development of national identities, however, such results are largely in line with what may be expected from a historical perspective. National identities in Europe usually also first developed amongst particular groups of people that were structurally similar to the contemporary carrier groups of European identity (see the introduction of Chapter 4 on this point).

A counterargument to this parallel may be that present-day European societies are liberal democracies while their 18th and 19th-century counterparts had very few democratic elements. As such, one might argue that any polity depends on the majority of its citizens identifying with it for them to participate in (or construct) a public sphere which allows for political debate (Inglehart, 1970). This is a major component of the much-discussed 'democratic deficit' of the EU (Follesdal & Hix, 2006), and so from the perspective of identification with the EU as a prerequisite for true European democracy this is a valid and important point. During the development of national identities in Europe, elite carrier groups of such identities could dominate the political process and consolidate these allegiances amongst the wider population over time. In the case of contemporary Europe, the power of elites is still significant, but the general population can (and often does) vote against politics that do not align with their current frame of reference that is (usually) the nation-state. On this point, national identities and

European identities *can* in fact compete in the realm of political discourse, even though sociologically they usually do not (Carey, 2002; Duchesne, 2012; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008).

From a sociological perspective, therefore, it is relevant to examine the fact that the EU and Europe are often conflated in terms of what they mean to 'ordinary' citizens of Europe. Sociological imaginations of Europe should be disentangled from political views on the EU. This is politically important as well, because in the same way the EU institutions intentionally and unintentionally shape the identities of people, so too do people's imaginations of Europe as a broader concept feed back into how they evaluate the need for European integration on a political level. Identification with the *EU* (or the lack thereof) has been operationalized and investigated repeatedly, but the shifts in people's imagination of *Europe* have been left relatively under-examined. From an etic perspective, going beyond interpreting the civic identification with the polity alone (Bruter, 2004a, 2005a) is an essential component of understanding collective identification as a more holistic concept. From an emic perspective, the interviewees in this study almost unanimously found Europe to be a relevant frame of reference (but see the discussion on cisnationals in Chapter 4), but not always a marker of their *explicit* (i.e. emic) identity. Sociologically, therefore, the social dimension of European integration should be understood not only in terms of support for its politics or the outcomes of those politics in terms of identities, but particularly also the broader identity dynamics. This includes identifications beyond the scope of the European institutions, even though the EU always remains an important factor.

In order to disentangle views on the EU on the one hand, and imaginations of Europe on the other, it is helpful to intersect these two concepts along different theoretical understandings of Euroscepticism. Various authors have proposed alternative definitions of Euroscepticism. Broadly speaking, it refers to some degree of opposition to the idea of European integration, or to the way that this integration is being executed. One of the most influential definitions has been that of Paul Taggart, who held that Euroscepticism "expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). His later work, together with Aleks Szczerbiak, refined this definition after considering the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, and differentiated between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism. For them, "Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of

European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 27; 2004, p. 3). 'Soft' Euroscepticism, on the other hand, "involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, p. 4; 2005, p. 28).

In a critical review of these definitions, Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde argue that these definitions fall short for four main reasons. First, they point out that in Taggart & Szczerbiak's definition, soft Euroscepticism is too broadly defined, and therefore "virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included" (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). Second, they criticize Taggart & Szczerbiak for using the definition of hard Euroscepticism too loosely when they state that "in practice hard Euroscepticism can be identified by the principled objections to the current form of European integration in the EU" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 6). However, the authors amended this ambiguity in their conference paper somewhat in a later publication, where they extend the statement by saying that hard Euroscepticism in practice "is expressed by a principled objection to the *current form* of integration in the EU on the grounds that it offends deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, p. 3, original emphasis). While this defines grounds on which such contention would be based, Kopecký & Mudde have a third point of criticism: "the criteria that are used both to connect and to separate the two forms of Euroscepticism remain unclear," (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 300) meaning that there is no clear dividing line between where hard Euroscepticism ends and soft Euroscepticism begins. Finally, they argue that "the categories 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism do not do enough justice to the subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas of European integration, [...] and the European Union as the current embodiment of these ideas" (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 300).

After critiquing Taggart & Szczerbiak's operationalization of Euroscepticism, Kopecký & Mudde go on to propose their own scheme, by taking David Easton's distinction between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support for regimes (Easton, 1965). They inverse the concept of Euroscepticism by instead looking at ways in which, and degrees to which people (or political parties) support European integration and the EU. They define *diffuse* support for integration as "support for the general *ideas* of European integration that underlie the EU," and *specific* support for the EU as "support for the general

practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is developing" (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 300, original emphases). This is a helpful distinction, because it allows the separation of the views of people who consider themselves deeply European in their behaviours and worldview, yet (possible *because* of this) are critical of the EU and its policies or the way it is organized, from those who reject the EU as a matter of principle because of their inherently cisnational perspectives (see Chapter 4).

Political parties can take on different positions in these diffuse and specific Euroscepticisms. In the country cases under examination in this study (see Chapter 1 for an overview of the political situation at the time of fieldwork), those were often exaggerated positions, and so more in line with Taggart's indiscriminate 'hard' Euroscepticism, in the case of parties like the Dutch PVV. The Italian Lega Nord also had strong anti-European campaigns, including calls for Italy to abandon the Euro, although overall they state that they want European integration, but a Europe of the regions (*"Sì all'Europa, ma che sia quella delle Regioni"* (Movimento Giovani Padani, 2005)). This vision, in Kopecký & Szczerbiak's scheme, would classify them as having diffuse support for European integration, but no specific support for the EU. Other political parties in these countries, in particular some of the progressive parties and the social democrats, while arguing for specific support for the EU as an institution, at the same time criticized particular elements within it. This often made their position come off as comparatively technical to a public that seemed to be increasingly divided between more linear 'pro' and 'anti' EU positions (see Chapter 4 on this 'European gap').

When considering Euroscepticism as a term to describe citizen's positions, then, this distinction may be helpful for understanding their political allegiance, but not necessarily for understanding their identification and general experience of Europe. Nonetheless, due to this divisive political climate (see Chapter 1), their political allegiance does potentially shape their identity when it comes to Europe. Because the EU is politically presented as a choice (i.e. to be a member or not) rather than a given (as it would normally be for national identity within national[109] public spheres), when they are asked to consider their own Europeanness, their relationship to Europe's politics shapes their thinking – for better or for worse. Moreover, Eurosceptic parties across most EU member states continuously construct

[109] Though not to the same extent in cases of separatism such as Italy's *Lega Nord*.

a narrative that is opposed to the EU. When referring to the EU, these parties often use Europe and the EU interchangeably. This means that when people are asked about 'Europe' (also in the context of an interview), this narrative is activated, and they think of the EU. When people think of the EU, they consider their political perspective on it. When these politics are critical of the EU, their framing of 'Europe', in that moment, will be more negative as well.

Disentangling Identity and Support

The table below makes an attempt to systematically intersect the typologies as presented in Chapter 4 (Nationals, Situational Europeans, and Cosmopolitan Europeans) with Cram's (2012) distinction between *identification as* European, *identification with* the EU/Europe, and *support for* the EU. While using Cram's schematic is perhaps not an obvious choice for an interpretative project such as this one, this choice was made for two main reasons. First, it is helpful for connecting this classification and the typology as presented in Chapter 4 to the second part of this chapter, which goes into how 'classical' survey instruments have attempted to capture this phenomenon. Second, it is an attempt to bridge two increasingly differing approaches in the literature on European identity (see Chapter 2). What Cram means exactly by these distinctions will be addressed in the discussion of the scheme below the table. As she summarizes her categories (Cram, 2012, p. 72, original emphasis, bullet points added):

- *The self-allocated label or role* (*identification as*) – 'I am European';
- *The state of being* (*identification with*) – 'I am more or less intensively attached to the EU and/or its outputs'; and
- *The political behaviour* (*support for*) – 'I am a supporter of the EU, its policies and/or European integration'

She further argues that research should "go beyond the dominant focus on *identification as* Europeans and to problematize and explore the relationship between *identification as* a European, *identification with* the EU and *support for* (or opposition to) the EU" (Cram, 2012, p. 72, original emphasis).

The summaries that populate the cells in the table below are based on what emerged from the analysis of the qualitative interviews for this study, and they have largely been addressed in greater detail in the previous chapters. None of these typologies *necessarily* indicate a particularly positive or negative attitude towards Europe or the EU. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 4, they describe the meaning that Europe and/or the EU has to people in these typologies. Nonetheless, these meanings are often modulated by such an attitude. For that reason, the overview below contrasts positive and negative attitudes by expanding the scheme with the concept of disidentification (De Swaan, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2007), as discussed in Chapter 2. Disidentification is not simply the absence of identification. In many cases, it takes the form of a more active or explicit counter-identification, or *Othering* (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002) against Europe and/or the EU, or those who are perceived to support or identify with it. In some societies, this dynamic can cause a 'European gap' (see Chapter 4), where those who disidentify with Europe or the EU also see other individuals who do identify with these concepts as members of their out-group. Such an active disidentification with Europe is mobilized most vehemently in the realm of (national) party politics (Helbling et al., 2010; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Kriesi, 2007; Statham, Koopmans, Tresch, & Firmstone, 2010; Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2005) and the public sphere (Díez Medrano & Gray, 2010; de Wilde & Trenz, 2012), but as a discourse exists also amongst European citizens' daily interactions.

Table 3 – Typology of European identities

		Identification as European	**Identification with Europe / EU**	**Support for EU / integration**
Identification	*Nationals*	The nation is defined by it being inherently European.	The EU as an instrument to defend the nation's interests or expand its' influence.	EU membership is in the interest of the nation (see Q6 below).
	Situational Europeans	Europe as community of destiny (Laffan, 1996; Llobera, 2003; Sassatelli, 2002, p. 439; A. D. Smith, 1992, p. 58).	European integration benefits the nation, and offers a greater, shared good. Some European solidarity.	Integration is in principle a good thing for the nation (diffuse; see Q5 below) and the greater good, and EU is the proper instrument for this (specific).
	Cosmopolitan Europeans	Identification as European through group identity and social ties.	The EU is a relevant and effective framework to facilitate cosmopolitan ideals.	Integration is a necessary historical step, and the EU is the proper instrument for this.
Disidentification	*Nationals*	Europe is a collection of intrinsically distinct nations and cultures.	'Brussels' decrees detrimental regulations that are counter to national interests.	Integration is a threat to national sovereignty and identity.
	Situational Europeans	European nations share certain core values, but are otherwise distinct.	European cooperation or integration is desirable, but the EU is not the right framework for it.	Integration is the wrong discourse for cooperation.

Cosmopolitan Europeans	European, like national identity, is an arbitrary category and potential centre of power.	Typically *Alter-European* (de Wilde & Trenz, 2012).	Typically *Eurocritical (de Wilde & Trenz, 2012).*

Some of the cells in the table require a brief discussion. To start with the top-left category, Nationals who nevertheless identify *as* European, these were the Nationals who in Chapter 4 saw themselves as national only, but categorized their nation as a European *type* of nation. Mostly, this was a logical categorization of types of societies for these interviewees, without necessarily having strong (or 'hot') identifications with Europe as such. In the context of the conversation, this categorization was often done to argue against immigration and influences from outside of Europe. This is illustrated in Anu's (Estonia) response, when she was asked what makes someone European:

> Well, the culture and religion... I guess religion is the determining factor. After all an Indian isn't European. They have their own religion. All those Buddha's and such... And Japanese... Even if they live in Europe. In my opinion the heritage of the homeland always stays more or less vibrant even if the person lives in Europe. For example the Muslims who live [in Europe]. The Arabs. They may live in Europe, but it doesn't make them European, isn't that right?

Conversely, for others, the multiculturalism that they saw in such influences was precisely a defining characteristic of what it means to be European:

> **Rasmus:** I don't know, these things have become more complicated. Earlier I would have said that if someone had a Muslim background, though I'm not religious myself, then for me that would have been outside Europe, but that isn't adequate any more of course.
> **Interviewer:** So how about the culture of third-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany for example? Is their culture part of Europe?

Rasmus: I think it is. I have seen it so much in Sweden. I think it's even more European for me than what is happening here in Estonia [laughs].

By "what is happening here in Estonia", Rasmus was referring to how he saw the 'backwardness' of how Estonians treat the Russian minority, in his opinion. For him, Estonia was fortunately in a transition towards a more forward-thinking future (consider his quote on coming out from behind the 'woodpile' in Chapter 5). Such a definition of Europeanness is much more in line with cosmopolitan ideas on what Europe represents (Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007), and would fit in the row of Cosmopolitan Europeans under Identification in the table.

The Nationals who identified *with* Europe or the EU considered the EU a 'valued good' (Cram, 2012) in instrumental terms. The EU, to them, was a group of distinct and separate nations collaborating in the interests of the nation-states. Often, these were economic interests, but to the Nationals in particular, this collaboration also served the nation in a more fundamental sense. For Estonians in this category, for example, the EU represented a layer of protection against Russia, while for Dutch Nationals the EU was sometimes seen as an extension of the nation in the same sense as Western Europe represented Europeanness in Chapter 5.

A different type that bears highlighting, is where Cosmopolitan and Situational Europeans disidentified *with* Europe / the EU and showed little *support for* the EU, but nevertheless were in favour of European integration. Here, interviewees supported European integration as a matter of principle (or diffuse), but not in the particular form of the EU (or specific (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002)). For the Situational Europeans, this was the case for a wide variety of reasons. For example, some felt that the EU had gone too far by allowing Eastern European countries to enter, while others thought that Greece should not have been a part of the Eurozone, or conversely was being treated unfairly. For the Cosmopolitan Europeans, there was often a degree of political engagement, and an aspiration to formulate 'Another Europe' (Bieler & Morton, 2004; Della Porta, 2009), or, as De Wilde & Trenz label this perspective, 'Alter-European' (de Wilde & Trenz, 2012). The specific ways in which Europe would need to be organized differently in their perspective varied, but often centred around themes like social equality, social justice, solidarity, and the EU's democratic deficit, as Lotte's (Netherlands) view

illustrates: "I think that if you want Europe to work like a democracy, then you are going to have to change things. […] I believe the system needs to fundamentally change."

More broadly, views expressed in any of the cells in the table can be combined horizontally in any given individual perspective on Europe, although some combinations are more likely than others. It is conceivable, for example, that someone identifies *as* European, and has a cosmopolitan perspective on Europe, but is at the same time very much opposed to the EU as an instrument for European integration because of its perceived neoliberal focus (or Alter-European, as de Wilde & Trenz, 2012, p. 548 label this view) In fact, it is possible to identify *as* cosmopolitan European, but reject the *principle* of integration altogether. This may be the case, for instance, for someone who considers their cosmopolitan values reinforced by the idea of unity in diversity (Beck, 2006; Beck & Grande, 2007), extended to a global scale instead of particularly European. In such a case, the EU's perceived push towards cultural homogenization may in fact be seen as a threat to national identities and thus also to the principle of diversity itself. Conversely, it is also possible for someone to express a distinctly disidentifying national perspective when it comes to *identifying as* European, but simultaneously feel that the EU and the principle of integration is a good thing. Finally, Cram gives the example of someone who does not support the EU, does not identify *as* European, but nonetheless is attached to the EU "more than they recognize" (2012, p. 73). This implicit identification, as she calls it, is at the core of her notion of 'banal Europeanism' (Cram, 2001, 2009). For de Wilde and Trenz (2012), such a view aligns with what they call 'Status Quo' or 'Pragmatic' stances towards European integration.

While these views can indeed be combined, and exceptions to general expectations are possible – as Cram shows with implicit identification with the EU – there are some combinations that logically do not make sense. In most cases, individual perspectives may easily combine identification and disidentification across the three main columns, but they do not typically vary between worldviews entirely (national, situational European, cosmopolitan). Moreover, a radically different stance between *identification with* the EU on the one hand, and *support for* the EU on the other is only really possible through Cram's (2012) mechanism of implicit identification and/or through de Wilde & Trenz's (2012) 'Status Quo' or 'Pragmatic' typologies (or 'Europragmatists', as Kopecký & Mudde, 2002 call this type of position.). For de Wilde & Trenz (2012, p. 548), 'Pragmatic' stances are "the seemingly paradoxical

position of supporting the current EU institutional set-up, while at the same time denouncing integration in principle". This is possible because "these performances often understand the EU as a *fait accompli*, which might be undesirable in principle, but deserves support nevertheless, as other alternatives are either unrealistic or too costly" (2012, p. 548, original italics).

The specific compatibilities and incompatibilities described above reveal that *identification as* European is an intrinsically different phenomenon from either *identification with* or *support for* the EU. The latter is explicitly in relation to the EU or European integration as a 'valued good' in terms of Europe's institutions and politics. The former potentially refers to identification in a broader and more sociological sense, and can be based on, or even caused by an instrumental value of the EU – as Cram (2012) indeed argues. However, beyond Deutsch *et al.*'s (1957, p. 85) notion that "political habits of loyalty" may transfer between political units "if this seemed to offer a more promising framework within which this attractive way of life could be developed", the 'valued goods' offered by a sociological understanding of identification with Europe (as opposed to institutional or civic identification with the EU alone) are not necessarily directly related to what the *EU* as a polity provides. Instead, 'Europe' may have a richer and more diffuse meaning to at least some individuals.

Positions that span fundamentally different outlooks on *identification with* the EU and *support for* the EU (columns two and three) are unlikely, except in cases of Cram's implicit identification with the EU. On the one hand, this reveals the limits of Cram's distinction between the two in practical terms. Politically, if people's *identification with* the EU is merely implicit, and as such 'invisible' or so 'banal' that it goes unnoticed (Cram, 2001, 2009; Trenz, 2006), then in instrumental terms their support for the EU is not likely to be high. On the other hand, the potentially implicit and banal nature of *identification with* the EU highlights the avenues through which such an implicit *identification with* the EU might turn explicit (as Cram, 2012 explores further). It also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between *identification as* European and *identification with*, or *support for* the EU. Low levels of support for the EU, or identification with it, do not necessarily equate to low levels of identification as Europeans, and vice versa.

Measuring European Identity

Identification *as* European on the one hand and identification *with* or *support for* the EU on the other is not a trivial distinction, and it reveals some potential shortcomings in how attempts at measuring European identity have been undertaken in especially some large-N research on the topic. This is particularly true in the case of 'banal Europeanism' and the potential for implicit as opposed to explicit identification. Expressions of nationalism are often (usually) banal too (Billig, 1995), and yet it is effectively measured in surveys. A similar argument may be put forward here (i.e. that people might feel national in an etic and/or implicit way, and that typical survey questions do not capture this), but I propose that national and European identity can be different in at least one key aspect when surveyed: for many people, national identity falls in the category of 'identities' in the first place, while European identity does not. The interviewees in this study felt that Europe is 'there'; it exists (Castano in Herrmann et al., 2004, pp. 54-55), and all interviewees felt that in some way they were a part of it (the different ways in which are detailed in Chapter 4). When asked about national identity, however, it was – for everyone except some of the Cosmopolitan Europeans – an identity that they embodied, or identification *as* a national.

Cram's (2012) notion of implicit identification emphasizes identification with the EU, where people attach value to 'valued goods' that European integration in the form of the EU has provided them without necessarily being explicitly aware of it. In earlier chapters, I have distinguished between an *emic* and an *etic* view on identification with Europe. Implicit versus explicit identification with Europe is not exactly the same as the anthropological distinction between emic and etic, although they may be related in some instances. An etic understanding of European identity may draw conclusions about social reality regardless of how individuals themselves consider the matter of 'identification' with Europe. Instead, from this perspective, a social scientific definition of European identity guides how this phenomenon should be conceptualized and, thus, measured. The idea of implicit identification with Europe, on the other hand, presupposes that an individual's own (emic) understanding of identification could potentially become explicit under certain circumstances, especially also to the bearer him/herself. For studies in political science, the focal point tends to be the EU, its democratic legitimacy through the presence or absence of a demos, and support for the institutions. From this perspective, the distinction

between an implicit and explicit identification with the EU, and under which circumstances such a transition might occur, is of fundamental importance, as it directly relates to support for, and thus democratic legitimacy of the institutions.

From a sociological perspective, the question of European identity ought to be a much more conceptual one.[110] In a lot of research on the topic, the way it has been conceptualized has "taken its inspiration from the political science concept of identity as a sense of belonging to some larger political unit, especially as developed in the analysis of nationalism and national identity" (Kohli, 2000, p. 117). Such a political science conceptualization problematically often implicitly or explicitly assumes that European identity:

A. Relates to territory in a similar way as national identities (usually) do;
B. That it relates to a polity (the EU) analogous to nation-states, and/or;
C. That it is recognized as 'identity' by individuals themselves (i.e. explicit identification), or that it at least has this potential (i.e. implicit identification).

If the object of study is social or collective identity (as opposed to identification with a polity alone), none of these assumptions are always true in all cases. First, European identity does not necessarily refer to territoriality in the same way that nation-state identities do (Jensen & Richardson, 2003, 2004; Paasi, 2001). Second, it is certainly influenced by the EU, both intentionally and unintentionally, but identification with Europe does not always centre on the EU for all people in all situations. Moreover, the influence of the EU on European identity has been examined extensively (e.g. Bee, 2008; Delanty, 2005; Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Sassatelli, 2002; Shore, 2000; Shore & Black, 1992, 1994), but the inverse, where people's understanding of Europe may influence how they see the EU has arguably remained under-examined due to this focus on politics and institutions. Finally, and the main point that I am making here, what we might call 'identity' from a sociological, etic perspective does not necessarily align with what 'ordinary citizens' (i.e. from an emic perspective) understand 'identity' to be. I argue that

[110] To be sure, a broader, sociological conception of European identity is not inherently irrelevant for questions of EU citizenship (see Shore, 2004).

collective identity, as a concept in public discourse, has come to be associated with territorial identities (that is, predominantly the nation-state, regions, and cities). In other words, when people are confronted with a question that transparently asks them about how they 'identify', territorial definitions tend to come to mind. European identity may not always be such an identity (Giesen, 2003).

Moreover, even though research has established that European and national identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Carey, 2002; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995, 2008; Haller, 1999; Risse, 2010a), one's relationship to Europe may in some cases be underestimated when it is dialectically opposed (either in multiple follow-up questions or in single question phrasings) to their relationship to the nation. If European identity can in principle be understood as an identity onto itself, as opposed to in relation to national identity, then the sociological objective ought to be to understand this identification (or lack thereof) in its own right. Much like national identities need not be understood in contrast to regional identities (or vice versa), or territorial identities in contrast to individual/personal identities, so too can and perhaps should European identity be examined in its own right – both methodologically and conceptually.[111]

Similarly, in my view, 'European identity' should not be conceptualized (or measured) solely in terms of behaviours or (political) attitudes, or the lack thereof, but rather in terms of how individuals identify themselves in relation to, and within Europe. While attitudes and behaviours (and the absence of either) are comparatively concrete and 'easy' to measure, 'identity' is fairly nebulous and often implicit. To make matters worse, as described above, the word itself has not only become controversial in social science (see Chapter 2), but has also acquired strong connotations in popular discourse in many European societies. Moreover, many of the standard large scale surveys as reviewed below, and researchers who use these for their analyses continue to rely on existing question phrasings, largely uncritical of which connotations might be evoked in the imaginations of their respondents. This issue with existing large scale surveys is indeed exacerbated by the fact that they are often funded by European

[111] That is not to say that what it means to consider oneself European is wholly independent from national, local, or personal context (see Chapters 4 and 5 on this). Quite the contrary: such contexts can be decisive for understanding one's own Europeanness. However, perhaps analogous to how national or personal context will matter to, say, one's gender identity, this does not intrinsically mean that it should therefore be necessarily considered exclusively in relation to such contexts.

institutions (Duchesne et al., 2013, p. 7). These are the main reasons why I wanted to offer a largely descriptive account of how such questions were perceived at least by the interviewees in this project

To illustrate these points, the section below contrasts how interviewees in this study perceived the 'classical' survey questions as asked in some of the most relevant international surveys with how they imagined their relationship to Europe in the qualitative part of the interview. Each interview consisted of a semi-structured qualitative interview along with a number of visual probes (such as photographs and maps (see Chapter 5)), a number of structured questions about their social networks (cf. García Faroldi, 2008), and a short quantitative questionnaire (see Chapter 3 for an elaboration on how interviews were conducted, Appendix A for the interview guide and Appendix B for the questionnaire). The goal of this final component in the interview was initially twofold. First, it was meant to situate the interviewees in the existing quantitative research which is usually based on large-scale surveys such as Eurobarometer (EB), European Values Survey (EVS), World Values Survey (WVS), and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), by using questions that are directly taken from those surveys. Second, and more importantly for the discussion here, the goal was to be able to understand how people interpret such questions when they encounter them in one of these large survey programmes. This is in line with other efforts to understand and fine-tune the questions that are routinely asked in longitudinal surveys (Bourne, 2015; Bruter, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b; Duchesne, 2012; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995; Favell et al., 2011; Hanquinet & Savage, 2011; Sinnott, 2005), but from an explicitly qualitative angle and through the inclusion of non-verbal or non-explicit cues in agreement with what Jonathan White (2009, 2010, 2011) has proposed.

My goal for this chapter is to contrast two different types of data (the interview transcripts, and interviewees' reactions to the 'classical' survey questions) in order to shed some light on how at least the interviewees in *this* study interpreted such classical survey questions. Considering that it is precisely these questions that routinely form the basis for research on European identity and political attitudes towards Europe, this should allow for a natural connection to the first part of the chapter based on Cram's schematic that goes into 'Euroscepticism' in its diverse incarnations. It should be pointed out that there have been other, more extensive efforts where the authors have offered a review of typical

survey questions. Perhaps most notably, EUCROSS,[112] a large FP7 project that ran between 2011 and 2014, thoroughly and systematically reviewed such questions and gathered a large amount of data across six EU member states (Favell et al., 2011; Hanquinet & Savage, 2011). A somewhat older, but much-cited source for such critique is also Sinnott's review of some of the main survey items that have attempted to capture this phenomenon (Sinnott, 2005). Finally, Diez Medrano offered an extensive and well-documented review of such questions as well (Diez Medrano, 2010), and was similarly involved in a related project where measures of cosmopolitanism were put to the test (Braun, Behr, & Díez Medrano, 2017). The current chapter is not intended to improve on any of these earlier, more extensive efforts, but rather to supplement them with the perspectives that arise from the interviewees in this project.

There were ten questionnaire items relating to (European) identity that were asked of the first few interviewees in this study, taken from several different pre-existing surveys. In later stages of the data collection, three of these questions were merged into one single question, because there was a lot of perceived overlap and interviewees quickly grew tired of these particular questions (this section was administered after a lengthy in-depth interview, after all). For the overwhelming majority of interviewees, this put the total number of items that attempted to capture European identity at eight.[113] Below, the questions that were selected are briefly described.[114] They are reproduced here in English, but – as was the case for the rest of the interview – they were administered in the languages of the three country cases (see Chapter 3), with minor differences to account for local context (this is indicated below).

The first two closed questions that were asked on European identity are both what Sinnott (2005) classifies as 'Type C' questions. They are the most frequently used questions in quantitative

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[112] See also http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/158235_en.html

[113] Due to time restrictions for each interview, and the overall focus on the in-depth interview, not all survey questions on European identity that have ever appeared in any large-scale survey could be included in this examination.

[114] The quantitative results amongst the interviewees in this study are not reproduced here because they would be meaningless considering the type of approach and, consequently, the sampling technique in this study. See Chapter 3 for more on the methodological choices for this project.

research on European identity (Bourne, 2015, p. 59). The first question comes from EB 71.3 (administered in 2009) and 69.2 (in 2008), and asks:

> **Q1:** I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, [NATIONAL] or from a specific region. Some people say that with globalisation, people are becoming closer to each other as 'citizens of the world'. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are…
>
> 1. Regional
> 2. [NATIONAL][115]
> 3. European Union
> 4. Europe as a whole[116]
> 5. World Citizen

For this question, for each 'geographical' marker, interviewees could answer 'not at all', 'not really', 'somewhat', and 'to a great extent'. This question is very similar to an older EB question, which asks people to respond in degrees of "attachment" (very, fairly, not very, not at all) to their town, region, country, the European Union, and Europe as a whole.[117] The second question is also based on the EB surveys, but has a much longer history of being included (between 1992-2015, in various iterations):[118]

[115] For Estonia, an additional option was added for Russophones (see also Cheskin, 2015).

[116] In EB 71.3 and 69.2, no distinction is made between the European Union and Europe as a whole.

[117] EB ECS71, ECS73, 36, 43.1bis, 50.1, 51, 54.1, 56.3, 57.2, 58.1, 60.1, CCEB2003.4, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 67.2, 68.1, 71.3, 73.3, 77.3, 79.5, 80.1, 82.3, 84.1, and 84.3.

[118] EB 37, 40, 42, 43.1, 44.1, 44.2bis, 46, 47.1, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54.1, CCEB2001.1, 56.2, 57.1, CCEB2002.2, 58.1, 59.1, CCEB2003.2, 60.1, CCEB2003.4, 61, CCEB2004.1, 62, 64.2, 67.1, 73.4, 76.4, 77.3, 77.4, 79.3, 80.1, 81.2, 81.4, 82.3, 83.3, and 84.3.

Q2: In the near future, do you see yourself as:[119]

1. [NATIONAL] only
2. [NATIONAL] and European
3. European and [NATIONAL]
4. European only

Here, interviewees could select only one of the offered choices. The third question asked interviewees to rank their identification (i.e. 'Type A' in Sinnott, 2005), and is based on how the EVS and WVS. These surveys ask “Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?”, and then follows up by asking “And the next?” (see Sinnott, 2005, p. 214). Considering the prior two questions, this formulation was simplified somewhat in the questionnaire for this study. Most notably, compared to EVS/WVS, the explicit reference to geography was dropped:

Q3: Of the following things, in which order do you see yourself?[120]

1. Regional
2. [NATIONAL]
3. European

In the first interviews, there were three somewhat similar questions that followed this third question. These were later merged into a single fourth question. All three of these questions in essence relate to what Europe means to people in terms of its contents (in a sense, Barth’s (1969a) ‘cultural stuff’). This type of questions was not part of Sinnott’s (2005) typology, as they do not measure the degree / rating or ranking of identities in a direct way and a single dimension, which appears to be his focus. It is

[119] In some Estonian interviews, there were added options for Russophones in the questionnaire as presented in this study.

[120] The units to be ranked were supplemented by case-specific entities, such as ‘Russian-Estonian’.

doubtful, however, that European identity would be understood the same way in this one-dimensional type of questioning (Meinhof, 2004). The inclusion of the questions below therefore partly follow Bruter's (2003, p. 1154) argument that "when two individuals claim to 'feel European', they might mean totally different things in terms both of intensity of the feeling they describe and the imagined political community they refer to". The first of these questions is based on EB surveys from 2008-2015:[121]

> **Q4A:** European identity can be composed of several elements. In your opinion, which of the following are the most important elements that go to make up the European identity?

History
Geography
Democratic values
The European Anthem
The European flag
The single currency, the Euro
The European Union's motto
Economic prosperity
Culture
Peace
Modernisation
Free movement or open borders
Cooperation

For this question, interviewees had to say 'yes' or 'no' to all of the items. The second initial question was similar, but more directly asked what 'Europe' meant to the interviewee personally (as opposed to 'European identity' in abstract terms):

> **Q4B:** What does Europe mean to you personally?

History
Geography
Democratic values
Social protection
The European flag
The single currency, the Euro
Cultural diversity
Economic prosperity

[121] EB 70.1, 71.3, 73.3, 77.3, 77.4, 79.5, 82.4, and 84.1

Culture

Peace

Modernisation

Unemployment

Bureaucracy

Waste of money

Loss of our cultural / national identity

More crime

Freedom to travel, study and work

Free movement or open borders

Cooperation

The third question of this type was also similar, but instead asked them about a hypothetical change in the way they identify:

Q4C: Which of the following elements would strengthen your feeling about being a European *citizen*?

Being able to vote in all elections organised in [COUNTRY]

A European social welfare system harmonised between the Member States

A President of the EU directly elected by Member State citizens

A European Olympic team

A European ID card in addition to national ID cards

European embassies in non EU countries

A European service to fight European and international natural disasters

A European civic education course for children from primary school age

A common European military service

As mentioned earlier, these three questions were later merged into a single question based on Q4B in terms of question phrasing,[122] but expanded with some of the non-overlapping items from Q4A and

[122] Slightly expanded to read: "The word 'Europe' can mean different things to different people. What does 'Europe' mean to you *personally*?". For each item, interviewees could answer 'yes', or 'no'.

Q4C. After this, interviewees were asked about their evaluation of EU membership, based on three questions that have been used extensively in academic work that examines support for the EU.

Q5: Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]'s membership of the European Union is...?

1. A good thing
2. Neither good nor bad
3. A bad thing

Q6: Taking everything into account, would you say that [COUNTRY] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

1. Benefited
2. Not benefited

Q7: In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

1. Very positive
2. Fairly positive
3. Neutral
4. Fairly negative
5. Very negative

These three questions were usually easy for interviewees to answer, and they generally did not seem to give it a lot of deep thought. The final question about European identity that was included for evaluation

was taken from an Estonian survey called *Mina Maailm Meedia*[123] (Kalmus et al., 2004) that used a semantic differential scale (Abdelal et al., 2006, p. 703; Heise, 2010) to assess connotations that people have with Europe.

Q8: Below is a list of word pairs. For each pair of words, please select which description fits best with your feelings about Europe.

	Very much	On average	To some extent	Neither	To some extent	On average	Very much	
Fast	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Slow**
Familiar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Strange**
Open	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Closed**
Weak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Strong**
Warm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Cold**
Decreasing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Increasing**
Mobile	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Fixed**
Careless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Caring**
Rising	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Falling**
Colourful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Grey**
Secure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Dangerous**
Repelling	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Attractive**
Clean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Dirty**
Unfriendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Friendly**
Fragmented	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**United**

[123] 'Me, the World, Media'.

The response to this last question was interesting, because out of these eight questions, most interviewees would struggle most with providing an answer to this one. At the same time, many of them felt that this question did allow them to express a lot of the things that would remain unsaid in the other questions. Having been primed to speak a lot during the closed questions part by going through the qualitative in-depth interview first where they were obviously encouraged to do so, they would often engage in lengthy discussions for each of these word pairs. For later interviews, this prompted me to add another column to the right of this question that would enable such comments.

The table below briefly summarizes the typical interpretations to each of the questions above. This is a generalization, and for each of the interpretations mentioned below, there were several exceptions. As a general summary, however, these descriptions provide a context for how the interviewees in this study typically understood these questions.

Table 4 – Summary of typical interpretations of survey questions on European identity.

Question	**Typical interpretation by interviewees**
Q1: *"I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity…"*	Geography and territory, but interpreted differently by different people. See also Carey's (2002, p. 405) critique in the same vein.
Q2: *"In the near future, do you see yourself as…"*	Teleological self-perception, and with different meanings to different people. See also Bruter (2003, p. 1154) and Risse's (2004, p. 9) critique.
Q3: *"Of the following things, in which order do you see yourself?"*	Hard for interviewees to answer; depends on context. See also Meinhof's (2004, p. 220) critique.
Q4: Varied, but usually: *"What does Europe mean to you personally?"*	Usually interpreted as 'what does the *EU* represent?'

Q5: *"Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]'s membership of the European Union is...?"*	Evaluative: 'valued good' usually on instrumental aspects, but sometimes expression of cultural threat by Nationals.
Q6: *"Taking everything into account, would you say that [COUNTRY] has on balance benefited…"*	Evaluative: instrumental. Usually they only considered economic benefits. In Cram's (2012) terms, does the EU provide 'valued goods'?
Q7: *"In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive…"*	As it reads, but many used this question to express their *diffuse* support for European integration, which followed their view on Europe more broadly (especially Cosmopolitans).
Q8: *"Below is a list of word pairs. For each pair of words, please select which description fits…"*	Hard to answer, but usually activated their thoughts on Europe instead of EU.

Questions 1 and 2 are some of the most frequently used questions in research on European identity (Bourne, 2015, p. 59). The first question was understood to ask explicitly about geographical, territorial identities. In the light of using this question as a measurement of identification with Europe, the interpretation that the interviewees had of this question was subject to the centre-periphery relations between Euroscapes as discussed in Chapter 5. For many Estonians, for example, this meant that they had no reservations about saying that they identified as belonging to the European Union (Estonia was a member state, so there was 'hard evidence' of this identity), but they were more hesitant about saying that they were identified with 'Europe as a whole'. This was an identity that they largely ascribed to Western Europe, and to a lesser degree to particular individuals (those who were spatially mobile, for example, or those who were *'Euroopalikum'* – see Chapter 5). Differently put, identification is not only experienced, but also ascribed, and for many Estonians (and some Italians), they did not feel that this ascription applied to them.

This was less of an issue for the second question (*'In the near future, do you see yourself as…'*), precisely because it referred to how they *expected* to see themselves in the future. This teleology of *becoming* European was present in much of the narrative for many of the Situational Europeans in particular, and was not always necessarily taken to apply to the interviewees themselves, but rather to how they expected 'people in general' to feel in the near future. In other words, for some interviewees, this was taken as a question that was not about them as individuals, but rather about how they expected their society and people *like* them to feel in the future. Some of the interviewees who had children answered this question on the basis of how they expected them to feel (now or in the future), reflecting these generational expectations. Sandra (Estonia), for example, felt this way. When shown an image of the EU flag earlier on in the interview, she similarly responded that she had "no special feelings" towards it, but that her "children will have an emotional connection with it, because they have grown up in EU." In light of such expectations, many interviewees kept some memorabilia of this pre-European society in the form of national banknotes and coins (see also Risse, 2003). Both Salvatore (Italy) and Piret (Estonia) said similar things about this. Salvatore: "I have some Lira, like a souvenir, to show to my children." Piret (Estonia): "I did keep them as souvenirs. It is the relics of family, to show it to my children."

As has been pointed out before (Bruter, 2003; Risse, 2004), this second question does not reveal what people *mean* by these answers. The option 'National and European', in particular (currently the largest group, see Chapter 4), for some interviewees meant that to be European was an intrinsic part of their identity and how they related to the wider world, and how far their empathy would stretch. For others, it was simply a matter of logical categorization (see above). My nation is a European *type* nation and/or my nation is geographically within Europe. In this sense, Risse's (2010a) marble cake model might apply to *some* of the people who choose this option in surveys, while for *others* they instead consider this as layered (Laitin, 1998) or nested (Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Herb & Kaplan, 1999) identities, or not as identity at all but merely geography and topography.

Question 3 was often hard for interviewees to answer, and some would engage in criticizing the question on the basis that they had already explained to the interviewer that how they saw their identity depended on context. Indeed, this order may not be as fixed in reality as the question phrasing

presupposes. Ulrike Meinhof (2004, p. 220) similarly criticized assumptions in surveys that individuals hold fixed and continuous identities. Some of the interviewers further understood this question in terms of topography as well, where the region is logically within the nation, which is logically within Europe.

For all of these question, one potentially problematic aspect (in terms of measuring European identity) that emerges is that most interviewees either conflated how they regarded the EU (i.e. specific support (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002)) and Europe, or switched between thinking about the EU or Europe between questions. Qualitatively, these two concepts were usually distinct for the interviewees, but *how* they were different *exactly* typically only emerged after a long exchange, if at all. To some, there was barely any distinction, such as for Lotte (Netherlands) and Luisa (Italy):

Lotte

Because that is where you notice Europe: open borders we notice, an open market we notice, and of course [EU] policies, we notice. And so these things are rapidly about the EU [*'dan heb je het al snel over de EU'*]. So when I talk about Europe, then I largely mean the EU.

Luisa

I consider them [Europe and the EU] the same thing. Probably it is the same thing. I associate them to be the same because most European countries are part of the European Union. I don't see big differences between the two concepts.

Luisa's perspective also illustrates how the EU's institutional development has had an impact on the imagination of Europe itself. In this way, the EU's integration efforts have tapped into a sense of Europeanness amongst many of the interviewees in this study, and had itself come to embody the meaning of Europe. Valentina, an unemployed woman in her late 50s from Milan, expressed this aptly, by saying that: "The term Europe was a container and the EU has become the content [*'Il nome Europa era il contenente e l'UE è diventata il contenuto'*]." This is reminiscent of Barth's (1969a) 'boundary' (i.e. the 'container'), and the 'cultural stuff' (i.e. the 'content') that it encloses.

The conflation of meanings associated with Europe and the EU also meant that the interviewees often approached these questions from a political dimension. In all three countries the EU was heavily politicized, especially during the time of data collection. Different parties represented different concerns regarding European integration. Some parties, for example, emphasized the economic instrumentality of the EU, while others portrayed the EU as one of the causes of the Eurocrisis and of mass immigration from Islamic countries. As such, identification or disidentification with Europe can come to be linked to domestic policy concerns that are not intrinsically related to EU policies or Europe as a cultural notion (such as (im)migration, discrimination, religion, and language). This is partly because identification with Europe or (support for) the EU is not evenly distributed across social groups in society (see, for example, Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Fligstein, 2008; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; L. Hooghe & Marks, 2004a; Kuhn, 2011; McLaren, 2002; L. M. McLaren, 2006), and so opinions on some of those other issues may come to be associated with these different ways of positioning oneself in terms of identity as well. This entanglement of attitudes on different topics certainly emerged from many of the interviews in this study. For example, disidentification with Europe was seen by those who did identify with Europe as a symptom of a more generalized 'closedness' of those people, which to them would indicate that those others would probably also be anti-immigration and support radical right parties (such as the Dutch PVV, or the Italian Lega Nord). Similarly, interviewees who were critical about immigration from either Eastern Europe or from Islamic countries outside of Europe (particularly those in the Nationals type in Chapter 4), would often connect these issues to European integration by distancing themselves from the 'politically correct Europhiles'. For Anu, a manual labourer in her 50s from one of Estonia's islands, for example, only showing an image of the EU flag (see also Bruter, 2003; Cram & Patrikios, 2015) triggered the following response for her:

> It's the union's flag. I don't think it represents the entire Europe. […] I think closer European integration weakens national culture and identity. Maybe it's not a correct comparison, but we had the Russification during the Russian era [*'Vene aja'*]. A lot of foreigners came here. For the time being there's not a lot of people who would want to move here, but it may change. My husband's relative came back to Estonia last year. He had lived 21 years in the Netherlands and

> said that there are a lot of Muslims in Western-Europe. For example in Paris there are certain Muslim neighborhoods where even the ambulance won't go, because it is dangerous. […] I think we should cut back on immigration. The threat of terrorism is pretty serious. […] In Germany there are towns where there are more foreigners than natives [*'pärismaalane'*]. And the same is for some schools. There are more Muslim children than Germans. Of course they want to preserve their culture, but at the same time it is worrisome for the country they live in.

Conversely, but based on a similar argumentation, Adam (Netherlands), while talking about European integration and immigration from outside of Europe, felt that:

> I was just thinking about France, which has a very particular culture, of course, and that it differs in what way you have culture, and that can be a shame. Like how you think about abortion or euthanasia, for example, that this should become a little more unified [across Europe] in my opinion. But something like… Those funny [*'grappige'*] things about those countries, that the Netherlands celebrate King's Day, and that in France they eat French bread with brie, to put it stereotypically. But those sorts of things are very nice to keep, that shouldn't become uniform [*'eenheidsworst'*]. But I'm not afraid that those things will disappear. […] I very much enjoy the fact that there are all sorts of people from different countries coming in. Of course people with a war past can be difficult [to deal with], but I feel that immigration has only brought us good things; nice culture things [*'cultuurdingen'*], nice food, new languages. That is just beautiful. Otherwise things would be pretty boring.

On a political level, such holistic differences in perspective (i.e. perspectives on Europe combined with other, seemingly unrelated issues) are often amplified. As one local politician of the social-liberal D66 party in Dutch Limburg stated when talking about how they relate to the local fraction of the far-right and Eurosceptical PVV party:

> It is not a club of people with whom I would join into a coalition. It's just different on the point of cross-border cooperation [*'grensoverschrijdende samenwerking'*]. There, we are miles apart [*'dan zit je mijlenver uit elkaar'*]. Also the view on society. How you treat people from other/different [*'andere'*] cultures, from other/different backgrounds. There is such a world of difference between [how we see these things, and how they see them]. If you were to collaborate [with that party], then, how shall I put it… Then you will soon feel like a German centrist politician from the late 1920s, early 1930s.

Anu, when asked the questionnaire questions of whether the European Union had been a good thing for Estonia, and whether Estonia had on average benefited from being a member, answered positively without much hesitation. Note that this is after first exploring also the negative aspects of being an EU member state in great detail during the qualitative interview part, which arguably would have primed her to consider questions like these with more reservation than if she would have answered them in the context of the original surveys. When considering the question whether Estonia had overall benefited from EU membership, however, none of her National (Chapter 4) narrative appeared to matter in her answer. Instead, all that she considered in her answer here, was whether Estonia had benefited economically.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter looked at the interplay between what 'Europe' and the EU meant to the interviewees in this study. In doing so, it first examined the notion of Euroscepticism, and considered what support for the EU or the lack thereof means in that context. It then attempted to systematize the typologies as presented in Chapter 4 along Cram's (2012) conceptual distinction between identification *as* European, identification *with* the EU, and *support for* the EU, as well as De Swaan's (1993, 2001, 2003) duality between identification and disidentification. After that, the chapter looked at the ways in which European identity has been measured in surveys, and contrasted those questions with how the interviewees in this study interpreted them.

For many of the interviewees, there was not an immediate difference between how they understood 'Europe' and the EU. Cognitively, of course, they understood the conceptual difference, but due to the EU's dominant presence in contemporary political debate and rhetoric, the word 'Europe' had become entangled with a wide range of political, social, and cultural connotations. Because of this, when pressed to examine the differences in meaning between the two concepts, many interviewees saw Europe, when stripped from the meanings associated with the EU, as something of an empty container, or a geographical category with some general shared cultural traits. This did not apply to all interviewees, however. There were certainly those who identified *as* European, and saw the EU as its civic counterpart. In those cases, the EU represented Europe's civic component, and – *vice versa* – Europe represented the EU's cultural counterpart (Bruter, 2004a, 2005a). For most, however, there were certainly civic and cultural components of Europeanness, but they were present in both the conceptualizations of the EU and of Europe.

When operationalized in survey questions, therefore, the latent concept that can perhaps be labelled 'European identity' from a social science perspective needs to be approached from a variety of dimensions instead of one-dimensional questions about attachment or evaluation of the EU. Directly appealing to identity as a concept, either directly or indirectly (for instance by contrasting Europe to the nation or region) may trigger particular interpretations amongst respondents that deviate from how researchers may interpret them. This potential disparity between what identity means as a relevant notion to 'ordinary citizens' and how it is conceptualized when studying identity in Europe from an academic perspective I consider to be crucial for a re-imagination of how research on this topic should be conducted. This is also a particular issue considering the apparent conflation between 'Europe' and the EU. Many interviewees certainly made a clear distinction between the two concepts, particularly in cases where they would politically resist the EU or its specific institutions, but imagine and situate themselves squarely within Europe, and as European. These interviewees would normally not be opposed to the idea of political European integration, but instead might resist the EU in its current form (see also Della Porta, 2009, and Chapter 4).

When asked *explicitly* about their identification with Europe, many of the interviewees would approach this question in terms of European*ness*. Certain individuals and geographic areas were seen as

being 'more European' than others (see Chapter 5), and when asked to reflect on how they saw themselves, this frame of reference would be activated. In a sense, they considered their identity as they thought that they would *be perceived* by others. This meant that for some Italians, and most Estonians, their European identity was 'not there yet', but would likely be there for their children. This was influenced by the meanings associated with different Euroscapes. In sum, this suggests that an explicit, self-conscious reporting of European identity is mediated through European*ness*, which in turn is partly informed by the meanings of Euroscapes. These exist within a political space associated with centre-periphery dynamics embedded in the institutional history of European integration.

Chapter 7 – Conclusions

After the foundations and methodological approach described in Part I, the previous three chapters in Part II offered an analysis of the data that was gathered for this project. In this final chapter, the main contributions of this work will be discussed and connected, as well as its limitations. After that, it will end with suggestions for future avenues of research.

Looking Back

There is no European identity singular, but there are European identities, plural. This study aimed to understand these complexities in the ways in which different people, from different contexts, relate to Europe. The starting point for this investigation was the question:

> *What does Europe mean to different groups of people, and how does this relate to their identities, geographical imaginations, and political institutions?*

This guiding question suggests three parts: identities, geographies, and politics. For all three of these aspects, this study has examined on how 'ordinary people' imagine them, and which relations they see between them. To do so, mixed-type interviews were conducted with 95 people across three European countries: Estonia, Italy, and the Netherlands. Each interview centred around a semi-structured, in-depth interview of roughly two hours, which featured some elements of visual methods. One of these was photo elicitation (Clark-Ibáñez, 2004; Harper, 1998, 2002; Vila, 2013), the other was by taking blank maps of Europe and having the interviewees draw their imagined geographies (Aase, 1994; Harvey, 1990; Monnet, 2011; Said, 1979; Adrian Smith, 2002) on these maps while simultaneously discussing their drawing (see also Copeland & Agosto, 2012). After that, interviewees were given a short questionnaire with closed questions and a social network name generator (Bidart & Charbonneau, 2011; Burt, 1984; Killworth & Bernard, 1978).

The analysis that followed took on an interpretative approach, from which the core findings for each of the empirical chapters in Part II emerged. This discussion focused on a different component of

the central question in a separate chapter, each guided by their own sub-questions. Chapter 4 looked at the identities and meanings attributed to Europe by different people by asking:

Question Chapter 4: *What are meanings attributed to Europe, and how do such meanings relate to different people's worldviews and identities?*

This was done by adopting a typology analysis (Favell & Recchi, 2011, p. 68; Psathas, 2005; Załęski, 2010) of different ways in which people relate to, and understand Europe, and what this means for their regional, national, and European identifications. Such meanings varied according to different people's lived experiences and lifeworlds, and this variety was in principle infinite. To systematize matters, therefore, Chapter 4 distinguished between three main types based on the analysis of the data: Nationals, Situational Europeans, and Cosmopolitan Europeans. Within these typologies, there were distinct narratives. Particular attention was paid to the Nationals perspective, because this tends to be a somewhat underrepresented group of people in research on European identity.

The Nationals typology included what I have called *cisnationals*, but also *regionalists*, and *open nationals*. Both the regionalists and the open nationals share much of the core narrative of the cisnationals, but with usually small differences. By using the term cisnationals, I referred to those individuals who *only* took the nation-state as their frame of reference and nothing else. The regionalists, in turn, grouped together narratives that took any sub-national territorial identities and lifeworld as their frame of reference. They were categorized under Nationals nonetheless, because all of these narratives were necessarily in dialogue with their respective nation-states. The open nationals, like cisnationals, took the nation-state as their frame of reference, but considered the nature of the nation to be a European *type* nation. This was often functional to them, in order to differentiate between different perceived cultural threats to their nation: that of extra-European immigration (Muslims, Russians), and that of globalization. For all such threats, Europe and European integration, either represented a protective shell, *or* a threat in and of itself. The cisnationals categorically saw Europe as a potential threat, while the open nationals considered European collaboration as beneficial in some cases.

The Situational Europeans (Fligstein, 2008, 2009) are statistically often the largest group of people in most European societies. This type referred to people who see themselves as national first, but also as European given the appropriate context. This is the arena of most of the national political debates on European integration, and for the identities of the Situational Europeans it matters how Europe is portrayed in political discourse on any particular issue. A lot hinges on this group for the democratic legitimacy of the EU in the future. Discussing the significance of this group, Fligstein et al. (2012, p. 110) already argued that given a pro-European political discourse, over half of the people in Europe are likely to support further European integration, while if the opposite happens, the same group of people potentially favours a national solution to those issues. The Situational Europeans were a very diverse group. What they shared, however, was that they would emphasize the contextuality of their frame of reference and, sometimes, their identifications. Amongst the Situational Europeans, Europe always had a degree of entitativity, and European integration was a more or less natural part of their lifeworld. They were often still reluctant on how much influence the EU should have, however.

Finally, the Cosmopolitan Europeans represented the typology that has been the focal point of a lot of research on an emerging European identity, as they typically represented the most likely carrier groups of such identifications. Typically, these were the individuals that are expected to have benefited from European integration, or who might do so in their lifetimes. Characteristically, these are people who are young, higher educated (Moes, 2009), spatially mobile (Favell, 2008; Favell & Recchi, 2011), reside around national borders (Kuhn, 2012a, 2015), and who have a high number of international contacts (Sigalas, 2010; Stoeckel, 2016), such as Erasmus students (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Kuhn, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Sigalas, 2010; Stoeckel, 2016; Wilson, 2011) and European bureaucrats (Shore & Black, 1992, 1994; Zabusky, 2011). For the Cosmopolitan Europeans' perspective, Europe appears predominantly defined by politics and social Others who see the world from a Nationals perspective. For many, this means that establishing their cosmopolitan identities against relevant Others usually happens in opposition to these Nationals.

Within the Cosmopolitan European type, the chapter distinguished between two concepts that emerged from the analysis: the 'Rooted Cosmopolitans' (Beck, 2003), and the 'European Cosmopolitan Tribe'. For the European Cosmopolitan Tribe, *place* (Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1974. See also Chapter 5) had

rich and deep meanings, but never constituted a strong *place identity* (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Proshansky et al., 1983). The Rooted Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, did express such attachments. The European Cosmopolitan Tribe valued cultural diversity from an outsiders' perspective, while the Rooted Cosmopolitans appreciated diversity from within one or more cultures, looking outside.

In national political debates, these different ways of seeing Europe are often amplified. On the one hand, Eurosceptic, usually populist parties (e.g. PVV, Lega Nord) tap into the narrative of the Nationals, and particularly the cisnationals. On the other hand, there are some (often less dominant) political parties that attempt to appeal to the Cosmopolitan Europeans (e.g. the Dutch D66) when it comes to European integration. However, the biggest challenge is presented to the parties that attempt to the large group in the middle: the Situational Europeans. Here, particularly the (centre-)left often seems to struggle to formulate a narrative that is effective and appealing. Such arguments quickly become too technical (e.g. diffuse support for the EU, but specific opposition to neoliberal policies) to communicate effectively to a large electorate. The result of these competing narratives, in many European societies, seems to be an emerging 'European gap' between (cis)Nationals and Cosmopolitan Europeans (and some Situational Europeans).

After looking at the different ways in which the interviewees in this study understood their place in the world in terms of identities and meanings, Chapter 5 looked at the symbolic role that geographies and territory play in this dynamic. In this chapter, the empirical data generated through the map exercise mentioned above played a defining role. The question that guided this analysis was as follows:

Question Chapter 5: *What is the relationship between meanings of Europe, European identity and people's imagination of geographic space and territory?*

To some interviewees, their conceptualization of Europe was 'deterritorialized' (Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Scholte, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999), in the sense that Europe represented a complex and fairly ambiguous set of ideals and values rather than a territorial entity such as the nation-state. This does not mean that territory and geography as such were irrelevant in these

imaginations. Instead, the imagined geographies inhabited a specific symbolic space, which I attempted to capture in the notion of 'Euroscapes'. Like the typologies in Chapter 4, these Euroscapes represented a continuous complex of overlapping associations and meanings. This complexity was systematically categorized into the four main Euroscapes that represented how most of the interviewees understood the European geographic space: North, South, East, and West. Before describing these cardinal directions, the chapter first discussed the overall picture, and examined in particular where spatial divisions were absent.

The North was an obvious category for most interviewees, and was seen as a positive example for the rest of Europe in most ways. While they were regarded as culturally somewhat distant and 'cold', their progressive politics embodied an important component of what it meant to be European to many of the interviewees. Nevertheless, the North was not seen as the core of what Europe meant to the interviewees.

The South, in the middle of the economic crisis of the late 2000s, was seen as peripheral in terms of Europeanness to many interviewees because of their financial woes at the time. At the same time, the South represented the very core of a shared European cultural heritage in terms of values, ideas, and architecture. In addition, to some of the interviewees, the South – or the Mediterranean – was seen as Europe's membrane to 'non-Europe': a fuzzy boundary within which Europeanness and non-Europeanness was negotiated. For others, however, the Mediterranean Sea was a clear territorial boundary of Europe.

The East was almost always considered to be a transitory state between the past and the future. To most interviewees, including the Estonians, it was 'less European' than all other parts of Europe, which was mostly due to their Soviet / socialist past. In the long run, many interviewees expected the end of Eastern Europe, after which those areas would become fully European. Some expressed this transition by using Central Europe as a notion that would express this movement. Considering that one third of the interviews was with Estonians, it should be noted that none of them really considered their country to be part of Eastern Europe. Most of them felt that this was how Estonia was *seen* externally, however, and they regretted this 'misunderstanding'. This clash was part of a larger perceived difference,

which is the Western European view on history (seen by these Estonians as dominant in Europe) and the Eastern European one (seen as relatively peripheral).

The West, finally, stuck out because of its absence. When discussing the meanings of the various Euroscapes, the narratives of the interviewees often did not initially include Western Europe. They would easily draw it on the map, but when evaluating those drawings, this category did not merit immediate discussion for many of them. This was not due to its irrelevance, but paradoxically due to its centrality in defining what modern Europeanness represented. An important part of this was the historical development of the EU, which to many interviewees eventually embodied one important part of what Europeanness meant.

After discussing these four Euroscapes, Chapter 5 examined some of the boundaries and transitions between these spaces, as well as the boundaries of Europe as a whole. Notably, Estonians almost always saw the North Euroscape as their teleological destiny, but not quite their current position. Instead, they were currently caught in-between Euroscapes. From their past in Eastern Europe, defined by Soviet occupation, they were now on their vessel towards their 'rightful place': back to the North. To many, the name of that vessel was Baltic, even though most did not particularly identify with that label as such. Furthermore, Italians sometimes split their country in two parts: the North and the South. When they did, this was (amongst other things) along an axis of Europeanness, where the North was seen as 'more European' than the South. This notion of Europeanness pervaded much of the discussions in all three countries. It cross-cut not only Euroscapes, but also socio-economic groups (those who were more mobile were seen as more European, for example), and national territories (urban areas were often seen as more European than rural areas, 'where the nation was'). Most of all, but as a banal 'given', Western Europe was seen to symbolize and represent this Europeanness.

As mentioned above, Western Europe was seen by most as the epitome of Europeanness, largely because of the particular history of the institutional dimension of European integration. This suggests that people's understandings of 'Europe' and the EU have come to be conflated to some extent. Chapter 6 attempted to disentangle the ways in which these concepts were understood by interviewees. As a starting point, it asked:

Question Chapter 6: *How are Europe and the European Union imagined, respectively, and in which ways are these two concepts intertwined in the worldviews of individuals? How can identification with Europe and support for the European Union be disentangled analytically?*

The EU has had active and explicit policies that attempt to foster a sense of Europeanness (Meinhof & Triandafyllidou, 2006; Sassatelli, 2002, 2009a; Shore, 2000; Shore & Black, 1992, 1994). Beyond that, however, it has implemented policies that inadvertently may have fuelled such feelings, such as through open borders (Kuhn, 2012a; Stoeckel, 2016), the Euro currency (Risse, 2003), or the Erasmus programme (Kuhn, 2012b; Mitchell, 2015; Sigalas, 2010; Wilson, 2011).[124] More than that, the EU has shaped people's understanding of the concept of Europe *itself*, simply by being the civic representative of the pre-existing cultural notion of Europe. As one interviewee phrased it, the EU has become the contents of the container that is Europe.

Chapter 6 examined how the EU and Europe were imagined, and how politics and Euroscepticism played into those imaginations. It did that by summarizing how different types of Europeans (i.e. the Nationals, Situational Europeans, and Cosmopolitan Europeans) can be positioned in Cram's (2012) distinction between identification *as* European, identification *with* the EU, and *support for* the EU in terms of the duality between identification and disidentification (De Swaan, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003). This typology revealed that for some interviewees, European identity is better understood in terms of layered (Laitin, 1998) and/or nested identities (Díez Medrano, 2003; Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Herb & Kaplan, 1999). Particularly for those with an (open) National worldview, and many of the Situational Europeans, this appears to be the case. For the Cosmopolitan Europeans, and some of the other Situational Europeans, a 'marble cake' (Risse, 2010a) conceptualization seems more appropriate. In this sense, no singular conceptualization of 'European identity' emerges empirically; instead, 'ordinary people' themselves have their own models through which they relate to Europe.

[124] And, as could be argued, through the Eurobarometer surveys themselves, in that they 'statistically create' the Europeans, and that academics report on European integration based on the questions asked within these surveys.

Beyond this, Chapter 6 discussed the questionnaire questions that were administered after the in-depth interviews. The aim of those questionnaires was not to achieve quantitative metrics about the interviewees, but rather to assess their interpretations of those questions, and to align that with how they presented their views in the qualitative part. Here, it became clear that the concepts discussed in the two chapters before seemed to inform the ways in which interviewees understood these questions substantially. First, the examination of Euroscapes (Chapter 5) revealed that there was a centre-periphery logic at play which informed the way interviewees saw European*ness*. Considering that identification is not only experienced by its bearer, but also recognized and ascribed by others, the way particularly Italian and Estonian interviewees understood their own European identity was in comparison to Western Europeans, who, in their view, were more European by default. To be European, therefore, did not completely apply to them, considering that they felt that it applied to others even more. When the question phrasing was about how they expected to see themselves in the future (*'In the near future, do you see yourself as…'*), they were more willing to say that they were as European as any other. However, in these cases their argumentation was often generational instead of individual, meaning that they regularly felt that their children, or the people in the next generation like themselves, would be more European than they were now. Such an expected generational shift does not necessarily measure the same dispositions as individual identity changes, of course.

Finally, besides through Euroscapes, the way interviewees understood the questionnaire questions was also influenced by their national political contexts, and – indirectly – through the notion of the different typologies as discussed in Chapter 4. The word 'Europe' had become entangled with a wide range of political, social, and cultural connotations, due to the EU's dominant and politicized presence in contemporary political debate and rhetoric in all three of these countries. This aspect was amplified by the on-going economic crisis at the time of data collection. As mentioned above, political parties in these countries attempted (with varying degrees of success) to tap into the National, Situational European, and Cosmopolitan European narratives, amplifying the perceived differences between those groups. Through this widening 'European gap', the ideas on both the EU *and* on Europe had become politicized in the minds of many interviewees, and had come to symbolize not only the way they regarded the continent or its political integration, but also a wide range of political issues that were

attached to 'Europe' in the national political discourses. When answering some of the survey questions, this meant that it was hard to *really* separate affective, identity evaluations from instrumental questions.

Discussion

Before looking ahead at what the contributions of this research potentially mean for future avenues of research, I would like to take a brief moment to evaluate the compromises that were made in this study, and what limitations these choices imply. At the start of the project, my fundamental assumption regarding what we might call European 'identity' was that if there is such an identity in the first place, it needs not take the same form as other, perhaps better documented identities (spatial identities such as national, regional, or city, or often more individual identities such as gender, ethnicity, or kinship). As a consequence, a second notion guiding my early choices was that the vocabulary that is used to exchange thoughts about identities (e.g. in interviews, but also in ordinary daily exchanges) may not necessarily be adequate to understand European identity in particular. Simply put, when people use the word 'identity', they tend to think of it in terms of *national* identity, or *gender* identity; not primarily about how they relate to Europe as a concept and/or a category. This, in turn, may inform how they think (or do not think) about Europe in the first place. For these reasons, and based on the idea that meanings and identities are created in interaction, this project therefore set out to map and describe the different ways in which people situate themselves in relation to, and within 'Europe'. In the same way as the concept of 'Europe' is constructed in varied interactions, so is the concept 'identity'. Because of this, my goal has been to provide an etic perspective on the emic expressions articulated in the interviews.

Consequently, my data collection and analysis ultimately inhabited an often uncomfortable space in-between a more 'classical' qualitative, inductive, and mostly emic approach on the one hand, and a more quantitative, deductive, and etic approach on the other. While the benefits of such a position can potentially be very advantageous, it also created clear obstacles and drawbacks. One such obstacle was the sheer size of the resulting data, and what that meant for analysis and writing. Out of the 95 mixed mode interviews, only a small proportion could shine through in quotes in the final text. Each of those quotes (and the many that were part of the analysis but are not quoted in the text at all) hides many stories that needed to be left partially untold, for now. For every interview, context matters a great

deal. That depth of empirical information is necessarily somewhat lost in the current approach due to the balancing act between broader conclusions that emphasize my etic interpretation and showing the empirical evidence on the micro, necessarily emic level. As I have discussed in other chapters, this project has been a methodological 'experiment' in several ways. This applies to both my attempt at inhabiting a middle ground between different approaches as described above (and therefore also the way in which I have reported on my analysis), as well as to how the data collection strategy was set up (see Chapter 3). In retrospect, this was a somewhat precarious choice due to the inherent limitations that this approach brought with it.

Nonetheless, if we take seriously the possibility that conceptually, what might be labelled a nascent European 'identity' is potentially a 'different beast' than, say, national identity, then I maintain that such a starting position implies not only the need for reconceptualization of such identities, but also of the methods through which we attempt to capture it. Conceptually, emphasizing conventional outcomes of (national) identities in terms of behaviours, such as spatial mobility, intermarriage, trade, and linguistic practices, only tells part of the story. Beyond those 'hard' indicators, even (political) attitudes as expressed in surveys and explicit statements about 'identities' in some qualitative research may not penetrate the core of the phenomenon. Instead, I have tried to make the case that in order to trace the complexity of people's identifications within Europe in times of globalization, it is more helpful to map their imaginations of these social constructs. In doing so, expecting interviewees or survey respondents to react to the word 'identity' as such is problematic because the word itself has become loaded in popular vernacular. Therefore, in order to determine whether or not we can legitimately speak of any form or degree of European identity is a question of both conceptualization and of empirical evidence. Ultimately, at its core, I would argue that the 'weakest' form of European identity involves people recognizing Europe as a socially real concept to them personally, and situating themselves towards and within it. Virtually without exception, all of the interviewees in this project met that threshold, no matter how irrelevant they sometimes felt that the European *institutions* or politics in general were. Even for those who vehemently opposed the very notion of European integration could identify themselves *in relation to* Europe as a broader, cultural-historical notion, and would almost always positions themselves within that space. Seen in this way, for 'Eurosceptics' and 'Europhiles' alike, their

identification in relation to Europe did not necessarily hinge on any 'hard' indicators such as behaviours or comparatively easily measurable attitudes (such as discussed in Chapter 6), but was much more nebulous and at the same time fundamental to who they were in the world.

If this is the case, then this poses a methodological challenge as well. In order to attempt to tease out these imaginations while exploring where there may be more generally shared meanings and discourses across countries and social groups, methodological experiments that walk the line between the merits of traditionally qualitative and quantitative approaches may be necessary. This study was one such experimentation, with some strengths, but certainly also its caveats, as I have reflected on above and in Chapter 3. By extension, in order to attempt a redefinition of what European identity is from an etic academic perspective, one would perhaps need to construct a new theory on what identity in times of globalization means more broadly. This was a task that I frankly did not completely foresee at the outset of the project, and such an endeavour would require a theoretical study in and of itself. At a later stage in the research process, as I had gathered a lot of empirical materials, I had to prioritize working on the empirical cases themselves. As a result, I decided that a new theory on identity was overly ambitious within the confines of this project, and that it would have to be outside of its scope. This is unfortunate, but I hope that this contribution may in some small way help inform how future research on European identity can be conceptualized.

Looking Ahead

Considering the findings above, I argue that it is important for research on European identity to make the conceptual distinction between an emic and an etic perspective. Introducing this difference allows for researchers to define anew what can conceptually be called identification with Europe, as separate from how European citizens themselves express this explicitly. This is important, because both 'Europe' and 'identity' have become politicized concepts in the contemporary experience of people. While the word 'identity' for many people invokes a frame of reference that focuses on territorial identities such as the nation-state, the word 'Europe' invokes associations with the EU. Both of these things can be problematic: first, identification with Europe is not necessarily primarily defined through territory (although paradoxically, it plays a *symbolic* role through Euroscapes). Second, the EU as a set of

institutions is contested or supported for a wide variety of reasons, by both *diffuse* and *specific* Eurosceptics and Europhiles.

These issue are particularly salient in present-day Europe, where the economic crisis and the continuing issues around the European common currency continue to play a major role in national and European political debate. At the same time, the narrative of Eurosceptic and often xenophobic political parties manage to enter the public imagination in one European country after the next. These political movements manage to effectively tap into the imagination of Europe amongst what I have called the National typology. The same holds true for some political parties that align with the Cosmopolitan European narrative, but statistically (and thus, electorally), their numbers are much smaller. That leaves the complex and diverse narrative of the Situational Europeans, for whom traditional, pro-European parties have not yet formulated an effective (counter-)narrative. If the EU is to survive in the long run, and address its alleged democratic deficit, then finding such a narrative is crucial. After all, the Situational Europeans are generally national first, and European only second. If the narrative of the Nationals, put forward by the Eurosceptic right across most of Europe remains as effective as it is today, while simultaneously unchallenged by a counter-narrative, then many amongst the Situational Europeans may sway in a more Eurosceptic direction. If a political narrative is formulated that is pro-European (diffuse or specific), but different from the somewhat detached Cosmopolitan European narrative, then this large group of people could potentially rally behind new and ambitious directions for European integration.

To understand the dynamics of the Situational European narrative better, therefore, I argue that more research is needed to understand the complexities within this group in particular. Such research could take an explicitly political angle, considering the politicization of the EU that already exists, and the entanglement between the meanings of Europe and the EU. Quantitative approaches serve as a good starting point for looking at individual determinants of dispositions within the Situational European narratives. However, considering the complexity and diversity within this group, it is necessary that in-depth qualitative work is conducted amongst these people as well. While earlier (qualitative and quantitative) research has often looked at Cosmopolitan European (i.e. carrier group) narratives, the Situational Europeans in present-day Europe have remained under-examined.

The empirical data for this project was gathered in three country cases, one of which was in the Eastern half of Europe. Contrasting these countries (selected on the basis of a most different cases design) revealed clear differences, but also striking similarities. It is somewhat surprising that more than a decade after a large part of post-socialist Europe has entered the EU, it still seems that Western Europe, and the older EU member states are proportionally over-represented in research on these subjects. For longitudinal studies, this may have its roots in the availability of data. For other studies, it may be the case that Western Europe is seen to represent Europeanness not only amongst the wider population, but also amongst academics. In any case, I believe it is worthwhile for future research to explore the differences and similarities between *all* of the different Euroscapes. While Estonia is a post-Soviet country, that experience is likely different from the Polish, Hungarian, or Bulgarian experience. Likewise, it would be interesting to see how these issues play out in countries that are not currently in the EU, but may still have a European identity, such as Ukraine or Georgia. Inversely, it would be very interesting to understand how *leaving* the EU shapes identifications and imaginations in the UK, if that process does indeed continue.

Finally, on a methodological note, in this project, I found the use of some visual methods (photo-elicitation and particularly the use of map drawings) very helpful to better understand how interviewees imagined Europe and the geographic space it inhabits. There were two main reasons for this. First, this approach helped to 'ask' the interviewees complex questions without framing their responses in advance by using existing language (such as, indeed, 'identity', or 'Europe'). Second, these visual approaches enabled the interviewees to express their views on a broader 'bandwidth' than they would have at their disposal in more classical approaches. In future studies, it would be worthwhile to see how imagined geographies emerge amongst different people, on different scales, and in different contexts. To the best of my knowledge, research based on maps of this scale is rare (I did not find any). There are, of course, mapping approaches, as often used in ethnographic studies, but those are usually on a much smaller scale (e.g. of interviewees' direct surroundings, their town, etc.).

With this study, I hope to have contributed conceptually to the distinction between emic and etic views on European identity. I have introduced and examined different typologies of relationships towards Europe, as well as the notion of Euroscapes as symbolic negotiations of Europeanness. In

addition, I have examined how these concepts relate to the validity of common ways of assessing European identity in large-scale survey instruments. Combining the distinction between emic and etic views on European identity with the attempt at measuring identity in survey questions, an irony that emerges is that in order to measure identity, perhaps the word identity itself should not be used. At the intersection of the typologies and contemporary politics lies the 'European gap', in which Cosmopolitan Europeans are pitted against Nationals, each with a radically different worldview and political representation. The Situational Europeans, who demographically constitute the majority, inhabit this European gap and in many cases currently lack clear political advocates who put forward a new narrative on Europe and Europeanness. Such a liminal state may ultimately best embody the complexity of cross-cutting identities that define contemporary Europe.

Appendix A – Interview Guide

Note: the interview guide below is one of the variations used in the project. The interview guide evolved as the project progressed (see Chapter 3), and was slightly different between the country cases. The guide below should nonetheless give some indication of the topics that were addressed.

A project initiated at the EUI

Interview Guide

Estonia, Second Version

Interviewer instructions

The most important thing is that this interview is supposed to give us insight into **the way the interviewee**[125] **sees the world**. The primary goal is not to produce 'facts', but to document **personal views** on the topics under discussion. Try to **regularly remind the interviewee about this by saying that there are no right or wrong answers**. Otherwise, they are likely to say that they "don't know anything about the topic".

It is also crucial that the interview feels like a **natural, easy conversation**. Both you and the interviewee should feel **comfortable and relaxed** (meet at a location that feels 'safe' for both of you). Try to approach the interviewee with **calmness** and an **open attitude** and you'll be fine, even though some of the questions will be hard to answer (most likely due to complexity/abstraction, not emotion). Take your time, and **don't be afraid of short periods of silence**. Sometimes the interviewee will simply need some time to think.

On occasion, you may **disagree** strongly with your interviewee, and they may ask you **how you feel about the topic**. In this situation, you can tell them that you would be happy to discuss your personal view with them (if you want to, of course; your choice), but that you would like to wait until **after the interview**. It would be interesting if you could include these potential 'post-interview' discussions in your summary and communication to the rest of the team. Sometimes some of the most interesting information comes from these conversations.

[125] In this entire document, the word 'interviewee' is used to indicate the person you are interviewing (what you might usually call a 'respondent' (typically quantitative) or 'informant' (typically qualitative)).

		In this interview guide, instructions intended for you (like this one) will be in grey blocks and sometimes in CAPITAL letters. Obviously, you should not read these to the interviewee. In fact, *in general* the text in this document is intended as an interview **guide**, *not* as a text to literally read to your interviewee. Usually, the items in this guide will take the form of a small list of questions that you can use to stimulate the interviewee to elaborate as much as possible on the topic. Once you're comfortable with the interview guide, you are encouraged to **use your own words** so that it feels **more natural** to you, and even to **change the order** of the topics so that you can have **a 'normal' conversation** about this topic with your interviewee rather than a 'formal' interview. After a few interviews, you will get more at ease with the topic, and you can use this document as a kind of 'checklist' rather than a strict guide. The only **exceptions** to this are the closed questions towards the end of the interview. But don't worry: there will be a clear instruction once you get there. Please take the time to **read through this interview guide** at least once before you leave for your first interview. It is advisable to browse through it quickly also before each interview. **And most importantly: have fun!**

Just a gentle reminder: the texts below **should not be read from the paper**. They are intended as a kind of checklist for you to see which things should be mentioned when you're starting the conversation. Try to **be relaxed and spontaneous** and just have a **conversation** with the person sitting at your table. You'll find that if you are relaxed, the interviewee will become more relaxed as well.

Start the interview by introducing yourself and allow the interviewee to do the same.

Introduction

Let me start by saying 'thank you' for meeting me here today. As you know, the main objective of this interview is to understand **what you think about when you talk about 'Europe'**, and what your feelings are on this topic. It is very important for me and the rest of the research team to hear ***your* personal view** on these issues.

Keep in mind that we want to know what *__you__* mean by 'Europe', so that means that we are not *__necessarily__* only talking about the European Union.

Please keep in mind that there are **no right or wrong answers** to any of the questions. I am simply interested in learning to see the world through your eyes when it comes to these topics.

The way this interview is structured, is a **little different** from what you may be used to or may expect from an interview. My goal today is to try and have **a normal conversation** with you rather than to ask you for questions with pre-determined answers.

To do this, I will raise a number of topics and open questions and **ask you to think about those**. This may **sometimes be more difficult** than 'normal' survey questions, but I hope it will **also be more interesting** for both you and me. After that, I will ask you a couple of questions on the **people you discuss 'Europe' with** in your daily life, and at the end I will pose **a few simple, closed questions** so that we can better **compare your answers** to those of other people.

Before we start, I should tell you that **everything you tell me today will be treated with the highest confidentiality and privacy**, and your identity will not be shared with anyone besides me and the project leader without your permission. If there are any questions that you don't want to answer, this is of course completely your decision.

[IF YOU HAVE RECORDING EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE (like a recorder borrowed from the university or a personal MP3 player – highly recommended):] One practical question before we begin: would you mind if I record our conversation? This is just as a small help for me, and this recording will not be shared with anyone beside me and the project leader without your permission.]

Ok. Before we begin with the first topic, do you have any questions? [ANSWER QUESTIONS & WRITE THEM DOWN IF RELEVANT] If something comes up, feel free to interrupt me and ask any questions you may have during the interview.

Travel and international contacts

Let's start with an easy question. Could you tell me a bit about whether you travel sometimes, and if so, which **places you like to visit within Estonia**. Why these places? Do you visit them on particular dates or times of the year? Why are these places important to you?

What about travel to **other countries than Estonia**, do you ever travel abroad? Do you go abroad for work, vacation, or some other reason?

Which other **countries in Europe** have you travelled to?

SEE MAP 1 - Let the interviewee list and/or mark on the map all countries he/she has visited, and write them down. Do not correct whether a country is 'in Europe' or not. If asked by the interviewee, ask them about their definition of whether a country is 'in Europe' (see later topics in guide). If you suspect that the interviewee is simply listing all countries without considering whether they are in 'Europe' or not, feel free to remind them of the question. For 'border-cases', don't forget to ask them why they feel this country/region is in Europe.

Also pay attention to the order in which the interviewee marks the countries / places. Make a note about which order they take, and why.

Don't forget to write down the interviewee number on the map sheet before, during or immediately after the interview.

Which countries **outside of Europe** have you travelled to? SEE ABOVE REMARK, BUT NO MAP.

The current topic is TRAVEL. Try to discuss this topic in more detail based on the interviewees answers to the opening questions above. Below is a list of suggested sub-themes that you are encouraged to go into:

1. Try to get a general idea of how often the interviewee has travelled within Estonia, within Europe, and outside of Europe. Doesn't have to be very precise – just a general idea.
2. Why did they choose these destinations?
3. Where would they like to go, and why?
4. Do they feel that people were very different in those destinations? If so, what exactly was different about people, places, etc.?

Now I would like to ask you a few questions about individuals you have met here in Estonia and abroad. Please take a moment to think about your friends, family, and acquaintances in your city, within Estonia, and abroad.

Do you have any friends, family or acquaintances you are in more or less regular contact with in other countries than Estonia? Approximately how many international contacts do you have?

Where are those people from? Would you say they are from Europe? And do you consider them Europeans?
How did you meet? Roughly how often do you communicate with them?

Did you ever discuss national differences? Did you ever discuss national similarities? Did you ever discuss the European Union or Europe more generally?

Do you discuss 'European topics' often with friends, family, and acquaintances who are either in Estonia or abroad? If you do, what do you talk about? What are your discussions generally about? Do you often disagree about these topics? Do you ever discuss the European Union, open borders, or the Euro?

Would you say that 'Europe' plays an important role in your daily life in other ways?

Collective identity: Feelings of being Estonian, Russian, European, …

WHERE APPLICABLE: FIRST MAKE SURE YOU KNOW THE **BASIC SITUATION** OF THE INTERVIEWEE BY ASKING ABOUT THE FOLLOWING ASPECT:

[TIP: IF IT HELPS FOR THIS SECTION, YOU CAN USE THE LIST OF THEORY BASED FRAMES ON PAGE 237]

Could you tell me where you were born, and where you grew up?

IF NOT ESTONIA: When did you/your family first move to Estonia? What were the circumstances under which you moved?

NOTE DOWN COUNTRY/REGION WHETHER IT IS IN (PRESENT-DAY) ESTONIA OR NOT.

Could you describe how important it is to you to be living in Estonia? Why is this important to you?

When do you feel this way especially? Perhaps you could tell me about the last time you remember that you were **proud** to be living here? And have you ever been **ashamed** about living here? Why?

NOW TRY TO GO DEEPER INTO THE INTERVIEWEE'S **COLLECTIVE IDENTITY**/IDENTITIES BY GOING INTO THEIR 'FORMAL' IDENTITIES (I.E. CITIZENSHIP) AND ESPECIALLY THEIR EXPERIENCED IDENTITIES THOUGH THE QUESTIONS BELOW. YOU CAN OF COURSE SKIP THIS IN OBVIOUS CASES.

IF APPLICABLE: Do you own an Estonian passport and/or identity card?

IF APPLICABLE: Do you (also) have a citizenship of other countries? Which one(s)?

IF APPLICABLE: Do you consider yourself to be Estonian? Why / why not?

IF APPLICABLE: Do you consider yourself to be Russian? Why / why not?

IF APPLICABLE: Do you consider yourself to be an 'Estonian-Russian' / 'Russian-Estonian'? Why / why not?

THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE FOR EVERY INTERVIEWEE AGAIN.

What about your region and/or city/town? Do you consider your region or city/town important for who you are? [FOR EXAMPLE: Tartlane, Tallinnlane, Virumaalane, 'Maalane' (?)]

Do you consider yourself to be European? Why / why not?

Do you consider yourself to be a world citizen? Why / why not?

As you know, there are Estonian speakers and Russian speakers living in Estonia. Would you consider yourself a member of one (or both) of these groups? Which of these groups is more 'European', in your view?

In Estonian language, people often use the words '*Eestlased*', '*Eesti kodanikud*', and '*Eestimaalased*', when they are talking about people living in Estonia. How do you feel about these terms, and what do they mean to you? How are they related? Do you feel they mean something similar?

FOR RUSSIAN SPEAKERS ONLY: How would you describe these things in Russian? And how do you feel about the use of these different words in Estonian?

Which of the following things are important to judge whether somebody is '*Eestlane*' or not? Why are these things important? Are there other things that are (more) important for this? What is the most important thing? Can somebody become *'Eestlane'* after a while when he/she is not born '*Eestlane*'?

- Citizenship / Estonian passport
- Living in Estonia
- Having been raised in Estonia
- Being able to speak Estonian
- Knowing Estonian history
- Feel free to ask about other things that may be important according to you.

Do you personally know any people living in Estonia who according to you can't be considered Estonians?

According to you personally, what makes *a person* 'European'?

[ASK THE INTERVIEWEE TO GO INTO THIS LAST QUESTION FOR AS MUCH AS YOU CAN. THIS IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT AS OPEN AS POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE IN ORDER TO **GET AS MANY DIFFERENT ANSWERS AS POSSIBLE**.]

FOR **ESTONIAN** SPEAKERS: Do you consider '*Eestlane*' to be Europeans? What about other people living in Estonia? What about Russian-Estonians?

FOR **RUSSIAN** SPEAKERS: Do you consider Russian speakers in Estonia to be Europeans as well? And what about Estonian speakers?

Would you say that some people in Estonia are 'more European' than other people? Which (kinds of) people? Why these people? What makes them 'European'? What about various ethnic groups? And what about people who travel more? Is there also a difference between people living in the cities or in the countryside?

Would you say that some countries are 'more' European than others? **If so, what makes a country 'European'?** Could you give some examples? Which countries are more European, and which ones less? [ASK THE INTERVIEWEE TO GO INTO THIS LAST TOPIC FOR AS MUCH AS YOU CAN. THIS IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT AS OPEN AS POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE IN ORDER TO **GET AS MANY DIFFERENT ANSWERS AS POSSIBLE**.]

The current topic is COLLECTIVE IDENTITY. Try to discuss this topic in more detail based on the interviewees answers to the opening questions above. Below is a list of suggested sub-themes that you are encouraged to go into:

1. Can one person be both **Estonian and European** at the same time?
2. What about **Russian and European**?
3. What about **Russian and Estonian**?
4. If a person is '**more**' European, does this mean that they are always '**less**' Estonian?
5. Does the interviewee identify with concepts like **'Soviet' or 'post-Soviet'**? If so, what does that mean for them? Can these things go together with being 'Estonian', 'Russian', and especially '**European**'?

Estonia and Europe

In this section we would like to know more about the interviewee's perception of other countries (in Europe). Important to remember is that there are no right or wrong answers and we are interested in the interviewees world-view.

Regarding **language**: please try to **pay close attention to how people refer to 'Europe' and 'European'**. Which linguistic cases (*kääned*) are used by the interviewee to indicate the relation between Estonia and Europe (e.g. *"Eesti on Euroopa"*, *"Eesti on Euroopas"*, etc.)? Also try to be sensitive to indications of 'movement' (e.g. 'towards Europe' (*-le*), 'from Europe' (*-lt / -st*), 'into Europe' (*-sse*), etc.).

[TIP: IF IT HELPS FOR THIS SECTION, YOU CAN USE THE LIST OF THEORY BASED FRAMES ON PAGE 237]

Are Estonian people different from (other) Europeans? How are they different? How are they similar? Could you elaborate on different aspects about this?

Which other nations in the world are most like Estonia? Why are those nations similar? Are the people there similar to Estonians as well? [IF NOT SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONED, ASK ABOUT FINLAND, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, POLAND, SWEDEN, AND PERHAPS SLOVENIA, BELARUS AND RUSSIA]

Which nations have a similar history to Estonia? Do you think this is important?

Difficult question: **how 'European' is Estonia**? Why do you feel this way? Is this a good thing or a bad thing?

[IF YOU DON'T HAVE MUCH TIME, FEEL FREE TO SKIP THIS QUESTION ON LENNART MERI. OTHERWISE YOU CAN USE IT TO EXPLORE 'EUROPEANIZATION' OF ESTONIA.] **Lennart Meri** was Estonia's first elected president after the fall of the Soviet Union (1992-2001). Would you say he was an important person for Estonia's relation to the rest of Europe? Did he make Estonia 'more European'? Can you say in which way he contributed to this?

Would you say that Europeans have certain things in common to each other? Which things? Do they have these things in common with each other, but not with other people from outside of Europe?

The following set of questions doesn't need to be 'read out' like this. We would like you to **discuss the concepts of 'Eastern-Europe', 'Central-Europe', 'Western-Europe', 'Baltic', and 'Nordic'** with the

interviewee. Discuss **what these words mean** to the interviewee, and also pay attention to any **other regional labels** the interviewee may use.

These questions should be seen together with the second map assignment, and you can take out the map whenever you like. However, first discussing some of these concepts may help you to explain what the interviewee is expected to do in the map assignment.
To what extent would you say Estonia is an Eastern European country?
To what extent would you say Estonia is a Central European country?
To what extent would you say Estonia is a Western European country?
To what extent would you say Estonia is a Baltic country? [you can use **image 8** if you want]
To what extent would you say Estonia is a Nordic country?
Which of these regions is the best description for Estonia? Is this a good / bad thing?

Are people within these regions in some ways similar to each other? What is it that they share?

What about the *Baltic* <u>*Sea*</u> region? Are countries in this region similar to each other? [THE IDEA HERE IS THAT THE BALTIC ***SEA*** REGION IS A BROADER CONCEPT THAN 'BALTIC STATES', AND MAY INCLUDE FINLAND, SWEDEN, AND POSSIBLY POLAND]

For my next question, I would like to use another map and the coloured pencils I brought with me. What I would like to ask you is to use any colours you prefer [COLOURS ARE IRRELEVANT AND WILL NOT BE ANALYSED], and draw the different regions that we just discussed using the colour markers. As with all my questions, there are no right or wrong answers. Also, if you see this map as consisting of other areas than the categories that we talked about you can draw those instead. You don't have to stick to any real country borders.

Take out map 2 - let the interviewee mark on the map all regions (East, West, Baltic, etc.) That (s)he considers relevant (using the supplied coloured markers). Do not correct the interviewee, and ask them about their personal definitions. Especially go into **why** they draw the boundaries this way. Don't forget to write down the interviewee number on the map sheet before, during or immediately after the interview.

To some interviewees, this assignment may feel a bit 'childish'. Please explain that this will help you both to discuss these topics in more detail because it can be very hard to know precisely what we are talking about without it.

Below are some **follow-up questions** to this map assignment.

Is there anything that could happen in the future that would make you draw any of these lines in a different way? Why would you have drawn them differently? Do you think this will happen? [ASK ABOUT SEVERAL CONCEPTS (E.G. 'NORDIC') SPECIFICALLY, AND MAKE EXTENSIVE NOTES ABOUT THIS]

Would you have drawn these lines/areas differently in the past? What about 5 years ago? What about 10 years ago? What about longer ago? What would have been different, and why?

What if, in 10 years from now, Estonia is one of the richest countries in Europe? Do you think you would answer these questions differently if I would ask you again? Is there anything else that could change in the future besides economy?

The Euro

As you know, we adopted the Euro as our currency this year. How do you feel about this change? What are your first experiences with it?

At this point, try to encourage the interviewee to **elaborate as much as possible** on the Euro, and her/his feelings about this, without steering too much. They will probably go into several sub-themes based on this, and this will help us to go deeper into the issues and understand them from their perspective.

When Estonia officially started using Euro bank notes and coins on new year's eve, Andrus Ansip was one of the first Estonians who withdrew Euro money from a cash machine. He did this on national television, and afterwards he said in an interview that **"we are not only Estonians, we are also Europeans"**. To what extent do you agree with Andrus Ansip's statement? Why / why not? Did the adoption of the Euro change anything about whether Estonians are also Europeans? [You can optionally use **image 5** as a visual aid if the interviewee has seen this TV campaign]

Do you think it was a good idea for Estonia to adopt the Euro? Why do you think this? Has your opinion on this changed in the last couple of months?

As you may know, each country that has the Euro can design one side of the Euro coins issues in that country. Just to have an overview, these pages show the Estonian national design for all coins [IMAGE 4], and the common European side [IMAGE 3]. How do you feel about the Estonian design for the Euro? How do you feel about the general design of the Euro coins? [IF NOT MENTIONED SPONTANEOUSLY: ASK HOW THEY FEEL ABOUT THE MAP OF ESTONIA ON THE DESIGN]

And how do you feel about the Euro bank notes [PAPER MONEY]? How do you feel about the design of those notes?

Now take a look at these two images [IMAGES 1 & 2]. It may have been some time since you last saw these. Do you still keep some Kroons as a 'souvenir'? Why / why not? Do you feel nostalgic about the Kroon? Have your feelings about this changed over time?

Show Image 1 (Kroon banknotes) and **Image 2** (Kroon coins) – Ask the interviewee to reflect on these images. The design of the Kroon (especially the paper money) refers to national symbols and history, while the Euro paper money has no national symbols. In

	fact, the bridges and buildings on the Euro paper money are designed to be completely fictional in order to avoid national symbolism.

The European Union and 'Europe'

Now I would like to ask you some questions specifically about the European Union.

First of all, do you **remember** anything about when Estonia officially entered the European Union in 2004? What happened? What were people saying about it back then? And were you happy or sad about this back then? Could you tell me more about how you experienced this? And what about your friends and family? How did they feel about Estonia's new EU membership?

And what about now? How do you feel about Estonia's membership of the European Union these days?

And do you remember when Estonia officially opened its borders to other European Union countries in 2007? Was this a good thing? Did it change anything about how you feel about Estonia's neighbouring countries? [THE SCHENGEN TREATY]

The current topic is THE EUROPEAN UNION. The goal here is to understand the influence that European institutions (mainly the EU generally and the open borders under the Schengen Treaty) have on people's conceptualizations of Estonia and Europe more broadly. Try to discuss this topic in more detail based on the interviewees answers to the opening questions above. Below is a list of suggested sub-themes that you are encouraged to go into:

1. What happened to your idea about *Estonia* after 2004, when Estonia joined the EU?
2. Would you say Estonia became more 'European'? What does 'European' mean according to you?
3. Did Estonia become more 'Western' or 'Nordic' as a result of joining the EU? What does that mean to you?
4. What happened to your idea about *Europe* after 2004, when Estonia joined the EU?
5. Do you feel that Estonia's interests are taken seriously by the European Union?
6. Did you notice any differences that occurred as a result of Estonia's membership of the European Union? What about political changes? What about cultural changes?
7. Has it become more important for you to be Estonian / from Estonia since 2004?

If you think about the 'European Union' on the one hand, and about the broader idea of 'Europe' on the other hand, how are these two things the same to you? And how are they different? Do European countries share a specific culture, politics, or other elements *besides* the European Union? Which things? [TRY TO GO DEEPER INTO THIS TOPIC BY ASKING FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION, BUT SOMETIMES HARD TO MAKE.]

One could say that the Euro sign (€) is one symbol of European integration. The EU flag is another one [optional: IMAGE 12, SEE BELOW 'TAG']. Would you recognize this flag if you would see it somewhere? What kind of feelings does it give you? Do you know other symbols of Europe or the European Union?

If you would have to describe the 'image' that this flag gives you, which words would you use? If you would have to describe the European Union in general, which words would you use? And what about 'Europe' in general? Which words describe these concepts the best according to you? [THIS IS ANOTHER HARD TO ANSWER QUESTION. MAKE SURE YOU **TAKE THE TIME** TO TALK ABOUT THIS EXTENSIVELY.]

Show Image 12 (EU Flag) – Ask the interviewee to share the associations this symbol brings them. After that, go into the other two concepts mentioned (the **EUROPEAN UNION** and **EUROPE IN GENERAL**). Some reasonably negative words they may use are 'threat', 'danger', 'bureaucracy', etc. Positive words could be 'freedom', 'mobility', 'prosperity', etc.

Below is a list of more abstract 'frames' that has been found in earlier research (in various countries). You can use it to ask the interviewee about it in more detail:

- Peace / harmony
- Common market / prosperity / (in)equality
- Modernisation
- Social benefits
- Homogenization
- Sovereignty / preserving independence (e.g. for small nations)
- Identity (regional, national, European), in positive and negative sense
- Unity in diversity / stronger together / States are too small without EU
- Territorial identity (nations, regions, Europe, etc.)
- (Lessons from) World War II
- Free movement / removal of barriers / 'borderlessness'
- Fading of historical divisions / understanding / cooperation

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History and Symbols

Let's talk about Estonia's history a bit. I would like to remind you that this interview is not intended to test your knowledge about anything, and there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. I'm interested to learn about how *you* see things, and what your opinion is on these topics.

According to you, do other European countries generally speaking fully understand what happened in Estonia in the past century? **Which people generally understand Estonian history, and which people don't?** [FROM WHICH COUNTRIES / WHICH SOCIAL GROUPS] What don't they understand? Is it important that people from other countries are aware of Estonia's history? Why / why not?

Are there any special monuments, places, or buildings in other countries that are important to you? Why these places / buildings / monuments? Have you ever been there yourself?

In 2009, the *Vabadussõja võidusammas* was revealed on Tallinn *Vabaduseväljak* [Optional: IMAGE 6]. **Not taking into account the discussion on money issues or on how beautiful or ugly the monument is,** what is your view on this monument? What is it supposed to symbolize according to you? What does it mean to you personally? [TRY TO AVOID A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THE MONEY/BUDGET ISSUES AND THE ESTHETIC VALUE OF THE MONUMENT. THE POINT HERE IS TO FOCUS ON HISTORICAL AND SYMBOLIC MEANING.]

OPTIONAL: Show Image 6 (Vabadussõja võidusammas on Vabaduseväljak in Tallinn) – See the questions above. If you want to stimulate the interviewee further (and move towards the next item already), you could ask them about the former (Soviet) name of Vabaduseväljak: *Võidu Väljak*. What do these different names for the Freedom Square mean to the interviewee? What do they symbolize to them?

Here are two historical symbols [IMAGE 9]. Do they look familiar to you? Can you tell me what they are? What do they mean? What do they mean to you personally? How do they make you feel? What is negative about them? What is positive?

Show Image 9 (Estonian SSR symbols) – These symbols are for illustration purposes only, and to provoke a response from the interviewee.

Some people say that they have both good and bad personal memories of Estonia under the Soviet Union. How do you feel about this? What are your bad memories of this period? What are your sweet memories of these times? [TRY TO UNDERSTAND NOSTALGIC FEELINGS TOWARDS SOVIET PERIOD]

You probably remember the controversy surrounding the Bronze Soldier (*Pronkssõdur*, optionally show **image 10** for illustration) during the 'Bronze Night' (*Pronksöö / Aprillirahutused*) in 2007. What do you remember about this event? What is your personal view on this? According to you personally, are these events related to Europe or Estonia's place in Europe in any way?

Now, I brought some images of well-known symbols with me. I would like you to take a look at them and tell me what you think about them.

The first image I would like to show you is this one [IMAGE 13]. Could you tell me what you see? What do you think this means? How does it make you feel? What do you think the creators are trying to say? What is their message? Do you agree with them?

Show Image 13 (Soviet € Flag/billboard) – DO NOT REVEAL YOUR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THIS IMAGE AT THE START.

After the interviewee has given you her/his interpretation of the image, some people will be curious about what it is, and what it is supposed to symbolize. If you want, you can tell them that this image shows a Euro sign in the corner of a red rectangle, similar to a hammer and sickle (*sirp ja vasar / c*), thus in total resembling a Soviet flag. I took this photograph around 2007 in Riga. I don't know who put the billboard there, or what they were trying to say, but I think it is a provocative symbol, and it has often helped me to get interviews going in the past.

Follow-up questions:

Do you see any similarities between the Soviet Union and the European Union? How are they similar? How are they different? Why? How does this make you feel? How do you feel if other people (for example in the media) make this connection between the Soviet Union and the EU?

Could you tell me more about how you feel about the present-day Estonian flag? [optionally, you can use IMAGE 11] How does it make you feel? Do you think it is important that we show the flag on

nationally important days? Why / why not? **Should the European flag also be displayed next to the Estonian flag on these occasions? Why / why not?**

Are there any (other) days on which you believe the **European** flag should be displayed in Estonia?

Which other yearly events are important to you? Are there also internationally relevant events that you think are important to commemorate? Any special days that are important for Europe? What about the 'Day of Europe' (9 May)?

Appendix B – Closed questions section

In this section, the interviewee is asked a number of closed questions. That means that their answers should be relatively short, and you don't need to encourage them to talk about these topics as much as possible. We will use the data from this section to compare interviewees with each other, and to compare the results from our study with other, large-scale studies in the past (like *Eurobarometer*, *European Social Survey*, or *Mina, Maailm, Meedia*).

If the interviewee has questions or further (in-depth) remarks based on, or as a result of the following questions, please make notes of those discussions as well (it is recommended to leave any recording equipment you may have running).

Even though some questions are formulated in Estonian, it is recommended to read the questions out loud to your interviewee (in Estonian or Russian, not in English). For some questions, there are added instructions intended just for you.

Please don't forget to fill in the registration box below.

Date: [ ]
(dd/mm/yyyy)

Interview number: [ ]
Please use the format 'AB123', where the letters are your initials and the number your personal interview count. For example: 'JM004' would indicate **J**eroen **M**oes's **fourth** interview.

Finally, at the end of our interview, I would like to ask you a few short closed questions. These are important to us in order to be able to compare your answers to the answers other people give us.

In the first part, I asked you to make your answers as detailed as possible. For the following questions, however, I will provide you with some predetermined answering options. If you have any further remarks based on these questions, feel free to tell me and I will make a note about it.

Identity and politics

There are two short parts to these closed questions. The first part is about your identity, and the second part contains general background questions. Let's start with the questions about your identity.

1. I would like you to think about the idea of geographical identity. Different people think of this in different ways. People might think of themselves as being European, Estonian or from a specific region. Some people say that with globalisation, people are becoming closer to each other as 'citizens of the world'. Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are... (please mark the correct box with a ×)

	Not at all	Not really	Somewhat	Very much	DK
Regional					
Estonian					
European Union					
Europe as a whole					
World citizen					
[IF APPLICABLE] Russian					

2. In the near future, do you see yourself as: (please circle your answer)
   1. Estonian only?
   2. Estonian and European?
   3. European only?
   4. [IF APPLICABLE] Russian only?
   5. [IF APPLICABLE] Russian and Estonian?
   6. [IF APPLICABLE] Russian and European?
   7. [IF APPLICABLE] Russian, Estonian, and European?
   8. None of the above.

3. And of these things, in which order do you see yourself? (please rank your choices with '1', '2', '3', '4', and '5'. A *lower* number means *more* important. Leave blank if it is not important to you at all.)

Regional, rank: [ ] (e.g. Tartumaa, Harjumaa, Ida-Virumaa, etc.)
Estonian, rank: [ ]
European, rank: [ ]
Russian, rank: [ ] [IF APPLICABLE]
Russian-Estonian, rank: [ ] [IF APPLICABLE]

4. 'Europe' can mean different things for different people. What does Europe mean to you *personally*? Below is a list with a number of things. Please indicate 'yes' or 'no' for each element whether you associate this with 'Europe'. (please check box for 'yes' or 'no' for each item with an '×'. If you don't know the answer, you can leave it blank.)

Statement	Yes	No
History		
Geography		
Democratic values		
Social protection		
The European flag		
The single currency, the Euro		
Cultural diversity		
Economic prosperity		
Culture		
Peace		
Modernisation		
Unemployment		
Bureaucracy		
Waste of money		
Loss of our cultural / national identity		
More crime		
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in		
Free movement or open borders		
Cooperation		
The European Anthem (music like a 'national anthem')		

The European flag (twelve yellow stars on a blue background)		
The European Union's motto: "Unity in Diversity"		

5. Generally speaking, do you think that Estonia's membership of the European Union is...? (please circle your answer)

   1. A good thing
   2. Neither good nor bad
   3. A bad thing
   4. I don't know

6. Taking everything into account, would you say that Estonia has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

   1. Benefited
   2. Not benefited
   3. I don't know

7. In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

   1. Very positive
   2. Fairly positive
   3. Neutral
   4. Fairly negative
   5. Very negative
   6. I don't know

The questionnaire is continued on the next page.

8. Kumb igast sõnapaarist ja mil määral iseloomustab Teie tundeid Euroopa suhtes?

Märkige, palun, tabeli igal real ringiga see vastusevariant, mis sobib Teie tunnetega Euroopa suhtes kõige paremini. Kolm vasakpoolset tulpa näitavad vasakpoolse, kolm parempoolset parempoolse omaduse kehtivust.Igas reas saab olla ainult üks vastus.

	Väga hästi	Kesk-miselt	Vähesel määral	Ei seda ega teist	Vähesel määral	Kesk-miselt	Väga hästi		Optional clarification
Kiire	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Aeglane**	
Oma	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Võõras**	
Avatud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Suletud**	
Jõuetu	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Jõuline**	
Kahanev	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Kasvav**	
Liikuv	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Seisev**	
Hoolimatu	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Hooliv**	
Tõusev	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Langev**	
Turvaline	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Ohtlik**	
Tõrjuv	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Ligitõmbav**	
Ebasõbralik	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Sõbralik**	
Killustatud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Ühtne**	

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about globalisation?
(please check the correct box with an '×')

	Disagree	Agree a bit	Agree	I don't know
Globalisation is (also) a good opportunity for employment and companies in Estonia				
Globalisation is (also) a threat to employment and companies in Estonia				
Globalisation is (also) an opportunity for Estonian culture to be shown to the rest of the world				
Globalisation is (also) a threat to Estonian culture				
Globalisation is a good thing				

9. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale? (please circle your answer)

Left **Right**

1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10

10. In political matters people also talk of "progressive" and "conservative". How would you place your views on this scale? (please circle your answer)

Progressive **Conservative**

1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10

11. Which of the political parties below would you ever consider to vote for in national elections? (please indicate all that apply with an '×'; multiple answers are possible)

	Definitely	Maybe	Never
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit			
Keskerakond			
Rahvaliit			
Reformierakond			
Rohelised			
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond			
Mõni vene erakond Eestis			
Mõni muu erakond (milline?) ____________________			
Minu vaadetele ja huvidele pole lähedane ükski erakond			
Ei tunne huvi, ei tea nende erakondade vaateid			

People you know

For this short section, the interviewer should help the interviewee to administer the questions.

In this very short section of two questions, we would like to ask you a few things about people you are regularly in contact with. This will help us to understand how people share their ideas about Europe with their friends, relatives, and colleagues.

First, we would like you to think about **a maximum of 5 people** who are close to you with whom you have **ever talked about 'Europe'**, or you **could imagine** talking about 'Europe' at some point in the future. If you can't imagine talking about Europe to anyone, try to think of people who are generally close to you like your best friends, closest family, or colleagues you often talk to.

Now, for each of these people, please write down their **initials** in the table below (this is to ensure privacy for them and you). If you prefer, you can also write down fake names as long as you know who you are talking about. This part is **only to help you remember**. After writing down initials or names, please indicate what your most important relationship is to them.

	Initials or name	How do you know each other?			
		Family	Friend	Colleague	Other
Person 1:					
Person 2:					
Person 3:					
Person 4:					
Person 5:					

For the next couple of questions, keep an eye on this list of contacts in order to keep in mind who you are talking about.

Now, using the list of initials or names on the previous page, please fill in the questions in the tables below for each of your contacts.

12. First some basic information of your contacts. (please indicate your answers with an '×'. You can guess if you are not sure about the answer. Ask the interviewer for help if this question is unclear)

Person	Age	Education			Gender		Country (if not Estonia)	City
		Low	Middle	High	Woman	Man		
1								
2								
3								
4								
5								

13. And now a few questions about your contacts' views of Europe. (please indicate your answers with an '×'. If you don't know and are unable to make a guess, you can leave it blank. Ask the interviewer for help if this question is unclear)

Person	His / her general opinion about Europe (you can guess)			Do you think your contact thinks about 'Europe' in the same way as you do? (you can guess)		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Thinks very differently	Thinks more or less the same	Thinks very similarly
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						

14. Finally, please place an '×' for the contacts who also know each other. For example: if 'person 1' knows 'person 2', you can place an '×' in the second cell from the left on the first row. (Ask the interviewer for help if this question is unclear)

	Person 1	Person 2	Person 3	Person 4	Person 5
Person 1 knows:					
Person 2 knows:					
Person 3 knows:					
Person 4 knows:					
Person 5 knows:					

Background questions

Finally, I have some general background questions for you, which will help us to compare your answers to those of other people.

15. First of all, in which year were you born?

Year: [ ]

16. Gender: (please mark you answer with an '×')

- [ ] Woman
- [ ] Man

17. Where were you born? (please write down your city, region, and country if outside of Estonia)

[ ]

18. And your parents? (please write down city, region, and country if outside of Estonia)

Mother: [ ]

Father: [ ]

19. Teie rahvus (please mark you answer with an '×')

- [ ] Eestlane
- [ ] Venelane
- [ ] Muu (mis?)________________

20. Teie kodakondsus (please mark you answer with an '×')

- [ ] Eesti
- [ ] Vene
- [ ] Muu. Kirjutage, milline ____________
- [ ] Kodakondsuseta

21. How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

Age: [ ]

If not applicable, please select one of the following:

(please mark you answer with an '×')

☐ I never enjoyed full-time education

☐ I'm still studying

☐ I don't remember / don't want to say

22. What is the highest education degree you received? (please write down the name of your diploma, and if possible the level of study (e.g. keskkool, ülikool, etc.)

[ ]

23. What is your current occupation? (please circle the answer that is closest to your situation)

NON-ACTIVE

1 Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working

2 Student

3 Unemployed or temporarily not working

4 Retired or unable to work through illness

SELF EMPLOYED

5 Farmer

6 Fisherman

7 Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)

8 Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person

9 Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company

EMPLOYED

10 Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)

11 General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)

12 Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)

13 Employed position, working mainly at a desk

14 Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)

15 Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)

16 Supervisor

17 Skilled manual worker

18 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant

**If your answer to question 23 was 1, 2, 3, or 4 please continue with question 24.
If you gave any other answer, you can skip question 24 and
continue with question 25 on page 252.**

24. Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last occupation? (please circle the answer that is closest to your situation)

SELF EMPLOYED

1 Farmer

2 Fisherman

3 Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)

4 Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person

5 Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company

EMPLOYED

6 Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)

7 General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)

8 Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)

9 Employed position, working mainly at a desk

10 Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)

11 Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)

12 Supervisor

13 Skilled manual worker

14 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant

NOT APPLICABLE

15 Never did any paid work

25. How well do you speak the following languages? (please check the correct boxes with an '×')

Language	Not at all	Basic	Good	Mother tongue
Estonian				
Russian				
English				
Finnish				
German				
French				
Other 1: …………………………………..				
Other 2: …………………………………..				
Other 3: …………………………………..				

Interview data

[! FOR THE INTERVIEWER !] Please fill in this section **AFTER THE INTERVIEW** has finished and you said goodbye to the interviewee. Don't forget to note the interview number and date on the first page of the closed questions section, and to fill in the registration form (separate document) either online or on paper. If you need more space, feel free to use a separate blank sheet.

Location of the interview: Start time of the interview: End time of the interview: How did you find the interviewee?	
How well did the interview go in your view on a scale from 0 – 10? (please circle)	Very bad Very good 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10
Optional: Any other comments about this interview? (continue on separate sheet if necessary)	

Appendix C – List of Interviewees

This appendix lists all of the interviewees included in this project. When they are mentioned in the body of the text by name, their pseudonym is indicated. The list is ordered by country case first, followed by the regions as indicated in Chapter 3.

#	Pseudonym	Region	Age category	Sex	Education	Profession	Country
1	Reeta	North-East	30-40	Female	Lower	Desk worker	Estonia
2	n/a	North-East	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Estonia
3	n/a	North-East	20-30	Female	Higher	Education	Estonia
4	n/a	North-East	20-30	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Estonia
5	n/a	North-East	20-30	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Estonia
6	n/a	North-East	40-50	Male	Middle	Services	Estonia
7	n/a	North-East	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Estonia
8	n/a	North-East	40-50	Male	Lower	Self-employed	Estonia
9	n/a	North-West	40-50	Male	Middle	Entrepeneur	Estonia
10	Sofia	North-West	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Estonia
11	Paavo	North-West	40-50	Male	Higher	Unknown	Estonia
12	n/a	North-West	50-60	Male	Higher	Management	Estonia
13	n/a	North-West	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Estonia
14	n/a	North-West	40-50	Male	Lower	Unemployed	Estonia
15	n/a	North-West	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Estonia
16	Markus	North-West (islands)	50-60	Male	Middle	Fisherman	Estonia
17	Oskar	North-West (islands)	50-60	Male	Middle	Travelling worker	Estonia
18	Anu	North-West (islands)	50-60	Female	Middle	Manual worker	Estonia
19	n/a	South	50-60	Male	Lower	Management	Estonia
20	Liisa	South	70-80	Female	Lower	Retired	Estonia
21	n/a	South	30-40	Female	Lower	Desk worker	Estonia
22	n/a	South	50-60	Male	Unknown	Management	Estonia
23	Sandra	South	30-40	Female	Higher	Management	Estonia
24	Oliver	South	20-30	Male	Middle	Student	Estonia
25	Jaanika	South	70-80	Female	Middle	Retired	Estonia
26	Rasmus	South	20-30	Male	Higher	Management	Estonia

27	Piret	South	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Estonia
28	n/a	South	18-20	Male	Higher	Student	Estonia
29	n/a	South	70-80	Male	Unknown	Retired	Estonia
30	n/a	Centre	20-30	Female	Middle	Student	Italy
31	Francesco	Centre	20-30	Male	Higher	Unknown	Italy
32	Luisa	Centre	30-40	Female	Higher	Translator	Italy
33	Camilla	Centre	20-30	Female	Middle	Management	Italy
34	n/a	Centre	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Italy
35	n/a	Centre	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Italy
36	n/a	Centre	30-40	Female	Higher	Student	Italy
37	n/a	Centre	20-30	Male	Higher	Services	Italy
38	n/a	Centre	18-20	Female	Middle	Student	Italy
39	n/a	Centre	30-40	Female	Middle	Unknown	Italy
40	n/a	Centre	40-50	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Italy
41	n/a	North	18-20	Male	High school	Student	Italy
42	Benedetta	North	20-30	Female	Higher	Unknown	Italy
43	Valentina	North	50-60	Female	Lower	Unemployed	Italy
44	Vittoria	North	60-70	Female	Lower	Retired	Italy
45	Eleonora	North	20-30	Female	Middle	Student	Italy
46	n/a	North	30-40	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Italy
47	n/a	North	50-60	Female	Middle	Services	Italy
48	n/a	North	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Italy
49	n/a	North	50-60	Male	Higher	Unknown	Italy
50	n/a	North	40-50	Female	Middle	Unknown	Italy
51	n/a	North	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Italy
52	n/a	North	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Italy
53	n/a	South	30-40	Male	Higher	Student	Italy
54	Vincenzo	South	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Italy
55	n/a	South	50-60	Female	Middle	Employed professional	Italy
56	Salvatore	South	50-60	Male	Higher	Employed professional	Italy
57	Giulia	South	20-30	Female	Middle	Student	Italy
58	n/a	South	50-60	Male	Middle	Unknown	Italy
59	n/a	South	18-20	Male	Unknown	Student	Italy
60	Margriet	Centre	50-60	Female	Middle	Unknown	Netherlands
61	Bram	Centre	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Netherlands
62	n/a	Centre	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Netherlands
63	n/a	Centre	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Netherlands
64	n/a	Centre	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Netherlands
65	Pieter	Centre	40-50	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands

66	n/a	Centre	40-50	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands
67	n/a	Centre	40-50	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands
68	n/a	Centre	50-60	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands
69	n/a	Centre	30-40	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands
70	Luuk	Centre	30-40	Male	Lower	Services (truck driver)	Netherlands
71	n/a	Centre	18-20	Male	Higher	Student	Netherlands
72	n/a	South	40-50	Female	Middle	Politics (local)	Netherlands
73	n/a	South	20-30	Female	Higher	Volunteer/Unemployed	Netherlands
74	n/a	South	30-40	Male	Higher	Politics (local)	Netherlands
75	n/a	South	30-40	Male	Middle	Education / Politics (local)	Netherlands
76	n/a	South	20-30	Female	Lower	Health care / unemployed	Netherlands
77	Thomas	South	50-60	Male	Lower	Civil servant	Netherlands
78	n/a	South	60-70	Male	Higher	Retired	Netherlands
79	Adam	South	30-40	Male	Higher	Unemployed	Netherlands
80	Sam	South	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Netherlands
81	n/a	South	40-50	Male	Middle	Unknown	Netherlands
82	n/a	South	40-50	Female	Middle	Education	Netherlands
83	Thijs	South	20-30	Male	Higher	Student	Netherlands
84	n/a	South	50-60	Male	Unknown	Unknown	Netherlands
85	n/a	South	50-60	Female	Unknown	Unknown	Netherlands
86	n/a	West	30-40	Male	Higher	Services	Netherlands
87	n/a	West	40-50	Female	Higher	Self-employed	Netherlands
88	n/a	West	70-80	Female	Lower	Retired	Netherlands
89	n/a	West	40-50	Female	Middle	Entrepeneur	Netherlands
90	Lotte	West	20-30	Female	Higher	Student	Netherlands
91	n/a	West	60-70	Male	Middle	Entrepeneur / Politics (local)	Netherlands
92	n/a	West	30-40	Male	Higher	Education / Politics (local)	Netherlands
93	n/a	West	50-60	Male	Lower	Business / Politics (local)	Netherlands
94	n/a	West	40-50	Male	Higher	Entrepeneur / Politics (local)	Netherlands
95	n/a	West	18-20	Female	Higher	Student	Netherlands

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