



European
University
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DEPARTMENT
OF HISTORY
AND
CIVILIZATION

The Party Nobility

Cold War and the Shaping of an Identity at the
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(1943-1991)

Pierre-Louis Six

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

Florence, 15 December 2017

European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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The Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) was founded after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1943 with the mission of training a new generation of flag bearers of Communist ideals and Soviet State interests on the international scene, the so-called *meždunarodniki*. Often cited as the alma mater of most of the leading figures involved in the conduct of the Soviet diplomacy during Cold War, the MGIMO has received paradoxically little attention from scholars. Most researchers who have mentioned it present the Institute either as a crucible of social reproduction in the 1970s Soviet Union or as a subversive place, whose ‘net thinking’ paved the way to Gorbachev’s perestroika. For their part, numerous *meždunarodniki* describe the MGIMO as a Soviet Tsarskoye Selo or a Communist Lyceum: they surprisingly refer to their experience at the Institute in terms redolent of Russian imperial history, stressing the fact that they were much more than experts in foreign affairs and that they occupied a distinct place within the Soviet elite. Ranging from the end of World War II to the collapse of the USSR, this research aims at analyzing the making of a hybrid social category, what I describe as Party nobility in the Soviet Union, the identity of which shaped and was shaped by the Cold War. How did an institution and its alumni form a distinct social group that sat at the very core of the Cold War enterprise? How did MGIMO become the place where a specific praxis of foreign affairs was inculcated, based on the hybridisation of aristocratic manners and communist ethics during the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev era? Why was the loyalty of both the institution and the social group put into question during perestroika as early as 1985? These are some of the main questions this research will answer.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPSU : Communist Party of the Soviet Union (*Kommunističeskââ partiâ Sovetskogo Soûza*)

GARF : The Russian State Archives of the Russian Federation (*Rossijskie Rossijskie Gosudarstvennye Arhivy Rossijskoj Federacii*)

GORKOM : The city committee of the CPSU (*Gorodskoj komitet KPSS*)

HDS : The Higher Diplomatic School (*Vysšaâ Diplomičeskââ Škola*)

IMEMO : The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (*Institut mirovoj ékonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnošenij*)

KGB : The Committee of State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvenoj Bezopasnosti*)

KOMSOMOL : The Young Communist League (*Vsesoûznyj leninskij kommunističeskij soûz moloděži*)

MGIMO or IMO : The Moscow State Institute of International Relations or The Institute of International Relations. (*Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj institut mezhdunarodnykh otnošenij, Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnošenij*)

MID : The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstvo inostrannyh del*)

MIOS : The Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies (*Moskovskij institut vostokovedeniâ*)

MIFT : The Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade (*Moskovskij institut vnešnej trgovli*)

NARKOMINDEL: The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (*Narodnyj Kommissariat Meždunarodnyh Del*)

OBKOM : The Regional party Committee (*Oblastnoj Komitet*)

PARTKOM : The Party Committee (*Partijnyj Komitet*)

PNILSAMO : The Problem Laboratory of System Analysis of International Relations (*Problemnaâ naučno-issledovatel'skââ laboratoriâ sistemnogo analiza mezhdunarodnykh otnošenij*)

RGASPI : The Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History (*Rossijskie Gosudarstvennye Arhivy Social'no-Poličeskoj Istorii*)

VOKS : The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (*Vsesoûznoe obšestvo kul'turnoj svâzi s zagrancej*)

TASS : The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (*Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soûza*)

TSAOPIM : The Central Archive of the Socio-political History of Moscow (*Central'nyj Arhiv Obšestvenno-političeskoj istorii g. Moskvy*)

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

А А	Б В	В V	Г G	Д D
Ё Ё	Ж Ž	З Z	И I	Й J
К К	Л L	М M	Н N	О O
П P	Р R	С S	Т T	У U
Ф F	Х H	Ц C	Ч Č	Ш Š
Щ Š	Ъ "	Ы Y	Ь '	Э È
Ю Ů	Я Ā			

Names well known to English-speaking readers are presented in the text in their most familiar forms, for example, Yeltsin and Gorbachev. For similar reasons, I have used ‘perestroika’ rather than ‘perestrojka’ because the word has become familiar in English.

INTRODUCTION

‘The Moscow State Institute of International Relations (*Moskovskij Gosudarstvennyj Institut Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij*, MGIMO) was conceived as a Soviet Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, as a greenhouse within which a new young generation of diplomats could bloom, from which not laypersons but professionals would come out. It was a wholesome idea, but the rot has already set in, since it carried like a seed a contradiction, the risk of a potential implosion. In fact, Tsarskoye Selo Lycea not only trained civil servants but also fighters against tyranny. Do not think me a pedant: without even mentioning Pushkin, I do not claim that Decembrists came out of this building on the Krymskij Bridge. Nonetheless, the sciences that fed our minds, and most importantly, by whom and how they were taught to us, did involuntarily sow the seeds of freethinking in our young spirits.’¹

So wrote Melor Sturua in an anthology of memoirs by MGIMO graduates from the year 1949 that was published by the educational institute half a century later.² His surname ‘Melor’ is an acronym made up of the first letters of the names Marx, Engels, and Lenin, followed by the words ‘October Revolution’. Sturua was born in 1928 in Tiflis (Tbilisi)³ and the originality of his surname can be explained by his parents’ desire to give their child a name in line with communism’s ideals and history at the end of the 1930s. He was the son of one of the leading figures of the Georgian Communist Party and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic between 1942 and 1948. Despite an excellent academic record⁴ and his family background, the young Sturua was deprived of the opportunity to undertake a diplomatic career when he graduated from MGIMO in 1949. Following the publication of his father’s autobiography, which rehabilitated several Georgian political figures persecuted by the Stalin regime, his family fell into disgrace. His father was removed from office and Sturua declared that he had no

¹ Sturua’s memoirs are quoted in Boris Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom, kak mnogo dum roždaet on* [*MGIMO is our home, how many thoughts it creates*], MGIMO (Moskva, 2004), 6.

² For every year between 1998 and 2013, MGIMO alumni were offered the opportunity to write and publish their memoirs in order to mark the 50th anniversary of their graduation.

³ A biography of Melor Sturua is available on the website of the Institute for Politics at Harvard University: <http://www.iop.harvard.edu/melor-sturua>.

⁴ In 1949, Sturua got his MGIMO degree with a distinction, the so-called ‘red diploma’ (*krasnyj diplom*). The expression comes from the colour of the cover inside of which degrees with distinctions were granted in the Soviet Union.

choice but to begin a career in journalism.⁵ His biography mentions that he joined the editorial staff of the prestigious newspaper *Izvestiâ* thanks to the decisive influence of Anastas Mikoyan. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, he became one of Khrushchev's speechwriters while still working as a journalist. He had several experiences working abroad as the bureau chief of *Izvestiâ* in the United Kingdom between 1964 and 1968. He occupied the same position in New York between 1972 and 1976 and in Washington between 1982 and 1984. He finally became a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1989 and emigrated to the United States.

Issues related to the use of memoirs as historical sources are neither specific to Soviet history nor new.⁶ And yet, Sturua's retrospective statements show a peculiar paradox. By drawing a parallel between MGIMO graduates and the youth trained in the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, some of whom – the Decembrists – organised an uprising against Emperor Nicholas I in 1825, he argued that questioning the Soviet regime emerged from the very core of MGIMO's purpose. He claimed that the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, founded in 1944 as a place entirely dedicated to the training of a new generation of bearers of communist ideals and Soviet state interests on the international scene, was a subversive institution. Through teaching sciences to an elite, in his opinion, the Soviet state organised the mechanisms by which it was subjected to questioning: it sowed the seeds of its own demise.

In 2000, in a memoir anthology for MGIMO graduates from 1950, Vladimir Denisov also refers to imperial Russian history in order to depict his student experience,⁷ although he was much more cautious with it came to the subversive nature of the Soviet educational institution. By urging today's MGIMO students to resist the siren call of the present in their interpretation of Soviet history, he recalls:

⁵ Melor Sturua, 'Pozvočnyj Kadr [A Vertebrate Executive]', *Izvestiâ*, 10 February 2002, <http://izvestia.ru/news/259187>.

⁶ Giovanni Levi, '« Les Usages de La Biographie », Histoire et Sciences Sociales. Un Tournant Critique', *Annales E.S.C.*, November 1989, 1325–36; Pierre Bourdieu, 'L'illusion Biographique', *Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales* 62, no. 1 (1986): 69–72; Patrick Serriot, *Analyse Du Discours Politique Soviétique*, Institut d'Etudes Slaves (Paris, 1985); Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 6.

On the last day of instruction, we all gathered together for a farewell dinner at the restaurant 'Budapest'. At that time, as the traditions of Soviet diplomacy required, we drank our first toasts to Stalin and Molotov. We were grateful to the Party and the government for everything that had been done for us, for making us highly educated specialists. And although nowadays some people consider these things with irony, in the context of the time, the expression of our gratitude was sincere: in those difficult post-war years, we perfectly understood the price borne by our country and our people for funding our education, for giving us the possibility of being what we became. [...] According to Pushkin's testimony, during their feasts, Lyceum students proposed their first toast to the tsar who seized Paris and founded the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum. For us, Stalin was also a tsar: he took Berlin and built MGIMO. By looking at our past from today's perspective, this might seem weird and difficult to understand for our youth. And yet, for those of us who graduated in the 1940s, the present reality appears weird too.⁸

Denisov was born in 1928 in Moscow. By stressing that his graduation from a school for the working youth (*škola rabočej moloděži*)⁹ probably played a key role in his admission to MGIMO, he underlines his underprivileged social origin. After his graduation in 1950, he began a career both in journalism and academia. He worked for the Information Committee at the Council of Ministers of the USSR (*Komitet informacii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR*) and then became editor-in-chief of the press agency *Novosti*. He obtained a PhD degree (*kandidat nauk*) in philosophy at the prestigious Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1956. In the middle of the 1970s, after working for the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review in Prague, he was enrolled at the Academy of Sciences, where he conducted research on social philosophy and the history of philosophy. He finally became a doctor of sciences in philosophy (*doktor nauk*) in 1976 and was appointed professor in 1985.

⁸ Denisov's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, eds., *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta: (1945-1950) : vospominanija vypusnikov pervogo poslevoennogo priema v Institut [On the clock next to the Crimean Bridge (1945-1950) The memories of the graduates of the first post-war admission to the Institute]* (Moskva: Interstamo, 2000), 81.

⁹ The schools for young people and adults were part-time schools set up by the Soviet regime in the middle of the 1920s and reorganised as schools for the working youth and schools for the rural youth in 1943-44. Their curricula and teaching methods were almost the same as those of full-time general schools, although their courses were longer. Mervyn Matthews, *Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions Since Stalin* (Routledge, 2012), 7.

Whereas Sturua considered the teaching of social sciences at MGIMO to be a key factor in provoking people to question the Soviet regime, Denisov looks at his student experience from a rather different perspective. His retrospective statement reflects not on scholarship, but on belief. The toast episode is particularly telling, given that behind the authority of tradition Denisov assures us that his gesture was genuine. He wants us to believe that he meant the words he pronounced and brings up the mechanism behind this belief. He highlights the gratitude he felt towards the Communist Party and the Soviet state for his studies at MGIMO in the wake of World War II. He suggests he enjoyed upward mobility thanks to his graduation from MGIMO. Most importantly, he stresses how his time at the Institute became paramount in both the social position he later obtained and the identity he formed within Soviet society.

Despite their contradictory retrospective statements, both Sturua's and Denisov's comments highlight a collective identity acquired from their years at MGIMO. This shared identity does not correspond to a professional group. Their careers in journalism were certainly similar to those of many other MGIMO graduates, but still differ from the alumni who became Soviet diplomats or who occupied leading positions in the Soviet state or the party administration. However, when referring to their personal experiences, they assume that their points of view reflected the reality of the majority of their classmates, or even all of them. Written in the first person plural, they do not posit a difference between personal and collective memories. Although they had different social origins and developed opposite views towards the Soviet regime, they both referred to themselves as *meždunarodniki*, the title inscribed on their diploma when they graduated from MGIMO. They saw themselves as a specific part of the Soviet elite, defined by a distinguishing diploma. For them, this title stood not only for an academic degree or the specialisation in foreign affairs which had an impact on their future professional trajectories. It also meant a precise social role within Soviet society and, more specifically, an assumption of a shared system of beliefs, values, and behaviours inherited from their years at the educational institute.

In order to describe this collective identity formed at MGIMO, the two graduates referred to imperial Russian history. They both compared MGIMO to the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, an institution founded to train the children of the best families who

would afterwards occupy leading administrative positions in the imperial service. Admittedly, the building on the Krymskij Bridge, where the Institute was located between 1944 and 1985, was a former imperial lyceum for the children of the Moscow nobility.¹⁰ One could argue that parallels with Russia's imperial past were more likely to occur in memoirs written after the downfall of the USSR than before. Yet, Sturua and Denisov felt it necessary to align themselves with the children of the imperial nobility in order to characterise their student experiences. Sturua's statement mentions the imperial past in order to illustrate how the education of the future elite paradoxically contributed to the development of a critical relationship with the Soviet regime. Denisov does exactly the same in order to stress some of the mechanisms of the reproduction of the social order by revealing the ways in which the Soviet regime won the loyalty of its elite. His statements make visible how party and state structures succeeded in exerting a positive control over the Soviet elite by instilling a sense of duty and gratitude among future high officials.

Behind the references to the imperial Russian nobility, Sturua and Denisov's memoirs suggest an important set of questions about the making of the Soviet elite after World War II. How did the creation of the *meždunarodniki* as a new social category reflect the evolution of the criteria necessary to gain access to the Soviet elite dedicated to foreign affairs? Did this specific part of the Soviet elite distinguish itself from other social categories through a de-ideologised education at MGIMO? Did the Institute pave the way for the rapid diplomatic changes that occurred in the middle of the 80s? Or was it a conservative institution which played a key role in maintaining the social order during Détente?

Through a study of both MGIMO, an institution dedicated to the education of senior civil servants specialised in international affairs, and the social status of its alumni, the *meždunarodniki*, this research intends to analyse the role of an academic title in the trajectories of a specialised elite in the USSR. This study does not deal with the origins or causes of the downfall of the USSR. On the contrary, by focusing on the long period of late socialism (1943-91), it aims to provide a socio-historical inquiry

¹⁰ Ūrij Fokin gives a description of the building in Anatolij Torkunov and Rostislav Sergeev, eds., '*Staryj dom u Moskvy-reki...*' (1948-1953) *Govorât vypuskniki 1953 goda* [Old House near the Moscow River... (1948-1953) *The graduates of the year 1953 speak*], MGIMO (Moskva, 2003), 160.

into both MGIMO and the *meždunarodniki* by studying the relationship between the production of knowledge related to the world outside the USSR and the issue of social reproduction within the Soviet Union. Through the concept of party nobility, I will focus on some mechanisms behind the maintenance of social order and opportunities for change after World War II in the Soviet regime. This was a regime that was still characterised by the supremacy of the Party over social life, the collective ownership of the means of production, and the dominance of Marxist-Leninism in the social sciences.

MGIMO: a short history of the institution

The origins of MGIMO's establishment are to be found in the context of World War II, a time when war led to burgeoning international ties between the USSR and the rest of the world.¹¹ It is speculated that the issue of founding a new educational structure dedicated to the training of Soviet diplomats was raised during a State Defence Committee directed by Stalin following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1943.¹² Váčeslav Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, exposed the need for a new generation of foreign affairs specialists characterised by both fidelity to the Communist Party and possession of the high level of knowledge required in the new international context. Initially founded on 31 August 1943 as the 13th faculty of Moscow State University,¹³ the Moscow State Institute of International Relations was soon established by a Council of People's Commissars decree as a graduate school under the supervision of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (*Narodnyj Kommissariat Meždunarodnyh Del*, Narkomindel) on 14 October 1944.¹⁴ Two faculties were opened within the Institute, where newly enrolled students were taught

¹¹ A short chronology of MGIMO's history is placed at the end of the dissertation.

¹² Boris Kurbatov gives this information, although I have not found any document in the archive corroborating it. Boris Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'* [*MGIMO Alumni yearbook 1948-1954*] (Moskva: Moskovskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet, 1998), 7.

¹³ Postanovlenie N°932 ob organizacii v sostave Moskovskogo ordena Lenina Gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni M.V Lomonosova fakul'teta mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij, Sovet narodnyh komissarov SSSR [Council of People's Commissars' decree N°932 about the organisation of a faculty of international relations at the M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University of the Order of Lenin], Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 17.

¹⁴ Postanovlenie N°1412 o preobrazovanii fakul'teta mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij MGU im. Lomonosova v Institut mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij, Sovet narodnyh komissarov SSSR [Council of People's Commissars' decree N°1412 about the reorganization of the MSU faculty of international relations in the Institute of International Relations] 14/10/1944, GARF, fond 5446, opis' 46, delo 2495.

either English, French, German, or Spanish: one of international relations dedicated to the training of ‘historian-meždunarodniki’ (*istoriki-meždunarodniki*) and one of international law devoted to the training of ‘lawyer-meždunarodniki’ (*juristy-meždunarodniki*). From 1944, MGIMO benefited from an appropriate location in a former imperial lyceum on the Krymskij Bridge between the Kremlin and the House on the Embankment, the seats of political and social power.

When MGIMO was founded in October 1944, it was neither the first attempt by the Narkomindel to institutionalise the training of Soviet diplomats nor the only institution dedicated to educating specialists in foreign affairs. Under the direct supervision of the Narkomindel, internal training seminars were first set up under People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgij Čičerin and a department (*otdelenie*) dedicated to external relations (*vnešnie otnošeníâ*) trained meždunarodniki at Moscow State University in the 1920s.¹⁵ In 1934, under People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov, the creation of the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel constituted another precedent in the training of Soviet diplomats. However, the number of people trained at the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel was limited before World War II: there were only 33 graduates in 1935, 11 in 1936, and 37 in 1937.¹⁶ The Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (MIOS), founded after the October Revolution in 1921,¹⁷ and the Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade (MIF), established in 1931, were two other major breeding grounds for specialists in foreign affairs in the 1940s.

¹⁵ The origin of the term ‘meždunarodnik’ is not clear: there is no mention of it in the several editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* published between 1926 and 1990. The word ‘meždunarodnik’ was first mentioned in an advertising announcement for the review *Prožektor* in *Pravda* on February 1924. *Pravda*, 16 February 1924, 8. In June 1928, an article in *Pravda* made a direct link between the term meždunarodniki and the graduates of the MSU external relations department. ‘Šestoj Vypusk Meždunarodnikov [The Sixth Graduation of Meždunarodniki]’, 10 June 1928, *Pravda* edition, 4; For more information about the history of the MSU foreign relations department, see: Ůrij Kašlev, German Rozanov, and Valentin Šetinín, *Diplomatičeskââ Akademiâ MID Rossii: Istoriâ I Sovremennost’ [Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MID: History and Present]* (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo ‘Izvestiâ’, 2004), 46–52.

¹⁶ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetinín, *Diplomatičeskââ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 58.

¹⁷ The Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies was founded as a result of merging the Oriental studies departments in Moscow’s higher educational institutions and the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages, which had been founded in 1815. In the 1940s, the MIOS was under the supervision of the People’s Commissariat for Education and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Anatolij Torkunov, ed., *MGIMO universitet: 1944-2009 tradicii i sovremennost’ (1944-2009) [MGIMO University : traditions and modernity (1944-2009)]* (Moskva: Moskovskie učebniki i Kartolitografiâ, 2009), 22.

Compared to the creation of the Higher Diplomatic School, however, MGIMO's foundation meant not only a change in scale, but also a new way of selecting and educating a specialised corps dedicated to foreign affairs. With an average of 400 students graduating per year after a five- to six-year course¹⁸ between 1948 and 1991, the scope of careers for which MGIMO students were prepared covered a wide range of activities related to foreign affairs. Upon the Institute's foundation, MGIMO students were trained in order to join the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID)¹⁹ and other structures related to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet state, such as the Foreign Policy Commission (*Vnešnepolitičeskââ Komissiâ*), the Committee of State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvenoj Bezopasnosti*, KGB), the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (*Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soûza*, TASS), and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (*Vsesoûznoe obšestvo kul'turnoj svâzi s zagranicej*, VOKS).²⁰

Compared to the Higher Diplomatic School, the profile of students underwent a major change too. In 1943, MGIMO's first students were university graduates, war veterans, and school graduates.²¹ Selected through a thorough and attentive study of their personal files and an oral competitive examination organised by the Narkomindel, the enrolment of school graduates was in sharp contrast with the traditional practice of recruiting experienced party members in order to provide them a brief but intensive training course. Moreover, while MGIMO was initially closed to non-Soviet citizens, in 1946 the Institute started to welcome students from socialist countries, with six students from Mongolia initiating the trend.²² This was reinforced in the following

¹⁸ Between 1943 and 1991, the length of study at MGIMO fluctuated between four and six years. Alumni yearbooks indicate that around 17,500 *meždunarodniki* graduated from MGIMO between 1948 and 1991. However, there were important variations in the number of graduates in different years. In 1948, only 120 *meždunarodniki* graduated from MGIMO, while, in 1976, the number of graduates reached its maximum with 638 *meždunarodniki* receiving their diploma.

¹⁹ The Narkomindel was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1946. Igor' Ivanov, ed., *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2 [An Outline of the History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in Three Volumes. T.2]* (Moskva: OLMA-Press, 2002), 381.

²⁰ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 62.

²¹ Marie-Pierre Rey, 'Diplomatie et diplomates soviétiques à l'ère du dégel 1953-1964', *Cahiers du monde russe* 44, no. 2 (1 September 2003): 316.

²² Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 43.

years with new students from Albania, Czechoslovakia, China, Hungary, East Germany, North Korea, Vietnam, and Poland. Importantly, the first female students were admitted to MGIMO in 1946, though their number was subject to quota restrictions until the Gorbachev era.²³

In addition to tough selection criteria, the prestige of this institution in the Soviet Union was deeply rooted in the fact that it soon became one of the only educational institutions in the Soviet Union (other than the Higher Diplomatic School of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the faculty of international relations at Kiev University) where students could undertake an interdisciplinary academic course of five to six years focused on several aspects of international relations (history, law, and economics). In addition to the faculties of history and law, a new faculty of economics was established at the Institute in 1949.²⁴

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the exclusivity of the knowledge taught at MGIMO was progressively reinforced by two major decisions of the Soviet Council of Ministers: to merge it with the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies in 1954 and the Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade in 1958.²⁵ This assured MGIMO a monopoly over the training of those who wished to have a career in foreign affairs. Following the merger between MGIMO and MIOS, the scope of foreign languages taught at the Institute broadened, with new classes offered in Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, Farsi, and Turkish.

Khrushchev's ascent to power brought new opportunities for MGIMO students. With the beginning of the Thaw, internships abroad were made available, including travel to Western countries. A publishing house was opened for the Institute of International Relations (*Izdatel' stvo Instituta meždunarodnyh otnošenij*, IMO). The international context also strongly affected the Institute's everyday life: waves of decolonisation in the Third World created an environment in which the Soviet Union was able to carve out a position as a global revolutionary-nationalist leader. In parallel, the Kremlin

²³ It should be noted that for women, access to the faculty of international relations was particularly restricted. They represented less than 10 per cent of the faculty student body between 1960 and 1988. Yet, their number was more significant at the faculty of international economics from the 70s: they represented 25 per cent of the faculty students enrolled. Torkunov, *MGIMO universitet*, 31.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20–25.

aimed to reinforce the cohesion of and its control over the people's democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. By a decree of the Council of Ministers, MGIMO was obliged to provide the citizens of the people's democracies with between a third and a half of the Institute's places. In 1964, the total number of foreign students at MGIMO was 500.

Less than 20 years after its foundation, the enrolment of *meždunarodniki* in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already a mass phenomenon that affected the sociological profile of the whole Soviet diplomatic corps and major institutions connected with the conduct of foreign affairs. MGIMO was the consecrated anteroom for a career in Soviet diplomacy: in 1963, its alumni represented a third of the whole Soviet diplomatic corps, while 75 per cent of MID diplomatic staff were MGIMO alumni in 1972.²⁶ their weight within the Soviet MID reached its peak on the eve of the Gorbachev era.²⁷ According to Nikolai Mitrohin, the Moscow Institute also became the main recruiting ground for the international departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Within the party administration dedicated to international relations, MGIMO graduates represented 46.4 per cent of the staff between 1982 and 1985.²⁸ In his study on Brezhnev's foreign policy establishment, Jerry Hough indicates that, on the eve of the Gorbachev era, 56 per cent of Soviet international journalists were graduates from MGIMO.²⁹ Within the international relations institutions of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, MGIMO graduates also occupied key positions of authority: Nikolay Inozemcev, Georgij Arbatov, and Viktor Vol'skij, who all graduated from MGIMO in 1949, were nominated respectively as directors of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in 1966, the

²⁶ Stenogramma III otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii partijnogo komiteta MGIMO [Minutes of the 3rd report and election party conference of the MGIMO party organisation], 07/04/1972, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 121, 126.

²⁷ Kurbatov indicates that in 1980, 146 MGIMO graduates joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were 153 in 1981, 147 in 1982, 149 in 1983, 146 in 1984, and 138 in 1985. Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 132.

²⁸ Nikolaj Mitrohin, 'Èlita zakrytogo obščestva: MGIMO , meždunarodnye otdely apparata CK KP SS i prosopografiâ ih sotrudnikov [The Elite of "Closed Society": MGIMO, International Departments of the Apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Prosopography of Their Cadres]', *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2013): 152.

²⁹ Frederick Laird and Erik Hoffmann, eds., 'The Foreign Policy Establishment', in *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, by Jerry F. Hough (Berlin ; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1986), 157.

Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in 1967, and the Institute of Latin American Studies in 1966.

Under Brezhnev, the Institute extended the scope of its teaching and research activities. In 1969, new faculties appeared: the faculty of international law was re-established, the faculty of international journalism was founded, and a preparatory faculty for the working youth and veterans of the Red Army appeared.³⁰ In 1976, the foundation of the Problem Laboratory of System Analysis of International Relations (*Problemnâ naučno-issledovatel'skaâ laboratoriâ sistemnogo analiza meždunarodnyh otnošenij*, PNILSAMO) was aimed at providing new analytical tools for the study of international relations.

Apart from the quantitative dimension of meždunarodniki access to positions of authority, diplomats' memoirs reveal that the enrolment of a new generation of diplomats did not go unnoticed within the MID. In 1984, Nicolas Polianski, a former Soviet diplomat who deserted and joined the West on the eve of Gorbachev era, had an acute sense of the changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The sons, namely those who had been trained at MGIMO, were very different from their fathers. They differed in terms of their higher level of education, their knowledge of foreign languages, and finally their less dogmatic and more liberal turn of mind. In principle, they were attracted by a Western way of life. They started to consider that a reform of the function of the Communist Party was an absolute necessity. They were capable of indignation over the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They were thoroughly familiar with Solzhenitsyn's books because they used to sneakily bring them back from overseas.³¹

The former diplomat was thus pointing out the replacement of one generation by the next that occurred at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Brezhnev era. By evoking an attraction to the Western way of life, he made also explicit that the renewal of civil servants included a change of practices, values, and behaviours. Lastly, by using the expression 'fathers and sons', Polianski was referring directly to Ivan Turgenev's successful novel from the 1860s, where the main character, the nihilist

³⁰ Torkunov, *MGIMO universitet*, 27.

³¹ Laird and Hoffmann, 'The Foreign Policy Establishment', 157.

Bazarov, explains to his uncle that ‘a Nihilist is a man who does not bow before any authority whatever, who does not accept a single principle on faith, with whatever respect that principle may be environed’.³² Ironically, the nihilism that some scholars in intellectual history and literature have connected with the roots of the Russian socialism³³ was used in Poliansky’s book to describe the reformist character of the *meždunarodniki* within the Soviet Union.

A crucible of Soviet social immobility or a subversive place: a state-of-the-art survey of literature about MGIMO between 1970 and 2000

One of the motivations for writing this PhD dissertation is to question problematic and contradictory assumptions about both MGIMO and *meždunarodniki* which are often implicitly reproduced in much American and Western European academic writing today. What makes these assumptions particularly implicit is the fact that, in contrast to several institutions related to Soviet diplomacy such as the IMEMO,³⁴ the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU,³⁵ the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review,³⁶ or the Pugwash movement,³⁷ the Soviet past of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations has received surprisingly little attention from American and Western European scholars.³⁸

³² Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev, *Fathers and Sons* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 23.

³³ Jean Bourdeau, *Le socialisme allemand et le nihilisme russe* (F. Alcan, 1892).

³⁴ Jeffrey Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change - Soviet/ Russian Behaviour and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Pjotr Cherkasov, *IMÉMO: Institut mirovoï ékonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii: portret na fonde épokhi [IMEMO: The Institute of World Economy and International Relations: a portrait]* (Moskva: Ves' Mir, 2004).

³⁵ Mark Kramer, ‘The Role of the CPSU International Departement in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy’, *Soviet Studies*, no. 3 (1990); Leonard Schapiro, ‘The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy’, *International Journal* 32, no. 1 (Winter /1977 1976): 41–51.

³⁶ See the 6th chapter ‘Institutional Amphibiousness or Civil Society?’ In Archie Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 157–89.

³⁷ Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

³⁸ Tellingly, there is no mention of MGIMO in the three volumes of the Cambridge History of Cold War or in the Oxford Handbook of Cold War. Nonetheless, in the index of the two books, one finds numerous graduates, such as the researchers and heads of institutes at the Soviet Academy of Sciences Aleksej Arbatov (1973), Georgij Arbatov (1949), Gennadij Gerasimov (1953), Nikolaj Inozemcev (1949), Soviet diplomat Oleg Grinevskij (1954), senior KGB officer Nikolaj Leonov (1952), former KGB agent and deserter Oleg Gordievskij (1962), and former minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria

As far as I am aware, Martin Müller's 2009 PhD thesis is the only work that considers MGIMO as the main subject of investigation.³⁹ However, as he conducted a sociological study within the Institute today, Müller does not deal directly with the history of the institution. Among the leading articles on this subject, Marie-Pierre Rey is certainly the scholar who has paid the most attention to the institution: she aims to evaluate the impact of MGIMO on changes within the Soviet diplomatic corps and the conduct of Soviet diplomacy.⁴⁰ Nikolai Mitrohin's recent work, which questions MGIMO's place within the Soviet regime with a prosopography of the members of the CPSU International Departments, is also an exception in the contemporary literature.⁴¹ Yet, the two scholars do not deal with the institutional context that preceded MGIMO's foundation: they both tend to consider its establishment as 'year zero' for the training of diplomatic specialists within the Soviet Union. Moreover, by focusing exclusively either on the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs or on the Central Committee administration, the two scholars do not deal with the wide range of professional positions occupied by MGIMO alumni in the Soviet state, press agencies, and cultural institutions during the Cold War.

Paradoxically, while the Soviet past of the institution has not been considered as a matter of inquiry, since the 1970s MGIMO has been extensively referenced in a wide spectrum of research dealing with social history, international history, and intellectual history. In the underlying assumptions commonly made about MGIMO, the contrast

Petar Mladenov (1963). Their years of graduation from MGIMO are given in brackets. Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume I, Volume I*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Endings*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *Crisis and Détente*, The Cambridge History of the Cold War 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (OUP Oxford, 2013).

³⁹ Martin Muller, *Making Great Power Identities in Russia: An Ethnographic Discourse Analysis of Education at a Russian Elite University* (Berlin; London: Lit Verlag, 2010).

⁴⁰ Rey, 'Diplomatie et diplomates soviétiques à l'ère du dégel 1953-1964'; Marie-Pierre Rey, 'Le Département International Du Comité Central Du PCUS, Le MID et La Politique Extérieure Soviétique de 1953 à 1991' 74/75 (2003): 179–214; Marie-Pierre Rey, 'The Mejdunarodniki in the 1960s and First Half of the 1970s: Backgrounds, Connections, and the Agenda of Soviet International Elites', in *The Making of Détente: Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75*, ed. Wilfried Loth and George Soutou (Routledge, 2010).

⁴¹ Nikolaj Mitrohin, 'Èlita zakrytogo obščestva: MGIMO , meždunarodnye otdely apparata CK KP SS i prosopografiâ ih sotrudnikov [The Elite of "Closed Society": MGIMO, International Departments of the Apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Prosopography of Their Cadres]', *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2013).

between the research in social history in the 1970s and 80s and the pieces of intellectual history from the 1990s and 2000s is particularly striking. Opposite visions of the institution are manifested in the very terminology used to describe MGIMO's past and therefore the place of the *meždunarodniki* within Soviet society: the idea that MGIMO was a crucible of 1970s social reproduction where the Soviet elites 'cynically' maintained their social position from one generation to the next within the Soviet state gave way to a vision of the Institute as a breeding ground of 'enlightened' experts who made Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985 possible and spontaneously supported it. By using classificatory devices such as elite or expert, scholars often draw juxtaposed conclusions about both MGIMO's place within Soviet society and *meždunarodniki* roles in foreign affairs.

In much of the social history from the 70s and 80s, notions of elite, as defined by Charles Wright Mills, prevail. MGIMO was viewed as a place for the social reproduction of the Soviet elite, namely 'those who have the most of what there is to have'.⁴² Scholars called for attention to the common interests of different segments of the Soviet elite which occupied dominant positions in the party and state apparatuses. For them, members of the Soviet upper class strove to maintain their social rank from one generation to another by sending their children to MGIMO and thus strengthened their positions within the Soviet state apparatus after World War II. In 1985, Ilya Zemtsov reasoned that among the Soviet elite, generational changes went hand in hand with a career shift from Stalin's death onwards. From one generation to the next, MGIMO operated as a key link between political and governmental careers in the Soviet Union.⁴³ Moreover, the scholar emphasised that, for children of party and state officials, the appeal of diplomatic careers was related to the privileges to which they would gain access. In a Soviet system driven by the collective ownership of the means of production, possession of a MGIMO degree functioned as a way of making privileges hereditary.⁴⁴ As a profession, diplomacy guaranteed access to a variety of exclusive goods and services. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered a wide spectrum of services to its workers: it guaranteed access to a better healthcare system,

⁴² Charles Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford University Press, 2000), 9.

⁴³ Ilya Zemtsov, *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite* (New York: Crane Russak & Co, 1985), 63.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 67.

specific channels for consuming goods such as foreign exchange stores or the Kremlin ration (*Kremlevskij paek*),⁴⁵ and tourism overseas, three distinctive features of the Soviet elite.⁴⁶

In the 1970s-80s, scholars mainly stressed the role of MGIMO's competitive entrance examinations to describe the strategies developed by the Soviet elite for reproducing itself. In his study of the privilege in the Soviet Union, first published in 1978, Mervyn Matthews considered MGIMO as a 'case in point'⁴⁷ of Soviet social reproduction. By testing applicants' capabilities in foreign languages through a competitive examination, MGIMO automatically favoured the children of the Soviet elite, who benefited from private coaching or attendance at a Moscow special school. Therefore, because admission to the Institute required a recommendation from a party district secretary and 'even sometimes contacts at the Central Committee level', the English scholar argued that MGIMO's competitive examinations were based upon discriminatory non-academic criteria:⁴⁸ co-opting mechanisms based on party criteria automatically segregated children of the lowest social strata, who did not benefit from powerful family networks. This focus on the MGIMO competitive entrance examination reflects the fact that the Institute was not perceived in social history as playing a crucial role in the distribution of knowledge and know-how within the Soviet society: as a purely institutional device dedicated to the reproduction of social order, what *meždunarodniki* were learning at MGIMO was obviously of little importance. Appropriately, the term '*meždunarodnik*' appears neither in Matthews' nor Zemtsov's studies.

Obviously, the notion of self-interest in the analysis of the Soviet elite prevailed. Alexander Yanov shared this point of view in an approach that links social reproduction with the evolution of Soviet diplomacy. For him, the emergence of a new elite based on heredity was part of the domestic roots of Détente: de-Stalinisation

⁴⁵ For a study on the 'Kremlin ration', see Tamara Kondratieva, *Gouverner et nourrir : Du pouvoir en Russie, XVIe-XXe siècles*, Édition : 1 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002).

⁴⁶ Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union (Routledge Revivals): A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism*, Édition : Reprint (Routledge, 2013), 78.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 48.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

was a precondition for a 'new new class' or 'an aristocracy', in part trained at MGIMO, to raise and reproduce itself.⁴⁹ From an international perspective, he claims that the interests, values, and behaviours of this 'new new class' under Brezhnev were grounded in the burgeoning international ties between the Soviet Union and the West. He states that this new branch of the Soviet elite, 'hooked on western living standards',⁵⁰ strongly benefited from Détente thanks to the access to new consumer goods and services it offered. Their way of life was heavily dependent on the stabilisation of the economic and political relationship between the USSR and capitalist countries.

In the 1970s-80s, Matthews, Zemtsov, and Yanov were all very careful not to overestimate the possibility of radical change within the Soviet Union. Zemtsov made clear that MGIMO represented, above all, a way in which the Soviet elite reproduced their privileges at the expense of the toiling masses.⁵¹ Because this new elite knew about the contrast in living standards between the West and the Soviet Union and 'cynically' accumulated incredible wealth partly through organised criminal networks, it was much more concerned with preserving and perpetuating its class interests than reforming the Soviet regime. Yanov argued that the hardening of the Soviet stance towards capitalist countries would not be in the best interests of this new elite. This, he argues, would result in a likely inclination toward the status quo at the beginning of the Gorbachev era.⁵²

Just a few years before the downfall of the USSR, however, a completely new image of MGIMO emerged in research dedicated to the history of international relations. From a very different perspective, with the use of a completely different terminology guided by a renewed research agenda, the American Revisionist School identified MGIMO as a crucible of expertise in international relations research for Soviet foreign policy. The Sovietologists detailed definition of the term expertise, which differed from that developed in sociological research conducted in the West in the

⁴⁹ Alexander Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign* (Berkeley: Univ of California Intl &, 1977), 1.

⁵⁰ Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*.

⁵¹ Zemtsov, *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite*, 67.

⁵² Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, 78.

1980-90s. While Robert Pierson and Jean-Yves Trépos⁵³ stressed the notion of experience in their definition expertise, sovietologists preferred focusing on the distance between an ideological vision and practice of foreign affairs based on Marxism-Leninism and a supposed rational vision and practice of foreign affairs based on science.

In 1986, Jerry Hough argued that Soviet diplomacy could not be reduced to a pure matter of ideology by pointing out how a network of scientific institutions contributed to foreign policy.⁵⁴ By using social science concepts like ‘interest groups’, ‘expertise’, and ‘participation’ in his studies on Soviet institutions, Hough contributed helped contest the view that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian and monolithic state. He was not alone in his interest in Soviet diplomatic institutions and the role of expertise in the making of foreign policy: in 1979, Oded Eran published a book entirely dedicated to the *meždunarodniki*. Focusing mainly on the institutions related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences where they worked, he began his study by defining the term ‘*meždunarodnik*’ simply as ‘the Soviet term for experts on foreign countries and international relations’⁵⁵ and made no mention of MGIMO at all. In 1983, Rose E. Gottemoeller and Paul F. Langer translated the term ‘*meždunarodniki*’ as *internationalists*.⁵⁶ in juxtaposition to Eran, they stressed the role of MGIMO in the training of specialists of foreign affairs.⁵⁷

Growing out of Hough’s remarks and the notion of expert, in the 2000s a new wave of intellectual history connected the role of ideas in the end of the Cold War with the

⁵³ Robert Pierson, ‘The Epistemic Authority of Expertise’, *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* 1 (n.d.): 398–405; Jean-Yves Trépos, *La Sociologie de L’expertise*, Presses Universitaires de France, Que Sais-Je? (Paris, 1996); About the notion of expertise, see also: Steve Fuller, *Social Epistemology* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986); John Hardwig, ‘Epistemic Dependence’, *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXXII, no. 7 (1985): 335–49; Armand Hatchuel and Benoît Weil, *L’expert et le système* (Paris: Economica, 1992).

⁵⁴ See also: Jerry F. Hough, ‘Soviet Policy Making toward Foreign Communists’ 15, no. 3 (1982): 167–83; Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World. Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986).

⁵⁵ Oded Eran, *Mezhdunarodniki, an Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy*, First Edition edition (Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove Pub, 1979), 1.

⁵⁶ The translation given by Gottemoeller and Langer is quite misleading, as there is a term meaning internationalist in Russian (*internacionalist*), which derives from *internacional*.

⁵⁷ Rose E. Gottemoeller and Paul F. Langer, *Foreign Area Training and Utilization in the Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1983), 20.

institutions of Soviet diplomacy. This scholarship was often opposed to a realist approach to international relations, which states that both the evolving structure of the international system and Soviet domestic policy guided by economic decline made Gorbachev's foreign policy revolution after 1985 either likely or necessary.⁵⁸ In work dedicated to 'New Thinking' (*Novoe myšlenie*), such as Robert English's *Russia and the Idea of the West*,⁵⁹ academic and research structures related to Soviet diplomacy were presented as important incubators of Gorbachev's foreign policy.⁶⁰

Even though English's study does not deal with MGIMO in particular, it reflects some of the underlying assumptions made about the Moscow Institute in the 2000s. Indeed, since the downfall of the USSR, one of the main leitmotifs in studies referring to MGIMO has been the '*natural support*' that *meždunarodniki* gave to perestroika. Both American and French specialists viewed the foundation of MGIMO in terms of satisfying the need for high-level expertise in international relations and the rationalisation of the Soviet diplomatic apparatus, thus echoing the Weberian model of bureaucracy. Seen through this lens, the reopening of the Soviet Union to the foreign world under Khrushchev meant that *meždunarodniki* expertise should have led logically to the maturation of Gorbachev's New Thinking in Soviet diplomacy. Among the French sovietologists, Rey wrote:

Whether they were practicing diplomats or consultants for the International Department, a large part of the *mejdunarodniki*, when they became decision makers in the years 1965-1975, did in fact constitute a specific milieu that promoted the idea of East-West Détente – as way to improve the Soviet system – as well as the idea of an open and revamped socialism with a human face. And ten years later,

⁵⁸ William C. Wohlforth, 'The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005): 165–73; William C. Wohlforth, 'Review: Reality Check: Revising Theories of International Politics in Response to the End of the Cold War', *World Politics* 50, no. 4 (July 1998): 650–80; William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1 December 1994): 91–129; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War', in *Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates* (University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University, 2003), 273–309.

⁵⁹ Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

⁶⁰ Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change - Soviet/ Russian Behaviour and the End of the Cold War*; Robert English, 'The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (1 April 2005): 43–80.

they naturally formed a hothouse of new ideas and people devoted to the spirit of reform for Gorbachev's perestroika.⁶¹

In another striking example that demonstrates the widespread belief about MGIMO's 'natural support' for perestroika, Andreas Umland declared in a book review of Martin Müller's work that 'MGIMO is an untypical case in that it constituted one of the most progressive colleges during the Soviet period and a think tank for Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika.'⁶²

Behind the assumption that MGIMO was fertile soil for Gorbachev's perestroika, two key elements close to Robert English's line of argument about New Thinking are apparent. Firstly, such assumptions are based on the supposed pragmatism and professionalism of MGIMO students, which is held to be opposed to the ideological practice of diplomacy. Thomas Gomart argues that, just like their French counterparts trained at the National School of Administration (ENA), the Soviet diplomats educated at MGIMO were characterised by 'expertise on diplomatic issues'.⁶³ Caroline-Ibos Hervé stresses this point in almost the same language: she declared that MGIMO alumni support for Gorbachev's reforms was based on 'professional ethical standards' built on the 'rationalisation of the public action principle' and 'pragmatism'.⁶⁴ Secondly, access to the West is depicted as a matter of paramount importance. According to Gomart and English, contacts with the Western world, which were particularly corrosive among the *meždunarodniki*, fostered the triumph of New Thinking in 1985. Both travel overseas and the reading of foreign books edited in the West resulted in a surprising 'political awakening' about both the contrast between the development of the USSR and the capitalist countries and the need to reform the Soviet regime.⁶⁵ The experience of those who served in the West is depicted as having been particularly 'eyes opening':⁶⁶ 'shocked' by the obvious

⁶¹ Rey, 'The Mejdunarodniki in the 1960s and First Half of the 1970s: Backgrounds, Connections, and the Agenda of Soviet International Elites', 53.

⁶² Andreas Umland, 'Review', *Slavic Review* 70, no. 1 (1 April 2011): 226–27.

⁶³ Thomas Gomart and Robert Frank, *Double détente : Les relations franco-soviétiques de 1958 à 1964* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003), 63.

⁶⁴ Caroline Ibos-Hervé, 'Les diplomates russes et la politique étrangère' (Les études du CERI, October 1997), 8, <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude32.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Gomart and Frank, *Double détente*, 65.

⁶⁶ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 105.

differences between the USSR and capitalist countries, *meždunarodniki* were forced to balance the pros and cons of the two juxtaposed systems. Because some of them realised that ‘the [Soviet] system was just no good’,⁶⁷ both Gomart and English argue that *meždunarodniki* used these experiences abroad as an important source of inspiration for reforming the Soviet regime.

In the most extreme examples given by English, the scholar opposes, in a rather Manichean way, the old thinkers, defined as ‘elites ill-educated, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic’ [...] ‘drawn from Russia’s rural masses’,⁶⁸ and the new thinkers, enlightened spirits guided by expertise, freedom, and the power of ideas. He writes:

As domestic and foreign problems grew, the old thinkers – by virtue of their powerful places in the militarized Party-state system – seemed to hold all the cards. But the new thinkers, whose only institutional base was their fragile, academic-advisory posts that now came under fierce attack, had the power of ideas - a promising yet untried agenda.⁶⁹

The ‘binary metaphors’⁷⁰ used by English, such as pragmatism and ideology, old thinkers and new thinkers, and the West and the East, are obvious. No doubt, intellectual-history-centred approaches that emphasise the role of several MGIMO alumni (especially Inozemcev and Arbatov) correctly highlight the importance of Soviet academia and overseas contacts in the maturation of New Thinking. However, portraying *meždunarodniki* almost as dissidents seems highly inappropriate. *Meždunarodniki* belonged to what Archie Brown calls ‘within-system reformers’,⁷¹ what Alexander Shtromas refers to as ‘instructural dissent’,⁷² and what Pëtr Cherkasov identifies in a more critical tone as ‘liberal conformists’:⁷³ it is precisely because they had key positions in a wide range of institutions that they were able to affect Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, although several scholars in the field of

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 121.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 161.

⁷⁰ For more details about the use of binary categories in studies of the Soviet past, see: Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 4.

⁷¹ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 164.

⁷² Alexander Shtromas, *Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union*, Peter Lang (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), 75.

⁷³ Cherkasov, *IMÉMO*, 356.

international politics have perceived MGIMO as an incubator of New Thinking, a ‘think tank’ of Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Institute today gives a completely different version of this period: *meždunarodniki* are considered neither as old nor new thinkers.

Indeed, far from being a monopoly in the hands of historians, defining the past is also an occupation of former actors in Soviet history. While there is not much literature directly dedicated to MGIMO in the Western European and American literature and most of the research in social history seems to contradict the conclusions from scholars of Soviet diplomacy, MGIMO itself has sought to write its history from the beginning of the 2000s. The first volumes of MGIMO alumni memoirs began to be published in 1998.⁷⁴ At the very same time, the MGIMO alumni association published yearbooks containing lists of MGIMO graduates and a short description of the main events during their studies. Lastly, no less than three books devoted to MGIMO history have been edited by the former MGIMO personnel manager (*prorektor po kadram*) Boris Kurbatov and the current rector Anatolij Torkunov between 2004 and 2010.⁷⁵

In charge of preserving and enunciating the official history of MGIMO, MGIMO’s history books and museum, founded at the Institute in 1984, are silent about the Gorbachev era. Entitled *The MGIMO University: Between Tradition and Modernity*, the official history of MGIMO published in 2006 emphasised the glorious past of the former Soviet institution in order to define its place and legitimacy within the new Russian regime which emerged in December 1991. It declares: ‘MGIMO alumni have always differed from other Soviet graduate students because of their profound knowledge, their independence of mind, and their willingness to subordinate international politics to mutual interests.’⁷⁶ According to this history, MGIMO did not undergo radical changes during or after the Gorbachev era, unlike the Higher Party Schools in charge of training Soviet bureaucrats under the supervision of the

⁷⁴ Torkunov and Sergeev, ‘*Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...*’ (1948-1953).

⁷⁵ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*; Torkunov, *MGIMO universitet*. A new edition of the book was published in 2009.

⁷⁶ Torkunov, *MGIMO universitet*, 31.

Communist Party.⁷⁷ MGIMO is thus presented as the prestigious *alma mater* of the top Russian diplomatic elite.

Kurbatov gives some explanations about the silence of both the MGIMO museum and MGIMO's official history on this era. Instead of being a flourishing time for the institution, his study reveals that its *raison d'être* was thrown into doubt by the highest levels of the Communist Party between 1985 and 1991. Indeed, far from being a 'think tank' or a 'breeding ground' for Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, MGIMO is depicted as being entangled in a deep political and institutional crisis at the beginning of perestroika.⁷⁸ By comparing the 'years of a stagnant golden age' (*gody zastojnogo rascveta*) during Détente and the 'bolt from the blue' (*grom sredi âsnogo neba*) that was perestroika,⁷⁹ Kurbatov explicitly demonstrates that the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev led to a deep reorganisation of the institution. Blamed for its opaque relations with the KGB and a high level of nepotism (*semejstvennost'*), the Institute was targeted by First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee Boris Yeltsin between 1985 and 1988: he launched a campaign against corruption and family ties.⁸⁰

What the evolution of the historiography around MGIMO and changes in the terminology reveal is the difficulty of finding an accurate definition of what a *meždunarodnik* was during late socialism. When writing history, using certain categories and terms matters: considering MGIMO graduates as experts or an elite bares some underlying presumptions that do not fully fit with MGIMO's reality and *meždunarodniki* identity throughout the Cold War. Student experiences at MGIMO were important, which means that the *meždunarodniki* cannot be reduced either to their social origins or to their expertise in foreign affairs. The title *meždunarodnik* did certify the acquisition of technical skills, but it meant much more than a specialism or activity in foreign affairs. Many MGIMO graduates felt united by something common, a sense of togetherness that this research aims to explore.

⁷⁷ Eugene Huskey, 'From Higher Party Schools to Academies of State Service: The Marketization of Bureaucratic Training in Russia', *Slavic Review* 63, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 325–48.

⁷⁸ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 137.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁸⁰ The role of Boris Yeltsin is corroborated in Mlečin's book: Leonid Mlečin, *Kreml'. Prezidenty Rossii. Strategiâ Vlasti Ot B. N. El'cina Do V. V. Putina* [*The Kremlin and the Presidents of Russia, A Strategy of Power from B. Yeltsin to V. Putin*] (Moskva: Centrpoligraf, 2002), 96.

Cold War and the shaping of identities: a socio-cultural history of meždunarodniki through the prism of an institution

This study proposes to focus on MGIMO as an analytical framework for a socio-cultural history of the meždunarodniki. Taking an institution as an object of inquiry is nothing new: both Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault have long demonstrated the effect of institutions on the making of the *self*. Moreover, studies on educational institutions are numerous, whether conducted by social science scholars or by members of the institutions themselves.⁸¹ Lastly, major works on several pro-Soviet institutions have demonstrated the interweaving of categories of thought and the intellectual development of those individuals who were supposed to be the guardians of ideological orthodoxy but were nonetheless influenced by regular contact with overseas institutions and agents.⁸²

The original contribution of this research will be connecting the question of making identities with the Cold War. Scholars like Alexander Wendt,⁸³ Ted Hopf,⁸⁴ and Robert Jervis⁸⁵ have stressed the need to look at the social construction of international politics: all three convincingly argue that foreign policy is inextricably bound to societies. However, my approach here is quite different, as it focuses on a micro-scale of analysis (MGIMO) to evaluate how the identity of a social group (the meždunarodniki) shaped and was shaped by the Cold War.

⁸¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996); Jean-Michel Eymeri, *La fabrique des énarques* (Paris: Economica, 2001); Professor Benjamin Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Shamus Rahman Khan, *Privilege: The Making of an Adolescent Elite at St. Paul's School* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012); Marie Scot, *La London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-2010: Internationalisation Universitaire et Circulation Des Savoirs*, Le Noeud Gordien (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2011).

⁸² Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*; Rey, 'Le Département International Du Comité Central Du PCUS, Le MID et La Politique Extérieure Soviétique de 1953 a 1991'; Cherkasov, *IMÉMO*.

⁸³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁸⁴ Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Cornell University Press, 2002).

⁸⁵ Robert Jervis, 'Identity and the Cold War', in *Crises and Détente*, First paperback edition, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 23–43.

Both identity and the Cold War are difficult to define: there is no consensus about their definition among scholars.⁸⁶ Instead of envisioning the Cold War purely as a period of time, that is to say as a simple framework for social, economic, and political events, this dissertation takes the Cold War as a struggle between two ‘competing social systems’⁸⁷ in which the ends and expectations of the actors involved changed sharply over almost half of a century. For sure, this definition is far from perfect. However, it does stress the role of ideas and ideologies⁸⁸ during the Cold War without either neglecting them or opposing them to the interests that existed in the struggle between the socialist and capitalist blocs.⁸⁹ Moreover, by mentioning the evolving character of Cold War, this definition emphasises that the struggle was made up both of confrontation and cooperation.⁹⁰

In this research, the *meždunarodniki* identity formed at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge and its relation to Cold War will be explored in three different ways. Firstly, questioning *meždunarodniki* identity will help us define the place of this singular social group within Soviet society and how its place changed in line with the development of the Cold War. Using MGIMO as a prism for the history of *meždunarodniki* enables us to set out a framework for the debates which deal with the question of the stability of the Soviet regime and the development of the Soviet bureaucracy. The hesitations over whether to designate the *meždunarodniki* either as an elite or as experts are not that surprising when we consider the roots of these

⁸⁶ For a synthesis of the historiography about Cold War, see: Frederico Romero, ‘Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads’, *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703.

⁸⁷ Jervis, ‘Identity and the Cold War’.

⁸⁸ David C. Engerman, ‘Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962’, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20–43; Nigel Gould-Davies, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War’, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1 (1999): 90–109; Mark Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 4 (1 October 1999): 539–76; Carew Hunt, ‘The Importance of Doctrine’, in *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, ed. Alexander Dallin (New York, 1960), 37–46.

⁸⁹ Wohlforth, ‘Review: Reality Check’; Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’.

⁹⁰ Jeremi Suri, ‘Conflict and Co-Operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 5–9.

binary categories go much deeper into the question of the allocation of power in the Soviet Union raised by Western scholars after World War II.⁹¹

By wondering ‘what happens to a revolutionary group when it has been in power for over a generation and forced to face the problems of governance in 1944’,⁹² Barrington Moore was the first scholar to raise the question about whether the post-war Soviet regime would face a dilemma related to the competing principles of the allocation of power and the demand for professional competence and political loyalty. He argued that the Soviet regime would have three options: evolving into a managerial-bureaucratic elite dominated by principles of merit, continuing to be based on a form of traditional authority connected with party loyalty, or inventing some mixture of these two principles.⁹³ In line with Moore’s work, Alex Inkeles predicted that the emphasis on higher education as a criterion for upward social mobility would receive strong emphasis in the Soviet regime and argued that, despite strong political and cultural differences, a similar tendency was occurring in both socialist and capitalist countries.⁹⁴ In 1979, George Konrad and Ivan Szelényi took further the analysis of the allocation of power within the Soviet Union by stressing that the Soviet regime was experiencing a fundamental change in the composition of its ruling class.⁹⁵ They identified two distinct paths to upward mobility within which criteria of educational credential and political loyalty were applied to different degrees. They reasoned that there were two separate career trajectories available in the Soviet

⁹¹ Andrew Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald Treiman summarise the evolution of the historiography about the allocation of power in socialist regimes in Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, ‘Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949 to 1996’, *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 2 (1 April 2000): 191–209; For more details about the question of social mobility in China, see Andrew G. Walder, ‘Markets and Income Inequality in Rural China: Political Advantage in an Expanding Economy’, *American Sociological Review* 67, no. 2 (1 April 2002): 231–53; Andrew G. Walder, ‘Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order’, *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 3 (1 June 1995): 309–28.

⁹² Barrington Moore, ‘The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928-1944. A Study in Elite Formation and Function’, *American Sociological Review* 9 (n.d.): 267.

⁹³ Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics - The Dilemmas of Power* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950).

⁹⁴ Alex Inkeles, ‘Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union 1940-1950’, *American Sociological Review* 15 (1950): 465–79.

⁹⁵ George Konrad and Ivan Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1979), 1979.

Union: one leading to professional positions with little power and the other leading to administrative positions of power and privilege.⁹⁶

In the case of the *meždunarodniki*, the double career path does not seem very appropriate. The professional positions available to MGIMO graduates (such as Soviet ambassador, the head of an institution related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, or the representative of *Pravda* or *Izvestia* in a capitalist country) were based on both political and educational criteria. Nonetheless, studies related to the allocation of power are useful because they stress how two types of capital structured Soviet social space: cultural capital and political capital. Indeed, the uniqueness of Soviet society is related to the fact that it was oriented and structured by the domination of political capital. Political capital can be defined as ‘the combination of fidelity of individuals toward the Communist Party and the cohesion of their personal social trajectory with the Marxist proletarian myth’.⁹⁷ This definition has to be completed by the notion of *partijnost’*, which stresses both resources related to one’s position in the CPSU and the knowledge of the Communist Party and the state that was necessary to make a career in the Soviet Union.

Obviously, *meždunarodniki* belonged to a hybrid social category grounded in both cultural and political capital, which is manifested by the fact that MGIMO was often presented as a ‘political institution of higher education’. However, understanding the identity of *meždunarodniki* is impossible without comprehending the place they occupied in the Soviet social hierarchy. Analysing this place means focusing on the criteria which formed the foundations of the social position of *meždunarodniki* in Soviet society and how this place was affected by the development of the Cold War.

⁹⁶ This idea of a double career path, one based on meritocracy and educational credentials and the other based on political criteria, is developed by scholars such as Jean-Robert Raviot, ‘L’ère Brejnev: La Mutation Des Élités (1965-1985)’, in *La Russie Contemporaine*, ed. Kathy Rousselet and Favarel-Garrigues, Fayard (Paris, 2010), 37–47; Eric Duskin, *Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite, 1945-1953* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Maryse Ramambason-Vauchelle, ‘Boris Eltsine : homme providentiel ou conjoncture providentielle ?’, *Parlement[s], Revue d’histoire politique* 13, no. 1 (26 May 2010): 72–86.

⁹⁷ This definition is from Claude Pénnetier and Bernard Pudal, *Autobiographies, autocritiques, aveux dans le monde communiste* (Paris: Belin, 2002), 9.

From a very different perspective, a second aspect of *meždunarodniki* identity was the seemingly mundane acts of everyday life at MGIMO. Here the notion of identity can be understood as what people did at MGIMO and how they did it. My point here is not that every single act by MGIMO students was related to the Cold War or that the Cold War lurked everywhere at MGIMO. What I argue here is that focusing on daily life at MGIMO enables us to question some of the categories traditionally used in the analysis of the Cold War, such as the West and the East or pragmatism and ideology.

When looked at through the prism of an institution and MGIMO everyday life, the concepts of West and East appear to have been inscribed both on the material context and within a wide range of practices. Ideas circulated in MGIMO everyday life because of certain conditions⁹⁸ and through specific channels (either inside or outside the Institute). They were related to materials (books, newspapers, radio) and were imported, discussed, and used by different categories of people (the teaching staff, students, or members of the party organisation).⁹⁹ All of this gave rise to a variety of practices and beliefs which were a central part of everyday life. The questions of how the materiality of an idea was related to a set of belief and gestures¹⁰⁰, what kind of practices the institution wanted to instil in its members, and, more importantly, how members appropriated them need to be explored. This stresses the specific link between everyday life and the emergence of shared perceptions and practices in foreign affairs among *meždunarodniki*.

Lastly, the relationship between *meždunarodniki* identity and the chronology of the Cold War needs to be raised. Obviously, the period between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 cannot be considered as a continuum. There is a world of difference between the period of Zhdanov's speech in 1947 about the division of the world into two camps, a democratic one headed by the Soviet Union and an imperialist one led by the United States, and that of the Malta Summit

⁹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, 'Les Conditions Sociales de La Circulation Internationale Des Idées', *Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales* 145, no. 1 (2002): 3–8.

⁹⁹ Johan Heilbron and Gisèle Sapiro, *La Circulation Internationale Des Idées*, Editions du Seuil, Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales 145 (Paris, 2012).

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence W. Levine, *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

between George H. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev which proclaimed the end of the Cold War.

Historians have long proved how wars change identities.¹⁰¹ Certainly, the specificity of the Cold War makes a comparison with World War I and World War II difficult. However, the question here is how events both at a domestic level and in international affairs during different periods of the Cold War were associated with different cohorts of MGIMO students and marked their identities.

How could the state assure the loyalty of those who had to be in contact with ideas contrary to Marxism-Leninism during their careers? How should foreign ideas be included in teaching programmes? How could the state deal with the enrolment of the children of the Soviet elite, despite the fact that the selection of diplomats had been based on their commitment to the Communist Party before World War II? All these questions had different answers at different times.

By analysing how time was inscribed in the spirits of those who were thought to be the flag-bearers of communist ideals and Soviet state interests on the world stage, I will show that the history of both MGIMO and the *meždunarodniki* was not linear. Periods of gradual change were punctuated by intervals of rapid intellectual upheaval. These changes combined to nurture what I define as the party nobility, a group that differed from the rest of the Soviet society and whose identity was not exclusively based on expertise in foreign affairs or a common social origin.

The party nobility as an analytical tool

The main thesis of this dissertation is that, like when the imperial Russian nobility was entitled to pursue a set of exclusive professions, a distinctive body of people trained at MGIMO succeeded in holding a quasi-monopoly over diplomacy within the Soviet Union during Cold War. The very term '*meždunarodnik*', which derives from the adjective '*meždunarodnyj*' (international) and the suffix '-nik' (commonly used in Russian to create nicknames or diminutives), perfectly reflects the specific junction

¹⁰¹ Philip Gleason, 'Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of American Identity', *The Review of Politics* 43, no. 4 (1981): 483–518; Antoine Prost, *Les Anciens Combattants et La Société Française, 1914-1939*, 3 vols (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977).

between a distinct set of individuals trained at MGIMO and the sphere of foreign affairs. The questions of how this new social and cultural distinction connecting foreign affairs and a singular social group appeared, how it was inscribed on the bodies and minds of MGIMO students during late socialism, and what it meant for this socio-cultural group to serve Gorbachev's perestroika between 1985 and 1991 are at the very core of this research.

Even though my choice of the term *party nobility* is clearly related to Pierre Bourdieu's famous book *The State Nobility*, this dissertation does not aim to compare the French system of 'grandes écoles' with MGIMO. Without doubt, many of the facts I will describe resonate with Bourdieu's analysis. This is especially the case when the French scholar argues that the reward of academic titles can be compared to the ceremonial dubbing of medieval knights, producing 'special, separate, sacred beings merely by getting everyone to be aware of and to recognize the boundary separating them from the commonplace, by making the consecrating distinction public, widely known, and guaranteed by the consensus omnium, and by creating thereby the conversion of belief that leads the chosen people to (re)cognize themselves as different.'¹⁰²

Just like the French *énarques*, *normaliens*, and *polytechniciens*, numerous MGIMO graduates were persuaded of the specific role they had in their society because of the process of ennoblement related to both their years of study and their diploma. A great majority of them did feel like 'separate and special beings' and believed they shared a set of values, beliefs, and practices with other MGIMO graduates no matter when they graduated.

Though, MGIMO occupied a specific place in the Soviet social imaginary because of the regular contacts its graduates had with the foreign world, especially with the West, at a time when the opportunity to travel abroad was still rare in the USSR.¹⁰³ By

¹⁰² Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 103.

¹⁰³ In 1978, Matthews gave the approximate number of a total staff of 8,000 outside the Soviet bloc: the whole Soviet population of 250 million made only a few hundred thousand trips at this time. Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union (Routledge Revivals)*, 42,50; For a study of the Soviet

positioning this nobility in the specificity of the Soviet regime, I will describe a reality rather different from social reproduction in France or other capitalist countries of that time. From this perspective, the fact that the term ‘party’ is attached to the word ‘nobility’ is not incidental: almost all of this dissertation will deal with the transmission of ‘political capital’ in late socialism and the relationship between the praxis of foreign affairs developed at MGIMO and the official ideology enunciated by the CPSU. Lastly, the question of what serving the Communist Party meant for *meždunarodniki* during perestroika will be raised. In doing so, I will question how the invention of a new social and cultural distinction was compatible with the specificity of the Soviet regime during the Cold War.

In this sense, the use of the term ‘party nobility’ aims to reject several binary categories of analysis (such as old and new thinking, expert and layman, and ideology and rationality) and provide new tools of analysis. In employing this term, I do not seek to throw opprobrium on the making of the Soviet elites or to denounce the cynicism of the Soviet upper class who knew about the West. What is important is that the lexical field related to nobility offers new heuristic perspectives for conducting a socio-cultural history of the *meždunarodniki*: *ennobling a body of peoples*, *nobility of characters*, *lineage*, and *serving* are powerful tools in that they transcend traditional binary categories. They shed new light on an important actor in the Cold War. This will help us to identify three important moments in the shaping of *meždunarodniki* identity.

By focusing on the notion of *ennobling a body of people*, the first and second parts of the dissertation aim to understand how the distinct body of people trained at MGIMO were able to attain a position at the very core of the Cold War enterprise after Stalin’s death. When MGIMO was founded in 1944, the Institute was not the only option on the table and the fate of the *meždunarodniki* was far from predetermined. To put it simply, if MGIMO had not existed, there would have been no need to invent it: from the 1930s, the Soviet regime had favoured the systematic replacement of diplomatic agents, which meant that several institutions for training specialists in foreign affairs

imaginary related to the West, see: Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 158–206.

already existed. Regular purges were regarded as a useful device for the Party in general and Stalin in particular to keep the upper hand over the state apparatus. What the discussions at the Narkomindel prior to MGIMO's foundation reveal is how the idea of educating a new specific body of people was the result of a bureaucratic consensus about the dearth of 'a certain type of cadres' (*takoj rod kadrov*) in foreign affairs. It was also the result of an assessment of the evolution of international relations following World War II and the place the USSR would have in the new world. This evolution was decisive: with the beginning of the Cold War, MGIMO would be assigned the mission of training cadres for the entire socialist bloc.

The cultural justification for a MGIMO degree, what some sociologists refer to as dubbing or a process of ennoblement, went side-by-side with a political justification embedded in the Stalin era. Obviously, the Narkomindel needed specialists in foreign affairs, but isolating a specific group of people was also perceived as necessary for testing the loyalty of future experts. MGIMO was a total institution in a totalitarian state: ensuring an overlap between academic life and party activities and between place of study and place of residence paved the way for a shared *meždunarodnik* identity.

From Stalin to Khrushchev, neither the expertise of MGIMO graduates nor privileged family background guaranteed success. Entrusting a new body of people with foreign affairs instilled hesitation, and it was only from 1954 to 1958 that the situation of the *meždunarodniki* radically improved. Once again, the international context was of paramount importance: the changing relationship with the West as well as growing interest in Third World Countries and the perceived need for cohesion in the socialist bloc were the prerequisites for reasserting the need for and the worth of *meždunarodniki* within Soviet society. The institutionalisation of Détente in a set of institutions was an overriding factor in the success of MGIMO graduates: *meždunarodniki* made their institutional homes in burgeoning research institutions, at the MID, in major Soviet press organs, and at the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The binding ties they had developed at the Institute mattered in particular: by promoting '*svoi*' (us/ours), they collectively succeeded in entering all institutions related to Soviet diplomacy.

By focusing on the notion of *nobility of character* in the third and fourth parts of the dissertation, I look at the making of a specific way of thinking and behaving related to ‘bourgeois theories’ when the USSR ‘reopened’ to the foreign world after Stalin’s death. Khrushchev’s rise brought about a fundamental change in MGIMO’s teaching process: de-Stalinisation, the imperative to describe the foreign world ‘as it is’, and the expanded enrolment of foreign students had huge consequences for the Institute’s everyday life. The problem at the Institute, it seemed, was not the competition between the USSR and West, but the development of an internal critique by foreign students, especially the Chinese, Polish, and Hungarians, outside the classroom. Therefore, the MGIMO primary party organisation paradoxically encouraged the inclusion and spread of both ‘bourgeois’ and revisionist (Chinese and Albanian critiques of the Soviet Union) theories within the Institute.

At the heart of this contradiction is the question of social distinction within Soviet society. Here again, the use of the term ‘party nobility’ is useful in the sense that it reflects the fact that the teaching of contradictory knowledge was grounded in the development of new distinct ways of thinking and acting.¹⁰⁴ A new praxis of foreign affairs emerged in the 1960s: however, it was not the possession of this knowledge but one’s relation to it that mattered. Western theories did not have an intrinsic worth: in the context of the reopening of the Soviet state, what was distinct at MGIMO was not the exclusivity of this knowledge but the *ease with which one knew how to use it*. To put it simply, reading Kafka, Remarque, or Falkner was one thing, but knowing how to make use of them was another. The apparent liberalism that tolerated ideas contradictory to official Marxism-Leninism was not in direct contradiction with the idea of training a new generation of communist standard-bearers in the international arena.

¹⁰⁴ The important point here related to the notion of nobility is that the relationship with the West varied depending on one’s social position within Soviet society. To make an analogy with *ancien régime* France, Guy Lemarchand convincingly argues that for two elites such as the bourgeoisie and the nobility in the 18th century, the influence of the Lumières did not result in the same political vision of the reforms necessary for the French monarchy. Guy Lemarchand, ‘La France Au XVIIIe Siècle: Élités Ou Noblesse et Bourgeoisie?’, *Cahiers Des Annales de Normandie* 30, no. 1 (2000): 107–23; About the idea of bourgeois values in Soviet society, see: Vera Dunham, *In Stalins Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction*, Édition : New edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); For a study of the perception of the West among those who did not have the opportunity to travel, see Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 158–206.

I argue that it was this new praxis of foreign affairs from the Khrushchev era which paved the way for the emergence of dynasties of *meždunarodniki* within Soviet society: it also allowed for the manifestation of new means for analysing foreign affairs under Brezhnev. The Problem Laboratory of System Analysis of International Relations founded in 1976 is a case in point with regards to the individual and collective strategies employed for dealing with bourgeois theories and inventing new practices that combined Marxism with foreign knowledge: these two elements made possible new frameworks of analysis when predicting the future of international relations.

By focusing on the notion of *serving* in the fifth part of the dissertation, I aim to show how the loyalty of the *meždunarodniki* was at stake between 1985 and 1991. Numerous MGIMO graduates felt that they were neither new nor old thinkers: they were seeking to serve the Soviet state and the Communist Party, two missions that, after 1989, often appeared highly contradictory. The questioning of Gromyko's legacy at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, campaigns against the children of the Soviet elite at MGIMO, and radical changes in Soviet diplomacy resulted in *meždunarodniki* disunity over Gorbachev's reforms between 1985 and 1991.

Using the term 'serving' here enables us to mark the differences of visions around New Thinking between the *meždunarodniki* and the Soviet political elite, and also the differences between Gorbachev's guidelines and the implementation of changes in Soviet diplomacy. In 1985, discussions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveal that the changes called for by the new General Secretary and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Èduard Ševarnadze were interpreted as being in continuity with Brezhnev's foreign policy. After 1989, *meždunarodniki* memoirs and interviews illuminate how several MGIMO graduates had a different perception of what serving the Soviet state and the Communist Party meant and how they were often forced to question their loyalty to the latter. Among the *meždunarodniki*, the West was not perceived homogeneously: nor did a positive view of it necessarily contradict a feeling of loyalty to the Party. For those who seemed to be Gorbachev's strongest supporters, New Thinking was best viewed as a watershed in socialism that was in unity with the West, not in opposition to it.

Sources

Most of the findings in this research have been gleamed from archives, MGIMO publications, meždunarodniki memoirs, and the interviews I conducted. I used three categories of sources:

Table 1: The categories of sources

Archives	Print sources	Retrospective sources
The Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation The Russian State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF) The Central Archive of the Socio-political History of Moscow (TSAOPIM) Archives of the MGIMO Museum	MGIMO dissertations MGIMO books published by the Publishing House of the Institute of International Relations (IMO) MGIMO student newspaper	Memoirs Biographies Interviews

Archives

Considered a leading political institution of higher education (*političeskoe vysšee učebnoe zavedenie, vuz*) during the period of late socialism, both the availability and the locations of archival sources concerning MGIMO reflect its unique position within the Soviet Union. It also means that most of the archives concerning MGIMO were difficult of access.

Archives related to the Institute are divided up according to the duality between the Communist Party and the Soviet state: within these two distinct categories, several political and administrative structures took part in the everyday functioning of the Institute. As documents from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (*Arhiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossijskoj Federacii*) are not easily accessible, the

dispersal of documents between several documentary funds in the Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History (*Rossijskie Gosudarstvennye Arhivy Social'no-Političeskoj Istorii*, RGASPI), the Russian State Archives of the Russian Federation (*Rossijskie Rossijskie Gosudarstvennye Arhivy Rossijskoj Federacii*, GARF), and the Central Archive of the Socio-political History of Moscow (*Central'nyj Arhiv Obščestvenno-političeskoj istorii g. Moskvy*, TSAOPIM) was an opportunity. However, each archive has its own distinct consultation rules.

First of all, some documents that could obviously enrich a study of MGIMO during the Soviet period have no deadline for declassification. As a concrete example, sources concerning the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Department of the Cadres Abroad of the Central Committee of the CPSU are still unavailable today. A similar situation exists for the great majority of the archives stored in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and especially for documents relating to the 'board of senior executives and training institutes of the Ministry' (*Glavnoe upravlenie kadrov i učebyh zavedenij MID SSSR*), the organ responsible for the administrative supervision of MGIMO. At MGIMO, administrative sources, including the minutes of the Scientific Council, the correspondence between the Institute's rector and vice-rectors and the party or state organs, and the personal files of administrators, students, and teachers were also unavailable.¹⁰⁵

A second case of restriction involved a set of documents available only from a certain period of time. Among the party archives, several funds were of especial interest for my research on MGIMO, but access was limited to the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. Access to fund 17/133 about the Department of Science and Higher Education at the Central Committee was restricted to the years between 1950 and 1966. The same holds true for documents from the Commission for Foreign Policy, access to which was limited to the period between 1949 and 1952. At RGASPI, a pleasant surprise arose when consulting Molotov's fund (N°82), which has several documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning MGIMO between 1944 and 1954. However,

¹⁰⁵ Because the Committee for State Security (KGB) also recruited many MGIMO graduates during late socialism, there is little doubt that the KGB also stored documents concerning MGIMO and personal files. This material is obviously unavailable today.

RGASPI does not store administrative sources concerning MGIMO, since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was under the authority of Andrey Gromyko, whose fund is located in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. At GARF, the situation is better, as there one can access documents from the Council of Ministers in fund N°5446 and the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education in fund N°9606. These contain decisions about MGIMO undertaken by the upper echelons of the Soviet state between 1944 and 1988.

As far as the political structures responsible for MGIMO everyday life are concerned, access to archival material was much easier. In contrast to collections related to the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, funds connected with MGIMO's (fund N°538) and the Higher School of Diplomacy's (fund N°1733) party committees (*partkom*) and the Moscow Party Committee (*Gorkom* fund N°4) are located in TSAOPIM. This archive also contains the fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' party committee (fund N°192). This resulted in wider access to documents, as the consultation rules in TSAOPIM are different from those of RGASPI and GARF archives. However, while there are no chronological restrictions, two other rules limit the availability of documents. In some cases, the political institution which transmitted files to TSAOPIM indicated that their circulation had to be restricted for a period of 30 years (*pod grifom*), after which scholars have the right to ask for the removal of the status before a review commission. In other case, the political institution mentioned nothing about restrictions, which means the documents are available, notwithstanding the presence of personal information. In the second case, archivists have the right to decide whether scholars can consult documents or not. This had important consequences for the development of my research, since files from the MGIMO Partkom for 1987-91 were not available due to the existence of a 30-year waiting period.

Print sources

Unfortunately, most MGIMO syllabuses and teaching programmes from the Soviet period were destroyed after the collapse of the USSR. From this perspective, the books edited by the publishing house of the Institute of International Relations and the dissertations defended at MGIMO were of considerable utility. 1,270 PhD theses were defended at MGIMO between 1951 and 1991. Used as traces of MGIMO's scientific

and educational everyday life between 1951 and 1991, the dissertations provided us with new evidence. Choices of topics, titles, and scopes of analysis reveal the different stages of knowledge renewal and scientific breakthrough during the Cold War at the Institute. Indeed, PhD dissertations are both a process and a result of the development of science: they are key elements in the transmission of knowledge, as they mark the acceptance of modes of demonstration and scientific judgment based on rules, norms, and logic. However, PhD theses are distinct from other forms of learning, as they need to contribute something new to a specialised field. Thus, they indicate what is both scientifically acceptable and new at some points but also differ from the larger diffusion and institutionalisation of knowledge in the teaching programmes of undergraduate and graduate students.

Retrospective documents and interviews

The catalogues of MGIMO graduates from 1948 to 19991 were particularly useful for making an accurate list of students in the Soviet period. However, they do not provide any information on social origin, date and place of birth, first job after graduation, and future posts. In this regard, being able to access the collection of memoirs from the MGIMO museum was much more important. These memoirs were collected and published systematically by the university between 1998 and 2014, making roughly 600 pages of retrospective narrations available. While one may question whether the editors of the memoirs have made some adjustments to the texts, the fact that several alumni are critical about the teaching at MGIMO or Soviet foreign policy allows us to conclude that a certain degree of freedom was permitted to graduates when writing. While the administrative and party personnel files of MGIMO alumni are still not available, the memoirs enable us to obtain personal data about the first generations of MGIMO students. For example, the memoir anthology for students who graduated in 1948 contains only 23 out of the 120 graduates from this year: however, the narratives offer additional information about 70 other graduates. Similarly, while only 35 memoirs are available from graduates in 1950 (out of a total of 303), I was able to find further information about 126 other alumni.

The choice to use oral sources was made due to the inherent constraints in contemporary history, especially while most of the archives concerning MGIMO during perestroika are still closed. The possibility of asking questions about the

perestroika was also an opportunity to stress the role played by ‘secondary actors’ who are not necessarily clearly identified in traditional archives and are not major political figures, but who, from the bottom-up, are still shaping the interpretation of perestroika 25 years after the collapse of the USSR.

The choice of the first interviewees was clearly related to my own career path: as I graduated with a master’s degree from MGIMO in 2010, I decided to contact my former professors in order to begin this research. This is why most of my first interviews were held at the department of political sciences. On the one hand, this was a great opportunity to get people to trust me. I could often refer to someone else in order to make contact with new interviewees. On the other hand, being a student who works on an academic field raised some extra difficulties. Some of the professors that I met preferred to supervise me or give me advice concerning my research instead of opening up about their engagement with perestroika.¹⁰⁶ Often, they considered themselves less as actors than as spectators of perestroika.

However, the choice to base my research on semi-structured interviews had a huge impact on the last two parts of the thesis. Indeed, the MGIMO teaching staff cannot be considered homogeneous. The interviews were sometimes difficult for those who were the oldest and formerly most important members of the MGIMO party organisation. The youngest generation, who entered MGIMO during perestroika and who sometimes had held a quite marginal position within the Institute before 1985, were much more enthusiastic about Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms. I also noticed that, in contrast to the Brezhnev era, a new profile of professor emerged during perestroika: they did not graduate from MGIMO but studied at Moscow State University and then entered the Institute. Following the method for qualitative research described by Stephane Beaud and Florence Weber,¹⁰⁷ I decided to compare the subjective statements of my interviewees with their social trajectories. In other words, I was trying to understand to what extent their points of view on and their

¹⁰⁶ This problem in interviews has been described by researchers at the French Ecole normale supérieure in Hélène Chamboredon et al., ‘S’imposer Aux Imposants. A Propos de Quelques Obstacles Rencontrés Par Des Sociologues Débutants Dans La Pratique et L’usage de L’entretien’, *Genèses* 16, no. 1 (1994): 114–32.

¹⁰⁷ Florence Weber and Stéphane Beaud, *Guide de l’enquête de terrain*, Édition : 4e édition (Paris: La Découverte, 2010).

relationship with perestroika have been influenced by the evolution of their social position and their relationship with the Communist Party. How they referred to the West was also a specific point of interest.

Table 2: List of the interviewees

Interviewees	Profession	Age	Arrival at the MGIMO	Alumni of the MGIMO	Family members, who taught or/and graduated the MGIMO	Former member of the CPSU
Ivan Ivanov	Professor of history at the MGIMO	82 years old	1948	Yes	1 (child)	Yes
Vladimir Maksimov	Former head of the department of history at MGIMO	81 years old	Unknown	No	1 (child)	Yes
Marina Olegova	Assistant professor of international relations at MGIMO	63 years old	1966	Yes	1 (father)	Yes
Maksim Borissov	Diplomat	58 years old	1974	Yes	3 (brother, wife, and child)	Yes
Elena Vladimirova	Professor of history at MGIMO	54 years old	1988	No	1 (father)	No
Ūrij Aleksandrov	Former head of faculty at MGIMO, professor of political sciences	61 years old	1989	No	No	No
Ivan Taranbančik	Visiting professor in political sciences at MGIMO	69 years old	1965	Yes	1 (wife)	Yes
Aleksej Kamčatov	Visiting professor in political sciences at MGIMO	73 years old	2000	No	2 (children)	Yes
Pavel Lûbimov	Professor of geography, member of the Academy of Sciences	58 years old	1993	No	No	No
Irina Kozlova	Professor and head of department at the faculty of political science	56 years old	1978	No	2 (husband and child)	No
Igor Pavlenko	Employee at the MGIMO museum	60 years old	2000	No	No	Unknown
Anna Barabanova	Professor of economics	56 years old	1981	Yes	Yes (mother)	No

In the research, the three aforementioned types of sources have been used for analysing the three aspects of party nobility I have identified: *ennobling a body of people, nobility of character, and serving*.

Part I, '*A new body of people for foreign affairs in the Soviet Union*', and Part II, '*From an academic title to a recognized social category: Meždunarodniki and the beginning of the Thaw*', are mostly based on archival documents found at GARF, RGASPI, TSAOPIM, and the archives of the MGIMO museum. The discussions prior to MGIMO's foundation at the Narkomindel were particularly revealing about the fact that the Institute was not a year zero in the training of Soviet diplomats and the variety of options considered in 1943 by the upper levels of the Soviet state. This allowed for the analysis of how and when MGIMO developed into the major institution for training foreign policy specialists in the Cold War. The comparison between the discussions at the MGIMO party committee and the Higher Diplomatic School party committee were particularly useful for criticising the notion that MGIMO alumni possessed exclusive expertise in foreign affairs, a notion that has been used to explain their success in Soviet diplomacy. Equally, putting alumni memoirs of the Stalin era alongside the minutes of the MGIMO party committee was enlightening with regards to how social and political skills were instilled in individuals who lacked a common social origin and how they developed a feeling of togetherness during their years of study.

In Part III, '*Between Art and Science: Developing Distinguishing Ways of Thinking and Acting towards Bourgeois Theories MGIMO (1956-1964)*', and Part IV, '*The Making of Dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era (1964-1984)*', the use of archives was quite different. Focused on the question of a *nobility of character*, these two parts are mostly based on the minutes of the MGIMO primary party organisation, the dissertations of former students, and some of the work conducted at the MGIMO research laboratory. This approach was particularly useful for analysing changes in the teaching programmes during the Khrushchev era and how bourgeois theories were used in the Institute's everyday life.

Because most of the archives concerning the MGIMO primary party organisation during perestroika are still unavailable, the final part of the thesis, entitled '*Serving*

the Party and the State (1985-1991)’, is mostly based on retrospective materials, such as interviews and alumni memoirs. The MGIMO student newspaper *Meždunarodnik*, edited from 1968 by students of the faculty of international journalism under the supervision of members of the primary party organisation, has also been used.

PART I
A New Body of People for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union

Vâčeslav Mihajlovič Molotov asked our veterans why they were still dressed in their military uniforms. The answer given by the Hero of the Soviet Union Andrej Ignat'ev, that he felt very comfortable in a military uniform and was used to wearing it, brought a smile to his face. He declared: 'You are future diplomats and the time has come for you to get used to wearing civilian suits, ties, and hats. We are thinking about how to provide you with them.' A few months later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs kept his word.¹⁰⁸

Mogen Pilosov was born in 1928. Unlike many of his classmates, he did not fight against Nazi Germany, being only 17 years old when he was admitted to Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1945. He graduated in 1950 and started out in journalism, first at the Information Committee at the Council of Ministers of the USSR and then in the press agency *Novosti*. In his memoirs, Vâčeslav Molotov's visit stands out as a landmark during his years of study at MGIMO. He especially remembered his surprise when Molotov and MGIMO Director Ūrij Francev suddenly entered the classroom where, along with seven other students, he was studying foreign languages. This was the first time he had seen the 'leader's comrade in arms' (*spodvižnik voždâ*) in the flesh. In this moment, absolute silence reigned supreme in the classroom.

Besides the strong personal emotion felt by Pilosov during his first meeting with Molotov, his memoirs provide important details about the atmosphere at MGIMO following World War II. Indeed, Pilosov's retrospective statements reveal that the diversity of student backgrounds was particularly noticeable in the classroom: three World War II veterans in his foreign language class were still wearing their military uniforms. While he admits that he had no doubts that he would study at MGIMO after secondary school, some of his classmates recognised the good fortune involved in their enrolment at the Institute. Some successful candidates had read the announcement¹⁰⁹ about the foundation of a new faculty of international relations by

¹⁰⁸ Mogen Pilosov's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 154.

¹⁰⁹ *Pravda* published the announcement of the foundation of the new faculty at Moscow State University on 13 October 1943. *Pravda*, 'Moskovskij Ordena Lenina Gosudarstvennyj Universitet im. M. V. Lomonosova ob'âvlâet priem studentov na 1 kurs fakul'teta meždunarodnyh otnošenij na 1943/44 učebnyj god' [The M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University of the Order of Lenin advertises the recruitment of first year students at the faculty of international relations for the academic year 1943/44.], 13 October 1943, *Pravda* edition, 4.

chance in the newspapers.¹¹⁰ Other students had heard this news thanks to well-informed acquaintances from the war, high school, or in the Communist Party.¹¹¹

Despite the apparent frivolity of the question relating to students' fashion choices, Molotov's remark carried several meanings in the wake of World War II. When he informed MGIMO students that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (*Narkomindel*) was eager to provide them with new civilian suits, he was indicating that students had to prepare for their future positions in Soviet diplomacy. The replacement of old military uniforms with new civilian clothes marked not only the transition from war to peace, but also the switch to a new social position. Commissar Molotov clearly indicated that the students needed to 'get used to' their new clothes. This meant they had to feel as comfortable in civilian outfits as they did in military garb. This visual change required a learning process. Between enrolment and graduation, it was necessary for students to become at ease wearing civilian suits, hats and ties. Working in Soviet diplomacy required both a specific mind set and a whole complex of gestures and attitudes in order to best represent the Soviet state.

In his memoirs, Pilosov also remembers the day when, several months after Molotov's visit, civilian suits and accoutrements were finally delivered to MGIMO.¹¹² Still, another divide soon replaced the original gap between the veterans and those students who had enrolled just after high school. While MGIMO students now looked like a united body, their attire distinguished them from the masses. Pilosov recalls that, from this moment, MGIMO students, with their characteristic dark blue suits, fashionable shoes, and wide-brimmed hats, looked very unusual compared to normal bystanders on the Krymskij Bridge, who were usually dressed in quilted jackets, kersey boots, and caps with earflaps.

¹¹⁰ Viktor Vitûk et al., eds., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998): govorât pervye vypusniki MGIMO [Half a century later (1948-1998): The first MGIMO graduates speak]* (Moskva: Moskovskie učebniki i Kartolitografiâ, 1998), 30.

¹¹¹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 87, 125, 176.

¹¹² Boris Kurbatov provides a transcription of the decision taken by Andrej Kosygin at the People's Council of Ministers to deliver these clothes to MGIMO and the Higher Diplomatic School on 16 December 1946 in Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 55.

By stressing the visible boundary that separated those selected by the Institute from other people, Pilosov's statements give us a sense of the link that existed between MGIMO and a distinctive social group designated for foreign affairs, the so-called *meždunarodniki*. The titles of the memoirs of Pilosov's comrades also reveal much about the impact of MGIMO on the collective identity of its graduates, many of whom would go on to be in charge of foreign affairs in the USSR throughout the Cold War. Several graduates refer to MGIMO as 'their home' even though they left 50 years previously.¹¹³ Many former students highlight the fact that their years at MGIMO changed their destinies. Arkadij Vâtkin argues that 'MGIMO was a bridge between his past and future',¹¹⁴ while Valentin Egorov begins his memoirs with the following sentence: 'what we were taught at MGIMO and what resulted from it'.¹¹⁵ Several other graduates also claim that their time at MGIMO affected their lives long after they left. The title of Karèn Hačaturov's memoirs is 'Five Years [of Study] and All the Rest [of My] Life',¹¹⁶ and Nikolaj Komobaškin stated that 'the Institute was always with us'.¹¹⁷ Their years of study mattered greatly to many MGIMO graduates. Feeling themselves distinct from others and united with their classmates by a kind of common experience, most MGIMO alumni often felt they were destined for the brightest futures available in Soviet society.

Why did the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the Soviet state decide to open a completely new institution dedicated to the training of specialists in foreign affairs? How did the daily life at MGIMO foster a feeling of togetherness connected to foreign affairs? What was the nature of the bonds that MGIMO graduates developed during their studies? These questions are at the very core of the first part of this dissertation.

¹¹³ Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Starýj dom u Moskvý-reki...*' (1948-1953), 58; Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 14.

¹¹⁴ Arkadij Vâtkin's memoirs are quoted in Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Starýj dom u Moskvý-reki...*' (1948-1953), 129.

¹¹⁵ Valentin Egorov's memoirs are quoted in Anatolij Torkunov et al., eds., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet... Vospominaniâ vypusnikov 1951 goda [Time moves iron hands (1946-1951) Memoirs of the graduates of the year 1951]* (Moskva: MGIMO, 2001), 87.

¹¹⁶ Karèn Hačaturov's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 230.

¹¹⁷ Nikolaj Komobaškin's memoirs are quoted in Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 213.

Compared to the other institutions endowed with the mission of training specialists in foreign affairs, the length of MGIMO study program and the choice of enrolling former school graduates marked a clear turning point in 1943.¹¹⁸ And yet, MGIMO, main impetus laid elsewhere, in the choice the Soviet regime made to train a specific body of people dedicated to foreign affairs, which would not be reduced to the traditional field of State diplomacy. This shift to the training of a distinct body of specialists, which would stand the test of time, is key for our understanding of *meždunarodniki* specificity. This concerned the traditional field of diplomacy but also international journalism, research and teaching in foreign affairs, the secret services and both the State and Party administration.

Creating a particular group for this task meant establishing boundaries separating MGIMO students from normal people. To a certain extent, the Soviet regime pursued the imperial policy of ennobling a body of people for the specific task they would carry out in foreign affairs. Still, the distinguishing features of this new group were deeply rooted in the context of High Stalinism. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the human resources department faced a dilemma: how could they be sure that this new generation of flag bearers for communist ideals and the interests of the Soviet state on the international stage would not be subverted by first-hand exposure to the West? This core issue would raise several implications for both daily life at MGIMO and *meždunarodniki* identity. This would be of paramount importance in the selection of students at MGIMO, where only the most promising and loyal applicants would be enrolled. Providing students with an education that would not be restricted to the classroom served as one of the main principles in the organisation of academic life: this gave students a set of intellectual, social, and managerial resources that would be crucial to their collective success in the context of foreign affairs during the Cold War.

This first part of the dissertation will include two chapters describing the emergence of this new body of people.

¹¹⁸ Several scholars discussed this fact. See: Sabine Dullin, 'Une diplomatie plébéienne ?', *Cahiers du monde russe. Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États indépendants* 44, no. 44/2-3 (1 April 2003): 454; Rey, 'Diplomatie et diplomates soviétiques à l'ère du dégel 1953-1964', 346.

In the first chapter, I will argue that the foundation of MGIMO was deeply rooted in the need to respond to the dearth of specialists and to adapt Soviet diplomacy to a new international context. The Soviet regime had several alternatives when it came to training a new generation of diplomats: thus, MGIMO's existence was not a foregone conclusion. However, in October 1943, the Council of People's Commissars decided to create a totally new structure. Founding a new faculty at the Moscow State University, which would soon become an independent institute in 1944, was perceived as necessary for training a new type of cadre that would include both non-Russian and non-Soviet students: their task would be to react to and influence public opinion in capitalist countries. The designation of MGIMO graduates as *meždunarodniki* reveals much about this choice. However, it should not be thought that MGIMO was the leading institution for training foreign affairs executives by the end of World War II: the Soviet authorities created several establishments to perform this task.

By focusing on everyday life at MGIMO during the period of late Stalinism in the second chapter, I will argue that one of the key elements in *meždunarodniki* cohesiveness was the truly original teaching methods, which were not confined to the classroom. MGIMO's first students were a diverse group, and their feeling of having something in common cannot be reduced either to shared social origins or to their mutual expertise in foreign affairs. Diversity among these students was particularly obvious in the classroom, and the sources of the knowledge they acquired during their years of study were not to be found in the syllabi alone. The strong *meždunarodniki* identity developed at MGIMO was the result of a paradox. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered MGIMO to be a privileged place where they could test the loyalty of future Soviet diplomats. By ensuring a complete overlap between the students' places of work, residence, and leisure, members of the MGIMO Party Committee thought that they could induce students to show their true colours in the privacy of their rooms or in the course of party activities. On the other hand, organising for students to spend time outside the institute during their five years of study would allow these individuals to develop mutual support networks and acquire a certain sense of how the Soviet state functioned.

CHAPTER 1

A NEW PATHWAY TO SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CAREERS: OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF THE MGIMO FOUNDATION

Many, including myself, had the highest praise for the Higher Diplomatic School before being admitted. I was in Byelorussia. When you get to meet comrades and you say that you are studying at the Higher Diplomatic School, everyone is envious. Everyone wants to study here.¹¹⁹

Marmalûk, student and member of the Communist Party at the Higher Diplomatic School

Why was there a need to transform the faculty of international relations into an independent institute? What was the reason for creating a completely new faculty, especially at the height of the war? Even though the existing structures did not suffice, would it not be easier to organise special groups or special departments at the faculties of economy, history, and law within Moscow State University?¹²⁰

MGIMO graduate Igor' Bestužev-Lada

When the Council of People's Commissars took the final decision to open a 13th faculty dedicated to the education of civil servants in the field of international affairs at Moscow State University on 31 October 1943, the issue of training Soviet diplomats was not a new one. Since the 1920s, the Soviet regime had already learnt from several more or less successful attempts. The organisation of internal training seminars within Narkomindel under Georgij Čičerin, the experiences of the department dedicated to international relations at Moscow State University, and the creation of the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel under Commissar Maxim Litvinov in 1934 constituted clear and established precedents. So, the Soviet

¹¹⁹ Protokoly obših partsobranij i protokoly zasedanij partbûro, Partorganizaciâ Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy MID SSSR [Minutes of the general party meetings and of the meetings of the Party buro, Party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], 18/10/1944, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 1, 65.

¹²⁰ Igor' Bestužev-Lada's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 36–37.

regime did not start entirely from scratch when the Council of People's Commissars decided to create a completely new educational structure.

At the height of World War II, it might have been preferable to improve existing structures, such as the Higher Diplomatic School (HDS) and the Institute for Foreign Trade, rather than create a new one. Instead of founding a 13th faculty (*fakul'tet*) at Moscow State University under the authority of Ivan Udal'cov, the new dean, the Council of People's Commissars could have opened departments (*otdelenie*) dedicated to international relations in several faculties, as had been the case in the 1920s. However, the choice was consciously made to set up MGIMO in order to answer several questions both old and new, questions that this first chapter aims to explore.

When focusing on the decision-making process that led to MGIMO's foundation, a wide range of factors can explain the Soviet regime's choice to open a new institution specialised in the teaching of foreign affairs in October 1943. In the 1940s, the dearth of specialists, the problem of guaranteeing the loyalty of civil servants to the Soviet regime, the issue of public opinion, and the need to train non-Russian and non-Soviet students loomed large in the minds of Soviet leaders. The term 'meždunarodnik' was clearly associated with the idea that a new generation was necessary to maintain and consolidate the international position that the Soviet state had won during World War II. The foundation of MGIMO was the result of this specific historical context at the end of the war. These changes combined to nurture the new educational structure, a Soviet *Tsarskoe Selo* dedicated to both the political and academic training of a new body of diplomats.

When MGIMO finally opened in October 1944, the institution was one of many endowed with the mission of educating foreign affairs specialists in the Soviet Union. Whereas the Soviet regime might have decided to combine several institutions in order to concentrate the training of future Soviet diplomats in one place, a range of establishments would be in charge of this task until the Khrushchev era. This situation clearly limited MGIMO's importance and the opportunities of its graduates in the years following the Institute's foundation.

In order to capture the reasons why MGIMO was conceived as one of the many pathways to a Soviet diplomatic career, one needs to understand the slow institutionalisation of diplomatic training in the USSR before World War II.

The institutionalisation of diplomatic training in the USSR before World War II

Following the October revolution, the idea of setting up an educational structure dedicated to the training of diplomats was not taken seriously by the Soviet authorities. Leon Trotsky, who had become People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1917, was quoted as saying that his task was rather limited: 'he would publish the secret wartime treaties previously signed by the Triple Entente and shut down shop.'¹²¹ In denouncing the intrigues, lies, and codes typical of secret diplomacy, he made it clear that Soviet foreign policy aimed at worldwide socialist revolution, with the hope that the working class would soon throw off the yoke of the capitalist system in Western European countries. In March 1919, the foundation of the Communist International (*Kommunističeskij Internacional* or *Komintern*) in Moscow, in charge of relations with other revolutionary communist parties, edged out the new People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (*Narodnyj Kommissariat po inostrannym delam, Narkomindel*) in the competition for control over Soviet diplomacy.¹²² While Soviet foreign policy was grounded on a party basis, the training of new diplomats was not considered to be a priority. In the context of a new world order, diplomacy and diplomats were either doomed to disappear or be reduced to the role of propagandists.¹²³

In the 1920s, beyond the well-known debates around the dilemma between socialist world revolution and socialism in one country, the social composition of the old

¹²¹ Robert Service, *A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin*, Édition : 2nd Rev. Ed. (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2010), 67.

¹²² Erik P. Hoffmann, 'Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 36, no. 4 (1987): 10.

¹²³ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 41. See also: Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1930* (SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 1979).

imperial diplomatic service came to be seen as problematic. As a bastion of the former aristocracy, the imperial diplomatic corps was composed of 39 barons, 32 princes, 15 counts, and one serene highness in 1913.¹²⁴ Several diplomats, such as Konstantin Nabokov, Sergej Sazonov, and Aleksandr Izvol'skij, refused to serve the new Soviet state, and a decree issued by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on 9 December 1917 terminated the service of former diplomats overseas. Starting from 1918, the staff of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was replaced. Under G. Čičerin and M. Litvinov in the 1920s and the early 1930s, the establishment of a new diplomatic corps operated in two modes. On the one hand, former revolutionaries with Communist Party membership, experiences of exile, and roles in the international labour movement (*meždunarodnoe rabočee dvizenie*) filled prominent positions within the new commissariat. On the other hand, middle and lower positions were given to specialists who had no political affiliation but came with an academic degree.¹²⁵

The first diplomatic courses prioritised this second category by the end of 1920.¹²⁶ Organised within the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for people already working in the Soviet diplomatic corps, this education was initially quite short. The sporadic nature of these courses is to be explained by hesitations about the form, duration, and people who should be included in diplomatic training. In a letter dated 5 May 1920, Čičerin informed Lenin about the difficulties in recruiting new functionaries for the Soviet diplomatic corps and warned him about the scarcity of the resources allocated to the diplomatic administration and the need to set up political training for young members of the diplomatic corps.¹²⁷ At least two attempts to organise diplomatic training were made in the early years of the Soviet regime. Organised by both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the first training seminars enrolled 30 'listeners' (*slušatel'*) in a three-month course at the end of 1920. There were soon 150 on a six-month course in January 1921, but, following the work of a special commission of the Central

¹²⁴ Ibid., 40.

¹²⁵ Sabine Dullin, *Des hommes d'influences : Les ambassadeurs de Staline en Europe 1930-1939* (Paris: Payot, 2001), chap. 2.

¹²⁶ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 46–52.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 45.

Committee in June 1921, this form of training disappeared in 1922. Under the control of the Central Committee and the Komintern, the training of Soviet diplomats was transformed with the opening of a department dedicated to foreign relations within Moscow State University in 1921. After several years, however, the department was closed and responsibility for training diplomats was returned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.¹²⁸

The issue of organising systematic diplomatic training came to the fore in the middle of the 1930s. The failure of the German Communist Party to seize power in the early 1920s had already dashed the hopes of an immediate worldwide socialist revolution. Due to the need for stability and international recognition, the Soviet authorities soon began to favour traditional foreign policy goals: they inclined towards a Soviet diplomacy that was directed to 'meet national interests and national requirements'.¹²⁹ Therefore, while Komintern activity was soon made dependent on domestic goals after Lenin's death, Narkomindel's function was re-evaluated, as were the selection criteria for the Soviet diplomatic corps. Whereas knowledge of foreign states had been perceived as a professional necessity for newly recruited Soviet diplomats in the 1920s, this requirement gave rise to ideological and political suspicion in the middle of the 1930s. So, while spending time in foreign countries before October 1917 was a professional advantage for a career in Soviet diplomacy, it was also simultaneously a potential indicator of questionable political reliability. Knowing foreign languages meant that one either lacked a working-class background or had been exiled for several years. During the Stalinist era, these biographical details were held to be problematic when it came to the issue of political loyalty towards the Communist Party.¹³⁰

In 1934, under Commissar Litvinov, the training of Soviet diplomats was systematised and renovated in order to both improve diplomats' foreign language skills and reinforce the authority of the Communist Party over diplomatic careers. Orgburo's decision to set up the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel on

¹²⁸ Ibid., 45.

¹²⁹ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923* (Madrid: W. W. Norton & Company, 1984), 17.

¹³⁰ Dullin, 'Une diplomatie plébéienne ?', 438.

29 July 1934 stated that 40 applicants should be enrolled in a two-year course in 1934.¹³¹ In contrast to the previous period, this training was not targeted at existing officials, but at new applicants. Only 37 students were finally enrolled at the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel in 1934. There were 33 in 1935, 11 in 1936, and 37 in 1937. They were required to be party members between 25 and 32 years of age with at least five years of Communist Party membership (*partstaž*). They had to have graduated from an institution of higher education (*vysšee učebnoe zavedenie, VUZ*) prior to being enrolled at the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel. Priority was placed on those who had a position of responsibility within the Communist Party, the Komsomol (*Kommunističeskij Soûz Moloděži*), other parts of the state apparatus, or who knew foreign languages.

The Great Purge of 1937-1938 decimated the Soviet diplomatic corps and raised new questions around the training of diplomats. Due to the actions of Nikolaj Ežov as the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and Vasilij Korženko as the political police official in charge of the commissariat's personnel department, prominent figures of Soviet diplomacy, such as the Deputy Foreign Commissars Nikolaj Krestinskij and Grigorij Sokol'nikov, and the Narkomindel department heads Vladimir Barkov (chief of protocol), Evgenij Gnedin (press chief), David Štern (second western division), and Vladimir Cukerman (Central Asia division), disappeared.¹³² These were not isolated cases. At least 34 per cent of Narkomindel, including 62 per cent of those functionaries who occupied positions of paramount importance, were purged.¹³³ As a direct consequence, Litvinov informed the Politburo via a letter to Stalin dated 3 January 1938 about the large number of vacancies at Narkomindel: a new generation of Soviet diplomats could now emerge.¹³⁴

The vast majority of the new Soviet diplomatic corps were Russian provincials originating from low social strata. Despite the diversity of social origins mentioned in their personnel files (28 per cent defined themselves as workers, 10 per cent declared

¹³¹ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 56.

¹³² Teddy J. Uldricks, 'The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs', *Slavic Review* 36, no. 2 (June 1977): 188.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 60.

themselves as peasants, and 62 per cent identified themselves as employees), they generally did not come from affluent backgrounds.¹³⁵ Their trajectories present common features, such as upward social mobility based on engagement with the Komsomol or other party structures. While 80 per cent of the newly recruited diplomats were Russians, only 20 per cent came from Moscow and Leningrad regions (*oblast'*). 70 per cent were born between 1906 and 1914, meaning that the Soviet diplomatic corps was now much younger.¹³⁶ Last but not least, no woman was accepted.¹³⁷

On the eve of World War II, diplomatic training had a different meaning compared to that which had held sway in the 1920s. This was due to the establishment of new selection criteria. Academic accreditations were no longer understood as a validation of competence or a necessary prerequisite for a position within Narkomindel. Instead, in-house training became much more significant. In 1939, changes in the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel expressed this new logic, which remained in place until World War II.

In 1939, the Institute for Diplomatic and Consular Personnel was reorganised and renamed the Higher Diplomatic School of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (HDS).¹³⁸ Two departments (*otdelenie*) were created. The first, dedicated to the West, offered a two-year course. The second, devoted to the East, enrolled students on a three-year programme. More importantly, the establishment of a closed admission system (*zakrytyj priem*) marked a reorganisation of Soviet diplomatic training aimed at reinforcing the weight of the Communist Party in the selection of new staff. Selected through a study of their personal files, candidates were not supposed to apply for training at the HDS. Officials from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs were sent to several party districts (*rajkom*) in order to identify potential applicants who, through their loyalty towards the Communist Party and a

¹³⁵ Dullin, 'Une diplomatie plébéienne ?', 447.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 449.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 445.

¹³⁸ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetinin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 62.

suitable curriculum vitae,¹³⁹ met the requirements for a career in the Soviet diplomatic service. Successful candidates were then sent to Moscow for training.¹⁴⁰

Recurring issues of Soviet diplomacy: the dearth of cadres, mastering of foreign languages, and loyalty towards the Soviet regime

In 1943, MGIMO was only one of the many projects considered by Narkomindel to address the issue of a dearth in personnel. Unsurprisingly, World War II led to burgeoning international ties between the USSR and the rest of the world, which in turn meant there were a growing number of vacancies at Narkomindel.¹⁴¹ The USSR maintained diplomatic relations with 28 states in 1941; four years later, it had international links with 41 states. Between 1942 and 1944, the number of employees of Narkomindel increased from 522 to 756. In parallel, the Ministry was also reorganised. On the one hand, the number of geographical departments increased. The first European department was divided into five new departments, now including countries from Northern Europe. The American department was reorganised into two structures separating the United States of America from Latin America. An economics department without any geographical focus was also founded. At the same time, five new vice-commissar positions were added to the three existing posts occupied by Andrej Vyšinskij, Solomon Lozovskij, and Vladimir Dekanozov.

At Narkomindel, the staffing crisis was not only the result of the establishment of new diplomatic relations between the USSR and the rest of the world, but also of an ongoing process of systematically replacing the diplomatic corps. In the pre-war context, the continuous renewal of Narkomindel personnel had been a useful device

¹³⁹ For a study on the use of biographies in the Soviet Union before World War II, see: Pennetier and Pudal, *Autobiographies, autocritiques, aveux dans le monde communiste*.

¹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, books dedicated to the HDS do not mention the number of applicants enrolled in diplomatic training between 1938 and 1944. Aleksandr Panov et al., *Diplomatičeskââ akademiâ MID Rossii. 75 let vo blago otečestva: 1934 — 2009 [Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MID: 75 years serving for the Homeland]* (Moskva: Naučnaâ kniga, 2009), 45.

¹⁴¹ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 301–2.

for the Communist Party to keep tight control over the administration of the state apparatus. On 6 January 1949, during a Party Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Molotov indicated that, whereas ‘in 1939 Narkomindel was a shelter of opponents, an asylum for politically dubious elements (*polupartijnye elementy*)’, successive waves of replacements had enabled the upper echelons of Narkomindel to fill vacant positions with ‘tested Bolsheviks’ (*proverennye bol’sheviki*).¹⁴² He declared:

At the Ministry we serially conducted a policy of renewal of the cadres by replacing unreliable people with reliable ones, by promoting unprepared but reliable people instead of putrid and undisciplined elements.¹⁴³

Far from breaking with previous practices, he argued that the Ministry now had to get rid of several dubious ambassadors and delegates. Should there be the slightest doubt as to the reliability of an employee, he stressed the compelling need to always have several available candidates for each position at Narkomindel.¹⁴⁴

A specific device for organising the permanent renewal of cadres at the Ministry was the belief that the training of diplomats was never fully completed. Molotov made clear that:

From one day to the next, we are obliged to verify that people who are fine in their obligations today might not represent the line of the Party in a position abroad tomorrow because they stayed too long in the same place (*nastol’ko zasidelis’*) and developed a petty-bourgeois mentality.¹⁴⁵

Cadres were not supposed to remain in the same positions abroad for too long; if they did, they had to receive new internal training at the central apparatus once they were back in Moscow. In March 1945, Novosel’cev, secretary of Narkomindel’s Party Committee, argued that the Soviet diplomatic cadres needed to continually develop their political skills. He stressed that:

¹⁴² Vystuplenie V.M. Molotova na partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del [V.M. Molotov’s keynote speech at the party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 06/01/1949, RGASPI, fond 82, opis’ 2, delo 1027, 77.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 87.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 88.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 88.

Molotov declared that if our workers, the *Narkomindel'cy*, do not industriously and systematically work on improving their political theoretical level, they risk becoming functionaries (*činovniki*). Narkomindel is not a place for functionaries to work.¹⁴⁶

While criticism of both bureaucrats and the bureaucracy were not new in the Soviet Union, Novosel'cev's statements were telling about the permanence of a contemptuous and negative attitude towards functionaries after World War II.¹⁴⁷

The *vydvižency* (promoted workers) who had joined Narkomindel in the 1930s were recruited for political reasons. Yet, only the continuous improvement of their political abilities throughout their careers would prevent them from becoming functionaries and justify their long-term presence within the Ministry.

Both the purges and the dismissal of the so-called 'dubious elements' resulted in a high rate of turnover at Narkomindel. It is astonishing to see how often changes of position occurred in Soviet diplomatic careers. Konstantin Mikhajlov, the Soviet ambassador to Iran, held his position only a few months, from September 1943 to May 1944.¹⁴⁸ Nikolaj Novikov, Soviet ambassador in Egypt and Greece during World War II, served as ambassador to the United States from 10 April 1946 to 24 October 1947.¹⁴⁹ Ivan Bakulin suffered a similar fate: Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan from 1943 to 1947, he was named ambassador to Pakistan in November 1949 before being called back to the USRR just a few months later in February 1950.¹⁵⁰ All three

¹⁴⁶ Stenogramma otčetnogo-vybornogo sobraniâ pervičnoj organizacii VKP/b/, Partorganizaciâ Narodnogo Komissariata Inostrannyh Del [Minutes of the report-election meeting of the primary party organization of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs], 29/03/1945-31/03/1945, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis'1, delo 153, 2.

¹⁴⁷ Moshe Lewin stressed that members of the Politburo had already provided a critical analysis of Soviet bureaucrats at the end of the 1920s. Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 301–2.

¹⁴⁸ Russian Academy of Sciences Russia et al., eds., *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations 1941-1953: Part I: 1941-May 1949 Part II: May 1949-1953: 1941-49 Pt. 1* (London ; Portland, OR: Routledge, 2000), 958.

¹⁴⁹ Nikolaj Novikov, *Vospominaniâ diplomata: (Zapiski o 1938–1947 godah) [Diplomat's memoirs (notebook 1938-1947)]* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989).

¹⁵⁰ Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, 'Pakistan's Relations with the U.S.S.R', *Pakistan Horizon*, 14, no. N°1 (1961): 33.

ambassadors were finally forced to resign from the Ministry 'for political and practical reasons' following their return to the USSR.¹⁵¹

There was no guarantee for employees of the Ministry that they would at the same position for several years, regardless of their status. After almost a decade as vice-commissars at Narkomindel, Lozovsky was executed in 1952 and Dekanozov was eliminated in 1953 (after the arrest of Beria). At a lower level, A. Beljaev's trajectory, as detailed by Dullin, is also revealing of this perpetual game of musical chairs.¹⁵² Beljaev was a sculptor in a porcelain factory in the 1930s: he was recruited by the Ministry for his mastery of the German language. He became secretary of the embassy in Vienna in 1937. He then held the rank of counsellor of Narkomindel in Budapest until 1941. Between 1941 and 1948, he was recruited to the intelligence services of the Red Army's chief of staff. In 1948, his career suddenly stopped: he returned to the porcelain factory.

While waves of replacement had been useful for the Communist Party both before and after World War II, the turnover of Narkomindel personnel also posed several difficulties. As a result of this instability, diplomats who entered Narkomindel in the 1930s were fast tracked into positions of considerable responsibility without necessarily being prepared. In a speech delivered in front of MGIMO graduates on the 4 March 1955, Molotov pointed out that the careers of diplomats enrolled after the 1936-37 purges evolved particularly quickly before World War II.¹⁵³ He especially pointed out Sergej Vinogradov's rise to prominence. Vinogradov was born in 1907 in a village nearby Saratov and became a member of the Communist Party in 1926. He was a teacher of history when he was recruited by Narkomindel at the end of 1939. Without any knowledge of foreign languages or experience outside the Soviet Union, he was appointed as a counsellor for the embassy in Turkey in 1939. In 1941,

¹⁵¹ Stenogrammy sobranij aktiva partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR [Minutes of the meetings of the party activists of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR], 06/09/1950-07/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis'1, delo 294, 115.

¹⁵² Dullin, « Une diplomatie plébéienne ? », 456.

¹⁵³ Stenogramma vystupleniâ tov. V.M. Molotova na sovešanii sotrudnikov central' nogo apparata MID SSSR okončivših IMO [Transcript of V.M Molotov's speech at the meeting of the workers of the MID central apparatus, who graduated from the Institute of International Relations], 04/03/1955, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 167.

Narkomindel decided to dismiss the Soviet ambassador there and replace him with Vinogradov, who had only two years of diplomatic experience: he remained in the same position until 1948.

In contrast to Vinogradov, who, after his experience in Turkey, held the rank of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR in France between 1953 and 1965, several of the diplomats who entered Narkomindel in the 1930s without any experience in international relations (but a long spell in the Communist Party) were obviously unprepared for their new tasks. During a Party Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1955, Molotov indicated that the Narkomindel administration had made a mistake when nominating Sergej Suzdalev and Nikolaj Slavin as ambassadors to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea and Denmark.¹⁵⁴ Molotov argued that the two communists held their positions at the Ministry because of their long history of political involvement, and not because they had managed to cope with the important missions they had been assigned. According to the minister, both Suzdalev and Slavin declared that they 'did not have the required experience and were clearly unprepared for being ambassadors.'¹⁵⁵ He indicated that their professional abilities were not strong enough to fulfil their missions overseas.

There is little doubt that the HDS faced considerable difficulties in training communists with rather low levels of academic education before World War II. Even though Gromyko and Vinogradov were telling examples of successful upward mobility, some of the diplomats recruited because of their political involvement in the 1930s experienced huge difficulties in mastering foreign languages.

The time they spent at the HDS was often insufficient to prepare Soviet diplomats. On 25 September 1945, Volkov, a member of the HDS's Party Committee, raised this specific problem. He mentioned that 'this year there will be a significant event at the School. For the first time 26 school graduates will get their degree in Oriental

¹⁵⁴ Zaključitel'noe slovo V.M. Molotova na obšem partijnom sobranii partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del [Transcript of the closing address of V.M. Molotov at the general party meeting of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 03/08/1955, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 190.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 191.

studies.’¹⁵⁶ Yet, he regretted that ‘we have the same curriculum as the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, but the length of study is more than 5 years there.’¹⁵⁷ The communist Nihamin came to a similar conclusion when, during the same party meeting, he noticed that, compared to the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, the HDS suffered from a lack of teachers of Japanese, Chinese, and Arabic.¹⁵⁸

Providing a sustainable learning environment for foreign languages was hardly compatible with the high turnover of diplomats at Narkomindel consciously organised by the Soviet regime. The rotation of Soviet diplomats gave rise to a second set of problems. The communist Paž'gunov stressed that it was difficult to sustain continuity in the activities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs given with the constant renewal of personnel.¹⁵⁹ He highlighted that, in less than a year and a half, more than 14 employees of the Narkomindel press department had been sent out of the country in 1943.¹⁶⁰

However, more importantly, the reasons for MGIMO's foundation cannot be grasped without understanding how successive waves of staff replacement also affected the loyalty of the diplomats newly enrolled at the Ministry. One of the primary functions of the HDS was to test the trustworthiness of future Soviet diplomats during their years of study. As Novosel'cev openly stated during a party committee meeting at the HDS in 1944:

We must know the communists of our party very well. There is a great need for cadres. Some of them could be sent to work and serve abroad. The party organisation provides a letter of reference (*harektiristiki*). But to do this it is necessary to know our comrades. It seems like we do know people through

¹⁵⁶ Protokoly zasedanij partbûro, Partorganizaciâ Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy MID SSSR, [Minutes of the meetings of the party buro of the party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School of the MID], 25/09/1945, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 3, 122.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 122.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 122.

¹⁵⁹ Protokoly partijnogo sobranij i zasedanij bûro pervičnoj organizacii VKP (b), Partijnaâ organizaciâ Narodnogo Kommisariata Inostrannyh Del [Minutes of the party meetings and of the meetings of the Party buro, Party primary organization of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs], 12/05/43, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 141, 23.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 25.

meetings and talking, but in fact we do not look inside them deeply: this has to be compulsory.¹⁶¹

Organising waves of replacements was a useful device for ensuring that Soviet foreign policy was still grounded on a party basis. However, the high rate of turnover threatened the possibility to test the reliability of those sent overseas. This was a problem both before and after World War II. In 1947, the communist Panfilov declared:

The logic goes this way: if somebody is sent to our organisation, we expect that he has been previously tested and he is trustworthy. [...] And yet, the direction of human resources is reluctant to send our comrades abroad because the direction does not know the people working at the Ministry sufficiently well.¹⁶²

The practice of simultaneously training Soviet foreign policy workers and testing their political skills was not abandoned after World War II. Indeed, the institutions dedicated to the training of specialists were perceived as privileged places for testing the loyalty of future diplomats. In 1948, the HDS logically began to organise a nine-month training programme for existing members of Narkomindel.¹⁶³ During his speech in front of MGIMO graduates on 4 March 1955, Molotov declared that 'cadres always have to be in a process of party education and control.'¹⁶⁴ He clearly drew a parallel between the training and the control of the diplomatic corps.

¹⁶¹ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij búro, Partorganizaciâ Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy MID SSSR, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the meeting of the Party buro, Party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School] 18/10/1944, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 1, 70.

¹⁶² Protokol-stenogramma otčetno-vybornogo partijnogo sobraniâ, Partijnaâ organizaciâ Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del, [Minutes of the report-election meeting, Party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 15-16/07/1947, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 184, 43.

¹⁶³ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskaâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 67.

¹⁶⁴ Vystuplenie V.M. Molotova na sovešanii členov kollegii Ministerstva inostrannyh del sovместno s načal'nikami upravlenij, zaveduščimi otdelami i ih zamestitelâmi, [Tanscript of V.M Molotov's speech at the meeting of the MID Executive board, the heads of MID departments and the deputy heads of the MID departments] 25/12/1948, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 72.

While the difficulties with the lack of staff, mastery of foreign languages, and the loyalty of diplomats had loomed large in the minds of Soviet leaders since the 1920s, internal discussions at Narkomindel reveal that the emergence of a new international context had a strong impact on the choice to open a new faculty of international relations at Moscow State University in October 1943. Dekanozov was a highly significant figure in the creation of MGIMO.

A couple of months after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, Dekanozov, in a letter to Molotov dated 28 April 1943, supported the initiative to create a completely new educational structure dedicated to the training of cadres specialised in foreign affairs.¹⁶⁵ The vice-commissar argued that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) were experiencing a pressing need for cadres endowed with a deep knowledge of international relations and foreign languages. He justified the decision to create a new department at Moscow State University by referring to previous academic practices in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. He claimed that, even though Moscow State University did not train *meždunarodniki* before 1917, its educational structure used to provide theoretical and practical training in foreign affairs, including history of international relations, international, administrative, trade, and business law, the history of philosophy, and Russian, Greek, and Western European literature. He deplored the fact that the first attempt during Soviet times to organise training in foreign affairs within a department at Moscow State University was abandoned in the 1930s.

In addition to references to the past experiences of Moscow State University, Dekanozov argued that the existing educational structures could not fully address the lack of ‘this type of cadre’ (*takoj rod kadrov*). He wrote to Molotov:

¹⁶⁵ Pis'mo zamestitelâ nakorma inostrannyh del V.G. Dekanozova narkomu inostrannyh del V.M. Molotovu, [Vice-minister of foreign affairs V.G. Dekanozov's letter to minister V.M. Molotov] 18/04/1943, MGIMO Museum.

The need for this type of cadre is acute. Existing educational institutions such as the Higher Diplomatic School of Narkomindel, the Academy of Foreign Trade, and the Institute for Foreign Trade cannot meet all the requirements for this type of cadre.

He concluded his letter by reaffirming his support for the opening of a department (*otdelenie*) dedicated to foreign affairs at Moscow State University.

In Dekanozov's letter, the frequent reference to a certain 'type of cadre' was obviously rooted in the need to train civil servants for the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, journalists, and researchers. It is telling that preparatory discussions related to the founding of the institute that later became MGIMO included Âkov Havinson, the general director of TASS. In a letter addressed to Dekanozov dated 5 May 1943, Havinson supported the initiative to organise a new educational system that would provide civil servants for the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and for TASS.¹⁶⁶ However, he proposed founding an independent faculty instead of a new department at Moscow State University. Pointing out that a new department within the university's faculty of law would not be able to provide the necessary instruction, he asked for the creation of an independent faculty which would teach inter-disciplinary knowledge to newly enrolled students. He also proposed structuring the faculty into three different departments for the education of three kinds of specialists: consular workers (*konsul'skie rabotniki*), correspondents for TASS (*korespondenty TASS*), and workers for the Commissariat of Foreign Trade (*rabotniki vnešnej torgovli*).

The inclusion of Havinson in the preparatory discussions is not surprising if we refer to Molotov's statements on 4 March 1955. He stated very clearly that 'we must learn to make use of TASS, the special institutes, the Academy of Sciences, and other institutions for the purpose of state interests.' He added that:

Our mission is to guarantee state interests in the international arena. We have to influence public opinion and we have at our disposal the opportunity to impact

¹⁶⁶ Pis'mo otvetstvennogo rukovoditelâ TASS Â.S. Havinson zamestitelû narkoma inostrannyh del V.G. Dekanozova, [Head of TASS Â.S. Havinson's letter to vice-minister of foreign affairs V.G. Dekanozov], 05/05/1943, MGIMO Museum.

public opinion concerning international policies not only in our country but also abroad.¹⁶⁷

In the 1940s, the press was perceived as an important means for defending the position of the Soviet state abroad. This leitmotiv in Molotov's statements is one reason for A. Havinson's presence in the initial discussions related to MGIMO. At the beginning of 1943, the first drafts for the new educational institution mentioned that the future organisation would be a breeding ground for workers who would later be employed by institutions such as TASS and VOKS.¹⁶⁸ The correspondence between Molotov, Havinson, and Dekanozov reveals that they were aware of the need to train a new type of cadre capable of gaining access to foreign information and influencing public opinion in capitalist countries.

In part, the fact that the Soviet regime identified future MGIMO graduates specifically as *meždunarodniki* may reflect this need for a new type of cadre. In 1939, graduates from the HDS were clearly categorised according to profession and a specific rank within the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.¹⁶⁹ They were denoted as 'consultants for the central apparatus' of Narkomindel (*referenti dlja central'nogo apparata*), 'advisers, attachés, and secretaries of embassies and consulates' (*sovetniki, attashe i sekretar' polpredstv i konsul'stv*), and 'press workers in the organs of Narkomindel and those of overseas' (*rabotniki pechati v organah NKID i na zagranichnoj periferii*). By contrast, the term 'meždunarodnik' cannot be reduced to a degree, like an engineering diploma, a profession related to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or a specific position of authority.

After World War II, the term 'meždunarodnik' also differed from the title given to the graduates of the HDS. On 22 February 1944, in the regulation governing admissions to the HDS, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed students that, at

¹⁶⁷ Stenogramma vystupleniâ tov. V.M. Molotova na sovešanii sotrudnikov central'nogo apparata MID SSSR okončivših IMO, [Transcript of V.M Molotov's speech at the meeting of the workers of the MID central apparatus, who graduated from the IMO], 04/03/1955, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 74.

¹⁶⁸ Pis'mo zamestitelâ nakorma inostrannyh del V.G. Dekanozova narkomu inostrannyh del V.M. Molotovu, [Vice-minister of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov's letter to V.M Molotov], 18/04/1943, MGIMO Museum.

¹⁶⁹ A. Panov, V. Shhetinin, Y. Fokin, *Diplomaticheskaja akademija MID Rossii, 75 let vo blago Otechestva: 1934-2009*, Nauchnaja kniga, Moskva, 2009, 48.

the end of their training, each learner (*shlushatel*) who successfully passed the final state exams would be awarded a diploma which certified his status as a ‘scientific worker in international relations’ (*naučnyj rabotnik po meždunarodnym otnošeniam*).¹⁷⁰ In 1943, however, Dekanozov clearly designated future graduates from the new department at Moscow State University as *meždunarodniki*.¹⁷¹ In 1949, graduates from the MGIMO law faculty were logically called ‘lawyer-meždunarodniki’ (*juristy-meždunarodniki*), while their classmates from the faculty of history were ‘historian-meždunarodniki’ (*istoriki-meždunarodniki*).¹⁷² Their diplomas also mentioned their linguistic competence in English, German, French, or Spanish under the name of their translation adviser (*referent perevodchik*). In the wide range of professions related to foreign affairs, *meždunarodniki* were not only supposed to become diplomats, but also translators, journalists, lawyers, economists, researchers, and teachers of foreign languages. Unsurprisingly, the first MGIMO graduates occupied diverse positions in the party and state administrations or in various state companies.

*Training cadres for the socialist bloc: the impact of inter-allied negotiations on
MGIMO's foundation*

In addition to the internal discussions at the Ministry, a draft decree issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU about MGIMO's foundation provides further explanation about the reasons for the final decision taken by the Council of Ministers.¹⁷³ The document unambiguously stated that ‘the foundation of the Institute

¹⁷⁰ Y. Kashlev, G. Rozanov, V. Shhetinin, *op.cit.*, 2004, 64.

¹⁷¹ Pis'mo zamestitelâ nakorma inostrannyh del V.G. Dekanozova narkomu inostrannyh del V.M. Molotovu, [Vice-minister of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov's letter to minister V.M Molotov], 18/04/1943, MGIMO Museum.

¹⁷² Prikaz N°229 po Moskovskomu Gosudarstvennomu Institutu Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenij MID SSSR [Order N°229 about the Moscow State Institute of International Relations MID USSR], 06/07/1949 transposed in A. Torkunov, G. Zubkov, L. Moskvina, V. Pokhlebin, R. Sergeev (eds.), *Ptentsy gnezda MGIMO'va (Pjat'desjat let spustja), 1949-1999, Vtoroj vypusk instituta, Tom 1, Istoriki-Mezhdunarodniki i*, MGIMO University Press, Moskva, 1999, 12-13.

¹⁷³ Proekt postanovleniâ Centra'nogo Komiteta VKP(b) ‘O sozdanii Instituta Mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij Narkomindela SSSR 1944 g.’, [Draft decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU about ‘the foundation of the Institute of International Relations of the Narkomindel USSR], Archive of the

of Foreign Relations in Moscow is due to the reorganisation of the Narkomindel of the USSR into a commissariat of united republics.' Indeed, ministries of defence and foreign affairs were established in the Soviet republics following amendments to the Soviet constitution adopted in the 10th Session of the Supreme Soviet in February 1944. Therefore, the new institute was supposed 'to improve the training of Soviet diplomats and educate cadres for the ministries of foreign affairs of the federative republics.' The draft decree also stipulated the enrolment of 600 students from all the federative republics at MGIMO.

In his memoirs, Igor ' Bestužev-Lada reports a significant dialogue between two high officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his thesis defence. According to him, the starting point of this discussion was that one of the two higher officials could not comprehend why the MGIMO had been founded as an independent establishment. He therefore asked his colleague:

Why was there a need to transform the faculty of international relations into an independent institute? What was the reason for creating a completely new faculty, especially at the height of the war? Even though the existing structures did not suffice, would it not be easier to organise special groups or special departments at the faculties of economy, history, and law within Moscow State University?¹⁷⁴

Even though internal discussions in 1943 show that the need for the new structure was clearly related to the lack of a certain 'type of cadre', the second higher official gave a different answer to his colleague. He explained that the foundation of a completely new institute was deeply rooted in the international negotiations among the Allies during World War II about the replacement of the League of Nations with a new intergovernmental organisation.

According to him, discussions about the future United Nations pushed Stalin and Molotov to create a new educational structure in order to train staff specialised in foreign affairs who came from both the federate republics of the USSR and other socialist countries. For the two Soviet leaders, the fact that the states of the

Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia, fond 027a, opis' 1, delo 111, 70. The document is also available at the MGIMO Museum.

¹⁷⁴ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaš vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 36–37.

Commonwealth and the French Empire would be full members of the United Nations General Assembly appeared to marginalise the USSR. Stalin wanted to include republics belonging to the USSR in the new international organisation in order to counteract the weight of the capitalist countries.

According to the historian Robert C. Hilderbrand, Stalin actually linked the foundation of ministries of foreign affairs in the federative republics directly to discussions around the future United Nations in a letter to Roosevelt prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. He states that:

He [Stalin] reminded Roosevelt of the constitutional reforms that had broadened the authority of the republics in conducting foreign relations and pointed out that some of the constituent parts of the Soviet Union, such as the Ukraine and Byelorussia, surpassed both in population and political influence 'certain countries' that 'all of us' agree should be among the initiators of the international organization.¹⁷⁵

However, this discussion between the two officials at Bestužev-Lada's viva reveals that a new problem soon emerged when it came to training diplomats from the Soviet republics. The MGIMO graduate points out:

The totalitarian state seemed to shoot itself in the foot: Moscow equipped the Soviet republics with ministries of defence and foreign affairs. There was no doubt that, from above, these structures would be useless and fictional. Yet, it was necessary to find a kind of inner logic in order to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of that time.¹⁷⁶

Bestužev-Lada thus argues that the idea was to establish an independent faculty to educate diplomats from the federate republics of the USSR and other socialist states. According to him, MGIMO was to create a certain ideological unity in the socialist bloc to guarantee cohesiveness within the Soviet Union and the initiative that the Soviet Union held over other socialist countries. During a meeting of the executive board of Narkomindel (*zasedanie Kollegii NKID SSSR*) on 18 and 19 February 1944,

¹⁷⁵ Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (UNC Press Books, 2001), 99.

¹⁷⁶ Bestužev-Lada's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 37.

it was mentioned that diplomatic training had to include students from the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and the Republic of Karelia: this seems to corroborate the argument that Moscow aimed to strengthen its position in the socialist bloc by forming cadres from territories that had recently joined the Soviet Union.

When we consider Stalin's assertions about the nature of World War II and its aftermath, the conversation reported by Bestužev-Lada is not really surprising. Milovan Djilas mentioned that, during wartime, Stalin was quoted as saying:

This war is not as in the past: whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.¹⁷⁷

As the historian Norman Naimark argues, even though there is very little evidence that Stalin had clear notions in 1944-45 about developing some sort of communist bloc in Europe after the war, the conferences at Teheran in November 1944 and Yalta in February 1945 both made it clear that Eastern Europe would lie within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, several other sources offer further important insights into how inter-allied negotiations affected MGIMO's foundation. In their memoirs, *meždunarodniki* emphasised the contribution of students from the federate republics in everyday life in the 1940s. Lionel' Dadiani argues that seven Georgian students were successively enrolled at MGIMO in 1944 and 1945.¹⁷⁹ After their graduation, the majority of these Georgians found jobs in journalism, research, teaching, and the intelligence services. Ūrij Barsegov had a very successful career and would become a high official of the secretariat of the United Nations in the 1960s. In an alumni memoir written in this year, Kučkar Hanazarov claimed that a group of five Uzbek students were sent from Tashkent to the HDS in 1944 and to MGIMO in 1945. They were supposed to become diplomats for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Uzbek Republic and

¹⁷⁷ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, 1st edition (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1963), 114.

¹⁷⁸ Norman Naimark, 'The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944-1953', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 175.

¹⁷⁹ Among the Georgian students enrolled at MGIMO in 1944 and 1945, one finds Avtandil Ruhadze, Dmitrij Zedginidze, Ūrij Barsegov, Akakij Karanadze, Nodar Kikvadze, Tengiz Onoprišvili, Karen Hačaturov, Konstantin Engoân, Lionel' Dadiani, and Mèlor Sturua. Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 60.

the hypothetical delegation of the Uzbek Republic in the United Nations.¹⁸⁰ Hanazarov argued that, because of the very low number of civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Uzbek Republic (seven diplomats), all Uzbek *meždunarodniki* decided to enrol in a PhD programme in 1950. One of their number, Bahadyr Abdurazakov, became the minister of Foreign Affairs of the Uzbek Republic several years later.

Since Stalin and Molotov only got three delegations to represent the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia in the United Nations,¹⁸¹ the plan to recruit 600 students was abandoned in autumn 1944. However, while only 200 students were enrolled at MGIMO in October 1944, alumni memoirs reveal that a small group of this first batch of MGIMO graduates entered the Byelorussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948.¹⁸² The question about enrolling non-Soviet students soon emerged in Narkomindel as well. Compared to the HDS, which only began to enrol foreign students from socialist countries in 1964,¹⁸³ MGIMO welcomed students from Mongolia from 1946 onwards.

In a telegram to his government, the Soviet ambassador to the US Nikolai Novikov made it transparent that the Soviet Union sought to maintain the position it had won through force of arms via diplomacy. He declared:

In the Slavic countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia - liberated by the Red Army or with its help, democratic regimes have also been created and are consolidating which maintain relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of friendship and mutual aid agreements.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Among the Uzbek students, one finds Kučkar Hanazarov, Bahadyr Abdurazakov, Rifat Karimov, Latif Maksudov, and Rais Tuzmuhamedov. *Ibid.*, 238.

¹⁸¹ In a letter to Stalin dated on 31 August 1944, Roosevelt categorically refused the Soviet demand to have the 16 constituent republics considered for individual membership in the future United Nations. Susan Butler and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin* (Yale University Press, 2008), 255.

¹⁸² This information is given in Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 53.

¹⁸³ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 68.

¹⁸⁴ “Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership”, 27/09/1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP SSSR, f. 06. op. 8, p. 45, p. 759, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808>.

Just a few months before Zhdanov's speech in September 1947, which announced Soviet acceptance of the division of the world into two camps and compared American capitalism to German fascism,¹⁸⁵ there can be little doubt that the very early Cold War influenced the mission assigned to MGIMO to train cadres for the socialist bloc, since students from abroad were enrolled in the institution in 1946.¹⁸⁶

Indeed, the practice of enrolling non-Soviet students at MGIMO became regular in the beginning of the 1950s. In a letter addressed to the Presidium of Council of Ministers of the USSR from 22 May 1952, A. Vyšinskij spoke in favour of the wider involvement of students from the peoples' democracies at MGIMO.¹⁸⁷ He informed the Presidium that 66 students from socialist countries (Bulgaria, China, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia) had been trained at the faculty of international relations at Kiev University. Since Kiev University was not going to accept any foreign students in 1952, he asked for the enrolment of 20 to 25 foreigners at MGIMO in the following year. He claimed that this project was also justified by the recurring demand from socialist and communist countries' embassies to have the opportunity to send students to MGIMO. He finally proposed increasing the number of enrolled students at MGIMO in the following years, with an average of 75 foreigners per year.

Molotov's statements at Narkomindel also give some credence to the assumption that the foundation of a new educational institute was perceived as a useful tool for strengthening the ideological cohesiveness of the socialist bloc after World War II. The question of the role of cadres in the development of relationships between the USSR and other socialist countries was particularly acute in the 1940s-50s. Sending Soviet specialists to such states became a common practice after World War II. In a letter addressed to Molotov from 17 January 1951, a highly placed official informed him that 624 Soviet advisers and instructors were on missions in Eastern Europe, the

¹⁸⁵ David C. Engerman, 'Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38.

¹⁸⁶ Muller, *Making Great Power Identities in Russia*, 92.

¹⁸⁷ O prinâtii v Institut Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij 20-25 graždan stran narodnoj demokratii, [About the enrolment at the Institute of international relations of 20-25 citizens from the people's democracy countries], 22/05/1952, GARF, fond 5446, opis' 86, delo 771.

People's Republic of China, and Mongolia.¹⁸⁸ They had been assigned to issues of industry, agriculture, finance, trade, transport, planning, and education (*prosvešenie*). The official claimed that even though the Soviet ministries responsible for sending the advisors organised the trips properly, they did not keep in contact with them once they arrived. He deplored the fact that there were no specialists in charge of controlling and organising the work of Soviet instructors and advisors abroad. He finally proposed creating economic counsellors in every Soviet embassy to improve control over the activity of their citizens while they were on missions.

During his speech to the Soviet ambassadors of Eastern Europe in 1953, Molotov also drew an important parallel between the question of cadres and Soviet interests in socialist countries. He declared:

We need to focus on the fact that in the people's democracies, ministries of foreign affairs, state apparatus, and even party apparatus are composed of lowly qualified and weakly prepared people as far as external relations are concerned.¹⁸⁹

By pointing out the case of Czechoslovakia, he especially stressed the need to improve focus on the development of diplomatic relations between capitalist states and the people's democracies. Training foreign cadres at MGIMO was certainly considered to be one of the strategic devices useful in securing Soviet interests throughout the socialist bloc.

Several alternatives for establishing a new form of diplomatic training: a choice among a multiplicity of structures

¹⁸⁸ Pis'mo Baranenko o sovetskih specialistah v stranah narodnoj demokratii, [Baranenko's letter about the Soviet specialists in the people's democracy countries], RGASPI, 17/01/1951, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1030, 2-3.

¹⁸⁹ Vystuplenie V.M. Molotova na sovešanii poslov v stranah narodnoj demokratii, [Transcript of V.M. Molotov's speech at the meeting of the Soviet ambassadors in people's democracy countries] RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 156.

In the context of World War II, issues related to the lack of cadres, control over public opinion, negotiations around the future United Nations, and the unity of the socialist bloc explain the need for a new educational institution. However, MGIMO might have been very different from the final projects validated by the Council of People's Commissars in October 1943 and October 1944. In order to understand MGIMO's future place within the Soviet regime, it is important to situate the Institute in the overall institutional context of training cadres for the Foreign Service, including the HDS, the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies, and the Institute for Foreign Trade.

The leaders of the Communist Party and Narkomindel looked into several alternatives when planning the new institution. As previously mentioned, while both Dekanozov and Havinson shared a common diagnosis regarding the lack of properly trained personnel, they did not propose the same solutions. In 1943 and 1944, the Council of People's Commissars finally chose to entrust a plurality of organisations with the training of cadres and to limit the role of MGIMO to teaching Western European languages.

Rather than considering the new educational structure as an amalgamate of several existing institutions, in 1943 the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the Soviet state took the decision to divide the training of specialists in foreign affairs among several organisations. Following the correspondence between Dekanozov and Havinson, Sergej Kaftanov, the chairman of the All-Union Committee for higher educational institutions, gave a general endorsement to the proposal to create a new training establishment in May 1943. In a letter addressed to Dekanozov from 22 May 1943, Kaftanov proclaimed that the foundation of a new faculty of international relations at Moscow State University was 'opportune and appropriate'.¹⁹⁰ However, he defended an alternative project which differed from Havinson's proposal. Arguing that the training of cadres for foreign trade must remain under the authority of the appropriate commissariat, he claimed that the new faculty should only focus on the training of specialists for TASS and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In

¹⁹⁰ Pi'smo presedatelâ Vsesoûznogo Komiteta po delam vysšej školy pri SNK SSSR S.V. Kaftanova zamestitelû narkoma inostrannyh del V.G Dekanozova [Letter of the chairman of the All-Union Committee for higher educational institutions Sergej Kaftanov to deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov], 25/05/1943, MGIMO Museum.

contrast to Havinson's plan, he proposed to organise the new faculty into two distinct departments, one of which would educate 'correspondents for TASS' and the other 'consular employees'.

However, despite the chairman's opposition to the training of foreign trade specialists within the proposed institution, the decree establishing a faculty of international relations at Moscow State University in October 1943 clearly mentioned that MGIMO graduates could take to jobs at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.¹⁹¹ In their decree, both Molotov and Âkov Čadaev recommended that the All-Union Committee for Higher Educational Institutions and the People's Commissariat for Education of the Russian Republic organise the new faculty in order to prepare qualified cadres to work in international relations. Molotov and Čadaev indicated that 200 students would be trained at the new faculty over a period of four years. Among the newly recruited students, 100 were supposed to be trained for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. 60 people would join the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade after graduation. A special committee placed under the control of Narkomindel was charged with the recruitment of first-year students.

In 1944, during the preliminary discussions about the reorganisation of the faculty of international relations into an institute, the question of the plurality of structures responsible for training foreign policy experts was raised again. In a letter addressed to Molotov on 5 February 1944, Dekanozov and Mihajl Silin presented four proposals for increasing the number of specialists.¹⁹² They indicated that, because of the opening of ministries of foreign affairs in the Soviet republics, four different educational structures should be responsible for training the required cadres. First of all, the project included the recruitment of 100 communists who would undertake an

¹⁹¹ Postanovlenie N°932 ob organizacii v sostave Moskovskogo ordena Lenina gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni M.V Lomonosova fakul'teta meždunarodnyh otnošenij, SNK SSSR, [Council of People's Commissars' decree N°932 about the organisation of a faculty of international relations at the M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University of the Order of Lenin] in Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 17.

¹⁹² Pis'mo zamestitelâ narkoma inostrannyh del V.G Dekanozova narkomu inostrannyh del. V.M Molotovu otnositel'no predložanii po podgotovke diplomatičeskikh kadrov, [Letter of the deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov to the people's commissar V.M Molotov about various propositions concerning the training of diplomatic cadres] 05/02/44, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia, fond 027a, opis' 1, delo 111, 38. The document is also available at the MGIMO Museum.

internal training session of six months at Narkomindel. The document stressed that candidates must have a degree of higher education and five years of experience in management within the Communist Party at the regional level (*obkom*) or above. Secondly, Dekanozov and Silin's plan involved the creation of a diplomatic department (*diplomatičeskoe otделение*) at the Higher Party School of the Communist Party. 75 second-year students of the Higher Party School were supposed to be enrolled in this new diplomatic training programme for the academic year 1944-45.¹⁹³ Thirdly, Dekanozov and Silin pronounced themselves in favour of an increase in the number of students enrolled at the HDS. They proposed recruiting 150 first-year students in March 1944. Half of them would be prepared for positions at Narkomindel, while the other half would join the newly created ministries of the Soviet federative republics. Last but not least, the creation of an institute for international relations was also proposed. They prescribed the admission of 600 students in a four-year programme.

During the meeting of the executive board of Narkomindel (*zasedanie kollegii NKID SSSR*) on 18 and 19 February 1944, the proposal to divide the training of Soviet diplomats among four different structures was approved.¹⁹⁴ Only a few corrections were made. Students recruited for the six-month internal training scheme at Narkomindel now only needed three years of experience in the Communist Party instead of five. Narkomindel's executive board stressed that 110 students would be enrolled in the HDS according to both political and geographical criteria. The Baltic republics, Moldavia, and the Republic of Karelia were asked to send five students each. The plans to establish the Moscow Institute of International Relations and open a diplomatic department at the Higher Party School were approved.

¹⁹³ Placed under the authority of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Higher Party School was responsible for training the senior executives of the Communist Party. The choice of entrusting part of the training of future diplomats to the Higher Party School was an original one compared to previous practices of organising education in structures connected to Narkomindel. However, in their book about the HDS, Ů. Kashlev, G. Rosanov, and V. Šetinín inform us that the diplomatic department of the Higher Party School closed only a year after opening. Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetinín, *Diplomatičeskâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 64.

¹⁹⁴ Rešenie Kollegii NKID ot 18-19.02.44 (o podgotovke diplomatičeskikh kadrov), [Decision of the Narkomindel's executive board about the training of diplomatic cadres], 18-19/02/44, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia, fond 027a, opis' 1, delo 111, 35. The document is also available at the MGIMO Museum.

The inclusion of educational structures such as the HDS and the Higher Party School in internal discussions at Narkomindel clearly reveals that the foundation of a new institute was one of several solutions adopted by the party and state apparatus. In 1944, the upper echelons of the party and state decided to share out the training of cadres among different organisations, one of which was the future MGIMO. However, in October 1944, the number of newly recruited students at MGIMO was well below the initial figure prescribed in the project approved by Narkomindel's executive board. In addition to the fact that the federative ministries of foreign affairs did not dispatch many recruits to the new institution, the low number of students finally enrolled in October 1944 was linked to the abandonment of the plan to train both Occidental and Oriental experts at MGIMO. This obviously undermined the role of MGIMO given that there was a desperate need for specialists in eastern languages at this time.

The different preliminary projects related to MGIMO's foundation between 1943 and 1944 show that Soviet leaders regularly raised the question of training cadres specialised in Western and Eastern foreign affairs. In his letter to Dekanozov in 1943, Havinson clearly indicated that TASS was suffering from a lack of correspondents with specialist knowledge about Western and Eastern countries. He mentions that:

The situation with cadres for the Middle and Far East is nothing short of alarming. These circumstances must be taken into account in the organisation of the new faculty of international relations.¹⁹⁵

In his letter to Dekanozov in 1943, Kaftanov also supported the idea that the future cadres should be trained to work in American, European, and Eastern countries.¹⁹⁶

In their letter to Molotov containing four different proposals for the training of diplomatic cadres in February 1944, Dekanozov and Silin proposed to fuse together the faculty of international relations of Moscow State University and the Moscow

¹⁹⁵ Pis' mo otvetsvennogo rukovoditelâ TASS Â. Havinson zamestitelû narkoma inostrannyh del V. Dekanozova, [Head of TASS Â.S. Havinson's letter to vice-minister of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov], 05/05/1943, MGIMO Museum.

¹⁹⁶ Pi' smo presedatelâ Vsesoûznogo Komiteta po delam vysšej školy pri SNK SSSR S. Kaftanova zamestitelû narkoma inostrannyh del V. Dekanozova, [Chairman of the All-Union Committee for higher educational institutions Sergej Kaftanov's letter to deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs V.G Dekanozov], 25/05/1943, MGIMO Museum.

Institute of Oriental Studies.¹⁹⁷ The goal was to train cadres specialised in both Western and Eastern countries within the same organisation. The project stipulated that the faculty of international relations would be relocated to the building of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. In a letter to Molotov dated April 1944, Vyšinskij sent a draft of the decree establishing the future institute of international relations: the proposal to merge the faculty of international relations at Moscow State University and the Moscow Institute for Oriental studies was included.¹⁹⁸ In his draft, he mentioned that the future structure would train cadres for the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and TASS. Vyšinskij proposed organising the new institute into two different faculties: the faculty for the 'countries of Western Europe and America' and the faculty for Eastern countries. Before April 1944, training cadres for both Eastern and Western countries was clearly an important question for Narkomindel.

In October 1944, the project of amalgamating the faculty of international relations at Moscow State University and the Moscow Institute of Oriental studies was finally abandoned. Indeed, the decree establishing the Moscow State Institute of International Relations makes no reference to training cadres specialised in Eastern countries.¹⁹⁹ Given the lack of evidence about why the training of such personnel did not take place at MGIMO, one may suggest several hypotheses. Since the merger between MGIMO and the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies was only finally concluded in 1954, it is possible that Stalin did not approve of the merger proposed by Molotov in 1944. The perception of an emerging bipolar world might also explain why the proposed merger was finally rejected.

¹⁹⁷ As already mentioned, the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies had been founded in 1920 as a result of the merger between the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages and the oriental studies departments of Moscow's other higher educational institutions.

¹⁹⁸ Pis'mo zamestitel' narkoma inostrannyh del A. Vyšinskogo narkomu inostrannyh del V. Molotovu otnositel'no proekta postanovleniâ SNK SSSR Ob 'Organizacii Instituta meždunarodnyh del'. April' 1944G, [Deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs A. Vyšinskij's letter to the people's commissar V. Molotov about the draft decree of the Narkomindel USSR concerning the establishment of the Institute of international relations] Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Federation of Russia, fond 027a, opis' 1, delo 111, 90. The document is also available at the MGIMO Museum.

¹⁹⁹ Postanovlenie N°1412 o preobrazovanii fakul'teta meždunarodnyh otnošenij MGU im. Lomonosova v Institut meždunarodnyh otnošenij, SNK SSSR, [Council of People's Commissars' decree N°1412 about the reorganization of the MSU faculty of international relations in the Institute of International Relations] 14/10/1944, GARF, fond 5446, opis' 46, delo 2495.

Molotov and Čadaev signed the decree establishing the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on 14 October 1944: in the document, they explained their reasons for turning the faculty of international relations into an independent institute under the authority of Narkomindel. The new establishment was responsible for preparing highly qualified advisors in the field of international affairs over the course of a four-year programme.²⁰⁰ The Committee for Higher Educational Institutions was charged with elaborating teaching programmes in agreement with the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The decree included the enrolment of 250 male students selected via an open competitive examination organised by Narkomindel. I. Udal'cov, the former dean of the faculty of international relations, became the first director of the institute. MGIMO had been founded.

²⁰⁰ The term 'meždunarodnik' did not appear in the decree from Molotov and Čadaev.

CHAPTER 2

MAKING HIGH POLITICS AN IDENTITY: THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF A SOVIET TSARSKOE SELO IN LATE STALINISM

The whole world will hear about us!

There are no better students than we in the whole world!

It's the eighth wonder of the world!

What an honoured name!

The international faculty!

The first international faculty in the world!²⁰¹

Anthem of the faculty of international relations, written by Vadim Ardatovskij in 1943

We need to have a complete picture of students' trajectories from the first day to the last day of their studies.²⁰²

Statement of MGIMO Director Ūrij Francev in 1948

For an institution that would become a breeding ground for the majority of Soviet diplomats during the Cold War, in October 1944 MGIMO was only one of many institutions considered by Narkomindel to address the critical lack of diplomatic personnel. As a result of both the Great Purge of 1937-38 that decimated the Soviet diplomatic corps and the burgeoning international ties between the USSR and the rest of the globe during World War II, the dearth of foreign affairs staff was a critical concern for the Soviet political elite. However, as we have seen, in 1944 the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the Soviet state took the decision to share out the responsibility for educating new cadres specialised in foreign affairs among several organisations, such as the HDS, Narkomindel internal seminars, a new

²⁰¹ 'Sluh o nas projdet po vsej planete. Lučše nas studentov v mire net. Vos' moe čudo sveta. Kak slavno imâ èto - Meždunarodnyj fakul'tet. Pervyj v mire Meždunarodnyj fakul'tet.' Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 20.

²⁰² Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the meetings of the Party buro of the MGIMO party committee] 13/05/1948. TSAOPIM. Fond 538, opis' 1. delo 4., 17.

diplomatic department at the Higher Party School, and the Institute for Foreign Trade. Moreover, the failure to merge the faculty of international relations of Moscow State University with the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies also limited the spectrum of potential career paths for future MGIMO graduates.

Compared to the other institutions, however, MGIMO had a strong competitive advantage. The decision to conceive MGIMO as an independent institute, a Soviet *Tsarskoe Selo*,²⁰³ which would organise the collective life of the selected students over five years of study was a prerequisite for the development of an identity, a sense of togetherness connected to foreign affairs. From academic seminars to physical labour in kolkhozes during the summer, the organisation of daily life fostered a new social entity within Soviet society, that of the *meždunarodniki*. Many MGIMO graduates saw themselves as a specific part of the Soviet elite, defined by possession of a distinguished diploma. For them, this title was not only an academic degree or a representation of their specialisation in foreign affairs: it was also a precise social role within Soviet society, one which assumed a shared system of beliefs, values, and behaviours inherited from their years at the Institute.

Focusing on everyday life at MGIMO in late Stalinism, I will argue that, following World War II, the enrolment of women and non-Russian students from the Soviet federate republics, combined with a proactive policy of affirmative action for veterans and working-class families, resulted in a high level of diversity among the first MGIMO students. Then I will claim that the organisation of teaching at MGIMO was extremely important in creating a specific identity for future cadres of foreign affairs experts. The training was not limited to the auditorium; the MGIMO Party Committee paid special attention to scheduling students' time outside the Institute in order to ensure that this new generation of Soviet diplomats was not subverted by first-hand exposure to the West. The party committee and the MGIMO administration aimed to both control student behaviour and instil a particular way of behaving and thinking in the future *meždunarodniki*; thus, these administrative bodies spent a great deal of time and energy organising events that made the development of strong ties among

²⁰³ Melor Sturua's memoirs are quoted in Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 6.

students possible. This would provide students with a set of intellectual, social, and managerial resources that would be crucial in the success of a social group dedicated to foreign affairs during the Cold War.

World War II and the diversity of MGIMO students during late Stalinism

Examining the social origins of MGIMO students and questioning the nature of the ties that eventually bound them together is an essential step in assessing the extent to which this institution mattered in the development of a collective identity among its graduates. In his memoirs, Leonid Rozanov provides a detailed description of his very first day of class at the faculty of international relations at Moscow State University on 15 November 1943.²⁰⁴ Vice-commissars V. Dekanozov and S. Lozovskij and Dean I. Udal'cov welcomed the 200 new students. By stressing the quality of the students' outfits, Rozanov makes palpable his colleague's anxiety, pride, and willingness to match the high expectations placed upon them. MGIMO's first students were particularly modest in appearance:

The group of students standing at the entrance to the only faculty lecture hall looked very exotic. All students came to the opening in their best outfits, but not many of them had decent suits for this solemn event: even the suits of those who had them were often their only ones and were well-worn. Many students did not even have such suits, and they came in military uniforms without shoulder boards. But such was the state of thing. The war was going on and not many could afford civilian clothes.²⁰⁵

In 1943, MGIMO's first batch of students was composed of university graduates, war veterans, and school graduates.²⁰⁶ Selected through a thorough and attentive study of their personal files and an oral competitive examination organised by the Narkomindel,²⁰⁷ the enrolment of school graduates sharply contrasted with the

²⁰⁴ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 120.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 4.

²⁰⁷ Boris Kurbatov mentions that, soon after the Institute's foundation in 1944, the MGIMO entrance examination included four tests: Russian language and literature (verbal and written), history of the

traditional practice of recruiting experienced party members. After all, before World War II, the Higher Diplomatic School used to enrol party members between the ages of 25 and 32 with degrees of higher education for a rather short internal training scheme in foreign affairs. The choice to recruit school graduates had a profound impact on the composition of MGIMO's student body.

Unfortunately, the lack of access to the personal files of MGIMO graduates does not allow for a precise collective picture of the students' social origins. Still, the information gleaned from the memoirs of students who graduated from MGIMO during the Stalin era enables us to draw some limited conclusions. Out of the 1,294 MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1953,²⁰⁸ information can be found on 797 students in alumni memoirs.²⁰⁹ Of that number, details about the social origins of 218 graduates were found. Even though this sample cannot be considered representative of the majority of MGIMO graduates, it gives a certain sense of their diversity during the Stalin era.

To an extent, the argument made by several scholars that the new institute was an establishment for the children of the Soviet elite is true.²¹⁰ Among the first MGIMO students were children of major diplomats, such as Dekanozov's son, Molotov's daughter, Gromyko's son, the son of Soviet ambassador to France Alexandr Bogomolov, the son of Narkomindel chief of protocol Fëdor Moločkov, and

peoples of the USSR (verbal), geography (verbal), and foreign languages (verbal and written). High-school graduates who had been awarded a gold or silver medal for their excellent academic grades were exempted from the Russian language, history, and geography examinations. Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 43.

²⁰⁸ This figure is found by counting the number of alumni of each year between 1948 and 1953: *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1953'* (Moskva: MGIMO, 1998).

²⁰⁹ Information about MGIMO alumni was mainly gleaned from: Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*; Anatolij Torkunov, ed., *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va (Pât'desât let spustâ) 1949-1999 Tom 1 Istoriki-Meždunarodniki [The chicks from MGIMO nest (50 years later) Tom 1 Historians-Meždunarodniki]*, MGIMO, vol. 1, 2 vols (Moskva, 1999); Anatolij Torkunov, ed., *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va (Pât'desât let spustâ) 1949-1999 Tom 2 Ūristy-Meždunarodniki [The chicks from MGIMO nest (50 years later) Tom 2 Lawyers-Meždunarodniki]*, MGIMO, vol. 2, 2 vols (Moskva, n.d.); Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*; Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*; Torkunov Anatolij et al., eds., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952) [And in the eyes there will be the International Institute near Crimean Bridge (1947-1952)]*, MGIMO (Moskva, n.d.); Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...' (1948-1953)*.

²¹⁰ Mitrohin, 'The Elite of "Closed Society"', 155.

Alexandra Kollontai's grandson. The children of leading figures from the Communist Party and the Soviet state were also numerous: among MGIMO's first students, one finds Aleksej Flerovskij, (son of the former People's Commissar of the Baltic Fleet), Vladimir Nagovicyn, (son of the former People's Commissar for Social Welfare), Ūrij Nosenko (son of the 1st Deputy Commissar of the Tank Industry during World War II and People's Commissar for Transport Engineering), and Aleksandr Suhodrev (son of People's Commissar for Justice of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). The son of Politburo member Anatas Mikoyan also studied at MGIMO in the Stalin era.

In alumni memoirs, there are numerous references to the children of the political elite as the 'golden youth' (*zolotaâ moloděž'*)²¹¹ or 'sons of famous state figures' (*synov'â izvestnyh gosudarstvennyh deâtelej*).²¹² However, one must note that the proportion of children with parents in the upper echelons of the state was highest in two particular categories: women and students from the Soviet federative republics. Indeed, among the Georgian students, Mèlor Sturua, Akakij Karanadze, Avtandil Ruhadze, Niko Čerkezišvili, and Mihail Džibladze had very privileged social backgrounds compared to the other students.²¹³ Sturua was the son of the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.²¹⁴ Karanadze was the son of the minister of the Interior of the Georgian Republic.²¹⁵ Džibladze was the son of one of the founding member of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia.²¹⁶ Čerkezišvili was the nephew of Sergey Kavtaradze, the former vice-commissar at Narkomindel and Soviet ambassador to Romania between 1945 and

²¹¹ Anatolij Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:40.

²¹² Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 122.

²¹³ The results of an enquiry into MGIMO students' nationalities conducted in March 1949 indicate that, out of the 1,470 MGIMO students, there were 199 non-Russians. At that time, students from 18 different nationalities were studying at MGIMO. Among the best represented, one finds Armenians (49 students), Ukrainians (47 students), Georgians (19 students), Byelorussians (19 students), Jews (17 students), and Mongolians (14 students). *Spravka o studenčeskom sostave Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Instituta Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij MID SSSR*, [Report about the MGIMO student body] 18/03/1949, MGIMO Museum.

²¹⁴ Anatolij Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:489.

²¹⁵ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 62.

²¹⁶ Anatolij Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:336.

1952.²¹⁷ Ruhadze entered MGIMO thanks to his uncle, who held the rank of minister of State Security of the Georgian Republic.

Even though the number of women enrolled at MGIMO during Stalin's era was small,²¹⁸ many of them were daughters of leading figures. Among the women admitted to MGIMO in 1946 were Èra Zhukova, daughter of Georgy Zhukov,²¹⁹ Svetlana Molotova, daughter of Vâčeslav Molotov, Luiza Novikova, daughter of the Chief of the Central Board of the Ministry of Electric Power Plants of the USSR Ignat'ev Novikov, Ninnel' Goremykina, daughter of the Minister of Agricultural Engineering Petr Goremykin,²²⁰ Lûdmila Kosygina, daughter of the candidate member of the Politburo Aleksej Kosygin, and Marina Arutûnân, daughter of the Chief of the Economic Department at the Soviet MID Amazaspov Arutûnân.

Just as for students from the Soviet socialist republics, the regulations governing admission into MGIMO certainly favoured women from the elite. Of course, mastering a foreign language was crucial, but simply knowing about the recruitment procedure was a fundamentally important factor in gaining admission to the Institute, which was not yet as famous as it would be during the Cold War. Sent to Moscow to provide the new ministries of foreign affairs in the federative republics with a generation of diplomats, these non-Russian students were selected by the local authorities without competitive examination.²²¹ While women were subject to an oral competitive examination and quota restrictions from 1946, having high social origins presented them with a certain advantage as well. The fact that some of them knew their classmates before being admitted at MIGMO was particularly important.²²² Èra

²¹⁷ Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 81.

²¹⁸ The first female students were admitted to MGIMO in 1946, although their number was subject to quota restrictions until the Gorbachev era. Out of the 1,294 MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1953, there were 102 women. *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1953'* (Moskva: MGIMO, 1998).

²¹⁹ Georgy Zhukov's third daughter Ella would also graduate from MGIMO in the 1960s.

²²⁰ 'Ministr sel' skohozâjstvennogo mašinostroeniâ SSSR'.

²²¹ All the Georgian students were from Tiflis [Tbilissi]; only Ūrij Barsegov was not a former school graduate in 1950. Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 60.

²²² In their childhood, Rimma Bicaeva and Svetlana Krikunova attended the same Moscow elementary school. Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 168.

Zhukova, Liliâ Andreeva, Svetlana Molotova, and Ninnel' Goremykina had all attended the 175th Moscow elementary school before going to MGIMO.²²³ Even though they did not attend the same school, Goremykina already knew Inna Kolyčeva. They prepared for the entrance examination together and were admitted in 1946.²²⁴ Èra Zhukova explains that it was through Svetlana Molotova's mother Polina Žemčužina that the recruitment of women at MGIMO came to her knowledge. It was only because of this that she decided to apply.²²⁵

Thus, the student body that emerged from the selection process was at least partially constituted by young ambitious people on their way up in the Soviet system.²²⁶ Women and students from the Soviet republics are two telling examples of how social origins could matter when it came to entering MGIMO. Nonetheless, their enrolment at the Institute brought true diversity to MGIMO's student body in the Stalin era.

One of the most striking aspects of this golden youth was certainly the variety of their parents' occupations within the Soviet regime. Some students were heirs of the contemporary intelligentsia, such as Evgenij Udal'cov, whose father was MGIMO's first director,²²⁷ and Ūrij Semenov, son of the first director of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.²²⁸ Mark Vilenskij's father took part into the first aircraft-assisted Soviet expedition to the North Pole²²⁹ and Èduard Rozental' was the son of a famous professor of linguistics at Moscow State University.²³⁰ Some students were rooted in the artistic life of that time.²³¹

²²³ Ibid., 49.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Èra Zhukova's memoirs are quoted in Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 97.

²²⁶ Many students from the upper class declared that they had a clear career plan before MGIMO's foundation. They intended to study either at the Moscow Aviation Institute or at the Moscow Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History.

²²⁷ Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 46.

²²⁸ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 18. In 1956, Nikolaj Semenov was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry.

²²⁹ Ibid., 21.

²³⁰ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 234.

²³¹ In his memoirs, Leonid Roznanov mentions that Valerij Savčenko, whose father was a famous screenwriter and film director, and Kim Panferov, the son of a renowned writer and the acclaimed film actress Alla Tarasova, were both admitted into MGIMO in 1943. However, they did not finish their studies at the institute. Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 121.

Georgij Merkulov was the son of Sergej Merkulov, a prominent Soviet sculptor.²³² Natal'â Babočkina's father Boris was a famous Soviet actor and director from Leningrad.²³³ Anatolij Karcev's father (also Anatolij) was the writer of the widely known novel *Magistral'*.²³⁴ Marat Bruhnov's mother was member of the Writers' Trade Union,²³⁵ while Nikolaj Inozemcev's mother was a member of the Artists' Trade Union. Vladimir Koz'min-Borodin's mother was the head of the Egyptology department at the Pushkin Museum.²³⁶

Last but not least, the progeny of senior leaders and executives in the Soviet military apparatus complemented the motley group of the children from the Soviet elite. In their memoirs, some 20 alumni declared that they had fathers working in the Red Army. Among them, five had fathers holding the rank of general in the air, marine, and land-based divisions of the Red Army: these were Georgij Zubkov (1949),²³⁷ Anton Šugol'skij (1950), Džermen Gvišiani (1951),²³⁸ Ol'var Kakučaa (1951),²³⁹ and Anatolij Matveev (1951).²⁴⁰ Nikolaj Âkovlev (1949) was the son of a marshal and Vsevolod Parhit'ko's father served as a colonel in the Red Army.²⁴¹ Ūrij Voroncov's (1952) father was the Soviet military attaché to Berlin in 1939; he commanded the Soviet navy as a vice-admiral in 1943.²⁴²

Except considering that the offspring of the intelligentsia had the same childhood, values, and social practices as the scions of senior leaders and executives in the Red Army, the diversity of children from the Stalinist elite at MGIMO is rather clear. However, more importantly, there were many Soviet children and youngsters from

²³² Ibid., 114.

²³³ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...'* (1948-1953), 34.

²³⁴ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ* (1948-1998), 133.

²³⁵ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...'* (1948-1953), 148.

²³⁶ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:371.

²³⁷ Anatolij Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va (Pâtdesât let spustâ) 1949-1999 Tom 1 Istoriki-Meždunarodniki*, 1:68.

²³⁸ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 47.

²³⁹ Ibid., 184.

²⁴⁰ Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 77.

²⁴¹ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:420.

²⁴² Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 108.

middling and modest backgrounds. Approximately 60 MGIMO graduates openly indicated their rather humble social origins in their memoirs. Half of them can be identified as belonging to the Stalinist middle class: their parents were often directors and teachers in primary schools, engineers, the employees of banks, and doctors. The other half had much less exalted origins: their parents worked in agriculture and industry. In their memoirs, Aleksej Striganov (1948),²⁴³ Vladimir Silkin (1949),²⁴⁴ Vladimir Vladimirkij (1949),²⁴⁵ Nikolaj Lebedev (1950),²⁴⁶ Ivan Makejčev (1950),²⁴⁷ Anatolij Koškin (1951),²⁴⁸ and Nikolaj Zabelkin (1951)²⁴⁹ clearly mention that their parents were peasants. As for as Ūrij Pankov (1949),²⁵⁰ Vitalij Fedorinov (1949),²⁵¹ Ivan Serikov (1950),²⁵² Mihajl Tihonov (1950),²⁵³ and Nikolaj Ignatušin-Larin (1951),²⁵⁴ their parents were workers in the Soviet industrial complex. Last but not least, several MGIMO graduates such as Valerij Ūr'ev (1949),²⁵⁵ Valentin Lebedev (1950),²⁵⁶ Viktor Korotkov (1949),²⁵⁷ Ūrij Buzulukov (1949),²⁵⁸ and Valentin Falin (1950)²⁵⁹ declare that they themselves had been employed as workers prior to their admission into MGIMO: they were millwrights or turners before or during World War II.

Among MGIMO's first students, there was an obvious social divide, one which coincided, unsurprisingly, with the different ways in which applicants had heard about the Institute. Vasilij Safrončuk, the son of a peasant who had received an education at

²⁴³ Ibid., 12.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 23.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 28.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 41.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 57.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 92.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 89.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 22.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 24.

²⁵² Ibid., 45.

²⁵³ Ibid., 46.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 90.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 25.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 20.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 17.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 64.

a military school (*voennoe učiliše*) before World War II, points out that ‘at this time in Moscow very few people knew about MGIMO’s existence’.²⁶⁰ Those with modest social origins often stated that they learned of MGIMO’s existence by chance through the radio or newspapers (either *Pravda* or *Komsomolskaya Pravda*). Several veterans explain that MGIMO’s existence came to their knowledge when traveling home from the army after demobilisation or when staying in a hospital because of a war wound. This situation sharply contrasted with the children from more privileged backgrounds, who received this information through their parents or classmates. For them, their parents’ professional networks mattered most.

The social divide among MGIMO’s first students was probably more evident for students from poorer social backgrounds. Evgenij Panfilov, whose father died in 1942, recalled that he felt uncomfortable and somewhat out of place studying at MGIMO. In his memoirs, he writes:

The offspring of party and Soviet bureaucrats followed another way of life. [...] Although we were learning together, I did not feel that the mutual estrangement between us was ever overcome. Of course, social class could change. But not ‘theirs’, as they already belonged to the higher-ups, together with their future grandchildren, but the social class of some of ‘us’.²⁶¹

Panfilov’s distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ reveals not only the variety of student trajectories before MGIMO, but also that social origins might have been an obstacle for the development of a collective identity among future *meždunarodniki*. Since students from the Soviet elite often benefited from strong ties with their classmates that derived from sharing a privileged childhood (for instance, some had spent time together at the House on the Embankment [*Dom na naberežnoj*]), those from a more unassuming background might feel awkward to their advantaged classmates. They had difficulties with finding their place.

²⁶⁰ Torkunov Anatolij et al., ‘*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*’ (1947-1952), 252.

²⁶¹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor’ Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 145.

Yet, during the Stalin era, the age criterion was certainly as important as social origin. Indeed, the diversity of clothing pointed out by numerous MGIMO graduates in their memoirs was not only a question of parental wealth: it was often related to the variety in the ages of this first batch of students. This factor clearly contributed to the heterogeneity of graduates between 1948 and 1953.

In contrast to the sparse information available on the social origins of MGIMO graduates, alumni yearbooks give us a complete picture of the age of each *meždunarodnik* who graduated between 1948 and 1953. The age group distribution reveals particularly important disparities between those students who graduated between 1948 and 1951. Even though 60 per cent of MGIMO graduates were under 19 years of age when they were admitted into the Institute, age discrepancy remained important. Indeed, among MGIMO graduates in 1950, there was a difference of 14 years between the youngest and the oldest student. The fact is that, between 1948 and 1951, 40 per cent of MGIMO graduates were over 19 years of age when they enrolled at MGIMO. As far as graduates between 1952 and 1953 are concerned, one observes that the average age decreased compared to previous years. Even though there was still a difference of nine years between the youngest and the oldest graduates in 1952, 35 per cent of MGIMO graduates were over 19 years of age when they enrolled at MGIMO in 1947. This fell to 24 per cent in 1948.

What makes the age criterion important (and also explains the significant reduction in the average age of applicants to MGIMO between 1943 and 1948) is the experience of World War II. Alumni memoirs mention that more than a half of the 386 students enrolled at MGIMO in 1945 were veterans.²⁶² A couple of years later, this proportion declined: out of the 305 students enrolled at MGIMO in 1948, only 43 were veterans.²⁶³ The ways in which students experienced the war with Nazi Germany varied according to age. Older students often had university degrees or had taken part in battles against the fascists.

²⁶² Ibid., 7.

²⁶³ Torkunov and Sergeev, *‘Staryj dom u Moskvy-reki...’ (1948-1953)*, 7.

World War II affected student social trajectories in different ways. First of all, war had an important impact on the mobility of students in the Soviet Union. The victory over Nazi Germany resulted in the return of Red Army veterans to old or new places of residence. In his memoirs, the veteran Vâčeslav Mitrofanov recalls that, in May 1945, following the liberation of Caucasus, he was released from hospital and went through Moscow on his way home to his mother. It was during his journey that he heard about MGIMO's existence and thus decided to apply, settling down in the Soviet capital. War engendered geographical mobility not only among soldiers, but also among some of the MGIMO's youngest applicants. In 1942, Nikolaj Kanaev had been evacuated to the Ryazan oblast' with his mother and siblings. While his father was at the front, he attended high school and worked in the local kolkhoz from the age of 15.²⁶⁴ He declared that this experience played a fundamental role in the development of his character, which certainly would have been very different had he remained in Moscow.

For some of the students, victory over Germany came at a bitter price, becoming orphans in post-war Soviet society. Those who had lost their fathers on the battlefield often experienced huge difficulties balancing the demands of study and their families. Deprived of paternal support in economic, social, and political terms, they had to provide for their relatives. Even though the Soviet state granted veterans special privileges while mass demobilisation was under way,²⁶⁵ Sergej Moločkov indicated that a war pension was not sufficient to provide a decent living in Moscow; indeed, it often pushed veterans to abandon their studies.²⁶⁶ The veteran Vladimir Vinogradov claimed that his years of study were a permanent 'struggle for survival' (*bor'ba za vyživanie*),²⁶⁷ while Georgij Mamrykin explained that, because of his father's death, he had no choice but to work while studying at the Institute.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 183.

²⁶⁵ The socioeconomic situation of veterans at MGIMO probably worsened after mass demobilisation was completed. Mark Edele indicates that the 'legal acts passed in September and December 1947 basically cancelled all privileges connected to high decorations: all transfer payments, the right to one free round trip per year, free tram travel, housing privileges, and special pension rights.' Mark Edele, 'Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955', *Slavic Review* 65, no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 125.

²⁶⁶ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 208.

²⁶⁷ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 35.

²⁶⁸ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:30.

War not only had an impact on students' social situations and geographical mobility. For all veterans, the front was the fundamental experience of their lives. It often resulted in a radical change in self-perception and career expectations. Those who had experienced the horrors of war often developed a certain sense of self-esteem, shrewdly noted by the historian Elena Zubkova. She writes:

People who had experienced more mobility during the war and who had been permitted to communicate outside official channels believed their wartime sacrifices now entitled them to more dignity and autonomy than they had previously received.²⁶⁹

Many war veterans believed that they were entitled to a better future, which some associated with their admission into MGIMO. For the veteran Aleksej Striganov, the experience of war was a key factor in making him feel bold enough to imagine studying at MGIMO.²⁷⁰ He declared that 'I had just returned from the battlefield, and the audacity was still there. That is the reason why I decided to apply.'²⁷¹ Mihail Tihonov obviously shared the same feeling. Despite his modest social background, he argued that his two years of experience on the battlefield, and the two war wounds received there, made him confident about 'deserving a place at MGIMO'.²⁷²

To a certain extent, war smoothed over differences in social status. Among the students admitted into MGIMO during the Stalin era, the veterans Viktor Vol'skij, Andrej Ignat'ev, Ūrij Vinnik, Nikolaj Zabelkin, and Mihail Kudačkin were all 'Heroes of the Soviet Union' for their courageous feats in service to the Soviet state during the war. They enjoyed a prestigious status within the Institute regardless of their social origins. Indeed, veterans clearly benefited from a kind of moral authority among the younger students who had just graduated from school.²⁷³ For many

²⁶⁹ Elena Zubkova and Hugh Ragsdale, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 16–17.

²⁷⁰ Torkunov and Sergeev, 'Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...' (1948-1953), 146.

²⁷¹ Viktor Vitŭk et al., *Polveka spustŭ (1948-1998)*, 146.

²⁷² Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 181.

²⁷³ Sergej Nesterov stresses this specific point in Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:117.

veterans, army service in World War II became a channel for upward mobility in the Communist Party.²⁷⁴ Ivan Makejčev declares that, among the students enrolled at MGIMO in 1945, there were 170 communists who had been, for the most part, admitted to the Party because of their military merit.²⁷⁵ The records of the MGIMO Party Committee indicate that, in March 1947, the primary party organisation at the Institute consisted of 387 members. Only 39 belonged to the teaching staff, while 80 per cent were students, the majority of them veterans.²⁷⁶ They would soon take on an important role in MGIMO's daily life by occupying major positions within the Institute's party bureau.

Last but not least, the experience of war developed ties of mutual assistance and support among the veterans enrolled at MGIMO. Rafaël' Saakov stressed that a special sense of solidarity united him with those who had experienced war.²⁷⁷ According to him, it was the support of veterans that helped him to overcome both his economic difficulties and troubles with foreign languages during his years of study. Memory of war obviously fostered close bonds. Alumni memoirs also mention that veterans used to box together when studying at MGIMO. They regularly met at the Institute's boxing club.²⁷⁸ Practising sport together obviously enabled them to maintain the special connection they had through their shared experience of war.

The enrolment of veterans together with children of different genders and social backgrounds meant that the MGIMO student body was not a sociologically uniform group. The feeling of togetherness that students experienced during and after their years of study was not based on age or social position. When comparing the students' sociological profile with the rules for admission, this variety takes on a different and

²⁷⁴ In his book, Loyd E. Lee notes that 'at the end of the war half the Communist party was in the armed forces. A quarter of all soldiers (more than 3 million) belonged to the Party, most having joined during the war.' Loyd E. Lee, *World War II: Crucible of the Contemporary World: Commentary and Readings* (M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 258.

²⁷⁵ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 128.

²⁷⁶ Protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij, Partijnaâ organizaciâ MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] TSAOPIM, 12/03/1947 fond 538, opis' 1, delo 2, 22.

²⁷⁷ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 237.

²⁷⁸ Alumni memoirs mention that only one member of the boxing club was not a veteran. Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:515.

rather more important character. It seems that MGIMO student diversity during the Stalin era was related to complementary strategies pursued by the Soviet regime to ensure the loyalty of future cadres specialised in foreign affairs.

The application form (*anketa*) completed by each applicant during the Stalin era is a good indicator for the information that the selection board wished to know before admitting candidates to the Institute.²⁷⁹ The questionnaire consisted of 30 questions that applicants were required to answer when they applied to the MGIMO entrance examination. Even though there is a lack of data on how the answers to each question were evaluated by members of the entrance board,²⁸⁰ the profile of applicants admitted to MGIMO suggests those features which were especially valued by the institution.

²⁷⁹ Boris Kurbatov provides a transcription of the application form in Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 44–50. Kurbatov indicates that, in addition to the application form, each applicant had to provide the following documents: a resume, a general education certificate in the original, a passport (submitted personally), three photographs, and a military commissariat certificate.

²⁸⁰ Unfortunately, the minutes of the entrance board's meetings are unavailable.

The MGIMO application form during the Stalin era²⁸¹

1. Last name, first name, patronymic. If you changed them, indicate your previous last name or first name (place, time, and circumstances of the change).
2. Year and place of birth (according to the old and new administrative divisions).
3. Citizenship and nationality (indicate if you had a foreign citizenship in the past).
4. Social estate or social class background prior to the October Revolution (peasantry, urban commoners, distinguished citizens, merchantry, clergy, military estate, etc.).
5. Education (general, vocational, or military). Main occupation (according to work experience and education). Academic degree (rank). Do you have any scientific work and inventions?
6. Which foreign languages do you know?
7. Party membership and experience in the Communist Party (*partstazh*). Indicate the date of joining the CPSU and the number of the party membership card and the party candidate card. By which organisation were you admitted to the party? (Region, province, or republic)
8. The date of joining the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League: number of the membership card.
9. If you used to be a member of CPSU or Komsomol, indicate the membership period and the reason for leaving.
10. Have fines ever been imposed on you during your membership in CPSU or the Komsomol? (Where, when, by whom, what fines? Were they withdrawn?)
11. Have you ever had any deviations from the general line of CPSU²⁸² or participated in opposition or anti-party groups? (Where and when? What groups?)
12. Have you or your relatives ever been brought to trial and placed on remand; been arrested or had administrative or legal penalties imposed; been disfranchised? (Where? When? For what?) Are your relatives being tried or serving their sentences at the present time?
13. Have you ever been abroad? (Where and when? What were you doing there?)
14. Do you or your wife have relatives abroad at the moment or did you or your wife have them in the past? (Whom? Where?) Do you keep in touch with them? (Did you keep in touch with them in the past?) State if any of your relatives had foreign citizenship.
15. Did you or any of your relatives serve in the White Army and its institutions or White government institutions? (Where? When? Position?)
16. Were you or your relatives taken captive or interned during the Imperialistic War²⁸³ or the Civil War?
17. Were you or your relatives in the territories temporarily occupied by the Germans taken captive or encircled during the Great Patriotic War? (Where? When?)

²⁸¹ Boris Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom, kak mnogo dum roždaet on*, MGIMO (Moskva, 2004), 44-50.

²⁸² 'Byli li kolebaniâ v provedenii linii VKP(b)'.

²⁸³ First World War.

18. Did you serve in the Red Army (Where? When? Last position and military rank). If you are doing military service at the present moment, indicate your position and military rank. If you have a draft deferment from the Red Army, indicate the place of your military registration.
19. Did you take part in the Civil war or the Great Patriotic War? (Where? When? As what?)
20. Did you participate in the partisan movement or in underground activities? (How and when did you join? Your duties?)
21. Health condition (Do you carry any wounds? Did you suffer from concussion? Which wounds did you receive? When?)
22. Indicate which of your relatives listed in question 27 was a member of other parties, worked in the police, the gendarmerie, at a public prosecution office, a court, a prison institution, the border, or as escort guard prior to the October Revolution.
23. Marital status (married, single, widowed). List the members of your family who depend on you and indicate their age. If you are widowed, divorced, or remarried, indicate the last name, first name, and patronymic of your previous wife (husband).
24. Your residential address. Since when have you lived there? Home and office telephone numbers.
25. List your previous residential addresses (at least one year of residence) and periods of residence.
26. What have you been occupied with since the beginning of your professional life? (including studies in all educational institutions and military service).
27. Information about close family members (provide information about your wife, children of majority age, mother, father, siblings. Wife has to provide pieces of information about her husband and her close family members).
- Answer categories: last name, first name, patronymic (in full), relation degree, year of birth, place of birth (according to the new administrative division), nationality, party membership, place of employment (position and exact address), current residence address.
28. Participation in central, republican, provincial, regional, and district elective bodies.
29. Your social activities (party, Komsomol, Soviet, trade union activities, etc.)
30. What awards do you have? (Indicate when and with what you were awarded).

Other than the queries intended to provide conventional information about the candidate's identity (name, surname, date of birth, and address of residence), the questions can be divided into four categories. Nine of them dealt with the applicant's family and social origins.²⁸⁴ Seven questions were related to the applicant's involvement in the Communist Party, the Komsomol, and other party and administrative structures.²⁸⁵ Five questions referred to the applicant's military past.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ Questions 4, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, and 27.

²⁸⁵ Questions 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 28, and 29.

²⁸⁶ Questions 18, 19, 20, and 30.

Only two questions directly focused on the academic background of the applicant and his or her knowledge of foreign languages.²⁸⁷

Guided by a desire to enrol the most promising and loyal applicants, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to favour two different types of applicant profile. By comparing the questionnaire with the profile of applicants admitted, one might observe that the Narkomindel selection committee practised a policy of positive discrimination in favour of World War II veterans and graduates from schools for the working youth. Those questions related to military background and involvement in party and administrative structures seemed to value people who had early political careers and/or served with great distinction during World War II.

Just as with those students who enrolled at the HDS in the 1930s, criteria based on experience in the army and the Communist Party would have enhanced the social diversity of MGIMO graduates at the end of the Stalin era. As the historian Loyd Lee notes, war experience was clearly a factor in patterns of upward mobility within Soviet society after 1945. He writes:

The dominant pre-war pattern of elite requirement – large-scale admission of workers in the Party and systematic promotion of lower-class Communists into administrative jobs – had begun to lose favour with the political leadership before the war and was dropped altogether in the 1940s. What took its place in the immediate post-war period was the appointment of veterans who had joined the Party during the war to positions of civilian leadership.²⁸⁸

Admittedly, there were still applicants from schools for the working youth with no military records among the students enrolled at MGIMO. This shows that the pre-war

²⁸⁷ Questions 5 and 6. The 13th question relating to travel abroad is particularly difficult to categorise. On the one hand, it might have positively highlighted the applicant's experience and knowledge of foreign languages and cultures. On the other hand, in the context of high Stalinism, mentioning trips abroad obviously provoked high suspicion in regards to the applicant's past.

²⁸⁸ Lee, *World War II*, 258.

patterns of elite composition were not completely abandoned.²⁸⁹ However, the inclusion of questions relating to the military past of each applicant reflected the interest of the entrance board in veterans and party members. The ninth, tenth, and seventeenth questions about one's presence in an occupied zone during World War II and the absence of sanction or an exclusion from the Communist Party or the Komsomol indicate that these three elements were obviously seen in negative terms. However, by admitting applicants engaged in party structures and the military, the entrance board certainly considered such records to be an advantage, helping them select those whose loyalty had already been tested. Members of the entrance board could consider them trustworthy by basing their opinion on the information already collected by the Party, the army, and other parts of the state apparatus.

The loyalty of applicants from underprivileged families was often guaranteed by the feeling of accountability that the students themselves experienced. Born into a modest family, Vladimir Denisov is clear about the gratitude he felt towards the Communist Party for offering him the opportunity to study at MGIMO. He writes:

We were grateful to the Party and the government for everything that was done for us, for making us highly educated specialists. And although nowadays some people consider these things with irony, in the context of that time, the expression of our gratitude was sincere: in those difficult post-war years, we perfectly understood the price borne by our country and our people for funding our education, for giving us the possibility of being what we became.²⁹⁰

By admitting applicants with strong levels of involvement in the Party and military records, the entrance board had at its disposal a wide range of information on the pasts of enrolled students and was able to place those who benefited from upward mobility in a position of indebtedness.

²⁸⁹ At least three students who graduated from MGIMO in 1950 declared that they were from a school for the working youth: Vladimir Aleksandrov, Vladimir Denisov and Viktor Tarasov in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 14, 76, 194.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

At the same time, the inclusion of questions related to applicants' academic backgrounds and families seems to have favoured a second type of profile. As already noted, knowledge of MGIMO's existence, mastery of foreign languages, and a certain capacity for forthright repartee²⁹¹ gave advantages to applicants with high social origins. However, the numerous questions about applicants' families suggest that social origins played a more important and direct role in the selection process.

Nine questions focused on family relations. Each applicant was required to answer questions not only about their social origins and the activities of their parents, but also about the occupations of any siblings. Secondly, the questionnaire focused on possible contacts with family members abroad or in occupied territories during the war. More surprisingly, three questions dealt with the pre-revolutionary past: the entrance board was obviously paying attention to whether members of the applicant's family might have held an 'anti-revolutionary' profession in either the police or the judiciary. Lastly, one question pertained to the applicant's conjugal relationships.

Having a clear understanding of the applicant's familial relationships was important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 14th and 15th questions were clearly aimed at preventing desertion. Knowing whether the applicant had correspondence with family abroad who had fled Russia during or after the Civil War was useful for understanding whether he or she had the necessary resources at their disposal to escape to the West and join the enemy. Because it was more difficult for married people with children to flee the Soviet Union, the details requested about an applicant's wife or husband might have played a similar role. Secondly, the field of diplomacy has traditionally emphasised the role of the couple in the conduct of foreign affairs. Future diplomats trained at MGIMO were likely to be sent overseas with their wives and children. The party apparatus was therefore interested if partners

²⁹¹ Among applicants, it was rumoured that some candidates were asked during oral examinations about how many columns supported the façade of the Bolchoi Theatre. Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 20.

were as reliable as the applicants themselves.²⁹² Therefore, questions about an applicant's relatives were also connected to testing loyalty.

Several scholars have argued that, for members of the Soviet elite, sending their children to MGIMO was a way of making social positions and privileges hereditary within the USSR.²⁹³ The enrolment of the heirs of major leading figures was also a useful mechanism for controlling members of the Soviet elite. When admitting the children of the Stalinist upper class, the entrance board was perfectly aware of the applicants' connections. In the last years of the Stalin era, the enrolment of elite children was a helpful tool for keeping a tight grip on the Soviet diplomatic corps.²⁹⁴

MGIMO's foundation marked an important turning point. The selection of new students brought together heterogeneous heirs of the Soviet elite, including women, students from the Soviet republics, and scions of the intelligentsia and the Red Army: they were joined by children from middling and low social backgrounds. In the aftermath of World War II, a network of varied students - some with degrees, others with experience of the battlefield, some with connections within the Moscow Soviet elite, others with a shared trajectory of upward social mobility - came together to undergo a new form of training in foreign affairs, one especially amenable for defending Soviet interests on the international stage. MGIMO's foundation meant not only a change of scale, but also a novel way of educating a specialised corps dedicated to foreign affairs: this paved the way to the formation of a new identity, which was not only based on expertise in international relations.

²⁹² The transcripts of a closed party meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that the behaviour of diplomats' family members, and especially their wives, was also scrutinised during their stay abroad. In 1947, a member of the MID Party organisation declared: 'unfortunately, their wives – family members of our personnel – do not always remember that our diplomats – our Soviet representatives abroad – remain representatives in any kind of situation. There is a tailor in London who provides his services to the Russian embassy. He is a certain Antony. And of course, he cooperates with Scotland Yard. So, the wives of our personnel coming to this tailor feel at ease. They characterise this or that diplomat, speak about who goes where and when, discuss how this or that man works.' Stenogramma zakrytyh partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MID SSSR, 01/08/1947, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 185, 18.

²⁹³ Zemtsov, *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite*; Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*.

²⁹⁴ Children of the Soviet elite probably had a greater chance of being successfully enrolled at MGIMO, but at the same time they were also more likely to be affected by political repressions. This point will be developed in the next chapter.

The organisation of teaching and the formation of an identity

In October 1944, the faculty of international relations at Moscow State University was relocated to an imposing building on the Krymskij Bridge which had once housed a military school for the aristocracy. It was a former imperial lyceum, a place where the children of the Moscow nobility had been raised before the October Revolution. The analogy made by several graduates between the building on the Krymskij Bridge and a Soviet Tsarskoe Selo is important. It reflects the fact that the decision to establish MGIMO as an independent institute, a separate structure under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had an impact on students' self-perception. Compared to the faculties at Moscow State University, MGIMO benefited from a distinct and appropriate teaching location between the Kremlin and the House on the Embankment, the seats of political and social Soviet power. Like MGIMO, the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies was located in a prestigious building, but its place on Armânskij pereulok was used to provide education not directly or solely related to the training of cadres for foreign affairs. Lastly, in regards to the HDS, the length of study at MGIMO was twice as long: while students from the HDS studied for no longer than three years, future *meždunarodniki* participated in a five-year study programme.²⁹⁵

The presence of many children from the Soviet elite, the majesty of the building, and the marble hallways, parquet floors, and two statues of Aristotle and Plato at the entrance probably contributed to making students feel special, distinct, and destined for bright futures.²⁹⁶ By presenting themselves as heirs to an imperial youth trained in an insular and proud place, many students demonstrated their intention to occupy an important future social position within Soviet society. What MGIMO students were taught mattered in the formation of a collective identity; however, the organisation of

²⁹⁵ Boris Kurbatov provides a transcript of the decision taken by V. Molotov and Â. Čadaev at the People's Council of Ministers to extend the length of study at MGIMO from four to five years on 14 February 1947. Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 56.

²⁹⁶ For a detailed description of the MGIMO building on the Krymskij Bridge, see Ůrij Folkin's memoirs in Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 160.

daily life and a varied teaching process also created favourable conditions for the development of strong ties among the future *meždunarodniki*.

Following the foundation of MGIMO in October 1944, the Institute was organised into two faculties, one preparing lawyer-*meždunarodniki* and the other historian-*meždunarodniki*. Eleven departments (*kafedra*) composed the basic units of the two faculties.²⁹⁷ Among them, one finds departments specific to MGIMO or the HDS, such as the department of the history of international relations and diplomacy, directed by the member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (*akademik*) Evgenij Tarle, and the department of the history of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, chaired by Professor Boris Štejn. Several departments were similar to those found at Moscow State University: the departments of Marxism-Leninism, political economy, state law, global history (*kafedra vseobšej istorii*), area studies (*kafedra obšego stranovedeniâ*), and military and physical education. Last but not least, the Institute also had three foreign language departments specialising in English, German, and the Romance languages.

The fact that MGIMO succeeded in attracting the most brilliant minds of the Stalinist intelligentsia to teach at the Institute was significant in developing a belief among the students that they were special.²⁹⁸ On 24 March 1945, Molotov, acting in his capacity as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, created attractive working conditions for members of the MGIMO teaching staff.²⁹⁹ He reduced the number of teaching hours for all categories of teacher. He based his decision on the fact that the teaching staff were required to spend time in archives and had to read foreign literature to prepare their lectures and seminars. He also said that it was necessary to improve the salaries of MGIMO teachers in order to render the Institute more

²⁹⁷ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 26.

²⁹⁸ In 1949, the MGIMO teaching staff consisted of 276 members, among whom 83 were full members of the Communist Party, 3 were CPUS candidates, 18 belonged to Komsomol, and 172 were without any political affiliation. With 187 members, Russians represented almost 70 per cent of the teaching staff. As far as academic hierarchy is concerned, 3 academicians, 12 professors (*professor*), and 33 assistant professors (*docent*) made up the teaching staff. 12 members held a doctoral dissertations (*doktorskaja dissertacija*), 60 held PhD dissertations (*kandidatskaja dissertacija*), and 167 were without specific qualifications (*prepodovatel'*). MGIMO Alumni yearbook : *Vypusniki MGIMO MID SSSR 1948-1954*, Moskva, 2007, p. 258.

²⁹⁹ Rasporâženie N°4868-P, Sovet Narodnyh Komissarov SSSR, 24/03/45, Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 29.

attractive.³⁰⁰ Less than a month later, MGIMO was also declared a ‘first category establishment of higher education’.³⁰¹ This helped make the Institute more attractive to the teaching staff given that the prestige of academia was increasingly significantly within the Soviet Union.³⁰²

Among the members of the teaching staff, some professors were already well known to the student body. Ivan Vitver and Nikolaj Baranskij were professors at the Moscow State University whose textbook on economic geography was included in high-school curricula.³⁰³ Evgenij Tarle enjoyed an undisputed and worldwide reputation as the most renowned Soviet specialist in history of international relations, having published major books on *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia* (1937) and the *Crimean War* (edited in 1941).³⁰⁴ Albert Manfred, a senior research fellow at the Academy of Sciences and an internationally renowned scholar, taught French foreign policy.³⁰⁵ Filipp Notovič was the author of *The League of the Nations and the USSR* (1929).³⁰⁶ Aleksej Efimov, the editor of the first volume of the official *History of Diplomacy* (1940) and Stalin prize laureate in 1942, also taught at MGIMO.³⁰⁷ Among the professors of law, there were Il'â Trajnin, member of the Academy of Sciences, and Professors Vsevolod Durdenevskij and Sergej Krylov, three of the most brilliant and experienced Soviet

³⁰⁰ From this day, an hour of instruction was remunerated at a rate of 80-100 roubles per hour for members of the Academy of Sciences, 55-75 roubles per hour for professors, and 30-50 roubles per hour for assistant professors.

³⁰¹ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 30.

³⁰² Mariâ Zezina indicates that, during 1946, the salaries of members of the Academy of Sciences were quadrupled from 5,000 to 20,000 rubles per month. The salaries of professors and assistant professors represented 3,500 and 2,000 rubles per month respectively in the early stages of their careers. Mariâ Zezina, ‘Material’noe Stimulirovanie Naučnogo Truda v SSSR 1945-1985’, *Vestnik Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk* 67, no. 1 (1997): 22.

³⁰³ Ūrij Pivovarov, ‘Odin iz osnovopoložnikov sovetsoj èkonomičeskoj geografii; Ivan Aleksandrovič Vitver (1891-1966)’, *Lomonossow* 1 (2005): 41–45.

³⁰⁴ Boris Kaganovich, *Evgenij Viktorovich Tarle: Istorik I Vremia* (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo Evropejskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2014), 1.

³⁰⁵ In her book review, the historian Madeleine Rebérioux states that French scholars were very familiar with Albert Manfred's work. Madeleine Rebérioux, ‘Albert Manfred, Essais d'histoire de France du XVIIIe au XXe siècles (compte rendu)’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 26, no. 5 (1971): 1077–78.

³⁰⁶ Abdulhan Ahtamzân and Istâgin Leonid, ‘Professor F.I. Notovič – odin iz pervyh professorov MGIMO’, [Professor F.I. Notovič, one of the first MGIMO professors] *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, 25, no. 4 (2012): 277–79.

³⁰⁷ Aleksandr Prohorov, ed., ‘Efimov Aleksej Vladimirovič’, 3–e izd. ed., 30 vols, *Bol'shaâ Sovetskaâ Ènciklopediâ* (Moskva, 1969).

specialists in international law. Durdenevskij was involved in the elaboration of the Charter of the United Nations and had taken part in the Potsdam and Paris conferences in 1945 and 1946.³⁰⁸ Krylov worked as a member of the International Court of Justice between 1946 and 1952.³⁰⁹

The excellence of the MGIMO teaching staff was rooted in the variety of its members' backgrounds and their diverse theoretical and pedagogical approaches. Tarle, Durdenevskij, and Notovič all graduated from higher educational establishment before 1917. Thanks to his explorations in the French, British, and Russian archives before the October Revolution, Tarle was a true 'historian-archivist'. He never joined the Communist Party. In contrast, some of the younger history teachers had an academic trajectory marked by upward social mobility that began with experience in both the Communist Party and Soviet diplomacy before earning a doctoral degree. Vladimir Truhanovskij, head of the department of global history between 1947 and 1959, had been a history teacher before being recruited by Narkomindel. After studying at the Diplomatic Academy in 1941, he had been sent to Great Britain and Iran during the Second World War and had taken part into the San Francisco conference, where the foundation of the United Nations was discussed, in 1945.³¹⁰ He did not defend his thesis until 1947, after which he became a head of department at MGIMO. For some members of the teaching staff, World War II also played a key role in the transition from an academic milieu to the state administration. The lawyers Durdenevskij and Krylov already held doctoral degrees when Narkomindel recruited them during World War II for their expertise in international law. They had no experience in diplomacy prior to this point. In addition to the recruitment of scholars with strong academic reputations, Narkomindel also valued the experience of practitioners of international relations. Boris Štejn had a long and outstanding career in Soviet diplomacy before World War II. He had been Soviet ambassador

³⁰⁸ Ūrij Dubinin, 'Professor V.N. Durdenevskij – Vydaŭšijsâ Učenyj I Diplomāt', [Professor V.N. Durdenevskij: a bright researcher and diplomat] *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, 25, no. 4 (2012): 282–83.

³⁰⁹ Abdulhan Ahtamzân, 'Zasluzennyj deâtel' nauki RSFSR, professor S.B. Krylov (1888-1958)', *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, 27, no. 6 (2012): 303–5.

³¹⁰ Natalâ Kapitanova, 'Akademik Vladimir Grigor' evič Truhanovskij v MGIMO', *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, 19, no. 4 (2011): 287–94.

(*polnomočnyj predstavitel'*) to Finland between 1932 and 1934 and Italy between 1934 and 1939. Some graduates also remember that Vice-commissar Lozovskij used to teach a course about 'the current state of international relations' at MGIMO at the end of the 1940s.³¹¹

The inclusion of both experienced diplomats from the MID and renowned scholars helped students to believe they would share a common future in Soviet diplomacy. Molotov himself announced to the students they had to be prepared for such a career.³¹² Moreover, the teaching of very specific disciplines, such as the history of international relations and the history of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, reinforced this belief.

After 14 February 1947, a panoply of new disciplines was included in the MGIMO curriculum:³¹³ history of philosophy, Russian and foreign literature, history of the state and law (*istoriâ gosudarstva i prava*), and the economics and politics of foreign states (*ëkonomiki i politiki zarubežnyh stran*). These new subjects joined dialectical materialism, political economy, economic geography, history of the USSR and the Communist Party, history of foreign policy and Soviet diplomacy, international law, and Soviet public law. This range reflected an ideal of the erudite person who was not too narrowly focused on a specific field: this was strongly related to the versatile 'cadre' V. Dekanozov portrayed in his initial letter to Molotov in 1943.³¹⁴ The aims of the MGIMO curriculum were thus very broad, and graduates were required to demonstrate in-depth knowledge in several disciplines.

MGIMO succeeded in attracting some of the best specialists in international relations and its curriculum included a wide range of subjects: interdisciplinary knowledge was clearly valued. However, students did not spend most of their time attending lectures.

³¹¹ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 9.

³¹² Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 154.

³¹³ Boris Kurbatov provides a transcription of the decision taken by Molotov and Čadaev to include new disciplines in the MGIMO curriculum on 14 February 1947. Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 56.

³¹⁴ This ideal of the erudite person can be matched to Nikolaj Mitrohin's idea that *meždunarodnik* identity was partly based on shared universal 'humanistic values'. Mitrohin, 'The Elite of "Closed Society"', 161.

During a typical week at the Institute, future *meždunarodniki* devoted most of their time to studying a foreign language. Indeed, the teaching programme from 1948 stipulates that 1,670 out of the 4,760 hours of teaching that students were to receive during their five years at MGIMO should be dedicated to the learning of foreign languages.³¹⁵ Out of the 34 hours per week required of first- and second-year students, 12 were dedicated to foreign languages. From the third year onwards, the number of total hours per week was reduced to 28. However, the amount of time dedicated to languages remained unchanged: thus, they occupied more than 40 per cent of the time devoted to instruction.

From Monday to Saturday, students attended foreign language seminars for two hours per day. In comparison, the history of international relations was taught for only two hours per week from the third to the fifth years of study. The same amount of time was allocated to international law, the teaching of which took place during four semesters out of the ten included in the MGIMO curriculum.

The prevalence of foreign languages in the MGIMO teaching programme had several consequences for the formation of identities. As Nikolaj Mitrohin notes, knowledge of foreign languages was a sign of the social distinction that separated the students from others, a form of symbolic capital. These subjects fed the students' imagination and enthusiasm. Some already envisioned themselves travelling abroad, a somewhat romantic notion when such opportunities were extremely restricted during the era of High Stalinism. Learning foreign languages also allowed the students privileged access to foreign sources. Vikentij Matveev stresses the fact that reading the foreign press, including so-called 'bourgeois newspapers' such as the *New York Time* and the *Times*, was possible at the MGIMO library.³¹⁶ Thirdly, for some students, foreign

³¹⁵ The MGIMO teaching programmes were found in GARF. All the figures mentioned are from this source. Učebnye programmy po različnym predmetam dlâ gosudarstvennyh universitetov i različnyh vuzov: MGIMO MID SSSR, Moskovskogo Instituta Vostokovedenij. [Teaching curricula of various disciplines for the state universities and other institutions of higher education: MGIMO, MIOS] GARF, 1948, fond 9396, opis' 16, delo 770, 11-12.

³¹⁶ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 92. This holds true not only in alumni memoirs, but also in party archives: members of the primary party organisation dealt with the question of the bourgeois newspapers at the Institute in February 1949. Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava MGIMO,

language seminars fostered their sense of self-esteem. Looking back on his French class and its teacher, Vasilij Gavrilûk remembered how hard it was for him to pronounce the letter ‘u’ in French; he asserts that the instructor managed to ‘reawaken the obvious but hidden skills, self-confidence, and pugnacity in all of us’.³¹⁷

More importantly, this focus on foreign languages contributed to the creation of ties between students. Unsurprisingly, MGIMO graduates particularly remembered their foreign language seminars, where teaching was provided to small groups of about six to twelve students.³¹⁸ There is striking equivalence between the everyday schedule of students and the people they remember the most in their memoirs. Alumni often focused on being among the German-, Spanish-, English-, or French-speaking students. Since foreign language seminars brought together students with different social trajectories, they fostered the creation of new social ties. Of particular significance here is the fact that the seminars were themselves organised into academic groups (*akademičeskie gruppy*): these regularly brought students learning the same languages together.³¹⁹ In other words, the form of pedagogical organisation was a significant causal factor in the development of social skills. Socialising six days a week over five years of study with their classmates from the same language group gave students the opportunity to establish strong support networks before graduation.

Moreover, the teaching of foreign languages was not bound to the framework of the classroom. It took also the form of evenings dedicated to foreign languages, excursions to Moscow museums, and performances and concerts. Some graduates remembered very clearly the evening meetings dedicated to foreign literature and the rehearsals inside and outside the MGIMO building. Reminiscing about his German class, Boris Stolpovskij emphasises his role in the play *William Tell*.³²⁰ Even though

[Minutes and transcripts of the party meetings and partyburo meeting of party primary organization of the MGIMO teaching staff] 21/02/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 6, 31-34.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 64.

³¹⁸ Ibid.; Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:476; Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 11; Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...*' (1948-1953), 250.

³¹⁹ Vitalina Koval' remembered that an academic group was made up of four foreign language groups. Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...*' (1948-1953), 229.

³²⁰ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 140.

he graduated from MGIMO two years later, Igor ' Hohlov describes exactly the same episode.³²¹

The idea that teaching at MGIMO should not be limited to the classroom provoked controversy within the primary party organisation at the end of 1947. Indeed, during a party meeting at MGIMO on 19 November 1947, the party bureau blamed the Institute's administration for not dealing with the problem that some teachers also worked in another institute of higher education at the same time (so-called *sovmestiteli*).³²² The argument may seem surprising: since the foundation of the Institute, it had been precisely the flexibility of the recruitment process that had made it possible to gather so many outstanding specialists: they were not obliged to resign from their positions at other establishments. However, the conclusions of the members of the party bureau were logical: because the *sovmestiteli* were not involved enough in daily student life both outside and inside the Institute, their interests were perceived as being contrary to those of MGIMO (*interesy sovmestitelej na storone, ne v institute*).³²³ The party committee reminded the *sovmestiteli* that teaching was not limited to lectures and seminars.

Controversies around *sovmestiteli* present two interesting instances, which demonstrate how a collective identity soon formed in the minds of future *meždunarodniki*. Firstly, the idea that student identity was based on the knowledge exclusively provided at MGIMO is erroneous. As was already mentioned, the responsibility of training a future generation of specialists in foreign affairs was divided among many different institutions. E. Tarle also worked as a part-time professor at Leningrad State University.³²⁴ In the 1940s, he taught at the HDS,³²⁵ as

³²¹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 242.

³²² Protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the partyburo meetings of the MGIMO primary party organization] 19/11/1947, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 3, 149.

³²³ Ibid., 149.

³²⁴ Kaganovich, *Evgenij Viktorovich Tarle*, 252.

³²⁵ Postanovlenie Sovnarkoma SSSR, utverždennoe rešeniem Politbûro ot 23 marta 1940 g., [Council of People's Commissars' decree about the implementation of the Politburo's decision taken on 23 March 1940] RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 3, delo 1021, 104, quoted in Ibid., 222.

did V. Durdenevskij, S. Krylov, and S. Lozovskij.³²⁶ The general dearth of specialists in foreign affairs meant that scholars in this subject were in short supply; the Institute therefore did not always succeed in attracting outstanding professors and researchers. In a letter to Dmitri Šepilov, head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, dated 21 November 1948, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Valerian Zorin asked for six professors from Moscow State University, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Institute of History and Archives to join the MGIMO teaching staff.³²⁷ Šepilov only agreed to transfer three scholars: Professor Ivan Vitver (geography), Professor Pavel Glušakov (also geography), and Assistant Professor Aleksej Nikonov (history).³²⁸ Despite the efforts made to improve this situation, 65 per cent of MGIMO teaching staff were *sovместители* in January 1949.³²⁹

Secondly, the controversies about *sovместители* reflected the fact that the teaching of the future *meždunarodniki* took place in a variety of places both inside and outside the Institute. The organisation of life outside the Institute was an important factor in the sense of togetherness developed by MGIMO graduates. For teachers, checking whether students really read Stalin's works at home³³⁰ and organising physical labour in *kolkhozes* during the summer was part of the job³³¹. Student-teacher clubs (*kružki*) were also introduced for discussing the latest decisions of the Communist Party or the classics by Lenin and Stalin.

For students, the diversity of learning environments encouraged regular contact with classmates from different age groups or those with different experiences and social origins. This may have been more pronounced at MGIMO than the HDS, since the

³²⁶ Panov et al., *Diplomatičeskaâ akademiâ MID Rossii. 75 let vo blago otečestva: 1934 — 2009*, 53.

³²⁷ Pis' mo V. Zorina Šepilovu, 21/11/1948, [V. Zorin's letter to Šepilov] RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 132-133, delo 73, 148.

³²⁸ Ibid., 150.

³²⁹ Protokoly II partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR, MID, [Minutes of the 2nd party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, MID] 04/01/1949-07/01/49, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 239, 69.

³³⁰ Protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 18/02/1947. TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 2, 9.

³³¹ Ibid., 62.

study programme was longer, most students were younger, and some lived in dormitories and were thus separated from the family environment.

Indeed, MGIMO's dormitories were valued as teaching environments by the primary party organisation and the Institute's administration. 180 students lived in the two student dormitories on Voronsky and Gorky streets.³³² Each room could house two to eight students. The party bureau had a high regard for those teachers who routinely visited students in the dormitories and supervised extra-curricular activities, since they set an example to the other members of staff. That the party bureau devoted especial attention to the dormitories reflects the fact that they were intended to provide a degree of continuity in the teaching process. Thus, immediately after a review of the dormitories, Kirilin, a member of the party bureau, was indignant that several fifth-year students had been caught sleeping on a Sunday at about two o'clock in the afternoon.³³³ Even though Sunday was considered a day of rest, MGIMO students were required to dedicate the day to individual work, whether it be reading party newspapers or preparing for lessons. Dormitories were places where students were supposed to apply and give shape to the concepts and knowledge from the classroom. At a party meeting, the communist Kuročkin also pointed out that practical application of skills and knowledge was necessary. He declared that 'it is very important not only to gain knowledge, but to learn to use it in real life.'³³⁴ The main focus was to bring academic knowledge into the student's daily life.

Alumni reminisced often about the time they spent in the dormitories. For Evgenij Murašov, the room he shared on Gorky Street with five classmates was where he built bonds of friendship that continued long after he graduated.³³⁵ Vladimir Belozеров describes the dormitory as a 'special world' (*osobennyj mir*), a 'place of brotherhood':

³³² Protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the Party buro meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 10/09/1945, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 1, 25.

³³³ Protokoly parsobranij i zacedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the Party meetings and of the meetings of the Party buro of the MGIMO party organization], 29/11/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 7, 69.

³³⁴ Stenogramma protoly partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the Party general meetings of the MGIMO Party organization] 16/02/1951, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 15, 48.

³³⁵ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:106.

there were certainly tensions, but also strongly fraternal moments.³³⁶ Viktor Belâev recalled his room, number 115, at the dormitory: it was here where he had the opportunity to get to know his classmates, especially in the course of events during evening or on days before exams.³³⁷

Both the MGIMO administration and the primary party organisation took care to supervise daily life at the Institute and in the dormitories. Furthermore, they managed the canteen, holidays, and sports.³³⁸ The local trade union committee (*mestnyj komitet profsoûza*) was in charge of living conditions, taking especial care of accommodation and leisure time. Several students wrote school newspapers, such as the *IMO Magazine* (*žurnal IMO*), the *Meždunarodnik Newspaper*, and the *IMO Literary Almanac* (*Literaturnyj Al'manah IMO*).³³⁹ Thus, the Institute provided both space and time for the students to learn to live together.

Among the strong ties established between students during their years of study at MGIMO, marriages are probably the most emblematic. Among the women who graduated from MGIMO in the Stalin era, at least 30 met their husbands at the Institute. Their memoirs reveal much about how initial age and social gaps between students were gradually bridged. Kira Zueva³⁴⁰ and Ninnel' Goremykina³⁴¹ both met their husbands at MGIMO. Even though they came from rather different social backgrounds (Zueva's father was an engineer while Goremykina was the daughter of the minister of Agricultural Engineering), they both reminisced about the spontaneous connection they felt with their female classmates. The small number of women admitted into MGIMO encouraged a particular feeling of unity. Equally, by regularly attending foreign language seminars, the meetings of academic groups, and the political activities supervised by the Party,³⁴² they were able to meet their future

³³⁶ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:249.

³³⁷ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 23.

³³⁸ For details about sports at MGIMO during the Stalin era, see: Torkunov Anatolij et al., 'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952), 286.

³³⁹ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:18.

³⁴⁰ Torkunov Anatolij et al., 'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952), 80.

³⁴¹ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 49.

³⁴² Kira Zueva took an active part in the editing of the Institute's newspapers. Torkunov Anatolij et al., 'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952), 80.

husbands and establish new connections with veterans and provincials.³⁴³ Larisa Basova met her husband Vsevolod Knâžinskij, a MGIMO graduate in 1950 whose parents lived in Tashkent, not in the classroom but during their propaganda work together at the Stalin car factory (*zavod imeni I. V. Stalina*).³⁴⁴ Ol'ga Borodyn, one of their classmates, provides a vivid impression of how years of study together helped to bridge the social gap between students. In her memoirs, she describes how, despite her privileged social background and her father's opposition, she decided to marry a MGIMO student from less exalted stock who used to live in the dormitory.³⁴⁵

The veteran Vasilij Safrončuk's memoirs provide an insight into another process of socialisation at the Institute. He also met his wife there. As a veteran, he explains that he felt a spontaneous bond with those classmates who had also experienced the heat of battle. The son of a peasant, he stressed how important foreign language seminars and academic groups were in the creation of new links with his classmates, just as just Kira Zueva and Ninnel' Goremykina did. More importantly, his status as a veteran enabled him to become a party organiser (*partorg*) and a member of the party bureau. He thus took part in a wide range of activities at the Institute that also included younger students from a more privileged background. His responsibilities within the Party meant he regularly visited the MGIMO dormitories, where he got to know students from foreign countries. Finally, one can assume that his marriage also allowed him to establish connections with his wife's female friends, some of whom came from the Moscow elite.

Vladimir Aleksandrov and Larisa Basova's description of the Institute as their 'home'³⁴⁶ demonstrates the blurred frontiers between private and public life at MGIMO. By ensuring a complete overlap between places of work and leisure, the party bureau was not only providing the students with a political education, but also testing the future diplomats and creating the very core of their future identity within Soviet society.

³⁴³ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 35.

³⁴⁴ Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...*' (1948-1953), 67.

³⁴⁵ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 37.

³⁴⁶ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 14; Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...*' (1948-1953), 58.

Instilling social and political skills: MGIMO as a total institution

During a party meeting on 13 May 1948, MGIMO Director Û. Frantsev stressed that the Institute had to 'learn more about the students'.³⁴⁷ He openly declared that 'we need to have a complete picture of students' trajectories from the first day to the last day of their studies'. Since the teachers of foreign languages had a greater degree of contact with students, he argued, they were more capable of giving a full report of students' abilities and discipline. His statements are not surprising when we refer to Molotov's statements a couple of months later during the Second Party Conference in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 January 1949. The archetype of what a Soviet diplomat should be was very clear. Molotov declared that 'as the Party of Lenin and Stalin teaches us, diplomats are political secret service men in the opposite camp'.³⁴⁸ MGIMO students were supposed to be very competent in foreign languages, totally loyal to the Communist Party, and devoted to the interests of the Soviet state. Their studies were conceived as both a means for preparing a future generation of diplomats and an occasion to really scrutinise student life, especially in terms of social and political skills.

Student training required intense political work. Just as the faculties, departments, and academic groups structured the daily teaching process within the Institute, the primary party organisation and the Institute's All-Union Leninist Young Communist League led everyday political activity. Records from the MGIMO primary party organisation reveal the full scope of this political involvement. In September 1947, the primary

³⁴⁷ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the meetings of the party buro of the MGIMO party Committee] 13/05/1948. TSAOPIM. Fond 538. Opis' 1. delo 4., 17.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 62.

³⁴⁸ Vystuplenie V. Molotova na partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Transcript of the Molotov's speech at the party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 06/01/1949, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 80.

party organisation consisted of 502 communists.³⁴⁹ As was already noted, there were 430 students among this number, including 168 candidate members. The 1,078 other MGIMO students were involved in the Komsomol. Despite a decline in party membership among the students in the following years (300 out of the 1,600 students were members of the primary party organisation in 1952), all of the student body was still affiliated with at least one political organisation by the end of the Stalin era.³⁵⁰

Veterans played a primary role in the supervision of political training. Between 1944 and 1953, the MGIMO party bureau consisted of six annually elected members. By comparing alumni memoirs and records from the MGIMO's primary party organisation, one observes that at least 12 veterans were members of the party bureau during their years of study. Veterans also occupied major positions in the different elements of the primary party organisation: in addition to their work as monitors (*starosta*) in academic groups, veterans took part in the organisational bureau of each class (*Orgburo kursa*), the faculty party organisations (*partijnaâ organizaciâ falul' teta*), and the party groups (*partijnaâ gruppa*).³⁵¹ Among the students designated as members of the organisational bureau of first-year students (*Orgburo*) in 1947, the eight candidates that applied were all veterans. They had been junior officers during World War II. Because of their presence in each party structure and the specific role they were assigned, this situation facilitated daily contact between students from different age groups and social backgrounds. These individuals set the tone of everyday life at MGIMO.

As a political establishment of higher education (*političeskij vuz*),³⁵² several specific activities defined the political training of MGIMO students. During the Second Party Conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1949, Secretary of the

³⁴⁹ Protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of meetings of the partyburo of the MGIMO party organization] 10/09/1947, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis'1, delo 3, 117.

³⁵⁰ Stenogramma, doklad o rešenie partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes, transcript of the keynote and decisions of the party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] 19/05/1952, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis'1, delo 22, 146.

³⁵¹ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvj-reki...'* (1948-1953), 228.

³⁵² In his memoirs, Anatolij Ignat'ev argues that MGIMO was a political establishment of higher education (*političeskij vuz*) because all the students were involved in daily political activities. Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 90.

MGIMO Party Committee Žilâkov detailed the political activities of the students.³⁵³ Each student was assigned a political task (*partijnoe poručenie*). 150 communist students were enrolled in propaganda work, exposing people in Moscow factories and institutions to current international events. MGIMO students held 60 lectures per month at the Stalin car factory. In addition to physical work in kolkhozes during the summer, students also organised lectures during their trips to the Soviet republics, especially Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Latvia, and the region of Khabarovsk (*Habarovskij kraj*).³⁵⁴ Žilâkov added that an important part of political training took place within the Institute, where, in the framework of political clubs and student scientific societies (*naučnoe studenčeskoe obščestvo*), students discussed recent party resolutions, the ‘classics’ of Marxist-Leninist literature, and Stalin’s biography.

The specific role assigned to veterans in daily social and political activities was justified both by their membership in the Communist Party and the decisive influence they were supposed to have in fostering patriotic sentiments among the students. They were required to set an example³⁵⁵ and transmit their sense of duty and devotion to the Soviet state to the younger students.

Yet, the upper levels of the Soviet regime expected much more than patriotism and loyalty to the Communist Party from MGIMO students. A month after the Second Party conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the newly elected MGIMO Party Secretary S. F. Bezvesel’nyj reported on the full scope of the requirements. He declared:

The decision of the Second Party Conference obliges the party organiser of IMO to train specialists working in the field of external affairs who are highly skilled, utterly devoted to Lenin and Stalin’s ideas, irreconcilable with bourgeois ideology, permeated with the spirit of the Bolshevik party, vigilant, eager, and self-motivated,

³⁵³ Protokoly partijnoj konferencii partijnoj organizacii MID SSSR, [Transcripts of the party conference of the MID party organization], 04/01/1949-07/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 239, 62.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, 67.

³⁵⁵ Torkunov and Sergeev, *‘Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...’ (1948-1953)*, 140.

punctual and cultivated, and strong in safeguarding national secrets and maintaining secrecy.³⁵⁶

The type of cadre that the MID expected as a result of political and academic training was fully detailed. MGIMO students were required to give shape to the ideals and interests of the Soviet state and the Communist Party overseas. This was a very particular approach to forming an elite: it aimed at instilling a combination of values and behaviours associated with the ethics of Communism (*partijnost'*) and a classical (and rather aristocratic) notion of diplomacy.

Indeed, alumni indicate that, alongside the teaching programmes based on the ideal of the erudite person with a broad knowledge of history, literature, law and foreign cultures and languages, the curriculum at MGIMO included etiquette classes during which the students learned how to behave in polite society. Stanislav Men'shikov recalls the etiquette classes supervised by Sergej Kuznetsov, who taught him how to behave at a theatre.³⁵⁷ Oleg Feofanov remembers when he learned dance steps in preparation for balls.³⁵⁸ Through mastering foreign languages, developing specific skills in foreign affairs, and learning how to behave in society, students acquired a set of mental and behavioural patterns which enabled them to distinguish themselves from the masses. Learning table manners, how to dance, and the proper way of acting at the opera inscribed aristocratic values upon the bodies of students, who learnt to display their higher social status through interactions with their classmates.

On the other hand, however, the party bureau sought to prevent the future generation of Soviet diplomats from losing contact with the masses (*byt' v otryve ot mass*) by assigning party responsibilities (*obšestvennââ rabota*) supervised by veterans. Elitism was a potential problem: superciliousness was considered an evil that had to be eradicated. Members of the party bureau reported that several MGIMO students had an unacceptably dismissive attitude towards employees at the Moscow library of

³⁵⁶ Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava, [Minutes and transcripts of the party meetings and of the party buro meetings of the primary party organization of the MGIMO's teaching staff] 22/02/1949, fund 538, opis' 1, delo 6, 1.

³⁵⁷ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 107.

³⁵⁸ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 217.

foreign languages and students from other institutes.³⁵⁹ While promoting feelings of authority and responsibility among students, party organisations sought to combat the conceit (*zaznajstvo*) and derogatory behaviour of those students associated with the *stilyagi* movement (particular bugbears were their moustaches and sideburns).³⁶⁰ MGIMO graduates were not supposed to behave like superior beings or an elite distinct from the masses: rather, it was necessary to develop modesty in the students during their time at the Institute. Propaganda work in factories and kolkhozes in particular was aimed at bringing the knowledge that students received in the classrooms to the people. Similarly, physical work was supposed to bring the future Soviet diplomatic elite and the masses together.

However, the fact that both the MGIMO administration and the primary party organisation sought to instil certain patterns of thought and behaviour in the students reveals the contradictions involved in teaching when control is at stake. Student behaviour was kept under close scrutiny by the state administration and the Party in order to test devotion to the regime and detect potential faults. Grigorij Kislov thus remembers that, when participating in propaganda work at factories and Soviet farms, his behaviour was supervised by several KGB officers.³⁶¹ When reeling off a speech about Soviet foreign policy in front of a crowd, his discourse and his gestures were closely watched: the officers wanted to know whether he was embracing different opinions outside or inside the walls of MGIMO.

Narkomindel wanted to train a distinct body of people who would be entitled to pursue exclusive professions in Soviet diplomacy. Student Mark Vilenskij's satirical story (*fel' eton*) 'The Men with Green Hats' (*Zelenošlâpniki*), published in the Institute's newspaper in the 1940s, reveals the particularity and contradictions of the training that MGIMO students received.³⁶² By ridiculing the elitism of MGIMO students who wore green hats while harvesting potatoes for the Communist Party, Vilenski raised the question of distinct *meždunarodniki* behaviour and values. His

³⁵⁹ Protokol sobraniâ partijnogo aktiva partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the activists of the MGIMO party organization], 23/01/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 11, 3.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 32.

³⁶¹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 87.

³⁶² Ibid., 217.

story reflected the difficulty of training future diplomats to occupy prestigious positions without breaking their links with the people. Indeed, by the end of the Stalin era, instilling both technical diplomatic skills and *partijnost* often seemed to be irreconcilable goals.

At the beginning of 1949, the Second Party Conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a turning point in the daily lives of MGIMO students. The increase in diplomatic conflicts between the USSR and the West, marked by the Berlin Blockade from June to May 1948 and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in April 1949, deeply affected everyday life among both students and teachers. In terms of domestic policy, the illusion that the repressive Stalinist regime had relaxed did not survive long after World War II. These tensions with former allies soon turned into a witch hunt against rootless cosmopolitans in the Soviet Union, and at the Institute in particular. The struggle against cosmopolitanism imposed its rhythm on students' everyday lives during the final years of the Stalin era.

By January 1949, the campaign against cosmopolitanism had been going on for awhile in the USSR, although its scale reached a previously unknown extent in the last year of High Stalinism.³⁶³ The 'Leningrad Affair' (*Leningradskoe delo*), where a large number of prominent politicians and members of the Communist Party in Leningrad were condemned in a number of fabricated criminal cases, announced the continuation of the purges initiated in the 1930s against the elite. The Jewish intelligentsia was a designated target, but the purges also affected a wider circle of people considered unpatriotic because of their supposed pro-Western leanings.³⁶⁴ The crusade against cosmopolitanism would continue until the Doctor's Plot (*Vračubijcy*), a campaign organised in 1952-53 against Jewish doctors accused of conspiring to assassinate Soviet leaders.

³⁶³ The Russian scholar Gennadij Kostyrčenko stresses that, in contrast to the pre-war period, the purges related to cosmopolitanism between 1949 and 1953 were of a universal nature (*universal' naâ čistka*). Gennadij Kostyrčenko, *Stalin protiv 'kosmopolitov' Vlast' I Evrejskaâ Intelligenciâ v SSSR, Istoriâ Stalinizma*, Istoriâ Stalinizma (Moskva: ROSSPĖN, 2009), 210.

³⁶⁴ Konstantin Azadovskii and Boris Egorov, 'From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the "Anti-Cosmopolitan" Campaigns on Soviet Culture', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 1 (1 January 2002): 66–80.

In this atmosphere of general suspicion, the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge was seen as a place infiltrated by rootless cosmopolitanism for numerous reasons. The mission assigned to MGIMO to train cadres for foreign affairs, student access to 'bourgeois' newspapers, the high proportion of part-time professors, and the low number of Communist Party members among the teaching staff all encouraged the regime's distrust. Following the replacement of Molotov as the minister of Foreign Affairs by A. Vyšinskij in March 1949, Ivan Verešagin, a general from the Ministry of State Security, was appointed director of MGIMO.³⁶⁵ Under his watch, a campaign against cosmopolitanism was launched at the Institute between 1949 and 1952.

On 19 April 1949, a meeting of the MGIMO Party Committee was entirely dedicated to the struggle against cosmopolitanism at the Institute.³⁶⁶ The secretary of the primary party organisation opened the session with an indictment of cosmopolitanism, which was directly contrasted with patriotism. He declared: 'cosmopolitanism means renouncing being part of any nation, the denial of the civil and moral duty of people to their nation and homeland'.³⁶⁷ In front of other members, he added that it was an absolute necessity to drive cosmopolitanism out of the Institute. The suspicion was widespread. Many of the most prominent figures among the teaching staff, especially the Jewish teachers, were personally targeted by the campaign. There were two major kinds of criticism. As some teachers, such as Il'â Trajnin, used to refer to pre-revolutionary books and foreign scholars in their classes, they were accused of admiring bourgeois science. Professor Baranskij was especially blamed for giving a special course on US economics based not on Marxism-Leninism, but 'a spirit of

³⁶⁵ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 67. The fact Kurbatov was able to provide a transcript of the 1949 enquiry (*spravka*) into the MGIMO teaching staff is revealing. To our knowledge, such documents do not exist for earlier years. The enquiry was signed by a functionary from the head of cadres at the MID, which suggests that it was held by the MID. It is also dated March 1949, which corresponds with the replacement of Molotov at the MID. Finally, it includes information about students' and teachers' ethnicities and teachers' membership in the Communist Party and work in other establishments of higher education. One can easily assume that the enquiry was held especially to combat cosmopolitanism at the Institute.

³⁶⁶ Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava. [Minutes and transcripts of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the party primary organization of the MGIMO's teaching staff], 19/04/1949, fund 538, opis' 1, delo 6, 8.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 8.

devotion to the bourgeois geographical sciences'.³⁶⁸ Similarly, some teachers were accused of falsifying and misrepresenting both Russian science and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mihail Lifšic, an associate professor of philosophy, was criticised for 'reaching the complete negation of the materialist tradition of the foremost Russian social thinking'.³⁶⁹ Gergij Zisman, a teacher of philosophy, was castigated for denying the fundamentality of the dictatorship of the proletariat. By declaring in front of his students that socialism could be built without such a dictatorship, he was accused of making an obvious political mistake and 'a gross distortion of Marxism-Leninism'.³⁷⁰ Trajnin and Lifšic were finally expelled from the MGIMO teaching staff at the end of the meeting.³⁷¹ Despite his Jewish origins and his lack of Communist Party membership, E. Tarle was initially spared in 1949. However, the Russian historian Boris Kaganovich argues that 'his role at the Institute became increasingly decorative'.³⁷² Tarle was finally attacked in an article published in the *Bolshevik Review* in 1951.³⁷³ He was chastised for worshipping foreign scholars and underestimating Mikhail Kutuzov's role in his book *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia*.

Criticism focused strongly on the foreign language departments. Kacyn, head of the department of English, was the perfect scapegoat. She had lived for several years in the United States, where her parents and sister emigrated after the Russian Civil War. Despite her status as a candidate member of the Communist Party, which she obtained while in the United States, her applications to become a full member were always denied after returning to the Soviet Union.³⁷⁴ Her crime here was related to the 'cosmopolitan' character of the English texts she gave her students. A member of the Communist Party declared:

³⁶⁸ Ibid, 223.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, 13.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, 25.

³⁷¹ Ibid, 223.

³⁷² Kaganovich, *Evgeniĭ Viktorovich Tarle*, 304.

³⁷³ Ibid., 305.

³⁷⁴ Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava. [Minutes and transcripts of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the party primary organization of the MGIMO's teaching staff], 19/04/1949, fund 538, opis' 1, delo 6, 144.

In some cases, classes in foreign languages are the channels through which bourgeois ideological influence, alien to us, penetrates the student community and infiltrates our institute. [...] There are a number of objectivistic and simply politically harmful texts in the referred [English] textbook.³⁷⁵

This member noted that only 4 of the 60 reviewed texts used in English seminars were excerpts from *The Daily Worker*, the newspaper published in New York by the Communist Party of the USA. Teachers in the English department were lambasted for ‘openly stating that the political language of the English and American communist press was allegedly too barren and, in contrast, strongly touted the language of the reactionary press, such as *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*.’ Finally, they were also criticised ‘for not paying special attention to veterans who had a large break from their studies’, since ‘it is more difficult for them to learn.’³⁷⁶

Kacyn was forced to make amends in front of the communists of the Institute, but she also stressed that:

The fact is that we proceeded from the wrong conception, from the conviction that, in preparing students for a future diplomatic career, we should introduce them to the content of bourgeois newspapers and teach them to read bourgeois newspapers.³⁷⁷

Even though she received support from one of her students, who stressed that ‘the language should be studied through the bourgeois press as well, because we must know the language of our enemies in order to fight them’, she was fired. In the midst of widespread suspicion, introducing foreign cultures and languages to students seemed irreconcilable with the need for unswerving loyalty to the Communist Party.

Students too were targeted by the campaign against cosmopolitanism. In everyday life, the scale of the purge was particularly visible. The gap between the number of students admitted into the Institute and those who graduated is obvious. Out of the 200 students enrolled at MGIMO in 1943, only 120 graduated. In 1950, 295 students out of the 383 applicants admitted in 1945 graduated.³⁷⁸ This trend continued until the

³⁷⁵ Ibid, 29.

³⁷⁶ Ibid, 36.

³⁷⁷ Ibid, 29.

³⁷⁸ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor’ Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 7.

end of the Stalin era, with 238 graduates in 1953 out the 305 students admitted in 1948.³⁷⁹ Students noticed that their classmates were disappearing from the Institute on a daily basis. Vladimir Tkačenko remembers that, out of the 12 students of his Spanish language group, only six graduated from MGIMO in 1949. Nikolaj Kanaev indicates something similar: out of the eight students in his French language group, half of them abandoned their studies.³⁸⁰ Certainly, some left MGIMO because they could not cope with all their academic obligations. However, during one of his lectures at the Institute, S. Lozovskij openly declared that the Soviet security organs regularly arrested students because of their contacts with foreigners.³⁸¹

What made the purges particularly visible were the identities of the students affected and the publicity surrounding the exclusion process. Following the Leningrad Affair, Inna Rodionova, the daughter of Deputy Premier of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (*Predsedatel' Soveta Ministrov RSFSR*) Mihajl Rodionov, was forced to abandon her studies. Her marriage with her classmate Sergo Mikoyan in the same year, 1949, took place without her father, who was executed a year later.³⁸² Èduard Rozental', the son of a famous Jewish professor of linguistics at Moscow State University, was slightly luckier. Following the publication in *Culture and Life Review* of an article presenting his father as 'the connecting link of cosmopolitanism in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy in the Soviet academic milieu', he found himself unwillingly involved in debates concerning his father's anti-patriotism during a party meeting at the Institute.³⁸³ Although he received his degree from MGIMO in 1951, he lost his job following the Doctor's Plot in 1953.³⁸⁴

The campaign against cosmopolitanism left a profound mark on MGIMO students' collective memory. The continuous disappearance of both students and teachers made the effect of the Stalinist purges very visible. The publicity of the debates organised in

³⁷⁹ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...' (1948-1953)*, 7.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 187.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 121.

³⁸² Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952)*, 27.

³⁸³ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 235.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

the Komsomol and the primary party organisation had the specific purpose of setting an example to all members of the Institute. Students were encouraged to detect and condemn deviant and unpatriotic behaviour. Yet, as an unforeseen side effect, the campaign against cosmopolitanism became a lesson in how to adapt to the Soviet regime. As one graduate remarked:

The most persevering students were already preoccupied with their future careers in their first year. They had passion for social activities, were keen to flaunt their alleged achievements. We were getting to know each other better and became familiar gradually with the game rules acknowledged in the real career life.³⁸⁵

Developing social skills, adapting discourse according to the situation, dealing with the hierarchy, and ‘manoeuvring’ were political lessons that were not included in the MGIMO curriculum.

In their memoirs, numerous alumni suggest that their education in the context of the Stalinist regime pushed them to interiorise a specific relationship with the Soviet regime and adopt a certain state of mind. Genrih Borovik remembered that one of his classmates sincerely did not understand a paragraph from one of Stalin’s works during a seminar. Yet, when he asked his teacher for further explanation, he received the following answer:

You’re talking absolute nonsense, Miranskij! What does it mean, ‘I didn’t understand’? Comrade Stalin wrote everything perfectly clear. It is impossible not to understand him. You want to delude all of us. You state that you ‘didn’t understand’ Comrade Stalin. But, in fact, you don’t agree with him. So, give it to us straight, ‘I don’t agree’. And now confess where you disagree with Comrade Stalin!³⁸⁶

Miranskij finally answered that he understood everything and took his place. For Borovik and his classmates, the episode was an effective demonstration of the

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 158.

³⁸⁶ Torkunov Anatolij et al., *‘A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...’ (1947-1952)*, 29.

authoritative discourse of Stalin, which was not supposed to be fully understood or, more importantly, questioned by students.

‘Giving the right answer’ during seminars or exams was not an easy task. Students were forced to adapt to the intellectual context: Soviet scholars who had fallen into disgrace during the campaign against cosmopolitanism could not be used as references anymore.³⁸⁷ In 1953, the student Vladimir Spiričev was excluded for Trotskyism, which served as a political lesson for MGIMO students.³⁸⁸ Even though the student had read the classics of Marxism-Leninism thoroughly and quoted Lenin in abundance at his end of dissertation, he was excluded for calling the bureaucracy an obstacle to real communism. It was not until 1956, during destalinisation, that he was able to defend his dissertation at MGIMO.

Another unexpected effect was that the purges sparked a sense of solidarity among students. Nikolaj Bolhovitinov recalled that, in 1951, he considered the criticism against the book *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia* particularly unfair. Leonid Dmitriev recollected in similar terms that he felt a profound feeling of injustice at the public accusations against Mihail Lifšic.³⁸⁹ When her friend and classmate Mihail Zenovič, was condemned for ‘immoral behaviour’ during a Komsomol meeting, Natal’â Babočkina was reminded of her father’s useful advice. He recommended her to act with dignity (*vedi sebâ dostojno*), which meant not seeking to openly challenge the exclusion of her friend while also helping him to address the consequences of this fate.³⁹⁰

This sense of solidarity was important for surviving in the Stalin era. Gregorij Morozov’s memoirs are particularly revealing. He is most well known for being the first husband of Stalin’s daughter. When his marriage was dissolved in 1948, Morozov’s father was immediately arrested and sentenced to seven years in prison. At that time, he had just graduated from MGIMO and had enrolled in a PhD programme at the Institute. He stressed that it was thanks to his friendship with Ūrij Vol’kov, the

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 172.

³⁸⁸ Torkunov and Sergeev, ‘*Saryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...*’ (1948-1953), 20.

³⁸⁹ Torkunov Anatolij et al., ‘*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*’ (1947-1952), 66.

³⁹⁰ Torkunov and Sergeev, ‘*Saryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...*’ (1948-1953), 41.

first deputy secretary of MGIMO's party organisation, that he was able to remain. Indeed, Vol'kov made sure that his friend's situation would not be appear on the agenda.³⁹¹

After experiencing five years at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge, numerous students gradually came to understand the importance of the ties they established with their classmates, those they considered 'ours' (*nashi*).³⁹² Leonid Dmitriev noted that when one of his classmates was suffering from tuberculosis and required antibiotics available only in the USA, he automatically turned to his classmate Sergo Mikoyan for support. Anastas Mikoyan's son soon obtained the medicine necessary to heal their sick colleague. More tragically, Rafaël' Saakov recalled the occasion when his uncle, the head of a can factory in Samarkand and a member of the party bureau's *obkom*, was sentenced to death in 1951.³⁹³ The student reported the situation to members of MGIMO's primary party organisation and asked for the help of his classmate Aleksandr Suhodrev, son of the minister of Justice of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Through Suhodrev's father, he was able to have his uncle's appeal judged in Moscow. The death sentence was lifted.

This long-lasting feeling of togetherness acquired during students' time at the Institute was crucial. It was not based either on common social origins or age groups. What the students were taught was certainly important, but the structure of the curriculum was also particularly significant in expanding a feeling of common identity. The study programme included activities both inside and outside the walls of MGIMO: thus, *meždunarodnik* identity cannot be reduced to expertise based on exclusive knowledge. By ensuring a complete overlap between work and leisure, the Institute's administration and the Communist Party sought to both keep a close eye on student behaviour and impose new ways of thinking and acting. However, many also developed a set of skills not included in the MGIMO curriculum but necessary for finding one's place within the Stalinist regime. It was precisely these social and political skills that were fundamental for the large number of students whose career

³⁹¹ Ibid., 112.

³⁹² Ibid., 53.

³⁹³ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 238.

expectations were nevertheless dashed in the years following their graduation from MGIMO.

PART II

FROM AN ACADEMIC TITLE TO A RECOGNISED SOCIAL CATEGORY: MEŽDUNARODNIKI AND THE BEGINNING OF THE THAW
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From Stalin to Khrushchev, entrusting a new body of people with foreign affairs did instil hesitation. For a group who would sit at the centre of the Soviet diplomatic apparatus during the Cold War, the future success of the *meždunarodniki* was far from predestined in the final years of the Stalin era. Until the second half of the Khrushchev era, MGIMO was just one of the many institutions charged with training cadres for Soviet diplomacy. Tellingly, in 1948, just 118 of the 200 successful applicants enrolled in 1943 graduated from MGIMO; from among them, only 20 *meždunarodniki* were hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁹⁴ In comparison, in 1946, 130 graduates from the HDS joined the Ministry after a study programme lasting only two years.³⁹⁵ The *meždunarodniki* trained at MGIMO were often in competition with graduates from the HDS. The latter group had already obtained degrees from institutions of higher education and benefited from the powerful support networks within the Communist Party they had developed prior to their enrolment.³⁹⁶ Their two or three years of diplomatic training were also more in accordance with the requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, at the beginning of the Cold War, prioritised the recruitment of Oriental language specialists in order to better deal with other communist states. Finally, a long career in Soviet diplomacy was the exception rather than the rule in the 1950s. The human resources (HR) department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued a proactive policy of regularly and systematically replacing the diplomatic corps, just as it had before World War II.³⁹⁷ MGIMO was just one pathway into Soviet diplomacy among many others: the *meždunarodniki*'s knowledge about international relations did not guarantee success.

How did the social position of *meždunarodniki* as a group change within Soviet society from Stalin to Khrushchev? What was the impact of the Thaw on the

³⁹⁴ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 62.

³⁹⁵ Protokoly obših partsobranij i protokoly zasedanij partbûro, Partorganizaciâ Vysšej Diplomaticeskoj Školy MID SSSR, [Minutes of the general party meetings and of the party buro meetings, Party organization of the Higher Diplomatic School] 12/04/1946, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 4, 71.

³⁹⁶ Kašlev, Rozanov, and Šetin, *Diplomatičeskaâ Akademiâ MID Rossii*, 56.

³⁹⁷ Stenograma soobraniâ aktiva partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes of the meetings of the activists of the party primary organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 06/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 294, 91, 111.

meždunarodniki? How were long careers in Soviet diplomacy made possible in a system which had long favoured the systematic replacement of diplomatic agents? These questions are at the heart of the second part of this dissertation.

From 1948, the first graduation of MGIMO students, to 1958, when MGIMO and the Institute for Foreign Trade were merged, the issues of selection criteria and setting up a clear career development system posed real problems. There were major differences in opinion between those who believed that it was necessary to pursue the systematic replacement of the diplomatic corps on the basis of both political experience in the Communist Party and working-class family background and those who claimed that graduates from MGIMO, because of their diplomas and affiliations, could pretend to the same positions and remain at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a long period of time. A third path consisted of giving MGIMO graduates access to less prestigious positions at the Ministry while allocating graduates from the HDS high-status occupations.

It was only after the 20th Congress of Communist Party that the fate of the meždunarodniki was decided. The détente orchestrated by Nikita Khrushchev led to a reduction in the number of institutions charged with training cadres in foreign affairs. The principle of peaceful coexistence with the West sparked a new surge of interest in cadres specialised in Third World countries and international economy: this was marked by the opening of the Academy of Science's Institute of World Economy and International Relations in 1956. This reinforced the position of MGIMO, which became the main breeding ground for Soviet diplomats, and gave its graduates new professional opportunities and resources outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In parallel, new recruitment policies both at MGIMO and the Ministry solved the dilemma of whether to recruit cadres on the criteria of political experience or academic performance: it was decided to promote applicants from MGIMO who had experience in farms or factories, military backgrounds, and demonstrable commitment to the Party.

It took almost 15 years from the foundation of the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge for the meždunarodniki to seize the sphere of foreign affairs, at which point an MGIMO diploma almost bestowed a natural right on the holder to enter the Soviet diplomatic corps. By the time détente blossomed, the meždunarodniki were a

consecrated elite in Soviet society. This meant that they were not only distinct, but also recognised by others and themselves as having the specific abilities required to work in foreign affairs. Long careers in this line of work were finally made possible in the Soviet Union. By the middle of the Khrushchev era, MGIMO alumni had already succeeded in developing powerful and lasting networks by integrating together a wide range of professions related to international affairs. The nodes of these networks ranged from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the party administration in the Central Committee, and also included the Academy of Sciences and powerful press organs like *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

This second part of the dissertation will include two chapters describing the emergence of the *meždunarodniki* as a recognised social category within the Soviet Union.

In the third chapter, I will show why Molotov's aim to train a new body of diplomats within a new educational structure enjoyed only rather limited success in the years following MGIMO's foundation. Only a minority of *meždunarodniki* were enrolled at Narkomindel after graduation. Indeed, a MGIMO diploma meant very little until the end of the 1950s: it designated neither a right to a diplomatic career nor membership of an elite. During late Stalinism, contact with foreign ideas was perceived as particularly subversive, and the Communist Party suspected both MGIMO students and graduates of disloyalty towards the Soviet regime. Campaigns against cosmopolitan ideas had brutal consequences for the Institute and its graduates. Since ensuring a constant turnover in cadres had always been a device for maintaining the Party's control over the Soviet administration, the *meždunarodniki* were very far from being guaranteed a long career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or in other organisations related to international relations until the mid to late 1950s.

The situation of the *meždunarodniki* progressively improved under Khrushchev. In the fourth chapter, I will analyse how principles of peaceful coexistence, as a hallmark of Soviet diplomacy, were linked with the establishment of new recruitment policies both at MGIMO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The recognition attained by the *meždunarodniki* within Soviet society was the result of various factors. Among them was the reduction of the structures in charge of training specialists in foreign

affairs. Furthermore, the resolute action of MGIMO alumni contributed to the maintenance of a distinct elite in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus until the Gorbachev era.

CHAPTER 3

GREAT EXPECTATIONS DASHED: QUESTIONS AROUND THE VALUE OF AN MGIMO DEGREE IN THE LAST YEARS OF THE STALIN ERA

It is difficult to find a MGIMO applicant who did not see himself as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in his own mind. But five years passed. And getting a bit older, we already understood that the luxurious banquet at the Reception House in the presence of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs could be explained only by the fact that Molotov's daughter and 39 other daughters of 'big men' graduated from MGIMO in the same year. [...] Having raised a toast, the Vice-Minister said that of course not all participants of this celebration would become diplomats, but that did not matter.³⁹⁸

MGIMO graduate Leonid Rozanov

Since in the coming years the number of those graduating from MGIMO will be significantly higher than the existing demand for international affairs experts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Higher Education are to be granted the right to send part of the Institute's graduates to work not only in bodies dealing with international issues, but also in other institutions of the state apparatus and public organisations which need personnel with legal, historical, and economic training.³⁹⁹

Vsevolod Stoletov and Andrej Vyšinskij's letter to V. Molotov on 2 October 1951

Between 1948 and 1953, the first generation of MGIMO graduates finally reached the end of a challenging five-year course which had tested both their academic and political skills. *Meždunarodniki* graduated with a sense of excitement and pride: for the majority of them, their years of study had forged a common belief in a singular destiny. Viktor Filatov argues that the Institute gave 'a start in life' (*institut dal putevku v žizn'*),⁴⁰⁰ while Sarkis Sarkisov explains that many graduates truly believed

³⁹⁸ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 122.

³⁹⁹ Pis'mo Stoletova i Vyšinskogo Molotovu, [Vsevolod Stoletov and Andrej Vyšinskij's letter to V. Molotov] 02/10/1951, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1030 pp. 75-81.

⁴⁰⁰ Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 262.

that the ‘time would come for each of us in the grand life’ (*dlâ každogo iz nas pridët svoj čas’ v bol’sjoj žizni’*).⁴⁰¹ This enthusiasm was probably tempered by the fact that very few people understood what a *meždunarodnik* was at the end of the 1940s. Graduate Valerij Mazaev stresses that the term ‘*meždunarodnik*’ was not clear,⁴⁰² while Rëm Krasil’nikov admits that the concrete meaning of this new profession was still obscure (*neponâtnââ professiâ "meždunarodnik"*).⁴⁰³ For many graduates, their enthusiasm would soon vanish. Even though they were prepared to embrace a bright diplomatic career, their great expectations were dashed in the years following their graduation.

The significant gap between the anticipated and actual futures of MGIMO graduates fed into their disappointment. In the final years of the Stalin era, the invention of a new degree related to foreign affairs did not result in the creation of a distinct social category of specialists, which should have logically benefited from the recognition of its specific ability by the Soviet regime. Despite their academic achievements and political involvement, MGIMO graduates soon understood that their degrees would not guarantee them a position of authority in foreign affairs. Focused on discussions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about graduates from MGIMO and the HDS, this chapter is subdivided into three sections which aim to understand why this was the case: to do this, we will look at the value of an MGIMO degree as Stalinism approached its end.

First, in comparison with other graduates holding a diploma attesting specific training in foreign affairs, the *meždunarodniki* came late to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainly because of the length of the study programme at the Institute. The competition between MGIMO and HDS graduates for careers related to foreign affairs clearly weakened the social position of the *meždunarodniki* within the Soviet regime. During the annual active members’ meeting of the party organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Personnel Pëtr Strunnikov stressed the fact that, in contrast to MGIMO, the HDS trained diplomatic experts specialised in Oriental languages. He added that this was precisely this type of cadres that were needed by the Ministry of

⁴⁰¹ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 2*, 2:472.

⁴⁰² Rostislav Sergeev, Igor’ Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 138.

⁴⁰³ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 2*, 2:375.

Foreign Affairs in order to coordinate socialist diplomacy at the beginning of the Cold War.⁴⁰⁴

Secondly, the value of an MGIMO degree was connected with other non-academic criteria: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs required much more than a diploma testifying to technical skills. The expectations of MGIMO students often collided with the suspicion of the Communist Party in the years following the foundation of the Institute. Between 1948 and 1953, the professional situation of the first *meždunarodniki* within Soviet society was highly paradoxical: the Communist Party regularly questioned the loyalty of those it trained at MGIMO. The presence of veterans from occupied territories, the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, and the purge of the Stalinist elite contributed to a climate of general mistrust towards *meždunarodniki*. Gender, family background, and marital status must be taken into account to fully understand what constituted the value of the *meždunarodniki* title during this period.

Thirdly, the Soviet regime also faced social issues relating to whether the children of the Soviet elite should occupy positions of authority; after all, they had not proved their loyalty by long political or military commitment. Strunnikov revealed that there was no clear or stable career development system for either MGIMO graduates or Soviet diplomats in general in the 1950s. This was in large part due to the fact that the dominant pre-war pattern of elite requirement, which was based on working-class social origins and strong political involvement, faced difficulties as new generations came to the fore in Soviet society.

The late arrival of meždunarodniki into diplomatic careers

In early 1949, Ovčinnikov, a functionary at the HR department (*otdel upravleniâ kadrov*), was pleased to announce the striking increase in the number of communists

⁴⁰⁴ Stenograma soobraniâ aktiva partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes of the meetings of the activists of the party primary organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 06/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 294, 123.

at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁰⁵ He indicated that the Ministry would henceforth have good personnel: the operational and management cadres were 100 per cent communist and a large proportion of employees had scientific titles and degrees.⁴⁰⁶ Ovčinnikov had every reason to be glad about this situation: a few days before the personnel party meeting, Minister Molotov himself had stressed the high quality of the diplomats working at the Ministry, underscoring that they were 'totally prepared and politically mature'.⁴⁰⁷ This glowing report from Ovčinnikov is striking when we consider how few MGIMO graduates were employed in Soviet diplomacy. Indeed, six months earlier, in the spring of 1948, only 20 *meždunarodniki* had been hired at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁰⁸ This was absolutely nothing compared to the 1,808 communists affiliated with the primary party organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1949.⁴⁰⁹

In the early Cold War, a strong, steady, and rapid increase characterised the number of both employees and communists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Moscow City Committee's⁴¹⁰ register of MID party members is indicative of the pace of the phenomenon.⁴¹¹ While records from the MID state that the number of communists

⁴⁰⁵ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro i plany raboty p/o otčela kadrov partijnoj organizacii MID SSSR, [Minutes of the party meetings and partyburo meetings and work plans of the HR department of the party primary organization of the MID USSR], 13/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 263, 1.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Protokol II partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR, MID, [Minutes of the 2nd party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 04/01/1949-07/01/49, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 239, 34.

⁴⁰⁸ B. Kurbatov, *op.cit.*, 2004, p.62.

⁴⁰⁹ The 1,808 communists in the records obviously included both communist students and teachers from MGIMO and the HDS. Indeed, prior to 1951, the primary party organisations of these two institutions of higher education were subordinated to the primary party organisation of the MID. The records of the Gorkom logically indicate that, out of the 1,808 communists of the MID, 466 were students and 61 were teachers at institutions of higher education. Even if the 527 teaching or studying at MGIMO and the HDS are subtracted from the total number of communists at the MID, one finds that MGIMO graduates represented only 1.5 per cent of the communists working at the Ministry in January 1949.

⁴¹⁰ Moskovskij gorodskij komitet (Gorkom).

⁴¹¹ Otčet o sostave členov i kandidatov VKP(b) po social'nomu položeniû, rodu zanâtiâ i raspredelenii členov i kandidatov partii po otčel'nym vidam partkoma MID SSSR, [Account about the situation of the candidates-members and members of the CPSU at the MID USSR: social status,

had already doubled to 1,193 in 1947,⁴¹² the party primary organisation recorded 1,611 full members and 197 candidates members in 1949. The register specifies that, out of the 1,808 communists, 655 had a diploma of higher education and 521 had benefited from secondary education.⁴¹³ Among them, one finds 212 engineers, 172 teachers, and 30 economists. The ages of these communists varied greatly: out of 1,808 members, 750 were under 30. The effect of World War II was particularly visible: 614 communists had been admitted to the Party before the war, while 698 persons had become members between 1941 and 1945. In other words, 66 per cent of the members of the MID primary party organisation joined the Party after 1941. As far as nationality is concerned, Russians dominated the local organisation: 1,567 were Russians, 80 were Ukrainians, 36 were Jewish, 34 were Byelorussians, 24 were Armenians, and 16 were Tatars. Last but not least, the MID primary party organisation included 1,122 employees. Five years earlier, there had been only 756 employees at Narkomindel.⁴¹⁴

This steady increase in both the number of employees and Communist Party members was not limited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This increase was reflected mostly in several major organisations related to Soviet diplomacy. Following the reorganisation of the Committee of Information (*Komitet informacii*),⁴¹⁵ which was transferred from the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to the MID in 1949, the structures in charge of the foreign intelligence service also grew in number. The Moscow register of party members indicates that, in March 1948, 697 communists

occupation of the candidates-members and members at the MID party primary organization] 01/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 4, opis' 127, delo 80, 16.

⁴¹² Protokol-stenogramma otčetno-vybornogo partiynogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes and transcripts of the report-election meeting of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 15-16/07/1947, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 184, 1.

⁴¹³ All the indicated figures are from the Moscow Party organization's records: otčet o sostave partorganizacii po partiynomu stažu, obrazovaniû, vozrastu, nacional'nosti i prebyvaniû v drugih partiâh partkoma MID SSSR, [Report about the composition of the party primary organization of the MID USSR in regards to years of experience in the party, education, age, nationality and membership in another party], 01/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 4, opis' 127, delo 80, 20.

⁴¹⁴ Igor' Ivanov, ed., *Očerki istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V treh tomah. T.2* (Moskva: OLMA-Press, 2002), 301–2.

⁴¹⁵ For more about the reorganisation of the foreign intelligence services in the 1940s, see: Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 144.

worked for the Committee of Information.⁴¹⁶ As of January 1949, this number was 1,934, including 1,780 employees.⁴¹⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Trade, where no MGIMO graduates were sent between 1948 and 1951, certainly experienced growth similar to that in the MID and the Information Committee. The Moscow Committee's register indicates that, in January 1951, 2,279 communists worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, including 1,861 employees.⁴¹⁸

When asked about the current situation with the workforce at the Ministry in January 1949, Strunnikov replied optimistically. He admitted that there were still 34 vacant positions in the Ministry's central apparatus and 92 overseas. However, he declared: 'we are often asked, why do we often have empty places in our diplomatic corps? Are we experiencing a lack of diplomatic cadres? The answer is no. We have the people we need.'⁴¹⁹ He explained that no less than 68 diplomats were in reserve and that 190 consultants (*referenty*) would be promoted to higher diplomatic positions in the coming months.

The growth in the number of employees and communists at the MID was mostly due to the pro-active policy of diplomatic training initiated from World War II onwards. As early as 1944, the number of learners (*shlushatel*) at the HDS increased from 26 to 300 thanks to the organisation of four admission periods throughout the year.⁴²⁰ In

⁴¹⁶ Statističeskij otčet o čislennom sostave i dviženii partorganizacii partkoma Komiteta Informacii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, [Statistical account about the composition of the party organizations of the party committee of the Information Committee] March 1948, TSAOPIM, fond 4 opis' 127, delo 88, 1.

⁴¹⁷ Otčet o sostave členov i kandidatov VKP(b) po social'nomu položeniiu, rodu zanâtiâ i raspredelenii členov i kandidatov partii po otdel'nym vidam partorganizacij Partkoma Komiteta Informacii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, [Report about the composition of the candidates members and members of the CPSU at the party organizations of the Information Committee in regards to social status and occupations] 01/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 4, opis' 127, delo 88, 33.

⁴¹⁸ Statističeskij otčet o sostave členov i kandidatov VKP(b) po social'nomu položeniiu, rodu zanâtij i raspredelenii členov i kandidatov partii po otdel'nym vidam partorganizacij Partkoma Ministerstva Vnešnej Torgovli SSSR, [Report about the composition of the candidates members and members of the CPSU at the party organization of the Ministry for Foreign Trade in regards to social status and occupations], 01/01/1951, TSAOPIM, fond 4, opis' 127, delo 81, 13.

⁴¹⁹ Protokol II partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR, MID, [Minutes of the 2nd party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 04/01/1949-07/01/49, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 239, 83.

⁴²⁰ Protokoly obših partsobranij i protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy, 18/10/1944, [Minutes of the party meetings and partyburo meetings of the party organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 1, 69.

1948, 145 learners graduated from the HDS, thus outcompeting MGIMO in this issue during the same year.⁴²¹ In parallel, the successive waves of experienced communists regularly undertaking internal training at Narkomindel progressively eliminated staffing deficits.

Compared to graduates from similar institutions, MGIMO's first cohort arrived late at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since they only graduated in 1948. However, more importantly, the profile of MGIMO graduates was not necessarily the one the Ministry needed at this point in the Cold War.

The main problem that the personnel department faced was not merely one of quantity, but also of quality. Semën Kozyrev, MID party secretary and head of the First European Department, clearly defined the professional profile that the Ministry required. The Ministry lacked diplomats in leading positions, especially advisers (*sovetniki*) and first secretaries (*pervye sekretarii*).⁴²² Ovčinnikov also noted similar findings, adding that the Ministry had to attract scholars and renowned expert-consultants, including in the field of economic diplomacy, as a priority.⁴²³

More importantly, following Mao Zedong's declaration of the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 and a burst of tension in Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned towards the East. The opening of a new field of the Cold War in Asia prompted the governing body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to recruit specialists in Oriental languages. At the beginning of 1950, after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, the Ministry gave high priority to the further development of diplomatic relations with China. As

⁴²¹ Protokoly partijnyh soobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro meetings of the primary party organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], 18/05/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 7b, 44.

⁴²² Protokol II partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR, [Minutes of the 2nd party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR], 04/01/1949-07/01/49, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 239, 36.

⁴²³ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro i plany raboty p/o otdela kadrov partijnoj organizacii MID SSSR, [Minutes of the party meetings and partyburo meetings and work plans of the HR department of the party organization of the MID of the USSR], 13/01/1949, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 263, 2.

Russian scholar Igor' Ivanov notes, this required targeted fast-track training of diplomats in Chinese languages.⁴²⁴ The opening of a trainee school (*Škola stažerov*) at the Soviet embassy in Beijing was to serve this specific purpose. Following Mao's visit to Moscow, this school was endorsed by the MID executive board (*Kollegiâ MID*) on 4 August 1950.⁴²⁵

During a party meeting at the Ministry at the beginning of September 1950, the party member Vas'kov openly criticised Strunnikov for the lack of interest that the personnel department showed in providing staff specialised in the East. He stressed the pressing need for specialists of Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, and the Philippines.⁴²⁶ The most striking thing about his statements is that Vas'kov did not even mention MGIMO as a potential part of the solution. He encouraged the personnel department to become fully involved in the training of specialists at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. He also suggested recruiting graduates from Leningrad University.⁴²⁷

Strunnikov regretted that the *meždunarodniki* had no training in Oriental languages, unlike graduates from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and the HDS.⁴²⁸ Compared to the *meždunarodniki*, the 'scientific workers in international relations' trained at the HDS had a profile more tailored to the specific needs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the Cold War. First, they already had a degree in higher education prior to their enrolment at the HDS, and they also benefited from long experience of management within the Communist Party, at least on a regional level or in the Komsomol.⁴²⁹ During their enrolment at the HDS, this situation gave

⁴²⁴ Igor' Ivanov, ed., *Očerki istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V treh tomah. T.2* (Moskva: OLMA-Press, 2002), 365.

⁴²⁵ Protokol N° 20 Kollegii MID, [Minutes N°20 of the MID Executive board], 04/08/1950, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1033, 4.

⁴²⁶ Stenogramma sobraniâ aktiva partijnoj organizacii MID SSSR, [Minutes of the meeting of the activists of the party organization of the MID USSR], 06-07/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 194, 19.

⁴²⁷ Ibid, 15.

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 123.

⁴²⁹ Protokoly obših partsobranij i protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii Vysšej Diplomaticeskoj Školy, [Minutes of the general party meetings and partyburo meetings of the party

them the right to take a qualifying examination for a candidate degree (*kandidatskij minimum*): several students began writing a PhD dissertation parallel to their studies. Secondly, half of these students had undergone a three-year training course in Oriental languages. Arabic, Persian, Chinese, and Japanese had been taught at the HDS since 1943.⁴³⁰ Thirdly, giving students internships at the Ministry's central apparatus and overseas during their studies⁴³¹ ensured that they were better integrated into the diplomatic corps than the *meždunarodniki*.⁴³²

In contrast with the graduates from HDS, numerous former MGIMO student recalled that they felt they lacked preparation when they started working in Soviet diplomacy. Nikolaj Homutov stresses that he received a strong education in the humanities at MGIMO, but was not prepared for a concrete profession.⁴³³ When he was employed at the MID, Tejmuraz Gordeladze admitted almost the same thing: he lacked the technical knowledge required of a diplomat. Writing a diplomatic memo, drafting a press release, and faithfully transcribing diplomatic negotiations were skills he learnt on the job.⁴³⁴ Just like Homutov and Gordeladze, Valerij Ūr'ev indicates that, after graduation, 'a trial-and-error method' allowed him to learn the basics of Soviet diplomacy.⁴³⁵ However, he soon found that, in the context of the widespread suspicion related to Cold War, the slightest error could take on major proportions for an individual's career. Since any mistake could be interpreted in political terms,

primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], 18/10/1944, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 1, 70.

⁴³⁰ Protokoly obših partsobranij i protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy, [Minutes of the general party meetings and partyburo meetings of the party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], 13/01/1943, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 1, 28.

⁴³¹ Protokoly zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii Vysšej Diplomičeskoj Školy, [Minutes of the partyburo meetings of the party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], 15/05/1945, TSAOPIM, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 3, 39.

⁴³² The idea of introducing an internship at the MID central apparatus in the curriculum of MGIMO fifth year students was only discussed in the end of 1950. Proekt programmy učebno-proizvodstvennoj praktiki studentov IMO, [Projet of introducing a pedagogic and productive internship for IMO students], 25/10/1950, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1033, 43.

⁴³³ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:216.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., 1:55.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 1:237.

dismissal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another diplomatic organisation might be the consequence of a lack of caution.

Aware of the problem of excess personnel at subordinate levels, Strunnikov defended the project validated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to create a clearer distinction between the functions of MGIMO and the HDS.⁴³⁶ In front of his colleagues, he argued in 1950 that the HDS would organise a programme targeting the training of the higher ranks of the Soviet diplomatic corps: secretaries (*sekretarii*), consuls (*konsuly*), and advisers (*sovetniki*). In parallel, MGIMO would be used as a privileged channel to recruit diplomats for the lowest positions: consultants (*referenty*) and attachés (*attaše*).⁴³⁷

In the course of 1950, members of the HDS party organisation had already realised the consequences of the decision taken by the governing body of the MID. Professor Boris Štejn declared:

Comrade Vyšinskij said that ‘the school outlived its usefulness’. This does not mean that the school turns out bad cadres. It is just that there is no more need for providing cadres at an accelerated tempo. And that is the reason which explains the minister’s decision concerning the further existence of the school.⁴³⁸

This important change meant reducing the number of pupils enrolled at the HDS in order to focus on the training of those who would hold key positions in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus.

It would, however, take some time for the reform to take root. The competition between the *meždunarodniki* and the graduates from the HDS over careers clearly

⁴³⁶ Stenograma soobraniiâ aktivâ partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes of the meeting of the activists of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 06/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 294, 122.

⁴³⁷ Ibid, 121.

⁴³⁸ Partijnye sobranii i zasedanii partbûro pervičnoj partorganizacii Vysšej diplomatičeskoj školy, [Minutes of the party meetings and partyburo meetings of the party primary organization of the Higher Diplomatic School], TSAOPIM, 14/04/1950, fond 1733, opis' 1, delo 7v, 93.

weakened the social position of the former. On 24 March 1951, an internal memo ‘about the job placement of MGIMO and HDS alumni’ revealed that the problem of MGIMO graduate unemployment cast a significant shadow over thinking at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴³⁹ Indeed, the number of MGIMO graduates was oversized compared to the needs of Soviet diplomacy.⁴⁴⁰ Over the three previous years, 598 people graduated from MGIMO, 429 more than from the HDS: however, as the aforementioned note indicated, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had recruited only 20 per cent of MGIMO graduates in comparison to 50 per cent of the HDS cohort.

Table 3: The job placement of MGIMO and HDS alumni in March 1951

JOB PLACEMENT	MGIMO	HIGHER DIPLOMATIC SCHOOL
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	127	82
Central Committee of the CPSU		3
Committee of Information	42	26
VOKS	9	7
TASS	33	8
Soviet Information Bureau	19	7
Ministry of State Security	7	
The Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR at the Central Committee	9	
Intelligence Agency at the Central Committee ⁴⁴¹	19	
Press and publishing bodies	45	
State Committee for Radio Broadcasting	49	12
State Committee for Radio Information	45	
GLAVLIT	8	
Ministry of Cinematography		8
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions	25	
Academy of Sciences	34	
Doctoral programme at MGIMO	47	
Other organisations	71	16

⁴³⁹ ‘O raspredelenii vypusnikov IMO i VDSH’, [‘About the job placement of MGIMO and HDS alumni’], 24/03/1951, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1030, 52-53.

⁴⁴⁰ For details about the jobs of MGIMO and HDS graduates in March 1951, see appendix 3.

⁴⁴¹ Glavnoe upravlenie spetsslužby pri CK SSSR.

This internal memo reflects that the distribution of MGIMO graduates was at considerable variance with that envisaged in the discussions between V. Dekanozov, M. Silin, A. Havinson, and Molotov in 1943-44. Out of 598 graduates, only 169 *meždunarodniki* were recruited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). The vast majority did not become diplomats: they instead pursued careers in the Soviet news media. Including those enrolled at TASS, a total of 198 graduates participated in the press, broadcasting, and publishing via positions at the Sovinformburo, the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting, the State Committee for Radio Information, Glavlit, and various press and publishing bodies. Additionally, 81 graduates pursued a scientific career either at the Academy of Sciences or in a PhD programme at MGIMO. To all this, it must be added that 77 MGIMO graduates got their first jobs in the intelligence services, especially in the Committee of Information, the Intelligence Agency at the Central Committee, the Ministry of State Security, and the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR at the Central Committee.

The internal memo pointed out that the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had recruited only 20 per cent of MGIMO graduates was particularly unsatisfactory and demonstrated a lack of interest in the *meždunarodniki*. 71 graduates in the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth were considered to have a job that was quite inappropriate to their specialisation. The memo was also concerned that the Ministry was without news about 47 MGIMO graduates: they had simply disappeared after their graduation.

The problem of MGIMO graduate jobs is all the more revealing when we consider that the first *meždunarodniki* did not necessarily obtain prestigious positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not only did they occupy the Ministry's lowest ranks as consultants (*referenty*) and trainees (*stažëry*), but also none of them were sent to the capitalist countries in which they had specialised, such as France, Spain, Great

Britain, and the USA.⁴⁴² Furthermore, they were not guaranteed a long career in Soviet diplomacy. Mark Vilenskij recalls that there was a very tense atmosphere at the MID in the 1950s, with waves of staff replacements frequently occurring.⁴⁴³ Vilenskij himself was advised to resign because of his Jewish origins during the campaign against cosmopolitanism. He became a journalist after his resignation in 1953.⁴⁴⁴

Table 4: The job assignment of MGIMO graduates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1948 and 1953⁴⁴⁵

Structure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Number of MGIMO graduates
Central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	34
Soviet embassy to China	20
The Allied Commission for Austria	17
The Soviet Control Commission in East Germany	12
Soviet embassies to Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Albania	13
First, third, and fifth departments of the MID central apparatus	6
Press and archive departments of the MID central apparatus	5
Legal department of the MID central apparatus	4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belarus	4
Soviet embassy to Korea	2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kazakhstan	1
Department of the Far East at the MID central apparatus	1
Consular department	1
Soviet embassy to Finland	1

The logic of job assignment at the MID reflected less the specialisations acquired by MGIMO students during their years of study than the priorities of Soviet diplomacy.

⁴⁴² Thanks to the information gleaned from alumni memoirs, it was possible to find out about the employment of 121 MGIMO graduates at the Ministry. See appendix 4.

⁴⁴³ Torkunov and Sergeev, *‘Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...’ (1948-1953)*, 27.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁴⁵ Source: alumni memoirs.

Among the MGIMO graduates sent abroad through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most fortunate were those who had learnt German. Because of the Soviet administration of occupied territories in East Germany and Austria until 1955, a significant contingent of *meždunarodniki*⁴⁴⁶ were recruited as translators at the Allied Commission for Austria and the Soviet Control Commission in East Germany.⁴⁴⁷ Despite their total lack of familiarity with Oriental languages, a significant number of graduates found themselves sent to China and Korea. Last but not least, with the objective of coordinating socialist diplomacy at the beginning of Cold War, a fair number of graduates were sent to people's democracies in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria) or to the ministries of foreign affairs in the Soviet republics (Belarus and Kazakhstan). Job assignments often had little relationship with the skills the *meždunarodniki* had developed during their years of study. The large number sent to China is particularly misleading, as these graduates had no real diplomatic status: they were supposed to receive additional training in Chinese at the Soviet embassy in Beijing in order to become translators.⁴⁴⁸

At the MID, the HR department was very aware of the problems caused by these job assignments. During a party meeting at MGIMO on 16 April 1951, Strunnikov forthrightly condemned the track records of the communists at MGIMO.⁴⁴⁹ Kislov and Tarasov, two *meždunarodniki* who had been presented as the best and brightest of the 1950 cohort, refused to be sent to wartime Korea because they wanted serve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at home. Blaming the MGIMO Partkom for both a serious error in judgement and the loopholes in the 'political education' of the two MGIMO graduates, Strunnikov argued that the *meždunarodniki* had to be prepared to take up any job at the Ministry, independent of their preferences.

⁴⁴⁶ In his memoirs, Anatolij Antonov mentions that 200 MGIMO graduates, including their wives, worked in Vienna until 1955. Unfortunately, we found no way of verifying this number. Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 12.

⁴⁴⁷ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvy-reki...'* (1948-1953), 278.

⁴⁴⁸ Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...'* (1947-1952), 179.

⁴⁴⁹ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] 16/02/51, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 15, 72.

The situations of those MGIMO graduates who did not enter the Soviet diplomatic apparatus were more varied. Deprived of the opportunity to enter the Ministry, numerous *meždunarodniki* were disappointed by their jobs. Anatolij Bolgarev mentions that, like the great majority of his classmates, he was refused the career he had always expected at the MID, which was considered at that time to be the most prestigious diplomatic institution for which to work.⁴⁵⁰ His classmate Ůrij Ivanov emphasised that the first job offer he received was very far from the ambitions he had nurtured during his studies. He recalls:

The MGIMO registrar's office sent us for talks at the Federal Ministry of Justice. We were offered to go to distant towns, mostly in Siberia. We were to take part in the elections with the support of local authorities. But there were already experienced negotiators in our group. They quickly realised that the specialty in our diplomas, lawyer-meždunarodnik, gave us a reason to refuse the proposed jobs.⁴⁵¹

Years of study had instilled a sense of ambition in students that was punctured by the scope of the careers offered during the job assignment process. Ivanov finally accepted, albeit 'without enthusiasm', a job at the legal department of the Soviet Central Bank's foreign transactions division.⁴⁵²

Like Ivanov and Bolgarev, many graduates had to reconcile themselves with the fact that they would not work directly in Soviet diplomacy. The most fortunate were enrolled in powerful press organs, such as TASS, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia*. In comparison, graduates perceived the State Committee for Radio Information, the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting, and VOKS as less prestigious organisations.

Valentin Devinin recalls that the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting was so insignificant in the field of Soviet diplomacy that several MGIMO graduates cynically dubbed the organisation the 'tomb of the unknown journalist'.⁴⁵³ He recalls that:

Despite having diplomas with distinctions, myself and two dozen other graduates got an assignment that was not very prestigious according to the general

⁴⁵⁰ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 30.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 116.

⁴⁵² *Dogovorno-pravovoj otdel Upravleniâ inostrannyh operacij Gosbanka SSSR* Ibid., 117.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., 31; *ibid.*, 248; *ibid.*, 73.

understanding of that time. We were assigned to international broadcasting. Most friends asked with astonishment, ‘What is it?’ And the most easily understandable explanation was ‘It is our “Voice of America”’.⁴⁵⁴

The State Committee for Radio Broadcasting was considered to have little to do either with the skills MGIMO graduates had developed or with foreign affairs. Ūrij Suhanov points out the reasons he was disappointed by his first job at the Committee. He argues:

It was officially considered that a job at Inoradio⁴⁵⁵ was work in the specialty. But, in fact, this was not true for many graduates. Having studied French, I was assigned to the Rumanian editorial office. There was no need for international specialisation there either: the foreign editorial offices of Moscow Radio had to cover the life of the USSR, not foreign policy problems, as there was an institution of political observers for that. So one had to start life from the beginning, rather than continue it, and forget as useless everything that had been studied at the Institute.⁴⁵⁶

Suhanov’s memoirs reveal both the disappointment that graduates felt towards their job assignments and the development of alternative career strategies in the years following graduation. He argues that, being very dissatisfied with his job at the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting, he took the first opportunity to enrol in a PhD programme in order to remain in contact with foreign affairs. This was exactly the same strategy employed by all the Uzbek *meždunarodniki*, who, because they found no job at home in the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided to enrol in a PhD programme in 1950.⁴⁵⁷

The *meždunarodniki* were in competition with graduates from other institutions. Their late arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hampered their integration into the Soviet diplomatic apparatus. Their lack of knowledge in Oriental languages and their confinement to subaltern positions in Soviet diplomacy reduced the scope of their

⁴⁵⁴ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 66.

⁴⁵⁵ Foreign Department of the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting.

⁴⁵⁶ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 2*, 2:506.

⁴⁵⁷ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor’ Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 238.

opportunities. Equally, the widespread suspicion felt towards specialists in foreign affairs meant that the value of an MGIMO degree was highly dependent on non-academic criteria.

*Widespread suspicion towards specialists in foreign affairs: non-academic criteria
and the job assignments of MGIMO graduates*

In 1950, the decision implemented by the MID HR department to draw a sharp distinction between the functions of MGIMO and the HDS was objectively good news for *meždunarodniki*. Admittedly, the HDS was assigned the mission of training diplomats for leading positions at the MID both at home and overseas. However, at the same time, the quota for trained specialists in international relations was significantly reduced; logically, this gradually resolved the problem of excessive numbers of foreign-affairs specialists over the coming years. Nonetheless, a second phenomenon strongly affected the value of an MGIMO degree in the last years of the Stalin era. In job assignment, the use of non-academic criteria such as gender, family background, and the marital stability frustrated the ambitions of numerous MGIMO graduates. The *meždunarodniki* soon discovered that getting and then maintaining diplomatic careers required much more than an MGIMO degree.

Both Vol'f Sedyh-Čekannikov and Vladimir Razmerov stress that the logic of job assignments was not only related to the excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs or the priorities of Soviet diplomacy. The two graduates argue that the jobs assigned to them took into account non-academic criteria based on their personal biographies. Razmerov noted:

It has to be admitted that, in the early 1950s, the assignment of MGIMO graduates to the radio, but not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other solid state and party institutions or national newspapers, was not considered a success. Perhaps there was

something ‘wrong’ in the biographies of the parents of these journalists beginning their careers.⁴⁵⁸

By suggesting that individuals’ biographies were just as important as their academic records in receiving a job, Razmerov makes it clear that MGIMO degrees were extremely dependent on criteria other than academic ones. Sedyh-Čekannikov took the analysis further by arguing that both the MGIMO administration and party primary organisation accumulated compromising documents about students during their studies. This was of paramount importance in the job assignment process. He declares:

The punitive authorities unleashed their fury on students for all the voluntary, and more often involuntary, shortcomings and lapses they had accumulated over five years of study. A variety of damaging evidence, as it is said today, accumulated, too: someone was in the occupied territories, someone was found out to have relatives persecuted for political reasons, etc. Such ‘penalised persons’ were punished during the assignment; of course, they did not have any chance to do postgraduate studies or work at the Central Committee or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were sent to less prestigious organisations such as the All-Union Central Soviet of Trade Unions, the Radio Committees, and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations (VOKS).⁴⁵⁹

Sedyh-Čekannikov clearly recalled a MGIMO classmate he had known since high school. His friend was a war veteran who had been awarded with the prestigious Order of Lenin. Despite his academic and army records, the compromising facts gathered about him at MGIMO meant that he was packed off to teach in distant Kazakhstan after graduation.⁴⁶⁰

The information from the memoirs of students who graduated from MGIMO during the Stalin era seems to corroborate the statements of Sedyh-Čekannikov and Razmerov about the use of non-academic criteria during the job assignment process.

⁴⁵⁸ Vladimir Razmerov’s memoirs are quoted in Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 1*, 1:169.

⁴⁵⁹ Vol’ f Sedyh-Čekannikov are quoted in Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 248.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

Out of the 1,294 MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1953,⁴⁶¹ 245 students received degrees with distinctions (*krasnyj diplom*). However, when considering the 121 graduates who stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruited them after their graduation in the 1950s, one observes that only 27 had distinctions. 22 graduates were veterans and, more surprisingly, only 13 were members of the Communist Party.

To understand the impact of various non-academic criteria on job assignments, gender is a telling example. Regardless of their academic records and social origins, female graduates could not undertake a diplomatic career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1950s. Lûdmila Kosygina was the sole exception to this rule. Yet, she was assigned a job in a department of secondary importance: the MID archives. The past example of Alexandra Kollontai appears to have been forgotten. A considerable number of women were sent to the State Committees for Radio Broadcasting and Information. Several were pushed to renounce their assigned professions in order to follow their husbands in their work outside Moscow. Getting enrolled in a PhD programme after MGIMO was a privileged option for those who sought to avoid downward social mobility. Both Èra Zhukova and Svetlana Molotova began writing a PhD dissertation once they graduated from MGIMO in 1951.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ This figure is found by counting the number of alumni for each year between 1948 and 1953: *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1953'* (Moskva: MGIMO, 1998).

⁴⁶² Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 100.

Table 5: The job assignments of female MGIMO graduates between 1951 and 1953⁴⁶³

JOB PLACEMENT	NUMBER OF MGIMO GRADUATES
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1
State Committees for Radio Broadcasting and Information	8
PhD programme	8
VOKS	1
Soviet Ministry of Culture	1
Library	2
Committee for the Soviet Youth	2
Publishing house	1
The municipal information bulletin of Vladimir	1
Without job placement after their husbands' appointment outside Moscow	3

The use of non-academic criteria was of particular importance given the endemic atmosphere of distrust at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 1950, a year after the delegates of the Second MID Party Conference regarded the staffing situation as satisfactory, members of the Communist Party expressed doubts over the trustworthiness of the newly recruited cadres. Great suspicion hung over the whole diplomatic staff following the appointment of Vyšinskij as minister of Foreign Affairs and the campaign against cosmopolitanism. At the beginning of September 1950, Nikolaj Adyrhaev, counsellor at the MID Far Eastern Department, pointed out that the persistent problem of vacancies at the Ministry was not related to the dearth of specialists, but to scant knowledge about the ministerial staff. He declared: ‘it has been said that we have a lot of vacancies, but they are not filled because people are not known and therefore are not recommended. This situation has not yet changed.’⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶³ Of the 102 women who graduated from MGIMO between 1951 and 1953, information about 29 of them was found in alumni memoirs.

⁴⁶⁴ Stenograma soobraniâ aktivaj partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes of the meeting of the activists of the MID party organization] 06/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 294, 59.

Mass arrivals of new staff at the Ministry reinforced misgivings surrounding those considered insufficiently known and, consequently, potentially guilty.

Ineluctably, rising numbers of specialists within the diplomatic corps pushed the HR department to find and use ways of testing the loyalty of both newly recruited diplomats and those sent abroad. Despite the strong political control exerted over MGIMO students during both their application to the Institute and their years of study, compromising documents were found about the *meždunarodniki* just a few months after their graduations. In answer to Adyrhaev's statements, Nikolaj Sulickij, a diplomat and former second secretary of the Sverdlovsk city committee of the Communist Party, strongly recommended that the personnel department should include both Party and Komsomol organisations when recruiting MGIMO graduates to work at the MID. He stressed that the department had assigned 14 *meždunarodniki* to work abroad without requesting the opinion of the Komsomol committee. They had already received passports, or in some cases had actually left, when compromising documents were finally received by the Ministry.

In support of his argument, he gave two examples of the inopportune facts found about the 14 MGIMO graduates recruited at the MID in 1950:

For example, there was information about Rudakov's misconduct at home and his relatives. Svetličnyj was already prepared to work abroad and submitted the passport without the profile of the Komsomol committee. When the profile was received, it was found that Svetličnyj had been expelled from the Komsomol for non-payment of dues in 1944. During the fact-finding, it turned out that when entering the Institute of International Relations, he had hidden the fact of his expulsion from the Komsomol, fearing that he would not be accepted, and in 1950 he had reported it, because he had been afraid that everything would be revealed beyond his control.⁴⁶⁵

Delving into the past of individuals was considered a standard procedure for predicting the reliability of recruited diplomats. A failure to pay party membership fees (*členskij vzos*), time spent in occupied territories, or having convicted relatives

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 82.

were considered worrying signs of potential treason. However, it was the family background of individuals and their lineage that served as a particularly important guarantee of trustworthiness.

No matter how many years of experience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an individual might have, having a distant relative who had been convicted was considered anathema to the boundless loyalty required by the Communist Party for working at the MID. Čigar'kov, the second secretary of the Department of Near and Middle Eastern countries, was made the second secretary of the USSR diplomatic mission in Syria in May 1950.⁴⁶⁶ It turned out that neither the party nor the personnel department had checked Čigar'kov's past. Through the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party at his birthplace, it was found that his mother, the daughter of a merchant, had been engaged in trade and was thus de-kulakised in 1930. Čigar'kov was called back to Moscow.

The practice of investigating diplomats' relatives was already widespread: the increase in the number of diplomatic staff was an impetus for its further development. Graduate Ůrij Tumanov recalls that he was initially supposed to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when he graduated in 1950.⁴⁶⁷ While preparing for the Soviet diplomatic mission to Bulgaria, he and his family were prevented from leaving Moscow. His father had served as an officer in the Red Army for 25 years, but it was found that his uncle had been sentenced to death and executed in 1937. Deprived of the possibility of working at the MID, Tumanov eventually joined the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting.

Because of the lineage criterion, those MGIMO graduates who were the sons and daughters of the Soviet elite were amongst those most affected by the political purges. Paradoxically, the applicants who had been the most likely to successfully pass the MGIMO entrance examination because of their social origins were the people the most likely to experience downward mobility after graduation. MGIMO students had

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁶⁷ Ůrij Tumanov's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 201.

to face the witch-hunt against cosmopolitanism during their studies and after their graduation. When a member of their family fell into disgrace, the *meždunarodniki* concerned were automatically considered unreliable. The lineage criterion mattered much more than academic records. This played an important role both during job assignments and subsequent career development.

Melor Sturua's trajectory is a case in point. Despite an excellent academic record and privileged social origins, his family's fall into disgrace prevented him from aspiring to a diplomatic career. Following the publication of his father's autobiography, which rehabilitated Georgian political figures persecuted by the Stalin regime, his father was removed from office; Sturua declared that he had no choice but to begin a career in journalism in 1949. He did not match the Ministry's non-academic requirements.

The practice of testing the reliability of graduates through their family backgrounds was relevant for all the institutions dealing with foreign affairs. As already mentioned, Mark Vilenskij and Èduard Rozental' were assigned jobs they soon lost because of their Jewish origins. Ol'var Kakučaâ, the son of a general, and his wife Tamara Česnokova (who had also graduated from MGIMO in 1951) suffered a similar fate. Because of his lineage, both were fired following Lavrentiy Beria's arrest in 1953.⁴⁶⁸ After Kakučaâ's resignation, he asked for a full-time position at the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting. The chief of personnel answered him unambiguously: 'so long as you are not working at a factory, you are a parasite. I do not employ parasites here.'⁴⁶⁹

Relatives of leading figures in the Communist Party or the Soviet state were not really in an enviable position in the 1950s. After their graduation, the fates of Akakiâ Karanadze, son of the minister of the Interior, and Avtandil Ruhadze, nephew of minister of State Security of the Georgian Republic, were connected with the rise and fall of their powerful relatives. After graduation, Karanadze pursued an academic career in Georgia. He moved quickly up the ladder in the local party organisations and

⁴⁶⁸ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 184.

⁴⁶⁹ 'Raz vy ne rabotaete na zavode - govoril kadrovik Ol'varu, - značit vy tuneâdec, a â tuneâdca ne voz' mu.' Ibid.

soon became party secretary at the University of Tiflis: he was therefore party secretary of one of the most important Tiflis committee districts (*rajkom*). However, when, in 1952, his father was arrested on charges of espionage on behalf of Turkey, he had to abandon his political ambitions.⁴⁷⁰ After his graduation, Ruhadze occupied an important position in the state security organs of the Georgian Republic until the execution of his uncle in 1953: he had no choice but to work as an employee in a Moscow bookshop.⁴⁷¹

The professional trajectories of Ninnel' Goremykina, Redžinal'd Dekanozov, and Èra Zhukova were also associated with the fates of their parents as Khrushchev took over from Stalin. After her father's arrest in 1951, Goremykina was informed that she would not be assigned a job after graduation. After being rejected on numerous occasions, the only work she could find was proofreading in a Moscow typography.⁴⁷² Following his father's execution, Dekanozov encountered difficulties in his career. In a letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated 31 December 1953, Attorney General Roman Rudenko and Minister of the Interior Sergej Kruglov proposed the introduction of movement restrictions for the relatives of repressed leading figures, such as Lavrentiy Beria, Vladimir Dekanozov, Vsevolod Merkulov, and Sergo Goglidze.⁴⁷³ Dekanozov, along with his mother, wife, sister, and brother in law, were literally banned from Moscow, Leningrad, Tiflis, and the Caucasus. Increased supervision by the security services was imposed on those considered to be too close to enemies of the people. For Zhukova, troubles began after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party. Just after defending her PhD thesis in law under the supervision of Professor Vsevolod Durdenevskij, the radical change in her father's position directly threatened her own early career. She argues that it was only through the support of Professor Sergej Krylov that she was able find a job in academia.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷⁰ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 62.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 63.

⁴⁷² Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 51.

⁴⁷³ Delo Beria, [Beria's personal file] 31/12/1953, RGASPI, fond 17, opis' 171, delo 474, 99-105.

⁴⁷⁴ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 100.

Just as with the criteria of gender and lineage, individual acts mattered too. Lev Moskvín recalled that his friend Volodâ Nogovicyn had been found in the possession of forbidden books by Nikolaj Buharin and Aleksej Rykov.⁴⁷⁵ Although this had no immediate consequences for his graduation from MGIMO, this information was recorded in his personnel file. Nogovicyn would be among the first MGIMO graduates to be fired when staff cuts were made at the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting.

Surveillance also extended to individuals' families and acquaintances. A few months before he was forced out of power at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Molotov himself asserted that ministerial staff had to be supervised both as a group and individually. He declared:

The party committee should help management figure out what kind of worker this or that person is, why he behaves badly, does not work, what kind of environment he lives in, including his family and acquaintances, who the comrades around him are, and why they do not pay attention to it [inappropriate behaviour]. Party work will not include influence only on this person, but also on his environment and those comrades who either keep silent or condone these shortcomings.⁴⁷⁶

In retrospect, his statements were tragically ironic. Accused of Zionism, Molotov's wife Polina Žemčužina was sentenced to five years in a labour camp just a few months before he was removed from the office.

In the attempt to test the loyalty of the ministerial staff, focusing on family bonds presented several advantages. Firstly, the HR department could check through family members the answers given in the biographies that diplomats had to write when recruited by the MID. Strunnikov mentioned that summoning the family members of MID functionaries was a useful device for obtaining complementary information. He declared:

We have a lot of gaps: we don't check personnel enough, there have been few requests to organisations recently, conversations are not being recorded etc.

⁴⁷⁵ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:408.

⁴⁷⁶ Vystuplenie V.M. Molotova na partijnoj konferencii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Transcript of the speech of V.M. Molotov at the party conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] , 06/01/1949, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 91.

Kasenikina was sent abroad. When her sister, living in Moscow, was called in, it was found that one of Kasenikina's sisters was in England, another was in Turkey with a Frenchman, and the third was arrested, and her husband was arrested too. Was it possible to find out all of this beforehand? Yes, it was.⁴⁷⁷

Secondly, family stability and a good character enabled the HR department to ensure that diplomats would not be tempted to flee the Soviet Union during their missions. Nikolaj Leonov recalls that, a few months before his graduation, he and four other MGIMO students were embroiled in a sex scandal. While he had been initially assigned a job at the MID because of his excellent academic results and political record as a komsomol organiser (*komsorg*), he was summoned to the minister's office. Because of the scandal, Vyšinskij informed him that he could not hope for more than becoming a schoolteacher in Siberia.⁴⁷⁸ The HR department looked askance at divorce too. Ūrij Alimov stressed that his divorce meant he was never recommended for a job overseas again: he remained in a low-level position at the MID archives for many long years.⁴⁷⁹

Thirdly, the families of diplomats were under scrutiny because the HR department aimed wanted to provide political training for diplomats' wives and children. Strunnikov argued that the personnel department had to put forward an initiative to conduct educational work among the wives of diplomats: 'the reality is that there is an urgent need to continue to work with members of diplomats' families. This work completely stopped for unknown reasons, but it should be resumed.'⁴⁸⁰

This control also encompassed those children of the diplomatic corps who remained in boarding schools supervised by the MID in Moscow. In a letter to Georgij

⁴⁷⁷ Protokoly sobranij partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov Ministerstva inostrannyh del SSSR, [Minutes of the meetings of the party organization of the MID HR department] 31/01/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 313, 30.

⁴⁷⁸ Torkunov Anatolij et al., '*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*' (1947-1952), 192.

⁴⁷⁹ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 11.

⁴⁸⁰ Stenograma soobraniâ aktiva partijnoj organizacii Ministerstva inostrannyh del, [Minutes of the meeting of the activists of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 06/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 294, 3.

Malenkov dated 24 June 1950, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Nikolaj Mihajlov related the situation in the boarding schools. He outlined that eight boarding schools instructed 934 children of Soviet citizens working abroad. The schoolchildren were between 7 and 19 years of age, and two boarding schools were directly supervised by the MID. Mihajlov argued that efforts must be taken to ensure that the children of diplomats were never subverted by bourgeois ideology because of their parents' presence overseas. He stressed:

Some educators often ignore the misunderstanding of the socio-economic structure of bourgeois states by pupils who were abroad, they do not help children to see the true nature of bourgeois culture and morals, do not instil a sense of Soviet patriotism enough in children.⁴⁸¹

Control was therefore to be imposed on several generations.

In the atmosphere of political vigilance that permeated the MID in the 1950s, it was difficult for a specialist in foreign affairs not to be found guilty of something. Having convicted relatives, possessing forbidden literature, or making a mistake interpreted by authorities as a political act all affected the value of an MGIMO degree. The inflation in the numbers of Soviet diplomatic staff went hand in hand with higher levels of suspicion against all those who dealt with foreign affairs. However, at the turn of the 1950s, the worth of an MGIMO degree was also weakened by the larger social problem of the emergence of a new generation.

Facing generational change in Soviet society

In the very last years of the Stalin era, members of the HR department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed uncertainty over the future outlook of the diplomatic services. They faced a dilemma: on the one hand, the continuous renewal of

⁴⁸¹ Pis' mo Malenkovu G.M o položenii del v škol' nyh internatah dlâ detej, roditeli kotoryh rabotaût za granicej, [Letter to Malenkov about the situation in the boarding schools for the children whose parents are working abroad] 24/06/1950, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1029, 111.

diplomatic personnel had always been a useful device for the Communist Party to keep tight control over the MID administration, but, on the other hand, the ministerial staff consisted entirely of members of the Communist Party. Both the long-term presence of experienced cadres with the arrival of a new wave of young specialists raised novel questions: would it be necessary to carry out mass renewal of the diplomatic staff in the context of higher international tensions with the West? Or would it be more relevant to promote internally the experienced officials already present by implementing clear career structures? MGIMO graduates posed a specific problem. They had received training entirely devoted to foreign affairs. However, the youngest *meždunarodniki* lacked political experience in a system which had always valued social origins and political involvement as pre-conditions for accessing the leading positions within Soviet society.

Endemic distrust and the excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs led the HR department directed by Strunnikov to prefer to embark on a new wave of replacements following the nomination of Vyšinskij as minister of Foreign Affairs. The records of the HR department of the Ministry's Party Committee for 1949 and 1950 are revealing about the scale of this phenomenon.⁴⁸² In 1949, 512 diplomatic agents were sent abroad, while 603 persons returned to the USSR. In 1950, 428 were sent overseas and 326 called back to the Soviet Union.

In September 1950, Strunnikov declared that the MID central apparatus was overcrowded and announced the pressing need to dismiss 50 people.⁴⁸³ Ten departments were affected by this downsizing. The department of Balkan countries was forced to part ways with ten of its employees, while the department of the Near and Middle East was judged to have a surplus of 13 people. The Soviet diplomatic corps abroad was not spared. Despite years of experience working in Soviet diplomacy, Konstantin Mikhajlov, Nikolaj Novikov, and Ivan Bakulin were fired

⁴⁸² All the indicated figures are from: Stenogrammy sobranij aktiva, Partorganizaciâ Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del, [Minutes of the meeting of the activists of the party organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 06/09/1950-07/09/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis'1, delo 294, 91.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 112.

following their return to the USSR.⁴⁸⁴ As a logical result of mass replacement, Strunnikov identified 165 vacancies in Soviet diplomatic missions overseas.⁴⁸⁵

However, in September 1950, this policy did not produce consensus. While Strunnikov announced a new wave of replacements within the diplomatic staff, several MID functionaries stressed the need to consider diplomatic careers from a long-term perspective. They raised the question of establishing a clear policy framework to guide diplomatic careers in the coming years. During the party meeting, the statements of the communist Rebanè summed up the situation very well. Criticising Strunnikov for reducing MID HR policy to a mere list of figures regarding the scale of the replacements, he blamed the chief of personnel for ‘throwing the baby out with the bath water’.⁴⁸⁶ According to him, the core of the diplomatic cadres remained out of sight of HR policy. Rebanè’s criticism, which was frequently harsh, wanted to establish that the HR department should give priority to the development of careers for experienced cadres.

Rebanè was not alone in this sentiment. The topic of career development had long been put to one side by the HR department. In 1943, the introduction of diplomatic ranking enabled the establishment of a hierarchy in the MID central apparatus and abroad.⁴⁸⁷ Still, several MID functionaries stressed that there were no explicit career trajectories which made clear the pathway from one diplomatic rank to another. In this respect, communist Gusarov recalled: ‘our former chief Comrade Mikhajlov condemned comrades who raised the issue of ranking: in a good humour he liked to joke, “Well, your hair is already grey, and you are still an attaché”’.⁴⁸⁸

During the same party meeting, the communist Perfil’ev echoed both Gusarov’s and Rebanè’s statements by stressing the urgent need for defining clear prospects for those diplomats who had remained for many years at the same position within the diplomatic apparatus. He based his argument on the situation in Department 10, which was dedicated to the Far East, declaring:

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 115.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., 54.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 50-51.

There is a category of people in Department 10 who work as trainees for one or two years, and some of them do the work of a senior assistant. The situation with assistants is not good either: they are advisors (*referenty*) for five years or more. It seems to me that if the department heads paid more attention to cadres, this would never happen. If a person works as a trainee or an assistant, the human resources department needs to pay attention to it: if he does not perform his duties, he should be dismissed, but if he works well, he should be promoted, for example, a trainee to an assistant or a senior assistant.⁴⁸⁹

Gusarov took the analysis further. He stressed the need to rationalise the management of diplomatic careers, but also added that the underlying and permanent feeling of doubt towards agents of Soviet diplomacy complicated the task. He revealed that Department 10 did not have enough personnel; however, when a new functionary arrived, the issue of his recruitment was discussed for three months. He stated: 'you see, someone saw him drunk somewhere in the street, but nobody knew where and when exactly. However, it was enough for the heads of Department 10 to resist the recruiting of that comrade.'⁴⁹⁰

Without putting into question the principle of vigilance over the recruitment of cadres for the Ministry, he defended the idea that doubts about diplomats had to be based on concrete and serious evidence. Rumours could not paralyse the HR policy at the MID indefinitely.

For Perfil'ev, Gusarov, and Rebanè, the situation of experienced cadres at the Ministry was unsatisfactory. However, assigning jobs to the new graduates from MGIMO also raised questions. Perfil'ev denounced the absurdity of the recruitment of *meždunarodniki* at the MID:

I think that the assignment of Institute graduates is not always rational in terms of the knowledge of languages. There was a small group of individuals in MGIMO this year who studied Swedish and specialised in Scandinavia in their final-year

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., 49.

dissertations. These students were sent to Germany, but two assistants with German and one with French were sent to our department. The person who graduated from MGIMO and only knew French was sent as an interpreter to the Åland Islands, although maybe only the governor of the region studied French once: the whole population speaks Swedish.⁴⁹¹

In terms of establishing a stable career path at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MGIMO graduates raised a specific problem for the HR department. To a certain extent, this problem had very concrete consequences for the daily lives of MGIMO students until Stalin's death. Within the MGIMO primary party organisation, the admission of the youngest students to the Communist Party regularly generated debates about the place of the new generation of specialists within Soviet society.

In one respect, the enrolment of veterans at MGIMO enabled the HR department to postpone the problem raised by the renewal of the Soviet diplomatic corps. Military experience had been incorporated into pre-war patterns of elite requirement by substituting political experience for military honours. Thanks to the mass admission of veterans into the Communist Party, this strategy did not fundamentally upset a social order based on working-class origins and individual political commitment in the years following World War II.

However, because of the gradual diminution of veterans enrolled at MGIMO, the question of how to test the political value and merits of the youngest students soon arose. As was already mentioned, out of the 305 students enrolled at MGIMO in 1948, only 43 were veterans.⁴⁹² On 1 November 1950, discussions around the admission of Ūrij Ostrovitānov to the Communist Party were emblematic of the debates raised by this issue.⁴⁹³ Ostrovitānov was born in 1925 and had been a member of the Komsomol since 1941. Following his graduation from MGIMO, he was

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁹² Torkunov and Sergeev, *‘Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...’ (1948-1953)*, 7.

⁴⁹³ Protokoly partijnyh sobrannij i zasedanij partbūro pervičnoj partorganizacii meždunarodnogo ěkonomičeskogo fakul'teta MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the primary party organization of the MGIMO faculty of international economy], 01/11/1950, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 12, 37.

admitted into the Institute's PhD programme. Members of the Party Bureau were divided about Ostrovitânov: the discussion revolved around whether the PhD candidate deserved admission to the Communist Party. The communists Kuročkin and Melešin argued that the members had to refuse the student's application due to the fact that he neither served in the Soviet army nor worked in a factory during World War II. Vorobov and Šarov, members of the Party bureau, justified the admission of Ostrovitânov on other grounds. Vorobov argued that the PhD student had been released from conscription, while Šarov stressed the student's impressive academic marks and his devotion to the daily political tasks assigned by the party organisation. Despite three members voting against and three abstaining, Ostrovitânov's admission to the Communist Party was approved with 39 votes in favour.

Discussions around Ostrovitânov's application were symptomatic of the problems raised by the changing nature of the MGIMO student body. During a visit to MGIMO on 16 February 1951, Strunnekov emphasised that the lack of political experience among students was a great challenge for the HR department.⁴⁹⁴ That same month, Director Verešagin announced that students' political training was to be the main focus of attention for the higher levels of the Communist Party. Due to the lack of 'life experience' of the majority of MGIMO's students, he stressed the pressing need to compensate for this deficiency. He declared that only physical labour and the fulfilment of political tasks could make up for the lack of life experience and therefore make it possible to check the quality of the students.⁴⁹⁵

To a certain degree, one can observe the intellectualisation of the political tasks required from students by the MGIMO primary party organisation. Rigorous knowledge of the classical canon of Marxism-Leninism, exposing people in Moscow factories to current international events during propaganda activities, or spending a few months in a kolkhoz had little to do with the experiences of the first generation of

⁴⁹⁴ Stenogramma obšego partiynogo sobraniâ partiynoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 16/02/51, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 15, 70.

⁴⁹⁵ Protokoly partiynyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partorganizacii meždunarodnogo èkonomičeskogo fakul'teta MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro meetings of the primary party organization of the MGIMO faculty of international economy], 10/02/51, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 18, 2.

communists, who had attained upward mobility thanks to factory labour and lengthy political involvement in the 1930s. In a telling example, MGIMO veterans were not necessarily the most at ease with political subjects like the history of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. They had life experience but often had difficulties understanding the so-called basics of Marxist ideology.⁴⁹⁶

In the 1950s, the right strategy to be adopted towards the shifting character of the student body was not clear. On 28 February 1952, during a party meeting entirely devoted to the improvement of MGIMO political training, the communist Smirnov announced that the Moscow District Committee (*rajkom*) refused to approve the admission of 81 candidate members to the Communist Party as requested by the MGIMO primary party organisation.⁴⁹⁷ Six applications had already been rejected by the Rajkom organisation, and 75 applicants were to be subjected to additional verifications. Smirnov explained that, unfortunately, the upper levels of the Communist Party judged MGIMO political training to be very unsatisfactory since it failed to provide a replacement for life experience.

In the wake of Stalin's death, MGIMO graduates experienced years of disappointment. In response to the internal memo 'about the placement of MGIMO and HDS alumni', Minister Vyšinskij seemed to call into question the very value of MGIMO degree even further. He made clear that a degree could not guarantee MGIMO students access to a career in foreign affairs.

In a letter to Molotov on 2 October 1951, Vyšinskij and Stoletov stated that MGIMO graduates often occupied inappropriate positions given their training.⁴⁹⁸ Indeed, they indicated that the excessive numbers of graduates, especially from the MGIMO law faculty, had caused high unemployment rates among the lawyer-meždunarodniki.

⁴⁹⁶ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 08/10/51, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 15, 207.

⁴⁹⁷ Stenogramma, doklad i rešenie partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes, transcript of the report speech and decision of the party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] 28/02/51, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 22, 84.

⁴⁹⁸ Pis'mo Stoletova i Vyšinskogo Molotovu, [Stoletov's and Vyšinskij's letter to Molotov], 02/10/1951, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1030, 75-81.

Surprisingly, Stoletov and Vyšinskij did not call for a reduction in the number of students enrolled at MGIMO, but neither did they ensure wider access for *meždunarodniki* to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or other international organisations. By proposing to introduce a new set of seminars dedicated to ‘administrative and farm law’ (*administrativnoe i kolhoznoe pravo*) and ‘Soviet construction and management’ (*sovetskoe stroitel'stvo i upravlenie*), they conceded that MGIMO graduates had to be prepared to occupy positions not related to foreign affairs.⁴⁹⁹

Vyšinskij and Stoletov defended a project that seemed very unlikely to satisfy the career interests of MGIMO students. They explained:

Due to the fact that in the coming years the number of graduating from MGIMO will be significantly higher than the existing demand for international affairs experts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Higher Education are to be granted the right to send part of the Institute's graduates to work not only in bodies dealing with international issues, but also in other institutions of the state apparatus and public organisations which need personnel with legal, historical, and economic training.⁵⁰⁰

After years of hesitations about the worth of an MGIMO degree, Vyšinskij aimed to provide a legal basis for depriving students of the right to gain a diplomatic career. The role of MGIMO as a breeding ground of Soviet diplomacy was questioned.

In the 1950s, the title ‘*meždunarodnik*’ meant very little: it signified neither a right to a certain position in foreign affairs nor a distinct and separate social group. The excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs and the weight of non-academic criteria threatened the social position of graduates. The expectations of MGIMO students, who anticipated a logical career path in Soviet diplomacy after graduation, were clearly dashed, and the upper levels of the Communist Party did not know how to manage the problem of the rise of a new generation within the Soviet Union. *Meždunarodniki* were not inherently an elite; indeed, the children of the Soviet elite

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

who had graduated from MGIMO were especially affected by the political purges. This situation raises questions about when and how the *meždunarodniki* became a social category. This process began after Stalin's death in March 1953, when this group finally benefited from social recognition of its abilities.

CHAPTER 4

FROM CRISIS TO RECOGNITION: MEŽDUNARODNIKI AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

1953. The year of I. V. Stalin's death. The year of our graduation. And 'everything was in confusion in the Oblonsky house'. By the time of our assignment, N. S. Khrushchev had begun the purge of Stalin's state apparatus. This manifested itself particularly in the mass layoffs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Committee for State Security, Intourist, the departments of foreign relations of several ministries and research institutions, and the foreign departments of Radio and Television and other media; in other words, at organisations that mostly employed our graduates. As a result, none of the MGIMO graduates got any offer of employment that year.⁵⁰¹

MGIMO graduate Nikolaj Kanaev

When I worked in London, there were two more of our classmates working there too: the correspondent of *Pravda* Gennadij Vasil'ev and an employee of an international organisation Andrej Žudro. We met often and at any time were willing to give each other a helping hand in professional and everyday matters.⁵⁰²

MGIMO graduate Vladimir Ivanov

For the MGIMO graduating class of 1953, the very first consequence of Stalin's death was the cancellation of the job assignment process in June. Concerned about gaining the upper hand in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus, the new First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev demanded a new wave of layoffs at the MID. The evidence suggests that the hopes of MGIMO graduates of reaching the MID and more generally a career related to foreign affairs faded away still further. The number of those who joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was low in 1953: only 28 graduates joined upon graduating.⁵⁰³ In the previous year, this figure had been twice

⁵⁰¹ Torkunov and Sergeev, '*Staryj dom u Moskvy-reki...*' (1948-1953), 191.

⁵⁰² Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va* Tom 2, 2:351.

⁵⁰³ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 93.

as high, with 56 *meždunarodniki* recruited by the MID.⁵⁰⁴ The downsizing of the whole Soviet state apparatus clearly undermined the position of the *meždunarodniki*. In 1954, in order to tackle the excessive number of specialists involved in international relations, a project was implemented by the MID to introduce a second professional speciality for half of all MGIMO students: they would be trained to become high school teachers of Western languages. Disappointment was high.⁵⁰⁵

Within a few years, however, the employment situation of *meždunarodniki*, changed significantly: between 1954 and 1958, their professional situation radically improved. Important diplomatic changes in relation to the West (the so-called policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’) and the Soviet Union’s growing interest in third-world countries were the prerequisites for a reassertion of the worth of the *meždunarodniki*. 1954 was a particular turning point. The merger between MGIMO and the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies (MIOS), which led to the expulsion of a thousand students, provoked an unexpected crisis, the solution of which resulted in a compromise situation over the next few years. In exchange for a higher enrolment rate of members and candidate members of the Communist Party at MGIMO, the *meždunarodniki* were guaranteed wider access to careers connected with diplomacy.

When comparing the merger between MGIMO and MIOS in 1954 and the one completed with the Institute of Foreign Trade in 1958, the contrast in terms of *meždunarodniki* job placement is particularly striking. The merger in 1958 did not include a reduction in the size of the MGIMO student body; rather, it clearly reinforced the upper hand of *meždunarodniki* vis-a-vis graduates from the Higher Diplomatic School, since MGIMO graduates gained the opportunity to choose from a wide range of new professions related to foreign trade. Furthermore, half of them graduated with a speciality in Oriental languages.

The implementation of *détente* in several new institutions, including international organisations, the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and research institutions linked to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, would also have a

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ *Prepodavatel' srednej školy so znanie inostrannogo âzyka. Ūrij Bulatov, ‘Diplomatiâ. Načalos’ vse s odnogo fakul'teta MO.’, [Diplomacy. It all begin with one faculty of international relations] Meždunarodnaâ žizn’*, no. 11 (2003): 157.

decisive impact on the fate of the *meždunarodniki*. This new institutional context not only provided new economic resources for graduates and gave them access to career-related privileges, but also opened new pathways within the Soviet elite. By using the strong ties they had developed at MGIMO, ties that, as we have seen, far exceeded the framework of common expertise in international relations and were not just about common social origins, the *meždunarodniki* would soon succeed in both dominating a wide range of professions and developing powerful and lasting networks.

Focused on the impact of the Thaw on the social position of *meždunarodniki*, this fourth chapter is subdivided into four sections which together aim to understand how, after 15 years of existence, MGIMO was finally recognised as the main breeding ground for Soviet diplomats.

Firstly, I will stress that Stalin's death in 1953 did not immediately improve the situation of *meždunarodniki* within the Soviet Union; indeed, the opposite was the case. In 1954, the merger between MGIMO and MIO long supported by Molotov finally allowed the institution to train cadres for both the West and the East. However, the expulsion of 1,000 students as a consequence of the merger resulted in a major crisis. Student mobilisation against the project reflected a major challenge in making a MGIMO degree valuable in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, one that was tackled by guaranteeing access to diplomatic careers.

The launch of a proactive all-union policy of affirmative action for working-class children (the so-called policy of 'polytechnisation') in 1955 had important consequences for MGIMO students. By making access to major diplomatic positions dependent on proletarian experience, the Soviet regime established standardised and clear patterns of upward social mobility. This policy solved the problem of a lack of political experience among MGIMO students raised by the MID HR Department during the Stalin era by directly tackling the issue of generational turnover.

Thirdly, I will argue that the blossoming of *détente* had a determining effect on the fate of the *meždunarodniki*. Between 1954 and 1958, one observes a diminution in the number of institutions dedicated to training specialists in foreign affairs, but also the opening of new diplomatic institutions. The policy of 'peaceful coexistence' thus became institutionalised. The new set of institutions enabled *meždunarodniki* to gain more career opportunities, especially in academia and international organisations.

It was in the specific international and domestic context of the Thaw that the ties which MGIMO graduates had fostered during their years of study particularly mattered. As already mentioned, *meždunarodniki* confronted more difficulties than HDS graduates when attempting to gain access to the MID during the Stalin era. However, in the final section, I will describe how MGIMO graduates were incorporated into a wider network of institutions related to foreign affairs that was not limited to the MID: this was crucial for guaranteeing their success in Soviet society. By gaining positions at several institutions during the Thaw, they were able to help their classmates successfully access key positions of authority and, more importantly, remain at the very core of the diplomatic apparatus.

Students on strike: a struggle to establish the value of an academic degree in the post-Stalin Soviet Union

After three decades of Stalin's monopoly on near-absolute power, Nikita Khrushchev's appointment as the first secretary of the Communist Party was a major turning point in Soviet history, one which could not fail to have an impact on the fate of the *meždunarodniki*. Holding strong after his victories over Lavrentiy Beria in 1953 and Georgij Malenkov in 1955, Khrushchev hastened to further consolidate and increase his control over the state apparatus. Through the appointment of loyal comrades to key positions in the Soviet state, especially in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he progressively rid himself of those leading figures of the Stalin regime whose legacy was considered too cumbersome.⁵⁰⁶ However, this takeover was not restricted to Stalin's senior statesmen. It was a general movement to strengthen the authority of the Communist Party over the state apparatus. As the historian Moshe Lewin notes, 'one of Khrushchev's first professed objectives had been to restore the

⁵⁰⁶ Rudolf G. Pikhoia, Arkadi Vaksberg, and Benoît Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir: Quarante Ans D'après-Guerre Tome I* (Longueuil; Montigny-le-Bretonneux: Kéruss, 2007), 230.

pre-eminence of the party – in the first instance, of its apparatus – in order to make it an instrument of his own power.’⁵⁰⁷

After his return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following Stalin’s death, Molotov initiated a new reform of the MID, aiming to downsize the ministerial staff. An order given by Molotov on 15 September 1953 implied a reduction of the workforce and yet another wave of replacements in the diplomatic corps.⁵⁰⁸ Just as with the replacements that occurred after Vyšinskij’s appointment in 1949, the policy was aimed at strengthening the control of both the minister and the Communist Party over the definition of Soviet diplomacy. Among the most important nominations from the Communist Party were the appointments of Leonid Il’ičev, chief editor of *Pravda*, as head of the MID press department and member of the MID executive board, Ūrij Andropov as the head of the fourth European department, and Mihail Zimânin, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, as a member of the MID executive board.⁵⁰⁹ Andrej Gromyko left his post as Soviet ambassador to Great Britain to become the first vice minister at the MID: Molotov also called back Valerian Zorin from New York to become one of his vice ministers. As for Vyšinskij, he held the position of permanent Soviet representative to the United Nations.⁵¹⁰

On 25 November 1953, a party meeting featuring communists from the HR department sought to identify what had to be done to meet the remaining objectives in replacing the diplomatic staff.⁵¹¹ The symbolic firing of Chief of Personnel P. Strunnikov from the MID a couple of months before reflected the pace of change at

⁵⁰⁷ Moshe Lewin, *The Soviet Century*, ed. Gregory Elliott, 1st edition (London; New York: Verso, 2005), 226.

⁵⁰⁸ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID, [Minutes of the party meetings and meetings of the buro of the MID HR party organization], 25/11/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 448, 94.

⁵⁰⁹ Zimânin soon replaced Andropov as the head of the fourth European department when the latter was named Soviet ambassador to Hungary in 1954. Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 384.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., 383.

⁵¹¹ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID, [Minutes of the party meetings and meetings of the buro of the MID HR party organization], 25/11/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 448, 94.

the ministry.⁵¹² In accordance with the minister's order, at least half of the vacancies open on 1 September in missions abroad were supposed to be filled by 1 December. Molotov's order concerned major Soviet embassies, especially those in the UK, the USA, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. On 1 September, these offices had 118 vacancies: 52 vacancies had been filled by 25 November, i.e. 44 per cent.⁵¹³

The downsizing of the diplomatic staff applied above all to the central apparatus. In contrast, the number of diplomatic agents overseas increased. About 230 new posts were introduced in foreign offices after the publication of Molotov's order, including 69 posts for diplomatic personnel. In parallel, a significant number of employees were recalled to study at the HDS. Thus, by 15 November, the number of vacancies had increased to 155.⁵¹⁴

In January 1955, Molotov announced that the measures already undertaken were expected to save 4.5 million roubles.⁵¹⁵ The waves of replacements subsided over the following years. In March 1956, 500 people had been appointed to foreign offices over the preceding eight months, and a further 300 were employed in the following three months.⁵¹⁶ In July 1957, a functionary from the HR department announced that the 'MID apparatus has been significantly updated over recent years'.⁵¹⁷ He declared that 36 new workers had arrived in the HR department, i.e. half of its staff. Five department heads were replaced, the department of the Americas was almost

⁵¹² In August 1953, Ovčinnikov mentioned that P. Strunnikov had been fired suddenly, without the functionaries of the HR department knowing exactly why. *Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID*, [Minutes of the party meetings and meetings of the buro of the MID HR party organization], 14/08/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 448, 38.

⁵¹³ *Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID*, 25/11/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, [Minutes of the party meetings and meetings of the buro of the MID HR party organization], opis' 1, delo 448, 94.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁵¹⁵ *Vystuplenie V.M Molotova na partijnom sobranii MID SSSR*, [Transcript of V.M Molotov's speech at the party meeting of the MID USSR], 10/01/1955, RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1027, 125.

⁵¹⁶ *Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo būro i partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov*, [Minutes of the meetings of the buro and the party meetings of the MID HR party organization], 30/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 538, 11.

⁵¹⁷ *Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo būro i partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov*, [Minutes of the meetings of the party buro and of the party meetings of the MID HR party organization], 18/07/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 48. All the figures mentioned are from the same source.

completely renewed, and nearly half of the employees at the departments of people's democracies, Oriental countries, and European countries were new.

In terms of MGIMO graduates, this new wave of replacements at the MID did not improve their professional situation within the Soviet state. On the contrary, the cancellation of the job assignment process in June 1953 reflected the fact that there were an excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs. Nikolaj Kanaev recalls his disappointment when the graduates of 1953 were finally summoned for job placements during summer. He writes:

Sometime in July, the invitation from the Assignment Committee, which included the institute's administration and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education, and a number of other ministries and departments, followed. Everybody was offered the same: teachers of foreign languages in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Every one of us decided to refuse. [...] It was virtually our first participation in an act of disobedience, which was unacceptable at that time. None of the graduates gave their consent. For the Assignment Committee, it was a complete failure. But we were none the better for it.⁵¹⁸

On 3 July, a decree was proclaimed by the Council of Ministers to add a sixth year of study to the MGIMO curriculum.⁵¹⁹ However, this adjustment served only to defer the resolution of existing problems until another time. As early as August 1953, the HR department was already facing huge difficulties in finding positions for those Soviet diplomats who had returned from East Germany and China.⁵²⁰ On 30 November 1956, the official Fokin stressed that out of the 26 Soviet diplomats who

⁵¹⁸ Anatolij Torkunov and Rostislav Sergeev, eds., *'Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...' (1948-1953) Govorât vypuskniki 1953 goda*, MGIMO (Moskva, 2003), 191.

⁵¹⁹ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 93.

⁵²⁰ As early as August 1953, the communist Grabar', a functionary at the HR department, stressed that the ministry required more help from the upper levels of the Communist Party to place the significant number of Soviet diplomats who had already returned from East Germany. *Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID*, [Minutes of the meetings of the buro and of the party meetings of the MID HR party organization], 14/08/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 448, 41.

had returned from China during the year, only six had found new jobs at the ministry.⁵²¹

The MID reform was not limited to replacing ministerial staff. With the return of Molotov to office, the old project of merging MGIMO with MIOS was revived in 1954. There is little doubt that Molotov took advantage of recent budget reduction in order to justify a project which had been blocked during the Stalin era. However, the merger between MGIMO and MIOS also reflected the better inclusion of third-world countries, especially in Asia, into the development of Soviet diplomatic grand strategy. Orešnikov, secretary of the Party bureau at the MGIMO Oriental faculty, stressed:

Comrade Zorin, the vice minister, speaking at the last party meeting, said that the initiative to merge the two institutes on the basis of MGIMO came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the decision is intended to adjust the training of Oriental staff to the practical issues of external work, [which is needed] because of the special position of Oriental countries in modern international politics and life.⁵²²

The project moved forward with the decree promulgated by the Council of Ministers on 1 July 1954. Georgij Malenkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Anatolij Korobov, the administrator of Affairs of the Soviet Union, signed decree no. 1341, 'on the training regulation for specialists in the foreign affairs, philology, and history of foreign Oriental countries'. The two statesmen were highly critical of the training offered in Oriental languages and cultures. In the preamble of their decree, Malenkov and Korobov stated uncompromisingly:

The Council of Ministers of the USSR notes there are major deficiencies in the training, assignment, and use of specialists with higher education in the international

⁵²¹ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID, [Minutes of the meetings of the buro and the party meetings of the MID HR party organization], 14/08/1953, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 538, 93.

⁵²² Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party primary organization], 16/10/1954, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 36, 60.

relations, philology, and history of foreign Oriental countries. This manifests itself in excessive quantities of such specialists for Western countries ([and also] Turkey, Japan, Mongolia), but at the same time there is no training at all for international affairs specialists for Vietnam, Burma, and some other countries in Southeast Asia.⁵²³

Malenkov and Korobov mentioned that nine institutions of higher education were training diplomats, linguists, and historians specialised in Oriental countries. In addition to criticism of the scattered educational structures, the two politicians stressed the low quality of the specialists trained: they could neither speak Oriental languages fluently nor translate from them into Russian.

Solutions for addressing these challenges included the reduction of the number of structures involved in training specialists in Oriental languages. MGIMO, Leningrad State University, Moscow State University, Central Asian State University, Tbilisi State University, and Yerevan State University were all supposed to educate a new generation of specialists. However, because of the merger with MIOS, MGIMO had a dominant position in this new system. With an expected figure of 150 applicants to the new Eastern faculty in September 1954, the number of students studying Oriental languages at MGIMO surpassed the total to be trained in the other institutions of higher education mentioned.⁵²⁴ The merger also attracted several of the best specialists in Oriental languages to MGIMO, such as Mihail Kapica⁵²⁵ and Sergej Tihvinskij.⁵²⁶ Equally, the institute obtained the prestigious library collections of MIOS that had been inherited from the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages. Last but not least, MGIMO developed its property portfolio, gaining two new student dormitories, a kindergarten, and an apartment building in Moscow.⁵²⁷

⁵²³ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 93–94.

⁵²⁴ The decree prescribed the training of 150 students at MGIMO, 45 students at Leningrad State University, 23 students at Moscow State University, 20 at Central Asian State University, 15 students at Tbilisi State University and 7 at Yerevan State University. Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Valerij Grešnyh, 'Nezabvennyj MihČtep', *Vestnik MGIMO* 22, no. 1 (2002): 296–309.

⁵²⁶ Larisa Efimova, 'Moj Učitel' I Nastavnik Sergej Leonidovič Tihvinskij', *Vestnik MGIMO*, no. 6 (2011): 264–66.

⁵²⁷ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 95.

Even though MGIMO occupied a central place in this new system, two points of the decree certainly undermined the ambitions of MGIMO students.⁵²⁸ In the context of a general reduction of the size of the Soviet administration following Stalin's death, the decree stated that a significant number of the students already enrolled would necessarily have to continue their studies in another institution. In pursuance of the same goal, the decree included a major change in MGIMO's teaching programmes. New students at the Eastern faculty were to learn a second Western European language (English, French, German, or Spanish) so that they could be employed as high school teachers if need be.

Lastly, Malenkov and Korobov's decree made a link between improvements in the training of specialists in Oriental languages and the need to increase the number of non-Soviet students enrolled at MGIMO. They prescribed:

In order to meet the requests of the governments of the people's democracies for the admission of their citizens to study at MGIMO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to be obliged to provide the citizens of people's democracies with one third to half of the institute's places.⁵²⁹

The increase in the number of non-Soviet students directly reduced the number of Soviet applicants who could be admitted through the MGIMO entrance exam. It also affected the chances of prospective Soviet students from the provinces, who had to have a place in the student dormitories in order to study at MGIMO.

On 28 August 1954, an order from the Ministry of Higher Education announced the expulsion of a 1,000 students in order to prevent an excessive number of graduates resulting from the merger between MGIMO and MISO.⁵³⁰ In 1954, 1,099 students, including 228 fifth-year MGIMO students and 179 fifth-year MISO students, had to continue their studies in another educational establishment.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Ibid., 97.

This situation produced a powerful protest movement during the summer 1954, which Boris Pâdyšev portrayed as a student strike. For him, the protest revolved around two major points. On the one hand, it resulted from fifth-year students' anger, which was fed by the fact that they were forced to abandon their studies at the very end of their MGIMO course. On the other, students disputed the use of vague and elastic criteria for determining those who could study at the institute. The submission of a petition to the upper levels of the Communist Party including the signatures of several members of the MGIMO party bureau reflected the mobilisation of political resources to advance this cause. Pâdyšev also claims that the students were able to achieve some coverage in the foreign media, such as the BBC.⁵³¹ If this is true,⁵³² the use of foreign media reveals how students thought outside the box to put pressure on the MID.

On 3 September 1954, the Ministry of Higher Education finally issued a new decree.⁵³³ Out of the 1,083 second-, third-, and fourth-year students at MGIMO and MIO, 576 were sent to another institution. Fifth-year students from both institutes were now exempt from the exclusion: they were supposed to remain at MGIMO for a sixth year of study based on the academic programmes of both institutions. Lastly, 100 fourth-year students were included in a specific training course dedicated to improving their foreign languages skills (*kursy usoveršenstvovaniâ inostrannykh âzykov*).⁵³⁴

During a party meeting on 17 September 1954, the MGIMO director went back over the events that had taken place during summer. He expressed surprise at the student protest, stressing that it reflected 'important loopholes in students' political education'.⁵³⁵ The communist Mamatov argued that, even though the 'strike' was intolerable, it was easily explained by the fact that many of the students who were

⁵³¹ Boris Pâdyšev, 'On Strike. Zabastovka v MGIMO, Avgust 1954 Goda', *Meždunarodnaâ Žizn'*, no. 2 (2003): 24.

⁵³² This information has not been verified in the BBC archives.

⁵³³ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 96.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁵³⁵ Stenogramma i protokoly partijnykh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization] 17/09/1954, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 36, 29. For a description about how the closure of MISO was perceived by its students, see: P. Šastitko and M. Čaryeva, 'Kak Zakryvali Moskovskij Institut Vostokovedeniâ', *Vostok. Afro-Aziatskie Obščestva: Istoriâ I Sovremennost'*, no. 6 (2002).

allowed to remain used their parents' influence at the MID to supplement their requests. He raised the specific case of a veteran who was forced to abandon his studies; according to Mamatov, he deserved to remain on by virtue of his military record.⁵³⁶ Just like during the Stalin era, the issue of non-academic criteria in career development arose again.

The summer incident clearly caught members of the Communist Party unawares. The communist Šustov proposed that an initiative committee be rapidly set up to deal with those students excluded from MGIMO. Nevertheless, he also stressed his lack of understanding for students who had 'defended their own personal interests at the expense of the collective'.⁵³⁷

When it came to discussing the most appropriate reaction to the events, diametrically opposed views collided. By stressing the political nature of MGIMO, several members of the Communist Party argued that MGIMO graduates necessarily had to submit to the decision of the upper levels of the Party. Nikolaj Sarapkin, a representative of the MID sent to the MGIMO party meeting in October 1954, declared:

What happens when graduates with such defects are accepted? First of all, we have political organisations and the issue of the testimonial: the public face of these cadres moves to the forefront. We all know that our party ethics, and indeed Soviet ethics, do not allow [people] to gather together and collectively write any petitions. This is essentially wrong. And here, in front of the party organisation, under the nose of the Party Committee, some people work and collect signatures: even some members of the Party and the Komsomol put their signatures on these collective petitions. Judge for yourselves: when the central authorities receive such a collective petition, what do they think of this institute of international relations, and above all of the party organisation that tends to the political antennae of Communists and Komsomol members.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 35.

⁵³⁸ Stenogramma i protokoly partijnyh obščih sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 16/10/1954, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 36, 119.

He concluded that the ministry could not guarantee a place for each MGIMO graduate in the Soviet diplomatic system.

From a very different point of view, several students openly expressed their disappointment that they were being offered jobs that did not meet their legitimate expectations. In justifying the summer incidents, a student directly answered Sarapkin's statements:

It is said, he who has nothing to eat is glad to get any work. That's right. But is it a way out? Do we spend so much effort and energy to master our profession in order to get any kind of work, simply to not starve?⁵³⁹

The situation did not improve in the following years. A couple of years later, the student Makarov was even clearer about the disappointment of MGIMO graduates, which was fuelled by the MID's unfulfilled promises. He stressed:

Each time the assignment is close, it is said that the situation is abnormal and comrades decline their assignments. Just imagine, our teachers tell us from the first year: 'You are MGIMO students, you are being trained to work abroad'. But then they say: 'You will go here or there and work as a propagandist or a school teacher.' And it turns out that a person has been educated for six years with one idea, but then suddenly another idea emerges. Naturally, he will decline the assignment. So, students should be told where they will work exactly, but not in the way we do it now.⁵⁴⁰

Even though the merger between MGIMO and MIOS enabled *meždunarodniki* to consider taking diplomatic positions related to the East, Sarapkin and the students quoted above reveal that this new situation solved neither the problem of graduate access to the MID nor the issue of which positions a MGIMO diploma enabled one to obtain.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., 98.

⁵⁴⁰ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 89.

When MGIMO Director Mihail Ivanov spoke at a meeting of the primary party organisation on 27 January 1956, he raised the issue of *meždunarodniki* job placement once again. Emphasising that MGIMO is a 'political institute of higher education', he called for a radical change concerning the second speciality of students. Everything suggests that Ivanov was very cognizant of the fact that the introduction of a second speciality had reduced career prospects to teaching in high school, which was detrimental to the prestige of MGIMO. Nonetheless, he admitted that a second specialty was necessary:

The question of the second specialty [is explained] firstly by the difficulty of placing large groups of graduates, which numbered in the hundreds both at the Western and the Eastern faculties; secondly, due to the specificity of our institute, it is necessary to have a second specialty as a reserve, because no one can guarantee that the graduates of our institute will work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at other organisations and agencies related to foreign policy and global developments.⁵⁴¹

Highlighting the constraints caused by an excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs, Ivanov called upon the upper levels of the Communist Party and the MID to change the second professional specialisation. He argued:

If we look at what specialty was assigned in our institute as the second one, I think everyone would agree that a mistake has occurred in this case. The second specialty in our institute has been defined as a teacher of Western language in high school. Such a specialty diverges from the main specialisation of our institute. The main specialisation of our institute is that of a political institute.⁵⁴²

Ivanov proposed abandoning the second professional specialty, stressing that it did not offer MGIMO graduates real future prospects. He convincingly claimed that,

⁵⁴¹ Stenogramma obšego partiynogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 27/01/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 12.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

because of World War II, the number of Soviet pupils was going to decrease in the forthcoming years. He also argued that the second professional speciality had to be in history and not foreign languages. In the absence of a job in the diplomatic apparatus, Ivanov recommended using MGIMO graduates as propagandists, journalists, functionaries of the Komsomol (*komsorg*), or collaborators in the party and state structures, especially in the district and town committees.⁵⁴³ His proposal was revealing, as it reflected the strategies being adopted to make MGIMO degrees valuable at the beginning of the Thaw. By stressing the political dimension of MGIMO studies, Director Ivanov defended graduate access to positions of authority within the state and party apparatus. For him, political skills mattered much more than talent in mastering foreign languages. He argued that the institute had little in common with other bodies of higher education dedicated to foreign languages within the Soviet Union. By proclaiming MGIMO's political specificity, he justified a specific social place for the *meždunarodniki*.

Between 1953 and 1956, an excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs, the expulsion of students following the merger between MGIMO and MIOS, and the introduction of a second professional speciality revealed both the MID's hesitations concerning the destiny of the *meždunarodniki* and the low value attached to a MGIMO degree in the years following Stalin's death. Yet, just a few months after this series of crises at the institute, the professional situation of the *meždunarodniki* radically improved. A telling sign of this was the fact that the provision for a second professional specialty was definitely abandoned and removed from teaching programmes in September 1956.⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 18.

⁵⁴⁴ Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/09/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 67.

The Khrushchev compromise: the impact of polytechnisation on meždunarodniki careers

Between 1956 and 1964, the profile of MGIMO students changed, and so did their experiences at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge.⁵⁴⁵ MGIMO strongly favoured applicants who were members of the Communist Party with manufacturing and farming experience or a military past, the so-called *proizvodstvenniki* ('production candidates'). The institute was directly affected by the policy of discriminatory action launched under Khrushchev to promote the upward social mobility of the working class. This had considerable consequences for the admission process, the rules guiding job assignments, and, above all, the establishment of clear professional paths within Soviet diplomacy.

Following Stalin's death, Khrushchev's goal of reinforcing the pre-eminence of the Communist Party over social life did not only manifest itself through the placement of members of the Party in key positions of authority within the Soviet state. It also meant re-establishing Leninist ideology and thus improving social upward mobility for workers and peasants. By promoting the children of the working class, Khrushchev sought to assert his authority and gain popular support in a context where the social ladder had almost been broken in 1953.

In his general study of *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, Mervyn Matthews depicts the roots of Khrushchev's education reform. He stresses that 'being of humble origin himself, and having studied as a part-time student, Khrushchev was quite convinced that Soviet society had much to gain from drawing more young workers and peasants into the intelligentsia.'⁵⁴⁶ Matthews stresses that Khrushchev became fully aware of the mechanisms of Soviet social reproduction in higher education after World War II.⁵⁴⁷ Starting from the 1950s, the Soviet educational system tended to reproduce existing inequalities. Drawing on a body of statistical and demographic work published after 1956, the scholar states that the Soviet regime faced a double issue after Stalin's death. On the one hand, the demand for higher education had sharply

⁵⁴⁵ For details about the changes in the MGIMO teaching programme, see part III.

⁵⁴⁶ Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 1st edition (London: A.Lane, 1972), 293.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 287.

increased. Between 1946 and 1953, the number of pupils finishing full-time and part-time schools increased from 137,000 to 579,000, resulting in a very large student body. In 1969-70, there were over four and a half million students enrolled in full- and part-time academic establishments.⁵⁴⁸ On the other hand, the rise of a mass higher education system was contradicted by the fact that the system favoured students from privileged homes. Matthews indicates that peasant and working-class children were soon marginalised in a Soviet higher education system saturated by the scions of the intelligentsia.

In his recent study on Khrushchev's education reforms, French scholar Laurent Coumel reaches almost the same conclusion. According to him, the proportion of workers and peasants in first-level university courses had fallen from 62 per cent in 1935 to 37 per cent in 1955.⁵⁴⁹ He stresses that 'as a consequence the country had returned to the situation that existed at the end of the 1920s, before the mass proletarianisation of the universities and engineering institutes had begun.'⁵⁵⁰

For Matthews, 'polytechnization was strongly promoted after 1955, when Khrushchev was pretty well dominant in the Party. It was the central element in a major reform of education which he attempted in December 1958'.⁵⁵¹ In order to cope with the problem of social reproduction in the USSR after Stalin's death, the full-time VUZ entrance rules were radically modified in 1955 so that people who had been employed for two years or more in a farm, factory, or office would have a fixed quota of VUZ places set aside for them. These measures undoubtedly had a strong influence on the selection of VUZ students to the advantage of children from less privileged homes. By autumn 1964, when Khrushchev was dismissed, 62 per cent of all VUZ entrants were production candidates.⁵⁵²

⁵⁴⁸ Matthews argues that the ratio of students to population was higher in the Soviet Union than in Japan, France, and England.

⁵⁴⁹ Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev* (Routledge, 2009), 67–68. For more details about Khrushchev's education reforms, see also: Laurent Coumel, *Rapprocher L'école et La Vie: Une Histoire Des Réformes de L'enseignement En Russie Soviétique: 1918-1964*, Méridiennes (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2014).

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 268.

⁵⁵² Ibid., 295.

MGIMO did not remain on the margins of the reform; the student body's sociological profile was soon directly affected by the polytechnisation movement. During a party meeting at MGIMO on 14 September 1956, Ivanov informed the audience that 44 out of the 120 newly enrolled students were members and candidate members of the Party. He added that 64 of them were *proizvodstvenniki*.⁵⁵³ In comparison, in 1955, there were only eight members and candidate members of the Communist Party and 12 with production experience (*proizvodstvennyj stazh*) among the first-year students admitted.

Kurbatov stresses that, in parallel with the development of a strategy for favouring applicants with production experience at MGIMO, the upper levels of the Communist Party tightened the conditions of eligibility for admission.⁵⁵⁴ Just as was the case for the HDS in the 1930s, the MGIMO entrance examination became a closed competition: candidates could no longer spontaneously submit an application. Their applications had to be vetted by the district or city party organisations or by Komsomol institutions for non-communist students. This new system sought to both prevent a recurrence of the protest in 1954 and promote applicants already selected by the Party and the Komsomol.

These important changes to encourage upward social mobility raised questions, however. At the MID, Nikolaj Sarapkin argued that the ministry had no interest in completely renouncing applicants with a more privileged social background who had been educated in special secondary schools. He pointed out:

At MGIMO, only people with prior experience were admitted this year. What does this mean? This means that a man graduated from a ten-grade standard school 5-6 years ago and has now decided to learn. Well, would studying a foreign language be worthwhile for such a man? At the age of 25 years, it is difficult to master a language in 5 years, i.e. to know it as a mother tongue. There are special schools in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov. Children are taught foreign languages from early

⁵⁵³ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 14/09/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 53.

⁵⁵⁴ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 102.

childhood there. We should accept in the Institute of International Relations the most gifted children from these schools.⁵⁵⁵

Of course, Sarapkin could not directly oppose Khrushchev's reform of education. Yet, his statements are revealing about how the new criterion of production experience was taken into account both during the entrance examination and job assignment process at MGIMO in the following years. The institute continued to recruit applicants trained in special schools, but they were limited in number: the explicit requirement for certain kinds of work experience also limited their job opportunities after graduation.

Indeed, during a party meeting at MGIMO on 14 September 1956, Ivanov was worried that, at the end of the last academic year, 20 MGIMO graduates had not been recruited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of their lack of production experience.⁵⁵⁶ Their personal profiles did not fit the ministry's requirements. Thus, he justified a higher enrolment rate of *proizvodstvenniki* and party members at MGIMO. As far as the recruitment of schoolchildren from special schools at MGIMO was concerned, he added that priority would be given to those trained in simultaneous translation. Unlike Soviet diplomats, translators had a subordinate status which did not require the same recruitment criteria, even though they too were *meždunarodniki*.

In November 1958, the 'Thesis of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on Strengthening Ties between School and Life' containing the reform of the Soviet educational system was published. At the end of same month, in a review of the previous academic year, the new MGIMO Director Fëdor Ryženko expressed a logic very close to Ivanov's recruitment and job assignment policy two years

⁵⁵⁵ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo būro i partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the meetings of the partyburo of of the MID HR party organization], 25/05/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 538, 71-72.

⁵⁵⁶ Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/09/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 54.

before.⁵⁵⁷ Like his predecessor, Ryženko argued that MGIMO would aim to ensure the predominance of those *proizvodstvenniki* who had benefited from at least two years of work experience. Nonetheless, the institute would still recruit applicants from special schools: they would be assigned to learning Oriental languages. The logic of distinguishing applicants according to their social background was explained by the fact that *proizvodstvenniki* faced greater difficulties mastering Oriental languages and almost always failed their exams. For Ryženko, this balanced recruitment policy enabled the institute to improve the opportunities of applicants from modest social backgrounds while also gaining the strong language skills possessed by the youngest students from special schools. This second category of students would be trained as highly qualified specialists in Oriental languages.

On 23 January 1961, Ryženko detailed reinforcing the admission of students with experience in manufacturing work, a military past, or a political background. He announced that the number of former schoolchildren would be strictly limited to 15 per cent of the newly enrolled students. He added that this minority would be directed towards the acquisition of rare ‘Oriental’ languages: these which were more difficult to learn and also provided fewer job opportunities at the MID compared to Western European languages.⁵⁵⁸

Unfortunately, the lack of access to student personal files means we cannot draw clear conclusions about the real effect of the polytechnisation policy on the number of students from modest social backgrounds at MGIMO between 1956 and 1964. As Matthews rightly points out:

Many young people, especially those with ten classes of general schooling behind them, had no intention of working for very long anyway. They were much more interested in getting into a full-time VUZ, and went to work either to pass the time until the next set of entrance exams came along, to earn some money, or to get a

⁵⁵⁷ Protokoly i stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij i sobraniâ partaktiva partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings and of the meetings of the activists of the MGIMO party organization], 27/11/1958, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 54, 81.

⁵⁵⁸ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 10/05/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 78, 43.

certificate proving they had actually been ‘on production’, and were thus genuine production candidates.⁵⁵⁹

Just as in the rest of the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that applicants to MGIMO found ways of circumventing the rules favouring production candidates. However, both Ivanov’s and Ryženko’s statements make absolutely clear that job placement went hand-in-hand with the creation of clear professional patterns based on explicit criteria. The two MGIMO directors made a link between different categories of students and their job prospects in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus. This certainly hindered the ambitions of graduates from more privileged social backgrounds, but, in contrast to the Stalin era, when terror strongly limited the degree of opacity around the criteria guiding career paths, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now established explicit potential professional trajectories after graduation.

When MGIMO made explicit the use of non-academic criteria for admission and job assignment, the HR department raised the question of career trajectories at the MID. The discussions initiated at the HR department under Stalin about career plans finally resulted in important changes concerning diplomatic careers. After years of replacements, the HR department bureaucrat Fëdor Barynenkov announced that much had been done to certify diplomatic staff at the ministry.⁵⁶⁰ He gave a detailed picture of the ministerial staff. There were 1,453 employees with a diplomatic rank: 710 at the central office and 743 abroad. 745 were certified in 1957; half of them were employees of the central office. 375 of the certified staff were rated up.⁵⁶¹

The certification process enabled functionaries to have a concrete picture of the composition of the ministerial staff. However, more importantly and contrary to what occurred during the Stalin era, the HR department, directed successively by Petr Deduškin and Nikolaj Tupicyn between 1956 and 1958, managed to rationalise career trajectories. In April 1956, a HR official declared:

⁵⁵⁹ Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 313–14.

⁵⁶⁰ Očët būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa za period sentâbrâ 1956 g. - dekabr' 1957, [Account of the bureau of the party organization of the MID HR department related to September 1956 – December 1957], 30/12/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 44.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

Personnel who we send to work abroad are given permission for 2 years. Can we give them permission for 3 years? During 3 years, we could easily find replacements for them. As of now, we have to extend their period of stay and collect background information about their relatives again.⁵⁶²

The pace of careers became standardised in the coming years, which meant that the turnover of diplomatic agents abroad was much more stable than before. Three-year missions or more outside the Union progressively became the norm.

The reform also went together with a better flexibility in the lower positions at the MID, which reinforced the influence of the ministry in the definition of career paths. During the party meeting mentioned directly above, the same functionary declared: 'it is very good that attaché is no longer an appointed position. I would like to pursue this matter. I think that second and third secretaries should also be excluded from the *nomenklatura* system.'⁵⁶³ By emancipating the selection of the lower cadres from the authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the HR department benefited from a greater level of flexibility in the choice of its own cadres.

Lastly, some members of the HR department claimed that the rationalisation of the resignation process was also necessary. The bureaucrat Mihail Boronin declared in December 1957:

While the influx of new personnel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from MGIMO and the HDS is regular, the other side of this issue - the outflow of staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - is chaotic and illegitimate. There is no legal basis for vacating job positions. It is necessary to take into account the inevitability of this situation and give it the necessary legal forms. Otherwise, we will have constant difficulties in finding positions for diplomats coming from abroad; moreover, about 20-25% of job positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are 'frozen'.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶² Protokoly partbûro i partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the partyburo and of the party meetings of the party organization of the MID HR department] 25/04/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 538, 64.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 65.

⁵⁶⁴ Očët bûro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa za period sentâbrâ 1956 g. - dekabr' 1957, 30/12/1957, [Account of the buro of the party organization of the MID HR department related to September 1956 – December 1957], TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 78.

Contrary to the situation during the Stalin era, the MID's HR policy was clearly rationalised from 1956. By openly raising the issue of non-academic criteria at MGIMO and establishing professional patterns at the MID, the HR department prepared the ground for the important diplomatic changes initiated by Khrushchev.

Crucially, the sociological profile of MGIMO students changed and stable career plans were set up at the MID at the same time as the issue of *meždunarodniki* job placement was resolved. The problem was definitely resolved at the end of the 1950s. In 1961, the HR bureaucrat Belov argued that 'maybe, starting from this year, student enrolment to MGIMO should be increased.' He indicated that 126 people would graduate from the institute in this year; however, the MID had received no less than 485 requests for them.⁵⁶⁵ After years of difficulties with assigning jobs to MGIMO graduates, the ministry was finally able to authorise an expansion of the student body. While Ryzhenko stressed the continuity of discriminative action for workers and veterans, he also announced an increase in the number of new students to be enrolled at MGIMO in 1962. The number of first-year students would grow by 20 at the faculty of international relations and by 40 at the faculty of international economic relations.

At the end of the 1950s, the resolution of the problem caused by an excessive number of specialists in foreign affairs was not that surprising. The polytechnisation policy mattered, but the improvement of the professional situation of *meždunarodniki* was also based on the radical change of foreign policy orchestrated by Khrushchev, who proclaimed peaceful coexistence between the USSR and Western capitalist countries in the international arena. These important diplomatic changes provided a decisive career opportunity for *meždunarodniki* through the institutionalisation of *détente*.

⁵⁶⁵ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MID, [Transcripts of the party meetings and the party buro meetings of the MID HR primary organization], 27/02/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 716, 4.

The institutionalisation of détente as a professional opportunity for specialists in foreign affairs

The establishment of career trajectories at the MID and the new place occupied by MGIMO graduates in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus during the Thaw cannot be understood until we address them in their proper diplomatic context. Khrushchev's accession to power resulted in a reconceptualisation of the relationship between the USSR and the West. As scholar Vojtech Mastny rightly concludes, 'the decade between the death of Iosif Stalin and the Cuban missile crisis was one of great promise and great peril. The promise consisted in the possibility of reversing the Cold War confrontation, the peril in its turning into real war.'⁵⁶⁶ The détente orchestrated by Khrushchev and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrej Gromyko (appointed in 1957) was a clear turning point after Stalin's demise. More importantly for the *meždunarodniki*, however, the implementation of this change of policy was managed by a set of new institutions. By multiplying the organisations related to foreign affairs, this new context presented tremendous professional opportunities for MGIMO graduates.

Matthews points out the role of Khrushchev's personality in the legislative reform of the Soviet system of higher education: Mastny does the same when explaining the important diplomatic changes that occurred after Stalin's death. He writes: 'among the top Soviet leaders, Khrushchev was the last true believer in the ideals of Communism. He sincerely believed his country could beat its capitalist foes because of its system's supposed ideological assets, political strength, and superior economic performance'.⁵⁶⁷ He further adds: 'Khrushchev expected the capitalists to realize eventually that they had no future and to start making concessions out of necessity.

⁵⁶⁶ Vojtech Mastny, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Cambridge University Press, vol. I, 2010, 312.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 318.

He tried to induce them by taking the lead to demilitarize the Cold War, thus making possible what came to be known as the “first détente”⁵⁶⁸.

When he became first secretary, Khrushchev was a layman in foreign affairs. His first years in power were, however, a clear break with the Stalinist past, and he progressively succeeded in taking the initiative out of Molotov’s hands when it came to the definition of Soviet diplomacy. Indeed, starting from 1953, Soviet diplomacy shifted from the idea that war is ineluctable because of the inherent nature of capitalism to the principle of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist countries. With Khrushchev’s ascent to power, Soviet foreign policy became grounded on three complementary principles: the Kremlin aimed to reinforce the cohesion of and control over the people’s democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, promoted neutrality for countries acquiring independence during decolonisation, especially in Asia and Africa, and pursued a policy of reducing tensions with the West and promoting cooperation on an economic level.⁵⁶⁹

Despite Molotov’s return as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the changes in Soviet diplomacy soon became visible. As far as several burning issues were concerned, the Kremlin aimed to ease the diplomatic tensions inherited from Stalin’s foreign policy. By using what Georges-Henri Soutou calls a policy of ‘strategic surprises’,⁵⁷⁰ Soviet diplomacy strove for a rapid appeasement in the Korean War, which resulted in the armistice signed by the two Koreas in July 1953.⁵⁷¹ Between February and April 1955, the question around the neutrality of Austria was also solved, which reflected the growing influence of Khrushchev on the definition of Soviet diplomacy. Whereas Molotov sought to maintain Soviet military forces in Austria, Khrushchev succeeded in withdrawing Soviet troops, arguing that Austrian neutrality would weaken NATO influence and secure Soviet interests in the region.⁵⁷² Seeking to break with Stalin’s legacy, a Soviet delegation comprised of Khrushchev,

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah*. T.2, 390.

⁵⁷⁰ George Soutou, ‘Ciel ! C’est Si Soudain ! La Surprise Politico-Diplomatique - Cairn.info’, *Stratégie* 2, no. 106 (2014).

⁵⁷¹ Avram Agov, ‘North Korea’s Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War’, *The Journal of Korean Studies* 2, no. 18 (2013): 239.

⁵⁷² Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 2nd edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 99.

Bulganin, and Zhukov was also sent to Yugoslavia at the end of May 1955 to bring the country back into the Soviet sphere of influence and improve Moscow's geopolitical position in the Balkans. By officially recognising the diversity of paths to socialism, Khrushchev inflicted a new political defeat on Molotov, who left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the last time in 1956.

Among the key events of détente with the West, July 1955 was a singular moment. Khrushchev met President Dwight D. Eisenhower in Geneva at the first summit conference since the beginning of the Cold War.⁵⁷³ The Kremlin submitted both a disarmament proposal and an ambitious draft of a collective security treaty designed to lead to the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Even though the United States opposed Soviet proposals because they suspected the plan might be meant seriously, the contrast with Stalin's foreign policy was clear.

Obviously, the détente conducted by Khrushchev should not be idealised. The period between 1953 and 1964 was punctuated by major diplomatic crises both inside the socialist bloc (in Poland and Hungary) and in the relations between the USSR and the West, where tensions reached a peak in Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962. The historian Vladislav Zubok in particular argues that détente in East-West relations did not really occur; indeed, the Cold War got a second wind under Khrushchev. For him, mutual fears and mistrust remained high between the two opposed blocs and undermined the attempt to reduce international tensions. He writes: 'American policy makers were concerned that the rhetoric of "peaceful coexistence" could disrupt their plans to build up a European centre of power, which, together with Great Britain would bear the burden of "containing" the Soviet bloc.'⁵⁷⁴ On the Soviet side, the historian argues that 'despite the shift to peaceful coexistence, Kremlin rulers retained some basic elements of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm and continuity with Stalin's foreign policy.'⁵⁷⁵

Even though historians still debate whether tensions between the East and the West were really reduced in a context where the two superpowers had nuclear weapons at

⁵⁷³ Mastny, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962', 312.

⁵⁷⁴ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 94.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.

their disposal, it cannot be doubted that changes in Soviet diplomatic policy occurred in relation to the East. As early as May 1953, the Kremlin sought reconciliation with the major Oriental powers. The USSR hoped to develop and stabilise its diplomatic relations with Turkey by renouncing its former territorial ambitions.⁵⁷⁶ Support from Iran was sought: the resulting improvement in diplomatic relations was symbolised by the Shah's visit to Moscow in 1956.⁵⁷⁷ Lastly, the Kremlin restored full diplomatic relations with Japan in October 1956.⁵⁷⁸

In regards to its relations with Asia, and with third-world countries more generally, the USSR wanted to do much more than repair the damage caused by Stalin's aggressive leadership. During winter 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin embarked on a six-week tour of South Asia, with stops in India, Burma, and Afghanistan. The USSR strove to play a major role in Asian, African, and American countries during the processes of decolonisation that followed World War II.⁵⁷⁹ This often found a sympathetic ear among many anticolonial leaders, who were disappointed when the victorious powers refused to honour promises of self-determination at the post-World War II peace conferences. As Odd Arne Westad points out, 'not only did the Bolsheviks condemn colonialism and offer alliances to those who resisted it, but they also showed the way, it was believed, toward a non-exploitative form of modern society.'⁵⁸⁰ Waves of decolonisation created an enabling environment, inside of which the Soviet Union was able to carve out a position as a global revolutionary-nationalist leader. The MID and the international department of the Central Committee started to seek alliances with revolutionary-nationalist leaders and movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

A final aspect to be underlined concerning Khrushchev's *détente* was the greater place given to economic cooperation. As Zubok notices, 'Stalin was obsessed with keeping the Soviet Union closed to Western influences and preferred autarky and

⁵⁷⁶ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 377.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., 390.

⁵⁷⁹ Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).

⁵⁸⁰ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, new ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80.

isolation to economic trade ties with Western countries'.⁵⁸¹ After his death, the Kremlin soon reconsidered the idea of 1920s Bolshevik diplomacy that trade ties with capitalist countries were a useful way to both improve political relations and obtain vital technologies and resources. Allies and third-world countries were part-and-parcel of this new emphasis on foreign trade. The Kremlin developed a plan of Soviet assistance to China in 1954-59 which was the equivalent of seven per cent of Soviet national income for that period.⁵⁸² Following Nehru's first official visit to the USSR in 1955, the economy was considered as a priority in the development of Soviet-Indian diplomatic relations, especially in terms of heavy industry.⁵⁸³

The rapid and radical changes in Soviet diplomacy mattered for the *meždunarodniki*. More importantly, discussions at the HR department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveal that MGIMO graduates were assigned a specific role in the diplomatic changes. During a party meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1959, Secretary of the MID primary party organisation Nikolaj Važnov made a link between peaceful coexistence and the evolution of the ministerial staff and its practices. He reminded his MID colleagues of the guidelines of Soviet foreign policy by beginning with a quote from one of Khrushchev's speech during his visit in the United States in September 1959. He quoted: 'we are currently fighting for communism, for the very best of humanity. And we are not fighting with weapons, but with words, peaceful means, and our labour.'⁵⁸⁴

For Važnov, the major changes introduced in Soviet diplomacy after Stalin's death required both a new rhetoric and new practices. He declared: 'young communist diplomats, together with senior comrades, will have to look for new challenging proposals on foreign policy, new arguments and methods of diplomacy'.⁵⁸⁵ The reference to MGIMO graduates was obvious. To a certain extent, Važnov continued

⁵⁸¹ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 103.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵⁸³ David C. Engerman, 'Learning from the East: Soviet Experts and India in the Era of Competitive Coexistence', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 33, no. 2 (2013): 227–38.

⁵⁸⁴ Protokol otčetno-vybornogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MIDa SSSR, [Minutes of the report-election meeting of the MID party organization], 02-10/12/1959, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 630, 3.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

along the lines of the initial project led by Molotov when the MGIMO was founded in the 1940s. The context of détente, which enhanced the place of public opinion and the coordination of socialist diplomacy, was in accordance with both the role and training of *meždunarodniki* as defined during World War II.

Far from being perceived as a difficulty, the diversity of age groups at the ministry was considered a useful resource for introducing new practices into foreign policy. During the same party meeting, the functionary Nikolaj Firûbin declared:

What cadre problem are we talking about? Judging from the available data, we do not have a problem of young and old cadres. We have a good mix of young cadres and those who have experience. For example, Comrade Bogomolov, a man of great experience in diplomacy, spoke yesterday. And we have so many such comrades. They try to share their experience, to help young comrades.⁵⁸⁶

The role of the *meždunarodniki* was strengthened in the new diplomatic context because MGIMO's position as the principal breeding ground for Soviet diplomats was reasserted. In 1957, alongside the stabilisation of diplomatic careers, the issue of reducing the number of institutions training cadres for the MID was raised. The HR official Šitarev pointed out:

I think we should establish a procedure according to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only accepts graduates from the HDS and MGIMO on the recommendation of the higher party organs. There are people who are employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through calls or notes (i.e. through pull), and sometimes they are not of especial value to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which leads to the corruption of our system.⁵⁸⁷

The ministry clearly broke with the past practice of endowing several institutions with the mission of training Soviet cadres for foreign affairs. The merger between MGIMO

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., 38.

⁵⁸⁷ Očēt būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa za period sentâbrâ 1956 g. - dekabr' 1957, [Account of the buro of the party organization of the MID HR department related to September 1956 – December 1957], 30/12/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 83.

and MIOS was the first step towards the reduction of the number of institutions dedicated to training specialists: it was soon followed by the merger between MGIMO and the Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade (MIFT) in 1958. In direct contrast with the discussions of MGIMO's weaknesses during the Stalin era, graduates from the HDS were now subjected to the heaviest criticism. Because of their political experience, 'scientific workers in international relations' were supposed to play a key role in the development of diplomatic relations with the people's democracies; however, as the official Ivanov stressed, their professional skills were far from satisfactory:

It seems to me that the vast majority of cadres graduating from the HDS with party, administrative, and economic experience would have to go to the people's democracies. But it turns out that we cannot take anyone from the HDS. What does the HDS gives us now? From the experience of my department, I can say that we are going to employ only one graduate this year, but even he is questionable.⁵⁸⁸

In comparison, he stressed that MGIMO graduates were better qualified and felt at ease in fulfilling their tasks at the ministry:

Comrade Tol'styh graduated from the HDS last year. He came to the school from the Ministry of the Oil Industry and had some experience of political work in the past. After graduating from the HDS, he was assigned to the MID's 5th European department. The head of the 5th European department requests to transfer him to another department, as he does not feel very good at the department, because he is under-performing in comparison with the young professionals who came from MGIMO. And this is not an isolated case.⁵⁸⁹

By stressing the high quality of MGIMO graduates, Ivanov made clear the central place that the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge now occupied in the training of Soviet cadres for foreign affairs. The strengthening of MGIMO's position within the Soviet training system of specialists was confirmed with the merger with MIFT in 1958.

⁵⁸⁸ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the party meetings and the meetings of the buro of the party organization of the MID HR department], 29/05/1957, TSAOPIM, fund 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 144.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 145.

The merger became effective with the decree undertaken by the Council of Ministers on 8 July 1958. Chairman Alexei Kosygin and the Administrator of Affairs of the Soviet Union Pëtr Demičev signed the relevant decree.⁵⁹⁰ By placing the training of specialists in foreign trade under the authority of the MID, the merger reflected the particular place given to economic diplomatic relations in the conduct of Khrushchev's diplomacy. Kosygin and Demičev's decree was short: the main point was the transfer of MIFT students and teaching staff to MGIMO. The institute's internal structure was, however, modified: the Eastern and Western faculties were replaced by two faculties dedicated to international relations and international economic relations. Just as in 1954, the MGIMO property portfolio again increased with the transfer of the MIFT dormitory.⁵⁹¹

Compared to the crisis in 1954 following the closing of MIOS, the 1958 merger did not include a reduction in the size of the MGIMO student body. In September 1959, Ryženko was very pleased to announce that the merger between MGIMO and MIFT was a complete success. He highlighted that the international economic faculty was the sole example of such an establishment of higher education in the USSR. More importantly, he indicated that the merger opened new professional opportunities for MGIMO students in Soviet economic missions, the state planning agency (Gosplan), and research institutions dedicated to international economics.

Moreover, students who entered MGIMO at the very beginning of the 1960s also benefited from better access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organisations related to Soviet diplomacy upon graduation. In 1959, 559 MGIMO graduates were

⁵⁹⁰ Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR ot 8 iūlā 1958 g. N°728 "Ob'edinenii Instituta Vnešnej Torgovli Ministerstva Vnešnej Torgovli s Moskovskim Gosudarstvennym Institutom Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del SSSR", [Council of Ministers' decree N°728 on 8 July 1958 'The merger between the Institute for Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 09/07/1958, GARF, fond 5446, opis' 1, delo 678.

⁵⁹¹ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 107.

already working at the ministry:⁵⁹² an average of 60 *meždunarodniki* were supposed to join the MID on an annual basis in the forthcoming years.⁵⁹³

The specific role assigned to MGIMO graduates for the invention of new diplomatic practices and arguments was important. However, the shift towards peaceful coexistence and the formation of many new independent states also led to a considerable increase in the number of Soviet embassies and missions abroad.⁵⁹⁴ As American-Soviet tensions reduced in the 1950s, the demand for new institutions was all the more pressing. *Détente* was thus progressively institutionalised, which ensured new professional opportunities for MGIMO graduates.

In addition to the missions opened in newly independent countries, *détente* manifested itself in the revival of international organisations in the USSR. Whereas international organisations were often considered the Trojan horse of imperialist capitalism under Stalin, Khrushchev's diplomacy paid particular attention to the advantages of the international system inherited from World War II in defending the interests of the Soviet state. Records from the MID are particularly telling in this regard. In December 1959, there were 135 Soviet international functionaries.⁵⁹⁵ Out of them, 37 diplomats had been sent abroad earlier.⁵⁹⁶ In November 1960, diplomat Gagarinov detailed that between 1956 and November 1960, the number of such functionaries had increased from 56 to 175.⁵⁹⁷ *Détente* spread both through international organisations and transnational movements. As Matthew Evangelista points out in his study on the Pugwash Movement, the context of *détente* gave birth to

⁵⁹² Protokol otčetno-vybornogo sobraniâ i otčetnyj doklad partkoma MIDa, [Minutes of the report-election meeting and report of the party committee of the MID], 02/12/1958, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 595, 94.

⁵⁹³ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 27/02/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 716, 1.

⁵⁹⁴ Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union (Routledge Revivals)*, 146.

⁵⁹⁵ Protokol otčetno-vybornogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MIDa SSSR, [Minutes of the report-election meeting of the party organization of the MID] 02-10/12/1959, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 630, 45.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 16/11/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 677, 75.

powerful transnational movements based on cooperation between the West and the East.⁵⁹⁸

In the Soviet foreign missions, international organisations, and transnational movements during détente, the place given to press outlets is striking. Détente changed the landscape of Soviet publications dedicated to the world beyond the Union's borders. In addition to *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud*, and *Kommunist*, new materials appeared to support Soviet foreign policy. For instance *International Life* (*Meždunarodnaâ žizn'*) was founded by the MID in November 1953 with an ambitious print run of 50-75,000 copies.⁵⁹⁹ The review *USSR*, soon renamed *Soviet Life* (*Sovetskaâ Žizn'*), was launched in October 1956 to spread Soviet propaganda in capitalist countries. The review *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, based in Prague, appeared in September 1958. Conceived as a forum for discussion between representatives of communist parties across the world, this review reached a circulation of more than half a million and was read in some 145 countries.⁶⁰⁰ *Problems of Peace and Socialism* was of special significance to the *meždunarodniki*. Former MGIMO Director Ūrij Francev was the managing editor of the review in the 1960: among the *meždunarodniki* of the Stalin era, 28 graduates declared they worked for *Problems of Peace and Socialism* in Prague after graduation from MGIMO.

A final aspect of the institutionalisation of détente under Khrushchev was the opening of several new research centres. As Oded Eran has pointed out, 'the globalization of Soviet foreign policies after the death of Stalin, and the varying degrees of the Soviet foreign aspirations, was reflected in the institutional proliferation of Soviet foreign policy studies during the Khrushchev era.'⁶⁰¹

A direct successor to Varga's Institute of World Economy and International Affairs (which existed from 1925 to 1948), the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO) was founded in 1956. With

⁵⁹⁸ Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, 25.

⁵⁹⁹ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 384.

⁶⁰⁰ Richard F. Staar, *Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union*, 1st edition (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), 93.

⁶⁰¹ Eran, *Mezhdunarodniki, an Assessment of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 63.

a specific focus on theoretical and applied socio-economic research and political and policy-oriented research on international affairs, the IMEMO gained a strong reputation and maintained specific relationships with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the department of international relations of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It gave birth to a series of regional research institutions in the following decade, with the opening of the Institute of the International Labour Movement in 1966 and the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in 1967.

Oded Eran notes that the foundation of several research institutions was strongly related to the political changes that occurred after Stalin's death. He writes:

Because of the lack of an absolute single authority and the coalition-nature of the regimes ruling the Kremlin since Stalin's death, the institutional development of area-research projects has been, to a degree, reflective of distributions and re-distributions of power positions between the various participants in the ongoing political bargaining inside the Kremlin.⁶⁰²

While this scholar stresses that the opening of research institutions was related to the political dimension of the Thaw, important evolutions in *meždunarodniki* professional trajectories reveal that the 're-distribution of power positions' went well beyond the Kremlin walls. The proliferation of Soviet missions abroad, the launch of new reviews, and the opening of research institutions gave a concrete and stable basis for Khrushchev's *détente*, which consequently required a considerable number of personnel. It was inside this new institutional framework that the *meždunarodniki* built their careers and promoted those they identified as 'svoi'.

Promoting 'svoi' in a powerful network of institutions related to foreign affairs

For the first time since the foundation of MGIMO, the *meždunarodniki* found themselves in a favourable environment, one which emphasised the value of their expertise in international relations and their political and social skills. The reduction of institutions dedicated to the training of specialists in foreign affairs, the

⁶⁰² Ibidem.

establishment of explicit career paths, the development of a set of institutions related to Soviet diplomacy, and the burgeoning of international ties and contacts between the USSR and the rest of the world; all of these elements promoted access to diplomatic careers. Yet, the *meždunarodniki* did not remain passive or indifferent to *détente*. They took advantage of the situation to build careers in this new institutional context. By supporting ‘*svoi*’ (‘us’/‘ours’), who were perceived as much more than just classmates, they succeeded in accessing and enduring within the Soviet diplomatic apparatus.⁶⁰³

During their years of study at the institute, the diversity of learning environments resulted in the development of a strong feeling of togetherness among MGIMO graduates. As mentioned in the second chapter, the content of the academic programmes and the organisation of teaching during the campaign against cosmopolitanism led to an unsurprising result: the expression of a strong level of solidarity among the *meždunarodniki*. This feeling of sharing something in common with other MGIMO graduates was certainly significant in the period of transition from Stalin to Khrushchev.

Of the MGIMO graduates who encountered professional difficulties during and after Stalin’s era, several describe how ties of solidarity particularly mattered in their careers. After Èduard Rozental lost his job following the Doctor’s Plot in 1953, he benefited from the helping hands of two classmates. While he was denied access to several jobs after his resignation, his classmate Rafik Saakov offered him employment at the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace.⁶⁰⁴ Another MGIMO comrade, Vladimir Angarskij, helped him to find a side job when he began a PhD programme.⁶⁰⁵ Finally, at the beginning of the Thaw, Rozental managed to join the press agency *Novosti*.

Similarly, Ûrij Tumanov recalls that when he was deprived of the possibility of working at the MID, he joined the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting with the

⁶⁰³ For more details about the notion of ‘*svoi*’, see: Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 102.

⁶⁰⁴ Èduard Rozental’s memoirs are quoted in Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 235.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

help of his MGIMO schoolmate Viktor Agapov.⁶⁰⁶ Like Rozental, he avoided downward social mobility in the late Stalin era thanks to assistance from his friends. Of course, the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace and the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting were less prestigious than the MID or powerful mass-media outlets like *Pravda* or *Izvestia*. Nonetheless, these institutions acted as a safety net for many MGIMO graduates through which they could maintain their careers in Soviet diplomacy.

The situations touched on by Rozental and Tumanov are all the more revealing because they reflect the nature of the ties built at MGIMO. The solidarity towards those considered 'svoi' was based neither on common social origins nor direct personal knowledge. Whereas Rozental is a rather typical representative of the children of the Soviet intelligentsia, Saakov was a very modest veteran from the provinces. Karen Kačaturov reminisced about his friend Konstantin Engoân, who found a job in the Georgian newspaper *Večernij Tbilisi* after graduating from MGIMO in 1950. According to Kačaturov, Engoân kept his job thanks to the 'MGIMO brotherhood' (*mgimovskaâ vzaimovyručka*).⁶⁰⁷ When he was threatened with dismissal, Engoân received unexpected support from the young Central Committee functionary and MGIMO graduate Leon Onikov during a visit to Georgia. The two *meždunarodniki* did not know each other before they met in Tbilisi, but their common experience at the institute was enough for Onikov to come to Engoân's assistance.

MGIMO graduates knew how to make use of the ties they had developed during their education: they also quickly learned to defend their cause through the different levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. When Ol' var Kakučaâ was refused a full-time position at the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting in the 1950s, he could count on the support of Nikolaj Šišlin and Leon Onikov.⁶⁰⁸ The two MGIMO graduates succeeded in arranging an interview with the chief of the propaganda department at the Central Committee where they both worked. By using the

⁶⁰⁶ Ůrij Tumanov's memoirs are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 201.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., 236.

⁶⁰⁸ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 184.

supremacy of Communist Party over state structures, they got Kakučá the position he desired at the Radio Committee.

From Stalin to Khrushchev, MGIMO graduates learned to wage a permanent struggle for their positions, trapped as they were between the suspicion of the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state on the one hand and the army of specialists in foreign affairs who looked at them with envy on the other. In the context of the insecurity at the heart of the Stalinist regime, the ties of solidarity developed at the institute were crucial when it came to maintaining careers in foreign affairs. With the blossoming of détente and MGIMO graduates' improved access to positions of responsibility, these ties became an even more important resource.

Once again, Édouard Rozental's professional trajectory reveals much about how the 'MGIMO brotherhood' was deployed in the development of careers. At the beginning of the Thaw, Rozental worked for *Novosti*. However, he believed that his career was stagnating. He asked his superiors to send him to overseas, but the HR department replied that his request had to be rejected because he had no experience of visiting a foreign capitalist country. However, his classmate Nikolaj Sofinskij, the Soviet vice minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education at the beginning of the 1960s, offered him a teaching mission in Mali.⁶⁰⁹ Once in Bamako, Rozental recalls that he benefited from the support of Igor ' Makarevič, another MGIMO graduate and Soviet diplomat, who helped him to stay overseas despite the animosity of the Soviet ambassador to Mali.⁶¹⁰

Rozental's memoirs are important for understanding the role of MGIMO solidarity in the development of careers. They also reflect that the graduate believed he had a specific role to play within Soviet society: despite numerous professional difficulties, Rozental implemented career strategies with the support of other MGIMO graduates. His successful application to *Novosti*, his PhD defence, and his mission in Africa were moments when the aid of other MGIMO graduates particularly mattered: it helped him to secure a particular social role within the Soviet Union. Thanks to similar ties,

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., 236.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

numerous MGIMO graduates were able to improve their careers in a wide spectrum of institutions during the Thaw.

If we compare the job situation of *meždunarodniki* in 1951 and in 1960, one observes that MGIMO graduates clearly succeeded in improving their professional situation.⁶¹¹ They developed career strategies in the organisations where they had been present since the Stalin era, such as mass-media outlets and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were able to join key institutions related to Soviet diplomacy and *détente*, such as the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and international organisations. Lastly, they benefited greatly from the opening of new foreign policy research institutions in the framework of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and, more particularly, at IMEMO.

As already noted, 559 MGIMO graduates were already working at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1959:⁶¹² an average of 60 *meždunarodniki* were supposed to join the MID on an annual basis in the forthcoming years.⁶¹³ Of 3,168 MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1959,⁶¹⁴ a total of 20 per cent joined the MID over the whole period. This is a rather large proportion when one considers the suspicion that surrounded MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1956. The figure is even more impressive when we note that the relative weight of MGIMO graduates at the ministry gradually increased during the same period. In December 1956, the entire ministerial staff consisted of 2,117 people in December 1959:⁶¹⁵ the *meždunarodniki* represented 30 per cent of the MID apparatus in June 1960. By the end of 1962, the symbolic

⁶¹¹ Appendix 6: The job placement of the MGIMO alumni of the Stalin era in March 1951 and in 1960.

⁶¹² Protokol otčetno-vybornogo sobraniâ i otčetnyj doklad partkoma MIDa, [Minutes of the report-election meeting and report of the party committee of the MID], 02/12/1958, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 595, 94.

⁶¹³ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 27/02/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 716, 1.

⁶¹⁴ This figure is found by counting the number of alumni each year between 1948 and 1959: Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*; Boris Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1955-1957 gg.'* [MGIMO Alumni yearbook 1955-1957] (Moskva: MGIMO, 2000); Boris Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1958-1960 gg.'* [MGIMO Alumni yearbook 1958-1960] (Moskva: MGIMO, 2004).

⁶¹⁵ Protokol otčetno-vybornogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MIDa SSSR, [Minutes of the report-election meeting of the party organization of the MID] 09-10/12/1959, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 716, 39.

figure of 1,000 MGIMO graduates were enrolled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶¹⁶

More importantly, the positions which MGIMO graduates could access improved qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Numerous alumni of the Stalin era recalled the moment when they finally got a job in a Soviet mission located in a capitalist country. Rostislav Sergeev became one of Gromyko's assistants and took part into several major diplomatic talks.⁶¹⁷ Vladimir Rodin was included in the first Soviet diplomatic delegation sent to West Germany in 1955.⁶¹⁸ At almost the same time, Ūrij Rahmaninov became the press agent of the Soviet embassy to Belgium,⁶¹⁹ while Vladimir Snegirev became first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Paris in 1960.⁶²⁰ In Eastern countries, the career development of *meždunarodniki* was also obvious. Mihail Kurbackij became the Soviet vice consul in China⁶²¹ and Genrih Kireev would hold the positions of third, second, and first secretary at the Soviet embassy in China between 1960 and 1966.⁶²²

During their missions overseas, numerous *meždunarodniki* met other MGIMO graduates they had not known personally during their time at the institute but with whom they nevertheless felt a shared bond. In 1960, Ūrij Teplov was appointed second secretary at the Soviet embassy in London,⁶²³ where he soon became acquainted with Boris Aver'ânov, who was in charge of relations with the British trade unions. Vasilij Safrončunk, another MGIMO graduate who had defended a PhD

⁶¹⁶ Stenogramma i protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the party committee of the MGIMO party organization], 19/12/1962, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 85, 232.

⁶¹⁷ Abdulhan Ahtamzân and Igor' Pavlenko, 'Sergeev Rostislav Aleksandrovič – prezident Asociacii vypusnikov MGIMO v 1991–2004 gg.', *Žurnal Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, Zolotoj Fond, 32, no. 5 (2013): 299–300.

⁶¹⁸ Torkunov Anatolij et al., '*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*' (1947-1952), 204.

⁶¹⁹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 156.

⁶²⁰ Torkunov Anatolij et al., '*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*' (1947-1952), 247.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 183.

⁶²² Ibid., 159.

⁶²³ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 152.

thesis following the completion of his course of study, also held the position of economic counsellor (*sovetnik po ekonomike*) at the London embassy.⁶²⁴

A similar phenomenon was observed in the United States: just as in Great Britain, career opportunities were created in accordance with the priorities of détente. Despite his young age, Valerij Ūr'ev was appointed first secretary at the Soviet embassy to Washington in 1956 in order to manage the circulation of the review *Soviet Life* in the USA.⁶²⁵ Later, he met the MGIMO graduates Âkov Ostrovskij, who joined the Washington embassy in 1960, and Ūlij Voroncov. The latter became an attaché and then a counsellor before joining the USSR's permanent representation to the United Nations in New York. In his memoirs, Voroncov observes tellingly, 'regardless of the country where we were sent, we suddenly met one of ours from the institute.'⁶²⁶

The *meždunarodniki* collectively advanced their careers not only at the MID, but also in mass-media outlets. MGIMO solidarity mattered all the more when they began to occupy positions of responsibility in editorial boards. Ūrij Alimov recalls that Vladimir Gorodnov was able to assist Anatolij Koškin to find a job principally because of his position as the deputy chief editor of the publisher *Progress*.⁶²⁷ Ūrij Suhanov mentions that he was indebted to Aleksej Strigannov for his first mission to France during the Thaw. While the two men had never met before, when Strigannov, as the representative of Sovinformburo in Paris, started looking for a second in command, he immediately turned to a MGIMO graduate.⁶²⁸

After 1956, the arrival of *meždunarodniki* in the Central Committee of the CPSU and international organisations was also clear. While very few of their number gained access to the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU during the Stalin era,⁶²⁹ no fewer than 33 MGIMO graduates of this period declared in their memoirs that they joined the Central Committee apparatus, especially the international

⁶²⁴ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:247.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., 1:237.

⁶²⁶ 'Priezžaeš' v kakuû-nibud' stranu i vdruk vidiš' "svoego", s kursa.' Torkunov Anatolij et al., '*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*' (1947-1952), 54.

⁶²⁷ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 9.

⁶²⁸ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:508.

⁶²⁹ 'O raspredelenii vypusnikov IMO i VDSH', 24/03/1951, ['About the job placement of MGIMO and HDS alumni'], RGASPI, fond 82, opis' 2, delo 1030.

department, during the Thaw. Vadim Zagladin certainly had the most brilliant career of these individuals. After a few years spent at the editorial board of the *Novoe Vremâ* newspaper, he defended a PhD thesis and taught at MGIMO between 1949 and 1956. In 1964, he was appointed first deputy secretary of the international department of the Central Committee, which was then directed by Boris Ponomarev. He remained in his position until 1988.⁶³⁰ In a similar way, the USSR's restoration of international organisations strongly favoured MGIMO graduates. 21 *meždunarodniki* of the Stalin era indicate that they joined such an organisation during the Thaw. Grigorij Kislov recalls that the redefinition of Soviet priorities in the international area was connected with his transfer from the permanent mission of the USSR to the United Nations office in Geneva to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), an institution which had practically been abandoned under Stalin.⁶³¹

Lastly, the opening of new research institutions dedicated to foreign affairs during détente were a major opportunity for those who had defended a PhD thesis after graduation. Records of the MGIMO library reveal that 344 dissertations were defended at the institute between 1951 and 1964.⁶³² 74 *meždunarodniki* mention that they joined institutions related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences after defending their theses: among them were IMEMO, the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of History, and the Institute of Comparative Politics. The trajectories of Nikolay Inozemcev and Georgy Arbatov are particularly illuminating. While historians have often stressed their role in the preparation for the diplomatic changes of the Gorbachev era,⁶³³ their trajectories show much about the new professional opportunities available to the *meždunarodniki* during détente. Both Inozemcev and Arbatov began PhD theses while holding jobs in journalism after graduation from MGIMO in 1949. They never joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but still led breath-taking careers as two of the foremost Soviet specialists in international relations. From 1959 to 1961, Inozemcev was deputy director of

⁶³⁰ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:67.

⁶³¹ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 102.

⁶³² This figure was reached by counting the number of PhD theses defended each year at MGIMO between 1951 and 1964.

⁶³³ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 125.

IMEMO. In 1961, he became deputy chief editor of *Pravda*⁶³⁴ before being appointed as director of IMEMO in 1966. After several years as a journalist at the review *Kommunist* and a researcher at the Academy of Sciences, Arbatov founded the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in 1967.⁶³⁵

With the proliferation of institutions related to foreign affairs and their strategies for building a career in this new institutional context, the *meždunarodniki* also accumulated the social and material resources needed to establish a strong common social position within Soviet society.

The salaries of diplomats and Soviet specialists sent overseas increased during the *détente*. In December 1957, functionaries of the MID HR department agreed on the necessity of improving the working conditions of Soviet diplomats sent to Oriental countries.⁶³⁶ Aware of the importance of preserving the attractiveness of diplomatic positions in the East, they decided to align wages with those of Soviet specialists sent to Western capitalist countries. Moreover, a decree of the Council of Ministers had a strong effect on the material situation of the *meždunarodniki*. On 7 October 1958, the Council of Ministers changed the rules regarding the working conditions of Soviet workers abroad,⁶³⁷ authorising the payment of salaries in foreign currencies.

The opening of new institutions also gave access to concrete privileges at the same time that changes in Soviet foreign policy made new consumer goods available.⁶³⁸ As Matthews stresses, ‘many top-ranking organizations (e.g. the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, the KGB, Academy of Sciences, and Ministry of Defence) had their own housing stocks which are of good standard, centrally located and sometimes provided with cleaning and special delivery services’.⁶³⁹ Despite the acute housing

⁶³⁴ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 1*, 1:78.

⁶³⁵ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO’va Tom 2*, 2:264.

⁶³⁶ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 13/12/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 569, 73.

⁶³⁷ Postanovlenie ot Soveta Ministrov SSSR ot 7 oktâbrâ 1958 g. N° 1120-540 ob ‘usloviâh truda sovetских rabotnikov za granicej’ [Council of Ministers’ decree on 7 October 1958 N°1120-540 about the working conditions of the Soviet workers abroad].

⁶³⁸ Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, 3.

⁶³⁹ Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union*, 43.

shortage, the most powerful state and party organisations possessed housing stocks and provided places of leisure and special medical services for ministerial staff.⁶⁴⁰

As we have seen, the years spent at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge resulted in both the emergence of a strong identity among MGIMO graduates and binding ties among the *meždunarodniki*. Détente also strengthened the cohesion of this specific social group. Even though Stalin's death resulted in a certain opening of the USSR to the world outside, opportunities to work and travel abroad remained rare until the Gorbachev era.⁶⁴¹ Both in missions overseas and in Moscow, the *meždunarodniki* often shared a common way of life. Détente made available new consumer goods and services. These privileges meant that the group shared common social practices based on the consumption of Western and superior Soviet goods and visitation rights to socially prestigious locations, such as the network of foreign currency and certificate shops known as *berezka*.

In the context of détente, new structures related to foreign affairs provided MGIMO graduates the career opportunities required to attain a high social status. For those *meždunarodniki* who did not joined the MID, heading the foreign representation of mass-media such as *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, taking part in the editorial boards of reviews based in Prague or Washington, or building a scholarly career in the Academy of Sciences were possible alternatives. In advancing their careers, *meždunarodniki* could count on the support of their fellows. However, they also attained immaterial resources which were of a considerably different nature.

After graduation in 1949, Boris Ūrinov joined the Soviet intelligence services. In his memoirs, he recalls that access to information and the development of ties within the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state were of especial importance as the *mezhhdunarodniki* built their careers.⁶⁴² He notes that Sergej Romanovskij, Valentin Vdovin, and Evgenij Grigor'ev all joined the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth in 1947 for internships during their studies. According to Ūrinov, this experience was particularly useful for the three graduates, as their participation

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., 47.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., 51.

⁶⁴² Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:539.

resulted in the development of a powerful network of contacts. Both Romanovskij and Vdovin joined the MID in 1959. They were among the first MGIMO graduates to become ambassadors: Vdovin became Soviet ambassador to Chad in 1965 and Romanovskij was appointed Soviet ambassador to Norway in 1968. As far as Evgenij Grigor'ev is concerned, he became the deputy chief editor of *Pravda* in the 1960s.

Some *meždunarodniki* can be identified as career diplomats or journalists. Vladimir Čerednik,⁶⁴³ Vitalij Agapov,⁶⁴⁴ and Ūrij Zolotov⁶⁴⁵ spent their entire careers at the MID, moving up from the position of trainee to that of Soviet ambassador. In journalism, Vadim Nekrasov spent more than 20 years at *Pravda*, finally becoming a deputy chief editor.⁶⁴⁶ However, defining the professions of the majority of the *meždunarodniki* between the 1950s and the 1970s exactly is not an easy task: MGIMO graduates could be diplomats, journalists, researchers, or functionaries at the Central Committee at various stages of their careers.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., 2:524.

⁶⁴⁴ Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 36.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 54.

⁶⁴⁶ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:109.

Table 6: The professional trajectories of Romanovskij, Ambarcumov and Švedkov in the Soviet organizations related to foreign affairs

MGIMO Graduate	MID	International organization	Newspaper	Institution of research and teaching	Review	Central Committee	Soviet State organization
Sergej Romanovskij (1949)	Soviet ambassador to Norway (1968)	Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Budapest	Deputy Chief editor at the international Department of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper			Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League	Soviet Vice-Minister of Culture and Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
Evgenij Ambarcumov (1951)	Soviet diplomatic delegation to East Germany (1952) Ambassador of the Russian Federation		Journalist in the newspaper <i>Novoe vremâ</i>	Head of Department at IMEMO	Redactor for the Problems of Peace and Socialism review		
Ūrij Švedkov (1949)	Functionnary at the MID Department of the USA and Canada (1958-1963)			Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies of the Academy of Sciences (1968)		Functionnary at the international Department at the Central Committee of the CPSU (1963-1968)	

The professional biographies of meždunarodniki tell us much about these transitions from one profession to the next: it was this flexibility that enabled them to make long careers. For instance, before being appointed as Soviet ambassador to Norway, Romanovskij was a deputy chief editor at *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Budapest, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, Soviet vice minister of Culture, and deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. His trajectory was not an isolated case.

Evgenij Ambarcumov is another demonstrative example of the upward mobility of the meždunarodniki. He rose from the rank of trainee to the position of ambassador over the course of several decades. Nonetheless, he did not spend his entire career at the MID. After graduation, he took part in a Soviet diplomatic delegation to East Germany in 1952. Upon his return, however, the Soviet MID could not find him a job; thus, he became a journalist on the editorial board of *Novoe vremâ*. He also

enrolled in a PhD programme, which enabled him IMEMO to recruit him in 1956. After three years in Prague in the 1960s as an editor for *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, he became a head of department at IMEMO. Upon Gorbachev's appointment as first secretary of the CPSU, he strongly supported perestroika and was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Finally, after the downfall of the USSR, he returned to the MID, holding the position of ambassador.⁶⁴⁷

Ůrij Švedkov's professional trajectory also shows how MGIMO graduates made their expertise and social and political skills attractive. After graduation, Švedkov defended a thesis in economics at MGIMO entitled 'Wall-Street Financial Magnates: The Projected Power of USA Imperialist Aggression in Western Europe'.⁶⁴⁸ Following his defence, Švedkov was an official at the MID department dedicated to the USA between 1958 and 1963 and the international department of the Central Committee between 1963 and 1968: he finally became a researcher at the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in 1968. At the end of his career, he was a first-class councillor at the MID.⁶⁴⁹

The trajectories of Romanovskij, Ambarcumov, and Švedkov are typical of the strategies implemented by meždunarodniki during détente. As diplomat Vladimir Ivanov underlines in his memoirs, the fact that MGIMO graduates managed to become part of a wide range of institutions during the Thaw was a crucial factor for success in Soviet society. He writes:

When I worked in London, there were two more of our classmates working too: the correspondent of *Pravda* Gennadij Vasil'ev and an employee of an international organisation Andrej Źudro. We met often and at any time were willing to give each other a helping hand in professional and everyday matters.⁶⁵⁰

Via their ability to chart a course through a variety of institutions, the meždunarodniki individually and collectively advanced their careers. To some extent, they finally

⁶⁴⁷ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 14.

⁶⁴⁸ Finansovyje magnaty Uoll-strita - napravlâûšaâ sila imperialističeskoj agressii SŠA v Zapadnoj Evrope.

⁶⁴⁹ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:224.

⁶⁵⁰ Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:351.

performed the function for which MGIMO was designed after years of suspicion: creating a strong connection between a distinct set of individuals and the specific sphere of foreign affairs. Their professional activity led them to not only engage in traditional state diplomacy, but also in international journalism, research and teaching, the secret services, and the party administration. These institutions offered both an opportunity to move up the social ladder and a guarantee that they could maintain control over foreign affairs for a body of people who felt as if they had a specific role.

PART III

Between Art and Science: Developing Distinguishing
Ways of Thinking and Acting towards Bourgeois
Theories at MGIMO (1956-1964)

External policy is a class-motivated policy in any kind of society. Therefore diplomacy, a tool of external policy, has always been and is class-motivated, whatever class society we refer to. [...] Bourgeois diplomacy is bound up with the ruling class of its society and that is why it protects the interests of the bourgeois society. Diplomatic issues have always been and are being resolved now by one caste of professional diplomats from privileged classes who carry orders from monarchs, banks, and industry. In capitalist countries, the common people 'from the street' are not allowed to have diplomatic jobs.⁶⁵¹

So began the speech of Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Leodinovič Orlov to members of the MGIMO primary party organisation on 26 April 1963. Together with MID Chief of Personnel Nikolaj Važnov, Orlov was invited to deliver the keynote address at the review meeting on the previous academic year. By putting emphasis on class struggle, the vice-minister reminded the audience that the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West conducted by the Soviet MID since 1956 did not signify the abandonment of class conflict in diplomacy: *détente* was just defence of the interests of the working class in the international arena by other means.

For Orlov, the fact that the foreign policies of capitalist countries were aimed at defending the interests of the bourgeoisie was not only explained by the economic nature of capitalism. According to him, it was deeply imbedded in the very sociological profile of their diplomatic corps. The vice-minister based his argument on three observations. Firstly, by using the archives of the tsarist diplomatic corps, he demonstrated that before 1861, the year when serfdom was abolished in the Russian Empire, diplomats were required by the foreign office to indicate the number of serfs they possessed in the questionnaire included in their personal files.⁶⁵² Looking through the personal record of Prince Golitsyn, a diplomat in the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was found that his father had had 7,500 serfs.⁶⁵³ The father of another Prince Golitsyn, a translator in the imperial diplomatic apparatus, had 13,000 serfs.⁶⁵⁴ Orlov mentioned that information about landed property replaced the requirement to detail the number of serfs in the questionnaire after 1861, thus

⁶⁵¹ Stenogramma obšego partiynogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, 26/04/1963, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, 88, 4.

⁶⁵² Ibid., 7.

⁶⁵³ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibidem.

showing the strong link between the interests of large landowners and the conduct of tsarist diplomacy. Secondly, by comparing the training of diplomats in socialist and capitalist countries, Orlov stressed that the British Foreign Office staffed its embassies with specialists who had graduated from Cambridge and Oxford universities, depicted by the vice-minister as the breeding grounds of 'the cream of the English bourgeoisie and aristocracy'.⁶⁵⁵ Lastly, he argued that, prior to John Kennedy's rise to power in 1962, a hallowed tradition of appointing rich people who had made a major contribution to the funds for the presidential election as ambassadors prevailed in the United States. Thus, he stressed that US diplomatic service explicitly defended the interests of millionaires in the international arena.⁶⁵⁶

In contrast with the examples drawn from capitalist countries, MGIMO was presented as a total success of the Soviet regime, which based its diplomacy on new recruitment and training procedures: this had provided a brand new diplomatic corps fully dedicated to the ideals of the Communist Party and the interests of the Soviet state. The Institute was clearly depicted as an anti-Oxbridge. Even though it shared with the two British universities the common ambition of being one of the most prestigious institutes of higher education in the world, the inclusion of new biographical criteria and teaching methods based on Marxism-Leninism allowed the Institute to train foreign offices cadres entirely devoted to working-class interests. According to Orlov, MGIMO provided 'politically competent and linguistically well-trained personnel for international affairs',⁶⁵⁷ specific skills he related to the place *meždunarodniki* occupied in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus at the beginning of the 1960s.

In 1963, 900 out of 3,550 MGIMO graduates were currently working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whether in the central apparatus or missions overseas.⁶⁵⁸ By including graduates working for institutions other than the MID (especially the Ministry of Foreign Trade), Orlov was able to show that 800 MGIMO graduates were working outside the Soviet Union.⁶⁵⁹ He stressed that many graduates already had

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., 17.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., 20.

responsible diplomatic jobs: they worked as deputy department heads, senior advisers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and senior commodities experts (*staršie tovarovedy*) in Soviet economic missions. At the same time, Orlov was pleased to announce that the policy of training students from socialist countries was already having a great effect in the defence of the interests of the world proletariat: among foreign MGIMO graduates, many were heads of departments and deputy ministers in their countries of origin: one had even risen to become a minister of foreign affairs.⁶⁶⁰

Orlov finally concluded his speech with the following statement: 'nowadays no agency or institution involved in foreign policy or foreign economic relations can do without graduates from your institution.'⁶⁶¹ The recurrent problem of *meždunarodniki* job placement was nothing more than a bad memory.

In addition to the review of the situation of MGIMO graduates in the Soviet diplomatic corps, Orlov provided guidance on the future training of *meždunarodniki* at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge. Using the symbolic figurehead of Lenin in his speech, he argued that diplomacy was a combination of art and science: 'Lenin taught the young diplomats that politics is science and art. It does not fall out of the sky and is not a gift; the proletariat, if it wants to conquer the bourgeoisie, must bring its own proletarian politicians and ensure that they are no worse than the bourgeois politicians.'⁶⁶²

In Orlov's statements, diplomacy was considered a science partly because it required learning a set of objective laws directly deriving from Marxism-Leninism. The

⁶⁶⁰ Vice-minister Orlov was obviously referring to Puntsagiyn Shagdarsüren, who graduated from MGIMO in 1953 and held the position of minister of foreign affairs in the Mongolian People's Republic between 1958 and 1963. Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 156. Among the other examples of MGIMO alumni from socialist countries who had bright diplomatic careers, one could mention Petar Mladenov, who, after his graduation in 1963, was the minister of foreign affairs in the Bulgarian People's Republic between 1971 and 1989. Boris Kurbatov, 'Vypusniki MGIMO MID SSSR 1961-1966 gg.' (MGIMO Universitet, 2005), 68. In the Soviet republics, the number of MGIMO alumni who were ministers of foreign affairs is particularly striking: Teymuraz Gordeladze, who graduated from MGIMO in 1949, was appointed minister of foreign affairs of the Georgian Socialist Republic between 1979 and 1981, Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 1*, 1:55. Bahadyr Abdurazanov and Malik Fazylov, who both graduated from MGIMO in 1950, held the same position in Uzbekistan between 1980 and 1985 and in Kazakhstan between 1973 and 1976 respectively, Kurbatov, *Sbornik 'Vypisniki MGIMO 1948-1954 gg.'*, 36, 47.

⁶⁶¹ Stenogramma obšego partiynogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 26/04/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, 88, 19.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, 13.

scientific and technical knowledge of foreign affairs was judged to be indispensable for predicting the future of international relations and the right position for by the Soviet state and its representatives. When referring to diplomacy as an art, Orlov stressed that a diplomat needed to have a set of special skills, a certain mind set and gestures, to serve his country with honour abroad. In order to be more accurate about the specific art and science the *meždunarodniki* needed to acquire and to show how Soviet diplomats had to distinguish themselves from their capitalist counterparts, he directly quoted Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov:

‘Learn the language, communicate with ordinary people; public figures, do not fence yourselves off from working people, as the ambassadors of the autocratic tsar did. They bribed the grand vizier and officials. This is not our way of doing business, we need to be friends with the common people.’⁶⁶³

However, Orlov also mentioned that knowing the bourgeois and aristocratic codes of capitalist diplomacy was also necessary. He added that a Soviet diplomat was expected to know the entire repertory of Bolshoi Theatre precisely, be familiar with classics of foreign literature, and develop the sharp repartee necessary for daily interactions in high society.⁶⁶⁴

Orlov’s statements clearly reflect the fact that both MGIMO and the *meždunarodniki* now occupied a central place in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus. Nonetheless, both *détente* and the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union marked an important intellectual turning point in the teaching strategies of the Institute. Even though discussions about the need to eradicate Stalin’s legacy from teaching programmes were not very original compared to those in other institutions of higher education,⁶⁶⁵ increasing student contacts with non-Soviet students, the creation of overseas internships, and the establishment of the MGIMO University Press had a strong impact on the education of *meždunarodniki*.

How did a set of new ideas distinct from official ideology become part of everyday life at MGIMO after the Twentieth Congress? What role did foreign students play in

⁶⁶³ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., 114.

⁶⁶⁵ Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia*, 129.

the rethinking of teaching strategies? How did the original project of considering MGIMO to be a socialist camp in miniature come about and what did it mean for the students? These questions are at the heart of the third part of this dissertation.

With a rapidly growing number of students enrolled in overseas internships, the question of the coexistence of official ideology and bourgeois theories in the Institute took a new turn at the end of the 1950s. The obligation to test the fidelity of students sent to the capitalist bloc led to the implementation of new teaching strategies. Just as during the Stalin era, having a life outside the Institute was identified as a matter of paramount importance: time spent in the world beyond its walls was fundamental for testing the concrete effects of bourgeois theories on students. Student dormitories and holiday camps were identified as privileged places for learning about the ways of life of MGIMO students; here, members of the Communist Party were responsible for testing loyalty to communist values and ideas. Knowing whether students were playing card games, identifying their reading habits, and establishing a list of their acquaintances were still considered effective methods for determining the extent of their affinity for interests and values contrary to those of the Soviet Union.

What distinguished *meždunarodniki* from other students was less their knowledge of foreign matters, which became more common in the late fifties, than their specific manner of dealing with them and their capacity to react to them: this third part of the thesis aims to explore this issue by examining MGIMO party primary organization's records and the teaching and research material from the 1950s and 60s. By instilling a specific way of being and acting, MGIMO's primary party organisation and administration made it clear that the introduction of bourgeois theories did not contradict official dogma. On the contrary, it was understood to be a part of MGIMO students' political training.

The idea that this meant the introduction of 'less ideologised' or 'de-ideologised' teaching at MGIMO is, at best, greatly oversimplified: binary categories of analysis, which oppose ideology and rationality or old and new thinking, do not reflect what occurred at MGIMO during the Thaw. Again, the term 'party nobility' is useful in the sense that it reflects that the teaching of contradictory knowledge was grounded in the development of new ways of thinking and acting among the *meždunarodniki*.

Introducing a set of foreign ideas was clearly aimed at both limiting the circulation of bourgeois ideology and testing student loyalty towards the regime. However, at the same time, this new intellectual context made a wide range of new ideas available.

In the fifth chapter, I will argue that while using material from conservative English and American newspapers had raised suspicion towards MGIMO teachers and students during the campaign against cosmopolitanism in the late 1940s, the Twentieth Congress, the introduction of overseas internships, and the wider enrolment of students from socialist countries were turning points that led to a surge of new ideas in the Institute after 1956. In addition to the necessity of preparing future *meždunarodniki* for struggling against bourgeois ideology, the development of sharp criticisms from non-Soviet students against the Soviet Union brought new burning issues to the fore. This wave of new ideas was often related to both major internal evolutions within the Soviet regime and diplomatic changes across the entire socialist bloc.

During a committee party meeting at MGIMO in 1961, the intervention of Yuri Andropov revealed how the renewal of teaching strategies was developed partly in reaction to open criticisms pronounced by non-Soviet students. Not only did Andropov stress that MGIMO played an important role in the future success of internationalism by educating the future diplomats of the socialist world, but he also argued that their criticisms had to be included into teaching programmes. In the sixth chapter, I will stress that instead of rejecting critical statements made by non-Soviet students or forbidding access to critical sources, teachers were encouraged to respond. By including both bourgeois and revisionist theories in teaching programmes, the goal was clearly to control and limit the possible diffusion of ideas hostile to the Soviet regime. Following the introduction of this completely new approach, students' schedules were modified in order to increase the number of seminars at the expense of lectures. Student participation was clearly encouraged; however, at the same time, MGIMO teachers were now expected to publish new manuals in order to teach students the art and science of recognising and criticising anti-communist statements.

CHAPTER 5

A SURGE OF NEW IDEAS IN MGIMO EVERYDAY LIFE

I want to say this about the statement of the Commission on Leaving for Abroad (*Kommissiâ po vyezdâ*) when comrades go to the briefing. [...] I think there is no need to embellish or exaggerate the situation in conversations with them. This is how it is. It seems to me that people leaving for a particular country should be told everything as it really is, because they will learn everything as soon as they reach their destination. Our main concern in this case should be to tell our personnel how to orientate themselves in the new situations in which they find themselves.⁶⁶⁶

Pavel Safonov, secretary of the primary party organisation of the MID HR department, 3 January 1957

Students receive information and they turn to us, members of the teaching staff, in order to receive some explanation about how to understand the standpoint of Chinese communists. The problem is that because this information originates from the Chinese Communist Party press and more specifically from the newspaper *The People's Daily*, the Chinese Communist Party pretends that official statements of the Albanian leaders are neutral, I would even say objective.⁶⁶⁷

Boris Isaenko, member of the MGIMO primary party organisation, 14 November 1961

Following Khrushchev's 'secret speech' on 25 February 1956, members of the MGIMO primary party organisation gathered together to discuss the 'outcomes of the Twentieth Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union and their implications for the MGIMO party organisation' on 26 March.⁶⁶⁸ Numerous participants openly admitted that the denunciation of Stalin's crimes and cult of personality came as quite a shock. However, it was the shared responsibility of the Communist Party in Stalin's

⁶⁶⁶ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij búro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa SSSR, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro meetings of the MID HR party organization], 03/01/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 8.

⁶⁶⁷ Stenogramma obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 121.

⁶⁶⁸ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 36.

cult and the scale of de-Stalinisation at MGIMO, especially in the teaching programmes, that were the burning issues for them. While Khrushchev's secret speech was certainly the biggest issue with which they were dealing, it was not the only one.

In the late 1950s, de-Stalinisation, coupled with the new opening of the USSR to the rest of the world, soon had direct and visible consequences on daily life in the Soviet Union. Some significant events made a decisive break with the Stalinist past. The Pablo Picasso exhibitions at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow and the State Hermitage Museum in Leningrad from October to December 1956,⁶⁶⁹ the publication of various American authors previously unavailable or forgotten in the USSR such as Ernest Hemingway or John Steinbeck,⁶⁷⁰ the rapid increase of Soviet tourism in Eastern Europe,⁶⁷¹ and the World Youth Festival in July-August 1957⁶⁷² clearly offered new possibilities to experience foreign cultures. These opportunities often aroused huge interest. It is a telling fact that some 2,700,000 Soviet citizens visited the American National Exhibition held in Moscow in 1959 during its six-week run: this attraction offered visitors a kind of virtual day trip to America.⁶⁷³ For MGIMO students, this new context was signified by the introduction of internships abroad for sixth-year students, the availability of new sources of information, and the arrival of a large number of students from the people's democracies, who came to represent up to a third of the student body in 1963.

Based on discussions within the MGIMO primary party organisation, this chapter focuses on how a surge of new ideas distinct from those of the official ideology appeared at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge at the end of the 1950s. The key task here will be to identify the origin of these new ideas, what it was that made them new, and the mechanisms for their creation and circulation in everyday life at MGIMO.

⁶⁶⁹ Eleonory Gilburd, 'Picasso in Thaw Culture', *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 47, no. 1 (1 September 2008): 65–108.

⁶⁷⁰ Stephen Jan Parker, 'Hemingway's Revival in the Soviet Union: 1955-1962', *American Literature* 35, no. 4 (1964): 485–501.

⁶⁷¹ Anne E. Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 79.

⁶⁷² Ilic and Smith, *Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev*, 46.

⁶⁷³ Susan E. Reid, 'Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959', *Kritika* 9, no. 4 (2008): 857.

Special attention will be paid to PhD dissertations, since these can help determine the concrete ideas and approaches related to this new openness.

Firstly, I will argue that the Twentieth Congress pushed members of the MGIMO primary party organisation to undertake a series of reflections on teaching at the Institute. Debates surrounding the consequences of the secret speech focused on the various criteria for eradicating Stalin's legacy from the teaching programme, the relationship between print and speech, and the problem of the circulation of knowledge within the socialist bloc. Secondly, one of the central pillars of Khrushchev's education reform, which dealt with 'strengthening the ties between *'school and life'*', offered new opportunities for both MGIMO students and teachers, providing them with access to travel and new sources of information. Thirdly, I will focus on the impact of the presence of students from socialist countries at MGIMO, since they played a key role in the circulation of knowledge at the Institute and often threatened the authority of what was taught after 1956.

This wave of new ideas at the Institute cannot be reduced to a result of the confrontation with the West: it was the consequence of both domestic and foreign changes, including important evolutions throughout the socialist bloc. In order to capture how these ideas suddenly surged through everyday life at the Institute in the middle of the 1950s, one first of all needs to raise the question of whether this new openness to the foreign world, including the West, was a shock for MGIMO students and their teachers during the Thaw.

A shock from the West: reality and fantasy

The direct and indirect consequences of the opening of the USSR to the foreign world as a result of both détente and de-Stalinisation have long attracted scholars' attention. For Vladislav Zubok, the rediscovery of the world following détente necessarily went together with a 'culture shock'.⁶⁷⁴ According to this scholar, 'the growing exposure to foreign influences began, very slowly, to shape the minds of larger groups of educated

⁶⁷⁴ Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children - The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 94.

Russians, especially youth in Moscow and Leningrad.’⁶⁷⁵ Robert English highlighted almost the same process, though in a more radical way, claiming that first-hand exposure to the West during the Thaw had a devastating impact on the old beliefs and stereotypes inherited from Stalin’s era. He makes a direct correlation between participants in Thaw-era exchanges and those who later emerged as prominent ‘Westernising’ reformers during the Gorbachev era.⁶⁷⁶

Assessing the extent to which the opening up of the USSR was a shock for MGIMO students and how it shaped *meždunarodniki* minds is, however, a more difficult task than it may at first seem. As already mentioned in chapter 2, the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet MID had created powerful mechanisms to ensure *meždunarodniki* loyalty despite their contact with the outside world during the Stalin era. The trustworthiness of MGIMO students and graduates from underprivileged families was often guaranteed by a feeling of gratitude towards the Communist Party. Although the graduate Vladimir Denisov became fully aware of Stalin’s crimes after 1956, he still confessed that his belief in the superiority of both the Soviet regime and Marxism-Leninism was based on his very personal experience of the social mobility he had enjoyed as a result of his enrolment at MGIMO.⁶⁷⁷ For students and graduates from more privileged families, it also seems hard to speak of a shock when a new window onto the rest of the globe was opened. Lev Šutkin suggests that the contrast between standards of life in Sweden and the Soviet Union, ‘where life had never been sweet either before or after World War II’ (*sladkaâ žizn’*), was striking. However, he had noticed this well before his admission to MGIMO: it had come to his attention during his youth when his father used to work at the Soviet Trade Representation in Stockholm.⁶⁷⁸

Years of study at MGIMO mattered as well. In his memoirs, Anatolij Antonov recalls that he joined the MID after graduation and was soon sent to Austria, where he was

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., 89.

⁶⁷⁶ Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 75.

⁶⁷⁷ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor’ Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 81.

⁶⁷⁸ Torkunov Anatolij et al., ‘*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*’ (1947-1952), 292.

upon Stalin's death in March 1953. He admits that he and his classmates noticed the contrast in living standards between capitalist and communist countries. He also used to regularly read the conservative press, which, as he recalls, was particularly critical about Stalinism. Yet, the MGIMO graduate stresses that 'the system of ideological training he received during his years of study was particularly effective'.⁶⁷⁹ It provided him with a kind of 'ideological immunity',⁶⁸⁰ which supported his belief about the superiority of the Soviet Union as a political, moral, and economic model. He admits that it was not until the Twentieth Congress in 1956, when the critique of Stalinism was internal, that he began to express doubts about the validity of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was not necessarily a shock, since it still took him a long time to 'progressively shed a black and white image of foreign affairs'.⁶⁸¹

The plurality of criteria used by *meždunarodniki* to describe the contrast they perceived between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world is also revealing. In their studies of the Cold War, scholars such as Walter Hixson and Victoria de Grazia often privilege an economic approach, which stresses the importance of living standards and consumer goods, when analysing the relationship of the Soviet people to the West.⁶⁸² However, many MGIMO alumni reveal that they included a wide spectrum of values in their assessment of the capitalist world. Graduate Roman Krest'âninov admits that the contrast in living standards between Belgium and the Soviet Union was obvious by the end of the 1950s, but this discovery was associated with an ethical judgement. In his memoirs, he recalls very precisely his pure and simple rejection of 'the values of selfish Western consumerism', which he considered doomed to disappear with the triumph of worldwide communism.⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁸⁰ The expression is from the MGIMO graduate Roman Krest'âninov in Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 162.

⁶⁸¹ Torkunov Anatolij et al., *'A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...' (1947-1952)*, 13.

⁶⁸² Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War*, 1998 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 213; Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2006), 356.

⁶⁸³ Anatolij Torkunov et al., *Vremâ strelki železnye dvižet...*, 162.

The statements of Denisov, Šutkin, Antonov, and Krest'âninov show that their discovery of the foreign world was not necessarily associated with a 'shock': it was a longer and more multi-dimensional process of forming a new perception of the internal political and economic situation of the Soviet Union. Their statements often reflect the fact that their views on foreign states or Stalin's crimes were related to the social position they occupied within Soviet society. Having benefited from upward mobility during the Stalin era or knowing the capitalist world before studying at MGIMO logically had an effect on graduates' perception of the foreign world. Lastly, the graduates argue that they paid attention to where and how they had gotten information about the Soviet regime. Antonov, for instance, distinguished between the critique of the Soviet Union in bourgeois newspapers and the internal attack on Stalin's crimes pronounced by Soviet communists themselves in 1956.

The memoirs of MGIMO graduates serve as a reminder that historians must be cautious about the correlations they make. As Anne Gorsuch rightly points out in her study on Soviet tourism at home and abroad after Stalin, 'for many elite travellers in the late 1950s and 1960s, it was possible for them to admire, purchase, and envy Western consumer goods, and still believe in the future of Soviet socialism.'⁶⁸⁴ Experiencing foreign realities did not inevitably lead to anti-Soviet opinions or actions. The historian argues that even though some travellers did become oppositionists after visiting the West, for many in the Khrushchev era, a trip to the capitalist world reaffirmed their high social status within a positively viewed system. In her study on the American National Exhibition held in Moscow in 1959, Susan Reid reaches almost the same conclusion that close encounters with the West did not inexorably lead to discrediting the communist project. She stresses that 'the advantages of a system that promised social security, services, housing, and free education and health care still represented important sources of identification and patriotic pride.'⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸⁴ Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 166.

⁶⁸⁵ Reid, 'Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959', 858.

The real impact of the confrontation with foreign realities on *meždunarodniki* minds needs to be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the Institute's archives reveal the real anxiety members of the MGIMO primary party organisation and the Soviet MID had about regular student contacts with the outside world. No matter how true or imaginary this culture shock was for the majority of students, the primary party organisation and the MID took the idea that first-hand exposure to foreign ideas could lead to subversion very seriously.

In 1957, Pavel Safonov, secretary of the primary party organisation of the MID HR department, prescribed that 'people leaving for a particular country should be told everything as it really is, because they will learn everything as soon as they reach their destination.'⁶⁸⁶ In other words, it was better for people sent abroad to learn from the ministry itself the differences between the USSR and capitalist countries than wait for them to shape their own opinion once outside the Soviet Union.

During his visit to MGIMO in 1963, Vice-minister Orlov came to the same conclusion and, with small variations, made the same recommendations:

Our specialist who goes abroad and who is just 22-25 years old directly meets hostile anti-Soviet, anti-communist propaganda, and it is necessary to have a really resistant steel to endure this; he also must have excellent political toughening and ideological training. When you get into Paris or New York, you see devil-knows-what kinds of pictures: for example, posters with half-naked and naked women /laughter/. You are laughing at it, but this pornography is around you and rushing at you. That is why our specialists must be well prepared from the ideological point of view.⁶⁸⁷

Orlov's reference to pictures of nude females flooding the streets of New York and Paris was welcomed with some amusement during the meeting. Nonetheless, his

⁶⁸⁶ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij būro partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDa SSSR, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro meetings of the MID HR party organization], 03/01/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 569, 8.

⁶⁸⁷ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization] 26/04/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 88, 111.

choice to use the example of erotic images in capitalist countries was significant: his statements made clear the strong relationship between the subversive power of foreign realities and the preparation meždunarodniki should receive at the Institute before entering the supposedly perverted West.

First-hand exposure of MGIMO students to the West caused considerable concern among the Soviet authorities. From their point of view, regular contacts between MGIMO students and the foreign world was still a risk, even though the USSR was deliberately and increasingly opening up during détente. Indeed, discussions surrounding Stalin's cult of personality, overseas internships, and the presence of numerous foreign students made exposure to foreign realities and different opinions a fact of life at the Institute after 1956.

Eradicating Stalin's legacy: a plurality of paths

In order to show how Khrushchev's secret speech was perceived and discussed by MGIMO members of the Communist Party on 26 March 1956, one needs to understand how the Twentieth Congress came to an unexpected end on the night of 25 February 1956. The very manner in which the first secretary of the CPSU set out an unrelenting indictment of Stalin's crimes clearly framed the discussions conducted by the members of the MGIMO primary party organisation and their various proposals to eradicate Stalin's legacy from the Institute's programmes.

As a consequence of the legal rehabilitation of purge victims, which began as early as 1953 with the exoneration of those accused in the Doctors' Plot and the charges against L. Beria and G. Malenkov, a session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU held on 31 December 1955 focused on questions related to rehabilitations. A special commission headed by Pyotr Pospelov was established with the specific aim of inquiring how it had been possible to carry out mass repression against the members and candidate members of the party elected in 1934 at the

Seventeenth Congress.⁶⁸⁸ The report produced by Pospelov's commission documented the ruthless scale of Stalin's crimes. It stated that, between 1937 and 1938, 1,548,366 people had been repressed, 700,000 of whom were executed.⁶⁸⁹

Despite in-depth and advance preparation, Khrushchev's secret speech, partly based on Pospelov's report, was highly unexpected by the delegates of the Twentieth Congress. Attendees were given no advance warning of what to anticipate: the Congress had formally ended as planned during the afternoon. Deliberations following Khrushchev's intervention took place in a closed session without the presence of any foreign comrades, making the meeting as secret as it was unscheduled.

In his speech, Khrushchev carefully detailed the repressions, arrests, terror, and murders for which the once revered leader was responsible. The attention of the audience was drawn to Lenin's testament, copies of which had been distributed to delegates, where the revolutionary leader accused Stalin of 'rudeness': Khrushchev also quoted letters some victims had written to Stalin from prison, giving a radically new image of purge victims.⁶⁹⁰ In addition to accusations and hints of accusations, including the suggestion of Stalin's culpability in the murder of Sergey Kirov, the cult of personality, which meant one-man rule associated with a revered image built through mass media, was also denounced.

Ruthless in its indictment of Stalin's deeds, Khrushchev's secret speech was still very careful in its limitations. As the historian David Priestland points out, the first secretary concentrated on criticising the 1936-38 Terror without condemning some very important aspects of the Stalinist system, such as forced collectivisation and industrialisation, the centralisation of political power, or the responsibility of the

⁶⁸⁸ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and Serge Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev* (Penn State Press, 2006), 206.

⁶⁸⁹ Pikhoia, Vaksberg, and Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir*, 284.

⁶⁹⁰ Miriam Dobson, 'POWs and Purge Victims: Attitudes towards Party Rehabilitation, 1956-57', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86, no. 2 (April 2008): 330.

People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in the purges.⁶⁹¹ The Communist Party appeared to be a helpless victim more than an agent which took part in Stalin's actions. By calling for a return to the revolutionary fight to transform society, Khrushchev aimed to restore the place of the Communist Party and Leninist ideals in the Soviet regime.⁶⁹² Crucially, the rehabilitation of political victims did not include Trotsky and Bukharin, who were still considered traitors for their anti-Soviet activities.

Very cautious about the consequences of his speech, Khrushchev forbade delegates from taking notes during the session. Breaking with habit, his intervention was not transcribed in the minutes.⁶⁹³ It was only on 5 March that a letter was addressed to the lower levels of the Communist Party with an amended version of the secret speech. During this week, inflammatory rumours circulated, especially among diplomatic circles in Moscow, about Khrushchev's 'sensational speech denouncing Stalin for heinous crimes, including murder and torture.'⁶⁹⁴ Even though the letter of 5 March finally informed a large part of the Soviet population about the conclusions made at the Twentieth Congress, readership was still limited to members of the Communist Party.⁶⁹⁵ The publication of the full secret speech was not authorised until the Gorbachev era.⁶⁹⁶

Just as in the rest of the country, where stormy discussions about the secret speech were taking place during closed party meetings, a closed meeting for the communists of the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge was organised with some urgency for 26

⁶⁹¹ David Priestland, 'Cold War Mobilisation and Domestic Politics: The Soviet Union', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume I*, eds. Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 458.

⁶⁹² Pikhoia, Vaksberg, and Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir*, 290.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁶⁹⁴ John Rettie, 'How Khrushchev Leaked His Secret Speech to the World', *History Workshop Journal*, no. 62 (Autum 2006): 187.

⁶⁹⁵ Pikhoia, Vaksberg, and Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir*, 294.

⁶⁹⁶ Polly Jones provides an analysis on the strategies employed by the Soviet authorities to control the reception of the secret speech following the Twentieth Congress. Polly Jones, 'From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to de-Stalinization', in *The Dilemmas of de-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, Routledge, BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 23 (London; New York, 2006), 41–63.

March 1956. In addition to the 371 MGIMO party members and candidates attending, Kaverin, the deputy head of the MID HR department, and Dobrodomov, the deputy head of the propaganda department at the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, also took part.

What certainly stoked the minds of the participants was that Khrushchev had been as vague about how de-Stalinisation would happen as he had been precise about why it should occur. Attendees were obviously shocked about the criticisms of Stalin made by the highest level of the Communist Party, but they were also very concerned about the ambiguity surrounding how they should initiate de-Stalinisation at MGIMO. Curiously, the two higher-ups of the Communist Party and the Soviet state present at the meeting did not take the floor. Their silence can be interpreted as a mark of the central place that Stalin's works and speeches had occupied in Soviet daily life over the previous 30 years, but it was also a consequence of the lack of clear instructions from above. The first *Pravda* article to reveal the secret speech and provide 'the correct interpretation' of Stalin's cult of personality was published on 28 March, a couple of days after the MGIMO party meeting.⁶⁹⁷ Obviously, Kaverin and Dobrodomov had no concrete answer regarding the right strategy to adopt during de-Stalinisation. Such is not surprising when we consider that Stalin's *Short Course* had been formally repudiated during the Congress.⁶⁹⁸ Prior to 1959, when the new version of *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* went to press, there was no approved history of the CPSU.

Just as how Khrushchev had absolved the CPSU of all the blame for Stalin's misdeeds, members of the MGIMO party organisation did not deal with the question of their own responsibility for the witch hunt against cosmopolitanism or the massive political exclusion of students that had taken place a couple of years before. Instead, their discussions focused on de-Stalinising the teaching programmes. However, shaping a post-Stalin intellectual curriculum proved to be a difficult individual and

⁶⁹⁷ Susanne Schattenberg, "'Democracy' or 'Despotism'? How the Secret Speech Was Translated into Everyday Life', in Polly Jones *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, Routledge (London; New York, 2006), 66.

⁶⁹⁸ Arup Banerji, *Writing History in the Soviet Union: Making the Past Work* (Berghahn Books, 2008), 148.

collective endeavour for the party members, in part because it dredged up longstanding and complicated questions about the criteria to be used when erasing Stalinism.

During the party meeting, there is little doubt that the speech of F. Ryženko, head of Marxism-Leninism department (*kafedra*), was one of the most awaited because of his central role in the teaching of ideology at the Institute.⁶⁹⁹ He summed up the issues related to the eradication of Stalin's legacy from MGIMO's courses. While cautioning against a radical exclusion of Stalin's work, he argued:

Fighting the cult of personality, we must not underestimate the importance of the theoretical relevance of the party's work. And in this regard, I believe it is wrong to pose the questions whether Stalin is a classic or not, which pieces of work must be chosen, which must be discarded, etc. It cannot be decided at our party meeting if he is a classic or not. Are scientific issues dealt with this way? The party calls us not to hurry or rush, but to present the history of our party without a personality cult correctly, in a theoretically justified way based on the documents, protecting the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory and situating every person of our party history exactly in the place he or she belongs.⁷⁰⁰

In his argument that documents and theoretical justifications would provide a certain degree of objectivity when it came to choosing which of Stalin's works to keep or abandon, Ryženko claimed that there was a danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater just because Stalin's name was attached. He unambiguously stated that 'many of Stalin's works that had been studied and are studied at MGIMO are still correct'.⁷⁰¹ What made the former leader's works correct was less their objectivity and scientific evidence than the collective dimension of their writing and reception. He declared:

⁶⁹⁹ F. Ryženko was appointed MGIMO director in 1958. He held this position until 1963, when he was nominated rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Abdulhan Ahtamzân and Vladimir Trofimov, 'Fedor Danilovič Ryženko – Naš FDR', *Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta* 26, no. 5 (2012): 270–73.

⁷⁰⁰ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 122.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 123.

Many of these works are associated not only with Stalin's name, but with the name of the Central Committee, because the will of the people, not only of one person, is expressed in many summary reports delivered by Comrade Stalin at congresses. Therefore, if we throw overboard everything at once, I believe we will do a disservice to history.⁷⁰²

Even though Khrushchev strove to clear the CPSU of Stalin's abuses, Ryženko's statements show that eradicating Stalin's legacy from teaching programmes would not be as simple as just removing his works from MGIMO syllabuses. Throwing out his writings did not answer the question of how the whole Communist Party tolerated and approved the twisting of Marxism-Leninism ideology for almost three decades. In a similar way, deleting every work associated with Stalin's name cast scorn on the entirety of MGIMO's teaching staff, who had all failed to contest the obvious mistakes he had committed.

This is exactly this point raised by Vanifatij Rad'kov, professor of law and former head of the MGIMO law faculty. Rad'kov was obviously confused by the revelations made about Stalin, but what made the secret speech a personal matter for him was the responsibility he felt for having given an erroneous version of Marxism-Leninism to students:

We went to students with a certain provision about the constitution. As is known, Stalin said that the Constitution of 1936 was not a programme. And we said this to students. But as for the Constitution of 1918, we could see that Stalin's position was wrong, because the Constitution of 1918 had programme provisions. Our teachers and researchers found themselves in a very difficult situation, as students posed the relevant question of how to combine it all.⁷⁰³

Since students had clearly asked questions about the consequences of the secret speech during the last month, Rad'kov revealed, just as Ryženko had, that eradicating Stalin from teaching programmes did not solve questions about the responsibility of the teachers in spreading a false version of Marxism-Leninism. For him, fighting

⁷⁰² Ibidem.

⁷⁰³ Ibid., 111.

Stalin's cult of personality meant that it was necessary to re-establish the place of law in the Soviet state. However, he did not give details about how this should be done.

Arguing that 'no speculation must be done' in the changes to the teaching programmes, the communist teacher Kutuzova was more precise than her colleagues about how several members of the MGIMO teaching staff were already proceeding with de-Stalinisation. Just like Ryženko, she called on her comrades not to embark on the radical eradication of Stalin from the Institute. At the same time, she stressed the need for teamwork in this particularly difficult task:

We have some comrades who have already discarded some of the works of Stalin, for example, his speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress. Others have discarded his work about economic problems, and some even say that there is no theoretical heritage left, and everything written by Stalin in Lenin's time will be retained while everything written after Lenin's death will be discarded.⁷⁰⁴

The variety of approaches to de-Stalinisation at MGIMO was obvious in Kutuzova's speech. No consensus was found with regards to how fast and far de-Stalinisation should go at the Institute and on which criteria it should be based. Her mention of the use of Lenin's presence as a criterion of objectivity for discarding works written after 1924 emerged from the search for new models to determine the '*nauchnost*' (scientific verity) of Stalin's work before the Twentieth Congress. The use of Lenin certainly enabled some teachers to adopt a position from which one could easily verify how Stalin's writing differed from orthodox Marxism-Leninism.⁷⁰⁵ However, the outpouring of individual initiatives clearly threatened the unity of the ideology spread to MGIMO students.

Ryženko, Kutuzova, and Rakov's statements shed light on the confusion that reigned among MGIMO teaching staff in March 1956. As Karl E. Loewenstein rightly points out, 'Khrushchev and the party leadership did not want to open debate about Stalin,

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., 101.

⁷⁰⁵ The use of Lenin's as a unquestionable criterion in the judgement of Stalin's work mentioned by Kutuzova is somewhat reminiscent of the role of Stalin as a master external signifier in ideological discourse as depicted by Alexei Yurchak in his study on the last Soviet generation. Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 39.

but wanted to set a new, unquestioned course. Instead, the speech caused a great deal of confusion'.⁷⁰⁶ Indeed, discussions around the cult of personality focused on questions about the criteria of objectivity to adopt when judging Stalin's intellectual legacy, the speed with which de-Stalinisation should occur at the Institute, and the people who should be responsible for the conduct of de-Stalinisation.

Even though he made the same observation as his colleagues about the necessity of sorting through Stalin's *oeuvre*, Assistant Professor and Secretary of the MGIMO party organisation Nikolaj Lebedev argued that the Institute's academic departments (*kafedry*) had to take responsibility for de-Stalinisation:

Of course, nobody will tell us 'discard this or that', but there are creative teams at the academic departments, there are scientists at the academic departments. They must decide for themselves what is useful and essential in the works of Comrade Stalin and can be used by students and what is wrong and therefore must be corrected.⁷⁰⁷

Lebedev's statements were somewhat surprising, as he did not mention either the MGIMO party primary organisation or the upper levels of the Communist Party as parts of the de-Stalinisation process. Yet, they obviously reflect the state of emergency and the ambiguity inherent in Khrushchev's secret speech.

In March 1956, a whole variety of viewpoints towards Stalin's legacy emerged at MGIMO. Some attendees were shocked not only by the revelations Khrushchev made regarding the scale of Stalin's crimes, but also by the absence of clear guidelines, which were usually announced in *Pravda*. MGIMO student Arcybasov's statement is revealing:

I served abroad in the army for 6 years, and I know life in the Soviet Union only through the *Pravda* newspaper, which I read regularly. For 30 years we had been

⁷⁰⁶ Karl E. Loewenstein, 'Re-Emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech', *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (December 2006): 1330.

⁷⁰⁷ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, 26/03/1956, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 130.

brought up with the name of Stalin, and now, for some 2-3 years, we have been told that we must give up the name of Comrade Stalin.⁷⁰⁸

In terms of subversion, this radical shift from a single truth clearly announced in the pages of *Pravda* to a plurality of opinions about Stalin was clearly more crucial than the impact of contacts with the West. To this new generation of MGIMO students, for whom the Soviet state had always been associated with the central figure of Stalin, the secret speech was a clear shock. What Arcybasov's statement reveals, however, was that the discussion around de-Stalinisation also undermined the very authority of *Pravda*. Fighting the cult of personality cast doubt on Stalin and his legacy, but also brought general discredit on what had been written about him in *Pravda*, now considered erroneous. Arcybasov's sentiments were somewhat similar to graduate Antonov's notes in his memoirs about the confusion and doubts he experienced regarding the validity of Marxist-Leninist ideology once Soviet officials themselves propounded a critique of Stalinism.⁷⁰⁹

The problem of eradicating Stalin's legacy soon led to a second issue: student propaganda activity among the masses, as organised by MGIMO's primary party organisation. Although the Soviet authorities certainly hoped that they had means to keep information about Khrushchev's speech under their control, this soon proved to be an illusion. The issue of de-Stalinisation was clearly coupled with the dissemination of ideology by students among workers and peasants and the broad variety of opinions it provoked within Soviet society.

When Kutuzova called upon the MGIMO community to establish a correct version of Marxism-Leninism based on scientific proofs, she mentioned the responsibility that members of primary organisation bore for bringing this new correct version of Marxism-Leninism to the masses. She unambiguously stated:

We, the teachers, must equip students with the correct Marxist-Leninist theory. Our students go from us to the common people as agitators and propagandists. We are not allowed to ad-lib. [...] If some works do not correspond to Marxist-Leninist

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., 126.

⁷⁰⁹ Torkunov Anatolij et al., '*A v glazah budet meždunarodnyj institut vozle krymskogo mosta...*' (1947-1952), 13.

theory, do not contain the proper analysis, then they can be discarded, but not in a hurry: this must be done on the basis of scientific research. Then we will properly orient the people among whom the students spread propaganda.⁷¹⁰

However, student Arcybasov soon expressed his concerns about the difficulties MGIMO students had recently encountered in their propaganda activities. The very manner in which the Central Committee of the CPSU informed the population about the secret speech (through a letter that was discussed in closed party meetings) was seen as highly problematic. Students faced rumours about the secret speech in factories and kolkhozes, which were nourished by the silence of *Pravda*. The student stated:

I am not sure if your comrades know how this letter is responded to among workers. We communists read out this letter. It is quite right, this is the decision of the Central Committee and no-one can challenge it. But the CC really thinks that if such a letter is read only to communists, then a non-communist worker at a machine will learn nothing. However, a worker may learn [about it], not from an official source but from ten other lips; in such a situation he could reach any number of conclusions. This letter should have been brought to the attention of the masses.⁷¹¹

As well as criticising the relative silence of the upper levels of the Communist Party, the student also described how de-Stalinisation was perceived and discussed differently at MGIMO and in the factories:

There were comrades here who were talking a lot about the subjective aspect of the cult of personality. These issues interested teachers, but I think it is easier for teachers to talk to students than for students to talk to the workers engaged in our study groups at the plants, because they [the students] do not raise the question of whether there are rich and poor people in the Soviet Union. The question is simple, but try to answer it.⁷¹²

Talks between teachers and students in the present context were of a different nature to those in the factories where MGIMO students intervened. While students were

⁷¹⁰ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 101.

⁷¹¹ Ibid., 127.

⁷¹² Ibid., 124.

supposed to bring a new and correct version of Marxism-Leninism to the masses, their own convictions were obviously destabilised by the fact that the Party gave them no clear guidance about the task they had to fulfil.

Lastly, a third aspect of the discussion about the Twentieth Congress dealt with concerns over the circulation of knowledge within the socialist bloc. Once again, Arcybasov's statements reveal that a whole variety of new viewpoints were emerging in Soviet daily life. Pointing out the contrast between the situation in East Germany and the USSR, the student made it transparent that new ideas originating in the socialist block mattered in the public debate around de-Stalinisation. He emphasised the fact that, in contrast to the silence of *Pravda*, an article about the secret speech had been published in *Neues Deutschland*, the official party newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, on 18 March 1956:

Why do the German people have an opportunity to learn about the inner life of our country but our people do not? Why does Walter Ulbricht address the German people with an article in order to enlighten them, but no-one from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee appears in *Pravda* with an article to tell people the truth, in some measure, about what is going on right now in the country? This position is not clear to me, that is why it is extremely difficult for us propagandists to work.⁷¹³

Khrushchev himself publicly admitted there were a variety of paths to socialism: examples and opinions drawn from other socialist countries were new resources in the debates about the secret speech. The aftermath of the Twentieth Congress created conditions in which references to socialist states took on a new meaning.

Ryzenko pointed out exactly the shift occurring in the relationship between the USSR and other socialist countries:

Let's take the problem of sharing our experience and its application by fraternal communist parties. We often thought that everything that happened with us had to be exactly the same in all countries undertaking the proletarian revolution. And if anything differed from our model there, it was often considered as deviation from Leninism.

⁷¹³ Ibid., 127.

Ryženko presented the recognition that there were a variety of paths to socialism as a useful new diplomatic strategy: it guaranteed the coherence of a socialist bloc wrecked by Stalin's brutal manner towards some of the USSR's allies after World War II. As an indirect but very concrete consequence of this, MGIMO students had access to and legitimate use of alternative ideas originating from the people's democracies.

Beyond the shock provoked by Khrushchev's secret speech, the variety of opinions towards de-Stalinisation at MGIMO, the difficulties encountered by students in their propaganda activities, and the new use of foreign socialist references created a very new intellectual context at the Institute. The ambiguity of the Communist Party and the silence of *Pravda* paved the way for the emergence of a wide range of new ideas that differed from official ideology and its application in the Institute. Preparing the next generation of flag-bearers of communism for missions abroad was conducted in the new context created by both de-Stalinisation and openness to the rest of the world.

Preparing the flag-bearers of communism: new ways of describing the foreign world

The meeting held at MGIMO on 26 March 1956 marked both the beginning and end of a process. On the one hand, the question of Stalin's crimes and Stalinism would never again be raised as directly by members of the primary party organisation until the Gorbachev era. The letter of 28 March by the Central Committee, entitled 'Why is the cult of personality alien to the spirit of Marxism Leninism?' and published in *Pravda*, obviously limited the framework for opinions about de-Stalinisation at the Institute.⁷¹⁴ A few months later, in December 1956, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a further letter entitled 'On strengthening the party organisation among the masses and cutting off the attacks of hostile, anti-Soviet elements': as Loewenstein points out, this missive strictly reduced the framework for debates about

⁷¹⁴ 'Počemu Kul't Ličnosti Čužd Duhu Marksizma-Leninizma?' [Why is the cult of personality contrary to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?], *Pravda*, 28 March 1956, 2-3.

Stalinism by ‘rejecting the influence of public opinion’.⁷¹⁵ However, despite this backward step, some of the concerns and ideas raised on 26 March became common references for the communists of the primary party organisation in their future speeches and debates. Discussions about changes in teaching programmes at the Institute in 1956 reveal much about this phenomenon: they also enabled a surge of new modern ideas to enter the Institute’s everyday life.

In parallel with their debates over de-Stalinisation, members of the MGIMO primary party organisation fundamentally rethought how to best prepare the flag-bearers of communism for foreign missions. In line with Khrushchev’s aim of ‘strengthening the ties between *school* and *life*’, the idea of preparing students for practical work in Soviet diplomacy emerged as a new guiding principle in the reform of MGIMO’s teaching programmes. Internships in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus and missions abroad for sixth-year students were included in the Institute’s curriculum. However, the goal of strengthening the ties between school and life at the Institute was not only based on internships. In the primary party organisation, discussions also dealt with the need to provide students with foreign literature, including contemporary theories and new sources of information.

Following the campaign against cosmopolitanism in the early 1950s, the amount of published material from overseas was extremely limited at the Institute. During a party meeting at MGIMO in January 1956, the PhD student Vasilij Safrončuk pointed out that ‘during recent years, MGIMO had not received any books and publications from abroad with the exception of newspapers and journals. The Institute had no budgetary resources to purchase [even] the slightest books or dictionaries.’ Safrončuk welcomed improvements in the situation, even if they were slow in arriving. He stressed that the ministry had invested 4,000 rubles worth of foreign currency for the purchase of foreign literature each year. Yet, he stressed that MGIMO still had not taken up the opportunity of receiving literature from the operations departments of TASS and the MID. Finally, an agreement with TASS was made, which meant

⁷¹⁵ Loewenstein, ‘Re-Emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech’, 142.

MGIMO was able to obtain literature through this institution.⁷¹⁶ At the same time, Safrončuk notified his party colleagues that ten sixth-year students were supposed to be sent overseas in 1956: five were going to be sent to the East and five to the West for several months. Eight teachers in law and economics would have the same opportunity. However, the Institute's administration had been waiting for final agreement to this scheme from the MID for the last three months.

The situation described by Safrončuk changed radically in the following months. In their arguments for a more liberal attitude to new foreign published material at MGIMO, members of the Communist Party made abundant references to other socialist countries during their discussions of de-Stalinisation on 26 March 1956. The MID functionary Orešnikov made a pledge that MGIMO students would have greater access to literature, including the economics research, reports, and statistics published by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. He based his argument on the fact that these written materials were sold without restrictions in Chinese and Czechoslovakian bookshops:⁷¹⁷ he thus saw no justification for forbidding access to these sources of information.

During the same meeting, the student Kotlârov also made a direct link between de-Stalinisation, a more open attitude towards the outside world, and the inclusion of internships abroad into MGIMO's teaching programmes. He related the following:

We are told that overseas training courses must not be organised because, firstly, they are very expensive, secondly, some students might have something [problematic] in their biographies, and, thirdly, we will not be accepted. Concerning the first point, it just doesn't hold water. Such a small country as Albania has the opportunity to send to the Soviet Union a huge number of student-specialists who study here on exchange programmes and so on. And I have a question. Why are we students who were specially trained to work abroad not able to go there? I don't think it is right. It is said that some students have some disadvantages in their

⁷¹⁶ Stenogrammy obših partsobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 27/01/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 23.

⁷¹⁷ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 46.

biographies, but it seems to me that comrade Khrushchev in his report clearly pointed out the state of such a situation and stressed that it can be reviewed.⁷¹⁸

Kotlârov thus claimed that members of the communist organisation had to free themselves from two intellectual blocks that had prevented students from learning about foreign situations during the Stalin era. Firstly, his reference to the Albanian students who received higher education in the Soviet Union placed the discussion in a context where examples drawn from socialist countries gained new value. Restrictions on the mobility of Soviet students appeared unjustified when compared to the situation in this socialist country. Secondly, Kotlârov made creative use of the secret speech to openly contest the biographical criteria used during the Stalin era to justify restrictions on travel outside the Soviet Union: he instead suggested new criteria based on academic results.

In September 1956, the student Čepoharenko, the *partorg* for the third-year students, also made a link between the experience future *meždunarodniki* would gain from learning from trips to socialist countries and the inclusion of internships in the curriculum. He suggested:

Why can't we organise internships not only for a [select] number of students, but for all students studying the languages of the people's democracies, Chinese in particular? I believe that it is possible to provide an opportunity for everyone to have an internship in the People's Republic of China. After all, China is not the United States, they are our friends.⁷¹⁹

By stressing the contrast between the United States and China, the student suggested that the *meždunarodniki* had a lot to learn from foreign socialist regimes. More importantly, however, in taking care to stress the divide between socialist and capitalist countries, he implicitly pointed out how an argument carried a very different weight according to its geographical and ideological origin. The turnaround was huge:

⁷¹⁸ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 128.

⁷¹⁹ Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partsobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/09/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 12.

in contrast to under Stalin, socialist countries were now considered as examples and sources of inspiration from whence reforms could be imported.

Indeed, as early as September 1956, MGIMO Director Mihail Ivanov was very glad to announce to members of the party organisation that the reform of the undergraduate programmes was to be ready for the beginning of the new academic year. The reform included a reduction in the number of lecture courses: MGIMO students were now entitled to two free days per week. The structure of teaching was changed to increase the number of hours dedicated to learning economics, and students were also supposed to specialise in a country related to the language they were learning. However, the major innovation was that internships either in the USSR or abroad were now available to all MGIMO sixth-year students. They were required either to complete an eight-week internship at the MID, TASS, VOKS, the State Radio Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or the editorial boards of several major Soviet newspapers or to spend a six-month internship abroad. Ivanov announced that, thanks to MID support, 47 students were to spend their foreign internships in Soviet diplomatic missions in East Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, India, Syria, Egypt, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.⁷²⁰ In parallel, he revealed that the MID executive board had pledged 15,000 rubles of foreign currency to fund the renewal of MGIMO's foreign literature holdings.⁷²¹ Finally, the director declared that nine foreign teachers in oriental language had been recruited and would teach at the Institute during the next academic year.

So less than six months after Safrončuk had pointed out the isolation of MGIMO from the outside world, foreign literature and internships were to be made accessible for students before their graduation. At the beginning of 1960, sending MGIMO students and teachers abroad through internships was already a widespread practice: 90 sixth-

⁷²⁰ Ibid., 49.

⁷²¹ Ibid., 52.

year students, one third of all the students in their last year of study, were sent abroad.⁷²²

Greater access to the foreign world was not all. More importantly, the need to prepare students for internships meant the development of a new set of questions and information in the teaching programmes. Teachers were now required to analyse the foreign world in general, and the West in particular, 'as they really were'. To a certain extent, the research in international relations conducted by the older generation of scholars such as E. Tarle, F. Notovič and A. Manfred lost its relevance. Of course, the long period of closed borders during the Stalin era had considerably reduced their ability to conduct extensive research in foreign archives.

In January 1956, Ganin, a teacher at the academic department of Marxism-Leninism, unambiguously stated:

Nowadays we have a growing fascination with history. Of course, this is necessary and very useful, but not too important. With [too much] enthusiasm for the past, many sections of modernity that our students most need are missed. Here are the facts about the course on the history of the USSR: all the materials on the history of our country from the Great Patriotic War to the present day were given to students in two lectures. Such significant events were presented in just four hours. This is despite the fact that this is the part of the course with which our graduates must be well armed and which they will need to carry out practical work with regards to the conduct of the Party's policy abroad; here, they will pursue a modern policy, not the policy of Ivan Kalita or Bolshoe Gnezdo.⁷²³

⁷²² Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partijnoj organizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDA, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 04/01/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 677, 113.

⁷²³ Stenogrammy obših partsobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization] 27/01/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 9.

In the writing of MGIMO textbooks, teachers had privileged the study of the history of Western countries prior to 1917 during the last years of the Stalin era.⁷²⁴ Now they had to adapt to new requirements concerning the analysis of the modern world. This was a major change in both teaching and research: this new wave of interest in modernity necessarily meant the inclusion of aspects of contemporary Western philosophy (identified as bourgeois theories), the history of the Soviet Union's allies and capitalist countries, and studies focused on third-world countries.

These changes were directly reflected in the titles and topics of PhD theses defended at the Institute between 1951 and 1964.⁷²⁵ Indeed, the range of the topics raised by MGIMO PhD candidates is a rather good indicator of how teaching and research came to focus on very contemporary issues in the foreign world. The records of the MGIMO library indicate that between 1951 and 1954, 343 PhD theses were defended at the Institute, for the most part in law, history, and economics.⁷²⁶

⁷²⁴ At the end of 1954, teachers at the academic department for the history of Western countries and global history informed members of the party organisation that they had worked for two years on four new textbooks, including the history of England between 1815 and 1842, the history of France between 1870 and 1918, and the history of France between 1642 and 1870. Only the handbook dedicated to the history of the United States between 1927 and 1953 offered an insight into the contemporary situation of a capitalist country. *Protokoly zasedanij partkoma partijnoj organizacii MGIMO*, [Minutes of the party committee meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 02/12/1954, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 38, 61.

⁷²⁵ As a PhD programme lasted at least three years in the Soviet Union, one can presume that the first PhD defence at MGIMO took place in 1951.

⁷²⁶ The Institute's library possesses a catalogue of all the dissertations defended at MGIMO, the Institute of Foreign Trade, and the Institute of Eastern Studies from 1939.

Table 7: Short summary of the PhD theses defended at MGIMO between 1951 and 1964

1951-1956					
193 PHD THESES					
DISCIPLINES	HISTORY	ECONOMICS	LINGUISTIC	LAW	UNKNOWN
	55	55	37	36	10
HISTORY					
CHRONOLOGICAL SCOPE					
	BEFORE 1918	INTER-WAR PERIOD	WORLD WAR II	World War II - Present time	UNKNOWN
	7	20	7	18	3
1957-1964					
132 PHD THESES					
DISCIPLINES	HISTORY	ECONOMICS	LINGUISTIC	LAW	PHILOSOPHY
	30	55	12	34	1
HISTORY					
CHRONOLOGICAL SCOPE					
	BEFORE 1918	INTER-WAR PERIOD	WWII	World War II - Present time	
	4	6	1	19	

In the field of history, we witness one main tendency after 1956: fewer PhD students studied the period preceding the Second World War and more focused on the contemporary world. Out of the 55 PhD theses in history defended at MGIMO between 1951 and 1956, 18 dissertations dealt with the modern era (36 per cent). During the period 1957 to 1964, 19 PhD theses (63 per cent) concerned the years following World War II. While students were previously much more disposed to choose a topic related to the international conferences that took place just after or before 1917, this trend disappeared with the emergence of a new interest in the economic and political history of capitalist countries, such as the United States and Great Britain. From this perspective, one may note an ‘acceleration’ of history: PhD students became more interested in themes related to contemporary situations. For instance, the first PhD theses ever defended at MGIMO dealt with war compensation

after 1918,⁷²⁷ ‘the colonial policy of Japanese imperialism in Korea and the fight of the Korean independence movement between 1910-1918’,⁷²⁸ and ‘the anti-Soviet policy of the English conservative government of Stanley Baldwin between 1924 and 1927’.⁷²⁹ This presents a strong contrast with the situation which emerged in the first years following Khrushchev’s secret speech, when a new fascination with recent world history emerged.⁷³⁰

In the disciplines of law and economics, some tendencies reflecting a new interest in the contemporary foreign world can also be noted. First of all, there is a very sharp contrast between the ban on bourgeois newspapers and literature during the Stalin era and the clear interest that PhD students and their supervisors developed in them after 1956. In economics, the PhD candidate M. Barabanov defended a dissertation entitled ‘A critique of bourgeois American political economy in the question of competition between two systems’ in 1961.⁷³¹ In 1964, D. Ermolenko and R. Matveev shared a similar research interest in Western theories and released two dissertations in philosophy and law respectively: the first was entitled ‘A critical study on the contemporary bourgeois philosophy of the United States (main tendencies and branches)’⁷³² while the second was ‘Critics of the contemporary political ideology of

⁷²⁷ D. Čurbanov, ‘Germano-Anglijskie Otnošení v Period Otmeny Reparacii. 1931-1932 Gg. (Ot Plana Gunera Do Lozanskoj Konferencii)’ (MGIMO, 1951).

⁷²⁸ N. Semenova, ‘Kolonial’naâ Politika Âponskogo Imperializma v Koree I Nacional’no-Osvoboditel’naâ Bor’ba Korejskogo Naroda / 1910-1918 Gg.’ (MGIMO, 1953).

⁷²⁹ S. Nikonova, ‘Antisovetskaâ Politika Anglijskogo Konservativnogo Pravitel’sstva Bolduina v 1924-1927 Godah’ (MGIMO, 1955).

⁷³⁰ Several titles of the PhD theses defended at MGIMO after 1956 point to this new interest in third-world countries, contemporary foreign affairs, and the domestic policy of capitalist countries: take, for instance, ‘Socio-economic and political changes in Liberia after World War II (1945-1960)’, ‘Monopolies and the main tendencies of US domestic policy (the domestic policy of the Republicans between 1952 and 1960)’, or ‘The foreign policy of England on the issue of West-Germany rearmament (1949-1955)’. V. Egorov, ‘Social’no-Èkonomičeskie I Političeskie Izmeneniâ v Liberii Posle Vtoroj Mirovoj Vojny (1945-1960 Gg.)’ (MGIMO, 1962); V. Zorin, ‘Monopolii I Osnovnye Napravleniâ Vnutrennej Politiki SŠA. (Vnutripolotočeskij Kurs Pravitel’sstva Respublikancev 1952-1960 Gg.)’ (MGIMO, 1962); A. Baryšev, ‘Politika Anglii v Voprose Perevooruženiâ Zapadnoj Germanii 1949-1955’ (MGIMO, 1957).

⁷³¹ Mihail Barabanov, ‘Kritika Buržuznoj Politèkonomii SŠA Po Voprosam Èkonomičeskogo Sorevnovaniâ Dvuh Sistem’ (MGIMO, 1961).

⁷³² Dmitrij Ermolenko, ‘Očerki Kritiki Sovremennoj Buržuznoj Fisolofii SŠA (Nekotorye Osnovnye Tendencii I Tečeniâ)’ (MGIMO, 1964).

the monopolistic bourgeoisie of France'.⁷³³ In these three cases, the students were interested in Western political thought.

However, the fact that some of the research conducted at MGIMO was now focused directly on bourgeois theories was not the only dimension of this attempt to analyse the contemporary world. Some of the dissertations dealt directly with foreign business companies and the function of specific markets. Both before and after 1956 PhD students in economics privileged a macro-economic approach centred on one foreign country either in the West or in the East; nonetheless, different research topics began to emerge in the middle of the 1950s. Two dissertations from the 1960s dealing with the Krupp Company and the English Imperial Chemical Industries reflected an interest in microeconomics.⁷³⁴ In parallel, studies focused on specific markets also appeared, including research on tourism,⁷³⁵ the rubber market after World War II,⁷³⁶ and the capitalist market in agricultural equipment.⁷³⁷

Last but not least, studies on economic relations within the socialist bloc were becoming increasingly popular. Firstly, some dissertations unambiguously stressed the problems of economic integration: take D. Mahova's 'Some problems of the economic relations of Czechoslovakia with the USSR and the European people's democracies'⁷³⁸ or A. Alekseev's 'Pricing in Bulgaria and the problem of prices in the worldwide socialist market'.⁷³⁹ Secondly, and somewhat more positively, P. Atanasov and G. Kuliev stressed the role of Soviet republics in economic relations between the USSR and the rest of the world. In the beginning of the 1960s, they defended two dissertations respectively entitled 'The participation of the Azerbaijan

⁷³³ R. Matveev, 'Kritika Sovremennoj Politicheskoj Ideologii Monopolističeskoj Buržuazii Francii' (MGIMO, 1964).

⁷³⁴ O. Denisov, 'Anglijskij Himičeskij Koncern "Impiriël Kemikl Industriz' (MGIMO, 1964).

⁷³⁵ G. Gocev, 'Značenie i Perspektivy Meždunarodnogo Turizma / Na Primere Narodnoj Respubliki Bolgarii' (MGIMO, 1963).

⁷³⁶ A. Dmitriev, 'Osnovnye Faktory Razvitiâ Kon'ûktury Rynka Kaučuka Posle Vtoroj Mirovoj Vojny' (MGIMO, 1963).

⁷³⁷ P. Zav'âlov, 'Osnovnye Tendencii v Razvitii Mirovogo Kapitalističeskogo Rynka Sel'skohožajstvennogo Oborudovaniâ v Poslevoennyj Period' (MGIMO, 1964).

⁷³⁸ D. Mahova, 'Nekotorye Problemy Èkonomičeskij Otnošenij Čehoslovakii S SSSR i Evropejskimi Stranami Narodnoj Demokratii' (MGIMO, 1959).

⁷³⁹ A. Alekseev, 'Cenoobrazovanie v Bolgarii i Problema Cen Mirovogo Socialističeskogo Rynka' (MGIMO, 1962).

Soviet Socialist Republic in the development of the foreign economic ties of the Soviet Union'⁷⁴⁰ and 'The contribution of Uzbekistan in the development of the economic relations of the Soviet Union with foreign countries'.⁷⁴¹

Obviously, studies on recent world history, the analysis of bourgeois theories, and an interest in microeconomics reflected a surge of new ideas at MGIMO. It was not only the internships outside the USSR that made this possible: access to new sources of information also played a considerable role. Foreign newspapers and books, statistics, and Soviet diplomatic telegrams were now available to MGIMO students and their teachers when they came to describe and analyse the contemporary world 'as it was'. These ideas were obviously new, but it is their position and status in MGIMO everyday life that really strikes one. Banned from teaching and research programmes before the Thaw, foreign ideas and bourgeois theories were now considered worth studying.

An unexpected critique from the East: Non-Soviet students at MGIMO

Both de-Stalinisation and openness to the outside world created a new intellectual context. Nonetheless, for the Soviet authorities, this did not signify an abandonment of ideological control: the most loyal students were selected to be sent abroad, just as the foreign literature available on the shelves of the MGIMO library was chosen on the basis of ideological criteria. However, a third aspect of MGIMO's novel openness was much more uncontrollable and therefore worrying for the Institute's party organisation. The enrolment of foreign students from socialist countries emerged as a rather unexpected problem after 1956. Not only did foreign students openly criticise both the USSR and Soviet diplomacy, but, by basing their critique on foreign socialist newspapers, they also questioned the authority of what was taught at MGIMO.

⁷⁴⁰ G. Kuliev, 'Učastie Azerbajdžanskoj SSR v Razviti Vnešneëkonomičeskikh Svâzej Sovetskogo Soûza' (MGIMO, 1964).

⁷⁴¹ P. Atanasov, 'Vklad Uzbekistana v Razvitie Èkonomičeskikh Otnošenij Sovetskogo Soûza S Zarubežnymi Stranami' (MGIMO, 1963).

In 1956, ten years after the first foreign students were enrolled at MGIMO, 305 students from socialist countries were admitted so that they could following a five-year training programme.⁷⁴² Malenkov and Korobov's decree requiring that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide citizens from the people's democracies with one third to a half of all the Institute's places, had concrete and visible effects. Foreign students accounted for 25 per cent of the overall student body at MGIMO. In December 1963, there were 500 foreign students, 30 per cent of the student body at the Institute and 5 per cent of all foreign students in the USSR.⁷⁴³

From the Hungarian crisis to the Vietnam War, international tensions in the socialist bloc were accompanied by a trenchant critique of the USSR and Soviet diplomacy from foreign students at MGIMO. Although MGIMO had been founded in order to create ideological unity in the Soviet bloc and to guarantee the upper hand of Moscow, the presence of foreign students at MGIMO soon became very problematic after Khrushchev's secret speech.

Indeed, following the Twentieth Congress, an important critique was launched by foreign students: this was defined by the Communist Party at MGIMO as an expression of 'anti-Soviet imperialist propaganda' that was meddling in the ideological unity of the Institute's everyday life.⁷⁴⁴ Approaches centred on relations between the USSR and the West, which emphasise economic competition between the capitalist and socialist blocs, often fail to account for some of the very concrete problems bedevilling Moscow and MGIMO during the Thaw. In the critique carried out by non-Soviet students at MGIMO, it was less a question of the contrasts between the capitalist and socialist blocs than of the diversity of views within the socialist bloc itself. Even though members of the MGIMO party committee strove to categorise these criticisms as an expression of imperialist propaganda, they did failed to pull the wool over the students' eyes.

⁷⁴² Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/09/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 60.

⁷⁴³ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 09/12/63, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 89, 128.

⁷⁴⁴ Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 04/10/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 114.

During a party meeting at MGIMO on 14 September 1956, Safrončuk reported on the enrolment of foreign students. He reminded the members of the MGIMO party committee that the party district (*rajkom*) had asked MGIMO communists to keep a close eye on the current mood (*nastroenie*) among foreign students. He stated that MGIMO communists were not only supposed to train highly qualified specialists in foreign affairs, but also to make foreign students into 'true Leninists' who would devote themselves to 'proletarian internationalism' and 'be capable of defending the interests of socialism in their countries of origin'.⁷⁴⁵ However, Safrončuk brought to the fore the fact that MGIMO students from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary were now taking a very critical stance towards Soviet foreign policy.

Miners' strikes in Poznan and the uprising in Budapest in June 1956 were among the first results of Moscow's policy of de-Stalinisation. Even though party leaders from Eastern Europe were not present when Khrushchev delivered his secret speech, they were sent the full text a couple of weeks later. The speech resulted in an unexpected outburst of tensions in Eastern Europe.⁷⁴⁶ As Csaba Bekes points out, the events in Poznan and Budapest immediately demonstrated the limits of the new Soviet policy:

The radically different means of handling the two crises illustrated the real boundaries of Soviet tolerance: Polish reforms preserving Communist rule and the unity of the Soviet alliance system were still tolerable, but the Hungarian revolution, which was rightly seen as the transformation of the regime into a Western-type democracy, had to be crushed. This pattern shows clearly that Moscow deemed the orderly political and economic functioning of these frontier states as vital to Soviet empire.⁷⁴⁷

At the Institute, there is no denying that criticisms from non-Soviet students as a direct consequence of growing tensions in Eastern Europe were alarming for members of the MGIMO party committee. Yet, what worried Safrončuk the most was the fact that non-Soviet students got their information from sources other than the official

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid., 117.

⁷⁴⁶ Tony Kemp-Welch, 'Dethroning Stalin: Poland 1956 and Its Legacy', *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006): 1261.

⁷⁴⁷ Csaba Bekes, 'East Central Europe 1953-1956', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume I*, ed. Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Cambridge University Press, vol. I (Cambridge, 2010), 335.

Soviet media. He indicated that, following the riots in Poznan in June 1956, several Polish students complained to their MGIMO professors about the biased coverage of these events in the Soviet newspapers. The majority of MGIMO's Eastern European students spent their summers in their home countries: thus Polish students were able to identify the differences between the coverage in the Polish and Soviet medias. On 30 June, *Pravda* dubbed the Polish riots as the 'hostile provocation of imperialist secret services in Poznan',⁷⁴⁸ but the Polish students at MGIMO argued that workers demanding better conditions had initiated the demonstrations.⁷⁴⁹ Foreign students were questioning the vast differences in media coverage and thus information discourses within the socialist bloc itself.

Starting from 1956, the issue at MGIMO was less about the presence of a critique against the Soviet Union than about the origins of this critique. Another discussion held at a party meeting at MGIMO on 12 April 1957 reveals that MGIMO communists were much more at ease with criticisms based on sources that had been clearly identified as either bourgeois or western by the Soviet regime. Professor Tarasenko informed his comrades that some students were listening to foreign radios and Voice of America (*Golos Ameriki*) in the dorms.⁷⁵⁰ Yet, this situation was much less problematic than the riots in Poznan. In their conclusions, members of the MGIMO party committee simply indicated that offering more regular classes on the international environment and events abroad would be able to refute hostile information against the Soviet regime.⁷⁵¹ Party newspapers such as *Pravda* and *Izvestia* offered ready-made terms for answering criticisms from the West.

The task of training the diplomatic elites of other socialist countries was much more difficult. On his return from a trip to Poland in 1960, Director Ryženko reported the weight of this task:

⁷⁴⁸ 'Vraždebnaâ provokaciâ imperialističeskoj agentury v Poznani', [The hostile provocation of imperialist secret services in Poznan], in *Pravda*, 30/06/56, N°182, 4.

⁷⁴⁹ Stenogrammy i protokoly obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization] 04/10/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, p. 115.

⁷⁵⁰ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij vostočnogo fakul'teta partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Transcripts of the party meetings of the of oriental faculty of the MGIMO party organization] 12/04/57, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 52, 86.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

We have to deal with an international student body. No fewer than 56 different nationalities from the Soviet Union and foreign countries are currently studying at MGIMO. Nowadays everything that happens in the socialist camp is reflected in miniature in MGIMO everyday life.⁷⁵²

He continued his speech with a concrete example of these difficulties. Accompanied by a delegation of MGIMO professors, Ryženko unexpectedly encountered a Polish MGIMO graduate in 1960. At this time, the graduate was working for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, this unexpected reunion between the graduate and his former Moscow teachers was far from warm, since the student pointedly refused to speak in Russian to the MGIMO delegation. Even though the Soviet regime succeeded in training foreign diplomatic elites who afterwards occupied positions of authority in their countries of origin, the Polish student's behaviour clearly demonstrated obvious failures in what was referred to as the 'political training' of foreign students at MGIMO (*političeskaâ vospitatel'naâ rabota*). The board of the MGIMO party committee urged teachers to learn more about foreign students during their time at MGIMO. This included knowing what foreign students were doing during their spare time, analysing what they were reading, and learning how they cared for other comrades.⁷⁵³

The enrolment of non-Soviet student at MGIMO was far more ideologically corrosive than Western propaganda against the Soviet regime. Elaborating a framework to address a critique from within was a much more difficult task, especially since sharp criticisms of the Soviet regime not only emerged from Eastern European students but also from Asian ones.

In the beginning of the 1960s, the worsening of the USSR's diplomatic relations with the people's republics of Albania (the Soviet-Albanian split) and China (the Sino-Soviet split) raised new problems for the MGIMO teaching staff. Obviously this was not the first time that Moscow had faced difficulties with its socialist allies. Nonetheless, the diplomatic quarrel between the two principal protagonists of worldwide socialism undermined the ideological unity of the entire bloc.

⁷⁵² Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 20/09/60, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 68, 58.

⁷⁵³ Ibid., 41.

Supporting India in the 1959 Sino-Indian border war and pulling out of a deal to furnish China with a prototype atomic bomb were perceived as highhanded arrogance and disdain from the Chinese perspective. Nonetheless, the complete disintegration of the robust alliance built after World War II took several years: Sergey Radchenko reports that Khrushchev strove to improve the diplomatic situation with Moscow's most powerful ally until October 1962. He was quoted as saying to the departing Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, that 'our most cherished dream is to get rid of the cold current which is separating us, and to return to the close and intimate relations we had before 1958.'⁷⁵⁴

While Moscow still aimed at diplomatic rapprochement with Mao's China and in the absence of clear orientation from the Communist Party about the evolution of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, the sources of information on which the criticisms from Chinese MGIMO students were based particularly mattered. During a party committee meeting at MGIMO on 14 November 1961, a few days after the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party, Boris Isaenko, professor of Chinese language and literature, declared:

Our Institute and our students receive foreign newspapers, including Chinese ones. The questions about how Chinese comrades consider the new course of Albanian policy and whether the official statements of the Albanian leaders are Leninist or anti-Leninist are ones we have had to deal with very practically in our teaching and political pedagogical work.⁷⁵⁵

The MGIMO teaching staff faced a dilemma. Several teachers felt unable to address the criticisms published in Chinese newspapers, previously considered an objective and reliable source of information. As Isaenko indicated, foreign students cast doubt on what was taught at MGIMO by basing their critique on these newspapers:

Students receive information and they turn to us, members of the teaching staff, in order to receive some explanation about how to understand the standpoint of Chinese

⁷⁵⁴ Sergey Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split', in *Crises and Détente*, eds., Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, First paperback edition, vol. II, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 350.

⁷⁵⁵ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 121.

communists. The problem is that because this information originates from the Chinese Communist Party press, and more specifically from the newspaper *The People's Daily*, the Chinese Communist Party pretends that official statements of the Albanian leaders are neutral, I would even say objective.⁷⁵⁶

By placing the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West conducted by Nikita Khrushchev and the accusations of revisionism pronounced by the Albanian leadership on the same level, *The People's Daily* demonstrated the diversity of opinions concerning de-Stalinisation within the Second World. Just a few months before the USSR and the People's Republic of China broke off diplomatic relations in 1962, members of the MGIMO party committee expressed their anguish over the spread of a critique by foreign students. Inevitably these developments led to an attempt to formulate an appropriate answer that would demonstrate the relevance and coherence of the Soviet position. In order to improve the political training of both Soviet and foreign students, members of the MGIMO party committee were forced to consider several alternatives.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., 121.

CHAPTER 6

MGIMO AS A SOCIALIST CAMP IN MINIATURE

A Portrait of a Diplomat

You should not even smile at a friend
See an acquaintance and keep silent
Shake the blazing enemy's hand
Look without seeing, but, moreover, notice everything

Sloping the back is to express an honour,
Stubbornly freeze the face
Do not express anger at reading
And, without stumbling, run to the porch

But if you do smile at a friend
Do not put a friend under libel
With difficulty he will stretch out his hand
Then you are a diplomat and a man.⁷⁵⁷

Poem of MGIMO graduate Vitalij Suhov

In the middle of the 1950s, the fear that contacts with alternative ideas and realities could lead to the subversion of MGIMO students was not totally unfounded. Subversion was, however, less the logical consequence of an unexpected shock from the West, whose economic superiority and values could automatically endanger the Soviet communist project, than the result of a wide range of factors: Khrushchev's secret speech, strengthening ties *between school and life*, and the very strong presence of students from socialist countries all called into question the authority of what was

⁷⁵⁷ 'Kak molody my byli...'. *Vospominaniâ vypusnikov MGIMO 1958 goda (10-j vypusk)*. (Moskva: MGIMO Universitet, 2008), 193.

taught at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge.⁷⁵⁸ In all three cases, the shock was neither accidental (fighting the cult of personality, introducing internships, and acquiring foreign literature were choices consciously made by the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state) nor exclusively related to opening up to the capitalist West. In this new intellectual context, examples and arguments drawn from socialist foreign countries had a very specific place in the discussions held by the primary party organisation. There was a fundamental change in their value, for now they were regarded as sources of inspiration and possible reforms at MGIMO. Compare this to the Stalin era, when interest in the foreign world was considered highly suspicious and therefore subject to sanction.

Obviously, MGIMO was not the only institution to face this situation in the USSR. MGIMO students' knowledge of foreign realities was of course based on their experience of study, but it was also founded on their experience of Moscow everyday life in the 1950s and 60s.⁷⁵⁹ They got information from their teachers and gained real experience from internships abroad; however, life in Moscow also proffered students the opportunity to listen to *Voice of America*, read West European and American literature, and enjoy jazz. These were things over which the Institute had little control or influence. This import of ideas and practices produced outside the Soviet bloc generally questioned how one could use this new knowledge within a society still characterised by the supremacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology over all the social sciences.

After 1956, describing the foreign world as it really was did not signify a renouncement of ideology at MGIMO. The use of traditional binaries such as 'ideologised' or 'pragmatic' when describing approaches to teaching often fails to take into account the specificity of this new intellectual context, which was

⁷⁵⁸ Among the several examples given by MGIMO alumni about the 'internal origins' of a critical attitude towards the Soviet regime following the 20th Congress, Ůrij Ůmašev's memoirs are revealing. He stresses: 'a critical attitude towards authorities was born during the lectures on foreign relations when, for example, our lecturers were not able to answer how such a small country as Finland could attack the USSR or what dictated the alliance with Hitler.' Rostislav Sergeev, ed., 'Skol'ko ponâli i uznali, zamečatel'nyh knig pročli...'. Vospominaniâ vypusnikov MGIMO 1961-1962gg. (Trinadcatyj vypusk) (Moskva: MGIMO Universitet, 2012), 45.

⁷⁵⁹ Among the memoirs of MGIMO alumni from 1958, seven graduates argue that their participation in the World Youth Festival held in Moscow in July-August 1957 was of paramount importance in their discovery of the foreign world. 'Kak molody my byli...', 8-9, 15, 92, 141, 152-53, 197, 201.

characterised by a radically different way of conceiving knowledge without necessarily abandoning Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the renewal of teaching programmes brought about not only a surge of new ideas, but also the introduction of a completely new relationship to knowledge. To paraphrase a famous quotation from Michel Foucault, for MGIMO students ‘truth was not outside of ideology or lacking ideology’. The French philosopher detailed:

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.⁷⁶⁰

In the case of MGIMO, Foucault’s idea is particularly useful in the sense that instead of looking for a hidden truth behind ideology, it invites us to question the concrete organisation of contradictory types of knowledge within the Institute: it pushes us to understand how new limits were set between the true and the false by several actors and institutions and how these limits were embedded into the discourses and behaviours of both future *meždunarodniki* and their teachers in the everyday life of the Institute during the 1960s.

The previous chapter aimed to identify the mechanisms behind the deluge of new ideas at MGIMO during the Thaw, what kind of ideas appeared, their value in the Institute’s everyday life, and how they challenged the teaching model created during the Stalin era. Analysing the rather original strategy implemented at MGIMO to deal with this surge of ideas distinct from the official ideology will be at the very core of this sixth chapter. At the turn of the 1960s, the idea that MGIMO had to be considered a socialist camp in miniature revealed the new strategy employed by the Soviet authorities to organise the spread of new ideas, determine what is true and false, and therefore control the loyalty of students. Indeed, the swell of new ideas described in chapter 5 came with the concrete organisation of their propagation within the institution. This new approach to knowledge gave rise to a new science and art of

⁷⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, *Dits et Ecrits, 1954-1988. Tome III : 1976-1979* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994), 112.

foreign affairs, a new praxis of international relations closely connected to so-called bourgeois theories. MGIMO students not only possessed exclusive knowledge related to foreign affairs, but also knew how to refer and react to international developments: they formed specific strategies to make such knowledge their own and use it in daily life.

Far from being contradictory, the renewal of teaching at the Institute makes sense if we consider the organisation of pedagogy at an MGIMO conceived of by the Soviet authorities as a socialist camp in miniature. Firstly, I will argue that members of the primary party organisation connected the wave of new ideas with an analysis about the places and times of their use at MGIMO. They were concerned by the contestation of official ideology and Soviet foreign policy, especially when it came from foreign students; however, they also paid a great deal of attention to when and where this contestation took place. Secondly, I will claim that the growing interest in bourgeois theories went hand-in-hand with the inculcation of a new praxis of foreign affairs: teaching bourgeois theories not only sought to control anti-Soviet statements in daily life and student loyalty, but also offered a new range of opportunities to the future *meždunarodniki*. Thirdly, I will focus on how daily interactions at the Institute, especially those between Soviet and non-Soviet students, were understood as part of a new training scheme: they were specific moments when students could implement the knowledge they had received in the classroom.

Criticism of the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy at MGIMO at the end of the 1950s

Between the mid- to late 1950s, members of the MGIMO Party Committee discussed several pedagogical strategies in order to find the right response to the harsh criticisms voiced by students, especially the foreign ones. However, in their struggle against anti-Soviet discourses, the space of possibilities was limited by several phenomena. Members of the primary party organisation made a link between time, place, and the critical discourses that turned out to be commonplace at the Institute. Firstly, the specific regulations governing foreign student admission to and exclusion

from MGIMO obviously weakened the authority of the local Communist Party organisation over non-Russian students. Secondly, the spread of criticisms against the Soviet regime was not confined to the classroom. Soviet foreign policy was the subject of thorough discussions in MGIMO dormitories,⁷⁶¹ which rendered ineffective a renewal of teaching strategies limited to life inside the Institute and its classrooms. Thus, debates in the MGIMO Party Committee focused upon two sets of questions in order to frame the debates: should foreign students be considered a different body, separate from the Soviet ones? And should the answer to the criticisms of foreign students be unanimous or differentiated?

A couple of months after Khrushchev's secret speech, the frequency with which members of MGIMO primary party organisation discussed the situation of foreign students reveals much about the everyday nature of the criticisms they pronounced against the Soviet regime.⁷⁶² Obviously, the years 1956-57 and 1961 were culminating moments, matching as they did tumultuous years in Soviet policy towards both Eastern Europe and China: it was in such moments when the issue of how to proceed with regards to foreign students was posed most acutely.⁷⁶³ Furthermore, brief respites in the relationships between the USSR and its allies did not make the issue of assessing the 'mood' (*nastroenie*) of foreign students disappear.⁷⁶⁴ The variety of party meetings during which communists raised their doubts about the correct approach to adopt towards foreign students revealed a general problem concerning all the faculties of the Institute. On 12 April 1957, members of the party organisation reported troubling rumours and slanderous discourses about Soviet foreign policy, heightening the impression that critical

⁷⁶¹ The records of the party primary organisation of the MID HR department indicate that, following the mergers between MGIMO, the MIOs, and the MIFT in 1960, 700 students lived in one of the institute's dormitories. *Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partburo pervičnoj partorganizacii upravleniâ kadrov MIDA*, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the MID HR party organization], 04/01/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 677, 113.

⁷⁶² For a detailed list of the party meetings held at the Institute when the situation of foreign students was put on the agenda, see appendix 2.

⁷⁶³ As one should note in the appendix 2, members of the party primary organisation discussed the situation of foreign students at the Institute approximately once a month between October 1956 and December 1957. In 1961, this topic was on the agenda of party meetings at least six times.

⁷⁶⁴ Anthony Kemp-Welch stresses that after October 1956, 'even though the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remained subservient, a degree of formal sovereignty was restored.' Anthony Kemp-Welch, 'Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity', in *Crisis and Détente, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 219.

statements were everyday occurrences.⁷⁶⁵ While recognising the limited control that the party organisation had over these slanderous discourses, rumours and their impact on Soviet students were clearly connected with the specific place of foreign students at the Institute.⁷⁶⁶

Indeed, of all the various difficulties faced by the MGIMO Party Committee in dealing with the criticisms of foreign students, the fact that ministries of foreign affairs in the people's democracies selected the students to be sent to MGIMO was probably seen as the most problematic. While MGIMO was directly affected by the policy of discriminatory action launched under Khrushchev in the mid-1950s in order to promote upward social mobility, the foreign students were excluded from this. During a party meeting at MGIMO on 23 May 1957, Director M. Ivanov informed the audience that, in comparison with Soviet students, foreign students were not selected by a competitive examination but by their home countries. He noted with regret that 'our control is limited to the health status of foreign students and a brief assessment of their level of Russian.'⁷⁶⁷ The selection of foreign students was beyond the control of MGIMO.

In their attempts to identify the roots of the problems posed by non-Soviet students, some teachers made a link between this specific regulation governing foreign student admission and their obviously 'apolitical attitudes'. The communist Černikov declared that almost half of the first-year students enrolled at MGIMO were foreigners. Two thirds of them were not members of their national communist parties. They had no manufacturing or farming experience. By stressing both their national and social origins, Černikov was pointing to the alarming lack of discipline among foreign students. He especially emphasised their 'apathy towards socio-economic

⁷⁶⁵ As sociologist Philippe Aldrin stresses, rumours are characterised independent of their content by a specific way of speaking and exchanging between people based on the circumvention practices of public speaking. Philippe Aldrin, *Sociologie politique des rumeurs* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, 2005), chap. II.

⁷⁶⁶ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro vostočnogo fakul'teta partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the eastern faculty of the MGIMO party organization], 12/04/1957, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 52, 84.

⁷⁶⁷ Protokoly sobranij pervičnoj partorganizacij vostočnogo i zapadnogo fakul'tetov MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings of the party organizations of the MGIMO eastern and western faculties], 23/05/57, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 50, 112.

disciplines', their 'apolitical state of mind', their 'lack of conviction', and their 'petty-bourgeois behaviour'.⁷⁶⁸

Obviously, the problem did not just go away. A couple of years later, Černikov again warned members of the party organisation about the obvious loopholes in the political training of foreign students. He informed them that, since the beginning of 1960, 24 foreign students had been expelled from MGIMO and that three Polish students had proven to be 'Catholic fanatics'.⁷⁶⁹ Finally, he criticised the fact that several Polish religious 'fanatics' were still studying at MGIMO. Excluding foreign students was a clear sign of weakness to members of the primary party organisation and no doubt an obvious recognition of their failure. Not only did it reveal the difficulties they had with convincing foreign students about the validity of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence, but inflexibility among party members also caused problems, since it fuelled the doubts of the remaining foreign students and resulted in incomprehension among Soviet students. Because foreign students were selected and supported by their embassies in Moscow, they were much more difficult to expel than the average Soviet student.

In October 1958, discussions at MGIMO about introducing preparatory courses were another example of the specific place occupied by foreign students at the Institute and a clear indication of how they succeeded in contesting the authority of the primary party organisation from within.⁷⁷⁰ While both the MGIMO Party Committee and the administration had proposed to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to open preparatory courses for foreign and non-Russian students from the federate republics of the USSR, the former group thwarted this plan. Party committee member Krutov explained that this project was necessary to bring foreign students' language and mathematics skills up to scratch. He indicated that 33 students from the Soviet republics had been enrolled in MGIMO without any competitive examination in September 1958. He complained that they had a lower academic level compared to

⁷⁶⁸ Stenogrammy partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 20/09/60, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 68, 34.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid., 35.

⁷⁷⁰ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party committee meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 09/10/58, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 56, 4.

Russian students selected through the entrance examination. However, when the project of creating specific classes reserved for non-Russian students (in other words, the establishment of separate and exclusive classes for different types of students) was floated, foreign students already enrolled at MGIMO opposed it. Krutov indicated that it was thanks to the support of their embassies in Moscow that these students were able to scotch the plan for preparatory courses.

In addition to the fact that MGIMO did not control the selection of foreign students, the development of criticisms against the Soviet regime outside the classroom particularly worried members of the Party Committee. While diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the USSR were at their lowest ebb at the beginning of the 1960s, the MGIMO director stressed that the dormitories were an arena for debates among the foreign students: this was a forum beyond the control of both the Party Committee and the administration. He declared:

Chinese students have just arrived. Their behaviour has clearly changed. Everyone knows that we have a divergence of views on several questions with the Chinese Communist Party. Everyone keeps quiet about that, but, in the privacy of their rooms, students behave differently. In dormitories, there are Poles, Hungarians, and other students from socialist countries. Conversations are open, and it is no coincidence that you can listen to this kind of conversation between Chinese and Polish students: 'You blamed us for being revisionist but you are dogmatic.'⁷⁷¹

Ryženko warned the Party Committee that the development of criticisms towards some socialist countries in MGIMO dormitories was much more worrying than the controversial questions raised by students during seminars. Because the former occurred outside the classrooms, both the MGIMO administration and the Party Committee failed to control what was said about the disagreements between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. Moreover, the director's statements were telling with regards to the difficulties that members of the party organisation faced when preparing a common answer for students belonging to the various countries of the socialist bloc. While Chinese students were sceptical about what they defined as

⁷⁷¹ Stenogrammy partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 20/09/60, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 68, 58.

Khrushchev's revisionism, Polish students, in contrast, attacked the first secretary's dogmatism. Lastly, by suggesting that students showed their true colours in the privacy of their rooms, the director clearly expressed the concern that they might be living a double life.

At the end of this speech to the MGIMO Party Committee, Ryženko indicated that teachers had to take time spent outside the Institute into consideration when dealing with foreign students. However, only a narrow range of options was available to answer anti-Soviet statements. He declared:

It goes without saying that we cannot ban these kinds of discussions from MGIMO dorms. [...] We can only act upon these talks through advice, guidance, debates, and recommendations, in a thoughtful and discerning way, to foreign students, a way that shows respect towards the sovereign authority of the parties and youth organisations of the people's democracies. Nonetheless, we cannot go to extremes, we cannot go too far the other way by leaving them on their own. We have been entrusted with training these foreign students for six years so that they can become real internationalists once outside of our walls. We are accountable for all of this.⁷⁷²

Given both the low level of control over the selection of foreign students and the development of criticisms in the MGIMO dormitories, two different strategies were considered in order to end the so-called 'imperialist critique' from within.

Members of the MGIMO Party Committee considered either creating teaching programmes specifically designed for foreign students or pushing ahead with undifferentiated treatment of both Soviet and foreign students, expecting the same, academically and politically, from both of them without distinction. During a party meeting on 13 November 1958, the Party Secretary of the MGIMO Western Faculty Tatarinova indicated that MGIMO communists had long hesitated over whether foreign students should receive different courses than Soviet students. She complained that because of past mistakes in the teaching strategy towards non-Soviets, foreign students were now cut off from their Soviet classmates.⁷⁷³ The

⁷⁷² Ibid., p. 59.

⁷⁷³ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the party committee of the MGIMO party organization] 13/11/58, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 56, 26.

communist Semën Gonionskij shared this interpretation. Blaming the fact that the MGIMO administration and the Party Committee had long considered foreign students as a separate pool, he urged members of the Party Committee to adopt the same political and academic expectations for all students, regardless of national origins.⁷⁷⁴ The development of stronger links between Soviet and foreign students was a matter of concern for the Party Committee.

During the same party meeting, the communist Sevost'janov provided important details about the differentiated treatment of foreign students at MGIMO before 1958 and the reasons for its failure. He explained that students from Eastern Germany were not included in collective activities outside MGIMO. For instance, they contributed neither to sporting activities nor to the propaganda work required from Soviet students.⁷⁷⁵ According to him, the growing gap between Soviet and German students was due to this differentiated treatment. By arguing that MGIMO training was based on teaching both inside and outside the Institute, he spoke in favour of undifferentiated treatment which could bring the Soviet and foreign students together. He stressed that the success of the internationalist task entrusted to them by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union required the development of life-long friendly bonds between the Soviet and foreign students at MGIMO. He made clear that 'these closer friendly bonds must be skilfully and tactically established during activities outside MGIMO.'⁷⁷⁶ Teaching in the classrooms mattered, but extracurricular activities were needed to instil a sense of friendship between Soviet and foreign students: Sevost'janov argued that these strong links would be of paramount importance in the success of internationalism.

In their reflections on the best response to criticisms, the MGIMO Party Committee dealt with a second set of questions: on whom should they rely to answer student critiques? In other words, they wondered whether they should ignore them, set down a collective response, or let each teachers address these criticisms personally. There is no doubt that this second set of questions echoed the discussions about Stalin's legacy a month after Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech, when members of the Party

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid., 27.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., 30.

Committee debated whether they had to bear the responsibility for criticising Stalin's cult of personality individually or wait for instructions from the upper levels of the Communist Party.⁷⁷⁷

Here again, discussions prior to the Sino-Soviet split reveal much about the strategies considered by the Party Committee to answer criticisms. During a Party Committee meeting at MGIMO in November 1961, the student Zavražnov declared that the lack of official information about the tensions between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties could not satisfy the need to openly and collectively address the criticisms of non-Soviet students.⁷⁷⁸ By suggesting the organisation of seminars, conferences, and lectures by both the MGIMO Party Committee and the administration, Zavražnov argued that anti-Soviet criticisms needed to be addressed collectively and publicly. This meant that MGIMO communists had to be better informed about the evolution of Soviet foreign policy.

During the same meeting, Professor Boris Isaenko, a specialist in Chinese language and literature, gave a distinctive opinion. Even though he shared the view that it was necessary to respond to the criticisms of foreign students, he called for discretion. He declared:

We have to deal fearlessly with these criticisms, but without showing off. The reason why our party press does not deal with this is understandable. But within our Institute and our party organisation, we have to answer these questions. We have to dot the i's.⁷⁷⁹

Isaenko stressed that the lack of information about tensions within the Second World was probably due to the closed nature of the diplomatic negotiations between the USSR and the People's Democracy of China. These circumstances made it difficult to openly and collectively discuss these tensions within MGIMO. Indeed, he pointed out the need to answer criticisms from foreign students even though the party newspapers did not provide clear information. The discretion for which he called also meant that

⁷⁷⁷ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 26/03/56, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 45, 99.

⁷⁷⁸ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 123.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid., 122.

teachers might individually answer foreign students' comments or criticisms about the Soviet Union.

Bourgeois theories and a new praxis of foreign affairs

At the beginning of the 1960s, members of the MGIMO primary organisation discussed several pedagogical strategies in order to respond to the criticisms of foreign students. Less than intellectual debates about the variety of paths to communism or the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, these strategies were deeply inscribed in the concrete aspects of daily life at the Institute: they were framed by the places and contexts where critical statements against the Soviet Union were uttered. As members of the primary party organisation were discussing the correct approach towards foreign students, a new wave of interest in the teaching of bourgeois theories emerged after 1960.⁷⁸⁰ The variety of viewpoints in the Second World was counterpoised to the necessity of fighting together against the propaganda of the Western capitalist enemy. Including bourgeois theories in teaching programmes would be based on a new organisation of pedagogy, the aim of which was to control anti-Soviet statements in daily life. It would set new limits between what was considered true and false at the Institute, a distinction that soon became of paramount importance in the development of a new praxis of international relations for future *meždunarodniki*.

At the Institute, teaching bourgeois theories was designed to achieve several objectives. The international propaganda war between the two blocks in the 1960s had been deeply changed by cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West.⁷⁸¹ Certainly, the massive enrolment of students in internships abroad and

⁷⁸⁰ For a detailed list of the party meetings held at the Institute that dealt with the question of bourgeois theories, see appendix part III.

⁷⁸¹ For more details about the American-Soviet cultural agreement signed in 1958 by Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev, see: Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War*, 1998 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), xiv; For an analysis of the cultural Cold War, see: Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, 'Culture and the Cold War in Europe', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge

access to foreign literature resulted in a need to deepen the study of contemporary bourgeois ideology. However, this was not all. Indeed, in September 1960, Director Ryženko made a clear connection between the presence of foreign students at the Institute and the spread of bourgeois ideology within the Institute. He declared:

As has been reported, we have 427 foreign students, and some of them have different political beliefs and worldviews, starting with supporters of modernism and Catholics. We also have a dozen foreign specialists mainly with bourgeois views who are native speakers. Beginning in the third and fourth years [of study], all our students closely communicate with representatives of the bourgeois world while working with delegations here or going overseas. Our party organisation cannot ignore such facts, as the influence of bourgeois ideology is expressed, in one form or another, to a single student or even the entire group.⁷⁸²

His statements were revealing about the variety of channels through which bourgeois ideology was spread at the Institute. Contacts with foreign delegations, just like internships in capitalist countries, contributed to close proximity between MGIMO students and ideas contradictory to Marxism-Leninism. However, by specifically mentioning Catholicism and modernism, the director stated without ambiguity that foreign students, and especially those from Eastern Europe, were considered important mediators of bourgeois ideas between the capitalist West and the Soviet Union.

Trapped between the necessity of training both Soviet and foreign specialists and the emergence of critical voices among foreign students, the Party Committee took important steps to redefine the teaching strategies connected with bourgeois theories at MGIMO. The visit of Yuri Andropov, who informed members of the MGIMO Party Committee about both the state of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the USSR and the correct reaction to the criticisms of foreign students, reveals much about how a new teaching model gradually emerged.

University Press, 2010), 398; Nicholas J. Cull, 'Reading, Viewing, and Tuning in to the Cold War', in *Crises and détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, First paperback edition, vol. II, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 438.

⁷⁸² Stenogrammy partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 20/09/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 68, 56.

Andropov's visit on 14 November 1961 was indeed a landmark moment in the renewal of teaching strategies. The speech of the head of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries in the Central Committee of the Communist Party was a clear expression of the recognition of MGIMO as a key institution endowed with the mission of training foreign specialists. By reporting on trends in the diplomatic relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, Andropov stressed that MGIMO members must be kept informed about the most recent evolutions in foreign affairs. He updated them about the current Soviet line towards the Chinese Communist Party:

You are aware that last year during the November Congress, our Party and the Chinese Communist Party stated their differences of opinion on several aspects of the development of today's world. These divergences dealt with the question of assessing the trends of our time and the variety of paths towards socialism. The Chinese comrades put in doubt the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism and the possibility of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries in our times.⁷⁸³

Andropov took note of divergences within the socialist bloc. Yet, at the same time, he stressed its unity in the confrontation with capitalist countries. He indicated:

Neither the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union nor the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party considered these divergences a problem because we fully agree on what is fundamental. We are united in our struggle against imperialism and in our fight for peace. We recognise one single pattern of building socialism in every socialist country.⁷⁸⁴

Of course, diplomatic relations between the USSR and China deteriorated in the following months and contradicted the Soviet leader's speech.⁷⁸⁵ Yet, Andropov's statements tell us much about how he asked the MGIMO Party Committee to deal with the diversity of opinions among foreign students. His speech was not just limited to providing information about Soviet diplomacy. He also gave clear and concrete

⁷⁸³ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 104.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid., 104.

⁷⁸⁵ The records of the MGIMO party organisation do not mention the precise moment when MGIMO Chinese students were called back after the Sino-Soviet split. Obviously, it happened in less than a year after Andropov's visit to the Institute.

guidelines on some issues that particularly bedevilled the MGIMO Party Committee. He reminded its members about the strategic importance of MGIMO in the success of proletarian internationalism and defended the wider enrolment of foreign students from socialist countries.⁷⁸⁶ More importantly, however, he spoke out in favour of including criticisms of the Soviet regime in MGIMO's teaching programmes, especially those bourgeois theories that both Soviet and non-Soviet students would have to challenge in their future careers.⁷⁸⁷

In 1956, members of the party organisation stressed the need to strengthen the ties between *school* and *life*; in contrast, the aim of giving an overview of the diversity of opinions within the Second World while stressing the unity of the socialist countries in opposition to the West seemed like a new pattern of teaching. What strikes one is the frequency of party meetings during which this specific issue was discussed. Between February 1959 and April 1964, the records of the organisation indicate that the issue was on the agenda of at least 17 party meetings. Just as with the question of foreign students, issues concerning bourgeois theories were raised in all MGIMO faculties without exception.

This new surge of interest in scientific research conducted in the West was explicitly formulated on 14 October 1960, when a meeting of the MGIMO Party Committee started to prepare a scientific conference about contemporary bourgeois theory. Three party members were responsible for organising the event: the secretary of the primary party organisation and professor of history G. Dongarov, professor of philosophy Ů. Zamořkin, and assistant professor in economics E. Bugrov.⁷⁸⁸ The list of interventions approved by the party organisation is highly indicative of the tactics deployed to present the last development in bourgeois theories. Focusing on concrete questions such as 'individual liberties', 'technology', or 'the national issue', bourgeois theories were systematically put alongside Marxist viewpoints. There can be no doubt that organising a conference entirely dedicated to foreign knowledge

⁷⁸⁶ Stenogrammy obřih partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 164.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid., 166.

⁷⁸⁸ Stenogramma i protokoly zasedanij partkoma, [Minutes and transcripts of the party committee meetings], 14/10/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 70, 73.

marked a clear break with both the Stalin era and the beginning of the Thaw. However, this was just the beginning.

Table 8: List of interventions at the scientific conference about bourgeois theories presented during a party meeting at MGIMO on 14 October 1960

List of interventions	Spisok vystuplenij
Ideological struggle about the problem of the individual and society	Ideologiĉeskaâ bor'ba vokrug problem liĉnosti i obŝestva
Ideological struggle about the national issue in the contemporary world	Ideologiĉeskaâ bor'ba vokrug nacional'nogo voprosa v sovremennyh usloviâh
Ideological struggle about the problems of economic competition between two systems	Ideologiĉeskaâ bor'ba vokrug problemy èkonomiĉeskogo sorevnovaniâ dvuh sistem
Bourgeois and Marxist understanding of democracy and individual liberty	Burĉuaznoe i marksistkoe ponimanie demokratii i svobody liĉnosti
Ideological struggle about the problems of technology and human beings	Ideologiĉeskaâ bor'ba vokrug problemy tehnik i ĉeloveka
Ideological struggle about the problems of peaceful coexistence	Ideologiĉeskaâ bor'ba vokrug problemy mirnogo sosuŝestvovaniâ
Against the falsification of the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU	Protiv fal'sifikacii istorii Sovetskogo Soûza i KPSS

A month later, at the conclusion of the party meeting on 25 November 1960, the MGIMO Party Committee board set itself the objective of 'instilling in students the art of leading discussions, the capacity of eruditely setting out their arguments, and the ability to unmask bourgeois ideologies, Soviet revisionism, and dogmatism.'⁷⁸⁹ The purpose was clearly to teach students how to both categorise and criticise any anti-Soviet point of view. By mentioning Soviet revisionism and dogmatism, the Party Committee required students to deal with criticisms from other socialist countries. By putting the emphasis on unmasking bourgeois theories, it also enabled them to find common ground between Soviet and non-Soviet students, who had different views about the right path to socialism but were required to unite in their common fight against capitalist imperialism.

⁷⁸⁹ Stenogrammy i protokoly zasedanij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 25/11/60, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 70, 172.

Therefore, the Party Committee contributed significantly to the importation of bourgeois ideas into the teaching programmes. In October 1960, after the conference led to the development of an *ad hoc* educational model, bourgeois theories progressively spread across all seminars and lectures. In December 1960, the communist Blinov declared:

The struggle against bourgeois ideology and arming students in counter arguments is not set to the proper level and on a specific soil. In what sense [will it occur]? Of course, it is very nice that especially printed courses will be developed and a number of lectures criticising bourgeois historiography and certain provisions of bourgeois historians given. [...] Well, as much as possible, in lectures on one of the most critical sectors of the ideological front, where every day there is a controversy, when the bourgeois press and radio are pouring buckets of dirt on us, we have to find the time to engage in polemics against these arguments.⁷⁹⁰

Conclusions about the need to include the study of bourgeois theories in a wide range of seminars and lectures were soon drawn. After stressing the requirements of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the upper levels of the Communist Party in the renewal of teaching strategies, the Party Committee made the following resolution on the teaching of economics in May 1961:

A new discipline will be included in the second-year teaching programme of the department of economics. The discipline of world economics will familiarise students with the economies of capitalist countries, the economies of socialist countries, and the economies of economically underdeveloped countries. Students will be required to learn the objective scientific laws of economics based on Marxism-Leninism. They will also have to be cognisant of bourgeois economic studies. As such, they will be able to perform their duties in international organisations and will be capable of having heated debates with foreign economists.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁹⁰ Stenogrammy i protokoly zasedanij partkoma, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee] 21/12/1960, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 70, 235.

⁷⁹¹ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro fakul'teta meždunarodnyh èkonomičeskikh otnošenij MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the partyburo meetings of the MGIMO faculty of international economic relations], 11/05/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 79, 14.

By including bourgeois theories in their programmes, MGIMO teachers obviously aimed at categorising what was contrary to Marxism-Leninism and opposed to the interests of the socialist bloc. More importantly, however, the inclusion of bourgeois theories served to reduce the diffusion of ideas potentially hostile to the Soviet regime. Secretary of the party organisation Dongarov was clear about the motivations behind this new interest in bourgeois theories:

We have to wage a merciless battle against bourgeois points of view in every lecture and seminar. But there is another aspect to this fight. We have to deal with several contradictions in Soviet everyday life. This is particularly obvious for our students. They respond more noticeably to these contradictions. They are troubled and they are often searching for answers. Some students without ideological preparation (*zakalki*) without temperament are looking for answers in the bourgeois newspapers. We must not await the moment when students discuss these questions by themselves. We must go to encounter them. We have to give them the correct understanding of these burning issues.⁷⁹²

Dongarov signified that including bourgeois theories in the academic curriculum was also a means for controlling and limiting the spread of negative ideas about the Soviet regime. It was not just a matter of improving the education of MGIMO students. The inclusion of foreign points of views presented several advantages. Teachers kept control of the foreign authors included in teaching programmes. They could anticipate questions and remarks by leading the discussion to carefully chosen foreign ideas.

If one draws a parallel between the teaching of bourgeois theories and alumni memoirs, the specific method by which MGIMO teachers introduced bourgeois theories stands out all the more clearly. Gennadij Uranov recalled his internship in Paris during his last year of study in 1958 and made a connection between his first experience abroad and the teaching he had received at the Institute by way of the metaphor of ‘a paned window to the West’:

⁷⁹² Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the party committee’s meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 16/10/62, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 84, 90-91.

We arrived in Paris on 12 December 1958 and were immediately plunged into a completely new life, one in many ways unusual for us. A very short note: studying at the MGIMO, we, thanks to the status and educational material of this institution together with the foreign press it received, had access to a permanently open ‘paned window’ (not a window [*okno*], but a ‘paned window’ [*fortoška*] to the West); for us, this was a great educational and cultural privilege. And having suddenly appeared in Paris, we had just come to the forefront of the Western world: we got the opportunity to meet closely, in the words of Balzac, its ‘shine and poverty’.⁷⁹³

When Uranov discovered Paris in 1958, he plunged into a world different to the one he had known in Moscow. Yet, his new place of residence was not totally alien to him. Thanks to the paned window at the Institute, he had received enough knowledge so as to not feel like a stranger in Paris. Moreover, Uranov clearly stressed that even though this world was new, the skills he had developed at the Institute and, obviously, his reading of Balzac allowed him to assess the ‘shine and poverty’ of everyday life in Paris. Lastly, he suggests that he thought his internship was a great privilege for which he was grateful to MGIMO.

The metaphor of the paned window is telling with regards to the way in which the MGIMO administration and primary party organisation sought to keep a hand on the tiller when disseminating bourgeois theories. By circulating some bourgeois theories themselves, the party organisation hoped to preempt and control the questions raised by students and the grounds for their further discussion. The metaphor of the paned window also meant that bourgeois theories were arranged and organised both in material and ideational spaces in the Institute’s everyday life. This organisation of knowledge was of paramount importance in the development of a specific praxis connected to bourgeois ideas.

Indeed, the materiality of these alternative ideas is demonstrated in how they were arranged in specific physical places within the Institute. Far from being freely accessible at the Institute’s library, foreign literature was carefully placed in a special storage section called the *special’ noe hranenie* (*spechrany*), inside of which undesirable books containing bourgeois ideological ruminations were kept. It was

⁷⁹³ ‘*Kak molody my byli...*’, 203.

only in their fourth year of study that MGIMO students could access the bourgeois literature.⁷⁹⁴ In order to benefit from this access, students were required to clearly nominate the literature they wanted to consult, obtain permission from a qualified authority, and justify its use. Furthermore, books situated in the special storage section had to remain within the library and could not be borrowed by either students or researchers. This material distinction in the library between bourgeois and Soviet literature mattered. The system of *spechrany* was not specific to MGIMO.⁷⁹⁵ However, for MGIMO students, it was obviously part of a larger teaching strategy designed to show them about how to make use of knowledge that contradicted official ideology.

By focusing on the content of written material dealing with bourgeois theories, a common strategy implemented by MGIMO teaching staff towards the use of alternative ideas can be revealed. As Russian scholar Pavel Cygankov rightly points out, both the study and teaching of bourgeois theories had to respect certain rules and use suitable words:

The dominant approach was naturally orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, every foreign paradigm had to be absorbed by and assimilated within the dogma, carefully wrapped in a Marxist terminology when this integration was not possible, or, finally, designed as a form of critique of the bourgeois ideology.⁷⁹⁶

The discussions at MGIMO party meetings, alumni memoirs, and PhD theses defended at the Institute after 1956 are revealing of this very specific organisation of the use of bourgeois theories.

On the one hand, without dealing openly and directly with bourgeois theories, some aspects and notions developed by Western scholars could contribute to new thinking about topics for discussion and pedagogy. As early as 1956, the philosophy teacher Semënov pointed out the need to study ‘some aspects and questions of bourgeois

⁷⁹⁴ Protokoly zasedaniy partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 02/04/1962, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 82, 40.

⁷⁹⁵ Kseniâ Lûtova, *Spechran biblioteki Akademii nauk: iz istorii sekretnykh fondov*, Akademiâ nauk SSSR (Moskva: BAN, 1999); Valeria D. Stelmakh, ‘Reading in the Context of Censorship in the Soviet Union’, *Libraries & Culture* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 143–51.

⁷⁹⁶ Pavel Cygankov, *Političeskaâ sociologiâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij*, [Political sociology of international relations] Radiks (Moskva, 1994), 24.

social sciences due to the fact that they are in the interests of Soviet social science':⁷⁹⁷ his recommendation seems to have been implemented in the following years. Indeed, the records of the primary party organisation indicate that, on 8 May 1961, members of the history of the CPSU department led heated discussions about 'the role of the middle class at the present time'.⁷⁹⁸ Even though the party records do not give any indication about the thrust of the debate, the topic was quite bold, and even surprising when we consider the fact that the very term 'middle class' did not appear in official Soviet statistics or the nomenclature of social categories.⁷⁹⁹

Elements of bourgeois theories seemed to contribute to new ways of thinking about aspects excluded by the official ideology at the beginning of the 1960s. They also turned out to be useful for introducing new pedagogical methods after 1956. In her memoirs, Adelaida Grigor'evna recalls the high quality of the teaching at the Institute, with the exception of the course about the 'principles of Marxism-Leninism' (*Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*), which she found particularly dull. However, she remembered that, thanks to Professor Ryženko, an important change in pedagogy occurred. In addition to his charisma and erudition, she stresses the fact that he introduced game theory into his lectures on Marxism-Leninism.⁸⁰⁰ The teacher divided up the students into several political groups (the left, the centrists, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party) to provoke debates about the pre-revolutionary situation in the Russian Empire. It was certainly a very unorthodox way of presenting the preconditions of the October Revolution; nonetheless, the use of game theory was an element in the teaching that Adelaida Grigor'evna especially remembered and eventually used in her later career.

Obviously, many MGIMO students learnt how to make use of the vagueness and silence of orthodox Marxism-Leninism on certain problems they faced in their future

⁷⁹⁷ 'O neobходимosti izučeniâ nekotoryh buržuaznyh aspektov i teorij obščestvennyh nauk, v svâzi s tem, čto oni vypadaût iz sfery interesov sovetskoi obščestvennoj nauki'. Stenogramma i protokoly obščih partijnyh sobranij, [Minutes and transcripts of the general party meetings] 04/10/1956, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 46, 77.

⁷⁹⁸ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma, [Minutes and transcripts of the party committee meetings] 09/05/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 76, 25.

⁷⁹⁹ Alain Blum and Martine Mespoulet, 'Classer une société sans classe', in *Anarchie bureaucratique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 240–59.

⁸⁰⁰ Sergeev, 'Skol' ko ponâli i uznali, zamečatel'nyh knig pročli...', 90.

careers. In his memoirs, Evgenij Silin remembers that he was questioned about the unorthodox views of his classmate and friend V. Ârovoj, with whom he was working in the Committee of Youth organisation. He answered that ‘as the CPSU did not have clearly set out position in any document in relation to social democracy and the Socialist International, it would be difficult to blame Ârovoj for not toeing the party line.’⁸⁰¹ At the same time, he advised his friend to recognise some obvious mistakes and to be extremely cautious.

On the other hand, the records of the MGIMO library reveal that some research and teaching material was entirely dedicated to the study of bourgeois theories. There was, however, a major difference between the discussions held by students in the intimacy of dormitories and the strategies applied by MGIMO teachers and members of the Party organisation. Within both the teaching and researching processes, bourgeois theories were criticised publicly. They were always put alongside Marxist-Leninist dogma in such a way as to benefit the latter. Last but not least, discussions and written material respected a specific hierarchy.

The introductions of PhD theses devoted to bourgeois theories in the 1960s adhere systematically to a common framework, revealing the importance of the organisation of knowledge in the Institute’s daily life.⁸⁰² After a quotation from Lenin about the need to unmask propaganda from capitalist countries, they presented the origins, newest developments, and failures of *bourgeois* ideas in the field of philosophy, economics, and history.

When Ermolenko defended his PhD dissertation in 1964, he positioned himself in such a way so that, rather than contesting the supremacy of Marxism-Leninism, he officially and publicly denounced contemporary American philosophical concepts, which he identified as a propaganda tool for defending the interests of the capitalist bloc. In his introduction, the Soviet researcher justified his choice of thesis by arguing that ‘while capitalism is consecutively losing the struggle with the Soviet bloc, it

⁸⁰¹ ‘*Kak molody my byli...*’, 163.

⁸⁰² Barabanov, ‘Kritika Buržuaznoj Politèkonomii SŠA Po Voprosam Èkonomičeskogo Sorevnovaniâ Dvuh Sistem’; Ermolenko, ‘Očerki Kritiki Sovremennoj Buržuaznoj Fisolofii SŠA (Nekotorye Osnovnye Tendencii I Tečeniâ)’; Matveev, ‘Kritika Sovremennoj Političeskoj Ideologii Monopolističeskoj Buržuazii Francii’.

mobilises every available means in order to exert ideological domination over the masses, to defile the bright ideals of communism, and to defend its own interests at any cost.’⁸⁰³

The choice of words did matter: PhD dissertations which dealt with bourgeois theories often reflected a common lexical field. Marked as ‘bourgeois’, ‘imperialistic’, and even ‘fascistic’, these theories were linked with the decline and forthcoming collapse of capitalist countries. Far from contradicting orthodox Marxism-Leninism, these dissertations pretended to take part in the ideological battle against capitalism. By identifying them as smokescreens, researchers stressed the superiority of Marxism-Leninism and the accomplishments of the Soviet bloc. It required a rather good knowledge of the party literature to give a relevant answer to the most controversial points raised by the bourgeois theories analysed.

A. Obuhova’s thesis on American political realism is also a telling example of such a framework.⁸⁰⁴ After identifying realism as a propaganda tool against the Soviet bloc, she described the Machiavellian and Hobbesian origins of the doctrine. She continued with an accurate analysis of Hans Morgenthau’s books before proving that, in ethical and moral terms, Soviet values were superior to the aggressive and anarchical model developed by American realists. Here again, far from contradicting orthodox Marxism-Leninism, the dissertation took part in the ideological battle against capitalism.

By publicly criticising Western concepts and ideas, these PhD dissertations testified to a deep knowledge of bourgeois theories. In 1964, Ermolenko’s work precisely described not only American philosophical ideas but also the ways in which they were connected with leading researchers, scientific reviews, and universities or research centres. In doing so, he convincingly distinguished between a mosaic of schools of thoughts, such as the proponents of objective idealism based at Yale University, where professors Northrop and Weiss published *the Review of Metaphysics*, and the supporters of a pragmatic and positivist orientation at Columbia, where they

⁸⁰³ Ermolenko, ‘Očerki Kritiki Sovremennoj Buržuaznoj Fisolofii SŠA (Nekotorye Osnovnye Tendencii i Tečeniâ)’, 5.

⁸⁰⁴ A. Obuhova, ‘Doktrina “političeskogo Realizma” v SŠA Na Sovremennom Ètape.’ (MGIMO, 1965).

published *the Journal of Philosophy*. He gave also a precise description of Harvard as a breeding ground for new positivists, while the University of Chicago was depicted as a cradle for the philosophy of ethics and existentialism: it was also noted that the University of Minnesota, where Herbert Feigl was situated, had a school of phenomenology which published *the Journal of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research*.

The bibliographies of the dissertations defended at MGIMO after 1956 reflect both that a wide range of ideas from the West was available to MGIMO students and how these contradictory ideas were situated and organised into a specific hierarchy within an ideal space. The bibliographies all begin with a section dedicated to the reference works of Marxism-Leninism (*Proizvedeniâ osnovopoložnikov marksizma-leninizma*). This was subdivided according to a genealogical order: the published works and personal archives of Marx and Engels were always placed first. A list of books or public speeches given by Lenin followed.⁸⁰⁵ A second section was devoted to the documents from communist party congresses, speeches and written pieces by CPSU political leaders, and documents from the state and party structures (*partijnye dokumenty, vystupleniâ i trudy KPSS, Sovetskogo gosudarstva i kommunističeskoj partii SSSR*). A different order organised this second subsection, as texts related to party congresses appeared before the works of the general secretary.

A third section was dedicated to either the presentation of sources or the literature. Because it was based on a double hierarchy, the structural order of this third part differed from the two previously mentioned. Contrary to the genealogical order used in the first section, the third was arranged in alphabetical order. However, a political criterion was also introduced. Literature produced by Soviet authors occupied the first rank, and then foreign Marxist authors were quoted; last but not least, bourgeois literature concluded the bibliography. It was not rare for the leaders of national communist parties to be included among foreign Marxist authors. For instance, in his

⁸⁰⁵ In the early 50s, the bibliographies of the first dissertations defended at the MGIMO also mentioned Stalin's books and speeches: they came after Lenin's.

critical study of bourgeois political science in France, V. Danilenko cited the works of Maurice Thorez, Waldeck Rochet, and Georges Marchais.⁸⁰⁶

Bibliographies show that, between Marxist-Leninist dogma and bourgeois theories, there was a broad spectrum of theories and ideas which had to be organised into a hierarchy by PhD researchers. Using foreign knowledge meant learning the value of working with foreign theories and how to preserve the relationship with orthodox dogma while obscuring it. PhD students, and MGIMO students as a whole, had to classify, situate, and organise more or less contradictory types of knowledge in order to comply with the supremacy of Marxism-Leninism. However, by proclaiming the uniqueness and scientificity of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet PhD students and researchers had the opportunity to explore a wide range of aspects related to the opposite bloc.

Rules mattered. Pavel Cygankov, Adelaida Grigor'evna, and Evgenij Silin's statements and dissertations dedicated to bourgeois theories all reveal the same thing: it was one thing to know bourgeois theories or to have unorthodox views, but it was something else to know how to use them. While a wide range of new ideas were made available, using and talking about bourgeois theories required a certain artistry.

This ability to know bourgeois theories and how to use them could have unexpected consequences if not done in the right way. Indeed, even in the context of the Thaw, the use of foreign knowledge was not a trifling matter and could be burdensome. Cygankov emphasised that the importation of foreign knowledge carried certain risks:

Every research laboratory that did not fit in the conventional categorisations of Marxist-Leninist policies and every individual dealing with a theoretical work encountered additional difficulties: the access to essential but undisclosed information and data, and the particular risks of such works. Each *faux pas* could be potentially dangerous.⁸⁰⁷

These statements about the paradox of indigenous knowledge that always had to be presented publicly through the prism of Marxist-Leninist ideology also reveals a

⁸⁰⁶ V. Danilenko, 'Kritika Metodologičeskikh Osnov I Nekotoryh Teoretičeskikh Konceptij Buržuaznoj Političeskoj Nauki vo Francii' (MGIMO, 1971).

⁸⁰⁷ Cygankov, *Političeskaâ sociologiâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij*, 34.

range of practices. While members of the party organisation contributed to the dissemination of bourgeois theories, they also set clear limits as to their use.

On 13 April 1962, several communist students called upon teachers in the German department to use the classics of German literature and West German newspapers during their seminars. In support of this request, they stressed that the limited use of written material from West Germany would make them incapable of fighting bourgeois theories thoroughly in their future work. Monahimovič, the head of the German language department, responded unambiguously that using bourgeois newspapers and literature represented ‘an additional workload for teachers’.⁸⁰⁸ It would mean commenting upon the texts chosen ‘not only in terms of language but also in terms of criticism of their political ideology’.⁸⁰⁹ For him, this additional challenge signified that teachers would necessarily have to consult with their colleagues in the departments of political economy, the history of the USSR and the CPSU, and Marxist-Leninist theory in order to find texts related to the ideological points raised in the Western newspapers. Using bourgeois theories, even as a member of the teaching staff, clearly represented a risk.

Evading the rules of circulation also raised suspicion. On 16 October 1962, members of the primary party organisation warned the MGIMO administration about the influence of bourgeois theories on students and the problem of postal correspondence from bourgeois countries to students who had taken a training course abroad.⁸¹⁰ By reminding students that their correspondence with foreign countries had to be sent from and received at the Institute, the members of the primary party organisation drew a red line.

Lastly, letting the students teach themselves bourgeois theories was not only a risk, but also a strong signal of a dangerously close acquaintance with such disreputable materials. On 10 April 1964, the report of the ideological commission of the Party

⁸⁰⁸ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 13/04/1962, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 82, 39.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibidem.

⁸¹⁰ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts and minutes of the MGIMO party committee meetings] 16/10/1962, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 84, 93.

Committee emphasised the need to control the ideological content of the education undertaken in student societies such as *Znanie* and *Sovremennik*.⁸¹¹ Once again, the primary party organisation reminded students that bourgeois theories had to be discussed publicly in line with Marxist-Leninist dogma and with respect to a specific hierarchy.

Learning about international relations in daily interactions between Soviet and non-Soviet students

In the last years of the Khrushchev era, disseminating bourgeois theories meant both the multiplication of ideas available at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge and, at the very same time, the reinforcement of control. To not only know bourgeois theories and revisionism, but also, and more importantly, to be capable of using them, organising them into a hierarchy in line with Marxism-Leninism, and understanding the limits of this was both a science and an art. Including bourgeois theories within MGIMO teaching was accompanied by the encouragement of the practical application of knowledge inside what members of the primary party organisation defined as a socialist camp in miniature. This meant comparing what students said and how they acted, stressing the importance of time spent outside the classroom, and including Soviet students much more in the daily responses to the criticism of foreign students.

Ermolenko was one of the members of the teaching staff who contributed the most to the study of Western philosophical thought at the Institute in the years following the 20th Congress. However, his statements during a party meeting dedicated to exam marking policies make it clear that his interest in bourgeois theories was not associated with a greater tolerance for heterodox thought. While he urged members of the teaching staff to compare the answers given by students with their personal convictions, he also argued that grades had to be based on an evaluation of student behaviour. He declared:

⁸¹¹ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of the party committee meetings], 22/01/1964, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 97, 116.

It is wrong to tear students' responses away from their practical convictions. I clearly remember the situation when I [only] gave a satisfactory mark on dialectical materialism to the student Molâkov; many teachers said that it was impossible, he was a good student and it was wrong to assess his knowledge in such a way. But, first of all, we should take into consideration which knowledge in philosophy and the field of morality must be carried out in practice. If the student breaks the theory and practice in his behaviour, the examiner and assistant should take this into account while discussing the exam result. If they don't have clarity, they should ask a number of additional questions to see how much a student believes in the principles that he argues. Otherwise we run the risk of making some mistakes.⁸¹²

Examples abound of cases where both Soviet and foreign students were blamed for being under the influence of bourgeois theories, even though, paradoxically, the primary party organisation contributed to the spread of such ideas. In October 1962, two Soviet students were expelled from MGIMO.⁸¹³ The Party Committee concluded that they were exposed as anti-Soviet thanks to their activities outside MGIMO. It was agreed that their academic results did not provide grounds for predicting their anti-Soviet conduct beyond the walls of the Institute.

Compared to the Stalin era, the content of teaching programmes had radically changed; however, members of the party organisation still shared a very similar concern regarding time spent outside the Institute, especially in internships, for measuring student loyalty to the Soviet regime. The expulsion process of the student Solomonov following his internship in Paris demonstrates how time outside the Institute was used to judge the extent to which students were under the influence of bourgeois theories.

The student in question had been found with erotic magazines in his suitcase at customs control in Sheremetyevo airport. At the Institute, teachers presented Solomonov as 'a very good and capable student', someone 'who had always showed himself modestly', and 'had never even been seen with girls and had never been

⁸¹² Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma, [Minutes and transcripts of the party committee meetings], 26/05/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 76, 89.

⁸¹³ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Transcripts and minutes of the meetings of the party committee of the MGIMO party organization], 16/10/62, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 84, 90-91.

drunk.’⁸¹⁴ However, the communist Bobunov stated that, thanks to his internship in France, the primary party organisation had a very different image of the student. He declared:

Today Solomonov showed his duplicity. On the one hand, there is the party line on his character but, on the other hand, he has his own personal line. On the one hand, he led propaganda activity, but at the same time he was buying pornographic items. His petty-bourgeois cowardice led to such a result.⁸¹⁵

By allowing different approaches to teaching and by drawing conclusions from students’ experiences during internships, the members of the party organisation hoped to reveal the duplicity of both foreign and Soviet students. Making students talk about bourgeois theories and sending them to the West was a useful method for identifying deviant behaviour.

Putting into practice the knowledge they received within the classroom was a requirement for foreign students too. In May 1961, Ermolenko warned members of the Party Committee about the lack of knowledge that an Albanian student had demonstrated when it came to critiquing Yugoslav revisionism during an exam.⁸¹⁶ Compared to the Stalin era, the change was radical: the teacher expected the Albanian student to demonstrate nothing less than a deep knowledge of the criticisms of Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence. One may suppose that the student either had no precise idea about revisionism or that he did not want to reveal what he actually thought. However, for Ermolenko the student’s silence was unsatisfactory and perhaps even denoted guilt: the teacher needed the Albanian student to talk. By comparing student statements with what had to be said, the examiners could make up their minds about conviction and reliability.

⁸¹⁴ Protokoly partsobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj partorganizacii fakul'teta meždunarodnyh èkonomičeskikh otnošenij MGIMO, [Transcripts of the party meetings and of partyburo meetings of the primary party organization of the MGIMO faculty of international economic relations], 20/02/1959, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 66, 55.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid., 56.

⁸¹⁶ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partkoma, [Transcripts and minutes of the party committee meetings], 26/05/1961, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 76, 92.

Not surprisingly, the teaching of bourgeois and revisionist theories was accompanied by a new focus on time spent outside the Institute. The idea regularly pronounced by members of the party organisation, that MGIMO was a socialist camp in miniature, was particularly useful for defining how knowledge received in the classroom was to be implemented. In 1961, during a Party Committee meeting, the student Ivanov unsurprisingly declared:

Through its structure, MGIMO is a miniature socialist bloc. I know Vietnamese students pretty well; they are irreproachable in all respects, in particular morally. Many Soviet students should [strive to] achieve such a moral standard. I believe that the organisations of the Party and the Komsomol youth, as well as the administrative apparatuses, should fight for the enhancement of relationships between non-Soviet and Soviet students. Then, when back in their home countries, these students will keep the memory of those close bonds alive and keep this strong friendship in mind when developing the whole Socialist camp in their country.⁸¹⁷

By stressing the key role of party organisations and the Komsomol youth, the Soviet student argued that MGIMO teaching was not limited to the classroom. Cultural and sporting activities, dormitories, and vacations, no less than the lectures halls, were places for building the socialist camp in miniature. As was already mentioned, there were also places and times when students were more likely to show their true colours.

Because he suggested that Vietnamese students exemplified high moral standards, Ivanov's statements also imply that Soviet students had to continually learn from their daily interactions with foreign students. This shift in perspective reflects a new logic whereby it was held that foreign students could impart a great deal to their Soviet comrades. By drawing a parallel between the diplomatic relations of states and Soviet and non-Soviet daily interactions, he argued that the success of proletarian internationalism depended on building friendship networks at MGIMO. Through daily interactions with their Soviet counterparts, non-Soviet students would learn how to deal with and manage the future diplomatic relations between the USSR and other socialist countries.

⁸¹⁷ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 14/11/61, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 74, 142.

During a party meeting at MGIMO on 25 November 1963, the communist Lebedev indicated the strategic places where MGIMO teaching took place. After mentioning that MGIMO was a socialist camp writ small, he declared:

It is necessary to get to know each foreign student individually. We must know them. This means that we have to be present in student dormitories. We must meet the students not only during lectures and seminars, but also in their homes. We need to discuss matters with them, not avoid questions that sometimes disturb us. We must be interested in their personal data.⁸¹⁸

Time outside the Institute was considered to be a privileged moment when members of the Party Committee were able to scrutinise student conduct and assess the degree of influence of bourgeois theories. However, at the same time, extra-curricular activities were a key target of new teaching strategies: it was here where Soviet and foreign students had to learn about proletarian internationalism through their daily relations.

In April 1965, Ermolenko revealed that MGIMO had achieved an overall improvement in managing foreign students outside the Institute.⁸¹⁹ Celebrations to mark both Soviet and foreign special events and summer holidays in recreational camps were pointed out as important moments for fostering unity between Soviet and foreign students. Moreover, the daily lives of foreign student were not ignored. The pro-rector indicated that sporting activities and propaganda work would henceforth include both Soviet and foreign citizens. The departments of Russian and foreign languages also conducted visits to museums, kolkhozes, and factories. Evenings dedicated to literature in the MGIMO dormitories were mentioned. All these events outside MGIMO's walls were perceived as privileged moments for teaching both Soviet and foreign students. He concluded that it was absolutely necessary to enrol Soviet students and teachers in every event that foreign students attended.⁸²⁰

⁸¹⁸ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 25/09/63, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 89, 15.

⁸¹⁹ Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 23/04/65, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 102, 16.

⁸²⁰ Ibid., 17.

Ermolenko's insistence on bringing Soviet and foreign students together was related to another aspect in the renewal of teaching strategies. In addition to testing the impact of bourgeois theories on both Soviet and foreign students and a new interest in time spent outside MGIMO, giving Soviet students the responsibility for addressing the criticism of their foreign friends was another dimension of the idea that MGIMO was a miniature socialist camp.

In one respect, members of the Party Committee started to deal with foreign criticism in a more horizontal way. The idea of a miniature socialist camp symbolised the move from a vertical model of teaching (based on the relationship between teachers and students) to a horizontal model, which stressed the relationship between Soviet and foreign students. Just like learning foreign languages or economics, answering criticisms voiced by foreign students was now considered an important part of the academic and political requirements imposed on Soviet students.

On 2 April 1962, the Party Committee indicated that a disciplinary commission had just assessed one student's case. The Soviet student's disgrace reveals the new responsibilities that they had to bear in their relationships with foreign comrades. Surprisingly, the Soviet student was not blamed either for his acquaintance's or his own anti-Soviet statements: it was that he had not given the right response which was considered reprehensible. The Party Committee clearly stated that 'he had not been able to react with enough diligence and efficacy' to the critiques formulated by a Chinese student during a student party at MGIMO.⁸²¹

During a Party Committee meeting on 25 September 1963, Party Secretary Kutakov made exactly the same comment about the obligation of Soviet students to answer the criticisms conveyed by their foreign comrades adequately. He declared:

We have found evidence that Vietnamese students share the views of the Chinese dissidents [*kitajskie raskol'niki*] on a number of issues. I really feel nothing other than a lot of shame that our students are not always able to give the right answer to

⁸²¹ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of party committee of the MGIMO party organization], 02/04/62, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 82, 117.

these facts. I mean that it is not only a matter of roughly refuting something. They have to convince and prove to foreign students that our position is the right one.’⁸²²

By putting the burden of critique on the shoulders of Soviet students, the Party Committee aimed at creating a systematic response to critical statements about the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet students had more direct contact with their foreign classmates than MGIMO teachers. They were able to give an answer both inside and outside the classrooms. Soviet students had a much more important role in a model that especially targeted activities outside the Institute as moments for learning.

This ability to react to anti-Soviet statements was exactly what Vice-minister Orlov expected from MGIMO students. In front of the members of the party organisation, he recalled that, in Paris, a foreign correspondent came up to a Soviet diplomatic worker and asked him how many suits he could afford with his salary. For Orlov, the answer given by the Soviet diplomat was perfectly adapted to the situation:

The diplomatic worker touched his suit and said: ‘Ones like yours – five, ones like mine – only one’. It is just such conviction and ability to respond timely to the enemy that we must educate. The moral code of the builder of communism should be the inner conviction of each teacher, graduate, and undergraduate student.⁸²³

By controlling whether Soviet students answered the criticisms voiced by foreign students, the Party Committee also tested the loyalty of future Soviet diplomats. The cases of those Soviet students blamed for not answering foreign students clearly reveals that silence was interpreted as a sign that they agreed with critical statements. At the same time, by requiring from Soviet students an appropriate response to criticisms, the Party Committee intended to test their professional skills. Kutakov’s statements are clear about the fact that Soviet students had to do more than just contradict criticisms from foreign students. They had to convince them about both the superiority of the USSR over capitalist countries and the validity of Soviet foreign policy compared to its Chinese equivalent. Indeed, in their professional careers, Soviet students would have to be prepared to answer criticisms from both outside and

⁸²² Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 25/09/63, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 89, 60.

⁸²³ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, 26/04/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, 88, 64.

inside the Second World. It was all part of the training in a socialist camp in miniature.

PART IV
The Making of Dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev Era (1964-1984)

Of all the various factors that explained Khrushchev's downfall in October 1964, the international causes obviously occupied an important place.⁸²⁴ In the decade between his rise to power and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev as first secretary of the CPSU, the policy of peaceful coexistence had been confronted with the reality of series of major international crises, both with the West and with other socialist countries.⁸²⁵ Not surprisingly, in a memo prepared for the 14 October 1964 Central Committee plenum, during which Khrushchev's removal from power was ratified, Politburo member Dmitriy Polânskij was quoted as saying:

During the Suez crisis, "we were a hair away from a big war", yet "we didn't have a mutual assistance agreement with Egypt, and hadn't even been asked to help them". As for Berlin, "only a fool would have thought it necessary to fight a war to make Berlin a free city". And the main effect of sending missiles to Cuba "was to produce a global crisis, bring the world to the edge of war, and terrify the very organizer of this dangerous undertaking".⁸²⁶

The list of grievances which Polânskij pointed out in order to justify Khrushchev's removal was by no means exhaustive: one could easily add the several diplomatic imbroglios that had also undermined the authority of the Soviet Union within the socialist bloc, whether with regards to Eastern Europe or Mao's China.⁸²⁷

⁸²⁴ In his analysis of the causes of Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, Pikhoia places particular emphasis on the internal situation, especially in agriculture and Khrushchev's personal relationships with the ruling political elites in the CPSU, the Red Army, and Soviet industry. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, Arkadi Vaksberg, and Benoît Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir: Quarante Ans D'après-Guerre Tome 1* (Longueuil; Montigny-le-Bretonneux: Kéruss, 2007), 383. Like Pikhoia, Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle stress that Khrushchev's removal from power was related to his difficult relationship with other members of the ruling political elite. For them, Khrushchev's dismissal reveals a picture of Brezhnev as a 'décisive man with clear views on how the Communist Party should be run' and someone 'who knew very well the corridors of Soviet power'. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, eds., *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (S.I.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 10.

⁸²⁵ For a quick overview of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world in 1964, see William J. Tompson, *Soviet Union under Brezhnev* (Place of publication not identified: Routledge, 2016), 9.

⁸²⁶ Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1975', in *Crises and Détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, First paperback edition, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 139.

⁸²⁷ Paul Du Quenoy, 'The Role of Foreign Affairs in the Fall of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964', *The International History Review* 25, no. 2 (2003): 334; Archie Brown and Marie Mendras, eds.,

Just like Khrushchev in 1953, the new first secretary, as well as Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny, was a layman in international affairs: once again, the future of Soviet diplomacy was far from predestined. Indeed, one might have expected a resounding return to the more Russo-centric and militarist version of Soviet foreign security policies of the Stalinist period.⁸²⁸ This possibility made sense when considering the weight of the members of the upper levels of the CPSU who took part in Khrushchev's removal from power and who were opposed to de-Stalinisation and some of the radical reforms conducted by the former first secretary: Mikhail Suslov, the second secretary of the PCUS and head of propaganda department; Sergei Trapeznikov, the former rector of the High Party School at the Central Committee and head of the science department in 1965; Dmitry Ustinov, the former head of the Ministry of Defence Industry under Stalin (made a candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee by Brezhnev in 1965); and Andrej Grečko, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces who became minister of Defence in 1967 and a full member of the Politburo in 1973. Within the CPSU, and especially the Politburo and the Central Committee, the influence of the partisans of a hard line in foreign affairs was obvious. It was also striking that, among the most experienced members of the Soviet state and Communist Party in charge of diplomacy (the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, the Minister of Defence Rodion Malinovsky, and the Chairman of the KGB Vladimir Semičastnyj)⁸²⁹ were not even Presidium members: they were therefore reduced to subordinate political roles.⁸³⁰

However, several years after his rise to power, it became clear that Brezhnev was one of the main defenders of détente in the Soviet leadership. In contrast to the regular waves of replacements at the MID that occurred after each change of minister of Foreign Affairs and first secretary of the Communist Party since World War II, the

'Politics inside and Policy Outside', in *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union*, The Macmillan Press (London: Springer, 1989), 142; Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split', 350.

⁸²⁸ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 204.

⁸²⁹ Semičastnyj was replaced by Andropov as head of the KGB in 1967.

⁸³⁰ Zubok, *Zhivago's Children - The Last Russian Intelligentsia*, 194.

retention of both Gromyko as head of the MID⁸³¹ and Ponomarev as head of the international department assured a certain continuity with Khrushchev's diplomacy.⁸³² The conduct of Soviet foreign policy was basically organised into a double-track system, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs endowed with the mission of state-to-state relations on the one hand, and the International Department of the Central Committee in charge of party-to-party relations on the other.⁸³³ Foreign policy was still based on the same three axes: peaceful coexistence with the West, the search for cohesion of and control over the people's democracies in Eastern and Central Europe (made explicit by the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968),⁸³⁴ and support for newly independent countries that acquired sovereignty during decolonisation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁸³⁵ What made détente very concrete in the years following Khrushchev's downfall was a whole package of agreements successfully ratified between major capitalist countries and the Soviet Union, especially those treaties providing for the 'inviolability' of existing borders in Central Europe (a non-aggression pact, the Moscow Treaty, between the USSR and West Germany in 1970,⁸³⁶ the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT I, in 1972, and the Helsinki Accords in 1975).⁸³⁷

⁸³¹ Scholars agree that the Soviet minister of Foreign Affairs gained the upper hand in the definition of Soviet diplomacy when Gromyko was finally made a member of Politburo in April 1973.

⁸³² The official history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stresses that there was no major change in the conception of foreign policy when Brezhnev came to power: 'When in 1964 L. Brezhnev came to power and became the head of the Party and the state, it did not bring any radical changes in the doctrinal-conceptual approaches of the Soviet leadership to the framework of the USSR's foreign policy.' Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 387.

⁸³³ For more details about the activity of the international department during the Brezhnev era, see: Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy'; Robert Kritinos, 'The International Department of the CPSU', *Problems of Communism*, no. 5 (1984); Rey, 'Le Département International Du Comité Central Du PCUS, Le MID et La Politique Extérieure Soviétique de 1953 a 1991'; Elizabeth Teague, 'The Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU', *Supplement to Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 27 October 1980.

⁸³⁴ Jean-Christophe Romer points out that the Brezhnev doctrine was elaborated and announced with a certain degree of urgency in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In concrete terms, it meant that members of the Warsaw Pact could not 'compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc' and therefore had only limited sovereignty. Jean-Christophe Romer, 'La Fin de La Doctrine Brejnev', *Arès*, no. 2 (1990): 8.

⁸³⁵ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 399.

⁸³⁶ Savranskaya and Taubman, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1975', 147.

⁸³⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., 'Détente in Europe, 1962-1975', in *Crises and Détente*, by Jussi M. Hanhimäki, First paperback edition, The Cambridge History of the Cold War,

One of the main factors usually associated with the détente conducted by Brezhnev after 1964 was a new generation of diplomatic specialists working at several departments of the Central Committee and in the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jerry Hough evokes the emergence of a ‘brain trust’⁸³⁸ or a ‘community of experts in foreign affairs’,⁸³⁹ which provided a strong contrast in terms of age, mind-set, and practices with the core of Brezhnev’s foreign policy establishment.⁸⁴⁰ Marie-Pierre Rey stresses the important role of ‘heterodox thinkers’ especially recruited at the International Department by Boris Ponomarev in the 1960s.⁸⁴¹ As for Zubok, the scholar stresses the crucial place of ‘a few enlightened foreign policy experts’ in the conduct of Brezhnev’s diplomacy.⁸⁴² He portrays them as ‘specialists in foreign affairs, who came from universities and academic research institutes’. According to him, since they were ‘shaped by the cultural Thaw and de-Stalinization’: ‘they were much more open-minded and sophisticated thinkers than the average nomenklatura members’.⁸⁴³ For these three scholars, most of this new generation of specialists was trained at MGIMO.

In October 1964, the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge had little in common with the institution it had been following Stalin’s death. With Leonid Brezhnev’s successful consolidation of power as general secretary of the CPSU,⁸⁴⁴ MGIMO was not only

edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 217.

⁸³⁸ In the Soviet context, the term ‘brain trust’ seems obviously something of a misnomer. Though, that is the term used by Hough.

⁸³⁹ Laird and Hoffmann, ‘The Foreign Policy Establishment’, 151.

⁸⁴⁰ Hough identified 15 top foreign policymakers in the Brezhnev diplomatic establishment in 1980: Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, Iurii Andropov, Ivan Arkhipov, Anatolii Blatov, Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, Aleksei Kosygin, Vasilii Kuznetsov, Nikolai Patolichev, Nikolai Pegov, Boris Ponomarev, Konstantin Rusakov, Semen Skachkov, Mikhail Suslov, Dmitrii Ustinov. Ibid., 142.

⁸⁴¹ Rey, ‘Le Département International Du Comité Central Du PCUS, Le MID et La Politique Extérieure Soviétique de 1953 à 1991’, 199.

⁸⁴² Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 206.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ Most of scholars agree about the fact that it was only in 1967-68, when Brezhnev succeeded in removing his rivals from positions of authority, that he became ‘the uncontested head of the party apparatus’. Pikhov, Vaksberg, and Gascon, *URSS Histoire Du Pouvoir*, 474; Savranskaya and Taubman, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1975’, 142; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, 2 edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 204; Marie Mendras claims that Brezhnev’s reestablishment of the title of

the principal institution for training Soviet diplomatic specialists, but it also, through its powerful alumni network, sat at the very core of the Cold War enterprise. Vadim Zagladin's (1949)⁸⁴⁵ appointment as the first deputy secretary of the international department of the Central Committee in 1964, Nikolay Inozemcev's (1949), Georgy Arbatov's (1949), and Viktor Vol'skij's (1949) nominations as directors of IMEMO in 1966, the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies in 1967, and the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1966 respectively, Anatolij Kovalëv's (1948) appointment as Head of the first European department at the MID in 1965 and member of the MID executive board in 1966,⁸⁴⁶ the nomination of Valentin Falin (1950) as member of the MID executive board and head of the second European department at the MID in 1966,⁸⁴⁷ and the nomination of Evgenij Grigor'ev (1949) as the deputy chief editor of *Pravda* in the 1960s were telling facts of the access that the meždunarodniki trained during Stalin's era had to positions of high responsibility in all spheres related to Soviet diplomacy.⁸⁴⁸

On the other hand, and in a quite paradoxical way, the training of this very first generation of meždunarodniki had very little in common with the education the next generation received at MGIMO after 1956. The new openness of the USSR to the foreign world during the Thaw had led to a complete renewal of the teaching programmes and determined new academic and political requirements. The surge of new ideas, internships abroad, and the presence of students from 'fraternal countries' broke away from the teaching practices inherited from the era of Stalinism: it resulted in the instilment of a completely new praxis of foreign affairs related to the

'General Secretary of the PCUS' in 1966, which had been replaced after Stalin's death by 'First Secretary of the PCSU' was a telling signal of Brezhnev's rise to power. Brown and Mendras, 'Politics inside and Policy Outside', 143.

⁸⁴⁵ Years of graduation from MGIMO are given in brackets.

⁸⁴⁶ Andrej Gromyko, ed., *Diplomatičeskij Slovar'*, Nauka, vol. II (Moskva, 1985), 51–52. In 1968, Kovalëv was replaced by another MGIMO graduate as head of the first European department: Ūrij Dubinin.

⁸⁴⁷ Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časah vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 211.

⁸⁴⁸ During a party meeting at MGIMO in 1970, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrej Smirnov indicated that out of the 1,200 MGIMO alumni working at this time at the MID, two MGIMO graduates were members of the MID executive board, five were heads of an MID department, 20 alumni were deputy heads of departments, and eight graduates were ambassadors of the Soviet Union abroad. Stenogramma otčetno-vybornoj II partijnoj konferencii partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the 2nd report-election party conference of the MGIMO party organization] 11/11/1970, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 115, 87.

development of distinct ways of thinking about and acting towards bourgeois theories at MGIMO.

A cursory look at the memoirs of MGIMO alumni reveals much about the magnitude of the changes during the Khrushchev era. Just a couple of months before he resigned from the MID in 1953, Mark Vilenskij remembers an episode that marked him deeply and intimately. As a young functionary at the MID press department, he benefited from privileged access to foreign newspapers and magazines, especially *Life*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*.⁸⁴⁹ As a Jew, however, he was a designated target of the purges conducted during the struggle against cosmopolitanism at the MID a few months after his graduation from MGIMO in 1948. While leafing through one issue of *Life*, he found an abstract from the memoirs of a former employee of the NKVD who had joined the West. The former agent recounted at length that Stalin laughed in 1936 at how 'Zinoviev wept during torture, how, held the armpits, he was dragged back into his cell, and how he called to the Jewish God for assistance'. The story horrified Vilenskij: 'it took his breath away', especially since he immediately understood that he had no other choice but to keep silent.⁸⁵⁰ When he was fired from the MID a few months later, he admits that he felt nothing but a deep sense of relief which he partly related to this own symbolic experience of Stalin's crimes during his reading at the MID press department.⁸⁵¹

While Vilenskij's trajectory was very revealing of the context of the Stalin era, characterised by both the difficulties that MGIMO graduates had with maintaining their position in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus and the considerable contrast between what MGIMO students were taught and what they discovered during their professional lives, the scene was hardly the same in the 1960s. Following Khrushchev's 'secret speech', MGIMO graduate Adelaida Grigor'evna presented herself and her classmates as 'children of the 20th Congress'.⁸⁵² Her awareness of Stalin's crimes was not based on a personal experience, as in Vilenskij's case, but on

⁸⁴⁹ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 23.

⁸⁵⁰ Torkunov and Sergeev, 'Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...' (1948-1953), 24.

⁸⁵¹ Viktor Vitûk et al., *Polveka spustâ (1948-1998)*, 28.

⁸⁵² Sergeev, 'Skol'ko ponâli i uznali, zamečatel'nyh knig pročli...', 90.

the discussions conducted collectively by party activists at MGIMO and in the Soviet press. She welcomed changes in the teaching of Marxism-Leninism led by Professor Ryženko, which she henceforth found convincing. Like the rest of her classmates, internships overseas and the absence of major difficulties in the job assignment procedure⁸⁵³ were perceived as specific privileges which provided the *meždunarodniki* of the 1960s with great career opportunities while also distinguishing them from the rest of Soviet society. There was a world of difference between Adelaida Grigor'evna's and Vilenskij's experiences at the Institute. Therefore, one could easily ask: what did the two graduates share except for their diplomas?

These different generations of *meždunarodniki* had at least one important thing in common: both in the 1950s and the 1960s, what united these very different generations was the shared idea of a specific social role within Soviet society based on a system of beliefs, values, and behaviours inherited from their years at the Institute.

Brezhnev's ascension to power and conduct of foreign affairs proved them right. Whether at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or the international department of the Central Committee, the main institutions of Soviet diplomacy recruited MGIMO alumni on a massive scale throughout Brezhnev's era. During a party meeting at the Institute in 1972, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrej Smirnov announced that 75 per cent of MID diplomatic staff were MGIMO alumni.⁸⁵⁴ This figure rose in the following years, with a minimum of 125 MGIMO alumni recruited each year by the MID between 1971 and 1985.⁸⁵⁵ More importantly, this steady increase in the recruitment of *meždunarodniki* was not limited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his study on Brezhnev's foreign policy establishment, Hough indicates that, on the eve of the Gorbachev era, 56 per cent of Soviet

⁸⁵³ Adelaida Grigor'evna enrolled in a PhD programme when she graduated from MGIMO in 1962. Therefore, she found a job at IMEMO.

⁸⁵⁴ Stenogramma III otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii MGIMO, [Minutes of the 3rd report-election party conference of the MGIMO] 07/04/1972, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 121, 126.

⁸⁵⁵ For details about the number of graduates recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1971 and 1985, see appendix 1.

international journalists were graduates from MGIMO.⁸⁵⁶ As for consultants (*sotrudniki*) in the international departments of the Central Committee, Mitrohin argues that 47.6 per cent were MGIMO graduates in 1982.⁸⁵⁷

Undoubtedly, overseas internships were also important for building strong ties between different generations of *meždunarodniki* and reproducing the supportive alumni networks set up during the Stalin era. Statistical information issued from the MGIMO Partkom's records indicated that, at the faculty of international economic relations, 30 to 40 per cent of MGIMO students had had an internship abroad by the end of the 1970s. The rest were sent mainly to the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Gosplan. In comparison, only 5 to 7 per cent of students from the Maurice Thorez Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages (*Moskovskij institut inostrannyh âzykov im. Morisa Toreza*) benefited from a similar experience overseas.⁸⁵⁸ In retrospect, Kurbatov convincingly argues, with a touch of humour, that the period of *détente* was 'a stagnant golden age' (*gody zastojnogo rascveta*) for both the Institute and its graduates.⁸⁵⁹

Between 1964 and 1982, MGIMO was the consecrated anteroom for a career in Soviet diplomacy. Indeed, the specific abilities of the *meždunarodniki* were related to an inherent right to occupy positions of authority within Soviet society and, more especially, the diplomatic apparatus: the value of an MGIMO degree was in its

⁸⁵⁶ Hough does not give a clear definition of what he means by 'international journalists'. However, he does indicate that 14 per cent of them were graduates from the institutes for eastern studies, 7 per cent graduates from the HDS and IMEMO, and 3 per cent graduates from institutes for foreign languages. Hough, 'The Foreign Policy Establishment', 157.

⁸⁵⁷ By the 'international departments at the Central Committee of the PCSU', Mitrohin means the international department (*Meždunarodnyj otdel*), the department of international information (*Otdel meždunarodnoj informacii*), the department for liaison with communist and workers' parties in socialist countries (*Otdel socstran*), and the department of the Soviet cadres overseas (*Otdel zagrankadrov*). Mitrohin indicates that Moscow State University (MSU) was the second most significant breeding ground of collaborators for international departments; however, it occupied a place far behind the MGIMO, with 16 per cent of its graduates among staff. Mitrohin, 'The Elite of "Closed Society"', 152.

⁸⁵⁸ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro fakulteta MÈO partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, 22/05/1968, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 111, 48.

⁸⁵⁹ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 134.

guarantee of access to the diplomatic field.⁸⁶⁰

A crucial step for maintaining a stable intergenerational framework that allowed the *meždunarodniki* to keep the upper hand in the implementation of Soviet foreign policy was the emergence of dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era. The memoirs of *meždunarodniki* who graduated from the institution in 1949 openly present a gallery of portraits of their children and grandchildren who graduated from the same institution in the 1970s and 80s.⁸⁶¹

⁸⁶⁰ This situation is specific neither to the Soviet Union nor to the MGIMO. French sociologist Louis Chauvel argues that the value of a degree corresponds to its capacity to guarantee a 'position of authority' within society. Louis Chauvel, 'La seconde Explosion scolaire: Diffusion des diplômes, structure sociale et valeur des titres', *Revue de l'OFCE*, no. 66 (1998): 5–36.

⁸⁶¹ 'Est' i deti i vnuki u nas - Vse opât' povtorilos' snačala...(Deti i vnuki vypsusnikov-49, kotorye tože okončili MGIMO)'. Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:601.

Table 9: MGIMO graduates in 1949 and their children and grandchildren who graduated from the same institution in the 1970s and 80s

MGIMO graduates in 1949	Professional occupation in the 1960s-70s	Children, grandchildren, and other family members (Years of graduation are indicated in brackets)
Arbatov G.A	Director of the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies (1967-95)	Aleksej (1973), Ekaterina (1999)
Âkovenko T.G	Diplomat	Pavel (1975)
Âkunin D.Z	Consultant (<i>sotrudnik</i>) at the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU	Son (unknown)
Aver'ânov B.A	Second secretary at the Soviet embassy in London	Tat'âna and son-in-law
Beglov S.I	Head of the TASS representation in London	Natal'â (1972), Oleg (1975), Mihail (1976)
Berkov A.A	Consultant at the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU	Dmitrij (1975)
Buzulukov Ū.M	Consultant at the Central Committee of the PCSU	Mihail (1980)
Borisov M.D	International official at the UNESCO	Sergej (1973), Marina (1979)
Episkoposov G.L	Diplomat	Brother (1949)
Fedorinov V.K	Diplomat	Aleksandr, Natal'â
Fedorov R.P	Consultant at the international department at the Central Committee of the CPSU (1979)	Wife (1952)
Grigor'ev E.E	Deputy chief editor of <i>Pravda</i>	Aleksej (1983)
Ivanov B.N	KGB agent at the Soviet embassy in Washington	Nikolaj (1990)
Ivanov V.E	Journalist/collaborator (<i>sotrudnik</i>) for the review <i>Problems of Peace and Socialism</i> in Prague	Kirill
Ivanov S.A	Researcher at the Institute for the State and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences	Inna Rodionova (1952) (wife), Inessa (1973)
Kotov B.A	Press correspondent in Paris for <i>Pravda</i>	Aleksej (1975), Pavel (1982)
Kollontaj V.M	Economist at IMEMO/International official at the UN	Aleksandr (1989), Mihail (1982)
Kuz'mišev V.A	Researcher at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences	Aleksandr (1975)
Lebedev I.A	Researcher at the Soviet Academy of Sciences	Andrej (1974)
Lobačev V.K	Director of the European Department at the UN in Geneva (1972-79), Soviet	Andrej

	ambassador to Congo (1982)	
Merzlâkov N.S	Researcher at the Soviet Academy of Sciences	Ŭrij (1971), Ekaterina (1999)
Nesterov S.M	Researcher at the Soviet Academy of Sciences/International official at the UN	Andrej (1978)
Oberemko V.I	Consultant at the Central Committee of the CPSU and Soviet ambassador to Italy (1980)	Sergej (1979)
Parhit'ko V.P	Soviet diplomat/international official at the UN and professor at MGIMO	Tat'âna (1971), Petr (1977), Ivan (1977), Vsevolod (1988), Stanislav (2000)
Romanovskij S.K	Soviet ambassador to Norway (1968-75) and Belgium (1975-84)	Vladimir
Sentebov L.S	Researcher at the Soviet Academy of Sciences	Aleksandr
Sturua M.G	Bureau chief of <i>Izvestia</i> in the United Kingdom (1964-68). He occupied the same position in New York (1972-76) and Washington (1982-84)	Andrej (1973), Gregorij (1976)
Šejkin N.L	Diplomatic counsellor (<i>sovetnik</i>) in Togo (1967-68) and Cameroon (1971-74)	Leonid (1977)
Ŭrinov B.D	Secret services	Tat'âna
Ŭr'ev V.K	First secretary at the Soviet embassy in Washington	Tat'âna (1972)
Vdovin V.P	Soviet ambassador to Chad (1968)	Andrej (1972), Svetlana (1979), Anastasiâ (1996)
Vinogradov V.F	Died a year after his graduation from MGIMO.	Sergej (1972)
Vol'skij V.V	Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Soviet Academy of Science (1966-92)	Elizaveta (1970)
Zagladin V.V	First deputy secretary of the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1964-88)	Brother, Nikita (son), Ekaterina (daughter)

These figures are somewhat revealing of the establishment of diplomatic dynasties in the Soviet Union: out of the 180 graduates from 1949, at least 34 meždunarodniki had 44 children who studied at MGIMO in the 1970s and 80s.⁸⁶² When observing the sociological profile of their parents, what strikes one first and foremost are the key professional positions they occupied in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus on the eve of the Gorbachev era. Just as Arbatov, Beglov, Grigor'ev, Kotov, Sturua, Vdovin, Vol'skij, and Zagladin gained leading positions in several fields connected to foreign affairs, their children were about to be enrolled as students at the Institute. Obviously,

⁸⁶² According to the editors of the collection of alumni memoirs from 1949, the list given of graduates who had children and grandchildren enrolled at MGIMO in the 1970s and 80s is not complete. Ibid.

Vsevolod Parhit'ko represents the most impressive case of a MGIMO graduate of the Stalin era: he sent four of his children and one grandchild to study at the Institute during the Brezhnev era. Kollontaj is also a symbolic case of social reproduction in Soviet diplomacy: since his grandmother occupied the rank of Soviet ambassador in the 1920s, his two sons, Mihail and Aleksandr, were the fourth generation to be specialised in foreign affairs in the Soviet Union.

The establishment of dynasties at MGIMO was not alien to the specific praxis of foreign affairs that emerged under Khrushchev. Indeed, between 1964 and 1982, the development of distinct ways of thinking about and acting towards bourgeois theories at MGIMO (analysed in the third part of the dissertation) had two major consequences. Firstly, the specific political and academic requirements expected from applicants to MGIMO in terms of the instilment of specific behaviours and attitudes towards both official dogma and bourgeois theories were obviously used as a lever by *meždunarodniki* for maintaining their social position from one generation to the next. Secondly, the importation of foreign knowledge made possible through the new praxis of foreign affairs elaborated under Khrushchev led to the opening of a research laboratory at MGIMO in 1976.⁸⁶³

How did the specific praxis of foreign affairs which emerged at MGIMO after the 20th Congress of the CPSU maintain the social position of the first generation of *meždunarodniki*? How did family ties play a major role in both the social reproduction of Soviet elites and the conduct of diplomacy after 1964? How did the specific praxis of foreign affairs taught at MGIMO become of paramount importance in studies of international relations on the eve of the Gorbachev era? These questions are at the heart of the fourth part of this dissertation.

This part of the dissertation is mainly based on MGIMO Party Committee records, work dedicated to international relations published by members of the Institute's teaching staff during the Brezhnev era, some recent Russian studies on scholarly research dedicated to foreign affairs during late socialism, and some interviews I conducted at MGIMO during my research. It will include two chapters describing the

⁸⁶³ 'Problemnaâ naučno-issledovatel' skaâ laboratoriâ', Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 134.

emergence of diplomatic dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era.

The seventh chapter aims to explore the mechanisms of social reproduction at the MGIMO under Brezhnev. Scholars have often stressed the central place of corruption in Soviet society during the 1970s-80s⁸⁶⁴ and the fact that MGIMO was accessible only to the children of the Soviet elite. Admittedly, members of the MGIMO party organisation were increasingly alarmed by the pressure of very powerful parents who wanted to send their children to the Institute. However, by focusing on the selection of applicants, the teaching process, and the job assignment procedure during the Brezhnev era, I will prove that the specific political and academic skills required from students and the specific praxis of foreign affairs favoured the children of *meždunarodniki*.

Meanwhile, the eighth chapter will focus on the emergence of new thinking about international relations in the second half of Brezhnev's tenure (1975-82). Just as the children of *meždunarodniki* were about to occupy a central place among the new students to be trained at the Institute, new thinking on predictive tools, models, and best practices for anticipating changes in foreign affairs emerged. The teaching of international relations theories, understood as a new discipline in 1973, was deeply inscribed in the praxis of foreign affairs which had appeared under Khrushchev. These new models were distinct from orthodox Marxism-Leninism, but had little in common with the New Thinking that appeared after Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985.

⁸⁶⁴ William Clark argues that, during the Brezhnev era, the very functioning of the Soviet economy made it more efficient to use bribes than the formal channels for the allocation of resources, which paved the way to a wide series of informal arrangements among the elite that in many instances supplanted the formal institutions of the Soviet state. William A. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Soviet Elite, 1965-90: Combating Corruption in the Soviet Elite, 1965-90* (Routledge, 2016), 12; Andrei Sokolov shares the same point of view when he writes that 'the system itself generated permanent infringement of the law.' Tamara Kondratieva, ed., 'Les Régimes Dans Les Entreprises Soviétiques', in *Les Soviétiques: Un Pouvoir, Des Régimes*, by Andrei Sokolov (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 2011), 135. For a sociological approach to corruption during the Brezhnev era based on local Soviet archives, see Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, 'La Bureaucratie Policière et La Chute Du Régime Soviétique', *Sociétés Contemporaines*, no. 57 (2005): 63–81.

CHAPTER 7

STRENGTHENING SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AT MGIMO DURING THE BREZHNEV ERA

The Institute of International Relations prepares good and necessary personnel for our country in order so that they can work in the field of foreign policy. Our Institute is the only one [of its kind] in the country. I would also like to say that some comrades think that our Institute should prepare translation personnel. But the question cannot be given in such a way. First of all, the Institute must prepare qualified diplomatic personnel with good knowledge of foreign languages (not just one but two languages). This means that the main task of the Institute is to prepare qualified diplomatic staff. As for translation institutes, there are many of them all over the country, including in Moscow.⁸⁶⁵

Comrade Važnov during a party meeting at MGIMO on 9 December 1963

In a certain way, the working conditions for our team (*naš kolektiv*) have changed compared with what they were a few years ago. Now the Ministry and other central authorities and agencies are able to employ people with good knowledge of foreign languages, which they obtained not only at our Institute: this was a field in which we had a monopoly some years ago. Now there is no such monopoly. There is the Institute of Asia and Africa, which has a set of specific conditions and will prepare appropriate specialists. Take industries related to the economy, finance, and law: there are institutions that prepare very good personnel and they are not only located in Moscow.⁸⁶⁶

Deputy Head at the MID HR department and MGIMO graduate (1958) G. V. Uranov during a party meeting at the Institute on 21 March 1973

⁸⁶⁵ Stenogramma partijnyh obščih sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 02/12/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 89, 140.

⁸⁶⁶ Stenogramma zasedanij partijnogo aktiva partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the party activists of the MGIMO party organization], 21/03/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 128, 67.

During a party meeting at the Institute at the end of 1963, Comrade Važnov addressed members of the political organisation, reminding them of the specificity of MGIMO in the Soviet system for training specialists in foreign affairs. By stressing the specific political and academic requirements expected from MGIMO graduates, he made it clear that studying at MGIMO could not be reduced to learning foreign languages: the *meždunarodniki* were distinct from translators in the Soviet Union. Clearly, the communist was drawing a link between the very specific and exclusive competencies the *meždunarodniki* had in foreign affairs with the monopoly the Institute gained in training diplomatic specialists. The MGIMO was the principal path to beginning a career in Soviet diplomacy, a situation which was maintained via social reproduction during the Brezhnev era.

When compared to studies on the reproduction of social inequalities through the system of higher education in capitalist countries in the 1970-80s, this situation appears to be specific neither to the Soviet Union nor to MGIMO. Indeed, when referring to historical and sociological work related to the issue of social reproduction, one finds that the cultural capital of students plays a determining role in access to higher education. Since they do not possess the knowledge, language, and culture necessary to succeed in higher education, students from underprivileged families tend to reproduce their parents' social status.⁸⁶⁷ Success in higher education requires a certain cultural capital, understood not only as a set of socially oriented knowledge, such as classical culture, but also as specific social codes of behaviour ('the importance of fitting in and feeling comfortable').⁸⁶⁸ Successful students are depicted as those who, due to their family background, possess the cultural resources which are more in accordance with the requirements of the educational institutions to which they apply.

Even though knowledge of foreign languages and bribery are often considered by scholars as two central elements for being enrolled and succeeding at the Institute in

⁸⁶⁷ Louise Archer, Merryn Hutchings, and Alistair Ross, *Higher Education and Social Class: Issues of Exclusion and Inclusion* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002), 17; Alice Sullivan, 'Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment', *Sociology* 35 (November 2001): 893–912.

⁸⁶⁸ Stephen Ball et al., 'Classification' and "Judgement": Social Class and the "Cognitive Structures" of Choice of Higher Education'', *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 23, no. 1 (2002): 51–72; *ibid.*

the 1970s and 80s, the question of the specificity of political and academic requirements at MGIMO remains unexamined. The specific praxis of foreign affairs elaborated in the Khrushchev era related to Marxism-Leninism had little in common with social reproduction in capitalist countries. The key issue here was the specific competencies that the institution required from MGIMO students and to what extent they were socially discriminative with regards to those from less privileged backgrounds. In other words, which cultural and political properties, defined by sociologists as ‘habitus’ (understood as ‘internalized dispositions, schemas and forms of how-how and competence both mental and corporeal’), mattered most for success in application, study, and job assignment at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era?⁸⁶⁹

Identifying which skills were required from students during the Brezhnev era will help us to understand how MGIMO began to favour the establishment of diplomatic dynasties. But first, one needs to understand how the setting up of dynasties at MGIMO was related to a wider socio-economic context related to the mixed results of positive discrimination policies at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era.

The mixed results of positive discrimination at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era

From Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the issue of ensuring the access of working-class children and ‘production candidates’ to MGIMO did not disappear. Indeed, between 1964 and 1982, this specific question was raised openly and collectively each year within party meetings dealing with the organisation of the selection procedure. Specific attention was paid to the number of production candidates, students from the working class, and members and candidate members of the Communist Party enrolled at the Institute. However, despite several attempts to promote the enrolment of applicants from less privileged social backgrounds (in particular, a new law enacted

⁸⁶⁹ Bourdieu defines habitus as ‘the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce *habitus* [emphasis in original], systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express master of operations necessary in order to attain them.’ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1990), 53; For more clarity, I chose to refer to the definition given by David Swartz, ‘The Sociology of Habit: The Perspective of Pierre Bourdieu’, *The Occupational Therapy Journal of Research* 22 (2002): 61–69; *ibid.*, 62.

by Vâčeslav Elûtin, the minister of Higher and Middle Special Education of the USSR, in 1968), their proportion in the student body would never be as high as it had been during the Khrushchev era. Both the proactive policy of affirmative action for working-class children launched in 1955 and the system of preparatory sections attached to institutions of higher education for ‘the best workers, collective farmers and demobilized soldiers’ established in 1969 faced serious obstacles.⁸⁷⁰ Some of them were not specific to the MGIMO, such as the bypassing of policies of affirmative action by various levels of the Communist Party (ironically the very bodies supposed to implement it), the ‘residency permit’ system (the so-called *propiska*),⁸⁷¹ the Moscow housing problem, and the sociological makeup of Soviet society in the 1970s and 80s.

In the last years of the Khrushchev era, the policy of ‘polytechnisation’ had shown its limitations; the questioning of this pro-active policy was not specific to MGIMO. Matthews points out that, in a long article published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in November 1961, Aleksandr Aleksandrov, rector of Leningrad University, openly blamed the university Komsomol organisation for ‘overpraising physical labour at the expense of study.’⁸⁷² Considering the authoritative position of the author in Soviet higher education and the medium by which his criticism was published, there is little doubt that Aleksandrov gave voice to a viewpoint supported by several people in the highest levels of the Communist Party.

At MGIMO, the debates surrounding the results of affirmative action policies were reflected in a party meeting on 28 November 1962, during which Rector Ryženko was put on the spot. While being questioned by a commission set up by the Moscow *Gorkom* to examine his brutal policy towards staff at the Institute (one participant mentioned that 550 members of the teaching and administrative staff had been fired over the five last years) and his lifestyle (the rector had gotten divorced and then

⁸⁷⁰ Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 303.

⁸⁷¹ The term *propiska* derives from Russian verb *propisat'*, formed by adding the prefix *pro-* to the verb *pisat'* ("to scribe, to write"). The residency permit system had existed in the Russian Empire. However, as Jane Zavisca points out, with the development of the internal passport system, which further tied housing to work, the residency permit was a much more binding limitation on internal migration in Soviet society during the 1970s. Jane R. Zavisca, *Housing the New Russia* (Cornell University Press, 2012), 25.

⁸⁷² Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 300.

married a member of the Institute's administrative staff), accusations about favouring the children of the Soviet elite were also raised.

Charges against the MGIMO rector were not very original when we consider that accusations of discrimination against veterans, children of the working class, or production candidates had been a simple and effective way to discredit someone since the Stalin era.⁸⁷³ However, the explanations given by Ryženko reveal how those who were supposed to ensure the correct application of the all-union rules sometimes deliberately circumvented affirmative action. The rector declared:

I have always told all the deans and the party organisers – if there are good students from other institutes, let's take capable people into our institution to avoid a large screening. We took Puškarev. I don't know who his parents are, but he is not 'somebody's son'. By law, I am entitled to make transfers; nobody can forbid me from doing this. He had a recommendation from the District Party Committee. [...] Černusov was admitted to the Institute on legal grounds, he scored enough points and finished school with a gold medal: nonetheless, in our Institute he was only able to reach before the third course. He is the son of the former chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers.⁸⁷⁴

Ryženko's justification reveals different practices surrounding the policy of polytechnisation at the beginning of the 1960s. Firstly, the rector's statements suggest how the hazy area around the rules guiding the admission of students was used without infringing Soviet law. The rector clearly stated that he had the right to act the way he did, but he also used the exclusion of production candidates during their years of study in order to recruit new students from other academic institutions. The latter obviously came from more privileged backgrounds. Secondly, as regards to possible corruption, he brought to the fore the fact that admission was not arbitrary, but was based on both political and academic criteria, such as recommendations from the District Party Committee (*Rajkom*) and academic medals. Thirdly, in his statements, the rector's room for manoeuvre was obvious. Yet, by mentioning the wide range of

⁸⁷³ It is enough to remember how teachers of foreign languages were accused of not paying special attention to veterans who had a large break in their studies in the 1940s.

⁸⁷⁴ Stenogrammy i protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee] 25/11/1962, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 85, 196.

persons from both party and academic structures who were aware of this practice, he was also arguing that it was less a personal decision than a collective one.

Indeed, Ryženko's statements also demonstrate that several levels of the Communist Party, and more especially the Moscow Gorkom, also contributed to bypassing the rules they were supposed to supervise. In his speech in front of the Gorkom commission, the rector ingeniously brought out the case of a student whose mother was a functionary at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The student had received the support of the Gorkom in his application to MGIMO:

I know about the very difficult case of Pozdnâkov. With regards to this student, the City Party Committee petitioned about him not because of his mother, who is an ordinary official at the Ministry of Finance, but only because of his father, who died at the front. As his mother is in a very difficult situation, she addressed a letter to the City Party Committee. She has two or three children. We consulted with each other and decided to take the guy. Is it a crime? Such exceptions are possible.⁸⁷⁵

By mentioning that criteria other than social origins or professional activity could be taken into account to favour the admission of certain categories of students at MGIMO, the rector made it clear that some levels of the Communist Party had also contributed to limiting the scope of polytechnisation.

After the resignation of the rector in 1963,⁸⁷⁶ open criticism of Khrushchev's policy became more pronounced at the Institute. During a party meeting on 19 June 1964, members of the primary party organisation Alekseev and Ivanov voiced strong criticism of the student selection procedure. Like Ryženko in 1962, Alekseev stressed the responsibility of the upper levels of the Communist Party in the subversion of a system which was supposed to promote the children of the working class and production candidates:

It should be right to say that we accept in the Institute those who have not previously had a job or did not enter the Institute after finishing secondary school. [Such students make up] a considerable part of the students at our institute, not everybody but rather many. This is the fault of the Institute, the Party, and

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁶ He was appointed rector of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.

Komsomol organisations that recommend their representatives, Komsomol and Party members, to our institute.⁸⁷⁷

Alekseev's criticisms were harsh: he argued that the admission of production candidates had nothing to do with either academic or political meritocracy. Worse, still, he suggested that the recommendations made by the Communist Party were guided by an old-boy network rather than a reliable assessment of applicants' skills.

During the meeting, Alekseev could count on the support of Ivanov, head of the local committee of the Trade Union (*Predsedatel' mestnogo komiteta profsoûznoj organizacii*). While the communist's criticisms were more measured, he suggested the introduction of a mixed selection model in the coming years. The justification for this did not lack in audacity:

I believe we need to take into the Institute both workers and school-leavers, and we should not follow the way we often go. There is no need to take workers only because of their work experience; we should take qualified people who will be able to study at our institute. As for school-leavers, it would be nice to increase their recruitment. Somehow everybody says from this rostrum that this is the requirement of language teachers. Well, for language teachers it is important, but it is also important from the point of view of political education work, because when you are dealing with such grateful material as a young person at the age of 19-20 who has no world outlook, you can put into him real Marxist-Leninist ideology. The situation is quite different if you have to work with a 29-30-year-old person who has already developed certain attitudes and a certain psychology. It is not a secret that we often consider the personal cases (*ličnye dela*) of production workers, but not schoolchildren.⁸⁷⁸

What made the questioning of polytechnisation possible was the fact that their remarks were not exclusively relevant to MGIMO, but were deeply inscribed in a larger context questioning social reproduction within the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's removal from power. Indeed, in April 1965, Mihail Prokof'ev, deputy minister of Middle Special and Higher Education of the USSR, stressed that

⁸⁷⁷ Stenogrammy i protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 19/06/1964, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 98, 45.

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid., 53.

production candidates would have ‘a harder time in entrance examinations’.⁸⁷⁹ Following a new law passed on 18 March, the heads of institutions of higher education were henceforth authorised to share available places between production candidates and applicants straight from school in proportion to the size of each category.⁸⁸⁰

Just as in the rest of the Union, where the number of production candidates experienced a sudden drop to 30 per cent of the VUZ intake by 1967,⁸⁸¹ the figure of *proizvodstvenniki* at MGIMO plummeted to its lowest level since 1955. Indeed, the reversal of the sociological profile of the student body became obvious when members of the primary party organisation discussed the results of student selection in 1966 and 1967. Not surprisingly, it was several of the young communists who had benefited from polytechnisation when attempting to enrol at the Institute who pointed out the social marginalisation of students from underprivileged families. The communist student Ivan Studennikov noticed a complete reversal of the situation in the admissions procedure between the moment he had joined MGIMO and June 1966:

We, young communists, have often observed such ‘dashing aside’: at first it was said that we should mainly take into the Institute people with production work experience, and there were 80-90 per cent such students in the first year, but their ability to study was not taken into consideration. Now it is said that we should take more capable people after school, and we can see a completely different picture – 80 per cent of students are just out of school and there are significantly fewer people from the army and from the factories, people who have passed the school of Party-Komsomol work.⁸⁸²

When one looks at the figures related to the procedure of selection for 1967 and 1968, it has to be said that Studennikov’s statements were very close to reality:

⁸⁷⁹ Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 302.

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸⁸² Stenogrammy obših partijnyh sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO [Minutes of the general party meetings of the MGIMO party organization], TSAOPIM, 26/04/1966, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 104, 168.

Table 10: The figures related to the procedure of selection of MGIMO applicants for 1967 and 1968

FIGURES ABOUT THE APPLICANTS	1967	1968	FIGURES ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS	1967	1968
Faculty of International Relations	653	842			165
Faculty of International Economic Relations	602	759			245
Evening faculty	258	244			Unknown
TOTAL	1513	1845		420	410
FINAL CANDIDATES	1255	1601			
APPLICANTS' PROFILE			SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS' PROFILE		
PARTY MEMBERSHIP					
Candidate members and members of the CPSU	81	192		36	54
Members of the Komsomol	1174	1409		374	356
WORK EXPERIENCE					
More than two years and army service	238	478		75	118
Less than two years	306	268		104	45
High school graduates	720	855		231	247
GENDER	1092	905			
Men	350	500			
Women					
MEDALLISTS	271	304			116
SOCIAL ORIGINS					
Worker				49	58
Military personnel				49	30
Employee				308	316
Peasant				4	6
SOCIAL PLACE					
Worker				50	52
Military personnel				12	24
Employee				118	202
Students				230	234

These figures demonstrate the marginalisation of candidate members and members of the CPSU, production candidates, and children of the working class within the Institute.⁸⁸³ Following the immediate halt to polytechnisation, the percentage of children of workers and peasants among successful applicants stood at around 12 per cent in 1967 and 15.7 per cent in 1968. As for candidate members and members of the CPSU, they represented only 8.5 per cent in 1967 and 13 per cent in 1968. The figures related to production candidates were somewhat better: they made up 18 per cent of successful candidates in 1967 and 29 per cent in 1968. The effects of the end of Khrushchev's higher education policy were obvious. Compared to Matthews' study, the figures indicate that the marginalisation of children of the working class was more significant at MGIMO than in other institutions of higher education.

However, the numbers should not mask the fact that, between 1955 and 1965, applicants and their parents had learnt several ways to get around the system. Corruption was not necessarily useful, as several loopholes permitted the promotion of one's children in the Soviet system of higher education. For instance, being from a privileged family but strategically presenting oneself as a production candidate by possessing one or two years of work experience in a factory or kolkhoz was possible. When Elûtin finally relaunched a policy of affirmative action for production candidates in 1968, the new system faced the same difficulties.

Indeed, in 1968, Elûtin made a strong appeal for increased representation of both working-class and rural youth in the student body of higher education institutions. His policy had the same goal of promoting social mobility as the previous one, although he employed a different approach. On 6 September 1969, *Pravda* published a decree entitled 'On organising preparatory sections attached to institutions of higher education'. The creation of preparatory sections at institutions of higher learning with 8-to-10-month-long courses, whether on a full-time or part-time basis, was supposed to favour production candidates without having detrimental effects on academic requirements. However, the new law was not really binding, as production candidates

⁸⁸³ All the figures were found in protokoly zasedanij partiynogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 13/12/1968, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 110, 174.

were defined as ‘those who had at least one year of work on production behind them’.⁸⁸⁴

The enforcement of Elûtin’s law rapidly affected the Institute. On 3 June 1969, Mihail Âkovlev, a member of the MID executive board who had been appointed as the new MGIMO rector in 1968, emphasised the decision undertaken by the Central Committee on 26 May in order to ‘prepare the diplomats who come from the working class, from factories and plants’.⁸⁸⁵ The stated goal of the Central Committee was ‘to open the way to our institute from all cities and towns of the Soviet Union in order to avoid it being said that our institute is open only for children of Foreign Ministry employees.’⁸⁸⁶

The rector detailed that this return to affirmative action went along with sending MGIMO professors to identify potential applicants in Moscow industries and in large peripheral industrial centres like Rostov-on-Don, Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, Penza, Dnepropetrovsk, and Donetsk.⁸⁸⁷

On 22 October 1969, Boris Mordovin, the secretary of the party bureau of the newly established preparatory faculty, declared that the new ‘faculty should prepare for further training in the first year a large group of production workers who have considerable experience at enterprises, collective farms, and in party and Komsomol organisations’.⁸⁸⁸ He detailed the social structure of students within the new faculty, stressing that 52 had been workers ‘who came to the institute fresh from open-hearth furnaces, lathes, and large enterprises’, 43 were ‘yesterday soldiers of the Soviet army, [have] honours in military and political training, and proved themselves in the social work’, and 28 were ‘employees, engineers, and masters who had a great way of working and some experience in dealing with people’.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁸⁴ Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, 304.

⁸⁸⁵ Stenogramma sobraniâ partijnogo aktiva MGIMO, 03/06/1969, [Minutes of the meeting of the MGIMO party activists] TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 114, 17.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁸⁸ Stenogramma I otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the first report-election party conference of the MGIMO party organization], 22/10/1969, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 112, 29.

⁸⁸⁹ Ibidem.

Despite the attempts announced for promoting social mobility at MGIMO, it was soon clear that the percentage of production candidates was still lower than during the Khrushchev era. Indeed, the MGIMO primary party organisation revealed in 1975 the limited effect of the new policy of affirmative action:⁸⁹⁰

Table 11: The figures related to the procedure of selection of MGIMO applicants for 1975

FIGURES ABOUT THE APPLICANTS	1975	FIGURES ABOUT THE APPLICANTS ADMITTED	1975
Faculty of International Relations	441	Faculty of International Relations	136
Faculty of International Economic Relations	482	Faculty of International Economic Relations	287
Faculty of International Law	88	Faculty of International Law	41
Faculty of International Journalism	57	Faculty of International Journalism	34
TOTAL POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP	1195	TOTAL POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP	498
Candidates members and members of the CPSU	Unknown		101
Members of the Komsomol	Unknown		397
WORK EXPERIENCE	Unknown		
Production candidates	Unknown		189
School graduates	Unknown		309

Certainly, the situation was better than in 1967-68. The increase in the number of applicants admitted (498), combined with the establishment of two new faculties at the Institute in 1969 (the faculties of journalism and law), enhanced the chances of all

⁸⁹⁰ Figures were found in protokoly zasedanij partiynogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee] , 27/08/1975, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 133, 200.

categories of applicants to receive a place at MGIMO. Production candidates reached 37 per cent of the applicants admitted and the percentage of communists stood at around 20 per cent in 1975. However, because of the very definition of 'production candidates' (applicants with work experience of at least one year), one might remain reasonably sceptical about the real effect of the preparatory faculty on social mobility at MGIMO, especially since the records are silent about the social origins of candidates.

Just as at the end of Khrushchev era, the strengthening of social reproduction at the Institute was based on objective circumstances. Certainly, the difficulties led to the same practices of bypassing the new law. However, what clearly distinguished the situation under Brezhnev from that under Khrushchev was the exclusion of applicants from the provinces at the end of the 1970s. This problem was not new and has to be related to the Soviet residency permit system. As early as 1963, Vice-Minister Orlov stressed how the problem of housing in Moscow and the propiska system were major headaches for the Ministry:

Before coming here, I had a letter to the Party Central Committee on my desk. In this letter, we ask for residence permits for our specialists who were hired after graduating from the Higher Diplomatic School and for some others. It is a very painful question. They study at the Institute only six years, but they come to our organisation for a lifetime and we must provide them with dwellings. Every year we employ 60-70 people and 50 of them don't have flats. We have a crisis situation with housing, despite the fact that the Moscow City Council gives us apartments and we ourselves are building as well. Now we will organise cooperatives, we will build new houses at the expense of the employees and, of course, we will continue receiving flats from the Moscow City Council.⁸⁹¹

Difficulties arose on two levels. On the one hand, applicants had to find accommodation in Moscow: the Institute's dormitories had limited capacity. On the other, when they graduated from the Institute, students originating from the provinces had no right to remain in the capital unless they possessed a residency permit. Orlov's

⁸⁹¹ Stenogramma obšego partijnogo sobraniâ partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the general party meeting of the MGIMO party organization], 26/04/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, 88, 117.

statements made it transparent that the Soviet ministries based in Moscow were reticent about hiring MGIMO students, since they had to provide them with accommodation in the capital upon giving them a residency permit.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the situation had clearly worsened, affecting the sociological profile of potential applicants. Indeed, this had an automatic effect on the potential number of production candidates and students from the working class and the Communist Party. On 31 May 1972, Dean Viktor Pâtnenkov of the faculty of international economic relations declared:

Now we're entering a crucial period [in relation to] admission to the Institute. Past experience shows that very good communists and production workers mostly come to us from the periphery. We have set the task to teach at the Institute the children of workers and farmers, but Muscovites cannot be farmers and we have a very difficult situation in the dormitory. If such a situation continues, we will have to refuse a very large contingent of peripheral communists who come from industrial enterprises and who are now the strong backbone of the Party.⁸⁹²

In August 1975, the records of the primary organisation indicated that only 95 applications from the provinces were accepted out of the 1,014 who gained the right to sit the competitive examination.⁸⁹³ Promoting a more socially diverse student body also conflicted with the strategy of training foreign students from other socialist countries: both foreign students and students from the Soviet republics had priority access to the Institute's dormitories. The records of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education show much about the allocation of housing in the MGIMO dormitories to foreign students.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁹² Stenogrammy sobranij partijnogo aktiva partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the party activists of the MGIMO party organization], 31/05/1972, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 123, 12.

⁸⁹³ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 27/08/1975, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 133, 209.

⁸⁹⁴ Pasport MGIMO, GARF, fond 9606, opis' 9, dela 860-861. The data was not available for 1978 and 1979.

Table 12: The records of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education about the allocation of housing in the MGIMO dormitories

Years	1976	1977	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Number of students residing in MGIMO Dormitories	1201	1201	1070	Unknown	1143	1143	1143	1143	1369	1470
Percentage of students who received a place at MGIMO dormitories compared to those who asked for one	66.8	66.8	100	92	100	100	100	95		100
Number of foreign students enrolled at MGIMO	Unknown	Unknown	822	Unknown	853	853	851	893	Unknown	929

The fact that 100 per cent of students who asked for a place at the MGIMO dormitories in 1980 received one while the number of students residing in MGIMO dormitories was simultaneously in decline is obviously a sign of the exclusion of applicants from the periphery at the end of the Brezhnev era.

On the eve of the Gorbachev era, the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge was almost closed to students from the provinces, and was also more difficult to access for children of the working class and applicants with long work experience than in the Khrushchev era. Unfortunately, the relevant data in the party archives are missing; the statistics given by Kurbatov are one of the few sources available. He stated:

At the beginning of the 1960s, production workers and school children accounted for 80 per cent and 20 per cent respectively of the first year students, but in 1972, for example, 63 per cent of people at the age of 20-26 with work and army experience entered the faculty of international relations (IR), the faculty of international law (IL), and the faculty of international journalism (IJ), while 23 per cent joined the faculty of international economic relations (IER). In 1979, this category of people made up, approximately, 40 per cent, in 1980 – 41 per cent (to IR – 60 per cent, IL – 70 per cent, and IJ – 58 per cent), and in 1981 – 39.5 per cent (IR, IL, and IJ, approximately 45 per cent).

The reliability of these figures can be questioned, especially since it was much easier to be considered as a production candidate under Brezhnev than under Khrushchev.

Although no binding figures can be determined, two conclusions can be drawn from the party records. On the one hand, members of the Party Committee who had themselves benefited from upward mobility through the policy of polytechnisation forwarded production candidates from the Moscow factories. However, such action had to confront the fact that MGIMO was not the only institution of higher education which was making an effort to find production candidates. Moscow State University had the same policy.⁸⁹⁵ Given the shortage of skilled manpower in Moscow factories, members of the party organisation admitted they had difficulties getting in touch with the directors of Moscow's major industrial factories, who disliked letting go of good workers and members of the CPSU.⁸⁹⁶ Rector Aleksandr Soldatov himself admitted that 'it should be taken into consideration that other universities also face similar problems and now in Moscow there are not very many good production workers with secondary education who are able to study at the Institute and who are party members or candidates'.⁸⁹⁷ In other words, MGIMO was confronted with a wide range of socioeconomic problems related to the sociological fabric of the Soviet capital.⁸⁹⁸

On the other hand, the promotion of social diversity at MGIMO was challenged by the strategies of applicants from more privileged families, especially from those whose parents had studied at MGIMO in the 1940s and 50s.

⁸⁹⁵ Stenogrammy sobranij partijnogo aktiva partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the party activists of the MGIMO party organization], 31/05/1972, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 123, 47.

⁸⁹⁶ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 06/04/1977, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 36, 4.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid., 47.

⁸⁹⁸ For more details about the causes of the growing labour shortage in the 1970s, see Lewin, *The Soviet Century*, 334.

Application, study, and job assignment: the academic and political skills needed for success

During a party meeting on 18 January 1980, Vice Rector Mihail Perežogin declared his indignation with regards to the pressure exerted by the parents of some applicants during the selection procedure. He openly declared that ‘sometimes there is an impression that it is not the son who is a student but his father, since the latter comes to the Rector’s Office much more often than the former does. And how many telephone calls from parents we receive!’⁸⁹⁹ While complaining about the regular visits of parents to his office, Perežogin sought to reassure the Party Committee by explaining that he made sure that justice prevailed in the selection of new students. He announced:

Only well-prepared children can come to our institute. Everybody knows this. Nevertheless, we have quite fresh instances of parents who have tried to arrange training at our institute for children who were not clearly prepared. When they failed, they behaved unworthily. We tried to convince these parents, taught them morality, we have opposed our integrity, endurance, and objectivity to their dissatisfaction. And it has given good results.⁹⁰⁰

While Perežogin put emphasis on the inflexibility of the administration with regards to parental pressure, he also regretted the reduction in the number of children from the working class enrolled at the Institute since 1979.⁹⁰¹

Assessing the extent to which the selection procedure exacerbated corrupt practices among the MGIMO administration and the level to which some parents succeeded in evading the rules is a rather difficult task. As Perežogin’s statements make clear, the fact that parental pressure consisted of phone calls and visits to the rector mean that there are very few archival sources available for evaluating whether competitive examination was fair during the Brezhnev era.

⁸⁹⁹ Protokoly plenumov partiynogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the plenums of the MGIMO party committee], 18/01/1980, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 2, delo 495, 17.

⁹⁰⁰ Ibidem.

⁹⁰¹ Protokoly plenumov partiynogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the plenums of the MGIMO party committee], 21/02/1979, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 2, delo 340, 12.

Memoirs are useful in this task, even though graduates are not likely to acknowledge that they or their parents bribed the administration.⁹⁰² However, exceptions do exist: among the illustrious alumni of that time, Vladimir Potanin declared that ‘of course, my enrolment at MGIMO did not happen by chance’.⁹⁰³ He emphasised a widespread system of corruption that he himself had benefited from upon entering the Institute. Defectors from the USSR are also more likely to stress the role of so-called ‘blat’ in the recruitment procedure.⁹⁰⁴ Tellingly, Gottemoeller and Langer have stated that ‘blat seemed to be almost vital for MGIMO entry’ in the 1970s,⁹⁰⁵ quoting Vladimir Sakharov’s memoirs by way of proof:⁹⁰⁶ he was a defector who graduated from the Institute in 1968. However, by using this quotation, the two scholars paradoxically prove that admission to the Institute required much more than corruption and powerful family connections:

Beyond having the right connections, I had to have a superior academic record, graduating with at least what in the US would be an A-minus average in all required subjects – politics, history, geography, languages, literature, and science. In addition, I had to have a good sports record and have taken part in competitions. Naturally, I had to be a model communist youth, with officially approved tastes,

⁹⁰² Political scientists have long identified a ‘grey area’ around the perception of corruption. The rhetoric of helping out a friend or an acquaintance often goes along with practices of corruption. One might wonder whether numerous applicants and their parents considered the same act of exchange as *blat* when carried out by others, but as altruistic help when they did it. Philippe Bezes and Pierre Lascoumes, ‘Percevoir et Juger la «corruption politique»’, *Revue française de science politique* 55, no. 5 (2005): 757–86.

⁹⁰³ Ūliā Taratuta, ‘Vladimir Potanin: «Bez Kompleksov Govorū, Čto Byl «blatnym»’, *ForbesLife*, December 2014, <http://www.forbes.ru/forbeslife/obrazovanie-i-karera/274759-vladimir-potanin-bez-kompleksov-govoryu-cto-byt-blatnym>. Vladimir Potanin was born in 1961. His father was a functionary at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade who was posted in New Zealand when he enrolled at MGIMO in 1978. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1983.

⁹⁰⁴ *Blat* is a difficult word to translate. By stressing that *blat* presents a distinctive form of social relationship or exchange articulating private interests and human needs against the rigid control of the state, Alena Ledeneva argues that it ‘does not really need to be conceptualised as a distinctive phenomenon in its own right’. Alena V. Ledeneva, *Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange*, Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies 102 (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1,2,7; Markku Lonkila explains that the closest English expressions, such as ‘pulling strings’ or ‘using connections’, refer to similar social mechanisms of arranging things informally through social relations. However, they ‘neither capture the extent nor the pervasiveness of these practices during the Soviet era.’ Markku Lonkila, review of *Review of Russia’s Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange*, by Alena V. Ledeneva, *Acta Sociologica* 42, no. 2 (1999): 173.

⁹⁰⁵ Gottemoeller and Langer, *Foreign Area Training and Utilization in the Soviet Union*, 23.

⁹⁰⁶ Vladimir Sakharov was born in 1945 and was the son of a diplomat. He joined the CIA as a double agent while assigned to the Middle East by the KGB in the 1980s.

conduct, and interests. For the entrance interviews, I had to develop poise, quickness of mind, and be ready with the right answers for any situation. Finally, I had to prove I was a real communist worker. This could be accomplished either by volunteering to do work for the Komsomol or by holding a job for two years.⁹⁰⁷

In the MGIMO party committee records of that time, when looking at three specific moments of the Institute's academic life (the selection procedure, the teaching process, and job assignment), one might wonder to what extent bypassing the rules was necessary for guaranteeing the success of students from more privileged families. Indeed, despite the obvious differences between MGIMO and other leading western universities, the recruitment procedure, study, and job assignment seem 'so obviously designed to guarantee students already endowed, through their background, with the dispositions they require that we have to wonder whether, as the Romans used to say, they aren't merely "teaching fish to swim"'.⁹⁰⁸

In the 30 years between Khrushchev's rise and Brezhnev's death, the recruitment procedure changed little. MGIMO was still defined as a 'closed institution of higher education (*zakrytyj vuz*)',⁹⁰⁹ where those who wished to sit for the exam had to receive a recommendation letter from either party or Komsomol organisations and provide a biographical essay. Applicants had to pass a preliminary interview with two members of the selection committee as well as a written exam.

Despite this apparent stability, one is struck by how the testing of academic skills became more socially discriminatory under Brezhnev. In the middle of the 1950s, the requirements for a biography and a letter of recommendation from party organs were implemented in order to both highlight candidates with long political experience and ensure their loyalty towards the Soviet state. With a diminishing number of candidate members and members of the CPSU taking the competitive examination and Moscow's housing problem, one can affirm that this requirement began to favour

⁹⁰⁷ Vladimir Sakharov and Umberto Tosi, *High Treason* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981), 53; Gottemoeller and Langer, *Foreign Area Training and Utilization in the Soviet Union*, 20.

⁹⁰⁸ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 73.

⁹⁰⁹ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, 06/04/1977, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 36, 5.

candidates whose parents were members of the Communist Party in the Moscow region.

Indeed, in the context of the Brezhnev era, the system of party recommendation obviously worked to the advantage of those candidates whose parents were communists and whose place in the Moscow organs of the CPSU often meant they possessed considerable social capital. Receiving a letter of recommendation from the party or Komsomol when 17 years old was obviously not the same thing as being recommended after several years of political or administrative service. Contrary to what had happened in the 1950s and early 1960s, when applicants could rely on their own political networks built during military service or work experience, the use of letters of recommendation led to a greater degree of emphasis on parents' membership in the Communist Party. After all, it is difficult to see how a 17-year-old applicant could obtain a letter of recommendation from the Gorkom or Rajkom without relying on his or her parents' social network.

Understanding the system of the Party in Moscow and identifying key persons in party organisations presented a certain advantage in the competition. It is sufficient to bring up Ryženko's statements about Pozdnâkov's case in 1962 and Alekseev's statements in 1963 about how some Moscow Party organisations recommended sometimes their own representatives to understand how political organisations could favour some candidates and refuse others. This is especially the case when we consider that the MGIMO Komsomol organisation could also recommend applicants during the recruitment procedure.

As far as the academic skills tested during the written examination are concerned, lineage had an important role there too. In 1973, the competitive exam included several tests in mathematics, Russian, foreign languages, geography, and the history of the Soviet Union.⁹¹⁰ The content and form of the written examinations were based on testing academic skills which were obviously, but not necessarily deliberately, related to parental social status. Indeed, testing the level of foreign language of applicants was a logical necessity for training future members of the Soviet

⁹¹⁰ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 28/06/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 126, 79.

diplomatic corps; however, it favoured candidates with a privileged social background. The fact that some children of *meždunarodniki* had spent part of their childhoods overseas obviously enhanced their chances of success during the competitive examination. Moreover, as Matthews, Yanov, and Zemtsov point out, the system of special general schools, where part of the teaching was conducted in foreign languages, flourished in Moscow at the end of the 1960s: in the 1970s and 80s, these institutions became dominated by the children of the Soviet elite.⁹¹¹ According to Gottemoeller and Langer, about 1 in 150 Soviet pupils in Moscow and Leningrad attended special language schools in 1976-77.⁹¹²

Discussions during party meetings about the MGIMO entrance exam in the middle of the 1970s reveal that a number of other factors also worked in favour of applicants from the elite, and especially the children of *meždunarodniki*. Firstly, applicants were not obliged to choose French, German, English, and Spanish as foreign languages during the competitive examination: they could choose a rare language they had learnt during their childhood. Secondly, before 1973, the practice whereby some examiners worked as private tutors (*repetitors*) for candidates prior to the selection procedure was not forbidden.⁹¹³ Moreover, during the recruitment procedure, alternative pathways such as the preparatory faculty could also be used by applicants from privileged backgrounds as part of their strategy to join the Institute, even though this faculty had been established to promote the inclusion of students from the working class.

In the middle of the 1960s, the problem had already been clearly identified by members of the primary party organisation. As communist Komissarov declared during a party meeting dedicated to the selection procedure:

This year during the entrance examinations, an official policy for limiting the admission of non-residents was conducted. Our institute has become a transshipment point – if a person has worked in a cloakroom or in an administrative

⁹¹¹ Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union (Routledge Revivals)*, 64; Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, 12; Zemtsov, *The Private Life of the Soviet Elite*, 119.

⁹¹² Gottemoeller and Langer, *Foreign Area Training and Utilization in the Soviet Union*, 15.

⁹¹³ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 28/06/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 126, 80.

department for a year, he becomes an activist. So, just before the entrance exams, he has an 80-90 per cent chance to become a student.⁹¹⁴

15 years later, members of the MGIMO party organisation noticed the same phenomenon. When asked about the level of German possessed by production candidates at the preparatory faculty, the teacher Kevorkova answered that the overall level was excellent: the vast majority of the students were graduates from Moscow special general schools which specialised in German.⁹¹⁵

Among the MGIMO graduates of that time, the biography of Andrei Kozyrev, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia under Boris Yeltsin, demonstrates a good synthesis of the criteria required for success during the recruitment procedure.⁹¹⁶

Kozyrev was born in Brussels in 1951. He was the son of two engineers working for the Ministry of Foreign Trade. When he applied to the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge at the end of the 1960s, he admitted that he could fill out an ‘absolutely perfect application form’ (*soveršenna ideal’na anketa*).⁹¹⁷ In an interview, he declared: ‘In the Soviet Union, the application form was most important. I was bitten into my face [because of my appearance] but was appointed according to the application form.’ His parents were members of the Communist Party, and he graduated from a Moscow Spanish special school. On graduating from school, he made the very conscious and strategic choice of working for a year in a Moscow vacuum cleaner plant. He admitted that at that time he truly believed in the future of communism and was very much involved as a party activist in the factory Komsomol organisation. However, this work experience did not last long. One year later, the party organiser at the plant advised him that ‘the best thing for him was to get our recommendation’: he would ‘give him recommendation from the plant and would be admitted to any institute’. Therefore, he had a letter of recommendation from the factory primary party

⁹¹⁴ Stenogrammy partijnyh obših sobranij partijnoj organizacii MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party organization], 25/09/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 89, 77.

⁹¹⁵ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo būro MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party buro], 05/12/1979, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 2, delo 343, 60.

⁹¹⁶ All the information about Kozyrev’s application to MGIMO has been gleaned from his interview given to journalists Petr Aven and Al’fred Koh. Petr Aven and Al’fred Koh, *Revolūciā Gajdara, Istoriā reform 90-h iz pervyh ruk*, Al’pina Pablišer (Moskva, 2013), 253.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid., 254.

organisation to hand and could be considered as a production candidate. He suggests that his knowledge of Spanish also had a crucial role in his admission, as 'Spanish is a rare language' and he thought that, compared to applicants with English, 'it was rather difficult to assess his level'. He was enrolled at the faculty of international relations and graduated from MGIMO in 1974 before joining the Soviet MID the same year.

Benefitting from his parents' biographies, using their contacts in the Moscow organisations of the Communist Party, and mastering foreign languages in a special school were crucial factors in his success during the selection procedure. Understanding the mechanisms of the selection procedures mattered too. Thus, social background continued to influence students' experiences at the Institute.

Here again, the mastery of foreign languages is particularly enlightening with regards to the weight of parental influence. From the beginning of the 1960s, the members of party committee had clearly identified that learning two foreign languages was the major difficulty for production candidates. In 1963, the party member Sobakin stressed:

The fact is that our faculty takes 110 students, and the number of students in the first year who learn two foreign languages - an Oriental language and a Western one - is growing. Meanwhile, we take into the Institute a great number of people who have had a long break in their studies, and it is very difficult for them to learn foreign languages, especially two. They do their best, but to no avail. The teachers of both languages and other subjects may have the impression that these students are conscientious comrades, good communists and Komsomol members, but, due to a heavy workload at the Institute, they are unable to master all the knowledge required from graduating students.⁹¹⁸

However, in the middle of the 1970s, students' scores in foreign languages were still considered an integral part of the assessment for an internship overseas.

⁹¹⁸ Stenogrammy partijnyh obših sobranij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the party general meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 09/12/1963, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 89, 121.

During a party meeting in 1975, Onopenko, a student and party organiser for the fourth-year students at the faculty of international economic relations, began his intervention by stressing the fact that out of the 60 communists enrolled in the faculty, half of them had a part-time job to supplement their budget. What makes his statements particularly interesting is the way he demonstrated how the use of purely academic criteria in the distribution of internships among students may have led to discrimination against production candidates:

It is also said that students who have a satisfactory mark in a foreign language are not worth sending abroad to be trained. I believe that this is not right at all. The students who, for the same reasons, have already been abroad should not be sent there again for training. It is not a reward. Maybe it is necessary to send the students who need to get better acquainted with a language and have some practice, and so on.⁹¹⁹

By selecting students who had already had the opportunity of travelling abroad and learning a foreign language in special schools, the Institute did choose the best students to be sent on internships at an academic level. However, this simply contributed to reproducing and legitimating the original social divide that existed between students from different social backgrounds.

Moreover, Onopenko's statements also reveal that parental influence was sometimes expressed in a much more direct way:

I would like to focus on the issue of the distribution of work experience. It is not frequent, but different situations sometimes happen. I would not see anything wrong if I arrived, for example, from the kolkhoz (and I really do come from there) and this farm called me for work experience. That would be natural and clear, but when a 17-18-year-old student has declared that he was called for work experience by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I think this is wrong. I would like to draw special attention to this issue; there should not be any personal relations or applications from the MID because there are many unnecessary rumours [about this].⁹²⁰

⁹¹⁹ Stenogramma IV očetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii MGIMO, [Minutes of the 4th report-election MGIMO party conference], 15/10/1975, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 132, 44.

⁹²⁰ Ibidem.

Because they had the opportunity to benefit from the support of their parents in Soviet diplomatic institutions, students from more privileged families were also much better placed to gain an internship in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus prior to their graduation.

Onopenko was right to point out the major role of foreign languages in sorting the students at the Institute and how not all the students had the same opportunities because of their family backgrounds. However, he missed an important, perhaps even vital, point required for success that was extremely relevant in the Brezhnev era: the fact that the Institute required specific ways of behaving and thinking and certain schemas and forms of how-how and competence was just as important as mastering foreign languages. Professor Ferdinand Piskoppel's statements reveal this clearly:

What is a modern, civilised, cultured man? A truly cultured man is a person who is modest in behaviour and clothes, who knows how to properly hold himself with his elders, a man who respects women and girls. Obviously it is not enough to read some works by Kafka, Remarque, or Falkner to consider oneself a cultured man.⁹²¹

Thus, Piskoppel stressed that simply reading foreign literature was not enough to acquire the way of being and acting expected from MGIMO students. For different categories of students, this had different meanings. For children of the Soviet elite, the emphasis was put on asceticism and modesty in the expression of one's social status,⁹²² while, for children from less privileged social backgrounds, understanding the codes of conduct and manners in Soviet diplomacy was a basic requirement for their success.

What retrospective statements from some of the children of the first generation of *meždunarodniki* reveal is the extent to which they were already endowed, through their background, with the specific skills that the Institute expected from them. The

⁹²¹ Protokoly partijnih sobranij i zasedanij partijnogo būro fakul'teta meždunarodnyh èkonomičeskikh otnošenij MGIMO, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro of the MGIMO faculty of international economic relations], 20/02/1968, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 111, 43.

⁹²² On 18 January 1980, Mihail Perežogin's statements contain this revealing phrase: 'Have a look at some of our girls – how much jewellery they are wearing!' Protokoly plenumov partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the plenums of the MGIMO party committee] 18/01/1980, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 495, 18.

story of Marina Olegova,⁹²³ whose father graduated from MGIMO in the 1950s and worked at the Soviet embassy in Washington in the 1960s, is particularly enlightening. She recalls:

During the worst years of the ‘Cold War’, I lived in the USA: my father worked at the Soviet embassy. My family lived there just for five years between the Suez and the Caribbean crises. Can you imagine? This was real cold war. When you live far from your homeland, in the centre of the USA, a very patriotic and state-centric worldview is formed. Well then, it was the pride of the state. But when I came back to this state and saw how poor people lived here, I felt ashamed. [...] Well, because, you see, when I arrived I was wearing clothes that no one in the school was dressed in. I remember I came home from school, took off all the clothes and told my mum: ‘Please buy me the clothes all other children are wearing here. I do not want to be a “black sheep”’.⁹²⁴

Olegova was particularly aware about the contrast in living standards between the USSR and the USA. However, her feeling of shame upon returning to Moscow in order to enrol at MGIMO was counterbalanced by the patriotism she nurtured during her childhood in Washington. Despite her privileged childhood, she claims that when she came back to Moscow, she spontaneously adopted asceticism into her way of being. This was exactly what the members of the MGIMO primary organisation expected from her.

From this perspective, we can also hypothesise that the children of privileged families and *meždunarodniki* had more intellectual resources for understanding the political and academic requirements that were not explicitly declared during the teaching process. The diplomat Maxime Borissov, the son of two Soviet state functionaries who graduated from MGIMO in 1980 and whose elder brother also studied at MGIMO in the 1970s, remembers the academic requirements of that time:

What was written in the newspaper *Pravda* was one thing and what actually happened another. Of course, everybody learned to read *Pravda* in such a way so as

⁹²³ For reasons of anonymity, the names and surnames of the interviewees have been changed.

⁹²⁴ **Interviewee:** Marina Olegova. **Date:** [15/03/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 45 minutes.

to catch between the lines the truth that was not written there. Such a school of political analysis in Soviet foreign policy, especially among the MGIMO graduates, was very highly developed. And there were no special authorities, it was necessary to proceed from real foreign policy: you could hide behind the official ideology but a successful diplomat always has to be a good analyst. Good analysis is the ability to understand where the truth is and where there is no truth. These skills were important and in demand at that time.

Catching the truth in between the lines of *Pravda* and the official requirements of the MGIMO teaching programmes, understanding the issues surrounding the interests pursued by Soviet foreign policy, and knowing how to make use of ideology to defend one's ideas were challenges that may have been easier for someone who had spent all their childhood in a Soviet embassy overseas.

The job assignment procedure was the last, but also the most important, moment when the social capital of graduates and their families mattered. Clearly, not all the graduates had the same access to the most prestigious institutions of Soviet diplomacy.

In 1973, Nikolaj Lebedev, the dean of the faculty of international relations, was delighted to announce that 80 per cent of the people recruited at the MID each year came from his faculty. While stressing the traditionally strong link that united the MID and MGIMO, the dean indicated that this result should not mask the difficulties concerning the jobs assigned to numerous production candidates. He stated:

We tried to provide a higher percentage of production workers by reducing the entrance requirements and then we suffered the whole period of study at the Institute. Moreover, we injured those workers who were admitted to the Institute. We excluded them or, after bringing them to the last year of study, we couldn't offer them the jobs they had expected.⁹²⁵

During the assignment procedure, graduates from less privileged backgrounds certainly did not have the same opportunities as *meždunarodniki* children, even

⁹²⁵ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 01/11/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 127, 37.

though they had the same diploma. Those who could use their parents' networks possessed clear advantages.

At the end of the 1970s, Piskoppel' described how the job assignment procedure gave rise to deals with the personnel departments of the institutions which recruited MGIMO graduates. Parents engaged their social influence to make sure their children got the best possible jobs:

Last year, our party organisation decided to take part in the job assignment procedure but, all the same, the most interesting positions (*v naibolee interesnyh mestah*) were occupied by the children of the most responsible comrades (*deti naibolee otvetsvennyh tovarišej*). It is necessary that the Komsomol organisation be actively involved in the distribution process. Responsible fathers and mothers must be directly told about this; therefore it is necessary to directly address the governing body, the Politburo, to prevent such actions.⁹²⁶

To a certain extent, Piskoppel' was suggesting that the hierarchy among the positions of authority in the institutions in charge of Soviet diplomacy directly affected the job assignments of graduates. Thus, the mention of the Politburo was not insignificant, as the professor was clearly highlighting that the higher levels of the Soviet diplomatic corps were involved. What supports Piskoppel's statements is the place of both personnel and professional ties in Soviet foreign affairs during the Brezhnev era.

Personnel and professional ties in Soviet foreign affairs

During a party meeting at MGIMO in the middle of the 1970s, G. Uranov, the deputy head of the MID HR department, announced a break with the past in the MID recruitment procedure. He stated:

In a certain way, the working conditions for our team (*naš kollektiv*) have changed compared with what they were a few years ago. Now the Ministry and other central

⁹²⁶ Protokoly partijnyh sobranij i zasedanij partbûro fakul'teta Meždunarodnyh èkonomičeskij otnošenij, [Minutes of the party meetings and of the party buro of the MGIMO faculty of international economic relations], 10/04/1968, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 111, 35.

authorities and agencies are able to employ people with good knowledge of foreign languages, which they obtained not only at our Institute: this was a field in which we had a monopoly some years ago. Now there is no such monopoly. There is the Institute of Asia and Africa, which has a set of specific conditions and will prepare appropriate specialists. Take industries related to the economy, finance, and law: there are institutions that prepare very good personnel, and they are not only located in Moscow.⁹²⁷

Uranov did not give the reasons that motivated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Soviet central administrations to recruit part of their cadres in a new range of research and training institutions. However, compared to the Khrushchev era, when the fusion of MGIMO with the MIOS and the MIFT had created a monopoly for the Institute, the change was clear. In 1975, the opening of a department dedicated to the training of ‘journalist-meždunarodniki’ (*otdelenie žurnalistov-meždunarodnikov*) at Moscow State University contested MGIMO’s monopoly over the training of foreign specialists in an even more symbolic way: the graduates of the new MSU department were called *meždunarodniki*, just like MGIMO alumni.

When asked about this, Perežogin answered that the department had been opened in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He affirmed that there was ‘nothing wrong with this’, stressing that the new department would be in direct competition with MGIMO: ‘At Kiev University, there is also the faculty of international relations. It is even good for us, as now we have a competitor with whom we will have to compete.’⁹²⁸

A couple of years later, however, Ūrij Budancev, the former assistant editor at the Soviet central television station⁹²⁹ and professor of journalism at MGIMO, had to reassure the primary party organisation about the competition between the faculty of international journalism and its counterpart at Moscow State University. He declared:

⁹²⁷ Stenogrammy sobranij partijnogo aktiva MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of MGIMO party activists], 21/03/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 128, 67.

⁹²⁸ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 27/08/1975, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 133, 209.

⁹²⁹ zam. glavnogo redaktora CT SSSR (1967—1970).

We completely fulfil the requests of the organisations, but their needs are growing. When hiring, practical organisations prefer our graduates. If we increase the admission to our faculty by 10-15 people every year, we will not make a mistake. There is an opinion that it is necessary to close some departments of the journalism faculty at MSU (the department of Prof. Zasurskij). The graduates of the department are not in demand. And in terms of theoretical and scientific training, our graduates are much better.⁹³⁰

The extent to which the journalist-meždunarodniki were worse in terms of theoretical and scientific training is debatable: ironically, Budancev was himself a graduate of Moscow State University. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that, compared to MGIMO graduates, the journalist-meždunarodniki from MSU did not have the personal and professional ties that the first generation of meždunarodniki and their children had established since the end of the Khrushchev era. Tellingly, when in 1976 Uranov used the term 'team' and addressed the members of the party organisation in the first person plural, he was reflecting the fact that he himself had graduated from MGIMO in 1958.

Because of the accession of MGIMO graduates to all responsible positions in the Soviet diplomatic corps after 1955, most of those doing the recruiting during the Brezhnev era were Stalin's and Khrushchev's meždunarodniki. Of all the different PhD dissertations mentioned in the previous part of this thesis, Ermolenko's work is undoubtedly interesting in several respects. Apart from the turning point it marks in the importation of the so-called bourgeois theories, it also symbolises the accession of the first MGIMO alumni to the rank of assistant professor and then professor. Henceforth, the Institute was capable of recruiting its own alumni: the number of teaching staff who defended a PhD in history or economics at MGIMO and then took an administrative, academic or research position there gradually increased until the collapse of the USSR. The exchange of specialists between MGIMO and Soviet foreign policy institutions was not rare. At the end of the 1960s, Ermolenko was finally recruited by the MID as a counsellor (*sovetnik*), where he led a research group

⁹³⁰ Protokoly zasedanij būro partiynogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of meetings of the buro of the MGIMO party committee], 05/12/1979, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 343, 78.

at the department of planning for external political events (*Upravlenie planirovaniâ vnešnepolitičeskikh meropriâtij*).⁹³¹

The trajectories of MGIMO rectors during the Brezhnev era are also highly symbolic of the place that the Institute occupied in the Soviet diplomatic corps. The exchange of specialists allowed for the integration of MGIMO and its graduates into an institutional network dedicated to foreign affairs.

Table 13: The trajectories of MGIMO rectors during the Brezhnev era

Surname Name	Occupation before	Occupation after
Fedor Danilovič Ryženko (1958-63)	Head of the department of the history of the CPSU at MGIMO (1949-58)	Rector of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.
Leonid Nikolaevič Kutakov (1963-65)	Counsellor in the Soviet embassy to Japan Head deputy at the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (1960-63)	Senior counsellor in the Soviet mission at the UN
Boris Pantelejmonovič Mirošničenko (1965-68)	Head of department at the Central Committee	Soviet ambassador to Canada (1968-73)
Mihail Danilovič Âkovlev (1968-71)	Rector at the Higher Diplomatic School	Soviet ambassador to Sweden (1971-82)
Aleksandr Alekseevič Soldatov (1971-74)	Soviet ambassador to Cuba (1967-70)	Soviet ambassador to Lithuania (1974-86)
Nikolaj Nikolaevič Lebedev (1974-85). Graduated from MGIMO in 1950.	Dean of the MGIMO faculty of international relations	

⁹³¹ Abdulhan Ahtamzân, 'Ermolenko D.V. – Pervyj Prorektor MGIMO Iz Vypusnikov Vuza', [D.V. Ermolenko: the first MGIMO vice-rector among the institute's alumni], *Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta* 28, no. 1 (2013): 267.

The integration of MGIMO into a network of institutions mattered. However, it was also important that these ties were often built on both personal and professional grounds: this was because of the significant place occupied by the dynasties of *meždunarodniki* under Brezhnev. On this matter, the memoirs of the Lopatin sisters are particularly revealing:⁹³²

Lopatin, Elena (graduated from MGIMO in 1980)

Mezencev (Lopatin), Ksenâ (graduated from MGIMO in 1987)


In memory of Ūrij and Lûdmila Lopatin

MGIMO means a lot to our family. We were born into the family of two 1958 graduates of this institute, Ūrij Leonidovič Lopatin and Lûdmila Mihailovna Zaiceva - that is why we have heard this abbreviation since our childhood. Our parents – Ūrij and Lûsâ then – met at a French consultation in 1952. Since that, they were never apart. After graduating from the Institute in 1958, my father was dispatched to the news agency TASS and worked there all his life. As he was a good specialist on Western Europe and a strong journalist on international affairs, his work was mainly connected with long foreign trips to France, Italy, and Switzerland. My mother always accompanied him and was responsible for the accounting of all the TASS offices. Between the trips, she taught French in foreign language courses. When in Moscow and during business trips, our parents often came across their classmates. Together with my father, V. Koročancev also worked at TASS. In Italy, they were at the same time with G. Uranov. From early childhood, we heard such names as G. Akimchenko, F. Bogdanov, G. and V. Suhov, N. and V. Stupišin, and M. Lûbimov. Among our parents' friends and acquaintances, there were many MGIMO graduates from other years – A. Krasikov, G. Šiškin, G. Dragunov, A. Zvancov, and many others. Our parents always warmly recalled their student days and enjoyed meeting with the graduates of their alma mater. One of their classmates, Peter Stepanovič Zav'âlov, became our relative after getting married to our mother's sister. He worked at the Union Scientific Research Conjuncture Institute for many years; he defended a PhD and then a doctoral thesis and became a well-known specialist on the market research side [of things]. We walked in the footsteps of our parents by graduating from MGIMO's faculty of international economic relations. Their youngest son-in-law got a law degree at the faculty of international law and, in the summer of 2007, their eldest grandson also went to this faculty. Thus, the dynasty continues.

This intermingling between professional and personal ties is particularly obvious when considering the place of women at the Institute at the end of the Brezhnev era.

⁹³² *'Kak molody my byli...'*, 55.

Indeed, women played a crucial role in both the development of studies on international relations and the establishment of dynasties. Graduating from the MGIMO for the first time in 1951, female graduates were characterised by their marginality within the Institute and their specialisation in international economic relations during the Brezhnev era. Correlating the quantity of theses defended with the number of alumni per year between 1960 and 1988, it appears that not only were men strongly dominant within the Institute (they represented 82 per cent of the total number of graduates),⁹³³ but also that women made up the majority of those participating in courses on international economics. While they represented less than 10 per cent of the graduates at the faculty of international relations, they made up 26 per cent of those who received a diploma in international economics. In order to show the gender divide between the disciplines, another key figure has to be mentioned: among the women who graduated from the MGIMO between 1960 and 1988, 66 per cent were from the faculty of international economy, whereas 20 per cent graduated from the faculty of international relations and only 14 per cent got a diploma in either law or journalism. A minority of the graduates, women were also much more marginal in terms of those who defended a PhD thesis at the Institute. They represented only 20 per cent of the total number of PhD students between the 60s and the end of the 80s.



However, doing a PhD meant something different to women and men. While one of my interviewees admitted that it was an *unusual choice* for a man to prefer an academic career to a diplomatic one after graduating with a specialism in Chinese, several women mentioned that they had made a *logical choice* by beginning a PhD. Because they were excluded from careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an academic path was an alternative way to maintain or reach a social position in the field of international relations. For instance, the women who spoke rare oriental languages were offered the opportunity to stay at the MGIMO in order to teach the next generation of students. They could then undertake a specialisation in history or economics and build a career.

Whereas a PhD dissertation helped men boost their careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (it allowed them to ask for an expert position), access to the MID was clearly restricted for women. Confined to low-ranking positions like translators, accountants, and secretaries, women with the same degrees could not have the same expectations as men. However, for women, undertaking a PhD in order to begin an academic career within MGIMO may have also presented other advantages in terms of social reproduction: marriage with potential future diplomats at MGIMO might have allowed them to preserve or attain a prestigious position within the Soviet social hierarchy.

As Marina Olegova, one of my interviewees, observed, the question of marriage was raised often during her time at MGIMO. Men who wanted to start a career as a Soviet diplomat were required to be members of the Communist Party, possess excellent academic degrees, and also be married. Thus, some of the female students received several marriage proposals during their final year at the Institute. For the students from provinces, getting married to a female graduate from Moscow was also strategic, as it would allow them to avoid the constraints of the *propiska* system. This obviously reinforced graduate homogamy.

The records of the Institute's party organisation echo the same facts found during interviews. In 1973, Dean Viktor Pâtnenkov of the faculty of international economic relations informed his colleagues that, unfortunately, the three female students who

had enrolled into a PhD programme in economics the previous year had left the Institute after marrying three MGIMO graduates appointed to foreign positions.⁹³⁴

By teaching at the Institute while their husbands were working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, women could play an important role in the family unit. This division of labour played an even more important role during the Gorbachev era. In a period when the market economy was growing and academic institutions were under-resourced, several female professors remained at the Institute while their husbands started new careers in business or worked abroad. As Anna Barabanova noticed with humour, ‘my husband often says: my wife loves her job. I do my job.’⁹³⁵ Since they had a foot both in the educational and administrative spheres, these couples could also promote their children in the closed field of international relations. Thanks to a PhD degree, a career in the academic milieu might help to perpetuate the establishment of a Soviet diplomatic family.

Therefore, we must consider the correlation between the mechanisms of social reproduction during the Brezhnev era and the establishment of new ways of thinking about international relations, which emerged at the very same time.

⁹³⁴ Protokoly i stenogrammy zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts and minutes of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 01/11/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 1, delo 127, 31.

⁹³⁵ **Interviewee:** Anna Barabanova **Date:** [17/05/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 32 minutes.

CHAPTER 8

PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE GORBACHEV ERA

I would like to mention the strengthening of the ties in the scientific work of the Institute with the practical needs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, which is especially true for the faculty of international law and civil law. A number of teachers are involved in consultations, making reports, and participating in international conferences. A very important role belongs to the research laboratory of the Institute, which, during the reported period, has shifted from development of sometimes abstract schemes to the implementation of specific tasks in close contact with the USSR MID department of the planning for external political events. A number of original models and techniques with practical applications have been developed.⁹³⁶

Secretary of the MGIMO primary party organisation Nikolaj Nikulin on 22 October 1980

It is useful to trace the formation not only of schools, but also of *types* of theoretical schools in our country. In terms of organisational-institutional sources, we can speak about the historical formation of two such types: the first one is more theoretical (the school of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations) and the second is more practical (the school of MGIMO).⁹³⁷

Former head of the MGIMO research laboratory between 1990 and 1998 Mark Hrustalev in an interview given in 2016

Traditionally, the end of the Brezhnev era is associated with a heightening of tensions on the international front. In the three axes considered priorities by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (peaceful coexistence with the West, the search for cohesion of and control over the socialist block, and support for newly independent countries), Soviet diplomacy had only limited success.

⁹³⁶ Stenogramma otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii MGIMO, [Minutes of the report-election MGIMO party conference], 22/10/1980, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 494, 89.

⁹³⁷ Mark Hrustalev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', *Meždunarodnye Processy* 11, no. 2 (Maj-Avgust 2006): 120.

As soon as Brezhnev rose to power, his and Kosygin's hopes of rebuilding a close relationship with China were dashed: the USSR never really succeeded in convincing Mao of the need for unity in the socialist camp, especially since the Chinese leader was engaged in 'a struggle against revisionism' which often appeared to be 'a struggle for recognition and greatness for Communist China'.⁹³⁸ In Third World countries, the dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola (1975-76) and Ethiopia (1977-78) with Soviet military and logistic support led to an inexorable worsening of Soviet-American diplomatic relations.⁹³⁹ President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski declared the following during the Ethiopian crisis: 'SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden.'⁹⁴⁰ After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet-American relations were at their lowest ebb since the Cuban missile crisis. As far as Europe was concerned, while the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not stop the policy of peaceful coexistence, the rise of the Polish anti-communist national movement "Solidarity" and labour strikes in Gdansk in 1980, which escalated into a crisis for the communist regime in Poland, appeared to threaten Soviet interests in the region.⁹⁴¹

For MGIMO, this tense international context was particularly significant, as it created new opportunities for the institution on the eve of the Gorbachev era. It represented what today would be described as a 'meeting point between specialists in foreign affairs and a problematic international context':⁹⁴² just as practitioners of foreign

⁹³⁸ Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split', 362.

⁹³⁹ Piero Gleijeses convincingly argues that Moscow's support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola was not spontaneous. The scholar claims that 'by deciding to send troops Castro challenged Brezhnev, who opposed the dispatch of Cuban soldiers to Angola.' However, Gleijeses also distinguishes between the Soviet support given to Cuba in Angola to that given in Ethiopia: 'In Angola, the Cubans acted without even informing the Soviet Union, whereas in Ethiopia there was close consultation'. Piero Gleijeses, 'Cuba and the Cold War', in *Crises and Détente*, First paperback edition, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 343-344.

⁹⁴⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1983), 189.

⁹⁴¹ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 228.

⁹⁴² The original expression developed in some French sociological studies on expertise is '*la rencontre d'une conjoncture problématique et d'un spécialiste*' in Christiane Restier-Melleray, 'Experts et Expertise Scientifique', *Revue Française de Science Politique* 40, no. 4 (August 1990): 549.

affairs faced the fact that they lacked data⁹⁴³ and, more importantly, justification for the promotion of their views at the highest level of the Communist Party,⁹⁴⁴ a group of researchers at MGIMO was able to promote the use of new analytical tools in the study of international relations. Indeed, heightened foreign tensions and regular rounds of diplomatic negotiations served the interests of this group in a struggle that was partly domestic: its main goal was to promote a new approach of foreign affairs. This was reflected in the institutionalisation of IR theory as a discipline at the Institute in 1973, the foundation of the Problem Laboratory of System Analysis of International Relations (*Problemnaâ naučno-issledovatel' skaâ laboratoriâ sistemnogo analiza meždunarodnyh otnošenij*, PNILSAMO) in 1976, and the publication of several books dedicated to theories of international relations and system analysis in foreign affairs in the early 1980s.⁹⁴⁵

While the previous chapter was focused on the Soviet domestic context and the establishment of dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era, this eighth chapter aims to demonstrate how the international situation had a strong impact on theoretical academic approaches to foreign affairs at the Institute. Paradoxically, change emerged from the strengthening of social reproduction during the Brezhnev era: this new approach to foreign affairs emerged partly thanks to the personal and professional ties

⁹⁴³ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 149.

⁹⁴⁴ Hrustalev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', 120.

⁹⁴⁵ Vera Antihina-Moskovčenko, Anatolij Zlobin, and Mark Hrustalev, *Osnovy Teorii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij, Učebnoe Posobie [The Main Theories of International Relations, a Handbook]* (Moskva: MGIMO Universitet, 1980); Ivan Tûlin, Mark Hrustalev, and Aleksej Kožemâkov, *Analitičeskie Metody I Metodiki v Issledovanii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij Sbornik Naučnyh Trudov [Analytical Methods and Techniques in Research on International Relations (A Collection of Research Articles)]*, Laboratoriâ sredstv pečati MGIMO (Moskva, 1982); Gennadij Ašin and Ivan Tûlin, eds., *V.I Lenin I Dialektika Sovremennyh Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij Sbornik Naučnyh Trudov [V. I. Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations: A Collection of Scientific Articles]*, MGIMO (Moskva, 1982); Mark Hrustalev, *Osnovy Teorii Vnešnej Politiki Gosudarstva (Učebnoe Posobie) [Foundational Theories of State Foreign Policy (Handbook)]*, Ministerstvo vyššego i srednego special'nogo obrazovaniâ SSSR (Moskva, 1984). After the Brezhnev era, the most notable publications of the researchers at the research laboratory concerning system analysis were: Mark Hrustalev, *Sistemnoe Modelirovanie Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij (Učebnoe Posobie) [Systems Modelling in IR (Handbook)]* (Moskva: MGIMO, 1987); Andrej Zagorskij and Marina Lebedeva, *Teoriâ i metodologiâ analiza meždunarodnyh peregovorov Učebnoe posobie MGIMO [Theory and Analysis Methodology of International Relations: An MGIMO Handbook]*, MGIMO, *Problemnaâ naučno-issledovatel' skaâ laboratoriâ sistemnogo analiza meždunarodnyh otnošenij* (Moskva, 1989); Ivan Tûlin, ed., *Sistemnyj Podhod: Analiz I Prognozirovanie Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij (Opyt Prikladnyh Issledovanij) Sbornik Naučnyh Trudov [The System Approach: Analysis and Forecasting of International Relations (the Experience of Applied Research): A Collection of Scientific Works]*, MGIMO, 1991.

meždunarodniki in Soviet diplomatic institutions. The very same praxis of foreign affairs identified in part three of the dissertation had creative and original consequences for the development of research on international relations, both theoretically and practically, on the eve of the Gorbachev era. However, this paradox was certainly not as pronounced as it seems: the establishment of meždunarodniki dynasties was aimed at carving them a niche in the future of Soviet society, while the new research practices sought to predict the future of international relations.

What were the mechanisms that allowed for the development of a new approach to international relations at MGIMO? How was this approach formed as a genuine tool to help decision-makers, principally those at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? These are the questions at the heart of this last chapter on the Brezhnev era.

A new research laboratory at MGIMO: Encounters between researchers and practitioners

The maturation and mobilisation of new approaches to foreign affairs in the middle of the 1970s could not have occurred without the foundations laid by Khrushchev. The specific praxis of international relations that emerged after 1956, the foundation of numerous research institutions dedicated to foreign affairs at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the increase in the number of MGIMO teaching staff, and ever-deepening knowledge of the research conducted in the West were prerequisites for the convergence of views between researchers and practitioners about the need of new approaches to Soviet diplomacy.

During a party meeting at the Institute on 16 October 1973, party member Ivanov was delighted to announce that over the previous six years, the overall academic level of the Institute's teaching staff had improved.⁹⁴⁶ More now had PhD degrees:⁹⁴⁷ in January 1966, the MGIMO teaching staff consisted of 129 candidates of sciences

⁹⁴⁶ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 16/10/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 126, 142.

⁹⁴⁷ A candidate of science was the first postgraduate scientific degree in Soviet higher education. In order to become a full professor, one needed a doctoral degree.

(*kandidat nauk*) and 128 assistant professors (*docent*),⁹⁴⁸ while in January 1972, there were 188 PhDs and 143 assistant professors. As far as the number of professors was concerned, Ivanov noticed a decrease: 31 doctors of sciences (*doctor nauk*) and 40 professors (*professor*) had been present at the Institute in 1966, while there were 26 doctors and 33 professors in 1972. Nonetheless, he argued that this reduction was explained by the fact that MGIMO professors were of such high quality that they were recruited by the MID and various institutes related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He concluded by emphasising the robust and regular rhythm in the training of researchers at the Institute, with 31 to 50 PhD theses defended there between 1966 and 1971.⁹⁴⁹

When considering the number of the theses defended between 1964 and 1982 recorded in the MGIMO library, the importance of training PhD students is abundantly clear. One finds that 673 dissertations were defended in law, economics, linguistics, history, and philosophy during this period. 55 people received a PhD in linguistics, 199 in history, 275 in economics, 137 in law, and 7 in philosophy.

The place held by research at the Institute was not only quantitative, but also qualitative. Behind the classification of contradictory ideas, new ways of doing research took shape. In 1970, Aleksandr Bessmertnyh's⁹⁵⁰ PhD thesis about the secretariat of state in the USA is an enlightening example of the evolution in research practices.⁹⁵¹ Even though he respected the required form, especially within his bibliography, the quantity of foreign literature considered bourgeois was much higher than the number of Soviet references. His bibliography contained 40 mentions of the

⁹⁴⁸ People with a PhD degree and a teaching position of assistant professor at the Institute.

⁹⁴⁹ Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 16/10/1973, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 126, 142.

⁹⁵⁰ Aleksandr Bessmertnyh was born in Biisk in 1933 in the Altai krai. From a Russian province and a rather modest family (his father died when he was 10), his social trajectory (characterised by significant social upward mobility) is quite typical of the generation trained at MGIMO in the 1950s. When he graduated from MGIMO in 1957, he joined the MID, where he spent his entire career. He was the first MGIMO graduate to become minister of Foreign Affairs. However, he served in this position very briefly, between 1990 and August 1991. His memoirs about his years of study at MGIMO can be found in Anatolij Torkunov, Aleksandr Bessmertnyh, and Nikolaj Izvekov, eds., *MGIMO - Èto My, Naši Sud'* by I Duši Vspominaût Vypusniki 1957 G. (Moskva: MGIMO Universitet, 2017), 9–59.

⁹⁵¹ A.A. Bessmertnykh, *Diplomaticheskoe vedomstvo SShA: organizacija, funkcii, upravlenie*, Moscow: MGIMO library, 1970.

works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and CPSU political leaders, 103 quotations from Soviet researchers, and 320 'bourgeois' references.

The strategy of importing knowledge from the West not only meant an interest in the problems concerning the foreign world. It also had a deep impact on the borrowing and diffusion of new approaches in the Soviet social sciences. In the 1960s, M. Barabanov's, A. Obuhova's, and Ermolenko's dissertations had already paved the way for a deeper integration of bourgeois science into the study of international relations: the three scholars identified the dominant theories of international relations in the West (such as Realism and Idealism), their philosophical roots, and the academic and scientific institutions which supported them, whether at foreign universities or in scientific reviews.

In the context of the 1970s, one observes a handover between the first generation of *meždunarodniki*, whose dissertations in the 1950 and 60s were often focused on a specific school or one state and its diplomacy in a specific region, and a new generation of scholars.⁹⁵² From one generation of *meždunarodniki* to the next, a deeper interest in contemporary Western approaches emerged: a wide range of new research questions were raised by the new generation of young scholars who would soon become affiliated with the laboratory when it was founded in 1976.

Among the twelve scholars I found participating in the research laboratory, nine were MGIMO or MIOS graduates and had defended a PhD thesis at the Institute.⁹⁵³ What

⁹⁵² The titles of the dissertations defended by the supervisors of the PhD students who would be enrolled at the research laboratory is telling of the evolution in the approaches to foreign affairs developed at MGIMO between the 1950-60s and the 1970s: M. Balgaj, 'Social'naâ deâtel'nost' imperialističeskogo gosudarstva / Političeskie i pravovye aspekty [The Social Activity of the Imperialist State: Political and Legal Aspects]' (MGIMO, 1967); V. Antûhina-Moskovčenko, 'Istoriâ Francii 1870-1918 [The History of France, 1870-1918]' (MGIMO, 1963); Dmitrij Ermolenko, 'Očerki Kritiki Sovremennoj Buržuaznoj Fisolofii SŠA (Nekotorye Osnovnye Tendencii I Tečeniâ)' (MGIMO, 1964); D. Tomaševskij, 'Vostočnaâ Politika Soûza I Družby S Pol'skim Narodom I Proval Imperialističeskoj Politiki SŠA I Anglij v Otnošenii Pol'shi v 1941-1944 Gg. [The Eastern Policy of Union and Friendship towards the Poles and the Failure of the Imperialist Policy of the USA and England (1941-44)]' (MGIMO, 1953). In this list, A. Ahtamzân is an exception. Although he defended his dissertation as late as 1974, the focus of his thesis on peaceful coexistence is rather classical. A. Ahtamzân, 'Rapall'skaâ Politika - Opyt Mirnogo Sušestvovaniâ v 1922-1932 Godah [The Rapallo Policy: An Attempt of Peaceful Coexistence (1922-32)]' (MGIMO, 1974).

⁹⁵³ The list of individuals who took part in the MGIMO research laboratory between 1976 and 1985 is definitely incomplete. The members listed and the elements of their biographies were found in the retrospective works of Russian scholars, especially Aleksandr Orlov and Aleksandr Čečevišnikov, 'Naučno-Praktičeskie Ėkspertizy I Analitika Instituta Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij [Applied Analysis

is striking is their age: eight of them were only around 30 when they joined the laboratory.

An overview of the dissertations defended at MGIMO by the majority of the future members of the laboratory reveals that, prior or during their work there, their research dealt with new actors, concepts, and contemporary questions related to foreign affairs. For instance, Mark Hrustalëv defended a PhD thesis on the ‘Army in the social structure of contemporary Arab society’, which was concerned with the stability of political regimes in the Arab world: his research cannot be reduced either to the classical questions of Marxism-Leninism or to questions explored by Western researchers.⁹⁵⁴ In the same way, Aleksandr Kožemâkov’s and Šamil’ Sultanov’s research on decision-making and the implementation of foreign policy respectively seemed particularly new and was directly connected with the recent publication of Graham Allison’s famous book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* in 1971.⁹⁵⁵ Finally, the very manner in which some scholars raised their research questions is also striking. Instead of using classical expressions like ‘the war with Algeria in French foreign policy’ or ‘imperialist French foreign policy towards Algeria’, Andrej Zlobin’s title was ‘the Algerian problem in the policy of France (1958-62)’: the contents stressed the relationship between high and low politics.

at MGIMO University], *Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta* 38, no. 5 (2014): 56–78; Ivan Tûlin, ‘Issledovaniâ Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij v Rossii: Včera, Segodnâ, Zavtra [Studies on International Relations in Russia: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow]’, *Kosmopolis*, Al’manah, 1997, 18–28; Hrustalev, ‘Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]’; Marina Lebedeva, ‘Mirovaâ Politika Kak Nauka I Učebnaâ Disciplina: Škola MGIMO [World Politics as a Science and an Academic Discipline: The MGIMO School]’, *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, Sociologîa i politologîa, 18, no. 3 (2004): 97–108.; Aleksandr Čečevišnikov, ‘40 Let IMI: Ot Problemnoj Laboratorii K Institutu Meždunarodnyh Issledovaniï [40 Years of the IIS: From the Problem Laboratory to the Institute of International Studies]’ 47, no. 2 (2016): 234–41.

⁹⁵⁴ Morris Janowitz’s and Samuel P. Huntington’s studies were published long before Hrustalëv’s, although the two authors dealt with their own country, the USA. Morris Janowitz, *Professional Soldier with a New Prologue*. (Free Press, 1964); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 19. print (New York: Belknap Press, 1957).

⁹⁵⁵ Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed (New York: Longman, 1999).

Table 14: List of researchers involved in PNILSAMO during the Brezhnev era

Name	Date of birth	University and year of graduation	Title of the PhD thesis	Specialisation	Non-academic work experience	Dates of arrival and departure at the research laboratory
Mark Hrustal'ev	1930	MIOS (1953) (PhD thesis defence at MGIMO in 1969)	The army in the social structure of contemporary Arab society	History	KGB (1953-66)	1975-98
Aleksandr Kožemákov	Unknown	Unknown (PhD thesis defence under the supervision of M. Balgaj at MGIMO in 1976)	The state-legal mechanisms of the implementation of foreign policy in bourgeois country	Law		Unknown
Vladimir Lebedev	1953	MGIMO (1980)			MID, diplomatic service in the Soviet embassies to Zimbabwe (1981-84) and South Africa (1991-96).	1980-81
Marina Lebedeva	1955	MSU (1977) (PhD defence thesis at MSU)	Unknown	Psychology		1978
Vadim Lukov	1953	MGIMO (1975) (PhD thesis defence at MGIMO under the supervision of D. Tomaševskij in 1979)	A critical inquiry into the American bourgeois concepts of the "national interests" of the USA		MID (1979-2016) Vadim Lukov Viktor Sergeev	Unknown
Andrej Podberězkin	1953	MGIMO (1979) (PhD thesis defence at MGIMO under the supervision of I. Usačev in 1982)	A critical study on bourgeois concepts of the meaning of the arms race in the military and political strategy of the United States in the 1970s	History	Committee of Youth Organisations (1981-85) IMEMO (1985-90)	1979-81
Viktor Sergeev	1944	Moscow Power Engineering Institute (1967) MSU (1970) (PhD defence at the Joint Institute for High Temperatures, Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1973)	Unknown	Physics and Mathematics	Institute for US and Canadian Studies (1986-90)	1978-86
Šamil' Sultanov	1952	MGIMO (1976) (PhD thesis defence at MGIMO under the supervision of D. Ermolenko in 1981)	A critical inquiry into the bourgeois concepts of decision-making in foreign affairs	History	Unknown	(1976- unknown)
Vladislav Tihomirov	1930	Unknown	Unknown	Physics and Mathematics	Researcher at the UN Institute of Training and Research Policy Efficiency Studies in Geneva (1978-...)	1976-78

Ivan Tûlin	1947	MGIMO (1970) (PhD defence at MGIMO under the supervision of D. Ermolenko in 1972)	A critical inquiry into several bourgeois socio-philosophical concepts of international relations on the basis of work by contemporary French authors	Philosophy		1978-91
Andrej Zagorskij	1959	MGIMO (1981) (PhD defence at MGIMO under the supervision of A. Ahtamzân in 1985)	Concepts of security in the foreign policy of West Germany (1970-80)	History		
Andrej Zlobin	1932	MGIMO (1956) (PhD defence at MGIMO under the supervision of V. Antûhina-Moskovčenko in 1965)	The Algerian problem in the policy of France (1958-62)	History	Secret services (1956-61)	

Détente was clearly a powerful boost to a deeper interest in bourgeois theories of international relations. The praxis of foreign affairs identified in part III, which to a certain extent enabled the importation of foreign theories and practices, was useful. Yet, in the middle of the 1970s, this practice had also shown its limits.

Ivan Tûlin, who graduated from MGIMO in 1970 and became head of the laboratory in 1978, stressed the limits of presenting the study of international relations either in the framework of one discipline or as something exclusively focused on state diplomacy:

The separation of the object of international relations among different disciplines not only limited the research on international relations but also made an adequate understanding of their integrity difficult, if not impossible. Besides this approach, the analysis of international relations focused primarily on the foreign policies of individual countries, but the system of communication between them remained practically unexplored. Of course, sooner or later the question of how to merge the separate disciplines studying international relations had to be brought up.⁹⁵⁶

Without further ado, one can say that the goal of merging separate disciplines into a single approach of international relations was soon attained by members of the laboratory. An overview of the researchers involved in the laboratory in the late 1970s

⁹⁵⁶ Tûlin, 'Issledovaniâ Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij v Rossii', 18.

clearly shows a dialogue of different views, disciplines, and actors thanks to the range of academic traditions involved: history, law, philosophy, psychology, and physics and mathematics. While Tûlin considered interdisciplinarity to be a priority in the new research agenda, this was clearly not the main difficulty researchers encountered in the foundation of the laboratory.

What caused much more trouble was that the new research approaches lacked legitimacy: they could not be defined either as Marxist or as bourgeois theories. Marina Lebedeva, a former member of the laboratory and the holder of a PhD degree in psychology from MSU in the 1980s, perfectly summed up the challenges of researchers trapped between a rock and a hard place. She recalls that ‘back then, the assumption that the theory of international relations could not be fully described through Marxism had nothing less than a revolutionary character.’⁹⁵⁷ Nonetheless, she soon added: ‘the novelty for Soviet science was also to propose a theoretical framework of international relations which would not be limited to the study of research conducted overseas (the so-called critique of bourgeois theories) but would search for new approaches.’⁹⁵⁸

The situation in the Soviet social sciences described by Lebedeva was not specific to MGIMO. If one considers the ban on the political sciences as an academic discipline in the USSR and the constraints stemming from the upper levels of the Communist Party in sociology,⁹⁵⁹ developing a new approach defined neither as a traditional discipline recognised by the Ministry of Education nor as a critique of foreign theories presented obvious risks.

On this specific point, two examples can be given. The Russian scholar Denis Degterev pointed out the difficulties around the implementation of game theory in the

⁹⁵⁷ Lebedeva, ‘Mirovaâ Politika Kak Nauka I Učebnaâ Disiplina: Škola MGIMO [World Politics as a Science and an Academic Discipline: The MGIMO School]’, 99.

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid., 100.

⁹⁵⁹ Martine Mespoulet, ‘Quelle Sociologie Derrière Le “ Rideau de Fer ” ? », *Revue D’histoire Des Sciences Humaines* 1, no. 16 (2007): 3–10; For more details about history of Soviet sociology, see: Boris Doktorov, *Sovremennaâ Rossijskaâ Sociologiâ, Istoriâ v Biografiâh I Biografii v Istorii [Contemporary Russian Sociology, History in Biographies, and Biographies in History]*, Izdatel'stvo Evropejskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge (St Peterburg, 2012); Boris Firsov, *Istoriâ Sovetskoi Sociologii 1950-1980-E Gody [History of Soviet Sociology]*, Izdatel'stvo Evropejskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge (Sankt-Peterburg, 2012).

study of international relations at the end of the 1960s.⁹⁶⁰ In two articles published in 1966 and 1967,⁹⁶¹ he detailed how Gennadij Gerasimov strove to show the timeliness of the concept and its potential use in Soviet studies on foreign affairs, but without success. For Degterev, political science's lack of institutionalisation undermined the very possibility of a wider use of game theory, which would remain part of the sociology of conflict in the official framework until the 1990s. The memoirs of Vladimir Gojlo, a MGIMO graduate in 1950 and professor in economics, are even more telling about the risks involved: as an assistant professor, he was denied the right to defend his doctoral thesis about the notion of human capital (*čelovečeskij kapital*) in economics, which was judged as anti-Marxist by the MGIMO faculty of international economic relations in the 1970s.⁹⁶² He had to wait until the end of perestroika in 1990 to defend his doctoral thesis.

When Andrej Zlobin and Mark Hrustal'ev proposed introducing a training course in IR theory at the Institute at the beginning of the 1970s, they faced the same difficulty. Hrustal'ev's retrospective statements are also revealing of how dogma served the interests of those who served it at the Institute. He declared:

In the 1970s at MGIMO, the training course in theory was twice removed and thrice reformed. For these troubles there were purely administrative reasons, but there were also some political intrigues. Official science, in the persons of the representatives of the Scientific Communism Department (*kafedra naučnogo kommunizma*) and their supporters, saw in IR theory a challenge to their dominance in the field of any theory at all.⁹⁶³

Faith to dogma served not only to rationalise the domination of Marxism-Leninism over the social sciences, but also to justify the preeminent place of members of the Scientific Communism Department at the Institute and within the party committee.

⁹⁶⁰ Denis Degterev, 'Raboty Po Teorii Igr [Foreign Works about Game Theory]', *Meždunarodnye Processy* 20, no. 2 (2009).

⁹⁶¹ Gennadij Gerasimov, 'Teoriâ Igr I Meždunarodnye Otnošeníâ [Game Theory and International Relations]', *Mirovaâ Ėkonomika I Meždunarodnye Otnošeníâ*, no. 7 (1966): 101–8; Gennadij Gerasimov, 'Teoriâ Igr Na Službe Amerikanskikh Militaristov [Game Theory in the Service of American Militarists]', *Problemy Vojny I Mira*, 1967, 244–61.

⁹⁶² Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 49–50.

⁹⁶³ Hrustal'ev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', 123.

Nevertheless, in their strategy for both including theories of international relations in the curriculum and the foundation of the laboratory, MGIMO scholars were far from isolated. To some extent, from a community of researchers sharing a specific praxis in foreign affairs and urging a new approach to international relations emerged a group of experts engaged in a policy enterprise where the definition of new knowledge played a major role.⁹⁶⁴ The scientific context in which MGIMO scholars found themselves in the middle of the 1970s had an administrative parallel. A crucial element was the convergence of the research interests of MGIMO scholars with the practical interests of practitioners of foreign affairs, especially those at the MID. At the end of the 1960s, Ermolenko, recruited by the MID as a counsellor (*sovetnik*), began to lead a research group at the department of planning for external political events. His PhD student (and future head of the department) Tûlin took an active part in a regular seminar organised either at MGIMO or the MID.

Ermolenko thus made a decisive step in the creation of ‘hybrid forums’: a variety of participants came from MGIMO, the MID, and IMEMO.⁹⁶⁵ The fact that, before becoming MGIMO rector in 1971, Aleksandr Soldatov had been head of the department of planning for external political events between 1966 and 1968 also had a significant impact on the exchange of ideas between practitioners and researchers.⁹⁶⁶ However, Anatolij Kovalëv, another MGIMO graduate from the Stalin era,⁹⁶⁷ played an even more important role because of his strategic position as vice-minister of foreign affairs between 1971 and 1986 and chief of the department of planning for external political events between 1971 and 1985.

⁹⁶⁴ Madeleine Akrich, ‘From Communities of Practice to Epistemic Communities: Health Mobilizations on the Internet’, *Sociological Research Online* 15, no. 2 (n.d.).

⁹⁶⁵ Instead of defining Ermolenko’s seminars as a ‘think tank’ or a ‘brain trust’ as several Western scholars do, I deliberately use the notion of ‘hybrid forum’ elaborated by Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe. This choice may seem inappropriate for characterising the Soviet situation, but the notion enables us to stress both the variety of actors involved in the seminars (practitioners and researchers), the diversity of their academic backgrounds (philosophy, mathematics, and history), and, last but not least, the space for debate that existed between them about the need for new tools in the analysis of Soviet diplomacy. Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe, *Agir Dans Un Monde Incertain. Essai Sur La Démocratie Technique*, Le Seuil, La Couleur Des Idées (Paris, 2001).

⁹⁶⁶ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 350.

⁹⁶⁷ Kovalëv graduated from MGIMO in 1948.

Indeed, his *The ABCs of Diplomacy*, published for the first time in 1968 and re-released in 1984, was a real plea for forward-looking analysis in foreign affairs. To emphasise the importance of reliable information in the art and science of diplomacy, Kovalëv begins the book with the following lines:

People begin their days in different ways; their place in society, education, and habits are unequal, each country has its own social conditions and customs. But all over the world, people start the day with the news. [...] What does a new day bring with it? What will come out of the events taking place in the neighbourhood or far away? Can we expect the success of the talks held on the shores of Lake Geneva or under the roof of a skyscraper in New York? What new things do these recently held talks and visits of governmental officials bring to international life? What do the plans developed at NATO sessions bring with them?⁹⁶⁸

Having reliable information about the foreign situation at one's disposal was a basic but nonetheless important requirement of diplomacy. More particularly, in the last chapter of his book, 'Negotiations and Détente' (*Peregovory i Razrâdka*),⁹⁶⁹ Kovalëv stressed an important paradox: 'diplomatic negotiations have been much written about and are still being written about. But they have been written and are still being written very little.'⁹⁷⁰ The vice-minister put emphasis on the extensive literature about the activities of the anti-Hitler coalition in the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. He demonstrated familiarity with numerous autobiographies and memoirs of Western political leaders such as de Gaulle, Kennedy, Adenauer, and Brandt. However, he regretted the lack of studies on diplomatic negotiations:

And still further, diplomatic negotiations have not been much written about. It is not very much to say that the further systematisation of views on the role and value of negotiations is required as the most important means of implementing foreign policy

⁹⁶⁸ Anatolij Kovalev, *Azbuka diplomatii [The ABCs of Diplomacy]*, Meždunarodnye otnošeníâ, Vnešnââ diplomatiâ (Moskva, 1968), 3.

⁹⁶⁹ In Russian, the expression '*peregovory i razrâdka*' is particularly interesting from an etymological point of view. The noun *peregovory* derives from the verb *peregovorit'* containing the prefix 'pere-' (again, over) and the verb *govorit'* (to talk, to discuss). The term *razrâdka* derives from the suffix 'raz-', used in Russian to state dispersal or the reversal of an action, and the verb *zarâdit'* (to charge). Ibid., 214.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

objectives and settling inter-state cases in conditions when the age-old alternative to negotiations – an act of force – poses the risk of nuclear war.⁹⁷¹

Kovalëv's experience as a diplomat helps us to better understand his statements. When he published his *ABCs*, he was head of the MID's first European department, which dealt with diplomatic relations between the USSR and France, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Nederland, and Italy. At that time, France was considered a strategic partner in the capitalist West, especially after its NATO exit in 1966, the importance of which was symbolised by the regularity of meetings between French presidents and Leonid Brezhnev (beginning with the visit of de Gaulle to Moscow in June of the same year).⁹⁷² Bipartite negotiations certainly affected Kovalëv's view about the need for research on negotiations. In parallel, from 1973, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) inaugurated a series of regular diplomatic negotiations, including major gatherings between the two blocs in Helsinki (1975), Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83), and Vienna (1986-89). In 1975, Kovalëv took part in the CSCE, the final act of which was the Helsinki Declaration.⁹⁷³

The problem of analysing international relations neither in the framework of official Soviet ideology nor in terms of the studies published in the West arose at the same time at IMEMO. Cherkasov points out how the Institute directed by Inozemcev moved from economic forecasts on capitalist and developing countries to the political assessment of diplomatic crises. The topic of foreign theories of international relations appeared for the first time in the journal *Mirovaâ èkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošeníâ* (MEiMO) in the late 1960s, the same year when a forecast department was founded at IMEMO.⁹⁷⁴ Just as a group of MGIMO scholars gathered around Ermolenko at the MID, IMEMO researchers such as Deputy Director Evgenij

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

⁹⁷² Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 401.

⁹⁷³ Robert English stresses Kovalev's role in the Helsinki conference by stressing that 'he had worked most assiduously for Moscow's acceptance of Helsinki's human rights provisions.' English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 154.

⁹⁷⁴ 'Problemy Teorii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Problems of International Relations Theory]', *Mirovaâ Èkonomika I Meždunarodnye Otnošeníâ* (MEiMO), no. 9 (1969).

Primakov,⁹⁷⁵ future head of the forecast department for international relations (*sektor prognozirovaniâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij*) Vladimir Gantman,⁹⁷⁶ and Vladimir Lûbčenko developed a similar interest in new approaches, especially in terms of situation analysis (*situacionnyj analiz*, *sitanaliz*).⁹⁷⁷ In the same year, the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (*Institut naučnoj informacii po obščestvennym naukam RAN*) was founded.

According to Hrustalëv, Director Inozemcev of IMEMO was particularly sensitive to this new approach. However, what the scholar stresses above all else is how the expectations of researchers matched administrative issues,⁹⁷⁸ even though their problems were of a different nature. For Soviet diplomats, the development of new analytical tools would help them better legitimise their point of view among those who defined and implemented Soviet foreign policy:

Inozemcev had to do this, as a wide range of problems in the field of international relations and world economy was determined that were impossible to understand them from the point of view of official Soviet ideology. Therefore the persons who were to take state decisions didn't have any adequate vision of reality and this meant they didn't have reliable theoretical justifications for making such decisions.⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁵ Evgenij Primakov (1929-2015) graduated from the MIOS in 1953. After working for *Pravda*, he joined the IMEMO in 1962 as a senior researcher. Between 1970 and 1977, he worked as deputy director of IMEMO, before becoming director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He was finally appointed director of IMEMO in 1985. In 1991, he became as head of KGB, a position he left to become minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation between 1996 and 1998.

⁹⁷⁶ Vladimir Gantman (1925-88) graduated from the MIFT in the 1950s and had work experience in the newspaper *News* before joining IMEMO. In 1969, he became head of the IMEMO forecast department. These biographical details were found in Cherkasov, *IMÉMO*, 133–34. Tûlin indicates that Gantman edited a book entitled *Contemporary Bourgeois Theories of International Relations* (*Sovremennye buržuaznye teorii meždunarodnyh otnošenij*) in 1976.

⁹⁷⁷ According to Cherkasov, Primakov probably learned about *sitanaliz* during his visit to the Brookings Institution in Washington in the late 1960s. *Ibid.*, 415.

⁹⁷⁸ This point raised by Hrustalëv is close to Peter Haas' research questions in his study on epistemic communities: 'if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions?' Peter Haas, 'Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination' 46, no. 1 (1992): 1.

⁹⁷⁹ Hrustalev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', 120.

Practitioners and researchers had a common interest in developing new tools of analysis, even though they did not necessarily pursue the same practical aims with regards to the implementation of these methods.

The regular diplomatic crises faced by MID functionaries especially with the West in the 1970s were obviously one factor behind their embrace of new analytical tools. However, this was made possible by regular meetings between both practitioners and researchers in institutions related to Soviet diplomacy. Indeed, gatherings on planning Soviet foreign policy grew in prominence in terms of defining a new approach. The philosophy professor Aleksej Šestopal recalls how, when he was a PhD candidate, he used to attend the seminar organised by Ermolenko with his friend Boris Starostin, another MGIMO graduate and PhD student. It is precisely here where he met Tûlin. Their meetings were not restricted to Ermolenko's seminars, however:

After getting acquainted, [Vanâ Tûlin] and I began to meet at exhibitions, concerts, and premieres, where he often appeared with his mother Natalâ Ivanovna. A shared circle of acquaintances was formed – it was not only a circle of international relations employees, but also young musicians and artists. Soon Tûlin became a graduate student and chief assistant to Ermolenko, holding seminars on modelling international relations at the MID and conducting meetings at the sections of international relations in the Sociological Association and Philosophical Society headed by Dmitrij Vladimirovič. During the same years, Ivan worked as an assistant to the MGIMO rector. So, when he defended the PhD thesis, he became the head of the Problem Laboratory of System Analysis of International Relations: he already knew everyone and everyone knew him.⁹⁸⁰

Šestopal's statements are interesting for many reasons. First, the philosopher gives an overview of the variety of places and people engaged in the discussion about planning foreign diplomacy. Discussions took place at the MID and MGIMO, but also at the Soviet Association of Sociology and among Soviet philosophers. However, these talks were not limited to the professional sphere. Connections between participants in these meeting were deeply inscribed in the private sphere too: Šestopal's mention of Tûlin's mother and their attendance at cultural events in the capital is an enlightening

⁹⁸⁰ Šestopal's statements about Tûlin are quoted in Čečevišnikov, '40 Let IMI', 236.

example of how professional and personal ties were intertwined. Just as time outside the Institute played an important role in fostering a sense of identity among the students enrolled at MGIMO, a similar phenomenon took place after graduation. Lastly, Šestopal gives a rather deep overview of how Tûlin managed to develop his knowledge of institutional structures and networks at MGIMO, IMEMO, and in the Soviet diplomatic apparatus: this he did by being an assistant to Lebedev and Ermolenko's PhD student simultaneously.

In their strategy to develop a new approach, both professional and personal ties were of paramount importance. In horizontal terms, professional and personal ties favoured unity among a group of researchers dedicated to the same goal. Vertically speaking, the offspring of many high-ranking state and party officials who graduated from MGIMO and occupied key positions in the MID, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the Central Committee during the 1970s were effective relays for propagating a new approach in foreign affairs. The professional trajectories of laboratory members, some of whom, like Zlobin and Hrystalëv, had experience in the Soviet secret services, certainly helped them to make contacts in the KGB. Hrystalëv also admits that the introduction of a course dedicated to IR theory in the MGIMO curriculum in 1973 would have not been possible without the authority of Inozemcev, who played a decisive role in its 'legalisation'.

In the middle of the 1970s, the efforts of practitioners and researchers soon coalesced into a major initiative. Hrystalëv claimed that, in 1975, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB supported the foundation of a research laboratory at MGIMO in order to provide the Soviet authorities with decision-making tools.⁹⁸¹ However, in terms of raising consciousness about the need for a new structure, the key figure was not a *meždunarodnik* but the mathematician and physician Vladislav Tihomirov: he became the first director of the laboratory in 1976.

In the foundation of the new laboratory, Tihomirov's influence is described as being particularly important. Hrystalëv argues that his connection with Brezhnev's military advisors and his prior career within the Soviet military-industrial complex were

⁹⁸¹ Hrystalëv, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', 121.

decisive factors.⁹⁸² However, Tihomirov had at his disposal other, more symbolic resources. He was the first head of the department of mathematical methods and information technology at MGIMO, a post he held between 1975 and 1978.⁹⁸³ The belief in the CPSU that computer programs with near-human intelligence would soon be created provided advantageous soil for proposing a new approach based on mathematical methods. Hrustalëv recalls how this specific belief in progress in the natural sciences mattered at this time:

There was a massive penetration of the natural sciences into the social ones. The specialists who came from the natural sciences thought that the mathematical approach they knew would solve all the problems by itself.⁹⁸⁴

Thanks to Tihomirov's voluntarism, Minister Elûtin, in a letter dated on 30 March 1976 to Gromyko, finally agreed to the foundation of a laboratory for systems analysis at MGIMO.⁹⁸⁵ He detailed that the laboratory's activities would be based on the following directions:

- the investigation of the use of systems analysis and quantitative methods in the preparation of the data for making more informed decisions in the field of international relations, with the aim of reducing the level of uncertainty in the assessment of the expected consequences of these decisions;
- the use of expert evaluations in the field of political forecasting, their use in solving problems related to the assessment of the political situation in capitalist and developing countries;
- the assessment of the political background for the development of scientific, technological, and political cooperation with foreign countries;

⁹⁸² Ibid.

⁹⁸³ Zaveduûsim kafedroj matematičeskikh metodov i informacionnyh tehnologij MGIMO.

⁹⁸⁴ Hrustalev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]', 127.

⁹⁸⁵ A copy of Elûtin's letter to Gromyko is available at the MGIMO museum and on the following website: 'Istoriâ Sozdaniâ - Institut Meždunarodnyh Issledovanij MGIMO [History of the Foundation of the MGIMO Institute of International Studies]', accessed 5 January 2017, <http://imi.mgimo.ru/ru/ob-institute/istoriya-sozdaniya.html>.

- studying the experience of the use of modern research methods in international relations and the use of computer technology in the training of foreign affairs personnel abroad.

In order N°506, dated 11 May 1976, Rector Lebedev finally endorsed the creation of the laboratory.⁹⁸⁶ Tihomirov became its first director: the new structure was assigned a group of ten researchers.⁹⁸⁷

An applied approach of international relations: sources of inspiration, research agenda, and the development of new schemas

In 1978, Tihomirov joined the United Nations and was replaced by Tûlin as head of the research laboratory. Marina Lebedeva summarises the key issues of these first years as being in line with the ‘contemporary methods of analysis’ developed in the USA at this time: however, they sought neither to simply copy from the West nor to conduct a critique solely from a Marxist viewpoint. According to Lebedeva, this situation resulted in the development of new research themes, such as the utilisation of quantitative methods in research on foreign affairs, the study of international negotiations, and the emergence of comparative studies on regional conflicts.⁹⁸⁸

The two books edited by Ivan Tûlin and other members of the laboratory in 1982 (*Analytical Methods and Techniques in the Research on International Relations* and *Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations*) permit us to identify in detail the works available to MGIMO scholars at the end of the Brezhnev era and how they affected research practices and interests within the laboratory.⁹⁸⁹

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁷ The primary party organisation records mention that the laboratory was assigned a group of ten researchers when it was founded. However, in May 1977, 13 researchers were affiliated with it. Protokoly zasedanij partijnogo komiteta MGIMO, [Transcripts of the meetings of the MGIMO party committee], 18/05/1977, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 2, delo 36, 92.

⁹⁸⁸ Lebedeva, ‘Mirovaâ Politika Kak Nauka I Učebnaâ Disciplina: Škola MGIMO [World Politics as a Science and an Academic Discipline: The MGIMO School]’, 97.

⁹⁸⁹ The format of the quotations has been especially conserved from their sources of origin.

Table 15: The foreign literature quoted in Analytical Methods and Techniques in the Research on International Relations and Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations

Foreign literature quoted in <i>Analytical Methods and Techniques in the Research on International Relations</i> (1982)	Foreign literature quoted in <i>Lenin and the Dialectics of Contemporary International Relations</i> (1982)
B. Azar, J. Ben-Dak, eds. Theory and Practice in Events Research, N.Y., 1975.	D. McLellan, W. C. Olson [and] F. A. Sondermann, «The theory and practice of international relations», New York, 1974
Ch. Hermann, M. Hermann. CREON: Comparative Research on the Events of Nations, «Quarterly Report», Mershon Center, vol. 1, N°3, 1976	K. London, The Soviet Impact on World Politics. New York, 1978, p. 56.
Ch. McLelland. The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises». International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research». N.Y. 1972	P. Hill-Norton. No Soft Options. The Political-Military Realities of NATO, London, 1978, p. 16.
K. Goldmann. Tensions and Détente in Bipolar Europe. Stockholm, 1974.	M. Görtmaker. Die unheilige Allianz. Die Geschichte der Entspannungspolitik, 1943-1979, München, p. 191.
A. Legault, J. Stein, J. Sigler, B. Steinberg. L'analyse comparative des conflits internationaux dyadiques (CADIC). «Etudes internationales», VOL. IV, N°4, December, 1973.	T. Larson. Soviet-American Rivalry, New York, 1978, p. 284
D. Frei, D. Ruloff. Measurement of Détente in Europe. Universität Zürich: Kleine Studien zur Politischen Wissenschaft. Nr. 139, 1979	Is America Becoming Number 2. Current Trends in The U.S - Soviet Military Balance. Washington, 1978, p. 25.
Th. Sloan. The Development of Cooperation and Conflict International Scales. Theory and Practice in Events Research, pp. 29-37.	W. Ascher. Forecasting. An appraisal for policy and Planners. Baltimore. The Jones Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 109.
P.T Hopmen, T.C Smith Soviet-American Interactions in the Test Ban Negotiations 1962-1963. In: The Negotiations Process. N.U. 1978, p. 149-174.	L. Rubin, L. Brown. The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. NY, 1975.
J. Raser Simulation and Society. An Exploration of Scientific Gaming. - Boston, 1972.	I. Pruitt, D. Kimmel. Twenty years of experimental gaming: critique synthesis and succession for future. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 1977, 26, pp. 363-392.
C. Abt. Serious Games. - N-Y, 1970.	I. F. Barry «Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Societies» in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evenston, 1966, p. 169.
D. Druckman. Understanding the Operation of Complex Social System. Some uses of Simulation Design. - Simulation and Games, 1971, N°2.	I. P. Newstadt, Presidential Power. Harvard University, 1960, p. 22.
L. Finkelstein, P.K M'Pherson. SAFEX: An international crisis game, - London, 1977.	J. Herbers. Nixon's Presidency: Centralized Control. «The New York Times», March 6, 1973.
R. Dawson, Simulation in Social Science. - In: Simulation in Social Science, Ed. by H. Guetzkow, N.Y., 1962.	H. Kissinger B. Brodie. Bureaucracy, Politics and Strategy. Los Angeles, 1968, p. 4.
J. Robinson, L. Anderson, M. Hermann, R. Snyder. Teaching with Science Review, - 1966, vol. LX, N°1.	I. Destler. Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy. Princeton, 1972, p. 64.
P. McFarlane Simulation as a Social Psychological Research sites: Methodological advantage-Simulation and Games, 1971, N°2.	M. Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, 1975, N, p. 6.

When considering the foreign literature quoted in the books, one can stress three main aspects.

Firstly, despite the Iron Curtain, a very similar set of research questions were raised in the USSR and in Western countries. The threat of a nuclear war created a kind of global context for researchers: so, despite their Soviet background, MGIMO scholars had a very similar interest in the regulation of conflicts and negotiations to that of their Western counterparts. Obviously, both Soviet and Western scholars shared a commitment to exploring new analytical tools and a determination to serve both peace and their states' interests in the Cold War. This global context is also rather clear when we consider the geographical origins of the publications quoted: even though American research was clearly dominant, mentions of British, German, and Canadian studies reveal a shared interest between researchers from different nations in a common topic.

Secondly, among the pieces of literature quoted, two subgenres seem to have particularly piqued the interest of MGIMO scholars: studies on bureaucracy and on negotiations. As with their American counterparts, the MGIMO scholars sought to open the black box of making foreign policy. The mention of Destler's and Halperin's works about the bureaucracy and its role in decision-making demonstrates this clearly.⁹⁹⁰ There was obvious continuity in the interest in Allison's study.⁹⁹¹ That negotiations were also of interest to MGIMO scholars is revealed by the use of Rubin and Brown's study about the social psychology of bargaining and negotiations⁹⁹² and Hopmann and Smith's analysis of the test ban negotiations.⁹⁹³

Thirdly, the foreign literature quoted reveals the transfer of methodological practices from Western scholars, with specific attention paid to simulation and modelling. Mentions of Druckman's study and Dawson's chapter in the book edited by Guetzkow about simulation in the social sciences are demonstrative of the search for

⁹⁹⁰ I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform*, Princeton Paperbacks ; 320 (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1974); Morton H. Halperin, *National Security Policy-Making: Analyses, Cases, and Proposals* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1975).

⁹⁹¹ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*; One may be surprised that Richard Neustadt does not appear in the foreign literature quoted by MGIMO scholars. Richard Elliott Neustadt, *Presidential Power: With Afterword on J.F.K.* (New York, NY u.a.: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1968).

⁹⁹² Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation* (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

⁹⁹³ P.T Hopmann and T.C Smith, 'An Application of a Richardson Process Model: Soviet-American Interactions in Test Ban Negotiations 1962-1963', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (1977): 701-26.

new methods of analysis aimed at modelling international relations.⁹⁹⁴ Lebedeva recalls that MGIMO scholars had made the methodologies of both event analysis (*ivent-analiz*) and cognitive cartography (*kognitivnoe kartirovanie*) their own when *Analytical Methods and Techniques in the Research on International Relations* was published in 1982.

Nonetheless, the influence of Marxism, especially on the structuralist dimensions of the new studies, should not be disguised by the presence of foreign literature. In the two books, quotations from the works of Lenin, Marx, Engels, and Brezhnev, along with articles from *Pravda* and research by Soviet scholars, are numerous and surpassed references to foreign studies. One can assume that this was strategic: the need for new tools in foreign affairs analysis was legitimised by keeping with an older Marxist-Leninist tradition. However, the very belief that, upon defining a set of scientific laws based on the correct choice of factors, one could predict the future of foreign affairs through modelling and simulation shares obvious common points with Marxism.

The surge of interest among Soviet scholars for modelling was certainly not alien to Marxism; indeed, the common points seen between the works of Marx and the development of quantitative models in the Western social sciences certainly made the transfer of these methods easier. In their chapter on the methodology of forecasting in foreign affairs, Kožemâkov and Tûlin⁹⁹⁵ quoted numerous Soviet scholars who had developed new approaches based on modelling in various social sciences in the 1970s. As well as Ermolenko's and Pozdnâkov's books,⁹⁹⁶ one finds the same interest for models in philosophical and historical works written by Soviet scholars at Moscow State University and the Soviet Academy of Sciences: Igor Blauberg and

⁹⁹⁴ D. Druckman, 'Understanding the Operation of Complex Social Systems: Some Uses of Simulation', *Simulation & Games* 2 (1971): 173–95; Harold Steere Guetzkow, Philip Kotler, and Randall L. Schultz, *Simulation in Social and Administrative Science: Overviews and Case-Examples* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

⁹⁹⁵ Aleksej Kožemâkov and Ivan Tûlin, 'Nekotorye Voprosy Metodologii Naučnogo Prognozirovaniâ Vnešnej Politiki I Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Some Questions about the Methodology of Scientific Forecasting of Foreign Policy and International Relations]', in *Analtičeskie Metody I Metodiki v Issledovanij Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij Sobornik Naučnyh Trudov* (Moskva: MGIMO, 1982), 5–27.

⁹⁹⁶ Dmitrij Ermolenko, *Sociologičeskije Problemy Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Sociology and the Problems of International Relations]*, Meždunarodnye otnošenija (Moskva, 1977); Èl'giz Pozdnâkov, *Sistemnyj Podhod I Meždunarodnye Otnošenija [The Systemic Approach and International Relations]*, Meždunarodnoe otnošenje, 1976.

Èrik Ŭdin,⁹⁹⁷ Avenir Uemov,⁹⁹⁸ Zaid Orudžev,⁹⁹⁹ and Ivan Koval'čenko.¹⁰⁰⁰ Obviously, the influence of modelling went well beyond the analysis of foreign affairs.

On another level, what makes the research conducted at MGIMO laboratory distinct from foreign studies on negotiation and bureaucracy was the concept of 'system' used to analyse both negotiations and decision-making in diplomacy. In their chapter, Aleksandr Kožemâkov and Ivan Tûlin wrote:

In Marxist literature, the term 'systematic approach' is commonly understood to mean a set of principles and provisions of a theoretical and methodological nature oriented towards objects in the form of systems (i.e. a set of elements related to interactions and therefore acting as a single unity) and giving the opportunity to identify multiple connections and relationships both inside the system under study and the system in relation with its external environment, operation, and development.¹⁰⁰¹

Because of the central place occupied by the notion of system, an analogy could be drawn with some works developed by the American Realist School at approximately the same time (especially Kenneth Waltz's approach).¹⁰⁰² Nevertheless, both the focus on decision-making and negotiations and the choice of factors taken into account when modelling systems reveal again the place of Marxism:

The approach to the assessment and influence of the factors that should be taken into consideration in the decision-making process changed significantly. Sometimes the picture of interconnection and interdependence of the factors taken into consideration is so different from the traditional one in the field of foreign policy that it creates the image of an avalanche in the sphere in which the people taking

⁹⁹⁷ Igor Blauberg and Èrik Ŭdin, *Stanovlenie I Sušnost' Sistmnogo Podhoda* [*The Formation and the Essence of the Systemic Approach*], Nauka (Moskva, 1973).

⁹⁹⁸ Avenir Uemov, *Sistemnyj Podhod I Obšaâ Teoriâ System* [*The Systemic Approach and the Global Theory of System*] (Moskva, 1978).

⁹⁹⁹ Zaid Orudžev, *Orudžev Zaid Dialektika Kak Sistema* [*Dialectics as a System*] (Moskva, 1973).

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ivan Koval'čenko, 'O Modelirovanii Istoričeskikh Âvlenij I Procesov [About Modelling Historical Events and Processes]', *Voprosy Istorii*, no. 8 (1978).

¹⁰⁰¹ Kožemâkov and Tûlin, 'Nekotorye Voprosy Metodologii Naučnogo Prognozirovaniâ Vnešnej Politiki I Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Some Questions about the Methodology of Scientific Forecasting in Foreign Policy and International Relations]', 9.

¹⁰⁰² Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw-Hill, 1979).

foreign policy decisions operate. A country, region, continent, regional international system as a whole, block of nations, inter-state union, government and its individual members, political parties of the country, their programme and tactics, national features, positions of social groups, individual branches of the economy, military issues – this is not a complete list of the ‘coordinate system’ in whose framework political leaders select targets while taking their decisions.¹⁰⁰³

The list of factors identified by Kožemâkov and Tûlin is rather impressive. It includes geographical criteria, socioeconomic factors, collective and individual actors, and elements related to tactics and strategies. It is within this hybrid framework, based on both Soviet research doused in Marxism-Leninism (and more precisely structuralism) and foreign literature about bureaucracy, negotiations, and quantitative methods, that research at the MGIMO laboratory was conducted.

When considering the scope of the research interests on the agenda of MGIMO scholars, one can find a variety of themes: the correct foreign policy to adopt after the overthrow of the Iranian shah’s regime in 1979, Soviet diplomatic negotiations with South Africa and Zimbabwe, the conduct of diplomatic negotiations in the framework of the CSCE, the place of the USSR at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the conduct of political leaders in history, such as the strategy employed by Bismarck for the unification of Germany and Kennedy’s behaviour during the Cuban missile crisis.

On the laboratory’s agenda, the weight of orders received from the MID was obvious. Hrustalev argues that, just before the Gorbachev era, the laboratory began to increase in size as the number of orders from the MID became ever more numerous. He states that there was a project to predict the development of the situation in Iran after the overthrow of the shah in 1979, ‘at a time when it wasn’t clear for the MID which line was advisable in the Iranian issue’.¹⁰⁰⁴ According to him, researchers defended the position that ‘the Mullah regime’ in Teheran was stable and that it was useless to

¹⁰⁰³ Kožemâkov and Tûlin, ‘Nekotorye Voprosy Metodologii Naučnogo Prognozirovaniâ Vnešnej Politiki I Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Some Questions about the Methodology of Scientific Forecasting in Foreign Policy and International Relations]’, 9.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Hrustalev, ‘Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]’, 122.

enter into a conflict with them concerning the repression of the Tudeh Party (the Iranian communist party).¹⁰⁰⁵

The fact that members of the research laboratory dealt with the burning diplomatic issues of the times is not surprising when we consider the exchange of cadres between MGIMO and the MID. Besides the use of foreign and Soviet literature, an important factor in the elaboration of new analytical tools for the study of foreign policy was the concrete experience the researchers obtained during missions overseas. In October 1980, Nikolaj Nikulin, secretary of the MGIMO primary party organisation, pointed out how such exchanges were a common practice that enriched the analysis of the research laboratory. He declared:

I would like to mention the strengthening of the ties in the scientific work of the Institute with the practical needs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, which is especially true for the faculty of international law and civil law. A number of teachers are involved in consultations, making reports, and participating in international conferences. A very important role belongs to the research laboratory of the Institute, which, during the reported period, has shifted from development of sometimes abstract schemes to the implementation of specific tasks in close contact with the USSR MID department of the planning for external political events. A number of original models and techniques with practical applications have been developed.¹⁰⁰⁶

As with the reading foreign literature, short missions or longer stays overseas mattered in the choice of the research agenda. Even though the MID and the KGB had a major influence on the agenda at the laboratory through their orders, one may observe how several members probably benefitted from their personal ties when developing their own research interests.

Among the members of the research laboratory, the spouses Lebedev are a revealing example of the importance of experiences gained abroad and how they were deeply inscribed into career trajectories between administrative and research structures. At first sight, Vladimir Lebedev seems to have had a very negligible impact on the

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Stenogramma otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii MGIMO, [Minutes of the MGIMO report-election party conference] 22/10/1980, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 2, delo 494, 89.

research. He graduated from MGIMO in 1980 and worked at the laboratory for just a year before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He did not publish an article in the two books edited by Tûlin in 1982. However, Vladimir was also Marina Lebedeva's husband, and his diplomatic missions to Africa (at the Soviet embassies to Zimbabwe between 1981 and 1984 and South Africa between 1991 and 1996) were of considerable significance.¹⁰⁰⁷ At the very same time as when he was engaged as a Soviet diplomat in the question of preventing and regulating conflicts in Africa, his wife worked on the question of conflict regulation, strategies, and negotiation tactics at the research laboratory. Here again, the importance of the intertwining of professional and personal ties in the creation of new approaches to foreign affairs is obvious.

Among the research topics developed by members of the laboratory at the end of the Brezhnev era, two are worth emphasising: the modelling of decision-making at an individual level and the modelling of negotiation strategies. Firstly, these two research directions reflect the originality of the research approach adopted by scholars at the laboratory. Secondly, they are also among the pieces of work available compared to most of the research elaborated at this time for the MID.

In their chapter in *Analytical Methods and Techniques in the Research on International Relations* in 1982, Vadim Lukov and Viktor Sergeev proposed 'an attempt to create indicators of conflict and cooperation in international affairs' based on a historical analysis of German ruling circles during the Franco-Prussian War.¹⁰⁰⁸ The two scholars reconstructed the strategy employed by Bismarck via his memoirs. They identified no less than 40 points in Bismarck's thinking patterns and developed the following scheme:¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁷ A short biography of Lebedev is available on the following website: 'Rukovodstvo MDS', accessed 10 January 2017, <http://www.mosds.ru/about/leaders/>.


¹⁰⁰⁸ Vadim Lukov and Viktor Sergeev, 'Opyt Postroeniâ Indikatorov Konflikta I Sotrudničestva v Meždunarodnyh Otnošeníah [An Attempt to Create Indicators of Conflict and Cooperation in International Affairs]', in *Analitičeskie Metody I Metodiki v Issledovanii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij Sbornik Naučnyh* (Moskva: MGIMO Universitet, 1982), 74–84.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid., 83–84.

Table 16: The 40 points in Bismarck's thinking patterns

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensuring the national unity of Germany. 2. Overcoming the resistance of France. 3. The avoidance of conflicts inside Germany. 4. Restoring the title of German emperor. 5. Undermining the influence of Austria in the German league. 6. Creating abroad the impression of Prussia's state power. 7. The weakening of Bavarian and Saxon autonomy. 8. The creation of the North German Confederation. 9. The defeat of France by blitzkrieg. 10. Avoiding the territorial reorganisation of the German principalities. 11. Saving monarchical titles in the German principalities. 12. Restricting the use of military force within Germany. 13. The military defeat of Austria. 14. Delaying the resolution of internal issues. 15. Deprivation of their allies against Prussia. 16. Combining Eastern and Western Prussia. 17. Seizure of Paris. 18. The accumulation of military forces. 19. Isolating France from potential allies. 20. Prolonging the war. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 21. The growing influence of England on public opinion on the continent. 22. The intervention of neutral powers in the war. 23. The impact of British propaganda on Wilhelm's wife. 24. The conflict within Germany. 25. Preventing an Austro-French alliance. 26. Preventing a Russo-French alliance. 27. Preventing an Italian-French alliance. 28. The limitation of the Austro-Prussian War in terms of time and objectives. 29. Concluding a favourable peace for Austria. 30. Prussia's support for the abolition of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris by Russia. 31. The support for anti-French sentiments of the republicans in Italy. 32. Preventing the growth of the national liberation movement in Eastern Europe. 33. Saving the Austrian state. 34. French resistance to German unification. 34a. The opposition of France to the establishment of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Spain. 35. The probability of British support for Prussia in the war against France. 36. Russia's reaction to the possibility of Prussian victory in the war against France. 37. Italy's reaction to the Franco-Prussian war. 38. The support for Catholics in Germany. 39. Discrediting the North German Confederation as a power guarantor of Prussia. 40. The humiliation of Prussia in case of non-support of...¹⁰¹⁰
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¹⁰¹⁰ The end of the sentence is unreadable in the original source.



What is particularly striking in Lukov and Sergeev's study is the impressive ability of the two scholars to list a large quantity of highly distinct factors in Bismarck's decision-making while simultaneously mapping them onto a schema. On the one hand, the idea of being able to determine the future with a scientific approach based on the choice of relevant factors weighted according to their importance is obvious. To some extent, the two scholars' study is within a Marxist tradition which puts emphasis on both structures and aims in forecasting. Representing Bismarck's thinking through a model is demonstrative of this fact. On the other hand, there is a total absence of socioeconomic factors in the schema; equally, there is no mention of the working class or the peasantry. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case: the two

scholars clearly privileged factors based on inter-state relations (*ensuring the national unity of Germany; overcoming the resistance of France; undermining the influence of Austria in the German league*), their interests (*the weakening of Bavarian and Saxon autonomy; concluding a favourable peace for Austria*), the role of individuals (*Wilhelm's wife*), and collective actors ranged according to their nationality (*the support for anti-French sentiments of the republicans in Italy; support for Catholics in Germany*).

In addition to this 1982 model of Bismarck's thinking, Sergeev, Zagorskij, and Lebedeva conducted research on negotiations, which they also understood as a model.

The context helped. Sergeev stresses that when he joined the laboratory in 1978, he was advised by Tûlin to analyse 'negotiations as a process' and to identify 'critical moments'.¹⁰¹¹ This demand was related to the preparation for the Madrid Conference in 1980, which required the elaboration of new analytical tools. The experience of the Helsinki Conference in 1975 and the analysis of MID reports were of particular significance in the development of new schemas. In contrast to the model of Bismarck's thinking, which aimed to list exhaustively the different factors which influenced his decisions, modelling negotiations helped to reduce the process to two major points. Sergeev explains:

We started with the analysis of the situation in the negotiations on the Helsinki Decalogue.¹⁰¹² This analysis defined two key points in the huge volume of negotiations: the inviolability of borders and human rights. We found that there was an exchange for these items and that a package deal was brewing. The concession of the West of the former followed for the concession of the USSR of the latter. We prepared a large and detailed report to the MID, which was highly appreciated.¹⁰¹³

Lebedeva gives details about how the model elaborated for the Helsinki Conference was utilised to analyse other negotiations, which resulted in the establishment of a theoretical model in the form of a matrix. Here again one finds the influence of structuralism, as negotiations are conceived as 'a system defined according to the

¹⁰¹¹ Abstract of Sergeev's memoirs are in Čečevišnikov, '40 Let IMI', 236.

¹⁰¹² The Helsinki Decalogue refers to the Final Act's catalogue of principles, adopted in 1975.

¹⁰¹³ Čečevišnikov, '40 Let IMI', 236.

goals of each participant, the proposals that each actor received, and how they perceived them'.¹⁰¹⁴ The matrix sought to define the positions of actors during the negotiations, to understand how they might evolve or not, and to define which points rendered the result of negotiations successful or not. As with the Bismarck model, this led to the formation of a hierarchy of the interests and goals of each participant: this was organised by identifying the various aims they principally pursued and the constraints they faced.

Both the Bismarck model and the negotiation matrix reveal that researchers at the laboratory were quite successful in turning the international context to their advantage in order to pursue their research interests between 1976 and 1984. Obviously, their research had little to do with the orthodox Marxism-Leninism officially proclaimed at that time. Yet, it had also little in common with Gorbachev's New Thinking.

A multiplicity of paths on the eve of the Gorbachev era: New Thinking as one alternative among many

Although several American scholars of Soviet history have argued that MGIMO was an incubator of New Thinking, a 'think tank'¹⁰¹⁵ for Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, an analysis of the rather considerable amount of literature published in Russia after 1991 reveals a striking gap: the positions adopted by studies on the New Thinking diverge fundamentally from the research of several MGIMO scholars and their retrospective accounts of their own practices. Compared to some of the researchers enrolled at IMEMO and the Institute for US and Canadian Studies who paved the way for Gorbachev's New Thinking,¹⁰¹⁶ MGIMO scholars, who based their research on a systemic and applied approach of foreign affairs, distinguished themselves in three main ways: their perception of perestroika, their relationship to research, and the place of their work in the intellectual debate prior to perestroika.

In recent studies that deal with the history of international relations as an academic field in the USSR, Russian scholars have generally not labelled MGIMO as a natural

¹⁰¹⁴ Lebedeva, 'Mirovaâ Politika Kak Nauka I Učebnaâ Disciplina: Škola MGIMO [World Politics as a Science and an Academic Discipline: The MGIMO School]', 103.

¹⁰¹⁵ Umland, 'Review'.

¹⁰¹⁶ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*; English, 'The Sociology of New Thinking'; Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change - Soviet/ Russian Behaviour and the End of the Cold War*.

breeding ground for the New Thinking. By stressing that, rather than a binary analysis between ‘Old and New Thinking’, other categories such as ‘realism and liberalism’ or ‘applied and theoretical research’ are more suitable for describing the diversity of views in IR studies during the 1970s and 80s, they highlight that the New Thinking was not the only route in 1985.

In their study on the sociology of international relations, Pavel and Andrej Cygankov argue that Gorbachev’s New Thinking strongly differed from the ‘historical-systemic trend’ (*sistemno istoretičeskoe tečenie*) that characterised several works by MIGMO scholars written during the Détente.¹⁰¹⁷ They state that even though Gorbachev’s New Thinking and historical systemic approaches were both deeply rooted in the Marxist framework of global thinking, they were based on divergent paradigms. While the New Thinking marked Gorbachev’s evolution from ‘official Soviet Marxism’ to ‘European social democracy’ and asserted a set of ‘liberal values’ such as the interdependency of nations, universalism, and democratisation as elements of Kant’s perpetual peace, ‘the historical-systemic trend’ at MGIMO had since the 1970s stood for a realist approach of international relations. They convincingly conclude that assumptions about the role of material factors, state interests, and structures had little to do with Gorbachev’s New Thinking, which was not a hegemonic view at MGIMO.¹⁰¹⁸

In line with the Cygankovs’ study, Hrustalëv sheds new light on the plurality of approaches in international relations on the eve of the Gorbachev era. According to him, starting from the 1970s, scholarly research was divided into two branches in the USSR. At IMEMO, researchers played a major role in the importation of new ideas from capitalist countries and became specialists in the ‘critique of bourgeois theories’; meanwhile, MGIMO scholars focused on applied research in international relations. By stressing that MGIMO was a centre of analytical and forecast studies, Hrustalëv’s

¹⁰¹⁷ Andrej Cygankov and Pavel Cygankov, *Sociologiâ Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij: Analiz Rossijskikh I Zapadnyh Toerij* [The Sociology of Internal Relations: Analyses of Russian and Western Theories], Aspekt Press (Moskva, 2008), 18; See also: Pavel Cygankov, *Političeskaâ sociologiâ meždunarodnyh otnošenij* [The Political Sociology of International Relations], Radiks (Moskva, 1994).

¹⁰¹⁸ Aleksej Bogaturov, ‘Realističeskaâ Tendenciâ v Rossijskoj Teorii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij [Realism in the Russian Theory of International Relations]’, *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Sociologiâ i politologiâ*, no. 3 (2003).

statements suggest that the Institute was neither a bastion of Gorbachev's supporters nor a stronghold of orthodox Marxism-Leninism.¹⁰¹⁹

Among the scholars most critical of Gorbachev's New Thinking, one finds the former director of the laboratory Tûlin. He writes:

Very soon [after Gorbachev's ascent to power] the flow of new approaches and concepts virtually dried up, the opportunities for the self-development of science decreased. Dogmatism demonstrated great vitality, hiding under new masks. Thus, the dogma of 'irreconcilable class struggle in the world politics' was replaced by the priority of 'universal human interests'. In the past, it was believed that universal harmony could be achieved with the help of the worldwide triumph of socialism and communism. Henceforth, such a harmony was seen as 'a world free of nuclear weapons and violence'.¹⁰²⁰

Tûlin's critique of the New Thinking is harsh: the scholar stresses that it was just a new dogma, similar in many points to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. He continues his analysis by stressing the relationship between researchers and politics in the emergence of the New Thinking:

It should be noted that 'the New Thinking' in Soviet foreign policy was an act of political will by the Party and state leadership, instilled by the political into the academic community, although, to some extent, it was prepared by the latter in a 'closed manner'. [...] Such approaches caused the fair criticism of a number of experts who stressed that the goal of the New Thinking was to awaken a new political consciousness that the antithesis of such thinking was not old 'thinking' but a critical and creative attitude to reality. The same critics noted that the New Thinking, after destroying the old scheme, didn't move ahead in developing effective instruments in foreign policy to provide it with constructiveness and dynamism.

Tûlin does not deny the impact of the Soviet academic community on the maturation of Gorbachev's New Thinking. Yet, at the same time, he makes it clear how expertise in foreign affairs was at the centre of a domestic struggle between different groups of

¹⁰¹⁹ Hrustalev, 'Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]'.

¹⁰²⁰ Tûlin, 'Issledovaniâ Mezhdunarodnyh Otnošenij v Rossii', 398.

researchers engaged in the definition of both the aims and the means of Soviet diplomacy.¹⁰²¹

The Cygankovs, Hrustalev, and Tûlin all stress that the new approaches developed within the MGIMO laboratory had little to do with Gorbachev's New Thinking. They convincingly argue that the opposite of the New Thinking was not 'Old Thinking', since both remained indebted to Marxist dogma. They demonstrate the political dimension of the New Thinking by arguing that it was not a scientific or rational way to conduct foreign affairs.

In retrospect, what may seem particularly surprising is the fact that American and Western European intellectual histories of Gorbachev's New Thinking make no mention of the existence of the MGIMO laboratory or its research during the Brezhnev era.¹⁰²² Clearly, MGIMO and its researchers do not fit into the binary categories of old and new thinkers on which Robert English's study is based. Tûlin did not recognise himself as a new thinker, but yet he can be hardly defined as an old thinker, a category presented by English in Manichean terms as made up of 'elites ill-educated, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic, who belonged to successive waves of *vydvizhensty* largely drawn from Russia's rural masses.'¹⁰²³

More importantly, the silence of the Western literature is also related to the place of the laboratory among other research institutions dedicated to foreign affairs. Cherkasov has stated that 24 specialised units (*specializirovanye gruppy*) with no less than 175 scientific collaborators (*nauçnye sotrudniki*) were in charge of preparing economic forecasts on major Western countries as early as 1967.¹⁰²⁴ In comparison,

¹⁰²¹ The relationship between a domestic competition among various experts from the same nationality and the international arena is particularly well developed in Sandrine Kott's study on experts at the International Labour Organization: Sandrine Kott, 'Une "communauté Épistémique" Du Social ? Experts de l'OIT et Internationalisation Des Politiques Sociales Dans L'entre-Deux Guerres', *Genèses* 71, no. 2 (n.d.): 26–46.

¹⁰²² Exceptions exist, even though they concern literature about negotiations during Cold War: in his book dedicated to Russian negotiating strategies, Paul Bennett mentions Lebedeva and Zagorskij's book from 1989 several times. He writes: '[the book] provides an extremely open and honest description of tactics, including negative ones. This publication supports and in a few ways goes beyond the Western literature.' Paul R. Bennett, *Russian Negotiating Strategy: Analytic Case Studies from SALT to START* (Nova Publishers, 1997), 6.

¹⁰²³ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 121.

¹⁰²⁴ Cherkasov, *IMÈMO*, 260.

the MGIMO research laboratory was a dwarf: it never included more than 15 to 20 researchers.

Coupled with this situation is the fact that the research conducted at MGIMO was subject to clear rules of circulation. Pavel Cygankov points out that before the Gorbachev era, the nomenclature of Soviet science in international relations had three main levels. One of them was ‘intended to serve the regime’s practical foreign policy needs (analytical notes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CPSU Central Committee, and other “leading authorities”) and was only for a limited number of organisations and individuals.’ A second ‘was addressed to all the scientific community (to tell the truth, sometimes classified for “Official Use”)’. The third was ‘intended to solve the problems of propaganda regarding “the achievements of the Communist Party of the Soviet State in the field of foreign policy” among the masses.’ Cygankov’s statements are important, as they help us to understand how the three different levels were related to the various ways in which discourses and research about foreign policy circulated within Soviet society.

For researchers at the MGIMO laboratory, however, this way of conducting research had important constraints. The fact that their analytical works (*analitičeskie spravki*) were focused on the analysis of concrete problems and proposed strategic views for the MID had direct consequences on the attractiveness of the laboratory for young scholars. Hrustal’ev argues that ‘the difficulties with personnel soon began. Young talented employees who had already gained a certain level of experience started to look for a more prestigious job.’¹⁰²⁵ Tihomirov’s departure from the laboratory in 1978, after only two years as its head, in order to join the UN Institute of Training and Research Policy Efficiency Studies in Geneva was symbolic of the lack of attractiveness of the laboratory compared to other professional trajectories. Because of the regular contacts researchers had with structures related to Soviet diplomacy, a career at the MID or IMEMO seemed much more promising. Vadim Lukov left the laboratory for a diplomatic career at the MID in 1979. Both Viktor Sergeev in 1978 and Andrej Podberëzkin in 1981 joined institutions related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In terms of salary, a career at the MID, IMEMO, or in international

¹⁰²⁵ Hrustal’ev, ‘Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]’, 122.

relations was much more beneficial for young scholars than staying at MGIMO. On a symbolic level, their research, conducted collectively for a restricted audience, often appeared irreconcilable with their attempt to ‘make a name for themselves’ in the Soviet social sciences.¹⁰²⁶

Obviously, this situation had a concrete effect on the influence of applied studies from MGIMO on the design of perestroika between 1985 and 1991. Compared to the IMEMO and the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies, the laboratory had neither the academic staff nor the publishing house to decisively influence Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Despite the fact that Tûlin, Hrustalëv, Lebedeva, and Zagorskij had spent almost ten years elaborating new negotiation models, they were little used when the USSR became fully engaged in multilateral negotiations after 1985. For the MGIMO researchers in particular and the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge in general, perestroika would come to represent the most significant crisis they had faced since the institution’s creation.

¹⁰²⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Le Champ Scientifique’, *Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales* 2, no. 2 (1976): 100.

PART V
Serving the Party and the State (1985-1991)

In an article entitled *The Pride of Soviet Diplomacy* published on 17 April 1984,¹⁰²⁷ a press release from the TASS agency informed *Pravda* readers that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had awarded 44 members of MGIMO with the Order of the Red Banner of Labour for their achievements in training Soviet diplomats.¹⁰²⁸ The day before in Moscow at the Pillar Hall of the House of the Unions,¹⁰²⁹ a solemn meeting devoted to honouring MGIMO with ‘the highest award of the Homeland’ had been held. The ceremony took place in the presence of several chairmen of the departments of the CPSU Central Committee (Leonid Zamâtin, Boris Stukalin, and Stepan Červonsnko)¹⁰³⁰ and the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Vasilij Kuznecov. During the ceremony, the latter declared:

This reward is recognition of the significant contribution of MGIMO to the implementation of Lenin’s policy in international affairs, strengthening friendship and cooperation between fraternal socialist countries, and the development of mutual understanding among nations. At the same time, it is also a generous assessment of the achievements of MGIMO graduates, who for almost four decades have been working fruitfully on foreign political and economic fronts and representing abroad the socialist way of life, the ideas of communism and peace.¹⁰³¹

With hindsight, Kuznecov’s statements about MGIMO’s bright past and promising future seem highly ironic at best. In the ‘seven years which changed the world’¹⁰³² after Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power on 11 March 1985, the USSR ceased to exist, the Cold War ‘suddenly and surprisingly’¹⁰³³ ended, and MGIMO’s mission to train professional cadres devoted to Marxist-Leninist ideals for the whole socialist block was terminated. In retrospect, what makes TASS’ assumptions particularly ironic is

¹⁰²⁷ TASS, ‘Gordost’ Sovetskoi Diplomatii [The Pride of the Soviet Diplomacy], *Pravda*, 17 July 1984, 3.

¹⁰²⁸ *Orden Trudovogo Kranogo Znameni*. The Order of the Red Banner of Labour was established in 1928 by a decree of the Presidium of the Soviet Supreme to honour great deeds and services to the Soviet state and society.

¹⁰²⁹ The House of the Unions is near Red Square in Moscow.

¹⁰³⁰ At the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Zamâtin was chairman of the International Information Department, Boris Stukalin was chairman of the Propaganda Department, and Stepan Červonsnko was chairman of the Cadres Abroad Department.

¹⁰³¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰³² Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*.

¹⁰³³ Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000*, Updated edition (Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2008); Leon Aron, ‘The “Mystery” of the Soviet Collapse’ 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 21–35.

neither that the *meždunarodniki* knew that the Soviet regime was ‘doomed to disappear’¹⁰³⁴ nor that Gorbachev would fail ‘to reform the unreformable’.¹⁰³⁵ Equally, the irony in the TASS statements is not related to a naïve belief among *meždunarodniki* that nothing needed to change in the Soviet regime: indeed, on the contrary, the research models elaborated at the MGIMO laboratory during the Brezhnev era prove that several *meždunarodniki* were looking for new ways to conduct Soviet diplomacy at the beginning of the 1980s. The irony was that, just two months after being depicted as the pride of Soviet diplomacy, perestroika ushered in the worst crisis in MGIMO’s recent history.

Usually translated as ‘rebuilding’, ‘restructuring’, or ‘revolutionary reform’¹⁰³⁶ of the Soviet regime, the term *perestroika* grew in importance after the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986. Launched by Mikhail Gorbachev between March 1985 and December 1991, the ambitious reform programme was comprised of four main dimensions: an economic aspect, which consisted of introducing free market mechanisms in 1988; a political aspect, which led to the introduction of pluralism in competitive elections after December 1988; transparency in public life, so-called *glasnost*, with the opening of the archives about Stalinism and the loosening of censorship; and last but not least, an international aspect, which meant nothing less than the end of Cold War. This was proclaimed by President George H. Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev during the Malta Summit in 1989 and was manifested by the signature of several disarmament treaties between the USSR and the USA between 1985 and 1991.

More importantly for Soviet diplomacy was the concept of New Thinking (*Novoe myšlenie*), the definition of which causes a specific problem for researchers: it was not developed instantly, as Gorbachev admits himself in his memoirs.¹⁰³⁷ To give a simple definition, New Thinking embraced several novel guidelines about both the

¹⁰³⁴ Martin Malia, ‘Leninist Endgame’, *Daedalus* 121, no. 2 (1 April 1992): 57–75.

¹⁰³⁵ Stephen F. Cohen, ‘Was the Soviet System Reformable?’, *Slavic Review* 63, no. 3 (2004): 459.

¹⁰³⁶ Jean-Paul Scot, *La Russie de Pierre le Grand à nos jours*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2005, p. 208.

¹⁰³⁷ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Gorbachev: On My Country and the World* (Columbia University Press, 2005), 66; Alexander Dallin convincingly argues that ‘there was never a precise or authoritative Soviet enumeration of what, for the foreign policy establishment, were the essential elements of the New Political Thinking’. Alexander Dallin, ‘The Rise of New Thinking on Soviet Foreign Policy’, in *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia*, ed. A. Brown (Springer, 2004), 179.

nature of international relations and the conduct of Soviet diplomacy: the idea that the world was becoming increasingly interdependent; that security must be mutual and based on political instruments in a context where there could be no victors in a mutual nuclear war; and that human interests take precedence over the interests of any particular class.¹⁰³⁸

At MGIMO, ‘New Thinking’s coming to power’¹⁰³⁹ did not bring natural support. Depicted as ‘a storm in a blue sky’ (*grom sredi âsnogo neba*),¹⁰⁴⁰ the Gorbachev era described by Boris Kurbatov is radically distinct from the traditional interpretation given by historians, in which the Institute is described as fertile soil for Gorbachev’s reforms and its graduates as a rather homogeneous group who logically and spontaneously supported perestroika. However, although the elite educational institution was praised in 1984 for its achievements, with the ascent of Gorbachev MGIMO came in for the heaviest criticism. The dismissals of Rector Lebedev and three faculty heads corresponded with the new General Secretary’s desire to renew the diplomatic corps. He assumed that foreign policy had to be pre-eminently defined by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴¹

For *meždunarodniki*, the short rule of Mikhail Gorbachev was a contradictory period: the title of this last part of the dissertation, *Serving the Party and the State*, aims to stress this ambiguity. The very term ‘service’ is once again related to the lexical field of nobility and needs to be explored in relation to the question of loyalty in both history and sociology. As André Berelowitch points out, ‘in the Indo-European world, and even beyond, service to the sovereign is, in theory at least, the *raison d’être* of the nobility. This is not a hollow formula: loyalty towards the monarchy, which in no way prevents independence of thought, occupies an essential place in the noble ways of thinking (*les mentalités nobiliaires*) in Western Europe.’¹⁰⁴² Some scholars, like

¹⁰³⁸ Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State*, 1 edition (New York: Pearson, 1997), 149.

¹⁰³⁹ The expression is from English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 193.

¹⁰⁴⁰ MGIMO Alumni yearbook : *Vypusniki MGIMO MID SSSR 1985-1987*, Moskva, 2007, p.5.

¹⁰⁴¹ Vladimir Samojlengko, *Diplomatičeskâ Služba [Diplomatic Service]*, Norma (Moskva, 2011), 51.

¹⁰⁴² André Berelowitch, *La Hiérarchie des égaux : La noblesse russe d’Ancien Régime, XVIe-XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 175.

Hartmut Rüss, even argue that in the 17th and 18th centuries the Russian nobility found both its roots and its justification in service to the prince (*služiloe dvorânstvo*) and not in land ownership or in blue blood, as was the case in several European countries.¹⁰⁴³ In the present case, the use of the terms ‘service’ and ‘serving’ as heuristic devices enables us to look at MGIMO and *meždunarodniki* between 1985 and 1991 from three different points of view.

First, using the terms ‘service’ or ‘serving’ is aimed at avoiding the moral bias included in the dichotomy between ‘good’, ‘pragmatic’, ‘disinterested’, and ‘pro-Gorbachev’ reformists and the ‘bad’, ‘ideologised’, ‘interested’, and ‘anti-Gorbachev’ conservatives. Certainly, there were individuals and groups who defined themselves as pro- and anti-Gorbachev and whose visions were different. However, ‘perestroika meant different things for different people at different times’.¹⁰⁴⁴ boundaries between pro- and anti-Gorbachev perspectives changed over time, since those who supported him in 1985 might have opposed him after 1988-89. Moreover, different actions and visions do not necessarily mean that both the anti- and pro-Gorbachev factions were not genuinely convinced that they were both serving the Soviet state and the Communist Party between 1985 and 1991. Stressing this important point invites us to reconsider the binary between ‘conservative ideology’ and ‘reformist pragmatism’ traditionally used in studies investigating the role of MGIMO and the *meždunarodniki* in the Gorbachev era.

Secondly, the terms ‘service’ and ‘serving’ are usually employed in the political sciences to emphasise the distinction between the rulers and the higher levels of the state administration or the bureaucracy.¹⁰⁴⁵ Stressing the differences between these two entities helps us to understand where the fractures were and what different ethics, practices, and visions competed to define Soviet state interests between 1985 and

¹⁰⁴³ Hartmut Rüss, *Herren Und Diener: Die Soziale Und Politische Mentalität Des Russischen Adels, 9.-17. Jahrhundert*, Beiträge Zur Geschichte Osteuropas, Bd. 17 (Köln: Böhlau, 1994), 298; For a summary of the discussion about the notion of service as a distinguishing feature of Russian nobility, see: Michaël Confino, ‘A Propos de La Notion de Service Dans La Noblesse Russe Au XVIIIe et XIXe Siècles’, *Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 34, no. 1 (1993): 47–58.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, ix.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Jacques Lagroye, Bastien François, and Frédéric Sawicki, *Sociologie politique* (Paris : Paris: Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz, 2006), 475.

1991.

Thirdly, the expression 'serving the party and the State' brings the question of *meždunarodniki* loyalty to the Party and the state to the fore. Since the foundation of the Institute, *meždunarodniki* were supposed to be devoted both to the Communist Party and the Soviet state: however, for many these two missions seemed highly contradictory after 1988. The variety of reactions related to *meždunarodniki* loyalty might be explored in terms of the works which have followed in the path of Albert Hirschman's famous book *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*.¹⁰⁴⁶ To put it simply, the expression 'service', associated here with the question of loyalty, puts emphasis on how the bureaucracy's traditional mission of ensuring the continuity of the state was confronted by the radical political changes conducted by Gorbachev which led to the collapse of the USSR.

How did *meždunarodniki* serve perestroika at the MID in 1985 and were their visions of both international relations and the Soviet state's interests similar to those of Gorbachev? Why did the MGIMO undergo a crisis between 1985 and 1988 and what does this situation reveal about the conflicting visions about the Soviet state and the Communist Party among the members of the institution? How did the system of party nobility, core to the MGIMO since 1943, suddenly disappear during the Gorbachev era? These are the three main questions of this last part of the dissertation.

Because most of the archives concerning the MGIMO primary party organisation of this time are still unavailable,¹⁰⁴⁷ this final part will be mostly based on retrospective materials, such as interviews and alumni memoirs. The MGIMO student newspaper *Meždunarodnik*, edited by the students of the faculty of international journalism under the control of the members of the primary party organisation, has also been used.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Harvard University Press, 1970).

¹⁰⁴⁷ The files (*dela*) of the fonds of the MGIMO party and Komsomol organisations kept at the Moscow TSAOPIM archives for the period 1985-1991 are all classified documents. The same holds true for the files of the Moscow party organisation (*Gorkom*) for 1985-86. They are inaccessible for a minimum of 30 years. Once this period has expired, researchers will have the opportunity to request their declassification. This allowed me to consult files 343, 344, and 345 of the MGIMO party committee fond (538) for 1986.

Finally, some archival material from the MID and MGIMO primary party organisations from between 1985 and 1987 is now accessible. This fifth part of the thesis is composed of two chapters exploring the implementation of Gorbachev's New Thinking by *meždunarodniki* at the MID and the development of perestroika at MGIMO.

CHAPTER 9

SERVING GORBACHEV

If we say that we lost the Cold War, well, we didn't lose the Cold War to America. We lost the rivalry between the communists and the social democrats to European social democrats.

At the beginning of 20th century, there was a dispute between the social democrats and the communists regarding the right way towards socialism: whether to try and somehow change the system from the inside and make gains there or to make a revolution at once and build a perfect, ideal, good society. It turned out that the communist way worked nowhere, but the democratic path did [work].¹⁰⁴⁸

*MGIMO graduate and former assistant (pomošnik) of the secretary of the Central Committee
Ivan Tarabančik*

It was believed that because of the MID apparatus, its meticulous process of negotiations, and its meticulous analysis of the positions from which it was already impossible to retreat (it was simply an axiom of the MID's behaviour: we had a 'red line' from which we did not back down), many of the breakthrough initiatives of Gorbachev would not have been implemented if Shevardnadze had not given 'the green light'. He did not have a 'red line'. But there always was a 'red line' for any MID professional, and because of this Shevardnadze was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁴⁹

Professor of history at MGIMO Elena Vladimirovna

Much has been written about the factors which pushed Gorbachev to proclaim the need for new political thinking in international relations in the middle of the 1980s. The economic situation of the USSR and the perception of decline made it rather difficult to maintain the military rivalry with the USA.¹⁰⁵⁰ The decline in oil

¹⁰⁴⁸ **Interviewee:** Ivan Tarabančik. **Date:** [25/05/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 44 minutes.

¹⁰⁴⁹ **Interviewee:** Elena Vladimirova. **Date:** [05/03/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 45 minutes.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Brooks and Wohlforth, 'Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War', 273.

production by 1983 (combined with the fall in the price per barrel in the 1980s)¹⁰⁵¹ and the Chernobyl accident in 1986¹⁰⁵² were all objective factors which framed the options for Soviet foreign policy: they were also therefore important stimuli for change. From a completely different perspective, Gorbachev's personality certainly had an impact on the definition of Soviet diplomacy.¹⁰⁵³ Lastly, ideas also played a role: here, we must define the ideas in question and what they meant for different actors within the state and party apparatuses.

Both Ivan Tarabančik and Elena Vladimirovna, whose statements open this chapter, were never Gorbachev's closest advisors. Their comments were made more than a decade after perestroika and both their personal and professional trajectories are rather different. Tarabančik was born in Moscow in the 1940s. He gained labour experience after finishing school and was considered a production candidate when he entered MGIMO. After graduating from the MGIMO international faculty (where he met his wife) at the beginning of the 1970s, he enrolled in a PhD programme at IMEMO. Several years later, he helped edit the journal *World Economy and International Relations* before joining the Central Committee as an assistant in 1985. Vladimirovna, on the other hand, is not a MGIMO graduate, even though she sometimes employed the first person plural to refer to the *meždunarodniki* in our interview.¹⁰⁵⁴ She was born at the end of the 1950s in Moscow. She never joined the Communist Party, although she is the daughter and granddaughter of two communists and history professors. After graduating from MSU and defending a PhD thesis dedicated to the history of diplomacy, she joined MGIMO at the beginning of the 1980s, where her

¹⁰⁵¹ Randall W. Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade* (Princeton University Press, 2002), 37.

¹⁰⁵² Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, *Perestroika and the Economy: New Thinking in Soviet Economics* (M.E. Sharpe, 1989), x.

¹⁰⁵³ Gorbachev was only 52 years old upon becoming General Secretary of the CPSU: he had been a member of the Party since 1952 and graduated from Moscow University in 1955. He was First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee between 1970 and 1978. Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (OUP Oxford, 1997); Fred I. Greenstein, 'The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis', *Political Psychology* 19, no. 1 (1998): 1–16; Vladislav Zubok, 'Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Different Perspectives on the Historical Personality', in *Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates*, ed. William Curti Wohlforth (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 207–41.

¹⁰⁵⁴ 'We have a "red line" from which we do not back down'; 'U nas est' «krasnâ čerta», za kotorû my ne otstupaem'.

father was head of department (*kafedra*).

What makes Vladimirovna's and Tarabančik's statements about perestroika particularly interesting is that they both point to two intertwined aspects of Gorbachev's New Thinking. To the question about whether ideas influenced both the maturation and implementation of New Thinking, Tarabančik answers positively. However, his statements make it clear that there were several alternatives for the evolution of the Soviet regime and that the West was not perceived uniformly by *meždunarodniki*, regardless of the institution for which they were working. Tarabančik also stresses that for him perestroika meant not the renunciation of socialism but the transition from one model of socialism to another deeply rooted in European examples of social democracy. As far as Vladimirovna is concerned, her statements put emphasis on the differences between the New Thinking evoked by Gorbachev and its reception by the *meždunarodniki* working at the MID. Her mention of the 'red line' and the 'green light' is important, as this stresses that, for different categories of actors in Soviet diplomacy, both perestroika and New Thinking had different meanings and therefore presented greater or fewer opportunities. She also puts focus on the role of the bureaucracy in the implementation of the New Thinking from 1985.

The crisis MGIMO went through after November 1985 reflected these two intertwined aspects. First, the perestroika required from MGIMO by the upper levels of the MID and the Communist Party signified embracing neither a de-ideologised nor a pragmatic vision of foreign affairs. It meant training a new generation of diplomats capable of conducting foreign policy based on a new vision of international relations and Soviet diplomacy. Second, changes in Soviet foreign policy required institutional arrangements in the organisation of diplomacy that would manifest the Party's desire to keep the upper hand over the state apparatus. In other words, the questions here are: which policies were the *meždunarodniki* at the MID ready to support in 1985 and how were radical changes in Soviet diplomacy implemented? In order to answer these questions, one needs first to define the characteristics of Gorbachev's diplomacy between 1985 and 1991.

In a speech delivered on 18 December 1984 during a trip to United Kingdom as second-in-command in the Kremlin, Gorbachev mentioned publicly for the first time the need for New Thinking in foreign affairs. He declared that ‘the nuclear age dictates new political thinking’ (*novoe političeskoe mišlenie*). He claimed that ‘whatever is dividing us, we live on the same planet and Europe is our common home, a home, not a theatre of military operations’. Finally he added that ‘the foreign policy of every state is inseparable from its internal life’.¹⁰⁵⁵

In 1984-85, it would be hard to argue that this New Thinking was perceived by the majority of the Soviet population in general and members of the Party and state in particular as anything more than a new ‘Soviet propaganda weapon’.¹⁰⁵⁶ Indeed, as Rey notes, the idea of a European common home was not a novelty in 1984.¹⁰⁵⁷ Gromyko had evoked it in the early 1970s during talks with the French President Georges Pompidou, when the Soviet minister had promoted the necessity of supporting a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev did exactly the same during his visit to Bonn in November 1981.

Gorbachev’s New Thinking began to take shape during the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, when the General Secretary put new emphasis on ‘interdependence, universal values, and all-human interests in the conduct of foreign affairs’.¹⁰⁵⁸ However, the concept was not static. In his 1987 book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Gorbachev dedicated his work to the notion that ‘more than once Lenin spoke about the priority of interests common to all humanity over class interests. It is only now that we have come to comprehend the entire depth and significance of these ideas.’¹⁰⁵⁹ In his speech to the United Nations on 7 December 1988, however, Gorbachev seemed to dispose of Marxism-Leninism by connecting

¹⁰⁵⁵ Archie Brown, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War’, in *Endings*, First paperback edition, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad ; volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 244; Marie-Pierre Rey, ‘Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept’, *Cold War History* 2, no. 4 (2004): 34.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Dallin, ‘The Rise of New Thinking on Soviet Foreign Policy’, 178.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Rey, ‘Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept’, 33.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 222.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid.

New Thinking to the need for ‘the de-ideologization of interstate relations, which has become a demand of the new stage’.¹⁰⁶⁰

Between 1985 and 1991, the notion of New Thinking was blurred, and one can even suggest that it is exactly this which made it a successful concept. Before MID functionaries in a speech in May 1986, Gorbachev made the key point with regards to the necessity of a reorientation in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy. He declared:

Time is requesting of us the intensification in the use of all the forms and means of Soviet diplomacy, an increase in its activity. Today, when considering both positive and negative sides of the recent experience of our foreign policy and planning its future, it is necessary to consider with a wider and sober mind the real facts and events and not to deal with a problem by taking into account only our own interests. Each state has its own interests, but if it is unable to cooperate, make concessions and find common interests with other states, then normal international relations would be made impossible.¹⁰⁶¹

Gorbachev’s statements in May 1986 were a rather telling example of the importance of the vagueness of New Thinking for its successful further development. ‘Considering real facts’, ‘dealing with concrete problems’, and ‘considering other states’ interests’ are terms which could have fit perfectly the agenda of the research conducted at the MGIMO laboratory. However, mentioning the need for ‘cooperating and making concessions based on the fact of taking into account other states’ interests’ might already signify the implementation a foreign policy that would enter into contradiction with a realist vision of international relations, even though they shared a common concern for ‘analysing the world as it really is’.¹⁰⁶²

Gorbachev’s change in foreign policy was soon implemented with the adoption of very concrete measures and important concessions made towards the United States. Only a month after coming to power in April 1985, Gorbachev announced a reduction in the SS-20 missiles deployments to the level of June 1984. In parallel, he announced

¹⁰⁶⁰ ‘The Gorbachev Visit - Excerpts From Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military Cuts’, *The New York Times*, 8 December 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/world/the-gorbachev-visit-excerpts-from-speech-to-un-on-major-soviet-military-cuts.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 439.

¹⁰⁶² Dario Battistella et al., *Dictionnaire des relations internationales - 3e éd.: Dictionnaires Dalloz*, 3e édition (Paris: Dalloz, 2012), 26.

a complete withdrawal of SS-5 missiles, proposed a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive forces, and suggested an agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles.¹⁰⁶³ With regards to Eastern Europe, Gorbachev broke with the Brezhnev doctrine as early as Černenko's funeral, when he privately informed East European party bosses that Moscow would no longer take military action in Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁶⁴ As far as Afghanistan was concerned, Gorbachev ordered the preparation of a plan for withdrawal from the country in the near future.¹⁰⁶⁵

Just as New Thinking which was perceived as a rhetorical cover by a great majority of Politburo members and Western political leaders, these first measures were considered more as reasonable accommodation in Soviet foreign policy, feeding the hopes of a return to Détente rather than for a revolutionary changes. The need for a new policy of peaceful existence was shared by both members of the Politburo and most Soviet bureaucrats, who did not want another uncontrolled confrontation with the West.¹⁰⁶⁶

So, what was it that made Gorbachev's foreign policy idealist? The question is a difficult one. As already mentioned, the definition of New Thinking was not static between 1985 and 1991. A second difficulty arises from the fact that there is no real consensus among scholars about the definition of idealism in international relations.¹⁰⁶⁷ Most of those who have proposed a precise definition for the term consider themselves its opponents, such as Edward Carr.¹⁰⁶⁸

What can be said about Gorbachev's idealism is that, to paraphrase Hedley Bull, just like the Idealists in the 1930s, the General Secretary held that 'the system that gave rise to the Cold War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more

¹⁰⁶³ Rey, '“Europe Is Our Common Home”: A Study of Gorbachev's Diplomatic Concept', 34.

¹⁰⁶⁴ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 204.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 203.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 280.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Peter Wilson, *The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century Idealism* (Springer, 2005), 11.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Macmillan, 1956).

peaceful and just world order.’¹⁰⁶⁹ This idea appeared quite early in Gorbachev’s foreign policy agenda when he argued that the world was becoming increasingly interdependent and that security must be mutual and based on political instruments in 1984.

The emphasis on human interests over class interests is a second element in Gorbachev’s idealism in foreign affairs. Gorbachev first mentioned it after the Reykjavík Summit in October 1986 during a trip to Kirghizstan.¹⁰⁷⁰ he provided a theoretical justification in his book *New Thinking* in 1987. Although he clearly abandoned the principle of class struggle, he did not embrace the idea that states’ interests ruled supreme over human ones. This is an important point when we consider the main focus of researchers related to the Realist school.

A third element concerns the place of international organisations. In 1988, during his speech at the United Nations, Gorbachev announced an expansion of ‘the Soviet Union’s participation in the monitoring mechanism on human rights in the United Nations and within the framework of the pan-European process’.¹⁰⁷¹ He clearly positioned himself within the tradition of the Wilsonian 14 points¹⁰⁷² by announcing that the jurisdiction of the International Court in the Hague in relation to human rights should be obligatory for all states.

The idea that Gorbachev’s idealist policy meant that he ‘embraced liberal priorities over socialist ones’¹⁰⁷³ is obviously a misunderstanding and an oversimplification of the roots of both perestroika and New Thinking, which were partly inscribed in the experiences of foreign socialism. As Brown rightly points out, ‘within his first five years in power, Gorbachev evolved from Communist reformer to democratic socialist of a social democratic type.’¹⁰⁷⁴

¹⁰⁶⁹ Hedley Bull’s original sentence is: ‘The system that gave rise to the World War I was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order.’ Wilson, *The International Theory of Leonard Woolf*, 12.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 294.

¹⁰⁷¹ ‘The Gorbachev Visit - Excerpts From Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military Cuts’.

¹⁰⁷² Battistella et al., *Dictionnaire des relations internationales - 3e éd.*, 273.

¹⁰⁷³ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 194.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Brown, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War’, 244.

This conversion to social democracy has to be related to several institutions which promoted a new vision of socialism: one of these was *The Problems of Peace and Socialism* review, whose editorial board was situated in Prague. The fact that most of the Soviet researchers and philosophers who promoted changes in foreign affairs, such as Ivan Frolov, Merab Mamardašvili, Oleg Bogomolov, Nikolaj Inozemcev, Georgij Arbatov, Anatolij Černâev, and Georgij Šahnazarov, participated in the review was not sheer chance: these individuals contributed to the development of New Thinking.¹⁰⁷⁵ Just as we saw in the third part of the dissertation when focusing on the concrete channels for the dissemination and circulation of ideas between the First and the Second Worlds, Eastern European countries were fertile soil for change, especially because they were not associated with the capitalist West.¹⁰⁷⁶ Quoted by Rey, Vladimir Lukin's retrospective statements are quite revealing of this fact:

The journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* was the only one edited in Russian and sold in the USSR that escaped censorship. The only censor was Rumâncev, its director in the early 1960s... and he allowed himself to be convinced: he was a sincere communist, open to discussion, and attracted by creative people. Thus, the journal praised *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* by Solženicyn at a time when this was viewed negatively in Moscow. We other editors also arranged things to attribute to foreign communists, in the articles we edited, certain innovative formulae and ideas: in this way, we knew they would be spread in Moscow... In 1968, I was taken on a plane and sent back to Moscow with ten other people: Henkin, who later emigrated abroad, Mihail Polâkov, Krivočejn, who was the *Izvestiâ* correspondent. Our error was to have protested against intervention in Czechoslovakia in a public and official manner; others were content to grumble more discretely.¹⁰⁷⁷

¹⁰⁷⁵ English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, 71.

¹⁰⁷⁶ It is always quite astonishing to see how some Western scholars are ready to point out the 'Western character' of Eastern European countries when we consider the fact that they were breeding grounds for Gorbachev's New Thinking. This fact contrasts with the 'trap of backwardness' usually associated with studies conducted on nationalism in Eastern Europe. See: Maria Todorova, 'The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism', *Slavic Review* 64, no. 1 (1 April 2005): 140–64.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Rey, 'The Mejdunarodniki in the 1960s and First Half of the 1970s: Backgrounds, Connections, and the Agenda of Soviet International Elites', 55.

In many ways, Lukin's statements fit with Brown's central idea about the role of 'institutional amphibiousness' in the maturation of New Thinking. The English scholar especially claims that in the review 'most influential members spent less time impressing on the East-Central Europeans the unique advantages of the Soviet way of doing things and more time learning from the experience of reform – both its successes and failures – in the other European Communist states.'¹⁰⁷⁸

More importantly, Lukin's statements also explained why the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review was fertile ground for revamped socialism. Located in Prague, the review was positioned in a specific context outside of the Soviet Union that was still deeply rooted within the socialist experience. Despite their common adherence to the Communist Party, members of the review had different origins and different experiences of socialism. Just as when discussions about de-Stalinisation took place at MGIMO in 1956, it is far from certain that, within the debates held at the review editorial board, the opinions of non-Soviet members would have had the same weight and therefore the same impact on Soviet members if they had come from the West. Moreover, Lukin also stresses that the very possibility of spreading new ideas from overseas in the Soviet Union was connected with the fact that the editorial board of the review was within the socialist bloc. It was an advantage compared to other reviews dedicated to a Western readership such as *Soviet Life*, the circulation of which within the Union was much more limited.¹⁰⁷⁹

The regular contacts between Moscow researchers and party and state functionaries with both European communist and socialist parties (institutionalised through the International Departments of the Central Committee) were also of paramount importance. As Brown points out, 'Gorbachev and his associates strove in an unbiased way to examine the experience of western countries in general and of social democracy in particular.'¹⁰⁸⁰ According to Gennadij Gerasimov, who took also part in the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review:

¹⁰⁷⁸ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 174.

¹⁰⁷⁹ For more information about the MGIMO graduates' activity in the review *Soviet Life*, see Valerij Ūr'ev's memoirs in Torkunov, *Ptency gnezda MGIMO'va Tom 2*, 2:235.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 172.

Unlike us, the foreign communists had not been cut off from real Marxism, from social democratic traditions. Our debates with the French and Italians were very important, the European socialists certainly influenced us much more than we influenced them.¹⁰⁸¹

Here again, Gerasimov's statements clearly reveal that the West was not understood as a uniform category: this is especially because the political character of these contacts, based on the idea of the need to organise communism at both European and world levels, rendered available positive and attractive examples for changes in the Soviet Union. This phenomenon concerned those who took part into the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review and were enrolled at the International Department. However, the idea of bringing the CPSU and European socialist parties closer was also related to direct political contacts with Western communist and socialist European leaders. Gorbachev, for example, developed close ties with the former German chancellor and president of the socialist international Willy Brandt and Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez.¹⁰⁸²

In this regard, Gorbachev's mention of Lenin as a source of inspiration is not that surprising. Certainly, one can argue that in 1985 and in 1987 Gorbachev had to frame his policy with an eye to what his opponents in the Politburo, and especially in the Soviet military administration, were willing to support. However, Černâev leaves no doubt about the influence of Lenin's work on Gorbachev's New Thinking. He admits that 'during the first three years of perestroika, Gorbachev thought about improvement of the society in Marxist-Leninist categories'. According to him, 'he was convinced that had Lenin lived ten years longer, there would have been a fine socialism in the USSR. The general secretary worshipped the founder of Bolshevism, he kept Lenin's works on his desk and reread them in the search for clues and inspiration.'¹⁰⁸³

In a more important way, the use of Lenin as a source of inspiration corresponds to

¹⁰⁸¹ Robert English and Ekaterina Svyatets, 'Soviet Elites and European Integration: From Stalin to Gorbachev', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne D'histoire* 2, no. 21 (2014): 223.

¹⁰⁸² Brown, 'The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War', 244.

¹⁰⁸³ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 296.

what Martin Griffiths identifies as the two main forms of idealism in international relations: nostalgia (the evaluative reification of the past) and imagination (the reification of the future, a characteristic of chiliastic thought).¹⁰⁸⁴ While Gorbachev did renounce the idea of class struggle as a guiding principle of Soviet diplomacy and international relations, his intervention during the 28th Congress of the CPSU in 1990 revealed that the use of Lenin was both a return to the past and a projection into the future. He declared: 'While restoring and developing the initial humanist principles of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, we include in our ideological arsenal all the wealth of our own and world socialist and democratic thought.'¹⁰⁸⁵

At the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the idea of returning to Lenin and using him as a source of inspiration for building a new world order was manifested symbolically by a new relationship between Soviet diplomacy and the past. In 1987, during a meeting at the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Èduard Ševarnadze had several proposals for marking the 70th anniversary of the Soviet diplomatic service. Among them, he stressed the need to honour the People's Commissars Čičerin and Litvinov and Ambassador Kollontaj.¹⁰⁸⁶ In December 1987, the MID central apparatus began designing a museum dedicated to Čičerin.¹⁰⁸⁷

Just as with the use of Lenin, these acts to honour the memory of those who played a major role in Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s and 30s¹⁰⁸⁸ reflected two goals. One was a return to the origins of the Soviet Union in a celebration of its past. The other aimed at finding leading figures who could embody the future of international relations.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation* (Routledge, 2013), 16.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Mark Sandle, *A Short History Of Soviet Socialism* (Routledge, 2003), 314.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ivanov, *Očerki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del Rossii. V Treh Tomah. T.2*, 440.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Protokoly kustovyh partsobranij pervičnyh organizacij ministerstva s povestkoj dnâ "Očet partkoma po rukovodstvu perestrojkoj v kollektive Ministerstva.", [Transcripts of the party meeting of the party primary organization of the ministry with the following agenda: account of the party committee about the conduct of the perestroika at the Ministry], 14/12/1987, TSAOPIM, fund 192, opis' 1, delo 2439, 106.

¹⁰⁸⁸ For more details about Soviet diplomacy in Europe in the 1920s, see Mikhail Narinskiĭ, *L'URSS et l'Europe dans les années 20: actes du colloque organisé à Moscou les 2 et 3 octobre 1997* (Presses Paris Sorbonne, 2000).

Given that Čičerin played a key role in promoting a restart of international relations in Europe through the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 and the Locarno treaties in 1925, the use of his memory in 1987 was not surprising:¹⁰⁸⁹ the 1920s represented a lost golden age. The need to return to true Marxism and true Leninism to revamp Soviet socialism offered useful guidelines for establishing a new world order.

The use of meždunarodniki for New Thinking: implementing changes in foreign policy

Idealist in his foreign policy, Gorbachev was much more pragmatic on the domestic level when it came to implementing his New Thinking. Just like his predecessors, changes in the definition of Soviet foreign policy required keeping the upper hand over the diplomatic apparatus and therefore the promotion of new men to key positions. Although it is commonly believed that the influence of the former general secretary caused delays,¹⁰⁹⁰ a new administrative arrangement was quickly put into place. Even though Gorbachev did not upset the institutional balance between the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that existed before he came to power, he soon changed the key people within the Soviet foreign policy-making team. Among the new strong men of Soviet diplomacy, Èduard Ševarnadze at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anatolij Dobrynin at the International Department of the CC, and Aleksandr Ākovlev at the Propaganda Department of the CC occupied preeminent positions. They were not MGIMO graduates.

At the MID, the choice of First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Ševarnadze¹⁰⁹¹ as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs was rather surprising and reflected Gorbachev's desire to put a party man instead of a professional diplomat at its head. Pikhov provides significant details about the Politburo meeting on 29 June 1985 when Gorbachev first mooted the name of Ševarnadze. He was quoted as saying:

¹⁰⁸⁹ Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (University of California Press, 1994), 158.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 17.

¹⁰⁹¹ He held this position between 1972 and 1985.

‘We will not find a second Andrej Gromyko with his experience, his knowledge of foreign policy problems. But Andrej Andreevič himself once began his diplomatic career without the experience and the knowledge he possesses now. During the Teheran conference, he was not the man he is now. I discussed with Andrej Andreevič the issue of the candidacy to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. We have numerous talented diplomats. Georgij Kornienko is an experienced worker; Stepan Čevonenko has been working both within party and diplomatic affairs. Anatolij Dobrynin springs to mind. And yet, our thoughts went another way. The post of minister requires a leading figure, someone coming from our group, someone we know well.’ Gromyko intervened into the discussion: ‘An entire cohort of diplomats is ready for that’. But Gorbachev interrupted the veteran of the diplomacy. Finally, we decided to recommend Eduard Amvrosevič Ševarnadze.¹⁰⁹²

Ševarnadze’s nomination closed the book on Gromyko’s diplomacy: after 28 years as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was appointed to the honorific post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in July 1985. The ascendancy of the party structures over those of the state was clear: when joining the MID, Ševarnadze was a complete layman in foreign affairs and owned nothing to Gromyko. Nonetheless, Gorbachev trusted him and he was made member of the Politburo in July 1985.

At the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a similar wave of replacements occurred with the removal of Boris Ponomarev, who held the office between 1955 and 1986. He was replaced by Anatolij Dobrynin in 1986, who had spent 24 years as the Soviet ambassador to Washington before joining the Central Committee. Georgij Kornienko, the former first vice-minister of foreign affairs, was appointed as Dobrynin’s first deputy at the International Department. At the Socialist Countries Department of the CC, Konstantin Rusakov was replaced by Vadim Medvedev, a Gorbachev ally.¹⁰⁹³

The choice of new men was important, but their weight within the diplomatic

¹⁰⁹² Rudolf Pikhoia and Benoît Gascon, *URSS : Histoire Du Pouvoir : Tome 2, Le Retour de l'Aigle Bicéphale* (Longueuil, Québec: Kéruss, 2008), 70.

¹⁰⁹³ Brown, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War’, 250.

apparatus mattered too. According to Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbachev's new foreign policy aimed to enhance the role of the International Department and to some extent marginalise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁹⁴ In 1985, Gorbachev assumed that 'issues of foreign policy had to be placed directly into the hands of the Communist Party'.¹⁰⁹⁵ At the Central Committee, Aleksandr Âkovlev, the former Soviet ambassador to Canada and director of IMEMO between 1983 and 1985, was appointed head of the Propaganda Department and soon became Gorbachev's principal foreign policy advisor.¹⁰⁹⁶ By summer 1987, he was made a secretary of the Central Committee and a full member of the Politburo.¹⁰⁹⁷ He was assisted by Anatolij Černâev, who had spent most of his career at the International Department of the Central Committee and became Gorbachev's foreign policy advisor in 1986. At IMEMO, changes occurred too. Following Âkovlev's appointment at the propaganda department, Primakov was appointed as Director of the Research Institution,¹⁰⁹⁸ while Arbatov remained head of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies.

Change quickly became also a reality for all Soviet diplomatic staff. Soon after his appointment, Ševarnadze undertook a voluntary policy of cadre renewal at the highest levels of his ministry: he decided to nominate eight new vice-ministers and heads of departments while replacing the great majority of Soviet ambassadors.

In less than two years, 74 out of 124 Soviet ambassadors had been replaced. In March 1989, only 19 ambassadors out of 128 remained in the same positions they had had at the beginning of perestroika.¹⁰⁹⁹ In this new organisation, MGIMO graduates did not dominate numerically. Out of the 124 Soviet ambassadors in 1986, the diplomatic dictionary indicates that only 29 of them were MGIMO graduates.¹¹⁰⁰ Seven were ambassadors in the United States and Western Europe (Austria, Cyprus, Eire, Iceland, Spain, USA, West Germany), seven in Mexico and Latin America (Argentina,

¹⁰⁹⁴ Rey, 'Le Département International Du Comité Central Du PCUS, Le MID et La Politique Extérieure Soviétique de 1953 a 1991', 204.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Samojlengko, *Diplomatičeskâ Služba [Diplomatic Service]*, 51.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Yakovlev and Gorbachev had met each other during Gorbachev's visit to Canada in 1983.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Exchange student at the University of Columbia (281)

¹⁰⁹⁸ Cherkasov, *IMEMO*, 531.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Kramer, 'The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy', 434.

¹¹⁰⁰ Gromyko, *Diplomatičeskij Slovar'*.

Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Suriname), five in the Middle East (Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates), five in Africa (Djibouti, Guinea, Morocco, Mauritius, Somalia), three in Asia (Indonesia, Japan, Singapore), and two in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). With the exception of Vasilij Kolotuša, the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, they had graduated from MGIMO during the Stalin era (20) or under Khrushchev (8). Although they represented a minority in numerical terms, some of them occupied strategic positions in the conduct of Cold War, such as Ambassador to the USA Ůrij Dubinin and Ambassador to Western Germany Ůlij Kvicinskij. Èrnest Zverev and Viktor Minin were ambassadors in Kuwait and Iraq respectively at the beginning of the 1990s.

When looking at the records of the conference of the MID party organisation held on 29-30 November 1985,¹¹⁰¹ which marked the beginning of the waves of replacements, one notices that changes in the diplomatic staff went smoothly. If we look at the members of the presidium during the party conference and how their positions changed in the following years, one can reach several conclusions.

Table 17: The members of the presidium at the conference of the MID party organisation held on 29-30 November 1985

Name	Date of birth	Institute of graduation	Position held at the MID in November 1985	Position held at the MID or other state/party organisations in 1986-87
Èduard Ševarnadze	1928		Minister of Foreign Affairs	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Stepan Červonenko	1915	Kiev University	Chairman of the Cadres Abroad Department of Central Committee of the PCSU	Chairman of the Cadres Abroad Department of Central Committee of the PCSU
Georgij Kornienko	1925	Moscow Law Institute (1953)	Member of the Central Committee - First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Head at the International Department of the Central Committee
Viktor Mal'cev	1917	Moscow Academy of the rail transport	Member of the Central Committee – First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs	Soviet ambassador to Serbia
Leonid Il'ičev	1906	North Caucasian Communist	Vice-minister of	Vice-minister of

¹¹⁰¹ Protokol XVIII otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii partorganizacii MID SSSR [Minutes of the XVIIIth report and election party conference of the party organisation of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the USSR], 29-30/11/1985, TSOPIM, fond 192, opis ' 1, delo 2232, 1.

		University	Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs
Nikolaj Ryžov	1907	Moscow Institute of Textiles	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs	Retirement
Aleksandr Bessmertnyh	1933	MGIMO (1957)	Head of the MID USA Department and member of the MID Executive Board	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs
Aleksandr Bondarenko	1922	MGIMO (1949)	Head of the MID Third European Department and member of the MID executive board	Head of the MID Third European Department and member of the MID executive board
Vladimir Vinogradov	1921	D. Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia (1944)	Member of the MID executive board and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic	Member of the MID executive board and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
Vladimir Kazimirov	1923	Moscow State Linguistic University (1953)	Head of the MID First Department of Latin America	Soviet ambassador to Angola
Mikhail Kapica	1921	Moscow State Linguistic University	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs	Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
Anatolij Kovalev	1923	MGIMO (1948)	Vice-minister and Head of the MID Department of Planning for External Political Events	First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Komplektov	1932	MGIMO (1954)	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs	Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU
Vadim Loginov	1927	Higher Diplomatic School (1967)	Head of the MID Fifth European Department	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Lomejko	1935	MGIMO (1960)	Head of the MID Press Department	Soviet representative to the permanent UN commission for Human Rights in Geneva
Dmitrij Nikiforov	1917	Leningrad Naval Institute	Member of the MID executive board	Retirement
Ričard Ovinnikov	1930	MGIMO (1953)	Deputy Head of Soviet representation	MGIMO rector

			to the United Nations	
Vladimir Petrovskij	1933	MGIMO (1957)	Head of the MID International Organisations Department	Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs
Igor Rogačëv	1932	MGIMO (1955)	Head of the MID First Far East Department and member of the MID executive board	Vice-minister of the Foreign Affairs
Nikolaj Solov'ev	1931	MGIMO (1957)	Head of the MID Second Department of the Far East	Soviet ambassador to Japan
Viktor Stukalin	1927	Bauman Moscow State Technical University (1953) Higher Diplomatic School (1964)	Vice-minister and chair at the Soviet Commission for UNESCO	Soviet ambassador to Greece
Al'bert Černyšëv	1936	MGIMO (1959)	Head of the General Secretariat and member of the MID executive board	Soviet ambassador to Turkey

Out of the 21 members of the presidium, I was able to identify 18 people (an overwhelming majority) who changed positions in the following years. It should be noted that the waves of replacement were not as brutal as they had been in the Soviet past. Retirement facilitated the departure of the oldest members of the diplomatic apparatus (Nikolaj Ryžov and Dmitrij Nikiforov). Even individuals who had occupied the prominent position of vice-minister of foreign affairs under Gromyko, like Viktor Mal'cev, Mikail Kapica, and Viktor Stukalin, were offered rather prestigious new jobs as ambassadors or directors of an institute at the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As far as the MGIMO graduates are concerned, their trajectories were marked by career advancement: Igor Rogačëv, Vladimir Petrovskij, Anatolij Kovalev, and Aleksandr Bessmertnyh, who became vice-ministers of foreign affairs under Ševarnadze, were already quite well situated within the diplomatic apparatus during the Brezhnev era as either heads of departments or vice-ministers.

While replacing some of Brezhnev's veterans was certainly thought to be necessary in order to ensure the loyalty of the Soviet diplomatic apparatus, it did not mean that Gorbachev, Èduard Ševarnadze, Anatolij Dobrynin, and Aleksandr Âkovlev shared

the same views about New Thinking as MID functionaries. The minutes of the 18th conference of the MID party organisation held in November 1985 tend to prove that the *meždunarodniki* were receptive to the changes and were supportive of New Thinking, for the time being at least. However, discussions during the party meeting reveal that they saw things in a rather different light from Gorbachev: without opposing the new guidelines of Soviet diplomacy, several MID functionaries gave voice to a distinct opinion about how they understood New Thinking and its implementation.

Indeed, despite the emphasis that Gorbachev placed on taking into account the interests of other states and the need for cooperation, Soviet interests, as the MID functionaries saw them, were different. While the head of the First European Department Anatolij Adamišin,¹¹⁰² for example, certainly wanted the USSR to move closer to Western European countries, he also noted that ‘we must look at the world not only through the prism of Soviet-American relations’.¹¹⁰³ He put especial emphasis on the success of Gorbachev’s visit to France in 1985.

For him, the concessions made by the USSR about the issue of human rights, identified in his speech as Soviet ‘unilateral moves’, were justified. However, human rights were not an end in themselves, he stated. Making concessions on human rights was supposed to support rapprochement between the USSR and France, which would ultimately be used as a bargaining tool for appeasement in the diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA. From this perspective, Gorbachev’s visit to France presented two interests, according to Adamišin. France, governed by President Mitterrand, and its capital Paris offered a tribune for advancing the ideas of *détente* and disarmament to people in Europe and the rest of the world.¹¹⁰⁴ Through

¹¹⁰² Anatolij Adamišin was born in Kiev in 1934. He graduated from the MSU faculty of economics in 1957. He joined the MID in 1957, where he climbed up the career ladder successfully. In 1970, he defended a PhD thesis dedicated to the European policy of the Soviet Union in the framework of the OSCE. Between 1978 and 1986, he occupied the position of head of the First European Department. He was nominated vice-minister of foreign affairs in 1986, a position he held until his appointment as Soviet ambassador to Italy in 1990.

¹¹⁰³ Protokol XVIII otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii partorganizacii MID SSSR [Minutes of the XVIIIth report and election party conference of the party organisation of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the USSR], 29-30/11/1985, TSOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 2232, 41.

¹¹⁰⁴ ‘ispol’zovanie Pariža v kačestve tribuny k narodam Evropy i mira s ideâmi razrâdli i razoruženie.’

rapprochement with France, the USSR had increased bargaining power a month before President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev first met at the Geneva Summit in November 1985.

Adamišin was not isolated in his remarks about the Soviet state's interests and could count on the support of the head of the Second European Department (dedicated to English speaking-countries) Vâčeslav Dolgov. Dolgov was a MGIMO graduate and had had a career path very similar to Adamišin's, spending all of it at the MID (he joined in 1961).¹¹⁰⁵ The manner in which Dolgov defined both the interests of Great Britain and those of the Soviet Union reveals the important gap between Gorbachev's vision of a 'European common home' and the professional and political requirements Dolgov expected from the Second European Department. He declared that 'in Great Britain, we are dealing with a case of a complete range of political stripes that we have to take into account and more importantly make use of in the defence of our own interests.'¹¹⁰⁶

Taking into account the interests of a negotiating partner and looking for those among the British political class more open to negotiations with the Soviet Union can be considered a foundation of diplomacy. However, when Dolgov evoked the 'eternal interests' (*večnye interesy*) of Great Britain, he was overtly threatening. For him, the USSR had every reason to remind Thatcher that interest number one for the British was survival and not the special relation between Great Britain and the United States. He implicitly argued that the USSR should strategically raise the spectre of nuclear war in Europe, where there could be no winner, in order to get Great Britain to bring all its weight to bear on its American ally in the negotiations with the USSR.

Therefore, Dolgov gave also a very different interpretation of the need to search for common interests with European countries. While providing guidelines for the functionaries of the Second European Department, he declared without ambiguity: 'Communists of the Second European Department are expected to provide intense

¹¹⁰⁵ Vâčeslav Dolgov was born in 1937. He graduated from the MGIMO faculty of international relations in 1961 and then joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he spent this entire career. He was twice sent overseas (to the Soviet embassy in Canada between 1968 and 1973 and to the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom between 1982 and 1984). In 1990, he was appointed Soviet ambassador to Australia.

¹¹⁰⁶ 29-30/11/1985, TSOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 2232, 47.

analytical work, a clear analysis of the very limits of how far the British are willing to go, and therefore identify our possibilities for action.'¹¹⁰⁷

In November 1985, neither Adamišin's nor Dolgov's statements were incompatible with Gorbachev's New Thinking: there is no reason to argue that they did not support it. It might legitimately be said that their loyalty towards the new General Secretary was not at stake: they did not 'experience a painful contradiction'¹¹⁰⁸ between the new aims of Soviet diplomacy proclaimed by Gorbachev and their *habitus* as high-ranking officers of the Soviet state. Nonetheless, the two had an interpretation of New Thinking quite different from Gorbachev's.

Does that however mean that MID functionaries shared a common view of New Thinking with other state ministries or the research institutions of the Academy of Sciences? This question was raised at the Ministry during a party meeting in December 1987.¹¹⁰⁹ Here again, one may note that MID functionaries and the *meždunarodniki* trained at MGIMO understood the goals and the means for implementing New Thinking in a very specific way. Just as Adamišin and Dolgov had done, several participants gave their own interpretation of Gorbachev's policies.

Head of Department Dmitrij Rûrikov informed the participants that new ties had been established between the communists of his department and researchers at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, most particularly the Institute of State and Law. Supported by Ševarnadze, the aim was to bring scientific and practical approaches towards international law closer together in order to assist with the implementation of New Thinking. However, Rûrikov was quite sceptical about the results obtained:¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 47.

¹¹⁰⁸ Jacques Lagroye argues that the question of the loyalty of individuals is especially raised in a context of painful contradiction between their *habitus* and the institution in which they are involved. Jacques Lagroye, *La Vérité Dans l'Église Catholique. Contestation et Restauration D'un Régime D'autorité*, Belin (Paris, 2005), 18.

¹¹⁰⁹ Protokoly kustovyh partsobranij pervičnyh organizacij ministerstva s povestkoj dnâ "Očet partkoma po rukovodstvu perestrojkoj v kollektive Ministerstva." [Minutes of the party meeting of the primary organisation of the Ministry with the agenda 'Report on the management of the perestroika within the Ministry staff'] 14/12/1987, TSAOPIM, fund 192, opis' 1, delo 2439.

¹¹¹⁰ Dmitrij Rûrikov was born in 1947 in Moscow. When he graduated from MGIMO in 1969, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his career, he was sent to Afghanistan and Iran. Between January and August 1991, he was a head of department at the MID of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic.

The experience of contacts with researchers shows that, at present, raising great expectations about such collaboration is not realistic. For too long, practice and science took different paths: science confronts practice very little and our concrete interests are far from those of science. As a result, we found ourselves in a position where the advice and viewpoints from researchers of the Institute of Law and State were completely useless in our work devoted to solving concrete problems.¹¹¹¹

In principle, Rûrikov argued that he was not opposed to collaboration with researchers from the Academy of Sciences; however, in reality, researchers and MID diplomats did not have the same 'set of assumptions and categories for thinking about foreign affairs'.¹¹¹² His statements made clear that the green and red lines evoked by Vladimirovna were not the same for researchers and diplomats. Tellingly, Rûrikov declared that 'obviously the strengthening of the ties between practice and science implies not only attracting researchers to work on our problems: it also requires significant work from MID workers to make explicit for researchers our goals, issues, and the specificities of our activity.'¹¹¹³ One could even argue that there was competition between different actors in different fields for the definition of New Thinking and how it should be implemented.

During the same party meeting, the intervention of Sergej Bacenov¹¹¹⁴ suggests that New Thinking gave rise to different interpretations among those involved in state administration at a domestic level. He declared:

The problem of the contacts of the MID with other ministries is raised principally for economic questions. From my point of view, this issue also exists in the military-political apparatus. It is important here not only to develop regular contacts with the party organisations of other state administrations, but also to pay attention to ourselves (*obratit' vnimanie na samyh sebâ*). This means making sure that the process of building consensus with other state administrations will not turn into an

¹¹¹¹ 14/12/1987, TSAOPIM, fund 192, opis' 1, delo 2439, 82.

¹¹¹² Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, 'Beauractric Politics: A Paradigm and Some Implications', *World Politics* 24 (Spring 1972): 41.

¹¹¹³ Ibidem.

¹¹¹⁴ Sergej Bacenov graduated from MGIMO in 1976. In 1989, he was appointed Soviet ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (1989-93).

inter-ministerial compromise (*meždevomstvennye kompromissy*) at the expense of the political interests of the Soviet Union, or at least how we perceive them.¹¹¹⁵

What Bacenov's statements reveal is the complexity of the interactions between various state administration when it came to defining New Thinking. He invites us to consider that the definition of New Thinking was not only the object of negotiation between the Communist Party and the MID apparatus, but also the subject of domestic 'bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in different governmental administrations'.¹¹¹⁶ Thus, he urged his comrades to pay attention to defining a clear position ('to pay attention to ourselves') in this domestic bargaining with other Soviet state administrations.

Thus, in terms of the changes to Soviet diplomacy, Gorbachev's position was not necessarily strong among the *meždunarodniki* working at the MID: nor was it based on the same perception about the means and goals of Soviet foreign policy. Still, few then perceived in Gorbachev's words the deeds that were to follow. With the aim of both redefining the course of Soviet diplomacy and making sure of its correct implementation in the hands of the CPSU, MGIMO would soon become a target for both *perestroika* and New Thinking in 1985.

Perestroika against MGIMO: training new meždunarodniki for a new Soviet diplomacy

What is most striking when analysing the impact of *perestroika* on MGIMO is the speed at which it hit the Institute in November 1985. There was nothing extraordinary in the removal of Rector Lebedev following the appointment of Ševarnadze as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Compared to his eleven predecessors, some of whom stayed in the office for just a couple of months, Lebedev holds the record for longevity, with no less than 10 years as rector. In terms of the roughness of his dismissal, Lebedev was an exception too.

¹¹¹⁵ 14/12/1987, TSAOPIM, fund 192, opis' 1, delo 2439, 93.

¹¹¹⁶ Allison and Halperin, 'Beauractric Politics: A Paradigm and Some Implications', 43.

Given that most of the key positions in Soviet foreign policy establishment had been given to new candidates, Lebedev lost his powerful networks in the Brezhnev-era state and party apparatuses.¹¹¹⁷ MGIMO graduate Sergej Isaev, who was deputy head of the MGIMO Komsomol primary organisation, tells us more precisely how Lebedev was fired in November 1985:

At the end of 1985, the campaign to loosen the personality cult of Rector Lebedev started. A document prepared in Staraâ square¹¹¹⁸ was read in the party organisation in private. The rector was reminded of everything: what was possible and what was wasn't: that during his stay in the partisan detachment in occupied Belarus, he had, allegedly, illegally appropriated a combat medal, that he entered MGIMO without having finished secondary education (he really didn't have a school certificate, but only a certificate given by the director of a rural school), and that his thesis was not a scientific work but only a compilation. It was said that he ignored the opinion of the party committee, established an authoritarian style of leadership in the Institute, that he squandered public funds, including on the construction of his summer country house, and so on. People in the Institute were at a loss: they whispered in the corners and wondered why only two years ago in 1984 Lebedev had been awarded the Order of Lenin and now he was being kicked out of the Party and removed from work.¹¹¹⁹

Proclaiming the need for New Thinking did not mean a renunciation of old methods. In many ways, Lebedev's removal, as described by Isaev, is a case study of the rather old Soviet strategy of compiling an incriminating file (*kompromat*).¹¹²⁰ Each aspect of the former rector's biography was gone through with a fine-tooth comb by the upper levels of the CPSU: his graduation from school, his military records, his PhD research, and his management of the Institute. The mention of the 'rector's

¹¹¹⁷ This is the explanation given by Boris Kurbatov to explain Lebedev's removal, see: Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 147.

¹¹¹⁸ The expression 'the Staraâ Square' (*Staraâ plošad'*), literally the Old Square, is the expression usually employed to refer to the building located at 4 Staraya Square in central Moscow, where the headquarters of the Central Committee of the CPSU was located.

¹¹¹⁹ Sergej Isaev, 'Sergej Isaev. Otčet Za 20 Let! [Sergej Isaev. 20 Years of Report!]', accessed 1 February 2017.

¹¹²⁰ *Kompromat* is the short form of the Russian expression 'komprometiruûšij material' (literally, compromising material). It is a body of evidence, either true or false, collected to compromise someone.

personality cult' also reveals how the Soviet past (and more especially the experience of Stalinism) offered ready-made tools for getting rid of someone even in the 1980s.

Lebedev's replacement in November 1985 by Ričard Ovinnikov, a career diplomat described by Ševarnadze as a 'experienced man and a recognised researcher for whom we have great expectations',¹¹²¹ did not end the criticisms raised against MGIMO. Regular waves of replacement took place in the different faculties between 1985 and 1988. The head of the faculty of international relations Mihail Perežogin was replaced by MGIMO graduate German Fokeev (1956)¹¹²² in 1986. He held his position for only two years before being replaced by Anatolij Torkunov, who occupied the same position for just one year. Something similar occurred at the faculty of international economic relations with the removal of Vasilij Trepelkov (1950) in 1986: he was replaced by another MGIMO graduate Igor' Sysoev (1967), who himself was replaced after a couple of months by Ūrij Evseev (1966). At the faculty of international law, Evgenij Pavlov (1974) was chosen to replace Anatolij Orlov (1960). Just as had happened at the faculties of international relations and international economic relations, he too was soon removed in favour of Viktor Gladyšev.¹¹²³ At the faculty of journalism, Aleksandr Borisov (1968) was an exception: he remained in his position until 2000.¹¹²⁴

These dismissals did not end the criticisms: the Institute needed to reform itself in order 'to rise to the challenges of perestroika'.¹¹²⁵ Valentin Šetin, the dean of graduate studies (*prorektor po učebnoj rabote*), details that the situation at MGIMO was discussed in November 1985, May 1986, and September 1986 in various forums such as the MID 28th party conference, several meetings of the MID executive boards, and during meetings at the Moscow Gorkom, where Boris Yeltsin declared that 'the

¹¹²¹ Protokol XVIII otčetno-vybornoj partijnoj konferencii partorganizacii MID SSSR, [Minutes of the XVIIIth report and election party conference of the party organisation of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the USSR], 29-30/11/1985, TSOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 2232, 117.

¹¹²² Dates of graduation from MGIMO are indicated in the parentheses.

¹¹²³ Gladyšev did not graduate from MGIMO.

¹¹²⁴ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 185–92.

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

situation at MGIMO remains serious' (*do sih por situaciâ v MGIMO ostaetsâ složnoj*).¹¹²⁶

With Yeltsin's appointment in December 1985 as First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, a new surge of criticisms against the Institute soon appeared.¹¹²⁷ Vladimir Kazimirov, MGIMO graduate and head of the First Latin America Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985-86, recalls:

I remember a conversation with Boris Nikolaevič on the way back at Chenon while we were walking around the airport terminal. He bristled at MGIMO as a hotbed of corruption and toughness: he threatened to close the Institute and to call the rector on 'the carpet'. Recognising that defects had not bypassed the Institute, I tried to show him that, thanks to MGIMO, the country had received well-prepared foreign personnel for many institutions and departments, such as journalists on international affairs and so on, that there was no need to close it but [rather] things should be put in order there. However, he was adamant, although it was unlikely that he himself could shut down an institute that belonged to the MID of the USSR.¹¹²⁸

Certainly, the inference of Yeltsin in MGIMO internal affairs is not surprising when considering Gorbachev's reliance on the party rather than on the state when it came to defining Soviet diplomacy. MGIMO was under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Institute was also expected to comply with the requirements of the upper levels of the Communist Party: its primary party organisation was under the control of both the Party District and Town committees. Yeltsin was just using the dual system of state and party administration, which placed the Institute (as well as the ministries in Moscow) under his supervision.

Immediately after his conversation with Yeltsin, Kazimirov called Rector Ovinnikov, his friend and classmate between 1948 and 1953, to inform him about Yeltsin's intentions. The Institute was not closed. However, in parallel with Yeltsin's criticism, Lev Ageev, the head of the MID educational establishments, was suggesting merging

¹¹²⁶ Protokoly N°3-10 zasedanij partkoma MGIMO MID SSSR, [Transcripts N°3-10 of the meetings of the MGIMO party Committee], 26/09/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 5, delo 343, 17. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the records of the Gorkom organisation for this period of time in the TSAOPIM archives are still unavailable to researchers.

¹¹²⁷ Mlečin, *Kreml', Prezidenty Rossii*, 96.

¹¹²⁸ Torkunov and Sergeev, *'Staryj dom u Moskvyy-reki...' (1948-1953)*, 177.

the Diplomatic Academy of the MID¹¹²⁹ with MGIMO to strengthen the control of the Ministry over the training of diplomats ‘from the beginning to the end of the teaching process’.¹¹³⁰

The situation at MGIMO reflected the institutional arrangements between party and state structures in the implementation of change in Soviet diplomacy. However, the crisis also shows that the new guidelines meant training a new type of *meždunarodnik*. Indeed, the implementation of New Thinking in foreign affairs went side-by-side with the recruitment of new men, which was to be done by recovering the tradition of positive discrimination in favour of members of the Communist Party and production candidates. Perestroika in foreign affairs had to go together with the internal perestroika of each member of the Institute in order to instil future diplomats with a completely new conception of international relations. Tellingly, when Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Valentin Nikiforov explained the Ministry’s expectations to MGIMO party activists, he declared: ‘Perestroika has to occur inside each of us, in our hearts, and become a conscious necessity. Loners cannot understand this great task. It requires a mental attitude, talent, energy, and social concern in each of us and all together’.¹¹³¹

For Nikiforov, this internal perestroika had to lead to concrete changes within the Institute. He added: ‘May each person sitting in this room (and you are party activists, the anchor men of perestroika) confront these questions: have I done everything possible to cleanse myself from the outdated, the useless, and the dogmatic? How can I concretely start working better? What is my personal contribution to perestroika?’¹¹³² Members of the primary party organisation were asked to address two requirements: the reform of the admissions procedure and changes in teaching programmes.

¹¹²⁹ The Higher Diplomatic School was renamed the Diplomatic Academy of the MID in 1974.

¹¹³⁰ *Protokoly partsobranij pervičnoj partorganizacii upravleniâ kadrov i učebnyh zavedenij MID SSSR*, 02/10/1986, [Transcripts of the party meetings of the primary party organization of Direction of senior executives and training institutes of the Ministry], TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis’ 1, delo 2350, 64.

¹¹³¹ *Protokoly N° 1-2 sobranâ partijnogo aktiva MGIMO MID SSSR*, [Transcripts N°1-2 of the meetings of the MGIMO party activists], 05/11/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis’ 5, delo 345, 40.

¹¹³² *Ibidem*.

As far as the struggle against what were defined as '*semejstvennost*' (nepotism) and '*protekcionizm*' (patronage) was concerned, a series of measures were soon undertaken by the MGIMO primary party organisation and the administration.¹¹³³ Dean Šetinín details that all the members of the admissions committee were replaced, the exam questions were developed by people outside MGIMO, and the names of the selected examiners were announced only on the day before the competitive entrance examination. All the examiners had to sign a document stating that they had not been private tutors and that none of their family members or acquaintances were taking part in the competitive examination. These changes bore fruit: Šetinín announced that 50 per cent of the selected applicants had military records or were production candidates with at least two years of labour experience. 24 per cent were candidate-members or members to the Communist Party, while 30 per cent were from the provinces. The number of successful applicants from the working class also improved, since they now made up 30 per cent of the newly recruited students. Conversely, the number of successful applicants with parents working in the field of foreign affairs (*studenty iz semej po profilû "meždunarodnyh otnošenij"*) was cut in half.¹¹³⁴

With regards to the evolution of the teaching programmes, the task was much more difficult. While the student newspaper *Meždunarodnik* clearly indicated that changes in teaching programmes aimed at training MGIMO students 'capable of implementing "new political and economic thinking" in life' (*sposobny provodit' v žizn' 'novoe političeskoe i èkonomičeskoe myšlenie'*) were required,¹¹³⁵ Vice-minister Nikiforov himself was particularly ambiguous about the ministry's concrete requirements. He declared that 'the task of the Institute is to ensure the training of young specialists, capable of thinking and working in new ways and in new conditions, who will be highly qualified and entirely devoted to the cause of the Party and the People.'¹¹³⁶

Compared to the Ministry's requirements during the Brezhnev era and the justifications given by the TASS agency with regard to awarding 44 members of MGIMO with the Order of the Red Banner of Labour, the changes were not obvious.

¹¹³³ 26/09/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 5, delo 343, 18.

¹¹³⁴ 26/09/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 5, delo 343, 21.

¹¹³⁵ *Meždunarodnik*, N°501, 29/09/1986, 7.

¹¹³⁶ 02/10/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 192, opis' 1, delo 2350, 45.

The vice-minister did not formulate new concrete guidelines for the teaching staff, with the exception of including the New Thinking in the teaching programmes.

Moreover, as we have already seen, New Thinking did not mean renouncing old methods for reforming the Institute. Nikofirov was quite threatening when pointing out that the MGIMO administration and the primary party organisation had to take all measures necessary to identify the 'hidden and convinced opponents of the perestroika' at the Institute and put them 'where they would not do any harm.'¹¹³⁷ For many members of MGIMO, whether in the teaching staff, the administration, or the party organisation, Nikofirov's statements and Gorbachev's New Thinking sounded just like a new dogma.

¹¹³⁷ Ibid., 41.

CHAPTER 10

PERESTROIKA AS A TIME OF CRISIS FOR MGIMO

They demanded that we reform, or more precisely operate what they called ‘perestroika from inside’. What did this mean? It was not obvious. We rejected it. It wasn’t too painful for us: of course we were worried, but MGIMO solidarity acted at all party meetings. It was the solidarity of the teaching staff and it demonstrated its value in practice.¹¹³⁸

MGIMO graduate and former secretary of the MGIMO primary party organisation Ivan Ivanov

I can say of myself that I joined the Party by conviction: I thought that it was the way it should be and that communism had a bright future. Especially when in the 1970s in Italy and France there were all possible versions when the communists were in power together with the socialists – there were such *les lendemains qui chantent* [better tomorrows].¹¹³⁹

MGIMO graduate and professor of history Marina Olegovna

While two boards of enquiry under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party were placed in charge of controlling the evolution of perestroika at MGIMO in late 1985, the Institute was also required to reform itself. Two principal organisations were endowed with this task: the Institute’s primary party organisation,

¹¹³⁸ **Interviewee:** Ivan Ivanov. **Date and Time:** [20/04/2017] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of the interview:** 46 minutes.

¹¹³⁹ **Interviewee:** Marina Olegova. **Date:** [15/03/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 45 minutes.

with its new secretary Vitalij Volodin, and its administration, with Rector Ovennikov and Dean Šetinin at its head.

However, in 1985-86, the specificity, direction, and scale of perestroika were not yet considered by members of the Communist Party as revolutionary. From this point of view, the statements of Ivanov, the former secretary of the MGIMO primary party organisation, about the vagueness of the meaning of perestroika in 1985 are enlightening. By claiming that members of the Institute simply rejected perestroika, Ivanov clearly suggests that they by no means welcomed the new policy with open arms. His assumptions soon raise other questions: how could the Institute's administration, primary party organisation, and teaching staff reject perestroika given that their very mission was to train *meždunarodniki* devoted to the Communist Party and the Soviet state? What do Ivanov's statements reveal about conflicting visions of the Party and the state during perestroika?

When studying the development of perestroika at MGIMO, the danger is to assume that the expectations of both the MID and the Gorkom soon became operational facts within the Institute rather than an aspiration towards which MGIMO members strove with varying degrees of success. For MGIMO, perestroika created a 'zone of uncertainty' or a 'grey zone',¹¹⁴⁰ inside of which staff continued to possess a certain degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, they often had to deal with the very intimate question of their loyalty to the Communist Party. Crisis created constraints and opportunities, even though their autonomy varied depending on the role they had within the institution, their sociological profile, and the chronology of the political and economic reforms progressively introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Two moments must be pointed out in particular. Even if the perestroika period was a turning point in the evolution of MGIMO, the first consequences of the reforms led by Gorbachev mainly appeared after 1988. Indeed, the rise of a new General Secretary to power did not revolutionise the structure and functioning of the teaching staff, the administration, and the primary party organisation in March 1985, even after the

¹¹⁴⁰ Philippe Bernoux, *La Sociologie Des Organisations*, Editions du Seuil (Paris, 1985), 145.

removal of the rector and the faculty heads. Although the Institute faced criticism from the highest levels of the Communist Party, which blamed MGIMO's administration for its conservatism in teaching, perestroika's limits and direction were not clear at the beginning of the Gorbachev era: for many, New Thinking was just like Old Thinking, a dogma to implement within the everyday life of the Institute without really changing the rules.

The situation clearly changed after 1988. Because of the Constitutional Reform Act adopted on 1 December 1988, both the Gorkom and the MID progressively toned down their criticism, while the hierarchal balance between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPSU changed. The first free election of a new rector in April 1990 was proof of this institutional reversal: Viktor Râbov, the candidate supported by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, lost to the former diplomat Andrej Stepanov, whose candidacy was solicited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹¹⁴¹ The introduction of free market mechanisms offered new career opportunities outside the Institute, principally for the law, economics, and foreign languages teaching staff. The Constitutional Reform Act created new possibilities for the youngest generation of history teachers with the founding of a department of political sciences (*kafedra politologii*) in 1989. This also meant an end to MGIMO's central role in training a party nobility dedicated to foreign affairs within the Soviet Union.

In this chapter, assessing the development of perestroika at MGIMO enables us to point out various phenomena. Firstly, focusing on the daily implementation of the reform at MGIMO allows us to definitely reject not only the idea that members of the institution as a whole spontaneously supported perestroika, but also that there were major differences between the requirements of the MID and the CPSU in the implementation of perestroika in daily life. Secondly, with the recognition of pluralism in the USSR, both New Thinking and perestroika became bones of contention during party meetings, revealing conflicting visions of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Thirdly, studying the development of perestroika at MGIMO means considering an important paradox that emerged after 1988. Even

¹¹⁴¹ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 150.

though numerous members of the institution did not welcome perestroika with open arms and Gorbachev's reforms made the training of a party nobility at MGIMO useless, the *meždunarodniki* certainly had the best resources in both intellectual and institutional terms to benefit from the economic and political reforms introduced after 1988.

Interpreting and implementing perestroika

While Ivanov surprisingly argues that the members of the Institute successfully rejected the perestroika required by the upper levels of the Communist Party and the state without too much pain, Elena Vladimirovna is much more sceptical about this assumption. As a member of the Komsomol organisation and a young professor of history, she recalls:

Perestroika was a top-down process. [...] Both the organisation and the principles of the activity of the Komsomol institution, in line with the activity of the CPSU, were based on the principle of democratic centralism. This means that a decision undertaken by the upper-level organisations was obligatory for lower levels. From this point of view, as MGIMO was an ideologised institution of higher education integrated in the state system which performed an ideological function in Soviet society, MGIMO simply could not reject reforming itself (*perestroit' sâ*) and had to obey.

Ivanov and Vladimirovna were both working at the Institute during perestroika: they both took part in the party and Komsomol meetings and there is no obvious reason why either of them would lie today about the development of perestroika at MGIMO. At first glance, there is a world of difference between their assumptions: indeed, it would seem that they both perceived completely different situations at the Institute. However, their statements are not necessarily contradictory: 'rejecting perestroika' or 'obeying what the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state required' are two extreme points of a continuum, within which there was a room for manoeuvre. Despite the sharp criticisms against the Institute, its members negotiated the reform, just as Adamišin and Dolgov did with New Thinking at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Obviously, the vagueness surrounding the very term ‘perestroika’ helped in the implementation of the reform. If we consider perestroika as the last in a long line of reforms in the teaching process since MGIMO’s foundation, there is no obvious reason to think that the changes required by the MID and the CPSU in 1985-86 were perceived as original.¹¹⁴² Since the end of World War II, there had been several attempts to reform the Institute and many members of the teaching staff and the administration had experienced them from different positions (as former students, members of the party organisation, and teachers). Ivanov is a demonstrative example: he had graduated from MGIMO in the 1950s, had been secretary of the primary party organisation in the 1970s, and was professor of history and head of department in the 1980s.

For Aleksej Kamčatov, head of the social sciences department in 1985-86 and former participant in the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* review, the radical change called for by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 was not obvious. The new General Secretary blamed Leonid Brezhnev for the stagnation of the Soviet Union, just as the latter did, though for other reasons, with Nikita Khrushchev in 1964.¹¹⁴³ Perestroika was barely distinct from the other attempts to reform education: the reshaping of education was a top-down movement and it adopted a critical point of view toward previous educational reforms. In this regard, Kamčatov’s statements are particularly revealing:

Thus, in 1986 there was a meeting of the heads of the social sciences department at the Grand Kremlin Palace, where the academic (*akademik*) Pëtr Fedoseev talked about how we should teach. He spoke about how it was necessary to refer to different figures who could now be praised and who should be criticised. We criticised Hegel for idealism, but now he needed to be praised for the dialectic. So, he began to give orders how we should teach. Who is to be praised and who must be criticised. How we should evaluate real socialism, how to evaluate this or that event.

¹¹⁴² The word ‘perestroika’ was not new in 1985. In the archival documents of the primary party organisation, I have found that the term was already used by several communists in debates about the reform of the teaching programmes in the Khrushchev era.

¹¹⁴³ **Interviewee:** Alexej Kamčatov. **Date:** [15/04/2011] **Location:** at the interviewee’s home **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 8 minutes.

It was just as it is in the army – a command was given to estimate everything in such a way.

According to Kamčatov, the reform of the social sciences conducted by the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet Ministry of Education was distinct from previous forms neither in its form nor substance.

For Marina Olegova, a young history teacher and member of the Communist Party, the fact that the reform was both obliquely defined and dogmatically imposed from the top-down presented some advantages. She recalls that ‘under the USSR, the historical approach of international relations was always presented as a struggle: the struggle of the Soviet Union for peace, the struggle of the Soviet Union against nuclear weapons. This idea of struggle was everywhere.’ When the MID required reform as early as 1985, she took advantage of the situation to set up new seminars within the Institute with a colleague that were in line with the latest developments in Soviet diplomacy. She recalls that she was soon leading seminars about the Helsinki process and including the concept of the ‘human factor’ in her teaching. Just as MGIMO teachers had learnt to use the concepts of ‘détente’ and ‘peaceful coexistence’ during the Brezhnev era to promote their own teaching and research agenda, ‘perestroika’, glasnost’, and ‘New Thinking’ were ready-made tools for dealing with new topics without contesting the official line of the Communist Party.

For many members of the institution, however, the first years of perestroika soon became a time of crisis: they experienced difficulties trying to cope with the contradiction between the expectations of the higher levels of the state and the CPSU and their own vision of necessary reforms. Olegova’s enthusiasm for the new opportunities associated with Gorbachev’s perestroika was counterbalanced by the regular commissions sent both by several levels of the CPSU and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to control the development of the reform: ‘they came to our department (*kafedra*) and demanded us to show them how we worked, they came to seminars, they came to lectures, they regularly talked with students.’ According to her, the upper levels of the Communist Party sent no less than five commissions to MGIMO in 1985-86. As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned,

Kurbatov mentions that four meetings of the MID executive boards were dedicated to the reform of the Institute between 1986 and 1988.¹¹⁴⁴ When understanding how perestroika affected MGIMO in the early years of the Gorbachev era, it is important to realise that the reform did not occur in an 'institutional vacuum' but in the midst of a functioning routine.

In November 1986, Andrej Zlobin admitted during a party meeting that:

Perestroika is going very slowly. There is a tactical attitude of wait and see. I would like to give my support to the rector. He does a lot to implement perestroika, but we do not really help him, and that is the reason why even if the Institute is not [currently] strapped for cash, it is heading towards [such a situation].¹¹⁴⁵ It would be wrong to say that Lebedev's rule has not left a mark. People received positions under Lebedev and they received missions abroad from him. Why would they need perestroika? If we do not break up the structure, nothing will change.¹¹⁴⁶

The tactic of wait and see explicitly mentioned by Zlobin was not surprising: before undertaking reform, members of the party committee advanced prudently, all the more so since they did not necessarily know what was expected from them. In parallel, Zlobin also explained that the status quo at MGIMO was also deeply inscribed in the arrangement of the positions held by those who had been appointed under Brezhnev. By claiming that six to eight professors made up six positions of authority within the Institute, he argued that their monopoly over administrative and party positions hindered changes.

Zlobin also demonstrated how Lebedev succeeded in remaining in his position for more than ten years by providing privileges in terms of administrative responsibility or missions abroad in exchange for support. Kurbatov notes that when the new secretary Volodin was elected, the members of the Partyburo did not change: in other words, he relied on the same members of the party.

¹¹⁴⁴ Kurbatov, *MGIMO - naš dom*, 138.

¹¹⁴⁵ The Russian expression is: 'institut esli i ne sidit na meli, to očen' blizok k ètomu.'

¹¹⁴⁶ Protokoly N° 1-2 sobranâ partiijnogo aktiva MGIMO MID SSSR, [Transcripts N°1-2 of the meetings of the MGIMO party activists], 05/11/1986, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 5, delo 345, 33.

Certainly, the weight of the oldest members of the party organisation was important in the implementation of reforms. However, the statements of Vera Antúhina Moskovčenko during the party meeting reveal that some practices inherited from the past did not disappear. In line with the assumptions made by Nikofirov, she stressed that perestroika was going slowly because of 'its hidden opponents within the Institute and the sabotage of certain members'.¹¹⁴⁷

In 1985-86, members of the Institute found themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they were obliged to make the criticisms of the institution their own, follow the rule of party discipline, and proclaim the need for reform, even if some like Ivanov were not absolutely convinced of its necessity. In a press release published in *Meždunarodnik* by members of the party committee on 25 January 1986, they expressed their full support for perestroika, their loyalty to the CPSU and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and even justified the criticisms made against them. They agreed with the need for change:

Developing a creative approach towards problems, focusing our efforts in the implementation of the foreign policy elaborated by the Party, implementing deep changes in the economy of our country, and improving the training of meždunarodniki, who will become fighters on the ideological front, flag bearers of peace as defined by Lenin and international cooperation for the good of our homeland and brother countries: that is the moral duty of each of us.¹¹⁴⁸

Members of the MGIMO primary organisation never criticised either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the upper levels of the CPSU in the columns of *Meždunarodnik* between 1985 and 1991. On the contrary, the newspaper faithfully continued to publicise the criticisms against the Institute made by the upper levels of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.¹¹⁴⁹

On the other hand, members of the institution negotiated, both consciously and unconsciously, the reform by giving their own interpretation of perestroika and thus limiting its concrete effects within the Institute.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Meždunarodnik*, N°491, 25/01/1986, 1.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Meždunarodnik* N°544-545, 08/09/1988, 7.

When Šetin in related information about the evolution of teaching programmes in November 1986, it was apparent that not much had been achieved. The implementation of perestroika had led to an ‘individualised plan of studies’ for students, the organisation of teaching seminars for counter-propaganda, and a strong focus on foreign languages. Several potential lines of improvement concerning the teaching of foreign languages were identified: better use of basic grammatical constructions by students, a stronger focus on pronunciation, and improvement of translation skills.¹¹⁵⁰ Needless to say, this was far from the internal perestroika expected by Vice-minister Nikiforov.

The strong focus on foreign languages is not surprising. Indeed, one might argue that the focus on the activity of the foreign language departments was strategic: the percentage of members of the Communist Party here had always been lower than in the departments of political economy, history of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, and scientific communism, where all members had to be candidate-members and members of the Communist Party in order to teach. In July 1987, *Meždunarodnik* informed its readers that three members of the Russian language and literature department had been fired. Obviously, the hidden opponents of perestroika had been found.¹¹⁵¹

Between 1987 and 1988, the teaching reforms directed by the MGIMO Partkom continued, but not without hesitation. While both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the highest levels of the CPSU still called for deep reform to improve the education of Soviet diplomats, perestroika soon became a bone of contention, especially within the MGIMO primary organisation. As Ioulia Zaretskaïa-Balsente notes, perestroika continuously pushed the limits of critique further: while initially the critique was limited to Stalinism, it progressively extended to all aspects of the Soviet regime.¹¹⁵²

Indeed, the organisation of debates about the pace and direction of perestroika, where participants exposed different points of views about reform at the Institute and in the Soviet Union, went against the tradition of party discipline. Its unity was eroded as debates contradicted the founding principle of unanimity in decisions taken by the

¹¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁵¹ *Meždunarodnik*, N°520, 19/07/1987, 1.

¹¹⁵² Ioulia Zaretskaia-Balsente, ‘La Censure À L’époque de La Perestroika: Le Passé Surmonté? De La Symbiose Forcée À La Scission Inévitable’ 33, no. 1 (n.d.): 113–47.

Party. In *Meždunarodnik*, an announcement published on 1 September 1988 presented apologies from the party committee following articles by Sebko and Babin, two members of the primary party organisation who settled their differences publicly and criticised each other about the reforms at MGIMO. The announcement ended with a call for unity and pointed out the dangers of disunity within the primary organisation.¹¹⁵³

What is particularly striking is the rapidity with which changes occurred within the Institution after 1988 and how the official truth enunciated by the upper levels of the Communist Party could vary from one day to the next. Anna Barabanova, a professor of economics who graduated from MGIMO in 1986 and was a PhD student at this time, recalls:

I decided to go to Prague to write my PhD thesis. I chose a hot topic [...] and when I came back to the USSR in order to submit my dissertation, I was informed that it did not fit with the requirements. As my thesis did not correspond to the official statement of the Communist Party about Czechoslovakia, I was asked to rewrite it completely. This was in 1988. I refused because, first of all, I strongly disagreed with this comment and, secondly, I had just given birth to my first child: I had no time to resubmit it. Six months after, the Velvet Revolution began in Prague and my dissertation was proved to be true. I received a call from my supervisor, who asked me to defend my PhD dissertation. I successfully defended it and started work at MGIMO. This was in 1990.

For members of the primary party organisation, changes in official ideology mattered in the evolution of their views on perestroika, but the emergence of competing institutions inside MGIMO was also worrying. In September 1988, Sergej Vodolagin, a student at the faculty of international relations, announced the founding of a debating club independent of both the primary party organisation and the Komsomol. He explained that the aim was to deal with major social debates, especially about Stalinism. He stressed the independence of the new structure from the CPSU and that the founding of this new structure was a bottom-up initiative.

¹¹⁵³ *Meždunarodnik*, N°543, 01/09/1988, 1.

On 1 September and 1 December 1988, Manukovskij, a member of the primary party organisation and Hudâkov, a new secretary of the party organisation, took action with regards to this initiative. They argued that while it was necessary to respect diversity of opinion, the Party had a key role in the patriotic education of students. Marxism-Leninism was just one opinion among many others.

Paradoxical loyalties

The border between pro- and anti-Gorbachev opinions obviously became tenuous in the years 1988-89 at MGIMO, a fact true for all *meždunarodniki*. The diversity of views towards perestroika, how individuals showed their loyalty to the Communist Party, how they defined the correct foreign policy for the Soviet state, and how they connected their perception of perestroika and New Thinking with their experiences and knowledge of the foreign world need to be analysed.

Hirschman's book is undoubtedly useful in the analysis of the loyalty of individuals and groups towards organisations. The title of this work (*Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*) reveals alternative ways of reacting to dissatisfaction with organisations: one, 'exit', requires members to quit the organisation, while 'voice' refers to attempts to urge and exert influence for change 'from within.' The fact that Hirschman considers loyalty as a compromise between exit and voice is a problem that has been well identified by scholars.¹¹⁵⁴ Usually defined as a feeling of strong support, allegiance, or attachment, sociologists have also shown the variety of loyalties and how they might be highly paradoxical.¹¹⁵⁵ In a study on 'militant disengagement' in the French Communist Party, Catherine Leclerc convincingly proves how some militants still refer to themselves as communists despite having quit the Party: they left in order to create a new communist identity even more intransigent than that which had been required

¹¹⁵⁴ Guy Bajoit, 'Exit, Voice, Loyalty...and Apathy. Les Réactions Individuelles Au Mécontentement', *Revue Française de Sociologie* 29, no. 2 (1988): 325–45; Patrick Lehinque, 'L'éclipse de La Loyalty, Dans La Trilogie Conceptuelle d'A.O. Hirschman', in *La Loyauté Dans Les Relations Internationales*, L'Harmattan (Paris, 2010), 59–86.

¹¹⁵⁵ The term is from Yann Raison du Cleuziou's study of the variety of possible reactions related to loyalty: he defines these as situations of imbalance between the habitus of individuals and the institution to which they belong (*désajustement de l'habitus et une institution*). Yann Raison du Cleuziou, 'Des Fidélités Paradoxaes Recomposition Des Appartenances et Militantisme Institutionnel Dans Une Institution En Crise', in *Sociologie de L'institution* (Paris: Belin, 2011), 267–90.

from them previously.¹¹⁵⁶ In the present case, the term ‘loyalty’ is interesting in relation to how *meždunarodniki* referred to foreign countries in order to show their loyalty towards the CPSU.

From the interviews I conducted at MGIMO, the analysis of MGIMO alumni memoirs, and Mikhail Narinski’s article about the oral history of the Cold War,¹¹⁵⁷ I have identified four different groups of *meždunarodniki*, which I distinguish according to various criteria: whether they mention their membership in the Communist Party in their assessment of Gorbachev’s foreign policy and *perestroika*, the references to the West and the East they made, and how they considered New Thinking. While it is necessary to have a much larger group of interviewees to draw firmer conclusions, the results are nonetheless useful. Surprisingly, their perceptions of Gorbachev’s foreign policy do not seem to be based on a common year of graduation or a similar profession in foreign affairs. Gender also seems to be of little importance. They all had several experiences abroad, whether working within a Soviet embassy, being a visiting scholar, or participating in scientific or diplomatic missions.

¹¹⁵⁶ Catherine Leclercq, ‘Engagement et construction de soi. La carrière d’émancipation d’un permanent communiste’, *Sociétés contemporaines*, no. 84 (16 January 2012): 127–49.

¹¹⁵⁷ Narinski’s article is based on interviews of 40 protagonists in the Soviet foreign policy establishment (diplomats, service men, functionaries at the CC of CPSU) between 1985 and 1991 collected by the Hoover Institute at Stanford University and the Gorbachev Foundation. Mikhail Narinski, ‘Histoire Orale de La Fin de La Guerre Froide’, *Communisme* 74–75 (2003): 217–36.

Table 18: The disunity of meždunarodniki members of the CPSU towards New Thinking and perestroika after 1988 and their various uses of the West and the East

	Leaving the Communist Party		Remaining within the Communist Party	
	From socialism to liberalism	From socialism to realism	Orthodox socialists	Social democrats
Pro-Gorbachev in 1985	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pro-Gorbachev in 1988-89	No	No	No	Yes
Assessment of Gorbachev's foreign policy	A good orientation but limited developments	A risky foreign policy not based on the Soviet state's interests	Betrayal of the Soviet state's interests	Agreement with the search for peace, Europe as a common home
Assessment of the Communist Party under Gorbachev's rule	Incompatibility between the Communist Party and democracy	New Thinking and Perestroika as 'new dogmas'	'A traitor to communism and the Communist Party'	Experiencing 'true socialism'
Relationship to the West: inspiration, references, perceptions	The West as a horizon for democracy and a partner in foreign policy, the USA, economics	The West as a partner in negotiations in the international arena	Suspicion, the West as an enemy	European socialist parties as an inspiration, the European Union
Relationship to the East: inspiration, references, perceptions				Eastern European communist parties, the 1920s (Lenin, Plekhanov)
Meždunarodniki (interviewees, memoirs)	M. Borisov (1980); A. Kozyrev (1974)	I. Tûlin (1970); A. Lebedev (1953); V. Kitaev (1953); Roza Zamojskaâ (1952); Vladimir Kačalin (1952); V. Falin (1950)	I. Ivanov (1954); V. Maksimov; Antûhina Moskovčenko	M. Olegova (1972); I. Tarabančik (1970); A. Kamčatov; A. Silin (1952); A. Bel'čuk (1953); Georgij Kanaev

When studying the frontier between pro- and anti-Gorbachev opinions, it is noteworthy that the people I interviewed were all supportive of change in 1985. Even Ivanov, who claimed that MGIMO collectively rejected perestroika, stresses that he was enthusiast of Gorbachev's rise in March 1985.

However, positions rapidly changed around 1988 and 1989. The evolution of the Antûhina Moskovčenko's perception of perestroika is revealing. After having fully supported perestroika and Mikhail Gorbachev, Olegova recalls that Moskovčenko was fiercely hostile toward the reforms at domestic and international levels when things turned around and a divergence in opinions appeared:

She graduated from Leningrad University in the 1930s, while the struggle against Trotskyism raged. From this time, she inherited her stringency. She worked within MGIMO until 1989, where she taught the history of international relations. When she continued to teach students communist, aggressive, ultra-conservative opinions by arguing that perestroika was a mistake and that nothing should have changed in the USSR, the students, especially the foreign ones, just rose and left the lectures in crowds.

Ivanov, Maximov, and Antûhina Moskovčenko are demonstrative of how loyalty to the CPSU was stretched between 1985 and 1991. Portraying them as anti- or pro-Gorbachev does not really make really sense, as they both supported and resisted perestroika within a very short span of time. All of them had been in Western Europe on several occasions: furthermore, Antûhina Moskovčenko actively participated in the importation of bourgeois theories during the Brezhnev era, when she published the first handbook dedicated to theories of international relations with Zlobin and Hrustalëv in 1980.¹¹⁵⁸

What Olegova's statements reveal is that, for Antûhina Moskovčenko, serving the CPSU meant an absolute devotion to Gorbachev's reforms in 1985: she even suggested launching a witch hunt against hidden opponents and saboteurs in 1986. In a context when perestroika was not clearly defined, it was not 'painful' to respect party discipline and the new line proclaiming changes and a return to Lenin. In 1989,

¹¹⁵⁸ Antihina-Moskovčenko, Zlobin, and Hrustalev, *Osnovy Teorii Meždunarodnyh Otnošenij, Učebnoe Posobie* [The Main Theories of International Relations, A Handbook].

a new institutional framework marked by pluralism contrasted sharply with the one in place when she had joined the CPSU. Therefore, being loyal to both the CPSU and communist ideals meant exactly the opposite to what it had done in 1985: her conviction about what the party 'had to be' was in total contradiction with Gorbachev's rule. Resisting Gorbachev, considered a 'traitor' both to the interests of the Soviet state and the CPSU, meant staying loyal to the CPSU.

For Olegova, Tarabančik, and Kamčatov, the question of loyalty towards the Communist Party did not come into play after 1988. On the contrary, Olegova felt satisfaction and well-being, perhaps even happiness, with her involvement in the party meetings organised at MGIMO.¹¹⁵⁹ Alongside the fact that perestroika meant that she could develop her own teaching and research interests in line with the concept of a European common home, she also recalls that she felt she was experiencing true socialism during party meetings. She emphasises this by stating that the new situation within the CPSU broke with the usual monotony of party meetings during the Brezhnev era:

There was, of course, an absolutely new atmosphere at the party meetings. I want to remind you that the Communist Party was dissolved in 1991 after the coup. And absolutely all the issues associated with Gorbachev's perestroika, especially with new foreign policy thinking, were discussed at the Institute's party meetings. By the way, we had the party organisation mixed with the students, but at our overall Institute party conferences we discussed all the questions that people found it necessary to discuss. Naturally, everything revolved not so much around the new thinking in foreign policy, but we from the first were engaged in our internal affairs. Democratisation, freedom of departure from the Soviet Union (*vyezd*) – all these issues began to be discussed at MGIMO.

Just as with Tarabančik, who stresses that the USSR lost the Cold War to European social democracy and not to the USA, Olegova claims that her belief in communism did not contradict her knowledge of the West, which she associated principally with

¹¹⁵⁹ In their sociology of institutions, Jacques Lagroye and Johanna Siméant identify this feeling of happiness as a particular state of an individual who identifies with the institution and feels appreciated by it. Jacques Lagroye and Johanna Siméant, 'Gouvernement Des Humains et Légitimation Des Institutions', in *Etre Gouverné: Études En L'honneur de Jean Leca* (Paris: Presses de Sciences po, 2003), 53–71.

experiences of Western European socialism. There was no contradiction: indeed, she managed to integrate her knowledge of foreign socialist experiences, especially in France, with the values, ideals, and rhetoric of communism.

I can say of myself that I joined the Party by conviction: I thought that it was the way it should be and that communism had a bright future. Especially when in the 1970s in Italy and France there were all possible versions when the communists were in power together with the socialists – there were such *les lendemains qui chantent* [better tomorrows].

For her, Soviet diplomacy did its best to prevent military intervention in Eastern Europe: she considers the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union as the main achievement of both Ševarnadze and Gorbachev.

For those *meždunarodniki* I identify as moving from socialism to realism or from socialism to liberalism in their vision of Soviet foreign policy, belonging to the Communist Party and supporting Gorbachev had different meanings. In foreign affairs careers, party membership was a mass phenomenon because each diplomat had to be a member of the CPSU: one might wonder whether this situation fuelled *apathy* among members of the primary party organisation before and during perestroika. What is certain, however, is the fact that ‘militant disengagement’ began long before perestroika.

First Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and MGIMO graduate Kozyrev’s retrospective statements are certainly telling of those who moved from a socialist to a liberal vision of foreign affairs. In this sense, his perception of the West is very different from that of Olegova. After graduating from MGIMO in the 1970s, he joined the MID and was sent to the Soviet representation in the UN for a mission. While he claimed that he joined the Communist Party out of conviction in the 1970s, he describes ‘the shock’ that led to ‘an internal revolution’¹¹⁶⁰ when he read Pasternak’s *Doctor Zhivago* in New York’s Central Park in 1976. This intellectual shock was doubled by an economic one: he emphasised his first time in an American grocery store, where he discovered that ‘capitalists are normal people’ (*obyknovenye*

¹¹⁶⁰ Aven and Koh, *Revolúciã Gajdara*, 259.

lûdi).¹¹⁶¹ To this extent, his disengagement trajectory perfectly corresponds with Robert English's theory, which focuses on the role of the West for those who supported New Thinking. However, in the second part of perestroika, Kozyrev's apathy towards the CPSU and what groups of orthodox socialists and social democrats criticise today as a 'careerist' utilisation of party membership soon led him to the exit. He felt that perestroika was not going far enough. He mentions that Yeltsin's statements that 'democratic Russia has to be and will be as much of a true ally of the Western democratic countries as the Soviet Union was the enemy of the West' convinced Kozyrev to support him.¹¹⁶² His statements show the incompatibility he saw between the Communist Party and democracy, socialism, and the West. In 1990, he left the Soviet MID and the Communist Party to join the Ministry of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. It was not necessarily a disinterested choice. Even though the Russian MID was not as influential as the Soviet one,¹¹⁶³ it offered him many more career opportunities: he became the first minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation in 1991, a post he could not have expected if he had remained at the Soviet MID considering the slow career development there. Moreover, it is far from certain that Kozyrev's perception of the West was dominant at the MID. Kozyrev himself reports that he met fierce resistance from the diplomatic corps 'for political reasons' once he held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1992.¹¹⁶⁴

In contrast to the three aforementioned groups, what is particularly interesting about the fourth group of *meždunarodniki* was how they balanced their loyalty towards the Communist Party and that towards the Soviet state. The term '*loyalties*' in the plural seems much more appropriate for them. Just as in Kozyrev's case, they conveyed a sense of apathy towards the Communist Party and were not necessarily hostile to the West. However, they did not recognise themselves in Gorbachev's foreign policy, which they found to be idealist, dogmatic, and incompatible with the defence of the

¹¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁶² Ibid., 262.

¹¹⁶³ Anne de Tinguy, 'L'émergence de La Russie Sur La Scène Internationale', *Politique Étrangère* 57, no. 1 (1992): 49–61, doi:10.3406/polit.1992.4097.

¹¹⁶⁴ Kozyrev's statements about his return at the MID in 1992 are quoted in Ibos-Hervé, 'Les diplomates russes et la politique étrangère', 17.

Soviet state's interests, especially after 1989. For example, while Valentin Falin was for change in Soviet diplomacy, he wanted to keep the Soviet state.¹¹⁶⁵ He was born in the late 1920s and graduated from MGIMO in 1950. After his graduation, he joined the MID, where he became Soviet minister to West Germany between 1971 and 1978. Once back in Moscow, he held the position of deputy head at the International Information Department of the Central Committee between 1978 and 1982. Between 1989 and 1991, he was head of the International Department of the Central Committee. During perestroika, he supported Gorbachev, although not the means he employed in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy. Tulin at the MGIMO laboratory is another telling example of such a position among *meždunarodniki* who defined themselves as defenders of Soviet state's interests based on a realist vision of foreign affairs.

Among the *meždunarodniki*, the West was not perceived homogeneously: nor did a positive view of it necessarily contradict a feeling of loyalty to the Communist Party. However, after 1989, so-called bourgeois theories gained a totally new value at MGIMO.

Making new use of bourgeois theories: the foundation of a political sciences department at MGIMO in 1989

The foundation of a political sciences department had huge consequences for the teaching staff's hierarchy. The use of Western theories or books at MGIMO reveals that they not only depended on the social context, which restricted or opened the field of possibilities in research and academic practices, but also that they were related to a young generation of professors who strategically promoted new criteria of objectivity to legitimise their academic positions. Although some bourgeois theories had been taught since the 1960s, in the context of perestroika they gained a completely new value and therefore a new use in MGIMO's academic life.

¹¹⁶⁵ Valentin Falin's memoirs about MGIMO are quoted in Rostislav Sergeev, Igor' Hohlov, and Anatolij Torkunov, *Na časaх vozle Krymskogo mosta*, 211.

MGIMO was one of the first educational institutions in the Soviet Union to open a department of political sciences in 1989. Its establishment reveals two interrelated processes: debates on the nature of Marxism and the organisation of semi-pluralist elections in 1988 progressively caused problems for both the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Not only did new disciplines emerge, but new criteria in both scientific objectivity and the structure of the teaching staff's hierarchy were also promoted.

Far from being accepted by the teaching staff as a whole, the new department was sharply criticised by the most conservative members of the Communist Party. While Marxist-Leninist ideology was no longer the official truth that guided academic programmes, Alexandrov, Vladimirova, and Olegova, who all were young assistant professors in philosophy or history, insist on the highly controversial nature of this department's foundation.

In contrast to the people they defined as the most conservative members of the CPSU, these three professors assert their lack of contact with Marxist ideology. For example, Vladimirova observes that:

I was pretty satisfied to finally have the possibility to say aloud what I really thought about the Stalinist repressions and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. It was clear to me that it was not possible to analyse foreign policy and its further development without referring to what was an open secret.¹¹⁶⁶

Marina Olegova recounts a similar story related to historical debates around the Prague Spring during the Gorbachev era. Even though she was a young member of the Communist Party, she opposed to a biased presentation of this controversial episode of Soviet history:

I do remember the master's degree thesis defence of a student whose work dealt with the Prague Spring during the summer 1989. The highest levels of the CPSU

¹¹⁶⁶ **Interviewee:** Elena Vladimirova. **Date:** [05/03/2011] **Location:** MGIMO **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 45 minutes.

had not yet formulated an official position on this burning topic. The student was right to base his work on the new sources he collected from newspapers. At that time, there still were plenty of conservatives at the Institute, and when they started to discuss his mark, he got a bad report. Even though I was quite a young assistant professor, I raised objections.

The debates and controversies around the foundation of the political sciences department reveal that the competition for jobs was tough in the disciplines of history, international relations, and philosophy. Far from being purely intellectual debates, the controversial discussions dealt with the definition of new criteria of objectivity in the social sciences, which is why they had huge consequences for the criteria imposed during the appointment of new professors.

The emergence of new criteria of objectivity in the social sciences cannot be considered a sheer coincidence: some professors who were both convinced and interested in their promotion supported them. The sociological features of the teaching staff of this new department were different from those in the traditional departments of the history of the CPSU and scientific Marxism Leninism. The opening of job positions in this new discipline led to the recruitment of professors who seem to have been selected according to new criteria that fit with novel academic and research requirements. In order to depict an archetype of these new members of the MGIMO teaching staff, four tell-tale characteristics should be pointed out in particular.

First, because the average age of the appointees was between 30 and 40, the new recruits were mainly young assistant professors (*docent*). This is in contrast to those departments of political sciences founded after the collapse of the USSR, which had to recruit former professors of Marxism-Leninism. As Ūrij Aleksandrov noted:

In contrast to other departments founded after 1991 in the Russian Federation, our department of political sciences was free of several work commitments: we had *carte blanche*. We took advantage of this situation because we had the opportunity to recruit members who perfectly matched our academic expectations. We had no cultural baggage, no tradition, and no old professors.

Secondly, thanks to the support of the MGIMO administration (Torkunov and TŪlin), professors who did not graduate from the Institute progressively entered the new

departments.¹¹⁶⁷ This phenomenon even spread across other departments after 1991. When MGIMO introduced tuitions fees from 1988, the Institute became capable of attracting and paying professors from the Academy of Sciences or Moscow State University, where wages had decreased considerably because of the collapse.

Thirdly, these new professors were often familiar with overseas countries and had contacts with foreign academics. Aleksandrov, a visiting professor at Berkley University in 1992 and 1994, insists on this specific aspect of recruitment: ‘We could recruit young assistant professors who had contacts overseas. In my view, this was most important.’ Vladimirovna shows the connection between her disaffection with the Communist Party and her knowledge of French scientific works: ‘My cultural baggage was composed of reading French newspapers, the *Revue des Annales*, and the books of Claude Lévi Strauss. In other words, I used to read everything that was published abroad and not in the USSR.’

Behind this new recruitment based on the criteria of objectivity in the social sciences, the traditional timeline of career plan in academic and research fields in Russia also changed after 1988. Those who had not had the opportunity to attain the rank of professor took advantage of the situation by preparing another doctoral dissertation (*doktorskaja dissertacija*) in the political sciences. Not surprisingly, both Hrustalëv and Tûlin were among the first assistant professors to defend a dissertation in political sciences at the Institute in 1990.¹¹⁶⁸ This phenomenon probably intensified after the downfall of the USSR, allowing for the formation of new expectations about being able to obtain the most prestigious jobs within the Institute.

As new criteria of objectivity in the social sciences were selected and new job positions opened within the MGIMO, contacts with international academia emerged as a useful resource for these newcomers, leading to what was known as the internationalisation of the teaching staff. Knowing and using Western research, taking part in academic conferences or publishing abroad, being invited as a visiting professor to a Western university – all of these activities were doubly advantageous.

¹¹⁶⁷ **Interviewee:** Ūrij Aleksandrov. **Date and Time:** [30/05/2011] **Location:** Higher School of Economics **Length of the interview:** 40 minutes.

¹¹⁶⁸ Čečevišnikov, ‘40 Let IMI’; Hrustalev, ‘Dve Vetvi TMO v Rossii [Two Branches of IR Theory in Russia]’.

First, they allowed new professors of political science to distance their scientific works from Marxism Leninism. By referring to Western research, they explicitly stood up for the pluralism of opinions in knowledge. They cast opprobrium on both the conservative and hegemonic aspects of Marxist ideology in order to better promote the novelty and legitimacy of their approaches. This situation is completely different to that which had prevailed at MGIMO before 1985. Before the Gorbachev era, Western theories were presented as something lower than Marxism-Leninism, but now they were used to contest the supremacy of the official ideology and the authority of the Communist Party over the social sciences.

Whereas most of the education given to students before the Gorbachev era was based on a historical approach to international relations, new theories and teaching methodologies were openly and positively mobilised after 1988. As Aleksandrov has stated, ‘when we elaborated new teaching programmes at the department of political sciences, we gave priority to the “Western mainstream”. Numerous professors had already taught abroad.’ Partnership agreements concluded between MGIMO and foreign institutions and universities, such as the Georgetown School of Diplomacy, the Helsinki School of Economics, and the Paris Chamber of Commerce, gave credibility to new methods of teaching from outside the USSR.¹¹⁶⁹ Role-playing games and oral presentations were progressively introduced into teaching programmes.

At the same time, in defending the need for new criteria of objectivity in the social sciences based on foreign exemplars, the younger generation of the MGIMO teaching staff developed a common corps career strategy corresponding with their own objective interests. Quoting foreign research, they not only tried to reverse the old hierarchy within the MGIMO teaching staff, but also established new criteria for accessing old and new job positions and restricting the number of potential new entrants. In requiring from professors a perfect knowledge of Western theories and languages that were once marginal, new barriers and criteria in career development were established.

¹¹⁶⁹ MGIMO Alumni yearbook : *Vypusniki MGIMO MID SSSR 1988-1991*, Moskva, 2007, p. 6.

As a result of two different processes, the internationalisation of the MGIMO teaching staff reveals the specific dynamic of the academic and research fields in Russia from 1985 to 1991 and the development of new strategies undertaken by a specific category of the teaching staff. The trajectories of some of the professors are quite relevant for explaining the scale of the changes incurred by perestroika. Some of those who did not possess the criteria necessary before 1985, such as the CPSU membership, could finally access formerly unattainable job positions in an academic world structured and directed by new rules.

Staying at or leaving MGIMO

Perestroika at MGIMO did not bring consensus. However, after the passage of the law on cooperative societies on 26 May 1987, the introduction of free market mechanisms within Soviet society offered several new opportunities to MGIMO members. Not only did the administration have the possibility of raising new funds by developing fee-based academic programmes, but students could also find jobs outside the ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade by collaborating with multinational companies or developing their own businesses. On the one hand, the extent to which the competence in law, economics, and foreign languages the *meždunarodniki* had developed from the Brezhnev era was related to the need for new specialists following the introduction of the free market mechanisms is striking. On the other, these important changes announced the end of MGIMO's role in the training of a party nobility within the Soviet Union.

Even if it is still difficult to give an accurate number of departures from the institution, the distinction made by Pierre Bourdieu between *the sciences of power* (law, economy) and *the sciences on power* (history, sociology, political sciences) is relevant for understanding the differences in the careers of the teaching staff when new opportunities emerged.¹¹⁷⁰ While the need for specialists in foreign affairs in the developing private sector grew, some professors and assistant professors in the sciences of power were tempted to resign in order to get a job in a Western

¹¹⁷⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, 1 edition (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1984), 96.

multinational company or to create their own small businesses. Unlike professors of history, philosophy, or sociology, lawyers, economists, and linguists had more opportunities to apply their academic knowledge outside the educational institution.

Some circumstances were already in favour of such important changes within the MGIMO teaching staff. As mentioned in the previous part of the dissertation, the scope of the topics chosen by PhD students showed more in-depth knowledge of certain aspects of Western, socialist, and Third World countries. Paradoxical though it may seem, dissertations in marketing and management were defended at the MGIMO during the Brezhnev era. Although they always took a critical view on the capitalist bloc, these theses contributed to the importation of new types of indigenous knowledge, which gained new meaning and value only in the second half of the perestroika period, when elements of the free market were introduced into the Soviet economy.¹¹⁷¹

The contrast between Barabanova's and Olegova's statements is revealing of the very different career opportunities they had at the end of perestroika and the beginning of the Yeltsin era. Barabanova recalls that the knowledge of economics learnt at MGIMO was what was required by the foreign companies setting up in Moscow:

When the market economy was growing in the USSR, a lot of young PhD students decided to leave the Institute. We had a crucial advantage: we knew foreign languages and foreign companies were looking for people like us. Many colleagues left. I also tried and had several appointments and interviews. For instance, I applied for a job at the Coca Cola Company.

For Olegova, being a professor of history offered far fewer opportunities:

In the early 1990s, people just ran into business. By the way, different people started doing business: well, imagine an average associate professor of the department of history – what does he understand about business? Nevertheless, everybody did it

¹¹⁷¹ I Rožkov, 'Osovennosti reklamnoj deat'losti na kapitaličeskom rynke v sovremennyh usloviâh' (MGIMO, 1983); A. Gorâčev, 'Metody marketinga vo vnešnetorgovyh operaciâh na rynke èlektronnyh komponentov' (MGIMO, 1984); A. Kuricyn, 'Vnutrifirmenoe upravlenie v promyšlennyh kompaniâh Âponii' (MGIMO, 1985).

because it was impossible to even call for a serviceman to fix something in the house. The pension of my parents was more than my salary here, can you imagine?

Knowledge mattered, but some MGIMO professors and graduates also had networks, which grew in importance with the structural reforms engaged by Mikhail Gorbachev. Professors of foreign languages in particular had already collaborated with institutions such as the Supreme Council, the Committee of Councils for Youth (*Komitet moloděžnyh sovetov*), and the World Trade Chamber (*Torgovaâ meždunarodnaâ palata*). These contacts were all the more important when career perspectives changed to a considerable extent. In a changing society, networks and new competencies were crucial.

This holds true both for teachers and for MGIMO graduates. Vladimir Potanin's biography is again an interesting example of the opportunities students and professors had after 1988.¹¹⁷² After he graduated from the faculty of international economy at MGIMO in 1983, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, where he worked at the Central Purchasing Agency (*Soûzpromèksport*). In 1990, he quit the public sector in order to create his own private association for foreign trade (*Interros*). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he became one of the most famous oligarchs, buying the company MMC Norilsk Nickel with Mikhail Prokhorov. He finally became first deputy of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in 1997.

The duality of change among disciplines shows the transition of a social space: this transition was characterised by the introduction of economic capital as an element in the social hierarchy after 1988. The paradox lies in the fact that *meždunarodniki* were not necessarily all supportive of perestroika, even though they had the best resources for professional retraining in the growing market economy.¹¹⁷³ To some extent, the departure of teachers of law, economics, and foreign languages from MGIMO was also the precursor for the end the Institute's role in training of a party nobility, which could no longer make sense once the USSR disappeared.

¹¹⁷² Taratuta, 'Vladimir Potanin: «Bez Kompleksov Govorû, Čto Byl «blatnym»'.

¹¹⁷³ Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova, and Richard Anderson, 'Russia — Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983–1993', *Theory and Society* 24, no. 5 (1 October 1995): 639–68, doi:10.1007/BF00993401; Raviot, 'L'ère Brejnev: La Mutation Des Élités (1965-1985)'.

Surviving the Soviet state

Until 1991, the MGIMO was, along with the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the faculty of international relations at Kiev University, a unique place where Soviet students could receive interdisciplinary knowledge in international relations. However, this monopoly disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Anatolij Torkunov, the new rector, declared on 1 December 1992 that ‘many institutions of higher education opened faculties and departments similar to MGIMO, inside of which are trained lawyers, economists, and journalists specialised in international relations.’¹¹⁷⁴

The fall of the system of party nobility was not only due to the emergence of new structures dedicated to the teaching of international relations. Kamčatov convincingly stressed two phenomena which called into question the role of MGIMO in the training of the Russian elite. He noted:

MGIMO does not have the same prestige it once did. Nowadays, high-ranking civil servants do not send their children to MGIMO but to the West, to Cambridge, Oxford, and the American universities. Over there, they learn foreign languages and other disciplines. Once there was only MGIMO and, after graduation, future diplomats could spend a comfortable life in Switzerland, France, and elsewhere. Nowadays, a second type of student studies at MGIMO, the first type being in France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States of America.¹¹⁷⁵

Obviously, the sociological profile of MGIMO students changed after the Soviet collapse. The disappearance of the Soviet system for distributing privileges also rendered diplomatic careers far less attractive:

Once MGIMO was an anteroom for a career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was a very prestigious organisation. The Ministry provided accommodation for its functionaries and they had the right to travel outside the Soviet bloc.

¹¹⁷⁴ *Meždunarodnik*, N°635, 1992, 1.

¹¹⁷⁵ **Interviewee:** Alexej Kamčatov. **Date:** [15/04/2011] **Location:** at the interviewee's home **Length of interview:** 1 hour and 8 minutes.

Nowadays, the Ministry does not provide accommodation for its youngest workers and their wages are so low that they cannot afford to buy one. That is reason one why the students who graduate from MGIMO do not aspire anymore to a career at the Ministry but in the private/commercial sector.

Once the state and party institutions lost their monopoly on the allocation of travel abroad, new careers in the private sector seemed much more attractive.

In contrast to educational institutions founded after the downfall of the USSR, such as the Higher College of Economics (HCE, *Vysšaâ Škola èkonomiki*), MGIMO faced a crisis of legitimacy both in the very last years of the Gorbachev era and the first years of the Yeltsin era. How could an institution whose function it was to educate specialists in foreign affairs in the peculiar context of the closed Soviet Union survive the collapse? The rewriting of MGIMO's official history was a useful resource for redefining MGIMO's place in the new regime. After 1991, MGIMO insisted on the unity of its teaching staff and the logical transition from one regime to another.

In October 1992 and 1993, the MGIMO celebrated the anniversary of its foundation. These two events were special occasions on which to analyse the ways MGIMO defined its place in the new regime. Far from rejecting its Soviet past, MGIMO's administration put emphasis on the cohesion and logical development of its own history. In celebrating the origins of the Institute, Anatolij Torkunov declared: 'The first generation of MGIMO students put a human face on the Institute. It laid the foundation for student brotherhood, respect, and pride towards our *alma mater*. We take our hats off to the first professors who took part into the creation of this singular and beloved institution. Most of the students and professors of this first generation are not among us today. We will not forget them.'¹¹⁷⁶

In contrast to other educational institutions like the HCE, MGIMO did not use the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to create an objective approach to international relations. The French sociologist Carole Sigman has noticed that, at the HCE, the first recruited professors were not economists.¹¹⁷⁷ Because the HCE

¹¹⁷⁶ Mezhdunarodnik, N°634, 20/11/1992, 1.

¹¹⁷⁷ Carole Sigman, 'Le Haut College D'économie : École de Commerce, Université et Think Tank, Zoom Sur Les Universités Russes', *IFRI, Centre Russie/NEI*, n.d.

administration judged the economists educated at Moscow University to be too close to Marxist ideology, it decided to recruit mathematicians and engineers who were introduced to economics only after the collapse of the USSR. Unlike MGIMO, the HCE did not base its legitimacy on Soviet history: it used the break between the old and new regimes to forge an objective approach to teaching.

Alumni yearbooks help us to analyse the ways in which MGIMO considered Soviet history after the downfall of the USSR. They declare: 'MGIMO's collective unity and its tenacity in developing the Institute while at the same time respecting the state's interests enabled it to go through the collapse peacefully'. They also underscore: 'The MGIMO teaching staff freed itself from Marxist-Leninist dogma without any difficulties. Conferences and seminars became more popular and interesting. Students and professors established new relationships. They were more open, without complexities, and were tolerant for the sake of all of us.'¹¹⁷⁸

Behind this rewriting of the institution's history, two elements were especially disregarded after 1991. First, MGIMO's staff cohesion and homogeneity was certainly less important than the alumni yearbooks pretend. As seen before, perestroika was perceived and used in different ways with regards to a wide range of social criteria such as age, CPSU membership, and the discipline taught. Secondly, the rewriting of MGIMO's official history was elaborated according to new criteria related to the requirements of the present. Insisting that Western theories were an important part of teaching at MGIMO before 1985 should not hide the paradoxical nature of their use. Known at MGIMO since the 1960s, Western theories and approaches became dominant only in the second part of the Gorbachev era. Behind the common terms 'MGIMO' and 'perestroika', there were plenty of realities and interpretations between 1985 and 1991. Far from being a logical continuum, MGIMO's history is composed of several temporalities which are not necessarily reflected in its official history book.

In this institutional history, which privileged an approach to Soviet history as a whole and denied that perestroika was an important moment for the Institute, the former

¹¹⁷⁸ Alumni Yearbooks, (1988-1991), *op.cit.*, 13.

members of the Communist Party I interviewed delineated their retrospective and subjective statements towards perestroika.

Like the internationalisation of the teaching staff, the subjective perception of the pace of transition from the Soviet to the Russian regimes is the result of both objective and strategic dynamics. Whereas some criteria, such as membership in the Communist Party, lost their relevance in a social space structured by new rules, some who had once held top positions within MGIMO thanks to their fidelity to Marxism-Leninism felt threatened by the new generation of professors who emphasised foreign scientific works.

At MGIMO, interpretations of perestroika were various: some of the actors of this period today deny that the Gorbachev era had a key role in the development of MGIMO. By minimising the impact of perestroika, their statements are close to those in MGIMO's official history. Those who had held high positions within the Communist Party were the most critical of Gorbachev and the most insistent about the Soviet past of MGIMO. In their view, the Gorbachev era was not as important as the foundation of the Institute under the Soviet regime. By contrast, those who had taken advantage of perestroika by getting jobs they could not have had without Gorbachev's reforms were the most enthusiastic and talkative. They insisted on the key role of Marxist ideology before 1985 and the conservatism of the older professors who had become members of the Communist Party in order to advance their careers. They set an important distinction between the old and new regimes, between past and present, and were tempted to consider the collapse of the USSR as a point zero in MGIMO's history.

Among the former members of the Communist Party, different discursive strategies were developed in order to find a legitimate social position in the new Russian regime. Three different examples are to be pointed out.

Whereas CPSU membership became a political stigma after 1991, some of the former communists of the MGIMO Partkom claimed to be representatives of Mikhail Gorbachev's liberal supporters. For example, Olegova's statements show the ways in which some professors and assistant professors distinguished themselves from conservative members of the Communist Party after 1991. She has declared that the collapse of the USSR put an end to her political involvement. In contrast to the Soviet

period, she insists on the need for different points of view to be included in teaching programmes. In her view, the downfall of the USSR led to an important distinction between her private and public practices: while she continued to teach at MGIMO, her political opinions remained in the private sphere.

Ivanov and Maximov, who both had positions of responsibility within the Communist Party and were around 60 when the USSR disappeared, developed different discursive strategies relating to the perestroika period. In their view, their practices of researching and teaching did not change because of the Gorbachev era. Vladimir Maximov argues that ‘academic programmes changed slowly. Those who taught Communist Party history were the same as those who taught Russian history after 1991. Did my political opinion change in 1991? Absolutely not.’¹¹⁷⁹ He insisted on the stability and continuity of his professional practice between the two regimes: ‘Once, I received a call from someone who was interested in my publications. We had an interview in my office at MGIMO. He asked me, why, in contrast to other historians, did I not change my teaching and research approaches after the Gorbachev era? I answered that, in contrast to other historians, I could not change my opinions so easily.’ Ivan Ivanov had similar reasoning, denying that perestroika had any impact on the Institute. He paradoxically insists on the lack of ideology at MGIMO during the Soviet period: ‘We are true professors and we do not change our point of view because of political requirements. A large number of us study international relations not from books and newspapers, but from archives. It is only when the Russian presidential administration gave us access to new sources that we changed our teaching.’ In their view, the influence of perestroika as a breaking point between two regimes should not be overestimated.

Behind this variety of perceptions on the Gorbachev era, the choices actors have made when forming their own chronologies of events reveal how qualifying the pace of transition is highly strategic. Saying that ‘everything has changed’ or ‘nothing has changed’ since 1985, the actors of this period reflect not only their objective

¹¹⁷⁹ **Interviewee:** Vladimir Maksimov. **Date:** [18/04/2011] **Location:** at the interviewee’s home **Length of interview:** 2 hours and 40 minutes.

trajectories in line with the Soviet past, but also the variety of strategies they have developed to better define their place in a new Russian regime, just as the Institute itself did.

CONCLUSION

Once the state and party institutions lost their monopoly on the allocation of travel abroad, new social categories in the Soviet and Russian population gained access to the West at the end of the 1980s. In his book *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More*, Alexei Yurchak details that ‘when many Soviets first travelled to Western Europe, between 1988 and 1990, they were particularly impressed not by a glimpse of Western cars or the variety of food in shops, as the West had expected, but by a sudden realization that the real West was somehow ordinary’.¹¹⁸⁰ The scholar convincingly argues that the West represented an elsewhere of socialism during the Soviet epoch, the position of which was both internal and external to late Soviet culture. He argues that the first experience of a Western country was quite disappointing compared to the imaginary America and Europe, ‘a whimsical, adventurous space, full of fanciful names, sounds, images and knowledge’.¹¹⁸¹

For numerous *meždunarodniki* trained at MGIMO, there was nothing particularly imaginary about the West: they did not discover it only at the end of the 1980s. Nonetheless, the statements of Marina Olegova about her travels in the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union reveal much about the changes of perception that occurred among the *meždunarodniki* with regard to their own society and the place they occupied within it in the 1990s. She reveals how little the new Russian travellers partly described by Yurchak had in common with the *meždunarodnik* trained at MGIMO:

In the 1990s, I was ashamed when travelling abroad because our compatriots behaved awfully overseas. I recall that when I was in France and when I visited King’s College in Great Britain in 1997, I had to explain: ‘I am an old Russian, I am not a new Russian.’ Then, they asked: what is an old Russian? I answered that it is someone educated in the tradition of decency (*v tradiciâh èlementarnoj porâdočnosti*), someone who follows the Commandments (*čelovek, kotoryj priznaval zapovedi*).

¹¹⁸⁰ Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More - The Last Soviet Generation*, 205.

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid.

While Olegova presented herself as an atheist, her use of the terms *porâdočnost'* and *zapovedi*, the latter a direct reference to the Ten Commandments, sheds light on the hybrid character of both aristocratic values and communist ethics that were a pillar of *meždunarodniki* identity during the Cold War. By stressing the contrast between old and new Russians, she admits that she did not recognise compatriots in the categories of the population who were given the opportunity to travel abroad in 1991.

Between 1943 and 1991, MGIMO was endowed with the mission of training flag-bearers of communist ideals and the Soviet state's interests: its graduates were the *meždunarodniki*, whom I identify as a party nobility in this dissertation. By using this term, I rejected two juxtaposed visions of MGIMO, which consider the institution either as an insular crucible of expertise connected to the West or as a breeding ground of the elite, who cynically and exclusively sought to reproduce its interests and therefore the existing social order. Party nobility is useful as a concept, as it shows the hybrid character of the *meždunarodniki* and their non-linear history during the Cold War.

In the first and second parts of the dissertation on ennobling a body of people, I argued that it took almost 15 years for MGIMO to be finally recognised as the foremost school for specialists in Soviet diplomacy. Once only one option among many, the institution now sat at the very core of the Cold War enterprise. Obviously, MGIMO's monopoly on foreign careers could never be absolute: when dealing with technical fields such as physics, agronomy, or geology, the Soviet Union often sent specialists in these subjects who were trained at institutions like Moscow State University.¹¹⁸² Moreover, the MID continued to recruit several of its ambassadors from among the party elite even during the Gorbachev era. However, from the Khrushchev era onwards, MGIMO was without a doubt the principal institution for training diplomatic specialists.

The distinctiveness of MGIMO among other Soviet institutions was connected to the distinctiveness of its graduates within Soviet society. The first part of this thesis

¹¹⁸² Gottemoeller and Langer, *Foreign Area Training and Utilization in the Soviet Union*, 42.

sought to identify the specificity of *meždunarodniki* by looking at the categories traditionally used by scholars to define MGIMO graduates, such as ‘expert’ or ‘elite’. On the one hand, I argued that students at MGIMO acquired not only technical knowledge related to foreign affairs, but also social and political skills. *Meždunarodniki* understood that they had a specific role to play within Soviet society and felt united by much more than common expertise in foreign affairs. On the other hand, knowledge did not guarantee social success and a MGIMO degree did not spontaneously make the *meždunarodniki* into an elite.

The regular mention of MGIMO as a *Tsarskoe Selo* or a ‘political institution of higher education’ in both alumni memoirs and the minutes of the MGIMO primary party organisation reflect the strategy implemented by the upper levels of the Communist Party and Soviet state to train of a specific body of people dedicated to foreign affairs in the context of the Cold War. When led by Molotov, the MID hoped to educate a new generation of flag-bearers for communist ideals and Soviet interests on the international scene; however, the question of their loyalty pushed the MID to employ innovative techniques to train this distinctive social group. The term ‘party nobility’ demonstrates this hybridisation of aristocratic manners and communist ethics.

The second part of this dissertation strove to discuss how the *meždunarodniki* succeeded in gaining and maintaining their position in foreign affairs within a Soviet system which had long privileged purges and regular waves of replacements as HR policy. I argued that, in diplomatic careers, there was no ‘premium on skills, on productivity, on performances instead of political adroitness and ideological orthodoxy.’¹¹⁸³ I also stressed the need to take into account the concrete institutional context of both the numerous rivals of MGIMO and the set of institutions its graduates had access to from Stalin to Khrushchev in the context of peaceful coexistence.

The success of the *meždunarodniki* and the specific place occupied by MGIMO were the results of a wide range of factors related to the Thaw. The establishment of clear

¹¹⁸³ Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction*, new edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 5.

career paths, the reduction of institutions dedicated to the training of diplomatic specialists, and the blossoming of Détente created a favourable environment in which the *meždunarodniki* could individually and collectively advance their careers. Paradoxically, the identity and specific skills they had acquired during the Stalin era were of paramount importance for moving up the social ladder during the Thaw and then remaining at the top.

From 1956, the *meždunarodniki* finally became a recognised social group. Their influence was growing, as they were able to act through a powerful set of institutions related to foreign affairs. The abilities of the *meždunarodniki*, who now had an almost inherent right to occupy positions of authority, would not be put into question until the Gorbachev era.

Khrushchev's rise to power brought fundamental changes in the training of *meždunarodniki* at MGIMO: Parts III and IV aimed at analysing the impact of these changes through the notion of nobility of character. The third part dealt with the invention of distinct ways of thinking and behaving related to the surge of new ideas in MGIMO's everyday life. I argued that with a rapidly growing number of students enrolled in overseas internships, the question of the coexistence of official ideology and bourgeois theories in the Institute took a new turn at the end of the 1950s. The obligation to test the fidelity of students sent to the capitalist bloc led to the implementation of new teaching strategies. However, changes in teaching programmes cannot be analysed simply as the result of a new openness towards the West: the development of sharp criticisms from non-Soviet students against the Soviet Union brought new burning issues to the fore. This fact was much more worrying for members of the party primary organisation because this wave of new ideas was often related to both major internal evolutions within the Soviet regime and diplomatic changes across the entire socialist bloc. They put into question the authority of texts once perceived as objective, such as *Pravda*.

In the 1960s, by including both bourgeois and revisionist theories in teaching programmes, the goal was clearly to control and limit the diffusion of ideas hostile to the Soviet regime. Following the introduction of this completely new approach, students' schedules were modified in order to increase the number of seminars at the

expense of lectures: a new praxis of foreign affairs emerged at MGIMO based on the idea that the Institute was a socialist camp in miniature.

In October 1964, when Brezhnev came to power, the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge had little in common with the institution it had been following Stalin's death: its powerful alumni network sat at the very heart of the Cold War. However, despite generational changes, *meždunarodniki* still had at least one important thing in common: both in the 1950s and the 1960s, what united these very different generations was the shared idea of a specific social role within Soviet society based on a system of beliefs, values, and behaviours inherited from their years at the Institute. A crucial step for maintaining a stable intergenerational framework that allowed the *meždunarodniki* to keep the upper hand in the implementation of Soviet foreign policy was the emergence of dynasties at MGIMO during the Brezhnev era.

By exploring the mechanisms of social reproduction at MGIMO under Brezhnev, I argued that corruption in Soviet society during the 1970s and 80s¹¹⁸⁴ in terms of the selection of applicants, the teaching process, and the job assignment procedure meant that the specific political and academic skills required from students, as well as the specific praxis of foreign affairs, favoured the children of *meždunarodniki*.

The teaching of international relations theory, understood as a new discipline in 1973, was deeply inscribed in the praxis of foreign affairs which had appeared under Khrushchev. Clearly, the new approaches developed at the MGIMO research laboratory were also an important turning point in the history of the institution. They revealed the creativity of researchers, who knew how to make use of foreign theories and how to promote them among the diplomats of the MID. These new models were distinct from orthodox Marxism-Leninism, but had little in common with the New Thinking that appeared after Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985.

¹¹⁸⁴ William Clark argues that, during the Brezhnev era, the very functioning of the Soviet economy made it more efficient to use bribes rather than the formal channels for the allocation of resources, which paved the way for a wide series of informal arrangements among the elite that in many instances supplanted the formal institutions of the Soviet state. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom*, 12; Favarel-Garrigues, 'La Bureaucratie Policière et La Chute Du Régime Soviétique'; Kondratieva, 'Les Régimes Dans Les Entreprises Soviétiques', 135.

Lastly, by focusing on the Gorbachev era in the last part of the dissertation and the idea of serving the Communist Party and the Soviet state, I argued that perestroika was a contradictory period for the *meždunarodniki* and that they did not all support New Thinking in foreign affairs.

On the one hand, both the MGIMO and *meždunarodniki* had obviously and paradoxically paved the way for Gorbachev's perestroika. Intellectual-history-centered approaches which emphasise the role of several MGIMO alumni (especially Inozemcev at IMEMO and Arbatov at the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies) rightly highlight the importance of the Soviet institutional basis of foreign affairs and overseas contacts in the maturation of New Thinking. However, what the pro-Gorbachev *meždunarodniki* had gained at the Institute on the Krymskij Bridge was not only to do with regular contacts with the West, which, as was seen in Parts I and III of the dissertation, were almost non-existent during the Stalin era and very closely controlled during both the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev eras. What was definitely much more important in the maturation and implementation of perestroika was the fact that all these different generations of *meždunarodniki* were persuaded that they had a distinct role to play within Soviet society in general and in foreign affairs in particular. Having ideas mattered, but benefiting from a specific social position in the field of foreign affairs was of paramount importance. *Meždunarodniki* belonged to what Archie Brown calls 'within-system reformers',¹¹⁸⁵ what Alexander Shtromas refers to as 'instructural dissent',¹¹⁸⁶ what Pëtr Cherkasov identifies in a more critical way as 'liberal conformists',¹¹⁸⁷ and what I identify as the party nobility. Feeling themselves to be a specific social group within Soviet society, acquiring a sense of the functioning of the Soviet state during their studies, and having the required resources, both in an intellectual sense and in institutional terms ranging from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Central Committee and IMEMO, some of the *meždunarodniki* were able to promote change and implement it within diplomacy. The positions within the state and party apparatuses they obtained during the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev

¹¹⁸⁵ Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, 164.

¹¹⁸⁶ Shtromas, *Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union*, 75.

¹¹⁸⁷ Cherkasov, *IMÉMO*, 356.

eras gave them the opportunity to play a significant part in the changes orchestrated by Gorbachev after 1985.

On the other hand, a great majority of *meždunarodniki*, including those who implemented Gorbachev's reforms, were certainly looking for a different kind of perestroika, one which would have meant keeping the Soviet state while liquidating the Soviet regime. Regular contact with the West did not result automatically in *the* perestroika conducted by Gorbachev, so often presented by scholars as the inexorable victory of the light of reason or the triumph of pragmatism over ideology.

Firstly, pointing out the West as the only factor for the changes related to New Thinking often masks the idealist character of Gorbachev's diplomacy and the fact that it was based on the influence of Eastern European reforms, the diplomatic experience of the Soviet Union in the 1920 and 30s, and the close ties between the CPSU and Western European communist and socialist parties. Secondly, what few among the *meždunarodniki* understood in 1985 was the sheer pace of the changes that the new General Secretary was willing to introduce into Soviet diplomacy. At the same time when numerous *meždunarodniki* occupied key positions within the Soviet diplomatic apparatus, MGIMO ran into a crisis: furthermore, many teachers and students did not know what perestroika actually meant. Thirdly, numerous *meždunarodniki* did not recognize themselves in Gorbachev's foreign policy: they found it idealist and incompatible with the defence of the Soviet state's interests, especially after 1989. A majority of MGIMO graduates were clearly in favour of change in 1985, but they were neither old nor new thinkers.

SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF MGIMO'S HISTORY

1943: Foundation of a faculty of international relations at Moscow State University.

1944: Foundation of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations as an institute for practical training under the supervision of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Two faculties are founded: the faculty of international relations and the faculty of international law.

1946: The Institute started to welcome students from socialist countries, with six students from Mongolia, and female students.

1947: The length of study increased to five years. The scope of the disciplines taught broadened, with classes dedicated to intelligence (*razvedka*) and international journalism.

1948: First graduation year for the lawyer-meždunarodniki and historian-meždunarodniki.

1949: Foundation of a third faculty at MGIMO dedicated to economics (renamed the faculty of international economics in 1950).

1952: MGIMO was permitted to welcome 75 students from socialist countries for a six-year course.

1953: The length of a MGIMO course increased to six years.

1954: The Moscow Institute of International Relations and the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies were merged together by a Council of Ministers' decree. The western faculty and the eastern faculty replaced the faculty of international relations, the faculty of international law, and the faculty of international economic relations. Internships abroad were made available to MGIMO students, including travel to Western countries. In parallel, the decree obliged MGIMO to provide the citizens of people's democracies with between a third and a half of the Institute's places.

1956: A publishing house was opened at the Institute named the Publishing House of the Institute of International Relations (*Izdatel'stvo Instituta meždunarodnyh otnošenij, IMO*).

1958: The Moscow Institute of International Relations and the Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade were merged together.

1959: The faculty of international relations and the faculty of international economic relations were re-established and replaced the western and eastern faculties.

1961: Five teachers of African languages from Africa were recruited on a three-year contract to teach at MGIMO.

1964: Nine teachers of Asian languages from Asia were recruited on a three-year contract to teach at MGIMO. The total number of foreign students at MGIMO was 500. They were from 11 socialist countries.

1967: The length of a MGIMO course was reduced to five years.

1969: Three new faculties were opened: the faculty of international journalism, the faculty of international law, and the preparatory faculty dedicated to the working youth and veterans of the Red Army.

1976: MGIMO laboratory for applied research in international relations is founded.

1984: The Supreme Soviet awarded 44 members of MGIMO with the Order of the Red Banner of Labour for their achievements in training of Soviet diplomats. The MGIMO museum was founded.

1985: The Institute moved from the building on the Krymskij Bridge to a new building located on Prospekt Vernadskogo (southeast Moscow). The total number of foreign students at MGIMO was 893.

Following the nomination of Ėduard Ševarnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs, MGIMO rector Nikolaj Lebedev was fired and two boards of inquiry, under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party respectively, were placed in charge of controlling the evolution of perestroika at MGIMO.

1991: The MGIMO alumni association was created.

1994: MGIMO obtained the status of a university.

APPENDIX

1- Appendix of the PART I and PART II:

The establishment of a database of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era (1948-1953)

This document provides a summary of the process of creating a database of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era. The goal of this database is to address the impossibility of accessing the personal files, be they administrative or party, of former MGIMO graduates.

It provides important information concerning the first and second parts of the thesis on the formation of a body of specialists in international relations and its social status in the USSR. In particular, it allows further discussion of the categories of elite and expert commonly applied by some researchers to describe MGIMO graduates. The database also clarifies the transition from a diploma awarded by an educational institution to the formation of a social group whose political and academic qualities were finally recognized by the Soviet regime in the management of international affairs in the early 1960s.

I-The sources used:

The database was constructed from three types of documents.

First of all, the database is based on MGIMO alumni yearbooks from 1948-1954. The yearbooks contain the years of birth of each graduate, their specialty (law or history) within MGIMO and the distinctions students were granted as they obtained their diplomas, the so-called 'red diploma' (*krasnyj diplom*). Though the yearbooks allow us to establish a comprehensive list of MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1954, they do not provide any information concerning social and geographical origins, their first positions after graduation from MGIMO or future professions.

A database of former students would not be possible without the anthology of memoirs by former graduates obtained at the MGIMO museum. The memoirs were collected and published systematically by MGIMO on the fiftieth anniversary of each graduation between 1998 and 2014. They provide the principal source of information for the database. Given that former MGIMO graduates have been invited to publish their memoirs each year since 1998, a digest containing up to 600 pages of retrospective narratives was published. Even though we could question whether some texts were redacted by the editors, the presence of very critical sections concerning education at MGIMO or foreign policy during perestroika implies that former graduates were permitted a certain degree of liberty.

The analysis of former graduates' memoirs being the major source of information, the processing of data in the form of a database has often allowed me to go beyond the collection of personal information concerning the memoirs' authors. For example, from the digest of 1948, which contains only 23 authors from the 120 graduates of

that year, I gathered information for 70 former graduates. Similarly, thanks to the memoirs of 35 authors from 303 graduates of 1950, I gathered data for 126 persons. Some graduates remembered only that they were at school or in the army with some of their fellow students. Others remembered having participated in some collective activities that brought together a large number of students on a regular basis during their studies. Finally, some emphasized that they worked with many of their former fellow students during their careers. Thus, creating a database based on former graduates' memoirs has allowed for the consistent analysis of some information that a simple reading would not have allowed me to extract.

Having exhausted the yearbooks and the memoirs of former graduates, I utilized a third type of document. I used archival data to complement the information already gathered. With the help of the archives of the Party organization at MGIMO, I added some data relevant to the membership of former students in the Communist Party. The date they joined the Party (before, during or after their studies) may prove crucial for understanding the logic of job assignments within the Party and government administration after graduation, as well as their future careers.

II- The problem of variables for the database:

The problem of choosing variables for processing former graduates' memoirs into a database clarifies several important aspects of the social trajectories of the first MGIMO graduates. At first, I spontaneously chose several variables like age, gender, social or geographical origin, nationality, marital status, the administration or the organization that accepted the graduate after job assignment, membership in the party and the most important position of his/her career. These variables seemed to be the most important ones, even though lack of information, namely data concerning social origins, remains a problem. Similarly, the geographical origins of students are particularly difficult to define. The graduates' memoirs bear witness to the massive migrations of future students caused by the Second World War: this relates to those who returned from the front to study at MGIMO as well as young school graduates evacuated to the provinces with their families between 1941 and 1945.

Then I added other variables, namely the places or moments presented as important in the narratives of former graduates. In other words, I was interested in the social contexts of the memories of former graduates. The choice to include a 'student residence' variable indicating whether an individual lived in a MGIMO student residence was related to numerous stories about important moments of socialization among MGIMO students within the student residences. Thus, some graduates remembered their roommates. The mere fact of living in a student residence signified that the student was not a native of Moscow. This is also why a 'language group' (the main MGIMO specialization) variable is used. Several former graduates introduced themselves as belonging to a group of Spaniards, Germans, Englishmen, etc. This can be explained more specifically by the frequency of language lessons at MGIMO, by the organization of soirees (theatre, reading, literary evenings) where the language teachers were in charge and by the fact that, during extracurricular activities organized by the Communist Party and youth organizations (Komsomol), an academic group brought together four language groups composed of 5 to 7 students.

The choice of this second group of variables corresponded with one of my past discoveries suggesting that the development of team spirit at MGIMO, the sense of

belonging to the institution, was based on the educational organization of studies both inside and outside its walls. That is to say, if language studies brought together larger groups of students, namely in a lecture hall, were less regular or lasted for a shorter time period (for the record, MGIMO courses were 5 years long during the Stalin era), the memories that some former graduates retained of their fellow students would surely be less precise. It is easy to understand that the organization of teaching inside and outside MGIMO was important for the development of team spirit.

From the third perspective, the choice of some of the variables (such as profession or integration into the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs after graduation) quickly turned out to be rather vague. Finding that some people were successively journalists, professors, researchers, diplomats and party officials made it difficult to clearly establish their professions after graduation from MGIMO. Similarly, having found that several students of MGIMO accepted into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sent to socialist Eastern European countries despite their Western Europe specializations, I thought it necessary to analyze the types of positions occupied by the MGIMO graduates in the hierarchy of the ministry.

The challenge of this third variable corresponds with the limits I have identified in the works by Nikolaï Mitrohin and Marie-Pierre Rey on MGIMO. Given that the articles of these researchers do not take into account the place of the Institute within competitive and hierarchical institutional space, they often contribute to a version of history that conceals the different alternatives open to the Soviet regime with regards to the training of diplomatic cadres under Stalin. In 1944, there were other institutions responsible for training of such cadres. MGIMO was in competition with the Higher Diplomatic School, the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies, the Moscow Institute for Foreign Trade and internal seminars at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A question arises as to the type of employment to which MGIMO graduates had access in comparison with other institutes' graduates. Similarly, focused on some categories of graduates, namely Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials or Party officials, these pieces of research do not address the variety of positions for which the MGIMO graduates were eligible in the press agencies or the cultural institutions of Soviet diplomacy. Finally, by accentuating the fact that several MGIMO graduates from 1948-1953 were ambassadors or senior Party officials on the eve of perestroika, the two researchers often obscure the thwarted trajectories of MGIMO students between obtaining their diplomas and gaining access to the most important positions within Soviet diplomacy.

For a specific example, from the 200 students admitted to MGIMO in 1943, only 120 graduated from the institution in 1948; just a dozen of them were recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, the archives of the Party committee of the Higher Diplomatic School specify that in 1946, 130 of its graduates joined the ministry after just a two-year course. The very low number of MGIMO graduates joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 contradicts the idea of MGIMO as the natural school for elite diplomatic training in the USSR in the 1940s-1950s. Likewise, if we analyze the trajectories of those who graduated from MGIMO in 1948-1953, we see that after they obtained their diplomas some of future senior officials spent a decade in various institutions, namely the press agencies TASS and RIA Novosti, in several journals or reviews (*Pravda* or *Communist*) and in research centers within IMEMO or the Institute of United States and Canada. In my opinion, it is during this very period between 1948 and 1960 that some former MGIMO graduates managed to

accumulate all the administrative, scientific and social resources required for their future ascent to positions of authority.

III- Thwarted trajectories under Stalin:

A database based on former graduates' memoirs allows us to complement information obtained earlier on the emergence of a body of specialists in foreign affairs educated at MGIMO from 1948 to 1960 . The whole point of the first and second parts of the thesis is to understand how the body of senior officials educated at MGIMO was endowed with the mission of managing foreign affairs in the USSR. This database complements the archival sources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It also allows us also to gain a deeper understanding of some aspects of Molotov's *fond* and the archives of MGIMO's Party committee. We can emphasize the following three aspects in particular:

1) Even though we still have gaps concerning the social origins of MGIMO students, a database demonstrates a certain social diversity during the first years of the Institute. In particular, this result contradicts the idea of MGIMO being an incubator of the elite¹¹⁸⁸, as brought up by Nikolaï Mitrohin in his study of cadres of the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Although some students were evidently encouraged to study at MGIMO by parents and friends belonging to the political, administrative or cultural elite under Stalin (students coming from the Soviet republics and female students in particular), many had modest social origins and came from the provinces. The students' narratives concerning how they found out about MGIMO are particularly telling of this diversity. Likewise, a substantial number of students living in the student residences shows quite clearly that not all the students were natives of Moscow.

Participation in the Second World War contributed in particular to this social diversity among the first students. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' admissions committee favored those who were demobilized from the army. Furthermore, we find positive discrimination mechanisms in favor of the working class preceding the Second World War. Thus, some students indicated that they had received their secondary education at schools for the working youth. They combined their studies with work before joining MGIMO.

The fact that the notion of an elite seems particularly inappropriate for the first graduates is also related to several cases of the children of the Soviet elite experiencing severe social displacement during their studies or after they obtained their diplomas. In the context of Stalinism, the ongoing physical or political extermination of several high officials had important repercussions for those whose children studied at MGIMO. In other words, some students indeed took advantage of their parents' support to enter MGIMO but did not maintain their social positions in the USSR. Therefore, they had to abandon their studies because of the repressions that had struck their parents. Those who managed to finish their studies at MGIMO had to give up the idea of obtaining a position of responsibility as a result of their parents being in disgrace.

¹¹⁸⁸ Mitrohin, « The Elite of "Closed Society" ».

Thus, the diversity of students to which the former graduates' memoirs bear witness emphasizes the two strategies applied by the Communist Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure the fidelity of future cadres. On the one hand, the admission of the children of the elite allowed them to exercise control over parents as well as children. Admittance of the children of the elite was aimed to both reward many generations whilst ensuring their loyalty to the regime. The disgrace of some led to downfall of others. On the other hand, accepting students from the lower classes allowed them to promote future executives indebted to the Party for their exceptional upward mobility, as had been the case in the 1930s.

2) Another important aspect concerns the final job assignments of students once they had obtained their diplomas. The memoirs are broadly consistent with the assumptions I had concerning the disappointment that some MGIMO graduates felt as they obtained their diplomas. Even though a more sophisticated statistical treatment is definitely necessary, it is clear that there is no correlation between obtaining a diploma with a distinction and joining the Soviet MID. Likewise, some students with a rather well-to-do background admitted their disappointment with the job assignments proposed, namely those in the news agencies or cultural organizations with an international dimension.

The memoirs of former diplomats reveal in particular the difficulties that the Soviet regime had in placing MGIMO students. The year of Stalin's death is particularly telling because several students bear witness to the fact that no jobs were initially provided, leaving the students to search for employment by themselves. Some students noted the proposition made by the MID to send the graduates of 1953 to the provinces as foreign language teachers in secondary schools. Many former graduates report having refused. This information is consistent with the archival documents that I have found in the Molotov *fond* concerning the challenge of finding organizations willing to admit MGIMO graduates. This includes the project of the Ministry to prepare some MGIMO students to become kolkhoz administrators or else foreign language teachers. This problem is also reported in the archival *fonds* of the Party committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

If we focus on the graduates that joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we see a paradox. The positions at the ministry for which the MGIMO graduates were eligible often demonstrates a mismatch between the education the students received and their applications. Even though they were specialists in the analysis of capitalist countries, many of them were sent to the people's democracies, namely China, Korea or Eastern Europe. Likewise, they predominantly held the junior positions of translators and 'referents' in the ministry.¹¹⁸⁹ The research I did on the Party committees of the Higher Diplomatic School and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that despite similar ages or identical trajectories as war veterans, MGIMO graduates were in competition with Higher Diplomatic School graduates as far as eligibility for the positions of responsibility was concerned.

¹¹⁸⁹ The archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide the following hierarchy: translator, intern, referent person, attaché, secretary of the third category, secretary of the second category, secretary of the first category, envoy (*poslannik*), councillor, consul and ambassador/department head in the central administration.

3) The third and final goal of my database was to better grasp the moment from which former MGIMO graduates gained access to positions of greater responsibility. At the beginning of the 1960s, the graduates of 1948-1953 obtained the position of first secretary of an embassy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, those assigned to news agencies became correspondents of *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other journals in capitalist countries. Others gravitated towards the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, rapidly climbing through the ranks as researchers.

In my opinion, it was at this very moment during the Thaw that the title of *meždunarodnik* granted by MGIMO took on its full meaning: it now allowed many MGIMO graduates to accumulate all the administrative, scientific and social resources that were not necessarily available to the Higher Diplomatic School graduates, whose careers developed in the very bosom of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The narratives of former graduates concerning their trajectories in major news agencies like *Pravda* or TASS, research institutes or the Party administration demonstrates the establishment of a MGIMO alumni network in the sphere of foreign affairs. We only have to look at the trajectories of those who did not gain access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately after they received their diplomas but yet later obtained an ambassadorship after a career in several administrations or research institutions related to foreign affairs.

Some graduates clearly admit that they preferred to recruit MGIMO alumni from the moment they obtained a position of power in an administration related to foreign affairs. This phenomenon was not limited to their own generation, since they also contributed to the recruitment of later MGIMO graduates. Even though other aspects account for the fact that MGIMO became the principal school for the education of diplomatic cadres,¹¹⁹⁰ the ties created at MGIMO appear to be the key factor for understanding the social recognition gained by graduates at the end of the 1950s.

The establishment of these powerful networks is often ignored when the term ‘expert’ is used to characterize MGIMO graduates. Reducing the MGIMO curriculum to gaining expertise or a specialization in foreign affairs, one tends to overlook the fact that the establishment of a body of senior officials was also based on collective experiences and political training within the Party organizations: this partially explains the development of a powerful collective identity among those who completed their education at MGIMO.

IV- Limits of the database

One of the principal limitations of the database is that it covers only MGIMO graduates and does not incorporate all the students admitted to the Institute. As far as I am aware, there is no list available that would indicate the identities of all the students accepted. Consequently, this does not allow us to identify the sociological profile of students more likely to be excluded from the Institute.

¹¹⁹⁰ I am referring here to the fact that MGIMO was merged with the Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies in 1954 and the Institute of Foreign Trade in 1958. This merger reduced the number of educational institutions preparing cadres, whilst also allowing MGIMO students wider access to the administrations of Soviet diplomacy, namely the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Furthermore, I also had to deal with a lack of information concerning Higher School of Diplomacy graduates. Unlike MGIMO, the Higher School of Diplomacy does not have a policy of collecting and publishing its former graduates' memoirs. Nevertheless, the exploitation of the archival *fond* of the Party committee of the School and Molotov's *fond* at RGASPI allowed me to address some gaps, namely those concerning the number of students annually recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the types of positions for which they were eligible. Likewise, the diplomatic dictionaries containing biographical information on the major Soviet diplomatic cadres and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an important source for the analysis of the moment when former MGIMO graduates gained access to the most important positions of the Ministry.

Another limitation is related to the absence of consistent data on social origins or the number of people from the same families between 1943 and 1991. Nevertheless, I managed to identify that some of the children of the 1948-1953 generation studied at MGIMO by analyzing the yearbooks of 1970-1980, former graduates' memoirs and patronyms.

Finally, the establishment of a database of MGIMO graduates during the Thaw period would be much more complicated. Starting from 1954, the yearbooks do not contain their dates of birth and whether they received distinctions. Likewise, given that some graduations of the 1960s contained up to 400 persons, a statistical treatment of these MGIMO would be very time-consuming.

The categories in the database of the MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

The statistical treatment I performed had two main objectives: to verify the hypotheses I made in Chapter II concerning the social origins of students and the impact of World War II.

I sought to understand the relationship between the social origins of MGIMO students and the other characteristics I designated in my database, namely their geographical origins, their age, living in a student residence, participating in World War II, Party membership, and how they found out about MGIMO.

I also analyzed the association of variables like Party membership, social origins and distinctions obtained by the students with acceptance into MID after graduation in order to corroborate the assumptions made in Chapter III.

From among the 1,294 MGIMO graduates between 1948 and 1953, I found information on 797 students in alumni memoirs. Of that number, details about the social origins of 218 graduates were found. Given that Chapter II deals with the question of social origins in particular, I chose to focus on the sample of 218 graduates about whom I had obtained the necessary data. Eight variables were finally selected, namely social origins, geographical origins, gender, age, Party membership, veteran status, life at a student residence and knowledge of MGIMO.

The statistical treatment of my database implies the need to establish categories for each variable analyzed. The categories that I designated are described below.

A- The social origins of graduates:

Choosing the categories dealing with the social origins of MGIMO graduates was a complex issue. Indeed, scholars have long identified the central role of state statistics in the building and assignment of individual and collective identities within societies in general,¹¹⁹¹ and the construction of ‘a society without class’ in the Soviet case.¹¹⁹² As Alex Inkeles notes, in 1936 the new Soviet Constitution officially divided Soviet society into two major classes, the *working class* and the *peasantry*. For its part, the intelligentsia was presented by Stalin just as a *stratum*.¹¹⁹³ Even though by 1940 these three entities were constituted by 10 subgroups¹¹⁹⁴, the lack of a full description of each of the groups and the absence of information about the methodology applied to create them made this new categorization particularly difficult to use. Yet, the proposal for a completely new categorization based on foreign exemplars also foundered. For example, the wage criterion used in the statistics of Western countries was hardly useful when applied to the Soviet case, where social statuses were related to privileges in terms of housing, health and travel.¹¹⁹⁵

Moreover, another difficulty is related to the fact that individuals also learnt to deal with the identities they were assigned by the Soviet state. In the sources related to the MGIMO Party committee, a telling example came from Svetlana Molotova’s application for CPSU membership: in April 1952, she indicated “employee” (*služašij*) as her father’s profession.¹¹⁹⁶ Likewise, during Stalin’s era when asked “who are you parents?” (*kto vaši roditeli?*) in applications for CPSU membership, MGIMO candidates often answered “communists” instead of giving their precise professions. They deliberately stressed membership in the Party instead of their professional activity. These cases bear witness to a fact that has already been described by several historians and sociologists, namely that a person is likely to define him- or herself in a manner different from the identity provided by the state.¹¹⁹⁷ In the Soviet case, this trait led to the necessity of adopting strategies to present oneself in various application forms (*anketa*).¹¹⁹⁸

¹¹⁹¹ Alain Desrosières et Laurent Thévenot, *Les catégories socioprofessionnelles*, 5e éd. (Paris: La Découverte, 2002).

¹¹⁹² Alain Blum et Martine Mespoulet, « Classer une société sans classe », in *Anarchie bureaucratique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 240.

¹¹⁹³ Inkeles, « Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union 1940-1950 », 465.

¹¹⁹⁴ Inkeles identifies 10 subgroups: the ruling élite, the superior intelligentsia, the general intelligentsia, the white-collar group, the working class aristocracy, the rank and file workers, the disadvantaged workers, the well-to-do peasants and the average peasant, forced labor.

¹¹⁹⁵ Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union* (Routledge Revivals).

¹¹⁹⁶ Protokoly partsobranij i zasedanij partbûro pervičnoj organizacii istoriko-meždunarodnogo fakul'teta, [Transcripts of the party meetings and party bureau meetings of the primary party organization of the faculty of international history], 15/02/1952, TSAOPIM, fond 538, opis' 1, delo 29, 4.

¹¹⁹⁷ Gérard Noiriel, « Représentation nationale et catégories sociales. L'exemple des réfugiés politiques », *Genèses* 26, no 1 (1997): 25-54, <https://doi.org/10.3406/genes.1997.1431>.

¹¹⁹⁸ Bernard Pudal et Claude Pannetier, « Écrire son autobiographie (les autobiographies communistes d'institution, 1931-1939) », *Genèses* 23, n° 1 (1996): 53-75, <https://doi.org/10.3406/genes.1996.1386>.

Last but not least, I also had to deal with the MGIMO's specificity, especially with the fact that children belonging to the so-called elite were far from being a homogeneous group. Furthermore, the concept of 'elite' is highly relative. For example, the category of engineers has often been identified by scholars as belonging to the elite in Soviet society during Stalin's era,¹¹⁹⁹ whereas they were actually 'elite' in their own field of activity. It would be a mistake to perceive the children of engineers and the children of the top-level administration enrolled in MGIMO as belonging to the same social stratum.

Therefore, it seems important to propose a mixed model of categorizations based on the activities of the graduates' parents (Party and state administration, the army, intellectual professions and industrial and agricultural production) and the specific rank they occupied. In other words, I sought to indicate the hierarchy of the social positions of parents in various fields. In order to complete this task, I developed the following guide to the composition of categories based on the positions occupied by MGIMO graduates' parents:

- 1- *Top-level Party and state administration*: members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU, People's Commissars and Vice-Commissars, Heads of Department at the Central Committee of the CPSU.
- 2- *Top intellectual professions*: directors of scientific and cultural organizations, members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, professors, editors-in-chief of major newspapers.
- 3- *Top military professions*: generals, admirals, marshals.
- 4- *Intermediate professions in the Party and state* : heads of organizations and senior civil servants in the Party (*obkom, gorkom, rajkom*) and state (the Soviet ministries).
- 5- *Intermediate professions in the economic domain*: employees of banks, heads of kolkhoz and sovkhoz, accountants, heads of factories.
- 6- *Intermediate military professions*: colonel (*polkovnik*) and lieutenant colonel (*podpolkovnik*)
- 7- *Intermediate intellectual professions*: engineers, doctors, teachers in primary schools, journalists.
- 8- *Working class*: graduates of schools for the working youth, miners, millwrights and turners)
- 9- *Peasantry*

The statistics of these categories in my database are described below:

¹¹⁹⁹ Eric Duskin, *Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite, 1945-1953* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

Table 19: The social origin of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

Social origin	Number of graduates
1- Top-level Party and state administration	27
2- Top military professions	13
3- Top intellectual professions	22
4- Intermediate professions in the Party and state	16
5- Intermediate professions in the economic domain	16
6- Intermediate military professions	12
7- Intermediate intellectual professions	49
8- Working class	44
9- Peasantry	19
Unknown	571

B- The geographical origin of graduates:

Having analysed the database entries for this variable, I chose the following categories:

- 1- Moscow
- 2- Regions of Russia
- 3- Leningrad and other big Russian cities¹²⁰⁰
- 4- Soviet Republics
- 5- Suburbs of Moscow

Table 20: The geographical origin of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

The geographical origins of graduates	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Moscow	175	96
2- Regions of Russia	62	44
3- Leningrad and other big Russian cities	27	12
4- Soviet Republics	44	26
5- Suburbs of Moscow	21	9
6- Unknown	460	31

¹²⁰⁰ By big Russian cities, I mean those whose population was higher than 400,000 in the 1950s by The Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

C- Gender:

This variable has an obvious structure:

- 1- Female
- 2- Male

Table 21: The gender of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

Gender	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Female	51	14
2- Male	738	204

D- Age:

Having analysed the database entries for this variable, I chose the following categories:

- 1- 15-17
- 2- 18-20
- 3- 21-24
- 4- 25-30

Table 22: The age of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

Age	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- 15-17	160	53
2- 18-20	395	106
3- 21-24	201	53
4- 25-30	31	6
5- Unknown	2	-

E- Party membership:

- 1- Students admitted before MGIMO
- 2- Students admitted during their study at MGIMO
- 3- No admission before or during studies

Table 23: The party membership of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

Party membership	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
Before	35	18
During	92	41
No	145	45
Unknown	517	114

F- World War II veteran:

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

Table 24: The World War II veterans at MGIMO during Stalin's era

World War II veterans	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Yes	242	64
2- No	508	148
3- Unknown	39	6

G- Student residence:

Table 25: The figures of MGIMO graduates at student residences during Stalin's era

Student residences	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
<i>No</i>	<i>124</i>	<i>68</i>
<i>Yes</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>35</i>
<i>Unknown</i>	<i>572</i>	<i>115</i>

H- Knowledge of MGIMO:

With the 'knowledge of MGIMO' variable, I tried to question the ways in which people got to know about the Institute. The term 'vocation' refers to those MGIMO graduates who were convinced that a career in foreign affairs was their vocation and therefore searched for opportunities in this field.

Table 26: The ways in which MGIMO students got to know about the Institute during Stalin's era

Knowledge of MGIMO	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Vocation	9	4
2- Family and/or friends	74	52
3- Army	9	7
4- Party	2	2
5- Press/Radio	17	13
6- By chance	11	9
7- Unknown	667	131

I- Job assignment to MID

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

Table 27: The job assignment of MGIMO graduates to MID during Stalin's era

Job assignment to MID	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Yes	153	36
2- No	636	182

J- Diploma with distinction

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

Table 28: The MGIMO graduates with a diploma with distinction during Stalin's era

Diploma with distinction	Number of graduates	
	For the whole database	For those graduates whose social origins are known
1- Yes	246	82
2- No	543	136

The study of relationship patterns between the database variables

The statistical relationship study that I undertook aimed to verify some of the assumptions that I made in Chapters II and III. I performed the analysis in two steps. Firstly, I checked whether there is a significant statistical relationship between variables. Secondly, I measured the intensity of those relationships that were statistically significant.

In order to verify whether the chosen variables are independent, I chose to perform the Chi-squared test. The Chi-squared test is based on contingency tables constructed for each pair of variables: it compares the frequencies that are assumed to be correct for the independence relationship pattern with the actual cell values. The objective of the test is to check whether the so-called null hypothesis that the variables are independent is true. The alternative hypothesis is that the variables are associated. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis is considered to be true. The test was performed with a significance level¹²⁰¹ of 5% on the basis of the so-called p-value:

- if the p-value is lower than 5%, then the null hypothesis is rejected (variables are considered associated);
- if the p-value is equal or very close to 5%, both interpretations are possible;
- if the p-value is higher than 5%, the null hypothesis is accepted (variables are considered to be independent).

Nevertheless, merely rejecting the null hypothesis does not provide us with any information on the intensity and character of the relationship between variables. The qualitative analysis that I performed in my dissertation should account for the character of this relationship, while the association measure should give a quantitative estimate of its intensity. More precisely, the degree of association between variables can be evaluated by means of the contingency coefficient based on the Chi-squared statistic calculated as a part of the test described above.

Another possible solution for categorical variables would be to apply a log-linear regression. However, given that this provides the means to analyze the type of relationship and not its intensity while the Chi-squared test provides instruments for both types of analysis, this does not seem to be a prudent choice. It would have been useful if I wanted to check the relationship patterns for more than two variables at a time, but, given the character of assumptions that I made in Chapters II and III, the pairwise analysis of variables seems much more appropriate.

The contingency coefficient is constructed in such a way that the lowest value (denoting the absence of an association between variables) is equal to zero and the highest value (denoting perfect dependency) is equal to one. I did not calculate this coefficient for the pairs of variables if their relationship was not statistically significant (in other words, if the null hypothesis in the Chi-squared test was not rejected).

¹²⁰¹ The significance level (commonly referred to as alpha or α) is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (the type I error).

The results of the statistical analysis of associations between the variables of my database are presented in the table below:

Table 29: The associations between the variables of the database of MGIMO graduates during Stalin's era

Variables		Chi-squared statistic	p-value	Null hypothesis	Contingency coefficient	Degree of association
Social origin	Knowledge of MGIMO	75,97	0,0005165	Rejected	0,6827587	High
Social origin	Geographical origin	73.291	0,0000442	Rejected	0,5306361	High
Social origin	Student residence	34.623	0,0000313	Rejected	0,501576	High
Social origin	Age	37.452	0.03942	Rejected	0,3828983	Medium
Social origin	World War II veterans	14.399	0.07193	Accepted	-	-
Social origin	Party membership	30.694	0.01472	Rejected	0,4773643	High
Party membership	World War II veterans	56.778	0,000000	Rejected	0,5979928	High
Job assignment to MID	Diploma with distinction	0,000000	1	Accepted	-	-
Job assignment to MID	Party membership	1,4049	0,4954	Accepted	-	-
Job assignment to MID	Social origin	10,84	0,2109	Accepted	-	-

The study of relationship patterns between the database variables allows me to confirm some of the main hypotheses in Chapters II and III:

- 1) The results of my analysis confirm a strong relationship between social origin and knowledge of MGIMO, social origin and geographical origin and social origin and living in the MGIMO student dormitory. Obviously, social origin operated on several levels: it was a crucial factor in the very application process. According to their social origins, applicants had different ways of finding out about MGIMO: those who were from the most prominent families (*top-level Party and state administration, top military professions and top intellectual professions*) often found out about the institution through family and friends. As far as graduates who belonged to the working class and peasantry are concerned, they often stressed that they found out about the Institute through newspapers, the Party or the army. Moreover, the role of graduates' social origins in finding out about MGIMO also corroborates with the idea that their experiences of socialization within the Institute were different. From this point of view, the memoirs of graduates from cities other

than Moscow emphasize the strong ties they developed with their classmates while living in the student dormitory.

2)

The study of relationship patterns between the database variables also shows the major role of World War II in the diversity of students enrolled in MGIMO during Stalin's era: not only did World War II transcend the social divisions within Soviet society by enrolling various social groups in the fight against Nazi Germany,¹²⁰² but it was also a specific moment when the Party welcomed those who showed their merit in combat. The fact that the association between social origin and Party membership is less strong than the relationship between the latter and the veteran status also suggests that participation in combat bears witness that new criteria for access to the Party complemented those used between the two world wars.

3) Lastly, this statistical treatment confirms some of the hypotheses I developed in Chapter III. Neither social origin nor Party membership nor obtaining a diploma with distinction are associated with being enrolled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Stalin's era. Even if we lack the data (especially the transcripts of party meetings dedicated to job assignments) to answer this question, one can assume that during the assignment of MGIMO graduates, non-academic criteria were at stake (section 2 of Chapter III). Indeed, while many graduates' memoirs present the MID as the most prestigious organization in the field of the foreign affairs, one can assume that access to the Ministry was related to other criteria such as individual biographies (*anketa*).

¹²⁰² There is no association between veteran status and the social origin of a MGIMO graduate.

2- Appendix of the PART III :

Table 30: List of party meetings at MGIMO dealing with the question of students from socialist countries

Source: TSAOPIM archives, fond 538.

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
04.10.56	Report and election meeting	About changes in the mood of students from the people's democracies (CPD) after the events in Poznan.	538.1.46.114
24.10.56	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Western Faculty	About the incorrect view of some members of the Komsomol on the events in Hungary in 1956.	538.1.48.133
29.11.56	Meeting of the Party Committee	The results of the commission on teaching CPD students and the problems of nationalistic outbursts among the Hungarian and Polish students.	538.1.47.151
13.12.56	Meeting of the Party Committee	Critical of the Soviet students' mood and the role of CPD students.	538.1.47.159
14.02.57	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the incorrect behaviour of a student from Vietnam.	538.1.50.21
18.03.57	Meeting of the Party Committee	About listening to Western radio stations and the discussion of the Party Committee about increasing its requirements from CPD students.	538.1.50.60
26.03.57	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Eastern Faculty	Hungarian events and the mood of students in relation to them.	538.1.52.76

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
12.04.57	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Eastern Faculty	About work with CPD students and the need for joint work against the spread of rumours and slander.	538.1.52.84
23.05.57	Meeting of the Party Committee	About weak control and requirements for the admission of CPD students to the Institute.	538.1.50.112
11.12.57	Meeting of the Partyburo	About indications of the misconduct of CPD students in the dormitories.	538.1.52.127
		538.1.53 – not received	
09.10.58	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the approval by embassies of the draft on the organisation of preparatory courses for students from CPD.	538.1.56.4
13.11.58	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the lack of communication between foreign students and Soviet students at the Western Faculty.	538.1.56.27
26.12.58	Assembly of party activists	About the establishment of a preparatory course for CPD students.	538.1.54.131
		538.1.57 – the protocols of the Western Faculty meetings were not received. 538.1.58 – shorthand report and protocols of Western Faculty meetings were not received. 538.1.59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 – not received.	
16.03.59	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	About the lack of attention to students from the CPD during and after teaching hours.	538.1.66.60

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
20.03.59	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	About excursions for CPD students and the need for Soviet students at the excursions.	538.1.66.4
		538.1.67 – not received	
20.09.60	General party meeting	About the spread of religious ideology among some CPD students.	538.1.68.35
08.01.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the absence of specific training materials for CPD students.	538.1.76.118
23.01.61	General party meeting of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	About cultural events for the CPD students. About the study of Russian by the Soviet press for CPD students.	538.1.78.1
10.03.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	About making the Institute's board of honour and the inclusion of CPD students in it.	538.1.75.80
08.05.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	About explaining to Polish students the incorrect position of some Polish artists.	538.1.76.50
26.05.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	About an Albanian student's lack of knowledge of the criticism of Yugoslav revisionism during the exam. About a student from Albania promoting non-party and non-political views among Soviet students.	538.1.76.92 .98
14.11.61	General party meeting	About the discussions concerning Soviet-Sino relations in the dormitories. About the MGIMO as a small socialist camp.	538.1.74.121 .142

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
02.03.62	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	About the programme of cultural events for students from Vietnam.	538.1.86.78
16.10.62	Meeting of the Party Committee	About CPD students who conduct anti-Soviet rhetoric.	538.1.84.93
28.11.62	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the MGIMO as the place of study for all the countries of the socialist camp.	538.1.85.214
26.04.63	General party meeting	Speech of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlov to members of the MGIMO party organisation about the perspectives of CPD students in their home countries.	538.1.88.19
25.09.63	General party meeting	<p>Speech of the secretary of the Party Committee of the MGIMO about the complexity in the variety of views among students of different nationalities.</p> <p>About the difficulty in the reasoning and reactions of some Soviet students with regards to the criticism of Soviet policy by Vietnamese students</p> <p>The problems of Soviet-Sino relations and their effects on everyday life at MGIMO.</p>	<p>538.1.89.13</p> <p>.60</p> <p>.103</p>

Table 31: List of party meetings held at MGIMO dealing with the question of bourgeois theories

Source: TSAOPIM archives, fond 538.

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
04.10.56	Report and election meeting	About the need to study some aspects and questions of social sciences raised by bourgeois theory since doing so was in the interests of Soviet social science.	538.1.46.77
20.02.59	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	The recommendation to expel Soviet student A. I. Solomonov, who brought erotic pictures with him after his training course in Paris.	538.1.66.56
20.03.59	General party meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	About the penetration of bourgeois ideology inside MGIMO following A. I. Solomonov's importing of erotic images from Paris.	538.1.66.9
15.09.59	General party meeting of the Eastern Faculty	About the necessity of introducing a course on Western philosophy at the Eastern Faculty.	538.1.65.25
02.09.60	General party meeting	About the necessity of controlling the effect of bourgeois ideology due to training courses in the West and the presence of foreign students at MGIMO. About exposing the ideology of imperialism in the process of teaching.	538.1.68.56/ 77
14.10.60	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the preparation of a scientific conference on contemporary bourgeois theory at the MGIMO.	538.1.70.73

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
25.11.60	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the students' lack of knowledge of bourgeois scientists, economists. 'The students must be armed with convincing examples against the arguments of Western theorists'.	538.1.70.67/ 168
21.12.60	Meeting of the Party Committee	Criticisms against a teacher who did not speak in his lectures about the American falsification of the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Japan. About how the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the need to equip students with counterarguments are not set up properly.	538.1.70.214/ 235
28.12.60	General party meeting	About the need to study contemporary bourgeois theories and criticise them.	538.1.68.144
08.05.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the discussion and unfinished dispute of members of the CPSU History Department on 'the role of the middle class at the present time'.	538.1.76.25
11.05.61	Meeting of the Partyburo of the Faculty of the International Economic Relations	'Our style of teaching does not give students enough of the knowledge they need for everyday work. We should strengthen our ideological work because of the upcoming English and French exhibitions. It is necessary to protect our population from bourgeois propaganda at the exhibition'. 'The students will study the operation of objective economic laws inherent in different social formations; they will learn modern bourgeois economic doctrines from the perspective of Marxism-Leninism and thus prepare themselves for upcoming practical matters in different international organisations'.	538.1.79.6/ 13

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
26.05.61	Meeting of the Party Committee	A proposal for members of the teaching staff to make sure a student really believes what he is saying and conducts it in practice during the exam.	538.1.76.89
13.04.62	Meeting of the Party Committee	<p>About the request of students to learn German through the classics of German literature and West German newspapers and to use such sources in order to put their knowledge into practice in their future work.</p> <p>About the necessity of studying bourgeois press and literature not only in terms of its language but also in terms of critiquing its political ideology.</p>	538.1.82.38/ 40
27.06.62	Meeting of the Party Committee	'A very serious party meeting was held at the Faculty of International Economic Relations, during which they considered one communist who did not react properly to anti-party and anti-Soviet statements from his comrade in the Chinese Communist Party.'	538.1.82.117
16.10.62	Meeting of the Party Committee	About the influence of bourgeois theories on students and the problems with postal correspondence from bourgeois countries to students who had been on a training course abroad.	583.1.84.93
26.04.63	Report and election meeting	<p>About the struggle against bourgeois theories as mathematics.</p> <p>Speech of the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs about the need for special training in relation for students' future work abroad.</p>	538.1.88.86 111

Date	Form of the party meeting	Themes, main aspects, quotations	Tsaopim archives Fond, opis', delo, page
25.09.63	General Party meeting	'Many cases of immoral behaviour arise from greedy hobbies and a love for foreign things. I remember one example given at the Plenum. A correspondent in Paris came up to our young diplomatic worker and asked 'How are you getting on?' The worker answered: 'Everything is alright.' 'How many coats can you buy for your salary?' The worker touched his suit and said: 'Ones like yours – five, ones like mine – only one.' We must educate just such conviction and ability to respond timely to the enemy. The moral code of the builder of communism should be the inner conviction of each teacher, graduate student, and undergraduate student.'	538.1.89.64
10.04.64	Meeting of the Party Committee	The report of the ideological commission of the Party Committee about the need to control the ideological content of the educational process in student societies such as <i>Znanie</i> and <i>Sovremennik</i> .	538.1.97.116
		538.1.96, 99, 100, 101 – not received.	

3- Appendix of the PART IV:

Table 32: The number of MGIMO graduates recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1971 and 1985

Sources: Boris Kurbatov, MGIMO - naš dom, kak mnogo dum roždaet on, MGIMO (Moskva, 2004), 132. The total number of MGIMO graduates between 1971 and 1985 were found in Pasport MGIMO, GARF, fond 9606, opis' 9, dela 860-861.

Years of graduation	Total number of graduates	Number of graduates recruited by the Soviet MID
1971	415	125
1972	467	131
1973	550	134
1974	620	141
1975	600	144
1976	652 ¹²⁰³	130
1977	602 ¹²⁰⁴	143
1978	631	139
1979	580	131
1980	562	146
1981	554	153
1982	504	147
1983	490	149
1984	523	146
1985	462	138

¹²⁰³ In *Pasport MGIMO*, GARF, fond 9606, opis' 9, dela 860-861, the numbers of graduates from MGIMO in 1976 and 1977 were missing. They were found in the alumni yearbooks of that time.

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