EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

The Interplay between Occupational Career and Family Formation in Spain

by

María José González López

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view
to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute

Florence
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Summary

The thesis illustrates current processes of women's stratification over their family and occupational biographies. The individual biography is studied in a dynamic perspective, so that family decisions taken at different stages of the life course (e.g. remaining single or forming a partnership, choosing one partner or another, having children or remaining childless) have been correlated with the resulting occupational patterns. The main concern has been to investigate the extent to which similar family related decisions, e.g. forming *assortative mating partnerships*, have had different effects on women's patterns of labour force participation. The cause of these differentiated effects has been theoretically attributed to differences in family background, cultural context, individual ascribed features (e.g. educational attainment), position in the labour market (e.g. job placement, working in public or private sector) and, last but not least, the influential role of the partners' characteristics. The interaction of these variables, observed across time and generations, has explained the course of women's early occupational trajectories.

I have hypothesised that women's strategy of careful mate selection determines their occupational behaviour and career advancement. The argument is that the formation of *assortative partnerships* (i.e. both partners have with similar educational attainment and, therefore, relatively equal earning capacity in the market place) enhances women's chances of achieving parallel careers with their husbands. The results show that women with high educational attainment tend to reconcile their career obligations and family life, but at the cost of reduced family size. The ongoing process of polarisation across family models indicates that the lesser educated have a higher likelihood of being trapped in *one-earner families*, while the highly educated have a higher likelihood of forming *dual-career families*. I finally conclude that it is the combination of two main variables, educational attainment and careful mate selection, that best predicts the formation of dual-career families in young generations of women born after the mid-1950s.

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Introduction

This thesis is a socio-demographic study of the relationship between family formation and occupational behaviour in Spain. The study mainly focuses on *women's early lifetime trajectories*, looking at how different levels of occupational attainment are related to the decisions young women make about partners, childbearing, and market and non-market work. Through the analysis of the typical trajectories, I typologise women's employment strategies for meeting concurrent family needs as following a *linear* pattern (continuous participation in the labour market); an *interrupted* pattern (quitting and returning to the labour market); or a *curtailed* pattern (permanent withdrawal from the labour market). The last two patterns entail a high economic and personal cost in the Spanish context because insurance schemes are mostly related to employment: while social insurance benefits and services are provided for paid workers, family dependants have only derived social rights. Despite this penalty, interrupted or curtailed careers are a common strategy amongst married women and rare amongst married men.

The research covers the historical period from the post-civil war (1940s) to the beginning of the 1990s, a period marked by the progressive emergence in young generations of the *dual-earner family* model, where both partners are remunerated employees in the formal economy. The *one-earner family* model entails a high degree of "female domesticity" or gender inequality. In this thesis it is shown that the dual-earner family model also entails "gender conflicts", but of a different nature. These conflicts stem from the fact that couples face scarcity of economic and time resources at various stages of family formation, and are thus forced to resort to different strategies, such as the flexibility of working time to meet family needs. One interesting aspect of this research is that it evaluates the different *life course effects* these strategies have for women.

According to French demographer Bozon (1991) "marriage represents *the conjunction of two social careers*, the effect of which is to consolidate the positions acquired or to support the evolutions in progress" (p.171). The hypothesis defended

in this thesis is that young women, especially those with certain levels of investment in human capital, develop strategies to secure the conjunction of their employment and family careers by avoiding partnerships that might bring gender conflicts. I theorise that some women engage in family building only when they see that they will not face a situation of competition for time resources with their spouse, which may lead to an unequal gender division of labour, or simply when they have already consolidated their career. One possible strategy for forming egalitarian partnerships is to search for "marriable candidates" among highly educated men, the reason being that education is commonly associated with a higher awareness of gender equality. Another possibility is to follow the principles of assortative mating, forming a partnership with a man who has similar educational attainment. Given that education can be used as a predictor for future earnings, women could thus seek men likely to have similar earning potential.

The research places particular emphasis on the role of increased educational attainment among women in imposing fundamental changes on current patterns of family formation and gender relationships. Studies on social mobility show that increased education does not necessarily mean the disappearance of gender inequalities in couples' careers. The fact is that while most western European countries have narrowed the gap between male and female levels of education, there are still important gender differences in the *subjects* men and women pursue in school, which represents an important element of persisting gender inequalities (see Shavit & Blossfeld 1993).

The unexpected consequence of the educational expansion in countries like Britain has been that some professional fields (e.g. medicine, dentistry, optics and pharmacy) encourage workers to be *practitioners* rather than *careerists* (Crompton & Sanderson 1990). *Practitioners* are individuals, usually women, who expect to maintain their occupational status while assuming the flexibility and mobility associated with discontinuous employment and without envisioning a linear progression in their career. Careerists, on the other hand, engage in continuous life time employment careers after a childbearing interval in countries like Britain has driven many women to return to the labour market on a part-time basis, consequently suffering the associated drop in occupational status (i.e. falling within the secondary labour market), social benefits, and promotion opportunities (Lewis 1992). This strategy is, however, not very feasible in countries like Spain where part-time work provides only a small proportion of employment opportunities.

According to Solsona (1994), the life course pattern of women born before the mid-1950s used to be that of permanently leaving the labour force upon marriage.[1] The author shows that later on, the effect of marriage on women's labour force participation decreased for the younger cohorts born from 1955 onwards. Motherhood, however, continued to exert the same effects. This has especially been the case, for instance, in industrial areas where the service sector and flexible forms of paid employment have not been developed enough to attract mothers' engagement. It is worth noting, however, that there is no one single pattern of women's integration into the labour force in Spain, but many owing to the strong regional socio-economic inequalities and varied cultural features. This makes regional variables an essential and obligatory component of the analysis.

The singularity of the Spanish case study is that despite the fact that the participation of the female labour force is far below the European average from a cross-sectional perspective, the proportion of women with *continuous careers* is fairly high within the European context (Kempeneers & Lelievre 1993). As many as 4 out of 10 ever-married women born between 1955 and 1960 have had a long-term attachment in the labour force (see Solsona 1991). Thus, in Spain family currently either exerts a strong effect on women's occupation or it has a close to nil effect on it. It is no longer true today that only a small proportion of women has continuous careers as compared with other European states. However, there is a persistent problem as only a minority of those who drop out of the labour force ever return, though the proportion is increasing in young generations.

In a historical perspective, the conflicts that women have faced to harmonise career and family have changed alongside other macro socio-economic processes. The most important transformations are the progressive development of the welfare state (extension of women's social rights as workers and family dependants), the increase in the demand for female labour force participation, the ongoing labour-market de-regulation and, last but not least, the increase participation of women in the educational system. These elements have shaped the current system of social and gender relations and have also determined the set of opportunities enjoyed by different generations of women. The explication of this macro level is necessary for understanding why women today are still largely responsible for non-market work.

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[1] The World Fertility Survey (1978 and 1985), from which the author drew the data, provided retrospective information on labour force participation and fertility behaviour for the first time in the Spain.

Research Goals

The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which similar family related decisions, e.g. forming an *educational assortative marriage*, have different effects on women's patterns of labour force participation. Gender stratification is analysed by looking at the interaction effects of individual features such as educational attainment and occupational status, family background, the influential role of the partners' characteristics and the regional effects. In doing so, I respond to questions such as the extent to which occupational status determines the formation of continuous careers of married women; whether highly educated women have a high likelihood of achieving parallel careers; whether partners' similar education attainment leads to similar outcomes in terms of labour force attachment; and whether certain socio-economic features of husbands restrain or facilitate wives' occupational mobility. These questions are of prime interest for designing social policy on gender equal opportunities and family issues.

The analysis illustrates the effect of family life (i.e. first entry into partnerships, childbearing and caring work in general) on women's opportunities - or lack of opportunities - for occupational achievement in the institutional context of the Spanish State. It also shows how women's jobs status (part-time versus full-time) and occupational category (low or high prestige) in their early career affects their leverage in negotiating on the organisation of family life.

Summary of Empirical Hypotheses

Cross-sectional data indicate that Spain can currently be characterised by two main features: low fertility levels and low female labour force participation. The total fertility rate was 1.20 in 1999, and has been the lowest in Europe since 1996. The activity rate of women aged 15-64 was only 47.5 per cent in 1998, compared with 44.2 per cent in Italy and 48.5 per cent in Greece.[2] Both indicators rank among the lowest levels in the European Union, which indicates the complexity women face in reconciling family life with new aspirations of career fulfilment and economic

[2] Data on activity rates (Eurostat 2000) and on total fertility rates (INE 2000).

independence. I believe this particular situation prompts an ongoing process of stratification whereby some women find themselves on a *family formation track* (though with few children) and others on a *career formation track* (with even fewer children, probably conceived very late in a woman's reproductive years). Taking one or another track will very much depend upon several determinants, which are incorporated in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Women with higher educational attainment are more likely to become permanent members of the labour force, to enjoy more guarantees of economic independence and to form *dual-career partnerships*. On the other hand, low-educated women will be more inclined to form traditional families (*one-earner households*), to enter partnerships earlier, and to participate in the flexible sector of the labour market (e.g. fixed-term contracts) to meet family demands. In short, in a context of low female participation rates, women's educational attainment becomes a fairly good predictor of women's continuous careers.

Hypothesis 2: Individually achieved features are not enough to predict women's family and occupational trajectories because of the influence of women's male partners. Therefore, mate selection really matters. It is expected that women in a*ssortative partnerships* would have a higher likelihood to form dual-earner or dual-career partnerships. This is understandable because when both partners have similar levels of educational attainment and thus similar earning capacity in the market place, they should be less inclined to employ rigid gender divisions of labour.

The nature of the welfare state, together with labour market characteristics, explain the long life of the *housewife marriage* model, but neither element has clear-cut effects after accounting for the regional context. This means that it always necessary to include regions in the analysis in order to control for their mediating effects. Regional variations include not only economic inequalities but also differences in identity and cultural values regarding to gender roles and family expectations. Accordingly, I expect to find that the above-mentioned predicted effects (hypotheses 1 & 2) of education and assortative mating will also vary according to the regional context.

Data Sources

The thesis consists of a single case study with comparisons across cohorts. The hypotheses described above require a two-step research model. First, the study begins by exploring attitudinal data on family values and individual expectations regarding gender roles, labour force participation and state intervention in family affairs. Second, the research continues with the study of partnership formation and the analysis of women's early labour force biographies. The work histories include the study of women's first entry, first exit and return to the labour market as well as the occupational outcomes measured by their opportunities to experience an upward occupational mobility.

The study relies basically on two main data sources: the attitudinal data and the quantitative data on actual behaviour. The combination of both types of data allows us to grasp the new patterns emerging from evolving social attitudes as well as the changes in the organisation of individual biographies.

The research mainly focuses on women but also indirectly includes men. Most evidence suggests that men have *linear careers,* regardless of their family life, which are organised permanent full-time paid employment broken only by spells of unemployment. Women, as Crompton and Sanderson (1990) observed in Britain and which I generalise to Spain, have a different trajectory. Their typical work history is characterised by breaks (not unemployment) in paid employment, and they are less likely to work according to any career plan. Hence, while I focus on the female mobility in particular I also include the interaction effect of their male partners. In this way I test whether certain features typical of husbands (e.g. educational attainment and occupational prestige) influence wives' occupational behaviour.

Cross-sectional Attitudinal Data

The analysis of attitudinal data is used to test differences in values and expectations between men and women and across generations and regions. It is envisaged as a complement to the quantitative research in which these aspects are absent but indirectly implied in the analytical discourse. The fact is that individual behaviour is better understood when values, social norms or expectations regarding categories

such as gender, generations, kinship or social classes are taken into consideration. This analysis also aims to examine the presumed spouses' rationality or maximising behaviour to organise family life and employment, which would be a rational choice approach to family behaviour. Furthermore, the study describes gender differences in the propensity to share care work; in the satisfaction with the domestic division of labour; and in individual opinions on welfare state performance in the field of family policy.

The first survey, *Social Inequalities in Family and Domestic Life* ("La desigualdad social en la vida familiar y doméstica II"), was conducted in 1990 by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS). It consists of a sample of 2,485 individuals aged 16 and over. The second survey, *Population and Family* ("Población y familia"), was also carried out by CIS in 1992 with a sample of 2,467 individuals aged 18 and over. The data consists of mainly categorical and non-ordered variables provided by responses to multiple-choice questionnaires. The methodology used consists mainly of the contingency tables analysis (for further details on the survey methodology see Appendix 1 and 2).

The surveys have a cross-sectional design that renders their synthesis with the Socio-demographic Survey - described below - unfeasible. The breakdown of data by birth cohorts should be able to capture the changing and emerging notions about family, work and gender roles.

Socio-demographic Retrospective Data

The statistical analysis of women's occupational and family behaviour is based on the retrospective Socio-demographic Survey (Encuesta Sociodemográfica, hereafter ESD) conducted in the fourth quarter of 1991 by the Spanish National Bureau of Statistics *(Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE)*. In this survey people were asked about events which happened in the past in order to construct detailed life histories of the persons interviewed and their relatives and their partners. The survey was administered to representative sample of the Spanish population aged 10 years and over who were residents in private households.

The ESD sample consists of 160,000 individuals from whom information about other individuals (up to 25) living in the same household was indirectly gathered. The interviewee was asked to provide information concerning the life history of their parents, siblings (up to 25), and sons/or daughters (up to 16). Finally, the interviewee provided information about their marital unions, changes of residence, and their educational and labour force histories. Detailed information on the survey methodology, such as the sampling design or the interview process, is included in Appendix 3.

The methodological approach used in the empirical research is *event history analysis*. This approach allows for the study of the interactions between family and professional events over the life course. Several authors have already stressed the usefulness of event history analysis as a new approach to the investigation of casual explanations (Blossfeld & Rohwer 1995, Allison 1984). The main originality of this methodology is its capacity to predict how different specific conditions that change over time, such as educational attainment, affect individual future decisions. In other words, it is an instrument that allows *time-related* empirical representations of the structure of causal arguments.

The ESD provides a large representative sample of the Spanish population residing in private households, and contains extensive biographical information over each respondent's life course. However, retrospective surveys are generally criticised for two main reasons. First, these surveys rely on individuals' memories of their life histories, which may be inaccurate. In response it should be said that the quality of ESD retrospective data appears to be reliable enough, with only the minor problem of data heaping towards round numbers on some particular questions such as respondents' current age. Second, there might be some problems of sample bias owing to a survey design based on survivors that leaves omitted from the sample individuals who died or migrated. Notwithstanding these critiques, the research on biographical designs of the sort used in the ESD is still extremely valuable for the study of casual relationships.

At this stage I will provide no further methodological details because each empirical chapter contains its own particularities with regard to data preparation and statistical calculations. In Chapters IV and V I have used *logistic regression analysis* applied to event history data. Thus, for example, I have estimated the relationship between variables such as age and education and the likelihood that a woman will experience a transition in employment status. For instance, I estimate the likelihood a woman will shift from full-time homemaking to paid work in a particular year. The

independent variables are described at the beginning of each chapter. In Chapter VI, however, missing information has confined the research to the use of cross-sectional data and the selection of a smaller sample. Further details are given in the methodological section of the chapter.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of two main parts: description of the theoretical approach and the institutional context of the case study, and the empirical research. In Part I, *Chapter I* introduces the debate on mainstream theories on family functioning in industrialised societies. The aim is to identify the best theoretical framework to explain recent changes in family life and gender relations. *Chapter II* describes the historical transformation of the welfare state, the weakening of the "housewife marriage" and the model of women's integration into the labour market. The intertwining of these three areas - namely the state, the family and the market - provides the framework to understand the Spanish model of social stratification in relation to the category of gender.

Part II (Socio-demographic Evidence) introduces the empirical research and is divided into four main chapters. *Chapter III* introduces the analysis of attitudinal data that examines women's and men's preferences in family formation, occupational choices, and the organisation of caring work. *Chapter IV*, instead, analyses processes of mate-selection and, particularly, the trend towards educational homogeneity across generations. *Chapter V* analyses women's occupational biographies starting from the year of entry into their first marital or consensual union. Last, *Chapter VI* deals with women's upward occupational mobility with the aim to capture differences in career advancement between married and single women.

PART I: DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM: WHO IS PENALISED BY FAMILY DECISIONS?

CHAPTER I

Explanations of Family Behaviour and Gender Inequalities: Rationality, Values or Constrained Choices?

The analysis of family change can be approached on a purely descriptive level whereby one identifies new structures and patterns in living arrangements. A more stimulating analysis, however, arises when one attempts to understand the causes and meanings of current family change. It is precisely at this level of analysis where one rarely finds a broad political consensus. Interpretations vary enormously according to the ideological postulates of the theoretical frameworks or the differences in the methodological approaches. This chapter is devoted to the current and controversial debate on the interpretation of family change and gender relations. The final goal is to justify the theoretical framework that I have chosen to guide the empirical research. In particular, I discuss mainstream theories to which I will regularly refer throughout the research.

The chapter begins by presenting the theory on family functioning developed in the "new home economics" (hereafter NHE) of the neo-classical school, a theory popularised by authors such as Becker (1993, 1993b) and Pollak (1985). The approach has been used extensively in socio-economic studies to rationalise the division of labour between spouses, altruism in the family, and current demographic trends such as declining fertility.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the main criticisms arising from the application of NHE, which has been strongly attacked on several fronts. In general, it is considered a poor framework for understanding the transformation of family life. However, there are two legitimate reasons for reviewing its postulates. First, it is still

a popular framework amongst sociologists and economists[3]. Second, I borrow some concepts and arguments from the rational choice model of the NHE for my own analysis. In no way should this choice be understood as a whole-hearted embrace of the inferences of the model.

In view of the generally unsatisfactory explanation provided by NHE, the third part of the chapter examines the contributions of feminist social theory to the understanding of family change. This part is subdivided into three sections. The first explores the relationships between the state and the family following the paradigm of *gendered welfare states*. This refers to the study of comparative social policy conducted from a feminist perspective and assumes that each type of welfare state differently influences structures of gender inequalities. The second section deals with the influences of culture, preferences and values on the formation of family/household arrangements, and the methodological problem of including these attitudinal variables in the analysis. The third and last section proposes a final definition of key concepts such as family and marriage. These definitions have logical consequences for the design of the empirical research, which are also explicated here. The chapter concludes with the outline of the research design that will guide this investigation.

I.1. The Rational Choice Approach to the Family

Many studies rely on economic rational choice models to explain individuals' behaviour within the family. Here I review the central ideas of this framework which will later be tested in the Spanish case study. Gary Becker, particularly in his 1981 book "A Treatise on the Family", has been the most influential proponent for the application of rational choice models to the family.[4] In this book, he develops a theoretical framework based on rational behaviour to describe the organisation and

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[3] Recent publications that have tested the validity of Becker's theses on marriage decisions in different Western countries include Blossfeld 1996, Lesthaeghe 1995, Cherry 1998.

[4] Becker published an expanded edition of this book in 1993. In this he tried to respond to some of the criticisms he has received on the earlier edition. The most pronounced of these was that he did not consider differences in power and bargaining in marriage, and that he used the argument of biological differences to partly justify the division of labour between spouses. Some of these aspects are further developed in this chapter.

structure of the family. The framework is intended to provide a useful method for cross-national comparisons. He describes his work as an attempt to analyse nonmaterial behaviour (i.e. marriages, birth, divorce or decisions on the division of labour in households) with the tools developed for material behaviour (i.e. the functioning of markets with monetary transactions).[5]

Becker's rational-choice theory rests on three main assumptions: (1) that individuals maximise their utility, (2) that basic preferences do not change rapidly over time, and (3) that an individual's behaviour is co-ordinated by market equilibrium (the quantity demanded of any good is negatively related to its price). From these assumptions he develops his theoretical model of family behaviour. Here, I have chosen to examine three of the theses implied in his theory that are closely related to the research topic. These are also the theses most well known in the sociological literature.

I.1.1. Thesis 1: Women and Men Gain from a Division of Labour between Market and Household Activities

In Becker's model, the gender division of labour is explained as the result of a combined effect of biological differences, different life experiences at work, and different investments in human capital. Even if a husband and wife were intrinsically identical, he argues that they would still gain from a division of labour between market and household activities, with one of them specialising more in market activities and the other more in household activities.

In the rational-choice model, a family would be more *efficient* if its members used extensive specialisation in the allocation of time and the accumulation of human capital. The reason for this is that the time spent at work measures the *intensity of use of capital* which, at the same time, affects the *rate of return on investments* in specialised capital in any given sector. Therefore, each person *maximises utility* by choosing the optimal path (i.e. investing either in the market or in the household

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[5] Becker was influenced in his early writings by functionalists such as Talcott Parsons (1949, 1954) who wrote on the complementary role of gender specialisation as a crucial constituent for marital stability.

sector) and allocation of time.[6] Consequently, it is not worth allocating time both at home and in the market. The optimal decision upon which person specialises in either sector depends on the principle of the *comparative advantage*:

"The theory of the comparative advantage implies that the resources of members of a household (or any other organisation) should be allocated to various activities according to their comparative or relative efficiencies. /.../at the beginning everyone is identical; differences in efficiency are not determined by biological or other intrinsic differences. Variations in skill result from different experiences and other investments in human capital" (Becker 1993: 32).

Therefore, the justification of the division of labour is that the person with the greater comparative advantage in the market in relation to the other family members should fully specialise in the market sector. This principle does not foresee the reconciliation of both market and non-market activities; for instance, one person spending several hours a day on household activities while maintaining paid employment. The logic is that he or she would have the incentive to invest only in specialised capital (incidentally, in the examples given by the author it is usually men who tend to specialise in the market), because returns depend on the hours spent in utilising that capital. This would explain why even in the case that all members in a multi-person household are equal, they would still benefit from a sharp division in the allocation of investments. Thus, in an *efficient household* every member would be made better off by an efficient division of labour.

The author argues that not all investments in human capital are the same, even if they correspond in principle to equivalent degrees. Some investments mainly raise the productivity of *market time* while others, such as taking classes in child care or art history (examples given by the author), mainly raise the productivity of *household time*. These different investments happen to coincide with the traditional educational segmentation by gender.

He emphasises that the division of labour is not only due to differences in the advantages of specialised investments, but also to intrinsic differences between the sexes. These intrinsic differences are, according to the author, due to the fact that

[6] For detailed clarifications on the estimation of specific economic concepts refer to the author's mathematical appendix. In models of social action individuals are expected to act rationally in the pursuit of their own self-interests. Rational actors *optimise their utility* by maximising benefits or minimising costs when they make their choices from a set of alternatives.

women are "biologically committed to the care of children". Therefore, "...an hour of household or market time of women is not a perfect substitute for an hour of the time of men when they make the same investments in human capital" (p.38). By this statement the author justifies the labour force segmentation by sex as well as the gender-gap in earnings.

Finally, his model also envisages that the gender division of labour might no longer be an optimal choice for some individuals. This would occur when both partners have invested equally in human capital and eventually achieve a similar *earning power.*[7] In this case the division of labour is no longer efficient for the family members or, in particular, for the couple. This situation mainly emerges with the take-off of industrialised societies and the corresponding educational expansion for women. This new scenario takes us to the second thesis.

I.1.2. Thesis 2: The Gain from Marriage Decreases as Women's Human Capital Increases

During the past decades there has been a high growth in women's participation in the labour force. This higher participation is mainly due to their greater investment in human capital and the consequent increase in their earning power. It is for these women that there is a reduced gain from marriage, considering that "...persons marry each other if, and only if, they both expect to be better off compared to their best alternatives" (p. 331). These women would also perceive divorce as a more attractive option than low-qualified women would. In his analysis of the marriage market "the incentive to remain single depends on income while single relative to income expected if married" (p.17). Here the concept of the *marriage market* expresses the symbolic idea that individuals mate in a highly systematic and structured pattern. A typical example of a well-organised "market" is the educational system, where individuals with similar "qualities", i.e. educational attainment, tend to mate with each other.

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[7] Earning power is normally associated with the individuals' higher educational attainment. The reason for this is that inequality of earnings and income tends to be positively related to inequality in education and training (see Becker 1993$_b$).

Once women's participation in the labour force is strongly consolidated, the sexual division of labour within the household becomes less advantageous. It is at this point that women are indicated as being less interested in marriage and more inclined to form other living arrangements such as *consensual unions* (unmarried partners living together) or families headed by women. Nonetheless, marriage *per se* should not be considered a problem if it is constituted on the basis of an *optimal sorting of mates*. This means that women search for the marriage candidate who maximises their expected well being.

In an efficient marriage market *positive assortative mating* is more likely to occur (high-quality men matched with high-quality women or low-quality men with low-quality women) than *negative assortative mating* (each with different qualities). That is to say, superior persons would tend to marry one another (*mating of likes*) so that each person maximises the total gain from all possible marriages (market based on equilibrium conditions and monogamy). In negative assortative mating the woman or man with the *cheaper time*, or less productivity in the market, will tend to be used more extensively in household production.

Positive sortings are more likely to take place because, if optimal, they entail a maximisation of aggregated output. Therefore, it follows that lower-quality persons would be more likely to remain single. In other words, they would be less attractive partners in the marriage market. The author uses this argument to explain why low-income lone mothers on welfare benefits are not interested in marrying "low-quality" men. The reason given is that their situation would not be expected to improve dramatically.

I.1.3. Thesis 3: Fertility Declines as Women's Human Capital Increases

As implied above, the increase in women's earning power raises the relative cost of children and, consequently, reduces the demand for them. Furthermore, the educational expansion brings about an interaction effect between the *quantity* and the *quality* of children. This interaction means that as education becomes more valuable, the cost of raising children or simply the "price of children" increases. The demand for children also depends on the full income of families. Thus, in developed countries rich families have fewer children than poor families because children of the rich are more expensive.

Fertility is also determined by the degree of parents' altruism. Parents behave altruistically towards their children because of the *utility function of each child.* Becker operationalises family altruism by the alleged *rotten kid theorem* which infers that "each beneficiary, no matter how selfish, maximises the family income of his benefactor and thereby internalises all the effects of his actions on other beneficiaries" (1993: p. 288). Hence, the utility function of an altruist depends positively on the well-being of other individuals. Consequently, he is made better off by actions that raise the family income, such as investment in his children's education. Importantly, this investment may increase the cost of children and eventually cause a decline in the fertility levels. The underlying assumption in this reasoning is that a single family utility function, based on the altruist's preferences, is assumed by all the members in the family.

I would like to conclude this section with a brief comment on the role that Becker attributes to the state. In general, while his work pays little attention to the state as an institution, he is concerned with understanding why individuals would be interested in state interventions from an economic point of view. He observes that individuals have reduced the degree to which they rely on the family because many family functions have been taken over by the market and the state. For example, there is public training and education for young people, social assistance for old age risks, and coverage for prolonged unemployment. He concludes that state interventions have the main function of raising the efficiency of individuals' behaviour in case they make "wrong" choices according to his model of rationality. For example, the state comes in when poor families under-invest in their children's human capital. I shall come back to this issue.

I.2. A Critical Assessment of the Economic Theory of the Family

The aim here is to discuss the many failures ascribed to the mainstream rational economic model of family behaviour. I will focus on several points, ignoring parts of the theory now considered totally outrageous and obsolete. For example, I will not elaborate the view that biological differences partly cause differences in comparative advantage, or that a "normal" biological orientation gives rise to "the usual" sexual division of labour. In fact, it is no mere coincidence that the analysis conducted by the school of NHE has been labelled as *androcentric*, as it fundamentally enhances old masculine ideals about the functioning of the family (Ferber & Nelson 1993). An

example of this androcentric perspective is well illustrated by the assumption about the presumed gains from a gender division of labour, which was originally inspired by world trade specialisation theory. The following points pick up on Becker's hotly contested assumptions.

I.2.1. Who Gains from the Gender Division of Labour?

The NHE view on the division of labour between family members is one of the most widely criticised theses. The first critique of this thesis is that, given the current occupational instability, it is no longer possible for the family to rely only on the male specialisation in the labour market, (Oppenheimer 1994). In addition, while the NHE's theory of the division of labour requires that family members share a form of "joint benefits", we know that this may not always be the case. In fact, not all families enjoy full harmony, and neither do they always agree on the allocation of resources. In the end, the "gain from marriage" in male breadwinner families is likely to be the "man's gain from marriage", because there is no guarantee that fathers are willing to share all or part of their income with their wives. Ferber and Nelson (1993), for instance, insist on the fact that Becker forgets that families have both husbands and wives who may have separate intentions and interests. Furthermore, Becker's argument on the advantages of a gender division of labour falls into a circular reasoning. He implies that women specialise in home production because they earn less in the labour market; women, however, earn less in the market place because they hold more household responsibilities.

In response to challenges arguing that families might not equally share benefits, Becker would argue that it is in the interest of the household head to be altruistic towards his family. The assumption is that there is a single family utility function. Yet, as England (1993) reminds us, the altruist is also the person who has the greatest power to withhold resources in the household. This implies differential power by gender, an issue totally ignored in his treatise on the family. The advantages of a gender division of labour are discussed in depth, while the disadvantages of male power over women are not touched upon at all.

Strassmann (1993) has ironically depicted the assumption that the main household provider rationally makes decisions in the best interest of the family as "the story of the benevolent patriarch". The theory implies that the family decisions made by the

patriarch give equal weight to the needs of all family members and, on the whole, form a *single utility function*. It also implies that family members all tend to behave altruistically. Strassmann claims that the NHE explanation is in some aspects right, but that it is also only a partial story of the reality that they want to reflect. The problem with partial stories is that they provide a poor foundation for policy directives, for which they may well be used. In this case they would embody serious errors as to how to improve income distribution, taxation, welfare and economic development (this is further elaborated in the next point on welfare state analysis).

Becker suggests that while altruism is common in families, selfishness is common in market transactions, because altruism is less "efficient" in the market place. Therefore, he establishes two distinct features of human behaviour according to the private-public divide. However, it might be the case that the same person who behaves altruistically in the family empathises with other individuals in the market place (England 1993). In this case his assumptions about rational economic selfishness in the market would not stand. As noted by England (1993):

"If economic man or woman is so altruistic in the family, might not some altruism be present in market behaviour as well? Doesn't this altruism imply an ability to empathize with others that might permit making at least rough interpersonal utility comparisons?" (p. 48)

I.2.2. Equality and New Patterns of Mate Selection

Regardless of the comparative advantage, it seems unrealistic to expect that individuals of either sex, especially those born during the *baby boom* of the 1960s and onwards, would intentionally choose long-term full economic dependence in a newly formed partnership. Most authors have already indicated that current trends in family life imply a move towards social individualisation rather than towards outmoded social forms such as the traditional *male breadwinner/female carer family model* (Beck 1992).[8] Thus, if new partnerships no longer rely on a division of labour or on complementary roles, why should women have a reduced gain from marriage? As many other authors suggest, married and unmarried couples still enjoy the dual-

[8] Individualisation here refers to "the variation and differentiation of lifestyles and forms of life, opposing the thinking behind the traditional categories of large-group societies - which is to say, classes, estates and social stratification." (Beck 1992:88).

earner family benefits of joint production and consumption in addition to emotional attachment, love, and sexual intimacy (Cherry 1993, Oppenheimer 1988).

Therefore, the prediction that the increase in women's educational attainment would reduce the gain from marriage does not necessarily hold. In fact, other types of hypotheses emerge from the *search theory of mate selection* proposed by Oppenheimer (1988). She argues that greater independence allows qualified women to set a higher standard for the minimally acceptable match. This means selecting a marriage candidate with potentially similar bargaining position or, in other words, forming an *assortative mating* partnership in terms of education or occupational category. This type of partner selection process has various consequences in the marriage market that should not be interpreted as women's rejection of marriage. These consequences are an increasing delay at first marriage, a greater risk of non-marriage (i.e. the longer the time spent searching, the fewer the number of candidates available in a given age group) and higher marriage instability. Oppenheimer argues strongly for the view that the strategy of searching for a "high-quality" match is consistent with the continued desire to marry.

I.2.3 The Educational Expansion: Delayed Motherhood and Increase in Children's Quality

Becker predicts that the increase on women's human capital reduces the demand for children. More education gives women higher earning capacity in the market place and, therefore, increases their opportunity cost if they remain at home as caregivers. Since the 1970s declining fertility and increasing women's labour force participation have gone hand in hand in countries like Spain and Italy. However, the reduced fertility rate is partly attributed to changes of timing at marriage and at childbirth rather than to the cost of children (Castro 1992). A single variable such as educational attainment probably is not sufficient to explain the current fertility decline, because women in general have experienced a decline in fertility. In any case, it is obvious that the explanation cannot be reduced to the higher price of children. Indeed, Bergmann (1995) states that Becker

"...comes to plainly ridiculous conclusions because it is too simple; it leaves out considerations of prime importance /.../. The thing picked out by Becker's analysis as most significant is totally insignificant for the general population: an inheritance for children on which a return is earned which is controlled by the rate of interest" (p. 149).

I.2.4 Questioning Rationality: Imperfect Information and Cultural Values

This last remark obviously points to a basic assumption of rational choice models, which is that individuals act rationally. Indeed, Becker's very first statement was that he would analyse human behaviour without considering emotional decisions and would, therefore, assume that individuals make rational choices throughout the lifecourse. The rationality under the notion of optimisation in the economic model is understood in terms of economic transactions, and as such it does not consider the influence of other elements such as "traditions", which may drive individuals to make choices with sub-optimal results (Ferber & Nelson 1993). Furthermore, it might also be the case that not all individuals are able to perceive that there are any choices available to them (Blank 1993). Breen and Rottman (1995) also mention the role of socialisation in individual acts, because "much of what we do is unreflective, we do not constantly engage in the calculus of costs and benefits. Rather, people's behaviour is shaped by the processes of socialization through which constrains become internalized" (p. 8).

The problem with models of rational choice based behaviour is that we are constrained to assume a normative concept of rationality. These models do not consider the variation in social norms or ideologies, or the extent to which the notion of rationality is itself subject to change (Duncan & Edwards 1999). Neither are they a useful framework for cross-national comparisons because, as suggested by Pfau-Effinger (1998), we would have to assume the very infeasible premise that women share homogeneous pattern of actions and orientations regarding family and waged work throughout all Western societies.

However, the major shortcoming of the economic theory of the family is its failure to theorise the concept of *power* within relationships, which greatly limits its explanatory power (Münch 1992). The assumption that individuals conduct *economic transactions* under conditions of free choice is very problematic. As argued by Münch, in relationships based on an unequal gender division of labour one party is normally subjected to the power of another party and, therefore, may not refrain from an action that he or she otherwise would not perform. The main sources of power might originate from the fact that the power-holder has exclusive access to individual and collective goods and services, control over affective bonds, and the possession of knowledge about the market. This situation might prevent the other

party from forming outside relationships, and it might shape their perception about their chances to participate in the market place. Münch stresses that rational choice theory does not serve as a truly comprehensive theory of action, because "they reduce the whole complexity of social life to terms of economic calculation and transaction, the complexity of modern society to the simplicity of liberal society" (p. 160).

In brief, Becker's rational choice model applied to the family has given rise to intense debate among their many advocates and their no less numerous sceptics. Despite the fact that I have intentionally stressed the critiques, I should say that these models do at least provide simple analytical tools for advancing hypotheses on individual set of choices. As Blank (1993) puts it:

"Even economists who believe that the assumptions of the simple model of economic behaviour are unlikely to be true nonetheless find it a useful 'defining device' they can evoke as a "base case", from which they can develop more realistic variations./.../ Even in situations where choices are extremely bounded, it can still be useful to analyze the situation as one where the participants choose the best option./.../ we should not assume the economic model gives us a complete answer, merely that it gives us a way to think coherently about some of the important responses with which we are concerned" (P.p.: 139-40).

In the analysis, I categorically depart from the fundamental interpretation of family behaviour and organisation implied by NHE. I do borrow, however, some of its concepts concerning the marriage market. Throughout the empirical research, I will critically revise the NHE's working hypotheses. I will initially accept the premise that marriage decisions partly reflect rational behaviour based on an evaluation of the benefits and costs of future partnerships. Indeed, inspired by this premise, I have formulated the research hypotheses which predict certain scenarios about women's family behaviour in the context of educational expansion in Spain (c.f. the Introduction).

In the interpretation of family behaviour conducted to date one significant aspect has been left systematically out of the analysis. This aspect has to do with the exogenous constraints that determine individual choices, and with the role that social institutions play in affecting the organisation of family life and the structuring of individuals' life courses.[9] Feminist theorists have largely studied the notion of constrained choices. The next section reviews precisely the main contribution of gender theory in the

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[9] *Life course analysis* acknowledges the importance of the overlap in the chronology between individuals' lives and social and institutional structures. It implies the analysis of transitions over time between various states (e.g. from single to married, from childless to first birth and so on) and, therefore, it is particularly conceived for longitudinal data (Dex 1991).

understanding of family change, which is presented as an alternative and more comprehensive theoretical framework.

I.3. Rethinking the Family from the Feminist Theory Standpoint

So far I have not found a satisfactory way of conceptualising the family and, in particular, the gendered effects of family formation. Nor do I have a satisfactory theoretical framework to account for historical transitions. Here, I argue that family functioning can be better explained by feminist theory. I have chosen to focus on two strands: the structuralist theory of *patriarchy* and the theory of the *gender contract*. Despite the fact that both strands currently coexist and are widely accepted, I have decided to begin with the concept of *patriarchy*, which has undoubtedly set the benchmark for feminist thought. Ultimately, however, I argue in favour of the theory on the *gender contract*.

In the rational choice model described above it was presupposed that families were functional for the society as a whole. Feminists had also noted this function as early as the 1960s and 1970s, but from a completely different perspective. For the Marxist feminists, the family functioned for the capitalist mode of production, which made it a primary site of women's exploitation and subordination. The family was conceived of as a patriarchal structure (i.e. the system of male oppression of women) developed and reproduced by the capitalist system. This formed the basis of the dual system theories of patriarchy.

Many feminists have felt, nonetheless, unhappy with such an ahistorical theory of patriarchy. It was ahistorical insofar as it was unable to explain the transformation of women's subordination across time. It could not address, for instance, the question of why patriarchy was also present in pre-capitalist societies. Furthermore, it did not provide the basis for any political action that would include working class women or minorities. The reason was that their image of the family essentially corresponded to the reality of white middle class women. Therefore, despite the significant contributions that patriarchy theory offered in the re-conceptualisation of women's subordination and in the revision of gender-blind social theory, it appeared to be inadequate in accounting for the historical and trans-cultural variations in the situation of women.

In view of the difficulties encountered with the concept of patriarchy, some other authors have continued to develop new ways of theorising it. Walby (1990), for instance, has proposed a theory of patriarchy in industrialised countries. Articulated in six partially interdependent structures, her model interprets patriarchy and capitalism as being analytically independent. This solves the problem of dealing with historical and cross-culturally variable forms of gender inequalities. She identifies three levels of abstraction: the system of patriarchy, the six structures of patriarchy and patriarchal practices. The six structures of patriarchy are: (a) patriarchal mode of production, (b) patriarchal relations in wage labour, (c) the patriarchal state, (d) male violence, (e) patriarchal sexuality and (f) patriarchal culture. The *patriarchal practices* are contained in each of these six structures. Thus, each historical time would produce different *forms of patriarchy* depending upon the relations between its structures. In this model family and household relations are depicted as the space where husbands expropriate women's labour.

Despite Walby's major improvements in theorising patriarchy, the theory still incurred some problems. First, it maintained the outmoded practice of depicting families as the site of entrapment of wives within the patriarchal system. Second, her theory retains some methodological weaknesses. Acker (1989), for instance, rightly indicates that Walby relied on a dual-systems strategy in her conceptualisation of patriarchy, as she relates patriarchal structures such as "the patriarchal domination in paid work" to capitalism. Again, this dual systems-patriarchy approach appears to be inadequate in accounting for historical change and cross-cultural variation. Therefore, Acker (1989) is amongst those who propose abandoning the notion of patriarchy and focusing instead on the concept of gender. Gender has different connotations such as those of "structural, relational, and symbolic differentiations between women and men" (p. 238).

The concept of *gender* instead of *patriarchy* entails a new strategy of social theory, far removed from structuralism, which assumes that all social relations are gendered. However, we need to explain the mechanisms whereby these gendered forms emerge in the first place. This is successfully achieved by the theory of the *gender contract*.

It was initially Carole Pateman (1988) who spelled out the idea that "social contracts" were normally blind to the reality of gender while they implied several kinds of hidden "sexual contracts". These sexual contracts structured the rights of men and, indirectly, those of women as dependent individuals. As a result, her focus did not fall on the structures that determined women's subordination, but on the interdependence between women and men in producing social and cultural structures.

Rantalaiho (1993) defines the *gender contract* as the "unspoken rules, mutual obligations and rights which define the relations between women and men, between genders and generations, and finally between the areas of production and reproduction" (p. 2).[10] She argues that there are two principles within the abstract gender system: that of hierarchy and that of difference (or segregation). Both are intertwined in multiple ways. The principle of *difference* means that women should be clearly discernible from men in both ideas and practices, while the principle of *hierarchy* means that men should take precedence and set the primary norms. The gender contract could experience historical change as women used it differently to pose their demands. Of course, contracts do not arise from the transaction of two free parties representing the interests of women and men. As explained by Rantalaiho (1993), the idea of a "contract" simply represents a challenging way of questioning tacit agreements which take gendered structures for granted. As soon as a particular gender contract becomes unacceptable to some of the parties or entails any tension between interest groups, it is open to political "renegotiation".

The main problems concerning the concept of the gender contract arise at the empirical level. For instance, how should we operationalise this concept in a comparative research, which are the more appropriate geographical levels to study the gender contract (national, regional or local), which indicators should we take? Few efforts have been made to apply this concept in empirical research, so consequently a lot of work must be done to assess, develop, and advance towards its applicability.

Hirdman (1998), the architect of the concept, provides one of the few examples of the use of the gender contract in an empirical research applied to the Swedish case study. In her study she identifies two types of gender contracts along the period covered from 1930-1975. Initially, she refers to *the household contract* (1930-60) based on the ideology of "man, the breadwinner" and "woman, the housewife and mother" which was strongly embedded in the labour movement as well as the trade unions. During this period, 1930-1975, emerging new strata of social democrats claimed that the question of the "reproduction" should be posed in the political agenda. The problem of how to deal with household and childcare chores was considered to be the "gender conflict". This group called for a reformulation of the social policy, or

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[10] The definition of the *gender contract* is here extracted from Rantalaiho's article instead of from Yvonne Hirdman. Hirdman originally defined the concept, but her early papers have not been translated from Swedish (for the original source see: Hirdman, Y. (1990) "Genussystemet", in *Demokrati och makt i Sverige*. Maktutredningens huvudrapport. SOU, Stockholm, 44).

family policy, which would allow women to have a free choice in performing the dual role of mothers and workers.

The second type was *the equality contract* (1960-75) which meant a further radicalisation of previous ideals in line with the so-called socialist family policy. Women and men were both expected to have equal rights and obligations in the areas of paid work, housework and childcare. This expectation created the basis for a more powerful welfare state that would solve "the gender conflict" or the full integration of women in society. Political reforms favoured the increase in women's labour force participation, but also the emergence of a new form of gender segregation within the expanding public sector. Finally, in the period that followed the late 1970s there was a shift towards *the equal status contract,* which claimed not only equal gender opportunities, but also the same share in responsibilities and duties. This contract aimed at dismantling the gender segregation process in the labour force.

Hirdman's concept of gender contract provides a useful framework to study "the gender-creating process" in any given context. In the Swedish case, the author describes a process of negotiation in the search for solutions to the gender conflict between the state and the abstract collective women. This negotiation of the gender contract eventually led to the formulation of the individuality of men and women, and the generalised spread of the *two-income family*. This process can also be expressed as state-guided *defamilialisation*, whereby women and men are able to sustain families and themselves without having to depend on the economic contribution of their respective partners.[11] Complete defamilialisation is still far from being realised in most European countries, and Chapter II illustrates that it is especially distant in Spain.

In brief, feminist theorists have unseated beliefs that any specific family arrangement is natural, biological, or "functional" in any timeless way. They have criticised structures of power and conflict, they have refused to glorify the nuclear family as a loving refuge, and they have challenged traditional theoretical dichotomies between the private and public spheres. This last is important because of the relevance of these dichotomies to the organisation of paid work, the state-provided welfare, and

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[11] The concept of *defamilialisation* was initially suggested by authors such as Orloff (1993) and McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) as an addition to the notion of *decommodification* used by Esping-Andersen (1990) (i.e. "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation" p.: 37).

other institutions (Thorne 1992). In the next section, I illustrate the current nexus between the nature of the state and the functions of the family.

I.3.1. State-Family Relationships

This chapter began with a description of the NHE approach, in which the state has a residual role and is mainly meant to intervene as an efficiency-raiser for individual choices. The paradigm of *gendered welfare states*, on the contrary, emphasises that welfare state social provisions have a significant impact upon inequalities within marriage, family behaviour and gender relations. The term *gendered* stresses the feminist approach adopted in the analysis of comparative social policy. Here I argue that the study of the individual's behaviour in relation to the family should also take into consideration the impact of the welfare state, which might to some degree determine individuals' sets of opportunities. The assumption is that different models of welfare state constrain, support or facilitate certain family forms, gender relations and the organisation of care and paid work.

The role of public institutions in the transformation of families is present in most theories of social modernisation, where the growing number of functions assumed by the state and the market presumably leads to the weakening of the family as an institution. As Beck (1992) puts it:

> "The individual is indeed removed from traditional commitments and support relationships, but exchanges them for the constraints of existence in the labor market and as a consumer, with the standardizations and controls they contain. The place of *traditional* ties and social forms (social class, nuclear family) is taken by *secondary* agencies and institutions, which stamp the biography of the individual and make that person dependent upon fashions, social policy, economic cycles and markets, contrary to the image of individual control which establishes itself in consciousness" (p. 131).

The only opposition I raise to Beck's approach is assumption that there exists only a single path of modernisation in which traditional ties and social forms such as the community or the family inevitably lose their role as social safety nets. In reality, Western European societies have evolved along different paths of modernisation or social compromises between classes and genders. At the same time, there are different *gender contracts* that support different relationships between generations, various constructions of motherhood/fatherhood, and multiple patterns of women's

integration into the labour force. Each modernisation process entails different gender contracts, which at the same time reinforce different family models (Pfau-Effinger 1988).

The idea introduced above can be illustrated by looking at the nature of several welfare states and their predominant family models. For instance, the cluster that results from the investigation done by Hantrais, Letablier (1996) and Fox-Harding (1996) provides an interesting example.[12] These authors constructed a typology based on analytical distinctions between states' commitments to social policies aimed at reconciling family and employment. They came up with four categories: (a) states which support non-interference in family affairs (United Kingdom and Ireland), (b) financially constrained state interventions (Mediterranean countries), (c) sequential ordering of paid work and family life with state support (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Luxembourg), and (d) active state intervention guided by egalitarian principles (the Scandinavian states).

The criterion of the classification described above - reconciliation between family and employment - particularly concerns working parents and, more specifically, women. Let us illustrate this point with some examples. In Britain, the state resorts to the subsidiarity principle in order to be excused from playing a major role in supporting families. As a result, kinship solidarity still plays an important role in the less affluent sectors of the population. This is demonstrated by the research conducted in 1980 on a sample of female employees in Britain. It revealed that the care of pre-school children of those working full-time was provided in 65 per cent of the cases by the child's father, grandmother or other relatives, while 87 per cent of those in part-time work depended on this informal care rose (Clarke & Henwood 1997). Thus, many women accommodated family responsibilities by reducing paid work and adopting the *male breadwinner/female part-time carer* model.

In Scandinavian states women rely on a universalistic and high quality welfare system which extensively supports the *dual breadwinner/dual carer family* model (see Leira 1992). In Mediterranean states, however, families are the main resort for the care of children, young adults and the elderly. Indeed, in states like Spain the *kinship solidarity family* model - cohesive bonds of solidarity within the extended family - is still firmly in place (Jurado & Naldini 1996). This model of allocating

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[12] Fox-Harding focussed on Britain, while Hantrais and Letablier included in their research an additional number of European states. Here I take results from the both studies.

family responsibilities has negative effects, such as the curtailment of women's occupational careers.

In recent years different typologies of welfare state regimes have been proposed to describe the influence of the state on the organisation of daily life, and its interplay with the labour market. Each typology has been organised around different criteria and has given rise to different clusters of countries.[13] I do not intend to discuss these typologies indepth, but rather to use them to demonstrate family-state relationships. The Hantrais, Letablier and Fox-Harding typology described above exemplifies two main political stances in family policy that have consequences for family arrangements and gender relations: the tendency to socialise services through the state apparatus, and the tendency to marketize services on the grounds of non-interference in the private sphere of the family. In these two cases the role of the state in defining responsibilities within the family is completely different. The peculiarity of the Spanish welfare state is developed in Chapter II.

The relationship between social policies and individual behaviour is always difficult to prove and some policies may not even have any clear-cut effects. However, there are always interactions between the policies and their recipients. Sainsbury (1994), for instance, develops the idea that a particular choice of social policy reflects underlying assumptions about family functioning and organisation. When these assumptions are translated into social policies they in turn have prescriptive effects.

Sainsbury refers to two hypothetical types of social policies, as shown in Table I.1. The first is a social policy scheme to fit the breadwinner family. There, the family is the unit for which social insurance, contributions, and taxation are calculated, with deductions or allowances for dependants. This choice embodies the notion of "the family wage" which means that the system supports *one-earner families* (the earner usually being the male household head). In this case, the main breadwinner (the husband) enjoys all the benefits of social security thanks to his participation in the labour market, while the rest of the family dependants derive their rights from his

[13] After the publication of "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (Esping Andersen 1990) a long debate took place among feminist social scientists. They argued that Esping Andersen's typology was based only on the relationship between paid work and welfare, and that it neglected the relation of women with welfare and many other forms of unpaid work (see, for instance, Lewis 1992 and Orloff 1997). I do not wish to enter into this controversy. My only intention is to show some examples of the effect of different welfare state regimes on gender inequalities and family responsibilities.

contributions. That is to say, other family members are protected only insofar as they are family dependants and not because of their individual social rights.

Table I.1. Dimensions of Variation of the Breadwinner and The Individual Models of Social Policy

Dimension	Breadwinner Model	Individual Model
Familial ideology	Strict division of labour Husband = earner Wife = carer	Shared roles Husband = earner/carer Wife = earner/carer
Entitlement	Differentiated among spouses	Uniform
Basis of entitlement	Breadwinner	Other
Recipient of benefits	Head of household	Individual
Unit of benefit	Household or family	Individual
Unit of contributions	Household	Individual
Taxation	Joint taxation	Separate taxation
Employment and wage policies	Deductions for dependants priority to men	Equal tax relief aimed at both sexes
Sphere of care	Primarily private	Strong state involvement
Caring work	Unpaid	Paid component

Source: Sainsbury (1994: 153).

In the second type of social policy the state designs a scheme to include all individuals regardless of their family status. In this case, individuals as independent paid workers are the unit of by which benefits, contributions and taxation are calculated. This model encourages to a larger extent the formation of *dual-earner families*. Sainsbury's examples support, again, the proposition that social/institutional variables can exert an important effect on the relative bargaining positions of spouses, as well as on the organisation of family life in the medium- or long-term.

To conclude, a complete understanding of the family should ideally take account of the role of institutional variables. Yet this does not imply a deterministic relationship between state policies and family behaviour. Indeed, national-level social policies do not predict the differences in family systems that arise at the regional and local levels. Other variables such as embedded traditions and cultural values might have significant effects on the organisation of family life and living arrangements. This

later remark takes us to the next section, which examines the influence of social norms on family behaviour and explains their inclusion in the empirical analysis.

I.3.2. Against Rationality: the Role of Social Norms and Gender Values

Above, I argued that individuals' decisions may not wholly reflect the rational behaviour guided by financial incentives or social policies, but may also follow the differences in preferences or cultural values embedded in their social context. The main problem in dealing with these variables lies in ascertaining which part of family behaviour is due to cultural factors, and deciding how to approach these variables in the absence of adequate qualitative information. These are the issues I will now discuss.

Becker attempted to include the altruistic behaviour of parents towards family members in his rational model despite the fact that altruism is intrinsically a non-economic variable. He correctly noticed that altruistic families had more insurance against economic uncertainty and tried to explain this behaviour by the so-called *rotten kid theorem*. However, he imposed this normative concept (parents are altruists because well-maintained children have higher utility value) onto the model and constructed a mathematical operationalization as though altruism could be measured or monitored.

In practical terms, one can seldom operationalise values or culture through a mathematical theorem or a single quantitative variable. Another way to go about this problem is to look for proxies or variables that indirectly express differences in values or social norms. This has been done, for instance, by approaching broad cultural differences through particular geographical areas that share some cultural homogeneity or historical heritage. Duncan (1991), for instance, showed that a woman's status in paid employment in Britain reflected not only labour market specificities, but also social histories and cultures originating at a regional scale. Sackmann and Häussermann (1994) provided another example for Germany. They argued that geographical differences in women's labour force participation could not be fully understood by classical economic theory. They needed to resort to historical and social research to reveal how different paths towards industrialisation, mostly shaped at the regional level, have given rise to different gendered patterns of employment and family orientations. Solsona (1998) also illustrated the role of

cultural factors in the construction of specific gender identities in her case study of Catalonia. She referred in particular to the weaker level of patriarchal relationships embedded in Catalonia as compared with other Spanish regions. These studies support the idea that the distinction of different "regional or local cultures" sheds more light on the complex reality that is concealed under the boundaries of the nation state.

Another proxy to control for differences in values, traditions or social norms can be found in variables such as the individual's age (different stages over the life course), historical periods or birth cohorts. Birth cohorts or generations are normally arbitrarily delimited by a certain range of birth years. However, they also symbolise a group of individuals who might share an identity due to their common history of life events. As Berger, Steinmüller and Sopp put it, "...members of a particular cohort respond to common experiences and develop common behaviour patterns and norms" (1993: p. 57).

Thus, contrary to Becker's premise that basic preferences do not change rapidly over time, I argue that preferences and values must be allowed to vary across time. These variables are difficult to handle but can be approached by proxies which, of course, will always require cautious interpretation.

I.3.3. Attaching Meaning to the Modern Construction of Families, Households and Marriage

In the previous sections, I provided explicit arguments for dissociating from Becker's (NHE) or Walby's (theory of patriarchy) definitions of the family. However, these difficult concepts must still be operationalised for the empirical research. It should be noted that even in the sociological literature, terms such as family, household and marriage may be used interchangeably or even changed meaning according to the time period or ideological orientations of the research.

In the Barret & McIntosh's (1990) book called "The Anti-Social Family", the authors brought up the point that the social and economic institution of the *family-household* also has specific cultural representations. In the Britain of the 1980s this representation consisted of a group of relatives organised on the basis of close

kinship relations and a division of labour between spouses. This stereotypical model of the family pervades in many public institutions, despite representing only a minority of the population.

The socially and historically constructed *conventional ideology of the family*, where a bread-winner father and a full-time mother live together in a long-term union with exclusive sexual and reproductive practices, was probably only briefly relevant to real families in most societies. At most, it may have represented a marginal group of the population. Indeed, this formulation only represents the *bourgeois family*, since in most industrialised countries working-class women have always had to engage in some from of paid labour to help sustain their families (Lewis 1992b). The conventional family ideology normally implies the exclusion of women from long-term attachment to the labour force and the guarantee of a *family wage* (i.e. remuneration which allows workers to sustain dependent relatives) to men through their stable long-term occupational careers. The conditions allowing these arrangements no longer exist in most countries and post-industrial societies cannot maintain the *male breadwinner/female carer family model* either economically.

The increase in women's labour force participation and educational attainment have triggered major changes in the traditional patterns of family formation and living arrangements. The timing of marriage, the timing and number of births, levels of cohabitation and levels of living-apart-together (i.e. a relationship in which both partners live in separate households) and follow new trends. These trends have on some occasions been depicted as "family decline", because they involve higher marital instability through easier exit from unwanted relationships, growth in stepfamilies and the reconstitution of new families, delayed marriage and fertility and so on (Popenoe 1993).[14] These trends might instead be interpreted as the result of women's new aspirations to form intimate relationships far removed from the *housewife marriage* model (González & Solsona 2000).

Giddens (1992), for example, speculates about the materialisation of *pure relationships* whereby individuals enter a social relationship:

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[14] Popenoe (1993) conducted research on American families. He depicted a dreadful scenario by announcing the break up of the nuclear family, predicting serious social consequences especially for children.

"...for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it" (p.58).

Giddens proposes a fairly progressive definition of what partnerships can be about. However, his description leaves out important aspects of the complexity of family life. For example, he overlooks the fact that most couples might be tied by economic interdependencies, commitments, and different kinds of support and obligations (e.g. parenting and care) acquired over their shared past (Finch 1989). The inclusion of these elements in the analysis of partnerships would provide a better picture of the foundations of most contemporary marital or consensual unions. That is to say, there are different degrees of duty and kin obligations in each social context, but they always tend to be present to some degree. Southern European society, for instance, is closely associated with the embeddedness of distinct intergenerational and kinship solidarity. Thus, in this context, we need a wider concept of family or partnerships that includes other aspects of modern family life.

Oppenheimer (1996) provides an alternative definition of partnerships which includes these other dimensions. She defines *marriage* in particular as a social relationship which typically involves a "multi-dimensional package of mutual interdependencies" (p.239). In this conceptualisation, the contribution by the husband to the marriage goes beyond his income. In addition, it also involves companionship over a sustained period of time and a varied and large set of rewards, mutual support, and obligations between spouses. Contrary to the notion of the patriarchal family, her idea of marriage does not necessarily include the assumption of gender antagonism or subordination. Her definition would most adequately fit within the context of post-industrial societies where the housewife marriage is replaced by a "newly integrated family autonomy model" (Crouch 1999). This model is characterised by a low level of female domesticity, a high age at marriage, higher female education levels, more career-oriented individuals, and careful mate selection processes.

The post-industrial family model goes beyond early feminist interpretations where the family was considered the primary site of women's oppression, that is, as the place where married women were trapped within the patriarchal order of subordination (e.g. Bernard 1973, Hartmann 1976). Furthermore, it transcends the idea that women and men occupy separate spheres of social life: the private sphere at home and the public sphere at work. Women and men who identify themselves as partners and/or parents within marriages or stable unions exist. In these relationships

women are not necessarily oppressed, nor are men necessarily independent. Both partners may interactively and experientially construct their own arrangement of family life or intimate relationships.

To guide this research, Oppenheimer's ideological definition of partnerships and families. This has various implications for the empirical study. First, I do not take the family but the individual (women/men) as a unit of reference. Second, I shall also consider the influence of partners on family decisions, given that partnership formation means the *conjunction of two parallel social careers* (Bozon 1991). Third, and last, I shall consider partnerships as arrangements that change over time alongside the shared family life cycle. For this reason the methodology must rely on life-course analysis.

Various definitions have been discussed throughout this section. However, the variety in family forms and composition is observed not only across countries but also across social groups and generations. Many relationships may not exactly fit any of the concrete definitions discussed here. It is the aim of the empirical analysis to test whether some of the described family forms exist in the case study. It is important to define different family models because each of them entails different degrees of women's dependence within the family, different forms of organising paid and unpaid work, and different models of gendering responsibilities. Furthermore, the assumptions about how the family functions "...form[s] a crucial element of the conditions on which women and men are employed, the level of their wages, and the taxes and benefits" (Barret & McIntosh 1990: 7).

I.4. Conclusions: Towards an Analytical Framework

To date there has not been a comprehensive theoretical explanation capable of guiding cross-national studies on family change and gender relations. There are only few contributions from different theoretical perspectives, by which the feminist theory has gained the major insights into the field. This is no coincidence since the family, as a socially constructed institution with strong implications for women's life chances has been a classic target of study in feminist research.

Neo-classical economists have had the main virtue of simplifying the complex reality of family behaviour into a handy supply-and-demand curve diagram (Bergman 1995) leaving aside, amongst other things, differences in power and principles of gender equality. In the NHE approach everything is instead reduced to income and benefits. It is thus not recognised that family welfare depends on a number of different resources among which female caregivers make, by and large, the most important contribution. Because family caregiving is rarely monetarised, it remains a black box in the economic system that NHE theorists fail to adequately assess.

Families are shaped by a wide system of social relations (see Figure I.1) which includes the state (with its different degrees of commitment to "women-friendly" policies) and the labour market (with its different models of women's integration in paid employment).[15] Because of the apparent influence of these factors, the study of the family and its influence on women's life chances should thus not be limited to an analysis of just the family. Institutions, as socially constructed entities, create different mechanisms of exclusion. They are the products of different values and goals that themselves are derived from historical experiences or unique cultural heritages.

The triangle in Figure I.1 shows an interrelated system of social relations by including the state, the family and the labour market. The interesting aspect is that each society places - under particular "gender contracts" - different weight on each component of the triangle for the supply of welfare. In industrialised societies most welfare is procured through the wages obtained in the market and the caregivers working in the home. In post-industrial societies most of these responsibilities have been transferred to the state and the private sector. This means a diversification in sets of opportunities, which no longer depend exclusively on the individual's fate or on the individual's family background. The peculiarity of the Spanish case is that families still play a relatively important role in welfare provision. They are the main providers of care. This kinship solidarity springs partly from prevailing values about family responsibility, and partly from the lack of other sources of support. These values are further analysed in Chapter III.

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[15] Hernes (1987) proposed the term of "women-friendly states" to refer to those states which enable women "...to have a natural relationship to their children, their work, and public life", and which do "...not force harder choices on women than men" (p. 15). This term is commonly ascribed to the Scandinavian states.

Figure I.1. Research Design to Estimate the Effect of Family Decisions on Women's Occupational Careers from a Life Course Perspective



It should be noted here that with only one case study, it is difficult to test empirically the role played by institutional variables in shaping an individual's family behaviour. Consequently, the aim here is simply to examine the potential effects of welfare social policies over time on family behaviour. In the next chapter I illustrate the role of state policies - or the effect of their absence - in understanding the historical development of the family into the institution that it is today.

CHAPTER II

Interpreting the Foundations of Social and Gender Relations in Spain: The Welfare State, The Labour Market and The Family

This chapter examines the foundations of social and gender relations in Spain from a historical perspective. These relations generated by the particular interactions that happen at different points in time between the state, the family and the labour market. A discussion of each of these elements forms the structure of the chapter. I begin in the first part with debate on the historical role of the welfare state in encouraging particular gender relations and family models. The analysis focuses on the description of recent policy reforms and the extent to which they have encouraged the emergence of *dual-earner families*. Stress is placed on family related policies with the understanding that gendered family responsibilities are at the cornerstone of women's disadvantages in the labour market. This is not to say that other areas of social policy such as those related to the labour market have less effect in enhancing women's interests.

The model of the welfare state is important insofar as it determines family arrangements and the organisation of caring work. As stated by Orloff (1993) "...the character of public social provisions affects women's material situations, shapes gender relationships, structures political conflicts and participation, and contributes to the formation and mobilization of identities and interests" (p. 304). As a matter of fact, most social systems of protection in western European states originally rested on the assumption that societies were organised around traditional families, namely a family model with men as the main *wage earners* (family providers) and women as the main *caregivers* (family dependants). This is the model of the *housewife marriage*, in which women take up the main bulk of care work in the marriage.

Naturally, the role of women has changed as a result of their growing access to the educational system and the labour market. Therefore, the housewife marriage is not

really the model that fits the reality of younger female generations. However, some European welfare states have not yet completely adapted to deal with modern family arrangements and the specific needs of social protection associated with the new demographic trends. This lack of adaptation inhibits the formation of a new *gender contract* that could help families create alternatives to the *housewife model*.

The last part of the chapter deals with the growing number of *dual-earner families* at the regional level. This family model is used to estimate the presence of symmetrical partnerships (i.e. partnerships in which partners do not have a rigid gender division of labour). I conduct a regional analysis because, given the large territorial differences, the position of women in the labour market cannot be explained by national-level macro-economic trends. The uneven outcomes between geographical areas may reflect the model of economic development as well as the cultural heterogeneity concerning gender roles and family systems. This preliminary approach indicates the importance of regions as intervening variables in any sociological analysis.

II.1 The Role of the Welfare State: How does the State Influence Family Life and Structure Gender Relations?

This section examines the general characteristics of the Spanish welfare state and, in particular, how different policy actors have conceptualised gendered family responsibilities and women's integration into the labour market. The analysis starts with the period of the dictatorship (1939-1975) which harshly enforced the functions and obligations of the patriarchal family. It then proceeds to the developments prompted by the mandates of the Socialist Party (PSOE) from 1982 until the end of the 1990s (see abridged chronology in Appendix 4).[16]

[16] PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español).

II.1.1. Institutional Legacies: the Family Wage (1939-1975)

It is essential to bear in mind that the authoritarian regime quashed many of the expectations for greater gender equality that had been generated during the Second Republic (1931-1936). It also truncated the reform of social assistance schemes meant to bring Spain line with other modern European states such as German (Moreno and Sarasa 1993). In the days of the II Republic there was not really a total rupture with the traditional views generally held about women and gender relationships. Nevertheless, the political climate favoured the implementation of legislative reforms in the field of family related policies which some authors think would have been very promising (Nash, 1983). The II Republic, for instance, approved the right to civil marriage, it recognised equal rights for illegitimate children, it gave women the right to have a declaration of paternity on the part of their children's father, it prohibited of dismissal on marriage or pregnancy (1931), it approved a divorce law (1932), it legalised the right to abortion (1936), it implemented a compulsory maternity insurance in the Workers' Statute (1929) and it inaugurated the women's suffrage (1931). The introduction of a comprehensive set of social insurance schemes was eventually aborted by the outbreak of the civil war.

Under *Francoist despotic corporatism*, Spain adopted very extremist conservative policies particularly in the first years of the dictatorship. This so-called autarchic period (1939-1959) was mainly characterised by its closed economy. In this period *the family wage* to male workers was provided in the form of wage complements such as family allowances and family bonuses to alleviate the burden of family dependants.

In other countries the family wage was the result of the struggle of working-class men to exclude women competitors from the workplace and reproduce the middle-class housewife model (Fox-Harding 1996). In Spain male privileges over married women were imposed by the state. However, because they were targeted only at industrial workers, they did not have the originally desired impact. Non-salaried workers remained excluded despite representing around 40 per cent of the population in 1960s (Meil 1995).

In Spain the family wage was justified as a way to preserve the cohesion of the family in a way consistent with the Catholic social doctrine. This scheme, however, eventually turned out to be an irrational system of wage control (not lifted until 1956) that served more to guarantee capitalist accumulation than to produce the pronatalist

outcomes for which it was intended (Meil 1995). The system's fiscal policy directly discouraged married women from working in paid employment by eliminating the income supplement men would receive for having dependent wives or children (Nash 1991). Otherwise, at that time the subsidy (wage-complement) for a dependent wife was equivalent to that for four dependent children (Meil 1995).

Thus, while the authoritarian regime had a great impact on suppressing women's freedom to enter the formal labour market, it did not really succeed in promoting an increase in fertility (Nash 1991). Franco was resolved to regulate female sexuality, work and education according to his patriarchal notion of motherhood whereby women were conceived "...as potential breeders /.../ halting national degeneration through an expanded birth-rate and maximum development of their reproductive capacities" (Nash 1991: 160).

In 1959 the economic isolation came to an end with the implementation of the *Stabilisation Plan*, which inaugurated the second phase of the Francoist period. The new economic policy brought about the so-called *economic miracle of the 1960's* and supported the reform of the irrational family policy (1963-1973) inherited from the previous phase, in which workers were rewarded according to their family burden rather than by their professional qualifications. The economic growth coincided with the decline of agricultural work and the massive migration of labourers from rural areas to industrial cities. In rural society women typically contributed to the family economy, though not in ways recorded by the official statistics. In this period of major economic change a new law (22/1961) was passed to expand women's working rights. The law represented a rather limited reform, but it was important as it mandated equal pay and did away with gender discrimination in employment except in the judiciary, the military and the merchant marines (Valiente 1998). This reform also prohibited the dismissal of women on marriage, which had been instituted in some companies. By the end of the dictatorship (1975), married women no longer needed thus husband's permission to work outside of the home, which had previously been required. These years brought signs of the progressive weakening of the husbands' privileges as "heads of household".

II.1.2. Recent Reforms since 1976: Towards the Dual-System of Welfare Protection

The significant incorporation of women into the labour force, however, did not come about until the mid-1980s. The newly elected democratic regime inaugurated profound social-democratic reforms in core issues for women's emancipation. These included legalising the use of contraceptives (1978), decriminalising non-marital unions (1978), legalising divorce (1981), granting full legal recognition of children born outside wedlock both (1981), and partially decriminalising abortion (1985).

Nevertheless, the authoritarian system of social provision had furnished the foundations of a familiaristic welfare system from which future developments did not completely deviate. That is, social benefits were still designed based on the assumption of the presence of a male family head and a female caregiver. The state was not a fully engaged in enhancing women's individual capacities for independence as it was in presupposing individuals' (women's and children's) dependence within families. Indeed, the social functions accomplished by the family discouraged the state from initiating higher levels of public provision (Naldini 2001). Furthermore, in order to more rapidly overcome the economic problems inherited by the Franco era, the Socialist party sustained market-oriented 'social liberal' reforms rather than real social democratic policies (Almeda & Sarasa 1996).

The resulting welfare state system has been categorised as a *late-corporatist welfare state with a mixed system of social assistance* which decentralises many social services (they are devolved to regional autonomous communities and municipalities) (see Ferrera 1995; Moreno and Sarasa 1993). Estivill calls it "a mixed system, midway between the Bismarck and the Beveridge models, which is far from the development of the so-called "welfare state", in most European countries" (1993: 255).

In the sphere of social services there was not a profound commitment to gender equal opportunities for women (Carrasco et al. 1997). The absolute shortage of publicly funded day care centres and the organisation of school timetables and children's holidays do little to accommodate parents' regular work schedules and illustrate the political immobility in the sphere of family policy. As Table II.1 shows, the day care shortage is particularly serious for children under 3, while for pre-school children aged 3-6 the coverage is fairly vast. The same applies for elder care since almost 90 per cent of home-based assistance is currently provided privately by families (Ditch et al. 1996).

Despite the existence of subsidies (tax relief on the cost) for acquiring childcare services in case that both parents are employed outside the home or have a low income, most families tend to rely on informal networks for childcare. In 1990 as many as 25 per cent of children of working mothers were looked after by their grand-parents (Instituto de la Mujer 1990, see also Table II.1). Grandmothers or grandfathers may look after the children if mothers decide to continue in employment (Solsona *et al.* 1992), but this arrangement generally implies lack of geographical mobility for the parents.

Table II.1. Publicly Funded Child Care Services (% Provision For Children By Age Groups), Selected European States, 1993

Countries	Children under 3	Children aged 3-6	Age at compulsory schooling	Length of school day (hours)
Spain	2%	84%	6	8
United Kingdom	2%	60%	5	6.5
France	23%	99%	6	8
Denmark	48%	82%	7	3-5.5

Note: in Denmark data refer to 1994.
Source: European Commission (1996).

Compared with other European states such as France or Denmark, Spain offers little provision of childcare for children under 3. Compared to Britain, it does relatively better on services for pre-school children aged 3-6. The shortage of public care is the result of explicit policy guidelines whereby the choice for care is perceived as a private matter. The costs for private childcare are relatively high and consequently informal arrangements have become the most common solution (European Commission 1996).

The availability of informal networks for child care, together with the rigidity of the labour market for permanent workers, discourage women with consolidated positions in the labour force from taking long career breaks for childbearing (Vaiou 1995; see Solsona and Treviño 1995 for Spain). Thus, despite the relatively low proportion of women in the labour force compared to other European states, it is not so rare that many women with family responsibilities have continuous careers. Chapter V will reveal the variables that most frequently determine women's withdrawal from the

labour force.

The current welfare system reproduces indirect gender discrimination through the *dual system* of contributory and non-contributory social provision (Carrasco et al. 1997). Women are over-represented in the group with non-contributory social protection because they have traditionally sustained the main bulk of domestic and caring work. These women have derived social rights from their husbands, though they may have occasionally worked in irregular employment contributing no Social Security dues, or might have had a short work history. The 1985 Law made access to direct pensions more difficult for women by increasing the number of required years of contribution from 10 to 15. This restriction contrasts with the relaxation of the requirements for derived pensions, such as widows' pensions. Both marriage and the extended life expectancy of women have accentuated the increase in claims to widows' pensions in the last years. The main problem is that these pensions are economically less valuable. In the two years observed, 1994 (Mota 1996) and 1997 (De León 1999), for instance, a widow's pension represented only 55 per cent of the typical male pension.

As for the social welfare services currently available through the Social Security System (see Table II.2), where entitlement depends on previous contributions, women enjoy fairly good *maternity benefits* (in the past depreciatively called *incapacity leave*) which are equal to 100 per cent of the last salary. To qualify, women must have paid social security contributions for a minimum of 180 days during the five years preceding the birth.

There are also *family allowances* for children with a low income parents (the income threshold has been adjusted upward every year since 1994).[17] This allowance is part of the small array of family benefits administered by the Ministry of the Social Affairs (created in 1987) aimed at combating poverty rather than pursuing either demographic or distributive aims (Cabré et al. 1989; Estivill 1993). Along the same lines, there is also a *social minimum income* (*renta mínima de inserción social*) granted to very low-income households; this has been the first attempt to universalise social coverage during the democratic period. Currently, lone-parents and old people living alone are the main recipients of this income (Meil 1994).

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[17] The initial income threshold was 1,000,000 Ptas and 1,157,414 Ptas in 1997 which is below the maximum income levels providing exemption from income tax declaration (as quoted in Fernández-Cordón 1996).

Table II.2. Statutory Leave for Workers with Children: Spain 1995

Lengths of maternity/parental leave available per family after the birth of each child	36 months
Maternity leaves (After birth)	16 weeks (can be partly taken by fathers)
Paternity leaves	2 days
Parental leaves	Until child is 36 months, family entitlements
Leave for family reasons	2 days per parent per illness Payment at full earnings except maternity/parental leave which is unpaid

Note: *maternity leave*: is a health measure and usually only available to fathers in case of maternal death or severe illness; *paternity leave*: is for fathers usually for a short period of time around birth of a child; *parental leave*: it may be taken by either partner, generally while children are of pre-school age, and: *leave for family reason*: is usually to care for children or other relatives who are ill or for other domestic situations.

Source: European Commission 1996.

At present, state contributions per families *per se* are mainly directed to offset the costs of children in large families[18], and they especially target citizens in particularly disadvantageous circumstances (Valiente 1995). Despite the restricted reforms in the field of family policy, other areas of social protection have experienced an extraordinary expansion. This is the case for universal health care (achieved in 1989 by the State Budget Law) and the establishment of non-contributive (means-tested) retirement pensions in 1990. Pensions make up the main bulk of social spending at the present time, representing almost 45 per cent of the public budget in 1993 (Mota, 1996). According to the same author, the amount of a contributive pension for a typical industrial manual worker in 1992 was 97 per cent (after taxes) of their past average wage as compared with the average of 75 per cent replacement in the European Union. In contrast, a non-contributive pension provided only about 30 per cent of the past average wage for a typical industrial manual worker. In the European context, the Spanish pension system is relatively generous to retired individuals who

[18] In the current legislation large families consist of three children (two if one of them is disabled) aged 21 or younger, 25 if they are still engaged in the educational system.

had continuous careers in the paid labour force, but not to workers who had irregular occupational careers - the most typical pattern amongst women.

The reform of the pension system meant a fundamental change in the scheme of social protection. It aimed at covering not only stable workers but also people with weak attachment to the labour force, or interrupted occupational careers, which is the case for many married women of the elder generations. Women are also entitled to the widow's pension but, again, not through an extension of full citizenship rights but rather as derived right from their status as spouses.

The recent fiscal policy reform, which facilitated a new system of income tax (Law 20/1989 effective in 1991), is also worth mentioning. The new system allows the choice between joint taxation of the spouses' income and individual taxation. Joint taxation can be more advantageous for couples in the case that only one of them engages in paid employment, or the household income distribution is very unequal. However, the joint system tends to discourage the employment of married women. Economists like Phipps and Burton (1995) argue that "if lower-income wives are subject to their husbands' higher -marginal tax rates, then traditional unitary models predict that households will respond to lower market returns by reducing women's labor-force participation"(p.161). Hence, allowing married people to file individually represents an important advance for gender equality and the equal treatment of men and women as well as married and single women. Cohabiting couples (heterosexuals or homosexuals), however, are not considered as family units entitled to couples joint taxation or any other benefits granted to officially married (e.g. social security, inheritance, etc.). In 1989 the requirement that married individuals should maintain their civil status to be entitled to a widow's pension was eliminated. Thus, divorced people could claim the right to a pension according to the number of years they had lived together with their former companion (De León 1999).

In addition to fiscal reforms, the establishment of the Women's Institute (*Instituto de la Mujer*) in 1983 also represented a promising achievement for the implementation of equal gender policies. Its main goal was to supervise and encourage the implementation of non-discriminatory practices against women as stipulated in the 1978 Constitution. The role of this political body, later independently established in the autonomous communities, was nevertheless limited from the beginning. In reality, it did not have real political power and simply functioned as an administrative advisory body to the Ministry of Culture. It was meant to reflect the reformist character of the socialist government in office at that time (Folguera 1989). Its limited power in the political sphere and the job-centred nature of the welfare state

reproduced the exclusion of women's interests. Therefore, the progressive introduction of women into the labour force was only supported by patchy actions in the field of social policies. As a whole, the ideological discourses have strongly exalted the social cohesion of families as a primary source of welfare supply without considering the need for relief from the gendered burden of family responsibilities.

Though there seems to be a renewed interest in family matters, family policy as such is still a rather neglected area within the welfare state, in spite of, or possibly owing to, the crucial role of the inter-generational solidarity played by families. Reforms in social policy have been shadowed by more pressing issues since the beginning of the 1980s, including the high unemployment rate (22.2% in 1996), industrial restructuring, and the achievement of international competitiveness.[19] Therefore, families have continued to be the basic institution for alleviating the social exclusion of unemployed youth and reconciling the difficult relationship between women's paid employment and family responsibilities (Flaquer 1995, Ferrera 1995, Meil 1994, Viaou 1995).

There are other interpretations for why well-developed family policy and/or women's claims were left off the political agenda immediately after the dictatorial period. Some authors have argued that social policies originating after the authoritarian regime were intentionally designed to avoid a repetition of the strong pronatalist state intervention enforced during the dictatorship, the memories of which were still quite vivid (Gauthier 1993; Valiente 1995). The economic explanation suggests that Spain never experienced important labour shortages which, in other states, had pulled women into paid employment and, accordingly, mandated public services for families. In Britain, for instance, the labour supply shortages in the 1960s imported both female and male manual workers from the ex-colonies to fill vacant jobs. This permitted the survival of the hegemony of the white male breadwinner and middle class families (Williams 1995).

The fact is that while the democratic transition (between 1975 and 1981) inaugurated important expansions and changes in the fields of education, health and tax reforms, it did not make a profound revision of the system of social protection. The access to welfare remained defined by the traditional combination of a minimal state, the market and the family. It was precisely during the democratic transition that a new

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[19] Unemployment refers to the total average annual rate for 1996 (AELAS 1996).

social contract should have integrated the progressive individualisation of women's rights. On the contrary, the political agenda at that time was very carefully designed to first integrate the main claims posed by both conservative and left parties. In the context of growing unemployment and the deep economic crises of the 1970s, women's claims were postponed in favour of economic efficiency and the rationalisation of political priorities within a common agenda (De León 1999). The direct consequence was that women's claims remained without a direct interlocutor in the political system.

Trade unions were not able to channel women's claims either, they were divided into two main groups (CCOO and UGT), each strongly linked to the interests and goals of the left parties PCE and PSOE, respectively.[20] The trade unions focused on protecting mate, regular workers, while peripheral labourers and homemaking women did not get the same treatment. The exclusion of these workers solidified the social division between private and public spheres. Therefore, the inertia in the field of social policy did nothing to change the conservative approach to gender relationships in society, which at the same time legitimated the existence of unequal gender structures (De León 1999). The next section brings up the particular model of women's introduction into the labour market.

II.2. The Labour Market: Women's Growing Employment and Men's Diminishing Occupational Stability

One of the main features of the Spanish labour force is the low presence of women: the total female activity rate in 1996 was only 37 per cent, as compared with 63 per cent of men (EPA, 1996). However, in just the decade between 1980 and 1990 women's participation in the labour force grew at a rate of 3.5 per cent; this is the highest rate recorded among Western countries (see Figure II.1).[21] The increase cannot just be attributed to the structural effect caused by the low levels of women's

[20] CCOO (Comisiones Obreras), UGT (Unión General de los Trabajadores) and PCE (Partido Comunista Español).

[21] The figure is taken from Bonke (1995) who relied on the OECD Labour Force Statistics from 1971-1991. For the comparison the twelve original members of the European Union together with Norway, US and Canada were considered.

labour force participation in the labour force that lasted until almost the mid-1960s, but to the clear emergence of the new economic role of women.

In spite of the of fact that a large number of women have rushed into the labour force since the mid-1970s, there remains a significant gender gap in employment for married individuals (Figure II.2). While single women tend to have employment behaviour similar to single men in all observed age groups, married women over age 24 have a significantly lower presence in the labour force compared to their male counterparts.

Figure II.1. Absolute Growth of the Labour Force by Sex, Spain 1964-1999



Source: EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) 4th quarters.
Note: the growth estimated consists of the difference between the number of individuals in the labour force in any given year and the number in 1964 by sex.

The real dimension of change in the incorporation of women into the labour force is better illustrated in Figure II.3. This figure shows the activity rate at different stages of the life course for different generations of women. The real turning point comes with women born after the mid-1950s. They are the first generation to perform continuous labour force careers. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the activity rate reached by women aged 30-34 in the 1949-53 cohort was only 37 per cent, while the activity rate of women aged 30-34 in the younger cohort (1964-68) was 67 per cent.

Figure II.2. Activity Rate by Sex, Civil Status and Age, Spain 2000



Source: EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) 2nd quarter, 2000.

Figure II.3. Participation of Successive Birth Cohorts (1919-1973) over their Life Cycle, Spain



Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) (data from the 2nd quarters of the years observed).

Note: birth cohorts' participation rates taken from the longitudinal transformation of consecutive series of cross-sectional data.

In general terms, increases in the incorporation of women in the labour force have coincided with three main economic phases. The first one corresponds to the economic takeoff of the period 1964-1974, in which women were incorporated mainly through the expansion of the service sector and the growth of feminised industries such as cloth, textile and food processing. The second stage coincided with the economic crisis of the period 1975-1985. While workers in the private and male-dominated industrial sectors were negatively affected, the positive trend in female employment continued mainly through the increasing number of public sector jobs in fields such as education, health services and public administration. The third phase corresponded to the economic recovery of the period 1986-1990, in which the proportion of women in permanent employment was higher than the proportion conducting discontinuous careers (Moltó 1993).

It could be said that the typical career of married women during the authoritarian regime almost always included a definitive withdrawal from paid employment during the childbearing years. In contrast, the typical career of most young females in the late 1980s was continuous employment coupled with postponed childbearing responsibilities (Solsona 1991). These patterns are later reviewed in Chapter V.

The growing presence of women in the labour force since the mid-1980s, however, has been parallel to an increase in the number of unstable and irregular jobs. This trend emerged with the early amendments to the Workers' Statute in 1984 (Law 32/1984), which aimed to encourage job creation by deregulating the labour market. The reform contributed to the formation of a dual labour market, where new entrants to the labour market were subject to flexibilitation rules while permanent workers continued to enjoy the privileges of very rigid employment security legislation. The consequence has been that new entrants in unskilled jobs, largely women, young people, and recent immigrants, are subject to an unstable labour market trajectory. They form the bulk of the *peripheral sector* of the labour market. As a consequence of these reforms, in the second quarter of 1990 as many as 30 per cent of the population had fixed-term contracts (Bel-Adell 1991) and by the end of 1991 almost 40 per cent (Toharia 1998). These rates of occupational precariousness rank among the highest in the European Union.

The deregulation of employment has reinforced both the segregation of female workers into the service sector, and the segmentation of the labour market into jobs where different groups of workers are exposed to very different working conditions. In 1996 women held the largest share of part-time employment (68 per cent), and while 36.7 per cent of employed women held temporary contracts, only 28.3 per cent

of working men had such contracts. Contrary to other European states, however, women were not significantly involved in part-time employment.[22] In 1980 only 6.8 per cent of women were working part-time (i.e. less than 40 hours a week), rising to 15.9 per cent in 1996.[23] Part-time work is common in many other industrialised countries and has typically facilitated the introduction of married women in the labour market. The limited development of part-time work in Spain is partly attributed to the lack of interest of the main trade unions in promoting this type of contract. Some argue that unions fear that part-time employment jeopardises the male-household-head privileges derived from the family wage (Durán 1996).

The growing presence of women in the labour force has also gone hand in hand with the growth of unemployment. In 1996 29.6 per cent of women were unemployed (only 17.6% for men), with young women being at highest risk. As many as 45.7 per cent of women aged 20-24 were unemployed (33.7% of men in the same age group).

The extremely high unemployment rates recorded in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s were considered socially unbearable. However, other conditions managed to pre-empt any related serious social upheaval. First, some individuals could rely on unemployment subsidies, while others relied on family solidarity. In addition, some suggest that unemployment was not perceived as being very problematic because of the way the Spanish labour market unequally distributes risks between *insiders* and *outsiders*. Thus, unemployment was concentrated among new entry workers and women, while male household heads were less affected because of their privileged position as *insiders* in the labour market (Toms et al. 1995, Carrasco et al. 1997).[24]

Women and young people are also regarded as dependent family members and temporary unemployment does not create a real social stigma for them. Of course, it is assumed that families - rather than the state - will support the unemployed dependants (Jurado 1995). This is actually the case, since many parents tend to sustain their children's educational career until they acquire better occupational

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[22] Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (1996).

[23] Data from 1980 taken from Alcobendas (1984); other recent labour force statistics are from Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.

[24] Replacement rate for the first month of unemployment for a couple with tow children at the average level of earnings is higher in Spain than average for OECD countries (as quoted in Fernández-Cordón 1996).

prospects, generally at their own expense. Empirical studies have shown, however, that when young people -especially men - have a stable market income, are at least 25, are not enrolled in education and come from a farmer or non-skilled worker background, they are likely to live independently (Jurado 2001). It is interesting that Spanish students' nest-leaving does not depend on their parents' resources. This suggests that explanations for why young adults leave home should take into account the social norms that connect enrolment in education with social dependence (Jurado 2001).

Reports indicate that family networks are an important mechanism for young people's entry into the labour market. A 1984 survey (*La Encuesta de Juventud*) revealed that as many as 24 per cent of young people found their first job through family networks and 34 per cent through friends. A more recent study conducted in the city of Malaga in 1990 revealed similar patterns (Iglesias 1995).

In general terms, female paid-employment has increased though Spanish women must then maintain the *double-burden* of work in and out of the household. Although an unequal gender division of labour is found in most western industrialised countries, the situation seems particularly critical in Spain (see Figure II.4) where women still carry out the bulk of routine domestic work. According to the selected countries in Figure II.4, the state with the lowest gender gap in the time allocated to household work is Denmark. This low difference might be attributed to the achievements of *women-friendly* policies (i.e. generous parental leaves and child care services) which have encouraged the formation of *dual breadwinner families* (Lewis 1997).

In the Spanish context, the combined daily hours of paid and unpaid labour performed by women are almost double those worked by men. At the end of 1996, for instance, women worked an average of 64.31 hours per week while men only worked 31.85 hours (Durán 1997).[25] This finding supports the thesis of Durán (1997) and Carrasco (1995) who argued that the present standards of living are essentially maintained thanks to women's enormous contributions of unpaid work.

[25] Figures as quoted in the work of Durán (1997) which correspond to the Time-Budged Survey conducted by CIRES in 1996 for population aged 18 and over.

Figure II.4. Time Allocated to Household Work: Women and Men Aged 25-64, Selected European Countries



Source: Bimbi 1995.

It should be noted that not all women are equally over-burdened. Time-budget statistics conducted in 1987 showed that married women with low educational attainment were more over-burdened by domestic and caring work than were single, educated women (Ramos 1990). There are also noticeable differences across social classes. The family's total needs covered by domestic production in relation to those met through purchased or public services were about 50 per cent in the working classes and around 40 per cent in the middle classes. These results emerged from a field work analysis carried out in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area in 1990 (see Carrasco 1995). The author of that study also points out that not even middle-class families could guarantee their survival and reproduction without women's domestic work.

Women's paid employment is also very unevenly distributed. This is illustrated within Europe. This is illustrated by the multiple box plots of female activity rate (women aged 35-44) recorded in 1995, shown in Figure II.5 for a selected group of countries. The box plots show the minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and maximum of the distribution of the regional activity rates. Outliers are drawn in separately. Two main features stand out clearly: first that Spain is among the countries with the largest regional variations in activity rates and, second, that it has the lowest median female activity rates. Spanish territorial divisions are shown in Appendix 5.

Figure II.5. Regional Inequalities: Mean, Standard Deviation and Range of Female Activity Rates: Women Aged 35-44 (Selected Countries), 1995



Note: outlier in Portugal is Açores (57.7% activity rate) and in Italy is Valle d'Aosta (77.9% activity rate).
Source: Eurostat 1996 (NUTS 2).

The box plots have used NUTS 2 which correspond to the "Autonomous Communities". These territorial units were recognised in the 1978 Spanish Constitution as distinct regional entities with their own cultural and linguistic heritages. Besides the cultural differences, there are sharp economic differences reflected in the uneven distribution of women's and men's participation rates. The roots of these territorial inequalities are normally attributed to the historical process of economic development and the large population displacement following the 1959 Stabilisation Plan.

The massive population transfer from rural areas to urban centres accentuated the territorial concentration of economic activity. Traditional agricultural zones lost population to such an extent that small rural areas were nearly completely deserted. The main destinations were large cities and the coastal regions of the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. In addition, industrial activities spread along the Ebro Valley

that links the Catalan and Basque centres. During the last two decades, this regional distribution of labour has only been strengthened (Méndez & Caravaca, Toharia 1997).

Figure II.5, which shows the differences in the activity rate of women aged 35-44, takes into account the nature of the regional economic structure. Galicia has the highest activity rate and Asturias and Cantabria also have an important share of female employment, despite being among the job-losing regions since the early 1980s. This is explained by the role of women in small family holdings, an agrarian structure that has traditionally expelled male labour. Eastern regions such as Catalonia, the Valencian Community and Murcia are above the national average in female activity rates, but the reason is the importance of traditionally labour intensive manufacturing sectors like textiles, clothing and the food industry. Female participation is also important in metropolitan regions such as Madrid, which has experienced an intense tertiarization, and it is also the case in tourist regions such as the Canary and Balearic Islands.

II.3. Families in a New Socio-demographic Context: The Fragility of the Marriage Contract

Sociological studies on family change in industrialised societies usually associate the continuous pluralization of living arrangements and the increasing social permissiveness in the organisation of intimate relations with the increase in women's economic independence (Roussel, 1993; Thorne and Yalom, 1992). The more these trends are accentuated the less the family appears to be institutionalised. In Spain this presumed "deinstitutionalization" of families has not taken place to the same extent as it has in the northern or central European states. Actually, Spain is often described as a *family centred society* (Jurado & Naldini, 1996).

To understand the present features of family arrangements and the new role of married women, it is necessary to first consider the main social transformations that occurred in the period under study (1940-1990). Of particular importance are the lengthy tenure of the Authoritarian regime (1939), the take-off of capitalist modernisation (around the 1960's) and political democratisation (since 1976).

Family life also experienced intense transformations from 1940-1990. In brief, the 1960s and early 1970s were characterised by the *traditional family path* of rapid family formation. That is, individuals married earlier and children arrived soon after marriage. By the 1980s, however, women had adopted an *innovative family building strategy*, postponing both marriage and childbearing. In 1996 the average age at marriage was 26.2 years for women and 28.7 for men, while in 1990 the average age of women at the birth of their first child was 29 (Castro 1992). Women also increased the time between the first and the second births, and delivery of a third child became rather uncommon.[26] These combined factors account for the current Spanish *baby bust*.

The scarce potential for economic autonomy among women and young people, who both face great obstacles in entering paid employment, could be one of the causes of this new model of delayed family formation. Generally, young people leave the parental home very late, usually to form an independent household with a spouse rather than alone or with a cohabiting partner (Delgado & Castro, 1998). At the same time, fathers who continue to host their adult children in the family home seem to be relatively more tolerant of their adult children's personal autonomy (Valero & Lence, 1995).

Another aspect of family life liable to change in the recent context of growing women's economic autonomy is the level of marital disruptions. Recent figures show an increase in divorce, although it is still very low compared with other European States. According to the 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey, in the 1946-1950 marriage cohort only 2 per cent of first marriages ended in divorce, while for the younger marriage cohort of 1971-75 6 per cent divorced by 1991 (Solsona, Simó and Houle 1997). The low rate of divorce should not be attributed to the cultural heritage of the Catholic Church, but rather to the large number of women, above all those with limited work experience and low educational attainment, who have low prospects for attaining economic self-sufficiency.

Spanish society has experienced a rapid process of secularisation. This is evident in new marriage and cohabitation practices. For instance, as many as 37-38 per cent of marriages contracted in cities such as Burgos or Valencia were performed in civil ceremonies in 1991 (Treviño 1996). Although cohabiting couples are still the

[26] Figures as quoted in Requena (1997).

minority among the total number of partnerships in Spain (only 1.2 per cent of women cohabited in 1980, 1.3 per cent in 1990 and 3.3 per cent in 1993), they are on the increase, especially in urban centres (Delgado & Castro 1998). Cohabiting couples represented 22 per cent of all partnerships formed between 1990-94 in the metropolitan area of Barcelona (Solsona 1998).

It should be noted, however, that there is not one clear-cut family model in Spain, but rather many variations across regions. Culturally cohesive regions have traditionally held different degrees of complexity in the family structure as well as in the marriage markets (Cabré, 1999, Reher, 1997; Solsona and Treviño, 1990). Solsona and Treviño (1990), for instance, conducted a study with the 1981 Census data and identified four major family models: the northern expanded traditional family, the Andalusian expanded traditional family, the traditional nuclear family and the Castillian nuclear family. These regional differences have been associated with historical family systems that emerged from different models of land inheritance (Reher 1997).

Land inheritance practices stem from the economic function of families and especially from the importance placed on preserving family property. Thus, in regions where the inheritance is divided equally among children (Castille, the areas of north and south of Madrid, Extremadura, Andalucia, Murcia, Cantabria, and other parts of the north coast), neolocal residence and the formation of nuclear households is more usual (Reher 1997). In the northwest region of Galicia, the practice was to choose one heir (known as *millorado*) who would be expected to remain in the parental home. This system favoured the formation of complex households. Catalonia, the Pyrenees (northern Aragon), the Basque Country and parts of Valencia had the strongest tradition of the stem-family system, although in all these regions there is considerably heterogeneity in family systems.

In the introduction I argued that present patterns of demographic behaviour could be attributed to the transition towards modern egalitarian society. This is the argument sustained by McDonals (1997), who claims that given "the incoherence between the levels of gender equality applying in different social institutions" (1997: 16), it is not so odd that Southern countries like Spain or Italy have currently reached the lowest levels of fertility in industrialised countries. Women are expected to perform in the labour market under the same conditions and commitments as men, though private institutions and governmental policies still have not acknowledged the very simple fact that women give birth and, therefore, have further burdens and period of limited time resources.

Matthews (1994) also argues that asymmetrical conditions lead egalitarian women and egalitarian couples to lower family demands by having fewer children. Couples in which both members have occupational aspirations succeed in their relationship only if they have the *career flexibility* by which both can make the same efforts to accommodate work in and out of the household. The Spanish case does not demonstrate such flexibility, because it is the woman who generally sustains the double-burden of paid and unpaid labour (this point is further illustrated in next chapter).

In short, although women have expanded their economic role in the market place, they still hardly manage to reconcile it with the time and energy demands of family life. This is largely due to the fact that the welfare state has not really revised the old *gender contract*. The next section provides a general picture of different work arrangements at the regional and national levels.

II.3.1. An Outlook on Family Arrangements and the Organisation of Paid Work: National and Regional Patterns

This section describes the organisation of paid work by couples in which the women are aged 26-45. Different categories of household have been constructed. Among women living with partners in full-time work, we see the following household types:

1. *Traditional families* (breadwinning man working full-time and homemaking economically inactive woman);

2. *Modified traditional-families* (breadwinning man working full-time and contributing woman working part-time);

3. *Dual-earner* (both partners working full-time); and

4. *Other households* (men working full-time and women unemployed or seeking a job)

Finally, there is another group that includes those women living with a partner who is not engaging in full-time work (unemployed, inactive, etc.).

The distribution by household type reveals that from the overall group of women

aged 26-45 living with a male partner, only 12 per cent are living with men not working on a full time basis (see Figure II.6). From the group of women aged 26-45 living with a full time working man (household type b) 22 per cent fall into the category "other households". These households consist of women who are unemployed or studying, and they are excluded from the analysis in order to facilitate the interpretation. Each of the remaining household types (traditional, modified-traditional and dual-earners) may be interpreted as indicating different *degrees of female domesticity* in family relationships. Results from other studies show that women's contribution to family income (or women's labour market position) is highly correlated with their ability to exercise decision-making within the family (Ferber & Nelson 1993, Orloff 1993). That is to say, women's position in the labour market partly determines their capacity to change patriarchal relations of power within the household.

Figure II.6. Gender Organisation of Paid Work in Spain 1991
(Women Aged 26-45 Living with a Partner)



Source: ESD 1991.

Overall, 88 per cent of women aged 26-45 live with a full-time working man (see Figure II.6). They are distributed across the following types of families: 25 per cent in dual earner households, 7 per cent in modified-traditional households and 34 per cent in traditional households. This means that of 10 full-time working partnered men, 4 have female partners working full-time, 1 has a partner working part-time and 5 have partners who are full-time homemakers.

According to Hakim (1996) traditional and modified households have many things in common in states like Britain. In her research the female workforce in Britain is divided between: a) family-centred women, who work part-time but for whom paid work is a subsidiary task with less importance than domestic responsibilities; and b) women committed on a full-time basis to paid employment, associated with status attainment, who tend to take up continuous, year-round employment. However, this description of the British female labour force has been strongly contested by many feminist sociologists and economists (see Ginn *et al.* 1996; Breugel 1996). The main criticism is that she has neither considered the cultural conditions (the breadwinner ideology of the family, labour force discrimination) nor the material constraints (employer policies, access to childcare facilities, etc.) by which female employment is mainly determined. In addition, other research supports the idea that part-time employment has significant importance in terms of women's control of their earnings, women's sense of identity, and the distribution of poverty (Lister 1992, Brannen et al. 1994 as cited by Ginn et al. 1996).

From the outset, the act of entering the formal labour market means a revision of women's traditional role as homemaker. It sets the conditions for enlarging the culture of female paid employment, despite the precarious conditions associated with part-time work. Therefore, British women, whether married or cohabiting, have extended their presence in formal paid employment, but mostly within the context of part-time work. Spanish women living in traditional households have not had the same opportunities for part-time employment. Instead, strategies to earn money are more likely to be located within an informal economy and go unrecorded in official statistics. These jobs include family help, occupations in small feminised workshops, home-based work and so on.

Trade unions estimate that 42% of working women in Spain work in the underground economy, although only 19 per cent of men's activity is in this sector (data from 1991, CCOO 1993, see also De Miguel 1988, Bagnasco 1983). It is very difficult to know where these informal activities are concentrated, but many women working in the older and less productive industries work at home. The city of Valencia, for instance, is well known for the large number of women carrying out home-based work in textiles and toy making (European Commission 1996d).

As far as women who work full-time are concerned, it is important to note that the structure of the Spanish labour market is very rigid and has great impact on certain patterns found in occupational biographies. It is often the case that women who leave their position in the labour market rarely return. This explains why few women

decide to leave their full-time jobs even at the arrival of a child or the formation of a new union. This may account as well for the high proportion of women in continuous careers (Solsona 1991). Spain demonstrates a bipolar pattern between women who have continuous careers in full-time work - with child care covered mostly by extended family networks or private centres - and women who leave their careers entirely to become full-time homemakers (Solsona et al. 1992). In contrast, in states like Britain women may shift from full-time to part-time work or return to work at later stages in the family life cycle (probably as part-time workers again).

In conclusion, while the gender organisation of paid work is far from equal, one seems to find more egalitarian arrangements among younger partnerships. In fact the group of women aged 26-45 is large and may include very heterogeneous categories of women. To really identify new tendencies in the gender organisation of paid work, it is better to narrow the observation to a younger cohort. Thus, I now look at the group of women aged 26-35 living with partners, at the regional level.

Andersen (1991) argues that the increased participation of women in the labour force has resulted in a higher proportion of dual-earner partnerships. However, other authors claim that *local regional cultures* (see Bowlby et al. 1986; Duncan 1991; McDowell and Massey 1984) might play a great part in defining geographical inequalities and, therefore, the unequal development of dual-earner partnerships.

It is difficult to explain the underlying reasons for the existence of higher or lower proportion of *dual earner couples* (DECs hereafter) in a given region without going deeply into the characteristics of local labour markets, the traditions of female employment, and the prevalence of particular *gender cultures* with regard to the main role expected of women. Nonetheless, it is worth analysing to what extent regional differences affect the interpretation of family arrangements.

First of all, DECs mainly appear in the regions where women have traditionally maintained high activity rates (see Figure II.7.). Their distribution roughly coincides with the map of the regional geography of female work. DECs appear in the more industrialised and urbanized regional autonomous communities of the north-east coast (Cantabria and Basque Country), in Navarra and Aragon, in Catalonia in the north-east, and in Madrid (Madrid is highly feminised because of the concentration of women working as a civil servants in the bureaucratic apparatus of the central Spanish state). Cross-regional differences in the proportion of DEC's are very strong in Spain. For instance, Catalonia has the highest proportion (40%) of dual earner

couples, while Andalusia and Castilla-La Mancha have the lowest (18%).

It is still unclear that an increase in women's access to the labour force may necessarily result in a higher proportion of dual-earner families. In particular regions or localities women's employment may be organised according to both their opportunities for paid work and the social expectations associated with each gender when married or cohabiting. Women do not appear to automatically take up full-time employment.

Figure II.7. Women Aged 26-35 in Dual-Earner Couples (%): Spain 1991



Source: ESD 1991.
Note: Canary Islands are in the range 21.50-32.50%. Percentages estimated in relation to absolute number of women aged 26-35 living with a partner.

II.4. Summary and Last Remarks

This chapter provided the context for the empirical research. It analysed the major transformations of the welfare state, the labour market and the family. As far as welfare provision is concerned, the extended family and women's intergenerational solidarity are considered to be the main safety nets as the state provides no extended child or elderly care services. The Spanish welfare state's social assistance programs

are underpinned by strong *familistic ideologies*. By *familistic* I refer to the ambiguous liberal ideology of valuing family privacy and freedom while failing to support other forms of welfare that do not rely on women's unpaid caring labour.[27] The result is that caring and reproduction tasks are mostly located in the private sphere of the household and the boundaries between private and public spheres are very strongly delineated.

Though women still face great difficulties in reconciling family and paid work, the Spanish welfare state has not greatly modified the organisation of social reproduction or gender inequality during the last decades. Existing policies on "the family" are basically aimed at families in special or underprivileged circumstances. In contrast, women in other western European countries have gained more power through their participation in the labour force, thus 'defamilialising' themselves in the sense that they are less dependent on traditional family relations to maintain an acceptable standard of living.

Comparisons at the regional level reveal important internal inequalities in the distribution of dual earner families. These inequalities suggest that more research needs to be done to identify the elements shaping particular regional gender cultures, which in turn influence the formation of particular family systems. Regions will be incorporated in the analysis as a contextual variable.

New doubts emerge that future transformations of the modern machinery of welfare states will be any more accommodating. Welfare provision is continually threatened by liberal policy interests which favour more residual and targeted systems of social provision. It is clear that the premises of full-male-employment and family stability, though perhaps valid in the 1950s, no longer provide a reasonable or realistic foundation for welfare state policy. It is obvious that debates on welfare state reforms are of great concern today. I shall return to this discussion in the concluding chapter.

The next chapter analyses the social norms and family expectations which contribute to the long lasting survival of the *housewife marriage* model and the intergenerational gender contract. This is an approximation of the cultural variables

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[27] The concept of familism was originally used in the 1970s to indicate the degree of commitment to the idea or centrality of the family (Hantrais and Letablier, 1996).

which cannot be grasped by the statistical data that proceeds in Chapters IV, V, and VI.

PART II: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

CHAPTER III

Social Norms and Family Expectations

The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of social norms and gender expectations in shaping women's work and family life. It also intends to shed more light on the existing *normative obstacles* - let us call them culture, values or traditions - to the modernisation of the female life course in Spain. By modernisation of the life course I refer to patterns of family formation which deviate from the *housewife marriage* model.

Insofar as gender expectations and culture are usually taken for granted the analysis in this chapter is necessary to understand the work-family dilemma. For instance, the low rates of full-time employment of married women are depicted as problematic because occupational patterns of married men are taken as the ideal norm. I leave aside the fact that in some countries part-time work is highly feminised and associated with fewer social rights. The point here is that we ignore how many married women with small children really wish to be in full-time jobs, in part-time jobs or outside the labour force bringing up their children. Another example is the general assumption, also implied in the research hypotheses described in section 1.2, that higher educational attainment brings about higher commitment to gender egalitarian values. It is certainly true that highly educated women behave differently with regard to demographic patterns of family formation (i.e. different timing and intensity at marriage and childbirth). Yet, it is still unclear whether this reflects constraints (roles-incompatibility) or choices (different family expectations). Some of these questions will be addressed in the following analysis.

The chapter is conceived of as a complement to the following empirical research which exclusively focuses on actual behaviour. It should be noted that an ideal research design would be to have a single model containing data both on individual and family characteristics and on contextual and attitudinal variables concerning

family and occupational careers. The reality is that few surveys include all of these types of information and none of the biographical surveys do. None of the Spanish surveys available up to the 1990s combine these types of data.[28] Therefore, the ideal model as such remains unreachable. Yet, this analysis, by combining these types of data from various sources, can avoid simplistic assumptions concerning women's preferences and goals that are not founded in empirical data.

The chapter has been divided into three large sections, each of which focuses either on the family, paid and unpaid work, or the state. The empirical data consist of two surveys: "Social Inequalities in Family and Domestic Life" (1990) and "Population and Family" (1992). The Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS) has conducted both surveys, which are described in detail in Appendix 1 and 2.

III.1. The Social Construction of the Family

The new home economics justifies each spouse's engagement in paid or unpaid labour by differences in financial incentives. In this account the logic of individuals' behaviour was mainly guided by rational economic calculations as individuals tried to be "income maximisers". Other non-economic goals were at once disregarded. These other goals and priorities concerning relationships and family life are, instead, the focus of the next sections.

III.1.1. Ideal Family Models

The ideal family models here discussed are not defined by the criteria of economic rationality. They represent the preferences of women who are already living within partnerships. These ideal models are subsequently compared with the real family situation in which these women are living. The comparison reflects the existing gap

[28] The recently appeared Fertility and Family Survey (Population Activities Unit, United Nations Economic Commission) would allow a better approximation to this type of analysis, but it was not available at the time of the research.

between preferences and behaviour. It also reveals the capacity of women to achieve their goals with regard to the organisation of family life and paid work.

The gap between *preferences* and *behaviour* is shown in Figure III.1, which represents a "snap-shot" of two selected birth cohorts in 1990. First of all, it is striking the fact that, if we look at the preferences of female young generations, the housewife marriage has almost disappeared. In the younger cohort (1957-1966) the large majority aspire to form a dual-earner family (66%) and only a small proportion (11%) express preference for the housewife marriage (12% less than in the older cohort 1947-56).

If we look at actual *behaviour*, it emerges that only 38 per cent of women in the younger cohort (1957-1966) were really in dual-earner families (this was the preferred model for 66% of women), while as many as 53 per cent were in housewife marriages (this was the preferred model for only 11% of women).[29] In the oldest cohort (1947-56) as many as 63 per cent were also within the housewife marriage, while only 23 per cent said it was their preference.[30]

The reason many women are within the model of the housewife marriage is probably related to the lack of flexible occupational arrangements (for the Spanish labour market characteristics refer to section II.2) and the fact that many women have entered marriage without having previous occupational experience. The lack of occupational experience makes these women "less employable", given that the major obstacle for job searchers is the first introduction into paid employment, which becomes even harder as the individual ages. The proportion of women who entered partnerships without previous job experience was relatively large: 32 per cent in the older cohort and 23 per cent in the younger cohort. This follows the traditional path of leaving home whereby women pass from being *dependant daughters* to be *dependant wives*. In general, Figure III.1 illustrates the paradox that only a minority of women considered the housewife model as their ideal family arrangements while, in practise, this model represented the larger group. It also reflects their failure of

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[29] It should be noted that we are comparing preferences and actual behaviour at one point in time, which is a limitation of the survey. A more appropriate observation would compare preferences at several points in time with the final behaviour, as it may happen that women had different preferences, which determined their current situation.

[30] The 63% housewife marriages in the older cohort is the sum of 31% of wives with previous occupational experience before marriage and 32% wives without occupational experience.

achieving a modified model in which they are both mothers and paid workers. This "failure" will be further discussed in Chapter V, where women's shift from part-time work to unpaid caregivers is analysed.

Figure III.1. Family Models: Preferences and Behaviour of Women Living in Partnerships 1990 (%), Spain



Source: CIS 1990 (study n. 1867) and CIS 1992 (study n. 1990).
Note: Preferences as expressed by women in CIS 1990 (question P5) and behaviour estimated from CIS 1992 (question P60 asked to married or cohabiting men about the economic activity of their current female partners).

The overall level of economically dependant married or cohabiting women in 1990, namely those without paid employment, was 60 per cent. While 21 per cent of these were actively seeking a job, the rest fully assumed their role as the main caregivers (CIS 1990). However, if one carefully analyses homemaking women, it becomes clear that they constitute a very heterogeneous group in which are concealed many *discouraged workers*. At the same time, some women may voluntarily and legitimately choose to be the main caregivers within the family.

In order to grasp the self-perception of homemaking women, the survey asked them whether they regretted not having paid job. The result was that around 32 per cent of them "frequently regretted" the fact of not having a job, and 42 per cent "sometimes

regretted" it (CIS 1990). In the end, only a quarter of homemaking women seem to be fully assured of their specialised role within the family. The main reasons homemaking women remain outside the labour force are, by order of importance, the lack of time to cope with family and paid-work responsibilities (58%) and their perception of an acute employment shortage (54%).

III.1.2. Family Obligations

Intergenerational solidarity is a longstanding feature of the Southern European family model. The welfare function it provides, however, an extra burden on women as caregivers within the family. This also might partly explain the difficulty women have arranging themselves in their preferred family models.

Table III.1 illustrates women's and men's perceptions of family obligations. The table is a cross-tabulation between several questions concerning family responsibilities, and a variable comprising four categories (female 1947-56 cohort, female 1957-66 cohort, male 1947-56 cohort and male 1957-66 cohort). In general, there seems to be a strong sense of responsibility within family members (see percentages in the row totals), but gender and cohort are not always significant categories.[31] In other words, the perception of certain obligations is not always a matter of gender or generation.

Most individuals, agreed with the statement that "Parents ought to be ready to sacrifice their own well-being, if need be, in order to be able to offer the best to their children", the proportion is significantly higher among the oldest female cohort and significantly lower among the youngest male cohort. As far as the elderly are concerned, most individuals felt that *care for them should be provided within the family.* Very few, regardless of gender and cohort, agreed upon the statement that an old people's home or residence was an option for elderly relatives.. The overall conclusion is that family obligations transcend the realm of the nuclear family: this is the distinctive characteristic of Southern European families.

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[31] Adjusted standardised residuals have been calculated to determine which of the cells in the table contributed most to the significance of the total. Since adjusted standardised residuals are normally distributed, a residual larger than 1.96 indicates a statistically significant deviation of the corresponding cells frequency from the situation of independence.

Table III.1. Selected Indicators of Family Obligations by Sex and Birth Cohorts (%), Spain 1992

	Women (N=474)		Men (N=463)		
	1947-1956	1957-1966	1947-1956	1957-1966	Total
Parents ought to be ready to sacrifice their own well-being, if need be, in order to be able to offer the best to their children[1]	83% (2.2)	77% (-0.2)	81% (1.7)	69% (-3.5)	77%
Elderly should live in the old people's home or residences[2]	13% (0.5)	11% (-0.2)	14% (-0.2)	9% (-1.6)	12%
Elderly care is the children's obligation[2]	73% (0.5)	74% (0.9)	70% (-0.5)	69% (-1.0)	72%
My parents know they can come to live with me whenever they want[2]	85% (1.1)	83% (0.2)	87% (1.9)	76% (-3.1)	82%
I would like my parents coming to live with me when they get old[2]	72% (1.1)	72% (1.2)	70% (0.5)	61% (-3.0)	69%
My preferred living arrangement when I get old and still enjoy good health would be:					
Living in my house but with professional assistance	41% (-0.2)	48% (2.5)	44% (0.8)	33% (-3.2)	42%
Living with my children	17% (-0.2)	15% (-0.9)	19% (0.9)	17% (0.2)	17%

[1] Percentage of people who agree with this statement instead of accepting that "parents have their own life and should not sacrifice their wellbeing for that of their children" or "none of the above statements".
[2] Indicates the percentage of individuals who "agree" or "fully agree" to the suggested statement.
Note: Standardised adjusted residuals in parentheses.
Source: CIS 1992 (study 1,990).

One methodological remark should be made on Table III.1. How would the results have looked if the question about elder care arrangements had specified that caring be provided in publicly funded residences? If respondents assumed that the "old people's homes or residences" would be private, as is normally the case in Spain, most low to medium income families might have favoured informal family arrangements for economic reasons. In this case, the response that has been interpreted as *family obligations* would simply reflect *economic constraints*. In any case, the final outcome is that elder care is largely assumed within the family. Indeed, most directives of social policy count on this solidarity as a source of informal welfare provision (see Naldini 2001). This issue has obviously never been an economic or social priority for politicians in office.

There are also some signs that indicate the weakening of the so-called *generational contract*. That is, fewer individuals expect to be cared for by their younger relatives. Instead, there is a significant pattern by gender and cohort concerning the proportion of individuals who expect to remain in their house with professional assistance. In particular, there seems to be a higher proportion of women in the younger cohort and a lower proportion of men also in the youngest cohort who agreed upon this option.

Therefore, there seems to be a growing expectation of not depending on the children. It is foreseeable that that stigma of living in an old person's home, of not being "properly cared for" relatives in the family's home, may be subsiding. For the time being, as we will see later in this chapter, families and particularly women assume the caring needs of most of the aged population.

III.1.3. Commitment to Gender Egalitarian Values

The emergence of new cultural and ideational factors has been at the core of current family change in western societies.[32] These factors include the manifestation of individual autonomy and post-materialist values, which stress individual freedom for self-realisation and greater emphasis on partners' equality in interpersonal relationships. As it has been argued before, these values would be expected among highly educated individuals who, after a prolonged period of investment in human capital, would seek self-fulfilment through both their relationships and their career.

The association between educational attainment and gender egalitarian values rests on the assumption that education affects *sex role behaviour*. Educated persons would be more likely to embrace gender egalitarian values. Thus, higher educational attainment among men should predict their greater participation in domestic work. But do individuals with higher education (let us say at the post-compulsory level) really hold more gender egalitarian values than their less-educated counterparts? Some indicators of "commitment to gender egalitarian values" included in Table III.2 help us answer this question. For the sake of organisation, they have been classified by three main categories: *gender values* (attitudes concerning duties and obligations of each sex), *gender roles (*actual sexual division of labour), and *post-materialist values* (emphasis women and men place on individual self-fulfilment and involvement in political representation).

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[32] Theorists of the Second Demographic Transition supported this argument to account for the demographic and family trends arisen in European states from the 1965s until today (see Lesthaeghe 1995, Van De Kaa 1987, Solsona 1998). Inglehart (1997) initially instigated the debate on these 'ideational factors'. He argues that since the 1970s most advanced societies have experienced a fundamental shift from *materialist priorities* such as economic well-being to *post-material values* such as self-realisation and quality of life.

The first outcome concerning women is that there are not large differences in the degree of commitment to gender egalitarian values across educational groups. Yet, higher proportion of women with post-compulsory education systematically tend to support more *gender egalitarian values* than lesser-educated women for all the items analysed. The main differences by educational group are not so much related to gender values but to *gender roles*. As Table III.2 shows, highly educated women were much more in favour of sharing reproductive tasks such as feeding children (53% as compared with only 23% in the low educated group) and doing the household cleaning (36% as compared with 12% in the low educated group). It should be noted, however, that more highly educated women are more likely to be employed than less-educated women (this point is further elaborated in Chapter V). Consequently, they might feel more self-confident in negotiating the distribution of daily domestic chores with their male partners.

The most important divergence between the two educational groups has to do with *post-materialist values*. While both groups highly valued economic independence, women with less education conferred much less importance on having a self-fulfilling job (40% as compared the 58% of post-compulsory) or increasing women's involvement in politics (59% as compared with the 84% of post- compulsory).

As far as men are concerned, they also show distinct differences in *gender values* according to their educational attainment. These differences support the above-mentioned influential role of education in arousing further awareness of gender equality. Highly educated men, for instance, seemed to be more prone to share the administration of the family budget (70% post- compulsory as compared with the 52% up to compulsory) or to take temporarily leaves to care for ill children (60% post- compulsory as compared with the 43% up to compulsory).

Some authors have also used the notion of *gender values* to explain the recent dynamic of women's labour force participation. This is the case in Hakim's (1993) study on female occupational behaviour in Britain. She argues that there are *family-oriented* women (i.e. women who give priority to caring work and have low commitment to the male patterns of continuos full-time year-round employment) and *career-oriented* women (i.e. women who execute continuous labour biographies in full-time employment). This thesis is very difficult to sustain without evidence from in-depth interviews. The main weakness is that it underestimates mothers' constraints to remain in or enter paid work in the first place. If one believes that women's polarisation between labour force insiders and outsiders is due at least partly to their different "gender values", the slow growth of female full-time

employment would be misunderstood as a supply problem instead of a demand problem in the gendered labour market.

Table III.2. Various Indicators of Commitment to Gender Egalitarian Values by Large Educational Groups: Women and Men aged 16-50 Living with a Partner, Spain 1990 (%)

	Up to compulsory education	*Post-compulsory education*	*Up to compulsory education*	*Post-compulsory education*
	Women		**Men**	
Gender Values				
• Agreement with the statement: "It is natural sharing household chores among partners"[1]	82%	94%	83%*	87%*
• Who should take the responsibility for birth control?				
Should be men	3%*	--	2%	4%
Should be women	27%*	23%*	26%	16%
Both	71%*	77%*	71%	80%
• Who should administer the family budget?				
Should be men	8%	4%	10%	8%
Should be women	38%	30%	39%	22%
Both	54%	66%	52%	70%
• Who should take a leave for a child's temporary illness?				
Any partner	40%	56%	43%	60%
• Agreement with the statements: "Woman in paid employment propitiates a happy marriage"				
Highly or fairly agree	47%*	52%*	32%	46%
Gender Roles				
• Who feeds the children?				
It is shared or done by a third person	23%	53%	41%*	49%*
• Who does the household cleaning?				
It is shared or done by a third person	12%	36%	16%	32%
Post-materialist values				
• "It is important for women having economic independence"				
Highly or fairly important	86%*	92%*	80%	93%
• "It is important for women having a self-fulfilling job"				
Highly important	40%	58%	41%	56%
• "To what extent do you think that women need a major presence in politics?"				
Totally or quite needed	59%	84%	51%	63%

Source: CIS 1990 (Study 1,867).
Note: Sample consists of 515 women and 418 men.
[1] other option was that "men should not help with household chores".
*Chi-square indicates a probability higher than 0.0500. the hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected. Patterns observed in the data might have arisen by chance owing to the particular sample drawn.

We can also check whether women *specialised in care-giving* (not seeking employment) and women *specialised in the market sector* (employed or searching jobs) hold very different values concerning career and family. In fact, there is not such an evident cleavage between them. As many as 85 per cent of homemaking women (aged 16-50) agreed that "the importance attributed to having economic independence" was highly or fairly high important for them. Likewise, 91 per cent of women either in paid employment or actively seeking jobs expressed the same level of importance to economic independence (CIS 1990). Attitudinal differences concerning paid work do not seem to be the determining factor in understanding why women are polarised as either outsiders and insiders of the labour force.

III.2. Paid and Unpaid Work

In analysing women's labour, it is difficult to disassociate paid work from unpaid work. They are interconnected insofar as the low presence of women in paid work reflects the weight of their unpaid work in the household. Therefore, I analyse paid and unpaid work together.

III.2.1. Gender Division of Household Labour

The majority of employed women interviewed in 1990 claimed to work a *double shift*. Hence, in spite of being in the labour force, working women still internalise the bulk of caring and daily domestic chores in the family. The only change is in men's involvement in unpaid work when their female partner is unavailable. Time budget studies indicate that women working outside the home have more help with household tasks from their partners than do women in one-earner families (see Appendix 6).

Feeding children and repairing household equipment are the tasks most commonly transferred to the market in households where the female partner is in paid employment. For some particular tasks, however, women's employment status does not make any difference in how couples divide the labour. This is the case for *routinely domestic tasks* (i.e. household cleaning, doing dishes, cleaning up the kitchen or doing beds) which are overwhelmingly done by women and rarely by men. The only task in which men stand out is in repairing household equipment. Men

engage in such work in 63 per cent of the cases when then partners work in paid labour and 49 per cent of the cases when their partners do not work. However, these are not daily tasks like the domestic work regularly performed by women.

In general, the gender division of household labour in the 1990s is characterised by large inequalities in the allocation of time. Women in middle and low-skilled jobs feel particularly constrained by family responsibilities: 72 per cent of managers or semiskilled women aged 25-40 claimed that family responsibilities "highly" or "fairly highly" affected their chances to make a career (CIS 1990).

Gender inequalities in the distribution of work within the family seem to be rather difficult to eradicate. As a matter of fact, not even states with a long tradition of equal opportunity policy have managed to significantly ameliorate these gender inequalities. Scandinavian states, for instance, have been pioneers in the implementation of policies that strengthened the economic rights of women and the reconciliation of motherhood and employment. Despite these policies, significant differences in the gender division of household labour still remain (see Gershuny 1999). Therefore, although the increase in two-earner families implies a certain degree of social modernisation in women's life courses, it also entails a high proportion of over-worked mothers who support tedious second-shifts. This is especially true during the *life cycle squeezes,* when heavy pressure is placed on working parent's time resources.

Ferree (1991) interprets the persistent gender inequalities in the division of labour as the result of persistent inequalities in the labour market. It is certainly true that the participation of women in the labour force has increased enormously in the last decades. However, neither their paid working hours nor their incomes have increased to levels on par with their husbands. Consequently, further structural changes are still needed to achieve complete gender equality in the workforce. Women's employment alone does not seem to be able to transform the household division of labour.

III.2.2. Who are the women specialising on care giving?

The proportion of married or cohabiting women aged 25-40 who specialised in

homemaking was 60 per cent among a sample of 297 women in 1992 (CIS 1992). This figure exemplifies again the persistence of the *housewife marriage* model. Of these women, 34 per cent of them claimed that they *preferred to stay as homemakers*, 4 per cent *were not sure about abandoning caring work*, 27 per cent *would take up a job* as soon as they had a chance, and 23 per cent had looked but *did not find a suitable job*.

The same proportion of homemaking women has been estimated by regions, but for all women (regardless of their marital status) (see Figure III.2). The regional disparities are remarkable. The lowest percentages of homemaking women are in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands and the highest in Castilla La Mancha. Both extreme cases represent autonomous communities with completely different economic structures. The Balearic Islands, for instance, have a large service sector that employs female workers, while Castilla La Mancha is characterised by a more traditional male-oriented agricultural and industrial economy.

Figure III.2. Percentage Distribution of Women (aged 25-40) Specialised in Homemaking by Regions: Spain, 1991



Source: ESD 1991.
Notes: (Chi-square=104039.687, df=17, p=.000).
The question posed was whether the person was not in paid employment but doing homework.
Abbreviations: B= Balearic Islands, N= Navarra, CAT= Catalonia, G= Galicia, PB= Basque Country, C= Canaries, A= Asturias, MU= Murcia, MA= Madrid, AR= Aragon, CV= Valencian Community, AN= Andalusia, CL= Castilla-Leon, EX= Extremadura, CAN= Cantabria, LR= La Rioja, CM= Castilla-La Mancha.

It is interesting to investigate the reasons why homemaking women quit their jobs in the first place. This analysis is done with women aged 25-40.[33] In 1992 roughly half of the homemaking women (aged 25-40) had occupational experience. The main reasons they left paid labour are marriage (38%), pregnancy (18%), child rearing (14%), and loss of their job (16%). Big differences in why women leave their jobs do emerge when educational attainment is taken into account. Marriage, for instance, does not have equal effects across educational levels. Only 15 per cent of women with post-compulsory education named marriage as a reason for quitting, while 44 per cent of those with only compulsory education quit for that reason. These is thus clearly an "educational divide" stratifying women as they make employment decisions during their childbearing years. The reasons to quit paid employment have also changed qualitatively over time, as Table III.3 shows. Marriage, in particular, has become a less important cause over time, while pregnancy or upaid and caring work at the household remains the same (there are not significant differences in the two periods analysed). Furthermore, it increases considerably the proportion of women who leave the labour force after experiencing an spell of unemployment (they might become discourage workers).

Table III.3. Homemaking Women with Previous Occupational Experience: Reasons for Leaving the Labour Force by Year of Withdrawal 1950-1992 (%), Spain

	Withdrawn at:			
Causes:	Prior to 1985	1986-1992	Total	Change
Got married	58% (4.8)	26% (-4.8)	46%	-
Got pregnant	10% (-0.9)	14% (0.9)	12%	
Overburden of domestic chores and problems to reconcile it with children	10% (-0.3)	11% (0.3)	10%	
It was any longer economically necessary or my partner does not want me to work any more	5% (-1.6)	11% (1.6)	7%	
Unemployed (job ended)	7% (-2.2)	15% (2.2)	10%	+
Others	10% (-2.7)	22% (2.7)	14%	+
Total	100%	100%	100%	
N=	163	91		

Source: CIS 1992 (study 1990).
Note: (Chi-square=25.978, df=5, p=.000). Standardised adjusted residuals in parentheses.

[33] Whenever possible small age groups are taken as a reference to avoid the mixing effects of different birth cohorts.

The category of homemaking women is highly heterogeneous and its size varies across regions. In general, the proportion of homemakers is strongly related to the regional or local economic structures which shape both female occupational demand and gender segmentation in the labour market. The combination of both factors may account for the large proportion of female "discouraged" workers hidden within the large category of female homemakers.

Some authors have tried to connect women's low presence in the labour force with their Spanish Catholic heritage[34]. I disagree with this thesis, as there is no evidence that religion explains today patterns of declining fertility, or women's occupational behaviour. In addition, most Catholics in Spain are baptised but not confirmed, and few actively practise this religion. Although most individuals consider themselves Catholics (age group 18-50), only 3 out of 10 are practitioner s (CIS 1992).

Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Attending Religious Services in a Frequent Basis by Regions (%), 1992



Source: CIS 1992 (Study 1990)
Note: (Chi-square=163.190, df=15, p=.000).

[34] Castles (1998), for instance, correlates the effect of the 'Catholic culture' with the low female labour force participation and the low fertility level in Southern Europe.

Figure III.3 illustrates religiosity by regions in Spain. This indicator is measured by the percentage of individuals frequently attending religious services (at least one time per week). The map illustrates the great variation in the degree of religiosity across regions which, furthermore, does not seem to follow any particular pattern. Catalonia and the Community of Madrid are the regions with the lowest proportion of individuals attending masses on a regular basis (14% and 16% of the population respectively). In the other extreme, La Rioja and Asturias appear as the regions with the highest proportion of population regularly attending masses (47% and 46% of the population respectively). By no means can we state that the Catholic heritage determines women's work choices, especially for younger, more secularised cohorts.

III.3. State Responsibilities and Individuals' Claims [35]

The Spanish welfare state was defined in Chapter II as being characterised by a high degree of "familism". This concept referred to the fact that families have traditionally assumed the risks of social exclusion, supporting the economic and emotional needs their relatives. The expansion of the welfare state should have meant the gradual decline of individual dependence on family members. However, for various reasons, the public sector has never played such a large role. According to authors such as Esping-Andersen (1999) this is due to the combination of two assumptions, one being that families make up the main safety net and the other that families do not fall apart. These assumptions have had legal prescription, and both eventually reinforce family obligations in a kind of vicious circle. In this section I show how individuals are increasingly demanding further development of family policy.

First of all it should be noted that public opinion about the performance of the state in the field of family policy is rather low. This is not surprising given the state's policy of non-intervention in family affairs (see Arango & Delgado 1995). In the age group 25-40, as many as 27 per cent of individuals considered state performance bad or very bad, while 48 per cent said it was simply average. People living alone and couples without children were the ones expressing the most dissatisfaction (CIS 1992). As many as 38 per cent of individuals agreed or strongly agreed that *family*

[35] Statistics presented in this section are all based on CIS 1992, unless other sources are specified.

law or related policies had no noticeable effects on families, and 37 per cent agreed on strongly agreed that *current policies make life for parents more difficult.* In the next section, I analyse individual claims for state support to ameliorate the family burden with the following indicators: cash benefits for families with dependent children; parental leave; and the call for public support for motherhood and the expansion of facilities to help combine family and working life.

III.3.1. Cash Benefits for Dependent Children

One example of the low coverage of Spanish family policy is that in 1992, only 25 per cent of individuals (age group 25-40) living with a partner and having at least one child aged 3 or younger received any family allowances for dependent children (CIS 1992). Of these 25 per cent, 92 per cent considered the amount received too low, and 8 per cent considered it just fair (CIS 1992). It would be interesting to look at this opinion across the socio-economic stratum, but the low response rate to questions concerning income makes it infeasible.

In general, most individuals living with a partner agreed with some principle of social redistribution to make up for the *children's economic burden.* As many as 85 per cent agreed that couples with children should pay fewer taxes than couples without children. There was no consensus on the different systems of family allowances, but many also agreed (67%) to make use of some principle of social redistribution. A system where couples with dependent children are granted periodic allocations inversely related to income was supported by 46 per cent of the respondents. 24 per cent thought that couples with dependent children should received allocations of equal amounts. Finally, 22 per cent think that only low income families should be entitled to tax relief-

III.3.2. Parental Leave[36]

In 1992 only 26 per cent of married or cohabiting women (aged 25-40) who have ever had a child enjoyed a paid maternity leave (n= 260). Employment law stipulates that they must be workers with a regular attachment to formal paid employment, with a minimum of 6 months of paid social security contributions in the previous year preceding the birth to qualify. Women who cannot take a leave and opt for a career break are probably negatively affected in the course of their occupational careers because they might not ever return to the labour force.

Only half (54%) of the women who ever enjoyed a maternity leave with or without additional parental leave returned to employment; a large part of them (25%) quit their jobs; and a minority (6%) managed to return in the form of part-time jobs. According to the study of Saurel-Cubizolles et al. (1999), Spain has the lowest rates of returning to work after childbirth compared with countries such as France and Italy. This is explained by the fact that female manual workers, women in low income groups, and women with less secure jobs are much more likely to take long breaks (that is, a parental leave), which means a difficult return to paid work. However, in 1992 female professionals and managers had rather high rates of return, similar to those in France.

It can be said that mothers' post-natal occupational breaks allow male partners to remain at their job as usual, since 75 per cent of fathers simply continue working as usual after their female partners have completed maternity leave. A minor proportion (3%) of fathers shifted into part-time jobs, while others (11%) took extra-holidays. Please note that 11 per cent of male partners did not provide information on their working activities after their wives' maternity leaves were completed.

The opinion on the desirable *length of paid maternity leave* (officially sixteen weeks maximum) is divided: 39 per cent consider it too short and 43 per cent consider it sufficient. However, there was a general consensus (80%) on having maternity leave paid in full (at 100% of earnings). In 1991 it was only paid at 75 per cent of the worker's regular earnings (Gauthier 1995).[37] As far as the use of the leave is

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[36] There are four main categories of parental leave (descriptions included in the footnote of Table II.2, Chapter II).

[37] Parental leave (additional time after paid maternity leave, whereupon women still maintain job security to return to their workplace) is unpaid and can last up to thirty-six months. Whereas maternity

concerned, most women (74%) said that it should be enjoyed only by the mother either after birth or divided in two periods before and after birth. Just a minority (8%) seemed to be willing to share it with their male partners. This attitude varied according to the educational level. More individuals with post-compulsory education were of the view that both parents should share the leave (14% of women and 18% of men) than those with only up to compulsory education (6% of women and 9% of men).

III.3.3. Incentives for Motherhood

Women aged 25-40 living with a partner and with zero to two children were asked whether there was any measure that would encourage them to have one or more additional children. Only 16 per cent said that they would be willing to have a child (or another child) if "more economic support" was available to them (56%). This was the most preferred pronatalist measure.

Childless women within the age group 25-40 (12% of all partnerships in this age group) were asked to indicate the main reasons for not having a child. They mentioned as the most important reason *felling hindered by their professional activities and work* (33%). Other secondary reasons suggested were that *children would make them to give up part of their free time* (17%) and that *they would not be able to attend to both the household and the family* (17%).

I next analyse women's claims for state intervention in the field of family policy. These claims have been summarised in Table III.4, which distinguishes women according to their situation in the labour force (i.e. inside or outside). The reason I make this distinction is because I expect that each group of women will have different concerns and needs regarding state support. However, it arises that all women, regardless of whether they were inside or outside the labour force, placed similar importance to the three most popular policy measures indicated in Table III.4. The most cited measures had to do with the economic relieve of the cost of children (measure 1 and 2 in the table) and the access to better housing

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leave is paid, although only since 1994 is paid in full (at 100 per cent of the usual salary) by the National Insurance System.

It is worth noting that *better day-care facilities* was not mentioned as an imperative demand (it was the fourth most scored), while most sociological studies suggest that the inadequate number of publicly available caring services (e.g. kindergartens) is a key reason for women's low labour force participation. Let us recall that women's most common solution for childcare is to resort to the extended family. In 1990, at least 63 per cent of one-year-old children with working mothers were cared for by a grandmother or another relative (Saurel-Cubizolles 1999). Perhaps women's general opinions on the need for day care were not tapped because of the wording of the question, which inquired whether individuals agree that facilities should be improved. It did not ask whether childcare facilities should be *expanded in* coverage and made *publicly available.*

Table III.4. Priorities of New Family-Related Policy Measures Claimed by Mothers (Aged 25-40) Married or Cohabiting (percentage distribution of those with a positive attitude), Spain 1992

The three most popular priorities:	In the labour force (n=170)	Outside the labour force (n=188)	Total
1. Lower income tax for people with dependent children	34% (-0.1)	35% (0.1)	34%
2. Better housing for people with children	27% (-1.6)	35% (1.6)	31%
3. An allowance for families with dependent children	25% (0.5)	22% (-0.5)	23%
4. Better child-care facilities for children younger than 3 years old	23% (0.9)	19% (-0.9)	21%

Note: Women were asked to choose only the three most effective measures of social policy, which should be introduced by the government. They were given a list of policy measures already applied in other European states. The forth most voted policy has also been included in the table. This is multi-response question which has been treated as a set of separate variables.
The test of the chi square statistic has determined that the relationship between the policy priorities of women with children in and out of the labour force is not the significant. Standardised adjusted residuals in parentheses.

Source: CIS 1992.

III.3.4. Claims for Work-Family Reconciliation

Finally, cohabiting or married women (aged 25-40) were asked about the best arrangements for reconciling paid work and the family. The best choice according to

women with post-compulsory education (n=84) was *working part-time and having two children* (32%), followed by *working part-time and having one child* (12%) and *working full-time and having two children* (10%). Women with up to compulsory level of education or less (n=191) also pointed to *working part-time and having two children* (25%) as the preferred arrangement. The other two preferences selected indicate priority on the care of children. Sixteen per cent selected *not working until children are adolescent* and fourteen per cent chose *not working if having children.*

Results obtained from this enquiry suggest that the expansion of part-time jobs would significantly attract more women with family responsibilities into the labour force. It should be noted again, however, that preferences are conditional upon the current socio-economic context, personal circumstances, and the prevailing social norms of their environment. That is to say, women define their preferences regarding employment and family in relation to their own particular constraints and opportunities. The question I thus pose is how these preferences would be if family care, including services for children and the elderly, were completely public. Would many of these women still prefer part-time jobs during child rearing?

III.4. Conclusion

The chapter has raised the question of whether gendered family expectations and obligations hinder the modernisation of women's life courses. Because most analyses of occupational and family behaviour ignore or taken for granted the role of cultural and social norms, my analysis makes an important contribution in understanding the work-family preferences of this population.

The study reveals significant cross-regional differences in indicators, such as religiosity, which also might shape social norms regarding the role of women in the family. I have not found, however, any pattern that would suggest an association with the geography of female labour force participation and the geography of "religiosity". Galicia, for instance, is a depressed agricultural region that it has both a high degree of religiosity and a high level of female participation.

As far as the commitment to *gender values* is concerned, there were differences across educational groups. Yet, very large differences could not be empirically

demonstrated. It can be inferred that most ideological cleavages with regard to gender are cohort-driven. That is to say, younger generations of females hold higher expectations for gender equality. These attitudes are present despite that a significant proportion of this group is specialised in caring work.

There seems to be an association between the female's status in the labour force and the degree of unpaid work shared by both partners. However, even employed women or women with post-compulsory education carry on unequal load of household chores, above all in very routine household tasks. Hence, even women in paid employment do not escape the *double-shift.* This suggests that the increase in women's labour force participation does not necessarily imply the externalisation of unpaid work into the private sector. Authors such as Esping-Andersen (1999) argue that this would ultimately expand female labour force participation.

At the present time, the distance between preferences and behaviour in relation to family and employment is rather large. The gap reflects current social policies that reinforce traditionalism and family dependence by leaving care to the private realm of the family or the market. This failure of policy to enhance individual social rights is of course coupled with a rigid of the labour market that fails to integrate women and, above all, women with family responsibilities. The Scandinavian experience shows that gender friendly policies alone cannot dramatically change gender inequalities within the sphere of the family.

There are emerging values of social individualism, but the *career woman without children* is certainly not the model to which most women aspire. The majority of women living with a partner - regardless of educational level – responds that their best model to reconcile family and paid work is working part-time and having two children. Nonetheless, this model does not correspond with the reality, as there is a very low proportion of the female working population that fits this model. Furthermore, if this model of mothers working part-time prevailed it might generate new forms of occupational segregation according to gender (i.e. mothers and fathers) and family situation (i.e. presence or absence of small children or dependant relatives).

Very few women envisage a situation in which they can have more than one child and still continue in full-time employment. Of course, the fact that most partners do not equally divide household work means that if women remain in full-time employment, they would be working a *double shift* every day. Hence, though most

women do no want to have to choose between family and employment, the opportunities to combine both things are simply not at hand. The core of the problem is that the social construction of the family, which is shaped by the combination of culturally embodied obligations and economically driven constraints, is highly demanding on women.

Many women aspire to an alternative model in the organisation of social production. Individuals do count to some degree on the state to relieve the family burden, despite a general dissatisfaction in the performance of family related policies. Thus, state support for families should be expanded in coverage and in the level of benefits. An important barrier, however, is found in mainstream feminism which mainly supports the guarantee of equality through the market and access to the political system, rather than through state assistance with family obligations (see section II.1.2, Chapter II). This resistance remains strongly problematic for accomplishing full economic independence.

In order to make full-time employment compatible with child rearing major transformations are needed *inside the family* (i.e. tackling the double shift) as well as *outside of the family*. The reform of the family from the outside could be done by the implementation of the "social mothering" (Simonen 1999: 231), whereby caring is considered a public responsibility. This is a long and complex debate that will be further analysed in the concluding chapter.

The next chapter examines patterns of partnership formation across generations. The main objective is to see whether women are really developing *assortative mating* strategies, that is searching for candidates with similar earning potential in order to achieve dual-earner families. It is then the aim of Chapter IV to ascertain whether assortative partnerships really enhance women's occupational careers.

CHAPTER IV

Partnership Formation in the Context of Women's Growing Educational Attainment

The educational expansion in Spain started in the mid-1950s, soon after the second large wave of emigration from the countryside, which coincided with a period of growing industrialisation. The expansion of higher education, however, only reached the working and middle-classes some time later in the 1970s. This chapter analyses the effect of the educational expansion on the partner selection process. In particular, it focuses on the mechanisms whereby individuals make choices about future partners.

Educational expansion can affect the marriage market in different ways. It can be the case that the educational system functions as a *marriage market* in which different educational groups meet and reproduce intergenerational class differences. However, once a minimum level of education becomes universal, we would expect that educational attainment would become a less important individual feature in the selection of partners. In this case, partners would simply pursue the ideal of romantic love regardless of the future candidate's schooling or earning potentials.

The value of studying the *couple's educational homogamy* mainly resides in its capacity to capture degrees of *social openness*. As Smits, Lammers and Ultee put it; "if the boundaries between social groups are weak, the social structure of that society is said to be open; if the boundaries are strong, the social structure is said to be closed" (1998: 264). Thus, a low level of educational homogamy will reflect a high level of social mixing between partners, that is, marriages between persons who

belong to different educational groups and thus presumably to different social classes.

There are several reasons, however, for predicting an increase in marital educational homogamy rather than marital educational heterogamy. The first comes from search theory rationality, which presupposes that individuals aim to match themselves with "like individuals" in order to reproduce their own status. This is a *social origin mechanism* that operates in the process of spouse selection. According to this assumption, it would be irrational for a highly educated person (where high levels of education are a proxy for high social class) to marry a poorly educated person. It is worth noting, however, that in the traditional action model *men's hypogamy* (husbands having higher educational attainment than wives) has been commonplace. This is so because social class was supposed to be embodied by the figure of the male provider. The increase in women's labour force participation has, however, clearly challenged this assumption.

The second rational mechanism is *gender related.* It is predicted that women would attempt *educational assortative mating.* In other words, women seek to form partnerships with persons with similar social opportunities (as described by Blossfeld, Timm and Dasko 1998). By pursuing assortative mating, women can avoid asymmetrical and oppressive gender relationships. In choosing an equal, they are no longer disadvantaged when bargaining on the organisation of market and family and caring time (Oppenheimer 1988). Nonetheless, similar human capital investments are not always equivalent to similar comparative advantages in the market place. A certain level of gender discrimination and segmentation in the labour force persists. In the optimal scenario of a gender-egalitarian society, women's may not need to pursue rational calculations in partnership formation and, again, maybe romantic love would operate as the guiding principle in the selection of spouses.

The third and final mechanism, which may favour a couple's educational homogamy, is simply *space-related.* This acknowledges that the proximity of individuals in their common relational networks facilitates the initiation of intimate relationships. Couples' educational homogamy may occur simply because relationships are structurally determined by the *contact opportunities* which emerge first in school and, later on, in the working place (Blau 1994).

This chapter explores whether education really matters in the marriage choices of individuals in Spanish society. The population studied consists of cohorts born between 1920s and the mid-1960s. This research also aims at measuring the degree and intergenerational patterns of educational homogamy. The methodological tool used to do this is logistic regression. If this procedure proves to be insufficient in explaining partners' selection processes, we can claim that mate selection is better explained either by choices based on the individual's subjectivity or on rational calculations that escape our knowledge.

There are two complementary explanatory hypotheses. The first, inspired by industrialist theorists such as Treiman's (1970), argues that the importance of family background on individual's achievement decreases while the importance of individual educational features or formal merits increases. Therefore, intergenerational marital homogamy with regard to education is likely to increase as modernisation occurs. The second is the romantic-love hypothesis, as suggested by authors such as Smits et al. (1998), which suggests that marriage choices are fundamentally guided by the attraction of persons from any social background. If this is true, educational homogamy would tend to decrease as modernisation occurs. In other words, individuals follow their subjective preferences, rather than their material interests in choosing a partner; this implies a higher degree of social mixing.

In the next section, I describe the process of educational expansion and the consequences for the marriage market in Spain. This is necessary for understanding major changes in the marriage market. The description of the statistical method (i.e. competing risks models) and the discussion of the main findings follow the aforementioned sections.

IV.1. The Closing the Gender Gap in Education: Historical and Generational Trends

The growing presence of women in the educational system has been perceived as one of the main achievements of the present century. This was instigated in Spain by profound social and economic changes. Over the period of study, 1940-1990, the Spanish educational system witnessed a dramatic turn from very selective schooling limited to upper classes to a more democratic system. Compared with other western European countries, the state became responsible for public education relatively late.

Before, education was for many years the result of private initiatives. During the dictatorship (1939-1975), for instance, the state took on a *subsidiary role* in the provision of education. This non-invasive approach meant delegating a great deal of responsibility to institutions such as the Catholic Church, which was quite active in post-compulsory education. The result was that educational provision targeted only certain social groups in the wealthy communities.

In this same period (1939-75), universities were run by the state. The Ministry organised the curricula though the influence of the church was strong here, too. University studies functioned primarily to channel the children of the elite into the elite professions (Boyd-Barrett 1995). There can be no doubt that there was extremely high social closure among individuals who reached higher education. Nonetheless, it is difficult to speculate about marriage choices at that time because the Catholic conservatism of that period discounted women's educational attainment (Carabaña 1981). Thus, highly-educated men could marry women with low or high educational attainment as long as they seemed potentially "good mothers".

During and immediately after the Francoist period, general educational attainment was very poor and there were high levels of illiteracy. A survey conducted among the working population in 1965 (cross-sectional data) showed that 5% had had no education; 90% had been to primary school; 3% had been to secondary school; and 2% had been to university. A turning point in the educational system came about in 1970, a few years before Franco's death, with the introduction of a new educational act (*Ley General de Educación, LGE*). This was regarded as the beginning of a qualitative transition from one model of education to another (Boyd-Barret 1995*). The act aimed to modernise the educational system so that it could produce workers with the skills required in the market place. The main achievement of the reform was the introduction of free, compulsory education for children between the ages of 6 and 14. It did not, however, succeed in lowering high drop-out rates, which ranged around 30 per cent (Boyd-Barret 1995*).

In general, the provision of compulsory education was achieved in a relatively brief period and education at the primary level became universal. Under this public system, elitism and the influence of the Church also began to wane. Nonetheless, social class differences were still reproduced by discrimination between pupils who attended state schools and those who attended grant-aided private schools. This distinction, however, tended to disappear during the 1980s.

Gains in female achievement in education during the last century are remarkable. Around 1900 as many as 71 per cent of women were illiterate, compared with 56 per cent of men. In the 1930s illiteracy rates changed to 47 per cent of women and 37 per cent of men. The rates in 1990 stood at 7.9 per cent for women and 3.2 per cent for men.[38] The latest figures, however, mainly refer to elderly population who grew up during the civil war and the impoverished post-war period. Generally, individuals born between 1925 and 1950 were instructed in a patriarchal and religious educational system that included few females. Major changes in the gender balance of pupils came with the economic development of the 1960s, continuing its upward trend until today.

Figure IV.1 illustrates how the gender gap in higher education has narrowed. Overall, there has been a 54 per cent growth in the number of registered students between 1975 and 1984, with the increase mainly due to the growing presence of women. The number of female students increased by 103 per cent, while the number of men increased only by 26 per cent (CIDE 1988). By 1986 the number of women enrolled at university surpassed that of men in all regions, and by 1991 as many as 56 per cent of all graduates aged 25-29 were women. Patterns of gender segregation by speciality still persist: only 16 per cent of architecture and engineering graduates were female.[39]

The growing presence of women in higher education took place thanks to the reduced costs of education and the improvement of infrastructure across regions. The growing interest of working and middle-class families to provide education to both their male and female children, particularly in a context of unbearably high youth unemployment, also plays a role (CIDE, 1988). Finally, there has clearly been an ideological change, with more women holding higher aspirations for individual autonomy and self-realisation.

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[38] Figures of illiterate population from 1900 and 1930 as quoted by Capel (1990) and figures for 1990 as quoted by Garrido (1992).

[39] Figure for 1986 as quoted in Garrido (1992) and figures for 1991 are from the Spanish Census of 1991 (INE 1994).

Figure IV.1. Gendered Patterns of Enrolment in Higher Education (absolute numbers) and Proportion of Single Women Aged 20-30, 1975-1984



Source: Instituto de la Mujer (1988) and Garrido (1993).

Despite the recent significant expansion of higher education to the middle class, authors such as Cabrera, Dávila and González (1998) argue that access is still far from democratic. The original and current sources for the expansion include the economic improvement of middle-class families, very high youth unemployment rates,[40] highly subsidised state universities, and great expectations from university degrees. However, many young students take up higher education opportunities as if they were in a kind of "parking lot", waiting for better occupational prospects (Garrido 1992). Furthermore, the presence of students from modest family backgrounds (i.e. their parents have low educational level) is very small given their actual numbers in the population. These students also tend to apply for degrees with

[40] Youth unemployment rates (age group 20-24) in 1981 were 33% for women and 27% for men; in 1991 were 36% for women and 24 for men; and in 1996 were 45% for women and 34% for men (MTSS 1984 and INE 1991 and 1996).

the lowest social prestige. Children whose parents are highly educated instead tend to apply for degrees with greater social prestige that require longer periods of study (e.g. medicine or engineering) (Cabrera, Dávila and González 1998).

Figure IV.2. Women's and Men's Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort





Source: ESD 1991.

In a generational perspective, the rapid improvement in post-compulsory education amongst the younger cohorts stands out (see Figure IV.2). While only 12 per cent of women born in the post-civil war period (1940-1944) had access to post-compulsory education, as many as 45 per cent of the next generation of women born from 1960 to 1964 attained post-compulsory education. The reverse trend in the gender-gap at higher levels of education mainly emerges in cohorts born from the 1950s, onwards.

For example, in the 1940-1944 birth cohort the proportion of men who attained a university degree was 10 per cent, double that of women. In the 1960-1964 birth cohort, however, women over took men with 18 per cent of them completing degrees compared to 12 per cent of men the proportion of men. This is a clear shift in the structure of opportunities for upward and downward marriages between women and men.

IV.1.1. Consequences of Educational Expansion on Marriage Choice

So far, the increase in women's educational attainment has by no means reached universal levels. The expansion of higher education, for instance, still involves a low proportion of individuals. We thus see a polarisation in family formation between highly and lesser educated women. On the one hand, there is a growing number of educated women who tend to delay marriage and motherhood as late as possible and, on the other, there remains a significant numbers of low educated women who tend to marry and have children at early ages.

This means that as more women enter the educational system, the proportion of young single women in the population will increase. The trend in the level of spinsterhood was depicted in Figure IV.1 together with the absolute number of students enrolled in higher education. The figures give the impression that highly educated women reject (Becker would say they lack interest) marriage at ages earlier than 30 years. Indeed, a strong association has been found between educational level and spinsterhood. For instance in 1990, only 22 per cent of women aged 25-29 with only primary education were single, while 79 per cent of women with a university degree were unmarried (Garrido 1992). This pattern fits Becker's theory of marriage, which suggests that better-educated women marry at lower rates because they have less to gain from marriage.

The delay in first partnership by women's educational attainment is illustrated in Figure IV.3. Around 50 per cent of women with *primary studies* married at the age of 22, while 50 per cent of women with *university degrees* married only at the age of 26. By the age of 31, only 10 per cent of those with primary studies and as many as 30 per cent with a university degree were single. For men, the main polarisation process occurs between university and non-university groups, but by the age of 30

these educational effects tend to disappear. This means that education is a good indicator for predicting age at first marriage, above all for women.

Figure IV.3. Women's and Men's Cumulative Percentage of Entering First Partnership by Educational Level: Cohort 1955-1959 (Aged 32-36 in 1991)





Source: ESD1991.

Though, better-educated women have certainly changed the timing of marriage, whether or not they personally perceive remaining single as more attractive is far from evident. Yet, in relative terms, women do not seem to avoid partnership formation, but rather to postpone it (Miret 1997). In attitudinal surveys, families invariably are considered to provide the best environment for attaining emotional and economic rewards (Cruz 1995). For the American context, Oppenheimer (1996) mentions both the economies of scale and the economic security gained by dual-earners as desirable arrangements in a context of uncertain labour markets. Dual-earner families are also more attractive and less economically risky than the traditional gender-symmetric family. Likewise, from the gender perspective, partnerships today are depicted as a "multi-dimensional package of mutual interdependencies" where efficiency and rewards are granted even for the better-educated women (Oppenheimer 1996).

An immediate consequence of delaying partnership formation is the reduced time available to reproduce. Although the best educated women might catch up with the fertility levels reached by poorly educated women, some indicators show this is not necessarily the case. For instance, the average number of children born to women within the age groups 35-39, 40-44, 45-50 and 50-54 is very different according to their educational attainment (see Table IV.1). It is important to note that these figures do not reflect the completed family size of all these women, because women aged 35-39 might continue having children until later ages. For a better approximation, we can look at the oldest groups (women aged 45-50 and 50-54 in 1991). Here we see that the average number of children produced declines with the increase in a woman's education.

Table IV.1. Women's Average Number of Children (Live Births) by Educational Attainment and Age Groups, Spain 1991

	Age groups			
Educational level	**35-39**	**40-44**	**45-50**	**50-54**
Illiterate	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.7
Without formal education	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8
Primary studies	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.5
Secondary studies	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.4
High education	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.1
Total	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.7

Source: INE 1991 (Census data).

As postulated by Oppenheimer (1988), better-educated women with a high investment in human capital would be more inclined to secure a *good match* in order to protect themselves from the high opportunity costs of leaving paid employment. The pressure to abandon the labour force might arise if a husband with greater advantage in the market place reasoned that his less-advantaged wife should be the more flexible of the couple. The question now is whether women with higher educations are more likely to marry with equals than are less educated women, or whether in the new educational context men are more likely to marry downwards irrespective of their social class. Some of these questions shall be addressed later in this chapter. Next, I present a preliminary look at the trends in educational pairings across cohorts.

IV.2. Trends in Educational Homogamy

Educational homogamy has not attracted much attention in sociological studies in Spain. A pioneering study was conducted in 1981 by Carabaña in which he studied occupational homogamy at two levels: homogamy between fathers-in-law and between married couples. The author identified a greater tendency among women to marry men with greater occupational prestige. In contrast, men had a higher tendency to select female partners across the social strata. In the 1980s this pattern was not uncommon given the weak position of women in the labour market. Carabaña showed that daughters of working class parents had a slightly higher social mobility through marriage than sons: 8 per cent fewer working class daughters than sons remained in the same social class after marriage.

All things considered, Carabaña rejected the hypothesis that women had significantly higher occupational mobility than men through marriage. Because of the striking combined effect between the tendency of partners to have fathers with similar occupational prestige and the tendency of partners to have similar prestige (occupational endogamy of couples). The latter trend stemmed from the segmentation of marriage markets according to different occupational categories.

The occupational homogamy of married couples was also shown in a study conducted by Iglesias (1995). The author highlighted that the marriage market in Spain was to a large extent *occupationally homogamic*. This means that partners with similar occupations tend to mate owing to the fact that most of the relationships

took place from the spatial proximity in the workplace and other daily activities. Indeed, he estimated that as many as one out of five marriages were occupationally homogamic in 1980. The categories with a higher degree of marital homogamy were technicians and professionals (46%), followed closely by students (44%). The demographer H.V. Musham (1974) has also argued that the marriage market tends to be restricted by the simple fact that the partners' selection is usually made in a "socially restrained" space.

The findings of both studies suggest that there are two main networks which influence the process of partner selection: classmates, and colleagues. If the educational system can be said to provide the main relational network in which individuals select their partners, marital homogamy should tend to increase as educational expansion occurs. If, on the contrary, individuals tend to date - let us say - for marital purposes at a rather late age, marital heterogamy should also increase significantly.

In the 1940s and 1950s it was common for people to marry very late; the mean age at first marriage was almost 29 years for men and 26 for women. People began marrying earlier at the end of the 1960s and, by 1975, men got married on average at 26 years and women at 24 years. This pattern has reversed ever since the 1980s with a continued delay of marriage. In 1992 men got married on average at 29 years and women at 24 years keeping on average a two year difference between the partners 1997).[41]

Table IV.2 summarises trends in educational homogamy in Spain by birth cohorts. It stands out the extraordinarily high proportion of homogamous marriages (see the observed percentages), even in the youngest birth cohorts.[42] Some authors explain

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[41] The two-years of difference between partners, however, is an average which may vary according to major changes and adjustments in the marriage market, for instance, due to shortages of women or men in certain areas or the influx of large number of women or men immigrants in a particular area. As Cabré (1993) argues western societies have tended to adjust the age difference between partners whenever there has been a 'shortage' on the part of one of the sexes, before the possibility of staying single.

[42] It would be very interesting to compare the degree of couples' educational homogamy across countries, but this task is rather difficult unless we make sure that a strictly comparable classification scheme of educational attainment is used in all the countries. A German study, for instance, also mentions the existence of a high level of educational homogamy for the young 1954-58 female cohort (see Blossfeld & Tim 2001). They used four hierarchical levels to classify the marital homogamy (lower secondary and intermediate schooling, lower secondary and intermediate schooling with

the high degree of homogamy by cultural factors such as the traditionalism of family life in Catholic countries (Smits, Ultee and Lammers 1996). However, I explain it as the result of both a high degree of *social closure* and structurally limited opportunities for social mixing, as I will explain in this section.

Figures between parentheses in Table IV.2 warn us that they may not be completely reliable. The eldest cohorts may incur in problems of recall as data are drawn from a retrospective survey, whereas the youngest cohorts are too young to draw definitive conclusions. The Spanish curriculum system is explained in greater detail in Appendix 7.

The opportunities for social mixing are limited because of the generally low educational level of the population, above all in those generations born before the mid-1940s. In this situation, highly educated individuals generally come from the most privileged social groups, and they try to preserve their social status by not marrying down. This may lose its importance with more universal access to education, and we might see a higher degree of marital heterogamy. Indeed, some authors consider educational heterogamy as a good proxy for social modernisation. Ultee and Luijkx (1990), for example, found in their comparative study of 23 countries that the degree of educational homogamy was negatively related to the level of economic development. Therefore, as countries modernise educational homogamy should decrease.

As it was explained in the previous section IV.1, Spain has had a very rapid change in its educational structure. However, this has not had a dramatic effect on the degree of educational homogamy. As table IV.2 shows, the only result is a progressive, moderate decline of homogamy rates across the generations. This reinforces the argument, also stated by Carabaña (1994), that couples' educational homogamy is a social constant in Spain.

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vocational training or higher secondary schooling, specialised technical college degree, and university degree) and estimated 70 per cent of homogamous marriages.

Table IV.2. Distribution of Upward, Downward and Homogamous Partnerships with regard to the Educational Attainment Level for Birth Cohorts (Partner's Highest Educational Attainment Level): Three Educational Categories

Cohorts	Upward Partnership		Homogamous Partnership		Downward Partnership		Total
Wives	*Observed*	*Predicted*	*Observed*	*Predicted*	*Observed*	*Predicted*	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	6.0	6.5	92.9	91.4	1.1	2.0	100.0
1915-1919	6.7	2.0	92.2	90.8	1.1	7.2	100.0
1920-1924	6.0	1.8	93.2	91.1	0.7	7.2	100.0
1925-1929	7.9	2.4	91.0	88.5	1.2	9.0	100.0
1930-1934	7.4	3.2	91.2	87.6	1.4	9.2	100.0
1935-1939	11.5	5.5	86.4	80.4	2.1	14.1	100.0
1940-1944	13.6	8.9	82.5	73.8	3.9	17.3	100.0
1945-1949	16.7	11.3	78.3	67.5	5.0	21.2	100.0
1950-1954	17.4	16.6	74.3	59.0	8.3	24.3	100.0
1955-1959	19.0	22.7	69.1	48.7	11.9	28.6	100.0
1960-1964	17.0	26.5	66.8	47.3	16.2	26.2	100.0
1965 older	14.9	22.5	68.5	57.3	16.6	20.2	100.0

Cohorts	Upward Partnership		Homogamous Partnership		Downward Partnership		Total
Husbands	*Observed*	*Predicted*	*Observed*	*Predicted*	*Observed*	*Predicted*	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	1.2	2.8	92.5	89.8	6.3	7.4	100.0
1915-1919	2.1	3.9	92.5	89.4	5.4	6.7	100.0
1920-1924	1.7	3.4	93.0	89.8	5.4	6.8	100.0
1925-1929	2.4	4.6	91.1	87.3	6.5	8.0	100.0
1930-1934	3.4	6.2	89.3	84.6	7.3	9.1	100.0
1935-1939	2.0	6.1	87.7	79.9	10.3	14.0	100.0
1940-1944	3.4	9.6	81.4	69.9	15.1	20.5	100.0
1945-1949	6.2	13.1	76.9	64.1	16.9	22.8	100.0
1950-1954	9.8	19.0	71.1	53.8	19.1	27.3	100.0
1955-1959	13.1	22.9	66.9	47.8	20.0	29.3	100.0
1960-1964	18.0	26.3	65.2	47.6	16.8	26.1	100.0
1965 older	15.7	21.2	70.9	59.2	13.4	19.6	100.0

Note: the table includes empirically observed percentages and predicted percentages. The latter are based on the assumption that marriage decisions were taken randomly given the distributions of educational attainment levels of women and men for each birth cohort (see Appendix 8 and 9).

The classification of educational attainment used to estimate the type of marriage was the following: 1) Low educational level (primary school or less); 2) Secondary studies (high school or technical school); 3) Higher education (college, university or post-graduate studies).

Source: ESD 1991.

Heterogamy becomes only slightly significant in the generations born after the middle 1950s. These cohorts benefited from the educational expansion of the 1960s and 1970s.[43] The most outstanding feature in these heterogamic couples is the increase in women's *hopogamic marriages* (i.e. they marry less accomplished men). This illustrates the progressive decline of traditional gender roles in marriages, where husbands had the privilege of formal education given their role as the main economic providers. Interestingly enough, in the earlier cohorts women who married downward tended to have low educational attainment (secondary level at most) (see Appendix 8), which suggests rather progressive thinking on their part. It should be pointed out that women with university degrees were statistically rare in the older cohorts. In the younger generations, it increases the proportion of women with secondary education who marry downwards.

There is also an increase in *women's hypergamy (*they marry men with higher educational attainment) across generations, though the initial hypothesis predicted that women would tend to avoid traditional gender partnerships. This pattern may be partly related to the general improvement in the population's educational attainment whereby there is more room for mobility through either *upward or downward marriages*. In any case, the apparent decrease in homogamous marriages is a clear sign of social change that deserves closer examination.[44]

In contrast, Table IV.2 shows a significant increase in men's upward marriages (i.e. non-traditional marriages) involving as many as 18 per cent of partnerships formed in the 1960-1964 birth cohort. In the earlier cohorts these men usually had low educational attainment, possibly related to their early entrance into paid work. In the younger generations upward marriages mainly involved men with post-compulsory education (see Appendix 9). Similarly, in the younger and more highly educated generations men make fewer downward marriages and more homogamous marriages.

The observed percentages shown in Table IV.2 can, however, be affected by the changing distributions of women's and men's educational attainment across birth cohorts. Consequently, we need to estimate the expected patterns of partnership formation according to the couples' educational match under conditions of statistical

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[43] Hereafter the distinction between young and old birth cohorts will refer to those born before and after the 1950s.

[44] I will normally refer to women's/men's downward, upward and homogamous partnerships to avoid confusions regarding the type of arrangement.

independence (see predicted percentages in Table IV.2). Expected values indicate, for instance, the tendency of individuals to form assortative partnerships, given a random selection of partners and the distribution of the educational attainment level of men and women respectively, in each birth cohort. Expected values are estimated by the cross-tabulation between women's and men's educational match (see Appendix 8 and 9).

Given the recent educational expansion, the probability of forming a partnership with a higher educated person should have continuously increased for each younger cohort. This is clearly seen if one compares the observed distribution with the expected "random" distribution of the couples' match according to the educational attainment. The observed values of the homogamous partnerships, for instance, have always been "above the chance" especially in the youngest cohorts (those born since the 1945 onwards). This means that, given the gender-specific distribution of the educational attainment, there has been a structural need for both women and men to form assortative mating.

It is worth noting that in the oldest birth cohorts the distribution of partnerships according to the couples' educational match is fundamentally explained by the educational structure of these specific birth cohorts, given that the differences between observed and expected values are very low. This conclusion confirms the limited opportunities for social mixing in the older cohorts mentioned above. Here is an example, in the 1920-1924 female cohort as many as 92 per cent of low educated women married low educated men, only 1 per cent above the percentage which would have been expected had they married randomly.

In the younger 1955-1959-birth cohort the situation is rather different because there is a lower degree in the couples' educational homogamy (69%) than in the 1920-1924 cohort (93%). However, the homogamy in this young cohort could have been even lower given the gender-specific distribution of educational attainments. In the 1955-1956 cohort 69 per cent of women formed assortative partnerships (first entry into a partnership), though around 20 per cent could have married men with a different educational attainment (difference between the observed and the expected values).

In brief, despite the higher possibilities of couples' educational mix among young cohorts, a large proportion of women have chosen to form assortative partnerships. In 1955-1956 cohort (see Appendix 8 and 9), women with a higher educational attainment could have formed downward partnerships to a higher degree, had they

chosen partners among lesser-educated men. Thus, there is still more room for the couples' educational mix. The empirical research precisely investigates how the changes in the process of partner selection have taken place in the life-course of single women and men in successive birth cohorts.

Now, I should be stressed that the high degree of educational homogamy mentioned at the beginning of this section has to be cautiously interpreted specially on international comparative studies. The reason is that small changes in the classification of educational categories can easily modify the resulting distribution of marriage types (assortative, upward or downward). Therefore, some country differences in the proportion of marriage types may sometimes reflect different educational classifications rather than real differences in marriage types.

The classification in Table IV.2 follows the following divisions: 1) low educational attainment (i.e. primary school or less); 2) high or technical school; and 3) college or university degree. The fact that these categories are large means that estimates of marital mobility in terms of education may be smaller than what would result from a more detailed breakdown. It also means that this classification may return over-estimates of educational homogamy.

My selection of this classification scheme followed an exploration of two other possible systems. First of all, I could have divided the top of the educational structure into more detailed categories. However, the expansion of higher education took place only very recently, and very few cases would have fallen within these top categories. It, thus, seemed more sensible to divide the bottom of the educational structure into smaller groups, given the larger proportion of the population concentrated there (see Figure IV.2). The results of this breakdown are presented in Table IV.3 for the female cohorts.

There are striking differences between Tables IV.2 and IV.3 with regard to the distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages by birth cohorts. The most important difference is that in Table IV.3 the proportion of women's downward marriages is much larger than in Table IV.2, which gives the impression that Spanish women have long been forward-thinking in their marital selection, choosing husbands with a lower educational attainment. This is not exactly the case.

Table IV.3. Women's Distribution of Upward, Downward and Homogamous Marriages with regard to Educational Attainment Level for Birth Cohorts (Partner's Highest Educational Attainment Level): Four Educational Categories

Cohorts	Upward Marriage	Homogamous Marriage	Downward Marriage	Total
Wives	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	(13.6)	(63.6)	(22.8)	100.0
1915-1919	(12.0)	(62.8)	(25.2)	100.0
1920-1924	14.6	61.7	23.7	100.0
1925-1929	17.6	60.3	22.1	100.0
1930-1934	16.2	60.6	23.1	100.0
1935-1939	22.1	55.6	22.3	100.0
1940-1944	23.7	54.7	21.6	100.0
1945-1949	27.0	51.1	22.0	100.0
1950-1954	26.0	53.0	21.0	100.0
1955-1959	25.7	53.4	20.9	100.0
1960-1964	27.3	49.6	23.2	100.0
1965 and later	(28.7)	(48.8)	(22.6)	100.0

Note: The classification of educational attainment used to estimate the type of marriage was the following: 1) Without formal education (illiterate, literate and uncompleted primary education); 2) Completed primary studies: 3) Secondary studies (high school or technical school); 4) Higher education (college, university or post-graduate studies).
Source: ESD 1991.

Downward marriages have traditionally involved less-well educated women, as originally expected. In the cohorts born before the mid-1950s, for instance, downward marriages usually involved women who had completed their basic education and who married men with even lower educational attainment (see Appendix 8). For example, as many as 77 per cent of women who had completed no more than a primary education in the birth cohort 1945-1949 married downwards. These downward marriages of less well-educated women came about in a traditional gender environment in which men, typically in agrarian regions, would have interrupted their formal education at an early age to enter paid employment. Women, instead, completed their elementary education and initiated formal or informal work (e.g. family help) some time later. In the 1945-1949 birth cohort 77 per cent of women with primary studies and 23 per cent of women with post-compulsory educations married downwards. In the younger 1960-1964 birth cohort the distribution shifted: 30 per cent of women with no more than primary studies and 70 per cent of women with post-compulsory educations married downwards. This simply reflects the fact that in modern times downward marriages tend to involve women with higher levels of education.

Which of the tables here presented best captures the reality of educational homogamy across the generations? The main difference between both of them is that while the former over-estimates the homogamy rates, the latter over-estimates female hypogamy. There are, however, several reasons why the classification used in Table IV.2 appears to better approximate educational homogamy than that used in Table IV.3: the distribution by marriage types illustrated in Table IV.2 captures substantial movements across large educational categories. In this table it is not so important that a woman with a low educational level marries someone with even less education; indeed, they are all in the same category of individuals with a "low educational level". After all, they belong to the bottom of the educational structure and their mobility through marriage in terms of differences in the partner's human capital is not so significant. Though the proportion of individuals who fall into the category of "low educational level" is very large, especially in the older generations, it is theoretically sensible to maintain it as a single group.

There is yet another reason for rejecting the classification used in Table IV.3. This has to do with "memory failure" on the part of either men or women. While many women with primary studies declared that they married men with a lower level of educational attainment, very few men in the same or relatively close birth cohorts reported that they had married women with a higher level of education. It is impossible to know who - women or men - remembers less clearly the details of their partner's education. The only solution to overcome this problem is to cluster both categories (no formal education and completed primary studies) into a single one of individuals with a "low educational level". Therefore, logistic regression models will be based on the distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages which result from the classification system in Table IV.2. All individuals are pooled into a single sample in order to explore which variables shape their partner selection.

IV.3. Data, Methods and Variables

The statistical model described next is based on the Socio-demographic Survey (ESD) which I discussed in the introduction. The methodology used is event history analysis with discrete-time. Each observation is equivalent to a *person-year*. That is, there is an observational record for each year that a person is known to be at risk of forming a partnership. In this research a person is considered to be at risk as long as he or she is not living in either a consensual or marital partnership.

Three dependent variables have been estimated separately in the logistic regression models. The first is the probability that a man or a woman marries (or lives with) a partner with the same educational level (*homogamous marriages*). The second is that he/she marries a partner with lower educational level (*downward marriages*). The third and last is that he/she marries a partner with a higher educational level (*upward marriages*). The observations begin when the individual is aged 15, and end on the event of the first marriage or union. The observations end at the age of 50 (right censored) or at the time of the interview in 1991 (right censored) if the individual remains single.

The analysis is based on *multistate models*, or models with competing risks, in which there is a single origin state "being single and aged 15-50" and three possible destination states: marrying homogamously, marrying upwards, or marrying downwards. For example, if the dependent variable is the probability of marrying homogamously and at some point the individual marries upwards or downwards, this person would be right censored from the risks set since he or she is no longer at risk of contracting a homogamous marriage. In the models for upward marriage, the highest educational group has been dropped out of the risk set since they have a nil probability of marrying someone above their level. The lowest educational group has accordingly been dropped out of the analysis of downward marriages.

In the sample, selection was partly constrained by the characteristics of the survey. To start with, only individuals who ever enter a first partnership that lasted until the time of the interview in 1991 have been included in the study. Thus, individuals who experienced a partnership breakdown due to death of the partner, separation, or divorce have not been included. The reason for this is that questions about partners were posed only to those individuals who were living in a partnership at the time of the interview, and only the current partner was described. This entails several problems. First, if a person has had more than one partner in the past only the last one is known and, secondly, there is a sub-representation in eldest cohorts which suffer from a higher incidence of mortality. Nonetheless, the restriction of the analysis to first partnerships does not imply a great deal of sample bias given the low level of separation and divorce in Spain. Divorce was only legalised in 1981. The proportion of marriages that ended in divorce or separation was 2.9 per cent in the 1956-1960 marriage cohort, 4.5 per cent in the 1966-1970 marriage cohort, and 4.9 in the 1976-1980 cohort (Solsona, Houle & Simó 2000).

Concerns about sub-representation in retrospective surveys suggest the suitability of limiting the sample to births cohorts born from 1920 (aged 70 in 1991) onwards. The

historical period of observation is from 1940 to 1990. The years prior to the dictatorship (the civil war lasted from 1936-39) are thus not considered, although its disruptive effects on marriage behaviour may be felt among the older generations.

Another shortcoming of the data is that they provide only cross-sectional information at the time of the interview. We must assume that the educational attainment reported in the interview is the same as it was at the time of marriage. The assumption is probably accurate though as less than 4 per cent of individuals continued within the educational system after they were married.

The following set of independent variables were included in the analysis:

a. Individual variables

- *Age*: Log (current age-14) and log (51-current age). The two parameters are meant to approximate the non-monolithic pattern of age dependence of marriage rate (the distribution assumption about the underlying duration). The baseline hazard function for age is a two-piece splined function with slopes for young and mature ages. Thus, if the effect of the second parameter is much stronger than the first, the transition into the different types of partnerships will be skewed to the right. The conversion into logarithms was done because non-linear specifications did not significantly improve the model fit, whereas the estimated parameters approximated a linear trend on a logarithmic scale.

- *Education*: Time-varying categorical variable which consists of three large categories: primary education or less, secondary and high education. The reference category varies according to the model.

- *Not in School*: Time-varying dummy variable. Coded 1 if the individual is not in school and 0 otherwise.

- *Duration in school:* Time varying variable measured in number of years

- *Duration since leaving school:* Time-varying variable measured according to the number of years after school: 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, >12. The reference category is being 'in school'.

- *Birth Cohorts*: Categorical variable constructed using a series of dummy variables of different birth cohorts (ten year birth cohorts, five year the last one). The reference category is for the period 1920-1929. This variable is meant to control the changes in the structure of opportunities for educational mix across cohorts. If the coefficients are positive and significant this would mean that educational homogamy is partly produced by changes in the structure or changes in sex-specific differences.

b. Social background

- *Father's education:* Time-varying variable that indicates father's education when respondent was 16 years old. It comprises four dummy variables: no formal qualification (reference category), primary education, secondary education and higher education.

- *Change in social origin:* Time varying variable which measures the relationship between father's and child's education (father's education when respondent was 16 years old). It comprises three dummy variables: father's education lower than daughter's/son's, father's education higher than daughter's/son's and father's education equal to daughter's/son's (reference category).

Respondent's education and father's education aim at measuring different effects. The first one captures the effect of women's education on their marriage behaviour, and the second one, captures the effect of their social origin. Thus, as women's education rises, their marriage market circumstances may also change, which indicates that women's ascribed characteristics (such as family origin defined by the father's education) becomes less important than their achieved characteristics (such as their income potential defined by their higher educational attainment). Then, change in social origin captures the importance of surpassing her/his father's own education on her/his marriage behaviour. It allow us to address questions such as whether women would be more inclined to marry someone from their family sphere or change their social stratum as their educational attainment changes.

c. Contextual variables

- *Regions: North* (Galícia, Asturias, Cantabria, País Vasco, Navarra, la Rioja and Aragón), *Eastern* (Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana and Baleares), *Southern* (Andalucía, Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla and Canarias). Reference category: *Madrid and centre* (Castilla-León, Castilla La Mancha and Extremadura).

The first variables introduced into the logistic regression models were age (a combination of two independent variables to fit the base line of the probability of marriage) followed by an interaction term of education and age, and birth cohorts. Overall, five nested models for the marriage formation have been estimated.

IV.4. Results from the Statistical Model

The previous sections have described the trend in assortative partnerships and the peculiarities of educational expansion. Now we turn to the event history analysis of partnership formation. This section has been divided into three parts according to the type of partnership formed: *assortative partnerships* (both partners have the same educational attainment), *female upward partnerships* and *male downward partnerships* (men have a higher educational attainment than women do) and *female downward partnerships* and *male upward partnerships* (men have an inferior educational attainment than women do).

IV.4.1. The First Transition: Assortative Partnerships

The trend in homogamy rates over the life course has been illustrated in Figures IV.4 and IV.5 for the 1950-1959 birth cohort (individuals aged 32-41 in 1991). The curves obtained are a simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 and summarise the main trends in marital homogamy with regard to educational attainment (see the statistical models in Table IV.4 and IV.5). In this simulation individuals had finished school. The likelihood of forming a partnership during the completion of formal education is very low, above all in the youngest cohorts, which tend to delay marriage for as long as possible. Therefore, the workplace must offer an important relational network for partner selection since most people are only "marriage-ready" some years after school completion.

For women, homogamy rates are higher in the low and high-educated categories, while lower among women with secondary studies. Therefore, the bottom and the top of the educational structure experience the highest homogamy rates over the life course. It is striking, however, that low educated women are far more homogamous than the highly educated.

This polarisation by educational attainment indicates that women with a low investment in human capital find it difficult to move out of their social category. In other words, there is a very high degree of *social closure*. It is as if the least attractive candidates for marriage were essentially "stuck" with one another, whereas

women with secondary studies enjoy greater mobility through either upward or downward marriages.

Figure IV.4. Women's Transition Rates of Forming Assortative Partnerships according to The Educational Attainment (1950-1959 Birth Cohort)



Source: Simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 in Table IV.4.
Note: *up to compulsory* embraces individuals exempted of qualifications or with completed elementary studies.

Figure IV.5. Men's Transition Rates of Forming Assortative Partnerships according to Their Educational Attainment (1950-1959 Birth Cohort)



Source: Simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 in Table IV. 5.
Note: *up to compulsory* embraces individuals exempted of qualifications or with completed elementary studies.

Table IV.4. Transition Rate Models for Assortative Partnerships: Women

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	6.99 ***	6.73 ***	0.70 ***	0.58 ***	0.58 ***
Log(51-current age)	13.49 ***	13.03 ***	35.42 ***	28.50 ***	28.54 ***
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	--	--	--	--	--
1930-1939	0.22 ***	0.21 ***	0.21 ***	0.20 ***	0.20 ***
1940-1949	0.34 ***	0.35 ***	0.35 ***	0.33 ***	0.33 ***
1950-1959	0.50 ***	0.48 ***	0.48 ***	0.47 ***	0.46 ***
1960-1964	0.65 ***	0.68 ***	0.69 ***	0.66 ***	0.65 ***
Education * age					
Primary education * log(current age-14)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	0.33 **	-0.16	-0.23	-0.17	-0.15
High education* log(current age-14)	-0.02	-0.62 ***	-1.35 ***	-2.11 ***	-2.06 ***
Primary education * log(51-current age)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	-1.22 ***	-0.89 ***	-0.23	-0.16	-0.17
High education * log(51-current age)	-0.66 ***	-0.48 **	0.57 ***	1.33 ***	1.32 ***
Not in School[1]		0.99 ***	-1.13 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		0.11	0.00	-0.09	-0.06
Cohort 1930-1939 * High education		0.33	0.33	0.29	0.27
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		-0.21	-0.33	-0.42	-0.40
Cohort 1940-1949 * High education		0.47 **	0.51 **	0.49 **	0.50 **
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		0.29	0.20	0.13	0.15
Cohorts 1950-1959 * High education		0.73 ***	0.78 ***	0.85 ***	0.85 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary Education		0.28	0.22	0.22	0.23
Cohorts 1960-1964 * High education		0.43 **	0.52 ***	0.76 ***	0.75 ***
Duration in school				-0.10 ***	-0.10 ***
Duration since leaving school			0.01 ***		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				-0.86 ***	-0.84 **
3 - 4 Years After School				-0.39 ***	-0.38 **
5 - 6 Years After School				0.01	0.03
7 - 8 Years After School				0.29 ***	0.31 **
9 - 10 Years After School				0.51 ***	0.52 **
11 - 12 Years After School				0.53 ***	0.54 **
> 12 Years After School				0.11 ***	0.11 **
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--
Primary education			-0.30 ***	-0.31 ***	-0.27 **
Secondary education			-0.22 **	-0.25 **	-0.20 *
High education			-0.38 ***	-0.40 ***	-0.34 *
Social origin					
Father 's Education = daughter's			--	--	--
Father 's Education < daughter's			-0.61 ***	-0.63 ***	-0.62 *
Father s Education > daugther's			-0.85 ***	-0.91 ***	-0.90 *
Last region of residence					
North					0.02
Madrid and centre					--
Eastern					0.17 *
Southern					0.12 *
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					0.19 *
Constant	-28.53 ***	-28.60 ***	-69.89 ***	-57.22 ***	-57.52 *
Number of events	28589	28589	28245	28245	28245
Subepisodes	527507	527507	521187	521187	521187
-2 Log Likelihood	197511	196700	199191	198059	197727
Degrees of Freedom	10	19	25	31	35

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level

Reference category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 * Primary education; 3) in school 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.

-- Referece category

Data: ESD 1991.

Table IV.5. Transition Rate Models for Assortative Partnerships: Men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	10.56 ***	10.40 ***	0.77 ***	0.68 ***	0.68 *
Log(51-current age)	14.43 ***	14.26 ***	34.82 ***	30.46 ***	30.38 *
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	–	–	–	–	–
1930-1939	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
1940-1949	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04 *
1950-1959	0.23 ***	0.16 ***	0.14 ***	0.14 ***	0.12 *
1960-1964	0.38 ***	0.32 ***	0.34 ***	0.33 ***	0.31 *
Education * age					
Primary education * log(current age-14)	–	–	–	–	–
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	0.30 **	0.13	0.27 **	0.16	0.12
High education* log(current age-14)	0.93 ***	0.61 ***	0.00	-0.53 ***	-0.62 *
Primary education * log(51-current age)	–	–	–	–	–
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	-1.15 ***	-1.71 ***	-1.42 ***	-1.15 ***	-1.14 **
High education * log(51-current age)	-1.33 ***	-1.79 ***	-0.99 ***	-0.31 **	-0.28
Not in School[1]		0.56 ***	-0.77 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		0.11	-0.07	-0.21	-0.20
Cohort 1930-1939 * High education		0.60 ***	0.61 ***	0.60 ***	0.60 **
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		0.68 **	0.51 **	0.37	0.38
Cohort 1940-1949 * High education		1.18 ***	1.22 ***	1.21 ***	1.22 **
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		1.20 ***	1.05 ***	0.90 ***	0.92 **
Cohorts 1950-1959 * High education		1.31 ***	1.32 ***	1.36 ***	1.37 **
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary Education		1.27 ***	1.16 ***	1.07 ***	1.11 **
Cohorts 1960-1964 * High education		1.09 ***	1.12 ***	1.23 ***	1.26 **
Duration in school				-0.05 ***	-0.05 **
Duration since leaving school			0.01 ***		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				-0.68 ***	-0.65 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				-0.40 ***	-0.36 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				-0.22 ***	-0.18 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				0.04	0.08 **
9 - 10 Years After School				0.39 ***	0.42 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				0.58 ***	0.61 ***
> 12 Years After School				0.28 ***	0.31 ***
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			–	–	–
Primary education			-0.14 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.13 ***
Secondary education			0.00	0.00	-0.01
High education			-0.13	-0.13	-0.14
Social origin					
Father 's Education = son's			–	–	–
Father 's Education < son's			-0.30 ***	-0.30 ***	-0.30 ***
Father s Education > son's			-0.33 ***	-0.38 ***	-0.41 ***
Last region of residence					
North					-0.13 ***
Madrid and centre					–
Eastern					0.08 ***
Southern					0.14 ***
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					-0.14 ***
Constant	-33.70 ***	-33.82 ***	-71.04 ***	-62.82 ***	-62.66 ***
Number of events	29,404	29,404	29,008	29,008	29,008
Subepisodes	656,966	656,966	648,342	648,342	648,342
-2 Log Likelihood	205,203	204,715	207,994	207,044	206,635
Degrees of Freedom	10	19	25	31	35

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level
Referece category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 * Primary education; 3) in school; 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.
– Referece category
Data: ESD 1991.

The results for men are fundamentally the same as those of women. Again, those at the top and bottom of the educational structure experience the highest homogamy rates over the life course. Men differ from women, however, in the timing at which they enter homogamous marriages. The higher the men's educational level, the later they enter into homogamous partnerships. The reason why women do not seem to have this delay might be that men's decision to marry is mostly conditional upon school completion or economic independence. Women's decision to marry might be, instead, conditional upon other factors. Indeed, most women assume they will be economically dependent on their companions either temporary or for the long term. Therefore, these differences may reflect the existence of a traditional gender model of family formation that still persists in this 1950-1959 birth cohort. This traditional model of family formation is to a large extent reinforced by the worsening situation for women in the labour force. Women are, for instance, over-represented among unemployed and atypical workers (Moltó 1995).

In contrast to model 2, model 3 shows no changes in the sign of the effect for women with high educational attainment but a change in the shape of the curve with respect to age changes. In other words, the interaction effect of education and age is a change in the timing at which women would form assortative mating (see Table IV.6).

Table IV.6. Interaction Effect of Women's Educational Attainment and Age on the Probability of Forming Assortative Partnerships: Women

Educational Attainment	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
	Young	**Young**	**Young**	**Young**	**Young**
Primary education	6.99	6.73	0.70	0.58	0.58
Secondary education	7.32	6.57	0.47	0.40	0.43
High education	6.97	6.10	-0.66	-1.53	-1.49
	Mature	**Mature**	**Mature**	**Mature**	**Mature**
Primary education	13.49	13.03	35.42	28.50	28.54
Secondary education	12.27	12.14	35.19	28.35	28.37
High education	12.83	12.55	35.99	29.84	29.86

Note: computed with coefficients in Table IV.4.

In an intergenerational perspective, education acquires a more significant and positive effect on the women's decision to marry "like partner" in the younger generations (see the interaction effect of cohorts and education in models 4 and 5 in Table IV.4). Therefore, a university degree in the youngest cohort increases the likelihood of engaging in *assortative mating.* For men, high educational attainment has always had an important effect on the decision to choose homogamous marriages for all generations, being highest for the youngest cohorts.

Time after leaving school has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of homogamous mating. More specifically, the temporal effect of leaving school is u-shaped, so that in the first four years after finishing education the likelihood of marrying someone with the same educational attainment decreases, then it increases steadily up to 12 years after leaving school (see Figure IV.6). Presumably, then, the longer the period men and women stayed single after completing education, the higher their likelihood was to marry homogamously. There is a threshold, however, at which this probability decreases. If they wait for more than 12 years after leaving school their chances begin to decrease.

Figure IV.6. Temporal Effects of Leaving School on the Probability of Forming Assortative Partnerships: Women



Source: coefficients in model 4 (Table IV.4).

The temporal effect of leaving school on the probability of marrying homogamously has the same u-shape for men and women. The only difference is that the increase in the probability that men would marry homogamously occurs some years later than for women. This might just reflect the age-gap differences on marriage by sex.

I now turn to examine the effect of *exogenous variables* on the partner's decision to marry homogamously. Interestingly enough, fathers' education has a significant effect on women while it seems to exert a lesser effect on men. Hence, the likelihood that a woman marries homogamously decreases when the father has elementary education as compared with illiterate fathers or those without even completed primary school. This pattern reinforced the notion of social closure, because the higher the fathers' education the higher the probability that daughters marry homogamously and, thus, remain "stuck" in their social class.

The fact that men are less influenced by their fathers' education may reflect, again, a gendered model of social stratification. Hence, men may manage to surpass their social origins thanks to their occupational achievement, whereas women may be more constrained by their family status and their own educational achievements. Therefore, we shall next look at the effect of women's education when they attain a higher educational level than their fathers. Do they still have the same likelihood of marrying homogamously? The results indicate rather a low probability of marrying homogamously compared with the reference category (i.e. fathers and daughters with the same educational attainment). This means that even in the case that they individually overcome their social class origins (in terms of their fathers' education), it is unlikely that they will choose an equal in terms of their own educational level. These results contrast with findings in other countries such as Germany (Blossfeld at al. 1998), where a small proportion of individuals managed to move up intergenerationally as a result of their individual educational attainments.

Finally, daughters with lower educational attainment than their fathers have an even lower likelihood of marrying homogamously. In this case, they might feel attracted to the idea of marrying upwards to procure the same family status through marriage. In short, rather than ameliorating rigid social class boundaries, the educational system seems to reproduce the same class structure or even class inequalities. This is so at least for the cohorts analysed here.

In the last model two contextual variables were incorporated: regions and the size of the place of residence. It might be difficult, in principle, to grasp the influence of

these contextual variables on longitudinal observations. Nonetheless, by the time people decide to marry they may have achieved a certain territorial stability which, at the same time, determines their marriage choices. Spain has large regional differences in terms of cultural identities and economic structures; it therefore also seems reasonable to test whether territorial differences affect the main effects of other explicative variables. In general, their inclusion in the last model does not seem to fundamentally change the main effects of other variables, although contextual variables turned out to be significant.

IV.4.2. The Second Transition: Female Upward Partnerships

The first, and clearest, feature in women's traditional unions is the across-cohorts increase in the likelihood that a woman in any cohort will marry a man with higher education (see table IV.7). This might be a structural effect related to their increased educational opportunities. One interesting point, however, emerges in the interaction term between birth cohorts and educational attainment. In the younger cohorts (born after the 1950s) attaining more than an elementary education decreases the likelihood of forming traditional unions. Therefore, in later cohorts women's preferences for spouses with a higher educational attainment and, therefore, higher earning potential fade away as soon as they themselves attain higher education. Thus, the effect of education on marriage decisions has only recently been felt in the highly qualified younger cohorts of women.

The pattern of marrying upwards over the life course is different than in assortative partnerships. The sooner women marry after leaving school, the higher their chances of marrying someone with a higher level of education. As time goes by these chances of upward marriage increase up to 7-8 years and then decrease afterwards (holding all else constant; see Figure IV.7). In reality, an early marriage would be more typical of a conventional marriage. If women marry soon after completing their education, they do not have much time to consolidate their professional career before they face family responsibilities. The absence of state support for working parents (i.e. the scarcity of public child-care) and the additional inequalities in the female labour market makes *negative assortative matings* (i.e. men have higher earning potential) in Spain highly undesirable for a career-oriented women. The main reason is that women with lower (potential) occupational status compared with their male partners may be compelled to drop out of the labour force.

Table IV.7. Transition Rate Models for Upward Partnerships: Women

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	9.28 ***	9.08 ***	0.92 ***	0.87 ***	0.87 ***
Log(51-current age)	17.10 ***	16.57 ***	46.99 ***	40.08 ***	40.02 ***
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	--	--	--	--	--
1930-1939	0.52 ***	0.48 ***	0.48 ***	0.45 ***	0.44 ***
1940-1949	1.31 ***	1.25 ***	1.22 ***	1.14 ***	1.11 ***
1950-1959	1.83 ***	1.89 ***	1.84 ***	1.72 ***	1.72 ***
1960-1964	1.88 ***	2.08 ***	2.06 ***	1.86 ***	1.87 ***
Education * age					
Primary education * log(current age-14)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	1.01 ***	0.29	-0.07	-1.19 ***	-1.21 ***
Primary education * log(51-current age)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	-0.92 ***	0.49 **	0.53 **	1.15 ***	1.11 ***
Not in School[1]		0.92 ***	-1.32 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		0.25	0.12	0.12	0.16
Cohort 1940-1949 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		-0.38	-0.50	-0.41	-0.32
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		-1.17 ***	-1.18 ***	-1.07 ***	-1.00 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary education		-1.55 ***	-1.51 ***	-1.36 ***	-1.28 ***
Duration in school				0.00	0.00
Duration since leaving school			0.01 **		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				0.94 ***	0.93 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				1.26 ***	1.25 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1.52 ***	1.52 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1.66 ***	1.67 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1.54 ***	1.55 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				1.39 ***	1.41 ***
> 12 Years After School				0.49 ***	0.51 ***
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--
Primary education			0.54 ***	0.48 ***	0.42 ***
Secondary education			0.97 ***	0.91 ***	0.79 ***
High education			0.98 ***	0.93 ***	0.79 ***
Social origin					
Father 's Education = daughter's			--	--	--
Father 's Education < daughter's			0.27 **	0.23 **	0.17
Father s Education > daugther's			0.27	0.21	0.22
Last region of residence					
North					0.06
Madrid and centre					--
Eastern					0.16 ***
Southern					0.06
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					-0.41 ***
Constant	-38.61 ***	-38.58 ***	-94.77 ***	-84.64 ***	-84.29 ***
Number of events	4,728	4,728	4,688	4,688	4,688
Subepisodes	474,678	474,678	468,766	468,766	468,766
-2 Log Likelihood	46,080	45,746	45,941	45,284	45,094
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level

Reference category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 Primary education; 3) in school; 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.

-- Referece category

Data: ESD, 1991.

Figure IV.7. Temporal Effects of Leaving School on the Probability of Forming Upward Partnerships: Women



Source: coefficients in model 4 (Table IV.7).

Fathers' education also has a significant and positive effect on women's upward marriages. A father with a post-compulsory education increases the log odds that his daughter will marry upwards as compared with fathers without any qualifications. This might reflect the fact that the traditional gender rationale within better-off families is transferred to the daughters.[45] Furthermore, in model 5 (Table IV.7), changes in the daughters' social class origins do not seem to have a significant effect on the log odds of marrying upwards after controlling for contextual variables.

The trend of men to marry downwardly strongly declines for those with secondary education and declines less strongly for those with higher education (see Table IV.8). However, contrary to women, highly educated men in the later cohorts (born after the 1950s) have a stronger likelihood of forming a traditional marriage than those with only secondary studies. After all, following the same status competition logic, they do not risk being compelled to drop out of the labour force as would often happen to

[45] Here fathers' education is taken as a proxy for social class. As mentioned above, in Spain the expansion of public education is very recent, which means that highly educated fathers in the older generations must generally coincide with privileged or well-off families. This assumption may not work for fathers in the young birth cohorts.

their wives. Instead, women to some extent often facilitate their partners' abilities to combine of career and family.

Duration since leaving school has a significant and positive effect, so that the longer men wait to marry, the higher their chances of finding a partner with a lower education (the log odds of duration since leaving school=0.05 at the $p<0.001$ level). After 9-10 years of leaving school, this likelihood decreases (see Table IV.9).

Fathers' education does not have a significant effect, although changes in social class origin do. If sons surpass their fathers' education, the likelihood of forming traditional marriages is higher than if both fathers and sons have the education. However, if fathers have a higher education they do not usually form traditional marriages. Maybe the fact that sons experience family-dissimilarity in terms of their fathers' education favours a more open attitude towards accepting non-traditional unions. Finally, living in small towns seems to make it more likely that men will make traditional marriages.

Table IV.8. Interaction Effect of Men's Birth Cohort and Highest Educational Level on the Probability of Forming Downward Partnerships (Holding all else Constant): Men

Variables	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Secondary	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
1920-1929	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1930-1939	-0.19	-0.21 **	-0.19	-0.19
1940-1949	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05	-0.05
1950-1959	-0.23 **	-0.26 **	-0.23 **	-0.23 **
1960-1964	-0.50 ***	-0.48 ** *	-0.49 ***	-0.51 ***
High education	*b*	*b*	*b*	*b*
1920-1929	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1930-1939	0.11 **	0.10 **	0.09	0.10 **
1940-1949	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
1950-1959	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
1960-1964	-0.24	-0.17	-0.13	-0.13

Note: computed with coefficients in Table IV.9.

Table IV.9. Transition Rate Models for Downward Partnerships: Men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	12.49 ***	11.12 ***	0.73 ***	0.58 ***	0.5
Log(51-current age)	17.71 ***	16.32 ***	35.31 ***	25.16 ***	25.3
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	–	–	–	–	–
1930-1939	-0.04	-0.19	-0.21 **	-0.19	-0.1
1940-1949	-0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05	-0.0
1950-1959	-0.14 **	-0.23 **	-0.26 **	-0.23 **	-0.2
1960-1964	-0.42 ***	-0.50 ***	-0.48 ***	-0.49 ***	-0.5
Education * age					
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	–	–	–	–	–
High education* log(current age-14)	0.78 ***	0.61 **	0.11	-1.01 ***	-1.0
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	–	–	–	–	–
High education * log(51-current age)	-0.86 ***	-0.82 ***	-0.28	0.61 ***	0.5
Not in School[1]		1.03 ***	-0.94 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohort 1930-1939 * High education		0.30 **	0.32 **	0.28	0.2
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohort 1940-1949 * High education		0.05	0.09	0.05	0.0
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohorts 1950-1959 * High education		0.23	0.29 **	0.25 **	0.2
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary Education		–	–	–	–
Cohorts 1960-1964 * High education		0.27	0.31 **	0.35 **	0.3
Duration in school				0.00	0.0
Duration since leaving school			0.05 ***		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				0.37 ***	0.3
3 - 4 Years After School				0.96 ***	0.9
5 - 6 Years After School				1.26 ***	1.2
7 - 8 Years After School				1.32 ***	1.3
9 - 10 Years After School				1.25 ***	1.2
11 - 12 Years After School				0.93 ***	0.9
> 12 Years After School				0.62 ***	0.6
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			–	–	–
Primary education			-0.22 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.1
Secondary education			-0.14	-0.12	-0.1
High education			0.10	0.15	0.1
Social origin					
Father 's Education = son's			–	–	–
Father 's Education < son's			0.39 **	0.42 **	0.4
Father s Education > son's			-0.47 ***	-0.53 ***	-0.5
Last region of residence					
North					-0.0
Madrid and centre					–
Eastern					0.1
Southern					0.1
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					0.0
Constant	-40.50 ***	-37.93 ***	-71.06 ***	-53.77 ***	-54.2
Number of events	4,609	4,609	4,568	4,568	4,56
Subepisodes	118,643	118,643	117,675	117,675	117,67
-2 Log Likelihood	35,165	34,726	34,826	34,619	34,58
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	2

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level

Referece category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 * secondary education; 3) in school; 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.

– Referece category

Data: ESD 1991.

IV.4.3. The Third Transition: Female Downward Partnerships

As mentioned in section IV.1, downward marriages were not so rare in the recent past. Women at the lowest level of educational attainment in the old generations tended to marry men with even lower levels. Both women and men were at the bottom of the educational structure and presumably shared a similar status. Therefore, they do not fit within this notion of *new unions* in which we expect a substantial "gender imbalance" in favour of women, because traditional gender roles are inverted (i.e. women have a relatively higher educational attainment than men). This is captured in the model where women's downward mobility, for example, can take place only for those with secondary or high educational attainment (women with "low educational level" are removed from the sample as they cannot marry someone below their level). New unions among these two educational groups of women only emerged in Spain in the youngest birth cohorts.

In general, the likelihood for an individual to form a *new union* is very low, with assortative partnerships being far more common. The interaction term of education and cohort has no significant effect on the female population (see Table IV.10). Therefore, it cannot be stated that the phenomenon of women marrying downwards is increasing in the younger cohorts and more specifically, among highly educated women. Why should not the interaction effects of education and cohort have a significant effect if it is only recently that educated women are supposedly marrying downwards? The answer must be that the sample is rather small or that there is not any clear pattern across cohorts in downward marriages. I would rather support the latter idea that there is not any clear pattern across cohorts. The explanation is that, against common beliefs, women have always married downwards.[46]

Furthermore, women with secondary and high education seem to have similar probabilities of marrying downwards. The interaction effect of women's educational attainment and age is shown in Table IV.12

[46] There is a reference about the process of women's downgrading their social status through marriage in Catalonia at the beginning of the 20th century (Ferrer-Alós 1987).

Table IV.10 Transition Rate Models for Downward Partnerships: Women

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	7.13 ***	5.30 ***	0.38 ***	0.22 ***	0.24
Log(51-current age)	12.85 ***	10.77 ***	22.10 ***	11.28 ***	11.79
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	–	–	–	–	–
1930-1939	0.41 **	0.28	0.41	0.32	0.36
1940-1949	0.46 **	0.34	0.54 **	0.46	0.47
1950-1959	0.80 ***	0.82 ***	1.00 ***	0.91 ***	0.92
1960-1964	0.99 ***	0.99 ***	1.20 ***	1.08 ***	1.06
Education * age					
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	–	–	–	–	–
High education* log(current age-14)	-0.12	-0.30	-0.59 **	-1.37 ***	-1.36
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	–	–	–	–	–
High education * log(51-current age)	0.04	0.07	0.58 **	1.06 ***	1.07
Not in School[1]		1.25 ***	-1.07 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohort 1930-1939 * High education		0.19	0.03	0.13	0.05
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohort 1940-1949 * High education		0.24	0.02	0.11	0.12
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		–	–	–	–
Cohorts 1950-1959 * High education		0.09	-0.02	0.06	0.03
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary Education		–	–	–	–
Cohorts 1960-1964 * High education		0.25	0.17	0.31	0.28
Duration in school				0.00	0.00
Duration since leaving school			0.07 ***		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				0.79 ***	0.75 *
3 - 4 Years After School				1.30 ***	1.26 *
5 - 6 Years After School				1.61 ***	1.56 *
7 - 8 Years After School				1.54 ***	1.47 *
9 - 10 Years After School				1.52 ***	1.45 *
11 - 12 Years After School				1.43 ***	1.36 *
> 12 Years After School				0.87 ***	0.79 *
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			–	–	–
Primary education			-0.26 ***	-0.26 ***	-0.22 *
Secondary education			-0.47 ***	-0.46 ***	-0.40 *
High education			-0.50 **	-0.50 **	-0.42 *
Social origin					
Father 's Education = daughter's			–	–	–
Father 's Education < daughter's			0.27	0.27	0.26
Father s Education > daugther's			-0.62 ***	-0.66 ***	-0.64 *
Last region of residence					
North					0.25 *
Madrid and centre					–
Eastern					0.38 *
Southern					0.18 *
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					0.39 *
Constant	-29.37 ***	-25.58 ***	-45.09 ***	-26.74 ***	-28.26 *
Number of events	2,391	2,391	2,373	2,373	2,373
Subepisodes	85,565	85,565	85,034	19,872	85,034
-2 Log Likelihood	20,704	20,240	19,963	85,034	19,737
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level
Reference category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 * Secondary education; 3) in school; 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.
– Referece category
Data: ESD 1991.

Table IV.11. Transition Rate Models for Upward Partnerships: Men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Log(current age-14)	10.98 ***	10.94 ***	0.81 ***	0.87 ***	0.86 ***
Log(51-current age)	13.22 ***	12.78 ***	34.03 ***	34.24 ***	34.02 ***
Birth Cohorts					
1920-1929	--	--	--	--	--
1930-1939	0.39 ***	0.40 ***	0.39 **	0.38 **	0.37 **
1940-1949	1.17 ***	1.10 ***	1.06 ***	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
1950-1959	2.35 ***	2.43 ***	2.40 ***	2.29 ***	2.30 ***
1960-1964	2.95 ***	3.23 ***	3.23 ***	3.01 ***	3.03 ***
Education * age					
Primary education * log(current age-14)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(current age-14)	2.05 ***	1.46 ***	0.90 ***	0.16	0.11
Primary education * log(51-current age)	--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education * log(51-current age)	-1.63 ***	0.03	-0.08	0.20	0.20
Not in School[1]		0.66 ***	-1.13 ***		
Cohorts * Education[2]					
Cohort 1930-1939 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohort 1930-1939 * Secondary education		-0.64	-0.69 **	-0.60	-0.58
Cohort 1940-1949 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohort 1940-1949 * Secondary education		-0.72 **	-0.74 **	-0.56	-0.55
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Secondary education		-1.47 ***	-1.48 ***	-1.33 ***	-1.30 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Primary education		--	--	--	--
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Secondary education		-2.15 ***	-2.15 ***	-1.94 ***	-1.89 ***
Duration in school				0.05 ***	0.05 ***
Duration since leaving school			-0.01 **		
Years After School[3]					
1 - 2 Years After School				1.44 ***	1.44 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				1.43 ***	1.43 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1.63 ***	1.64 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1.63 ***	1.64 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1.70 ***	1.72 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				1.43 ***	1.45 ***
> 12 Years After School				0.77 ***	0.80 ***
Father's education					
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--
Primary education			0.49 ***	0.44 ***	0.40 ***
Secondary education			1.39 ***	1.39 ***	1.29 ***
High education			1.30 ***	1.33 ***	1.26 ***
Social origin					
Father 's Education = son's			--	--	--
Father 's Education < son's			0.67 ***	0.69 ***	0.67 ***
Father s Education > son's			-0.10	-0.15	-0.17
Last region of residence					
North					-0.02
Madrid and centre					--
Eastern					0.12 **
Southern					-0.04
Less than 100,000 inhab.[4]					-0.37 ***
Constant	-36.46 ***	-36.56 ***	-75.19 ***	-78.00 ***	-77.38 ***
Number of events	2,784	2,784	2,758	2,758	2,758
Subepisodes	600,898	600,898	592,884	592,884	592,884
-2 Log Likelihood	29,312	29,143	29,170	28,879	28,780
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level

Referece category: 1) in school; 2) cohort 1920-1929 * primary education; 3) in school; 4) more than 100,000 inhabitants.

-- Referece category

Data: ESD, 1991.

Table IV.12 Interaction Effect of Women's Educational Attainment and Age on the Probability of Forming Downward Partnerships: Women

Variables	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Log(current age-14)	7.13***	5.30***	0.38***	0.22***	0.24***
Log(51-current age)	12.85***	10.77***	22.10***	11.28***	11.79***
Education * age					
Secondary * log(current age-14)	--	--	--	--	--
High edu.* log(current age-14)	-0.12	-0.30	-0.59**	-1.37***	-1.36***
Secondary * log(51-current age)	--	--	--	--	--
High edu. * log(51-current age)	0.04	0.07	0.58**	1.06***	1.07***
Interaction term education * age:					
Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Young	Young	Young	Young	Young
Secondary education	7.13	5.30	0.38	0.22	0.24
High education	7.01	5.00	-0.21	-1.15	-1.12
	Mature	Mature	Mature	Mature	Mature
Secondary education	12.85	10.77	22.10	11.28	11.79
High education	12.90	10.85	22.68	12.33	12.85

Note: computed with coefficients in Table IV.10.

Family background also has a significant effect on the decision to marry downwards. Fathers with post-compulsory education negatively affect their daughters likelihood to form *new unions,* as compared with fathers with no educational qualifications (reference category in the model; see Table IV.10). These fathers might be less open to their daughters' "modern partnerships". This same negative influence emerges if fathers' education is higher than daughters' education.

The results for men also show an increase in these new unions across-cohorts (see Table IV.11). However, these unions are more typical among the low educated. Thus men with secondary education levels (high or training school) will marry homogamously or form traditional marriages rather than form *new unions*. This trend is reinforced in the youngest cohort where reaching secondary education has a significant negative effect on the probability of forming new unions. This is the main difference between women and men concerning education: attaining a certain level of education (above elementary school) has a negative effect on men's probability to form *new unions*, whereas attaining an equally high educational level has a positive effect on women's probability to form *new unions*. This is not a coincidence as

women, more often than men, have more to lose from "imbalance relationships" in which male partners have higher educational attainment or earnings potential.

The effect of father's education is different for men than it is for women. For sons, the higher the educational level of the father, the higher the likelihood that they will marry upwards. This means that having a highly educated father has a positive effect on the probability that a man will marry upwards. Moreover, the fact that sons go beyond their fathers' education also has a positive and significant effect on their likelihood of marrying upward. This means that they first overcome their social class origins via their educational attainment and, in a second stage, via their union. These cases may correspond, however, to a minority of men.

IV.5. Summary and Conclusions

I began this chapter by posing two hypotheses with regard to educational homogamy. The *industrialist hypothesis* states that individual educational attainment becomes more important than family background in partner selection. This pattern ultimately produces an increase in homogamy rates by educational groups. On the contrary, *the romantic-love hypothesis* states that educational attainment becomes less important in marriage decisions and that we should expect a decrease in educational homogamy.

The Spanish case partly supports the industrialist hypothesis. I say "partly" because, contrary to the expectations of this theory, family background and social origins still have an important effect on marriage decisions. I would then say that the Spanish marriage market is characterised by a high degree of *social closure.* The data show extremely high levels of educational homogamy in the lowest and the highest educational categories. The high degree of educational homogamy does not arise because educational attainment is more valuable, as the hypothesis implies, but because high investment in human capital still represents a "social mark". This is further reinforced by the persistent importance of family background and social origins on partner selection, above all for women.

These results may simply reflect the fact that educational expansion came about only recently (in the 1970s for higher education) and only partially affected the youngest

generations included in the study. It would be interesting to apply the same analysis to a sample with younger cohorts. Generally, there is the impression that the expansion of higher education has been tremendous. However, this perception is slightly exaggerated because while many students have had access to high education, very few have completed the courses and obtained a degree. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s the drop out rate of students from universities fluctuated, on average, between 30 and 50 per cent (Latiesa 1992).

The industrialist hypothesis, which predicts an increase in the value of individual educational attainment, also assumes that employment is based on merit. This might be one of the reasons why it can only partially explain the processes of partner selection in the Spanish context. The expansion of higher education from the 1970s coexisted with high rates of unemployment, above all for young people and women. This situation meant that a large number of jobs were, and continue to be, given on a clientelistic basis. Moreover, working parents can hardly count on state support to combine family responsibilities and paid work. The lack of assistance reinforces the traditional one-earner family model or encourages women to interrupt their careers.

In the situation described above, social class and gender (men always have better chances of promotion regardless of education) are very important factors of social stratification. People from more advantaged backgrounds tend to have better networks for finding work, regardless of their education. Men always enjoy more promotion opportunities than women. At the same time, both class and gender conceal the potential effects of educational achievement on partner selection processes, because rewards from education are not so directly or easily achieved in the labour market. Earning potential is also related to family background and/or the barriers encountered in the labour market as women or lone-parents.

Despite the high degree of educational homogamy, there are signs of change in the emergence of the so-called *new unions* in the younger generations. This is a foreseeable trend given the larger proportion of women than men in higher education. This study has also revealed that the nature of women's downward marriages has changed across the generations. In the older cohorts (born before the 1950s), and probably in rural areas, women with only an elementary education married downwards. In contrast, in the youngest generations (born after the 1950s) highly educated women are the most likely to choose this type of union. If it is true that in both generational groups (old and young cohorts) women's education was higher than men's, only in the young cohorts do new unions imply a real challenge to the patriarchal family. These educated women would most probably secure their role as

workers and mothers in equal terms with their partners, contrary to the role complementarity assumed by low-educated women.

This chapter has focused on individuals who decide to marry and has overlooked those who decide to remain single or to delay marriage. These are important aspects of the current marriage market; not only has the mean age at first union increased but so too has the sociological profile of single people. In the past, these were mainly the low educated who did not find "marriable candidates". Now, instead, they are rather individuals with secondary education or university degrees. This is also a new female strategy, as women seem to be more determined to put their economic security first rather than to invest everything in more or less stable marriages. The positive aspect of delaying marriage (to a certain extent) for women might be that they have higher probabilities of forming *assortative mating partnerships.* If it is true that individuals with equally high investment in human capital are more prone to form dual-earner families, the hypothesis empirically tested in the next chapter, *assortative mating* must be a way to guarantee women's reconciliation between their professional careers and motherhood.

If partnership selection by assortative mating seems to be a reasonable life course strategy for women, traditional marriages (i.e. men have higher earning potential) seems rather the opposite. The increase in this latter type of arrangement can partly be a structural effect given the recent educational expansion and, consequently, higher chances of upward mobility. The type of woman who would most likely choose a partner with higher education is the lowest educated. This pattern illustrates the continuity of a certain kind of family traditionalism, insofar as many women still choose to form marriages with dissimilar partners.

In short, the main feature of the Spanish marriage market is the high degree of educational homogamy. In the 1960-1964 women's birth cohort alone, 67 per cent of all constituted partnerships and 65 per cent in the same men's cohort show this trend. Highly educated women in the youngest generations, however, seem to be at the forefront of most changes. They are, for instance, less prone to form traditional marriages in which men have higher educational attainment than they do and, therefore, higher earning potentials. They might have indeed started to realise the potential conflicts which might arise in traditional partnerships. The real effect of assortative mating on women's occupational careers is illustrated by the findings in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER V

The Effect of Assortative Mating on Women's Occupational Careers

The previous chapter has illustrated the changes in the patterns of partnership formation. The main feature that emerged is the high degree of homogamy present in the Spanish marriage market at the high and low extremes of the educational structure. This chapter deals with the question of whether *assortative mating* increases the women's chances of experiencing a career parallel to that of their partners. The main hypothesis is that homogamy reduces *gender conflict* in couples' organisation of paid and unpaid work, thus allowing both breadwinners to devote equal amounts of effort to their career.

Becker's economic theory of the family (1981) predicts that wives and husbands specialise in the tasks for which they have acquired greater comparative advantages. In the past, for example, husbands would specialise in market production because their comparatively greater training and work experience represented a greater investment in human capital. In recent times, however, more women themselves have achieved high educational attainment and, consequently, they hold higher expectations for individual autonomy and professional self-realisation. Women's higher educational attainment reduces their gains from marriage making it a less attractive arrangement.

Oppenheimer (1988) suggests that while women's greater economic independence reduces gains for women who marry down -she refers to *poor quality matches* - it does not necessarily reduce the gains from marriage in general. Hence, the fundamental question to raise is what types of husbands would be most likely to guarantee equal regard for their wives' career? One hypothesis may well be that better-educated husbands are more committed to an equal gender division of labour or to flexible gender arrangements of family work than the less educated. The

analysis of attitudinal data in Chapter III, however, shows that educated men had only slightly more gender egalitarian values and roles.

It is assumed that spouses' decisions concerning work organisation are made jointly. Consequently, I include the husband or male cohabiting partner in the analysis to control for the effect of the spouses' interaction over the family cycle. The sample in this chapter consists of individuals aged 15-50, born between 1930 and the mid-1970s and observed during the rather turbulent time-period from approximately the beginning of the Spanish Dictatorship in 1940 to the democratic era of the late 1980s. The constriction of the time span is given by the data, which are from a retrospective 1991 ESD.

Given the biographical nature of the survey, not much can be learned from the youngest respondents. Birth cohorts from the baby boom of the 1960s and cohorts from the early 1970s provide the best information. Young adults emerging from these cohorts saw the implementation of the newly instituted democratic regime of the Socialist Party, and the expansion of the welfare state. They are expected to be at the forefront in the transformation of gender relations and family models in Spain.

I divide the chapter into two parts. The first part deals with the description of the statistical model based on event history analysis. This model captures the effect of assortative mating on women's occupational behaviour. In the second part I describe and discuss the main findings.

V.1. Definition of the Statistical Model

The empirical research is based on the retrospective 1991 ESD described in the introduction. In this survey, each ever-married or cohabiting woman provided information on her *male partner*. If a woman had ever had a former cohabiting experience but she eventually made her union official by a civil or religious marriage, only this last situation was recorded in the survey. Therefore, the proportion of women with previous cohabiting experience compared to that of women who directly married cannot be known. Given that these two types of paths into relationships are not discernible in the first place, those married and those in stable non-marital relationships are both considered in the analysis.

As far as the information on male partners is concerned, that which is available is far from ideal for the precise purposes of the research. There are two main shortcomings in particular. First, women were asked about the *current partners* with whom they were living at the time of the interview. Thus, divorced or separated women were not asked about former partners apart from a few figures such as dates and number of children born from these past stable relationships. Equally, women living with a second or third partner at the time of the interview only provided detailed data on this last partner, giving no information on previous partners. In this case, the analysis regarding *parallel careers* becomes rather troublesome. Second, the *current partners* are not asked to provide their own biographical data. The female participants provide second-hand information on their partners' educational attainment and position in the labour market at the time of the interview.

To overcome these shortcomings, only *women with stable partners* are included in the analysis. In this way, the detailed information available on the current partner will certainly correspond only to this first and current partner. This solution, although far from perfect, is not so problematic given the relatively low incidence of divorce and separation in Spain. Of course, one could argue that the consequence for a couple in irreconcilable parallel careers would be precisely the breakdown of their relationship. However, it is not of interest here to study family arrangements of separated career women or men, but the arrangements derived from their mutual bargaining.

The historical period covered in this analysis goes from the 1940s to 1991. The population observed are women and their male partners born after 1930 who have ever married or cohabited. The oldest people from the sample, who were 61 years old at the time of the interview, were born during the Second Republic and suffered the worst hardship of the post-civil war years. Oldest cohorts might encounter some problems recalling cardinal events of their personal histories, and the sample selection has excluded the very old generations.

V.1.1 Methods and Variables

There are *three dependent variables* (or transition probabilities) to be analysed. They indicate the probability that a married (or cohabiting) woman changes from full-time paid employment to full-time homemaker, from part-time employment to full-time homemaker and, lastly, from full-time homemaker to full-time paid employment.

Characteristics of their male partners as well as family background and contextual information (regions) have also been included in the models.

In the reconstruction of the labour force biographies from the ESD some shortcomings were found related to the questionnaire design. The section on labour force histories allows for four cycles of activity/occupation and their corresponding cycles of inactivity. However, there is significant obscurity in the way occupation has been recorded. Respondents were asked about the "date of entry into labour force" (when they started searching for a job) and the "date of entry into occupation" (when they actually found it). The following question is the "date of entry into inactivity" (when they were not actively seeking a job). However, they were not asked for the time when they left their previous occupation. Despite, this obvious drawback, for the sake of this analysis we assume they left the previous occupation. Therefore, in order to measure the spells of occupation the clock starts ticking at their entry (while married or cohabiting) into employment and it stops when they become inactive.

The method for the analysis of the discrete-time event history data is the *logit regression model*. The subject matter is the probability that an event will occur at a particular time to a particular woman given that she is at risk at that time. Thus, for the first dependent variable, is transition probability that a married woman makes a first change in her "economic status" (i.e. becoming full-time homemaker) within a particular year given that she was at risk (i.e. being in a partnership and in full-time employment). The *single event* is considered as a discrete time because we only know the year in which the transition occurs.

Original ESD data have been transformed into *person-year observations* to apply this methodology. For each individual known to be at risk a separate observational record has been created. Thus, for example, in the first model a woman who changed from full-time employment to full-time homemaker in the 3rd year would contribute 3 person-years. Right censored women will be those who have never experienced this transition during the observed period, thus contributing the maximum number of persons-years (from their 15th birthday until their 40th).

The dependent variable is coded 0 on each person-year if a woman remains at risk at that year and 1 if she changed her occupational status within this particular year. *Women have been observed from their 15th to 50th birthday.* The reason for

choosing this age-period is that these are the years of family formation in which both spouses achieve their parallel careers.

The next step is to specify the explanatory variables of the regression model on which the three above-mentioned dependent hazard rates depend. Some of them are assumed to be constant over time, like gender, and others varying over time (time-dependent) like number and age of children living in the household.

The following set of independent variables were included in the analysis:

a. Women's age and occupational history:

- *Woman's age*: Time-varying variable. I have employed nonlinear functions to model age. It has been included in the model both in a linear and in a quadratic form to test for the baseline rate over the life course (see Moen 1991).

- *Duration*: Time-dependent variable. It measures the time spent in employment or in homemaking (cumulative number of years) prior to the transition. For the first model, the duration refers to the number of years in full-time employment. The assumption is that the longer her attachment to the labour market the less probable will be her transition into a full-time homemaker. It has been grouped into four categories where women with up to one year of experience in full-time work are taken as a reference category.

- *Woman's educational attainment*: Time-varying dummy variable. It measures the highest educational level attained in a given particular year of observation. It comprises seven categories: uncompleted basic education, primary education (reference category), secondary education, vocational training, three years university degree, university degree (5 years) and doctorates or post-doctorates. See Appendix 7 for the Spanish curriculum.

- *Woman's occupational status at her last job* (or current job): Time-constant variable. It indicates the highest occupational status attained at the time when they decided to quit paid employment and become a full-time homemaker. Coded according to the SIOPS.

- *Women's job contract*: Time-constant dummy variable. It comprises six categories: permanent job (reference category), seasonal or temporary and occasionally. It is meant to measure the occupational stability.

- *Woman's occupational experience before marriage*: Dummy variable where 1= worked before marriage (reference category), and 0 otherwise. For the analysis of

entry into full-time employment the variable measures work experience prior to being a homemaker.

- *Woman in public sector*: Time-constant dummy variable (1= works in public sector, 0= otherwise). This variable represents a "women friendly" environment because of the reasonably good job protection, flexible working-times and policies for equal opportunities which characterised the public sector.

- *Marriage cohorts*: Dummy variable that measures the woman's year of marriage. This variable is meant to measure period effects.

b. Family background:

- *Father's occupational status:* ordinal variable (time-constant) representing the occupational status of the father when women were aged 16. The ESD classification of occupations has been adapted to Treiman's *Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale* (SIOPS) (1977) which provides a hierarchical ordering of occupations with respect to their social prestige. Mother's occupational status was not included because it turned out to be highly correlated with the variable "mother's main family role".

- *Mother's educational attainment:* Time-constant dummy variable. It measures the highest educational level attained by mothers when women were 16.

- *Mother's main family role:* Time-constant dummy variable where 1= mothers who had labour market experience (reference category), and 0 = mothers who were mainly full-time homemakers when women were 16.

c. Childrearing history:

- *Number of children*: Time-varying variable (number of children accumulated).

- *Presence of an infant child (aged 0-3).* Time-varying dummy variable (coded 1= child aged 0-3, or 0 otherwise). The relevance of this age category is related to the availability of publicly managed day-care facilities. In the academic course 1993-4, the coverage of publicly-funded services was only 2 per cent of children under 3 and almost 84 per cent for children aged 3-5 (European Commission Network on Childcare 1996). Compulsory schooling starts at the age of 6.

d. Partner's resources:

- *Partner's educational attainment:* Time-constant dummy variable that measures the highest educational level achieved by the partner.

- *Partner's occupational status:* Time-constant variable coded according to the SIOPS.

e. Contextual variable:

- *Region of residence* (NUT I): indicates the residence at the time of the interview (dummy variable). It comprises six large regions: *north-western* (Galícia, Asturias and Cantabria), *north-eastern* (País Vasco, Navarra, la Rioja and Aragón), *Madrid and centre* (Castilla-León, Castilla La Mancha and Extremadura), *eastern* (Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana and Baleares), *southern* (Andalucía, Murcia) and *Canarias*. See Appendix 5 for the Spanish territorial divisions.

It is important noting that we do not have time-varying information on the partner's career. However, it is presumed that partners' features in the past could have differently affected woman's occupational behaviour. For example, a husband in an early phase of career formation is expected to exert certain pressures on his wife to remain in paid-employment given his own job insecurity. In contrast, a partner with an established career may exert different pressure. Given the data restrictions, husbands' effects on women's occupational behaviour have to be explored assuming that a man with a fairly stable work career at the time of the observation had high potential stability in the past. The same applies for the next variable.

V.2. Results From the Statistical Model

Previously, it was advanced that since the mid-sixties, women have joined formal paid-employment despite its incompatibilities with motherhood, eventually withdrawing from paid work at an early age. By the mid-eighties, however, young and better-educated women, either single or married with family responsibilities, rushed into the labour force. On the whole, the male breadwinner ideology of the past was no longer sustainable. Couples who aim at pooling their resources to maximise their joint interests are expected to follow alternative strategies to overcome the constraints derived from parallel career laddering. Be that as it may, I hypothesise that young marriage cohorts will follow gender flexible roles (i.e. both partners attempt to accommodate family responsibilities in their daily life) based on the recognition of *mutual dependency* rather than on what Becker calls *contract of gendered specialisation.*

If education is highly associated with less gender asymmetry in the distribution of reproductive work, one would expect that *hypogamous couples* and *highly educated*

homogamous couples will have a more equal gender division of labour. This hypothesis shall be tested in the empirical research. As it was shown in the previous chapter, the pattern of highly educated women marrying men with lower educational attainment has only recently emerged among young cohorts (see section IV.4.3 in Chapter IV). The most common pattern is educational homogamy between partners. The high degree of homogamy raises doubts about whether these couples integrate gender role flexibilitation in their daily life. On the contrary, they may simply retain gender-specialised roles. In the next section I present the main conclusions arising from the empirical research.

V.2.1. Transition 1: Changes from Full-Time Employment to Homemaking

The main purpose of the event history models introduced here is to identify the *net effect* of husbands' career resources on wives' occupational behaviour. By husbands career resources, I mean the man's educational level and job prestige. The analytical strategy, therefore, consists of first identifying the effects of other intervening variables on women's occupational behaviour. Then, I include the partners as independent variables. The variables have been introduced as follows: (1) employment duration; (2) life course effects; (3) family background; (4) woman's education; (5) labour force characteristics; (6) childrearing biography together with the husband's educational attainment; (7) husband's occupational status; (8), all previously described independent variables are fitted together with the addition of the regions of residence.

Thus, the first model shows the log-odds of woman leaving full-time employment (to become a homemaker) associated with the employment duration (results presented Table V.1). The pattern describes that the log-odds of exiting employment increase after the first year and decrease from the fifth year onward. The probability of married women leaving full-time employment seems to be, in general, relatively low. Thus, let us imagine a synthetic cohort composed of 1,000 married women working full-time.[47] If we apply the probabilities of model 1 (i.e. the effect of time on the

[47] The synthetic or hypothetical cohort is a theoretical concept by which an indicator can be calculated for particular periods analogous to those calculate for a true cohort. In period analysis the age-specific occurrences of a given phenomenon are often cumulated as though they were observations relating to a cohort.

Table V.1. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Probability of a Married or Cohabiting Woman Change from Full-Time Paid Employment to Full-Time Homemaker

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Mode 8
Employment duration:								
< 1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2-3 years	0.6099***	0.5166***	0.5295***	0.5346***	0.1741*	0.2247**	0.2352**	0.2389**
4-5 years	0.7236***	0.639***	0.6475***	0.5888***	0.0874	0.1366	0.1185	0.109
> 5 years	-0.0693	0.8651***	0.8603***	0.6382***	-0.0185	0.0263	0.0107	0.0202
Women's age		-0.4531***	-0.4469***	-0.3685***	-0.3068***	-0.2191***	-0.2126***	-0.229***
Women's age2		0.0048***	0.0047***	0.0036***	0.0027***	0.0021***	0.002***	0.0022***
Marriage Cohorts:								
1945-1954		-1.057***	-1.036***	-1.0002***	-0.9428***	-0.8217***	-0.7977***	-0.7734***
1955-1964		--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1965-1974		0.0306	0.0362	0.0952**	0.0747*	0.0697*	0.0610	0.0359
1975-1984		-0.3251***	-0.3224***	-0.201***	-0.2715***	-0.3453***	-0.3689***	-0.426***
1985 or later		0.0694	0.0798*	0.2366***	0.0836*	-0.1634***	-0.1842***	-0.2515***
Father's occupational status			-0.0045***	-0.0017**	-0.0017**	-0.0011	-0.0015*	-0.0012
Mother's education attainment:								
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--	--	--	--
Primary education			-0.0783**	0.0604*	0.0685*	0.0026	0.0132	-0.014
Secondary education			-0.0793	0.3455**	0.4486***	0.3658**	0.3803**	0.3762**
High education			-0.5236***	-0.0427	0.0343	-0.0259	-0.0621	-0.1085
Mothers' without work experience			0.4577***	0.4686***	0.3657***	0.3379***	0.3287***	0.2419***
Women's education attainment:								
Basic Education not completed				0.0046	-0.0905***	0.0054	-0.0089	-0.0209
Primary education				--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education				-0.7292***	-0.4504***	-0.5455***	-0.5327***	-0.5765***
Vocational training				-0.4882***	-0.2433***	-0.3128***	-0.2905***	-0.271***
Three years univ. degree				-1.2174***	-0.4865***	-0.623***	-0.6141***	-0.6344***
University degree (5 years)				-1.2741***	-0.448***	-0.6686***	-0.638***	-0.6845***
Doctorates and other high.deg.				-1.7527***	-0.8417**	-1.0839***	-1.2178***	-1.2508***
Women's status last job					-0.0201***	-0.0229***	-0.0236***	-0.0229***
Women's type of job contract:								
permanent					--	--	--	--
seasonal/temporary					-0.1488***	-0.0704*	-0.0341	-0.066
ocasionally					0.0751	0.1901**	0.2115**	0.1523*
Previous work experience>marriage					0.7638***	0.5546***	0.5816***	0.5567***
Women in public administration					-0.7525***	-0.7588***	-0.7231***	-0.797***
Number of children						-0.7364***	-0.7322***	-0.7185***
Having a child < 3						0.0964**	0.1068**	-0.454***
Partner's educational attainment:								
Without formal qualifications						--		--
Primary education						0.079**		0.0624*
Secondary education						0.1164**		0.0576
High education						0.2082***		0.0616
Partner's occupational status							0.0056***	0.0011
Last region of residence								
North-western								-0.1015*
North-eastern								0.4334***
Madrid and centre								0.6158***
Eastern								--
Southern								0.4394***
Canarias								0.0381
Husband occup. status * without a child or a child <3								
Husband occup. status * a child < 3								0.0145**
Constant	-2.428 ***	5.8197 ***	5.4986***	4.3647***	4.0768***	2.9414***	2.7773***	3.023***
-2 Log likelihood	76281	66620	65190	64428	60714	58286	53044	53044
Sub-episodes	132261	132261	129787	129734	118231	117800	106727	106727

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.

-- Referece category

Note: Sample based on person-year observations (time period 1940-1990): women aged 15-50, cohorts born since 1930.

Data: ESD, 1991.

likelihood of leaving the labour force), by the end of the fifth year 669 women would remain in paid-employment (for the estimates see Appendix 10).

Earlier studies support this finding. The low exit of full-timers is basically explained by the existence of a very rigid labour market with few women in paid employment. Given the limited availability of part-time work, the possibility of a future return is not easy even if it is desired.

It should be noted that the sample of women in this first model is already a sort of "favoured group" which belongs to the so-called *dual-earner families.* It is a favoured group because the proportion of full-time homemakers in Spain is still significant, above all, among mature cohorts (as it was shown in Figure II.3). One can hypothesise that employed and married women are less exposed to the risk of becoming homemakers since they may have made an a priori decision to participate on a long term basis in the labour force, regardless of their family life. On the other hand, other women may have followed the traditional path whereby marriage or childbearing implies an exit from employment. These two models may largely correspond to the described generational break (or structural change hypothesis), whereby younger cohorts take the chief role of maintaining permanent economic independence within unmarried partnerships.

Model 2 in Table V.1 shows the period effects (marriage cohorts) on the transition into homemaking. Marriage cohorts could also be interpreted as a proxy for the generational change as it would be generally expected that different birth cohorts entered partnerships in the consecutive marriage cohorts. Indeed, the pattern is very distinctive. The reference category (marriage cohort 1955-1964) contains women who married during the period of the dictatorship's economic openness, when women started to join the labour force, at least during their single years. The following marriage cohort (1965-74) corresponds to women who had entered partnerships by the end of the dictatorship and who were also ideologically pushed to reproduce a traditional form of motherhood. This group did not appear to have a significant effect on the transition. This is probably due to the similar effect this group has compared with the reference category. Women forming partnerships from 1975 onwards, however, were less likely to become homemakers. This pattern emerges clearly even after controlling for all the covariates included in model 8.

Women who married at the beginning of the democratic regime, that is after 1975, are within the population that enjoyed the impressive expansion of higher education

(as illustrated in Figure IV.1). Thus, for those women who got married from 1985 onwards the log-odds of becoming homemaker significantly decreases by -0.2515 when compared to women who married at the height of dictatorship (1955-1964).

The log-odds of the older marriage cohort (1945-1954) also show that older women were less likely than both the reference category and younger cohorts to withdraw from employment. This is simply due to the specific period effect of impoverishment that characterised the post-civil war years. At that time, married women at work had no other option but to be a family provider. A traditional marriage with a woman specialising in caregiving and household chores was not an option for most families, especially those deriving their living from agriculture, which was the major productive sector. This observation may appear to contradict Figure II.2, which showed the low activity rates of married women. The difference is due to the fact that for Figure II.2, female participation was based on aggregated data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey. In this model, we have only a sub-sample of "selected women" who are married and employed in full-time work.

The effect of age in the transition to homemaking appears to operate as if the likelihood of exit initially declines as a woman's age increases. This pattern continues until women reach a threshold-age sometime between 45 and 50, when the likelihood slightly increases. Therefore, younger women seem to be more at risk for leaving work until certain maturity, let's say at their 30th year of full-time employment, when the risk of leaving begins to decline.

Model 3 in Table V.1 incorporates the woman's family background. The assumption is that women's occupational behaviour may respond to the values, or social capital, inherited from the family of origin. Indeed, this seems to be the case in model 3. The higher the occupational prestige of the father the less likely women are to withdraw from full-time employment. Equally, the education of the mother also corresponds to a neat pattern, whereby the higher the mother is educated the stronger the attachment of the daughter to the labour force. It follows, then, that working-class families (a combination of low occupational prestige and low educational attainment) probably transmit more traditional gender roles to their daughters than do middle-class parents with university degrees.

It should be stressed, however, that the effect of the family background on the daughters transition into the homemaker role seems to be suppressed (i.e. becomes not significant) once we introduce the respondent's own education into the model. In

this case, women with greater human capital investments have greater professional expectations regardless of their family background.

An exception to the influence of the family of origin emerges with the variable of the "mother's main family role" which is statistically significant even after controlling for woman's own educational level. Having a homemaker mother is associated with an increase of .2419 in the log-odds of becoming a homemaker (model 8). From this result, it can be stated that mothers seem to play a more significant role than the fathers in transferring values of individual self-fulfilment to their daughters. This pattern remains when other variables are included in the consecutive models.

Next, model 4 in Table V.1 shows that women's education appears to be a strong and significant predictor of the probability of leaving full-time employment to become homemaker: the higher the educational attainment the lower the likelihood to quit employment. The same effect occurs in regard to the occupational prestige at the last job (in model 5, Table V.1): the likelihood to leave employment decreases as the prestige increases. Therefore, highly educated women secure their attachment to the labour force regardless of family life, because even after controlling for their childbearing biography (in model 6, Table V.1) education still has a significant influence in the transition. This result is illustrated in Figure V.1 which presents the difference in the predicted probability of becoming homemakers for women of the marriage cohort 1975-84 who differ in their educational levels and occupational prestige.

It is quite revealing that women in low prestige jobs, such as the labourer in Figure V.1, are more likely to become homemakers. The differentiated propensity for becoming homemakers by occupational groups can be explained not only by the differentiated rewards obtained from their job, but also because low-wage earning women are more restricted economically in their options to use private means to reconcile full-time employment and childcare. Equally, the fact that less-educated women are more likely to be engaged in occasional work contracts (i.e. the most precarious form of work) may further discourage them from remaining in paid employment. Indeed, women with occasional contracts are more likely to withdraw from employment than women with permanent contracts.

Figure V.1. Probability of Experiencing a Transition from Full-Time Employment to Homemaking (Married or Cohabiting Women)



Note: graph displays predicted values as estimated from the equation of model 7 of the logistic regression (Table V.1). Labourer corresponds to unit 19 and dentist to the unit 70 of Treiman's (1975) scheme.

Hence, features attributed to the labour supply seem to matter a lot in explaining the transitions of married or cohabiting women from employment to the homemaking role. This is best exemplified by the fact that the public sector employment has a systematic and significant negative effect. Thus, for women working in the public sector the odds ratio of experiencing a transition to homemaker decreases by 55 per cent.[48] Indeed, the female share of jobs in the public sector has grown in recent years from 29 percent to 42 percent between 1983-1992. This reflects the general recognition that this sector offers fairly good working conditions and, is therefore attractive to educated women (Moltó 1992).

Work experience prior to marriage, contrary to expectations, seems to have a significant and positive effect on the log-odds of the transition. This may be

[48] Since (exp(-0.7977)-1)x100%=54.96%.

attributed to the fact that women with greater working experience expect an easier re-entry than do women who only worked after marriage and, therefore, have shorter professional careers and less secure positions as workers.

Model 6 in Table V.1 introduces the woman's childbearing biography. The pattern that emerges is that the presence of children undoubtedly exerts a significant effect, but in different directions. On the one hand, an increase in the number of children decreases the probability of leaving employment, possibly due to greater financial needs. It may also be the case that in large families domestic chores are distributed among relatives, thereby freeing the mother to work. On the other hand, the presence of an infant child (aged 0-3) slightly increases the likelihood of becoming a homemaker.

The effect of small children, however, changes after controlling for regions of residence. With region accounted for, the presence of an infant child reduces significantly the probability of abandoning full-time employment. This may be interpreted, by the fact that different regions may encourage or discourage different occupational strategies to manage work and family. Regional inequalities in female activity rates are illustrated in Figure II.4. It may also be explained by the fact mentioned above that women in this sample are a unique groups. That is, this sample includes women who are full-time employees, despite being married and burdened with family responsibilities. They are of the group that that broke with the old model of the patriarchal family.

Moltó (1994), for instance, argues that the beginning of the 1980s marked a crucial change in the traditional pattern of employment. During these years, women made family and working life compatible for the first time. It should be added that compatibility depends very much on the occupational position of the women and on the availability of family networks to support child-care. Adam (1997) sustains similar arguments in support of the structural change hypothesis, which differentiates between the long-term participating mothers who do not want to lose human capital investments associated with absences from the labour force, and the *a priori* inactive mothers.

Now, how do these transitions work when we consider the influence of the husbands? The pattern that emerges is that the spouse's resources have a significant and positive effect on the woman's exit from full-time employment. In the case of the husband's education, the estimate odds of becoming homemaker are 14 per cent

higher if she marries a man with a university degree than if she married a man who only had primary school education.[49] The same conclusion arises when the husband's occupational prestige is included (model 7 in Table V.1), here the likelihood of becoming a homemaker increases as husband's prestige at work increases.

The result described above seems to be in line with Becker's (1981) theory of the marriage market, which predicts that individual members of the family make decisions in order to maximise the joint family utility. The maximising strategy implies that the person obtaining higher returns from market production specialises wholly in market work, whereas the other specialises in domestic production. But, in this case, who are the women who - as it was argued above - break with the traditional gender asymmetrical family model?

Figure V.2 summarises the various interactions that take place in the determination of married women's exit from full-time employment. To simplify the picture slightly, one could say that different groups of women enter partnerships based on different *gender contracts*. Thus, highly educated women secure a *good quality match* by marrying highly educated men, in which case they would probably reproduce a permanent *dual-breadwinner family model*. On the other hand, if the husband has higher occupational prestige, this unequal set of conditions drives the wife into caring work within the family as expected in *housewife marriage* model. In these relationships both spouses quite probably hold unequal bargaining power to decide their work organisation and, therefore, women have less alternatives to pursue a career outside the family. However, also low-educated woman who marries the low-prestige worker faces a high likelihood of reproducing the "housewife marriage".

The result obtained reinforces the idea that education stands as a good indicator of non-traditional attitudes towards family models and occupational behaviour. Castro (1992) found similar results with regard to differences in fertility among educational groups: 80 per cent of women with no education gave birth soon after marriage (two years later) as compared with 57 per cent among women with a college degree.

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[49] Odds ratio associated with the coefficient of husband with university degree is (exp(0.2082)-1)x100%=23%, whereas with primary school education it is (exp(0.079)-1)x100%=8%.

Figure V.2. Models of Gender Contracts in Partnerships: Transitions from Full Time Employment to Homemaking (Married or Cohabiting Women)



Note: graph displays predicted values as estimated from the equation of the seventh model of the logistic regression (Table V.1). For the couple with both members having a high occupational prestige the unit number 70 of Treiman's (1975) scheme has been used (wife's education: university degree), for the couple, low prestige, unit 28 (wife's education: primary school) and for the couple where the husband has higher prestige than wife's unit 70 for him and 24 for her (also with primary school) have been used.

In model 8 (Table V.1), an interaction term has been introduced between the husband's occupational status and the presence of an infant child. This interaction turns out to be positive and statistically significant, which means that having a husband in an upwardly mobile career trajectory and a small child increases the likelihood that a wife may abandon full-time employment. In other words, wives support their husbands' careers while helping them, or allowing them, to "enjoy fatherhood".

Lastly, regional effects are shown as well in model 8. It should be stressed that almost all regions exert a significant effect. The influence of living in the north-western region, however, is particularly different: there the probability of leaving employment is greater than in the eastern region. This pattern can be explained by the large share of female employment in small family agricultural holdings, such as those found in Galicia, Asturias and Cantabria.

Variations at the regional level may also come from cultural differences in the approach to work and the family, as well as varying economic constraints associated with labour supply. Finally, regions differ in family assistance of infrastructures such as day-care centres. The report on the European Commission Network on Childcare (1996), for instance, reveals significant regional differences in public services for childcare. Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque Country offer 10 per cent coverage (public and private) for children aged 2, whereas in other autonomous communities the coverage is less than 2 per cent.

V.2.1.1. The Effect of Couples' Educational Match on Women's Likelihood of Leaving Employment

Next, the effect of the type of couples' educational match (assortative, downward or upward) is directly tested. Figure V.2 shows predicted values as estimated from the equation using various combinations of women's and men' occupational statuses considering that they had one child. The goal now is to separate the effects that the partner's characteristics may have from the effects that might be caused by the particular way in which these characteristics are paired.

A new independent variable has been included in Table V.2: *women's type of partnership*. It consists of the women's and men's educational match. The educational mobility is established according to the women's change of status through the formation of the partnership: ascending, descending or remaining at the same level of the partner (see Table IV.2). There is only one methodological shortcoming concerning the construction of this variable. The women's educational attainment is a time-varying variable, whereas the type of partnership has to be constructed as a time-constant variable. The reason is that the partners' education is provided only for the highest educational level achieved at the time of the interview. A more sophisticated analysis shall be made in a future research to allow the use of a time varying variable on the couples' educational match.

The main finding is that the women's type of partnership has different effects according to the women's stage throughout their life course, as will be shown later in this section. In model 1 (Table V.2) the type of partnership has a significant effect on the likelihood that a woman will withdraw from a full-time paid employment. In

particular, partnerships in which women marry upwards have the lowest likelihood of withdrawal, as compared with women in downward partnerships.

It is an interesting fact that women in downward partnerships - a union labelled as the *new union* because of the supposed implications for breaking asymmetrical gender roles - have the strongest likelihood of dropping full-time employment. The reason being that educational expansion has led more women to marry downwards, though these women have mostly secondary education rather than higher education. Then, it might well be the case that a woman with a secondary education who marries a man with only a primary education will have a similar or even a lower social prestige than their husband in the market place. This means that it is not really appropriate to refer to a 'new union', since it does not seem to imply a real break of traditional gender roles and therefore, the proneness of dropping employment is similar to that of women in a more traditional setting, such as the upward marriage.

In model 2 (Table V.2) the effect of marrying upwards is lower once we control for the women's own educational attainment. In this model the likelihood to withdraw from full-time employment is lower for women in upward and homogamous partnerships as compared with women in downward partnerships (reference category).

The most interesting finding, however, is related to the effect of the type of partnerships in the presence of children. This is captured by the interaction effect of women's types of partnership and the presence of children under 3. The effect is summarised in Figure V.3 (see also Table V.1a). In the case of women having an infant child, these women in homogamous partnerships have the lowest likelihood of dropping full-time paid employment to become homemakers. Thus, the comparison between the effect of the types of partnership with and without the presence of a child under 3 years old indicates that it is during childbearing that the couple's educational match becomes more relevant determining the organisation of paid and care work in the family.

Table V.2. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Probability of a Married or Cohabiting Woman Change from Full-Time Paid Employment to Full-Time Homemaker: Testing the Effect of the Type of Partnership

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Employment duration:				
< 1	--	--	--	--
2-3 years	0.5209 ***	0.5324 ***	0.4947 ***	0.2196 ***
4-5 years	0.6288 ***	0.5856 ***	0.5051 ***	0.1240 *
> 5 years	0.8212 ***	0.6320 ***	0.5133 ***	0.0072 ns
Women's age	-0.4440 ***	-0.3711 ***	-0.2680 ***	-0.2167 ***
Women's age2	0.0046 ***	0.0036 ***	0.0027 ***	0.0021 ***
Marriage Cohorts:				
1945-1954	-1.0289 ***	-0.9991 ***	-0.8770 ***	-0.8211 ***
1955-1964	--	--	--	--
1965-1974	0.0329 ns	0.0848 ***	0.0977 ***	0.0751 **
1975-1984	-0.3187 ***	-0.2145 ***	-0.2586 ***	-0.3322 ***
1985 or later	0.1050 ***	0.2261 ***	0.0101 ns	-0.1393 ***
Father's occupational status	-0.0048 ***	-0.0017 ***	-0.0014 **	-0.0008 ns
Mothers' without work experience	0.4573 ***	0.4564 ***	0.4250 ***	0.3339 ***
Women's type of partnership				
Downward partnership	--	--		
Upward partnership	-0.5583 ***	-0.1714 ***	0.1761 ***	0.2484 ***
Homogamous partnership	-0.1246 ***	-0.1285 ***	0.2270 ***	0.2182 ***
Women's education attainment:				
Basic Education not completed		0.0023 ns	0.0965 ***	-0.0068 ns
Primary education		--	--	--
Secondary education		-0.7331 ***	-0.8162 ***	-0.5196 ***
Vocational training		-0.4493 ***	-0.5456 ***	-0.2727 ***
Three years univ. degree		-1.1510 ***	-1.3062 ***	-0.5233 ***
University degree (5 years)		-1.2006 ***	-1.4433 ***	-0.5382 ***
Doctorates and other high.deg.		-1.6715 ***	-1.9137 ***	-0.9424 ***
Number of children			-0.7318 ***	-0.7356 ***
Having a child < 3			0.6129 ***	0.6785 ***
Downward partnership * having a child < 3			--	--
Upward partnership * having a child < 3			-0.3472 ***	-0.3740 ***
Homogamous partnership * having a child < 3			-0.6390 ***	-0.6811 ***
Women's status last job				-0.0226 ***
Women's type of job contract:				
continuous				--
seasonal/temporary				-0.0736 **
ocasionally				0.1852 ***
Previous work experience>marriage				0.5650 ***
Women in public administration				-0.7554 ***
Constant	5.6016 ***	4.5484 ***	2.8232 ***	2.7644 ***
-2 Log likelihood	65116	64486	62005	58432
Sub-episodes	118588	118588	118588	107391
Events	11125	11125	11125	10793

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.

-- Referece category

Note: Sample based on person-year observations (time period 1940-1990): women aged 15-50, cohorts born since 1930.

Data: ESD, 1991.

Figure V.3. The Effect of Women's Type of Partnership on the Transition from Full Time Employment to Homemaker (controlling for covariates of model 4)



Source: Appendix 11.

V.2.2. Transition 2: Changes from Part-Time Employment to Homemaking

The proportion of women employed in part-time jobs is relatively small. As mentioned earlier, it comprised only 6.8 per cent of the working female population in 1980 and 15.9 per cent in 1996. Data can only capture those transitions from part-time employment to homemaking that took place prior to 1991. A similar analytical strategy used in the study of first transition (gradual inclusion of independent variables) has been followed for a sub-sample of part-time married or cohabiting women (see Table V.3).

For this group of women it emerges that the older and younger marriage cohorts were significantly less likely to withdraw from part-time jobs to become homemakers than was the 1955-64 marriage cohort, which is the reference category (see model 2 in Table V.3). However, once we control for the husband's education and the region of residence in model 8 (Table V.3), marriage cohorts lose statistical significance. It seems that the elements associated with continuing in a part-time job are having a university degree, having had a working mother, and having relatively more children.

Table V.3. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Probability of a Married or United Woman Change from Part-Time Employment to Full-Time Homemaker

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Mod 8
Employment duration:								
< 1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2-3 years	0.6027***	0.5663***	0.5784***	0.5793***	0.1948	0.2045	0.2465	0.243
4-5 years	0.4927***	0.3414**	0.3673**	0.3632**	-0.2417	-0.2544	-0.2554	-0.264
> 5 years	-0.0061	0.648***	0.6679***	0.6577***	-0.1151	-0.1257	-0.1621	-0.165
Women's age		-0.5065***	-0.5085***	-0.4988***	-0.4687***	-0.3627***	-0.3559***	-0.357
Women's age2		0.0059***	0.006***	0.0058***	0.0056***	0.0045***	0.0044***	0.004
Marriage Cohorts:								
1945-1954		-0.7059***	-0.6539***	-0.6241***	-0.6739***	-0.5887***	-0.5074**	-0.439
1955-1964		--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1965-1974		0.0589	0.0727	0.0386	0.0590	0.0851	0.0802	0.062
1975-1984		-0.0167	-0.0345	-0.0646	-0.0012	-0.0462	-0.0375	-0.118
1985 or later		0.5404***	0.5277***	0.4905***	0.4832***	0.2891*	0.2779*	0.157
Father's occupational status			0.0004	0.0008	0.0024	0.0018	0.0028	0.002
Mother's education attainment:								
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--	--	--	--
Primary education			0.0864	0.0780	0.0735	0.0173	0.0253	-0.028
Secondary education			-0.0357	0.2073	0.1294	-0.1013	-0.0138	-0.117
High education			-0.4790	-0.2840	-0.1403	-0.1654	-0.0843	-0.135
Mother's without work experience			0.1929**	0.2122**	0.2604**	0.2404**	0.2348**	0.189
Women's education attainment:								
Basic education not-completed				-0.2174**	-0.1612*	-0.0291	-0.0906	-0.080
Primary education				--	--	--	--	--
Secondary education				-0.0386	-0.0780	-0.2011	-0.1337	-0.143
Vocational training				-0.0102	-0.0939	-0.1632	-0.1000	-0.108
Three years univ. degree				-0.2686	-0.1930	-0.3713	-0.3141	-0.393
University degree (5 years)				-0.8109***	-0.8595**	-1.1557***	-1.0343***	-1.102
Doctorates and other high.deg.				-1.5421*	-1.4265	-1.7366*	-1.6025*	-1.834
Women's status last job					0.0055	0.0016	-0.0005	-0.001
Women's type of job contract:								
permanent					--	--	--	--
seasonal/temporary					0.2892***	0.2964***	0.2762**	0.324
ocasionally					0.1004	0.1299	0.1233	0.112
Previous work experience>marriage					1.0635***	0.8783***	0.8425***	0.892
Women in public administration					-0.3863*	-0.3379*	-0.3395	-0.380
Number of children						-0.516***	-0.5136***	-0.523
Having a child < 3						-0.221*	-0.1739	-0.519
Partner's educational attainment:								
Without formal qualifications						--		--
Primary education						0.1911*		0.249
Secondary education						0.1644		0.200
High education						0.4115*		0.437
Partner's occupational status							0.0043	-0.000
Last region of residence								
North-western								0.252
North-eastern								0.402
Madrid and centre								0.624
Eastern								--
Southern								0.532
Canarias								0.398
Husband occup. status * child<3								0.009
Constant	-2.6205***	6.295***	6.1331***	6.0833***	4.8281***	3.5785***	3.5247***	3.292
-2 Log likelihood	10561	9099	8920634	8882	7562	7287	8070	6570
Sub-episodes	19964	19964	19524	19520	16288	16197	14417	1438

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.

-- Referece category

Note: Sample based on person-year observations (time period 1940-1990): women aged 15-50, cohorts born since 1930.

Data: ESD, 1991.

The fact that women in part-time work are given temporary contracts also significantly increases the likelihood of becoming homemakers by almost 38 per cent. Of course, part-time contracts on an occasional or temporary basis are certainly the most precarious working arrangements. By contrast, women in public sector employment are less prone to abandon part-time work (see model 5 in Table V.3).

The effect of male partners, whether married or cohabiting, seems to reflect the pattern previously described. Model 6 estimates that a woman working part-time who marries a man with a university degree is 30 per cent more likely to withdraw from the labour force than if the man only had a primary education.

V.2.3. Transition 3: Changes from Homemaking to Full-Time Employment

As it was hypothesised before, there is a distinct division between those female workers with a permanent attachment to the labour force and those with truncated labour force biographies. For the most part, these latter women experience the type of transition discussed here.

According to the ESD data, only 15 per cent of women in the 1956-60 birth cohort ever returned to the labour force after the first interruption. In the younger 1961-65 cohort, the proportion slightly increased with 24 per cent returning. In the case of men from the same birth cohorts, who usually exit the labour force to complete compulsory military service, as many as 90 per cent had returned by the age of 24.

The first model (see Table V.4) provides information about the influence of the time women spent as homemakers in their transition to employment. The pattern that emerges is very clear: the longer they worked as homemakers the more difficult or unlikely was a transition to full-time employment. It should be stressed, however, that the probability of entering or returning to full-time employment is generally relatively low, although it has grown significantly for the younger marriage cohorts (see Figure V.4). Moltó (1995), for instance, states that the exclusion of housewives from the economically active population in Spain has a structural explanation.

Table V.4. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Probability of a Married or United Woman Change from Homemaking to Full-Time Employment

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Time in full-time homemaking:							
< 1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2-3 years	0.3106***	0.3864***	0.3942***	0.4179***	0.538***	0.5974***	0.5872***
4-5 years	-0.0137	0.1457	0.1722*	0.2209**	0.2988***	0.3678***	0.353***
> 5 years	-0.5018***	0.0045	0.0374	0.1572*	0.1099	0.195*	0.1759*
Women's age		0.0136	0.0074	-0.0311	-0.0428	-0.0370	-0.0296
Women's age2		-0.0003	-0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001
Marriage Cohorts:							
1945-1954		-0.1775	-0.1470	-0.1352	-0.1818	-0.0796	-0.0963
1955-1964		--	--	--	--	--	--
1965-1974		0.5446***	0.5178***	0.484***	0.4531***	0.4675***	0.4591***
1975-1984		1.0425***	1.0102***	0.8793***	0.87***	0.9149***	0.9198***
1985 or later		1.6537***	1.6055***	1.4063***	1.4086***	1.4735***	1.4835***
Father's occupational status			0.0058***	0.0021	0.0016	0.0009	0.0003
Mother's education attainment:							
Without formal qualifications			--	--	--	--	--
Primary education			0.1689***	0.0133	-0.0111	0.0132	0.0156
Secondary Education			0.3745*	-0.0694	-0.0514	-0.0117	0.0162
High education			0.3959*	-0.1269	-0.1107	-0.1379	-0.0999
Mother's without work experience			-0.368***	-0.3593***	-0.3434***	-0.3579***	-0.2911***
Women's education attainment:							
Basic Education not-completed				-0.1423**	-0.1259*	-0.2164***	-0.1769**
Primary education				--	--	--	--
Secondary education				0.4129***	0.4326***	0.4253***	0.4327***
Vocational Training				0.686***	0.6855***	0.692***	0.6698***
Three Years Univ. Degree				1.2108***	1.2597***	1.2797***	1.3263***
University Degree (5 years)				1.1879***	1.2943***	1.2897***	1.3311***
Doctorates and other high.deg.				1.6454***	1.7575***	1.679***	1.7298***
Previous work experience					0.0931*	0.0848	0.0544
Number of children					0.1515***	0.1393***	0.1445***
Having a child < 3					-0.4636***	-0.4923***	-0.7154***
Partner's educational attainment:							
Without formal qualifications					--		--
Primary education					0.1435**		0.153**
Secondary education					0.1010		0.1364
High education					0.0288		0.1004
Partner's occupational status						-0.0039*	-0.0073**
Last region of residence							
North-western							-0.2226**
North-eastern							-0.55***
Madrid and centre							-0.6019***
Eastern							--
Southern							-0.4056***
Canarias							-0.259*
Husband occup. status * child<3							0.0060
Constant	-4.646***	-5.7226***	-5.5023***	-4.793***	-4.4997***	-4.3551***	-4.1806***
-2 Log likelihood	30576.86	29958.63	30284.55	29043.77	28874.67	25871.30	25871.30
Sub-episodes	362625	362625	362625	355582	354308	305254	305254

* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.

-- Referece category

Note: Sample based on person-year observations (time period 1940-1990): women aged 15-50, cohorts born since 1930.

Data: ESD, 1991.

Figure V.4. Marriage Cohorts Effects on the Transition from Homemaker to Full Time Employment (Controlling for Covariates of Model 7)



Note: Odds ratios from model 7 in Table V.4. For the sake of simplicity only the logistic regression coefficients (*b*), instead of the odds ratio (Exp(*b*)), have been included in the table.

In this sample, the patterns of entry into employment after homemaking for the various marriage cohorts are as follows: supposing a synthetic cohort (married between 1965-1974) consisting of 100 female homemakers, by the end of the fifth year only 13 women would have entered or returned to full-time employment. For the following marriage cohort (1975-1984) the proportion would have grown to 20 and for the youngest cohort (married from 1985 onwards), 33 women would have assumed full-time employment.[50] This is not a large proportion, though the traditional model of not returning at all seems to be gradually changing.

Who are the women most likely to experience a transition from homemaking to full-time employment? Again, educational attainment seems to be a strong and significant predictor of the future integration of women in the labour force (see Figure V.5).

[50] Probabilities estimated from coefficients in model 7 (Table V.4) and interpreted with the logic of a life table.

Figure V.5. Women's Education Effects on the Transition from Homemaker to Full Time Employment (Controlling for the Covariates in Model 7)



Note: Odds ratios estimated from model 7 in Table V.4.

As happened in the case of women who exited full-time employment, mother's education has a significant positive effect. In other words, having a highly educated mother increases the log-odds of women entering the labour force. This effect drops out as soon as we control for the effect of women's own education. This reveals that it is the woman's own education which most determines her labour force biography, regardless of the presumed social capital inherited from the family of origin. Interestingly enough, however, if the mother performed a traditional homemaker role her daughter would be more likely to reproduce this family model. This effect remains even after controlling for women's family characteristics or other labour market features.

Furthermore, if previous work experience also increases the likelihood of entering full-time employment. This effect, however, drops out when we control for the presence of children and husband's occupational status.

The influence of childbearing on female homemakers is twofold. On the one hand, an increase in the number of children increases the likelihood that a woman will enter full-time employment. However, the probability grows very slowly as the number of

children increases, and large families are rare in Spain anyway.[51] On the other hand, model 7 demonstrates that the presence of an infant child seems to discourage women from entering employment, even after controlling for the geographical context (see Table V.4). Therefore, the presence of small children clearly prevents women who are already out of the labour force from entering into paid-employment.

Finally, how do male partners influence their wives' transition into full-time employment? Partner's education turns out to be insignificant in all educational categories except primary school. Being married to a man with only a primary school education significantly increases the log-odds of entry into full-time employment compared to women whose husbands have advanced degrees. Furthermore, an increase in the occupational prestige of the husband significantly decreases the wife's likelihood of abandoning homemaking. For instance, if a homemaker is married to a sanitary officer her likelihood of entering full-time employment decreases by 30 per cent. If later on the husband is promoted to an official dentist her likelihood will have decreased by almost 40 per cent.

V.3. Discussion and Last Remarks

This chapter has dealt with the question of whether forming *assortative mating* partnerships has a positive effect on women's occupational careers and, in particular, improves their chances of sustaining *parallel careers*. Highly educated partners were expected to have a positive effect as they were associated with a higher degree of commitment to gender egalitarian division of labour. The results show that marrying a highly educated man does not necessarily guarantees greater role compatibility or an enhanced capacity to sustain a parallel career. The main findings are summarised in the following section.

If the husband has much higher labour market resources (i.e. educational attainment or occupational status) than the wife, the couple tends to settle into complementary gender roles where the wife carries the main bulk of domestic work and childrearing

[51] The predicted probability of a woman for the younger marriage cohort (1985 onwards) entering full-time employment while having from 1 to 3 children only changes from 7 to 9 per cent as estimated from the equation in model 7 holding constant all covariates (Table V.4).

while supporting their husbands' careers. In the case of these partnerships, Becker's comparative advantage rationale seems to be at work. This comparative advantage reasoning presumably explains the gender roles within heterogeneous partnerships. However, my research has also shown that even *working-class homogamous partnerships* tend to perform gender role specialisation. That is to say, in these partnerships wives are more likely to withdraw from the labour force than wives in *middle-class homogamous partnerships*. The term of class was estimated by a proxy variable consisting of the spouses' occupational prestige. These differences were illustrated in Figure V.2.

The gender specialisation among *partners with similarly low earning potentials* cannot be easily explained by the economic theory of marriage. In principle, there should not be a rational calculation that justifies women's specialisation in home production. The only explanation has to be found in the labour market characteristics and the fact, not acknowledged by Becker, that in equal conditions women will always face some degree of discrimination in the labour market and, possibly, at home. Women's limited opportunities are, moreover, accentuated within the category of workers with low occupational prestige. In this case, gender specialisation has to be understood as the result of *wives' constrained choices* rather than the formation of an efficient division of labour within the family.

I also hypothesised that highly educated women could avoid gender asymmetrical relationships by making *a good quality match,* that is, by marrying individuals with their same earning potential. In this way, they have no reason to compete in the allocation of time, and women are less exposed to the high opportunity costs of having to leave paid employment after high investments in human capital. For this specific category of highly educated women, the likelihood of abandoning full-time employment is relatively low, and in case of an early exit from the labour force, the return tends to be invariably high regardless of the husbands' educational attainment. Therefore, male partners do not exert a negative effect on their wives' occupational career. This means that the rise in wives' earnings potentials do not reduce their gains from marriage, as specified by Becker. Therefore, they can secure a satisfactory marital match - using Oppenheimer's (1988) terminology - through an assortative partnership.

In this research the significant negative effect that precarious forms of employment have on women's decision to abandon paid-employment is also evident. Labour market rigidity has an additional negative effect. This rigidity refers to the barriers to women's continuous entries and exits from the labour force. These flows are

common for married women in many other northern European states. In Spain, however, relatively few women enter or return to employment after periods of homemaking.

This study has shown that large proportions of homemakers become structural outsiders to the labour force. The low rate of return to employment is typical even among young marriage cohorts. Moreover, only women with high labour market resources enjoy a high probability of remaining at work.

This chapter has shown that the probability that married or cohabiting women will remain in full-time employment varies markedly according to their own occupational prestige, regardless of their partners' characteristics. These differences indicate an enormous polarisation among employed women whereby only those with high human capital investment seem to be able to minimise the effect of motherhood on their employment patterns. Women with high levels of human capital manage to return to the labour market after interruptions.

There are still some pending questions regarding to the effect of family formation on women's careers. For instance, it remains puzzling whether highly educated women living with a partner, and possibly children, have career prospects similar to their single counterparts. Another important question arises from the evidence that the greater a woman's educational attainment, the older her age at first marriage or cohabitation. It is still not clear whether this delay eventually brings some reward in terms of career outputs for the "waiting time". These questions are the concern of this following last empirical chapter.

CHAPTER VI

Differences in Career Advancement between Married and Single Women

Previous chapters have examined processes of partner selection and the effect of family background, labour force situation, and individual achieved features on the structuring of women's early labour force biographies. This chapter focuses on women's occupational mobility. In particular, it deals with *upward mobility*, an investigation that will neatly mirror the difficulties married women face in reconciling family life with occupational mobility.

The core of the question is the following: do single-working women enjoy greater chances for upward occupational mobility than do their married or cohabiting counterparts? Answering to that question entails a comparative study on the differences in career advancement between women without family responsibilities and women who, at some point in their life, decide to form a partnership and, possibly, have children. In short, the main purpose of the chapter is to investigate the extent to which the process of family formation affects women's occupational mobility. We will look for these negative effects by comparing the rates of upward shifts in occupational status of married and single women.

The chapter also intends to explore whether certain features of the family composition present particular obstacles to acquiring higher positions in the occupational structure. It could be hypothesised that it is not the family itself which causes a negative impact on a woman's career, but rather the nature of the partnership. By nature of the partnership I refer to whether or not the partners are matched for education. It is presumed that women in assortative partnerships have more negotiating power regarding unpaid work and caring obligations than do

women who have less education than theirs partners. Therefore, a woman in a "good quality match" - borrowing Oppenheimer's expression (1988) - may enjoy more egalitarian arrangements at home, and the effect of the family on her career achievements might be negligible. In this case, the career trajectories of married women might resemble those of single women.

The study of women's upward mobility in Spain has to be understood within the context of rather low levels of female labour force participation compared to other EU states. In 1991 the employment rate for women aged 20-39 was 39 per cent, a figure far below the European average of 59 per cent (Eurostat 1991). This low level of participation, however, contrasts with the fact that there is a high proportion of women who never take a long break from their occupational career. These two opposite career profiles, where a large proportion of women withdraw while a few remain permanently, are peculiar to Southern European states. The contrary happens in other states where women experience long interruptions, sometimes coinciding with motherhood. This is the case in Northern countries (Rubery, Fagan & Smith 1994). Chapter V already revealed some of the factors which determine women's decision to remain in full-time paid employment. These included achieving a minimum level of education and gaining access to regular and stable paid employment.

The low number of women who participate in the labour force and, furthermore, perform continuous careers suggests two different scenarios. On the one hand, they may compose a unique group of women who are determined to work and are not easily influenced by family demands. They may even seek to adapt their family life (e.g. number of children) to the requirements imposed by their working life. In other words, family obligations would not determine their occupational achievement, once they had achieved a high degree of labour force attachment. On the other hand, if women anticipate that family responsibilities would have a negative impact on their career, they might tend to avoid or postpone responsibilities as far as possible or, at least, up to the moment they have consolidated their position in the labour market. Consequently, singlehood or late entrance into a partnership would be associated with higher rates of women's upward shift.

To investigate whether variation in the family formation of married or single women under the age of 35 affects their career achievements, several logistic regression models have been estimated. The statistical analysis is based on data from the 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey. The chapter begins by introducing the debate on the formation of continuous careers according to the women's marital status. It

continues with the description of the sample, the statistical method, and the variables included in the empirical analysis.

VI. 1. Relationship between Women's Marital Status and the Formation of Continuous Occupational Careers

There is a growing tendency among European women to remain single for a longer period of time, especially among highly educated women in Spain (Blossfeld 1996). As singlehood becomes a legitimate status for adult individuals, as it used to be in the recent past, more women tend to postpone the age at which they enter their first union. Several reasons lay behind this trend, although most authors refer to material constraints (i.e. employment shortage and precarious jobs) combined with the lack of state support for young adults to leave the parental home (Jurado 2001). Furthermore, emerging values of social individualism, also encourage the trend towards prolonged singlehood.

There is a relevant question regarding that prolonged status of singlehood: is the delay of the first union accordingly rewarded by better outcomes in the labour force? If the empirical research indicates that occupational mobility is associated with the length of singlehood, then we have a clear case for social policy reform. The aim of such policies should be to counteract the negative effects of family responsibilities on women's careers. This claim shall be justified in the current context of declining fertility and population ageing. Both issues are currently of major political concern. Indeed, one of the most important factors in fertility decline is that women postpone motherhood until the last of their reproductive years, thereby making additional offspring unlikely.

Despite the potential *role conflict* that may arise within marriage, the fact is that most women tend to enter into partnerships before their mid-thirties. This has been the pattern followed by women born between 1946 and 1956. In this generation 90 per cent entered a first partnership by the age of 35 (ESD 1991). The choice of the birth cohort is not arbitrary, but responds to the requirements of the research design explained in the methodological section VI.2.

It is also clear that the delay at entering the first partnership must not be too prolonged because the pool of suitable candidates diminishes with time.[52] The length of singlehood seems to be closely related to the women's educational attainment, as those with university studies usually wait until their education is complete. This is illustrated in Figure VI.1, which includes only the sample of women with continuous careers and shows the cumulative percentage of women entering first partnerships by age and education. By age 34, as many as 19 per of low educated women were single, while the figure went up to 35 per cent for highly educated women.

Figure VI.1. Women with Continuous Careers up to the Age 35: Cumulative Percentage of Entry at First Partnership by Age: 1946-1956 Birth Cohort



Source: ESD 1991.

In short, single women tend to have on average a higher educational attainment than their married or cohabiting counterparts. They also enter paid employment at later ages and remain in the labour force for a longer time. The theory of the marriage market proposed by Oppenheimer (1988) suggests that *satisfactory marital matches*

[52] This principle works as long as the marriage market is structured by current social norms whereby individuals match within a narrow age group. In western European societies, for instance, men tend to be on average two years older than their female partners (Bozon 1991).

do not necessarily entail negative effects on women's occupational careers. From this theory it follows that a long delay for marriage is not necessary to make a career. It is just a question of forming assortative partnerships or testing the partnership long enough (e.g. pre-marital cohabitation) before formalising a stable union. In this way women can afford a family whilst consolidating their position in the labour market.

There is evidence from other studies about the real effects of postponing the age at marriage or forming non-assortative partnerships on women's careers. The study of Houseknecht, Vaughan & Statham (1987) in particular reveals that postponing marriage did not help women achieve higher degree of career advancement. These authors interviewed 663 American professional women with high-level degrees obtained between 1964 and 1974. According to the study, women who postponed marriage until the completion of graduate school did not have more positive outcomes in their careers. The reason was that once married and exposed to greater family constraints, their progress greatly diminished. Furthermore, women who had assumed longer-term family responsibilities much earlier managed to surpass women who postponed them.

The study of Houseknecht, Vaughan & Statham (1987) supports the theory of the *role conflict*, that is to say, the fact that marriage represents a major constraint on women's career progression, which not even the strategy of a delayed union can prevent. Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1996), inspired by the functionalist approach, argue that the effect of marriage on women's careers depends on the status competition between spouses. Occupational status differences lead to different outcomes regarding wives' participation in the labour force. This postulate takes them to formulate three hypotheses. First, the *family competition hypothesis* predicts that wives will drop out of the labour force if their potential occupational status is the same or higher than their husbands' occupational status. Second, the *among families competition hypothesis* predicts that only wives with lower potential occupational status than their husband's will drop out. Third and last, the *status-similarity hypothesis* predicts that only those wives with similar potential occupational status as their husbands' occupations will remain in the labour force.

Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1996) conducted a study with data from the Eurobarometers, which included 12 countries analysed between 1988 and 1991. They found, on the one hand, that women married to husbands with low occupational status achieved less than similar single women did. This was defined as a *ceiling effect* whereby husbands determine their wives' career achievements. On the other hand, they also found that the careers of working wives were enhanced when the

wives were partnered with men in professional or managerial occupations. In these cases they refer to a *facilitating effect*, because marriage to husbands in high-level occupations helps women achieve more than do comparable single women.

The study of Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1996), however, did not provide similar results across countries. This inconsistency was explained by cultural factors, which were eventually reduced to religious beliefs. Thus, "predominantly Catholic" states (i.e. those states in which more than 75 per cent of individuals identified as Roman Catholics in the mid 1970s) were considered to be more conservative in family-related matters than Protestants. As a result, the effect of occupational status differences between spouses was particularly strong and negative for women in Catholic countries, Spain included. In this case, the explanation appears to be too reductionist on cultural values, leaving other important elements such as regional or generational differences completely omitted.

Next, the research design and main variables included in the empirical analysis will be described. The models should test the theoretical issues here discussed. Thus, women's occupational achievements, the dependent variable, will be analysed in relation to four main variables: partnership status, age at first union, couples' educational match and educational attainment.

VI.2 Definition of the Model: One Birth Cohort in a Cross-sectional Study

The main goal of the model estimation is to compare processes of upward occupational mobility between single and married or cohabiting women. The ideal research methodology to analyse changes in occupational mobility would positively be based upon duration or event-history analysis. Unfortunately, the ESD does not provide information on the time at which women entered and exited from different type of jobs. The only information available is the following: date of first entry into occupation, characteristics of first occupation, characteristics of last occupation (if substantially different from the first one) and date of first exit from the labour force. With these limitations, there is no alternative but to confine the research design to a cross-sectional analysis. This is described below.

First of all, the birth cohort of women born between 1946 and 1956 has been selected for analysis. The main characteristic of the sample chosen is that, given the retrospective nature of the survey, we can retrieve information from all women up to their 35th birthday. The sample selection has been illustrated in the Lexis' Diagram drawn in Figure VI.2. Only women who have remained single up to their 35th birthday and women who have ever entered a partnership before reaching the age of 35 are considered in the comparative analysis.

Figure VI.2. Selected Birth Cohort: Women Born between 1946 and 1956



Given the fact that the observation is right censored at age 35, the research is limited to only the early stages of women's occupational mobility. The main objection to including observations on older women is that there are very few single women in this population. Consequently, the comparison would have no purpose as most women would have already married or formed a consensual union.

The dependent variable has been constructed by computing the occupational status of a woman's first job, which is subsequently compared with their last occupational

status. It is assumed that the *shift in occupational status* takes place before their 35th birthday. This assumption has to be made without knowing the exact date of entry into the last job. Only the dates of women's withdrawal from the labour force are known. According to the survey's methodology, it is up to the respondents to indicate how many different types of occupations they occupied. If they consider that during the time they were within the labour force they did only one type of job, only one occupational status is reported. Occupational status change is, therefore, very loosely defined in the ESD, which might cause some inaccuracy in the results obtained.

The analysis is restricted to women with continuous careers. This means that only women who entered the labour force as youths and remained there at least up to their 35th birthday are included. In the 1946-1956 female birth cohort 19 per cent had never been in paid employment, and of those who held a paid job as many as 61 per cent dropped out of the labour force before achieving their 35 birthday. These figures reflect an acute sample selection bias which primarily affects the category of ever married or cohabiting women (see Figure VI.3). In fact, 66 per cent of ever married or cohabiting women and 22 per cent of single women from the 1946-1956 cohort dropped out before the age of 35.

Figure VI.3. Sample Selection throughout the 1946-56 Female Birth Cohort: Women with Continuous Careers in the Labour Force up to the Age 35 according to the Partnership Status



Source: ESD 1991 (weighted figures).

Figure VI.4. Cumulative Percentage of Women Entering Paid Employment and Leaving the Labour Force for the First Time, by Age according to Whether They Form a Partnership Prior to Their 35 Birthday: 1946-1956 Birth Cohort



Source: ESD 1991.

The "mortality rate", or the proportion of women withdrawing from the labour force among those who ever formed a partnership, is very high. The same selection process showed in Figure VI.3 has been drawn in Figure VI.4, this time indicating the pattern over time. Here, earlier timing of first entry into paid employment among ever-married or cohabiting women becomes evident. By the age 17 50 per cent of these women in the 1946-56 generation had entered paid employment, while only 34

per cent of single women had done so. On the other hand, ever-married women have an earlier withdrawal and a higher quota of dropouts from the labour force. By age 30, 55 per cent of ever-married women had withdrawn, while only 9 per cent of single women had done so.

After describing the different occupational behaviours of women according to whether or not they have formed a family before their 35th birthday, it would seem that, judging by the few remain in the labour force, married women with continuous careers resemble the stereotypical model of the "super-woman". Yet, it is an open question whether these women have similar or lower chances of career achievement than do their single counterparts. It is the task of the models estimated in the next section to respond to this question.

VI.2.1. Statistical Methods and Variables: Capturing Early Stages of Female Occupational Mobility

The method used is logistic regression analysis with cross-sectional data in which the dependent variable is the probability that a woman experiences an *upward shift in occupational category.* The variable is coded 1 if women have an upward shift and 0 otherwise. An upward shift is defined as a job change that results in an increase in occupational status. Job shifts leading to either no change or a downward change in occupational status are treated as if no change occurred. After all, the main issue of concern is whether women under different individual circumstances achieve similar gains throughout their career.

The shift in occupational category or status has been estimated by transforming occupational data into an ordinal variable coded according to the Treiman scheme used in Chapter V. In this analysis the classification was adapted to data on the Spanish Socio-demographic Survey (ESD). Treiman's scale provides a hierarchical ordering of occupations with respect to social prestige.

Occupational mobility depends on individual features such as birth cohort; ascribed characteristics such as education and individual labour force experience; and contextual factors such as the region of residence. These variables are described next.

The following set of independent variables were included in the analysis:

a. Individual Features:

- *Birth cohorts:* Dummy variable made up of two cohorts (1949-50 and 1951-1956) in which women born between 1951 and 1956 are the reference category. In both cohorts women reached the age of 25 during the 1960s, but the younger cohort reached their 35th at the beginning of the economic crisis of the 1980s. The aim of this variable is to assess the specific socio-economic circumstances encountered by each cohort.

- *Partnership status:* Dummy variable which indicates whether women have ever lived with a partner or have remained single, up to their 35th birthday. Single women are the reference category.

- *Couples' educational match:* Dummy variable consisting of four categories: downward, upward, homogamous partnerships and single women (i.e. women not living with a partner). Single women are the reference category. The variable is intended to capture the effect of the educational match of the couple on a woman's career advancement.

- *Number of children prior to age 30:* Dummy variable that accounts for the effect of children. The reference category is childless women. The variable has been fixed at age 30 because it is not only the number of children that matters, but also the timing at which they arrive. The presence of children before women have consolidated their position in the labour force, here established at age 30, can be a major obstacle for women's upward occupational mobility.

b. Occupational Related Features:

- *Length of time living in the parental home being single and holding paid employment:* Continuous variable measured in years. The aim of this variable is to assess the "facilitating effect" that family solidarity has on female career fulfilment. It is expected that women who profited from the family resources for a longer period of time are able to assume further risks (i.e. periods of unemployment and prolonged period of training) and eventually develop a more solid career.

- *Years in paid employment:* Continuous variable that measures the length of time in paid employment. It is expected that long careers would be associated with high rewards concerning occupational category.

c. Individual Ascribed Features:

- *Women's highest education attainment at the age of 25:* Dummy variable. It consists of five categories which correspond to the standard classification of the Spanish Curriculum (see Appendix 7). Women with up to basic education are the reference category. Other categories are: high school, technical-school, three years

university degree and five years university degree or further. In order to overcome the constraint of using a cross-sectional model for the study of occupational mobility, this variable has been fixed at women's 25th birthday. Therefore, it marks the potential human capital that would determine women's final achievements.

- *Women's initial position in the labour force:* Dummy variable. It is included to control for two main factors which determine the rate of an upward shift: the economic sector in which the person works (civil servants or other private sector) and the initial occupational position (i.e. ceiling to their future mobility).

d. Contextual Variable:

- *Regions of residence:* Dummy variable that intends to control for the effect of regional economic and cultural differences. This variable consists of six large regions as used in Chapter V.

- *Church attendance:* Dummy variable coded 1 if more than 50 per cent of the people in the province of residence frequently attend religious services (this is considered as "high" degree). It is coded 0 if less than 50 per cent of people frequently attend services (considered as "low" degree). High degree of religiosity could be associated with higher traditional family expectations. Thus, in an environment of high religiosity, mothers may be discouraged from engaging in paid employment and nurturing career aspirations.

In order not to mix women with different marital life histories both groups are "pure categories". This means that the category of *single women*, for instance, is made up of women without previous experiences of cohabitation. Past relationships could have constrained their occupational career, but we cannot account for this effect. Single women with previous experiences of cohabitation represent only 0.1 per cent of the sample in the 1946-1956 birth cohort. The category *ever-married or cohabiting* includes women who entered their first partnership prior to their 35th birthday. Only durable first unions, at least up to the age 35, are considered. Divorced or separated women are excluded because they do not report information on former partners, and we can neither assess the effect of past relationships on women's careers.

It is expected that women in assortative partnerships will enjoy relationships based on more egalitarian principles which would position them on par with single women regarding career prospects. An alternative or complementary hypothesis is that women in traditional upward marriages could take advantage of the social and

economic support of their husbands to enjoy career prospects similar to those of single women.

VI.3. Results of the Statistical Analysis Predicting Women's Upward Mobility

The models on upward occupational transitions are reported in tables VI.1 and VI.2. On the first step, the aim was to assess the impact of *partnership status*, *age at marriage* and *couples' educational match* on women's occupational mobility. These variables have been entered in separate models to avoid problems of collinearity. On the second step, the aim was to assess the impact of women's educational attainment on career achievements. It is expected that education will be the main determinant in the likelihood of an upward shift, outweighting the negative effect attached to family formation.

VI.3.1. The Effect of Partnership Formation in Occupational Mobility

Let us begin by describing model 1 in Table VI.1. This is the simplest model which includes the net effect of three main variables: generation, partnership status and time spent in the parental home during which women were single and held a paid job. The later variable can be summarised as *parents' support*.

The most striking element in model 1 is that the only variable with a significant effect on women's likelihood for an upward shift is *parents' support*. According to this coefficient, for each additional year spent at the parental home, women have a 4 per cent increase in their odds of experiencing an upward shift.[53] This finding will support the positive effects of the family solidarity system on women's prospects.

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[53] Since (exp0.035)-1)x100%=4%

Table VI.1. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Transition Probability of Upward Occupational Women with Continuous Career at least up to their 35th (1946-56 Birth Cohort)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Controlling for:	*Partnership status*		*Age at marriage*	*Couples' educational Match*	
Birth cohorts					
1946-1950	--	--	--	--	--
1951-1956	0.022	0.085	0.073	0.068	0.046
Partnership status up to the age 35					
Single	--	--			
Ever married or cohabiting	-0.135	-0.299 **			
Parents' support	0.035 ***	0.001			
Years in paid employment		0.102 ***	0.110 ***	0.111 ***	0.108 ***
Age at marriage					
Remains single up to the age 35			--		
14-23			-0.283 *		
24-30			-0.381 **		
31 or later			-0.140		
Couples' educational match					
Living without a partner				--	--
Women's downward marriage				-0.429 *	-0.448 *
Women's upward marriage				-0.149	-0.185
Homogamous marriage				-0.368 **	-0.378 ***
Regions of residence					
North-western					-0.528 **
North-eastern					0.139
Madrid and centre					-0.271
Eastern					--
Southern					-0.113
Canary Islands					-0.166
Constant	-1.934 ***	-3.381 ***	-3.507 ***	-3.502 ***	-3.311 ***
-2 Log Likelihood	2713.8	2638.9	2856.8	2854.1	2837.3
Goodness of Fit	3364.1	3322.4	3636.3	3654.2	3697.2
Degrees of freedom	3	4	5	5	10
Number of cases	3374	3374	3706	3705	3705

Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.
-- Reference category
Data: ESD 1991.

It is a well-known trend that families are assuming the care of adult children for longer periods, even if they could be economically independent. This strategy diminishes the risk that adult children would have a lower standard of living than their parents, and makes their initial introduction into the labour market easier. Bettio and Villa (1998) brilliantly summarise this, explaining that the emancipation of children in Mediterranean countries is made "within, not from, the family".

The scenario described above, however, changes in model 2 (see Table VI.1). In this case other variables prove to be more important than the parents' initial support to predict women's upward career. It could be said that the effect of parents' support becomes insignificant as long as we control for the women's own experience in the labour force. Thus, *the time women have spent in paid work* has a positive and significant effect, while parents' support has no effect at all.

The positive effect associated with the number of years in employment must correspond to the seniority system, whereby the experience within a particular firm or business is eventually rewarded by higher positions in the occupational structure. Actually, an additional year spent in paid employment increases the odds of having an upward shift by 11 per cent ($p<0.001$).[54]

The other remarkable outcome in model 2 is the significant and negative effect of partnership status on the likelihood of experiencing an upward shift. This is evidence that family formation matters for women's career advancement. The coefficient indicates that forming a partnership before reaching the age of 35 reduces the odds of experiencing an upward shift by 26 per cent.[55] Figure VI.5, in particular, shows the predicted effect of partnership formation over a time span of 15 years of women's experience in paid employment.

It should be noted, however, that differences in career achievements between married and single women are not too large. There are two positive interpretations of these relatively small differences. First, family formation is not, after all, the most important factor causing negative effects on women's occupational mobility. Second, only strongly career-committed married women manage to achieve upward

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[54] Since (exp0.102)-1)x100%=11%

[55] Since (exp-0.299)-1)x100%=26%

occupational mobility. Hence, the effect of family formation on occupational mobility is not as large as expected, because the comparison concerns single women and "super-women", or the few women who manage to reconcile family responsibilities with continuous and ascending careers. I am more inclined towards the second explanation.

Figure VI.5. Probability of Experiencing Upward Occupational Shift by Number of Years in Employment and Women's Partnership Status up to Their 35th Birthday



Note: graph displays predicted values as estimated from the equation of model 2 of the logistic regression (Table VI.1).

In short, few women in the analysis managed to remain in paid employment and the ones who did remain - regardless of their partnership status - have been full competitors in the labour force. Nevertheless, single women always tend to have better outcomes as far as career achievements are concerned. If it is true that forming a partnership restrains women's careers, we must also ask to what extent a woman's age at first union determines her occupational prospects? This question shall be addressed in model 3 (Table VI.1).

In model 3 age at first union appears to have a significant effect. The pattern by age groups reveals that a late union, formed when women were 31 or older, is the least damaging strategy - after remaining single - to women's occupational mobility. This category (i.e. women married at 31 or older), however, is not significant quite

probably owing to the fact that the coefficient is very close to the reference category (i.e. being single).

It is worth noting that a very young union, formed when women were aged 14-23, seems to be less harmful for women's upward mobility than a union formed when they are between 24 and 30 years of age. This pattern is similar to the results obtained by Houseknecht, Vaughan & Statham (1987) discussed in section VI.1. They found that women with long-term family commitments eventually managed to surpass women who postpone their union until the completion of an advanced degree. The only difference I would highlight in the Spanish case is that a very late union, formed at the age of 31 or later, seems to be even better than a very early one (before age 24). Nonetheless, singlehood - at least up to the age of 35 - still appears to be the most favourable strategy for securing better chances of occupational mobility.

Models 4 and 5 in Table VI.1 include the variable *couples' educational match.* I focus here on model 5 where coefficients are standardised by the *region of residence.* The predicted effects according to the type of partnership have been illustrated in Figure VI.6. Again, single women are by far the category with the highest likelihood of experiencing an upward shift. Of those living with a partner, women in upward partnerships have the highest likelihood of experiencing an upward shift. This result refutes the hypothesis that assortative partnerships would place women on par with singles in terms of career achievements. On the contrary, this finding is similar to the one reported by Smits, Ultee and Lammers (1996) who formulated the *facilitating hypothesis* whereby husbands with higher educational attainment facilitate their wives' achievements. This effect occurs because husbands can mobilise economic, intellectual and social resources to support their spouses' position in the job market (Bernasco 1994 as quoted in Smits, Ultee and Lammers op. cit.).

Therefore, although the chances of upward mobility are always better for single women, it is not homogamous but rather upward partnerships that produce the best outcomes in terms of occupational mobility. The worst possible arrangement is a female downward partnership. This model breaks from traditional patterns of union formation, because the male improves his status from the marriage. Women might have less chances for career advancement in these types of unions because these unions are formed among the lesser educated groups of the population. A typical example was given in Chapter IV. There, it was described how a large proportion of women with secondary studies tended to marry men with primary studies, especially among the older cohorts. The presumed reason is that occupation, rather than

education, defined social status. Because there was generally poor access to formal education, a union with a low educated man did not really break with traditional gender norms.

Figure VI.6. Probability of Experiencing Upward Occupational Mobility by Number of Years in Employment and Women's Type of Educational Match with Their Partner up to Their 35th Birthday



Note: graph displays predicted values as estimated from the equation of model 2 of the logistic regression (Table VI.1).

VI.3.2. The Mediating Effect of Educational Attainment in Occupational Mobility

The main objective now is to investigate whether women's higher educational attainment suppresses the negative effect of marriage or cohabitation on women's career achievements. If educational attainment is the most important predictor of upward shifts, the effect of partnership status will either drop out or diminish once we control for education.

Model 1 presents the parameter estimates controlling for educational attainment and women's initial position in the labour force. Here, the effect of partnership status on the transition probability of an upward shift slightly declines after controlling for

education (result compared to coefficient in model 2, table VI.1). In view of that result, it cannot be said that education by itself completely suppresses the negative effect of marriage on upward mobility, although it diminishes it.

However, the introduction of an additional variable in model 2 (see Table VI.2) changes the effect of partnership status, which turns out to be insignificant. The first variable added into the model is the number of children women had before reaching age 30. Children have a negative net effect on the log odds of an upward occupational shift, above all in the category of women with 3 or more children.

The effect of children, however, is not very robust. When we control for contextual variables, such as the region of residence, the coefficient appears insignificant. This result might indicate that the influence of children on women's careers depends very much upon the region of residence. As a matter of fact, living in the north west region, as compared to living in the eastern part, reduces the log-odds of experiencing an upward shift by -0.450 (model 3 in Table VI.2).[56] It is difficult to theorise on reasons behind this fact without conducting a detailed geographical analysis. I would dare to associate the lower likelihood in the north west regions to the fact that it is a job-losing region with a depressed agricultural economy. In this context, supports such as caring services for women in careers must be lower than in regions with longer tradition of female employment in the urban sector and with a more diversified economy, as it is the case in the eastern region.

From model 2 (Table VI.2), we shall conclude that forming a family does not seem to affect women's career as long as they have reached the highest level of educational attainment. Hence, having a university degree or Ph.D. is significantly and positively associated with women's upward career mobility, even after controlling for other possible variables in the consecutive models shown in Table VI.2. Figure VI.7 illustrates the net effects of women's educational attainment (odds ratio) on the transition of an upward occupational shift. It is not enough for women to complete secondary studies or 3 years university degree (*diplomatura*). The level that clearly exerts a positive effect on the likelihood of experiencing an upward shift - regardless of the women's family formation history - is the completion of 5 years university degree (*licenciatura*).

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[56] The north west region comprises the autonomous communities of Galicia, Asturias and Cantabria, while eastern region comprises Catalonia, Valencian Community and Balearic Islands.

Table VI.2. Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Transition Probability of Upward Occupational Mobility Women with Continuous Career at least up to their 35th (1946-56 Birth Cohort)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Birth cohorts				
1946-1950	–	–	–	–
1951-1956	0.067	0.057	0.047	0.033
Partnership status up to the age 35				
Single	–	–	–	–
Ever married or cohabiting	-0.245 *	-0.096	-0.131	-0.131
Parents' support	0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
Years in paid employment	0.087 ***	0.091 ***	0.086 ***	0.087 ***
Women's education				
Basic education at most	–	–	–	–
High School	0.072	0.040	0.043	0.067
Technique School	0.116	0.083	0.041	0.034
3 years University Degree	0.233	0.203	0.197	0.234
University Degree, Ph.D.	0.957 ***	0.914 ***	0.894 ***	0.889 ***
Women's initial position in the labour force				
Head or manager of firm	–	–	–	–
Workers in co-operatives	-0.016	-0.057	-0.152	-0.132
Family help	1.310 ***	1.305 ***	1.341 ***	1.371 ***
Wage earners	1.294 ***	1.287 ***	1.228 ***	1.187 ***
Civil servants	0.114	0.109	0.078	0.072
Housekeeping workers	1.926 ***	1.958 ***	1.926 ***	1.863 ***
Number of children > age 30				
Childless		–	–	–
1-2		-0.194	-0.173	-0.147
3 <		-0.496 *	-0.471	-0.469
Regions of residence				
North-western			-0.450 *	-0.404 *
North-eastern			0.128	0.157
Madrid and centre			-0.258	-0.232
Eastern			–	–
Southern			-0.108	-0.107
Canarias			-0.254	-0.249
Church attendance				
Low				–
High				-0.244
Constant	-4.380 ***	-4.385 ***	-4.125 ***	-4.121 ***
-2 Log Likelihood	2551.1	2546.4	2534.461	2490.364
Goodness of Fit	3294.9	3296.1	3323.22	3259.885
Degrees of freedom	13	15	20	21
Number of cases	3373	3373	3373	3309

Statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at 0.01 level; *** Statistically significant at 0.001 level.
– Reference category.
Data: ESD 1991.

Figure VI.7. Main Effects of Women's Educational Attainment on the Probability of Experiencing an Upward Occupational Shift



Note: Odds ratio estimated by (Exp(b)) using coefficients in model 3 (see Table VI.2).

Therefore, for women in the top educational categories (i.e. 16 per cent of single women and 9 per cent of ever married or cohabiting women) having a family does not exert such a negative effect on their early prospects for career advancement. However, highly educated women might make more of an effort to limit their family size in the first place (see Table VI.1).

One element of the positive effect of higher educational attainment for which we cannot control is income differences. Average income would provide information on the capacity of lone mothers or couples to pursue caring services in the market. This ultimately determines the capacity and time availability of spouses to focus on career mobility.

Model 4 (Table VI.2) incorporates the variable of Church attendance. The theoretical assumption behind the inclusion of this variable was that women immersed in a very Catholic environment could be discouraged from holding individual values of career fulfilment. Parameters indicate that frequent Church attendance (refereed in the table as "high") reduces the log odds of experiencing an upward occupational shift. Nonetheless, after controlling for other variables such education (see model 4 in Table VI.2), religious values do not seem to exert any significant effect on women's career fulfilment. Therefore, religion is not a good explanatory variable in the study of occupational mobility. Having said so, the model which best fits the equation

predicting women's upward shifts is model 3, where the -2 log likelihood test reaches the lowest value.

It might be the case that women's living arrangements (e.g. whether they are living with a partner and the partners' characteristics) are not so relevant, but rather the combination of living arrangements with the presence of children. This suggests testing for the existence of interaction effects between couples' educational match and children. The inclusion of this term, however, does not appear to have a significant effect. Neither does the *family background* variable appear to have a significant effect on the pattern of women's upward occupational mobility. As reported in Chapter V, background was instead highly influential in women's decisions to remain in or return to paid employment.

VI.4. Discussion and Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to compare the differences in career advancement between single and ever-married or cohabiting women. The category of single women has been so far largely neglected. I now introduce it into the analysis as it is through this comparison that the full disadvantage suffered by women with family responsibilities especially emerges.

This chapter has tried to answer two main questions. The first question was whether certain features of a woman's family composition particularly restrain her from acquiring a higher position in the occupational structure. Results indicate that single women indeed have higher chances of experiencing upward mobility than women who have ever engaged in family life prior to their 35th birthday. However, the advantage of single women is not as large as expected. The main difference between the two categories is that women with family responsibilities have a very short life within the labour force, rarely managing to conduct continuous careers. Therefore, single-working women eventually compete with a very select group of married women who are extraordinarily committed workers. The outcome in terms of career achievements will always tend to be slightly higher for single women.

The second question was whether higher educational attainment could suppress the negative effect of family responsibilities on a woman's career achievements. Only

those with a university degree or more suppress the negative effect of bearing additional family responsibilities. This is in some way a bleak result given that highly educated women are a minority among the few married women with continuous occupational careers. At the same time, it can also have a positive interpretation inasmuch as educational attainment becomes a relevant factor predicting women's attachment to the labour force. Chapter V also showed that educational attainment was strongly associated with lower rates of female withdrawal from the labour force. A high level of education might equally be associated with higher earning potential, which in Spain is the necessary pre-condition to combine family and career in the absence of "women-friendly" policies.

This analysis has also revealed that the strategy of postponing the age at marriage has its rewards in terms of career achievements. Unions formed right at the beginning of women's careers, let us say after the completion of the university degree when women are in their mid-twenties, appears to have more negative effects than a late marriage (31 or later) on women's upward occupational shift. A less clear pattern emerges concerning couples' educational match. A downward marriage appears to exert the strongest negative effect on female upward mobility. Furthermore, not even forming a homogamous partnership seems to help women reach the levels attained by their counterparts. Hence, the mere fact of being in the *dual earner-family model*, in which both spouses have similar earning potential, does not seem to guarantee a *dual career-family model.*

To conclude, I would like to make some remarks concerning the models. The aim of any regression analysis is to define parsimonious models within the limits of the data. The main concern here is the extent to which the results are weakened by the absence of relevant data. Other relevant data, which were unavailable, include the proportion of publicly funded child care centres available at the provincial or municipal level, the number of elderly family members in need of care, the solidarity networks at hand (e.g. relatives which support married women's careers), and so on. These data, seldom available in time series data or local levels, would provide fundamental information on the functioning of the Spanish family system and, in turn, women's occupational behaviour.

This research also neglects the distinction between consensual and marital unions when calculating their influence on women's occupational behaviour. It might be the case that each union offers women a different capacity to negotiate the household gender division of labour. Some studies have revealed, for instance, that consensual unions are more egalitarian because they are in constant re-negotiation. This is partly

due to the fact that they are more easily dissolved than a formalised union (Clarke & Henwood 1997). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop this theme. One reason is that couples in consensual unions within the 1946-56 generation are very rare and any inference made on the sample would be unreliable.

Conclusions: the Relationship between Women's Occupational Career and Family Formation in Spain

The main concern of this research has been to identify the modern processes that polarise women over their family and occupational biographies. The individual biography has been viewed in a dynamic perspective, so that family decisions taken at different stages of the life course (e.g. remaining single or forming a partnership, choosing one partner or another, having children or remaining childless) have been correlated with the subsequent occupational patterns. A secondary interest has been to investigate whether forming an *assortative partnership*, has an effect on women's patterns of labour force participation. Theoretically defined sources of variation include differences in family background; in regional gender culture, individual ascribed features (e.g. educational attainment); initial position in the labour market (e.g. job placement, working in public or private sector); and, last but not least, the influential role of partners' characteristics. The interaction of these variables, observed over time and across generations, explains the course of women's early occupational trajectories.

The first undertaking of this research was to delimit the theoretical framework, which I did in Chapter I, where I explored mainstream explanations of family behaviour and gender relations. In doing the literature review, I realised that one of the most influential, yet most highly criticised, approaches in sociology and demography has been the new home economics models, and the numerous variants of purposive action models. The choice-theoretic framework in its pure form, as Gary Becker (1993, first edited in 1982) originally formulated it, appears to be an over-simplification of the complexity of family behaviour. The main shortcoming is the absence of an adequate theorisation of power-relationships within the family and the reductionist view that human relations can be understood as economic transactions

between free actors. Power, submission, and authority within relationships gives rise to unequal benefits and long-term costs for the family members. Because these are not captured by the economic theory of the family, it therefore appears to have rather limited explanatory power.

To explain women's occupational outcomes, I needed a more comprehensive theoretical framework better suited to deal with the influence of social contexts on choice and the changing character of social actions. I needed to integrate into the analysis different aspects of gender relationships which are the main catalysts of current family change, as well as the influential role of institutions in shaping individuals' life chances. Both elements were encompassed by the concept of the *gender contract.* This concept provides an alternative approach which incorporates elements such as the nature of the welfare state and the constant renegotiation of gender relations. It also overcomes structural or economically deterministic explanations while providing a framework for historical explanations. It is this theoretical framework that in essence inspired the formulation of the research hypotheses summarised in the introduction.

Having established the theoretical approach, in the second Chapter I provided an extensive description of the elements which determine the system of social and gender relations in Spanish society, namely the historical transformation of *the family*; the gendered nature of *the labour market;* and the model of *the welfare state.* The period under analysis extended from the beginning of the dictatorship to the late 1990s. These two chapters constitute the first section of the thesis.

The second part of the thesis presents the bulk of the empirical research. There, I analysed women's transitions towards different patterns of partnership formation and occupational biographies. I was fundamentally interested in outlining the presence of occupational *life course effects* associated with the process of family formation. It is in this part of the research that I define the mechanisms behind the ongoing processes of polarisation across different life courses. Thus, the approach has been mainly based on longitudinal observations drawn from the retrospective Socio-demographic Survey (1991). Whenever possible, I used *event history analysis* to explore causal relations and estimate the above-mentioned temporary or long-term effects.

I shall note once again that I have always had in the background an ideal type of occupational biography, although it might not have been made that explicit. This type coincides with the typical "male norm" of long-term attachment to the labour

market on a full-time basis. I am aware, however, that continued labour force deregulation tends to make this model ever more unreachable even for men and, above all, for the younger members of the working population. The "male norm" might not even be the most desired model for many women. This is, at least, what arose from the analysis of social values and normative beliefs conducted in Chapter III. Nonetheless, it is an essential model inasmuch as it constitutes the best means to gain full access to citizenship rights. According to Spanish welfare state, the time spent in regular paid employment directly determines a large part of the package of social protection to which each person is entitled (i.e. maternity leave schemes, old-age pensions, invalidity pensions and employment benefits). Therefore, unstable occupational careers, part-time employment and atypical work, which contribute little to social security, always entail higher risks of social exclusion in the medium or long term.

I next articulate the discussion on the role of education in behavioural change, and partners' influence on wives' occupational behaviour. I have used the concept "the double formula" to emphasise that it is the combination of two main variables, educational attainment and careful mate selection, that best predicts the formation of dual-career families.

Socio-demographic Evidence: Segregation of Careers and Family Models

Women's greater access to the educational system is a widespread trend in industrialised societies. According to the economic theory of marriage, increased access to the education system should bring about profound changes within the family, given that the gender division of labour between spouses is no longer an "optimal choice". The immediate consequence would be that highly educated women will lose interest in marriage as soon as their earning potential is equal to their husbands'.

The prediction of the economic theory of marriage has been contradicted with two arguments. First, I argued that women's capacity to organise the gender division of labour within the family depended not only on their *earning potential* in the market place, but on the nature of the welfare state regime and the characteristics of the labour market. Therefore, marriage or partnership might have different implications for women and gender relationships depending on the national or regional context.

Second, the new home economics approach only considers aspects related to the "economic efficiency" of the family, while outrightly neglecting the non-economic values attached to the family.

Non-economic variables, such as gender roles and gender expectations, are difficult to include in rational choice models. However, they play a fundamental role in understanding how paid and caring work is organised within the family. Chapter III, for instance, showed the peculiarities of the gendered family obligations and the intergenerational solidarity which characterises the functioning of most families in Spain.

References only to optimality and the efficiency of the gender division of labour also fail to account for the gender implications of unequal access to resources. The reference to an "efficient specialisation" in the allocation of time between spouses implies that only one party has the advantage of goods and services, exclusive affective bonds and good knowledge of market relations. While it assumes that the other power-subjected party has no alternatives outside the relationship.

Finally, I adopted an alternative notion of marriage following the conclusions of Oppenheimer (1988). This author argues that women might be interested in forming a marriage or a consensual union at different stages of their life, but not at any cost. Paraphrasing Münch (1992), some individuals may be willing to make concessions in a *bargaining game* under the conditions of relatively equal power and equal flexibility instead of playing an *all-or-nothing* game. In other words women may find ways to compromise instead of completely rejecting the idea of marriage or forming a family. Therefore, Oppenheimer speculates that women would not necessarily avoid marriage, but would rather set a higher standard for the minimally acceptable match. With this as a starting point, I proceeded to elucidate the hypothesis that it was in the interest of women to develop certain strategies of mate selection and to form *assortative partnerships* in which both actors maintain to relatively equal potential power. I have operationalised *power* as the partners' earning potential in the market place associated with their educational attainment. I am aware, though, that this notion of power has some limitations as long as it presupposes the absence of gender discrimination, which might be present to different degrees in most societies, and the absence of non-economic power relations.

The formation of an *assortative* partnership promises a higher probability of achieving parallel careers in which both spouses maintain a long-term attachment to

the labour market. The underlying assumption is that partners with similar earning potentials will not compete and, therefore, would not be inclined to have an unequal division of labour. This statement implies a certain degree of individual rationality that I found instrumental in the development and design of the statistical analysis. The results of the research can be summarised by the "the double formula", which I develop in the next section.

The Double Formula: Higher Educational Attainment and Good Quality Matches in Partnership Formation

Following the reasoning explained above, highly educated women should strive to form assortative partnerships, or unions between equals, in order to assure a more egalitarian gender division of labour within the family and the promise that partners maintain *parallel careers*. Indeed, there is some evidence that more highly educated men tend to express more commitment to egalitarian values than their less educated counterparts (cf. Chapter III).

If the scenario exposed above is correct we would expect an increase in the degree of couples' homogamy over time, facilitated by the progressive educational expansion. The analysis conducted in Chapter IV revealed such a high degree of educational homogamy within couples. However, if we look at it across generations we realise that it is not something new. On the contrary, it is the continuation of an old trend. A high level of homogamy was common in the past because most individuals had low educational levels and, therefore, had also limited opportunities for social mixing. Interesting enough, couples' educational homogamy also remains very high among young cohorts, despite the higher chances of mobility across educational categories.

The high level of marital homogamy indicates a high degree of *social closure* in which partnership formation processes have not really become more flexible. This is what we called in Chapter IV the refutation of the "romantic love hypothesis". The hypothesis predicted that processes of modernisation should have brought about further social mixing regardless of the individuals' ascribed features. This postulate was only used in contrast with the opposite prediction of greater homogamy, which was here confirmed. Nevertheless, we cannot be completely sure whether the high level of homogamy corresponds to the predicted women's strategy of searching

potentially similar partners or to the social closure that characterises the Spanish marriage market.

Spanish marriage practices are not static; the formation of so-called *new unions* is an emerging pattern. These unions represent a reverse in the traditional gender roles because women are marrying men with inferior educational attainment. In fact, this was a foreseeable trend given women's increased access and participation in the higher educational system, which since the mid-1980s has surpassed that of men.

Paradoxically, "new unions" were also common in the birth cohorts prior to the mid-1950s. The main difference is that these early "new unions" involved low educated individuals and did not really break from the traditional family model. In the younger generations, however, highly educated women are marrying or forming unions with a lesser educated men. This is really meaningful for the renegotiation of gender relations and the division of labour. Indeed, highly educated women in the youngest generations seem to be at the forefront in challenging the model of the traditional family by delaying marriage and forming dual-career couples (see Chapter V). In other words, younger and more educated female generations have managed to avoid the potential conflicts associated with *negative assortative mating.*

It should be noted that being within an assortative partnership is not the only condition necessary for attaining parallel careers. In Chapter V it emerged that women enjoyed a high probability of forming parallel careers only in *assortative partnerships* formed by highly educated spouses. The same did not apply to assortative partnerships formed by low-educated spouses. Though in theory there should not be *role competition* between them, the reality is that women in these unions had a high likelihood of dropping out of the labour force and becoming full-time homemakers. This indicated the influence of educational attainment on the sex role behaviour. Therefore, partnerships among low-educated individuals probably involve more traditional expectations regarding the gender division of labour. This is, of course, coupled with the fact that low educated women also tend to form the bulk of peripheral or secondary workers. These workers have much more limited prospects of stability and improvement in working conditions, especially if they bear the additional responsibility of caring for small children. This factor determines their earlier and higher incidence of labour force withdrawal and, consequently, their higher likelihood of being in *one-earner families.*

It is difficult to know whether it is their low education or their position in the peripheral sector that drives the transition into traditional patterns. In any case, both elements together highly determine women's eventual withdrawal from the labour market. The main problem lies in the fact that after more than a short period outside the labour force, the return to paid work becomes rather difficult and not very feasible. The reason is the employment rigidity that affects permanent workers, coupled with the very high female unemployment rate.

As for the relationship between education and equality, highly educated men are not necessarily more likely to support gender egalitarian relationships, especially when their female partners have lower levels of education. In these cases, it is quite probable that husbands' careers take priority, while their wives leave paid employment to meet family needs. The only arrangement really likely to produce dual-career families requires "the double formula", where both partners are highly educated and matched in terms of earning potential. This pattern indicates that social changes are not simply *cohort driven* but parallel to the progressive educational advancement among advantaged sectors of the population.

I have regularly used the notion of *parallel careers*, though only having information on whether or not both spouses were in paid employment. These might be better labelled *dual-earner partnerships*. If it is certain that both partners have similar chances of achieving parallel careers, then we can call their union a *dual-career partnership*. It is for this reason that Chapter VI analysed whether a woman living with a partner had similar chances of experiencing occupational mobility as a woman with similar characteristics but without family responsibilities.

I could have compared the career advancement of male and female spouses, but it seems more relevant to compare single women without family responsibilities to married women. This better illustrates the extent to which different family compositions, partner characteristics and educational attainment levels determine women's occupational mobility. The results show that single women tend to have a higher likelihood of experiencing occupational mobility than do women living with a partner, although the differences among them were not very large.

The small differences in career advancement between single and married women have been attributed to the strong selection process undergone in the labour force by the latter group. Only a low proportion of married women manages to perform continuous careers. They are women who, after consolidating their position in the

labour market, enjoy a greater likelihood of experiencing upward occupational mobility. Highly educated women in the younger generations tend to delay entry into marriage, and are also rewarded by high chances for upward mobility. Therefore, in the Spanish context occupational mobility is highly associated with the length of singlehood. Only married women with high educational levels have chances of career advancement similar to those of single women.

Educational attainment emerges again as decisive in women's likelihood to remain in the labour market and experience upward occupational mobility regardless of family composition. Married women's chances of career advancement are similar to single women's, as long as they have had high educational attainment. The cost of their career advancement, though, might be a reduction of the family size.

The analysis of married women's career advancement indicates that *dual earner partnerships* do not necessarily mean *dual career partnerships*. The reason is that only those women within the top educational categories have high chances of early upward occupational mobility, while the others remain stable or experience a downgrade in their occupational position in their early years of their career. This reinforces the argument that it is only "the double formula" of high educational attainment and a good quality match that enables women to form and maintain autonomous households without the need to place themselves within a "housewife marriage".[57]

In the Spanish case study only women that, through various strategies, accomplish this so-called *double formula* seem to be able to harmonise family life and career fulfilment. This pattern does not indicate a real equalisation of choices for women, but a polarisation across educational categories.

Open questions for further research

This section essentially revolves around the main obstacles and problems accumulated during the empirical analysis. If I had to identify the most serious

[57] Idea developed by Orloff (1993)

problems, I would point to the quality and nature of available data. The fact is that most analyses rely on data which were originally produced to address questions that are not among those of the researcher. In the case of the socio-demographic survey (ESD) conducted in 1991, for instance, the main goal was to complement the information regularly gathered by the Census. Additionally, it provided for the first time in Spain the opportunity to work with longitudinal records. Before, this was only possible with smaller samples streaming from the Spanish Fertility Surveys conducted in 1978 and 1985.

Despite the originality of the ESD, the survey design suffers from many shortcomings. The most important is related to the reconstruction of the occupational biographies, which are greatly over-simplified. I would say it presupposes occupational stability in a world characterised by increasing instability, above all among women and young people. The same applies to assumptions about women's relationship histories, where information on partners prior to the current one is not pursued. Therefore, there seems to be some biases in the perception of reality, which have ultimately shaped survey questionnaire.

A similar critique applies to the surveys used to draw information on attitudinal data. Most of these shortcomings were discussed in Chapter III. The main criticisms consist of the inadequate way in which the questions were posed to the persons interviewed, and the omission of other relevant questions for the subject matter. Both factors have rendered the work presented in Chapter III rather exploratory while leaving some information gaps that demand further analysis.

I would also like to make some remarks on the effect of motherhood on women's work histories. Presumably the presence of small children has a negative effect in women's occupational biographies. However, results streaming from the analysis in Chapter V do not reveal a clear relationship between both variables, namely the presence of small children and women's lack of continuity in paid employment.

It is true that in cross-sectional analysis shows that a large proportion of women with children is mainly working as unpaid caregivers. The conclusion from the longitudinal study is that over time, it is less conceivable that well-positioned women in the labour market will withdraw upon the arrival of children. If the labour market provided more opportunities for women to return after breaks, or to have more flexible arrangements, women's employment and return rates after leaving would be much higher. This is the pattern followed in other central and northern European

states where married women take career breaks, shifting into part-time jobs during demanding periods of family life. Such a labour market in Spain might drive a negative relationship between withdrawal from paid employment and the presence of small children.

I would like to stress that event history analysis, the main methodological approach used in this research, has proved to be very fruitful for the dynamic analysis of partnership and career formation. Both the historical and time-dependent processes that typically determine the decision making of individuals have been incorporated in the empirical analysis. The research could have been enriched with additional information on individual financial resources, but data do not always accommodate everybody's interests.

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APPENDIX

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Appendix 1: 1990 Social Inequalities in Family and Domestic Life ("La desigualdad social en la vida familiar y doméstica II")

The sample survey was designed following the standard sampling procedures used by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS). The universe consisted of men and women aged 16 and over. The sample size was of 2,485 individuals. Ceuta and Melilla were excluded from the survey.

Weighting

The sample design is proportional to the national population and therefore, there is not a weighting factor. Systematic sampling was chosen to select individuals from 155 municipalities and 45 provinces.

Sampling procedure

The multi-stage, stratified cluster sampling was used. The primary sampling units were the municipalities selected by random proportional basis. The second sampling units were the sections chosen randomly. Finally, the third sampling units were individuals chosen on random routes and sex and age quotes.

The strata were defined within each of the 17 autonomous regions according to the size of the town: divided into seven categories, up to 2,000 inhabitants, from 2,001 to 10,000, from 10,001 to 50,000, from 50,001 to 100,000, from 100,001 to 400,000, from 400,001 to 1,000,000 and over 1,000,000 inhabitants.

Sampling error

The confidence interval was calculated at the 95.5% confidence level (two-sided) and P=Q. The sampling error is plus or minus 2% for the whole of the sample.

The procedure for this survey is very similar to the survey described above. This survey was also carried out by CIS in 1992 following exactly the same sampling design. The target population was women and men aged 18 and over, and the sample size was of 2,467 individuals. Ceuta and Melilla were also excluded.

Weighting

There is not a weighting factor, given that the sample design is proportional and representative of their own universe. Systematic sampling was used to select individuals from 155 municipalities and 46 provinces.

Sampling error

The confidence interval was calculated at the 95.5% confidence level (two sided) and P=Q. The sampling error is plus or minus 2% for the whole of the sample.

Analytical constraints

Both surveys on attitudinal data (the 1990 Survey on Social Inequalities in Family and Domestic Life and the 1992 Survey on Population and Family) entailed some analytical constraints for multivariate analysis given the small samples. Tests of statistical significance (i.e. chi-square, adjusted standardised residuals) were calculated for cross-tabulated tables when it was appropriate.

The 1992 Survey on Population and Family in particular proved to be completely unreliable for certain variables such as the household income. This relevant variable was also absent in the ESD. Figure 2 shows, for instance, the interesting income differences which arise according to the family types (e.g. the nuclear family seems to be much better off than other family types). Unfortunately, due to missing data being unbearably high, these figures were made totally unreliable. For instance, 23 per cent of single people living alone did not report on their income.

Additionally, for some variables the proportion of missing values or the proportion of individuals that did 'not state' any answer or 'did not know' was extremely high to render these variables statistically reliable. Therefore, these variables were totally disregarded.

Figure 1. Monthly income per household (after taxes) by family types (ptas.)



Source: CIS, 1992.
Note: by order of appearance in the figure the percentage of missing data is the following: 15% (n=93), 34% (n=105), 23% (n=83), 22% (n=14), 24% (n=1573), 19% (n=21). The sample of single people with children (n=14) is too low to reach statistical significance.

Appendix 3: The 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey (ESD)

In the fourth quarter of 1991 the National Statistical Institute (INE) conducted the Socio-demographic Survey (ESD) containing retrospective information about the individuals biography in the fields of partnerships, fertility, work, migration and education. The universe of reference consisted of the Spanish population over 10 years old registered in the 1991 Census. Individuals living in institutional households were excluded. The sample consisted of 160,000 interviews.

The main purpose of the ESD was to provide in-depth information about certain socio-demographic areas insufficiently developed in the Census (see INE 1993). It was also designed to assess the quality of 1991 Census data.

Sampling procedure

The Spanish population over 10 years old registered in the 1991 Census was 34,423,453 of which 34,175,684 lived in private households. The theoretical sample (households and individuals) was distributed by provinces and regions (autonomous communities). The survey was carried out by a three-stage sampling design with stratification at the first stage. The primary sampling units were the sections, the secondary units were private households and the tertiary sampling units were the individuals in a given household. All of them were selected on a random proportional basis. The primary sampling units were stratified according to the geographical area (provinces) and number of inhabitants in the municipality. The selection of sections was chosen randomly and Census data was ultimately used to correct the bias caused by non-response.

The eligible survey consisted of 159,154 dwellings. One individual from the household was chosen randomly, provided he or she was born prior to the 1st of January 1982, while those under 10 were excluded. Thus, the eligible survey population was of 159,154 individuals. They were proportionally distributed within the autonomous communities (regions). However, the interviewed population was actually 158,264 dwellings and 158,264 individuals.

Collection of data and non-response

Data was collected through personal interviews. The interview was conducted at the selected dwelling in 76.3 per cent of the cases. In 15.8 per cent of the cases the interview was conducted in a first substitute dwelling, in 5.2 per cent of the cases in the second substituted dwelling and in 2.8 per cent of the cases in the third and the nth substituted dwelling. Table 1 reports on the frequency of reasons for substitution.

Table 1. Reasons for Substitution of the Households Selected in the ESD

Reason	Absolute frequency	Per cent
Dwelling ruined or abandoned	331	0.21
Inaccessible dwelling	260	0.16
Dwelling not found	1,171	0.74
Unoccupied dwelling	4,034	2.55
Second residence	828	0.52
Refusal of interview	16,192	10.23
Long-lasting absence	13,126	8.29
Absence of capable respondent	334	0.21

The most problematic reason for non-response was the refusal to be interviewed (10%) and the long-lasting absence (8.29%) which could have caused some bias if it had been systematically concentrated on certain groups of the population, such as foreigners. The other reason for non-response (0.74%) was that some dwellings could not be found. This was attributed to their location being mostly in small villages scattered throughout the regions. The total non-response rate is 2.4 per cent.

As for the questionnaires, the actual number of non-valid interviews was 1.42 per cent. The reasons for non-valid questionnaires are reported in Table 2. Non-valid questionnaires were repeated whenever possible, but 570 interviews were definitely eliminated thus reducing the effectiveness of the survey population.

Table 2. Per Cent of Non-Valid Questionnaires by Regions: ESD

Regions (Autonomous Communities)	a. The eligible survey population	b. Interviewed survey population	Rate (%) of non-valid questionnaires
Total	159,154	158,264	1.42
Andalucía	23,480	23,347	0.8
Aragón	5,982	5,909	0.7
Asturias	5,780	5,753	0.3
Baleares	4,398	4,376	1.2
Canarias	6,859	6,777	1.5
Cantabria	3,899	3,896	0.2
Castilla - La Mancha	7,507	7,490	0.8
Castilla – León	11,158	10,934	6.2
Cataluña	20,953	20,833	1.6
Comunidad Valenciana	13,939	13,905	0.8
Extremadura	5,660	5,654	0.9
Galicia	11,159	11,151	0.9
Madrid	17,119	17,082	1.3
Murcia	5,400	5,393	1.1
Navarra	3,898	3,885	0.5
País Vasco	8,960	8,949	0.9
La Rioja	2,363	2,291	4.7
Ceuta / Melilla	640		0.9

Table 3. Frequency of Reasons for Non-Valid Questionnaires: ESD

Reasons	Absolute frequency	Per cent
Wrong substitution due to temporary absence	1,019	45.1
Wrong use of supplementary information	479	21.2
Refusal of interview wrongly accepted	248	11.0
Wrong substitution instead of random selection	117	5.2
Other reasons	39	17.5

Sample bias

Differences between the number of eligible persons according to the national statistics (1991 Census) and the number of target persons was when feasible solved by supplementary respondents.

Foreign population was included in the sample but in practice these new-comers had a poor knowledge of the Spanish language so found difficulties to complete the questionnaire and were sometimes difficult to reach, which all in all created a serious problem of sample bias. This sub-sample bias was then corrected with the Census data.

Weighting

The survey provides two weighting factors, one for the estimation of the population and one for the dwellings. Furthermore, these estimators correct the sample bias. There are not any similar ESD-type surveys in Spain, but the quality of the ESD data can be compared with the Census data. Figure 1 illustrates the average number of children that women born in 1946 have had (they were aged 45 at the time of the interview in both the ESD and the Census).

ESD seems to over-estimate slightly the average number of children that higher educated women in the 1946 cohort have had, as compared to the average number of children reported by the census data for the same female birth cohort. Nonetheless, they both show a general pattern whereby women with primary education have the highest average number of children (2.4 in the census, 2.5 in the ESD) in comparison with women who had completed post-compulsory education. Therefore, it can be stated that there are no serious divergences between both sources of information.

Figure 2. Average Number of Children in the 1946 Female Birth Cohort by Educational Attainment according to the 1991 Census and the ESD



Source: ESD and Census micro-data.

The use of weighting in the sub-samples analysed

Each empirical chapter contains a detailed description of the sub-samples used in the logistic regressions which were selected according to the theoretical and technical requirements of the research question. These sub-samples were not weighted for the individual-level logistic regression for two main reasons. On the one hand, the coefficients obtained were almost the same, but on the other hand, the coefficients obtained from the logistic regression in event history analysis turned out to be systematically significant with the weights. This was owing to the fact that the observations were over-represented because of the transformation of individuals into person-year observations. Weighted samples were used in descriptive statistics, since the differences arising between weighted and non-weighted data were important.

Appendix 4: Abridged Chronology of the Political, Economic and Policy Developments in Spain: 1933-1991

1933-36	• **The Second Republic**
	• Female suffrage
	• Divorce by consent
	• Abortion Law Reform
1936-39	• **Civil War**
1937	• Family benefits paid to employed male household head
1939-75	• **Francoist dictatorship**
1937	• Family allowances for workers (paid to fathers)
1938	• Ban on married women working outside the household without husbands' permission
	• Marriage loans (paid to male household head)
1939-59	• Implementation of autarchic policies of state interventionism and international economic isolation
1942	• Family bonuses for workers (paid to men as a compliment from salary)
1960-75	• Implementation of the Stabilisation Plan: "the economic miracle" of the 1960's
1963	• Non-contributive pensions for people aged 70 and over
1975	• Death of General Franco
	• Abolition of permission of husband for wife to work outside the household
1975-1982	• **Democratic transition**
1977	• First democratic elections since 1936: victory of UCD (central-right party)
	• Moncloa Pacts: agreements on prices and incomes policies between government and political parties
1978	• Constitution of the Spanish State and the Regional Autonomous Statutes (Autonomous Communities): introduction of civil rights (such as equality, freedom and religious liberty), political rights (such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, participation and strike), and socio-economic rights (such as right to work, collective bargaining, and to education)
	• Socio-economic commitments: protection of the family, of the elderly and of health
	• Legalised contraception
	• Decriminalised acts of adultery and start living together without recognition of the State (Church)
	• Reorganisation of the welfare state into four independent institutes: health care, social security benefits, social services and unemployment
1980	• Welfare state reform: measures for increasing the coverage and expenditure on pensions and other risks
1975-85	• The deep recession
1981	• Failure coup d'Ètat
	• Legalisation of divorce
	• Rights of children born outside wedlock
	• **Consolidation of Democracy**
1982	• Second general election: victory of Socialist party (PSOE)
1983	• Legalisation of decisive contraceptive methods and creation of the Women's Institute
	• Amendments to the Workers' Statute: growth of fixed-term contracts
	• Buoyant recovery
1985	• Partial decriminalisation of abortion (only under certain circumstances)
	• Spain becomes full member of the European Community and establishment of Health General
1986	• Law which inaugurates des-centralisation of services and universal coverage of public health

	• Parental leave introduced and maternity leave extended
1989	• Tax reform: wives and husbands can now opt for taxed separately
1990	• Social minimum income: entitlement for families out of the scope of social security (non-contributory assistance) and non-contributory based pensions
1991	• Welfare state reform: introduction of means-tested non-contributory benefits for pensions, invalidity benefits and family allowances

Appendix 5: Spanish Territorial Divisions

Large regions NUTS 2	**Autonomous Communities NUTS 1**	**Provinces**
North-western	Galicia	La Coruña, Lugo, Pontevedra, Orense
	Asturias	Asturias
	Cantabria	Cantabria
North-eastern	Basque Country	Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Alava
	Aragon	Huesca, Zaragoza, Teruel
	La Rioja	La Rioja
	Navarre	Navarre
Madrid & Centre	Madrid	Madrid
	Castilla-Leon	León, Palencia, Burgos, Valladolid, Zamora, Soria, Segocia, Salamanca, Avila
	Castilla-La Mancha	Toledo, Cuenca, Albacete, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara
	Extremadura	Cáceres, Badajoz
Eastern	Catalonia	Lérida, Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona
	Valencian Community	Castellón, Valencia, Alicante
	Balearic Islands	Balearic Islands
Southern	Andalusia	Málaga, Granada, Almería, Huelva, Sevilla, Córdoba, Jaén, Cádiz
	Murcia	Murcia
Canaries	the Canaries	Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Las Palmas

Appendix 6: Couples' Gender Division of Household Labour according to the Women's Occupational Status: Spain, 1990 (%)

	In Paid-work	*Not in paid-work*	Total
Preparation of breakfast			
Mainly man	6 % (2.5)	2% (-2.5)	3%
Mainly woman	47% (-6.0)	70% (6.0)	65%
Shared equally	44% (4.8)	26% (-4.8)	30%
None	3% (2.5)	1% (-2.5)	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Doing dishes			
Mainly man	4% (3.2)	1% (-3.2)	1%
Mainly woman	68% (-6.0)	87% (6.1)	82%
Shared equally	26% (4.9)	12% (-4.9)	15%
None	3% (2.3)	1% (-2.3)	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Cleaning up the kitchen			
Mainly man	3% (2.4)	1% (-2.4)	1%
Mainly woman	65% (-6.0)	85% (6.0)	81%
Shared equally	30% (5.1)	13% (-5.1)	17%
None	2% (1.9)	0% (-1.9)	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Household repairs			
Mainly man	45% (-0.9)	49% (0.9)	48%
Mainly woman	21% (-1.8)	28% (1.8)	26%
Shared equally	29% (2.4)	21% (-2.4)	23%
None	5% (1.4)	3% (-1.4)	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Feeding children			
Mainly man	1% (0.3)	1% (-0.3)	1%
Mainly woman	55% (-4.7)	73% (4.7)	69%
Shared equally	26% (3.1)	16% (-3.1)	18%
None	17% (3.0)	10% (-3.0)	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Household cleaning			
Mainly man	1% (0.4)	1% (-0.4)	1%
Mainly woman	70% (-6.3)	89% (6.3)	84%
Shared equally	26% (5.6)	10% (-5.6)	14%
None	4% (2.9)	1% (-2.9)	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Doing the beds			
Mainly man	3% (3.5)	1% (-3.5)	1%
Mainly woman	61% (-8.1)	87% (8.1)	81%
Shared equally	34% (7.0)	12% (-7.0)	17%
None	2% (2.5)	0% (-2.5)	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Note: Sample of women in paid-work 189 and women without paid-work 612. Question addressed only to women married or cohabiting. Standardised adjusted residuals in parentheses.
Source: CIS 1990 (study n. 1867).

In this study only the individual's formal education has been considered. Thus, other qualifications such as training courses offered by public job centres, have not been included in the individual's educational career for several reasons. The most important and socially valued degrees are obtained from the officially regulated educational curriculum. Training courses mainly play the role of upgrading the unemployed or helping them to go back to work. Thus, workers are expected to show their official degrees and employers normally tend to provide them with specialised training taking advantage of public subsidised job contracts for young inexperienced workers or long-term unemployed.

A standard classification of the educational system has been elaborated to reconstruct the individual's education. This is not without a great deal of difficulty given the wide period under study during which various educational systems have coexisted as many reforms were being introduced. The homogenisation of the educational system has been made according to the following classification (does not consider reforms undertaken after the 1990s):

1. *Without formal qualifications*: illiterate or literate individuals who may have attended school but never completed or simply failed the courses.

2. *Primary education* (normally includes students aged 6-12): the student obtains a degree in elementary studies (*certificado de escolaridad*) or equivalent if older educational systems are applied (e.g. *certificado de estudios primarios*).

3. *Secondary education* (normally included students aged 13-17): this level can be attained either through high school for those who passed their primary studies (*bachillerato* route) or through technical school for those who did not pass (*formación profesional* route). Technical schools were for some time the main destination of students who failed to achieve their certificate in the elementary education, but as these schools have modernised including new branches, their reputations have changed and more students have opted for a technical education. Students who have completed high school can also jump to the second grade of technical schools.

4. High education: *College Degree* (*diplomatura*) programmed to last three years (short track) or *University Degree* (*licenciatura*) which last five years. Although, university degree is above college degree in terms of time needed to complete the grade and educational system, many technical colleges, such as

those of engineering, may have more occupational prestige and economic rewards than some university students. In this category has also been included students with *post-graduate studies* (Masters or Ph.D.).

A new educational reform was introduced in 1990 (*ESO: Educación Secundaria Obligatoria*) which, among other things, enlarged compulsory education to the age of 16 (legal working age). This reform, however, does not reach the cohorts studied here.

Appendix 8: Analysis of the residuals: actual and expected distribution of women's type of partnerships (upward, downward and homogamous) according to the educational attainment of women and their male partners by birth cohorts

COHORTS

1910-1914

Observed percentages



Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	91%	2%	4%	98%
Secondary	1%	0%	0%	1%
High	1%	0%	0%	1%
	93%	2%	5%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	1%	0%	-1%	98%
Secondary	0%	0%	0%	1%
High	-1%	0%	0%	1%
	93%	2%	5%	100%

1915-1919

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	92%	1%	0%	93%
Secondary	3%	0%	0%	3%
High	4%	0%	1%	5%
	98%	1%	1%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	91%	1%	1%	93%
Secondary	3%	0%	0%	3%
High	5%	0%	0%	5%
	98%	1%	1%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	1%	0%	-1%	93%
Secondary	0%	0%	0%	3%
High	-1%	0%	0%	5%
	98%	1%	1%	100%

1920-1924

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	92%	0%	0%	93%
Secondary	3%	0%	0%	3%
High	3%	0%	1%	4%
	98%	0%	2%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	91%	0%	1%	93%
Secondary	3%	0%	0%	3%
High	4%	0%	0%	4%
	98%	0%	2%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	1%	0%	-1%	93%
Secondary	0%	0%	0%	3%
High	-1%	0%	1%	4%
	98%	0%	2%	100%

Source: EDS 1991.

1925-29

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	90%	1%	1%	91%
Secondary	4%	0%	0%	5%
High	3%	0%	1%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	88%	1%	1%	91%
Secondary	5%	0%	0%	5%
High	4%	0%	0%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	1%	0%	-1%	91%
Secondary	0%	0%	0%	5%
High	-1%	0%	1%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

1930-1934

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	90%	0%	1%	91%
Secondary	4%	0%	0%	5%
High	3%	0%	1%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	87%	1%	2%	91%
Secondary	4%	0%	0%	5%
High	5%	0%	0%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	2%	-1%	-1%	91%
Secondary	-1%	0%	0%	5%
High	-1%	0%	1%	5%
	97%	1%	2%	100%

1935-1939

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	84%	1%	1%	85%
Secondary	5%	1%	1%	7%
High	5%	1%	2%	8%
	94%	3%	3%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	80%	3%	3%	85%
Secondary	6%	0%	0%	7%
High	7%	0%	0%	8%
	94%	3%	3%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	4%	-2%	-2%	85%
Secondary	-1%	1%	0%	7%
High	-3%	1%	2%	8%
	94%	3%	3%	100%

Appendix 8 (cont.).

1940-1944

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	78%	2%	1%	81%
Secondary	7%	1%	1%	9%
High	5%	2%	3%	10%
	90%	5%	5%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	73%	4%	4%	81%
Secondary	8%	0%	0%	9%
High	9%	1%	0%	10%
	90%	5%	5%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	6%	-3%	-3%	81%
Secondary	-1%	1%	1%	9%
High	-4%	2%	2%	10%
	90%	5%	5%	100%

1945-1949

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	73%	3%	1%	76%
Secondary	9%	2%	1%	11%
High	5%	3%	4%	12%
	86%	7%	6%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	66%	6%	5%	76%
Secondary	10%	1%	1%	11%
High	11%	1%	1%	12%
	86%	7%	6%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	7%	-3%	-4%	76%
Secondary	-1%	1%	0%	11%
High	-6%	2%	3%	12%
	86%	7%	6%	100%

1950-1954

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	65%	5%	2%	71%
Secondary	9%	3%	2%	15%
High	4%	4%	6%	14%
	79%	12%	10%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	56%	8%	7%	71%
Secondary	12%	2%	1%	15%
High	11%	2%	1%	14%
	79%	12%	10%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	9%	-4%	-5%	71%
Secondary	-2%	2%	1%	15%
High	-7%	2%	5%	14%
	79%	12%	10%	100%

1955-1959

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	54%	7%	2%	63%
Secondary	11%	7%	3%	21%
High	3%	5%	9%	17%
	68%	18%	14%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	43%	11%	9%	63%
Secondary	14%	4%	3%	21%
High	11%	3%	2%	17%
	68%	18%	14%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	11%	-4%	-7%	63%
Secondary	-3%	3%	0%	21%
High	-8%	2%	6%	17%
	68%	18%	14%	100%

1960-1964

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	51%	11%	2%	64%
Secondary	10%	10%	3%	23%
High	2%	5%	7%	14%
	63%	25%	12%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	40%	16%	8%	64%
Secondary	14%	6%	3%	23%
High	9%	3%	2%	14%
	63%	25%	12%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	11%	-5%	-5%	64%
Secondary	-4%	4%	0%	23%
High	-6%	1%	5%	14%
	63%	25%	12%	100%

1965 and later

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	58%	14%	1%	73%
Secondary	11%	9%	2%	21%
High	1%	3%	1%	5%
	71%	25%	4%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	52%	19%	3%	73%
Secondary	15%	5%	1%	21%
High	4%	1%	0%	5%
	71%	25%	4%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	7%	-5%	-2%	73%
Secondary	-4%	3%	1%	21%
High	-3%	1%	1%	5%
	71%	25%	4%	100%

Appendix 9: Analysis of the residuals: actual and expected distribution of men's type of partnerships (upward, downward and homogamous) according to the educational attainmen of men and their female partners by birth cohorts

COHORTS

1910-1914

Observed percentages



women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	91%	3%	3%	97%
Secondary	0%	0%	1%	1%
High	1%	0%	1%	2%
	92%	3%	4%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	90%	3%	4%	97%
Secondary	1%	0%	0%	1%
High	1%	0%	0%	2%
	92%	3%	4%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	2%	0%	-1%	97%
Secondary	-1%	0%	1%	1%
High	-1%	0%	1%	2%
	92%	3%	4%	100%

1915-1919

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	91%	2%	3%	96%
Secondary	1%	0%	1%	2%
High	1%	0%	1%	2%
	93%	2%	5%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	89%	2%	4%	96%
Secondary	2%	0%	0%	2%
High	2%	0%	0%	2%
	93%	2%	5%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	2%	0%	-1%	96%
Secondary	-1%	0%	1%	2%
High	-1%	0%	1%	2%
	93%	2%	5%	100%

1920-1924

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	ondary	High	
Low	92%	2%	3%	96%
Secondary	1%	0%	1%	2%
High	1%	0%	1%	2%
	93%	3%	4%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secon	High	
Low	90%	3%	4%	96%
Secondary	2%	0%	0%	2%
High	2%	0%	0%	2%
	93%	3%	4%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secon	High	
Low	2%	0%	-2%	96%
Secondary	-1%	0%	0%	2%
High	-1%	0%	1%	2%
	93%	3%	4%	100%

Source: EDS 1991.

Appendix 9 (cont.).

1925-29

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	89%	3%	3%	95%
Secondary	1%	0%	1%	2%
High	1%	0%	1%	3%
	92%	3%	5%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	87%	3%	5%	95%
Secondary	2%	0%	0%	2%
High	2%	0%	0%	3%
	92%	3%	5%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	2%	0%	-2%	95%
Secondary	-1%	0%	1%	2%
High	-1%	0%	1%	3%
	92%	3%	5%	100%

1930-1934

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	87%	3%	3%	93%
Secondary	2%	0%	1%	3%
High	2%	0%	2%	3%
	90%	4%	6%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	84%	3%	6%	93%
Secondary	3%	0%	0%	3%
High	3%	0%	0%	3%
	90%	4%	6%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	3%	0%	-3%	93%
Secondary	-1%	0%	1%	3%
High	-2%	0%	1%	3%
	90%	4%	6%	100%

1935-1939

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	84%	6%	3%	93%
Secondary	1%	1%	1%	3%
High	0%	1%	3%	4%
	85%	7%	7%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	79%	7%	7%	93%
Secondary	2%	0%	0%	3%
High	4%	0%	0%	4%
	85%	7%	7%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	4%	-1%	-4%	93%
Secondary	-1%	1%	1%	3%
High	-3%	0%	3%	4%
	85%	7%	7%	100%

Appendix 9 (cont.).

1940-1944

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	75%	9%	4%	89%
Secondary	2%	2%	1%	5%
High	1%	1%	4%	6%
	77%	12%	10%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	69%	11%	9%	89%
Secondary	4%	1%	1%	5%
High	5%	1%	1%	6%
	77%	12%	10%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	6%	-2%	-5%	89%
Secondary	-2%	1%	1%	5%
High	-4%	0%	4%	6%
	77%	12%	10%	100%

1945-1949

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	69%	11%	4%	84%
Secondary	3%	2%	2%	7%
High	2%	2%	6%	9%
	74%	15%	12%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	62%	12%	10%	84%
Secondary	5%	1%	1%	7%
High	6%	1%	1%	9%
	74%	15%	12%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	7%	-1%	-6%	84%
Secondary	-2%	1%	1%	7%
High	-5%	0%	5%	9%
	74%	15%	12%	100%

1950-1954

Observed percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	59%	12%	4%	75%
Secondary	5%	5%	4%	13%
High	2%	3%	7%	12%
	66%	20%	14%	100%

Expected percentages

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	49%	15%	11%	75%
Secondary	9%	3%	2%	13%
High	8%	2%	2%	12%
	66%	20%	14%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

men's edu. \ women's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	10%	-3%	-7%	75%
Secondary	-4%	2%	2%	13%
High	-6%	1%	5%	12%
	66%	20%	14%	100%

Appendix 9 (cont.).

1955-1959

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	52%	14%	3%	68%
Secondary	7%	7%	4%	18%
High	2%	4%	8%	14%
	61%	25%	14%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	41%	17%	9%	68%
Secondary	11%	5%	2%	18%
High	8%	4%	2%	14%
	61%	25%	14%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	10%	-3%	-7%	68%
Secondary	-4%	3%	1%	18%
High	-7%	1%	6%	14%
	61%	25%	14%	100%

1960-1964

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	49%	13%	1%	63%
Secondary	11%	11%	3%	24%
High	2%	5%	5%	12%
	62%	29%	9%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	39%	18%	6%	63%
Secondary	15%	7%	2%	24%
High	8%	4%	1%	12%
	62%	29%	9%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	10%	-5%	-4%	63%
Secondary	-4%	4%	0%	24%
High	-5%	1%	4%	12%
	62%	29%	9%	100%

1965 and later

Observed percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	60%	12%	0%	73%
Secondary	12%	10%	1%	23%
High	2%	2%	1%	5%
	74%	24%	2%	100%

Expected percentages

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	54%	17%	2%	73%
Secondary	17%	5%	1%	23%
High	3%	1%	0%	5%
	74%	24%	2%	100%

Difference between observed and expected

women's edu. / men's edu.	Low	Secondary	High	
Low	6%	-5%	-1%	73%
Secondary	-5%	4%	0%	23%
High	-2%	1%	1%	5%
	74%	24%	2%	100%

Appendix 10: Estimates for Logit Models Predicting the Probability of a Married or United Woman Change from Homemaking to Full Time Employment

Variables	Model 1 K	=ϑ+K	=exp(K)/ (1+exp(K))	Survivals synthetic cohort	Drop outs
Time in full-time Homemaking:					
< 1	–	-2.43	0.0811	1000	81
2-3 years	0.6099	-1.82	0.1397	919	128
4-5 years	0.7236	-1.70	0.1539	791	122
> 5 years	-0.0693	-2.50	0.0760	669	51
Constant	-2.4280			618	

Appendix 11: Interaction Effect of the Type of Partnership and the Presence of Children < 3 on the Transition from Full Time Employment to Homemaking

Main effects:	*b*	
Not having children < 3	Ref. cat.	
Having children < 3	0.68	***
Downward Marriage	Ref. cat.	
Upward Marriage	0.25	***
Homogamous Marriage	0.22	***
Downward Marriage* Having children < 3	Ref. cat.	
Upward Marriage*Having children < 3	-0.37	***
Homogamous Marriage*Having children < 3	-0.68	***

Interaction term:

	b	*exp (b)*
Downward Marriage * not children < 3	0	1.0
Upward Marriage* no child < 3	0.25 ***	1.3
Homogamous Marriage* no child < 3	0.22 ***	1.2
Downward Marriage * child < 3	0.68 ***	2.0
Upward Marriage* child < 3	0.55 ***	1.7
Homogamous Marriage* child < 3	0.22 ***	1.2

Note: coefficients from model 4 in Table V.2 (Chapter V).