



EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences

**Consolidating Democracies: The Theory and Practice
of Democratisation in Post-Communist Eastern
Europe (1989-2000)**

By

Svetlozar A. Andreev

This thesis submitted for assessment with
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
European University Institute

Florence, March 2003

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


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


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Examining jury:

Prof. Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard University)
Prof. Peter Mair (Leiden University)
Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter (EUI)
Prof. Jan Zielonka (EUI, supervisor)

Florence, March 2003



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Almost six years of one's life is not a short period. I am lucky to have spent them in the European University Institute and in Florence. I am thankful to my professors, colleagues and friends to have shared this period with me and created a truly 'multicultural' and pleasant environment which I became part of.

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As somebody else had probably already said (and, hence, I'll only repeat it): “Thanks to Jimmy Hendrix for playing the guitar and the Ramones for singing!”

Abstract

This thesis generally deals with the process of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe. Specifically, it explores the latter stages of this process: the consolidation and persistence of democracy, following the demise of the *ancien regime* and the conclusion of democratic transition. In other words, it tries to describe the conditions for and consequences of increased regime stability and legitimacy after the actual establishment of democracy. In theory, this usually happens after the initial holding of free and fair elections and the fulfilment of some other minimal criteria of political democracy like the existence of a multiparty system, the protection of the freedom of speech and the pluralism of media, the adoption of the constitution and the foundation of the basic political institutions of a democratic state. In practice, the consolidation of democracy is a never-ending process and even long-established democracies periodically face the problems of deconsolidation and reorganisation of their internal structure.

This research, which began in the second half of the 1990s, has followed the majority of these scientific trends quite closely and has taken over some of the theoretical ideas, conceptual tools and research methods of the previous analytical explorations of Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. It has become progressively integrated within the mainstream comparative democratisation studies, which was, and continues to be, the predominant research current focusing on democratic transition and consolidation. At the same, this thesis has acquired certain independent normative features and tried to comprehensively describe the conditions for consolidation of democracy in a post-communist context. The critical analysis of most of the recent theories of democratisation has proceeded by testing several alternative hypotheses regarding the future of democracy in the region. Moreover, the normative research on the establishment of political democracy in Eastern Europe has been supplemented with an original method of conceptualising and measuring the degree of consolidation and the quality of democracy. Together with the extensive theoretical analysis of the different paths towards democratisation, the final empirical section, featuring the innovative statistical *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM), are the two most significant contributions of this thesis.

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Introduction

This thesis generally deals with the process of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe. Specifically, it explores the latter stages of this process: the consolidation and persistence of democracy, following the demise of the *ancien regime* and the conclusion of democratic transition. In other words, it tries to describe the conditions for and consequences of increased regime stability and legitimacy after the actual establishment of democracy. In theory, this usually happens after the initial holding of free and fair elections and the fulfilment of some other minimal criteria of political democracy like the existence of a multiparty system, the protection of the freedom of speech and the pluralism of media, the adoption of the constitution and the foundation of the basic political institutions of a democratic state. In practice, the consolidation of democracy is a never-ending process and even long-established democracies periodically face the problems of deconsolidation and reorganisation of their internal structure.

Nowadays, the mainstream social research on transformation of the post-Soviet regimes predominantly relies on various theories and analytical approaches derived from the historical experience of other regions like Southern Europe and Latin America. Using the 'conceptual lenses' from other parts of the world to interpret political change and democratisation did not, however, transform Eastern Europe merely into a useful pool of data to enrich the existing literature, but turned it into a leading region in the study of democratic transition and consolidation. Already by the mid-1990s, post-communist Europe was firmly embedded in comparative democratisation studies, while new approaches to conceptualising and measuring democratic performance were increasingly experimented with relation to the previously autocratic countries.

This research, which began in the second half of the 1990s, has followed the majority of these scientific trends quite closely and has taken over some of the theoretical ideas, conceptual tools and research methods of the previous analytical explorations of Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. It has become progressively integrated within the mainstream comparative democratisation studies, which was, and continues to be, the predominant research current focusing on democratic

transition and consolidation. At the same, this thesis has acquired certain independent normative features and tried to comprehensively describe the conditions for consolidation of democracy in a post-communist context. The critical analysis of most of the recent theories of democratisation has proceeded by testing several alternative hypotheses regarding the future of democracy in the region. Moreover, the theoretical research on the establishment of political democracy in Eastern Europe has been supplemented with an original method of conceptualising and measuring the degree of consolidation and the quality of democracy. Together with the extensive theoretical analysis of the different paths towards democratisation, the final empirical section, featuring the innovative statistical *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*, are the two most significant contributions of this thesis.

There are three principal research questions in this thesis. They highlight both the theoretical debate on democratisation of Eastern Europe and the study of particular post-communist contexts in the region:

- *Question 1. What are the chances of consolidating democracies in a post-communist context?*
- *Question 2. Which are the factors contributing most to the consolidation of democracy in the region?*
- *Question 3. What are the types of democratic regimes emerging in Eastern Europe, and what are the qualitative differences among them?*

Six research hypotheses complement the answers to the above broadly-defined questions. They focus primarily on the process of consolidation of democracy and the quality of democracy in individual Eastern European countries.

Regarding the measurement of the consolidation of democratisation, the selected model of analysis concentrates on **procedural/institutional** aspects of **consolidation**. This model predominantly relies on *regime change* and *neo-institutionalist* theories of democratisation. This is a combined approach measuring the consolidation of democracy at different thresholds and at different points of time. The central goal of the consolidation process is to achieve political democracy of a superior quality without compromising either on the internal or external sovereignty of the state. After the IDEM has been scored for 20 Eastern European countries over a period of 11 years, the final results have been analysed using various statistical techniques. These

outcomes explain the relative position of individual post-communist countries with respect to the process of democratisation: i.e. their speed of accomplishing transition to democracy, their method of achieving consolidation and the likelihood of building good quality regimes.

This doctoral project has four main parts and seven chapters. Part I sets up the research framework for analysing democratisation in post-communist Europe. Part II defines political democracy, synthesises the analytical debate about conceptualising normatively transition to and consolidation of democracy, and proposes a new way of analysing theoretically and operationalising empirically these two processes in terms of democratisation. Part III addresses the issue of measuring the level of political democracy and the degree of its consolidation using the IDEM. Finally, Part IV presents the conclusions of this research.

Regarding the structure and content of individual chapters, they follow closely the functional distribution of the different parts of this thesis. Chapter 1 presents the main features of this project, including the theoretical hypotheses, the concepts, the empirical variables and the research design. Chapter 2 takes a look at the central elements of a democratic system and provides a working definition of political democracy. Chapter 3 explores the impact of various institutional arrangements on post-communist democratisation. Chapter 4 reviews the principal theoretical assumptions of 'transitologists' and 'consolidologists'. A new method of conceptualising and operationalising the processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy is also proposed. Chapter 5 examines the overall structure of the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* by looking into the choice and meaning of the individual factor variables. Chapter 6 analyses the statistical results of the IDEM for a period of eleven years. Finally, chapter 7 evaluates the theoretical and empirical outcomes for the social sciences after a decade of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe.



Part I

A Research Framework of Studying Democratisation in Eastern Europe

“It is better to ask some of the questions than to know all of the answers”.

– James Thurber (1945),

The Scotty Who Knew Too Much



Chapter 1

Consolidating Democracies: Main Concepts and Research

Hypotheses

1.1. Introduction

More than a decade has elapsed since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. The different countries from the region have chosen diverse paths of political, social and economic transformation. Although some of the divergences between East-Central European countries and the former Soviet satellite states have become increasingly obvious, few regimes from the old Communist Bloc have rejected democracy both as a political ideal and system of government or have opted for autocratic variants of state rule. With the gradual transformation of most of the former Communist parties from totalitarian into normal political parties, and the remarkably 'low profile' kept by the military and former security services, the prospects of democratisation for the whole of Eastern Europe have been more positive than anytime before. As with previous transitions to democracy in other regions of the world like Southern Europe and Latin America, the attention of scholars and decision-makers has increasingly shifted from the earlier preoccupations of creating the necessary conditions for democratisation and avoiding democratic breakdown to the deepening of democracy and improving the performance of democratic regimes.

Thus, the question of consolidation of democracy has steadily emerged in the discussions of regional specialists and local experts. The notion of democratic consolidation has traditionally been mentioned as the period after the transition from autocratic rule to another type of political regime, usually presumed to be a democracy. In other words, consolidation has been considered to start immediately after the actual realisation and institutionalisation of democracy. This process has also been referred to as a 'transition from democracy to democracy'. Its main

characteristics have been regime stability and the elimination of the uncertainties regarding the establishment of political democracy. A necessary condition for the successful consolidation of democracy has not only been the mere survival of government, but also the attitudinal and behavioural support by the majority of the population. That is why many observers pointed out that, temporally, the consolidation of democracy has been a much lengthier process than the transition to democracy.

There is hardly any doubt that the post-communist context has additionally influenced the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe and has certainly rendered this process far more complex than other democratic transformations. A number of interrelated issues have influenced the process of democratisation. For instance, the problem of simultaneous political and economic transitions, the priority of nation- and state-building, the increased role of international factors in domestic matters and globalisation in general, the pervasiveness of the former *nomenklatura* elite recruitment system and the shortage of well-prepared and experienced administrators, the poor institutionalisation of the political parties and other democratic institutions, the lack of a proper legal basis for conducting reforms and the outdatedness of most communist constitutions, the remarkable passivity of civil society and the lack of a democratic political culture have only been some of the important issues characterising the post-revolutionary phase after the demise of the previous autocratic system. The practical realisation of democracy in a post-communist context has been so variegated and ridden with tasks that the consolidation process, which some of the countries of the regions have only begun, has been much more complicated and profound than had initially been expected. Apart from the considerable *number* of reforms needed to be implemented in a short time, another unique feature of Eastern European democratisations has also been the *sequencing* of these transformations, i.e. their temporal adjustment with the electoral cycle and the busy calendar of individual politicians. As a result, not a single type of democracy, but a whole range of political regimes, including a notable majority of democratic ones, has emerged after the fall of communist rule. Bearing all of these factors in mind, it is probably appropriate to speak of 'consolidation of democracies' rather than of a unitary and overarching process of 'consolidation of democracy'.

This chapter addresses the structure and scientific *raison d'être* of this thesis as a whole. It reviews the main concepts, research hypotheses and analytical variables regarding the study of the consolidation of democracy in post-autocratic Eastern Europe. It also tries to incorporate some past and present theories of democratisation based on the experience of Southern European, Latin American and other regimes having previously undergone democratic transformations into the current research. Moreover, this chapter attempts to critically look at the period after the fall of communism and to analyse which factors have contributed most to the democratisation of individual Eastern European countries and the region in general. A final contribution of this part of my thesis is to establish a link between the various theories of democratisation and empirical reality after the collapse of the previous political system – namely, by building an analytical model that includes the possibility of measuring the degree of consolidation and the quality of democracy.

1.2. Positioning of the Research

This thesis generally deals with the process of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe. Specifically, it explores the latter stages of this process: the consolidation and persistence of democracy, following the demise of the *ancien regime* and the conclusion of democratic transition. In other words, it tries to describe the conditions for and consequences of increased regime stability and legitimacy after the initial establishment of democracy. In theory, this usually happens after the holding of free and fair elections and the fulfilment of some other minimal criteria of political democracy like the existence of a multiparty system, the protection of the freedom of speech and the pluralism of media, the adoption of the constitution and the foundation of the basic political institutions of a democratic state. In practice, the consolidation of democracy is a never-ending process and even long-established democracies periodically face the problems of deconsolidation and reorganisation of their internal structure.

The notion of consolidation of democracy is a relatively recent theoretical concept. The coinage and primary usage of this term were predicated upon the depiction of the state of democracy in some formerly autocratic countries that were quite different

from the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Historically, the core of 'transition studies' were the Latin American countries which had experienced numerous attempts at democratisation and repeated failures of successive democratic governments because of military interventions and poor economic performance. Although social sciences in Europe and North America had traditionally been strong at studying democracy as a political regime, it was only after the democratisation of Southern Europe in the mid-1970s and of several South-East Asian countries like Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea a decade later that the issues of consolidation and deepening of democracy decidedly came into being. Not surprisingly, most of the classical writings of the emerging sub-disciplines of 'transitology' and 'consolidology' were produced by comparative social scientists during roughly the same period of time.¹ For instance, these scholars analysed the liberalisation of and modes of extrication from the previous authoritarian regime, as well as the performance of the new democratic governments in such vastly different places as Brazil and Greece, South-Korea and Portugal.²

The issue of comparison was hardly relevant in the communist context, while democratisation was not envisaged by the majority of local and foreign specialists as even a distant prospect. Because of the 'opaqueness' and staunchly autocratic (as well as ideological) nature of most of the Communist Bloc regimes, the research of the political and social systems of these countries was dominated by regional experts. The academic writings of the so-called 'Sovietologists' were predominantly descriptive and carried little 'added value' for social scientists interested in regime transformation cases outside the communist system.³ For example, regional scholars usually focused

¹ Huntington, S. (1968); Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University); Rustow, D. (1970); "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April 1970), pp. 337-63; Dahl, R. (1971); Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale University Press); and O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

² Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (eds.) (1978); The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Weiner, M. (1987); "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy", *Political Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 1987); Karl, T. and Schmitter, P. (1991); "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 45, pp. 269-84; and Chull Shin, D. (1994); "On the Third Wave of Democratisation: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research", *World Politics*, No. 47 (October 1994).

³ Hough, J. F. (1977); The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Harvard: Harvard University Press); Bunce, V. (1983); "The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, pp.129-158; and Voslensky, M. (1988);

either on the power shifts at the highest levels of the communist party apparatus in key socialist countries, or on the predominant structural conditions of these countries related to competition with the capitalist 'West' internationally and the possible civil discontent with, and opposition to, selected policies of the ruling elites domestically.⁴

Already in the mid and late 1970s some of the inherent limitations to communist studies were becoming apparent, and even the close similarities among most socialist regimes could not be rationalised scientifically and produce discernible theoretical results.⁵ Moreover, because of a number of objective difficulties, the vast majority of social scientists conducting empirical research on the region and the communist system were little able to expand their respective analytical views until the Gorbachev era. These problems were primarily related to the unavailability or provision of unreliable data regarding most of these countries, closed archives, linguistic limitations and the lack of funds for travelling and publishing one's original findings. Even the initially promising sub-discipline of 'comparative communism', focusing on the similarities and differences between communist systems, did not advance very much either, mainly because of the above-mentioned practical problems of data collection and processing as well as because of the generally poor theoretical contributions on the part of interested researchers.⁶ The inconsequential character of the majority of comparative writings focusing on communism led to the public acknowledgement by some authors about an "elusive target" and the "unfinished revolution" of the sub-field, while these feelings combined with an overall pessimism about the possibility of making substantial new progress in this domain.⁷

"The Soviet System: Historical and Theoretical Evaluation", in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan (eds.) The Soviet Union and the Challenge of the Future, Vol. 1: Stasis and Change (New York: Paragon House Publishers), p. 3-12.

⁴ Fleron, F. and Hoffman, E. (eds.) (1993); Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology (Boulder, CO: Westview); Amann, R. (1986); "Searching for an Appropriate Concept of Soviet Politics: The Politics of Hesitant Modernization?" *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.16, No. 4, pp. 475-494; Odom, W. (1992); "Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts", *World Politics*, Vol. 45 (October 1992); and Tucker, R. (1992); "Sovietology and Russian History", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp.175-196.

⁵ Nelson, D. (1993); "The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe", in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.) Developments in East European Politics (London: MacMillan), pp. 242-61, p.246.

⁶ *Ibid.*; p. 247.

⁷ Bunce, V. and Echols, J. (1979); "Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era: Pluralism or Corporatism", in Donald R. Kelley (ed.) Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (New York: Praeger), pp. 1-26; and Tokes, R. (ed.) (1975); Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology and People (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

By the time certain communist regimes in East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union itself began to show increasing signs of instability and of potentiality for political and social liberalisation, the prevailing attitude among social scientists was that traditional area studies could be incorporated into conventional political science only with great difficulty, because of the considerable theoretical distortions and conceptual gaps in analysing communist regimes. According to Henry Teune, however, “without general theoretical concepts, the study of Eastern European political systems [will] remain an ‘area study’, a descriptive enterprise apart from mainstream political science”.⁸ That is why, by the end of the 1980s the message of leading scholars studying the transformation of other authoritarian regimes was quite clear: for a number of reasons already stated, ‘Sovietologists’ were lagging behind in the development of the necessary methodological and empirical tools for studying and predicting the future of the communist system. At the same time, the majority of the theories produced by area specialists were both increasingly marginalised within the rapidly progressing comparative political sciences and unhelpful for further use outside the boundaries of the Communist Bloc.

It came as no surprise then, that, after the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe, regional studies were quickly absorbed by the wider discipline of comparative politics. These latter became, in turn, dominated by democratisation studies as a leading political science sub-field in the post-communist period.⁹ Nowadays, social research on the transformation of the post-Soviet regimes seem to have decidedly retreated from area and system-specific studies, while the majority of comparative specialists have gradually moved into the Eastern European ‘research market’ by introducing various concepts and analytical visions derived from the experiences in Southern Europe and Latin America.¹⁰ Using the ‘conceptual lenses’ from other parts of the world to interpret systemic change and democratisation did not, however,

⁸ Teune, H. (1984); “Integration”, in Giovanni Sartori (ed.) Social Science Concepts: A Systemic Analysis (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications), p. 130.

⁹ Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2000); “What has Eastern Europe Taught Us about The Democratisation Literature (and Vice Versa)?”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (June 2000), pp. 517-39, p. 517.

¹⁰ Linz, J. (1990); “Transitions to Democracy”, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Summer 1990); Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press); and Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1992); “The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America”, in Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, Peter Volten (ed.) (New York: Institute for East-West Studies), pp. 42-68.

transform Eastern Europe merely into a useful pool of data to enrich the existing literature, but turned it into a leading region in the study of democratic transition and consolidation. Already by the mid-1990s, post-communist Europe was firmly embedded in comparative democratisation studies, while new approaches to conceptualising and measuring democratic performance were increasingly experimented with relation to the previously autocratic countries.¹¹

This research, which began in the second half of 1997, followed the majority of these scientific trends quite closely and has taken over some of the theoretical ideas, conceptual tools and research methods of the previous analytical explorations of Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. As a matter of fact, it has become progressively integrated within the mainstream comparative democratisation studies, which was, and continues to be, the predominant research current focusing on democratic transition and consolidation. At the same, this thesis has acquired certain independent normative features and tried to comprehensively describe the conditions for consolidation of democracy in a post-communist context. The critical analysis of most of the recent theories of democratisation has proceeded by testing several alternative hypotheses regarding the future of democracy in the region. Moreover, the research on the establishment of political democracy in Eastern Europe has been supplemented with an original method of conceptualising and measuring the degree of consolidation and the quality of democracy. Together with the extensive theoretical analysis of the different paths towards democratisation, the final empirical section, featuring the innovative statistical *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*, are the two most significant contributions of this thesis.

To sum up, this research is based upon, and applies, some of the theoretical assumptions of the comparative democratisation studies. Although being a regional study of democratic transformation of post-communist Eastern Europe, it utilises the

¹¹ Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Geddes, B. (1996); "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America", in Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America, Lijphart, A. and Waisman, C. (eds.), (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press), pp. 15-41; Gasiorowski, M. (1996); "An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 469-483; and Schedler, A. (1997); "Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation", Working Paper, No. 50 (November 1997), Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna.

system study methods and theoretical concepts developed during previous transitions to democracy in, for instance, Southern Europe and Latin America. With regards to the various dimensions of consolidation of democracy – this being the main analytical focus of my research – they are explored using the most recent theoretical approaches in the field. Finally, I try to express my own theoretical view about the progress of democratisation in Eastern Europe and, simultaneously, I experiment with a new method of measuring the level of democratic consolidation using the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*.

1.3. Main Concepts


Although this thesis analyses the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe in its entirety, taking into account its various aspects and phases, prime attention is paid to the **consolidation of democracy (CoD)**. The main problem of dealing with the concept of consolidation of democracy (or ‘democratic consolidation’) is the difficulty of perceiving it both as a final objective and a distinct sub-process of democratisation. In other words, the notion of democratic consolidation may serve a double purpose: to refer to a stage of the democratic transformation process or describe a continuous development. Later on in this thesis, I provide a full range of analytical perspectives towards explaining the different uses of the concept of consolidation of democracy.¹² Here, I would like only to highlight the central place of the notion of democratic consolidation in this research as well as to establish its analytical relationship with other important concepts, such as autocracy, political democracy and the quality of democracy.

Below I propose a scheme of the evolution of the democratisation process as depicted by the majority of the comparative democracy theories. Under each important stage, or threshold, of democratic transformation, there is a reference to one main concept used to clarify the chief ideas and research hypotheses of this thesis. The periods spanning the various important ‘political moments’ leading to democratisation are denoted as Transitions 1, 2 and 3, and they correspond to the provisional phases of

¹² See Chapter 4 “Transition to Democracy and Consolidation of Democracy, and Possible Ways of Measuring Them”.

regime change as envisaged by most scholars in the actual transition and consolidation literature.¹³

Diagram 1



Autocracy – in the case of Eastern European countries the type of autocratic system, *communism*, is quite different from other oppressive modes of political rule. It is one of the extreme forms of dictatorship, characterised by an exclusive ideology and a totalitarian/military structure of both the state and society.¹⁴ Because of the severity of the previous political system, the liberalisation of the various autocratic regimes has been virtually impossible or, when it occurred, it has been rather brief compared to other democratic transitions. Parallel to this, the particular legacies of communism, differing sometimes considerably from country to country, have been more intractable

¹³ Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation ..., (fn. 11); Plasser, F., Ulram, P. and Waldrauch, H. (eds.) (1998); Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe (London: MacMillan); Schedler, A. (1998); "What is Democratic Consolidation?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2; and Schmitter, P. and Guilhot, N. (2000); "From Transition to Consolidation. Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy", in Dobry, Michel (ed.) Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe. Lessons for the Social Sciences, (London: Kluwert Academic Publishers), pp. 131-46.

¹⁴ For some empirical reflections on and normative classification of the communist models of governance see Selznick, P. (1952); The Organizational Weapon (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press); Friedrich, C. and Brzezinski, Z. (1965); Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); and Perlmutter, A. (1981); Modern Authoritarianism. A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New heaven and London: Yale University Press), esp. Chapters 2 and 4.

and hard to describe normatively than the legacies of milder versions of authoritarian regimes, i.e., in Latin America and Southern Europe.¹⁵

Political democracy – with the establishing of this kind of ruling system, Transition I ('transition to democracy') is completed. Of course, the varieties of existing regimes corresponding to the theoretical description of 'political democracy' are numerous, but it is generally assumed that this kind of governing system is based on certain political principles and rules that are valid for all democratic regimes. These are, for instance, the fundamental political rights of competing for office and getting elected, of participating in elections without exclusion and not being constrained to perform one's official duties by certain "veto groups" such as the military, a hierarchical bureaucracy and the secret police, or the civic freedoms of having free access to independent information and being able to disseminate it, of being allowed to hold public meetings and strike, and of having the liberty to associate with other individuals and to create professional and other sorts of interest organisations.¹⁶ Additionally, the political unit (the 'state') should be guaranteed its territorial and functional integrity, whereas a democratic constitution should usually be adopted in order to guarantee the lawful working of democracy after transition. In the next chapter, I define political democracy as the main theoretical variable which allows me to operationalise the consolidation of democracy both as a concept and as a sub-process of democratisation.

Consolidation of democracy (CoD) – this has become one of the principal procedural criteria for assessing the progress of democratisation and systemic transformation in general. The meaning of this notion varies considerably, especially in a post-communist context. Some scholars describe it as a 'second' transition to a more stable and better performing democratic regime.¹⁷ Others equalise it with political

¹⁵ See, for instance, Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.) (1997); Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press), IAS, No. 96.

¹⁶ These political criteria correspond to the main categories of Robert Dahl's popular description of an almost-perfect democracy, *polyarchy*. Dahl, R. (1989); Democracy and its Critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 221-22.

¹⁷ Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995); The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: The

institutionalisation and legitimacy.¹⁸ Whereas a third group of social scientists associate this term with regime persistence¹⁹ and with the passage of time during which democracy is intensely tested but continues to exist.²⁰ Probably the most central feature of democratic consolidation is that it is a period of 'normalisation' of political and social life after the previously dynamic phase of elite confrontation and different revolutionary tactics during the extrication from the *ancien régime*. Philippe Schmitter stresses the role of the "bounded uncertainty" of the situation following the first stage of democratic transition and the "contingent consent" of political actors willing to respect the outcomes of democratic reforms produced during the whole democratic transformation but especially during the second period of democratisation, i.e. consolidation.²¹

According to him:

"Consolidation could be defined as the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities, i.e. politicians and citizens, that participate in democratic governance."²²

A final consideration regarding the nature of the democratic consolidation period (Transition 2) is that it could be much lengthier than the preceding transition to

Johns Hopkins University Press); and Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (eds.) (1998); Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist Societies, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

¹⁸ Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press); and Morlino, L. (1995); "Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe", *International Political Science Review* Vol.16, pp. 145-67.

¹⁹ Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (1996); "What Makes Democracies Endure?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 39-55; and Schedler, A. (1997); "Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation", Working Paper, No. 50 (November 1997), Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, (fn. 11).

²⁰ Berglund, S., Aarebrot, F., Vogt, H. and Karasimeonov, G. (2001); Challenges to Democracy. Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), p. 11.

²¹ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); "What Democracy is ... And is Not", *Journal of Democracy* 2, (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88.

²² Schmitter, P. (2000); "Neo-Corporatism and the Consolidation of Neo-Democracy", in Stein Ugelvik Larsen (ed.) The Challenges of Theories on Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 30-53, p. 41.

democracy. This is not only because of the purely 'technical' time needed to set the necessary political institutions of democracy up, but also because of the slowness of achieving consensus among politicians and the citizens to support these institutions.²³

Quality of democracy (QoD) – the issue of the quality of democracy is closely linked to the problem of consolidation of democracy. Some authors have suggested that this represents a distinct set of political and social goals after the initial moment of consolidation, since consolidated political regimes can improve their qualities further or, alternatively, deconsolidate.²⁴ Despite the growing interest in studying the quality of democracy, this issue has not been researched completely and systematically. The comparative democratisation literature includes different studies which focus, however, on limited aspects of democratic quality: namely, societal, administrative/bureaucratic, socio-economic, institutional and legal.²⁵ Thus, the question of a third 'qualitative' transition after the demise of autocratic rule remains largely unresolved, while many scholars continue to research the various dimensions of the quality of democracy.

Finally, it is interesting to analyse the existing relationship between these four concepts. The first relation is a temporal one; it is clear that democratisation is a continuous process, beginning with the liberalisation (or direct termination) of the former autocratic regime but staying open-ended because of the changing quality of the already established democracy. The second link is a functional one. Each one of these four notions represents a different threshold on the way to democratisation. For example, in order to achieve democratic consolidation, one has to be sure that (a) the vestiges of the previous autocratic regime are all safely eliminated, and (b) that the

²³ The consolidation of democracy is often perceived as reconfirming the rules of political democracy as the "only game in town". See, for instance, Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, (fn. 11), p. 5.

²⁴ Schmitter, P. and Guilhot, N. (2000); "From Transition to Consolidation. Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy", (fn. 13).

²⁵ Rose, R. and Chull Shin, D. (1998); "Qualities of Incomplete Democracies: Russia, the Czech Republic and Korea Compared", *Studies in Public Policy* No. 302 (Glasgow, UK: University of Strathclyde); Lijphart, A. (1999); *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press), especially Chapter 16 on the 'quality of democracy', pp. 275-307; Green, A. and Skalnik Leff, C. (1997); "The Quality of Democracy: Mass-Elite Linkages in the Czech Republic", *Democratization*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 63-87; Sartori, G. (ed.) (1994); *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, (NY: New York University Press); and Merkel, W. (1996); "Institutions and

political system one consolidates is really a democracy and not some kind of hybrid regime. The functional distances between these theoretical thresholds are tentatively designated as Transitions 1, 2 and 3. Although all these developments take place within and characterise the process of democratisation, they by no means describe a linear development; i.e., the evolution towards consolidated and better-quality democracies is an irregular one. This fact is supported empirically by the existence of numerous 'reverse waves of democratisation' during some previous transitions to democracy in Latin America and in other parts of the world during the 1960s, 70s and 80s.²⁶ From a normative point of view, if taken separately as theoretical concepts, both the type of autocracy (*communism*) and political democracy are *fixed* temporally and functionally, while the consolidation of democracy is *continuous* temporally but well-defined (sort of *fixed*) procedurally, and the quality of democracy is a *fluid* (unspecified) concept both temporally and functionally in this research.

1.4. Central Research Questions

Anyone trying to analyse the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe comparatively faces a double dilemma: on the one hand, the various elements of this process have to be conceptualised and integrated into a broad range of theories of democratic transformation and, on the other, the particularities of the communist system both as a historical reality for the countries of the region and as a theoretical exception among the well-known types of autocratic regimes discussed by contemporary political science literature have to be taken into account. Instead of limiting my focus to solving one of these research tasks and examining the problem of democratic consolidation from a single perspective, I would formulate the central questions of this thesis in a broader, more open manner, as follows:

Question 1. What are the chances of consolidating democracies in a post-communist context?

Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe", the *Juan March Institute Papers*, Madrid, No. 86, (December 1996).

²⁶ On the 'reverse waves of democratisation' see Huntington, S. (1991); *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press); and Diamond, L. (1996); "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions and Directions for Consolidation", in Farer, T. (ed.), *Collectively Defending Democracy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

Question 2. Which are the factors contributing most to the consolidation of democracy in the region?

Question 3. What are the types of democratic regimes emerging in Eastern Europe, and what are the qualitative differences among them?

The answers to this triad of questions are, of course, neither simple nor straightforward. They very much depend on the method of analysis as well as on the empirical perspective one takes towards exploring these issues. Although it is still not certain which Eastern European countries have managed to consolidate democracy, it is quite probable that a large number of them have completed democratic transition and are already in a process of consolidation.²⁷ Because of the blurred boundaries between hybrid and democratic regimes, on the one hand, and unconsolidated political democracies and consolidated ones, on the other, it is very difficult to identify the exact set of factors having an impact on democratic consolidation. As for the answer to the third question, even though the number of research cases is limited to the actual countries of post-communist Eastern Europe, it is clear that the variety of political regimes and the emerging qualitative differences among them are quite substantial.

Finally, it is interesting to note that, although I try sometimes to respond to these questions separately, in the major part of my thesis, I attempt to do this simultaneously. Parallel to this, however, the possible answers to the above three questions are not only theoretical but also practical. That is why, apart from critically using various comparative theories of democratisation in relation to my main variable – the consolidation of democracy – I also try to measure the level of consolidation and the quality of democracy empirically by using the statistical *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*.

1.5. A Tentative Model of Analysis

²⁷ Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A., Shor, B. (1997); Nations in Transit 1997: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).

In this section, I expose my principal dependent variable and its different aspects. I also make a selection of the general theories and sub-theories, the main hypotheses and theoretical models, as well as the various explanatory variables related to the consolidation of democracy. As a whole, I try to build a tentative model for analysing the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe. By doing this, I hope to conceptualise my central research concepts normatively and operationalise them for measurement purposes. However, I would like to underline, that this is not a comprehensive model of addressing the whole range of problems linked to the consolidation of democracy in the former Communist Bloc, rather, it represents my own view about how this concept could be theorised and measured empirically. This is accomplished bearing in mind both the current theoretical achievements of the comparative democratisation literature as well as the specific historical background and the emerging qualitative differences among the Eastern European countries. In Table 1 below I exemplify the various characteristics of this model (see Table 1).

In the last couple of decades, many scholars have unsuccessfully tried to 'crack' the consolidation of democracy 'conceptual nut'. The main problems with describing analytically and operationalising this term have been (a) its multidimensionality as a concept describing the 'state of democracy' either within a political regime or in general and (b) its differentiated significance as a sub-process related to and depending on the progress of democratic transformation in a given governing system. In other words, we can distinguish between a static and dynamic notion of democratic consolidation, and between a condition of democracy and sub-processes of democratisation. Moreover, when speaking about consolidation as a systemic feature of democracy, people generally mean the consolidation of a political regime, but they may also refer to the prerequisites and, even, to certain qualities of consolidated democracies such as a functioning market economy, a state's overall economic development, social welfare, cultural homogeneity, a democratic constitution and a working legal system, the freedom of speech, the independence of the media and so on. At the same time, when analysed dynamically (i.e. as a continuous political development), democratic consolidation is described both as an independent sub-process and a goal of the same or another process like democratisation, democratic transition, political liberalisation, globalisation, etc.

Table 1

Dependent variable	Main aspects	General theories	Sub- theories	Testable models & hypotheses	Theoretical approaches	Explan (independen variables)
CoD	<u>Procedural</u>	<i>Regime change</i>	1. Mode of transition	Elite settlement; Political competition and participation	Actor-centred (procedural/ behavioural/ attitudinal)	Elite-elit elite-so relatic electoral mode: politi competi particip:
			2. Democrati- sation ("only game in town")	Double- transition; Absence of "reserved domains"; Consolidation of democracy (as an independent process)	Procedural/ Structural (mixed) (Behavioural)	Democ procedur norm politi behavi quality democr tim
	<u>Institutional</u>	<i>Neo- institutionalism</i>	3. Institutions of democracy (institution- building)	Constitutional engineering; Parliamentary vs. presidential regimes; Types of electoral systems	<i>Institutional/ Legal</i> (structural)	Politic instituti the legisl the execu the politi parties, media, courts, constituti other kin laws

This, in turn, has often led to conceptual tautologies and to an overlapping between the notional meaning of consolidation of democracy and the analytical features of this process.²⁸

It is for this reason that some scholars, such as Giuseppe Di Palma and Geoffrey Pridham, have preferred to separate the defining aspects of democratic consolidation into two groups: (1) *institutional and procedural*, and (2) *attitudinal and social*.²⁹ The

²⁸ Schedler, A. (1998); "What is Democratic Consolidation?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, (fn. 13).

²⁹ Di Palma, G. (1990); *To Craft Democracies ...* (fn. 10); Pridham, G. (ed.) (1990); *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London: Routledge); and Pridham, G. (1999); "Democratization in the Balkan Countries. From Theory to Practice", in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds.) *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans* (London: Routledge).

first group of qualities stresses the formal organisational features of democracy, while the second focuses on the overall societal, economic and cultural characteristics of the democratic system. It is worth mentioning that Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have also analysed a number of types of consolidation which are closely related to the above mentioned groups.³⁰ They distinguish between *constitutional*, *attitudinal* and *behavioural* consolidation. *Constitutional* consolidation refers to a society's habituation with the institutions and formal (legal) rules of the democratic process. *Attitudinal* and *behavioural* consolidations mean that a strong majority of the population has reached a consensus about the legitimacy of the existing political regime and does not seek antisystemic alternatives to change the democratically elected government. Finally, Sten Berglund and his colleagues have not only accepted the institutional/procedural and attitudinal/social distinction, but they have also proposed a list of four factors for each group of the consolidation aspects. The elements of institutional/procedural consolidation are:

- constitutional framework;
- functioning of the political system (including electoral legislation, party system, and government stability);
- elite relations;
- international environment.

The list of factors characterising attitudinal/social consolidation includes:

- social cohesion and the level of modernity;
- people's ability to cope with differences (for example, differences of opinion or ethnicity);
- coping with political freedoms and human rights;
- civil society and political culture.³¹

I cannot fully agree with these eight elements of democratic consolidation, because both lists are neither comprehensive nor distinguishable from each other in any clear cut manner. Moreover, I strongly doubt that they reflect (as the authors claim) the present-day political situation and the problems of consolidation in most Eastern

³⁰ Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", in Larry Diamond, *et al.* (eds.) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 14-33, p. 16.

European countries. Despite all the weaknesses of this model, however, this is a good example of the analytical separation of the main aspects of consolidation of democracy and their subsequent operationalisation by listing the pertaining factors.

Following the previous discussion about the various theoretical perspectives towards consolidation of democracy, I would like to stress that in this thesis I only deal with the **procedural and institutional aspects** of this process. Why do I do that? The reason is that I prefer not only to limit my focus to merely half the relevant criteria for consolidation, but I also find it very difficult to describe analytically and measure the attitudinal/social elements of consolidation of democracy at the same time. In principle, I agree with some scholars that the attitudinal and social factors of democratisation could also be measured, but, for me, the main problem is one of processing and operationalising public opinion data. As I explain later on in my thesis, the method I use to measure the level of democratic consolidation is quantitative and not qualitative.³² Moreover, I consider the attitudinal and social elements to be less tangible and complicated to grasp, and that it would be exceptionally difficult to gather such information for all of my cases in post-communist Eastern Europe. That is why I decide to focus on the 'hard' and more specific aspects of consolidation of democracy, like procedures and institutions, rather than on the 'softer' and more elusive ones, like public attitudes and social performance.³³

The general theories used to analyse procedural/institutional consolidation are *regime change* theory and *neo-institutionalism*. The reasons for choosing these two theories are many. Primarily, I have selected them because of the particular theoretical focus of this thesis, which deals with the transformation of procedural norms and political institutions. Another reason is that both kinds of theories are comparative in character or are, at least, supportive of conducting comparative research. A third reason is that both *regime change* and *neo-institutionalist* theories are well-integrated theoretically in the democratisation studies and are often present in the contemporary democracy

³¹ Berglund, S., Aarebrot, F., Vogt, H. and Karasimeonov, G. (2001); Challenges to Democracy. Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), pp. 13-14.

³² See Chapter 5, section 5.4. "Conceptualising Analytically the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*"

³³ However, this does not mean that efforts to measure these particular aspects of the emerging political regimes in post-communist Eastern Europe has not been done. Notable examples of this are the World

literature as well. Within the group of regime change theories, the selected sub-theories are the *modes of transition* and *democratisation* (“only game in town”) theories. The other main theoretical ‘branch’ of this research, neo-institutionalism, is represented by the *institutions of democracy (institution-building)* model. Although all three sub-theories, or theoretical models, are not completely illustrative (i.e. ‘covering ground’) of their respective theoretical fields, they are by no means randomly chosen. On the contrary, they are generically linked with three alternative theoretical approaches towards studying procedural/institutional consolidation. These three approaches are: the actor-centred (procedural), institutional/legal (structural) and procedural/structural (mixed) approaches. Both the sub-theories and related theoretical approaches are well-ingrained in the comparative democratisation studies. I dedicate roughly one chapter to describing each one of the three sub-theories of my analytical model.³⁴ Moreover, I investigate the possible consequences of applying the three alternative analytical approaches in the case of consolidation of democracy of post-communist Eastern Europe. Below, I list a number of research models and hypotheses, as well as a number of connected explanatory variables, which exemplify the three main sub-theories of procedural/institutional consolidation and test the corresponding theoretical approaches at the same time.

Regarding the *modes of transition* sub-theory, the principal testable models are the ‘elite settlement’ and ‘political competition and participation’ models. These actor-centred approaches are chosen as a result of the specific transition to democracy process in Eastern Europe. For instance, in a fairly large number of post-communist countries, Round Table talks or other forms of political consultations between representatives of the opposition parties and the outgoing communist elite were organised, while electoral contestation was institutionalised in the majority of cases relatively easily. The independent variables which explain these two models are the

Values Survey and the New Democracies’ Barometer aimed at capturing societal attitudes and evaluating socio-political performance in the region.

³⁴ Chapter 2 touches upon certain aspects of procedural/structural democratisation as well as the actor-centred approach. Chapter 3 predominantly deals with institution-building and various structural approaches to consolidation of democracy. Chapter 4 focuses on both the modes of transition and different democratisation sub-theories. Chapters 5 and 6 try to measure the level of consolidation and the quality of democracy by mainly using a mixed approach and the sub-theory of democratisation. The individual factors of the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* represent, however, a collection of different theoretical notions from all three approaches.

'elite-elite' and 'elite-society' relations, the general type of 'electoral rules', and the different modalities of 'political competition and participation' besides elections.

The *democratisation* sub-theory combines several testable hypotheses: the 'double-transition', the 'absence of "reserved domains"' and the 'consolidation of democracy' (as an independent process). This is my preferred approach for measuring the progress of consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. The explanatory variables of this model are the set of 'democratic procedures and norms' contained in my definition of political democracy, the 'political behaviour' of elites and citizens, the 'quality of democracy' and 'time'. I would also like to underline that the last element is not exclusive to this analytical model, but 'time' is considered a key variable when the duration of democratisation (and consolidation in particular) is measured.

Finally, the process of *institution-building* is tested by focusing on 'constitutional engineering', the structural differences between governing regimes – i.e. 'parliamentary vs. presidential regimes', and the 'types of electoral system'. The respective variables, clarifying these theoretical hypotheses, are: the varieties of political institutions, such as the 'legislature', the 'executive', the 'political parties', the 'media', the 'courts', the 'constitution and other kinds of laws'. Of course, the list of institutional/legal variables explaining democratic consolidation is not complete from a normative point of view. However, this particular theoretical approach emphasises the structural differences between political regimes which could be empirically observed and measured.

1.6. Why Measure the Consolidation of Democracy (CoD)?

The answer to this question is not simple. Primarily, it should be mentioned that what I try to measure is not CoD as such, but the *progress* towards CoD. Additionally, one can attempt to measure the *level* of consolidation and the *quality of democracy* after an initial moment of consolidation. In fact, these are two separate dimensions of the same procedural concept. Finally, I would like to recall that what is consolidated is not a *single type* of democracy but *many different kinds* of democratic regimes. Thus, presumably, we consolidate democracies instead of a democracy.

The modern democratisation literature contains few examples of attempts to measure CoD. It is only recently that this has been done by a number of scholars in a theoretically consistent way. Worth mentioning here are Samuel Huntington's "two-turnover test"³⁵, the analytical method of Andreas Schedler³⁶, and Philippe Schmitter and Carsten Schneider's *scalogram model*, which uses an original statistical technique (*Guttman* scaling) to measure democratisation.³⁷ However, these have been just the initial – and, consequently, widely contested – attempts of measuring CoD. Indeed, CoD has traditionally been very difficult to define analytically and operationalise practically. Moreover, its 'dual nature' as a concept, describing both an ideal 'state of the political system' and a 'continuous process', have rendered the measuring of any of its features quite problematic.³⁸

Despite the apparent lack of profound theoretical or empirical research on how to measure CoD, I make a consistent effort to accomplish this task within the limits of this thesis. In chapter 4, I deal with the theoretical aspects of this problem, while in chapter 5 I conceptualise and stipulate the factors of the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM). In the following chapter 6 I describe the results obtained for 20 post-communist countries during the period 1989-1999. In conclusion, I make several proposals of how to improve this particular measurement technique, as well as of how it could be replicated in other regions and under different political circumstances.

The theoretical evolution and practical construction of the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM) for Eastern Europe follows several important stages. Firstly, from a normative point of view, I develop a specific critique of the available theories of regime change and political stability, which, in turn, explain a large part of the CoD process.³⁹ Secondly, I analyse the sub-processes and outcomes of transition to and

³⁵ Huntington, S. (1991); *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (fn. 26), pp. 266-67.

³⁶ Schedler, A. (2001); "Measuring Democratic Consolidation", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 66-92.

³⁷ Schmitter, P. and Schneider, C. (2002); "Measuring the Liberalisation and Consolidation of Democracy", paper presented at the 1st Congreso Latino-Americano, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, 9-11 July, 2002.

³⁸ See Chapter 4, section 4.6.2. "Efforts to Measure Consolidation of Democracy".

³⁹ See Chapter 4, section 4.7.1. "Revising the Normative and Practical Links between Transition to and Consolidation of Democracy".

consolidation of democracy. And, thirdly, I describe CoD as a sub-process of a large and complex systemic transformation, i.e. from communism to democratisation in the case of Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ From an empirical perspective, I operationalise CoD as a dynamic process leading to political democracy of a certain quality. I make clear that this is not a linear process, developing regularly and achieving its declared goals after a given period of time, but that, in most cases, it is reversible both qualitatively and quantitatively. I dedicate the entire chapter 5 to explaining the rationale behind the creation the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* and to outlining the characteristics of its individual factors. Finally, in chapter 6 and the appendixes at the end of this thesis, I analyse the measurement results for twenty post-communist countries and compare them with those of similar indexes pertaining to the same geographical region.

1.7. Preliminary Research Hypotheses

Following the elaboration of my research model regarding the consolidation of democracy (section 1.5.), I propose a number of preliminary hypotheses that can potentially satisfy the intermediary theoretical objectives and anticipate some of the final empirical results of this analysis. These hypotheses are by no means comprehensive and do not cover the entire research plan of this thesis. However, they address certain important aspects of the democratisation process in Eastern Europe and reveal, at the same time, the way these problems have been originally conceptualised. Moreover, by presuming certain things about the prospects of consolidation in these countries, I can later verify my assumptions both theoretically and practically using the analytical method elaborated above and the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*.

Because of the uncertain outcome of many of the ongoing transformation processes in the former Communist Bloc, I have chosen to formulate most of my investigative queries rather broadly, i.e. as general questions related to the contemporary political reality in Eastern Europe. I have six research hypotheses, which I explain below:

⁴⁰ See Chapter 4, section 4.7.2. "Alternative Perspectives: Sub-processes and Outcomes of Transition to and Consolidation of Democracy. (The Index of Democratisation – IDEM)."

Hypothesis 1. Even though transition to democracy may occur relatively quickly, consolidation of democracy will take much more time.

Unlike other democratic transformations, e.g. in Southern Europe and Latin America, I hypothesise that in post-communist Eastern Europe transition to democracy will be accomplished much faster. Democratic consolidation, being a much lengthier and uncertain process than transition to democracy, might take more time compared to transition to democracy, but it will certainly not be longer temporally than consolidation in Southern Europe and Latin America.

Hypothesis 2. Although a fairly large number of Eastern European states will become functioning political democracies, for some post-communist regimes will be very hard to accomplish a democratic transition and will remain autocratic or hybrid regimes.

This hypothesis refers to the possibility that certain political regimes will barely try to accomplish democratic transition or will get 'stuck' between autocracy and democracy. Thus, it will be impossible for them (at least initially) to develop the necessary political characteristics and institutional set-up of consolidated regimes. It is interesting to analyse whether substantial regional and sub-regional differences will in this respect emerge among the countries of the former Communist Bloc.

Hypothesis 3. The holding of free and fair elections and the building of a complete set of democratic political institutions are not sufficient guarantees that democracy will be consolidated.

This research hypothesis, increasingly popular among social scientists, questions the effectiveness of the 'electoralist' and 'institutionalist' paradigms for democratisation. I explore it in the case of the Eastern European countries. I claim that elections and other, certainly important, formal institutions are not sufficient to consolidate democracy. Moreover, I presume that political behaviour (and societal and attitudinal norms) is, for instance, equally, if not more, important for consolidating democracies after a prolonged period of communist rule.

Hypothesis 4. The problems of territorial unity, national and ethnic identity and socio-economic crisis might prove more difficult to resolve in a post-communist context and, consequently, they may stall democratic transition and consolidation.

Nowadays, these are the 'classical' diseases that plague the majority of transitions to democracy on a global scale. I assume that the post-communist context might prove inauspicious for democratisation, since the great majority of East European states are new political entities with occasionally deep ethnic and cultural cleavages amongst their populations. At the same time, these countries are obliged to conduct multiple reforms simultaneously, thus experiencing sharp economic decline and political crises as a result of the emerging problems.

Hypothesis 5. The role of international factors of democratisation will be much stronger during the initial stages of political and social transformation than during the later ones.


Apparently, the role of international factors in breaking up communist rule in Eastern Europe was substantial. However, in the subsequent period of democratisation, the impact of external actors and influences has not been so clear. After the initial phase of democracy-building, when international experts helped organise and monitor the first free elections and assisted in writing democratic constitutions, many transnational organisations retreated from the region and moved further Eastwards and Southwards. I hypothesise that the 'marginal return' of external actors' democracy promotion would be much lower during the consolidation stage than during the previous transition to democracy.

Hypothesis 6. Although some countries may consolidate democracy in general, certain political and economic institutions, being part of the governance regime ("partial regimes"), might eventually deconsolidate and affect the quality of democracy.

Here I refer to the notion of “partial regimes” (sub-systems) of political democracy.⁴¹ I believe that, after the consolidation of democracy, it is possible that certain institutions (e.g. the political parties, the central bank, the media, the secret services, etc.) may lack the proper leadership, necessary resources and organisation and, consequently, they may underperform socially and politically, or, they may even, begin to operate against the normative principles of democracy. This may, in turn, provoke the ‘melting’ (deconsolidation) of the entire political system. That is why it is important to constantly monitor the quality of democracy of such fledgling political regimes as those in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Finally, I would like to mention that I intend to come back and revise some of the original research hypothesis once this thesis is completed. In the last chapter (Chapter 7), I conclude my thesis by trying to link the theoretical and empirical observations of the process of consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. Moreover, I try to statistically ‘double-check’ some of these hypotheses by measuring certain key aspects of the above-mentioned theoretical assumptions with the innovative *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM).

⁴¹ Schmitter, P. (1992); “The Consolidation of Democracy and the Representation of Social Groups”, in Larry Diamond and Gary Marks (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Democracy. Essays in Honor of S.M. Lipset (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications), pp. 422-49.




Part II

Defining Democracy and Conceptualising the Process of Democratisation in a Post- Communist Context

“I distrust all systematisers and avoid them.
The will to a system shows a lack of honesty”

– F. W. Nietzsche (1888),

Maxims and Missiles



Chapter 2

Defining Political Democracy

2.1. Introduction

As it becomes obvious from the analysis made in the previous chapter, democracy and democratisation, defined both as theoretical concepts and elements of a political reality, have come high on the agenda of scientific researchers and decision makers concerned with the ongoing social transformations in Eastern Europe and in other territories of the world formerly dominated by communist regimes. Perhaps the temporary exhaustion of prevailing political ideologies and of modes of organisation and governing the state has led to the perception that no or almost no political doctrine could pose a serious challenge to democracy. At the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, democracy and, more concretely, one particular variant of democracy, liberal democracy, has increasingly been seen by social analysts as spreading at such a rate around time and space that it has begun to be conceived as an almost 'universal value' for different nations and diverse social and cultural milieus.⁴² At the same time, the end of history has been predicted (certainly not for the first time) as a glorious victory of free market and global democracy after the collapse of state socialism and other kinds of oppressive regimes during the past decade.⁴³

Not surprisingly, such a uncritical vision of democratisation – reminiscent of a Rostovian 'marathon race of growth' in which all follow the same track towards the same finishing-post in economics, though starting at different times and running at

⁴² Diamond, L. (1996); "Is the Third Wave Over?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1996), pp. 20-37; Sen, A. (1998); "Democracy as a Universal Value", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1998), pp. 3-17; Freedom House (1999); Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century, Century Project Team (eds.), in *Freedom in the World: 1999-2000*, (NY: Freedom House Press).

⁴³ Fukuyama, F. (1989), (1992); "The End of History", *The National Interest*, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18; and The End of History and the Last Man, (NY: Free Press).

different speeds – has raised some eyebrows among political scholars and has made them begin to question some of the premises of the currently prevailing perceptions about the spread, building and consolidation of neo-democracies. This novel form of dissatisfaction with the ambiguous environment that the study of democratisation has been evolving in and the multiple and often contradictory connotations that the term ‘democracy’ has been evoking in a large number of publications since the early 1980s, has led to the appearance of a certain version of disenchantment with and criticism of the above-mentioned developments in the political science theory.⁴⁴ The centre of this academic current has become continental Europe, especially Germany and France,⁴⁵ but it has also been solidly present in Latin America⁴⁶ and in Eastern Europe.⁴⁷ In fact, the normative stance of those critically-minded students of democracy has not been founded so much on the defence of an alternative to democracy, because it is hard to imagine a real alternative to democracy at this moment of time or in the near future, but it pretends to be treating issues which have been overlooked or simply ignored by part of their colleagues who have continuously preached the unequivocal success of political democratisation. This alternative position towards the way democratic regimes function has been linked primarily with the potential crisis of contemporary capitalism, expressed by the declining role of the welfare state, or the state in general, the rise of ethnic tensions and demands for secession by national minorities on a local level, as well as the uneasiness generated in most well-established societies about the global character of the world economy.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Albert Hirschman speaks about varieties of ‘desencanto’ with the predominant form of government in his Chapter on Disappointment, in Hirschman, A. (1982); Shifting Involvements, Private Interests and Public Action, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

⁴⁵ Nolte, D. (1992); “Diktaturen auf Urlaub?”, Der Überlick, No. 3 (1992), pp. 47-49; Offe, C. (1994); Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts, Erkundungen der Politischen Transformation in Neuen Osten, (Frankfurt/Main: Campus), 1994, Chapter 5 “Die ‘Demokratische Revolution’ in Osteuropa - eine neue Bewährungsprobe der Demokratietheorie”; and Manent, P. (1997); “Democracy without Nations?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 92-102.

⁴⁶ Weffort, F. (1990); “La América Equivocada. Apuntes sobre la Democracia y le Modernidad en le crisis de América”, in Luis Busmante et al. Estrategias para el desarrollo de la Democracie, Lima, 1990; and O’Donnell, G. (1994); “Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1994), pp. 55-69.

⁴⁷ Ágh, A. (1994); “The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the Transition Process”, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 15-34; Nodia, G. (1996); “How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 15-29; and Markwick, R. (1996); “A Discipline in Transition?: from Sovietology to ‘Transitology’”, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 255-76.

⁴⁸ Offe, C. (1996); Modernity and the State: East, West, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

During the unfolding of the current intellectual debate between the supporters of the absolute prevalence of liberal democracy and critics pointing at the geo-political particularities and socio-economic factors influencing the process of democratisation, much of what has been specific to the creation of democratic institutions and the development of democratic practices during the last decade has largely been forgotten. To a certain degree, both decision-makers and social scientists have abused the meaning and overstated the significance of liberal democracy. They have either championed the idea of the fusion between liberal democracy and capitalist economy as the only progressive and viable combination of social systems,⁴⁹ or they have simply underestimated the problems related to the quality of democracy (QoD) by focusing exclusively on the gains already obtained by reform-minded political leaders based on a dichotomy between democratic and non-democratic forms of government.⁵⁰

I can think of three possible explanations for this unsettled situation. First, this is the loose application of the term 'democracy' to describe the variegated types of political regimes which have emerged from the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Second, this is the absence of clarity about what democracy is and is not, namely, the promotion of theoretical knowledge about and consensus of what represent the basic *elements* and *principles* of political democracy, as well as the minimal set of political *procedures* (and political institutions) that make democracy operate in practice. And, third, this is the prevalent lack of understanding and integration in the contemporary literature of democratisation of the relationships between democracy, on the one hand, and the state, civil society, the rule of law, and the economy on the other, especially in the context of the recent academic attempts to explain the different outcomes of democratisation through the fusion of efforts of various socio-economic agents influencing democratic politics.

⁴⁹ Emizet, K. (2000); "The Relationship between the Liberal Ethos and Quality of Life", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 8 (October 2000), pp. 1049-1078, p. 1049; and Armijo, L., Biersteker, T., and Lowenthal, A. (1994); "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 161-175.

⁵⁰ Lijphart, A. (1999); Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 276.

Taking into consideration the above general arguments concerning the definition of democracy and the conduct of comparative analysis of the types of democratic regimes, this chapter tries to deal with a number of mutually connected issues: (a) critically to evaluate whether contemporary definitions of democracy and particularly the one I choose for my research will fit the cases of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe undergoing transformation, (b) to present a conceptual definition political democracy, (c) to make a list of the fundamental elements and principles which are essential for the operation of political democracy, and, at the end, (d) to analyse the application of these principles and norms in practice and see what kind of impact they have on the quality of democracy.

2.2. Defining Democracy

Anyone wishing to compare political democracies and measure the progress towards democratisation should have a high degree of conceptual clarity about the exact meaning of 'democracy'. Most of the democratic regimes in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and those, in particular, newly founded in the former Communist Bloc, are characterised by a great diversity of social and political conditions as well as by different post-authoritarian settings which have influenced the democratic governments' fate. Moreover, the multiplication of international factors has created different interdependencies between democratic regimes not only at the level of the state but also at the supra-national level. However, the generally optimistic spirit associated with the global rise of democracy has led some social scientists to describe certain types of government as being democratic, even though some widely accepted institutional traits of political democracy and freedoms associated with it have been successfully obscured by autocratic rulers or have been entirely absent.

The present-day confusion reigning in comparative democratisation studies regarding the meaning and appropriate employment of a dominant analytical concept, has incited social researchers to look for new ways to address the dual problem of increasing the **analytic differentiation** related to the inclusion of variegated forms of democratic regimes in the area of application of its original definition(s) and of not going beyond the limits of the **conceptual validity** of what the term 'democracy'

means in reality. With very few exceptions, this apparent contradiction has not been resolved successfully by modern social science theory.⁵¹ This has resulted in turn in what has been defined *conceptual stretching* of the notion of democracy.⁵² Democracy has often been used to denote virtually any kind of political regime which managed to do away with the previous authoritarian one, but has still not provided enough guarantees that the new rulers would govern democratically or would be allowed to do so by overarching domestic and external actors. Furthermore, similarly uncertain outcomes of the democratisation process, and, to an even greater extent, of the political, cultural, social or other sort of changes, have been labelled 'democratic' simply because they have been perceived as naturally linked with democracy as a political system or have been considered as facilitating conditions for the establishment of democratic government in power. This has led to the proliferation of cases when the term democracy has been accompanied by adjectives describing different results and types of political regimes. For example, nowadays, one can encounter academic writings where democracy is combined with such incongruent adjectives as 'guided', 'neo-patrimonial', 'national', 'bourgeois', 'electoral', 'economic' and 'corporatist', as well as with qualifiers such as 'pseudo-', 'proto-' and 'mezzo-'. David Collier and Steven Levitsky have identified more than 550 'sub-types' of a definition of democracy.⁵³ Had it been updated since publication, their list could easily have included another twenty or more recent definitions of 'democracy' and 'democratisation'.

2.2.1. *Minimalist and Intermediary Definitions of Democracy*

If democracy is to be described analytically, i.e. in terms of its political features, and not on the basis of its economic, ethnic, cultural or geographical ones, then, definitions of democracies could be divided into two main groups: *minimal* and

⁵¹ Collier, D. and Levitsky, St. (1997); "Democracy 'with Adjectives': Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Literature", *World Politics*, 49(3), p. 430.

⁵² The following publications present a difference in this respect: Sartori, G. (1970), (1984); "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970); and "Guidelines for Concept Analysis", in *Social Science Concepts*, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd.), pp. 15-72; and Collier, D. and Mahon, J., Jr. (1993); "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis", *American Political Science Review* 87, (December 1993).

⁵³ Collier, D. and Levitsky, St. (1997); (fn. 10), pp. 430-451.

intermediary.⁵⁴ Minimalist definitions trace their roots from Joseph Schumpeter's authoritative definition of democracy produced during the 1940s. He describes democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote".⁵⁵ Schumpeter's emphasis on electoral competition as the essence of the 'democracy game' pleased the majority of social scientists for many years, either because they studied the arrival of democratic regimes to power as a result of the improving of socio-economic conditions (the so-called 'modernisation paradigm'),⁵⁶ or because they tried to compare the performance of democratic governments in the West with that of authoritarian/totalitarian ones in the communist East.⁵⁷

Present-day diminished sub-types of democracy commonly acknowledge the need also for some minimal levels of political rights and civil freedoms in order for competition and participation to be meaningful. For example, Samuel Huntington states that "the most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes in which virtually the entire adult population is eligible to vote".⁵⁸ Similarly, Adam Przeworski defines democracy as a "regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections".⁵⁹ To my mind, however, these definitions do not devote enough attention to certain other fundamental liberties valued by members of society, which can allow citizens to make the rulers accountable outside the regular

⁵⁴ Further on in this work, I use the notion of 'political democracy' as a substitute for the more general concept of 'democracy'. The former is described exclusively by its political features. Moreover, its extended definition takes into account the necessary condition that there should be an 'undisputed territory for the state' in order for political democracy to be considered viable.

⁵⁵ Schumpeter, J. (1947); Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed., (NY: Harper Publications), p. 269.

⁵⁶ Almond, G. (1956); "Comparative Political Systems", in Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, Eulau, H., Eldersveld, S. and Janowitz, M. (eds.), (Glencoe, IL: Free Press); Cutright, P. (1963); "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis", American Sociological Review 28, (April 1963); and Lipset, S. M. (1994); "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", American Sociological Review 59, (February 1994), pp. 1-22.

⁵⁷ Flanigan, W. and Fogelman, E. (1971); "Patterns of Political Development and Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis", in Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development, and Democratization, Gillespie, J. and Nesvold, B. (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications), pp. 441-74; Bobbio, N. (1987); The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota); and Arat, Z. (1991); Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).

⁵⁸ Huntington, S. (1991); The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 10.

⁵⁹ Przeworski, A. (1991); Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 10.

cycle of elections. Moreover, civil liberties may go beyond and even sometimes contradict some of the legal provisions of the constitution. Thus, it is very difficult to include them in a definition of democracy explicitly. These civil liberties are, for instance, for individuals, the freedom to have free access to information and to be able to disseminate it, the right to hold public gatherings and to strike and, for groups, the possibility to form independent associations, including political parties, trade unions and various minority and interest organisations.⁶⁰ Minimalist definitions of democracy have often been equated with the outcome of competitive struggle for power every couple of years and have been particularly common among Western policy-makers who monitor and celebrate the expansion of global democracy. Such definitions run the risk of simplifying things theoretically and omitting some of the most important features of political democracy. These characteristics are usually those falling into the category of non-partisan or less overt forms of expression of political values and interests, particularly functional, territorial, co-operative and clientelistic ones. The mistake of privileging electoral contestation over some other dimensions of democracy has been what the American political scientist Terry Lynn Karl has called the “fallacy of electoralism”.⁶¹

Many social scientists tried to conceptualise democracy in a more comprehensive way, namely, by using *intermediary* definitions of democracy. It is difficult to employ here the term *maximal*, as opposed to *minimal*, because it would inevitably lead to the incorrect assumption that either most descriptions of democracy could be expanded ad infinitum by adding new social objectives and political institutions to their basic practical meaning, or that democracy could in fact be perceived as a normative threshold (or an ideal state of the political system) which all efforts of the relevant political actors should be directed to. Consequently, it might be implied that a maximal ‘property space’ exists, to be covered by such expanded definitions. For these reasons, I prefer to use the notion *intermediary* and not ‘maximal’ or ‘complete’ when referring to political democracy. In my opinion, democracy is described extensively enough at the intermediary level and there is no need to complement it

⁶⁰ Most of these liberties are listed in Robert Dahl’s definition of *polyarchy*; this is a more neutral interpretation of what constitutes a democratic regime in practice; Dahl, R. (1989); Democracy and its Critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 221.

with additional qualifiers. Further specifications would inevitably load a simple definition of democracy with extra meaning and the regime less susceptible to change.

A good example of an intermediary definition of democracy is that of David Beetham. According to him, "democracy is a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly – one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise".⁶² This is a relatively neutral conceptualisation of democracy which leaves little space for disapproval, but does not make it clear enough how the democratic regime operates in practice. In his definition, Beetham focuses predominantly on the process of decision-making and the problem of how citizens can exercise control over decision-makers. A similar, although a little bit broader version of a procedural definition of democracy, including the principle of political competition among candidates running for state positions, is formulated by Jane Mansbridge. She postulates that "the newly democratizing nations thus have two tasks: they must act quickly to foster the aggregative institutions that settle issues of fundamental conflict fairly on the basis of 'one person one vote,' but they also must provide what is not so common in the West, extensive forums for deliberation in which citizens have a voice in determining the common good".⁶³ Today, it seems undeniable that, before the population and rulers decide upon the formal and informal institutions regulating the functioning of the democratic regime, there should be a discussion about the nature of the political system as such and the common good(s) derived from political transformation. However, it remains an open question whether political democracy might be considered a common good in and for itself. Some may describe it as a common good while others may reject it altogether or, at least, perceive it as a 'non-sufficient' one to satisfy their desires. In modern-day society, it

⁶¹ Karl, T. (1990), (1995); "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990), pp. 14-15; and "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America", *Journal of Democracy* 6, (July 1995), pp. 72-86.

⁶² Beetham, D. (1992); "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratisation", in Held, D. (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy*, Political Studies 40, special issue, (Norwich: Blackwell Publishers), p. 40.

⁶³ Mansbridge, J. (1991); "What is a Democracy", *Transition to Democracy, Proceedings of a Workshop*, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council (ed.), (Washington, DC: National Academy Press), p. 8.

is very important to determine who is in possession of the ultimate authority to define the common good, including the type of democracy.

It becomes evident from the above reflections, that the various meanings people attach to the term democracy can be valuable for and serve different purposes – intellectual, philosophical or political. That is why social scientists have gradually learned to distinguish between democracy as a *system of government* and democracy as a *political ideal*. Here and generally in this research, I am predominantly interested in the first aspect under which democracy appears in social reality, i.e. as a *system of government*. As early as 1971, Robert Dahl successfully formulated the basic principles upon which modern political democracy rests: public contestation and the right to participate in political life.⁶⁴ Considering every democratisation as guided by these two key principles and every democratic regime as having been derived from these common dimensions, he proposed eight criteria for evaluating whether a given regime represented a democracy. *Polyarchy* was the name by which Dahl collectively labelled all democratic regimes. According to him, political democracy was another ideal regime and, hence, a non-existent one to be operationalised in social sciences.⁶⁵ Later on, many scholars borrowed Dahl's formal criteria of *polyarchy* based on the principles of competition and participation. Together with some further requirements, especially for the respect of human rights, civil liberties and territoriality of the political unit, they built their intermediary definitions of democracy.⁶⁶

Finally, a popular definition, which again draws heavily on Dahl,⁶⁷ is that of Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. It appears in the introduction of their book *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. In this intermediary definition, the authors describe democracy predominantly as a system of government. They also emphasise the fact that economic and social problems of democracy should clearly be separated from issues of the governmental structure and style of rule. Otherwise, it is maintained, there could be no way to analyse practically how

⁶⁴ Dahl, R. (1971); *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 1-7, esp. pp. 5-6.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; (fn. 23), p. 3.

⁶⁶ Bollen, K. (1979); "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 572-87; Sorensen, G. (1993); *Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 23-24.

⁶⁷ Dahl, R. (1971); *op. cit.*, (fn. 23).

variations on the political dimension are related to variations on the economic and social dimensions. As a result, Diamond, Linz and Lipset suggest that democracy is “a political system which meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a 'highly inclusive' level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation” (emphasis mine – S.A.).⁶⁸

2.2.2. *Defining the 'Dependent Variable': Political Democracy*

The preceding reflections on the use (and abuse) of the term democracy as well as its replacement with an alternative concept such as *polyarchy*, lead us to the conclusion that, it is rather difficult to impose restraint on the academic and practitioners' communities to refer to democracy as a political and not as a social, economic or cultural phenomenon. Therefore, I try to restrict my usage of this notion only to a distinctive political regime.⁶⁹ I identify this type of regime more specifically as 'political democracy'. Democracy, thus, becomes operationalised exclusively in terms of its political characteristics. Parallel to this, it is possible that certain qualitative aspects of the same regime to be described by referring not only to the political but also to the economic, social, cultural and security systems.

Political democracy is consequently defined as:

“The political system of governance of a state in which power is exercised by those elected by the citizens without exclusion and in which the rulers are held

⁶⁸ Diamond, L., Linz, J., and Lipset, S. M. (eds.) (1990); Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume four: Latin America, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. xvi-xvii.

⁶⁹ Gillerimo O'Donnell defines 'political regime' as “the set of effectively prevailing patterns (not necessarily legally formalised) that establish the modalities of recruitment and access to governmental roles, and the permissible resources that form the basis for expectations of access to such roles”, in

accountable for their actions in the public realm, while abiding to the principles of free competition and cooperation between the leaders who must validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their right to govern according to the constitutional and legal rules. Without exempting any officers who have the competencies to exercise effective administrative power within the territory of the state, the basic freedoms of association, information and expression are respected in all their legally recognised forms and manifestations”.

The above definition of political democracy is based on two previous intermediary definitions of democracy. Primarily, this is Juan Linz's definition of political democracy, according to which “[d]emocracy is a political system in which power to govern a state is exercised by those elected by the citizens without exclusions, which today means universal adult suffrage, free to formulate their political preferences, making use of the basic freedoms of association, information, communication and the free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means the right to govern according to constitutional and legal rules without exempting from legal control any officers with effective power and within the territory of the state. It is government *pro tempore*. It is government excluding the use of force to gain or retain power except within the limits defined by the law and respecting basic freedoms in a political system in which those governing are accountable for the violation of the basic laws by those empowered by the electorate”.⁷⁰ Secondly, this is Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl's definition of democracy in their seminal article “What Democracy is ... And is Not”. They state that “modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and co-operation of their elected representatives”.⁷¹ It seems to me, that these two definitions synthesise quite well the meaning of democracy both as a political ideal and system of governance. At the same time, the different perspectives that they offer complement

O'Donnell, G. (ed.) (1988); Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 6.

⁷⁰ Linz, J. (1997); “Democratisation and Types of Democracies: New Tasks for Comparativists”, background paper for the conference on “Democracy and Federalism”, All Souls College, Oxford, June 5-8, 1997 (unpublished paper), p. 10.

⁷¹ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); “What Democracy is ... And is Not”, *Journal of Democracy* 2, (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88, p. 76.

each other nicely and, thus, they contribute towards a good intermediary definition of political democracy.

I would like to outline hereby a number of important procedural arrangements and structural characteristics of political democracy, which are part of this definition. I shall start by clarifying the meaning of the concept "*system of governance of a state*". By this term I mean a notion comparable to the already-mentioned definition of political regime.⁷² Formulated in a different way, this represents an established pattern of rules which are observed during the making of publicly binding decisions by those having the resources and strategies to gain access to governmental positions. Moreover, the mode of access to those positions and channels of recruitment of people in power are legally institutionalised, i.e. regularly practised, habitually known and accepted by the majority of actors in the state. In many countries of the world today, the political regime requires the institutionalisation of and obedience to a complex system of legal rules. The inauguration of such a system is usually 'crowned' with the adoption of a written constitution, while many other legal norms and procedures co-exist with it and continue to have an informal, implicit or precedent basis as well. Finally, by referring to a *state* as the territorial emanation of political democracy, one should also take into consideration the fact that modern states are much more complex and conflictual in their organisation structure and institutional composition than they used to be, with implications for the size and functional scope of the political system itself.⁷³

The next paragraph deals with the meaning of the phrase "*elected by the citizens without exclusion*". Just a century ago, democracy was not the universal system of rule, practised by everyone and servicing a great number of people as it is at present. On the contrary, democracy was confined to limited sets of individuals, distinguished by their right to citizenship and belonging to a particular social and religious class, or gender, ethnic and age group. The people promoted to government positions under such a system of rule had the double privilege of being able both to vote in elections and to deliberate and decide about the future of democratic regime. Social scientists

⁷² See fn. 28.

gave different names to such early variations of democracy. These regimes were generally referred to as *proto*-democracy or *pseudo*-democracy, but more specific appellations of political systems where full suffrage was missing were also provided: "limited democracy",⁷⁴ "male democracy",⁷⁵ and "oligarchic democracy".⁷⁶ Nowadays, the participation of individuals in the democratic process is considerably less restricted, allowing the inclusion of the majority of the population in politics (e.g. women, minorities and young people) and the universal extension of the right to vote. Nevertheless, there are still blatant cases of segregation with regard to the occupation of government positions and choice of candidates on the basis of gender, language and race in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia.

The sentence "*the leaders ... must validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their right to govern*" regards the issue that elections in a political democracy should be held reasonably frequently. Elections should be conducted usually every four or five years, depending on the provisions made as a reference to this in the constitution. This is a well-established practice in most developed Western democracies and in some newly consolidated ones in other parts of the world. There are, of course, slight exceptions to the rule. For instance, the election of the French president every five years is an exceptional case as it is due to a unique combination of political and historical reasons. This situation dates back to the early days of Fifth Republic when President Charles De Gaulle decided to introduce a complex system of government with a powerful president who shared power with the prime minister and the legislature. There is a debate going on in France now, however, whether and by how much the current seven-year mandate of the president should be reduced. An additional feature of modern democracies is that regular elections should be held not for the national executive and legislature only, but at all levels of public administration, i.e. local, provincial and federal. This depends very much on the size of the polity, while the effectiveness of the different levels of government (local,

⁷³ Luhmann, N. (1992); "Complessità Sociale", *Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali*, Rome 1992, Vol. II, pp. 126-34; Carothers, T. (ed.) (1999); *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*, (Washington, DC: Brooking's Press), esp. pp. 157-207.

⁷⁴ Archer, R. (1995); "Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy", in Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (eds.), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 166.

⁷⁵ Sorensen, G. (1993); (fn. 25), p. 20.

provincial, federal) influence directly the overall quality of democracy. Ultimately, what is understood by the expression “*to validate by non-violent means*” is that both leaders and individuals should compete for governmental positions without the use of violence, particularly by not applying physical force against each other or silencing political opponents by using other less overt methods of coercion. The actual application of this principle is quite important, especially with concern to the period after elections, because it is believed that democracy as a political system should set up not only fair procedural rules under which political parties compete, but also to enforce compliance among actors to learn “lose peacefully”.⁷⁷

I would like to turn now to my final consideration about the meaning of the phrase “*without exempting any officers who have the competencies to exercise effective administrative power within the territory of the state*”. This requirement hinges upon a quite central feature of modern democracies: the maintenance of the political and functional autonomy of the persons elected to power. As has been demonstrated by number of publications on this subject previously, interference in the work of democratic institutions is one of the most common ‘diseases’ plaguing present-day democratic regimes.⁷⁸ One way of doing this is to terminate the regular mandate of elected and some appointed officials prematurely. Even though the constitution or other legal provisions may outlaw this practice on paper, rulers often resort to administrative measures to get rid of their political opponents. This mode of solving problems by using discretionary powers has been labelled “delegative democracy”,⁷⁹ since government officials act as if having been delegated powers by other political institutions or directly by the people. The predominant political role played by popularly elected presidents in certain regions and countries is sometimes a case of

⁷⁶ Hartlyn, J. and Valenzuela, A. (1994); “Democracy in Latin America since 1930”, in Bethell, L. (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. 6, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 99.

⁷⁷ Mansbridge, J. (1991); (fn. 22), pp. 6-7.

⁷⁸ Valenzuela, S.J. (1992); “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions”, in Mainwaring, S., O’Donnell, G., and Valenzuela, S. J. (eds.), *Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in a Comparative Perspective*, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press), esp. pp. 64-66; and Harald, D. (ed.) (1998); “Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability: A Conference Report”, *Institut für Hoehere Studien*, Politikwissenschaft, working paper No. 320.

⁷⁹ O’Donnell, G. (1993), (1996); “Delegative Democracy”, in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 94-108; and especially “Illusions about Consolidation”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 34-51.

autocratic behaviour. These are, for instance, in Latin America, Peru's former president Alberto Fujimori and Venezuela's current one Hugo Chavez, and, in the CIS, Russia's former head of state Boris Yeltsin and the majority of leaders of the recently created Central Asian republics. The rule of all of these people has been characterised by frequent intervention in the operation of other public institutions, like the legislature and the judiciary, and this has substantially deteriorated the domestic and international image of such regimes as being democratic indeed. Another way of excluding democratically elected officers from effectively occupying their positions is to allow unaccountable groups, like the military, the state bureaucracy or the secret services to intervene in certain policy areas, which should normally be controlled by civilian authorities. Although most of the enumerated non-democratic practices and actors have successfully been dealt with during the early period of transition in East-Central Europe, non-elected authorities and especially the armed forces are conditioning the development of democracy in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in Latin America and particularly in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in Central America.⁸⁰ There is a third, less obvious, way of denying democratically elected office to rule effectively – by imposing a supreme political authority over them by actors situated and operating outside the administrative premises of the state. Although there is relatively little research done on this subject, it seems relevant to analyse such developments, especially after the collapse of the East/West geo-political divide and the surge of global economic and social interests. This is significant, particularly in the case of smaller states, because even if their larger neighbours may actually be democratic, any outside intervention could be considered a threat to one's national identity and an imposition of the larger and more power political unit's will. Historically, there are many examples that may support such a thesis. I need only to mention the cases of Cyprus, Granada, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia to give some understanding of the problem that this profoundly undemocratic practice presents.

⁸⁰ Karl, T. (1995); "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America", *Journal of Democracy* 6, (July 1995), pp. 73-86; Remmer, K. (1996); "The Sustainability of Political Democracy: Lessons from South America", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 6, pp. 611-634; and Boussard, C. (2000); "Civil Society in the Consolidation Process: Illustrations from Central America", paper presented at the ECPR Joint-Sessions Workshop, Copenhagen, Denmark, April 14-19, 2000.

2.3. Key Elements, Principles and Procedures of Political Democracy

In this section I am going to describe the most important elements, principles and procedures characterising political democracy as a unique system of government. Primarily, I shall concentrate on several key structural and agency-related elements of political democracy. Secondly, I shall analyse certain central political principles and procedures which guide the operation of this kind of regime. All of these essential components of political democracy will be defined both as generic concepts and characteristics of political reality. In this way it will be possible to distinguish between varieties of democracies qualitatively and to compare political regimes quantitatively using statistical tools.

2.3.1. Elements of Political Democracy

The main elements of political democracy could tentatively be divided into two groups: structure- and agency-related. The structural ones are the *public realm* and *political institutions*. The agents (or actors) making political democracy function as a system of governance are the *rulers*, *citizens* and *representatives*. I shall start to define and explain the specific role played by each one of these elements by clarifying its relationship with the other elements according to the prevailing social and political context in a democracy.

2.3.1.1. Structural elements

- *Public realm*:

The dimensions of the *public realm* are specific to every political system, that is why they differ greatly even between established democracies. The public realm represents the space between the rulers and the ruled, excluding the primary units of societal organisation, such as families, tribes, villages and other basic forms of private grouping. More concretely and in functional terms, it is portrayed as the voluntarily or coercive exchanges between society and the state, resulting in the production of collective norms and choices which are binding both for the individuals and public

institutions. The existing substantive differences between private and public, which may reflect for instance the level or degree of regulation/deregulation, subsidisation/privatisation and collectivism/voluntarism in treating the political, economic and social resources of the state, may in turn produce a democratic regime of a liberal, conservative, corporatist or mixed kind.⁸¹

- *Political institutions:*

Institutions, and especially *political institutions*, are an indispensable part of any democratic system. Institutions usually perform a double function: they serve as formal and informal channels of political communication between actors in a democracy and they influence human behaviour in various important ways without constraining it to such a degree as to determine its eventual outcome.⁸² Peter Hall defines institutions as "the formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and the economy".⁸³ Political institutions bear a special relationship to society and the *public realm* in particular. The first relationship is best described by one of the forerunners of today's neo-institutionalist school of analysis Alexis de Tocqueville. According to him, this is a double-edged relationship. On the one hand, institutions are created by society; on the other, they set the framework for it.⁸⁴ As regards the *public realm* which society is also part of, James March and Johan Olsen have recently explained that "political institutions not only respond to their own environment but create this environment at the same time".⁸⁵ Institutions exist, in other words, in a reciprocal relationship with their social surroundings. Thus, institutional patterns tend to have not only a short-term political effect on the

⁸¹ Schmitter, P. (1993); "More Liberal, Preliberal, or Postliberal", in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 329-35.

⁸² Finnemore, M. (1996); "Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociological Institutionalism", *International Organization*, No. 52, pp. 325-347; and Aspinwall, M. and Schneider, G. (2000); "Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration", *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 38, pp. 1-36, esp. pp. 1-13.

⁸³ Hall, P. (1986); Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 19.

⁸⁴ Tocqueville, Alexis de (1969); Democracy in America (Garden City: Anchor Press).

⁸⁵ March, J. and Olsen, J. (eds.) (1989); Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press), p. 162.

governing regime, but also a long-term structuring effect on society and the public realm.⁸⁶

In established democracies, agents use institutions in a routine manner and, consequently, there is no need for rulers, citizens or representatives to ask for their explicit legitimisation all the time. Thus, actors become socialised to a set of political institutions.⁸⁷ It might be useful to mention that political institutions differ from other kinds of institutions, e.g. economic, religious, social, cultural and religious ones, by performing specifically political roles at a given moment of time. In other words, they not only structure the socio-political process, but they live 'a life of their own' by strictly applying the main principles that democratic regimes are based upon: *competition, participation and cooperation*, as well as on *consensus, access, majority rule and responsiveness* (see the section on principles of democracy below).

Apart from the already-enumerated functions of institutions as principal structural elements of political reality, they have an additional purpose in democratic regimes. They tend to shape the debate among major actors, who, in turn, try to deliberate about the nature of the political regime according to the principles of competition, participation and cooperation. As a result of this, there may exist many different types of democracy. However, the limited choice and number of specific 'constellations' of institutions which allow the application of those and several other key principles intrinsic to the operation of democracy outline the profoundly political character of these structural arrangements. Both theoretical and practical experiences show that there exist certain prevalent combinations of political institutions at the level of the state and civil society which influence the consolidation and general type of the new democratic regimes. These are, for example, executive–legislative relations, the electoral and party systems, the constitution and legal system, and the mass media. The varieties of institutional interactions and accompanying problems related to democratisation are analysed in the next chapter in much greater detail. In it, I pay special attention to the process of consolidation of democracy (CoD) in post-

⁸⁶ Hadenius, A. (ed.) (2001); *Institutions and Democratic Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 82.

⁸⁷ Jepperson, R. L. (1991); "Institutions, Institutional Effects and Institutionalism", in Powell, Walter and DiMaggio, Paul (eds.): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 143-163, p. 149.

communist Eastern Europe and the resulting qualitative differences among political regimes as a function of the specific choice of institutions.

2.3.1.2. Political actors

- *Rulers:*

The *rulers* are those who occupy dominant positions in the formal structure of government. Democratic rulers are distinguished from autocratic ones mainly by two things: the precise legal and political norms that determine how they become rulers and the regularised practices that hold them accountable to the people who elected them. Furthermore, since democracies need to be governed and anarchy should not prevail over their territory, they depend on individuals who perform specialised and sometimes highly professional roles in the state bureaucracy. Rulers are those who should command authority and appear politically legitimate to large segments of the population, otherwise, they should step down and organise new elections.

- *Citizens:*

All political regimes have rulers and some sort of public realm, but only democracies have *citizens*. Indeed, the big societal struggles about human rights and civic freedoms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries revolved permanently around the definition of citizenship. Citizenship as a political concept became gradually 'disembodied' from the restrictive set of criteria which did not permit significant groups of the population to share with the achievements of democratic state for a long time. Certain kinds of requirements imposed on individuals to be able to vote were, for example, age, gender, class, race, property status and level of literacy. Nowadays, citizenship continues to be a much-disputed issue all over the world. The growth in importance of 'supranational citizenship' has also been registered parallel to the emergence of large regional political and economic associations of countries as the EU, CIS and NAFTA. The main problems to creating credible citizenship rights at the supra-national level are, on the one hand, that similar supranational conglomerates have still not become political democracies comparable to ordinary states and, on the other, the concepts of citizenship and democracy have intimately been linked with the

notion of territory, which in turn explicitly requires the presence of clearly defined and internationally-recognised boundaries, plus some kind of centre of political and administrative authority. Anyway, the notion of democratic citizenship at the supranational level might gradually gain ground if the political and civil rights of legal residents on the territory of a regional bloc (most notably, in the EU) get codified; then, one may expect that democratic citizens, or *denizens*, will emerge as a visible social and political group.


- *Representatives:*

Representatives are probably the most visible and active agents in a political democracy. They are either elected or appointed – directly by the people or indirectly through institutionalised channels of selection. Most of these people, whom citizens choose to do the business of representing them, are not political amateurs but usually professionals. They are occupied full-time with managing the different problems that arise in a democratic system. It might be a matter of argument whether to classify the formally designated representatives of citizens as part of a given ‘technocratic elite’ or of the ‘political class’, but it is certain that without individuals who invest their lifetime and careers in making democracy work, there cannot be political democracy at all. Hence, one of the main questions today is how to keep the representatives accountable for their actions in the public realm. There are two possible ways: directly, by petitioning, pressurising and communicating with them, especially before and during elections, and indirectly, through a variety of established channels of political communication and intermediation, the last set of which includes political parties, interest associations and social movements as three broadly-defined bodies of representation at the intermediary level.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ There has been an ongoing academic debate related to the most reliable definitions of modern political democracy. It has mainly been concerned with the fact whether citizens keep their rulers accountable for decisions taken in the public realm directly through referenda, petitioning or other forms of social pressure, usually referred to as instruments of *direct democracy*, or indirectly through their respective representatives, practising variations of *deliberative democracy*. On opposed definitions of democracy regarding the form of representation see Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); “What Democracy is ... And is Not”, (fn. 30), p. 76 and Linz, J. (1992); “Change and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies”, in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (eds.) Reexamining Democracy (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 182-207. On differences between direct and deliberative democracy see Budge, L. (1996); The New Challenges of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press); Saward, M. (1998); The Terms of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press);

Diagram 1 shows how rulers and citizens relate to each other and exercise control over their representatives. It also suggests the different means of representation (direct and indirect) at the disposition of groups of political actors in a democracy.

Diagram 1: The Principal Elements of Political Democracy and Various Channels of Representation



Legend:

- > Directly
- - - - -> Indirectly

This leads us to the next section dedicated to the most important political principles of democracy. They regard the functioning of the political system in a variety of institutional domains, including *citizenship*, *representation* and *decision-making*. Moreover, they represent a set of key political features that make a qualitative difference not only between autocracies, democracies and hybrid regimes, but also between democratic regimes themselves.

2.3.2. Principles which Make Political Democracy Operate in Practice

and Fishkin, J. (1999); "Review of Dahl's *On Democracy*", *American Political Science Review*, No.

The list of principles that describes what political democracy is and outlines at the same time the main priorities of political actors during the process of 'democratic bargaining'⁸⁹ can be divided into two parts: one containing the primary, or basic, principles characterising the prevailing democratic regime, and another referring to the secondary principles which indicate how democracies function differently as political systems. The first set of principles includes the principles of *competition*, *participation* and *cooperation*. The second collection of principles comprises the principles of *consensus*, *access*, *majority rule* and *responsiveness*. The main difference between these two sets is that the first one is linked to the basic functioning of political democracy and emphasises the importance of the unique combination of determining principles (the 'triad' *competition-participation-cooperation*), while the second aims to provide a more general sense of how democracies vary qualitatively by prioritising one or another type of governmental form and societal interaction (i.e. a *majoritarian* vs. *consensus* system of government, or more or less *accessible* and *responsive* rulers).

2.3.2.1. Primary principles

The principle of *competition* is intrinsically linked to the functioning of contemporary democratic regimes and especially to the holding of elections. Historically, competition has been seen as a necessary evil by many political leaders and scholars, and it has been believed to encourage tendencies disruptive to the harmonious organisation of the state. As James Madison lamented in the famous *American Federalist Papers*, "the latent causes of faction are sown into the nature of man".⁹⁰ With the emergence of political parties and of various interest groups and social movements, a gradual consensus was built around the issue that it is better to recognise the "mischief of faction" and to attempt to control its effects through certain political procedures and forms of intermediation and representation established within the democratic regime. Different systemic actors preferred to institutionalise competition than to confront the results of its suppression directly. In this way, they

93, pp. 698-99.

⁸⁹ Dahl, R. (1970); *After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

⁹⁰ *The Federalist Paper No. 10*, "Publius" (1961); (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison), (New York: Anchor Books, 1961).

contributed to the creation of diverse sub-types of democracy, i.e. more pluralist, consensus or corporatist.

Participation has not always been considered a prime characteristic of political democracy.⁹¹ The reasons for this are several. On the one hand, although legally entitled to take part, citizens may lack the necessary political and economic resources or be unwilling to participate on equal terms with more active citizens. On the other hand, the results of a high voter turnout in elections or membership in political parties and civil society organisations might be misleading, because, during communism, for example, people were formally requested to participate as much as possible in the politics and be members of various organisations, while in some democratic states, like Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, voting in national elections is the constitutional obligation of every adult citizen. However, an increasing level of consensus has been reached among social observers and decision-makers, that higher levels of political participation are preferable on the whole, and that the progress towards consolidation and, in certain cases, the quality of the democratic regime depend very much on improved rates of voter turnout in elections and membership in political associations.⁹²

Cooperation is probably the least obvious among the primary principles characterising political democracy, but its centrality is almost permanently evident during the daily functioning of democratic regimes. Although it seems natural that many people are inclined to view the political arena where the democratic process takes place as a competitive market place, it is in fact true (although counterintuitive) that in order to compete political actors must primarily co-operate. In practice, this is achieved by initiating deliberations about the common goals and selecting the types of public goods in the political systems. Citizens, alone or as members of political

⁹¹ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); (fn. 30), p. 47; and Schmitter, P. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union ... and Why Bother? (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), Chapter 1 "Euro-democracy: Introduction", pp. 1-22.

⁹² Kohli, A. (1992); "Indian Democracy: Stress and Resilience", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 52-64; Wyman, M. (1996); "Developments in Russian Voting Behaviour: 1993 and 1995 Compared", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (September 1996), pp. 277-292; Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (1997); "Old Legacies, New Institutions: Explaining Political and Economic Trajectories in Post-Communist Regimes", in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions, Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.), (Berkeley: University of California), pp. 1-39, esp. pp. 19-22.

parties, interest groups or movements, decide to nominate candidates and petition authorities; they are expected to articulate social preferences and influence policies first, and, only after that, to compete in the public realm again through their elected representatives. This co-operative kind of activity, which certainly receives less attention from the media than the competitive struggle between candidates during elections, teaches members of society to respect each other, learn about others' political preferences and, eventually, become more civic-minded by attempting to resolve their conflicts peacefully and without the coercive intervention of the state. As some social scientists have rightly observed, co-operative behaviour among individuals and groups, improves, on the one hand, the quality of citizenship and, on the other, makes the political system far better governable by not overloading decision-makers with too many different problems and by allowing people in power the necessary autonomy to govern effectively.⁹³ It should be noted, however, that problems related to political 'collusion' between the ruling elite and the opposition might occasionally occur. In this case, the progress towards democratisation will certainly be more difficult.

2.3.2.2. Secondary principles

Among the secondary principles which guide the operation of contemporary political democracy, *consensus* represents by far the most important. Consensus is necessary for achieving smooth relations between the executive and legislature and for the successful completion of a government's programme, especially in times of profound transformation of the political and socio-economic systems. It is also true that not all citizens and parties may actually agree on the role of the state or some other substantive goals of the political system, but if these actors do not spend significant resources and do not engage in activities supporting anti-system alternatives, one can be sure that democracy is attitudinally and behaviourally consolidated. Hence, the return of the previous authoritarian regime becomes highly unlikely.⁹⁴ It is believed that consensus among the major political forces in a political democracy is

⁹³ Mansbridge, J. (1980); *Beyond Adversarial Democracy*, (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Huntington, S. (1984); "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly* 99, (Spring 1984), pp. 193-218; and Ágh, A. (1994); (fn. 6).

⁹⁴ Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2., (April 1996), pp. 14-33, p. 16.

strengthened further by making such agreements explicit, i.e. by writing them down as collectively binding political documents and, even better, by submitting them to a popular referendum and constitutionalising them. Similarly positive and far-reaching were the political outcomes of the Spanish Moncloa Pacts during the late 1970s and early 1980s⁹⁵ and of the Round Table talks held between the ruling communist party and the democratic opposition in many Eastern European countries in the period 1989-90.⁹⁶

Access, or occasionally referred to as *accessibility*, represents the right of individuals and groups to express preferences and influence the political process by bringing their potential grievances to those in positions of power. Although rulers may not always consider with equal seriousness each and every question and grievance of all who come before them, the *access* principle should provide citizens at least nominally with the opportunity to approach state authorities. It is reportedly much easier to approach rulers at the local level than those at the central one. It is not only because persons in smaller territorial and administrative units might know each other better, but also because the institutions of intermediation and legal procedure guaranteeing the access to people in government positions might be less numerous and complicated. As a result, certain democratic regimes make it an important political priority to decentralise and increase the role of the subsidiarity principle at all levels of public administration. In modern democracies, the right of accessibility is reinforced by the availability of multiple channels of communication and different representatives who deal with the problems of individuals and interest groups. Contemporary mass media, such as radio, newspapers, television and internet, has the possibility to spread information on the whole territory of the state, at a moment's notice, twenty-four hours a day. It transforms itself into a powerful weapon in the hands of those who monitor how well rulers respect the right of formal access and the degree of their political and social accountability.

⁹⁵ Linz, J., Stepan, A. and Gunther, R. (1995); "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe", in Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), Chapter 3, pp. 77-123.

⁹⁶ Elster, J. (ed.) (1996); The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

The principle of *majority rule* appears to be inextricably linked with the type of political regime and particularly with elections. It is hardly conceivable for a government today to make decisions without taking into consideration the opinion of the more than half of those eligible to vote, or at least of those who are interested in participating in elections. Certain decisions may require a qualified majority or two-thirds approval by members of parliament or by those having the right to pronounce themselves politically on a given subject matter. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to mention that the mere counting of votes is sometimes not the most relevant procedure for the working of democracy. This means that the relative political stance and behaviour of certain political actors may be more important in solving a particular problem. Thus, the primary principles of *participation*, *cooperation* and *consensus* will have priority in these cases. This is especially true as regards the empowerment of minority groups – territorially, by creating political autonomies and forms of regional self-government; nationally, by including the political parties of minorities in coalition cabinets and creating second chambers in parliament where the votes of minority groups count more; and functionally, by promoting various ‘affirmative action’ policies and adopting special ‘bills of rights’ which place certain things relating to minorities beyond the reach of governing majorities.

Finally, *responsiveness* is a principle that does not necessarily determine the survival rate and political fate of democracy, but is connected to a large extent with a political regime’s quality via the behaviour of its rulers. Rulers may not always decide to follow the political and social desires of citizens and satisfy the latter’s preferences. They may refuse to act on grounds of ‘reasons of state’ and ‘overriding national interest’. However, and at the same time, rulers must be held accountable for their action or inaction by the citizens. Ideally, this should not present a contradiction in a political democracy, particularly if rulers are responsive to the population. Responsiveness is different from responsibility, because the needs of individuals and social groups may undergo revision in the short and medium term, while political responsibilities are relatively permanent and change in the long term. It could be inferred that the act of responsiveness involves both elements of anticipatory and co-operative behaviour on the part of rulers and citizens, but mainly of rulers, and, in

such a way, consists of a central characteristics of contemporary democratic regimes.⁹⁷

2.3.2.3. Three additional procedural norms

I would like to discuss briefly here the nature of three procedural norms, contained in my original definition of political democracy, which are important for democracy to work in practice. These are the holding of *elections*, the respect for *basic civic freedoms* and *political rights*, and the adoption of *constitutional and legal rules*. Normally, procedures differ slightly in meaning and content from political principles, because they can (a) either be derived from some kind of fundamental principle (e.g. the organisation of *elections* procedure stems in large part from the principles of competition and participation) or (b) be more specific sometimes than certain broadly-defined principles and, hence, refer to the concrete operation of democracy as system of rule (e.g. citizens and rulers or institutions, as with respect to some of its political actors and structural elements). Although they are not necessarily basic defining conditions of democracy, procedures are needed for democratic systems to endure. Essentially, they represent political rules and legal arrangements, albeit not always explicitly formalised, that actors are ready to respect over a period of time.⁹⁸ Moreover, they are prime indicators of the qualitative differences among regimes: namely, to what degree democracy is democratic and follows the rule of law.⁹⁹

The organisation and holding of *elections* are probably some of the most visible performances of systemic actors and, for this reason, democracy is often equated with the electoral struggle among political opponents. Elections provide a natural platform for politically mobilised groups and individuals to express their albeit highly aggregated preferences about who should govern the state over a period of time. However central they may be to the political process and, consequently, to democracy, elections occur intermittently, every four to five years. During the

⁹⁷ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); (fn. 30), p. 84.

⁹⁸ On the relationship between formal and informal norms under democracy see O'Donnell, G. (1994, 1996); "Delegative Democracy", (fn. 5), pp. 55-69 and "Illusions about Consolidation", (fn. 38), pp. 34-51.

⁹⁹ For a discussion on the degree of 'democraticness' of a democratic system see Sartori, G. (1987); Theory of Democracy Revisited, especially Chapter 7 "What Democracy is Not...", (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 182-213.

intervals between elections, citizens should be given the opportunity to influence public policies and keep their leaders accountable for their actions through alternative means. This is mainly done with the assistance and through the selection of various intermediaries: political parties, business associations, trade unions, social movements and interest organisations broadly defined. As Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter posit about modern democracy, it “offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values – associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral to its practice”.¹⁰⁰

The respect for *basic civic freedoms and political rights* is a crucial dimension of any democratic regime. Civic freedoms are, for instance, the freedom to have access to independent information and to disseminate it, to hold public meetings and protest, and to associate oneself with other persons and create independent interest organisations. Political rights are the rights to compete for office, to participate directly or indirectly (through representatives) in the democratic process. Although civic freedoms and political rights represent two different things, they are nevertheless closely related both as theoretical concepts and practical elements.¹⁰¹ Apart from these necessary procedures, one should be guaranteed also the respect for one’s own dignity and physical inviolability through an exhaustive set of legal and effective rights, commonly known as ‘human rights’. Usually, it does not matter how well-intentioned public authorities are towards the social and political activity of citizens and civil society organisations, what matters is the respect for certain basic civic freedoms and political rights, which should be protected by the constitution and even by special laws, nationally and internationally ratified and recognised, to which the ruling regime subscribes permanently.

This leads me to my third and final point about the relevance of *constitutional and legal rules*. Since the beginning of the current wave of democratisation in Portugal and Spain during the mid-1970s, but particularly since the recent regime changes in the former Communist Bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the world of politics

¹⁰⁰ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991); (fn. 30), p. 78.

¹⁰¹ Bollen, K. (1990); “Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps”, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No. 25, pp. 7-24, p. 10.

has been experiencing a virtual 'legal revolution'. It is no accident that legal norms and constitutions play such a central role as underlying criteria of neo-democracies.¹⁰² The reasons for this are several, but two appear to be of particular importance. First, encompassing legal frameworks for the political regime, like constitutions, have the function of limiting the uncertainty characterising the democratisation process, but also of reducing the effect of unexpected contingencies afterwards. In other words, basic laws represent unified sets of rules that help distribute the various tasks and roles among institutional and other kinds of actors and to establish some hierarchical relation between them. This, in turn, provides actors with some approximate indication and rules how to operate within the political system. Second, with the increased chances of democracies surviving the first couple of months and years after their establishment, the focus of social scientists has gradually turned away from the problems of transition towards those related to the consolidation of democracy. Consolidation is a more lengthy phase and ridden with uncertainties, requiring, at a given point of time, the adoption of a new constitution as a guarantee for the irreversibility of the process of democratisation. Constitution builders can definitely benefit from the experience of political actors in other regimes having undergone democratic reforms, as legal rules have been spreading and become relevant globally.

2.4. The Practical Fulfilment of Political Democracy's Principles and Norms

In the previous section, I reviewed some of the main political elements, principles and procedures defining political democracy. Because of the multitude of social conditions and the complexity of rules that political democracy is based upon, one might easily get confused and, consequently, fail to make an *analytical link* among each one of these elements as belonging to a distinct set of theoretical components as well as distinguish between their purely theoretical meaning and political reality. It is also quite difficult to pinpoint the principal characteristics of political democracy from those of another system of governance, since the same or almost-the-same principles

¹⁰² Beyme, K. von (1996); Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, (London: MacMillan Press); and Elgie R. and Zielonka J. (2001); "Constitutions and Constitution-Building: A Comparative Perspective", in Jan Zielonka (ed.) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

and rules are applied in more than on case. For these reasons, as well as because of the numerous quantitative and qualitative differences emerging between the newly-established democratic regimes especially in post-communist Eastern Europe, I intend to analyse the existing theoretical linkages between these elements and rules and to study their relevance to the political system in practice.

Democracy is popularly understood as government of, by and for the people. Although many authors try to portray it as a regime based upon a set of universal values (i.e. of freedom, equality and law),¹⁰³ a dose of critical thinking is needed in order to make a strict differentiation between democracy as a *political ideal* and *political reality*. In fact, a badly-functioning democratic regime can still be a democracy, while an efficient, for instance, socially and militarily autocratic regime, which tacitly but intermittently suppresses the civic freedoms and political rights, will certainly not qualify as a regime administered by the rule of law and following basic civic norms. Sometimes, however, the boundary between democratic values and effective government is quite blurred. That is why, one should constantly take into consideration the normative elements and principles of political democracy and see whether a regime's real intentions and acts are conform with those of a democratic one. Thus, the comparative research of the types of democracy should not only stress a static 'ideational' model of democratic government, but should also pay attention to the social and political realities, knowing that the legitimacy and efficacy of the democratic regime affect the citizens equally if not more than a regime's structure. That is why, in order to understand the fulfilment of the principles of political democracy in practice, both the theoretical and empirical analysis of democratisation should go hand-in-hand with the qualitative and quantitative measurement of democratic performance.¹⁰⁴ This is exactly what I try to achieve in the next chapters, but, primarily, I try to understand the practical importance of and describe the functional links between the various elements and theoretical norms underlining the functioning of political democracy.

¹⁰³ Sen, A. (1999); *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred Knopf); and Stepan, A. (2000); "Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations"", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 37-57.

¹⁰⁴ Hadenius, A. (1992); *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Foweraker, J. and Krznaric, R. (2001); "How to Construct a *Database of Liberal Democratic Performance*", *Democratization*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 1-25.

Most definitions of political democracy emphasise three key principles: *competition*, *representation* and *cooperation* (see section 2.3.2.1). Although researchers concur that these principles are indispensable for the operation of modern democratic regimes, they cannot agree whether there exists any theoretical hierarchy or chronological sequence between them. Hence, single definitions of democracy stress either electoral competition, political participation, or consensus-searching, or, alternatively, present a number but never all of these principles with equal strength. Another serious problem is related to the general fulfilment of these norms by the political elites in practice. Although nominally independent from each other, through their implementation, the rules of democracy tend usually to satisfy the interests only of particular a set of political actors and facilitate the functioning of certain sets of political institutions. For instance, competition and participation might unequally favour the ruling classes, because these are the ones who have the authority to decide on matters of state importance on a daily basis. At the same time, unlike ordinary citizens, persons in ruling positions usually possess a disproportionate amount of information, skills and other kinds resources to influence the selection of representatives. As regards the question of achieving a consensus in a democratic system, this process might occasionally be distorted by the irreconcilable positions of different political factions defining themselves on a national, ethnic, linguistic or cultural principle. This might in turn induce some groups to pursue a 'zero-sum game' with their opponents about certain issues, as well as make them behave in a populist manner in order to satisfy the demands of their respective constituencies.

Depending on their importance to political actors and social agents, I can identify at least three areas of realisation of the main principles of political democracy (*competition*, *representation* and *cooperation*): namely, *citizenship*, *representation* and *decision-making*. The analytical identification of the latter three functional domains coincides almost perfectly with the already-described set of political actors in a democracy – *citizens*, *representatives* and *rulers* (section 2.3.1.2).¹⁰⁵ This is not accidental, because the formulation of the normative principles of political democracy rests not only on the establishment of a generic link between procedural rules and

¹⁰⁵ Schmitter, P. (2000); "Designing a Democracy for the Euro-Polity and Revising Democratic Theory in the Process", in Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo (eds.) Designing Democratic Institutions (New York: New York University Press), pp. 224-50.

structural elements of democracy, but also on the proactive role of agents emerging out of and benefiting from this contractual relations. They are those who define and reformulate its main principles contemporaneously. Conversely, one might assume that the principles of political democracy actually reinforce the capabilities of individuals to seek the realisation of a basic set of social, civil and political rights more actively both through structure and agency. Although I do not plan to explain the relationship between structure, agency and the defining principles of political democracy in detail here, this theme is extensively discussed in the social science literature, including in the ongoing debates on morality, justice and the rule of law in a democratic context.¹⁰⁶

So far, I have identified three main domains of application of the core principles of political democracy (i.e. *competition*, *representation* and *cooperation*), and they are *citizenship*, *representation* and *decision-making*. Although most definition of democracy try to balance between these prime political principles as well as between an additional set of secondary principles and procedural norms (e.g. *access*, *consensus*, *responsiveness*, the holding of *elections*, the respect for *basic civic freedoms and political rights* and the adoption of *constitutional and legal rules*), the actual practice shows that they emphasise one or, at best, a couple of functional domains where these normative rules are applied. In the majority of cases, this choice is made out of necessity, i.e. in order to provide more succinct or intermediary definitions of democracy. As already demonstrated (section 2.2.1), however, most definitions of democracy are rather complex, so, they unavoidably express a particularistic viewpoint not only about how the political system functions, but also how it should function in order to make a difference with and preclude any autocratic alternatives. Depending on the focus and scope of their research, however, social scientists might unintentionally express a bias towards either *representation*, *citizenship* or *decision-making*. For example, the popular definition of Joseph Schumpeter, describing democracy as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for

¹⁰⁶ Dahl, R. (1989); *Democracy and Its Critics* (New heaven: Yale University Press), p. 108; O'Donnel, G. (2000); “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics”, working paper No. 274 (Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute); and Rawls, J. (2001); *Justice and Fairness. A Restatement*. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).

the people's vote",¹⁰⁷ clearly underlines the importance of *decision-making* and to a lesser extent that of *representation*. Similarly, the intermediary definition of David Beetham, explaining that "democracy is a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly – one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise",¹⁰⁸ stresses *decision-making* and touches vaguely upon the role of *citizenship*.

In my definition of political democracy, describing it as "the political system of governance of a state in which power is exercised by those elected by the citizens without exclusion and in which the rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm, while abiding to the principles of free competition and cooperation between the leaders who must validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their right to govern according to the constitutional and legal rules; without exempting any officers who have the competencies to exercise effective administrative power within the territory of the state, the basic freedoms of association, information and expression are respected in all their legally recognised forms and manifestations" (section 2.2.2.), I explicitly mention the main functional principles of political democracy as well as the accompanying civic freedoms and procedural norms. Apart from illustrating rather comprehensively the procedure of electing *representatives* and controlling them through the constitution and legal rules, I also pay attention to *decision-making* and certain political aspects of *citizenship*. I should admit, however, that this definition is nevertheless slightly biased towards recounting the role of *representatives* and the mechanisms of *representation* than equally focusing on *decision-making* and *citizenship*. Since my definition of political democracy is a result of the analytical synthesis of two previous definitions of Juan Linz (1997) and Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1991),¹⁰⁹ it necessarily carries some of the main characteristics and, probably, flaws of these two original descriptions, namely, with respect to their strong emphasis on *representation* and *decision-making*.

¹⁰⁷ Schumpeter, J. (1947); (fn. 14).

¹⁰⁸ Beetham, D. (1992); (fn. 21).

¹⁰⁹ See footnotes 29 and 30.

Consequently, we can speak of at least three different *logics* of defining political democracy depending on the background against which the fundamental principles of democracy are applied. These are the logics of decision-making, representation and citizenship. Most definitions of democracy predominantly emphasise the process of decision-making, considering it the most central feature of modern regimes. The two other logics, i.e. of representation and citizenship, allegedly play an equally important role for the functioning of democracy, but they are included much less often in operational definitions of this kind of political system. Below I provide a brief overview of the definitions mentioned in this chapter and their relationship to the practical application of these logics (see Table 1). Although the criteria for choosing these ‘mainstream’ definitions of political democracy could be discussed, the initial impression is that most definitions stress the logic of decision-making and occasionally that of representation, while the notion of citizenship is rarely conveyed, despite the fact that citizens are the most distinct element of contemporary democracy (see section 2.3.1.2.).

Table 1: The main focus of selected definitions of democracy

	<i>Decision-making</i>	<i>Representation</i>	<i>Citizenship</i>
Schumpeter, J. (1947)	X	x	
Huntington, S. (1991)	X		x
Przeworski, A. (1991)	X	x	
Dahl, R. (1971)	X	x	x
Diamond, L., Linz, J., and Lipset, S. (1990)	X		X
Beetham, D. (1992)	X		x
Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991)	X	X	x
Andreev, S. (section 2.2.2)	X	X	X

Legend:

X – strongly supported

x – intermediary or weakly supported

The overall picture of some of the most important previous attempts at defining democracy shows that it is virtually impossible to ‘uniformly’ capture the disparate logics of decision-making, representation and citizenship. Certain definitions cover some aspects of these principal domains better than others. Then, the key question is ‘which are these definitions and why they perform their task better?’. Primarily, it seems that intermediary definitions of democracy have a greater capacity to ‘cover ground’ than their minimalist homologues. However, this could well be due to their word-length than analytical profoundness. Secondly, some definitions, like Dahl’s (1971) and Schmitter and Karl’s (1991), which focus not only on political actors (rulers, citizens and representatives), but also on the normative principles guiding their actions and the ones creating linkages between them as social groups, appear to be more comprehensive and fulfilling the general criteria of political democracy. Finally, my own definition of political democracy is an example of a composite definition, combining the features of two other intermediary definitions.¹¹⁰ Although it does not make claim to be a perfect representation of what modern political democracy is in each and every case, I hope it will at least be a good working, e.g. ‘operationalisable’, definition of democracy. In this way, it will permit me not only to formulate and test various hypotheses concerning transition to and consolidation of democracy, but will also allow me to ‘disentangle’ the concept of political democracy and measure it within the context of the systemic transformation in post-communist Eastern Europe.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I try to come up with a definition of one of my ‘core’ dependent variables – political democracy. I believe that, without having a unambiguous idea what democracy is as a political system, it is very difficult to describe and measure

¹¹⁰ **Ibid.**

the progress towards consolidation of democracy. Firstly, I compare various definitions of democracy which could serve the main theoretical and empirical purposes of my academic research. By analysing them critically, I arrive at the conclusion that I would need an intermediary definition that lists most of the important elements and principles of political democracy in a balanced way. Secondly, I formulate a working definition of political democracy, which contains the necessary characteristics and is suitable for operationalisation and measurement at the same time. Then, thirdly, I review the basic elements and principles of political democracy, in order to understand how they relate to each other and whether there exists an analytical hierarchy between them. I anticipate that, at a later stage of my research, this would help me devise some criteria for measuring the consolidation of democracy (see chapters 5 and 6). Fourthly, I clarify how the theoretical principles and rules of political democracy are fulfilled in practice, while I define the main contextual conditions (*logics*) of application of these norms. Finally, I pay attention to the quality of democracy, a closely related term to political democracy which describes both the state and performance of the political system. It offers a more extensive picture of the processes going on within the regime after the establishment of a democratic government and beyond its consolidation. The closeness existing between the definition of political democracy and the description of its quality determines the place of the latter further down in this work.

Chapter 3

The Choice of Political Institutions and the Resulting Types of Democratic Regimes

. 3.1. Introduction

During the last couple of decades, the vast and growing literature on democratic systems has reached a consensus about several key institutional settings that help social scientists distinguish political democracies qualitatively. Among these arrangements the ones related to the type of executive, legislature, political parties, constitution and electoral system have gained an increasing amount of popularity. The particular choice of executive structure (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary), of legislature (single or double chamber), of political parties (pluralistic or hegemonic, and adversarial or consociational) and of electoral system (majoritarian, mixed or proportional), as well as the direct effects and concomitants of combinations of these institutional elements, has influenced the overall performance and stability of democracy worldwide.¹¹¹

To this basic list, in which are enumerated some of the most important political institutions affecting the democratic process, I would also add the necessity to analyse the central role of constitutions and the political relevance of the media and legal systems in the governance of the state. This has importance both theoretically and empirically, since a number of new developments have been taking place in these fields in the last couple of decades. Institutional innovations related to the constitution, media and law came in vogue largely as a result of the recent democratisation efforts in Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world. As a

¹¹¹ Sartori, G. (ed.) (1994); Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, (NY: New York University Press); Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (1995); Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); and Merkel, W. (1996); "Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe", the *Juan March Institute Papers*, Madrid, No. 86, (December 1996).

consequence, the importance of domestic and international actors operating within media- and legal-type institutions has been steadily growing.¹¹²

One of the principal motives of studying political institutions is to determine to what extent they influence the consolidation of democracy (CoD). It is also interesting to see which of them are most important for achieving a positive outcome of democratisation, namely, a more persistent and improved quality of democracy (QoD). It is challenging to test most of the hypotheses concerning political institutions, including the claim that one can measure the level of democracy through the choice of structural format and performance of institutions, in the real-time conditions of Eastern European transitions.

In this chapter, I address the question of how democratic regimes differ according to their institutional format. In order to do this, I look at three important aspects related to institution-building and institution-performance in post-communist Eastern Europe. First, I describe the main political features and role of institutions in the democratisation process in Eastern Europe. Second, I analyse certain key structural arrangements influencing the actual operations of institutions in contemporary democracies. Most specifically these are the distinctions made by political scientists regarding the types of executive, legislature, political parties, constitution, elections, media and legal system. Third and finally, I try to make sense of the political actors' choices concerning a particular set of institutions and the resulting qualitative differences among newly-founded democracies.

3.2. The Role of Institutions in Eastern European Democratisation

Present-day global and regional surveys, and particularly those conducted in Eastern Europe, have clearly demonstrated that institutions make a difference and individuals like to express opinions about how institutions should be structured and how they

¹¹² Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), Chapters 4 and 5; Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.) (1997); "Old Legacies, New Institutions: Explaining Political and Economic Trajectories in Post-Communist Regimes", in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley: University of California), pp. 1-39.

should function in a democracy.¹¹³ More often than not citizens tend to see the low efficiency of the regime as a function of the poor performance of political institutions. The vast empirical evidence gathered during the democratisation of the majority of countries around the world would tell us that, although citizens and rulers usually show a strong commitment to the already-established procedural norms of democracy, especially to free and fair elections and the unfettered access to information, they may actually disagree about the concrete choice of institutions and the structural format of the political system as whole.

Because institutions in a democracy tend to operate as intricate networks of legally constituted and elected bodies, they do not only transmit power but also provide authority to various agents in the political system. This is perceived as a legitimate operation, so it is usually incorporated explicitly in the democratic constitution. During periods of profound political and social transformation, as is the case in most countries of Eastern Europe for more than a decade until now, the new institutional framework does not only gradually reduce the potentially dominant role of unaccountable leaders and limit uncertainty about the future of the political system, but manages also to formulate “the very criteria by which people discover their preferences in a competitive environment”.¹¹⁴ As a consequence, institutions have been increasingly valued for their distinctive contribution to the survival of the political regime and the emergence of civil society during democratisation.

Of course, one of the principal dilemmas facing the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe has been how to create incentives for politically relevant individuals and groups to channel their demands within the institutional framework. As Adam Przeworski et al. argue, “regardless of how pressing their needs may be, political forces must be willing to subject their interests to the verdict of representative

¹¹³ Inglehard, R., Basanez, M. and Moreno, A. (1998); Human Values and Beliefs: a Cross-Cultural Sourcebook of Political, Religious, Sexual and Economic Norms in 43 Societies. Findings from the 1990-93 World Values Survey, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Rose, R. and Haerpfer, C. (1993); “Adapting to Transformation in Eastern Europe: *New Democracies Barometer II*”, Studies in Public Policy, No. 212, (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1993); and Rose, R. and Haerpfer, C. (1998); *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey*, Studies in Public Policy, No. 306, (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1998).

¹¹⁴ DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (eds.) (1991); “Introduction” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).

institutions".¹¹⁵ This has been considered one of the major criteria of successfully completed democratisation, especially when behavioural and attitudinal support for the regime has been assured in addition to this.¹¹⁶ Viewed from such a perspective, the type of institutional setting should also have a strong effect on the consolidation and quality of democracy.

Another key question that must be addressed by political actors in post-communist Eastern Europe is how to ensure compliance with a particular institutional setting, when the material conditions and standard of life continue to deteriorate in some of these countries. This seems to be a pretty serious dilemma in most of the countries of the CIS and the Balkans, and it does not have an easy solution. The difficulties associated with 'multiple transitions' in the political, economic and social spheres, as well as the problem of state building, are sometimes too many and profound to be resolved only by institutional means. Consequently, it appears logical to hypothesise that political institutions may contribute significantly towards regime change and consolidation, but cannot successfully achieve these alone. Their role is certainly more qualitative and should probably be analysed alongside that of other equally important agents and factors of democratisation.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the delayed establishment of certain political institutions and especially the adoption of constitutions can considerably reduce the chances of democracy being consolidated. The failure to reach agreement between members of the democratic opposition and communist elite in certain Eastern European countries has left many institutional issues unresolved. This is one of the main reasons for the high vulnerability of post-communist structural arrangements and for the uncertain future of reforms in other fields. The incomplete institutionalisation and half-hearted solutions proposed after each successive election tend to keep the conflict surrounding institutional format open. Moreover, there is also a strong chance that citizens will become tired and dissatisfied with permanent changes, and as a result, develop strong preferences for interim institutional outcomes,

¹¹⁵ Przeworski, A., et al. (1995); *Sustainable Democracy*, (NY: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 5: "Economic Reforms in New Democracies".

¹¹⁶ Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2., (April 1996), pp. 15-17.

as has been the case in some ex-Soviet republics.¹¹⁷ Half-hearted institutional transformations, or ones inappropriate for the specific political and economic conditions of a state, are very difficult to improve not only because of their low legitimacy and, hence, lack of interest in their operation by the majority of population, but also because of the reduced bargaining potential of institutional creators. In such circumstances, it is very problematic to induce political actors to observe the rules of the 'democratic game'. It is even less possible to get them 'habituated' to them, since the institutional background against which these democratic principles are applied has not yet crystallised to a sufficient degree.

Some political-science specialists working on Latin American and Southern European transitions have pointed to the fact that certain models of institutional setting have a strong impact on the prospects of democratisation.¹¹⁸ Their analytical research has however been too limited to grasp the entire institutional system. They have preferred to concentrate mainly on the issues of division of power, i.e. among the executive, legislature and courts, as well as on the problem of constraining unaccountable 'veto groups' such as the military and state bureaucracy from getting into power. Of course, this has been in unison and served the agenda of democratic agents in these two regions, because apart from the political sphere all other major fields of economic and social activity had already been established under the previous authoritarian regime. As one of these scholars, Scott Mainwaring, explains, there has sometimes been an almost exclusive focus on the type of political regime created in Latin America and Southern Europe. According to him, "among all choices regarding institutions, none is more important than the system of government: presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary or some hybrid...", while "choices of political institutions are especially important during transition to democracy".¹¹⁹ In fact, the replacement of people in

¹¹⁷ Przeworski, A. (ed.) (1991); Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

¹¹⁸ Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., and Valenzuela, S. J. (eds.) (1992); Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in a Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); and Munck, G. L. (1994); "Explaining Institutional Choices in Democratic Transitions: Comparative Perspectives on the East European and South American Cases", paper presented at the XVI World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, Germany, (August 21-25, 1994).

¹¹⁹ Mainwaring, S. (1991); "Presidentialism, Multiparty Systems, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination", paper prepared for the Hungarian-American Roundtable in Political Science, Budapest, Dec. 15-18, 1991, p. 1.

power might well have been the most straightforward way towards democracy in these two regions, but what is crucial with regard to political reforms in Eastern Europe is that things have gone much further than a mere change of government.

In the former communist countries, the political transition and the socio-economic factors surrounding this process, including institutional reform, have been very different to those accompanying political transformations in Latin America and Southern Europe a decade earlier. Moreover, following the end of the Cold War, the significantly changed political and macro-economic international context has created many new requirements and possibly even some impediments for contemporary political institution builders.

The choice of institutions in Eastern Europe has proved to be quite a complicated matter too. The simultaneous liberalisation of many spheres – political, economic and social – initially created more problems than solutions (but allowed for more trade-offs and buy-outs during the subsequent period of transition). The ensuing institutional transformations have taken place and are still continuing on a scale and pace ‘without precedent’. The mere replacement of an autocratic government has not always been translated into a more comprehensive change of the political system. Much like most of their Southern counterparts, the East European ‘electoral democracies’ have still to become stable, inclusive and better performing socially. Since the early 1990s, virtually all of these countries have been in process of developing features of institutionalised democracies, but some of the predictions about many of them were that they will probably undergo political and economic problems as deep as those in Latin America and certainly deeper than in Southern Europe before being able to consolidate democracy.¹²⁰ Therefore, Valerie Bunce is earnest enough to warn against “using such familiar phrases as ‘the crafting of political institutions’, the ‘design of political institutions’, or even ‘institutional choice’ to summarise institutional developments in post-communist Eastern Europe”,

¹²⁰ Dahrendorf, R. (1990); Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, (Chatto and Windus, 1990); Jenkins, R.M. (1992); “Society and Regime Transformation in East-Central Europe”, in G. Szoboszlai (ed.) Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe, (Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association).

because they might simply be empirically inaccurate and analytically counterproductive.¹²¹

The process of institution-building in post-authoritarian Eastern Europe has predominantly proceeded in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Apart from the problems of initiating political democratisation and the absence of certain important socio-economic prerequisites for achieving this, the vagueness surrounding the selection of institutions has also been nurtured by the condition that this has been far from a purely rational act. The lack of information, time and willingness to compromise has incited political agents to act exuberantly sometimes and not to select those political institutions which best suit a country's needs in a particular moment in time. As a result, executive structures, constitutions and electoral laws have had to be revised several times before being settled more permanently. Furthermore, even after having been established, political institutions have not always served the best interests of democracy. This has been so, because structures and legal norms have been constantly modified, not out of political and social necessity, but because 'quick-fix' and compromise solutions had to be found by political actors proposing alternative candidates or staunchly defending opposite ideological positions.

It should also be stipulated however that institutional models borrowed directly from the West have not worked automatically in the majority of post-communist countries. This has happened not so much because these models have been intrinsically bad, but because their application has not been satisfactory. Eastern Europeans have failed to implement those institutional solutions either because the arrangements taken over from the West have not been suitable for the post-authoritarian system of a specific country and, hence, served only the narrow political interests of their selectors, or because institution builders have decided to focus exclusively on the definition of power relations within and among a limited number of institutions (as in the new constitution), thus guaranteeing the procedural minima for a democratic regime but over which specific elaboration they have had no incentive or political capacity to act. As early as the period of the Roundtable Talks and first free elections in East-Central

¹²¹ **Bunce, V. (1997); "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern Europe", in Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, Mettenheim, K. von (ed.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 161-76, pp. 165-66.**

Europe, political actors have realised the importance of the flexibility of institutional structures. The subsequent changes which have occurred in the executive, political party, legislative and media institutions after each important bargaining or political event, have re-confirmed the fact that institutional choices, once made, have not been written in stone. This has been especially valid during the transitions in Eastern Europe after 1989. The institutional framework has frequently been manipulated and power centres emerged as rapidly as they vanished. As a result of the unstable relations persisting both at the level of state and society, the confidence in the newly created institutions has been significantly undermined and people have often been prompted to question the capacity of institutions to assist democratisation.

Because of the sheer volume of reforms in Eastern Europe, institution-builders generally have preferred to concentrate on certain major institutions of the political system first. They have proceeded in a fairly standard way: primarily, they re-established the political parties, then held elections, convened parliament, voted a government in power, and, at the end, adopted a new basic law. Once the official structures of state authority were put in place, actors have continued with their specific political and economic agenda. At the same time, however, they have tended to disregard some equally important institutions that have occasionally not been described in the constitution. These latter institutions have usually been regarded not as belonging to mainstream politics but as part of, for example, civil-military, labour-industry and media relations. Moreover, they have sometimes been classified by Eastern European political leaders as 'interest group' institutions and, hence, have been treated as similar to trade unions and business or civil-society organisations. Depending on the country and the concrete political situation, these institutions have been looked at with suspicion by the government as having some positive, although not completely proven effect on democratisation. Quite often, this kind of institutions has been accused of weakening further the broken-down state and diverting the attention of decision-makers from other significant problems. In the more advanced democracies of East-Central Europe, these informal institutions have occasionally been considered as being too far away from the main axes of real political power and, thus, their existence presumably did not matter a lot to society. Usually, state officials have proclaimed that such institutions could easily survive both organisationally and

financially either on their own or on foreign donations. As a result of the 'benevolent' attitude of political actors towards a large number of these intermediate-level institutions, the process of democratisation have not been successfully completed and the correct choices concerning the type of institutional set-up have not been made in some if not the majority of post-communist polities.

Finally, in those Eastern European countries where the constitutional system is fairly well-developed, e.g. in East-Central Europe, the Baltic States and in certain parts of the Balkans, the overall structural framework has already been established and the principle of division of powers is generally observed. Nevertheless, the policy style of deciding about and adopting institutions through official and non-official political channels remains a divisive point among the relevant actors. This is very important, because this factor helps shape confidence in the new democratic institutions. Unless there is a degree of compatibility between structural arrangements and policy styles, no one could expect either the institutions or political actors to provide the necessary legitimacy of the fragile political system alone. The key dilemma is then not simply what type of institutions to build in order for the political regime to qualify as a democracy, but also the degree of policy style and sequence of choices about institutions during transformation. Moreover, this combination of elements is not only instrumental for changing the political system, but is equally essential for consolidating democracy, not least of all because the quality of the new government is also dependent on the institutional setting and the behaviour of political actors.

In the next section I am going to analyse certain key institutional settings and factors, which are believed to contribute to democratisation most. These are, for instance, the executive-legislative relations, the electoral system, the political parties, the constitution, the legislature, the mass media and the legal system. All of these are studied with respect to the progress of consolidation to democracy and the resulting quality of democracy. By describing the performance and relevance of institutions in Eastern European transformations, I shall try to investigate the existing relationships between the institutions outlined above, both among themselves and with other state institutions. As a result, I shall try to hypothesise about certain institutional

interactions which have the largest possible effect on the type of political regime and its quality.

3.3. Types of Political Institutions and Varieties of Institutional Settings

3.3.1. Executive–Legislative Relations: Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies

It is an undeniable fact today that a parliamentary, semi-presidential or presidential regimes or a truly parliamentary monarchy can equally satisfy the universally-established criteria for democracy. Nevertheless, members of society can still be deeply divided on the issue of which type of executive system can best serve their interests. Occasionally the decision of the majority of deputies in parliament in favour of one or another variation of an institutional set up may not be sufficient to achieve the necessary consensus. The problem of identifying an appropriate model of the executive system is not a simple matter. It must combine in itself a large number of features, such as certain cultural and political traditions of a nation. It should also take into consideration a multitude of socio-economic and political factors. All these have a major impact on the general structural format and administrative efficiency of the executive institutions.

The typology of democratic regimes developed by social scientists so far according to the distinction made between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes cannot be exhaustive of a rather more diverse and complex reality. On the one hand, there is a small number of democracies which do not fit into either of the three main categories of executive system and thus they represent unique variants of democracy by themselves. These are, for instance, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus before the 1974 breakdown, and Israel after the recently introduced innovation concerning the executive format combining a parliamentary system with direct election of the prime minister. On the other hand, there is an increasing tendency for ‘oscillation’ between democracies as they shift from one or another kind of executive format under changed circumstances. Most often these are borderline situations, like

the French Republic, which has been characterised by alternating presidential and parliamentary governments during the last half-a-century, but has usually been described as 'semi-presidential' in mainstream political science theory.

The growing body of research regarding the classification of democratic regimes according to their formal institutions, i.e. parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential, has produced a large number of analytical insights into how democracies differ when this criterion is taken into consideration, alone or in combination with some other criteria.¹²² However, objectivity would tell us that until relatively recently the comparative studies of democratic regimes were not so much concerned with presidential or semi-presidential forms of government, because the large majority of consolidated democracies in the world were parliamentary; outside the United States there were few long-lasting stable presidential democracies, while only the French Fifth Republic stood out as a distinct case of semi-presidential, semi-parliamentary regime. The completion of successful democratic transitions and the prospects of consolidating democracy in a number of Latin American and Asian states, whose institutions have been mainly derived from the United States presidential system, as well as a few post-communist democracies in Eastern Europe, have obliged social scientists to look more seriously at the implications of presidentialism versus parliamentarianism and incorporate them into their comparative theoretical framework.¹²³

By looking at the relationship between the type of political democracy and the choice of executive structure one has necessarily to take a large number of factors into account. Primarily, one has to make a *generic* distinction between the varied effects of presidential, mixed and parliamentary forms of government on the political system as

¹²² Linz, J. (1990); "The Perils of Presidentialism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 51-69; Shugart, M. and Carey, J. (eds.) (1992); Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, (New York: Cambridge University Press); Linz, J. and Valenzuela, A. (eds.) (1994); The Failure of Presidential Democracy, (Baltimore, MD: John's Hopkins University Press); Jones, M. (ed.) (1995); Electoral Laws and the Survival of Democracies, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); and Fiorina, M. (ed.) (1996); Divided Government, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996).

¹²³ Liebert, U. and Cotta, M. (eds.) (1990); Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Bunce, V. (1997); "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern Europe", in Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, Mettenheim, K. von (ed.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), (fn. 11), pp. 161-76; and Taras, R. (ed.) (1997); Postcommunist Presidents, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

a whole, regardless of its being a democracy or another kind of regime. Political scientists who prefer a parliamentary system to a presidential one have stressed the fact that in the first kind of regime the power of the executive is dispersed among members of the cabinet coming from different political parties, social groups and experts, while in the second, the power is concentrated in the hands of one person, who might be less accountable to the political party and, consequently, to the people who have promoted and elected him/her to power.¹²⁴ It is also believed that presidentialism promotes a 'zero-sum' interaction between president, parliament and political parties, but presumably the same is not necessarily true in the case of parliamentary systems.¹²⁵ One possible reason for this is that, by virtue of their constitutionally defined powers to impose veto on the executive and parliamentary majorities' decisions ('reactive powers') and to legislate by decree ('pro-active powers'), presidents occasionally tend to neglect the role of legislature and political parties in general.¹²⁶ Conversely, it is proclaimed that presidential systems are more stable politically and are more conducive to bringing about consensus in society in times of deep social and political crisis. A hypothetical explanation for this is that a cabinet's life can be shortened by votes of no confidence and shifting political majorities in the legislature, while it is very unusual for the President's mandate to be interrupted before the official term in office is over.¹²⁷ Presidentialism or at least semi-presidential systems are usually institutionalised with the desire to counteract the negative effects of divided and hence weak parliamentary and governmental majorities and to speed up political and social reforms by promoting greater efficiency in decision-making.¹²⁸

Viewed from a historical and practical perspective, these arguments are debatable. On the one hand, as Martin Lipset and Donald Horowitz point out in two of their separate

¹²⁴ Riggs, F. (1993); "Fragility of Third World's Regimes", *International Social Science Journal*, No. 45, pp. 199-244; and Coppedge, M. (1999); Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Patriarchy and Functionalism in Venezuela, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

¹²⁵ Linz, J. (1990); "The Virtues of Parliamentarism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 84-91.

¹²⁶ Shugart, M. and Mainwaring, S. (1997); "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate", in Mathew Shugart and Scott Mainwaring (eds.) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 12-54, esp. 41.

¹²⁷ Linz, J. (1990); "The Perils of Presidentialism", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 51-69, (fn. 12).

publications, many pre-W.W.II parliamentary systems, like Germany, Italy, Spain and Hungary, collapsed because they were not viable. Having learned from the unsuccessful pre-war experience of other European countries, in 1958, Charles de Gaulle decided to increase presidential powers on the grounds that the instability of the Third and Fourth French Republics was due to the multi-party parliamentary system. In this way, he managed to substantially prolong the life of presidential cabinets.¹²⁹ In more recent times, even the legitimisation through holding a referendum for greater constitutional powers of the President did not appear to solve the entangled knot of problems related to the distribution of political authority between the executive, legislature and local government in the Russian Federation.¹³⁰ On the contrary, in the summer of 1993, President Yeltsin ordered the army to bomb and capture the "Duma". The excuse for this was that the intention to hold a national referendum for the adoption of a new federal constitution had been purposefully blocked by the majority party groups in the Duma. After the majority of deputies were evicted from the building of parliament and some of their leaders were sentenced for high treason, the referendum eventually took place in December 1993 but results from this overtly political act are still inconclusive. In just the same way, the recurrent regime failures in Latin America during the last couple of decades can also be attributed to the rise of strong and consequently not so accountable Presidents. Similar political situations may get quite complicated and even lead to authoritarianism, because, when state leaders see that they may lose legitimacy domestically and abroad, they gradually start to look for the support of and associate themselves with 'non-elected veto groups' such as the military or a powerful bureaucracy and begin to repress their political opponents.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Warwick, P. V. (1994); Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 139; and Bunce, V. (1997); "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern Europe", (fn. 11), p. 168.

¹²⁹ Lipset, S. M. (1990); "The Centrality of Political Culture", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 80-83; and Horowitz, D. (1990); "Comparing Democratic Systems", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 73-79.

¹³⁰ Gadzhiev, G. (2001); "Power Imbalance and Institutional Interests in Russian Constitutional Engineering", in Jan Zielonka (ed.) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 269-292.

¹³¹ O'Donnell, G. (ed.) (1973); Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South American Politics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Valenzuela, A. (1985); "Origins and Characteristics of the Chilean Party System: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government", Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, Working Paper No. 164 (May 1985).

Any judgement about the success (or failure) of presidentialism as opposed to parliamentarianism should also be made with respect to the quality of political democracy. The *locus classicus* of such an analysis has been and remains the seminal book of Arend Lijphart *Democracy in Plural Societies*, based on a comparison between the United States and United Kingdom executive systems.¹³² In it, the author develops a typology of existing democracies, classified as a continuum of 'presidential-parliamentary' political regimes. Among other things, Lijphart observes that in presidential systems the power to enact laws, pass budgets, make appointments and decide on foreign policy and state security matters is divided among the president and usually two legislative houses. On the contrary, parliamentary systems are examples of more centralised or "unitary" governments. For instance, the cabinet and prime minister in particular have the power to propose legislation to parliament as well as to produce ordinances, known as 'secondary legislation'. Moreover, they are responsible for enacting this legislation, but they may resist administratively implementing the decisions of parliament.

In mature democracies the probability of such conflicts occurring is greatly reduced, especially recently. It is mainly so because of the existence of independent judiciary and a working system of courts to which parliament may appeal at any time. Arguably, if a judicial review or legal process against the government is started, the executive may suffer proportionately larger losses of political legitimacy than the legislature, simply because the focus of public attention would concentrate on fewer people, i.e. the prime minister and his/her ministers and closer associates. Moreover, as a public institution representing a concrete political line cabinets are potentially more 'vulnerable' politically than legislatures, which are in turn characterised by a more mixed type of party representation. Nevertheless, an increasing tendency of premiers to concentrate political and administrative power has been observable in modern democratic regimes. In Great Britain and in a number of other European countries, the actual authority of prime ministers as political leaders and heads of the state administration has been on the rise for more than three decades. At the other end of the democratic spectrum, constitutional presidents, usually constrained by Congress, like in the United States and in a couple of Latin American and Asian

¹³² Lijphart, A. (ed.) (1977); *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

states, have been less able to pass legislation and muster the same amount of public support as they had previously been able to do.¹³³

The evidence derived from the experience of the post-communist countries undergoing transition shows that the majority of these regimes has opted neither for a purely presidential nor purely parliamentary system of government, but for a mixed one. It should be noted, however, that there seems to be a marked contrast between the East-Central European countries, which have predominantly chosen some version of parliamentarianism, and the Soviet Union successor states, with the outstanding exception of the Baltic countries, which selected a mixed or presidential system. This last fact has led some analysts to hypothesise that the selection of a parliamentary system of government in Eastern Europe creates a competitive advantage both in political and socio-economic terms.¹³⁴

It is perhaps obvious to most people familiar with the recent transformations of the former Communist Bloc states that the countries of East-Central Europe have performed far better than their CIS counterparts, but the mechanisms by which parliamentarianism has produced this outcome are still unclear. One possible suggestion of how this result has been achieved could be found in the politically neutral European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report from 1997. This report points out that "the advanced countries have, on average, held larger numbers of democratic elections, have had more frequent government turnovers, and have had shorter government tenures than the less advanced reformers".¹³⁵ In principle this is a factually accurate assessment of the situation in the region, but it is however difficult to explain in a critical manner how certain South Eastern European countries have under-performed socially and politically, while they have had one of the highest rates of government turnover by the date of this report's publication.

¹³³ Blondel, J. and Mueller-Rommel, F. (eds.) (1988), (2001); Cabinets in Western Europe, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988) and Cabinets in Eastern Europe, (London: Palgrave, 2001); and Kiewiet, R. D. and McCubbins, M. (eds.) (1991); The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

¹³⁴ Hellman, J. (1996); "Competitive Advantage: Political Competition and Economic Reform in Post-Communist Transitions", paper presented at the APSA convention, San Francisco 1996, pp. 3-4; Ekiert, G. (1999); "Do Legacies Matter? Patterns of Postcommunist Transitions in Eastern Europe", occasional paper, No. 53, Woodrow Wilson Center, East European Studies Program, p. 21.

¹³⁵ EBRD (1997); Transition Report 1997, (London: EBRD Publication, 1997), p. 23.

Another, slightly modified, proposal asserts that, indeed, frequent elections and cabinet changes are conducive to democracy, but those should be concentrated at the beginning of transition rather than at its intermediary and latter stages.¹³⁶ This is again a suggestion which is difficult to prove empirically, since the time that has elapsed since the fall of communism has been too short for one to be able to speak about 'stages' or 'periods' of transition in Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, it is also problematic to say whether a democratic transition has been started in some ex-Soviet states, as in the case of the Central Asian state members of the CIS, where it is more accurate to talk of the preservation of the former authoritarian structures and of corrupt 'sultanistic' political regimes. Finally, there are authors like Lipset who argue the opposite, i.e. that, especially in Eastern Europe, parliamentary systems have failed to produce stable governments and that they consider this a negative factor threatening the prospects of these countries completing their simultaneously unravelling reforms and, above all, of their consolidating their fragile democracies.¹³⁷

In my opinion, it is neither parliamentarianism nor presidentialism alone that has contributed to the development and stabilisation of political democracies in the region. It is more credible to contend that potentially successful choices of form of government have been accompanied by a myriad of other institutional arrangements, social and cultural elements and economic decisions. In addition to this, it is also valid to point to the fact that political actors would have anyway been obliged to make calculations, both rational and irrational, which certainly cannot be described even by someone trying to build up a separate theory about the number of counterfactuals which contribute positively or negatively to one or another type of democratic system. In other words, the creation and consolidation of democratic regimes are extremely complex processes, and a single set of institutional arrangements, no matter how central to political and social life it can be, is not enough to guarantee once and for all the general outlook and overall quality of political democracy.

¹³⁶ Ekiert, G. (1999); op. cit., p. 22.

¹³⁷ Lipset, S. M. (1994); "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review* 59, (February 1994), pp. 1-22, p. 11.

3.3.2. Electoral Systems

The nature of electoral system in today's democracies has been continuously debated by social scientists. It is not only because electoral systems represent an aggregation of procedures and norms that describe the concrete modes of how elections should be held, but also because of their largely political effect on the outcome and structural format of political democracy as a ruling regime. As it has been noted, one distinguishing feature of electoral systems has been their general flexibility and propensity to change according to the evolving socio-political circumstances.¹³⁸ When compared with other institutional arrangements, they tend to be more accessible to reform, as they may typically be revised by conventional legislative actions and simple majorities. The frequent alternation of rules under which elections are conducted has not only been a distinguishing feature of unconsolidated democracies, but has often been encountered in long-established democracies like Italy and Japan. With the transition to democracy being over, however, the complexity of revising the electoral system is greatly increased. First, this is because regular elections become an inseparable part of the general institutional framework of the democratic political system and, hence, a change of some of the other institutional arrangements (e.g. territorial, constitutional and administrative) is customarily required parallel to the electoral one. Second, it is assumed that the persons voted into power under the previous electoral conditions, and especially those working in the executive and those occupying seats in the national legislature, acquire a vested interest in getting elected under the old electoral system and, consequently, would not be willing to change the essential rules of political competition and democratic representation.

The predominant models of electoral system in the world today are known to be the majoritarian, mixed and proportional ones. The first of them establishes the principle of plurality, when few parties and their candidates compete in single-member districts (SMDs). Usually, this system tends to reproduce a two-party system, like in the United States and in the UK, while, in combination with a strong president or prime

¹³⁸ Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. (1989); Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 218; and Horowitz, D. (1991); A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

minister, it is supposed to lead to political stability and better governability of the state. The proportional and mixed systems have been the predominant choice of the recently democratising countries of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these types of electoral system have also been practised in Germany, Israel, Italy and Scandinavia for many years. Proportional systems, as their name suggests, give priority to the equal representation of a maximum number of political parties and social interests in parliament. They regularly produce coalition governments which, in turn, may be administratively successful or fail after a short period of rule after the political support for the executive has been withdrawn. A mixed system emphasises the positive qualities of the previous two systems (majoritarian and proportional), but the problem with it has not so much been the content but the degree. This means in practice that political elites have often failed to reach a consensus about the percentage of seats in parliament to be elected under either of the two systems, since the prevalence of plurality or proportionality would have had a direct effect on the number of political parties represented in the legislature as well as on the size and political strength of the governing majorities. The electoral experience of the post-communist countries shows that only in times of high uncertainty, namely, during the holding of founding elections, and particularly those resulting in voting of a constitutional assembly, a mixed electoral system has been chosen (e.g. in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia). However, later on, with the adoption of constitutions and new electoral laws this system has rarely been replicated in Eastern Europe.

Despite the fact that in different political situations and periods of time, more majoritarian or, respectively, more proportional electoral systems have had greater success, it would be a big mistake to assume that one specific model is suitable for all cases and can guarantee a particular kind of partisan outcome. This assertion has theoretically as well as empirically been confirmed by a series of studies on the linkage between the type of electoral system and the nature of democracy.¹³⁹ One of the best known students of comparative electoral systems since the 1970s, has been Arend Lijphart. He managed to analyse and rank twenty-one Western democracies,

¹³⁹ Rae, D. (1967); The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.) (1986); Electoral Laws and Their Consequences, (New York: Agathon, 1986); and the essays written by Ken Gladdish, Arend Lijphart, Guy Lardeyret and Quentin Quade in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 162-206.

according to their choice of electoral system, i.e. its being majoritarian- or consensus-based.¹⁴⁰ Together with his associates, Lijphart then explored the important relationship between electoral systems and party systems for the period after World War II until 1990.¹⁴¹ These publications clearly demonstrate that neither majoritarian, nor proportional, nor mixed electoral systems are intrinsically better than the other ones, but that it is just a matter of certain institutional trade-offs in a political democracy. For instance, there could be considerations about installing a more efficient or more representative democratic regime in power as well as about staffing government institutions with people more affiliated with their political parties or more directly accountable to their territorial constituency elected officials.

How can these in-built contradictions in the structure of electoral systems be reconciled with the goals of contemporary democracy, namely, the ones of encouraging participation, co-operation and competition?¹⁴² Apart from the primary and not so elementary, as it has been demonstrated above, choice of electoral system (majoritarian, mixed or proportional), countries may decide in favour of a system with a relatively low or high *electoral threshold* for admission of candidates to parliament. Likewise, during presidential elections, some countries' laws make it an explicit condition that a certain number of citizens' signatures or significant political parties support an individual before they be allowed to compete for office.

Electoral thresholds have been increasingly used by political elites as instruments to consolidate the number of parties in parliament and build stable governing majorities in times of transition or when state system is placed under considerable domestic social and political as well as international pressure. For example, in the 1991 parliamentary elections in Poland, 29 parties gained seats with no minimum threshold being applied. In 1993, however, their number dropped down to seven after a five-percent threshold was introduced.¹⁴³ Similar was the case in Russia, where the process

¹⁴⁰ Lijphart, A. (1984); Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1984).

¹⁴¹ Lijphart, A. (1994); Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹⁴² See Chapter 2 for a list of the main principles and procedures guiding the operation of political democracy.

¹⁴³ According to the electoral law passed on May 28, 1993, an even higher electoral threshold of 8 percent was established for coalitions of parties to get into the Sejm, while only those who received 7 percent of the vote would be eligible for redistribution of the national remainder of proportional

of creation of new political parties and their transformation into more permanent entities has begun pretty slowly and is still not completed. Until December 1993, when Yeltsin introduced his electoral reform through a referendum, there were 14 organised factions, each with 48 or more deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies, plus 199 independent deputies. The deputies elected to the new Duma were already organised in only 12 factions, plus about 120 representatives who did not belong to any political faction.¹⁴⁴ Even a slight increase of the electoral threshold, like in Israel from 1 percent to 1.5 percent, induces the smaller parties to merge with each other or with larger ones, in order not to lose their chance of being represented in parliament during the next elections. Thus, in Israel, the political parties present in the Knesset dropped down from fifteen in 1988 to ten in 1992.¹⁴⁵

It is generally assumed that Eastern Europeans look to the West to see how to design their own institutions, including about how to stage elections.¹⁴⁶ The two predominant institutional models that have been imported are France's mixed presidential-parliamentary system of government with a majoritarian election of the president and mixed proportional one for the legislature, and Germany's parliamentary federalist model with a mixed electoral system for both chambers of the legislature. The American and British types of government, elected under majoritarian systems, have been far less popular with the leaders and population in the new democracies in the East.¹⁴⁷ Consequently, it may be hypothesised that the debate about the choice of electoral system in many post-communist countries initially revolved around the theme of proportional or majoritarian elections for both the executive and legislature, but later on it settled firmly as either a mixed or proportional one depending on the type of executive system in place.

representation votes that went above this threshold; in Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: ..., (fn. 2), pp. 287-88.

¹⁴⁴ *Economist* (1993); "Russia in the Swamp", May 22, pp. 59-60; and Lipset, S. M. (1994); "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review* 59, (February 1994,) pp. 1-22, p. 11 (fn. 27).

¹⁴⁵ Bogdanor, V. (1993); "The Electoral System, Government, and Democracy", in Israeli Democracy under Stress, Sprinzak, E. and Diamond, L. (eds.), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 83-106.

¹⁴⁶ Bunce, V. (1997); "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern Europe", in Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, (fn. 11), p. 165; and Zielonka, J. (1994); "New Institutions in the Old East Bloc", *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 87-104.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; p. 165.

Finally, it should be clear that the reform of the electoral system should not be an arbitrary act aimed at favouring one political elite over another. Precisely because their institutionalisation in a democratic context necessitates time, routinisation of procedures and predictability, electoral systems should be changed only when there is incontestable evidence of flaws in the current system of electoral competition and representation of voters' interests. When there has been a significant shift in the public opinion in favour of replacing the existing electoral system with a new one, the radical reform should be performed as specifically as possible so that former institutional or legal mistakes be eradicated completely and the citizens' preferences concerning the electoral norms and procedures be satisfied to the largest extent possible.

3.3.3. *Political Parties*

Since the rise of mass politics and especially since the dramatic progress of democracy as a major system of government a couple of centuries ago, the role of political parties has been increasingly growing. It can be claimed with a more-than-average degree of confidence that, nowadays, political parties occupy a central place in the institutional framework of democratic regimes, which makes them a defining condition for the type of political rule itself. Despite the recent fact that the overall social significance of political parties has been gradually eroding thanks to the increasingly important role played by the mass media and civil society, it is still believed that a well-institutionalised party system – namely, political parties with effective, autonomous organisations and strong vertical and horizontal linkages between well-established organisational structures of political supporters and party elites – is an indispensable condition for the consolidation of democracy in modern times.¹⁴⁸ Leaving aside the actual problems experienced by various party systems on a global scale, it might be predicted that political parties have the potential to retain and even increase their dominant position in contemporary democracies, mainly because of their singular capacity to represent the citizens' interests both at the national and

¹⁴⁸ Diamond, L., Linz, J., and Lipset, S.M. (eds.) (1990); "What Makes for Democracy?", in Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume four: Latin America, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), p. 34 (fn. 23); Merkl, P. (1993); "Which are Today's Democracies?", *International Social Science Journal*, No. 45, pp. 257-70; and Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (1995); Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (fn.1), pp. 4-5.

local level. Moreover, it is not a minor factor that the majority of the fundamental rights and obligations of political parties are explicitly written down in and, hence, protected by the state constitution.

Social researchers interested in the operation of political parties have come up with four basic functions which distinguish political parties from other institutions in a democracy. First, parties help to structure the electoral process by nominating candidates for office and providing a canvass for votes by proposing alternative nominees for leadership positions to the electorate. Second, apart from being directly involved in the electoral competition, political parties offer most citizens with permanent and distinctive combinations of political ideas and symbols. This is what has been termed the function of “symbolic integration” and it has been contended that elites can capitalise upon party identification only gradually, sometimes with the passage of several generations.¹⁴⁹ Third and probably most relevant to the regime establishment and consolidation, is the function of government formation. It is of primary importance that political parties are able to fill top political and administrative offices, respecting all necessary democratic procedures at the same time.¹⁵⁰

As has been recognised by a number of social observers, however, political parties have lost a considerable part of their capacity to act as exclusive agents, proposing and selecting the people in government, with respect to the previous dominant periods of their existence. The rapid professionalisation and technologisation of the political sphere has reduced and occasionally rendered insignificant their role as “gatekeepers” of the access points to real power in the state.¹⁵¹ Fourth, as a summary of all the above functions, political parties might be perceived as institutions capable of aggregating

¹⁴⁹ Converse, P. (1969); “Of Time and Partisan Stability”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 2 (July 1969), pp. 139-71.

¹⁵⁰ Although not always the same, the basic functions of political parties revolve around the functional characteristics outlined in the section above and concurrent with those mentioned by Philippe Schmitter, in Schmitter, P. (1997); “Intermediaries in the Consolidation of Neo-Democracies: the Role of Parties, Associations and Social Movements”, working paper No. 130, Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials, Barcelona 1997, pp. 10-11. See as well Von Beyme, K. (1994); “Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Post-Modern Party State?”, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1994), pp. 135-59.

¹⁵¹ On guardianship see Dahl, R. (1989); *Democracy and Its Critics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 52-64. For the origins of the term “gatekeeping” see Easton, D. (1971); *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, (New York: Knopf, 1971).

the passions and interests of a significant portion of the population, and this is mainly done through continuously innovating and fulfilling their political and social programmes. This ultimate 'aggregative function' of parties reserves them a special place in the democratic political system, somewhere between the official institutions of public contestation and deliberation and civil society. They tend to perform this predominantly by transforming the discrete and fragmented demands of the citizenry into more manageable and coherent general objectives and political proposals brought in front of the ruling elites.¹⁵²

As a result of the multiplicity and functional versatility of political parties, two different sets of party systems may be identified. One set is composed of pluralistic and hegemonic party systems, the other of adversarial and consociational party systems. The first is associated, generally speaking, with party systems existing in autocratic and democratic regimes and in regimes in transition, while the second is referred to mostly in situations where political democracy has already been established and is well on its way towards consolidation. Although these two types of party system hinge upon qualitatively different foundations, they are, nevertheless, linked to each other in a variety of ways: structural, programmatic, social, political, historical and identity. Quite often they even overlap in time as essential elements of the process of democratisation.

The answer to the question whether a certain party system is pluralistic or hegemonic is determined by a number of factors. The most important of these are the nature and strength of the social cleavages in the state, as well as the structure, leadership and the programmatic standpoints of the parties which compose this system.¹⁵³ Although the transition from the previous authoritarian regime and the early phase of democratisation in Eastern Europe were dominated by exponents of the former communist party, this influence varied considerably between countries and sub-regions. However, neither the newly created party systems nor the emerging elites

¹⁵² Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (eds.) (1990); Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Katz, R. and Mair, P. (eds.) (1992); Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-90, (London: SAGE Publications, 1992).

¹⁵³ Rokkan, S. (1970); Citizens, Elections, Parties, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970); and Inglehart, R. (1984); "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies", in Dalton, R. J.,

were completely submerged by a single political force, as had occurred in other countries such as India, Japan and even Italy after WWII.¹⁵⁴ To my mind, two factors account for the almost complete absence of hegemonic party systems in the ex-communist bloc, with the possible exception of the staunchly autocratic regimes of Belarus and those of the Central Asian republics which are members of the CIS. These factors are (a) the emergence of political parties from opposition social movements mostly as 'umbrella' and 'bloc' parties and (b) the holding of Round Table talks in a number of countries of the region. As a result, the political transition was carried out peacefully and the heirs of the former communist and other authoritarian parties were given the opportunity to participate in the new party system on equal terms with other parties and organisations.

As a matter of fact, most developed democracies in the world today are pluralistic in kind, but one cannot consider any democratic regime as the exclusive representation of one of the two extremes of a 'pluralism/hegemony' political party scale. Instead of occupying certain positions associated with their relative pluralistic or hegemonic character, party systems in a democracy should rather be imagined as representing different political and programmatic standpoints situated somewhere between the ends of this continuum. Social scientists interested in the analysis of and comparison between party systems have usually described as hierarchical the systems of most CIS and Latin American countries.¹⁵⁵ Although this type of party system is in a minority globally, it appears to be surviving the difficulties of the day and constantly re-emerging in diverse settings. It is predominantly so, because the political parties in these two regions are still in flux and not well-established yet. Moreover, the consolidation of the party system might not be the only and most crucial factor determining the success of democratic transition in each and every case. 'Uncertainty' is the key word here and a major driving force behind this kind of transformation. Once the process of democratisation is completed however, it has been proven in

Flanagan, S. C., and Beck, P. A. (eds.) Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment and Dealignment?, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

¹⁵⁴ Beyme, K. von (1996); Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, (London: MacMillan Press), Chapter 7 on political parties, pp. 122-46, esp. p. 122.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; p. 41; Schedler, A. (1995); "Under- and Overinstitutionalization: Some Ideal Typical Propositions Concerning New and Old Party Systems", working paper No. 213, Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, 1995; and Diamond, L. (ed.) (1999); Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 97.

practice that pluralistic party systems might also be institutionalised in polities having previously had a history of hegemonic party systems under authoritarianism. This outcome was achieved in a number of countries because of the presence of profound political and socio-economic cleavages, for instance. These cleavages pre-determined the pluralist character of the party system in the young democratic regimes of Taiwan, Thailand and India, where the specificities of the local context (e.g. historical, social and political) played a major role in shaping the political party system.¹⁵⁶

The second set of party systems distinguishes between adversarial and consociational party systems and all the varieties in-between. The cradle of adversarial party systems has been considered for a long time to be the Anglo-Saxon countries, and Great Britain in particular.¹⁵⁷ According to this model, it is presumed that the party system must remain competitive, even once political democracy has been well-established for a considerable period and has taken root in society, simply because politics is inherently conflictual and the adversarial relations between political parties must not only be preserved but must also be nurtured. The other version of pluralist liberal democracy is based less on competition and more on accommodation, as Lijphart has proposed.¹⁵⁸ Similar arrangements among political forces are aimed at including most if not all significant parties in government or, at least, to make them support a given type of executive arrangement in the legislature. This process is guided by the principles of tolerance and consensus-building among diverse and sometimes mutually exclusive social and political identities. The implementation of the consociational model in practice has been a political feature characterising the party systems of several stable West European democracies such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and, with variations and intermittently, Austria.¹⁵⁹

A decade after the crumbling of communism, it is interesting to note whether the political party systems in Eastern Europe have been organised according to the

¹⁵⁶ Das Gupta, J. (1989); "India: Democratic Becoming and Combined Development", in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, L. Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 53-104, esp. p. 95; and Blondel, J. (1999); "The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Democratization Process", in Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance. East and Southeast Asia, Marsh, I., Blondel, J. and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999).

¹⁵⁷ Finer, S. (1975); Adversarial Government, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

¹⁵⁸ Lijphart, A. (1977); Democracy in Plural Societies ... (fn. 22).

¹⁵⁹ Lijphart, A. (1984); Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries ... (fn. 30).

principles and norms which are central for the functioning of Western party systems. In addition, it would be valuable to see where post-communist political parties stand on the 'pluralist-hegemony' and 'adversarial-consociational' axes of structuration of the party system. As some political science authors have warned, it might well be the case that traditional cleavages which determine the general outlook of the party system in the West may be quite different in Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁰ More than forty years of one-party domination and extreme ideologisation of both state and civil society would certainly compel political actors in Eastern Europe to look at least for additional options for their respective party systems rather than the already established ones in the West like, for example, the widely popular Lipset and Rokkan multiple-cleavage theoretical model.

Despite the bulk of research on political parties produced so far, it is still hard to make definite pronouncements concerning the existence of a certain pattern of organisation of the party systems in the new post-communist democracies.¹⁶¹ It is even harder to draw far-reaching conclusion about the types of parties chosen to be built by the political elites in these countries. Because the region itself is quite vast territorially and diverse politically, historically, culturally and socio-economically, it is natural to assume that party systems and associational life in East-Central Europe have evolved somewhat differently than those in other places further East and South in the former Communist Bloc.¹⁶²

Several key developments and institutional features are nevertheless characteristic of all party systems in Eastern Europe. Everywhere the structures of mass politics and the institutional environment in particular, took time to settle down, although in some parts of the former Communist Bloc this process has still not begun. As a result of

¹⁶⁰ Beyme, K. von (1996); Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe ..., (fn. 44), p. 126; and Karasimeonov, G. (1996); "Bulgaria's New Party System", in Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. G., (eds.) Stabilising Fragile Democracies. Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, (London: Routledge, 1996).

¹⁶¹ Held, J. (ed.) (1993); Democracy and Right-Wing Politics in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, (Boulder, CO: *East European Monographs*, 1993); and Zielonka, J. (1994); "New Institutions in the Old East Bloc", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 87-104.

¹⁶² Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. (1993); "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 521-48; Lewis, P. (1994); "Democratization and Party Development in Eastern Europe", *Democratization*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 391-405; and Wightman, G. (ed.) (1995); Party Formation in Eastern Europe, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995).

this, the precise fate of party systems in these new democracies still remains somewhat uncertain. Similarly to Portugal and Spain in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the process of institutionalisation of new political parties in Eastern Europe was characterised by considerable volatility and change.¹⁶³ Most of the parties in the region are relatively young and they lack deep organisational roots and political identities. Judging on the basis of the sheer openness of the electoral market, what might be expected is the emergence of fragile parties lacking the necessary resources, which, if they cannot make a lasting impact upon the political system, may suddenly collapse. Although 'pluralist' and highly competitive, these types of party system do not augur well for the consolidation of democracy since they are likely to promote instability rather than advance the quality of the new regime with every new consecutive election.¹⁶⁴

The transition from hegemonic to pluralist party structures in Eastern Europe was accompanied by a number of difficulties. The previous authoritarian regime had championed the exclusive leadership of one political party – the communist one. As a result of this deliberate and long-standing policy of the former elites, after the collapse of communism large segments of the population expressed either strong anti-party sentiments or dissatisfaction with the slow progress of introducing party pluralism and dismantling the political and economic structures of the old *nomenklatura* parties and organisations. These social attitudes were reflected in the debates of political elites concerning the election of new legislature and drafting of a democratic constitution. In some countries, especially those where truly multi-party Round Table talks had not taken place, the fragile consensus achieved among the communists and opposition at the moment of extrication from the previous regime was replaced by the far more confrontational bipolar model of party relations resembling Sartori's "polarised

¹⁶³ Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990); *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), (fn. 42); and Bozóki, A. (1994); "Party Formation and Constitutional Change in Hungary", *Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.10, No. 3, pp. 35-55.

¹⁶⁴ Zielonka, J. (1990); "The Assertion of Democratic Movements", in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielonka (eds.), *Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a New European Order* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990), pp. 43-58; and Mair, P. (1993); "How, and Why, Newly-Emerging Party Systems May Differ from Established Party Systems", paper presented at a conference on "The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy", University of Bristol, September 1993.

pluralism".¹⁶⁵ Hence, it is easy to hypothesise that strongly adversarial relations between the major parties, particularly those represented in parliament, may have a largely detrimental effect on the stability of government. Moreover, the recent historical experience of Russia, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria (until the end of 1996) clearly demonstrates, that confrontational party systems and split majorities in parliament may prevent the introduction of necessary political reforms and block the transformation process, especially in the economy.¹⁶⁶

Achieving party pluralism, although a very positive thing, particularly in a political context like that of the emerging Eastern Europe regimes after the collapse of communism, should not be an end in itself. This theoretical observation has been almost completely confirmed by empirical reality: electoral volatility in post-communist countries has been extremely high, while voter turnout has been steadily decreasing and is establishing itself at critically low levels. It is a paradox how after the initial 'shock' after transition, partisan loyalties in many of these polities do not seem to have stabilised but continue to oscillate significantly compared to most contemporary West European democracies.¹⁶⁷ Electoral volatility in East-Central Europe has been roughly 30% during the mid- and late-1990s. In South-Eastern Europe and the CIS, unconsolidated democracies the sway of citizens' preferences for different parties reached 50% and above. Electoral participation has also been extremely low: in the Polish 1993 elections it was just over 50% and in the Hungarian 1994 elections it was just around 65%. The situation with local elections turned out to be even worse. Voters' availability has often been below 50% and sometimes even below 30%.¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, the number of parties and movements registered for elections has been persistently high and in some countries has led to a large dissipation of votes. Against the background of 67 parties in Poland, 45 in Hungary, 37 in Bulgaria and 74 in Romania which took part in their respective founding

¹⁶⁵ Sartori, G. (1976); Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); see also Dellenbrandt, J. Å. (1993); in Paul G. Lewis (ed.) Developments in East European Politics, (Basingstoke: MacMillan), p. 158; and Krustev, I. (1997); "Party Structure and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (March 1997), pp. 91-106.

¹⁶⁶ Karasimeonov, G. (1995); "Bulgaria's New Party System", in Wightman, G. (ed.) Party Formation in Eastern Europe, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 154-78.

¹⁶⁷ Gallagher, T., Laver, M., and Mair, P. (1995); Representative Government in Modern Europe, second ed., (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p. 397.

¹⁶⁸ Rose, R. (1997); "Evaluating Election Turnout", *Studies in Public Policy*, No. 290, (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1997).

elections, the effective number of parties in parliament was rather small and the percentage of under-represented voters was above 20-25%.¹⁶⁹

Furthermore, it should be added that the unsettled institutional environment in Eastern Europe offers a lot of opportunities for various political entrepreneurs and reinforces the role of continuity and discontinuity with the recent past in the formation of party systems in these new democracies.¹⁷⁰ There are certain political parties, having emerged during the transition period and having been established by very small groups of people, which have largely remained *taxi parties* (i.e. all their members could fit into one taxi). Such parties usually relied on strong and charismatic leaders who could air the programmatic opinions of those parties on national broadcast media or in the press. Typically populist in character, these messages were aimed at reaching the maximum number of people, so party leaders did not shy away from voicing some socially and politically unrealistic or even sometimes xenophobic slogans. Thus, it should become largely clear, political parties in Eastern Europe have not only been used to foster democracy and good governance, but have also been employed by former communist cadres and various autocratic rulers to perpetuate their participation in contemporary political life. The political parties supporting the electoral campaigns and government policies of Belorussian President Lukashenka, Croatia's Tudjman, Yugoslavia's Milosevic, Slovakia's former Prime Minister Meciar and the majority of state leaders of Caucasian and Central Asian republics part of the CIS are vivid cases in point.

As to what regards the destiny of traditional parties in Eastern Europe, wherever those were restored after half a century of communist rule, many of their backers found these organisations changed beyond recognition and ideologically unfit to cope with the different aspects of the democratisation process.¹⁷¹ The champions of the communist idea remained mostly disillusioned too. This was either because the

¹⁶⁹ McGregor, P. (1993); "How Electoral Laws Shape the Eastern European Parliaments", RFE/RL research report, No. 4, pp. 11-18, esp. p. 13.

¹⁷⁰ Cotta, M. (1996); "Building Party Systems after Dictatorship. The East European Cases in Comparative Perspective", in Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. G. (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies. Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 99-127; and Grzymala-Busse, A. (2002); Redeeming the Communist Past. The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

¹⁷¹ Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U. K. (eds.) (1998); Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

former communist party was banned from politics while its structures were officially dismantled like in the Russian Federation, or this formerly totalitarian party was radically transformed and its name was changed to resemble more a social-democratic variant of the old 'leading' party. The only exception in the region was the Czech communist party, which disbanded itself immediately after the 'Velvet revolution' of 1989 but succeeded in reconstituting itself as a Marxist party, managing to preserve some of its electorate and to play a role, albeit a minor one, in the political life of the country.

Finally, it might be concluded that a large number of the organisational and ideological problems currently experienced by political parties in the West appear to be relevant to the post-communist parties in Eastern Europe. For instance, a common problem for both regions is the declining role of political parties as representatives citizens' political interests and social identities.¹⁷² The broad basis of support for certain traditional political parties, accumulated throughout several consecutive generations, has been rapidly declining in recent times.¹⁷³ Moreover, political parties everywhere seem to be gradually moving from society to the state, in order to perform greater governing functions. Their popular duties described in the constitution, programme of cabinet or code of parliament have been replaced by largely administrative tasks.¹⁷⁴ It could be hypothesised that this has been mainly occurring because of the changed pattern of people's participation in democratic politics and the obsolescence of political parties as an effective means of communication and socialisation between political elites and citizens.¹⁷⁵ Voting in elections and taking part in party politics, two essential characteristics proving stable partisan affiliations in a representative democracy, have been increasingly regarded as *passé* and have

¹⁷² Barnes, S.H., McDonough, P. and Lopez Pina, A. (1985); "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1985), pp. 625-721, p. 715; Tedin, K.L. (1994); "Popular Support for Competitive Elections in the Soviet Union", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1994), pp. 241-71; and Mair, P. (2000); "Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy", paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session in the workshop on "Competing Conceptions of Democracy", Copenhagen, 14-19 April, 2000, p. 7.

¹⁷³ Converse, P. (1969); "Of Time and Partisan Stability", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1969), (fn. 39), pp. 139-71; and Chull Shin, D. (1995); "Political Parties and Democratization in South Korea: The Mass Public and the Democratic Consolidation of Political Parties", *Democratization*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Summer 1995), pp. 20-55, esp. pp. 23-25.

¹⁷⁴ Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (1995); "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of Cartel Party", *Party Politics*, pp. 5-28.

¹⁷⁵ Lawson, K. and Merkl, P. (eds.) (1988); When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

been slowly replaced by reliance on electronic media¹⁷⁶ and on the membership in professional associations and civil organisations.¹⁷⁷ Although it is difficult to predict whether these social tendencies will continue and be preponderant in the future, they are nevertheless indicative of the current 'transitional' status of political parties not only in Eastern Europe but throughout the world.

The existing similarities with Western models of institutionalisation of party systems and their effect on democratisation have still not been investigated fully and in a comparative perspective. It might easily be presumed, however, that the majority of problems and difficulties listed above are not only repeated but even accentuated in the social and political environment surrounding Eastern European transformations.¹⁷⁸ Only the future may tell which of the former communist countries will manage to consolidate modern and functioning party systems comparable to the ones in the West. These are party systems with stable membership identification, strong organisational capacity, and the ability to compete with the other bodies of representation such as different interest groups and social movements.

3.3.4. *Constitutions*

Constitutions are both political declarations and legal documents establishing the principles of distribution of power in the state, the allocation of tasks and hierarchy between institutions, and the juridical provisions which are meant to defend the individual and collective rights of citizens. Constitutions are versatile political instruments and can cover a wide 'functional space'. They contain the essential meta-rules of the state system and these legal norms should be accepted by the majority of citizens. Although constitutions are said to be politically neutral, the making of the

¹⁷⁶ Kellner, D. (1991); *Television and the Crisis of Democracy*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and Butler, D. and Ranney, A. (eds.) (1992); *Electioneering*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

¹⁷⁷ Berger, S. (ed.) (1981); *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics*. (NY: Cambridge University Press); Wilson, F. L. (1983); "Interest Groups and Politics in Western Europe: The New Corporatist Approach", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 105-23; and Schmitter, P.C. (1992); "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups", *Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 35, Nos. 4 and 5 (1992), p. 444.

¹⁷⁸ Bermeo, N. (1990); "Rethinking Regime Change", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1990), pp. 357-77; Olson, D. (1993); "Political Parties and Party System in Regime Transformation: Inner Transition in the New Democracies of Central Europe", *American Review of Politics*, Vol. 14 (Winter 1993), pp. 619-85; and Bruszt, L. and Simon, J. (1991); *The Codebook for the International Survey of*

basic law is a profoundly political process.¹⁷⁹ Because of its centrality to the life of many people and public institutions, but also because of its relative permanence despite government turnover, constitution-building involves the passions and interests of a large number of individual actors, interest groups, political parties and society as a whole. In effect, constitutions can either serve as strong political declarations or they might be used as legal instruments for problem-solving (or, ideally, both). Moreover, they can be more populist or specific in character and more constraining or liberal depending on the concrete political and socio-economic situation and the exact procedure regulating the application of their legal provisions.¹⁸⁰

The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is rather complex and it is difficult to postulate about any direct sequential link between the two. Being quite important for the functioning of democratic regimes, constitutions are not considered exclusive elements of political democracy and they can be encountered in other political circumstances and milieus. According to a recent report, most existing states have written constitutions, but only between one-third and two-thirds of them are democratic.¹⁸¹ These are mostly 'electoral democracies' and democracies in the process of consolidation; thus, it is very complicated to establish the precise place and relevance of codified constitutions in these regimes.

Although a constitution may not be an "intellectual commodity that can be used to sell, impose or transplant political models", as one researcher of the subject has put it,¹⁸² it is a recognised fact today that the 'constitutional pillar' of democracy and of the political system in general plays an increasingly important role. This fact might be explained by the decline of political parties and trade unions as traditional means of representing peoples' interests and these organisations' gradual moving from society

the Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe During the Transition to Democracy, (Budapest: TARKI, 1991).

¹⁷⁹ Elazar, D. J. (1985); "Constitution-making: The Pre-eminently Political Act", in Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations, Banting, K.G., and Simeon, R. (eds.), (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985), pp. 232-248.

¹⁸⁰ Banting, K. G. and Simeon, R. (1985); "Introduction: The Politics of Constitutional Change", in Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations, Banting, K. G., and Simeon, R. (eds.), (Toronto: Toronto University Press), pp. 1-29.

¹⁸¹ Democracy Forum (2000); World Movement for Democracy, *Final Declaration*, Warsaw Convention, Warsaw, Poland, (September 2000).

to the state.¹⁸³ The evolving political parties and trade unions' functions, i.e. from being *representative* to being *governing* agencies, necessitates the constitutionalisation of this novel institutional set-up. The apparent distancing between the popular and constitutional principles guiding the operation of contemporary democracies has brought to the fore the double issue of how, on the one hand, to curtail the growing populism of politicians who want to exploit the dissatisfaction of citizens with the actual performance of democracy as a political regime¹⁸⁴ and, on the other, to limit the sometimes voluntaristic behaviour of a individual members of society for whose illegal acts government is responsible to the rest of the people.¹⁸⁵

Contemporary political scientists who have studied the effects of constitutions on democratic regimes, including the ones in Eastern Europe, have come up with four major arguments in favour of adopting a codified basic law.¹⁸⁶ First, constitutions stipulate the 'rules of the game' and particularly the ones relating to the supremacy of law in a democracy. Thus, constitutions contribute to the effective and legal functioning of democracy. Second, the prerogatives of different institutions and the various decision-making procedures are clearly spelled out. In this way, the basic law brings about the predictability and stability necessary for the survival of the democratic system. Third, constitutions provide the ruling elites and the citizens with a catalogue of fundamental rights. Moreover, constitutions not only recognise these basic rights, but they also set up mechanisms for their effective protection. Finally, the adoption of constitutions in Eastern Europe served as symbolic opportunity for the population of these countries to assert through voting (usually in a referendum) their

¹⁸² Faundez, J. (1993); "Constitutionalism: A Timely Revival", in Constitutionalism and Democracy. Transitions in the Contemporary World, Douglas Greenberg et al. (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 358.

¹⁸³ Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (1995); "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party", *Party Politics*, No. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 5-28, (fn. 64).

¹⁸⁴ Mény, I. (1998); "Populism", Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence; and Mair, P. (2000); "Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy", paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on *Competing Conceptions of Democracy*, University of Copenhagen, 14-19 April, 2000, p. 7.

¹⁸⁵ Bogdanor, V. (ed.) (1988); Introductory chapter in Constitutions in Democratic Politics, (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), p. 3; and Holmes, S. (1988); "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy", in Constitutionalism and Democracy, Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 195-240.

¹⁸⁶ Elgie, R. and Zielonka, J. (2001); "Constitutions and Constitution-Building: A Comparative Perspective", pp. 25-47, and Morlino, L. (2001); "Constitutional Design and Problems of

popular aspiration for independent democratic statehood after a long period of communist rule in the region.

Because this research focuses not only on democratisation but also on the transitional environment in which this process develops, it is valid to mention that the adoption of a new constitution does not automatically change the constitutional system or the institutional structure of the political regime *per se*.¹⁸⁷ Constitution-making often represents a power-struggle and so has it been during previous transitions to democracies, i.e. during the 'second wave' of democratisation after 1945, as well as since the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Southern Europe and Latin America.¹⁸⁸ Most constitutions in Eastern Europe managed to preserve some of the features and contradictions of their socialist-period predecessors, because they had often been elaborated as compromises between rival political forces.¹⁸⁹ Political actors were predominantly motivated by their narrow interests and short-term goals, not least because of the urgency of problems needed to be solved in the early period of transition. Both the ruling elites and opposition preferred to negotiate 'pacted' constitutions with other parties or to substantially reform their former communist constitution, as was done in Hungary (1989) and Albania (1991) and in most states of the CIS. Poland's 1992 "Little Constitution" and Ukraine's 1994 "Law of Power" stand out as examples of interim constitutional arrangements which paved the way to the adoption of real constitutions. Interestingly enough, two of the Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, decided to reintroduce their pre-communist constitutions in order to show primarily a continuity with a presumed past democratic tradition. Furthermore, in this way they tried to denounce both legally and symbolically the violent Soviet occupation of 1939 and to assert their right of independent post-Soviet statehood.

Bridging past national political experience via the adoption of new constitutions has been emphasised not only because of particular agreements having been reached

Implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe", pp. 48-108, in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol.1 Institutional Engineering Jan Zielonka (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

¹⁸⁷ Pogany, I. (1996); "Constitution Making and Constitutional Transformation in Post-Communist Societies", *Political Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1996), p. 589.

¹⁸⁸ Von Beyme, K. (1996); "Institution-Building and Democratization", in Klaus von Beyme (ed.) Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, (London: MacMillan Press), (fn. 44), esp. pp. 99-101 and p. 119.

during the negotiation of basic laws, but also because of a variety of cultural, economic and social factors typical of a country.¹⁹⁰ This is nowhere better visible than in the preambles and the initial articles of the new constitutions. Preambles and the first few articles of a basic law are believed to represent the image a political regime and society have of themselves in a given moment of time. Moreover, these are popular messages with broader significance aimed at promoting integration of the citizens in the political system and conveying positive hopes for the future.¹⁹¹

For instance, the self-image transitional regimes have compared to the previous authoritarian ones is represented either in a vague fashion or more directly in the new constitutions. The formulation of phrases such as the “peaceful political transition to a legal state which realises a multiparty system” (Preamble of the Hungarian Constitution), the “political pluralism” (Article 1 of the Romanian Constitution) or the “parliamentary system of government” (Article 1.1 of the Bulgarian Constitution) came as a result of the political bargaining between the old and reform-minded political forces coining the basic law. The excesses of the former communist system *vis-à-vis* the citizens and social elites were openly denounced (Article 1 of the Slovenian Constitution and Article 6 of the Polish Little Constitution). Catchwords like the concepts of “civil society” (Preambles of the 1992 Lithuanian and Slovenian Constitutions) and “social-market economy” (Preamble of the Bulgarian Constitution and Article 1.3 of the German Reunification Treaty) were included to provide a political direction and some kind of social reassurance to people after the collapse of the previous communist structures and the building of new ones. Finally, most of the basic laws of the newly-created or restored states in Eastern Europe tended to emphasise different historical facts as just reasons for their national emancipation and political independence from the former authoritarian regimes that had dominated them. Slovakia’s constitutional fathers invoked the “cultural heritage of Cyril and Methodius” and the “historic bequest of the Grand Moravian Empire”, while the Croatian ones inserted a whole list of sovereign decisions made by various Croatian estates in the past centuries.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*; p. 119.

¹⁹⁰ Elgie, R. and Zielonka, J. (2001); “Constitutions and Constitution-Building ...”, (fn. 76), p. 35.

¹⁹¹ Von Beyme, K. (2001); “Institutional Engineering and Transition to Democracy”, in *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol.1 Institutional Engineering* Jan Zielonka (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 11-12.

Because constitutions are encompassing systems of legal rules which regulate and control the relationship between the other institutions in the state, in the case of Eastern European constitutions they concentrate on a number of elements and procedures that appeared to be most relevant to constitution-builders at the time of their creation. Social researchers working on post-communist constitutions have underlined several key themes incorporated in the new basic laws.¹⁹² These themes stress the importance of preventing the recurrence of totalitarianism and assuring the stability of democratic government. They also emphasise the separation of powers of the main public institutions (e.g. church and state), the protection of private property and some major social rights, and the guaranteeing of the normal operation of political parties and association of different social and interest groups. In several of his publications dedicated to this subject, Klaus von Beyme draws a special attention to the treatment of ethnic minorities and the protection of human rights by the new Eastern European constitutions.¹⁹³ The Yugoslav and Russian constitutions, for instance, being fundamental laws of multiethnic federations, speak generously of the “democratic tradition of nation-building” (Yugoslav Constitution Art. 4) and of the existence of a “multinational people” (Preamble of Russian Constitution). Nevertheless, as actual reality shows, these have quite often turned out to be only pseudo-liberal declarations which have not benefited the minority populations in practice.

The procedure by which a single (usually an ethnic majority) language is ‘fixed’ as the official language in the state has been another important test of the human rights credentials of its founders. Actually, special legal provisions granting a predominant place of the majority language were included in a number of East European constitutions (Art. 3 of the Bulgarian Constitutions, Art. 14 of the Lithuanian Constitution and Art. 68.1 of the Russian Constitution). Minority groups were additionally obliged to follow under different pretexts their “constitutional duty to learn” the official state language (Art. 36.2-3 of the Bulgarian Constitution and Art.

¹⁹² Guggenberger, B. et al. (eds.) (1991); *Eine Verfassung für Deutschland*, (München: Hanser); Von Beyme, K. (ed.) (1996); “Institution-Building and Democratization”, (fn. 44), pp. 96-121; and Elster, J. (1997); “Ways of Constitution Making”, in Axel Hadenius (ed.) *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 123-42.

¹⁹³ Von Beyme (1996); *ibid.*, pp. 117-19; and von Beyme (2001); *op. cit.* (fn. 81), pp. 12-14.

32 of the Slovak Constitution). Naturally, 'affirmative action policies' regarding ethnic minorities that have been incorporated in the constitutions of certain Eastern European countries have so far been more successful in the ethnically homogeneous Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic than in the mixed South and Eastern European ones. In the former cases, the respective governments have mostly been generous by granting ethnic minorities organisational and financial assistance, but there is still a lot of social resentment with regard to the national integration of foreign nationals and especially gypsies.

We have so far analysed only the nature of East European constitutions and their impact on the system of democracy. Theoretical researchers have pointed out, however, that for a political regime to become consolidated one must make a clear distinction between constitutions as singular documents and institutions of democracy on the one hand and the process of constitution-building which has some wider implications for the entire system of governance on the other.¹⁹⁴ This implies that in practice the process of constitution-making is at least as important as its product. Three aspects can primarily be mentioned in relation to constitution-building in the context of the ongoing transitions in Eastern Europe: the time necessary for preparing a constitution, the kind of actors taking part in the adoption of this key document and the procedure chosen for legitimating the new constitution.¹⁹⁵ In both practical and analytical terms, this means that the factors surrounding any of these three issues could possibly influence the success rate of the constitutional process and, eventually, produce certain significant qualitative differences within the new political regime. Table 1 exemplifies the differences among most post-communist countries regarding the timing of adoption of a new constitution and the specific ratification procedure chosen by constitution creators.¹⁹⁶

In the period between 1989 and 1991 after the collapse of communist rule, political actors adopted different strategies of reform and transformation of their respective

¹⁹⁴ Schmitter, P. C. (1997); "Process' not 'Product' Engineering in the Consolidation of Democracy", paper presented to the Conference of Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, European University Institute, Florence, (24-25 January, 1997).

¹⁹⁵ Elgie, R. and Zielonka, J. (2001); "Constitutions and Constitution-Building: A Comparative Perspective", in *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering* Jan Zielonka (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press), (fn. 76), pp. 32-33.

constitutional systems. The countries involved can be divided into three groups according to the time frame of adopting a new basic law. There are those which voted and started implementing the provisions of new democratic constitutions fairly quickly, such as Bulgaria (1991), Romania (1991) and Lithuania (1992).¹⁹⁷

Table 1

Varieties of Eastern European Constitutions after 1989

	Adoption			Ratification	
	Pre-1989 constitution (significantly amended)	Interim constitution	New constitution	Parliament	Parliament + referendum
Albania	1991		1998		X
Armenia			1995		X
Azerbaijan			1995		X
Belarus		1994	1996		X
Bulgaria			1991	X	
Croatia		1990	1991		X
Czech Republic			1993	X	
Estonia			1992*		X
Georgia			1995		X
Hungary	1989			X	
Latvia			1993*	X	
Lithuania			1992		X
Macedonia			1991		X
Moldova	1994			X	
Poland		1992	1997		X
Romania			1991		X
Slovakia			1992	X	
Slovenia			1991	X	
Ukraine		1994	1996	X	
Uzbekistan			1992	X	

* The 1922 Latvian constitution was fully reinstated with a couple of amendments (i.e. regarding the lowering of voting age to 18 and the creation of a Constitutional Court), while the new Estonian one integrated only certain parts of the 1938 constitution to show historical continuity with the pre-1939 Estonian statehood.

¹⁹⁶ For clarity sake I focus only at the 20 post-communist countries whose democratic performance is analysed subsequently in my thesis.

¹⁹⁷ Estonia and Latvia reintroduced their pre-communist constitutions in 1992, while the Czech and Slovak Republic adopted its federal constitution in the same year, but shortly afterwards the two countries split definitively, each of them having a constitution of its own.

At the same time, there are others which decided to postpone the adoption of a new constitution, such as Ukraine (1996), Poland (1997) and Hungary (which still does not have a new basic law). And there is a third group of countries which implemented constitutions in the medium time range, these being practically all the remaining political entities.

Actual practice has shown that political transitions have gone smoother in places where constitutions have been adopted earlier than in other places where this process has been slowed down. Despite some possible difficulties associated with the hasty adoption of the basic law, political actors and constitution-builders in these countries benefited from the initially strong support of the population and the achieved implicit consensus to conduct reforms in these societies.¹⁹⁸ It should be mentioned, however, that in the majority of CIS countries and in certain parts of former Yugoslavia, the adoption of a new constitution did not have the same effect on the political system and democracy as such. This was either because the political leaders intentionally blocked the realisation of constitutional principles or they did not have the authority to supplement certain constitutional provisions with enough state power, mainly because they did not control the entire territory and resources of the polity.¹⁹⁹

The constitution framers in the modern history of Eastern Europe have been many and varied. It is probably correct to hypothesise that the power position of constitutional promoters occupy matters a lot, as was the case with President Boris Yeltsin's influence over the 1993 Russian Constitution or President Lukashenka's one over the 1994 Belorussian Constitution. It is also probably valid to assert that the existing distinctions in the political background of major actors who agree upon a draft of a constitution seem to be quite relevant in a democratic context. The current experience with East-Central European constitution-making provides sufficient evidence that certain groups of constitution makers, belonging either to the democratic opposition or the ruling communist government, are likely to produce better qualitative results

¹⁹⁸ Holmes, S. (1993); "Back to the Drawing Board", *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Winter 1993); Merkel, W. (1996); "Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe", working paper/estudio No. 86, (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1996), (fn. 1).

¹⁹⁹ Elster, J. (1993); "Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea", *Public Administration*, Vol. 71 (Spring-Summer 1993), pp. 169-217; and Lukashuk, A. (2001); "Constitutionalism in Belarus: A False Start", in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering Jan Zielonka (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 293-318.

and generate popular legitimacy for the new basic law depending on the concrete situation. For instance, constitutions born out of consensus models, such as the Round Table talks, and political agreements concluded between the democratic parties in parliament have been universally accepted and have been more successful in terms of their actual implementation and legal strength.²⁰⁰ On the contrary, constitutions devised by a single political force have tended to be more conflict-prone and illegitimate, and that is why they have often been rejected subsequently by the population.

The survival of political elites and the continuity of certain social ideals in Eastern Europe have drawn the attention of state actors to the possibility of using plebiscitarian methods to adopt a new regime's constitution. The popular principle of wider involvement of the people in decision-making matters, having remained mostly on paper under the former socialist system, has gradually started to be implemented in a transitional environment during the process of constitution-making. Citizens could take an active part in this latter development either as electors of a constitutional assembly or by deciding upon a draft of a constitution in a national referendum. Initially, the tendency to hold a referendum concerning the final approval of a version of a new constitution prevailed in a large number countries. Moreover, this procedure had already successfully been experimented in several 'second-' and 'third-wave' European democracies before that, i.e. in Ireland (1937), Italy (1948), Denmark (1953), France (1946 and 1958) and Spain (1978). However, the political and economic situation in most countries of Eastern Europe appeared highly uncertain in the first half of the 1990s. Consequently, it might be assumed that it resembled more the post-war transition environment of the Federal Republic of Germany, where the basic law had been adopted only by parliament without being subject to plebiscite, than the Western democracies cited above. Despite the numerous difficulties surrounding the adoption of a new constitution, the German basic law (*Grundgesetz*) as most Eastern European constitutions approved only by the legislature proved to be a lasting and democratic legal solutions for these societies.

²⁰⁰ Sajó, A. (1996); "The Roundtable Talks in Hungary", p. 92; and Kolarova, R. and Dimitrov, D. (1996); "The Roundtable Talks in Bulgaria", p. 199, in Jon Elster (ed.) The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).

On the contrary, there were some Eastern European polities that had quite a mixed experience with various plebiscitarian forms of adopting a new constitution. Instead of providing the much-desired legitimacy, referenda provoked controversies among political opponents and occasionally served the interests of demagogues. Popular referenda in the newly-created democracies of Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland proved to be costly procedures which did not achieve all their ends in comparison with other cases where constitutions were adopted only by a constitutional assembly. For instance, in Lithuania, people had merely twelve days for public debate over a constitutional draft between its initial approval by parliament and the actual date of the referendum, while, in Poland, only 24% of the eligible voters cast their vote in favour of the constitution. Apart from creating sometimes serious legitimacy problems, referenda could also fall prey to manipulation by powerful political leaders. In Russia, for example, President Boris Yeltsin resorted to plebiscitarian tactics numerous times, in order to reduce the influence of his political opponents in Parliament on decision-making and increase, respectively, his own grip on state power. The manipulation of public opinion through the organisation of referenda was even worse in Belarus. By staging a couple of referenda between 1995 and 1996, President Lukashenka managed to increase his powers, establishing a supremacy over the decisions of parliament and controlling the formation of the state budget. The 1995 referendum, proclaiming Russian as the second official language alongside Belorussian, was held in an atmosphere of mass terror and intimidation of the opposition. Although it was staged in clear violation of the 1994 Constitution, it nevertheless took place despite the explicit objection of the majority of members of Parliament and the Constitutional Court.²⁰¹

In conclusion, it might be said that certain models of constitution-making and constitution-adopting have contributed more to the improved quality of democracy in Eastern Europe than others. What becomes certain after a decade of constitutional activity in Eastern Europe is that codified basic laws cannot alone produce functioning democratic regimes. Nevertheless, the dynamic process of constitution-building, which in itself is a wider political process involving institution-building, can significantly contribute to the consolidation of democracy in these countries.

²⁰¹ "Constitutional Watch" (1996); *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 4, (Fall 1996), p. 5.

Apparently, the relatively short period of adopting a new basic law facilitates the successful realisation and completion of democratisation to the largest possible extent. Moreover, the political background of constitution framers (being representatives of the former authoritarian regime or democrats) has a medium-to-low importance, hence, it varies greatly from case to case. Finally, the organisation of a referendum gives little added legitimacy to the newly adopted constitution, whereas, on many occasions, it can serve as an instrument of manipulation in the hands of politically unaccountable and populist leaders.

3.3.5. Legislatures: Single and Double Chambers

Legislatures together with political parties are considered indispensable institutions for the functioning of modern democracies. In a consolidated political regime the operational link between these two types of institutions is established very closely. At the end it is predominantly the political parties' candidates that are promoted as elected representatives to the national legislature and this is often written down in the constitution. The strategic position the parliament occupies in a democracy makes it crucial for the promotion of any structural changes in other public institutions, such as the executive, the political parties, the election system, the media and the court system, to mention just few of the better-known fields where it has the right to extend its authority to control and approve legislation. The role of legislature is crucial during the period of transition. A lot of key political and economic steps cannot be initiated and finalised without the backing of parliament. These are, for instance, the adoption of a new constitution, the investiture of the cabinet or head of state, the passing of laws of extreme importance for the functioning of the state, such as the budget law and many international conventions and agreements.

Although legislature occupies a central place in the public sphere, it is generally assumed that it differs very little in terms of its formal functioning. It appears to be so because, on the one hand, the work of legislatures is regulated quite tightly by the various provisions of the constitutions and by a special legislative code approved at the beginning of each new term of parliament by its members. Furthermore, a number of other actors and institutions of equal importance in the official political and state

hierarchy, like the President and the constitutional court, have the right to veto some of parliament's decisions. In practice, this leaves very little space for "constitutional engineering", to use Giovanni Sartori's expression, of the formal institutional format of legislatures.²⁰²

The current state of political institutions in many democracies shows, however, that legislatures can differ substantially both quantitatively and qualitatively in terms of their composition. Structurally, there could be single- and double-chamber parliaments. Presumably the existence of a second chamber is justified by the increased representation of those people belonging to a national minority or living on the territory of a federal unit or sub-unit. In the second chambers, called Senate, Bundesrat, or Chamber of Nationalities, the different segments of population are represented rather unequally. This is usually done in favour of the minority groups of citizens, who do not have the opportunity of a satisfactory functional and political representation in the lower chambers of legislature.²⁰³

The second chambers can be elected in two different ways: directly, by the residents of the federal sub-units, or indirectly, by their respective parliaments. Second chambers may also represent, for instance, like the German Bundesrat, the governments of the territorial sub-units (the *Länder*). In addition, the second chambers may differ considerably in their composition and political power. In some of them the representation is almost proportional to the population of the sub-units in a federal state (e.g. in Austria and Belgium). This seems not to be a very convenient variant of promoting representation of the federal territories at the central level. That is why diverse other forms of democratic compensation for the minority groups are provided. For example, there can be guaranteed seats in the decision-making bodies and an increased influence over the policies of a number of other public institutions, e.g. the ministries of education, ecology, tourism, transport and infrastructure, and through the trade unions as well as via representation in certain major social and religious organisations. The role of second chambers may range from having very limited powers to being almost equal in functions to the first chambers. Second chambers

²⁰² Sartori, G. (ed.) (1994); Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, (NY: New York University Press), (fn.1).

may either be chambers of 'opinion' or 'advice', but whose final decisions may easily be overridden by the first chamber, or they may cast a vote of confidence to the executive and be consulted on most matters concerning the legislative process and the running of a country's domestic and foreign policies.²⁰⁴

The comparison between the British Parliament and the American Congress, both of which are bicameral legislatures, presents an interesting example of the possible two extremes of the existing relation between the lower and upper chamber in parliament. The British Parliament consists of two houses: the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The former consists of 635 members who are directly elected in regular free elections. It is a highly representative institution and the leader of the majority, who is also an MP, is usually appointed Prime Minister. The House of Lords is qualitatively and quantitatively very different from the House of Commons. It is mainly composed of members appointed by the Prime Minister and members holding hereditary titles of nobility or bishops from the Church of England. Because the selection of deputies serving in this second chamber is not a completely democratic process, the House of Lords has increasingly played a marginal role in modern British politics, except in the cases when the opinion of the members of the upper house has been explicitly asked for. Conversely, the American Congress is a truly bicameral legislature, in which both houses have substantially equal powers. The most notable difference between the two is the degree of representativeness, determined as a function of the size of each member's constituency. A member of the House of Representatives represents a constituency of about half-a-million people, while a member of the Senate represents an entire federal state. The House of Representatives numbers 435 members and a senator is one of 100 colleagues. The functional equality between the two chambers of American Congress can partly be explained by the federal structure of the country and the division of labour and political competencies between the central and local units of governance. Interestingly enough, in the Federal Republic of Germany, which is a consolidated and prosperous West European democracy, the lower house, the Bundestag, is elected directly by the voters, while the upper house, the Bundesrat,

²⁰³ Linz, J. (1997); "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism", revised version of a paper presented at the Istituto Accademico di Roma, April 3, 1997, p. 5.

²⁰⁴ Loewenberg, G. and Patterson, S.C. (1979); Comparing Legislatures, (New York: University Press of America, 1979).

represents the *Länder* and its members are not elected but appointed by the federal government.²⁰⁵

It is also quite important to remember that legislatures should be endowed with all necessary technical and material resources, in order to produce good results in a rapidly changing social and political environment. Nowadays, the agenda of legislators is overburdened with administrative tasks which prevent deputies from occupying themselves exclusively with the making of laws. Quite often, the legislative process is influenced by political actors and socio-economic forces situated outside parliament. As one of the researchers of legislative behaviour in advanced democracies, John C. Wahlke, observed: "Whatever legislative bodies are doing when they debate and vote on proposals to spend more or less money on this or that program, it is no longer easy to think of them as 'deciding' or 'choosing' to do so because of the limited capacity of deputies to legislate effectively".²⁰⁶

Because the analysis, elaboration and adoption of complex legislature usually requires specialised knowledge, whole armies of experts serve in today's parliaments. The chronic lack of time and absence of concrete information forces national legislature to rely increasingly on the skills of hired personnel and lobbyists to investigate and deliberate on the more complex issues. Over the last decades, this kind of work has become highly sophisticated from a technical and administrative point of view. For this reason, a functioning operational structure of legislative committees and subcommittees, supplied with modern technology and information databases, is required to allow the legislative system to deal with its tasks. Furthermore, parliamentary committees should be strong and have stable membership, whereas resourceful chairmen and women are vital for the operation of legislatures.²⁰⁷ This is even more valid in times of transition when rapid decisions must be made related to legislation, which have broad and lasting effects on the political and socio-economic system, as in Eastern Europe.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*; pp. 28-38.

²⁰⁶ Wahlke, J.C. (1970); p. 79, cited in Loewenberg, G. and Patterson, S.C. (1979), *ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁰⁷ Diamond, L. (ed.) (1999); *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), (fn. 45), p. 98.

Apart from some quite general observations, it is very difficult to give specific recipes for how national legislatures should be structured in order to work more efficiently. In the world today, there are wide variations in terms of the quality of performance and composition of parliaments. It is probably valid to point out, however, that every regime and people get not only the legislature they deserve, but also the one they are willing to pay for. The choice of an appropriate legislative system depends also on the initial political and socio-economic conditions surrounding its institutionalisation and the desire of actors to make political concessions by allowing the legislature to operate autonomously. As for the possibilities of deputies and staff to perform their legislative functions, their situation is certainly influenced by a wide range of socio-political and economic factors that are quite important but the study of which transcends the actual theme of analysing the differences between single- and double-chamber legislatures as a measure of the quality of democracy in Eastern Europe.

3.3.6. The Impact of Mass Media

It is not insignificant that the role of mass media is today analysed alongside that of such major institutions as parliaments, executives, political parties and elections. This is so probably because, besides its main function to inform and shape public opinion, media has been quite influential in determining the general type of political system and, in particular, democracy. Since the early 1970s, the importance not only of broadcast but also of printed media both East and West has been growing continuously.²⁰⁸ Although it is difficult to be very specific about how large the direct impact of media on political behaviour and decision-making is, it is nevertheless certain that media fills some important gaps in the field of social communication. These opportunities for the media have appeared predominantly as a result of the declining role of political parties as intermediaries between state elites and the citizens, as well as following the increasing influence of international factors on the domestic political arena.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Rogers, E. (1976); "Communication and Development: The Passing of a Dominant Paradigm", *Communication Research*, No. 3 (1976), pp. 213-40; Rosen, J. (1992); "Politics, Vision, and the Press: Toward a Public Agenda for Journalism", in *The New News vs. The Old News*, J. Rosen and P. Taylor (eds.), (NY: Twentieth Century Fund Press), pp. 3-33; and Fallows, J. (1994); "Did you have a good week?", *The Atlantic Monthly*, 274 (6), pp. 32-33.

²⁰⁹ Blumler, J. (1983); *Communicating to Voters*, (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publication); Blumler, J. and Gurevitch, M. (1995); *The Crisis of Public Communication*, (London: Routledge Publishers,

Two of the basic distinctions between the various kinds of media systems are between public and private and between printed and broadcast media. Until not long ago, one of the crucial criteria determining the relative independence of media was its being private, i.e. not being in the hands of state agencies. This seemed to be a valid argument at the time, especially against the background of a well-recorded experience of domination of the media by *nomenklatura* organisations and authoritarian regime's appointees in Eastern Europe. Nowadays, international bodies that monitor the freedom of media have pointed out that new, subtler methods have been devised by autocratic rulers to silence independent and alternative sources of information.²¹⁰

Firstly, media can be a private monopoly, i.e. in the hands of people close to the political regime or individuals who do not necessarily have the ambition of improving the performance of democracy, but are primarily profit-driven and, hence, have other more prosaic and commercial ideas in mind.²¹¹ Secondly, it has been a relatively recent trend in autocratic or semi-autocratic societies that elites have attempted to establish a government or private-based monopoly on broadcast media, namely, on television and radio, and, occasionally, on internet too. However, they have been less inclined to impose explicit restrictions on printed media or to control free access to it completely.²¹² These more intricate methods of censorship have been reinforced by the close contacts of the ruling elites with power business groups that kept a virtual monopoly on advertisement both in broadcast and printed media in post-communist Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world. At the same time, the newspapers of the opposition parties have been systematically barred from reaching their respective audiences, or at least severely obstructed, by virtue of the imposed 'softer' legal and economic restrictions in the distribution network of papers. During the last couple of

1995); and McQuail, D. (1996); Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, third edition, (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1996).

²¹⁰ See among others the annual reports on media freedom of the *Freedom House, Journalistes sans Frontiers, European Media Institute (EIM)*, as well as The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Transparency International (TI) regular reports on the free access to and diffusion of different kinds of information in Eastern Europe.

²¹¹ Jamieson, K.H. and Campbell, K. (1992); The Interplay of Influence: Advertising, Politics, and the Mass Media, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth).

²¹² Wasburn, P.C. (1995); "Democracy and Media Ownership: Comparison of Commercial, Public and Government Broadcast News", *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 17 (1995), pp. 647-76; Hoffmann-Reim, W. (1996); Regulating Media: The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in Six Countries, (NY: the Guilford Press, 1996).

decades in a large number of countries in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the CIS and South Eastern Europe, this was the predominant mode of suppressing critical and politically divergent media publications.²¹³ The immediate effect of such acts of intolerance towards alternative political viewpoints and the diversification of the available means of information cannot be assessed fully, much less measured empirically, because of the obvious absence of verifiable sources of information. Jean Blondel is however quite correct to posit about similar types of development, that “it would seem inconceivable, especially in the long run, ... that it should not affect markedly the views of citizens about the actions of government and the reaction of the opposition: indeed, the citizens may not even come to know what are the standpoints of the opposition parties”.²¹⁴

Although competitive and private media may not always be at ease with the democratic process, nevertheless, most authors recognise that media can indeed contribute to the consolidation of democracy. It may also play the role of a ‘Fourth Estate’ among the other state institutions of governance, but it can perform this function only if it is endowed with several key characteristics and is able to satisfy certain societal needs.²¹⁵

Most importantly, it should:

- be pluralistic and free of excessive governmental or private ownership control and censorship;
- provide citizens with electoral and other kinds of social choices related to the provision of information about political candidates and events;
- be vigilant against corruption practices and tendencies.

²¹³ Halloran, J. (ed.) (1970); The Effects of Television, (London: Panther Books, 1970); and Kellner, D. (1991); Television and the Crisis of Democracy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). On Internet surveillance and restrictions see Freedom House, (1996, 1997); “Journalists as Pariah” and “Press Law Epidemic: A Year of Restrictions”, Press Freedom Report, (NY: Freedom House).

²¹⁴ Blondel, J. (1999); “The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Democratization Process,” in Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance. East and Southeast Asia, Marsh, I., Blondel, J. and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999), (fn. 46), p. 30.

²¹⁵ King, A. (ed.) (1987); Power of Communication, (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1987); Keane, J. (ed.) (1991); Media and Democracy, (NY: Polity Press, 1991); and Humphreys, P. J. (1996); Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

While it should also:

- keep public figures accountable in the public realm;
- scan information and set the agenda for politicians and citizens in the domestic and international arena;
- open communication channels and organise a dialogue among the various elements of society concerning everyday problems, chiefly with respect to the protection of ethnic and minority rights.

It is still a matter of debate whether the media in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe is able to live up to the above multiple challenges, especially in the short and medium run. In all countries undergoing transition there are many factors, both intrinsic to the creation of independent media and extrinsic to the development of such a process. They influence the general type of media regime and the behaviour of media actors. For instance, the absence of certain institutional guarantees present in mature democracies, such as laws regulating the media market and protecting journalists from interference in their work, have a negative influence on the media sector in transition.²¹⁶ Moreover, constitutional and other legal requirements reserving programme time for minority group broadcasts and stipulating the percentage of cultural and sports programmes and advertisement slots are much needed specifications for the operation of democratic media.²¹⁷ At the level of public communication between social actors and representatives of the media, it is also useful for there to be certain formal rules regulating the relationship between journalists and politicians, for instance, when the latter serve as a major source of information for media professionals.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Sussman, L. (1993); "The Year of Press Law Debates: Much Talk, Little Progress as Officials and Journalists in Eurasia and Eastern Europe Try to Define Press Freedom", *Editor and Publisher*, January 2: p. 28; and Stoyanova, L. (1994); "The New Legislation", *Balkan Media*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 38-9.

²¹⁷ Petev, T. (1994); "Transitive Democratization of the Bulgarian Press: Postponed Victories", in Nikolai Genov (ed.) *Sociology in a Society in Transition*, (Sofia: Bulgarian Sociological Association, 1994); and Orcutt, A. (1993); "Optimism, Pessimism, and Paradox: Broadcast Press Freedom in Slovakia", in Al Hester and Kristina White (eds.), *Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), pp. 311-39.

²¹⁸ Johnson, O. V. (1993); "Whose Voice? Freedom of Speech and the Media in Central Europe", in Al Hester and Kristina White (eds.), *Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), pp. 153-87; and Ognianova, E. and Scott, B. (1997); "Milton's Paradox. The

Despite the progress achieved in many countries of the former Communist Bloc, the present picture of media reform is not the most optimistic, and the difficult social and political conditions are not altogether conducive to consolidation of democracy.²¹⁹ The general impression is that media freedom frequently becomes a target of abuse and, at the same time, represents the most common means in the hands of autocratic rulers to vilify political opponents and manipulate public opinion. These practices provide certain state leaders, especially those of the former Soviet Union and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the means to preserve their positions as 'untouchables' who are allegedly 'clean' from corruption and stand above the political class and ordinary citizens.²²⁰ As a consequence of the uncritical and even passive attitude of news media in these countries, substantial political advantages were handed to such unaccountable leaders. In East-Central Europe, where the situation with media liberties seems to be rapidly improving not least because of the vast help provided by many European and American organisations as well as the political pressure exercised by large number of international monitoring agencies, a great percentage of the printed and broadcast media is in the hands of foreign or local private owners.²²¹ Nevertheless, some political rulers, having received a democratic mandate from the population, have increasingly supported different authoritarian tendencies and practices in the media space. Namely, they have tended to assume that media should continue to act as their mouthpiece or that they could appoint 'politically friendly' personalities on media boards and broadcast commissions to serve their interests. This has happened in most if not all countries in the region, occasionally resulting in bitter

Market-Place of Ideas in Post-Communist Bulgaria", *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 369-90.

²¹⁹ Freedom House (1995-99); "Press Freedom in the World", *Freedom House Surveys*, (reports on Eastern Europe and CIS media freedom under the supervision of Leonard. N. Sussman), Freedom House.

²²⁰ Shalnev, A. (1993); "On to Yegas - Glasnost for Russian Press", *Media Studies Journal*, (Autumn: 1993); pp. 81-86; Radojkovic, M. (1994); "Mass Media Between State Monopoly and Individual Freedom: Media Restructuring and Restriction in Former Yugoslavia", *European Journal of Communications*, No. 9(1994): pp. 137-48; and Johnson, O.V. (1995); "East Central and Southeastern Europe, Russia, and the Newly Independent States", in John C. Merrill (ed.) *Global Journalism: Survey of International Communication*, third edition, (Whyte Plains, NY: Longman, 1995), pp. 153-87.

²²¹ Merritt, R. (1994); "Normalizing the East German Media", *Political Communication*, Number 11, pp. 49-66; Dimitrov, R. (1996); "Borbata za Chetvurtata Vlast v Iztochna Evropa. 7: Kude sme Nie?" (The Struggle for the Fourth Estate in Eastern Europe. Part 7: Where are We?), *Kontinent 5*, April, p. 11.

'media wars' between TV and printed media directors on the one hand and politicians on the other.²²²

It should be mentioned, however, that the impact of mass media may actually be reinforced (or diminished) in the cases when it operates as an element of political life and in conjunction with other institutions or institutional arrangements. The role of media at election times is crucial.²²³ It has been estimated that in Eastern Europe television has overshadowed the political parties as a means of intermediation between the governing elites and the citizens. From here the so-called 'media parties' have emerged – small in numbers but relying on the charisma of the political leadership of their parties. In the early days of transition to democracy in the region, the presidential elections in several countries, like in Poland in December 1990 and in Bulgaria in January 1992, brought relative success to personalities with dubious political credentials, such as the 'self-made' Western businessmen Stanislaw Tyminski and George Gantchev. These political leaders relied chiefly on populist tactics and on the media effect to win potential voters.

This situation where the media is adapting itself to the rising expectation of the market is even further complicated by various factors linked to the political transition in Eastern Europe. There are, for instance, lingering fears about the effect of liberalised media on the future of the political system. Civil society leaders, political party activists and business community members struggle not only to gain access to various media resources and create a favourable public image of themselves, but also to influence and gain control of broadcasting as much as they can in order to turn it to serve their particular interests. Unfortunately, public opinion in most of post-communist Eastern Europe has very little impact on these processes affecting the distribution of media resources. Instead, it tends typically to follow a path of compliance with the powerful liberal market mechanisms guiding news media. Moreover, those people who have already fallen into passive acceptance may begin to consider the ongoing transformation of the political system as an 'entertainment'

²²² Hankiss, E. (1993); "The Hungarian Media's War of Independence", Analysis of the Centre for Social Studies, Budapest, Hungary; and Kramer, E.M. (1993); "Reversal of Fortunes: Rehabilitations and Counterpurgues in Bulgaria", in Al Hester and Kristina White (eds.), Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993), pp. 161-90.

where personal appearance and extravagant behaviour portrayed by the media matters more than political ideals and affiliations to social or political groups.²²⁴

With deregulation of the media market, the role of market forces and institutions driving liberal economics has also been increasing in importance. On the one hand, numerous publications and television and radio programmes which appeared during the 'hey day' of early democracy in the transition period 1989-91 turned out not to be economically viable and simply could not live up to growing expectations of more objective and versatile media. On the other hand, with the survival and consolidation of some large Eastern European press and broadcasting companies and the arrival of even larger Western ones, there are still lingering fears that the tyranny of the state may easily be substituted by the tyranny of the market. For example, the absence of traditional 'defence mechanisms' against subtle advertisement techniques and aggressive media messages in local audiences may occasionally lead to conflict when publications or transmissions are scandalous and pornographic. Moreover, the obvious weakness of some other important intermediaries of public communication in consolidated democracies, such as the political parties, interest groups and social movements, allows the media to play a relatively more powerful role in filling the information gaps in the political sphere than in already established democracies.²²⁵

Politically frustrated and entertainment-driven audiences desiring more high drama and TV shows, are an important driving force behind the transformation of the media sector in the whole region. For example, the rapid and uncontrolled privatisation of most media resources in Russia during the mid-1990s led to the penetration of Mafia interests into public radio and television. This has provided various nationalistic and populist leaders to voice their propaganda with the help of the newly-privatised broadcast companies.²²⁶ In other places in Eastern Europe, the arrival of foreign

²²³ Semetko, H., Blumer, J.C., Gurevitch, M. and Weaver, D.H. (1991); The Formation of Campaign Agendas, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum).

²²⁴ Balcerowicz, L. (1995); Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, (Budapest: CEU Press, 1995), pp. 152-53, referring to a "visibility effect" of broadcast media, esp. p. 153; and Laitila, T. (1995); "Journalistic Codes of Ethics in Europe", *European Journal of Communications*, 10(4), pp. 527-44.

²²⁵ Seymour-Ure, C. (1974); The Political Impact of Mass Media, (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications); Entman, R.M. (1989); Democracy Without Citizens, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Balcerowicz, L. (1995); Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, op. cit., (fn. 113).

²²⁶ McNair, B. (1994); "Media in Post-Soviet Russia", *European Journal of Communication*, No. 9 : pp. 115-35.

capital and the growing consumerism of the population, fuelled by powerful advertising campaigns, have influenced media policy to such an extent that virtually from the beginning of its free existence news media has been obliged to follow rigid market principles of economic survival and profit maximisation reminiscent of the era of wild capitalism.

It might eventually be supposed that after the collapse of communism the Eastern European audiences, having less time for politics and being increasingly driven by sensationalism and corruption scandals, would probably start to demand more truthful and complete information. But more truthful information is not always quick and easy to obtain.²²⁷ The logic of diverse social processes unfolding simultaneously and the constraints of simple public legality require time to produce concrete results and, hence, information. The fast transmission of information is, however, not incompatible with realistic reporting by journalists. This is exactly one of the main objectives that almost all news publications and broadcast agencies in advanced Western democracies pursue.²²⁸ Nevertheless, even in some of the richest global media companies specialised in instant reporting mistakes are made. For instance, during the latest American presidential elections, the public was misled about the outcome of the elections several times thanks to the premature results announced by some news agencies.

3.3.7. *The Legal System: Judicial Review and Constitutional Courts*

The presence of a functioning legal system and even of a written constitution are still not sufficient guarantees that parliamentary majorities and different state institutions will not abuse the law and try to modify it to suit their own interest without being supported explicitly or implicitly by the majority of citizens. Quite often, legislators, being themselves the judges of the constitutionality of their own decisions, are tempted to resolve potential conflicts in their favour. For this reason, most of the new democracies in Eastern Europe have adopted the procedure of *judicial review*. This

²²⁷ Schlesinger, P. (1977); "Newsmen and Their Time Machine", *British journal of Sociology*, No. 28, pp. 336-50; and Patterson, T. E. (1998); "Time and News: The Media's Limitations as an Instrument of Democracy", *IPSA Journal*, (London: SAGE), Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 1998).

²²⁸ Owen, D. M. (1991); *Media Messages in American Presidential Elections*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood).

means that the authority to test the constitutionality of administrative decisions and laws is delegated to a special body, which is not necessarily democratic by itself. Of course, an independent federal or supreme court may easily perform such a role, but usually a separate institution is created, i.e. a **constitutional court**. This specialised tribunal for conducting judicial review is part of the legal system but is not directly accountable to the executive or the legislature. In the majority of Central and Eastern European countries constitutional courts were established immediately after the collapse communist rule and this quickly became the predominant institutionalised form of judicial review.²²⁹

Judicial review may take one of two forms depending on the exact situation: *concrete* judicial review, referring to the challenge to a law derived from some specific case before a court, and *abstract* judicial review, being one taking into consideration a law without reference to any specific case. As a matter of fact, the predominant part of the post-communist legal systems have their roots in the civil law tradition, consequently, abstract judicial is practised in these countries to a larger extent. Nevertheless, the adoption of the EU basic legal framework, the *acquis communautaire*, and the adherence of these new democracies to the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have prompted a “gradual convergence of the two systems” (i.e. between the civil and common law jurisdictions).²³⁰ As a result of this rapidly evolving legal tendency, a substantial rise in concrete judicial review linked to the application of EU standards and jurisdiction in many spheres might be expected. It should also be specified that concrete judicial review can be initiated by any defendant who believes that the law under which they are being prosecuted is unconstitutional, whereas abstract review can be initiated by any state authority who is clearly designated in the basic law, such the prime minister, the head of state or a given percentage of the members of parliament. This is quite an important

²²⁹ Constitutional courts were first created in Poland, Czechoslovakia (later on, in the Czech and Slovak republics), Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia. Nowadays, constitutional courts function in the remaining ex-communist countries, including the former Yugoslavia and most of the CIS member states. However, the generally poor performance and presumed dependence on the central government remain a case in some of these polities. See **Gallagher, T., Laver, M., and Mair, P. (1995); *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, second ed., (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1995), (fn. 57), p. 66; and Sadurski, W. (ed.) (2001); *Justice* (Aldershot: Ashgate).**

²³⁰ **Holland, K. (1988); “The Courts in the Federal Republic of Germany”, in Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. Holland (eds.), *The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies*, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1988), p. 85.**

clarification concerning the future development of Eastern European courts and the evolution of the legal system there, because it has a direct effect on the distribution of relative legal power between the state institutions.

The particular outcomes of abstract judicial review, which is the predominant form of judicial review in Eastern Europe and is expected remain so at least for some years, depend very much on the *timing* of the start of this legal procedure. In certain countries, it can be initiated during a fixed period of time (typically three months) after a special law has been adopted. This is better known as the *a posteriori* abstract review. In some other countries, like Portugal, France and Ireland, judicial review can be initiated before (or only before, as it is in the latter two countries) a bill has become law. This practice is commonly referred to as the *a priori* abstract review.

The historical record of practising abstract judicial review in Eastern Europe has been quite mixed so far. Hence, it is very difficult to make far-reaching conclusions about a particular trend in the timing of initiation of judicial review. The general impression, however, is that the constitutions of these countries have been quite permissive concerning the period of initiation of abstract judicial review and the choice of actors who may trigger it. For instance, the constitutional provision regulating the actual authority of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is a case in point and represents an original exception in the most recent European legal practice. This court is permitted to review the constitutionality of bills of the Hungarian Parliament before enactment on its own initiative. Moreover, this procedure may be triggered not only by state authorities but also by independent civic associations and interest groups.²³¹ For example, the court ruled that Hungarian citizens might attempt via a petition to hold a referendum on whether or not to call an early parliamentary election. This represents an advanced form of a rather liberal *a priori* abstract judicial review. By augmenting the role of the Constitutional Court to such an extent, Hungarians have not only gained the admiration of the backers of advanced forms of judicial review East and

²³¹ Brunner, G. (1993); "Zweieinhalb Jahre ungarische Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit", *Der Staat*, pp. 287-315; and Majoros, F. (1993); "Ungarische Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit seit 1990", BioST Publication, p. 15.

West (and the suspicion of 'democrats'), but also of those promoting the idea of broader EU constitutional powers at the supranational level.²³²

Judicial review and judicial activism of the court system are not always perceived as directly proportional to the level of political democracy and its quality. On the one hand, it depends very much on the historical tradition of the supremacy of the rule of law and the constitution; on the other, it depends on the strength of judicial review and the role of constitutional courts perceived by both domestic and international actors.

The Greek constitution, for example, grants broader powers to the courts and binds them "not to apply laws, the contents of which are contrary to the Constitution".²³³ At the other end of the spectrum stands the Dutch constitution which, in its Article 120, explicitly denies the power of judicial review to the legal system, by stating that "the constitutionality of acts of parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts".²³⁴ France, which was long considered a prime example of a country staunchly defending the principle of popular sovereignty and non-revision of the decisions of parliament by courts, changed its stance regarding judicial review in the mid-1970s. A special constitutional amendment gave the right to relatively small minorities in the legislature to initiate judicial review and appeal to the Constitutional Council. The Constitutional Council, which is another version of a constitutional court, had previously been quite inefficient and served more to protect the executive against the encroachments of the other branches of power and public institutions in the Fifth Republic than to perform judicial review. After the above landmark decision was adopted, the Constitutional Council's position considerably changed and it started playing a more active role as an arbiter in French politics.²³⁵

In many places around the world, like in Germany, Belgium, Japan, Malta, Australia, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, the power of judicial review is entrusted not to

²³² Schwartz, H. (1993); "The New East European Constitutional Courts", in Howard, D. (ed.) Constitution Making in Eastern Europe, (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 176-77.

²³³ Brewer-Carías, A. (1989); Judicial Review in Comparative Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 169.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*; op. cit.

²³⁵ Stone, A. (1992); The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 225.

the legal system in general but to the constitutional court. This serves as a kind of 'compromise solution' between the already-described procedures to allow regular courts to start judicial review and the one specifically denying any possibility of legal revision of the decisions of parliament. Although the decentralised form of judicial review, according to which all courts may decide about the constitutionality of laws, is still common in many polities around the globe,²³⁶ in some of the pioneering countries of the recent 'third wave' of democracy, like Spain (1980) and Portugal (1983), a more centralised system of judicial review was institutionalised. In this kind of system, the independent constitutional court has been performing the main role regarding judicial review. It might consequently be hypothesised that some of the new democracies in Eastern Europe have followed the example of these two Mediterranean countries to a certain extent, while the structure, legal obligations and prerogatives of the former communist states' court system were taken over and explicitly written into their respective constitutions.

The selection of members of constitutional courts is done through appointment, with judges serving either for a fixed period of time or for life. The power to appoint judges varies from country to country. In Eastern Europe it depends on the distribution of *quotas* among the major institutions in the state regarding the selection of constitutional court members. Seats are usually distributed among the parliament, president, the cabinet and, possibly, an independent bar association.²³⁷ Members of the constitutional court usually serve for a limited period of time, but this period is never less than five years.²³⁸

In Eastern Europe, the political neutrality of the members of the judiciary has been a complicated issue. In Russia, for instance, the first president of the constitutional court Valery Zorkin was promoted in office by Aleksandar Rutskoj's 'Communists for Democracy' party. From the beginning he became closely allied with President Boris Yeltsin, too. Following a period of relatively high judicial activism until May 1993, the court's powers were drastically curtailed by an article in the newly adopted

²³⁶ Favoreu, L. and Jolowicz, J. A. (eds.) (1986); Le Control Juridictionnel des Lois: Legitimité, Effectivité et Développement Récents, (Paris: Economica, 1986).

²³⁷ Verheijen, T. (ed.) (1999); Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe, (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).

constitution. At the same time, this legal provision allowed the president of the constitutional court to play an important role as arbiter of conflicts between the various members the constitutional court (Article 80). The actual influence of Zorkin on the decisions of the court finally diminished and his political position became more neutral only once the effective powers of the speaker of parliament Ruslan Chazbulatov (another prominent leftist politician and ally of Rutskoj) were curtailed and he was no longer a direct opponent to President Yeltsin.²³⁹ In other parts of the CIS, it has not been rare for constitutional judges to engage in personal conflicts and act according to their political views and personal interest.²⁴⁰ In East-Central Europe, where constitutional courts were established earlier than in the former Soviet Union, direct interference in their work has been less manifest, but differences in the efficiency and fairness of constitutional courts still prevail.²⁴¹ Although the performance of constitutional courts has not been the same in all countries of the region during the transition period, the role of constitutional courts in East-Central Europe has been generally seen as positive for the consolidation of democracy and this fact is acknowledged by both political actors and academics.

The strength of judicial review and the power of courts are relative. They depend very much on their respective roles as described in the constitution of a democracy. The legal activity and decision-making style of judges is an important matter too. It is particularly true in countries where there is no written constitution.²⁴² It also depends on the type of national legislature and on the prevailing political situation domestically and internationally at the moment of initiation of judicial review. Arend Lijphart is among the few social scientists to make a comprehensive assessment of the impact of both judicial review and power of courts. He does this firstly according to the presence or absence of judicial review, and secondly based on the degree of

²³⁸ Schwartz, H. (2000); The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000).

²³⁹ Von Beyme, K. (1996); Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, (fn. 44), p. 120; and Wise, C. and Brown, T. (1998); "The Consolidation of Democracy in Ukraine", *Democratization*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (London: Frank Cass), Spring 1998, pp. 105-37.

²⁴⁰ Holmes, L. (1997); Post-Communism: An Introduction, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 190-93.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*; p. 191.

²⁴² Drewry, G. (1992); "Judicial Politics in Britain: Patrolling the Boundaries", in M. L. Volkanssek (ed.) Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 9-28 and esp. p. 25.

judicial activism manifested by the court system.²⁴³ His first criterion is quite straightforward and, hence, easy to understand. The second factor is evaluated by counting the number of laws and ordinances declared unconstitutional by the judges. The author assumes that the invalidation of at least five percent of the laws and executive decisions is a good sign of high judicial activism.

Furthermore, constitutional courts are considered strong and independent if their members take a clear stance against the alleged influence of political parties, state institutions and individuals. For example, if a constitutional judge votes against the constitutionality of a piece of legislation adopted by the majority in parliament from whose ranks this person comes, this may put the judge at odds with the members of a parliamentary group and former party colleagues. In order to prevent such things from happening, the members of the constitutional court adopt most of their decisions by consensus. After a certain decision has been approved, an elected speaker makes an announcement and explains the viewpoint of the majority of the constitutional court. In this way, the confidential character of votes cast during a constitutional court session is maintained and the political legitimacy of individual members and the public institution as such are preserved.

3.4. Institutions and the Prospects for Consolidating Democracy

The emerging Eastern European elites have opted for diverse combinations of institutional formats. Huge differences in the institutional setting have been observed not only among sub-regions but also among neighbouring countries within the former Communist Bloc. In fact, there has been little wholesale importation of Western models of institutional arrangements that could play a predominant role in shaping the political system of the entire region. This is mainly because local political actors have believed that transition from communist rule is unique in itself, and that there are significant historical and cultural differences between Western and Eastern European nations, and indeed among Eastern Europeans themselves.

²⁴³ Lijphart, A. (1999); Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 225-26.

This wide variety of institutional choices is presented in Table 2. The information contained in this table clearly shows some of the major institutional combinations in twenty post-communist countries as of the end of 2000. In this table, some of the most central structural characteristics of the contemporary political systems in Eastern Europe are listed. Those parameters include, for instance, the constitutional type of regime related to the executive format (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary), the variety of electoral system (proportional, hybrid, majoritarian), the specific distribution of seats in parliament (single/proportional/non-affiliated) as well as the effective number of political parties both according to the seats won in the legislature and the votes received in elections. Although the information in Table 2 provides only a snapshot demonstration of the most important institutional arrangements in Eastern Europe, it nevertheless exemplifies the great heterogeneity among countries and sub-regions.

Table 2

Institutions and Political Regimes in Eastern Europe (1989- 2000)

Country	Constitutional type of regime	Electoral System				Effective number of parties (according to seats won in parliament)**	Effective number of parties (according to votes received in elections)**
		Type	Last parliamentary elections	Distribution of seats in parliament (ss/PR/indep.)*	Electoral threshold		
Albania	Semi-presidential	Hybrid/Major.	1997	115/40/-	4%	2.23	2.87
Armenia	Presidential	Hybrid	1999	75/56/32	5%	4.98	4.76
Azerbaijan	Presidential	Hybrid/Major.	1995	100/25/-	8%	3.45	2.42
Bulgaria	Parliamentary	PR	1997	-/240/-	4%	2.55	3.01
Belarus	Presidential	Major.	2000	110/-/-	***	***	***
Croatia	Presidential	Hybrid	1997	151/140/5	5%	2.92	4.08
Czech Rep.	Parliamentary	PR	1998	-/200/-	5%	3.71	4.73
Estonia	Parliamentary	PR	1999	-/101/-	****	5.50	6.89
Georgia	Presidential	Hybrid/PR	1999	85/150/-	7%	2.68	3.98
Hungary	Parliamentary	Hybrid	1998	176/152 + 58/-	5%	3.43	4.64
Lithuania	Semi-presidential	Hybrid	2000	71/70/-	5%	4.22	5.58
Latvia	Parliamentary	PR	1998	-/100/-	5%	5.49	7.03
Macedonia	Semi-presidential	Hybrid/Major.	1998	85/35/-	5%	2.9	5.18
Moldova	Semi-presidential	PR	1998	-/104/-	4%	3.64	5.79
Poland	Semi-presidential	PR	1997	-/391+69/-	5%	2.95	4.6
Romania	Semi-presidential	PR	2000	-/327/19	3%	3.55	5.24
Slovakia	Parliamentary	PR	1998	-/150/-	5%	4.75	5.33

Slovenia	Parliamentary	PR	2000	-/88/2	4%	4.65	5.14
Ukraine	Presidential	Hybrid	1998	224/225/ - (114)	5%	5.96	3.04
Uzbekistan	Presidential	Major.	1999	-/-/250	***	***	***

* Single seat/ proportional representation/ non-affiliated or reserved seats for minorities

** Calculated according to the formula for effective number of parties provided by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera in Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979); "'Effective' Number of Parties: Measure with Application to West Europe", *Comparative Political Studies* 12, No. 1 (April), pp. 3-27.

*** Elections in Belarus (since 1996) and Uzbekistan have not been free and fair.

In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenka selected single-handedly the 110 members of the House of Representative (*Sojm*) out of the pre-1995 Supreme Soviet of Belarus.

In Uzbekistan, the parliament, *Oli Majlis*, comprises 250 deputies of whom 83 are elected directly and 167 by local councils for a period of five years, but most parties are excluded.

**** complex system, featuring national and district candidate lists

When analysing the data regarding the variety of institutional choices in Eastern Europe as of the end of 2000, it is quite difficult to formulate firm theoretical hypotheses and to discern definite political trends concerning the consolidation of democracy in the region. This is, because of the relatively short period of time that has elapsed since the collapse of the previous authoritarian system and the still undetermined stage of democratisation of most post-communist countries. Moreover, the relatively large number of countries and, probably, the limited quantity of factors in the sample above, does not allow us to differentiate among polities and permits us only to speak of certain tendencies in the development of democratic institutions in the region and of their still unproven effect on democratic consolidation.

The constitutional type of regime, being presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary, is perhaps one of the most influential and, certainly one of the most often-cited factors contributing to the process of democratisation. Nevertheless, the advantages of one type of democratic government over another cannot be established fully unless one takes the concrete political context into account; this being, primarily, the combination of domestic and international influences over the regime's policies, as well as the blend of the official type of regime with the structural pattern and performance of some important sub-regimes and institutions, such as the electoral, party and legislative systems or the courts and the media.

The brief overview of the decade-long efforts of post-communist countries to democratise speaks in favour of parliamentarism versus presidentialism or semi-presidentialism. This fact does not however support the accompanying theoretical

hypotheses that the parliamentary form of government contributes automatically to the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, parliamentary rule has been the favoured choice of some of the most successful democracies in Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia. The majority of the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, together with Albania, opted for a semi- or full-presidential system. A possible explanation for this might be that they are recently-created polities: namely, not having established a completely modern national identity, they tended to choose quite strong but also sometimes autocratic leaders that could guarantee the survival both of the state and the political system. Finally, the citizens of Poland, Romania and Lithuania also elected strong presidents to power, thus giving birth to variations of French-type semi-presidential regimes.

The electoral systems initially chosen and later modified by the political elites in Eastern Europe have not corresponded to the typically dichotomous majoritarian/proportional form of representation; some other hybrid modes of representation have also been selected in a number of countries. Nevertheless, similar to the pattern of the regional distribution of constitutional regimes analysed in the previous section, the more socially and politically advanced countries of East-Central Europe have opted for a proportional or hybrid system, while most of the ex-Soviet republics, except for the Baltic state and Moldova, have chosen a variety of majoritarian rule. At this point, it is interesting to note that, so far, the post-communist countries have confirmed the much-debated, mostly empirical, hypothesis formulated during the Latin American and South-European transitions: namely, that parliamentarism plus proportional representation in the elections improves considerably the chances that a regime will democratise. It is important, however, to mention the deep socio-economic and cultural divisions within the former Communist Bloc, where certain countries of Central Europe have been more prosperous and have had national statehood longer than the majority of their ex-Soviet counterparts.

As regards the other two key elements of the electoral system in my table, the distribution of seats in parliament and the level of electoral threshold, there are no large variations among the polities in the region. Concerning the distribution of seats in the first chamber of parliament between single seat, PR and independents, the only

intriguing aspect from a theoretical point of view is the current situation in the legislatures of some of the former Soviet republics, like Ukraine, Armenia and Uzbekistan, where a relatively large number of independent candidates have been elected. In other countries, such as Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Romania and Croatia, there are either reserved seats for ethnic minorities, or the electoral threshold is artificially lowered in order to facilitate the election of independent and minority candidates.

At the beginning of the democratic transition in Eastern Europe, there were huge variations in the levels of the electoral threshold for entering parliament. However, by the end of the decade, and after several elections, most post-communist countries have preferred thresholds between 3 and 5%. Only in Azerbaijan and Georgia (after the 1999 elections) has the electoral barrier been 8% and 7% respectively, while in a number of polities, such as Poland, Croatia and Romania, the coalitions of political parties have to satisfy more rigorous electoral criteria for acceding to parliament, one of which being the ability to pass a threshold of more than the average required for single parties or individual candidates.

Although the effective number of parties in parliament cannot tell us much about how the democratisation process evolves, their number can divulge something about the nature of the political system (e.g. its being centred around a few political parties or being more pluralistic) and about the representative character of the parties themselves. In Table 2, I try to measure the effective number of parties by applying two methodologies: (1) by counting the seats won by political party candidates in parliament; and (2) by taking into account the votes received in elections. As expected, there have been no major differences in the results obtained by the two methods, but, nevertheless, this step has permitted me to double-check and be more specific about the figures for a relatively large sample of countries. As regards the latest parliamentary elections (until the end of 2000), interestingly enough the Baltic States have a relatively high number of parties in parliament according to both counts. This might be indicative either of a very high representativeness in their electoral system or, most likely, the non-consolidated nature of their political parties. In Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova and Romania, there is a larger percentage of effective parties according to the votes received in elections than according to the seats won in

parliament. This might reflect the specificity of the electoral system in a particular country, where voters support a larger number of parties but only a few of them obtain effective representation in the legislature. Ukraine provides evidence of the opposite trend, but the very different political backgrounds of the persons occupying seats in parliament is mainly due to the large quantity of independently elected candidates – virtually a quarter of all deputies.

It becomes obvious from the observations made above that although some minimal trends could be discerned, especially regarding the constitutional form of government (presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary) and the type of electoral system (majoritarian, hybrid and proportional) as well as the relationship between them, it is quite difficult to demonstrate that the transitional pattern of most institutions contributes significantly (and even less directly) to the consolidation of democracy in the region. It could be concluded though, that all things being equal – mainly the domestic and international context of institution-building – a parliamentary form of rule combined with a proportional system of electoral representation leads to a higher quality democracy. This being the case of most East-Central European countries, it is logical to ask whether their quick transition and previous experience with democracy have not induced them to chose this particular combination of institutions, rather than the fact that a specific mix of institutions has contributed to the democratisation of these polities. As regards the other institutional factors listed in Table 2, no definite conclusions can be made. The major implication of this, as well as of the previous discussion, is that some major sets of institutions or rules about institutions could be important for the consolidation of democracy. As consolidation is a multivaried process, it requires more than one kind of procedural arrangement, structure, actor, practice and tempo in order for it to get firmly on track. The major theoretical lesson for students of democratisation however is, that one should not attempt to prioritise certain institutional arrangements (even those regarding such obvious ‘candidates’ as political parties and elections) over some others (e.g. the constitution and the media), because modern social transformations are dynamic processes and, hence, political structures may shape the priorities of political actors but their purpose may also change according to the needs of the protagonists in this “game of democracy”.

3.5. Conclusion

Eleven years after the beginning of political transformation in the region, it might be said that all of the countries of East-Central Europe and the Baltic States have achieved considerable progress in restructuring their main state institutions. The same conclusions apply to the few stable authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, whose leaders have already decided upon the predominant institutional format of their respective countries. However, the consolidation of democratic institutions and their legitimisation in society have as yet been finalised nowhere, although some countries are much closer to consolidation than initially expected. Political structures even in some of the most advanced democracies in Eastern Europe have not yet 'crystallised' and they do not operate without problems. The high rate of interventionism on the part of constitutional courts to resolve conflicts between the different branches of power is additional proof of the uncertain quality of both of these institutions and the political system in most post-communist countries. Needless to say, in those countries where the constitution and other important structural elements of the political system were adopted in a hurry, and without the consent of the majority of the population, there have been constant disagreements about the composition and allocation of tasks among institutions.

Despite the considerable work done so far, the process of institutional selection in the former Communist Bloc is far from concluded. One should make a clear distinction between countries in transition, countries in a consolidation phase, and countries with an autocratic form of government. The general purpose of institutions may easily change according to the rapidly evolving political and other general systemic circumstances. However, the complicated initial conditions of certain fragile political entities have substantially delayed the building of democratic institutions. Among the most difficult legacies of communism to handle has been the problem of state-building, when resolved in parallel to the ongoing political, social and economic reforms. The time-horizon of crafting institutions has in the case of some Eastern European countries been shortened by the unstable international and domestic security environment. Conversely, the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts and the speedy adoption of a new constitution and its implementation in practice have considerably

promoted institution-building. For instance, the creation of a working judiciary and the establishment of free and independent media – some of the most necessary and most difficult to establish political institutions and agencies of democratic transformation – have been adopted in countries where some of the above conditions have been present.

The period since 1989 has of course been too short to make definite pronouncements about the structural format and political future of post-communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Moreover, not all of them, especially some of the CIS countries, have followed a steady path of democratisation. As noted in the previous sections, institutions alone cannot bring about political change and consolidate democracy. It is generally acknowledged by social scientists that apart from political institutions some other factors, notably political actors, the modes of bargaining and governing, political tradition and culture, as well as certain favourable socio-economic conditions – and chance – are necessary to give an impetus to the transformation process if it is to achieve any degree of success. Hence, it might be presumed that political institutions affect the quality of the regime to a greater extent than its eventual type, i.e. its being democracy, an autocracy or some kind of hybrid regime.

Chapter 4

Transition to Democracy and Consolidation of Democracy, and Possible Ways of Measuring Them

4.1. Introduction

Over the last twenty years the political literature on democratisation has advanced a large number of new paradigms, assumptions and research orientations. Among these, those related to regime change and the introduction of new kinds of institutional arrangements in the state have enjoyed the largest share of scholarly attention and have gained their established place among the numerous publications of comparative politics. 'Transitology' and 'Consolidology' have been two closely related but independent currents of the same theoretical effort to explore the factors and possible situations that arise after the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the engagement of a country's elites with democratic reforms. Some of the first theoretical insights in this direction have been made during the so-called 'third-wave' transitions in Southern Europe in the 1970s and in Latin America during the period from the 1950s until the late 1980s.²⁴⁴ However, a real 'breakthrough' for these two distinctive sub-disciplines of contemporary political research has been achieved in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia during the 1990s.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴Rustow, D. (1970); "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April 1970), pp. 337-63; Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (eds.) (1978); The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); and Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, S. J. (eds.) (1992); Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparable Perspective, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press).

²⁴⁵ Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press); Bermeo, N. (ed.) (1991); Liberalization and Democratization. Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore, MD: The John's Hopkins University Press); Bova, R. (1991); "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective", *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct. 1991); Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1992); "The Types of Democracies Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America", in Peter Volten (ed.) Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe (New York: Institute of East-West

Despite the abundance of comparable cases of attempts at transition to democracy and the progress being made by social scientists in managing the various policy instruments of transformation politics – namely, in sequencing the change of regime and the building new democratic institutions – there still exist a lot of ‘blank spaces’ in democracy theory which have to be explored analytically. Furthermore, and quite important for the vast social science research conducted in Eastern Europe, there is the fact that a large number of problems have emerged in association with the usage of some general theoretical concepts and policy prescriptions, derived from the practice of regions and states endowed with their own unique historical, geographic, political and economic characteristics, which have increasingly been applied in quite different social circumstances and/or have been promoted as ‘panacea’ that have across-the-board effects over the establishment of new political regimes in almost every corner of the contemporary world.

In spite of the continuous and increasingly focused efforts of social scientists to define the notions of ‘transition’ from autocratic rule and ‘consolidation’ of democracy, these two concepts have not been able to attract a consensus among scholars and advance “a common understanding of key terms in the field”.²⁴⁶ On the contrary, they have remained “essentially contested” and “virtually unoperationalised” in empirical research.²⁴⁷ During the recent transitions which have been taking place in Eastern Europe, the crumbling of the previous seemingly ‘quite solid’ communist system has generated a great deal of speculation and raised questions about the possibility of the newly-founded political regimes to accomplish a democratic transition and consolidate democracy as successfully as some of their Western counterparts decades and even centuries before them. The actual experience of political transformation in Eastern Europe, however, has shown that many of the initially anticipated problems simply did not materialise or turned out not to be so important to the political actors

Studies); and Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

²⁴⁶ Ostrom, E. (1986); “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions”, *Public Choice* 48, p. 4, quoted by Andreas Schedler in relation to the problematic study of ‘democratic consolidation’ in his article “What is Democratic Consolidation?”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998, p. 92.

²⁴⁷ Schedler, A. (1997); “Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation”, working paper No. 50, (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies), p. 1.

concerned, while others, not mentioned in the writings of 'transitologists' and 'consolidologists', have emerged with greater acuteness.

There are two lessons to be drawn from this experience. First, the countries included in such a vast region as Eastern Europe – spanning from Central Europe to Central Asia and from the Baltic to the Black Sea areas – that have undergone a dramatic transition from a prolonged period of one of the hardest kinds of authoritarian rule, i.e. communism, have followed diverse and sometimes diverging paths to democracy, while the process by which these countries try to achieve their particular political and economic objectives still continues. Second, the actors involved in the processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe have been obliged by circumstances to pass through some of the stages of development that their Mediterranean and Latin American predecessors had already been through, and they have been undergoing social and political transformations similar to those of countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina followed long before them. Eastern European actors have, of course, had the opportunity to take most of these past experiences into account, and have thus been able to take several 'short-cuts' on their way toward political democratisation and economic transformation. However, they have at the same time been forced to face new challenges, such as state-building, political de-ideologisation of society, large-scale privatisation, regional integration and globalisation.

From here follows the need to redefine normatively the concepts of 'transition' and 'consolidation', and to devise a method to measure political democracy which could be tested empirically in the context of the current systemic transformation in Eastern Europe. This chapter deals with the problem of this redefinition and studies in detail the relationship between these two essential aspects of regime change. Initially, transition to and consolidation of democracy are defined as theoretical concepts, with special attention paid to the particular experience of Eastern European states and the recent evolution of these theoretical terms in the contemporary political science literature. Then, some of the established ways of measuring political democracy and its consolidation are presented. Finally, an alternative theoretical method for measuring transition and consolidation is presented. This method basically stresses the

importance of democratisation as an overarching and unifying process of social transformation, taking political democracy of a certain quality as its product. The task of building a quantitative indicator of democratisation is addressed in the subsequent chapter, which looks at the concrete elements that such an index might consist, as well as at the possibility of evaluating the level of democracy and the degree of its consolidation, both from an analytical point of view, by studying the theoretical foundations that such a measurement technique could be based upon, and in practice.

4.2. Transition to Democracy

The classical definition of the concept of transition relates to the "the interval between one political regime and another".²⁴⁸ By referring to a specific amount of time delineating the period between the existence of two different regimes (or similar ones, in the case of restoration), this definition reveals some major weaknesses in this type of conceptualisation. The first is that it is primarily concerned with the initial moments of regime change, without being able to respond to the questions of *why* and *how* the *ancien régime* went into a decline and *what* will follow after the new regime comes to power. By setting the beginning and end points of this process deterministically, such a definition simply ignores the issue related to the *types* of regimes standing at both ends of the transition path. The second weakness of this definition of transition to democracy is that by describing political transition as an interval between one political regime and another, one cannot grasp the important relationship existing between the various other elements describing a larger systemic transformation. In the case of replacing communism as a complex system of governance of the state, this requires considerable knowledge about the public institutions and co-ordination of the multiple spheres of social activity having direct influence over the development prospects of a particular regime, such as the economy, religion, education, civil society, social welfare, the national and inter-ethnic relations, to mention but a few, as well as a whole set of important international factors affecting the domestic context of democratisation.

²⁴⁸ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); (fn. 1), p. 6.

The contemporary political science literature concerned with regime change has been profoundly involved with explaining the nature and concomitants of a specific type of transition: the transition to democracy. This transition begins with the dissolution of the old authoritarian system as the new regime makes provisions for laying the institutional foundations of a democratic system and for extending specific political rights and civil liberties to individuals and groups. A transition can be regarded as having achieved its goals if a 'no return' point is reached, while individuals are able to effectively participate in the political life and to keep their rulers accountable. Moreover, the opportunity for individuals to improve their social existence in every sense relevant to them should also be mentioned as a possible mission of this kind of transition. Consequently, a clear parallel could be drawn between the positive outcome of a democratic transition and the achievement of a better quality of democracy (QoD).

Almost every definition of systemic change, which is a collective social concept in itself, tends to approach the notion of transition either as a *reform* or a *revolution*. Of course, this renders the analytical understanding of transition to democracy very relativistic and difficult to express in qualitative or quantitative terms.²⁴⁹ Ralf Dahrendorf tries to solve this problem by describing democratic transition as a "controlled transformation from a more illiberal state to a more liberal one".²⁵⁰ His definition is fundamentally different from some other previous definitions of democratic transition because it precludes the possibility that one is forced to choose between alternative descriptions of transition to democracy, which conceptualise this political process either as a reform or a revolution. At the level of the details, Dahrendorf's definition tries to incorporate the different meanings of transition in a rather neutral way. By focusing on the type of state instead of regime, the author shows the gradual and manageable character of such a transformation.

But this type of conceptualisation is not devoid of problems either, the most serious of which being its inability to cover all of the possible cases of post-communist change since 1989. And the conflict here is not only between the *content* of the

²⁴⁹ Bozóki, A. (1994); "From Soft Communism to Post-Communism Authoritarian Legacy and Democratic Transition in Hungary", in Kovacs, J. M. (ed.) Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 125.

transformation of the political system envisaged by Dahrendorf but its *degree* and *scope*. In principle, every transition in Eastern Europe, apart from the deeply conservative and mostly authoritarian regimes in some Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, has gone beyond the framework of reform, but – with the possible exception of Romania – did not take the shape of a classical revolution.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, the outcomes of the transformation of the communist system were mostly revolutionary, although achieved in a peaceful way. For this reason Timothy Garton Ash concluded that the conventional categories cannot automatically be employed to the East European post-communist cases of transition to democracy and, therefore, he proposed another term, coined from the words reform and revolution: *refolution*.²⁵²

It has also been asserted by a number of influential political science publications, that no transition to democracy could be initiated from a totalitarian regime.²⁵³ In totalitarian regimes the ruling group is not expected to be accountable to any elected body. Parallel to that, it tends to employ an official ideology to control individuals as well as their lives, and it is impossible to remove it from power by any institutionalised peaceful means.²⁵⁴ As history clearly demonstrates, countries of the 'second wave' of democratisation after 1945, managed to democratise after taking part in the Second World War and losing it. In defeated countries like Germany and Japan, democratisation took place under the control of the occupying powers and their populations were quick to internalise the rules of the 'democratic game' because of strong foreign political pressure and economic assistance inversely proportional to the rigidity of the previous totalitarian regime. Among this group of democratising countries only Austria had a middle status between liberated and defeated nation, not least because of its 'delicate' position between the American and Soviet bloc

²⁵⁰ Dahrendorf, R. (1990); "Politik, Wirtschaft und Freiheit", *Transit*, Heft 1, (Herbst 1990), p. 38.

²⁵¹ For a useful description of the different type of revolutions see Tilly, C. (1993); *European Revolutions 1492-1992*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers), pp. 8-15.

²⁵² Ash, T. G. (1990); *The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague*, (New York: Random House), p. 14.

²⁵³ Fletcher, G. (1966); "Against the Stream", in T. Aczel (ed.) *Ten Years After* (London: Macgibbon and Kee), p. 56; Brzezinski, Z. (1967); *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p. 139; and Huntington, S. (1984); "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly* 99, (Spring 1984), p. 212.

²⁵⁴ Linz, J. (1990); "Transitions to Democracy", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Summer 1990), p. 144.

occupation zones, while it chose to emphasise the continuity of the democratic system of the first republic.²⁵⁵

The predominant number of Eastern European countries, before the ultimate and most critical years of the communist system in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were far from being totalitarian. It could hardly be denied, however, that they had many institutional features which made them very much like the totalitarian model of regime, including an official state ideology, which had been imposed upon their respective governments half a century or more before that. Following the logic of the events of the '80s and '90s, it then becomes somewhat difficult to understand how these countries have managed to undergo a democratic transition that has occurred so smoothly and peacefully.

In the next few sections, the question of the peaceful transition from the previously authoritarian/totalitarian regime will be addressed in detail and the different modes of 'extrication' from state-socialism will be analysed. One possible explanation lies in the several efforts of the communist system to reform itself in the past. More concretely, this idea derives from the experience of the East-Central European governments with respect to economic and political change. The Hungarian 'new phase' (1953-54), the 'new economic mechanism' (1966-72) and the "Prague spring" (1968), starting as reforms but launching independent social movements in the East-Central European countries, are some of the most well-known cases. *Perestroika* (initiated by the Soviet elite in 1987) is a more recent example of reform but one with less clear social and political consequences. Another explanation is linked with the strategy of some Eastern European leaderships to attempt to demobilise their respective populations politically, as well as to channel the emotions of their citizens into different directions than the immediate transformation of the previous communist system. Comparable goals were pursued by those political elites, who had no problems changing their ideology and acquiring new legitimacy under the guise of reformed communists or extreme nationalists-populists. The practical knowledge of transition accumulated since the collapse of communism has taught social scientists that such a transfer of power can be assured in two possible ways by the former ruling

²⁵⁵ Beyme, K. von (1987); America as a Model. The Impact of American Democracy in the World. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

class: either by trying to replace the conservative elements in the communist elite and promoting reformers in their place (like in the cases of Bulgaria and the GDR in the period 1989-90, and Romania after the December 1989 revolution) or by appealing to the nationalist and 'patriotic' feelings of the population (which has happened in reality in most of the member-countries of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the early 1980s onwards and in Slovakia under Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, in office from June 1992 till October 1998). The 'change of guard' in the republics of the former Soviet Union was conditioned by the abrupt dissolution of the previous authoritarian system in August 1991 and, with the exception of the Baltic States, they followed a kind of middle-path of the already described two trajectories of transition.

In addition, there exists a third mode of extrication from the communist system without the use of violence. It consists of conducting negotiations between the opposition forces and the ruling authoritarian elites and of providing guarantees to the former communists that they would not be repressed in any way just because of their political views. Rather counterintuitively for those wishing a quick end to the previous political system and moral compensation from the outgoing autocrats for their deeds under the previous regime, former leaders should also be given the chance to compete for office on an equal basis with the other political parties. Similar 'Round Table Talks' were organised between 1989 and 1990 in Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. They were not of equal importance nor did they produce the same results in each country. Their success depended very much on their timing and the political context in which they were introduced.²⁵⁶ By experimenting with a novel form of institutional setting, which the 'Round Table Talks' in fact were at that time, the participating elites created the necessary conditions for a peaceful change of regime, such as providing the various political parties with an opportunity to talk among themselves and decide about the terms of organising elections, voting a new democratic constitution and beginning social and economic reforms.

It could be argued that the majority of Eastern European countries has not followed a singular political model of transition, which would permit them to obtain the same set of 'optimal' results in their multiple other transformations and which could help them

²⁵⁶ Elster, J. (ed.) (1996); *The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

eventually to democratise. The successful completion of a transition to democracy has usually been attained in several stages. The existence of favourable legacies from the period before the collapse of the former communist regime, such as the existence of previous attempts at reform and/or revolution, accompanied by the making of particular kinds of systemic choices in the aftermath of the political change of the 1989-91 period and the ability to sequence them in the right way, have been some of the key steps towards attaining the desired outcome. For example, Hungary had to go through two social reforms (1953-54 and 1966-72) and one revolution (1956), before it was able to start a real democratic transition in 1989. Poland's 'self-limiting' revolution of 1980-81 and 'Round Table' model from the spring of 1989 had wide-ranging influences over the political transformation of the whole region and gave rise to a robust democratic tradition in the country itself. The communist leadership of Bulgaria was largely caught 'off-guard' by the strong wave of change that swept across Eastern Europe after the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in the early days of November 1989. That is why it decided to cede political power to the 'reformers' in the party without struggle. But once the opposition, re-constituted and unified politically under the label of Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), was part of the Round Table Talks, it managed to provide a counterbalance to the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and negotiate its participation in the government administration via various institutional channels that the democratic process had opened to them. Similar was the fate of the rest of the East-Central European countries which managed to complete a rapid transition to democracy, while a number of other states, situated further East, followed in their tracks shortly afterwards, but have had a mixed record of success until now.

4.3. The Main Stages and Strategies of the Process of Transition to Democracy

Transition to democracy does not represent a single periodisation, with clearly defined beginning and end points. It should rather be conceptualised theoretically as a dynamic process, which follows a specific logic and has consequences that affect areas outside the immediate range of applicability of ordinary political decisions. During the transition itself, one can distinguish three phases: (1) *the erosion of the old*

system, which, at the level of elites, is characterised by an internal conflict in the governing apparatus of the authoritarian regime and, at the level of society, by an increased tolerance towards the different forms of activity of the opposition parties and autonomous movements; (2) *the moment of extrication*, when the people holding power step down from the political scene and make way for new actors who would assume the responsibility of governing the state; and (3) *the institutionalisation (or formal establishment) of the new regime*, a slightly longer phase when new political rulers become elected. Moreover, to be successful, those actors participating in and making possible the realisation of the latter two stages of the transition to democracy and in particular the second one, should be careful not to allow any institutional and legal 'hangovers' from the previous system, as well as direct intervention by 'unaccountable power groups', such as the military, the secret police, secessionist groups, members of the state bureaucracy and intervening international factors, to constrain the new regime from ruling effectively, despite all the remaining objective and subjective difficulties that it may encounter in its post-transitional environment.²⁵⁷

In their book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter characterise transition as including two separate stages: *liberalisation* and *democratisation*.²⁵⁸ According to them, *liberalisation* can be distinguished from *democratisation* by the criteria that it focuses exclusively on the authoritarian system and the efforts of the ruling elites to accommodate themselves to a new social and political reality. *Democratisation*, on the other hand, is conceptualised more broadly: first, by the larger period that it covers, second, by the fact that it may occasionally overlap with the timing of liberalisation, and, third, by the presumably 'clear' direction that such a political sub-process originally sets, namely, towards democracy, but without one having the opportunity to specify, even very approximately, when exactly it starts and/or ends.

²⁵⁷ Samuel J. Valenzuela is among the first to conceptualise the term 'unaccountable power groups' and treats a wide range of related issues in great detail in Valenzuela, S.J. (1992); "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions", in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., and Valenzuela, S. J. (eds.), Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in a Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 57-104.

²⁵⁸ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); (fn. 1), Vol. 4.

By taking over the concepts devised a decade earlier by their colleagues, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan decided to analyse further the issues related to the notional definition of *liberalisation* and *democratisation*. In principle, they concur with the assumption that *liberalisation* unravels in a predominantly non-democratic setting and that it entails a strategy of 'opening up' of the old system. In their opinion, this provides for "somewhat greater space for the organisation of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as *habeas corpus*, the releasing of political prisoners, ... and most important, the toleration of opposition".²⁵⁹ *Democratisation* is however envisaged as a "wider and more specifically political concept". This represents a useful clarification of a well-known definition of *democratisation*, because this latter is perceived as an intrinsically political process (although *liberalisation* can also be conceived as having lasting effects in the field of politics, as did some of the efforts of Gorbachev's administration in this direction) rather than one having influence on or being influenced by something else, e.g. the economy, social welfare, culture and ethnicity. Since *democratisation* centres on the structural aspects of the transition to democracy, i.e. on the emerging institutions and novel procedures during that particular period of time, it also stresses the importance of passing through all the stages of the transformation process and of achieving political democracy of a certain quality. This includes among other things the holding of free and fair elections, the voting of a new democratic constitution and the initiation (preferably simultaneously) of political, social and economic reforms, which will have more profound consequences for the balance between and the specific organisation of the state institutions, as well as the overall well-being of the entire population. "Using these definitions," the authors conclude, "it is obvious that there can be *liberalisation* without *democratisation*."²⁶⁰

Without delving further into the concrete definition of *liberalisation* and *democratisation*, which for the phase of *democratisation* is done in much greater detail in chapter five, it will be interesting to look at the potential outcomes of democratic transition in terms of the type of regime it may produce. Generally speaking, there are three scenarios which have to be taken into consideration when analysing the diverging trajectories of transition to political democracy. First,

²⁵⁹ Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); (fn. 2), p. 3.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p.3.

transition may begin and fail immediately after its initiation. This is called a 'sudden death' scenario and was the fate of the newly-founded democracies in Latin America and in Africa during the 1960s, '70s and '80s, when the military decided to intervene in the process of regime change by staging *coups d'état* and installing such rulers who would defend their particular interests as a privileged class in the state. In the post-communist world, this has been the case of the majority of Central Asian countries. Second, the established political system might be able to progress to democracy and even reach a favourable position from which the consolidation of democracy becomes possible. Third, and this includes the majority of cases, is the creation of some kind of *hybrid* regime, which may either contain a number of democratic institutions or simply 'imitate' political democracy, but would never be quite able to transform itself into a functioning democratic state.

One obvious watershed, which separates the predominant part of intermediary situations in this last third category of transition to democracy, is the holding of elections. Of course, there are those regimes that call themselves democracies without having held elections. There are others which managed to organise elections but they were not free and fair and their outcome was known well in advance. Finally, there exist the so-called '*façade* democracies' which held elections, some of them having even been free and counted fairly, but the regimes subsequently failed to democratise. When democratic elections did not take place but the governing elites have managed nevertheless to liberalise some spheres of social life, for example concerning certain individual rights, releasing political prisoners and/or to loosening administrative control over the publication and transmission of information in the media, those regimes have been labelled *dictablandas*. The second type of political rule, characterised by the holding of elections but the parallel diminution of the effective powers of the elected civil officers by the military and other 'unaccountable veto groups', has been predicted to lead to a *democradura*, a *pro forma* democracy which cannot progress further quantitatively and qualitatively as a political regime and extend various liberties and legal rights to its citizens.²⁶¹ The comparative social research of emerging democracies has made it clear that neither of the above two

²⁶¹ O'Donnell (1992); "Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes", in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., and Valenzuela, S.J. (eds.), Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American

types of intermediary arrangement might indeed be long-lasting, nor does anyone of them deserve to be called democratic. The experience of some of the third-world *hybrid* democracies has shown so far that, in the case of *dictablandas*, the liberalisation efforts of the authoritarian regime might eventually lead to a surge of civil society and the organisation of a powerful opposition, which might in turn attempt to overthrow the existing regime, while in the case of *democraduras*, elections have tended to produce unexpected winners who might wish to try to broaden not only human rights but also push for a full-fledged political democracy. It could be concluded from the above observations, that these represent outcomes that autocrats had hardly ever thought of or meant to concede while formulating policies and taking certain decisions before transition to democracy was started and *dictablandas* and *democraduras* became established.²⁶²

Samuel Huntington identifies a different kind of problem regarding the fate of contemporary *semi*-democracies and the risk they run of retrogressing slowly into authoritarian rule by seeing the popular legitimacy of the system being watered down and eventually lost. This has been labelled 'democratic erosion' or 'slow death'. The symptoms of a gradual erosion have been quite evident in some of the newly-created Latin American and Eastern European democracies, and particularly in some former Soviet Union republics, such as Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia. Here the conservative elements of the previous authoritarian/totalitarian regime, connected with the military and the communist party *nomenklatura*, have systematically thwarted the advance of the transformation in many important spheres of social life and, thus, have imperilled the existing fragile democratic system in these countries. Huntington is convinced that, in the case of modern "waves" of democracy, "the problem is not overthrow but erosion: the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it".²⁶³ It could also be added that, in the contemporary world, "slow death" is accomplished through the suppression of political freedoms, institutional guarantees and processes that are vital to political democracy. In the context of recent attempts at democratisation, the exponents of

Democracies in a Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 17-56.

²⁶² Schmitter, P. (1994); "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), p. 79.

authoritarian ideas have been inclined to use more subtle methods and instruments to 'suffocate' democracy rather than to challenge its fundamental principles directly.

For example, they have tended to render the democratic system politically and socially inefficient. They have done this by trying to downplay the effects of some of the legal provisions made in the democratic constitutions, by promoting corruption and bureaucratic procrastination, by impeding the official contacts and established means of 'checks and balances' between state institutions and by setting ubiquitous standards of unaccountability for the various elites *vis-à-vis* the citizens. It is very difficult to make a catalogue of these critical situations or to say how long it would take for erosion to reach its climax and take its political toll. It has been suggested by some social scientists, that this latter process might indeed be confirmed to have occurred by the coming to power of a more authoritarian and, inevitably, more populist leader, who might openly decide to 'turn his/her back' to *façade* democracy and rule in a different way. Usually, these have been periods measured in years and, sometimes, it has been virtually impossible to tell when the *semi*-democratic political system regressed to authoritarian rule, simply because it had never been fully democratic before that and its transition stopped at the beginning or intermediary stages of its evolution.²⁶⁴

Finally, by producing so many and varied types of regimes, such as democracies, autocracies, *democraduras*, *dictablandas*, military and bureaucratic authoritarianism, transitions to democracy have been persistently characterised as periods of high uncertainty and anticipation by scholars dealing with regime change.²⁶⁵ They are described as political situations in which the conflict between the chief actors is predominantly over the nature of rules according to which the new political system is to be structured. In a transitology perspective, the general type of regime is prevalent over its organisational and procedural aspects, which are treated much better by the sub-discipline of consolidology. The comparative analysis of various forms of

²⁶³ Huntington, S. (1996); "Democracy for the Long Haul", *Journal of Democracy* 7, (April 1996), p. 7.

²⁶⁴ See an illuminating discussion of modes and trajectories of regression to authoritarianism in Diamond, L. (1996); "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions and Directions for Consolidation", in Farer, T. (ed.), *Collectively Defending Democracy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

²⁶⁵ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); (fn. 1), pp. 3 and 66.

transition to democracy has tended to look at the emerging political regimes more as ideal types and tried to distinguish between those being democratic from the non-democratic ones than to understand the intricate processes leading to the realisation of certain policies and their 'crystallisation' into a specific set of institutions. Furthermore, the unpredictable character of the power relations and relative lack of constraint by political institutions and legal norms during transition have inevitably limited the choice of authors to a smaller number of actors and patterns of behaviour they felt important to look at.²⁶⁶ This has produced several standard assumptions and 'models', that have been applied to a wide pool of cases, cutting across time and space, and which have in turn been analysed in relation to an even larger set of contingencies that have been peculiar to each new situation. In Eastern Europe, the debate featuring transitions to democracy has included the majority of topics relevant to the previously-held discussions about Latin American, Southern European and Asian democratisations, and alongside this has raised the important question of the 'comparability' of the models of post-communist transitions with those in other parts of the world.²⁶⁷

4.4. Consolidation of Democracy²⁶⁸

With the contemporary rise in the number of countries which are managing to accomplish a successful transition from authoritarian rule to some kind of democracy, the earlier preoccupations of political scientists, as well as policy-makers, about the survival capacity of these newly-founded regimes have been considerably mitigated and their attention has shifted towards another set of problems connected with the

²⁶⁶ Przeworski, A. (1988); "Some Problems of the Study of Transition to Democracy", in O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., and Whitehead, L. (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 47-63; and Colomer, J. (1991); "Transitions by Agreement: Modelling the Spanish Way", *American Political Science Review* 85, No. 4, pp. 1283-1302.

²⁶⁷ Karl, T. and Schmitter, P. (1991); "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 45, pp. 269-84; Morlino, L. (1995); "Democratic Consolidation: Definitions and Models", in Transitions to Democracy, Pridham, G. (ed.), (Dartmouth: Aldershot), pp. 571-90; and Geddes, B. (1996); "Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America", in Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America, Lijphart, A. and Waisman, C. (eds.), (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press), pp. 15-41.

²⁶⁸ I prefer to refer to the 'consolidation of democracy' (CoD) than to the more vastly used term in the political science literature 'democratic consolidation' (DC), (a) because the latter seems to imply that the process of consolidating democracy must itself be democratic and (b) because it appears necessary from a normative point of view to make the specification that what one consolidates is a democracy and no other political system, which might itself be a variation of a democratic regime.

choices and dilemmas of what it has become increasingly popular to call 'consolidation of democracy' (CoD). Initially, the term 'consolidation of democracy', or 'democratic consolidation', was meant to designate a set of particular steps and moves that made new democracies secure against an authoritarian reversal in a highly unpredictable post-transitional setting, but with the expansion of the list of challenges linked with the degree of institutionalisation and the quality of performance of those regimes, 'consolidation of democracy' has transformed itself from an embryonic sub-discipline of 'transitology' studies into a real 'growth industry' for some social scientists.²⁶⁹

The recent progress made by students of democracy in analysing the historical transformations occurring in Eastern Europe and the post-communist world has unfortunately not been accompanied by a substantial advance in their attempts to conceptualise analytically the concept of 'consolidation of democracy' and/or to reach a consensus about its meaning.²⁷⁰ The multiple usage and different definitions of CoD have dramatically broadened the scope of application of this notion and have made it very difficult for political researchers to operationalise it empirically and, even less, to be able to measure it statistically.²⁷¹

There are at least two groups of generic problems that could be mentioned in relation to the 'unduly' high expectations that the process of CoD evokes in the minds of both social scientists and decision-makers and, thus, accounts for part of the conceptual confusion surrounding this term:

²⁶⁹ Whitehead, L. (1989); "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies", in R. Pastor (ed.), Democracy in the Americas, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 13-16; Ethier, D. (ed.) (1990); Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, (Houndmills and London: MacMillan), esp. pp. 3-21; Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, J. S. (eds.) (1992); Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press); Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (eds.) (1992); Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995); The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press); and Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

²⁷⁰ Schedler, A. (1997); "Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation", Working Paper, No. 50 (November 1997), Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, p. 3, p. 7; and Boussard, C. (2000); "Civil Society in the Consolidation Process: Illustrations from Central America", paper presented at the ECPR Joint-Sessions Workshop, Copenhagen, Denmark, April 14-19, 2000, p. 3 (unpublished).

²⁷¹ Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995); (fn. 26), p. 5.

1. Democracy as a political system should not be supposed to be completely consolidated, since it always institutionalises some degree of uncertainty which permits it to be flexible enough in order to survive the changing social conditions of the day. Deprived of this quality, democracy, which is in the unique position among other systems of governance to transform its norms and institutions, will not only lose some of its most important assets to govern effectively, but it will be 'kept in the dark' about certain intrinsic processes occurring within itself, such as *who* is chosen in office, *how* they behave once elected to power but also *what* the rules of the political system should look like in the future.²⁷²

2. Authors who have used the concept of CoD have tended to write about 'democracy' and 'consolidation' as unequal terms or have looked at their combination as too *polysemic* to make a good pair.²⁷³ This, of course, should not be a reason for not taking the notion of 'consolidation of democracy' seriously or using it in its entirety in the comparative political science literature at all. Rather and particularly in my mind, the normative component contained in the meanings of 'democracy' and 'consolidation' should not be so 'pure' as to specify things that do not even exist in real life. Thus, by establishing and analysing 'consolidated democracies' one should not attach any special requirement *ex ante* to the particular type of democracy which is to be consolidated, its survival capacity or its inherent stability, all of which are problems that relate to the 'quality of democracy' (QoD) which is in a process of consolidation.

Andreas Schedler, one of the social scientists who has conducted some of the most extensive research in the field of consolidology and has, in addition, written a lot about the theoretical conceptualisation of the term democratic consolidation, is quite correct to point out that its meaning depends to a great extent on the epistemological foundations that one bases one's interpretation upon.²⁷⁴ He distinguishes between five

²⁷² Schmitter, P. and Guilhot, N. (2000); "From Transition to Consolidation. Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy", in Dobry, Michel (ed.) Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe. Lessons for the Social Sciences, (London: Kluwert Academic Publishers), pp. 131-46.

²⁷³ O'Donnell, G. (1996); "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), p. 38.

²⁷⁴ Schedler, A. (1998); (fn. 3), pp. 92-94.

different types of concepts of consolidation of democracy depending on where one stands (the empirical viewpoint) and where one aims to reach (the normative horizon). The definition and usage of consolidation of democracy may consequently vary according to the context and the goals one has in mind. The five perspectives of CoD that he delineates are a selection of the possible outcomes one may want to attain in relation to the establishment of a liberal democracy (or, *polyarchy*, in his presentation) as a political regime. The classification of the categories of consolidation of democracy differs according to whether one would like not to regress from liberal democracy by “avoiding democratic breakdown” and “avoiding democratic erosion” (negative notions), or one would like to improve the institutional framework and quality of democracy by “institutionalising democracy,” “completing democracy” and “deepening democracy” (positive notions). In Schedler’s opinion, there is nothing intrinsically good or bad about any of the described goals of democratic consolidation and they in any case do not present a clear picture of what analytical grounds the term CoD should cover. Hence, he proposes that the meaning of democratic consolidation be confined to its original concern – to assure the political regime’s survival.²⁷⁵

I cannot concur, however, with such a self-limiting interpretation of the concept of CoD, which is restricted only to two of its negative objectives: avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion. I also find problematic the positive usages of CoD (completing, organising and deepening democracy), because I believe, first, that no democracy can ever become “fully consolidated”²⁷⁶ and, second, that both notions of “organising democracy” and “deepening of democracy” are still quite unclear and poorly defined. Moreover, the above definition of consolidation of democracy might be interpreted differently as well as to connote an “equifinality” of the democratisation process,²⁷⁷ when a given specific type of democracy is consolidated and at the same time this model of consolidation is presented to the

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 103.

²⁷⁶ Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (eds.) (1998); *Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist Societies*, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 36.

²⁷⁷ The notion of equifinality is introduced in relation to the possibly limited types of outcomes in the recent transitions to and consolidations of democracy (especially in Eastern Europe) in Schmitter, P. and Santiso, J. (1998); “Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy”, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (London: SAGE Publications), pp. 69-92.

public as if the elites in the state had already had it in mind long before starting the democratic transition.

As it becomes obvious from some of the previous reflections, the concept of consolidation of democracy has most often been equated with that of stability or institutionalisation. It should be noted, however, that the mere preservation of democracy or another similar kind of governing regime does not necessarily lead to its consolidation.²⁷⁸ Stability and consolidation do not seem to represent the same thing, although the former might be conceptualised as being a necessary attribute of the latter. As some authors have already noted, the mere retention and persistence of democracy do not always entail an improved quality of its performance, which is probably the most important characteristic in relation to which CoD can ultimately be measured.²⁷⁹ The characteristic examples of transitions to democracy in Argentina, Ukraine and Armenia clearly demonstrate that certain democratic regimes may last almost indefinitely if no serious challenges or alternatives appear, but at the same time, they might not be capable of conducting any sensible social and economic reforms or mobilising their elites and populations to improve the functioning of political democracy in these countries. In short, consolidated democracies should represent something more than institutional stability and survival capacity of the people in power.

To gain a clearer understanding of the meaning of CoD one has inevitably to take into account both the structural and the procedural factors that influence the definition of this term. In addition to that, one must also look both at the level of the behaviour and attitudes of citizens and rulers in order to evaluate how these two socially important groups perceive the progress being accomplished by the democratic regime during the period of consolidation. Earlier theories of democratisation tended to focus on the development of a "social consensus" around the rules and institutions of the state.²⁸⁰ Dankart Rustow spoke about the effect of "habituation" of the rules of the game under the influence of structures themselves,²⁸¹ while Laurence Whitehead referred to the

²⁷⁸ Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (eds.) (1992); (fn. 26), p. 7.

²⁷⁹ Valenzuela, S. J. (1992); (fn. 15), p. 59; and Chull Shin, D. (1995); (fn. 2), p. 144.

²⁸⁰ Ethier, D. (ed.) (1990); (fn. 26), p. 13.

²⁸¹ Rustow, D. (1970); (fn. 1), pp. 358-61.

“internalisation” of norms and procedures under almost the same circumstances.²⁸² The supremacy of the structural aspects of consolidation reached its climax in the late 1980s with the appearance of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, the normative perspective offered therein and later on describing consolidation of democracy as the process by which “social relations can become social structures, ... so regular in occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating the behaviour that they become autonomous in their functioning and resistant to externally induced change.”²⁸³ More recently, social scientists have recognised the importance of procedural factors alongside the independent role of social structures for the consolidation of democracy and their views about the matter have become more balanced and complete.

Other authors, like John Higley and Richard Gunther, have postulated that democracies become consolidated only when elite consensus is coupled with extensive mass participation in elections and other formal and informal institutional processes.²⁸⁴ Once elections and all surrounding political and social freedoms have properly been institutionalised and regularly practised, the problem of consolidation becomes much simpler and boils down to the questions of reaching an agreement about the nature of the political system and *synchronising* the powers and moves of the “politically significant actors” in their everyday political life. According to Juan Linz, democracy is consolidated when “none of the major political actors, parties or organised interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers ... To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the ‘only game in town’.”²⁸⁵ Strategically, the consolidation of democracy as a political process must be able to perform one final function: to be able to channel and transform the behavioural and attitudinal support of elites and citizens for democracy (in principle) into a permanent pattern of critical behaviour and attitudes toward the political regime (at a given moment of time), without significantly altering the opinion of the majority in the state about the fate of

²⁸² Whitehead, L. (1989); (fn. 26), p. 79.

²⁸³ Schmitter, P. (1988); “The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe”, unpublished manuscript, Stanford University and European University Institute, Florence.

²⁸⁴ Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (eds.) (1992); (fn. 26).

the political system (in general). Likewise, Scott Mainwaring asserts that democracy cannot be achieved without converting “expedient” and “superfluous” democrats among both elites and masses into “authentic” believers in democracy. Their strong commitment to democracy “helps make possible the creation of effective democratic institutions” and also “generates a legitimacy that can help new democracies withstand less-than-excellent policy performances.”²⁸⁶

The procedural components of consolidation of democracy, much more than the structural ones, have been notoriously difficult to describe empirically and define as analytical subjects of political research, so their operationalisation has been hampered by the conceptual confusion prevailing among the students of the procedural as well as the structural determinants of democratic consolidation.²⁸⁷ For this reasons, many scholars prefer Linz’s minimalist definition of ‘the only game in town’, which is quite neutral in comparison with some other definitions of CoD that demonstrate, for example, some socio-political or cultural bias towards certain countries and regions in the world, which are assumed to be more advanced in their democratic practices than others,²⁸⁸ while Linz’s definition allows for a broader scope of interpretation of its meaning for the purpose of its operationalisation. I am inclined to favour the approach developed later on by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in their article ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’, in which they single out three important criteria (one contextual, one structural and one procedural) for describing consolidated democratic regimes.²⁸⁹ These “minimal conditions,” as they call them, are: (1) a viable and functioning state, (2) a completed democratic transition and (3) a government that rules democratically. They define CoD, very similarly to Linz’s previous ‘narrow’ definition, as being the process through which “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives

²⁸⁵ Linz, J. (1990); “Transitions to Democracy”, *Washington Quarterly* 13, (Summer 1990), pp. 156-58.

²⁸⁶ Mainwaring, S. (1992); “Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues”, in Mainwaring, S., O’Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, S.J. (eds.), (fn. 1), p. 309.

²⁸⁷ Gasiorowski, M. and Power, T. (1998); “The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 6, December 1998, (London: SAGE Publications, Inc.), pp. 740-41.

²⁸⁸ Putnam, R. (1993); *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press); and Wildavsky, A. (1993); “Democracy as a Coalition of Cultures”, *Society*, No. 31, (December 1993).

²⁸⁹ Linz, J. and Stepan, AL (1996); “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 14-33.

has become 'the only game in town,'" while "democracy," on the other hand, "with consolidation ... becomes routinised and deeply internalised in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success."²⁹⁰

In addition, Linz and Stepan propose a working definition of a consolidated democratic regime, three dimensions of which are developed as follows. *Behaviourally*, a democratic regime is perceived to have been consolidated "when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state." *Attitudinally*, a democratic regime is consolidated "when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life." And *constitutionally*, democracy is consolidated when people in power as well as those outside the official state institutions "become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process."²⁹¹

Finally, it must be acknowledged, that consolidating democracies behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally is not a simple task, which is why one has to keep two important things in mind. The first is that, by virtue of the fact that the process of consolidation of democracy is endowed with so many complications and uncertainties, one cannot be sure to be able to consolidate only one type of democracy, but many and different democracies, and this is one of the principle objectives of this thesis – to provide a quantitative, as well as a qualitative, expression of the varieties of democracies that might be consolidated. Secondly, when once a democracy is assumed to be consolidated, one should not preclude the possibility that at some future moment in time it might regress in quality or even break down. In other words, consolidation and deconsolidation are processes inextricably linked with the type and quality of the regime one attempts to establish, and, in the case of the present

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 15-16.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 16.

theoretical analysis, this is exemplified by the process of consolidation of democracy (CoD).

4.5. Studying the Relationship between Transition to and Consolidation of Democracy

It is absolutely necessary to analyse the existing relationship between transition to (TtoD) and consolidation of democracy (CoD) as two separate and at the same time intimately connected processes, in order to be able to measure the level of political democracy and the degree of its consolidation as a consequence of systemic change. This has to be done prior to presenting a specific quantitative or qualitative model estimating the progress achieved during consolidation and transition. The logic behind this procedure is that one has to be certain what is analysing and measuring: the process or the product of democratisation. Moreover, before being able to speak of consolidation, one has also to know first whether the regime about to be consolidated is a political democracy or some other form of hybrid rule. Therefore, stricter criteria about the initiation and end of transition as well as about the beginning of consolidation have to be established. In my mind, this cannot be done without understanding the analytical and practical link existing between the processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy and between the two concepts in the political science literature.

When looking back at the history of building political democracies in the twentieth century, one should note that, fortunately or unfortunately for the development of some research areas of comparative social sciences, it is no longer the case that roughly two out of three efforts at democratisation fail: since 1974, a very high proportion of countries has been able to accomplish one or another type of transition to democracy and has been spared the destiny of regressing to their respective autocratic *status quo ante*.²⁹² As a result of this less threatening environment, especially once communist ideology had been mostly discredited in many parts of the world during the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers became less preoccupied

²⁹² Schmitter, P. and Santiso, J. (1998); "Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (London: SAGE Publications), pp. 69-92, esp. pp. 69-70.

with studying difference between political systems (democracy versus autocracy) and political transformation *per se*, but concentrated on regime change, particularly on change of authoritarian regimes, which were supposed to 'disintegrate' under the pressure of 'democratic waves'. In this way, an important epistemological shift occurred in the political science profession, which led to a major readjustment of the conceptual tools and reformulation of research priorities toward studying democracy more as a governing regime and much less as a political system.

Arguably, a lot of academic energy has been diverted away from analysing the essential normative features of political democracy (as well as certain varieties of authoritarian rule) as singular and evolving political system towards building theories of how democracy could be institutionalised and consolidated. In the last couple of decades, this new current in the comparative political science has been very productive and has produced a lot of valuable knowledge about social transformation and democratisation strategies. Initially, the emerging literature about the subject tended to enumerate the factors to explain the modes of why and how the *ancien régime* went into decline and what kinds of political arrangements were reached between the outgoing autocrats and incoming democrats.²⁹³ 'Transitology' was born. Subsequently, by understanding that putting a democratic government in power was not sufficient to guarantee its survival and successful functioning, social scientists decided to further extend their interest in researching the problems of regime stability by studying the degree of the latter's institutionalisation and its legitimacy among the population. In this way, 'consolidology' was also created.

However, consolidation of democracy has turned out to be a difficult concept to define and conceptualise analytically than it had been previously thought. Moreover, 'consolidology' as a sub-discipline of the democratisation studies has failed to convince many social scientists in its normative and empirical foundations, mainly because of its 'fluidity' and voluntaristic usage by social scientists. Therefore, it has

²⁹³ Modernisation theories concerned with socio-economic development and mass political culture, as well as studies of elite behaviour and elite settlement, influenced considerably the early research on democratic transition. See, for instance, O'Donnell, G. (1973); Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Studies in South American Politics, (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies); Diamond, L., Linz, J. and Lipset, S. M. (eds.) (1989); Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner); and Karl, T. and Schmitter, P.

been virtually impossible to operationalise and measure it in a methodologically consistent way.

There are several problems, in my opinion, which have prevented students of democracy from evaluating both quantitatively and qualitatively the progress achieved during transition to and consolidation of democracy. First, there has been no agreement among social scientists about the precise meaning of the concepts of transition and consolidation in the context of political democratisation. Second, a major impediment to the advancement of theoretical knowledge in this field has been the fact that both transition to and consolidation of democracy have not been properly presented in the comparative political science literature in terms of the different political, economic and social goals that they pursue as well as in terms of the possible relations existing between these objectives. Third, it has been difficult for both specialists and non-specialists to figure out from the various publications produced on these subjects what the time limits of transition and consolidation are and whether a certain sequence exists between them. That is why it seems appropriate to provide a conceptually clearer picture of the multiple interactions between transition and consolidation as social processes underlying the same practical attempt of establishing and stabilising democratic regimes around the world.

4.6. Describing the Analytical Goals and Temporal Sequences of Transition and Consolidation

In order to determine the presence of political democracy and evaluate the level of its institutionalisation, social scientists have adopted different strategies for treating transition and consolidation both as theoretical notions and, since the beginning of the recent wave of democracy, as empirical reality. Theoretically, transition to and consolidation of democracy have always been looked at as intertwined and mutually reinforcing processes. Empirically and temporally though, they have either been seen as interconnected but parallel processes producing systemic transformation or they have been conceptualised as separate but sequencing ones leading to regime change. In the latter circumstance, transition to and consolidation of democracy have been

(1991); "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", *Journal of*

seen as focusing independently at political change (in the case of transition) or political order (in the case of consolidation), thus being the product themselves of the conscious activity of political actors during the process of democratisation. Thus, it is probably correct to speak of certain pre-established theoretical perspectives explaining transition to and consolidation of democracy. Having finally elaborated these perspectives, together with the particular sequences between the periods of transition and consolidation, social scientists have not only managed to distinguish between various analytical perspectives but between the political processes themselves as well as between their underlying goals. In my opinion, without clarifying some of these basic theoretical differences and interdependencies, one could not fully understand the current analytical debate about transition and consolidation, which as social processes are part of a larger democratic transformation process occurring in the region. Below I list some of the most important of these perspectives and the existing, at least notionally, sequences between the transition to and consolidation of democracy.

4.6.1. The Different Analytical Perspectives

4.6.1.1. The systemic transformation (democracy versus autocracy) perspective

Primarily, it should be recalled that both transition to and consolidation of democracy deal with **substantial transformation** of the existing political system, be it the former authoritarian or the newly established democratic one. In practice, the outcomes of this transformation seem mostly clear to everybody, particularly those enjoying the benefits of political democracy, but they are, nevertheless, not equally appreciated by all people and in all social contexts around the globe. From an analytical perspective, it could easily be speculated that politics is always about change: promoting change, resisting change, and debating the degree of change. In that sense, all politics is 'transformatory' and wherever there are social processes there are expected to be transitions within and consolidations and deconsolidations of the political system.

Two aspects should, however, be looked at in relation to the aims of some policies of transformation in the creation of neo-democracies: the *scope* and the *nature* of

systemic change. This is quite important, because it helps one distinguish between the results and nature of 'ordinary' and 'transformation' politics. The greater scope of systemic transformation as opposed to regime change could be emphasised in two possible ways: once, through the juxtaposition between the fixed terms 'political system' and 'political regime' and, second, through contrast between the dynamic notions 'transformation' and 'change'. Although, social scientists have most often used the concepts 'system' and 'regime' interchangeably and, hence, blurred the initial theoretical distinctions between the two terms, there is still an ongoing debate about democracy being a distinctive type of political regime or political system.²⁹⁴

In my view, political systems are much more general and overarching than a given political regime. For example, when speaking of a political system (e.g. communism, fascism, democracy, autocracy), we mean a certain pattern of rule and access to office reaching beyond the political sphere well into the economy, society and, sometimes, even into family life. At the same time, political systems are themselves exclusive; they are formed and exercised against some political and legal principles not compatible with their way of functioning and legitimation.²⁹⁵ Regimes, on the contrary, have more blurred boundaries. They essentially describe a particular kind of government exercised on the territory of a political state (polity). They can be democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian or hybrid. As far as the continuity between varieties of ruling regimes is concerned, it is also a matter of degree how much democratic or autocratic these regimes are.²⁹⁶ That is why students of democracy and autocracy often attach adjectives to the above broadly-defined labels in order to specify what kind of political regime they envisage in practice. Still many of the social science disciplines, and particularly comparative politics, suffer not only from a poor conceptualisation of what political democracy and autocracy are, but also from making a clear distinction between varieties and types of democratic and authoritarian regimes. Finally, concerning the usage of the notion of 'transformation' as opposed to 'change' in the context of the prevailing situation in most of the countries in post-communist Eastern Europe, I share the opinion of a long-time student of the region,

²⁹⁴ O'Donnell, G. (1993); "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems", *World Development* 27 (8), pp. 1355-69.

²⁹⁵ Sartori, G. (1987); *Theory of Democracy Revisited*, especially Chapter 7 "What Democracy is Not...", (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 182-213.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*; p. 184.

Richard Rose, who posits that the application of the term 'transformation' is much more correct both from a theoretical and practical point of view. According to him, 'transformation' captures a wider variety of political and social aspects linked to democratic transition and "is much more apt to describe the cathalytic process of fundamental and pervasive change from the Baltic to the Black Sea".²⁹⁷ Therefore, the term 'transformation' is both suitable to portray the simultaneity of the different kinds of political, economic, social, cultural, and territorial-administrative changes going on in Eastern Europe as well as the profound evolution from communist system to democratic governance.

As regards the nature of systemic transformations, especially the ones happening after communism, they are definitely much more complex and full with uncertainties than during the periods of liberalisation or democratic change.²⁹⁸ In a recent paper, presented at a conference on the "Individual vs. The State" at the Central European University in Budapest, Adam Czarnota singles out two important factors which make 'transitional politics' very different from the politics practised in stable democracies, and even in stable repressive regimes.²⁹⁹ The first is the comprehensiveness of the social reform, when everything is 'up for grabs' at the same time. The second factor is that 'transitional politics' is realistic in the sense that there is a real engagement between the political foes and there is both contestation and consensus-searching about the basic rules of the game, which inevitably makes that period less predictable and more open to influence from actors both within and outside the boundaries of the political unit. The same author defines 'transitional politics' as "politics about comprehensive simultaneous changes to the political fabric of society, conducted in circumstances where, for whatever underlying reason, politics about politics has become possible after long being foreclosed by the very system that is now subject to

²⁹⁷ Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (eds.) (1998); Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist Societies, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 7.

²⁹⁸ In connection with Latin American and South European transitions to democracy, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter speak of *liberalisation*, *democratisation* and *consolidation* as distinct political periods characterising the change of the former authoritarian regime into democracy, in O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), Vol. 4.

²⁹⁹ Czarnota, A. (2000); "François Du Bois: Law, Politics and Quasi-Legal Institutions", unpublished paper, presented at conference "The Individual vs. The State", Central European University, Budapest, May 19-21, 2000.

pressure for change".³⁰⁰ Transitional politics are usually very complex, that is why one should not expect the outcome of systemic transformation to be always democratisation, and it need not be. Although the breakdown of undemocratic regimes is a constituent feature of transitional politics, it is by no means inevitable that will result in democracy, and even much less so in consolidation of democracy.

Ultimately, because of the overall favourable international environment and the pressure on domestic rulers to move quickly to some form of democracy, the probability of reaching consolidation after the first free elections, or at least after the second ones, has considerably increased. Although this had not exactly been the case in previous transitions (e.g. in Latin America and parts of Africa), and because new democracy there suffered setback through autocratic re-election or military coups, this has prompted many students of democracy to concentrate on consolidation as a period when the gains of democratic transition have to be preserved first and then multiplied. Thus, by focusing exclusively on regime stability during the consolidation phase, social researchers have almost forgotten to address regime institutionalisation and survival as a dynamic processes: for instance, in terms of an improved quality of democracy and the existence of a possibility that democratic regimes might become deconsolidated at some point in the future. In other words, the *transformatory* capacity of consolidation as a social process has been ignored; moreover, the stress has been placed on the 'consolidated regime' as a notion and product of consolidation, which is arguably tautologous.

4.6.1.2. The regime change (transition) perspective

In the comparative studies of democratisation, the notion of regime change, which has been the most often used concept, has usually been presented in a double-sided fashion as involving change (a) of the **procedures** of the 'political game', and (b) of the **normative behaviours** of actors taking part in this process.³⁰¹ On the one hand,

³⁰⁰ Ibid.; p. 3.

³⁰¹ Collier, D. and Collier, R. (1991); Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Collier, D. and Levitsky, St. (1997); "Democracy 'with Adjectives': Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Literature", *World Politics*, 49(3), pp. 430-451; and Linz, J. (1997); "Democratization and Types of Democracies: New Tasks for Comparativists", background paper for the conference on "Democracy and Federalism", All Souls College, Oxford University, June 5-8, 1997 (unpublished).

the newly-established regime has been defined by the rules which determine the form of government, the channels and conditions of access of the citizens to the ruling elites and the way of keeping the latter accountable, the modes of decision making, the structure and size of the state administration, and the extent to which the population is eligible to participate in these processes. According to these criteria, regimes, characterised predominantly by their procedures, may range on a continuum between persistently autocratic to consolidated democratic. On the other hand, it is believed that a democratic regime has the capacity to survive the challenges of its own environment if the relevant actors choose to accept the rules of the political system they operate in as the most appropriate and legitimate at the current moment of time, while they must persistently reject any authoritarian alternatives to the regime in place. This is what is called the normative behaviour criterion, according to which political regimes are also described as being in a transitional or more advanced consolidation phase of development.

The analytical distinction between **procedural** and **behavioural dimensions** of a political regime has been quite salient to those who have tried to establish the analytical link existing between transition to and consolidation of democracy as two closely related, but also quite different, social processes. According to Geraldo Munck,³⁰² 'transitology' as a political science sub-discipline has been primarily concerned with changes in the *procedural aspects of politics* during the initial period of high uncertainty when the authoritarian regime is overthrown and attempts are made to build a new political system, usually expected to be a democracy. Whereas 'consolidology', on the other hand, has mainly been expected to deal with *the degree of institutionalisation of the rules characterising political democracy and the selection of specific types of democracy*. Seen from such a perspective, the notion of political regime has not only been disaggregated into procedural and behavioural aspects in the theoretical literature of democratisation, but transition and consolidation have in fact been used to distinguish between two analytical perspectives which do not perfectly fit with the general area of application of transitology and consolidology as such, and this is where some of the major complications in the general usage and

³⁰² Munck, G. (1996); "Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization", working paper, Kellogg Institute of International Studies, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), p. 6.

concept-stretching relating to transition and consolidation of democracy have occurred in practice.

At the beginning of the current wave of political change during the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, when there was not enough empirical and theoretical knowledge accumulated about how system transformation unravelled, especially in a comparative perspective, it was quite convenient for social researchers to separate between procedural and behavioural aspects of political regime. In this way, they managed to achieve a higher degree of conceptual precision concerning the underlying processes of social change, as well as formulating the existence of a specific periodisation, at least theoretically, of how political regimes change, namely, through the sequence of political events and structures manifested during transition to and consolidation of democracy. But with the collapse of the formerly communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and with the adding of a large number of new factors and institutional practices to the original list of tasks to have been accomplished during political transition and afterwards, it became even more apparent that the strict separation between procedural and behavioural perspectives characterising the concept of regime cannot be analogous to the existing relationship between transition and consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, although it is a recognised fact that the periods of transition and consolidation may frequently overlap in practice,³⁰³ it is far from certain or proven in reality that they represent the sequence of the same process of regime change articulated in time. Rather, it has been suggested by some more recent publications in this field that transitology and consolidology hinge in fact "on different epistemological foundations, to a certain extent mutually exclusive, which have contributed to shape different objects."³⁰⁴

What follows as a conclusion from the arguments presented above is that it is not systemic transformation, the initial analytical purview of 'transitology' and 'consolidology', but more specifically regime change, which offers a totally new analytical vision of the concept of political regime, and political democracy as a

³⁰³ Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995); The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 3.

concrete type of regime in the context of the contemporary surge of democratic efforts, that has caused the majority of problems associated with understanding and operationalising the terms transition to and consolidation of democracy.

4.6.1.3. The regime stability (consolidation) perspective

If one can accept that both transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy require norms and behaviours specific to the context of their realisation, and not that each process refers exclusively to one of these attributes of political regime, then one may conclude that there exist certain principles intrinsic to the 'democratic game' that are valid both during the period before the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the one after the establishment of political democracy. It is, however, very complicated to identify the type and quality of political regimes that emerge out of these processes, because, it may also be necessary to know whether they would be sufficiently stable to resist further outside intervention and political reversal, or at least be internally well-organised and efficient enough to minimise the probability of such occurrences. So, important social transformations necessitate not only the institutionalisation of regime change but also of a degree of regime stability.

It has been often repeated by social scientists that without the presence of a viable state, a working administration and political institutions that can exercise legitimate authority over the entire national territory, one can hardly speak of democracy, least of all of a consolidated democratic regime.³⁰⁵ As early as 1968, Samuel Huntington elaborated a specific theory of political order (stabilisation) and modernisation, and in the opening sentence of his book he makes it clear that "the most important political distinction is not between democratic and authoritarian regimes, but between countries in which the government governs and unstable countries".³⁰⁶ That is why, modern political democracies make requirements of more than one set of factors and of formal or informal institutions. For instance, the concept of regime stability,

³⁰⁴ Guilhot, N. and Schmitter, P. (1998); "Conceptualizing and, then, Measuring the Consolidation and the Quality of Neo-Democracy", unpublished paper, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, April 1998, p. 7.

³⁰⁵ Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 14-33.

³⁰⁶ Huntington, S. (1968); Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University), p. 1.

already mentioned in the previous chapter in association with the process of consolidating democracies is believed to contain in a nutshell all the important characteristics of the criteria of political order. However, as the current theoretical debate unravels, it may fall short of providing a very central perspective of political regimes, namely, of improving the quality of democracy by institutionalising a degree of political uncertainty and allowing the possibility of the regime deconsolidating itself partially or completely at any future point in time.³⁰⁷

4.6.2. Sequencing the Processes of Transition and Consolidation in Time

One of the major reasons for the complications associated with conceptualising consolidation of democracy has been the way in which transition to and consolidation of democracy have been viewed chronologically. Under its standard definition, the concept of transition refers to “the interval between one political regime and another”.³⁰⁸ Thus, it should be assumed that either transition and consolidation unravel simultaneously or that consolidation follows transition to democracy, as many people believe it does.³⁰⁹ Then, the legitimate question is whether consolidation of democracy results from transition to democracy or not. Depending on the answer, one may also like to know what are the substantive goals and temporal end-points of these two processes: democracy or consolidation. In the case of a completed transition, the possible outcomes could either be political democracy or consolidation, while, in the case of consolidation achieved – this could only be political democracy of a certain quality, i.e. one granting social and political stability and improved governance capacity and accountability. As already indicated, it is highly improbable that the final product of the consolidation process be ‘consolidation of democracy’ or ‘democratic consolidation’, because the process and objective of consolidation will overlap both notionally and temporally and will in this way produce a tautology. The only two

³⁰⁷ Schedler, A. (1997); “Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation”, working paper No. 50, (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies); and Schmitter, P. and Santiso, J. (1998); “Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy”, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (London: SAGE Publications), pp. 69-92.

³⁰⁸ O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); p. 6.

³⁰⁹ Mainwaring, S., O’Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, S.J. (eds.) (1992); *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparable Perspective*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press); and Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995);

possibilities remaining, making sense both from a theoretical and chronological point of view, are (a) the 'concept-stretching' of the term political democracy in the case when the process of consolidation ensues after that of transition, and (b) 'concept-specification' (and concept-reformulation) of both political democracy and consolidation of democracy, in the case when consolidation unravels parallel to transition. If both processes are parallel to each other, however, it would also be interesting to observe whether the period of consolidation continues after that of transition chronologically or follows strictly the timetable of democratic transition.

Most social scientists have preferred the first variant, i.e. to 'stretch' the concept of political democracy to match the supposed goals of consolidation. It is not sure whether this has been the most appropriate choice of dealing with the issue, since the more the meaning of political democracy has been 'extended' the more difficult has it been to delineate the parameters of consolidation of democracy and, hence, to measure it. The reasons that many social scientists chose this first option of describing transition and consolidation chronologically are different and still unclear. From an epistemological point of view, it might be presumed, that this has been done following the rapid and almost simultaneous evolution of 'transitology' and 'consolidology' as theoretical sub-disciplines during the 1980s and 1990s. From here, TtoD and CoD have shown an increased capacity to influence each other by developing common conceptual tools and methods of analysing similar political events. An additional reason for this particular choice of depicting these two processes has been that, since the beginning of this historical period of social transformation, the normative understanding of political democracy as a social science term has fallen far behind the global expansion of democracy as a ruling regime spreading beyond the borders of the nation-state. This has resulted in a cross-breeding with other sub-fields of theoretical knowledge as economics, finance, law and sociology, thus further diluting the notion of democracy.

The alternative possibility – of specifying and reformulating the concepts of political democracy and consolidation of democracy – has received relatively little attention in the professional community. Nevertheless, there have been encouraging attempts by

The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore,

various social scientists, especially recently, to redefine and operationalise these concepts according to stricter rules of academic research.³¹⁰ It still has to be seen, however, whether this 'minority current' in the study of emerging democracies could assert itself and contribute to describing democratic transition and consolidation chronologically.³¹¹

4.7. Traditional Measures of Political Democracy and Consolidation of Democracy

With the current trend of increasing numbers of successful democratisations around the world, there is an acute need for reliable social indicators that can measure the level of democracy in the various polities world wide and assess the progress being made toward consolidated democratic regimes. Unfortunately, the explosion of publications, which has occurred in the literature concerned with transition to and consolidation of contemporary democracies, has not been accompanied by a comparable surge in either the quantity or the quality of measures of democracy. On the contrary, the majority of indicators, used in the years before the 'wave of democratisation' reached its climax with the dissolution of the socialist/communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, are no longer efficient enough to capture every aspect of the different types of modern political democracy. Indeed at times they have even been inappropriate for the measurement of democracy on a global scale, since some of the factors influencing democratisation now were not of the same relevance to those territories democratising in the past or were not present at all.³¹²

MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

³¹⁰ Sartori, G. (1987); (fn. 50); Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996);(fn. 26); Schedler, A. (1997) and (1998); (fn. 3) and (fn. 4); and Berglund, S., Aarebrot, F., Vogt, H. and Karasimeonov, G. (2001); Challenges to Democracy. Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), esp. Chapter 1 on democratic consolidation.

³¹¹ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1992); "The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America", in Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, Peter Volten (ed.) (New York: Institute for East-West Studies), pp. 42-68.

³¹² Interesting is the scholarly debate about the relative importance of domestic and international factors in bringing about democracy and consolidating it. Samuel Huntington claims that in earlier waves of democratisation it was either domestic or international factors that played the key role in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes -- not the combination of the two; in Huntington, S. (1991); The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 35. Doh Chull Shin recalls that, in the majority of democratic transitions in Latin America, domestic factors played the more powerful role, while, by contrast, in Eastern Europe international factors played the

4.7.1. Efforts to Measure Political Democracy

The ongoing efforts to measure democracy as a political reality can be grouped in two broad categories: subjective and objective. Subjective indicators rely on the perception-based approach of individual experts who evaluate the state of democracy in the different territories and regional political units around the globe. Among the best-known subjective indicators of democracy are Russell Fitzgibbon's *Measurement of Latin-American Political Phenomena*,³¹³ Arthur Banks's *Cross-National Time Series Data Archive*³¹⁴ and Raymond Gastil's *Survey of Freedom*.³¹⁵ Recently, a popular indicator of political democracy in Eastern Europe and the post-communist world has been Adrian Karatnycky and associates' *Nations in Transit Surveys*,³¹⁶ in which they base their empirical measures of democracy on the methodology used by the *Freedom House* staff in its regular surveys of the *Freedom in the World*.³¹⁷

There have been numerous and often well-founded critiques of the scientific approaches used by the authors of subjective indicators. One of the main concerns has been that, since most of the information provided to individual experts had previously been collected by other people who have themselves a presumably better understanding of the social conditions and political processes developing on the ground, these rates are not highly reliable because they might become subject to voluntary or involuntary misinterpretation by governmental and/or non-governmental agencies.³¹⁸ Furthermore, by examining eight subjective indicators, the sociologist Kenneth Bollen has identified three major sources of recurring measurement error of

more influential role; see Chull Shin, D. (1994); "On the Third Wave of Democratisation: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research", *World Politics*, No. 47 (October 1994), p. 153.

³¹³ Fitzgibbon, R. (1951); "Measurement of Latin-American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment", *American Political Science Review*, No. 45, (March 1951).

³¹⁴ Banks, A. (1979); *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*, (Binghamton: State University of New York).

³¹⁵ Gastil, R. (ed.) (1988); *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, (NY: Freedom House).

³¹⁶ Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A., Shor, B. (1997); *Nations in Transit 1997: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers); and Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A., Graybow, C. (1999); *Nations in Transit 1998: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).

³¹⁷ Freedom House (1999); *Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-99*, (NY: Freedom House Press).

³¹⁸ Chull Shin, D. (1994); (fn. 49), p. 147.

various components of democracy: (1) the political and other characteristics of the judges; (2) the quantity and the quality of information available to judges; and (3) the characteristics of the method of constructing the ratings or scales.³¹⁹

Unlike the subjective ratings based on experts' opinion, the objective approach relies upon observable facts concerning the multiple dimensions of political democracy, including those of participation and competition.³²⁰ Objective measures of democracy usually offer finer gradations than their subjective counterparts and they are easy to replicate by other social researchers. On the other hand, they evince some of the problems described above, which are related to the degree of impartiality of the persons who provide the methodology and grading for such ratings, and it might thus be concluded that objective measures can also be manipulated. Moreover, if one tries to compare the objective with subjective ratings on the basis of how well they describe all elements included in the definition of political democracy, it is evident that just as objective indicators capture better the civil freedoms and other less tangible but important aspects of the political process, so subjective indicators are better estimators and predictors of the observance of various political, socio-economic and legal rights in a transitional period, especially those that relate to the most concrete meaning of mass participation and electoral competition.

Therefore, the task of finding additional methods to measure democracy, combining the strengths of both the objective and subjective ratings, is a demanding one. At present, each and every estimation of democracy, be it of a subjective or objective kind, attempts to indicate the extent of the advance or regression of democracy in a country at a given time. Undoubtedly, quantitative measures of political democracy are important for understanding many of the social processes connected with regime change. Nevertheless, a more qualitative input provided by the results of modern empirical ratings of democracy would be more than welcome, since it would shed light on the typology of democracies that become established in many regions of the

³¹⁹ Bollen, K. (1993); "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures", *American Journal of Political Science* 37, (November 1993), p. 1226.

³²⁰ Lerner, D. (1958); *The Passing of Traditional Society*, (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press); Cutright, P. (1963); "National Political Development", *American Sociological Review* 28, (April, 1963); and Vanhanen, T. (1990); *The Process of Democratization. A Comparative Study of 147 states, 1980-88*, (New York: Crane Russak).

world as well as on the dynamics of transition to and consolidation of democracy in a contemporary context.³²¹

Finally, there is a separate current in the comparative political science literature, which tries to examine the qualitative differences in democratic performance by classifying the different types of democracies according to selected features of their mode of institutionalisation or functioning. Arend Lijphart, for example, the father and inspiration of such a current, has identified nine major types of democratic political systems on the basis of their being either majoritarian or consensual.³²² Terry Lynn Karl designates three types of democracy – conservative, corporatist and competitive – according to whether a nation's party system is restrictive, collusive or competitive.³²³ John Freeman, by contrast, has found only two types, pluralist and corporatist.³²⁴ The two major problems related to this sort of conceptualisation of the qualitative parameters of democratic regimes are that (a) however progressive, the main goal of most of these classifications is to differentiate between consolidated democracies and (b) the quantitative expression of most of these qualitative differences between the various types of democratic regimes is barely discernible in the analyses of most of these scholars and leaves much to be desired in terms of sufficient empirical information which could be used in further comparative research.

4.7.2. Efforts to Measure Consolidation of Democracy

In the contemporary political science literature, there have been relatively few suggested methods for measuring consolidation of democracy. This has been due not only to the quite recent history and development of the sub-discipline, but also to the fact that the concept of CoD has been defined quite abstractly and, hence, has been practically unused for measurement purposes. As has already been demonstrated,

³²¹ Chull Shin, D. (1994); (fn. 49), p. 148.

³²² Lijphart, A. (1984); Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, (New Haven: Yale University Press); and Lijphart, A. (1989); "Democratic Political Systems", *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, (January 1989).

³²³ Karl, T. (1990); "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, No. 23, (October 1990).

³²⁴ Freeman, J. (1989); Democracy and Markets, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). On the evolution of the European Union as a supra-national type of democracy see Dehousse, R. (ed.) (1998); "Institutional Models for an Enlarged Union: Some Reflections on a Non-Debate," in An Ever Larger Union? The Eastern Enlargement in Perspective, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

there has been a general tendency in the literature dealing with this phenomenon either to specify consolidated democracy as an *ideal type* or to search for the *necessary conditions* that can bring a regime undergoing transition to consolidation. In the social and political context of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, when not only the stability but also the quality of political regimes matters, an increasing number of students of democracy have noted that, despite the attraction of conceiving of consolidation as a threshold, it is more appropriate to conceptualise it as a continuous process.³²⁵ Hence, new measures of consolidation of democracy should attempt to grasp the elements of continuity and change, as well as the evolution of democracy as a political system.

Below I provide the example of three techniques that have been used to try to measure CoD. The first makes use of the popular definition of a consolidated democratic regime, characterised by the absence of 'reserved domains' and 'tutelary powers' over the governing officials. This empirical measure derives its central features from Samuel J. Valenzuela's observation that the presence (and, respectively, absence) of the above-mentioned factors is key to consolidating democracy in post-transitional settings and, especially, after the holding of second (post-founding) democratic elections which must be free, fair and inclusive for all segments of the population.³²⁶ The second indicator of consolidation of democracy, proposed by Samuel Huntington, holds that consolidation occurs when the democratic regime survives a second alternation in power within the rules prescribed by a democratic constitution. Such an indicator demonstrates the crucial willingness of political elites to surrender power after their term in office is over or when they feel unable to rule, and other political parties come to govern. In such circumstances, the former rulers remain hopeful that during the next elections they might be returned to power and, if this happens, the same patience and peaceful acceptance of the transfer of power are expected from their political opponents.³²⁷ This, probably best-known measure of consolidation of democracy, demonstrates some accompanying problems too. It might be argued that it is unnecessarily rigid for countries where the party system is not majoritarian and/or

³²⁵ Zielonka, J. (1996); "Decalogue of Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe", unpublished manuscript, European University Institute, Florence, p. 4; and Wise, C. and Brown, T. (1998); "The Consolidation of Democracy in Ukraine," *Democratization*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (London: Frank Cass), Spring 1998, p. 118.

³²⁶ Valenzuela, S.J. (1992); (fn. 14).

bi-polar. Similarly, the requirement of the 'two-turnover test' was not met by the United States until 1840 and by Japan until 1996. In Eastern Europe, most of the countries could not meet this criterion until the period 1996-98, while others have still not done so.

The third measure, in contrast to the first two which assess whether the main contenders for power have come to accept the democratic 'rules of the game', estimates consolidation in relation to the duration of a democratic regime. Needless to say, this represents a quite arbitrary indicator of consolidation of democracy, but it is also true that the institutions of democracy can only take root and become accepted by the majority of population and political elites with the passage of time. By analysing 66 transitions to democracy³²⁸ and 97 independent Third World countries in the period from 1980 till 1992, Mark Gasiorowski and Timothy Power come to the conclusion that political regimes have every chance of becoming consolidated once they have lasted for 12 years.³²⁹ The question which could be asked here is, of course, whether a diminished probability of democratic breakdown can be equated with institutionalisation of democracy and even more with the process of consolidation of democracy.

4.8. Alternative Ways of Measuring the Progress of Democratisation during Transition and Consolidation

4.8.1. Revising the Theoretical and Practical Links between Transition to and Consolidation of Democracy

Thus, it is quite complex, if not impossible, to measure political democracy or the degree of its consolidation, let alone its quality, by simply conceptualising transitions to and consolidation of democracy as a result of regime change or regime stability. At the same time, however, it is important that one tries to acquire a broader vision and deeper understanding of the process of system transformation which takes place

³²⁷ Huntington, S. (1991); (fn. 49), pp. 266-67.


³²⁸ Gasiorowski, M. (1996); "An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 469-483.

³²⁹ Gasiorowski, M. and Power, T. (1998); (fn. 44), p. 747.

beyond any singular event of regime change (i.e. the election of a new government or the adoption of a democratic constitution) but affects the nature of the political system as such, by prioritising between regime change and stability while making the issues related to them compatible and prone to unexpected transformation. This can be achieved, in my mind, only by analysing the transition to and consolidation of democracy as interrelated but nevertheless profoundly different processes. Parallel to this, one should accept that the transformation of the former autocracy into political democracy does not occur in a vacuum but is guided by a certain underlying logic, particularly by the principles of change and stability. This happens intermittently during the dismantling of the previous system and the institutionalisation of the new one. Hence, the achievement of the qualitatively higher 'democratic order' during the consolidation phase might be considered as a result of an overarching democratic transformation, or *democratisation*, which spans the periods of transition to and consolidation of democracy both normatively and temporally. Moreover, the potential usage of the notion of *democratisation* reifies the system transformation perspective which offers an original and more dynamic synthesis of the practical goals of transition and consolidation, political change and political order.

This is graphically presented in Diagram 1:

Diagram 1



democratic transformation in post-communist Eastern Europe and their implication on the theoretical debate about using the term 'democratisation' in similar circumstances. Parallel to this, one should also pay attention to the temporal sequence between the processes of transition and consolidation, because it is of prime importance for measuring the progress during the ongoing democratic transformation. In this way, one would not only be able to trace the quantitative and temporal parameters of both processes, but would also be able to distinguish between the analytical perspectives and the political and social objectives of these processes. Concerning this latter couple of tasks, a leading scholar in the democratisation studies, Andreas Schedler, has made it clear that from a methodological point of view both 'transitology' and 'consolidology' have often failed to distinguish between defining features and causal variables, as well as between concepts and operational indicators. In other words, what one sometimes adopts as a analytical perspective towards transition and consolidation (i.e. systemic transformation, regime change or regime stability) does not always and completely coincide with the intermediate or final goals of these processes (i.e. political change and order or political democracy and its persistence). The same author also elaborates five different types of conceptual meanings of consolidation of democracy depending on the *empirical viewpoint* (the social conditions and temporal sequences) and *normative horizon* (the theoretical perspective and political goals).³³⁰ Thus, it is very important to know not only the final product of a political process and the method of reaching it, but also the sequence of events and the social context in which these events take place.

4.8.2. Alternative Perspectives: Sub-processes and Outcomes of Transition to and Consolidation of Democracy. (The Index of Democratisation – IDEM).


Following the results of the discussion above, we have, on the one hand, the procedurally independent but temporally sequencing processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy as well as their products – 'electoral democracy' and 'consolidated democracy' respectively. On the other hand, we have the analytically

³³⁰ Schedler, A. (1998); "What is Democratic Consolidation?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 92-94.

related but chronologically parallel processes of transition and consolidation which aim at a predominantly same goal – democracy of a higher quality. This duality of procedural and temporal aspect of transition to and consolidation of democracy has greatly complicated the analysis of these issues. Hence, apart from a more detailed elaboration of different social and political aspects of the processes of democratic transition and consolidation and of their substantive goals evolving in time, some more work should be done on finding a common ground between these developments leading to democratic transformation. This could be achieved, in my mind, by conceptualising transition to and consolidation of democracy as part of a larger social process, preserving and combining, though, the key principles of political change and stability. This composite process can, for instance, be the process of *democratisation*. Through it, not only the most direct result of regime change – democracy as opposed to authoritarianism – but also the combined product of transition and consolidation – political democracy of a superior quality – could be defined and measured.

Diagram 2 exemplifies the temporal sequences as well as the possible interactions and outcomes of the processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy, represented by the regime change and social transformation perspectives, as well as by the *democratisation* approach.

Diagram 2



TtoD - Transition to Democracy

CoD - Consolidation of Democracy

QoD - Quality of Democracy

This is a substantial upgrading of the already presented rather limited, theoretical perspective of systemic transformation (4.5.1.2.1). In the first place, this analytical approach helps identify the prevailing structural and behavioural continuities typical of the previous authoritarian regime, which affect the subsequent political regimes. This is done by looking at the relevant transformation areas (e.g. the “partial regimes”) that induce the former political system to turn into a variety of democracy. Secondly, this method underlines not only the importance of the high uncertainty during the indeterminate period of transition from authoritarian regime to democracy, but explains how the effect of contingent factors could be limited by incorporating the logic of political change and political order in one’s own analysis. Thirdly, once political democracy is established, consolidation of democracy may take place. This stage of democratisation envisages primarily political order or, at least, a minimal degree of predictability for the political regime that guarantees its persistence. However, this regime cannot continue to improve unless certain important behavioural patterns and procedural elements which have begun to be institutionalised during transition are not accepted by society and the ruling elites. This is for instance the evidence of attitudinal and behavioural support for the regime by domestic and international actors and the existence of a functioning state administration. Finally, a better quality democracy does not necessarily need to be consolidated completely, rather it needs a degree of flexibility to be viable. In functional terms, CoD does not only mean political order and social stability, but also political change. Consequently, consolidated democracies may occasionally get de-consolidated and are likely to transit from one type of political democracy to another (from democracy to democracy) – not to regress to autocracy.

This set of general considerations about political order and change, the selection of political institutions and the decision-making process in general are indispensable as theoretical vantage points for anybody wishing to measure transition to (TtoD) and consolidation of democracy (CoD). In order to choose a specific quantitative or qualitative method of estimating the dynamics of transition and consolidation, one should also have an idea of their parameters as part of the larger process of

democratisation. This means in practice that political democracy, the principal goal of both transition and consolidation, should clearly be defined. Only in this way the presence or absence of some of its underlining elements can be quickly registered. Moreover, different other socio-economic aspects as well as the persistence of the regime should also be taken into account in order to be able to measure the quality (QoD) and consolidation of democracy (CoD). In the next chapter five, the individual factors of the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM) are presented, while, in the following chapter six, the actual measurement with the IDEM is performed. This innovative measurement technique tries to capture most of the procedural elements and partial outcomes of the processes of transition (TtoD) and consolidation (CoD), especially with respect to the ongoing democratic changes in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.

4.9. Conclusion

The empirical evidence gathered from previous, and some recent, political transformations shows that the transition to and consolidation of democracy cannot easily be measured using traditional indexes of democracy. This is particularly valid in post-communist Eastern Europe where the factors leading to democratisation are so many, and do not influence the political system separately but predominantly at the same time. There can be two main reasons why social scientist dealing with regimes in transition have been incapable of measuring the level of political democracy, and especially the degree of its consolidation, consistently. First is the notorious absence of agreement among political researchers of what transition to democracy (TtoD) and consolidation of democracy (CoD) represent theoretically and in practice. This has led to the poor conceptualisation and, from there, the poor operationalisation of these concepts. Second, there has been a general lack of understanding of the existing relationship between TtoD and CoD as social processes. On the one hand, they have been presented as sequencing periods (i.e. transition coming first and consolidation second) of the same process of democratisation, while, on the other, they have been described by comparative political science literature as pursuing differing systemic goals.

An additional weakness of most of the approaches to establishing the level of democracy and the extent of its consolidation has been the strict separation between quantitative and qualitative measures. Most of these methods fail to include the notion of the quality of democracy, looking exclusively at the final results of the processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy, which is to a certain extent analytically confusing. It is also methodologically wrong to pre-select the political and social characteristics of some already established democratic regimes and to assume that they could be used as valid measurement criteria in completely different circumstances around the world. The democratisation experience of the majority of Eastern European countries has been quite valuable in this respect. The decade-long efforts of democratic actors from the region have confirmed some of the theories that transitologists and consolidologists worked out for Latin America and Southern Europe, but other theoretical views and predictions about Eastern Europe have been significantly amended or rejected altogether. Probably one of the most important conclusions from communist transitions has been that, as political transformations cannot be set apart from social, economic and territorial ones, similarly, neither transition nor consolidation can be separated as political processes. Still less can the substantive goals and qualitative characteristics of the resulting political regimes be analysed independently of each other. Therefore, some new measures of political democracy, and particularly of consolidation of democracy, should be invented and tested. This is what I try to do in the next chapter, by introducing the mechanism of an innovative statistical index – the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*.

Part III

Measuring Political Democracy and Its Consolidation. The Index of Democratisation (IDEM).

"What would life be without arithmetic, but a scene of horrors?"

– Rev. Sydney Smith (1835)

1911

Chapter 5

The Factors of the *Index of Democratisation* in Eastern Europe

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I present an original method of measuring the consolidation and quality of democracy in Eastern Europe by using the new *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM). Consolidation of democracy (CoD) together with transition to democracy (TtoD) are considered part of the larger process of democratisation, whereas the quality of the new regime is perceived as an important criterion helping to distinguish between fragile and consolidated democracies. Since both theoretical concepts, CoD and QoD, require that democracy be initiated as a political regime first, before one is able to speak about consolidation and quality of democracy, I choose to refer to political democracy as the central element of the IDEM.

Political democracy is operationalised mainly as a result of Robert Dahl's original definition of *polyarchy*. It also incorporates certain later theoretical proposals made by Philippe Schmitter, Terry Karl and Guillermo O'Donnell concerning democracy. These scholars speak about the *territorial integrity of the state and the absence of reserved domains and veto groups*.³³¹ They also stress the *accountability (vertical and horizontal) of ruling elites* during Latin American and Southern European political system changes.³³² The IDEM, which is based upon a broader definition of political democracy, also includes formal provisions about the presence of the rule of law, the constitution, the media, the political parties, trade unions and civil associations. Of

³³¹ Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1993); "What Democracy is ... And is Not", in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 39-52; and O'Donnell, G. (1996); "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 34-51.

³³² O'Donnell, G. (1993); "Delegative Democracy", in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 94-108.

course, the majority of these elements is not completely unknown from previous transitions to democracy, but they appear to be particularly salient to students of post-communist transformations in Eastern Europe such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Klaus von Beyme, Jan Zielonka, Claus Offe and Gzegorz Ekiert.³³³ That is why these factors and institutional elements of the newly established regimes have been analysed comparatively as being very important for achieving consolidation and better quality of democracy.

This chapter explains the method of creating the Index of Democratisation and also presents its factor variables. The chapter is divided in five sections. The first describes the logic behind the IDEM, enumerating the index's component factors and clarifying their relevance to Eastern European democratic transformation. Secondly, the process of democratisation is traced as a 'common path' between transition and consolidation leading to political democracy, and, eventually, to political democracy of a certain quality. In the third section, the IDEM is conceptualised analytically; it is portrayed as a statistical instrument which attempts to measure of consolidation and quality of democracy. Fourthly, political democracy together with some other structural elements of political regimes are considered pivotal criteria for identifying and formulating the individual factor variables of the IDEM. Finally, the IDEM is constructed, while different methodological and technical aspects of the measurement technique are discussed in detail.

5.2. What is the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*?

The *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* covers twenty countries from Eastern Europe during the period from 1989 until 1999. It offers an in-depth examination of the determinants that contribute most directly to the establishment and quality of democracy in these states. It attempts to be one of the first comprehensive studies,

³³³ Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press); Beyme, K. von (1996); Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, (London: MacMillan Press); Zielonka, J. and Pravda, A. (eds.) (2001): Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 2 International and Transnational Factors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Offe, C. (ed.) (1996); Modernity and the State: East, West, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and Gzegorz Ekiert (1996); The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

based on the most recent developments in the theory of democracy, for the region of Eastern Europe. It tries to measure the levels of democracy in such vastly different places as the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan, Estonia and Macedonia, and in every country in between. Recently, a number of other studies have appeared that examine such issues as political rights and civil liberties, as well as the independence of the media and economic freedom in Eastern Europe.³³⁴ The IDEM, however, is the only one that looks exclusively at democracy and the factors that contribute to its consolidation. It also analyses such critical social and political determinants of democratisation as:

- **A self-governing polity** where the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions are clearly defined, where the constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories, and outside actors do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions;
- **Elected officials** who are chosen through competitive elections, whose mandate is not arbitrarily terminated by various veto groups, and who have responsibility for the agenda of the major institutions;
- **Free and fair elections** which are conducted in a free and fair manner, are uncertain in their outcome, inclusive and regularly held, and there is consensus among the major political parties about their results;
- **A democratic constitution** resulting from the significant reform of the old undemocratic constitutional system or the adoption of a brand new democratic constitution, in which there exists a separation of powers, and where equality between state institutions is enforced;

³³⁴ Freedom House (1992); Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1991-92, McCalm, Bruce (eds), Freedom House Survey Team, (NY: Freedom House Press), Freedom House (1999); Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-99, (NY: Freedom House Press), Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A., Shor, B. (1997); Nations in Transit 1997: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A., Graybow, C. (1999); Nations in Transit 1998: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), The Heritage Foundation (1999); 2000 Index of Economic Freedom, O'Driscoll, Holmes, Kirkpatrick (eds.), (NY: The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal).

- **Freedom of expression**, where the regime does not have political prisoners and torture is not practised, where the ruling authorities do not retaliate against critics with the closure of newspapers and TV stations, and there are legal guarantees for citizens to express themselves freely, including the freedom to protest and strike;

- **Alternative information**, where the media is not monopolised and is free of government control, there is legal provision for access to independent sources of information, and the plurality and neutral coverage of the various political points of view is observed;

- **Associational autonomy**, where there is more than one legally recognised and tolerated opposition party, where there exist independent trade unions and professional associations, and citizens are allowed to form civic and interest organisations of their own.

The IDEM measures the level of democracy on an annual basis. This is very important since it permits the inclusion of the most recent data from the region under consideration. Not surprisingly, changes in governmental policy and the quality of democracy occur at an alarming rate in most former communist states. Some countries of the former Soviet Bloc accomplish major political and economic policy reversals on an almost daily basis. Some studies that focus on Eastern Europe but are not published annually may be quite out of date by the time of their publication and once they reach their audience they may already be obsolete. In addition, the information available about certain countries of Eastern Europe and the region as a whole is scarce or of varying quality. This brings about the question of what might be the most appropriate choice of sources and how to make a balanced judgement in the case of countries where there is not enough information about a certain factor or event.

This study covers a period of eleven years (1989-1999 inclusive). It relies on the most up-to-date primary and secondary sources of information and attempts to interpret them in a most impartial way. Unfortunately, this experimental type of academic research did not permit me to hire individual experts who could code and interpret the information for each country of Eastern Europe independently. Hence, I tried to code

most of the countries myself using the criteria of the IDEM and asked for the help of colleagues and specially hired assistants only when uncertainties appeared about some of the determinants. Ideally, what should count at the end should be both the theoretical method and the empirical research. Nevertheless, the theoretical aspects related to the precise conceptualisation of democratisation and its measurement have always been predominant in this research. While calculating the levels of democracy for the various countries of Eastern Europe, numerous other practical considerations and developmental trends did eventually emerge, which were directly linked to the analytical method used and are extensively discussed in the conclusions of this thesis.

Any further development of the IDEM should also include the systematic collection of data from an even wider array of sources and the training of individual experts to analyse information related to democracy and its various aspects. It is indispensable that the individuals involved in the realisation of such a project be well-grounded in the theory of democracy and have some background experience with the countries and/or region being analysed. They should also be able to speak local languages and show eagerness to learn about their subject as well as to identify new sources of information that could be used comparatively for survey periods even longer than a decade.

5.3. *Democratisation as a 'Common Path'*

The term 'democratisation' has been widely used by both political theorists and practitioners dealing with democracy and the process of establishing and preserving democratic regimes. Probably because of its multiplicity and broad spectrum of applicability, this notion has not been properly defined as a theoretical concept and its operationalisation has been left at the discretion of the individual authors. In the political science literature and especially that dealing with comparative issues related to democracy in its various forms, democratisation has been omnipresent and its usage has even increased in the last decade. Initially, democratisation was introduced to describe the process of achieving a particular result from the transition from authoritarian rule, namely, the election of a democratic government, usually in an

austere domestic and international political environment.³³⁵ It is useful to compare the limited role assigned to the term democratisation, designating only one of the stages of the democratisation process, with another commonly used concept in the large-scale research over the last fifty years – ‘modernisation’. What has been characteristic of the latter in direct contrast with the former is that it has been referred to by the advocates of the economic development paradigm almost intermittently as the process rather than the product of a specific modernisation effort, such as urbanisation, education, increased life expectancy and broader spread of mass media information.³³⁶ Democratisation, for its part, has been additionally marginalised by being used with relation to the increasingly popular, but unspecified analytically and chronologically, concept of describing the historical drive towards democracy in terms of ‘waves of democratisation’.³³⁷

During the 1980s and 1990s, with the contemporary rise of the two theoretical currents dealing with political transformation of the states around the globe, transitology and consolidology, the concept of democratisation has been predominantly applied in cases where the stress fell either on the different inherent characteristics and stages of regime change or on the process of stabilising the new rule and making it legitimate in the eyes of the citizens of the polity. The vagueness surrounding the area of usage of the term ‘democratisation’ and the constant lack of theoretical precision on its behalf have turned into a concept describing everything and nothing. Today, one can encounter a number of notions in the comparative political science literature which include the word ‘democratisation’ and have contradictory meanings: combinations such as ‘incomplete democratisation’, ‘multi-functional democratisation’, ‘economic democratisation’, ‘Asian-style democratisation’ and so forth. This has led to much confusion and a general

³³⁵ Almond, G. (1956); “Comparative Political Systems”, Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, Eulau, H., Eldersveld, S., and Janowitz, M. (eds), (Glencoe, IL: Free Press), pp. 34-42; Huntington, S. (1968); Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University); and Dogan, M. (1988); Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy, (Boulder, CO: Westview).

³³⁶ Cutright, P. (1963); “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis”, *American Sociological Review*, No. 28, pp. 253-64; Bollen, K. and Jackman, R. (1985); “Economic and Non-economic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s”, *Research in Political Sociology*, No. 1, pp. 27-48; and Muller, Ed. (1988); “Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality”, *American Sociological Review*, No. 53, pp. 50-68.

³³⁷ Huntington, S. (1991); The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), pp. 5-13.

unwillingness on the part of scholars of democracy to define it theoretically for the purpose of its operationalisation.

The current usage of the term 'democratisation' has been predicated upon the assumption that it represents a "complex historical process", which consists of "several analytically distinct but empirically overlapping stages". Doh Chull Shin, being the only author to my knowledge who has come closest to providing a working definition of democratisation, asserts that this is a process that should undergo four stages: (1) decay of authoritarian rule, (2) transition, (3) consolidation, and (4) the maturing of democratic political order.³³⁸ The brief overview of the present state of the academic field of comparative political science, however, has shown that the second and third have received by far the most attention from the scholarly community.³³⁹ These two periods have also been the subject of intensive debate among governmental and non-governmental officials in charge of development aid. Moreover, different authors writing specifically about democracy have either focused on the early stages of democratisation (liberalisation and transition),³⁴⁰ or on its intermediate and late ones (transition and consolidation),³⁴¹ but almost never on the process as a whole.³⁴²

Actually, the problem of not being capable of defining and operationalising democratisation does not lie in choosing to study one or other aspect of regime change towards democracy, but rather in tracing the relevant parameters of a political process

³³⁸ Chull Shin, D. (1994); "On the Third Wave of Democratisation: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research", *World Politics*, No. 47 (October 1994), pp. 135-70.

³³⁹ Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies, (Berkeley: University of California Press); Huntington, S. (1994); "Democratic Development in the Post-Cold War", (Keynote speech at the International Political Science Association Roundtable, Kyoto, March 26, 1994).

³⁴⁰ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press); Karl, T. (1990); "Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, No. 23 (October 1990); and Bermeo, N. (1992); Liberalisation and Democratisation: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

³⁴¹ Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., and Samuel Valenzuela, J. (1992); Issues in Democratic Consolidation, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press); Lawson, S. (1993); "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratisation", *Comparative Politics*, No. 25 (January 1993), pp. 88-92; and Gasiorowski, M. and Power, T. (1998); "The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 740-771.

³⁴² Exceptions to this are Whitehead, L. (1996); The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. pp. 3-26 and Chull Shin, D. (1994) (fn. 5).

which leads to a given type of regime that relates to a political system known to represent a democracy. In other words, the issue here is to perform a double function, namely, (1) to set up some kind of fixed criteria according to which one is to judge whether the process of democratisation advances or regresses and this, in my opinion, can only be realised by providing a proper definition of what 'political democracy' is, and (2) to incorporate in one's analysis the uncertainty of the environment that characterises the actions of the protagonists during the democratisation effort, above all by keeping track of the timing and pace of reforms during the various stages of the transformation process.³⁴³ The first operation permits one to follow the development of the entire process from various angles and possibly say at the end whether something happened and what it was, in relation to political democracy. The second hinges on the possibility of determining *when* something happened as well as in *what order* and *sequence* it occurred. The approach described is a versatile one, because it gives one the opportunity to make a conceptual shift from that traditionally employed by transitologists and consolidologists – structural and behavioural/attitudinal determinants of democracy – toward a more process- and actor-oriented approach. And the implications of this method are not merely theoretical. They could also be quite practical, bearing in mind that politicians are obliged to take decisions on a number of different types of issues and the consequences of these decisions are often unpredictable and "play themselves out at different rates".³⁴⁴ The recent transitions in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have confirmed this theoretical assumption and produced the empirical observation that several transformations of the state/political/social-economic systems have been going on at the same time and have been subject to unforeseen interactions between various elites and institutions of the post-communist reality, which were not present during the democratic transitions in Latin America, Southern Europe or other parts of the world before that.³⁴⁵

To my mind, democratisation could be operationalised to serve as a 'common path' between the theoretical research and the practical activity of establishing democracy and achieving its eventual consolidation. It is very important to stress that the system I

³⁴³ Schmitter, P. and Santiso, J. (1998); "Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (London: SAGE Publications), pp. 69-92.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

am talking about is not any kind of democracy (social, economic, cultural or national), but political democracy. I exclude the use of the term 'democracy' in conjunction with adjectives connoting something completely different outside the realm of politics, such as liberalism, modernisation, technology or regionalism. I have already defined political democracy³⁴⁶ as "the political system of governance of a state in which power is exercised by those elected by the citizens without exclusion and the rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm, while abiding to the principles of free competition and co-operation between the leaders who must validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their right to govern according to the constitutional and legal rules without exempting any officers who have the competencies to exercise effective administrative power within the territory of the state, and in which the basic freedoms of association, information and expression are respected in all their legally recognised forms and manifestations". As to the consolidation of democracy (CoD), this issue entails an additional requirement which states that the regime should have effective *control* over its domestic and international environment. This implies in overall the absence of 'reserved domain' for any politically illegitimate groups, the universal spread of the constitutional and legal norms over the territory of the state and its administration, as well as the lack of foreign intervention in all matters which can significantly modify fate of the political system domestically. As has already been noted elsewhere,³⁴⁷ it does not matter if the international actors are democratically constituted or act in the supposed interest of democracy in a formally sovereign nation-state. The question of elected officials being able to make binding decisions without the approval of actors outside their territorial domain has been a salient one for the new democracies, since the consolidation of the regime can only be achieved with the backing of a substantial portion of the population, both *attitudinally* and *behaviourally*.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ **Offe, C.** (1991); 'Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', *Social Research*, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 865-92.

³⁴⁶ Chapter 2.

³⁴⁷ **Schmitter, P. and Karl, T.** (1993); "What Democracy is ... And is Not", in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 39-52, esp. pp. 45-6.

³⁴⁸ See the previous Chapter 4.

5.4. Conceptualising Analytically the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM)

The contemporary political science literature has made substantial strides in its attempt to define what democracy is and to describe how regimes accomplish transitions to different types of democratic systems. Despite the notable progress achieved so far, there still remain a lot of blank spaces in the field of democracy studies and between its various sub-fields. The biggest problems have been related to the theoretical conceptualisation and measurement of the level of democracy. In addition to these, the different theoretical and empirical models advanced in relation to the process of assuring the stability and overall consolidation of democracy have been notoriously difficult to operationalise, while it has been even more difficult to classify the rapidly emerging theoretical notions emerging out of those complex social outcomes.

Parallel to this and regardless of one's own professional background, whether academic or practical, the issues of putting in place and consolidating democratic regimes have involved several critical questions, which have been asked on almost every occasion:

- A. Does the regime represent a democracy or not?
- B. If a democracy, what are the chances of it surviving in its own environment?
- C. What type of democracy is it? Does it resemble any of the kinds of democratic regimes already known?
- D. Do the rulers govern democratically and are they accountable?
- E. What is the quality of this democracy? Can the regime assure effective participatory equality for all citizens and groups and the uniform application of the laws, which could eventually bring about a greater social justice for the majority of these groups?

Although limited in number and in analytical depth, these inquiries could provide a *prima facie* indication of how people think about democracy or, more precisely, what democracy should look like in the contemporary sense of a political system with these

parameters. *Democratisation*, as an empirical reality and political concept, has been widely used to embrace most of the issues listed above as well as to follow the chronology of their development. This has been an unrealistic task, of course, both in terms of the descriptive capacity of this term and the possibility of its operationalisation with the purpose of producing various indices that can measure the level of democracy and the progress being made toward consolidation of democracy.

With the new *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM), however, I try to do a number of things. Following the principle that democratisation under its present definition, however limited it might be, is too wide to be operationalisable, I decided to choose its most apparent feature, political democracy, to serve as a dependent variable, while leaving open the possibility that the regime, once democratised, might become consolidated. This is realised by pursuing the two objectives of the following analytical method simultaneously: by treating political democracy deterministically (presence/absence of certain factors of political democracy) while considering consolidation of democracy probabilistically (by trying to reach such a high level of institutionalisation and legitimisation of political democracy that the prospects of its becoming consolidated are virtually certain). In addition, one has to be able to identify those factors of political democracy which are present at the level of its theoretical definition and those which assure the stability and quality of the regime as such.

Table 1 presents two sets of criteria according to which one could possibly establish the relationship between the consolidation of democracy (CoD) and the quality of democracy (QoD):

Table 1

<u>Consolidation of Democracy (CoD)</u> ³⁴⁹	<u>Quality of Democracy (QoD)</u> ³⁵⁰
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³⁴⁹ These criteria could primarily be referred to in Linz, J. and Stepan, A.L. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), ch. 2 and Linz, J. and Stepan, A.L. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2., (April 1996), pp. 14-33.

³⁵⁰ The criteria under this heading could be encountered in Valenzuela, S. J. (1992); "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions", in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., and Valenzuela, S. J. (eds.), Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in a Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of

1. To be a democracy	1. Absence of 'reserved domains'
2. Rulers to govern democratically	2. Effective application of the 'rule of law' to all groups and territories
3. Achieving attitudinal and behavioural support for the regime by both the rulers and the citizens	3. Social equality and security for most citizens

Although it might be fairly easy to define consolidation and quality of democracy in general terms, it is quite difficult to specify when and in what sequence they occur or are achieved. It is even more difficult to identify the period of time during which 'attitudinal and behavioural support for the regime' or 'social equality and security for most citizens' are obtained. The latter is, of course, a complicated task and the degree of both CoD and QoD is not easily subjected to operationalisation and computation. In order to establish whether the people are actually satisfied with the political system they live in and whether they considered it to be consolidated, one should probably interview individuals about democracy and its relevant aspects for achieving a stabilisation of the democratic regime's institutional features.³⁵¹ For instance, Hans-Dieter Klingeman and Ronald Inglehard have conducted such large-scale surveys for a group of more than 120 countries around the world over a period of more than 30 years.³⁵² Recently, they have concluded a separate project on the change in people's values and consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe.³⁵³

Thus, I propose to rationalise things by referring explicitly to the consolidation and quality of *political democracy*. In this way, the operationalisation of both terms is achieved in a much more straightforward way, because the issues related to assuring

Notre Dame Press), pp. 64-66, Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1993) (fn. 14), and O'Donnell, G. (1996); "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 34-51.

³⁵¹ Schedler, A. (1997); "Expected Stability. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation", Working Paper, No. 50 (November 1997), Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, esp. the conclusion. Although this is a method I do not personally subscribe to, it is valuable in itself because it operationalises consolidation of democracy as the "expected consolidation of the regime as such."

³⁵² Inglehard, R. (1990); *Culture Shifts in Advanced Industrial Society*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and Klingeman, H.-D. (1998); "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: a Global Analysis," working paper (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung, 1998), Arbeitspapier FS III, pp. 98-202.

³⁵³ Inglehard, R. and Klingeman, H.-D. (1998); *World Values Study 1995-97 in Central and Eastern Europe*, (Berlin: WZB, 1998).

the attitudinal and behavioural support for the regime and guaranteeing the social equality for the majority of population, although very important, are extremely difficult to specify and measure. If one concentrates on the factors situated above the dark dotted-line in Table 1, one can see the logic underlying the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*; namely, that it measures the level of political democracy, but without its most intangible societal aspects related to the general satisfaction with the working of the political system and the willingness of individuals to participate in its functioning, and the increased social inclusion linked to the socio-economic prosperity of the population that has made individuals feel more politically effective as a whole.

5.5. Political Democracy as the Central Element of the IDEM

In order to be able to operationalise political democracy and measure its level in relation to democratisation, one has to accomplish a number of tasks. Firstly, a normative threshold must be established that separates all democracies from all non-democracies. The location of such a threshold depends very much on the questions asked, so it is always discretionary. Theoreticians dealing with this issue have offered many definitions of democracy, but the one I find particularly useful for operationalisation is Robert Dahl's concept of *polyarchy*.³⁵⁴ I prefer it to other definitions because it cuts off a good part of the criteria included in my previous definition of *political democracy* presented in chapter 2. Once a reasonably well-delimited set of democracies is obtained, the second task is to complement this 'intermediary' definition of *polyarchy* by adding to it other contemporary criteria of political democracy which are missing from its original conceptualisation. This may be accomplished by examining the bulk of comparative literature of democratisation and the various standards it has established for most of the recent transitions to democracy. For example, these necessities include the presence of a democratic constitution and a relatively institutionalised media regime, as well as the existence of formal equality between the major public institutions that are kept accountable to each other. Finally, one probably has to think of ways of how political democracy as a regime may become weakened and even terminated. This could happen, for instance,

if there are 'tutelary powers' over the officially elected ruling representatives in a country, if appointments are made outside the competitive processes prescribed by the constitution or if the domestic and international contexts of the state are characterised by a lingering instability and a lack of potential for self-governance.

Polyarchy, as defined by Dahl, has seven attributes in its most recent version: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy.³⁵⁵ Attributes 1 to 4 refer to the fundamental aspect of *polyarchy* - elections, and that they must be inclusive, fair and competitive. Attributes 5 to 7 relate to the state of the political and social freedoms that are minimally necessary but not sufficient in order for a regime to be considered democratic. In fact, most of the current democracies in the world have institutionalised most of the features of *polyarchy* but have either failed to implement them fully or to expand the popular rights and freedoms. Table 2 provides a list of and an explanation to each of Dahl's seven criteria.

Table 2

<u>The Institutions of Polyarchy</u> ³⁵⁶
<p><i>Polyarchy</i> is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all of which must exist for a government to be classified as a <i>polyarchy</i>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Elected officials</i>. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. 2. <i>Free and fair elections</i>. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 3. <i>Inclusive suffrage</i>. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

³⁵⁴ Dahl, R. (1971); *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 3.

³⁵⁵ Dahl, R. (1989); *Democracy and its Critics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 221.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

4. *Right to run for office.* Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.

5. *Freedom of expression.* Citizens have the right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology.

6. *Alternative information.* Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.

7. *Associational autonomy.* To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

These seven attributes of *polyarchy* seem to satisfy the procedural minima for a political regime to be designated as democratic, but other attributes need to be added to Dahl's list. This is connected with our second and third tasks of defining political democracy more fully and then trying to test it against the background of the existing social circumstances. An important factor of the present day reality of building democracies is that, in contrast with previous periods of transition from authoritarian rule and when the democratisation efforts were confined geographically to a limited number of regions, mostly in the Western hemisphere, particularism now persists in an uneasy tension with the previously established rules and institutions of formal democracy. *Polyarchy*, however useful it might appear as a theoretical concept, is not going to solve the myriad of problems connected sorting out the many new types of Third World democracies and their prevailing distinctions. As to the subsequent consolidation of most of these fledgling political regimes, conceptual precision would reveal a significantly higher number of these primarily 'electoral' democracies have failed to become consolidated than has officially been recognised by most political leaders in the West.

For the reasons already outlined above, I propose to add two other criteria to Dahl's original list. For reasons of parsimony, I have first decided to compress attributes 1 to

4 of Dahl's "Institutions of *Polyarchy*", which refer to the conduct and type of elections as well as to the competitive struggle between candidates to run for office (elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; and right to run for office), to basically two items (free and fair elections and elected officials) which I believe capture all the characteristics of the previous four and leave space for additional items. The two new attributes regard the prior existence of a "self-governing polity",³⁵⁷ and the recognition of the importance of the "rule of law" through the adoption of a democratic constitution. The first might be thought of as an implicit prior condition to all the remaining ones, while the second is considered to be a key feature describing the constitutional side of the establishment of democratic institutions in almost every modern democratic state around the globe.

I would like to devote a little more space here to these last two attributes of political democracy. Firstly, it should be mentioned that it does not matter so much whether a given government and its public officials have been elected freely and have achieved a certain amount of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, if prior to this one element – essential to the establishment of any kind of political regime – was not present, namely, a self-governing polity. This basically relates to the problem of resolving the 'spatial dimension' of democracy so that eventually all the other elements of the political regime can become a reality. Logic dictates the prior existence of an autonomous territorial unit, endowed with internally and internationally guaranteed boundaries and an administrative centre, where the appropriate institutions can exercise control over the territory of the state. In fact, it is much later, during the process of transition, when the citizens have accumulated enough practical experience and become sufficiently socialised with a given set of political institutions, that these institutions can be modified and transformed into democratic ones. Otherwise, if the very existence of the state in its existing boundaries and form is called into question, as is currently the case in many uninstitutionalised and poor states around the globe, democracy and, even worse, transition to democracy becomes impossible.

³⁵⁷ This criterion appears in Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1993); p. 45 (fn. 14); and O'Donnell, G. (1996); p. 35 (fn. 17).

In my analysis, I relate to the term 'state' in a much broader context than many authors have done before me.³⁵⁸ I also use this notion rather flexibly by referring to it through the much more neutral term 'polity'. With this, I aim at two things: a) to show that democracy, as a system of governance, needs a specific elaboration of its spatial dimensions outside of its narrow conceptualisation as a regime of a conventional state, and b) to speculate that it will probably not be so long before 'polities' or 'independent territorial units' will be able to decide to democratise regardless of the currently predominant arrangement of international politics which favours sovereign states and particularly nation-states.

Secondly, the recent experience of transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and in many other parts of the world makes it clear that without a well-developed legal framework and, most notably, a constitution, it becomes virtually impossible to complete this process and consolidate a functioning political regime. The implementation of a comprehensive and modern legal basis means that governmental and non-governmental forces alike become subjected to and habituated to the same legal provisions and would try to resolve their conflicts through the procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. Many scholars have studied the issues of formally establishing one or another type of legal arrangement and, especially, of constitutions. It has been generally agreed that constitution building is a profoundly political process.³⁵⁹ By restoring and significantly reforming the previously existing democratic constitution or by adopting a brand new one, the political leaders of a society in transition make their choice of the 'core procedures and rights' of a distinctive type of regime meant to be a democracy. Constitutions are also projects which aim to bring together the various elements of the political system and establish a "single, overarching set of 'meta-rules', assign specific tasks to each

³⁵⁸ See Linz, J., Stepan, A. and Gunther, R. (1995); "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe", in Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, P. (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 77-123, esp. p. 85; and Linz, J. (1997); "Democratisation and Types of Democracies: New Tasks for Comparativists", background paper for the conference on "Democracy and Federalism", All Souls College, Oxford University, June 5-8, 1997 (unpublished paper), pp. 7-8.

³⁵⁹ Elgie R. and Zielonka J. (2001); "Constitutions and Constitution-Building: A Comparative Perspective", in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol.1 Institutional Engineering, Jan Zielonka (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[of these elements] and enforce some hierarchical relation among them.”³⁶⁰ Arguably, constitutions should not be exclusive: i.e. formal provisions regarding democracy should not (and cannot) be concentrated in a single document but they should be dispersed throughout the entire legal body. Although the relationship between political democracy and the law can not be established straightforwardly, it might nevertheless appear that constitutions are necessary, though not sufficient conditions, for consolidating a democracy. Nevertheless, the conduct of the East European systemic transformations has shown exactly the opposite. Despite the existence of states which do not have a written constitution, like Great Britain and Israel, the experience of the newly democratising countries of the former Communist Bloc tells us that it is almost impossible to create a democracy without a constitution.³⁶¹ Furthermore, the adoption of a democratic constitution in the contemporary reality is predicated upon the fact that the majority of the newly-established political rights and civic freedoms within a state needs adequate protection from the manipulation of different elites and nationalist majorities, itself a new phenomenon following the collapse of the old authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s.

Therefore, the complete list of seven criteria which defines a modern political democracy, including the provisions of the existence of a “self-governing polity” and the adoption of a “democratic constitution”, is presented in Table 3:

Table 3

<u>Seven Criteria of a Political Democracy</u>
I. <i>Self-governing polity.</i> A political system whose governmental officials are not constrained to make binding decisions without the approval of actors outside their territorial domain.

³⁶⁰ Schmitter, P. (1997); “‘Process’ not ‘Product’ Engineering in the Consolidation of Democracy”, conference paper (unpublished), European University Institute, Florence, Italy, (January 1997), p. 3.

³⁶¹ Beyme, K. von (2001); “Institutional Engineering and Transition to Democracy”, in Jan Zielonka (ed.) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press); O’Donnell, G. (1998); “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America”, Instituto Juan March Working Paper, No. 125, (December 1998); and Elgie R. and Zielonka J. (2001) (fn. 30).

II. *Free and fair elections.* Elected officials are chosen in frequent, inclusive and fairly conducted elections, which are free of any form of coercion.

III. *Elected officials.* Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally and effectively vested in elected officials.

IV. *Democratic constitution.* (1) The old undemocratic constitution is significantly reformed and/or (2) a new democratic constitution is adopted.

V. *Freedom of expression.* Citizens have the right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology.

VI. *Alternative information.* Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, such sources of information exist and are protected by laws.

VII. *Associational autonomy.* To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

It might be concluded that, at the present moment in time, no polity in the world could be considered a political democracy without the presence of one of these seven elements. Additional arguments about the specific qualities of the democratic regime, i.e. its being more prosperous, consensual, liberal, majoritarian, presidential or parliamentary, federalist or unitary cannot change this perception substantially. They could only testify to the fact that there is an underlying logic behind the existence of a distinct set of conditions of political democracy and that democracies could only differ by the extent of their consolidation and the mode of their adaptability to and operation in their individual environment.

5.6. Constructing the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*

The time has come to make the theoretical efforts of conceptualising political democracy and build the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* concretely. The 'Seven Criteria of a Political Democracy' above could serve as the basis for this, considering each of the seven determinants of political democracy independently and assigning to each a given set of factors that best describe in a balanced way its characteristics. For instance, for the first criterion of a *self-governing polity*, I have selected the following three factors:

- There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions;
- Actors operating outside the polity's territory do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions;
- The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories.

Each of these statements is written so that it can be answered with a straightforward "yes" or "no". The purpose of this method is to register the presence or absence of certain institutions or qualities of political democracy and establish the existence of a generic link between its various components. The detailed meaning of any single factor included in the IDEM is provided in the section below. The choice of factors and their interpretation are based on the most recent theoretical findings of the comparative literature of democracy. Furthermore, the IDEM tries to focus not only on the state of political democracy in general, but on the *present* state of political democracy, using as empirical background the experience of Eastern European countries with transition to democracy and its consolidation.

The number of factors for each of the seven criteria of political democracy is fixed at three, which makes 21 factors in seven categories. Of course, this is an arbitrary choice, but I believe it provides a balance between the exact amount of statements and their quality, in respect to each of the criteria in Table 3. The issue of weighing is discussed further down in this chapter. The sample of countries is also set close to that number: 20. All of them are from Eastern Europe, including some Caucasian and Central-Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. They have been selected in such a way as to represent a range of variations between the several large geo-political

regions of the former Communist Bloc. These countries come from Central Europe and the Balkans, from the Baltics and the Caucasus, and from the European part of the former Soviet Union and Central Asia. I have opted for a relatively large number of countries in the hope of obtaining a reliable statistical data-set based on the comparative evidence about the process of democratisation in this part of the world. The further goals of this project are connected with establishing empirically the most recent conditions of arriving at political democracy and discovering some new variables and trends that might be present during the period of its consolidation.

5.6.1. The Factors of the Index of Democratisation (IDEM)

Factor No. 1: Self-governing polity The existence of a self-governing polity is a key factor describing the prior existence of a manageable political unit and the degree of stateness in it. No polity, or state, could claim to be a democracy unless it has stable international borders and has effective control over a large part of the territory under its jurisdiction. In addition to this, no domestic or international actors should have the power to intervene in the internal affairs of the polity or, worse still, overturn decisions already made by its elected officials.

The statements that best describe the different aspects of the availability of a self-governing polity are the following:

- 1) There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions.
- 2) Actors operating outside the polity's territory do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions.
- 3) The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories.

The first statement hinges upon such important characteristics of the political unit as the existence of a 'national territory' and the clear definition of its 'administrative borders', within which the state institutions can exercise those powers which are exclusively and legally vested in them. The second statement makes the assertion that no polity can be considered independent, if outside actors "prevent elected officials

from making binding decisions". The third variable deals with the overall applicability of the constitution and other legal regulations over all groups and territories in the polity.

Factor No. 2: Free and fair elections The conduct of free and fair elections is probably the most salient feature of contemporary democracies. With the rapidly expanding suffrage throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in many countries around the globe, the principle of 'public contestation' has obtained a predominant position among the other underlying dimensions of what Robert Dahl has described to characterise a *polyarchy*.³⁶² Some scholars have even tried to identify democracy exclusively with the 'competitive' element of its overall conceptualisation as a distinct type of political regime.³⁶³ This has been done despite the evidence from many societies in the world that either substantial portions of the population have been excluded from the voting act or that particular parties and candidates could not freely participate. This unfortunate tendency, present in the theory of political science, has been designated the "fallacy of electoralism",³⁶⁴ by which democracy is equated with the regular holding of elections, whether honest or not. The IDEM tries to avoid this and to provide a more balanced picture of elections as a means by which citizens can influence politics and keep their rulers accountable, albeit for the short period of time around elections. Elections in a democracy might be viewed as a regular procedure, which should enjoy the consent both of the majority of political elites and the public in general. Furthermore, the holding of elections could be perceived as an input/output operation through which the interests and passions of the citizens are optimally represented by the political parties, associations and other organised partisan groups.

³⁶² Dahl, R. (1971), (1989); see (fn. 21) and (fn. 23).

³⁶³ Schumpeter, J. (1950); Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed., (NY: Harper), p. 250; Huntington, S. (1991); The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), pp. 5-13; and Lipset, S. M. (1981), (1994); Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, expanded ed., (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 21 and "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, (February, 1994), p. 1.

³⁶⁴ Karl, T. (1986); "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador", in Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, Drake, P. and Silva, E. (eds.), (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego), pp. 9-36.

The three statements designated, compatible with a modern and, at the same time, neutral definition of 'free and fair' elections are the following:

- 1) Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes.
- 2) Those in positions of public authority and the major opposition parties respect the results of these elections.
- 3) Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently and regularly.

The first statement makes an assertion about two basic conditions of the electoral process: that elections should be conducted in a free and fair manner and that the outcome of these elections should not be predetermined by factors outside of the process of the electoral competition. The second statement stresses the importance of the act of 'recognition' of the results of these elections by the ruling elites as well as by the opposition parties. The third combines two formal requirements for holding elections which as such are expected to be democratic: namely, that they should include all groups (without exclusion on the basis of, e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, profession, etc.) that have the legal right to vote, and that these elections should occur at pre-determined periods of time and reasonably often at all levels of decision-making.

Factor No. 3: Elected officials This factor describes the situation of those who run for office. They have the right to participate in the elections and they should participate on an equal footing with all other candidates. Once elected, however, the political reality in many countries is such that control of governmental decisions is not always in the hands of those voted into power but lies with one institution or sometimes even a single person who, having the position of a head of state for instance, gains a dominant position over the other democratically elected officers. The experience of some of the long-established Latin American democracies with the unruly activity of veto groups and the presence of reserved domains for dictators and the military, would suggest that this might not be such improbable scenario for other more recent cases of transition to democratic regime.³⁶⁵ Furthermore, some

³⁶⁵ See Valenzuela, S. J. (1992); (fn. 17); and Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); Problems of Democratic... (fn. 16).

contemporary examples of undemocratic practices have been registered in some presumed to be democratic states, where democratically elected officials have dismissed other democratically elected officials before their constitutionally granted mandate is over. This has been especially true for a number of Third World and former Soviet Union states which have recently emerged out of authoritarianism.

The three items referring to this specific factor are the following:

- 1) Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials.
- 2) Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated.
- 3) The composition and term of office of government is not decided by a single person or political body, and appointments are not made without the holding of elections (except in cases explicitly described by the constitution).

The first statement is derived from the general understanding that all the main official positions of government should be filled after the holding of free and fair elections. The second one rules out the possibility of intervention by 'unaccountable groups' and institutions that supersede their level of authority, impeding the work of the elected officials. The third statement promotes the idea that appointments in a democracy should preferably be competitive, except for those offices where the constitution specifies who and what institution should make a certain appointment.

Factor No. 4: Democratic constitution The adoption of a democratic constitution represents a landmark act by which the political process is streamlined and given a legal dressing. The practice shows that democratic constitutions come into existence after an old and often undemocratic constitutional system is radically changed or a new democratic constitution is adopted. Apart from its functions of setting the 'rules of the game' and assigning each public institution its appropriate function and place in a democracy, constitutions principally provide the political rights and civil liberties of the individuals that inhabit the territory of the political unit. Sometimes, constitutions require the existence of new institutions and institutions with new functions. Most importantly, democratic constitutions legally establish the formal division and

equality of the public institutions. Constitutions are usually drafted by a small number of people, but adopted by a constitutional assembly and sometimes ratified in a referendum. They are the highest legal document of a democratic polity and they may be changed only once a very difficult procedure has been evoked and implemented in practice.

The three statements that are most characteristic of the 'democratic constitution' criterion are the following:

- 1) The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties for all citizens and these are observed in practice.
- 2) There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution.
- 3) The constitution is newly drafted and ratified.

The above criteria obviously underline the importance of the existence of a modern constitution which supports democratic principles and procedures. Among these are the respect of citizens' political rights and civil liberties (statement no. 1), the division of powers and equality between state institutions (statement no. 2), and the adoption of a new democratic constitution by doing away with the majority of elements of the old authoritarian legal system (statement no. 3).

Factor No. 5: Freedom of expression The 'freedom of expression' criterion coincides with the right of citizens to express themselves freely and be able to criticise public officials, the government and even the prevailing ideology within the state. Most of the consolidated democracies in the world do not try to silence their citizens, although the governing elites might be quite sensitive to situations when criticism comes from the intermediary bodies and organised interest groups of individuals, and when the latter's opinions spill over to the media. In democracies of objectively lesser quality and democracies with still unestablished institutional practices, freedom of expression is viewed with an even greater degree of suspicion, since it is automatically associated (not always without the help of the propaganda of the predominant state regime) with anarchy. When other vital citizens' interests, and especially social and economic ones, are infringed upon by those in power, then

freedom of expression takes on practical importance for the previously politically uninvolved.

There are three proposed factor variables for the freedom of expression criterion:

- 1) The regime has no political prisoners, and political terror and torture are absent.
- 2) There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution and closure of newspapers and TV stations).
- 3) There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for those providing 'essential services').

The first statement implies that political prisoners and political terror are characteristic of a regime that does not allow freedom of expression, thus, although not directly linked with the original meaning of this factor, these features are clear signals of the absence of this freedom. The second statement relates to silencing opinions by 'softer' means, such as removing one's critics from work, denying them access to the media and even prosecuting them legally. The third statement embraces the principle of the right to assembly. In the case of strikes, which should be allowed for most professional groups, exceptions are envisaged for those workers who are constitutionally obliged to provide services to the population, such as firefighters and some medical and military professionals, but who can express their opinion in different ways – for example, by striking symbolically.

Factor No. 6: Alternative information The right to seek out alternative sources of information is inextricably linked to all other political and civil freedoms in a political democracy. Unfortunately, the current practice in some states of the world shows that precisely this criterion is the one most abused by those in public authority. Beyond the normal cycle of elections, which are regularly monitored by foreign observers, it is very difficult to inspect the freedom of the media on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, indicators about this are difficult to provide because of the growing division between printed and broadcast media and the sometimes obscure commercial interests of the various kinds of media organisations. Consequently, legal regulations for the media

market have been very difficult to produce, and it has been hard for public or private institutions to enforce them in an environment of so many vested interests on the part of the state and of private economic and social agents.

The three factors presented below have been chosen to describe the issues connected with best practice in and the smooth functioning of a democratic media, as well as access to alternative sources of information by the population:

- 1) The media is not a state (nor private) monopoly and is free of government control.
- 2) There is a media law which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information.
- 3) The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed.

It is strongly believed that, in order for a political system to operate as a modern political democracy, the media should not be a public or private monopoly and no excessive governmental control should be exercised upon it (statement no. 1). The second statement holds that legal rules should be set up for the media market, guaranteeing the right of citizens to simultaneously alternative sources of information. Thirdly, if the political process matters to those elected to power and those in opposition, the media should observe the neutral and equal coverage of political points of view, backed by the plurality and neutrality of the information disseminated.

Factor No. 7: Associational autonomy This is the principle that citizens can organise themselves freely in associations and political interest groups. This principle emerges not only from the wish to ensure that citizens are able to direct their 'voice' more effectively toward those in governing positions, but from the need to counteract the various negative effects of the competitive democratic process, in particular elections, which tend to ignore the importance of votes cast for the losing side and give priority to those elected to power for a definite period of time. Within a healthy democracy, the opposition and minorities in general should be assured the right and prospect to stand chances of getting elected to power in the next elections or, at least, be

guaranteed the freedom of self-organisation and possibility of keeping officers in power accountable for their deeds within the prevailing state system.

The following three statements are chosen as the most pertinent to the question of freedom of associational autonomy:

- 1) There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party.
- 2) There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties.
- 3) Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations.

The first statement refers to the right of opposition parties to exist and compete in elections, without the intervention of those representing the ruling elites and party. The second one deals with the issue of free association among professional groups, namely, the formation of independent trade unions and other labour associations. The final statement mentions the citizens' right to participate actively in public life through all forms of interest associations, including educational, religious and ethnic minority ones.

The summary of all 21 factor variables is presented in Table 4 below:

Table 4

21 Factors of the IDEM

I. Self-governing polity

- 1) There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions.
- 2) Actors operating outside the polity's territory do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions.
- 3) The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories.

II. Free and fair elections

- 4) Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes.

6) Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently and regularly.
5) Those in positions of public authority and the major opposition parties respect the results of these elections.

III. Elected officials

7) Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials.

8) Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated.

9) The composition and term of office of government is not decided by a single person or political body, and appointments are not made without the holding of elections (except in cases explicitly described by the constitution).

IV. Democratic constitution

10) The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties for all citizens and these are observed in practice.

11) There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution.

12) The democratic constitution is newly drafted and ratified.

V. Freedom of expression

13) The regime has no political prisoners, and political terror and torture are absent.

14) There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations).

15) There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for those providing essential services).

VI. Alternative information

16) The media is not a state (nor private) monopoly and is free of government control.

17) There is a media law which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information.

18) The plurality of opinion is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed.

VII. Associational autonomy

19) There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party.

20) There are trade unions and professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties.

21) Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations.

5.6.2. The Problem of Weighting the Individual Factors

The IDEM has 21 factors spread evenly across seven categories and treats them as equally important to the level of democratisation in any country. Thus, to determine the overall score for each of the twenty Eastern European countries, these factors are weighted equally. Although, there could certainly be periods of time when the relative importance of one of the factors or a group of factors might be greater than some other factor or group of factors, this approach is probably the fairest and most consistent with the functional purpose of the IDEM: to produce a score of the institutional environment for the progress of democratisation in every country. Other studies of democracy are designed primarily to explain the presence or absence of political democracy and to describe the type of governmental regime already been established (for example, 'democratic' vs. 'undemocratic', and 'free', 'partly free' and 'not free' in the comparative indices of the various Freedom House surveys). By contrast, the IDEM has been set up to analyse the whole range of factors necessary for democratisation to occur in the first place.

In addition, at this stage of development in the comparative political science research on democratisation and at the current level of theoretical conceptualisation of issues related to political democracy and its consolidation, it is difficult to know with a high degree of precision which factors are more important than others. What is certain, however, is that, for a country to achieve the long-term stability of its democratic institutions and stand a chance of consolidating them, it must perform well in all or almost all of the factors of the IDEM.

If the current IDEM eventually gets expanded such that it can 'capture' empirically and measure statistically specific traits related to the consolidation of democratic regimes and the quality of democracy, the *Index's* methodology could become more flexible and permit one to assign variables other than '0' and '1' for each of the items and to consider its various factors not of the same magnitude. Until that time, however, it is believed that at this early stage the most objective way to grade the level of democratisation is to weigh all the factors equally.

5.6.3. The Grading Scale

Each country in the IDEM receives an overall democratisation score based on the total sum of the 21 individual factor scores. Each factor is scored according to the presence or absence of a certain characteristic or institution necessary for this factor to support the existence of political democracy. The 21 factors are distributed in seven categories, which describe essentially political rights and civil freedoms in a self-governing state. The IDEM brings together a wide spectrum of political issues under the title of 'democratisation' and tries to measure them in a coherent fashion, addressing themes from the fairness of elections to media ownership and from the privilege of expressing oneself freely to the right to create independent associations. Although, the number of factors in each of the seven categories is reduced to three and each statement is graded simply with '0' and '1', or 'Yes' and 'No', because this method presupposes the existence of a relationship not only within the seven broad categories summarising the various aspects of political democracy but also across these categories and among the factors themselves, no information is lost during the aggregation of the outcomes. From a statistical point of view, the *Index* resembles a simple version of a Guttman scale, but is in fact a "panel data", with 20 subjects (countries), acting under the influence of 21 stimuli (factors), and distributed in seven categories. Thus, the level of political democracy in a given region of the world (Eastern Europe) is measured comparatively among the selected 20 countries.

The main advantage of the IDEM is not solely that it measures the level of political democracy in a much more thorough and theoretically founded way than other indices of democracy, but that it measures political democracy differently. This could be especially useful for interpreting the relationship between the quality of democracy and its consolidation at different thresholds. Most other measures assign each country a single number, the practical meaning of which is hard to fathom. For example, what exactly does a '3' on the Freedom House political rights scale tell us about a given country? Can such general labels like "free" or "partly free" describe the qualities of a particular regime and the mode of its establishment? If one wants to investigate issues like the constitutional rights of elected officials, the freedom to hold public protest and to strike, or to have unhampered access to media sources, similar ratings would be useless. Essentially, the information about similar factors in other indices of democratisation was taken into consideration once the rating was being assigned, but it was lost when it was aggregated with all other information that went into a single

number. That is why the IDEM represents something different. This is an index based on discreet-type evaluations and items are distributed equally among its seven categories, so it describes both the overall degree of democratisation in a country and the more specific political-democracy characteristics of the polity which are captured by the individual components of the scale.

5.6.4. Thresholds of Democratisation

Once the measuring is completed and an overall score assigned to each of the twenty countries, it would be interesting to distinguish between each of the cases not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This could be done by establishing thresholds along the democratisation continuum between 0 and 21 and ranking the countries according to the numerical interval they belong to.

The three broad rankings of democratisation for the countries are:

- **Authoritarian** - countries having an overall score between 0 and 7 inclusive;
- **Transitional** - countries having an overall score between 7 and 15 inclusive;
- **Democratic** - countries having an overall score between 15 and 21 inclusive.

According to this ranking, only countries having satisfied all 21 factors of the IDEM could be considered as having completed democratisation and having achieved substantial progress toward consolidating democracy. This fact clearly describes the *Index* as very rigid with regard to which regimes that could qualify as political democracies. This has practical implications for the other political levels of democratisation below this threshold. The way of determining whether a polity is in an 'authoritarian', 'transitional' or 'democratic' stage of development is determined through a complex evaluation of all possible factor outcomes.

Two specific reflections on the establishment of political democracy justify the choice of the exact mark of these thresholds. Firstly, that the 'self-governing polity' factor (number 1, including the first three out of twenty-one items in Table 4) of the IDEM is too general and may refer to any political unit, even, certainly undemocratic ones; thus, it is not directly linked to those factors that explicitly describe a democratic

regime. Its statements could therefore be regarded as the three possibly 'odd-criteria-out' that could be descriptive of an authoritarian regime in the numerical range between 0-3, when no factor of the remaining six broad categories has been satisfied. Secondly, there are three statements in each of the seven factor categories. At least two of the three should be answered positively in order for the democratic criteria in a single factor-group to be considered preponderant. The cases which present 'border-line' situations, i.e. between 'authoritarian', 'transitional' and 'democratic' regime, should be decided in favour of those cases where two thirds of the statements in at least two of the factor categories are given an affirmative response – so that democratisation has 'taken root' in at least two areas. To this figure one should add the maximum number of positive answers from the 'self-governing polity' factor, providing a complete pointage for democratic, authoritarian and all regimes in-between.

This means in practice:

First threshold: 7

AUTHORITARIAN / TRANSITIONAL

2 + 2 (of at least two factor categories of political democracy) + 3 (the 'self-governing polity' maximum number of positive answers) = 7

Second threshold: 15

TRANSITIONAL / DEMOCRATIC

6 x 2 (a majority scoring, two-thirds, of all 6 areas different from the 'self-governing polity' criterion) = 12

12 + 3 (the 'self-governing polity' maximum number of positive answers) = 15

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY is at 21.

There are two additional intermediary thresholds in the 'transitional' and 'democratic' regime categories:

First threshold: 10

Obtained in two ways:

1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 (if all 6 areas get represented with one positive answer and one area with two positive answers) = 7

7 + 3 (the 'self-governing polity' maximum number of positive answers) = 10

or

(b) 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 (half of the 6 areas get represented with two positive answers and one positive answer is obtained from the remaining three areas to make a majority of positive answers in these 6 areas) = 7

7 + 3 (the 'self-governing polity' maximum number of positive answers) = 10

and,

a second threshold: 18

Also obtained in two ways:

(a) 2 + 2 + 2 (half of the 6 areas get represented with two positive answer to make a majority of positive answers in these three areas) = 6

3 x 3 (full number of positive answers is obtained from the remaining three areas) = 9

6 + 9 = 15 + 3 (full number of positive answers for the 'self-governing polity' criterion) = 18

or

(b) $3 \times 6 = 18$ (maximum figure for all 6 areas but the 'self-governing polity' category).

The overall situation with the thresholds of the IDEM is illustrated in Table 5:

Table 5

<u>Thresholds of Democratisation:</u>	<u>Intermediary Thresholds:</u>
AUTHORITARIAN — 0 – 7	
TRANSITIONAL — 7 – 15	10
DEMOCRATIC — 15 – 21	18

5.6.5. Testing the Validity of the IDEM

Since the IDEM is based on a precise theoretical method and is specifically designed to measure the level of democratisation, it is both transparent from a normative point of view and capable of analysing a wide variety of data about the state of democracy in the political units around the world. Each individual country is assigned a grading from 0 to 21 according to the availability of a certain factor of political democracy. The statistical technique is one of a simple scale, where subjects and stimuli are intercepted directly, so practically no information about single factors or the country in general is lost in the process of aggregating the results of the measurements in the separate categories of the *Index*.

It would be intriguing to investigate additionally through the various means of this empirical method whether current conclusions about the establishment and consolidation of political democracy in the works of authors like Dahl, O'Donnell and

Schmitter still hold valid for situations outside of the territories and continents these writers have studied. This research tries to answer a good part of this question by attempting to analyse the issues related to democratisation for the region of Eastern Europe and for the countries having recently emerged out of different types of communist regimes. Finally, if this method proves successful, its validity and overall area of applicability should be tested in other countries of the world and expanded to include comparative cases from distant and varying territories, while the time horizon should envisage cases of present as well as past experiences of attempts at democratisation.

5.6.6. Sources and Materials

The analysis of the separate factors of the *Index* relies heavily on the availability of relevant sources of information. Most of the sources used in this research are primary ones, namely, they relate directly to the problems or issues at stake by revealing 'what has happened'. But for some of the statements in the IDEM, which needed further clarification and more profound interpretation by some of my assistants and myself, a number of secondary sources were also used. This was the case, for example, in the topics related to freedom of media, political prisoners and the recognition of the outcome of elections by the opposition parties – which were in fact some of the most difficult ones to judge concretely in a '0' or '1' fashion. In similar situations, it was necessary to look for additional sources of information and, in the event of their not being compatible with the previous information provided, a further assessment by an outside second and sometimes even third referee was made. It should be mentioned, and this is probably one of the major weaknesses of the scaling method, that it has been very difficult to squeeze a lot of information in a single digit by simply answering with 'yes' and 'no'. Thus, in the end, the qualitative estimate is the one that should matter most, especially for this pioneering method of research dealing with the practice and theory of democracy and democratisation.

It has been a recognised reality since the early 1990s, that the sources available for most of the post-communist countries and Eastern Europe have been extremely limited. And if such sources are available, usually in the form of newspaper articles

and Internet sites, they cannot be gathered together, listed in a coherent fashion and customarily evoked for each country and case of democratisation. In the table below, I try to provide some of the sources used in this study, the general ones as well as some the other possible citations for each type of factor included in the IDEM. It is of vital importance that similar information databases be developed globally and for each of the political territories in the world undergoing democratisation, so that the relationship between the restricted number of sources available and the results of the various indices do not turn out eventually to be too close and, thus, impossible to compare and/or for relevant conclusions to be drawn about the state of democracy in each individual country.

Table 6

General sources

The Europa World Yearbook (1999), Vols. 1 and 2
Keesing's Record of World Events (1989-99)
The World Factbook (1996-97)
 Banks and Muller's *Political Handbook of the World* (1998)
Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook (1999), Vols. 1 and 2
The Statesman's Yearbook (1998-99)
 Open Media Research Institute, Prague, *Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (1995-96)
 East-West Institute, New York, *Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (1997-99)

Online resources related to Eastern Europe

Territory

U.S. Department of State *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (1993-99)
[Http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999\(8,7,6,...\)_hrp_report/99\(8,7,6.\)hrp_report_eur.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999(8,7,6,...)_hrp_report/99(8,7,6.)hrp_report_eur.html)

Elections

OSCE *Election Reports* (1990-99) <http://www.odhr.org/>
 CNN Election Watch <http://cnn.com/WORLD/election.watch/europe/>

Human Rights

U.S. Department of State *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1993-95)
[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999\(8,7,6,...\)_hrp_report/99\(8,7,6.\)hrp_report_eur.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999(8,7,6,...)_hrp_report/99(8,7,6.)hrp_report_eur.html)
 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights *Reports*
[Http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/osce99/](http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/osce99/)

Associations & Trade Unions

U.S. Department of State *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, 1993-95)

[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999\(8,7,6,...\)_hrp_report/99\(8,7,6..\)hrp_report_eur.htm](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999(8,7,6,...)_hrp_report/99(8,7,6..)hrp_report_eur.htm)

OECD reports (1992-99) www.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/


5.7. Conclusion

The analysis conducted in this chapter clarifies several things with respect to the method of measuring consolidation of democracy (CoD) and quality of democracy (QoD):

- First, the search for a 'common path' between process and product leading to the establishment of contemporary democratic regimes has singled out democratisation as the process and political democracy as the product. This concept appears to bridge the analytical gap between transition to democracy (TtoD) and consolidation of democracy (CoD), and also between regime change and political change in Eastern European transformations. Political democracy refers to the final product of democratisation, but it also implies a certain bias towards a better quality of the established regime;
- Second, in order to measure consolidation (CoD) and quality of democracy (QoD) effectively, one has to be able to operationalise these two concepts empirically. This implies the consideration of procedural and behavioural elements at the same time. A variety of other structural factors, for example economic, social, cultural, international, as well as the relative size of the population and the political territory, should also be paid attention to as affecting the process of democratisation.
- Third, not all the aspects of consolidation (CoD) and quality of democracy (QoD) could be captured by a simple and straightforward mathematical index. What can be measured is the presence of certain institutions necessary for the CoD and QoD

mentioned in the definition of political democracy. This is achieved in practice and to the largest possible extent by the new *Index of Democratisation*.

- Fourth, the *Index of Democratisation* is a statistical index composed of 21 factors distributed in seven categories. It reflects the current state of democratisation theory; consequently, it is probably best suited for measuring CoD and QoD in post-communist Eastern Europe. Its validity is however limited by the new developments taking place in the world of democracy on a daily basis. Consequently, previous theoretical definitions of political democracy and perceptions about patterns of democratisation should be constantly upgraded in order to determine whether to continue to use the same factors of the IDEM in the future.



Chapter 6

Measuring Political Democracy and The Degree of its Consolidation Using the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*

6.1. Introduction

One of the principal objectives of this project is to evaluate empirically the progress of democratisation in a large part of the post-communist world. Arguably, this could be done in two ways: qualitatively and quantitatively. In the first half of the thesis (parts I and II), political democracy is defined and the procedural and institutional aspects of democratisation in Eastern Europe are described; this is not limited to a qualitative analysis of these developments. In part III (and particularly in this chapter), the relevant factors of democratic transformation in the region are studied quantitatively. An attempt is made to determine the probability of consolidating democracies and improving the quality of democracy in the former communist regimes by developing a new *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*. This statistical indicator is organised as a “panel data” for twenty Eastern European countries covering the period 1989-99. Although it rates the individual factor variables numerically (i.e. with ‘0’ and ‘1’) over a period of time, the specific method of analysis is not purely quantitative but represents a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research. Thus, an analytical investigation of post-communist democratisation in Eastern Europe using the IDEM applies a combined approach towards studying the possible outcomes of this process.

This chapter deals with the measurement procedures and empirical results of using the IDEM in twenty post-communist countries. It is organised in the following way:

- first, the practical necessity of devising various social indicators measuring political democracy and their historic emergence in Eastern Europe will be described;

- secondly, a number of key questions will be answered related to what the IDEM actually is and what the implications are of using it;
- thirdly, the results obtained for this set of Eastern European countries will be considered and report will be included on the most important features and consequences of conducting democratic reforms in the region;
- fourthly, the IDEM will be correlated with similar social and political indexes covering roughly the same time period and group of former Communist Bloc states;
- fifthly, the relevance of individual IDEM factors for the democratisation of Eastern Europe will be analysed, and for this reason, Spearman correlation and factor analysis will be used to explain cross-country difference as a function of the sequential arrangement and the relative weight of individual items of this index;
- sixthly, by assuming that the IDEM could be reduced to several factors, all 21 factors will be regressed statistically to determine exactly which set of variables represent the rest of the factors to the largest possible extent;
- finally, some inferences will be drawn about the prospects of achieving good quality democracy and consolidating it in different places across Eastern Europe by summarising the outcomes of the above-mentioned mathematical observations.

6.2. The Emergence of the First Social Indicators in Eastern Europe

Social scientists were unable to foresee the fall of communism in 1989 and the subsequent rapid institutionalisation of democracy in post-communist Eastern Europe. Despite the uneasiness about the predictive capacity of their respective theories, scholars from different social science disciplines recovered from the initial shock following the collapse of the socialist system relatively quickly and moved on to explain the various courses of the political and social developments in the region. Most of their efforts were directed towards describing the momentous transformation in the former Communist Bloc using different theoretical models and conceptualisations from previous systemic transitions as in Latin America, Southern Europe and East Asia. The growing amount of empirical evidence about democratisation and other kinds of reforms in the former Communist Bloc contributed to an exponential increase in the number of transformation theories and notions about

democracy, market economy, the state institutions, civil society, political culture and ethnic relations. At the same time, the new tasks emerging before these frail democratic regimes have called for new practical approaches towards and analytical interpretation of such critical problems as nation-state building, the consolidation of democracy, privatisation, interest group relations, European integration and globalisation. This, in turn, contributed to an additional multiplication of the theories and concepts in circulation, thus rendering the discussion and normative predictions about the present and future of post-communist Eastern Europe quite complex.

With respect to the study of democratisation in the region, the field was dominated by comparative political scientists from the very beginning. They took over from the declining academic disciplines of geopolitical and Soviet elite studies ('Sovietology') and imposed their theoretical models and conceptual vision about how various democracy-related topics should be treated. By the mid-1990s, the mainstream social research of democratic transformation in post-autocratic Eastern Europe was comfortably split into two distinct but fraternal sub-disciplines: 'transitology' and 'consolidology'. Depending on the progress made by individual countries in their democratisation efforts, different scholars preferred to focus either on the transition from autocracy or the consolidation of democracy. Each one of these political processes had its own characteristic features and carried specific implications for the democratisation of the post-communist world. As a result, since the collapse of the previous system in Eastern Europe, a large amount of comparative theoretical research on the transition to and consolidation of democracy has been produced. It is probable that no other region has been subject to so many studies on democratisation and social transformation as Eastern Europe. Moreover, the level of academic enquiry into the post-communist countries for the development of new theories, models and hypotheses and their testing in practice has been unparalleled in the social sciences.

This boom of comparative political research in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as the heuristic selection of the Eastern part of the European continent as an experimental field for the majority of contemporary social science theories, was accompanied by the rapid evolution of information technologies and means of communication, such as satellite television, the internet and fast air and road connections. Arguably, these new achievements of humanity contributed substantially

to the crumbling of dictatorships and the consolidation of new democratic regimes throughout the world at the end of the 20th century. The former communist system, albeit a staunchly ideological and oppressive one, had not been an exception to the rule. On the contrary, individual countries had been participating in these global developments and exchanges to various degrees, sometimes quite actively even before 1989. The opening up of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism was almost immediately accompanied by a large-scale Western political and economic intervention aimed at the de-communisation, market liberalisation and democratisation of these countries. A large number of Western-based private and public agencies as well as many international organisations moved quickly into the region. They sought primarily to stabilise and to safeguard democracy, but they also attempted to impose their own models of democracy and market economy on these fledgling regimes.

Since the transfer of political and social knowledge as well as of various forms of material and financial assistance was far from automatic, further research into the specific social and political state of affairs of the individual former communist countries and the region had to be conducted. Large international organisations like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and the EBRD started closely monitoring the economic, administrative and political transformation in these countries. Some of these international organisations, as well as many private companies, produced regular reports regarding the evolution of reforms in Eastern Europe. Today, more than twenty state and private organisations conduct annual surveys of various aspects of social and political change in the region. Most of this research is descriptive and focuses on particular characteristics of post-communist transition with the aim of maximising company returns on investment in this region or increasing the influence of a particular country or international organisation in the area. However, a number of reports have concentrated on the long-term performance of the Eastern European countries and on some general transformation processes like privatisation, state and administrative reform, re-organisation of social welfare, democratisation, and human and economic development. This is how some of the first socio-political indicators featuring Eastern Europe appeared. At present, there are several internationally recognised indexes treating different problems of post-communist states and societies.

They concentrate on different topics ranging from democratisation to economic performance, from financial risk to immigration, and from social welfare to corruption.

Despite the growing interest among social scientists and decision-makers in learning more about the region and transformation processes after communism, there has not been close collaboration between scholars and other professionals operating in Eastern Europe. This was partly because the interests and objectives of these groups did not completely overlap (e.g. regarding the prioritisation between *democratisation* and *privatisation*, for instance), or because the theoretical visions of students of social transformation were predominantly imported from Latin America, Southern Europe and other regions that had very little to do with communist-type of dictatorships. The overall impression was that the advice provided by the academic community concerning social and political change was rarely taken at face value by decision-makers and, for this reason, it was almost never implemented in practice. At the same time, the body of academic research describing different reform processes in Eastern Europe, and democratisation in particular, has been constantly expanding, thus contributing to the increasingly independent character and emancipation of certain theoretically-focused social science disciplines from the problems of daily life. Moreover, some new conceptual tools and analytical explanations devised in a post-communist context were of very little use to the non-academic community, since they were not always precise or, on the contrary, they could not grasp the entire range of issues regarding political and other types of transformation in the region. Quite often, by the time some of the scientific research was published and the various analytical models and theoretical concepts were tested in practice, they were already outdated because of the dynamism of social change in the region.

These problems were particularly relevant with respect to the study of democratic transformation and the consolidation of new regimes in Eastern Europe. Arguably, since the late 1980s, a substantial part of the comparative social science literature was dedicated to the establishment of democracy in post-autocratic settings both regionally and internationally; however, most of the conclusions regarding democratisation in Eastern Europe have not been significant from a theoretical point of view and have rarely been tested in practice. This was probably because many

authors hastened to enter the Eastern European research market immediately after the fall of communism without seriously thinking about the theoretical relevance and practical consequences of their analytical proposals. In consequence, it could be argued that the gentle 'colonisation' of Eastern European social sciences produced as many negative outcomes as positive ones. The quick penetration of a large number of predominantly Western-based conceptual models and the frivolous application of variegated theories and notions in the post-communist reality produced many theoretical contradictions and conflicts about the empirical evidence describing the development of particular social processes. With the passage of time and the crystallisation of the long-term goals of different groups, however, both the academic and policy communities began to require not only general descriptions and vague analytical prescriptions, but also hard data about monitoring and predicting developmental trends within various sectors of Eastern European economies and societies. This is how, by the middle-period of the post-communist transition, an acute demand for reliable social indicators emerged.

Unfortunately, mainly because of the lack of trustworthy first-hand statistical information about the former socialist countries, most of the political and economic indexes did not cover the region at all before 1989.³⁶⁶ After the collapse of communism, it took some time until these indexes included Eastern Europe as an area of study. From the beginning of the transition to democracy, however, a couple of completely new social indicators were conceived and started operating.³⁶⁷ By the second half of the 1990s, several annual publications specialised in covering the progress of the countries from the region in different reform domains appeared: namely, the Freedom House *Nations in Transit*, the Open Media Research Institute *Transition Reports*, the East-West Institute in New York *Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, the Economist Intelligence Unit *Surveys of Eastern Europe*, and the OECD *SIGMA* public administration reports. A number of international organisations also started to monitor the evolution of Eastern European regimes and societies; these included the OSCE, the International Helsinki Federation

³⁶⁶ Only the *Freedom House* political rights and civil liberties indexes and the *United Nations Human Development Index* covered Eastern Europe in the pre-1989 period.

³⁶⁷ See, for instance, the *European Bank of Reconstruction and Development* (EBRD) *Privatisation and Legal Development* indexes, the *Heritage Foundation* *Index of Economic Freedom* and the *Transparency International* *Corruption Perceptions Index*.

for Human Rights, Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the UNDP, and, above all, the EU and NATO – two organisations that enlarged or planned to enlarge eastwards in the near future.

With respect to the elaboration of specific social indicators accounting for the progress of democracy of individual countries from the region, there were very few of them and those that existed were predominantly of a relatively poor quality. The main problem with these indexes was that they either covered such a large number of countries around the world that they could not concentrate on the challenges of post-communist democratisation sufficiently, or that they treated political democracy as one among many variables explaining a particular social development or historical process.³⁶⁸ An additional complication with analysing the advance of democratisation and especially the degree of consolidation of democracy was that the key concept of ‘political democracy’ was not theoretically clarified to the necessary extent. That is why it was quite difficult to operationalise it for measurement purposes. Only a couple of recent studies tried to address the crucial issue of defining democracy normatively in order for it to be measured empirically in the specific context of Eastern European transitions.³⁶⁹ It could, in turn, be hypothesised that the difficulty of properly conceptualising political democracy and identifying all of its individual elements has prevented social scientists from developing reliable indicators to measure this important notion in all its possible dimensions.

³⁶⁸ For some examples of this before 1989, see Cutright, P. (1963); “National Political Development”, *American Sociological Review* 28, (April, 1963); Gastil, R. (ed.) (1978); Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1978 (Boston: G.K. Hall); Banks, A. (1979); Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Binghamton: State University of New York); and Bollen, K. (1980); “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy”, *American Sociological Review* 45(2), pp. 370-90. For more recent data sets covering democracy partially or fully, see Arat, Z. (1991); Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), esp. pp. 136-66; Hadenius, A. (1992); Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), esp. pp. 61-69; and Gasiorowski, M. (1996); “An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 469-483. Among the global social surveys including the evolution of political regimes in Eastern Europe over a longer period of time (i.e. a century or more), see Jagers, K. and Gurr, T. (1995); “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with the Polity III Data”, *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4), pp. 469-82; Vanhanen, T. (1997); Prospects for Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (New York: Routledge); and Vanhanen, T. (2000); “A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998”, *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2), pp. 251-65.

³⁶⁹ Baker, P. and Koese, K. (2001); “Measuring “Polyarchy Plus”: Tracking the Quality of Democratization in Eastern Europe, 1992-2000”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 02, 2001, San Francisco, California; Schedler, A. (2001); “Measuring Democratic Consolidation”, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 66-92; and Soos, G., Toka, G. and Wright, G. (eds.) (2002); The State of Local Democracy in Central Europe (Budapest: LIGI/Open Society Institute Press).

6.3. A Critical Overview of the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*

In this section it is proposed to present some of the important features of the IDEM and its relationship with other statistical indexes. Moreover, it is intended that the measurement validity of the current edition of this index covering the period 1989-99 be considered. Finally, the possibility of replicating this measurement procedure in other regions and political settings is discussed.

The presentation of information in this section is organised in the form of “questions and answers”, focusing on selected issues related to the construction and performance of the IDEM. The section below describes the concrete analysis of different aspects of this index and the measurement technique it employs.

Q: What is the Index of Democratisation (IDEM)?

A: The IDEM is a statistical index monitoring the process of democratisation in 20 Eastern European countries over a period of 11 years, from 1989 until 1999. It has 21 factor variables distributed evenly in seven groups covering different themes linked to the establishment and consolidation of political democracy. From a technical point of view, this index is organised as a dynamic panel of data analysing the democratic transformation of a set of post-communist countries for a given period of time. In other words, changes occur both across countries and across time and this is exactly what the IDEM tries to measure with respect to the democratisation process in the region.

Q: What does it measure?

A: From a normative point of view, the IDEM measures the progress of democratisation in each country and in the region as a whole. Concretely, it measures the presence or absence of political democracy and some qualitative aspects of the existing political regime (e.g. the lack of political power ‘veto groups’ and the effective application of the rule of law to all groups and territories). Furthermore, it

attempts to cover the majority of procedural/institutional features of an ideally consolidated democracy in Eastern Europe. This latter regime is conceptualised as “political democracy + a possible range of qualities of democracy”. In this sense, the IDEM is not deterministic with respect to consolidation; rather, it shows a *tendency* of the development of this process as well as the accomplishment of *key procedural and institutional steps* (up and down) towards this goal, such as the establishment of political democracy and the achievement of national statehood and a degree of effective control over the decision-making and implementation processes on a given territory.

Q: How does it measure democratisation?

A: The IDEM is a binary index: it measures different items related to democratisation with ‘0’ or ‘1’. In fact, it is not very flexible as a statistical index, since it only registers the presence or absence of a certain feature of political democracy or its quality in a given moment of time. What could be done to improve the scoring technique is to introduce a third possible result, namely, ‘0.5’, which would show an unfinished or partially completed process of democratisation in a certain domain. Another weakness of the IDEM is that it measures the state of democracy in a country at the end of each year. This means that all the changes that occur throughout this period could not be fully observed and understood simply by concluding with ‘0’ or ‘1’ at the end of every twelve months. Admittedly, this measurement technique is not fully compatible with registering changes during the transition to democracy, which is a relatively brief and quite dynamic process. However, if shorter spans of time for monitoring events were chosen (e.g. 3 months instead of one year) or this kind of empirical analysis were to be conducted over a longer period – say over several decades – the majority of inherent structural flaws of this measurement method would considerably diminish and probably disappear altogether.

Q: Does the IDEM resemble any of the existing democracy indexes?

A: As already mentioned, there are very few social science indexes that focus both on the process of democratisation and the current transformation problems of post-

communist Eastern Europe. However, there are a number of political indexes that relate to one theme or the other. For instance, from a democratic theory perspective, the IDEM closely resembles Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke's Polyarchy Scale and Tatu Vanhanen's Polyarchy Dataset.³⁷⁰ From a regional perspective, the IDEM could easily be related to the Freedom House dual index of political rights and civic freedom and EBRD Transition Indexes (i.e. of legal reform, market liberalisation, privatisation, etc.). The only social index that almost fully meets the analytical objective and structural composition of the IDEM is the recently created "Polyarchy Plus" Index of Peter Bekker and Karrie Koesel.³⁷¹ Unfortunately, the latter index has not been extensively publicised in the academic community yet and, hence, has not been submitted to serious scholarly critique and empirical testing.³⁷² However, it demonstrates a positive tendency towards explaining the problems of democratic transition in post-communist Eastern Europe using the latest theoretical achievements in the comparative democratisation literature. Moreover, the "polyarchy plus" index tries to measure the progress of democratisation via a new, conceptually and analytically better-grounded indicator of democracy functioning and quality.

Q: What is the measurement validity of the IDEM?

A: Although certain aspects of this issue have already been discussed in the previous chapter (i.e. the way of scoring and the conceptual consistency of different elements of this index), a more general and empirically-orientated analysis of the measurement validity of the IDEM should be provided. First, it is reiterated that the majority of countries included in this study have been coded by the author, while other researchers and practitioners have occasionally contributed to evaluating the progress of democratisation in a given polity. Secondly, various written sources of information have been used to code individual post-communist countries, but the number of these publications has never been less than two and quite often three or more for each factor variable. That is why the results of this measurement procedure should probably be

³⁷⁰ Coppedge, M. and Reinicke, W. (1991); "Measuring Polyarchy", in Alex Inkeles (ed.) *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction), pp. 47-68; and Vanhanen, T. (2000); *The Polyarchy Dataset: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy*. Retrieved from <http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen>, see also Vanhanen, T. (2000); *Ibid.*, (fn. 3).

³⁷¹ Baker, P. and Koesel, K. (2001); "Measuring "Polyarchy Plus", *Ibid.* (fn. 4).

³⁷² The "polyarchy plus" index was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, California on August 31, 2001.

considered relevant from a statistical point of view, while their significance in providing an exact picture of the process of democracy-building and consolidation in Eastern Europe, as well as offering the possibility of being used as important practical evidence for policy creation and implementation, should be accepted only after having been critically assessed by various specialists in the field. What is proposed in this latter case is to recode the IDEM at some future point in time in order to cover the same or an even larger number of countries and a longer period of time. The main idea is to have at least two coders per country, while the results obtained should be compared and agreed upon. If irreconcilable differences in scoring emerge, then the country (or set of items) should be re-coded by a third coder and, thus, the overall scores could be consolidated.

In this thesis no particular claim is made about the statistical validity of the IDEM, neither as regards its individual elements nor its general presentation; instead, the theoretical and conceptual validity of this measurement technique with respect to evaluating democratic performance in the post-communist world will be ascertained. Finally, it is argued that the method used to score the IDEM for Eastern Europe is a universal one: it could be replicated in other regions and historical contexts. Moreover, its conceptualisation and specific structure enables us to score not only established state-entities undergoing democratisation, but also disputed territories and provinces as existing units of decision-making and people's representation subject to political analysis within the contemporary system of international relations.³⁷³

Q: How are the individual cases of the IDEM selected?

A: The overall reliability and representativeness of the current IDEM depend very much on the answer to this question. Among the 20 Eastern European countries

³⁷³ Specific reference is made here to 'polities' whose political status has not been permanently regulated and whose future depends primarily on the will of the international community represented by the UN and on a couple of larger states holding a special interest in the internal matters of these units. In Eastern Europe, these are, for instance, the constituent republics of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the province of Kosovo in Serbia, the Transdnister republic in Moldova, the Abkhazia province in Georgia and the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internationally, the number of these quasi-state entities is even greater. It is enough to mention the Palestinian Authority in the Middle East, the Republic of Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara in Morocco and Kashmir in India to be able to imagine the problem that these political units pose for foreign analysts and researchers to study on a par with internationally recognised states.

selected there are a few significant omissions. These are, for instance, the Former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. In the case of the first group of countries, the decision not to include them in this sample was predicated upon the fact that there was civil war in those territories and the legal status of those political units was not completely settled neither domestically nor internationally. In the Russian case, it was presumed that the largest republic of the ex-Soviet Union would probably have been very difficult to analyse, because there could not be an 'average' Russia. This reality would have certainly posed problems for the collection of information and the measurement of the process of democratisation across the whole of the Russian Federation. As a counter example to the option of excluding certain post-communist countries, I have included two 'non-European' states from Central Asia which were part of the former Soviet empire: namely, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. By integrating them in this sample, it is proposed to look primarily for common features and trends in the political development of these previously autocratic regimes, whose transformation occurred and has been heavily influenced by a Soviet-style communist elite that has managed to preserve its former administrative power and political authority in these newly-created countries.

6.4. The IDEM: Presentation of the Results and Preliminary Conclusions

In this section the results of the IDEM are presented and some initial inferences about the process of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe for the period 1989-99 are made. As already mentioned, the IDEM has 21 items evenly distributed in seven categories. These factor variables are listed in the table below.

Table 1

21 Factors of the IDEM

I. Self-governing polity

1) There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions.

- 2) Actors operating outside the polity's territory do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions.
- 3) The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories.

II. Free and fair elections

- 4) Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes.
- 5) Those in positions of public authority and the major opposition parties respect the results of these elections.
- 6) Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently and regularly.

III. Elected officials

- 7) Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials.
- 8) Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated.
- 9) The composition and term of office of government is not decided by a single person or political body, and appointments are not made without the holding of elections (except in cases explicitly described by the constitution).

IV. Democratic constitution

- 10) The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties for all citizens and these are observed in practice.
- 11) There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution.
- 12) The democratic constitution is newly drafted and ratified.

V. Freedom of expression

- 13) The regime has no political prisoners, and political terror and torture are absent.
- 14) There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution and closure of newspapers and TV stations).
- 15) There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for those providing essential services).

VI. Alternative information

- 16) The media is not a state (nor private) monopoly and is free of government control.
- 17) There is a media law which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees access to alternative sources of information.
- 18) The plurality of opinion is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed.

VII. Associational autonomy

- 19) There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party.
- 20) There are trade unions and professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties.
- 21) Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations.

Each of these items is given a score of '0' or '1' for every country for each consecutive year between 1989 and 1999. Appendix I exemplifies how this is done in practice. It shows an empty sample table and all democratisation scores for the period

covered by this study. The results of this measurement procedure are summarised in the next table. The raw scores of every country are added up for each year. In addition, the average score per country and per year are provided at the right-hand side and at the end of this table.

Table 2

Index of Democratisation - IDEM (1989-1999)

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	Average (by country)
Albania	3	3	6	14	17	17	16	12	7	18	20	12.09
Armenia			3	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6.55
Azerbaijan			2	4	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	3.22
Belarus			4	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5.22
Bulgaria	3	16	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	18.90
Croatia			8	8	8	8	10	11	13	13	18	10.77
Czech Republic	4	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	19.27
Estonia			18	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	20.44
Georgia			4	7	8	10	13	13	16	16	16	11.44
Hungary	8	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	19.81
Latvia			18	19	19	20	21	21	21	21	21	20.11
Lithuania			18	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	20.67
Macedonia			7	10	11	14	15	13	18	19	19	14
Moldova			5	8	9	16	17	17	18	18	17	13.89
Poland	14	20	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	20.09
Romania	3	13	19	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	18.27
Slovakia	3	20	20	21	18	19	19	19	20	21	21	18.27
Slovenia			21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Ukraine			10	11	11	13	14	15	15	15	15	13.22
Uzbekistan			3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Average by year	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
	—	—	12.4	14.15	14.25	15.2	15.6	15.35	15.7	16.4	16.7
	5.43*	16.14*									

* Valid for only six countries: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Appendix II presents the overall results of the IDEM for Eastern Europe both numerically and graphically. Additionally, the final results for the period 1989-99 are aggregated region by region within the former Communist Bloc: i.e. featuring the progress of democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic and other former Soviet Union states, South-Eastern Europe, and the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The information provided in Table 2 and Appendix 2 reveals a number of important matters regarding the process of democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe. First, the data for the period under consideration shows that this has been an unevenly developing process, characterised, however, by the constant progress of democratic transformation. This evidence is supported by the results of the average IDEM scores by country and year at the end of Table 2. Although certain states and sub-regions have fared much better than others with respect to accomplishing the transition to democracy, the general political outlook of the region is a positive one in the sense that more and more countries have crossed the critical point of 'no return' to autocracy and have engaged in consolidating democratic regimes. Secondly, it seems as though the democratisation drive of certain polities could be considerably slowed down and even interrupted in the event of a serious economic crisis (e.g. Albania and Moldova) or when the ruling elite does not have a full control over the entire state territory to implement its decisions and the rule of law (e.g. Georgia, Macedonia and Moldova). These two issues, together with the problem of civil war, seem to be plaguing the democratic transitions of some post-communist countries, thereby preventing them from conducting more profound reforms and consolidating democracy.³⁷⁴ Thirdly, it appears that a number of former Soviet Union countries, after having initially undertaken democratic reforms (or, more precisely, after having liberalised their political systems) have given up efforts to establish political democracy and constitutionally-based regimes. This has not only been valid for the typical in this respect Central Asian republics like Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent,

³⁷⁴ This observation coincides almost entirely with the conclusions of Petr Kopecky and Cass Mudde in their article "What has Eastern Europe Taught Us about The Democratisation Literature (and Vice Versa)?", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (June 2000), pp. 517-39, where the authors describe "state and nation building" and "internationalisation and European integration" as some of the relatively understudied but most important factors of democratisation in the former Communist Bloc.

Azerbaijan, but also for Belarus and Armenia, whose leaders have established personal dictatorships using some of the institutions of democracy as a 'façade' for autocratic rule. Fourthly, certain newly-created regimes, such as Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia and Ukraine, made substantial progress in democratisation during the first couple of years after the collapse of communism and have given the impression that they are steadily moving towards consolidation of democracy. Unfortunately, their results have stalled and even regressed in the second half of the 1990s, confirming those specialists proclaiming the reversible character of democratic reforms in Eastern Europe. These four countries together with Croatia and Albania represent the most dynamic group in this sample, while their results determine to a large extent the final results and general outlook of the IDEM for the entire region. Fifthly, the majority of countries of East-Central Europe and the Baltic States have moved quickly from communism to some form of political democracy, thus setting a remarkably rapid *tempo* of democratisation which has still not been paralleled anywhere in the world. In the case of Slovenia, but also in Hungary and the Czech Republic, the transition to and consolidation of democracy merged into virtually the same process, resolving the problem of the existence of a stable democratic regime but opening the debate on improving the quality of democracy. Finally, attention is drawn to the observation that the general results of the IDEM for the period 1989-99 confirm some of the initial hypotheses stated in chapter 1: namely, that *"although a fairly large number of Eastern European states will become functioning political democracies, a number of post-communist regimes will never accomplish a democratic transition and will remain autocratic or hybrid regimes"* and *"the holding of free and fair elections and the building of a complete set of democratic political institutions are not sufficient guarantees that democracy will be consolidated"*. This is quite important, because, in this way, some of the original theoretical views expressed in this thesis about the evolution of the democratisation process in Eastern Europe have found their empirical confirmation, thus creating a link between the theoretical elaboration of the various factors of the IDEM and practical reality.

When analysing the results of the IDEM by sub-region (Appendix II), one cannot help but make one particular observation: namely, that the countries situated further to the east and south fare less well in democratic reforms than their East-Central European and Baltic counterparts. It seems that countries whose geographical position is much

closer to the core Western European countries and the capital of the EU, Brussels, complete democratic transition and manage to deepen democracy much faster. Although such an empirically-derived conclusion is difficult to explain analytically, since it might well be based on spurious evidence about the situation of democratic reforms in the former Communist Bloc and be influenced by various contextual factors, it is interesting to note that, from a historical perspective, the majority of countries around the world placed near key centres of regional integration or large democratic neighbours have managed to modernise their economies and to establish political democracy much more rapidly than countries on the periphery.

Since the underlying interest of this thesis includes not only *which* countries democratise faster but also *how* and *why* they democratise,³⁷⁵ an attempt is made to compare the political development of countries via a Spearman rank correlation for the country data aggregated over the period 1989-99 (Appendix III). Spearman correlation for a discrete statistical index such as the IDEM (i.e. which scores items with '0' and '1') works in the following way: it looks for similar rank ordering of factors according to their quantitative contribution to IDEM, presuming that countries with a comparable arrangement of factors would have undergone virtually the same political experience and are part of the same social process. The modern terminology thus refers to "measures of associations" between the elements of two rank versions being, for instance, the final measurement scores for country X and country Y in the IDEM, rather than the correlation among the countries themselves.³⁷⁶ According to the results obtained for 20 post-communist countries, two South-Eastern European countries, Bulgaria and Romania show a similar pattern of democratisation among themselves and with all East-Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). This is also true, but to a much lesser extent, for Albania, Armenia and Belarus, that had initiated democratic reforms in the early 1990s but that experienced substantial setbacks and regression in their democratic political development. It is suggested that the figures for this latter set of countries are not fully representative of their real state of democratic affairs in the sense that they parallel the dynamic evolution of the East-Central European counterparts in the first

³⁷⁵ See the discussions in sections 6.3. and 6.4. on the analytical purpose and conceptual logic of creating a statistical index of democratisation.

couple of years after the collapse of communism, but fail to preserve democracy and the stability of their political regime. For this reason, their 'nominal' results show a stagnation of democratisation at virtually the same low-intermediate levels. Finally, it is probably worth mentioning that cross-country comparisons using the Spearman correlation are not reliable when countries have the same score over the entire survey period. Among the twenty selected East European countries, Slovenia and Uzbekistan are the polities with the highest and lowest IDEM scores over the entire period. Slovenia, having a score of 21, and Uzbekistan, having a score of 3, ever since the beginning of their existence as independent states in 1991, has not permitted the comparison of their political development with other countries in the region.

6.5. Relation with Other Indexes

In this section, the results of the IDEM are compared with those of other socio-political indexes covering the same or virtually the same set of countries over the period 1989-99. The conceptual foundations of the index are also revised, especially in terms of its success in representing various aspects of the democratisation process and ability to capture political changes that other statistical indexes try to measure in different ways. Five main indexes are considered: the IDEM-adjusted, the *Freedom House* democracy index, the *EBRD* transition index, the *Heritage Foundation* index of economic freedom, and the *UN* human development index. The *Freedom House* and *EBRD* indexes are split into several indexes: the first – into the 'political rights' index (PR), the 'civil liberties' index (CL) and the mixed PR/CL index, and, the second – into the 'private share of the GDP' index and the 'legal reform' index. Each one of the five principal indexes covers a part of or the entire period between 1989 and 1999. The IDEM-adjusted and the *Freedom House* index deal with the full eleven years of this study, while the *EBRD* and the *Heritage Foundation* indexes include a shorter period of five year (1995-99) and the *UN* Human Development Index (HDI) features the years between 1989 and 1997.

Before the IDEM is related to other social and political indexes measuring various features of the democratisation process, an explanation is offered of what the adjusted

³⁷⁶ Pirie, W. (1988); *Encyclopaedia of Statistical Sciences*, Vol. 8, Samuel Katz and Norman Johnson (eds.) (New York: John Wiley and Sons), pp. 584-87.

IDEM represents. Returning to Table 1 in this chapter, where the individual factor variables of the original IDEM are listed, it is easy to remark that the first three elements (the "self-governing polity" set of factors) are not intrinsically linked to the process of democratisation and do not even determine the format of the political system being established. However, the 'territorial' factors are quite important for the stability of the governance unit and represent in fact a condition *sine qua non* for the functioning of democracy or any other kind of political system. Since many countries in Eastern Europe have had more or less serious problems strengthening their border regimes and establishing full control over their entire state territory, It has been presumed that it would be useful to create a new index of democratisation which centres primarily on the political process as such and disregards, at least for a while, the national/territorial preoccupations of the post-communist elites. Thus, by stripping the original IDEM from its "self-governing" factors, a different IDEM-adjusted has been produced.

In fact, the IDEM-adjusted correlates quite highly with the previous IDEM. This is not because of a statistical chance, but because both indexes are quite similar by construction. In some countries like Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Macedonia and Moldova, however, small variations in the original results could be observed: namely that in Azerbaijan and Croatia, territoriality factors seem to play a greater role than in the other countries of the region. In the remaining set of post-autocratic states, concern for the successful completion of various political reforms and democratisation appears to prevail.³⁷⁷ Despite the small statistical disparities among countries, the IDEM-adjusted offers an interesting opportunity empirically to probe some of the key hypotheses of political scientists regarding the impact of territoriality and sovereignty on democratisation in a post-nation-state era.

The IDEM correlates quite well with the different *Freedom House* indexes (PR, CL and PR/CL). Despite the many structural divergences and different ways of scoring the IDEM and the *Freedom House* set of democracy indexes, the range of correlation

³⁷⁷ The inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and especially Russia would certainly have changed the general outlook of the IDEM with respect to state building and territorial control. Presumably, this would have increased the importance of the IDEM-adjusted mathematical relation with the original IDEM, which would have provided, in turn, more complete information about the role of "self-governance" factors in post-communist Eastern Europe.

between them is as high as 80-90 percent in at least half of the countries, while most of the results in the majority of the other cases are between 40-50 percent. Interesting evidence that also emerges from correlating the results of the IDEM with those of the 'political rights' (PR) and 'civil liberties' (CL) indexes is that the IDEM correlates evenly with both *Freedom House* indexes. This probably means that, although being a predominantly procedural index of democratisation, the IDEM addresses equally well issues related to citizens' rights, associations' activity and media freedom.

As regards the relation with the next two indexes, the *EBRD* and the *Heritage Foundation* indexes, the information obtained from these surveys for different countries is not full and occasionally absent. This is either because the assessment period has been relatively short (i.e. between 1995 and 1999) and, hence, there has been little variation in the data, or because these social indexes have not included some of the post-communist countries in their surveys or have included them only quite recently, so not enough statistical observations have been made to compare their results with the results with the IDEM. Among the various outcomes of the partial correlation of these indexes with the IDEM, I would like to single out some of the statistically significant results obtained after a correlation with the *EBRD* "the private share of GDP" sub-index. For countries like Croatia, Georgia and Slovakia, but also, much less pronouncedly, for Macedonia and Ukraine, the processes of privatisation and democratisation appear to go hand-in-hand. However, once these results have been accepted as reliable by most specialists, it becomes very difficult to tell which one of these processes spurs the other. The real dilemma for researchers and decision-makers is to say which reform precedes the other (i.e. in the economic or in the political sphere) in order to achieve optimal results both in terms of democratisation and restructuring of the state industry and finances at the end.

The correlation with the last of the five selected indexes, the *UN Human Development Index (HDI)*, demonstrates that despite the severe social, economic and demographic problems facing the post-communist countries, democratic transformation has proceeded smoothly in some countries while in others it has progressed unevenly or has completely stopped. Moreover, it appears that in the transitional phase after the collapse of the former autocratic system, the various political processes, and democratisation in particular, have been showing quite diverse trends from "human

development” and modernisation. In fact, both sets of processes seem to have been going in different directions since the beginning of post-communist transition. This is also supported by the strongly negative correlation between the IDEM and the HDI. In relation to this, it is interesting to note that with the progress of democratic and various economic reforms in some regions like East-Central Europe and the Baltic States, the HDI values stabilised and began rapidly to improve in the second half of the studied period (1989-97). In the vast majority of the other Eastern European countries, however, the pre-1989 HDI levels have never been attained and the time-horizon for improving the social welfare and the quality of life of the population has moved even further away with each consecutive year of reform in some countries. Finally, despite the numerous imperfections of both the IDEM and the HDI, what becomes generally clear after correlating them is that the extrication from communism is a painful process and no one can guess how long the successful completion of this transformation will take.

6.6. Factor Analysis and Regression Analysis

The idea behind factor analysis is to see which set of the 21 elements of the IDEM better explains cross-country differences during the period 1989-99. The principal goal of this procedure is to reduce the IDEM to a combination of several factors that, presumably, have the largest collective impact on the democratisation of post-communist Eastern Europe. In Appendix IV, an attempt is made to explain the total variance of this statistical index by using a principal component analysis. The results of this mathematical procedure show that the IDEM contains **three** autonomous indexes that represent most of its features. According to the information presented in the table of total variance of democratisation factors (Appendix IV), the IDEM could be reduced to approximately **five** factors explaining 93 percent variation. The problem that will be addressed further on in this section is to find out exactly which are these factors. One possible way of doing this is to regress the total set of 21 IDEM factors and to choose five factors that best capture the meaning and convey the logic of the IDEM.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to return to the three mini-indexes (components) representing different aspects of the IDEM. The three outcomes obtained through a principal component extraction method paint the following picture:

- 1) The first component proves that all but the first three 'territorial' factors (see Table 1 of this chapter) constitute a single index. These are basically the entire set of Robert Dahl's *polyarchy scale* requirements plus the additional factors regarding the democratic role of the constitution and the media.
- 2) Conversely, the second component gives priority to the "self-governing polity" and overlooks the importance of the other factors.
- 3) The record of the third component is rather mixed: within it, only the "associational autonomy" factors (19 to 21) are relatively important.

What can be concluded from this mathematical operation? It should first be mentioned that the IDEM could be split into **three components (indexes)**, but they are very difficult to interpret, because all three of them represent variance of different groups of IDEM factors. Secondly, one can single out the first two indexes as statistically significant – one focusing on 'political democracy' and another on 'self-governing polity'. The data of the third component does not demonstrate any consistent trends with respect to democratisation, therefore it should be excluded. Thirdly, the total variance of my index is explained by the first two indexes almost completely, the third index adding only about 5 percent total variance up. Fourthly, the proportion of total variance explained by the first and second component is 70 to 10 percent in favour of the *polyarchy scale*. This shows a clear predominance of the 'political democracy' criteria over the 'territorial' criteria.

As already mentioned, not only can the IDEM be divided into two separate statistical indexes, but also its factor variables can be reduced to approximately **five factors** (this is at least what the factor analysis in Appendix IV demonstrates). The benchmark for choosing five instead of four or six factors is an eigenvalue of more than .5, which is of course arbitrary from a mathematical point of view. The real question then

is which of these factors best represents the whole set of 21 IDEM factors. After regressing all 21 items of the IDEM on different combinations of five factors, it is concluded that the following combination of five factors explains most successfully the variation of the individual variables of my statistical index. These factors are (see Table 1):

- # 3. "The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories";
- # 4. "Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes";
- # 12. "A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified";
- # 16. "Media is not a state (nor private) monopoly and is free of government control";
- # 21. "Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations".

It should, however, be specified that these five factors are representative of the entire set of remaining 16 IDEM factor variables with the exception of two. These are namely:

- # 2. "Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions";
- # 19. "There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party".

If the last two statements are added to the previous list of five factors, then it could be concluded that the IDEM could easily be reduced to seven factors (five plus two). Moreover, the new 'collapsed' version of the IDEM seems to be quite representative of the different features of the process of democratisation. For instance, various topics like defending national sovereignty and applying the rule of law (items # 2 and 3), the holding of free and fair elections (item # 4), drafting and ratifying a new democratic constitution (item # 12), guaranteeing the independence of the media (item # 16), and assisting the development of the political parties and civil society (items #19 and 21) are covered by this minimalist variant of the IDEM. Finally, it is worth noting that these factors are evenly spread across all three 'components' from the component

matrix in Appendix IV. This is additional proof that these five or seven factors are the ones explaining the total variance of the IDEM to the maximum possible extent.

6.7. Gradation of Factors by Region and Sub-region

Using the statistically manipulated data in Appendix V, it is proposed to differentiate among IDEM factors according to their difficulty to achieve throughout the period covered by this research. Initially, the results for all of Eastern Europe will be analysed. Two large groups of post-communist countries will be considered: the EU candidate states and the rest of the countries from the region. Finally, the different sub-regions in Eastern Europe will be discussed, i.e. East-Central Europe, the Baltic States, South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the FSU countries of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The main idea is to find out which factors are key to establishing political democracy and consolidating it by judging the relative difficulty and frequency of achieving them at the same time. In other words, it is assumed that the analytical and practical foundations of the IDEM are sound enough to distinguish among factors depending on the various circumstances in which they are applied.

According to the information obtained for the whole of Eastern Europe (Appendix V), it could be argued that some of the most difficult to achieve factors are related to the creation of independent and democratic media and the implementation of the 'division of powers' written down in most post-communist constitutions. This set of factors is closely followed by the important procedural requirement that public authorities and major opposition parties respect the outcomes of elections. Among the easiest to satisfy elements of democracy (with a couple of notable exceptions, however) are the nominal resolution of the territoriality and sovereignty problem and the toleration of opposition parties and other civic organisations.

The distinction made here between EU candidate states and the rest of Eastern Europe produces some interesting results with respect to my previous hypotheses about the role of regional integration and the relevance of the distance from Brussels for the

democratisation and economic development of the post-communist countries.³⁷⁸ The more-advanced in democracy-building first group of countries stresses the importance of drafting and implementing a new democratic constitution. In addition, the EU candidate states set another legalistic issue as a key priority: the adoption of a media law that establishes the rules of the market and designates the media-related authorities and institutions. The second group of countries, composed of countries which are not EU candidates, experiences serious difficulties in enforcing "horizontal accountability" between the people in power, on the one hand, and between the most important state institutions, on the other. It also fails to guarantee the independent and non-monopolistic character of the media. The 'easy-to-achieve' items in both sets of Eastern European countries are quite similar, thus they directly influence the final result for this category of factors for the entire region discussed above.³⁷⁹

The empirical investigation on the relative role of individual IDEM factors for democratisation proceeds at the sub-regional level by looking at different territories and groups of countries in the former Communist Bloc. In the three ex-Soviet Union republics of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, the most difficult to achieve items are related to the role of the independent media, the division of powers between state institutions and the accountability of political leaders before and after elections. Presumably, the criteria which are much easier to satisfy are solving problems related to the role of foreign 'veto groups' and the official recognition of opposition parties. Regarding the Caucasus and Central Asia, the political picture is quite similar. The only difference in these countries is the larger emphasis that should be placed on freedom of the means of communication and the implementation of the political and civil rights of individuals, especially with respect to their freedom from persecution and torture for political reasons. In East-Central Europe, the principal issues are the creation of a new democratic constitution and the attitudinal support of the population for democratic reforms. In the Baltic States the chief problem is the application of constitutional principles and norms to all groups and territories and their observation in practice by state authorities. This is particularly valid in the case of the discriminatory treatment of Russian and other minorities, at least during the period

³⁷⁸ See section 6.3. of this chapter.

that this study has researched. Finally, in South-Eastern Europe the principal difficulties are related to the application of the division of powers and the enforcement of the constitutional rules. Moreover, the creation of democratic media institutions and the guarantee of their independence are equally deserving of concern in this scale of issues.

In summary, it appears that the main sub-regions of Eastern Europe do not differ so much with respect to their democratisation requirements. The only important cleavage that emerges is between the EU candidate states and the remaining group of Eastern European countries. The chief difference between them is the necessity to develop the legal framework in the first group much faster while prioritising the assertion of various civil liberties and the independence of media in the second group. Moreover, the overall impression regarding the state of democracy in the countries not applying for EU membership is that the separation of powers and the freedom of elections are not completely guaranteed in all of them, which, in turn, poses serious problems for the consolidation of democracy.


6.8. Conclusion

In this chapter an attempt has been made to measure the level of political democracy and its consolidation using the index of democratisation. Compared to the predominantly theoretical reflections on democratisation in a post-communist context and the conceptualisation of the IDEM in previous chapters, this has been a completely different exercise. Various statistical techniques have been applied to process and analyse the data for the period 1989-99. Initially, the results of individual Eastern European countries were correlated in order to find out variations and similarities among former autocratic states. Next, the democratic development of the entire region and its several sub-regions was monitored by comparing the outcomes of the IDEM with other socio-political indexes covering the transformation in countries of the former Communist Bloc. An analysis of the structure of the IDEM followed, which employed factor analysis and a regression technique to find out which factors

³⁷⁹ Incidentally, the groups of EU candidate states and the remaining Eastern European countries are equal in numbers (10 countries each), thus having the same quantitative impact on the final score for the whole of Eastern Europe.

have contributed most to the establishment and the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. All 21 factor variables of the IDEM were graded in order to see which ones had been the easiest and which ones had been the most difficult to achieve throughout the studied period. Finally, an assessment has been made of the varied importance of particular factors for democratisation and their difficulty in achieving a specific differentiation among individual and groups of countries.

However, it should be clearly stated that the IDEM contains some general weaknesses and possible measurement errors. For instance, the period of measuring democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe is quite short (11 years) and no far-reaching pronouncements about the consolidation of democracy could be made. Moreover, this index fails to capture all the relevant aspects of democratic transformation: most notably, the impact of international factors and the role of regional integration. Another serious problem is related to its failure in distinguishing between different consolidated democratic regimes. For example, although Romania and Poland might have the complete IDEM score of 21 during most of the years, the resilience and quality of democracy of these two states was certainly not equal at the end of this period. The question that arises in relation to this is what exactly does the IDEM measure, and the correct answer is: "procedural/institutional" consolidation and not "attitudinal/social" consolidation as some people might expect. Then, according to the results obtained by measuring using this index, the suggested logic is that after a certain point of 'no return' towards autocracy (i.e. when the 21 threshold is achieved), the consolidation of democracy becomes more a question of time rather than of welfare and social consent. This empirical outcome is not consistent with most democracy scholars' idea of democratic consolidation and certainly not with the original analytical conceptualisation of the IDEM. Despite its potential flaws, however, the IDEM has its strong points too. For instance, it provides a good snapshot picture of democratic transformation in the region as well as some specific information about the initial steps towards democratisation of most Eastern European countries after 1989. Moreover, by using such an innovative measurement technique, this research offers not only a comparative overview of democratic reforms and institution building, but also a quantitative (as well as qualitative) account of the democratic achievements of political elites and the citizens of the region at different points of time after the collapse of communist rule.




Part IV

Conclusions

“It is not the business of the botanist to eradicate the weeds.
Enough for him if he can tell us just how fast they grow”.

– C. Northcote Parkinson,
Parkinson's Law



Chapter 7

What Have We Learned from the Eastern European Democratisations?

7.1. Introduction

Comprehensive analyses of the outcomes of both the theoretical research and the measurement of various features of the processes of democratisation and social transformation in a post-communist context have already been presented in the previous chapters. In this chapter, only some major points related to the theoretical and empirical results will be summarised, while the overall scientific contribution of this doctoral project will be evaluated. The possible impact of this research on the evolution of comparative democratisation studies and the development of new measurement techniques gauging the advancement of political democracy and its quality will also be appraised. Moreover, the theoretical hypotheses regarding Eastern European democratisations laid down in chapter 1 will be reviewed and juxtaposed with the empirical findings produced in some of the later chapters. Based on these preliminary conclusions, an attempt to propose guidelines for further research on democratisation and other closely related topics will be made. Before performing this, however, the state of the social science discipline(s) dealing with the post-communist transformations in Eastern Europe will be examined. It will be described analytically with respect to the recent progress made by the comparative democratisation studies, and particularly by 'transitology' and 'consolidology' as emerging sub-disciplines of this kind of academic research. Finally, the possibility of measuring democracy both within Eastern Europe and outside of the region, as well as the validity of IDEM and other statistical indexes of democratisation, will closely be evaluated.

7.2. The State of the Discipline

The global spread of Western-style political democracy and, implicitly, capitalism, was seen by both social scientists and those in positions of power in Eastern Europe as the culmination of the societal quest for freedom and justice similar to the goals of the American and French Revolutions from the end of the 18th century. However, the dismal failure of communist ideology and the return of the majority of the Eastern European countries 'back to Europe' and to democracy were not sufficient proof to proclaim a complete victory over authoritarianism and the "end of history".³⁸⁰ The political and economic gains achieved on a regional scale had to be consolidated first before being exported elsewhere. That is why the excessive enthusiasm with which the majority of social scientists greeted the crumbling of the communist system has laid them open to criticism for failing to understand democratic transitions. The early and occasionally uncritical attitude towards studying the multiple challenges of post-communist transformation certainly had a negative influence on further academic research of political change and democratic consolidation.

One of the major problems for social science disciplines focusing on democratisation after the fall of communism was the general 'conservatism' of some area specialists who had already been studying Eastern Europe for several decades. These social scientists continued a long-standing tradition of describing the former Soviet Bloc countries as one uniformly developing mass of states subject to the same ideological treatment. The traditional Russo-centrism and even Moscow-centrism of some political scholars also precluded a social and political comparison not only between the newly emerging Eastern European regimes and their Western counterparts, but also between regimes within the former Communist Bloc.

After having initially gained momentum and popularity both among Eastern and Western academics during the 1960s and 70s, the altogether promising sub-discipline of comparative regional studies of Eastern Europe, focusing primarily on the systemic differences and similarities between the then-socialist countries,³⁸¹ was eventually (and quite inexplicably) reduced to studying the structure and performance of

³⁸⁰ Fukuyama, F. (1989); "The End of History", *The National Interest*, No. 16 (Summer 1989).

³⁸¹ Skilling, H. G. (1966); *The Governments of the Communist East Europe* (New York, Crowell); Brzezinski, Z. (1967); *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press); and Kanet, R. E. (1974); *The Soviet Union and The Developing Nations* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

communist government and the role of *individual leaders* in the former Soviet Politburo.³⁸² This, in turn, gave birth to the completely new sub-disciplines of "Sovietology" and "Kremlinology" – exclusively concentrated on Moscow's ruling elites.³⁸³ Despite their narrow specialisation in the political affairs of one country, describing mainly the power relations among its leadership, sovietologists failed to predict the rise of such a reformist First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party as Michail Gorbachev and paid little attention to the growing ethno-nationalist tensions at the periphery of the Soviet Empire as, for instance, in the Caucasus and in the Baltic States.³⁸⁴ One political scholar shrewdly described this category of social scientists as "analysts for whom the Politburo and the queuing at Lenin's mausoleum sufficed as a window on the politics of communist states ...".³⁸⁵

Dealing with the prevailing stereotypes about conducting theoretical and empirical investigation in post-communist Eastern Europe has not been easy and, consequently, it took some time. It is easy to imagine, however, that even for critically-minded researchers, using different theoretical concepts and research methods than the one used by the area specialists or sovietologists, it has been quite difficult initially to transcend the communist/post-communist dichotomy of describing these states. It can also be presumed that the former communist regimes were simply too distant and unknown, especially for Western scholars. That is why social scientists were unwilling, but also unable, to predict the exact outcome of such an indeterminate systemic transformation as the one from communist rule. *Uncertainty* was indeed the 'code word' when referring to post-socialist democratisation and especially to the process of transition to democracy. Some examples could be provided to illustrate the complex outcomes emerging out of the regime change in different countries of the region and the opposite reactions of social scientists. For instance, in some parts of the former Communist Bloc, the change of the former communist leaders has been quite

³⁸² On this topic see Fleron, F. and Hoffmann, E. (eds.) (1993); Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

³⁸³ Markwick, R. (1996); "A Discipline in Transition?: From Sovietology to 'Transitology'", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (September 1996), pp. 225-276, p. 258.

³⁸⁴ Motyl, A. (1989); "'Sovietology in One Country' or Comparative Nationality Studies?", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1989), pp. 83-88; and Malia, M. (1992); "From Under the Rubble, What?", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2 (January-April 1992), p. 105.

³⁸⁵ Nelson, D. (1993); "The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe", in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.) Developments in East European Politics (London: Macmillan Press), pp. 242-61, p. 250.

smooth and conclusive, while in other sub-regions the unreformed *nomenklatura* clutched to power leaving no opportunity for the evolution of pluralism and political democracy. These contrasting experiences, which are probably best visible when comparing the countries of East-Central Europe with those of the Caucasus and Central Asia, have led to a lot of conceptual confusion and political regime labelling. Another famous judgement mistake was made with respect to the early optimistic scenarios about the development of civil society and its role in Eastern European democratisations. It was predicted that, immediately after the collapse of communist rule in the region, civil society would spontaneously emerge as a response to the "leading role of the party" playing the role of a powerful instrument of democratic change.³⁸⁶ What happened in reality was a mixture of regime outcomes: political processes sustaining democratisation emanated from both *below* and *above*, and not solely from *below*. Moreover, in many countries civil society not only did not fill the power gap after the retreat of the communist party and its related political and social organisations, but occasionally contributed to the growing societal confusion and institutional disarray in the transitional period.³⁸⁷

Consequently, it could be argued that the majority of the early regime change theories regarding elite and civil society politics in post-communist Eastern Europe have not been as innovative or comprehensive as originally presented. Furthermore, they often failed to identify the critical challenges and explain the underlying problems of democratic transformation in the region as, for instance, the rise of nationalism and the diverging political and economic performance of certain groups of countries. As a response to the rapid evolution of the social sciences in both Eastern and Western Europe and the pressing need for producing substantial research results, most scholars studying democratic transformation in Eastern Europe decided either to adopt the relatively new but already proven **comparative research methods**, which had already been used to analyse regime change in Southern Europe and Latin America, or to resist altering or reformulating their conceptual viewpoints by maintaining their narrow area studies focus.

³⁸⁶ For some cautionary opinions see Schopflin, G. (1991); "Nationalism and National Minorities", *Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 45, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 51-65; and Dahrendorf, R. (1990); Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (London: Chatto and Windus).

³⁸⁷ Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U. (eds.) (1998); Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 25.

7.2.1. *The Triumph of Comparative Social Sciences*

To compare or not to compare? This has been one of the crucial questions repeatedly put forward by different generations of social scientists working on Eastern Europe. This problem has become quite relevant after 1989-91, since scholars using and promoting comparative methods of analysis would not only study the similarities and differences between countries and processes in the region, but would compare them on a larger European and global scale. One of the most discussed issues in the early 1990s was whether transitions from communism in Eastern Europe could logically be compared with democratic transitions in other parts of the world, and particularly the ones of the same "democratisation wave", i.e. in Southern Europe and Latin America. This academic debate tentatively opposed two groups of social scientists – the comparativists and the sovietologists. The former claimed that the path of the former socialist states to democracy or to other kinds of political systems was similar to that of the post-autocratic regimes in other regions experiencing social and political change before or at the same period of time. Moreover, they suggested that there existed universal and, hence, replicable analytical models and research designs that could be advanced in Eastern Europe. The latter group of social scientists disqualified such proposals by pointing to the extreme differences between post-communist Europe and other regions of the world, mainly in terms of the *ideological* nature of the previous political system and its *encompassing* character (i.e. controlling all the political institutions and most spheres of public life, including 'civil' society and its primary elements such as the ethnic group, village, family and even single individuals). Despite the well-founded scientific arguments of both types of political scholars, practice has eventually shown that the preferred method of analysis by students of democracy both East and West has been the comparative one. However, the efforts of regional specialists and former sovietologists were not left 'ungratified' either. These political scholars managed to enrich significantly the comparative democratisation literature with new insights on the widely-used theoretical analyses of transition to democracy by offering (may be for the first time) a serious critique of established conceptualisations such as the modes of *extrication* from authoritarianism and the *consolidation* of democracy after an initial period of transition.

The theoretical debate between comparativists and sovietologists reached its climax in the middle of the 1990s with the exchange of articles in the *Slavic Review* between representatives of various political science currents.³⁸⁸ Comparative social scientists like Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter argued that the sequence, rhythm and methods of doing away with the previous autocratic regime and the consolidation of democracy could largely be compared to those in Latin America and Southern Europe. They took a firm stance against the increasing “ghettoisation” of post-Soviet social sciences in the face of a delayed introduction of advanced qualitative and quantitative comparative methods. Area studies’ specialists or sovietologists like Valerie Bunce claimed that the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe were too different both structurally and ideologically from the autocracies in other parts of the world to be compared effectively. The supposed ‘uniqueness’ of the former Soviet-type political system and the different points of departure of the countries of the region after the collapse of the *ancien régime* were mentioned as main reasons for not using comparative methods more regularly. It is also interesting to note that both groups of social scientists paid at least some attention to the role of international factors in transforming the communist system and initiating democratic reforms, but they rarely included external factors as an important set of variables in their analyses on democratic consolidation, or presumed that the ‘Soviet Empire’ was the only relevant international factor.

More than a decade after the initiation of this theoretical debate, the majority of social scientists studying democratisation in post-communist Eastern Europe have agreed that the scientific importance of area studies has fallen into relative decline, while comparative methods have expanded their research scope and have been extensively used since the end of communist rule in the region.³⁸⁹ Meticulous observers would

³⁸⁸ See *Slavic Reviews*, Vols. 52-54: Terry, S. M. (1993); “Thinking About Postcommunist Transitions: How Different Are They?” (Summer 1993), pp. 333-37; Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1994); “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt To Go?” (Spring 1994), pp. 173-85; Bunce, V. (1995); “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?” (Spring 1995), pp. 111-27; Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1995); “From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?” (Winter 1995), pp. 965-78; and Bunce, V. (1995); “Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers” (Winter 1995), pp. 979-87.

³⁸⁹ Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2000); “What has Eastern Europe Taught Us about The Democratisation Literature (and Vice Versa)?”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (June 2000), pp. 517-39, p. 518.

even point out the fact that, throughout this period, 'former sovietologists' have occasionally employed comparative analysis tools to describe the cultural, institutional and historical peculiarities of the emerging political regimes in Eastern Europe.³⁹⁰ This symptomatic victory of the comparative political science theories over the narrowly-focused area studies has also been confirmed in practice. For instance, some of the analytical prescriptions derived from the experience of Southern European and Latin American countries with respect to the sequencing of the different stages of democratic transformation, i.e. the holding of political negotiations between the ruling elites and the opposition as well as the organisation of elections and the adoption of new democratic constitutions, were readily supported and implemented by the decision-makers in Eastern Europe.³⁹¹

A tentative consensus was eventually reached among students of democracy that the problem of comparing post-autocratic transitions in the former Soviet Bloc countries with those of other regions in the world was more a question of *degree* than of *substance*.³⁹² The task of democratising post-communist countries was probably perceived as more difficult not only because of the ideological character of the former socio-political system, but also because of the unpredictability and scope (e.g. the divergence among individual countries and the interlocking of 'multiple transitions') of this transformation. As one political scientist perceptibly remarked with regards to the future study of regime change in the region:

"The wrenching shift from communist to post-communist may be one of the least important for Europe's eastern half. ... Far more vital for East European

³⁹⁰ Fish, S. M. (1994); Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Bunce, V. (1997); "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern Europe", in Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, Mettenheim, K. von (ed.), (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 161-76; and Bunce, V. (2000); "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6/7, August/September 2000, pp. 703-34.

³⁹¹ Political personalities in Eastern Europe were often quoted to refer to the Spanish model of transition to democracy as having inspired them to organise and participate in the Round Table talks between members of the former communist government and the opposition parties during the early 1990s. See, for example, Elster, J. (ed.) (1996); The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: Chicago University Press); Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); and Bozoki, A. (ed.) (2002); The Roundtable Talks of 1989: A Genesis of Hungarian Democracy. Analysis and Documents (Budapest: CEU Press).

³⁹² Nodia, G. (1996); "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 15-29, pp. 17-18.

populations are ordinal and interval-level distinctions – the *degree* of political legitimacy, the *extent* to which security is achieved, and the *level* of socioeconomic development. These critical issues demand comparative and longitudinal studies, incorporating data from communist and post-communist periods”.³⁹³

The theoretical position supported by this research project with respect to the diverging positions of various social scientists in this academic debate is a predominantly comparative one. Not only is the process of democratisation conceptualised and analysed in this perspective, but also variations among countries along the path towards consolidation and quality of democracy are measured comparatively. For instance, process developments featuring the building of post-communist democratic regimes are studied comparatively both within and among the countries of the region, as well as by juxtaposing Eastern Europe to other areas of the world which have experienced democratisation. This doctoral thesis generally rejects the argument which was initially advanced by sovietologists that the political transformations of the former communist regimes in the region are too different from those of their counterparts in Southern Europe and Latin America. At the same time, however, this project tries to revise the general premises and adapt the theoretical hypotheses of the traditional comparative studies to the post-communist reality in Eastern Europe. One example of this is the attempt to measure the presence/absence of political democracy through the innovative *Index of Democratisation* first, before any pronouncements about the degree of consolidation and quality of democracy are made. Another example of a more balanced approach towards analysing some of the theoretical issues discussed by different social science schools is related to the choice between an actor-centred and a structural approaches to democratisation. It is assumed that neither the ‘modes of transition’, nor the ‘institutional design’, nor ‘socio-economic development’ models could explain fully the democratisation of the Eastern European countries. As mentioned in the opening chapter, and proven in the subsequent chapters, only a more mixed and process-driven approach can account for the massive drive towards democracy in the region.

³⁹³ Nelson, D. (1993); “The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe”, (fn. 6), p. 251.

Although clearly comparative, this thesis tries not to repeat some of the mistakes made by both comparativists and sovietologists. For instance, one of the key issues in the scientific debate between these two groups of social scientists has been the distinction between "concept borrowing" and "concept stretching". On the one hand, there seems to be nothing wrong with the first operation since the importation of theoretical notions and analytical models from other parts of the world could only enrich political researchers' understanding of the transformation processes in post-communist Eastern Europe as well as providing them with important indications about the methodological validity of some of their analyses. On the other hand, the 'blind' borrowing of theoretical concepts without bearing in mind the specificity of local conditions can only create more confusion, because it is quite possible that the specific qualities and contingent properties of a theoretical model may replace or blur the practical outcomes of the transformation process of the political system. The same double-sided argument goes for the notion of "concept stretching". Unfortunately, this term has been used rather idiosyncratically by both comparativists and sovietologists. The former group of scholars has used it in a predominantly Sartorian sense, meaning that a concept has either been applied outside of its initially agreed upon analytical 'property space', or it has been used 'elastically' to include several levels of vertical abstractions – referring to more than one hierarchically related process or subject of research. Sovietologists, on the other hand, principally referred to the idea of "concept stretching" when opposing the 'imperial intent' of comparativists, who, allegedly, nurtured an ambition to take over the Eastern European social studies with their particular analytical methods and concepts.

Regarding the issue of 'concept stretching' this doctoral project argues that, since the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe presents not only an extreme case of regime change, but also of systemic change in the modern theory and practice of social sciences, it appears necessary that some of the traditional notions and conceptual tools of comparative political research should be revised and possibly updated. Before doing this, however, one should be clear about the extreme socio-political divergences between the different countries of the region (the question of neatly defining the 'property space'). Moreover, when analysing transformation processes like transition from autocracy to democracy and consolidation of democracy, one has to also take into account both the unequal starting conditions of

the politics in the regions and their different paces of effectuating change, i.e. with respect to the sequencing of political and economic reforms *cum* the important historical and systemic tasks of EU and NATO integration.

Another important dilemma that was expounded by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, which still remains far from completely resolved by the majority of social scientists conducting research on Eastern Europe, is the so-called fallacy of “retrospective determinism”.³⁹⁴ The closest definition of this notion is that ‘what did happen is what had to happen’ and, in the case of the post-communist countries, it means that there was simply no way out of either autocracy or democracy. This argument is directly linked to the much-discussed concept of “equifinality”.³⁹⁵ This notion assumes that, despite the diverging paths of democratisation of countries in one region or between countries in different regions of the world, the range of possible outcomes and regime types might be the same. Although “retrospective determinism” and “equifinality” clearly present different theoretical arguments, the danger, according to this thesis, is that the eventual outcome of democratic transition in certain Eastern European countries should not automatically be attributed to either the initial conditions enabling these politics to start and complete democratic change, or to the force of contingent events (i.e. international factors) that have ‘siphoned’ these regimes, recently emerging from communist rule, to democracy or, respectively, autocracy.

Finally, there have been the ‘classical’ problems of scale and belonging to a specific geographical and political region. In both cases one has to make a choice not about whether to compare at all but about what to compare. As already noted, comparison between countries can be made both within and outside of the former Communist Bloc. For researchers from the region the differences between various Eastern European states have been so obvious that they tended to discriminate against post-communist countries and sub-regions that were in fact similar but situated far apart geographically. For instance, the question of including Central Asian, Caucasian and even some Balkan countries in one’s analysis of the Eastern European

³⁹⁴ Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1994); “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists ...”, *ibid.* (fn. 8), p.180.

democratisation process has been rather difficult for some social scientists used to territorially and culturally clear-cut cases. Consequently, certain attempts to not only describe comparatively but also to measure the political and social experience of some of the post-communist regimes with respect to democratisation could also make use of the “most different systems” analysis. As indicated by some social scientists having previously worked on other regions undergoing political transformation, for many years the predominant logic of selecting an appropriate research design has been the one aimed at elaborating plausible hypotheses regarding regime change. This purpose was best served by the “most similar systems” model. Today’s problems of social scientists being rather different, including the task of gathering qualitative and quantitative data on newly democratising regimes all over the world, such research has required the “testing, verifying, modifying and/or falsifying concepts and hypotheses that have been generated elsewhere”.³⁹⁶ From the perspective of this doctoral thesis, the choice of a more ‘universalising’ type of comparison, such as the “most different system” analysis, is key to understanding (and measuring) the process of consolidation of democracy in post-communist Eastern Europe – from Central Asia to Central Europe, and from the Baltics to the Balkans.³⁹⁷ As a matter of fact, however, since one of the essential aspects of this project is to gauge already existing theories about democratisation against the background of post-1989 political and social reality in the former Communist Bloc, the general model of analysis of systemic transformation in the region is a more differentiated one. It makes primary use of the “most similar systems” model while discussing theoretical issues (i.e. comparing the experience of Southern Europe and Latin America with that of Eastern Europe), while it avails itself of the methodological insights of the “most different system” research design when elaborating a way of including different post-communist countries into the measurement procedure regarding the consolidation and quality of political democracy in the region (i.e. during the creation and performance of the *Index of Democratisation*).

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*; and McFaul, M. (2002); “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World”, *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 319-38.

³⁹⁶ Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1995); “From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain ...”, *ibid.*, p. 971.

³⁹⁷ On designing cross-regional comparison and the relative usefulness of different types of comparative research methods see, for example, Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. (1970); *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons); and Ragin, Ch. (1987); *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

7.2.2. *Transitology and Consolidology: A Conceptual Mess*

As already demonstrated in the previous section, comparative social sciences gained a preponderant position in the academic debate about the choice of appropriate methods of studying regime change in Eastern Europe. Together with the importation of theoretical concepts, empirical assumptions and research hypotheses derived from the transformation experience of Latin American and Southern European countries, two additional key notions were introduced by comparative political scholars working on the democratisation of the post-communist region: transition and consolidation. These terms denoted two closely-related, although quite different both technically and temporally political processes, referring to different stages of the democratic development of post-autocratic states. As a result of the theoretical searching of political scholars and decades-long exchanges of various analytical points of view about democratisation in different parts of the world, two distinct social science sub-disciplines emerged: 'transitology' and 'consolidology'.³⁹⁸ These were based on a rich tradition of studying regime change comparatively and systematically during the 1970s and 1980s. Students of democracy like Dankart Rustow, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Guiseppe di Palma contributed significantly to clarifying the process mechanisms, the system transformation methods of political actors, and the sequencing and the general logics of transition to and consolidation of democracy.³⁹⁹ Their normative stance and analytical prescriptions were taken over by a new generation of social scientists emerging in the post-communist period which began conducting research on democratisation on a much

³⁹⁸ In a recent paper Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl reveal that the first of the two labels has been invented by scholars from Eastern Europe, and this gave rise to the latter. See Schmitter, P. C. and Karl T. L. (2002); "Concepts, Assumptions and Hypotheses About Democratization: Reflections on 'Stretching' from South to East", prepared for the workshop on Regime Transitions: Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective (Center for Democracy, IIS, Stanford University), November 15-16, 2002.

³⁹⁹ Rustow, D. (1970); "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April 1970), pp. 337-63; Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (eds.) (1978); The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press); and Di Palma, G. (1990); To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

larger scale – East and West, and North and South.⁴⁰⁰ Since the mid-1990s, a gradual convergence of theoretical standpoints has been witnessed both among students of democracy and comparative social scientists focusing on regime change in particular.⁴⁰¹

However, with the increasingly versatile applications of concepts and research tools developed in a small number of countries and in an even smaller number of regions having undergone regime transformation during the last “democratisation wave”, the criticism against the frivolous use of theoretical concepts and analytical approaches related to ‘transitology’ and ‘consolidology’ grew as well. The disapproval with the theoretical tenets of mainstream regime-change scholars was predominantly channelled in two directions. First, a powerful argument in the hands of democratic transition and consolidation critics was the fact that many members of the academic community frequently used interchangeably, stretched or simply ignored the original meanings and assumptions of concepts devised by comparative social scientists.⁴⁰² Secondly, a group of social scientists, closely linked with the area studies specialists and the sovietologists, reproached the ‘classical’ theoretical approach of transition to democracy for neither taking seriously into account norms, beliefs and political and social ideas, nor such key ‘structural prerequisites’ of democratisation as economic development, political culture and historical institutional arrangements in post-communist Eastern Europe.⁴⁰³ The only structural condition that allegedly had some

⁴⁰⁰ Gunther, R., Puhle, H. and Diamandouros, N. (eds.) (1995); The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press); Merkel, W. (1996); “Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe”, the *Juan March Institute Papers*, Madrid, No. 86, (December 1996); Schedler, A. (1998); “What is Democratic Consolidation?”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 91-107; and Berglund, S., Aarebrot, F., Vogt, H. and Karasimeonov, G. (2001); Challenges to Democracy. Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar).

⁴⁰¹ See Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (1995); The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, *ibid.* (fn. 3); and Diamond, L. (ed.) (1999); Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

⁴⁰² Munck, G. (1994); “Democratic Transitions in a Comparative Perspective”, *Comparative Politics* 26, pp. 355-75; Plasser, F., Ullram, P., Waldrauch, H. (1998); Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Houndmills: MacMillan), esp. pp. 44-45; Schedler, A. (1999); “Uncertain Uncertainty. The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation”, presented at the conference, “Regime and Political Change in Latin America”, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 6-7 August; and Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2000); “What has Eastern Europe Taught Us ...”, *ibid.* (fn. 9), pp. 517-39, p. 519.

⁴⁰³ Jowitt, K. (1992); New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press); Kovacs, J. M. (ed.) (1994); Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers); Crawford, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds.)

importance for transitologists was the prior existence of a nation-state with an independent and internationally recognised territory where political democracy could thrive.⁴⁰⁴

Both 'transitology' and 'consolidology' have often been presented as actor-centred approaches, where the mode of extrication from the *ancien régime* and transition to democracy determined the type of democracy to be constructed. Despite the large amount of scientific research on the impact of political actors on democratisation,⁴⁰⁵ the comparative democracy studies also provide other examples of the positive role of institutions and socio-economic factors enhancing the probability of success for political regimes after the fall of autocracy.⁴⁰⁶ For instance, as regards an issue which is highly disputed among academics – the usefulness of 'pacted' transitions to democracy "à la Espagnole" in post-communist Eastern Europe, practice has in fact demonstrated that some of the criticisms against comparative social scientists have been excessive and that the variety of democratic outcomes after the conclusion of the Round Table talks reconfirmed the resourcefulness and versatility of this approach.⁴⁰⁷

(1997); "Old Legacies, New Institutions: Explaining Political and Economic Trajectories in Post-Communist Regimes", in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions, (Berkeley: University of California), pp. 1-39; and McFaul, M. (2002); "The Fourth Wave of Democracy ...", *ibid.* (fn. 15).

⁴⁰⁴ Rustow, D. (1970); "Transitions to Democracy ..", *ibid.* (fn. 19); and on the popular statement "No State, No Democracy!", see Linz, J. and Stepan, Al. (1996); "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 14-33.

⁴⁰⁵ O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986); Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), Vol. 4; Higley, J. and Burton, M. (1989); "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns", *American Sociological Review* 54, No. 1 (February 1989), pp. 17-32; Valenzuela, S. J. (1992); "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions", in Mainwaring, Scott, O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Valenzuela, Samuel J. (eds.) Issues of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in a Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 57-104; and Colomer, J. (2000); Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

⁴⁰⁶ Karl, T. (1990); "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, No. 23, (October 1990); Przeworski, A. (1991); Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Schmitter, P. and Santiso, J. (1998); "Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (London: SAGE Publications), pp. 69-92; Morlino, L. (1995); "Democratic Consolidation: Definitions and Models", in Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.) Transitions to Democracy (Dartmouth: Aldershot).

⁴⁰⁷ On the relative importance of 'pacted' and other modes of transitions in a post-communist context see Karl, T. L. and Schmitter, P. C. (1991); "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 45, pp. 269-84; Przeworski, A. (1993); "The Games of Transition", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.) Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 105-52; and Munck, G. and

Then, it is probably necessary both from a theoretical and empirical point of view to conclude with a more constructive opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of comparative methods of democratisation. This is especially needed in the case of 'transitology' and 'consolidology' as increasingly popular sub-disciplines among students of democracy in Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. Unfortunately, the former and present-day critics of democratic transformation studies do not seem to have reached a conclusion about which aspects of 'transitology' and 'consolidology' to disagree with. The result is a total rejection of the insights of both theoretical currents and a failure to recognise their practical significance for Eastern European democratisation. Indicative of this situation is the opinion of Harald Waldrauch expressed in his article "Incommensurability? On the Comparison of Eastern and Southern Regime Change". In this work, the author provides three main reasons for questioning the applicability of the transitological framework in a post-communist context:

1. The *concepts* of transitology and consolidology are vague and unclear and the *theoretical background assumptions* of these theoretical approaches are either inadequate or outright wrong;
2. Transitology/consolidology is *mere approach*, not a theory at all, and does not deliver any testable hypothesis; and
3. The changes taking place in Eastern Europe *differ too much* from those in Southern Europe and Latin America and can therefore hardly be forced into the same conceptual boxes; meaningful comparisons between the regions are therefore difficult, if not impossible.⁴⁰⁸

It is obvious that this list of arguments negates most of the achievements of comparative democratic students without recognising their efforts to conceptualise and explain theoretically the systemic transformation in Eastern Europe. According to the results of the theoretical research developed in the first four chapters of this doctoral project, however, it could be affirmed that some of the above statements are only partly true and others are not true at all. For instance, the first point, concerned with the analytical and theoretical value of the concepts of transitology and

Skalnik Leff, C. (1997); "Modes of Transition and Democratization in Comparative Perspective", *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997), pp. 343-62.

⁴⁰⁸ Waldrauch, H. (1998); "Incommensurability? On the Comparison of Eastern and Southern Regime Change", in Stein Ugelvik Larsen (ed.) *The Challenges of Theories on Democracy. Elaboration Over New Trends in Transitology* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 99-146, p. 100.

consolidology, is only partly correct in saying that the notions used in relation to these two approaches are “vague and unclear”, and this has been quite commonplace among the majority of social scientists. Declaring that the “theoretical background assumptions [of transitology and consolidology] are either inadequate or outright wrong”, however, is at the very least not precise and needs substantial factual confirmation and normative specification. Depending on the theoretical stance of individual political scholars, one can also agree or disagree with Waldrauch’s second argument. The present doctoral research tends to support Waldrauch’s point: ‘transitology’ and ‘consolidology’ are not theories but, probably, they are mere approaches or sub-disciplines of a larger academic current studying democratisation, but this hardly presents a problem for those trying to analyse post-communist transformations. Finally, the third of the above arguments fails to address the main analytical concerns of ‘transitology’ and ‘consolidology’, which are democratisation and the mechanisms of achieving improved continuity and quality of democracy. Hence, it goes back to the old fruitless debate between sovietologists and comparativists on whether it is feasible and desirable from a theoretical point of view to analyse comparatively Latin America, Southern Europe and post-communist Europe with the same conceptual tools.

Eventually, it should be mentioned that although making extensive use of the analytical prescriptions, assumptions and hypotheses of transitologists and consolidologists, this doctoral project diverges in some significant respects from the predominant standpoint of these two groups of social scientists about (a) how democratisation proceeds in practice and (b) how it should be analysed. First, it is generally assumed in this thesis that the temporal relationship between transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy is not a sequential one: i.e. transition preceding consolidation, and consolidation being the second phase of a more comprehensive drive towards democracy. On the contrary, it is sustained that these are two closely related but quite distinct social processes, which can overlap in time but do not share the same systemic goals. Secondly, it is argued that some of the theoretical misunderstandings and widespread conceptual confusion in the studies of regime change are due to both unfortunate coincidences and analytical preconceptions on the part of social scientists regarding the development of ‘transitology’ and ‘consolidology’ as analytical approaches towards explaining two different stages of

democratisation. For instance, the process of democratisation is often conceptualised as undergoing serious qualitative and sequential modifications depending on the cultural, historical, legal, social and economic circumstances in various countries and regions around the globe. This assumption could seem to be groundless, at least in the mind of some theoretical comparative social scientists who posit that democratisation needs few structural preconditions but a viable state. However, the practice of social and political transformation of post-communist Eastern Europe has shown exactly the opposite: important qualitative differences between the existing regimes have emerged, thus affecting rhythm and scope of the process of democratisation. In chapter 4, it is also proven that the existing theoretical conceptualisation of regime change (and the notion of political regime itself) is clearly insufficient to bridge the procedural and temporal gaps between transition to and consolidation of democracy as sub-processes. As a result, this definition has frequently been manipulated by social scientists to serve the dual need of describing transition and consolidation analytically and maintaining a high level of theoretical precision at the same time. Thirdly, having probed both theoretically and empirically the efficiency of actor-centred and institutional/legal approaches to account for the democratisation of specific countries in post-communist Eastern Europe, it is argued that the analytical assumptions about transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy as well as relationship between them should be dynamic. In such a way, both processes could be conceptualised not as individual approaches towards explaining regime change at various points of time, but as being part of a larger process of systemic transformation from communism to political democracy. This overarching social and political process is identified as 'democratisation', from where the measurement of its specific procedural features and institutional qualities is performed by the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*.

7.2.3. Measuring Democracy and Democratisation

One of the key issues preoccupying present-day students of democracy is the fact that the analytical research of political and social transformation in different parts of the

world does not go hand-in-hand with quantitative or qualitative research.⁴⁰⁹ In Eastern Europe, for instance, the theoretical reflections on post-communist democratisation, having quickly developed under the influence of the recognised achievements of the comparative democratic studies from Southern Europe and Latin America, have preceded by almost a decade empirical investigations on the same topic. Only recently, have some customised indexes of democracy appeared to include political regimes from post-communist Europe in their analyses.⁴¹⁰

It should be recalled, however, that measuring democracy and democratisation has neither been commonplace nor easy.⁴¹¹ On the one hand, there have always existed problems with defining and conceptualising the relevant parameters of both terms. On the other hand, the main difficulty has been to distinguish between a *product* and a *process(es)* of democratisation: a political process leading to democracy might have a certain number of qualitative and notional thresholds and to contain several sub-processes whose partial results could also be measured. For example, the main landmark events of the process of democracy-building in Eastern Europe in its initial period have been the replacement of the former ruling elite (although not always achieved in the countries of former Soviet Union), the changing of the political form of governance in the state from “one-party” to a pluralist one, the holding of elections and the adoption of a new democratic constitution. At the same time, these achievements have marked the beginning or the end of the liberalisation, state transformation, transition to and consolidation of democracy sub-processes within a larger process of systemic change from communist to democratisation.

This doctoral project does not attempt to solve all the problems related to measuring democracy and the degree of its consolidation in the countries of Eastern Europe. It only provides some practical and conceptual guidelines about how these difficulties could potentially be solved. Parallel with this, it tries to measure the presence/absence

⁴⁰⁹ King, G., Keohane, R. O. and Verba, S. (1994); Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

⁴¹⁰ See section 6.2. “The Emergence of the First Social Indicators in Eastern Europe”, Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁴¹¹ Regarding information about some of the ‘classics’ of democracy measurement on a comparative international scale, see Cutright, P. (1963); “National Political Development”, *American Sociological Review* 28, (April, 1963); Banks, A. (1979); Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Binghamton: State University of New York); and Bollen, K. (1980); “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy”, *American Sociological Review* 45(2), pp. 370-90.

of democracy at a given point of time together with the necessary qualitative (procedural/institutional) requisites of this kind of political regime to be considered as consolidated. In a way, it is both a qualitative and quantitative study of the systemic transformation in post-communist Eastern Europe. The measurement procedure is based on the theoretical proposals made by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan about the evolution of the process of consolidation of democracy in various regions of the world during the last "democratisation wave". These authors posit that democratic consolidation is achieved when three conditions related to the regime status and functioning are satisfied:

- 1) To be a democracy;
- 2) Rulers to govern democratically;
- 3) Attitudinal and behavioural support for the regime is achieved.⁴¹²

According to this conceptualisation, consolidation of democracy is completed when democracy is present and both rulers and citizens not only comply with the existing regime, but actively support it as the only possible alternative system of governance to autocracy. One of the principal objectives of this research is to identify key moments of this dual process of introduction of and habituation with the democratic institutions and "rules of the democratisation game". As a result of the extensive theoretical analysis conducted in chapters 2, 3 and 4, as well as in the beginning of chapter 5, two important thresholds on the way towards the consolidation of democracy have been identified: **political democracy** and **the quality of democracy**. Of course, the level of the quality of democracy may vary from case to case and, for this reason, there exist different degrees of consolidation (and deconsolidation) of democracy. Political democracy is predominantly operationalised through the elements of Robert Dahl's *polyarchy scale*⁴¹³ while the quality of democracy is represented by such factors as the

⁴¹² Linz, J. and Stepan, AL (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), Chapter 2.

⁴¹³ Dahl, R. (1971); Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 3. To Dahl's original list of factors focusing on free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational autonomy are added a couple of new items featuring the latest contribution of the independent media and the constitutions to the democratic process in Eastern Europe.

absence of 'reserved domains', the existence of 'horizontal accountability' and an effective application of the 'rule of law' to all groups and territories.⁴¹⁴

In summary, devising a mathematical index that measures democratisation at different thresholds (i.e. political democracy and the quality of democracy) has not been simple.⁴¹⁵ On the one hand, transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy are both conceptualised as large-scale socio-political processes and products of post-communist transformation. On the other hand, the dependent variables such as political democracy and certain aspects of the quality of democracy need to be precisely defined and conceptualised as sets of quantifiable variables in order to have measurement procedure across time and space. Historically, very few methodological and practical examples exist showing how this can be done. The innovative *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* attempts to fill this gap by measuring various features of the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe over a period of 11 years (from 1989 to 1999 included). Moreover, this is performed with respect to a region having recently emerged from communism, that is why the specific post-autocratic context is so important for political scholars trying to measure democracy and democratisation in general. Without being comprehensive statistically and irrefutable from a methodological point of view, the results of the IDEM for the period indicated are primarily helpful for those aiming at discovering new trends of institutionalising democracy and consolidating its gains in today's Eastern Europe. Furthermore, by using the latest normative assumption and analytical models of the comparative democratisation theories, the conceptualisation and practical development of the IDEM is already an achievement in itself, since it not only provides a method of constructing a statistical index, but also adapts its various features to the necessity of analysing a large N (number) of countries from the former Communist Bloc comparatively.

⁴¹⁴ For a detailed list of the political democracy and the quality of democracy factors and their transformation in the *Index of Democratisation* see tables from 1 to 4 of Chapter 5.

⁴¹⁵ For exceptions see Vanhanen, T. (2000); "A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998", *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2), pp. 251-65; Baker, P. and Koesel, K. (2001); "Measuring 'Polyarchy Plus': Tracking the Quality of Democratization in Eastern Europe, 1992-2000", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 02, 2001, San Francisco, California; and Schmitter, P. and Schneider, C. (2002); "Measuring the Liberalisation and Consolidation of Democracy", paper presented at the 1st Congreso Latino-Americano, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, 9-11 July, 2002.

7.3. Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Findings

7.3.1. Theoretical Reflections

In this section, the original hypotheses advanced at the beginning of this doctoral project will be reviewed and, possibly, revised as a result of the accomplished theoretical and empirical research.⁴¹⁶ Below these six research hypotheses are listed and analysed with respect to the theoretical visions to which they contribute:

Hypothesis 1. Even though transition to democracy may occur relatively quickly, consolidation of democracy will take much more time.

This hypothesis is confirmed both empirically and normatively throughout post-communist Eastern Europe. A real problem from a theoretical viewpoint is how to identify when transition to democracy begins and when it ends. Arguably, some countries emerging from the former Soviet Union have only replaced communism with another type of autocratic political and social system. It is often tempting to claim that a state is in a process of transition or consolidation but some clear cut-off points should be established that determine when these processes begin and, probably, end.

Hypothesis 2. Although a fairly large number of Eastern European states will become functioning political democracies, for some post-communist regimes will be very hard to accomplish a democratic transition and will remain autocratic or hybrid regimes.

This statement reflects the practical results of systemic transformation in Eastern Europe that are indirectly confirmed by the comparative theories of democratisation developed in other regions of the world. The *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*, which is conceptually and statistically well-fit to capture changes in the regime type during transition, is also supportive of this observation regarding the future of democratisation in the region. From a democracy theory perspective, this assertion endorses two empirical facts related to the process of democratic transition: (a) its

⁴¹⁶ These hypotheses are presented in Chapter 1, section 1.7.

uncertain character, and (b) the *asynchrony* and *reversibility* of similar sub-processes of systemic (post-communist) transformation during all their stages.

Hypothesis 3. *The holding of free and fair elections and the building of a complete set of democratic political institutions are not sufficient guarantees that democracy will be consolidated.*

'Electoralist' and 'neo-institutionalist' models of democracy have been fully embraced by the populations of the post-communist countries. As a matter of fact, procedural/institutional democracy has been accepted and implemented almost everywhere in the region with the exception of Central Asia, but the necessary momentum for completing transition to democracy and starting consolidation of democracy has not been evenly maintained throughout Eastern Europe. As a result, a significant number of hybrid regimes have been built, while, even consolidated, some of the political democracies are of a much poorer quality than their Western European counterparts.

Hypothesis 4. *The problems of territorial unity, national and ethnic identity and socio-economic crisis might prove more difficult to resolve in a post-communist context and, consequently, they may stall democratic transition and consolidation.*

The relatively brief period of post-communist transition (1989-2000) provides ample evidence that the countries and populations of Eastern Europe have not only undergone painful state, national and socio-economic transformation, but they have served as examples that actually contributed significantly to understanding the interplay between these structural factors and democratisation. It is also interesting to note that some countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia managed to solve almost all of their territorial problems peacefully. The same is true for Bulgaria's political elite reaction regarding the profound financial and economic crisis of 1996/97, when rulers and opposition collectively solved this problem. As unsuccessful experiences with conflict- and crisis-resolution, the following examples can be cited: the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and in Russia (Chechnya). Violent protests have also erupted in Albania in the beginning of 1997 against the failure of 'virtual' banks and the subsequent irresponsible behaviour of the government to

prevent the draining of the personal savings of the majority of the population. Moreover, the open-ended territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Kharabah, between Moldova and its Russian population over Transdnier, and the loose control over the national territory in Georgia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have considerably slowed down the establishment of democracy at the central level, leaving large portions of the state territory in the hands of foreign nationals or local corrupt leaders. This latter fact has prevented the consolidation of democracy and the initiation of radical economic reforms in most of these countries. Hence, the popular dictum of Linz and Stepan, "No state – no democracy!", can probably be paraphrased "No state – no consolidation of democracy!"

***Hypothesis 5.** The role of international factors of democratisation will be much stronger during the initial stages of political and social transformation than during the later ones.*

In general, it is quite difficult to prognosticate as to when international factors play a prime role during democratisation (i.e. during transition to democracy or during its consolidation phase). This research does not provide a conclusive response to this question either. Although predominantly centred on domestic aspects of democratic transition and consolidation, this doctoral project analyses a variety of international factors at work. It could be argued that, on the one hand, the type of international factors, and their relation to political power both locally and internationally, play a key role during democratisation, while, on the other hand, the timing of international intervention is very important for assisting democratic change and consolidation. For instance, the role of the foreign media was quite important in bringing down communism and starting democratic transition in the countries of East-Central Europe, but its role evolved fast as these societies started to make progress towards democratic consolidation. The same is true for most of the pan-European international organisations such as the EC/EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe whose impact on democratisation in the Eastern part of the continent has been considerable at different moments of the post-communist transformation, but much stronger during the consolidation period.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁷ In fact, Jan Zielonka predicts in the conclusion of the book Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol.2: International and Transnational Factors Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.) (Oxford:

***Hypothesis 6.** Although some countries may consolidate democracy in general, certain political and economic institutions, being part of the governance regime (“partial regimes”), might eventually deconsolidate and affect the quality of democracy.*

Both concepts ‘consolidation of democracy’ and ‘quality of democracy’ have various degrees and levels of theoretical abstraction. For this reason, once a regime is consolidated it can easily de-consolidate, while the quality of democratic regimes may also constantly be in a state of flux. However, only rarely will such countries return to autocracy (communism) – much more often, they will to another type of democracy. The theoretical part of this research does not discuss the issue of “partial regimes” in detail. However, it specifies that the process of democratisation does not proceed linearly and does not end up with one single type of democratic regime. It can also be presumed that both transition to and consolidation of democracy normally hinge on different sets of factors or “partial regimes”. That is why it is argued that the de-consolidation of autocracy and, respectively, the consolidation of democracy occur in the sub-systems or “partial regimes” first and, only then, at the overall systemic level. It will be an important challenge for any further research on democratisation to nominate both some general and some specific sets of “partial regimes” that play a role during the transformation of communism and other types of political systems.

7.3.2. Empirical Findings

The empirical findings regarding the evolution of the process of democratisation in post-1989 Eastern Europe are generally gathered and processed in two ways in this doctoral project: analytically and mathematically (statistically). In the first four chapters, but particularly in chapters 3 and 4, various analytical approaches towards evaluating the change of political regime in the regions are probed. Two methods for measuring the progress or retreat of democracy in the countries of the former Communist Bloc have been selected: (a) analysis of the institutional choices,

Oxford University Press, 2001), that certain international factors have been more conducive to the consolidation of democracy than to the liberalisation of the *ancien régime* or to transition to democracy.

including the constitutional form of the state, and (b) exploration of the different modes of extrication from the old political system and analysis the outcomes of transition to democracy. Chapter 5 focuses on the conceptual creation and normative elaboration of the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM), while chapter 6 gives an account of the quantitative results obtained after measuring with this new statistical index.

The information collected with respect to the institutional (structural) and constitutional (legal) transformations of the former Communist Bloc countries produces mostly qualitative results that, apparently, do not affect substantially the final outcome of political transition and the prospects of consolidation of democracy. The empirical data contained in tables 1 and 2 of chapter 3 demonstrate that countries that have adopted post-communist constitutions quickly and their political elites have agreed upon the main principles of electoral competition earlier on, including the type of electoral system (majoritarian, mixed or proportional) and the magnitude of the electoral threshold, have generally performed better than countries which have delayed these choices. It should be underlined, however, that some of these institutional combinations were hardly accidental or fortuitous, since they came as a result of prolonged Round Table talks in the majority of East-Central European countries in the beginning of the 1990s. Another interesting empirical observation relates to the choice of the official (constitutional) type of the political system: parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies in Eastern Europe, having a proportional system of electoral representation, have performed relatively better than presidential regimes with majoritarian-elected legislature and government. Of course, the period of study of these events has been quite short and comparable political developments could have been due to a number of spurious factors, e.g. the time of starting democratic transition or the influence of various international factors on post-communist transformation. Regarding the institutional results for all 20 countries in this research, *ceteris paribus*, post-communist regimes with a parliamentary form of government and a proportional electoral system with a relatively high threshold (i.e. 4-5 percent) have performed at least slightly better in terms of democratisation than other political regimes that did not have these structural characteristics.

The actor-centred approach of analysing different modes of transition from autocracy has also been indirectly explored in this thesis. This has been done in spite of the fact

that the main theoretical focus of this work has been on the latter stages of democratisation and the consolidation of democracy in particular, rather than on transition to democracy. It should be noted, however, that the specific mode of extrication from communism in some countries (i.e. from *below* or from *above*, or cooperatively from *below and above*) has played a significant role for the further development of democracy and its consolidation. As already mentioned, the holding of political talks between the representatives of the communist party and the opposition in the early 1990s has made the transition to democracy much smoother and more peaceful. Moreover, based on the experience of the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, some political scholars have gone even further to argue that certain modes of transitions, as for example the 'pacted' ones, also increase the probability of consolidating democracies.⁴¹⁸

The dual aim behind the creation of the *Index of Democratisation* (IDEM) is to put some of the theoretical findings of students of democracy and post-communism in Eastern Europe to an empirical test and to juxtapose some of the above-mentioned analytically-obtained results with mathematically-produced ones. The combined outcomes of the measurement procedure, which included 20 former communist countries and 21 factor variables of democratisation evenly distributed in seven groups, have been presented in the previous chapter in greater detail. That is why, in the next section, only selected statistical findings of this index will be presented. They will predominantly focus on the most distinct empirical results about democratisation using the IDEM.

One of the most easily expected outcomes using the IDEM has been to discover substantial differences in the levels of democratisation between various regions of the former Communist Bloc. For instance, according to the final results for the period 1989-99, all the countries of East-Central Europe, as well as the Baltic and South-Eastern European states that are candidates for EU membership, have completed

⁴¹⁸ Higley, J. and Burton, M. (1997); "Types of Political Elites in Eastern Europe", *International Politics* 34 (1997), pp. 153-68; Schmitter, P. C. (1995); "Transitology: The Science and Art of Democratization?", in Joseph S. Tulchin and Bernice Romero (eds.) *The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers); and Waldrauch, H. (1996); *Was heißt demokratische Konsolidierung? Ueber einige theoretische Konsequenzen der osteuropäischen Regimewechsel* [What Does Democratic Consolidation Mean? On Some Theoretical Consequences of

transition to democracy and established procedural/institutional democracies which are close to consolidation. At the same time, some countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus (i.e. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan) offer a different kind of certainty: they have managed to consolidate autocratic/oligarchic regimes that have little to do with the normative principles and political ideals of democracy. There is a large group of statistically "in-between" countries, composed of regimes in transition. This cluster of countries accounts for the largest amount of quantitative and qualitative variation within the IDEM and, hence, is the most dynamic from the point of view of democratisation. Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia and Moldova are the most statistically fluctuating cases within the entire set of 20 post-communist countries. The former Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine oscillate arguably less from their statistical means of IDEM score than the other countries from the region, but, nevertheless, they also show a potential for political change in the short to medium-term future.

The following three partial conclusions can be derived from the above-stated facts: (1) countries participating or actively aspiring to participate in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes fare much better in terms of democratisation than countries living in a 'self-imposed' isolation; (2) countries having undergone profound economic and financial crises reduce their chances of consolidating democracy or of improving the quality of the existing political regime; and (3) territorial disputes and civil war have been powerful factors stalling democratic transformation in many places in Eastern Europe after 1989-91. The chief problem with these three empirical findings is that they do not establish a direct causal relationship between these three confining/enabling conditions and the process of democratisation. In other words, it is difficult to understand whether this set of factors encourage democratisation or *vice versa* – democratisation provokes them.

Another interesting statistical discovery is that the IDEM correlates highly with some of the best-known contemporary political and social indexes covering all or most of the post-communist countries. For instance, it correlates remarkably well with the *Freedom House* indexes of political rights and civic freedom and with the UN *Human*

the Regime Changes in Eastern Europe] (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, Political Science Series No. 36).

Development (HDI) index. The correlation with other indexes is either insignificant or is, in the majority of cases, impossible to establish, because of the lack of enough statistically important observations of transformation processes in the whole of Eastern Europe. Two empirical findings, however, are worth mentioning; both regard the correlation between the IDEM and the HDI, and the IDEM and the EBRD *Transition Index of Market Liberalisation and Privatisation*. In the first case, it is detected that, despite their initial decline in the early 1990s, the political democracies of East-Central Europe and the Baltic States started quickly to recover their pre-1989 HDI scores. The countries of the other sub-regions in the former Communist Bloc have nonetheless experienced steady declines in their quality of social life and economic development in the last decade. A generally positive trend of democratisation is maintained in those Eastern European countries that have achieved higher levels of market liberalisation and have managed to privatise an especially high number of the state-owned assets. Although it is difficult to presuppose a robust statistical relationship between democratisation, on the one hand, and 'human development' and privatisation on the other, it is nevertheless important to consider that, even though they might not influence each other causally, these processes develop in parallel, and the success of one of them does not delay but actually boosts the progress of the others.

The factor and regression analyses of IDEM have produced some equally exciting results.⁴¹⁹ First, it has been discovered that the IDEM can be split into several autonomous indexes that represent the main aspects of the theoretical conceptualisation of the index as well as correspond to different modes of functioning of political democracy in practice. Three sets of relevant political features, representing potentially three autonomous statistical indexes within the original IDEM have been identified: (a) territorial and state-related, (b) minimalist-democratic or *polyarchy*-based, and (c) mixed.⁴²⁰ Secondly, it has been shown mathematically that the IDEM can be reduced from 21 to five or less factor variables that would represent equally well the remaining factors of the index. Thirdly, after regressing all 21 political democracy items on different combinations of five, it has been established

⁴¹⁹ See section 6.6. "Factor Analysis and Regression Analysis" in Chapter 6.

⁴²⁰ These three outcomes have been obtained through a principal component extraction method and are displayed in section 6 of Chapter 6 (see *ibid.*).

that the following group of five factors conveys the general meaning and reproduces the variation of the final results of the IDEM to the best possible extent:

- 1.) The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories;
- 2.) Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes;
- 3.) A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified;
- 4.) Media is not a state (nor private) monopoly and is free of government control;
- 5.) Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations.

Fourthly, after having analysed the IDEM results for various sub-regions of the former Communist Bloc, it has been discovered that two particular factors have been quite hard to satisfy by virtually all countries during their democratic transformations. These difficult to achieve conditions are those related to the creation of independent media authorities and the guaranteeing of division of powers between the state institutions. The two corresponding IDEM criteria are:

- 1.) There is a media law which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees access to alternative sources of information; and
- 2.) There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution.

The tasks that are easiest to accomplish during democratisation turn out to be, albeit with some crucial exceptions among the former Soviet and Federal Yugoslav republics, the solving of territorial and national sovereignty issues with respect to the operation of external actors and factors (i.e. "Actors operating outside the polity's territory do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions."), and the unconditional toleration of opposition parties and other civic organisations (i.e. "Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations.").

7.4. Suggestions for Further Research

The diverse social, political and economic outcomes emerging as a result of regime change in the former Communist Bloc have provided ample opportunity for academics to test various social science theories and conceptual models originating in other regions of the world during the last "democratisation wave". Despite the huge amount of research on democracy and democratic transformation conducted in the region, Eastern Europe still offers ample opportunity for developing, complementing and refining existing democratisation theories and models. There is also a clear need to gather more quantitative and qualitative data on different subjects related to this most recent systemic transition from communism. However, as some social researchers have indicated, the relationship between the region and democratisation studies has so far been hardly symmetrical.⁴²¹ According to them, this has been mainly because the political transformation of post-communist Europe has been one of the most intensely researched topics in the last decade, while the global democratisation literature has contributed relatively little to understanding and explaining the dynamics of democratic change and consolidation in the eastern part of the continent. This doctoral project attempts to close partially this gap, both in terms of empirical data and theory, by conducting large scale research on the process of democratisation in twenty Eastern European countries over a period of more than eleven years.

The main features of this project will be briefly summarised once again before proceeding with some suggestions for further research. The principal focus of this study is the consolidation of democracy and the possible ways of achieving this range of political and social outcomes. Different neo-institutionalist and actor-centred approaches are initially taken into consideration, in order to explain the success or failure of democratisation in selected countries from the region. Eventually, a combined systemic approach is adopted, which essentially describes transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy as separate, although sequential and complementary, processes of a much wider post-communist transformation leading to democratisation. The progress of this latter process (and, indirectly, of transition to

democracy and consolidation of democracy) is measured at various thresholds. The most important of these thresholds is **political democracy** (the others being linked to the quality of democracy and time). This term is theoretically conceptualised and empirically operationalised as the sum of the political elements of Robert Dahl's *polyarchy* scale, territorial factors and certain legal-practical requirements regarding the democratic functioning of the constitution and the media. After having followed a specific measurement procedure and after having processed and analysed the statistical results of the innovative *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*, a number of important conclusions about the prospects of democratisation in a post-communist context have been drawn.

Based on these tentative theoretical and empirical (mathematical) outcomes, a number of concrete suggestions for further research on democratisation and other related topics could be made. These future-oriented proposals lean on three general observations regarding the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in post-1989 Eastern Europe and on one practical concern about the measurement of democracy and its quality in a subset of countries occupying a "grey zone" between autocracy and democracy not only in the region under consideration but also throughout the world. Moreover, several suggestions about studying specific factors influencing democratisation will be made as a result of the analysis of the statistical outcomes of the IDEM for the period 1989-99.

It is believed that any prospective research on democratisation should focus on at least three issues that, unfortunately, have not been fully developed by the comparative democracy literature: (1) state and nation-building, (2) elections and the (3) impact of international factors on democracy. It has already been proven empirically that state and nation-building play a major role both during the periods of regime change and the consolidation of new democracies in Eastern Europe. It is enough to mention the current political problems of two of the largest federal entities in the region, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Russia, to understand that state-preservation and ethnic-integration have usually taken priority over democratisation. Although statehood and nationality issues could not eventually be solved without the post-

⁴²¹ Kopeccky, P. and Mudde, C. (2000); "What has Eastern Europe Taught Us about The Democratisation Literature (and Vice Versa)?", *ibid.* (fn. 9), p. 532.

communist states and societies beginning to democratise, these difficulties have often prevented a deeper democratisation. Possible answers and inspirations about how to answer this dilemma could be found in the classical political writings on size and democracy,⁴²² state-building and state-formation⁴²³ and strengthening of the state administration by taming autocratic bureaucracies.⁴²⁴ Complementary interdisciplinary approaches can also include the appropriate academic fields from nationalism studies, sociology, history and anthropology that not only explain ethnic and cultural diversity among former communist societies but also create links between the process of institutionalisation of political democracy and the resolution of national, linguistic, religious and other individual or collective identity problems in these countries.⁴²⁵ Any final consideration regarding the relationship between state, nationality and democratisation in a post-communist context should necessarily take various other structural factors into account as well, such as the level of socio-economic development and the presence of modern public institutions staffed with competent administrators able to run the whole system of political governance.⁴²⁶

Unlike other understudied topics like state and nation-building and the international dimension, the impact of elections on democratisation has been thoroughly researched during the last couple of decades (and even before that), but some of the results of these studies have been duly forgotten or simply ignored either because of the rapid conclusion of transition of democracy in a given country or because social scientists have feared being accused of 'electoralism' by fellow academic colleagues.⁴²⁷ The

⁴²² Dahl, R. and Tuft, E. R. (1973); Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

⁴²³ Rokkan, S. (1970); Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget); and Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975); The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

⁴²⁴ O'Donnell, G. (1973); Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of Berkeley); and Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (eds.) (1978); The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

⁴²⁵ See, for instance, Gellner, E. (1983); Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); Hroch, M. (1985); Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Ramet, S. (ed.) (1998); Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); and Cordell, K. (ed.) (1999); Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe (London: Routledge).

⁴²⁶ This argument is well-developed in the final part of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's article "Toward Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 14-33, (fn. 24).

⁴²⁷ On the excessive reliance on elections as determining the overall outcome of democratisation see Karl, T. (1986); "Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador", in Drake, P. and Silva, E. (eds.) Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985 (San Diego: Center

recent boom of political regimes that hold regular elections and claim to be functioning democracies on the basis of this generally accepted political procedure necessitates further investigation into what makes elections free and fair.⁴²⁸ In a recent polemical article about the relevance of various regime change paradigms in the contemporary social sciences, Guillermo O'Donnell has re-emphasised the importance of democratic and fair elections:

"This is not because such elections will lead to wonderful outcomes. It is because these elections, per se and due to the political freedoms that must surround them if they are to be considered fair (and, consequently, if the resulting regime is to be democratic), mark a crucial departure from the arbitrariness of authoritarian rule. When some fundamental political freedoms are respected, this means great progress in relation to authoritarian rules and give us ample reason to defend and promote fair elections".⁴²⁹

Exactly because of the close relation between competitive elections and the general principles of political democracy, it is necessary to provide additional guarantees that elections are free and fair. Moreover, being *uncertain* in their outcomes, democratic elections represent a dual opportunity for citizens to change their political leaders at regular intervals and for democracy to renew itself compared to other political systems. Consequently, it is crucial to have a relatively good understanding of what democratic elections consist of and what they entail in a particular national setting and at a particular moment in time.

Despite the impressive scholarly work carried out so far on various domestic aspects of democratisation, the international dimension of this process has not been given proper consideration both in terms of theoretical and empirical research. As has been clarified already in several chapters of these doctoral project, this situation has been partly due, on the one hand, to the still influential tradition in the comparative democratisation studies going back to the Latin American and Southern European

for Iberian and Latin American Studies, Center for US/Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego), pp. 9-36; and O'Donnell, G. (2001); "Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics", *Studies in International Comparative Development* 36 (2001), pp. 5-36.

⁴²⁸ As a starting point for this research one can use the following articles in the *Journal of Democracy*: Elkit, J. and Svensson, P. (1997); "What Makes Elections Free and Fair", *Journal of Democracy* 8, No. 3 (July 1997) and Carothers, T. (1997); "The Observers Observed", *Journal of Democracy* 8, No. 3 (July 1997), as well as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) methodology by looking at IDEA (1997); The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (Stockholm: IDEA).

⁴²⁹ O'Donnell, G. (2002); "In Partial Defence of an Evanescent 'Paradigm'", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 6-12, pp. 8-9.

regime changes that partly ignores the role of international factors on democratisation and, on the other, to the general complexity of theorising and operationalising the impact of external actors on post-communist transformations. The overall results of this thesis, however, indicate that some more work needs to be done exactly in this respect. Particular attention should be paid to the process of European integration in which some Eastern European countries are actively involved. EU and NATO memberships, being the highest policy goals of most governments in the region, have not only provided post-communist societies with a political direction and much-needed socio-economic assistance, but have also allowed ruling elites to draw 'external' legitimacy from the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes.⁴³⁰ With the increasing number of security concerns, resulting from civil conflict, immigration and traffic of illicit goods and humans, and with the growing Euroscepticism among the populations both East and West, it could easily be foreseen that certain international factors will play a key, although not unambiguous, role for the subsequent democratisation of Eastern Europe and its full integration in the EU and other international organisations.⁴³¹

Future research on democratic transformation should also address one practical issue that has gained preponderance during the ultimate decade. This is the problem of identifying and conceptualising a "grey zone" of countries lying between various kinds of autocratic and democratic regimes. As a sub-set of political regimes, the "grey zone" regimes are not consolidated political regimes. Their destiny also remains uncertain – they can shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other, or continue occupying an ill-defined 'property space' between democracy and autocracy. A recent debate in the *Journal of Democracy* raised the question of what was the most appropriate theoretical method of analysing the unique experience of each and every

⁴³⁰ See Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U. (1998); Institutional Design in Post-Communist Democracies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Phillips, A. (1999); "Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in East-Central Europe", *Democratization*, Vol. 6, pp. 70-98; and Pridham, G. (2001); "External Causes of Democratisation in Postcommunist Europe: Problems of Theory and Application", *Central European Political Science Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 6-23.

⁴³¹ See the Report of the Reflection Group on "The Political Dimension of EU Enlargement: Looking Towards Post-Accession" (Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute and Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission), Chairman: Jean-Luc Dehaene, Rapporteur: Ania Krok-Paszowska, Florence: December 2001.

country falling into this "grey zone".⁴³² Although this discussion has still not produced conclusive results, it is worth mentioning that the majority of democracy scholars have preferred to include these political regimes and study them within the framework of open-ended regime change theories.⁴³³ From the perspective of this doctoral project, it seems appropriate also to combine the theoretical analysis of this ever-growing set of hybrid political regimes with an empirical (and why not statistical) investigation of their individual characteristics. Since it appears unlikely that the majority of the leaderships of these "grey zone" countries will come up with any systemic alternatives to political democracy in the foreseeable future, it is necessary to adopt a more positivist approach towards interpreting the transformations in some of these countries by treating these intermediate regimes as potential democracies, while the *Index of Democratization* (IDEM) could eventually be used in their case.

Finally, based on the results obtained after measuring democratisation in the countries of post-communist Europe, it can be suggested that two additional topics of research should be further focused upon in the future. These are the problems of the media freedom and independence and of the implementation of the constitutional norms and procedures in practice. As the experience of the vast majority of former autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe clearly demonstrates, the democratic functioning of the media and the constitution should be considered an integral part of the democratic political process, while both the media and the constitution should be regarded as central political institutions in any democracy. Because of their ability to influence directly public opinion and the functioning of the entire political system without their authority being seriously questioned by anyone through the usual accountability channels, it can still be quite difficult to include them in a standard definition of

⁴³² The debate was started by Thomas Carothers (2002); "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5-21. For previous publications on this topic see Zakaria, F. (1997); "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November-December 1997), pp. 22-43; Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (eds.) (1998); Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 36. Even earlier commentaries on the intermediary outcomes of post-autocratic transformation include O'Donnell, G. (1996); "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (April 1996), pp. 34-51; and Schmitter, P. (1994); "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 76-94, especially the section on "persistently unconsolidated democracies".

democracy. However, as shown in relation to the analytical conceptualisation of the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)* in this doctoral project, they can be successfully integrated into an operational definition of this kind of regime.

7.5. Conclusion

Since the main purpose of this chapter is to serve as a general conclusion to this work, there is little left to be said with respect to the analytical reflections already presented in this final part of the thesis. The only point to be stressed, however, is that, despite all possible theoretical mistakes, ideological allusions and mathematical gaps, the principal goal of this research has been to illuminate a number of the most disputed issues in the contemporary political sciences literature, especially as regards the democratisation of post-communist Eastern Europe. Despite the failure to reconcile some of the conflicting theoretical views of social scientists and the almost certain presence of statistical errors following the imperfect coding and complex statistical analysis of the results of the *Index of Democratisation (IDEM)*, this project has tried to open new avenues for political researchers both in terms of novel theoretical approaches and data about one of the most recently democratising regions in the world. Although some of the results of this work may not be equally satisfactory to everyone, either in substance or in quantity, the presentation of an alternative theoretical approach towards post-communist democratisation together with measurement of some of the central features of this process are both justifiable outcomes in themselves. The fact that this is a comprehensive study of the democratic transformation of Eastern Europe – a region which has been ruled by a harsh and ideologically-based autocratic political system until only a decade ago, the completion of this doctoral project can be considered a potential starting point for subsequent research on post-autocratic transformation and democratisation of other regions in the world.

⁴³³ O'Donnell, G. (2002); "In Partial Defence of an Evanescent 'Paradigm'", pp. 6-12; and Nodia, G. (2002); "The Democratic Path", pp. 13-19, both in the *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July 2002).

APPENDIX I

A Sample Table and Raw Score Tables

IDEM (1989-1999)

Sample table

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions																			
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions																			
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories																			
4	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials																			
5	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated																			
6	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the																			

	holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)																					
7	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes																					
8	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections																					
9	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently																					
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice																					
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution																					
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified																					
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and																					

	coverage of various political points of view is observed																					
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party																					
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties																					
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations																					

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1989																				
1	1		1	1			1			1					1	1	1			
2	1		1	1			1			1					1	1	1			
3	1		1	1			1			1					1	1	1			
4	0		0	0			0			0					0	0	0			
5	0		0	0			0			0					1	0	0			
6	0		0	0			0			0					1	0	0			
7	0		0	0			0			0					1	0	0			

14	torture are absent There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0						
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0						
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						

<u>1990</u>		AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	1			1			1			1					1	1	1			
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	1			1			1			1					1	1	1			
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	1			1			1			1					1	1	1			
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	0			1			1			1					1	1	1			
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	0			0			1			1					1	0	1			
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	0			1			1			1					1	1	1			
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the	0			1			1			1					1	1	1			

8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	0	1	1	1							1	1	1			
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	0	1			1						1	0	1			
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	0	1			1						1	0	1			
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0	0									1	0	1			
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0								1	0	0	0			
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	0	1			1						1	1	1			

	torture are absent																				
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	0	1						1						1	0	1				
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	0	1						1						1	1	1				
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	0	0						1						1	0	1				
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0						1						1	0	1				
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	1						1						1	1	1				

	coverage of various political points of view is observed																				
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

1991		AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0

0	veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	coverage of various political points of view is observed	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1992

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0

8	hands of elected officials Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	torture are absent																						
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0

1993

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
4	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0

14	torture are absent There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1994

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MKD	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1995

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

8	hands of elected officials Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	torture are absent																					
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1996

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	hands of elected officials	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

14	torture are absent There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1997

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

8	hands of elected officials Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

torture are absent																								
14 There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
15 There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
16 Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
17 There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
18 The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	

1998

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

8	hands of elected officials	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	
	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated																							0
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

1999


	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
5	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
7	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	hands of elected officials	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

APPENDIX II

IDEM (1989-99): Presentation of the Results





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1996

1997

1998

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IDEM by Region

Central and Eastern Europe

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	4	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Hungary	8	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Poland	14	20	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Slovakia	3	20	20	21	18	19	19	19	20	21	21

The Baltic & Other Former

Soviet Union States

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Estonia			18	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21
Lithuania			18	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Latvia			18	19	19	20	21	21	21	21	21
Belarus			4	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
Moldova			5	8	9	16	17	17	18	18	17
Ukraine			10	11	11	13	14	15	15	15	15

APPENDIX III

IDEM: Spearman Correlation and Correlation **with Other Indexes**

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CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF FACTORS ORDERED ACCORDING TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO IDEM
(Spearman rank correlation coefficient, values aggregated over 1989-1999)

	AL	ARM	AZ	BG	BLR	CRO	CZ	EST	GRG	HU	LIT	LV	MK	MLD	PL	RO	SLK	SLO	UKR	UZ	
Albania	1,00																				
Armenia	<u>0,69</u>	1,00																			
Azerbaijan	0,40	<u>0,62</u>	1,00																		
Bulgaria	<u>0,69</u>	<u>0,58</u>	0,35	1,00																	
Belorussia	<u>0,59</u>	<u>0,65</u>	<u>0,49</u>	<u>0,50</u>	1,00																
Croatia	0,35	<u>0,65</u>	0,41	0,31	0,49	1,00															
Czech Rep.	<u>0,68</u>	<u>0,69</u>	<u>0,55</u>	<u>0,70</u>	<u>0,60</u>	0,21	1,00														
Estonia	0,35	0,33	0,33	<u>0,50</u>	0,12	0,26	0,38	1,00													
Georgia	0,15	0,29	0,37	0,18	0,07	0,39	0,02	0,39	1,00												
Hungary	<u>0,59</u>	<u>0,74</u>	0,35	<u>0,60</u>	<u>0,55</u>	0,36	<u>0,61</u>	0,09	-0,01	1,00											
Lithuania	0,18	-0,05	-0,07	0,18	-0,30	-0,35	0,09	<u>0,46</u>	0,02	0,04	1,00										
Latvia	0,17	0,05	0,28	-0,01	-0,01	0,19	-0,14	<u>0,56</u>	<u>0,48</u>	-0,21	0,26	1,00									
Macedonia	0,36	<u>0,54</u>	0,30	<u>0,46</u>	<u>0,62</u>	<u>0,52</u>	0,18	0,15	0,43	<u>0,47</u>	-0,02	0,20	1,00								
Moldova	0,02	0,12	0,01	0,11	-0,03	0,19	-0,11	0,30	<u>0,75</u>	0,10	0,21	<u>0,46</u>	<u>0,44</u>	1,00							
Poland	<u>0,56</u>	<u>0,48</u>	0,32	<u>0,58</u>	0,24	0,27	<u>0,48</u>	0,43	0,35	<u>0,55</u>	0,35	0,01	0,24	0,27	1,00						
Romania	<u>0,74</u>	<u>0,65</u>	<u>0,46</u>	<u>0,86</u>	<u>0,57</u>	<u>0,52</u>	<u>0,64</u>	<u>0,54</u>	0,33	<u>0,55</u>	0,13	0,17	<u>0,51</u>	0,19	<u>0,55</u>	1,00					
Slovakia	<u>0,72</u>	<u>0,56</u>	0,29	<u>0,77</u>	<u>0,49</u>	0,28	<u>0,72</u>	0,15	-0,07	<u>0,57</u>	-0,04	-0,25	0,31	-0,13	0,29	<u>0,77</u>	1,00				
Slovenia																					
Ukraine	<u>0,61</u>	<u>0,56</u>	0,42	<u>0,59</u>	<u>0,49</u>	<u>0,52</u>	<u>0,47</u>	0,40	<u>0,50</u>	<u>0,64</u>	0,12	0,17	<u>0,56</u>	0,40	<u>0,70</u>	<u>0,72</u>	<u>0,45</u>	1,00			
Uzbekistan	<u>0,62</u>	<u>0,56</u>	0,38	<u>0,70</u>	<u>0,69</u>	0,24	<u>0,77</u>	0,20	-0,19	<u>0,52</u>	-0,22	-0,18	0,21	-0,37	0,29	<u>0,65</u>	<u>0,72</u>	<u>0,37</u>	1,00		

Values in bold are significant at 0.05 level

Underlined values in bold are significant at 0.01 level

Index of Democratization (IDEM), (1989-1999)
Correlation with Other Social and Political Indexes

	IDEM - adjusted (1989-99)	Freedom House Index (1989-99)			EBRD (1995-99)		The Heritage Foundation	UN Human Development Index (1989-97)
		(-)			(+)		(+)	(+)
		PR	CL	PR/CL	Private Share of GDP	Legal Reform Index		
Albania	.99	-.61	.07	-.32	-.15	-.28	-.21	-.68
Armenia	1	-.43	-.75	-.67	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.69
Azerbaijan	.80	.15	-.34	-.24	.46	.30	N/C	-.39
Belarus	1	-.24	-.45	-.36	N/C	N/C	-.44	.01
Bulgaria	1	-.99	-.94	-.98	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.84
Croatia	.97	.30	N/C	.30	.92	-.12	N/C	.92
Czech Republic	1	-.96	-.99	-.99	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.74
Estonia	1	-.34	-.81	-.57	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.81
Georgia	1	-.89	-.81	-.91	.84	.40	-.1	-.64
Hungary	1	-.87	-.1	-.93	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.57
Latvia	1	-.61	-.54	-.64	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.94
Lithuania	1	-.66	-.40	-.58	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.67
Macedonia	.99	.04	-.56	-.34	.66	.27	--	-.1
Moldova	.99	-.83	-.60	-.84	.56	-.23	.76	-.85
Poland	1	-.89	-.97	-.93	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.75
Romania	1	-.81	-.86	-.84	N/C	N/C	N/C	-.77
Slovakia	1	-.97	-.82	-.95	.82	-.56	.51	-.65
Slovenia	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C
Ukraine	1	-.41	.75	.32	.69	.25	-.70	-.94
Uzbekistan	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C

(+) positive
 (-) negative
 N/C non-correlated

Index of Democratization (IDEM), (1989-1999)

Correlation with Selected Indexes: IDEM-adjusted, Freedom House and UN-HDI

	IDEM – adjusted (1989-99)	Freedom House Index (1989-99)			UN Human Development Index (1989-97)
		Political Rights (PR)	Civil Liberties (CL)	PR/CL	
	(+)	(-)			(+)
Albania	.99	-.61	.07	-.32	-.68
Armenia	1	-.43	-.75	-.67	-.69
Azerbaijan	.80	.15	-.34	-.24	-.39
Belarus	1	-.24	-.45	-.36	.01
Bulgaria	1	-.99	-.94	-.98	-.84
Croatia	.97	.30	N/C	.30	.92
Czech Republic	1	-.96	-.99	-.99	-.74
Estonia	1	-.34	-.81	-.57	-.81
Georgia	1	-.89	-.81	-.91	-.64
Hungary	1	-.87	-1	-.93	-.57
Latvia	1	-.61	-.54	-.64	-.94
Lithuania	1	-.66	-.40	-.58	-.67
Macedonia	.99	.04	-.56	-.34	-1
Moldova	.99	-.83	-.60	-.84	-.85
Poland	1	-.89	-.97	-.93	-.75
Romania	1	-.81	-.86	-.84	-.77
Slovakia	1	-.97	-.82	-.95	-.65
Slovenia	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C
Ukraine	1	-.41	.75	.32	-.94
Uzbekistan	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C	N/C

(+) positive

(-) negative

N/C non-correlated

APPENDIX IV

Factor Analysis and Regression Analysis



Factors of IDEM		Letter
Number		
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	A
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	B
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	C
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	D
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	E
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	F
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	G
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	H
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	I
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	J
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	K
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	L
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	M
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	N
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	O
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	P
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	Q
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	R
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	S
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	T
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	U

Factor Analysis

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	14.951	71.193	71.193	14.951	71.193	71.193
2	2.294	10.923	82.117	2.294	10.923	82.117
3	1.016	4.837	86.953	1.016	4.837	86.953
4	.674	3.210	90.163			
5	.575	2.740	92.903			
6	.437	2.082	94.985			
7	.344	1.640	96.625			
8	.241	1.149	97.774			
9	.155	.736	98.510			
10	.130	.618	99.128			
11	8.394E-02	.400	99.528			
12	3.920E-02	.187	99.714			
13	2.473E-02	.118	99.832			
14	1.582E-02	7.531E-02	99.907			
15	1.323E-02	6.299E-02	99.970			
16	4.096E-03	1.950E-02	99.990			
17	1.419E-03	6.758E-03	99.997			
18	6.452E-04	3.073E-03	100.000			
19	4.679E-05	2.228E-04	100.000			
20	7.204E-16	3.431E-15	100.000			
21	2.596E-16	1.236E-15	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component		
	1	2	3
A	.431	.849	.106
B	.506	.615	.266
C	.540	.770	9.056E-02
D	.954	-.143	-4.552E-02
E	.901	-.129	-.180
F	.952	-7.690E-03	8.401E-02
G	.947	-.167	.112
H	.889	-.220	-7.668E-02
I	.944	6.399E-02	-.207
G	.932	3.236E-02	-5.306E-02
K	.914	.213	-.202
L	.778	-.182	6.963E-02
M	.944	-1.022E-03	-6.405E-02
N	.921	-.115	-.277
O	.899	-.311	.107
P	.911	.167	-.230
Q	.882	.276	-5.729E-02
R	.889	-.185	-.265

S	.607	-.251	513
T	.864	-9.433E-02	395
U	.803	-.291	370
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.			
a 3 components extracted.			

Regression Analysis

a	R ²		0,868364
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
Constant	3,1027	0,0083	0,4026
c	0,84623	0	0,8195
d	0,15027	0,4816	0,036
p	-0,00499	0,9726	0,0001
l	-0,10782	0,4511	0,0412
u	-0,19517	0,213	0,1084

b	R ²		0,532434
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
c	0,18864	0,024	0,3139
d	0,11697	0,4364	0,0438
p	0,038937	0,7035	0,0107
l	-0,12846	0,2097	0,1099
u	-0,00891	0,9336	0,0005
Constant	7,9227	0	0,8991

e	R ²		0,877218
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
d	0,93352	0,0015	0,525
p	0,16935	0,3162	0,0717
l	-0,0859	0,5971	0,0205
u	-0,08961	0,608	0,0193
Constant	0,31231	0,7905	0,0052
c	-0,04282	0,7291	0,0088

f	R ²		0,908395
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
p	0,25571	0,09	0,1915
l	0,19398	0,1783	0,1255
u	0,22845	0,1429	0,1468
Constant	-0,93915	0,3608	0,0599
c	0,0815	0,4482	0,0417
d	0,37525	0,0879	0,1938

g	R ²		0,937664
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
l	0,16053	0,1322	0,1544
u	0,30182	0,0143	0,3582
Constant	0,58244	0,4378	0,0436
c	-0,07006	0,376	0,0564
d	0,41392	0,0154	0,3521
p	0,15805	0,1472	0,144

m	R ²		0,926721
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
p	0,29879	0,0443	0,2585
l	-0,10446	0,4414	0,0429
u	0,063418	0,6615	0,0141
Constant	-0,6638	0,4995	0,0332
c	0,10065	0,334	0,0667
d	0,73225	0,0023	0,4966

n	R ²		0,918185
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
l	0,13999	0,3237	0,0695
u	0,030775	0,8374	0,0031
Constant	0,75845	0,4581	0,0399
c	-0,21181	0,062	0,2271
d	0,2744	0,201	0,1139
p	0,68192	0,0003	0,6276

o	R ²		0,932914
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
u	0,31205	0,0256	0,3083
Constant	-0,11461	0,8939	0,0013
c	-0,11232	0,2257	0,1029
d	0,61509	0,0032	0,4728
p	-0,04014	0,7412	0,008
l	0,29148	0,025	0,3102

q	R ²		0,84077
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
Constant	-3,0416	0,0572	0,2347
c	0,31286	0,062	0,2271
d	0,089934	0,7703	0,0063
p	0,48293	0,0353	0,2793
l	0,37246	0,0867	0,1952
u	-0,03927	0,8592	0,0023

r	R ²		0,862526
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
c	-0,24819	0,1098	0,1724
d	0,26122	0,3743	0,0567
p	0,53796	0,0155	0,3512
l	0,4851	0,0233	0,3166
u	0,011225	0,9571	0,0002
Constant	0,14553	0,9177	0,0008

h			
		R ²	0,907236
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
u	0,00926	0,9519	0,0003
Constant	0,80888	0,4403	0,0431
c	-0,05705	0,6023	0,0199
d	1,0496	0,0002	0,6418
p	-0,01621	0,9119	0,0009
l	-0,02935	0,8372	0,0031

s			
		R ²	0,461802
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
d	-0,03729	0,8982	0,0012
p	0,082346	0,6817	0,0124
l	0,20374	0,3057	0,0747
u	0,28474	0,1887	0,12
Constant	6,1189	0,0006	0,5799
c	-0,11992	0,4259	0,0458

l			
		R ²	0,958249
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
Constant	-0,21857	0,7677	0,0064
c	-0,03789	0,627	0,0173
d	0,10568	0,4908	0,0345
p	0,74211	0	0,7892
l	0,21106	0,0531	0,2416
u	0,041244	0,7069	0,0104

t			
		R ²	0,964119
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
p	0,13949	0,0676	0,219
l	0,21831	0,0067	0,4194
u	0,76943	0	0,8859
Constant	0,217	0,67	0,0134
c	0,1273	0,0291	0,2968
d	-0,24547	0,0313	0,2903

j			
		R ²	0,875288
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
c	0,1815	0,1777	0,1258
d	0,77284	0,0081	0,4048
p	0,11389	0,5184	0,0304
l	0,026576	0,8763	0,0018
u	0,030006	0,8701	0,002
Constant	-1,6129	0,2064	0,1114

k			
		R ²	0,91201
Variable	Coefficient	t-prob	PartR ²
d	0,10184	0,6529	0,0149
p	0,66039	0,0007	0,5738
l	0,28505	0,0751	0,2089
u	-0,08642	0,5963	0,0206
Constant	-1,7902	0,1186	0,1649
c	0,17474	0,1448	0,1456

APPENDIX V

Factor Ranking by Regions and Sub-Regions

Number	Factors of <i>IDEM</i> : Eastern Europe	Cum. Score
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	93
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	99
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	109
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	116
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	118
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	118
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	120
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	121
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	126
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	130
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	133
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	134
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	142
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	144
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	145
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	155
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	157
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	160
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	168
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	179
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	190

Number	Factors of <i>IDEM</i> : EU Candidate States	Cum. Score
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	85
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	87
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	90
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	90
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	91
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	92
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	93
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	95
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	96
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	96
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	97
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	97
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	97
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	97
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	98
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	98
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	98
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	99
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	101
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	101
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	102

Number	Factors of <i>IDEM</i> : States which are not EU Candidates (The Rest of Eastern Europe)	Cum. Score
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	9
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	16
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	23
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	24
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	25
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	28
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	29
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	32
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	36
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	38
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	41
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	45
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	47
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	48
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	54
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	59
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	62
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	66
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	80
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	89

Number	Factors of IDEM: The FSU States (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine)	Cum. Score
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	2
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	6
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	6
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	9
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	9
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	11
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	12
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	13
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	13
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	14
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	16
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	17
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	17
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	18
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	18
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	18
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	19
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	20
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	25
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	27

Number	Factors of <i>IDEM</i> : <u>The Caucasus and Central Asia</u>	Cum. Score
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	0
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	0
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	1
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	3
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	3
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	3
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	5
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	5
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	6
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	6
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	8
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	8
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	9
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	9
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	12
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	14
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	17
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	18
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	23
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	27
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	36

Number	Factors of <i>IDEM</i> : <u>East-Central Europe</u>	Cum. Score
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	33
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	36
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	37
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	39
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	40
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	40
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	40
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	40
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	40
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	41
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	41
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	41
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	41
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	42
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	42
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	42
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	42
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	43
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	44
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	44
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	44

Factors of IDEM: the Baltic States		Cum. Score
Number		
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	21
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	21
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	25
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	26
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	26
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	26
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	27
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	27
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	27
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	27
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	27
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	27
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	27
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	27
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	27
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	27
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	27
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	27
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	27
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	27
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	27

Number	Factors of IDEM: <u>South-Eastern Europe</u>	Cum. Score
11	There is a division of powers and the formal equality between the state institutions is enforced by the constitution	31
17	There is a media law, which establishes the rules of the media market, designates independent media authorities and guarantees the access to alternative sources of information	32
5	Those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties respect the results of these elections	34
16	Media is not a state (or private) monopoly and is free of government control	36
14	There is freedom of expression and the regime does not retaliate with punishment against its critics (such as dismissal from work, legal prosecution, closure of newspapers and TV stations)	37
18	The plurality of opinions is protected by law and the equal and neutral coverage of various political points of view is observed	39
10	The constitution provides for equal political rights and civil liberties to all citizens and authorities ensure that these are observed in practice	41
13	The regime has no political prisoners and political terror and torture are absent	41
9	The composition and term-in-office of government is not decided by a single person or political body and appointments are made only after the holding of competitive elections (unless in those cases explicitly described in the constitution)	42
4	Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are uncertain in their outcomes	44
8	Veto groups do not constrain elected officials and the officials' constitutional mandate is not arbitrarily terminated	47
12	A new democratic constitution is drafted and ratified	47
6	Inclusive elections are conducted at all levels of political decision reasonably frequently	49
7	Control of the agenda of the major institutions of government is in the hands of elected officials	50
3	The constitution and other legal regulations are effectively applied to all groups and territories	51
15	There are legal guarantees for the freedom of assembly and the right to strike (except for certain professionals who provide 'essential services' to the population)	51
19	There is one or more legally recognised and tolerated opposition party	55
20	There are trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties	55
21	Citizens are free to form independent civic and interest organisations, including non-profit, educational, religious, ethnic and minority associations	55
1	There is a national territory that clearly defines the borders of administrative jurisdiction of the state institutions	56
2	Actors, operating outside the polity's territory, do not prevent elected officials from making binding decisions	59

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
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