PEACE MOVEMENTS IN MILITARISTIC SOCIETIES

ISRAEL AND TURKEY AS UNIDENTICAL TWINS

Didem ORAL

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 17 May 2018

European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

PEACE MOVEMENTS IN MILITARISTIC SOCIETIES

ISRAEL AND TURKEY AS UNIDENTICAL TWINS

Didem ORAL

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Examining Board

Prof. Donatella della Porta (Supervisor- Scuola Normale Superiore)
Prof. Olivier Roy (EUI/RSCAS)
Prof. Klaus Eder (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Prof. Joel S. Migdal (University of Washington/JSIS)

Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme

I , Didem Oral, certify that I am the author of the work "Peace Movements in Militaristic Societies: Israel and Turkey as Unidentical Twins." I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).

I declare that this work consists of 90,800 words.

Statement of language correction:

This thesis has been corrected for linguistic and stylistic errors. I certify that I have checked and approved all language corrections, and that these have not affected the content of this work.

Signature and date: 2 May 2018

PEACE MOVEMENTS IN MILITARISTIC SOCIETIES

ISRAEL AND TURKEY AS UNIDENTICAL TWINS

Didem ORAL

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, 17 May 2018

to my mom Şerife and my dad Reşit...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor Professor Donatella della Porta whose vision and wisdom inspired me during my PhD. I felt lucky to have her valuable guidance and advice all these years. Without her support, this research would not have been possible. I am also very thankful to my jury members, Professor Olivier Roy, Professor Klaus Eder and Professor Joel S. Migdal for their suggestions and feedback.

During this research, I spent time in Italy, Israel, Turkey, U.S.A. and Sweden. I would like to thank to Professor Eitan Alimi at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Professor Adriana Kemp at Tel-Aviv University, Professor Jim Jasper at CUNY Graduate Center and Professor Michele Micheletti at Stockholm University for hosting me as visiting scholar and providing me a great academic environment while I was working on my research. At the EUI I was lucky to get a funding for my research and I would like to thank to Swedish Institute for giving me a scholarship during my stay in Stockholm. Stockholm also provided me with a safe academic environment, while we, Academics for Peace, faced many threats from the Turkish state just for pointing out the human rights violations. This work has been carried out despite the oppression in Turkey and I stand in solidarity with all my colleagues from Turkey who lost their jobs as a result of this state violence.

I am very grateful to my lifelong friend Utkan Çorbacıoğlu for helping me with managing Word documents and for his endless patience with many drafts. Thanks to Yıldız, Marion, Aviva, Oğuz, Ofer, Assaf, Tamar, Mustafa, Sahar, Tayfun, Guy, Ruthie, Emily, Hakan and Noa I was able to get in touch with my interviewees. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Nilay and Dinçer for their help, patience, dedication and encouragement for the successful completion of this thesis.

A very special thanks goes to my dear Naeem who always managed to put a smile on my face and fed me with sushi in my desperate times. I feel fortunate and blessed to have him in my life.

Without my interviewees in Israel and Turkey this research would remain incomplete. I thank all of them for sharing their views with me and for making this thesis possible. They played a significant role throughout this journey. I got to know so many people and I learned so much from them.

I am very grateful to those very special people, my beloved family, my mother Şerife, my father Reşit, my sister Sinem and her husband Zafer whose encouragement, positive energy and continuous support make me believe in me and my work. During this journey I missed my beloved ones, Arda and Duru so much. I thank my family for their unconditional love and support during all these years.

Lastly, I am very thankful to Florence, Istanbul, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, New York and Stockholm for hosting me and offering me an enjoyable life during my PhD.

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... **i**

TABLE OF CONTENT ..... **iii**

ABSTRACT ..... **vii**

LIST OF TABLES ..... **ix**

LIST OF FIGURES ..... **xi**

1. INTRODUCTION **1**

1.1. Mobilization around peace and the puzzle 3
1.1.1. What is militarism? 4
1.2. The scope of the thesis: Israel and Turkey in comparison 5
1.3. Thesis outline 8

2. A ROADMAP TO STUDY PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND TURKEY **11**

2.1. Peace movements in scholarly work: what do we know so far? 11
2.2. Elaboration of the research questions and the model 14
2.3. The conceptual framework used to explain the model 15
2.3.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS) 15
2.3.2. The role of citizenship regimes and the discursive aspect of foundational ideologies 18
2.3.3. Framing 20
2.3.4. Mobilizing structures 22
2.4. Methodology 24
2.4.1. Case selection and data collection 25
2.4.2. Fieldwork: before and after 27
2.4.3. Reflexivity and ethics 28
2.4.4. Limitations 29
2.5. Concluding remarks 30

3. ISRAEL: THE NEW HOME FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE **31**

3.1. The Zionist project: the Israeli state in the making 32
3.2. The six-Day War in1967 and the occupation of Palestine 34
3.3. The changeover in the Knesset: from bipolarization to fragmentation, 1977–1984 35
3.4. The First Intifada: a result of twenty years of occupation 37
3.5. The Oslo Accords: signing for peace on paper 38
3.6. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and its aftermath 40
3.7. Camp David: another attempt at peace, fact and interpretation 42
3.8. The Second Intifada: violence follows provocation 43
3.9. Operation Defensive Shield: The post-9/11 era 45

3.10. The Geneva Initiative and the Roadmap 46
3.11. The Wall, the Disengagement Plan and Operation Cast Lead 47
3.12. Concluding remarks: the situation today 50

4. TURKEY: AN ASSIMILATIVE REPUBLIC 53

4.1 Turkey as a nation-state 53
4.1. The Kurdish question in Turkey 56
4.2.1. The destruction of Kurdish identity and rebellion as a reaction 57
4.2.2. Looking for political rights through democratic channels 59
4.3. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* (PKK) 63
4.4. Anti-war movements as anti-globalization movements in Turkey 65

5. ISRAEL: THE DEMOCRATIC OCCUPIER? 69

5.1. Setting the scene: how and why do peace advocacy groups emerge? 70
5.1.1. After the Second Intifada: the disappointed Zionist left and the dormant Israeli public 75
5.1.2. When systematic occupation brings normalization 79
5.1. How do peace movements frame the issue and what do they want? 80
5.1.3. Legal and political advocacy groups: one- or two-state question 81
5.1.4. Military service refusal, avoidance and conscientious objection: to serve or not to serve 91
5.1.5. Human rights monitoring organizations: occupation management? 97
5.2. United we stand, divided we fall: alliances among groups and organizations 105
5.1.6. Legal and political advocacy groups: uniting under the Zionist umbrella 106
5.1.7. United Front of Objectors? 111
5.1.8. Human Rights Monitoring: United Legal Front 112
5.3. Concluding remarks 116

6. TURKEY: BLIND TO THE WAR AT HOME? 119

6.1. Setting the scene: between existence and mobilization 119
6.2. How do peace movements frame the issue and what are their demands? 123
6.2.1. No War on Iraq Coordination (NWIC) 124
6.2.2. What peace and with whom? 129
6.2.3. Conscientious objection 148
6.2.4. Human Rights Monitoring Groups and Organizations 155
6.3. Sporadic and informal: alliances among groups and organizations 160
6.4. Concluding remarks 162

7. YOUNG REPUBLICS OLD CONFLICTS: A COMPARISON OF PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND TURKEY 165

7.1. The role of political opportunity structures and the interplay with movement characteristics 165
7.2. Know your audience, tell your message 174
7.2.1. Jewish Israeliness as a Privilege vs. the legacy of Kemalism 176
7.2.2. Human Rights Monitoring: to politick or not to politick? 182
7.3. No coalition, no gain 184
7.3.1. Zionism Runs through it all vs. Not without Islamists and Kemalists 186
7.4. Revising the model 188

7.5. The morning after: Mobilization during the Operation Protective Edge and Gezi Demonstrations 190
7.6. Deadlock in peace: concluding remarks 198

8. CONCLUSION: THIRTY-SEVEN SHADES OF PEACE? 201

8.1. Primary Empirical Findings and Further Theoretical Implications 202
8.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 203
8.3. Final Words 204

Bibliography 207

Appendix- Interview Questions 223

Appendix- Interviews Cited 225

ABSTRACT

This qualitative research studies different characteristics of peace movement groups and organizations in militaristic societies by using the most similar system design to compare Israel and Turkey. It attempts to explore the dynamic interaction of political opportunity structures (POS), mobilizing structures and framing through different time periods. The two countries are similar in many types of POS like having a militaristic society, ethnic division and being involved in armed conflicts. If Israel and Turkey have similar POS, does it mean that they also have similar characteristics of peace movements? With my research, I found out that in the two countries mobilizing structures and frames vary consistently. This can be explained through the fact that the development of mobilizing structures and frames is affected by other types of POS, in which Israel and Turkey differ: citizenship rights and foundational principles. These types of POS that vary between the two countries also explain the variance of peace movement groups' and organizations' characteristics.

This study covers the period from 2000 (the Second Intifada) in Israel and from 2002 in Turkey (when AKP came to power) until Summer 2014. The research is conducted using interviews during fieldworks in Istanbul, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem between June 2012 and September 2014. This research is based on sixty-seven intensive interviews with thirty-seven peace movement groups and organizations; such as human rights organizations, anti-NATO groups, political organizations and groups supporting conscientious objectors. It includes mobilization during turning points like Operation Protective Edge (2014) and Gezi Protests (2013). It builds on the theories of political, as well as discursive opportunity structures, and citizenship studies, which are important to analyze how framing works through mobilizing structures in militaristic societies. To my knowledge, there is no previous research which deals extensively, and exclusively, with this topic, therefore my research is the first attempt to categorize and label these groups. The originality of this research depends on its empirical data as well as on its conceptual framework. Considering the recent mobilization in Israel, Turkey and the surrounding regions, this research is a very timely project. Besides that, it also contributes to the theoretical as well as methodological understanding of social movements, and peace movements in particular.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 : Overview of the fieldwork conducted in Israel and Turkey 26
Table 7.1 : Findings on descriptive level: Empirical differences in movement characteristics 167
Table 7.2 : The repertoires of action used by different groups in two countries 169
Table 7.3 : Analytical evidence to explain the variation..... 178

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: The Model 15
Figure 5.1: Groups and organizations examined in Israel 75
Figure 6.1: Groups and organizations examined in Turkey 122
Figure 7.1: The Revised Model 189

1. INTRODUCTION

David Meyer argues that "By engaging in activism, an individual creates himself or herself as a subject, rather than simply an object, in history and… is unlikely to retreat to passive acceptance of the world as it is" (1999: 186). My starting point for this research was to understand the interplay between political opportunities and peace movements, and to demonstrate how these opportunities affect mobilizing structures and framing in particular historical circumstances and in a given period. Because I was interested in the interaction of activist mobilization and institutional politics, I decided to use a political opportunity framework to understand this dynamic.

My objective is to explain how and why peace movements differ in Turkey and Israel, and in order to do this I have addressed the relatively stable aspects of both states. In particular, I focus on two aspects which although not neglected in research, have been underemphasized in the existing literature. In order to do so in this research on political opportunity structures I examine citizenship rights such as freedom of speech by analyzing the state's capacity for and degree of actual repression (see McCarthy 1997: 255) together with the foundational principles of each state. Furthermore, in trying to understand mobilizing structures, I look at alliances between peace movement groups and organizations in order to highlight their criteria for building alliances and to understand under which conditions they are more likely to take part in coalitions. Framing plays an important role in examining how activists define the problem in their respective militaristic society and what kind of solution they offer, as well as the way they communicate with their target audience. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly call for a dynamic mobilization model and they suggest:

> "Rather than look upon "opportunities and threats" as objective structural factors, we see them as subject to attribution [and emergent construction]. No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is (a) visible to potential challengers and (b) perceived to be an opportunity. The same holds true for threats, an underemphasized corollary of the model … Attribution of opportunity or threat is an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert populations" (2001: 43).

Social movement organizations, at the end, "provide individuals culturally close to a given political contention with an opportunity to convert their dispositions to participate in concrete action" (Passy 2003: 24).

To the best of my knowledge, there is no study on peace movements in Turkey, and there is no academic work which looks at peace movements in Israel from the social movements perspective I use. None of them takes so many groups and organizations into account, and there is no academic work which compares peace movement groups and organizations in Israel to those in Turkey which is the most original element in my research. The analysis of Israel and Turkey provides clarity and avoids simplification, and it is not hard to transpose to other cases of militaristic societies. I believe the originality of this research depends not only on its rich empirical data, but also on the fact that I employ social movement theories and theories of citizenship together in order to construct a conceptual framework which future researchers can build on when they want to study peace movements in other militaristic societies or other studies of Israel and Turkey, in particular. I argue that research on peace movements in militaristic societies can deeply affect contemporary discussions about state-society relations[1], freedom of speech and democracy.

Before starting I should make one point clear: Here I study peace movements from the perspective of the oppressor state by only conducting interviews in Turkey and Israel, and not in Turkey's Kurdistan, and Palestine. One of the main points is how to define Palestinians living under the occupation; are they Palestinians, Palestinian citizens of Israel, Israeli Arabs or Arab Israelis? In this thesis I will refer to them as Palestinians.[2] Mann argues that when it comes to ethnic differences, they "entwine with other social differences – especially of class, religion, and gender" and concludes that "ethnonationalism is strongest where it can capture other senses of exploitation" (Mann 2005: 5).

The distinction between an Israeli and a Palestinian is very clear, but when it comes to Turkish and Kurdish peace activists the distinction is much more blurred. Associating the movements with an ethnic and national component such as "Israeli" and "Turkish" would be problematic as they are not a reflection of a particular nationality. The issue becomes even more complicated when we

[1] See Migdal (2001) for the "State-in Society" approach.
[2] Ghanem uses the term "Arab citizens of Israel," as he argues both Jewish and Arab people's affiliation is determined according to their original ethnic membership (Ghanem 1998: 430).

start asking whether it is a Jewish or an Israeli identity when it comes to talking about peace movements in Israel — who is an Israeli, and what kind of a role does Jewishness play in this context? Therefore, instead of calling them "Israeli" and "Turkish" movements, I decided to refer to them as peace movements in Israel and Turkey. These are big topics on their own but they will be touched on in the following chapters. Lastly, I will not define them as Palestinian or Kurdish "conflicts" because the word "conflict" implies a sense of parity which assumes that there are two equal parties within a common problem. This is not the case either in Israel or in Turkey.

1.1. Mobilization around peace and the puzzle

According to della Porta and Fillieule, social movements "challenge the given configuration of power that is expressed in state institutions" (2007: 217). Contentious politics, Tarrow argues, comes into existence "when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents" (1998: 2). For Rucht, social movements are "networks of groups and organizations prepared to mobilize for protest actions to promote (or to resist) social change (ultimate goal of social movements) and individuals who attend protest activities or contribute resources without necessarily being attached to movement groups or organizations" (1996: 186). Meyer and Tarrow define social movements as "*collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purpose and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and* authorities" (1998: 4, emphasis in original). As movements can mobilize money, labor and legitimacy as pointed out by McCarthy and Zald (1977), land, labor, and capital can be mobilized by movements as well (Tilly 1978: 69).

As argued by Amenta and Young, it is not surprising that social movements mainly target the state (1999: 30). The reason is that without the support of the state, social changes cannot prevail (Jenkins 1995: 16). Therefore, as Whittier argues there is a need for a multilayered view of social movements:

> "Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters or organizations, networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by participation in challenges and collective identities through which participants define the boundaries and significance of their group. Like movements, states and institutions also have structure, engage in action, and construct meaning. Like movements, states are not unified actors but are composed of specific organizations, campaigns, ideologies, factions, and

> individuals. These are grounded in particular organizational contexts and relationships, alliances, chains of command, and power struggles, ad in legitimizing discourses and collective identities" (2002: 289).

Gelb and Hart look at women's movements in the US and the UK, both of which try to introduce a feminist agenda in the presence of hostile governments as well as countermovements and do survive despite the hostile political era (1999: 149). We can also assume that peace movements do not flourish in completely peaceful societies, and in the words of Cobb and Elder "[t]o define a policy problem is to imply its solution and to delimit its solution possibilities. Situations defined as inevitable and unalterable, however lamentable, are not likely to be considered policy problems, but rather just hard facts of life" (1983: 174).

If we take della Porta's and Diani's definition of social movements that there should be transformations in social conflict, collective identity[3] and solidarity, informal networks through which interests and ideas are represented and the use of protest (2006: 22–28), one of the main issues I had to decide before starting to write this thesis was how to define the movements I am analyzing: Are they peace movements or anti-war movements? How different are they from each other if we talk about two countries involved in armed conflicts within their own territories? Although peace movements, anti-war struggles, anti-militarism and pacifism have a long tradition in Israel, this is not the case for Turkey. Both countries were founded after major wars, but the peace movement tradition could not and did not develop in Turkey, which is a NATO member. In order to understand why I chose peace movements in both countries, I should explain what militarism is. This will be my next point.

1.1.1. What is militarism?

The military-historian Alfred Vagts defines civilian militarism as:

> "the unquestioning embrace of military values, ethos, principles, attitudes; as ranking military institutions and considerations above all others in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly in military service and action, including war – to the preparation of which the nation's main interest and resources must be dedicated, with the inevitability and goodness of war always presumed. Such

[3] See Eder (1993) for collective identity formation in collective action.

> high regard leads to the advocacy of applying military values, organization- notably hierarchical features- to the totality of nation's life" (1981: 453).

Militarism can be understood as the predominance of military sentiments within a national population, or the way military efficiency is the state's pre-eminent concern (Berghahn and Bicheno 2001: 584). From a feminist concern, militaries, as institutions, are a "part of the construction of a gender order or gender subjectivities" (Kronsell 2012: 9). Ekirch emphasizes militarism as "a society in which war, or preparation for war, dominates politics and foreign policy. Soldiers and military-minded civilians become a governing elite dedicated to expanding the military establishment and inculcating martial values" (1999: 438). According to Ben-Elizer, militarism is an ideology which is not a direct cause of war but which makes war to be perceived as a "possible, available and reasonable solution" (1998: 8). Considering these definitions, my question is why, although there are similarities between Israel and Turkey, which will be mentioned briefly in the next section, peace movements in the two countries have different characteristics. This is an analytical blind spot which I will elaborate on in this thesis.

In addition to the similarities, there are differences between groups and organizations within one country in terms of their movement characteristics. I am thus aware that we cannot and I should not assume there is something like "the" movement when I talk about peace movements in Turkey and Israel. Their diverse nature in the two countries makes it crucial to underline this.

This raises many questions as to how we can explain that despite the fact that Israel and Turkey are both militaristic societies, their peace movements have different movement characteristics. The main problematique of this thesis is how we can explain that peace movements, which are mobilized around the conflict, could evolve in one way or another with different movement characteristics even though they exist in similar militaristic environments. This is the puzzle which led me to write a thesis on this topic. The research questions I will try to answer will be elaborated on Chapter 2, however now I will turn to the scope of the thesis.

1.2. The scope of the thesis: Israel and Turkey in comparison

At first glance Israel and Turkey do not lend themselves to comparison. Turkey is geographically nearly forty times larger than Israel, with a population ten times its size. Geographic scope is an important component when it comes to the comparison of both countries. Both Israel and Turkey

have central governments, but because Israel is much smaller than Turkey, it is easy to mobilize and coordinate from Tel Aviv, whereas in Turkey we observe a dispersal and Istanbul is the main center of political activity. Kriesi introduces the notion of the "degree of urbanization" arguing that on the local level political opportunities may play a different role in different parts of the country" (1989b: 304). But since Israel and Turkey are highly centralized states, I will not take degree of urbanization into consideration.

Upon closer examination, there are dimensions where these countries are strikingly similar. Both of them have militaristic societies, the army is an important political actor and respected throughout society, military service is compulsory and the right to conscientious objection is not recognized in law. Moreover, they have ethnically divided populations, with the Kurds in Turkey and the Palestinians in Israel, and both countries are involved to some degree in armed conflict. What is even more striking is that after the Second Intifada in Israel in 2000 and AKP's victory in national elections in 2002 in Turkey both countries have seen a rise in organizations campaigning for peace. The evolution of these organizations has also changed in different times depending on political opportunity structures, framing and mobilizing structures. Given these similarities between these two countries, I look for differences in the independent variable; political opportunities, which can explain the variation in the characteristics of peace movements in these two countries. This project thus represents an in-depth study of peace movement organizations and groups in Israel and in Turkey. I use the watershed moment of 9/11 2001 to start my analysis, which allows me to see how the impact of peace movements are altered in militaristic societies as wars develop and internal domestic situations change (Kaldor 2006). For the research and analysis in the Turkish case, I take the year 2002 as the starting point, when the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to power where it has since remained.[4] In the Israeli case, as I take the period from the Second Intifada, with the year 2000 as the beginning and for both cases the year 2014 will be taken as the closing point.

In order to investigate peace movements in countries where national feelings play an important role and where military service is viewed as an important aspect of citizenship and adulthood, the two prime examples I chose were Israel and Turkey. This was not only due to their key role in

[4] As of January 2017.

international relations and in the Middle East, but also due to the different characteristics of peace movements as a part of social movements, despite the fact that these two countries have many similarities as mentioned above.

In other respects, however, the two countries differ. In Turkey only men are obliged to do military service, whereas in Israel it is compulsory for both men and women. Moreover, Palestinians are excluded from military service in Israel, whereas in Turkey not only Turks, but also Kurds, must complete this duty. The Kemalist tradition in Turkey and Zionism in Israel provide different pictures in terms of political and cultural structures of these countries. The role of religion and the collective memory of the past signify another important point in underlining their different citizenship regimes. The Turkish state defines itself as a secular state where the army is the guardian of secularism. However, in Israel Jewishness is emphasized and often used as a tool in legitimizing survival and security concerns by referring to the history of the Jews. The stance of the current governments should be taken into account to understand the implemented policies. It is remarkable that peace movements, critical of the conflict and suggesting solutions to the conflict in their respective countries, could even evolve in one way or another. It is also important to consider how they evolved in different ways, even though they exist in similar environments. Therefore, from this comparative study we can learn something about the characteristics of peace movements in general. On a final note, when I say Kurdish people in Turkey or Palestinians in Israel, I would like to remind the reader that I am aware these minorities are not homogenous in themselves when it comes to their political aspirations and their responses to the policies of the states in Turkey and Israel.

To provide a background to my cases, there are some main works on militarism in Israel. Uri Ben-Elizer's *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (1998) provides a detailed historical analysis of the social forces and practices which contributed to the construction of Israeli militarism from 1936 until 1956. *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society* was the first edited book which focused on different aspects of militarism in Israel (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999). The book edited by Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barrak, *Militarism and Israeli Society* (2010) is a more recent publication where the transformation of Israeli society, and the army, is described from different perspectives, for instance the relationship between the security issues and the media in Israel (Peri 2010), the challenges faced by religious soldiers in combat units which sometimes lead to conscientious objection (Cohen 2010), the allocation of financial resources to the army (Shiffer 2010), and the

construction of psychological discourses about war (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 2010). The War Resisters' International Report (2003) for the Human Rights Committee provides a background in terms of the general legal situation and imprisonment of conscientious objectors in Israel. Compared to the Israeli case, in Turkey militarization and conscientious objection is a new topic in academic research. Altinay (2004) provides an excellent analysis of militarization in Turkey taking both compulsory military service and national education system into account. *Conscientious Objection: Resisting Militarized Society* is an edited volume which not only discusses the issue conceptually and legally, but also demonstrates the link between gender and objection (Cinar and Usterci 2009).

1.3. Thesis outline

This research first of all provides a deep insight into characteristics of peace movements in militaristic societies where war plays an important role in many aspects of daily life. From a theoretical perspective, it contributes to the field by providing evidence of how peace movements are capable of mobilizing structures, framing and making use of political opportunity structures. Moreover, it studies these issues in a period in which countries around the world have become increasingly concerned with their security based agendas and have become more willing to go to war (Carty and Onyett 2006). This has marked an entirely new period for peace activists. Over time, countries have changed, sometimes opening up politically, sometimes facing challenges from within. Governments have been replaced by new ones, with a frequent change in alliance structures as well. Society's support has also shifted at different times. Even in militaristic societies, where there is an unquestioning recourse to military values, attitudes, principles, and ethos (Vagts 1981: 453), peace movements have some type of positive effect when the support comes not only from society, but also from political allies. There have been cycles, not moments, when peace movements obtained resonance. Even in this age of globalization and internationalization, however, social movements are influenced by their own nation-specific political context (Beyeler and Rucht 2010: 21).

This research focuses on this period and thus informs us about the role peace, intended as a goal, plays in a context where security seems to have become the main, if not the exclusive, imperative. Moreover, this research focuses on one of the dynamic regions in the world, as both Turkey and

Israel are to a different extent involved in different conflicts in the Middle East. Both Turkey and Israel have experienced intense mobilization during the last few years. This research grasps these recent mobilizations as it makes use of sixty-seven interviews[5] conducted in both countries. This material allows me to compare two different trajectories too: peace mobilization in times of war/conflict (Operation Protective Edge) and during large-scale demonstrations (Gezi Protests). My contribution to the literature is not only empirical but also theoretical insofar as I attempt to elaborate on citizenship studies within social movements literature with the help of political opportunities, framing and mobilizing structures concepts, each of which is in itself a further step towards understanding the evolution of social movements in general, peace movements in particular.

This thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background to the structure of the thesis. It summarizes the main conceptual approaches, which are relevant to the research questions in this thesis. It also discusses what kind of methodology is used in this research.

Chapter 3 elaborates on Zionism and the question of Palestine in Israel while taking the history of the relevant peace movements into account. I will use this background information in analyzing my findings in the relevant chapters.

Chapter 4 deals with the Turkish state and the Kurdish question. It focuses on the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the emergence of the PKK, as well the history of peace movements in Turkey. This contextual and historical description helps provide a background for my analytical arguments in the following chapters.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present the empirical findings based on my fieldwork in Israel and Turkey, respectively. The main emphasis is on the examination of different peace organizations and groups in each country, based on interviews I conducted during my fieldwork. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 outline the political structure in their respective countries and demonstrate under what conditions these groups build coalitions with each other, how they define the conflict, and what kind of a roadmap they offer for the conflicts within their borders.

[5] See Appendix for the Interviews Cited.

In Chapter 7 the focus shifts to the comparison of the peace movements in Israel and Turkey based on empirical findings. My intention is to highlight the main differences in the characteristics of the peace movements by basing my arguments on the difference in citizenship rights and discursive aspects of foundational ideologies in these two countries. The two cases illustrate how coalitions are formed and how messages are communicated to the audience under different political structures.

Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by summarizing the main findings and underlining its empirical and theoretical implications for social movements literature.

2. A ROADMAP TO STUDY PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND TURKEY

As the first scholar to carry out comprehensive and comparative research on peace movements in Israel and Turkey, I had to decide the starting point myself. This is why I decided to call this chapter 'A Roadmap,' since it is the first attempt in the literature at studying this phenomenon. In his work on the Dutch peace movement, Kriesi argues that it should be considered as a new social movement (see Kriesi and van Praag 1987; Kriesi 1989a, 1989b), but I disagree with his approach. Instead of posing a duality between "new" and "old" social movements, I argue for an analytical account of a focus on peace movements as such. In this chapter I make a brief review of peace movement literature in general, followed by an elaboration of my research questions, and the model used for the research. I then focus on the concepts I used to explain my model. The chapter concludes with a section on methodology.

2.1. Peace movements in scholarly work: what do we know so far?

Understandably the bulk of peace movement literature has focused on the impact of peace movements on policy, and mobilizing strategies, and political opportunity structures (Klandermans 1991; Rochon 1988). Much of this scholarly work has focused on the reasons leading to mobilization. As Andrews changed his perspective from the ordinary question of "whether movements have an impact" into "how movements have an impact" (2002: 107), he explains the way social movements affect the "extent and form of social change" (115). The lesson that can be learned from existing research is that the evolution of social movements is mainly determined by political opportunity structures (POS). The other two factors influencing the development of social movements are mobilizing structures and framing. The scheme that emerges from the literature is that POS directly affect the internal characteristics of social movements, namely mobilizing structures and framing. For example, Marullo and Meyer (2007) focused on movements against nuclear weapons in the USA after World War II and concluded that POS are crucial for successful mobilization. Rochon and Meyer (1997) observed the nuclear freeze movement in the USA in the

1980s and demonstrated the importance of movement coalitions, and POS, emphasizing the change in allies, which lead to mobilization. They assessed whether the day-to-day work of peace movements has had any measurable impact on important decisions in the realm of politics. Yeo (2011) has analyzed anti-nuclear base movements in five countries to demonstrate the importance of security consensus among activists and allies. In his article on the political cycles of peace movement, Meyer (1993b) notes that unfavorable changes in policy may lead to mobilization when government policy appears to be hawkish and there are no institutional opportunities for influence, it is probable that activists reach a broader audience and mobilize support.

Among these, the influence of POS on social movements has been strongly emphasized (Kriesi 1995; 2007). The chances of getting together to become a social movement are higher if there is increased access, influential allies, unstable political alignments, and a repressive state (Tarrow 1998). Beyeler and Rucht, for example, analyze the demonstrations against the war on Iraq and focus on two dimensions of POS; formal access to the decision-making system and configuration of the institutionalized left (2010: 20). Verhulst and Walgrave, on the other hand, urge us to consider specific factors such as politics, the media, and public opinion, and argue that the way the media deals with peace issues, together with its coverage in the public sphere play a key role in the effectiveness of movements (2010: 43). In respect to resource mobilization, Walgrave and Klandermans (2010) suggest we consider two dimensions of mobilization: strong *vs* weak ties and open *vs* closed mobilization channels. After arguing that the strength of weak ties is based on the fact that they connect groups with strong ties, they continue to distinguish between open and closed channels of communication where the former does not use restrictions on whom they target, whereas closed mobilization channels target members of an organization (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010: 172). Following an examination of mobilization patterns during the demonstrations against the war on Iraq in eight countries, they conclude that open patterns of mobilization are not dependent on "strong ties" and they "employ open channels of communication" (190). Benford's (1993a) analysis on frames of nuclear disarmament movement demonstrates how narratives operate as frames that lead to successful mobilization in the anti-nuclear movement.

To understand the characteristics of social movements, many scholars have examined opportunity structures, and some have looked at organizational variables. Kriesi (1989b), for example, shows how POS in the Netherlands, and the degree of openness in the Dutch political system in particular,

have an effect on the Dutch peace movement. McAdam and Su (2002) have also examined the mechanisms of signaling, protest and public opinion shift in their research on anti-war protest and congressional voting and they conclude that threatening forms of protest increase the chance of pro-peace voting whilst slowing down overall congressional action. In addition to the role of POS, organizational variables should also be taken into account in my analysis. To understand the effect of a movement's infrastructure on policy, Andrews proposes a "movement infrastructure model" in which he distinguishes between leadership, organizational structure and resources (2001: 75). Moreover, other scholars have also focused on the role of movement allies. According to Zald and Ash, a coalition is likely to occur if "it promises greater facilities, financial aid, or attainment of goals" (1966: 335). Staggenborg (1986) also emphasizes that coalitions are likely to be formed if there is an exceptional opportunity or threat, and that they are more likely to succeed if external funding is secured with the help of established organizations. Similarly, Meyer and Whittier (1994) demonstrate how feminist and peace groups in the USA in the 1980s cooperated in order to cope with the hostile environment of the era, and how they adopted each other's frames, tactics and leadership structures. Lastly, framing should also be taken into consideration. In their research the mobilization of the homeless in the USA Cress and Snow demonstrate how social movement organizations differ in their degree of articulating diagnostic and prognostic framing which lead to different impacts of these organizations (2000: 1072). In the same way, McCammon analyzed women's jury-rights frames and concluded that it these are more likely to have favorable outcomes if there are "frames which diagnose the social problems as serious," if these frames "outline a specific rationale for activists' demands," and if they are "empirically credible" (2009: 59).

This necessarily brief literature review, makes it obvious that differences in state structures affect the structures of peace movements (Tarrow 1996: 49), but as Tarrow was quick to point out, this does not preclude cross-national difference between movements (51). While this is undoubtedly correct, the assumption that we can see the state as a "continuously similar" actor has also been questioned. Tilly has argued that state-making is not inherently stable. In 1984 he already called on researchers of social movement to "recognize social movements as sustained interactions between changing sets of challengers and authorities" (Tilly 1984: 315). In other words, that are no stable processes, but society as a whole is in a constant state of flux, which leads to constant adaption and re-adaption by all actors, including the social movements. This not only includes political and discursive opportunity structures, but also organizational variables such as

infrastructure and framing which are my theoretical toolboxes for this project as I will show in my model.

2.2. Elaboration of the research questions and the model

In this thesis I follow McAdam's suggestion to be "explicit about *which* dependent variable we are seeking to explain and *which* dimensions of *political* opportunity are germane to that explanation" (1996a: 31, emphasis in original). In order to find out what it is that varies in the characteristics of a peace movement in a particular type of context, namely a militaristic society, we need to examine persistence. In order to answer the question of how persistence may vary, I examine the three analytical levels of political opportunity structures (POS), framing, and mobilizing structures (MS), which will allow me to describe different forms of being a peace movement. I consider how peace movements make use of different political opportunities, how these political opportunities shape the internal structure of peace movements, as well as the movements' framing. What I show is how different POS lead to different trajectories of peace movements' characteristics. I use the classic independent variable, POS to see how it affects my dependent variable, characteristics of movements. A number of follow-up questions help to elaborate on this issue, which is linked to social movement literature in general:

How do peace movements survive POS? How do movement characteristics adapt to POS?

How do they adapt their internal framing that they communicate a public opinion? To what extent is their framing shaped by POS?

How do they adapt internally? To what extent are resources mobilized by POS?

In asking these questions, I follow the reasoning of McAdam, McCarthy and Zald that "the effects of the three factors are interactive rather than independent" where political "changes encourage mobilization not only through the 'objective' effects they have on power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further undermine the legitimacy of the system or its perceived mutability" (1996: 8). In the same vein, Staggenborg also highlights the importance of looking at "organizational characteristics of SMOs and changes over time in organizational structures, comparing different types of SMOs" (2002: 126).

In this interactive model, my starting point is that peace movements reproduce themselves in a world which is changing because of action. First, by looking at POS, we are able to see the re-

appropriation of conditions: Peace movements change POS for themselves, and for the opposition. Moreover, we can check whether new actors such as elites, political parties, police or international institutions are introduced or what this would mean for peace. By analyzing the way they adapt internally, we can see whether networks grow or dissolve, whether new alliances are built, and what the implications are for organizational structure in terms of strategies they use. Finally, adaptation of their internal framing tells us whether they reframe what peace means for them, whether they change their policies, and whether the "we" definition becomes inclusive or exclusive over time. This model not only helps us to understand within country variation, i.e. different groups and organizations in one country, but also helps us to have an elaborative comparison between two countries.



Figure 2.1: The Model

2.3. The conceptual framework used to explain the model

Here I introduce the concepts I used to examine which factors play a role in a peace movement group's and organization's characteristics. What do we mean by POS, mobilizing structures and frames? As I showed in the model, I focus not only on mobilizing structures and framing (organizational infrastructure), but also on movement's environment (POS). By combining those, I emphasize the "qualitative sensitivity to the political opportunity approach by referring to the content and nature of the claims that are made by challengers in different settings" (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 142).

2.3.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS)

Social movement studies have been using, and exploiting, POS for a very long time. In his work on the pace of black insurgency McAdam (1982; 1983) developed the political process approach,

in which he showed that opportunities for protest and institutionalized political power are closely connected. Meyer defines POS as the "institutional and political factors that shape social movement options" (1993a: 455). The POS approach has been used to explain the emergence, rise and fall, and the outcomes of social movements. It is one of the most frequently used theoretical tools in analyzing different units in a comparative perspective. For example, Eisinger (1973) looked at local political institutions and political protest activities in forty-three different cities in the USA, and Kitschelt (1986) analyzed anti-nuclear movements in four democracies to understand the policy-making capacities of government.

Scholars have taken different variables into account to analyze political opportunities (Kriesi et al. 1992; 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Rucht 1990). Eisinger (1973) was the first to consider openness of government as the determining factor in opportunity structures. In addition to openness, Kitschelt (1986) underlined the role of state capacity in determining influence. He considered open or closed input structures and strong or weak output capacity, in which blockage led to confrontational tactics whereas openness resulted in assimilative ones. Both Eisinger (1973) and Kitschelt (1986) highlighted stable aspects of governments. McAdam (1982) also emphasized the importance of openness, which was a reflection of favorable changes in policy and political environment in the specific case of African-American civil rights mobilization. Kriesi and his colleagues (1995) also took openness into consideration in addition to the political position of the organized left. They noted that it is not only the facilitated access provided by the state which makes action possible, but also political threats and undesired policies which makes inactivity costly. Both McAdam (1982) and Kriesi et al. (1995) have emphasized volatile aspects of political opportunity such as alliances and public policy. According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), political opportunities have four main components: increasing popular access to the political system, divisions within the elite, the availability of elite allies, and diminishing levels of state repression. In his another work, McAdam emphasized POS as "the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence or absence of elite allies and the state's capacity and propensity for repression" (1996a: 27). Della Porta (1995), on the other hand, argues that state repression is not an independent dimension, but more an expression of the vulnerability or receptivity of POS.

As shown in my model, I follow the classical model of social movements, as demonstrated by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), and I argue that POS affect the framing of peace movements and their mobilizing structures. Tarrow warned scholars a long time ago that political opportunities "may be discerned along so many directions and in so many ways that it is less a variable than a cluster of variables – some more readily observable than others" (1998: 430). Following this line of thought, I agree with McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) that we should be careful that POS do not turn into a concept which "sponges" all the political developments surrounding the movement in question. Gamson and Meyer warn scholars that political opportunities are "in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment" (1996: 275). However, we cannot deny the importance of the theoretical use of the concept in social movement studies. I do not agree with Goodwin and Jasper (2004) who criticized the concept for trying to explain too much and too little at the same time first by undermining the importance of activist agency and second by introducing a mechanistic understanding.

It is not true that political opportunities only reflect the stable aspects of a political system, because although established institutions, and the way they are arranged, may be stable in a given country, political alliances and discursive aspects of political opportunities comprise dynamic aspects. Although Meyer's advice is crucial when it comes to tracing "the processes through which changes in opportunity translate into mobilization – and into subsequent changes in opportunity" (2004: 139), I still think it is important to generate a structural analysis. In the last instance, no matter whether political opportunities are stable or dynamic, movements operate within and through political processes. Therefore, I follow Tarrow's definition when I discuss political opportunity structures: "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (1994: 85). He makes a distinction between cross-sectional and static structures of opportunity and intrasystemic and dynamic ones, in which he claims that dynamic statism approach will help to "specify political opportunity for different actors and sectors, to track its changes over time, and to place the analysis of social movements in their increasingly transnational setting" (Tarrow 1996: 45). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald highlight that in order to compare social movements in different nations, political opportunities are more static because they reflect "differences in the political characteristics of the nation states" where the movements came into being (1996: 3). In this thesis, while trying to explain how seemingly similar

movements — in my case peace movements — differ in two countries, I emphasize more stable aspects of both countries although them being stable does not exclude the dynamic nature of them.

2.3.2. The role of citizenship regimes and the discursive aspect of foundational ideologies

Before we move to citizenship regimes, we should ask what a state is. According to Amenta and Young, states are "sets of political, military, judicial, and bureaucratic organizations that exert political authority and coercive control over people living within the borders of well-defined territories" (1999: 30). The state is the final moderator for the allocation of societal goods because it is the "institutionalized center for the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence" which makes it "simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 3). But, then, what is the link between states and citizenship?

Koopmans and Statham define citizenship as "the set of rights, duties, roles, and identities linking citizens to the nation-state" (1999a: 654). Turner argues that citizenship is "pushed along by the development of social conflicts and social struggles within such a political and cultural arena, as social groups compete with each other over access to resources" (1990: 194). Statham does not see citizenship as a formal and legal field only, but also as a place where political and social rights are contested together with cultural obligations (1999: 599). In the same vein, a more elaborative definition comes from Tilly:

> "Citizenship designates a set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories of persons to agents of governments … It differs from most other contracts in 1) binding whole categories of persons rather than single individuals to each other, 2) involving differentiation among levels and degrees of members, 3) directly engaging a government's coercive power. To the extent that governments control substantial resources, including coercive means, there three differentials single out citizenship as a potent form of contract liable to fierce contestation" (1997: 600).

Koopmans elaborates on the way states define who belongs to the nation and distinguishes between "community of consent," which is composed of people contributing to the common political institutions and values, and "community of descent" where ethno-cultural component plays a big role; France being an example of the former and Germany for the latter (1999: 629–30). Turner argues that in Germany "citizenship stands in a passive relationship to the state because it is primarily an effect of state action" (1990: 207).

Brubaker introduces a comparative historical analysis between France and Germany to explain their different understandings of nationhood where he claims French citizenry is based on a territorial community emphasizing a state-centered and assimilationist view, whereas the German one is based on a community of descent highlighting an ethno-cultural aspect (1990: 380). As he explains the roots of French conception of nationhood as secular, universalist and unitarist which led to a citizenship defined in political terms, he adds that the German conception was differentialist and organic underlining a racial, linguistic or cultural community (Brubaker 1990: 386). In his comparison, Brubaker (1992) emphasizes that citizenship is a reflection of the cultural implications of nationhood, in the sense that Germany is a case of *jus sanguinis*, where ethno-cultural belonging to the nationhood influences citizenship rights, whereas *jus soli* citizenship in France is tied with territorial birthright highlighting the civic concept of nationhood. According to Giugni and Passy, this reflects the fact that "German citizenship is ethnic-based and reflects the idea of the *nation*-state, while French citizenship is civic-based and reflects the idea of the nation-*state*" (2004: 57, emphasis in original). When we consider the vast literature on citizenship, Koopmans and Statham explain, there are two dimensions of citizenship when we talk about citizenship regimes and these are the "criteria for formal access to citizenship" and comprise the "cultural obligations that this access to citizenship entails." The first refers to an "open" understanding of citizenship when it comes to a "civic territorial (*jus soli*)" criteria, and a "closed" one for the "ethnocultural (*jus sanguinis*)" component. The second dimension, distinguishes between assimilationism and cultural pluralism (Koopmans and Statham 1999a: 660). According to these dimensions, Germany has a "ethnocultural exclusionist citizenship regime" whereas France has a "civic-assimilationist" regime (661).

Shafir and Peled introduce the concept of "citizenship discourses" which is "political and linguistic strategies of membership fashioned out of alternative combinations of identities and claims" (1998: 409). They explain that whereas in the liberal discourse the focus is on personal liberty; the republican one emphasizes "political attachment" in the sense that what makes a person a citizen is "the virtue of participating in the life of their political community" and "identification with its characteristics" (Shafir and Peled 1998: 410). Lastly, the ethno-nationalist approach takes the nation or ethnic group as the reference point, where belonging to a homogenous group with a particular language, religion and history makes them different from other nations or ethnic groups

(411). Brubaker takes the different history of Germany and France into account when he elaborates on the formation of citizenship and claims that:

> "In France [...] a bureaucratic monarchy engendered a political and territorial conception of nationhood; while in Germany, the disparity in scale between supranational Empire and the subnational profusion of sovereign and semisovereign political units fostered the development of an ethnocultural understanding of nationhood" (1992: 4).

Although I take Brubaker's (1990; 1992) definition of French citizenry defined in political terms and German one in ethno-cultural terms as a starting point to elaborate on my cases, i.e. Germany for Israel and France for Turkey, I use the concepts of republican citizenship regime for Turkey and ethno-national citizenship regime for Israel for the comparison.[6] Koopmans and Statham's research elaborates on the national citizenship model:

> "migrant and minority claims making will be strongly affected by the opportunities and constraints for intervening in the public sphere set by the institutions, rights, and discourses that derive from nationally specific modes of incorporation of migrants into the political community through citizenship" (1999a: 671).

I follow this line of thought and expect that the different citizenship regimes in Israel and Turkey lead to differences in framing and mobilizing structures as a result of the different implications they have within their respective nation-state, and between Israel and Turkey. I argue that the different citizenship regimes in Israel and Turkey influence the movement characteristics they display not only between the two countries, but also within them.

2.3.3. Framing

In recent decades framing has become a very popular approach to use in social movement studies. It can be said that it emerged as a response to the growing critique regarding the limitation of the resource mobilization theory. Goffman introduces the concept of "schemata of interpretation" in order to emphasize the role of frameworks which helps us "locate, perceive, identify, and label a

[6] Instead of using the term "models of citizenship" which is mainly used for migration studies in the literature (see, for example, Koopmans and Statham 1999a; 1999b; 2000) I have chosen to use "citizenship regimes". This is because I am examining peace movements relating to minorities in their own territories (i.e. Palestinians and Kurds), and not immigrants. The discussion of Palestinians as minorities or indigenous population is very important one, however for my analysis I am describing them as minorities to refer back to the political conflict.

seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (1974: 21). Two scholars who have been working on the issue widely are Snow and Benford. In their first article written together with other scholars in 1986 they mainly focused on frame alignment processes (Snow et al. 1986). In contrast to ideology, Snow and Benford argue, framing is "*an empirically observable activity*" (2005: 210, emphasis in original).

Snow and Benford introduce the verb "framing" in order to explain the micromobilization processes by which SMOs and their agents "frame or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists" (1988: 198). In the same article, the two scholars take a step towards frame resonance by claiming that defining a situation as unjust is not enough in itself because modes of attribution and articulation should also be taken into account. Although they defined three tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, for the purpose of my research my main reference point consists of the first two in my theoretical model and analysis. Diagnostic framing is the first of the three core framing tasks to refer to the diagnosis of the problem, which needs to change. It puts "problem identification as well as the attribution of blame or causality" at the center, whereas the second task of prognostic framing refers to the "identification of a solution to the diagnosed problem," while specifying its targets, tactics, and strategies (Benford 1993a: 199).[7] We should note that these two tasks aim to achieve what Klandermans (1984) defined as "consensus mobilization." Another work by Snow and Benford (1992) focused on the link between master frames and cycles of protest and called for other scholars' attention towards this interplay.

Building on their previous work Benford published an article on motivational framings, which takes collective action frames within the nuclear disarmament movement as its focus. He is asking about the role of vocabularies of motive in recruitment and participation in this movement, and to see how vocabularies of motive; severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety are framed. He shows that participant action precedes not only collective action frames, but also vocabularies of motive (Benford 1993a). He argues that four vocabularies of motive provide the impetus for collective action: severity underlining the immensity of the danger; urgency pointing out the pressing need

[7] In his another work, Benford focuses on frame disputes (1993b) because it is not unlikely that diagnostic and prognostic frames debated within a group or organization lead to these frame disputes.

of the desired world; efficacy emphasizing the new awareness with a potential leading to change; and propriety calling for the need to take action (Benford 1993a: 196). He claims that all these vocabularies of motivation played a role in pointing out the urgency and the seriousness of the nuclear threat and in emphasizing the efficacy and propriety of taking action (201). He concludes that motivational framings emphasizing the seriousness of the issue must be convincing so as to lead to ameliorative action because acknowledging the existence of a problem in itself enough to stimulate mobilization (Benford 1993a: 201).

Koopmans and Duyvendak claim "the same accident may be a major political event in one country while provoking as little controversy as the weather report in another" (1995: 248). They conclude that because political power relations work differently in different countries, political opportunities and framing should be analyzed together (249). Diani (1996), too, links frames with political opportunities. He showed "how different degrees of consistency between the opportunity structure and actors' frames can render organizational resources more or less valuable and effective" (Diani 1996: 1054). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald define framing as the "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (1996: 6). Zald underlines that frames are different than ideologies which "tend to be more complex and logical systems of beliefs than frames, though frames may be embedded in ideologies" (1996: 262). In this thesis, I follow Snow and Benford (1998) in operationalizing frames. I consider what the groups and organizations see as the main problem regarding the political conflicts in their respective countries (diagnostic frames) as well as what kind of solutions they offer (prognostic frames).

2.3.4. Mobilizing structures

The role of resources in mobilization has been highlighted by many social movement scholars (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The work of McCarthy and Zald (1977) was a milestone in resource mobilization theory where the emphasis shifted from "why" movements emerge to "how" they do so. They underline that the resource mobilization approach focuses on not only societal support but also constraint of social movements:

> "It examined the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1213).

How should we point out strategies used by social movements? Tilly (1978) introduced the concept of "repertoire of contention"[8] to explain that activists choose tactics from among many options. McCarthy defines mobilizing structures as "those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular "tactical repertoires," particular "social movement organizational" forms, and "modular social movement repertoires" which also includes:

> "the range of everyday life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of the state structure itself. This encompassing scope allows us to address their routine dynamics as well as their common reciprocal interrelationships with both political opportunity structures and framing processes" (McCarthy 1996: 141)

This thesis is obviously not the first attempt to illustrate the link between political opportunities and mobilizing structures; the interaction between them has been shown in many studies. For instance, Piven and Cloward (1977) demonstrate that as poor people do not have a direct link to the center of the policy process, and since they are dependent on government support, extreme political methods are their only way to exert influence.

I agree with McCarthy, who argues that "more stable elements of political opportunity are central in shaping the available range of mobilizing structures in the long run" (1996: 150). Therefore, I will take a stable aspect of political opportunity, that of citizenship regimes, and illustrate the link between that and coalitions built by movements. Staggenborg argues that coalitions are more likely to be formed: "(1) when individual organizations lack the resources needed to take advantage of opportunities or fend off threats, or (2) when coalition work allows movement organizations to conserve resources for tactics other than those engaged in by the coalition" (1986: 388). Zald and Ash underline the importance of coalition formation as following:

> "The coalition pools and resources and coordinates plans, while keeping distinct organizational identities. It will take place if it promises greater facilities, financial aid, or attainment of goals. Thus coalitions are more likely when MO's appear to be close to the goal than at other times, for

[8] For an elaborative analysis on repertoires and regimes, see Tilly (2006) and Tilly (1995).

then the costs of investigating in the coalition seem small in comparison with the potential benefits" (1966: 335).

Kriesi and van Praag stress that because of the centralized nature of the Dutch political system, where defense policies are decided at the national level, there should be a high degree of national activity and organization (1987: 323). According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, mobilizing structures are "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (1996: 3). Rucht argues that when we observe social movements, "structural features consist of networks of groups and organizations" (1996: 187). I follow Rucht in operationalizing mobilizing structures in this thesis. I examine whether peace movement groups and organizations build alliances with each other and their criteria for cooperation.

2.4. Methodology

Zald and Ash define social movements as "a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures" (1966: 329). A social movement organization (SMO) is, according to McCarthy and Zald, a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (1977: 1218). They also introduce the concept of social movement industry which includes all "SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement" which can be seen as the "organizational analogue of a social movement" (1219).[9] The social movement sector, on the other hand, is composed of all SMIs in a society (1220).

For this thesis, I conducted qualitative research which is exploratory (della Porta and Keating 2008). A case study, according to Yin, is "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" (Yin 1994: 13). The aim is to see whether the theory works in a real life situation (de Vaus 2001: 222). This comparative case study of Israel and Turkey will help us to understand the variation in peace movements' characteristics. The aim is providing

[9] McCarthy and Zald argue that it is useful to differentiate between a social movement (SM) and social movement industries (SMI) because "SMs are never fully mobilized," it brings organizational component of activity more importance, SMs are composed of by more than one SMO and "rise and fall of SMIs that is not fully dependent on the size of an SM" (1977: 1219).

deep knowledge on a small number of cases, explaining causal complexity, interpreting specific cases and demonstrates several dimensions and characteristics (della Porta 2008). Comparison will help me to explain how similar situations lead to different outcomes (Mair 2008: 177). I will implement most-similar system design which assumes that "factors common to the countries sampled are irrelevant in explaining some observed differences, focusing instead on the variables that are different" (della Porta 2008: 214). As qualitative research pursues inductive reasoning (Marzano 2014), the research design and subsequent questions developed during this work.

2.4.1. Case selection and data collection

Bleijenbergh (2012) suggests that in case study research scholars should select cases which would provide the maximum amount of information about the research aim. In his research, Kriesi found out that the alliance structure of the Dutch peace movement was composed of political parties, unions and churches (1989b: 308). Following that I mapped the actors in the field of peace movements in both countries before I proceeded with fieldwork.

Kriesi and van Praag demonstrate that the Dutch peace movement has a two-tiered structure consisting of four currents: namely an anti-militarist tradition based on anarchistic view of the state; a socialist tradition aimed at disarmament; a Christian tradition focusing on moral and ethical values and condemning war; and a women's peace movement (1987: 326). There is no peace movement in Turkey which is officially supported by the mosques, i.e. which are linked to the government agency, the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Peace movements emphasizing Islamic components are therefore uncommon. In Israel I did not consider Orthodox Jewish organizations, to which as a secular person I had limited, or no, access. This led me to exclude religious groups from both countries in my analysis.

For this research I tried to include activist groups and organizations based on their involvement in the struggle of their respective countries. As Coy and Woehrle highlight "a comparative analysis across the terrain of organizations is necessary because, although peace movement organizations hold many positions and ideologies in common, they also harbor significant differences" (1996: 295). Even though this project is based on a similar design, I am aware that we cannot reach an absolute parallel between the two. As a result, in both countries I managed to talk to similar types of organizations, namely human rights groups, and to ones which were different, such as anti-NATO groups in Turkey, which do not exist in Israel. In order to obtain insights about the

foundation, mission, membership structure, vision and functioning of these organizations, I contacted people from these organizations who could provide me background information (see Table 2.1).

	Israel	**Turkey**
Turning Point	Second Intifada: 2000	AKP came to power: 2002
Transformative Events	Operation Protective Edge: 2014	Gezi Demonstrations: 2013
Organizations/Groups Studied in this Research	Alternative Information Center, Anarchists Against the Wall, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Boycott from Within, Breaking the Silence B'Tselem, Coalition of Women for Peace Combatants for Peace, Parents Forum Families Circle, Gisha, Gush Shalom, ICAHD, New Profile, Peace Now, Physicians for Human Rights, Rabbis for Human Rights, Refuseniks, Shministim Tarabut, Who Profits, Yesh Din, Yesh Gvul, Zochrot	Anti-Militarists, Art for Peace Initiative, Conscientious Objection Association, Conscientious Objection for Peace, East West Brotherhood Platform, Global Peace and Justice Coalition, Human Rights Association, Peace Assembly, Peace Initiative, Saturday Mothers, Soldier Rights, No War On Iraq Coordination, Taksim Solidarity[10], Women Conscientious Objectors, Women for Peace Initiative
Total Number of Groups	23(+2)[11]	14 (+4)[12]
Total Number of Interviews	36	31

Table 2.1 : Overview of the fieldwork conducted in Israel and Turkey

Because the main interest of my research is not activists'/members' personal stories, I chose my interviewees on the basis of their interest and availability to help me with my research.[13] Therefore, sometimes I managed to reach spokespersons, sometimes the head of the relevant department, and sometimes committed activists. My data includes recorded interviews, for which I received verbal

[10] Taksim Solidarity has not been examined in this thesis extensively because it is neither a peace movement group nor a peace movement organization. Interviews of Taksim Solidarity has been used only in Chapter 7 in order to show the mobilization during Gezi Park protests.
[11] For the main purpose of this thesis twenty-three organizations in Israel have been examined in detail. During the Operation Protective Edge, I conducted two interviews with members of Da'am and Hadash. I would like to remind the reader that these two political parties are not included in this thesis.
[12] As mentioned in Footnote 9, for the main purpose of this thesis I studied fourteen organizations and groups in Turkey in detail, however to look at the mobilization during Gezi Park demonstrations I conducted four more interviews from Taksim Solidarity.
[13] See Appendix for the interviews cited.

consent from my interviewees. In Turkey I conducted my interviews in Turkish and in Israel the interviews were in English. I transcribed and translated them myself.[14] During the semi-structured interviews,[15] my interviewees provided me with roadmaps, so that my research tended to snowball. Afterwards, I used my interviews and organizational documents to provide an insight about POS in the two countries. Through analyzing these interviews, I was able to demonstrate the way POS affect framing and mobilizing structures of groups and organizations.

How did I manage to convince my interviewees to talk to me? Confidentiality means "agreements with persons about what may be done with their data" (Sieber 1992: 52). I told that I am a PhD researcher and I explained them briefly what my research is about. Confidentiality can be managed in three stages of preinterview (planning of the research), during the interview and postinterview (data analysis) (Kaiser 2014). In order to assure confidentiality, the data needed to be edited and transformed into hard copy (Coffey, Holbrook and Atkinson 2011). I analyzed and interpreted data I collected from the examination of documents as well as interviews I conducted. I listened to each interview and transcribed them myself which assured the authenticity of them. Although I had permission from my interviewees to use their real name in this thesis, because both Israel and Turkey are going through political turbulence where freedom of speech is restricted and activists face risks, I decided not to use their real names. Instead, I coded each of them with two letters, which are not necessarily their initials.

2.4.2. Fieldwork: before and after

I agree with Ellis who claims that "As social science researchers, we believe it important to state and reflect on our own social positions, both for insight into how they may influence our treatment of the data, and because our understanding of others and of larger social processes proceeds most profitably from within our own experiences" (Ellis 1995: 89). Coffey defines fieldwork as the following:

---

[14] As Turkish is my first language, I had no language issues in Turkey. It was surprising for me that in Israel all my interviewees were very fluent in English, some of them were bilingual. Therefore, it was not a problem that I do not speak Hebrew.

[15] For the interview questions, see Appendix.

> "Fieldwork always starts from where we are. We do not come to a setting without an identity, constructed and shaped by complex social processes" (1999:158).

As can be seen in Table 2.1, the fieldwork for both cases was conducted in different time periods between June 2012 and September 2014. For the Turkish case, in addition to collecting organizational documents, I carried out thirty-one semi-structured interviews with members and representatives of fourteen different peace movement organizations and activist groups in Istanbul. For the Israeli case, I also collected organizational documents and conducted thirty-six semi-structured interviews with members and representatives of twenty-three peace movement organizations and activist groups in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In the Turkish case, some interviews were made before the Gezi Park protests, which took place in June 2013 and Spring 2013, and some were conducted after the protests in Summer 2014. In this way I am able to compare two different time periods, before and after the Gezi protests, to see the difference in mobilization. Similarly, my first fieldwork in Israel was in Autumn 2013 and then I went back to the field when the Operation Protective Edge started in Summer 2014. In the Israeli case, I conducted interviews in 2013, before the War on Gaza, and I compared them to the interviews carried out during and after the war in Summer 2014 to indicate the difference between activism when there is no war and mobilization during war. This allows me to elaborate on the comparative dimension in both cases, as well as between each other. In Israel, I focused on three different groups of peace movements: political organizations; human rights organizations; and groups supporting conscientious objectors and military service avoiders. In Turkey, I concentrated on political organizations, anti-war groups and anti-NATO groups, and groups supporting conscientious objection and military service avoiders.

2.4.3. Reflexivity and ethics

Wilkinson defines reflexivity as "disciplined self-reflection" (1988: 493). This means the interviewer is aware that he/she is an active co-participant in conversation. In order to answer what the researcher is trying to do and how his/her approach is influencing the research, Finlay (2014) offers five lenses of reflexivity which are strategic, situational-discursive, embodies, relational and ethical. In my case, reflexivity means that I acknowledge as a young woman with her own political views towards a demilitarized world, my background affected not only the research questions of

this study but also how I presented myself to access my interviewees. I explained them how I cultivated my research interest on peace movements in order to establish trustworthiness.

Briggs (2011) points out power relations and knowledge production in interviews where not only the interview itself but also that particular interview setting is a place of controlling the circulation of discourse. This would require the researcher to recognize power imbalance between himself/ herself and the participants, where cultural biases, ethnical issues and frames of reference are self-questioned by the researcher (Begoray and Banister 2012). Throughout this research I tried to manage anxieties of political networks around me as well as my own stress: Some of my interviewees were arrested, some of them were put in prison, and some of them were attacked by settlers. Reading and hearing about my interviewees in this way was not easy for me as a researcher. Moreover, during my second fieldwork in Israel in August and September 2014, Operation Protective Edge was going on and I was waking up to sirens early morning and trying to find a shelter. Due to space limitations, I will not be able to shed some light on the difficulties in studying this topic which I encountered not only during my fieldwork, but also after that. Suffice it to say that when I signed the peace petition "We will not be a party to this crime" in January 2016 as a member of Academics for Peace (Turkey), I thought it was my responsibility to take a stance against the crime Turkish state was committing in Turkey's Kurdistan not only as an academic researching on this topic, but also as a fellow human being. As of 2017, Turkish state accuses us, the 1,1128 signatories of the petition, with spreading terror propaganda. This is my personal experience as the person who conducts the research. In oppressive regimes like Turkey interviewing subjects who challenge the state discourse would also mean putting them at risk by revealing their identities and political views. It is not uncommon in such regimes that activists become targets of discrimination as well as physical attacks. Therefore, when it comes to conducting research in and on fascist states it is not only academic freedom which is at stake but also the well-being of the interview subjects.

2.4.4. Limitations

My research was the first one to address peace movements in Turkey, as well as provide a comparative framework between Israel and Turkey from a broad perspective. Although this contributed to the originality of my work, I had to decide every aspect of this research from scratch. For an in-depth qualitative analysis, it is important to have a background knowledge of history,

norms, and language (Olsen 2014). I had a deep familiarity with the Turkish case as I was born and raised in that country where I also developed my political consciousness. Israel, on the other hand, was a country where I had never been to before my fieldwork. As I worked on my research in Israel, I had the chance to explore and experience the country as much as possible.

Another limitation I faced was not being able to have enough access to documents in Turkey. When it comes to retrospective data, document analysis may have an advantage over interviewing (Hurworth 2011). Unfortunately, as a reflection of their organizational culture, not all groups and organizations in Turkey could provide me their documents as many of them were either not recorded or were lost. Although documentary sources are important to provide reliability as well as limit bias (Olson 2012), I had to rely on my interviews because of the unavailability of documents.

Lastly, although I included many groups and organizations in Israel and Turkey to provide a diversity, I am aware of the fact that when we take a case-oriented approach an "in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases provides the basis for generalizations that are temporarily limited to the cases studied and whose wider relevance should be controlled through further research" (della Porta 2008: 206).

2.5. Concluding remarks

This chapter has focused on theoretical and methodological aspects of this thesis. First, I provided a brief summary on peace movements literature. Then, I elaborated on the research questions and I set up my model. I argued that in order to understand how external conditions influence movement characteristics, I should use concepts which are derived from social movements literature. In order to explain my model, I underlined a conceptual framework including political opportunity structures, framing and mobilizing structures. By using my model, I aim at finding differences in independent variable; political opportunities, which can explain the variation in dependent variables; the form of the movement operationalized by its particular framing strategies and by its organizational patterns. As for methodology, I pointed out that I use most similar research design in this thesis and I conducted semi-structured interviews in Istanbul, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Total number of groups studied in this thesis is thirty-seven. In both countries sixty-

seven interviews are conducted in different time periods between June 2012 and September 2014. Lastly, I briefly touched upon the issues of reflexivity, ethics and limitations.

3. ISRAEL: THE NEW HOME FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE

The State of Israel was founded in 1948. During this period, from 1948 to the present day, the Jewishness of the state has been emphasized in many different ways. Religion was an important element for organizing society, yet the idea of a Jewish state was presented as a Zionist project to bring all Jews in the Diaspora to live in Israel (*aliya*). Yet for another people living in the same territory, namely the Palestinians, this emerging nation-state project was referred to as the catastrophe, the Nakba.

After its foundation in 1948, and until the Six Day War in 1967, political, economic and military measures were taken to secure the foundation and survival of the state. In this period, Israel had to fight many wars, starting with the First Arab-Israeli War, then the Six Day War, and the Yom Kippur War in 1975. There were some attempts at peace in the wake of the First Intifada, which ended in 1996. From 1996 until 2001, the country had been ruled by the Netanyahu and Barak governments. The Second Intifada broke out in 2000, and was followed by a series of operations and military plans to counter the failure of the peace processes thus far marked by the Intifada.

In this chapter, I provide a brief background of the history of the State of Israel, from its creation to the present day. I focus on turning points that were generally considered to have had an impact on the peace process, which had always failed without reaching a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. First, I explain Zionism and how it was reflected in the establishment of the State of Israel. The Six Day War and the occupation of Palestine, the changing political composition of the Knesset for the first time since its foundation, the First Intifada and the Oslo Accords that came in its aftermath were followed by the assassination of the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. I then present a chronological outline of the key events in the history of Israel in relation to the Palestinian conflict. I refer to the Camp David Meeting, the Second Intifada, Operation Defensive Shield, and

the Geneva Initiative with its Roadmap. In the last part, I discuss the construction of the West Bank Wall[16] and its economic and political implications, the Disengagement Plan and Operation Cast Lead. The conclusion of this chapter reflectins on the situation today.

3.1. The Zionist project: the Israeli state in the making

Sternhell (1998) argues that when the Zionist project emerged, the idea of "the right to the land" was already a historical notion. He explains that as early as 1912, when A.D. Gordon, the well-known Zionist philosopher, emphasized the right of the Jewish people to Palestine, he was reinforcing the idea that the "historical right had precedence over a right based on labor." Although recognizing the Arab people's historical right to the land, Gordon never recognized their right to rule it because they had never had political control over it. To make his point clearer, after noting the Arab people's historical right to the country, just like that of the Jewish people, he insisted that the right of the Jewish people was "undoubtedly greater" (Sternhell 1998: 70).

Dieckhoff (2013a) points out that when Israel was established in 1948, it was implementing a "unique type of nationalism" in the sense that it was being established within the territory where another "indigenous population" was already living. The demographic factors meant enforcing a regular immigration of Jews from the Diaspora and the option of buying up land. According to Dieckhoff, these two factors could be realized under the Mandate so that Herzl's Zionism turned into colonization by population (2013a: 6). Once the territory had been chosen, the Zionist project continued to work on other elements of its plan. Policies regarding the Palestinians were implemented in the sense that in this Jewish state, the non-Jewish population was made invisible through a mechanism which "contained, controlled, and eventually expelled" them (Bowman 2011: 65). As in every nation-state project, once the territory has been defined, a collective memory needs to be created in order to give people a sense of nationhood. In the case of Israel, the Zionist movement followed the strategy of emphasizing the need "to participate in history once again," which meant transforming the Jewish people into active protagonists who decided on their own destiny and sovereignty and the development of a historical past, instead of a theological one (Ben-Amos 2013: 47). This modern Jewish identity was based on the recognition of anti-Semitism,

[16] Sometimes referred to as "separation fence."

which interrupted Jewish assimilation into a European identity, and rejecting pre-modern Jewishness, which had sparked anti-Semitism (Bowman 2011: 73). This idea went hand in hand with the Zionist movement, which aimed at creating a state for the Jewish people where they would be the majority and politically dominant, and which would put an end to their status as a political minority (Dieckhoff 2013b: 11).

The 1948 War of Independence meant the long dreamt of Jewish homeland for Israel, but a catastrophe for the Palestinian people. Dieckhoff stresses that the first Arab-Israeli conflict can be divided into two distinct periods. In the first, from late November 1947 to mid-May 1948, the Zionists faced irregular Palestinian troops, backed by Arab volunteers. After the declaration of the Independence of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, it was attacked by the five Arab armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, followed by an armistice in 1949. The Arab population of Palestine was on the brink of collapse because many towns had been captured by the Israeli army and 750,000 Palestinians had been forced into exile. At the end of the war, Israel won its independence and the Palestinian people were largely dispersed (Dieckhoff 2013c: 165–166).

After the creation of the State of Israel, Charpit (2013) explains, its political system was influenced by the phase of the "State in the Making" (*ha-Medina she-ba-Derekh*). This phase brought together the electoral system of proportional representation, pragmatism and compromise among different political groups, supported by a decision-making process based on long-term planning. Most of the parties in the lists of the 1930s managed to get votes in 1949 with the help of party leaders, spiritual leaders, and intellectual supporters, and with specific moral references, ideological views and institutional structures. As a result, for over thirty years Ben Gurion's Mapai party enjoyed an unassailable position as a political force in all the coalitions, which allowed it to choose its partners to build a coalition (Charbit 2013: 58).

In June 1948, the Israeli government refused to allow refugees who had been exiled during the 1948 War to return, despite the opposition of the Leftist Party, Mapam. On 11 December 1948 the United Nations adopted Resolution 194, to help give refugees the choice to return to their homes or to receive compensation. At this point, the Israeli army, the Jewish National Fund and the Kibbutzim movement worked together to step up the destruction of Arab villages and the creation of Jewish settlements. Israel had no incentive to conform to the U.N. Resolution, because the return of Palestinian refugees would be incompatible with the Jewish state in which a Jewish

demographic majority was a priority. Moreover, in summer 1948, a wave of Jewish immigrants from the Diaspora arrived and were settling in the homes, left empty by fleeing Arabs, and in the new settlements (Dieckhoff 2013c: 166). Yet Ilan Pappé argues that the return of the refugees and their resettlement were not the only issues at stake. There was also the question of "the money expropriated from the 1,300,000 Palestinians, the ex-citizens of Mandatory Palestine, whose finances had been invested in banks and institutions that were all seized by the Israeli authorities after May 1948" (Pappé 2006: 212).

3.2. The six-Day War in1967 and the occupation of Palestine

The idea of a "Greater Israel" is at the core of the Zionist project of reclaiming Palestine. Kaminer (1996) points out that the right wing interpreted it as "the complete Eretz Yisrael" (the complete land of Israel). Although the precise geographical boundaries of Greater Israel are open to interpretation, there is no doubt that they can extend beyond the occupied territories, which are inhabited by Palestinians. No Israeli government had the legal right to relinquish sovereignty over this territory, and this was accepted by both the secular nationalists and the religious right. The fact that this approach to the question of Israeli land was supported by both religious and secular nationalists led to the objective of Israeli sovereignty over the entire West Bank, which was heavily populated by Palestinians. Even though it was strategically important, the demographic reality did not reflect the Zionists' notion of a Jewish state: three million Jews dominating the lives of over one and a half million Arabs living under military rule, in addition to more than half a million Israeli-Arab Palestinians, and *de facto* Israeli citizens (Kaminer 1996: 8). This unexpected consequence of Israel's victory in 1967 led to the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The answer to the question of what should be done with the conquered territories was clear from the perspective of international law:

> "Like Sinai and the Golan Heights, these territories were affected by the U.N. Security Council's Resolution 242 (22 November 1967), which required the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces, while asserting the right of each state to live within secure and recognized borders (the Palestinians are only mentioned in the context of the refugee question). This text, which simultaneously established the unacceptability of acquiring territory through war and the State of Israel's right to existence, is still today the touchstone of a global settlement of the conflict, although it has no effect in the war-like atmosphere of 1967" (Dieckhoff 2013c: 168).

Following the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the student left in Israel believed that this occupation supported the orthodox Marxist view that the Zionist project was inherently colonialist. The fact that the Western powers supported Israel against the pro-Soviet regimes in Egypt and Syria led many left-wing, Zionist and non-Zionist, Israelis to believe that Israel had a colonialist character as a result of this situation (Kaminer 1996: 10–11).

3.3. The changeover in the Knesset: from bipolarization to fragmentation, 1977–1984

In Israel the Knesset plays a central role in political life due to the lack of a formal constitution, which gives the legislature the legal power to decide on all legislation. The Israeli electoral system is based on proportional representation. Article 4 of the Knesset Basic Law of 1958 states that the Knesset "is elected by general, national, direct, equal and proportional election." This means that the whole country functions as a single district, which elects 120 members. Based on the number of votes won by each of the lists, the distribution of seats is calculated according to proportional representation. For the remaining distribution, the D'Hondt method is used. This pure proportional representation has led to an atomization of political life in Israel (Klein 2013: 20–21).

The Israeli elections in 1977 was a watershed moment in terms of results and for Israeli parliamentary democracy in general. This election led to the collapse of Labor as the dominant party and the rise of Likud in its place. This was the first major political changeover, and a positive step for the institutional consolidation of democracy. Yet at the same time this extreme fragmentation of political life made the formation of coalitions extremely difficult (Dieckhoff 2013b: 16).

The May 1977 elections for the ninth legislature in the Knesset, which resulted in a change of government, were a defeat for Labor and a victory for Likud, and both sides were equally surprised by the results. Therefore, 1977 marked a reversal in which the Labor Party's domination came to an end and was followed by the victory of Likud's nationalist right wing. Menachem Begin became Prime Minister and the settlement policy was enforced more intensively. New actors, unsatisfied with the once-every-four-years participation in political life, decided to take part in extra-parliamentary activities. This bipolarization in Israeli political life was represented by two movements at the two extremes of the political spectrum, and which were to influence public opinion in the future. Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), created in 1974, as was Peace Now

(Shalom Achshav). Their political instruments and motivations were completely different. Gush Emunim represented a messianic theological-political dimension looking for a legitimate ideological space, absent until then. They were engaged in militant activism by supporting the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria without taking Israeli public opinion into account. Peace Now, on the other hand, was trying to act as a counterbalance to Gush Emunim, by pressuring government to reach a peace agreement by mobilizing the Israeli public. This bipolarization led to the most tense electoral campaign that Israel had ever seen in summer 1981. Public opinion was less divided over the Israeli-Arab conflict at that time, but what reinforced the tensions was the ethnicization of political differences. Secular, bourgeois, educated Ashkenazi Israelis were the 'doves' who voted for the left, whereas people from the working class, who were unskilled, traditionalist and Sephardic were the 'hawks' and voted for the right wing. This polarization between doves and hawks, which were depicted as the peace camp and the national camp, led to regular power exchanges in elections followed by significant political events, which were used by the two sides to suit their agendas (Charbit 2013: 61–67).

In this context, from the early 1980s onwards, Israeli NGOs were affected by two factors. One was the aspect of identity, in which different characteristics such as sex, ethnicity and creed were given a platform. The other factor was the empowerment of organizations, which aimed at challenging Israel's political structure (Laskier 2013: 72). Laskier points to the establishment of the New Israel Fund (NIF) as a decisive factor in the development of Israeli NGOs, and which provided them with funding opportunities. In 1979 North American Jews founded NIF as a result of joint cooperation between North Americans and Israelis to stimulate the Jewish tradition of *tikkun olam* ("healing the world") (Laskier 2013: 72). Human rights organizations such as B'Tselem and the Association for Human Rights in Israel profited from NIF's financial support, in the sense that there were court cases in their favor on the issues of torture, land sales, urban planning and women's rights (72).

Zionism had to rely on primordial elements in order to gain legitimation and start mobilization, for which Jewish religion was the most important factor because it was the only common denominator for the Jewish people. As the support of orthodox Jews was needed for the legitimacy, "cultural autonomy" was granted to orthodox Jews which manifested itself in education, family law and military service (Peled and Shafir 1996: 400). Laskier points out that even though there were victories in the name of civic groups, civil society was not immune to the pressure imposed by

Haredim (ultra-Orthodox) groups. These challenges mainly resulted from the issue of how to separate state and religion, which was prompted by the fact that the absence of a constitution did not favor Israeli activists. As a result, the fundraising opportunities of these civil liberties organizations were limited, although fundraising was necessary for them not only to gain legitimacy, but also to increase the awareness of civil rights within Israeli society (Laskier 2013: 79–80).

3.4. The First Intifada: a result of twenty years of occupation

Gelvin (2015) explains that by 1987, after twenty years of occupation, all aspects of the lives of Palestinians were affected by land use, employment and travel. Israelis were even appropriating land in the occupied territories for military training. In the countryside, settlements were being built in the West Bank and Gaza where the settler population increased to over 68,000. Palestinian agriculture was damaged by Israeli agricultural policies, and less land was under cultivation in 1987 than in 1947. Palestinian workers were also discriminated against by Israeli labor policies in that they were deprived of the social benefits and wages granted to Israeli workers. According to Gelvin, "there was no aspect of life in the occupied territories, no sector of the Palestinian economy, no part of the Palestinian landscape that had remained untouched by the occupation" (2005: 215).

In December 1987 a large Palestinian uprising broke out against the twenty-year occupation. Dieckhoff (2013c) claims that this protest led to demonstrations, strikes and stone throwing, which became the symbol of resistance, referred to as the "war of stones." In the face of this non-militarized rebellion, the Israeli government acted with brutal force; by the end of the six-year Intifada 1,100 Palestinians had been killed by the security forces. For the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the situation changed dramatically as a result of the First Intifada. In November 1988 the independence of the State of Palestine was proclaimed with the help of a Jordanian decision to break administrative and legal ties with the West Bank. The left of the Labor Party interpreted the situation in a way that suggested they could foresee a political opening for the PLO. Not surprisingly from the mid-1980s secret meetings took place in Europe between the leadership of the PLO, representatives of the left parties of Israel and members of the Israeli intelligence service (Dieckhoff 2013c: 170).

3.5. The Oslo Accords: signing for peace on paper

Abu-Laban and Bakan (2011) argue that the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the coming together of a range of factors which helped create a change in the dynamic between Israel and the PLO. The end of the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War, the decline in Gulf State support for the PLO and questions about the morality of the occupation of Palestine as a result of the First Intifada played a role in this shift. In 1988, the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, took the step to abandon the call for armed struggle in order to achieve the aim of a secular and democratic Palestine. His new strategy was to recognize Israel's "right to exist", which would lead automatically to a two-state solution. This new call helped to create the basis for the 1993 Oslo Accord after it emerged that Israel had been negotiating with the PLO leadership at secret meetings in Oslo in order to reach a peaceful agreement to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 13 September 1993 Prime Minister Rabin and Arafat signed the Accord at a ceremony in Washington hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton, with the historical handshake. The Oslo Accords were originally named "The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government" and led to agreements in the 1990s. As a result, Israel withdrew from parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority was created (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2011: 285).

Gelvin (2005) underlines that the Oslo Accord was composed of two separate protocols. The first was the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between the two parties. This exchange of recognition was not unequivocal. Palestinian opponents of Oslo pointed out that even though Arafat's letter guaranteed the recognition of the State of Israel, Rabin did not recognize the right of the Palestinians to establish a sovereign state of their own in his letter to Arafat. The recognition of Israel would also mean that around 80 percent of historic Palestine territories within the pre-1967 borders of Israel were not negotiable. The Declaration of Principles was the second protocol signed by Arafat and Rabin. It underlined that within three months the PLO and Israel would negotiate the withdrawal or redeployment of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Both Gaza, excluding the Israeli settlements, and Jericho would be granted self-governing status; Israelis and Palestinians would negotiate an "interim agreement," which would define and authorize the creation of a Palestinian representative council. This council would submit a master plan for an "interim self-governing authority," namely the Palestinian Authority. The two sides would engage in permanent status negotiations after elections had been held in the Palestinian territories, which had to be concluded by July 1977. However, some crucial issues, such as

Jerusalem, the right of return, refugees, settlements, and security were left untouched (Gelvin 2005: 232–234).

After the deadline for an interim agreement, Arafat and Rabin signed Oslo II Accord in September 1995. This agreement carved the West Bank up into three separate areas of different Israeli control, known as Zones A, B and C. According to this, Israeli forces had to withdraw from each area according to a timetable, after which the Palestinian Authority would take control of them. Withdrawal from Zones A and B would be realized; however, withdrawal from Zone C was linked to the permanent status negotiations:

> "The agreement held Palestinian Authority control over approximately 70 percent of the West Bank hostage to negotiations over Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security. No matter how much of Zone C eventually came under the control of the Palestinian Authority; those roads would act as dividers preventing free movement of Palestinians from one "canton" to another" (Gelvin 2005: 235).

In the Oslo agreements, it became clear that the territories were no longer open to negotiation; however, they were not appropriated. Zones A, B and C were "organized and arranged according to the security interests of the Israelis and the settlers in the West Bank" (Debie 2013: 195). Israel took a unilateral security approach, so that it continued to bomb the Palestinian territories and to engage in military operations into Gaza and towns in Area A. Israel also felt entitled to arrest suspects in the territories. As a result of security operations, many factories and schools and a great deal of infrastructure were destroyed. The introduction of Israeli checkpoints in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank followed. After many military operations in Palestinian towns, Israel withdrew from Area A. However, it continued to build roads and to erect security measures at contact points between Israelis and Palestinians such as checkpoints and glacis. An external glacis along the Jordan River functioned as an "iron curtain" and settlement construction continued around Jerusalem (Debie 2013: 195).

Pappé (2006), however, looks at the Oslo Accords from a different perspective. He regards them as a peace process with a built-in Nakba denial, which means that the events of the 1948 dispossession and expulsion are excluded from the agreement. He argues that the main motivation behind Oslo was Zionist, in the sense that the Nakba was never mentioned so that Israeli intellectuals from Israel's peace camp prepared Oslo. The main intellectual group was Peace Now, which was an institutionalized ex-parliamentary movement. However, it avoided mentioning 1948

as well as the refugee issue; and Arafat did not oppose this (Pappé 2006: 241). According to Pappé, when the Oslo process began in September 1993 Israel had three guidelines. First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dated back to 1967, so that to resolve the issue an agreement was necessary that would regulate the future status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which only involved 22 percent of Palestine. Second, in the West Bank and Gaza everything was visible, including the territory, people and natural resources. Lastly, 1967 was taken as a starting point, which means that anything that occurred before that date, including the Nakba and ethnic cleansing, Pappé argues, would not be negotiable. In this way, the refugee issue would never be discussed, so that the end of the Israeli occupation would mean the end of the conflict despite the fact that 1948 is the key to the issue for Palestinians (Pappé 2006: 239). Sternhell, on the other hand, defines the Oslo agreements in the history of Zionism as a "true revolution" because it was the first time in the history of the Jewish national movement that it recognized Palestinian people's equal rights to independence and freedom. There was the understanding that a Palestinian state would be established, when the time came. This would mean that Jews were no longer regarded as the sole and exclusive owners of the land and that the two peoples were equals (Sternhell 1998: 339–40).

3.6. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and its aftermath

When Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995, Grinberg (2010) argues that it marked not just the end of an era of charismatic leadership, but also the end of a charismatic transformation of the political arena. This led to mutual hatred between the right wing and left wing in Israeli politics. The discourse of security was inverted and led to the closure of political space for Palestinians. Labor and Likud reverted to their strategy of gaining support through the cultural symbols of identity whilst taking different political positions. This meant Peres ending negotiations with the Palestinians and backing the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, whereas Netanyahu respected the Oslo Accords and wanted to meet Arafat (Grinberg 2010: 110). The 1996 Knesset elections were pending and a new leadership style emerged in the wake of Rabin's assassination. Peace was not attained, the occupation continued and the borders remained unclear; but for Israeli society this was peace. There was no framework to follow, and thus the parties could not negotiate compromises or mediate conflicting interests (Grinberg 2010: 112). Unable to look for compromises the parties chose to mobilize their supporters on the basis of hatred and fear, using mythology, nationalism and cultural discourses based on the reciprocal hostility of the

communities. It was in this context that a new style of leadership emerged, adopted by Netanyahu prior to the 1996 elections. This stirred up the depiction without any public debate on policy aims and one which could not survive with so many contradictions within the post-election coalition. There were many conflicts of interest, not only between Israelis and Palestinians, but also among Israelis themselves after Rabin's assassination (Grinberg 2010: 112).

Charbit (2013) argues the fact that Rabin had been assassinated by a nationalist religious student was a reflection of the inability of the political system to resolve a domestic conflict through democratic means. In February 1996 there were subsequent attacks in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem during the electoral campaign. In this atmosphere, the Likud candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, was able to neutralize the Rabin peace process in the wake of his assassination. This damaged the right wing, which was blamed for having created a hostile environment in the period running up to Rabin's murder (Charbit 2013: 68).

It was when Netanyahu became Prime Minister that Israeli military leaders decided to become politically involved in the decision-making processes in order to curb his combative impulses. Grinberg (2010) claims that during his time as prime minister Netanyahu the IDF became the main actor to restraining Netanyahu and managed to block actions that could have provoked the Palestinians and destroyed the calm. The IDF assumed the role of guardian to prevent escalation and considered it important to protect the imagined peace and prevent violence with the Palestinians for purely military reasons. The IDF's approach was the result of its belief that there was no military solution to the First Intifada, and that it was crucial to reach a political solution. This view led the IDF to support and to help shape the Oslo Accords. However, in the public discourse there was a consensus regarding the use of force, which in turn affected the motivation of soldiers to fight (Grinberg 2010: 113). Following this, the Netanyahu-Barak leadership was doomed to failure because it evolved in a context which required the cooperation of two political camps inside and outside Israel, whereas it did not have the necessary tools to make legitimate decisions, which was in turn a result of the lack of cooperation with the Palestinian leadership. Netanyahu and Barak came from two different worlds. Netanyahu's political opponents were the Ashkenazi secular elite, alienated from the other Jewish sectors. Barak, on the other hand, was the enemy of the ultra-Orthodox Jews who avoided military service, and who used the security card to win support from people who used to vote for the right (Grinberg 2010: 123).

3.7. Camp David: another attempt at peace, fact and interpretation

In July 2000 the Oslo peace process seemed to have reached deadlock. To break that deadlock, U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat at Camp David in a last attempt to revive the peace process (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2011: 239). The aim was to reach a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the issues of refugees, Jerusalem, security measures, borders and Jewish settlements (Dieckhoff 2013c: 171). As a result of the Camp David summit, Israelis and Palestinians attributed opposite meanings to the same issues. For many Israelis, Grinberg (2010) argues, it was Barak who did his best to reach a peace agreement with a series of compromises, which were already problematic for Israeli society, and it was the Palestinians who chose to reject them. The fact that Barak was willing to discuss sensitive issues such as East Jerusalem and the Holy Places demonstrated his willingness and good intentions to reach an agreement. For many Palestinians, on the other hand, it was Arafat who was able to reject the Israeli-American cooperation to force Palestinians to sign an agreement in which none of their original demands would be approved. Arafat was courageous enough to say "No" to the Israelis and Americans without capitulating (Grinberg 2010: 138). The Israelis were also disappointed and blamed the Palestinians. For them, Israel was ready to bargain for mutual gains at Camp David, and it was the Palestinians who insisted on their early position by insisting on the recognition of the 4 June 1967 borders and full compensation for every square kilometer which Israel occupied. The Palestinians did not give up on the Right of Return, noting that they would be willing to negotiate some limitations on its implementation, and they refused to agree to Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount (Grinberg 2010: 139). Barak managed to construct a myth by declaring that Israel had "no partner for peace;" a message which was immediately reproduced throughout the Israeli media. Arafat was depicted as the one refusing to make peace whereas it was Barak who had been unable to build a coalition to proceed with negotiations. Arafat, on the other hand, chose to reject Barak's "everything or nothing" ultimatum (Grinberg 2010: 141). According to Pappé (2006), the main problem with Camp David was that Israel was the only one putting up items for the peace agreements. It was an Israeli plan supported by the Americans. Even though Israel offered to withdraw from some parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and intended to leave Palestinians about 15 percent of the original Palestine, that 15 percent was to be in the form of separate districts divided by Israeli highways, settlements, walls and army camps. The plan did not involve

Jerusalem either, since it Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine was not on the agenda. Neither was there a solution to the refugee problem. Pappé argues that:

> "the way the proposal defined the future Palestinian state amounted to a total distortion of the concepts of statehood and independence as we have come to accept them in the wake of the Second World War II and as the Jewish state, with international support, had claimed for itself in 1948" (2006: 242).

Arafat refused to sign this proposal. Another important issue at Camp David was the fact that the issue of the Nakba had always been excluded from peace negotiations; there was uproar when the issue was raised at Camp David. Pappé argues that the Israeli negotiators' "worst fear" was having to negotiate Israel's responsibility for the events of 1948. As a response, some measures were taken by the Israeli side. The Knesset passed a law banning any Israeli negotiator from discussing the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees to their 1948 homes. In 2001 the Law to Safeguard the Rejection of the Right of Return was guaranteed (Pappé 2006: 244). According to Pappé, for Israelis the issue of recognizing the Palestinians as victims of Israeli actions has two dimensions: This acknowledgement would not only mean that they had become aware of the historical injustices committed by Israel in the "ethnic cleansing of Palestine" in 1948, which would also mean questioning the "foundational myths" of the State of Israel, but would also raise the moral question of what implications this would have for the future of that state (Pappé 2006: 245).

3.8. The Second Intifada: violence follows provocation

In 28 September 2000 the leader of Likud, Ariel Sharon made a very public visit to the Temple Mount. Grinberg (2010) explains that even though the police had warned that this would spark off serious protest, there was no immediate reaction from the Palestinians. Despite the international uproar, things stayed more or less calm, and the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli police remained in control. The day after, however, seven Muslim demonstrators were killed near the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Palestinian demonstrations broke out. This Second Intifada discarded the post-conflict agenda, so that Israeli society, which was divided, unified around the new discourse of defeating the enemy "who rises to destroy us." Camp David interpretations of "revealing the true face of Arafat" and putting the blame for the end of negotiations solely on the Palestinians became a "national unifying myth" (Grinberg 2010: 145).

When Palestinian protests and demonstrations were violently repressed they spread to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and other Arab-populated areas in Israel. Dieckhoff (2013c) notes that there was a rapid militarization of the conflict. The Palestinians responded to Israeli tanks, shells and helicopters with suicide bombings. There was a huge loss of human life, with over 5,800 deaths and 40,000 wounded. Although both sides suffered from the brutal violence, for the Israelis this Intifada was the first time since 1948 that there had been "terrorist violence that affected the civilian population" within Israeli territory. According to Dieckhoff (2013c), the Israeli government's response had two dimensions. First, they applied more repressive measures in the Palestinian territories with closures, checkpoints, arrests, reoccupation of towns and killings. To separate Israel from the West Bank, they started building the Wall in 2000. They then continued with a diplomatic withdrawal in the sense that Ariel Sharon, who was elected Prime Minister in 2001, stated that the Palestinians were no longer a trustworthy partner. Sharon decided on a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August-September 2005 by evacuating both settlers and the armed forces. Meanwhile, the January 2006 Palestinian legislative election was marked as a victory for Hamas, which recognized neither the Oslo Accords nor the State of Israel. Israel carried out a large military operation from December 2008 until January 2009 in the Gaza Strip to put pressure on Hamas, which started to make rocket attacks on Southern Israel. In this war many Palestinians lost their lives, but Hamas' hold on the Gaza Strip persisted (Dieckhoff 2013c: 171). It is important to note that the Palestinian masses did not react to Sharon's visit *per se,* but to the fact that Israeli police armed with rifles and live ammunition had entered the Temple Mount following Friday Prayers and shot dead seven demonstrators. This scene of Palestinians being wounded or killed in the grounds of their holy mosque triggered an explosion of anger.

This rage of five years of imagined peace was followed by Israeli politics that ignored Palestinians' economic and political suffering, considering their despair to be the result of the expansion of settlements, the construction of by-pass roads and checkpoints. According to Grinberg, it was this "Israeli indifference" which was a "symbolic violence–violence that only dominant elites can allow themselves, but after five years, it turned into very real violence" (Grinberg 2010: 155). The reaction of the Israeli police force was disproportionate and unplanned; they lost control and entered the mosque, and as a result demonstrations spread throughout Israel-Palestine. As Palestinians took to the streets to demonstrate, the Israeli police responded with sniper fire and brute force. In the Israeli media, the violent clashes between the Israeli police and the stone-

throwing Palestinian demonstrators was portrayed as a war in order to legitimize the use of force and shooting demonstrators, whilst picturing the police were presented as being in danger, which justified their actions as self-defense. Another response was that Jewish demonstrators also began to participate in street battles and started to attack Palestinians. In Jaffa and Tel Aviv, some of them went hunting for Palestinians working in restaurants, throwing stones and threatening to lynch them, and some were even kept prisoner in Jaffa's Hasan Bek Mosque for hours (Grinberg 2010: 157). Pappé underlines that this Second Intifada was initially a non-militarized popular protest, like the First Intifada. However, the moment that Israel decided to respond with lethal violence, it turned into an armed clash, "a hugely unequal mini-war" (Pappé 2006: 246).

3.9. Operation Defensive Shield: The post-9/11 era

Early in 2002, the post-9/11 U.S. policies also started to have an impact on the security perspectives of other countries. In March 2002 a suicide bombing killed thirty people in Israel. Ariel Sharon decided to implement a new Israeli policy, under the name Operation Defensive Shield. It was the largest post-Oslo intrusion into the Palestinian territories. On 8 April 2002, Ariel Sharon gave a speech in the Knesset in which he declared that:

> "IDF soldiers and officers have been given clear orders: to enter cities and villages which have become havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and, primarily, their dispatchers and those who finance and support them; to confiscate weapons intended to be used against Israeli citizens; to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, laboratories, weapons production factories and secret installations. The orders are clear: target and paralyze anyone who takes up weapons and tries to oppose our troops, resist them or endangers them – and to avoid harming the civilian population" (Sharon quoted in Reich 2012: 226).

As a result, Israeli ground, air and naval forces reoccupied Palestinian cities and towns in zones A, B, C, which included Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Gaza, Ramallah and Jenin. Israeli forces were engaged in gun battles with armed Palestinians in order to uncover the "terrorist infrastructure", so that they blew up houses, used bulldozers, tanks and helicopter gunships and arrested a great many Palestinians. Around five hundred Palestinians died in this operation (Gelvin 2005: 245). Even reserve soldiers were called up. The aim was not only to target Palestinians, but

to create a belief in those Israelis who had previously questioned the need for armed intervention, a belief in the need to fight that had to be reinforced (Grinberg 2010: 171).

3.10. The Geneva Initiative and the Roadmap

After 9/11, security concerns were reframed in terms of the "terrorist threat". Victimization discourse was reproduced with the development of a new combination of Islamic extremism and a new anti-Semitism, which in turn affected any challenging of Israeli state policies (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2011: 287).

Reich (2012) notes that during the war in Iraq, the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations came together as an international quartet and started meeting informally to discuss the Israel-Palestine conflict. On 24 June 2002, President Bush gave a speech in which he stressed the need to establish an independent Palestinian state, which would peacefully coexist with Israel. According to this plan, the Palestinian Authority had to make democratic reforms, was to give up "terrorism", in return for which it was to receive statehood. Israel, on the other hand, would accept the establishment of a Palestinian state and stop constructing settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. As a result, in September 2002 a Roadmap emerged as a first step towards implementing President Bush's vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, which would live side by side in peaceful and secure conditions (Reich 2012: 245).

According to Grinberg (2010), this step was important since it meant Sharon had to abandon his government's 'no-partner' policy, when faced with the detailed peace agreement between members of the opposition, led by Yossi Beilin, and Fatah activists. Senior Palestinians who were working closely with popular Palestinian leaders signed the Geneva Initiative. Sharon could not resist this, considering that even the European Union was embracing the document and Colin Powell invited representatives to discuss any concerns with him. Even though the Roadmap emphasized the establishment of a Palestinian state, the borders were not specified (Grinberg 2010: 182).

It was on May 23 that the government of Israel formally announced that it accepted the steps outlined in the Roadmap and Sharon's office released the following statement:

> "In view of the recent statement of the U.S. regarding the Israeli comments on the Roadmap, which shares the view of the Government of Israel that these are real concerns and in view

> of the U.S. promise to address those concerns fully and seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap to fulfill the President's vision of June 24, 2002, we are prepared to accept the steps set out in the Roadmap. I intend to submit this acceptance to the Government of Israel's approval" (Official statement quoted in Reich 2012: 250)

Pappé (2006) notes that the Roadmap of the Geneva Accord was a political product of the Middle East Quartet, a self-appointed body of mediators composed of the United Nations, the USA, the EU and Russia. He argues that the Geneva Accord was the best offer which the Jewish Israeli peace camp had provided in the new century. Even though this document recognized the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees, it restricted it to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Without referring to "ethnic cleansing," it offered compensation as an option. Moreover, the territories, which were set aside for a Palestinian state to be established included a densely populated area, the Gaza Strip. In other words, the agreement undermined the prospect of a Palestinian Right of Return. From another point of view, with this document Israel secured its recognition as a Jewish state. This meant the acceptance of all Israel's past policies in order to maintain its Jewish majority at the cost of all else, including "ethnic cleansing" (Pappé 2006: 246–247).

3.11. The Wall, the Disengagement Plan and Operation Cast Lead

The Roadmap offered a provisional Palestinian state but without defining its borders clearly, and which has not yet materialized. At this point, with Yasser Arafat's partnership, a final status agreement for the establishment of a Palestinian state was issued. In October 2003, the first unilateral move was taken in this direction, with the Israeli government's decision to construct a wall on a "route that would annex 16 percent of the West Bank territory outside of Israel" (Grinberg 2010: 182).

When the Israeli government announced in April 2002 that it would start constructing a barrier, its argument was to prevent suicide bombers from entering Israel via the West Bank. This barrier was, and still is, referred to as a 'security fence' by Israelis and 'the Wall' by Palestinians. The route of the Wall is, however, a circuitous one. During its construction, the 1949 armistice lines were not respected, and were already being seen as Israel's unofficial border. This barrier consists of a 450-mile stretch of concrete wall, electronic fences as well as trenches, to cut into the occupied

territories, which would eventually merge some West Bank settlements and Jerusalem (Gelvin 2005: 246).

Palestinians, Israeli human rights groups, and members of the international community denounced the construction of the wall. It brought new issues to the negotiation table for the Israeli side. Moreover, Gelvin (2005) claims, the construction of the wall meant uprooting Palestinians, impounding their land and separating villages from their agricultural land. The Wall follows such a path that in some areas it surrounds entire towns, such as Qalqiya and Tulkarm, and encircles East Jerusalem, which also of cuts off Palestinians living in there from the rest of the West Bank. According to the World Bank, over 300,000 Palestinians live in territory under direct Israeli jurisdiction, which leaves them with only two choices: to live under Israeli rule; or to leave and move to territory under Palestinian jurisdiction. As a result, for many Palestinians, human rights groups and members of the international community, the wall symbolizes the first move towards a "gentler form of ethnic cleansing" (Gelvin 2005: 247-248).

After this decision to construct the wall, Israel's "security fence" became the point of attention of the international community. In October 2003, the U.N. General Assembly voted 144 to 4 to oblige Israel to dismantle the wall. On November 28, Secretary General Kofi Annan submitted a report defining the construction of the wall as a "deeply counterproductive act" which resulted in great socio-economic suffering for the Palestinians. In December 2003, the General Assembly held an emergency session, which resulted in 90 votes in favor, 8 against, and 74 abstentions in order to file a petition to the International Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the Wall (Reich 2012: 256). In 2004 the extension of the "separation barrier" was ruled illegal by the ICJ, and this was subsequently confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. Today, the construction of the wall still continues and no legal sanctions have been taken for the violation of the U.N. ruling (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2011: 287).

In November 2003 Sharon formally announced that the government would implement unilateral actions, which would include the evacuation of settlements. Furthermore, in February 2004 Sharon also claimed that the government would carry out the unilateral Disengagement Plan. When he mentioned his intention to evacuate seventeen settlements in the Gaza Strip, he faced opposition not only from Likud, but also from his own government, and the entire Israeli political system. What followed in March 2004 was a deliberate escalation by the IDF, and from then until October

2004, a month before Arafat's death, 27 Israeli soldiers, 42 Israeli citizens, and 590 Palestinians were killed in incidents, including assassinations (Grinberg 2010: 182-183). Settlers opposed the Disengagement Plan, as they were afraid of the approval of the Gaza withdrawal without any opposition, which would later mean that, as a next step, Sharon would evacuate them from the West Bank. Within and outside Likud there was also some opposition because they would have to agree to leave Gaza as a result of an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, in order to prevent Hamas from gaining more power (Grinberg 2010: 184).

Following the Disengagement Plan, on 15 August 2005 the evacuation of the 8,500 residents from all twenty-one Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip began and lasted until 21 August 2005. For the first time since 1967, Palestinian control of Gaza replaced Israeli control when the settlers were evacuated, the settlements were demolished, Israeli troops were withdrawn, and their military positions abandoned (Reich 2012: 260).

Grinberg (2010) argues that the evacuation of Gaza must be understood in the context of the blurred border between the West Bank and Israel, and Israel's economic power. This blurred border prohibits the creation of a separate Palestinian economy, which would be independent from Israel by controlling the border crossing. However, Israel's economic power depends on the fact that it can enforce the interests of Israeli industrialists and merchants over the Palestinians by selling them expensive goods while obstructing the import or manufacture of cheaper goods. As a result, neither the reduction of military control nor decolonization could be achieved. The border between the West Bank and Israel was already blurred, in the sense that Israeli industrialists and merchants were profiting from Palestinian economic dependence (Grinberg 2010: 189–190).

After the evacuation of Gaza, there were still periodic escalations of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip towards the town of Sderot. As a response, in mid-January 2008 Defense Minister Ehud Barak froze all imports to the Gaza strip, including food and fuel. Israel responded with military action against Hamas, which continued its attacks (Reich 2012: 283). In December 2009 Israel started Operation Cast Lead, with air strikes on Gaza and followed by ground assaults. Among its objectives were to:

> "stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians by destroying and damaging the mortar and rocket launching apparatus and its supporting infrastructure and to improve the safety and security of

southern Israel and its residents by reducing the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza to carry out future attacks" (Reich 2012: 289).

3.12. Concluding remarks: the situation today

Sternhell (1998) argues that in the twentieth century the Jewish people perceived Zionism, especially after the establishment of the sovereign State of Israel, as a guarantee of a form of political arrangement to ensure their survival and security within a nation state. In this context, the Jewish people demanded a country for themselves and their argument of having a historical right to Palestine, a demand which they justified by themselves. Therefore, for the early Zionists the need to conquer the territories was a moral imperative. Their claim to having a historical right to that land was in line with their political aims and was used as propaganda. In the wake of the Holocaust, this argument was not questioned given the continued threat to the Jewish people (Sternhell 1998: 338).

After the foundation of the State of Israel, given the separation of powers, competitive political pluralism, basic freedoms and the recognition of popular sovereignty, Israel was considered a democracy (Dieckhoff 2013b:15). In this democracy, Ben Amos (2013) claims, a national memory had to be created not only through education, but also through military service. In this respect, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) contributed to the creation of a national memory. The Military Education Command is a unique military institution, which does not exist in any Western army, and in which there is a superior officer responsible for education. In this way, the army was able to create and transmit the national memory through memorial ceremonies, Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, Memorial Day, visits to battle sites and organized trips to the death camps in Poland. During these activities, the role of the army in the national narrative of the creation and development of the Jewish state was always emphasized. With this mechanism, a collective Israeli memory has been created, and was engraved temporally through days and ceremonies of remembrance, and spatially through archeological sites, monuments, and cemeteries (Ben Amos 2013: 50–51).

Another issue in this new nation state was the formation of political parties. There was resistance by the religious parties, both Zionist and non-Zionist, to the danger of secularization, which is one of the many factors responsible for the absence of a constitution in Israel. The danger of

secularization was never considered as an issue in Israeli society because labor nationalism had already introduced historical, religious, and semi-religious values (Sternhell 1998: 320). If Zionism is considered an ideology of liberation, even when it was dominated by the Labor government or other socialist approaches, it never promised to free workers from their dependence on the capitalist system. Zionism aimed at making the worker the agent of national restitution in order to bring the largest number of Jewish people to Israel and to give Jewry a new nation state in historically significant parts of the country (Sternhell 1998: 330).

Today, Grinberg (2010) claims, the difference between the right-wing parties, and those in the center and on the left is mainly a question of the different language used to discuss 'the Arabs'. The right wing has an openly racist and hostile attitude towards the Arabs, whereas the center parties and the left describe them as a "demographic danger", for which a separation wall and a unilateral retreat from the Gaza Strip were necessary. None of the Jewish parties stressed the issues of recognition, dialogue, and compromise with Palestinians in their party platforms. In elections, internal economic issues are discussed, whereas the Palestinian issue has been avoided (Grinberg 2010: 192).

The same attitude can also be seen in the current practices of surveillance, control, and construction of the wall in Israel. The real purpose is not to protect Jewish civilians and state institutions against violent attacks by a hostile non-Jewish population, but to "protect Jewish identity, and the state, which has founded itself on it, from dissolution from within" (Bowman 2011: 76). It is not a coincidence that Naomi Klein has identified the manufacturing and export of the Israeli security industry in the post-9/11 era as an ideological opportunity and a profitable path for Israeli capitalism. The Wall has been a prototype for increasing surveillance in other parts of the world in the aftermath of 9/11 (Klein quoted in Abu-Laban and Bakan 2011: 289). At the same time, we can conclude that the State of Israel is itself under surveillance, not only by human rights organizations, but also by foreign intelligence agencies, and U.N. agencies. For example, Peace Now monitors the settlement activity through an internationally funded project (Cohen 2011: 110).

Today politics in Israel is a highly contradictory and divisive concept. Charbit (2013) notes that it is not uncommon for individual Israeli citizens to take their complaints to the Supreme Court. Especially after the Court's acceptance of the right to a universal case submission, it accepts cases submitted not only by individuals who have been damaged by public authorities, but also from

civil society organizations. The reason for this political closeness may be due to the use of proportional representation in Israeli politics and to the failure to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The occupation of the Palestinian territories continues, however, and the conflict is visible to the entire the Israeli public spite of the polarization of opinions (Charbit 2013: 70–71).

4. TURKEY: AN ASSIMILATIVE REPUBLIC

The issue of peace in Turkey's is strongly shaped by the nature of its founding principles, which are in turn shaped by the challenges faced by the Turkish state. In a militaristic society such as Turkey, anti-militarism is not only important in times of armed conflict, but also in times of peace because of the intrinsic relationship between militarism, state and society. Therefore, I have selected three issues along these basic dimensions to give a general picture of peace-related movements in Turkey: the Kurdish question, conscientious objection, and the anti-war movements. In this chapter, I first explain how modern Turkey emerged as a nation-state in order to describe how these three issues relate to peace in Turkey. Then, I give brief background information about the Kurdish question: how it emerged and evolved over time; the suppression of Kurdish identity; Kurdish rebellions as a reaction to the Turkish state; the foundation of Kurdish political parties followed by their ban by the state; and the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as a strategic actor. Lastly, I discuss the anti-war movements, which are linked to anti-globalization movements in Turkey, especially in the case of anti-USA and anti-NATO movements.

4.1 Turkey as a nation-state

Eder and Giesen argue that the modern concept of the nation required the new sovereign to invent its history, imagine its natural origin and construct its identity and homogeneity (2001: 253). Turkey was established as a republic in 1923, and presented itself as a modern, secular nation-state. As is the case with any nation-state, many reforms have been made to guarantee its success. These reforms took place during the creation of the Turkish nation-state and their implications are not dealt with in the current research. Instead I focus on the process of creating a nation-state which prioritized Turkishness in terms of ethnicity by identifying the Kurdish people as an obstacle to Turkey's nation-state homogeneity. In order to provide a general picture to understanding issues related to peace in Turkey, in this section I discuss how the nation is defined and how Kemalism became the state ideology.

It is important to note that the roots of the Kurdish question date to the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920. This stressed the prospects of founding a Kurdish state in Kurdish populated areas in South-East Turkey, and parts of Iran and Iraq. The treaty was ignored by Mustafa Kemal, who eventually founded the Turkish state within borders which still exist today (Robins 1993: 659). Consequentially, according to Sirkeci, the historical traces of the Kurdish question can be found in the state-building deficiencies of the early 1920s when the Turkish Republic was founded (2000: 150). Mustafa Kemal regarded "contrasting ethnic nationalisms" as being responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, so that the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 recognized three non-Muslim communities — Armenian, Jewish and Greek —as official minorities. All other Turkish citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, language and culture were merged into the greater Turkish community (Tocci and Kaliber 2008: 3). Kurban (2005) argues that since the Treaty of Lausanne accords official minority status exclusively to non-Muslim citizens, non-recognized minorities such as the Kurds, were expected to abandon their minority identities in return for equal rights under the Turkish Republic. Kurds and Alevis, she continues, "rejected minority status arguing instead that they were among the 'founding peoples'" (Kurban 2005: 342). Robins shows how the Treaty of Lausanne took precedence over the Treaty of Sèvres by not referring to the non-Turkish minorities. This meant that the Kurds could not, and were not, defined as a legally recognized minority (Robins 1993: 660).

Kemalism was the ideology of the six arrows, which were officially recognized at the congress of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), in 1931. These became part of the party program in 1935, and were defined as "the principles of Kemalism," before being encoded in the Constitution in 1937. Zürcher point outs that two of the six arrows — republicanism, secularism, nationalism, revolutionism, populism and statism — are about the means to ends, namely republicanism and statism. Therefore, he argues, the other four define Kemalist ideology (Zürcher 2009: 44). According to Laciner and Bal the Kurds rejected two of the six arrows: nationalism and secularism. The former emphasized ethnic rather than religious origins and the latter downgraded Islam as the unifying factor between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples (Laciner and Bal 2004: 495). During the foundation of the Turkish nation-state, the Kemalist state apparatus tried to impose the six arrows on Turkish subjects through two key channels; military service and education.

In the age of nation-states, each state maintains an army not only in times of war, but also in times of peace. Turkey is no exception when it comes to giving importance to its army. The goal was for the nation-state to have a male population ready for war at any time. Mustafa Kemal founded the Turkish Republic after the War of Independence, which in turn followed World War I. It left a strong national narrative of patriotism and bravery where soldiers sacrificed their lives for independence. Consequently, the image of the soldier has great historical importance in Turkey. In militaristic societies, serving in the army is seen as a duty to one's nation. Hence, in addition to everyday practices, some institutional arrangements had to be provided to maintain and promote a militarist culture in society. Militarism plays a crucial role in convincing people that they should serve their country through military service. It is reproduced every day, through cultural narratives and formal education. In Turkey, one of the most visible areas of militarism is compulsory military service.

In Turkey compulsory military service is regulated by the Turkish Constitution (1982). Under the title "Political Rights and Duties" Section 5, Article 72 states: "national service is the right and duty of every Turk." It continues by saying that this service "shall be performed or considered as performed either in the Armed Forces or in the public service and shall be regulated by law." The Military Service Law (1927) states that according to the regulations "it is compulsory for every man who is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey to do military service."[17] This law stipulates that this service must take the form of military service by Turkish male citizens, since there is no civic alternative. Yet what happens if a man refuses compulsory military service?

A conscientious objector is someone who "refuses either to bear arms or to serve in the military or continue to serve in the military because of religious or moral beliefs that are opposed to killing, or, more recently, are opposed to relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence" (Moskos and Whiteclay Chambers 1993: 5). Conscientious objection is officially recognized in Resolution 337 adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1967),[18] in Article 9 of the

[17] In Turkey has military service lasts fifteen months (for those with a lower level of education) or twelve or six months (for those holding a minimum of university education and after an exam).

[18] "Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service, shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such service. This right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the fundamental rights of the individual in democratic Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights."

European Convention on Human Rights by Council of Europe (1950),[19] and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adapted by United Nations (1948).[20] Turkey has been a member of the United Nations since 1945 and of the Council of Europe since 1949, but it does not recognize conscientious objection as a legal right. In spite of this unofficial status of conscientious objection, there are still people who claim to be objectors. Since the first conscientious objection case in Turkey in 1989,[21] there have been many refusals based on different reasons, such as being an anti-militarist, anarchist, feminist, environmentalist, etc. (Altinay 2004). It is not uncommon that there are objectors who based their objections on their religious faith and some of them defined themselves openly as Muslims. One interesting case is that of a Protestant pastor in Turkey, Kerem Koç, who defended his objection to military service on the grounds of his Christian faith. These objectors have on thing in common — they define themselves as individuals with a religious faith, and compulsory military service is hence a violation of that faith and of their religious conscience. Here too, despite the international agreements, to which Turkey is a signatory, and the Turkish Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion and conscience, their faith-based objection is not recognized.

4.1. The Kurdish question in Turkey

The Turkish state is based on the political myth of a homogenous nation. The state has a policy of assimilation based on the definition of Turkishness as a common national, linguistic and territorial identity (Taspinar 2005: 203). In this respect, we should note that the Kurdish question is a political issue, and therefore, directly related to peace. Several points must be taken into account when

---

[19] "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

[20] "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

[21] Tayfun Gönül was the first one who declared his conscientious objection against the compulsory military service in Turkey.

discussing the origins and development of the 'Kurdish question' in Turkey.[22] To give an overview of the problem, first I provide a historical background to the issue. This is followed by an explanation of the efforts of Kurdish politicians to gain democratic rights. Finally, there is the emergence of the PKK which must be understood against these historical developments and in relation to the denial of the Kurdish people's rights together with the Turkish army's involvement in the region.

4.2.1. The destruction of Kurdish identity and rebellion as a reaction

Before examining the Kurdish question in Turkey in more detail, it is necessary to explain that the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in Turkey with their own roots and history:

> "The Kurds are a Sunni-Muslim, Indo-European speaking people whose traditional homeland is concentrated in the rugged, mountainous area of the Middle East where Turkey, Iraq and Iran converge. (…) Although they constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, the Kurds lack their own independent state" (Gunter 1990:1).

While Turkey denies its existence, most Kurdish political groups refer to the mountainous area that Kurds have inhabited for centuries as Kurdistan. It is estimated that today, around 24–27 million Kurds live in the Middle East, about half of them (13 million) in Turkey. It is probable that they may account for approximately 23% of the total population of Turkey today (McDowall 1996: 3). Another estimation put forward by van Bruinessen, however, is that 7–12 million Kurds live in Turkey (2000: 43). There is no consensus as to the number of Kurdish people living in Turkey, because no census takes the ethnic origins of the Kurdish people into account either under the Ottoman Empire or the Turkish Republic (Laciner and Bal 2004: 486). Another reason why there is no accurate estimation of the number of Kurds living in Turkey is that some people are afraid, or unable, to describe themselves as Kurdish, and many others are assimilated and no longer speak Kurdish. This is in addition to the Turkish state's preference for minimizing the number, irrespective of what this is. In this regime, the Kurdish people still hope to obtain some basic rights and freedoms as they represent the largest non-Turkish group in Turkey. The inequality they face

[22] There are many other issues related to the Kurdish question in Turkey, such as the right to education in the mother tongue or the right to a defense in one's mother tongue in the courts. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, and would need to be analyzed within the context of democracy in Turkey, ethno-national movements and/or issues related to human rights.

is itself reflected in the denial of the right to develop their cultural heritage and to exercise political rights. The main problems are the laws forbidding the use of the Kurdish language, a concentrated military presence in the area of Turkey's Kurdistan, and forced deportations and economic underdevelopment. Language is the primary factor in creating a national community and its prohibition plays a crucial role in destroying the cultural and political rights of that community.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic ethnic diversity was perceived as a threat to its territorial integrity. As Kurds were the largest non-Turkish ethnic group, they were seen as the largest obstacle to the goal of homogeneity; the only solution was to assimilate them (Bozarslan 1992: 103). Symbols of ethnic identity were suppressed, the use of the Kurdish language was forbidden, they were not allowed to wear traditional Kurdish dress, and names had to be Turkish (van Bruinessen 2000: 13). When Turkish nationalism was implemented and secularism was introduced during the setting-up of the Republic, it undermined the unifying factors between the Turkish and Kurdish people (Laciner and Bal 2004: 483). Any reference to Kurdish identity was prohibited. The idea was to commit people to Kemalism through education in order to build a homogenous nation and any denial of unity was interpreted as a potential threat to that nation. In this respect, the Turkish Hearth organization (*Türk Ocağı*) founded in 1912 is a good example of a strategy to Turkify the Kurds. The aim was not only to make Kurds into political Turks, but also into cultural and social Turks through assimilation. It functioned as a way to impose the sense of shared Turkish nationhood onto the people. In 1924, special units of the Turkish Hearth were dispatched to regions with the highest density of Kurds where they influenced and persuaded the population to become good Turks. At the time this was presented as education, but education meant Turkification (McDowall 1996: 201). Içduygu, Romano and Sirkeci admit that the political dimension is central to the Kurdish issue, although they conclude, that based on Kurdish population data for Turkey,[23] the socio-economic inequality of the Kurdish people should also be taken into account, and this is the result of a lack of proficiency in Turkish and education (1999: 1003).

[23] The empirical data used in their article are taken from the 1993 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, which demonstrates the lower socio-economic status of Kurds as a result of an insecure material and non-material environment.

As a reaction to the processes of assimilation, between 1925 and 1938, a total of eighteen Kurdish and Islamist uprisings had to be suppressed. There were three major revolts by the Kurds: the uprising in 1925 of Sheikh Said; the insurrection led by Kheybun under General Ihsan Nuri Pasa in the Ararat area in 1930; and the Dersim rebellion led by Sheikh Said Rida from 1936 to 1938 (Gunter 1990: 12). It is argued that the main reason for these rebellions was not the quest for national independence, but the need to challenge central government in order to protect their status and power as feudal lords and sheiks (Laciner and Bal 2004: 498). From 1925 until 1946 parts of the Kurdish region were under martial law (Smith 2005: 465). As a response to the rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s, the Turkish state broke its promise to abide by the Lausanne Treaty, the use of Kurdish names was banned and the state implemented the Resettlement Law to reduce the Kurdish presence in the region (Tocci and Kaliber 2008: 3). As a result, many Kurdish people were killed or deported, meant that they were assimilated into the Turkish majority, and that their children no longer speak Kurdish (van Bruinessen 2000: 59).

4.2.2. Looking for political rights through democratic channels

Attempts were made to suppress the Kurds in such a way that they were not allowed to represent their political claims. In 1938, the governing party, CHP had branches in all Turkish provinces except for those east of the Euphrates, including Agri, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Van, Tunceli and Urfa. Although the CHP was the ruling party, it did not have a foothold in the Kurdish provinces (Cagaptay 2006: 113). Before the Kurdish parties were set up the Turkish Labor Party (*Turkiye Isci Partisi*, TIP) took an interest in the Kurdish problem. It won fifteen seats in the 1965 elections. In October 1970, it passed a resolution at its fourth congress and claimed that there was a Kurdish people in the Eastern part of Turkey and that the fascist authorities had suppressed the Kurdish people under the policy of assimilation. This move by the Turkish Labor Party was a unique step since the founding of the Republic. No previous political party with seats in the Parliament had recognized the existence of the problem. However, in June 1971 there was a coup, all political parties were dissolved and the Labor Party leaders were sentenced to prison for their advocacy of Kurdish interests (Gunter 1990: 16). The next coup took place on 12 September 1980, which led to the detention of around 81,000 Kurds until September 1982, along with the deployment of two-thirds of the Turkish army in the Kurdish region to maintain order (McDowall 1996: 414). From 1987 until 2002, the Turkish state implemented a

state of emergency in ten provinces of the Kurdish region (Tocci and Kaliber 2008: 4). A special regional governor was given extraordinary powers, which led to a two-tiered system of law in Turkey (Kurban 2003: 190). The first official opening towards recognition of a Kurdish people was in 1990 when President Turgut Ozal publicly recognized the existence of a Kurdish people and a Kurdish question during his trip to the Kurdish region of Turkey. This helped to undermine the official state discourse that the Kurdish people do not exist as such, and in 1991 the law was amended to depenalize the use of non-Turkish languages in private (Scalbert-Yucel and Ray 2006: 57).

The first legal Kurdish party, the People's Labor Party (*Halkin Emek Partisi,* HEP), was established in 1990 by eight former deputies of the Social Democrat People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halk Partisi,* SHP), who had been expelled from the party after attending a Kurdish conference in Paris in October 1989. The HEP's ideology was based on Kurdish nationalism (van Bruinessen 2000: 255). In October 1991 there were general elections in Turkey. Under the Turkish electoral system, a political party must get at least ten percent of the national vote in order to have seats in Parliament. The SHP wanted to reunite with the HEP, as an electoral strategy. In the end, twenty-two politicians with an HEP background were elected to Parliament. When the time came to take the oath, two of them, Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle, adding their own words to the oath. Dicle declared that he only took the oath because the constitution obliged him to do so, while Zana added in Kurdish that she took the oath for the brotherhood of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples (Gunter 1990: 8; van Bruinessen 2000: 256). The response was that the deputies in the Parliament, including those of the SHP, began drumming on their desks in protest. Public opinion and the court condemned them for being separatists. Several trials began against individual HEP members by the Ankara State Security Courts and the party was banned in July 1993. The HEP members then established a new party, the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*, DEP) in May 1993, but it was banned in June 1994 on the grounds that it betrayed Turkey's interests. The People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, HADEP) established in May 1994 was also banned in May 2003, on the grounds that it supported the PKK. It is worth noting that during the four years that the HEP and the DEP existed, around sixty-four of their leaders and members were killed (van Bruinessen 2000: 268). In 2005, the Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, DEHAP) was dissolved and was succeeded by the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP; *Partiya Civaka Demokratîk*, PCD) which was founded in 2004 by former DEP members on their

release from jail (Tocci and Kaliber 2008: 6). In the 2007 elections, the independently elected Kurdish representatives united in Parliament under the umbrella of the DTP. The goal was to meet the Kurdish people's political, social and cultural needs and to represent their interests in a democratic way. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opened a case to ban the DTP claiming that they were representatives of the PKK. As the court case was underway, the Peace and Democracy Party (*Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi,* BDP) was founded as a precaution. Eventually, the DTP was banned in 2009, and the BDP became its successor after the DTP. As of February 2013, there are twenty-nine BDP deputies in the Parliament.

Turkey's Kurdish question was not only a domestic political problem, it also created an obstacle for Turkey's progress in accession to the European Union. In this respect, the European Commission produced annual reports on Turkey's progress towards EU membership. From 1998 to 2002, when the armed conflict was declining after reaching a peak in the 1990s, the Commission published reports assessing Turkey's ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria. There reports mainly dealt with human rights and Kurdish rights as a minority issue, pointing to the death sentence for Abdullah Ocalan, bans on newspapers, magazines, TV and radio broadcasting in Kurdish, the denial of education in the Kurdish language and attacks on the work of human rights associations (Blätte 2003: 14). In an 'official' move Turkey claimed that it would recognize the basic rights of Kurds, but only because the EU required Turkey to do so, and Parliament approved some rights and reforms in 2002. It is often pointed out that even if Turkey attempts to approach Europe by trying to meet its criteria, Kemalist ideology is so entrenched in the military, the courts and the bureaucracy,[24] that liberalizing efforts are limited to the official ideology (Smith 2005: 451).

Behind the efforts of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* AKP) to grant Kurdish people their cultural and linguistic rights was not only the EU accession process, but also the competition it was engaged in with the Kurdish political parties to win votes in the region. It was argued that Kurdish support from the region was a result of improvements in public services and some other rewards such as food and coal aid to people in need. For the faithful, the

[24] The AKP's electoral victory in 2002 was criticized by Kemalists for trying to establish its own ideology whilst giving important bureaucratic positions to its supporters. Some scholars, however, offer a different view. According to Altan, the AKP chose to be a "religious Kemalist" party rather than a democratic one (*Ilke Haber*, 11.06.2012). Eliacik, on the other hand, criticizes the AKP for being able to do what Kemalists could not, to wit, introducing capitalism to religious Anatolia (*Timeturk,* 22.12.2012).

AKP had a religious appeal; they did not choose it for ideological reasons, but on religious and material grounds (Tezcur 2010: 782). Even though in the 2007 national elections, the DTP won twenty-two seats in Parliament, which meant that Kurdish politics could become an integral part of Turkey's politics in a parliamentarian sense (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012: 8), according to Tezcur, in 2007 after the AKP increased its share of the vote among the Kurds in the parliamentary elections, it ended any moves towards a consistent and moderate Kurdish policy (Tezcur 2010: 784).

In 2009, however, despite the former ban on the use of the Kurdish language in Turkey, there was a remarkable moment when the 24-hour channel of the Turkish state's official television channel, TRT, started to broadcast in Kurdish, TRT SES (Ayata 2011: 524). Ayata points out that these improvements were not only the result of the EU accession process, but also the outcome of the efforts of Kurdish organizations in Europe, which demonstrated in favor of the existence of Roj TV broadcasting in the Kurdish language to Kurdish people in the Middle East. This channel was seen as a threat by the Turkish state, as it jeopardized "the Turkish military's monopoly of information regarding the internal war in the Kurdish region" (Ayata 2011: 526). In the end, the Turkish state decided to offer a Kurdish channel, TRT SES, in order to compete with the information provided by Roj TV (530). Khayati points out that this recognition of the Kurdish language by the Turkish state has been interpreted by some as a "cosmetic operation" in the sense that it was monopolized under the official state broadcasting television channel TRT (Khayati 2008: 74). He claims that even though this was an improvement on the total denial of the reality of the Kurdish people, today they only enjoy a "folkloric existence" in the private sphere, which means that they are able to enjoy their culture in the form of Kurdish music, dance, cuisine etc., as long as it does not have a political implication in public, which was the main reason behind the banning on Newroz[25] celebrations (Khayati 2007). This ban in turn, led to feelings of exclusion on the part of young Kurdish people who were attracted by the PKK's confrontational approach (Tezcur 2010: 778).

[25] Newroz is the Kurdish Sunni festival which celebrates the new year at the beginning of spring.

4.3. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* (PKK)

According to Radu, the name of the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was synonymous with the party through which he built a "personality cult" (Radu 2001: 49). This allowed him to prohibit intraparty opposition, and for other Kurdish leaders, such as Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, to define him as a madman (Cornell 2001: 40). The PKK emerged in the late 1970s as a secretive and authoritarian organization with radical ideologies and violent policies. It believed that Kurdistan is a colony of the Turkish bourgeoisie and that a war of liberation is inevitable (van Bruinessen 2000: 60). The PKK followed the path of revolution in which it saw Kurdistan repressed by colonial rule, which led to feudal lords cooperating with the state to exploit the lower classes (Cornell 2001: 39). It was not Kurdish nationalism but Marxism, which defined the PKK (Radu 2001: 48). Jongerden and Akkaya argue that the PKK emerged from the revolutionary left, which was engaged in the liberation struggle in Kurdistan and which, at the same time, aimed to unify the left (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012: 2). According to them, it was Kemalism that prevented the left from being oppositional, because the radical left in Turkey "was crucially defined (through Kemalism) by the same force (colonialism) it was fighting to be free from (i.e. the oppression of a dominant class empowered by/as a controlling state)" (Jongerden and Akkaya 2012: 7). Kemalism is a project for the modernization of Turkey with its emphasis on cultural terms, and which led to assimilationist policies regarding the Kurdish people, whereas Ocalan opted for a democracy with citizens' rights (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012: 6). For the PKK this armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army was a war of liberation for Kurdistan while, for the Turkish state it was a struggle against terrorists with separatist aims in the region. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the PKK was responsible, and not the more moderate and democratic organizations, for forcing the Turkish state to admit that Turkey has a Kurdish problem which urgently needs to be resolved and not denied (van Bruinessen 1992: 59). Akkaya and Jongerden claim that the first decade of the 2000s were critical for the PKK which experienced three distinct phases: "shock and retreat (1999), impasse and reconstruction (2000–2004) and return to the stage (2005–today)" (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012: 10). As a justification for the re-engagement of its armed struggle, the PKK pointed to the operations of the Turkish Armed Forces and Ocalan's poor prison conditions. It is a fact that the PKK always pursued the armed struggle to the exclusion of any other strategy, and it did not need to do so either because of its steady recruitment rate. The reasons for this revival in

the armed struggle after 2005 are the formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and the rise of the AKP as an alternative in the Kurdish region (Tezcur 2010: 779–781).

Because Ocalan proposed democratic confederalism for the unification of the Kurdish people and Kurdistan, since 2005 the PKK and associated organizations have been reorganized under the Association of Communities in Kurdistan (*Koma Civaken Kurdistan,* KCK). This is an alternative to the nation-state and is based on the principle of democratic confederalism, so as to expand radical democracy based on peoples' democratic organizations and for decision-making powers to be valid wherever the Kurdish people live (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012: 7).

It is sometimes argued that PKK violence was rational and instrumental given the fact that it was trying to alter the political and juridical status of Kurds by giving them independence or partial political autonomy (Bozarslan 2004: 23). However, this does not alter the fact that Turkey suffered 38,000 casualties and an estimated $250 billion in material costs and damages between 1983 and 2000 (Cagaptay 2006: 2). It also led to the impoverishment of the region in general and to a lack of foreign investment, which made clear that "state suppression was only sustainable at the cost of a seriously impaired economy" (McDowall 1996: 446). According to a 2010 report by Human Rights Watch the Kurdish question led to the forced displacement of at least 1 million Kurdish civilians, around 44,000 PKK guerillas, Turkish soldiers and civilians, not to mention the thousands of human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2010).

In addition to the Turkish army's engagement in low-intensity warfare with the PKK, another tool used to fight the PKK was the village guard system. In 1985, the Turkish state decided to arm some villagers, so that they could protect themselves against the PKK and fight it, if necessary. Village guards were local Kurdish self-defense forces created to respond to PKK operations (Radu 2001: 57). Many people were willing to become a village guard. They were paid for each guerilla killed, and as a result many people who had nothing to do with the PKK were killed. On the other hand, from the PKK's point of view, the village guards were ideal targets because they were state collaborators (van Bruinessen 2000: 251). The tribes which rejected the call to sign up as village guards were at risk of retribution, and some of them were expelled from their villages, which were later razed (McDowall 1996:423). Many people joined the system simply to avoid eviction and to keep their land (van Bruinessen 2000: 273).

4.4. Anti-war movements as anti-globalization movements in Turkey

According to Kabacali, the youth movement in Turkey reached a peak in the period 1961–1971. According to many people, the main forces behind the 27 May 1960 coup[26] were young people and the army (Kabacali 2007: 157). The military commanders of the coup followed and exploited the student events of April 1960, and they saw the students as the heroes of the coup. This led to the empowerment of students, and gave them the opportunity to found new leftist organizations and to legitimize their politicization (Alper 2010: 81). As a result of this political climate, Karasapan emphasizes that between 1967 and 1969 there were many student movements, including protests against the Vietnam War and the 6th Fleet of the U.S. navy. These anti-imperialist movements were a reaction against U.S. policy in Cyprus, U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East and the Vietnam War (Karasapan 1989). Alper also argues that the starting point for these social protests was 1968, when students began to occupy the universities along with mass mobilizations (Alper 2010: 70). The 6th Fleet of the U.S. Navy was stationed in Istanbul and, as the power base of the USA in the Mediterranean, it was exposed to student protests from June 1967. These protests ended with "Bloody Sunday" in February 1969[27] (Kabacali 2007). On 24 June 1967, students took down the U.S. flag from Dolmabahce Harbor, where the 6th Fleet was anchored and replaced it with the Turkish flag. In October 1967, reactions to the 6th Fleet were not limited to a hunger strike by students, but also involved physical attacks on U.S. soldiers, who had eggs thrown at them (Karadeniz quoted in Kabacali 2007: 168). The attacks were repeated on 15 July 1968 when the 6th Fleet anchored in Istanbul, and when U.S. soldiers were attacked by students and paint was thrown at them. The police responded by occupying the Istanbul Technical University and by taking some of the students into custody and beating up others. One of the students, Vedat Demircioğlu, died as a result of police violence (Kabacali 2007: 195–196).

In April 1968, during this period of student activism, Unity of Revolutionary Power (*Devrimci Güç Birliği*) was set up to act against imperialism as a whole, and brought students, workers, teachers and unions together. One of the most remarkable events organized by this organization

---

[26] As demonstrated in section 4.1.1, the 12 September 1980 coup had the opposite effect on young people when their freedom was taken away and their entry into the political arena as political subjects was prohibited to them through harsh measures.

[27] The violent retaliation by police and right-wingers to student protest led to two deaths. This will be explained further in the upcoming paragraph.

was the "No to NATO Week" on 14–19 May 1968. They not only put up posters, but also burned the NATO emblem in Taksim Square. In a press release, they emphasized that Turkey was the first country in world history to fight a war of independence against imperialism and to have won, and yet it still become a member of this exploitative imperialist institution. The students insisted on saying "No to NATO" because they were against the USA and against imperialism and because they supported the people's rights. In this statement, they also referred to the Vietnam War in which, they claimed, the people had won against imperialism, and that this was also possible for Turkey (Kabacali 2007: 175–176).

On 10 February 1969 the 6th Fleet returned to Istanbul. Kabacali (2007) explains that this time, students started their protest with a statement accusing the fleet for being the symbol of imperialism and exploitation. They also put up a flag with the photo of Vedat Demircioğlu on the university campus. When the students started to march, the police beat up not only students, but also civilians and journalists who were on the street at the time. The protests continued almost daily until 16 February with marches, demonstrations and banners. Students used slogans such as "Independent Turkey," "National Army," and "Sixth Fleet, Go Home!" On 16 February a "workers' march against imperialism and exploitation" was organized. The right-wing media, the Minister of the Interior, Faruk Sukan, the Minister of Logistics, Sadettin Bilgiç, and right-wing students cooperated to prevent the march of 40,000 people. When the students and workers reached Taksim Square, the police collaborated with the right-wingers, and prevented protestors from escaping when bombs exploded and hundreds of students and workers were injured, two of whom died (Kabacali 2007: 209–12). Reports pointed out that the attacks came from the declared military zones, which had not only been paid, but also armed, by the Justice Party government (Karasapan 1989: 8).

Alper emphasizes that some political factors such as student mobilizations in 1968, the increasing capacity of the organization of workers, public employees and teachers, and the spread of a left-Kemalist political frame between 1968 and 1971 played an important role in changing the balance of power in favor of organized political groups. This helps explain the increased mobilization of underrepresented groups of farmers, workers, civil servants and students (Alper 2010: 79). In Alper's view, it was the success of the 1968 student protests, which were inspired by their Western European and North American counterparts, which triggered a reaction by workers, farmers and civil servants into organizing and protesting (2010: 93). These can be regarded as the first big

protests in the history of republican Turkey, which were later followed by anti-globalization protests.

In Turkey, the effects of globalization were first observed in 1994, which was the year of a severe economic crisis in Turkey. In her research on the emergence of anti-globalization movements in Turkey, Gümrükçü demonstrates that they started in the 1990s in the form of protest events against the IMF and the World Bank. Their numbers increased in the first decade of the 2000s, having reaching a peak in 2003 as a result of the war on Iraq. She mentions that it was during the 1990s protests against privatization, the IMF and the World Bank that the "anti-MAI and Globalization Working Group"[28] was founded in 1998 (Gümrükçü 2007: 80). Some members of this group even went to Seattle in 1999 to see how the alternative globalization was developing and how people responded to it. Some traditionalist leftist groups such as the Labor Party (*Emek Partisi*, EMEP) and the Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP), however did not want to take part in a world struggle against globalization and distanced themselves because they believed in national solutions and did not have much regard for international demonstrations (Baykan and Lelandais 2004: 521).

Social forums organized in Turkey should also be taken into consideration when discussing events organized around anti-globalization issues. In April 2002, the Istanbul Social Forum (ISF) was founded and took part in demonstrations abroad. It also participated in the preparation of the European Social Forums in Florence (2003) and Paris (2004) (Baykan and Lelandais 2004: 521). The first meeting of the Turkey Social Forum took place on 30 September and 1 October 2006. The issues discussed were similar to those in the World Social Forum and the European Social Forum: imperialism, alternative globalization and energy policies, as well as local problems in Turkey such as prison conditions (Gümrükçü 2007: 39).

Baykan and Lelandais claim that the ISF made its mark on the social and political struggles in Turkey, in that it managed to coordinate the alternative globalization movement in Turkey, which in turn triggered the anti-war movements. These included around 200 organizations representing a range of interests which had never come together before (2004: 523). Gümrükçü argues that

[28] Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which is a part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

being anti-war is intermeshed with being anti-capitalism, and anti-globalization, which enabled the social movements against globalization in Turkey to benefit from an anti-war consciousness (Gümrükçü 2010). Consequentially, the anti-war platform was set up early in 2002 with the signatures of over 170 civil society associations and organizations. On 14–15 September 2002, an international conference on the war in Iraq was organized. The anti-war platform was assigned the role of "coordination against the war in Iraq" in December 2002. It was followed by a massive rally in Ankara on 1 March 2003, against the Parliament's meeting to vote on giving U.S. forces the right to use Turkey as a base for sending soldiers to Iraq to support the U.S. army. In the end, the vote was rejected by the Parliament (Baykan and Lelandais 2004: 521).

Gümrükçü demonstrates that in Turkey the anti-globalization movements brought groups from different backgrounds together, and how this applies to anti-war movements against the war in Iraq, which were supported by leftists, feminists and Islamists who do not generally cooperate on a common agenda (2010: 176). According to Tarrow, when protests were organized all around the world, including capital cities such as Rome, Berlin and Madrid in February 2003, around 16 million people participated (2005: 15). Gümrükçü (2007) argues that this number demonstrates the sheer scale of anti-globalization movements in general and how this is reflected in the anti-war movements in particular. In other words, 2003 was a year of anti-globalization movements and witnessed the development of anti-war movements as a result of the U.S. declaration of war on Iraq (Gümrükçü 2007: 61–62). Turkey was no exception and in this period the number of anti-globalization protests increased and were also organized against the war in Iraq. The reason why anti-globalization movements go hand-in-hand with anti-war movements is not only having witnessed war in a neighboring country, but also the shared perception of the USA as a capitalist power, and the war as the result of capitalist policies (Gümrükçü 2007: 78).

5. ISRAEL: THE DEMOCRATIC OCCUPIER?

This chapter is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Israel, consisting of interviews with activists in grassroots groups and organizations, members and spokespersons of these organizations together with professional staff in human rights organizations. All of these groups and organizations are working for peace and take all factors leading to conflict and the continued occupation of Palestinian Territories as their focus. First, I will explain the current political context in Israel and the ways in which it is linked to the peace movements mentioned in this chapter. My argument is based on the theoretical section in Chapter 2 which sets out how the citizenship regime in Israel is ethno-national, thus making political opportunities open in terms of mobilization for certain peace groups. Moreover, for the groups and organizations which perceive Israel as an occupier there is the question of whether a country declaring itself a democracy can also function as an occupying power.

"Democracy is a central pillar of Israel's political self-perception" (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998: 323). But then, what do I mean with democratic occupier? By that term, I refer to Israel's position on the democracy and ethnic affiliation line, which has been a discussion topic for many scholars. In an earlier work, Smooha argued that "Israeli political democracy is a reconciliatory 'consociational democracy' for religious Jews, a restricted democracy for the Oriental [Jews], and a failing *Herrenvolk* democracy for Israeli Arabs" (1978: 22, emphasis in original). Later on, Smooha (1990) and Peled (1992) define Israel as an ethnic democracy, Lustick (1988) sees it as a consociational democracy whereas according to its self-image, Israel is a liberal democracy. It is also not uncommon to define Israel as a colonial and settler state-society based on Jewish Zionist settler's control and domination of Palestinians (Shafir 1989). Palestinians are excluded from Israeli institutions, which serve mainly Israeli Jewish purposes as a reflection of the official ideology of Zionism rather than general Israeli interests. Horowitz argues that "much of what passes for the usual democratic rules either does nothing about ethnic exclusion or actually fosters it" (Horowitz 1994: 45).

In response to my research question, how we can explain the different characteristics of peace movements in Israel and Turkey, I first look at the formation of these groups and organizations in order to get a general picture of their work. Secondly, I demonstrate how they define the issue and what they demand, what they suggest as a solution to the problem, and what their vision and agenda is. Lastly, I consider the criteria they employ to form alliances.

5.1. Setting the scene: how and why do peace advocacy groups emerge?

Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld (2002: 15) assume that peace movement organizations (PMOs) make claims that run counter to, and challenge, those of the dominant political elite, and that they also try to influence the forces that enforce conflict or prevent peace; they should therefore be categorized as social movement organizations (SMOs). When looking at a group or an organization mobilized around the issue of peace, we find that their framing and mobilizing structure are affected by the political opportunity structures (POS), which can in turn be shaped by the organizations' framing and mobilizing structures. In order to have a better understanding of this dynamic process, it is important to look at when and under which circumstances they emerged. But first, a brief theoretical look is necessary to provide a contextual map.

What is the link between democracy and social movements? Meyer and Minkoff (2004: 1458) stress the importance of "issue-specific opportunities" which help us to demonstrate the difference between openness in general and openness to specific constituencies. Although Israel claims to be a democratic country with freedom of speech, the line is drawn when it comes to the issue of Palestine. Here I will also refer to the concept of citizenship. As Benhabib and Resnik emphasize, "Jus soli, or "birthright citizenship," means that a person born on the given state's territory has the right to citizenship without further inquiry," whereas "*Jus sanguis* disregards territorial claims and bases the inheritance of citizenship rights on the citizenship status of both parents" (2009: 3, emphasis in original). Raijman claims that in Israel, in addition to the Jewish community, which she calls as the "in-group," there are three differential out-groups defined along two dimensions based on ethno-national origin (Jewish vs. non-Jewish) and citizenship status (citizen vs. non-citizen). First one is immigrants with Jewish origin, who are granted citizenship under the Law of Return; second there are Israeli Arabs who are citizens of Israel; and lastly there are labor immigrants who are not Jews, not Arabs and not citizens (2010: 90-91).

The political opportunity approach rests on the assumption that context matters and, as Meyer argues, exogenous factors are capable of helping or hindering social movement's prospects for "advancing particular claims *rather than others,* cultivating some alliances *rather than others,* employing particular political strategies and tactics *rather than others"* (2004: 126, emphasis mine). I should add that when we look at the framing of PMOs studied here, we find that the emphasis and content of their frames varies. For instance, most of them stress the severity of the problem, and the need to take urgent action, but their use of frames for introducing change or their belief in effective collective action was less likely so. When it comes to effectiveness, "optimism about the outcome of a collective challenge" is likely to "enhance the probability of participation" whereas pessimism tends to have the opposite effect (Snow et al. 1986: 470). Movements develop a rationale to foster a sense of moral duty and ethical responsibility for their own and future generations, and Benford emphasizes the importance of believing in the correctness of taking action, which is necessary to alleviate the problem (1993a: 206–207). McCarthy and Zald argue that: "there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established group" (1977: 1215). Tarrow claims if social movements mirror national institutional contexts there would not only be "much less infranational variation in movements", but also the "variations within the same movement, which is a reflection of movement's heterogeneity" (1996: 50-51). Zald and Ash (1966) underline the diverse organizational structures which are effective for different purposes such as centralized bureaucratic structures can provide technical expertise as well as coordination; whereas decentralized informal structures are helpful in mobilizing grassroots. Jenkins, on the other hand, claims that most SMOs fall somewhere between the bureaucratic and decentralized models, which makes it possible for SMOs to benefit from the mobilization advantages brought by decentralization and the tactical ones of centralization (1983: 542).

According to Kriesi, the integration of social movement organizations (SMOs) in their organizational environment, which he calls "external structuration" has three components: "its relation with its constituency, its allies and the authorities:"

> "Diversification of the resource base generally decreases dependency on a single supportive group. Support from a powerful ally may provide important resources but also reduce the autonomy of the SMO and threaten its stability. Relation with authorities provide public recognition, access to

> decision-making procedures and public subsidies however the integration into established systems of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilization capacity of the SMO and alienate parts of its constituency" (Kriesi 1996: 154–156).

Why is framing so significant for analyzing social movements? Its importance lies in the fact that it is the action and what the actors understand by it, "mediating between opportunity and action are people and the … meanings they attach to their situations" (McAdam 1982: 48). Among the available frames and repertoires, Zald claims that "repertoires of contention and of organization have to 'fit', to be 'appropriate to' the injustice" (1996: 267). McAdam stresses the importance of linking framing with mobilizing structures, and argues that a movement's "signifying work" can be better understood only if we look at its actions and tactics as a whole (1996b: 354). Koopmans and Statham emphasize the importance of discursive opportunities:

> "This discursive dimension extends the institutional focus of the traditional concept of political opportunities to bring cultural and discursive elements of issue-fields back into consideration as variables for shaping collective action. Equally, by combining discursive and institutional dimensions of political opportunities, we redress the present indeterminacy in framing literature, by demonstrating why some framing efforts succeed in mobilising a public constituency" (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 143).

Therefore, I look at diagnostic and prognostic framing of the organizations and groups in order to understand what they perceive as a problem and what they propose as a solution. In order to grasp mobilizing structures, I delve into the alliances built with other groups and organizations and their criteria for such cooperation.

In contrast to the Turkish case, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, the Israeli peace movement has a longer history and, as I will demonstrate, it is stronger in terms of movement characteristics. In Israel, the existence and culture of peace movements is not a recent phenomenon. There are various ways to study peace movements. For example, organizations can be classified in terms of advocacy work, conflict resolution and dialogue, links with research and think-tanks, and human rights and aid. However, this is a rather broad way of looking at groups mobilized around the issue of peace. Therefore, it is necessary to narrow down the peace camp. Since the aim of this research is to look at such groups in ethnically divided militaristic societies, I focus on the groups and organizations currently working on the Palestinian question in Israel. Their common criterion is

organized around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which means working on different aspects of issues relating to the Palestinian question and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). For example, some groups only work on issues related to OPT in terms of the 1967 borders, while others work in terms of the 1948 border. It is important to emphasize what I mean with 'border'[29] in this context:

> ""The border" is a term that designates the community's threshold – a site where states maintain physical and administrative boundaries toward the outside world. It is the regulatory locus of the admission of foreigners, and, correspondingly, of their exclusion. It is, more broadly, the regulatory domain of citizenship in the status sense; it is the site where citizenship as status originates and in which it is governed" (Bosniak 2006: 126).

In this research when I refer to Israel's control as per the 1948 borders, I mean not only the West Bank, but also Gaza, because even though Israel technically withdrew from Gaza in 2005, it still controls its external borders.

In this study I examined twenty-three groups and organizations in Israel (see Figure 5.1), and for this chapter carried out twenty-seven in-depth interviews.[30] The groups or organizations were selected for being active in dealing with the Palestinian question. Among these I selected those involved in political advocacy work and activism and issues related to monitoring human rights violations. These functions are not necessarily mutually exclusive and there may be a degree of overlap between organizations. I divided this large network of groups and organizations into three main groups on the basis of their specific focus (see Figure 5.1). The short lines around the circles indicate that there are no clear-cut distinctions between them, making diffusion possible.[31] The first group define themselves as legal and political advocacy groups with an agenda. They are not only engaged in legal activism through a series of alliances and strategies, but also suggest solutions to the conflict, depending on their particular vision. I have classified civil disobedience groups as a subcategory composed of anarchists, groups using direct action as a strategy to help Palestinians in the occupied territories and activists supporting the boycott of Israel. The second group consists

---

[29] Benhabib argues it is sociologically inadequate to have a binarism between citizens and migrants and between nationals and foreigners because "many citizens are of migrant origin, and many nationals themselves are foreign-born" (2006: 68).
[30] See Appendix for the interview questions.
[31] I would like to thank Dr. Kivanc Atak as this figure with short lines around circles was his suggestion.

of military service refusers, avoiders and conscientious objectors (MSRA+CO). The last group includes human rights monitoring organizations (HRMOs), which mainly focus on legal issues in the occupied territories in order to reduce or eliminate human rights violations. Political advocacy groups are the highest in number compared to other two groups, but this does not mean that they received a disproportionate amount of attention in this study.

As with Turkey all the PMOs and groups examined exist in a legal environment, in the sense that they are not 'illegal' underground organizations. Some of them are even funded by Israeli agencies and registered to pay tax. All of them are active in the public sphere, and most of them are well known in Israeli society, although not always supported by it.

I started by examining the mission statements of the PMOs and groups published on their websites in order to select the ones to interview. I then carried out in-depth interviews in order to have a thorough understanding of their framing, alliances and political environments. Given the sheer number of PMOs, and in order not to over-extend the research I did not take each single campaign and event they organize or take part in into consideration. However, the interviews provided me enough material to examine their framing, mobilizing structures and political opportunity structures, which they either make use of or deprived of. In what follows I describe how the groups and organizations were set up, and what factors affected their involvement in the peace issue in Israel. I also take a brief look at the changing context in Israel in the wake of the Second Intifada in order to demonstrate how this period has affected peace movement organizations and groups operating in the field.



Figure 5.1: Groups and organizations examined in Israel

5.1.1. After the Second Intifada: the disappointed Zionist left and the dormant Israeli public

In October 2000 during violent crushes Israeli police killed 13 Palestinians, who were citizens of Israel participating in a demonstration to protest the killing of non-citizen Palestinians in the OPT. In November 2000 a commission of inquiry, headed by Justice Theodore Or of the Israeli Supreme Court investigated the killings. In Or Commission's report, Peled argues, "while relating the continuous and incessant violation of the Palestinians' citizenship *rights* by the state, the Commission demanded that they adhere to their *obligation* to protest this violation within the narrow confines of the law" (2005: 90, emphasis in original). He claims further that the Commission based its argument on Israel's "presumed character as a liberal democracy" so that it could "avoid a critical examination of the true nature of the Israeli state, describing the real-life situation of the citizen Palestinians as an aberration, rather then a manifestation of Israeli democracy" (Peled 2005: 94).

The Second Intifada was a transformative event for the peace movement community. Over the last fourteen years after the Second Intifada, many peace movement organizations and groups have had to shift their focus of their involvement in Palestinian question as a result of: a) increased settlements and construction of the Wall; b) the EU and US push for peace; c) the statement issued by Palestinian NGOs calling for a boycott of Israel; d) withdrawal from Gaza; and e) periodic operations in Gaza after disengagement.

During this period, the shift in peace groups' agenda and demands became very obvious considering the newcomers which were established after the Second Intifada as a result of the frustration caused by the inability of the long-standing peace community to resolve the conflict. Moreover, over the years the balance of power between settlers, peace activists and Palestinians changed in such a way that some of the groups focus specifically on the expansion of settlements and violence by settlers. Because the occupation continues uninterrupted, many human rights organizations have chosen to record and monitor human rights violations in the occupied territories as a way to lessen or eliminate them. Some of them claimed that the elimination of the violations is beyond them, and they focus instead on monitoring and recording violations by taking issues to court, if necessary. Investigating the political economy of the occupation and Palestinians as a captive market was a new approach taken by some, too.

Meyer argues that:

> "Elite actors, particularly scientists and strategic experts, mediate between the state and protest movements, identifying which aspects of policy are most vulnerable to assault, legitimating and sometimes aiding insurgent movements, and framing solutions to the political problems movements cause. As government reaches an accommodation with elite opponents, it becomes progressively harder for dissidents to convince supporters of the need or efficacy of extra-institutional protest" (1993a: 473)

This is what happened when the Second Intifada exploded unexpectedly. As the authorities respond, political opportunities can alter differentially for different groups within the same movement and also lead to changing opportunities for other claimants (Meyer 2004: 141). Therefore, when the long-standing peace movements were perceived as inefficient, new groups and organizations emerged which I will show later in this chapter.

During interviews, it became clear that after the Second Intifada the Zionist left, represented by Peace Now and Gush Shalom, was disillusioned. Despite this they did not give up their vision of a two-state solution and their 'change from within' perspective by keeping their focus on the Israeli public as their audience. The Zionist left was unable to adapt to changing circumstances and continued their clear-cut political program, without checking whether or not it was popular with the Israeli public. For them it was a matter of coherence to insist on the two-state solution. While the Second Intifada led to a crisis within the Zionist left, new groups emerged which realized that old visions and strategies no longer worked. They learned their lesson, as G. D. from Zochrot points out; Israel has no way to see Palestinians other than as enemies:

> "In the frame of Israel as a Jewish state expecting equality between Jews and Arabs is understanding the situation in a wrong way. We have either to be more Zionist and say the Jewish state is very important, "I like democracy but it is not the main thing," this is what the right wing says very openly and honestly. Or I overcome my nationalistic sentiments and fight for democratic values; if there is a clash between Jewish and democratic, you have to choose. If I am really for democracy and equal rights, I cannot be a Zionist."[32]

This political opportunity led to the setting up of Zochrot ('remembering' in Hebrew) as an organization which challenges core Zionist beliefs about the OPT. It took the one-state solution, the return of refugees, and Palestinian demands as their point of reference. Among the newcomers, Zochrot and ICAHD (Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions) are examples of this, as well as the old organization AIC (Alternative Information Center) which never abandoned its stance despite changing circumstances.

The disappearance of the two-state solution led to a crisis for the Zionist Left's position on peace making it hard to maintain groups which still supported the two-state solution. As a result, Peace Now and Gush Shalom were no longer a relevant force in peace camp. The disappointment of the Zionist Left after the Second Intifada led to a period of apathy, making it impossible for them to mobilize public support for peace. The Zionist Left no longer has big numbers of supporters for public demonstrations and anarchist groups can sometimes command larger numbers than the Zionist left. In the words of a member of Peace Now, L. C.: "Peace Now is not a force anymore, it

[32] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.

is not relevant in Israeli politics."[33] However even though they analyze the situation in terms of the Israeli public's current lack of interest in peace, not changing their point of reference from the Israeli public can be interpreted as a rigid position.

Many interviewees stressed that when there was violence during the First and Second Intifada, there was discussion about occupation among the Israeli public. Now that the Israelis feel comfortable thanks to economic prosperity, international isolation was no longer such a great threat and they feel safe in the absence of terror attacks, so that occupation was not seen as an urgent issue. The present period can be defined as weak, making it impossible to rally people for demonstrations which reveals the disillusion of the Zionist left. L. C. stated:

> "It is a time of apathy and disbelief. Palestinian violence hurt us terribly. Israel leaves Gaza and the answer [is that] you launch rockets at the south of Israel, the ordinary person who thinks Palestinians are the enemy, learns from that you [we] cannot leave the West Bank, or there will be rockets [launched] on Tel Aviv."[34]

After the Second Intifada, because the Israeli left was separated from the Palestinians, the linkage between the Israeli left and the Palestinians on the scale of Anarchists against the Wall (AAtW) is something entirely new. Before the Second Intifada the International Solidarity Network used to be linked with intellectuals, university students and NGOs, but after the Second Intifada Palestinian intellectuals were isolated. There was a big break, in the sense that the Israeli Zionist left felt betrayed by the Palestinians, and the Palestinians were tired of the Israeli left. Due to this separation for Israelis going to a Palestinian village was considered a very radical act; whereas now the situation is reversed, and the connections are stronger in the villages. M.U. from Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) argued that it is easier for them to connect with less politicized elements in Palestinian society, not only because villages along the wall are easier for them to reach geographically, but also because there are more Hebrew speakers in those villages, which is a new level of solidarity. Instead of Israelis being needed as messengers thanks to technological improvements, Palestinians can now make their own video recordings.[35]

---

[33] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[34] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[35] Interview with M.U., Tel Aviv, 1 December 2013.

5.1.2. When systematic occupation brings normalization

After the Second Intifada the focus of the Zionist left has shifted towards the settlements. By blaming it on settlers, the Zionist left reproduced the narrative that the problem did not exist until 1967, while thinking within the Zionist box in which both the left wing and right wing refer to the same issue. As G.D. from Zochrot pointed out: "the left wing says everything was wonderful until 1967, 1967 is a distortion of Zionism; we say no, 1967 is completion."[36] Their interpretation of history is different yet it shapes the way they formulate their framing. Y.C. from Gush Shalom said that in the past decade the dynamic element has been the settlements, and that even the current government is a government of settlements.[37] On a similar note, N.N. from Combatants for Peace (CfP) argued that settlers are bankrupting the economy and destroying the education, health and welfare systems because all the money goes to the settlements: "There is tons of money in this country but you are maintaining another country, the settlements."[38]

Human rights monitoring organizations have also pointed out that human rights violations are no longer an everyday event, in the sense that there were times in the past when people were being beaten up and arrested every day. A. U. from B'Tselem argued that:

> "It is not as if they go into houses of people every night and detain them. Policies are much more rooted in the system. They have [a] settlement system, [a] military court, which is another tool for them to control the population. It is routine now than big things happen every day."[39]

As a result, the Palestinian NGO Network issued a normalization statement in 2006, based on the idea that Palestinians should discontinue all contacts and collaboration with Israeli organizations that do not accept the right of return and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital. This mainly affected groups in Israel which are still doing joint work with Palestinians in the OPT. The situation became more complex for joint organizations such as Parents Forum Families Circle (PFFC) which does cooperative work, in the sense that the Palestinian members who take part are subject to criticism from their own society. T.G. from the PFFC emphasized that as a joint organization the criticism is much harsher on the Palestinian side,

---

[36] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.
[37] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.
[38] Interview with N.N., Jerusalem, 3 November 2013.
[39] Interview with A.U., Jerusalem, 26 December 2013.

which is told "you cannot work with them, there will be no peace, you make them stronger, the occupation is still there, if you work with Israelis, you hurt the Palestinian side." She believes, however that cooperation is helpful because if they work with Israelis, they get to know the other side this will help change the situation.[40] Zochrot, on the other hand, does not work on the occupation as such, in contrast to Zionist left organizations which take the 1967 border as their reference point. As G.D. argued, working inside the 1948 Israeli border, makes them 'kosher' in normalization discussions.[41]

Normalization was an issue taken seriously by all human rights organizations, and in some cases this led to self-criticism. With civil society organizations there is always the question of whether they are taking on responsibilities that are the competence of government, and whether they make government's life easier by taking on some of its responsibilities allowing it to present itself as having a successful civil society. A.U. from B'Tselem claimed all their work together with other human rights organizations is a red light for the occupation authorities. They know there are things they cannot do, and they work a great deal to ensure that everything they do is legal:

> "It is not like other countries where they torture or people disappear. Everything they do is very ordered and legal. It is important for them that they act according to international law, in the army they have an international law department."[42]

5.1. How do peace movements frame the issue and what do they want?

In this section I look at the demands and agenda of peace movement groups and organizations in Israel. I take the Israeli-Palestinian issue as the main point, noting that they work on and around different aspects of the Palestinian question.

Here I mainly focus on organizations' and groups' diagnostic and prognostic frames: how do they define the issue and what do they propose as a solution. I also take into consideration whether they are founded before or after the Second Intifada noting that my research covers the period after the Second Intifada until Summer 2014 in order to see whether there is a difference between the

[40] Interview with T.G., Ramat-Efal, 15 December 2013.
[41] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.
[42] Interview with A.U., Jerusalem, 26 December 2013.

newcomers and old organizations. I examine which groups are targeted as their audience and how they expect change on the issue will come about — from within Israeli society or outside it.

5.1.3. Legal and political advocacy groups: one- or two-state question

The agenda of political groups is mainly based on their definition of the conflict, and thus differs according to how they attribute the conflict to the political actors such as right-wing parties, settlements or Palestinians. Hence, their prognosis for the prospect of resolving it with the establishment of one-state or two-state model, their evaluation of the prospect of a Jewish democratic state and to what extent this state can embrace non-Jewish people, such as Palestinians. It also changes according to whether they are looking for a change within Israel or they think that external international pressure is necessary. This is reflected in their target audience, according to whom they formulate their framing.

There has been a shift in the agenda and demands of peace groups. The newcomers were established after the Second Intifada as a result of the frustration caused by the inability of the longer-standing peace camp in resolving the conflict. Moreover, over the years the balance of power between settlers, peace activists and the Palestinians has changed in such a way that some groups now focus specifically on violence by settlers.

Peace Now is one of the oldest peace groups in Israel. It was one of the main groups that pushed for the Oslo Agreements and unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Since its foundation Peace Now has always advocated a two states for two peoples solution, Israel and Palestine as two separate countries side by side. Its audience is mainly the Israeli public and represents middle-class Ashkenazi Jews. L.C. justifies this vision by saying that:

> "Palestinians need a state, sovereignty, their own police force, their institutions separate from Israel, Israel needs to allow that, in order for Israel to survive; it's mutual, they need independence, Israel needs security."[43]

For Peace Now the problem is that Palestinians do not have their own state, and therefore their solution is two states. She referred to the Israeli public getting used to occupation and Peace Now's new focus on the settlements:

---

[43] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.

> "It doesn't cost them [the Israeli public] anything. So why bother? Peace Now is against the occupation on every level, it is morally wrong and the settlements are a cancer for Israeli society because they symbolize violence and are an economic burden for Israel. Israel is increasingly isolated in the world."[44]

The shift in Peace Now's focus on the settlements after the Second Intifada can be seen by their new Settlements Watch Project and they are trying to prove the economic and social burden of settlements to the Israeli public. L.C. stressed that regarding the outposts, Peace Now does not only focus on legal part, but also on Israeli public opinion and world opinion. She cited examples from Merkel and Kerry, where she claimed that Peace Now has contacts with world public opinion and political leaders, through which they try to influence Israeli public opinion.[45]

Gush Shalom also works towards a two-state solution and tries to get support from Israeli public. Their booklet *Truth Against Truth*, gives a short course of history by combining opposite narratives of Israelis and Palestinians. The purpose is to allow each side to understand what the other side did, and why. Y.C., one of the founders of Gush Shalom, stated that:

> "The Arab side does not equalize our right to be here, the Israeli side does not recognize the existence and right of the Palestinian people. Both sides consider the whole country their natural homeland. It makes peace more difficult since each side is totally ignorant of the narrative of the other side."[46]

He underlined that they put their message in a way that maximum number of Israeli citizens can accept it because according to him the change must come from bottom and inside Israel, as he argued "in order to change the policy, we have to change the government, in order to do that we must convince people that we can make peace and that peace is possible."[47]

Another two-state supporter is Combatants for Peace (CfP), whose vision is the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. To achieve this, they use non-violent activism to influence public opinion in both Palestine and in Israel. This is also a reflection of it being a joint organization. CfP's objectives are:

---

[44] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[45] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[46] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.
[47] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.

> "To raise public awareness among Israelis about the evils and ill-doings of occupation, in order to create a sufficient body of people, who will influence public opinion to oppose government activities in the OPT. We do not want to destroy Israel; we want liable states living side by side."[48]

The Families Forum Parents Circle (FFPC) works on reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. It is based on the idea that once the peace agreement comes, it will not only mean a ceasefire, but also a need for trust between two peoples in order to have peace. T.G. stated that:

> "The bereaved members are saying, if we who lost our loved ones, paid the highest price, can sit together and talk together, anyone in Israel can do it. You cannot say no; if we can, you can."[49]

In order to create empathy to the pain on both sides, as a joint organization, they organize dialogue meetings and use the narrative project. Both strategies aim to change the perception of the other side. The goal is to call on people to get to know the other side and to create a reconciliation process between the two sides. This is reflected in their slogan "It Won't Stop Until We Talk."[50]

Political advocacy groups are a diverse community, and include some who do not support a two-state solution. The Alternative Information Center (AIC) is one of the oldest organizations that existed before and after the Second Intifada. Because of the rupture between Israeli and Palestinian political movements and societies, O.Z. stated that as a joint organization AIC tries to rebuild this broken tie and to "keep holes in the wall," which has been internalized by both societies:

> "We need our constituency to show that there are good Israelis, good Jews around the world, otherwise we are trapped in the dynamics of a clash of civilizations. The Jews against the Arabs, the Israelis against the Palestinians."[51]

AIC focuses on rights and justice and avoids the concept of peace, which is, they argue, distorted to justify everything. The AIC is not a public movement, but their political identity is against any philosophy of separation. Therefore they do not address the general public, but the politicized public for which they work as a catalyst in order to push for change.[52]

---

[48] Interview with N.N., Jerusalem, 3 November 2013.
[49] Interview with T.G., Ramat-Efal, 15 December 2013.
[50] Families Circle Parents Forum Document.
[51] Interview with O.Z., Jerusalem, 24 October 2013.
[52] Interview with O.Z., Jerusalem, 24 October 2013.

Zochrot is the only organization in Israel which works for the recognition of the Nakba and the acknowledgement and implementation of the right of return. The organization does not focus on the right of return, but the return itself, because it takes the right as a given, and deserving recognition. Zochrot works through the right to be acknowledged and materialized based not only on the wishes of refugees, but also on the reality on the ground in Israel. Zochrot's goal is to raise awareness among Israelis about the Nakba by changing their knowledge in order to make them take responsibility. Zochrot does not organize public campaigns for the right of return because they know that their Israeli audience is unlikely to accept the right of return as such. G.D. emphasized that the language used by Zochrot is quite similar to that used by the right wing in Israel:

> "With the right wing we have a very strong common language, contrary to the left wing. The left wing says the problem is occupation here. The right wing says, "what are you talking about, you are sitting here in Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University is Sheikh Muwanniss' village. You are signing all these petitions against Ariel University to ban us." Zochrot says, yes you are. In principle Tel Aviv University and Ariel University are the same. The right wing says, this one is legitimate and the other is legitimate. We say no, neither of them is legitimate. Both are occupation, 1948 and 1967. On the description of reality we agree."[53]

They introduced the Nakba to the Israeli discourse, in order to prevent the term being misused in any other way than destruction and displacement. Zochrot works on civil society and at a cultural level. G.D. argued that considering Israel's political conditions there is no chance that they will convince the majority, which elects a new government, and that the law will be changed.[54] Despite this they continue with their work because they consider it as a morally and politically right thing to do for Israelis:

> "I live here and I want to live here, but not as colonizer at their expense so that they cannot return. It enables me as an Israeli to decolonize myself."[55]

He added that the change for return will not come from inside, but that international pressure on Israel, based on a campaign of *Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions* (BDS) might be able to put pressure

[53] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.
[54] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.
[55] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.

on the government. This will lead to Zochrot playing a big role as a reference and source of knowledge on how to implement the right of return.

Another non-Zionist organization, *Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD)*, has the vision of one bi-national democratic state in Israel and Palestine. The voice they listen to and cooperate with in this sense is the Palestinian left, represented by the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO). ICAHD considers peace as a part of a triangle together with justice and human rights. L.J. argued that demolishing homes is a vehicle, which shows how the occupation works in terms of its bureaucratic mechanism, zoning, planning and legal administration:

> "Occupation is proactive, it is not defensive. Israel does not demolish homes or build settlements for security reasons. In house demolitions we say "Look at this family. They are not terrorists." The BDS campaign began with caterpillar, which is the bulldozer which demolishes."[56]

ICAHD aims at international civil society putting pressure on governments to put pressure on the Israeli government. It was the first organization to endorse BDS, which is also related to the fact that most of their work is abroad. ICAHD is not part of the public debate in Israel:

> "Our voice is not heard because it is a Zionist box, you have [a] Zionist left and [a] Zionist right. I do not want to be defined by Zionism. I am an Israeli. We are the critical left, it means we are not defined by Zionism; we are going beyond the two-state solution."[57]

Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) is a feminist joint organization where Jewish and Palestinian activists work together. It was founded in 2000. At the beginning, they were for the two-state solution, however afterwards they decided not to support any solution in particular. This led some groups such as Machsom Watch and Women in Black to leave the coalition:

> "We recognize Nakba, from this we recognize the right of return of Palestinian refugees. For many Jewish groups, this is still a taboo. There is an occupation, it is unrealistic to think that the next step will be peace automatically."[58]

---

[56] Interview with L.J., Jerusalem, 20 November 2013.
[57] Interview with L.J., Jerusalem, 20 November 2013.
[58] Interview with O.F., Tel Aviv, 7 September 2014.

In 2007 CWP started with a research project "Who Profits" which examines the economic profit of the occupation (see Section 5.2.3.). As they speak both Hebrew and Arabic they published information kits in order to increase public awareness about the connection between Israel's economy and occupation. O.F. claimed that this project led more groups recognizing economic profits although not all of them support BDS.[59] In other projects such as the right to housing, they show how it is connected to feminism, as women are affected more when it comes to evictions and house demolitions.

Tarabut Hithabrut has been founded in 2006 after some of them left Taayush and decided to start another group. They saw that they needed more beyond activism on the ground and they realized the conflict in Israel was "a colonial conflict between settler colonialism and indigenous population"[60] and looking at the issue from a peace and occupation perspective would be a limited understanding. Their idea was that colonial societies are based on complex links between different forms of inequality, so that Tarabut Hithabrut had to address them together such as house demolitions, evictions, labor rights and problems of refugees and immigrants. While recognizing the differences, they emphasize how different dimensions of oppression are connected without being identical. Their slogan is "connecting struggles" and their vision of reaching decolonization and equality is reflected in their framing as well:

> "Tarabut means coming together. Our idea is to create trust and cooperation between oppressed groups within Israel like Bedouins, oriental Jews, Ethiopians, workers. It is not a rainbow coalition from above but it is from below. In colonial situations everyone is used against each other so that they are instruments of oppression and victims at the same time."[61]

As they do not support a one- or two-state solution in particular, Tarabut Hithabrut was one of the few groups which realized the importance of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. I. C. claimed that when it comes to Gaza it is an ongoing war against the "biggest refugee camp in Israel" which is a war on "sons and daughters of refugees":

> "In 2004 we were the only ones opposing Sharon's Disengagement Plan from Gaza because we analyze political reality from bottom up. This would mean prison for Gaza. Israelis don't know the

[59] Interview with O.F., Tel Aviv, 7 September 2014.
[60] Interview with I. C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.
[61] Interview with I.C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.

difference between fences and borders. Gaza is showing the future of the West Bank, separation fence is ghettoization of the West Bank."[62]

As I showed, among political advocacy groups the issues focused on are different. The Zionist left organizations such as Gush Shalom, Peace Now and Combatants for Peace had two-state-solution as the main issue on their agenda, so that they challenged the 1967 occupation and the settlements built in the OPT. The PFFC's focus was on reconciliation while creating a bridge of empathy between the bereaved families from both the Israeli and Palestinian side. In this sense the diagnostic frames used by the PFFC and Gush Shalom are similar. Both are based on the assumption that the problem is Israelis and Palestinians not knowing each other's narrative, and that the solution is to generate empathy to reach reconciliation. As was the case with Gush Shalom, Peace Now and CfP see the problem as two peoples without two separate states for two peoples, for which they offer the two-state solution as a remedy for the occupation.

When it comes to non-Zionist organizations, AIC is in charge of providing information flow, whereas ICAHD monitors house demolitions to expose the harm done by the occupation. CWP looks at the Palestinian question from a feminist perspective. Tarabut Hithabrut, on the other hand, thinks that discussions of one- or two-state solution do not address the main problem which is Israel being a settler colonial state leading to different types of inequalities. Zochrot is the only one, which works on the right and implementation of the return of Palestinian refugees and the recognition of the Nakba by the Israelis by introducing the term to the Israeli discourse. Unlike Zionist leftist organizations, non-Zionist ones see the problem at the core of the founding ideology, so that they challenge Zionism by not focusing on the two-state solution, because they consider no solution is viable without the concepts of equality and justice. In order to refer to these concepts, they emphasize the indication of the demolition of homes within the context of occupation and the importance of a reliable information flow between the two sides. In this sense, Zochrot for example looks for ways to implement the right of return of Palestinian refugees, without which a solution to the conflict will not be possible.

[62] Interview with I.C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.

As we have seen, political advocacy groups can be divided into two types in terms of the direction they take to find a solution. The divide between the groups which were founded after the Second Intifada and before the Second Intifada is not very relevant in the sense that we can observe groups belonging to both. Long-standing peace groups such as Peace Now, Gush Shalom as well as organizations established after the Second Intifada such as Combatants for Peace and Families Circle believe that the change will come from below and from within, namely from the Israeli public. Zochrot and ICAHD are two organizations set up after the Second Intifada, however unlike the old groups they believe that the change will not come from Israeli public, but international community will push Israeli government to change the situation. Alternative Information Center is the only one which exists for a very long time and unlike Peace Now and Gush Shalom, AIC does not expect a change coming from within.

In their research on the link between protest and political ideology, Opp et al. found out that in Israel "both leftists and rightists are more active than individuals in the political center" (Opp et al. 1995: 64). As I illustrated in my research, there is a clear divide between the groups representing the Zionist left and the others, which have a critical point of view about Zionism. Peace Now, Gush Shalom and Combatants for Peace are Zionist left organizations which support openly two-state solution. Even though the Zionist left defines itself to be disappointed after the Second Intifada, and feel betrayed, they still believe in their cause. Gush Shalom, for instance, followed Uri Avneri's iconic leadership from its creation and over the years, so that it was a two-man movement together with Adam Kellner. This is a clear indication that the old group has become a tradition which cannot be challenged, and they were unable to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances. Combatants for Peace's meliorism is evident in such statements as "I believe that peace will come sooner or later."

5.1.1.1. ***Civil disobedience groups: no change from within?***

Civil disobedience is considered a legitimate political act in liberal democracies. Kellner argues that "the democrat is not being inconsistent or undemocratic":

> "when in a restricted and careful fashion, he violates some democratically derived law in order to protect some advance toward ideal democracy which has been made or to protest some deviation from the path toward the actualization of the ideal" (1975: 907).

The starting point for civil disobedience groups is the acknowledgement of the need to involve the international community in Israel, particularly in the OPT. These groups assume that where the international community has substantial leverage to influence Israeli politics, the question is what they choose to do with that power. In this sense, the international governments and organizations should realize their responsibilities as third parties, which are politically and financially involved in the area.

The goal of Boycott from Within (BfW) is to promote the Palestinian BDS based on fair principles. They do not have any vision beyond the principles of the Palestinian call, and the return of refugees according to international law. R.P., who is a BfW activist stated that the BDS campaign is necessary because there is no way that Israeli society will change from within considering the root of the problem:

> "In Israel there is a combination of racism, religious fanaticism, Jewish history and nationalism. There are financial economic interests in maintaining the occupation and the apartheid system. The Israeli economy is a high-tech war economy profiting from the status quo. It is this superpower with an arms industry. I am not one of those mistaken Israeli leftists, I don't blame it all on settlers. It's a very rooted policy towards taking a much land as possible, it's a siege mentality. But occupation and apartheid come at a price. You can't think of yourself as a nice Western enlightened democracy and oppress many people without suffering the consequences."[63]

Because BfW sees the problem as Israel being an apartheid state, activists believe that the change will come from outside with international pressure, so that the idea is to approach international people. R.P. claimed that "if you have a substantial support within Israel, you don't need BDS, the whole idea is based on the notion that you cannot persuade people here."[64] Another BfW activist I talked to is T. D. whose words highlighted how critical he is of Zionism, which he defined as a "colonialist movement based an ethnic supremacy which is against Judaism and democracy."[65]

Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) is a group which consists of individuals, many of whom obtained their political education abroad. They are the only group which focuses on action on the ground with direct actions and demonstrations. They accompany and provide support to help

[63] Interview with R.P., Jerusalem, 6 November 2013.
[64] Interview with R.P., Jerusalem, 6 November 2013.
[65] Interview with T.D., Jaffa, 7 September 2014.

Palestiniain communities survive. Their contacts were made through the International Solidarity Network. Although not all Palestinian villages invite them because they are Israelis, some do ask them to come, so that they take part in village demonstrations every Friday. M.U. claimed that it is hard to talk about the group's agenda because they do not have a platform; opposition to the wall was something clear from the outset. AAtW does not try to reform Israeli society and speak to it, but to put pressure on it:

> "If you try to speak to it, you are constrained by what they are able to understand. As Israeli society moves further to the right, it forces you to do the same. It is more accurate to describe us an international group rather than an Israeli one because we don't appeal to Israeli society. It is more accurate to think of us as a local branch of ISM, rather than something connected to Israeli society."[66]

He added that the group itself does not work on BDS but that they have many activists in common. They do not offer any solution regarding the conflict because they do not see it as a relevant question. They think the problem is the Israeli policy:

> "Our message is that we are going to resist Israeli policy, apartheid and ethnic cleansing, it expresses itself in many ways. Once you step out of Israeli society and its term of reference it becomes very clear. It is only confusing if you are immersed in Israeli culture."[67]

The target audience for BfW and AAtW is the international community because they want to appeal to the public abroad. They constitute a focus point for the international community, which needs to be something happening in Israel, in order to follow up and respond to it. This is what the resistance in the villages does. At this stage their activism is not yet sufficiently large to stop Israel and make the West Bank ungovernable, like South Africa.

Civil disobedience groups emphasize that peace as a concept cannot be achieved as long as the occupation continues. They start with the diagnosis that the problem is Zionism which is incompatible with equal treatment for Palestinians. The prognosis they offer is to reject the trade-off between Zionism and equality while supporting the boycott campaign initiated by Palestinians and engaging in solidarity with Palestinians during demonstrations. In parallel, they also question

[66] Interview with M.U., Tel Aviv, 1 December 2013.
[67] Interview with M.U., Tel Aviv, 1 December 2013.

Zionism and democracy, where the former only offers exclusive rights and freedoms for Jewish Israelis.

5.1.4. Military service refusal, avoidance and conscientious objection: to serve or not to serve

In Israel military service is compulsory for men and women. Although there are ways to be exempt from enlisting, it is not uncommon for some men and women at military service age, and during their reserve service to refuse to serve in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). Although there are different groups and organizations for refusal, avoidance and conscientious objection, the way they frame their refusal, avoidance or objection depends on their own statement, where they give their motivation for such a decision.

New Profile describes itself as a movement for the demilitarization of Israeli society. It is an organization which provides information about what one should expect if he or she decides to refuse or avoid military service. Their counseling network helps 2,000 people a year at any point in the procedure for military service. Their expertise is on how to get out of compulsory military service through CO committee or for mental health reasons. They explain what the committee looks for to release someone and what kind of questions they ask. Among the groups and organizations I interviewed in Israel, New Profile is the only one who focuses on demilitarization. U.Z. from New Profile's counseling network claimed that New Profile sees the occupation as a symptom but not as the root of the problem, which is made possible through military conscription. She argued that Israel is a very militaristic society which is reflected in the election campaigns of politicians which focus on what they did in the army. I asked her whether there is a link between conscientious objection and occupation:

> "Most CO do it because they are either against violence in general or specific acts of violence; occupation is a very good example of both. Most people who refuse military service in Israel are not necessarily classic CO doing it for political reasons, they do it for economic or personal reasons. In counseling network, we don't ask the reason. CO has a very political connotation; most people don't prefer it. We call them military refusers and avoiders. Media reports COs who go to prison but no one talks about how many people gets out of the army through mental health which is much more common."[68]

[68] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 8 December 2013.

As a feminist, non-hierarchical and consensus based organization, New Profile connects the link between the issues of militarism, sexism and heteronormativity. U.Z. reflected on the past:

> "There is something very militaristic in the way refusal movement is created, ten years ago it was more masculine. If you look at 2003 refusal movements, it was the biggest Shministim Letter; men were in prison and women were exempt, they were organizing the support and men were being men in prison. In demonstrations we used to say "the refuser is a hero" because it is sexist, masculine and militarist, we don't say it anymore."[69]

In 2009, after Operation Cast Lead there was a criminal investigation against New Profile. The accusation was incitement for refusal and assisting people to get exempt on false grounds. U.Z. claimed that the investigation was closed for lack of evidence because, based on a professional mechanism, New Profile knows what their legal restriction are: they do not invite anyone to refuse and they do not tell someone to lie to mental health officer.[70]

She added that although New Profile has ad-hoc access to Balad and Hadash politicians, there is no politician in the Knesset who would propose a bill to end conscription. When it comes to lobbying for professional army, she asked "should we even try, is that a language we are willing to go towards?"[71]

Another group focusing on conscientious objection is Yesh Gvul which was founded in 1982 by combat veterans who refused to serve in the Lebanon War. Yesh Gvul means in Hebrew "there is a border," "there is a limit," and "enough is enough" which underline the reasoning of their refusal that they believe war in the occupied territories is not a just war. Their vision is to reach a two-state solution with the Green Line marking the border of Israel.

K.O. was the spokesperson of Yesh Gvul for many years and explained that Yesh Gvul works on the right to refuse and they emphasize in their campaigns that it is an obligation to refuse to take part in non-democratic activities. He claimed that:

> "We established the right of citizens not to take part in wars and occupation, which is the biggest achievement of Yesh Gvul. They second one is our fight against war crimes, we started talking about it during the Lebanon War. Now everybody talks about international humanitarian law. Lastly, we

[69] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 8 December 2013.
[70] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 8 December 2013.
[71] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 8 December 2013.

> challenged the role of the army in Israeli society, we showed that army is not a holy cow you have to obey. were leading the refusal concept, and now even the right wing is using it. Now it is accepted as a legitimate strategy against occupation and wars."[72]

He described Yesh Gvul as a volunteer and "a little anarchist" organization as they changed the perception about the limits of obedience. He claimed that they are not pacifists; if IDF leaves OPT and becomes an army of defense again, as an organization they do not have a problem with serving in the army. They are not affiliated with any political party as an organization and they believe change will come from bottom to top. There are Zionist members in Yesh Gvul too because, according to K.O., the issue is not Zionism; but to decide "what is more important, universal values of democracy, human rights or nationalistic values?"[73]

In 1980s they were considered as a radical group because of their refusal to serve. It took them fifteen years to make refusal accepted as a legitimate strategy against occupation. The right to refuse and the right to civil disobedience are not considered as extreme-leftist ideas anymore.

After the army found different ways of dealing with refusers, the number of refuseniks dropped and Yesh Gvul managed to change its focus from refusal to other issues. Yesh Gvul changed its focus towards war crimes and universal jurisdiction. For instance, Yesh Gvul took the use of white phosphorus weapon in the Gaza War 2008-2009, Operation Cast Lead, to the Supreme Court arguing that it is a war crime.

When in 2013 P.D. refused to serve in the military, he was the first to repeatedly refuse (since another refusal case in 2009), and notched up ten prison sentences. Yesh Gvul organized many campaigns around his refusal using slogans such as "Stop the Occupation" and "Free P.D." New Profile cooperated with Yesh Gvul in organizing demonstrations in front of the prison for his release. K.O. said that P.D. was not willing to go to psychiatrist because the reason for his refusal was political underlining that it is his right not to serve when the main task of the army is occupation.[74]

---

[72] Interview with K.O., Jerusalem, 29 October 2013.
[73] Interview with K.O., Jerusalem, 29 October 2013.
[74] Interview with K.O., Jerusalem, 29 October 2013.

I met P.D. after his release when he was doing civil service instead of the military equivalent and he emphasized that what he is doing is voluntary and that he does not serve the state, but society. Even then, he was not exactly sure why he was released:

> "Many things happened during my imprisonment, so we have no idea which one worked. Someone told me there is a law, so that after ten times you get out. It was because I passed 180 days, I was sentenced without a military court, but with an officer. It was a disciplinary thing. They could not give me more than thirty days sentence at once, they did not want to send me to a real trial, because media coverage would be huge otherwise. I am also an Italian citizen, someone from the Italian Embassy visited me during that time, maybe it played a role."[75]

His case was another example of how arbitrarily the procedure could work for conscientious objectors so that the support of groups such as Yesh Gvul and New Profile is even more important in keeping the issue alive in the media and with as much societal support as possible.

Shministim is the Hebrew word for twelfth-graders. The first Shministim letter was sent in 2001, with sixty-two signatories from a geographically limited area of Tel Aviv and Sharon. A year later they managed to create a bigger group since they already knew each other from existing political circles such as demonstrations of Taayush in the West Bank and meetings of Hadash. The 2002 refusal letter was signed by 215 young people from all over Israel, and addressed Prime Minister Ariel Sharon:

> "The state of Israel commits war crimes and tramples over human rights, destroying Palestinian cities, towns and villages; expropriating land, detaining and executing without trial, conducting mass demolitions of houses, businesses, and public institutions; looting, closure, curfew, torture, prevention of medical care, construction and expansion of the settlements – all these actions are opposed to human morality, and violate international treaties ratified by Israel. In these and other actions Israel systematically prevents Palestinians from carrying on their day-to-day lives. This reality leads to suffering, fear, and despair, which yield terror attacks. Therefore, the occupation is not only immoral; but it also damages the security of Israel's citizens and residents. Such security will be achieved only through a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians."[76]

---

[75] Interview with P.D., Tel Aviv, 13 September 2014.
[76] See Shministim (2002): To Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

In order to refuse to serve the occupation the Shministim used different strategies such as refusing to enlist or refusing to serve beyond the Green Line. They sent their letters to the Minister of Defense, Minister of Education and Chief of Staff, but in their statement they also called on other young people, soldiers in the IDF and reserve soldiers to refuse military service. One of the signatories of the Shministim letter in 2002 was a member of the core group which came together to write the letter and he was one of the first to spend two years in prison for refusing to enlist. He told me that they were a group of the same age who had already been 'doing politics' together According to J.O., their letter served two purposes:

> "Conscientious Objection helps to vitalize political discussion here in Israel, because ten years ago there was daily violence and Israeli media and public opinion were not interested in Palestinians. They were talking about occupation, only if it affects Israelis. Our objection was part of inner Israeli racist discourse in the sense that people who wouldn't care about Palestinians would find it interesting that Israeli would-be soldiers refuse to serve. Moreover, CO is a tool for dialogue, like partnership between Israelis and Palestinians. If they know that there are Israelis who refuse to take part in it, it is like a joint struggle."[77]

The army is central to Israeli society, and challenging it was not taken easily by the Israeli public. Although the Shministim of 2002 did not have any real vision for the one-state or two-state solution in Israel, they managed to create a public discussion about not enlisting. As a group of young people, they claimed that Israel was committing war crimes and that they would not serve the occupation. Other than this they did not have a particular agenda because although they were united under "we refuse to serve the occupation," everyone in the group interpreted not serving the occupation differently. Some of them went to the army psychologist and avoided active service, some were against serving in the OPT in combat units, but were willing to serve outside the OPT, whereas others were against serving in the army in any capacity. Their slogan was "We Don't Shoot, We Don't Kill" which rhymes in Hebrew.[78]

Shministim letters are not an annual event. It depends on the mobilization of young people coming together and deciding to refuse as a group. Each Shministim letter is independent of the others and

---

[77] Interview with J.O., Tel Aviv, 5 December 2013.
[78] "Lo yorim, lo horgim"

may have a different motivation. For Instance, the Refuseniks Letter of 2014 was signed by sixty Israeli teenagers in March 2014 and addressed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

> "We, the undersigned, intend to refuse to serve in the army and the main reason for this refusal is our opposition to the military occupation of Palestinian territories. Palestinians in the occupied territories live under Israeli rule though they did not choose to do so, and have no legal recourse to influence this regime or its decision-making processes. This is neither egalitarian nor just. In these territories, human rights are violated, and acts defined under international law as war crimes are perpetuated on a daily basis. These include assassinations (extrajudicial killings), the construction of settlements on occupied lands, administrative detentions, torture, collective punishment and the unequal allocation of resources such as electricity and water. Any form of military service reinforces this status quo, and, therefore, in accordance with our conscience, we cannot take part in a system that perpetrates the above-mentioned acts."[79]

The tone of the letter is more critical about the occupation and highlights war crimes, torture and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, it criticizes Israel's militaristic masculine army culture in their letter where they blame the army for stirring up "racism, violence and ethnic, national and gender-based discrimination." When I was in Israel for my second fieldwork in August 2014, which was also during the time of Operation Protective Edge, I managed to talk three young refusers. F.A. told me that she obtained clearance under Profile 21 before she signed the letter, so that she was already exempt from military service, yet she still felt the need to sign it:

> "I asked myself, why should I do military service? What did this country give me? Why should I use violence with solving nothing? If you are part of the army as a citizen of Israel, I take part in occupying them, I use violence to destroy them. I live because Palestinians suffer. We occupy them, there is no symmetry. Now I'm part of this group, they support me, I support them."[80]

The case of another refusenik, Y.U. became very well-known in the Israeli media because he was sent to prison. During his temporary release, I asked how they emphasized the link between occupation and conscientious objection:

> "We do not see our refusal as a target, it is a symbolic tool we use against the occupation. When I do not go into the army and say it in public, in the media, why I refuse it, many people get to hear it. To

[79] Refusenik Letter 2014.
[80] Interview with F.A., Tel Aviv, 17 September 2014.

> get Profile 21 is one option, but I wanted to make the issue public, for most people it is not easy to go to jail. In my case my family supports me. Every time I refuse to serve, I go to prison for twenty days. When I go back now, they will ask me if I want to serve, I'll say no, then I'll get another ten days."[81]

Because his refusal and his time in prison overlapped with Operation Protective Edge, he told me that he felt "it is the right time to refuse because until the occupation stops every two to three years there will be another operation."[82]

P.Z. also obtained exemption under Profile 21 before she signed the letter. She claimed that she signed it to increase public awareness and as an act of solidarity with Palestinian resistance so that they can see there are Israelis who oppose the occupation. She argued that all struggles are connected:

> "Occupation and militarism are the main problems which lead to other problems. I can relate it to feminism, men should fight for women or to animal rights, men should eat meat. The government and the occupation are racists. In schools they tell us that we should learn the Arab language to understand our enemy, not because we need to communicate with them. In history classes they do not tell us the whole truth, how the Palestinians were wiped out in 1948."[83]

As I showed above military service avoiders, refusers and conscientious objectors all denounce the occupation and its links with militarism, albeit for different reasons.

5.1.5. Human rights monitoring organizations: occupation management?

HRMOs work in a different way to political advocacy organizations and civil disobedience groups. Instead of advocating a political solution, they refer to human rights violations and work towards to reduce or eliminate them, depending on the organization. In Israel organizations and groups working on peace *per se* are distinct from human rights organizations in the sense that they work with different frameworks and perceive themselves as being mandated to do different things. Although there is a relationship on the discourse, objectives and some of the strategies, there are different linkages between them and institutionally organizations working on peace and human

[81] Interview with Y.U., Tel Aviv, 17 September 2014.
[82] On 30 October 2014, he was sent to prison for the fifth time.
[83] Interview with P.Z., Tel Aviv, 11 September 2014.

rights organizations are separate. These organizations do not take a position on the political solution to the conflict, but offer a human rights perspective in this regard. Human rights organizations' claim is they dissociate themselves from political parties and politics. Whereas peace organizations are politically-oriented, human rights monitoring organizations attempt to depoliticize the discourse.

The division of labor among human rights monitoring organizations are clear-cut, the work is mainly divided according to geographical area and their expertise based on their previous experiences related to similar work. In order to do this, they use a legal frame while holding Israel accountable for Israeli laws or international law.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) works on wider area of human rights violations in Israel and the territories under its control, the OPT. V.H., the lawyer from ACRI stated that:

> We present an objective professional way of handling the human rights discourse, stressing that human rights are universal, and try to hold Israel accountable to uphold its human rights obligations.[84]

ACRI does not have a position on the solution to the conflict. Instead it provides a human rights perspective and presents the legal human rights implications of a proposed solution. ACRI's audience is the Israeli public as well as policymakers. Because ACRI is keen on policy change, it rarely handles individual cases. It uses impact litigation for policy change or policy advocacy. This means that it meets with decision-makers, lobbies in the Knesset, and carries out public work through the media. V.H. claimed that the OPT department has two strategic goals:

> "ACRI views the occupation in and of itself as a human rights violation. It strives towards ending of the occupation. This is the wider strategic goal. But taking our capabilities into account, it is almost impossible, so our second goal is to minimize and reduce human rights violation in OPT."[85]

When ACRI does a public campaign they frame their legal message in a way that would be more comprehensible to a larger public. For instance, with the "45 Years of Occupation" campaign they tried to relate the message that 'occupation' is a legal term:

> "Occupation is not a dirty word. Rejection of, and immediate deterrence from it [occupation], is emotional and psychological. It has nothing to do with the legal term itself. When you say the Hebrew

[84] Interview with V.H., Tel Aviv, 3 December 2013.
[85] Interview with V.H., Tel Aviv, 3 December 2013.

word for occupation, people are immediately attached to it. This is a politically very loaded term and we try to dissolve this sense of political notion."[86]

B'Tselem is working on Area C on issues related to settlements, detention and violence. The lawyer from B'Tselem, A.U. stated that it tries to influence both public opinion in Israel and policy-makers, so that they focus on these two target audiences:

"There is a discussion in the organization as to where the emphasis should be; diplomatic level or policymakers, only in Israel or should we give up on the Israeli public because they don't want to hear it, etc. We decide according to the issue. There are some issues Israelis don't want to hear, then we go to diplomatic level. If there's a small chance of influencing the Israeli public, then that's what we do."[87]

In B'Tselem there is an ongoing discussion as to whether they should work to stop human rights violations or to end the occupation. She said that eliminating the violations are beyond B'Tselem; therefore, the goal of their reports is to reduce these violations:

"Occupation in itself is not a violation of human rights, how they conduct it is a violation of human rights. We don't deal with the way to end the occupation. Legally you can have occupation and not violate human rights, as long as it's temporary, [so that] you don't build settlements and checkpoints."[88]

Gisha is the only organization which provides individual legal assistance for those needing a travel permit in Gaza. U.D., the lawyer from Gisha claimed that they engage in public advocacy to change policies that violate the right of freedom of movement because although the Israeli authorities justify the restriction on freedom of movement with demands for security, it needs to be balanced against the rights and needs of people living in Gaza.

She claimed that although their vision is not political, peace organizations are peripheral to their work in the sense that Gisha educates people about what is going on the ground because if there are policies that restrict travel between Gaza and the West Bank, it may have implications for peace negotiations. The working links between peace organizations and human rights organizations is based on sharing information and briefings. As an organization working in Gaza, Gisha has

[86] Interview with V.H., Tel Aviv, 3 December 2013.
[87] Interview with A.U., Jerusalem, 26 December 2013.
[88] Interview with A.U., Jerusalem, 26 December 2013.

different problems to those organizations in the West Bank with the checkpoints, in the sense that Gaza residents are not allowed to enter Israel and, as Israelis, Gisha staff cannot go to Gaza to meet their clients and colleagues.

Gisha aims at changing the way that Gaza is perceived. She claimed that this is not a popular topic with the Israeli public and part of their responsibility as Israeli organizations is to educate Israeli public and to provide an alternative narrative to the one provided by government. However, Gisha is not immune to the dilemma faced by the other human rights organizations in terms of lessening or eliminating human rights violations:

> "Our strategic goals are related to freedom of movement and the dormant strategic goal is ending the occupation. Human rights can never be completely protected in a situation of occupation. We believe that the information we put about the nature of occupation does contribute to ending it. We don't actively work to end the occupation, in part because we don't have an opinion about how to replace it, we don't take a position whether there should be one state, two states or five states."[89]

Part of Yesh Din's work is accompanying Palestinians to helping them feel the confidence and security to file complaints about offences committed against their property. G.U., the lawyer from Yesh Din explained that it works in two ways:

> "Yesh Din is putting reports on the desk of every member of the Knesset, our reports are out in the word of Israeli decision-makers. We try to raise awareness through blogging and publishing op-eds in Israeli news and abroad. I am helping individuals on the ground but I am also trying to address the giant machine of the occupation."[90]

She claimed that change has to be bottom-up which is the idea behind organizations like Yesh Din noting that nothing permanent can happen without the top ordering it, the bottom will influence the top:

> "What we are trying to do is to convince Israel not only that it's the moral thing to follow international law, but also to have a future in this region. On a political level that is the most political thing we say; you have to abide by the international law if you want peace there."[91]

---

[89] Interview with U.D., Tel Aviv, 2 December 2013.
[90] Interview with G.U., Tel Aviv, 24 November 2013.
[91] Interview with G.U., Tel Aviv, 24 November 2013.

Rabbis for Human Rights (RfHR) is another organization which works against human rights abuses suffered by Palestinians in the form of house demolitions. It also provides assistance such as volunteer English lessons for children, building schools, making sure that Palestinians are not evicted from their homes, planting trees and sometimes acting as human shields to protect Palestinian farmers against attacks by settlers. They are also engaged in legal work via the courts to ensure access to land and to prevent or reverse land requisitions. They combine fieldwork and legal work.

One has to be an Israeli rabbi, or studying to be a rabbi, to be a member of RfHR, yet they have Palestinians on their staff. One of the founders of the organization C.C. stressed that although everything they do is in some way related to politics, they are not a political organization *per se*:

> "We don't have a position on where the borders should be. We see peace as a very important Jewish value, if you look at the Hebrew language, roots of the word has a lot to do with wholeness. We support the peace process, but not a particular peace process. Our main goal is to end human rights violations; we see ending the occupation as a necessary component to achieve that goal. We say that the occupation must end because it leads inevitably to human rights abuses."[92]

A key principle for RfHR is that they believe every human being is created in God's image, 'B'Tselem'. Although they take international human rights law as an importance source, their mandate comes from the Jewish tradition, so that they give references to Jewish sources. Instead of slogans they use teachings from the traditional passages and quotations from Torah scholars in order to emphasize power relations and how human rights violations occur. He added that although they try to lobby, the current political make-up of the Knesset does not offer any opportunities for improvement:

> "We have much bigger chance with the courts or with the army than when we are dealing with the Knesset although we are involved in Knesset hearings. If we think that we can accomplish things by engaging the security forces, we do that. There are some who find it problematic that we have contact with the occupation forces. But we are in a different position, we are Israelis, we are fellow citizens. We see the army as a citizen's army, we don't see them as the enemy even though they are the occupying force. When current international law was written, no one imagined forty plus years of occupation. According to international law, it doesn't demand the end of the occupation; it says what

[92] Interview with C.C., Jerusalem, 28 November 2013.

> you can do and what you can't do when an occupation is going on. It says try to solve the issues internally before you go to an international court. For all these reasons, it is essential that we engage the army."[93]

When it comes to legal restrictions, RfHR is free to act that they are able to use courts and the free press. The fact that they are a rabbinic organization composed of Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis speaking from a Jewish tradition allows them to gain legitimacy and have supporters in both the orthodox and secular world. This gives them access to the world-wide Jewish community that not every human rights organization has in Israel. Yet, their main challenge is to make the Israeli public pay attention to the reality. In order to achieve real change, he stressed the importance of outside pressure. As RfHR works with Palestinians as equal partners, he did not believe that they are part of the normalization process.

Physicians for Human Rights- Israel (PHRI) underlines the right to health. Their focus is not only Palestinian medical community but also Palestinian patients. One of their main slogans is "medical ethics and medical professionalism must include human rights." As with other human right organizations, they believe that human rights violations stem from occupation. J.B. from PHRI claimed that during the Operation Cast Lead they sent a groups of international experts to collect testimonies. They handed in a lot of evidence to Goldstone Committee in order to hold Israel accountable. She stated:

> "Sometimes there are Palestinian patients at checkpoints, and you want them to cross. I was fighting with soldiers at the checkpoint telling that the ambulance must pass because it is an emergency. We helped a lot of people, but we forgot to fight the machine [occupation]."[94]

She underlined that they do not allow politicians to take part in their meetings, however they do lobby if a Palestinian patient needs to come to Israel for treatment but stopped because he/she does not have a permit to enter through checkpoints. However, she added, PHRI does not like to be depicted as the 'nice face of Israel' by some politicians.[95] As it was the case with other human rights organizations, PHRI does not offer a specific political solution, however, they have a say on which political decision would violate human rights.

---

[93] Interview with C.C., Jerusalem, 28 November 2013.
[94] Interview with J.B., Jaffa, 12 November 2013.
[95] Interview with J.B., Jaffa, 12 November 2013.

The focus of Breaking the Silence (BtS) differs from the human rights organizations mentioned so far. It brings the testimonies of soldiers to the public in order to make people understand the outcomes of military occupation. For BtS, having the Israeli public as an audience is important for many reasons. C.U. underlined that:

> "If Israelis understand what is happening on the ground, it will change their standpoint and they will become more accountable. Israelis keep repeating the mantra that we have the most moral army in the world; it is not true. The military is there to control the West Bank; we are here to expose this. We should recognize our obligations, we develop guns as a means of control, nothing else. Palestinians are locked in a dungeon."[96]

Through soldiers' accounts BtS explains how the military apparatus perpetuates control of the occupied territories. Their aim is to end the occupation:

> "Mainstream media tries to display the concept of soldiers' misconduct as exceptions, the 'rotten apples'. This is a problem for us because we are not trying to fix the army. There is no way you can be a 'moral occupier'. We are not a company; we are not the sneaky leftist traitors they want to portray us as. We are you, we are your children, deal with it."[97]

The title of the organization refers to the silence in Israeli society. Soldiers speak out about their experience in the occupied territories, and how Israeli society choose to ignore systematic misconduct. According to C.U., Palestinian issue is not a story of self-defense, but a story of control. In addition to publishing testimonies BtS also organizes tours in some parts of the OPT. BtS wants to expose the military control over Palestinians by focusing on Hebron:

> "Hebron is the shaky leg of the occupation. They see shops closed with metal bars and a road divided in the middle, Jews are allowed to walk on the one side, Muslims are allowed to walk on the other. Everything that happens in Hebron is happening all over the West Bank. Nobody can say this is for the security of the people who live there, it's obviously about controlling Hebron. I want people to know what is happening there because I know if I win Hebron, I kick the shaky chair."[98]

Among the HRMOs Who Profits is the only one which focuses specifically on the political economy of the occupation. According to them, the settlement industry is the core of the problem

---

[96] Interview with C.U., Tel Aviv, 2 November 2013.
[97] Interview with C.U., Tel Aviv, 2 November 2013.
[98] Interview with C.U., Tel Aviv, 2 November 2013.

because it includes services like supermarkets, gas stations and construction in order to provide a Western lifestyle for settlers. Who Profits collects information and creates a database. In the researcher's words, "we report how companies enjoy the Palestinian market as a captive market."[99]

Who Profits does not do advocacy work, organize campaigns or lobby decision-makers. The information is there for everybody, whoever wants it can use it for labeling or boycotting. Their target audience is not in Israel, but outside it. They work with different bodies to make them think about what it means to operate economically in a conflict zone, and they challenge the "blame it all on the settlers" discourse which is common on the Zionist left.

Although their research is targeted on what happens in the West Bank and Gaza, politically they see it as a broader mechanism:

> "[w]hen they talk about occupation in economic terms most of the Israeli left wing say the money for education and health care goes for tanks and bombs, it's a burden on the Israeli economy and society, without the occupation most citizens would have been better off. We say the opposite. It is not Israeli society but many industries and many individuals that profit from the occupation and as long as occupation continues to be profitable, it will continue. They benefit from colonial control of Palestinian territories; we must make them lose a lot of money. Multinational companies should think what happens if they do business with Israeli companies, that would force Israeli decision makers to think again."[100]

Who Profits works to end the occupation by putting pressure on the Israeli government and its public through economic tools, namely the only aspect that the Israeli public would consider:

> "Things are pretty calm; the financial situation is not amazing, but they have a good life. There is no reason for them to think about what happens in forty minutes from here, they will pay attention when they suffer sanctions for the acts of their governments, then they change their political perspective. There is no other way to convince the Israeli public."[101]

As I showed above, because the occupation continues uninterrupted, human rights groups choose to record human rights violations in the OPT to lessen them, considering the fact that elimination of violations is not an attainable target.

---

[99] Interview with T.O., Tel Aviv, 2 September 2014.
[100] Interview with T.O, Tel Aviv, 2 September 2014.
[101] Interview with T.O., Tel Aviv, 2 September 2014.

All the human rights organizations claimed that they were not political organizations, yet all of them are highly politicized. Even if they do not offer a concrete solution, they operate within a political environment in which they use the legal framework and direct their attention towards policymakers as well as the Israeli public. The fact that they obtain some of their funding from Israeli agencies is reflected in their diagnostic framing; they are not trying to eliminate the occupation, but look at it from a legal perspective in order to lessen human rights violations.

Their work is very important when it comes to highlighting human rights violations, but they are constrained because they target Israelis, both the public and policymakers, which means that they avoid harsh criticism of policies implemented by the Israeli state. This, not challenging and confronting the wider mechanism of occupation by only focusing on cases of violations, is in itself a political position contrary to their claim that they are not engaged in political work.

The other two organizations, BtS and Who Profits, on the other hand, are not engaged in legal work but focus on providing information through monitoring the mechanisms of occupation. In this sense, BtS is limited in the same way as human rights organizations because it targets the Israeli public and policymakers in order to show the ill-doings of occupation. Who Profits, however, takes a more radical approach by asking who profits economically from the occupation and tries to show the link between the occupation industry and its political maintenance. However, because Who Profits' audience consists of international investors and consumers, its maneuvering capacities are constrained by the extent that this international audience is willing to engage in BDS.

5.2. United we stand, divided we fall: alliances among groups and organizations

When it comes to internal structuration Kriesi argues "the older and the more resourceful an SMO, the more likely it is to formalize, professionalize, and to differentiate its internal structure" (1996: 172). Here I look at mobilizing structures, focusing on alliances built with other groups or organizations. Some of the groups have opposing views, and others engage in constant cooperation with each other in different campaigns or events.

I demonstrate what their criteria is to build those alliances, under what circumstances groups tend to come together to form a coalition and what kind of a role the vision and the agenda of the group plays a role. I provide a table to demonstrate their action repertoires, too.

Here too I refer to interviews based on mission statements in order to show the alliances among them and the criteria for building coalitions. I look at the main three groups used in the previous section, because the alliances between them are not very cross-cutting. This is an indicator in itself that when they build alliances they usually cooperate with their similar type of groups, their criteria being agreeing on the same argument, rather than their strategy. I would like to remind the reader that I only look at their alliances with other Israeli groups, and not with Palestinian ones, which goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.1.6. Legal and political advocacy groups: uniting under the Zionist umbrella

When the two-state solution was dropped after the Second Intifada, so did the alliances of the Zionist left with Palestinian groups. For Peace Now, this has led to a shift in their alliances, and for the last ten years they work with Geneva organizations and the criteria for working with other groups is to be "Zionist, not far left"[102], which is also the reason why they do not mobilize on the issue of the Wall, which has been a focal point for some groups after the Second Intifada:

> "It was a very far left issue. Most of our people vote for Meretz and part of the Labor Party. They are all happy with the wall because they think it reduced the terror. It is a fact; the other part of the story is [that] the Palestinian police have stopped terror in coordination with our army. Today nobody would vote to take down the wall, only as a part of an agreement."[103]

The other supporter of the two-state solution, Y.C. argued that in Gush Shalom they have no ideology but a program to achieve peace so that they can work with both Zionist and anti-Zionist groups, but he added, "it's difficult to work with someone who believes in one state idea, which is nonsense."[104] Gush Shalom is willing to take part in demonstrations with different groups, but it tries to take what the Israeli public believes in, and why, into consideration:

> "Radical peace activists are obsessed with their message that they are unable to put it in a way that the public can accept it. They antagonize the public and push the center into the hands of the right wing. We have trouble with people who conduct direct actions, they say "we will not carry national flag, for us it symbolizes settlements, the army and the right wing." I say this is wrong. This is a

[102] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[103] Interview with L.C., Tel Aviv, 26 November 2013.
[104] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.

national flag, if you want to tell people that your message is patriotic, peace is patriotic, you must do everything [you can] to show people you are patriotic."[105]

He continued that coalitions are not able to work together to create a force in Israel. One of the reasons is the difference between different generations in the sense that left-wing people are individualistic and not inclined to work together, "when tomorrow a young man comes up with a new idea to do something for peace, he thinks the history starts with him:"

> "Anarchists lead demonstrations in Bil'in; they are young and courageous, but unable to work with anyone else. It's a question of ideology. They do not want to believe in any state, one or two."[106]

Combatants for Peace is a member of the olive harvest coalition. N.N. argued that CfP would build partnership with any organization that wants to cooperate and asks for their assistance. He emphasized the symbolic importance of picking olives:

> "We want to help Palestinians to pick olives because it's a very difficult job and it takes hours for a single tree. Second, we provide emotional support for Palestinians. Third, settlers stay away when Israelis are there, they don't want confrontation."[107]

Parents Circle Families Forum has the narrative project, in which Israelis and Palestinians underwent a process of learning each others' personal and national narrative, in order to change their perception of the other side. T.G. claimed that all groups are busy with activism but without knowing the narrative of the other side. She noted that the PCFF approached the CfP about this process, arguing that it would be easier to bring their message to the public together, as a result of which they carried out a shared narrative project with CfP.[108]

AIC has been a joint organization for thirty years. It is not based on *ad hoc* collaboration between Palestinians and Israelis, but is connected politically with a joint vision. Even though AIC works to provide information, it is also a catalyzer of brainstorming on many issues through workshops and seminars for activists. In the level of activism, people working in AIC take part in coalitions. O.Z. claimed that criteria for building coalitions depends on the issue:

---

[105] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.
[106] Interview with Y.C., Tel Aviv, 26 December 2013.
[107] Interview with N.N., Jerusalem, 3 November 2013.
[108] Interview with T.G., Ramat-Efal, 15 December 2013.

> "In order to have more moderates such as Peace Now, which says "we don't want the slogan 'Hell Israel'" I am loyal to the decision, if it is decided collectively. Our political identity is against all the philosophy of separation. A coalition, which focuses on separation as a goal, left Zionists' position, is not our place. We will never compromise on the principles of equality. We know that many Israelis do not agree to the right of return of refugees. I will have no problem to be in a coalition, where it is not mentioned, but we will not be part in a coalition where the right of return is deformed, it's an absolute right not to be negotiated."[109]

Zochrot has partner organizations in Palestine, but apart from that they do not collaborate with any other organization. G.D. emphasized that as Israelis they have a weak culture of collaboration. He added that collaborating with an organization in the West Bank is strategically an advantage for both sides as it shows donors that they have partners actively working on the right of return.[110]

ICAHD is the only critical left group that works systematically with international civil society such as churches, trade unions and political groups and they have observer status in the U.N.. According to them, because they can never change Israeli society it is better for them to focus on international alliances. L.J. argued that there is not much collaboration among groups, which he defined as a problem of the left. Considering that a large part of the left in Israel is Zionist, it is not surprising that there is no cooperation with an organization such as ICAHD, whose agenda is not Zionist. Whereas ICAHD works abroad to mobilize civil society, the civil society groups in Israel are weak and therefore ICAHD has remained isolated:

> "We haven't managed to break out of the circle of concerned people around the world about Israel/Palestine. There are other issues of women, environment, each one has its circle, it is fragmented in a way. We haven't succeeded in crosscutting them. We failed to connect different movements, we never created a movement of movements."[111]

Although Coalition of Women for Peace recognizes Nakba and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, during the times of crisis such as war they collaborate with Zionist left. O.F. claimed that because they are a non-Zionist organization, it is not easy to be with a Zionist party, so that they cooperate with individuals from Meretz which is not an official collaboration with the party *per se*:

---

[109] Interview with O.Z., Jerusalem, 24 October 2013.
[110] Interview with G.D., Tel Aviv, 27 November 2013.
[111] Interview with L.J., Jerusalem, 20 November 2013.

> "We live in a militaristic society which is blind to racism, occupation and oppression of people. We challenge the militaristic discourse here during war, they say "soldiers are there to protect you and you don't appreciate it. Some groups hear our name, Tarabut, anarchists, or New Profile and they don't cooperate with us. Even groups with a militaristic past like CfP and BtS area sense closer to us when it comes to criticizing it."[112]

I.C. argued that in Israel Left is a middle class movement, therefore in Tarabut Hithabrut there are more poor people than in any other group in the Left. He mentioned the demonstrations in Hebron as the most significant collaboration where leftist groups come together. He underlined that the Israeli Left should create "a real alliance with Palestinians, oriental Jews, poor people and workers because Israeli elites are not capable of decolonizing this society."[113]

As I demonstrated above, after the Second Intifada two-state solution was no longer seen as feasible by PMOs. This also affected their alliance-building. Their framing of the issue, how they define the problem and what they suggest as a solution, affects the alliances they built, which works as criteria for them. In this sense what we observe is alliances among Zionist left organizations and groups, which open up themselves to others only if there is an issue which is agreed on despite their ideological differences. Then both sides compromise on the message and come together, which is more likely to happen when there is one clearly defined goal. Otherwise non-Zionist organizations remain outside Zionist circles which leaves them alone in their struggle within Israel leading them to look for building alliances with international actors such as the EU, international policy-makers and international civil society.

5.2.1.1. Civil disobedience groups: a bad label for collaboration

Boycott from Within's collaboration with other organizations is almost non-existent because of their framing of the issue, which is defining Israel as an apartheid state and calling for boycott as a solution. BfW cannot compromise to collaborate with other groups by its nature because it is done according to a Palestinian call. There is nothing to be negotiated; it is either supported or not. R.P. underlined that as BfW activists they were not appreciating some campaigns which endorse subsets of BDS as a selective form of boycott, in other words, some people were willing to boycott the

[112] Interview with O.F., Tel Aviv, 7 September 2014.
[113] Interview with I.C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.

occupation industry but not broader forms of BDS. According to him, the problem with alliances is the huge NGO industry in Israel:

> "NGOs are running the show here, but they are restricted, they will never call for BDS. Most of them are under the umbrella of New Israeli Fund. They don't challenge the underlying apartheid system. They cannot go beyond the "Jewish and democratic" framework. Most NGOs are not radical."[114]

T.D. from BfW argued that "there is an ongoing occupation not inspite of but thanks to the Peace Camp" because most of the Left is composed of "moral Zionists" who were never a true opposition.[115]

Regarding the anarchists, M.U. argued that every village where they hold demonstrations are in themselves a campaign because it is about 'moving the fence'. In terms of collaborating with other groups he claimed that they have also been to demonstrations with the Zionist left, for example when there is an emergency that the construction of the wall starts and everybody gathers outside army headquarters:

> "Sometimes they bring Israeli flags. I am not thrilled about it but I am not going to leave because of that. It's a personal decision."[116]

If there is a mass demonstration in Tel Aviv, AAtW would import slogans in Arabic which is disturbing for the Zionist left:

> "They don't understand what is being said and they get nervous. It could be simple stuff like 'end the war', 'liberate Palestine'. In their minds if it is in Arabic, they start imagining all sorts of things. If you call for Intifada, they might consider that a call for violence. If you honor the martyrs, they consider Palestinian martyrs as just suicide bombers."[117]

Because the BfW group takes being anti-racist as its reference point, this framing alienates it from many other groups in terms of collaboration. They are defining themselves by what they are not, 'non-Zionist', which is reflected in the lack of alliances. Their call for boycott of Israel alienates them from other groups and organizations, which do not want to be associated with them. Anarchists, on the other hand, do not base their activism on anarchism as a rigid ideology, but on

---

[114] Interview with R.P., Jerusalem, 6 November 2013.
[115] Interview with T.D., Jaffa, 7 September 2014.
[116] Interview with M.U., Tel Aviv, 1 December 2013.
[117] Interview with M.U., Tel Aviv, 1 December 2013.

a set of principles, which allows them to cooperate even with the Zionist left if there is an issue on which they can mobilize together.

5.1.7. United Front of Objectors?

Groups and organizations mobilizing around military service refusal, avoidance and conscientious objection demonstrate a quite close link when it comes to building alliances with each other. They usually get together once there is an objector who has to go to prison because of his/her refusal as it was the case with P.D.'s refusal and imprisonment which I explained in Section 5.2.2. Although they are aware of each other's work, there is a division of labor between them. Whereas both New Profile and Yesh Gvul provide a dedicated support for the refusers who are in prison, New Profile provides a space for people to talk about militarism and how they feel about the army through youth groups and alternative summer camps. As New Profile is a feminist organization working for the demilitarization of the Israeli society, they do not initiate petitions for people to refuse, they only provide support for those who want to refuse or who are military service avoiders. Yesh Gvul, on the other hand, tries to mobilize people for refusal. Whereas New Profile has an anti-militarist agenda and does not differentiate between within and beyond Green Line, Yesh Gvul is mainly focused on refusing to serve in the OPT and refusers who are put in prison. In Israel, refusing to serve and opposing the occupation is considered a radical left attitude by Israeli militaristic culture. Therefore, when it comes to building alliances with each other, groups and organizations are aware of how they are going to be labeled in the eyes of the Israeli society once they support refusers. Although all the human rights monitoring organizations I mentioned above are involved in monitoring human rights violations in the OPT, military service refusal and conscientious objection is not in their field of interest. Moreover, within the refusers community, it is not uncommon that New Profile is criticized for being against prison, in the sense that they provide guidance and help for those who do not want to do their military service. The counter argument in this case implies that it is important that people go to prison for their refusal which makes the conscientious objection issue visible.

K.O. from Yesh Gvul claimed that they cooperate with every group which is against occupation such as olive harvest coalition and solidarity with Bedouin resistance against the Prawer Plan. When it comes to refusal, there is no division of labor between Yesh Gvul and New Profile *per se*, as New Profile helps young people to answer their questions about the compulsory military service

and Yesh Gvul focuses on the issue from a political perspective emphasizing the importance of not serving in the OPT. K.O. argued that "if a young person comes to us and says 'I don't care about the political impact, I need help to avoid the military service,' we tell him to talk to New Profile."[118] U.Z. claimed that because New Profile is the "marginalized of the marginalized" they cannot afford not to collaborate with others noting that if they have same goal in a project, then they probably have the same ideological line.[119]

5.1.8. Human Rights Monitoring: United Legal Front

HRMOs take a professional approach in the sense that they operate within a legal framework to highlight human rights violations. They divide their work according to thematic focus on geographical location in order to use their relevant expertise and experience, and cooperate with each other on different levels.

During some specific campaigns they work together. Apart from this, the division of labor among HRMOs is clear. If it comes to building settlements, Yesh Din is involved because it has a project dedicated to this issue where it has a certain expertise. Issues are channeled based on who is working on what. B'Tselem works on a focus on deaths caused by IDF soldiers in the West Bank. ACRI is involved in the South Hebron Firing Zone. The collaboration is important, especially in terms of information-sharing, because no single organization can do everything.

The cooperation's aim is using the legal platform to inform audiences that are important in influencing decision-makers, such as media platforms and jurists in addition to petitions and public statements on behalf of other actors such as authors. Whereas ACRI is stronger on legal analysis and advocacy work, B'Tselem is significant in fieldwork, data collection, and documenting. BtS is active in arranging tours and bringing different sorts of actors together to give the campaign more visibility. Each organization's special expertise and experience are used to create a united front about a specific issue.

---

[118] Interview with K.O., Jerusalem, 29 October 2013.
[119] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 8 December 2013.

V. H. argued that ACRI uses thematic criteria for cooperation, it depends on whether there is an issue they want to work with or if the other organization has the relevant expertise. In order to maximize their work and add things they are lacking; they bring the strength of each organization together.[120] B'Tselem has partners in the human rights organizations community as well:

> "It is not that we work together, but we exchange information. We write joint reports; we won't do it with political organizations like Peace Now. Exchanging our data, we would do [it] with anybody, even with the right wing. But if the issue is writing and publishing reports together, we only do it with human rights organizations."[121]

While dividing the work into formal and informal coalitions they share resources and cases. Topics and legal issues are covered by one organization. Because the human rights community is specialized, in order to have an impact they choose to work together. They share ideas and resources to avoid a duplication of work. As U.D. stated:

> "While taking a human rights position, in a joint press conference we can talk about [a] range of issues, clients' stories, exchanging of ideas. We learn from and help each other. We recommend each other for grants or we refer journalists to other groups. You expand your impact by expanding your college organizations."[122]

As the only Israeli human rights organization which provides legal assistance and consultation for Gaza, Gisha is asked for their reports by other organizations reporting on Gaza.

The community of Israeli human rights organizations comes together when there are major events; G.U. claimed that Yesh Din filed petitions to the court in the name of all these organizations during these times. Consultation, information-sharing, and joint petitions are common. She underlined that the question of when to work together is only strategic:

> "Working together means a lot of times having more power, demanding something as a group of larger organizations increases the leverage as a team."[123]

Because the human rights community is based on professional legal work, there is no competition but instead a collaboration between them. If there are issues that overlap between different

---

[120] Interview with V.H., Tel Aviv, 3 December 2013.
[121] Interview with A.U., Jerusalem, 26 December 2013.
[122] Interview with U.D., Tel Aviv, 2 December 2013.
[123] Interview with G.U., Tel Aviv, 24 November 2013.

organizations, the organization which either has the resources for it at the time, or when previously has been on the ground, and collected the case takes care of the issue.

G.U. claimed that it is easier for Yesh Din to collaborate with certain groups when the message is more specific and targeted, because when it has a more political tone to it, it becomes harder. She gave the example of Yesh Din and the Coalition of Women for Peace (CoWfP) which were the only two Israeli organizations that testified before the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on settlements, when Israel did not even allow members to carry out their fact finding, and they had to meet in Amman. She defined it as a recent critical example of which organization does what:

> "None of our other college organizations agreed to testify. That was a political decision on their part because the Fact Finding Mission was criticized by the Israeli public as being biased from the start. B'Tselem sent a letter attaching its reports, ACRI did the same thing, they sent information to the mission. That was important information, on which the mission could rely. But actually giving an oral testimony and giving a Q&A opportunity to the committee was almost not done by any other organization. As far as Yesh Din was concerned, it was not a political decision to testify before the mission, it was a human rights decision. Providing them with the information is exactly why organizations like Yesh Din exist."[124]

As Rabbis for Human Rights is engaged in both legal work and active in the field, they cooperate with many different and groups and organizations such as Yesh Din, Bt'Selem, ACRI, Gisha and Breaking the Silence from human rights community, as well as Gush Shalom, Peace Now, and Taayush. The rabbi pointed out that it is not very common for a human rights organization to have cooperation with such a broad community:

> "Most Israeli human rights organizations won't work with political organizations, there is a clear need to separate human rights organizations and political ones. The irony is that left and right classically refer to economic policy, but here in Israel it is what your position is in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most people in Israel would assume that if you are for Palestinian's human rights, you are left-wing although human rights should be beyond and above the left-right divide. Some politicians associate us with the left in order to delegitimize us. We don't see ourselves as the left. We cooperate with all organizations on the basis of human rights."[125]

---

[124] Interview with G.U., Tel Aviv, 24 November 2013.
[125] Interview with C.C., Jerusalem, 28 November 2013.

J.B. from PHRI stated that all the organizations working on OPT consult them sometimes. She said that in 2009 during the Goldstone Report she witnessed the cooperation at its best:

> "When we were organizing a press conference, there was a big debate on how we say "war crimes." At that point we had to compromise and we used the word "suspicion that war crimes are done there." Using this definition enabled most of the human rights organizations to give their testimonies to the Goldstone Committee. There is no risk in alignments because then we would do it alone. Going radical is easy, the risky thing is how far to compromise."[126]

Unlike the human rights organizations mentioned above the work of the BtS and Who Profits differs in the sense that they do not focus on cases as legal professionals. C.U. stressed that BtS provides information for other organizations for their reports such as Yesh Din, "when they got the story from Palestinians for their lawyers, they want stories from soldiers to get the whole picture."[127] It helps to increase their public credibility if they work with others in joint campaigns. He argued that they will not cooperate with other groups made up of soldiers:

> "We are an organization of soldiers that uses the stories and the information, we will not be 10,000 soldiers marching in Tel Aviv. We maintain a clear line between us and groups like Yesh Gvul because we are not calling on the soldiers to refuse. We just call them to tell their stories."[128]

T.O. from Who Profits pointed out that for their last report on bulldozers they took testimonies from BtS about operation engineering during Operation Cast Lead (Gaza War 2008-09) and consulted ICAHD on the house demolitions in East Jerusalem. T.O. claimed that they do not organize campaigns or work together; it is only about obtaining information.[129]

In addition to having professional legal experts human rights monitoring organizations divide their work in terms of data collection for petitions, campaign organization, arranging tours, inviting authors and jurists to sign petitions, and making public statements. In addition to the nature of their work, there is a geographical divide with organizations focusing on the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Area C and Gaza. This emphasizes the role of each organization: going to court, drawing up legal documents, collecting data, documenting and publishing information.

---

[126] Interview with J.B., Jaffa, 12 November 2013.
[127] Interview with C.U., Tel Aviv, 2 November 2013.
[128] Interview with C.U., Tel Aviv, 2 November 2013.
[129] Interview with T.O., Tel Aviv, 2 September 2014.

5.3. Concluding remarks

This chapter has analyzed the changing political context in Israel after the Second Intifada while looking at the peace movements' characteristics focusing on prognostic and diagnostic frames used by organizations and groups, as well as the alliances they build with each other. In Israel there is a clear message of the peace community focusing on either the one-state or the two-state solution, and with its own well-defined audience. There is a critique of government, whereas the army was mentioned as an implementer in most interviews. Considering the groups, which are Zionist left it became clear that the core of the Palestinian problem was not necessarily seen in Zionism. Their vision and agenda differ from each other according to the diagnostic and prognostic frames they use, which works as criteria for them in building coalitions. The movement characteristics are strong in Israel, in the sense that there is a big peace camp with different actors such as Zionists, anarchists, leftists, human rights professionals and feminists. Diverse strategies such as direct action, demonstration and petitions is also evident. Organizations set up before the Second Intifada turn out to have more moderate forms of framing in the sense that they still opt for the two-state solution and try to influence the Israeli public as their audience. This can be explained by them being Zionist leftists co-opted in the founding ideology. These empirical findings lead to three conclusions which I will elaborate in Chapter 7 where I compare Israel and Turkey. First, the critique of militarism is not an explanatory factor behind the mobilization of PMOs in Israel. Second, Zionism's discursive aspect as a founding ideology plays a role in shaping the movements' framing. Lastly, unlike Palestinians the degree to which Israeli Jews enjoy citizenship rights is influential in freedom of expression and action within Israel.

As in Israel, I argue, the one and only common good is the fulfillment of the foundational ideology, Zionism, Palestinians are de-facto excluded and discriminated against based on their non-contribution to Zionism. Hence, it is true that Israel is a democracy for its Jewish citizens, but not for all its citizens; so that we should ask whether a country could be considered as a democracy if it guarantees basic rights and privileges to a certain group of people based on their ethnicity/religion (Jewish) and exclude others, even some by domination, control and occupation. It is not a surprising practice that a state, which defines itself as a Jewish one, does not treat its non-Jewish citizens as equals. However, a democracy, understood by general terms, cannot give preference to and prioritize any particular group or community. Therefore, the exclusive aspect of the Zionist-Jewish state structure cannot be overseen which would also de facto make it impossible to

assimilate the Palestinians within itself. In order to underline the discriminations faced by Palestinians in the Jewish state, Ehrlich argues, it is important to "make the connection between the status of the Arabs and the structure of the state" where the "discriminations are attributed to the *situation* (war) rather than to the *structure* (Jewish exclusivism)" (1987: 132, emphasis in original).

As I showed, the precise historical moment, the Second Intifada, has been interpreted differently in the peace movement organizations and groups. The Zionist left organizations, which advocated the two-state solution from the outset felt themselves betrayed. Others such as BfW and AAtW saw this as their final crisis during which they understood that it was not feasible to expect a change from within. For Zochrot, it was necessary to challenge the Zionist core of the Israeli state. After the Second Intifada occupation became the routine, instead of a form of everyday violence. Peace movements changed their characteristics accordingly and organizations monitoring human rights began to focus on reducing human rights violations rather than eliminating them, something for which they are often criticized, i.e. for turning the occupation into something more manageable.

6. TURKEY: BLIND TO THE WAR AT HOME?

This chapter is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Turkey. As in the previous chapter on Israel, it is based on twenty-seven interviews with activists of grassroots groups and organizations, members and spokespersons of organizations and professional staff from human rights monitoring organizations, all of which are mobilized around the peace issue in Turkey from their particular perspective. In order to answer my research question, "How can we explain different characteristics of peace movements in Turkey?" I examine fourteen groups and organizations in Turkey. These are less in number and have weaker movement characteristics compared to their equivalents in Israel. Firstly, I demonstrate how they define their issue, what their demands are, and whether they propose a solution to the issue they raise, and if so, what kind of solution. Secondly, I consider whether they form alliances with other groups and what kind of strategies they use. Lastly, I emphasize how POS in Turkey play a role vis-à-vis these groups' framing and mobilizing structures. This explains their weak movement characteristics, compared to the Israeli case. I argue that because these groups are trying to mobilize around the peace issue, which is not regarded as an anti-war movement as such by Turkish society, their framing does not find an audience. Moreover, ideological differences over Islam and the Kurdish issue are a reason for the lack of alliances. The lack of organizational culture, thanks to the 1980 coup and the lack of collaboration along the discursive frames of Kemalism, means that the peace issue is never discussed in broader terms. This also explains why Turkey has never had a consolidated peace movement, which had never received strong support from different types of groups.

6.1. Setting the scene: between existence and mobilization

According to Zald and Ash, movement organizations are an "incentive structure" with purposive incentives, which have "goals aimed at changing the society and its members; they wish to restructure society or individuals, not to provide it or them with a regular service" (1966: 329). Meyer and Minkoff raise an important point by asking "political opportunities for whom?" to stress the importance of constituency-specific and issue-specific elements (2004: 1461). This may raise

the question of whether the Kurdish problem is an issue-based movement (the Kurdish question as a part of a peace movement), or whether it should be interpreted as a marginal constituency (based on ethnic Kurdish identity)? This plays a role in putting their agenda within or outside institutional politics. Meyer points out the importance of the political context which "sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others" (2004: 128). In Turkey, it is not the content of the claim itself which counts, but who vocalized it, and for whom. Therefore, a claim regarding freedom of speech can be seen under the headline of democracy; yet the moment that the subtext includes anything related to the Kurdish issue, the owner of the claim is immediately disregarded, and is often labeled as a traitor, if not a terrorist. Meyer reminds us that "a polity that provides openness to one kind of participation may be closed to others," and how different components of political opportunity may exert influence on claims-making in different ways (2004: 136). When analyzing the Chernobyl disaster, Koopmans and Duyvendak stress that the effects of the accident were "conditioned by situational factors such as the state of the anti-nuclear movement at the time of the accident, the political situation in which it occurred, and the outcome of interpretive struggle between the anti-nuclear movement and pro-nuclear authorities" (1995: 241). Although the Kurdish issue had been a salient point of discussion since the creation of the Republic of Turkey, public opinion was never fully mobilized around the issue of war, peace or conflict, and there was no single movement which was organizationally sufficiently well-equipped and well-prepared and, more importantly, there was not one single concrete problem and proposed solution on which to focus mobilization.

In comparing left-libertarian movements in Italy and West Germany, della Porta and Rucht argue that the "position and behavior of the major left-wing party is the most relevant factor in determining the social movements' behavior" (1995: 262). In analyzing potential alliance partners in the Dutch peace movement, Kriesi looks at the *configuration of the relevant political actors on the left* in order to assess the strength of the left within the political system, the extent of its fragmentation, whether the major party on the left is social democratic or communist, and whether the left takes part in government (1989b: 296, emphasis in original). He explains that in the Netherlands the peace movement was an "attractive ally" for left-wing opposition parties (299). This was not the case in Turkey where not only center parties but also left-wing parties avoided being associated with the Kurdish movement. This was because it could lead to them being labeled as supporters of terrorism rather than pro-peace. Regarding the discontinuity between groups, I

agree with McAdam and his colleagues who argue that in order to survive "insurgents must be able to create more enduring organizational structure to sustain collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 13). Tarrow acknowledges that movements rise and fall according to the political conditions of the moment, but he also asks "What kinds of struggle and which aspects of political opportunity are most likely to provide opportunities for social movement mobilizers?" (1996: 53–54).

Jenkins define mobilization as the "process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action" and he highlights the major points as "the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts, the processes by which the group pools resources and directs these towards social change, and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources" (1983: 532-533). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald stress that "the form the mobilization takes is affected by the kind of opportunity." (1996: 10). In contrast to the Israeli case, the Turkish peace movement has evolved sporadically and has weaker movement characteristics. Kriesi describes the selective exclusion of challengers as the "combination of a strong state and an exclusive dominant strategy," where the state can ignore the challengers or simply repress them (1996: 160). Since the purpose of this study is to examine groups in ethnically divided militaristic societies, I focus on the groups and organizations mobilizing around peace, anti-war movements, the Kurdish issue and conscientious objection. To my knowledge, there is no previous research which deals extensively, and exclusively, with this topic, therefore my research is the first attempt to categorize and label these groups.

In this study I interviewed fourteen groups and organizations in Turkey (see Figure 6.1).



Figure 6.1: Groups and organizations examined in Turkey

As a new political party running for election for the first time, the election victory of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*, AKP) in 2002 was a transformative event for Turkey. As a result, Turkey was back to single-party government under the AKP. Over the last twelve years[130] of AKP government some groups and organizations have mobilized around the peace issue as a result of: a) the War on Iraq; b) the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials against the military clique from 2003 onwards; c) the leftist-liberal group mobilized under the name of "Not enough but yes" (*Yetmez ama Evet*) during the 2010 referendum to promote it; and d) the Solution Process for the Kurdish question, 2004–2010 followed by Kurdistan Communities Union (*Koma Civakên Kurdistan,* KCK) trials.

[130] The period from 2002 until 2014.

During this period the Turkish peace movement had some new entries, although short-lived. They could not go beyond temporary mobilization, as a result of their weak movement characteristics such as unclear framing, undefined audience and a lack of alliances. This can be attributed to the political culture of the regime in Turkey which has an exclusionary character so that bargaining and negotiation with movements is not viable. In the following sections I refer to groups' and organizations' framing and how this may constitute an obstacle to forming alliances, in order to demonstrate the role of closed/open POS and discursive frames of foundational ideology.

6.2. How do peace movements frame the issue and what are their demands?

Following Tocqueville's work on states and collective action, Tarrow argues that the stronger the state, the weaker its encouragement of institutional participation, and the greater the incentive to resort to confrontation and violence when collective action does break out (1996: 46). The relative absence of strong peace movements in Turkey can be interpreted as a function of the institutional strength of the Turkish state. Ruth claims that as with the powerful French state it "limits challenger movements, sometimes by repressive means, rather than being a neutral third party, there is little reason to create countermovements" (1996: 199). This is also true for Turkey. Gamson and Meyer claim that political institutions reflect whether a state is weak or strong if we look at the extent to which the executive's branch is limited which is complemented with checks and balances. However, they add, culture also plays a role in determining the kind of central position the state should have and where the state's responsibilities begin and end in which areas of life (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 282). According to Whittier, it is not only structure but also meaning which are necessary in order to understand a movement's internal dynamics and external environment, as well as how they interact with each other:

> "Structural elements include state structures and political opportunities and social movement organizations and communities. Meanings include the cultural context in which movements operate, that is, the dominant culture, discourse, and collective identities that explain and justify existing hierarchies, practices, and distinctions among groups" (2002: 292).

In examining the demand and agenda of peace movement groups I focus mainly on how they formulate the issue; whether and how they use diagnostic frames; what they think will be the solution for that issue; and whether and how they use prognostic frames. I take the Kurdish question as the main point, noting that not all groups mobilize around this issue in the first place. I refer to

the way they describe and label the issue and what they propose as a solution to the highlighted problem. To do this, I refer to my interviews given the lack of recorded documents of the groups and organizations. This in itself tells us a great deal about the movement characteristics and movement culture in Turkey.

6.2.1. No War on Iraq Coordination (NWIC)

During the war on Iraq Turkey witnessed the biggest anti-war mobilization in its history. The enormous peace movement which was organized through anti-war activism was not only against this particular war, but also against allowing U.S. forces to use Turkish soil as a base. Later on this also led to the development of anti-NATO campaigns and demonstrations. During this particular historical moment, groups and organizations from different, and even opposite, ideological spectrums, such as Kemalists and Islamists, were able to stand side by side. The base of their solidarity was being united in a common cause, namely, the War on Iraq and Turkey's involvement in that war. On 1 March 2003 their mobilization led to a historical event when the Turkish Parliament rejected a government-backed bill that would have allowed the U.S. army to use Turkey as a base for military attacks on Iraq. Although the AKP government was keen to pass the law, the opposition parties were against it. The coalition's aim was to influence MP's decisions in favor of a 'No' vote through using personal connections. The only opposition party at the time was the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), as the Kurdish parliamentarians were independents.[131] In the end some AKP members voted 'No' and the bill did not become law. During this period even though the AKP made it clear that it would support the USA, peace movement groups managed to win the support of some AKP MPs, together with the CHP and Kurdish independents in Parliament. These groups organized meetings in cities and villages throughout the country to explain the cost of Turkey's involvement in the war on Iraq. During their campaign, they deployed all their human and financial resources very efficiently, e.g. involving celebrities in their campaigns to gain societies' attention. The use of celebrities and well-known people is common for SMOs not only to increase its credibility but also to appeal to public (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1231). In their framing, they used clear statements of being against the war, the

[131] Turkey has a ten percent threshold for parliamentary elections.

occupation, the Bush administration and its policies, whereas slogans criticizing the AKP government came second, if at all.

NWIC consisted of 167 different groups and organizations, including political parties, trade unions, activists and NGOs. One of the reasons why so many different groups managed to come together and build a coalition, as Zald and Ash argue, is that coalitions "are most likely to take place when there is one indivisible position or reward at stake" (1966: 335). In addition to preventing the bill from being passed in Parliament, the main purpose of the coordination was to create a sensitive public mass, to engage in solidarity with the Iraqi people and the international public against the war, and to oppose the USA's aggressive policies in the region. Many of my interviewees added that there was also discussion within the coordination over what name to give it. The division was over how to define their struggle: are they against all kinds of wars or just imperialist wars? Should it be called "No War Coordination," or should they single out this war and call it "No War on Iraq Coordination?"

The coordination can be divided into three main ideological groups: leftists, liberals and Islamists. Coordination was successful in terms of representing different groups of people in Turkey, which made it easier for them to appeal and convince the Turkish public. Coordination considered public as their main audience, which could pressure the newly-elected AKP government to oppose against the passage of the bill. Because there were different groups in the coordination each of them had different motivations to be in the coordination and hence different framing in their statements. R.K. from Ozgur-DER claimed that public in Turkey was influenced by two points. First, people were afraid that Turkey's involvement in this war would cause many economic problems, therefore they did not want to get into any trouble. Second, some people were worried from an Islamic point of view that this foreign non-Muslim attack was directed at their Muslim brothers, which would end up in invading their neighbors. Therefore, he argued, they had an easy propaganda to make as an organization composed of Islamists, so that they used Islamic references to appeal the public as well as to influence the AKP government:

> "On March 1 [2002] we had a protest after Friday prayers in Beyazit. Our banner read "Fear Allah, not America." To the AKP MPs we were saying that the Iraqi people are Muslims, all Muslims are brothers and therefore they [AKP MPs] shouldn't collaborate with the imperialistic aggression. We used Islamic statements and verses from the Koran. "It is the blood of our brothers which are at stake,"

> we told them, also, if Turkey supports the war, our God would not forgive this and there will be a pay-back in the afterlife."[132]

A.D. was one of the main figures of the Islamic platform in the coordination, and argued that this anti-war movement had three dimensions. First it concerned his own country, Turkey, second it was about a neighboring country, and lastly it was a threat against the Islamic world: "The issue concerned me along these three dimensions in terms of my identity as a Muslim, as a human and as a Turkish citizen." The coordination was able to refer to people's different backgrounds and concerns, and enabled them to mobilize the general public on a large scale irrespective of their ideology. He points out that the purpose of the group was to "create public pressure:"

> "We said that we'll go everywhere and tell everyone, religious groups, political groups, that we want peace and we refuse a bill which would force you [Turkey] to say yes to America. It is against sovereignty. Liberals in the coordination were talking about universal peace, Marxists were refusing the war based on imperialism, and I was using religious references; verses and hadiths, for example "those who keep silence against injustice are devils with no words." We were generally accepted by the public, they did not see us as traitors. Maybe some of them thought we are putting ourselves at risk, or we are putting Turkey in a difficult situation against America, but they knew our intentions were good."[133]

A.Y. was part of the Socialist Party of the Oppressed (*Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi*, ESP) coordination. She claimed that their main agenda was to put public pressure on Parliament in order to get as many vetoes as possible. She stated that the important thing was "to save people from being war supporters."[134] S.I. from the Labor Party (*Emek Partisi*, EMEP) stated that in addition to opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq, they were against Turkish involvement in the war. It was the biggest ever coordination in Turkish history since a long time:

> "The aim was to enlighten the public about the war. It was a campaign, nothing permanent, it was organized for a limited period. The target was the war on Iraq, preventing Turkey's involvement in the war, and U.S. plans in the region. We managed to bring different groups together and to emphasize "we" to show our unity, instead of saying "I", and putting forward their own organizations."[135]

---

[132] Interview with R.K., Istanbul, 5 July 2013.
[133] Interview with A.Y., Istanbul, 3 July 2013.
[134] Interview with A Y., Istanbul, 3 July 2013.
[135] Interview with S.I., Istanbul, 8 July 2013.

He also mentioned that they created an anti-war public opinion from three perspectives:

> "We managed to explain to people that if Turkey is involved, their children would fight in this war and they could die. We gave examples from Vietnam. Some of them said Iraq is none of their business. Also we said in Islamic circles that Muslims will be bombed. We exposed Erdoğan's intentions, what it means when he declared himself as the co-chair of GMEI [Greater Middle East Initiative]."[136]

D.D. took part in the coordination representing LambdaIstanbul, a Turkish LGBTI rights organization:

> "The mentality causing wars is the same [as the] one suppressing gay people. The coordination's name was NWIC, however Lambda was saying no to all wars and no to all kinds of militarism. We scratched out the word 'Iraq' from the NWIC badges. In the coordination, there were anti-American groups and groups saying that this is an unjust war. We as Lambda do not believe in just or unjust wars, but as a coordination we focused on this war as an unjust one. It was a moment when anger exploded from different groups against America, against governments. This coordination provided a platform for them to express their different concerns. We have nothing to do with this war, yet the government will send our children to this war and they will die. In that sense we managed to tell people what war means."[137]

He added that anti-militarist slogans started emerging during this period: "We Will Not Die, We Will Not Kill, We Won't Be Anyone's Soldier", are still used today in protests.

Transnational organizations in the coordination also played a role. For example, T.T. from Greenpeace explained that its involvement in the coordination concerned control of oil in the region camouflaged as the destruction of mass weapons:

> "We, as Greenpeace told in our press releases that the USA is a rogue state, we gave the example of the U.S.'s non-ratification of the U.N.'s Child Rights Treaty, the Convention on Discrimination against Women and withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We initiated anti-American politics against the U.S. government. Everybody already knew about the oil issue. It was more like a movement against the American government, rather than an anti-war mobilization. What irritated people was America's dictating its terms long-distance. If Iran were to attack Iraq, the same

[136] Interview with S.I., Istanbul, 8 July 2013.
[137] Interview with D.D., Istanbul, 3 July 2013.

> mobilization would not occur. I don't think there were many anti-war people in the coordination. We couldn't even name it as "No to War" coordination, we had to add "on Iraq.""[138]

He added that their main targets were AKP MPs because the coordination took MPs from other parties for granted assuming that they would vote 'No.' They did not want support from politicians in order to avoid the factionalism in the coordination. Therefore, they targeted AKP MPs whom they could influence. The Islamic wing in the coordination knew the MPs so that they could figure out who could be convinced.

In addition to international organizations, some celebrities were also active. The actor M.A.A. took part in the coordination as a spokesperson and emphasized that celebrities add popularity to movements, which can be seen as a form of advertisement which gives them public visibility. He argued that what happened in Seattle in 1999 was reflected in Turkey not in the form of an anti-capitalist movement, but as an anti-war movement. According to him, without an ideology this movement organized around being anti-war managed to bring different oppositions together leading to the creation of an alternative public opposition.[139]

Why was mobilization possible during the war on Iraq with so many different ideological groups? After analyzing my interviews, I argue that there were two factors working hand in hand. First, the AKP was a newly elected party. It did not yet have a hegemony in Parliament even among its own MPs. Second, movement characteristics played a role in the sense that many groups from different backgrounds with different ideologies and agendas manage to come together under one roof for one target: stopping the bill. This anti-war framing and anti-Turkey's involvement brought them together. As I show below, this can also be interpreted as the main reason why the same groups could not, or did not, work around the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Muslim circles were involved in this coalition with a pro-Muslim anti-U.S. agenda. They did not want the country of their "Sunni brothers" to be invaded by a Christian imperialist power. As a neighboring country Turkey also played a role in the mobilization since most people did not want a war on their doorstep. The AKP, on the other hand, was a newly-elected new party, which had neither the experience nor the time to impose its own policy and suppress dissidents, as it did later on. When different groups united against the war, it appealed to the general public since everyone could identify with those opposing

[138] Interview with T.T., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[139] Interview with M.A.A. Istanbul, August 2012.

the war because it was not monopolized by any specific group, political party or ideology. After the Gezi Park protests and the polarization in Turkish society, however, protest is no longer viewed sympathetically by the general public, and protestors are regularly attacked by police with a massive use of teargas and water cannon. The unity achieved during the war on Iraq could not be realized either for the war on Syria or on the Kurdish question.

6.2.2. What peace and with whom?

Della Porta and Rucht argue that social movements do not simply disappear even though the issue at stake loses its mobilizing capacity or reaches a compromise between the conflict sides, "[o]rganizations and personal networks survive, keeping the social movement identity alive during a state of low activity or latency" (1995: 268). In 2003 a group from the coordination split and set up the Global Peace and Justice Coalition (GPJ), based on the call by Tarik Ali. They split from the previous group for two reasons. First, the invasion of Iraq had already started and the group had managed to achieve its aim of a 'No' vote in the Parliament. Second, during one demonstration a far-left group in the coalition threw a molotov cocktail into a fastfood eating place. It was the use of this kind of violence that divided the group; the timing overlapped of the occupation of Iraq.

Y.O. pointed out that once Tarik Ali made this statement, some of NWIC activists decided to be signatories:

> "There cannot be peace in Turkey as long as there is no peace internationally. We created this peace movement in Turkey as a part of anti-globalization movement, we think they are related."[140]

The GPJ views the peace issue from a broader perspective. In addition to war and occupation, militarism is also seen as a form of war. Therefore, they also oppose the daily practices reproduced through war frames in the form of militarism and sexism. Once the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan became permanent, they changed their main focus to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Their audience is mainly in the western part of Turkey, which could be a driving force for public opinion:

> "We want a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict. We aim to be the voice for non-Kurdish people who want peace. Kurdish people have already done many things in the Kurdish provinces. But what

[140] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 25 July 2012.

we call Turkey is Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. We are trying to organize events where social democrats and people from Islamic circles can attend. We try to explain that the Kurds are a separate group and their demands are basic human rights."[141]

Although they managed to mobilize public opinion during the invasion of Iraq, they were not as successful when it came to the Kurdish issue. According to Y.O., this was due to different opinions on the Kurdish issue even within the group:

> "We are an ideologically diverse group. I agree with those who say that it's a Turkish question. It should be Turkish people in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir who say "enough with this war." At the societal level, people don't understand the Kurdish question in Turkey, they don't support it either. People in Turkey should see that Kurds are a separate people and they should decide themselves whether to live with Turkey or be separate from it."[142]

She added that in a nationalist and militarist country such as Turkey, peace movements alone were not enough to change people's perception, which is fed by state mechanisms such as national education and military service. She argued that identifying Öcalan as the head of a terrorist organization and reacting to the Kurdistan flag in Syria were not the Turks' business:

> "In order to change that nationalist perception, we need a very broad grassroots movement. When there was the "70 million people against coup d'états" march, it was supported by the Gulen Community. We were there as leftists, but half of the group was Muslims from that Community. Their participation has an impact on the state and the government, not the leftists'. We need a movement, which can influence around 50% of the population, which votes for the AKP. We always believed that this can be solved through dialogue with government, so that we need to put a pressure on it. How do we do it, well, the government isn't interested in a thousand leftists making a claim, but if there is one Muslim emphasizing something, the government listens to him."[143]

Another GPJ activist T.M. pointed out that although they publish statements about the war in Syria, they cannot get the same level of support as for the war on Iraq because "The religious circles remain impartial, they do not want to be involved," which makes their influence limited. He emphasized that their biggest impact was on the Incirlik Air Base which became known by the public, as a logistic military center housing nuclear arms, thanks to their efforts. They took the

---

[141] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 25 July 2012.
[142] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 25 July 2012.
[143] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 25 July 2012.

issue to court in order to force government to reveal the content of the secret deal signed with the USA, but lost. As a result, the deal is extended every June for one year. According to him, the problem is the perception of war and peace in society:

> "People perceive peace as something to achieve in the wars we took part in outside our territories, like the Korean War. People don't see the need for peace for the low-intensity warfare we are now involved in, people see it as a terrorist issue, so that we can't make peace with them, they [the PKK] should surrender and give up so that it would end. If you talk to people, they claim that they want peace. But who are you going to make peace with? Obviously not with your friend, but with your enemy."[144]

Although some members of the GPJ were active during the coordination against the War on Iraq, one of the main criticisms against them was not putting the Kurdish question, which can be also considered as a domestic war, on their agenda. It was only in the second half of 2000s when they launched their first campaign on the Kurdish question, referring to peace. After that, almost every year they came up with a different campaign under a different name, for example, "Silence the War, Raise the Voice of Peace," "Peace Comes First," and "Yes to Peace." I argue that since they change the names of their campaigns constantly makes it more difficult for people to follow them.

The GPJ tried to stress that in addition to the Kurdish people, there are Turkish people from the West who also want to have peace. However, Y.O. confessed that there are diverse opinions within the group, which makes it difficult for them to issue a statement on which everybody would agree. According to her, although it is easy for people to say no to a war in another country, when it comes to the Kurdish question, people have a different opinion. It revolves around the question of a just war, calling the region Kurdistan or not, equating the state's violence with PKK violence or demanding that the PKK be the first to disarm.[145] This discussion is not unique to the GPJ, but is repeated in among leftist circles in Turkey where there are diverse opinions on the Kurdish question and how to define the PKK.

Y.O. argued that as the GPJ they created a new form of dissidence, which was adopted by different groups such as anti-capitalist Muslims and Women Who Meet. The GPJ, according to her, was a

---

[144] Interview with T.M., Istanbul, July 2012.
[145] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 15 April 2013.

milestone in bringing people from different backgrounds and ideologies together.[146] As was the case with many other groups mentioned here, the main location for their events is Istanbul. The choice of Istanbul is significant. First, because it is the most densely populated city in Turkey. Second, when there is a need to create an awareness about the Eastern part of the country, Istanbul is the first point to spread it. Lastly, this centralized attitude of coordinating everything in Istanbul is reflected in the inability to diffuse the issue and awareness in the other parts of the country, mostly rural areas, which are neglected when it comes to notions of democracy and human rights. In order to create a collective mobilization about the Kurdish issue, as many groups pointed out it is necessary to put it on the agenda of the Western part of the country. This would not be enough if the issue was not discussed with Turks in Anatolia, which is compulsory for making an issue public.

After 2007 the GPJ focused on the Kurdish issue as the war on Iraq and Afghanistan lost its momentum, but other groups emerged focusing on the peace issue. The Peace Assembly (PA) is one of them, and offers a solution to the Kurdish question from a democratic perspective giving priority to human rights and transparency. It was set up by a core group of people involved in the Kurdish question including ex-guerillas who had returned to Turkey after the Habur process. The Assembly's agenda focuses exclusively on the process of resolving the Kurdish question. Their audience is mainly the government and the law makers who they see as being capable of "influencing the ones who can influence the public."[147] It is not a mass movement; its aim is to provide a basis for peace. It does not define itself as a party to the negotiation, but as a public base for the solution and facilitating the peace process based on a democratic dialogue, which would lead to disarmament on both sides. The Peace Assembly supports a dialogue with Öcalan and Kandil, which could contribute to the process, however what they call a negotiation is to empower the civic, democratic, and parliamentary politics. Although they agree that peace is signed between the opposing sides, peace can be attained through societal change and changes of attitude and transformation. They do not believe that peace can be achieved without transforming the culture leading to war.

[146] Interview with Y.O., Istanbul, 15 April 2013.
[147] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.

H.T. linked the beginning of the Kurdish question to the foundational principles of Turkey:

> "It is a very centralist state; Ankara decides everything which undermines pluralism. The founding philosophy rests on one nation, one country and one language. There is a culture based on otherization in Turkey. [This is] like in the saying "A Turk has no friends but the Turks.""[148]

He added that during the 1990s, society saw the PKK as the main enemy, whereas now it is hostile to Kurds in general. According to him, the same now applies to the Kurds; they have lost trust in the Turkish people's commitment to peace given the prolonged lack of a solution.

He explained that after the 1980 coup, the state does not have sympathy towards people being a part of an organization, which is one of the main problems in Turkey. According to him this means that there is no perception of a civil society and no awareness of being a citizen:

> "There are three tendencies towards the solution process. One of them supports everything that the government does. The second is "the state is meeting the PKK, the intelligence service and the PM are involved, we should stand aside", and the last is opposing this meeting. However, the Kurdish question is spread throughout society, it can't be solved just by watching. Society doesn't want to be a part of this process. The reason is that there is a weak awareness of being an individual, being a citizen in Turkey. People and the media position themselves according to what Ankara is saying. You can't have a strong movement here; this is a passive position. Why aren't there one billion people marching in Turkey against the war?"[149]

He claimed that once negotiations stopped, the two sides would separate from each other as those close to the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, Partiya Aştî û Demokrasiyê, BDP) versus those on the side of the AKP. H.T. argued that civil society organizations, the general public and the media, position themselves in line with government by following its path without necessarily opposing it. He argues that this is an impact of the founding ideology as the problematic relation between state and citizen, where citizens are there for the state, and perceive Ankara as the absolute decision-maker. As the Peace Assembly they ask with whom government will negotiate and they insist that it has to be based on democratic political process including Parliament, so that

[148] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.
[149] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.

the BDP should be one of the sides of the negotiation. Öcalan should be in touch with the PKK but he should not be seen as the only party in charge during the negotiation, H.T. argued.[150]

However, he argued that there is no transparency in the solution process so that its content is unclear in terms of democracy and human rights. Rather than proposing a specific solution to the conflict, the Peace Assembly defines how the process should work:

> "The peace process depends on the transformation of society. We demand that society be included in the process, [which makes] access to true information necessary. Therefore, transparency is very important. We are not interested in where the PKK leaves its guns, but whether government faces up to the past in order not to repeat the same mistakes. We believe that the foundation of the truth and reconciliation committee is necessary for equal citizenship rights."[151]

If we take the PKK as a response to, and a result of, the Kemalist ideology's suppression of Kurdish people and the denial of their rights, the Peace Assembly is one of the few organizations interviewed which mentioned the PKK and its emergence by relating it to the Kurdish question:

> "I think the state and the AKP has a perception problem about the rights of Kurdish people. They try to solve it by granting them the minimum amount of rights, as late as possible. We [Peace Assembly] think that the key to Turkey's democratization is the solution of the Kurdish question, they [the government] do not share this view. If you recognize that Kurds exist, you must recognize that they have rights too. If the core of the Kurdish question is the denial of Kurdish people's existence, and them being massacred, the PKK is the result. What will destroy the PKK is granting them their rights."[152]

Peace Assembly advocates a civic democratic political process to resolve the Kurdish conflict, where Öcalan is not left out of the dialogue, but the negotiation process is open to everyone. The reason is it is not a question of the war between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK, but also a conflict between different parts of society, which resulted in differences in perception between eastern and western parts of Turkey. This is reflected in Ergenekon trials being on the agenda in the West, whereas the Kurdish question was discussed in the East. The West looked at the Ergenekon trials as the punishment for military coups, whereas in the East it was seen as a trial for

[150] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.
[151] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.
[152] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.

the unsolved murders of Kurdish activists and politicians. When those accused were only charged with attempted coup, but not for unsolved murders and disappearances, the Kurdish people felt left out of the legal process. In this sense the AKP did not investigate members of the army and officials for the unresolved deaths of Kurds, but only when these people ran counter its own political aims. Although the Ergenekon trials were an opportunity to bring those responsible for unsolved Kurdish crimes to justice, the AKP only used it as a means to rid itself of the military's influence on politics.

As was the case with many groups, Peace Assembly's greatest support came from the BDP, which has suffered mostly from the conflict. H.T. claimed that the government keeps its distance from the Peace Assembly because since 2007 the AKP has been pursuing a policy based on polarization, namely; those who support the AKP and those who are against it. As a result, whoever criticizes the AKP is considered a dissident, with whom all dialogue and channels of collaboration are closed. H.T. also stressed that the way government formulates the issue influences the media, which in turn forms the opinions of people regarding the peace process. It is also related to the fact that the main actor during this transformation process, both regarding the exclusion of the army from the political sphere and the solution process, is a conservative political party, which reinforced the Kemalist anxiety of society becoming more conservative and under the influence of Islam. Therefore, it was also strongly opposed by secular circles that the AKP carries on this solution process.[153]

Peace Initiative (PI) was founded in 2003 to oppose military intervention in Iraq. It was a group of artists, academics and writers. In other words, a closed circle of intellectuals acting on the Kemalist legacy of '*aydin*'[154] who is entitled to bring civilization to the people from a top-down. When Peace Initiative started working, the BDP represented the Kurds and not the HDP, so that the Peace Initiative managed to bring the Kurdish issue to the Western part of Turkey as a problem which concerns everyone in Turkey. This gap of addressing the public in Turkey regarding the Kurdish problem was filled by them. There is no ideological homogeneity in the group, except their shared demand for an immediate solution to the Kurdish question. It is a mixed group with liberals,

[153] Interview with H.T., Istanbul, 8 April 2013.
[154] *Aydin* means intellectual, educated and enlightened person to refer to 'intelligentsia' in Turkey.

communists, supporters of the AKP, and autonomists, and those who think it is premature to discuss Kurdish independence. One of their main slogans was "Peace, Immediately, Now."

G.G. stated that their aim was to influence both society and politicians:

> "We had statements with different tones, some directed at the public, some at government. In any case freedom of speech is limited in Turkey, so we sometimes had to self-censor ourselves in order to avoid harsh phrases, our lawyers were checking them. We couldn't do systematic work either, very rarely we went into the field and told people, "Let's talk about the Kurdish issue.""[155]

He added that in addition to their meetings with the CHP, AKP and BDP, they were also engaged in dialogue with international representatives such as MEPs. He was the only interviewee who pointed to the CHP as a key political actor in the peace process to make the issue well-known to the public. He emphasized that a political solution rejected by the CHP would be difficult for the public to accept.

G.G. claimed that the advantage of being a group of intellectuals and writers was being taken seriously and not marginalized. According to him, this elitist side of their initiative did not prevent them from gaining popularity, since they were not detached from the public, but in dialogue with it. He also admitted that if they have been an initiative by Kurdish intellectuals, they would have been treated differently and arrested. In this sense their profession and being known figures gave them a kind of immunity. He also emphasized that in terms of political and legal procedures, they did not face any restrictions and there were no legal proceedings against them. Their biggest obstacle was to make their voice heard, and being ignored or not finding a place in the media, which is controlled by government. He claimed that PI was exposed to indirect pressure in some universities where young academics faced tension within the academic hierarchy due to their activism.[156]

G.G. added that since a peace process has already started, the need for their group has declined. According to him, the main issue is no longer to make the process visible, but to develop it by

---

[155] Interview with G.G., Istanbul, 16 July 2014.

[156] This changed dramatically in 2016 when Academics for Peace signed the peace declaration entitled "We will not be a party to this crime." As of March 2017, over 360 signatories have been purged from Turkish universities through statutory decrees and forced resignations.

informing and preparing the public.[157] What we see here is that the PI could not adjust to the changing POS, where it stepped back once the process started and left it to be commanded by the AKP. It was exactly this point that the PI and groups like them should have monitored the AKP. In this case the governing party would have felt that it was being checked by other groups, and this would mean there was a pressure from the bottom to reach a solution to the conflict. Moreover, there was no group to which it could delegate its knowledge and expertise of the struggle thus far. The vague way of articulating their message and their failure to decide on a specific target audience, in the context of limited time and energy, made it difficult for them to channel themselves through two different audiences, the public and government. Moreover, as a general problem of peace movements in Turkey, they tried to resolve the issue without going into the field and without talking to people about what the peace process means and why there is such a need for it. This made them detached from the public and limited to their closed circle of activists without spreading their movement and their message to the general public. As a result, the part of society they were referring to consisted of academics, intellectuals and artists like themselves, and this did not allow the movement to gain a base and hence support within society as a whole. They tried to mobilize writers and academics who were already engaged in the issue, but not the masses, who had to be informed about the peace process. That Jacobin legacy of Kemalism attributing the role of enlightening the public to the intellectuals was visible in this group.

G.G. was also the spokesperson of a small group of ten people composed of mainly writers, journalists and academics, which in 2005 had a meeting with Erdoğan about the Kurdish question. They told Erdoğan that as Prime Minister he could not ignore the Kurdish situation, and that the issue had to be resolved. Erdoğan agreed to this. G.G. claimed that the AKP was giving the public an image of itself meeting with peace activists, whilst following its own political agenda by postponing the peace process for as long as possible. At the time of our interview Erdoğan had not yet been elected President. G.G. defined this prospect as a serious risk to a potential peace process:

> "The Kurdish issue goes parallel with democratization in Turkey. The more it becomes democratic, the more easily the Kurdish question will be resolved. The more easily the Kurdish question is resolved; the more democratic Turkey will become. This government and Erdoğan have no sense of democracy, this is why him being a president would put peace and democracy at risk. Then he would

[157] Interview with G.G., Istanbul, 16 July 2014.

> have guaranteed his power until 2023, which might lead him to retract the gains [made] in the Kurdish issue which Turkey has achieved so far."[158]

The Women for Peace Initiative (WPI) was set up in 2009 and it takes a holistic approach, emphasizing that peace not only refers to the end of war, but also to a struggle against patriarchy, sexism and the oppression of different identities and orientations. N.T. stated that as a heterogeneous group composed of only women from different parts of the political spectrum including women supporting different parties in Parliament, WPI aims at change from women's perspective in order to democratize society. For them, peace means coexistence based on equality, justice and dignity despite their differences. They are an anti-militarist group, which is against sexism, homophobia and the suppression of different beliefs. The main reasons of war, they believe, are the non-recognition of identities, beliefs and differences. Their starting point is that women suffer from this; war means migration, poverty and rape. Their slogan is "Women Don't Want War."[159]

N.T. stated WPI's point is that in a patriarchal world it is very important that women are actively included in the processes, not only because they make up half the population, but also in order to spread peace to the whole society and provide sustainability and transparency. WPI defines the main problem as the mentality:

> "We claim that if this was a society where women could think freely, the problem would already have been solved. But it can't be done only with our efforts. It has to spread to the whole society. The current government argues peace is necessary, but they still use the word terrorism, they should change their framing."[160]

WPI's audience is society in general, as they think it is necessary to include everyone in the peace process, so that peace is not only an agreement signed by two parties. As mentioned by some other groups, their perception of the peace process is a democratization process of Turkey.

As with the previous groups, WPI does not offer a specific and clear roadmap for how to achieve peace. Their vision and goals take a more general, and less clear, approach when it comes to what

[158] Interview with G.G., Istanbul, 16 July 2014.
[159] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.
[160] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.

kind of peace and with which actors. However, it is one of the few groups which thinks that facing the past is a precondition to solving the Kurdish question. N.T. argued that:

> "The right to the mother tongue [Kurdish] must be discussed in the whole society, the Constitution has to change, so that this right can be granted and secured. However, as long as the mentality does not change, it doesn't matter how good a constitution it is. There can be no peace if we don't face up to the past, what Kurdish people through. If this society would face the military coups in 1915, 1938, 1980, Maras and Corum[161], the peace process would be easier, but Turkey has no such tradition."[162]

Because they think it is important to have a dialogue with all sides during the peace process including guerillas and MPs, they are engaged in dialogue with representatives of the parties in Parliament, so that they also had meetings with women MPs from the AKP, CHP and BDP. N.T. stated that as a nationalist conservative party the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) is not keen to have such meetings, so they simply do not ask the MHP for a meeting. As a group they think that international solidarity is very important. Therefore, in order to create international pressure, they sometimes read their declarations in front of the consulates.[163] However, as with other groups engaged in dialogue with international representatives, it did not create sufficient pressure on government to improve the conditions of the peace process.

Despite their efforts, she argued that they were limited in spreading their voice because they are a women-only group. It is not only because society turns a blind eye to statements by women, but also because the political process does not want women's demands and actions to be visible. The patriarchal mentality is endemic in Turkish society, she argued, and this is why they remained invisible. N.T. also emphasized that once they had meetings with women from the group of 'Wise People,[164] very few of them referred to women's issues during their visits in Turkey.[165] As the system suppresses women, there is a tendency to internalize this suppression and rather than to challenge it. This can also be attributed to the conservative policies of the government; when Erdoğan had meetings with women early in the peace process he told them how important it was

---

[161] Those are cities in the eastern part of Turkey.
[162] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.
[163] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.
[164] The 'Wise People' were a group composed of sixty-two actors, journalists and former politicians selected by Erdoğan. They were divided into seven groups for seven different regions in Turkey in order to talk to the public about the peace process.
[165] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.

that all women should have three children. During the peace process it was also AKP's policy, mentioned in other interviews, not to follow a transparent path, and not to include different civil society initiatives in the process. The AKP repressed any controversial opinion about the process and did not want to share the initiative with anyone else. Therefore, as WPI's starting point was voicing their view from women's perspective, as a conservative party the AKP did not want to hear women's voices outside their traditional domain. The idea behind this was, according to N.T., once women express different opinions, it would cause awareness in society, which would put the AKP under pressure within its own system.[166]

Art for Peace Initiative (*Barış için sanat girişimi*, API) started in 2009 during the opening up to the Kurdish peace process alongside KCK operations and the arrest of students and artists. As people interested in art, who do not necessarily call themselves artists, they came together to support this process whilst emphasizing their concerns contentiously. For them, even if the Turkish state makes an agreement with the Kurds, the opposition should still strive for democracy and equality. According to T.K, API's starting point was that peace should include multiculturalism:

> "Real peace is possible when different identities are not exposed to hegemonic relations. Peace should be multicultural with all identities being equal, this can only be realized under democracy. The real struggle for peace will start once the war is over because it is societies and different people who should make peace with each other, it is not a real peace if the state structure dictates it."[167]

They tried to avoid focusing exclusively on the Kurdish question, and to include many issue on their agenda, such as honor killings, women's rights and gender rights in order to highlight all kinds of victimhood. In terms of audience, T.K. emphasized that it makes little sense to explain peace to Kurdish people, or to express solidarity with them all the time as an initiative. According to him, it would have made more sense to reach out to Turks from the Western part of Turkey in order to generate empathy between the two sides.[168] They were focusing on equality, peace and democracy. On the one hand, it was important that they were combining all three aspects in their activism. On the other hand, this vague definition meant that their target was not clear-cut, with a well-defined problem and a specific solution.

---

[166] Interview with N.T., Istanbul, 20 May 2013.
[167] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[168] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.

The API consisted of artists from different spheres of art, including those close to the Kurdish movement, and artists who are distant from it. T.K. defined the coexistence of people who think differently from different disciplines of art as an advantage, which make it possible for them to be engaged in some activities. However, once the word 'peace' is uttered, there is an immediate association with the Kurdish issue directly, and at an extreme level people are labeled as PKK supporters. T.K. also pointed out that although they tried to reach beyond the Kurdish issue, to all victims, such as honor killings, women and gender, because most of the victimizations in Turkey revolve around the Kurdish issue they were perceived as a Kurdish group. This is, he claimed, one of the reasons for the weakening of engagement among activists involved in their group.[169]

F.O. argued that when it comes to the activism of artists, it comes second to their own creative work. When their activism was limited to actions on the streets between Taksim and Tunel,[170] people had become less engaged because they thought that there were already other people taking on action on their behalf.[171] T.K. stressed that peace movements in Turkey cannot be strong and organized movements with long-term goals, which make them subject to changes in the political climate. In addition to artists' other commitments which made them disengaged from the group, once the peace wave has been transformed back into the war rhetoric, where the number of people arrested in the KCK trials increased, some activists were afraid of being arrested if they continued with their activism by attending API protests and meetings. T.K. claimed that as the API they could not achieve their aims:

> "We should have been a durable entity. In Turkey peace processes are not developed as a result of pressure from activists like us or NGOs. Those in power decided to take a step, and their framing decides how the process goes. Dissidents like us are not active and do not participate. The AKP shapes everything the way it wants; however, a real peace cannot be achieved in this country if there are no grassroots movements pushing for it. We also have a responsibility that the AKP is not solving the issue. We should have been able to influence people outside our circles."[172]

F.O. argued that as API they recognized the importance of cultural pluralism, which is what they understood under peace. When they had a meeting with Erdoğan, they gave him a letter, in which

---

[169] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[170] Taksim and Tunel are large squares in central Istanbul used for large gatherings.
[171] Interview with F.O., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[172] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.

they wrote that in order to reach a real peace different identities in the society, as men, women, LGBT, Kurdish, Alawites and Armenians they should be able to have equal rights and the coup d'état constitution from 1980 had to be changed.[173] T.K. emphasized that although they tried to contact many political parties, they managed to have effective communication only with the BDP:

> "The BDP is the only opposition party in Turkey, the other three all follow the interests of the state. It is not realistic to expect anything from the AKP. The CHP's structure would not allow it [to act] either because they have a state mentality, their main concern is never the problems of society, it's not on their agenda. On other issues, the only time they showed a big opposition was when militarism lost its power."[174]

Their slogan was "It's Enough if We Reach Peace."

F.O. also pointed out that all social dissidents are being silenced and controlled by the political structure:

> "The problem is the term "society's sensibilities." "People will say, Turkey isn't ready for this." It should be stopped. If the government allows it, all the taboo words are being used. If the government says that it can have a meeting with Öcalan, people can get used to it. Therefore, the language of war should be put aside, [and] instead the language of peace should be used."[175]

The East West Brotherhood Platform (*Doğu Batı Kardeşlik Platformu*, EWBP) was also set up in 2009 to monitor and contribute to the solution process. It is a platform composed of Islamic NGOs from urban areas in Turkey. H.P. claimed that they started the group as an initiative, but not as a movement. The aim was to bring NGOs from Turkish Kurdistan together with Islamic NGOs from Anatolia, so that the latter would keep the Kurdish problem on its agenda. Their starting point was a critique of the Islamic NGOs, which depicted the AKP as the only political actor in charge of solving the conflict. According to H.P., in this sense Islam carries a big potential because during the solution process common values can serve as a bridge to build strong bonds. He defined the Kurdish question as an area abandoned by Islamic circles in Turkey.[176]

---

[173] Interview with F.O., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[174] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[175] Interview with F.O., Istanbul, 15 May 2013.
[176] Interview with H.P., Istanbul, 10 July 2014.

Each NGO has to prepare their own presentation for their annual meeting, where they analyze the Kurdish question for that year and draft a press release. He stated that their audience is both the public and the politicians in order to create an awareness of the Kurdish question, where they mainly try to spread their voice towards the bases of Islamic NGOs in both the Turkish and Kurdish communities. They discuss the issues with Quranic references such as the Hujurat verse, which emphasizes the importance of getting to know and to accept each other's sacred existence. They talk about such verses in relation to the right to education in the mother tongue and racism in the context of the Kurdish problem. H.P. pointed out that as a platform they do not have a clear framing in terms of defining the problem and offering a solution:

> "The heterogeneity of our group prevents it from being a powerful actor pressuring the process. Anatolia sees the PKK as a terrorist organization. There are very few groups which offer a solution to the conflict. The state mentality persists in some groups; they are trying to create a base which will not cause them trouble. But if we cannot come up with a process based on structural, economic and psychological solutions, the PKK may disappear and another group may emerge, there is always the risk of a new conflict prone to being steered by domestic and foreign political actors. The main targets are clear, people should not die and there should be stability, however there are no principles set to obtain this. This is a problem of the other Islamic hinterland of the AKP."[177]

The fact that during the solution process the AKP was seen as the only political actor capable of solving the conflict led some groups to believe that it had the power to act for them too, so that they dedicated the entire process to the governing party assuming that it would do whatever is necessary to solve the conflict. H.P gives the example of the use of Kurdish letters. When he used letter 'w', which does not exist in the Turkish alphabet in his column in the newspaper he writes for, his article was censored. However, when the AKP introduced a law which allows the use of non-Turkish letters, the Islamic NGOs did not oppose it. He claimed that the problem with Islamic groups is that they do not push the government for such change themselves, where it should have been them who should put pressure for the use of the letters without leaving it to the governing party to decide for it.[178]

---

[177] Interview with H.P., Istanbul, 10 July 2014.
[178] Interview with H.P., Istanbul, 10 July 2014.

As it was stressed by H.P. from EWBP and G.G. from PI when it comes to freedom of speech and expression, which has been curbed by many laws and through the KCK trials in Turkey, there was a double standard because laws are applied selectively with the AKP's efforts. PI activists were not exposed to it thanks to their professional status, which depicted them as respected Turkish intellectuals. H.P., on the other hand, argued that their immunity is based on the fact that they share the same Islamic background, so that their views are either tolerated or ignored. In both cases this means that no legal proceedings have been taken against him when he criticizes government or expresses his opinions on the Kurdish question. In this sense, we can talk of an immunity provided for political Islamists by the AKP when it comes to discussion of the Kurdish question.

H.P. also argued when each NGO prepared its presentation for the annual conference to discuss the core of the Kurdish question and possible solutions, they did not often get the same results as in Istanbul. Islamic NGOs are ideologically close to the AKP, and this led them to believe that the AKP is involved in the process and already doing whatever is necessary, so that any intervention by Islamic NGOs would slow down the process. This in turn, I argue, led to the absence of diagnostic frames:

> "For Islamists this issue is a paradox. In their ivory towers they call the state nationalist, which commits sins, however in their own community they could not create this consciousness and be influential because they could not expose the state's secular, Kemalist, nationalist, Turkish character. This is a paradox because what they say is different than what they think. They talk about the independence of Chechnya, they appreciate Latin American revolution, however when it comes to Kurdistan… Treating the National Pact [on Turkey's borders] (*Misak-i Milli)*[179] as sacred is infecting both the Turkish left and the Islamists."[180]

This statement accords with the fact that Islamist circles in Turkey do not show the same responses to the Kurdish issue as they do for the Palestinians. When there is a conflict in Palestine Islamic organizations in Turkey respond in a coordinated way. I refer to this as 'selective communitarianism,' because although they define themselves as Islamic groups, which defend the rights of Muslims, they are selective in their responses and apply a double standard. Clearly they are not exempt from Kemalist indoctrination when it comes to the Kurds. Thus their sense of

[179] This is the National Pact which established Turkey's borders in 1920.
[180] Interview with H.P., Istanbul, 10 July 2014.

belonging to the Turkish nation takes precedence over their Muslim identity. How can we explain the influence of Kemalism? If we look at the political parties shut down by the courts in Turkey, we see the red lines of Kemalism which could not tolerate certain ideologies; such as leftist, Communist and Kurdish movements. Pro-Kurdish movements are labelled as separatist, whereas Islamic movements have been associated with an intention to impose the Sharia law. They are accused of being the domestic enemies of the state.

According to H.P., the AKP, however, emerged from this exclusion with a strong focus on its Islamic character. During the history of Turkish Republic, Islamist movements have always been in the opposition, it is the first time with the AKP that such movements have a place in the state apparatus. Hence, he continued, the struggle of Islamists lost its oppositional character. After holding power for over ten years, now it is the AKP's years of mastering governance. As a result of long experience in government, H.P. from EWBP claims, Islamist groups tend to conform and delegate the solution of the Kurdish question entirely to the AKP, which has the monopoly on state resources and has its own advisors and think tanks. Nevertheless, H.P. argues, the mission of Islamic NGOs should not only be to support the AKP, but also to challenge it when it makes a mistake:

> "The tradition of Islamic struggle should not lose its oppositional character. Because the AKP comes from an Islamic background, it gives the impression that Muslims are involved in the solution process. However, for Turkey's Islamists it is a problem to stay in the hinterland of the AKP and to approve everything it does [...] because it means letting the AKP represent themselves completely. As such this is the first time that Islamism meets the state on common ground, it never happened before, politically conscious Islamic circles used to have an oppositional stance against the Kemalist nationalist state structure."[181]

As can be seen, groups such as the GPJ and the PI target the public in the Western part of Turkey, and try to mobilize mainly Turkish public opinion. The EWBP, on the other hand, aim at Turkey on a larger scale, and brings the Kurdish question not only to urban areas, but also rural areas. By focusing on metropolitan areas in Turkey, where the majority of the population lives, we can say that many groups neglected the rural areas. However, without influencing people from the rural

[181] Interview with H.P., Istanbul, 10 July 2014.

areas, where nationalist sentiments are high, it is difficult for them to have an impact. Moreover, during their events and campaigns, they do not necessarily inform them about what is going on in Turkey's Kurdistan, as was the case with PI, they only focus on their statement which aims at the solution without referring to the underlying reasons and process which leads to war today. For older groups active before the widespread use of social media, one of the obstacles they faced was being ignored and not finding any representation in the media. This made it difficult for them to reach the public and to advocate their demands. However, once social media became more accessible and widely used, the Turkish state could no longer turn a blind eye on them since groups were able to use their own media channels to make their voice heard.

In general, we can say that peace movements in Turkey need to make clear who their audience is, and what their agenda consists of. First, is their main issue only the Kurdish question, or struggling for all the oppressed ones in opposition or in principle they only aim at democratic requests? In terms of audience, the Kurds are already mobilized for themselves, so does it make sense for peace movements to claim that they support Kurdish people's demands? If nothing materializes this may not go beyond an act of solidarity. Instead if they had chosen the Western part of Turkey as their audience and explained the causes of war and the need for peace, they might have succeeded in their demands, and extended their range of mobilization. My research revealed that they did not choose a clear audience or define a clear message to transmit either to the public or to politicians in decision-making mechanisms.

Another problem with peace movements in Turkey is that they cannot reach the masses. They are stuck in a small circle of activists from similar ideological, and often professional and social backgrounds, which make them limited in their ability to reach the public. Their weak organizational structures can be seen as a result of the 1980 coup. Moreover, they are viewed as elitist movements because of their closed circles. In addition to their weak organizational structures, peace movements in Turkey try to exist in a challenging environment limited by closed POS. As many other groups stated, the main parliamentary party which they can use to make their voice heard is the Kurdish party of BDP. This is a weakness because AKP holds the majority in Parliament, and they can block all political initiatives. Moreover, when it comes to collaboration with Muslim circles the AKP is a big obstacle. Many Muslims see the AKP as representatives of their values and the government, which represents them, and they are not keen to protest against it. Furthermore, in Turkey's Kurdistan, the AKP is the first or second party in every election,

depending on the region. The AKP gets the vote of not only of Turkish Muslims but also of Kurdish Muslims.

This political and legal pressure lead to opposition groups being unable to create mass support, or to transform themselves into a mass movement from below, so that they were limited to activist groups in active positions within the group. Because of this closed POS, a peace demand does not materialize as a result of pressure from below or civil society, and the only actor in charge of the process is government, which binds it to one party's agenda; –the AKP which is in power for over thirteen years. Because of this pressure, oppositional groups cannot reach the masses and last long. Many interviewees stressed that not only was it unrealistic to be in solidarity with, and get support from the AKP as the governing party, but they also did not have good prospects from the largest opposition party in Parliament, the CHP. They defined it as a party which serves the state's interests and never puts society's concerns on their agenda. Today this state mentality, as a legacy of Kemalism, is still carried by the CHP so that it cannot take any initiative in terms of resolving the Kurdish question and attaining peace. The CHP did not manage to be a true opposition to the AKP. Both were serving the interests of the state, and not those of the people. Moreover, when it comes to the Kurdish issue, we see that in the Turkish context the two opposing sides, secularists and Islamists, can merge in their opposition to the Kurdish conflict, which solution requires them to give Kurds their rights and freedoms. Therefore, as the largest opposition party in Parliament, the CHP was never an opposition party *stricto sensu* since most cases they were symbolically opposing everything the AKP stands for, but without a solid base. This led many groups to support, and be supported by the Kurdish party only, so that they were sometimes labeled as '*Kürtcü*' (Kurdish sympathizer) and supporters of terrorism.

Lastly, it would be unjust not to give credit to the AKP for having managed to curb the power of the military on politics. Since the creation of the Republic the army has seen itself as the guardian of secularism and the unitary state, making it one of the biggest obstacles to the solution of the Kurdish conflict. In the end, the army was the one fighting the PKK in Turkey's Kurdistan. The army did not see the Kurdish question as a structural problem generated and maintained by Kemalism. On the contrary, the army's rigid ideological stance made it perceive the Kurdish issue as a security problem. Therefore, the PKK has always been defined as a separatist terrorist organization, which had to be fought with military instruments, instead of its literal meaning of Kurdistan Workers Party. The governments before the AKP always handled the Kurdish question

from the army's perspective; whatever the army offered as a solution was accepted by the governing party. This mentality changed when the AKP came to power, not only as a result of the armed struggle of the PKK and the political struggle of the Kurdish movement, but also due to the changing shape of events in the Middle East together with AKP's early policies on European Union accession. However, this all changed dramatically in 2015, when the AKP faced the risk of losing power in the region when the Rojava revolution took place.

6.2.3. Conscientious objection

Conscientious objection (CO) is an interesting case in Turkey, not only because military service is compulsory for men, but also because it is not defined in law; it is neither a legitimate right nor a crime. It is not just this gap in Turkish law which make people conscientious objectors. There are many political motivations behind this action. In this section I discuss four groups: anti-militarists; CO for Peace; Women Conscientious Objectors; and the CO Association, which were formed to build solidarity and offer support for men considering conscientious objection. I examine when they were set up, whether they have a vision and goal, who their audience is, how they define the problem, and what kind of solution they offer.

In Turkey conscientious objection is not a recent phenomenon, but it is a contradictory one because it rejects one of the core components of militaristic society which is compulsory military service. Although there are many people[182] who declared their objection, conscientious objection was never a movement, and remained more or less an individual choice. There have been some attempts to organize, but we cannot talk about a monolithic CO movement.

Y.A. is one of the founders of the anti-militarist initiative, and was also active with the war resisters in Izmir. In September 1991, a few people came together in Izmir including him and declared their conscientious objection. As anti-militarists, they set up the Izmir War Resisters Association later shut down by the police, then they continued their activities via War Resisters webpage, which is still on-line and active today. As anti-militarists, they preferred to express themselves as war resisters rather than as pro-peace activists, because according to the literature of militarism peace is simply the time between two wars:

[182] According to the War Resisters webpage, in May 2013 the number of conscientious objectors was 210 (Savas Karsitlari 2013).

> "The first time we were planning to declare our objection, we asked ourselves, "There is a war going on here, what can we do against it?" We issued a call to stop using humans as resources in war and invited people to become objectors. We faced a lot of censorship in the media, Israeli objectors were in the news, but we weren't. From the early 2000s on, that censorship decreased because of a military coup and the so called "demilitarization" process by the AKP to remodel the army for its own ends."[183]

He claimed that when they were organizing campaigns for imprisoned objectors, their aim was to create public awareness to release them. "Stop the Human Resources of War," "Don't go to war," "Don't Kill Your Brother," and "Refuse, Resist, Say No, Don't Go to the Army" were common slogans. At the same time they were also emphasizing the term "disobedience" in some campaigns. As an anarchist Y.A. engages in dialogue with politicians when it serves a functional purpose in terms of conscientious objection. He added that the Peoples' Democratic Congress (*Halkların Demokratik Kongresi*, HDK)[184] was interested in the issue because their main aim is to bring a solution to the war as it is the case with conscientious objectors who refuse to serve the war.

Another point he made was that the reason why conscientious objection is not legalized is the role of militaristic culture and of army as an organization in Turkey where soldiers see themselves as the founders of the Republic, which gives them the right to shape and direct the society the way they want. He argued that the state is planning to replace compulsory military service with a professional service, not because it is anti-militaristic, but because it would be a more efficient and profitable system for the army, without having to deal with military service avoiders and objectors.[185]

The definition conscientious objectors used for refusers was inclusive: anyone who refuses compulsory military service for political, ethical, religious or ethical reasons, and it was not measured in terms of anti-militarism. Total objectors were generally anti-militarists, who refused any compulsory service imposed by the state, including civil service:

> "Although the reason why we declared our objection in the first place was being against the war in this country, in the past few years there have been some rumors among objectors that we didn't take

---

[183] Interview with Y.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.
[184] The HDK was set up on 15 October 2011. It is a union of many left-wing parties, organizations and grass-roots movements and it represents all those who are discriminated and oppressed because of their class, ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation.
[185] Interview with Y.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.

> the Kurdish question into consideration, that we didn't deal with it, etc. Followed by that 'Kurdish CO' emerged and they defined themselves as not anti-militarist, which is okay, but they used a nationalist framework. This did not make sense because we started this by thinking what to do against the war in Kurdistan. This destroyed the motivation among the movement and it made it harder to stand together. Our voice may be heard more now, but it does not have the same effect as it did in the past."[186]

For him, although the number of conscientious objectors has increased, it is no longer as effective as it was during the period when anti-militarist initiative and war-resisters were active. Part of the problem is, said Y.A., they only go into action when someone has been put in prison. Moreover, as an independent autonomous group it was not easy to engage in politics considering Turkey's exclusionist political culture. They were a much more respected entity when they kept their independent structure instead of becoming a tool for a political movement.[187]

When issues such as justified violence and militarism vs. anti-militarism discussions took place among objectors, this ideological breakthrough led to the founding of the Conscientious Objection for Peace Platform in 2009. According to one of the platform's initiators, it was based on the idea that if objectors define themselves as anti-war, their first step must be to take action against the Kurdish War:

> "We claimed that anarchists should vote because of the special circumstances in Turkey in the sense that having MPs in Parliament who represent oppressed Kurdish women and children is not the same as having MPs from a Turkish nationalist party. Then during the hunger strike, some of our anarchist friends issued a statement and said both the state and the Kurdish movement call people to die for the cause. We claimed that this is ignoring Kurdish people's agency. We had a lot of arguments and they accused us of politicizing the conscientious objection movement by merging it with the Kurdish politics."[188]

The CO for Peace Platform gave priority to challenging the notion of compulsory military service as an untouchable subject in society. Another issue they dealt with were the suspicious deaths of soldiers who died during military service since most of them belonged to a minority group such as Armenians, Kurds, Alewites, or leftists. Although they managed to present these issues forward so

---

[186] Interview with Y.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.
[187] Interview with Y.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.
[188] Interview with E.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.

that the public now knows about them, he claimed that they should have been engaged with grievances faced by military service avoiders and soldiers earlier. They did not manage to convince dissidents in Turkey to question compulsory military service:

> "The left does not think that fighting against a militaristic structure is possible through anti-militarism and it sees conscientious objection as a pacifist act which does not criticize the system. The left believes that fighting on the streets is an obstacle to become a conscientious objector. They regarded conscientious objection as a luxury issue because Turkey already has so many problems. Then we explained to them that our problems are similar because we are also against violence, militarism, racism, and nationalism. We said there are many objectors from different backgrounds. Once we broadened the issues we deal with, they started to understand us."[189]

Anarchists who were part of the anti-militarist initiative have been accused of not being sufficiently involved in the Kurdish question because E.A. claimed that as total objectors anarchists are against all kinds of war including the Kurdish military struggle.[190] The CO for Peace Initiative was criticized for politicizing objection by siding with the Kurdish movement and dealing with many issues including compulsory military service and military service avoiders, which made them lose the focus on objection *per se*. Within CO there was an ongoing debate as to whether they should only focus on objection itself, whether they should also take in grievances faced by soldiers during military service, or should they work to promote legislation to legalize conscientious objection and to make civil service an alternative. The main problem is that conscientious objection is not seen as a human right since militaristic culture does not question compulsory military service. It is instead seen as a privilege and a luxury in contemporary Turkey with its many problems. What is missing is to see the link between conscientious objection, militaristic culture and ending the war with the Kurds.

Conscientious objection was often viewed as supporting the Kurdish movement by refusing to fight against them. The Turkish Left could not put aside its nationalist identity and therefore did not treat conscientious objection as an issue. It was the same in Islamist circles which showed sympathy for the Palestinian movement but not its Kurdish equivalent. This is reflected in their attitudes to conscientious objection.

---

[189] Interview with E.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.
[190] Interview with E.A., Istanbul, 9 April 2013.

When M.C.E. declared his objection for religious reasons he was part of the anti-capitalist Muslims group. He argued that according to Islam serving any state institution is not right and because compulsory military service makes you to obey the army, Islam does not consider this as legal. He added that declaring an objection as an individual is important in the sense that the stated reasons for objection lead to discussion of war, religion, destruction of nature and hierarchical structure of the army:

> "In our conscientious objection statement, we criticized hierarchy and the nation-state and argued that Allah is the only one whom we will obey. We used Islamic references and we also stressed the Kurdish question in the sense that we defined the Turkish army as the protector of the global capitalist imperialist system. We are anti-militarist, but we are not against violence, the Quran is our reference. According to the Quran, if your rights are taken away, you should use violence, if not you don't have any pride and dignity. It is a holy right to defend the right to life and therefore the Kurdish people's struggle is legal for us."[191]

Unlike the other objectors I interviewed he argued that having women as conscientious objectors had a negative impact on the influence of declarations. He thinks that it does not make sense for anyone who is not liable for compulsory military service to declare his/her objection. To him, instead of being conscientious objectors, women should create solidarity platforms for men conscientious objectors as their mothers, partners or children because otherwise the media does not take them seriously.[192]

Although military service is only compulsory for men, there are also women objectors in Turkey. They argue that in order to oppose compulsory military service; they do not have to be liable to enlist. One of them is from the Women's Conscientious Objectors Platform, which was set up on 15 May 2011, on International Conscientious Objection Day, when women declared their objection. M.A. thinks that with women's conscientious objection, issues of militarism and being a soldier are discussed from a different angle:

> "It is not only men but also women who suffer from war, military service and the army. As women, we do not do military service, but we live in a militaristic society. Ours is an act towards stopping the

[191] Interview with M.C.E., Istanbul, 11 April 2013.
[192] Interview with M.C.E., Istanbul, 11 April 2013.

> war on these territories and women conscientious objectors contribute to the emergence of peace culture."[193]

She added that they managed to challenge the idea among conscientious objectors that women cannot declare their objection as they are exempt from military service, because their common point is rejecting compulsory military service. She said they were ignored by the political structure although the number of objectors is increasing. Nevertheless, the mainstream media was interested in them when they first declared their objection not because they were willing to criticize militarism, but because they found women declaring conscientious objection to be media-worthy, interesting and colorful. Like other objectors I interviewed, she said that although they do not ask help from politicians directly, Sebahat Tuncel is supportive of them because of her role in the Kurdish struggle and the women's movement.[194]

O.S. is a long-term activist involved in conscientious objectors' mobilization and he was engaged in setting up the War Resisters' webpage. He emphasized that as the group and supporters of objectors they are reactive so that if one of them goes to jail, they get together and organize demonstrations. For him, the movement consists of conscientious objectors, war resisters and anti-militarists who have the potential to create resistance once an objector goes to jail.

> "Although there are Muslim objectors, it's not easy for them because they are seen as traitors by their fellow Muslims who think that it's very problematic not to obey the state, and they claim that Islam does not allow refusal of military service. Moreover, our friends who put anti-militarism first were concerned about Muslim refusers. These anti-militarists who also define themselves as anarchists think that to be anti-war means to be against all kinds of war. So, when Muslim refusers say they are not against jihad, socialist refusers say they would be willing to fight in a revolution, or when Kurdish refusers claim they are not against guerilla warfare; it created a big divide. Anarchists are total objectors. Once the diversity among objectors increased, anarchists kept their distance."[195]

He said that when it comes to conscientious objection it is important to influence society first, so that politicians will take them seriously. He emphasized that the AKP would not approve of conscientious objection for religious reasons because Muslims are divided among themselves when

---

[193] Interview with M.A., Istanbul, 24 April 2013.
[194] Interview with M.A., Istanbul, 24 April 2013.
[195] Interview with O.S., Istanbul, 3 April 2013.

it comes to refusing military service. Objectors received support from Kurdish MPs who worked to introduce bills on conscientious objection. However, objectors do not get much support from leftist circles because for some leftists it is difficult to associate themselves with anti-militarist action.

O.S. argued in 2010, when they mobilized around CO for Peace, their focus was not only on the declarations made by conscientious objectors and the difficulties they faced if arrested, but also on war and soldiers who died during military service. When their main point shifted to the war against Kurdish guerillas, the anarchists kept their distance because of their anti-militaristic stance. O.S. claimed that the reason why conscientious objection is not legal in Turkey is the ongoing war, for which the state needs men to do their compulsory military service. As long as the war continues, conscientious objection cannot be recognized as a legal right in Turkey.[196]

As the objectors were so diverse in their reasons for refusal, they were dispersed and dormant when none of them was in jail, although they continued to object to compulsory military service. In order to solve their problems and to support them when they face difficulties, some of them pointed out the need to establish an association to provide objectors with legal support, and to supply information to those who are considering conscientious objection. This led to the creation of the Conscientious Objection Association in 2013.

D.E. provides legal support to the association and said that they have two main aims: the recognition of conscientious objection as a legal right under the Constitution; and to demonstrate to society what the implications of war are, and why there is a need for making a stand against militarism. This also includes soldiers' rights and suspicious deaths of soldiers during their military service. He emphasized that the main problem is in Turkey neither citizens nor politicians have knowledge about human rights, so that refusing to do military service is not considered within a human rights framework. The state, on the other hand, treats objectors as soldiers who refuse to do their duty. In order to conceal their objection and prevent a debate on the topic, the state's tactic is to issue conscientious objection with anti-social behavior disorder reports and to thus exempt them from compulsory military service.[197]

---

[196] Interview with O.S., Istanbul, 3 April 2013.
[197] Interview with D.E., Istanbul, 3 July 2014.

As I showed, the mutual solidarity of conscientious objectors emerged on a temporary basis; they tend to react in times of need rather than presenting an efficient and well-organized channels and concrete targets. Although they come into existence as initiatives, in order to emphasize their collectivity, I chose to refer to them as 'a movement.'

S.T.[198] was one of the few MPs who submitted a bill to Parliament to make conscientious objection a legal right in Turkey. As already mentioned she conferred with refusers about the bill's content and participated in their activities to demonstrate her solidarity. She claimed that it is not easy to link conscientious objection to the peace process in Turkey:

> "There are only few refusers who express their refusal to do their military service in order not to participate in war. For instance, Young Kurds want to avoid military service in the first place, so it [only] becomes a political statement indirectly. Conscientious objection in Turkey did not become a strong peace movement because very few people claimed that they do not want to shoot their Kurdish brothers, therefore they declare their conscientious objection. The reason for refusal is more like their beliefs, their criticism of being a soldier as a profession or LGBTs emphasized gender politics."

She argued that military service helps the war to continue and that if people want to achieve peace, they should express this by not doing their compulsory military service.[199]

6.2.4. Human Rights Monitoring Groups and Organizations

The Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği,* IHD/HRA) has branches throughout Turkey. It was created after the state's use of torture in prisons in the wake of the 1980 coup. Women, mainly mothers and partners of men in prison, came together to organize against this ill-treatment in prisons. As they focus on human rights discourse, their main slogans are "A Human is a Human with his/her Rights" and "Everybody Equal, Everybody Different."

U.E. from HRA claimed that peace has many prerequisites in Turkey in relation to human rights:

> "It is important that the weapons are put aside, but peace can be attained if we build mechanisms based on justice, human rights and democracy. All the marginalized should be equals during peace; Kurds, women, LGBTs. We need a new constitution, which will include the foundation of a truth and

[198] S.T. has been arrested on 6 November 2016, approximately two years after I interviewed her. As of December 2017, she is still in prison.
[199] Interview with S.T., Istanbul, 23 April 2013.

reconciliation committee. This request should come from civil society, from the bottom; we do not want a democracy which is an instrument of the AKP's election campaign."[200]

She claimed that what distinguishes them from other organizations is whenever there is a human rights abuse, they go to the place in order to ascertain what happened, so that the public knows about it. They also provide free legal support when necessary.

U.E. emphasized that as a human rights organization, they try to keep the same distance from all ideologies, yet not all political parties in Turkey are treated equally, since they only support the ones which deal with human rights abuses. She also noted that they try not to collaborate with political parties since all of them represent a specific ideological group. Nevertheless, when the Kurdish party, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) was attacked the HRA showed its support of the BDP, albeit not in the form of an alliance. As a result they were labeled a "Kurdish sympathizer association," which brought many restrictions:

> "We are one of the most controlled organizations. Many of our directors are in prison, two of our executives have been murdered. We were put on trial many times. We receive a lot of threats. We believe that the state is responsible for human rights abuses. And they know it, this is why the state wants to control us."[201]

Saturday Mothers (*Cumartesi Anneleri*) is a civil disobedience group composed of women whose relatives or acquaintances have disappeared while in custody. After the coup in 1980 society was under pressure and could no longer resort to political activism. After this period of oppression in the 1990s the Kurdish movement and the groups which claimed political rights gained momentum. S.A. claims that to suppress this, the Turkish state systematically used disappearance in custody:

> "Enforced disappearance is different from other rights abuses because it creates uncertainty and a frightening atmosphere, making it even more effective than unresolved crimes. By doing this the state does not risk its legitimacy because once it denies [that the person has been in custody], you cannot prove their disappearance. This was a state policy in the 1990s that human rights defenders, members and executives of HRA, unionists, journalists, Kurdish and socialist politicians disappeared. This requires a huge mechanism: Army officers or police make you disappear, there will be no judicial

[200] Interview with U.E., Istanbul, 22 April 2013.
[201] Interview with U.E., Istanbul, 22 April 2013.

> inquiry, the bureaucracy will not question it, and the media will not publish it. There is not one single academic work in the 1990s dealing with this. During the state of emergency being Kurdish was enough for enforced disappearance. Apart from the state of emergency, the highest number [of disappeared] is in Istanbul including a great many university students."[202]

The Saturday Mothers was set up when two activists, Hasan Ocak and Ridvan Karakoç were taken into custody in Istanbul in 1995. Three months after their disappearance their bodies were found abandoned in a graveyard. The forensic reports found signs of torture yet the prosecutor decided not to open legal proceedings arguing that the Turkish police would not commit torture. After that, the women from the HRA's Enforced Disappearances Commission reached the conclusion that there was no legal option open. In order to put pressure on the judiciary and state institutions, they decided to inform society about enforced disappearances. Following the example of the *Plaza de majo* mothers in Argentina, women from the HRA and relatives and acquaintances of those who had disappeared started a vigil in Galatasaray Square in central Istanbul every Saturday to influence public opinion. In addition, another ongoing goal is to have enforced disappearances defined as a crime in the Turkish Penal Code.

The Saturday Mothers gather every Saturday, holding the pictures of missing people and one of them reads a statement, which tells the story of one missing person, what happened to them, when they disappeared, who is responsible for the disappearance, and where he/she is now. The Saturday Mothers are also well known internationally. In the 1990s police put them in a closed bus and then used teargas. They were beaten with police batons by the police and many arrests followed:

> "We had to take a break for ten years as the violence became unbearable for old mothers. Then the Ergenekon trials began and some of the officers arrested for planning a [military] coup were also responsible for Turkey being sentenced in the ECHR [European Court of Human Rights] due to enforced disappearances. Then we said, now that they are arrested, they should be put on trial not only for planning a coup, but also for crimes against humanity. We went to the trials, families filed applications to be involved in the trials, we tried to make public opinion aware. Unfortunately, they were only charged for planning a coup, not for crimes against humanity. There were also some people

[202] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.

> in senior positions within the AKP who were involved in enforced disappearances in the past, so there was a connection between the government and disappearances."[203]

At this point it is important to note that during the Ergenekon trials the AKP only wanted to put officers on trial for planning a coup, but not for forced disappearances. The AKP changed POS in its own favor to avoid any charges which would put high-level AKP executives on trial.

In 2011 as a result of public pressure, Prime Minister Erdoğan met the Saturday Mothers. Ten women attended the meeting, the youngest was 78 and the oldest was 105 years of age. They presented their case and their expectations and delivered a dossier with the records of the enforced disappearances. They reminded him that since 2006 Turkey had not signed the U.N. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which makes states responsible for disappearances. Nothing changed after the meeting, S.A. added. Although they were able to use POS at some point, opportunities stayed closed to them as a result of the AKP's selective approach to the Ergenekon trials.

In terms of political alliances within Parliament, she claimed, they are supported by the BDP and Sezgin Tanrikulu and Hüseyin Aygün from the CHP have filed parliamentary questions about enforced disappearances.[204] Nevertheless, once the AKP rejects an issue, a commission or enquires cannot take place. Although they have allies within Parliament, the fact that the AKP has a majority means it can block any attempt as a result of closed political opportunities.

Political opportunities within Turkey were closed to them and prevented them from seeking punishment for those responsible. Despite this, many cases have been finalized at the ECHR underlining that the Turkish state was responsible for enforced disappearances.[205] Once the ECHR comes to a decision, the cases have to be reexamined in Turkey. S.A. explained that:

> "The re-examination process did not take place; it has been twenty years. The prosecution works to conceal the crimes committed by the state against its citizens. However at least after the 1990s the state could not initiate enforced disappearances thanks to Saturday Mothers who would otherwise

[203] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.
[204] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.
[205] See "The ECHR Judgments on Enforced Disapperances" by Hafiza Merkezi (No date).

> announce disappearances to the public immediately. They managed to rebuild the collective memory by not forgetting disappeared people and those responsible for it despite the state's efforts."[206]

The slogans used at the vigil are: "We want our disappeared ones back", "We will not forget; We will not forgive", "The perpetrators are known, where are the disappeared ones". They aim to bring injustices and crimes against humanity into collective memory not only in Turkey's civil society, but also in international public opinion. The Saturday Mothers believe that once they can appeal to the conscience of people, the public will demand the punishment for the perpetrators responsible for enforced disappearances. For Saturday Mothers the prognosis is the state taking an active role in enforced disappearances, whereas the diagnosis is having a democratic country which respects human rights. Therefore, a peace process which does not take enforced disappearances into consideration cannot be successful. The remedy is for society to insist on it.

Another important aspect of the Saturday Mothers work is that their activism is transferred from generation to generation. M.O. claimed:

> "The memory we create here in this vigil is always fresh, now three generations are standing side by side. When I first came here for my brother, I was nineteen. Now my daughter is here, the mothers are getting old here in this vigil. It's always women who stand up against fascist regimes. We see motherhood differently, when we talk about our children, no one means their own child, all the disappeared people are our children."[207]

S.A. emphasized that enforced disappearances were part of the Kurdish question since they were a result of war policies. As long as there is no democratic state, which does not treat all citizens equally by recognizing their existence, there will be war but no peace, she said. For a true peace there should be negotiations based on equal grounds not only with the PKK, but also with segments of society whose rights have been taken away and who were 'otherized.'[208]

Another human rights group "Soldier's Rights" works as an online platform to monitor physical and verbal abuse during military service. Its webpage allows soldiers to record an instance of abuse during military service with the time, place and witnesses if possible. T.I. decided to set up this blog after his own military service, during which he encountered many abuses:

---

[206] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.
[207] Interview with M.O., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.
[208] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 26 July 2014.

> "Everybody experiences some kind of abuse during their military service. The most common reaction is to forget, but there are others who were heavily affected by this trauma. This blog provides the opportunity to face the bad treatment and to claim your right to be treated according to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel behavior. This includes beating, insults, any abuse during military service. We create reports and try to make an issue out of it."[209]

He stated that their audience is not the army because they want to be in dialogue with civil institutions such as the Ministry of Defense and government. Their aim is to make military service something to be monitored and controlled in order to prevent abuse. He added that unlike objectors, who refuse to enlist, Soldier's Rights became a platform which could not be marginalized by the public because it included men who had completed their military service.

Soldier's Rights emerged at the time when the AKP claimed that it had initiated a process of demilitarization in Turkey. As an organization which exposes abuses during military service it found a platform for itself in Parliament's human rights commission. The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (*İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği,* Mazlumder), is an Islamic human rights organization which supported Soldier Rights and created its own unit to deal with abuses. The support of the AKP, and Mazlumder gave vital backing to Soldier Rights. This brings us to my argument that Islamists' support is very important in the Turkish context if an organization tries to fuel activism. Moreover, the AKP's sympathy for Soldier Rights should not be read as a democratic move, but as an instrument to impede the army.

6.3. Sporadic and informal: alliances among groups and organizations

Turkey's peace camp is small and not very diversified with no strong alliances among peace movement groups and organizations. Although the leftist and activist circles are small so that many people know each other in person, they do not cooperate, nor do they build alliances.

The main question is why they have such weak organizational characteristics. First, is it because they are very vulnerable to the changes in the political sphere? Or is it because they have a weak organizational culture, with no financial base or offices, which could otherwise allow them to work

[209] Interview with T.I., Istanbul, 26 June 2013.

more professionally? If we take the latter, it is clear that when an activist is not engaged directly, but delegate tasks to others, then the movement is restricted to a few people in the cadre, and depends on their time and energy of those few. Their capacity for activism is also limited to the number of people attending meetings. This, in turn, leads to a loose structure, which can disintegrate at any time. Activist groups need to carry out autocriticism in order to question activism issues and what is understood by mobilization. It should be taken up by many, so that it is not limited to a core group of activists' time, energy and commitment in order to make it a durable movement, and subject to the sudden changes in the political environment and government policies.

Another problem with peace movements in Turkey is that they have never been robust, persistent and long-lasting entities. They have been formed in reaction to events, which made them dependent on POS, and on AKP policies in particular. They usually took the task of monitoring, criticizing, collaborating with, or contributing to, the existing situation, but did not initiate the peace process themselves. They never managed to be a political force capable of putting pressure on government.

For peace movements there is always the risk that they position themselves in line with the AKP, which makes the AKP the sole actor accountable for and in charge of peace negotiations. This means that peace movements are on shaky ground, where they cannot create an initiative themselves independent of the ruling party. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the closed political opportunities do not provide the movements with the necessary path whereby they could detach themselves from the ruling party. In Turkey, therefore, peace movements are trapped by: closed political opportunities on the one hand, and a lack of organizational skills to provide a clear agenda with a single goal and well-defined actors in the process of conflict-solving, on the other.

However, it is remarkable that although in 2002 NWIC succeeded to mobilize many people, it could not channel its energy after its success with the veto from Parliament on Turkey's participation in the war on Iraq. This can be related to three things. First, the coalition was based on only one aim through which they managed to bring different groups together. There was no other agenda to be agreed on other than preventing Parliament from passing the law. Second, Muslim circles were satisfied with this result and did not continue their collaboration with other groups on other issues. Lastly, "Not enough but Yes" (*Yetmez ama* Evet) movement was a turning point for dissidents in Turkey. The left was divided among itself so that liberal leftists were accused

of being AKP supporters and therefore traitors. This led to a decline in their unity so that coalition-building around any other important issue such as the Kurdish question was no longer possible. The fact that they could not continue with their opposition in order to solve other problems can be seen as a failed accomplishment on the dissidents' side, where they managed to achieve a momentum during the Iraq war. Muslim community circles, leftists and liberals managed to reach thousands during NWIC, but they remain divided when it comes to the Kurdish question. Another important point mentioned in the interviews was that LGBTQ people's attendance is a deal breaker for some religious organizations' representatives which makes collaboration not possible.

6.4. Concluding remarks

This chapter has analyzed the political context in Turkey after AKP came to power in 2002 while looking at peace movements' characteristics asking whether there are prognostic and diagnostic frames used by the groups and organizations and to what extent they are capable of building alliances. I demonstrated that there is no clear message of the peace community although they were focusing on the solution of the Kurdish question. The lack of a well-defined audience was reflected in their statements. There was a big critique of AKP government and mainly of Erdogan, however Kemalism as the founding ideology has not been discussed as the root of the problem. Although there was a big mobilization during the war on Iraq, the cooperation within NWIC could not continue on the solution of the Kurdish issue as activists within NWIC were from different ideological backgrounds with a different understanding of the Kurdish question. My empirical findings lead to three conclusions which will be elaborated in Chapter 7 in detail. First, there was no critique of militarism and Kemalism during the mobilization of PMOs in Turkey. Second, Kemalism's discursive aspect as a founding ideology by otherizing and discriminating against Kurdish people was not a discussion topic. Lastly, thanks to Turkish state's bad record on freedom of speech, groups and organizations were limited in their capacity to vocalize their demands.

It is interesting to note that most interviewees stressed the need for a 'permanent' solution to the Kurdish question. This, I think, reflects the extent to which they trust political structures and institutions because they are afraid of another rupture in peace process. Some of them, on the other hand, see conscientious objection as a receipt to end the war, in that war cannot persist without soldiers. Although some objectors broadened their activism to areas beyond the recognition of conscientious objection as a legal constitutional right, alongside soldiers' rights and abuses and

death while in military service, mobilization is still sporadic. They are aware that they need to be more target-oriented and proactive, not merely reactive when an objector ends up in prison.

7. YOUNG REPUBLICS OLD CONFLICTS: A COMPARISON OF PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND TURKEY

The starting point for my research is the observation that despite similar political opportunity structures (POS), the peace movements in Israel and Turkey have different movement characteristics. In Chapters 5 and 6 I examined the different movements in the two countries separately. In this chapter I take the analysis to another level and explore the differences between peace movements across the two countries, Israel and Turkey.

In the analyses I have used concepts developed in the study of social movements, in particular POS, framing and mobilizing structures. At the end of my analysis three main findings emerged. First, the critique of militarism is not an explanatory factor when it comes to the mobilization of peace movements in either Israel or Turkey. Second, different levels of enjoyment of citizenship rights — favoring Israeli Jews in Israel and Turks in Turkey — help account for differences in freedom of expression and action in both countries; in return the differences shape the framing and mobilizing structures. Lastly, the variance in movement characteristics is largely attributable to different interpretations of their founding ideologies. In Israel the core of the problem is not necessarily attributed to Zionism, which has many groups and organizations following the discursive aspect of Zionism, in addition to those set up to deconstruct its claims. In Turkey Kemalism was not held accountable for the emergence and persistence of the Kurdish question, and thus no solution has been sought within its discursive aspect. In contrast to Israel, in Turkey we find no organization set up to question and challenge this founding ideology.

7.1. The role of political opportunity structures and the interplay with movement characteristics

Meyer (1993a) highlights the link between political opportunities and cycles of peace movement engagement. He emphasizes that political choices do not occur in a vacuum but are influenced "by

one's proximity to the locus of decision making, available political resources, the magnitude of the changes sought, as well as the responsiveness of those in power to both dissenters and their ideas" (Meyer 1993a: 457). He notes that despite the fact that nuclear issues were debated in public venues, their focus was not on policy alternatives, but only on "existential shock" (462). He concludes that "public opinion on nuclear weapons has remained generally constant" but "only when elite actors have legitimated criticism of government policy have strong movements emerged" (473). This worked well in Israel where Jewish identity was in itself a tool for legitimizing criticism of government, as it gave an insider point of view. In Turkey, however, top-down republicanism produced its own elites which were a reproduceable tool. In the end the criticism of the 'enlightened intellectuals' (*Aydin*) failed to reach the broader public precisely because it was a replica of the founding ideology: intellectuals felt obliged to explain the truth to the uneducated masses and lecture them in a top-down way on what was best for the country without providing a base for the peace and democracy discourse.

Kriesi and van Praag argue that "in countries with a broad range of institutionalized channels of participation for challengers to the political system, the probability that new social movements will engage in negotiations of this kind is expected to be greater than in countries where no or only very limited such possibilities exist" (1987: 321). This is the case with Israeli peace movements, where communication channels and lobbying power are open, giving them access to the Knesset. In Turkey, on the other hand, channels for negotiation with political actors in Parliament are restricted and we find a selective negotiation process, where groups which are a part of the establishment or pro-government, have relatively easier access to Parliament in comparison with their Kurdish counterparts. Kriesi and van Praag conclude that the Dutch peace movement is not separated from traditional political organizations in the sense that activists maintain relations with them since they are not completely alienated from the political system (1987: 341–42). The degree of access to the traditional political system differs across Israel and Turkey, and within both countries. One of Kriesi's main findings is the presence of smaller and more radical parties on the left reinforce the favorable political opportunity structures of peace movements (1989b: 309). Jenkins argue that changes in governing coalitions regulate the "expansion and contraction of" the SMS, in the sense that the "dominance of a center/left governing coalition generally increases the opportunities for reform movements by reducing the likelihood of repression and increasing the likelihood of sponsorship by polity members" (1983: 548). Moreover, the Dutch government delayed stationing

cruise missiles in the Netherlands because the party allies of the peace movement were in opposition at the time (Kriesi 1989b: 309). This shows the importance of having political allies influential enough to change government policy.

		Israel	Turkey
Movement characteristics	**Mobilizing structures (alliances and repertoire)**	Big community of human rights organizations	Small community of human rights organizations
		Big peace camp with different actors (anarchists, rabbis, feminists, leftists, Zionists)	Small camp with no diversity
		Coalition among organizations	No alliances among groups
		Complex strategies (direct action, demonstration)	Simple strategies (petitions, workshops)
	Framing (diagnostic and prognostic)	Clear message of the peace camp (1-state or 2-state solution)	Lack of one clear message/solution
		Well-defined audience to transmit the message	Lack of well-defined audience
		Clear lines of belonging to the group	Membership based on vague definitions
		Critique of army and government	Critique of government but no strong opposition to the army
		The core of the problem is not necessarily seen in Zionism	The essence of the problem is not attributed to Kemalism

Table 7.1 : Findings on descriptive level: Empirical differences in movement characteristics

The peace movements in the two countries differ consistently in the number and diversity of groups and organizations involved (see Table 7.1). One of the sharpest contrasts I found is in Israel there is a big peace camp with different political actors with different ideologies from a range of backgrounds. This is indicative of a difference in mobilizing structures, as Israeli peace movements seem to have bigger structures to mobilize their campaigns. The greater strategic capabilities of Israeli peace movements are related to the more varied composition of their organization. In fact, in Israel there are organizations and groups composed of rabbis, anarchists, feminists, leftists and Zionists. In Turkey, on the other hand, the peace camp is much less diverse and is mainly composed of activists and engaged actors with center-left and left points of view. The reason for the diversity

on the peace camp in Israel can be attributed to the fact that "as the competition within any SMI increases, the pressure to specialize intensifies" (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1234). In Israel, I also observed the presence of human rights organizations which were engaged in legal work, procedures, and the documentation of cases. In Turkey human rights organizations is a small community, which is involved in the Kurdish issue to varying degrees at different times. This difference in composition is also related to different capabilities in terms of coalition-building. In Israel, even though there is diversity in active groups, they build coalitions and *ad hoc* alliances, if not regular ones. In Turkey, there is almost no alliance or cooperation among different groups.

Gamson and Meyer distinguish between "institutional means of influence" such as electoral politics and lobbying; and "extrainstitutional strategies" such as boycotts and demonstrations (1996: 283). As shown in Table 7.2. in Israel peace movements are capable of pursuing complex strategies, such as direct action and demonstrations. In Turkey, however, their repertoire is mostly limited to petitions and conferences. Lastly, in Israel organizations are hierarchically structured with leadership and a well-defined division of labor. In the Turkish case, on the other hand, there are no clear-cut hierarchies and groups are not structured in terms of leadership, which underlines the horizontal structure of the organizations.

	Israel	Turkey
Legal and Political Advocacy Groups and Organizations	Demonstrations, petitions, lectures, exhibitions, projects, seminars, boycotting, non-violent direct action, speaking tours abroad	Petitions, organizing conferences, panels
Military Service Refusal, Avoidance, and Conscientious Objection	Demonstrations in front of prisons, press release, publishing testimonies	Demonstrations in front of prisons, press release
Human Rights Monitoring Groups and Organizations	Lobbying, legal work, media work, cooperation with international community, campaigns	Booklets, organizing conferences, panels

Table 7.2 : The repertoires of action used by different groups in two countries

Kriesi argues that it is important for the configuration of power to be on the left in the sense that supporters of social movements are very likely to be from the political left, and the Left may try to instrumentalize these social movements to dominate the Left and to win elections against the right (1996: 163). This is not the case in Turkey, as the Left does not take on responsibility for bringing peace to the country. This gap has been filled by the Kurdish movement. In a similar vein, in Israel the Left is split between its Zionist and non-Zionist wings. Both are involved in peace issues, but their standpoint on Zionism is decisive when it comes to the reason for, and the solution of, the Palestinian question.

Kriesi points out how the role of external structuring of a social movement organization (SMO), i.e. its members' party preference and the alliances it builds with partners outside the subsector, depends on the political context, in which the political Left plays an important role (1996: 174). However, peace and human rights issues are not open to negotiation and should not be monopolized by one party or ideology on the political spectrum. Kriesi also highlights the role of diversified networks which helps building a range of alliances (1996: 177), that is not the case in Turkey.

People who come together are always from the same circles, which can be an obstacle to the socialization of the peace issue.

It is important to remember that "a state and its challengers disagree but share the same culture and political context for collective action" (Koopmans and Statham 1999b: 232). Gamson and Meyer distinguish between "fixed and given" political opportunities which are entrenched in "political institutions and culture," whereas others which change depending on events and policies, which makes them volatile (1996: 277). They also remind us of the cultural aspect of opportunities which reach beyond political institutions and the links between actors (279). Snow claims that the concept of discursive opportunity helps to demonstrate how political contexts influence framing processes and the discursive fields in which they are integrated (2007: 404). In singling out Zionism and Kemalism as discursive opportunities, I should point out that both have different ways of suppressing ethnic minorities. In Turkey the Kurds were seen as a threat and their identity was, at best, ignored. The response of the Turkish state was 'Turkification' and assimilation. Hence, the Turkish saying that "There is no such a thing as a Kurd", and "Kurds are mountain Turks." The idea was to unite everybody under the common umbrella of Turkishness. In Israel, on the other hand, the Palestinians were seen as a threat and their identity was strictly excluded from the Jewish nation-state. Jewish Israelis were seen as superior to and different from Palestinians. In Turkey the Kurds have been assimilated and are perceived as Turks irrespective of their religion and culture. In Israel, on the other hand, everything is defined through Jewishness, in the sense that a Jewish person can enjoy full citizenship rights, whereas non-Jews cannot. Palestinians in the OPT are living under military occupation since 1967, who are not citizens of the Israeli state. Peled underlines that Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents in the OPT are subjected to different laws in the sense that as Jewish settlers benefit from the protection of Israeli civil law, Palestinian residents are exposed to oppressive and arbitrary military rule (2008: 338). Shachar claims that citizenship as a concept implies the right to exclude nonmembers, however "citizenship can also act an internal leveler of opportunity by providing the basic enabling conditions for members to fulfill their potential" (2009: 35). Therefore, we can conclude that although in Israel there is more legally protected freedom of speech and expression compared to Turkey, the fact that only Jews have this right makes it a *de facto* privilege. The precondition for enjoying citizenship rights fully in Israel is to be Jewish. This privilege of being a Jewish activist in Israel is not the result of a democratic notion, but is based on the very fact of being a Jew. In Turkey, the laws do not

differentiate between Turks and Kurds as such, however the different treatment depends on one's opinion about complying with the state ideology by not challenging it, even though for Kurds it means not being allowed to enjoy their cultural and political rights.

The fact that in Israel freedom of speech is a privilege given to Jewish people merits an explanation. Peled argues that Israel cannot be a liberal democracy because as Israel is not neutral towards its citizens based on their ethnic and religious affiliation, as a nationalizing state, borrowing Brubaker's concept (1996); Israeli nationalism is not the nationalism of the Israeli state, but "Zionism, that is, *Jewish* nationalism" (Peled 2005: 91). As Smooha claimed that Israel is an ethnic democracy by combining liberal democracy and Jewish ethno-nationalism (1997), some others argued that in Israel we observe the combination of liberal discourse, which requires the equal treatment of all citizens; ethno-national one which gives a privileged status to Jews and republican discourse which allocates rights and privileges according to the contribution to the common good (Peled and Shafir 1996: 396; Peled 2005: 92). As Peled divides Israel's citizenship discourse into three segments, he underlines that the liberal discourse serves the purpose to separate the Jewish and Palestinian citizens from the non-citizen Palestinians in the OPT, whereas the ethno-nationalist one emphasizes to discriminate between Jewish and Palestinian citizens within the official borders of the Israeli state. Lastly, he claims further, the republican discourse functions to underline different positions of major Jewish groups like Ashkenazim and Mizrachim, men and women; and secular and religiously orthodox (Peled 2008: 336).[210] In his earlier work, Peled claims that as liberal citizenship is ethnically blind, it cannot serve the purpose of foundational ideology of Zionism. He defines Israel's political culture as ethnorepublicanism, where "Jewish ethnicity is a necessary condition for membership in the political community, while the contribution to the process of Jewish national redemption is a measure of one's civil virtue" which, as a concept, excludes the Arabs, who as non-Jews cannot be a member of that ethnically defined community (1992: 435). Shafir and Peled argue that since 1980s the republican discourse is in decline as a result of the emergence of new cultural and political elites, whereas the liberal discourse based on civic criteria of membership to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens in Israel and the

[210] Peled underlines that as the privileged status of the settlers is certain, it is interesting that ultra-orthodox communities have been granted many privileges too although they do not serve military service unlike religious Zionists. He argues that their privileges position derives from them being the significant symbols of Jewish historical continuity in the 'Holy Land' (Peled 2008: 339).

ethno-national one privileging Jewishness by discriminating between Jewish and Arab citizens are now the two leading discourses competing with each other for the hegemony (2002: 42). As a result, it would be possible to view Israel as an immigrant settler society with an ethno-nationalist structure along with its ideological and institutional elements (Rouhana 1997; Smooha 1990). Peled and Shafir claim that in Israel there is a democratic frontier society where "exclusionary imperative of settlement and nation-building and the universalist imperative of democratic state-building" contradict leading to a hierarchical and fragmented citizenship structure (1996: 409). If citizenship discourse is affected by its political environment, how should we understand it into the context of a nation-state?

Joppke argues that the nation-state is a "dual concept" in the sense that "[*q*]*ua* states, nation-states are territorial organizations characterized by the monopolization of legitimate violence; *qua* nations, nation-states are membership associations with a collective identity and a democratic pretension to rule" (1998: 7, emphasis in original). In Israel, the state and the army are founded on Zionism, a religion-based ideology, whereas in Turkey the army is part of the secular ideology of Kemalism. The role of Zionism, the glorification of the Jewish state as the founding principle, plays an important role in Israeli peace activism when defining groups' alliances with each other and framing the issue. According to Snow and Benford, ideology is "a *cultural resource* for framing activity" (2005: 209, emphasis in original). Moreover, in Israel the state and society often refer to the Holocaust by recovering the collective historical memory. Rosenhek underlines anti-Semitism as one of the most significant layers of the Jewish-Israeli ethnos (1999: 589). The importance of a belief and value system is highlighted by della Porta and Diani "in the absence of references to one's history and to the particular nature of one's roots, an appeal to something new risks seeming inconsistent and, in the end, lacking in legitimacy" (2006: 85).

In Israel the army is defined by religion in the sense that it is a Jewish army with army rabbis. In Turkey, however, the founding principle is based on Kemalism, which is defined through the secular nationalism of the state. Until very recently the army was regarded as the main guardian of secularism and the unitary state. If we look at the AKP's intervention in army affairs during the early 2000s, we see that its main motivation was not demilitarization, but power changing hands. Once the AKP had eliminated the secular wing of the army, it turned its warmongering efforts on the Kurds. Another important point is how some liberal parts of civil society gave credit to the AKP to eliminate the army's role in politics, although it was the AKP which was most likely to

engage in the military invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s. The AKP managed to curb the role of the army in the political sphere, and filled the hegemonic void left by the army itself causing a shift of power. Erdoğan was sometimes blamed for political opportunism by my interviewees, and Tarrow reminds us that political opportunism is "not a monopoly of either Left or Right, parties of movement or parties of conservation" (1996: 60).

Except conscientious objectors, most of my interviewees in Turkey did not criticize the army. Moreover, unlike Israel, in Turkey most of my interviewees did not refer to any catastrophic event in their collective memory, which they could link to contemporary activism. Although Kurdish massacres were sometimes cited, the Armenian genocide was almost never mentioned. It was remarkable that it was not a topic during interviews when the cruelty of the Turkish state was being discussed. If a society such as Turkey cannot face its own crimes and engages in systematic denial of its past, it is difficult to move towards peace with society as a whole. Here the denial of the Turkish left runs parallel to the Turkish state's ideology, and is very visible. Mann claims that Turkey "remains bedeviled by two Young Turk legacies: military authoritarianism and an organic nationalism that now repress Kurds rather than Armenians" (2005: 179). We can conclude that although in Israel there are groups who see the core of the Palestinian problem in the foundational ideology, Zionism, there are also some groups and organizations which are trying to find a solution to it within the same discursive opportunities. In Turkey, on the other hand, the essence of the Kurdish question is not attributed to Kemalism, and there are no groups and organizations that define themselves Kemalist *per se*, which does not necessarily mean that they are immune to the impact of the foundational ideology in their framing. As Horowitz point out, when it comes to ethnic politics, "inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods, including the prestige of the various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as belonging more to one group than another" (1994: 35).

Rouhana and Ghanem highlight that it is not possible for Israel within its existing ethnic structure to provide its Palestinian citizens with equality, security, and identity because the "political superstructure and exclusive collective identity of an ethnic state inevitably place an ethno-national minority in a predicament" (1998: 321). In terms of citizenship, we observe varying degrees of state presence in both countries. In Israel, activists enjoy freedom of expression and action. Most of the time activists did not face restrictions in organizing campaigns where they criticize the state's policies on the Palestinian issue. In the Turkish case, freedom of expression and action is limited

by laws on the right to demonstrate and the anti-terrorism law. These are based on vague definitions and can limit virtually any kind of activism which challenges the state. This is also reflected in the degree of involvement of peace activists in the dialogue and negotiation with state authorities to solve the conflict in Israel. In Turkey, although peace movement organizations are occasionally engaged in dialogue with government, they are never a part of the negotiation process. As mentioned before, in Israel, when it comes to repertoires of contention, we saw complex strategies like direct action and demonstration whereas in Turkey simpler strategies such as petitions and workshops were preferred (see Table 7. 2). This proves the point made by McCarthy and Zald:

> "Means of communication, transportation, political freedoms, and the extent of repression by agents of social control, all of which may affect the costs for any individual or organization allocating resources to the SMS, serve as constraints on or facilitators of the use of resources for social movement purposes" (1977: 1225).

Lastly, in terms of engaging citizenship rights Palestinians and Jewish Israelis are engaged in different levels of political participation. In Turkey, on the other hand, Turks and Kurds have the same formal right to vote and run for an office based on free and fair elections.

7.2. Know your audience, tell your message

In Chapter 2 we saw that definitions and interpretations of similar events can vary from one context to another. This process of defining and interpreting historical events has been the subject of research on framing (see Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; 1992). Snow et al. claim that:

> "potential constituencies are sometimes galvanized and mobilized, on other occasions framing efforts fall on deaf ears and may even be counter-productive. This obdurate fact thus begs the question of why framing processes succeed in some cases but not in others" (1986: 477).

Koopmans and Duyvendak ask whether "the success of framing efforts depends on the argumentative power of the discourse as such" as this would emphasize an independent effect of frame alignment, or whether "framing functions primarily as a mechanism that translates structural conditions, constraints, or opportunities into articulated discontent and dispositions toward collective action" (1995: 242). They suggest to "combine the framing and political opportunity perspectives and to look at the political conditions under which specific discourses become imaginable" (249). While Benford focuses on diagnostic and prognostic frames in the college sports reform movement, he emphasizes that as with most social movements, this particular

movement produced more detailed diagnoses than prognoses (2007: 17). As shown in Table 7.1, regarding frames I found that one of the striking contrasts is groups in Israel have a clear message in terms of solving the conflict; they either support a one-state or a two-state solution. In Turkey, by contrast, there is lack of a single clear message and no specific solution is suggested regarding the conflict. The way they define their belonging or membership of the group is clearly defined in the former, whereas membership or belonging is based on vague definitions and loose bonds in the latter. Moreover, there is a well-defined audience in Israel to which a well-defined message is transmitted. In Turkey, on the other hand, the lack of a well-defined audience is reflected in activists' messages. In the same case, I observed that there was an anti-government criticism, whereas there was no strong opposition to the army. In Israel, on the other hand, both the army and government were criticized and blamed for the ongoing conflict. Lastly, in Israeli groups the core of the problem is not necessarily seen as Zionism, and this is proved by the presence of many Zionist groups in the peace camp. In Turkey the essence of the problem is not attributed to Kemalism, which is not taken as the starting point, for any discussion of the history of the Kurdish issue. This proves how important it is to understand that the "arc of a social movement's life course –mobilization, engagement, and decline- without understanding how the various players interpret what the problem is, what must be done, who the opponents are, and what opportunities are present" (Noakes and Johnson 2005: 24).

In Turkey the groups try to come together through their opposition to the AKP, which means that their opposition is framed only in terms of its critique of the governing party, without questioning the founding ideology and its implications; because the Kurdish issue did not start with the AKP. In Israel, on the other hand, even though the groups criticize and oppose Prime Minister Netanyahu and his policies, their critique and opposition is more broad-based.

Some interviewees stressed that during AKP's early years the European Union perceived the AKP as a liberal democratic force and gave it credit for this. Because the AKP silenced all opposition in Turkey, referring to the international audience as foreign politicians and international civil society may have helped peace movements in Turkey make their voice heard. Whereas in Israel, the reason why some groups target an international audience is not necessarily the repression of opposition within the country, but because they see it as the only possible way to resolve the conflict once Israel faces international pressure in the economic, academic and cultural sectors. In Turkey, on

the other hand, groups could not ask for a change from outside, since foreign politicians, and in particular, the EU, did not question AKP's policies on the Kurdish conflict.

More strikingly, what is considered as peace is also different in the two contexts. Contrary to the Israeli case, when it comes to peace, militarism is not mentioned as a problem in Turkey. In Israel the issue is mainly discussed within the one-state or two-state solution, whereas in Turkey what is meant by the term 'solution' is in more general terms such as autonomy, cultural rights and ending the war. In Israel peace movements are not fragmented and do not act independently and autonomously: they identify the occupation as a problem and they respond to same implications of that occupation, even though they may use different framing for the cause of the problem and a different strategy. In Turkey, on the other hand, peace movements are rather fragmented and act autonomously, which makes it impossible for them to work on common ground even though they are mobilized around the Kurdish issue. Whereas the movements in Israel increased the political cost of constructing the Wall and oppressing the Palestinians (e.g. HRMO efforts to ensure the government that its policies and actions are checked), in Turkey state repression is so strong that dissidents are repressed and their parliamentary representatives are arrested. Although none of the groups has an official link to any political party, because many of them indicate the word 'peace' in their group's name or because their activism is based on ending the conflict and achieving peace in Turkey, some of them are accused of being pro-Kurdish or even PKK supporters. As a political party, the BDP (and later the HDP) did not escape being labeled 'terrorist' although they were in Parliament to pursue legal politics. As a result, in Turkey there is no channel through which the government can be held accountable and punished accordingly. Kriesi describes the selective exclusion of challengers as the "combination of a strong state and an exclusive dominant strategy," where the strong state can ignore the challengers or simply repress them (1996: 160). This is what we observe in the Turkish case.

7.2.1. Jewish Israeliness as a Privilege vs. the legacy of Kemalism

It is important to consider the role of Zionism and of Kemalism in shaping movement characteristics (see Table 7.3) because discursive opportunity structures explain:

> "the shape and life course or history of discursive framing processes and the fields in which they are embedded are not only a function of the stream of events coursing through them and the cultural

> resources, interactants, and framing debates that constitute them, but are also influenced by the enveloping political context" (Snow 2007: 403).

Rouhana and Ghanem stress that as Israel is founded as the state of the Jewish people regardless of residency or citizenship, "inclusion in the state's identity and definition is determined by belonging to the Jewish people, not to its citizenry" (1998: 322). Jamal argues that nationalizing states "design and render the citizenship if indigenous national minorities into a 'hollow citizenship' that is devoid of substantive cultural, economic and political meaning, since these minorities, often by their mere existence, tend to challenge the basic vision of the state" (2007: 473). In Israel, almost all of my interviewees emphasized the privilege of being Jewish Israelis, it being an advantage in terms of freedom of speech and organization. However, their claim that democracy only functioned within the Green Line and only for Jewish Israelis led to an in-depth discussion of democracy by referring to citizenship rights which Palestinians are deprived of. Kimmerling and Migdal (1992) underlined long time ago that the territory inside and outside the Green Line should be viewed as a unit under a single system of control in order to emphasize that it consists of, on the one hand, one polity with citizens who are entitled to full rights; on the other hand, the rest is deprived of civil and political rights. In this sense, the Supreme Court is an ally in Israel's liberal democracy and blocks laws that violate freedom of speech and human rights. Israel defines itself as a liberal Western democracy so that it does not enact laws that are deemed too restrictive. However, in order not to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of Israeli public, the Supreme Court prefers not to enforce international law harshly and its decisions do not lead to dramatic changes in policy. We see here political opportunities working for the Court in two ways: On the one hand it is used as a tool for ethnic democracy in order to present Israel as a liberal democracy. On the other hand, it functions as a restriction when it seeks to avoid taking decisions that highlight the illegal nature of the settlements and holding government accountable for not upholding its laws and not changing policy in order to regulate and end all human rights violations. It is very important to note that Israeli groups are also very familiar with the laws and legal structures whereas in Turkey very few interviewees pointed out the legal issues.

		ISRAEL	TURKEY
External Conditions	POS		
	Discursive Opportunities	Victimization Discourse (collective memory) Foundational Principle: Zionism (Jewish state) Army: Jewish (religious)	N/A (Armenian genocide: not mentioned) Foundational Principle: Kemalism (secular state nationalism) Army: Guardian of secularism
	Citizenship Regimes	Dialogue and negotiation with state authorities Freedom of expression and action	Dialogue but no direct negotiation Freedom of expression and action is limited through laws

Table 7.3 : Analytical evidence to explain the variation

Peled and Shafir believe that in Israel a colonial, frontier imperative coexist with a democratic, civil imperative which are a reflection of the exclusionary practices for the former and the universalist practices for the latter (1996: 392). In Israel what gives the groups their legitimacy is their Zionist discourse. Their support for Zionism, albeit from a left-wing perspective, gives them a basis for credibility and legitimacy as we see in Peace Now. It was remarkable that some of my interviewees argued that laws are also used by the state to make these organizations disreputable in the eyes of the Israeli public. In order to protect the appearance of Israel as a democracy, the government does not oppose their freedom of expression directly, but it does so indirectly by introducing a law on foreign funding of NGOs. In Turkey, Kemalists never supported the solution of the Kurdish question and none of the organizations mobilized around the Kurdish issue refer to Kemalism, although it was precisely this state ideology that perceived and presented Kurds as 'the other,' and as a group of people to be assimilated. While Ghanem classifies both Israel and Turkey as ethnic states, he argues that an ethnic-democracy cannot be democratic, first because those two are contradictory terms and second Israel does not provide equality before the law and freedom for all its citizens (1998: 431). As both cases have taught us citizenship should not only be defined as legal rights, but it must be seen as "a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights" (Isin 2000: 5).

In both Israel and Turkey human rights violations are mostly blamed on the current government. In Israel groups claim that although Netanyahu should be held responsible for the violations, as he is Prime Minister, the occupation is the main question, so that even though governments change, the issue will remain the same and the occupation will continue to exist, irrespective of which party is in power. Israeli organizations and groups often cited Netanyahu as the main problem, and in Turkey Erdoğan and his party, AKP are seen as the main cause of all the country's political problems. However, the situation in Israel is not due to a specific government, because previous Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres and Barack all led left-wing governments and settlements were built during their time in office, and not only under Netanyahu. It is the same in Turkey; as Erdoğan exacerbates the Kurdish conflict, the fact that PMOs blame him for everything carries the risk that the root of the problem may be overlooked. To put it differently, the continuation of the same trend disseminated by Zionism and Kemalism was not mentioned in my interviews directly. In their research, while elaborating on women facing housing problems Dobash and Dobash claim that while British MPs do not take feminist analyses into account, the "solution was adopted while the nature of the problem was denied or transformed" (1992: 84). Therefore, we can also repeat once again the importance of diagnostic frames used by peace movements both in Israel and Turkey in referring to the root of the problem in their respective countries.

Going back to political opportunities, differential citizenship status for the different ethnic groups and varying degrees of rights given to them which would eventually lead to different levels of inclusion have been the topic of some scholarly work (Migdal 2006; Shafir and Peled 2002). Shafir and Peled argue that it is important to look at who has been included and denied full membership because "full citizens, second- and indeed third- and fourth-class citizens, as well as non-citizens may exist under a single democratic political authority" (2002: 8). When McAdam talks about "expanding political opportunities" he means changes in the institutional features, informal political alignments, or repressive capacity of a given political system that significantly reduce the power disparity between a group which challenges the status quo and the state (1996a: 32). During my fieldwork analysis I observed two aspects of citizenship rights with regards to movement characteristics (see Table 7.3). They were engaging in dialogue and negotiation with state authorities in a way that lobbying channels were open for them. Moreover, as Jewish Israelis they enjoyed freedom of expression and action. However, Israel's red lines were protected by laws to regulate the peace movements; the Nakba Law, the Boycott Law (Law for the Prevention of

Damage to the State of Israel), and the NGO funding law. Law-making was used as a threat by government to draw the lines of the scope of peace movements' work and if necessary, to silence Jewish Israelis dealing with the peace issue. When Rucht talks about environmental movements in Western societies, he claims that what is "more impressive than its growth, institutionalization, and internationalization is the movement's success as an agenda setter" (1999: 206). This is the case with the works done by the peace movement groups and organizations mentioned above, in response to which the state of Israel felt the need to introduce laws to punish their efforts. As Meyer points out "[a]s states alter the costs and benefits of collective action and develop new techniques for controlling collective action, they allow, encourage, provoke, or discourage movements' particular changing strategies of influence" (2002: 14).

McCarthy claims that the aim of frames is "both internal —adherents and activists of the movement itself— as well as external, including bystanders, opponents, and authorities" (1996: 149). Therefore, it is fair to say that in their framing peace movements in both countries were appealing to their own supporters by choosing appropriate framing for them. However, this led to a blind spot for the mobilization itself, where they could not challenge and reach out to their opponents. It is worth mentioning that in Israel groups refer to each other by sharing their opinions and feedback on each other's work, for example the controversy of criticizing Breaking the Silence for serving the occupation forces. This creates its own dynamic, which is reflected in their framing because they feed off each other. In Turkey, however, there is no dynamic in how they frame the issue by referring each other's works, simply because they are not so much aware of each other's work.

The groups I interviewed in Israel differed in the way they framed the conflict, their vision and their actions, which determine their access to political bodies, Israeli society and the media. Whether they are considered as legitimate or radical groups was also reflected in their influence on political structure and society. This point is clearly made by Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) who claim that movements are capable of influencing not only the political environment but also material as well as cultural resource available to themselves and to challengers. Most groups did not require their supporters to have the same ideological view; however, having the same vision about the solution of the conflict was decisive. Some were critical of the army, whereas others were trying to fix the army, which they considered one of the most moral in the world. The same applied in giving priority to Jewish or universal values in their group: some wanted to serve the Jewish state's interest no matter what, whereas for others a Jewish state was incompatible with universal

democratic values. The way they deal with the occupation reflects this priority. For some, the occupation was not compatible with Jewish values, which was a moral and political threat for their own people. On the other hand, the groups prioritizing universal values focus on the harm done by the occupation to the Palestinians in political, social and economic terms. This view is reflected in the way they are willing to cooperate with political actors in the Knesset using legal mechanisms, which in turn meant having access to decision-makers and being taken seriously by them. Using violent direct action versus legal demonstrations was another difference marked by a group's choice of strategy. Despite their differences, however, depending on the policies of government it is not unlikely that different groups come together in their opposition to occupation and share their resources. Jamal underlines that in order to understand the complex relationship between Israel as a nationalizing Jewish state and Palestinians as an indigenous minority, it is important to remember that the state, the market, and Zionism "operate in tandem and are mutually interdependent, feeding each other reciprocally and forming a complex power system that discriminates, deprives, and marginalizes" (2007: 474).

Groups in Israel also make deliberate choices about attacking the occupation, not only as a concept, but also by considering its implications and practices not only for Palestinians, but also for Israelis. Israelis are open to self-critique by emphasizing how to connect Zionism with democracy. However, in Turkey no link is made between Kemalism and democracy, or that Kemalism is an obstacle for the democratic rights of the Kurds. Ironically, in Israel there are groups which do not consider that the root of the problem is Zionism; there are many groups that openly call themselves Zionist and that campaign within this framework by claiming that Zionism is compatible with granting Palestinians their rights, as long as this is within 1967 borders. Ehrlich claims that:

> "The conflict, as the most basic aspect of the developments in Palestine, is not integrated analytically into the theoretical framework of the sociological discourse: it is not taken as an inherent aspect of the Zionist project. … At best, if at all, the Arabs and the conflict are regarded as an external addendum, an appendix to an internally self-explanatory structure: an appendix which erupts from time to time in a temporary inflammation. The Arabs and the conflict are thus viewed as external to the structure and process of Israeli society" (1987: 131).

What is common in both cases is that these conflicts in both countries were seen as external to the society as if they exit as a separate phenomenon. Neither Kemalists nor Zionists admitted that the problem was one of their constituent elements, their survival depended on the continuation of these

conflicts. They were seen as a separate element and mainstream belief was concerned with what would happen to the Jewish and Turkish majority. Zionism and Kemalism as foundational ideologies tried to shift our perceptual focus in a way that Kurdish and Palestinian people were subjects which needed to be modernized, assimilated or excluded. Rouhana and Ghanem highlight "the difficulty in articulating the desired form of relationship with the state, the social and political gaps between Arab and Jew, the failure to fully internalize democratic values, and the cultural crisis itself are all exacerbated by the internal structure of the society" to stress the relationship between Arabs and Jews in Israel (1998: 339), the same link works for Turkey, too in terms of Kurdish people and the Turkish state.

7.2.2. Human Rights Monitoring: to politick or not to politick?

Benhabib argues the tension between the principles of human rights and sovereignty of a concrete people is a question of inclusion and exclusion:

> "The sovereign people becomes one by declaring their allegiance to universal principles; but this declaration can only be concretized through the concrete legal, political, economic and cultural framework of a specific human community. This is the root tension between the universal and the particular, the principles of human rights and that of popular sovereignty" (2001: 24).

In Israel human rights organizations make more of an effort to stress that human rights are not a political issue, even though what they are dealing with in the occupied territories and Gaza is a political problem. In Turkey, on the other hand, human rights activists are aware that they are always involved in a political question. In Israel human rights monitoring organizations can work freely despite attempts to limit funding, expression and civil society human rights work in the OPT. As professional organizations they enjoy a reasonable degree of freedom of speech and are able to use courts in a professional way, but the introduction of the Nakba Law and Boycott Law shows to what extent the Knesset is able and willing to circumscribe the public discourse and the work of civil society organizations. All human rights organizations in Israel claimed to be non-political organizations, yet all these groups are highly politicized. Even if they do not offer a concrete solution, their organization has a vision about how the future of Israel should look. Because they appeal to the Israeli public, they try not to contradict it with their claims.

McAdam argues that three mechanisms are important for the process by which an existing social group mobilizes for contentious action: attribution of threat or opportunity, social appropriation

and innovative contentious action (2003: 291). All the groups and organizations interviewed pose the big question: what will bring about change? Although the answer is related to the issue and the topic, some things can be changed through legislation or policy change, whereas the others might be changed if there is a groundswell of popular support. Therefore, the groups which cannot imagine a sustainable solution or a sustainable change without a broad base support from the Israeli public continue their work vis-a-vis the public despite any challenges. They think it is important to continue the discourse with the Israeli public. Other groups, by contrast, do not believe in change from within, and therefore focus their attention on the public abroad or international actors.

If, as in the Israeli case, politics and the judicial aspect of the occupation are treated in two different ways, instead of being combined, this might create a discourse around itself that human rights are not political, and that these two are mutually exclusive. To what extent can we treat occupation as a phenomena detached from politics? Whether reducing human rights violations contribute to peace in Israel remains an open question. Would the elimination of human rights violations contribute to peace? In the case of Turkey, because the country has not been democratized bottom-up there is no social movement *per se* to defend human rights and freedom of speech exclusively. Each group supports their struggle from their own particular ideological background, but not from a comprehensive perspective such as the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, within the framework of Islam freedom of conscience is understood as people being free to practice their religion, but refusing to do military service based on conscience is not considered within the same framework. In Israel human rights are regarded as a legalistic and left-wing issue. This is why we see two different types of groups: human rights organizations in NGO form and left-wing groups supporting human rights issues. In Turkey, on the other hand, awareness on the importance of human rights is very limited among the population. In my interviews, too, many activists did not mention it as an important universal concept. This explains why in Turkish political culture, there is not much emphasis on human rights issues, and could be the reason for the existence of a smaller human rights community in Turkey compared to Israel. Lastly, as was the case in Israel, the Turkish state does not call the armed struggle it is engaged against the PKK a war, because then it has to respect international agreements. However, this important point was not mentioned by any of my interviewees in Turkey, unlike Israel.

7.3. No coalition, no gain

In order to emphasize the link between organization and framing processes, McAdam and his colleagues claim that the latter "encourage mobilization, as people seek to organize and act on their growing awareness of the system's illegitimacy and vulnerability" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 7). As demonstrated, peace movement organizations differ from other types of formal organizations not only because "they mobilize their constituency for collective action," but also because they have a "political goal, to obtain some collective good (avoid some collective ill) from authorities" (Kriesi 1996: 152). According to Zald and McCarthy "exchange and division of labor" are not uncommon when it comes to collaboration between organizations:

> "Ad hoc exchanges serves to utilize the facilities or services of another organization. Organizations may also exchange information and their expertise in order to oversee their environments for mutual enhancement which would lead to stable relationships as well as joint organizations or campaigns" (1980: 14).

Meyer notes that authorities can enhance or inhibit the forging of coalitions because "the extent of grievances, the viability of various strategies of influence, and the perceived costs and benefits of various alliances all change over time" as a result of social movements' actions and the way in which the authorities respond to them (2004: 140). The question is, then, whether it is the state which sets the boundaries of coalitions by singling out and labeling activists with a certain background as 'traitors,' and thereby producing an identity.

In Turkey there is no unity and collaboration among the different groups which are divided into small fractions. They did not manage to bring all the groups under one roof when needed, which might have helped achieve their aim. For instance, there have been groups such as women conscientious objectors, conscientious objection platform, conscientious objection for peace and although the issue they mobilized around was the same, these groups never managed to work under a common umbrella or to unify their many voices. Chapter 6 examines the reason for their disunity that they see ideological differences as an obstacle rather than as a catalyzer bringing them together for a unified and mutual cause.

As demonstrated, in Israel joint organizations provide Israeli-Palestinian collaboration. Yet this collaboration runs the risk of the normalization critique. In Turkey, on the other hand, the groups do not define themselves as joint organizations, even if they have Kurdish and Turkish members.

In one way, this lack of distinction is productive because it enables difference blindness by not taking different subjectivities into account, which, however, could also mean ignoring differences. I can only speculate that if there were a distinction in the organizations in Turkey, whether joint organizations or Turkish organizations, it would make the line between oppressor and oppressed clear, and this would lead to taking different responsibilities and the consequent measures.

In Israel, all the groups are active and visible in the public sphere, and most are well known in Israeli society, though not always supported by it. Some of them challenge the core of the Jewish state by opposing Zionism directly, which is reflected in the way they frame the issue and the limited alliances they can build only with groups with the same vision. Others believe that they can try to influence policy-makers through dialogue. Whereas some of the groups have opposing views, others engage in constant operation with each other in different campaigns or events. The groups undergo change over time as a result of the changing political climate within and outside Israel. They aim at political influence, for which some of them choose radical strategies such as direct action, whereas some of them still try to appeal to the Israeli public opinion through campaigns.

In contrast to Israel, in Turkey activists have different affiliations with many groups. In Israel activists are more focused on their work and activism in their respective groups and organizations. This focus leads to a more concrete framing of the issue, and sustainable alliances. Old groups created a tradition of movements, although they are also criticized for their agenda and tactics. However, this criticism has been turned around productively to provide a roadmap for new groups as they asked what did not work, what should be fixed and be done better. In Israel it is more like a competition and ideological struggle within groups to prove who is better or closer to the solution, who offers a better strategy and who is more integrated in the political arena, all of which creates a dynamic and is consequently influenced by political opportunity structures. As Zald and McCarthy highlight whereas groups may compete over legitimacy and resources, they can also build alliances for a joint goal (1980: 22). In Turkey, on the other hand, there is no ‘entrenched’ peace movement and groups develop sporadically. Therefore, the movements do not have a tradition to refer to while building their agenda other than referring to old leftist movements, some of which have Kemalist tendencies. Hence it is rather difficult to develop a peace movement in Turkey because of the use of the Kemalist discourse by left-wing groups, who seem to be the only possible ally on the political spectrum compared to the right-wing organizations.

Kriesi claims organizational growth and decline is related to the amount of financial resources and membership size and the amount of resources of a SMO depends on the political context and its age, so that the more recently founded SMOs have less financial resources and less members (1996: 171). As in Turkey peace movements cannot go beyond the stage of early development, building *ad hoc* alliances and they are never able to reach the resources they need. In return, as they do not have resources they cannot develop any further, which makes them to find themselves in a vicious cycle.

7.3.1. Zionism Runs through it all vs. Not without Islamists and Kemalists

Taking Benford's (1993a) four motivational framings set out on in Chapter 2, I argue that the public did not perceive the peace issue as an urgent matter, and that it was not reflected in the framing of the organizations which do not stress all four points in their statements regarding the conflict in their respective countries. The question is whether peace organizations devote their energies to amplifying the severity, urgency, efficacy, or propriety of the problem. Did they manage to inform the public that the problem is the most important and urgent matter to be resolved in their respective countries? Did they manage to mobilize people based on the belief that their action would lead to the desired changes? This brings us back to Klanderman's (1984) argument that participants and activists should believe that their action will be effective. Tarrow argued that political actors are likely to frame their demands which are comprehensive to the wider society (1998: 25). It is worth mentioning that if the groups are caught in a dichotomy between a one-state or two-state solution their mobilizing capacities will be limited accordingly. The question is whether the groups in Israel should look for joint activities or whether they should be joint groups in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli public through their actions. This leads to another question of normalization, through which many joint organizations are criticized. In Israel both state and society are based on Zionism and this has an impact on the characteristics of Israeli peace movements. In Turkey, on the other hand, the poor organizational capabilities of peace movements are to a large extent due to laws limiting freedom of expression. In Israel groups were keener to collaborate with each other based on ideological common ground or for practical reasons such as organizing a demonstration together. This was not the case in Turkey. It is also remarkable that in Turkey there is no organization which challenges the core of Kemalism, like Zochrot in Israel. In

Turkey groups only analyze the issue from the Kurdish perspective so that they put the agency solely on the Kurds. They never discuss why it is also important for Turks to achieve peace, that Turks also have to face the implications as well as the responsibility of the founding ideology in the shape of a lack of democratic rights and human rights abuses. Not just Palestinians, but also Israelis live with the occupation, the struggle has also been taken over by the Israelis. In Turkey, however, oppression and state violence has been experienced mainly by Kurds. Turkish society does not see it as a basic democratic issue, and consequently refuses to take responsibility for it.

However, there are some other reasons why the Kurdish issue persists. First the ideological tools inherited from Kemalism are still in force in Turkey. From the beginning, the Turkish state had three enemies: Islam, the Kurds and Communism. All were seen as a threat to the founding ideology. Second, there was no reconciliation process in the history of modern Turkey, which was unable to acknowledge massacres such as the Armenian Genocide or the Dersim Rebellion. Moreover, the Kurdish question was seen as a separate issue, so that the lack of democracy has not been questioned. Lastly, because the AKP is trying to manage the Kurdish question, claiming to be the only actor to initiate the process in a top-down way, civil society has been limited in its attempts to take part in the process. It is not a sustainable and durable process led by democratic channels, it is prone to dissolve at any moment when there is a change in the political environment. Although Communists, Islamists and Kurds are the three red lines of the Turkish state's founding ideology which cannot be crossed, it is also a fact that any movement which is not supported by Islamists or Kemalists cannot grow and legitimize itself in Turkish society. However, in the current context of Turkey, it is Islamic groups, and not leftists, which will have an impact on government to change policies regarding peace including the Kurdish question, human rights, and conscientious objection.

Jenkins argue that it is necessary to differentiate between the state, the regime, and the government in order to be able to "distinguish between social movements that challenge the government and its policies, those directed at the regime and its legitimizing myths, and those that adopt the more radical goal of reorganizing the state and its territorial claims" (1995: 15). However, the fact that in my interviews the words 'state' and 'government' are used interchangeably shows that in both cases the government is intertwined with the state ideology which has strong links to their founding

principles. Interviewees also stated that democracy and solution to their respective armed and political conflicts are intertwined.

7.4. Revising the model

Building on their past experiences in what tactics to use, peace movement groups and organizations chose the familiar ones, which confirms Alinsky's point that they should avoid tactics "outside the experience of your people" (1972: 127). In Israel we see conventional and non-conventional action repertoires together, which can be violent sometimes. In Turkey, on the other hand, action repertoires are more moderate, not only because activists choose conventional ways to articulate their demands, but also due to repressive political opportunities. I also demonstrated that Israeli peace movement organizations have more access to the Knesset. Indeed, Kriesi has already emphasized that organizations with "formalized and professionalized structures have easier access to public authorities, because government bureaucracies prefer to deal with organizations with working procedures similar to their own" (1996: 158).

Political context matters when it comes to framing, mobilizing structures, action repertoires and alliances. PMOs from Turkey are usually weak in that they have poor financial and human resources, use moderate and conventional action repertoires, do not build alliances with each other, and have limited access to the Parliament. In Israel, on the other hand, movement characteristics are much stronger, they use both conventional and non-conventional action repertoires, they cooperate with each other, and they have some access to the Knesset. In Israel and Turkey, the link to the establishment is clear when it comes to Zionism and Kemalism, which respectively function as main determinants influencing their characteristics. How can we explain that framing, mobilizing structures, alliances, as well as action repertoires affect each other?

My initial model in Chapter 2 was that POS influence framing and mobilizing structures. However, as I demonstrated above, I have to specify more systematically which external condition have an influence on characteristics of peace movements. Hence, in this revised model I demonstrate that it is foundational ideologies and citizenship regimes which have an effect on movement characteristics. Moreover, I also showed in my research that it is not only POS affecting framing and mobilizing structures, but also framing and mobilizing structures influence each other in the sense that one group's framing has an effect on the alliances it builds and the strategies it uses; in return if one organization builds coalitions, it has an impact on its framing as well. Therefore, the

model should be complemented by secondary flows of influence claiming that framing and mobilizing structures also influence one another as shown in Figure 7.1.



Figure 7.1: The Revised Model

After revising the model, we should revisit militarism issue before conclusion. Zinn claims that "massive violence has been accepted historically by citizens (but not by all; hence desertions, opposition, and the need for bribery and coercion to build armies) because it has been presented as a means to good ends" (2003: 289). I argue that in militaristic societies dissidents are more exposed to pressure compared to other societies where there is a war going on. Thus, oppositional groups are not likely to find grassroots support and cannot transform into a mass movement but are limited to a circle of activists. This, in turn, leads to short-term activism. In Turkey, as long as groups do not challenge militarism, it is unlikely that they can compensate their lack of democratic structures and citizenship regimes. In Israel, on the other hand, even though it is a militaristic society it managed to mobilize, there is still the potential to achieve more and to reach a broader level of mobilization once militarism has been highlighted as a key issue. Howard claims that it is necessary for peace and order that the military should be subordinated to the government and the popular will, and legal restrictions should control the government, instead of military (1957: 12). The reason is history does not start with the current governments in both countries and violations in the past should not be overlooked. Bacevich claims that as contemporary American militarism has its roots in the American history, no particular president can be held responsible for it because in no presidential election there was a commitment of changing it (2005: 4-5).

7.5. The morning after: Mobilization during the Operation Protective Edge and Gezi Demonstrations

Last round of my fieldworks both in Israel and Turkey were during and after the transformative events in them which provided me the opportunity to observe how the mobilization emerged during the times of conflict. In Israel, groups and organizations managed to get organized quickly and come together during the time of crisis, which was the case in Summer of 2014. They managed to use the specific moment for their mobilization and repeat their demands in the context of war, the Operation Protective Edge against Gaza. In Turkey, on the other hand, although Gezi protests opened a space for discussion as well as dialogue, it did not go beyond being a moment in the history of Turkey, where Kurdish question and the issue of peace has not been made a reference point. I argue that the reason for this difference is because in Israel peace movements have stronger organizational and strategic capabilities, as mentioned in the previous section, which enables them to act quickly during the times of mobilization.

A senior member of B'Tselem argued that as human rights violations are increasing during war times, B'Tselem's monitoring of violations and killings is important. He argued that "it is important to bring information to people, because after the war ends, we will be able to understand what was illegal. Our fieldworkers in Gaza are on the ground, the information is reliable."[211] He added that during war they did not take part in demonstrations as an organization because demonstrations are a platform where political bodies voice their demands. He highlighted that the main problem is Israeli public is not interested in human rights violations, as the media blames Hamas for everything. F.B. repeated the same self-questioning which was also the case with other HRMO officials I mentioned in Chapter 5 that they should think more about whether they help decreasing the human rights violations or they just spend time on monitoring them. The lawyer from ACRI emphasized the importance of the division of labor between the HRMO during war times. She said that as B'Tselem collects information about attacks, death and injury rates in Gaza, Physicians for Human Rights reported on things concerning medical facilities and how to evacuate the injured people, whereas Gisha worked on the crossings focusing on goods and people coming into and

[211] Interview with F.B., Tel Aviv, 27 August 2014.

going out of Gaza.[212] This proves that even during war HRMO maintain their specialization and act coordinated.

During the Operation Protective Edge, in Tel Aviv there have been demonstrations in Habima Square and Kikar Rabin.[213] Peace Now took part in organizing one of these demonstrations during the first cease fire. One of its directors said, as they openly opposed the war, one of their slogans was 'our soldiers don't believe in this war:'

> "We have to phrase our message in a way that is receptive to Israeli ear. We don't wanna be alienated from the public but bring them together. We also want to be legitimate after the war. In one demo, one person held a sign saying 'airforce is murderers.' Some people are afraid to be depicted like this, so they don't wanna join in such protests. Once Peace Now and Meretz joined forces in our demonstration, people are able to voice their opinions against this war."[214]

O.M. from Combatants for Peace said that during this war they participated in demonstrations for the first time because most of their activities are usually in the West Bank. She complained about some slogans used in the demonstrations for being "violent" such as "pilots are murderers" and "what is going on in Gaza is slaughter." As it was the case with Peace Now, she said that they want the Israeli public to listen to them and slogans as such create antagonism: "You don't have to hate the army, this war is wrong, and you have to stop it. Our slogans were "there is another way" and "stop the violence."[215] N.C. from another project of Peace Now claimed it was important that Peace Now said "we sent our soldiers to Gaza" because of the perception in Israeli society that it is only the right wing people who are in the military:

> "There are many left-wing supporters who go and do their military service. We have many activists who were called on reserve duty. We wanna change the perspective that it is a right wing thing. Peace Now's position is not to attack military and military policies although we criticize the amount of violence the military uses. But first we try to criticize the government and its policies. The government is sending the military there. Everybody does military service in Israel."[216]

---

[212] Interview with V.H. Tel Aviv, 15 September 2014.
[213] These are two main squares in Tel Aviv where people gather to protest.
[214] Interview with C.D.P., Tel Aviv, 16 September 2014.
[215] Interview with O.M, Tel Aviv, 12 September 2014.
[216] Interview with N.C., Tel Aviv, 17 September 2014.

Coalition of Women for Peace took active role in organizing demonstrations against the war in Summer 2014. They managed to bring many groups together to speak about the siege. According to O.F., it was an emergency, so that they had to swallow their disagreements and come together. O.F. claimed that in addition to CWP, Tarabut Hithabrut, Daam and Combatants for Peace gained credibility, which was not the case for Meretz Party:

> "During each military operation, Meretz feels it is not appropriate to criticize during war. OK, let's wait until everybody dies and then say something, or what? This time it was even worse because they said about our protests that it is not legitimate, it is radical and extremist. They take it from a Zionist point of view. In our (CWP's) eye, if a pilot bombs Gaza, he has responsibility. He should not pay the price alone, but every time he gets on that plane, he takes that decision again and again. For many mainstream groups it is too much that we criticize soldiers. I told one of Meretz people that they are wrong for thinking that Israeli Jewish public see the difference between me and them. The extreme right wing sees us the same."[217]

As slogans like "prime minister and minister of defense are murderers" were too radical for many people because they had family and friends serving in Gaza, CWP chose other slogans which suit more people such as "Not in my name" "Free Gaza," "End the Siege" and "in Gaza and in Sderot people want to live"[218] which rhymes in Hebrew.

O.F. noted that when there was a violent attack by the extreme right wing on demonstration in Tel Aviv on July 12 (2014), police did not stop the attackers and they took pictures together with people attacking them. However, she argued, they did not face any limitations from the government:

> "It is because we are Jewish. Six-hundred Palestinians have been arrested in Israel within two months, some of them are still under arrest. In Tel Aviv, only fourteen Jewish people were arrested and released within seven hours. For Palestinians in Jaffa, Nazareth and Haifa, it was completely different. People told me we shouldn't go to demos, because then it would seem there is democracy here. I don't agree with this. For me as a privileged Jew, it is not a democracy as such but we have democratic freedom."[219]

---

[217] Interview with O.F., Tel Aviv, 7 September 2014.
[218] Be-Aza be-Sderot Yeladim rotzim likhyot.
[219] Interview with O.F., Tel Aviv, 7 September 2014.

For Tarabut Hithabrut, the slogan "end the siege" was important because, according to I.C., part of the trajectory of the war was the denial of the siege. I.C. criticized Peace Now for not having demonstrated during the war, but having organized a "fancy demonstration" after the war: "What they did was not a demo against the war; it is a way of reproducing pattern that led to Gaza War."[220] He claimed that "war is bad for activism in Israel:"

> "It was terrible to be an activist during war, people were depressed and felt isolated; family members were not talking to each other over political disagreements, it makes you alienated from mainstream society. People outside of Israel overdramatize the conflict; they only see war against Palestinians and bombs fired on Gaza. I understand colonial wars differently, I don't see any difference between a tank and a bulldozer, they are powerful symbols of colonization. It is the same structural violence. I wish people abroad wouldn't think about the conflict only during war times."[221]

As international civil society was following the war closely, BDS became visible and it gained in importance as a measure from outside Israel. Boycott from Within activist R.P. claimed that "usual suspects" were mobilized during war, there were no new people showing up as they think "you cannot change Israel from within:"

> "Demonstrations are not effective. No Israeli group which focused on activities within Israel was successful during the war. If you don't practice hard core civil disobedience, what you do means nothing. People are now convinced that you cannot count on Israeli public or Western governments, you can only count on Western civil society."[222]

As one of the groups participated in demonstrations in Tel Aviv, C.C. from Da'am claimed that when CWP, CfP, anarchists and PCFF came together to raise their voice against the war, their common point was that they are Israelis who are committed to the Palestinian side as well as peace. He claimed that Peace Now is very central to Israeli policy and they have no reference point on the Palestinian side because they do not want to lose their credibility in Israeli society.[223] Although the main slogan of the demonstration was "stop the war, ceasefire now" Da'am used their own slogan which was "we are fed up with Hamas and Netanyahu."[224]

---

[220] Interview with I.C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.
[221] Interview with I.C., Tel Aviv, 14 September 2014.
[222] Interview with R.P., Jerusalem, August 2014.
[223] Interview with C.C., Tel Aviv, 1 September 2014.
[224] Interview with C.C., Tel Aviv, 1 September 2014.

Like other interviewees I mentioned above, C.C. criticized Meretz and Peace Now too claiming that instead of addressing human rights violations and siege, they were saying that they served in Gaza and how proud they are of their service in the IDF. U.Z from New Profile argued that during the war it is shown by the Zionist left how important it is to serve, like Peace Now's poster saying "right now as we speak there are left wing soldiers who are called for reserve service and now serving in Gaza, next time before you curse the left wing for being traitors, think about them."[225] She added that during the war, New Profile helped around hundred reserve soldiers by telling them what their options because they did not want to do their service.[226]

The Refuseniks Letter of 2014 mentioned in Section 5.2.2. was also a highlight during the war. They prepared a satiric poster which was mimicking a letter sent from IDF to its soldiers. It was a big poster hanging all over Tel Aviv saying "occupying civil population is illegal," "we call soldiers to refuse," and "all these things are war crimes."[227] As one of the refusers, P.Z. claimed that in demonstrations they used radical slogans such as "all politicians are killers," and "security minister, how many children did you kill today?"[228] "stop killing protestors in West Bank, free the refusers."[229] Another refusenik F.A. said that they took t-shirts, put red paint on them and hung it on a rope all over Rothshild Boulevard in Tel Aviv. They also painted graffiti with the names and number of people killed in Gaza.[230] This shows that refuseniks managed to use radical instruments during the war which was linked to their refusal of serving in the army.

P.N. from Hadash said that for a big demonstration in Haifa, Hadash published their call in both Hebrew and Arabic. Right wing attacked the demonstrators physically and it became very violent. She described the atmosphere during the war as "anti-left" because anything leftist was a target.[231] C.C. from Da'am described the environment "anti-Arab."[232]

One of the main things I found out in this research is that in Israel, groups managed to use the war as a watershed moment to repeat their claims about peace. HRMO continued with their professional

---

[225] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 3 September 2014.
[226] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 3 September 2014.
[227] Interview with P.N., Jaffa, 9 September 2014.
[228] Hebrew version is "Bugi Bugi, Sar Ha-bitakhon, kama yeladim hargta hayom?"
[229] Interview with P.Z., Tel Aviv, 11 September 2014.
[230] Interview with F.A., Tel Aviv, 17 September 2014.
[231] Interview with P.N., Jaffa, 9 September 2014.
[232] Interview with C.C., Tel Aviv, 10 September 2014.

work and monitored the violations during the war. Refuseniks used this moment to repeat their reasons for refusing to serve in the army which had an anti-militaristic tone. Peace Now, which represents the Zionist Left was criticized by many interviewees because of their hesitation to protest during the war and their emphasis on the importance of serving in Gaza.

Moreover, in Israel mobilizing structures were changing in the aftermath of major events as POS was changing. For instance, during Operation Protective Edge there was pressure from the Jewish diaspora, so that they were more involved in negotiations to end the war and some of the organizations were willing to cooperate with them. Organizations from the Zionist left referred to these Jewish organizations in the Diaspora during times of conflict in order to look for support from the member states of the European Union and the United States. Moreover, when the conflict reached a peak, in order to build coalitions Arab Israeli and Jewish Israeli joint organizations were preferred when a demonstration or campaign had to be organized in order to represent both peoples. Frames used by groups were also changing in the sense that the more the cycle of violence repeated itself, the less certain they were that their moderate messages were actually making a difference. Therefore, some of the groups changed their frames radically; they started mentioning the Nakba (catastrophe) or displacement of Palestinians during the creation of the state of Israel. It was also remarkable that they began to discuss the right of return of Palestinian refugees, which, according to them, would mark a positive step to end the violence on both sides. This shows that after such big events although the short-term effect would be "political polarization in the political spectrum" according to della Porta, the long-term implication would be "new forms of collective action become part of the accepted repertoires" (1996: 81). All in all, mobilization alters "as opportunities for collective action open and close, allies appear and disappear, political alignments shift, and elites divide and cohere" (Tarrow 1996: 54).

Gezi protests of 2014 earmarked a very important point in the history of Turkey. It all started with the foundation of Taksim Solidarity Platform (*Taksim Dayanismasi*) which was against the urban transformation of the Taksim area and its surroundings. Moreover, Taksim has been known as the gathering square for many political events, however Taksim square has been closed down by the police for the May 1 demonstrations in 2013. Taksim Solidarity was set under these circumstances, in order to protect Taksim and Gezi Park against any destruction and to keep Taksim as a demonstration venue. At the end of May 2014 bulldozers entered the Gezi Park and started cutting down trees. The immediate reaction did not only come from the Taksim Solidarity, but also from

people who were accumulating their anger towards the repressive policies of Erdogan such as his rude rhetoric against dissidents, his speeches against abortion and the alcohol ban he initiated. This led to a mobilization of people who decided to take part in the Gezi protests. M.T.[233] from Taksim Solidarity claimed that there were many slogans against Erdogan asking him to resign:

> "We discussed a lot whether we should put the resignation of the government at the center of the Gezi Park protests, because many people were asking for it. However, we decided not to initiate something like this but focus on the protection of the Gezi Park."[234]

I asked him whether Gezi Protests were a step towards to the solution of the Kurdish conflict:

> "I don't know if there wasn't the peace process going on, Gezi Park protests would emerge or not. I think as a result of peace process, people were relieved and got rid of their paranoia that Turkey will be divided, so they could focus their energy on something different like Gezi. Kurdish people, however, were hesitant about Gezi at the beginning. We were criticizing the government, and Kurdish people were negotiating with the government; they thought it can affect the peace process in a negative way. This is why they did not come to the demonstrations in masses but only a few hundred. There were Kemalists in the demonstrations as well, so Kurdish people did not know what to think about that either. I wish they could see that our struggle in Gezi in the name of democracy was much important than the peace negotiations they were having with the government. However, I remember hearing Kurdish slogans such as "biji Kurdistan."[235]

One of the spokespeople of the Taksim Solidarity also claimed that:

> "In Gezi Park Protests Kurdish people did not participate in masses, they were there only symbolically. They participated only after Apo's[236] confirmation that they can go and protest. Kurdish people might think that Gezi Protests undermined the peace process, but I think it contributed to it because Turkey learned how to make peace with itself during these protests."[237]

---

[233] M.T. was my literature teacher in high school who was very special to me. Since 2017 he is not with us anymore. May he rest in peace.
[234] Interview with M.T., Istanbul, 4 July 2014.
[235] Interview with M.T., Istanbul, 4 July 2014.
[236] 'Apo' is the short name for Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK.
[237] Interview with T.K., Istanbul, 15 July 2014.

In order to understand Kurdish people's mobilization during the Gezi Protests, I asked one of the senior officers[238] of the People's Democratic Party Istanbul Branch (HDP, *Halklarin Demokratik Partisi*) whether it was true as claimed by others that Kurdish people were hesitant at the beginning in participating the protests:

> "We, People's Democratic Congress, are part of Taksim Solidarity Platform. It is true that during the first days of the protests, many nationalists were there, so Kurdish people hesitated. But then they did participate. People in Turkey learned what it means to be on the streets to fight for their rights in Gezi, Kurdish people have been doing that for the last thirty years already. However, I am not sure to what extent Gezi Protest really understood the long struggle of the Kurdish people."[239]

Labor Party (EMEP, *Emek Partisi*) was a member of Taksim Solidarity too. E.I. from Labor Party said that everyone interpreted Gezi differently. Some of them expected to start a revolution from the protests, whereas some poeple wanted to destroy AKP and replace it with the old nationalist and pro-army establishment. Others aimed at building a strong grass roots movement against AKP's repressive policies. According to him, it is understandable that Kurdish people hesitated about Gezi protests at the beginning as Kemalists were also participating, who are not only against AKP but also against the solution of the Kurdish question which they do not see as a democracy issue. He argued that it was a wake-up call for non-Kurdish people in Istanbul who faced police violence and they started thinking what Kurdish people should have been going through over the years through curfews and tortures in Kurdish regions.[240]

As I showed, activists I interviewed during and after the Operation Protective Edge were aware of the political context, the history and the chronology of the events. They were referring to Hamas and other Palestinian leadership as political actors, albeit criticizing them most of the time. However, in Turkey PKK, Ocalan and the other Kurdish actors involved in the Kurdish question have not been mentioned as if it is a separate phenomenon. There was a clear divide between the demands of the Gezi Park demonstrations and peace process in general as pointed out by my interviewees. As I highlighted in Chapter 6, seeing the Kurdish question and solution for it detached from other political processes in Turkey repeated itself during Gezi protests. It was a positive sign

---

[238] S.A. has been arrested on 20 February 2018, approximately two and a half years after I interviewed him. As of April 2018, he is still in prison.
[239] Interview with S.A., Istanbul, 14 July 2014.
[240] Interview with E.I., Istanbul, 7 August 2014.

that the army was not glorified during the protests, and protestors distanced themselves from the police as well as the army. However, this watershed moment has not been used to criticize the army, militarism and Turkish state; the focus was only on AKP, which oversees the fact that AKP is a product of the Turkish state's foundational ideology. When it comes to freedom of speech, in Israel all my interviewees claimed that their protest against war will not have an effect on curbing the freedom of speech. The only thing Israeli HRMO pointed out was the attempt by the government to undermine their funding in the aftermath of war which they saw as a punishment strategy by the government for their documentation of the war. In Turkey, however, during Gezi Park protests the Turkish police used immense violence against the protestors with tear gas and water cannons which resulted in seven deaths and many injuries. It was very surprising for me to find out that in Tel Aviv police did not use tear gas during the demonstration against the war on Gaza. U.Z.'s answer was that police did not use it because Israel is a "nice democracy for the Jews."[241]

7.6. Deadlock in peace: concluding remarks

Rucht warns us that scholars analyze opportunities as "objectively existent rather than socially constructed" (Rucht 1996: 189). There is an important cue to peace movements both in Israel and Turkey that, in order to develop they "must attract new recruits, sustain the morale and commitment of current adherents, mobilize the support of various bystander publics, constrain the social control options of its opponents, and ultimately shape public policy and state action" (McAdam 1996b: 339–40).

Careful examination of both cases reveals that the development of mobilizing structures and frames depends on the founding ideology and citizenship rights. In Israel the fact that the state and society are based on Zionism has also had an impact on the characteristics of peace movements. In Turkey, on the other hand, in addition to the poor organizational capabilities of the peace movements I observed weak movements characteristics with limited repertoires of action and unclear diagnostic and prognostic frames. Kemalism's legacy was visible in limiting freedom of expression.

[241] Interview with U.Z., Jerusalem, 3 September 2014.

In Israel, it is important to bear in mind that peace movements did not end the occupation but they have a platform from which to raise their arguments. In Turkey groups mobilized around the Kurdish issue do not focus on one particular solution, which leaves them a broader political space to move in. Yet this makes them lose their focus without knowing what to achieve in particular and how to plan to achieve it. Moreover, in Israel the groups usually refer to each other and are familiar with each other's work, even though this may entail criticism and support. In Turkey the groups never made reference to each other's work because they do not follow each other's agendas.

8. CONCLUSION: THIRTY-SEVEN SHADES OF PEACE?

According to Meyer and Tarrow, social movements are "*collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purpose and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities*" (1998: 4, emphasis in original). The question of why movements emerge, why they rise and fall, and how they achieve success has been the focus of many social movement scholars. In this thesis, I went beyond the clear-cut separation of political process approach and resource mobilization theory as they are both useful to have a comprehensive understanding of the interaction between external environment as well as internal dynamics of a movement.

Before I started my research I was puzzled that peace movements, criticizing the conflict and suggesting solutions to conflict in their respective countries, could evolve in one way or another with different movement characteristics even though they exist in similar militaristic environments. As a result, the main question that guides this thesis is: How do peace movements emerge in militaristic societies, and how can we explain the variations across peace movements, if any, and their different characteristics in two different contexts?

In order to answer this question, I was guided by four specific aims. First, I wanted to abstract three concepts that have emerged as central from the literature on social movements: political opportunities; framing; and mobilizing structures. Second, by focusing on them, I hoped to deepen our understanding of each of these three concepts. My third goal was to develop an understanding of the dynamic relation among these three in order to sketch a broader analytical framework on peace movements. Finally, I wanted to explore and provide a cross-country and within-country perspective by discussing the concepts of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures.

In order to investigate peace movements in militaristic societies I selected two prime examples, Israel and Turkey, not only because of their important role in international relations and the Middle East, but also for the different characteristics of peace movements as a part of social movements,

despite the fact that the two countries have many similarities. Upon closer examination, the two countries have many similarities, for example both are nation-states where militarism plays a key role. Armies in these countries are not only technologically strong, but they also have a say in politics and are respected in society. Both countries implement compulsory military service and conscientious objection is not recognized as a legal right. Moreover, taking Israel's ongoing war with Palestine and the Kurdish question in Turkey into account, we can observe that these long-standing armed conflicts placed both countries in a continual state of alert against perceived threats.

8.1. Primary Empirical Findings and Further Theoretical Implications

The primary finding of this research is that the difference in political opportunity structures, citizenship regimes and the discursive aspect of foundational principles in Israel and Turkey explain differential outcomes; different movement characteristics, i.e. framing and mobilizing structures.

One of the main empirical findings of this study is that two of the components of political opportunities examined, the discursive aspect of foundational ideology and citizenship regime, are ultimately related but distinct factors when it comes to shaping framing and mobilizing structures of peace movements in both countries. While I examined both countries, I underlined the role of the the founding ideologies in mobilizing peace movements, Zionism in Israel and Kemalism in Turkey. While emphasizing how political establishment shapes peace movements, I found that groups' and organizations' specific experience with the state affected their assessment of the state, which in turn clearly demonstrated variations across countries as well as variations within a country. I showed how the foundational elite was entitled to define the boundaries of the collective in both countries. In the same vein, disadvantages can be attributed largely to these boundaries drawn by the foundational ideologies.

One of the main aims of this research was to analyze the movement characteristics of peace movements. I found that the engagement of the peace movement in Turkey developed sporadically, in the sense that movements did not mutually reinforce and strengthen each other or help mobilize among themselves and to collaborate with other groups except at an *ad hoc* level. As a result groups failed to learn from their past experiences in order to apply it to reach a substantial level of

engagement. In Israel, on the other hand, the movement characteristics were much stronger and they had the ability to mobilize in a determined manner.

In Turkey although peace movements have sometimes had a chance to appeal to a broader public, the quest for peace has remained a largely intellectual concept which prevents it from being integrated into the social and political life of a country. Over time the objection to war tends to become limited to elite circles. Instead, peace movements have to mobilize people, organize them and act with the society to be effective. If all relevant actors, such as workers, women, LGBTQs, and political party members are represented, then socialization of the movement will be possible by increasing the level and scope of participation. Organizing panels, which is the most common instrument used by the organizations and groups is an opportunity to discuss the same issues with the same people, which in turn makes the peace message circulate within a limited environment, so that it remains a monologue.

8.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

In this dissertation I have tried to diversify the movement organizations and groups consulted during my research, and therefore I analyzed thirty-seven of them in both countries. By doing so, my aim was, on the one hand, to provide a bigger picture with a broader range of activists, and on the other hand, I wanted to ensure that I could involve as many of them as possible. However, this prevented me from taking a deeper look at each group and organization due to limitations of time and space. Nevertheless, I can still state that my research, as a first attempt to map peace movements in both countries in such a broad manner, will serve as a guidance for future researchers wanting to focus solely on some groups and organizations examined here.

Another point which has not been considered in this study is the class component of peace movements in both countries; for example, what the mobilization, demobilization and remobilization of certain socio-economic classes tell us. This may be a drawback of my work, as it could give an idea of future research as a starting point or another area to investigate.

Thirdly, as social movement scholars observe the sequence of events, the content and outcomes of activist mobilization over time and across different institutional contexts in different countries, one of first ideas that comes to mind for future research is to look at the achievements of peace movements in the two countries. Further research might also be to discuss how these movements

succeeded with their aims in the first place, and which opportunities facilitated or limited their survival over time.

Fourthly, in order to examine the causal link between POS and peace movements, secondary flows could have been introduced in the model in order to examine to what extent the causality works in both directions. Provided with a clear chronological account, this could help in identifying specific effects in different points in time in order to identify a pattern as a result of this feedback mechanism between POS and peace movements.

As early on as 1996 McAdam was already warning scholars to take the international context into account when shaping domestic politics and alliances (1996a: 34). Therefore, the impact of Jews in the Diaspora on and lobbying power in Israeli politics can be another suggestion for the future.

Another line of research can combine political theories of the state with the feminist conceptions of women and men arguing that nationalism is a product of a "masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope" (Enloe 2010: 44). Benhabib and Resnik also underline:

> "[l]aws, policies, moralities, and theories of citizenship, as well as of sovereignty, jurisdiction, family life and migration, must grapple with the way histories of discrimination and subordination is based on gender affect the conceptualization and implementation of opportunities, rights, and burdens, as well we the nation-state's powers" (2009: 5).

Lastly, it is important to note that I did not take the administrative structure into account as it was not relevant for my research question. Moreover, because I analyzed not only organizations but also groups, it would not be a valid comparison where the latter does not have clear definitions when it comes to allocation of tasks. I did not consider the financial structure of the groups and organizations in this research either because it would be a separate research on its own to look at the financial support and donations thirty-seven groups and organizations receive from different sources.

8.3. Final Words

In Ann Scales' words, militarism is the "pervasive cluster of forces that keeps history insane: hierarchy, conformity, waste, false glory, force as the resolution of all issues, death as the meaning of life and a claim to the necessity of all that" (1989: 26). Militaristic societies value the military perspective as a way to solve conflicts over all other solutions. In such societies the definition of

security depends on conflicts. The whole mechanism is created around militarized solutions over everything else. In order to do that, a state has to maintain an army which cannot be criticized, create an education system based on militaristic matters and introduce compulsory military service built into the idea that the only way to survive is the militaristic idea of defense.

Peace has to be reflected in and on society, in the sense that demands made by peace movements have to be welcomed, understood, and accepted at the societal level in addition to the truth and reconciliation components of any lasting peace agreement. In order to avoid peace being a merely technical term used as a political tool, it should also extend to a confrontation from a socio-psychological perspective, which goes well beyond the scope of this research and requires a different kind of expertise. Although some Israeli peace movements made moves in this direction, their Turkish counterparts lack this kind of agenda altogether.

The present political climate in both countries provide an exceptional moment to return to the questions of militarism, freedom of speech and democracy. Israel and Turkey can both be characterized as states known for their exclusion, discrimination, oppression and exploitation of their Palestinian and Kurdish citizens respectively. It is clear that achieving peace requires more than signing an agreement, but a fundamental change in and challenge of the state's foundational principles of Zionism and Kemalism.

When the AKP first claimed that it would abolish militarism in Turkey, from a liberal point of view it was supported by the US and the EU. However, the AKP's real aim was to redesign all state institutions, and to instrumentalize militarism in its own favor. Not only the US and the EU, but also the liberals in Turkey gave the AKP much credit for such a claim, but they failed to see that in a country like Turkey where there is no real democracy and no real freedom of speech, and whose existence is based on the suppression of the Kurds, denial of the Armenian genocide and the discrimination against non-Turkish and non-Muslim identities, such a 'demilitarization attempt' was doomed to failure. Zinn underlines that war "does not enable the pursuit of happiness but brings despair and grief" (2007: 115). It is unfortunate, yet it tells us a lot, that the way the Turkish state deals with the Kurdish question does not resurrect the shade of the Armenian genocide in the consciousness of most Turkish citizens.

According to Kymlicka, the nation-state "was implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) seen as the possession of a dominant national group, which used the state to privilege its identity, language,

history, culture, literature, myths, religion, and so on, and which defined the state as the expression of its nationhood" (2007: 61). Palestinians and Kurds serve the purpose of being the subjects of political discussions in Israel and Turkey respectively. However, they are never asked about the broad political, cultural or economic issues concerning Israel and Turkey in general. In both countries more often than not, Palestinians and Kurds are seen as threats to and enemies of the state, rather than its equal citizens. Peace movements sometimes fail to address the main contradiction within countries, which defines themselves as democratic, whilst controlling and oppressing a large part of the population and denying them basic citizenship rights. It is important to stress that liberal democracies are in no way immune to discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation.

I must repeat that it is not only a question of the violation of rights of a specific group of people as a result of state policies, as is the case for Palestinians and the Kurds, but it is a struggle for democracy in both Israel and Turkey. With these dynamics we observe the changing boundaries of who and what is considered as legitimate, as the discourse is shaped in response to the interaction. As a result of this process, we can detect the re-emergence of a component of political opportunity structure faced by peace movements. In the words of Brubaker, we live in a world "in which nation is widely, if unevenly, available and resonant as a category of social vision and division" (1996: 21). In time, it will become –or has already become - obvious that conflicts such as the Kurdish and Palestinian questions, cannot be exclusively resolved within the nation-state framework as they are structural reasons for their emergence in the first place and because both countries emphasize nationalism and militarism in their national narrative.

Bibliography

Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, and Abigail B. Bakan. 2011. "The "Israelization" of social sorting and the "Palestinianization" of the racial contract: reframing Israel/Palestine and the war on terror." In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, territory, and power,* eds. Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. New York: Routledge, 276-294.

Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi, Joost Jongerden. 2012. "Reassembling the Political: The PKK and the project of Radical Democracy." *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 14: 2-16.

Alinsky, Saul D. 1972. *Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals.* New York: Vintage Books.

Alper, Emin. 2010. "Reconsidering social movements in Turkey: The case of the 1968-71 protest cycle." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 43: 63-96.

Altınay, Ayse G. 2004. *The Myth of the Military-Nation. Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Amenta, Edwin and Michael P. Young. 1999. "Making an Impact: Conceptual and Methodological Implications of the Collective Goods Criterion." In *How Social Movements Matter,* eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 42-65.

Andrews, Kenneth T. 2001. "Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971." *American Sociological Review* 66 (1): 71-95.

Andrews, Kenneth T. 2002. "Creating Social Change: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement." In *Social Movements. Identity, Culture, and the State,* eds. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 105-120.

Ayata, Bilgin. 2011. "Kurdish Transnational Politics and Turkey's Changing Kurdish Policy: The Journey of Kurdish Broadcasting from Europe to Turkey." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 19(4): 523-533.

Bacevich, Andrew J. 2005. *The New American Militarism. How Americans Are Seduced by War.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baykan, Baris Gencer, and Gulcin Erdi Lelandais. 2004. "Cross-readings of the anti-globalisation movement in Turkey and beyond. Political culture in the making." *International Social Sciences Journal* 56(182): 519-528.

Begoray, Deborah L., and Elizabeth M. Banister. 2012. "Reflexivity." In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research,* eds. Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 789-790.

Ben-Amos, Avner. 2013. "National memory." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 46-54.

Ben-Elizer, Uri. 1998. *The Making of Israeli Militarism.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Benford, Robert D. 1993a. ""You Could be the Hundredth Monkey": Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *The Sociological Quarterly* 34(2): 195-216.

Benford, Robert D. 1993b. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces* 71(3): 677-701.

Benford, Robert D. 2007. "The College Sports Reform Movement: Reframing the "Edutainment" Industry. *The Sociological Quarterly* 48(1): 1-28.

Benhabib, Seyla. 2001. *Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the Nation State in the Era of Globalization.* Assen: Koninglijke Van Gorcum.

Benhabib, Seyla. *Another Cosmopolitanism.* 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benhabib, Seyla, and Judith Resnik, eds. 2009. "Introduction: Citizenship and Migration Theory Engendered." In *Migrations and Mobilities. Citizenship, Borders, and Gender,* eds. Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik. New York: New York University Press, 1-46.

Berghahn, Volker R., and Hugh Bicheno. 2001. "Militarism" In *The Oxford Companion to Military History,* ed. Richard Holmes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 584.

Beyeler, Michelle, and Dieter Rucht. 2010. "Political Opportunity Structures and Progressive Movement Sectors." In *The World Says No to War. Demonstrations against the War on Iraq,* eds. Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 20-41.

Blätte, Andread. 2003. "The Kurdish movement ethnic mobilization and Europeanization." Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), 8th biennial conference, 27-29 March, Nashville, TN.

Bleijenbergh, Inge. 2012. "Case Selection." In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research,* eds. Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 61-63.

Bosniak, Linda. 2006. *The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bowman, Glenn. 2011. "A Place for Palestinians in the *Altneuland:* Herzl, anti-Semitism, and the Jewish State." In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, territory, and power,* eds. Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. New York: Routledge, 65-80.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 1992. "Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in contemporary Turkey." In *The Kurds. A Contemporary Overview,* eds. Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl. London: Routledge, 95-112.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 2004. *Violence in the Middle East: From Political Struggle to Self-Sacrifice.* Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers.

Briggs, Charles L. 2011. "Interviewing, Power/Knowledge and Social Inequality." In *Handbook of Interview Research,* eds. Jaber F. Gubrium, and James A. Holstein. Thousand Oaks: SAGE

Publications, 910-922.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1990. "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis." *International Sociology* 5(4): 379-407.

Brubaker, Rogers, 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cagaptay, Soner. 2006. *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* London: Routledge.

Carty, Victoria, and Jake Onyett. 2006. "Protest, Cyberactivism and New Social Movements: The Reemergence of the Peace Movement Post 9/11." *Social Movement Studies* 5(3): 229-249.

Charbit, Denis. 2013. "Political life: from dominant party to political fragmentation." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 57-71.

Cinar, Ozgur H., and Coskun Usterci, eds. 2008. *Çarklardaki Kum: Vicdani Red. Düşünsel Kaynaklar ve Deneyimler.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. 1983. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building.* Boston: Allyn& Bacon.

Coffey, Amanda. 1999. *The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity.* London: Sage.

Coffey, Amanda, Beverley Holbrook, and Paul Atkinson. 2011. "Qualitative Data Analysis: Technologies and Representations." In *SAGE Qualitative Research Methods,* eds. Paul Atkinson, and Sara Delamont. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2-17.

Cohen, Stuart A. 2010. "Tensions between Military Service and Jewish Orthodoxy in Israel: Implications Imagined and Real." In Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 120-144.

Cohen, Samy. 2010. "Civilian Control over the Army in Israel and France." In Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 238-258.

Cohen, Hillel. 2011. "The matrix of surveillance in times of national-conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian case." In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, territory, and power,* eds. Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. New York: Routledge, 99-112.

Cornell, Svante E. 2001. "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics." *Orbis* 45(1): 31-46.

Coy, Patrick G., and Lynne M. Woehrle. 1996. "Constructing Identity and Oppositional Knowledge: The Framing Practices of Peace Movement Organizations during the Persian Gulf War." *Sociological Spectrum* 16: 287-327.

Council of Europe. 1950. "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680063765 (December 16, 2015).

Cress, Daniel M., and David A. Snow. 2000. "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(4): 1063-1104.

Debie, Franck. 2013. "Israeli territorial strategies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 189-200.

De Vaus, David. 2001. *Research Design in Social Research.* London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction.* Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.

Della Porta, Donatella. 1995. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Olivier Fillieule. 2004. "Policing Social Protest." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 217-241.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2008. "Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented research." In *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective,* eds. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198-222.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Dieter Rucht. 1995. "Left-Libertarian Movements in Context: A Comparison of Italy and West Germany, 1965-1990." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements,* eds. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. London: University of Minessota, 113-134.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Michael Keating. 2008. "How many approaches in the social sciences? An epistemological introduction." In *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective,* eds. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19-39.

Della, Porta, Donatella. 1996. "Social movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of protest." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 62-92.

Diani, Mario. 1996. "Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: Insights from Regional Popularism in Italy." *American Sociological Review* 61(6): 1053-1069.

Dieckhoff, Alain. 2013a. "Introduction: Israel before Israel." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 1-9.

Dieckhoff, Alain. 2013b. "A Jewish and democratic state." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 11-19.

Dieckhoff, Alain. 2013c. "Israel and the Palestinians." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 163-176.

Dobash, R. Emerson, and Russell P. Dobash. 1992. *Women, Violence and Social Change*. London: Routledge.

Eder, Klaus. 1993. *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*. London: Sage.

Eder, Klaus, and Bernhard Giessen. "Citizenship and the Making of a European Society: From the Political to the Social Integration of Europe." In *European Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*, eds. Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giessen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 245-269.

Ehrlich, Avishai. 1987. "Israel: Conflict, War and Social Change." In *The Sociology of War and Peace*, eds. Colin Creighton and Martin Shaw. London: Macmillan, 121-142.

Eisinger, Peter K. 1973. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *The American Political Science Review* 67(1): 11-28.

Ekirch, Arthur A. 1999. "Militarism and Antimilitarism." In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History,* ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II. New York, Oxford University Press. 438.

Ellis Carolyn. 1995. *Final Negotiations: a Story of Love, Loss and Chronic Illness.* Temple University Press: Philadelphia.

Enloe, Cynthia. 2010. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Finlay, Linda. 2014. "Five Lenses for the Reflexive Interviewer." In *The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft,* eds. Jaber F. Gubrium, James A. Holstein, Amir B. Marvasti, and Karyn D.McKinney. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 317-332.

Gamson, William A., and David S. Meyer. 1996. "Framing political opportunity." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 275-290.

Gelb, Joyce, and Vivien Hart. 1999. "Feminist Politics in a Hostile Environment: Obstacles and Opportunities." In *How Social Movements Matter,* eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 149-181.

Gelvin, James L. 2005. *The Israel Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ghanem, As'ad. 1998. "State and minority in Israel: the case of ethnic state and the predicament of its minority." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21(3): 428-448.

Gidron, Benjamin, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, eds. 2002. *Mobilizing for Peace. Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giugni, Marco, and Florence Passy. 2004. "Migrant mobilization between political institutions and citizenship regimes: A comparison of France and Switzerland." *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 51-82.

Goffman, Erwing. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay On the Organization of Experience.* New York: Harper& Row.

Goodwin, Jeff, and Jim Jasper. 2004. "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory." In *Rethinking Social Movements, Structure, Meaning, and Emotion,* eds. Jeff Goodwin and Jim Jasper. Rowman& Littlefield, 2004 3-30.

Grinberg, Lev Luis. 2010. *Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine. Democracy versus Military Rule.* New York: Routledge.

Gümrükçü, Selin Bengi. 2007. "Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Doğuşu : Küreselleşme Karşıtı Hareketlerin Türkiye'de Ortaya Çıkışı." Master's Thesis. Izmir: Dokuz Eylul Universitesi.

Gümrükçü, Selin Bengi. 2010. "The Rise of a Social Movement: The Emergence of Anti-Globalization Movements in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 11(2): 163-180.

Gunter, Michael M. 1990. *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hafiza Merkezi (No date). "The ECHR Judgments on Enforced Disappearances." http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/en/kaynak/the-echr-judgements-on-enforced-disappearances/ (August 26, 2016).

Horowitz, Donald L. 1994. "Democracy in Divided Societies." In *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 35-55.

Howard, Michael E. 1957. "Introduction: The Armed Forces as a Political Problem." In *Soldiers and Governments. Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations* ed. Michael E. Howard. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 11-24.

Human Rights Watch. 2010. "Protesting as a Terrorist Offense: The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey." https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/01/protesting-terrorist-offense/arbitrary-use-terrorism-laws-prosecute-and (August 13, 2014).

Hurworth, Rosalind. 2011. "Document Analysis." In *Encyclopedia of Evaluation,* ed. Sandra Mathison. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 119-120.

Icduygu, Ahmet, David Romano, and Ibrahim Sirkeci. 1999. "The ethnic question in an environment of insecurity: the Kurds in Turkey." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(6): 991-1010.

Isin, Engin F. 2000. "Introduction: democracy, citizenship, and the city." In *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City* ed. Engin F Isin. London: Routledge, 1-22.

Jamal, Amal. 2007. "Nationalizing States and the Constitution of 'Hollow Citizenship': Israel and its Palestinian Citizens." *Ethnopolitics* 6(4): 471-493.

Jenkins, J. Craig, and Bert Klandermans. 1995. "The Politics of Social Protest." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements,* eds. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. London: University of Minessota, 3-13.

Jenkins, J. Craig. 1995. "Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements,* eds. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. London: University of Minessota, 14-38.

Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 9: 527-553.

Jenkins, J. Craig, and Charles Perrow. 1977. “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972).” *American Sociological Review* 42(2): 249-268.

Jongerden, Joost, and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya. 2012. “The Kurdistan Workers Party and a New Left in Turkey: Analysis of the revolutionary movement in Turkey through the PKK’s memorial text on Haki Karer.” *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 14: 1-20.

Joppke, Christian. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kabacali, Alper. 2007. *Turkiye’de Siyasal Cinayetler*. Istanbul: Gurer Yayinlari.

Kaiser, Karen. 2014. “Protecting Confidentiality.” In *The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft,* eds. Jaber F. Gubrium, James A. Holstein, Amir B. Marvasti, and Karyn D.McKinney. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 457-464.

Kaldor, Mary. 2006. *New&Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaminer, Reuven. 1996. *The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada.* Brighton: Sussex University Press.

Karasapan, Ömer. 1989. “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost.” *Middle East Report* 160: 4-22.

Kellner, Menachem M. 1975. “Democracy and civil disobedience.” *Journal of Politics* 37: 899-911.

Khayati, Khalid. 2007. “Kurds in Turkey: from total denial to folkloric existence” *Kurdish Globe,* No. 110, 24 May.

Khayati, Khalid. 2008. “From victim diaspora to transborder citizenship? Diaspora formation and transnational relations among Kurds in France in Sweden.” PhD diss. Linköping: Linköping University.

Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel S. Migdal. 1992. *Palestinians: The Making of a People.* New York: Free Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies.” *British Journal of Political Science* 16(1): 57-85.

Klandermans, Bert. 1984. “Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory.” American Sociological Review. 49(5): 583-600.

Klandermans, Bert. 1991. *Peace Movements in Western Europe and the United States.* Greenwich, Conn: Jai Pess.

Klein, Claude. 2013. “The political institutions of Israel.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 20-26.

Koopmans, Ruud. 1999. “Germany and its immigrants: An ambivalent relationship.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25(4): 627-647.

Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 1999a. "Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claim Making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(3): 652-696.

Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 1999b. "Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy." In *How Social Movements Matter,* eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 225-251.

Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 2000. "Political Claims-Making against Racism and Discrimination in Britain and Germany." In *Comparative Perspectives on Racism,* eds. Jessika ter Wal and Maykel Verkuyten. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 139-170.

Koopmans, Ruud, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 1995. "The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe." *Social Problems* 42(2): 235-251.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1989a. "New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(5): 1078-1116.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1989b. "The Political Opportunity Structure of the Dutch Peace Movement." *West European Politics* 12(3): 295-312.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1995. "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements,* eds. J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 167-198.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2007. "Political Context and Opportunity." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriese. Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 67-90.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, eds. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni, eds. 1992. "New social movements and political opportunities in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 22(2): 219-244.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. "The organizational structure of new social movements in political context." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 152-184.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Philip Van Praag. 1987. "Old and new politics: The Dutch peace movement and the traditional political organizations." *European Journal of Political Research* 15(3): 319-346.

Kronsell, Annica. 2012. *Gender, Sex, and The Postnational Defense. Militarism and Peacekeeping.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kurban, Dilek. 2003. “Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of Minorities on Turkey’s Path to the European Union.” *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 35(101): 151-214.

Kurban, Dilek. 2004. “Unravelling a trade-off: reconciling minority rights and full citizenship in Turkey.” *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* 4: 341-372.

Kymlicka, Will. 2007. *Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Laciner, Sedat, and Ihsan Bal. 2004. “The Ideological and Historical Roots of the Kurdist Movements in Turkey: Ethnicity, Demography, and Politics.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10(3): 473-504.

Laskier, Michael M. 2013. “The new social movements.” In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel,* ed. Alain Dieckhoff. New York: Routledge, 72-80.

Lomsky-Feder, Edna, and Eyal Ben Ari, eds. 1999. The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Lomsky-Feder, Edna, and Eyal Ben Ari, 2010. “The Discourse of “Psychology” and the “Normalization” of War in Contemporary Israel.” In Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 280-303.

Lustick, Ian. 1988. “Creeping binationalism within the Green Line.” *New Outlook* 31(7): 14-19.

Mair, Peter. 2008. “Concepts and Concept Formation.” In *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective,* eds. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-197.

Marullo, Sam, and David S. Meyer. 2007. “Antiwar and Peace Movements.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 641-665.

Marzano, Marco. 2014. “Informed Consent.” In *The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft,* eds. Jaber F. Gubrium, James A. Holstein, Amir B. Marvasti, and Karyn D. McKinney. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 443-456.

McAdam, Dough, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Dough, and Yang Su. 2002. “The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973.” *American Sociological Review* 67(5): 696-721.

McAdam, Dough. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

McAdam, Dough. 1983. “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.” *American Sociological Review* 48(6): 735-754.

McAdam, Dough. 1996. “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions.” In *Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing: Comparative Applications of Contemporary Movement Theory,* eds. Dough McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23:40.

McAdam, Dough. 2003. “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements.” In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, eds. Mario Dinani and Dough McAdam, 281-298.

McAdam, Dough, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald 1996. “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes- toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-22.

McAdam, Dough. 1996. “The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 338-356.

McCammon, Holly. 2009. “Beyond Frame Resonance: The Argumentative Structure and Persuasive Capacity of Twentieth-Century U.S. Women’s Jury-Right Frames” *Mobilization* 14(1):45-64.

McCarthy, John D. 1997. “The Globalization of Social Movement Theory.” In *Transnational social movements and global politics: solidarity beyond the state,* eds. Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, 243-259.

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977 “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212-1241.

McCarthy, John D. 1996. “Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting, and inventing.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 141-151.

McDowall, David 1996. *A Modern History of the Kurds.* London: I.B. Tauris.

Meyer, David S. 1993a. “Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age.” *Policy Research Quarterly* 46(3): 451-479.

Meyer, David S. 1993b. “Peace Protest and Policy: Explaining the Rise and Decline of Antinuclear Movements in Postwar America. *Policy Studies Journal* 21(1): 35-51.

Meyer, David S., Sidney Tarrow. 1998. “A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century” In *The Social Movement Society,* eds. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham: Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield, 1-28.

Meyer, David S. 1999. “How the Cold War Was Really Won: The Effects of the Antinuclear Movements of the 1980s.” In *How Social Movements Matter,* eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 182-203.

Meyer, David S., and Nancy Whittier.1994. “Social Movement Spillover.” *Social Problems* 41(2): 277-298.

Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity.” *Social Forces* 82(4): 1457-1492.

Meyer, David S. 2002. "Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements." In *Social Movements. Identity, Culture, and the State,* eds. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-24.

Meyer, David S. 2004. "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125-145.

Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *The American Journal of Sociology,* 101(6): 1628-1660.

Michael, Mann. 2005. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Migdal, Joel S. 1996. "Whose state is it anyway? Exclusion and the construction of graduated citizenship in Israel." *Israeli Studies Forum* 21(2): 3-27.

Migdal, Joel S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Military Service Law. 1927.

Moskos, Charles., and John Whiteclay Chambers. 1993. "The Secularization of Conscience." In *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance,* eds. Charles Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers. New York: Oxford University Press, 3-20.

Noakes John A., and Hank Johnston. 2005. "Frames of Protest: A Roadmap to a Perspective" In *Frames Of Protest: Social Movements And The Framing Perspective,* eds. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1:32.

Olsen, Wendy. 2014. *Data Collection: Key Debates and Methods in Social Research.* London: SAGE Publications.

Olson, Margaret. 2012. "Document Analysis." In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research,* eds. Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 319-320.

Opp, Karl-Dieter et al. 1995. "Left-Right Ideology and Collective Political Action: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Israel, and Peru." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements,* eds. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. London: University of Minessota, 63-95.

Pappe, Ilan. 2006. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.* Oxford: Oneworld.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1967. "Resolution 337." http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15752&lang=en55 (December 15, 2015).

Passy, Florence. 2003. "Social Networks Matter, But How?" In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, eds. Mario Dinani and Dough McAdam, 21-48.

Peled, Yoav. 1992. "Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship: Arab citizens of the Jewish state." *American Political Science Review* 86(2): 432-443.

Peled, Yoav. 2005. “Restoring Ethnic Democracy: The Or Commission and Palestinian Citizenship in Israel.” *Citizenship Studies* 9(1): 89-105.

Peled, Yoav. 2008. “The evolution of Israeli citizenship: an overview.” *Citizenship Studies* 12(3): 335-345.

Peled, Yoav, and Gershon Shafir. 1996. “The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948-93.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28(3): 391-413.

Peri, Yoram. 2010. “Intractable Conflict and Media.” In Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 95-119.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. *Poor People’s Movements: How They Succeed, Why They Fail.* New York: Pantheon Books.

Radu, Michael. 2001. “The Rise and Fall of the PKK.” *Orbis* 45(1): 47-63.

Raijman, Rebeca. 2010. “Citizenship Status, Ethno-National Origin and Entitlement of Rights: Majority Attitudes towards Minorities and Immigrants in Israel.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(1): 87-106.

Reich, Bernard. 2012. *A Brief History of Israel.* New York: Facts on File.

Refusenik Letter. 2014. https://www.facebook.com/pg/refusingIDF/about/?ref=page_internal (15 December, 2017).

Robins, Philip. 1993. “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue.” *International Affairs* 69(4): 657-676.

Rochon, Thomas R. 1988. *Mobilizing for Peace. The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe.* London: Adamantine Press.

Rochon Thomas R., and David S. Meyer. 1997. “Introduction: The Nuclear Freeze in Theory and Action.” In *Coalitions and Political Movements. The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze,* eds. Thomas Rochon and David S. Meyer. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1-24.

Rosenhek, Zeev. 1999. “The politics of claims-making by labour migrants in Israel.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25(4): 575-595.

Rouhana, Nadim N. 1997. *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict.* New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

Rouhana, Nadim. N., and Asad Ghanem. 1998. “The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case of Palestinian Citizens in Israel.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30(3): 321-346.

Rucht, D., 1990. “Campaigns, skirmishes and battles: anti-nuclear movements in the USA, France and West Germany.” *Industrial Crisis Quarterly*, 4: 193-222.

Rucht, Dieter. 1996. “The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: a cross-movement and cross-national comparison.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185-204.

Rucht, Dieter. 1999. “The Impact of Environmental Movements in Western Societies.” In *How Social Movements Matter,* eds. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 204-224.

Savas Karsitlari. 2013. “Turkiye’de VR Aciklayanlar- 210 Kisi.” https://archive.is/ZbyMQ (December 25. 2015).

Scalbert-Yucel, Clemence, and Marie Le Ray. 2006. “Knowledge, ideology and power: Deconstructing Kurdish Studies.” *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 5.

Scales, Ann. 1989. “Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurispudence as Oxymoron.” *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 12: 25-76.

Shachar, Ayelet. 2009. *The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Equality.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Shafir, Gershon. 1989. *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882-1914.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shafir, Gershon, and Yoav Peled. 2002. *Being Israeli. The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shafir, Gershon, and Yoav Peled. 1998. “Citizenship and stratification in an ethnic democracy.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21(3): 408-427.

Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. 2010. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Shiffer, Zalman F. 2010. “The Debate over the Defense Budget in Israel.” In Sheffer, Gabriel, and Oren Barak, eds. *Militarism and Israeli Society.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,213-237.

Shministim. 2002. “To Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.” http://oznik.com/petitions/020917.html (March 7, 2015).

Sieber, Joan A. 1992. *Planning Ethically Responsible Research: A Guide for Students and Internal Review Boards.* Newburry Park, CA: Sage.

Sirkeci, Ibrahim. 2000. “Exploring the Kurdish population in the Kurdish context.” *Genus* 56(1/2): 149-175.

Smith, Thomas W. 2005. “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey.” *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(2): 436-470.

Smooha, Sammy. 1990. “Minority status in an ethnic democracy: the status of the Arab minority in Israel.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13(3): 389-413.

Smooha, Sammy. 1978. *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict.* Berkeley: University California Press.

Smooha, Sammy. 1997. “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype.” *Israel Studies* 2(2): 198-241.

Sternhell, Zeev. 1998. *The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, eds. 1986. "Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation." *American Sociological Review* 51: 464–481.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Observation" *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197-218.

Snow, David A. 2007. "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 380-412.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 2005. "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology." In *Frames Of Protest: Social Movements And The Framing Perspective,* eds. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 205-212.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest." In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,* eds. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 133-155.

Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1986. "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental Opportunities and Obstacles." *Social Problems* 33(5): 374-390.

Staggenborg, Suzanne. 2002. "The "Meso" in Social Movement Research." In *Social Movements. Identity, Culture, and the State,* eds. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 124-139.

Statham, Paul. 1999. "Political mobilisation by minorities in Britain: Negative feedback of 'race relations'?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25(4): 597-626.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41-61.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. *War, States, &Contention. A Comparative Historical Study.* Ithaca, Ney Work: Cornell University Press.

Taşpınar, Ömer. 2005. *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey. Kemalist Identity in Transition.* New York: Routledge.

Tezcur, Gunes Murat. 2010. "When democratization radicalizes: The Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(6): 775-789.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, Charles. 1984. "Social Movements and National Politics." In *Statemaking and Social Movements* eds. Charles Bright and Susan Harding. Ann Arbor, Michigan.: University of Michigan Press, 297–317.

Till, Charles. 1995. “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834.” In *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action,* ed. Mark Traugott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 15-42.

Tilly, Charles. 1997. “A Primer on Citizenship.” *Theory and Society* 26(4): 599-602.

Tilly, Charles. 2006. *Regimes and Repertoires.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tocci, Nathalie, and Alper Kaliber. 2008. “Conflict society and the transformation of the Turkey’s Kurdish question.” *Shur-case study report* wp 01/08.

Turner, Bryan S. 1990. “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship.” *Sociology* 24(2): 189-217.

Turkish Constitution. 1982.

United Nations. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (December 5, 2015).

Vagts, Alfred. 1981. *A History of Militarism.* Westport: Greenwood Press.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 1992. *Agha*, *Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures* of *Kurdistan. London: Zed Books.*

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 2000. *Kurdish Ethno- Nationalism Versus Nation-Building States*. Istanbul: The Isis Press.

Verhulst, Joris, Stefaan Walgrave. 2010. “Politics, Public Opinion, and the Media: The Issues and Context behing the Demonstrations.” In *The World Says No to War. Demonstrations against the War on Iraq,* eds. Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 42-60.

Walgrave, Stefaan, and Bert Klandermans. 2010. “Open and Closed Mobilization Patterns: The Role of Channels and Ties.” In *The World Says No to War. Demonstrations against the War on Iraq,* eds. Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 169-194.

War Resisters’ International Report. 2003. “Conscientious objection to military service in Israel: an unrecognized human right.” https://www.wri-irg.org/en/story/2003/conscientious-objection-military-service-israel-unrecognised-human-right (March 22, 2013).

Whittier, Nancy. 2002. “Meaning and Structure in Social Movements.” In *Social Movements. Identity, Culture, and the State,* eds. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 289-308.

Wilkinson Sue. 1988. “The role of reflexivity in feminist psychology.” *Women’s Studies International Forum 11(5)*: 493-502.

Yeo, Andrew. 2011. *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yin, Robert K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Zald, Mayer N., and Roberta Ash. 1966. “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change.” *Social Forces* 44 (3): 327-341.

Zald, Mayer. N. 1996. “Culture, ideology, and strategic framing.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,* eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 261- 274.

Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. 1980. “Social Movement Industries: Cooperation and Conflict amongst Social Movement Organizations.” In *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change*, vol. 3, ed. Louis Kriesberg. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1-20.

Zinn, Howard. 2003. *Passionate Declarations: Essays on War and Justice.* New York: HarperCollins.

Zinn, Howard. 2007. *A Power Governments Cannot Suppress.* San Francisco: City Lights Books.

Zürcher, Erik. J. 2009. “Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları.” In *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce 2. Kemalizm,* ed. Ahmet İnsel. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 44-56.

Appendix- Interview Questions

1. How does your group/organization define peace? What is the role of your group/organization in achieving peace?
2. Which campaigns or events did you organize? Which was the most effective one?
3. What is your group's/ organization's vision? What are your goals?
4. Do you cooperate with other groups or organizations? If yes, what is the criteria to choose them? Are there any advantages or disadvantages to work with others?
5. Which slogans do you use?
6. Do you cooperate with or get support from any political party during your campaigns? Do you have access to the Knesset/ Parliament? If yes/no, why?
7. Do you think that the current political and legal structure facilitates or limits your activities?
8. What is the perception of the (Israeli/ Turkish) society about your group/ organization?
9. Is the media interested in your activities?
10. In the last ten years, do you think there were some important moments to achieve peace in your country?
11. To what extent do you think as a group/ organization you achieved what you aimed for?
12. Which tactics do you use? Why do you use these strategies?
13. What is your group's/ organization's strength and weaknesses?
14. Considering the successes/failures of your group/organization you just mentioned, how would you describe the Israeli/Turkish state, society, government and the army?
15. How do you take decisions, is it based on majority vote or consensus? How is the division of labor?
16. How many financial and human resources do you have? Are they enough?

Appendix- Interviews Cited

ISRAEL

Alternative Information Center (AIC)	O.Z., Jerusalem	24 October 2013
Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW)	M.U., Tel Aviv	1 December 2013
Association for Civil Rights in Israel	V.H. Tel Aviv	3 December 2013
Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW)	M.U., Tel Aviv	1 December 2013
Association for Civil Rights in Israel	V.H. Tel Aviv	3 December 2013
Boycott from Within (BfW)	R.P., Jerusalem	6 November 2013
	R.P., Jerusalem	1 September 2014
	T.D., Jaffa	7 September 2014
Breaking the Silence	C.U., Tel Aviv	2 November 2013
B'Tselem	A.U., Jerusalem	26 December 2013
	F.B., Tel Aviv	27 August 2014
Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP)	O.F., Tel Aviv	7 September 2014
Combatants for Peace	N.N., Jerusalem	3 November 2013
	O.M., Tel Aviv	12 September 2014
Da'am	C.C., Tel Aviv	10 September 2014
Gisha	U.D., Tel Aviv	2 December 2013
Gush Shalom	Y.C. Tel Aviv	26 December 2013
Hadash	P.N., Jaffa	9 September 2014
International Coalition against House Demolitions (ICAHD)	L.J., Jerusalem	20 November 2013
New Profile	U.Z., Jerusalem	8 December 2013
	U.Z., Jerusalem	3 September 2014
Parents Circle Families Forum	T.G.,Ramat-Efal	15 December 2013
Peace Now	L.C., Tel Aviv	26 November 2013
	C.D.P., Tel Aviv	16 September 2014
	N.C., Tel Aviv	17 September 2014
Physicians for Human Rights- Israel	J.B., Jaffa	12 November 2013
Rabbis for Human Rights	C.C., Jerusalem	28 November 2013
Refuseniks	P.Z., Tel Aviv	11 September 2014
	F.A., Tel Aviv	17 September 2014
	Y.U., Tel Aviv	17 September 2014
	P.D., Tel Aviv	13 September 2014
Shministim	J.O., Tel Aviv	5 December 2013
Tarabut Hithabrut	I.C., Tel Aviv	14 September 2014
Who Profits?	T.O., Tel Aviv	2 September 2014
Yesh Din	G.U., Tel Aviv	24 November 2013
Yesh Gvul	K.O., Jerusalem	29 October 2013
Zochrot	G.D. Tel Aviv	27 November 2013

TURKEY

Antimilitarists	Y.A., Istanbul	9 April 2013
Art for Peace Initiative (API)	F.O., Istanbul	15 May 2013
	T.K., Istanbul	15 May 2013
Conscientious Objection Association	D.E., Istanbul	3 July 2014
Conscientious Objection for Peace	O.S., Istanbul	3 April 2013
	E.A., Istanbul	9 April 2013
Conscientious objector from Anti-Capitalist Muslims	M.C.E., Istanbul	11 April 2013
MP from Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)	S. T., Istanbul	23 April 2013
East West Brotherhood Platform	H.P., Istanbul,	10 July 2014
Global Peace and Justice Coalition	Y.O. Istanbul	25 July 2012
	T.M., Istanbul	July 2012
	Y.O., Istanbul	15 April 2013
Human Rights Association	U.E., Istanbul	22 April 2013
No War on Iraq Coordination (NWIC)	M.A.A., Istanbul	August 2012
	A.Y., Istanbul	13 May 2013
	T.T., Istanbul	15 May 2013.
	A.D., Istanbul	3 July 2013
	D.D., Istanbul	3 July 2013
	R.K., Istanbul	5 July 2013
	S.I., Istanbul	8 July 2013
Peace Assembly	H.T., Istanbul	8 April 2013
Peace Initiative	G.G., Istanbul	16 July 2014
Saturday Mothers	S.A., Istanbul	26 July 2014
	M.O., Istanbul	26 July 2014
Soldier Rights	T.I., Istanbul	26 June 2013
Taksim Solidarity	M.T., Istanbul	4 July 2014
	T.K., Istanbul	15 July 2014
	S.A., Istanbul	14 July 2014
	E.I., Istanbul	7 August 2014
Women Conscientious Objectors	M.A., Istanbul	24 April 2013
Women for Peace Initiative (WPI)	N.T., Istanbul	20 May 2013