


EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE  
Department of History and Civilisation



*The Greek Business Community in Marseille, 1816-1900:  
Individual and Network Strategies*

Anna Mandilara


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
Members of the Jury:

- ☒ Prof. Maurice Aymard, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris
- ☒ Prof. George Dertilis, University of Athens
- ☒ Prof. Jaime Reis, EUI
- ☒ Prof. Robert Rowland, ISCTE, Lisbon (supervisor)

Florence, November, 1998

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**EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE**  
Department of History and Civilisation

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**Anna Mandilara**


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


Florence, November, 1998



To Areti Mandilara

whose unconditional love, poetic nature and free mind,  
makes Vassilis, George, Hugues and Anna a family



As you set out for Ithaka  
hope the voyage is a long one,  
full of adventure, full of discovery.  
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,  
angry Poseidon - don't be afraid of them:  
you'll never find things like that on your way  
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,  
as long as a rare excitement  
stirs your spirit and your body.  
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,  
wild Poseidon - you won't encounter them  
unless you bring them along inside your soul,  
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.

Hope the voyage is a long one.  
May there be many a summer morning when,  
with what pleasure, what joy,  
you come into harbors seen for the first time;  
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations  
to buy fine things,  
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,  
sensual perfume of every kind -  
as many sensual perfumes as you can;  
and may you visit many Egyptian cities  
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.

Keep Ithaka always in your mind.  
Arriving there is what you are destined for.  
But do not hurry the journey at all.  
Better if it lasts for years,  
so you are old by the time you reach the island,  
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,  
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.

Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey.  
Without her you would not have set out.  
She has nothing left to give you now.

And if you find her poor, Ithaka won't have fooled you.  
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,  
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.

C.P.Cavafys, *Ithaka*

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## Acknowledgments

This doctoral dissertation is my "Ithaka": a long voyage in space and time, "full of adventure" "full of discovery". When I weighed anchor, I did not hope the voyage to be a long one, but it was; and I did encounter Laistrygonians and Cyclops and wild Poseidon because I brought them along inside my soul, because my soul set them up in front of me.

Nevertheless, I came into harbors seen for the first time; I stopped at Phoenician trading stations to buy fine things. But more than anything else, I visited many cities to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars: all those whom I deeply thank.

My supervisor, Professor Robert Rowland whose seminars, discussions and patience transformed my intuitions into hypotheses which ought to be based on solid research and sober, unbiassed analysis;

My external supervisor, Professor George Dertilis, who, all these years, since I was a student at the University of Athens, guided me as a teacher to the world of science and inspired me as an intellectual to the world of knowledge;

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Professor Alain Plessis who informed me about the existence of the material concering "l'Affaire des Maisons Grecques", and the historian M.P.Bougerol who guided me as to its use;

Professor Gerard Chastagnaret whose hospitality at the University of Aix-en-Provence made my research all the easier;


I am especially indebted to Pierre de Broche des Combes and to his wife Madame de Broche, descendants of the merchant Petrocochino, who always treated me with a lot of care and love as a real relative;

My friends historians Panaghiotis Kimourztis, Ada Dialla, Despina Vlami, Alexis Franghiadis, Nikos Melios, Niki Maroniti, Yannis Yannakitsas who offered both intellectual and sentimental support;

I especially wish to thank my friend historian Leonidas Kallivretakis for his advice, help and courage during difficult intellectual moments;


My husband, Hugues Festis who has been more important for this thesis than himself probably thinks.

As I was writing this doctoral dissertation, the most Reverend Bishop Cyril and my best friend in Marseille, Pierre de Broche des Combes, passed away. I, also, dedicate it to their memory.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS AND MAIN THEMES</b>	
A. Greek communities in recent Greek historiography	1
B. The Greeks in Marseille: Resources, Institutions, Identities	11
<b>PART ONE: FROM A TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO A LONG-TERM ESTABLISHMENT</b>	
Chapter One: The Greeks in Marseille (1793-1815) and the rise of Mediterranean trade	26
<i>French Levantine trade</i>	
<i>Greek Mediterranean trade</i>	
<i>The early Greek presence in Marseille</i>	
Chapter Two: Establishment in the city: Greek Merchants, the Orthodox Church, the Philhellenes	70
Chapter Three: Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns	82
<i>Marseille: features of urban growth</i>	
<i>Foreign communities in Marseille: continuity and change</i>	
<i>The demographic evolution of the Greek population</i>	
<i>Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality</i>	
<b>PART TWO: BUSINESS AND BUSINESSMEN: CONDITIONS, MEANS AND STRATEGIES</b>	
Chapter Four: A dominant group of merchants	117
<i>Economic Structure and Main Occupations</i>	
<i>The Group of Merchants: Socio-professional profile</i>	
Chapter Five: Partners and Partnerships	169
<i>Commercial Association</i>	
<i>Organization, Management and every-day life in business</i>	
<i>Commercial Association: Common Secrecy</i>	
Chapter Six: The import-export trade	186
<i>Trade organization</i>	
<i>The Wheat trade</i>	
Chapter Seven: Figures of the Prow: Greek Ships, Greek shipowners Merchants, shipowners, or both?	245
<i>Chartered ships</i>	
<i>The movement of shipping</i>	
Chapter Eight: Networks of Credit and Banking: a Response to change	275
<i>Merchant Roles in Finance</i>	
<i>The Evolution of Merchant Roles in Finance</i>	
<i>Economic Conjuncture, Networks of Credit and Business Mentalities:</i> <i>Greek Banking and the Financial Crisis of 1861</i>	
<b>PART THREE: "Dear father I offer my respects": SOME REFLECTIONS ON ATTITUDES, RELATIONS, MENTALITIES</b>	
Chapter Nine: Power in the city	360
<i>Big Fortunes</i>	
<i>Conquering the Institutions</i>	
Chapter Ten: The culture of everyday life	371
<i>The Mechanisms: Family, Church, Education</i>	
<i>Representations of everyday life</i>	
<b>CONCLUSION: HIERARCHIES, NETWORKS, STRATEGIES: A la recherche des hommes perdues</b>	390



**INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS AND MAIN THEMES**

**A. Greek communities in recent Greek historiography**

Our collective memory has not been engraved by vivid descriptions in poems and novels about the life of cosmopolitan and still nationalist Greeks' in the city of Marseille. Nor did my ancestors live in this city but, strange as it may seem, "La Cannebiere"- the main marseillaise road leading to the port - and the world-wide soap-brand "Camay", Marseille's export product, were part of my childhood's aromas and imagined worlds: my father was a seaman and Marseille was one of his main destinations in the late 1960's. My relationship with Marseille

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[1]. I paraphrase here a sentence from the preface of A.Kitroeff's book [1989] v.

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[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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ends here,- to this remote memory becoming a personal reference or a private joke,- exactly where my scientific interest starts. Of course, all this can also be bluntly attributed to the structure of my knowledge formed in a specific social and economic environment, (which, ironically, leads back to a father's profession and narrations); it can also be attributed, in more scholarly tone, to the influence of a specific scientific community, which leads to my deliberate choice of the Greek community in Marseille and, finally, to the Greek historiography concerning the Greek communities in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

Studies of the Greek communities during the period under discussion, constitute a paradox; even though they have increased considerably, during the last three decades, they are still insufficient in number and inadequate in interpretation. This paradox, in many respects, reflects the history of Greek historiography as a whole: studies with a total theoretical-explanatory scheme, based on meagre research, have recently been replaced by descriptive-informative monographs, without many theoretical ambitions. As a result, studies with an interesting conceptual base have not been supported or properly questioned by analysts who have presented a vast amount of new data.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the study of a Greek community poses

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[2]. I mainly refer to the lack of dialogue among indisputably good historians and studies.

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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significant methodological and theoretical problems; for one thing, the historian is charged with the usual extensive primary research inherent in every community study (the contextual and geographical dispersion of a large range of material concerning a socially and geographically mobile group of individuals is only part of the problem); for another, he or she deals with a complex demographic, economic and social phenomenon which covers almost three centuries, concerns a large number of commercial centres at the eastern and the western end of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Central Europe,<sup>3</sup> and can be extended into the overlapping fields of economic development and entrepreneurial history or into the disputed subjects of "ethnic minorities" and "diasporas".

The views of Greek historians on the conditions of development of Greek communities, the periodization of these settlements and the strategies of merchants tend - in spite of differences of interpretation or disagreements - to converge around a set of considerations; some are still assumptions, others form adequately proved interpretations. The most important of these disputed interpretations may be depicted as

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[3]. We recall that Greek establishments were, grosso modo, extended from Constantinople and the coast of Minor Asia towards Venice and Trieste, from Thessaly and Macedonia towards Budapest, from Bosphore and Trebizonde towards Taganrog and Odessa, from Galatz towards Vienna, from the Aegean Sea to Livorno, Marseille, London and Manchester and from all the regions of the Greek peninsula and the Levant towards Alexandria, Cairo and Port-Said.

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[Introduction]

follows:

- A first period observed, covered the 18th century and was extended until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The emigrants were originally craftsmen<sup>4</sup> who travelled between the local or the regional commercial centres of the Ottoman Empire and the European traditional fairs and markets, in order to sell their own products.

The success of their trading led some to establish enterprises across the international commercial roads (Central and Northern Europe, Mediterranean, the Black Sea): "la route de commerce, route de l'emigration".<sup>5</sup> This process in some cases, lasted for two or three generations.

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[4]. In contrast, K. Tsoukalas [1977] argued that emigrants were mainly small-scale free peasants, pressured by the competition of the European commercial, then capitalist market. Although this assumption occupied an important part of his work, it was supported by scant evidence found in secondary sources; in fact, the same author, some years later, admitted the "economic availability of land" during the whole period under consideration, which indirectly contradicted his aforementioned thesis. See K. Tsoukalas [1981] p.272.

[5]. Chapter's title of C.Hatzioiosif's unpublished thesis [1981]. The same author published in 1983 an article in the journal *O Politis*, titled "Commercial Colonies and Independent Greece: interpretations and problems" (in greek "Emporikes Paroikies kai Anexartiti Ellada: Erminies kai provlimata) which proved to be the most valuable reference on the subject. In the first part of the article, he dealt critically with all the published studies which either offered a total interpretation about the role of the Greek communities and their relations with the Greek state, or, were important for the progress of the subject; in the second part, the author, based on his own work about the Greek colony in Egypt, attempted a periodization and an interpretation of the phenomenon. His account, full of insight, remains classical.

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The expansion is largely attributed to the overall increase in the Empire's trade with Europe and to the privileged position of some of the non-muslim groups (mainly Greeks, Jews and Armenians) in the economic system of the declining Ottoman Empire.

The economic and social structure of the host country also played a decisive role in the patterns of emigration, permanent or temporary, single male or family. Communities were mainly established in countries with a weak middle class, beyond the immediate sphere of European penetration (Northern Balkans, Southern Russia). Emigrants were also oriented towards commercial centres with a traditionally tolerant attitude to foreign traders (Livorno, Amsterdam).<sup>6</sup>

- A second period is held to have started after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and lasted until the end of the Crimean War.

During this period, economic circumstances were more favorable. Napoleonic Wars proved to be a major setback for French mediterranean trade, whilst maritime and continental communication had considerably ameliorated. Under such new conditions, the Greek traders re-organized their enterprises and formed large informal networks with the aim of extending their activities to a larger range of commodity and credit

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[6]. See C. Hatzioiosif [1981], [1983], K. Tsoukalas [1977]; see also O. Katsiardi-Hering [1986], one of the best documented studies of the recent Greek historiography, concerning the Greek community in Trieste.

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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markets. Marseille, London and Manchester harboured Greek colonies of merchants and commission agents with well-established commercial know-how, alongside a new generation of fortune-hunters selected and patronized by richer firms. The evolution observed is rather more qualitative than quantitative.

During this period, the Greek War of Independence in 1821, with its consequent political, economic and social turmoil and the formation of the Greek State in 1830, gave additional impetus to emigration and changed in many ways the chances of the emigrants.<sup>7</sup>

- The third period begins with the end of the Crimean War. A new era of European expansion had begun, associated with the enormous change of industrialisation. This had far-reaching implications for international trade and finance. European joint-stock banks penetrated the Levantine markets, becoming the pace-setters and market leaders of the post-war economy and seriously undermining the comparative advantage held traditionally by the Greek traders. Of the latter, the richer and most perspicacious, turned to finance and banking in an attempt to meet the challenge. The numerous banking firms they created after 1850, originally intended, at least in principle, to engage in ordinary commercial banking, became instead the bankers of Levantine governments;

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[7]. The consolidation of an ethnic constituency and the emigrants's multifarious interaction with their "homeland" are the main changes referred to here.

and they proved most helpful in tiding over the prodigal or inefficient governments of the Ottoman Empire, Greece, and Egypt, in repeated financial difficulties.

The study of the relations between the Greek state and the Greek communities can be metaphorically presented as Hydra, the great sea serpent of the ancient Greek mythology, with many heads that grew again if cut off. Greek historians had indeed a Herculean task to perform. Some of them attempted to mutilate the beast, some to deform it, others treated it as a pet, finally nobody seems to have tamed it. Nevertheless, the difficult problems of the interaction between Greece and the communities, as well as the impact of the communities upon Greek society, motivated research and advanced greek historiography.<sup>8</sup>

Historians whose interest was focused on Greece rather than on the communities themselves, used the assumed position of the emigrants in the world economy and their relations with the Greek state as the cardinal point of theoretical schemes aimed at explaining Greece's "facets of underdevelopment", or "national and social consciousness" in Greek society, or "dependence and reproduction".<sup>9</sup>

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[8]. See N. Svoronos [1956], whose writings on the Greek and the "transbalkan" commercial strata and groups opened the subject up to Greek historians and G.B.Dertilis [1980] which was the first and for many years the only study on the interaction between Greek state and Greek communities.

On the other hand, historians of specific communities attempted, as far as their sources permitted, to tackle the subject from the point of view of the community chosen as a case study. Although this approach often leads to partial conclusions, it constitutes a fairly well documented premise for further research and facilitates comparison.<sup>10</sup>

Fortunately, despite the presented differences, there is some degree of consensus, especially on the economic and the ideological aspects of the problem. I shall attempt to present these points of agreement.

The big traders and bankers of the Levant and the diaspora did not seem to be much interested in the economy of the small kingdom of Greece for at least the first fifty years of its existence. Their activities, extending to the Balkans and Minor Asia, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, included the Greek peninsula only marginally. They showed a relative indifference towards the prospect of investment in industry or of direct exploitation of agricultural estates.<sup>11</sup> However, between

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[9]. The parts in square brackets are titles of books in which I am referred here: N. Mouzelis [1978], K. Moskof [1972], K. Tsoukalas [1977]. These studies were, more or less, influenced by the school of "dependent development" of countries found in the "periphery" or the "semi-periphery" of the world capitalist economy. This is not the place to discuss the merits of these contributions; I rather criticize the use of the concepts and theories of this school to explain the Greek case, at the then "underdeveloped" stage of historical research in Greece.

[10]. See C. Hatziossif [1981]; of the same author [1988] "Banques grecques et banques europeennes au XIX<sup>e</sup> siecle" in G.B.Dertilis (ed); also O. Katsiardi-Hering [1986]; A. Kitroeff [1989].

1869 and 1916 they did invest in Greece, because of the increasing European competition in the Levant and the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkans and eventually in Turkey.<sup>12</sup>

Of much greater importance for the expansion of the Greek economy seems to have been the merchant marines closely connected with the other activities of the Greeks living abroad. It has been shown how the Greek-owned commercial boats depended, to a great degree, upon the Black-Sea's freight and grain-merchants or how the Greek merchant-shipowners established informal but complex networks with the maritime centres of Western Europe.<sup>13</sup>

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[11]. See G.B.Dertilis [1988] "Les capitaux entre l'industrialisation et ses alternatives" in Dertilis (ed) p.218-219.

[12]. See G.B.Dertilis [1980] and G.B.Dertilis [1988] "Les capitaux entre l'industrialisation et ses alternatives" in Dertilis (ed) p.219; C.adziiossif [1988] "Banques grecques et banques europeennes au XIX<sup>e</sup> siecle: le point de vue d'Alexandrie" in Dertilis (ed) p.194; H. Exertzoglou [1986].

The impact of their capitalistic choices and strategies on the Greek economy, has been pointed out by G. Dertilis in the above reference, [1988] p.219: "*Ces placements contribuent considerablement a la monetarisation de l'economie et, par ce biais, a l'expansion quantitative de la production agricole. Or, leur impact sur l'industrialisation est minime et parfois meme negatif. Les investissements industriels sont peu nombreux. En revanche, les operations sur le secteur tertiaire sont tres importantes et elles recouvrent tantot des placements tres conservateurs, tantot des operations speculatives, soit deux categories diametralement opposees. Placements conservateurs: depots bancaires, actions de la Banque nationale, batiments urbains. Activites speculatives: achats de grandes proprietes agricoles et urbaines, grosses operations de change et operations boursieres sur des actions et des obligations d'Etat.*"

[13]. The vast and in many respects unexplored field of maritime history has been recently enriched considerably. See among others G.B.Dertilis "The Greek Merchant Marine from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century", paper presented at the Symposium *Modern Greece in the European*

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[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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If capital transfer - though delayed - and the merchant marine activities of the Greek diaspora into Greece was a major element of economic interaction between the communities and Greece, the main force of political and social interaction was the flow of nationalist ideas from Athens, to the communities. The formation of the Greek state - with its organised mechanisms of production and reproduction of common culture, common tradition and even of common future (the "Great Idea"),<sup>14</sup> was a catalyst with far-reaching effects on the destiny of the Greek communities.

The transmission of nationalist ideas from Athens to the communities depended, of course, on the geo-political position of the community and on Greece's political interests. Ideology had a stronger impact on the community of Constantinople or of Egypt, for example, than on those of Trieste, Marseille or London.<sup>15</sup>

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(...continued)

*Context*, New York University, 1983. For a annotated bibliography on the primary and secondary sources about Greek maritime history see G.Harlaftis [1990] "A Bibliographical Essay on Modern Greek Economic Maritime History", *Modern Greek Society: A Social Science Newsletter*, v. XVII, n. 1, December; of the same author, [1991] "Elliniki Nautiliaki Istoría: Oriá kai Píges", *Ta Historica*, v. 8, n. 14-15, p.217-230, with an extensive bibliography and list of international archives. Research about the merchants-shipowners established in the Greek communities remains scattered, bound to the study of the respective community or the interests of the historian. See C. Hatziiossif [1981], O. Katsiardi-Hering [1986], P. Herlihy [1986], E. Frangakis-Syrett [1992].

[14]. The "Great Idea" was the nationalistic concept, coined to serve the Greek expansionist policy, which prevailed in the political scene until 1922. Symbol of national unity, in 1830 prefigured the glorious future of the small kingdom. See E. Skopetea [1988], A. Politis [1993] pp. 61-65.

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[Introduction]

B. The Greeks in Marseille: Resources, Institutions, Identities

A growing number of Greeks had begun to settle in Marseille during the first half of the nineteenth century, after the city's perturbation through the Napoleonic Wars, a major setback to the predominance of the marseillais trade in the Levant. The decline of the marseillais mercantile class, offered a good opportunity to the most perspicacious of the Greek merchants to penetrate a Western market which had absorbed, for more than a century, a substantial part of their commerce. Greeks started to rigorously control the goods market and the financial money market; they replaced the marseillais importers of raw materials and foodstuffs from the Ottoman Empire and the exporters of manufactured and colonial goods, and they benefitted from access to the city's banking and financial system.

Thus, the political conjuncture with its long-term effects on the economic structure of the city, weakened the competition of the marseillais merchants who had kept Greeks away from their territory

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[15]. The best and unique, to my knowledge, study of the interaction between Greek politics and community's politics is the aforementioned book of A. Kitroeff [1989].

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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during the eighteenth century and permitted the latter to create another link in the chain of commercial communities in the Western Mediterranean. The vicissitudes of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, gave an added impetus to the flow of immigrants from the areas in revolt and shaped their decision for a permanent establishment.

Greeks in Marseille never created a separate community institution. Therefore, there is no official date to mark the beginnings of the Greek community as an informal social group. Nonetheless, the year 1816 is a determining moment: a 20 % tax formerly imposed on merchandise imported by non-French ships was abolished. A number of important Greek commercial firms make their appearance in the local guides; and the Greek merchant from Salonica Demetrius Capudas becomes the new General Consul of the Porte, a position held until then by the Jewish merchant Joseph Raphael Cohen.

The "Community" was the main institutional form of organisation among Greeks living away from their homeland. Communities abroad tend to resemble the form and content of communal organisations in Ottoman Greece, administered by the local notables. To what degree this form of organisation was adopted, depended on the economic and political conditions of the host country and particularly, on that country's policy towards the establishment of foreign communities. Thus, the creation of a Greek community organisation was a decision of the immigrants themselves, but was also determined by the will of the host

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[Introduction]

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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state to organise, control or privilege (or, all three at the same time as happened very often in reality), the participation of foreign minorities in the local economy. The community organisation of Trieste in 1751, for example, fit both the Austro-Hungarian Empire's wish to encourage foreign mercantile minorities and the historically rooted experience of the Greeks about communal organisation and representation. All the same, the creation of Alexandria's community in 1843, was prompted by that country's concession of civil rights and privileges to Europeans, defined on the basis of their nationality.<sup>16</sup>

On the contrary, the settlement of Greeks in Marseille (and in London) was not particularly encouraged and thus facilitated by the French (or the English) state; as a result, the immigrants were never organised in communities. There was only one way for them to protect their economic interests and to be well established in the city: to succeed. A religious or an ethnic particularity never constituted an obstacle or an asset for long, in a city where a rich merchant was, almost by definition respectable. This general rule was reconfirmed in the case of the Greeks who had to face a certain hostility from the local bourgeoisie, during the first years of their presence. The Chamber of Commerce was an "irreducible adversary" of the Greek merchants and captains (treated as pirates) during the Greek War of Independence; some

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[16]. About the communities of Trieste and of Alexandria see respectively O.Kastriadi-Hering [1986] and A.Kitroeff [1989].

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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years later, it became the main supporter of some well known Greek merchants when the French administration repeatedly rejected their applications for acquiring French nationality.

Having no official community organisation, the Greeks in Marseille were somehow organised around the Orthodox church. Orthodoxy was an integral component of Greek culture during the Ottoman period. The self-governing Greek Orthodox *millet* under Ottoman rule preserved a sense of common ethnicity, "as if in a chrysalis"<sup>17</sup>, and made Greeks to be thought of, and to think of themselves as Orthodox, until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Thus, the foundation of a church everywhere the Greeks were established, was vital for the cohesion of the group and its cultural presence in the host country.

However, the Greeks in Marseille tended, in the long term, to think of themselves more as an ethnic and less as a religious group. This can be attributed to various factors: the emergence of Greek nationalism in the eighteenth century based on increasingly secular ideological discourses; the Greek War of Independence and the spread of Philhellenism in Europe (in which Marseille played an important role); the formation of a Greek state in 1830 with its aspirations to win over to nationalism all Greeks still living in Ottoman lands; and the ethnic character of the "autocephalous" Orthodox Church in independent Greece, with its partial identification with nationalism.

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[17]. See A.Smith [1991], p.35.

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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Although France had theoretically accepted the practice of all religions in her territory since the Revolution, the construction of a Greek Orthodox church in Marseille was initially hindered by the French government; in contrast, "l'Eglise Catholique du Rite Grec" created in 1820 in the city by the dynamic archimandrite Mazlum under the protection of the Pope, was given immediate permission. Despite the decision of Paris in 1821, not to permit the construction of a Greek Orthodox church, the Greeks attended the mass in a small chapel until 1836; and this was tolerated by the local authorities. Finally, in 1836, six years after the formation of the Greek state, and three years after the establishment of a Greek Consul in Marseille, permission was granted. The church - which still exists today - commenced in 1836 and finished in 1845, was controlled by the most important merchants of the community and expressed the moderate Greek nationalist spirit of the group.

In order to depict and to explain the workings of this microcosm, three different phases of the economic and social life of the Greeks in Marseille can be discerned: 1816-36, 1836-56, and 1856 to the end of the century.

During the period 1816-1836, the settlement of Greeks in Marseille formed a small merchant community (400 persons in 1825, according to the most reliable estimates), involved in trading in the Levant and using

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[Introduction]

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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the city as an operational base. It was made up of Greeks who came mainly from big commercial centres like Constantinople or Smyrna or from those Aegean islands which had developed, in the eighteenth century, an important commercial activity. Therefore, whatever their place of origin, migrants already belonged to a business network with sufficient capital and know-how.

The determining factors of the group's cohesion were, firstly, a common culture which was finally crystalised in the notion of a well-defined ethnicity (this was the period of the creation of the Greek state, the Greek consulate in Marseille, the Greek orthodox church and the introduction of modern Greek language and literature in the "College Royal" in Marseille); secondly, the family as a meeting place where resources were pooled and many important decisions were taken; and thirdly, clientele networks, with their dependency relations mainly linked with credit.

During the first period of establishment, the ethnic identity of the Greeks in Marseille was formed by their adherence to the ideology of the National Revolution and by the response of marseillaise society, whether positive or negative, to their presence. Practically that meant that after the formation of the Greek state in 1830, the Greeks in Marseille started to be thought of and to think of themselves as an ethnic entity bound by a common national culture, getting some new privileges (they could navigate, for example, under the Greek national

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[Introduction]

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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flag), and identified and accepted into marseillaise society through their particularities.

An initial male immigration was soon replaced by a family one; family and kinship proved to be the most important mediating institutions for local business establishment. In a highly competitive business environment and in the absence of modern efficient management and control, the internal organizational structure of the commercial firm was, very often, based on the effectiveness of the kinship hierarchy. Through family and its *habitus*, as Bourdieu puts it<sup>18</sup>, the position of the Greek merchants in Marseille was secured, whether it concerned the continuity of the enterprises or the transmission of wealth and social power. In a business where the birth of a son and a daughter's dowry were all-important, the marriage of girls presented the family with a problem which could be turned into an asset if a good "settled" marriage were arranged. Such a marriage, decided by fathers, uncles or eldest sons, ought to satisfy, ideally, two main

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[18]. *Habitus* is the concept that Bourdieu uses in his analysis of Pyrenees marriage strategies as strategies of social reproduction in a peasants' remote area; it means a whole system of predispositions inculcated by the material circumstances of life and by family upbringing structuring every decision without ever becoming completely and systematically explicit. This concept has proved very useful in our analysis since it provided the basis for the casuistic thinking of the merchants' family strategies required to safeguard the essential at all times, even if it should become necessary to violate some "norms" (religious restrictions in marriage for example). See P. Bourdieu, "Les strategies matrimoniales dans le systeme de reproduction", *Annales, E.S.C.*, 27 (July-October, 1972) 1105-25.

pressuppositions: the continuity of a business and the preservation of a tradition and a culture of which a vital element remained Orthodoxy. These two main goals, without ever becoming completely and systematically explicit, structured for a long time the marriage strategies and practices of the Greeks in Marseille. This, however, had to change with time. As we shall see, as the conditions of business changed, religious restrictions in marriage became a hazard for the economic and social integration of the Greek merchants. After 1870 a general trend of mixed marriages prevailed, even though the response to economic and social change differed, of course, according to each case.

In trade, the Greeks employed the system of parallel imports and exports; since they bought and sold on long term credit, dependency ties operated over long periods; and clients or suppliers, debtors or creditors, were increasingly evaluated according to their fortune, prompt payments or integrity. Thus, a network of information and an informal "who's who" was formed among distant associates, correspondents and commission agents. This enabled the merchants in Marseille to work smoothly and safely with clients who, sometimes, they had never seen. Personal relations and evaluations about clients constituted an important asset, transmitted from one generation to another.

The second period ends with the Crimean War in 1856 and covers twenty years of economic development, social promotion and integration: the possession of property, a visible sign of success and the

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[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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legitimation of their establishment, constituted for the Greeks an important landmark in their presence in Marseille.

The acquisition of land by foreign residents in any country is usually a good indication of how they perceive their future prospects in their place of residence. From the beginning of their establishment in Marseille, Greeks tried to become owners of a house where, usually, their firm was situated, or a simple warehouse in the commercial centre of the city. In the 1840's and 1850's, an "hotel particulier" in the residential areas of the city became a usual investment. The acquisition of a country-house, the famous "bastide", completed the pattern of a successful family well integrated in marseillaise society. Investing a part of their capital in real estate, especially after retirement from business, became also a usual practice at this late stage.

During this second period, the "bread and butter" of the Greek's economic activities remained trade in the broad sense, including credit and vertical diversification into ship-ownership. Beyond the traditional Levantine markets, new ones were gradually conquered, especially in the Black Sea and in Egypt; grain was the almost exclusive export-product of the former, cotton of the latter.

Since Marseille had never been an important centre of international finance, and, until 1835, credit was available only from private bankers, Greeks gradually had to consolidate their own financial networks. The emergent Greek bankers represented a small group of

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[Introduction]

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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wealthy firms who maintained their role as general merchants as long as possible; their financial services were part of their traditional mercantile activity. These firms somehow multiplied their capital by using various kinds of commercial papers and bills of exchange. They became the intermediaries between their countrymen wanting to discount paper remitted from abroad and the marseillaise market; the incentive was much cheaper credit than in the Levant.

Our traders and financiers showed a relative indifference towards the prospect of investment in the small kingdom of Greece; nevertheless, they benefited from the use of the Greek flag on their boats, and from trading with the island of Syros, an important commercial crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean.

A large part of the new generation, born and brought up in Marseille, received a good French education in one of the best schools in Marseille, the "College Royal". Eventhough the old generation of merchants considered their enterprises as the best schools for their sons' professional formation, the aspirations of their group for social acceptance and integration called for a general culture and a "savoir-vivre" obtained in good local schools. Thus, the new generation was formed culturally into two different, if not opposed environments: a "Greek" one at home and a "French" one in the city. The result was a mixed culture which combined Greek and French language, Orthodoxy, and various elements of two mentalities.

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[Introduction]

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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The third period covers the time-span between the end of the Crimean War and the end of the century. Although Marseille had long been an important maritime centre, it was during this period that the city became the economic capital of Mediterranean France, well administered and equipped with a highly developed commercial, financial and industrial system. But Marseille's industrialization was specific to port cities, tied to the growth of maritime commerce. Its industrial development resulted in a huge expansion in traffic at the port; this, in turn, rested on a fuller exploitation of the economic potential of the Mediterranean basin. By 1860, the Eastern Mediterranean had attained parity with Italy as Marseille's leading trade partner.

The Greeks continued to dominate the Levant's trade. Despite their small number, (they never exceeded the number of 800 persons), they imported industrial raw materials like olive oil, oil grains and cotton which were among Marseille's top ten imports for many years, and wheat. Constantinople, Smyrna, Egypt and the ports of the Black Sea continued to be the main sources of their imports. By the 1860's, the enormous changes in international trade inevitably reached the Greek diaspora communities. The Greeks' occupational identity, their know-how and organization changed profoundly. Much of their banking and shipping business had now to face competition from large joint-stock banks and big steamship companies. The traditional way of doing business declined; and the average Greek merchant lost his comparative advantage as

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[Introduction]

intermediary between the Levant and the West.

In Marseille, these changes were forced by the intervention of parisian capitalists who, having a broader vision of Marseille's potential and resources, were able to undertake large projects and carry them through successfully. Although the Greek business community as a whole, saw its profits decline, in the long run, some of the more important capitalists continued to prosper; for they were able to participate in the largest business projects of the city's business community.

The firm "Z et Z", created in Marseille as late as 1843 by the powerful Constantinople merchants and bankers, Zafiropulo and Zarifi, is a good example of successful Greek entrepreneurship: it continued uninterrupted for over a century: dominating the grain trade from the Black Sea during the French-Prussian War of 1870, active in the tanning industry and in shipping, Zafiropulo and Zarifi participated as simple investors or main partners in the biggest joint-stock enterprises of the period. Others, like Demetrius Baltazzi and his cousin Emmanuel, participated in many joint-stock banks and companies in Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, Odessa, or London, where Greek communities were established.

By the 1870's, the financial market of Constantinople absorbed a big part of the Greeks' capital, in the profitable but risky operation of short-term advances to the Ottoman state. Some merchants and bankers

[Greek communities - The Greeks in Marseille]

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
also became interested in business in the kingdom of Greece. Evangelis Baltazzi, for example, founded the Central Bank of Greece (Gheniki Pistoriki Trapeza) in 1871, in collaboration with one of the biggest bankers of Constantinople, Andreas Syngros.<sup>19</sup>


By the end of the second Empire, the Greek businessmen had become part of the marseillaise bourgeoisie, well integrated in the economic and social life of the city; by the end of century the golden period of their commerce in Marseille had passed; business called them elsewhere. Their stately family tombs in Saint-Pierre's cemetery, bought and built as late as 1870 in a separate section called "Carre des Grecs", are the silent witnesses of a successful and well integrated life through the acceptance of their particularities; but eventually, like in other historical times and places, the diaspora Greeks had "to say goodbye to her, to the Marseille they were losing".<sup>20</sup>

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[19]. See G.B.Dertilis [1980] chapter 2.

[20]. "...and say goodbye to her, to the Alexandria you are losing". From C.P.Cavafy, *Collected Poems*, "God Abandons Antony" translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard, edited by George Savidis, Princeton 1975, p.35.











MARIE MADON ZAFIROPOLO  
NEE MAVROYENI  
1859-1976

THE HONORABLE  
MRS. ZAFIROPOLO  
DIED 1916  
MRS. ZAFIROPOLO  
DIED 1916  
MRS. ZAFIROPOLO  
DIED 1916

[The early Greek presence]

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**PART ONE: FROM A TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO A LONG-TERM ESTABLISHMENT**

The formation of a community is a complex phenomenon regulated as much by conjunctural and medium-term socio-economic factors, as by the migrants' choices which usually escape the historian's notice. The actual establishment is a procedure which sometimes lasts many years, often a generation or two. Consequently, one can only surmise the passage of a number of people from a temporary migration to a medium or long-term establishment or viceversa the decline of emigration and the redirection of emigrants towards other places.

The Greek community in Marseille as such was an almost unknown subject. P.Echinard's work on Philhellenism opened it up to historians. It was neither the first nor the last Greek community created in an Mediterranean port. As a result, we have to put it in its Mediterranean perspective, underlining at the same time its specific characteristics; analyse it, in other words, in its context and in its autonomy.

[The early Greek presence]

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In chapter one Greek presence in the city is examined in the light of the growth in Greek trade and merchant marine development during the 18th century; the terms and the limits of this growth are taken into consideration. There follows a chapter assessing the Orthodox Church's role in communal life as the migrants' main "symbolic" organisation and the impact of Philhellenism on the merchants' relationship with the Church. Chapter three is concerned with the demographic characteristics of the Greek population with a special stress on nuptiality, fertility and mortality and with the expression of a collective "unconscious" in perpetual change, influenced by a socio-economic and cultural environment much different from that of the diaspora's origins.

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[Chapter 1]

[The early Greek presence]

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C H A P T E R   O N E

THE GREEKS IN MARSEILLE (1793-1815) AND THE RISE OF MEDITERRANEAN TRADE

*French Levantine trade*

For most of the eighteenth century, France surpassed the Netherlands and Britain in Levantine trade, despite the sophisticated mechanism of the Bank of Amsterdam or the competitive industries of London and the Midlands. The dominance of French trade in the Levant became apparent as early as the 1730s, with the administrative reforms of Louis XV, the diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Comte de Villeneuve-Maurepas at the Porte, and the development of the manufacturing industry in the South of France.<sup>1</sup>

The pattern of trade between France and the Ottoman Empire which

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[1]. See E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.85. The author shows that "from 1784 to 1786, for example, France accounted for 50 to 60 per cent of the Ottoman Empire's trade with western Europe and for over 50 per cent of Smyrna's trade." pp.85-86; see also N.Svoronos [1956] where the importance of the French trade is confirmed: "Non seulement il atteint une valeur equivalente a celle du commerce des autres nations reunies, mais vers 1770 la depasse"; p.314.

[The early Greek presence]

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was developed from the late sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, and was intensified in the eighteenth century, was determined by the dynamics of the world market and by the position of each country in the world economy. That is, as France became more industrialised in the second half of the eighteenth century, and as its needs for sources and markets for its goods greatly increased, she became a major importer of raw materials and foodstuffs from the Empire and a major exporter of manufactured and colonial goods to it.<sup>2</sup>

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[2]. Whether this pattern of trade favoured a relationship of economic domination between the Western European and the Ottoman economies in the eighteenth century, it is difficult to say. Scholars like N.Svoronos [1956] clearly supported this thesis, ("*..l'economie de l'Orient en general presente l'aspect d'une economie purement coloniale*", p.363), others like M.Morineau, "*Naissance d'une domination. Marchands Europeens, Marchands et Marches du Levant aux XVIIIe et XIXe siecles*" in (ed) [1976] were more skeptical ("*On croit communement que le commerce du Levant est plus avantageux aux Francs qu'aux Turks, parce qu'il est tout actif pour les uns, tout passif pour les autres; c'est une prevention qui ne se soutient pas a l'analyse. Le commerce est egalement avantageux aux uns et aux autres parce que dans les echanges de convenance, les deux contractants gagnent a la fois*", pp.145-184) and questioned European economic domination in the eighteenth century purely through transactions of trade. Yet Morineau did detect, in the same article, the ensuing European dominance in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, "*quand l'Europe se fit venderesse des produits anterieurement fabriques au Levant, continuant meme d'y etre fabriques dans des conditions de plus en plus precaires de rentabilite et de debouche...Quand s'ebroula la mecanique impitoyable de la deterioration des termes de l'echange qui devait aboutir a mettre dans les mains des occidentaux un pouvoir leonin... Quand, deciderement, une dichotomie lezarda le monde entre pays entres dans un processus de developpement rapide et pays penalises par le non renouvellement de leurs techniques et l'impuissance a tenir tete.*"; p.164. After all, the European influence on the Ottoman economy was not extensive during the eighteenth century since there was not any systematic investment and the Ottoman Empire's revenue depended on internal economic development. Yet there was an early European intervention into the Ottoman economy through

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[The early Greek presence]

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In the course of the eighteenth century, for many political and economic reasons, this trade was concentrated in the ports-cities of Smyrna, Salonica and Constantinople, which emerged as the most important ports in the trade of the Ottoman Empire with the West: European trading communities were established and extensive commercial and banking networks were developed.<sup>3</sup> French merchants involved in the trade with these ports outnumbered their European counterparts - mainly British - both in the Levant and in Marseille, which would monopolise this flourishing trade for most of the eighteenth century. Marseillais merchants bartered their cloth for Ottoman cotton or reexported West Indian products like cochineal and indigo for sure and handsome returns since they had succeeded in implementing monopoly conditions and practices, in contrast to the liberal principles of Colbert, and in tune with the corporative interests of a rather myopic Chamber of Commerce. According to Ch.Carriere, the onerous 20 per cent duty on all Levantine goods imported in Marseille by non-French ships,<sup>4</sup> did not boost the commerce of the already competitive French manufacturers: it only confiscated the largest part of this trade to the benefit of the marseillais merchants.<sup>5</sup>

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(...continued)

money supply and banking.

[3]. About these port-cities see amongst others: for Smyrna E. Frangakis-Syrett [1992]; for Salonica N.Svoronos [1956]; for Constantinople E.Edhem [1988].

[4]. About Marseille's exemption from custom duties see P.Masson [1896] p.161-167; of the same author [1904] p.16-38; G.Rambert [1954] v.IV,

[The early Greek presence]

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In the Ottoman Empire, French merchants secured their commercial superiority through Capitulations, these trading agreements between European countries and the Sultan which equalized the European merchants to the muslims and favoured them over the non-muslim ottoman subjects; in return, European countries offered political support to the ever weakening central authority of the Empire. Capitulations regulated the general framework of rights and obligations of the European merchants, but, of course, dynamic consuls or established businessmen managed to negociate the rendering of a specific article or the abolition of a certain tax.<sup>6</sup>

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(...continued)  
p.204-205.

[5]. Ch.Carriere [1973] shows, as well, how the 20 per cent duty contradicted clearly the port's franchise and, given the marginal cost of the Levantine trade, resulted in a "de facto" prohibition; and even more, "*par la s'explique l'implantation commerciale, presque entierement marseillaise, dans le Proche-Orient; l'ensemble de cette activite etant dirigee, surveillee jalousement par la Chambre. Le droit de 20 % fut le meilleur soutien de la fortune marseillais. Telle est l'efficacite, unanimement reconnue*"; p.320. The author goes even further in his analysis and questions the actual need of the 20 % duty (or of every administrative reform that Colbert instituted), for Marseille's commercial development: "*D'autre part, quand on lie, directement, l'essor du trafic levantin au 20 %, on fait une confusion de termes. En realite, la proposition juste est la suivante: le 20 % a confisque, au profit de Marseille, un mouvement qu'il n'a pas cree et dont on peut se demander s'il depend vraiment de lui....L'important n'est d'ailleurs pas la, mais dans la mutation des structures de ce commerce qui donne au XVIIIe siecle une physionomie particulierement originale;...Et s'il se produit, ainsi, une veritable transformation, point n'est besoin de Colbert pour l'expliquer.*"; p.321-322.

[6]. By the end of the seventeenth century, the import-export duty in Salonica was 5 per cent for non-muslim ottoman subjects, and 3 per cent for muslims and Europeans who had obtained capitulations. N.Svoronos [1956] p.38. During the eighteenth century, the Europeans were obliged

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[The early Greek presence]

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Rules and regulations, however advantageous to the French and other Europeans, were not the only means of the spectacular European development in Levantine trade; the real European advantage lay in money supply and banking. Various factors contributed to this kind of indirect domination.

A shortage of gold and silver was felt in the Ottoman economy as early as the 1600's; this increased considerably in the eighteenth century due, to a large extent, to the continuously heavier military expenses of the Empire.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, the expansion of the Empire's international trade multiplied the financial needs of the economy. As a result, specie and bills of exchange drawn on the European economic centres of the period, were sent to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, repeated depreciations of the Ottoman currency made it very unpopular in

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(...continued)

to pay more taxes, named *bid'at*, imposed by the Ottomans on various products. In reality however, these taxes were the return required by the required by the Ottomans in order to authorise the exportation of products which were not supposed to be exported, such as cotton and wheat. N.Svoronos [1956] pp.38-39.

[7]. F.Rebuffat & M.Courdurie [1966] pp.128-130; see also, E.Eldem [1988] pp.124-246.

[8]. E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] states that "*Silver from the New World was sent to Spain, where it was made into Spanish piastres and from the ports of Cadiz, Barcelona or Seville it was sent to Smyrna. Spanish piastres were also sent to Smyrna from Marseille, Genoa, and Livorno. Austrian thalers, known as talaris, were also very popular in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. They were minted in Augsburg in the Holy Roman Empire, and in Milan, Italy, and were sent to the port of Marseille whence they were shipped to the Levant. Gold Venetian sequins were in demand, too.*" p.12. See also, F.Rebuffat & M.Courdurie [1966] pp.26-28 and pp.78-84.

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[The early Greek presence]

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the Levant vis-a-vis the European currencies commonly referred to as "good money", and put European merchants in an enviable position: by controlling the flow of money in and out of the Levantine markets, they could, to a large extent, influence to their benefit the existing rates of exchange. Trade in money acquired a great importance in the Ottoman economy and financial speculation brought profits of 25 per cent or more.

According to French consular reports, another highly profitable French business in the Levant was the coastal trade. In principle, all the Capitulatory Powers, by paying only 3 per cent import-export duty, could freely carry Ottoman goods between ports in the eastern Mediterranean, whereas Ottoman subjects had to pay a tax in every port of the Empire.<sup>9</sup> But in reality, since the British were not allowed to take part in coastal trade and the Dutch chose not to,<sup>10</sup> the French came to dominate it.

For the coastal trade smaller ships were used than for overseas operations; and sometimes the ships left a port empty, picking up cargo as they went. From Smyrna, the most frequent round-trip routes were Smyrna-Istanbul, Smyrna-Alexandria, and Smyrna-Crete.<sup>11</sup>

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[9]. Beaujour (F.De) [an VII] vol.II, p.264. , vol.II, p.264.

[10]. ANF, AE Biii 272-274, Etats des batiments, Smyrna, 31 March 1763 to 30 June 1774, cited by E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.92-93, fn.91.

[11]. E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.91.

[The early Greek presence]

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During the course of the century, even though trade between the Ottoman Empire and France grew considerably, it also fluctuated and often suffered sharp declines.<sup>12</sup> French Levantine trade faced a number of problems: restricted monetary supply often resulted in acute economic crisis;<sup>13</sup> a restricted Levantine market that pushed the prices of French cloth down;<sup>14</sup> and France's participation in numerous wars that severely disrupted its trade in the Levant.<sup>15</sup>

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[12]. E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992]; N.Svoronos [1956]; V.Kremmydas [1972]

[13]. Restricted monetary supply and the consequent bankruptcies of brokers who often extended more credit than they had capital to repay, were the catalysts in the 1729-1731, 1752 and 1774 economic crises that affected especially Marseille but also the rest of Europe. According to Charles Carriere ninety-four commercial houses went bankrupt in Marseille during the 1729-1731 crisis, which triggered defaults in London, Amsterdam, Paris, Madrid, Cadiz, and Seville. The author also reports that in 1752, once again, the use of long-term and excessive credit resulted in fifteen bankruptcies in the market of Marseille. See C.Carriere [1973] vol.I, p.396. But the most serious financial crisis in the eighteenth century for Marseille was that of 1774, which caused a considerable drop in exports from Smyrna in 1175. See E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.132.

[14]. In Smyrna, Peloponnese and Salonica a long-term decrease in the price of French cloth was observed, which was felt especially in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. See E.Frangakis [1992] p.130, V.Kremmydas [1972] pp.374-7 and N.Svoronos [1956] pp.336-7, respectively. In contrast to other scholars, Charles Carriere did not consider competition from other Europeans as the determinant factor of the decrease of French exports in the Levantine markets; neither did the quicker profit from trade in money appear a sufficient explanation to him, for merchants would have kept both businesses if they could; and as far as the deterioration of cloth's quality was concerned, that was rather an effect not a reason for the decline of French exports after 1777. According to the author the most plausible explanation was for one thing, the political situation, namely France's involvement in many wars,

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[The early Greek presence]

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During the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1801) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), when the English maritime blockade cut off Marseille from its vital economic source - the Mediterranean trade - French Levantine operations suffered an abrupt but definitive blow: in 1793, the war ends the "long prosperity" of the eighteenth century French Levantine trade.<sup>16</sup> Despite the complete absence of statistics for the war period, some consular reports describe well the situation at the turn of the century:

*It results from the directions that the trade in the Levant has taken from 1793 to 1814 that Genoa, Livorno, and Trieste have become as far as France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland are concerned what Livorno was for England. For her own part, England has taken the place of France in exporting to the Levant its colonial and manufactured goods. And whilst the Levantines established in the Italian ports have to make up part of their cargo with French manufactured goods, it would*

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and for another, the incapacity of the Levantine market to absorb the ever-increasing amount of French manufactured goods. See Ch.Carriere [1973] pp.411.

[15]. The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714), the War of Polish Succession (1733-1738), the American War of Independence (1775-1782), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1801) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815).

[16]. Ch.Carriere [1976] vol.1, p.111.

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[The early Greek presence]

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*be even better if our manufactures did not have to turn to Livorno, Genoa and Trieste to get raw materials from the Levant that Marseille, due to the insufficient number of trading houses that it keeps in the Levant and their unreliability, can no longer provision them with enough quantities of raw materials and at competitive prices.'*<sup>17</sup>

#### *Greek Mediterranean trade*

The spectacular rise in the Ottoman Empire's international trade, was concentrated into areas populated not only by muslims, but also by non-muslim communities: Jews, Armenians, and Greeks.<sup>18</sup> By the eighteenth century, these communities controlled a substantial part of the Empire's internal trade and had established their position as intermediaries between the local, mostly Muslim, administrators-cum-landowners and the European merchants.<sup>19</sup>

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[17]. Report of M.Miege, French official in Livorno, see ANF, AE Bili 243, Miege, Renseignements sur le commerce du Levant, Livorno, 13 May 1825, reffered and translated from french E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.136.

[18]. According to the most reliable estimations throughout the eighteenth century the population of Salonica included 20.000 to 25.000 Jews and 16.000 to 20.000 Greeks; see N.Svoronos [1956] p.10,11. Jews, Armenians and Greeks were also numerous in the port of Smyrna: "Some Jews were in Smyrna by 1600, and by 1605 they were already organised as a community. In 16010, the diminishment of the textile industry of Salonica drove the Portuguese and Spanish Jews who had settled there in

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[The early Greek presence]

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According to E.Frangakis-Syrett, "the bargaining power of the Europeans vis-a-vis their non-Muslim brokers and intermediaries varied. At times the Europeans united to play one non-Muslim community off against another or to boycott a broker they did not trust. For example, in the early 1700s the Jews asked for a 6 per cent commission of gros grain yarn. The British merchants outmanoeuvred them, however, by getting the Armenians and Greeks to supply it to them at a 2.5 per cent commission. At other times, for instance when they were competing with local buyers for cotton, they found that they could not impose their own terms."<sup>20</sup>

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(...continued)

the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to Manisa and Smyrna; but since the growing European textile industries were increasingly drawing raw materials away from the local cloth producers in Manisa and elsewhere, by 1621 these Jews were concentrated mostly in Smyrna, which was becoming a thriving international port. Jews immigrated to Smyrna from Ankara, Corfu, and Crete, and particularly from other textile centres including Salonica, Jannina, and Tire." ; see E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.106. About the Greek settlement in Smyrna, the author reports that "from the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Greek settlement in Smyrna started to grow as immigrations, mainly from Anatolia but also from islands such as Chios, increased until by the eighteenth century the size of the Greek community was second only to that of the Turks and was continually expanding. Direct emigration from Greece, which started in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, boosted particularly the Greek population in the countryside around the city. With many Turks from all over Anatolia conscripted to fight in the army, the Karaosmanoglou family also increasingly imported workers from mainland Greece to cultivate cotton for export from the end of the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century. Three thousand Greek peasants settled around Kasaba, while by the beginning of the nineteenth century the area around Smyrna and the adjacent villages was populated almost entirely by Greeks brought over from Morea." p.40.

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[Chapter 1]

[The early Greek presence]

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For most of the eighteenth century, the economic development of these non-muslim communities took place on a local or provincial scale; but the changes precipitated by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which broke the supremacy of the port of Marseille and forced the Europeans to re-direct much of their Levantine trade, gave these communities the opportunity to take over a large part of the Empire's external trade with Western Europe.

The spearhead of the Greek merchants' growth during the eighteenth century was the establishment of commercial companies in European commercial centres: Amsterdam,<sup>21</sup> Trieste,<sup>22</sup> Livorno,<sup>22</sup> Genoa, Ancona, along with the creation of the Greek merchant marine. These interconnected activities were largely due to the accumulation of commercial capital and the creation of a group of wealthy merchants who were in a position to take charge of much of the European redirected trade at the end of the century. Yet the aspects and the mechanisms that Greek commerce and the Greek merchant marine developed, were bounded by

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[19]. Although, as we have seen, European merchants monopolized to a large extent the Empire's external trade, they usually had to go through organised and complicated networks of business inside the Levantine market. According to Goffman the local marketing network consisted of "the villager, the timar-holder, the peddler, the middleman and the port official"; see D.Goffman [1985] p.236. By the eighteenth century, the European merchant had to rely on one of these non-muslim agents who by their knowledge of the market and their versatility in business could secure the local produce.

[20]. E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.103-104.

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[The early Greek presence]

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the Ottoman Empire's development<sup>23</sup> and were mostly dependent on the economic conjuncture and on vast changes in the world economy.

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[21]. The Dutch were the first in the Levant to let the Greeks trade with them. As a result, by the second half of the eighteenth century, half of Dutch trade in Smyrna was in the hands of Greek merchants and Amsterdam's financial market was the centre of their arbitrage. See V.Skouvaras [1964]; see also B.J.Slot, "O Dimitrios Kormoulis kai to diethnes emporio ton Ellinon kata ta eti 1770-1784", *Mnimosini*, 5 (1974-1975), 115-148, and of the same author "Emporikes drastiriotites tou Korai sto Amsterdam", *O Eranistis*, (1980), vol.16, pp.69,71; E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] pp.100-101.

[22]. The flourishing Greek community in the port-city of Trieste during the eighteenth century, is largely attributed to the vivid interest of all the Emperors of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in South-Eastern Europe and their special effort to create the appropriate conditions for non-muslim merchants to establish themselves in Trieste. See O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] pp.7-17, and T.Stojanovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History*, XX, (July 1960), pp.283-288, 297-300. All the same, a contributing factor to the making of the Greek and the Jewish communities in Livorno was the port's "de juris" and "de facto" franchise which - unlike in Marseille - resulted in the foreign merchants's domination in the Levantine trade. The French Consul in Livorno, among other things reported: "*Un objet d'un interet majeur pour la France c'est de savoir en quoi le port de Livourne peut nuire a Marseille dans son commerce avec le Levant. Avant la reunion des etats genois et toscans a la France les ports de Genes et Livourne s'etaient empares exclusivement du commerce du Levant, qui se faisait a Livourne par l'intermediaire des maisons grecques. C'est ce qui arrivera toutes les fois que la France sera en guerre avec l'Angleterre. Mais en temps de paix le port franc de Marseille aura toujours l'avantage...Il y a bien ici quelques maisons francaises qui font le commerce du Levant; mais les maisons grecques l'emportent sur elles par leur nombre et leur opulence...*", Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, CC, Livourne 67, Livourne 31 decembre 1814, reffered by V.Kremmydas [1985] v.I, p.110-111, fn.76. About Livorno see amongst others, P.Masson [1904]; Ch.Carriere-M.Courdurie, "Les grandes heures de Livourne au XVIIIe siecle", *Revue Historique*, July-September 1975, pp.39-80; N.Tomadakis, "Naoi kai thesmoi tis Ellinikis koinotitos tou Livornou", *Epetiris Eterias Bizantinon Spoudon*, 16, 1940, pp.81-127. Vlami [1996].

[23]. The limits of their activites due to their position in the Ottoman economy and society has been emphasised by Michel Morineau, "Naissance

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[The early Greek presence]

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a) Trade

The inflexibility of the Levantine markets, their incapacity to absorb the ever-increasing amount of French manufactures, contributed to a steady drop in the prices French merchants could charge, and forced them to sell on credit. On the other hand, for their local purchases they were obliged to advance payment in cash. As a result, they often had no other choice<sup>24</sup> but to borrow from the local non-muslim brokers or financiers-cum-merchants. Of course, the latter were not on an equal footing with the Europeans; but they were well entrenched as intermediaries in trade and had secured for themselves a place in the local credit markets. The French Consuls complained that the Greeks were already exploiting the credit system in the early nineteenth century. Buying goods on credit from the French, they sold cheaply, but for cash;

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(...continued)

d'une domination. Marchands Europeens, Marchands et Marches du Levant aux XVIIIe et XIXe siecles" in (ed) [1976] p.167: "Pourtant, les conditions d'exercice du metier de marchand etaient difficiles. Si l'Occident - exception faite de la Hollande, de Venice, de Livourne et de Trieste - ne leur avait pas ouvert les bras, le monde ottoman ne leur laissait pas les coudees franches. A tous les sens du terme, ils etaient dans une position d'intermediaire. Ils en recevaient la marque et la limite....Ils avaient le droit de se meler de beaucoup de marchandises mais se heurtaient neanmoins a des monopoles ou au desir des aghas et des pachas de faire leurs affaires avec les Europeens. Ils avaient donc a manoeuvrer avec circonspection. Au reste, les marches se fermaient devant eux quelquefois."

[24]. In the Levant, for the period under consideration, did not exist any formal or official banking institution, see chapter eight.

[The early Greek presence]

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with that money they in turn bought local produce which they sold immediately, so that they could buy still more with the proceeds of the first sale, and thus reap profits from two sales before they had to repay their French creditors.<sup>25</sup> This way, the shrewd Greeks used the French goods as a steady source of capital advances and the system enabled them to conduct transactions with relatively low levels of capital.

French contemporaries<sup>26</sup> called this commonly used method of trade "commerce de circulation" in contrast to the normal "commerce d'echange". Although this concerned mainly small-scale Greek trade, it was not necessarily an exceptional practice of these particular merchants. It was the norm to secure a good position in the market, a sound trading practice, re-inforced by the Ottoman and the international political and economic conjuncture.<sup>27</sup>

Given the lack of banking institutions in the Ottoman Empire, merchants were left to supply the market with specie and with promissory notes. The permanent lack of specie led to the wide use of promissory notes which were bought by speculators despite the risk of not being honoured. Ottoman but non-muslim merchants and brokers, played a

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[25]. ANF, AE Biii 242, Miego, Renseignements sur le commerce du Levant, Livorno, 13 May 1825.

[26]. ANF, Biii 243, 6 February 1818, referred by V.Kremmydas [1985] v.2, pp.139-140.

[27]. V.Kremmydas [1985] p.140.

[The early Greek presence]

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prominent role in this practice; "20 per cent of all bills of exchange bought or sold in Istanbul and 50 per cent of all bills of exchange bought or sold in Smyrna were Ottoman bills, signed for by Greek and Jewish brokers who were ultimately responsible for the payment of these bills".<sup>28</sup> It appears that among non-muslim merchants, the Greeks eventually surpassed in banking turn-over both the Armenians and the Jews, since they were to become increasingly dominant in the Empire's internal trade. By the second half of the eighteenth century they were already involved in the trade of international currencies and in arbitrage of bills of exchange; Amsterdam's financial market was their centre for much of these operations. But their hegemony in finance would not come until the 1860's and 1870's.

b) Merchant Marine

The considerable growth of Greek trade and the creation of a Greek merchant marine during the eighteenth century, has been widely studied;<sup>29</sup> it will be helpful here to define those aspects of this development that were important for the early Greek presence in Marseille.

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[28]. E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.146.

[29]. See among others V.Kremmydas [1985]; Ch.Hadziiossif "Constructions navales et constructeurs de navires grecs (1833-1836)", *Navigation et gens de mer en Mediterranee*, Paris 1980, pp.119-128; Ch.Hadziiossif "Les marins grecs au XIXe siecle", *Le genti del mare Mediterraneo*, Naples

[The early Greek presence]

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According to V.Kremmydas, his data and statistics confirmed well-known hypotheses until then based on descriptions. These findings connect the peak of the merchant marine growth with the destruction of the French merchant fleet during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars by the British Navy. During a wider time-span, from 1776 to 1835, three phases are designated: the first ends with the century and coincides with the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars; the second comes to a close with the end of these Wars; and the third covers the rest of the period;<sup>30</sup> the reasons for the chronology are evident.

Until the end of the eighteenth century, Greek trade was shipped through the largest ports of the Mediterranean: Alexandria, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Salonica in the East; Venice, Trieste, Ancona, Livorno, Marseille in the West. But the Greek merchant marine was until then a small fleet restricted mainly to the Aegean Archipelago, and based on three small islands: Hydra, Spetze and Psara. From coastal trade, however, these islands soon diversified to become included in international routes.

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(...continued)

1981, v.II, pp.1059-1075; C.Papathanasopoulos [1983].  
For a commented bibliography on the primary and secondary sources about Greek maritime history see G.Harlaftis, "A bibliographical Essay on Modern Greek Economic Maritime History", *Modern Greek Society: A Social Science Newsletter*, v.XVII, n.1, December 1990; by the same author, "Elliniki Nautiliaki Historia: Limits and Sources, *Ta Historica*, v.8, n.14-15, pp.217-230, with extensive bibliography and list of international archives.  
[30]. V.Kremmydas [1985] v.II, p.140-141.

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[The early Greek presence]

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Primary sources about the movement of the Greek ships in the Western Mediterranean ports, are meagre. They do show, however, that the Greek share was initially low compared both to the movement of other European ships and to the Greek share in the Eastern Mediterranean ports.<sup>31</sup> Only the maritime island of Hydra, which developed a certain institutional framework, managed to make big inroads and to participate in the trade of the Western Mediterranean ports.<sup>32</sup> A considerable growth is largely attributed to the expansion of the Greek trade towards the West and the subsequent accumulation of mercantile capital sufficient to support shipbuilding.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the impressive quantitative growth of the Greek merchant marine, it remained continually dependent on the international conjuncture and was bounded by the commercial policy and regulations of

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[31]. The only exception was the port of Livorno where in 1793 the percentage of Greek ships arriving was around 12 per cent, whereas some years before it was up to 25 per cent. This activity is largely attributed to the establishment of many Greek commercial houses in the port from the beginning of the century. See V.Kremmydas [1985] v.I, p.110.

[32]. "It seems that whatever could be called the Western Mediterranean aspect of the Greek merchant marine's activity, it should be considered as Hydra's business". V.Kremmydas [1985] v.I, p.147.

[33]. This statement does not completely exclude the accumulation of capital from piracy and privateering at least in the beginning. The argument of Traian Stoianovich ("The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant" in *Journal of Economic History*, XX July 1960, pp.234-313) that "a general prerequisite to the rapid accumulation of wealth or capital formation is the initial readiness to use noneconomic means and the subsequent readiness to use all economic means to achieve the same desired end", holds true; even in the early nineteenth century, piracy and slave trade was a substantial source of profits, but of course, sources are not revealing on this matter.

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[The early Greek presence]

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the Ottoman Empire.<sup>34</sup> These two factors determined the nature and the quality of the Greek ships' commerce. The Greek ships traded mainly in cheap wheat and other staples to blockaded European ports, in risky but favourable conjunctures, picking up a lot of the trade Europeans lost because of the War; but what was profitable during the War was not in times of peace. V.Kremmydas hypothesises that it was not the general drop in the price of cereals after the War that resulted in profits decreasing which in turn caused for the Greek merchant marine a crisis, but that the cheap cereals, exclusively traded by the Greek ships, were no longer in demand in the European markets, which now tended to protect their own cereal production. Thus the observed crisis was not a profit-led but an investment-led crisis: the nature and the kind of commerce left to the Greek ship-owners after the war limited their activities and meant that a considerable part of their capital was under-utilized.<sup>35</sup>

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[34]. For the Ottoman state, the development of non-muslim trade was only part of the Empire's international relations or tax regulations.

[35]. V.Kremmydas [1985] v.II, pp.147-148.

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[The early Greek presence]

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*The early Greek presence in Marseille*

a) Merchants and Seamen during the Napoleonic Wars

During the 18th century the Greeks were not offered many opportunities to establish themselves in Marseille. There were, of course, some "settled" sailors, a handful of coffeshop-owners, and a few servants who had followed their masters, marseillais merchants trading with the Levant. There were also a few artisans with exceptional know-how.<sup>36</sup> But Greek merchants did not reside permanently in the city during this early period. We do not have to look far to see why: the mercantile class of Marseille, strong and closely knit in its corporate organisations, constantly guided by a laborious Chamber of Commerce, managed to organise a flourishing commercial community in the Levant whereas it discouraged Greeks or other Levantines from invading its territory.<sup>37</sup> It resisted remarkably for some years the political changes of the French Revolution, however radical and profound they may have been. The marseillais merchants continued their international business

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[36]. In 1772, for example, the Swiss entrepreneur named Fitler hired four Greeks from Roumely and Thessaly specialised in "the original double dyeing" of cotton, see P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] v.1, p.87.

[37]. Ch.Carriere [1986] p.277, and P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] p.92.

[The early Greek presence]

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as always. The regular movement of the port and the commercial correspondence prove it: after all, "les affaires restent les affaires".<sup>38</sup>

The situation changed dramatically with the beginning of the Wars. The English maritime blockade cut off Marseille from its vital economic source-the Atlantic and the Mediterranean trade-, and paralysed every activity in the city: in 1793, the war ends the "long prosperity" of 18th century marseillais trade.<sup>39</sup>

Paul Masson, historian of modern marseillais trade "par excellence" writes that the subject of the Revolution is almost unexplored. Many years later, Ch.Carriere confirms his predecessor, adding that the study of the economic history of the period is difficult because of the lack of statistics.<sup>40</sup> Our study, limited to the presence of the Greeks in the city, confronts two similar problems: firstly, the lack of data, a problem inherent to the study of a revolutionary period; and, secondly, the accumulation of contradictory consular reports concerning the role of the Greeks in the supply of grain to Marseille; not surprisingly, these contradictions result in controversial

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[38]. Ch.Carriere [1986] vol.1, p.120, 129.

[39]. Ch.Carriere [1986] vol.1, p.111.

[40]. P.Masson "Marseille depuis 1789", *Etudes historiques, Annales de la Faculte des Lettres d'Aix*, v.X, 1916, and Ch.Carriere "Les entrees de navire dans le port de Marseille pendant la Revolution", *Provence Historique*, v.VII, avril-juin 1957.

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[The early Greek presence]

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estimates.

Ch. Carriere<sup>41</sup> gives the total number of the Greek ships which entered the port of Marseille during the revolutionary period as it was registered in the *Registres des depositions*. Such general information was enriched by a critical selection of secondary sources and consular reports. This was the method chosen to form a synthesis of the most reliable data. Here is the emerging picture.

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[41]. The material in question, known to historians but used extensively by Ch. Carriere, is found in the *Archives departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone, serie E, Sante maritime*. The series comprises the *Registres des depositions des capitaines de navires entres dans les ports*, which gives the following information: boat's name, captain's name and place of origin, exact number of the crew, port and date of departure, port of call, information about the destination of other boats, ship agent, cargo and cargo's consignee. Chapter seven of the present study, is mainly based on this source for the first half of 19th century.

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Table 1.1. Greek ships in Marseille's port coming from the Levant  
(Constantinople, Salonica, Archipelago, Peloponese)

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Year	Arrivals	Departures
May 1793 - March 1795	4 <sup>1</sup>	
April 1796 - 1799	16 <sup>2</sup>	
1814		6 <sup>3</sup>
1815	1 <sup>4</sup>	6 <sup>3</sup>

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Sources:

1. P.Echinard, *Grecs et Philhellènes a Marseille de la Revolution française a l'Independance de la Grece*, 1973, p.9.
2. Ch.Carriere, *Negociants Marseillais au XVIIIe siècle*, 1973, p.210.
3. V.Kremmydas, *Elliniki Emporiki Nautilia, 1776-1835*, 1985, v.1, p.109.
4. R.Pascal, *Les relations commerciales entre Marseille et Constantinople de 1815 a 1835*, Memoire de Diplome, 1965, p.

From May 1793 to March 1795, four Greek freighters coming from the Archipelago or the Peloponese, were the only boats which entered the port. The first one, a barge named Saint-Nicolas, its captain a certain

[The early Greek presence]

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Theodore Mexis, arrived in Marseille on 16 May 1794 with 823 loads of wheat coming from the port of Salonica. The boat stayed for some months on the west coast and transported wheat to Marseille from the ports of Genoa and Livorno. In August 1794 she left for Smyrna with quite an unusual cargo: the correspondance of the French government to the consuls of the Levant, entrusted to the Greek merchant Anastasio Calovolo.<sup>42</sup> In July of the same year, two other boats arrived from the island of Tinos via Ancona loaded with wheat; finally in September the last Greek boat entered the port: she imported 1000 loads of wheat on behalf of the French government and "exported" the diplomatic correspondance of the same government.<sup>43</sup>

For the period between March 1795 and April 1796 we do not have any information about Greek trade from Carriere's work. From Pierre Echinard though we know that in 1795 the Greek merchants Despotis, Matetaos and Thomas Spagnolachis came temporarily to Marseille in order to receive cargoes of wheat as well as soap, oil, cotton etc, from Genoa and Livorno.<sup>44</sup> The same author follows the progress of the Greek

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[42]. A.D., 200 E 2a, 27 floreal an II, 15 messidor an II, 8 messidor an III and A.N., Aff. et., B. III 213, 6 fructidor an II, referred by P.Echinard [1973] p.9.

[43]. A.N., Aff. et., B III 213, 26 fructidor an II, referred by P.Echinard [1973] p.9.

[44]. P.Echinard [1973] p.10. The majority of the Greek names which are found in the archives or in the French bibliography are, for many different reasons, "francises" which usually resulted in the abolition of the letter s from the ending; we rather preferred the Greek endings -as, -is etc.

[The early Greek presence]

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merchants, captains and ship-owners in the provision of wheat to the city and he notes their relations with the ports of Genoa and Livorno but unfortunately his estimations are based on secondary sources.<sup>45</sup>

Another reliable but partial source are the charter-parties<sup>46</sup> contracted in 1794 and 1795 between the Greek captains<sup>47</sup> and the French mercantile house of Masse-Parsy et Cie for the transportation of wheat to Marseille.

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[45]. P.Echinard [1973] p.11.

[46]. Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, serie LIV. T. 101, Agence d'Afrique. Marine. Affretements de navires etrangers an II-III.

[47]. The captain of a Greek boat, usually, contributed to the capital outlay needed for the purchase of merchandise and he was responsible for it; in other words, he was partner and manager in the "company-cargo" of the ship for the duration of the trip and the commercial exchange. See V. Kremmydas [1985] v.II, p.60

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[The early Greek presence]

Table 1.2. The Supply of Wheat to Marseille by Greek boats  
according to charter-parties

Date	Captain's name	Flag	Ports of call	Wheat (kg.)
17/09/1794	KALOMATIS-DIASAKIS	MALTA	GENOA-TOULON	2,700
24/10/1794	ANAGNOSTOU	MALTA	GENOA-TOULON	2,800
25/10/1794	MIKARAKIS			4,000
25/10/1794	MIKARAKIS		GENOA-NICE-TOULON	4,000
15/11/1794	BONTOURIS	MALTA	GENOA-NICE-TOULON	4,000
15/11/1794	BONTOURIS	MALTA	GENOA-NICE	4,000
16/11/1794	GHIONI	MALTA	GENOA	2,000
17/11/1794	SAVA		GENOA	6,000
27/01/1795	DIASAKIS	MALTA	GENOA-NICE-TOULON	6,000
27/01/1795	DIASAKIS	MALTA	GENOA-NICE-TOULON	6,000
26/03/1795	KALAFATAKIS	MALTA	GENOA-NICE-TOULON	4,000
<b>Total</b>				<b>45,500</b>

The charter-parties were all contracted in Salonica except the first one signed on the island of Psara. Every contract did not correspond to a trip but to a different cargo, transported sometimes by the same boat; from the date, the name of the captain and the name of

[The early Greek presence]

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the boat, we infer that the number of trips realised was eight. The captain agreed to transport the cargo to Marseille, but in the case of a blockade he could unload at the ports of Genoa, Nice or Toulon. The freight differed inversely to the distance from Marseille: the bigger the distance, the lower the freight. The cost of freight was quite high - 71 paras by kilo for Toulon or Nice, 75 paras for Marseille and 40 paras for Genoa - compared to that of the French freight, and rather exorbitant compared to the extremely low prices that the Greek ships charged during peacetime.<sup>48</sup>

The quantities were given in kilos. We infer that it was meant the kilo of Constantinople, a common measure for cereals in the Ottoman Empire, equivalent to 22 okes (1 oke = 2.82 pounds or 1,283 grams).<sup>49</sup> If P.Echinard's estimations holds true,

*"Les Grecs prennent alors une part, qui est loin d'être négligeable, dans le ravitaillement de la ville en ble. Ainsi, en l'an III, livrent-ils a Marseille 7.430 charges en provenance de Nice, 3.920 de Genes, 7.230 de Livourne et 29.519 ramenees du Levant soit, au total, 48.099 charges ou 57.708 quintaux, ce qui constitue pres de 10 % de l'approvisionnement total de Marseille en ble, par voie de mer",<sup>49</sup>*

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[48]. V.Kremmydas [1985] v.II, p.57; it has been also sustained that during the Napoleonic Wars, Greek ships which supplied grain to blockaded ports doubled their capital in five months; see F.Tears [1972] vol.II, p.66.

[The early Greek presence]

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one can surmise that the 45,500 Kg. were Kilos of Constantinople and if so, represented as much as 5 per cent of the total grain-supply to Marseille by sea.

In April 1796, sixteen Greek boats from the Levant entered the port, exclusively transporting wheat;<sup>50</sup> apparently, they were the last until 1799. The war between France and the Ottoman Empire in 1798, added the latter's flag to the group of the former's "enemies's flags" and placed the Greeks as "sujets ottoman" in a very precarious situation; their unstable commerce was furthermore aggravated, and, as a result, their establishment in the city was discouraged.

In 1799, when the Directoire ordered that all foreigners in Marseille without residence permits were obliged to reside eighty kilometres away from the coastline, the Greeks were exempted "*en faveur des services qu'ils ont rendus a la Republique par leurs relations commerciales, de leur attachement a la France et des dangers auxquels ils seraient exposes, s'ils etaient contraints de retourner dans leur patrie*".<sup>51</sup> For the occasion, in April of the same year, the authorities made a list of the Greeks present in the city. Even though this document is not a real census - for example, some women married to Frenchmen were not included<sup>52</sup> -, it constitutes the first systematic registration of

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[49]. V.Kremmydas [1980] p.116, fn.11; P.Echinard [1973] p.11.

[50]. Ch.Carriere [1986] p.210 and P.Echinard [1973] p.12

[51]. A.D., L 175, 6 floreal an VII.

[The early Greek presence]

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the Greek population in the city during the Revolutionary period<sup>53</sup>.

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[52]. See P.Echinard [1973] p.22, fn.92. In spite of the Chamber's prohibitions, marriages of French with Levantines were frequent.

[53]. A.N., Aff. et., B. III·218, etat nominatif expedie le 26 floreal an VII.

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[The early Greek presence]

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Table 1.3. Greeks in Marseille in 1799

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Profession	Number
Merchants and Agents	17
Captains	10
Sailors	18
Various	6
Total	51

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Source: P.Echinard, *Greco et Philhellènes à Marseille, de la Révolution française à l'Indépendance de la Grèce*, 1973, p.22-23.

This recognition by the French Republic, long overdue, could not ameliorate the position of the Greeks in the city: the port was deprived of Levantine trade and some of the most important merchants had already left Marseille, such as *Despotis*, *Scarpas*, *Matetaos* and *Spagnolachis*, who were among the first to establish themselves in Marseille for two or three years. Some years later, we find *Despottis* and *Spagnolachis* among

[The early Greek presence]

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the big merchants of Livorno.<sup>54</sup> All the same, *Anastase Calovolos*, the biggest Greek merchant of the city, left Marseille immediately after the beginning of the French-Turkish war.<sup>54</sup> His brother-in-law, *Constantinos Papas Oglou*, said to be very rich, after a short passage from Marseille, went to Holland.<sup>54</sup> Others, like *Stefanos Alexandrachis*-the ex-consul of the Ottoman empire in Marseille and French "protege"- or *Alexandros Basilis*-coming from Janina, related to *Demetrios Basili* the secretary of *Ali Pacha*- joined the small group of Greeks in Paris.<sup>54</sup> Only about ten or so maintained some interests in the city, sufficient to be resumed some years after.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, captains and sailors, who represented half of the total number, did not reside permanently in the city; some were owners of merchandise they were in the process of selling, others were blocked in the port during this new commercial crisis, seeking employment. ....

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[54]. See *Almanacco di Livorno*, 1806..1816..etc. ; about *Calovolos* see A.D., 362 registre 240, 13 vendemiaire an IV, 16 prairial an IV, registre 241, 8 vendemiaire an V, 16 germinal et 17 floreal an V, registre 243, 6 pluviouse, 5 messidor et 6 fructidor an VI, registre 244, 6 vendemiaire, 11 and 24 frimaire and 18 pluviouse an VII, referred by P.Echinard, [1973] p.23, fn.96.; about *Papas Oglou* see A.D., 362 E, registre 341, 29 messidor an V and A.N., aff. et., B.III 218, 26 floreal an VII, 15 fructidor an VII. ; about *Stefanos Alexandrachis* see A.N., Aff. et., B.III 218, etat du 26 floreal an VII, and about *Alexandros Basilis* see A.D., 366 E, registre 357, n.232, 25 prairial an VI and A.N., Aff.et., B.III 218, etat du 26 floreal an V.

[55]. *Badetti brothers*, *Andre Giustiniany*, *Jean Pirghouly*, *Antoine Mirach*, *Giovanni Dimitri*, *George-Emmanuel D'Isay*, *Adamis-Paul Carus* and some others; See P.Echinard [1973] p.24, fn.103

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[The early Greek presence]

Table 1.4. Place of Origin of the Greeks in Marseille in 1799

Place	P r o f e s s i o n s				
	Merchants	Captains	Sailors	Various	Total
Hydra		3	15		18
Smyrna	6	4		2	12
Chio	3				3
Con/ple	2	1			3
Janina	3				3
Cyprus	1			1	2
Crete				2	2
Coron	1				1
Zagora	1				1
Naxos		1			1
Ios		1			1
Tinos			1		1
Rhodes			1		1
Zara			1		1
Seyde				1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>51</b>

[The early Greek presence]

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On the basis of this document on the geographical origins of emigrants, it appears that they came, basically, from two kinds of areas; either from the islands and ports which participated, in one way or another, in the making of a Greek merchant marine (Hydra mainly, but also Naxos, Ios, Tinos, Chios), or from commercial centres like Constatinople, Smyrna, Janina, Zagora.

b) The Greek political refugees, 1800-1815

After the successive defeats of France in the Ionian islands, in Malta and in Egypt, the transportation of thousands of French soldiers via Marseille and Toulon begun. They were accompanied by a considerable number of Levantines who had fought with the French army and who were therefore considered "collaborateurs" in their places of origin. Among them, there were a few Greeks who, after having faithfully served Napoleon and the ideals of the French Revolution, were persecuted by the Ottomans; even though never an appassionate pro-Napoleon city, Marseille represented a temporary refuge for them before joining the French army or going back to their home in more favorable circumstances.

This heterogeneous group of servicemen played an important role in the formation of the political ideology of the nascent Greek community and in their actual political attitudes and activities during the Greek war of Independence.<sup>56</sup>

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[56]. We shall see that in a later chapter.

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[The early Greek presence]

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The first group arrived in Marseille in 1799, after the defeat of the French army in the Ionian islands.<sup>57</sup> Deprived of their fortunes, most of them stayed there for a short period and then some joined the French army, others returning to the Ionian islands.

Among those who went to the Ionian islands or to Italy after a short passage from Marseille, the following persons have been identified:

*George Vitalis*, captain of the 6th brigade, in charge of transporting correspondance to the army in Egypt. He lived in Marseille for two years, then he went to Livorno and Ancona where he traded, and he returned to Marseille a fervent advocate of Greek Independence.<sup>58</sup>

*Demetrios Guzellis*, captain; he fought in Zante, asked to be enlisted in the Batallion "des Chasseurs d'Orient" and went to Marseille in order to defend his application.<sup>59</sup>

The Count *Demetrios Mercatis*, commander-in-chief of the National guard of Zante: he lived in Paris for some years and, in 1807, joined Donzelot in the Ionian islands. In 1814 he went to Marseille where he stayed for two years, and in 1818 he came back and obtained French nationality, before participating in the Greek war of Independence.<sup>60</sup>

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[57]. The history of the French occupation of the Ionian islands, and in particular of the political ideology that influenced and inspired the natives during the whole period under consideration, has been largely written. See among others H.Yannacopoulou [1989] and N.G.Moschonas [1989].

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[The early Greek presence]

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It seems that the only serviceman, who stayed on in Marseille for the major part of his life, was lieutenant John Maye, from Zante. Living with his wife and his three children in great misery for some years, he was finally nominated vice-consul of the Ottoman empire in Marseille from 1812 to 1823, a position which he served with "*probite, loyauté et honneur...Il était tellement connu sous ces qualités que tous les officiers attachés au consulat l'estimaient, l'aimaient et avaient pour lui une considération distinguée*".<sup>59</sup> In 1821, he organised the shipment of reinforcements, arms and supplies from Marseille to the areas of Greece in revolt.<sup>60</sup>

Among the group of "Maltese" refugees who arrived in the port the last months of 1800, a few Greeks were also traced, but apparently they did not have an active presence in Marseille.<sup>61</sup> On the contrary, among the Greeks who came to the city following the army of Egypt, there were some privileged, of a certain rank, who formed the core of of the local Greek "bourgeoisie" of military background.

The majority of Greek soldiers were enlisted in the two Legions

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[58]. About *George Vitalis* see Boulay de la Meurthe [1885] p.237-238 and *Meghali Elliniki Eghyklopedia*, Pyrsos, v.VII, p.370. About *Demetrios Guzellis* see J.Savant [1939]. p.389. About *Demetrios Mercatis* see J.-P.Bellaire [1805] p.452; A.Boppe [1914] p.100-101; J.Savant [1940] p.269-280.

[59]. Arch. M.G., dossier de pension n° 45.290, 1811 cited by P.Echinard [1973] p.29 ft.12. See also D.Konomos [1968] cited by P.Echinard.

[60]. See below.

[61]. The Ionians Jerome Mavromatis, Dimitris Callicopulos and Maria Tabacchi were found in the lists of these refugees. P.Echinard [1973] p.30, fn.16.

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[The early Greek presence]

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named the Greek and the Copt, which successively served Bonaparte and Kebler; immediately after the first defeats, the Ministry of War in Paris started to fear a massive migration of these auxiliaries, and in 1801 estimated that "1500 a 1800 Grecs, Coptes ou Egyptiens" would arrive in Marseille, coming from Alexandria.<sup>62</sup> The real number was undoubtedly smaller, the English boat "Pallas" disembarked only 230 individuals, joined by some hundreds more, transported by two other boats.<sup>63</sup>

It is quite difficult to calculate the exact number of Greeks among the other refugees, given the nature and the quality of the existing material. For one thing, the identification of the Greek names is rather hazardous, in documents where they were simply referred as "refugies egyptiens"; the place of birth was rarely given and the mixed marriages between Greeks and Egyptians complicated the task. For another, there were major omissions in the service records mainly because of a high rate of mobility inherent in these groups of refugees. Echinard estimates that a number of 40 to 80 individuals, servecemen and their families, is plausible; and that, despite mobility in terms of individuals, the total figure was stable during the period under consideration. In any case, the Greeks were a minority compared to the

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[62]. Cited by A.Louca "Mythe et realite de l'Orient romantique: Les Mameluks en France" extract from the *Catalogue de l'exposition sur l'Orient des Provencaux*, p.345.

[63]. See P.Echinard [1973] pp.30-31, and P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] pp.111-112.

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[The early Greek presence]

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total of oriental refugees.<sup>64</sup>

The French authorities, preoccupied by the presence of these soldiers in the city, "*petits, laids, basanes et absolument sans ce qu'on appelle en France la tournure....ils seraient ridicules et certainement tres malheureux d'etre le jouet continuel des autres soldats francais*",<sup>65</sup> decided on the creation of a squadron of 150 soldiers, Syrians and Copts mainly, named "l'escadron de Mameluks" and of a light infantry named "bataillon des Chasseurs d'Orient", under the orders of the Greek colonel Nicolas Papas Oglou.<sup>66</sup> A "depot des refugies egyptiens" was also created, which distributed bread and a small pension of 0,75 to 2,50 francs per day to the families of the servecemen.

The Greeks mainly enlisted in the "bataillon des Chasseurs d'Orient", which was dispersed at Martigues, Bouc and Toulon before going to fight in Dalmatia in 1806; a small number of them, considered either old or injured, stayed in Marseille with their families, surviving

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[64]. P.Echinard [1973] p.39.

[65]. This text is attributed to Theodore Lascaris, ex-collaborator of Bonaparte, a legendary personality, who passed through Marseille on his way to Paris. The text is found in Auriant, "Projets et notes sur l'Egypte par Th.Lascaris (1800-1801)", *A.R.M.H.*, v.I, p.241-242. About Th.Lascaris see also, Auriant, *La Vie du chevalier Theodore Lascaris*, cited by P.Echinard [1973] p.30, fn.18, and Auriant, "Le Citoyen Lascaris, fonctionnaire de l'armee d'Orient (1798-1801)" in *A.R.M.H.* v.II, p.44.

[66]. See J.Savant [1949] and Aug.Boppe [1914]. A historical anecdote about Nicolas Papas Oglou referred by P.Echinard [1973] p.39: Bonaparte, knowing his Greek origin, never called him anything else than Papadopoulos! If there is any truth in that, then ethnic stereotypes are quite old.

[The early Greek presence]

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on a pension.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the general impoverishment of the Greek servicemen, there were a few, as mentioned above, of a certain rank, who, not only possessed a sufficient fortune for a good living in the city, but were also easily integrated into the local French society, given their career in the French army. An eloquent testimony of this evolution is Barthelemy Serras, a Greek officer from the island of Chios, in command of a Mameluk group in Egypt. Known for his exceptional courage, but also for his cruelty, Serras arrived in Marseille in 1801 and obtained a comfortable annual pension of 3000 francs. In contrast to his adventurous life, he led in Marseille a life "*au milieu d'estampes, de bibelots, d'instruments de musique, de livres et de fleurs....fidele a la tradition qui faisait des Chiotas les jardiniers les plus reputes de tout l'Orient*".<sup>68</sup> Maintaining always his relations with the "Egyptian" colony, he frequented the marseillais bourgeoisie and he became a member of the Freemason's Lodge "l'Aimable Sagesse".<sup>69</sup> He was Catholic of the Greek ritual, speaking fluent French and dressing "a la francaise", but also reverently wearing his Mameluk uniform, a tribute to the

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[67]. Jean-Francois Nazos, for example, was a Greek officer who resided permanently in Marseille after being declared unfit for service. In 1802, he obtained a pension of 900 francs per year and until his death in 1821 he struggled against destitution. After his death his eldest son went to fight in Greece; the three other children married French nationals, facilitated by the fact that they were catholics of the Greek ritual, coming from the island of Tinos. See P.Echinard [1973] p.34-35, fn.36. Other known cases are these of Emmanuel Covas and Nicolas Candiottis; for detailed references see P.Echinard [1973] p.38-39.

[The early Greek presence]

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"exotisme", and the "orientalisme" a la mode.

c) Economic Fluctuation and the Renewal of Immigration, 1800-1815

In 1802 the marseillais Levant trade started to recover slowly from the vicissitudes of the maritime war; the peace treaty signed with England and the Ottoman Empire aroused enthusiasm in the mercantile circles of the city: "*On parait porte a oublier les maux passes par le bien present et par l'esperance a venir*", "...une sensation tres satisfaisante a la bourse et dans les armements maritimes".<sup>69</sup> But, despite the fact that commercial activity between Marseille and the Levant increased considerably - twenty-five to thirty French boats entered the port at the end of the same year<sup>70</sup> - the marseillais merchants were not the only beneficiaries; a part of the market was, slowly but firmly, conquered by Greek merchants already well established at the other end of the commercial route: the Levantine market places.<sup>71</sup>

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[68]. P.Echinard [1973] p.33. See also, P.Echinard-E.Temime [1986] p.122. The Freemason Lodges were particularly active in the administrative and military milieu; in the marseillais Lodges we traced the Greeks, Theodore Lascaris, Barthelemy Serras, Nicolas Papas Oglou, Nicolas Candiottis, George Bellias, Michel Chire and Theodore Racke. See P.Echinard [1973] p.40, fn.64.

[69]. A.N., F 7 7768, bulletin de germinal an X, "Esprit public", and F 7 3659 6, bulletin de nivose a ventose an XI, cited by P.Echinard [1973] p.44, fn.82, 83.

[70]. A.D., 200 E 2a, ans X, XI.

[71]. Even though Paul Masson sustains, that immediately after the peace

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[The early Greek presence]

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The small group of Greek merchants who had remained in Marseille during the war, was thus joined by partners or relatives coming mainly from Smyrna.

George-Emmanuel D'Isay,<sup>72</sup> had resided in Marseille from 1796 to 1799 working as agent of the Greek merchant Anastasios Calovolos; in 1799 he went to Paris like many other Greeks who could not leave France. He returned in Marseille in 1803 where he got married to the daughter of a French merchant and he established his own commercial house under the name (denomination), "George D'Isay et Cie" which collaborated with other commercial houses in Smyrna, Trieste, Livorno, Genoa and Amsterdam managed by relatives. He definitely left the city as early as 1805.

By the same time, the merchants Etienne Paraschevas, Emmanuel Maggioranis, Pierre Denas, Jean Pirghoulis, Michel Badettis, Andre Giustinianis and Pierre Homeridis Schilizzis tried to grasp the opportunities and avoid the risks that Marseille's trade with the Levant presented.

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(...continued)

treaty with the Ottoman empire, the marseillais merchants tried to reorganise their commercial houses in the Levant, other sources underline the insuperable difficulties that the merchants encountered. See P.Masson [1919] p.233; A.N., F 7 7768, floreal an X, cited by P.Echinard [1973] p.46.

[72]. In the German, Italian and French sources the name is found as D'Isay or Dissaia. In 1795 the merchant Ioannis Isaias from Smyrna, said to be well off, established himself in Trieste and got married to the daughter of another Greek merchant of Trieste, Constantinos Niotis. See O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] p.323, fn.97. About George-Emmanuel see also, P.Echinard [1973] p.48-49, fn.97.

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[The early Greek presence]

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Etienne Paraschevas, a relative of D'Isay, associated with the Swiss merchant Petitpierre for some period, left the city at the beginning of the Empire; Emmanuel Maggioranis and the merchant-insurance agent Pierre Denas after having traded with Egypt, also abandoned the city.<sup>73</sup>

Jean Pirghoulis, Catholic and French "protege", arrived in Marseille in 1799 in order to sell merchandise to the value of 20,000 francs. When he came back, in 1803, as secretary-interpreter of the special correspondent of Tunisia's Bey, he resided in Marseille and traded with Tunisia, Constantinople and Smyrna where his brother was established. Married to a French woman, he stayed and worked in Marseille until his death in 1840.<sup>74</sup>

These merchants could not be considered as war profiteers. At that time, goods from all commercial operations were at risk of being confiscated or destroyed. The neutrals were caught in the middle. Andre Giustinianis, is a good example, of those who had to pay the price.

Born in the island of Chios, Giustinianis arrived in Marseille in 1796, got married to the daughter of a well-known French merchant and, two years later, despite the difficulties the war presented started his

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[73]. All three were from Smyrna and they were members, like D'Isay, of the marseillais Freemason Lodge "l'Aimable Sagesse". See B.N., F M 2 (Archives) Marseille, 282, tome 2, table of 1804 to 1806.

[74]. About Pirghoulis see Chevrier-Alesandri [1952] p.246 and P.Echinard [1973] p.49, fn.99. Other Greeks found in Marseille at this period: Antoine Mirach and Adamis Paul Carus from Smyrna, Giovanni Dimitri from Zagora of Ipiros and Jean Scarfis.

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[The early Greek presence]

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own business: importing wheat and oil from the Archipelago, cotton from Smyrna or from Salonica, various goods from Palma and Messina. Ten years later, in 1806, he declared 12,100 loads of wheat in stock, a substantial amount for the time.<sup>75</sup> Soon after he invested in shipping first by granting loans to Greek captains or by insuring their cargoes, then by giving financial support to two vessels under the French flag, *Mariette* and *Le Petit-Gustave*. He was said to have earned as much as 11,000 francs in eight years only from his activities in insurance. By the end of 1806, the tide of fortune turned. A part of his cargoes were captured by the English, and some of his debtors became insolvent at the same time. Giustinianis became bankrupt and abandoned the city for good, leaving behind him a deficit of 314,173 francs.

Giustinianis's bankruptcy preceded a new commercial crisis between Marseille and the Levant; the vicissitudes of the maritime war between England and France continued to be a burden for the neutral nations as well. Once again, the port was paralysed. The Chamber of Commerce wrote, in a rather dramatic tone, to the minister of Interior:

*Il serait heureux pour nous, Monseigneur...de pouvoir adresser a  
Votre Excellence le bulletin de l'etat du commerce francais au Levant,*

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[75]. The same year we find him as "negociant, commissaire et agent etranger residant a Marseille, rue thubaneau, n.17", in the lists of *Tableau historique et politique*, p.197,245. See also P.Echinard [1973] p.52-53, fn.111, 112, 113.

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[The early Greek presence]

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*mais ce commerce n'existe pas..*<sup>76</sup>

By the end of 1808, as soon as the blockade loosened up, numerous Greek boats under the Ottoman flag re-appeared in the port: twenty-two arrivals from Levant, twenty-one departures for the same destination.<sup>77</sup> Even the marseillais merchants, desperate to keep this trade going, by any means, thought that the boats of their Greek competitors would serve their own Levantine interests. But the troubles of trade were not over. This time they would be caused by the intervention of the French authorities, in theory protecting the interests of their nationals.

Very often, in times of War, the French found it convenient to suspend some monopoly laws, in order to boost sales of French cloth or to increase imports of raw materials. On september 1810 for example, a decree stipulated that imports from Levant were allowed in neutral vessels, only if French manufactures were exported with the same boat.<sup>78</sup> For the same reasons, the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille pressurized by the French manufacturers for more raw materials or by the local merchants who were interested in consigning goods to non-Frenchmen, revoked the 20 per cent duty on all foreign' goods imported to Marseille or lifted its ban on consigning goods to Levantines, four times between 1781 and 1815.<sup>79</sup> But the French merchants established in the Levant succeeded in having monopoly practices reinstated each time, and in their

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[76]. E.Salvador [1854] p.339-340.

[77]. A.N., F 7 3659 6, bulletin du quatrieme trimestre 1809.

[78]. Arch. C.C.M., Nc 5, p.346-350, 9 November 1810.

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[The early Greek presence]

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name the consuls consistently hindered free trade on the grounds of safeguarding French interests.

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[79].E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] pp.93-94.

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[Chapter 1]

[The early Greek presence]

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The flow of Greeks to Marseille during 1793-1815, a period of political changes, economic fluctuation and crisis, was affected and determined:

1. By a number of political and military events such as the Napoleonic Wars which resulted in a commercial and political emigration;

2. By the conditions in the origin areas of migrants; for instance, captains-merchants from the maritime islands of Hydra or Spetze followed a new trade route with their boats; those from important commercial centres such as Smyrna and Constantinople tried to expand their activities in another market.

Even though there are no satisfactory statistics on the exact number of Greeks who emigrated to Marseille at this period, one can safely surmise that they never exceeded 100 to 150 individuals.

Their cultural characteristics appeared to favour some degree of integration in marseillais society: the majority of the merchants were Catholics which facilitated mixed marriages and stimulated language learning and the small group of career servicemen (Catholics as well, loyal to Napoleon and multi-cultural) shared a common predisposition to French culture and way of life.

However, a major, obstacle to their permanent establishment in the city, was lack of capital sufficient to resist economic instability due to the vicissitudes of the war, and competition from the local merchants.

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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## CHAPTER TWO

### ESTABLISHMENT IN THE CITY: GREEK MERCHANTS, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE PHILHELLENES

A new period for the Greek presence in Marseille started with the end of the War. The abolition of the onerous 20 % tax on merchandise transported by non-French boats in Levantine trade in particular, and the renewal of trade between Marseille and Smyrna, encouraged in 1816 the simultaneous establishment of a number of Greek commercial firms; these were to be the core of the mercantile group which founded the Greek Orthodox Church which, in the absence of community institutions, was their main "symbolic" form of organisation.

1816 was a determinant year for the flow of Greeks into Marseille: the merchant from Salonica Demetrius Capudas became the new General Consul of the Porte, a position held until then by the Jewish merchant Joseph Raphael Cohen and nine licensed commercial firms appeared in the local guides:

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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AMIRA Luc Fils

ARGENTI RALLI

BADETTI Bmi Cie

CAPUDAS THEODOSIDI

HOMERIDI SCHILIZZI

PARSALI LASCARIS

PETROCOCHINO VURO

PRASSACACHI freres

THESEE Nicolas'

One year later, the archimandrite Arsenios who had that year established himself in Paris, addressed a letter to the Russian plenipotentiary minister, Pozzo de Borgo, most probably solicited by the Greek merchants; eloquent in many respects, the letter reads:

*"Arsenios, archimandrite grec orthodox, natif de Sparte en Moree, ex-aumonier du Regiment grec, au service de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Russies aux iles Ioniennes, prend la liberte de s'adresser a Votre Excellence pour la supplier d'accueillir avec bienveillance le desir qu'il a de se rendre a Marseille, pour y exercer son etat d'aumonier, attendu qu'a Paris son ministere est inutile, et que les frais sont fort au-dessus de ses moyens d'existence.*

*"Comme le port de Marseille est tres frequente par les commercants*

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[1]. About the establishment of these commercial firms see detailed information in P.Echinard [1973] pp.86-96.

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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russes de la mer Noire et par les Grecs du Levant, et qu'il ne s'y trouve pas d'église orthodoxe de son rit, l'exposant reclame en sa faveur l'application du décret des trois Hautes Puissances qui l'ont promulgué à Paris, pour la tolérance de son église.

"L'exposant se flatte avec d'autant plus de raison d'être accueilli favorablement que Votre Excellence (en sa qualité de Ministre d'un Monarque aussi grand que magnanime, ne dans la sainte religion du rit que le réclamant professe) se plaira à étendre le règne de la saine morale suivie par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies: en accédant à sa demande, l'exposant aura la douce consolation d'apporter les secours spirituels aux infortunes de la religion orthodoxe qui meurent souvent sans avoir fait leur paix avec Dieu, faute d'être à portée d'entendre la voix d'un ministre de la religion.

"Sachant que toutes les églises grecques de l'Europe sont protégées par l'Auguste Monarque de toutes les Russies, et persuadé que pour l'exercice de cette religion à Marseille il faut une permission spéciale; l'exposant espère des bontés de Votre Excellence qu'elle daignera demander à Son Excellence le ministre de l'Intérieur de cette Monarchie une permission, afin que le réclamant puisse exercer les prières de son rit dans un logement, avec les fidèles de sa religion.."  
(A.N., F 19 10.933, sous-dossier Grecs schismatiques B.d.R., 1821-1828, le 13/25 avril 1817).

Despite the Major's favourable report to the Prefect of Bouches-

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[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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du-Rhone about the importance of the Orthodox community in the city, Arsenios' demand was rejected, probably because the number of the Greeks was estimated to be small and that of Russian citizens was practically non-existent;<sup>2</sup> Greek merchants did not intervene directly at any moment, although they started to celebrate Mass in private, at Nicolas Thesee's house.<sup>3</sup>

Two years later, the need for building a suitable place of worship for the city's Greek Orthodox congregation, was posed in a complex way. In 1820, the archbishop of Myre, Maximos Mazlum, arrived in Marseille with the intention of creating a Catholic Church *du rit Grec*, for Egypt's refugees and some Catholic Greeks.<sup>4</sup> His plans were to win the approval of the King since they had already won the approval of the Catholic Church; on 19 August 1820, he brought a very convincing petition before the Prefect:

*"Ces personnes n'auraient plus le meme éloignement pour assister au service divin qui se ferait selon leur liturgie, avec des ceremonies qu'ils connaissent, quoique ce fut dans une eglise catholique, ce serait un moyen de les ramener dans le giron de l'Eglise et a l'unite de la foi... Si au contraire, les Grecs schismatiques, jaloux d'exercer leur culte, obtiennent un local a cet effet et font venir un prete de leur nation, il est a craindre que beaucoup d'Egyptiens, soit par simplicité,*

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[2]. A.D., 128 V 1 .

[3]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 29 Oct.1820.

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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soit pour revoir des ceremonies qu'ils ne pourraient retrouver ailleurs, ne frequentent un peu trop cette eglise, et puissent se reunir aux schismatiques et partager leur erreur...[D'autre part]... les Grecs catholiques sont maintenant en butte dans l'empire ottoman, a une persecution sans cesse renouvelee. Cet etat de chose en oblige un grand nombre a s'expatrier, surtout parmi ceux qui ont de la fortune, quelques-uns meme sont arrives a Marseille, et s'y sont etablis...C'est principalement a Livourne qu'ils se portent avec leurs capitaux parce qu'ils trouvent dans cette ville une belle eglise grecque catholique, ou le service divin est celebre avec toute la pompe orientale... Si les Egyptiens etaient assez heureux pour que leur demande fut favorablement accueillie, il est hors de doute que ce serait a Marseille que les emigres se refugieraient, et les capitaux qu'ils y apporteraient ne pourraient que tourner a l'avantage du commerce de cette ville".<sup>5</sup>

The church was built in the record time of one year, partly financed by the town council, consecrated on 5 January 1822, with the participation of all the region's notables. Its foundation was a significant turning point in the Greeks' sense of religious zeal, spirit of competition and the concomitant efforts to create a Greek Orthodox church in the city.

In 1821, the archimandrite Arsenios called by the Greeks arrived

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[4]. A.D., M 11 23; P.Kayata [1901]

[5]. Arch.de l'archeveche, Marseille, dossier 320, supplique de Mazlum du 19 aout 1820, referred by P.Echinard [1973] p.100.

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[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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in Marseille and the General Consul of the Porte Demetrius Capudas wrote to the Prefect:

*"Les nationaux negociants grecs residant en cette ville m'ont demande par petition de leur procurer, a leur frais, un local ou chapelle ou ils puissent faire leur culte. D'apres la liberte des cultes etablie en France, j'ai du correspondre par tous mes moyens a leurs voeux. En consequence, j'ai fait choix de Monsieur Arsenios, archimandrite grec, digne pasteur de ce culte, qui reunit dans son etat toutes les qualites propres au maintien du pieux sentiment de nos nationaux...J'ai loue a la rue Saint-Savournin une maison qui remplira leurs besoins..."* (A.D., 128 V 1).

Despite the Prefect's favorable reports about the increasing number of Greek merchants in the city and "*la liberte des cultes*" in France, the government refused even to tolerate the small house out of the city "*tout a fait en dehors de la garantie du consul et de sa responsabilite personnelle.* (A.N., F 19 10.933, 6 June 1821)<sup>6</sup> But it seems that the local authorities had their way to run "local" matters: the Mayor in accordance with the Prefect came to an understanding with the consul to tolerate the existence of the Greek Orthodox chapel without "disturbing" the Minister.<sup>7</sup> Thus the Greeks, although bound to maintain the private character of their celebrations, definitely established the Orthodox Church in the city.

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[6]. In a first answer to the Prefect's request, the government had

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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Under these circumstances, the financing, administration and building of the Orthodox Church was totally controlled by wealthy merchants. In many respects, the Church became the main organisation of the Greeks in Marseille and substituted the Community; the emotional appeal of Greek Orthodoxy strengthened Greek ethnic consciousness and enhanced the cohesion of the group in the first period of its establishment.

In the first statute of 1820 the leaders of six commercial firms decided the administrative and financial obligations of each member.<sup>8</sup> The Church was run by all the constitutional members, that is every individual who had confirmed and signed the statute; it was agreed that they would offer 300 francs each every year, for the three years to come plus 1 % on the value of their merchandise.<sup>9</sup> As general administrators were elected every year two candidates by the council of the constitutional members.

The flow of immigrants into Marseille as a result of the

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(...continued)

replied that for religions known in Europe but not accepted in France, were tolerant of a simple domestic chapel in the respective's consul residence (A.N., F 19 10.933, 8 May 1821); the rejection of 6 June 1821 was based on the argument that the new chapel was outside the consul's residence and financed by the Greek merchants.

[7]. A.D., 128 V 1, 23 November 1828.

[8]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 1 December 1820. It was signed by: ARGENTI et Cie, OMIROS Theodore, RAKOS Theodore, PRASSACACHI freres, CAPUDAS THEODOSIDI and PSICHA George.

[9]. The 1 % "Church's fee" as it was called, was also levied in the communities of Livorno, Vienna, Venice and Trieste; see O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] v.I, p.166-167.

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[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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vicissitudes of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and the wave of Philhellenism in Europe, was a significant turning point in the Church's effort to strengthen its influence.

Although the history of Philhellenism in France and in Marseille is well known,<sup>10</sup> some points are worth recounting. On 29 April 1825 a fund was started in the city for the establishment of "*une Association en faveur des Grecs a l'image de celle de Paris*"; ten out of twenty members of the committee were marseillais merchants and four out of twenty were Greeks: the merchants Homere, Petrocochino and Racke and the archimandrite Arsenios. At the same year George Zizinia, a merchant known for his economic activities in Egypt and his personal relations with its ruler, started to construct two warships (one in Marseille and the other in La Ciotat) for Muhammad Ali which were supposed to be used against those Greeks in revolt. Then a paradoxical dispute emerged between two tendencies where the progressive was represented by the Church in tune with the Philhellenes "*les plus convaincus*" and the conservative by the Greek merchants. In a letter to the Prefect, the Mayor reported:

*"On dit que les sieurs Zizinia freres, negociants demeurant 29, allees des Capucines, Grecs de nation, sont charges de faire construire en ce port un ou deux batiments de guerre, pour compte du pacha d'Egypte."*

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[10]. See P.Echinard [1973].

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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"L'archimandrite grec schismatique [Arsenios], ayant appris cela, fit dire aux sieurs Zizinia freres, qu'il ne pouvait plus les admettre dans l'eglise parce qu'ils trahissaient la cause des Grecs en servant la pacha d'Egypte; il fit plus: il le dit publiquement a l'eglise. Depuis ce moment, les autres Grecs schismatiques se sont abstenus de se presenter a leur eglise et l'archimandrite a eprouve de leur part tant de mauvaises manieres, qu'il a ete force de donner sa demission."

"Les membres du comite grec sont extremement faches de la conduite qu'ont tenue dans cette circonstance les Grecs de cette communion etablis dans la ville, et les liberaux crient partout contre ces derniers, en ajoutant contre eux toutes sortes d'epithetes injurieuses..." (A.D., 128 V 1, 12 novembre 1825).

What Arsenios sought was to challenge the merchants' hegemony over the Church and to acquire, at the same time, the status of the community's leader, religious as well as secular. By this public proclamation, he implied that the Church was better placed to preserve Greek ethnicity.<sup>11</sup> Although backed by the Philhellenes, by the revolutionaries, and by a large part of public opinion,<sup>12</sup> the archimandrite could not possibly win in the confrontation; the merchants had established and financially supported the Church. As a result, the conflict ended up with his resignation and with Zizinia's total reestablishment.

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[11]. The Orthodox Church's role in shaping Greek ethnicity abroad has

[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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Thus the merchants remained in a favourable position to control the Church. They replaced Arsenios with the Chian priest from Livorno Kalinikos Kreatzoulis who was also asked to teach ancient Greek to the community's children.<sup>13</sup> In August 1826, a Greek flag sent to Messolonghi's defenders was solemnly benedicted in the chapel of Saint-Savournin; it marked a period of reconciliation between the merchants and the Philhellenes.<sup>14</sup>

In 1834, the merchants decided to buy a piece of land of 280 m<sup>2</sup> - in the corner of *rue de la Rotonde* and *rue de la Grande-Armee* - in order to build a Church; it cost 8.000 francs which were divided in fortieths between eight owners:<sup>15</sup>

*Eml. Rodocanachi* for "*Rodocanachi fils et Cie*".....7/40"

*George Zizinia* for "*Zizinia freres*".....7/40"

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(...continued)

been noted recently; see A.Kitroeff [1989] p.156-157. The author underlines the ethnocentric dimension of Greek Orthodoxy where ethnic and religious sentiments converge, an aspect which has been overlooked by several Greek historians who were overwhelmed by the secular-religious differences in the 19th century.

[12]. In 30 May 1826 the journal *Le Globe* reported a part of an article published in another journal *l'Independant de Lyon*: "*Les journaux ont plusieurs fois parle du negociant qui fait construire a Marseille les vaisseaux pour le pacha d'Egypte. Ce negociant est natif de Chio; son nom est George Zizinia, fils de Meni. Lorsque le Capitan-Pacha arriva a Chio, le pere de Zizinia, qui etait un de ses amis, vint a bord pour lui demander sa protection. La grace que je t'accorde lui dit le Capitan-Pacha, c'est de mourir sur mon vaisseau et non a terre. En meme temps il le fit pendre a une vergue..* Then followed the complete text of the excommunication.

[13]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 15\27 November 1825.

[14]. P.Echinard [1973] p.280.

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[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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Auguste Ralli for "Ralli-Schilizzi et Argenti".....7/40°  
M.Petrocochino for "Petrocochino et Agelasto".....5/40°  
Ambroise Argenti for "Argenti et Cie".....5/40°  
Nicolas-Jean Mavrocordato.....3/40°  
Jean-Demetrius Mavrocordato.....4/40°  
Michel Dromocaiti.....2/40°

Then the 21 constitutional members<sup>16</sup> met to write a new statute and to discuss the building of an Orthodox Church; a first edifice was built in 1835 which was totally demolished in 1844 and a new one was built in 1845, direct ancestor of the present.<sup>17</sup>

Because of the lack of a Community organisation, and despite the "illegal" presence of the Orthodox Church, the merchants used the emotional appeal of Orthodoxy to strengthen Greek ethnic consciousness in the Catholic and cosmopolitan surroundings of France and managed to make it their main institution; the Church was not only financially dependent on the merchants, but priests were hired and discharged by them according to their decisions.


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[15]. A.D., 357 E, registre 296, 14 June 1834; registre 297, 21 October 1834.

[16]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 27 August 1836; the constitutional members were the following: Parascheva Sechiaris, A. Pignatellis, Io. Ballis, Zorzis Ziziniias, Mich. Petrocochinos, Manouil Rodocanachis, Mich. Agelastos, Stephanos Rodocanachis, Th. Rakos, Andreas Argentis, Auguste Rallis, P.Z. Vlastos, Zorzis D. Ziziniias, Ioannis Baltazis, N.Ioannou Mavrocordatos, K.N. Varsamis, M. Dromocaitis, Zorzis Petrocochinos, I.D. Mavrocordatos, Georgios Grimanelis.

[17]. Arch.Orth.Church, paper dated 10 July 1834; devis de construction 7/5/1844.

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[Establishment in the city: Greek merchants, the Orthodox Church]

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Meanwhile, the number of the Greek population increased and as did the Church's role in communal life. In a reponse to a Mayor's letter about the number of Greeks established in the city, the committee estimated that "*le nombre de nos nationaux qui habitent la Commune de Marseille est d'environ Deux cents.*" <sup>18</sup> A meaningless number if one does not put it in a comparative perspective.

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[18]. Arch.Orth.Church, letter of 10 April 1844.

C H A P T E R T H R E E

ESTABLISHMENT IN THE CITY: DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS

*Marseille: features of urban growth*

Marseille experienced a prodigious urban transformation in the nineteenth century. Even though its population growth was by no means exceptional for a European city during this century, it was quite spectacular for a French city.<sup>1</sup> There is no doubt that in terms of elementary demography, Marseille in the middle of the nineteenth century was a very different city from Marseille under the Old Regime.

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[1]. See W.H.Sewell [1977] p.2. The author sustains that demographic history has shown that urbanization proceeded more slowly in France than in most other countries that industrialized in the nineteenth century.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.1 Nineteenth-century population of Marseille

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1800	1870	1900	Increase 1800-70 (%)	Increase 1800-1900 (%)
111,000	313,000	491,000	182	342

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Source: William H. Sewell, *Structure and mobility. The men and women of Marseille, 1820-1870*, 1977, 3.

Population growth far exceeded what demographers call a "natural increase": in the half-century following 1820, Marseille became a city of immigrants. William Sewell has shown that 94 per cent of Marseille's growth from 1821 to 1872 must be attributed to net immigration. It was only by attracting a large and continuing stream of immigrants that the city achieved its impressive growth in population.<sup>2</sup>

Underlying this migratory stream was the growth and transformation of the city's economy; a burgeoning of maritime trade, a restructuring of commercial institutions, and a local "industrial revolution". As a result, immigration varied considerably over time, following or

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[2]. See W.H.Sewell [1977] p.152. About migration in Marseille see also the collective four volume edition under the supervision of Emile Temime *Migrance* (Edisud); volumes 1 and 2 have been used here: P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] and R.Lopez-E.Temime [1990].

[*Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns*]

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preceeding the fluctuations of the economic transformation. The social composition of the immigrants varied as well, according to their place of origin, occupational background, the educational preparation and employment opportunities in Marseille. Despite the differences, immigrants in nineteenth century Marseille shared some common characteristics: first, they were surprisingly likely to be literate; second, a substantial proportion of immigration took place in family units, with the result that immigrants had kin living in the city, a local network on whom they could rely; third, they maintained extensive ties with their home places, and their immigrant communities in Marseille once they had arrived,<sup>3</sup> became, sometimes, parts of international networks: this is certainly the case with the Greek community.

*Foreign communities in Marseille: continuity and change*

Marseille's economic transformation was undoubtedly the major factor of mass immigration, but documentary evidence shows that there

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[3]. See W.H.Sewell [1977] p.211. Needless to say that none of these factors necessarily assured the success of the immigrants in the city. The only point made here is that the movement into Marseille generally took place by orderly and controlled processes and often did so within the context of mediating institutions.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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was no single cause behind such a multiple phenomenon. Migrants came from a variety of countries, therefore causes also differed in accordance with the conditions in each area during certain periods. Immigration had many phases.

On the other hand, the "constituents" of immigration appeared to be constant in their range and in their continuity. "Established" communities or communities "in transit", continued to have the same geographical origin as in the past;<sup>4</sup> geographical and historical restraints imposed permanences and maintained hierarchies.

A precise estimation of the respective number of the "established" communities, let alone the communities "in transit", is a difficult task.

For one thing, French censuses of the nineteenth century are quite disparate as far as the recording of foreign communities is concerned; in some of them small ethnic groups were underestimated, or other groups

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[4]. See R.Lopez-E.Temime [1989] v.2, p.29: "*Les 'gens du Nord', Allemands et Suisses, mais aussi Anglais, Belges, Hollandais et meme Scandinaves occupent une place importante dans les activites du commerce, mais ils sont deja presents a Marseille au XVIIe siecle. Juifs sepharades ou Armeniens ont rencontre sous l'Ancien Regime bien des difficultes pour s'installer a Marseille. Mais les mesures d'exclusion dont ils ont fait l'objet ont donne a leurs tentatives, meme infructueuses, un relief sans doute hors de proportion avec leur influence reelle. Grecs et 'Levantins', surtout venus apres la Revolution de 1789, se sont egalement heurtes a la mauvaise volonte du negoce marseillais, qui voyait en eux des concurrents redoutables. Mais, en 1830, ces interdits et ces reticences appartiennent au passe. Les diverses communautes d'origin mediterraneenne se renforcent a partir de ces noyaux anciens*".

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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not even identified.<sup>5</sup> For another, foreigners who obtained the French nationality, simply cannot be found.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, the information in the census of 1876, compared with that of 1851, provides a good general framework for further research.

Italians formed by far, the largest community in Marseille. In 1851 they numbered 16,000 individuals which represented 86 % of the foreigners established in the city, and 53,510 individuals in 1876, as we can see in Table 3.2, or the 91 % of foreigners.

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[5]. In the census of 1851, the Swiss were proved to be underestimated and other foreigners were recorded under the meaningless label "etranger". See R.Lopez-E.Temime [1989] v.2, p.35.

[6]. This is particularly true for the Greeks. See below.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.2 Foreign communities in Marseille (1876)

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Nationality	Population
Italian	53,510
Swiss	1,225
Spanish	955
German	472
Greek	394
English	309
Belgian	289
Austrian	163
Turk-Egyptian	140
American	129
Russian	126
Dutch	83
Asian	54
Portuguese	39
Norwegian-Swedish	30

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Source: Renee Lopez - Emile Temime, *Migrance: histoire des migrations a Marseille*, v.2, p.37, 1990.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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The other groups of "importance"<sup>7</sup>, Swiss, Spanish, Germans and Greeks, were recorded in both censuses; the only group appearing for the first time, in 1876, were the Austrians.

*The Demographic evolution of the Greek population*

The quantitative study of the Greek community shows clearly the difficulty of measuring an even relatively small number of people in the city. The Greek population is in fact constantly underestimated for various reasons, according to the period.

For the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the only quantitative source available is the *Statistique du Departement des Bouches-du-Rhone*, in four volumes, which covers the period 1821-1826, compiled by Villeneuve-Bargemont and his collaborators. This census underestimates by definition the number of the Greeks, because it only enumerates the refugees during the period under consideration, which is, actually, the period of the Greek War of Independence, therefore a period of persecution and immigration;<sup>8</sup> Greeks who normally established

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[7]. The active presence of these groups, in spite of their small number, has been emphasised by the authors of *Migrance* [1990] *op.cit.*, v.2, p.38.

[*Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns*]

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themselves in the city before this period, are not recorded. As a result, the totals given in table 3.3 concerning the period 1821-1825, show in reality, the increase of the Greek population in absolute figures.

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[8]. Informations about the Greeks are found, in particular, in *Tableau D, N° 27, tome III, "Etrangers refugies a Marseille a differentes epoques"*, published in 1826.

At the same period, the Greek community of Trieste, received a considerable number of refugees from every insurgent area. See O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] v.I, p.332-367.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.3. Movement of the Greek Population in Marseille (1819-1900)  
Comparison with the Communities of Trieste and of London

Year	Births	Deaths	In/De	Arriv.	Depart.	Total	Trieste	London
1820-29	22	4	+18	156 (1821)		156* (1821)	1500 (1821)	
							3200 (1821)	
				138 (1823)				
				51 (1824)		294* (1824)	2550 (1824)	
						345* (1825)	2200 (1825)	
							2131 (1826)	
							2050 (1827)	
1830-39	26	13	+13				1700 (1830)	
							1485 (1831)	
							1363 (1832)	
1840-49	33	17	+16					167 (1841)
							1487 (1848)	
1850-59	24	20	+4					387 (1851)
1860-69	18	30	-12			303 (1861)		477 (1861)
1870-79	19	43	-24			394 (1876)		587 (1871)
1880-89	1	45	-44					470 (1881)
1890-99	5	32	-27			713*** (1890)		

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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(notes from the previous page)

Sources: Villeneuve - Bargemont, *Statistique des Bouches-du-Rhone*,  
v.3, 1826.

\*\* Renee Lopez - Emile Temime, *Migrance: histoire des  
migration a Marseille*, v.2, p.37, 1990.

\*\*\* *List of members of the Greek orthodox community in  
Marseille*, undated, presumed date 1890-1900 (in Greek).  
Arch.Orth.Ch., Registres des baptemes, mariages et  
sepultures.

P. Argenti, *Libro d'Oro de la Noblesse de Chio*,

J. Mathieu, *Marseille, statistique et histoire*, 1861.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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Assesing changes in demographic behaviour requires examination of rates, rather than absolute figures, for natural increase and migration. It is quite clear that the Greek population was of the "open" type: increase was due mainly to migration and not only to births, at least during the first four decades of the nineteenth century.

The number of Greeks in the census of 1876 is also underestimated because many of them had by then obtained French nationality.<sup>9</sup> This is, actually, confirmed by the *List of members of the Greek Orthodox community in Marseille*, a document discovered among others in the archives of the Orthodox church. Although the document is not dated, research led to an estimated chronology: the document must have been composed between 1890 and 1900. Considering that almost all Greeks, irrespective of their nationality, were recorded in this list, and that no rapid increase of migration is recorded between 1876 and 1890, we can safely infer that by the end of the nineteenth century, the real number of the Greeks in Marseille (those with foreign plus those with French nationality), was almost double that given in censuses.

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[9]. See below chapter five.

### *Nuptiality, Fertility and Mortality*

Vital records - records of marriages, births, and deaths - which are found in the archives of the Orthodox church in Marseille, proved to be more adequate than censuses to answer demographic questions.<sup>10</sup> They cover the nineteenth century and by modifying French practice somewhat to take account of their idiosyncracies lend themselves to family reconstitution, the method pioneered by Louis Henry in the 1950s, and advanced by the English demographers of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure.<sup>11</sup>

Information abstracted from the registers was transferred to Family Reconstitution Forms. We calculated the mean, median and mode age at first marriage, mean birth intervals and mean age of mother at birth of the last child, mean age of death and infant and child mortality.

Vital records of the Orthodox church were checked and completed with information found in P.P.Argenti's *Libro d'Oro de la Noblesse de Chio*, the genealogies of some families from the island of Chios,<sup>12</sup> and

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[10]. The Greek Orthodox church's registers have recently been exploited by historians as much as their quality has permitted. In general they are confined to the nineteenth century, and they are not as detailed in their recording as the French or English registers. But given the importance of the Orthodox church as a mediating institution of establishment in a foreign country, the registers of the Orthodox church in the Greek communities are relatively richer.

[11]. See M.Fleury-L.Henry [1956]; L.Henry [1970]; E.A.Wrigley (ed) [1966].

that found in notaries' archives of the Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone. Complementary information mainly concerns marriages of some families established in Marseille, but which did not take final residence there.

Even though a full reconstitution was possible only for a part of the community, family reconstitution permits, "*the detailed examination of idiosyncracies of particular communities, even individual families*".<sup>13</sup> The figures obtained must be used with caution, however, because the total number in our sample is rather small.

a) *Nuptiality*

The level of nuptiality in a population is influenced both by age at marriage and by the proportion of individuals who never marry. Family reconstitution here, yields no information on the latter subject, because in the archives of the Orthodox church, age and marital status at death are not included in the burial register, a necessary element for the approximate measure of the proportion of women who

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[12]. These genealogical trees were published in 1955, by P.Argenti, a descendant of these families. They remain controversial as evidence of the existence of a Chian aristocracy as a result of the islands's occupations by the Genoans (1346-1555), but the information contained therein has been verified by Greek historians.

[13]. E.A.Wrigley-R.S.Schofield, "English population history from family Reconstitution: summary results, 1600-1799", in *Population Studies*, 37 [1983] p.183.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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never marry.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.4 Marriages of the Greeks in Marseille (1820-1919)

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Year	Marriages between Coreligionists	Mixed Marriages	Total
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1820 - 1824

1825 - 1829            1

1830 - 1834            4

1835 - 1839            3

1840 - 1844            2

1845 - 1849            5

1850 - 1854            6

1855 - 1859            3

1860 - 1864            7

1865 - 1869            8

1870 - 1874            7                    3

1875 - 1879            5                    1

1880 - 1884            3                    3

1885 - 1889            -                    -

1890 - 1894            1                    -

1895 - 1899            -                    2

1900 - 1904            3                    2

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.4 Marriages of the Greeks in Marseille (1820-1919)

(continued)

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Year	Marriages between Coreligionists	Mixed Marriages	Total
1905 - 1909	-	-	
1910 - 1914	-	1	
1915 - 1919	-	1	
Total	58	13	71

---

Table 3.5 shows the changes in mean ages at first marriage for men and women which took place in the three successive periods of the nineteenth century. The overall pattern is straightforward and very similar to those observed in the communities of Trieste, Vienna and London<sup>14</sup>:

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[14]. In the community of London during the period 1837-1881, the mean age at first marriage of women was 21.1 years and that of men 30.4. See D.Magriotis, "The demographic history of the Greek community in London, 1837-1881" in *Ta Historica*, v.3, [December 1986] p.357, (in Greek). In the community of Vienna in 1857, the difference between mean ages at marriage of brides and grooms was 13.6 years and in the community of Trieste in 1826 the same difference was 11.8 years. For the community of

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

delayed age of marriage for men and early age of marriage for women which results in a considerable difference between the respective mean ages at marriage of brides and grooms. This difference diminished steadily over time from 11.9 years during the 1800-1829 period to 7.3 years during the 1860-1889 period, since there was a tendency for the mean age at marriage of men to fall and that of women to rise.

Table 3.5 Mean age at first marriage

Year	Men		Women	
		N (of All)		N (of All)
1800-1829	30.7	7	18.8	7
1830-1859	31	33	20.3	33
1860-1889	28.9	46	21.6	47
1800-1889	29.9	86	20.7	87

(...continued)

Vienna see P.Schmidtbauer, "Zur Familienstruktur des Griechen in Wien", *Wiener Geschichtsblaetter*, jahrgang 35, [1980] p.155; for the community of Trieste see, O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] v.1, p.80.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

(continued)

Difference between mean ages at marriage of brides and grooms

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1800-1829	11.9
1830-1859	10.7
1860-1889	7.3

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1800-1889	9.2
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Changes in mean ages at marriage

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	Men	Women
Year		
From 1800-29 to 1830-59	+0.3	+1.5
From 1830-59 to 1860-89	-2.1	+1.3
From 1800-29 to 1860-89	-1.8	+2.8

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Changes in the median age at first marriage for both genders are much more dramatic than changes in the mean, being less dramatic in

[Chapter 3]



women's case; the modal age changed also over time.<sup>15</sup>

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[15]. The mode was calculated here from the mean and median using Tippet's formula, Mean-Mode = 3(Mean-Median). See L.H.C.Tippet [1952] p.35.

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Table 3.6 Age at First Marriage

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Men

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	No.	Mean	Median	Mode
1800 - 1829	7	30.7	32.2	35.2
1830 - 1859	33	31	30.2	28.6
1860 - 1889	46	28.9	27.2	23.4

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Women

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1800 - 1829	7	18.8	17.5	14.9
1830 - 1859	33	20.3	19.8	18.8
1860 - 1889	47	21.6	20.9	19.5

---

The contrast between different periods is well revealed in table 3.7, showing the percentage of old and young brides at different periods. The percentage of teenage brides changed dramatically between 1800-1829 to 1830-1859; while on the other hand the percentage of brides above 30 increased considerably at the end of the century.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.7 Women at first Marriage

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	-19		30+		40+	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1800-1829	5	71.4	0		0	
1830-1859	13	39.3	0		0	
1860-1889	15	31.9	2	4.2	0	

---

To complete this discussion of the main characteristics of first marriages table 3.8 presents the proportionate distribution of marriages by combining the ages of groom and bride. A line surrounds the contiguous values which collectively represent over 50 per cent of all first marriages, in order to show the change in marriage patterns that lay behind the tables previously presented. In 1800-1829 the combined values are found in the top right hand part of the table, which contains the higher ages for men and the lower ages for women. Already in 1830-1859, the combined values are moved to the centre, which confirms the aforementioned tendency for a fall in the mean age at marriage of men and a rise in the mean age at marriage of women. Moreover, during this

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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period the cell with the maximum frequency was that for marriages between men aged 30-34 and women aged 20-24, which comprised 24 per cent of all marriages. By 1860-1889 the combined values are also found in the centre but the most "popular" cell is moved to the left and comprises marriages between younger men aged 25-29 and women aged 20-24, which represent 30 per cent of all marriages.

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.8 Age at marriage combinations where both partners married  
for first time

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Groom

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	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-40	Over 40	All
-----							
1800-1829							
	15-19	2	2			4	
	20-24		2			2	
Bride	25-29						
	30-34						
	35-39						
	Over 40						
	All	2	2	2			6

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

(continued)

1830-1859

	15-19	1	4	5	3	13
	20-24		7	8	4	19
<b>Bride</b>	25-29			1		1
	30-34					
	35-39					
	Over 40					
	All	1	11	14	7	33

1860-1889

	15-19	6	5	3	1	15
	20-24	2	14	5	2	25
<b>Bride</b>	25-29	1	1	1	2	5
	30-34			1		1
	35-39					
	Over 40					
	All	9	20	10	5	46

b) Fertility

The examination of mean birth intervals and the mean age of mother at birth of last child can throw much light on the question of family limitation. According to Wrigley,<sup>16</sup> a tell-tale sign of a community beginning to practice family limitation is the marked rise in the mean interval between the penultimate and last births. It rises in these circumstances because even after reaching an intended final family size, additions are nevertheless occasionally made either by accident (failure of whatever system of contraception is in use), by a reversal of an earlier decision not to increase family size, or by a desire to replace a child whom has died.

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[16]. E.A.Wrigley [1966] p.94; see also Henry, *Anciennes familles genevoises*, esp. pp. 93-110.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.9 Mean Birth Intervals (in months)

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1800-1919

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	Women married at 15-19	Women married at 20-24	All Women
0 - 1	16.4 (17)	25.1 (26)	21.7 (43)
1 - 2	24.3 (18)	27 (24)	26.1 (42)
2 - 3	27.7 (18)	30.1 (19)	28.9 (37)
3 - 4	34.7 (18)	43.6 (11)	37.8 (29)
Last	44.2 (14)	31.4 (9)	39 (25)

---

Note: In parentheses the number of birth intervals from which the mean was calculated is given.

Table 3.9 shows the mean birth intervals 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 and penultimate to last of completed families<sup>17</sup> of four or more children in 1800-1919. The last birth interval is not abnormally long - given that older women are less fecund anyway -, which suggests that women had not been practising birth control; on the other hand, the mean age of mother at birth of the last child in table 3.10<sup>18</sup>, indicates the beginnings of control at the end of century. It seems that this was most evident among

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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women who married young and had several children well before the end of their fertile period. In Marseille the mean age of mother at birth of the last child was around 33 years; in the Greek community of London it was 33 years and 11 months for almost the same period.

Table 3.10 Mean Age of Mother at Birth of Last Child  
(Completed families only)

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Age at marriage	
Under 30	
1800 - 1829	33.5 (201)
1830 - 1859	33.5 (771)
1860 - 1889	29.5 (503)

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Note: In parentheses the numbers on which averages are based are shown.

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[17]. A completed family is one in which the woman has reached the age of 45 in marriage and would therefore in almost all cases have completed her child-bearing. See E.A.Wrigley, "Family limitation in pre-industrial England", *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 19[1966] p.92.

[18]. Another sign of family limitation is a fall in the age at which women bear their last child. This is likely to happen for the same reasons which tend to produce a long final birth interval.

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c) Mortality

We turn finally to mortality. Reconstitution data can usually yield valuable estimates of adult mortality if compared with A.J.Coale and P.Demeny life tables;<sup>19</sup> given that Greece is not included to any of these models, a high level of statistical techniques would be required in order to reach a satisfactory level of comparative data. We concentrate here upon a brief presentation of data.

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[19]. A.J.Coale - P.Demeny [1983].

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.11 Number of Deaths by Age and by Gender (1819-1900)

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Men

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	0-12	1-4	4-20	20-40	40-65	65+	Total
1819-29						1	1
1830-34	1		1	1			3
1835-39	1			2		1	4
1840-44	1	3		1		1	6
1845-49			1				1
1850-54		2		2	2	1	7
1855-59	1		2		1	1	5
1860-64	1			2	4	2	9
1865-69		1	1	1	2	1	6
1870-74			1	1	3	2	7
1875-79				3	4	8	15
1880-84			1	1	4	8	14
1885-89	1			4	3	5	13
1890-94				3	5	5	13
1895-1900				1	3	2	6
Total	6	6	7	22	31	38	110

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

(continued)

Women

	0-12	1-4	4-20	20-40	40-65	65+	Total
1819-29	3		1				4
1830-34							
1835-39				1	1		2
1840-44		1	2				3
1845-49			3		2	1	6
1850-54			2			1	3
1855-59							
1860-64	1	1		1	1	2	6
1865-69		2			1	2	5
1870-74				2		2	4
1875-79		1	2	1	2	2	8
1880-84	1				8	4	13
1885-89						2	2
1890-94			3		1	5	9
1895-1900				1	2		3
Total	5	5	13	6	18	21	68

[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

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The danger of an infants's death is bigger during the first months and, in particular, during the 30 first days of life; these deceases were not very often recorded even in the nineteenth century, given that infants had not been baptized.<sup>20</sup> In the Greek community infants' deceases were not satisfactorily recorded and correspond to 40% of females'deceases and to 28.2% of males's deseases; if that were the case, with 19th century mortality, there would be on average about 3.5 deaths a year per 100 polulation and 15 % or more of all deaths would be in the first year of life.

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[20]. See among others R.S.Schofield - B.M.Berry "Age at baptism in pre-industrial England" *Polulation Studies* 25, 1971.

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

Table 3.12 Number of Infants' Deaths by Age (months) and by Gender  
(1819-1900)

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Months	0-1	1	2	3	4-6	7-9	10-12	Total
Males	2			1	2		2	7
Females	2				1	1	1	5
Total	4			1	3	1	3	12

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Table 3.13 Number of Children' Deaths by Age and by Gender (1819-1900)

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Years	0-1	1-4	5-9	10-14	Total
Males	7	5	2	1	15
Females	5	5	7	2	19
Total	12	10	9	3	34

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[Establishment in the city: Development and Demographic Patterns]

The mean age of death shown in Table 3.14, was, 54,4 for men and 60,5 for women during the whole period under consideration. The respective rates in the Greek community of London were 66 for men and 63,8 for women<sup>21</sup> which was the result of the high rate of maternal mortality. Given the fact that the community was an elite one, the mean age of men's death was unexpectedly low, while the mean age of women's death was quite normal.

Table 3.14 Mean Age of Death (1830-1900)

Year	Men		Women	
	Mean	N (of all)	Mean	N (of all)
1830-1859	41	16	58	7
1860-1879	56.6	33	61	16
1880-1900	57.6	45	60.8	26
1830-1900	54.4	94	60.5	49

[21]. D.Mangriotis "I dimographiki istoria tis ellinikis emporikis paroikias tou Londinou, 1837-1881", *Historica*, p.362, 6, December 1986.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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**PART TWO: BUSINESS AND BUSINESSMEN: CONDITIONS, MEANS AND STRATEGIES**

Despite the unprecedent industrial development of Marseille's economy, in the nineteenth-century, the dominant force of its expansion continued to be maritime commerce but organised in a vastly different way. The Greeks, given that their main activity was the import-export commerce between Marseille and the Levant, tried to exploit the new opportunities and to organize a mediterranean network having the city as a base of operation.

Under these conditions, we analyse the terms and the limits of their business through the existing means and the strategies employed. As the economy changed, chapter four is concerned with the analysis of the Greeks' main professions in comparison with the occupational structure of the city; it is concluded that the absolute majority were merchants. Then, merchants are examined in the core of their activities, the commercial firm. Once the organization of business is analysed, chapters six, seven and eight which follow, examine the three areas in which the Greeks had gained some prominence: the import-export trade,

[A dominant group of merchants]

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shipping and banking.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### A DOMINANT GROUP OF MERCHANTS

The core of the initial settlement of Greeks in Marseille was formed by two groups of people: those from the military who had fought with the French army and small or medium-scale merchants who received occasionally some cargoes of wheat and other staples from the Levant, every time a Hydriot or a Spetziot captain managed to break Marseille's blockade. The economic misery of the former after the fall of Napoleon and the restricted capital of the latter under a regime with strong monopolistic tendencies, led to stagnation of the small Greek community formed during the Consulat and the Empire. The funeral of Colonel Nicolas Papas Oglou on 3 October 1819<sup>1</sup>, followed by the whole Greek community, - soldiers, sailors and merchants - , symbolised the end of a period marked by a great war and by extreme economic instability. The Greek soldier, loyal to Napoleon, mostly catholic, multi-cultural, and favorably predisposed to the French culture and way of life, was no

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[1]. E.C., deces le 3 octobre 1819, and Arch. de l'archeveche, registre des Chartreux, F<sup>o</sup> 11, 4/10/1819, inhumation au cimetiere Saint-Martin, cited by P.Echinard [1973] p. 76, fn.25.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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longer the characteristic figure in the Greek community. In peacetime business and businessmen were to prevail.

*Economic Structure and Main Occupations*

Nineteenth-century Marseille developed a fully diversified economy and became the economic capital of Mediterranean France. It was no more a mere commercial centre; it was also a centre of administration, industry and finance. The period from the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 to the fall of the Second Empire in 1870 was one of unprecedented growth, coupled with a fundamental transformation of the city's economic structure. Both industry and commerce played their parts in the expansion of the economy. But for all the dynamism of the local industries - mechanization increased to the point that one can speak of a genuine "industrial revolution" -, the dominant force in the economy's expansion continued to be maritime commerce.<sup>2</sup> The transformation of Marseille's commercial life during the 1850's and especially during the 1860's amounted to a commercial revolution as far-reaching as the industrial; and it resulted in a vastly different organization of commerce. The three major changes were the construction of the new docks; the creation of new steamship lines; and the formation of a new

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[2]. See P.Masson [1926] vol.9, pp.36,54,72,75.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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banking structure. W.Sewell describes the change eloquently: "although small groups of merchants, ship captains, and capitalists still pooled their resources to finance single voyages of sail-powered ships, cargoes were increasingly carried in steamships owned and financed by large shipping lines. When cargoes arrived in Marseille, whether in sail-powered or steam-powered vessels, they were unloaded by workers supervised by the *Compagnie des Docks*, not workers hired by the merchants and supervised by the longshoremen's society. And when a merchant needed credit to see a commercial transaction through to its completion, he would now be more likely to turn to a large joint-stock bank than to a *disposeur* - a fellow-merchant turned banker".<sup>3</sup>

As the economy changed, so did the occupational structure mostly in accordance with industrialization. The proportion of the working population engaged in artisan industry and agriculture declined, whilst the proportion engaged in unskilled and semiskilled factory trades, services trades, and clerical occupations, rose. However, as Sewell claims, unless the size and content of occupational categories and the extent and rhythms of change can be specified precisely, such unexceptional statements are not very informative.<sup>4</sup> The task of this chapter is, precisely, to define the occupations of the Greeks in Marseille during the period of economic change; "*voir si le*

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[3]. W.H.Sewell [1977] p.42.

[4]. W.H.Sewell [1977] p.44.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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*developpement du capitalisme est du meme ordre que celui des hommes*", as Carriere put it.<sup>5</sup>

The chapter that follows is based primarily on one source of quantifiable data and on qualitative data from various sources. Quantitative information is computed from the *Guide Marseillais* and *Indicateur Marseillais* of 1835-36, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1890. Qualitative information comes from the *Naturalisations* (naturalizations), the *Successions* (successions), the *Actes de societes* (constitution of a commercial entreprise) and a sample of notarial acts. None of these sources yields an entirely accurate estimate of the Greeks' occupational distribution. The basic problem with the *Guides Marseillais* is that they overrepresent what are conventionally called nonmanual or white-collar occupations and they underrepresent manual, or blue-collar, or working-class occupations. Eventhough the *Guide Marseillais*, was advertised as "a veritable *Indicateur Marseillais*", with information about the occupations of "*toutes les classes*", it left out a significant number of small artisans and the part of the Greek population whose work was not publicised like service workers, maritime workers and unskilled workers. On the other hand, the *listes nominatives* of the censuses which are, in principle, a complete count of the population, are not worth using: before 1851 the census takers did not indicate occupations; and when they did, in 1866 and 1872, their *listes*

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[5]. C.Carriere [1973] p.263.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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*nominatives* have not been preserved. Exact occupational figures, therefore, cannot be obtained. But with the figures at hand it is possible to provide some acceptable approximations. Qualitative data confirm the hypothesis that, even if the initial small group of merchants became diversified in its occupations, the Greeks never occupied all the rungs of the marseillais social ladder.

The occupations of the Greek population have been divided into five categories in accordance with the classification adopted by W.Sewell, based on the type of work performed:<sup>6</sup> 1.businessmen and professionals, 2.rentiers, 3.sales and clerical employees, 4.small businessmen, and 5.artisans. The contents of these categories are discussed in Appendix A and a complete list of the occupational titles included in each category is given in Appendix B.

The general outlines of the occupational structure of the Greek community, as it is presented in the three tables is clear. In the first place, it was predominantly an elite community. Of the elite occupations, a clear majority were merchants and of them a considerable number became rentiers. The second important category was what is conventionally called nonmanual, that of small business.

The trends in the occupational structure were characterised by changes with "traditional" and "modern" elements: while in Marseille, from the midcentury to 1870, there was a drop in the proportion of rentiers

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[6]. W.H.Sewell [1977] p.45.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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and an accelerated decline in the proportion of artisans, in the Greek community a sharp rise was observed in the proportion of rentiers and a presumed rise in the proportion of artisans (since there were not any data before 1880);<sup>7</sup> on the other hand, during the same important period, there was a continued rise in the proportion of sales and clerical employees and a substantial rise in small service business, in tune with Marseille's "commercial revolution".

The nature and timing of changes can be discerned more clearly when the larger occupational categories are divided into their component parts. This is done in Table 4.3.

The elite: The composition of the Greek elite was stable, with a constant tendency, from 1850 and on, to decline. Merchants and rentiers were the dominant groups with other business occupations of intermediate level but considerable importance; these two groups were inversely proportionate which underlines their interaction. After the Second Empire on, various members of the trading families continued as partners, but showed a strong propensity to early retirement to landed estate. This tendency was mainly due to big changes in the organization of trade in Marseille and in the Levantine markets and the response to

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[7]. Nevertheless, Sewell noted that even if the decline of artisans was important, artisans remained the dominant element of the working-class population and by far the largest single occupational group in the city. Thus, the rise in the proportion of Greek artisans at the two last decades of the century was not an exceptional element in Marseille's occupational structure.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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these changes by the Greeks according to business precepts.

As we have seen, the composition of Marseille's business community was changed by the emergence of new forms of commercial organization and, therefore, became more differentiated. Figures on other business occupations, which included mainly brokers and agents of various kinds inserted between captains and merchants, underline the importance of the commercial revolution that took place during the Second Empire.

All the same, the rise in the number of professionals bears out the "modern" elements of the Greek elite.

Finally, the commercial revolution influenced the occupational structure of the Greek elite, but the response to this change was differentiated from the general trends of Marseille's elite, according to the mentalities of the Greek businessmen and the means at their disposal.

**Sales and clerical employees:** The commercial revolution of the 1850's and 1860's also had an impact on the proportion of sales and clerical employees; there was an increase in the category as a whole, but the main rise was confined to the private sector, where the proliferation of large-scale enterprises meant the employment of an increasing number of clerks. The employment of Greeks in the public sector was, on the other hand, rather rare and came about only at the end of the century.

**Small businessmen:** The small-business category as a whole made up

[A dominant group of merchants]

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an important proportion of the Greek community. But there were some changes in its components: the proportion of small-scale entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector fell constantly (except for a small increase at the end of the century); the proportion of retail shopkeepers remained essentially constant between 1850 and 1870; partially compensating for the relative decline of small manufacturers was an increase of proprietors of service firms. As Marseille's population became wealthier and more mobile, demand for the services of hotels, restaurants, cafes and the like increased, and so did the number of proprietors.

Artisans: The limited number of cases does not permit certain conclusions. Nevertheless, from the sort of sources used, we infer that Greek artisans were self-employed proprietors and not wage earners, and that, except the fact that they were skilled craftsmen, they covered the same demand for services as the small businessmen in the service sector.

[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.1. Occupations of the Greeks in Marseille, 1835-1890

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Occupational

category	1835-36	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	Total
1. Business and professional	14	19	37	47	64	58	46	285
2. Rentier	1	1	5	6	22	19	26	80
3. Sales and clerical	-	-	2	3	6	6	6	23
4. Small business	3	2	4	3	10	7	11	39
5. Artisan	-	-	-	-	-	2	6	9
Total	18	22	48	59	102	92	95	436

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[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.2. Occupational structure of the Greek community in Marseille,  
1835-1890 (in percent)

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Occupational

category	1835-36	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890
1. Business and professional	77.7	86.3	77	79.6	62.7	63	48.4
2. Rentier	5.5	4.5	10.4	10.1	21.5	20.6	27.3
3. Sales and clerical	-	-	4.1	5	5.8	6.5	6.3
4. Small business	16.6	9	8.3	5	9.8	7.6	11.5
5. Artisan	-	-	-	-	-	2.1	6.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of cases	18	22	48	59	102	92	95

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[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.3. Occupational structure, subcategories (in percent)

Occupation	1835-36	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890
Merchant	72.2	68.1	58.3	66.1	49	46.7	30.5
Ship captain				1.6	0.9		
Other business		18.1	18.75	8.4	10.7	14.1	12.6
Professional	5.5				1.9	2.1	5.2
Rentier	5.5	4.5	10.4	10.1	21.5	20.6	27.3
Total elite	83.3	90.9	87.5	86.4	84.3	83.6	75.7
State employee						1	2.1
Private employee			4.1	5	5.8	5.4	4.2
Total sales and clerical			4.1	5	5.8	6.5	6.3
Industry	5.5	4.5	4.1	3.3	1.9	1	3.1
Commerce	11.1	4.5	2		2.9	2.1	8.4
Service			2	1.6	4.9	4.3	
Total sm.bus.16,6		9	8.3	5	9.8	7.6	11.5
Building-trades workers						1	
Small craft workers						1	6
Total artisan						2.1	6.3

[A dominant group of merchants]

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*The Group of Merchants: Socio-professional profile*

Definitions

From the end of the eighteenth century, the golden age of merchants, to the beginning of the twentieth century, the age of bankers and shipowners, there was a period of transition and transformation in Marseille's commercial life. Although merchants maintained their economic and social power throughout the nineteenth century - in Marseille more than in the rest of France<sup>8</sup> - they saw their sphere narrowed to specifically commercial operations as their functions of bankers or shipowners were taken over by specialized institutions. It is not by chance that in Littre's dictionary of 1859, under the terms "commerce, negoce, trafic" we read: "*Negoce, plus restreint, designe specialement l'exercice du commerce; aussi l'usage emploie-t-il negociant, de preference a commercant quand on parle de celui qui exerce un negoce particulier..., un negociant en vin.*"<sup>9</sup> This semantic evolution reveals a profound transformation: it mirrors, somehow, an economic change. Thus the denomination "negociant" did not, anymore, denote the same reality.

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[8]. See Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.251.

[9]. Littre [1859] referred by Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.252.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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Does this evolution hold true as far as the Greek merchants are concerned? Our main sources do not shed light on this matter, since during the whole period under consideration, they made use of the umbrella term "negociant" without any further specification. Unless an extensive use of qualitative data<sup>10</sup> concerning the "bread and butter" of their activities was employed, we could not identify the occupational and social profile of the merchants themselves.

The main activity of the Greek merchants was the import-export commerce between Marseille and its usual Eastern Mediterranean partners. Given the lack of banking institutions in the Ottoman Empire and the absence of a merchant marine, merchants were left to supply markets with specie and promissory notes and to develop their own merchant marine; for the needs of this trade, Greeks maintained their "polyvalence"<sup>11</sup> as long as they could and they employed part of their capital in chartering and buying ships, in banking, and finance.

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[10]. Such as *Naturalisations, Enregistrements de sociétés commerciales, Inventaires après décès, Bilans de faillites* and the commercial correspondence between the merchant Michel Petrocochinos established in Marseille and his eldest son Dimitrios sent to the Levant as a correspondent.

[11]. "...Ce qui le caractérise, c'est l'extrême polyvalence de son activité, aussi bien pour la nature des produits traités que celle des opérations qu'il conduit. Toutes les spéculations sont besogne de négociant, simultanément et successivement. Il s'attache tout à la fois aux transactions sur les marchandises (en commission ou en compte propre), à l'armement, à l'assurance maritime et à la banque;". Ch.Carrière [1973] vol.I, p.244. In fact, the Greek merchant of the nineteenth century imitated his French "fellow merchant" of the eighteenth century.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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The very next question is twofold and concerns the business community as a whole: how many of the allegedly designated "negociants" really were merchants and how was the business community protected by what was called the "usurpations de negoce".<sup>12</sup> Petrocochino's letters will serve as an apt illustration of this question.

"...With the next steamboat I send you two letters; the one is from Ioanni Boukra and Co and the other from Spyridon Damiano, both credit-worthy,..you can credit them 4.000 francs each because Scouloudi lend them without any mortgage 5.000 to 6.000 drachmas...";

"...I never accept Couzounieri's signature or other merchants' signature who I am not acquainted with in Marseille, do not worry...";

"...Les vendeurs sont G.Marcella & A.Vestarki, il n'y a aucune crainte pour leur solidite..."

"...Stavri est un tres brave homme; je le connais bien et il n'y a aucune crainte pour les f. 3.000 d'anticipations que je lui ai donnees...".<sup>13</sup>

It is clear that the young merchant Dimitrios - he established

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[12]. "A quel moment cesse-t-on d'etre marchand pour devenir negociant? On ne peut l'indiquer; le titre attribue dans un document n'est pas suffisant car les "usurpations de negoce" sont tres frequentes." Ch.Carriere [1973] vol.I, p.254.

[13]. Petrocochino's Private Archive, from now on P.A., Athens, 10 July 1843; Smyrna, 29 January 1844; Smyrna, 9 March 1844; Smyrna, 26 December 1844. The letters cover the period 1842-1854 and number over two hundred; they are long, often running to four or five pages and only Dimitrios' letters have been preserved. The original languages were Greek (translated in English) and French.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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himself in Smyrna as soon as he got his baccalaureat -, was familiar with this informal "who's who" evaluation system which was employed by the business community; he increasingly evaluated other merchants according to their fortune, prompt payments and integrity because credit was given or obtained *intuitu personae*; and this personal consideration was above all a consideration of one's fortune. Undoubtedly, there were always some merchants of inferior means and character, but contemporaries were rarely deceived for long:

"...Thomas is the best bridegroom that we could find...he is an intelligent young man, educated, with principles and capital, not like Couvela and Apalyra,.. peasants without any education, honesty or money, who were made merchants by you."<sup>14</sup>

In short, despite the changes that had meanwhile taken place in business practices, the occupational identity of the Greek merchant remained for a long time indistinguishable from that of banker or shipowner; and although cargoes were increasingly carried in steamships owned and financed by large shipping lines or credit was obtained by big joint-stock banks, small groups of Greek merchants, ship-captains and capitalists continued to pool their resources to finance single voyages of sailing ships or to turn to a fellow merchant turned banker every time they needed credit for a commercial transaction; bound as he

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[14]. P.A., Smyrna, 9 December 1843.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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was by dependency ties of credit and debit, the Greek merchant was, nevertheless, protected by an informal "who's who" which constituted an important asset transmitted from one generation to another.

### Figures

#### a) Sources and problems

A good definition combined with a systematic quantitative evidence, usually permits an accurate estimate; in fact, with the sources at hand, some basic problems had to be resolved.

To begin with, that of the upper and the lower "limit" of this socio-professional group; a legal criterion that would denote merchants artificially but without any ambiguity could not be used. Besides, already in the eighteenth century, *"ce groupe social ne faisait pas partie des corporations; il ne formait pas un ordre dont les reunions ou divers recensements etabliraient l'importance".*<sup>15</sup>

Another problem, closely related to the first, concerns the retirement on savings or on inheritance of the "notables", that is of the wealthiest merchants. It is already noted that after the Second Empire, a pattern had been established: Greek merchants became and

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[15]. Ch.Carriere [1973] vol.I, pp.252-253.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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declared themselves as rentiers; that is, men who lived on their investments and did not work for a living at all;<sup>16</sup> some were also conferred a title and lived as lavishly and tastefully as they could afford on their revenues.<sup>17</sup> Are they supposed to be counted as merchants?

The last problem is inherent in the sort of sources used: none of these yield a complete count of merchants, for the simple reason that they indicate firms and not people. The number of merchants and the number of commercial firms rarely coincided; and the multiplication of "societes en commandite" (firms of limited partnership), make impossible the use of a coefficient.<sup>18</sup>

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[16]. It has been noted that "in most contemporary Western societies, the rentier is a rare social type, but not so in nineteenth-century France.....Although the nobility as a privileged order had disappeared in the French Revolution of 1789, the prestige associated with its lifestyle lingered on through the nineteenth century". P.W.Sewell [1977] pp.46-47. This statement has been fully developed by N.Elias [1939] chap.1. The author argues that the French nobility in contrast to the German one, had a tendency to assimilate, to "colonize" in a way, characteristics of other social groups. Thus, in the French Revolution the bourgeoisie broke the political structure of the Old Regime but not the unity of the traditional social behaviour.

[17]. The most known case is that of Zizinia brothers: "*Anoblis a Lucques et en Toscane, ils finiront plus tard comme riches esthetes et n'interviendront plus dans les affaires de banque..*". From Chr.Hadziiossif, *Banques grecques et banques europeennes au XIX siecle: le point de vue d'Alexandrie* in G.B.Dertilis (ed) [1988] p.162.

[18]. To refer to only two examples from the first period: the commercial firm "ARGENTI - RALLI" (1816-Febr.1820) was run by the merchants Pantaleon Argenti, Ambroise Argenti and Paraschewa Sechiari; "ARGENTI & Co" (1820-1841) was a collaboration of Jean and Eustratius Petrocochino, Michel and Jean Vuro, Leon, Nicolas and Pantaleon Argenti, Pantia and Auguste Ralli and Paraschewa Sechiari.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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b) Results

In view of these problems, it will come as no surprise that the results comprise some questionable choices.<sup>19</sup> However, familiarity with a certain "corpus" of qualitative information minimised the possibility of error.

Firms with the denomination "rentier" were counted as mercantile, because partners moved in and out of trade according to circumstances, individually or under the denomination of the firm. The tables indicate the numbers of commercial firms and not of merchants who, taken individually, were usually more numerous.

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[19]. For example, in the beginning of the research the firm "ROCCA" was included as Greek in our categories. In the course, we discovered that a certain number of "ROCCA" firms were Italians and French and only one firm with the denomination "ROCCAS" was Greek. Finally, we did not include it first because it was declared as "marchand" and secondly because we did not find any other information, either about the family or about the firm. At any case, such problems are quite common in studies concerning the Greeks abroad. For information only: "*La colonie dominante dans ce milieu des relations commerciales avec Constantinople est composee des Grecs...Ils sont nombreux et prosperes. Nous avons vu Zizinia...Et il n'est pas seul: il y a Altaras et Sciama, Rodocanachi...*". R.Pascal [1965] p.114; beyond any doubt Altaras and Sciama were of Jewish origin, born in the Levant.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.4. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1816-1835

1816	1825	1835-36
AMIRA Luc fils	ARGENTI Cie	AGELASTO Michel
ARGENTI RALLI	BADETTI Michel	ANASTAZIADI A.
BADETTI Bmi Cie	BALLI	ARGENTI Cie
CAPUDAS THEODOSIDI	CAPUDA Demetrius	BADETTI
HOMERIDI SCHILIZZI	PETROCOCHINO AGELASTO	BALLI
PARSALI LASCARIS	PIRGHOU LI A.-M.	BALTAZZI Jean
PETROCOCHINO VURO	PSICHA Georges-Jn.	BALTAZZI freres
PRASSACACHI freres	RACKE	CANADACHI
THESEE Nicolas	RODOCANACHI fils Cie	CHIAPPA freres
	SCHILIZZI P.-E. Cie	DROMOCAITI
	ZIZINIA freres	MAVROCORDATO J.-D.
		MAVROCOR. VARSAMI
		PETROCO. TEPEGLIOSI
		PETROCOCH. AGELAS.
		REGGIO Georges
		REGGIO Jn.-Bte.
		RODOCANACHI fils
		SCHILIZZI P. Cie
		VITALIS

[A dominant group of merchants]

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(...Continued)

Table 4.4. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1816-1835

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1816	1825	1835-36
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YGLESIS

ZIZINIA freres

[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.5. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1840-1860

1840	1850	1860
AGELASTO Michel	AGELASTO M.	AGELASTO fils
ANASTAZIADI A.	AGELASTO Michel	AGELASTO de PETR.AGEL.
ARGENTI Cie	APALYRA Jean	AGELOPOULO Mano
BADETTI Michel	ARGENTI SECHIARI Cie	AMBANOPOULO Cie
BADETTI	ARGENTI Auguste	ARGENTI SECHIARI Cie
BALTAZZI Jean jeune	ARGENTI Andre	ARGENTI Auguste
BALTAZZI freres	BADETTI Michel	ARGENTI Andre
CANADACHI	BADETTI fils	ARGENTI Marie
CHIAPPA Jh.	BADETTI Neveu	BADETTI fils
CORPI F-J-N DUHANY C.	BALLI Francois	BADETTI Neveux
DROMOCAITI	BALLI fils de Fr.	BADETTI de Bad.Neveux
MAVROCORDATO PIGNATELLI	BALTAZZI Cie	BALTAZZI Cie
MAVROCORDATO VARSAMI	BALTAZZI Jean	BALTAZZI Demetrius
PETROCOCHINO Michel	CHIAPPA Joseph	BALTAZZI Jean
RALLI SCHILIZZI ARGENTI	DURUTTI Justine	BALTAZZI Evangeli
REGGIO Georges	MAVRO neveu d'A.	CARISSI VRISACHI
REGGIO Jn.-Bte.	MELAS Constantin	CARISSI de Caris.Vris.
RODOCANACHI fils Cie	NICOLOPOULOS	CRISTODULO Emmanuel
SCHILIZZI P. Cie	PAPUDOF Const.Jean	DAMIANO (Mme)

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.5. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1840-1860

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1840	1850	1860
VLASTO P.-J.	PETROCOCHINO Michel	DROMOCAITI V.-M.
YGLESIS	PETROCOCHINO AGELAS	DROMOCAITI freres
ZIZINIA freres	PSICHIARI MAVROCORDAT	DROMOCAITI Nicolas
	PIGNATELLI Antoine	DROMOCAITI Georges
	RALLI SHIL.ARGENTI	MAVRO Cie
	RALLI Auguste	MAVROCORDATO S.-S.
	RALLI fils de Cons.	MAVROCORDATO Constantin
	REGGIO freres	MELAS freres
	REGGIO Nicolas	NEGREPONTE P.-A.
	REGGIO Georges	SCARAMANGA Pandias
	RODOCANACHI Etienne	PAPIOLAKIS G.
	RODOCANACHI fils	PAPUDOF Const.Jean
	RODOCANACHI Emman.	PAPUDOF Alex.
	RODOCANACHI Paul	PETROCOCHINO fils
	SECHIARI Georges	PETROCOCHINO Michel
	SPARTALI LASCARIDI	PETROCOCHINO Demetrius
	VLASTO Pierre-Jean	PETROCOCHINO Eustratio
	VULUCLAS Leonidas	PETROCOCHINO AGELASTO

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[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.5. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1840-1860

1840	1850	1860
	ZARIFI freres	PETROCOCHINO Georges
	ZIZINIA cousin	PSIACHI Miltiade
		PSYCHA A.
		PRASSACACHI Emmanuel
		RALLI SCHILIZZI ARGEN.
		RALLI Auguste
		RALLI Jn.-Constantin
		RALLI VLASTO Cie
		RALLI NEGREPONTE
		REGGIO fils
		REGGIO Nicolas
		REGGIO J.-B.
		RODOCANACHI P.et Th.
		RODOCANACHI Etienne
		RODOCANACHI (Widow)
		RODOCANACHI Paul
		RODOCANACHI Th.
		SCOULUDI Thomas

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.5. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille, (licensed) 1840-1860

1840	1850	1860
		SECHIARI Georges
		SECHIARI Etienne
		SPARTALI Cie
		SPARTALI (Widow)
		SCARAMANGA Pandias
		TAMVACO MICRULAC.MAVR.
		TZIGARAS Nicolas
		VACALOPOULO D.-S.
		VITALIS C.
		VLASTO (Widow)
		VRISACHI de Car.Vris.
		VOURO Cie
		VOURO Eustratio
		ZAFIROPULO ZARIFI
		ZAFIROPULO Etienne
		ZIZINIA freres
		ZIZINIA G.-D.
		ZYGOMALAS Michel

[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

1870	1880	1890
AGELASTO Pandia	AGELASTO et fils	AGELASTO Michel
AGELASTO fils	AGELASTO Demetr.	AGELASTO fils
AGELASTO Michel	AGELASTO (Widow)	AGELASTO (Widow)
AGELASTO Demostenes	AGELASTO Mich.-Pan	AMBANOPULOS C.
AMBANOPOULO Cie	AMBANOPULO Cie	AMBANOPULO Cie
ARGENTI SCHILIZZI Cie	ARGENTI P.-Leon.	AMBANOPULO G.-N.
ARGENTI Auguste	ARGENTI Auguste	AVIERINO (Widow)
ARGENTI Andre	AVIERINO P.	AXELOS Nikos
ARGENTI Leonidas	BALTAZZI Jean	BADETTI Edmond
BADETTI Neveux	BALTAZZI Georges	BADETTI G.
BADETTI Barthelemy	BADETTI Leon	BADETTI Henri
BADETTI Melchior	BADETTI Neveux	BADETTI fils
BADETTI Leon	BADETTI Melchior	BADETTI Melchior
BADETTI Jean-Baptiste	BADETTI Edmond	BADETTI Leon
BALTAZZI Jean	CALVOCORESSI Demet	BADETTI Jean
BASILY VALIERI Cie	CALVOCORES.FERRIER	BADETTI L.
BASILY D.-M.	CANAPA Edouard	CALVOCORESSI Spyridon
BASSILIADES Cie	CARACOSSI J.-B.	CALOUTAS Pantaleon
CALVOCORESSI M.-G.	CARAMANO Phocion	CANAPA Edouard

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

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1870	1880	1890
CALVOCORESSI D.-N.	CARISSI Demetrius	CARAMANO Phocion
CALVOCORESSI Antoine	CONDOSTAVLOS Othon	CARAMANO Demetrius
CANAKIS Vassilios	CATZIGRAS Cosmas	CARISSI (Widow)
CANAPA Charles	CRITOPULO Michel	CATZIGRAS Cosmas
CARACOUSI J.-B.	DROMOCAITI (Mme)	CHRYSSOS Demetrius
CARAMANO Phocion-G.	FRANGOPULO L.-A.	CONTIADES ATHANASSOPULOS
CARISSI Demetrius	GRIMANELLI Veuve	CONTIADES Xenophon
CATZIGRAS Cosmas	GRIMANIS Demosten.	COUNDOURIS Panaghi
CHRISTODULO Cie	INGLESSI Gerasimo	COUNDOURIS Agamemnon
CRITOPULO Michel	INGLESSI Pierre-P.	COUPPA Ant.-G.
DROMOCAITI (Widow)	IOANNIDES Georges	CRITOPULO Michel
DROMOCAITI Aristide	LASCARIDI Pierre	CHRISTOPHIDES Demetrius
DROMOCAITI Georges	LASCARIDI Aristide	FRANGOPULO L.A.
FRANGOPULO L.A.	LASCARIDI Pericles	GRIMANELLI (Widow)
INGLESSI P.-P.	MAVROCORDATO S.-S.	GRIMANELLI A.
LAZARAKI Cie	MAVROCORDATO D.	INGLESSI Gerassimo
LASCARIDI Pierre	MELAS Constantin	INGLESSI Pierre-P.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

1870	1880	1890
MAVROCORDATO SCARLATO	MICHELIS (Mme)	IOANNIDES Georges
MAVROCORDATO S.-S.	MICHELIS E.	LASCARIDI freres
MELAS freres	MICRULACHI E.	LASCARIDI Pericles
MELAS Constantin	MICRULACHI S.-E.	MAVRO (Widow)
MELAS Michel	NICOLAIDIS S.-N.	MAVROCORDATO Cie
MICHOGLOU Cie	NICOLAIDIS Theodo.	MAVROCORDATO J.-S.
MICROULACHI E.	PAPAMARCO N.	MELAS S.
NEGREPONTE Platon	PAPANICOLI A.	MICHELIS fils
NICOLAIDI FENERLI	PERDIKIDI Nestor	MICHELIS (Widow)
NICOLAIDIS Theodore	PETROCOCHINO de M.	MICHELIS E.
PAPAMARCO N.	PETROCOCHINO Demt.	MICHELIS F.
PAPIOLAKIS G.	PETROCOCHINO Gerg.	MICROULACHI S.-E.
PAPPARIGOPULO Nicolas	PETROCOCHINO D.	NICOLAIDES S.-N.
PERDIKIDI Alexandre	PETROCOCHINO Paul	NICOLAIDES Theodore
PETROCOCHINO Eustratio	PRASSACACHI Emm.	NICOLOPULO D.
PETROCOCHINO Demetrius	PRASSACAH I (Wid.)	PAPADOPULO (Widow)
PETROCOCHINO Georges	PSOMADES (Widow)	PAPAMARCO N.
PIGNATELLI (Mme)	RALLI SCHIL.ARENT.	PAPANICOLI J.

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

1870	1880	1890
PRASSACACHI Emmanuel	RALLI Et-Jean	PETROCOCHINO Demetrius
PRASSACACHI (Widow)	RALLI Ambr.-Th.	PETROCOCHINO E.-Strati
PSIACHI Emmanuel-Jean	RALLI Michel	PETROCOCHINO D.
PSICHARI D.	RALLI (Widow)	PRASSACACHI Emmanuel
PSYCHA Antoine	REGGIO et fils	PRASSACACHI (Widow)
RALLI SCHILIZZI ARGENTI	REGGIO (Widow)	PSOMADES (Mme)
RALLI Auguste	REGGIO (Widow)	PSOMADES J.
RALLI Jean-Etienne	REGGIO (Widow)	RALLI SCHILIZZI ARGENTI
RALLI Ambroise-Th.	REGGIO E.	RALLI Ambroise-Th.
RALLI NEGREPONTE Cie	REGGIO (Widow)	REGGIO fils
RALLI Michel	REGGIO Alcibiade	REGGIO (Widow)
RALLI Alexandre	RODOCANACHI (Wid.)	REGGIO (Widow)
RALLI Antoine-E.	RODOCANACHI fils	REGGIO (Widow)
RALLI Antoine	RODOCANACHI P.T.	REGGIO Georges
REGGIO et fils	RODOCANACHI Th.-E.	REGGIO Nicolas
REGGIO Leopold	RODOCANACHI M.-Et.	REGGIO A.
REGGIO Michel	RODOCANACHI Emn.	REGGIO Michel
REGGIO Pericles	SCARAMANGA et Cie	REGGIO N.

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

1870	1880	1890
REGGIO Jean-Baptiste	SCARAMANGA Jean	RODOCANACHI P., T.
RODOCANACHI P.et T.	SCARAMANGA Jean-E	RODOCANACHI fils
RODOCANACHI Etienne	SECHIARI fr.et C	RODOCANACHI Theodore
RODOCANACHI (Widow)	SECHIARI Georges	RODOCANACHI Michel
RODOCANACHI Emmanuel	SECHIARI (Widow)	RODOCANACHI C.
RODOCANACHI Theodore	SECHIARI (Widow)	SCARAMANGA J.
RODOCANACHI Th.	SECHIARI Theodore	SCARAMANGA Esmeralda
RODOCANACHI et Cie	SERBOS Miltiade	SCARAMANGA MANOUSSI
RODOCANACHI Stamati	SIDERICOUDI Cie	SCARAMANGA Jn-E.
RODOCANACHI Antoine-T.	SOTIRICHOS Const.	SECHIARI (Widow)
SCARAMANGA et Cie	SPARTALI Cie	SECHIARI Emmanuel
SCARAMANGA Pandia	STAVRIDES Charal.	SECHIARI Veuve
SCHILIZZI Pier.-Emmanuel	SCOULOUDI (Widow)	SPANOUDI L.
SCOULOUDI T.-P.	SEVASTOPULO Cie	STAMOS Alexandre
SECHIARI Georges	TAMVAC.MICR.MAVR.	STAVRIDES Cie
SECHIARI fr.et Cie	THEOLOGO Xenophon	SEVASTOPULO Cie
SECHIARI Etienne	VAGLIANO Andrea	THEOLOGO Xenophon
SECHIARI Theodore	VAGLIANO Atanase	VAGLIANO Athanase

[A dominant group of merchants]

(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

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1870	1880	1890
SECHIARI (Mme)	VLASTO Etienne	VAGLIANO fils
SEVASTOPULO (Mme)	VRISACHI B.	VASSILIADI Cie
SOTIRICHOS Constantin	VUCCINA Freres	VLIASSOPULO F.
SOTIRICHOS Alexandre	ZAFIROPULO ZARIFI	VLASTO Etienne
SPANOUDI Alexandre	ZAFIROPULO Et.	VOUCCINA Theodore
SPARTALI Cie	ZAFIROPULO (Wid.)	ZACHARACOS M.G.
SPARTALI (Widow)	ZARIFI Pericles	ZACHARIADES J.
TAMVACO MICRUL.MAVROC.	ZIZINIA (Widow)	ZAFIROPULO ZARIFI
THEOCHARIDES freres	ZIZINIA Stamaty	ZAFIROPULO E.,C.,C.
THEOCHARIDES Georges	ZIZINIA Menandre	ZAFIROPULO G.-D.
VAGLIANO A.-A.	ZYGOMALAS A.-A.	ZAFIROPULO (Widow)
VASSILIADI Cie		ZARIFI Pericles
VITALIS Frederic		ZIZINIA Menandre
VITALIS Jean-Baptiste		ZIZINIA (Widow)
VLIASSOPULO F.		ZORAS Aristide
ZAFIROPULO ZARIFI		ZOUNTOURIDES Constantin
ZAFIROPULO Etienne		ZOUROS D.-N.
ZARIFI Leonidas		ZYGOMALAS (Widow)

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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(...Continued)

Table 4.6. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille (licensed), 1870-1890

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1870	1880	1890
ZIZINIA (Widow)		ZYGOMALAS Michel
ZIZINIA Stamaty		

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At the outset, two notable changes are observed in the number of commercial firms: a sharp rise during the decade 1825-1835 (the number actually doubled), and a sharp constant rise which started in 1840 and continued until 1870. These changes were generally associated with the steady evolution of the Greek business community in the city and underline the importance of their establishment. But unless the "recruitment" and the composition of this group are specified and defined more precisely, an increase in number remains a simple indication. Defining and counting necessitates analysis.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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Table 4.7. Greek Commercial Firms in Marseille with the denomination  
"negociant" or "rentier"

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1816	1825	1835-36	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890
9	11	21	22	39	73	110	101	109
§ 1.81	2.22	4.24	4.44	7.87	14.74	22.22	20.40	22.02

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#### Analysis

To make sense of the data given in the tables 4.4 to 4.7, the extent and rhythms of change of the commercial firms had to be examined. Such specifications are presented in the table 4.8. Here the trends of mobility stand out clearly. During the whole period under consideration, a permanent renewal is observed: a double movement of disappearance and replacement - a natural procedure, besides. This, however, bears some particularities.

Proportionately, the biggest change took place in 1816-1825; that was a crucial period for the establishment of Greeks in the city.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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Mainly the Greek War of Independence of 1821, but also the decline of Marseille's trade with the Levant, led a sequence of families to leave. Although the renewal of persecution in Smyrna and Chio gave an additional impetus to commercial emigration, a political role in the Revolution combined with economic instability, made the families of Thesee,<sup>20</sup> Amira,<sup>21</sup> Homere<sup>22</sup> or Prassacachi<sup>23</sup> progressively abandon Marseille.

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[20]. About Nicolas Thesee (Nicolaos Theseas in greek), Echinard writes: " Nicolas Thesee de nationalite russe, neveu de l'archeveque de Chypre Cyprien, etait lie avec les plus grandes familles de la Grece ou il exercait une certaine influence. Il s'etablit a Marseille dans les derniers mois de 1815. De 1816 a 1820, il fut le seul Grec de Marseille a avoir l'essentiel de ses relations d'affaires avec Chypre ou existait le siege social de "Cyprien Thesee et Cie". Par l'intermediaire de Chypre, Thesee pouvait disposer d'une grande variete de produits provenant non seulement de l'ile, tels vins, raisins secs ou coton, mais aussi des produits de la cote syrienne: plumes d'autruche, galles, huile, anis et en grande partie, laine, soie, vieux cuivre ou gomme; on peut noter encore des alizaris, des chevaux arabes, du caviar et des especes. Exceptionnellement, Thesee recur quelques produits de Livourne et Nice et, meme, en 1818, une caisse dont on ignorait le contenu en provenance de Londres par Gibraltar. Le 2 fevrier 1820, Thesee eut les honneurs du journal de Marseille pour l'administration que suscitaient dans la ville onze chevaux arabes qu'il venait de recevoir de Chypre. La sensation fut encore plus vive a Paris, lorsque Thesee vint presenter ses chevaux aux amateurs de la capitale....Des lors, semble-t-il, Thesee s'installa a Paris. Membre des societes secretes grecques, il devint en France l'un des agents les plus actifs de l'insurrection, avant d'aller rejoindre ses compatriotes. Il joua en Grece un role important, cependant son opposition envers Jean Capodistria le contraignit a l'exil en 1829. Thesee aurait fait ensuite une tentative malheureuse pour reorganiser son etablissement a Marseille, avant de retourner a Athenes et d'y mourir en 1839". P.Echinard [1973] pp.91-92.

[21]. Originated from Smyrna, Amira brothers - Constantin and Demetrius - were among the first merchants who established themselves in Marseille in 1817 and in 1815 respectively. A.D, serie M.11.9., 4 mars 1818 - 26 octobre 1831. About their commercial activities in Marseille P.Echinard describes: "Le coton domine leurs importations depuis Smyrne, devancant

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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(...continued)

nettement les laines, de toutes especes, les graines jaunes et une multitude d'autres produits. Apres leur avoir fourni, en 1816 d'importants lots d'avelanades, Livourne leur envoie, en 1817 et 1818, un assez grand nombre de sacs de ble provenance de la mer Noire. Ces bles arrivent aussi directement d'Odessa et Taganrog, ou bien encore par l'intermediaire de Constantinople. Les Amira reexpedient certains de ces chargements vers Barcelone. Quelques rares relations avec Genes, Alexandrie, Caffa, Spetzia ou Hydra viennent completer leur activites commerciales qui subissent un ralentissement marque des 1818, pour devenir quasi inexistantes en 1819 et 1820. Les Amira continuent neanmoins, a vivre encore pendant quelques annees a Marseille ou ils ont des liens familiaux etroits avec une autre famille de Smyrne, representee dans la ville depuis 1816 par Theodore Homere." P.Echinard [1973] pp.86-87. "Luc Amira et fils" was the sole Greek commercial firm in Marseille which competed in 1817 with the biggest French grain importers from Russia. See report A.N., Aff.etr., B III 278-279.

[22]. Unlike Amira, Homere's trade was exclusively oriented towards Smyrna; there was the firm "George Homere Cie", associated with the merchant Pierre Homeridi Schilizzi of Marseille. Homere, specializing in wool imports, tried in 1820 to overcome his difficulties with Smyrna's trade and turned to Livorno and Chyprus. In the same period he got involved in the Greek revolution, and went to Paris where he organised a tannery on behalf of a firm in London. See A.D., 381 E, registre 323, 18 mai 1819 and registre 326, 14 mars 1822; A.M., 5 E 8, 27 aout 1821 and 5 E 9, 27 decembre 1825 (cessation de commerce au 31 decembre).

[23]. About Prassacachi brothers, it was reported in their application for naturalization: "on assure que ces deux particulier etaient depuis plus de sept ans a Smyrne sous la protection francaise..Leurs moyens d'existence proviennent du commerce, en general, qu'ils ont toujours fait ainsi que leur pere. Divers negociants de cette ville, qui les connoissent assurent qu'ils ont de la fortune"; A.D., serie M.11.26., 22 fevrier 1817. One year later, in a new application it was reported: "ils y sont effectivement un commerce important avec le Levant. Leur maison peut etre, a cet egard, consideree comme etant a un rang eleve. Ils paroissent avoir beaucoup de moyen par eux memes et jouissent d'un credit considerable sur la place"; A.D., serie M.11.26., 2 novembre 1818. Involved both of them in the Greek Revolution, "Nicolas quittait Marseille des les premiers mois de l'insurrection et son frere, Theodore, apres etre reste quelques annees encore dans la ville, partit aussi en Grece, puis a Malte."; P.Echinard [1973] p.289.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.8 Renewal of Greek Commercial Firms

Years	Number of firms lost between the years	%	Number of new firms	%
1816-1825	6	66.6	8	72.7
1825-1835	3	27.2	13	61.9
1835-1840	3	14.2	4	18.1
1840-1850	7	31.8	23	58.9
1850-1860	10	25.6	40	54.7
1860-1870	21	28.7	40	36.0
1870-1880	42	37.8	23	22.7
1880-1890	27	26.7	34	31.4

The steady larger proportion of new firms during the whole period, was only partly due to arrivals and mainly the result of a pattern: the multiplication of firms with the same name. After the first period of establishment, the members of a family preferred to organise their own commercial firm (and to co-operate with members of other families who were usually relatives) and keep the same name. The Rodocananchi family for example, had one firm when it first appeared in 1825 and nine in 1870. Thus one new firm either disappeared after some years or, once established, appeared to multiply.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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This pattern is better illustrated with the examination of the merchants's places of origin. The majority of emigrants came from Chios, Smyrna and Constantinople, that is from a limited number of big commercial levantine centres. These merchants already belonged to a network of business with a certain know-how and they immigrated in family units or they had kin living in Marseille on whom they could rely for conducting business. Consequently, the "constituents" of this renewal were constant in range and structure: *"chaque changement est d'ailleurs suivi d'un renouveau du tissu social de ce groupe, dans une fièvre de mobilité sociale; renouveau qui s'opère par l'intrusion de parvenus, évidemment, mais aussi par le "recrutement" et l'assimilation de cadres qui deviennent partenaires, d'amis et de protégés sélectionnés, de membres bien choisis de la famille élargie. Mais quelle que soient les méthodes particulières de ce renouveau, la structure fondamentale de cette classe reste inchangée, fondée sur les réseaux d'ethnie, de famille et de clientèle."*<sup>24</sup>

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[24]. G.B.Dertilis "Réseaux de crédit et stratégies du capital" in G.B.Dertilis (ed) [1988] p.40. Professor Dertilis analyses the structure of the Greek Diaspora during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the social and economic role of merchants in the formation of the Greek state.

[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.9. Place of Origin of the Greek Merchants according to their application for obtaining the French Nationality

Year of arrival	Place of Origin								
	Con/ple	Smyrna	Salonica	Chios	Syros	Ithaca	Andr/ple	Gr	Livr.
1815-1825		3	1	15	1	1			
1825-1835	3	5		6					2
1835-1840	1								
1840-1850		2		2					
1850-1860		1				1			
1860-1870	2								1
1870-1880							1		
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>12.50</b>	<b>22.91</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>47.91</b>	<b>4.16</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>4.16</b>

Another way of examining the unity and cohesion of the group of merchants is, the other way round, by looking into the pattern and the trend of their integration in the country; the measure used was their

[A dominant group of merchants]

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applications for obtaining residence permits or the citizenship.

Although France had theoretically accepted the establishment of all foreigners in her territory since the Revolution, the Napoleonic legislation practically hindered easy access to citizenship: the letter of the law, its spirit, and the procedures imposed were made to discourage applications.<sup>25</sup> As a matter of fact, the "lettres de naturalite" (citizenship) were granted as an economic and social privilege to a small elite of the foreign population. Thus, every case was examined according to the social status of the applicant; the applications of the Levantins in particular, were easily rejected if not "strongly supported" by Marseille's (in this case) commercial world. That

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[25]. Residence permits - "*sorte de petite naturalisation, ce dangereux semblant de naturalisation qui met un individu a cheval sur deux pays*" (P.Echinard [1973] p.271) - were the *sine qua non* condition for getting citizenship, and were given much more easily to foreigners; they permitted the creation of an entreprise, the transmission of property etc. After ten years of uninterrupted residence in French territory. the applicant could start the procedure for obtaining the citizenship. The file was sent to the town hall and transmitted to the Prefecture; after an enquiry, the Prefecture decided whether the case was to be sent in to the Ministry of Justice. Sent from an office to another, the files risked being lost or forgotten; that was a problem for our study as well. In order to complete the file of every applicant, two archives were consulted; the Archives Departementales du Bouches-du Rhone where the applications to the Prefecture are found and the Archives Nationales where the responses are kept. The files in the Archives Nationales are difficult to obtain since their classification is quite complicated; we benefitted from Echinard's instructions and we used the order number usually found in the dossiers in the Archives departementales.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

Table 4.10. Formalities of Establishment in the city: Greek  
 Merchants' Applications for obtaining Residence Permits or  
 Citizenship

Year of Application	Number of Application for		Decisions		
	Residence	Citizenship	Residence	Cit/ship.	Rejections of Cit/ship.
1815-1825	6	4	5		1
1825-1835	6	7	4	3	2
1835-1840	7	12	6		7
1840-1850	1	15		12	
1850-1860	4	2	3	2	
1860-1870	1	8	1	3	4
1870-1880	3	3	3	2	
1880-1890	1	1	2	2	

was not the case - at least for the first twenty years of the Greek presence in Marseille - in a city where "*les groupes d'interet marseillais exercent, on le sait, des pressions pendant de longues annees, pour empecher la prise en compte de ces dossiers*".<sup>26</sup> But what mostly influenced the decisions of the French administration was the relations between the country and the Ottoman Empire; in 1842 the

[A dominant group of merchants]

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Ministry of Justice explained, in a response to a Greek merchant's application, the reasons for which the matter could become a source of tension between France and the Ottoman Empire:

*"...Les levantins ne demandent, en general, a devenir francais, que dans l'espoir d'echapper a la juridiction du souverain dans les etats duquel ils sont nes et ou ils comptent retourner. Mais la legislation Ottomane ne reconnais pas la validite des naturalisations etrangeres. Celles qui seraient accordees pourraient donc faire naitre des conflits, qu'il importe d'eviter entre les autorites turques et les agents francais. Ce motif fais rejeter les demandes formees par les sujets du grand seigneur."<sup>27</sup>*

The letter though ended with a "however": *"Toutefois, si le Sr Dromocaiti pouvait etablir que sa naturalisation n'aurais pas l'inconvenient...elle serait l'objet d'un nouvel examen"*. This proved essential for the outcome of this case: sixteenth months later Dromocaiti obtained citizenship. Important detail: the Chamber of Commerce, this "irreducible adversary" of the Greeks during the War of Independence, was his main supporter.<sup>28</sup> And he was not the sole merchant

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[26]. P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] v.1, p.99, fn.2.

[27]. A.D., serie M 11 16, Ministere de la Justice, Paris, 3 janvier 1842.

[28]. *"...M.Dromocaiti est un homme fort recommandable et digne sous tous les rapports de la faveur qu'il sollicite. Il est de notoriete publique que M.Dromocaiti par ses liens d'affaires et de famille est definitivement fixe a Marseille. Ce negociant est etabli dans cette ville depuis dix-huit ans, ses enfants y sont tous nes, il a acquis de nombreux immeubles, a passe un bail de dix annees pour la maison qu'il*

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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supported by the local larger merchants and entrepreneurs; Emmanuel Rodocanachi obtained his citizenship in 1833 with the support of many marseillais merchants, bankers and industrialists;<sup>29</sup> all the same, in the Zizinia brothers' file the support declarations of Lyon's and Nimes' seven most important manufacturers were found.<sup>30</sup>

The support of the local bourgeoisie for the Greek merchants was, somehow, inversely proportional to the system of indistinct exclusion of

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(...continued)

*occupe, en un mot, cet honorable negociant remplit les principales conditions du citoyen. Il a de fortes racines dans le pays.. des qualites personnelles qui le recommandent particulierement a la bienveillance du gouvernement: il est a la tete d'une maison importante qu'il n'a cesse de diriger avec une grande droiture. Aussi la Chambre verrait-elle avec plaisir M.Dromocaiti obtenir ses droits de citoyen francais...*" A.D., serie M. 11 16, lettre de la Chambre de Commerce, le 9 aout 1842.

[29]. Various certificates were signed by the merchants: F.-M.Fournier, P.-P.Lagrange, Hyp.Martin, Marius Dastrevigne, P.-J.P.Gavoty; by the coton manufacturer F.-L.Roustan; by the banker P.-Ant.Hesse. (A.N., BB 11 350, 1862 X 2). The signatures of the following merchants were also found: Arnavon, Alegre, Sciama, Lafont, Pascal, Pastre freres, Barequy fils aine, P.Jourdan, Alby aine, Milliau, Roussier, J.Berardi et fils, Boulouvard, Reymonet, Dromel, Hilarion Arnaud, rougemont, Mouton, Rambaud, Henricy freres, Moynier freres et Cie, etc. (A.M., extrait du juge de paix de Marseille, 2e arrondissement, le 19 juillet 1833, certificat de negociants marseillais, le 27 octobre 1831).

[30]. Marseille's Mayor reported on 12 October 1830: " *M.Zizinia (Stefano) fait un commerce assez important dans les echelles du Levant; qu'il y importe, annee commune, environ 200 balles de draps de nos fabriques, et qu'il en exporte, annuellement, en retour pour la France environ dix mille balles de coton en laine; que ses avis ont mis les fabricants de draps londrins de France et ceux ses soyeries de Lyon et de Nismes a meme d'approprier leur fabrication aux gouts et aux usage des habitants du Levant*". (A.D., M 11 33, Mairie de Marseille, le 12 octobre 1830). It follows the declarations of the seven merchants-manufacturers: J.Fraissinet, Jean Pastre, Reboul Pere & fils, Durant Cie, Pascal fils Cie, Lugagne Delpou fils... (one signature was illegible).

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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all Levantines, which prevailed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period between 1836 and 1840. Many times the citizenship office in the Ministry of Justice tried to reconcile the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' position with the interest of marseillais traders:

"...Je ne peux m'empêcher de faire remarquer que cette exclusion en masse a ses inconvénients, que Marseille attire une foule d'étrangers industriels qui porteront ailleurs leur activité et leur intelligence commerciale, s'ils doivent renoncer à jamais à l'espoir de devenir Français..."

"...Le hasard de la naissance ne serait pas une règle générale de refus..."

"...Permettez-moi de vous faire observer que les faits avancés par le sieur Dromocaiti ont été reconnus exacts et certifiés par les renseignements fournis par Monsieur le Maire et par la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, qui sont à même de connaître la vérité des assertions de ce négociant...mon avis s'est joint à ceux exprimés par les administrations locales, pour appuyer la demande du sieur Dromocaiti.

...Si tous ces détails ne peuvent suffire pour justifier à vos yeux du mérite de cette demande, je vous prie de vouloir bien m'indiquer quelles sont les autorités compétentes de qui doivent émaner les

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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*documents positifs que nous desirez avoir*".<sup>31</sup>

In view of these problems, the small number of applications is not surprising; but considered the other way round, the number was rather large, given the difficulty of the procedure. Only merchants of a certain status were favoured to get citizenship, but on the other hand they were probably those who needed it less: in Marseille, a religious or an ethnic particularity never hindered a local activity through international networks of high standards. Under this description we find the examples of Theodore Rodocanachi and Etienne Zafiropoulo.

Theodore was brought to Marseille by his father Emmanuel from Chios during the Turkish persecution of those in revolt. He received a good French education at the *College Royale* and he got married to a compatriot born and brought up in Marseille. At the end of the second Empire he possessed numerous buildings and a fortune evaluated at one million francs, made up from his commercial activities with the Levant. Theodore asked for the first time for residence in 1858 and for French citizenship in 1869, at the age of forty and fifty one years old respectively. On the contrary, his father had asked and obtained the citizenship in 1833, as soon as it was permitted by law. Theodore's reluctance or negligence to become a French citizen was neither an

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[31]. The first text is a report's extract from the Citizenship Service, referred by P.Echinard [1973] p.274; the second is a note from the Ministry of Justice, see A.N., BB 11 410 620 X 2 et 4324 X 2, 1840; the third is a letter of the Bouches-du-Rhone Prefect, see A.N., BB 11 325, 8455 B 7 X 2, 24 novembre 1842.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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obstacle to his relations with the commercial milieu of the city, nor to his professional success.<sup>32</sup>

All the same Etienne Zafiropoulo became a respectable member of marseillaise society without ever asking for French nationality. Although he arrived late in the city, he made his fortune quickly: the Black Sea grain-trade, the flour-milling industry, the merchant marine. His name was associated with the development of the biggest marseillaise business of the nineteenth century and he was honoured with the medal "Commandeur de la Legion d'honneur".<sup>33</sup>

In any event, the merchants' wish to obtain French nationality was each time shaped by the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but was decisively determined by the economic and social advantages that it could offer to the applicant. Merchants of the first generation of establishment usually begun the procedure as soon as they met an obstacle in the course of their activities; in such cases they were quite persistent. The second generation showed the same attitude, with one difference: many exercised the right that the law gave them as soon as they reached adulthood (the law provided that "*tout individu ne en France d'un etranger pourra reclamer la qualite de Francais*", but he should have applied "*dans l'annee qui suivra sa majorite*").<sup>34</sup>

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[32]. A.D., M 11 28, Ministere de la Justice, le 8 octobre 1858; Mairie de Marseille, le 15 octobre 1869; Ministere de la Justice, le 8 novembre 1869.

[33]. Among others see P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] v.II, p.41.

[34]. Cited by P.Echinard-E.Temime [1989] v.I, p.98. Among the Greeks

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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Thus, French citizenship did not constitute by itself a measure of assimilation of the Greek merchants into marseillaise society; still, in the long run, it added a cosmopolitan element to their social identity and conferred to the group, together with other factors, its "hybrid" status.

It is commonly known that the great preponderance of big firms of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were family businesses and that those able men from outside the ruling family who succeeded in obtaining partnerships, were incorporated into the founding family through marriage.<sup>35</sup> Research also showed that some business specializations like merchant banking, which required strong personal and family ties, were held by ethnic or religious trading groups (like Huguenots, Jews, Scots, Quakers, Lutherans, Greeks, Armenians etc.), dispersed by religious and political persecution, since this team activity had become a way of life for them. Apart from the Jews, Greeks appeared particularly clannish to

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(...continued)

who were born in Marseille between 1821 and 1830, ten declared their intention to become French citizens the year after they reached adulthood: Leonidas Argenti, Demetrios Petrocochino, Pandia Agelasto, Pierre Rodocanachi, Aristide Dromocaiti, Etienne Ralli, Menandre Zizinia, Eustratios Petrocochino, Laurent Dromocaiti and Etienne Schilizzi. Among those who were born after 1830 we found nine more: D.Agelasto, Roch Epaminondas Reggio, Nicolas Andre Argenti, Michel Rodocanachi, George Alcibiade Reggio, Thomas Zizinia, Andre Aristide Zizinia, Leopold F.A.Reggio and Nicolas A.T.Reggio. See A.M., 5 E 24 and 5 E 25.

[35]. See among many others D.S.Landes [1958] *passim* and p.19; Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.291 and v.II, p.726, pp.879-896; S.D.Chapman [1984] pp.63-65; R.Caty-E.Richard [1986] pp.100-125;

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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their contemporaries; in London the author of the popular magazine *Bubbles of Finance* (1865) maintained that "the Greeks are the only people of the world that could carry on that extraordinary trade [in Levant trade bills] because they form the only nation the natives of which have implicit confidence in one another. Whatever a Greek may be to the foreigner, he is always true to his countrymen".<sup>36</sup> This oversimplification, which expresses a lot of social prejudice, holds some truth if one analyses historically the constituents of this "implicit confidence": it is one of the functions of a well tempered network.

Wherever the Greeks were established, they showed a high degree of endogamy.<sup>37</sup> This was mainly the result of the Greek Orthodox doctrine, forbidding mixed-religion marriages; since Orthodoxy remained for a long time a vital element of culture (together with language and customs), the immigrants were restricted to seeking brides or husbands from their home towns and villages. On the other hand, the biggest mercantile families in the Greek communities also displayed a high degree of endogamy similar to the kind of occupational endogamy found in business elites.<sup>38</sup> At this point it would not be illegitimate to ask the question

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[36]. [M.R.L.Meason], *Bubbles of Finance* (1865) pp.163-164, referred by S.D.Chapman [1984] p.65.

[36]. In Egypt for example and as late as 1936, of the four largest foreign communities, the Greeks displayed the highest degree of endogamy. See A.Kitroeff [1989] p.14.

[A dominant group of merchants]

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whether the endogamy practised by the Greek merchants in Marseille was an occupational, an ethnic or a religious one. In other words, was a merchant's son married to a merchant's daughter because both families traded or because they were of Greek origin or professed the Orthodox faith?

In reality, the Greek merchants' marriage strategies tempted to ensure both the continuity of their business (or, in other words, the family's social and economic position) and the reproduction of a culture of which Orthodoxy and ethnicity were an integral component. For as long as merchants continued to thrive, these strategies, without ever becoming completely and systematically explicit, were seen as inherent in the nature of things: Petrocochino's daughters married Rodocanachi's sons, Marseille joined London and Manchester respectively, together with blood and marital relationships went business ties. Not always of course; as the economic and social conditions changed and the need for co-operation overwhelmed ethnic or religious loyalties, these strategies became incompatible.<sup>39</sup> And as professor Dertilis explains: " ...la parentele, tout particulierement, fut le plus souvent le fondement des reseaux d'entreprises au sein de chaque groupe. Mais ce qui constituait

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[38]. See O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] v.II, p.428; Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.291; R.Mousnier "Problemes de methodes dans l'etude des structures sociales des XVI<sup>e</sup>, XVII<sup>e</sup>, XVIII<sup>e</sup> siecles", *Spiegel der Geschichte*, Munster, 1964; R.Mousnier maintaines: "L'on pourrait presque dire le groupe social, ce sont les gens qui se marient entre eux", p.552.

[39]. Family strategies were never absolutely compatible because they were exercised in order to accomplish various exigencies at the same

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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initialement l'armature et la force de cette forme d'organisation contribuera finalement, au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, a son declin: son obsolescence l'affaiblira face a la concurrence des entreprises locales et surtout occidentales organisees de facon moderne et toujours plus agressives."<sup>40</sup> Thus, some dynamic entrepreneurs would be married into a catholic family against the moral principle of their religion, in accordance with the preservation of their economic and social status in the city.<sup>41</sup>

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(...continued)

time, like the transmission of an undiminished patrimony, the maintenance of the family's social and economic position, the biological continuity of the lineage, the reproduction of its work force etc. Thus, as P.Bourdieu puts it: "*Les strategies proprement matrimoniales ne sauraient donc etre dissociées sans abstraction des strategies successorales, ni davantage des strategies de fecondite, ni meme des strategies pedagogiques, c'est-a-dire de l'ensemble des strategies de reproduction biologique, culturelle et sociale, que tout groupe met en oeuvre pour transmettre a la generation suivante, maintenus ou augmentes, les pouvoirs et les privileges qu'il a lui-meme herites*". From P.Bourdieu "*Les strategies matrimoniales dans le systeme de reproduction*" *Annales, E.S.C.*, (Julliet-October 1972) pp.1105-25.

[40]. G.B.Dertilis "*Reseaux de credit et strategies du capital*" in G.B.Dertilis (ed) [1988] p.40.

[41]. The most indicative example is that of the Zarifi family. In 1910 Pericles Zarifi was one of the three biggest shareholders and one of the directors in Marseille's largest shipbuilding company (*Port-de-Bouc Chantier Navale*). Fifty years later, a member of Zarifi family continued to be not only the main shareholder but also the protagonist in the merging-indeed controlling-of *Port-de-Bouc's* shipbuilding company with its rival *La Ciotat* company. N.B.: Zarifi was Terrin's son-in-law, who was the man of all manoeuvring; he was at the same time president of *Port-de Bouc's* administration council, shareholder in *La Ciotat* and president of the company *Societe Provancale des Ateliers TERRIN* located in Marseille. See J.Domenichino "*Un Chantier, des Ouvriers, une ville: Port-de-Bouc et la construction navale. (1900-1966)*", these de doctorat, Aix-en-Provence, 1988, p.39, fn.1,2 and pp.411-412.

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1835-1840





Figure 4.1

1850-1860



1870-1890



[A dominant group of merchants]

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The cohesion of this group of merchants is very well depicted by the picture of their establishment in the city; in figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 what Carriere called "*le rapprochement par la residence, le domicile, c'est-a-dire l'installation des negociants dans les quartiers ou ils se sentent chez eux, distincts des autres*" appears clearly.<sup>42</sup>

Between 1835 and 1860, the majority of Greek merchants established their firms and their residence in the new quarter called "*Allees de Meilhan*" or "*des Reformes*" which was an suburban development to the east of the city.<sup>43</sup> There (*Allees des Capucines, Place Faineants/Capucines, Allees de Meilhan, Boulevard Dugommier, rue Senac, rue Mazagran, rue Canonge*) were to be found the firms of Petrocochino, Ralli, Schillizi, Argenti, Zarifi, Rodocanachi, Zizinia, Sechiari, Agelasto, Mavrocordato. Inside the walls but very close to the quarter (*marche des Capucines, rue du*

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[41]. Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.291.

[43]. A tour through Marseille's quarters is a tour through its history; the most important changes in its urban framework were four: "It was in the shelter of the hill guarding the northern side of the port that a colony of Greeks founded Marseille in the sixth century B.C., and it was on this same hill that the city remained throughout the Middle Ages....In the Middle Ages, Marseille was fortified by walls on the north and east and by a steep cliff leading down to the sea on the west, and the port basin that formed its southern perimeter was well guarded by a fortress at its narrow inlet....By the end of the seventeenth century, Marseille had outgrown its medieval limits, and new walls were built, approximately doubling the area of the city....The era of the Second Empire, however, changed the shape and face of the city far more fundamentally. The construction of new port basins along the northern coastline radically shifted the commercial center of gravity northward, and most of Marseille's new factories were also built in close proximity to the new ports, to assure ready access to low-cost transportation." W.H.Sewell [1977] pp.101-2, 104-7.

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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Musee, rue du Petit St.Jean, rue Thubaneau) the commercial firms of Vitali, Canadachi, Rodocanachi were established; the Greek Orthodox Church (rue de la Grande Armee) was also built there. At the beginning of the period, this quarter was underdeveloped and, therefore, most of the land was quite cheap; by 1860 it had been transformed into a spacious and comfortable place, attracting more and more wealthy groups from the city's population. Augustin Fabre provides us with a vivid description of the "Allees"'s development: "*Pendant plusieurs annees (du 19<sup>e</sup> siecle), la promenade des Allees de Meilhan, eut encore une physionomie d'isolement et ne s'animait guere que les dimanches et les jours de fete. Ces jours-la, les promeneurs, s'y portaient en foule, mais seulement du cote les Lyonnaises; celui des Capucines etait a peu pres abandonne. Tout le quartier des Allees conserva longtemps l'aspect d'un faubourg. Des jardins, des terrains a batir, des rues inachevees annoncaient le voisinage d'une grande ville, et ce n'etait pas la ville elle-meme qui n'avait pas encore besoin d'etendre ses limites. Marseille souffrit cruellement sous le premier Empire. Mais elle prospera sous la regne des Bourbons et de la paix. Sa population s'accrut; une rapide et puissante impulsion fut donnee aux affaires, et le quartier des Allees de Meilhan, place dans une voie d'ameliorations considerables, devint ce qu'il est aujourd'hui (1869), l'un des plus beaux d'une belle cite. Il y eut la de grands changements en 1860. L'axe du boulevard fut transformee en voie carrossable pour les besoins d'une immense circulation qui*

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[A dominant group of merchants]

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*rayonnait dans tous les sens et pour la facilite des abords du chemin de fer. L'elargissement de la route supprima la plus meridionale des trois allees de Meilhan".<sup>44</sup>*

Last but not least, education and business mentality<sup>45</sup> conferred for a long time unity and cohesion on the group; not always of course, but finally "*ce qui unit est beaucoup plus fort que ce qui separe*".<sup>46</sup>

Merchants established in Marseille were already professionally formed in their parents' or uncles' firms. These were considered as the "best schools" for a young man's education; and rightly so. After the elementary school an apprentice was taught a certain business know-how by working in his own father's or a relative's firm. On the other hand, the merchants' position in marseillaise society called for a general culture and a "savoir-vivre" offered in good local schools; the "College Royale" was the one which hosted the majority of the scions of the Greek mercantile elite.<sup>47</sup> Thus, a good French education combined with a solid business tradition, created this form of cultural segregation - also found among the other wealthy minorities in Marseille like the Swiss or the Germans - which consolidated the cohesion of the group and at the

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
[44]. A.Fabre [1869] v.V, pp.174-175. For a view of the *Allees de Meilhan* in a posterior time (la Belle Epoque) see the postcard.

[45]. By mentality we mean here a vague and somehow unconscious conception of the world which is detected by the observer. Mentality is usually defined in contrast to the term Ideology which denotes a system of conscious beliefs held by a social group. For theories on ideology see Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies [1980].

[46]. Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.296.

[47]. See next chapter.

MARSEILLE - Allée de Melhan



[A dominant group of merchants]

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same time did not hinder the integration of the Greek merchants into the bourgeoisie.<sup>48</sup>

At the core of the middling Greek community we identified a group of powerful merchants with distinctive characteristics who were the main actors of this establishment; we are thus guided to question the means and the conditions of their business, to analyse practices and strategies, to decipher, in other words, the first layer of this palimpsest that their life was.

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[48]. See Ch.Carriere [1973] v.I, p.294.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS

During the whole period under consideration, the Greek-owned commercial companies, in spite of the continuous renewal of partnerships, conserved the basic organizational structure known in Europe since the 18th century.<sup>1</sup> This structure was legally formed in two types of companies: General Partnership Company (*societe en nom collectif*) and Limited Partnership Company (*societe en commandite*). A cardinal question which guides the analysis is whether the commercial association constituted a way of mobilizing capital.

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[1]. See H. Levy-Bruhl [1938]. The materials used were the notarial deeds (*acte notarie*), the partnerships agreements (*actes d'association* or *actes de societes*) assigned to the Commercial Tribunal (*verse par le Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille*) and the aforementioned private archive of Petrocochino; information was too scattered to be precise, but in some sufficiently indicative cases we were offered a detailed view of the firms' organization (partnership, functions, capital formation, management, duration etc.), of the association with other firms in Marseille and in the Levant (that is, the structure of the network) and of some companies' finances.

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*Commercial Association*

a) General Partnership Company (*Societe en Nom Collectif*).

The foundation of a company was a private act drawn up by a notary, signed by the partners and deposited in the notary's archives to guarantee authenticity.

In this form of association partners cooperated as "known" or "visible" according to the terminology which means that they were legally undertaking "in solidum" the profits and the losses, each of their signatures represented the whole company, decisions were taken in common (Reggio: 1848, "*chaque associe a la gestion, administration et signature de la societe*"). The firm's name was usually their surnames (if not, their names were always found in the commercial circulars, in the notarial deeds etc). This equality of rights and obligations was practically determined by the initial capital of each partner which was usually of equal value. When on 15 April 1857 for example, Michel Petrocochino set up a new company with his two sons, in the fourth article of the contract was specified that "*la mise des fonds pour chacun des associes est fixee a cent mille francs. Cependant Monsieur Eustratio Petrocochino (his younger son, 29 years old at the period) versera pour le moment soixante mille francs et paiera six pour cent d'interet par an pour les sommes qu'il doit fournir par la suite soit*

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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*par le manquant successif des cent mille francs.* Usually but not always; a father or an uncle would share equally the administration and the signature of a company with a son or a nephew who would have offered a quarter of the capital (Reggio: 1848, "*le fond capital est de cent mille francs dont les trois quarts, soixant-quinze mille francs, sont versees par le S<sup>e</sup> Reggio pere, et un quart, vingt cinq mille francs, par le S<sup>e</sup> Reggio fils*"). In all the cases studied this principal capital was deposited in cash and never in merchandise or bills of exchange of any kind, a practice found in the Greek community of Trieste at the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> However, in reality this practice could well be concealed or reversed by techniques of accountancy.

b) Limited partnership company (*Societe en commandite*).

In this form of association there were two kinds of partners: "general" or "actual" and "secret" or "silent" ("sleeping" partner is contemporary term used); the former, like the "known" partners of the General Partnership Company, undertook all the profits and the losses; they directed the firm and the name of the company was taken from their names; the latter were responsible only for the contribution of their initial capital, the percentage of which was usually larger than that of the general partners; and they were not known to the public but just

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[2]. See O.Katsiardi-Hering [1986] vol.II, pp.416-417.

[Partners and Partnerships]

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mentioned as "et Cie".<sup>3</sup> However, "secret" partners were always merchants known to the mercantile world;<sup>4</sup> moreover, in detailed research of some illustrative cases, it has been shown that secret partners were relatives. "Badetti Bmi et Cie" was established in 1816 by the Chian Catholic merchant Barthelemy Badetti; he was the general partner and his two brothers Francois and Michel, the secret partners.<sup>5</sup>

An interesting example is that of "Argenti et Cie" which was established in the 1820's and continued in business until the 1840's. This firm was formed through a cluster of two families which at the same time created branches governed by geographically scattered partners. In Marseille the Limited Partnership Company was run by the "general" partner Ambroise Argenti, his eldest brother Pantaleon was a "general" partner as well and their uncle Paraschewa Sechiari (their uncle from their mother, Marouko Sechiari's side) was the "secret" partner and *bailleur de fonds*. The branch in Constantinople was run by the third brother, Pandia

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[3]. These firms were exactly the kind that Ch.Carriere describes as classical: "*c'est la commandite simple, classique: capitaux fournis par les commanditaires, gestion assuree par le complementaire qui donne son nom a la raison sociale, laquelle est suivie de la mention et Cie, responsabilite du commanditaire limitee a son apport initial*". Ch.Carriere [1973] v.II, p.887.

[4]. If not, regular attempts were made by the other merchants to reveal them. To this extent Limited Partnership Companies were personal companies during the period under consideration.

[5]. Barthelemy Badetti was one of the first Greek merchants to establish himself in Marseille in 1798; about him and his brother Michel see P.Echinard [1973] pp.62-67 and E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.110. About the second generation of the Badetti family see A.D. - M 11 42: Badetti Melchior - Naturalisation (7 avril 1874 - 6 novembre 1874), Badetti Joseph Edmond - Naturalisation (16 aout 1882 - 8 avril 1887).

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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Argenti, and his first cousin George Sechiari (son of Paraschewa Sechiari); the branch in Galatz by the same "travelling" Pandia Argenti. These details suggest that after their father's death<sup>6</sup>, the Argenti brothers' need for capital coincided with their uncle's desire to prepare the future of his own six sons, too young in 1825 to run an enterprise;<sup>7</sup> but by the 1850's, these six sons, the Sechiari brothers, were old enough to cooperate as "known" partners in the firm "Argenti Sechiari et Cie".

Two last examples will show the use of the Limited Partnership Company as some kind of a "relatives' association". In 1825 the company "Rodocanachi fils et Cie" - which was also still in business in 1840 - was run by Emmanuel-Paul Rodocanachi; "secret" partners were his two brothers; Etienne who arrived with him in Marseille in 1822, and Pandia who ran the branch "Rodocanachi fils et Cie" in Livorno.<sup>8</sup> All the same Dimitrios Baltazzi who had in 1834 established the firm "Baltazzi et Cie" as the first Greek "maison de Banque", promoted his two sons Evangelino and Miltiade to the positions of "secret" partners between 1850-1860.<sup>9</sup>

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[6]. See P.P.Argenti [1955] p.12: "*Leonidas Argenti, ne a Chio le 5 sept.1743, pris comme otage et pendu par les Turcs a Chio le 6 mai 1822*".

[7]. Except for his eldest son George who at the time was 22 years old and he already worked in Constantinople, the others were respectively: Ettienne 19, Ambroise 13, Pandia 9, Theodore 8 and Jean 7 years old. See P.P.Argenti [1955] p.243.

[8]. A.D., 380 E - 490 - Procuration - 17 fevrier 1831, 4 octobre 1831;  
A.D., 380 E - 430 - Procuration - 14 juin 1837;

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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The Limited partnership Company served mainly to organize trade between Marseille and the other markets where Greeks worked. What usually happened was that a General Partnership Company in Marseille cooperated as a "secret" partner with a Limited Partnership Company in Constantinople, in Smyrna or in London; the marseillaise company was the registered headquarters (la maison-mere), the other was the branch (la filiale). The firm "Mavrocordato Varsami et Cie" for example, headquarters of which was seated in Marseille, established in 1839 a limited partnership branch in Constantinople under the same name; one year later, another branch was established in Smyrna under the name "Sevasto de Michel et Cie".<sup>10</sup>

That was advantageous for the Marseille firm in two ways: firstly, it was responsible only for its own invested capital and secondly, it charged the branch a considerable percentage for credit. Marseille's predominance over the Levantine markets was a predominance in availability of the capital. A good example of this is the General Partnership Company "Petrocochino-Agelasto" in Marseille which in 1859-1860 charged 6 per cent interest to its Constantinopolitan branch "as if the branch were a mere correspondent;.. because all branches of our

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(...continued)

A.D., 380 E - 431 - Procuration - 10 juillet 1837, 28 aout 1837.  
Emmanuel's son Theodore became one of the richest Greek merchants in Marseille, known also for his charitable works in the city, see below.

[9]. A.D., M.11.10., Mairie de Marseille, 17 juillet 1858; Ministere de la Justice, 3 fevrier 1863

[10]. A.D., Serie 548 U 4 (1840-1845) - Actes de Societes.

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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*company did not work with their own capital but with that provided by the registered office in Marseille in the form of open credit bearing interest."*<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, and despite a legalistic typology which considers the Limited Partnership Company as a more "developed" form of association, it seems that Greeks had been well acquainted with both forms since the end of the 18th century; and they chose the one or the other according to market conditions and their own human resources. Petrocochino's correspondence provides us with the core of the firm's planning based on estimates about markets and reasonable expectations. In 1843-1844 the firm "Petrocochino Michel" in Marseille cooperated "en commandite" with a firm in Constantinople probably with the merchant Zorzis Petrocochino. It seems that this association did not work very well; and both father and son discussed extensively the various forms of association which would be best suited to each market.<sup>12</sup> In short, their experience suggested that they should avoid Limited Partnership Companies as far as they could, for reasons of administration and control; Dimitrios' orthodoxy remained the General Partnership Company with strong partners - preferably relatives - willing to share rights and responsibilities. The difficulty in practice was in finding reliable partners in such different markets as Tarsus, Satalia or London. The

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[11]. A.Syngros [1908] v.II, p.24.

[12]. P.A., Smyrna, 9 March 1844/ Constantinople, 27 August 1844/  
Smyrna, 9 October 1844/ Smyrna, 30 December 1844.

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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solution was the cooperation "en commandite" with a recommended fellow merchant or company with experience in the respective market; in compensation a small but regular commission on business was offered.

Overall, the number of General and Limited Partnership Companies reflecting the merchants' standard precepts about business in Marseille, is as follows:

General Partnership Companies %			Limited Partnership Companies %		
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1816	8	88.8	1		11.1
1825	8	72.7	3		27.2
1835-36	19	90.4	2		9.5
1840	19	86.3	3		13.6
1850	37	94.8	2		0.01
1860	66	90.4	7		9.5
1870	97	88.1	13		11.8
1880	96	95.0	5		4.9
1890	104	95.4	5		4.5
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*Organization, Management and every-day life in business*

The most experienced of the partners was usually appointed as director; and he was provided with yearly or monthly stipend in order to cover his extra expenses (Petrocochino: 1857, "*mais avant tout partage Monsieur Michel Petrocochino pere, fondateur de la maison, preleva chaque annee la somme de seize mille francs pour honoraires de gerance, frais de representation et autres*"). The director's main concern was the negotiation of sales and purchases in the market and in the stock exchange. In this, he was guided by the right information at the right time: a constant stream of letters gave the director in Marseille sufficient information about prices, the parities of foreign currencies in the Levant, or the bad character of a correspondent, a client, a purveyor, a debtor.

In a period when correspondence was the only means of communication, commercial letters were almost official documents; merchants kept them locked in an separate portfolio "*like the one where I put the bills of exchange*" (Petrocochino: 1844, Smyrna) and for even greater security, the Greeks in Marseille had somehow invented<sup>3</sup> two "types" of letters: the "common" or "general" ("kini" in Greek, "generale" in French) and the "particular" or "privare" ("meriki" in

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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Greek, "particuliere" in French).<sup>14</sup> The former, despite the usual personal greetings "dear Father" or "dear Mister X", was addressed to the whole company, the latter was addressed only to the addressee and contained special information or commercial "secrets". An interesting detail, indicative of the conception and the practical use of the Greeks' double cultural identity is that the "common" letters were written in French, the "particular" in Greek. The "active" correspondence, that is the letters sent, were copied in big register books and are rarely found nowadays in private archives; what one usually finds now, are the letters received, so-called "passive" correspondence.<sup>15</sup> In the 1840's letters were still handwritten, in contrast to the widespread practice of printing used by the marseillais merchants as early as the 1740's.<sup>16</sup> What this appeared to have been in practice was a printing press for keeping copies of the letters sent (Petrocochino: 1843, "*Do not forget to send me the printing press, the books about the press and the special press paper in order to copy the "particulars"; please send it, if possible, by steamboat and do not forget the receipt for making ink.*").

The expansion of trade and the multiplication of branches called

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[13]. That, to my knowlegde, was not practised in any other community.

[14]. The translation in English is mine.

[15]. See Ch.Carriere [1973] vol.II, p.770. This is also the case in Petrocochino's archive in which only the "passive" correspondence, the letters received in Marseille, are found.

[16]. See Ch.Carriere [1973] vol.II, p.771.

[Partners and Partnerships]

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for an efficient and accurate system of bookkeeping. Greek merchants had been acquainted with the double-entry bookkeeping system since the end of 18th century, the period of the Greek "Enlightenment".<sup>17</sup> The accountant, the so-called first secretary, was usually a young man who had been taught the complicated techniques of this system at his father's or a relative's firm as an apprentice, in return for a symbolic salary or just food and shelter.<sup>18</sup> The key books of the double-entry system were the "brouillard" ("prima nota") with all credits and debits, separately and by date; the "journal" ("giornale") in which credits and debits were copied; and the "grand livre" ("maestro") which was the final balance of all accounts, divided into left-hand (debit) and right-hand (credit) side.

Accountants were preferably chosen among relatives's sons or alternatively among young men without strong familial or personal relations and thus easily attached to the merchant's environment: *"I have been working here for three months with a very good first secretary; the good thing about him is that he does not come from Smyrna...he does not have any brothers and as time goes by he will be totally attached to me...because loyalty is far more important than business capacity."* (Petrocochino, 1843, Smyrna). As business turnover

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[17]. About the circulation of commercial manuals in 18th and 19th century see Tr.Sklavenitis [1989] and G.Papageorgiou [1990].

[18]. See G.B.Dertilis "Entrepreneurs grecs: trois generations, 1770-1900" in F.Angiolini - D.Roche (eds.) [1995].

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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grew, and a second or a third accountant or simple assistants were needed, merchants usually used as many members of their family as possible: sons preferably, but daughters as well. By the 1840's Demetrios's Petrocochino younger siblings (Harikleia: 19 years old; Ariadne: 17; Stratis: 16; Marigo: 12) were trained at their father's firm as bookkeepers or copy-writers.

Andreas Syngros<sup>19</sup> in his delightful descriptions of a merchant's every-day life in Marseille in the late 1850's, reveals the executive part of business; like in the famous paintings of Brueghel (*le paiement des redevances* for example), we see the Director going to the stock-exchange or to the market, the porter delivering merchandise, the longshoremen loading or unloading a ship. The young Constantinopolitan merchant used to work hard from early in the morning until late in the evening. His first impression of a Director's life in Marseille was how "easy if not lazy" it was.

Most offices were established in merchants's houses and those were situated close to the stock-exchange so that brokers visited merchants at their offices; it seems that a directors's favorite place was the club where sums of 10.000 francs were gambled and usually lost!

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[19]. A.Syngros [1908] v.I., pp.346-347. A.Syngros, important merchant and banker in Constantinople, became one of the magnates of the Greek state in 19th century. For the careful historian (like all auto-biographers Syngros idealizes his own life) his "memoirs", written in a pleasant literary style, provide valuable information about unknown or neglected aspects of the every-day life.

[Partners and Partnerships]

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To this extent the docker did everything related to the market and to the stock-exchange: delivering, checking and storing cargo. Moreover, the organization of cargo handling in Marseille, as much under the supervision of the powerful society of longshoremen (Societe des Portefaix)<sup>20</sup> up to the 1850's as under the subaltern employees of the Compagnie des docks after the construction of the new port basins in the 1860's, perfectly matched the merchant's demand for labour for loading or unloading a ship with a minimum of supervision.

*Commercial Association: Common Secrecy*

The great majority of firms covered here, whether General or Partnerships, were family businesses "stricto sensu"; that is, sons were always preferred to nephews, nephews to sons-in-law etc. Thus it would not be too bold to state that partners were found among first degree blood relatives: father cooperated with son, brother with brother, nephew with uncle. Such at any rate was the ideal; it was not always accomplished, because of geographical dispersion; or because of the hazards of war - many distinguished merchants were killed in the Chios massacres of 1822; or even because of the birth of too many daughters.

One way for able men from outside the ruling family to succeed in

obtaining partnerships was to marry into the founding family and in this

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[20]. See W.H.Sewell [1977] p.38.

[Partners and Partnerships]

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way to be incorporated into it. Even in this case, conflicts were very often in evidence and the outside member of the family was always under scrutiny and close supervision; Dimitrio's Petrocochino early enthusiasm about the future marriage of his sister with the merchant Thomas Skouloudis and his eventual cooperation with their firm, ended up in vivid scepticism when his father Michel proposed Thomas as a general partner: " *it is not in our interest if Thomas becomes a general partner; the future of our family must not depend on the signature of a son-in-law; he deserves to be my brother and your son-in-law but the interest of our family is sacred; as a result, either he will cooperate with me or let it be..*" (Petrocochino: 1844, Smyrna). Writing bluntly or implicitly, Petrocochino reveals three concentric cycles of confidence: the ruling family, including first degree blood relatives; the larger family, extended to second degree blood relatives and relatives by marriage; and the family's friends, compatriots, correligionists.<sup>21</sup> In the same spirit, employees were chosen either among relatives or among men without strong family relations, who would easily become attached to the ruling family.

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[21]. This quasi typology is descriptive and concerns only the Greek mercantile family in Marseille; it lacks any theoretical ambition and it does not relate to the enormous literature about family forms and structures in Europe which is based on the distinction between family and household and which analyses the former with data from the formation of the latter; given the lack of appropriate statistics our discussion is limited but benefits from the precision and depth of a rare testimony: that of a merchant.

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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In other words, commercial association, Limited or General, was not merely a way of mobilizing capital.<sup>22</sup> In these family firms, capital was created through common work, and by family autofinancing. Merchants invested their own capital or resorted preferably to their family. Thus association was not a means of amassing capital.

However, by the 1870's business demands and big changes in the organization of trade regularly challenged the Greeks' mercantile precepts. Leading firms in Marseille were drawn into various financial companies inspired by the Credit Mobilier. The exemplars of the new age were all "loners" who could move fast, select their alliances to suit the occasion, make instant decisions.<sup>23</sup>

A very important characteristic in the firm's organization and in the organization of trade in general, neglected until now, was the commercial secret. Extracts from some letters strikingly depict this every-day practice:

*"I secretly bought sesame from Aidini's pashas...nobody here in Smyrna knows this business not even Kouvelas"* (who was one of his

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[22]. As Ch.Carriere states: *"La maniere dont les hommes engagent les capitaux est revelatrice a la fois de leur mentalite et de leurs conception des affaires"* Ch.Carriere [1973] vol.II, p.875.

[23]. See chapter "Power in the city". Andreas Syngros, who was undoubtedly the most talented entrepreneur of his time, begun his career as an able man from outside the big Chian mercantile families (he was from Chios as well, but his father, a doctor, did not belong to the Chian "aristocracy"); his initial disadvantage became an asset as he was obliged to work as an individualist in a changing period where ties of blood were no longer the most enduring guarantee of business' success.

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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business partners in Smyrna; Petrocochino, 19 October 1843, Smyrna).

"You are right to employ a second accountant; but I wish that he should not read my letters until you get to know him better...I would like to be sure that nobody sees my letters except Guizou" (he was first secretary in Marseille and he was Turkish; Petrocochino, 19 November 1843, Smyrna).

"My uncle does not have a one half share in this business as I wrote to you in my "general" (on purpose for the accountants) but he has only 1/4." (Petrocochino, 9 March 1844, Smyrna).

"The best is when the Greeks here know nothing at all because they are all full of envy" (Petrocochino, 29 September 1844, Smyrna).

"Pour les fines dures, la partie que vous allez recevoir se vendra facilement a plus de F.12; , mais il faut qu'elle aille en droiture a Paris, sans qu'on la voie a Marseille, parce que nous l'avons travaillee a Symi en secret pour que les autres Symiotes ne connaissent pas cette affaire...C'est une affaire sure mais il faut qu'on n'en sache rien a Marseille, absolument rien" (Petrochino, 9 July 1845, Smyrna).

Small circles of confidence, blood relatives as a guarantee of mutual trust and harmony, continuous evaluation and supervision of

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[Partners and Partnerships]

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outside partners, suspicion, envy, commercial secrets as an every-day practice: we have the impression that Greek merchants lived in "Das Schloss" the "Castle" of Franz Kafka! But this is only an impression, because unlike K. the forces that our heroes were fighting against were visible: they were the forces of markets. This is where we should now turn: to the organization of markets, of commercial practices, of networks; an organization that was shaped by the merchants strategies, while at the same time restricting and forming their strategic choices.

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[Chapter 5]

C H A P T E R   S I X

THE IMPORT-EXPORT TRADE

"Il n'est pas possible de se dissimuler les dangers qui menacent de toute part la puissance ottoman, et le partage de ce vaste Etat paraîtrait même très prochain, si l'histoire à la main, il était permis de juger, d'après l'audace des gouverneurs des provinces, et l'insubordination des plus petits feudataires du serail.

Ainsi, d'autres couleurs vont flotter sur les rives méridionales de la Méditerranée, et quels que soient les nouveaux maîtres à qui les événements destinent cette terre favorisée par la nature, nous devons nous attendre au partage de la plus ancienne de nos relations commerciales, de celle qui, depuis quatre siècles, était devenue notre patrimoine exclusif... Si nous demandions aujourd'hui à l'administration des douanes ce qui nous reste de ce commerce, quelle serait sa réponse? Des magasins vides... des ateliers déserts... des Grecs dans nos ports,

[Import-Export trade]

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*et jusque dans l'interieur de nos provinces, apportant eux-memes leurs marchandises sur leurs propres navires... des marchands en costume oriental colportant leurs denrees dans les plus petits villages de Midi, et emportant notre or en retour... Ma plume se refuse a achever ce tableau. In me suffira de dire que Marseille, sous ce triste rapport, est devenue ce qu'elle a ete a son origine, une colonie exploitee en grande partie par les Grecs ou pour leur compte..."*

*Journal de Marseille, 9 aout 1820.*

The Eastern Mediterranean was Marseille's leading trading partner during the 18th century and the city's merchant marine was given a virtual monopoly on the Levant trade. The years of prosperity were followed by a period of deep economic depression during the Revolution and the Empire. The port of the city saw the emigration of merchants and capitalists, long naval blockades, the destruction of much of its merchant marine. As maritime commerce was the prime motor of Marseille's economy, the changes experienced were felt in all sectors.<sup>1</sup>

An important change was the taking over of much of the Levant

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[1]. One result, for example, was a fall in population from 110,000 on the eve of the Revolution to 95,000 in 1811; see W.H.Sewell [1977] p.18.

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[Import-Export trade]

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trade - the longtime staple of Marseille's commerce - by the Greeks. The considerable Greek involvement in this trade has been acknowledged in studies of Marseille's economic history but only in a very general way.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Greek historiography has recently been enriched by studies concerning Greek Mediterranean trade of the 19th century;<sup>3</sup> thus a corpus of literature has been created which brings together the "common places" of Greek mercantile activity. The purpose of this chapter is to put Marseille's Greek merchant enterprise in its Mediterranean context, with particular reference to those features which united it or differentiated it from similar Greek enterprises operating in other markets. The study has benefitted by statistics compiled from the valuable *Registres de Sante*<sup>4</sup> and the economic journal *Semaphore de Marseille*<sup>4</sup> and a handful of case studies, a rare source, where detailed inside information offers some feel for the considerations of the merchants.

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[2]. See in particular the original D.E.A. of Y.Bocognano [1958], C.Lastes [1962] and R.Pascal [1965] which were presented at the University of Aix-en-Provence, *Faculte des Lettres*, under the supervision of Prof. P.Guiral. These studies and the *Encyclopedie departementale des Bouches-du-Rhone* [1922] under the direction of P.Masson, constitute the pioneering and the only bibliography about the Greek mercantile activity in Marseille; this information based on primary sources has been usefully employed in the study by P.Echinard, from the perspective of Philhellenism. The problem is that in a typical approach of this kind one learns that the Greeks were generally prominent in Marseille's Levant trade but their activities were neither clearly distinguished from other levantine merchants nor examined by location of action, nature and order of operation.

[3]. Except the studies of the 1980's already mentioned in this thesis, see the very recent works of G.Harlaftis [1996] and V.Kardasis [1997].

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### Trade Organization

Greek Mediterranean trade was hierarchically organized in several levels, distinguished by place of action, kind and order of operation. The Greek merchant enterprise in Marseille occupied the highest level. It was constituted by import-export firms with either branches in the biggest centres of production, or simple collaborators in markets of secondary importance. As is shown by the documents presented in chapter five, the marseillaise company was usually the headquarters, providing

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[4]. *Les Registres de Sante*, known to historians but used extensively by Ch. Carriere, are found in the *Archives departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone, serie E, Sante maritime*. The series comprises the *Registres des depositions des capitaines de navires entres dans les ports*, which gives the following information: boat's name, captain's name and place of origin, exact number of crew, port and date of departure, port of call, information about the destination of other boats, ship agent, cargo and cargo's consignee. This precious source, as far as the merchandise is concerned, has some drawbacks: first, sometimes this is only addressed and not consigned to a merchant and secondly, very often merchandise is consigned to a temporary association of two or three merchants for example, which does not represent a commercial company. In any case, the first problem is solved if one is aware of the fact that in a statistic of imports by merchant, the figures given represents merchandise distributed and not necessarily owned; the second problem is lessened by the extensive use of secondary sources. The economic journal *Semaphore de Marseille*, although the second source of importance, has been extensively used by historians because of its easier access; it has the same drawbacks since it took its information from the aforementioned *Registre de Sante (Bureau de la Sante de Marseille)*.

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[Import-Export trade]

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capital to all branches, in the form of open credit bearing interest. This "leading" position was due to two main factors: first, it was actually European demand that determined Levantine supply; and the Greeks in Marseille were immediately informed about quantities and prices in local Levantine markets; secondly merchants in Marseille had access to credit both from the French banking system and from their European partners.

Still more important, Greeks merchants had successfully penetrated the Levantine centres of production, that is, precapitalist social formations dominated by merchant capitalism, where relations of exchange fashioned relations of production rather than the opposite.<sup>5</sup> In such isolated markets as the ports of the Black Sea or of Azof's Sea, with low levels of communication and virtually non-existent banking networks, Greek merchant capital dominated in many sectors of production. The only form of credit available to cultivators was that supplied by the merchant networks which influenced the commercialization of crop. Thus, the organization of commerce and the strategies of the exporters were chief factors in the formation of prices in the areas of production.

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[5]. See R.Rowland [1972] p.175 ff: *"Although it is correct to insist that a mode of production is defined by the sphere of production and not by that of circulation...we should not go as far as to assume that circulation can never determine the particular forms of manifestation of non-capitalist modes of production (or of non-developed forms of the capitalist mode of production) in specific historical situations"*. Although the relations between peasant agriculture and merchant capitalism are beyond the scope of this study, it would be useful to mention the paramount importance that relations of exchange may have for

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[Import-Export trade]

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In this economic context, the essence of the leaders' practice throughout the period was to retain a diversified commodity and financial business, within specific geographical areas, shifting interest from one to another as opportunities changed. The ways in which one branch of their activity could open up or support others were numerous, as were the problems arising from this mobility.

a) The import trade

The volume of merchandise imported by the Greek firms was large (see appendix C), but the principal imports were few, requiring almost exclusively no manufacturing or special treatment: raw materials used in the textile industries of France like silk, mohair yarn, cotton, cotton yarn, and wool; wheat and olive oil<sup>6</sup> as the most important foodstuffs; but also figs, raisins and dried fruit; and limited quantities of wax, gum, galls, hide, sponges, opium, madder root, valonia and scammony, as well as storax, vermilion, alum, gum ammoniac and boxwood.

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(...continued)

peasant agriculture in such precapitalist formations as the Levant and a big part of the Mediterranean during the 18th and 19th centuries. The predominance of merchant capitalism over the Greek economy has been shown by G.Dertilis "Structuration sociale et specificites historiques" in Dertilis (ed.) [1988] p.28; see also A.Franghiadis [1990].

[6]. These two products were among Marseille's first ten leading imports in 1828; wheat remained the city's first import 32 years later, see appendix D.

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[Import-Export trade]

Table 6.1. Opium imported by Greek firms in Marseille, 1823-1835  
(in boxes)

Year	Greek firms	Boxes	Total	%
1823	Rodocanachi	1		
1825	Petrocochino-Agelasto	2		
1827	M.Badetti	1		
	Petrocochino-Agelasto	6		
1828	Rodocanachi	2		
1830	Badetti	15		
	Reggio	2		
1832	Mavrocordato	21		
	Petrocochino	12		
1833	Mavrocordato	28		
1834	Badetti	5		
	Schilizzi	1		
1835	Zizinia	29		
Total		125	248	50.4

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1823-1835),

Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

[Import-Export trade]

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**Table 6.2. Wool imported by Greek firms in Marseille,  
1834,1840,1845,1850 (in bales)**

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Year	Bales
1834	422
1840	6,200
1845	13,032
1850	7,722

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Source: Serie Sante 200 . E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1834-1840-1845-1850), Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

[Import-Export trade]

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Table 6.3. Coton imported by Greek firms in Marseille,  
1840,1845,1850 (in bales)

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Year	Bales
1840	7,967
1845	6,389
1850	21,558

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Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1840-1845-1850),  
Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

[Import-Export trade]

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The main problems for the importers were to maintain expertise in diverse specialisation and in various markets of production; and to make a profit quickly, at the expense of their fellow merchants. In the Turkish market, for example, the leading firms, in order to eliminate competition tried to monopolize certain products or the commerce of certain places: *"Here in Smyrna, they believe that Roccas attempts to monopolize the oils, Baltazis exchange, Dromocaiti Smyrna's commerce...* (Petrocochino: 19 December 1843, Smyrna).

The key practice as far as the principal raw materials and foodstuffs were concerned, was to make purchases with anticipated payments direct to the cultivators through the ayans, the Turkish landowners who held their lands primarily through their functions as tax collectors and administrators: *"I go on with the purchase of wool; ...it seems to me a very good affair because apart from the guarantee of the advance payments, the money will be paid through the aga who is a friend of our agent"* (Petrocochino: 9 March 1844, Smyrna).

Anticipated payments against promises of delivery of determined quantities immediately after the harvest, first eliminated competition: *"Mavrocordato from Constantinople sent somebody to these two villages in order to give money, but our man, by being close to aga, does not allow him to do so* (Petrocochino, 29 March 1844, Smyrna); and second reduced considerably intermediate traders costs: *"Pour le moment il n'y a pas de laines a Smyrne et ce sera pour la prochaine recolte; j'ai demande des*

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[Import-Export trade]

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*renseignements pour voir comment nous pourrions acheter cette année-ci la récolte des villages qui produisent la qualité que je vous avais envoyée par Serenon, et qui s'élève de 200 à 250 balles. Nous achèterions si les prix sont convenables dans les villages..., de compte à demi avec celui qui nous a vendu celles par Serenon, et à l'arrivée des laines ici nous prendrions notre demi, et nous serions libre d'acheter l'autre 1/2 au cours ou à la lui laisser vendre à d'autres. Nous enverrions un cinquantaine de mille piastres de fonds garantis par Benjamin moyennant 1 % et nous enverrions le reste au fur et mesure de la réception de la marchandise. Les fonds étant fournis par nous celui qui achètera aux villages ne prendra point de commission" (Petrocochino: 29 January 1844, Smyrna). Moreover, this system allowed the merchant two possible gains, higher profit rates and higher competitiveness through lower prices. Most likely both options were weighed against one another, using whichever was more advantageous at the time.*

But in this system a basic question was of how the merchant managed to safeguard a reasonable cash-flow at all times. Demetrius Petrocochino in Smyrna systematically arranged funds by dispatching the bill of lading and a sample of the merchandise to his father in Marseille who sold it in anticipation of its arrival: "I received your second letter in which you inform me about the sales of sesame. Because of the good weather I hope that the ship will have passed the Archipelago and that it will arrive in Marseille before the end of the

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[Import-Export trade]

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year. But anyway, for the price that you sold it, we'll never lose out." (Petrocochino: 19 December 1843, Smyrna). From the same correspondence it is confirmed (see also below "the Greeks in the grain trade") that advance selling was a widespread method among the Greek merchants in the Levant trade; it enabled them to conduct large operations with relatively little capital and at the same time earn a reputation for prompt cash payments.<sup>7</sup>

Alternatively, they provided money for themselves by importing colonial and French goods from the Levant bought on long term credit, then sold them at discount but for cash: "*j'ai embarque aussi 30 sacs cafe pour Scio que nous avons ecrit a Couvela de vendre au comptant avec un rabais de 5 a 6 % sur les prix precedents pour etre paye comptant.*" (Petrocochino: 29 August 1843, Smyrna). In this regard imports in the Levant were sometimes used as real advances of capital.

Last but not least, a source of cash for advance purchases was the use of French currency in the Levantine markets. The rates of exchange

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[7]. This method is attributed by St.Chapman to Rallis who was at the time the "leader" in the Greek community of London; see St.Chapman [1984] p.127. The author bases his work on E.S.Fairlie's thesis, a pioneering work in the English literature about Greek business which, however, offered but scant information on Greek mercantile strategies, methods or techniques. As a result, despite the valuable contribution of this work, one should reconsider - in the light of primary sources - some historical conceptions like "*the Anglicised Greeks*" or "*their invention (of the Greek merchants) of the cargo trade*" etc.; see E.S.Fairlie [1959] pp.252-253, p.280. What is true is that Rallis was the model for several other Greek families and they had probably perfected this widespread technique for accelerating the turnover of capital.

[Import-Export trade]

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of almost all European currencies were favourable because of continuous currency devaluation in the Empire. Thus, all the European currencies had a positive *aggio* (called also *discount* or *benefice*) which was the current rate of exchange between the Ottoman piastre and the Venetian sequin; it was then applied to the rate of exchange between the Ottoman coin and all the other European currencies.<sup>8</sup> Our merchants were systematically financing their purchases by selling francs at prices higher than that of the "official" market: "*Here in Smyrna everybody wants my francs; as soon as the ship arrives when I go to the market, all the agents come to find me and they always offer a better price than the current in the market.*" (Petrocochino, 19 November 1843, Smyrna).

b) The export trade

The participation of Greek mercantile enterprises in Marseille's export trade is, on present evidence, very difficult to depict since official statistics do not exist<sup>9</sup>; however, data from individual firms offer important information.

As we have seen in chapter one, since the end of the 18th century

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[8]. See E.Frangakis-Syrett [1992] p.150.

[9]. The aforementioned *Registres de Sante* concerns only the boats' arrivals and not the departures and *Semaphore de Marseille's* information on departures is sporadic.

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[Import-Export trade]

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the Greeks had started to buy French manufactures (mainly cloth) on credit which they sold cheaply but for cash.<sup>10</sup> Our merchants followed the same system: they exported colonial and French goods from Marseille in order to have a steady flow of cash. In this regard, their export trade was partly complementary to their import trade, for many reasons.

As early as the 1800's, the ever-increasing amount of French manufactured goods was not absorbed by the Levantine markets, which were already glutted with English goods, offered at better prices. In many instances, the Greek exporters in Marseille complained about the difficulty in selling: "*Le capitaine Saraitopoulo est arrive et j'ai recu les marchandises que vous lui avez chargees pour moi. Les veaux cires sont dans un grand calme et ils garderont quelque temps le magasin. Pour les moucellines je n'ai rien fait encore; vous trouvez ci-inclus le compte de vente des 20 pieces chalyes que vous m'aviez envoyees primitivement....J'ai vendu aussi ces jours-ci 33 pieces chalyes par cap.Vuccassovich a P.9 3/8 comptant et j'ai encaisse l'argent; a ce prix nous perdons le benefice de Marseille et les commissions peut etre cepedant que la commission d'ici restera*" (Petrocochino: 19 April 1844, Smyrna).

Moreover, retail traders had started to be supplied directly from

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[10]. It is well known that for most of the eighteenth century, cloth was France's principal export and the product around which commercial exchanges of all types between the Ottoman Empire and western Europe revolved.

[Import-Export trade]

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French manufacturers: *"Il faut que vous sachiez que tous les magasins font venir eux memes de France ces objets (les cravattes) de modes de maniere que les negociants ne peuvent pas s'en meler ici"* (Petrocochino: 9 April 1844, Smyrna).

On the other hand, the participation of Greeks in the export of Marseillaise or colonial goods was somehow hindered by the organization of trade in some Levantine markets; Petrocochino explains that: *"..in Satalia, (or Antalya which is found on the Minor Asia coast south of Smyrna) the barter trade dominates; that is, when someone wants to buy export goods, he gets them easier and on better terms if he pays in import products and viceversa, if he wants to sell manufactured goods and other import merchandise it is to his benefit to get paid in exports."* (29 November 1844, Smyrna).

In any case, the export trade in which the Greeks were specialised underwent some far-reaching changes, until it became unprofitable. For the most perspicacious among diaspora Greeks that was one more signal to shift their activities and capital toward other operations. Andreas Syngros explains: *"Then (in the 1840's) I proposed to limit the import trade, rather passive, not only in Constantinople but also in the rest of our branches, to liquidate even those in Manchester and in Bucarest, and to shift the considerable capital that was engaged in long term credit operations in import trade, to banking with the Turkish government."* (A.Syngros [1908] p.353). This trend, however, was not to

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[Import-Export trade]

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be generalised until two decades later.

#### The wheat trade

*"La Mediterranee n'a jamais vecu sous le signe de la surabondance, sa gene meme, la recherche de compensations l'ont obligee a certaines habiletés. Etudier les problemes du ble, c'est atteindre une des faiblesses de sa vie et, en meme temps, saisir cette vie dans sa pleine epaisseur."*<sup>11</sup>

Wheat became the key product of the Greek import-export entreprise in Marseille from the second decade of the 19th century.<sup>12</sup> It remained so until the 1870's, in spite of the restrictions and regulations implemented by France. The very considerable Greek involvement in the wheat sector renders it an important study of the development and decline of Greek commercial networks more generally.

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[11]. F.Braudel [1990] v.2, p.264.

[12]. As we have seen in chapter one, wheat was also the exclusive import product of the first Greek ships arriving in Marseille during the Napoleonic Wars.

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[Import-Export trade]

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a) Constitution of commercial networks, 1815-1840

(1) The wheat import trade in difficulty

Shortages and Wars (declared or in the waiting) were the main factors which determined the wheat trade during the whole eighteenth and a large part of the nineteenth century. The end of the Napoleonic Wars and the dearth of wheat in 1816-1817 stimulated once again the marseillais grain trade and modified the structure of this market:

*La paix revenue et les mers libres, Marseille se tournait de nouveau vers le large. La part des bles francais dans ses importations diminua au fur et a mesure que se retablissaient les liaisons maritimes: de 99,3 % en 1814, elle tombait a 55 % en 1816 et 0,9 % en 1818. L'evolution s'effectuait au benefice des regions productrices de la Mediterranee. Des anciens courants commerciaux du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siecle, certains comme la Barbarie avaient a peu pres disparu; d'autres retrouvaient une certain vitalite, tel le Levant qui representait 5,5 % des importations de ble en 1816, 16,1 % en 1817 et 11,58 % en 1818; quelques-uns s'assuraient une place de premier plan, comme la peninsule italienne qui fournissait 31 % en 1817 et 37,5 % en 1818. Mais le fait le plus spectaculaire fut l'apparition d'un nouveau secteur qui domina vite tous les autres, celui de la mer Noire. Nul en 1815, il livrait*

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


Figure 6.1. Wheat and Flour Imports in Meville (in quintol)

[Import-Export trade]

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4,27 % des bles de Marseille en 1816, 39,84 % en 1817, 49,27 % en 1818 et 59,15 % en 1819: une entree en force qui ne fut pas etrangere a la legislation protectionniste de 1819 et 1821.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 6.1 shows the short-lived boom of wheat and flour imports immediately after the end of the Napoleonic Wars; a great part of the wheat imported, as R.Caty points out, originated from the Black Sea markets, which constituted a spectacular change in the structure of this trade. The increase was followed by an equally sharp fall lasting for at least two years, mainly due to laws voted in 1819 and 1821 by the Lower Parliamentary which restricted grain imports by introducing a sliding scale: when home prices were below certain levels imports were prohibited and when these levels were exceeded, imports were allowed on payment of a graduated scale of duties.<sup>14</sup> The arguments which were put forward in support of the new law were very similar to those heard in England<sup>15</sup> in the same period - the French farmer had basic costs which could not be reduced and unless he was protected against cheap imports, he would have to go out of business. The new law brought "*un coup mortel au commerce des bles, l'un des principaux de Marseille*".<sup>16</sup>

In Southern and in Northern Europe shortages continued on and off from 1827 until 1832. Harvests were not uniformly bad, but bad enough

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[13]. R.Caty [1973] p.194.

[14]. P.Masson [1926] v.9, p.30.

[15]. S.E.Fairlie [1959] pp.76-77.

[16]. P.Masson [1926] v.9, p.30.

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[Import-Export trade]

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and in enough places to maintain the general state of scarcity. Matters were constantly complicated by political events and Marseille's dependence on maritime trade made its economy extremely vulnerable to political or military crisis. In Southern Europe in particular, the Black Sea was closed to trade and unable to export during part of 1827, all of 1828 and part of 1829 because of the Russo-Turkish war. The results were to be seen in high wheat and rye prices all over Northern and Southern Europe in 1831-1832.<sup>17</sup>

(2) The first Importers

During this early period the establishment of the first Greek wheat importing firms in Marseille was mainly due to the opening of the Turkish, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof grain markets to Europe and the comparative advantages that the Greek merchants held in these markets in relation to their European competitors. In fact, this growing wheat trade was largely in the hands of a group of merchants established since the last two decades of the 18th century in Russia and being well connected with the commercial centres of the interior like Nizna, Kiev or Moscou;<sup>18</sup> moreover their mercantile experience and their commercial

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[17]. S.E.Fairlie [1959] pp.82-83; but it seems that part of the Black Sea wheat trade was conducted through Constantinople, see R.Pascal [1965] p.51.

[Import-Export trade]

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know-how sprang in many ways from areas of the Greek peninsula which resembled economically those of Russia: difficult communications, isolated markets with low levels of commercialization, virtually inexistant banking and finance, agricultural inland.

The first commercial firm to import wheat in Marseille was "*Amira Luc et fils*" established in 1816 by Demetrius Amira and his brother Constantin originally from Smyrna. In 1817 and 1818 the firm imported a considerable quantity of wheat through Livorno coming originally from Odessa, Tangarog and Constantinople; a part of the cargo was then exported to Barcelona. As P.Echinard points out, "*Luc Amira et fils fut la seule maison grecque de Marseille a rivaliser en 1817 et 1818 avec les principaux importateurs de bles russes de la ville. Elle recut pour plus d'un million de francs de bles russes en 1817*".<sup>18</sup>

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[18]. S.E.Fairlie [1959] p.236.

[19]. P.Echinard [1973] pp.86-87, fn.57.

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[Import-Export trade]

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Table 6.4. Grain imported from Con/ple by Greek firms in Marseille,  
1818, 1832 (in hectolitres).

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Year	Greek firms	Total	% (of the total)
1818	7,455	152,275	4.89
1832	57,073	113,784	50.15

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Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1818, 1832), Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone; Y.Bocognano, *Le commerce des bles a Marseille de 1840 a 1870*, Memoire de Diplome d'Etudes Superieures, Faculte de Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence, 1958, p...

Despite his considerable involvement in wheat trade and other imports, Amira's commercial activities were largely reduced in 1819 and 1820. Nevertheless, the wheat trade was to become the core of a group's of dynamic Greek merchants' business (some of these were already active in 1832, see table 6.5) who then dominated the market for more than thirty years.<sup>20</sup> The Prefect of Bouches-du-Rhone underlined the Greek presence in the city's wheat trade as early as 1821:

*"Il etait rare de voir des maisons grecques a Marseille...Celles*

[Import-Export trade]

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qui s'y trouvaient etaient en trop petit nombre...mais, depuis lors, le commerce avec cette nation, et surtout le commerce des grains avec les ports de la mer Noire ayant repris beaucoup d'activite, un plus grand nombre de maisons grecques sont venues s'etablir a Marseille".<sup>21</sup>

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[20]. In 1818 there was only one Greek importer out of twenty-four whereas in 1832 the proportion was six out of fifteen.

[21]. A.D., 128 v 1.

[Import-Export trade]

Table 6.5. Main Greek firms of Grain imports from Con/ple in Marseille,  
1818, 1832

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Year	Firm	% (of the total)
1818	AMIRA et FILS	4.89
1832	ZIZINIA	21.79
	RODOCANACHI	14.69
	SCHILIZZI	6.45
	MAVROCORDATO	3.67
	DROMOCAITI	1.99
	ARGENTI et RALLI	1.53

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Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1818, 1832), Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone; Y.Bocognano, *Le commerce des bles a Marseille de 1840 a 1870*, Memoire de Diplome d'Etudes Superieures, Faculte de Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence, 1958, p...

b) The golden age of the Greek wheat importers, 1840-1870

As it has been pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, Greek

[Import-Export trade]

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Mediterranean trade was hierarchically organized in several levels and the merchant enterprise in Marseille represented the highest level; that was first due to the advantageous position of the firms in Marseille in respect to the quotations of the European demand which defined the Levantine supply. This was also confirmed as far as the development of the commercial wheat networks were concerned; the predominance of the Greeks in the grain sector started after 1820, when they constituted their multinational network of branches in the Mediterranean and European commercial cities.<sup>22</sup> A second - equally important - reason for this success, was penetration into the centres of production; not only in the Levant, but mainly in Southern Russian markets.

(1) Conditions of development of the wheat import trade

Sometime between 1836 and 1846, a new period began in the history of the European grain trade. Western Europe became deficient in bread grains; and had to look for more and more of her supplies in areas outside Western and central Europe.

Shortages on the Continent occurred contemporaneously with those in

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[22]. See V.Kardasis [1997] p.283. In this regard, note the establishment of the leading commercial firms in Odessa in the first three decades of the 19th century: Theodore Rodocanachis in 1819, Zannis Rallis in 1820, Constantinos Papudoff extended his business in 1820, Alexander Zarifis moved to the city after 1820 and Spyridon Mavros in 1825.

[*Import-Export trade*]

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Britain, both in 1839-1842, and in 1846-1847: but if anything they were more prolonged and endemic, particularly because they endured between 1842 and 1846 in some places. Conditions of scarcity continued to prevail in 1839, and to a lesser extent in 1840-1841, and reappeared with severity in 1842. As a result grain imports increased considerably and France managed to have import balances in the bread grains, (in wheat and rye) in every year between 1843 and 1847 inclusive. Prices remained high in 1843 and they fell only slightly in 1844 and 1845.<sup>23</sup> (see Table 6.6.)

During 1845, 1846 and 1847 as is well known, famine covered most parts of Western and Central Europe, including Western Germany, the Prussian Dominions, Poland, North Western Russia and the Austrian Dominions. In many places, as in France, the Rhineland and the Netherlands, wheat prices in 1846 exceeded those in Britain. In France the corn laws and the Navigation Acts were suspended to encourage the importation of grain from all quarters, while export was prohibited; that's why high prices and shortages in 1846-1847 were followed by a sharp fall in prices and a glut of grain in 1848-1849.<sup>24</sup>

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[23]. See S.E.Fairlie [1959] pp.87, 91-92.

[24]. Harvest in the Russian producing areas had been good in 1846, at the time when harvests in most of Western and Central Europe had been bad. France imported the great quantity of 2,400,000 chetverts of wheat from Russia while Britain imported only 1,100,000. See S.E.Fairlie [1959] p.109, fn.137.

[Import-Export trade]

Table 6.6. Wheat Prices in London, Marseille and Odessa, 1839-1861  
(shilling /quarter)

Year	London	Marseille	Odessa	Harvest
1839	70.06	51.4	27.6	good
1840	66.04	50.7	27.8	bad
1841	64.05	42.1	28.7	bad
1842	57.05	45.6	25.8	good
1843	50.02	47.7	21.6	good
1844	51.03	45.1	22.2	good
1845	50.09	45.1	25.2	poor
1846	54.09	55.8	27.1	poor
1847	69.05	67.4	37.7	good
1848	50.06	38.8	26.7	normal
1849	44.06	35.6	26.6	poor
1850	40.04	33.2	26.8	normal
1851	38.07	33.7	23.1	poor
1852	41	40	25.7	good
1853	53.03	52	30.6	good

[Import-Export trade]

(...continued)

Table 6.6. Wheat Prices in London, Marseille and Odessa, 1839-1861

(shilling /quarter)

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Year	London	Marseille	Odessa	Harvest
1854	72.07	66.1	37.5	good
1855	74.09	68	30.7	
1856	69.02	71.6	48.8	
1857	56.04	56.7	31.8	
1858	44.02	39	30.7	
1859	43.09	38.8	35.8	
1860	53.03	46.1	39	
1861	55.04	57	40.8	

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\* This refers to Russia's previous harvest year.

Source: S.Fairlie, *The anglo-Russian grain trade*, 1959, Ph.D., London, pp.421-423 and V.Kardasis, *The Greeks in Southern Russia in 19th century*, 1997, Athens, pp.260-261 (in Greek).

In France there was a distinct positive correlation between good harvests, large yields, low prices and large exports to Britain;<sup>25</sup> and

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[25]. It is almost certain that in some years Russian Black Sea wheat

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[Import-Export trade]

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the reverse was true, since poor home harvests and high prices coincided with small exports to Britain and large imports from other sources, particularly Russia. This correlation is so striking as to give rise to the impression that in the period 1848-1861, France was the main determining country of West European wheat prices. Certainly she seems to have been the only important Western European country where prices were determined mostly by domestic conditions. This was aided by the fact that France retained her sliding scale until 1861 (although it was in permanent suspension between September 1853 and 1859). In 1860-1861, France like Britain, once more began to suffer from shortages. France reduced exports and repealed the sliding scale. She took in large exports from Russia, and in 1861 from the United States. During the 1860's, she ceased to be an important supplier to Britain.

(2) The leading firms

Under these advantageous circumstances, the Greeks dominated Marseille's wheat import trade for such a long time as to be considered "*Les Rois du ble*" in local people's minds. In this regard, the following statement, written in 1853, expresses more than a personal opinion:

*"Quelqu'un s'est-il jamais avise de reclamer a Marseille contre*

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(...continued)

reached Britain in substantial quantities via Marseille; see S.E.Fairlie [1959] pp.171-172.

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[Import-Export trade]

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*certain monopole que les Grecs exercent depuis grand nombre d'annees, monopole qui ne tend a rien moins qu'a ne laisser aux Marseillais une baie de la Mer Noire, de la Mer Azoff, pas un ilot du Danube a exploiter? Grace a l'activite dont les chefs de ces maisons grecques ont fait preuve a l'epoque ou ils etaient les representants ou les associes des riches proprietaires d'Odessa, de Taganrock et l'Egypte, ils sont parvenus a faire refluer vers nous ces vastes greniers du Danube auxquels l'Europe a toujours recours au moment de ses grandes disettes".<sup>26</sup>*

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[26]. F.Mazuy [1853] p.251.

[Import-Export trade]

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Table 6.7. Grain imported by Greek firms in Marseille, 1840-1870  
(in hectolitres)

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Year	Greek firms	Total*	% (of the total)
1847	5,048,448.75	9,752,307.88	52.,83
1857	2,273,087.65	4,377,263.11	51.92
1867	6,018,723.07	8,335,887.41	71.00

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\* Total of the arrivals of which we know the consignee.

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone; Semaphore de Marseille.

[Import-Export trade]

Table 6.8. Main Markets of Grain imported by Greek firms in  
Marseille, 1840-1870

Market	Percentage of the market's total		
	1847	1857	1867
Black Sea <sup>1</sup>	53,65	57,41	65,88
Turkey <sup>2</sup>	48,19	40,68	60,48
Syria <sup>3</sup>	10,40	79,88	90,52
Greece	86,87	-	72,58

1. Except the Russian ports of Crimea and of the Azoff Sea, there have been included the Turkish ports of the Danubian Provinces (Ibraila, Galatz, Varna, Burgas etc.) and those of the eastern coast of Constantinople (Heraclee, Samsoun, Soukhoun-Kaleh).

2. It includes Constantinople, Salonica and their dependancies; Smyrna and the ports of the Minor Asia coast until Scala-Nova.

3. The Turkish and the Syrian ports situated between Satalia and Jaffa.

[Import-Export trade]

Table 6.9. Main Greek firms of Grain imports in Marseille, 1840-1870

1847			
	Market	Hl	%
RODOCANACHI	Black Sea	1.543.522,36	19,45
	Turkey	60.133,22	5
	Greece	16.819,88	24,40
	Malta	8.059,08	
-----			
	Total	1.628.534,54	16,69
ZARIFI	Black Sea	737.956,64	9,30
	Turkey	125.811,16	10,53
	Greece	6.500,36	9,45
	Malta	3.088,19	
-----			
	Total	873.356,35	8,95
BASILY M.	Black Sea	679.288,74	8,56
	Turkey	46.923,74	4

[Import-Export trade]

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	Italy	19.907,73	10
	Malta	8.362,82	
	France	3.799	
-----			
	Total	734.539,30	7,53
<b>PAPUDOFF</b>	Black Sea	553.166,45	7
	Turkey	25.158,70	2,9
-----			
	Total	578.325,15	5,94
<b>DROMOCAITI</b>	Black Sea	185.915,21	2,34
	Turkey	81.690,51	6,83
	Greece	4.693,92	6,83
-----			
	Total	272.299,64	2,78
<b>ARGENTI-SECHIARI</b>	Black Sea	214.457,39	2,70
	Turkey	22.069,60	1,67
	Egypt	2.089,84	
-----			
	Total	238.616,83	2,44

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[Import-Export trade]

ZIZINIA	Black Sea	95.156,13	1,18
	Egypt	96.483,83	45,87
	Turkey	8.952,23	--
-----			
	Total	200.592,19	2,05
PETROCOCHINO	Black Sea	152.193,71	1,31
	Turkey	36.870,96	3,08
	Greece	2.489,20	3,62 --
-----			
	Total	191.553,87	1,09
AGELASTO	Black Sea	98.727,62	1,24
	Turkey	22.698,20	1,90
	Greece	19.912,98	2,89 --
	Syria	6.592,00	10,40
	Italy	986,58	
-----			
	Total	156.521,31	1,60 --
RALLI	Black Sea	142.408,26	1,46
-----			
	Total	142.408,26	1,78

[Import-Export trade]

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RALLI-SCHIL.-ARG.Black Sea	96.624,98	1,21
Turkey	19.351,75	1,70
-----		
Total	116.336,73	1,19
MAVROC.-PIGNATE.Black Sea	55.894,52	
Turkey	42.006,66	3,5
Syria	2.524,76	3,97
Egypt	2.176,34	1,03
-----		
Total	102.602,28	1,05
VLASTO --	96.590,36	
BALTAZZI .	72.319,47	
SPARTALI-LASCARIDI	65.095,16	
SCARAMANGA	16.611,67	
N.REGGIO	13.692,61	

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[Import-Export trade]

1857

	Market	Hl	%
RALLI-SCHIL.-ARG.	Black Sea	384.404	8,78
-----			
	Total	384.404	13,67
PAPUDOFF	Black Sea	278.973,37	9,92
	Egypt	19.882,89	4,90
	Italy	5.372,84	1,95
-----			
	Total	304.229,10	6,95
SPARTALI	Black Sea	241.589,41	8,59
	Syria	33.896,47	11,42
	Egypt	17.106,13	4,22
	Greece	3.008,73	10,13
-----			
	Total	295.600,74	6,75
RODOCANACHI	Black Sea	136.872,48	4,86

[Import-Export trade]

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	Turkey	76.796,72	17,33
	Syria	20.925,77	7,00
	Egypt	9.708,76	2,39
	Malta	2.472,80	
	Italy	964,65	
-----			
	Total	247.741,18	5,65
<b>M.BASILY</b>	Black Sea	209.161,53	11,44
	Turkey	15.219,68	3,43
	Syria	11.280,87	3,80
	Egypt	6.902,70	1,7
	Greece	3.556	11,98
-----			
	Total	246.120,78	5,62
<b>ZARIFI</b>	Black Sea	182.274,55	6,48
	Egypt	31.468,70	7,77
	Turkey	4.253,33	
-----			
	Total	217.996,58	4,98
<b>AGELASTO</b>	Black Sea	85.593,14	3

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[ Import-Export trade ]

	Syria	10.978,70	3,7
	Turkey	6.440	1,45
	Egypt	5.975,42	1,47
-----			
	Total	108.987,26	2,48
ZIZINIA	Black Sea	34.349,88	1,22
	Egypt	65.053,19	1,60
	Syria	6.874,20	2,31
-----			
	Total	106.277,27	2,42
LASCARIDI	Syria	84.062,74	28,34
	Turkey	10.791,20	2,43
	Black Sea	7.182,72	
	Egypt	4.238,50	1
-----			
	Total	106.275,16	2,42
RALLI	Black Sea	44.340	1,55
	Egypt	23.800	5,80
-----			
	Total	68.140	1,55

[Import-Export trade]

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<b>APALYRAS</b>	Syria	40.374,20	13,61
	Egypt	9.565,17	2,36
	Black Sea	7.922,18	
	Turkey	4.256,36	
-----			
	Total	62.117,91	1,41
<b>DROMOCAITI</b>	Egypt	50.152,70	12,38
	Turkey	4.345,11	
	Greece	2.382,52	
-----			
	Total	56.910,33	1,30
<b>CHRISTODULO</b>	Black Sea	53.786,89	1,91
	Italy	1.837,85	
-----			
	Total	55.624,74	1,27
<b>M.MAVROCORDATO</b>	Black Sea	50.196,47	1,14
-----			
	Total	50.196,47	1,78
<b>PETROCOCHINO</b>	Black Sea	25.047,57	

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[Import-Export trade]

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Turkey	14.908,53	3,36
Syria	5.013,54	1,67
Greece	3.271,52	11
-----		
Total	48.241,16	1,10
ARGENTI-SECHIARI Black Sea	34.826,88	1,23
Egypt	12.520	3
-----		
Total	47.346,88	1,08
MAVROCORDATO-PIGNATELLI	43.425,72	
VLASTO	41.603	
MELAS	35.850	
CARISSI-VRISSACHI	17.018	
N.REGGIO	14.659,78	
ZYGOMALA	12.386	

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[Import-Export trade]

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BALTAZZI

10.667,92

[Import-Export trade]

1867			
	Market	HL	%
SPARTALI	Black Sea	1.094.452,80	15,44
	Turkey	52.203,85	7,34
	Italy	1.461,60	
-----			
	Total	1.146.118,25	14,51
T. & P.RODOCANACHI	Black Sea	734.386	10,36
	Syria	35.186,67	48,6
	Turkey	31.505,15	4,43
	Greece	4.781,75	25,5
	Italy	1.539	
-----			
	Total	807.398,65	10,20
M.RODOCANACHI	Black Sea	471.452	6,66
	Turkey	23.569,16	3,31
	Syria	13.654,80	18,86

[Import-Export trade]

	Greece	3.911,60	20,93
-----			
	Total	512.587,63	6,48
<b>MELAS</b>	Black Sea	422.099,77	5,95
	Turkey	5.860,19	
-----			
	Total	440.172,76	5,56
<b>ZAFIROPULO ZARIFI</b>	Black Sea	412.372,61	5,28
	Turkey	17.468,13	2,45
-----			
	Total	429.840,74	5,43
<b>AMBANOPULO</b>	Black Sea	426.305,12	5,39
-----			
	Total	426.305,12	6
<b>ARGENTI-SECHIARI</b>	Black Sea	251.528,56	3,55
	Italy	19.910,80	29,2
-----			
	Total	271.439,66	3,43

[Import-Export trade]

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NICOLAI.-FENERLI	Black Sea	234.631	3,31
	Turkey	14.876,52	2
-----			
Total		249.507,56	3,15
BASILY-VALIERI	Black Sea	211.625,88	2,98
	Turkey	3.911,60	
-----			
Total		215.557,48	2,72
M.BASILY	Black Sea	211.691,93	2,67
-----			
Total		211.691,93	3
M.MAVROCORDATO	Black Sea	60.789,40	
	Turkey	57.676,81	8
-----			
Total		118.466,21	1,49
SCARAMANGA	Black Sea	100.197,92	1,26
-----			
Total		100.197,92	1,41

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[Import-Export trade]

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SERBOS	Black Sea	93.158,90	1,17
-----			
	Total	93.158,90	1,30
GHIONI		49.870,86	
N.REGGIO		34.644	
RALLI-NEGROPONTE		32.715,20	
PETROCOCHINO		31.273,50	
PRASSACACHI		15.597,92	
SIDERICOU DI		10.337,44	

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[Import-Export trade]

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Figures in Table 6.7 leave no doubt that the Greeks kept well ahead of their rivals throughout the period. Detailed data on each merchant's share in wheat imports show clearly the early lead taken by a small number of firms which they retained through the period: seventeen in 1847, twenty-three in 1857 and nineteen in 1867.

Among them the predominance of Rodocanachi, Spartali, Zarifi, Ralli-Schilizzi-Argenti, Basily and Papudoff is evident. They got respectively 39,02, 21,26, 14,38, 13,67, 13,15 and 12,89 percent of Marseille's wheat imports. The first three houses separately controlled 75 % of the city's wheat import.

It is characteristic of the firms' organization and of the network's structure that the same firms led the wheat trade both in Marseille and in the producing places such, as Odessa and the other Black Sea ports.<sup>27</sup>

Emmanuel Rodocanachi who arrived in Marseille in 1822<sup>28</sup> with his brother Etienne, stood in the tradition of the Greek mercantile families with their extended networks in the principal Levantine and European centres directed by brothers and their reputation for cohesion in dealings.<sup>29</sup> Very soon his brother Etienne went to Syros where he established the firm Rodocanachi fils et Cie. Except Emmanuel, five brothers directed the respective branches: Theodore in Odessa (1819),

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[27]. See V.Kardasis [1997] p.288; Spartali and Basily were the only firms which do not appear among the leaders in Odessa; Mavros who was not found in Marseille as such, was Melas' partner.

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[Import-Export trade]

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Pandias and George in Livorno, Pierre in Chios and Ettienne in Syros.

Emmanuel's success was mainly achieved by specialisation in wheat trade. In fact, during the years 1832, 1838, 1839 and 1840 he became the biggest grain importer in Marseille from Russia, a real "*Roi du ble*". In 1839 he received 44 ships loaded exclusively with grains originated from Odessa, Berdiansk, Tangarog, Ibraila and Galatz; next year he received 48.<sup>30</sup>

When Emmanuel died, in 1854, his marseillaise firm became independent from the other branches; and it was named after Theodore and Paul, Emmanuel's sons, who had started to work in the firm since 1838.<sup>31</sup> The two brothers continued successfully the wheat trade down to the 1870's, being well integrated into the city's political and social life.<sup>32</sup> According to J.L.Van Regemorter the firm appeared in Manchester and later on in London under the name D.E.Rodocanachi, which does not evoke Paul's and Theodore's initials.<sup>33</sup> What is certain is the firm's involvement in the loans to the Egyptian government in 1876; there can be little doubt that it was Theodore's father-in-law George Ziziniás who

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[28]. In his application for the French citizenship we read: "*Il habite Marseille depuis onze ans sans interruption, qu'il jouit comme negociant et sous le rapport du credit d'une reputation de premiere ligne*". 17 septembre 1833, Naturalisation, M 11 28, A.D.

[29]. In 22 of January 1819 members of the family contracted in Chios the constitution of a firm; four houses were established: in Smyrna (founding capital 285.625 piastres), in Constantinople (350.00 piastres), in Livorno (200.000 piastres) and in Odessa (150.00 piastres). Profits and losses were equally divided and it seems that Constantinople's house was the headquarter; see V.Kardasis [1997] p.291-292.

[30]. See C.Lastes [1962] p.166-167.

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[Import-Export trade]

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put them in business.<sup>34</sup>

There was not a big difference between Rodocanachi's and Zarifi's mercantile policies. The only contrast was Zarifi's early diversification of business mainly because George Zarifi and his son Pericles were late comers in the Mediterranean grain trade; Greeks had started to loose their predominance in the exporting centres.

George, the first son of an eminent Constantinopolitan family, established in Marseille a commercial house as late as 1845; in 1852 he cooperated with Zafiropoulo and they created the firm "Zafiropoulo et Zarifi" situated in Boulevard Musee and some years later in rue du Coq. Rue du Coq was to become legendary for Pericles' receptions in his luxurious house and for the French minister Maurice Rouvier's apprenticeship in this reputable Greek firm.<sup>35</sup> Before his establishment in Marseille, George had founded the firm "Zafiropoulo and Zarifi" in Constantinople with a branch in Odessa directed by his brother

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[31]. See J.L.Van Regemorter [ ] p.425 and fn.65 referred by V.Kardasis [1997] p.292-293, fn.532.

[32]. Paul for example was Chamber's of Commerce member for many years (nov.1852-jan.1863 and nov.1864-july 1872) see L.Bergasse [1913] p.259; for more details see below chapter nine.

[33]. See J.L.Van Regemorter [ ] p.424 and fn.56 referred by V.Kardasis [1997] p.294, fn.534.

[34]. A E, CCC, Alex., vol. 44, Alex., 22 avril 1876. George Ziziniás (or Zizinia) was a very powerful merchant in the Greek community: he was consul of the Greek state from 1836 until his death in 1868 and he was one of Mehemet's-Ali consultants, commisioners and friends. In 1848 he offered to Theodore a 120.000 francs dowry, see A.D. 380 E-465-N<sup>o</sup> acte 54, 19 janvier 1848 (mariage entre M.Rodocanachi & Mad<sup>me</sup> Zizinia).

[35]. See P.Leris [1913] pp.301-302.

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[Import-Export trade]

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Alexander.

In the decade 1850-1860 flour sacks with the characteristic initial Z+Z flooded the markets of Southern France. Entrepreneurs with outstanding business ability, George Zarifi and his partner and brother-in-law Etienne Zafiropoulo, diversified their business by creating a flour-milling industry "*pour utiliser les queues c'est-a-dire les soldes des chargements de ble dont ils ne trouvaient pas l'ecoulement*".<sup>36</sup>

In contrast to a pattern common to many entrepreneurial families, where the new generation does not much to the founders genius and at best continues business without major revision, Pericles Zarifi was an exception. His father's and his uncle's fortunes did not seem to make him sluggish or lukewarm for business activity. After his experience as representative of their firm in London and Constantinople between 1866 and 1870, he was established definitively in Marseille in 1871 where he succeeded his father as head of the house.<sup>37</sup> His marriage with Fanny Rodocanachi, Theodore's daughter, united him with the other leading family of the wheat trade.

But very soon Pericles started to move in finance in order to compensate losses from the decline of the wheat trade. In 1910 he was one of the three biggest shareholders and one of the directors in

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[36]. P.Leris [1913] pp.301-302. Bank's of England (Manchester branch office) report about "Zarifi Bros & Co" read in 1852: "*Very clever and have large means,...*", Bank of England (Manchester) letter books VIII (1852) reffered by St.Chapman [1984] pp.128-129.

[Import-Export trade]

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Marseille's largest shipbuilding company (*Port-de-Bouc Chantier Navale*). What is quite exceptional in Zarifi's case is the family's continuity and adaptation to new conditions: fifty years later, a member of the family continued to be not only the main shareholder but also the protagonist in the merging-see controlling-of *Port-de-Bouc's* shipbuilding company with its rival *La Ciotat* company.<sup>38</sup>

Information about the Spartali firm is quite meagre. The firm in Marseille represented the branch of the London company "*Spartali & Lascaridi*", founded in 1853 by the Lascaridi brothers (Antoine and Pierre) and Spartali. According to the *Bankers' Magazine* (August 1861), the firm traded wheat from Tangarog since 1853. In 1860 the firm was the second large among the Greek leading companies of the City, worth about 100.000 pounds.<sup>39</sup>

The history of Rallis family, on the other hand, is so rich (although information is extremely scattered<sup>40</sup>) that its presentation goes beyond the scope of this study: a historical monograph would have been necessary. What interests us here is Marseille's position in the most extended network of a Greek's firm branches.

Sources are contradictory as to the place of activity of Pantias Rallis before his definitive establishment in London, where he became the leading figure of the firm and of the Greek community: he was

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[37]. Naturalisation - M 11 8 - A.D.

[38]. See J.Domenichino [1988] p.39, fn.1,2 and pp.411-412.

[39]. St.Chapman [1984] p.127.

[Import-Export trade]

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nicknamed "Zeus". It seems that P.Echinard's information is the most reliable since it is derived from primary sources. Pandia with Pantaleon Argenti founded in 1816 in Marseille the firm "Argenti-Ralli" which was liquidated in 1820;<sup>41</sup> meanwhile Pandia's brother August joined them in 1817. Apparently Pandias then moved to London where he directed the firm "Ralli Bros" and in 1834 a new branch was founded in Marseille under the name "Ralli-Schilizzi-Argenti" by August Ralli, Petros Schilizzi and Pantaleon Argenti; the house was a branch of London's headquarter merged with the old firm "Schilizzi-Argenti" originally created in Marseille in 1816. At this period, of the five original Ralli brothers, Pantias remained in London, Eustratius moved on to Manchester, Augustus was in Marseille, Thomas in Constantinople and John in Odessa.<sup>42</sup>

The original foundation of Marseille's and London's firms almost at the same period (Pandias's father, Zannis, created in 1818 the firm "Rallis Petrocochinos" in London), shows that most likely both options were weighed against one another, but obviously the British capital proved the most dynamic. Despite a continuing diversification of business, Rallis attempted to retain the grain trade as late as 1870's

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[40]. In general sources about the Greek merchants are sparse and dispersed, that's why historians may be often mistaken about a person's identification; to make matters worse, as the reader will have already realize, the same surname did not always correspond to the same family. At the period merchants added nick-names to distinguish others or to get distinguished by others: Petrocochino Katzaros was one family and Petrocochino Armatolos another.

[41]. P.Echinard [1973] pp.88,89, fn.62.

[42]. S.E.Fairlie [1959] p.273, fn.172,173.

[*Import-Export trade*]

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and 1880's against the challenge of Dreyfous and the Jewish houses; in this regard, they were connected with many joint-stock banks as the bank of Alexandria (1872), the Anlo-Foreign Banking Co.(1872), the Ottoman Bank at some date after its reconstitution, and the Odessa Discount Bank (1879).<sup>43</sup>

c) Transformation and decline

The biggest wheat import firms in Marseille were constituted in the 1830's, that is, during the period of wheat's export trade development in Russia. This trade was continuously expanded up to 1846-1856, in Odessa firstly and in Azof's ports after 1840. After the Crimean War, however, the Greek participation in Odessa's wheat trade started to decrease in respect to that of other ethnic networks; the Jewish firms "*Ephrussi & Co*" and "*Mahs*", the Russians "*Raffalovich*", and the German-Jewish "*Neubert*", won their position as "first-class" houses, at the expense of the Greeks.<sup>44</sup>

V.Kardasis points out that during this period the Greek houses established in the European centres (Marseille, London, Manchester etc.) realized the limited opportunities their partners in Odessa had to expand any further, consequently, some of them made an early and clean

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[43]. St.Chapman [1984] p.166.

[44]. St.Chapman [1984] p.160.

[*Import-Export trade*]

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cut from the existing form of organization: they did not stop trading wheat altogether, but they ended their partnership with Odessa's firms. Detailed data on exports during the period 1883-1892 confirm the tendency of the bigger Greek houses to abandon wheat trade, following the international foreign firms' conquest of the market.<sup>45</sup>

Greek importers in Marseille shifted their interest to the ports of Azof after 1840. There, the expansion of the high quality *Ghirka* wheat variety gave a lead in exports from: Tangarog, Rostof, Berdiansk, Marioupol. Thus, the Greeks increased considerably their wheat trade with Europe. There, like in Odessa some years earlier, contemporary observers were unanimous in their statements: the Greek firms controlled the wheat trade almost in its totality for at least thirty years (1840-1870).<sup>46</sup> The leading houses in the Sea of Azof were Scaramanga and Vagliano brothers; as a matter of fact Scaramanga continued Odessa's Ralli bros branch activities.

On present evidence we have not established the precise relation between the marseillaise firm Scaramanga and of his director Sarando with the big houses Scaramanga in Tangarog and in Rostof. It is certain that Sarando was established in Marseille as late as 1842 which reinforces the hypothesis of cooperation if not partnership between the two firms; moreover we read in his application for citizenship that " 11

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[45]. V.Kardasis [1997] p.316.

[46]. See V.Kardasis [1997] p.318, fn.592, where he is referred to the French's consul reports (20 August 1859).

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[Import-Export trade]

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*possede un avoir de 50.000 fr. qui doit augmente en dernier lieu par suite de speculations qu'il a faites sur les bles*".<sup>47</sup> In any case, as we see in Table 6.9, Scaramanga passed from wheat imports of 16.611,67 hectolitres in 1847 to 100.197,92 in 1867 which put him among the first thirteen firms in Marseille.

Vagliano was a family originated from Cephalonia who became important in Tangarog's commerce after 1840. Marinos Vagliano was the first to be established in this port where he bought a number of small sailing boats which he employed in the wheat trade. Having Tangarog as the centre of their operation Marinos and his brothers Panaghis and Andreas created branches in Constantinople (1849), in London (1858) and in Marseille (1869); Panaghis directed London's firms and Andreas that of Constantinople's and later on of Marseille's.

They realized great profits during the Crimean War; Marinos bought considerable quantities of wheat in low prices during the period of export banning, which, at the end of the war sold them dearly in the western markets.

Vagliano were among the few families who made a clean cut away from commodity trade and invested in shipping during the period of renovation of the Greek merchant marine.<sup>48</sup>

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[47]. Naturalisation (19 aout 1847) - M 11 29 - A.D.

[48]. V.Kardasis [1997] p.321; see also G.Harlaftis [1994] chap.3 where the author presents Greek merchants who became ship-owners.

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[Import-Export trade]

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The success of the Greek wheat merchants was due to their business, combined familiarity and close personal connections in the exporting markets with immediate access to the local producers in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof areas. As a matter of fact was the endemic shortage of capital in nineteenth century Russia which gave a predominance to merchant capital over the grain sector; the main form of credit available both to small cultivators and to landlords was that supplied by the merchantile networks which influenced the commercialization of the crop. Moreover the absence of telegraphic communications with the rest of Europe gave the merchants exclusive source of information, and they were thus able to dictate their own terms to producers. In 1866 a British writer observed of the Black Sea wheat trade before 1861: "*The Greeks who monopolised this traffic generally secured a profit of 10/-to 15/- a quarter(!). ..It was a golden age for corn merchants*".

At the other end of the chain, in Marseille at any rate, the Greeks were helped partly by their method of anticipating sellings in what was at the time the most profitable attributes of the market; merchants were eloquent about that: "*I send you a sample of the wheat that I bought. You can see in the contract that if there is any difference between the sample and the product we will be payed; but I do not believe that it will be any. Because in the grain trade one has to*

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[49]. S.E.Fairlie [1959] p.280.

[Import-Export trade]

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be able to sell whenever he wants, there are periods of great haste, that's why I send you the sample, then you decide." (Petrocochino, 19 February 1844, Smyrna)

"Last Saturday I received a letter from Satalia...the wheat is in good barns and there is no difference from the sample, the ships are ready to leave; now you can sell "a livrer" without any fear. If you have already sold "a livrer" even better; this business is excellent." (Petrocochino, 19 April 1844, Smyrna);

and partly by their participation in the exports of marseillaise products.

Because of their solid economics on the one hand, and the use of the sliding scale until 1861 on the other, Greek merchants were very often in a position of speculating. As Y.Bocognano explains: "*de la speculation normale, obligatoire pour un commercant de cette époque s'il voulait se proteger contre les tres gros risques auxquels la legislation l'exposait, a la speculation coupable, visant a faire hausser artificiellement les prix de l'article, il n'y avait qu'un pas, que les negociants semblent avoir franchi assez souvent, au grand emoi des autorites: car la hausse du prix du ble entraînait obligatoirement celle du prix du pain, et la cherte des denrees alimentaires, le desordre et les dangers d'emeute*". This is exactly what happened during the winter of 1854.<sup>50</sup>

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[50]. Y.Bocognano [1958] p.162.

[Import-Export trade]

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In the 5th of December 1854, the Minister of Interior wrote to Bouches-du-Rhone's Prefect:

*"D'apres les renseignements qui nous sont donnees, une certaine agitation se serait manifestee ces jours derniers a Marseille a l'occasion de la cherte des vivres. La population serait persuadee que le haut prix des subsistances n'est pas le resultat naturel d'un deficit dans les approvisionnements, mais bien le produit de l'agiotage sur les bles, dont le commerce serait monopolise entre les mains de quelques negociants, parmi lesquels figurerait le chef actuel de la Municipalite de Marseille".<sup>51</sup>*

The Prefect of course tried to protect at least the Major, the big wheat merchant Monsieur Honorat, and he responded that:

*"ces accusations, que la population dirige contre les negociants, sont des bruits que l'on fait circuler a chaque epoque de cherte des grains".<sup>52</sup>*

Some years later, wheat merchants were again accused of speculation; this time the Minister of Interior appeared particularly persistent because the Emperor was personally interested in the matter.<sup>53</sup>

A series of notes were sent:

20 April 1857: *"On se plaint des exces du jeu de la Bourse sur les*

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[51]. Lettre du Ministre de l'Interieur au Prefet des B.D.R. 5 Decembre 1854 - Arch.Depart. M/8 - 49.

[52]. Lettre du Prefet des B.D.R. au Ministre de l'Interieur 7 Decembre 1854 - Arch.Depart. M/8 - 49.

[53]. Y.Bocognano [1958] p.162.

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[Import-Export trade]

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*cereales. Tendance continuelle a la hausse malgre les arrivages. Prix exorbitants, speculation scandaleuse des plus gros negociants; on se plaint*" (Depeche telegraphique du Ministre de l'Interieur au Prefet des B.D.R. - 20 Avril 1857 - Arch.Départ. serie M/8 - 67.

7 May: "On se plaint toujours des tripotages de Bourse. On cause de personnes que leur position devrait mettre a l'abri de tout soupcon - le Maire" (Le meme au meme - 7 Mai 1857 - Idem).

27 February 1858: "Hausse legere sur les bles; retour de la speculation" (Le meme au meme - 27 Fevrier 1858 - Idem).

4 September: "Speculation nouvelle et hausse sur les grains" (Le meme au meme - 4 Septembre 1858 - Idem).

The Greeks were not clearly mentioned in these notes but it is certain that some of them were always involved in speculation. Monopolistic attributes in the producing areas ascertained the risk of speculation now and then; and wheat trade was a traditionally speculative trade.

Despite their success, the commercial practices of the Greek merchants reached their limits after the end of the Crimean War: new conditions in the producing areas (the extended use of telegraph, big

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[Import-Export trade]

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steam-shipping companies, trains) called for a new organization of trade. Old competitors, like the Jews, penetrated the markets. They were backed by European capital, so as to make the Greeks' traditional expertise obsolete or unprofitable. That was the period that many abandoned trade for finance, a few for shipping, still fewer for landholding. These decisions can not be traced to a particular date; it was more a transition spread over a generation: a response to change.

[Figures of prow]

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

### FIGURES OF THE PROW: GREEK SHIPS GREEK SHIPOWNERS

We have already seen, in chapter one, the considerable development of the Greek merchant marine during the eighteenth century and its role in the early Greek presence in Marseille: ships arrived before merchants in the Phocian port. Their courses were parallel and almost simultaneous, but never identical. Greek trade in the Mediterranean was undoubtedly the main moving force of the Greek's merchant marine evolution; but neither the geographical areas where it spread, nor the people who invested in shipping were the same.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, after the Greek revolution, a big part of this merchant marine was immediately placed under the protection of the Greek state and constituted the most vigorous sector of the newly-established national economy.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the Greek merchants established in the flourishing communities of the Eastern and of the Western Mediterranean

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[1]. The Greek merchant marine was at the time a marine of the Aegean Archipelago, based on the three small islands of Hydra, Spetze and Psara. Of the three, only the maritime island of Hydra developed a certain institutional framework and thus managed to make big inroads in the trade of the Western Mediterranean ports.

[2]. See K.Papathanasopoulos [1983] p.19.

[*Figures of prow*]

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were the main cargo consignees and ship agents of the Greek ships. They closely cooperated with their compatriots, either captains or shipowners, and they acquired valuable knowledge concerning chartering and shipbroking. In Marseille, some of them bought their own ships, in order to increase profits from commerce.

This chapter is divided into three parts: Greek merchants/shipowners; ships chartered by the Greek merchants; and Greek ship-arrivals in Marseille. This way of analysis clarifies the components of a multiple phenomenon which is very often misconceived.

*Merchants, shipowners, or both?*

The transition from trade to shipownership was effected very slowly. As Roland Caty and Eliane Richard note "*evoquer les armateurs marseillais au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siecle n'est pas simple. Car si la fonction d'armement existe depuis que des navires prennent la mer, la profession d'armateur est nouvelle. Le groupe se constitue tardivement, ses contours sont encore flous, ses activites souvent instables et diversifiees. Ils se precisent au fil des decennies, en meme temps que se consolide la puissance de l'armateur.*"<sup>3</sup>

-- In fact, before 1850 the shipowner was usually a merchant who shipped his own merchandise on his own vessels. His captains were

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[3]. R.Caty-E.Richard [1986] p.17.

[*Figures of prov*]

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partners and managers in the "company-cargo" of his ships for the duration of the trip and the specific commercial transaction. The sailing boat was only a means of transportation.<sup>4</sup>

It is quite evident though, that during this period of transition the investment in ships differed considerably from one merchant to another, and in some instances marked the beginning of a specialization and a diversification. This was also the case for few Greek merchants/shipowners.

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[4]. See V.Kremmydas [1985] v.II, p.60; R.Caty-E.Richard [1986] p.19.

[Figures of prow]

Table 7.1

Greek merchants/shipowners in Marseille

Merch/shipown.	Ship	Tonnage	Flag	Date	Source
DROMOCAITI Michel Nicolas et		647/230	French	30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
	Aristide				7/92,n°1051
				02/04/1850	A.D. 200 E
				03/12/1850	A.D. 200 E
	Trois Soeur			30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
					7/92,n°1051
	Nicolas Heracles	199	French	30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
					7/92,n°1051
				04/12/1850	
	Laurent et Fanny			30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
					7/92,n°1051
	Nicolas Etienne jeune			30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
					7/92,n°1051
	Angelique			30/10/1854	A.D.X II Q 9
					7/92,n°1051
MAVROCORDATO	La Louise	120	Sardinian	27/05/1836	A.D. 380 E
PIGNATELLI					428 n° 279

[Figures of prow]

Table 7.1 (continued)

Greek merchants/shipowners in Marseille

Merch/shipown.	Ship	Tonnage	Flag	Date	Source
PETROCOCHINO Michel Chariclia		123	French	23/05/1850	A.D. 200 E
				17/09/1850	A.D. 200 E
RODOCANACHI Emml. Rodocanachi		350	Toscan	30/04/1840	A.D. 200 E
				21/12/1840	A.D. 200 E
				28/05/1845	A.D. 200 E
				Condor	148
SPARTALI et Cie					R.Caty-E.Richard [ ] p.23.
ZIZINIA	Jeune Cleanthe	105/126	French	23/02/1840	A.D. 200 E
				26/07/1840	A.D. 200 E
	Jeune Menandre	202	French	08/06/1840	A.D. 200 E
				19/09/1840	A.D. 200 E
				24/06/1845	A.D. 200 E
	Fanny	251/245	French	12/05/1845	A.D. 200 E
			06/06/1840	A.D. 200 E	

[Figures of prow]

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Table 7.1 (continued)

Greek merchants/shipowners in Marseille

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Merch/shipown.	Ship	Tonnage	Flag	Date	Source
				21/09/1840 A.D.	200 E
				03/03/1845 A.D.	200 E
	Penelope	199/202	French	29/10/1845 A.D.	200 E
				02/08/1850 A.D.	200 E
				25/04/1840 A.D.	200 E
				02/03/1845 A.D.	200 E
				25/05/1845 A.D.	200 E
	Zambelou				
	Cleopatre	197	French	26/05/1850 A.D.	200 E
				30/08/1845 A.D.	200 E
				09/02/1845 A.D.	200 E
				24/04/1845 A.D.	200 E
				09/09/1850 A.D.	200 E
	Cleanthe	326	French	12/05/1850 A.D.	200 E

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[Figures of *prova*]

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Michel Dromocaiti's and Zizinia's examples<sup>5</sup> illustrate this point; in both cases, their investment in boats represented almost 50 % of their capital.

At the time of his death on 30th October of 1854, Dromocaiti's fortune reads as follows:

" <i>Meubles</i>	3,000 fr.
<i>Valeurs Commerciales</i>	12,500 fr.
<i>Navires: Nicolas et Aristide</i>	30,000 fr.
<i>Trois Soeur</i>	35,000 fr.
<i>Nicolas Heracles</i>	25,000 fr.
<i>Laurent et Fanny</i>	20,000 fr.
<i>Nicolas Etienne Jeune</i>	25,000 fr.
<i>Angelique</i>	25,000 fr.
<i>Immeubles:</i>	
<i>Une maison...Julie des allees n.8, d'un revenue de trois mille francs, capital</i>	60,000 fr.

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[5]. The aforementioned lack of data led some historians to identify merchants/ship agents with shipowners based on the hypothesis that at the time the majority of the big merchants were shipowners as well. The hypothesis holds true only for the biggest merchants and not for every small merchant or ship agent. See the article of G.Harlaftis [1993] p.79-80 where a number of small merchants or simple agents were listed as merchants/shipowners. Further on in the article the author lists only eight shipowners which is much closer to reality (see page 106); still, the exclusive use of the journal *Semaphore de Marseille* - a good source for the port's movement - leads inevitably to mistakes which are not very important as such but if they are taken as given eventually distort our conclusions.

[Figures of prov]

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<i>Une propriete quartier St.Jean du dessert revenue mille francs,</i>	
<i>capital</i>	<i>20,000 fr.</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>255,500 fr.*</i>

Even if we suppose that his commercial capital was larger than it appears in his will<sup>7</sup>, the 160,000 francs of the ships' value represent the investment of a small or medium-sized shipowner in Marseille.\*

In this respect and if we take into consideration that as late as 1873 the most important of the group of medium-sized shipowners was "Bosc pere et fils" with eight sailing boats, Dromocaiti and Zizinia who, many years earlier, possessed six and seven respectively, were equally important.

The leaders' practice through the period was to use their own ships in order to reduce costs considerably. This practice allowed them two possible gains: higher commercial profit rates and/or higher competitiveness through lower freight costs resulting in lower prices. This option was resumed in Petrocochino's letters: "...Dromocaitis has considerable gains from his boats especially when he ships them with cheap but voluminous merchandise; he always compensates loses from the freight he gets; every time that he ships, for example, 400 bails of

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[6]. A.D., X II Q 9 7/92, n° 1051.

[7]. Roland Caty and Eliane Richard who worked extensively on this source, noted that the data were systematically dissimulated by the heirs in order to decrease the tax payed; in mercantile enterprises was commercial capital the easiest to be dissimulated.

[8]. See R.Caty-E.Richard [1986] p.46.

[Figures of profit]

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cotton in the space of one month, instead of waiting for a boat for at least three months, he saves two months expenses, that is 3,000 francs, and in this way a quantity of 40,000 francs cotton gets a profit margin of 7 to 8 per cent" (Petrocochino: 1843, October 29, Smyrna); "...anyway we absolutely need boats for saving freight expenses but we need them good and fast like *Dromocaitis*' and if we do not get them we will never do business" (Petrocochino: 1844, February 9, Smyrna).

On the other hand, most shipowners used to participate in the "company-cargo" of their fellow-countrymen's ships; the principle was to spread the risk of a transaction by splitting it into more but smaller parts.<sup>9</sup>

The French flag was mostly used, although various other flags were not unusual. Ships were registered and even made in France.<sup>10</sup> Among other advantages, this probably assured them of easy and reliable insurance. Greek boats often met with difficulties in getting insured: "*Les assurances se feront a Smyrne et ne vous en occupez pas. J'ai pris ce parti parceque a Marseille on assure difficilement ces navires grecs*" (Petrocochino: 1844, March 19, Smyrna).

Although it is possible to note, apart the aforementioned shipowners, some Greek merchants who functioned at one time or another as shipowners of small sailing boats, we know very little about their

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[9]. P.A., Smyrna, 3 May 1844.

[10]. P.A., Smyrna, 19 April 1844.

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[Figures of prow]

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activities during the transition from sail to steam.<sup>11</sup> Reading through the lines of some scattered information we infer the participation of certain big merchants/shipowners in further investments in shipping or in shipbuilding in Marseille.

The first piece of information: as early as 1855, Emmanuel Paul Rodocanachi's inheritance included a) "*quatre actions des Messageries Imperiales, 1<sup>ere</sup> serie, actions de cinq mille francs chacune, valant au jour du deces d'un mille huit cent francs chacun soit quarante trois mille deux cent francs 43.200*" b) "*quatre actions des dites Messageries Imperiales, 2<sup>e</sup> serie de 3750 francs, verses, valant au jour du deces huit mille huit cent cinquante francs l'un, soit en tous trente cinq mille quatre cent francs 35.400*" c) "*vingt cinq actions de bateaux a vapeur de la C<sup>ie</sup> Bazin Gaz, d'en chacune de quelles il a ete verse deux cent soixante quinze francs, valant au jour de deces quatre cent cinq francs l'action, soit en tout dix mille cent vingt cinq francs 10.125*"<sup>12</sup> both companies, the Messageries Imperiales and Bazin Gaz represented the big shipping capital in Marseille during the second half of the 19th century. Second piece of information: when E.Richard and R.Caty note in 1879 the disappearance or regression of some important shipowners like *Pastre freres, Bosc pere et fils, Guerin fils, F.Dor,* and *E.Debourg* they include the Greek merchant *Spartali et Cie.*<sup>13</sup> Third

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[11]. R.Caty and E.Richard estimate that the modernization of the marseillaise merchant marine took place between 1869 and 1873, much earlier than in the rest of Europe; R.Cary-E.Richard [1986] p.86.

[*Figures of prow*]

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piece of information: in 1899 the Greek merchants *Vagliano fils, Zafiropoulos et Zarifi, Th.Rodocanachi, Michel Rodocanachi, and Xenophon Theologo* were among the 27 shareholders of Marseille's large shipbuilding company *Port-de-Bouc Chantier Navale*; some years later, in 1910 Pericles Zarifi had become one of the three biggest shareholders and director of the same company. Fifty years later, a member of the Zarifi family continued to be not only the main shareholder but also the protagonist in the merging-read controlling-of *Port-de-Bouc's* shipbuilding company with its rival, *La Ciotat*.<sup>14</sup>

Clearly we have not assembled sufficient data here to form the basis of any far-reaching conclusions about the role of the Greek shipowners in Marseille and their impact on the overall development of the Greek merchant marine; what is certain is that they maintained their roles as general merchants for long and that their shipownership was a traditional mercantile activity. Yet, their "know-how" opened up the road to the formation of the contemporary Greek shipping company, at least in some instances.

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[12]. A.D., X II Q 9 7/94, n° 1255.

[13]. R.Caty-E.Richard [1986] p.23.

[14]. See J.Domenichino [1988] p.39, fn.1,2 and pp.411-412.

[Figures of *prova*]

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### *Chartered Ships*

The chartering of ships depended on commerce and on the Mediterranean market's supply of vessels. As we can see in table 7.2., the largest proportion of ships chartered by the Greeks in 1840 and 1845 was of Greek ships, but in 1850 French ships surpassed them. Still, if we add Greek-owned ships under the Russian, Ionian, Ottoman and Turkish flags, the percentage of the Greek-owned ships increases to 32, 48 and 39 per cent for the three years respectively.<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, the percentage of the foreign ships chartered by the Greek merchants in Marseille - apart the Greek, Turkish, Ottoman, Ionian and Russian - was important and represented 68.38, 52.11 and 62 per cent of the total.

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[15]. V.Kremmydas analyses in detail the flag/ownership problem concerning the Greek ships; he concludes that ships referred to in European archives as "Turkish", "Ottoman", "Greek", "Ionian" or "Russian" were Greek (see V.Kremmydas [1985] p.37-38 and V.Kremmydas [1976] p.119-121). This is partly confirmed in our research by the boats' and the captains' names.

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[Figures of *pro*]

Table 7.2 Ships chartered by the Greek merchants in Marseille,  
1840, 1845, 1850

Flag	1840	%	1845	%	1850	%
Greek	41	26.45	121	39.41	87	32.95
French	35	22.58	70	22.80	141	53.40
Austrian	31	20	60	19.54	11	4.16
Russian	4	2.58	15	4.88	5	1.89
Sardinian	19	12.25	7	2.28	9	3.40
Napolitan	15	9.67	11	3.58	-	-
Ionian	3	1.93	10	3.25	6	2.27
Ottoman	-	-	1	0.32	2	0.75
Moldavian	-	-	2	0.65	1	0.37
Roman	-	-	3	0.97	-	-
English	-	-	2	0.65	-	-
Norvegean	1	0.64	-	-	-	-
Turkish	1	0.64	-	-	1	0.37
Prussian	-	-	1	0.32	-	-
Toscan	4	2.58	3	0.97	-	-
Valaque	1	0.64	1	0.32	1	0.37
Total	155		307		264	

[Figures of prov]

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(notes from the previous page)

\* The percentage is of the year's total.

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone

[Figures of prow]

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The examination of the ships' tonnage though, presents a different dimension: in tonnage, ships under the Greek flag were continuously on top, as we can see in Table 7.3. In this regard, the percentage of the ships' tonnage is a better index for the participation of the Greek flag in the Greek commerce in Marseille - and vive-versa.

The importance of Greek ships in relation to foreign is shown clearly in Table 7.4: in 1840 Greek ships (including "Turkish", "Russian", "Ionian", "Ottoman") represented 42.05 per cent against 58 per cent of the foreign; in 1845 the percentage was 60.06 against 40; and in 1850 it was 54.17 against 45.82.

[Figures of prow]

Table 7.3 Ships' tonnage chartered by the Greek merchants in Marseille,  
1840, 1845, 1850

Flag	1840			1845			1850		
	T.T.	T.per S. ‰		T.T.	T.per S. ‰		T.T.	T.per S. ‰	
Greek	15063	221	36.61	46803	232	51.85	28565	250	47.18
French	5197	148	12.63	10597	151	11.74	23038	163	38.05
Austrian	9298	300	22.60	17800	300	19.72	2775	252	4.58
Russian	1147	294	2.78	4290	286	4.75	2096	419	3.46
Sardinian	3372	178	8.19	1252	179	1.38	1625	181	2.68
Napolitan	4247	283	10.32	3324	302	3.68	-	-	
Ionian	876	292	2.12	3002	300	3.32	1328	221	2.19
Ottoman	-	-		125	125	0.13	535	268	0.88
Moldavian	-	-		451	226	0.49	140	140	0.23
Roman	-	-		735	245	0.81	-	-	
English	-	-		401	200	0.44	-	-	
Norwegian	208	208	0.50	-	-		-	-	
Turkish	215	215	0.52	-	-		272	272	0.44
Prussian	-	-		180	180	0.19	-	-	
Tuscan	1283	321	3.11	1154	385	1.27	-	-	
Valaque	233	233	0.56	149	149	0.16	160	160	0.26

[Figures of *prova*]

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(notes from the previous page)

T.T: Total Tonnage

T.per S.: Tonnage per ship

%: of the year's total

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone

[Figures of *pro*]

**Table 7.4 Ships' number - Ships' tonnage:**

**Percentage of Ships chartered by the Greek merchants in Marseille**

	1840		1845		1850	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Greek	26.45	36.61	39.41	51.85	32.95	47.18
French	22.58	12.63	22.80	11.74	53.40	38.05
Austrian	20	22.60	19.54	19.72	4.16	4.58
Russian	2.58	2.78	4.88	4.75	1.89	3.46
Sardinian	12.25	8.19	2.28	1.38	3.40	2.68
Napolitan	9.67	10.32	3.58	3.68	-	-
Ionian	1.93	2.12	3.25	3.32	2.27	2.19
Ottoman	-	-	0.32	0.13	0.75	0.88
Moldavian	-	-	0.65	0.49	0.37	0.23
Roman	-	-	0.97	0.81	-	-
English	-	-	0.65	0.44	-	-
Norwegian	0.64	0.50	-	-	-	-
Turkish	0.64	0.52	-	-	0.37	0.44
Prussian	-	-	0.32	0.19	-	-
Tuscan	2.58	3.11	0.97	1.27	-	-
Valaque	0.64	0.56	0.32	0.16	0.37	0.26

[*Figures of prov*]

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(*notes from the previous page*)

(a): Percentage of ships' number

(b): Percentage of ships' tonnage

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone

[*Figures of prow*]

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To summarise, it may be said that ships under the Greek flag were chartered almost exclusively by Greeks; but the latter also chartered a considerable number of non-Greek ships. Therefore, Greek trade in the Mediterranean (in Marseille in this case) was the main moving force behind the evolution of the Greek merchant marine. This is also confirmed by the following analysis.

*The movement of shipping*

The study of Greek shipping in both its constituents, Greek ownership and Greek flag, would constitute a subject in itself and would be part of the Greek merchant marine in the history of Western Mediterranean. However, some statistics about the presence of Greek ships in Marseille could be the basis for further analysis that would be closer to our subject.

In earlier chapters it was said that during the Napoleonic Wars Greek-owned ships exclusively imported wheat and "exported" French diplomatic correspondence. They were not numerous; but, in contrast to V.Kremmydas' data, our sources show a larger number than his (see table 7.5.). According to these sources, Greek-owned ships continued uninterruptedly to arrive in Marseille, during the wars, despite the meagre presence of Greek merchants in the city, during this early period. We can thus safely infer that, until 1815 at least, the Greek

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[*Figures of prow*]

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merchant marine traded with Marseille without the support of the Greek merchants established there.

The vicissitudes of the Greek War of Independence, destroyed a substantial part of the merchant vessels - transformed to warships - and hindered for long Greek trade in the Mediterranean. Sources are unanimous: Greek ships disappeared from the port for at least six years after the revolution of 1821.

[Figures of prow]

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Table 7.5 Greek ships in Marseille's port coming from the Levant  
(Constantinople, Salonica, Archipelago, Peloponese)

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Year	Arrivals	Departures
May 1793 - March 1795	4 <sup>1</sup>	
April 1796 - 1799	16 <sup>2</sup>	
1814		6 <sup>3</sup>
1815	1 <sup>4</sup>	6 <sup>3</sup>
1816		4 <sup>4</sup>
1817		44 <sup>4</sup>
1818	3 <sup>3</sup> 24 <sup>4</sup>	36 <sup>4</sup>
1819 --	15 <sup>3</sup> 16 <sup>4</sup>	
1820	12 <sup>3</sup> 5 <sup>4</sup>	
1821	0 <sup>3</sup> 0 <sup>4</sup>	
1822	0 <sup>3</sup> 0 <sup>4</sup>	
1823	0 <sup>3</sup> 1 <sup>4</sup>	
1824	1 <sup>3</sup> 0 <sup>4</sup>	
1825	0 <sup>3</sup> 1 <sup>4</sup>	
1826	0 <sup>3</sup> 0 <sup>4</sup>	

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[*Figures of prow*]

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(*notes from the previous page*)

Sources:

1. P.Echinard, *Grecs et Philhellènes a Marseille de la Revolution française a l'Independance de la Grece*, 1973, p.9.
2. Ch.Carriere, *Negociants Marseillais au XVIIIe siecle*, 1973, p.210.
3. V.Kremmydas, *Helliniki Emporiki Nautilia, 1776-1835*, 1985, v.1, p.109.
4. R.Pascal, *Les relations commerciales entre Marseille et Constantinople de 1815 a 1835*, Memoire de Diplome, 1965, p.

[Figures of *pro*]

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In view of the paucity of evidence between 1830 and 1840 - an important period for the merchants' establishment in the city -, we proceed to the next decade. Figures in Table 7.6. confirm the shift: from the 1840s on, Greek shipping depends on Greek merchants meanwhile established in Marseille. By 1850, Greek ships were almost exclusively chartered by Greek merchants.

Moreover, Tables 7.7 and 7.8., show that the main product these ships transported was wheat: in other words, Greek ships served the kind of trade that merchants carried out.

[Figures of prow]

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Table 7.6 Greek ships in Marseille's port (arrivals), 1840, 1845, 1850

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Year	Number	Chartered by Greeks	% Chartered by Greeks	Chartered by Foreigners	% Chartered by Foreigners	Mentioned as "divers"	% Mentioned as "divers"
1840	68	41	60.29	16	23.52	10	14.70
1845	202	121	60	63	31.18	18	9
1850	114	87	76.31	10	9	17	15

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Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

[Figures of prov]

Table 7.7 Ships transporting grain to Marseille according to  
Country of Flag, 1847, 1857, 1867

	1847	%	1857	%	1867	%
French	183	8.93	99	9.26	54	3.83
Greek	667	32.55	280	26.21	383	27.18
Italian	557	27.18	297	27.80	641	45.49
Austrian	295	14.39	170	15.91	221	15.68
Russian	156	7.61	8	0.74	51	3.61
Ottoman	97	4.73			16	1.13
English	38	1.85	76	7.11	26	1.84
Ionian	29	1.41	11	1.02		
American	27	1.31	16	1.49		
Mecklenbourgeois			111	10.39	17	1.20
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,049</b>		<b>1,068</b>		<b>1,409</b>	

Source: Y. Bocognano, *Le commerce des bles a Marseille de 1840 a 1870*,  
Memoire de Diplome d'Etudes Superieures, Faculte de Lettres d'Aix-en-  
Provence, 1958.

[*Figures of prow*]

Table 7.8  
Marseille: Ports of departure of the Greek ships

Ports of Departure	1840		1845		1850	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Alexandria	8	11.76	4	1.98	3	2.63
Athens			1	0.49		
Berdiansk	7	10.29	5	2.47	4	3.50
Beirut					1	0.87
Haifa					8	7.01
Constantinople	4	5.88	7	3.46	5	4.38
Enos			4	1.98	1	0.87
Galatz	11	16.17	35	17.32	11	9.64
Ibrail	21	30.88	38	18.81	19	16.66
Jaffa					2	1.75
Jaxos (Danube)					1	0.87
Kerson	2	2.94			1	0.87
Marianopoli			2	0.99	1	0.87
Odessa	8	11.76	71	35.14	37	32.45
Pirgos (Black Sea)			1	0.49		
Pirgos (Roumelia)			2	0.99		

[Figures of prow]

Table 7.8 (continued)

Marseille: Ports of departure of the Greek ships

Ports of Departure	1840		1845		1850	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Smyrna			2	0.99		
Syra			1	0.49		
Taganrog	6	8.82	12	5.94	10	8.77
Salonica	1	1.47	1	0.49		
Varna			14	6.93	10	8.77
Volo			1	0.49		
Zante			1	0.49		
Total	68		202		114	

Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

[*Figures of prow*]

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The main type of ship used was the Brigantine (Brig); there were also a few 3 mats, and very few Schooners (Goelettes) (see appendix E where the boats are listed by their name). The variety of ships can be organised in a few categories, those showing the highest frequency: ships named after the shipowner's family names (sons', daughters', wives'); or after a patron saint (with a preference to the sailors' patron saint Nicolas and to the Virgin Mary); or after general concepts like Good Luck (Tichi) or even Despair (Apelpicia)! Many ancient Greek names are also found, usually referring to a relative's name.

Finally, the data assembled in Table 7.9 enabled us to assess the number of the Greek ships in Marseille, in comparison to the total arrivals and to the total size of the Greek merchant marine. As expected both percentages were low, which confirms the hypothesis that during the period under consideration, the bulk of the Greek merchant marine traded in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>16</sup>

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[16]. See V.Kremmydas [1985] vol.I, p.146-148.

[Figures of *prova*]

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Table 7.9 Greek ships as a percentage of total arrivals and of the  
Greek merchant marine

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Year	Number	% (of total arrivals)	% (of the Greek M.M.)
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1840	68	1.64	2.13
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1845	202	6.13	5.63
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1850	114	3.43	2.83
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Sources:

1. Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, Archives  
Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

2. K.Papathanasopoulos, *Greek Merchant Marine*, 1983, Athens, p.88.

C H A P T E R   E I G H T

NETWORKS OF CREDIT AND BANKING: A RESPONSE TO CHANGE (1860-1875)

*Merchant Roles in Finance*

Fernand Braudel in his book "La dynamique du capitalisme" sustains that big merchants throughout the centuries never specialised in a single product mainly because there was not any branch of commerce developed enough to demand all their attention. The sole specialization that sometimes tended to prevail in commercial life, was the trade of money. The success of this trade though, never lasted for long, probably because the structure of the society was not solid enough to support credit as the spearhead of the economy. Financial Capitalism

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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flourished after 1830-1860, when Banking overtook Industry and Trade and the economic system became strong enough to support this structure.<sup>1</sup>

The largest part of historical research concerning banking and finance concedes this thesis and Stanley Chapman in his book about the rise of merchant banking sustains that even during the 19th century merchants shifted all their resources into finance only if (or when) changes in the structure or conditions of trade made their traditional expertise obsolete or its employment unprofitable. Indeed, the transition of particular firms from trade to finance, was a process spread over a generation or more.<sup>2</sup>

The actors of international commerce were people whose international connections linked the big centres of commerce and finance. In conducting this business they acquired increasing expertise in the finance of trade and they became masters of various financial techniques and developments which, in the course of the nineteenth century, became identified with the emergent profession of merchant banker.<sup>3</sup>

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[1] F.Braudel [1985] *passim*.  
[2] St.Chapman [1984] p.126, 129.  
[3] St.Chapman [1984] p.1.

a) Minorities and the gentle calling of Finance

During the 18th and the 19th century a considerable number of international trading families resided permanently in the big commercial and financial centres of Europe. Prominent amongst this group of residents, were the Dutch Jews who established themselves in London as it succeeded Amsterdam as a centre for international exchange; they played a major role in banking, insurance, and investment in government stocks.<sup>4</sup>

Numerous French historians have examined the activities of the "international Huguenots", whose family dynasties linked Geneva, Berne, Paris, Frankfurt and other European centres with London, and who "practically monopolised the financial relations between England and France" in the eighteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

During the French Wars (1793-1815), the Dutch, French and Sephardic Jewish emigres were followed by a new wave of international trading families. Ashkenazi Jews from Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin and Leipzig were attracted to London by the dramatic growth of the British

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[4] C.Wilson [1941] pp.42,54,94, and 106-107. See also A.C.Carter "Financial Activities of the Huguenots in London and Amsterdam in the mid-Eighteenth Century", *Proc. Huguenot Soc.*, XIX [1959].

[5] H.Luthy [1961] p.318.

textile trade as well as by a greater degree of religious toleration. Other German merchants, sometimes with Huguenot backgrounds, joined the growing community when Napoleon occupied Frankfurt and Hamburg (1806-12). After the war there was an influx of Greek merchants whose trading posts had reached as far west as Amsterdam in the late eighteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

We are ignorant of the long process of urban and mercantile development that shaped these migrant families, but some of their most important characteristics can be identified. The cities from which they came - principally Frankfurt, Hamburg and Constantinople - were not only imperial cities, but also international entrepots. Their prosperity was derived from their location at the focal points of a mosaic of small states and at the meeting points of different ethnic and religious traditions. Over the centuries, and in each of these cities, an elite of mercantile families drawn from various "races" and creeds, was gradually formed. In other words, the geographic and economic advantages of these cities was favourable to the development of what Bergeron calls "*an aristocracy that knew no national frontiers*", and had limited local loyalties.<sup>7</sup>

Landes explains that the very nature of this business as a team

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[6] St.Chapman [1984] p.4.

[7] L.Bergeron, *Les banquiers rhenans, fin du XVIIIe siecle au debut du XIXe siecle*, *Bulletin du Centre d'Histoire economique et sociale de la region lyonnaise*, [1975].

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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activity required strong personal and family ties; ethnic trading groups that had been dispersed by religious and political persecution were more tenacious in maintaining on to them as this had become a way of life for them.\*

The immigrants brought not only mercantile experience and capital, but also specific expertise in trading to export markets hitherto only lightly touched by European-based enterprise. On the other hand, they adopted financial techniques which the Europeans had been familiar with since the end of 18th century.

b) New Specialisations and new Techniques

Stanley Chapman, talking about eighteenth century Dutch influences on British trade and finance explains that:

*"...much of the trade to and from Amsterdam was conducted by commission merchants, that is agents who sought out customers but did*

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[8] D.S.Landes [1958] *passim*. In analysing the structure of the strongest banking groups, the author underlines the importance of kin, national origin and religion; marriage strategies were also emphasized. "Nor was community a matter of common religion within and common pressure without. The prevalence of marriage within the group together with rationalized selection combined to produce a business class that was almost a clan. Carefully weighing dowry, family connexions, prospects, and all the other things that go to make a sensible union, banker's son married merchant's daughter; Amsterdam joined Frankfurt, and Paris, Cologne. And with blood and marital relationships went business ties. Not always of course". D.S.Landes [1958] p.19.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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not own the commodities in which they traded. This enabled them to trade on less capital and, by degrees, introduced them to shipping agency and acceptance credit, a most important development in the history of international trade. Acceptance credits worked in this way: during the eighteenth century it became an established practice for smaller merchants finding their way into international trade (such as many British merchants were doing at the time) to ask the established houses to endorse their trade bills so as to make them acceptable without question to foreign exporters, or to bankers at home and abroad. The long-established practice (which still continues) is for the importer to draw three months or six months bill of exchange on its accepting house, the bill maturing when payment becomes due from the customer.<sup>9</sup>

The accepting house concerned receives the bill and may hold it to maturity or (as increasingly happened in the course of growing specialisation) discount it with one of the financial intermediaries that made a trade of this function. When the bill matures the importer's remittance is paid direct to the accepting house for the account of his customer. This self-liquidating instrument for financing trade can

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[9] The most important instrument of international payment was the bill of exchange. This was fundamentally an acknowledgement of a debt and a promise to pay at some future time in another place and another currency. Beginning as a remittance from borrower to lender, it assumed by the early modern period its definitive form of a draft of creditor on debtor, to be accepted by the latter in recognition of a commercial transaction. See among others R.de Roover [1953] ch.1, with extensive bibliography.

readily be renewed on a "revolving" basis, but meanwhile offers the accepting house the opportunity of maintaining his liquidity and operating on a moderate capital. It is impossible to say exactly when this practice became widespread, but several London merchants were acting as agents for Dutch financiers in the 1660s, quite likely on the basis of this kind of credit".<sup>10</sup>

Another financial specialty that was promoted by the wealth of Amsterdam was that of lending to foreign governments.<sup>11</sup> Chapman notes the main features of the public loan system and explains that "transfer of money for investment, or of interest earned or won on successful speculations, was made through agents by means of the established commercial instruments, that is the bill of exchange, so that the loan business was quite conveniently run in harness with that of the merchant.....Secondly, particular firms specialised in the state issues of particular countries, for which they distributed prospectuses and recruited other financial supporters to share a sequence of

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[10] D.S.Chapman [1984] pp.1-2.

[11] "Already in the seventeenth century the Dutch were lending substantial sums to Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, Hamburg, Bremen, Emden, East Friesland and the Empire. At the end of the century when the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange, became William III of England, Scotland and Ireland, he borrowed heavily in Amsterdam to fight his continental wars. During the course of the eighteenth century successive British administrations drew on the same source, and William concluded that Dutch money was indispensable to the British government. Sweden, Russia and the German states also contracted a sequence of loans in Amsterdam, and after 1780 bold attempts were made to develop the financial tie with New York". D.S.Chapman [1984] p.2.

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loans.....Thirdly, the loan contractors assumed the responsibility for retailing the bonds not only on the Amsterdam bourse and in the Netherlands, but also throughout Europe. The loan business was from the outset essentially an international one".<sup>12</sup>

c) Hazards of a Hazardous Profession

By the middle of the nineteenth century, merchant banking in Western Europe - or foreign banking as it is often called - had centuries of experience behind it and had already attained considerable sophistication.<sup>13</sup> The staples of trade were still the bill of exchange and bankers' drafts to which were added letters of credit, mercantile and personal. The traditional merchant banker was guided by one fundamental principle: commercial credit must be based on commercial

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[12]D.S.Chapman [1984] pp.2-3.

[13] "*The foreign banker bought and sold paper drawn on outside markets, handled remittances and made collections, gave advances on consignments, changed currencies, shipped bullion and coin when the need for and price of precious metals rose high enough elsewhere to cover the cost of shipping, insurance, and minting if required - in short, performed all the functions necessary to keep international commerce running smoothly*". D.S.Landes [1984] p.4.

For the development of merchant banking as a technique, see D. S. Landes, "*Vieille banque et banque nouvelle: la revolution financiere du dix-neuvieme siecle*", *Revue d'histoire moderne*, III [1956] pp.204-222.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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transactions. Thus all bills of exchange discounted or accepted were presumed to be self-liquidating, originating in a real transfer of goods that would be sold before maturity of the note and would yield enough to reimburse the lender.<sup>14</sup>

To clients of long standing and good credit, the banker might accord the facility of drawing up to a certain amount in anticipation of transactions, such drafts to be covered prior to maturity by discountable paper or securities. To some, the banker might extend such an "open credit", as it was known, on a revolving basis, that is, the credit would be automatically renewed as old drafts outstanding were covered and new ones were replacing them. In all cases, however, the advance was presumed to be based on actual mercantile transactions - it was never intended to be a pure and unrestricted loan - and under no circumstances was the banker to be compelled to meet the drafts out of his own pocket.<sup>15</sup>

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[14] Often, if the credit of the drawer or drawee was not sufficiently well-established, the banker would insist not only on the draft itself but on the documents attesting to the commercial transaction behind it. On consignments of unsold goods, the banker might even have the bill of lading made out in his own name and transmit it to the consignee only on receipt of a counter-remittance to balance the advance already given the consignor. And to make doubly sure, payments on unsold commodities were carefully limited to some fraction of the estimated value to allow for a possible fall in price. See D.S.Landes [1984] p.4. For an interesting discussion on the techniques and procedure of merchant banking see R.W.Hidy [1949].

[15] D.S.Landes explains the need for some source of instruments of payment when ordinary trade acceptances were lacking. The result was the "banker's bill", a draft of one banker against credit provided by another, to be covered prior to maturity by paper purchased later when

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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All such open credits gave rise to far greater risks than advances based on current transactions, not because of the immediate danger that the borrower might not cover in time, but because of the long-run abuses that they encouraged. Under the circumstances, it was easy to employ such facilities, not for real transactions, but as a sort of short-term loan, which could easily become long-term if the credit was of the revolving kind and the borrower was careful to refund on time. The process of automatic liquidation which was in theory the safety valve of the profession was maintained in principle and often abused in practice. The situation was aggravated by the frequent use of the "accommodation bill", so called because it could exist only as an accommodation of one businessman by another; the one was accepting the other's draft in connection with a transfer of goods that had simply never occurred.<sup>16</sup>

Accommodation paper and revolving credits were a disguised method of direct loan credit investment; but bankers were frequently lured into disastrous positions by clients who found this an easy way to do

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it was more abundant and less expensive. Here again, in principle, bankers' bills were no different from commercial paper in deriving ultimately from genuine commodity transactions - in this case, anticipated rather than current. D.S.Landes [1958] p.5.

[16] We know that "superficially, such notes resembled perfectly the ordinary bill of exchange; in essence they were nothing better than promissory notes with two signatures, pure paper credit with no basis whatever in mercantile transactions. They were, indeed, far more risky than real promissory notes, for they pretended to be something they were not, and falsely commanded an acceptance they did not deserve". D.S.Landes [1958] p.6.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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business or to speculate with third party capital. Even among the most reputable merchants and bankers, there were always some who abused this practice, ready to use the apparatus in order to present a "legitimate" front to the world; accommodation paper covered by accommodation paper, forgeries, straw men etc.<sup>17</sup>

Even though the steady development of central banks made this risky procedure less necessary, abuses continued to shake the European money markets during the nineteenth century. And although every commercial crisis re-emphasized the dangers of direct borrowing disguised as mercantile credit, every boom brought its harvest of sham paper. Yet in 1860, the accommodation bill was flourishing as vigorously as ever, "*the greatest hazard of a hazardous profession*".<sup>18</sup>

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[17] Landes explains that in the eighteenth century accommodation was already a serious problem. In 1763, Amsterdam and Hamburg were shaken by an unprecedented crisis which was due largely to the collapse of a wide and complicated network of systematic accommodation. See D.S.Landes [1958] p.8.

[18] See the *Bankers' Magazine*, XX (1860), 529-532, 542-544, 621-625, and passim for the scandalous pyramiding of accommodation credit in the leather trade, cited by D.S.Landes [1958] p.8.

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*The Evolution of Greek Merchant Roles in Finance*

"On ne peut designer ces differentes maisons grecques sous une denomination quelconque, telle que Banquiers, Armateurs, Marchands de soie, ou tout autre. Ils sont tout cela a la fois s'elevant aux plus hautes transactions et ne negligean pas la plus ordinaire; ils sont marchands dans la plus large acception de ce mot, etendant leur commerce et placant leurs comptoirs d'Archangel a Bassora et de Gibraltar aux portes de la Chine. Ils sont les intermediaires necessaires entre les nations chretiennes, industriels et progressives, et ces multitudes mahometanes denses ou clairsemees qui peuplent ces regions entrecoupees de deserts ou s'etendait l'ancien empire d'Orient des Romains. A l'Est et a l'Ouest de la Mediterranee, a Constantinople et a Marseille, sont les sieges principaux de leurs affaires, et cette derniere place tend par leur fait a devenir le point ou viendra se solder la balance generale du commerce de l'Orient et de l'Occident".<sup>19</sup>

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[19] Rapports d'Inspection de 1860 (Louis Cordier) - Rapports d'Inspection, Marseille, 1858-1890. Banque de France.

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In the beginning of nineteenth century Greek merchants were already involved in almost every trade, from grain and barley, to cotton and manufactured goods; they had a dominant position in the expanding sectors of Egyptian cotton trade and the Russian grain trade and they had important settlements throughout Europe, the Black Sea and the Levant.

Their contemporaries considered them as the necessary "intermediaries" between the Christian Nations and the Muslims; for some historians they were mere "agents" of European capitalism,<sup>20</sup> which is certainly an over-simplification.

There is no doubt that the Greek merchants adjusted themselves to the existing conditions, that is the European predominance in Ottoman-European trade; but their activities had their own logic and autonomy. Their commercial companies began partly as supplementary to the older European ones; but inevitably they developed their own "raison d'etre" for their business. And in the 1840's and 1850's, many Greek merchants found that trade was the gateway to finance, as had happened before with their Western counterparts. Inevitably, some were more successful than others, so that out of a crowd of small and middle-sized firms, a core of large firms flourished for a great part of the nineteenth century.

In Constantinople or in Alexandria the Greek private bankers and

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[20] See for example K. Tsoukalas [1977], N. Psyroukis [1977], K. Moskof [1972].

merchants supplied the same sort of discount and exchange facilities as existed in cities of the West. Even in these big Levantine centres of trade and finance, however, there were few banks but many money-lenders, little investment but much hoarding, no credit but much usury. As a result, the price of financial accommodations was high, usually two or three times the going Western rate, and the lack of a steady current of exchange led to extreme fluctuations that gave commerce a distinct flavour of gambling instead of business.<sup>21</sup> The demand for credit was increased disproportionately to the growth in banking and capital accumulation; European credit became an indispensable source for merchants operations in the Levant. When European Capitalism arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean the Greek merchant was there. He flourished because of his "intermediary" position between the lure of fabulous interest and the offer of cheap credit.

a) Bankers and the Sultan

During the early decades of the nineteenth century the money market of the Ottoman Empire expanded along with the spectacular development of trade in the region. The pattern of credit though was determined by the existing capital resources and by the pattern of

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[21] D.S Landes [1958] p.57.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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economic development of the Empire: inadequate capital resources kept, in the long-term, interest rates high, and the expansion of cash crop cultivation of products such as cotton, silk, opium, grain and tobacco increased the demand for commercial credit.<sup>22</sup>

Credit, therefore, was closely connected with commerce and it was

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[22] Interest rates in the Ottoman Empire were extremely high; Landes says that the minimum rate of interest on the best security was from 12 to 20 per cent. and for poorer risks 3 and 4 per cent. per month was quite regular, while for the peasant, borrowing every year on his anticipated harvest and trapped on a hopeless treadmill of debt, rates of 5 and 6 per cent. per month were not uncommon (D.S.Landes [1958] p.57). In his thesis about Greek banking in Constantinople, H. Exertzoglou underlines the variations of interest rates in different regions of the Empire which reflected the fragmentation of the Ottoman economy and market:

"In the area of pre-independence mainland Greece, for example, interest rates during the early 19th century varied from 12-30 %. In towns and cities where commerce prospered, and trade links with Europe were close, 12 % was the usual figure charged. Conversely, in more backward areas, i.e those of subsistence agriculture, interest rates were considerably higher, varying between 30-40 %....Later in the century, the condition of interest rates remained much the same, even in the most prosperous regions of the country. In 1848 interest rates in Salonica were 20 % but with skilful management that could go as high as 32 %....In Smyrna during the early 1860's, interest rates for commercial transactions reached 12-18 % per annum. During the same period, interest rates in Salonica were at least 12 %, while in Bursa, ordinary rates varied, from 15-18 %...And this is only to speak of areas where commerce and export-orientated agriculture were extensive. In other parts of Turkey, 20 % was the lowest figure charged.....Broadly speaking, the Ottoman Empire was divided, into two parts; one with a low and one with a high level of interest rates. In areas around the Western coast of Asia Minor, a part of the Southern coast of the Black sea and the region of southern Macedonia and Con/ple, interest rates varied between 12-18 %, while rates in the rest of Turkey varied between 20-40 %. This distinction, however, is relative, and important only within the context of the Ottoman economy, for if compared to contemporary Western interest rates, both levels look exorbitant". H.H.A Exertzoglou [1986] pp.106-107, 108.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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in the main ports of the Empire that banking activities, however limited, took place in a regular fashion. The circulation of bills of exchange, discount facilities, drafts, exchange of coinage and similar transactions were carried out in the main ports of the Empire with relative frequency. The lack of commercial credit, however, remained an urgent problem and the limited local resources of capital could not match demand.<sup>23</sup>

Finding credit in Europe therefore became an indispensable outlet for merchants working in Ottoman Empire. In all major ports of the country commerce and banking became to a large extent inseparable and banking transactions were carried out by commercial companies, especially by those which themselves had good credit in Europe. Andreas Syngros, one of the biggest Greek merchants and bankers of Constantinople, recounts in his Memoirs that "*all the purchases took place during May and June, shipping at the end of August, and as late as October we started to sell in Marseille and therefore, to get back our invested capital. As a result, I was obliged to borrow money indirectly by drawing three months bills of exchange upon our firms in Europe and to cover them prior to maturity by new bills based on new transactions*".<sup>24</sup>

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[23] D.S.Landes [1958] p.56-57.

[24] A.Syngros, *Apomnemeumata*, 3 vols, (Athens, 1908), I, p.279-280. The Memoirs, written in a purely literary style, is a precious source for the every-day commercial life of the 19th century, and as such gives depth and variety to many economic, political and social events of the

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The early response to the growing demand for credit facilities was an increase in the number of firms which carried out banking transactions especially in Constantinople. But banking in the capital of the Empire was only partly connected with commerce. The numerous banking companies established in that city between the mid 1850's and early 1870's intended in principle to engage in ordinary commercial banking, proved most helpful in tiding the prodigal and inefficient sultanate over repeated financial difficulties. Once again it was the lure of high interest rates more than the needs of trade that attracted native and foreign investors, in a country with a poor banking system and inadequate capital accumulation.<sup>25</sup>

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(...continued)

period. Andreas Syngros started his career as a small bankbroker and finished as a magnate in the small kingdom of Greece. In the meantime he invested his capital in many commercial and financial operations in Constantinople, Alexandria and other important centres of the Eastern Mediterranean. He was one of those Greek merchants and bankers who thought that the Eastern Mediterranean was a single, integrated economic region which could be exploited as a unit. See G.B.Dertilis [1980] where Greek entrepreneurs' excellent historical portraits are presented; of the same author "Entrepreneurs grecs: trois generations, 1770-1900" in F.Angiolini - D.Roche (eds.) [1995].

[25] D.S.Landes, talking about British financial investments abroad, explains that the extent to which the special character of the Eastern trade would lead the English to neglect the legitimate activities of the finance company - railways, harbour improvements, colonial and state loans - for the large but hazardous profits of accomodation credit and even more so, money-lending, could not be foreseen. The author says that the sponsors of Turkish enterprises dazzled investors with the prospect of 3 to 6 per cent. per month interest, and the Egyptian Commercial and Trading Company, organised presumably to exploit the trade of the upper Nile valley, made it clear from the start that it expected to earn the bulk of its profits by lending to natives. D.S.Landes [1958] p.56, 58.

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It is hard to say when the debt of the Imperial government began. Even during the late 18th century the government seemed to be short of funds. In the beginning, extraordinary expenditures were covered by borrowing from certain local capitalists - the so called sarrafs - , against anticipated tax receipts.<sup>26</sup> In spite of the generosity of these lenders, however, the credit that they could provide was necessarily limited. When the need for funds became more pressing, it was the European money market to which the Ottoman government turned for a loan;<sup>27</sup> Theodore Baltazzi and John Alleon, a Greek and a Jewish banker, played a decisive role in the negotiations. Times were changing, and the sarrafs faced new competitors in the early 1850's; the emergence of Greek and Jewish banking companies and the introduction of foreign capital.

The financial embarrassments of the Ottoman state and the consequent promise of fabulous profits increased competition between

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[26] Sarrafs - known also as the Galata bankers because most of them resided in the area of Constantinople called Galata - were non-Muslims, mostly of Armenian origin, and initially they performed two types of services; the exchange of currencies and the granting of loans. In dealing with the Ottoman government, they acquired tax farming concessions and through that close connections with pashas and other senior officials. The immense services that they provided to the Ottoman state and to the Imperial family and even to the Sultan himself, made them important elements of the Ottoman administration. See L. Farley [1866] and R. Davison [1982] cited by Exertzoglou [1986] pp.111-113.

[27] Negotiations were successful but the loan was not raised. It appears that the failure was mainly due to the opposition of some of the wealthiest Armenian bankers who feared the success of the Greek and Jewish banking institutions. See M. Sturdza *Haute Banque et Sublime Porte* in P. Dummont (ed) [1983].

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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"traditional" and "new" fortune-hunters, natives or Europeans. The unquestionable advantage of Greek bankers was that they derived from a prosperous commercial community which had accumulated enough capital to support this venture and, more important, their organisation was superior to that of other local bankers: they belonged to an already established commercial network between Constantinople and the main commercial and financial markets of Europe, with significant human and material potentialities.<sup>28</sup>

(1). Short term loans to the Treasury: 1850-1860.

The years from 1850 to 1870 saw the finances of the Ottoman government deteriorate rapidly, a process that was greatly accelerated by the difficulty and cost of borrowing money in a tight market.<sup>29</sup>

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[28] These remarks are also valid with regard to Jewish bankers. In many cases, Greeks and Jews worked together and as we shall see further on in this chapter, in Marseille all the firms which were involved in the affair with the Banque de France were indistinctly called "maisons Grecques". However, what looked to Europeans as a clan, was in the reality a short-term professional co-operation of two distinct groups each with its own blood and marital relationships; more often than not they opted for co-operation or rivalry according to circumstances.

[29] A good general introduction to the history of banking in the Ottoman Empire is A. Du Velay [1903]. Within a period of six years (1854-1860), the Ottoman state raised four loans from European money markets and the General Debt reached 315 million fr (Du Velay [1903] p. 154, Damiris [1915] p. 410); in the next decade six more loans were raised

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The vicissitudes of the Porte in its efforts to deal with its debts were to shape and be shaped by those of the Greek bankers throughout this period. Since the early 1840's - when a financial crisis broke out and the Porte was anxious to reform its monetary system - Greek bankers were deeply involved in transactions with the Ottoman State. In co-operation or rivalry with the Europeans, they submitted various projects to the government for a central bank; many of these schemes died at birth in the shops of Galata, whilst a few led to the establishment of shortlived banks. In 1863 an Anglo-French syndicate succeeded in founding the Imperial Ottoman Bank which played a decisive role in the conduct of Ottoman finances. The new firm was a symbol of financial co-operation; it was also a typical example of European economic dominance.<sup>30</sup>

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(...continued)

whose nominal value was 90 million T. The proceeds of these loans were spent in various sectors: to sustain the cost of administration, to withdraw the paper money that the government had introduced after the crisis of the late 1830's, or to cover military expenditure. During the late 1860's and 1870's another reason for borrowing was added: budgetary deficits caused by the Debt itself, in a typical vicious circle. The 1871 loan for example, guaranteed by an increase in the Egyptian Tribute was spent entirely on budget deficits. The 1872 loan (Treasury bonds) was spent on the conversion of part of the General Debt. The proceeds of the 1873 loan were destined to pay off the floating Debt, the most difficult item of expenditure to deal with. The last loan of the period was issued in 1874; again it was devoted to pay interest on the Public Debt (Du Velay [1903] pp.313-315, Poulgy [1915] p. 62). The only loan which was not raised to pay interest on the Public Debt or to cover budget deficits was issued in 1870. This loan was supposed to fund the Oriental railway project of Baron Hirsh (Poulgy [1915] pp. 57-59).

[30] About the Imperial Ottoman bank see Landes [1958] pp. 62-64 with extensive references and bibliography and Exertzoglou [1986] pp. 129-130. During this period the Porte resorted many times to the services of

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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Greek banking in the Ottoman Empire was conducted, therefore, either by private banks and bankers or by banks founded or closely associated with Greek capital. In both cases, short-term advances to the Ottoman government or to individual State Departments were the main banking activities of the Greeks. Andreas Syngros in many instances recounts in his *Memoirs* the volume, the mechanisms and the significant profits of these transactions. In 1859 for example, when he was working in the firm of G. Petrocochino, he reports that "*only in the years of 1859 and 1860 did the balance sheets of our branch in Constantinople show an annual profit of 2.5 million fr. Bear in mind that this branch was working without proper capital because the necessary capital was provided by the central branch (of Petrocochino's firm) in Marseille*".<sup>31</sup>

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(...continued)

the Greek bankers. When in 1847 the Bank of Constantinople was founded Theodore Baltazzi, a Greek and John Alleon, a Jew, were appointed its managers and they presumably used some of their own capital. (Du Velay [1903] p. 126). In 1853 a group of Constantinople's capitalists founded the Ottoman Bank with capital of 200,000,000 piastres. The presence of Greek capital appeared to be important and their group of bankers and merchants included the names of Psychari, Zarifi and Glavany, all leading capitalists in Constantinople. In May 1858 an Anglo-Greek group got the approval of the Ottoman government to organize a national bank; the project was backed by Emanuel Rodocanachi, Mavrogordato, Ralli and Vlasto. The Bank of Turkey started operations the same year and its prospects were good, but in 1860 the good intentions of the syndicate foundered: the bank took a big share of the Ottoman loan of that year and lost a fortune in the operation. By 1861 the bank collapsed and nineteen companies in Constantinople were suspended. (See below, *Economic Conjunctionure and Networks of Credit*).

[31] Syngros [1908] II p.24, see also pp.30-34 where he describes the apparatus of fraud that some bankers used in order to get cheap credit from European money markets: they were drawing bills of exchange upon "straw men" in Marseille, London or other European markets that the

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In view of the paucity of evidence in the records of the Greek banking companies, it will come as no surprise that data on their short-term loans to the Ottoman state, profits from these loans and other indicators of the growth of their operations are quite meagre.<sup>32</sup> However, Exertzoglou maintains that throughout this period, Greek bankers controlled a large, and perhaps the major share of the Internal Debt of the Ottoman state. Therefore, our data on the internal Debt, although indirect, can be used as an indicator. Reading the commercial report by Barron on Ottoman Finances (1866-1867), Exertzoglou says that the sums due to Constantinopolitan bankers amounted in 1854 to about 550,000,000 francs. A few years later, in 1859, Du Velay reports that the internal Debt corresponded to 450,000,000 francs - the total Debt was 774,000,000 - , and it was almost exclusively in the hands of local bankers.<sup>33</sup> On 11th December 1860, the marseillaise commercial newspaper "Le Semaphore de Marseille", with a view to promoting a European loan to the Ottoman state published the financial situation of the Empire on its

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(...continued)

Greek network had access to. (See below, Economic Conjuncture and Networks of Credit).

[32] The history of private loans to the Ottoman government and consequently the history of much of Greek banking in 19th century belongs to the "limbo of undocumented history" as Landes puts it, but fortunately, they are not irrevocably lost as the author believes. At least, not all of them. However, we agree that, for every private loan to the Ottoman government which was publicly announced, like that of Oppenheim-Alberti in 1863, there were many that were never reported for reasons of state. Landes [1958] p.67.

[33] Report by Barron (1866-1867) p. 438 cited by Exertzoglou [1986] p.132; Du Velay [1903] pp.154-155.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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front page. The division of the internal Debt at that date reads as follows:



(2) Guarantees of the Ottoman State: forms and use.

Short term loans to the Ottoman Treasury or to its individual Departments were provided against guarantees, mainly in the form of promissory notes or Treasury bonds.

Promissory notes were documents acknowledging the obligation of the state to pay back the borrowed sum with interest to a specified person (not to the bearer), on a specified date (not on demand). Concrete instances of the forms and the economic use of these documents

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<sup>34</sup>(a) Internal loan of 6%. Syngros says that the Sultan at the suggestion of some "empirical economist" like himself, was convinced to withdraw from circulation different kinds of paper money and to issue bonds of 6% annual interest. Syngros [1908] II, pp. 62-63.

(b) Caime was the first paper money which the Treasury was forced to introduce after its financial crisis of the late 1830's. Caime bore interest of 12.5 % and had no backing specie. It was not convertible on demand into metallic currency unless it reached maturity, namely after eight years from its issue. In 1842 however, the Ottoman government decided to withdraw Caime from circulation in all provinces except the city of Con/ple. See Davinson [1980] pp.243-245, Mc Kenzie [1983].

(c) Short-term loans to the Ministry of Finances. See Damiris [1915] pp. 26-27 cited by Exertzoglou [1986] p. 132.

(d) Treasury bonds. Exertzoglou [1986] p. 132.

(e) We did not find any reliable source of information about this item of the Internal Debt. It is missing altogether from Damiris' book *To demosion chreos tis Tourkeas*, (Athens, 1915), which was used by Exertzoglou as the main source of the Internal Debt for the year 1859.

(f) Bons de consolidations; issued in order to consolidate the Civil list. Exertzoglou [1986] p. 132.

(g) Floating Debt.

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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against short term advances are provided by a big number of promissory notes found in the archives of the Banque de France, concerning the case of "les maisons Grecques" (See below).<sup>35</sup>

Promissory notes were often repaid in European currencies<sup>36</sup> and usually, bore a high rate of interest, ranging at times up to ?? per cent. In theory, these documents were nominative and they could not be transferred, in practice, an act of cession to the Ottoman government by the beneficiary was enough to make them transferable.<sup>37</sup>

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[35] Box No 1: Maisons Grecques-Negociants (1861-1871). ALLEON Freres.  
Box No 4: Maisons Grecques-Negociants (1861-1873). FALANGA  
(Affaire FALANGA).

[36] "Nous a offert...un titre d'Emprunt de 150,000 Livres Sterling sur le Gouvernement Turc..." 20 juillet 1861, Situation des debiteurs (Emmanuel Baltazzi), Conseil General.

"Tient a notre disposition un Titre d'Emprunt du Gouvernement Turc pour la somme de Livres Sterling 130,000 ..." 20 juillet 1861, Situation des debiteurs (S. Mavrogordato), Conseil General.

"Maison de toute confiance a egalement un titre d'Emprunt de 100,000 Livres Sterling..." 20 juillet 1861, Situation des debiteurs (Tubini et Corpi), Conseil General.

[37] However, these titles could not substitute liquid assets. Conversely, bankers used them as securities in order to obtain bills of exchange or money in Constantinople's market; alternatively they transferred them to other bankers who, in their turn, used them as collateral securities to get credit. According to our sources, it may be assumed that interest rate was included in the capital sum and that the beneficiary of a promissory note maintained his right on the sum which represented the interest rate even after an act of cession to another person. A concrete example is provided by the archives of the Banque de France:

*"M. Falanga, negociant a Constantinople, et fournisseur de l'armee, etait en relation d'affaires habituelles avec la maison Cuppa, etablie dans la meme ville, et meme un grand nombre de fountitures avaient ete faites en participation par les deux maisons. Au commencement de 1861, une crise financiere, qui a entraine depuis la ruine d'un grand nombre de negociants, eclata a Constantinople. (See below Banking and financial Crisis).*

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Treasury bonds were the other welcome resource to the Greek businessmen of the country against short term advances to the Ottoman state. Like promissory notes their high rate of discount made them a lucrative investment, while the amplitude and frequency of their fluctuations were ideal for speculation. In time, the several kinds of bonds, of varying maturity and dependability - issued because of the Ottoman loans contracted in Europe -, offered a wide field for arbitrage and manipulation.<sup>38</sup> Greek bankers had at their disposal large quantities

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(...continued)

*M. Cuppa, craignant de suspendre ses paiements, chercha les moyens de se procurer des fonds pour faire face a ses engagements.*

*M. Falanga lui devait des sommes importantes, et il etait creancier lui-meme de sommes plus considerables sur le Tresor turc pour les fournitures faites au Ministere de la guerre.*

*C'est dans ces circonstances qu'apres examen de leurs comptes courants respectifs (termes du traite) M. Falanga, par acte du 25 fevrier 1861, livra a M. Cuppa sa creance sur le gouvernement ottoman en un havale (titre) de 155,000 livres turques, a condition que ce titre servirait a se procurer des traites pour eteindre telles et telles dettes de Cuppa, et pour fournir 600,000 francs a Falanga personnellement.*

*Après ces operations, tout reliquat provenant des rentrees du havale devait revenir de droit a Falanga.*

*La valeur du havale etait de .....3,487,500 fr.*

*Les traites a fournir s'elevaient a.....3,250,000*

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*Il devait donc revenir a Falanga..... 237,500 fr.*

*Il etait d'ailleurs stipule que M. Cuppa pourrait transferer le titre qui lui etait remis, mais aux memes conditions, c'est-a-dire sous la reserve de l'excédant au profit de Falanga."*

Note pour le sieur FALANGA, Negociant a Constantinople, Demandeur, contre la Banque de France et MM. BALTAZZI, Demandeurs. Box No 4: Maisons grecques - Negociants (1861-1873). FALANGA (Affaire FALANGA).

[38] Landes referring to the Egyptian money market of the same period - so similar to the Ottoman one -, says that "businessmen who knew the right people or put money in the right pockets could cash their

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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of Ottoman bonds bought or granted to them as security for short term loans to the government.<sup>39</sup>

However, they never kept these titles for long periods of time; the impecunious Sultan, the exorbitant interest rates of the advances to the Treasury and the increasing financial needs of Constantinople's market did not favour mid-term, let alone long-term credit; liquidity was the main necessity. A financier becoming too involved with less liquid forms of paper could not avail himself of the increasing financial opportunities in a rapidly expanding money market. Greek bankers, therefore, used promissory notes and bonds as a guarantee in order to borrow short-term from European money markets. But since it was not easy to pledge a promissory note in Europe or even an Ottoman bearer bond as security, and utterly impossible to discount these titles before 1865 - when the latter were finally accepted in the European stock exchanges -, these operations required a ready-made interconnected group of people well established in more than one money market: a network.<sup>40</sup>

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(...continued)

*securities (bonds) without delay. Others found this so difficult that it was simpler to sell out to someone with more influence. All, however, found their profit.*" Landes [1958] p.110.

[39] There were cases where individual Greek bankers held large numbers of Ottoman bonds. George Zarifi was "one of the largest holders of the Ottoman loan of 1871 and of other loans." (Rose and Staniforth [1875] p.45) referred by Exertzoglou [1986] p.137.

[40] When Exertzoglou states that when "payment to the bearer of the document was acknowledge, they simply discounted those documents in Europe" (Exertzoglou [1986] p.133), he probably had in mind the case of Syngros's transactions with Ottoman bonds of the Pinard loan where the banker borrowed money in London pledging large numbers of these bonds as

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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A concrete instance of the mechanisms governing the supply of credit from European money markets - from Marseille in this case - against Ottoman titles is provided by the aforementioned "affaire Falanga" which is the best documented case among many found in the archives of the Banque de France, concerning the 1861 financial crisis of the Greek companies (see below Economic Conjuncture and Networks of Credit). The document, dating from 1861, recorded that Falanga, a merchant in Constantinople and supplier of the Ottoman army, transferred to his creditor, the merchant Cuppa, an Ottoman title (havale) in order to accommodate him to obtain bills of exchange drawing upon France or London pledging this title as security. Cuppa - who was entitled to transfer, in his turn, the title in order to get the required liquid assets - transferred it the very next day to Evagheli Baltazzi, merchant in Constantinople. Evagheli Baltazzi negotiated with seven bankers in the same city the provision of bills of exchange drawn upon Marseille and London and endorsed by them, against the Ottoman title.

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(...continued)

security. But that happened after 1865, and his creditors could sell the titles on the Stock exchange which is exactly what they did. Before 1865, it was almost impossible for Ottoman bonds to be simply discounted either by a European private banker or by a bank. Exertzoglou, of course, describes the general mechanism of the Greek network between the Levant and Europe and his sources do not permit him to draw these kind of distinctions. However, by ignoring the legal and economic procedure of discounting the Ottoman titles, at best, we underestimate the role of the Greek companies established in the European markets; and at worst, we do not understand how the functions of these networks really evolved over time.

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[Chapter 8]

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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The bills of exchange, though, drawn upon the Greek companies in Marseille, were discounted with the Banque de France and were finally protested. The losses were heavy and the Bank's first vice-president was sent to Constantinople to seek guarantees ensuring the payment; among other securities the Ottoman title (Cuppa-Falanga) was offered and accepted by the Banque de France.

The position of the Greek firms operating in European money markets thus became cardinal for the whole network. Pledging promissory notes or bonds as security, Constantinopolitan bankers drew bills of exchange upon the Greek firms in Marseille (and elsewhere in Europe, of course). The Greek firms in Marseille received the bill and, discounted it with the Banque de France or by one of the financial intermediaries. Considerable profits were made on the difference between rates of discount running in European markets and those prevailing on advances to the Ottoman Treasury. If all went well, a maturing set of bills was provided for by new bills. But should a commercial crisis occur, discounting stopped and not only the discounting companies in Marseille fell, but many companies in Constantinople were dragged down with them.<sup>41</sup>

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[41] This is exactly what happened during the financial crisis of 1861. Many big companies in Constantinople, Marseille and London had to wind up their affairs and some smaller-ones went bankrupt. See below.

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b) Bankers and the Director.

*Toute liaison humaine d'un bout a l'autre de la  
Mediterranee reste par contre une aventure.  
Pour le moins une gageure...les Grecs de l'Antiquite  
se sont loges a Marseille, d'ou pareillement ils  
essaieront.<sup>42</sup>*

A network consists of its human resources and of its functions; it makes a virtue of necessity and viceversa and it survives as long as it wins its "bet" as F.Braudel puts it.

The Greek companies in Marseille functioned as the main conduit of European credit for the whole network and throughout the nineteenth century. The success and the limits of the arrangement were determined by the internal organization of the network itself as much as by the interaction with the economic and social entities of the cities where it operated.

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[42] F.Braudel [1990] t.I, p.160.

(1) The Financial milieu in Marseille, 1815-1860.

In the closing years of the French Wars a combination of circumstances led to bankruptcy or retirement of many of the old big merchants of Marseille, the city which was one of the principal commercial partners of the Levant during the 18th century.<sup>43</sup> Increasing postwar competition created a new generation of fortune-hunters, wealthy merchants who were moving into finance and new kinds of specialists, commission agents resident in foreign commercial centres but usually having a partner or agent in Marseille. "Marseille est avant tout une place de commission" maintains the director of the Marseillaise agency

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[43] Even though the losses of the Napoleonic War are not well documented we can infer from the directories of the period that some big companies survived, some merchants retired to landed estates but the majority never regained their former prosperity. Ch. Carriere in his book about the marseillaise merchants in 18th century points out that "*cherchant le moment precis ou la croissance seculaire, cette longue prosperite, est brutalement brisee, le moment qui, pour les hommes dont nous suivons le destin, represente le coup d'arret decisif et durable, celui ou les comptoirs se ferment pour long-temps, ou vraiment se situe la fin de toute l'etude, c'est l'annee 1793 qui s'impose, lorsque la guerre arrete l'activite portuaire: guerre avec l'Angleterre, mais aussi avec la Toscane et les Bourbons d'Espagne ou de Naples; guerre economique accompagnee de blocus. C'est a la fois la destruction brusque, quasi totale, prolongee du commerce marseillais, et pour nous, la fin du XVIIIe siecle*". Ch. Carriere [1973] v.I, p.111.

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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of Credit Lyonnais in one of his reports to the head office. He continues: "*L'armement, l'industrie, la speculation y sont sans doute pratiques sur une importante echelle, mais le plus grand nombre des maisons marseillaises revendique la qualification de commissionnaires*".<sup>44</sup>

As early as 1816 many Greek houses were already permanently established in Marseille, and they started to control the import-export trade of the city with the Orient. During this period of their early settlement, they were backed by Constantinople capital and the organization of their network permitted the self-financing of their trade based on a circulation of bills of exchange moved between one company to another.<sup>45</sup> "*Les Grecs tiennent la plus forte partie du commerce de commission ...mais l' appareil bancaire n'est pas entre leurs mains*" points out Bouvier.<sup>46</sup> In fact, banks and credit institutions were in "nobody's hands" before 1860, actually they were

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[44] Rapport de Dentan au siege social, 1868. (Cited by J.Bouvier [1961] t.I, p.332, n.2.)

[45] It is confirmed in many instances by European sources that most bills were discounted within the Greek communities. See the Bank of England reports cited by St.Chapman [1984] p.166; in a praising report, the same Director of the Marseillaise agency of Credit Lyonnais points out: "*Les maisons grecques, outre la superiorite relative que leur donne leur genie commercial, leur connaissance du pays, l'influence qu'elles y exercent, sont representees dans les localites "exploitables" par des interesses, la plupart leurs parents ou allies; travaillant au profit commun elles retirent ainsi la quintessence de leurs operations, et ce, avec un capital relativement restreint par la facilite avec laquelle le commerce europeen se prete aux innombrables traites que ces maisons fournissent reciproquement sur elles*". Rapport de Dentan au siege social, 26 mars 1869 (cited by J.Bouvier [1961] t.I, p.332, n.1).

[46] J.Bouvier [1961] t.I, p.332.

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late arrivals in Marseille's money market.<sup>47</sup>

Private bankers who were generally merchant bankers,<sup>48</sup> were engaged in domestic or foreign exchange and discount; the structure of this banking system started to diversify after 1860, and the old established bankers and shipowners headed the creation of the big

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[47] During the same period banks and credit institutions in Northern Europe had gained considerable importance. Conversely, in the Mediterranean where merchants had been exceptionally powerful since a very early date, these institutions specialising in credit were fiercely challenged. In Marseille the omnipotent *Chambre de commerce* on 23 October 1818 announced to "sieur" Bourgeois who had proposed to its members the creation of "*une banque d'escompte et de pret aux commercants*", that "*la Chambre de commerce s'est impose la loi de ne point donner d'avis sur des questions de ce genre*". (Archives de la chambre de commerce de Marseille, carton MN3.1.3.2., *Memoire sur l'etablissement propose d'une banque de commerce a Marseille, 1818*, p.7; *Livre de deliberations*, vol.12, folio 183. Cited by Chr.Hatziliossif, *Banques grecques et banques europeennes au XIXe siecle: le point de vue d'Alexandrie*, pp.161-162, nn.8,9. in G.Dertilis (ed) [1988]). In crises Marseille's merchants, preferred to resort to public subsidy than to create a powerful rival of their own business of exchange and discount. It was only during the economic crisis of 1830-1832 and under the pressure of the government that the situation started to change; five private bankers and merchants in Marseille, in collaboration with what it was considered the Parisian "Haute Banque", proposed the creation of a bank with a capital of three million. Their project provoked the reaction of the majority of local merchants who proposed their own project of a "Banque commerciale de Marseille". In this Marseillaise quarrel the presence of three Greek merchants has been traced, significant members of the Greek network: Rodocanachi et Cie supported the first project, Baltazzi and Zizinia bros the second. In the 1850's and 1860's Rodocanachi and Baltazzi participated in the creation of many banks in Constantinople, London, Athens and Alexandria. (See Chr.Hatziliossif [1988] op.cit., p.162).

[48] British banking theory usually made a rigid distinction between the private banker and the merchant. But as Landes has shown, English banking represents a special case and on the Continent private bankers were generally merchant bankers. The only distinction made was between those engaged in foreign exchange and those who restricted their operations to the domestic market.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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Marseillaise institutions.

The two general categories cited in Table 8.2 follow the definitions given in annual directories and as a result a precise typology according to the various activities of the private bankers is difficult. The general category "banquier", prevails. Among them, Abram Felix et cie, Bonnasse, Couve E. et cie, Droche-Robin et cie, Mathieu et Martin, Pascal fils et comp. and Roux de Fraissinet were established both in Marseille and in Lyon and their assets represented a significant part of the local capital, which, between 1864 and 1874 was estimated at 5 to 8 million francs.<sup>49</sup>

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[49] J.Bouvier [1961] t.I, p.332, n.3.













[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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Rodocanachi. The Societe Marseillaise was created in 1865 with the financial support of the Credit Industriel et Commercial et des Depots et Comptes Courants; its capital was 40 million fr. in 1878, 60 million in 1880. Between 1865 and 1889 Pastre, A.Armand and A.Rey were its directors, and in 1880 the Greek Et.Zafiropoulo was member of its board of directors.<sup>50</sup>

(2) The Work of the Greek Companies and the Banque de France

The emergent Greek bankers based in Marseille represented a small group of wealthy firms and maintained their role as general merchants for as long as possible. They had won their position as first-class firms<sup>51</sup> by their skill in import-export trade with the Orient, and financial business was in itself an insurance against adversity. Since the business of the general merchant included the exchange of currency, buying and selling of bills of exchange and of different kinds of commercial papers, insurance and, perhaps on occasion, issuing as well, their financial services were a traditional mercantile activity.<sup>52</sup>

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[50] J.Bouvier [1961] v.I, p.332, Indicateur Marseillais, 1880, p.124.

[51] For example, the Banque de France's assessment of the largest firms Baltazzi, Hava and Lascaridi classified them as very good (Baltazzi: cote No.1), and good (Hava, Lascaridi: cote No.2). D.C.G., No. 36, Conseil General - 5 juin 1857.

[52] M. P.Bougerol's research about the Greek Companies involved in the case of the Banque de France concedes this position. He, actually,

"On thesaurise peu a Marseille. Le moyen le plus pratique de se procurer des fonds est de 'battre monnaie' avec le portefeuille d'effets de commerce".<sup>53</sup> The work of the wealthier Greek companies in Marseille consisted mainly of "making money" using different kinds of commercial papers and bills of exchange; in other words, they were the intermediaries between their countrymen who wanted to discount the paper which was remitted to them from abroad,<sup>54</sup> and the system of cheap discount credit of commercial institutions like the Banque de France. The system worked in this way: merchants or bankers established in Constantinople, drew a three month or six month bill of exchange on the Greek company in Marseille which functioned as an accepting house. The accepting company concerned received the bill and held it to maturity or

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(...continued)

points out that "*le negoci de l'argent etait une activite derivee pour les Maisons grecques. Mais cette activite devait etre non negligeeable puisque la plupart de ces maisons etaient souvent, a leur epoques, considerees, comme de veritable banques. Toutefois, il ne s'agissait pas de banques universelles. Elles ne pratiquaient guere le credit direct, leurs preferences allaient davantage a l'achat et de la vente de papier leur assurant un profit par la difference des taux et des usances*". P.Bougerol, *L'Affaire des Maisons Grecques, 1860-1875*, (September 1992) unpublished paper, Banque de France, HISMO.

[53] J.Bouvier [1961] t.I, p.333.

[54] As we have seen before, the financing of Greek trade was partly based on a circulation of bills of exchange drawn from one company of the network to another. But the great difficulty with the small firms or commission agents was where to discount the paper which was remitted from abroad, and if it were not for the biggest Greek firms they would have found it an impossibility to do so in Marseille or in other European markets. That is also valid for the Greek merchants in London; St.Chapman detects there, the evolution of a small group of merchant firms as the source of financial services for the remainder of the group. St.Chapman [1984] pp.127-128.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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- as increasingly happened - endorsed it, so as to make it acceptable without question, and passed it to the Banque de France which discounted it with the usual rate of discount. The accepting company usually charged the drawer a large commission: the higher the risk incurred by the accepting company, the bigger the commission.<sup>55</sup> This indirect borrowing for financing trade offered the accepting house the opportunity of maintaining its liquidity and operating on a moderate capital base.

The basic terms of this borrowing were first, the establishment of institutionalized credit of a bank like the Banque de France which was a complementary rather than an antagonistic source of credit for private bankers and secondly, access to this institutionalized credit.

According to the credit books and the reports of the Banque de France the biggest Greek bankers operated with the Bank since the time of the Crimean War and the consequent increase of their import trade from the Eastern Mediterranean. On 27 September 1855 the portfolio of the Marseillaise branch amounted to 22 MF and it seems that the Greek companies were involved in a considerable amount of trade in commercial

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[55] St.Thomadachi in his book about the role of the Greek National Bank in the development of discounting credit in the Greek market maintains that under difficult economic circumstances the drawee (in this case the accepting company) of a bill who passed it to be discounted, performed an important operation; he actually shared the responsibility with the drawer, and as a result, he reduced the financial danger incurred by the discounting institution. St.Thomadachi [1981] pp.72-73.



only ones; their involvement in the case of the "Greek Companies" called for closer attention by the administration of the Bank so that their assessments could sketch out the salient features of these concerns.

D. Baltazzi had arrived in Marseille in the 1830s. He had started off as a merchant importing wheat from Russia and as early as 1834 he founded "une maison de banque".<sup>59</sup> He appeared officially as a banker in the list of "L'Indicateur Marseillais" in 1850; he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Marseille from 1848.<sup>60</sup>

In 1861, when the crisis broke out (see next chapter "Banking and Financial Crisis"), he was running the company in Marseille Baltazzi Demetrius & Co. with his three sons, Miltiadi, Evangelino and Leonida. The Banque de France's assessment of him at the same period suggests

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[59] A.D., M 11-Naturalisations et admissions a domicile, M 11 10.

[60] Demetrius Baltazzi originated from Smyrne, and belonged to a family of very successful bankers in Constantinople. His cousin Emmanuel, in collaboration with the French-Jew banker Alleon, was responsible for the Bank of Constantinople founded in 1849 by the Sultan in order to regulate the Ottoman currency; Demetrius was appointed director in the same year. Both participated in many joint-stock banks and companies during the last half of the century and Demetrius's son Evangeli, founded in Greece in 1871 the Central Bank of Credit (Gheniki Pistotiki Trapeza), in collaboration with his rival, the Greek entrepreneur Andreas Syngros. About Emmanuel and Evangeli Baltazzi see G.B.Dertilis [1980]; H.H.A. Exertzoglou [1986]. Even though Greek historiography has recently been enriched by some very good work on Greek bankers and financiers, see for example H.H.A. Exertzoglou [1989], the best source of information about the entrepreneurs of the Greek diaspora remains Andreas Syngros's memoirs. The researcher can also find interesting information in J.Bouvier [1961], and D.S.Chapman [1984].

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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that he had close relations with Emmanuel Baltazzi of Constantinople but their interests were distinct.<sup>61</sup>

Gabriel Hava, with the second largest firm in Marseille, seems to have the same entrepreneurial profile with Baltazzi. However, he was not Greek; he was of Jewish origin.<sup>62</sup> The date of his first establishment in Marseille, is unknown. He traded with the Black Sea ports of Russia, importing mainly wheat. Very soon he was engaged in finance, and in 1850 he was presented in the "Indicateur" as "assureur particulier" and with a firm named Hava Gabriel & Cie. During the crisis, the Bank's assessment describes his operations as follows: "*Hava Gabriel et Cie, ... sont les correspondants des Banques a Constantinople, Beyrouth, et Alexandrie; on peut considerer ces cedants comme une annexe des maisons Elia Hava et fils de Constantinople, T.Hava d'Odessa, R.Hava de Beyrouth, Pierre Hava de Londres - toutes bien notees sur les places ou elles existent.*"<sup>63</sup>

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[61] "*Baltazzi Demetrius et Cie ...sont en relations avec Emml. Baltazzi de Constantinople, qui est au nombre des premieres maisons de cette ville, mais il parait certain que leurs interets sont distincts.*" D.C.G., 1860----22 novembre: Portefeuille des Succursales, verification trimestrielle.

[62] All the firms involved in this case, in Marseille were calling themselves "Maisons Greques"; in Constantinople, the same firms were called "Maisons du Levant". The majority of them were owned by Greeks, some by Jews and Armenians.

[63] D.C.G., 1860----22 novembre: Portefeuille des Succursales, verification trimestrielle.

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Lascardi's firm in Marseille represented the branch of the London company Lascardi & Co, which had been started in 1855; Antoine was the director in Marseille and his brother Pierre in London. Before his establishment in Marseille, Antoine worked in London with his brother and in 1853 they founded the firm Spartali & Lascardi. According to the Bankers' Magazine (August 1861), the firm traded wheat from Tangarog from 1853. In 1860 the firm was the second largest among the Greek leading companies of the City, worth about 100,000 pounds.<sup>64</sup>

The paramount importance of these companies operating in Marseille's market has already been noted. Their real assets though - usually unknown to the historian -, were traced during the financial crisis of 1861: a reputation of indubitable credit based on personal relationships with the members of the Marseillaise board of directors of the Banque de France and with the Director itself. The latter paid with his job, something rare in the Bank's history.<sup>65</sup>

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[64] St.Chapman [1984] p.127.

[65] The Director's close relations with the Greek bankers is constantly implied in the Reports of the General board of Directors in Paris. Ofended or defended the Director is subject to questions about his relations with the "influences locales". For example:

*"M.Durand se demande si la Banque peut s'en rapporter entierement a un Directeur qui fait preuve d'un optimisme inexplicable et semble avoir tenu peu compte d'avis qui remontent deja loin. Peut-etre serait-il bon pour le defendre contre toute influence locale d'envoyer a Marseille un Inspecteur des Succursales"*. D.C.G., 7 mars 1861.

*"Mais aujourd'hui, pour quelle cause, au mepris d'avertissements anciens et multiplies, le Directeur a-t-il laisse ces menus engagements monter a un chiffre triple de ce qu'ils etaient precedemment ?"* D.C.G.,

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*Economic Conjuncture, Networks of Credit and Business Mentalities:*

*Greek Banking and the Financial Crisis of 1861*

a) Chronicle of a loan's failure

Jules Mires, the financier, belonged to this generation of new fortune hunters who occupied the European scene of banking and finance for much of the 19th century. His modest background - he was son of a clockmerchant from Bordeaux<sup>66</sup> - did not impede his way to the top. At the zenith of his career he had succeeded in becoming Director of a bank, "La Caisse Generale des Chemins de Fer", the owner of the Parisian newspapers "Constitutionnel" and "Le Pays" and to be involved in many financial operations in Marseille from 1854 to 1860.<sup>67</sup> He dreamt of

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(...continued)

19 mars 1861.

*"Je remarque dans le Comite d'escompte, comme chez notre honorable Directeur, une grande et serieuse application et une complete impartialite dans l'examen du paper; il n'apparait nulle part que les influences locales exercent une action quelconque sur leurs decisions. Il n'en est une que tout le monde doit subir, celle qui ressort des faits eux-memes et de la situation delicate qu'ils creent a tout le monde".* D.C.G., 12 mars 1861, rapport d'inspection.

[66] See J.Mires [1861] p.7.

[67] J.Mires [1861] pp.38,42,44, and 57-66. In his text, which is an "apology" more than a memoir, he sums up his business in Marseille:

*"Il n'est pas inutile d'ajouter quelques mots sur les entreprises qui*

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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competing with the Rothschilds and he became known in the financial world, where there was no room for "sentiment or pique", because of his rivalry with the "king of bankers and banker of kings" James de Rothschild.<sup>68</sup> Whether an ambitious newcomer, or just a rowdy person, he found a loan to the Ottoman government an excellent opportunity when he came across it, in 1860.<sup>69</sup>

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(...continued)

precedent:

- *Les mines de houille de Portes et Senechas;*
- *Le chemin de fer qui relie ces mines au chemin de la Mediterranee a Alais;*
- *Les hauts fourneaux et fonderies de Saint-Louis;*
- *Le privilege de l'eclairage au gaz.*

*Ces entreprises forment actuellement une seule et meme societe et l'une des plus belles du Midi. Cette societe a ete transformee en societe anonyme sur la proposition de Son Excellence M. le ministre du commerce, apres une instruction qui a dure plusieurs annees et l'investigation la plus severe sur la valeur de l'actif de chacun de ces etablissements". J.Mires, p.66.*

[68] Landes describes the world of merchant banking and high finance as conservative, moderate and eminently sensible; there was no room for sentiment or pride. Even the most sensitive men, found it expedient to curb their temper when the occasion required. (D.S.Landes [1958] pp.45-46). But there were exceptions; the rivalry of Rothschild-Mires was one of them. According to Jules Mires, Rothschild was not only sensitive about his share in financial transactions but perhaps even more about the intangibles of prestige. See J.Mires [1861] pp.96-97.

[69] Mires describes his first contact with the representative of the Ottoman government in France: "*Dans le premier semestre de 1860, quelques maisons de Paris, appuyees par le Credit mobilier (Mires was a major stockholder of the firm since its foundation), firent un traite avec le representant du gouvernement ottoman, pour un emprunt que ce gouvernement voulait contracter.....Comme la societe du Credit mobilier ne peut faire d'emprunt etranger sans une autorisation prealable, le gouvernement francais fut consulte: tout en se montrant favorable en principe a l'emprunt, il repoussa cependant la combinaison aleatoire qui en etait la base. Le Credit mobilier n'ayant pas voulu modifier la combinaison financiere l'affaire n'eut aucune suite. Des propositions me furent faites alors par M.G.Court, representant special du gouvernement*

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On 29 October 1860 a treaty was signed between Mires and Court and an international commission was created to represent the contractors.<sup>70</sup> We do not know exactly how Mires ingratiated himself with the Ottoman government but since some important Greek bankers of Constantinople backed the project from the beginning, we can safely infer that he used their valuable connections in this unknown country.<sup>71</sup>

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(...continued)

*ottoman*". Mires, pp.136-137.

[70] J.Mires, pp.138-139. On 11 December 1860, the Marseillaise newspaper "Le Semaphore de Marseille" published the names of the members of the commission in Constantinople, in London and in Paris:

"Les membres residant a Constantinople sont:

*M.le marquis de Ploeuc, inspecteur des finances en France, envoye en mission a Constantinople sur la demande du gouvernement ottoman, pour cooperer a la reorganisation financiere,...a cet titre, membre du conseil superieur des finances de l'empire ottoman.*

*M.David Glavani, banquier a Constantinople et la plus haute comme la plus honorable des notabilites financieres de l'empire.*

*M.Ch.S.Hanson, banquier, l'un des censeurs de l'ottoman bank a Constantinople et frere d'un des directeurs de la Banque d'Angleterre.*

*M.C.Arlaud, l'un des chefs de la maison Arlaud G.Court et Cie, et associe du commissaire special du gouvernement ottoman, pour l'emprunt.*

"Membres residant a Londres:

*La direction de la Banque de Turquie composee de :*

*MM. Russell Ellice, de la maison Robarts Lubbock et Cie.*

*William Gladstone, de la maison Thompson Bonar et Cie.*

*H.- G.Gordon, de la Banque Orientale.*

*M.- E.Rodocanachi, de la maison Rodocanachi Sons et Cie.*

"Membres residant a Paris:

*M.le Comte Simeon, senateur.*

*M.Donon, banquier, consul general de Turquie.*

*M.Lichtlin, directeur de la Societe general de Credit commerciale et industriel.*

*M.Isidore Fould".*

[71] This hypothesis is furthermore supported by the fact that Mires was well connected in Marseille where the Greek bankers and merchants were considered as the local experts of the Levantine market. Moreover, Mires seems accurately informed about the short term advances of the Constantinopolitan bankers - Greeks in the majority - to the Ottoman

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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The fact is that he offered to the Bank of Turkey, the largest credit institution of Constantinople,<sup>72</sup> a place in the syndicate he was to lead. The offer was accepted. Three members of the bank's board of directors, Rodocanachi, Glavany and Hanson, became its representatives in the syndicate.<sup>73</sup> Two of these names were Greek.

To the great satisfaction of both sides,<sup>74</sup> Mires issued an international loan of 400 million fr. A small detail: the loan carried a 6 per cent interest rate and was issued below par at 0.5375; which meant a real yield of nearly 12 % or a risk factor reduced by half, from whichever side of it one may prefer to look.

The contract made provision for a commission of 1.5 % on the nominal amount i.e. almost 3 % on the price of issue and a premium was to be paid every year for the whole redemption period of the loan, which

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(...continued)

state and the circulation of this paper in the European markets. He writes: "...*Si maintenant on considere que la papier de circulation emis par les banquiers de Constantinople pour les besoins du gouvernement ottoman, et qui forme pour ainsi dire une partie de sa dette flottante, s'eleve a plus de 80 millions; si on considere encore que ce papier est en totalite dans les portefeuilles des Banques de France et d'Angleterre, des etablissements financiers, ou enfin des maisons francaises et anglaises qui font le commerce avec l'Orient, on trouve encore la une somme qui ne sortait pas de France, et cette somme doit depasser 80 millions;...*"

Mires, p.140.

[72] About the Bank of Turkey see the footnote 30 above.

[73] See Du Velay [1903] pp.159-161.

[74] Mires was involved in the withdrawal of the paper money from circulation for the Ottoman government (see the footnote 34,b above), and in the creation of a firm "*destinee a faciliter l'execution de tous les grands travaux et notamment les chemins de fer*". Mires [1861] p.141.

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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was 36 years.<sup>75</sup>

Public subscription which began on 11 December 1860, took place in European capitals and Con/ple. Mires's newspapers in Paris and the London "Morning Post" promoted the issue. The bank of Turkey was assigned to place 50,000 obligations in Constantinople. In the beginning, public reaction seemed to live up to everybody's expectations; Mires's in particular: "*..aussi de toutes parts les offres de souscriptions affluerent. De sorte que lorsque la souscription annoncee dans les journaux du lundi soir, 10 decembre, s'ouvrit le lendemain, mardi, on pouvait juger deja par l'empressement du public, par les souscriptions realisees le premier jour, comme par la disposition des esprits, que la souscription depasserait trois ou quatre fois les nombres des 250,000 obligations au public*".<sup>76</sup>

Four days later, on 15 December 1860, M.de Pontalba - "*le fondateur de la Caisse general des chemins de fer, le mandataire des actionnaires, en un mot le membre le plus actif du Conseil de surveillance!*"<sup>77</sup> - brought a charge of fraud against Mires. A legal search started immediately and two months later, on 17 February 1861, Mires was arrested<sup>78</sup>

Although Mires's newspapers in Paris attempted to soothe anxieties

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[75] According to Mires, as far as the exportation of money from France was concerned, the loan was a triumph. Mires [1861] p.139.

[76] Mires [1861] pp.142-143.

[77] Mires [1861] p.147.

[78] Mires [1861] pp.147,158.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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by promoting the positive perspectives of the Ottoman economy and the unexploited resources of the Empire, as always, rumours very quickly abounded about the financial circles which made the bonds even more unsaleable.

The loan's failure spread panic among bankers and merchants who were directly involved and among bankers'creditors who refused to renew credit facilities.

b) The affair of the Greek Companies and the Banque de France

(1). From Mires to the Greek Companies

"L'affaire des Maisons Grecques" - as it was reported in the meetings of the BF's Board of Directors in Paris<sup>79</sup> -, started to worry the administration of the Central Bank as late as the 28th February 1861 when the portfolio in Marseille increased considerably due mainly to a new circulation of bills of exchange discounted with the Banque de France.

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[79] The majority of the financial history of the Greek Companies was traced through the unpublished BF archives in Paris; our main source was the Central Council's reports which cover exhaustively the first two crucial years of the case; the accounting books and the correspondance were used selectively according to the needs of our work.

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

M. Andouille (who was the first Inspector of Finances in the administration of the Bank, vice-president during 1857-1867), presented a breakdown of the main firms involved:

	Principal			Total
	Assignor	Obligee	Endorser	
BALTAZZI (1st. Febr.	7,801,000	4,857,000	15,000	12,673,000
16 Febr.)	9,434,000	6,467,000	0	15,901,000
Increase since 1st.Febr.	1,633,000	1,610,000	-15,000	3,228,000
HAVA (1st.Febr.	6,885,000	5,670,000	505,000	13,060,000
16 Febr.)	8,161,000	6,300,000	430,000	14,891,000
Increase since 1st.Febr.	1,276,000	630,000	-75,000	1,831,000

This considerable amount of bills of exchange was only the "tip of the iceberg" of a bigger circulation of two types of bills: the so-called Mires bills of exchange and the Greek ones. The former were drawn by the Ottoman government on Mires's firm,<sup>80</sup> and the latter were issued

[80] In the meeting of 7th March 1861 it was revealed that "le banquier

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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and circulated by the Greek companies in their effort to renew credit facilities in the European markets, in Marseille and London in particular.

The effects of the loan's failure were felt heavily upon Constantinople's, London's and Marseille's money markets where the Greek companies operated. As already stated, Greek bankers had locked up a large share of their capital in short term advances to the Ottoman state and were in turn heavily indebted to European companies and banks.<sup>81</sup> As a result, the issuing of this loan would enable the Ottoman state to redeem them; what happened was quite the opposite. The loan's failure left the Treasury empty and the Greek bankers with unsaleable bills and bonds.<sup>82</sup>

As early as January 1861, immediately after the charge of M.de Pontalba against Mires, the Greek bankers in an effort to cover their shortage of funds, started to issue a new series of bills.

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(...continued)

*Mires avait autorise le Gouvernement turc, par anticipation et dans l'optique de l'emprunt manque de 1860, a tirer sur lui pour 23 MF de traites...*. D.C.G., 7 mars 1861.

[81] According to Mires, the short term bills of exchange that the Greeks had put in circulation in order to borrow money from the French market was 80 MF. See Mires [1861] p.140.

[82] Greek bankers were also involved in the circulation of Mires bills, at least as endorsers. The decision of the Banque de France on 17th February, to refuse the discount of any bill of exchange with Mires's signature, further worsened the position of the bankers. About the position of the bank and the explanations given by the board of directors see Mires [1861] p.159.

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In the end, the portfolio of the Banque de France in Marseille served as the largest single recipient of those bills; the Central Council, discovered Mires behind the Greek houses, the Ottoman government, well known for its lack of punctuality, behind Mires.<sup>83</sup>

(2). The circulation of the Greek bills of exchange: a sample

Most if not all of these bills reached maturity and were protested. Therefore they were listed in the Bank's accounting book "effets en souffrance".<sup>84</sup>

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[83] See for example the intervention of M.Darblay (industrialist, member of the board of directors from 1854 to 1878), and M.Durand (banker, member of the board of directors from 1849 to 1878):

*"M.Darblay...indique que l'interet exclusif que tiraient les Maisons de Constantinople (et par suite leurs succursales de Marseille) de leurs avances au Tresor turc a pu creer entre quelques uns d'entre elles et Marseille une circulation d'effets dont elles etaient sures mais a terme incertain de tirer de gros benefices".*

*"M.Durand...dit alors que les avances en question n'ont pas toujours ete remboursees (en temps voulu) par le Gouvernement turc et que par suite les maisons preteuses se sont couvertes en mettant en circulation leur propre signature..". D.C.G., 28 fevrier 1861.*

[84] The accounting books of the Banque de France concerning the affair of the Greek houses are a valuable source, most rare to my knowledge, about the extensive use of bills of exchange by the Greek networks. The series is complete, therefore sufficient for a statistical approach and it includes the following books:

1. Maisons grecques, Brouillard (20 Decembre 1861-1 Juillet 1873).
2. Maisons grecques, Comptes-Courants .
3. Maisons grecques, Journal.
4. Maisons grecques, Grand-Livre.

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

Year	Number of bills	Total value in francs	Average value in francs
1861	1254	24,073,742	19,197

The average value is unquestionably high,<sup>85</sup> which fully confirms the aforementioned statement that the bills were issued and circulated for providing liquid assets to the unpecuniary Greek companies and not for commercial operations.<sup>86</sup>

(...continued)

5. Maisons grecques, Contentieux.
6. Affaire grecque, Effets en Souffrance.
7. Maisons grecques, Effets a Recevoir.
8. Effets en Souffrance, Compte des divers obliges.
9. Effets en Souffrance, Enregistrement.

<sup>85</sup>Distribution by scales of value:

Scales	Number of bills	%	Total Amount	%
1- 5 000	18	1.43	71 955	0.30
5 001- 7 000	20	1.60	126 666	0.52
7 001- 9 999	38	3.03	323 471	1.35
10 000	79	6.29	790 000	3.30
10 001-12 000	58	4.62	667 087	2.79
12 001-14 000	77	6.14	1 049 000	4.38
14 001-16 000	158	12.60	2 419 690	10.12
16 001-18 000	108	8.61	1 895 805	7.93
18 001-20 000	253	20.17	5 021 646	21.00
20 001-25 000	236	18.81	5 645 066	23.61
25 001-30 000	202	16.10	5 648 012	23.62
30 001-	7	0.55	247 000	1.03

[86] On the 6th of March 1861, in a letter to the headquarters in Paris, the director of the BF Marseille's branch stated that there was "Greek paper" in circulation which mainly consisted of "le papier financier cree par suite d'avances faites au Gouvernement Turc". D.C.G., (No 37), 1861--7 mars.

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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In the book "effets en souffrance" the material is listed as follows:

Maturity date	Amount	Signatories	Residence
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Acceptor (Accepteur)

Drawer (Tireur)

Endorser (Endosseur)

Assignor (Cedant)

The categories of the signatories reflect the mechanism of circulation of the bills as much as the policy of the bank towards the signatories. The system worked in this way: the drawer (le tireur), drew a bill of exchange on his acceptor (l'accepteur) in the order of a beneficiary. The beneficiary endorsed the bill to another beneficiary under the quality of endorser (l'endosseur). In his turn, the second beneficiary endorsed it and assigned it to the final beneficiary, the Banque de France, being itself the assignor (le cedant).

According to the bank's interest, the drawer and the acceptor were the principal obligee of the paper that is, those principally responsible for its full payment. Hence, in addition to the listing book of bills of exchange, the bank kept, for the same bills, separate accounts for each principal obligee.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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The reconstitution of the circuits that these bills of exchange took, provided us with accurate information about the origin of each signatory and the specific role of Constantinople and Marseille. The data in the table 8.3 leave no doubt about the importance of Constantinople as a place of issue and the importance of Marseille as the final acceptor. In fact, the circulation was realised due to a small number of accepting companies operating in Marseille which functioned at the same time as assignors to the Banque de France.<sup>87</sup>

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[87] Compare "Appendix F. List of Acceptors" with "Appendix G. List of Assignors".

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]


Table 8.3 Origin of

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	Drawers	Acceptors	Endorsers	Assignors
Const/ple	30	---	48	---
Marseille	1	8	9	11
Paris	2	2	2	---
Lyon	---	1	1	---
London	1	---	11	---
Manchester	---	---	1	---
Smyrna	---	---	2	---
Odessa	2	---	3	---
Brousse	1	---	---	---
Beyrouth	1	---	---	---

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Source: Effets en Souffrance, Enregistrement. Affaire des maisons grecques de Marseille (Service Contentieux). Archives de la Banque de France.



Given the figures presented in table 8.3, which are furthermore illustrated by the analysis of a representative sample of bills of exchange found in the Archive,<sup>88</sup> we shall describe the above mentioned mechanism of circulation using two concrete examples:

On 27th February 1861, Mr. N.Sterio freres & Cricozzo drew from Constantinople a three month bill of exchange on his acceptor in Marseille Mr. Lascaridi & Cie, to the order of a beneficiary in Constantinople Mr. St.Mavrogordato & Cie. The nominal value of the bill was 10,000 francs. The very same day, the beneficiary Mr. St.Mavrogordato endorsed the bill to another beneficiary in Marseille, Mr. Pirjantz Thalasso & Cie. On 8th March 1861 the accepting house of Mr. Lascaridi in Marseille received the bill and three days later, on the 11th, discounted it with the Banque de France, the bill assigned to the bank by the second beneficiary, Mr. Pirjantz Thalasso.

The second case which is identical to the first one differs only in dates and people. A bill of 20,000 fr. nominal value was issued on 13th March 1861 by Mr. J.Gadban of Constantinople on his acceptor in Marseille Mr. G.Hava & Cie, to the order of Mr. Ab.Alahverdi of

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[88] In addition to the accounting books, many of the bills of exchange issued and circulated in that period are found in the Archive of the Banque de France, which provide the researcher with information that the accounts themselves lack (i.e. the duration of a bill, its date of issue, date of discount etc.).

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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Constantinople. The bill was endorsed, the very same day, by the original beneficiary to a second one in Marseille, Mr. D. Baltazzi and it was received by the accepting house in the same city, on 25th March 1861. The next day, the bill was discounted with the Banque de France, assigned by the second beneficiary Mr. D. Baltazzi.

If we call  $(T_d)$  the date of discharge,  $(T_i)$  the date of issue and  $(T_{di})$  the date of discount by the Banque de France, the period  $(T_d - T_{di})$  is the duration of committed liquid assets by the bank and the period  $(T_{di} - T_i)$  is the duration of committed liquid assets by the acceptor. In the cases presented above the period  $(T_d - T_{di})$  is much longer than the period  $(T_{di} - T_i)$  and leaves no doubt about the real cause of circulation of the Greek bills of exchange: provision of funds from the Banque de France, short term loans disguised as commercial operations.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

Table 8.4 Acceptances of the Greek Companies in 1861

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Accepting House	Residence	Total Amount in francs	Percentage
BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille	8,470,955.38	35.36
HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille	6,036,190.86	25.19
LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille	2,712,971.43	11.32
PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille	2,410,236.43	10.06
COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris	1,341,000.00	5.59
SACILLY D.	Marseille	1,178,045.00	4.91
COBELLI PIRJANTZ & Cie	Lyon	1,006,196.43	4.20
RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille	799,176.00	3.33
Total		23,954,771.53	99.96

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Source: Effets en Souffrance, Enregistrement. Affaire des maisons grecques de Marseille (Service Contentieux). Archives de la Banque de France.

Data on acceptances<sup>89</sup> presented here, since we lack any comparative data, reflect more the borrowing capacity of the Greek companies at a given time under certain circumstances than the usual volume of their operations.<sup>90</sup> At any case, if we take into account that

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[89] Acceptances here means liabilities on acceptances during the specific year.

[90] Adequate comparison also calls for data on capital, profits and other indicators of growth. The only source, to our knowledge, is the "Statement accounting for Deficiency from 1st January 1855 to 9th May 1861" of the Lascaridi company, which obviously cannot meet this need. The material presents:

"Capital at commencement of the Partnership 1st January 1855,

London -	116,000 pounds
Marseilles -	15,000 pounds
Total -	131,000 pounds

Profits shown by the books of the firm,

London, years 1855,6,7 & 1860	20,432 pounds
Liverpool, years 1855,6,7,8 & 1860	10,605 pounds
Manchester, years 1855,6,7,8	18,094 pounds

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	49,132 pounds
Marseilles years 1855,6,7,8 & 9	43,461 pounds

Lascaridi Co, Marseilles,

Amount due by the London House on Account Current, per Contra.....	52,192 pounds
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Amount due on <u>Bills Payable (acceptances)</u> , for which the Marseilles firm are liable per Contra.....	114,232 pounds
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	166,424 pounds

Note - The Amount of deficiency appearing to the debit of the Marseilles Firm arises from the fact of the London Firm being indebted to the Marseilles Firm in the sum of 166,424 pounds."

According to prof. Chapman, 100,000 pounds was considered a large capital for a British merchant towards the middle of the nineteenth century. By this standard and by the Bank of England's assessment of Lascaridi, the

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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the six months dividend of the Banque de France was around 13 MF, the 24 MF of acceptances represented a considerable amount of money.<sup>91</sup>

### (3). Internal Crisis and Economic tactics of the Bank

In view of these extraordinary circumstances, six consecutive "special" meetings were called by the BF's board of Directors in Paris, from 13th to 18th April 1861: these were the crisis meetings. At the outset the Governor explained the necessity, mostly known, of an open discussion and the urgency of making decisions. He stated:

*"Il n'y a rien de nouveau, mais c'est précisément la prolongation de cette situation qui lui donne toute sa gravité; voilà 5 semaines que malgré les instructions les ordres de toute espèce, au lieu de restreindre les engagements, on les aggrave...On a envoyé à Marseille un délégué, mais on a pu recevoir encore de lui aucun renseignement...On*

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(...continued)

firm should have been one of the biggest Greek companies in the City of London. The Marseillaise branch appears quite profitable in respect to its capital, though this can be attributed to various factors. However, it is explicit that in 1861 the bulk of the bills payable were accepted by the marseillaise branch, which shows its dominance in the network.

[91] Under the circumstances the General Council decided "de ne pas distribuer l'intégralité de dividende de l'année"; P.Bougerol points out that "reconnaitre devoir restreindre le dividende à cause d'effets en souffrance, sauf crise nationale, n'était pas chose usuelle". P.Bougerol [1992] conclusion.

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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attend encore la reponse a une depeche telegraphique et qui contient ce qui suit:

-- Les Maisons sont-elles en mesure de payer leurs echeances du 16 sans accroitre leurs engagements a la Banque? Reponse telegraphique le plus tot possible.--

Si la reponse est negative et si les banquiers grecs ne peuvent marcher sans la Banque, faut-il arreter? Ou bien vaut-il mieux gagner du temps et proceder avec menagement jusqu'a ce qu'on ait pu se saisir des garanties offertes? Le Conseil veut-il prendre aujourd'hui une decision ou prefere-t-il attendre?

Telle est la question soumise a sa decision. Elle est a la fois commerciale et un peu politique, la responsabilite de la Banque y est interessee au plus haut point comme ses interets, il s'en presente rarement une plus grave devant le Conseil".

From the beginning of the crisis the administration of the bank appeared reluctant to renew credit facilities in the Marseillaise market; behind the money lurked the question of "honour", see indubitable credit, with regard to the public, the shareholders, the Emperor.<sup>92</sup> Two Inspectors of Finance were already sent to Marseille with a view to impeding new discounts, but the instructions of the

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[92] That was the beginning of a difficult period for the bank's solvency, which ended in 1865's monetary investigation. See P.Bougerol [1992] p.12.

[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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headquarters were apparently ignored by the Director of the branch. On the other hand, the confidence that the Greek companies still inspired in Marseille's market<sup>93</sup> made some administrators, the Governor included, most unwilling to take the responsibility of an immediate suspension of payments which would precipitate a series of bankruptcies. Caught between two extremes - new discounts or suspension of payments - the bank preferred to maintain, for the time being, the actual credit, without any further increase, and to ask for solid guarantees.

The tension prevailed in the meetings of 13th, 14th and 16th April, debates led to disputes and even the most conciliatory members of the administration appeared reluctant to put up with the "enraging" attitude of the marseillaise branch.

M. Schneider's strong attack, mainly against the Director, is indicative, in many respects, of the crisis.<sup>94</sup>

*"M. Schneider dit que la situation ne fait que confirmer les preoccupations qu'il a concues depuis longtemps. Des le premier moment, il a compris qu'il s'agissait en realite de credits faits au*

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[93] At the meeting of 11th April 1861, the Governor "repond qu'il partage toute la sollicitude du Conseil, mais il ne peut s'empecher d'etre frappe de la confiance qu'inspire encore a Marseille les Maisons grecques et de la force meme des choses qui a empeche qu'aucune des decisions prises ait pu recevoir sont execution." D.C.G., 11 avril 1861.

[94] Schneider was an entrepreneur and Regent (a term used exclusively for the BF's members of the board of Directors) of the bank from 1854 to 1876). Because of its importance, we present a large part of his intervention.

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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Gouvernement ottoman; la Banque par ses attermolements successifs envers les banquiers grecs, recolte peu a peu tout ce que le credit public a prete a ce Gouvernement par l'intermediaire de ces banquiers; on ne fait pas seulement une mauvaise affaire, on fait un metier de dupes et de dupes. L'Administration de la Succursale de Marseille ne tenant compte d'aucune regle, d'aucun conseil, ne se renseignant pas ou se renseignant imparfaitement, cedant a la pression d'un Conseil d'Escompte probablement interesse, a fait un tres mauvais acte et de tres mauvais exemple; son Directeur a vide le portefeuille des membres du Conseil d'escompte au detriment de la Banque elle-meme. Il y a quelque chose et quelque chose d'important a faire de ce cote, en dehors meme de la question qui est actuellement posee devant le Conseil, c'est une affaire speciale a examiner. Il y a lieu d'examiner si les membres du Conseil d'Escompte oubliant le role qu'ils doivent jouer autour de tapis vert de la salle du Conseil, ne se sont pas exclusivement preoccupes du sort de la place de Marseille; ce serait un fait d'une bien grande gravite; c'est en effet un grand honneur pour la Banque de France qu'aussitot en Conseil chacun de ses Regents ne songe qu'a l'interet de l'institution, oubliant le sien propre, aussi bien que celui de ses amis ou de ses voisins; s'il en a ete autrement a Marseille, il faudrait y porter une serieuse attention. Si les reglements permettaient de destituer les membres du Conseil d'Administration de la Succursale, il n'hesiterait pas a le proposer; mais on peut revoquer le Directeur, et ce sera

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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*probablement une necessite...."*<sup>95</sup>

Taking into consideration Schneider's intervention, the administration unanimously approved a letter written by M. Andouille and addressed to the Director in Marseille:

*"Le Conseil, apres une mure deliberation, a ete d'avis qu'il ne pouvait tolerer plus longtemps une pareille situation ni encourir une aussi grave responsabilite, il a donc decide, quoi qu'il put en resulter, que les escomptes accordes aux maisons grecques seraient a l'avenir rigoureusement renfermes dans la limite des remboursements a faire a la Banque sur Effets engages a la Succursale, sans pouvoir, dans aucun cas, depasser cette limite: veuillez vous conformer strictement a cette disposition des l'echeance du 16."*<sup>96</sup>

#### (4). Finance's Saving Grace: Diplomacy

At the fifth consecutive meeting, on 17th April, the Governor reported his conference with the Turkish Ambassador, who had arrived in Paris some days before, after his visit to Marseille. The purpose of the

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[95] D.C.G., 12 avril 1861.

[96] D.C.G., 12 avril 1861.

Ambassador's trip to France was twofold: first to meet the Greek bankers in Marseille in an effort to support them<sup>97</sup>, and, secondly, to discuss a project of guarantees with the Banque de France. The Ottoman government intended to protect its creditors' interests and at the same time to safeguard its own future credit; a suspension of payments implemented by the Banque de France would precipitate an already smouldering crisis in Constantinople's market.

The proposition of the ambassador was clear and quite expected: the Mires loan had been provided to his country against considerable guarantees; these guarantees could be now transferred to the Banque de France on condition that the bank would not implement a suspension of payments to the Greek companies<sup>98</sup>.

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[97] The Ottoman government may have feared latent competition between the bankers of Marseille and their partners in Constantinople which would endanger Turkey's future credit; this fear was fully justified by the fact that the bankers of Marseille had refused to sign a project prepared by the bankers of Constantinople, in their effort to prove that they were independent. See D.C.G., 17 avril 1861. This attitude of "sauve-qui-peut", was already evident in a letter addressed to the bankers in Constantinople by Hava, one of the biggest banker in Marseille. Among other things he stated: "*Veritablement, le role de gens insolvables qu'on nous fait depuis quelques temps n'etait pas tenable et si la Banque de France etait degoutee de la circulation de Constantinople, nous en etions degoutes plus qu'elle avec la difference que nous, Maisons levantines, etablies en France, comprenant bien la situation, nous etions obligees de tolerer ces traites pour arriver a une liquidation honorable tandis que la Banque de France tout en desirant le meme denouement agissait avec nous comme on agirait avec des debiteurs insolvables*". D.C.G., 11 avril 1861.

[98] The Governor reported: "*L'Ambassadeur a ensuite rappele que son Gouvernement avait affecte des garanties considerables a l'emprunt tente, qui devait etre de F. 215.000.000 et qui n'a ete souscrit que pour 30 millions. Il paraissait penser qu'on pourrait distraire de ces*

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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The proposition triggered off new debates in the Council, the Governor objected that in reality the Ottoman government wanted to place its credit under the patronage of the Bank since, if the Bank tried to sell the titles offered as guarantees it would be obliged to issue new bonds because these titles were no longer offered to the public; and that would be the case since the Ottoman government was prohibited from issuing any kind of bond for a period of six months<sup>99</sup>.

In view of the circumstances the Governor finally approved the suspension of payments and, if needed, the departure of the second Vice-Governor for Constantinople.

The very next day, on 18th April, the Governor reported the decisions of the Bank to the ambassador in the presence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. The battle was to the strenuous, and for the time being, the Bank seemed to have the upper hand. The intervention of the French Minister who backed the Bank's position risked difficulties with the Ottomans.

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(...continued)

*garanties les plus solides que puisse offrir la Porte, un prorata des obligations non souscrites et il a offert de les transmettre a la Banque de France, a condition que les Maisons Grecques ne seraient pas mises en suspension de paiements, que la Banque leur continuerait ses secours et qu'on ferait la part de l'avenir". D.C.G., 17 avril 1861.*

[99] See D.C.G., 17 avril 1861.

c) "*La malheureuse race*", "*l'inexacte Porte*" and "*la rigoureuse Banque*":  
business mentalities of unequal partners

(1). Laws and Outlaws in Constantinople

An urgent mission to Constantinople was decided upon by the majority of the Regents; the 2nd Vice-Governor Baron Doyen, the lawyer M. Fortier and the silk entrepreneur M. Cousinery were the participants. The Bank seemed to have its own plan.

When the first report of Baron Doyen arrived, on 30th May, the picture begun to dawn upon everybody: the mission was in danger of failure. Constantinople was the centre of a world of political as against rational capitalism, as the Baron perceived these terms. His quasi-sociological analysis, is indicative in many respects of the depth of the gulf between these two worlds and even more so of the vanity of the partnership between unequal partners:

*"Vous m'aviez engage, M.le Comte, a prendre quelques jours pour voir et etudier les Grecs; hélas, il ne faut pas beaucoup de temps pour s'apercevoir des ravages que quatre siècles d'oppression ont exerce sur*

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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cette malheureuse race. Le niveau moral est au-dessous de zero, et la premiere vue comme la premiere conversation indiquent sans hesitation ce qu'il y a d'astuce, de dissimulation et de fausse bonhomie dans tous ces caracteres-la. M. Cousinery lui-meme,<sup>100</sup> ne les penetre pas toujours et sa mefiance ne fait que s'accroitre. En somme, nous avons a jouer un jeu qui repugne a des natures droites et c'est en se faisant une grande violence que l'on peut se resigner a tenir les cartes.... ...Les debiteurs de la Banque paieront ce que le Gouvernement Ottoman leur paiera,...je les crois capables de nous glisser entre les doigts ou a se laisser trainer devant leurs chancelleries respectives ce qui serait a peu pres la meme chose. L'un d'eux l'a insinue assez clairement".

Barons' second report on 7th June was more precise, but it did not satisfy the Council. The main points were two;

1. After having discussed with the debtors, Baron Doyen considered that the Bank could obtain, approximatively, 25 MF, on condition that the drawings would be separated from the endorsements; "autrement dit les debiteurs veulent bien honorer leurs tirages mais non leurs endossements".

2. The Ottoman Government and the Greek companies expected the Bank to accept the guarantees: " a) sous forme de delegations sur tels

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[100] M. Cousinery had worked for many years in the Levant and he offered his expertise in commercial affairs.

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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*ou tels revenus de l'Empire; b) sous forme de titres de rentes consolidees crees au taux actuel du change, avec faculte de remere pendant trois ans".*

The Bank was asked to accept the Ottoman government as its final debtor, in other words to put the credit of the Greek companies and of the Turks under its patronage. The guarantees themselves were dubious. For one thing, the collection of public revenue was impossible for the Bank; for another, the Ottoman bonds were unsafe; it was well known that the Ottoman government faced insuperable problems in paying even the interest on its public debt; last but not least, the Ottoman paper had not yet been traded in European stock markets.

Alternatively, the Bank could drag the Greeks into bankruptcy, the law taking over for the rest. Baron Doyen was in the unenviable position of estimating what a trouble that would be for the Bank:

*"Entre deux maux, il faut choisir le moindre et je ne la verrais pas sans effroi aux prises avec sept legislations etrangeres, devant des chancelleries qui, a part la notre, ne passent pas pour des sanctuaires de vertu, d'honnetete et de desinteressement. Il faut s'attendre a une guerre a outrance avec les gens orgueilleux qu'elle aura precipites de leur piedestal; toutes les ruses, tous les artifices, toutes les fraudes seront autant d'armes dans leurs mains, autant de raisons pour*

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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leurs juges. Il faut entendre le recit de ce qui se passe journellement ici, pour se faire une idee de la caverne ou la Banque devra s'enfoncer a la suite de ses debiteurs.....M. Alleon, M. Devaux, Inspecteur des Finances, M. Outrey, Premier Drogman de l'Ambassade, si familiers les uns et les autres avec le caractere des grecs et les formes plus qu'etranges des justices consulaires, me disaient dimanche dernier, qu'ils etaient completement de notre avis et que tout etait preferable aux inextricables procedures dont la Banque paraissait disposee a affronter les lenteurs, les dangers et les injustices..."<sup>101</sup>

The resulting atmosphere of intrigue and chicanery so prevalent in Constantinople, was one in which most European businessmen were lost, at least at first. That was the outcome of the penetration of European capitalism in the presumably independent Ottoman Empire;<sup>102</sup> the encounter of the crumbled Ottoman economic and political system with expansive Europe.

The point is that for a long time Europeans enjoyed a privileged status in the weak, underdeveloped lands of the Orient. The principle of extra-territoriality for them in the Ottoman Empire was the immediate outcome of the famous capitulatory system: commercial Treaties which the Empire signed with Western countries and secured the rights of all

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[101] D.C.G., 1861 - 27 juin: Portefeuille des Succursales, verification trimestrielle.

[102] It would be a mistake to picture the Ottoman state as the passive victim of Western exploitation; the Sultans were as interested in using Europeans as Europeans were in using them.

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foreign subjects trading in the Empire.<sup>103</sup>

This system, in effect, confirmed and codified the prevailing practice that European nationals in the Empire should be ruled by their own law. The system originated in the concept of law as something personal rather than territorial. With the passage of time, however, the privileges freely accorded by successive sultans were converted into prescriptive rights. Moreover, the vagueness and empiricism of extra-territoriality were such that its true content tended to reflect, not the principles it rested on, but rather the balance of power between the local government and the foreign residents.

Clearly, in such a situation neither side is all black or white; the Ottoman administration played the foreign merchants against one another and preferred private deals to impersonal market negotiations. Its informal techniques of business made disputes inevitable, and the corruption of its officials was an invitation to knavery.

In this context Greeks and the other Levantine trading peoples in the region (Armenians, Jews, Syrians etc.), finding their own way into trade, were the beneficiaries both of foreign protection and of their personal relations with the Ottomans.<sup>104</sup>

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[103] See D.S.Landes [1958] pp. 90-91; for the legal treatment of capitulations see J.H.Scott [1907] and A.Benoit [1890].

[104] The majority of the Greek merchants who returned to Constantinople after the Greek revolution, had already resorted to foreign protection. See Ubicini [1856] II, pp. 217-218, see also Pears [1911] pp. 119-121. Not only were most consuls in Constantinople prepared to defend the causes of their own nationals - whatever their merit - but for a sum

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[*Networks of Credit and Banking*]

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Foreign subjects who traded in Constantinople not only paid lower taxes but were also bestowed with certain immunities. According to a report submitted to the Commercial Department of the Greek Embassy in 1865 with regard to the bankruptcy of George Barras, "*a foreign subject who goes bankrupt has the right to resort to the judgement of the courts of his country*".<sup>105</sup>

Finally, Foreign Embassies reserved the right to approve the appointment of members to the mixed commercial courts.

No less important was the element of corruption. Success in the Ottoman Empire was not assured by the fairest but by those who knew a Pacha from childhood, or who dined with the Minister of Public Works. The Greeks knew by experience that at the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy friendship and influence could be bought with timely services, tactful kindness, tasteful gifts;<sup>106</sup> crass bribes were

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(...continued)

they would take the case of anyone, alien or even native. Every Western power had its lists of proteges, permanent and temporary, and the passport became a commercial commodity rather than a warranty of nationality.

[105] Ypothesis Barra (1865): Archive of the Greek Embassy in Con/ple in Archeia tou Ellinicoi Ypourgeiou Exotericon, (Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Athens), reported by H.H.Exertzoglou [1986] p.95.

[106] The Greek ascendancy in the Porte, existed until the Greek revolution by the Greek Dragomans, ceased. However, though their influence had been greatly diminished, the Greeks' participation in the higher echelons of the Ottoman administration continued, and by the second half of the 19th century many Greeks were employed by the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and staffed the Ottoman Embassies in Europe; see Alexandris [1980] pp. 368-375. Yet as a whole, the percentage of Greek participation in the Ottoman administration was insignificant. In the early 1880's, out of 23,826 people employed by the Ottoman

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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at least as effective with minor functionaries.

At the meeting of 21st of June, the main subject of the Council was Barons' Doyen next report. The letter was written in an intense tone, most unusual for the Bank and provided information about the legal establishment of the main debtor of the Bank, Em. Baltazzi:

*"Il n'est pas douteux pour nous, d'apres les revelations qui nous parviennent, que le premier effet d'une reponse defavorable doit etre un profond decouragement, suivi bientot d'une sorte de sauve-qui-peut emportant avec lui les esperances de la Banque, lui creant, au lieu de debiteurs de bonne volonte, des debiteurs mecontents qui, selon les usages de Constantinople, opposeront une force d'inertie presque invincible aux reclamations les plus justes, la jetteront dans des difficultes inextricables et se laisseront volontiers trainer devant leurs diverses chancelleries, surs de l'impunite qui les attend et peut-etre meme de l'interet qu'inspirera cette faillite generale qui, a la difference d'une faillite isolee, sera l'image d'un cataclysme et n'accusera, aux yeux d'un public prevenu que l'inexactitude de la Porte et la rigueur de la Banque. Des faits recents, d'un cynisme incroyable, sont la pour justifier mes paroles et me faire craindre de voir defiler*

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(...continued)

administration in Con/ple, only 348 or 1.2 % were Greeks; see Shaw [1977] p. 244.

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[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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a la suite de cette debacle toutes les ruses et toutes les fraudes qui sont, ici, le cortège habituel. D'un autre cote, nous savons aujourd'hui que la societe de l'un de nos principaux debiteurs, M. Em. Baltazzi, n'est pas meme regulierement constituee, ses operations pourraient, a notre grand detrimement, etre subitement arretees et la possibilite de prendre des arrangements lui etre enlevee avec la signature qui ne lui appartient pas legitimement; un pretendu scrupule de conscience pourrait meme, au moment de liquider sa dette, lui reveler son incapacite....".

(2). "Perisse un principe plutot que nos millions": the affair is concluded

In view of the circumstances, the Bank's struggle for predominance had come to an end; the situation called for solutions, that is compromise. Baron's Doyen majestic pragmatism expressed the "raison d'etre" of a bank, even if the bank concerned was the Banque de France:

"...Vous devez penser que nous attendons avec une impatiente sollicitude l'arrivee du prochain courrier puisque votre reponse doit prononcer sur le sort d'une des plus grosses questions dans lesquelles la Banque se soit trouvee engagee depuis sa fondation. Il m'est encore

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[Chapter 8]

[Networks of Credit and Banking]

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*permis de vous adresser l'expression d'un dernier voeu et je la fais en retournant une phrase restee celebre: perisse un pricipe plutot que nos millions."*<sup>107</sup>

The 18th July was practically the end of the "affair of the Greek Companies";<sup>108</sup> the Governor announced the arrival from Constantinople of M. Cousinery, and of the Greek bankers Pirjantz and G.Hava. Not surprisingly and in tune with the proposition of M. Cousinery, the Bank finally accepted to ask only for the payment of the issues and not of the endorsements; had the Bank insisted on payment of the endorsements, this would have forced the companies to go bankruptcy, causing insuperable problems for the Bank itself, due to the "defectiveness" of the Ottoman Law system.

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[107] D.C.G., 27 juin 1861 (letter dated 19 juin 1861).

[108] In reality the bank was paid off on 24 December 1875 when the accounts "Creances a Liquidier" and "Profits et Pertes" were finally balanced. See appendix "Note succinte sur l'Affaire, 1861 - 1875".

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[Power in the city]

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PART THREE: "Dear father I offer my respects (I bow)": SOME REFLECTIONS  
ON ATTITUDES, RELATIONS, MENTALITIES

Traders, shipowners or financiers, the Greek businessmen had become by the end of the second Empire, a part of the Marseillaise bourgeoisie, well integrated into the economic and social life of the city. Their social promotion based mainly on their fortunes, overcame their religious or ethnic particularity in a city where "*les principaux habitants sont des parvenus, dans le sens le plus honorable du mot; les autres ont l'espoir de parvenir en travaillant. Il n'y a donc que deux categories a Marseille: ceux qui ont fait leur fortune et ceux qui cherchent a la faire*".<sup>1</sup>

But adhesion to the city's system of values and web of relations, did not preclude the voluntary or even unconscious preservation of certain cultural characteristics which had an impact on their mentality, formed their attitudes and influenced their relations and their strategies.<sup>2</sup> The result was a mixed culture which combined Greek and

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[1]. E.About [1860] p.17.

[Power in the city]

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French language, some elements of Orthodox ethics alongside national feelings and despite a certain cosmopolitan outlook.

It was only possible to trace this aspect of life within the circle of Greek businessmen included in what has been called "the International of Notables", a group defined empirically by R.Lopez and E.Temime as "*par notables, il faut d'abord entendre le monde du negoce, des armateurs, des courtiers, les maitres du port, qui sont souvent aussi les hommes de l'industrie. Car les grandes fortunes, celles qui dominant la ville, constituent un monde restreint et relativement clos. Dans cette categorie limitee en nombre, il y a finalement peu d'etrangers au sens classique du terme. Leur longue implantation a Marseille est suivie d'une francisation assuree generalement sans trop de problemes. Pourtant nous assistons dans le premier XIX<sup>e</sup> siecle a un renouvellement assez considerable de cette elite, avec un apport exterieur a la fois d'origine francaise et d'origine etrangere. Le gotha marseillais comporte tout au long du siecle des noms a la consonance tout a fait revelatrice. Et il est remarquable que certains capitalistes aient tenu a garder durablement leur nationalite ancienne sans eprouver pour cela de veritable gene dans leurs activites*";<sup>3</sup> that was more imposed by the existing sources (actually by the lack of them) than dictated by a theoretical viewpoint: after the Intellectual History's

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[2]. For the use of the term mentality see Jacques Le Goff, "Les mentalites. Une histoire ambigue" in Jacques Le Goff - Pierre Nora [1974] v.3, pp.76-94.

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[*Power in the city*]

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research, we could not claim that the upper class play an exclusive role in the formation of society's ideology, mentality, behaviour and culture.<sup>4</sup>

Even at this level of analysis we contented with fragments of ideas, attitudes or mentalities; they do not constitute any systematic perception of the world which could be labelled as an Ideology; consequently, we proceed from what came to be the solid base of this thesis, that is, the economic activities of the Greeks, to the ill-defined area of the culture of every-day life. Following this framework, chapter nine analyses some of the Greeks' fortunes as indicators of perceptions on investments and then examines the Greeks' access to the Chamber of Commerce, the stronghold of the local bourgeoisie. There follows chapter ten discussing various components of culture, firstly through the examination of three main mechanisms of cultural transmission (Family, Church, Education) and secondly, through a concise case study: Dimitrios Petrocochinos' representations of every-day life.

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[3]. R.Lopez-E.Temime [1990] v.II, p.39.

[4]. See among others Dominick La Capra - Steven L.Kaplan (ed.) [1982].

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C H A P T E R N I N E

POWER IN THE CITY

*Big Fortunes*

As we have seen in chapter three, the community was some sort of an elite; within the elite, a clear majority were merchants; and of them, a considerable number became, by the end of the century, rentiers. Thus, the importance of their fortunes and the composition of their patrimony established a hierarchy and distinguished a number of Greeks from the mass of the population<sup>5</sup>; it revealed at the same time their perception of investment; that is, of their future prospects in their place of residence.

Based primarily on the *Enregistrement des mutations apres deces*,<sup>6</sup> our research benefitted from a small number of cases, which were

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[5]. It has been shown that the average fortune in Marseille increased considerably from the midcentury to 1870, but that there was only a small minority who possessed more than 100,000 francs. Although a large number of the population became impoverished, capital was concentrated in the hands of 3 to 6 %; the average fortune in this category was estimated around 300,000 francs. See R.Caty-E.Richard [1980] p.128, fn.5.

[Power in the city]

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sufficient nonetheless to depict the general trends of the group's attitude; some wills and marriage contracts were selectively used to complete the information.

Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 show property as a percentage of Agelasto's, Rodocanachi's and Dromocaiti's patrimony: the 17, 36 and 31.5 per cent respectively, in the 1850's. This property was of three types; principal or secondary residences, investment property for renting and commercial premises.

The importance of real estate comes as no surprise; it was consistent with the immediate need for offices and warehouses at the beginning of the merchants' establishment in the city and later on, the security of real property and of its revenues, with a view to counterbalancing business risks.<sup>7</sup>

Emmanuel Paul Rodocanachi owned, as early as 1855, three houses in the centre of the city and a country-house, with a combined value estimated at 255,000 francs. Both the houses in the city and the country-house were partly rented and they yielded a yearly revenue of

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[6]. Professors R.Caty and E.Richard not only informed me about the existence of this valuable source but they also guided me as to its use; I express my gratitude to both of them. The source (A.D., *serie XII Q 9 7*) comprises *les declarations qui seront faites par les heritiers, legataires, donataires eventuels, et par les survivants des epoux, pour les biens dont ils recueilleront la propriete ou l'usufruit, en execution des lois sur les successions, ou en vertu de testaments, codicilles et donations eventuelles.*

[7]. All the same, real estate represented a considerable part of all the big marseillaise fortunes of the period; see R.Caty-E.Richard [ ] p.129-130.

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MICHEL AGELASTO




Table 9.1

MICHEL DROMOCAITI




Table 9.2

EMMANUEL PAUL RODOCANACHI




Table 9.3

[Power in the city]

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12,700 francs. Two of the city houses were situated in the new quarter called *Allees de Meilhan* or *des Reformes* which, as we have seen in chapter three, was at the beginning of the century an underdeveloped area, but had attracted, by 1860, the wealthier amongst the population. Both were "*Hotels particuliers*", spacious enough to serve as a principal residence, as a commercial premise and eventually as an investment property for renting; detailed descriptions in the notarial deeds offer a picture with the precision of a photograph:

"une maison sise en cette dite ville de Marseille, Ile des allees n. 12 ...ayant deux facades, eleves de trois etages sur son rez-de-chaussee, percee de trois croisees a chaque etage, d'une porte d'entree et de deux croisees au dit rez-de-chaussee, avec mausaides, basies offices, cave, junts et jardin, au fond duquel il y a un cours de batisse compose d'un etage et d'un rez-de-chaussee, ayant issue sur une ruelle, commune a d'autres maison voisines, qui vient aboutir au boulevard Dugommier et surlaquelle dite ruelle la dite maison a droit de passage...". (A.D., 380 E 428, n° 187, 2 avril 1836).

"une maison sise en cette dite ville de Marseille, Ile des allees n. 20, la meme ou habite M.Fabry. Cette maison est moutee sur sa facade visant sur les allees de Meilhan de trois etages sur rez-de-chaussee et basses offices; elle est percee a rez chaussee d'une porte d'entree et

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[Power in the city]

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de deux fenetres et de trois fenetres a chaque etage; la facade de derriere est moutee seulement de deux etages sur rez-de-chaussee, percee au dit rez-de-chaussee de deux portes et d'une fenetre et de trois fenetres a chaque etage. A la suite de la dite maison est un grand jardin au fond duquel il y a un petit corps de logis, compose d'un savoir et de lieux d'aisance et a cote un corridor ou passage qui vient aboutir aux allees de Meilhan et passe sous la maison portant le numero vingt un des dites allees appartenant a Madame Limony veuve de Scelles qui est grivee de cette servitude. La dite maison a la jouissance des eaux de la ville...". (A.D., 380 E 450, n° 401, 14 mai 1844).

The acquisition of a country-house, the famous "bastide", was associated more with a "noble" lifestyle than with immediate economic profit; however, by reinforcing their social profile in the city, this lifestyle constituted an asset. In 1837 Michel Dromocaiti already possessed:

"une propriete rurale sise dans le territoire de Marseille, quartier de saint jean du desert, composee de deux pieces contigues entre elles et fesant partie d'une plus grande acquisition que le dit M.Chaix a faite du S.Mathieu Bectholf et des hoirs de la demoiselle Therese Victoire Roux, ainsi qu'il sera dit ci-apres, le restant de la dite acquisition qui consiste en une troisieme piece separee des deux

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[Power in the city]

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dont il s'agit, n'etant point comprise dans la presente vente et demurant la propriete du vendeur. Elle est complantee de vignes par oulieres, oliviers, arbres fruitiers et d'agrement. Il s'y trouve egalement un logement de maitre et de fermier, resuise, ecurie, cave cellier, puits lavoir et une source d'eau...ainsi qu'il vient d'etre dite, la propriete consiste en deux pieces de terres contigues ou se trouvent le batiment de maitre et de germier et autres ...La contenance totale de ces deux pieces est d'environ cent quatre vingt treize acres sans garantie neanmoins quant a ce, la presente vente etant faite en corps et non en mesure..". (A.D., 380 E 431 n° 422, 9 aout 1837).

Thirty years later, Pierre Pantia Ralli inherited nothing less than his father's chateau "situe a Bonnesance appele chateau Ralli, compose de maison de maitre avec des dependences pour logement des portiers, jardiniers et autres." (A.D., X II Q 9 7/15, n° 1176, 9 juillet 1865).

His share of the entreprise, as we can see in the same Figures, was of course entirely consistent with the earlier analysis of the Greeks' business: trade, shipownership, investment.

Agelasto remained a typical Greek merchant of the first generation; he earned his bread and butter from trade which represented 84 per cent of his fortune:

"Marchandises en route: .....200.000 fr.

[Power in the city]

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*Creances commerciales sur divers:.....170.000 fr.*

*Marchandises en magasin:.....80.000 fr.*

*Argents numeraire en billets de banque...50.000 fr."*

(A.D., X II Q 9 7/92, n° 410, 24 mai 1854)

Dromocaiti diversified his activities by investing in boats and ended up as a medium-sized shipowner; in 1854 his six vessels represented 63 of his fortune or the 91.16 per cent of his enterprise.

Finally, Rodocanachi's fortune represented the modern way of doing business, especially in the midcentury, which, in many respects was in itself an insurance against the decline of trade; the creation of a diversified portfolio. His investments can be roughly divided into international and local. The former, which were not estimated in his will, constituted the biggest part of his fortune:

*"Creances etrangeres sur divers en Russie, en Angleterre et en Italie, montant a 774.827 fr. decrites dans le partage recu par Ch.Rouan notaire en acte...le 9 octobre courant, qui ne sont portes ici que par memoire";*

The latter read as follows:

*"1. Quatre actions des Messageries Imperiales, 1<sup>re</sup> serie, actions de cinq mille francs chacune, valant au jour du deces d'un mille huit cent francs chacune soit 43.200 francs*

[Power in the city]

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2. *Quatre actions des dites Messageries Imperiales, 2<sup>e</sup> serie de 3750 francs, verses, valant au jour du deces huit mille huit cent cinquante francs l'un, soit 35.400 francs*

3. *Vingt deux actions de credit foncier de Marseille, de cinq cent francs, dont deux cent cinquante francs verses, valant au jour du deces cent cinquante francs, soit en tous 3.300 francs*

4. *Vingt cinq actions de bateaux a vapeur de la C<sup>ie</sup> Bazin Gaz, d'en chacune de quelles il a ete verses deux cent soixante quinze francs, valant au jour du deces quatre cent cinq francs l'action, soit en tout 10.125*

5. *Une inscription de rente sur l'Etat de douze cent francs valant au jour de deces, au cours de 67,08, 26.832."*

(A.D., X II Q 9 7/94, n° 1255, 25 octobre 1855)

Therefore, one cannot observe a uniform attitude towards investment: its nature and importance depended on the activities, the relations or even the age of the Greeks. What is evident is that a number of successful merchants, not only invested in real estate when their fortune reached a certain level, but showed a strong propensity to diversify towards real estate as a social-status symbol promoting their integration into the local, French society. Entrepreneurs in the beginning, the Greeks wished to become "notables" by the end of their lives.

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[Power in the city]

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### *Conquering the Institutions*

Given Marseille's assimilationist environment - like every other modern society -, wealth and power for the Greek noblemen eventually meant adhesion to the city's system of values and web of relations. Titles, philanthropic action, access to the Chamber of Commerce (the stronghold of the local bourgeoisie), these were, grosso modo, a nobleman's credentials during the period under consideration.

Honored with the medals "*grand cordon de l'ordre du Medjidie*", "*grand officier de l'ordre du Sauveur de Grece*" and "*commandeur de la Legion d'honneur*", setting up philanthropic institutions like the "*assistance par le travail*", "*oeuvre de la Bouchee de pain*", "*societe des habitations salubres*", "*extension de l'oeuvre de l'Hospitalite de nuit pour les femmes*", Etienne Zafiropulo was a typical case of those local noblemen who accumulated awards, responsibilities and functions as the best guarantee of their power in the city.<sup>6</sup>

All the same Etienne Zizinia, Mehemet Ali's personal friend, in addition to his titles as "*chavalier de la Legion d'honneur*", "*officier de l'ordre du Sauveur de Grece*" and "*commandant de l'ordre du Sultan*" became in 1849 "*comte hereditaire*" of the kingdom of Belgium. Later on, in 1871, Theodore Rodocanachi offered the city "*une salle de soins pour blesses et malades*" and Etienne Zafiropulo was the 1870's public loan

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[Power in the city]

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main guarantor."<sup>8</sup>

Last but not least, Demetrius Baltazzi, the most important banker in the "affair" of the Greek companies with the Banque de France, was awarded the "*chevalier de la legion d'honneur*" for his valuable services to the central bank!<sup>9</sup>

Still, the institution with the biggest interest for the Greek noblemen was the Chamber of Commerce; it was there that decisions about the city and the port were taken, the best pillar of their economic power.

The period of animosity against the Greeks because of the revolution of 1821,<sup>11</sup> had definitely passed; Greek merchants were no longer "*corsaires*" or "*pirates*" but "*des hommes fort recommandable*" to be coopted into the "*club*".<sup>12</sup>

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[8]. P.Guiral - F.Reynaud (ed.) [1988] p.259.

[9]. R.Lopez - E.Temime [1990] p.41.

[10]. A.D., M.11.10., 3 fevrier 1863.

[11]. Then the Chamber repeatedly denounced the Greek revolution as much as France's involment: "*les puissances chretiennes, la France notamment auront peu a se louer d'avoir admis ce peuple dans la grande famille europeenne et se repentiront, trop tard peut-etre, d'avoir fait tant de sacrifices pour lui procurer une independance dont is se montre se peu digne*"; L.Bergasse [1913] p.94.

[12]. "...*M.Dromocaiti est un homme fort recommandable et digne sous tous les rapports de la faveur qu'il sollicite.*" A.D., serie M. 11 16, lettre de la Chambre de Commerce, le 9 aout 1842.

Changes in the political system were always followed by changes in Chambers' organisation; once again in 1852, noblemen were given back the right to elect the members of the Chamber and "*la confection de la liste electorale fut laissee au pouvoir discretionnaire du prefet sous reserve de l'approbation du ministre de l'Interieur*"; L.Bergasse [1913] p.144.

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[Power in the city]

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Table 9.1. Greek merchant members of Marseille's Chamber of Commerce

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Name	Date of entry	Date of cessation
Rodocanachi Paul	Nov. 1852	Jan. 1863
	Nov. 1864	July 1872
Agelasto Demetrius	July 1872	Jan. 1879
	Feb. 1881	May 1885
Reggio Alcibiade	Jan. 1885	Jan. 1891
Rodocanachi Theodore-Paul	Jan. 1887	Feb. 1893
Agelasto Theodore	Jan. 1895	Feb. 1905
	Jan. 1909	Dec. 1910
Rocca Emilien	Feb. 1905	Dec. 1912

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Source: L.Bergasse *Notice Historique sur la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille (1599-1921)*, Marseille, 1913, pp.259-263.

[Power in the city]

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As we can see in Table 9.1., the Greeks from the midcentury on, had continuous representation in the Chamber; their presence was considered important enough to always be listed and mentioned alongside the biggest entrepreneurs of the city.<sup>12</sup>

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[12]. Paul Rodocanachi, for example, during the period 1852-1872 was distinguished for his action alongside merchants and ship-owners of the calibre of Henry Bergasse, Victor Regis, Charles and Hilarion Roux; see L.Bergasse [1913] p.146-7.

C H A P T E R   T E N

THE CULTURE OF EVERYDAY LIFE

For the Greeks in Marseille, the most important mechanisms of cultural formation were the family, the Church and public education. The family was a meeting place, where resources were pooled and decisions taken. The Orthodox Church contributed to the compatibility of religious and ethnic identity. Public education, finally, with its sophisticated set of rules and regulations, introduced the offspring of Greek families to the French system of thought and culture. Altogether, these determinant factors were transformed into basic categories of thought and structured specific ideas, attitudes and actions. In turn, these "representations" of the world became constitutive parts of everyday life.

[The culture of everyday life]

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*The Mechanisms: Family, Church, Education*

In many instances of this thesis, family has implicitly been recognised as the basic form of organisation of the Greeks in Marseille; the family at work, in particular, was the basic unit of the commercial firm. Consequently, there is a need to study family in its autonomy and not as a reactive group to externally imposed conditions. In other words, our aim was to see if and how social or institutional forms or rules were appropriated and allocated in different ways by this particular familial group and also transformed in the process.

It became immediately clear that sources rarely allow the family to be studied directly; such an orientation usually necessitates the cross-linking of a range of different records and the use of different methods.

What emerges strongly from all sources is that the Greek family as a mechanism of culture transmission was, during the 19th century in Marseille, in continuous change. Practices, strategies or the mental horizon appear to be changing in parallel with the local economic and social conditions; and the Greek family's social perception of culture converged with that of Protestant or Jewish families: it converged more and more with that of the local bourgeoisie. We can therefore support the claims by Roland Caty and Eliane Richard:

*"Ainsi la haute bourgeoisie marseillaise est traversée de clivages*

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[The culture of everyday life]

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ethniques et religieux. Il est certain qu'il existe une forte communauté protestante à la tête d'entreprises de commerce, de banque, d'armement; que les Grecs constituent un milieu spécifique dont les ramifications s'étendent au-delà des frontières; que les Juifs forment également un ensemble uni. Chacun de ces groupes possède ses lieux de culte, ses institutions de bienfaisance et de charité. L'endogamie y est de règle, au moins dans la première partie du siècle."

"Toutefois, cette diversité apparente ne doit pas masquer de réelles convergences. Un rapprochement s'effectue déjà dans les affaires ou des catholiques ne craignent pas de s'associer à des protestants ou des Israélites. De plus, cette bourgeoisie tend à se regrouper dans les mêmes nouveaux quartiers, au Chapitre ou près du cours Bonaparte - qui devient le cours Pierre-Pugier après la chute du Second Empire. Elle élève ses fils dans les mêmes établissements, partage le même style de vie, a le même goût pour la bastide. Elle se retrouve aussi dans des organismes de gestion comme le conseil municipal, le conseil général et la Chambre de commerce. Au fil des décennies, les différences s'atténuent, au fur et à mesure que s'affirme le sentiment d'appartenance à un même groupe social dominant."

To begin with, demographic characteristics bear witness to a pattern of rupture and change in nuptiality and fertility. First, the

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[1]. Marseille au XIX<sup>ème</sup>, *Reves et Triomphes*, Musées de Marseille, 16 Novembre 1991 - 15 Février 1992, p.327.

[The culture of everyday life]

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big difference between the respective mean ages at marriage of brides and grooms diminished steadily over time since there was a tendency towards a reduction in the mean age at marriage of men and a rise in the mean age at marriage of women; in other words, the "non European" pattern of youthful marriage for women and late marriage for men (because of their work), adapted to a more "European" model with older brides and a small age differences between the spouses.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, women started to practice family limitation, usually after the birth of the desired number of children, at the end of century.

On the other hand, marriage strategies would seem to have been essentially long-term, attempting to insure both the continuity of the family's social and economic position and the reproduction of a culture of which Orthodoxy was an integral component; but as the economic and social conditions changed, these strategies became incompatible with them and were finally transformed. Arranged marriages were no longer seen as inherent to the nature of things; the need for co-operation, for example, overwhelmed ethnic or religious loyalties; and the young generation's search for romantic love became a symbol of self determination against paternal authority and profoundly changed internal family relations. In this context Eustratios Petrocochinos' marriage (Michel's younger son) with the French actress Marie Josephine Dalmás

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[2]. About the European marriage patterns see J.Hajnal "European Marriage Patterns in Perspective" in D.V.Glass - D.E.C.Eversleg (ed.) [1965].

[The culture of everyday life]

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(albeit many years after his father's death), or Zarifi's marriage into a Catholic family, were not so much a transgression against a norm but more a case of matrimonial opportunities open to these families by virtue of their changing position in Marseille's social hierarchy.

Thus, the mercantile family transmitted a mixed culture which combined Greek or Levantine traditions with West-European and French values and a French "savoir vivre"; the result was well depicted in the ceiling of Zarifi's - Rodocanachi's house:

*"La bourgeoisie du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle saisit l'opportunité de défendre la cause familiale par l'évocation idéalisée de ses activités professionnelles....Le plus bel exemple se trouve dans l'hôtel des Zarifi Rodocanachi, famille importante de la colonie grecque de Marseille. Un plafond peint en 1896 par Clairin, l'un des décorateurs de l'opéra de Paris, offre une allégorie de la famille que dominent Hermès et une élégante déesse antique. À la douceur des gestes et des étoffes du groupe des enfants et de leur mère s'oppose le réalisme des Levantins qui déchargent les précieuses denrées apportées par les vapeurs."*<sup>3</sup>

We have already seen in chapter two, that the Church was the main organisation of the Greeks in Marseille which in many respects substituted the Community; it strengthened ethnic consciousness and

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[3]. *Marseille au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, Reves et Triomphes*, Musées de Marseille, 16 Novembre 1991 - 15 Février 1992, pp.246-247.

[*The culture of everyday life*]

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enhanced the sense of belonging to a Greek community, particularly in the first period of establishment. But given the French government's hostility to the creation of the Orthodox Church, the financing, administration and building of this institution was totally controlled by the big mercantile families.

The noblemen secured their dominance over the Church during the whole period under consideration and used it as an intermediate collectivity between them and the expanding "society of citizens" in the city. But the expansion of state welfare services in Marseille, closed the way for the development of large-scale charitable or other institutions financed by the Church and intended primarily for the benefit of Greeks. The Greek Hospital, for example, founded in 1857, was closed some years later "*because nobody in Marseille is in need of this Institution. As far as sailors and other persons passing by the city are concerned, they are very well succoured in the city's public hospital, where, anyway, they were obliged to go by a local order, during the last epidemic*";<sup>4</sup> in compensation, it was decided to ask the public hospital for a separate room for the Greeks.

In general, there was no need or space for the establishment of "ethnic" institutions, since not even the Church or any Greek Community were defined by law as distinct institutions. To mention two examples, when the Church's committee proposed "*the best way for the Greek*

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[4]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 23 Decem.1866.

[The culture of everyday life]

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community in Marseille to be defined by French law and to be founded as a charitable institution recognised by the French government ", the proposition remained suspended because "the same plan has been postponed because we feared the unjustifiable intervention of the French government in our Church".<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the abolishment of the annual funding that the Greeks offered to the public hospital for keeping a separate room for their poor country-fellows was proposed, the main argument against the proposal was that "it would not be decent for our community to abolish of such an old funding practice".

This was the price that the Church paid for reproducing Orthodoxy as a integral component of Greek culture in a foreign environment which emphasised assimilation. The most fundamental requirement for this was to preserve a "decent", disciplined and low-profile collectivity, which would ensure religious continuity and some degree of ethnic cohesion, but would not preclude integration.

In the long-term, the Church was transformed into some sort of Community institution, ensuring the domination of the group of noblemen over the whole Greek population in Marseille. Its growing fortune was placed in French state bonds and French equity shares. A system of benefactors was established, with their names inscribed on three marble slabs at the entrance to the Church. Finally, it was decided that benefactors would be given a special title according to the size of

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[5]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 1 Jan.1865.

[The culture of everyday life]

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their donations:

1) on the first marble slab the names of the Great Benefactors who contributed more than 10,000 francs will be inscribed.

2) on the second, the names of the Benefactors contributing between 5.000 and 9,999.9 francs.

3) on the third, the names of Donors who contributed between 1,000 and 4,999.9 francs. °

Thus, the ideological role of the Church was confined to religious services and ordinary sacraments such as weddings, christenings and funerals; and to the preservation of the Greek language, either ancient or modern.

At the end of the century, the ethnic-religious sentiment converged with the sense of belonging to Marseille:

*"Un an avant l'aube du 20<sup>e</sup> siecle en 1899, sous l'impulsion de la colonie hellenique et l'initiative du journaliste Bertas, une importante manifestation se deroule dans notre cite: la celebration du 25<sup>e</sup> centenaire de sa fondation. Cette manifestation emouvante souda l'importante colonie hellenique du 19<sup>e</sup> siecle avec celle de la fondation de Massalia. Le docteur Georgiades, delegue de Phocce, apporta le salut, du demos phocéen au demos marseillais et la "doxologia" ou Te Deum fut entonne par tout le peuple apres un remarquable sermon du grand archimandrite Gregoire Zigavinos, qui a laisse un souvenir imperissable*

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[6]. Arch.Orth.Church, report of 21 Decem.1882.

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[The culture of everyday life]

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*dans la colonie grecque du 19<sup>e</sup> siecle."*

The biggest cultural difference between the first generation immigrants and the second or the third, born and brought up in Marseille, was caused by the education each generation received. The former were usually formed in their parents' commercial companies - which were undoubtedly the best schools for business; the latter obtained a general culture in good local schools, like the famous "College Royal".

The problem of education for the young Greeks was for the first time posed during the Greek revolution, when a number of them arrived in the city, with or without their parents. Pierre Echinard offers some information on this:

*"On connait le succes du pensionnat Massol qui, a sa creation en 1823, ouvrit avec dix-sept pensionnaires grecs sur trente-quatre eleves. Resultat encourageant mais sans lendemain car, quelques mois plus tard, Theodore Prassacachi, mecontent de la facon dont on avait pris soin de son neveu Emmanuel, le retira et reclama en justice la restitution de menus objets. C'est etait fait de la clientele grecque de Massol qui des lors passa au pensionnat du sieur Ferry et, surtout, a l'Ecole speciale de Commerce et d'Industrie dirigee par le sieur Arquier".\**

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[7]. C.D.Tekeian [1961] p.8.

[8]. P.Echinard [1973] p.276.

[The culture of everyday life]

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After 1830, the Greeks' decision to establish themselves on a longterm basis in the city, once again posed the problem of a proper education for the future businessmen. The "College Royal" was locally considered as the best school for this purpose, especially after the introduction in 1835 of a Greek modern language course "*sous la pression de la colonie hellenique*"; the position was offered to professor M.Baphiadis who came from Greece.<sup>9</sup>

As we can infer from each year's prizes, Greek students were always among the best; to mention a few examples:

*Rhetorique*: D.Petrocochino, deuxieme accessit d'Excellence, premier accessit de discours francais et de version grecque, troisieme de version latine, quatrieme de vers latins.

*Troisieme*: Aristide Metaxa, premier accessit d'Excellence, premier prix de version grecque, premier accessit de theme latin, d'histoire et d'arithmetique, troisieme accessit de version latine et de vers latins; Hippas Agelasto, troisieme accessit de version grecque et d'arithmetique.

*Quatrieme*: Prix d'Excellence: D.Agelasto, premier prix de version et de theme grec, deuxieme prix d'histoire et de theme latin, premier accessit de version latine et de langue anglaise (deuxieme annee), deuxieme accessit de vers latin, troisieme accessit d'arithmetique;

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[9]. C.D.Tekeian [1961] p.3.

[The culture of everyday life]

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Pierre Rodocanachi, troisieme accessit d'Excellence, premier prix de langue italienne (deuxieme annee), deuxieme prix d'arithmetique, d'histoire naturelle et de version grecque, deuxieme accessit d'histoire, troisieme accessit de theme latin, quatrieme de theme grec.

Cinquieme: Leonidas Argenti, quatrieme accessit d'Excellence, premier prix de langue anglaise (premiere annee), deuxieme prix de version grecque, quatrieme accessit d'histoire.

Dessin: deuxieme classe d'apres gravure: premier accessit Miltiade Reggio.

Cours speciaux de Commerce et d'Industrie: deuxieme annee: Aristide Mavrogordato, deuxieme prix d'histoire-geographie, premier accessit de chimie-histoire naturelle et d'arithmetique commerciale, deuxieme accessit de langue francaise.

Langues etrangeres: Anglais, deuxieme annee: Aristide Mavrogordato, deuxieme accessit.

Grec moderne: Prix, Aristide Mavrogordato; accessit, Miltiade Reggio.<sup>10</sup>

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[10]. For the College's prizes see Marseille's press in August and September of each year; see also A.M., 33 R 2 (1834-1840).

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[The culture of everyday life]

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On the other hand, female education lagged behind. But here, girls were also provided with a basic education, usually at home or at a boarding school. In the local boarding schools, the education they acquired was, obviously, French. <sup>11</sup>

The first generation's aspirations for economic and social dominance and the second's or third's tendency to accomplish this desire, resulted in what could be called a "cosmopolitan" culture; or put it in a more literary tone, the Greeks, in many respects, remained "Levantines" in Europe by being "Europeans" in the Levant. In the specific economic and political circumstances in France, ethnic identity or ethnic "allegiance" was not the Greeks' dominant force;<sup>12</sup> therefore economic and cultural determinants proved to be much more important for the group's behaviour.

In 1867 it was a young Greek who organised an artistic circle in Marseille:

*"Les preoccupations culturelles sont aussi a l'origine du Cercle artistique fonde en 1867 par un groupe de jeunes artistes. Le cenacle, d'abord anime par le president Melas, d'origine grecque, entend propager*

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[11]. P.Echinard [1973] p.278.

[12]. In Egypt, for example, during the interwar period (1919-1937), ethnic identity and ethnic allegiance were the dominant forces behind the Greek community; see A.Kitroeff [1989]; the author uses the distinction of certain social scientists between ethnic "identity" and ethnic "allegiance"; see among others O.Patterson "The nature, causes and implications of ethnic identification" in C.Fried (ed.) [1983].

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[The culture of everyday life]

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la peinture, la musique et la littérature a travers la société marseillaise, et organise a cette fin expositions, concerts et conférences. Le rapide succès de l'entreprise montre la réceptivité des élites locales."<sup>13</sup>

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[13]. *Marseille au XIX<sup>ème</sup>, Rêves et Triomphes*, Musées de Marseille, 16 Novembre 1991 - 15 Février 1992, pp.328-329.

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[The culture of everyday life]

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*Representations of Everyday life*

In the course of this thesis, I had, very often, the impression that I was studying if not one man's life, a family's life: Petrocochino's. This first impression was repeated with the persistence of a certitude, every time that I hesitated about the truth of an event or of an idea offered by official sources; the very first thought was that I could always have recourse to Petrocochino's correspondence in order to compare or imagine how this specific event or idea would be experienced or perceived by these people.

This is not intended to reduce the study of the Greek community to a merchant's biography, but to underline the importance of such a vivid, precise and, why not, eventually cheerful or even amusing first hand account, provided the testimony is examined within its historical context. The case of this specific family's life, seen through Petrocochino's letters, therefore, was for this thesis a testing ground for the history of the ideas and the mentalities of their ethnic group.

After the analysis of economic and social networks, the classification of professions, the distinction of fortunes, I attempted a second reading of Dimitrios' letters. This reading focused on his allusions. He was not scholar enough to express and to formulate clearly the collective conscienciousness of his ethnic and professional group; but as every other man, he was defined by the principles and ideas of

[The culture of everyday life]

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his social group and at the same time by his personal religious, ethnic, aesthetic or other choices.

His descriptions almost exclusively referred to the Levant since he was writing from Smyrna, Constantinople or the Greek island of Syros. What emerges strongly from these representations of everyday life is that Dimitrios was a bearer of mentality, attitudes or contradictions found not only among the Greeks in Diaspora but also among the leading groups in Greece.<sup>14</sup>

LEVANT OR EUROPE? On his way to Smyrna in 1843, Dimitrios stopped for one month or two on the island of Syros. He was very excited about local hospitality: *"Last Sunday I was invited at Calvocoressi's, today I will go to Carali's for dinner...I saw the house that you lived in when you were here...everybody remembers you here, everywhere I go people talk about what you have done for Greece, how friendly you were with everybody; I understand what it means to have a father who is not only rich but with such a good reputation, I assure you that more people know me here than in Marseille. Here everybody knows me."* (P.A., Syros, 21 June 1843)

Some months later he wrote almost the same things from Smyrna and Constantinople: *"Everybody knows me, people in the street say hello to me, people that I do not know; I believe that in Smyrna everyone knows*

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[14]. For a comparison see A.Politis [1993].

[The culture of everyday life]

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me. Everywhere I go, in all kinds of company, I am welcomed, and to tell you the truth if trade was not so dead, I would like to live my whole life in Smyrna. (P.A., Smyrna, 29 September 1843) "Our relatives here are extremely kind to me. I was invited by Stratis Vuross, by Gialinas Thodoris, by Stephanis Rallis; I stayed two days at Rallis' country-house...I had a very good time at Corzis' and he treats me with a lot of love." (P.A., Constantinople, 17 August 1844)

But his genuine enthusiasm about life and relations in the Levant was followed by a severe criticism of Levantine business attitudes which was not only the result of his own experience but mainly arose from his father's perceptions and expectations; in other words, the son was somehow forced to perceive reality through his father's eyes: "I understand your complaints about Smyrna and you are absolutely right; not only is it a small city for trade, but the merchants are crazy" (P.A., Smyrna, 27 September 1843); one month later he wrote in the same tone but more bluntly: "...do not worry, you will see what it means to be one of us in Levant; the Levantine pretexts and excuses are no longer efficient" (P.A., Smyrna, 19 October 1843); a little later he totally conformed to his father's view about the Levant: "I hope that until springtime I will have enough money, because I want as much as you do to come back to our family, to get some rest and entertainment; do not ever think that Smyrna has got too many charms for me; Levantines who have not lived in Europe probably find it beautiful, but somebody who comes

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[The culture of everyday life]

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*from a European city cannot really like it.....camels and their bells, porters, stones in the streets tearing feet and shoes to pieces, all these summarise Smyrna's praise!"* (P.A., Smyrna, 19 November 1843)

**ALIMENTARY HABITS** Information is meagre but Dimitrios seems to be very well fed. Of course, he never fasted: "*Here I am very well entertained... ; I never fast, because during fasting periods they cook a separate meal for me.*" (P.A., Smyrna, 9 January 1844). Two explanations are equally possible: either he was ill, probably with an early stage of tuberculosis, a hypothesis sustained by some other allusions (he talks very often about his health, he says that Greece's climate was very good for him, and he notes that in the Summer in Athens he goes out only after the sunset); or his family's alimentary habits had changed in Marseille under the spirit of a liberalism and so they did not follow the strict Orthodox fasts, a hypothesis sustained by his father's close relations with the nationalist Archimandrite Arsenios who was forced to resign after his conflict with the merchant Zizinia and by the total absence of reference to God in any document of the archive. A third explanation would be the composition of the aforementioned: his illness was a good reason for being what he really was, a not very religious Orthodox.

**DRESS - SOCIAL EVENTS** In pre-revolutionary Greece, like everywhere in

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[*The culture of everyday life*]

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the Balkans, European cloths were not permitted for the local population, at least for men; immediately after the revolution, European ways of dressing were introduced in the country and became the dominant dress among the leading social groups. Traditional cloths were called "asiatic" and appeared incompatible with the Greeks' new outlook.<sup>15</sup>

In 1844, Dimitrios noted ironically that people (meaning Greeks) in Smyrna were not yet used to wear neckties: "*Careglas gave me the necktie that you sent me and it is very beautiful; everybody liked it because here people do not spent money on such things*" (P.A., Smyrna, 29 January 1844)

Smyrna offered enough entertainment and social events even for Dimitrios who was always the first! "*Everywhere I go I am the first; when I go to the theatre there are always five of six people who offer me a seat in their balcony.*" (P.A., Smyrna, 29 January 1844); "*I am entertained, I visit a lot of people, I go to the Casino..*" (P.A., Smyrna, 9 January 1844); and sometimes he even complained about the excess of some festivals: "*Je ne m'etends pas aujourd'hui d'abord faute de matieres et ensuite parceque le carnaval qui a fini hier ne m'a laisse que tres peu de temps a employer aux affaires....Je n'ai aucun achat ni aucune vente a vous annoncer dans la presente parcqu'ici pendant les fetes du carnaval toutes les affaires cessent..*" (P.A., Smyrna, 19 Fevrier 1844)

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[15]. See A.Politis [1993] pp.119-124

[The culture of everyday life]

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LANGUAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT The complicated linguistic problem of modern Greek endures until today; it resulted at the end of 19th century in the well known division between "katharevousa" and "dimotiki" language with many social, intellectual and political connotations. For A.Politis, considering language as mentality, "katharevousa" easily and triumphantly dominated, at least until the 1880's because it corresponded to the Greek's society need for a style which magnified and exalted.<sup>16</sup>

The instrumental use of language by the Greeks in Marseille in their correspondance influenced their style in both Greek and French and, therefore, their relation to language; their bi-culturalism was practically used in business ("common" letters written in French, "particular" in Greek) which resulted in a simpler relationship to both languages. In Greek they used a simple "katharevousa" mixed with a lot of everyday, demotic expressions and "trade-language" which were often paraphrased or translated Italian words; their French had a more scholarly and official tone.

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[16]. A.Politis [1993] pp.130-134.

[Conclusion]

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### CONCLUSION

**HIERARCHIES, NETWORKS, STRATEGIES: *A la recherche des hommes perdus***

The establishment of the Greek merchant in the Mediterranean, and the creation of the Greek communities during the period under consideration, was made possible by two successive historical processes. The one was the expansion of Western European trade in the Mediterranean at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The other process succeeded the first and partly cancelled its effects. It was the subsequent decline of the Western European merchants' shares of the Levantine markets because of the internal economic and political competition between themselves and their respective countries.

The initial expansion increased the West's trade with the Ottoman Empire and accelerated the Empire's integration into the international capitalist system. This allowed the Greek merchants and ship-owners to occupy an intermediate, minor position in the markets for wheat, timber,

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[Conclusion]

[Conclusion]

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and the traditional mediterranean products, olive oil, wine, and raisins. The second process, the decline of the Western market-shares, gave Greek merchants the opportunity to organize large networks between the Eastern and the Western Mediterranean markets. Between these two phases, the Napoleonic and, later on, the Crimean wars, played the role of catalysts. Expansion of the European presence in the Mediterranean, the Napoleonic wars and the decline that followed, allowed Greek merchants to flourish. Then, the reappearance of fierce Western competition after the Crimean war, forced them to re-adapt to the new conditions. Obviously, this succession of phases imposed strict limits to the rise of the Greeks.

By the end of the Crimean War, the European economic system was totally transformed; the development of industrial capitalism made the merchants' traditional practices obsolete and unprofitable, forcing them to modernise and expand, in order to recuperate their shares in the Eastern trade. Greek merchants, despite their previous success, were forced to meet these new conditions: many abandoned trade for shipping and finance, a few became landowners and rentiers. Industrial capitalism, modernisation of trade and banking; new imperialist policies of the Powers in the Levant; strong competition from new, larger and modernised Western traders and bankers; all these conditions posed a new trilemma for the Greeks: to expand, to adapt or to decline. For the Greeks of Marseille adaptation presupposed, first of all, further social

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[Conclusion]

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integration in their host country; it also meant, at the business front, diversification; which explains their new banking, shipping and even industrial activities, as described in this thesis.

The response of the Greek merchants in Marseille to these structural changes, therefore, has been the main axis of this thesis; and their response depended on the interplay between means at their disposal and economic and cultural mentalities. I have tried to show the multiple driving forces behind their activities during these successive phases of their presence in France; driving forces that depended upon economic and cultural, individual and collective considerations. In doing so, I used the concepts of networks and strategies; these concepts do not constitute a theory; they gave, however, some answers to my questions.

I have tried to show that a network consists of its human resources and of its functions; in other words, it is an organization of economic and social actors functioning in space and time. As such, it is a good conceptual link between space, time and individual actions.

The constituents of the Greek merchants' network in Marseille were family, religion, ethnicity and a certain "Know-how" in business; I have tried to show that all these factors coexisted and were interrelated in the first period of establishment. What mainly mattered to the Greeks at the time was economic and social success into a much different

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[Conclusion]

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environment from that of their origin. Thus, they employed familial, religious and ethnic ties as a guarantee of mutual trust in business and mutual support in a potentially hostile social environment.

The changing economic conditions both in Marseille and in the Levant after the end of the Crimean War imposed upon the network new conditions. What mattered to the Greeks from then on was to safeguard their business and to adapt to these new conditions; to do so, they had to overcome their religious or ethnic particularity, to adhere to the city's web of relations; and in doing so, new opportunities were opened to them by virtue of their changing position in Marseille's social hierarchy. Ethnicity or ethnic-religious identity changed to a form of bi-culturism, which converged with a new sense of "belonging" to the city. Thus, the network as such slowly lost its operational capacity, its own "raison d'etre"; its members were somehow emancipated; they could now sail on their own - but under the french flag.

Finally, I have to admit my difficulty in drawing the line between tactical and strategic actions, on the one hand, and economic and social mentalities on the other. I used the concept "strategy" in these cases where a conscious element of purpose prevailed in the merchants' action. But I preferred to explain action through the concept of "mentality" when the inert, unconscious elements seemed to have the final word. Strategy seemed to be more class-determined, mentality less so. For example, I

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[Conclusion]

[Conclusion]

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saw the choice of a partner as a "marriage strategy" because the wealthy Greek merchant tried to enhance, through marriage, the family's social and economic position; on the other hand, the Greek merchants' behaviour in the "affaire des Maisons Grecques" was seen as a result of a business mentality because of its rather "classless" character. Their mentality was shared by all social strata in their country of origin; it was a world view formed in the Levant and shared by "Caesar and the least of his legionnaires, Saint Louis and the peasant who tilled his fields, Christopher Columbus and one of his mariners".

The Greeks in Marseille, whether they belonged to the "haute" or the "moyenne" bourgeoisie, were, after all, common, ordinary people. They were prisoners and victims of time, this predominating human condition and circumstance. Victims like any other ordinary or extraordinary historical actor; and prisoners (that is, forgotten or simply lost) because of their modest nature, lacking the grand significance of extraordinary people. Thus, in the course of this thesis, I had to persuade myself that this mortal microcosm was not dead but sleeping; then, I used this idea as an instrument of discovery rather than as a reference.

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[\*]. J.Le Goff, *Les mentalites: une histoire ambigue* in *Faire de l'histoire*, eds. J.Le Goff-P.Nora, III, Paris, 1974, p.80, cited by C.Cinzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms*, Hopkins University Press, 1980, p.xxiii.

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[Conclusion]

[Conclusion]

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
In order to study these common people, I had to extend the historic concept of the "individual" in the direction of the "anonymous" and identify the complex of motives connecting these anonymous individuals to an historically determinate environment and society; I attempted, then, "d'y decrire les hommes (cela dut-il les faire ressembler a des etres monstrueux) comme occupant une place si considerable, a cote de celle si restreinte qui leur est reservee dans l'espace, une place au contraire prolongee sans mesure - puisqu'ils touchent simultanement, comme des geants plonges dans les annees, a des epoques si distantes, entre lesquelles tant de jours sont venus se placer - dans le Temps."\*\*

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
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[\*\*]. Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, III, p.1048, Gallimard, 1954.

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[Conclusion]



Dimichis Petocochimo, fils  
de Michel




Emmanuel Sabastopol  
Zélationovgor.


époux d'Aspasia de Galaffi,  
veuve de Cléopâtre Alexée Petocochimo,  
femme de Dimichis Petocochimo.



Michel Toi d'ocanachi epa va  
Blana na Petsoochina



Demosthenes Agelastis



Mr Zizinia, Consul,  
oncle de Mm D. Petocochino  
niec galotti, épouse de Zabelas galatti

[Appendixs]

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APPENDIXS

APPENDIX A: Contents of Categories

1. Businessmen and professionals. The biggest part of Greek businessmen denominated themselves by the omnibus term *negociant*, which is rendered in English as "merchant", but there were also some bankers, ship captains and insurance agents. Professionals included what was generally designated as *professions libres* in nineteenth century France, that is, doctors, professors of the Greek language, the clergy and some state officials. There were also professions that serviced the business community, such as accountants and brokers. Businessmen and professionals together with the rentiers of category 2, formed the small and wealthy elite of Marseille.

2. Rentiers. This is a somewhat mixed category that ranged from the rich merchants who invested in land or in bonds the profits they accumulated through commerce, to those of modest fortune who had retired

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[Appendixs]

[Appendix]

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on savings. This category included a considerable number of women designated as *rentieres* or *proprietaires*; they were usually widows bestowed a property or *rentes* on them by their late husbands. Even more than among men, the fortunes and social statuses of these women varied widely.

3. Sales and clerical employees. The largest number of them were designated by the omnibus term *commis*, which is rendered in English as "clerk" or by the equally vague term *employe*. Others had more specific occupational titles like "*agent de la compagnie russe de navigation a vapeur et de commerce*", "*agent de l'administration du cercle des Phocceens*", "*commissionnaire en grains*", "*commissionnaire fournisseur de navires*", "*teneur de livres*", etc. Both the kinds of tasks and the levels of skill and responsibility exercised varied widely. But in spite of their variety, they had certain characteristics in common. Even if they were subordinate salaried employees, the fact that their jobs required them to read, write and calculate fluently, at a time when these skills were scarce in the population at large, gave them a presumptive claim to bourgeois status.

4. Small businessmen. It is composed of working proprietors of small firms. Most proprietors engaged in retail trade were designated *marchand*, which is rendered in English by the term "shopkeeper". Included in the same category are owners of cafes and restaurants, of wine shops and of hotels. Finally, this category also includes working

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[Appendix]

[Appendixs]

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proprietors of small manufacturing establishments, commonly designated *fabricants* with a suffix indicating the particular trade: for example "*fabricant de savons*", "*fabricant bijoutier*", "*fabricant d'huiles de grain*", "*fabricant de soude*", "*fabricant de toiles a voiles*" etc. At the top of the small-business category, some of the Greeks who called themselves *fabricants* may have been wealthier than some of the city's *negociants*; as a matter of fact, most of them they were *negociants* and *fabricants* at the same time.

5. Artisans. In the nineteenth century, in both English and French, "artisan" meant any skilled craftsman whether as a self-employed proprietor or as a wage earner. The artisan category described here, includes both for two reasons: firstly, because artisans designated themselves by the name of the trade, leaving off the prefix indicating proprietorship and secondly, because the number of cases was so limited that it did not pose any statistical problem.

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[Appendixs]

[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX B: Occupations practiced in Marseille by the Greeks

1. Business and professional

Merchant: *negociant*

Ship captain: *capitaine au long cours*

Insurance agent: *assureur particulier, assuseur*

Broker: *Courtier, courtier maritime, courtier royal, courtier de commerce, courtier en bles, courtier en cotons, courtier representant*

Banker: *banquier*

Miscellaneous state officials: *ancien conseiller municipal, ancien membre de la chambre de commerce, chef du bureau des finances, consul de Grece, inspecteur de salaisons, membre de la chambre de commerce*

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[Appendixs]

[Appendix]

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Doctor: *docteur en medecine*

Barrister: *avocat*

Judge: *juge suppleant au 2e canton, ancien juge au tribunal de  
commerce*

Professor: *professeur de la langue grecque*

Painter: *peintre-decorateur*

Sculptor: *sculpteur-modeleur, sculpteur-statuaire*

Archimandrite: *archimandrite orthodoxe*

Priest: *archipretre orthodoxe*

## 2. Rentier

Rentier: *rentier*

Proprietor: *proprietaire*

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[Appendix]

[Appendixs]

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**3. Sales and clerical**

Teacher: *institutrice*

Interpreter: *interprete grec*

Miscellaneous minor state officials: *agent des postes, archiviste  
de la chambre des notaires*

Clerk: *commis (chemin de fer)*

Employee: *employe, employe de commerce, agent de la compagnie  
russe de navigation a vapeur et de commerce, agent de  
l'administration du cercle des Phocceens, commissionaire en  
grains, commissionnaire fournisseur de navires, teneur de  
livres*

**4. Small business**

Innkeeper: *aubergiste*

Grocer: *epicier*

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[Appendixs]

[Appendixs]

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Baker: *boulangier*

Miscellaneous shopkeeper: *cages, comestibles, drogueries, marchand de laines, marchande de balais, marchand de bas et toiles*

Miscellaneous small manufacturer: *confections, confections (marine), fabricant de savons, fabricant bijoutier, fabricant d'huiles de grain, fabricant de soude, fabricant de toiles a voiles, minoterie*

5. Artisan

Embroiderer: *brodeuse*

Shoemaker: *cordonnier*

Cabinetmaker: *ebeniste*

Forge worker: *forgeron de marine*

Tailor: *tailleuse*

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[Appendixs]

[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX C: Merchandises imported by Greek-owned firms in Marseille,  
(1840, 1845, 1850)

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Alizari	Langues fumees
Avelanide	Legumes
Beurre	Liqueur
Bois de cerfs	Mais
Bonnet	Manufacture
Bronze	Miroir
Cafe	Nacre
Cantaride	Noix de pipes
Caviar	Opium
Chevrons	Orge
Cire	Os
Cochenile	Peaux de beufs salees
Cocons	Peaux de chevres
Confitures	Peaux de lievres
Cornes de bufles	Peaux de moutons
Cornes de moutons	Pierres emeric
Cornes diverses	Pistaches
Cotton	Poie de lievres
Cuivre	Pois

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[Appendixs]

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Cymbales	Quincaillerie
Douelles	Raisin de Corinthe
Douves	Saframme
Eponges	Salpêtre
Essence de rose	Salep
Farine	Sapranum
Fruits secs	Scamone
Galles	Sesames
Gommes	Soie
Graines de line	Storax
Graines de teinture	Suif
Graines jaunes	Tabac
Grains de ravison	Tapis
Haricots	Viande Salee
Huile	Verre brises
	Vin

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Source: Serie Sante 200 E, Depositions et Arrivages, (1840-1845-1850),

Archives Departementales des Bouches-du-Rhone.

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[Appendix]

[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX D: The ten leading imports and exports of Marseille, 1828, 1860  
(in thousands of tons)

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Imports 1828

Imports 1860

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Commodity	Weight	Commodity	Weight
Olive oil	36.6	Wheat	112.0
Wheat	24.7	Oil grains	102.1
Lumber	15.5	Lumber	92.1
Sugar cane	14.8	Sugar cane	55.2
Sulfur	10.6	Coal	44.7
Salted cod	6.3	Olive oil	23.8
Madder	4.5	Sulfur	21.5
Lead	4.4	Lead	20.2
Rice	3.5	Coffee	19.4
Fruits	3.4	Lead ore	18.8

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[Appendixs]

[Appendix]

Exports 1828

Exports 1860

Commodity	Weight	Commodity	Weight
Wines and spirits	18.6	Coal	106.7
Refined sugar	6.4	Refined sugar	35.7
Madder	5.5	Flour	28.8
Soap	3.6	Wines and spirits	25.2
Wheat	3.2	Bricks and tiles	21.8
Lead	2.8	Metal products	16.3
Coffee	2.3	Linseed cakes	15.7
Salt	2.3	Wheat	15.2
Glass bottles	2.1	Lumber	14.5
Bricks and tiles	1.9	Lead	12.7

Source: Paul Masson (gen.ed.) *Les Bouches-du-Rhone: Encyclopedie departementale*, vol.9, *Le Mouvement economique: Le Commerce* (Marseille, 1926) pp.239-242, 245-248, 288-291, 296-297.

[Appendix]

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name, Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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		299	21	02/11/40
	3 MATS	378	16	01/17/45
	BRIG	113	9	06/28/45
	BRIG	129	8	10/05/45
	BRIG	118	8	11/02/45
	BRIG	114	7	11/15/45
	BRIG	198	10	11/20/45
	BRIG	220	8	07/22/50
	BRIG	141	9	07/31/50
	BRIG Gel	96	6	12/14/50
ACCORTO	BRIG	252	12	03/15/45
ACHILE	BRIG	234	12	02/13/45
ACHILE	BRIG	225	14	07/06/50
ACHILES	BRIG	224	11	11/15/45
ACHILLE	BRIG	220	14	02/12/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	231	14	03/05/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	400	20	07/26/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	224	12	08/01/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	137	9	11/27/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	202	18	12/24/40
ACHILLE	BRIG	149	9	01/11/45
ACHILLE	BRIG	248	12	12/27/45
ACHILLES	BRIG	235	12	11/15/45
ACHILLES	BRIG	239	11	01/22/50
ADELA	BRIG	187	11	09/19/40
ADELAIDE	BRIG	113	8	08/25/40
ADRIENE ET MARIE	BRIG	155	9	11/20/45
AGAPI-TICHIS	BRIG	226	11	09/18/45
AGATHI TICHIS	BRIG	209	9	11/17/50
AGATHI TICHIS	BRIG	166	13	11/02/45
AGIA TON AGION	BRIG	217	12	08/07/40
AGIOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	234	28	01/10/45
AGIOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	295	12	06/28/45
AGISILAO	BRIG	251	11	04/16/50
AGRIPPA	BRIG	204	10	10/29/40
AIA MARINA	BRIG	201	12	07/20/45
AIA-HELLENI	BRIG	254	11	08/20/45
AIMABLE ANTOINETTE	BRIG	212	13	07/31/40
ALBANO	BRIG	378	12	08/10/40
ALBANO	BRIG	336	12	01/05/50
ALBANO	BRIG	336	11	07/14/50
ALBERT	BRIG	149	9	03/19/40
ALBERT	BRIG	149	8	08/29/40
ALBRECLE	BRIG	125	8	03/13/50
ALCIBIADE	BRIG	286	12	06/21/50
ALERTE	BRIG	140	8	12/02/50
ALEXANDRE	BRIG	184	10	07/27/45
ALEXANDRE	3 MATS	313	15	11/14/45
ALEXANDRO PRIMO	3 MATS	400	14	06/12/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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ALEXANDROS	3 MATS	318	16	02/08/45
ALEXANDROS	BRIG	415	16	07/25/50
ALEXANDROS	BRIG	229	11	07/31/50
ALEXANDROS	BRIG	221	10	08/01/50
ALEXANDROS	BRIG	241	11	11/04/50
ALEXANDROS	BRIG	213	10	12/24/50
ALFRED	BRIG	155	9	08/12/50
AMALIA	BRIG	266	14	08/15/40
AMALIA	BRIG	262	12	07/18/50
AMALIA	BRIG	277	14	07/26/50
AMBROSIO	BRIG	336	14	11/03/45
AMEDEE	BRIG	255	12	03/08/45
AMICABLE	BRIG	121	8	01/22/50
AMODIGI	BRIG	264	11	08/25/45
ANEXARTITOS	BRIG	180	10	11/15/45
ANGELICA	BRIG	232	12	10/03/45
ANGELICHA	BRIG	181	9	12/24/50
ANGELINA	BRIG	162	9	07/24/45
ANIVAS	BRIG	265	11	06/13/50
ANNE POLYMNIE	BRIG	166	10	04/03/50
ANNE POLYMNIE	BRIG	166	10	09/17/50
ANNIBAL	BRIG	265	17	12/15/45
ANNONCIATION	BRIG	194	11	12/27/40
ANTOINETTA MARIA	3 MATS	550	18	03/02/45
ANTONIOS	BRIG	252	15	11/20/45
APELPICIA	BRIG	280	14	10/10/45
APELPISSIA	BRIG	280	7	01/24/45
APHRODITE	BRIG	260	13	08/23/50
APOLLON	BRIG	229	12	05/22/50
APOLON	BRIG	371	16	07/13/50
APPELO	BRIG	270	12	10/30/40
ARCHIDUC PALATIN	BRIG	270	11	01/05/40
ARCHIMEDE	BRIG	275	15	05/23/40
ARGHIRO ALESSANDRO	BRIG	200	12	10/27/45
ARGO	3 MATS	359	20	06/11/45
ARGOS	3 MATS	359	23	06/28/40
ARISTIDE	BRIG	189	19	06/22/40
ARISTIDE	BRIG	275	16	12/29/40
ARISTIDE	BRIG	187	13	09/17/45
ARISTIDI	BRIG	150	10	11/28/45
ARISTIDI	BRIG	275	12	10/25/50
ARISTOTELI	BRIG	228	11	08/01/45
ARISTOTELIS	BRIG	210	11	11/15/45
ARTEMISE	BRIG	206	12	11/14/45
ASESTARKIS	BRIG	149	12	01/18/45
ASPASIA	BRIG	162	12	03/16/45
ASPASIA	BRIG	162	13	11/09/45
ASPASIA	BRIG	390	14	03/30/50
ASPASIA	BRIG	189	10	04/08/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
ASPASIA	BRIG	198	10	11/24/50
ASPASIE ET HENRIETTE	BRIG	136	9	08/19/45
ASPASIE et HENRIETTE	BRIG	135	8	08/03/50
ASPASSIA	BRIG	198	10	08/30/45
ASSICURATORE	BRIG	181	9	08/25/40
ASSICURATORE	BRIG	294	9	03/23/45
ASSUNTA	BRIG	327	15	11/04/40
ASSUNTA	BRIG	315	15	10/05/45
ATHENES	BRIG	220	16	03/01/40
ATHINA	BRIG	255	12	11/03/45
ATHINA	BRIG	279	12	08/25/50
ATHON	BRIG	273	15	12/29/45
ATTILIO REGOLO	BRIG	262	14	10/31/40
AUETTA TRIESTINA	BRIG	155	9	01/26/50
AUREA HELLAS	BRIG	369	14	09/17/50
AURORA	GOELETTE	118	8	09/28/40
AURORA	3 MATS	248	12	12/29/40
AUSONIA	3 MATS	255	12	12/07/45
AYA PARASQUEVI	BRIG	148	8	10/15/50
AYA TRIAS	BRIG	188	9	09/08/50
AYA TRIAS	BRIG	283	13	12/24/50
AYA..	BRIG	199	12	11/26/45
AYIA ANNA	BRIG	255	12	05/18/50
AYIA MARINA	BRIG	250	12	09/19/50
AYIA THEODOSSIA	BRIG	269	16	11/14/45
AYIA TICHI	BRIG	209	14	08/19/45
AYIA TRIADA	BRIG	283	14	03/29/50
AYIA TRIAS	BRIG	223	11	07/18/50
AYOS CONSTANTINOS	BRIG	199	9	09/20/50
AYOS DIMITRIOS	BRIG	280	13	05/07/50
AYOS EUSTRATIOS	BRIG	250	11	08/24/45
AYOS GEORGIOS	BRIG	199	10	11/14/45
AYOS GEORGIOS	BRIG	207	10	12/28/45
AYOS GEORGIOS	BRIG	301	12	05/17/50
AYOS GIORGIOS	BRIG	190	11	08/19/45
AYOS GIORGIOS	BRIG	195	14	12/27/45
AYOS IAKOV	BRIG	219	11	12/29/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	229	12	06/30/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	189	13	07/19/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	199	10	07/27/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	192	11	08/25/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	162	13	09/08/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	3 MATS	293	15	10/03/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	198	10	10/16/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	229	12	11/01/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	112	9	11/03/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	307	16	11/04/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	164	9	11/15/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	233	12	11/15/45

11/25/98

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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AYOS NICOLAOS	3 MATS	322	13	12/15/45
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	226	12	01/04/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	233	10	03/05/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	213	10	04/08/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	236	11	04/30/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	233	12	08/01/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	198	9	08/12/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	173	8	09/15/50
AYOS NICOLAOS	BRIG	267	11	12/10/50
AYOS NICOLAS	BRIG	270	11	03/17/45
AYOS PANTALEIMON	BRIG	185	11	08/01/45
AYOS PANTELEIMON	BRIG	250	14	10/10/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	345	15	03/02/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	199	11	07/30/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	3 MATS	206	10	09/22/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	199	12	10/03/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	259	13	11/15/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	238	12	11/27/45
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	259	11	05/30/50
AYOS SPIRIDON	BRIG	254	9	08/24/50
AYOS THEODOROS	BRIG	232	11	09/23/45
AYOS TON AYON	BRIG	217	12	08/19/45
BAPTISTINE	BRIG	126	8	04/27/50
BELIMOREO	3 MATS	242	13	04/07/45
BIVARO	BRIG	326	14	11/14/45
BIZANTIN	3 MATS	198	12	04/23/40
BIZANTIN	BRIG	198	12	09/18/40
BON BERGER	BRIG	101	7	09/14/50
BON PERE	BRIG	93	7	07/17/40
BON PERE	BRIG	113	8	03/01/50
BON PERE	BRIG	113	7	12/24/50
BONNE MERE	BRIG	100	7	04/19/45
BONNE MERE	BRIG	103	7	01/29/50
BOUGIOT	BRIG	137	9	01/22/50
BRATINKI	BRIG	182	8	08/23/50
BRAVE	BRIG	111	8	06/11/50
BUDA	3 MATS	410	15	10/16/45
BUON CITADINO	BRIG	300	13	08/25/40
CALINIUS	3 MATS	562	18	11/04/45
CALIOPI	BRIG	305	13	01/16/50
CARICLIA	BRIG	123	7	01/22/50
CARLO-ALBERTO	BRIG	208	12	09/08/45
CARLOTTA	BRIG	140	9	01/14/45
CAROLINA	BRIG	168	13	10/31/40
CASIMIRO	BRIG	320	13	01/19/45
CATHERINE	BRIG	244	14	05/18/40
CATHERINE	BRIG	282	13	07/24/50
CATINGO	BRIG	150	10	09/09/50
CAULE DE BRUVWIEK	BRIG	216	10	09/19/45

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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CEFALONIE	BRIG	247	10	10/03/45
CELESTE JULIEN	BRIG	114	7	02/20/50
CELESTIN ET HENRIETTE	BRIG	112	7	10/09/45
CHARICLIA	BRIG	138	9	05/12/40
CHARICLIA	BRIG	123	8	05/23/50
CHARICLIA	BRIG	123	8	09/17/50
CHAUBORAU	BRIG	113	8	12/09/50
CHIMISSIS TIS PANAIAS	BRIG	286	12	09/26/45
CHOANITAS	BRIG	116	8	11/04/50
CHRISOPULO	BRIG	340	15	07/28/50
CHRYSOSTOME	BRIG	185	10	11/15/45
CHRYSOSTOMOS	BRIG	195	8	05/29/45
CIMON	BRIG	206	10	07/07/45
CIRCACIONO	3 MATS	339	15	02/09/45
CIRCASSIANA	3 MATS	339	13	11/18/45
CIRCONSTANCE	BRIG Gel	117	10	12/20/50
CIVILE	BRIG	294	13	11/28/45
CLEANTE	3 MATS	326	16	11/12/50
CLEANTHE	3 MATS	326	16	05/12/50
CLELIE	BRIG	112	7	08/01/45
CLEMENCE	BRIG	961	8	07/06/50
CLEMENTINA	BRIG	256	11	01/02/45
CLEOPATRA	BRIG	310	12	06/24/45
CLEOPATRA	BRIG	164	12	08/01/45
CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	12	02/09/45
CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	12	04/24/45
CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	11	08/30/45
CLEOPATRE	BRIG	208	12	11/30/45
CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	11	05/26/50
CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	11	09/09/50
CLOTILDE	BRIG	167	10	05/07/50
COLOMBO	BRIG	226	11	08/25/45
COMMERCE	3 MATS	208	12	12/29/40
COMMERE FANNY	BRIG	124	10	04/26/40
COMTE WORONSOFF	BRIG	362	14	01/03/40
COMTESSE ALMASI	BRIG	240	11	11/25/40
CONCEPTIONE	BOMBARDE	104	8	02/13/40
CONCEPTIONE	BRIG	151	10	10/24/45
CONDOR	BRIG	148	8	09/21/50
CONFIANCE EN DIEU	BRIG	127	9	05/15/40
CONFIANCE-EN-DIEU	BRIG	127	9	09/02/40
CONSTANCE	BRIG	263	12	08/15/40
CONSTANTIN		231	13	05/05/40
CONSTANTINOS	BRIG	317	12	06/03/50
CONSTANTINOS	BRIG	317	12	12/05/50
COQ	BRIG Gle	78	7	04/01/50
COSMOPOLITE	BRIG	140	9	01/22/50
COSMOPOLITE	BRIG	141	9	05/16/50
COSMOPOLITE	BRIG	141	9	09/23/50

11/25/98

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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COSMOPOLITE	BRIG	140	9	12/24/50
COSTANTINO	BRIG	230	11	11/27/45
CRITON	BRIG	210	13	11/05/45
CUPIDO	BRIG	282	14	05/02/40
CUPIDO	BRIG	394	12	11/07/45
CZAR-DUSSAN	BRIG	297	12	12/15/40
DARIE	GOELETTE	112	7	03/04/50
DELPHINE	BRIG	91	8	02/07/40
DEMETRIUS	BRIG	133	9	04/28/50
DESPINA	3 MATS	445	14	07/17/45
DEUX ...	BRIG	78	6	11/15/45
DEUX AUGUSTE	BRIG	174	10	07/07/45
DEUX BEAU FRERES	BRIG Gle	108	8	05/27/50
DEUX COUSINS	BRIG Gle	113	8	05/21/50
DIE-ODER	BRIG	180	9	09/03/45
DIMITRI	BRIG	223	12	11/18/45
DIMITRIO ZAMADO	BRIG	352	16	10/30/45
DIMITRIOS	BRIG	249	0	12/25/50
DIO ADELFI	BRIG	195	9	12/13/50
DIO ADELPHES	BRIG	293	12	07/16/50
DOYEN	BRIG	79	7	08/22/50
DROMEDARIO	BRIG	304	14	10/17/45
DUCHESS D'ORLEANS	3 MATS	216	12	09/24/45
ECCI ADELPOTE	BRIG	320	22	06/27/50
EFTICHIA	BRIG	146	10	11/20/40
EFTICHIA	BRIG	398	20	07/02/45
EFTICHIA	BRIG	131	8	08/29/50
ELEFTERIOS	BRIG	260	14	06/21/45
ELEFTERIOS	BRIG	260	13	11/05/45
ELEONOR & PHILIPPINE	BRIG	127	6	07/14/50
ELIE NICOLAS	BRIG	142	9	12/01/45
ELISABETH	GOELETTE	123	7	04/04/45
ELISE	BRIG	128	8	11/14/45
ELURE ET MALVINIA	BRIG	140	9	05/16/50
EMILIE CLAIRE	3 MATS	389	14	07/01/50
EMILIO	BRIG	295	10	08/27/50
ENOSSIS	BRIG	162	8	01/16/45
ENOSSIS	BRIG	192	9	10/31/45
EOLOS	BRIG	286	16	11/07/45
EOLOS	BRIG	286	14	09/14/50
EOLUS	BRIG	226	14	06/03/45
EPAMINONDA	BRIG	187	11	11/12/40
EPAMINONDAS	BRIG	135	13	06/21/40
EPAMINONDAS	BRIG	187	9	11/20/45
EPERVIER	BRIG	118	8	09/07/50
EPERVIER	BRIG	118	8	12/14/50
ERACLEA	BRIG	113	9	07/02/40
ERACLIS	BRIG	264	13	06/30/50
ERATO	BRIG	280	12	06/13/40

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. -----	Crew -----	Date -----
ERCEG	BRIG	252	10	10/03/45
EREBO	BRIG	114	10	08/28/40
ERMEK	BRIG	311	11	10/05/45
ESHILLOS	BRIG	223	19	08/20/45
ESMERALDA	BRIG	207	13	12/29/40
ESMERALDA	BRIG	247	12	08/01/45
ESPERO	BRIG	198	14	01/01/45
ESPULATEUR	BRIG	115	8	12/24/50
ETTORE	BRIG	210	10	08/11/45
EUGENE et ROSALIE	BRIG	82	8	12/24/40
EUGENIO	BRIG	305	12	04/28/40
EVAGELISTRIA	BRIG	177	10	08/31/50
EVAGHELISTRIA	BRIG	160	9	10/03/45
EVAGHELISTRIA	BRIG	316	18	11/15/45
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	193	12	08/29/40
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	193	9	07/30/45
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	250	11	09/03/45
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	194	11	10/17/45
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	229	13	12/19/45
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	158	10	07/14/50
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	160	13	08/16/50
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	226	10	08/23/50
EVANGELISTRIA	BRIG	199	9	09/16/50
EVANGHELISTRIA	BRIG	118	8	04/10/45
EVANGHELISTRIA	BRIG	203	13	11/09/45
EVANGUELLISMOS	BRIG	194	11	02/12/40
EVEUTIA (?)	BRIG	190	10	08/30/45
FANNY	3 MATS	245	14	06/06/40
FANNY	3 MATS	245	13	09/21/40
FANNY	3 MATS	251	15	03/03/45
FANNY	NAVIRE	251	14	05/12/45
FAVORITO	BRIG	297	12	07/26/40
FIGLIO	BRIG	366	13	01/22/50
FILOPIMIN	BRIG	215	11	08/25/45
FIUME	3 MATS	396	15	11/07/45
FLAMINIO	BRIG	207	11	09/10/45
FOKION	BRIG	277	14	01/15/45
FOKION	BRIG	226	12	03/05/50
FORTUNE	BRIG	116	11	02/11/40
FORTUNE	BRIG	211	13	07/17/40
FOS	BRIG	258	14	12/29/45
FOTINI	3 MATS	328	15	04/04/45
FRANCE	BRIG	316	12	09/08/45
FRANCIS & ROMULUS	BRIG	208	11	07/19/45
GABRIEL	BRIG	278	14	04/08/50
GAITANO	BRIG	282	13	07/16/50
GELINAK	BRIG	337	13	11/27/40
GENERAL HOCHÉ	BRIG	133	8	09/26/45
GIGLIO	BRIG	320	13	10/16/45

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. ----	Crew ----	Date ----
GIORGINA	BRIG	173	11	09/19/50
GIORGIO	BRIG	167	9	12/27/45
GIORGIOS	BRIG	306	12	08/23/50
GIORGIOS	BRIG	237	12	09/03/50
GIULIUS	BRIG Gle	109	7	07/30/50
GIUSEPPINO	BRIG	243	12	09/19/50
GIUSTO	3 MATS	349	13	11/29/45
GLORIA	3 MATS	307	13	11/14/45
GRECIA	3 MATS	598	19	11/20/45
GRIDA	BRIG	291	12	01/03/40
GUSTAVO	BRIG	158	8	11/22/45
HARIKLIA	BRIG	138	8	10/11/40
HEBE	BRIG	169	9	12/24/50
HECTOR	BRIG	220	10	08/20/45
HELAS	BRIG	195	10	12/24/50
HELENI	BRIG	182	9	07/28/50
HELLAS	BRIG	215	13	04/03/45
HELLAS	BRIG	215	12	10/05/45
HELLAS	BRIG	235	13	11/26/45
HELLAS	BRIG	202	12	12/27/45
HELLAS	BRIG	318	17	07/03/50
HENRICO	BRIG	246	13	11/04/45
HENRIETTE	BRIG	155	10	03/24/45
HERACLEA	BRIG	264	12	07/22/45
HERACLES	BRIG	208	10	05/29/45
HERACLES	BRIG	193	11	06/29/45
HERACLES	BRIG	318	13	11/14/45
HERACLES	BRIG	189	11	12/19/45
HERACLIS	BRIG	199	11	09/23/45
HERACLIS	BRIG	264	13	11/12/45
HERACLIS	BRIG	173	9	08/24/50
HERCULE	BRIG	200	11	03/20/40
HERMES	BRIG	219	10	08/01/45
HEUREUSE AUGUSTINE	BRIG GT.	167	7	12/28/45
HEUREUX ANTOINE	BRIG	193	11	12/15/40
HIRACLIS	BRIG	225	13	07/09/50
HOMERE	BRIG	185	16	09/01/45
HORSTENSE ELISABETH	GOELETTE	85	7	05/23/40
HYDRA	BRIG	175	11	11/04/45
HYPOLITE	BRIG	117	8	08/22/50
IBRGENT	BRIG	178	9	03/31/50
IDO	BRIG GOL	116	8	01/23/50
IDOMENEE	BRIG	93	9	10/03/45
IDRA	BRIG	217	10	06/20/50
IL POLE	BRIG	275	11	01/05/40
IL SALVATORE	BRIG	271	13	08/11/40
IMMACULATA	BRIG	299	12	12/06/40
IMMACULEE	BRIG	243	10	10/30/40
INDEPONDANT	BRIG	180	12	10/30/40

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. -----	Crew -----	Date -----
INDUSTRIE	3 MATS	275	12	10/16/45
IOANI	BRIG	269	13	10/17/45
IRINI	BRIG	135	8	01/10/50
IRIS	GOELETTE	75	5	03/03/50
IRMA	BRIG	187	10	05/13/50
ISIMOREE	BRIG	205	9	01/29/50
JACOV	BRIG	121	8	03/06/50
JASON	BRIG	245	11	07/27/45
JASON	BRIG	250	15	08/25/45
JASON	BRIG	358	14	12/29/45
JDA	BRIG	216	10	09/07/45
JEAN BAPTISTE	BRIG	162	13	04/18/40
JEAN BAPTISTE	BOMBARDE	90	8	07/13/40
JEANNE MENANDRE	BRIG	209	13	04/01/45
JEUNE BARREAU	BRIG	132	9	09/03/50
JEUNE BRIOL	BRIG	97	7	07/05/50
JEUNE CLEANTHE	BRIG	105	9	02/23/40
JEUNE CLEANTHE	BRIG	126	9	07/26/40
JEUNE FANNY	GOELETTE	78	6	08/25/45
JEUNE FANNY	BRIG	107	8	11/20/45
JEUNE HENRIETTE	BRIG	102	7	06/22/40
JEUNE MENANDRE	BRIG	203	13	06/08/40
JEUNE MENANDRE	BRIG	202	13	09/19/40
JEUNE MENANDRE	BRIG	202	13	06/24/45
JEUNE NICOLAS	BRIG	112	8	04/09/45
JEUNE NICOLAS	BRIG	112	7	04/04/50
JEUNE ROSALIE	BRIG Gel	94	7	11/30/50
JOLOVINSKI	BRIG	242	13	08/25/40
JOSEPH	BRIG	147	9	09/20/45
JOSEPHINE	BRIG	133	9	05/22/50
JOSEUF	BRIG	123	9	08/17/40
JOVANNA	BRIG	191	8	04/24/45
JOVANY	BRIG	272	14	06/13/50
JOVENIE GIUSEPPINO	BRIG	198	13	10/31/45
JULE et THEODORE	BRIG	134	9	08/14/50
JULIA	BRIG	188	12	12/29/40
JULIA	BRIG	199	12	07/19/45
JUSTINE	BRIG	155	8	05/15/50
KALI ADELFI	BRIG	355	15	09/23/45
KALI-ELPIS	BRIG	372	20	06/19/50
KALIOPI	BRIG	174	9	06/07/50
KARAIKAKI	BRIG	271	15	06/16/50
KARAIKI	BRIG	263	14	10/15/45
KARICLIA	BRIG	312	17	12/19/45
KIMISSI TIS PANAIAS	BRIG	246	17	09/22/45
KIMON	BRIG	206	11	12/19/45
KOLLETY	BRIG	329	13	06/30/50
L'ACHILLE	BRIG	211	14	06/29/40
L'ACTIF	BRIG	187	11	12/08/40

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. -----	Crew -----	Date -----
L'AMI	BRIG	174	9	07/13/50
L'ARGENT	BRIG	178	9	08/22/50
L'ECLAIR	BRIG	106	8	09/19/45
L'INFATIGUABLE	BRIG	113	9	06/10/50
L'ORIENT	BRIG	318	14	05/25/40
L'ORPHELINE	BRIG Gle	107	8	04/06/50
L'UNIONE	BRIG	318	13	10/17/45
LA CAMILLE	BRIG	120	8	12/28/45
LA CAROLINE	BRIG	133	19	02/11/40
LA CLEOPATRE	3 MATS	197	12	01/25/50
LA FANNY		251	13	01/22/40
LA FANNY	3 MATS	252	14	09/08/45
LA FRANCAISE	BRIG	90	7	03/05/50
LA MARGEURITE	BRIG	93	8	03/01/50
LA MARIE	BRIG	120	9	08/30/45
LA NOUVELLE ADELINE	BRIG	190	11	11/01/45
LA PENELOPE	BRIG	199	13	01/04/40
LA PENELOPE	BRIG	199	13	08/25/40
LA PENELOPE	BRIG	202	11	12/04/50
LA PERLE	BRIG	138	9	01/20/40
LA PERLE	BRIG	138	9	08/21/40
LA PERLE	BRIG	138	9	08/25/45
LA STELLA	BRIG	251	14	02/15/40
LA VICTOIRE	BRIG	161	9	07/05/50
LAURENCE ET FANNY	BRIG	195	16	05/25/45
LAURENS ET FANNY	BRIG	135	11	10/08/45
LAURENT & FANNY	BRIG	195	11	08/12/40
LAURENT ET FANNY	BRIG	195	12	04/27/50
LAURENT et FANNY	BRIG	195	11	12/18/40
LAURENT et FANNY	BRIG	193	12	07/22/50
LAURENT et FANNY	BRIG	195	13	09/18/50
LAURENTINE ET JULIE	BRIG	132	8	05/26/45
LE BAPTISTIN	BRIG	126	8	11/10/45
LE BOUGIOR	BRIG	137	8	12/14/50
LE CEDRE	BRIG	195	10	01/11/45
LE CETTAIS	BRIG	149	9	09/26/45
LE CHARLES	BRIG	182	10	05/24/45
LE CONONEL COMBES	BRIG	115	9	10/30/45
LE CONTENT	BRIG	174	12	12/03/50
LE COQ	BRIG Gle	109	6	04/28/50
LE CORMARD	GOELETTE	79	6	05/16/45
LE COURRIER	BRIG	191	10	11/28/45
LE COURRIER DE MEMPHIS	3 MATS	246	14	07/07/40
LE FRANCAIS	BRIG Gle	96	7	05/25/50
LE FRANCOIS	BRIG	116	7	05/26/50
LE FREDERIC	BRIG	166	9	03/01/50
LE GOURMAND	BRIG Gle	77	7	09/14/50
LE GRUISSANOIS	BRIG	118	7	11/28/50
LE JACQUES ANTONIN	BRIG	184	9	12/17/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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LE JEAN	BRIG	155	8	06/13/50
LE LYCURGUE	BRIG	314	24	07/02/40
LE NEPTUNE	BRIG	155	9	08/17/40
LE NOUVEAU FERUORUD	BRIG	160	8	07/22/50
LE NOUVEAU SERAPHINE	BRIG	153	9	04/09/50
LE PARACLET	BRIG	171	9	12/07/50
LE PERICLES	BRIG	380	26	07/02/40
LE PERNAUD	BRIG	108	7	06/30/45
LE PHENIX	BRIG	94	10	01/11/40
LE PHILANTROPE	BRIG	187	9	08/06/50
LE PLUTON	BRIG	373	13	03/01/40
LE PROGRES	BRIG	136	9	12/24/50
LE PROGRESSEUR	BRIG	196	9	02/20/50
LE PROGRESSEUR	BRIG	187	0	12/03/50
LE PROVENCAL	BRIG	116	9	05/22/45
LE RUBIN	BRIG	395	19	08/30/45
LE SAPTIOR	3 MATS	175	9	11/04/50
LE SAUVER	BRIG	105	8	06/09/40
LE SINX	BRIG	79	7	04/04/50
LE SPECULATEUR	BRIG	115	7	05/12/50
LE ST.TROPEZ	BRIG	285	9	07/02/40
LE STOICIEN	BRIG	141	8	12/24/50
LE TOSCANO	BRIG	266	12	08/28/40
LE TROIS	BRIG	189	10	04/03/50
LE VICTOR	BRIG	111	8	07/07/45
LE VIGILENT	BRIG	274	15	08/19/40
LE VOLTIGEUR	BRIG	126	8	11/05/50
LEMESSOS	BRIG	233	14	09/23/45
LEONIDA	BRIG	212	12	08/05/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	300	15	02/13/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	165	10	07/04/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	269	18	11/26/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	300	15	11/27/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	234	13	11/27/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	220	16	12/20/40
LEONIDAS	BRIG	269	17	01/01/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	183	11	06/29/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	269	14	08/01/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	312	16	08/03/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	174	13	09/23/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	188	12	11/08/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	138	9	11/15/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	205	11	11/20/45
LEONIDAS	BRIG	233	12	07/15/50
LEONIDAS	BRIG	174	11	08/16/50
LEONIDAS	BRIG	269	13	10/22/50
LEONIDAS/LEONIDION	BRIG	303	14	11/28/45
LEONIDI	BRIG	167	9	08/01/45
LES 4 FRERES	BRIG	121	8	12/14/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. -----	Crew -----	Date -----
LES AMIS	BRIG	164	11	02/03/40
LES DEUX AMIS	BRIG	99	7	04/28/50
LES DEUX AUGUSTES	BRIG	174	12	08/23/40
LES DEUX COUSINS	GOELETTE	107	7	07/06/45
LES EB.BIEN	BRIG	216	10	12/12/50
LES JUMEAUX	BRIG	129	8	11/11/50
LES TROIS	BRIG	186	6	08/23/50
LES TROIS	BRIG	186	10	12/24/50
LES TROIS FRERES	BRIG	196	10	01/22/50
LES TROIS FRERES	BRIG	172	9	09/08/50
LES TROIS FRERES	BRIG	196	9	11/29/50
LES TROIS SOEURS	3 MATS	295	14	05/30/50
LES TROIS SOEURS	3 MATS	235	12	08/12/50
LES TROIS SOEURS	3 MATS	235	12	12/02/50
LESBOS	BRIG	210	10	07/13/40
LESBOS	BRIG	210	10	09/26/45
LICOMIDIS	3 MATS	314	12	11/03/45
LISANDRE	BRIG	132	11	08/13/40
LISANDRO	BRIG	182	11	09/23/45
LO SUOLO	BRIG	123	8	11/28/45
LUCCIN AINE	BRIG	110	7	05/16/50
LYCURGUE	BRIG	314	23	01/20/40
MADONA	BRIG	256	14	11/06/40
MADONA D'HYDRA	BRIG	182	11	03/01/40
MADONA DE CHYPRES	BRIG	266	15	07/13/40
MADONA DEL ROSARIO	BRIG	264	18	09/23/45
MAJLATTO GYORGY	3 MATS	319	14	06/12/50
MALBROUK	3 MATS	215	18	08/29/40
MARABOUT	BRIG	172	9	04/01/50
MARASLI	BRIG	380	14	05/16/45
MARASLI	3 MATS	380	14	10/09/45
MARCELLI	BRIG	354	13	01/05/40
MARCO	BRIG	336	13	11/26/40
MARGARONA	BRIG	203	10	05/08/50
MARIANE	BRIG	124	10	02/28/40
MARIE	BRIG	220	9	07/06/50
MARIE	BRIG	242	11	09/23/50
MARIE D'OSTANCE	GOELETTE	99	7	04/23/45
MARIE JOUVETTE	GOELETTE	70	6	02/01/40
MARIE JOUVETTE	GOELETTE	70	5	07/04/40
MARIE ROSALINE	BRIG GOE	82	7	11/25/45
MARIETA	BRIG	284	13	09/14/50
MARIETTA	BRIG	240	12	01/20/45
MARIETTA	BRIG	240	13	11/20/45
MARIGO	BRIG	198	10	10/03/45
MARIGO	BRIG	198	9	04/04/50
MARIGO	BRIG	301	12	05/21/50
MARIGO	BRIG	300	13	11/11/50
MARIGO	BRIG	191	9	12/24/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
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MAROCAIN	BRIG GOE	93	7	12/03/45
MAROCO	BRIG	279	11	07/26/50
MARTHE	BRIG	165	11	08/12/40
MELVDANO	BRIG	212	11	09/20/45
MEMNON	3 MATS	230	12	01/19/50
MENTOR	BRIG	322	16	11/03/45
MENTORE	BRIG	289	12	06/24/50
MERIOLAKI	BRIG	234	13	11/04/45
MICAILI	BRIG	225	11	05/29/45
MICHAIL ARCANGELO	BRIG	428	19	07/07/50
MICHELE ARCHANGELO	BRIG	495	18	11/01/45
MILTHIADE	BRIG	400	18	04/11/40
MILTHIADE	BRIG	301	14	11/05/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	301	15	05/26/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	240	13	07/02/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	213	13	07/05/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	136	12	09/19/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	400	18	11/05/45
MILTIADE	BRIG	213	13	12/28/45
MILTIADI	BRIG	240	10	09/13/50
MINERVA	BRIG	192	10	04/06/50
MINORQUE	BRIG Gle	58	5	11/04/50
MIRISLAVO	BRIG	230	9	01/11/50
MLORDEU	BRIG	244	11	12/09/45
MOLDAVIA	BRIG	149	9	10/16/45
MOSCOU	BRIG	159	12	07/04/40
MUNIFISEUR	BRIG Gle	112	7	08/12/50
NAMA	BRIG	148	9	11/17/50
NAPOLEON	BRIG	209	10	09/03/45
NARCISSO	BRIG	308	14	07/07/45
NASLEDNIEK	BRIG	172	12	04/20/40
NAVIGATEUR	BRIG	132	8	11/04/50
NEA TICHIS	BRIG	280	18	10/30/45
NELSON	BRIG	252	10	07/13/40
NELSON	BRIG	252	13	11/26/40
NELSON	BRIG	206	12	08/27/45
NELSON	GREEK	216	12	12/28/45
NELSON	BRIG	216	10	09/15/50
NEMESIS	BRIG	130	8	07/17/40
NEMESIS	3 MATS	171	10	08/20/50
NEOS CONSTANTINOS	BRIG	206	13	05/16/50
NEOTIDE	3 MATS	217	21	11/10/45
NICOLAOS	BRIG	289	15	01/05/50
NICOLAS	BRIG	160	12	07/26/40
NICOLAS	BRIG	199	11	01/30/50
NICOLAS & HERACLES	BRIG	199	11	07/14/50
NICOLAS ARISTIDE	3 MATS	230	15	04/02/50
NICOLAS ARISTIDE	3 MATS	230	12	12/03/50
NICOLAS ET ARISTIDE	3 MATS	230	11	09/29/45

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. ----	Crew ----	Date ----
NICOLAS HERACLE	BRIG	299	12	04/12/50
NICOLAS HERACLES	BRIG	199	11	12/04/50
NICOLAS HERACLIS	BRIG	199	11	09/13/50
NICOLAS et ARISTIDE	BRIG	199	12	09/09/40
NICOLAS et ARISTIDE	BRIG	190	10	10/07/40
NICOLAS et ARISTIDE	3 MATS	230	12	07/30/50
NICOLAS et HERCULES	BRIG	199	14	04/08/45
NICOLAS-ARISTIDE	3 MATS	230	12	01/13/50
NICOLAS-ETIENNE JEUNE	BRIG	155	11	06/17/50
NICOLAS-HERACLES	BRIG	199	10	09/06/45
NICOLAS-JEUNE ETIENNE	BRIG	155	10	10/18/50
NICOLETTO	3 MATS	375	18	12/04/45
NICOLO	BRIG	252	13	11/02/45
NILO	BRIG	267	11	07/19/45
NITZA	BRIG	249	11	11/10/45
NOSTRO SIGNORE DELL'ORTO	BRIG	154	11	11/04/50
NOSTRO SIGNORE DELLE VIGU	BRIG	131	11	08/27/45
NOUPOUSIN	BRIG	168	11	05/06/50
NOUVELLE ADELINE	BRIG	190	11	10/11/40
NOUVELLE JULIE	BRIG	104	8	06/20/50
NUEVO LAZARINO	BRIG	196	11	05/20/50
OCHEANO	BRIG	214	13	01/22/50
ODESSA	3 MATS	546	18	11/04/45
ODESSA	3 MATS	390	18	06/15/50
ODESSIANA	BRIG	330	14	10/16/45
ODIYITRIA	BRIG	288	14	11/28/45
ODYSSEAS	BRIG	322	10	08/05/45
OKEANOS	BRIG	190	9	11/10/45
OLIMPIOS	BRIG	205	11	04/02/45
OLYMPIA	BRIG	320	11	03/31/50
OLYMPIAS	BRIG	218	10	02/01/50
OLYMPIOS	BRIG	218	10	12/28/50
OMEGA	BRIG	228	12	10/03/45
OMONIA	BRIG	361	15	03/30/50
ONORE	BRIG	304	12	06/22/45
OREA ELENE	BRIG	187	10	11/15/45
ORESTE	BRIG	202	11	12/28/40
ORESTE	3 MATS	247	12	04/06/45
ORESTE	BRIG	202	11	10/03/45
ORESTE ET PYLADES	BRIG	272	12	09/19/45
ORIENTE	BRIG	267	13	10/14/40
ORIENTE	BRIG	239	12	08/11/45
ORIONE	BRIG	169	10	12/24/50
ORISONTE	BRIG	292	12	11/18/45
ORIZONTE	BRIG	262	19	01/06/45
OTONE	BRIG	273	21	07/02/45
PANAIA CHIOU	BRIG	278	14	11/28/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type -----	Ton. -----	Crew -----	Date -----
PANAIA CHRISOPIYI	BRIG	174	11	08/30/45
PANAIA DESPINA	BRIG	192	11	08/01/45
PANAIA DI SPARTEA	BRIG	380	17	11/15/45
PANAIA KARUSENA	BRIG	310	13	03/08/50
PANAIA KICOU	BRIG	270	13	07/19/45
PANAIA PLATSANI	BRIG	187	20	06/02/45
PANAIA PLAZZANI	BRIG	245	14	10/15/45
PANAYA	BRIG	238	14	07/04/40
PANAYA	BRIG	182	13	08/25/40
PANAYA	BRIG	238	11	12/29/40
PANAYA	BRIG	299	13	07/16/50
PANAYA D'HYDRA	BRIG	182	9	09/13/50
PANAYA DE CHYPRES	BRIG	227	17	11/13/40
PANAYA SPIGLIOTISSA	BRIG	196	11	01/02/45
PANDIAS	3 MATS	416	17	07/17/50
PANONIA	3 MATS	506	16	09/14/45
PANSELINOS	BRIG	252	15	11/27/45
PANSELINOS	BRIG	376	13	12/15/45
PAOLO	BRIG	313	12	11/15/45
PAPA SISTO	BRIG	270	11	10/17/45
PAPOUDI	BRIG	247	13	07/16/50
PARAELEVE	BRIG	171	9	02/20/50
PARAITIS	BRIG	171	9	11/18/45
PARALOS	BRIG	251	14	11/07/45
PAUL ERNEST	BRIG	190	9	10/25/50
PAULINE	BRIG	82	7	09/23/40
PAULINE	BRIG	119	9	01/18/45
PELICCIN	BRIG	216	17	11/26/40
PENELOPE	BRIG	199	13	04/25/40
PENELOPE	BRIG	199	12	03/02/45
PENELOPE	BRIG	199	12	05/25/45
PENELOPE	BRIG	249	14	05/26/45
PENELOPE	BRIG	199	12	10/29/45
PENELOPE	BRIG	309	14	11/06/45
PENELOPE	BRIG	202	12	08/02/50
PENINIA	3 MATS	507	16	12/29/40
PEPINA	BRIG	223	11	03/24/45
PERICLES	BRIG	380	23	12/22/40
PERLE	BRIG	198	9	03/15/45
PERSEO	BRIG	122	8	09/24/40
PHILADELFIA	BRIG	218	12	12/19/45
PHILADELPHIA	BRIG	266	12	01/18/45
PHILADELPHIA	BRIG	218	11	08/23/50
PHILANTROPO	3 MATS	264	13	09/09/50
PIERRE JOSEPHINE	BRIG	134	9	09/10/50
PIRRO	BRIG	279	11	09/08/45
PITHIAS	BRIG	114	7	05/07/50
PLUTARQUE	BRIG	90	7	07/12/45
POLIBIO	BRIG	212	10	08/24/50

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. ----	Crew ----	Date ----
POLIVIO	BRIG	199	11	11/14/45
POSSIDON	BRIG	169	13	07/08/40
POSSIDON	BRIG	202	12	08/19/45
POSSIDON	BRIG	260	14	08/22/45
POSSIDON	BRIG	250	13	03/01/50
PRAGA	BRIG	180	9	07/06/50
PRIMOGENITA	BRIG	174	10	10/03/45
PRINCESSE EIMMA	BRIG	140	9	12/06/50
PRINCIPE COHARY	BRIG	316	11	06/07/40
PRINCIPE METTERNICH	3 MATS	267	12	10/07/45
PRINCIPE MIEKELLE	BRIG	228	14	03/03/45
STURZA				
PROVENCE	BRIG	109	8	11/15/45
PROVIDENZA	BRIG	270	12	08/01/45
RADOS	BRIG	239	11	05/14/40
RALLIS	BRIG	193	10	10/16/45
REDEMPTEUR	BRIG	310	14	10/30/40
REGATO	BRIG	300	13	10/30/45
RIGENERATO	BRIG	351	14	04/30/40
RITCHARD	BRIG	279	12	03/20/40
ROBUSTE	BRIG	157	10	09/09/50
RODOCANACHI	3 MATS	350	14	04/30/40
RODOCANACHI	3 MATS	350	15	12/21/40
RODOCANACHI	3 MATS	350	14	05/28/45
RORBEU	BRIG	196	13	02/20/50
ROSA	BRIG	150	10	10/26/50
ROSALIE	BRIG	117	7	01/22/50
ROSALIE	BRIG Gle	78	7	04/02/50
ROSE MARIE	3 MATS	414	16	11/12/40
ROSO MARIA	3 MATS	370	15	09/25/45
ROXANDRE	BRIG	237	19	02/27/40
RUBENS	BRIG	196	13	08/25/50
RUJITER	BRIG	120	6	03/30/50
SAGGIO	BRIG	266	13	12/15/40
SAIN SPIRIDON	BRIG	277	12	12/03/45
SAINT SPIRIDON	BRIG	231	10	04/17/45
SAINT SPIRIDON	BRIG	277	12	07/06/45
SAINT SPIRIDON	BRIG	345	14	09/23/45
SALOMON	BRIG	202	16	01/18/45
SALVATORE	3 MATS	426	14	11/14/45
SAN GIOVANI BATISTA	3 MATS	176	12	11/11/50
SAN MICHELE	BRIG	244	14	11/17/45
SAN NICOLA	BRIG	222	12	07/02/45
SAN NICOLA	BRIG	285	12	10/31/45
SAN NICOLO	BRIG	338	14	11/14/45
SAN NICOLO	BRIG	297	14	01/23/50
SAN PROSPERO	BRIG	206	10	09/22/45
SAN PROSPERO	BRIG	170	9	09/14/50
SAN SPIRIDON	BRIG	300	12	10/03/45

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name	Type	Ton.	Crew	Date
SANTA CATTARINA	BRIG	140	10	08/01/50
SAUVEUR	BRIG	105	7	01/14/45
SAUVEUR	BRIG	105	9	11/13/45
SAUVEUR	BRIG	224	10	01/17/50
SAUVEUR	BRIG	101	7	06/20/50
SCIO	BRIG	272	13	11/05/45
SCIPION	BRIG	180	13	06/22/40
SEBASTIANO	BRIG	173	12	11/17/45
SERBIA	3 MATS	308	17	05/26/45
SERBIA	3 MATS	320	15	10/29/45
SILENZIO	BRIG	294	12	10/16/45
SIMONE	BRIG	279	11	10/03/45
SINCERE	BRIG	149	9	03/04/50
SINDAGMA	BRIG	241	14	12/15/45
SIOR DIONISIS	BRIG	285	11	08/01/45
SLOVINSKY	BRIG	242	12	11/08/45
SOCOLIZZA	BRIG	265	11	11/06/40
SOCRATIS	BRIG	194	9	06/30/50
SOLON	BRIG	220	19	03/02/45
SOLON	BRIG	225	13	09/20/45
SOPHIA	BRIG	196	11	09/09/45
SOPHIA	BRIG	242	12	11/29/45
SOPHIA	BRIG	237	11	12/04/45
SOPHIA	BRIG	159	10	09/09/50
SOPHIA	BRIG	331	15	10/29/50
SOPHIE ET CELESTINE	BRIG	98	7	07/04/45
SOSSIMBURGO	BRIG	299	12	11/29/45
SPERANZA	BRIG	282	11	12/06/45
SPIRIDON	BRIG	174	15	07/13/40
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	143	11	08/05/40
ST. ANNE	GOELETTE	133	8	09/03/50
ST. ANTONIO	BRIG	292	12	09/23/45
ST. ESPRIT	BRIG	133	8	09/19/50
ST. GREGOIRE	3 MATS	340	21	04/03/40
ST. MICHEL	3 MATS	289	12	03/01/40
ST. MICHEL	BRIG	256	17	09/19/40
ST. MICHEL	BRIG	349	14	07/19/45
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	207	9	07/04/40
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	186	16	08/11/40
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	233	17	08/12/40
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	233	15	08/21/40
ST. NICOLAS	BRIG	147	12	09/23/40
ST. NICOLAS	3 MATS	275	16	12/27/40
ST. NICOLO		277	16	01/01/40
ST. NICOLO	BRIG	164	11	02/18/40
ST. NICOLO	3 MATS	293	19	06/22/40
ST. NICOLO	BRIG	222	15	12/24/40
ST. NICOLO	BRIG	191	12	08/01/45
ST. NICOLO	BRIG	273	13	11/08/45

11/25/98

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton. ----	Crew ----	Date ----
ST. SPIRIDON	3 MATS	206	14	08/19/40
ST. SPIRIDON	BRIG	234	20	08/25/40
ST. VIERGE	BRIG	108	8	01/14/45
STAMATIOS	BRIG	262	13	12/24/50
STELLA	BRIG	281	14	09/05/45
STELLA MATUTINA	BRIG	149	10	02/11/40
STELLA MATUTINA	BRIG	149	10	08/12/40
STELLA-DIANA	BRIG	290	14	11/04/40
STRUZA	BRIG	223	13	08/27/45
SULTANO	BRIG	333	19	03/18/45
SUMATRA	BRIG	193	10	11/05/45
TAXIARCH	BRIG	275	15	07/03/40
TAXIARCHE	BRIG	187	14	06/22/40
TAXIARCHI	BRIG	332	17	04/04/50
TAXIARCHIS	BRIG	306	15	07/05/50
TELEMACO	BRIG	144	10	08/24/50
TELEMACO	BRIG	271	13	08/24/50
TESAURO	BRIG	154	9	11/10/45
THEANO	BRIG	214	13	09/18/45
THEMISTOCLE	BRIG	347	18	11/27/40
THEMISTOCLE	BRIG	226	13	09/08/45
THEMISTOCLE	BRIG	252	12	09/30/45
THEMISTOCLES	BRIG	211	11	06/29/40
THEOLOGOS	BRIG	345	16	08/10/50
THEOPHANIA	BRIG	216	12	10/05/45
THIA CHARI	BRIG	351	15	08/27/50
THIMOLEON	BRIG	171	10	08/12/40
THIMOLEON	BRIG	289	15	12/13/40
TICHI	BRIG	125	15	07/28/45
TIMOLEON	BRIG	288	14	06/08/45
TOULON	BRIG Gle	101	8	08/22/50
TRAVAIL	BRIG	202	10	10/04/45
TRIONFO	BRIG	245	11	11/05/40
TRIS ADELFI	BRIG	255	12	08/19/45
TURQUIE	BRIG	113	8	03/03/50
TYCHI	BRIG	184	9	05/20/50
URMENY	BRIG	212	11	11/01/45
VALACHIA	BRIG	203	12	04/16/50
VARVAKI	BRIG	252	13	10/04/45
VENOGE	3 MATS	361	14	11/21/45
VEZZOSA	BRIG	292	10	05/14/40
VEZZOSO	BRIG	292	10	01/06/40
VICTOR	BRIG	111	7	12/13/50
VIERGE DE LA GARDE	BRIG	94	7	08/01/45
VIERGE DE LA GARDE		94	7	04/01/50
VIERGE DELLA STELLA	BRIG	151	10	03/19/40
VIERGE MARIE	GOELETTE	75	7	08/02/50
VIRGINIA	BRIG	145	10	10/07/45
VLADIMIR	BRIG	214	12	07/30/45

APPENDIX E: Greek ships in Marseille's port: Vessel's Name,  
Type, Tonnage, Crew, Date.

Vessel's Name -----	Type ----	Ton.	Crew	Date ----
VLADIMIRO	BRIG	449	16	11/26/40
VOCINSLAVO	BRIG	265	11	04/26/45
VOIE SARETEE	BRIG	118	6	11/29/50
VUK	BRIG	240	12	09/05/45
XENOPHON	BRIG	290	15	09/04/50
YO	BRIG	163	9	09/13/45
ZACHARIA	BRIG	355	14	02/17/50
ZENITH	BRIG	96	7	04/03/50
ZIZI	BRIG	181	11	04/01/45
ZORO	3 MATS	322	13	08/31/45
*** Total ***				

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[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX F: Lists of Acceptors

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Acceptor	Residence
ADAMIDES N.	Paris
BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
COBELLI, PIRJANTZ & Cie	Lyon
COBELLI, PIRJZNTZ & Cie	Marseille
COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
MACASDARIAN G. & Cie	Marseille
PIRJANTZ, THALASSO & Cie	Marseille
RALLI, VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
SACILLY D. & Cie	Marseille

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[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX G: List of Assignors

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Assignor	Residence
BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
CAMOIN A.	Marseille
DEBOURG Eug.	Marseille
HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
LASCARIDI E. & Cie	Marseille
MACASDARIAN G. & Cie	Marseille
PIGNATELLI A.	Marseille
PIRJANTZ, THALASSO & Cie	Marseille
RALLI, VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
SACILLY D.	Marseille
THEOLOYRE & LOZEANE	Marseille

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[Appendixs]

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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04/18/61	1600.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/18/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/18/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	27500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	12000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	45000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
-----	-----	-----	-----
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	11000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	13000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	13000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/23/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/25/61	12500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/25/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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04/30/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	22565.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	12000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	13000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	7000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	16000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	14000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	11000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	17000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	23000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	RALLI VLASTO	Marseille
04/30/61	15000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	17000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	HAVA G.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI.D & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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04/30/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	24000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	26000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	20000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	30000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
04/30/61	14000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	23000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	27000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	24000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	26000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	22000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
04/30/61	18000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	5000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/06/61	11000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/06/61	25000.00	PIRYANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	PIRYANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	PIRYANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	PIRYANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	PIRYANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	12000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	8000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	14000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	13000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	9000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount -----	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
05/06/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	26000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	21000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G.	Marseille
05/06/61	26000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	22000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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05/06/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	5236.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	0.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/06/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/13/61	10598.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/13/61	10402.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
05/13/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	8000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	7000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	13000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
05/13/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	5000.00	BALTAZZI D.Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	13000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	11000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15600.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	5000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	11500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	7500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	11000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	18000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	25000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	25000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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05/13/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	12500.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	13000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/13/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	12500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	7500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/13/61	26000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/13/61	25000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Marseille
05/13/61	14000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Marseille
05/15/61	11000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	10000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	9500.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	9000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	8000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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05/15/61	7500.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	7000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	6500.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	6000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/15/61	5500.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Lyon
05/20/61	10000.00	ADAMIDES N.	Paris
05/20/61	15000.00	ADAMIDES N.	Paris
05/20/61	12000.00	ADAMIDES N.	Paris
05/20/61	13000.00	ADAMIDES N.	Paris
05/18/61	5500.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/18/61	8500.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/18/61	9000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/18/61	8200.00	SACILLY D. & Cie	Marseille
05/18/61	4500.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	21916.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	13000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	11600.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	12000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	13000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	29000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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05/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	12000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	13000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	12000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	13000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	28000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	11000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	16000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	14000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	27000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	17000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	12000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	18000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	9000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	21000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	27000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
05/20/61	22000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	17000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	18000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
05/20/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
05/20/61	23000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
05/20/61	9000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	12000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	11000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	13000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/20/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
05/20/61	19000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
05/20/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
05/20/61	28000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	26000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	23000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	22000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	19000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	18000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	23000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	17000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/20/61	25000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/22/61	12500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	13000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	17500.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	14000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	22000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	21000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	15000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	17000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	18000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	16500.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	26000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	24000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	27000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	23000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	18000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	17000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	15000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	12000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	14000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	13000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
05/27/61	10000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount -----	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
05/27/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	22000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	21000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	21000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	29000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	32000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	28000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	11000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/27/61	12000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	23000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount -----	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
05/27/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Ci Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/27/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/27/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	12000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	13500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	9000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	12500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	13000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15500.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	11000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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05/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	32000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	28000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	10000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/27/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
05/27/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Marseille
05/27/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	24500.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/02/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/03/61	17000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/06/61	17000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/06/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/06/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/06/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/06/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI	Marseille
06/06/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	5000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	21000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	22000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	11000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	9000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D.& Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/06/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	12000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	7000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	17000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	17000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	17000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	8000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	30000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	30000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
06/06/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	25000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	15000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	13000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	12000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/06/61	10537.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/06/61	8500.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/08/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/08/61	14000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/08/61	11000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/08/61	9000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/09/61	5000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/13/61	15000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/13/61	10000.00	PIRJATNZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	22000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	6000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie.	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	22000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/13/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	694.55	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	1161.11	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25862.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	29000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	29000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	29000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25500.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24500.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	29000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	17600.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	29000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	21000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/13/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/15/61	11000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/15/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/15/61	10450.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/15/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/15/61	16450.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/15/61	13000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25200.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20600.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	6000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	4000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	15000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	17000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	25200.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO Ci	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	19000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	6000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/20/61	25200.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	22000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	18000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	7000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	35000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	11000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	9000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20200.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	20200.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	25400.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	5000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	5200.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/20/61	7000.00	MACASDARIAN G.	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/20/61	13000.00	MACASDARIAN G.	Marseille
06/20/61	12000.00	MACASDARIAN G.	Marseille
06/20/61	8000.00	MACASDARIAN G.	Marseille
06/22/61	7000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/20/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
06/20/61	30000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
06/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
06/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G.	Paris
06/27/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	16000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	15000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	25000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25260.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	14000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	23885.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	6000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	34000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	30000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	14000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	2000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

450

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount -----	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
06/27/61	17755.58	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19735.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19735.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	17000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	8106.42	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19735.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	19000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	14000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18735.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	35000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	34000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	30000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
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06/27/61	20000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	18000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	22000.00	PIRJANTZ THALASSO	Marseille
06/27/61	18371.43	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	14000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	21200.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	11000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	9000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
06/27/61	8000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	7500.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	5730.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	25000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	7590.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
06/27/61	10000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
06/27/61	14000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	14000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	25000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	26000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	9000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	11000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	14090.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	18371.43	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	25000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon

11/25/98

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date -----	Amount -----	Acceptor -----	Residence -----
06/27/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
06/27/61	18735.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/01/61	8075.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/01/61	7000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
07/03/61	20000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
07/03/61	30000.00	COUTURIER G. & Cie	Paris
07/03/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	25490.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	22000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	28000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	23000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	24000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	26000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	27000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	15000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	25000.00	HAVA G. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	15000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	13000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	19000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	25000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	SACILLY D.	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	30000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	12000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	13000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	19000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	16000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	15000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	25000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	20000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	8000.00	LASCARIDI & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	28000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	22000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille

APPENDIX H: Bills of Exchange Discounted with the Bank of  
France in 1861

Expiry Date	Amount	Acceptor	Residence
-----	-----	-----	-----
07/03/61	27000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	26000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	24000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	25000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	23000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	BALTAZZI D. & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	8000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
07/03/61	7000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
07/03/61	18000.00	BALTAZZI D.	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	19000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	17000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	14000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	24000.00	RALLI VLASTO & Cie	Marseille
07/03/61	10000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	15000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	24000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	26000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	20000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	25000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03/61	30000.00	COBELLI PIRJANTZ	Lyon
07/03			

[Appendix]

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APPENDIX I: Composition of the Administration Council of the  
Marseillaise branch (1857-1863)

ADMINISTRATORS

PASCAL Emile, Banker

appointed on 3 April 1839

LUCY Adrien, Secretary of the Treasury

appointed on 26 May 1853, resigned in December 1863

COUVE Edouard, Banker

appointed on 3 April 1839

HESSE Antoine, Banker

appointed on 25 Mars 1840

PASTRE Jean Baptiste, Egypt, Regent of Tunis, commerce of Levant

appointed on 23 Mars 1843

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[Appendix]

[Appendix]

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GAUJOU Francois, Leathers and Hides

appointed on 3 May 1849

ROBILIER Charles Henri, Shipowner

appointed on 24 Mars 1846, died in 1864

PUGET Wulfran, Shipowner, olives, colonial produce

appointed on 17 August 1848, died on February 1866

CANAPLE Edmond, Soap factory

appointed on 17 August 1848

BONNASSE Joseph, Banker

appointed on 29 July 1858

ROULET, Soap, olive

appointed on 29 July 1858

SOLARY, Capitalist

appointed on 17 January 1861

CENCORS

DEVILLE Jules, Shipowner

appointed on 17 August 1848

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[Appendix]

[Appendixs]

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SEJOURNE Camille, Banker

appointed on 26 December 1849

PERIER Theophile, Steamship

appointed on 25 April 1850

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[Appendixs]

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APPENDIX J: Creance a Liquidier :

Note Succinte sur l'Affaire

1861 - 1875

.....Au commencement de juillet 1861, apres les derniers protets,  
les effets impayes, constituant la creance de la Banque de France  
s'elevaient a fr: 27.446.889, 71  
Au 31 janvier 1862, etaient remboursees 4.374.254, 51  
A cette date, la Creance de la Banque se trouvait  
donc reduit a 23.072.635, 20

dont le remboursement etait garanti:

1. Par des Immeubles transferees a la Banque dans les formes usitees dans le Levant.
2. Par des Obligations sur le Gouvernement Ottoman.
3. Par des creances hypothecaires deleguees sur des particuliers.

Le montant des Garanties s'elevait a fr: 22.824.720

La Banque etait par ses mandataires en possession effective de toutes ces garanties sauf pour une somme de fr: 930.000, environ qui restait a regulariser au 31 janvier 1862.

Les divers traites entre la Banque et ses debiteurs accordaient des delais a ces derniers.

Le 31 janvier 1862, le Gouverneur, dans son rapport a l'Assemblee

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[Appendixs]

[Appendix]

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Generale des Actionnaires, apres avoir relate tres succinctement cette affaire s'exprimait ainsi: " Ceux qui avaient personnellement des paiements a faire aux termes de leurs traites se sont jusqu'a present ponctuellement executes. N'etait la situation financiere actuelle du Gouvernement, les remboursements se feraient moins attendre; c'est une question de temps; sans ceux qui s'occupent de nos creances n'ont pas de doute sur leur reglement et notre confiance est le meme. Cependantn, en presence d'un tel evenement, la plus ordinaire prudence commandait de ne pas distribuer l'integralite du Dividende de l'annee. C'est ainsi que des prelevements furent operes au Comptes de Profits et Pertes,

savoir:

1er Semestre 1861 fr: 3.077.919, 45

2e " 1861 " 3.820.921, 88

1er " 1862 " 1.800.000, "

-----  
8.698.841, 33

Ces diverses sommes furent portees au credit d'un compte "Creances a Liquider" et constituerent une reserve eventuelle qui devait faire retour aux actionnaires des que les rentrees se produiraient. Pour parfaire le dividende du 2e Semestre 1862, il fut pris, a ce compte, la somme de 634.679, 80 fr.

Pendant l'annee 1862, la Banque recouvra 9.261.220,91  
de sorte qu'au 24 decembre, le solde se trouvait reduit a 13.811.414,29

Pendant l'annee 1863, la Banque recouvra encore 10.411.414,29  
Le Gouvernement Ottoman, ayant rempli ses engagements, la creance de la Banque ne s'elevait plus, au 28 janvier 1864, qu'a environ 3.400.000, "

Ces 3.400.000 fr., dus encore par quelques maisons de Commerce,

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[Appendix]

[Appendix]

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etaient en partie, garantis par des Obligations hypothecaires ou par des nantissements.

En consequence de la reduction de la creance, la somme de 6.387.000 fr., fut prise au compte "Creances a Liquidier" et repartie aux Actionnaires a raison de 35 fr. par action.

Un nouveau prelevement fut encore opere le 29 devembre 1866, le compte fur debite de 1.168.000 fr., par le credit du Compte "agrandissement del'Immeuble de la Banque".

Le remboursement des 3.400.000 fr., restant dus au 24 janvier 1864 s'effectua lentement. Il ne fut termine qu'en juin 1875.

Le compte "Creances a Liquidier" fut solde le 24 decembre 1875 par Profits et Pertes.

Juin 1891

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[Appendix]

[Sources]

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- Liquidation de la maison Michel Petrocochino & fils, Caisse depuis la deces de Ms. Michel Petrocochino (1861)
- Ms. M.Petrocochino, Compte de son capital dans la maison Michel Petrocochino et fils (30 avril 1862)
- Compte de la liquidation de la maison de commerce Michel Petrocochino et fils (30 avril 1862)
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- Partage entre Ms. Eustratio Petrocochino et Demetrius Petrocochino tous deux demurant a Marseille allees de Meilhan No. 6

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- b) d' une propriete rurale situee dans le territoire de la dite ville au quartier de Bonneveine (14 mars 1870)
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