European University Institute
Department of History and Civilisation

Serving the Republic:
Scottish soldiers in the Republic of the United Provinces
1572-1782

By

Joachim Miggelbrink

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of
Doctor in History and Civilisation
from the European University Institute

Florence, April, 2005

B/C →

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Introduction

Social military history, especially the history of the army, has never been a popular item on the agenda of Dutch historians. The only researchers who have been interested in investigating the Dutch army have been those with a professional interest in military history, being ex-officers and military men. The "true" historian has long regarded military history as a rather insignificant area.

For a long time the focal point of scholars of the early modern Dutch Republic has mainly been the Dutch mercantile and military navy, which has been responsible for several archaic assumptions regarding Dutch military and mercantile behaviour that persisted well into the 20th century. One of the most indestructible myths surrounding the Dutch Republic of the 17th and 18th centuries was the concept of the Republic as a pacifist merchant state, wherein an elite of city regents independently decided the policy of the state. Many Dutch (and foreign) historians held on to the idea of a Dutch State where the emphasis was placed on trade, not on war, not only because war was considered "bad for business" but because, according to such historians, the Dutch lacked that specific kind of military tradition and warrior-ethos that was so often found in the other European powers of the time. This attitude also helped to explain the use of foreign soldiers in the Dutch army. After all, why would a mercantile elite desire to disrupt its own labour force in order to sustain an army, when soldiers could easily be purchased from abroad?

In his book on the Dutch army, the Dutch historian H.L. Zwitzer discusses various eminent Dutch historians who have contributed to the construction of this particular myth of the Dutch Republic. In his opinion, this tradition started in the mid 19th century with the Dutch historian Robert Fruin, who claimed that the Dutch were known as "not very valorous"[1]. Fruin's view was echoed by Johan Huizinga more than six decades later, when he stated that "even in the years 1568-1597, when the war flared up and temporarily died down, it was only with strong exception that native Dutch carried the arms. The Dutch suffered rather than waged the

[1] H.L. Zwitzer, *De militie van den Staat. Het leger van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden*, (Den Haag 1991), p. 39; R. Fruin, *Tien jaren uit de 80-jarige oorlog*, 1588-1598 (Den Haag 1882) p. 86.

war, the army consisted for the most part of soldiers recruited abroad; most of them Germans and Walloons."[2] Seven years before, Jan and Annie Romein wrote, "that since the first phase of the Eighty Years War[3], the regents had earned enough money to pay foreign mercenaries to fight their wars, so that every sort of military tradition was missing."[4] This one-sided tradition continued stubbornly towards the end of the 20th century. Verwey, in 1976, stated that "...fighting their own wars was alien to the Dutch, because for that purpose they have always employed mercenary soldiers."[5]

An important source that has been used to justify such views of the Dutch Republic as a pacifist mercantile state is a quote by Johan van Oldebarnevelt[6] taken from his Memoirs in which he discusses the Dutch attitude to fighting and war.

"*It needs to be taken into account that we are inclined to be docile and peace loving, not inclined to war; in such a way that even during the war we have kept our children and friends out of the war as much as possible. Therefore, it was necessary for our defence to send for foreign soldiers from different kingdoms and countries, it being very difficult to meet the demands that such a great need would require.*[7]"

When this text is considered separately from its context, it would indeed appear that it constitutes an argument for peace with Spain and, in more general terms, reflects the Dutch mentality towards warfare. Oldebarnevelt's biographer, Jan den Tex, states in his commentary on this particular passage that actually the opposite is true. When reading further, it becomes clear that this passage is not a plea for peace, but quite the opposite; it is a statement against

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[2] J. Huizinga, *Nederland's beschaving in de 17de eeuw* (Groningen 1976).p. 39-42.
[3] The Eighty Year's War between the Dutch Republic and Spain lasted from 1568-1648.
[4] J. en A. Romein, *De Lage Landen* (Utrecht 1949), p. 388-389.
[5] G. Verwey, *Geschiedenis van Nederland, levensverhaal van zijn bevolking* (1976), p. 671.
[6] Johan van Oldebarnevelt (1547-1619) Dutch politician and lawyer.
[7] This is my translation from the Dutch text, the original text is: "*Waertoe dient geconsidereert, dat wy van nature sachtmoedigh en vreetsaem syn, totten oorloge niet geneicht, sulcx dat wy oock gedurende den noot van den oorloge onse kinderen en vrunden al uytten oorloge gehouden en daer afgeraden hebben, soo veel ons mogelyck is geweest; daerom wy ter defentie vreemde soldaten uyt andere Coninckryken en Landen moetsen doen komen, 't welck soo haest nyet kan geschieden als sulcke noot soude vereisschen.*" M.L. van Deventer (ed.), *Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd*, vol. 1 (s'-Gravenhage 1860-1865),.p. 141.

an uncertain peace and in favour of strengthening unity within the provinces and the pursuit of a strong defence policy. "*The careful ones, confessing this, are of the opinion that we could have peace, provided that our borders are guarded with 25 to 30 thousand soldiers. It must therefore be considered whether this doubtful peace would not be more difficult than an open war...*"[8]

The notion that the Dutch had a reputation for disliking the soldier's trade, and that there was a shrewd economic calculation involved in the balance between Dutch and foreign soldiers in the armies of the Dutch States, is not exclusive to Dutch historians. The British historian M.S. Anderson, remarking on the Dutch attitude concerning the recruitment of foreign soldiers states that "if he (the mercenary) could be obtained cheaply, it might well make sense to hire him rather than take from civilian life a peasant or artisan who was contributing to the wealth of the state."[9] Anderson continues that "the heavy reliance of the United Netherlands, the most economically advanced part of the continent, on foreign mercenaries is to be largely explained in these terms."[10]

The entire concept of a mercenary army financed by a thriving mercantile state, as embodied by the Dutch Republic is prevalent in the opinions of other historians. M.D. Feld argues that "The Dutch army was perhaps the most efficient and certainly the most widely imitated force of its age. But its composition was largely mercenary. A national military tradition was almost entirely absent; and the dominant social and political class, the urban merchant oligarchs, has a positive aversion to military careers in any form."[11] While discussing the Dutch Republic, Feld relies heavily on the ideas of Johan Huizinga and Pieter Geyl.[12] He regards the Republic

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[8] "*De voorsichtigen, dit wel bekennende, meenen dat men daerin soude kunnen voorsien, mits houdende onse frontieren wel bewaekt mit 25 of 30 duysent soldaten. Dan, daerjegens moet gereekent syn, off ons dese twyfelachtige vrede nyet lastiger soude vallen als openbare oorlog...*" M.L. van Deventer (ed.), *Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd*, vol. 1, p. 141.

[9] M. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789* (London 1988), p. 51.

[10] Ibid.

[11] M. Feld, 'Middle-Class Society and the rise of Military Professionalism. The Dutch Army 1589-1609', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 1 (1974-1975) no. 4, p. 421.

[12] P. Geyl, *De Geschiedenis van Nederlandsche stam*, vol. IV (Amsterdam/Antwerpen 1961-1962); J. Huizinga, *Nederland's beschaving in de 17de eeuw* (Groningen, 1976).

as the same merchant state where military prowess was considered to be something alien, and where a military tradition was not only lacking, but also was not encouraged by the government. Feld states that "the maintenance of commerce and credit was accepted as a worthwhile end in itself. Investment in an armed force was regarded as one of the fixed expenditures of that trading company in extended form, the Dutch city. Commerce, not war, was the major occupation of the state and of its rulers."[13] The reason for the mercenary army, according to Feld, was not a matter of choice, but rather a natural consequence of the "nature of political and social circumstances". Namely, that the regents and autonomous towns which dominated the political climate in the Republic preferred financing a mercenary army with regular payments, rather than having their social and economic structure regularly disrupted through having to provide the Dutch army with sufficient manpower. Feld's view is the most common on the Dutch mentality towards warfare; unfortunately, it leaves many facets of the Dutch army unexplained.

The Dutch historian H.L. Zwitzer has strongly contested the myth of the Dutch Republic as a solitary pacifist merchant state lacking a proper military tradition. Firstly, according to Zwitzer, the concept of a mercenary army must be employed carefully. There is a distinctive difference between the ragtag army that served under William of Orange at the end of the 16th century, and the professional standing army which Maurice of Nassau helped to create at the beginning of the 17th century. Zwitzer states that an important development was the transition of a military force after 1588 (the return of the Earl of Leicester to England) from an army that consisted mainly of temporarily enlisted mercenary soldiers, to a permanent mobilised army of professional soldiers.[14]

The mercenary soldier was transformed into a professional soldier in the Dutch army under the direct control of their commanders and the States General. From the 17th century onwards, he received a regular payment and often settled in the Republic for a long period, creating a life for himself. Therefore, it would be more accurate in the 17th century to speak of foreign professional soldiers instead of using the term 'mercenaries'. The seasonal soldier who received pay for one or more campaigns and who offered his services to whoever was willing to pay had disappeared and was replaced by the professional soldier who signed up for a longer period, even for life. Zwitzer states that "ever since the introduction of the military

[13] Feld, 'Military Professionalism', p. 423.
[14] Zwitzer, *De militie van den Staat*, p. 15.

reforms (attributed to Maurice, but mostly accomplished through the encouragement of his cousin William-Louis), it had been too costly to discard the trained soldiers after the conclusion of the campaigning season."[15] Similarly, according to Maarten Prak, there has been a misconception about the professional soldier who has often been wrongly classified as a mercenary. These soldiers were no mere adventurers, but men who had made a profession out of soldiering. "Their service was anything but temporary; they often served for many years, got married and lived as regular people in the garrison towns in which they were stationed."[16]

Secondly, it is inaccurate to refer to the Dutch army exclusively as an army of foreign soldiers. Although, relatively speaking, the Dutch employed more foreign soldiers than most other countries in early modern Europe, the majority of soldiers were Dutch and not foreign. In the year 1635, for example, the overall strength of the Dutch army was 79,245 soldiers; there were 228 foreign companies comprising 31,690 soldiers and 322 Dutch companies of 47,555 soldiers.[17] Relatively speaking, the foreign soldiers comprised roughly forty percent of the Dutch army, while the percentage of Dutch troops in the Dutch army was sixty percent. Additionally, the usage of foreign soldiers was a widespread practice not only limited to the Dutch Republic, but also existed in other European states and the Ottoman Empire.[18]

Thirdly, and finally, the lack of a military tradition and the fact that the dominating mercantile elite preferred trade to war, is too convenient to be used as the only explanation for the use of foreign soldiers. Although Dutch military expansion on the continent was to be neglected, expansion overseas certainly was not, and the Dutch were just as aggressive as other European powers, for example, Louis XIV or Frederick the Great.[19] For a long period, the Dutch employed a large amount of troops when compared to the small size of the Republic. For example, in the year 1629, the total strength of the Dutch army numbered around 71,000

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[15] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 15.
[16] M. Prak, *Gouden Eeuw: het Raadsel van de Republiek* (Nijmegen 2000), p. 81.
[17] F. Ten Raa and F. De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, vol 4 (Breda 1911-1921), p. 221.
[18] R. Murphy, *Ottoman warfare, 1500-1700*, p. 133 (London 1999).
[19] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 54.

troops in February and grew to an astonishing 128,000 by July.[20]

According to Zwitzer, the supposedly pacifist mentality of the Dutch Republic cannot be used as the only valid argument to explain why they employed so many foreign soldiers. Although he agrees, for example, with Huizinga that a strong military tradition is not part of the Dutch heritage, he does not agree with some of the conclusions drawn by those historians who have made such claims. Rather, Zwitzer posits that the real reason behind the employment of such a large number of foreign soldiers by the Dutch State was more a result of demographic and economic factors.[21] Caught up in incessant warfare, the Dutch nation simply lacked the population necessary to supply its armies and navies. Around the year 1600, the Dutch population was estimated at between 1.4 and 1.6 million, a figure that would only slowly rise to 2.07 million by 1795. This, and the possibility of a large supply of foreign soldiers (and more importantly, the financial means of recruiting and maintaining them) is, in Zwitzer's opinion, the real reason why the Dutch State employed so many foreign soldiers.[22]

Besides the tenacity of the belief in the myth of the Republic as a pacifist merchant state, there has also been a stubborn emphasis on the Dutch navy and, in particular, on the Dutch East India Company. Dutch overseas expansion appealed more to the collective Dutch imagination than struggles in the southern parts of the Dutch Republic and in the Spanish (later Austrian) Netherlands. V.G. Kiernan says in his article on foreign mercenaries, that it was in sea fighting that Dutch glory was won[23]. Kiernan quotes Pieter Geyl's statement that, with the exception of the heroic defence of some besieged towns, "the warfare on land, with the foreign auxiliaries, the innumerable foreigners even in the States' pay, the foreign noblemen surrounding the princely commander, could never create a really national tradition – not during the whole period of the Republic's existence."[24] The importance placed on the Dutch navy as the national element within Dutch history, and the overall negligence of the Dutch army, is an unfortunate shortcoming. In the 17th century, the Dutch army was by far the biggest employer. The Dutch East Indies Company in 1625 had about 8000 people on their

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[20] H. Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648', in: G. G. Simpson (ed.), *Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124-1994* (Edinburgh 1996), table 1, p. 116.
[21] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 61.
[22] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 59.
[23] V. Kiernan, 'Foreign mercenaries and absolute monarchy', in: T. Aston (ed.) *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660* (London 1969), p. 128.
[24] Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1609* (London 1932), p. 107-117.

payroll, a number that was not even a quarter of the total army strength.[25] Furthermore, the "national" element of the Dutch navy (both military and commercial) was just as strongly undermined by the numerous foreigners who were employed as sailors as was in the army.[26]

An important aspect of the research concerning the Dutch army is the role that Dutch military changes played in the so-called Military Revolution. The concept of a military revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries was first examined by Michael Roberts in his inaugural lecture, entitled 'The military revolution 1560-1660' at Queen's University, Belfast in 1955.[27] Roberts' thesis was based on the idea that military developments in the following century, from 1660 to 1760, were of considerably less importance, and that only with the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars in 1792 would the pace of military change again accelerate. The main idea of Roberts' thesis was that at the end of the 16th century, the various technological and tactical changes required larger armies and more permanent state military forces. According to Roberts, the changes in tactics and strategy, the scale of warfare and its impact upon society, all of which had their origins in the United Provinces at the end of the 16th century and culminated in the Sweden of Gustaphus Adolphus were to be seen as 'revolutionary'.[28] According to Geoffrey Parker, there were four changes in warfare during this period which can be singled out as critical.

Firstly, there was a 'revolution in tactics', as represented by the replacement of the lance and pike by the arrow and musket. Secondly, and related to this development, was the considerable growth in army size. Thirdly, the increasing adoption of complex strategies designed to bring these larger armies into action. Finally, the impact these military changes had on society, since the increase in army size led inevitably to the construction of a larger administrative apparatus in order to control the logistics of the army.[29]

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[25] M. Prak, *Gouden Eeuw*, p. 81.
[26] A prime example of research done on foreign sailors working on the Dutch fleet is the book of J. Lucassen and J.R. de Bruijn, *Zeevarenden, Maritieme geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (Bussum 1976-1978).
[27] G. Parker, *The military revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge 1988), p. 1.
[28] J. Black, *A military revolution? Military change and European society 1550-1800* (Basingstoke 1991), p. 2.
[29] Ibid; Parker, *The military revolution*, p. 2.

A very crucial part of Roberts' theory was based on the tactical changes within the Dutch army that were conceived by Prince Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625) and his cousin Count William Louis of Nassau (1560-1620) in the 1590s. The improvements were both technical

and professional. The most important change ascribed to these two figures was probably the development of continuous firepower and the so-called 'Counter March'. William Louis of Nassau first suggested the counter march to his cousin in a letter written on the 8th of December 1594. William argued that six rotating ranks of musketeers could provide continuous fire at the front of the formation. In the event, ten ranks were initially needed to maintain constant fire. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden managed to improve this technique so that six ranks of musketeers sufficed.[30] In a counter march, when the first rank of musketeers had fired their volley, they would retreat to the rear and reload while the following ranks came forward and, in turn, fired their weapons. The development of continuous fire had, according to Parker, a major impact on 16th and 17th century warfare. Where earlier the battlefield was reasonably limited and armies were packed together, now they needed to spread out during battle, "both to maximize the effects of outgoing fire and to minimize the target for incoming fire."[31]

The complexities of the counter march required a new kind of military training in which the emphasis was placed upon discipline and speed. "The variable of continuous firepower was made a function of a fixed relationship between the individual's use of his assigned weapon and the commander's control of his company."[32] The training was facilitated, in 1599, by the States General, who agreed to provide funds to equip their entire field army with weapons of the same size and calibre. In order to match the resources available to finance them, it was important to reduce the size of companies (from 200 to 150 for the *company colonelle*[33] and from 100 to 70 for standard companies). Another important development was the publication of one of the first manuals of arms, the *Wapenhandelinghe* (Exercise of Arms) in 1607, by

[30] Parker, *The military revolution*, p. 19.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Feld, 'Military professionalism', p. 425.
[33] The company colonelle, or the colonel's company was the company that stood under the direct command of the colonel, who acted as the captain. It often included young men of noble birth who wanted the study the art of warfare.

Jacob de Gheyn[34]. The manual, primarily used as an instruction manual, is exceptional in its systematic nature.

Besides the tactical changes and the increasing uniformity of the Dutch army, another important alteration concerned the regulation of payment. The States General decided to supervise the execution of the changes applied to the army through a commissar-like agency of field deputies. As a result, the civil government became more involved in the conduct of war. According to Feld, the immediate effects were twofold. Firstly, the size of the army was brought into line with the resources of the state. The fiscal system was reformed to place military financing on a firm footing. Soldiers could expect year-round employment and regular payment. Secondly, the terms of service were no longer tied to the duration of a particular campaign, but rather to the upkeep of a standing army.

Jeremy Black has criticized Roberts' thesis on two points. Firstly, the emphasis on the period between 1560 and 1660 reduces the catalytic role of previous centuries, and secondly, the situation in the last decades of the 17th century hardly suggests that the revolution was over.[35] Furthermore, Black argues that, with regard to the concept of the "military revolution", excessive emphasis has been placed on the Dutch Republic. Victory normally went to the largest army and the more experienced force, instead of to the army that had adopted Dutch-style tactics. For example, at the battle of Breitenfeld (September 1631), the Saxons adopted Dutch tactics of small units deployed in narrow formations, but ran away when the Austrian army attacked.[36] Gustavus Adolphus, who had changed the Dutch counter-march from a defensive tactic into an offensive one, frequently used the newly developed technique, but because the Swedish army often was numerically superior to its opponent, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent the newly developed tactics helped Gustavus to achieve his victories.[37]

Geoffrey Parker, though generally agreeing with Roberts, differs from the latter to the extent that he believes Roberts is wrong to see only the Dutch and the Swedes as progressive. Parker

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[34] Jacob de Gheyn, *The Exercise of Armes*, with commentary by J.B. Kist (New York McGraw-Hill 1971).
[35] Black, *A military revolution?*, p. 8.
[36] Black, *A military revolution?*, p. 12.
[37] At the battle of Breitenfeld, the Swedish army for example, numbered 28.000 infantry, 13.000 cavalry and 51 heavy guns, while the Imperial army under the command of Count Tilly "only" had 21.400 infantry, 10.000 cavalry and 27 field guns.

says that the Spanish army in Flanders was in fact one of the most modern armies in Europe at the time. He suggests that the period described by Roberts should be extented back to the 15th century, when the use of gunpowder required a change in fortifications. The stronger fortifications, in turn, forced the offensive army to a siege with elaborate blockades, and thus to employ larger armies.[38] The heartland of the "military revolution" was, therefore, concentrated in those countries where the *trace italienne* (the new method of fortifications) was present, namely Italy, the lands of the Habsburgs, France and the Netherlands.

It is impossible and inappropriate to discuss in this thesis the entire problem of the "military revolution"[39]. Whether there was or was not a military revolution in Europe and in the Republic of the United Provinces is not directly relevant to this research. It is important, however, to realise that, whether revolutionary or not, there were important changes in the Dutch army in the early 17th century, changes that helped to transform the army from a more or less ragtag collection of mercenary soldiers into a professional standing army. Compared to the late 16th century, the Dutch army had considerably expanded and the demand for foreign soldiers kept steadily increasing over the decades. When the demand for more foreign soldiers increased during the middle of the 17th century, the influx of foreign soldiers to the Dutch Republic increased accordingly. Although, percentage wise, there was little change between the end of the 16th century and the middle of the 17th century, in absolute terms there was without doubt a strong increase. In 1599, for example, there were 1,500 Scottish soldiers employed by the States General, comprising four percent of the total army's strength. In 1636, the number of Scottish soldiers was 3,000, but the total number of the Dutch army was at that time 70,000, a relative increase of a mere 0.2%.[40] The absolute increase is also evident from the warrants issued by the Privy Council of Scotland between 1624 and 1637, permitting the recruitment of 41,000 Scots for military service on the continent.

The Dutch Republic had a reputation for being a migrant society, embracing various groups of migrants: Sephardic Jews from Portugal and Spain, Ashkenazim Jews from Poland, French Huguenots, Swiss pikemen, and labourers from the German Empire. The Dutch army played a

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[38] Black, *A military revolution?*, p. 5.
[39] For more detailed information on the Military Revolution and the Dutch army see O. van Nimwegen, 'Het Staatse leger en de Militaire Revolutie van de vroegmoderne tijd' in: *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol. 4 (2003), pp. 118.
[40] H. Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 116, table 1.

vital role as a motivation for migrant groups to come to the Dutch Republic. Together with the navy, the army was one the biggest employers of foreign groups. It is important, however, to

take the army out of the context of the standard military history of tactics, battles and sieges. The army was more than anything a way of life, not separate from civil society but interacting with it.

The aim of this dissertation is to look at the social history of Dutch warfare by focussing on the presence of Scottish soldiers in the Dutch army. By studying the Scottish soldier, many important concepts come to the fore. Issues such as cultural identity, political autonomy, authority, international diplomacy and social interaction are but a few of the aspects involved in this research. The reason for the focus on Scottish soldiers, despite their relatively small numbers and the presence of numerous other nationalities in the Dutch army, is that these soldiers represent a particularly fascinating group of foreign soldiers in the Dutch Republic. The Scots were unique compared to other foreign soldiers in the fact that they served almost continuously for more than two centuries in the Dutch army. Like no other foreign group, they were placed in their own specific military and cultural environment, while at the same time interacting successfully with Dutch society. This interaction with the Dutch State took place not only between a foreign group and the indigenous society, but, due to the special system of garrison towns where soldiers were closely situated to civilians, also between the military and the civilian. The presence of soldiers in these garrison towns often provided the civil community with the possibility of cheap labour.

The particular difficulty of this theme is that it touches on many complex issues and is multi-levelled. Aside from matters such as the regulation of payment, the order of command in the Scots Brigade, military discipline, promotion, pension, desertion and military discontent, other topics of equal importance must be examined in order to understand fully the position of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic. The role of Great Britain as a recruiting ground, for example, but also the relationship with the British government regarding the authority of the Scottish troops, are both crucial for the construction of a more complete picture of the Scots Brigade. Additionally, one has to look at the individual Scottish soldier and his relation to his officers, the army in general, as well as his contacts with Dutch society. Did the Scottish soldier intermarry with Dutch women? Was there a form of assimilation? If so, how strong was that assimilation? Finally, the Scottish soldier was stationed in a specific military unit with a unique military identity. How strong did the Scottish soldier associate with a

particular cultural identity? How was this identity expressed within the Dutch Republic and how did the Dutch State respond to it?

The sources that have been consulted for this research regarding Scottish soldiers in Dutch service are very diverse. They include political documents relating to statistical data such as army size and payment, but also pertaining to army regulations and international treaties; diplomatic reports regarding the levying of Scottish troops and international relations; ego-documents such as officers' letters and soldiers' diaries; judicial records regarding criminal offences committed by soldiers; genealogies of Scottish-Dutch families; and records of marriages and baptisms. Many of the Dutch political sources regarding the Scottish soldiers and officers were accumulated and published towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century by James Ferguson in his impressive work on the Scots Dutch Brigade.[41] The sources as published by Ferguson do not, however, yield everything regarding the Scottish soldier. Despite the diversity of the material, much of Ferguson's work is focused on the political aspects of the Scottish soldier. Additionally, Ferguson's approach is not without a certain element of favouritism towards the Scottish soldiers. His discussion of the history of the Scots Brigade is coloured by the political context of his time, at the end of the Victorian age when Great Britain was an empire in which the Scottish martial prowess played an important role. It was clearly Ferguson's goal to promote Scottish culture by focussing on the Scottish military achievements of the past. In this sense, Ferguson can be seen as an extension of the 17th century Whig-tradition.[42] It is therefore important not to regard Ferguson's work as a monograph on the Scots Brigade; rather, his historical exposé should be considered as an illustration and contextualisation of the sources. The main importance of *Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade* is that it is a wide-ranged collection of political sources dealing with the history of the Scots Brigade.

In order to create a more complete picture it was crucial that other (published and non-published) sources were consulted. To this end, both Scottish and Dutch sources have been used. The Scottish sources were mostly located in the National Archive in Edinburgh, or were published sources such as the Records of the Scottish Privy Council, the Calendar of State

[41] J. Ferguson, *Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1782*, vol. I-III (Edinburgh 1899-1901).
[42] For more information on the Whig interpretation of history see chapter 6, p. 177.

Papers and the reports of Venetian ambassadors. For the Dutch sources, a variety of collections in the Algemeen Rijks Archief in the Hague were consulted, and the municipal archives of the garrison towns of Bergen op Zoom and Den Bosch. While it would have been interesting to have had a more in-depth impression of the Scottish infantry soldier, the emphasis of most of the sources has been on the Scottish officer. Concerning the Scottish soldier, the sources reveal little, and often one is left to speculate regarding his position in Dutch society. An important part of the source material is constituted by the marriage lists between Scottish soldiers and officers and Dutch women. Most of this data was taken from the works of Johannes MacLean, who published the marriage lists for the soldiers during the 17th century.[43] The marriage patterns of soldiers during the 18th century relied on Ferguson, who added the marriage lists of the regimental chaplains to his work on the Scots Brigade.[44]

A remarkable feature of the Scottish soldiers, which differentiated them from other nationalities employed by the Dutch, was their official status of being on loan from the British crown. The King of Britain was considered their lawful monarch even though the Dutch authorities were paying for the Scottish troops. This controversy is an important aspect of the first chapter, which focuses on the political relations between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain concerning the political status of the Scottish troops in the Netherlands, whereby issues of conflicting loyalties and the attempts of the British monarchs to exert their influence over the Scottish troops in the Dutch service will be carefully studied. This international dimension in relation to the Scottish troops cannot be clearly examined without taking into account the specific political climate of the two states and their growing national sentiments towards the end of the 18th century. In this context, the problem of a 'national identity' or of 'national awareness' needs to be considered, since it strongly defined the attitude of both states towards each other and towards the Scottish regiments. Since the approach will be predominantly a chronological one, starting with Elizabeth and James I, it will at the same time outline the historical framework of the Brigade.

The international dimension will be continued in the second chapter, which deals with the concept of recruitment and the so-called military labour market. It is concerned only with the Scottish part of the military labour market, but the example of Scotland can be applied to

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[43] J. Mac Lean, *De huwelijksintekeningen van Schotse militairen (1574-1665)* (Zutphen 1976).
[44] Ferguson, *Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade*, vol. III (Edinburgh 1901).

other areas of recruitment, like for example Switzerland. Regarding the question of recruitment, a number of aspects are important. First, the political aspect, as can be identified in the attempts of the British government to control and centralise the levying of soldiers, but also with regard to the international competition and the usage of recruitment licences as a means of political pressure. Second, the individual aspect, for example, what were the motivations of the soldier to join the military service of a foreign nation? Thirdly, the organisational aspect, namely how did the Dutch organise the recruitment in Scotland and how did they regulate the recruitment in the Republic? This final aspect consequentially focuses more closely on the relationship between the Scottish soldiers and their Dutch employers.

The third chapter looks closer at the relation between the Dutch state and the Scottish regiments and, more precisely, the position of the Scottish regiments within the Dutch state army. However, in order to fully comprehend the particular relationship between the Dutch state and the Scottish troops, it is important firstly, to reflect upon the structure of the Dutch state and that of the Dutch state army. Because of the complexity of the political structure of the Republic of the United Provinces, it is paramount to establish which political organ was responsible for the army. Who had the highest military command and who took care of the payment? Another important point that has to be considered is the clear change in tactics and the organisation of the military during the course of the 17th century. Payments became more regular and on frequent intervals pamphlets were published with new regulations regarding the behaviour of soldiers both in relation to each other and to the civil population. For example, in the 17th century, duelling became strongly forbidden and was susceptible to severe punishment.

Despite better payment and stricter regulations on military discipline, however, the army remained far from perfect and many difficulties continued to exist. While some of these conflicts were internal and affected only the military unit, many other conflicts could potentially pose a threat to the civil structure. Chapter four deals in particular with the difficulties of army life. Bad payment, severe discipline, extreme living conditions and a high death rate, all took their toll on the soldiers, as can be seen from the frequent examples of desertions during the Eighties Years War. With the arrival of a more organised payment system, the number of desertions declined, but nevertheless remained high. However, desertion was not the only form of military discontent. Tension could run high among soldiers

and officers, resulting in cases of insubordination and sometimes of murder. Such incidents were not exclusively between soldiers and officers; within the officer class, tensions could rise equally high, as can be seen from the example of General Dundas and Colonel Bentinck.[45]

Many problems that appeared to be exclusive to the military unit could also have consequences for the Dutch state and their relation with the Scottish regiments. Mutiny, for example, did not only threaten the integrity of the military unit, but was consequentially a potential threat to the town in which the unit was stationed. Other examples of military discontent, like treason and betrayal, posed an even greater threat to the integrity of the Dutch state, given that Scottish officers had in the past sold Dutch towns to the Spanish.

Some of the examples of military discontent are more personal and posed a lesser threat to the integrity of the Dutch state. A few of Scottish officers came into direct conflict with the Dutch state regarding certain matters such as payment in arrears, denied promotions or refused commissions. These issues concerned mostly higher officers who would appeal to the Dutch States General. On occasion, they would appeal to Scottish or English authorities to intercede on their behalf. Because in these conflicts the initiative came from the Scottish officers and not from the British government, and they were thus personal conflicts with the Dutch state, I have decided to discuss these issues in the chapter on military discontent, despite the fact that British authorities from time to time interfered with the Dutch authorities. When the initiative came from the British side, as for example with the interferences of Charles I and James I on behalf of some Scottish officers, they can be considered as state interference, and therefore as a matter between Britain and the Dutch Republic.

In the fifth chapter, the relation between Scottish soldiers and the Dutch civilian population is discussed. The fact that most Scottish soldiers were stationed in garrison towns, and as such were strongly exposed to a civilian environment, makes the idea of a civil-military interaction particularly interesting. During the course of the chapter, it will be argued that despite the apparent differences in behaviour and social norms between the two social groups, this did not always imply that a conflictual situation would arise. According to the sources, it can be concluded that often there was a form of carefully constructed symbiosis between the two

[45] See chapter four, p. 115.

groups, whereby both groups could benefit from each other. Of course, there were also as many examples of civil-military clashes not only on an individual level, but also on a political level, where municipal authorities clashed with the military on matters such as jurisdiction and political control. In some cases, as with the example of Governor John Kirkpatrick, it becomes evident how the two groups could oppose each other. When there was a conflict of that nature, one of the parties (often the civil one) would refer to the higher political organs, such as the Council of State or the States General, in order to resolve the conflict.

Even though the idea of a distinct identity must be treated cautiously, it becomes clear from the sources that there was most certainly a number of cultural characteristics that separated the Scottish soldiers from the rest of Dutch society. In the sixth chapter of the thesis, it is proposed that this phenomenon of a particular Scottish military identity in the Dutch Republic was part of a larger perspective related to Scottish national awareness. Additionally, two important distinctions have to be made. First, this research on Scottish identity in the Republic of the United Provinces is only concerned with that of the Scottish soldiers and officers, not that of the intellectual and mercantile communities in the Dutch Republic. Of course, these groups are strongly related to each other and cannot be seen as completely separate, but in order to create some form of structure, it has been decided to focus only on the Scottish identity of the soldiers stationed in the Dutch Republic. Second, it is important to be aware of the fact that while the Scottish soldier was part of his primary group formation, that is the Brigade, regiment or company, the features responsible for the creation of a group identity do not necessarily have to correspond to the notions of an individual identity. In other words, social identity may be a collective phenomenon, but it is at the same time very much a personal and individual experience.

The final chapter completes the social acculturation process of the Scottish soldier in the Republic of the United Provinces and clearly shows his ambiguous position. While many soldiers married Dutch women -a trend that is clearly shown by the marriage records- rather than women of other nationalities, it did not necessarily imply that the Scottish soldier was wholly integrated into Dutch society. Often the soldiers who were active in the Brigade retained a strong element of their Scottish identity. The Scots Brigade remained until the end a bastion of Scottish military identity, a fact underlined by the recurring presence of Scottish officers of the same family in the Scottish regiments. Nevertheless, the Scottish Dutch families that are discussed towards the end of the chapter also demonstrate that many

Scotsmen were not exclusively concentrated in the Scots Brigade, but that a number of them managed to gain high Dutch (political) offices. Overall, from an analysis of these families it can be concluded that the national differences between 'Scots' and 'Dutch' were not as distinctive as the social differences in status and class. In other words, while in the marriage reports there was a high percentage of Scottish-Dutch marriages, they are invariably between people of the same social status. An additional factor of importance was the social network in the Brigade, which played an important part in the Scottish-Dutch interaction, whereby, for example, Scottish soldiers would often marry Dutch widows of other Scottish soldiers.

Chapter 1 "Whom do you serve?" The question of authority regarding the Scots Brigade

The involvement of the Scottish soldiers with the Dutch Republic began approximately in 1572, when Scottish soldiers assisted the besieged town of Haarlem against the Spanish army. This is probably the earliest report of Scottish fighting for the Dutch, but it is not unlikely that before that date individual mercenaries had been seeking Dutch service. The history of the Scots Brigade in the service of the Dutch Republic cannot be discussed, however, without examining its broader international context. Even though the Brigade was a permanent element in the army of the Republic of the United Provinces, it was at the same time still rooted in the British Isles. The Stuart monarchs considered the Scottish soldiers to be their subjects and many of the Scottish soldiers and officers in the Republic thought along the same lines. This despite the fact that most of them were living, fighting and dying in a non-Scottish state, were paid by that state, married Dutch women and were in many ways part of the culture of the 17th and 18th century Dutch Republic.

Officially, Scottish troops were on loan, paid for by the Dutch state, but belonging to the Stuart and Hanoverian monarch. This proved to be a complicated situation, since the Dutch authorities also demanded complete loyalty of these troops. This resulted in the fact that an officer was forced to take several different oaths of loyalty. First, to his rightful (Scottish and later British) monarch, then to the States General and the Prince of Orange, followed by his commanding officer and the governor of the town where he was stationed. While these were the official declarations on paper, it is interesting to see how this divided loyalty was actually expressed in practice. Were the Scottish troops truly merely a loan that could be recalled whenever their monarch desired, or was this idea of a loan more a formality between two governments, which the Dutch government could ignore when it did not suit them? How did the Scottish soldier and officer view this situation? Was he aware of the dual nature of his loyalty? Additionally, how did the authorities in London express their control over the Brigade? These issues form the central focus of this chapter, which will be enhanced by examples of Stuart and Hanoverian monarchs who occasionally attempted to exert their influence over the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Republic and, as a result, tried to interfere with Dutch policy regarding these regiments. In this context, it is paramount that the official

reactions of the Dutch government are also discussed. For the Dutch, it was clear that when the wishes of the English and later British[46] authorities interfered with, or were not in line with, Dutch policy, the request of the Stuart and Hanoverian monarch could be ignored, albeit in the most polite fashion. As a result, this relationship between the British Isles and the Dutch Republic regarding the Scots Brigade proves also to be an interesting example of international politics and diplomacy.

It would go too far to claim that the Scots in the Dutch Republic could be interpretated as a tool of influence for the English (and later British) government. The Brigade was not large enough to be of major diplomatic and political importance. However, despite the small number of soldiers involved, the fact remains that Scottish soldiers formed an important part of the Dutch army, and the Dutch relied heavily on them in combat situations. The frequent levying of troops in Scotland and the high casualty rate of the Scottish companies, only further contributed to this notion. If the Stuart and Hanoverian authorities did not use the Scots as a way to influence the Dutch directly, the soldiers could nevertheless be used as a means of pressure: by refusing recruitment in Scotland, the authorities in London could severely complicate matters for the Dutch. This situation was particularly apparent in the 17th century, when the Stuarts walked a thin line between appeasing the house of Habsburg and the protestant states. It seemed that the Stuarts (and later the British government) also tried to exert their influence over Scottish troops in the Dutch Republic to make it clear to the Dutch government that these troops, in the end, still belonged to the Stuart crown.

There are, in this respect, significant differences between the two countries regarding the 17th and 18th centuries. The international involvement of Great Britain in the 18th century was far more extensive than that of the Dutch Republic. Except for two wars, the 18th century could be seen as a period of relative peace and stability for the Republic, it was, however, an age of expansion for Great Britain. For Scottish soldiers stationed in the Netherlands this was a complicated situation; they were assigned to watch duty in the Low Countries, while their own monarch had great need of their fighting capabilities. Did these growing differences between the 17th and 18th century also reflect on the relationship between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain in the 18th century?

[46] The term "British" as it is used in a political context can only be applied after the Union of Parliament in 1707 when Scotland and England formed a political unity.

Elizabethan involvement

To understand the attitude of the Stuarts and the British government towards the Scottish troops in the Dutch Republic, it is crucial to retrace the origins of the Brigade. During the first stages of the Eighty Years War, the still unformed Dutch Republic was desperate for foreign troops to withstand the Habsburg onslaught. The Dutch provinces looked for foreign patrons like France and England to aid them in their struggle. Despite the fact that neither monarchies were very keen on getting too involved in the potentially dangerous situation taking place in the Low Countries, both aided (albeit indirectly) the rebel provinces. Elizabeth's main motive was (besides a shared religious conviction) to prevent Spain from gaining too much influence in Europe. Although she did not openly interfere with the situation across the Channel until 1585 -after the fall of Antwerp- she had much earlier allowed English soldiers to assist the Dutch in their struggle. Elizabeth, in turn, looked to the Scottish to assist her in her support for the Protestant cause. Before James VI started to play an active role in Scottish politics[47], Elizabeth's strongest ally in her overseas policy was James Douglas, the fourth Earl of Morton, who was elected regent in 1572[48]. In exchange for financial and military aid, Elizabeth received the unconditional support of Morton, which included the sending of Scottish troops to the Low Countries. When James VI began to assume control in the 1580s, a similar, if more strenuous, relationship between England and Scotland was established. This time though, the incentive was more personal. Since Elizabeth had no offspring of her own, her only direct successor was James Stuart, who strongly desired to ascend the English throne. During her reign, Elizabeth managed to dangle this potential future in front of James as a carrot in front of a donkey, ensuring his support in international affairs. As King of Scotland, James allowed Scottish troops to serve in the Dutch Republic, but at the same time he also tried to demonstrate his authority over these troops.

In 1588, a Scottish colonel by the name of William Stewart made several claims to the States General regarding payments due to him that were in arrears. James supported the cause of

[47] James ascended to the Scottish throne in 1569, when he was thirteen months old.
[48] R. Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces in the Revolt of the Netherlands and Anglo Scottish relations 1566-1609*, M.Litt thesis, (Aberdeen 1989), p. 9.

Colonel Stewart and requested that the States pay the Colonel. Instead of replying to James, the Dutch authorities asked Elizabeth to act as a mediator in the matter. The States expressed in clear terms that they objected to *"the unjust reprisals threatened by the King of Scots for Colonel Stuwardt"* and that they desired *"Walsingham to peruse their memorial and impart it to her Majesty and her Council, so that a speedy decision may be reached as to whether they are to go themselves, or whether her Majesty will write effectually on their behalf to the King and secure the cessation of Stuwardt's reprisals."*[49] The letter clearly speaks of threats made by James. While the exact nature of the threat is unknown, it is interesting that the Dutch authorities addressed Elizabeth in the matter as the one who could solve the issue. Apparently, Elizabeth's influence over James was also known in the Dutch Republic. However, when Elizabeth died and James ascended the English throne in 1603, James was no longer forced to be compliant to the wishes of the Dutch Republic.

James attitude towards the Dutch Republic

Although James's attitude towards the Dutch government grew considerably colder after 1603, he allowed the Scottish troops serving the States to remain there. This was not an act of generosity on his part, but a result of his lack of political control over these troops. Since Scotland was officially not at war with Spain, they did not openly support the Republic of the United Provinces, and as there were no official treaties between Scotland and the Dutch Republic, the soldiers that entered the war were not controlled by their king. Additionally, James did not seem to have the same weight with the States General that Elizabeth had had. Three examples help to illustrate this.

In 1586, James demanded royal licences for anyone recruiting soldiers in Scotland. Through this scheme, James tried to exert direct control over the Scottish military, whereby he would place himself at the head of an army of Scottish mercenaries *"for 'special caussis' which the King himself deemed worthy of Scottish military intervention."*[50] Although James, after 1587, controlled the licences of all the Scottish soldiers on paper, in reality he held little influence

[49] L. Voocht and J. Ortell to Walsingham, London, 28 October 1588, in: *Calendar of State Papers, foreign series of the reign of Elizabeth, 1588* ed. R. Bruce Wernham (1936), p. 285.
[50] Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces*, p. 62.

over his troops and levying continued as before. Moreover, many of the soldiers that went to fight in the wars in the Low Countries did so of their own accord, without an official licence from their monarch. James often ignored this practice, as demonstrated by the following example. After the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600, Scottish troops in the Netherlands were decimated and Colonel Edmond was send to Scotland to levy new troops for his regiment.[51] Edmond brought approximately eight hundred soldiers to the Netherlands, although there was no official licence granted for the recruitment. When an English agent by the name of George Nichollson commented to James on the levying of six hundred men with a Royal licence, which went to fight in the Low Countries, James hardly responded.[52] Since it was so difficult to control the levying of Scottish soldiers, James seemed not to be against this form of military migration, as long as it remained voluntary and was conducted quietly. This ambiguous policy, however, did not help to improve James's authority and influence over the Scottish troops fighting abroad.

A second attempt by James to control his military forces abroad was made in 1592 when he appointed Bartholomew Balfour[53] as the commanding officer of Scottish forces in the Dutch Republic. In a resolution from the States General, the States asked Colonel Balfour "*whether he held any commission from the King of Scotland to assume here in this Land command of the Scottish companies. He declared that it would not be his first commission of that kind, that he has had other commissions and appointments from His Majesty in Scotland.*"[54] For the States General, it was an impossible idea that a Scottish officer in their service also had commissions granted to him by another authority, even if this authority was his rightful sovereign. The States responded that he "*cannot serve in this country except on the commission of their Highnesses the States General; that he must therefore declare whether he will serve on the commission of same and no other, or not.*" Additionally, the States General handed a written explanation to the Scottish emissary "*giving the reasons why it can't be thought of, that the said Colonel should serve in these Lands with such said commission from the King.*" [55] The Dutch government had made it perfectly clear to James that a Scottish

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[51] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 32.
[52] Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces*, p. 80.
[53] See also chapter four.
[54] Resolutions of the States General 1592, December 18, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 107.
[55] Resolutions of the States General 1592, December 18, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 108.

officer in the service of the States could not serve under any other commission than that of the States General.

The final example dates from 1604 and is along the same lines as the previous one. In 1603, James had allowed an extra regiment to be levied for Dutch service under the command of the Lord of Buccleuch. He also gave the Lord of Buccleuch a commission as general over the Scottish soldiers stationed in the Dutch Republic. The attitude of the States towards Stuart interference remained unchanged; in a resolution of the States General of 5 April 1604 the States declared "*...that the said request of generalship is a novelty, never previously put into practice, and that they could not consent to it without making an opening for all the other nations in the Lands' service to ask in like manner for a general.*" The States General also distinctively conveyed the message that the Lord of Buccleuch should desist in future "*from seeking said generalship, and accept his commission as colonel.*"[56] The official reasoning of the Dutch authorities -the fact that they would have to allow other nationalities in their service the same privilege- could not hide their true motive, that if they accepted his request, James would have direct control over the Scottish forces in the Dutch Republic, a situation that the Dutch could not allow to happen. Despite James's generosity in allowing an extra regiment to be levied in Scotland for Dutch service, he had at the same instant lost direct control over these troops in the Netherlands.[57]

Shurmer correlates the failure of James to exert proper influence over Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic with the fact that Scottish soldiers sought Dutch service on a voluntary basis, and that Scotland was never officially at war with Spain. Therefore, James could not withdraw these soldiers by treaty or by halting the funds.[58] Furthermore, Scottish soldiers who were placed within the Scottish regiments in the Dutch army were never paid by the Stuarts. From the beginning of their service, the Dutch State had been responsible for their payment. As a result, the Dutch State regarded Scottish troops to a large extent as their own: Scottish soldiers and officers were required to take a direct oath to the States General and to the Prince of Orange and the States General appointed new officers' commissions and decided who was to be promoted or dismissed. During the course of the 17th century, the Dutch State began to consider the Scottish regiments more and more as their own responsibility, and as a

[56] Resolutions of the States General 1 April 1604, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 192-193.
[57] Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces*, p. 82.
[58] Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces*, p. 86.

permanent part of the Dutch army. Consequently, when their authority clashed with that of a Stuart monarch, they had no difficulty in abiding by their own rules.

The problem of authority in the 17th century

Like his father, James I, had done before him, Charles I sometimes acted as the supporter of his Scottish subjects with the States General. He was the sovereign and patron of his officers and could request privileges on behalf of his subjects from the Dutch authorities. On the 3rd of July 1626, the States General received a missive from Charles and from the Duke of Buckingham stating that the Earl of Buccleuch, serving in the Dutch Republic should receive the regiment of his father the Lord of Buccleuch plus two thousand guilders yearly.[59] This was not a spontaneous act from Charles; he merely stressed a decision taken by the States General in the previous year, wherein it was stated that the Earl would receive the regiment of his father.[60] In 1632, Charles recommended another officer to the States General by the name of George Stuart, Lord d'Aubigny. Charles asked the States to give Lord d'Aubigny the command of a company of grenadiers previously belonging to Sir William Urrie.[61]

In 1627, another incident arose that could not be defined as a direct confrontation between the Dutch States and England, but that serves as a good example of the attitude of the two nations regarding the position of Scottish officers serving in the Dutch Republic. Charles I requested in that year the service of Captain William Balfour and the use of a cavalry company which was to be levied in the Dutch Republic. Balfour was supposed to take responsibility for the levying of the cavalry company. The tone of the request was cordia but straightforward, and Charles had no doubt that the States would comply with his request: "*L'asseurance que Nous avons en vostre bonne affection envers Nous, Nous fait espérer que Vous Nous en rendrez cette nouvelle prevue, et qu'en suite il vous plaira, comme Vous Nous en prions tres affectueusement, de continuer le dit Sieur Balfore, un des premiers gentilshomes de nostre chamber privée, en la charge et solde qu'il a soubs vous, et de vouloir estimer que son*

[59] Resolutions of the States General, 3 July 1626, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 383.
[60] For the full details of this incident, see chapter four: p. 133-134.
[61] Letter from Charles I to the States General, 5 April 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 443.

absence et le service qu'il Nous rendra, moyennant la Grace de Dieu, sera comme si c'estoit pour le service de vostre Estat."[62] Four days later the King also requested that Balfour brought a company of harquebusiers.

However, as had been the case with James I, the States did not comply with the King's wishes. Their first reply was that another cavalry company would be placed at the disposal of the Charles I, but "*as the officers have received orders to be with their companies on April 1st, that therefore the permission requested for Captain Balfour to raise a company of harquebusiers and go with it to England must be refused.*"[63] Charles was not satisfied and continued requesting the service of William Balfour, his tone remaining cordial and polite. "*Nous ne faisons point difficulté de vous communiqués le besoin que nous avons de quelqu'un de noz subiets qui sont a vostre solde, lors que les occasions de noz affaires le requierent, et ayant pour le present suiet d'employer nostre feal et bien amé Guillaume Balfore en un service qui nous importe et auquel son experience, capacité et debuoir envers Nous, rend le choix que Nous faisons de sa personne fort considerable.*"[64] In this request, the position of the Scottish officer in the Dutch Republic is made quite clear: Guillaume Balfore, although paid by the States General, was a subject of the King of Britain. Therefore, Charles was within his right to request the service of Balfour, albeit in a polite way.

The States did not reach a decision and the matter was postponed until March of the following year, when another request came from Charles which concerned once more the levying of troops by Balfour in the Dutch Republic. This time, the States replied almost immediately and told Charles that it was in conflict with the constitution of the Dutch Republic to allow any foreign levies on Dutch soil, because the Dutch Republic had a strong need for these troops. Additionally, they could not allow Balfour to leave for such a long period because of the "*stringent resolution regarding absent officers*". However, if Charles wanted to employ Balfour, the States General would not prevent Balfour from leaving Dutch service.[65] The States inquired whether Balfour wished to terminate his service with the States, whereupon

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[62] Letter from Charles I to the States, Westminster 2 February 1627, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 369.
[63] Resolutions of the States General, 30 March 1627, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 370.
[64] Letter from Charles I to the States, Bagshott, 20 August 1627, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 371.
[65] Resolutions of the States General, 2 March 1628, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 372.

Balfour declared that he wanted a leave of three or four months to find out the intentions of Charles, and "*whether he wishes to keep him or permit him to remain here.*"[66]

In the end, Balfour made a decision. He declared that he had to obey his king regarding the levying of cavalry. However, he expressed the hope that the States General would take into account the services he had preformed for the Dutch Republic both within and outside its borders, and that they would not deprive him of his company without recompense.[67] The States answered that "*their High Mightinesses would prefer that he should continue in the service of this country, but that they do not wish now to prevent him from entering the service of His Majesty, and promising him that if he should have occasion hereafter to return, his good qualities and the services rendered by him would be taken into very earnest and favourable consideration.*"[68]

Despite the two powers that were involved here (that of the Stuart monarch and that of the Dutch Republic) it was in the end the individual who made the decision. He stated his loyalties. The States had some means of pressure, like forfeiture of a commission or a possible pension, but the officer was within his rights to terminate the contract. The monarch, on the other hand, had little means to enforce his authority besides applying diplomatic pressure on the Dutch government.

In the case of William Balfour, the situation was not that grave. Charles remained polite throughout the entire process, and the States likewise tried to resolve the matter as best they could, most likely because the consequences were not that severe for the Dutch authorities. In the end, it concerned the departure of only one officer. Other cases, though, prove that this attitude did not always prevail, and when the stakes were higher, the English and Dutch authorities could be less compliant.

An important occurrence in the relationship between Charles and the States regarding the Scottish troops was the war between Scotland and England[69]. Charles's autocratic behaviour in imposing the Anglican Church with its system of bishops on the Presbyterian Scottish

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[66] Ibid.
[67] Resolutions of the States General, 17 March 1628, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 374.
[68] Ibid.
[69] The Bishop Wars (1639-1640).

society was, for many Scots, a reason to withstand their rightful monarch. This also affected Scottish soldiers in Dutch service, some of whom returned to British Isles to fight either for or against Charles. The Venetian ambassador in The Hague, Gieronimo Giustinian, commented that "*A good number of the officers here, both English and Scots, are asking permission to return to their native country...The prince resigns himself to this most unwillingly, as by such means he sees a considerable number of his tried military leaders disappearing.*"[70]

Despite the fact that this occurrence was unfortunate for the Dutch authorities, the real problem began when Charles started making demands concerning the Scots in the Dutch Republic. It was one of the first attempts by a English monarch to interfere directly in Dutch affairs. Strangely enough, it did not concern the Scottish soldiers and officers stationed in the Republic, but the Scottish trade community of Rotterdam. The incident is reported by the Venetian ambassador in The Hague and provides a revealing insight into Anglo-Dutch relations. The States General was informed by the English resident that the Scots had been declared rebels by Charles and that, because of the friendly relations between the Dutch Republic and the English government, the States General should forbid any trade with the Scots and disrupt the Scottish staple market in Rotterdam. According to Giustinian, the States General did not intend to comply with the King's wishes *"since it means cutting the throat of a well established trade which brings a considerable benefit to the people here for the disposal of their cloth."* Gieronimo stated that the Dutch government was stalling in order to devise "*some excuse or colour to justify their refusal and so to evade the request.*" [71] The refusal of the Dutch States to destroy the trade community of Rotterdam would not be the last time that the Dutch authorities chose not to comply with the wishes of a English monarch.

The matter concerning the refusal of the Dutch to assist Charles in his attempts to defeat his Scottish opponents was more serious than it looked at first sight. The Venetian ambassador in The Hague expressed a concern that Charles was suspecting the Dutch of supporting the Scottish cause by providing them with weapons. "*The king is very uneasy about this, not only because of the way in which the Scots in their acts, have followed the principles of the*

[70] Gieronimo Giustinian, Venetian ambassador at the Hague to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 25 October 1638, in: *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice 1636-1639*, vol. XXIV (London 1923), p. 464-465.
[71] Gieronimo Giustinian, Venetian ambassador at the Hague to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 10 June 1639, in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1636-1639* vol. XXIV (London 1923), p. 547-548.

government here, but also by reason of the tacit connivance shown here in past months over the transport of arms to that kingdom."[72] Furthermore, a Scotsman by the name of Lamb mentioned that at Flushing, 20 to 30 ships were readied for war and were to be manned by "*some discontented Scots and Hollanders*". These ships would attack the English ships as soon as "*any probable act of war might be declared betwixt us (i.e. English) and the Scots.*"[73] Assuming the report to be legitimate it is highly unlikely that the Dutch State would openly defy the English in such a way. The gathering at Flushing must therefore be seen as an individual initiative, without the official consent of the Dutch government. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the Dutch were inclined to support the struggle of the Scottish, as the possibility of the Dutch trading weapons with the rebellious Scots was also mentioned in a letter of the Earl of Traquair to the Marquis of Hamilton, in which he says "*Their [the Covenanters] correspondence with the Hollanders, and the latter's underhand helping and supplying them, is that which has furnished them all they have of ammunition.*"[74]

The situation seemed almost to be a portent of what was to occur between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain a little less than 150 years later. As with the war between Great Britain and her American colonies at the end of the 18th century, the Dutch arms trade profited from the conflict. On both occasions, they supplied the opponents of England. While the conflict between Charles and the Covenanters was not necessarily a war of separation, both the Scottish and the American colonists fought for a form of independence, a struggle that the Dutch could identify with. Nevertheless, the official policy of the Dutch government was not to get involved and to make certain Charles had no reason to go to war with the Republic as George III (1760-1820) would do in 1780.

The first actual hostile confrontation between the two states which directly involved the Scottish regiments in Dutch service occurred with the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665. While the first war (1652-1654) between the Dutch government and the English did not affect the Scottish troops directly due to the fact that, according Scottish opinion, it

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[72] Gieronimo Giustinian, Venetian ambassador at the Hague to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 10 June 1639, in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1636-1639* vol. XXIV (London 1923), p. 547-548.
[73] Mr. Bogan to Secretary Windebank, 26 May 1639, in: *Cal of State Papers, Domestic series, 1639* (ed. W.D. Hamilton) (London 1873), p. 234.
[74] John Earl of Traquair to Marquis of Hamilton, 27 January 1640, in: *Cal of State Papers, Domestic series 1639-1640* (ed. W.D. Hamilton) (London 1877), p. 382.

was waged between a usurper[75] and the Dutch Republic, the second one did. The Second Anglo-Dutch War was a confrontation between England and Scotland under one (Stuart) king and the Republic of the United Provinces. The Scottish troops, being the subjects of Charles II (1660-1685) and on the payroll of the Dutch States, were in a difficult situation. The Dutch resolved the issue by making the English (4) and Scottish (3) regiments Dutch. The majority of the English officers left for England, but most of the Scottish officers stayed behind. A possible explanation was that many of these Scottish officers had been settled in the Dutch Republic for two or three generations and would, as such, have built up social and economic ties with the Netherlands. In 1643, the Venetian secretary in England had already commented when Charles I made a request for the aid of the Scottish and English regiments from the Netherlands, that: "*...I fancy that he (i.e. Charles) will meet with difficulties, not so much in obtaining permission as from the disposition of the men themselves, who are attached to that country by many interests.*"[76]

The Dutch authorities made it very clear that the Scottish soldiers that stayed in the Dutch Republic during the Second Anglo-Dutch War were loyal to the Dutch state. Besides the usual military oath, the officers had to swear a new and "unqualified oath of fidelity to the States"[77], abjuring all foreign authority. The precise conditions of the oath were that the officers had to swear to the effect that "*they were under no obligation to obey, and would not obey any commands except those of the States General, and the States their paymasters, or others indicated in the said oath of fealty, and that they acknowledged none but the States as their sovereign rulers.*"[78] More than ever, the States General made clear with this new oath that there was only one authority over the Scottish troops in the Dutch army. The old controversy of loyalty regarding the Scottish soldiers and officers in Dutch service was consequently nullified.

The new situation, however, was not final and with a new alliance between England and the United Provinces in 1678, the position of the Scottish regiments changed once more. The increased Scottish and newly formed English regiments were combined in one Brigade and

[75] The Scottish considered Cromwell to be a usurper who was responsible for the death of the rightful Stuart monarch. The Cromwellian invasion of Scotland in 1650 only further contributed to fuel the Scottish animosity.
[76] Gerolamo Agostini to the Doge and Senate, London, 13 November 1643 in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian, 1643-1647*, vol. XXVII (London, 1926), p. 39.
[77] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 468.
[78] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xxii.

placed under the command of an officer whose rank, pay and precedence was fixed by the defensive alliance of 1678 that was the sequel to the marriage of William III and Mary Stuart.[79] It was also expressly stipulated that the commanding officer should be a natural subject of the King of England and Scotland.[80] The first commander of the Brigade was the Earl of Ossory who, with the Prince of Orange, had signed the treaty of 1678. After his death in 1680, Charles wanted to appoint George Douglas, the Earl of Dumbarton, as the new commanding officer, but William refused because Dumbarton was a Catholic. The command was then given to Henry Sidney.[81] This incident, together with the fact that the States were still responsible for the payment, implied that despite the new status of the regiments, much remained the same as prior to 1665.

Another important feature of the treaty of 1678 was the so-called 'right of recall'. The English authorities considered the Scottish (and English) troops in Dutch service as part of their own army, and as result, demanded the right to recall these troops when they were required. It was especially this right of recall that proved to be a new point of difficulty between the two States. According to Ferguson, the Dutch refused to recognise this right of recall when the English invoked it. "*When, however, the critical occasion arrived and the king sought to exercise the right of recall in 1688, the States refused to let the regiments go, or to recognise the binding character of the capitulation, founding with some special pleading on what appears to have been a failure on the part of the Dutch government to fully carry out its terms in reference to the increase of pay.*"[82] This refusal is, however, not as straightforward as it seems, especially because the first time the regiments were requested in 1685 as a result of the Monmouth rebellion, William and the States General complied without any difficulties. Hugh Mackay of Scoury, an officer in the Scots Brigade who went with the Scottish regiments to England, received a commission from James II (1685-1688) as a major general, a fact that Ferguson himself mentions later.[83]

The relationship between the States and James II deteriorated gradually, not least because of James's Catholic sympathies and his growing anti-Dutch sentiments. When in 1688, James once more recalled the Brigade for service in England, this time without invoking the treaty of

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[79] K.H.D. Haley, *The British and the Dutch. Political and Cultural Relations through the Ages* (London 1988), p. 135.
[80] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xxi.
[81] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 476.
[82] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xxi
[83] Ibid.

1678, the States were not as compliant as in 1685. James's first letter addressed to the States General was dated the 17th of January 1688; the tone of the letter is polite and hopeful. "*Ayant pris la resolution de rappeler les six Régiments, tant Anglois qu'Ecossois, nos sujets, qui sont présentement au service de votre Etat, pour Nous en server icy, et ayant eu une prevue de votre amitié en les renvoyant avec beaucoup de promptitude en l'année 1685, Nous ne pouvons doubter que Vous ne leur accordiez leur congé de même, sur la demande que nous Vous en faisons à present.*"[84] At the same time, James had sent a letter to his son-in-law William of Orange stating his intention of recalling the six English and Scottish regiments. James thought that William, as commander of the Dutch army and as a James's relative, would support the request in the States General.[85] The reaction of the States, however, may not have exactly matched James's expectations because the States, even though they were willing to observe the treaties existing between His Majesty and the Dutch government, wrote that they "*do not find that either of the said treaties, or any other convention or capitulation, or anything whatsoever, binds or pledges them in any way to allow the whole or any part of the said regiments to be at His Majesty's service.*"[86] The Dutch claimed that James's request to recall the Brigade was, in effect, not valid since the regiments were raised partly from regiments and companies that were serving in 1674 as Dutch regiments and companies, and partly from private levies that were not connected with any regiment. Additionally, the Dutch had taken these troops into service *"at great expense in the way of bounty-money and costs of transport, which were all the heavier at the time, because his late Majesty (Charles II) could not agree to give any help or assistance to facilitate the said levy."*[87]

The Dutch authorities also had strong personal reasons for opposing James's request. Due to the increasingly tense political situation in Europe resulting from growing French aggression, the idea of sending away so many soldiers seemed ill-advised at best. "*The present situation of the time and affairs not only does not make advisable, but cannot permit or allow their High Mightinesses to part with such an important portion of their army, enlisted at so great expense, and up to this date reinforced, maintained, disciplined in military service and*

[84] Letter from James II to the States General, 17 January 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 542.
[85] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 477, note 1.
[86] Resolution of the States General, February 6 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 544.
[87] Ibid.

drilled."[88] The States were not, however, completely unwilling to comply with the request of James, and "*in order to show how well inclined they are to please His Majesty as much as possible, they will give a discharge and dismissal to such of the officers of said regiments as may ask for it, and discharge them from the oath and service, by which they are bound to the States.*"[89] The States, through this resolution, made it perfectly clear that, although James considered himself the rightful sovereign of the English and Scottish troops in Dutch service, in reality he had no rights to them. The Dutch Republic had recruited, drilled and paid for these troops and, what was more, the soldiers had taken a vow of allegiance to the Republic of the United Provinces. The solution of the States General to allow officers to leave on their own account is reminiscent of the incident with William Balfour in 1627. However, unlike the previous situation, the States ensured that the majority of the Scottish soldiers and officers would remain in the Dutch Republic. To this end, Dutch authorities sent deputies to each of the regiments to convince the officers to remain in Dutch service, stressing the advantages of their employment, praising the services of the Brigade, and stressing the probability of the English Parliament advising the King to reduce the army.[90] Furthermore, they persuaded General Mackay, who was inclined to return to the British Isles, to remain, "*and he was so influenced, that he returned and told his officers the king had called for them merely out of ill-will to the States, and that if they returned home they would soon want bread.*"[91] The result of the Dutch propaganda offensive was that, of the two hundred and forty officers in the six regiments, only sixty resigned their commissions and returned to Stuart service.[92]

The Scottish attitude, as well as James's motivation for the recall, is well illustrated by a report by the Dutch ambassador, van Citters, who resided at the court of James II. "*Here the English Brigade*[93] *in the Netherlands is held little in esteem, as they are considered to consist of persons very ill affected towards His Majesty, and that it is still remembered how few were willing to be of service to His Majesty against Monmouth, but that the only object of recall is*

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[88] Resolution of the States General, February 6 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 544-545.
[89] Resolution of the States General, February 6 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 545.
[90] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 477.
[91] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 478.
[92] Ibid.
[93] The English Brigade refers not only to the English troops in the Dutch Republic, but also to the Scottish. The term 'English' was often confused by foreigners with the term 'British', which could also imply 'Scottish'. See also chapter six on Scottish military identity.

to deprive others of the opportunity to employ them against the king."[94] According to Ambassador van Citters, the negative attitude of the Scottish soldiers towards their sovereign was well known in London. Whether or not this was a correct assumption is not known, but the fact remains that most of the soldiers and officers decided not to return to the British Isles when they were given the choice to do so.

The issue dragged on as the English ambassador, the Marquis d'Albyville, responded to the resolution of the States General with a letter in which he stated that there had been a treaty since the beginning of the Republic regarding subjects of the English Crown, which "*ne doit pas estre aboli par les guerres survenues depuis, sans un act ou une resolution particulierre des etats.*"[95] The States General continued to deny James's right to his Scottish and English troops and, in a resolution dated the 13th of March, following the letter of the English ambassador, they mentioned that the only treaty they knew of was a treaty drawn up in 1585 between Elizabeth and the Dutch Republic. Despite the fact that the treaty refers to the conditions on when and how Elizabeth should help the Dutch Republic, there is no mention in the treaty of the States General being obliged to allow English and Scottish troops in Dutch service and pay to enter Her Majesty's service at her desire.[96] The States General also mentioned that as a result of the second Anglo-Dutch war, the English and Scottish regiments had been discharged from service and the commanding officers dismissed, "*and that those of them who were again taken into service [in the Dutch army] in course of time were never again considered or regarded as officers of English or Scotch regiments.*"[97]

This resolution was not a mere justification for the States' refusal to send James the troops, as it went further than that, touching also upon topics such as individual freedom and naturalisation. "*Their High Mightinesses in so far as concerns the rights of nations are of*

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[94] Diplomatic correspondence, ambassador Van Citters tot the States General 24 February 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 546.
[95] Letter from Marquis d'Albyville to the States General, 1 March 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 548.
[96] Resolution of the States General, 13 March 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 552.
[97] Resolution of the States General, 13 March 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 553; the fact the Scottish soldiers were no longer regarded as British officers was a result of the Dutch turning these regiments into Dutch regiments during the second Anglo-Dutch war.

opinion that nothing is more natural than that any freeborn man should have the right to seek his living and settle where he thinks, and believing he can do so with most profit and advantage to himself. That he, consequently, has it also in his power to have himself naturalised, or by residence or other agreement to subject himself to those under whose government with person and goods he settles down and constitutes a family or binds himself otherwise; and that the government under which a person so settles or otherwise binds himself is at liberty either to accept or refuse such a person coming into its jurisdiction, and should the government accept him, either openly, by formal letters and document, or otherwise quietly by receiving him into the country and allowing him to live in it, or by taking him into service, the government thereby obtains over such a resident the same rights as it possesses over its own subjects and natives of the country."[98] The statement made by the Dutch government was profound in two ways. Firstly, it confirmed the right of any individual to establish himself in a foreign country and thereby subject himself (voluntarily) to the government of that state. Secondly, it denied James more or less the right of sovereignty to his troops in Dutch service by not acknowledging them as being English and Scottish subjects. James was not pleased and wrote, to William -whom he equally held responsible for what had happened- the following statement in response to the resolution: "*I did not expect to have had such an answer from the States to the Memorial lately given in by my Envoy, especially when your influence is so great; and sure it is the first instance, and I believe will be the last, where ever subjects were refused the liberty to return back when demanded to serve their Prince.*"[99]

The final reaction of James in the matter was to remind the Dutch government of the defensive alliance treaty of 1678 and the right of recall. It is unclear why James brought up the treaty of 1678 only at this point, but the result was the same. The States refused to acknowledge it because it was a personal treaty signed between the Prince of Orange and Charles II. According to the States General, the Prince of Orange had never shown the treaty to the States General to be approved of, and "*not a single clause of the said agreement has ever been put into practice.*"[100]

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[98] Resolution of the States General, 13 March 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 553-554.
[99] Letter from James II to William of Orange, 15 March 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 477, note 1.
[100] Resolution of the States General, 23 April 1688, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 564.

This entire episode regarding the right of recall of the Brigade brought out in detail the political status of the Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic, and the question of who had the final authority concerning these troops. It came down to the fact that both England and the Dutch States claimed sovereignty over the regiments, but in practice the English authorities were in no concrete position to lay claim to them. Despite past treaties made between the two states regarding the regiments, the Stuart monarch had no authority (either legal or political) to request these regiments. The States claimed that the regiments belonged to the Dutch Republic and that, in the end, the individual could decide where his loyalties lay. In effect, the soldiers were offered the possibility to respond to the call of James II and to return to the British Isles, or to remain in the Dutch Republic. The fact that many did remain in the Republic proved that there were already strong ties between the Scottish troops and the Dutch, a fact that was even further substantiated by the arrival of three Scottish and English regiments at the vanguard of William's invasion army in England, in 1688. Of the invasion-force of 11,212 infantry, 3960 were Scottish and English soldiers.[101]

Allegiance in the 18th century

The reign of William of Orange as King of Great Britain and Stadtholder of the Republic of the United Provinces meant that there were no conflicts for a while between England and the Dutch Republic regarding authority over the Scottish regiments. In the wars against France, the Scottish regiments that came over with William to England were part of a combined British-Dutch army and that fought together against the French. The Scottish regiments used by the Dutch invasion of the British Isles returned to Dutch service in 1697, augmented by three additional Scottish regiments, which remained in Dutch service until the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.

After the death of William in 1698, the old controversy between the two states regarding the Scottish regiments returned. Once again, English authorities tried to contest control over the regiments in the Republic with the Dutch States. The difference was that, this time, the Dutch government was politically and economically inferior to Great Britain and had less political

[101] Haley, *The British and the Dutch*, p. 138.

leverage than it had had in the 17th century. Even more so than before, the attitude of individual Scottish soldiers and officers in the Republic remained important. Their loyalty was, since the beginning of their service, strongly connected to the House of Orange, and that bond was, according to Ferguson, the only thing that kept the Scottish officers in Dutch service. The 18th century, despite two great wars that directly affected the Dutch Republic, was much more peaceful for the Dutch Republic than the 17th century had been. Military service was restricted to garrison duty, and this while Great Britain was in great need of the Scottish forces because of the outbreak of war with France in 1755. One historical account mentions that the Scots Brigade expected to be recalled as a result of the war, but when "*great bodies of troops were brought over from Germany for the defence of this island*", instead of "*six old battalions, of which both officers and private men were entirely British*", the Scottish regiments had severe difficulties. The idea that they were left in a "*foreign country, while many new regiments were raised at home*" [102] must have been hard to swallow for the Scottish troops. The soldiers in the Brigade believed that Princess Anne, the widow of William IV and mother of the infant William V, had requested of her father George II (1727-1760) not to recall these Scottish regiments because they could support her son against the republican pro-French and anti-Orange faction, which then began to gain ground in the Dutch Republic.

In 1756, an Act of Parliament was passed concerning British soldiers serving abroad. Once more, the issue of sovereignty was discussed. On March 31 1756, an order was read that prevented the subjects of the British king from serving as officers or soldiers under "*any Foreign Prince or state without his Majesty's Licence.*" The order also decreed that the officers serving in the Scots Brigade were to "*take and subscribe the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration within a certain time after the dates of their commissions, and to transmit a certificate thereof to His Majesty's Secretary at War.*"[103] The oaths had to be taken in the Dutch Republic before the British minister, or as the example of John Stedman later shows, before the British ambassador.

Did this Act of Parliament show a complete change in the attitude towards the British troops in the Dutch Republic? At the beginning of the Seven Years War between Great Britain and France, a proposal was sent to the Duke of Brunswick -who acted as the supreme commander

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[102] *A Historical Account of the British Regiments employed since the reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. In the formation and defence of the Dutch Republic, particularly of the Scotch Brigade* (London 1795), p. 84-85.
[103] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 394-395, note 2.

of the British troops in the Republic and as the guardian of the infant Prince of Orange- by the British authorities. In the proposal, it was suggested that the licence to levy in Scotland be withdrawn, and that three battalions of nine companies should be left in the Netherlands and the same amount of troops be sent back to Britain.[104] Needless to say, the Dutch authorities were not enthusiastic about the proposal, and the Duke of Brunswick refused because it would strongly affect the proposed augmentation of the Dutch military.

The sentiments of the Scottish officers serving in the Dutch Republic regarding the proposal from the British government are clearly demonstrated in a letter written by Colonel David Graham. In his letter, Graham states that the impossibility of recruiting in Scotland endangered the existence of the Brigade. "*Dans la vue de prévenir la ruine totale de la Brigade, un des plus anciens corps de l'Europe, dans lequel j'ai eu l'honneur de server longtemps, autant que pour l'avatage de la République, je me suis intéressé, étant à Londres pour mes affaires particulières, d'obtenir la permission de recruiter comme autrefois.*"[105] Furthermore, Graham expressed the opinion of other officers in the Brigade and, while stressing the importance of the Brigade, he equally wanted to find a solution to the issue which would be advantageous to both nations. "*Aiant a la fin engagé quelques persones en faveur d'une partie considerable que celle don't est composée la Brigade, on a desiré des considérations par lesquelles ce corps pourroit etre conservé pour la service de la République, mais sur un pied lequel seroit d'avantage pour deux Nations, si étroitement liées.*"[106] The letter shows unmistakably the ambiguous position of the Scottish officers who felt related to both cultures.

This ambiguous position of the Scottish soldier and officer was characteristic of the 18th century. The British state considered them British subjects, and many of the soldiers and officers were inclined to feel the same. A chaplain of the Scots Brigade by the name of Dr. Porteous, demonstrates this sentiment visibly when he said that "*Even the children born in the Brigade were British subjects without naturalisation or any other legal act. The beating orders issued by the War Office were in the same terms with those for other regiments...accordingly all the men were enlisted to serve His Majesty, not the States. Their colours, their uniform, even the sash and the gorget were those of their country, and the word*

[104] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 395.
[105] Letter from David Graham to Louis Duke of Brunswick, The Hague, 29 June 1758, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 462.
[106] Letter from David Graham, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 462.

of command was always given in the language of Scotland." [107] Porteous was chaplain towards the end of the 18th century, when the tensions between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic were running high and many Scottish officers were disappointed with the way they were used by the Dutch authorities. Nevertheless, the reality remained that the Scots Brigade had a separate status within the Dutch army. In the account provided by the Scottish/Dutch officer John Gabriel Stedman, the following passage is written with regard to dual national identity. When John Stedman was made an ensign, he had to swear an oath of loyalty to the States General. Shortly after, he and his fellow ensigns also went *"to sir Joseph York's*[108] *hotel, where we took oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration to the king George II, of which I sent my certificate to London, to be register'd at the War Office, the receipt of which was acknowledged to me by Lord Barrington, then Secretary of state."*[109] The fact that Stedman was born in the Dutch Republic, had a Dutch mother and spoke Dutch, did not seem to interfere with his feeling that he owed equal allegiance to the British Crown. Stedman performed according to the Act of Parliament of 1756 by taking an oath of loyalty to the British government as well as to the States General. Being born under the colours of Brigadier-General George de Villegas's regiment placed Stedman, in his own words, *"in the rights and privileges of a British subject."*[110]

The final incident between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic regarding the Scottish regiments dates from 1776. George III requested the aid of the Scottish troops in his fight with the American rebels. According to Ferguson, the recall was refused by the Dutch because of their commercial jealousy, their sympathy towards the Americans, and because of conflicting interests between the Duke of Brunswick and the States.[111] The Duke of Brunswick and the Prince of Orange (William V) seemed to agree with George's request. Brunswick proposed sending German troops instead of Scottish, while William V submitted a request of the king to the States General that stated that, in exchange for the usage of the Scottish troops, George would send over an equal number of Hanoverian troops."[112]

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[107] William Porteous was a chaplain of the First Battalion of the Scots Brigade. His 'Short Account' was added in 1795 to a publication by the name of 'An Exhortation to the Officers and Men of the First Battalion of the Scotch Brigade'; Ferguson, *Papers*, p. 1, xxxii.
[108] Sir Jospeh York (1724-1792) was at that time the British Ambassador in The Hague.
[109] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *The journal of John Gabriel Stedman, 1744-1797. Soldier and Author* (London 1962), p. 33.
[110] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *Journal*, p. 4.
[111] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 396.
[112] Ferguson, *Papers* , II, p. 396; see also chapter six, p. 195.

The States General related the matter to the provinces and Gelderland, Friesland, Overyssel and Stadt-en-Landen consented. The problem lay, however, with Holland and, in particular, with Amsterdam, which insisted on extra conditions concerning the loan of the Brigade, the most important one being that George should not employ the troops outside his territory in Europe (meaning in American territory). Although Amsterdam and the province of Holland were afraid that George would employ the Scottish troops in America, their main concern was that the Dutch would be burdened with the maintenance of the Scottish regiments, and that the Dutch navy would not profit, *"and that thus the resolution (to the effect that, in case it be resolved to retain the three regiments, an equal sum be granted to the navy) will be made illusory."*[113]

The entire episode regarding the recall of the Brigade in 1775 was grounds for a large discussion in the Dutch Republic and part of a broader political debate. One of the main protagonists in the discourse was Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, who promoted a stronger national character for the army and who was strongly opposed to the return of the Brigade to England. The political movement he belonged to was known as the Patriots, and they considered the Brigade to be a permanent part of the Dutch army. Van der Capellen referred to the Scottish regiments as the *Troupes van den Staat*, or Troops of the State. To return these troops to England, who would in turn use them in their conflict with the American colonies, would mean taking sides in a potentially dangerous conflict that was not the business of the Republic. Van der Capellen stated that "*to supply a nation with troops, which it requires to rescue itself from the troubles in which it finds itself; is nothing more than to take sides, and to place oneself in a danger that is deeper than one often can foresee in the beginning, if it really desires afterwards to be dragged along and to be exposed to all the consequences of a first measure.*"[114] He continues that "*The fire that burns in America is very capable of igniting the whole of Europe, which is already highly flammable.*" [115] Furthermore,

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[113] Copy of a letter of Mr. Rendorp to Mr. Grand-Pensionary van Bleiswijk, Amsterdam, 9 February 1776, Ferguson, *Papers* , II, p. 473-474.
[114] *'Advis, door Jonkheer Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, Over het verzoek van zyne Majesteit den Koning van Groot Brittannie, Raakende het leenen der Schotsche Brigade, op den 16 December 1775 ter Staatsvergadering van Overyssel uitgebragt, en in den Notulen dier Provintie geïnsereerd'*. Knuttel catalogus No. 19069, Koninklijke Bibliotheek Den Haag, p. 2, (translated from Dutch).
[115] 'Advis', p. 3 (transl. from Dutch).

Van der Capellen doubted the advantage for the Dutch Republic: "*What kind of advantage did she [the Dutch Republic] ever get from her close ties with England?*"[116]

Equally important was the fact that the Dutch had more in common with the rebelling Americans than with the British, since "*...it would be more hateful to see a people do it [i.e. to intervene] which itself has been a slave, and had carried its name, and in the end has fought for its freedom.*"[117] Finally, the lending of the troops could lead to an augmentation of the troops in the Dutch Republic, which in turn could lead to the interference of military authorities in civilian matters; Van der Capellen refers specifically to the military jurisdiction, which functioned as an *imperium in imperio*. With his small pamphlet, Capellen tot den Pol stirred up a lot of controversy. It was no longer only a matter of allowing the troops to go to England, but became a central issue of the conflict between the Orangists and the Patriots, the first choosing the side of the Stadtholder, the latter the side of the Republican factions.

The Patriot party was directly opposed to the party of the Stadtholder, the Orangists. The Orangists's view is also represented in the pamphlets, and tended to be more inclined to the British cause. This latter view is best expressed by an anonymous writer who comments on the essay of Van der Capellen and gives a clearly different view on the request of George III. The problem of choosing sides is, according to this writer, nonexistent because the battle between Britain and her colonies is an internal matter, and the fact that the Dutch Republic would lend these troops would do nothing to offend the other European powers. On the contrary, it would help to avoid a war because that way, the English would be successful more quickly, thus stopping this potentially dangerous situation. "*The sooner England is put in the position, by stopping the internal twist, to take away the fuel that feeds the embers of war, the earlier the peace can be achieved, the less opportunity can exist that Europe will become more restless.*"[118] According to the writer, the words of Van der Capellen seems to be offending and anti-English: "*do the words of [Van der Capellen] when they are closely put to the test not contain something offensive? And do they not confess a form of prejudice against that nation?*"[119]

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[116] 'Advis', p. 4 (transl. from Dutch).
[117] 'Advis', p. 6 (transl. from Dutch).
[118] *Hollandsche Vrijmoedige Bedenkingen, over het alom bekende gedrukte advis van Jonkheer J.D. van der Capellen tot den Pol, Briefsgewyze voorgesteld door een J….R,* Utrecht, 8 February 1776, p. 6; Knuttel catalogus No. 19128.
[119] 'Hollandsche bedenkingen', p. 9.

The same views were shared by the author of another pamphlet who also comments on the position of the Scottish soldier. This anonymous author comments specifically on the passage by Van der Capellen where he insists that it is strongly inappropriate to use '*onze trouppes*' (our troops) to suppress a conflict that some would classify as a rebellion.[120] The author writes that: "*I have before more than once mentioned and proved that the requested troops are known as National Scottish, and who are bound to the King of England by an oath of loyalty, and as such can not be reckoned among the ordinary Dutch troops.*"[121] Furthermore, the author states that, according to his opinion, England can request all subjects with a similar status from any foreign country, "*and if the Brigade is sent over to England no one can say that Dutchmen were sent over, on the contrary: they are their own countrymen.*"[122] It seems that these two different factions also had different opinions regarding the status of the Scottish troops in Dutch service. While the Patriots clearly saw the troops as part of the Dutch State and army, the Orangists considered them to have a separate status, and that England thus stood within its right to recall them.

In the end, the viewpoint of the Patriots prevailed over that of the Orangists, aided by a myriad other reasons, not least the sympathy for the American cause, the financial profit of the arms trade in Amsterdam and the commercial jealousy of Great Britain. It was decided not to send the troops to England, a resolution that further contributed to the deterioration of the relationship with Great Britain.[123]

The question of who had the final authority regarding the Scottish troops in the Dutch Republic was rather straightforward. While England (and later Great Britain) tried to exert its authority over the Scottish troops, it had little actual control. The Stuart and Hanoverian kings made use of personal ties, either between themselves and their relatives (as for example between William III and James II, or between George III and William V) or between themselves and their subjects (in the case of Charles I and the Earl of Buccleuch) in order to influence the Scots Brigade. While the Dutch considered the Scots Brigade to be a British military unit and allowed it to retain its British aspect, the Scottish soldiers were paid and

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120 'Advis', p. 6.
121 *Onpartydige en Vrymoedige Aanmerkingen, Over het bekend Advis van Jr. J. D. Van der Capellen tot den Pol*, Knuttel catalogus, Koninklijke Bibliotheek Den Haag No. 19127, p. 12.
122 'Aanmerkingen', p. 12.
123 See also chapter 6.

supplied by the Dutch. In every incident where Britain tried to influence Dutch policy making regarding the Scots Brigade, the States General successfully opposed British interference. While both Great Britain and the Dutch Republic claimed authority over the Scots Brigade, this authority meant nothing if it was not substantiated by the Scottish troops. Scottish loyalty was complex. While Scottish soldiers considered themselves to be the true subjects of the Stuart kings and, as such, loyal to Britain, this loyalty could also disappear when a Stuart king turned against Scotland (as Charles I did in 1639) or against Protestantism (as James II did). Scottish loyalty was also strongly related to the Brigade itself and the reputation it had built up over the centuries. The matter of authority remained an issue all through the existence of the Scots Brigade in Dutch service. Even though Great Britain had no effective control over the regiments, if Scottish soldiers decided to express their loyalty to Great Britain, there was little that the Dutch Republic could do. Not until the Dutch government had fully integrated the Scottish regiments in the Dutch army and had destroyed its British status, was the issue of authority resolved.

Chapter 2 Recruitment

As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, Britain did not have much leverage when it came to controlling the Scottish units in Dutch service. However, since the demand for soldiers increased rapidly in the early modern period, an important way of control was to try to centralise the recruitment and to direct the levying of Scottish troops through recruitment licences.

Wars in pre-early modern Europe were usually decided on the battlefield, where the cavalry delivered the *coup de grace*. After the proven superiority of an infantry equipped with missile weapons at the battle of Agincourt in 1415, the way in which battles were fought changed, as the emphasis in warfare shifted from cavalry to infantry. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the so-called 'military revolution'[124] altered warfare even more. Armies became increasingly more professional, new types of fortifications were constructed, and logistics became more complex.[125] A direct result was that a new demand rose for professional soldiers; no longer was warfare a matter for the elite only. Consequently, a new labour market was created which offered new financial opportunities. This new market appealed mostly to the inhabitants of regions benefiting from labour migration, like certain areas of the Germanic Empire, Scotland, Ireland, Switzerland and parts of the southern Netherlands.[126] Due to the availability of a growing supply of foreign soldiers, and because conscription was not generally introduced until the arrival of Napoleon, European nations relied heavily on this group to strengthen their armies. In some cases, like the Dutch Republic of the 17th century, the number of foreign soldiers that served under arms was, in some years, almost half of the total army's strength.

International soldiering was primarily an economic reality. The need for soldiers increased so dramatically during the course of the 17th century that, for some nations, it almost became their primary export good. For those societies whose resources were not always sufficient to

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[124] G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West* (Cambridge 1988).
[125] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic, its rise, greatness, and fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford 1995), p. 267.
[126] Zwitzer, *De militia van den Staat*, p. 56.

sustain their population, the export of troops for military service abroad not only contributed to diminishing demographic pressure, but could also help to improve the political position of a country with the economic benefits that came with this. Scotland, for example, received financial and political support from England in exchange for Scottish troops who participated in the wars in Flanders.

Scotland became a popular recruitment ground for soldiers in Europe. Despite its relatively small population,[127] there was a constant drain of men leaving Scotland to fight in the wars in Europe. Even though quantitatively speaking, the numbers employed by the Dutch States were not high compared with the number of Scottish soldiers employed during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) by Sweden[128], the demand for Scottish soldiers from the Dutch Republic was significant and persisted for more than two centuries.

While at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, Scottish recruitment was conducted more or less on a voluntary basis without any significant state control, this changed gradually during the course of the 17th century. As the demand for new recruits increased because of the growth in army size and the high casualty rate, volunteers no longer sufficed. This increase in demand also corresponded with closer political ties between Scotland and England and the centralisation of a court in London after 1603. There was a necessity to recruit entire companies, which could only be levied through official channels and with proper permission from the British authorities.

An important feature of recruitment were the circumstances that were responsible for an individual soldier to leave his country and to join a foreign (Dutch) employer. In the case of Scottish soldiers, there was a variety of reasons that made them decide to leave their country, ranging from social-economic circumstances to religious motivations, from possible career

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[127] In the middle of the 17th century the population of Scotland was approximately 1.0-1.2 million, T.C. Smout, N.C. Landsman, T.M. Devine 'Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', 85 in: *Europeans on the Move. Studies on European Migration 1500-1800* (ed. N. Canny) (Oxford 1994).

[128] For example in 1630, circa 12.000 Scottish troops were employed in the Swedish army (S. Murdoch, The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618-1640: a Conflict of Nationality and Identities, note 53, p. 55) in comparison to circa 4000 Scottish soldiers in the Dutch army in 1629 (H. Dunthorne, Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries 1572-1648, in G.G. Simpson (ed.) Scotland and the Low Countries 1124-1994). Relatively the difference was even more apparent: 16% of the total Swedish army strength was Scottish compared to 3.1% in the Dutch army.

opportunities to forced conscription. It is equally important to realise that it is incorrect to label most of the soldiers who joined the service of the Dutch States as mere mercenaries. While at the beginning of Scottish military service in the Dutch Republic the majority of the soldiers probably were mercenaries, this image changed gradually during the course of the 17th century when Scottish regiments became an integral part of the Dutch army. Officers joined the Dutch army in order to receive a military education. The strong family tradition among the Scottish officer class in the Brigade was another decisive factor in signing up for military service in the Dutch Republic.

Scottish and British policy towards foreign recruitment

One of the first known official licences for the levying of soldiers to assist the rebelling Dutch provinces was granted by the Scottish Privy Council on the 6th of June 1573, to Captain Thomas Robson. "*Capitane Thomas Robesoun –having obtenit oure Soverane Lordis licence to levey and tak up thre hundrith wageit men of weare and to depart with thame in the Law Cuntreis for serving in the defence of Goddis trew religioun aganis the persecutiouris thairof.*"[129] It is also mentioned that Captain Robson "*sall nowther, directlie nor indirectlie, lift nor transport ony Capitanis memberis of bandis or suddartis that presentlie ar in oure Soverane Lordis service without speciall licence of the Regentis Grace* [Morton]"[130]. Already in this early example, official attempts of the Scottish State to exercise its authority over recruitment can be identified. The Privy Council placed several conditions on the levying. Firstly, the recruiter shall levy "*without ony maner of oppressioun to be done be thame*" and that neither the recruiter nor the recruit shall "*partakaris with ony subjectis of this realme of Scotland aganis ony uther*". Secondly, it was forbidden to "*invade, troubill, pilye or tak geir fra, ony the subjectis of this realme, nor na friendis and confiderattis thairof.*" Thirdly, "*that thay sall na wayis serve with ony Papistis aganis the Protestantis professouris of the Evangell of Jesus Chryst*"[131]. The matter of a common religious cause was an important argument for consenting to the levying of Scottish troops for Dutch service. It needs to be said, however,

[129] *Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, 1569-1578* vol. II (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh 1878), p. 237; see also *Cal. of State Papers, foreign service, Elizabeth, 1572-1574* (ed. A. J. Crosby) (London 1876), p. 365.
[130] *Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, 1569-1578* vol. II (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh, 1878), p. 237.
[131] Ibid.

that the registered accounts of the permissions granted by the Privy Council to recruit in Scotland do not present an exact image of the number of Scotsmen that went to fight in the Low Countries. Since a large number of Scotsmen went to Flanders without the proper official consent and on an individual basis. Furthermore, not all of them entered the service of the Scots Brigade, but joined also non-Scots military units.

From 1572 onwards, Scotland regularly continued to grant licences for the levying of troops, despite the fact that they were not officially at war with Spain. In 1573, a licence similar to that of Captain Robson was granted to Captain John Adamson for the same number of 300 soldiers. In the same year, another licence was granted to Captain Diones Pentland, again for 300 soldiers.[132] In 1577, Captain Alexander Campbell received permission for the levying of 150 men. Also in 1577, a request came from Captain Henry Balfour "*humelie desiring thairfoir licence to stryke drummis, display handsenzeis, and lift and collect the saidis cumpaneis of futemen.*"[133] The Privy Council and the Regent Morton agreed to grant the licence to Captain Henry Balfour because of the honourable way the Dutch authorities had dealt with the Scottish troops.[134] Additionally, Captain Edward Preston also received, in the same year, permission to levy 200 soldiers in Scotland. Indeed, according to the register of the Scottish Privy Council, no less than eleven licences were granted for the levying of soldiers for the war in Flanders in 1577 alone.[135]

Diplomacy was crucial to get permission for the levying of troops. Royal occasions like weddings and baptisms proved suitable events, not only for securing financial and political support, but also for obtaining recruitment licences. A good example of how diplomacy and gift exchange functioned was the birth of Prince Henry. "*King James VI of Scotland having invited the States General to be sponsors to his new-born son, Prince Henry, with the Queen of England, and the Kings of France and Denmark, the States sent over to Scotland an Embassy, composed of the first Nobles of the Republic, with magnificent presents to the infant Prince, and an annual pension for life, the contract of which was presented in a gold box. The*

[132] *Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, 1569-1578* vol. II (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh 1878), p. 257.
[133] *Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, 1569-1578* vol. II (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh, 1878), p. 642.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Respectively to Capt. H. Acheson, Capt. P. Acheson, Capt. H. Balfour, R. Masterson, A. Montgomery of Braidstane, Capt. D. Murray, Capt. P. Ogilvie , Capt. J. Oliphant, Capt. D. Spalding and Capt. A. Traill, Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, vol. II 1569-1578 (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh, 1878), p. 709.

former treaties of alliance betwixt Scotland and the Netherlands were then renewed and confirmed. On the departure of the Ambassadors, fifteen hundred Scots were sent over to Holland, to augment the Brigade." [136]

In the course of the 17th century, the state's role concerning the levying of soldiers increased and further regulations were made to control the recruitment practice. An important role regarding the granting of recruitment licences to foreign powers was fulfilled by the monarch. When the States General were recruiting in Great Britain in the summer of 1632, they instructed the Dutch ambassador in England, Albert Joachimi, "*to do all you can with the King of Great Britain, in order that His Majesty may be pleased to consent to the exportation of the aforesaid soldiers from his kingdom to this country.*"[137] Also, the Venetian ambassador, Vicenzo Gussoni, mentions the involvement of royal British authority concerning the Dutch recruitment in Great Britain. He stated that the Dutch were raising numerous recruits for four regiments, three Scottish and one Irish, to serve in the Dutch army. In order to obtain permission, "*Dutch ministers went recently to audience of his Majesty.*" While they got royal permission, "*although with great difficulty*", there were two important conditions. Firstly, the recruitment could only be done by beating the drum publicly, which was often the official way of recruiting; and secondly, because of the peace between Spain and Britain, the same concessions were granted to the Spanish.[138]

The involvement of the monarch in recruitment also comes forward from the letter of Charles II written in 1682 to the Privy Council, in which he orders a warrant to be given to Colonel James Douglas to levy troops for his regiment in the service of the States General. "*Whereas wee are informed that our Scots regiment under the command of our right trusty and welbeloved Colonell James Dowglas in the service of the States Generall of the United Provinces, stands in need of a present recruit, wee have thought fit hereby to authorise and require yow to grant a warrant to the said Colonell and such other of the officers of the said regiment as are now there to leavy such a number of men as shall be by him desired and by yow thought reasonable for the recruiting of our said regiment, which leavy wee doe hereby*

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[136] *A Historical Account of the British Regiments employed since the reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. In the formation and defence of the Dutch Republic, particularly of the Scotch Brigade* (London 1795), p. 6.
[137] Minutes of Letters from the States to Joachimi, 30 July 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 409.
[138] 'Vicenzo Gussoni to the Doge and Senate, London, 20 August 1632' in: *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian 1629-1632* vol. XXII, p. 645-646.

appoint to be made in such an orderly and legall manner as is usual upon the like occasions, providing always that the said officers doe not meddle with any person or persons who are employed in our service in our standing forces of that our kingdome."[139] The Privy Council, in turn, granted James Douglas permission to levy in Scotland. This chain of events clearly showed the hierarchical order. Firstly, the monarch was approached and he had to grant permission, after this he ordered the Privy Council of Scotland to grant a licence for levying, which then, in turn, gave permission. Towards the end of the 17th century, the tendency for the monarch and the British government to get more involved with foreign recruitment and the 'export' of soldiers and officers and, as a result, their attempts to control it, increased considerably. While this was the official way of levying, however, in reality this order was not always followed.

British recruitment policies were often dictated by considerations of foreign politics. The Venetian ambassador in England provides an illustrative example of the international entanglements related to recruitment. The ambassador mentioned that Albert Joachimi was trying hard to make sure that the Dutch Republic had its new recruits as soon as possible, "*so that his masters may receive some service from them even before the end of the present campaign.*" The representatives of Spain and of the Archduke, however, "*made every effort, although without success, to prevent or at least to delay this grant.*"[140] James had an ambiguous foreign policy regarding the levying of Scottish soldiers, which was illustrated in 1603 when the Count d'Aremberg in the service of the Grand Duke and Duchess questioned the fact that the Dutch were levying troops in Scotland. According to Giovanni Scaramelli, the Venetian Secretary in England, the States General had sent three agents "*to hasten the levy of troops.*" While the English court and council were certain that these new recruits would join Dutch service, Giovanni Scaramelli was assured by Count d'Aremberg that James had other intentions. "*Count, I should be a bad King, if I allowed help to be sent to the States after the assurances their Highnesses have given me that they truly desire a sound peace with me. And although I have no cause to fear anyone, and reason urges me to support the States until*

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[139] *Reg. of Privy Council, 1681-1682*, vol. VII (ed. P. Hume Brown) (London 1915), p. 355.
[140] 'Vicenzo Gussoni to the Doge and Senate, London 27 August 1632' in: *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian 1629-1632* vol. XXII, p. 647.

we have concluded our agreement, in order that I may obtain the better terms, nevertheless I assure you that these troops will not cross the Scottish border."[141]

A similar episode occurred in September of the same year, when the Archduke complimented the King on his prevention of the passage of Scottish soldiers to the Dutch Republic. James responded that "*he had issued a proclamation, forbidding the passage of the Scottish levies into Flanders, and that the English levies were already disbanded; that if some few, enticed by the desire to fight, should disobey and follow the Baron of Buccleugh (Buclu) they would not be many in number, and another year more effective measures would be taken, absolutely prohibiting the levies.*"[142] It would be wrong, however, to view James's attitude as pro-Spanish and anti-Dutch. Despite James's statement in which he forbade Scottish soldiers to enter Dutch service, James had earlier consented to the levying of an entire new regiment under the command of Buccleuch to be used by the Dutch state. He had even insisted on making Buccleuch the commanding officer of the Scottish troops in the Netherlands.

The reaction of the Spanish ambassador indicates that James's dual policy did not go unnoticed at the Habsburg court. The Spanish ambassador complained about the fact that the Scottish recruits raised under the Baron of Buccleuch had joined the service of the Dutch Republic and considered this a "*breach of faith with the Ambassador of the Archduke.*" In his defence, James responded that "*the Scottish are poor and warlike, and have always kept the English border in unrest by rapine and violence.*" Although he stated that he would punish the ones responsible, he also mentioned that he was not displeased that the unruly Scots had left the kingdom, even if it was against his orders. He added that Scotland was also open for Spanish recruitment.[143] The Venetian secretary, and probably the Spanish ambassador, remained sceptical, and remarked that "*In his reply the King followed the lead of the King of France, who outlaws those who take service with the States, but as soon as they come back he*

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[141] 'Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian Secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate, Sunbury, 6 August 1603', in: *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian 1603-1607*, vol. X (ed. H.F. Brown) (London 1900), p. 73.
[142] 'Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian Secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate, Oxford, 28 September 1603', in: *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian 1603-1607*, vol. X, p. 97.
[143] Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli to the Doge and Senate, Kingston, 22 October 1603, in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1603-1607*, vol. X, p. 107-108.

frees them, and pets them as being excellent soldiers; and he tells the Archduke he may have as many troops as he likes, though he secretly [...] *the officers to take pay in that service.*"[144] Because of this dual policy and his refusal to be openly drawn into the conflict in the Netherlands, historians have often blamed James for being weak and cowardly. However, James was following a clear policy. The English treasury was exhausted from the war effort under Elizabeth, and James desired peace for his nation. James was a Scottish monarch on an English throne and he required time and peace to consolidate his power as a British king. Because the English forces employed in the Dutch Republic were paid by the English crown, he could withdraw them from Dutch service, but over the Scottish troops stationed in the Netherlands, or the ones that desired to go there, he had very little control. Many of the Scottish soldiers that went to Flanders on their own account were provided for and paid by the Dutch. The question remains, therefore, whether James really wanted to halt the flow of Scottish soldiers to the Dutch Republic completely. It was, after all, also in the interest of the British state that the power of Habsburg Spain was weakened on the continent.

Ways of recruiting

In the 16th and 17th century, recruitment was based on a voluntary system in which a country (or party) awarded a commission to an officer as colonel, stipulating the number, the pay and other conditions of recruitment. The colonel contracted captains, who were assigned to particular companies, and a date and place would be set for the troops to convene. The captains sent out sergeants, supported by a drummer, who would hire men at market places and inns. The soldier brought his own clothes, armour, and arms. At the first muster day, the regiment was formed.[145]

The company commander was usually responsible for maintaining the numerical strength of his company and for the raising of recruits. This involved returning to Scotland at intervals in order to take on fresh manpower as, for example, Captain Ormiston did in the summer of

[144] Ibid.
[145] M.C. 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state* (Manchester 1993), p. 33.

1573, and Henry Balfour a couple of years later, in 1577.[146] The States of War[147] reveal that most of the recruitment was first conducted in the Scottish Lowlands, in particular the counties around the mouth of the forth of Fife. Fife had the closest connection with the Brigade, but Perthshire, Forfar, Aberdeenshire, and the Highlands, especially after General Mackay opened them up, had their representatives in the Scots Brigade as well.[148] After the levying, the men were usually shipped from Leith to the ports of Zeeland and South Holland.

Due to the increasing demand for man-power made by the various European powers in the late 17th and in the 18th centuries, recruitment became more and more an affair of state. Hugh Dunthorne, in his article on Scottish soldiers in the wars of the Low Countries, says that "apart from issuing royal warrants from time to time permitting the raising of recruits for service abroad, the Scottish government played no part in this process: nor, on the whole, did the States General".[149] Dunthorne based his statement on the fact that there is little evidence of governmental interference in individual decisions to join up for military service. However, although the captain usually conducted the actual recruitment, the orders and commissions for recruitment were issued by the States General. Furthermore, the Scottish Privy Council had to give its consent on each occasion for the recruitment. Without this consent, it was extremely difficult for the Dutch Republic to levy soldiers in Scotland. Furthermore, without Dutch authorisation for the recruitment of new troops, and the granting of funds which paid for these troops, there would be no recruitment to start with.

The increasing demand for soldiers, however, made recruitment methods more aggressive; while forced recruitment for both internal and external service had previously been considered to be against the law, it was legalised in Scotland in 1694.[150] In 1701, an act was passed by the English parliament "*authorizing Justices of the Peace to levy able-bodied men without lawful calling, employment or visible means of support.*"[151] Since the number of new recruits was still low, the House of Commons decided, in 1704, that "*...a Power be given for one year to levy men in the respective counties of the Kingdom for increase of the marine companies,*

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[146] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Wars', p. 108-109.
[147].The States of War are documents drawn up to show the establishment of the Dutch army and to indicate how the military expenses were to be distributed among the separate Dutch provinces.
[148] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XXV.
[149] H. Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Wars', p. 109.
[150] C. Bartnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970. A military, political and social survey*, (London 1970), p. 141.
[151] Ibid.

and for recruiting the land forces."[152] In the end, only men who were unemployed were susceptible to drafting, while harvest workers and others were exempted.

The daily practice of recruiting could indeed be a very aggressive and serious business. According to a contemporary source, a certain "*James Askin, a Scotch captain in that garrison in the service of the Hollanders and very zealous for them has gathered up a great sort of his Majesty's subjects, and that with some kind of compulsion, for the poor fellows are kept at the Court of Guard, and nothing must be given to them, not so much as bread or water, till they yield to list themselves in the service of the Hollander.*"[153] The Dutch, like most other states, were notorious in their recruiting practices, and sometimes preferred to circumvent the official channels in order to raise troops. While usually they would not be directly involved and used agents (like the aforementioned James Askin), their practices did not go unnoticed. "*The Lord Commissioner his Grace and Lords of his Majesties Privy Council, being informed that some Dutch officers have presumed at their owne hand, without his Majesties warrant, to take on souldiers in this kingdom for the service of the States of Holland, doe ordaine macers of Councill to require and command them immediately to dismisse such as they have already taken on, and to discharge them hereafter to take on any of his Majesties special (sic) as they will be answerable upon their heist perrill.*" The Privy Council further ordered that all ships that set sail for Holland were to be searched for possible forced recruits, and that these recruits were to be released from Dutch service.[154] The decision of the Privy Council was not a hollow one, as is demonstrated by the example of a stranded ship of Leith in 1677. The ship was noted to have 120 men on board "*who appear to have been listed in Scotland for the service of Holland*", and the Scottish authorities ordered the forced recruits to be put ashore and to be given the choice of return to their homes.[155]

The same situation occurred in 1682 when a warrant was issued to seize a Dutch vessel in Leith and to bring ashore the people aboard to determine if they were illegally recruited. The Scottish authorities decided on this course of action after they had received complaints about

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[152] Bartnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 141; C. Walton, *History of the British Standing Army, A.D. 1660 to 1700* (London 1894), p. 716-717.
[153] Francis Bastinck to Williamson, Dover, 5 February 1675, in: *Cal of State Papers, Domestic series* (ed. F.H. Blackburne Daniell) (London 1904), p. 570.
[154] Act of the Privy Council of Scotland 1674, in: *Register of the Privy Council, 1673-1676* ,third series IV (1911), p. 178.
[155] Council order 21 March 1677, in: *Cal of State Papers, Domestic series 1677-1678* (London 1911), p. 40.

people being *"unjustly taken and shipped"*. The Scottish authorities knew precisely which people it concerned, and they instructed *"the Lords Elphinstoun, Justice Clerk, Collintoun and Sir George Kinnaird or majour part of them"* to find and return *"Alexander Baird, servant to James Inglis, cordiner in Edinburgh,...Smith, groome to the late Lord Chancellour, John McNab, tennent to the Laird of Lawers, John Malcolme, servitour to the Earle of Perth"*. The aides of the Privy Council were also instructed to question the Dutch officers as to why they would not liberate the forced recruits and, if given cause, *"to dismisse them or turne them back to the ship."*[156]

The recruiting practices of the Dutch on one occasion caused so much animosity with the local Scottish population that a riot ensued. The Scottish Privy Council mentions the incident, which began with an official petition presented to the Privy Council *"representing how the Dutch officers had prest somme of his Majesties subjects into their service."*[157] It got out of control when *"some prentices in Leith Wynd, alleadging that two of their number were forced away without any adresse to any magistrates, did riotously on Fryday last attaque some of the Dutch officers and one of the townes constables and abuse them."*[158] The apprentices were arrested and imprisoned as a result. The night after, the journeymen and apprentices of Leith, Wynd and Cannongate gathered and, joined by other apprentices, rushed the town. They seized the town guards, took their arms and imprisoned the mayor. They demanded the release of the prisoners and desired that the men who were put aboard the ships for Holland should also be released. In the end, the riot was suppressed and the instigators put in prison, but not without eight or nine casualties.[159]

Occasionally, special groups of men were employed to force men to sign up for military service. The Scottish officer John Gabriel Stedman gives a vivid account of the activities of these so-called press-gangs in his journal. Stedman relates an experience from his youth, coming back to Holland after he was sent to Scotland for his education, on a ship full of recruits. At a certain point, Stedman writes that *"I heard the most terrible noise of swearing, damning, trampling, and hauling of ropes upon the quarter deck, till I stamp'd open the door*

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[156] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1681-1682*, VII (ed. P. Hume Brown), p. 389.
[157] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1681-1682*, VII (ed. P. Hume Brown), p. 405.
[158] Ibid.
[159] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1681-1682*, VII (ed. P. Hume Brown), p. 407.

of my prison[160]*, and running up, saw a boat with armed men at our stern, firing with small arms, one shot after another, till we were brought into Yarmouth roads, allowing our convoy, and the other vessels, to proceed to Holland without us.*"[161] Stedman continues that "*The arm'd boat were an officer & press-gang, who having already wounded one of our men, came on board, sword in hand, threatening to sink us, and having imprest the best of our sailors, and being treated with punch for their politeness, left us to proceed on our voyage.*"[162] The actions of this press-gang seems to be particularly aggressive, and it appears strange that they would assault a vessel already carrying recruits. Nevertheless, these practices were not uncommon, as most press-gangs operated individually and were paid for every recruit they brought in. As a result, it was irrelevant to them whether they pressed men that were already recruited for Dutch service or free men.

Some of the recruits on Stedman's ship had also been recruited against their will, and a couple of them managed to escape during the visit of a captain of a merchant ship. Ten or twelve recruits stole the boat the captain arrived in and "*row'd around about the ship, seemingly to divert themselves while the company were at dinner in the cabin.*" The recruits were spotted sailing to shore and officers were called onto deck. Pursuit, however, was impossible, because the boats were lashed on deck. The officers were very confused about their actions. "*Holloing good words or menaces were the same, the recruits kept paddling as well as they could for shore, till at last several loads were fired after them, but all without effect.*"[163]

An illustrative example of the way in which recruiting practices were sometimes conducted is the case of Archibald Buchanan. Buchanan had a meeting with a Captain James Douglas who, under the pretence of hiring him as his servant and groom for his horses, put some money in Buchanan's hand, "*whereupon the petitioner wes ingadged.*" Douglas, in turn, handed Buchanan over to another Captain Douglas to be transported to Holland.[164]

It was not always the recruiting officer who was the villain that lured unsuspicious men to their overseas doom, because the Dutch demand for recruits proved to be a good solution for Scotsmen as well to get rid of their countrymen and to make some money in the process. The

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[160] Stedman was imprisoned because of his unruly behaviour.
[161] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *The journal of John Gabriel Stedman*, p. 17.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid p. 18.
[164] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1690*, XV (ed. E.W. Melville Balfour-Melville) (1967), p. 229.

acts of the Scottish Privy Council mention the case of a Robert Wilson who was abducted by his countrymen in an attempt to sell him to Dutch recruiting officers. James Bruntoun, farmer in Craiglockhart, David Raine, brewer in Portsburgh, James Porteous, gardener in Saughtounhall, James Borthwick, weaver in Borrowmuirhead, and George McFarland, one of the ordinary town officers of Edinburgh, decided to take Robert Wilson and to "*send him away with the Dutch officers.*"[165] On the 10th of March, they arrived at the house of their accomplice, the blacksmith William Bell, in whose house Wilson was staying. Bell opened the door and, after taking Wilson from his bed, they brought him to the house of another accomplice, George McFarlane. There they kept Wilson for twenty-four hours, after which they "*brought in some of the officers that were to sail to Holland and sold him to them, who immediately carried him away.*"[166] Upon hearing the accusation, the accused claimed that Robert Wilson, who had been in the service of a certain Barbara Ferguson, had "*out of mere splaine and malice against the said Barbara Fergusone raised a most base and unworthie scandal upon when she wes goeing to be marryed with a second husband.*"[167] Barbara had procured from the justices of the peace a warrant for his arrest and, as a result, he was kept for a while in the house of McFarlane before they would bring him to justice.

A recruiting officer by the name of Captain Hepburne, who was serving in the regiment of Colyear in the Dutch Republic, claimed that Robert Wilson voluntarily agreed to join the Scottish troops in the service of the States in exchange for a dollar[168]. The Lords of the Privy Council were not completely convinced by the story told by the accused, and conceded that "*Robert Wilson was unjustly kept under restraint and violence done to him, and ordain the defenders to be carried prisoners to the tollbooth of Edinburgh, to remain during the Council's pleasure.*"[169] In the end, the defenders decided to pay a fine of hundred merks to Robert Wilson in exchange for their freedom, which was agreed upon by the Lords of the Privy Council.

From the Dutch side, strong regulations were issued concerning certain aspects of recruitment, such as the age of new recruits, but also concerning the responsibilities of a captain towards his recruits. In 1687, the Dutch authorities issued a special resolution

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[165] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1691* XVI (ed. E.W. Melville Balfour-Melville) (1970), p. 500-501.
[166] Ibid.
[167] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1691*, p. 501.
[168] Ibid.
[169] *Reg. of Privy Council Scotland, 1691*, p. 502.

concerning the Scottish and English regiments. Four points of this resolution concern recruitment and the responsibilities of officers to their new recruits. Firstly, the Colonel was instructed to send, once a year, some officers to England and Scotland to hire and transport new recruits. The officer received 30 *caroli-guilders* for every soldier, on condition that they were delivered to Rotterdam. The remaining costs in the garrisons were the responsibility of the respective captains, and good and capable soldiers were not to be under 20 or above 40 years old. Secondly, every captain was instructed to pay for the recruits from his own sources with the help of the *solliciteurs,* who were ordered to provide the captains with the necessary loans and to withhold these loans from the wages of the captains. Thirdly, every captain was ordered to pay for the weapons and clothing of each of his recruits. Finally, when the recruits had arrived at their garrisons, they were to be inspected by the colonel. Those he considered to be too old or too young, or incapable in any other way, were to be dismissed from service, and the officers that recruited them ordered to replace them with other acceptable soldiers.[170]

In September 1726, a resolution was passed by the States General that further underlined the resolution of 1687 concerning the hiring of soldiers below the age of twenty. "*After deliberation is consented to write to the court martial of Breda, that on this occasion shall be written to the respective commanders of the regiments, that they, conform the resolutions of their High Mightinesses of 27 July 1714 and of 27 July 1726, shall take responsibility and care for the fact that in their respective regiments no soldiers shall be hired below the age of twenty.*"[171] These issues were a means to professionalize the army organization and to prevent desertion. Many of the deserters were young men who were too young for military duty and who were not prepared for the hardships of army life. By refusing recruits younger than twenty, the Dutch army tried to limit the risk of desertions.[172]

The age limit was initially only related to soldiers, as for officers there was no restraint on how old one had to be to enter military service. A possible explanation was that the army was also considered a training school, and the career of an officer started when he was young. In 1745, however, this also changed for officers. A resolution in 1745 put the minimum age for officers at sixteen: "*it shall be permitted to the captains of those companies when the levying*

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[170] *Groot-Placcaetboeck* (ed. Jacobus Scheltus), vol. 4 (Den Haag 1705), p. 168-170.
[171] *Groot Placaat-boek* (ed. Jacobus Scheltus), deel 6 (Den Haag 1746), *Resolutie van de Staten Generaal, 18 September 1726*, p. 129.
[172] For more on desertion in particular in relation to age, see chapter 4.

becomes reality to presented to their High Mightinesses every person capable of being an ensign on condition that from the baptism record or any other valid document can be determined that the age of sixteen has been reached".[173]

Motivations for foreign military service

"*The calamity of that good country (Flanders) is not only lamented by them, but goodwill borne to relieve part of their burden. Some number of men of war are already repaired thither, others upon the coming of his servant Captain Ormiston are in preparation, but the third sort are desirous to hazard themselves if they were certain of his pleasure, and what assured entreatment they might look for.*"[174] With these words, the anonymous author of a letter from Scotland painted a picture of what kind of soldier decided to join the war in Flanders. According to the words of the author, "*they* [i.e. the soldiers] *are not such as have been levied by wages in former wars, but rather some in the ranks of nobility, who have done valiant service in the cause of religion and repressing civil sedition here.*"[175] Is the writer accurate in his observation that the war in Flanders appealed especially to the pious noble Scotsman? If that were the case, then the entire issue of recruitment would never have been a problem for the Dutch States, because soldiers would have flocked to the States filled with the purest of ideals. Unfortunately, without denying the noble incentives of fighting in a foreign war, most motivations were less righteous.

One of the principal reasons for signing up for service for another nation was financial. In the 16th century, Scotland was a country at the economic periphery of Europe. This problem became acute especially in times of scarcity. In 1572, an act of the Scottish Privy Council was issued which gave permission for Scotsmen to join the wars in Flanders. Due to the '*present hunger, derth and scarcitie of viveris*' in Edinburgh '*and that the pure and impotent personis sall not perreis, nor the hable men and suldartis drawin to ony disperat necessitie, bot may haif commoditie to serve and leif owhter within the realme or to pas to the warres in*

[173] *Groot Placaat-boek* (ed. Isaac Scheltus), vol. 7 (Den Haag 1770), p. 264-265.
[174] Anonymous letter from Scotland, Stirling, 26 July 1573, in: *Cal. of State Papers, foreign series of the reign of Elizabeth, 1572-1574* (ed. A. J. Crosby) (London 1876), p. 395.
[175] Ibid.

Flanders, or uther foreyn cuntreis quhair they may haif sufficient intertenimentt"[176]. In a letter written in 1584, Walsingham also underlines the economic motive of joining Dutch service. "*As there continues great resort of poor Scottish gentlemen to the noblemen retired to Newcastle, who cannot bear the charge of so great numbers, the said gentlemen are desirous to be employed in the Low Countries. I therefore desire you to make a motion to them there to yield to the erecting of a Scottish band of a hundred under a Scottish captain, which, consisting mostly of gentlemen, valiant, well affected to the cause, and furnished in very good order, may be able to do them more service than thrice the like number.*"[177]

Besides the financial gain, there was also the opportunity of a military career and education. For many Scotsmen, the possibility of receiving military experience in the Dutch army as a professional soldier was an important incentive to join the service of this particular foreign power. Due to the military reforms of Maurice of Nassau, the Dutch army had a strong reputation as a military training school where, furthermore, in relation to other European countries, there was a greater possibility of being promoted through merit as opposed to through birth.

Another important reason was the social network that was part of the Scots Brigade. This network contributed to simplify the recruitment in Scotland, as family and clan members joined the Brigade as their relatives and clan leaders had done, as well as providing the Scots Brigade with a group of recruits from within the Dutch Republic. In the Scottish regiments, there was a long-standing family tradition of army service amongst the officer class. This seems to be underlined by the frequent occurrence of the same surnames such as, for example, Mackay, Balfour, Graham and Colyear, in the States of War and in lists of conduct. When comparing this information with the genealogies of influential Scottish families in the Dutch Republic, it can be seen that many of these officers came from Scots-Dutch families settled in the Dutch Republic, and not from Scottish families from Scotland. Although their cultural and ethnic background was not specifically Dutch, technically speaking they were not migrants either. Nevertheless, kinship ties can be considered as an extra motive for serving in the Dutch army. For example, after Hugh Mackay of Scoury had entered the Dutch army, two of Hugh's

[176] *Reg. of the Privy Council Scotland, 1569-1578*, vol. II (ed. John Hill Burton) (Edinburgh 1878), p. 148.
[177] Walsingham to Davison, London, 30 December 1584, in: *Cal. of State Papers, foreign service, Elizabeth, 1584-1585* (London 1916), p. 209-210.

nephews, Aeneas and Robert Mackay, also came over to the Dutch Republic and joined their uncle in the Scots Brigade.

Many soldiers fighting for the Dutch States were convicted criminals who were presented with the choice between joining the war in Flanders or capital punishment. A good example of this forced conscription is what happened to the 150 unruly members of the Graham clan, who were sentenced in 1605 to be sent off to the Low Countries wars "*in the hope that most of them would die there*".[178] In 1623, three Edinburgh millers by the names of John Boncle, James Alexander and Robert Gibsone, were apprehended by the provost and bailies of Edinburgh "*for the thifteous stealing of certane quheate send to the common millnis of our said burgh to be grund.*" The millers were convicted and sentenced "*to be hangit to the deade.*"[179] Their sentence was commuted thanks to a petition from Sir William Brog, the long-serving colonel of the first Scots regiment in the Netherlands, on the grounds that "*thair service in the warres...wald be more steadeble then ony goode that was to follow upoun their executioun.*"[180] The three convicted men managed to escape, however, while they were waiting for their transport in Leith: "*...thay, being unwoorthie of our favour and grace shawne unto thame, eshaiped and fled oute of the ship and come bak to thair houses in the Watter of Leythe. Commission is therefore given to the provost and bailies of Edinburgh, and all other officers, together with the dean of the bakers of Edinburgh, to search for and apprehend the three, and enter them within the Tolbooth of Edinburgh, there to remain till they suffer the doom formerly pronounced upon them.*"[181] Another example concerns a Willie Ushear, sixteen years of age, who was sentenced for theft. Due to his young age and frequent pleas from his relatives for his freedom, he was sent to the Low Countries "*and to mak intimatioun to the said Willie that, if at onie tyme heirafter he sall returne again within this kingdome without licence had to be him to that effect, that it salbe capitall unto him.*"[182]

The same fate awaited, in 1621, Andrew and Henry Allirdessis, who were put in the tollbooth of Edinburgh for maiming horses and oxen, a crime punishable by death. Ensign James Vetche, serving in the company of Captain Edmond, asked for custody of the men, promising

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[178] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Wars', p. 109.
[179] Commission of the Privy Council, Edinburgh, 7 January 1623, in: *Register of Privy Council of Scotland, 1622-1625*, vol. XIII (1896), p. 137.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Commission of the Privy Council, Edinburgh, 1624, in: *Register of Privy Council of Scotland, 1622-1625*, vol. XIII (1896), p. 631.

that "*he sall tak thame with him to Flanderis, and that he sall not suffer thame to come a shoir till he land thame in Flanderis.*"[183] Sometimes, the prisoner himself requested for military service in exchange for a pardon. William Cuming, for example, asked "*to reteir himself oute of the countrey and nevir to returne agane thairin withoute licence frome his Majesteis Counsaill, under the paine of deade.* Furthermore, "*he implores the Lords, therefore* 'to have pitie and compassioun on him', *and as Lieutenant Hamiltoun is* 'willing to tak him in service for the wearis in the Low Countreyes', *begs that he may be liberated, so that he may 'attend the said Lieutenent in the saidis wearis.*"[184]

Recruitment difficulties

There were many problems regarding the recruitment of Scottish soldiers. In addition to the obvious logistical difficulties, one of the biggest problems was that of the supply and demand of troops. Almost every country in Europe employed Scottish troops and not necessarily only the protestant countries; Spain on occasion made requests to James I to recruit in Scotland and France was one of the oldest employers of Scottish soldiers. During times of war, the demand was especially great and the supply was not always satisfactory. Furthermore, when combined with times when there was also an internal demand for men, for example during harvest time, the competition could be severe. The fact that on several occasions the areas of recruitment were closed off for the Dutch, as happened for instance during the second (1665-1667), third (1672-1674) and fourth (1780-1784) Anglo-Dutch Wars, did not contribute to lessen the demand for new troops.

The Venetian ambassador, Alvise Contarini, could not have expressed the problem of international recruitment better when he said that "*I will try to keep the contractors for troops in hope and faithful, but now that the levies for the King of Sweden and the two Scottish regiments have crossed to Holland, they have carried of the flower of the soldiery and of the*

[183] *Reg. of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1619-1622,* vol. XII (Edinburgh 1895), p. 431.
[184] *Reg. of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1619-1622,* vol. XII, p. 453.

commanders, who moreover, were well paid."[185]. Scotland was a very popular recruiting ground for most European states. Sometimes, when the market was really lacking, the Dutch States resorted to special incentives to recruit soldiers in Britain, as they did in the summer of 1632. Since the Scottish regiments had suffered a strong reduction in numbers due to disease and desertion, the States General gave the order to strengthen the regiments with five hundred new recruits from Scotland. They offered eight guilders for every new recruit brought across to Holland, plus the prospect of a company command.[186] The main reason for this incentive was that, on this occasion, the raising of recruits happened to coincide not only with the harvest, when men could earn a 'big wage' at home, but also with a high point in the European war, when the Swedish and Russian armies were also actively recruiting in Britain, thus competing with the Netherlands for Scottish manpower.[187] The Dutch ambassador in England, Albert Joachimi, mentions the problems of recruitment in Scotland in his letter to the States General. He says that "*...the season is unsuitable for obtaining men, as in harvest a big wage can be earned; moreover, that for some time back many levies have been made in the country, and that still daily the drum is being beaten for the King of Sweden and for the Grand Duke of Muscovy. The number of five hundred is also considered to be too large to be brought together and collected by one man, unless he happened to have many friends in the country...Two thousand men could be levied in one regiment with greater ease and more quickly than five hundred men by one officer alone, for the colonel would have his company formed by his captains, and the captains theirs by their respective lieutenants, ensigns and sergeants, if each of the said officers, to obtain his place, be engaged to bring in a certain number of soldiers.*"[188] This passage mentioned by Ambassador Joachimi not only underlined the fierce international competition regarding the military labour market, but it also emphasised the social network that was at the heart of the recruitment process. According to the Dutch ambassador, the number of 500 was considered to be too large to be brought together by one man, unless he happened to have many friends in the country. On the other hand, the levy of a higher number of soldiers was possible when every subaltern was obliged to bring in a certain number of soldiers.

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[185] Alvise Contarini to Girolamo Soranzo and Zorzi Zorzi, London, 15 June 1629, in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1629-1632*, vol. XXII, p. 96 (London 1919).
[186] Resolutions of the States General, July 9, 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 406.
[187] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', p. 109.
[188] Letter from Albert Joachimi to the States General, Chelsea, 13 August 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 412.

These demands on the labour market could lead to resentment amongst the European powers. "*No slight jealousy has been occasioned to the Dutch and the powers of the alliance by the grant made by the King of Great Britain of the levy of 6000 men, two thirds of them English and the rest Scots, in response to the pressing instances of the king here.*"[189] The Scottish levies were controlled by Lord Douglas, who had a warrant authorising each of his sixteen captains to levy 100 men in Scotland to make up his regiment in the Dutch Republic.[190] Sometimes, the source of competition was not other foreign states, but Britain itself. During the War of Spanish Succession, the recruitment of soldiers for the Scots Brigade was seriously hampered by the efforts of the English in Scotland at the same time, as they tried to make up Queen Anne's (1702-1714) national regiments.[191]

During the Austrian War of Succession, the Dutch Republic was faced with another problem, namely the policy of the British government to get directly involved in the recruitment conducted by the Dutch State in Scotland. The British authorities had always tried to control foreign recruitment, but now the British government expressed the desire to exercise some influence over the position of the officers in Dutch service, and the provisions for the return of the men to Scotland in case of need. Furthermore, they expressed their suspicions concerning Prince Charles Edward's uprising of 1745, and the determination of George II that those who had taken part in the rebellion should not be enlisted in the Scots Brigade. Measures were taken to prevent this from happening. Firstly, an inspection of all recruits by an officer was required in Scotland. Secondly, a certificate was needed (from both a magistrate of the place of enlistment and from the minister of the recruit's parish) stating "*that the recruit had not been engaged in the rising*".[192] The parish ministers, however, were reluctant to give a certificate in a purely non-religious matter, and the government decided to content itself with a declaration of the magistrate alone.[193] The Resolutions of the Council of State recorded the answer of the Dutch government: "*...their Noble Mightinesses are very far from wishing the recruiting for the Scots regiments in their service to serve the purpose of letting any of the rebellious subjects of His Majesty of Great Britain escape the lawful proceedings which are*

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[189] Francesco Michiel, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 15 July 1671, in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1671-1672*, vol. XXXVII (London 1939), p. 87.
[190] *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian 1671-1672*, vol. XXXVII, footnote p. 87 (London 1939).
[191] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 14.
[192] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. xi.
[193] Ibid.

taken against them."[194] The British were not completely satisfied by the answer, and even went so far as to arrest some of the officers that were sent over to recruit in Britain.[195]

Inevitably related to the issue of recruitment was the problem of the demographic pressure on the Scottish population. The permanent recruiting and levying, not only by the various foreign powers, but also by the British authorities, were reasons for concern, as expressed by a report of the Venetian secretary Francesco Zonca. "*These last days he sent the first secretary of state to inform the ambassador that seeing that Scotland was almost depopulated by the quantities of troops that had left it and were scattered, his Majesty had firmly resolved that he would grant no more permits to levy troops from his dominions, whether in large or in small numbers, to any one so ever.*"[196] A further reference regarding the demographic strain on the Scottish population was made in a letter by the Venetian ambassador, Anzolo Correr, to the Doge and Senate of Venice. Besides referring to the demographic pressure, it serves as an example of how international competition functioned. It concerned an official complaint by the French ambassador related to the fact that the Spanish were allowed to have more Irish recruits than the French were of Scottish recruits. In response, Charles commented that "*for many reasons the former (i.e. the Irish) were much more troublesome than useful, and for that reason they were not much concerned about reducing the number of subjects in that province, where they were just as abundant as Scotland was weakened by the continuous numerous levies.*"[197]

Some of the difficulties with recruitment came, not from foreign nations or governments, but originated from within the military structure itself. Since recruitment was often conducted by individuals who got a commission to levy a number of soldiers, there was consequently little means of control. There are numerous examples of officers who left for Scotland in order to levy soldiers and did not return with the promised men to the Dutch Republic, or did not return at all

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[194] Resolutions of the Council of State, 28 September 1746, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 274.
[195] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 220.
[196] 'Francesco Zonca, Venetian secretary in England to the Doge and Senate, London, 29 September 1634', in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1632-1634* vol. XXIII, p. 280 (London 1921).
[197] 'Anzolo Correr to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 December, 1634' in: *Cal. Of State Papers, Venetian 1632-1634* vol. XXIII, p. 303 (London 1921).

This behaviour could severely complicate matters for the military officials. Not only did it constitute a financial loss, but, in addition, new recruits were urgently needed to complete the muster rolls of the companies, as the example of Lieutenant William Graham and Sergeant John Leslie shows. Lieutenant Graham served in the company of Major Nicolson in the regiment of General Colyear. He was sent by his superiors to Scotland to conduct the levying of fourteen new recruits, "*of which he sent over only seven and not only did he not cross on the agreed time, but until now he has stayed behind and has taken the full amount of recruitment money for the fourteen men.*"[198] The court martial of Charleroi, where the regiment of Graham was stationed at that time, accused William Graham of the embezzlement of regimental funds and of failure in the conducting of recruitment. As a result, Graham did not only lose his commission as a lieutenant, but was also ordered to reimburse the money that he had taken, a total of 471 guilders and 16 stuivers.[199]

The same situation occurred with Sergeant Leslie, who was ordered to recruit ten new men from Scotland, but of which none were sent to Charleroi. The consequence of Graham and Leslie's actions was that, since the regiment had been expecting these new levies in order to fill up the ranks, without these new additions the regiment was not complete. While the incidents with Graham and Leslie did complicate matters for the military authorities in Charleroi, it also provided an excuse (for the States General) for the fact that the regimental numbers were incomplete: "... *Your High Mightinesses can see that the regiment would have been complete if the recruits would have come to the regiment...*"[200]

Due to changes in early modern warfare, there was a distinctive increase in the demand for soldiers. This growing military labour market became an important commodity of economic peripheral regions. Scotland had, since the beginning of the 16th century, been an important recruiting ground for the armies of Europe, which provided the Scottish (and later British) government not only with extra financial means, but also with a degree of political power. The European nations had need for Scottish soldiers and, by controlling the recruitment of these soldiers, the British authorities had extra political leverage in Europe. This was, however, mostly theoretic.

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[198] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 867, Charleroi, 30 September 1744.
[199] Ibid.
[200] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 866, Charleroi, 5 July 1744.

In practice the authorities had very little control over recruitment, which can be best demonstrated by the fact that when they refused Scottish soldiers from joining foreign service, the influx of Scottish soldiers to, for example, the Dutch Republic, continued.

Given that the labour market was scarce and the competition among the demanding countries fierce, the Dutch Republic was often required to employ more aggressive and un-official means in the levying of Scottish recruits. These practices often clashed with the Scottish authorities who, on those occasions, successfully intervened. Despite these examples of forced recruitments, however, most Scottish recruits agreed to serve in the Dutch army voluntarily. There were many reasons for joining the Dutch army, money and the 'Protestant cause' often being the most prominent ones. In addition, the reputation of the Scots Brigade was an important reason. Because of the long-standing tradition of the Scots Brigade in Dutch service, and its outstanding reputation both within- and outside the Dutch Republic, there was a continuous stream of young officers eager for a military career in the Scots Brigade. Family and kinship ties that grew with the continuation of the Brigade in Dutch service resulted in an elaborate social network that further facilitated the recruitment, by providing the Brigade with officers that did not come from Scotland, but from Scottish-Dutch families already living in the Dutch Republic. As a result of an increase in army sizes and change in military tactics, it was necessary to professionalize the Dutch army. These changes also had an impact on recruitment. New regulations were issued regarding the age of soldiers and officers, the armament and uniforms of soldiers, and the payment of the recruits. How the Dutch State finally dealt with the Scottish troops when they were part of the Dutch army will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 Military organisation and structure

Whilst in the previous chapters the position of the Scots Brigade in relation to the Dutch State and Britain has been discussed, the focus of the third chapter will be on the relationship between the Scottish regiments and the Dutch Republic itself. How did the unique position of the Scots Brigade within the Dutch Republic relate to the Dutch army and how autonomous was this position of the Brigade in the Dutch army? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look at who was responsible for the payment, the promotion and retirement of officers, and who assigned the commissions for officers and was responsible for military discipline. However, before the exact nature of the Scots Brigade in relation to the Dutch State can be discussed, it is first important to understand the political context of the Republic of the United Provinces.

The Dutch Republic in the early modern period was not like most other European states. It was a confederacy of small states (provinces) held together by their mutual animosity towards the Spanish hegemony in the Netherlands and their common religious sentiments. Therefore, the Republic's political system was decentralised and the States lacked an "omnipotent" political centre. With regard to military matters, there were in fact three important political institutions.

The first was the States General, the assembly in which the seven sovereign provinces of the Dutch Republic were represented. The responsibilities of the States General with regard to military matters were foreign affairs (declarations of war and peace) and the defence of the country, the augmentation and reduction of the army, the mobilisation of forces, the kitting out of the fleet, the strengthening of frontiers, and the building of warships.[201] The States General was also responsible for the administration of the navy and the army, and finally the appointment of higher military personnel.[202] On some occasions, the States General travelled as a body to the army's campsite. For example, at the time of the battle of Nieuwpoort, the States General resided in Ostend. This was however an exception. In general, the States General was represented in the field by the so-called *gedeputeerden ten velde* (field deputies), whose team also included members of the Council of State and deputies from the Provinces

[201] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 26.
[202] Ibid.

where the military activities took place. The field deputies were responsible for the administration of justice and supervised the payment of the soldiers. Concerning military activities, they represented the common interests of the States and as such their interests occasionally collided with those of the generals. Overall, they were supposed to assist the military commanders and to solve any possible conflicts.

The second political institution that exercised authority over the army was the Council of State. After the departure of the Earl of Leicester in 1588, the Council of State was appointed as the executive body of the Dutch Republic. Its duties with regard to the army were the levying and the usage of means of payment for the military, the presentation of a tri-monthly report to the States General and the Provincial states regarding the burdens of war, the placement of all the towns (also the unconquered ones) under an equal financial contribution and, finally, the administration of the oath of the officers employed by the Dutch State.[203] While the general authority of the Council of State was undermined by attempts of the States General which resulted in the Council of State becoming more of an administrative than executive organ, the Council of State nevertheless remained a very important political body with regard to the Dutch army.[204] This changed after 1651 when it was made explicit in the acts of the Council of State that the States General would make the military resolution, after deliberation with the Council of State.[205]

The third and final authority with regard to the Dutch army was the Stadtholder and the Captain-General of the Union. The office of the Stadtholder was a remnant from the past of the Republic, where the Stadtholder represented the sovereign monarch in the Netherlands. In that context, the Stadtholder was also the Captain-General of the army in his province. After the Northern Provinces declared their independence, the office of Stadtholder was not abolished, but continued to play an important part in the politics of the new Republic.

The office of Captain-General was also a remnant of the past. The viceroys of Spain in the Dutch Provinces had, in addition, held the position of Captain-General over the troops in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that the title of Captain-General was later often associated with that of the Stadtholder, it was never implied that the Stadtholder would automatically be the

[203] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 27.
[204] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 28.
[205] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 29.

Captain-General. The office of Captain-General had to be granted by the Dutch Provinces and their assembly, the States General. Prince Maurice, for example, never fulfilled the position of Captain-General, despite the fact that he was the commander of the Dutch army,. The first Stadtholder who held the office was Frederick Henry; he received the commission of Captain-General and Admiral of the Union on 23 of April 1625 from the States General. From then on, all the princes of Orange would be, at some stage, Captain-General of the Union.[206]

The office of Stadtholder, although in theory not associated with any family, was more or less monopolised by the princes of Orange and their Nassau relatives in Friesland. After the death of the Count of Nieuwenaar and Meurs in 1589, who was the Stadtholder of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, the House of Orange and the Frisian Nassaus were the only ones who held the office in more than one province. The House of Orange was always dominant over their Friesian relatives, having held the command of the army since William the Silent.[207] Alongside the office of Stadtholder, they had also been provincial Captain-Generals. Considering the fact that they were Stadtholder in more than five provinces (including Holland) and the so-called *Generaliteitslanden*[208], this meant that they had, in addition, a monopoly on the right to move troops within and outside of the Provinces. In theory, they were supposed to obey the orders of the Council of State, but in reality, this did not signify a very much, since the Stadtholders were also members of the Council of State.[209]

The composition of the army and the Scottish regiments

The army of the state was divided into two parts, one employed in the field and the other employed for garrison duties.[210] The army in the field was used for military campaigns and was, as a result, seasonal. After the Peace of Munster, not many actual battles were fought in the Dutch Republic, and warfare became thus mostly defensive, the army in the field was

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[206] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 30.
[207] This changed in 1702 with the death of William III, which also brought the Orange dynasty to an end.
[208] Those territories that fell under the jurisdiction of the Dutch Republic, but were not part of the Republic of the United Provinces.
[209] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 31.
[210] C. Schulten, J.W.M. Schulten, *Het leger in de 17de eeuw* (Bussum 1969), p. 22.

often a temporary phenomenon. It consisted of various companies that were employed as garrisons and temporarily levied troops which were disbanded after the campaign was over. The garrison troops, on the other hand, were employed on a permanent basis all through the year. Their task was both defensive and offensive, as they were used to strengthen towns but also to engage the enemy far away from their garrison town.[211] The infantry of the Dutch States was generally organised in regiments and companies, although it was not until the 17th century that this organisation was formally adopted for the Dutch forces. Foreign soldiers, amongst whom were the Scottish, were organised earlier into regiments.[212] The regiment was, in turn, divided into companies, whose sizes could vary widely. According to C.M. Schulten, it ranged from 8 to 18 companies, but the overall the size of a regiment was fixed at ten companies[213]. For example, in the year 1621, both the regiment of Colonel Brog and of Colonel Henderson counted ten regiments, including the *company colonelle*. The number of soldiers also varied, but the basic strength of a company was about 150 soldiers, while the *company colonelle* was 200. In 1598, the companies were reduced to 120 soldiers with a further reduction in 1607 as a result of the impeding truce with Habsburg Spain, which brought the company size down to 70 (a decision against which the Scottish colonels objected).[214]. In 1621, the end of the Twelve Years Truce, saw the companies once more increased to 120 soldiers.

It was, however, very difficult to maintain the companies at full strength, due to the high death rate and the number of desertions. Since many companies were privately owned by an officer who received a fixed amount for the soldiers in his company, it was a lucrative business for an officer to put more men down on paper than in truth existed. As a result of this widespread practice, the number of soldiers on paper hardly ever corresponded with the actual number of soldiers present in the unit. The Venetian ambassador in the Netherlands, Alvise Contarini, gave an example of the problem concerning the lack of men in the ranks. He mentioned the fact that the States had asked the English ambassador to urge the colonels to fill up the companies, "*many of which, I understand, do not muster twenty-five men, though they draw their pay and the commander profits considerably.*"[215] When it came to a muster in

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[211] Schulten, *Het leger*, p. 22.
[212] Ibid, p. 34.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xiv.
[215] Letter from Alvise Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 2 December 1624, in: *Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 1623-1625*, vol. XVIII (London 1912), p. 502-503.

order to inspect the company, it was not uncommon to hire men for the day to make up the vacancies in the ranks. A sailor named Robert Stuart, for example, confessed that he "*had taken on himself to pass in review among the company of Captain Balfour as a soldier of said company, under the name of Thomas Fowler, and that he seduced thereto other six sailors, who also were passed in review as soldiers of the said company.*" The officers discovered the scheme and the unfortunate Robert Stuart was sentenced "*to be hung by ropes till he be dead, as an example to others.*"[216] In the municipal archive of Den Bosch, there is an instruction for the muster master, P. Schuyl van Walhorn, who was responsible for the muster of the city garrison in 1636. The document clearly states how the muster should take place. First, the company must stand in file and will be counted down, ascertaining that the number of soldiers is not less than the number previously indicated by the officers. Second, the sick were ordered to be there and it was strictly mentioned that no borrowed persons and/or horses should be presented, who were not in the service of the company, but *who follow the company around and receive wages.* If this was discovered, not only the persons themselves, but also the captain and the officers who employed them would be prosecuted.[217]

The practice of temporarily bolstering the ranks during a muster was a thorn in the side of the Dutch and became a bone of contention between the Scottish and English, since the Scots put the blame for this practice on other foreign groups, while the English accused the Scottish of being at the root of the problem. William Borlas (Burlacy) wrote in a letter to Walsingham that "strangers" in the army caused many problems during the muster of Elizabeth's forces in 1589. "*The States complain of these strangers. Some of them only "put themselves in captains' rolls, without any pay, that they may go a-freebooting.*" *Some seven score are absent from the 3 horse companies and nearly 600 from the foot, as well as divers captains and officers, "the which is the overthrow of all good discipline.*"[218] William Borlas specifically states that these "strangers" were not Scots, but from all the other nations. In a response to Borlas' letter, certain "faults" are rectified by the muster master, in particular concerning the position of the Scots as not being strangers, and as such as not being responsible for the temporary filling up of vacant positions in the ranks. "*The queen is probably much abused hereby, for there are many broken needy companies in the Low Countries very easy to hire for such a purpose, the rather for that the nearness of their*

[216] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XXVIII.
[217] Stadsarchief Den Bosch No. 3885, no. 24, 18 January 1636.
[218] *Calendar of Foreign Papers January 1589-July 1589* (1950), p. 243.

language is such as they can hardly be discerned. The Scots are the captains' chief means for this abuse, now that the English bands in the States' pay are withdrawn. The muster-master once discovered 20 men borrowed from one company to make a false muster in another."[219] According to the muster master, therefore, the Scots are actually one of the main perpetrators of the practice of filling up the ranks in exchange for money. There are, however, no sources revealing that this was a particular Scottish enterprise, and the general anti-Scottish attitude of the English in this period should not be forgotten when the latter referred to Scottish behaviour in the Dutch army.

Above the company and the regiment stood the brigade and the battalion. At the beginning of the 17th century, a brigade numbered about 3000 men who were divided into separate regiments[220], a structure which continued until the end of the 18th century. The composition of the brigade corresponded with that of the Scottish regiments, which were converged in the Scots Brigade. The battalion as the final form of a military unit was considered to be half of a regiment.

Fourteen years after their first employment in the Dutch Republic, in 1586, the Scottish companies were divided into two different regiments under Colonels Henry Balfour and Aristotle Patten.[221] Balfour's regiment consisted of ten companies, while Patten's only had four. After Patten changed sides to the Duke of Parma, only one regiment remained. This situation continued until 1603 when a second regiment joined Dutch service under the command of Lord Buccleuch. The third regiment was formed in 1628 and the son of Lord Buccleuch, Sir Walter Scott, Earl of Buccleuch, became commander.[222] After the Peace of Munster, the States reduced their armed forces, but the three Scottish regiments remained intact. In 1655, because of a resolution of the States of Holland, the three regiments were temporarily converted into two, but in 1660 following a recommendation by Charles II, the regiments were re-organised into their previous formation of three. Due to the war with Britain in 1665, the Scottish regiments were integrated into the Dutch army and lost their Scottish character[223]. The command of the third regiment had earlier been in the hands of a

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[219] *Calendar of Foreign Papers January 1589-July 1589*, p. 281.
[220] Schulten, *Het leger*, p. 34.
[221] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xi.
[222] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xii
[223] See chapter 1 and 4.

Scottish officer, Louis Erskine[224], but the new commander became a Frenchman, Jacques de Fariaux, Lord of Maulde, under whose influence the number of Scottish officers was slowly replaced by non-Scottish officers. In 1676, the regiments were restored to their former situation, but the Scottish character of the third regiment under the command of de Fariaux was so weakened that both William of Orange and Hugh Mackay of Scoury, the commanding officer of the Scots Brigade, decided to create a new regiment in its place under the command of Alexander Colyear.

Although these three regiments continued their service until the final dissolution of the Scots Brigade in 1787, the number of regiments changed on several occasions. In 1577, the States accepted a special Scottish regiment under the command of William Stuart to aid them against Don John of Austria. In 1629, a Scottish regiment commanded by Lord Hay of Kinfauns -not officially a part of the Brigade- served at the siege of Den Bosch.[225] In 1697-98, three additional Scottish regiments were employed, replacing the three English regiments that went to England with William of Orange. During the Spanish War of Succession, three extra regiments were used in the army of Marlborough and disbanded after the conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht. Finally, a fourth regiment commanded by the Earl of Drumlanrig was employed in 1747 in the War of Austrian Succession, but as a result of the peace of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, the army was once again reduced. The fourth regiment was reduced to a one-battalion regiment in 1749, while in 1752 further resolutions were taken to disband the regiment completely. "*The second battalion of Drumlanrig's was broke upwards of three years ago, and the six companies still unreduced are joined to Halket's. By this late regulation there are reduced of the Scots twenty-eight captains, fifty-six second lieutenants, and seventy ensigns: the captains pensioned at nine hundred guilders a year, and obliged to serve, the subalterns at three hundred, and leave to go where they will.*"[226] The service of the Scottish regiments was not a smooth process from the beginning, but despite temporary reductions and augmentations, their existence in the Dutch army was more or less continuous. Because they were officially foreign troops in Dutch service, it is important to examine how their command was structured in the Dutch army, who held the final authority towards the

[224] Louis Erskine was colonel of the third Scottish regiment from 1662 to 1673, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 467 and 469.
[225] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xii.
[226] Resolution of the States General, April 1752, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 390-91 note 1.

Scottish officers who was responsible for the command and who appointed the Scottish officers.

The structure of command

At the beginning of the Eighty Years War the commanding officer, whether a colonel or a captain, was usually allowed to operate independently. He had to obey the Prince of Orange as his commander in chief, and the States General from whom he received his commission, but otherwise, he was in total control of his regiment. The commanding officer was free to lead his men as he wished and could appoint junior officers without any interference from any higher authority.[227]

This large level of independence changed near the end of the 16th century. New staff officers were being created, like, for example, the lieutenant colonel and the sergeant major, and it was usually the Prince of Orange or the States that made the appointments. There was gradually a closer control of the issuing of commissions by the States General, because of the reforms of Maurice of Nassau at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century. In 1608, the States of Holland resolved that the captains on their repartition[228] should not be allowed to fill vacancies for lieutenants and ensigns without the prior consent of the States or of the committee, who reserved the right of appointment. This right also appears to have been exercised by the other provincial states.[229]

Overall, during the existence of the Scots Brigade in the Republic of the United Provinces, the command structure was as follows. A Scottish regiment was commanded by a colonel, who often was also captain of the *company colonelle*. Each company in turn was commanded by a captain, followed by lieutenants and ensigns. Due to the creation of new ranks, the hierarchy was slightly changed; the commander of the regiment was still the colonel, but his second-in-

[227] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 112.
[228] The repartition system is a special system of payment, installed after the departure of the Earl of Leicester in 1588. It entailed that the different regiments were allocated to the various provinces that were responsible for the payment of those regiments. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XVI.
[229] Ibid.

command was now the lieutenant colonel, below him stood the sergeant major, below him the captain, who was again above the lieutenant, and so forth. The commander-in-chief of the Dutch army was usually the Prince of Orange, who had the special title of Captain-General of the Union, which was granted to him by the States. Generally, the States General were the main employers of the regiments; they decided the commissions, they conducted the diplomatic correspondences with the foreign sovereigns, and they were the ones to whom the officers had to swear their oath of allegiance. Additionally, since 1651, the authority of the Council of State regarding military affairs was strongly reduced in favour of the States General. The resolutions concerning military affairs were now taken exclusively by the States General after consulting with the Council of State.[230]

Payment

The Dutch army underwent a number of organisational and tactical changes as a result of the reforms of Maurice and William Louis of Nassau. One of the most important features of the military reforms was the construction of a relatively regular payment system. The concept of a regular wage was closely linked to the morale of the troops and their trustworthiness; in short their efficiency. It not only reduced the risk of desertions and treachery, but also helped to facilitate the levying and recruiting of new soldiers and officers. This does not mean that the financial situation was without any problems. The Dutch state walked the thin line between keeping the military expenses relatively low and, at the same time, keeping the troops from mutinying or deserting. Needless to say, on many occasions, they failed, however, when comparing the overall situation of the 17th and 18th century with the one in the late 16th century, the differences are clear to see. The desertion of whole companies and betrayal of towns to the enemy are far less frequent than before, if they occurred at all.

A remarkable fact is that, over more than two hundred years, the payment of officers stayed more or less the same, and even diminished. The payment of higher officers differed at times, ; for example, in 1598, there were colonels who received 400 guilders per month, while others received only 300. In a resolution of the States General of 22 April 1624, it was decided that

[230] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 31.

concerning the payment of colonels, the wages would not be higher than 300 guilders per month. Another resolution of the States General in 1666 even reduced the salary of colonels to 200 guilders a month, the salary of a lieutenant-colonel was fixed at 80 guilders a month, and that of a major at 60. In times of war, the wages would be higher, 300 for a colonel, 100 for a lieutenant colonel and 80 for a major respectively.[231] The wages earned by soldiers depended mostly on experience. Pikemen received between eleven and eighteen guilders a month, while a musketeer would earn between eleven and thirteen guilders. In 1681, the wages of pikemen and musketeers were equalised, and their salary was fixed on twelve guilders and five *stuivers* a month. There was no substantial increase in payment until 1792, when a musketeer started to earn fourteen guilders and one *stuiver* per month, ensigns received a general payment increase of eight guilders, and lieutenants an increase of fifteen guilders.[232] The daily pay of a soldier was between eight and six *stuivers*. In comparison; a day-labourer received twelve *stuivers* a day. The soldier, on the other hand, had a steady income, while the day-labourer was laid off when there was no more work to be done. A soldier received some extra payment to pay for his lodging within a city or a garrison, which had to be paid to their quartermaster. He was, however, responsible for his own food and, after the introduction of a military uniform, the costs of the uniform were also deducted from his wage, as they were supplied by the army. With the other expenses included, the average soldier earned about four *stuivers* a day.[233]

The situation for Scottish soldiers was almost the same as that of Dutch soldiers. In the extracts of the States of War from around 1579, a captain received £90 a month, a lieutenant £45, an ensign £40, a sergeant £24, a corporal £16, a clerk £12, a tambour £12, and a surgeon £12.[234] In 1774, it was decided that soldiers were to receive '*twopence a week more pay than the Dutch troops.*'[235] At that time, a captain's pay came down to about £140 sterling a year, that of colonel to about £350 sterling, and that of a lieutenant to not more than £40.

In 1588, after the departure of the Earl of Leicester, the States revised and reformed their military establishment. They instituted a system of allocating regiments and companies to different provinces, which were to be provided and supported directly by those provinces.

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[231] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 86.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 87.
[234] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 46.
[235] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XV.

This system is referred to as the "repartition system". In addition to the ordinary contributions of the provinces, extraordinary contributions were levied on the wealthier provinces, and the Council of State administered the revenue derived from them. At the end of each year, the central authority settled accounts with the respective provinces regarding both the ordinary and the extraordinary contributions.[236] The brunt of the expenses for the Scottish regiments was taken on by the States of Holland. From the States of War, it is clear how many of the Scottish companies were repartioned in Holland. In 1610, for example, there were 20 companies repartioned in Holland, compared to three in Zeeland and three in Utrecht. In 1665, there were 17 companies financed by Holland at the cost of £14,436 per month. The two other Provinces that were responsible for the financing of the regiments at this time were Utrecht, which took care of two companies (£1620 per month) and Friesland, where two companies were also repartitioned (£1,590 per month).[237] One consequence of this system of spreading the costs of the army over the different provinces was that the companies that preformed garrison duties did not remain indefinitely in one town. On the contrary, every year or so, they were relocated to a different part of the Dutch Republic.

Payment could lead to friction between the Scottish officers and the Dutch authorities. Especially in the early days of the Scots Brigade in Dutch service, the issue of payment was highly contentious. Colonel Balfour, for example, received for his company of 200 men £ 2200 per month, where each month was calculated as consisting of thirty-two days, although the monthly payment was, only made each forty-eighth day. In 1596, in order to limit the risk of possible mutinies and desertions, and after several Scottish officers had expressed their grievances towards the irregular payments[238], the States of Holland improved the situation somewhat by paying the troops (for which they were responsible) every forty-second, instead of every forty-eighth, day.[239]

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[236] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XVI.
[237] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 496-498; States of War 1665.
[238] See chapter four.
[239] Zwitzer, *Militie*, p. 85.

Military discipline

The increasing regulation of payment was one of the strongest disciplinary measures taken by the Dutch authorities, but in order to make the army function in an orderly fashion, other forms of discipline were still equally necessary. The primary form of maintaining discipline in the ranks was the creation of a form of military jurisdiction. In 1588, Prince Maurice installed the so-called *Hoge Krijgsraad*[240]. At first, the *Hoge Krijgsraad* was nothing more than a court-martial in the field, but after the Maurice's military reorganisations, it became a permanent court.[241] An important development in military jurisdiction and military discipline was the publication of the "*Artikel-brief*", or the "*Ordonnantie op de Discipline Militaire*", in 1590. This book was the only military penal code that existed during the Republic. When entering military service, the article was read out to the new recruits, after which they were held to be under military discipline.[242] Besides the *artikel brief*, many *placcaten* (or decrees) on military discipline were also published.

In the municipal archive of Den Bosch there is a specific decree that warns against duelling and quarrelling.[243] The decree, published in 1684, is very specific about the consequences of duelling and fighting amongst soldiers and officers, and the punishments were severe. The decree states at the outset that all officers, equestrians and soldiers should be living in peace and harmony. When an officer or soldier hurts someone else, either by words or by action, he should immediately be brought to military justice, "*Where he shall give satisfaction to the injured party and that he shall be punished either by imprisonment, banishment, a fine, or corporal punishment.*"[244] For a verbal insult, the offender was sentenced to prison for a couple of months and had to beg for forgiveness on his knees. An officer lost his rank during the period of his imprisonment. For physical violence, the punishments were more severe, with a prison sentence of a year and disciplinary punishment for a blow with the fist, while hitting somebody with a stick would incur a sentence of two years imprisonment, the loss of one's

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[240] That is the High Court-martial.
[241] A. Koenhein, 'De totstandkoming van de resolutie van 25 Maart 1651 als poging tot regeling van de militaire jurisdictie tijdens de Republiek, in: Mededelingen van de sectie krijgsgeschiedenis van de koninklijke landmacht' (1979), p. 57.
[242] Schulten, *Het leger in de 17de eeuw*, p. 57.
[243] Den Bosch oud-stadsarchief, No.3885, no.45 'Placcaat tegens de duellen ende krackelen' (1684).
[244] Ibid, p. 564.

commission as an officer, and eternal banishment. The strongest penalties were reserved for duelling, which was strongly forbidden in the Dutch army. The offenders, meaning both parties, faced the death penalty and the confiscation of their goods. The dead bodies of the duellers were afterwards suspended from the gallows. In addition, witnesses and everyone who was aware of the duel and failed to report it, would also be punished.

In the rules on military discipline there are, in total 82 regulations on various crimes and offences. The offences vary from blasphemy (three days imprisonment on water and bread for the first offence, and when convicted for the second time the blasphemer was to have "*a glowing iron thrust through his tongue, then be stripped to his shirt and so banished out of the United Provinces*"[245]) to murder, rape, adultery, thievery and arson. Serious offences that threatened the political or military order were punishable by death. Any soldier who conspired against the States, the country towns, the governors, or the captains, "*whereby the public state of the land may be in any sort damaged or endangered*", was to be hanged "*without any mercy*"[246]. The statutes also protected widows, married and unmarried women "*such are in childbed or with child or any young children*", prostitutes were expelled from the camps and were to be repeatedly whipped and then banished.[247]

Prostitution was apparently such a great problem for the Protestant mentality that, in 1581, a resolution from the Scottish Privy Council was released that mentioned specifically the "*mony and divers trowpis and cumpanies of licht wemen, uncumly, and indecent in thair maners, countenance, behaviour and array, not being mens wyffis nor having ony necessary knawin effaires or bissynes.*"[248] The Privy Council expressed the concern that the prostitutes were not only "*an offence to God*", but would dishonour Scotland and cause grief to those who were serving in the army. As a result, the Privy Council made a proclamation *"at the market crosses of Edinburgh, Dundie and Aberdine, the pier and shore of Leit"* that the *"skippers, mariners, and owners and masters of ships"* were to transport no women except known wives or women of good reputation.[249]

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[245] Ibid.
[246] Ibid, p. 564.
[247] Ibid.
[248] *Register of the Privy Council, 1581*, vol. III (1880), p. 400.
[249] Ibid.

An important part of disciplinary regulations was not only to maintain order and discipline within the ranks, but also to prevent the soldier from deserting or changing sides. It was stated that when a soldier went from one company to another, or when he left *"the colours under which he serves"*, he was to be in possession of a valid passport signed by his commanding officer, and any failure in complying with this regulation was punishable by death.[250] Furthermore, the soldier that left his garrison or company *further than a canon shot* without the permission of commanding officer was also to be punished by death.[251]

In the maintenance of discipline within the army, officers played a crucial role. Although there are not many sources that reveal disorderly behaviour by Scottish soldiers, when it did occur, it was usually because of the absence of a commanding officer. The punishments were especially severe when the military order was threatened. Prince Maurice, for example, had a soldier executed because he had gathered a group of fellow soldiers to challenge the disciplining act of a captain. The reason was that no soldier had the right to gather troops, especially not to challenge a commanding officer.[252]

Within the company, it was the task of the *provost* to maintain order and discipline at the lower level. The *provost* received payment for the execution of sentences, for instance three guilders for a whipping, and six guilders for decapitation and hanging. Serious crimes came before a court martial, but since it was impossible for a court martial to deal with all offences committed, minor crimes, such as insubordination and drunkenness, became the responsibility of commanding officers.[253] Sometimes, the issue became too complicated for the local authorities, who then in turn referred them to the national authorities. For example, in the city of Tiel in 1619, a Scottish Sergeant named Geddi who belonged to the company of Sir Francis Henderson, killed the soldier Jan Bruessen (or Brusson) belonging to the company of Sir Henry Livingstone. Besides Geddi, other soldiers were accused as well, but according to the governor they had no hand in the matter. Due to the complexity of the case, the governor of Tiel decided to send a request to the Council of State to ask if the Council could help him with

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[250] Den Bosch oud-stadsarchief, No.3885, no.45 'Placcaat tegens de duellen ende krackelen' (1684), p. 565.
[251] Ibid, p. 565.
[252] B. Nickle, *The military reforms of Prince Maurice of Orange, PhD University of Delaware* (1975), p. 98.
[253] Schulten, *Het leger*, p. 60.

the situation in order "*to perceive the real state of the case*".[254]

Finally, when dealing with foreign groups, different problems would surface that could threaten order within the army. In particular, the hostile behaviour of one nationality towards another was a cause of concern for the Dutch authorities. Despite their efforts to keep them apart, clashes were sometimes unavoidable. In a letter from Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, the Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate of the Venetian Republic, written on the 27th of August 1603, he mentions the following occurrence in the Dutch army camp: "*Many English have come back from the camp of Count Maurice on account of a quarrel between them and the French. And had not the Scottish interfered with arms more than the two hundred who fell would have been slain.*"[255] It is hard to verify the truth of this letter, but this example stated by Scaramelli is echoed by a letter addressed to Lord Walsingham. The author of the letter explains how the hatred towards other foreign units could seriously endanger military progress. "*Eyndhoven holds good, but I fear will hardly be relieved...for the French forces are too weak for the service, and the troops in the land of Waes, as I hear, have confederated together, English, Scotch, Walloons, and Flemings, not to depart thence without two months' pay, which the States, I think, will hardly be able to furnish suddenly, and, which is as bad a point, they mean no more to march into the field with the French, who they say will be ever practising to cut their throat...*"[256].

The Dutch seemed to be aware of potential friction between the different nationalities and conducted a policy of keeping the various foreign units separate. In 1628, for example, the States of Holland gave the command of an English cavalry company to an Englishman and not a Scotsman, "to prevent confusion of the two nations."[257] Also when campaigning, the Dutch tended to keep the nationalities separate, in the camp of Prince Maurice at the siege of Grol in 1597, for example, the English units were located at the north-west corner of the

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[254] Letter to the Council of State, 19 March 1619, from the governor of Tiel, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 299.
[255] *Calendar of State Papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice 1603-1607*, vol. X (London 1900).
[256] Letter from Audley Danett to Walsingham, 24 February 1583, in: *Calendar of Foreign Papers, 1583* (ed. A.J. Butler, S. Crawford Lomas) (London 1913), p. 153.
[257] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 111.

camp, while the Scots were stationed at the south-west and south-east corner of the camp, with the Dutch regiments between the two nationalities.[258]

Promotion and retirement

Promotion

Traditionally, in the army of the Dutch Republic, a noble background was considered to be less important than skill in order to be liable for promotion; in the words of Hugh Dunthorne, "it was a school in which promotion was to be achieved through merit rather than birth."[259] The career of Scottish Colonel William Edmond seems to confirm this. He was, in his own words, not "*a great man borne, merely the son of a poore Baker of Edenbourgh...[who] workes hard for his living*"[260] He became a commissioned officer nonetheless. Was the Dutch army an exception to the rule that applied to most other European states of an aristocracy-dominated military? The idea of a military not dominated by nobility seems to correspond with the idea of the Dutch Republic as lacking the presence of a strong noble class. Zwitzer provides an overview of the subaltern officers in the Dutch army in 1789, and the results indeed seem to illustrate a lack of nobles in the ranks. The total amount of subaltern officers in 1789 was 1199, of which 889 were Dutch and 310 were foreign. Of these subalterns, only 118 (or 10%) were of noble descent.[261] This appears to be a clear-cut case, but in order to complete the picture it is important to look at the higher officer ranks.

Zwitzer also gives an overview of the regimental commanders in the years 1702-1746 and 1747-1795, and here the perspective is completely different. Between 1702 and 1746, of the 271 regimental commanders, only 106 (39%) did not belong to the nobility, while 165 (61%) commanders were of noble birth.[262] For the years 1747-1795, the differences are more apparent. Of the 159 commanders, 53 (33%) had non-noble status, while 106 (67%)

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[258] Dunthorne, 'Sots in the wars', p. 121; Camp of Maurice at the siege of Grol 1597. From Jan Blaeu, *Novum ac magnum theatrum urbium Belgicae Regiae* 2 vols (Amsterdam 1649), I, p. 50.
[259] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 110.
[260] Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 110; Peacham, *The complete Gentleman* (London 1622), p. 15.
[261] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 131.
[262] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 132.

commanders belonged to the aristocracy.[263] It appears that while the nobility was under-represented in the subaltern ranks of the officer class, in the higher military functions, noble descent did indeed make a difference and, in this sense, the Republic was following the military traditions of other European powers. The Scots Brigade, however, did not seem to follow this trend, and examining a list of its regimental commanders reveals that many of its colonels were not of noble status. Between 1572 and 1782, there were 67 Scottish commanders, and of these only 27 (40 %) were of noble descent. While it could very well be that merit and skill were indeed more important than nobility for gaining high rank in the Scots Brigade, it must also be said, however, that most of the Scottish colonels served for a very long time, thus diminishing the possibility for other colonels of noble status to enter the ranks. Between the years 1689 and 1782, there were five colonels serving in the second Scottish regiment, three of which served 25 years and above. The same goes for the third regiment, which also had five colonels, of which one served for 49 years. The first regiment had nine colonels, with two colonels serving for more than 21 years.

With regard to the Scots Brigade, it seems indeed that social class was not that important for achieving a high rank, and that there were other factors involved. What were those other grounds that entitled an officer to a promotion? Who was responsible for the promotion? In 1618, an arrangement was made by the Council of State and the Stadtholder which concerned precisely the appointment of officers. When appointing an officer, it was important that he had conducted himself bravely in the past; captains had to have served for at least four years, lieutenants and ensigns three years, before being liable for promotion.[264] Captains, lieutenants and ensigns were named by the Stadtholder upon recommendation by 3-5 people employed by the Province responsible for the payment of the military unit.[265] For foreign captains and higher officers, the Stadtholder was the only responsible authority for promotion. Foreign lieutenants and ensigns were promoted by the regimental commander with the consent of the Stadtholder.[266]

In the lists of conduct[267] of the Scottish officers from the late 18th century, it is clearly shown

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[263] Ibid.
[264] C.J. Gudde, *Vier eeuwen geschiedenis van het garnizoen 's-Hertogenbosch* (Den Bosch 1958), p. 113.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Gudde, *Vier eeuwen*, p. 113-114.
[267] See appendix 1.

what the specific conditions were for promotion. Most of the officers that appear in the lists were considered candidates for promotion. There were several requirements which an officer had to meet in order to be promoted. In the conduct lists there are basically three conditions. Firstly, ambition and zeal with regard to the service; secondly, whether an officer is of good behaviour; and finally, his capability in drilling. Overall, promotions occurred on grounds of seniority. Most of the officers were recommended for promotion. There were 38 subaltern officers in the regiment of General Marjoribanks in 1773, 30 officers were recommended for promotion. For five of the officers it was not sure if they were liable for promotion, one was too old to continue to serve and two others deserved to be promoted, however, they were no longer capable because of physical complaints.[268] The same applied to the regiment of General Major Gordon, of the 37 subaltern officers, only four were not recommended for promotion.[269] The reasons for their refusal were straightforward, they were not capable enough in drilling (a quality crucial for the tactics of the early modern army), their behaviour was not of the best nature, and some of them lacked the necessary ambition.

Retirement

Since an official pension system was unknown in the early modern army, a position as an officer was, if one was not discharged or did not leave the unit, for life. Nevertheless, officers who became too old for active duty, or who were no longer capable of performing their duties because of physical difficulties, had the chance to be exempted from active military service.

There were two forms of pension. The first was a system whereby an officer who was too old for, or was physically incapable of, active service could be eligible for an allowance, whereby he became a so-called *appointé.* In 1675, the States of Holland decided to admit as *appointés* only those officers who were repartitioned to Holland and who, because of actions against the enemy, where so physically affected that they could no longer serve in the army.[270] In addition, soldiers/officers who had served for 30 years were equally allowed to become *appointés*. In the beginning, the *appointement* was for three years, after which it was decided if it should be continued. In 1706, however, Holland decided to exclude from this tri-annual re-evaluation soldiers and horsemen who had lost both arms or legs, and later those who were

[268] ARA, conduct list of General Marjoribanks, 1773.
[269] ARA, conduct list of General Major Gordon, 1773.
[270] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 99.

so gravely mutilated or were of such old age that they could no longer serve the Dutch Republic. These soldiers and equestrians were to be *appointés* for life.[271] How much money they received depended on the gravity of their injuries. The States of Holland also tried, following the tradition of the French army, to form a *compagnie des invalides*, which could perform guard duty in the garrisons. Other provinces, however, did not follow the example of Holland and had their own regulations concerning the *appointés*. In 1792, the States General created a resolution that applied the *appointé* regulation uniformly across all states of the Dutch Republic. The overall amount that was to be divided equally over the States came to 300.000 guilders.[272]

The second type of pension system concerned officers who were exempted from active service while retaining their wages and often their company. They were then placed with the *Armée van den Staat* (the Army of the State). This concerned mostly officers who appealed directly to the Stadtholder who had become (after the conclusion of the War of the Austrian Succession) the Stadtholder of all the provinces and who, as a result, could distribute military titles and could put older officers on non-active duty while keeping their income. According to Zwitzer, it was inevitable that this system would be susceptible to the arbitrariness of the Stadtholder, and that through this system the authority of the Stadtholder would be increased.[273] The officers involved were almost all older officers who had a respectable age and rank. They were excluded from any military activity in order to prevent any conflicts with younger officers who were, according to the rule of seniority, lower in rank than the officers placed by the *armée*.[274] The officers were still present on muster rolls and lists of conduct with their non-active state noted, and they also still resided with the company. It is evident that, for many older officers, this became a great opportunity to receive a pension where they usually would have had no possibility of acquiring one.

Specifically for the Scottish officers, there are registers that list every soldier and officer between the years 1762 and 1794 who was exempted from military service because of their old age or war infirmities.[275] Some of these officers and soldiers received a pension, but most

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[271] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 100.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 103.
[274] Ibid.
[275] ARA, archive of the States of Holland and West-Friesland after 1572, no. 3103, 3142,3146,3150, 3154, 3158, 3162, 3166, 3170, 3173, 3177, 3181, 3185, 3189, 3193, 3197,3201, 3205, 3209, 3213 etc.

of them were placed in one of the *compangnies des invalides* in the province of Holland. The soldiers that only received an allowance were allowed to settle anywhere they wanted, but soldiers that were placed in the *compagnies des invalides* were stationed within the garrison towns where these companies were serving. According to Maclean, soldiers who were pensioned were older than fifty and younger than seventy years, although there is one example of a soldier who was 75 in 1778.[276] The pension of a soldier was, in the 18th century, 7 guilders a month, and that of a sergeant 10 guilders a month. All the soldiers who were liable for the pension settlement had been serving continuously for 30 years and could no longer perform their duties because of old age or physical infirmities. In the year 1781, the largest number of soldiers were pensioned and allocated to the *compagnies des invalides*. There were 191 Scottish soldiers in total, of whom 92 received an ordinary pension, while the others were placed with the various *compagnies des invalides:* Delft received 14, Klundert 21, Naarden 24, Woerden 14 and Woudrichem 20 soldiers respectively.[277] A total of 439 Scottish soldiers were excused from military service on grounds of weakness, physical ailments or old age between 1762 and 1794.[278] Of these 439 soldiers, 271 were placed with the *compagnies des invalides* in Holland, and 168 received a regular pension.

The most common reasons for exemption from military service were physical ailments, usually due to old age, but also as a result of battle inflicted injuries. In the lists, there is no apparent distinction between the ailments of the soldiers placed with the *compagnie des invalides* and the ones put on a pension.

Despite their dual status, however, the autonomy of the Scots Brigade in the Dutch army was strongly restricted. Even though the Scottish regiments maintained their distinctive Scottish character and were seen as foreign citizens, where army regulations were concerned, they had to follow the policy of the Dutch authorities. The States General was responsible for any augmentations and reductions of the Scottish regiments, creating new regiments in times of need (as happened during the campaign of John of Austria) and disbanding as soon as a crisis

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[276] J. Mac Lean, 'De pensionering en de indeling bij de compagnieën invaldise van militairen van de Schotse Brigade 1762-1794', in: *Caledonian Society*, 5, No.3, p. 40.

[277] Ibid.

[278] The fact that the Scots Brigade was officially disbanded in 1782 did not mean that the Scots soldiers were disbanded as well, most of them were placed within other regiments, and even the former Scottish regiments, despite the fact they were "Dutch" now, still had Scottish soldiers and officers.

had passed. The States also made the appointments for new officers. As a result, while before the Scottish commander was fairly independent in his regiment, after 1608, the captain was no longer allowed to appointment officers in his regiment without the consent of the Provinces. An important consideration regarding the autonomy of the Scottish regiments was the fact that the Dutch Republic was responsible for the payment of these regiments. Although the captain could be allowed to buy a company as a form of investment, he still received his pay from the Dutch authorities. The Scottish commander was independent regarding the way he spent the money, but there were also restrictions, for example, the fact that the salaries of the soldiers and officers were fixed. In the end, the Council of State and the separate Provinces held the final responsibility regarding financial matters. The pension system was arranged by the separate Provinces and, soldiers and officers who were liable for a pension due to old age or war injuries either received a pension from a specific Province, or were allocated to one of the so-called *compagnie des invalides*. Once again, the Dutch Republic paid for this. Regarding promotion, the Scottish commander was free to do as he wished, so long as he had the consent of the Stadtholder. For disciplinary matters, there were strong regulations set up by the Dutch States, but most of the attribution of military justice was conducted within the regiment by the company commander. When an issue was too large to be handled on the level of the company or of the regiment, the Scottish officer or governor could, and would, refer to the higher national level of justice, where the Council of State and the States General would give advice and pass judgement. These restrictions on Scottish autonomy were, however, not always that easy to be put into practice. Thus despite the attempts of the Dutch States to control the Scottish regiments and to fit these regiments in the Dutch army, the Scots Brigade remained a non-Dutch unit, a fact which on occasion would become very clear. The example of the Scots refusing to help lift the siege of Eindhoven because of their animosity towards the French, or the fact that the Dutch government assimilated the Scottish units during the second Anglo-Dutch war, indicates that the Scottish regiments were in fact not as fully integrated in the Dutch army as the States desired.

Chapter 4 Military discontent

One of the inevitable consequences of the difficulties concerning military life and its hierarchical command structure was that it lead to many forms of conflict and strife. Military discontent is a universal phenomenon that is not limited to time, group and place, and therefore it is neither a specific Scottish phenomenon nor particular to the early modern period or the Dutch army. Nevertheless, it remained an important aspect of Scottish military life and its relationship with the Dutch State. Military discontent was expressed in many different forms, varying from insubordination against an officer to full-scale mutiny and treason. It is important to understand that while there were many varieties of military discontent, the cause of the conflicts was often homogeneous. As such, many examples of military discontent originated from either dissatisfaction with military life, or from conflicts of authority.

Military discontent affected mostly the military unit itself. Some of these conflicts, however, could also impact upon a wider environment beyond the military unit. There are examples of officers betraying the town in which they were garrisoned because of personal conflicts, or of companies mutinying against their commanding officer and thereby likewise endangering the town they were assigned to defend.

There were also direct conflicts between the Dutch authorities and the Scottish commanders, confrontations which were concerned mainly with the twin imperatives of payment and promotion. In these cases, the officer would usually lay claim to a position or a pension to which the Dutch authorities did not consent. However, while these confrontations can be regarded as a form of authority conflict, they were often very personal issues that did not always concern military matters. For example, while the conflict between the Dutch State and Colonel Bartholomew Balfour can be seen as a form of military discontent, the confrontation between the Earl of Buccleuch and the Dutch government was a very personal conflict that was more about honour than military discontent.[279]

[279] See pages 132-134.

A key issue of military discontent is the relation between officer and soldier, which, paradoxically, was more tense in times of peace than in times of war. According to Georg Simmel, in periods of war and combat, the subordinate structure of the army whereby the soldier is dominated by the officer and, as such, is rendered dependent, is more clear and under less strain than in times of peace and stability. "The cleavage between subordination within the organisation of the group, and coordination which results from common service in defence of one's country, is as wide as can be imagined. Understandably enough, the cleavage is most noticeable at the front. On the one hand, discipline is most merciless there, but on the other hand, fellowship between officers and privates is furthered, partly by specific situations, partly by the general mood."[280] The purpose of the soldier and the army in times of war is clear and, despite the differences between soldier and officer, combat action and rigorous discipline at the front prevents the rift between the two subjects from broadening. Only when the purpose of the army and that of the soldier becomes less focused, as occurs in times of political stability and peace, does the rift expand.

According to Simmel, in order to prevent the differences between soldiers and officers from becoming too large, it is important for the army to be subordinate to a higher structure which is that not of the officer, but rather of an objective goal. He refers to this, in his own words, as a 'super-subordination'. "During peace-time, the army remains arrested in the position of a means which does not attain its purposes; it is, therefore inevitable for its technical structure to grow into a psychological ultimate aim, so that super-subordination, on which the technique of the organization is based, stands in the foreground of consciousness."[281] This 'super-subordination' could be, for example, the defence of the country. Unfortunately, in the early modern period, the idea of 'super-subordination' under an objective idea did not apply. The soldier could not be made to serve an objective goal when such concepts had not been formulated, or at least when the soldier could not identify with them. Soldiering was a fluid profession; the soldier did not consider himself to be 'only' a soldier. Often, before joining the army, he had fulfilled a number of different professions which he could take up again as soon as he left the army. Compared with his contemporary counterpart, the early modern soldier was, geographically and socially speaking, far more mobile.

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[280] K. H. Wolff (ed.), *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (New York 1950), p. 266.
[281] Ibid.

The problem of the rift between soldier and officer became especially evident, therefore, in times of non-active military duty, when the two were confined together in the garrison towns of the Dutch Republic. It was then that the desertions were highest, which corresponds with the results of the observations of both Arthur Gilbert and Edward Shils[282]. Because of the organisational changes in the military apparatus in the late 17th and 18th century, whereby the army became increasingly a fixed political and economical unit, the conflict between officer and soldier, or between the need for structure and order and the necessity for mobility and fluidity, lessened gradually, although it never completely disappeared. The subordinate-superordinate relationship persisted as a source of conflict and tension.

Desertion

One of the most consistent and common forms through which military discontent was expressed was desertion. Desertion could apply to any kind of situation –individual and group- and to any kind of motivation –bad payment, boredom, hunger, confusion over enlistment and discharge terms, or personal conflicts. Unfortunately, most of the evidence regarding desertions by Scottish soldiers is qualitative and there is a strong lack of actual numbers. Consequently, it is almost impossible to say how many Scottish soldiers actually deserted during their service in the Dutch army. Fortunately, while lacking exact numbers, there are many specific examples of desertion that help to create a rather accurate picture of desertion amongst Scottish soldiers. These example help to understand better the process of desertion, why the soldiers deserted, how the army reacted to the desertions, and which group was most susceptible to desert. Unfortunately, the source material regarding most desertion cases has been difficult to interpret since most of the sources are testimonies of deserters brought before the military court. These deserters were strongly motivated to reveal anything the military court wanted to hear in order to avoid the often harsh punishments of the military tribunal. As a result, many testimonies are not completely accurate in describing the actual act and motivation for the desertion. Furthermore, it is difficult to make a general statement

[282] A. Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted from the Eighteenth-Century British Army' in: *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1980); E. Shils, 'A Profile of the Military Deserter', in: *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 3, no.3 (1977), p. 427.

regarding the desertion rate of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch army because of insufficient quantitative data.

The military reforms of the 17th century, such as the regulation of payment and stronger disciplinary measures, did help to professionalize the standing army and to diminish the problem of desertion. In other ways, however, these very same measures could also incite a soldier to desert, so that sometimes the cure appeared worse than the disease. Punishments for minor offences, for example, were often so severe in the army that soldiers would desert in order to avoid them. Arthur Gilbert looked into the defences of 455 soldiers in the British army who were found guilty of desertion at general court-martials between 1757 and 1762. According to Gilbert, in 39 cases (8.5%) the soldiers claimed that "fear of punishment had made them deserters."[283] It seems that the severe punishment used to counteract desertions could indeed be the cause of desertions. Gilbert gives the example of a certain Pat Coyle who, at his trial in 1761 declared "*that the night before the regiment marched, he unluckily was out of the encampment, and having drank too much liquor, stayed out of camp all night; that on his finding the regiment was marched away, he durst not follow them, for fear of punishment.*"[284]

It is also important to realise that desertion was not always a conscious process. In some cases, the soldier deserted because there were confusions regarding the terms of his discharge, a plausible phenomenon since military administration was not of exemplary efficiency in the 17th and 18th centuries. Nevertheless, the military authorities drew no distinctions, and considered "involuntary desertion" to be equally punishable as "voluntary desertion". In the court reports used by Gilbert, the motivations for deserting were derived from the defence statements made by the British deserters who tried to present themselves in a more favourable light in order to avoid punishment. Many of the statements refer precisely to this "involuntary desertion". In 30% of Gilbert's cases, the offender claimed to have been drunk and fallen asleep, or simply that he had got lost along the way. In some cases concerning the British soldiers who were stationed in Canada, they claimed they were abducted by Indians or French soldiers.[285]

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[283] Gilbert, 'Desertion in the 18th-century British Army', p. 561.
[284] Ibid.
[285] Gilbert, 'Desertion in the 18th-century British Army', p. 560.

The situation of the British troops in North America was not different from that of the Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic. Both groups of soldiers were in unfamiliar territory and far from home; indeed most of the Scottish soldiers who deserted from the Dutch army had come directly from Scotland. The following case of desertion gives a detailed description of the act of deserting and illustrates, at the same time, the attempts of the accused to defend their actions and, consequently, their hope of avoiding punishment. It concerned three young Scottish soldiers, John Campbell (19), Charles Mackleen (18) and John Mackleen (19), all three soldiers in the regiment of Lieutenant General Colyear. The report stated that in the year 1727, John Campbell and Charles Mackleen conspired to desert. In order to accomplish their goal, they took off the slings of their muskets, which enabled them to facilitate their descent of the city walls. After arranging with John Mackleen that he would join them later that night, they went together to the city walls. On the city walls, they tied together the slings, and Charles Mackleen was the first to attempt the descent. When John Campbell tried to make his way down, a corporal of the regiment of the Crown Prince of Prussia arrived, which caused John Campbell to climb up and to run back to the barracks together with John Mackleen. Charles Mackleen, who had by then completed his descent, decided to return and was arrested with the other two deserters.[286] The court martial judged that one of the three deserters should be punished by death, the victim being selected by chance. All three of them claimed to have been pressed into the military service, a claim for which no evidence existed.[287]

A statement of the corporal who discovered the deserters contributes to the further visualisation of the course of events. Christoffel Warnier, corporal in the company of Captain von Hitzacker, in the regiment of the Crown Prince of Prussia, stated that "*he saw the night before yesterday around ten o'clock a soldier on the city wall.*"[288] After he saw other soldiers approaching, he believed that they "*had there once again a prostitute, as they had the night before.*"[289] Being curious, he stood up and went there "*to see what kind of characters they were.*"[290] When he arrived on the wall, he witnessed three Scottish soldiers attempting to climb over the wall. One of them was already beneath the wall in the ditch, while the second was making his descent. The third soldier was lying on his stomach to help the second, and he

[286] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 780, rec. 8 August 1727.
[287] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 780, rec. 8 August 1727.
[288] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 780, B: 'statement under oath of Corporal Christoff Warnier in the regiment of the Crown Prince of Prussia, 28 June 1727.'
[289] Ibid.
[290] Ibid.

pulled the latter up. Once back on their feet, they ran away, after which the corporal found two musket slings on the floor. According to the statement of the corporal, he also took a rapier, but one of the two soldiers –the smallest one- snatched the sword from his hand. The corporal left to report the incident to the sergeant of the company, and brought the two musket slings as proof.[291]

The most interesting part of the entire case proves to be the reports of the three accused, all three of whom claimed to have been victims in the matter, and that they had been forced into it by the other two. In the first file of the dossier -the accusation of Colonel Murray against the three deserters- John Campbell stated that "*he was corrupted and forced by the other two to desert, but did not want to consent to. Notwithstanding that, they promised him to take him along with them on their expenses, and that they had enough money to go to Holland*[292] *together.*"[293]

A more detailed version of John Campbell's attempts at shifting the blame is to be found in his interrogation report. In addition, the entire file gives a good example of how the military justice process worked when dealing with deserters. The report starts with the personal data of Campbell. John Campbell, nineteen years old ("*or something of the sort*"[294]), was born on the island of Skye in Scotland and had served for three months in the company of Colonel Graham, in the regiment of Lieutenant General Colyear. After the personal data, the defendant was asked whether or not the *artikel brief*, with the disciplinary regulations of the army, had been read to him, and whether he was aware of the fact that when a soldier deserts, he would be hanged. Campbell responded that he was not present at the time the *artikel brief* was read out, that he knew deserters were hanged, but that he did not have the intention to desert. After the general formalities, the authorities began to focus more on the course of events of that particular night. The first question was whether the accused had removed the sling of the fire weapon he was carrying. Campbell claimed that he removed the sling so that it would not hinder him and that he had given the sling to John Mackleen for safekeeping. When asked whether or not he had gone to the city walls the night before yesterday in the company of Charles Mackleen and John Mackleen, Campbell responded that both Mackleens came to him

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[291] Ibid.
[292] By 'Holland' is meant the province of Holland.
[293] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 780, A: 'Aenklagte van den Colonel Murray, 24 June 1727.'
[294] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 780, C 'articles concerning the statements of John Campbell.'

that night and had asked him to accompany them. After Campbell, according to his version of events, had refused to go with them, they told him that they had enough money to help Campbell on his way. Campbell accompanied them to the wall, but began to hesitate, saying that he did not want to go with them, and then left the two men on the wall. To the question of whether the other two deserters used the slings to climb down the wall in order to desert, Campbell stated that he did not go further than the wall, and that he therefore did not know about it.[295]

Campbell's version of what transpired on that particular night clearly differed from the report of Corporal Warnier, and when the authorities confronted Campbell with the statement of the corporal, Campbell claimed to know nothing. The authorities asked Campbell whether the arrival of a corporal from the Crown Prince of Prussia had prevented them from deserting. Campbell answered that he saw a 'person' of the Crown Prince on the city wall, but that he did not know what was his rank. Concerning the rapier and the two slings that the corporal claimed to have seen and taken, the accused stated that he did not see any musket slings, but that he knew that the other two deserters each carried a rapier. When asked whether the corporal took the slings and the rapier, and whether the deserters yanked the rapier from the hand of the corporal, the accused pleaded ignorance.

The final question concerned the way in which the conspiracy came about, and which one of the three was the first to propose to desert. This question presented John Campbell with the opportunity to place the blame on the other two deserters and portray himself as a victim, or at least as an unwilling accomplice. "*On the twelfth (question) he answers that last Monday morning, the two Mackleens came to him, and told him that he could come with them, and (he) responded to that that he did not want to because he had given away his money, that is three shillings, to pay for his diner, so that he did not have left more than half a shilling from his loan, and Charles Mackleen said that he had been away before, but that he did not have his shoes yet, and that the other two said that they had money enough to go away, and that he had no knowledge of other accomplices and that Charles Mackleen had said that he understood enough English*[296] *to get away.*"[297] In the passage, John Campbell mentioned that

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[295] Ibid.

[296] This particular reference of Charles Mackleen understanding enough English to get away, indicates that the three soldiers were probably Gaelic speaking.

he did not have more than half a shilling from his loan. Many soldiers were not paid in full by their officers. This was mainly due to the absence of an efficient payment system and a lack of financial resources, however, it also served as an important instrument of binding the soldier to his company and to prevent him from deserting. The soldier lived constantly on the edge of poverty, and an officer by not giving full payment or by giving out loans to the soldier, made the latter dependant on him for his financial survival. Additionally, for Scottish soldiers the fact of not speaking Dutch or even English could be seen as an yet another determent from deserting.

Ultimately, the court martial decided that all three of them were guilty of desertion and "*to condemn the three prisoners and accused with a majority of the votes to select by chance who shall be punished by death, so shall the same be punished with the cord until death occurs.*"[298]

Motivation

In order to understand desertion as an example of regimental tension, it is important to define the motivations of the deserter. What drove a soldier to desertion and how did the military authorities respond to it, or tried to prevent desertion from happening? Although most of the examples deal with Scottish soldiers, the sources reveal no particular data that would indicate that Scottish behaviour towards desertion regarding motivation, but also concerning punishment, differed greatly from that of other nationalities.

Edward Shils investigated the behaviour of the 20th century American deserter. He states that "armies operated under especially difficult conditions since their members are isolated from the sustaining influence of local and familial influences and subject their members to the strain of discipline and danger."[299] With these words, Shils captures the greatest difficulty of being a soldier, namely the social isolation of the soldier and the strong pressure of army life and armed combat. Despite the fact that Shils refers to the profile of the 20th century military deserter, many problems that preoccupied the American soldier of the 20th century were of

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[297] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 780, C 'articles concerning the statements of John Campbell.'
[298] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 780, L 'sentence of the three accused'.
[299] Shils, 'A Profile of the Military Deserter', p. 427.

equal concern for the Scottish soldier in the early modern period. According to Shils, desertion is a universal phenomenon which is not limited to one type of army, to peacetime or to wartime.[300] Furthermore, as can be concluded from the desertions of the 20th century U.S. army, neither is it a chronological phenomenon that can be resolved through administrative, disciplinary and financial improvements.

On the 16th of September 1974, President Ford announced the Presidential Clemency Program. About 20,000 young deserters from the Vietnam war were affected by the proclamation. Research was conducted by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences in order to study the characteristics of the deserters from the enlisted ranks of the army who participated in the programme.[301] The profile that emerged from the study was a familiar one. "The deserter turns out to be the soldier who has not been integrated into society at large, into his family, or into his military unit. Of the deserters 50% gave "personal, family or financial problems" or some combination of them as reasons for their desertion."[302] It is impossible to say, with any degree of certainty, whether the conclusions of the report could apply to the profile of the early modern Scottish deserter in Dutch service. What is clear, however, is that the fact of being in foreign military service may be considered an extra factor for desertion.

Many Scottish soldiers who fled the service of the States General were returning to Scotland, as a letter from James II to the Scottish Privy Council illustrates. James commented that every day, numerous soldiers serving in the Scottish regiments in the Dutch Republic deserted and left their companies with the permission of their officers, and that these soldiers "*are harboured and employed in our kingdom of Scotland.*" [303] Another example comes from the year 1689. Because of the frequent desertions, the Scottish regiment of the Duke of Schonberge had an urgent need for 500 recruits. In response, King William made an announcement in which he authorized the officers of that regiment to seize "*as many of the deserters from the said regiment as they can find in that our ancient kingdom [Scotland]*".[304] Two years later, in 1691, an act of the Scottish Privy Council was published that gave

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[300] Shils, 'Military deserter', p. 427.
[301] Shils, 'Military deserter', p. 429.
[302] Ibid.
[303] *Register from the Privy Council, third series, 1685-1686,* vol. XI (ed. H. Paton) (1929), p. 124.
[304] *Register from the Privy Council, third series, 1686-1689,* vol. XIII (ed. H. Paton) (1932), p. 480.

permission to a certain Captain Home to levy troops in Scotland for a regiment in Flanders. During this recruitment, he was allowed to pick up any deserters who were in Scotland "*provydeing the saids deserters be not presently in their Majesties service, and upon the petitioners expences to receav into their prisones only such of the saids deserters as shall be proven to be such by famous witnesses or by the oaths of the persones.*"[305] Despite the fact that William of Orange was the King of England and Scotland, it was clearly not permitted to use deserters who were in his service in Scotland for regiments in Flanders.

The main motivation by far for desertion in the early modern period, as revealed in the sources, is discontent with the living conditions in the army. This conclusion had already been drawn in 1632 with regard to the Spanish army in Flanders. The adviser of Philip IV, Don Sancho de Zuniga y Monroy, mentioned that "*desertion springs principally from the ill-treatment and necessity which characterize the Army of Flanders.*"[306] The prime motivation seems indeed to have been more the inhumane conditions within the army camp than, for instance, fear of battle or death. The *cardinal-infante* explained to the Spanish king in 1635 that "in many deserters despair plays a greater role than fear, so much so that these days many soldiers go over to the enemy exclusively in order to get a safe-conduct to Italy or Spain."[307] Parker states that, during the siege of Bergen op Zoom in 1622, some 2,500 men of the Spanish army (one third of the total lost) fled to the besieged city in order to obtain money and a free passage home.[308] This phenomenon of desertion not out of fear, but as a result of despair or discontent, seems to apply regardless of the historical period; of the deserters interviewed during president Ford's clemency programme, only 3-4% were serving in combat units during the Vietnam war.[309]

Similarly, in the British army during the 18th-century, there were virtually no battle-related desertion trials. According to Gilbert, the reason why so few desertions took place during combat situations was because it was very likely that a soldier who attempted to desert on the

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[305] Register from the Privy Council, third series, vol. XVI, 1691 (1970), p. 46-47.
[306] G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659. The logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (Cambridge 1972), p. 206; Archivo General de Simancas, Guerra Antigua 1052, unfol., *consulta* of the Council of War, 21 June 1632, *voto* of Castaneda.
[307] Parker, *Spanish Road*, p. 211; AGRB SEG 213/157-8, cardinal-infante to the King, 11 October 1635.
[308] Parker, *Spanish Road*, p. 211.
[309] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted', p. 553.

battlefield would be shot on the spot by his officers.[310] Gilbert continues by stating that "the British soldier, in spite of the dangers of battle, did not leave the army because of fear of enemy guns. In other words, desertion tended to take place at times when the soldier was in a relatively peaceful environment, i.e., British army conditions, not the nature of warfare *per se*, led men to leave their units."[311] Taking into account the desertion cases concerning the Scottish soldiers, it seems that most of them deserted while either on garrison duty or while they were away on leave. Virtually no records exist of soldiers who deserted while engaged in battle.

The fact that most desertion cases took place during non-combat situations, and often during garrison duty, is further illustrated by the following case of two soldiers and a drummer who deserted from Bergen op Zoom in 1714. Julien Dúgue (23), soldier in the company of Colonel Bowie, David Marchal (19), soldier in the company of Major Mosman, and Edward Ghay (20), drummer in the company of Captain Nicolas Balfour[312], deserted with the aid of false passports. The two soldiers deserted in possession of their full equipment and weapons. The drummer had his uniform with him. They had three passports signed with the name of Captain Nicolas Balfour, as if all three of them had served in his company. The three deserters went to Bruges in order to join a Scottish regiment of fusiliers that was stationed there. Unfortunately, the commander of the fusiliers regiment became suspicious of the passes and wrote to the garrison of Bergen op Zoom asking whether the passes were legitimate. Bergen op Zoom responded that the three should be held by the provost until they could send a commander to retrieve them. Colonel Murray, who was the commanding officer, reported that he had taken the three deserters and the false passes.

The three deserters confessed that a certain Thomas Thinsill, a soldier in the company of Colonel Bowie, had made the counterfeit passes, who was also then taken into custody.[313] Julien Dúgue was the only Frenchman, being born in Brittany, while the other two were Scots, David Marchal from Streveling[314] and Edward Gay from Glasgow. All three were serving in the regiment of General Major Hamilton. Since the deserters had violated the military code and jurisdiction, an example had to be made of them, and thus the court martial

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[310] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted', p. 560.
[311] Ibid.
[312] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 710; ARA, archive Council of State, no. 187, fol. 332.
[313] ARA, archive Council of State no. 710.
[314] It is possible that Streveling is a dialectical form of Sterling.

condemned all three "*to be hanged by the neck until death, the bodies were not be removed but were to remain hanging until they are decomposed by air or by other causes.*"[315] The three soldiers applied to the Council of State for pardon, which consented to the request.[316] The argument for the pardon was that the desertion took place during peacetime and not during war, and that they were forced into such drastic measures out of poverty, since the regiment had not paid them.[317] The Council of State subsequently wrote to the court martial of Bergen op Zoom with instructions not to execute the three deserters.

The authority of the Council of State in military matters is also underlined by the case of Alexander Macdonald. In the resolutions of the States General of 28 August 1741, a petition is mentioned written by Cole Macdonald and Margaret Ogilvie, father and mother of Alexander Macdonald, 22 years old and sergeant in the company of Captain de Win, in the regiment of Colonel Tilly. The petition gives a very good illustration of how easy it was in general to desert, and that it was not always premeditated, but often a rash and spontaneous decision. According to the parents of Alexander, the accused had always been very obedient and had conducted himself well. He had, however, "*fallen in with four soldiers, likewise serving in the same regiment, who had formerly deserted and had again joined the regiment at the last general pardon.*" They went together to a tavern to drink, and after getting drunk, they went to another place where they were involved in a fight. Alexander had, as a result of his youth and his drunken condition, "*allowed himself to be misled*" and had, "*through inconsiderate rashness*", absented himself with one of the four soldiers and had gone to Amsterdam. After realising his mistake, Alexander wanted to rejoin his regiment, but he had already been retrieved by a dispatch from his regiment and "*brought to the garrison to be punished according to their deserts.*"[318] The petition must have been successful, because the initial death sentence of Alexander Macdonald was to be modified through another resolution issued on the 8th of September. The resolution decreed that Alexander Macdonald was to be degraded from sergeant to private, and that he was to serve the Dutch Republic for at least one year in that function. After that period, he would be eligible to be promoted again to the rank of sergeant, on condition that he had conducted himself well during that period.[319]

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[315] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 710, Bergen op Zoom.
[316] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 188, fol. 1316.
[317] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 187, fol. 332.
[318] Resolution of the States General 28 August 1741; Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 212-213.
[319] Resolution of the States General, 8 September 1741; I. Scheltus (ed.), *Groot Placaat-boeck* (Den Haag 1770), vol. 7, p. 1034.

For officers, the rules regarding unauthorised leave were less strict. It was common practice for officers to leave military service without going through the trouble of acquiring official consent. In a letter to the Council of State in 1609, the governor of Steenbergen states that "*Captain Gordon, whose company has been here for over a year, has never been more than one month with the same, indeed during twenty-six successive weeks he has never been with his company, and is still absent. His lieutenant was not there during six months, his oldest sergeant during six weeks. Such was the state of the matter that only one officer was found in the company, viz., the ensign-a foul, rank, and careless drunkard, the company being practically without a single officer.*"[320] The Dutch authorities had great difficulties with the practice of Scottish officers of being absent during military service, while at the same time drawing pay. Constantijn Huygens mentioned this problem in particular in a letter addressed to the Council of State. "*As we see daily that the colonels leaving this country remain for years absent from duty, and yet draw the country's pay, to the manifest detriment of the country, we deem it necessary that your High Mightinesses should be pleased to take into consideration whether it would not be beneficial to make a firm resolution that colonels, as well as lieutenant-colonels and captains, are not to remain away beyond a certain fixed time without losing their pay.*"[321] As a consequence, the States General decided that colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and captains must be "*in this country during the summer, and that during the winter the said colonels may be absent by permission six months, and the lieutenant-colonels and captains, likewise by permission, three months, on penalty of forfeiting their respective pay for the time beyond the above during which they remain absent from the country.*"[322] While the practice of drawing pay during absence was a common practice amongst officers during the early modern period, and cannot therefore be seen as being an exclusively Scottish phenomenon, many Scottish officers still had private interests in Scotland where they maintained estates and held property. As such, during his absence, it was normal for a Scottish officer to return to Scotland where he could oversee his affairs.

In some cases, even an officer could go too far. In June 1729, Lieutenant Colonel Hendrick van Lith de Jeude, in the regiment of Colonel Halkett, was away on leave, and managed to get an extension of this leave for four extra months. In 1730, he was again on furlough with

[320] Johan de Witt to Council of State, 7 October 1609, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 237.
[321] Letter from Huygens to Council of State, 7 December 1628, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 386-387.
[322] Resolution of States General, 12 December 1628, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 388.

another extension of two months. The same happened in 1732, when he received three months of extra leave. The military authorities must have realised that, even for an officer, this was somewhat excessive, because in May 1734, his request for a further furlough was denied. Nevertheless, he managed to obtain six weeks of leave in September of the same year because of illness. In September 1735, Lieutenant Colonel Lith was once more away on leave. In 1736, the situation ended when Lith left the regiment without permission. The court martial in his absence demoted Lith and sentenced him to death.[323]

Even though these examples deal with officers, who (temporarily) left military service without permission and who went away because of personal reasons, in some cases it concerned officers who simply deserted to the enemy. According to a letter from Stokes to Walsingham, in 1582, a Scottish nobleman, , the son of Lord 'Gree', went to Courtrai with four other Scottish gentlemen, where he joined Spanish service which "*received them with great joy and gladness; so it is feared more will follow.*"[324] In effect, it is hard to classify this type of desertion, since it is, in a sense, closer to defection to the enemy than just leaving the military unit without permission. In any case, it caused serious disquiet in Scotland, where further desertions/defections were feared.

In some cases, the reason for desertion was a question of loyalty and, therefore, a political matter. This happened in 1746, for example, when Prince Charles revolted against George II and two soldiers belonging to the regiment of Colonel Colyear were found on board a ship bound for Scotland dressed as sailors.[325] The same situation had occurred in 1716 when William Crightone, an ensign under the command of Colonel Murray, used the fact that he was in Scotland, to switch over to the side of the Pretender, James Stuart.[326] Three other soldiers, Lieutenant Fleming, and Ensigns Chalmers and Cars, who were at the time serving in

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[323] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, behorende tot het tweede Regiment van de Schotse Brigade in Nederland, ontleend aan het Archief van de Raad van state vanaf 1698 tot 1784', in: *Jaarboek van CBG*, vol. 24 (1970), p. 174.

[324] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, 5 August 1582 in: *Calendar of Foreign papers 1582*.

[325] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, behorende tot het derde Regiment van de Schotse Brigade in Nederland, ontleend aan het Archief van de Raad van state vanaf 1698 tot 1784', in: *Jaarboek van CBG*, vol. 26 (1972), p. 192.

[326] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, behorende tot het eerste Regiment van de Schotse Brigade in Nederland, ontleend aan het Archief van de Raad van state vanaf 1698 tot 1784', in: *Jaarboek van CBG*, vol. 22 (1968), p. 207.

the regiment of Colonel Lauder, also changed sides to join the Pretender in 1716 during their leave in Scotland.[327] In addition, Lieutenant Murray and Ensigns Dallas, Bosuall (Cosuale) and Robbertson also joined the Pretender's side while they were in Scotland in May 1716. Of these last four officers, it is known that they were each sentenced to death.[328]

Destination

What were actually the options for deserters after they had run away from their unit? Most soldiers that did not attempt to return to Scotland, and rather, tried to obtain employment in other military units. Such is demonstrated by the example of the three deserters who fled to Bruges to join a Scottish regiment of fusiliers.[329] Overall, when desertion occurred in large groups, there was a greater chance of capture. Individuals had more possibilities of escaping since official means of identity registration were practically non-existent. It was always possible for the deserter to settle in another area where people did not know him and to start a new life. Another option, and a more obvious one at that, was the practice among deserters to flee to a foreign power in order to escape military justice. In this, it was important to choose a foreign power which was not an ally of the Dutch Republic. During the War of the Austrian Succession, several Scottish soldiers who were stationed in the garrison of Den Bosch deserted. Their flight to Liège was successful because, when the military authorities despatched a representative to request the return of the deserters, as was stipulated in a treaty between the Prince-Bishop of Liège and the Dutch Republic, they failed to bring the deserters back, even though one of them had also been guilty of theft.[330]

The same situation occurred in 1744, when five Scottish soldiers who were stationed in Namur went over to the French side. According to a treaty similar to the one between Liège and the Dutch Republic, the governor of Namur requested that the French commander hand over the five deserters. The French commander avoided the issue by claiming that he lacked the proper authority to consent to such a decision without consulting with his superiors.

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[327] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 2nd reg.', p. 170.
[328] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 3nd reg.', p. 187.
[329] See p. 108.
[330] Resolution of the States General, 11 January 1746, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 322-323.

"Which was only a pretext, inasmuch as the said deserters would meanwhile be sent away, and no further redress could then be obtained."[331]

Another example, again in 1744, gives an additional demonstration of the role that foreign politics could play concerning desertion. Colonel Halkett sent Ensign Peter Grahame to Scotland to recruit there, since there were many desertions due to the proximity of French garrisons. *"The French do not detain deserters because they consider them to be in the service of the queen of Austria."*[332] Apparently, the French did not have a treaty with Austria -with whom they were at war at the time- concerning the exchange of deserters. The fact that the deserters were from towns in the Austrian Netherlands was, for the French, reason enough to claim that these soldiers were not in Dutch, but in Austrian service.

The region of Namur-Liège proved to be a particularly popular district for deserters. The Resolutions of the States General of 23 March 1736, mentioned that there was an increase in the desertions from the garrison in Namur, and in particular from the regiment of Schaumburg-Lippe stationed at the castle of Namur. According to the resolution, the reason for this lay in the ease by which the deserters could escape to an abbey by the name of Malone, which was situated in the territory of Liège *"and only a good half-an-hour from the aforesaid castle."* Several soldiers, even those who were keeping watch, had gone to that abbey in full uniform and fully armed. General Colyear, the governor of Namur, decided to take action after he had found out that another two deserters had left for the abbey. Colyear sent out a detachment *"in order to put an end to such a pernicious and ruinous practice"*, and to seize the deserters and take them prisoner. The soldiers found one deserter who was hiding in an inn situated near the abbey *"where it was the custom, not only to receive soldiers as into an asylum, but also to encourage that evil practice for profit."* The captured deserter was sentenced to death at his trial, but since there was no executioner in town, instead of being hanged he was to be shot.[333]

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[331] Resolution of the States General, 21 August 1744, in: Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 290.
[332] Council of State no. 254, fol. 121, 5 February 1744 and no. 863, Charleroy, 2 February 1744; J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen', vol. 26 (1972), p. 191.
[333] Resolutions of States General, 23 March 1736, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 201-202.

An additional explanation for the desertions in Namur is given later in a resolution of the States General of 21 February 1742. In this resolution, it is mentioned that the frequent desertions of soldiers resulted from other officers from different military units who tried to steal away the soldiers. "*He [Colyear] recently had clear proofs thereof of a certain Le Mede, who had received a commission to raise a company in the regiment of the Count of Arbergh, and who had completely debauched a corporal of the regiment of Reede in that place, and engaged him in his company.*"[334] Another interesting feature of the case of Namur is that, in this particular situation, the deserters were aided by civilians, although whether the civilians were also arrested and brought to trial is unknown. The fact that civilians aided deserters occasionally is well illustrated by the formal complaint of General Colyear, who stated that "*in the country, as well as in the towns, instead of apprehending them, the farmers so facilitated the desertion of the soldiers, who had deserted from the troops of your High Mightinesses, by purchasing their uniforms, arms, and by showing them the roads by taking which they would not be pursued.*"[335]

However, civilians were not always on the side of the deserter. In some cases, it turned out to be profitable for a farmer to hand over a deserter to the authorities. Joseph Glas, a soldier in the regiment of General Colyear and who deserted in the year 1738, was taken by farmers and turned in as a deserter. For their actions the farmers received ten *Rijksdaalders*.[336] It is very likely that whether civilians decided to harbour a deserter or to turn them over to the military authorities was inspired by greed and opportunism.

In his defence, Glas claimed to have been drunk at the time of his desertion, thus presenting it as a spontaneous act. The authorities were not convinced, however, and concluded "*that there were many indications of premeditated desertion.*"[337] Glas was sentenced to run the gauntlet four times up and down, passing four hundred men for two successive days. In addition, he was ordered to pay for the judicial costs.

A final possible destination for deserting Scottish soldiers was to join the Dutch East or West Indies Company. A resolution of the States General of 1627 stated that many French, English,

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[334] Letter from W.P. Colyear to Council of State, 21 February 1742, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 215.
[335] Letter from W.P. Colyear to Council of State, 1 October 1743, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 286.
[336] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 836, Namen, 2 November 1738.
[337] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 836, Namen, 2 November 1738.

and Scottish who are in the service of the Dutch Republic, desert from their companies to go to sea with captains serving the Dutch West Indies Company. In order to prevent this form of desertion, the States General ordered that any French, English or Scottish soldier in the service of the States General who left his company without a passport, would be punished *"as an example to others."* The States General forbade both the Dutch East Indies and the West Indies Companies to hire any French, English and Scottish without a passport, *"or to allow them to sail, on pain of confiscation of the wage of the captains or officers who sail on the aforementioned ships, also on pain of confiscation of the conquered loot."*[338] In 1637, ten years after the resolution of 1627, the States General issued a similar resolution stating that it was strictly forbidden to employ any French, English or Scottish soldiers in the service of the Dutch East or West Indies Companies.[339]

Prevention and determent

In order to counteract the general problem of desertions, which could not only be damaging to the morale of the troops, but could also cost the army a large number of its rank and file, the military authorities undertook several measures. Gilbert points to three which were applied by the 18th century British army, but which can be generalised to most of the armies of early modern Europe. First, the army tried to restrict the movement of the soldier and to exert a rigid control over the lives of the troops.[340] This was a difficult task to accomplish, since the idea of barracks was not developed until the end of the 18th century and most soldiers were stationed within private houses. The separation between soldier and civilian was thus less easy to maintain with the result that it was easier for the soldier to merge into civil society. In order to restrict the movements of a soldier, there were official regulations that severely punished a soldier (often by death) who wandered too far out of camp. The radius was often one mile, or as the Scottish Privy Council mentioned, "a canon shot". An ordinance of the Dutch government from the late 16th century relating to the foreign troops serving in the Dutch army, stated that *"[...] no soldiers of whatever nation, shall be allowed to leave their*

[338] Cornelis Cau (ed.), *Groot Placaet-boeck*, vol. 2 (1664 Den Haag), p. 227.
[339] Cornelis Cau (ed.), *Groot Placaet-boeck*, vol. 2, p. 314.
[340] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted', p. 555.

service under their captain, or under their company, other than with a valid passport, (otherwise) to be punished with the cord, without mercy."[341]

Another possibility in limiting a soldier's movements was to restrict the furloughs. In general, the army was afraid that when a soldier was on leave, he would be too tempted to return to civilian life. The paradoxical part was that -just as with the severe punishments- sometimes these restrictions could instead lead a soldier to desert. This might be the case when, for example, a soldier had urgent business to take care of at home and leave was denied, or in the case of the Hertfordshire men who were in such dire need of wood to burn, that they had to wander off for more than two miles from their fort in order to obtain it.[342]

Nevertheless, in many cases, the restriction of furloughs was not an illogical measure, as it did occasionally happen that a Scottish soldier on leave outside the Dutch Republic would refuse to come back. It was often too tempting for a soldier to stay in his home country and not to return to the dreary task of garrison duty, especially when he was provided with money to enlist new recruits in his home country. Lieutenant James Adair, for example, who went in December 1742 to Scotland in order to recruit 13 new men, never came back to the Dutch Republic.[343] The commander of Ath wrote in a letter that Lieutenant James Adair of the regiment of Colonel Mackay "*has until now not returned nor did he send over any soldiers, yeah, he even did not give a reason for his absence: because of that I feel obligated to call a court martial.*"[344] In addition, an ensign by the name of Don left for Scotland in 1741, but never came back and was reported missing.[345]

According to a report from the Military High Court, dated 15 July 1705, James Robisson was a lieutenant in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Hebborn, belonging to the regiment of Colonel Dalrymple. The report says that Lieutenant James Robisson was sent to Scotland to recruit new troops for the States. He was also provided with the necessary means to finance the recruitment. James Robisson, unfortunately, did not deliver as agreed, and like Lieutenant

[341] Cornelis Cau (ed.), *Groot Placaet-boeck*, vol. 2, paragraph 22, p. 227.
[342] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted', p. 556.
[343] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 1st reg.' p. 215.
[344] ARA, archive of the Council of State, no. 861.1, Ath, 30 July 1743.
[345] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 2nd reg.', p. 179.

Adair, he neither refunded the money nor did he return with the promised new recruits. The States pressed charges against him and he was sentenced in his absence.[346]

The second measure taken by the military authorities was, as mentioned previously, strong disciplinary actions against deserters. The idea behind it was to make the punishments so severe that they would deter any other potential deserters from leaving the unit. In many cases, it was because of the severe punishments that soldiers deserted in the first place. In the British army during the American Revolution, 25% of the 197 desertion trials ended in capital punishment, while the other convicted deserters received between the 750-1000 lashes.[347] During the Seven Years War the court martial were even more rigorous: less than 10% of the deserters tried were acquitted, and one-third of the deserters put on trial were given capital punishment.[348] In the Dutch army, it was also possible to try a soldier without a proper court martial in order to save time. The commanding officer had the option of charging a soldier with absence without leave instead of desertion, but he had no jurisdiction to hand out a death sentence. Nevertheless, the punishments could still be very harsh, since there was no limit assigned to the number of lashes an offender could receive.

However, there seems to be an inconsistency regarding the punishments. While on paper, desertion was almost always punishable by death, in practice, the majority of the cases report sentences of corporal punishment and degradation. The death sentence was primarily used as a deterrent for desertion. While in some cases a deserter was sentenced to a capital punishment, this was mostly done in order to set an example. Overall, the army was so pressed for soldiers that it could not afford to execute every deserter that was arrested and brought to trial.

Often, young soldiers were amongst the group of deserters who received a lighter sentence, because of their young age and the fact that they could still be formed by the army. Robbert Mar, for example, deserted from his unit in Namur on 16 September 1723.[349] Mar was arrested shortly after his desertion. During his trial, he apparently used his age as a defence, claiming to be 19 years old and to have been serving in the Brigade for three years. On being asked for the reason of his desertion, Marc claimed that "*he had not received everything that*

[346] ARA, Archive of the 'Hoge Krijgsraad' (1705).
[347] Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted', p. 557.
[348] Ibid.
[349] ARA, archive Council of State no. 208, fol. 826.

was promised to him."[350] Because Mar claimed to be 19 years old he was, according to the army regulation of 27 July 1714 which stated that no soldier shall be enlisted below the age of 20, too young for the army.[351] The regimental books revealed that Mar had lied about his age, and that he was already 20 years old in 1720 when he joined the regiment. This meant that the resolution of 1714 was not relevant for this particular situation.[352] Mar was sentenced to run the gauntlet for two successive days.[353] The governor of Namur, Walter Philip Colyear, thought that the punishment was unjust. In particular, he was not impressed with the leniency of the military justice towards deserters, especially after the accused had violated military regulations. Colyear sent his complaint to the States General, and wrote that "*...these days the military courts act very weakly and softly, and desertion has become too much a common practice, though there has not been in three or four years an example that a deserter in the hands of justice received the deserved punishment.*"[354]

The question of age and the role of the army resolutions concerning the enlistment of minors, also become apparent in another desertion trial. Nicolas Ross was convicted, also with two other soldiers, Alexander Matheson and Walter Mackleod, both 19 years old, for deserting. A document from the court martial of Ath reveals how the desertion came to be. The three soldiers went outside the town to drink in an inn, where they consumed beer and gin. In the early evening they left, but instead of returning to town, they walked away from it, "*because in their drunken state they saw no possibility to return to the town.*"[355] They asked some farmers the way to the garrison, but they could not understand them, and arriving at the city of Bruges, they saw no other possibility than to hand themselves in as deserters, hoping that their quick action would help them to be granted a pardon. In that context, they asked the commanding officer to write a letter to their regiment in Ath to request for leniency.[356] Ross claimed that he had not had the intention to desert, but that he had made this mistake under the influence of alcohol.[357]

Ross was recruited in June 1741 in Rosshire, Scotland, and was discharged after a couple of months because of his young age and the fact that his mother complained about his

[350] ARA, archive Council of State no. 762, Namen, 19 November 1723.
[351] See Chapter two, p. 58.
[352] Ibid.
[353] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 1st reg.', p. 209.
[354] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 761, Namen, 27 October 1723.
[355] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 864, Ath, 20 April 1744.
[356] ARA, archive Council of State, no. 864, Ath, 20 April 1744.
[357] Ibid.

enlistment. In December of the same year, he once again decided to join the army, this time claiming to be 19 years old. Ross had already been convicted of desertion one when, in 1742, he had left his company without the proper authorisation and was brought back as a deserter. Because Ross had deserted twice, he was, as a result, sentenced by the court martial to be hanged.[358] According to a resolution of the States General of 1744 the other deserters were to be punished with the gauntlet (that is running the gauntlet), but only Ross received a death sentence. The Council of State requested on behalf of Nicolas Ross that the States General commute the death sentence to a military punishment with gauntlets, because all three soldiers entered the army at the age of 17, which was against army regulations.[359] The States General agreed to the request, and wrote to the court martial in Ath to change Ross's death sentence to a disciplinary punishment.[360]

It appears that most cases dealing with desertion refer to young men between the ages of 18 and 24. This seems a logical phenomenon, given that at that age, the young men (frequently directly from Scotland) were often unaware of the difficulties of military life in the garrison towns, and were not prepared for the hardships they encountered. However, although, the risk of desertion was probably higher with soldiers of a younger age, there is too little data to assume that young men were as a rule more inclined to desert than older men. The fact that many of the desertion trials concern young men has also partly to do with the fact that, in the 18th century, the military authorities became aware of the age of their soldiers where as before, the age distinction had not been that relevant. As demonstrated by the examples of Robert Mar and Nicolas Ross and his fellow deserters, the Dutch army had drawn up new regulations in the first quarter of the 18th century forbidding the enlistment of young men below the age of 20.

The final measure undertaken by the British army was to issue from time to time a general pardon for deserters, who were allowed to return to their unit without being punished. It is known that the Dutch army also made use of this practice.[361] While this measure was not commonly used since it was clearly not beneficial for military discipline, it was sometimes

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[358] J. Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 1st reg.', p. 215.
[359] ARA, archive Council of State no. 254, fol. 525, 14 April 1744.
[360] Resolution of the States General, 29 May 1744, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 289.
[361] Resolution of the States General, 18 November 1726, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 130-131.

necessary to make use of the general pardon because, due to the high demand for manpower, the army could simply not afford to execute every deserter to brought in.

Whether or not these measures had the desired effect is not clear, but despite the fact that we lack the necessary figures in order to draw significant parallels between the desertion rate of the 17th and the 18th centuries, it seems as if the desertion rate did diminish over this period. Gilbert states that, of the 15,338 British soldiers stationed in England in the year 1758, about 613 (3.9%) deserted. He agrees that the desertion rate was probably higher among soldiers stationed abroad since the conditions were often more severe. The fact that the punishments abroad were often higher than in England an also be taken as a corroboration of this fact.

Personal conflicts and questions of authority

While desertion was one of the more obvious examples of military discontent in the regiments and posed a serious problem to the military authorities, it was rather passive in its nature. The soldier/officer withdrew himself from the military unit he belonged to without directly attacking the military hierarchy and structure. Many other forms of military discontent were more aggressive and of a more personal nature, and could directly threaten the military unit and hierarchy. The majority of these personal conflicts are forms of authority conflicts, which occurred amongst officers of different ranks or between soldiers and officers. In some of the cases, the nature of the conflict is unfortunately not that apparent, and while it is clearly a personal conflict, it does not necessarily have to be a conflict of authority.

In a letter from King William to the Scottish Council of State, this type of tension is accurately described. The letter regards the case of Lord Ballandine who had killed a soldier, and a petition made on his behalf. The letter states that "*...a petition offered to us for John, Lord Ballandine, representing that he hath been some tyme prisoner upon the occasion of a slaughter committed without any forethought malice or designe.*"[362] According to the party interceding on behalf of Lord Ballandine, there was no malice behind the deed; in effect, it was not a premeditated murder. The same letter also mentions a second petition, that of the

[362] letter from the King to the Council anent the Lord Ballandine, in: *Register of the Privy Council, 1691*, third series XVI (1970), p. 182.

widow of the victim. "*As also wee have received a petition from the widow of the person slaine representing that her husband, being a souldier in our service, was murthered by the Lord Ballandine and that she had only received two hundred and fifty merks out of charity to transport her back to Holland and ane obleidgement for two hundred and fifty merks more for herself and four children without granting any discharge of the blood.*"[363] Because of the unclear situation, William requested a further investigation into the matter. "*Wee have thought fitt to requyre yow to make inquyrie in this matter and to report to us if ther was any prejudice or grudge formerly betuixt the parties and wither the slaughter was committed upon forthought malice against the souldier or upon ill designe against our government or if it was the sudden effect of drunkenness and fury, and wither ther hes been any aggriement with the nearest relatione of the defunct or any discharge of the slaughter granted and what soumes have been payed or ingadged for to the widow or orphanes, that having a full representation of the caise from yow we may signifie our farder pleasure in relation to the two petitiones.*"[364] Whether William received an answer on his questions is not known, and it is unclear whether the murder resulted from a personal grudge between soldier and officer, or was indeed an act of 'drunkenness and fury'. Nevertheless, the fact remained that a conflict between an officer and a soldier had resulted in the death of a soldier.

A similar violent situation occurred between two soldiers in the regiment of Major-General Lauder in 1705, whereby one soldier killed another for unknown reasons.[365] In 1714, another soldier in the regiment of Lauder was found murdered. It may be supposed that these examples were not exceptional situations and that, as a consequence, they can be applied to any other army in early modern Europe.

Sometimes the personal element is more distinctive in a conflict between two officers, as is apparent from the case of Ensign Alexander Nilson. Nilson, who served in the regiment of General Lauder, was placed under arrest for ten weeks and additionally lost his rank because of false accusations made by the former sergeant, Daniel Macdonalt. Nilson acted as the commanding officer of the watch in Dendermonde and as such had encountered difficulties with Sergeant Macdonalt. Macdonalt claimed that Nilson had drunk with him during his

[363] Ibid.
[364] Ibid.
[365] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 2nd reg.', p. 166.

watch and had left his post to eat some soup.[366] Because of the accusations of Macdonalt, Nilson was sentenced by the court-martial of Dendermonde, and although the Council of State later annulled the verdict of the court-martial, another ensign had already been appointed in Nilson's place.[367]

Especially in the Scottish regiments, there was a history of violent conflicts between officers. Often, these conflicts were resolved through duels, as happened with the duel between Captain Bruce and Captain Hamilton, which resulted in the death of the latter in 1604; and with the duel between Captain Ormiston and Captain Henry Balfour, which led to the death of Captain Ormiston.[368] An important aspect of these conflicts between officers was that they were not often resolved by fighting a duel and killing one's adversary, as the conflict between David Ramsey and William Stuart demonstrates. On 1 May 1607, David Ramsay wrote to the Council of State that it was impossible to accept the request of Ensign William Stuart, who desired to be received into Captain Ramsay's company, because William Stuart was responsible for the killing of his kinsman. Ramsay says "*obviously therefore it would be impossible for me to endure to have the remonstrant going about before my eyes...and his being in it would give rise to divers serious inconveniences, which owing to natural affection for a blood relative, might supply material for more and greater grievance to the other than what has been referred to.*"[369] These kind of conflicts could be potentially very dangerous to the military structure as they could lead to a form of clan conflict. Because of the apparent threat to military order, the Dutch authorities were very adamant in preventing duels, and enforced strict punishment for those who took part in duels as well for those who were aware of them, but neglected to mention them to the proper authorities.

A frequently occurring form of personal conflict was insulting an officer of a higher rank. This form of conflict can clearly be categorised as an authority conflict whereby the super-subordinate structure is not respected, and a lower ranking officer challenges the authority of his superior. This type of conflict could take many forms, varying from insulting a higher ranking officer to accusing a commanding officer and bringing him to trial. In 1723, for example, Ensign John Alexander, son of Major James Alexander in the regiment of

[366] ARA archive of the Council of State, no. 189, fol. 1952.
[367] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 2nd reg.' in: *Jaarboek van CBG*, vol. 24 (1970), p. 169.
[368] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 8
[369] Letter to the Council of State, 1 May 1607, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 208.

Lieutenant-General Colyear, offended Captain Thomas van Beest, who served in the same regiment. According to the witnesses in the sentencing report, John Alexander had called Captain van Beest a 'foutu' captain and a 'hondsvot'[370] "*and many other words*", and this in the presence of the sergeant, corporal, drummer and other members of the watch. The report also mentions that Van Beest had asked Ensign Alexander if he was aware against whom he was addressing the insults, alluding to the fact that Van Beest was the captain of the watch and a superior officer. According to the report, instead of "*controlling his tongue*", Ensign Alexander further insulted the captain by "*calling him everything one can say in order to insult an honest officer*". The court martial was nevertheless lenient in its sentence, despite the serious consequences for and detriment to, military discipline, and the lack of respect towards a superior officer. John Alexander was sentenced to apologise to Captain van Beest in front of the entire parade and to give satisfaction to the offended party. He was also dismissed from his duties as ensign, and if he were to take any direct or indirect action against van Beest for any reason, he was to be punished in a rigorous and exemplary way.[371] The reason why Ensign Alexander was not given a more severe (corporal) punishment was probably due to the fact that the army did not wish to aggravate the matter. It was a personal incident between a subaltern and an officer and it concerned a matter of honour. Had Alexander been punished too severely, there was a chance that his fellow subalterns would have been angered, seeing it as an insult to their status in the army.[372] Before this incident, John Alexander had already been convicted twice in Doornik and twice in Namen. It is interesting to see that his request for pardon was signed by various captains and officers, among which figured Captain Thomas van Beest, the insulted party.[373] In 1728, Captain van Beest is once more mentioned, this time in a conflict with another officer who belonged to the regiment of van Beam. Unfortunately, the details of the conflict are unknown.

In some cases, it is not the accused or the offended party that brings the offender to trial and makes the accusations, but the role of complainant is performed by a third party. In 1738, the Ensigns David Melvill and David Greeme, both serving under Colyear, were taken to trial by a certain Major Nicolson for insulting another officer. Nicolson claimed that the two ensigns had stated that adjutant James Boar, who was also serving in the regiment of Colyear, was a

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[370] i.e. 'cur'.
[371] ARA, archive Council of State no. 758, sentence of Ensign John Alexander, Maastricht 24 March 1723.
[372] See also p. 127.
[373] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 3rd reg.', p. 188.

scoundrel[374] who should be chased away, as he was also driven away from the regiment of Colonel Lamy.[375] Nicolson arrested the two ensigns and made a request that "*the two ensigns would be punished according to the laws and plaques of the land and that the honour of Adjutant Boar would once more be restored.*" The court martial found the case difficult and required the advice of two impartial judicial scholars[376], whose counsel was accepted.

One of the most evident examples of a conflict of authority was the conflict between General Major Ralph Dundas and Colonel Volkert Rudolph Bentinck, commander of the regiment of General Dundas. Dundas was Bentinck's direct superior, and this case illustrates clearly not only the personal character of the conflict, but also how useful social network could be in fighting a conflict. The interesting aspect of this particular conflict was that, despite its intra-regimental nature, the conflict was externalised by the printing and publishing both of the accusations made by Colonel Bentinck regarding his superior and the response of General Dundas concerning these accusations. In addition, the fact that the Prince of Orange became involved attested to the added particularity of the extra-regimental dimension of the case. The case itself was rather straightforward. During General Dundas' stay in Scotland, Bentinck published a booklet entitled 'The true records'[377] to accuse –according to the author of the 'Response of Ralph Dundas'[378]- his superior and to justify his insubordinate behaviour. The latter author stated that Bentinck was taking advantage of the fact that Dundas was abroad, and that he possibly expected that Dundas would not return to the Dutch Republic so that the general could not respond to the accusations. Before Dundas left for Scotland, Bentinck had written, without his superior's knowledge, two letters to the Prince of Orange complaining about his commander.

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[374] It is interesting to see that in the original (Dutch) text the word 'scoundrel' is used and not a Dutch alternative indicating that the soldiers would be speaking in English or at last using English words to insult someone. Given that all the parties involved were British, the fact that the soldiers were speaking English is not unlikely.

[375] Mac Lean, 'Gegevens van militairen, 3rd reg.', p. 189; ARA, archive the Council of State no. 834, Namen, 2 July 1738.

[376] It is not clear whether these scholars were civilians, but it seems plausible that they were, an interesting fact considering it was a military affair. The decision of the court martial to request external aid indicates that the case was not as straightforward as it might seem.

[377] This is an English translation; the original Dutch title is 'Echte Stukken'.

[378] The original and complete Dutch title is: 'Antwoord van Ralph Dundas op een zeker boekje geïntituleerd: Echte Stukken', Den Haag 1785. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.

According to Dundas' reply, Bentinck had been undermining Dundas' authority from the beginning and had been acting as the commanding officer of the regiment. Dundas gives the example of the time that he went to Doesburg, where the regiment was garrisoned, to inspect his second battalion. Dundas found out that Bentinck was absent, and was surprised that certain commands and manoeuvres had been changed. After inquiring who was responsible for this change, the Adjutant Pringle replied that the changes had been on the orders of Colonel Bentinck. In addition, the way in which the recruits were taught to march had been changed, all this without informing his superior officer, Dundas.

The 'Response of Ralph Dundas' mentions several similar examples of Bentinck undermining Dundas' authority. The document is highly subjective, a fact underlined by the frequently sarcastic undertone. For example, on page six of the Response, "*another crucial example of Colonel Bentinck's affection and attention for his superior*"[379] is followed by the statement that Bentinck had tried to force his superior to install the preacher of the regiment with the second battalion instead of the first, "*although all the regimental preachers are permanently stationed with the first battalion.*"[380]

The Prince of Orange agreed to prosecute General Dundas based on the accusations of Colonel Bentinck. "*His Highness agreed, on June 27th 1780 to hand over [the case] to the Advocate Fiscal of the* 'Generaliteit' *(without giving the same to the general in order to respond to it)...*" "*Whereupon the Advocate Fiscal agreed to conduct a criminal process against the general and to summon him on the 16th of October 1780 to be heard on the [legal] articles before the High Court Martial on the 23rd of the same month; which happened and lasted for twelve days.*"[381] The fact that it became immediately a 'proces criminele' was equally astonishing, especially because there was no apparent evidence for making it such. In fact, the entire nature of the accusations is not made evident and the reaction of the general to this fact is clearly expressed. "*As long as it is not demonstrated clearly that any form of criminal offence has been committed by the aforementioned General against Colonel*

[379] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 6. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.
[380] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 7. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.
[381] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 8. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.

Bentinck, the General Dundas has to consider the request of the Advocate Fiscal, and the consent of High Court Martial to the same request, to be illegal and void."[382]

The Prince of Orange possibly realised the weak position of Bentinck and decided to stop the criminal process against Dundas. "*On 26 February 1783 His Highness consented once more, to order the Advocate Fiscal of the* 'Generaliteit' *not to continue the so-called criminal procedure against the general, but to consider the same and everything that depended on it nullified and destroyed.*"[383] A possible reason is given in the 'Response' as to why the Prince of Orange consented at first to assist Bentinck in his conflict with Dundas and why he decided against it later on. "*If there had not been an accusation and if His Highness nevertheless had agreed on a 'proces criminele' against the general, it would have had negative consequences for His Highness; to which the Colonel, already a favourite of His Highness, gave cause and because of the publication of the letter very likely injured, his protector and benefactor.*"[384]

Since the facts are not known, it is easy to speculate on the affair and to picture Bentinck as an upstart who used his personal contacts with the Prince of Orange to eliminate his superior officer, and to assume for himself the vacant position of commanding officer of the Scottish regiment. The fact that the only source available is the response of Dundas also further contributes to the one-sided perception of the colonel. Taking this into account, it is still plausible that Bentinck had made use of his personal contacts to further his own ambitions, and had deliberately attacked Dundas while he was away in Scotland and could not defend himself accordingly.

A final interesting aspect of the incident was that it was, above all, a public affair. In 'the Response', a reason is given why the entire process –despite the fact that the Prince of Orange was already involved- exceeded the intra-regimental level. "*The Colonel Bentinck did all this to make the public believe that the General was guilty of the crimes against the Colonel. And as a result the General feels obliged to open the eyes of the public regarding this fact and to demonstrate his amazement on what grounds the Advocate Fiscal used the previously mentioned letters to accuse the General and furthermore on what grounds the same were*

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[382] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 9. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.
[383] Ibid.
[384] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 11. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.

allowed by the High Court Martial, and what the nature was of any crime committed by the General against the Colonel."[385]

Treason and betrayal

One of the most dangerous consequences of military discontent was the possibility that a town, city or military unit could be surrendered to the enemy. In the early stages of the Eighty Years War, when payment was not regulated and when the Dutch army was still in its formative stage, towns were surrendered on a regular basis to the Spanish forces, either in exchange for money or because an officer felt dissatisfied with serving the Dutch State. There are several reasons why Scottish soldiers switched sides. An important reason was that the number of Catholic Scottish officers serving in the Dutch army in the beginning of the 17th century was relatively high. Another potential reason could be a personal conflict with another officer or simply the fact the political allegiance of some officers was not as stable as that of others, and whose loyalty could therefore be gained by Spanish bullion.

A good example of this phenomenon was the case of Captain William Semphill and his brother (a lieutenant) who delivered the town of Lier to the Spanish in 1582 as a result both of a conflict between them and Colonel Stewart and because of lack of pay.[386] According to Ferguson, the reason was "*pour se venger de quelque disreputation ou tort (selon qu'il disoit) les Etats luy avoient faict*"[387], which indicates that Semphill and his brother had a personal grudge against the Dutch States. The same Semphill is also mentioned in connection with the Spanish invasion army for England. According to Ferguson, there were eight Scottish companies in the army of Parma, and Captain Semphill was sent to Scotland to act as a Spanish agent in Scotland, where he was an intermediary between the catholic earls and the Habsburg court. It seemed that Semphill made use of other Scots as well. A certain Thomas Pringall, who had first served with the Dutch army for four years and later for eight years under Parma, was sent to Scotland by Semphill to meet with the Earl of Huntley.[388] The

[385] 'Antwoord', Den Haag 1785, p. 8-9. Royal Library, The Hague, Knuttel catalogue, vol. 5 1776-1795, no. 21090.
[386] Calendar of foreign papers, Elizabeth, 5 August 1582 no.220, p. 221.
[387] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 23.
[388] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 26 n. 2.

Scottish authorities, however, found out, and Pringall was executed in Edinburgh. In the same year that Lier was betrayed, a number of Scottish soldiers from the regiment of Colonel Stewart betrayed to the Spanish the town and the castle of Battenburg (the latter belonging to the wife of Stewart), which they had been ordered to defend.[389]

Occasionally, the treason performed by Scottish soldiers was politically motivated. In a letter from Villiers[390] to Walsingham, dated 31 December 1582, both the political element and Scottish involvement become clear. Pierre de Villiers wrote: "*Nevertheless I cannot conceal from you that since Aubigny has had credit there, we have seen nothing but treason on the part of the Scotch, and fresh ones are discovered from one day to another; in such wise that one is constrained to suspect that such practices come from elsewhere, although there are several honest men who would be grieved to commit a fault. But most have proceeded from Mr Stewart's regiment. I know well that it is no fault of his, but individual captains can bring a bad reputation to a whole regiment.*"[391]

In 1583, an incident was reported concerning Scottish treason, and again political motivations seem to be involved. In this case, it is unclear whether the betrayal was a result of pro-Habsburg sympathies or of a Dutch political conflict. In Dendermonde, a plot was discovered in which a Scottish officer with the name of Seton[392] had agreed with the Duke of Parma to open a gate in the city in order to allow the Spanish forces to enter. The writer of the letter mentioned that the plot failed and that Seton "*is now a prisoner with his confederates, as, would to God, he was who betrayed Lier to the enemy.*"[393]

In a letter to Walsingham, further reference to Seton is made -this time he is spoken of as a Scottish captain of horse- and more of Seton's part in the plot to betray Dendermonde is revealed. It becomes clear that Seton's treason was part of a power struggle between the

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[389] Letter from Herle (William Herle English envoy to the States in 1587) to Walsingham, 1 and 2 September 1582, in: *Calendar of foreign papers, Elizabeth*, p. 296.
[390] Josse de Villiers, seigneur de Soete, became Stadtholder of Utrecht in 1584.
[391] Letter from Josse de Villiers to Walsingham, 31 December 1582, in: *Cal. of foreign papers, Elizabeth*, no.537, p. 524.
[392] According to the calendar of foreign papers, letter from Bizarri to Walsingham, Seton was either a Scottish captain or a colonel, but according to Ferguson (*Papers*, I, p. 24) he was a lieutenant.
[393] Letter from Bizarri to Walsingham, 21-31 March 1583, in: *Cal. of foreign papers, Elizabeth*, p. 423.

governor of Dendermonde and a certain Hembise[394]. "*There is also imprisoned one Seyton, a Scottish captain of horse. Hembise's purpose was to have helped the Malcontents to take Dermonde, and he made Yorke and Seyton privy to it. Seyton's cornet, a young man of his name, had been divers times there, was familiarly acquainted with M. de Rilhove, the governor, and had underhand corrupted 150 Scots in the garrison, who were to have opened a gate and kept it till Montigny and other Malcontents had entered. Yorke and elderly Seyton were to have gone also. The plot was discovered by Rilhove, and young Seyton being put on the rack, confessed all and was hanged. This is come only by envy which is between Hembise and Rilhove.*"[395]

In the resolutions of the States General of 28 March 1583, further reference is made to the two protagonists. "*Letters are read of Mr. Van Rilhoven concerning the treason of the lieutenant of the colonel Citton (Seton)[396], to deliver the city of Dendermonde, with letters of the city of Gent to Mr. van Rilhoven, thereby stated that the Voorschepen Hembize part was of the conspiracy to take the city of Dendermonde, and also the captain York and others.*"[397]

The act of treason itself could in return be also the reason for a conflict within the regiment. Colonel David Boyd and eight of his ensigns (almost 400 soldiers) were rumoured to have chosen the side of Parma in 1584, while some of his captains refused to serve on the Spanish side.[398] Later that year, the rumours of Boyds defection were verified, and it was mentioned that Boyd was making contact with the Spanish. "*But some of his captains and soldiers will not serve against the Prince of Orange and seek to withdraw the men into Holland*", for which cause they were put in prison "*by the seeking*" of their colonel, "*which matter has made great discord among them.*"[399] According to Ferguson, the authorities in Bruges had sent for Boyd, who was stationed in Menin, to prevent Parma from taking possession of Bruges. Boyd, together with the Prince of Chimay who was acting as governor of Flanders, and the

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[394] Jan van Hembise, the Voorschepen (a town magistrate) of Gent.
[395] Letter from Bizarri to Walsingham, 23 March 1583, no.499, in: *Cal. of Foreign papers, Elizabeth* p. 424.
[396] The lieutenant's name was very similar to that of Colonel Seton, though it is unknown whether or not they were related.
[397] *Rijks Geschiedkundige publicatiën 1583-1584,* (ed. N. Japikse) (Den Haag 1919), p. 386.
[398] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, No. 562, 30 April 1584, in: *Cal of Foreign papers* p. 472.
[399] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, 5 May 1584, no.575, in: *Cal of Foreign papers,* p. 484.

majority of the (mostly Catholic) citizens -who were mostly Catholics- changed the city council so "*that Bruges also became 'reconciled to the king*'".[400]

The following passage in a letter from Parma sent to the soldiers in Bruges, finally confirmed the change of allegiance. "*In consideration of the good offices of the Scots colonel, officers and soldiers at Bruges in assisting to bring the said town into the obedience of his Majesty, his Highness consents that they shall be paid what is due to them from the said town.*"[401] A letter from Gilpin[402] to Walsingham further illustrates the behaviour of the Scottish soldiers in Bruges, and reveals the general suspicion the English had against the Scottish, and the fear of a possible Spanish-Scottish alliance. "*It is said for certain that most of the Scots which were in Bruges have agreed to serve the Duke of Parma, if he will within three months procure a warrant from the King of Scots for their discharge. And this is thought to proceed upon hope of the offered marriage by the King of Spain of his daughter to the said King.*"[403]

Often, the personal element of the conflict was part of a broader political context. This phenomenon is very apparent in the case of Colonel Aristotle Patton, which was part of a larger context where two main players, the Earl of Leicester and the Count of Hohenlo, played prominent roles. The exact position of the Scottish officers in the conflict between Leicester and Hohenlo is specified in a letter addressed to Leicester, where Colonel Balfour and some officers decided to side with Hohenlo. "*Sithence your lordship's departure, colonel Balfour, with divers captains of his regiment have (as I am credibly informed) taken bread and wine (as the manner is) with the Count Hohenlo, and protested to be wholly at his devotion, and to join with him in all things that he shall enterprise in diminution of your lordship's authority.*"[404] As a result, Wilkes[405] decided that it was prudent to divide the Scottish companies into two regiments: ten companies under the command of Bartholomew Balfour and four under the command of Aristotle Patton, "*whom I know to be at your lordship's devotion and well affected to our nation.*"[406] De Prounincq, the mayor of Utrecht, also warned

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[400] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 24.
[401] Letter from Duke of Parma to the Scots soldiers at Bruges, 11 May 1584, no. 591, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 495.
[402] Secretary of the Council of State.
[403] Letter from Gilpin to Walsingham, 21 May 1584, no. 606, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p.507.
[404] Letter from Thomas Wilkes to Leicester, 6 December 1586, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 258-259.
[405] Thomas Wilkes, English member of the Council of State in 1586.
[406] Letter from Wilkes to Leicester, 6 December 1586, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 259.

Leicester against the Scottish alliance with Hohenlo. "*His excellency must be aware of trusting the Scottish troops who follow the factions of Count Hohenlo and the rest of the Germans; and must either appease the Count or remove him by some fair means.*"[407] Leicester was aware of the Scottish involvement in the Dutch politics, and he resented, in particular, Colonel Balfour's part in it. In a letter to Walsingham, he wrote that "*I have no liking of Balford here, he is a bad fellow, and wholly at others direction and not mine; indeed and if the master of Greie (Grey) come not, he will look to be Colonel-General over them all, which I will not consent to.*"[408] Therefore, Wilkes proposition to divide the Scottish camp must have seemed an ideal solution to the problem.

Unfortunately, the solution of a pro-English faction in the Scottish camp that supported the Earl of Leicester, against the pro-German faction under the Count of Hohenlo, failed when Patton betrayed the city of Gueldres to the Spanish in 1587. What is interesting about this incident is not so much the betrayal itself, but the reaction of the English. The blame for Patton's treason was easily shifted onto the German faction. "*On Thursday, June 29, we heard that Gueldres had been yielded to the enemy by Paten a Scotsman, appointed commander there under sir Martin Schenk, on the recommendation of Count Hohenlo and the States since my lord's departure, who knew him so well by his former treasons that he would never admit to any place of charge.*"[409] The English also provided an account of the act of treason itself and the reaction of the civil population of another town after hearing what had happened in Gueldres. "*In this treachery he showed himself as master of his occupation, such cunning he used to blind the burghers [...] and such cruelty he used upon them and some few companies that colonel Schenck had in the town; for being suspected and accused of this practice by the burghers before it came to execution, did purge himself upon his knees, and with many tears did shadow his villany. And after he brought the enemy into the town, showed himself most bloody, both towards the soldiers and burghers that offered resistance. Whereof another town called Wachtersdonck being advised, put themselves into arms, and ran with great fury upon*

[407] Letter from G. de Prouincq to M. Hotoman (master of requests and agent of his Excellency), 27 June 1587, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 132.
[408] Letter from Leicester to Walsingham, 11 July 1586, in: 'Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. During his Governement of the Low Countries in the years 1585 and 1586', (ed. John Bruce) (London 1844), p. 347.
[409] Letter from Richard Lloyd (secretary of Leicester) to Walsingham, 2 July 1587, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 145.

a company of Scots that were garrisoned there, whereof they slew many and thrust the rest out of town."[410]

According to Ferguson, the betrayal of Patton was as an act of vengeance because '*Leicester estoit corroucé contre luy et qu'il avoit menacé de vouloir metre Stuart en sa place.*'[411] Apparently, the fact that Patton was to be replaced in his command of the regiment by another Scottish officer forced Patton to change sides. It is not known what Leicester's motivation was in replacing Patton with Stuart, especially since Patton was advised to Leicester as a new commander of the re-divided Scottish companies. Despite the political strife and struggles that formed the context concerning the nomination of Patton, the main reason for the betrayal of Gueldres was a disgruntled officer who was at risk of loosing his military command. Patton continued his military career in the army of the Duke of Parma. In the army lists of the Duke of Parma in 1588, Patton is mentioned as the commander of a Scottish regiment.[412]

A final example of treason is also the most curious one. It concerns Pieter Vermeulen, the Dutch provost of Zaltbommel, who, in 1688, tried to organise an insurrection against the King-Stadtholder William III and in favour of James II. It is important to realise that the revolt in Zaltbommel was used in order to facilitate a large-scale desertion. Vermeulen planned to set fire to Zaltbommel during the revolt, and in the confusion cross over to England with the deserting soldiers from Mackay's regiment who were at that time stationed in Zaltbommel. The conspiracy was discovered and the soldiers were executed. Vermeulen escaped to England, after which he joined the service of the Prince of Liège as a lieutenant.[413] This incident is interesting for two reasons; firstly, it is the only known example of an attempt at a revolt in the Dutch Republic in the late 17th century. Secondly, the leader of the revolt was not a Scotsman, but a Dutchman.

Overall, the accounts of treason remain fragmentary, not only because the actors are diverse - soldiers, officers, individuals and groups-, but also because the motivations are just as different -money, greed, sympathy, and discontent. The Scottish soldiers, notwithstanding the many examples given here, can by no means be considered more treacherous than other

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[410] Letter from Richard Lloyd to Walsingham, 2 July 1587, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 145.
[411] Ferguson, *Papers*, I., p. 26.
[412] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 26, note 2.
[413] A. Vos, *Dataschurk*, Rec. 2522, file no. 074-12.

nationalities, despite the often negative image painted by the English sources. The same account of betrayal can also be given of English soldiers and officers in the early stages of the Eighty Years War. What is interesting is that most of these acts of betrayal had come to an end by the beginning of the 17th century, a development which can be accounted for by the military and organisational reformations of Maurice, and the growing professionalization of the Dutch army. Like other forms of military conflict, most of the acts of treason remained individual cases where officers, on personal grounds, decided to change allegiance. Cases of treason were far more frequent in the early stages of the Dutch Republic, simply because the Dutch State did not have a strong control over its officers as it had in the late 17th century. Often, the reward for treason was big and the risks were small. As a result, personal grudges, whether ideological or religious, could easily escalate into treason. In the cases where a group is concerned, the soldiers were usually under the command of an officer who took the decision on behalf of the unit. The example of Boyd shows that even then, soldiers did not always obey their commander. Where a soldier mutinied because he was disgruntled with the dire conditions in the unit, there was a chance of betrayal, but the soldier was usually more concerned with improving his personal conditions than with committing treason.

Mutiny

Like with treason, mutiny as a form of military discontent could have serious repercussions outside the military environment. The consequences of mutiny were so high because through the actions of a mutiny, a military unit became paralysed and could not perform its assigned military duties, resulting in a potential threat to the safety of the state. In the Dutch Republic, the potential danger of mutiny was especially great, since many towns were protected by garrisons. When a garrison revolted, the security of the city was at stake, since it was not uncommon to surrender the city to the Spanish in exchange for payment. Overall, mutinies are more a phenomenon of the 16th and early 17th centuries than of the 18th century and, compared

to desertion, it is often easier to establish the motivation.[414]

Usually, the soldiers mutinied because of arrears in payments and harsh living conditions, although occasionally the financial motivation was part of a broader authority conflict between soldiers and their superior officer. In this context, the mutiny of the Scottish soldiers in Meenen serves as a clear example. On 7 April 1583, a letter was written to the counsellor of Queen Elizabeth, Lord Walsingham. It concerned the soldiers who were stationed in the town of Meenen who had revolted because of lack of payment, and it stated that they "*have thrust all their captains out of the town [...] and it is greatly feared, if they be not with speed 'set contented', they will give the town to the enemy.*" The writer continues, and even seems to sympathise with the mutineers, making it clear that it is the lack of proper Dutch provisioning that has caused this: "*surely the soldier does not complain without cause, for he is hardly dealt with. They are smally 'sorrowed' for by the magistrates and other rulers; and if that town be suffered to be lost, more will follow. All is for want of good government, which is their only want.*"[415] The anxiety of the writer seemed to be justified, because the Duke of Parma tried to win the mutineers over to his side. On 14 April, it is mentioned that "*The Duke of Parma plies them daily with letters and messengers; but as yet they will not harken to them.*"[416] In order to prevent the mutineers from surrendering the town to Parma, the magistrates of Bruges sent a month's pay to the Scottish soldiers. The money was accompanied by the Scottish captains. "*But it is feared they will not be contented with it, for the country owes them 22 months' pay for their service there.*"[417]

With the arrival of the commanding officers in Meenen, the conflict between the disgruntled soldiers on one side, and the commanding officers on the other, becomes frightfully clear. On 2 June 1583, Walsingham received a letter that showed that there was more to the conflict

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[414] While mutinies were more of a frequent occurrence in the 16th and early 17th century, one of the largest mutinies that took place in the Dutch Republic occurred in the year 1787 in Den Bosch. Although the Scots Brigade was disbanded by that time and it is unclear that Scottish soldiers had taken part in the mutiny, the example still serves to illustrate that mutinies were not only a 16th or 17th century phenomenon. For more on the mutiny of 1787 see M. Prak, *Republikeinse veelheid, democratisch enkelvoud. Sociale veranderingen in het revolutietijdvak 's-Hertogenbosch 1770-1820*, (Nijmegen 1999).

[415] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, Bruges, April 7 1583, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 250-251.

[416] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, Bruges, April 14 1583, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 267.

[417] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, Bruges, 21 April 1583, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 286.

than delayed payments. The soldiers of Meenen seemed to have a personal conflict with their commanding officer, Colonel Preston. *"The soldiers at Meenen, being all Scots, found themselves sundry times not well used at their colonel's hands, whose name was Preston."*[418] The soldiers approached the town magistrates with the complaint that Preston and the captains had been deceiving them, *"saying there were not 500 soldiers in all their nine ensigns which ought to be 1,350. This complaint, done in this sort was greatly to the shame of the colonel and captains, to want so many men of their number."*[419] The town magistrates, after accepting the apologies of the officers, did not pursue the matter, and paid the colonel for 150 soldiers in every ensign. After Preston received his money, he went to Meenen and paid the restless soldiers. The conflict could have ended with this action. Preston, however, *"to be revenged"*[420], took the action of the soldiers as a personal insult, and arrested and imprisoned six of the leaders of the thirty soldiers who had initially made the complaint to the magistrates of Bruges. *"The soldiers with great violence broke the prison, and 'fatte' them out, and so fell upon the colonel and killed him and his provost-marshal, and gave the colonel many wounds; for he fought with his sword against them as long as he could stand."*[421]

The personal element of the conflict comes also to the fore in the explanation given by the soldiers after the conflict had passed, by which *"every soldier came to his captain and told them that notwithstanding they had done this against the colonel, they would live and die with them in the service of the States, and keep the town against the enemy to the last man."* The Spanish made another attempt at bringing the soldiers over to their side by sending the soldiers of Meenen a message that *"if they would yield the town to them, the town of Lille shall pay them all that the States owe them, and give them a great overplus for a reward. But to this they made them a sharp answer, and would not harken to them."*[422] This example of mutiny is specific of the complexity of military discontent. Initially, it seems to be a personal conflict between the soldiers -who had 22 months of arrears in payment- and the commanding officer –who, together with his captains, had been receiving more money than there were soldiers. However, the issue was not confined exclusively to the military unit. Meenen as a city was endangered by the actions of its soldiers; Bruges had to interfere, first as a mediator

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[418] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, Bruges, 2 June 1583, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 384.
[419] Ibid.
[420] Ibid.
[421] Ibid.
[422] Letter from Stokes to Walsingham, Bruges, 2 June 1583, in: *Cal of Foreign papers*, p. 384.

between the officers and the mutineers, and later to pay for the overdue wages. Parma attempted several times to gain access to the city by writing letters to the mutineers. The fact that the soldiers refused to surrender the city to Parma and to continue their service serving the Dutch Republic does not, therefore, indicate that the situation was not potentially dangerous to the Dutch Republic.

Two years before the incident in Meenen, a similar situation occurred in Vilvoorde, where the Scottish garrison mutinied for want of pay and drove away their commander Colonel Stuart. Ferguson mentions that the soldiers were "with much difficulty appeased."[423] Another account of the same incident is given by a Dutch contemporary source. "*The state businesses are conducted badly, while the present rulers are serving in the war, the* Landraad *was still in the making, Anjou was to be expected; the government had not much authority and one did too little so that the scarcity of money led the Scottish occupants in Vilvoorde in March to mutiny who quieted down only after great difficulty. The same occurred in May in the Schanse in Willebroek....*"[424] It is unknown how long the mutiny lasted and what made the Scottish soldiers revolt, but from a newsletter dated 1 April 1581, it was clear that the problem of Vilvoorde was not yet resolved because "*the mutinous Scots in Vilvoorde are not yet appeased. Commissioners have been sent from hence with offers of money, which is hoped will quiet them.*"[425]

A smaller incident occurred in 1612 when soldiers of the cavalry company of Alexander Wishart revolted against their commander. The entire mutiny seemed to be non-violent on the whole, even civilised. In a letter to the deputies of the three Provincial states of Utrecht, Wishart unequivocally distances himself from the soldiers. "*He never gave any one belonging to his company the slightest reason to revolt against his Excellency, or take part in any plot or unlawful gathering.*" Wishart further condemns the entire action "*and such insubordination being not only injurious to this city and garrison, but also to this company, besides being of disadvantage to the Provinces.*"[426] Remarkably, a letter was also sent by the disgruntled soldiers to the governor and the council of war in Utrecht, in which they expressed their regret

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[423] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 21.
[424] This is a free translation from the original Dutch text, for the original text see P.C. Hooft, *Historiën*, 18, p. 781.
[425] Calendar of Foreign Papers, 1583 plus addenda (ed. Butler, Crawford Lomas) (London 1913), no. 615, p. 578.
[426] Letters and requests to the Council of State 1612, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 271.

concerning the situation and in which they appeal directly to the governor and the council of war. "*We the undersigned, all of us troopers of the company of Alexander Wishart, humbly pray that your lordship, the governor and the council of war will be pleased to pardon the liberty we have taken in approaching you with our claims, as set forth in the request we have signed. It happened through our ignorance, and we are heartily sorry to have given occasion to my lord governor and council of war to be incensed at our conduct; sorry likewise that we revolted against our captain.*"[427]

Although the lack of payment seems the most plausible motivation for a mutiny, it is not the sole explanation. Since many soldiers in the 16th and early 17th centuries were in similarly poor situations and not all of them revolted, other reasons for mutiny must also be considered. According to Geoffrey Parker, there are several explanations. Although he focuses on the Spanish army in Flanders, the causes he mentions may be taken as universal. First, it was a general feeling of "war-weariness" and frustration, especially during long and hard campaigns. A second reason Parker mentions is more basic, and concerns the negative and often unjust treatment of soldiers by their officers. He gives the example of a mutiny in 1574 in Antwerp where the mutineers asked "*that no man should be given 'a dishonourable punishment, like strokes of the lash, if the offence does not merit it, because often a man is dishonoured for little reason, leaving him and his friends outraged and perplexed with an excuse for in-discipline'.*"[428]

Parker sees mutinies as a "manifestation of the dignity of the underdog, a 'collective affirmation of existence' on the part of the humiliated soldiers."[429] Through their mutinous actions, the soldiers often managed to compel the respect they thought they were entitled to, and often they appealed to the highest authority for justice. The English soldiers stationed in Ostend in 1588 revolted because of a combination of a lack of pay and "atrocious victualling and the natural discomforts of the town".[430] The mutineers sent a petition to Queen Elizabeth with their complaints stating that "*they had not received a month's pay in the whole of the last two years*", the rations were neither "*wholesome, savoury, nor man's meat*" and the

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[427] Letters and requests to the Council of State 28 March 1612, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 272.
[428] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p.199-200; Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaria de Estado 558/51, articles agreed with the mutineers of Antwerp, 23 May 1574 (cl. 12).
[429] Parker, *Army*, p. 200.
[430] Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's army*, p. 169.

"companies were so depleted that the strain of watching and warding with insufficient numbers was quite intolerable."[431] To enforce their demands, they took some men prisoner, including the governor of Ostend and some captains. Elizabeth initially reacted in a very moderate way regarding the rebelling soldiers and promised the situation would be rectified, and in the meantime the soldiers were ordered to release the prisoners immediately. The situation continued for several weeks and payment was promised. New problems ensued regarding the division of the payment, and finally the situation was 'resolved' with the arrival of new troops: some of the mutineers were executed and the principal offenders were banished from the town.[432] The reaction of the governor of Ostend, Sir John Conway, to the mutiny was typical of the attitude of the early modern officer regarding living circumstances in the army. He remarked that the *"conditions were not as bad as they had made out."*[433] In effect, the conditions that were responsible for desertion were often the same as those that could compel a company to mutiny. Contrary to the harsh punishment meted out for desertion of individual soldiers, the immediate reaction to a mutinying unit was to appease the soldiers, but often when the danger had passed, punitive measures were taken against those who were seen as the main offenders.

Direct confrontations with the Dutch State

The final form of military discontent seems, at first sight, to focus mainly on a direct confrontation between the Scottish officers and the Dutch political authorities in matters of payment and promotion. However, not all the requests of officers concerned their own ambitions and interests. Some requests originated from the difficult living circumstances in the regiment. In the confrontation between "state" and "regiment", a hierarchical structure was apparent. The captains of the companies would interact with the Provinces on behalf of their soldiers, and the colonel –the commanding officer of the regiment- would speak on behalf of the captains.

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[431] Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's army*, p. 169-170.
[432] Ibid, p. 171.
[433] Ibid, p. 170.

This form of expression of military discontent differs from the other forms. First of all, the military unit was not directly involved and confrontation took place directly between the States General and Council of State and the officers through requests and petitions; in other words, there was more dialogue then when a unit expressed its discontent through mutiny, desertion or treason. Second, this type of conflict was not restricted to a particular period in time as were large-scale mutinies, desertions and betrayal of towns in the early stages of the Eighty Years War. Such personal conflicts continued well into the final stages of the Scots Brigade when, at the end of the 18th century, officers expressed their grievances for not being able to travel to England when George III recalled the Brigade, and for the fact that they were reduced to sentinel tasks in the garrison towns.[434]

One of the confrontations between officers, on the one hand, and state, on the other, whereby the motivations of the officers were not (only) inspired by personal ambition and gain, concerns the Scottish commander Bartholomew Balfour, who was colonel of the first Scottish regiment from 1585/86 to 1594. In 1588, Colonel Balfour together with several of his captains, voiced complaints concerning the irregularity of payment in the army. In the extracts of the Council of State, the situation was described as follows: "*Colonel Balfour was asked to come in, and was informed that their Honours understood he and his captains and officers felt themselves aggrieved at being asked to accept pay at the rate of 32 days for a month*[435]*, and it being well known that he was a lover of their Fatherland, their Honours did not doubt that he would be willing to put up with that, and give no occasion that through him the generally accepted footing be infringed upon.*"[436]

While Balfour relented after discussing the situation with the Council of State, his captains continued to press their case and the requests became a serious problem for both parties. Remarkably, the hierarchy within the ranks remained intact and, despite the fact that the captains continued, they would not concede on any point without the knowledge of their commanding officer. The captains involved were Murray, Nysbeth, and Waddel, who reported to the States that "*they were willing to go and to serve the country, but that they must have the means to make their soldiers willing and to satisfy them. Being asked what means they desired, they explained that they desired to get some security about the settling of*

[434] See chapter 6.
[435] See chapter 3.
[436] Resolutions of the Council of State, 28 May 1588; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 97.

accounts."[437] The States replied that "*they had no reason to insist upon that, or to refuse to serve the country on that account, and they were again charged not to fail to have their companies ready to march.*"[438] Furthermore, the Scottish captains were required to accept the pay of 48 days for a month, and to take a new oath. "*And should any objection be made by them to accept this commission, or take the oath, that they should be given their leave and discharge.*"[439] The Scottish captains responded that without their colonel, they could not accept any change in their commission, but the States were pressed for time since "*...the distress of the country could not bear any delay, but that the soldiers must be employed now against the enemy, they were urged therefore to give the matter further consideration. And meanwhile it was resolved that, having heard their declaration, the captains not agreeing to the terms should receive their discharge at once.*"[440]

In the end, Balfour tried to salvage the situation by acting as a mediator between the captains and the States, as "*it would not be agreeable to him if the Scottish companies, lately determined to be discharged, were to leave the service of the country for want of the necessary security, but that he would prefer that he should enter into negotiations with them in order that his own and the others' companies should still continue in their service, with reasonable concessions.*"[441] The attempt of Balfour was not successful and it was resolved, "*in order to maintain authority*", that three companies (belonging to the Captains Murray, Nisbeth and Blair) were to be disbanded.[442] While Murray's company was disbanded, Murray himself remained on the pay list of the States General, because he was "*a noble man of high rank, and has behaved himself always with great discretion, without meddling much with the protest of the Scottish captains*"[443].

A final attempt was made by Balfour to save the situation. He requested that the officers of the three companies should be enrolled in other companies, and the States consented that the lieutenants, ensigns and sergeants were to be placed in the other companies. Meanwhile, the States General drew up a declaration that aimed to ensure that, in the future, similar events

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[437] Resolutions of the Council of State 13 June 1588; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 98.
[438] Ibid.
[439] Resolutions of the Council of State 13 June 1588; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 98.
[440] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 99.
[441] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 100.
[442] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 102.
[443] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 103.

would never occur. The officers were ordered to sign the statement. Part of the declaration referred to the potential danger for the Dutch State and placed the blame almost exclusively on the Scottish soldiers. "*Since owing to the corruptions that arose among the soldiery and to other troubles occurring, the state of the United Netherlands has been weakened and injured, so that it is necessary to provide against the recurrence of such corruption and troubles by the best and surest means, therefore, we, the undersigned colonel and captains, together and severally* (...) *have promised and do promise in good faith, honourably and devoutly by this declaration, for ourselves and our soldiers under us, that we shall honestly and faithfully serve the States of the said lands after the tenor of our new commissions aforementioned, and shall be content and satisfied with receiving a full month's pay at intervals of 48 days, whether in more than one payment or delivery as may be most convenient to them; and on these terms maintain good military discipline ourselves and among our soldiers under us, in accordance with the rules of war and the oath we took, and that we shall not, because of the third part of our pay (which in future service is to remain for us and our soldiers in arrear) or even because of what the lands owe us for services rendered, refuse any service or permit or suffer any corruption, but oppose such to the uttermost of our power.*"[444] The declaration was signed by the Scottish officers. It was not entirely without reason that the Dutch States insisted on this declaration, as the army was anything but well disciplined and organised at this stage and, as had been demonstrated in the past, Scottish units had proved on occasion to be unreliable.

The declaration of the Scottish officers, however, did not help to stop the Dutch authorities from continuing to regard Scottish soldiers as a threat to the integrity of the Dutch State. In 1593, the States General referred once again to the possibility of a Scottish plot, which could injure "*the condition of the Land.*" After long deliberation, the States General decided that the only way to secure the service of the Scottish soldiers and the safety of the Dutch Republic was by advising Prince Maurice to divide the companies in garrisons, and to "*post them in such places, that they may not, and cannot do any ill.*"[445] This decision of the Dutch government involved again Colonel Bartholomew Balfour, who fulfilled an important role in maintaining the loyalty of the Scottish troops. In order to assure the continuation of the service of the Scottish soldiers, the States General decided, first of all, to satisfy Balfour by

[444] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 103-104, 24 June 1588; Instructie Boek van den Raad van Staaten.
[445] Resolution of the States General 2 December 1593, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 113.

paying him the arrears of his salary. Balfour, however, for reasons unknown, together with six other Scottish officers, did not consent to the settlement: "*And there Colonel Balfour, Captains Murray, Dalachy, Brog, Prop, Egger and Waddel were informed that since they will not content themselves with the settlement, of which an offer has been made them severally, nor otherwise with such pay as the other captains are in receipt of, that therefore they are discharged from their service and loosened from their oath.*"[446]

The States General finally decided to give Balfour a sum of 1500 guilders in "ready money", and "*1500 guilders a year till said salary be paid in full. But should any one among them desire to continue in the States' service, it is devised that he shall come to an agreement with the same.*"[447] In the end, and after a long period of conflict with the Dutch States, Bartholomew Balfour was dismissed from Dutch military service, and provided with a reasonable financial compensation. His company was in turn given to William Balfour[448], who had served as lieutenant in the same company.[449] The colonelship of the first regiment went to Alexander Murray, who was a brother of the discharged Captain William Murray.[450]

While Bartholomew Balfour came into direct conflict with the States General, his conflict was not a personal one. During the conflict, he acted foremost as a mediator, placing himself in between the Dutch State and his officers. He took responsibility as the commanding officer by requesting from the Dutch authorities the necessary payments that were due to him and his officers. Additionally, he tried to prevent the Scottish officers from ending their service with the States and to avoid the companies from being disbanded. Only in 1593, when he refused the settlement made by the Dutch government, was he discharged from service.

Another example of a direct conflict between a Scottish officer and the Dutch government was the example of Walter Scott, Earl of Buccleuch. Scott made several claims to the States

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[446] Resolutions of States General, 2-6 December 1593, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 114.
[447] Resolutions of States General, 2 and 6 December 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 113-114.
[448] William Balfour was the son of Henry Balfour (colonel of the first regiment from 1575 to 1580) and nephew of Bartholomew Balfour. Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 69, n. 3. Whether the promotion of William Balfour was part of the deal between the States General and Colonel Bartholomew Balfour is not known, William Balfour was already second in command of the company of Bartholomew Balfour and as such next in line for the commission of captain.
[449] Resolutions of the States General, 19 February 1594, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 93.
[450] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 28.

General. The first claim concerned the payment of arrears in the pension belonging to his father, Lord Buccleuch. There were four points expressed by the Earl of Buccleuch. "*Firstly a payment of a pension of twelve hundred guilders yearly, promised to him on December 3rd, 1615. Secondly, interest granted of twelve hundred guilders yearly, granted to him on June 12th, 1623, in place of the aforesaid pension. Thirdly, a pension of two thousand guilders yearly, voted to him on December 26th, 1625, with expectative of a company of cavalry, or some other important charge. And fourthly, that he received the pay and wages which fell due during his last absence before Maestricht.*"[451] The Dutch authorities responded that Walter Scott of Buccleuch had, in fact, no reason or right to demand such a sum of money from the Dutch States "*for the services rendered by his father, in the like capacity of colonel, inasmuch as he was absent for most of the time.*"[452] Therefore, the States General resolved to grant him a yearly pension of twelve hundred guilders, which the Earl of Buccleuch refused on grounds that "*he possessed such means and rank that twelve hundred guilders yearly made no difference to him.*"[453]

The second claim made by Buccleuch concerned the succession of the Earl as commanding officer of the first Scottish regiment, which was previously under the command of his father, Lord Buccleuch. By an act of the States General in 1620, Scott was promised to be the next in line to receive command of the regiment after the successor of his father, Sir Robert Henderson. Nevertheless, when Henderson died in 1622, Maurice decided to give the command not to Scott, but to the brother of Robert Henderson, Sir Francis Henderson. Buccleuch complained about this course of action, and the States General decided to award him a pension of "*two thousand guilders yearly as interest for the sum claimed by him, till he could be provided with a colonelcy.*" Scott was not satisfied with this solution and had involved the Duke of Buckingham, the Earl of Holland and Mr. Carleton, who was appointed as an ambassador-extraordinair to act on his behalf. The States proposed to give Scott a commanding position of the first cavalry company and the yearly pension of two thousand guilders. Ambassador Carlton agreed that the Earl should receive the pension until he received the colonelcy. However, when Francis Henderson died in 1628, Frederick Henry preferred not to give the command of the regiment to Walter Scott, who was in his eyes not

[451] Letter from Constantijn Huygens to States General, 6 February, 1635, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 392.
[452] Ibid.
[453] Letter from Constantijn Huygens to States General, 6 February 1635, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 393.

experienced enough, having missed the practical training in the campaigns in the Netherlands. Rather, he chose to appoint Sir John Halkett as his successor. In order to avoid further confrontation, the States resolved to create an extra regiment, which could be given to the Earl of Buccleuch. According to Huygens, Buccleuch was still not satisfied after receiving command of the newly formed regiment, because "*after he had held the colonelcy for some time, he commenced to renew his old claims to the pensions [of his father] which he had refused to accept before.*"[454]

Sometimes the conflicts between Scottish officers and the Dutch authorities were of a highly personal nature. In this context, it is difficult to describe accurately the nature of the conflict, whether based on personal grudges, or on discontent with military life, or with regard to the way in which the Dutch authorities conducted their affairs. The following example illustrates well this difficulty, especially since the exact nature of the conflict is unknown. It concerns the Marquis of Tullibardine, who commanded a Scottish regiment during the War of the Spanish Succession, and Johan Willem Friso of Orange. "*The Marquis of Tullibardine, who is said to have had a quarrel with the Prince of Orange, so bitter that they had agreed to fight a duel after the next engagement.*"[455] It is not clear whether the conflict was resolved by a duel, because before the duel could be fought, the Marquis of Tullibardine was killed in action in the battle of Malplaquet in 1709. It is interesting, however, that both Tullibardine and Orange had recourse to a duel in order to solve their conflict, which indicates that some form of personal honour must have been involved.

While the Scottish were not more discontented than other nationalities, there were nevertheless a number of features that made the Scots distinctive. Many deserters went back to Scotland, as could be seen from the letter of James II in 1686 and the announcement of William III in 1689. Additionally, the motivation for desertion was not always discontent with the conditions within the army. During the rebellion of James Stuart in 1716 and of Charles Stuart in 1746, for example, many Scottish soldiers serving in the Dutch army joined the Jacobean cause out of political conviction.

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[454] Letter from Constantijn Huygens to States General, 6 February 1635, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 395.
[455] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 16.

Despite the myriad forms of military discontent in the Scottish regiments, overall the situation in the Dutch army was not as dire as the examples given here may suggest. Most of the large-scale conflicts took place during the early stages of the formation of the Dutch army and the Dutch Republic. Payment in the beginning was irregular at best, and the "stick and carrot" policy of the Duke of Parma encouraged a number of Scottish officers to use their personal grudges as an excuse to change sides. When the Dutch army became more professional, the large-scale mutinies and betrayals became less frequent, although military discontent remained, as can be judged from the number of desertions and conflicts between Scottish officers and the Dutch authorities. It is futile to speculate as to whether military discontent was a specific Scottish phenomenon, despite the various examples of Scottish disloyalty and English opinion regarding the trustworthiness of the Scottish. Scottish soldiers, reasoning that they were often heavily involved in campaigning and, as a result, sustained heavy casualties, were not more disgruntled or dissatisfied than soldiers of other nations. The reasons that were responsible for their discontent -bad payment, poor living conditions, abusive behaviour of officers, boredom and hunger- could be applied beyond the Scottish example to any other early modern soldier. Only when the army became more modernised did the problems diminish, but although as illustrated by the experiences of the American soldier during the period of the Vietnam War they never completely disappeared.

While this chapter has looked at conflicts within regiments and between the Dutch government and the Scottish officers, in the following chapter another form of interaction will be looked at. As discussed previously, many of the Scottish soldiers were stationed in garrison towns, which on occasion could also lead to confrontations with the civilian population. These confrontations were not always of such an extreme nature as when a town was betrayed by its garrison to the enemy, but since soldier and civilian were often living together in a restricted environment, conflicts were not unusual. It is, however, important to note that while conflicts were common between the two different social groups, this was not inevitable. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, there are also numerous examples whereby both groups succeeded in maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship.

Chapter 5 A Fragile Symbiosis: Civil-Military Interaction

The image of the soldier as a social and economic liability during the early modern period is well known. In general, soldiers and the military were not to be trusted and to be feared, often with justified cause. The accounts of the atrocities committed by the Catholic League or by their Protestant adversaries during the Thirty Years War are legion. The sack of Antwerp by the Spanish forces in 1576 or the sack of Haarlem in 1572 would be more than enough reasons to warrant the hatred and fear of civilians towards the military. Especially during periods of continuous war, it was the civilian population that took the brunt of the feeding frenzy of large armies who were often required to live off the countryside in order to sustain themselves during their campaigns. In many cases, particularly when the circumstances were extremely dire, rural communities would form their own armies in order to defend and protect themselves against the marauding armies swarming the countryside. In the account of Robert Monro on the Thirty Years War, he mentions the murder of a Captain Bothwell by a 'horde of roguish peasants'. Because the soldiers could not find the culprits, they decided to burn down the entire village in retribution.[456]

Overall, soldiers were considered to be a necessary evil, that is useful for warfare, but a dangerous and expensive burden during peacetime. In countries that lacked a strong military tradition like the Dutch Republic or Great Britain, it was common procedure in peacetime to reduce the size of the army considerably. After the Spanish War of Succession the British army counted about 18,000 soldiers. In comparison; the French peacetime army was 133,000.[457] The numbers for the Dutch Republic were similar to those of Great Britain, after the peace of Utrecht, the Dutch army was reduced in size from approximately 120,000 around 1710, to less than 40,000 in 1720.[458]

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[456] H. Ruffer K. Zickermann, 'German reactions to the Scots in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War in S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Year's War 1618-1648*, (Leiden 2001).p. 10; H. Mahr (ed.), Oberst Robert Monro, Kriegserlebnisse eines schottischen Söldnerführers in Deutschland 1626-1633 (Neustadt an der Aisch 1995), p. 30f.

[457] T. Hayter, *The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England* (London 1978), p. 22; C.M. Clode, *The military forces of the Crown*, (1869) vol.1, p. 398; C. Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 165.

[458] H.L. Zwitzer, *De Militie van de Staat*, bijlage 1.

The civilian attitude to the army has always been ambiguous at best. In wartime, the army was indispensable, but also during peacetime -in particular in the Dutch Republic- the uses for the army were many. The Dutch Republic relied heavily on its military forces to occupy the many garrisons that surrounded their territory. In particular, in those garrison towns which were located in the southern parts of the Republic along the border with the Spanish (later Austrian) Netherlands, civil-military interaction was inevitable. Even though companies never stayed more than one year in a garrison, the civilians of the garrison towns were accustomed to interact on a regular basis with the military community, be it in a positive or a negative way. While the number of civilians was usually consistent, the number of soldiers stationed in the garrison towns was not, and therefore the relation between the number of civilians and soldiers could differ strongly. Den Bosch, for example, during the siege of Frederik Henry in 1629 had about 10,000 inhabitants and a garrison of about 3,000 soldiers.[459] In 1668, the number of civilians remained more or less the same, while the number of soldiers declined to 1,315 because of the peace with Spain. In the year 1747, however, Den Bosch had more than 10,000 soldiers in the garrison because of the impeding French siege.[460] Bergen op Zoom, while a town smaller in size than Den Bosch, had a similar pattern. In times of peace, there were approximately 1,600 soldiers stationed, compared to about 7,500 civilians. In times of war, however, the garrison could expand to more than 7,000 soldiers.[461] Nevertheless, despite fluctuations in the numerical relation between soldiers and civilians, garrison towns had a continuous military presence, which could strongly influence daily life.

The study of civil-military interaction has been mostly researched in the context of the relationship between 'army' and 'society'.[462] However, with regard to the interaction between 'soldier' and 'civilian', little research has been conducted. This civil-military interaction is a crucial element in social-military history, since the encounters between soldiers and civilians assist in further defining the social aspect of the army. This study is concerned with the human interaction between two different social groups, that is (Scottish) soldiers and the local civilian community. Despite the fact that the focus of the research is on the Scottish soldier, many examples which are presented deal with the soldier/military in general; furthermore, in

[459] M. Prak, *Gouden Eeuw. Het raadsel van de Republiek.* (Nijmegen 2002), p. 77.
[460] T. Kappelhof, 'Laverend tussen Mars en Mercurius', p. 56.
[461] E. Härtel, 'Bergen op Zoom. Proeve van een sociaal-geografische stadsanalyse'. (Terborg 1961), p. 41.
[462] See S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957); S. Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (London 1954).

none of the cases that were researched did I find that the behaviour of Scottish soldiers differed from that of non-Scottish soldiers. Therefore, the cases that deal with the interaction between Scottish soldiers and Dutch civilians can be taken as examples of more general civic-military interaction, and should not be considered as being specific for the Scottish regiments. In this respect, the cases that discuss the 'soldier' without mentioning a specific nationality can also be used to illustrate the Scottish case.

In the course of this research, some critical distinctions needed to be made. First of all, the political and social situation in the Dutch Republic during the early modern era was different compared with that of most of the other continental powers. Even though one may not agree with the theory that the Dutch Republic was a pacifist state without any military tradition, it is true that when comparing the military tradition in the Republic with that of France in the late 17th century and of 18th century Prussia, Dutch society was certainly less dominated by military culture. Unlike Prussia, and unlike France until the late 18th century, the Dutch were heavily involved in overseas trade and thus accorded significant importance to their navy. The defensive policy of the Dutch authorities had always been a delicate balance between army and navy, where sometimes the army and sometimes the navy would receive more attention. The Republic of the United Netherlands was very much caught between "the devil and the deep blue sea"; on the one hand, it had a very large stake in their overseas colonies and trade, while on the other hand, it had also to be constantly aware of continental politics and the threats that its neighbouring states represented. While both France and Spain were also divided between continental politics and their colonies, both states had more resources at their disposal. Additionally, the Dutch Republic, unlike Great Britain, did not have the geological advantage of being an island state, which protected it against a direct invasion by the other European powers. Furthermore, the delicate political situation in the Republic with its different factions, between monarchical and republican elements, made a policy that was exclusively focused on the army impossible.

It is important to revise the long-standing concepts of 'military' and 'civilian' as two incompatible opposites in early modern society. Putting aside the observation that the situation in the Dutch Republic was unique in comparison with other European states, the fact remains that the context of social interaction between these diverse groups is not amenable to straightforward definition. Extant letters, petitions, requests and so forth, indicate that the interaction was complex and existed on many different levels. It would therefore be rather

one-dimensional to speak only of a negative contact between the two groups -an image that has been strongly influenced by sources and studies on the Thirty Years War- since there are many cases where both groups did seem to interact well, and even seemed to benefit from each other. On the other hand, military society and civil society were two very different environments where each had its own set of morals and values and its own justice system, which could clash. Additionally, it is not only a problem on an individual level, between the soldier's morality and that of the civilian, but also on a more general level where many different social and political spheres become involved. When, for example, a large body of troops had not received their payment for a long period of time, this would not only affect the soldiers and officers in question, but also the civilians who housed them; the civil authorities that represented the civilians and often acted as a mediator between them and the military, and between the town and the higher political authorities on provincial and national level; and, finally, the States General and the Council of State that were responsible for the payment of the troops.

Since the social interaction between soldiers and civilians took place on many different levels and one single conclusion cannot be drawn there from, this chapter is structured as follows. First, one of the basic issues that had a profound effect on both the military and the civilian was the question of payment. As will be illustrated later, payment was often irregular and could, therefore, cause severe difficulties in the civil-military context. Nevertheless, there were many different aspects that could prevent a potentially dangerous situation from deteriorating, and could even assist in ameliorating the relationship between civilian and soldier. Related to the problem of payment is also the problem of credit, of food and of shelter. It was a common practice to lodge soldiers without a family with civilians, who in return received a payment. When a soldier was without funds, the host would provide him with money, but only as a loan, which he expected to be paid back in full. Of course, there was a risk in lending money to the military, and the records of the States General are riddled with petitions from various towns complaining of soldiers who were relocated to another town without having settled their debts.

The second issue concerns another important aspect of garrison life and civil-military interaction. It is important to stress the fact that between the end of the 16th century and the end of the 18th century, the army and, relatedly, the social interaction between soldier and civilian changed profoundly. Whereas at the start of the Eighty Years War the army can be

described as a mercenary band -uncontrolled and to be disbanded when the campaigning season was over- during the 17th century it grew into a much more orderly standing army with an officer corps and soldiers who were in receipt of regular pay. After the Peace of Munster, it was only on one occasion in the 17th century that Dutch territory was invaded and that armies fought on Dutch soil. This, without a doubt, also changed the relationship between civilians and the military. The 18th century, despite two wars that strongly affected the Dutch Republic, was, compared to the previous centuries, reasonably stable. The new static position of the soldier, who was assigned to perpetual watch duty, posed challenges for both the civilian and the military population since each had distinctive different social value systems.

In garrison towns like Bergen op Zoom, Den Bosch or Maastricht, there are many cases of conflicts between the military and civilians related to problems caused by conflicting social values. In theory, in these towns the highest authority was represented by the governor who was an officer, but the civil authorities could always appeal to the States General and thus get around the governor, a practice which often happened. In this context, the conflict between military jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction also became clear. In towns without a garrison, there was usually a civilian element responsible for maintaining public order, represented by the *provoost* (provost). In towns with a garrison, however, it was common for military patrols to make arrests. Often, these patrols were defined as 'the watch', the term suggesting a civilian connotation that clearly was not there. Because these patrols were definitely military and not civilian, there was often miscommunication between the two groups, and both sides were confused about the demarcation of their respective rights. Related to the communicational problems between the military and the civilian, was the question as to what kind of judicial authority individuals would be answerable. Since there was both a civil court and a military court, it was sometimes difficult to decide which court should be used. Often, when the military made an arrest, they would be inclined to bring a civilian before the military court. Whether or not a soldier could be tried before a civil court depended on the extent of civil authority. In garrison towns where the highest authority was often the governor, it was highly unusual for a soldier to be tried under civil law. On the contrary, in towns where no garrison was stationed, the situation was different, and there are more cases of soldiers being convicted by the civil courts.

The third point concerns the issue of the impact of military presence on the local labour market and economic competition. On the one hand, the static position of the soldier could

often be the cause of misbehaviour by the soldier, but on the other hand, it could also be an incentive to explore new ways of being productive. This relative inertia, combined with poor financial circumstances, resulted in many soldiers offering themselves as part-time labourers to civilians, who were in turn eager to take advantage of the relatively cheap labour-force. The soldier also contributed to the local economy by acting as a consumer, by spending his wage in taverns and by paying his lodgers. However, the presence of soldiers could also sometimes pose a problem for the local economy, because the army was in many cases self-sufficient, producing, their own clothing and shoes, for example. In this sense, the military created its own market that could compete strongly with local guilds.

The fourth part focuses on the positive aspects of civil-military interaction, whereby a delicate and mutually beneficial relation between the two social groups was created. Numerous examples from the sources reveal that the civil community would come to the assistance of the military when, for example, they had not received their payment for a long time, or when an individual soldier desired to remain in the city and sought citizenship. From the perspective of the civil community, the presence of a well-behaved group of soldiers was to be preferred to mutinous soldiers demanding their payment.

The final aspect is concerned more with civil-military interaction in the countryside. Since the interaction occurred mostly during wartime (given that at other times the military was stationed in towns) and was of a temporary nature, the relationship between the two social groups would have differed from the interaction in urban areas. What, therefore, was the impact of the army on the countryside and its population during wartime, and how responsible was the military for civil casualties during a military conflict?

Military presence and its economic impact

In the early modern period, soldiers were usually billeted with civilians. Army barracks were few and far between before the middle of the 18th century, and civilians would receive payment provided by the billeted soldier in exchange for providing board and lodging. Billeting, however, was not voluntary, and the civilian was obliged to lodge soldiers. In 1602, in Den Bosch, Henrick Jordens and his wife Margareta, for example, refused to lodge a group of soldiers. Such a refusal was considered a penal offence according to the law.[463] Since payment was often in arrears, the military was frequently without the necessary means to compensate civilians. This led to complicated and tense situations whereby companies and even regiments which were completely impoverished and did not have any means to sustain themselves, were incapable of paying their outstanding debts. This potentially dangerous situation could be fuelled by general misunderstandings between the two social groups. In addition, lodging and messing soldiers with civilians could lead to conflicts even when there were no financial difficulties. The Scottish officer John Gabriel Stedman, for example, was stationed in Maastricht in 1761, where he quartered at the house of a coppersmith.[464] He messed at the house of another Dutchman by the name of Verhulst, together with two ensigns. Verhulst interfered in a quarrel between Stedman and the two ensigns and took the side of the latter. Stedman avenged himself, by "*making him* [Verhulst] *with the assistance of Cunninghame* [a fellow ensign] *fall in the cellar while it was dark, which gave him a broken head to our great entertainment.*"[465] Though it is important to realise that this example comes from the personal diary of Stedman and thus cannot be interpreted as a general phenomenon of civil-military interaction, it still gives an example of how tensions between civilians and soldiers could build up, especially when they interfered in each others' spheres of influence.

The fact that wages were irregular did not necessarily imply that the relationship between soldier and civilian was always disrupted. When both groups were willing to compromise, it was possible that, despite the social differences, an agreement between the groups could be

[463] A. Vos, 'Dataschurk', rec. No. 1918, file No. 131-13.
[464] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *The journal of John Gabriel Stedman, 1744-1797 Soldier and Author* (London 1962), p. 34.
[465] Ibid, p. 37.

reached that could benefit social interaction. This is demonstrated by the example of Tiel in 1611. In the city of Tiel a group of Scottish soldiers was stationed, most of them belonging to the company of Captain Forbes. This group had not received any advance on their wages for 27 weeks and had severe difficulties in sustaining themselves. The situation became so desperate that "*because of hunger and anxiety they must have been forced to desert, had they not been supplied with victuals by the good burghers and inhabitants of this town, particularly by the widow of T. Reyner Gijsbrechts.*"[466] Whether the townsmen helped the suffering soldiers out of altruism or to prevent a starving and frustrated group of armed men from wreaking havoc on the town or countryside, is not known. It is interesting to note, however, that this action was unofficial, meaning that the municipal authorities seem not to have been directly involved. On the contrary, a particular emphasis is placed on the role of the widow. In the end, however, though the philanthropy of the citizens came to an end: "*But this support the citizens no longer could or would give, as there is now due to them by the company a considerable sum of money. On account of which they (the soldiers) have also pledged themselves to such an extent, that they have lost all credit.*"[467] Did this indicate that the primary aid given by the citizens was in fact a loan? It would be plausible that the burghers who provided the provisions were probably the same civilians who housed the soldiers, since they were directly affected by the fact that the soldiers and officers were without money and partly depended on the income provided by the quartered soldiers. Therefore, it would indeed appear more logical that it was rather a loan than a gift. With regard to the situation of the widow of Gijsbrechts, in a letter to the States General dated two weeks later, it is stated that the captain of the company paid 800 guilders in cash to the said widow "*who had long supplied the said soldiers with victuals*".[468] This incident serves clearly as an example of how the social interaction between soldiers and citizens could take place, and as a result, a potentially dangerous situation whereby the official authorities -the States General and the Provinces- were absent, was contained by the actions of civilians. On the part of the military, it needs to be said that they also kept their part of the bargain. The governor and commander of the regiment wrote to the States General not only on behalf of the soldiers, but also on behalf of the citizens who depended on the soldiers paying off their debts.

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[466] Letter of Diederech Vijgh, Lord of Soelen, Sheriff in Nederbetuwe and Commander of the garrison in Tiel to the States General, 18 April 1611, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 246.
[467] Ibid.
[468] Letter to the Council of State, 6 May 1611, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 247.

Furthermore, the captain himself repaid the widow who had apparently taken the brunt of supporting the soldiers.

Although the motivations of the civil authorities on some occasions seem to be based on respect and gratification in relation to the military community, in many circumstances self-preservation was the main motive. In 1607, when the soldiers in the town of Heusden were severely underpaid and disgruntled, the municipal institutions appealed to the Council of State not directly on behalf of the soldiers but, more importantly, to prevent the soldiers from mutinying and causing disorder. They state that "*the common soldiers complaining bitterly, because of their miserable rations and bad payment, and that to such a degree, that had not the soldiers at our earnest entreaty been provided with a weekly loan, by treasurer Bruynincx, we should today be in fear of a new species of mutiny.*"[469] Furthermore, the city strongly advised that "*some companies of the said foreign nations, and in particular that of Konnock* [English], *which had been the longest in garrison here, may be changed, a measure which will not only contribute to the security of this frontier place, but confirm our town and its inhabitants in greater loyalty.*"[470] In this case, the civil authorities mention the dire circumstances the soldiers were in only as a means to indicate the tense situation in the city and the potential threat, not only to the local civil order, but also to the civil order and political integrity of the Republic of the United Provinces. It was, after all, not unthinkable that mutinying soldiers would sell themselves and the city to the Spanish.

The officers were in general responsible for keeping the military unit disciplined and orderly, but when an officer was in no position to fulfil his obligations, it did not mean that the civil-military interaction was necessarily disrupted. In the case of Captain Archibald Erskine and the municipal authorities of Zwolle, the said captain had died without resolving his financial situation: "*Since the decease of Captain Archibald Arskin* (Erskine), *it has been found that he owed to our burghers here, and to others, a considerable sum of money. Moreover, some members of the said captain's family took upon them to remove by unlawful methods from this place, and retain the horses and other goods left by the captain.*"[471] The poor financial situation of the deceased captain presented a potentially even more serious situation. The

[469] Letter from the bailiff, the burgomasters, and rulers of the town of Heusden to the Council of State, 30 May 1607, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 209.
[470] Ibid.
[471] Letter from the Burgomasters, Aldermen, and Council of the town of Zwolle, 3 December 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 215.

company for which Captain Erskine was financially responsible had not been paid for two months. As a result, the soldiers had built up debts with civilians, and in turn, the civilians presented a petition in which they asked the municipal authorities to use their influence with the Council of State in order to receive payment.[472]

The same letter was also equipped with an appendix that contained a letter from forty-two soldiers who represented the point of view of the military in this situation. The forty-two soldiers, of whom the majority were Scots, appealed to the city council to intercede on their behalf in order to receive the payment in arrears. Because the soldiers had not received their payment for such a long time, they were forced to borrow from the burghers of the town "*who can in no way be satisfied, till payment be made to them of their arrears.*"[473] The request ends with the comment: "*And this with the further request, that the money to be paid be delivered to none, except to your worship alone, so that it be honestly handled, and nobody, whether burgher or soldier, be defrauded, or have deductions made from his account.*"[474]

There does not seem to have been any animosity towards the civilians who had provided the money. As a matter of fact their plight is used as an extra incentive in order to get their arrears, since "*...the remonstrants most humbly and submissively entreat and request that it may please you graciously to further the promotion of their request to their Highnesses the States, that payment may be made of their arrears, so that your burghers may afterwards be paid in full and satisfied, as they ought to be.*"[475] The strategy of the soldiers seems to have paid of, because five days later (December 3) the city council sent a letter to the Council of State with a request to pay the arrears.[476] In this example, like the previous case of Tiel, the civil community temporarily resolved the issue by providing the soldiers with a loan. The soldiers, in turn, were aware of the fact that it was a loan and they seemed to have been serious about re-paying the civilians.

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[472] Letter from the Burgomasters, Aldermen, and Council of the town of Zwolle, 3 December 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 215-216.
[473] Annex to the request sent by the Magistrates of Zwolle, presented 28 November 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 216-17.
[474] Annex to the request sent by the Magistrates of Zwolle, presented 28 November 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 217.
[475] Annex to the request sent by the Magistrates of Zwolle, presented 28 November 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 216-217.
[476] Letter from the magistrates of Zwolle to the Council of State, 3 December 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 215-216.

The situation in Zwolle is in many ways reflected by the following case of the regiment of Captain Gordon in Steenbergen. As with the company of Captain Erskine, the regiment of Captain Gordon found itself in serious financial trouble. Soldiers came to Johan de Witt, the governor of Steenbergen, on several occasions to plead their case: "*three times the said soldiers have besought me with increasing vehemence to advise your lordships of their misery and poverty, and some remedy must be adopted, otherwise they must perish in extremity.*" The soldiers also borrowed money from the burghers, who were equally worried about their payment, and it is stated "*also that many burghers complain, that in having out of compassion for the poor soldiers provided them with some necessaries, they have not been paid for it.*"[477]

De Witt made several request to the Council of State in order to find a solution for the problem. The Council of State in the end "resolved" the matter by disbanding the company. In a letter to the Council of State, dated 14 October 1609, Johan de Witt states that by disbanding the company the problems were, however, still far from resolved, and that "*his* [Gordon's] *soldiers, owing to ill payment, are deeply indebted to the burghers here...said soldiers have due to them a considerable sum of arrears of pay. Yet they do not wish to act otherwise than to pay their debts, and satisfy the burghers, who supported them so loyally with victuals and drink in their extreme poverty, to such a degree indeed, that but for their having done so, the company would have perished long ago- as everybody well knows.*"[478]

As with the other examples, it seems that when soldiers did not receive payment it was not evident that they commenced harassing civilians and plundering shops. Of course, their behaviour depended on how disciplined they were and how capable their officers were, but in the case of Gordon's regiment, as in the case of the soldiers belonging to the company of Captain Archibald Erskine, the amount of officers was the bare minimum. Of the commanding officers, only the ensign was on duty, while the other officers were on leave or otherwise absent for a period of time varying from six weeks to six months. Therefore, the good interaction between civilians and soldiers and, above all, the decent behaviour of the soldiers towards the burghers of Steenbergen, must have had a different cause.

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[477] Letter from Johan de Witt to the council of state, Steenbergen, 7 October 1609, Ferguson, *Papers*, I., p. 238.
[478] Johan de Witt to Council of State, 14 October 1609, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 239.

Any explanation of the relationship between the soldiers of Gordon's regiment and the citizens of Steenbergen can only be speculation. What can be said for certain, however, is that an important role in the matter was performed by Johan de Witt, who encouraged the burghers to assist the soldiers and to provide for them, since "*said support also was proffered mostly by my persuasions out of pity for the poor soldiers.*"[479]

The nature of civil-military interaction was therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, the military were a nuisance because they were billeted with civilians, had their own military court and social value system, and caused difficulties with the civil population as a result of inertia and boredom. Furthermore, they were numerous and often armed. On the other hand, the soldiers were considered a source of income for the civil community. The fact that the citizens of Steenbergen decided to aid the soldiers when in need was based on several factors. Firstly, the situation in Steenbergen was critical, and if the soldiers did not receive an income or a way to sustain themselves they could strongly disrupt the civil order and the local economy. Secondly, the soldiers were potential customers who also invested in the economy of Steenbergen, by buying goods and spending their income. Thirdly, many of the burghers had provided the soldiers with loans, and it was in both their and the military's interest that the States General would pay the wages in arrears.

It seems that there was a fragile symbiosis between the two social groups, whereby it was necessary that both groups kept their "part of the bargain" in order to preserve the peace and social structure. As far as the citizens were concerned, it was important that the military maintained its discipline and did not give in to plunder and disorderly behaviour. Naturally, a normal interaction depended on the attitude of both groups and on how they had been interacting with each other in the past. Mutual mistrust and suspicion remained, but the more positive examples indicate that in some cases it was possible for these social groups to co-exist in a peaceful and mutual beneficial way. Unfortunately, however, this fragile symbiosis broke down easily, and for every example of a friendly civil-military interaction, there are dozens that point to the contrary. The most common form of complaint from the civil authorities was probably the fact that many officers and soldiers had made long outstanding debts with civilians, which they could not, or would not, honour.

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[479] Johan de Witt to Council of State, 14 October 1609, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 239.

From the governor of Breda there came, in 1609, a letter to the Council of State declaring that two Scottish officers had left the city without settling the considerable debts they had with the burghers of Breda. The soldiers in question -Captain Forbes and Captain Scott- owed the citizens 300 and 45 guilders respectively. The burghers appealed to the governor in order to solve the issue, who in turn wrote to the Council of State: "*Not doubting that your lordships will so arrange that the good burghers shall succeed in getting payment, and that they at another time will be the more willing to assist the soldiers in their need.*"[480] It could be that the last remark was used by the governor as an extra incentive for the Council of State to resolve the issue, implying a fuller cooperation of the civilians in the future (if they got their payment). For the Council of State, it was favourable that the local authorities took care of any problems that might occur with the military. In practice it meant that civilians had to provide soldiers with loans in order to compensate for their delayed payment. Naturally, these loans were required to be paid back, not only to prevent the civilians from being too suspicious of lending money once again, but also to protect the financial interest of the burghers.

Another example comes from the municipal authorities of Bergen op Zoom with regard to a complaint of two burghers from the city. Aert de Voocht and Andries Spruyt -a chandler[481]- had supplied Lieutenant Colonel Allan Coutts with bread and other chandler's wares in support of the said lieutenant colonel's company during the time it was in garrison in Bergen op Zoom. The total bill amounted to the sum of six hundred and twenty seven guilders and nineteen stuivers, and the burghers were given bonds for the goods. Despite different appeals for payment made both to the lieutenant colonel and to some of his officers, the burghers had obtained no payment. Because the civil authorities had ordered the chandlers to supply the company "*which was in need and unprovided with money*" with the provisions, they considered themselves to be responsible for the incident and "*therefore, at the request of these our burghers, we could not neglect hereby humbly to petition and intreat your noble Mightinesses, that you may be pleased so to arrange matters, that the said burghers be paid*

[480] Letter from the governor of Breda to the Council of State, 8 August 1609, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 236.
[481] A kind of grocer, he sold mostly candles and provisions.

as they ought to be, whether out of the pay of the said lieutenant-colonel or from other sources."[482]

Not paying back the loans provided by civilians and the possibility of running a financial risk were comparatively minor incidents, although they occurred quite frequently. More grave was the situation when soldiers resorted to other means like plunder and extortion in order to make up for their financial deficit. The case of Heusden is a clear example of what really could go wrong in civil-military interaction when soldiers were not paid on time. "*Today certain soldiers of the company of captain Konnock proceeded to plunder several houses of bakers and provision merchants of the bread and victuals exposed in their shops, doing this, as I am informed, through want of money; and the citizens, because of this, are in perplexity and highly dissatisfied, and truly not without cause, since it might easily happen, particularly with the foreigners, that, although those in other companies are not in such a state of destitution, they might be seduced into taking part in a factious rising of the sort, through hope of disorder and pillage.*"[483] This example demonstrates what could happen when the soldiers were left to their own design. Furthermore, it also shows how crucial it was for the civil community to avoid these incidents by providing the military with financial assistance when required. This particular incident not only expressed a universal fear against the military, but more specifically against a *foreign* military group. Evidently, foreigners were not as disciplined as other military units and, moreover, they could infect other companies with their disrupting behaviour. These stereotypes seem not only to have been limited to the Dutch Republic. In his article on the Scottish soldier in 15th century France, Brian Ditcham stresses the often difficult relationship between the native population and the Scottish soldiers. When, for example, Isabella of Anjou as the new Lady of Tours approached the city with her army, amongst whom were also Scottish soldiers, the municipal authorities expelled all the Scottish within the walls out of fear, including women and a Dominican friar.[484]

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[482] Letter from Bailiff, Burgomasters, Aldermen and Council of the town Bergen-on-the-Zoom, 13 April 1624 to Council of State, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 344.
[483] Annex to letter written by the town of Heusden to the Council of State, 30 May 1607, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 210.
[484] B.G.H. Ditcham, 'Mutton Guzzlers and Wine Bags: Foreign soldiers and Native Reactions in Fifteenth-Century France', in: *Power, Culture, and Religion in France c.1350-c.1550* (ed. C.T. Allmand), p. 7.

Conflicting social values

The cause of many conflicts between civilians and the Scottish soldiers was the dreariness of everyday military life. For the peacetime Scottish garrison soldier, there were not many military tasks to perform, other than to "sitting and waiting". This inertia, especially in combination with poor payment, could result in conflicts between the two groups. Furthermore, the group identity of the military could at times be perceived as threatening to civilians, after all the value system of the civilian would be different to that of the military. The primary group cohesion that was paramount in wartime situations in order to deal with war related traumas could also continue in peacetime, pitting one social group against the other.

Misbehaviour by soldiers because of boredom and clashing social values was of course not sanctioned by official military authorities, but that did not mean that in the sphere of civil-military relations, the two authorities could not also clash on this topic. The conflict between military and civil authorities was in a way, another form of conflicting social values albeit on a more political level. In other words, it was more about power relations than about social disorder and military intimidation and extortion of civilians. The most common form in which the conflict became apparent was with regard to the issue of judicial authority. When a soldier had violated a (civil) law, an important issue could be under whose jurisdiction he should fall: civil or military?

The problem is complex, and directions were issued by the Council of State on when a soldier should be brought before the civil court and when he was to be tried under a military court. A.C. Koenhein mentions that not until the resolution of the States General of 25 March 1651 that a first restrictive definition of the competences of the military courts was undertaken.[485] Because the arrival of a standing army corresponded with the arrival of separate military-judicial regulations and organisation, in short a military jurisdiction, it was inevitable that it clashed with civil jurisdiction. Despite preliminary steps towards a defined military jurisdiction, many obscurities remained, however. Demarcation of each jurisdiction's

[485] A.C.N. Koenhein, 'De totstandkoming van de resolutie van 25 maart 1651 als poging tot regeling van de militaire jurisdictie tijdens de Republiek.' In: *Mededelingen van de sectie krijgsgeschiedenis van de koninklijke landmacht*, vol. 2 (1979).

competence, for example, did not occur, resulting in an unspoken and sometimes open struggle between the military commanders and the municipal authorities. The lack of a proper segregation of the two jurisdictions is symptomatic of the entire political structure of the Dutch Republic.[486] Because the Dutch Republic lacked a national legislation, laws were made on provincial level, whereby most issues of jurisdiction was decided locally. As a result, it is extremely difficult to have a clear and precise demarcation of the different judicial systems.

This conflict between civil and military authorities, and the extent to which a military commander could interfere in civilian matters, is well illustrated by the governorship of John Kirkpatrick in Den Bosch. Kirkpatrick, a Scottish officer, became colonel of his own regiment in 1639[487] and was made governor of Den Bosch in 1670. Kirkpatrick was vehemently anti-papist in a city that was traditionally Catholic, and he interfered in matters that were the exclusive responsibility of the municipal authorities. He ordered, for example, all the Jesuits and other foreign monks and clergy to leave the city, and civilians were forbidden to harbour them or allow worship in their houses. In front of the houses of prominent Catholics, Kirkpatrick placed sentries. The *schutters*[488] –the city counted four separate groups of these civic militias- were not allowed to host their annual anniversary as Kirkpatrick did not trust them because many of them were Catholic. The walls of the beguinage were to be pulled down because, according to the governor, in that secluded space too much 'Catholic mischief' could take place, without there being sufficient supervision.[489]

The municipal authorities protested strongly against the incursions of Kirkpatrick. They claimed that the responsibility of the governor was exclusively to take care of the garrison and the defence of the city. Concerning the demolition of the walls of the beguinage, the civil authorities addressed the Council of State. Despite the governor's objections, the city magistrates persevered and were rewarded by the decision of the Council of State of July 18th 1671 that the walls were not to be pulled down.

In turn, the civil authorities of Den Bosch also interfered with the military responsibilities of the governor. During the beginning of the war with France in 1672, the municipal council

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[486] Koenhein, 'Totstandkoming van de resolutie', p. 53.
[487] C.J. Gudde *Vier eeuwen geschiedenis van het garnizoen 's-Hertogenbosch* (Den Bosch 1958), p. 95; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 323, n. 7.
[488] The schutters or schutterij were a form of civil militia, with a strong organisation and tradition.
[489] Gudde, *Vier eeuwen*, p. 96.

requested that the Captain-General and the States General appoint a capable officer alongside the governor, a sign that the faith in the military expertise of the latter was not very great.[490] The conflicts between Kirkpatrick and the city of Den Bosch stem not exactly from clashing political and social interests, but seem to be more of a personal nature. Kirkpatrick presented himself as a very rigid man with strong anti-catholic sentiments, a trait which, in a border town like Den Bosch with a population that was three-fourths Roman-Catholic, was not appreciated. On the other hand, Kirkpatrick was Scottish and might therefore have been less well acquainted with Dutch administrative customs. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick had been serving in the Scots Brigade for a long period, and it was probable that he was not accustomed to sharing his authority. These factors, in combination with the fact that the responsibilities and tasks of the governor were not that well defined, could lead to inevitable clashes between the military, as represented by the governor, and the civil community, as represented by the municipal authorities.

The clashing social values between soldiers and civilians, and between civil and military authorities, also becomes clear in a report written by the governor of Naarden to the Council of State in 1746. A group of soldiers under the influence of alcohol started a brawl near the harbour of Naarden. They were surprised by a civilian in a chaise. The horse of the civilian stepped on the heel of one of the soldiers and the civilian aimed his whip at them, whereupon a Scottish soldier by the name of William Campbell drew his sword and swung it at the man in the chaise. The man jumped (or fell, it was not known) from the chaise and was injured. William Campbell ran away, but gave himself up the following day to the military authorities, represented by the governor of Naarden. The governor of Naarden, who wrote the report, made the decision to bring the soldier before the military court, and "*as I think that as Major-General of the state and Commander of Naerden I am qualified to have the said soldier punished according to his dessert.*"[491] The punishment took the form of having William Campbell run the gauntlet repeatedly. On the day that the sentence was to be carried out, the civil authorities, represented by the local sheriff, protested against the decision to punish the soldier according to military law and demanded that William Campbell "*should be given up in order to be sentenced by a civil judge, alleging that it was a 'commune delictum'.*"[492] The governor refused and had the sentence carried out because "*firstly, the sheriff, came too late to*

[490] Gudde, *Vier eeuwen*, p. 96.
[491] Letter to the council of state from B.C. Baron van Reede v. Oudtshoorn, Naarden, 25 November, 1746, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 346.
[492] Ibid, 346.

protest, as all the men are already armed, and he, the sheriff, had had abundance of time to do it sooner and timeously; secondly, because I think (subject to correction) that it can by no means considered a 'commune delictum', as it happened that the man clearly saw that these were drunk soldiers, and thus should not have driven towards them, much less so near that the horse trod on the heel of his shoe; nor should he have hit out at the said soldier with his whip. It must and can thus not be considered a disturbance of the public peace, but as a quarrel and an accident; yes, in my opinion, such a man ought to have been reprimanded because he rode towards the men in the darkness, and that too, when they were drunk."[493] Despite the fact that the governor actually blamed the civilian more for the incident than the soldiers, and in that way clearly presented himself as an advocate for the military, he came with justified arguments why the civil authorities had no right to put the soldier on trial.

Additionally, the governor pointed out the extent of civil jurisdiction and in which situations civil jurisdiction could prevail over the military court. "*And even if it could be called a 'commune delictum' (I, however, think it cannot), according to the resolution of March 25th, 1651, and that of February 9th, 1703, that all 'communia delicta' must have sentence passed upon them by the civil judge, this is applicable only to towns having suffrage and state."*[494] To illustrate his argument, the governor gives the example of an incident that occurred in Heusden in 1706, in which a cavalry officer had stabbed a *schent*[495]. The Council of State ordered that the officer should be tried before a court martial and not by a civil judge, since Heusden was not a city that had suffrage and state.[496] Therefore, the governor in order "*to preserve the rights of the military*", decided to sentence the soldier before a military court. The civil authorities did not agree with the governor's decision and decided to apprehend William Campbell. They wrote a letter to the governor stating that he should deliver the offender to them. The governor refused "*because I had already punished him according to military laws for what he has done.*"[497] He closes his report stating that "*I have thought it my duty to inform your Noble Mightinesses about this, in order, if need be, to be supported in my*

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[493] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 346-7.
[494] Ibid, p. 347. With 'suffrage and state' is meant that some towns in the Dutch Republic had the right to be represented in the Provincial States, in this case the States of Holland. Naarden, however, did not have this special status and as such, the laws applying to these towns did not affect Naarden.
[495] Sheriff or bailiff.
[496] In the original text it says *stem en staat*, which Ferguson has translated as suffrage and state.
[497] Letter to the council of state from B.C. Baron van Reede v. Oudtshoorn, Naarden, 25 November 1746, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 347.

defence of the rights of the soldiers and their good discipline."[498] This example shows in an impressive way how the two groups could oppose each other, and how vague the different jurisdictions were. Equally, it shows how little political influence the civil authorities without the 'suffrage and state' status had when confronted with a military governor. Because the governor assumed responsibility in the matter, the civil authorities were limited in their possibilities. They could try to by-pass the governor by protesting to the States General, but even then, their request might be ignored. The incident itself was not a very serious one, but nevertheless serves as an illustration of how the two groups could oppose each other on a power-based level. There are, however, cases wherein the conflict becomes more personal and wherein the military acts as a group against a civilian.

The military presented actions of soldiers against civilians as justified, non-random actions. It was not uncommon for soldiers in garrison towns to act as a kind of police force, despite the fact that the civil authorities had their own law enforcers. It is very difficult to establish whether actions undertaken by the military against civilians were justified, but it is not illogical to assume that on some occasions, it had more to do with military pride and morale that was injured by a civilian, than with a civilian who had truly violated the law. On 18 February 1783, for example, a civilian by the name of Coenraad van Nispen was arrested by a military patrol because of a row between him and a soldier from the local garrison, with the intention of trying the citizen before the military court.[499] The civilian was arrested because he was considered guilty of corrupting[500] a soldier of the garrison. When the *drossaard* discovered that the said Coenraad van Nispen had been placed under arrest by the military, he went to Lieutenant General Deutz, the governor of Bergen op Zoom, and claimed that Coenraad van Nispen, "being a civilian", was not subject to the jurisdiction of the garrison. Rather, he should be released from military prison and handed over to the *drossaard* according to his rights as a citizen of Bergen op Zoom. The governor refused the request. The civil authorities then wrote to the States General to order the governor to release the civilian. In the end, the States General concluded that van Nispen was actually not a inhabitant of Bergen op Zoom, but of Noordgeest, a village that belonged to the marquisate of Bergen op

[498] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 348.
[499] Municipal archive Bergen op Zoom, archive of the town clerk's department 1397-1810, nr 4764.
[500] In the original text (in Dutch) the verb 'debaucheeren' (to debauch) is given. The concrete nature of the corruption is not detailed, but it is not unlikely that because Van Nispen and the soldier went outside the city walls to fight, the military authorities considered the civilian guilty of tempting a soldier to fight.

Zoom and, consequently, was arrested as a stranger. Therefore, according to the States General, the governor and the military court were to inform the *baljuw* (bailiff) and the court of Noordgeest that they had arrested, and were to try, one of their civilians.[501]

A similar incident occurred in Bergen op Zoom in 1735. It concerned the unlawful arrest of a local innkeeper by the military. This particular case is interesting because both the military as well as the civil perspective of the conflict are given. The first document shows the view of the civilian. In October 1735, Nicolaas van Engelen, innkeeper of the tavern Den Draak, filed a complaint against Captain la Ville, who had entered his house without permission and - according to the plaintiff- had unjustifiably arrested him in his own home without specifying the reasons for the arrest. The burgher was gravely offended and considered the incident a serious threat to civil authority and autonomy: "*That no burgher* can *any longer be safe, neither be free in his own home unless action is taken against this, since the militia*[502] *has use of more and greater authority than even that of the Drossaart*"[503]. Despite the fact that this was a rather common form of civil protest against military intrusion, it seems that, when taking into account the previous example of Coenraad van Nispen and the impotence of the civil authorities regarding the case, the remark of Nicolaas van Engelen was not entirely without merit.

The second document illustrates the military perspective, where clearly the blame is laid with the civilian. Corporal Hendrik Sluyter, serving in the company of Captain Gersdorf in the regiment of Colonel Crommelin, and Daniel Henderson, a Scottish soldier in the regiment of Brigadier Halkett, serving in the company of Captain Graham, were witnesses to the fact that self-made fireworks were thrown out of the inn 'Den Draak'. "*That they proceeded to apprehend the person or persons who were responsible for the incident, they immediately seized a civilian who came out of the door at the same moment that the self-made firework was thrown out of the window. A crowed of citizens surrounded them and the civilian managed to escape. They also heard that the innkeeper had been very rude and uncivilised to Lieutenant Claubergh who had entered the inn in order to discover who had been the person*

[501] Municipal archive Bergen op Zoom, archive of the town clerk's department 1397-1810, nr 4764.
[502] Also in the original Dutch text the word militia (militia) is mentioned and not the word 'schutterij' (civil militia) indicating that it clearly concerned a military unit.
[503] Municipal archive Bergen op Zoom, archive of the town clerk's department 1397-1810, No. 4760.

responsible for the fire-works." [504] There was an additional witness, Pieter Willotte, who stated that he saw the burned out fireworks; he even picked up a burning piece and showed it to the captain of the city-guard. Another witness, Johan Tetfort, sergeant in the regiment of Brigadier Halkett, in Captain Graham's company, stated that on the evening of the third of October, he was on guard duty and heard that the innkeeper of 'Den Draak' had spoken in a very disrespectful manner to Captain La Ville, head of the watch. Despite the fact that the military had several witnesses supporting their case, the fact remained that no reason was given as to why the innkeeper had been arrested. It seems not unlikely that the military placed the innkeeper under arrest because he had insulted the captain of the guard and thereby had committed an offence against the military group identity. When confronted with a military that assumed a position of power within the civil sphere, the municipal authorities were rendered powerless.

It is important to realise that the situation where the military had an unofficially superior position concerned only towns with a garrison, where a governor was the highest official authority. In non-garrison towns where the highest authority was not represented by a governor, the situation was completely different. The municipal authorities would have more influence than the military authorities, as is illustrated by the convicted soldiers found in the criminal sentence books in the municipal archives of Leiden. For example, in 1591, Claes Hamilton, a soldier born in Scotland, was found guilty of using a false passport, beggary, violent conduct and theft. The court sentenced him first to be flogged, then branded, and finally he was banished from Leiden for life. In 1598, the same civil court of Leiden sentenced William Watts, born in Scotland, who was accused of desertion and theft, to be banished for ten years. In 1618, another Scotsman was convicted; Willem Crighton's crime had been beer smuggling and resulted in fourteen days imprisonment. Finally, in 1620, Richard Guilliam, a Scottish soldier, was banished for five years on account of theft.[505]

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[504] The Dutch text is as follows:"*…dat sij deponente daar op toeschooten om den persoon of persoonen die sulkx dede te apprehenderen gelijk dan ook den eerste deponent een burghermans persoon die buyten de deur kwam op hetzelfde moment dat het gemaakte vuurwerk uit het huis was geworpen bij de arm vastgreep die wijders daar op als van een menigte burghers omsingelt werden is weg en los geraakt gelijk sij deponente ook gehoort hebben dat den hospes van dezelve herberge op een seer bruske harde wijze tegen de lieutenant Claubergh te dier tijd het en in de zelve herberg gegaan zijnde om die te ontdecken wie het gedaan hadde was sprekende.*", Municipal archive Bergen op Zoom, archive of the town clerk's department 1397-1810, No. 4760.

[505] Caledonian society Dec. 1998, No. 4; Criminal sentence books of municipal archive of Leiden from 13 August 1590 to 14 July 1752.

Having said this, even in garrison towns the municipal authorities were not always impotent when soldiers violated the law. In Den Bosch in 1732, a certain Maria Heronimus from Mechelen in the Southern Netherlands was arrested on account of counterfeiting money along with her accomplices Elizabeth Cargel, Peter Mill and John Wolson. Both Mill and Johnson were Scottish soldiers.[506]

These conflict situations were not exclusively restricted to the Republic of the United Netherlands. According to Mary Elizabeth Perry in her research on crime and society in early modern Seville, clashes between civilians and soldiers were common and often violent. One such clash occurred in Seville when the crew of eleven ships had come ashore and were gambling on the riverbanks. Because the soldiers started to fight, the sheriff of Triana proceeded to make an arrest. The situation escalated when civilians began to take part in the fight and to throw rocks at the soldiers, who then retaliated. As a result, the sheriff could not make his arrest. The following day the situation was the same, but the civil authorities managed to arrest a soldier. In response, his comrades entered the Plaza de San Francisco with the desire to rescue their fellow soldier from prison. The situation was calmed down by their commanding officer, who negotiated with city officials that they released the soldier if all the soldiers returned to their ships. "*That night the head of the city council posted many guards on the city streets, locked the city gates, and hanged the imprisoned soldier in the Royal Prison. When a small group of his comrades came for him in the morning, they found his corpse.*"[507] To my knowledge, a situation like this did not occur in the Dutch Republic. Despite the many difficulties between the two groups, mutual distrust did not go so far that official authorities executed an individual without some form of trial. The civil authorities, when assured of their power, had no difficulties convicting and sentencing soldiers for crimes committed, but the cases where a soldier was arrested and illegally executed in order to set an example for other soldiers were extremely rare.

[506] A.Vos 'Dataschurk', rec. 574, file No. 129-09.
[507] M.E. Perry, 'Crime and Society in early modern Seville', The Library of Iberian Resources Online; Ariño, pp. 30-31. Guichot y Parody, 2:116-117. Pedro de Léon, appendix 1 to Part II, Case 208.

The military as labour force and as competitor

The presence of a large body of soldiers could not only lead to confrontations with the civil community, but it could also be potentially beneficial to the civil community. Many soldiers who were in serious need of financial funds would offer themselves as part-time labourers to Dutch civilians and during the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621), one of the complaints of the inspecting officers was the extent to which the soldiers left their garrisons to work for the country people.[508] The military presented a cheap labour force for a civil population which was more than eager to employ them. In order to regulate this form of labour, every company was equipped with four work-passes, which were valid for six weeks. Owners of such a pass were not allowed to go farther than six hours away from the garrison to prevent desertion; transgressions were punished by running the gauntlet.[509] Overall, the military seemed to be positive towards this experience, as can be demonstrated by a letter of the governor of Sluys to the Council of State on 25 April 1612: "*Moreover, I find daily that with increasing frequency the captains*[510] *grant leave to the majority of their soldiers to go out and work far and near; yea, many remain absent from their respective garrisons during the night, making provisions for their watches (so they say), which, if it happened to a small number, it might, I think, in present circumstances, be tolerated for a time, so that they may – living being so dear in the district- better support themselves in the service.*"[511]

Nevertheless, a military presence was not always an economic blessing. Since the military units were often used to be self-sufficient, they could also present a threat to the local economy. The military produced their own clothing and shoes and had no difficulties supplying not only the army, but also civilians, with their goods. As a result, they undermined the monopoly system of the guilds, whereby each new member had to pay in order to become part of that monopoly of the local labour market. In 1682, the Wardens and the Dean of the tailors' guild in Bergen op Zoom, whose income was seriously undermined by the economic behaviour of the military, lodged an official complaint at the military court and with the commander of Bergen op Zoom. "*The present weak state of revenues and the daily magnitude*

[508] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xxviii.
[509] Zwitzer, *De militie*, p. 87.
[510] Captain Balfour and Captain Douglas.
[511] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 272.

of complaints is the result of many soldiers belonging to this garrison who are withholding them [the tailors' guild] their income, and [they] produce clothing for every kind of person both military as political without making any distinction, because of that their [the guild] trade will perish." [512]

The solution, according to the tailors' guild, was simple. The authorities were politely requested to intervene and to order any soldier - whether infantry or cavalry - who was serving within the town of Bergen op Zoom to work exclusively for the needs of their own corps. Additionally, they were to be forbidden from keeping shop or from employing apprentices.[513] The military court and the governor granted the request made by the tailors' guild without causing any difficulties: "*Hereby is the request granted and every soldier and officer strongly forbidden to work for anyone else but himself and his comrades*[514] *on pain of the thereby consented punishment without keeping shop or to have an apprentice...*"[515].

The tailors' guild was not the only organisation that had difficulties with military competition on the local economical level. The following example concerns the complaint by the shoemakers' guild of Bergen op Zoom -assisted in their plight by the magistrates of Grave- addressed to the States General. The complaint of the shoemakers' guild was identical to the one by the tailors' guild 50 years earlier. The soldiers located in the towns of Bergen op Zoom and Grave did not limit themselves to their own companies and regiments, but additionally produced shoes for all the soldiers and officers of all the regiments without distinction. Furthermore, they made shoes for the women and children of the soldiers and were openly working for civilians and keeping shop.[516]

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[512] The original Dutch text is: "*Hoe dat mits de slappe neringe, ende dagelijksche groote aan klachten...ter oorzake omdat de soldaten van dezen garnizoen hun hare neringe ontrechten, ende voor allerlei personen zowel militairen als politieke, klederen maken zonder onderscheid, waardoor hun ambacht komt te vergaan.*" Municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, secretarial section: No.3142, 27 August 1682.

[513] Municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, secretarial section: No.3142, 27 August 1682.

[514] In the original text 'haare cameraden' or 'his comrades' is also underlined.

[515] "*Was het verzoek in deze toegestaan en alle militaire personen scherpelijk verboden om voor niemand anders dan voor haar zelve of te haare cameraden te mogen werken op de paene daar toe staande sonder evenwel winkel te mogen houden ofte knecht te mogen hebben...*" Municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, secretarial section: No.3142, 27 August 1682.

[516] Municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, secretarial section, nr 3143, 7 May 1732.

In this case, the response was different. Because the shoemakers' guild and the civil authorities of Grave directly approached the States General, the role of the military authorities of Bergen op Zoom and Grave was nullified. The States General wrote back stating that "*the complaint was justified and that the governor of Bergen op Zoom and the commander of Grave, and in his absence the commanding officers shall be addressed and commanded to maintain order and to prevent that no horsemen or soldiers shall keep shop or make and sell shoes, that they shall not make shoes for shops or work for civilians that keep shop, but that they will have to regulate themselves according to the content of the resolution of their High Mightinesses of 30th March 1729.*" [517] It is not clear why in one incident, the guilds preferred to interact with the military authorities and, in the other case, to bypass them in order to deal directly with their superiors in The Hague. It is interesting to see that in both cases the request was granted. Unfortunately, however, a general conclusion cannot be drawn from these two examples, although it seems that in both incidents the authorities, be they military or the States General, agreed on the fact that the labour of the soldier should be restricted to the company and the regiment in which the soldier was serving. Participation in the local labour market was not permitted.

Soldiers interfering in the civic economic sphere was actually a continuing phenomenon and not limited to one specific place. In Den Bosch, the actions of the military presented so much aggravation that the States General in 1723 issued a resolution that forbade soldiers to make clothes other than for the regiment under which they served. As in Bergen op Zoom, it was the Dean of the tailors' guild who requested the limitation of the interferences of the military in the privileges and businesses of the tailors' guild. The Council of State, that received the request, concurred, and the States General ordered that no soldier was allowed to make clothes other than for the regiment. Furthermore, if they required any help, they were required to employ members of the tailors' guild.[518]

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[517] Municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, secretarial section, nr 3143, resolution of the States General regarding the request of the shoemaker guild, 14 August 1732. The original text is as follows: "*Waar op gedelibereert zijnde is goedgevonden en verstaen dat de gouverneur van Bergen op Zoom en de commandeur van de Grave, en in hare absentie de commanderende officieren aldaar sal werden aangeschreven en gelast orde te stellen en te beletten dat geen ruijters of soldaten open winkels tot het maken en verkopen van schoenen komen te houden, dat ook geen schoenen voor winkels komen te maken of voor de winkels burghers werken maer dat zij haar zullen moeten reguleren na de inhoud van haar HoMo: Resolutie van den 30 Maart 1729, waarbij alsnog verwezen wordt.*"

[518] Scheltus, J. (ed.), *Groot Placaat-boek*, vol. 6, 6 February 1723, p. 105.

Concerning the interference of the military in the activities of trade and craft guilds, Ton Kappelhof reminds us that the wages of the common soldier were extremely low; consequently, the soldiers were forced to gain extra income through trade or craft.[519] Kappelhof mentions equestrians who traded in horses and infantry soldiers who occupied themselves with making and repairing shoes. According to Kappelhof, the revenues were small because, as in Bergen op Zoom, in Den Bosch most professions were also part of the guild-system. In order to practice a profession, it was important, firstly to be part of a guild. However, the only way to be a guild member was by being a 'poorter' (a burgher) and most of the soldiers were not burghers of a city. Social control was so extensive that a soldier who was practicing a trade without being part of a guild was quickly discovered. After which the guild members went to the town or city hall to complain.[520]

Civic support for the military

The myriad petitions addressed to the States General and the Council of State are not only filled with complaints from civil authorities regarding their 'military guests'. Many examples also exist of citizens and municipal authorities speaking in favour of the military. Naturally, these documents refer usually to individuals and not to the "military" as a whole, but nevertheless they provide a glimpse of the other side of the well-documented concept of civil-military strife.

One of the most important phenomena of early modern life that affected soldiers and civilians alike, and consequently had a major impact on civil-military relations, was war. For the soldier who depended on war for a living, the fact that he was no longer able to perform that task because of age or an injury could be disastrous. The Dutch army had a separate regiment of disabled soldiers, much like the 'corps des invalides' in France. On the lists of conduct, many officers who were not on active duty still received a form of commission, but for the ordinary soldier, it must have been extremely difficult when he was no longer part of the military sphere, and as a result, was obliged to fall back on civil support. The example of

[519] Ton Kappelhof, 'Leger en bedrijfsleven in de 17de eeuw', in: *'s-Hertogenbosch* (1996), vol. 1, p. 14-16.
[520] Ibid.

William Nory demonstrates clearly both the difficulties of being a disabled soldier and the willingness of the civil community to assist him. William Nory was a Scottish soldier and inhabitant of Willemstadt, who was wounded in the leg during the taking of the Scone of Crimpen. The wound became infected and started to fester and would not heal despite expensive treatments. Because of the high costs involved, Nory no longer had the financial means to sustain himself and his wife. The civil community decided to write to the States General on behalf of William Nory, because "*he has conducted himself honestly and burgherlike in this town for a considerable number of years*". They ask the States General to assist Nory and to give him a reasonable stipend "*both on account of his former services, and because he is unable to earn his bread, in order that he may thereby support himself in his extreme poverty and old age...*"[521] The reason why the civil authorities were so eager to plead Nory's case was probably not just because of his 'honest and burgher-like behaviour'. If Nory was in no position to support either himself or his wife, the civil community would then have the financial burden of doing so.

To be a burgher of a town was an important part of a good civil-military relationship. For the city or town, it was proof that a soldier was now also part of the civil community and posed less of liability to the civil order; for the soldier it meant that he could fall back on different resources than those available to him when he was exclusively part of a military community, and that he had a legal status and was part of a civil community. Being part of the civil community meant that the city council was in a position to make recommendations to higher political organs and to plead the cases of the soldiers. As in the example of the Scottish soldier Jacques Lawson, where the burgomasters and aldermen of Breda wrote to the States General in order to recommend Jacques Lawson for the post of cannoneer in Breda, because the "*said Jacques has served the Land for a long time well and faithfully, and that afterwards, as a burgher of this city, he conducted himself as a reputable and respectable man, and we never heard any other report of him.*"[522]

The military reputation of a (ex-) soldier could be crucial in deciding whether or not the civil community would support a soldier in need. This is illustrated by the example of David Niel and the city of Alkmaar. David Niel, who first served in the company of Colonel Henderson,

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[521] Letter from the municipality of Willemstadt, 10 November 1610 to the States General, Ferguson, I, p. 244.
[522] Recommendation by the burgomasters and aldermen of the city of Breda 26 July 1608, Ferguson, *Papers*, vol. I, p. 214.

and afterwards in the company of the Earl of Buccleuch, had been deprived of a hand by a bullet when he was a sentry at the siege of the city of Groll, "*which has rendered him not only unfit for public service, but also unable to win his bread and support his wife and children.*"[523] The Alkmaar authorities explain that they could not refuse the request, "*he being an inhabitant of our city*", but their reaction is particularly interesting because they seemed to be very inspired to plead on behalf of this soldier, finding less direct arguments as to why the Council of State should assist this man. "*Moreover it will encourage the soldiers to regard the perils of war less, when they see the aid of your Honorable Mightinesses is not denied to them. And a small gratification will encourage the petitioner to help himself further; otherwise he must of necessity fall as a burden on the inhabitants of these Provinces.*"[524] The civil authorities in this case were more straightforward in their argumentation than the ones in the previous examples. The authorities of Alkmaar sought to convince the States General that it was in their mutual interest to aid Niel financially, because he would otherwise be a burden to the Provinces. Unlike in the example of William Nory, the municipal authorities of Alkmaar do not mention Niel's good conduct or combat bravery.

Being an inhabitant of a town or city was certainly a considerable advantage in civil-military understanding. However, a good relationship with the civil community depended on many different factors which cannot always be clearly defined. It was important that a soldier was generally seen as an outstanding citizen, but the reputation of a soldier or officer could be considered to be of equal importance. When a soldier had behaved courageously during a particular incident -like the example of William Nory and David Niel-civilians could take pride in his achievements, which in a sense could rub off on the civil community where the soldier was based. For the soldier, it was often a matter of life or death, since being injured left him incapable of performing his tasks as a soldier and consequently to make a living for himself, and it was often the civil community that he thus had to fall back on for support. When the soldier or officer was deceased, it was often the town where he lived that had to take care of the remaining family. In these cases, the municipal authorities were highly motivated to plead the case of the poor widow and orphans before the States General in order to lighten, or even avoid, the financial burden. This is well demonstrated by the example of the widow of Captain Ramsay and the municipal authorities of Breda. The magistrate of

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[523] Request from Burgomasters and Rulers of the city of Alkmaar to the Council of State, January 29, 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, vol. I, p. 442.
[524] Letter from Burgomasters and Rulers of the city of Alkmaar tot he Council of State, January 29 1632, Ferguson, *Papers*, vol. I, p. 441-2.

Breda wrote to the States General claiming that Captain Ramsay has conducted himself as an honourable burgher, had maintained good order and discipline in his company and that his death was much lamented by soldiers and burghers alike. The authorities concluded the letter with a very straightforward plea stating that "*Wherefore we are moved humbly to pray your High Mightinesses that the said widow and children may find grace and favour in your eyes, and that said children, being three sons and a daughter, may be reared for the service of the country, in order that they may follow the footsteps of such a brave and virtuous father.*"[525]

The relation between civil authorities and soldiers could on occasion be so positive, that soldiers referred to civil authorities in their conflict with their military superiors. In 1607, Ensign Thomas Marchbank and Lieutenant George Ramsey requested that the municipal authorities of Utrecht promote them with the Council of State, because they had lost their position in the regiment as a result of a conflict with Colonel Brough, their superior officer. The two officers complained that, despite their outstanding behaviour, Colonel Brough had decided *"to shift them from their respective posts without, be it noted, having any reason for doing so"*. The reason according to the two officers was that Brough had acted out of revenge, thinking that they had demanded their arrears from the widow of Commander Edmond, their previous superior officer. Because there was no evidence for the fact that the two officers had harassed the widow, the charges were withdrawn. *"And since, as they said, we were acquainted with their good conduct while garrisoned in Utrecht; and further with their faithful services, which should be taken into consideration, in the battle of Flanders, the sieges of Ostend, Rynberck, and elsewhere, they therefore besought us most humbly to grant them a declaration or prescript to lay before your lordships, regarding their conduct and behaviour in Utrecht, in order that they may thereby promote their interests with you, in complaining of the matter aforesaid. That we will not refuse them; and we hereby declare, that the said company remained several years consecutively in garrison within our town; that the foresaid officers kept the company in such good discipline, and the soldiers conducted themselves so modestly and politely in their intercourse with the burghers, that we and the general community derived much pleasure from their conduct, which is the reason why we address your lordships."*[526]

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[525] Letter from the Burgomasters and Aldermen of the city of Breda to the States General; Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 283.
[526] Letter from the Sheriff, Burgomaster, and Aldermen of the Town of Utrecht, 25 April 1607, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 206-7.

This long letter is a clear example of the positive relations between civil and military communities. Not only did the municipal authorities of Utrecht convey their satisfaction concerning these two officers who managed to keep the company in "such good discipline" and whose soldiers "conducted themselves so modestly and politely in their intercourse with the burghers" to the Council of State, but the fact that the officers appealed to the civil authorities to intercede with the Council of State on their behalf, shows that the two social groups could interact well and that it could be a mutually beneficial relationship.

Rural civic-military interaction

The civic-military interaction in the countryside was different from that in the towns. The fact that soldiers were not often stationed outside the towns made the interaction between civilian and soldier more uncommon, and consequently there was more suspicion towards each other. Furthermore, the only time rural civilians were confronted with large bodies of troops was during campaigns, when the situation for a healthy civil-military interaction was, to say the least, not ideal. There are numerous accounts of civilians being victimized by large bodies of troops. According to Myron P. Gutmann's study of the territory of the Basse-Meuse[527], the impact of armies and soldiers on the countryside was huge. Soldiers did not often kill civilians directly, but theft, extortion and destruction of property were standard practices. Indirectly, the military was responsible for many casualties among the civil population in times of war. The armies of the 17th and of the 18th centuries were one of the greatest carriers of epidemics, which in combination with malnutrition, lack of shelter and bad weather, culminated in an extremely high death rate. Drawing on evidence from six parishes; Gutmann argues that, from 1675 to 1676, the death rate among the civilian population doubled. The reason, Gutmann explains, was that during the war with France, military action was brought to Liège and Maastricht, but an epidemic of dysentery, spread by the soldiers, broke out at the same time and was responsible for a sudden increase in the mortality rate.[528]

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[527] M.P. Gutmann *War and Rural Life in the early modern Low Countries* (Princeton, 1980).

[528] In 1675, the death rate was in 1675 103, in 1676 it doubled to 223, in comparison in the year, 1672, it was 65, M.P. Gutmann, *War and Rural Life*, p. 153 and 154.

Casualties caused directly or indirectly by the military were one aspect of the civic-military interaction in the rural sphere. More common, however, was for soldiers to use the at times anarchistic circumstances, and the inherent fear of country men towards soldiers, for their own benefit. From the borough of Den Bosch, there are two separate cases concerning soldiers taking advantage of the civil community through exactions and extortions. The first example concerns a Scottish soldier by the name of William Hay, who forced the civilians of Serle and Beek to pay him 73 guilders and 8 stuivers in the form of taxes on 17 February 1644. On the following 6 March, he received an additional 120 guilders and ten stuivers. The citizens lodged a complaint with the Sheriff of Aerle and Beek and, upon being questioned, William Hay, used as a excuse that he had escorted two gentlemen, but had received no money for it.[529] The second example concerns a cavalry captain who came with horses and foot soldiers to take up quarters at Geldrop. En route, they stayed at the village of Erp for 24 hours. During this period he not only exacted the necessary supplies for himself and his soldiers, but also additional ham knuckles, hams, and sixty-six guilders. One of the soldiers wounded a resident with a stone, who subsequently died of the injury. The response of the captain when addressed on this matter was that he was compelled to stay in Erp because of the long ride he was undertaking, but that it could not be proven that he had made demands of the local populace. The captain did acknowledge, however, that the surrounding villages, out of fear of large bodies of troops, might have "*complimented the officers with some things*"[530]. These 'things' amounted to one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty *rix-dollars*. The year before, the same captain had threatened to lay siege to the town of Helmond, when he was quartered in Geldrop. The town had to give him a "present" of about a hundred guilders in order to pay him off. In his defence, the captain replied that he did not make demands or extortions, adding that for six years he had never been in quarters at Helmond. He did not know, howe er, whether the above-mentioned "complimentary gifts" included the grant made by Helmond. Unfortunately, the verdict concerning these cases is unknown. The interesting fact is that the captain acknowledged that he received money from the villagers, but that they gave it to him voluntarily. Not only in the towns was there a general distrust of bands of soldiers. Especially in the countryside where the people were more scattered, fear for large bodies of soldiers was common. The incident with the cavalry captain occurred at the end of

[529] Summary of report presented by the Advocate-Fiscal of the United Provinces concerning the boroughs of 's-Hertogenbosch, 28 May 1645, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 460.
[530] Summary of report presented by the Advocate-Fiscal of the United Provinces concerning the boroughs of 's-Hertogenbosch, 28 May 1645, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 461.

the Eighty Years War, a time when the Dutch army was involved in campaigns against the Habsburgs. The resulting chaos could easily have helped the officer in achieving his goals, despite the fact that extortion and plunder were not allowed and were heavily punished. It is interesting to see that in these cases civilians reported the incidents and demanded justice from the local or higher authorities. It needs to be said that, as these are examples found in the archives of the States General, and concern official complaints of civilians, it seems plausible that many other complaints would have gone unheard, and it is not unlikely that many incidents were never reported.

In many cases, a prolonged lack of payment and food forced soldiers to plunder the countryside. For example, the English and Scottish soldiers who were fighting in Flanders in 1578, "*having no pay to live upon are likewise forced to get themselves food by spoil, and have lately fired Aerschot and rifled all the country thereabouts, bringing into camp the pillage of the villages near Louvain; whereby our camp is also infected with the pestilence, and partly thereby, partly by slaughter in their disordered spoils, half our people are consumed.*"[531] When the circumstances were most dire, the rural population took action themselves. In a letter from Davison[532] to the English government, the extreme situation in Flanders in the year 1579 is described. Peasants who were the constant object of plunder, theft and murder by both armies, "*have assembled in arms to the number of 9.000 or 10.000 between Alost and Dendermonde, where they have disarmed two companies of French, of whom they have taken 30 or 40 prisoners, have defeated three companies of Scots serving under one captain Cammell, and slain the said Cammell, his wife, and divers gentlemen of good note with the greatest cruelty and 'barbarism' that might be devised, and have since assaulted divers other companies scattered here and there in the country, but with their own loss. The soldiers have upon this drawn their forces together, and stand upon their guard, not without minds greedy of revenge; so I doubt the mischief will not rest where it is. This grows from the insolence of the soldiers in exacting, spoiling, and abusing of the peasants beyond all measure, which the others take as lawful excuse for their desperate course.*"[533]

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[531] Letter from John Digges to Lord Burghley, 4 September 1578, in: *Cal. Of Foreign Papers 1578-79* (London 1903), p. 178.
[532] Sir William Davison, Secretary of State and personal envoy of Elizabeth to Holland until 1588.
[533] Letter from Davison to the Secretaries 12 February 1579, in *Cal. Of Foreign Papers* (London 1903), p. 416-417.

Overall, the social-interaction between the Scottish soldier and the civilian was a carefully calculated symbiosis. It is too easy to state, as Ferguson does that "the general relations of the Scots with the Dutch population seem to have been friendly and cordial"[534], because this statement neglects the various motivations of both parties regarding their interaction. The symbiosis between the two groups could prevent strong social clashes and consisted of mutual economic ties. This symbiosis, however, was fragile and when one of the two parties was not willing or unable, the brittle bond could easily be broken with the obvious -negative- consequences. The relationship between civilian and military took place on almost every level, not only locally between individuals, but also on the higher political levels between civil and military authorities. Furthermore, these levels were not separated, but very much intertwined. The strong differences in social values between civilians and soldiers could add to the general mistrust between both groups, but when a soldier had for a longer period been stationed in a particular community and was no longer actively part of his military unit, the civil community would be more inclined to accept him into the community and offer him the chance of citizenship. When this would happen, the soldier was able to benefit from the new situation by receiving help from the civil community when he needed it. The civilian aided the soldier not out of philanthropy, but because he could avoid escalation of a potentially critical situation. When soldiers had not received their payments, for example, there was a serious threat to the public order. Furthermore, the reason why civil authorities often mediated with the States General on behalf of soldiers was that the military frequently had outstanding loans with civilians.

Cases when the symbiosis was seriously disrupted did not occur as regular in the Dutch Republic as in other European states, but incidents did happen. These situations took place mostly on an individual level where military authorities were not involved. When a soldier was accused of a crime against a civilian, he would usually be judged according to military law not civil. This was an extra cause of friction between civil and military communities. In cases where the conflict could not be resolved on a local level between military and civil authorities, both could refer to the higher authority of the States General and the Council of State.

[534] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xxviii.

The dynamics of civil-military interaction in the more rural areas is less well known, since most (Scottish) soldiers in the Dutch Republic, when they were not campaigning, were stationed in towns to perform garrison duties. Even when the soldiers were on a campaign, they were still part of a city garrison; rarely did soldiers stay in the countryside. Most of the interaction that took place between civilians in rural areas and large bodies of soldiers took place in wartime, and mostly in the 16th and 17th centuries. Despite the fact that the countryside undoubtedly suffered from the impact of war, it is not true that soldiers purposely murdered civilians.

There were strong penalties for plunder and extortion, and the army -especially in the 18th century- tried to maintain a strong discipline. Nevertheless, these acts did not really appear to deter soldiers from committing crimes against civilians, and the amount of reports and complaints of civilians illustrates this. Since these reports took place mainly in wartime, it is difficult and illogical to compare the attitude of civilians in rural areas with that of civilians in urban regions towards the military, and the two different encounters therefore have to be seen separately.

Finally, with regard to the attitude of civilians towards Scots and the attitude of the Scottish regarding Dutch civilians, there seemed to be not much difference between Scottish soldiers and Dutch soldiers, as most soldiers had been stationed for a long time in the Republic and were able to speak Dutch. To the civilian they were all military and it appears that the social differences between the military as a group and civilians were more pronounced than "national" differences. Additionally, the fact that many "Scottish" soldiers were born in the Dutch Republic must have diminished the issue of being a "foreigner".

Chapter 6 The Bulwark of the Republic: The Scottish soldier and his identity

The fighting skills, the bravery and the persistence of the Scottish soldier were greatly valued by most of the nations of early modern Europe; Scotsmen were fighting for the Habsburgs, France, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Russia. An account from the Thirty Years War gives an idea of how the Scots were perceived by their employers. According to this account, the Scotsmen were "*hard and tenacious, they can run fast and if necessary can cover 16 to 20 German miles in a day, additionally they are experienced in shooting.*"[535] A possible explanation why the Scots were, according to this source, such capable fighters could be the specific social circumstances that were part of Scottish society in the early modern period. Scotland in the 16th century was a nation fragmented by kin groups and beset with endemic feuding. The social structure whereby nobles or clan leaders imposed their own military obligations on their subjects made sure that every man was equipped to fight for his lord or clan.[536] Especially due to the political and religious instability of the 16th century, blood feuds were a common pattern. Because of the strong ties of kinship and solidarity, the Scotsman was always prepared to fight in order to resolve a conflict. Bishop Leslie wrote in 1578 that the Highlanders would fight "*if their masters command them.*" The Lowland nobles, according to Leslie, have "*great families [...] to defend themselves from their neighbours with whom they have deadly feud.*"[537] These specific social conditions in Scotland were not only responsible for the fighting capabilities of the Scotsmen, but also made them aware of a strong sense of inner community.

Just how important the honour of the community was for the Scottish soldiers is demonstrated by another example from the Thirty Years War. A German captain had cut off the finger of a Scottish soldier, but because he did not apologise for this act, despite being given the opportunity to do so during the interrogation, he was as a result nearly killed by another

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[535] J.R. Paas, *The German Political Broadsheet 1600-1700*, 5 (Wiesbaden 1996) p. 101.
[536] R.M. Shurmer, *Scottish Mercenary Forces in the Revolt of the Netherlands and Anglo-Scottish Relations 1566-1609*, (unpublished M. litt. thesis), (Aberdeen 1989).
[537] Smout T.C., *A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830* (London 1969), p. 43.

Scottish captain.[538] The sense of community was not only limited to the Scots employed in the German Empire. As will be demonstrated later, the Scots soldiers who served in the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Republic were completely devoted to their own specific regimental colours, which did not display any of the Dutch colours, but showed the Scottish Saltire and British symbols. Christian IV of Denmark encountered the Scottish pride regarding their own colours when, during the first stages of the Thirty Years War, the Scottish troops who were paid by him refused to carry the Danish cross in battle.[539] According to the account of Robert Monro; *"His majesty of Denmark would have the officers to carry the Dane's crosse, which the officers refusing, they were summoned to compeare before his majestie at Raynesberge to know the reasons of their refusal; at the meeting none would adventure, fearing his majestie's indignation, to gainestand openly his majestie's will, being then his majestie's sworne servands; and for the eschewing of greater inconvenience the officers desired so much time of his majesty as to send Captain Robert Ennis into England to know his majestie of Great Britaine's will, whether or no they might carrie without reproach the Dane's crosse in Scottish colours: Answere was returned they should obey their will under whose pay they were, in a matter so indifferent.*[540] This incident shows, according to Steve Murdoch, that loyalty to their country and king was strong on the part of the Scottish soldier, and that "they were not willing to fight under anyone's banner without thought for or consultation with their own monarchy."[541]

A fighting spirit, a sense of community and kinship are elements that have been associated with a particular Scottish identity, but how was this identity, or rather this 'collective awareness', expressed? Did Scottish soldiers and officers acknowledge that they belonged to a certain nationality? Did the fact that they were outside of Scotland and Scottish society change their perception of being 'Scottish'? Although there are many examples of Scottish

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[538] W. Brockington, *Monro, his expedition with the worthy Scots regiment called Mac Keys* (Westport 1999), p. 46.
[539] Brockington, *Monro*, p. 12.
[540] S. Murdoch, 'The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618-1640: A Conflict of Nationality and Identities', p.46 in: B. Taithe and T. Thornton (eds.), *War: Identities in Conflict 1300-2000*, (Gloucestershire 1998); Monro, *His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment called Mackay's* (London 1637), vol 1., p. 21.
[541] S. Murdoch, *The House of Stuart*, p. 46.

military presence in, for example, Sweden, Denmark and the Holy Roman Empire, the focus of this chapter will be on the question of whether there was a Scots identity among the Scottish soldiers employed by the Republic of the United Provinces and, if so, how this identity was perceived by the Scots and by the Dutch.

Finally, it is crucial to be aware of the differences between the 17th and 18th centuries in the context of national identity. While in the 17th century, the concept of Great Britain and a British identity was not yet apparent, in the 18th century it became reality. Scotland was since 1707 a permanent part of Great Britain and with that, Scottish identity became part of the British identity. That did not imply that Scottish identity was replaced with British identity - the two terms existed alongside each other- but it meant that the Scottish soldiers and officers in the Brigade were part of a larger whole; their loyalties were no longer limited to either Scotland or the Stuart monarchy as in the 17th century, but to the entire (British) state.

This ambiguity regarding a 'British' identity comes across, in particular, in the account of a Scottish soldier during the campaigns of Marlborough in Flanders.[542] This soldier, by the name of John Scot, demonstrates clearly how the idea of a Scottish identity could be used alongside that of a British identity, instead of being replaced by it. According to Dauvit Horsbroch, John Scot had a distinctive Scottish identity, but it did not clash with his British one, as can be demonstrated from this passage in his account.[543]

Our Scottish regiments serving in the English
Were engaged in batel also.
Lieutenant Cornall Crankstoun in batell was slain
And many brave officers moe.
Our Scottish Dragouns upon the right wing,
Stood of our British army.[544]

Horsbroch argues that there was a "single army which could be described as British and of which the Scots were an integral part, but which nonetheless consisted of distinct national

[542] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, 'The Remembrance', p. 307-577.
[543] D. Horsbroch 'Tae see ourselfs as ithers see us' in: *Fighting for Identity. Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (S. Murdoch, A. Mackillop eds.) (Leiden 2002), p. 116.
[544] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. 496.

forces with some Scottish distinguished as serving within 'the English' section. It is also clear that Scot did not regard British as another name for English."[545] Indeed, while the concepts of 'Scottish' and 'British' identity were interchangeable for the Scots, the English identity - sometimes confused with British identity- was clearly viewed as very distinct from Scottish identity.[546]

In order to comprehend how identity relates to the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic I have decided to structure the chapters as follows. First, it is important to consider how the term "identity" was regarded in the early modern period. Secondly, the focus will be on the Scottish military identity and how his military identity was related to a political and even a national form of identity. After having placed the Scottish military identity in a wider context, I will outline the different forms of how their military identity was expressed in the Dutch Republic. Issues such as clothing, armament, language, the presence of Scottish Masonic lodges, but also the interaction between the Scottish military and Scottish civil communities, will contribute to the idea of a distinctive Scottish military identity. The final part shall focus on a particular event in the history of the Scots Brigade, namely the fourth Anglo Dutch War. This event is crucial for the acceptance of a separate Scottish military identity in the Dutch Republic because it meant the complete absorption of the Scottish regiments in the Dutch army and the destruction of the unique status of the Brigade. The course of events instigated by the Fourth Anglo Dutch War clearly show the changes regarding a particular Scottish military identity. While before the majority of the officers were Scottish, and English was the dominant language in the regiments, after 1782 the number of Scottish officers drastically declined. The fact that the influx of new recruits from Great Britain had also halted further contributed to the loss of a specific Scottish identity.

[545] Horsbroch, 'Tae see ourselfs', p. 117.
[546] Horsbroch, 'Tae see ourselfs', 115

The concept of identity in the early modern age

Because the concept of identity is so multi-faceted and complex, it is necessary to consider first of all how this term was defined in the early modern era. As Laurence Fontaine has demonstrated in her article on the social identity of peddlers, social identity was not a fixed concept, but quite the opposite, flexible and fluid. According to Fontaine, the peddler was able to adapt his identity according to the social circumstances in which he found himself, as a matter of fact the peddler was able to 'play' with his identity and even to manipulate it: "The contemporary social identity cannot be separated from the strategic use of the representation of oneself, which the social actors try to influence according to their desires, in order to secure or even to broaden the basic characteristics of their social position."[547] What Fontaine stated about the peddlers could also be applied to the early modern soldier. Many soldiers occupied different professions before they entered military service, or had been fighting for various European armies of different religious convictions. Soldiering was often a transient occupation where nationality, language and religion were of secondary importance. The average early modern soldier was not fixed in his profession, and for many men the military profession offered a temporary solution which could provide some kind of financial security. This practice was also encouraged by the concept of the early modern army, which was not a standing army and which operated seasonally. The military authorities disbanded after each campaign, sending the majority of their troops home to take on their former professions. Only with the increasing professionalising of the army in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the transition from a seasonal army to a standing one, did this concept gradually change.

In addition, the aspect of social context, so important for the Alpine peddlers, was of equal importance to the Scottish soldier. A Scottish soldier was never just a 'soldier': he was Scottish, Highlander or Lowlander, Presbyterian, or Catholic, belonging to a specific family or clan and, depending on the situation in which he was placed, he would associate himself with one or with a number of these various identities that were part of him. Therefore, the

[547] L. Fontaine, 'Selbstdarstellungen und Gruppenportraits Die sozialen Identitäten der Wanderhändler', *Historische Anthropologie*, No. 3(2000), p. 356. The German text is as follows: "Die jeweilige soziale Identitäten ist nicht zu trennen von der strategischen Verwendung jener Repräsentationen der eigenen Person, welche die sozialen Akteure zu ihren Gunsten zu beeinflussen versuchten, um die wesentlichen Kennzeichnen ihrer sozialen Position zu sichern oder sogar zu erweitern."

concept of a 'Scottish professional soldier' as a particular identity was only accurate in some cases, depending on the specific social and political context in which the soldier found himself. To further complicate matters, in the Dutch Republic there were many generations of Scottish soldiers who were second or third generation immigrants. How did they perceive themselves? On the one hand, they were distinctively Scottish, belonging to a particular Scottish institution –albeit under Dutch control-, but on the other hand many of them had never been to Scotland and, as mentioned in chapter four, many were married to Dutch women. It was common practice for an officer or soldier to get married after he had been with the Brigade for a year.

According to Willem Frijhoff, (collective) identity in general has an internal and an external aspect, which can be also discerned in the identity of this particular group of professional soldiers.[548] The internal (how did the soldiers and officers in the Brigade see themselves?) and external aspect (how did the Dutch see them?) was highly intertwined and was crucial for the construction of the image of the Brigade. The internal factors mainly expressed through symbols, were partly responsible for isolating the Brigade within the Dutch army, and helped to contribute to the forming of the particular Scottish military identity. When in battle, the soldiers played the Scots March, their uniforms were the standard red of the British army, and they wielded specific colours that were associated only with their regiments and Great Britain and had no connection with the Dutch Republic. Thee were the symbols they identified themselves with.

It needs to be said that this 'splendid isolation' was not only the result of the attitude of the Scots Brigade, but also to a large extent the consequence of the Dutch governmental policy to keep all foreign military units as isolated from each other as possible. That did not mean that there were no non-Scots officers and soldiers in the Scots Brigade, or Scots officers and soldiers in other military units, but the majority of the Scots soldiers was located in the Brigade which had, unlike any other foreign regiment in the Dutch army, its own specific set of symbols. These symbols were not only used in order to create this military identity, but also helped to create a context in which the myth of the "Highlander-warrior" could flourish.

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[548] W. Frijhoff, 'Identiteit en identiteitsbesef. De historicus en de spanning tussen verbeelding, benoeming en herkenning', *BMGN*, 107 (1992) vol. 4, p. 622.

As will be demonstrated in the next part, this reputation of the Scottish as a warrior-like race was for some 17th century scholars crucial in the consolidation of Scottish national identity.

Scottish military prowess as part of a national identity

In his article on Robert Monro, Steve Murdoch demonstrates that group-formation and group identity in the case of Scottish soldiers in the Thirty Years War helped to contribute to the formation of a national identity. Initially, like with most military units, the soldiers came from particular regions in Scotland. In that context, regional identity and the identity of the clan was more important than national identity, but because of the continuous pressing demands for new recruits, it was inevitable that other regions within Scotland were opened up as recruiting grounds. "The regiment thus accelerated the process whereby Scots were incorporated into a group identity. Pride in their group uniqueness allowed them to maintain their distinctive identity in an alien world. The work of Monro provides a clear example of the evolution of primary group cohesion, a fundamental element of nationalism."[549]

The importance of primary group cohesion is also illustrated by the behaviour of American soldiers during the Second World War. Although an exact comparison is not advisable, given the historical differences, the fact remained that for both the 20th century American soldier as for the Scotsman who fought in the Thirty Years War, the formation of a primary group with its specific code and identity was often essential for military morale. Primary group cohesion helped the soldier to cope better with the intense and traumatic experiences of war, or as E. Shils stated: "Since the fear of death or injury is one of the chief deterrents of the execution of commands or the use of initiative in combat, one of the important functions of the primary group is the reduction of fear."[550] The element of fear and the possibility of dealing with the anxieties of war are crucial elements in the formation of a group identity, and although they are not mentioned in the sources available on Scottish soldiers, I believe that they were as crucial for the 17th century Scotsman as they are for the contemporary American soldier.

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[549] S. Murdoch, 'Robert Monro: Professional Soldier, Military Historian, and Scotsman', p. 14.
[550] E. Shils, *Center and Periphery. Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago 1975), p. 392.

According to Murdoch, another fundamental characteristic of the Scottish soldier was the pride he took in fighting. Monro states that Gustavus Adolphus was successful because of "*the help of the nation which was never conquered by any foraine enemy, the invincible Scots.*"[551] Furthermore, both Gustavus and Christian could not have achieved so much without the help of the "*old expert officers and old beaten blades of soldiers.*"[552] The love of war and their expertise in battle became particularly associated with the Scottish soldier who, as a result, was often employed in the most dangerous situations. The situation in the Dutch Republic was not different from the situation in the German empire during the Thirty Years War, and the Scots Brigade enjoyed the same reputation as had the soldiers who fought for Christian or Gustav Adolphus.

The reputation that surrounded the Brigade was partly constructed by internal factors in the shape of military symbols, but equally essential in the creation of this reputation were external factors. The soldiers were considered the best in the Dutch army, the most courageous and the most trustworthy. Frederick Henry, after their heroic efforts at the siege of Den Bosch in 1629, described them as the "Bulwark of the Republic"[553]. A famous account of how the Dutch viewed the Scots concerns Baron d'Ayla, a Dutch general of "distinguished reputation", whose misgivings about the Scots were later transformed into loyal support. D'Ayla had shown a prejudice against the Scots, "*whether because of the distinctions they enjoyed above the other troops in the pay of the Republic, or because the officers differed considerably in their character and manners from those of the German, Dutch, and the Swiss regiments; but ever after the battle of Raucoux, when any of the Scotch regiments happened to be in garrison at Maestricht, of which he was governor, he always treated them with the most distinguished favour, so much as sometimes to disoblige not only the Germans and the Swiss, but his own countrymen.*"[554]

Another typical example of how the Scots were perceived as noble and courageous is the anecdote of a Scottish soldier who went to see a regiment of German soldiers. "*One day during the war that was terminated by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749, one of the finest German regiments of grenadiers was passing trough a town where Colyear's regiment of*

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[551] S. Murdoch, 'Robert Monro', p. 14.
[552] Ibid.
[553] H. Dunthorne, 'Scots in the wars', p. 113; *Strictures on Military Discipline with some Account of the Scotch Brigade in Dutch Service* (London, 1774), p. 73.
[554] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 223.

Scots lay, when one of the lowest Scotchmen in it, but a man of approved bravery, was among the foremost of the spectators, when some one said to him, "What do you here, thou little diminutive creature; get out of the way." The little Scotchman, thinking himself at liberty to look on, said in a civil manner, "Sir, no offence, I hope; I'm little, it's true, but I have seen the day, not long ago, when these men and I fought in the same place, and I was then the head and shoulders taller than they."[555] The Scotsman in this anecdote referred to the battle of Raucoux[556] where five Scottish battalions were employed in covering the retreat of the rest of the Dutch army. The following image is given of the battle: "*The ardour of the British*[557] *soldiers to charge an enemy by whose fire they saw their comrades fall on either side may easily be conceived, but was so much restrained by the authority of their officers that the whole Brigade seemed immovable, except when the frequent breaches which the cannon made in the ranks required to be closed up.*"[558]

The pride the Scots took in their bravery and martial prowess is demonstrated by Robert Monro's comparison of the courage of the Scottish soldier with that of other nationalities. The Germans, for example, were considered fickle -changing allegiances often- and cowardly. One example from the Thirty Years War stated that a Scottish company had to fight through their German allies, who had changed allegiance, in order to reach their Swedish employers. Other nationalities like the Italians were, according to him, "*silly simple...and without courage.*"[559] Whether or not the reputation of the Scots was justified and whether or not Monro had a tendency to exaggerate, is less important than the fact that the account of Monro clearly illustrates the importance the Scots attributed to their fighting skills as being part of a typical Scottish identity.

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[555] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, 2, note 1, p. 223-224 (from *Strictures on Military Discipline, in a series of letters, with a Military Discourse: in which is interspersed some account of the Scotch Brigade in the Dutch Service, by an Officer'* (1774).

[556] Ferguson mentions the name Raucoux this is most likely Roucourt in the Belgian province of Henegouwen (Hainaut). The battle of Roucourt is probably better known as the battle of Fontenoy (1745), also a place in Hainaut.

[557] With the term British is meant Scottish in this context, these terms became interchangeable after 1707, see also the introduction of this chapter.

[558] 'An Historical Account of the British Regiments employed since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I in the Formation and Defence of the Dutch Republic, particularly of the Scotch Brigade (London 1795)', p. 80.

[559] S. Murdoch, 'Robert Monro', 15; Robert Monro, *Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called MacKeys Regiment)*, (London: W. Jones, 1637) II, p. 15.

But what is exactly the connection between their martial reputation and a Scottish national identity? The sociologist Anthony Smith has argued that the concept of 'nation' is not a wholly modern phenomenon, "be it the 'nervous tic of capitalism', or the necessary form and culture of an industrial society."[560] In fact, Smith claims that while the concepts of nation-state and nationalism as ideologies are relatively modern ideas dating respectively from the late 18th and 19th centuries, there existed already a long historical process of national sentiments and ethnic ideologies.[561] According to Colin Kidd, this notion "is particularly relevant to the study of Scottish and English identities." [562] He claims that "while many of the nations of Europe rediscovered or renewed their ethnocentrisms in the course of the 19th century, both Scotland and England had enjoyed lively ethnocentric identities based on history, religion and conceptions of freedom, on a continuous basis long before the 19th century. Many of the phenomena associated with the 19th century revival of nations, particularly pride in the national past, were part of the common currency of early modern Scottish and English political and historical discourse."[563]

This national awareness was part of different forms of historical approach, one of which was known as 'Whiggism'. H. Butterfield defines 'Whiggism' or the 'Whig historical tradition' as the "tradition to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present."[564]

In the early modern period, the image of the courageous Scotsman was strongly intertwined with Scottish nationalist sentiments. Already in the 15th century, the Scottish drew on their belief that they were noble, loyal and courageous in defence of their nationhood against English intrusion.[565] These sentiments were especially enhanced after the Union of the Crowns in 1603. Kidd, in his book on British identity, states that "perceptions that the Union of the Crowns was eroding the independence of the Scottish kingdom stimulated types of

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[560] A.D. Smith, *The ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 3.
[561] Ibid, p. 11.
[562] C. Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's past* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 5.
[563] Ibid.
[564] H. Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, p. 9.
[565] D. Allan, 'Protestantism, Presbyterianism and national identity in eighteen-century Scottish history', in: *Protestantism and national identity. Britain and Ireland 1650-1850* T. Claydon, I. McBride (eds.), (1998), p. 183.

particularist ideology."[566] First and foremost among these perceptions was the idea of 'limitations'. In other words, by choosing London as the new seat of power, the Stuart dynasty had estranged itself from one of its peoples, and, therefore, the authority of the King was no longer as important as when the seat of power had been based in Edinburgh.

While the idea of the courageous Scotsman was used by the Whig-tradition, it was, however, in the context of *particularism*, whereby Scotland was placed opposite 'imperialist' England, that the image was truly used. An important part of this view was Scotland's military history. Scotland had always been an independent and ancient nation that (unlike England) had never been conquered. "Identity was claimed between the fierce Caledonians praised by Tacitus, who forced the Romans to set physical limits to their Empire in the form of walls, and the ancient Scots. The Scots people had also seen off the Scandinavian invaders and the Plantagenets while the peoples of England, by contrast, had succumbed to every passing invader -Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans."[567] The role played by the Scottish soldiers employed by the foreign powers of Europe only contributed to this image, which was further enhanced by the accomplishments of Scottish *literati* on the Continent. "The humanist palladium of 'arms and letters' provided a way of extracting honour from the diaspora of Scots from economic backwardness in recent centuries."[568]

Expression of these sentiments was not exclusively confined to the intellectual arena. The Scottish conflicts with their sovereign Charles I proved that the Scottish nation was very much aware of Scotland as a separate country with its own specific Presbyterian identity. The thousands of soldiers stationed abroad that responded to the call of the Scottish covenanters during the Bishop's Wars (1639-1640) further emphasised the idea that there most definitely was a form of nationalism *avant-la-lettre*.

Scottish animosity towards the English and the social-political division between the two nations also became apparent during the Thirty Years War, when the Scottish commander, the Marquis of Hamilton, experienced difficulties leading a British army in Germany in 1631. The English troops 'did not like serving under a Scottish commander', even when Hamilton had been completely integrated at Charles's court in London. As a response to English

[566] C. Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's past*, p. 24.
[567] Ibid, p. 24-25.
[568] Ibid, p. 25.

animosity, Hamilton antagonised his men still further by insisting that they beat the Scottish March.[569]

After the Union of Parliament in 1707, the Scottish Whig-tradition and the concept of *particularism* was more and more criticised. Increasing Bourbon aggression on the continent made the idea of a union more acceptable. A good example was given by George Mackenzie, the Earl of Cromarty, who denied that the Union would be a surrender of 2000 years of national freedom. He argued "*that the Scottish nation was itself the result of earlier incorporations of peoples. An amalgam of Picts, Brigantes, Catti, Horesti and other forgotten tribes, the Scottish nation could hardly object to a further union with England.*"[570]

The martial reputation as part of a national awareness helps to better understand the actions of the Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic. They took pride in their fighting capabilities, but not in order to please their employers, although that was an inevitable consequence. For them, it was part of being Scottish. The siege of Bergen op Zoom and the heroic efforts of the Scottish soldiers could be interpreted as a sign of their loyalty and affection to the Dutch State. On the other hand, it is not unthinkable that it was not the Dutch State that evoked these reactions in them, but rather the reputation and honour of the Scots Brigade and since the Scots Brigade had strong ties with Scotland, it was important that the Scots Brigade had an impeccable reputation. After all, when reputation of the Brigade was tarnished it became less easy to attract new recruits. When, in 1747, the numerically superior French army under the Count of Lowendahl entered Bergen op Zoom after a long siege, two Scots battalions and one Dutch battalion remained to fight the French. After realising that there was no possibility of stopping the French army, the Scottish commanding officers, after having taken all the regimental colours of the garrison out of the governor's house, executed a regular retreat through the Steenbergse Gate while they were subjected to a fierce fire from the French artillery, which was in control of the bridge. The few soldiers and officers that remained alive marched with colours flying to their camp.[571] Although the Brigade had lost the city, they had saved their regimental colours and, with that, the honour of the Brigade.

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[569] K. M. Brown, 'From Scottish Lords to British Officers: state Building, Elite Integration and the Army in the Seventeenth Century', in: N. MacDougall (ed.) *Scotland and War AD 79-1918* (Edinburgh,1991), p. 150.
[570] C. Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's past*, p. 39; [Cromarty], A Letter from E.C. to E.W. Concerning the Union (Edinburgh 1706); [Cromarty], A Second Letter on the British Union (Edinburgh 1706), p. 18.
[571] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 225.

To establish further the idea of a Scottish military identity, it is important to look at other factors besides their martial reputation. As will be demonstrated also, other Scottish cultural characteristics such as family ties, clothing, language, contacts with Scotland, and even Scottish Masonic lodges, aided in constructing this particular phenomenon.

Kinship in the Scots Brigade

The extended family structure had always played an important part in Scottish society. The fact that families migrated to a different country did not mean that this aspect of Scottish society became irrelevant. Kinship-ties formed a crucial element within the command structure of the Scots Brigade. For example, in the first century of the existence of the Brigade, there were 17 or 18 captains named Balfour, two of whom were colonels (Sir Henry and Sir Bartholomew Balfour) of the first regiment in the 16th century. Sir David Balfour and Sir Philip Balfour were colonels of the second and third regiment during part of the Thirty Years War, and another, Bartholomew Balfour, was killed in command of the second regiment at Killiecrankie.[572] There was often a long-standing tradition within the families of delivering officers for the Scots Brigade. Two important examples were the Stewarts and the Grahams. The most illustrious member of the Stewart family was probably General Major Charles William Stewart (1697-1760), who was colonel of the second Scottish regiment. His father was Alexander Stewart, who was lieutenant colonel of the regiment of Colonel Strathnaver in 1701. He died in April 1702 from wounds received at the battle of Kaiserwerth. The father of Alexander Stewart, Jacob Stewart, was a captain in the Scots Brigade, just like his uncle Cornelis Stewart who was captain in the regiment of Colonel Kirkpatrick in 1674.[573] In addition, the Graham family also had a strong tradition regarding the Scots Brigade. Henry Graham was colonel of the first Scottish regiment from 1673 to 1677; his son Charles Graham was colonel of the third Scottish regiment (1691-1695). Charles' brother, Henry, also became lieutenant colonel. Another son of Colonel Henry Graham, William Louis Graham, became lieutenant colonel of a Scottish regiment in 1695; his son, William Graham, became lieutenant colonel on 26 March 1748.[574] The family structure in the military hierarchy of the Scots

[572] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. XXV.
[573] *De Nederlandsche Leeuw*, 1974, p. 135-151.
[574] *De Nederlandsche Leeuw*, 1973, p. 49-68.

Brigade had, according to the author of the 'Historical Account', an important advantage, since "*The rule observed in the Scots Brigade, of giving Commissions only to persons of those families whom the more numerous clan of the people in Scotland have from time immemorial respected as their superiors, made it easy to maintain that authority without such severity as might otherwise have been necessary.*"[575]

Uniforms, armament and language

An important way of expressing typical cultural characteristics could be in the way soldiers were dressed and armed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to expound in any detail about such characteristics given the paucity of source material. Concerning the uniforms, it can be said that, at least from the time of the reorganisation in 1674, the Scottish regiments were dressed in red uniforms. In 1691, the regiment of Mackay wore red, lined with red. The regiment of Ramsay wore red lined with white. Lauder's regiment was at that time in Scotland and the colour of the uniforms has not been recorded, but from a picture of an officer, serving in the regiment in the middle of the 18th century, it would appear that then the facings of the uniform were yellow.[576]

Before a specific uniform was commissioned for the Scottish regiments, it is not unthinkable that the Scots employed by the Dutch State –especially those who came from the Highlands- wore clothes that were distinctive of their Scottish background. There are several accounts to be found of the Scottish dress, if there was a typical one. According to a French account from 1549, the Highlanders *"wear no clothes except their dyed shirts and a sort of light woollen covering of several colours."*[577] In 1578, Bishop Leslie described a plaid that was *"long and flowing but capable of being neatly gathered up at pleasure into folds,"*[578] while an account from 1582 tells us that the Highlander was thrilled to wear: *"variegated garments, especially stripes, their favorite colours [being] purple and blue."*[579] Another description concerning the Scottish dress code describes Scottish levies that were sent to Ulster in 1594. *"Their exterior*

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[575] 'An Historical Account of the British Regiments', p. 80.
[576] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xviii.
[577] R.M. Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces in the revolt of the Netherlands and Anglo-Scottish relations 1566-1609*, p. 103.
[578] Ibid.
[579] From George Buchanan's account.

dress was mottled cloaks of many colours with a fringe to their shins and calves, their belts were over their loins outside their cloaks."[580] It ought to be said that the majority of soldiers sent to Ulster were coming from the Highlands. Even though there were also Highland soldiers present before 1689 in the Dutch army, the majority of the soldiers came from areas located on the east coast of Scotland (Aberdeenshire, Fife, and Perthshire). Though distinctively Scottish, their dress code would be different from the one used in the Highlands.

A final example concerning Scottish dress and the connection with a social identity is found in the journal of John Gabriel Stedman. John Stedman, who had been in Scotland for his education, was accompanied on his way to Bergen op Zoom by an officer by the name of Kenny Macklenan. On approaching Bergen op Zoom, where at that time the regiment of General Stuart was stationed, John Stedman mentions in his diary the following passage: "*Coming near Bergen op Zoom, I observed Kenny Macklenan, my governor, completely dressed in new highland clothes, with hose, fillibeg, short coat, plaid, bonnet and claymore, of which he seem'd uncommonly proud*".[581] In other words, the complete outfit of the traditional Highlander. It is important to mention that this took place in the year 1757, a period in which certain concepts of a typical Scottish identity were becoming more and more fashionable. Therefore, it might be advisable to place this specific account in a wider context: that of the construction of a Scottish identity as represented by its Highland traditions.

A German engraving from 1631 is one of the first known illustrations of the old Highland dress. The engraving depicts four soldier dressed in the Scottish/Irish fashion of the tartan plaid wrapped around the body and held together by a belt. One of the soldiers wears a pair of breeches. Parker comments that either these soldiers were reinforcements for Mackay's regiment, or troops brought to fight for Gustavus Adolphus in Germany by James, Marquis of Hamilton. Interestingly, the fillibeg (or kilt[582]) does not appear in the engraving.[583] Whether or not the Scottish soldiers employed by the Dutch were dressed in a Highland fashion, the fact remained that their dress code would have been distinctly different from the Dutch. Later

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[580] R.W. Munro, *Highland Clans and Tartans*, p. 27-28.
[581] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *The journal of John Gabriel Stedman*, p. 19.
[582] There are uncertainties whether the *fillibeg or kilt* is a traditional form of Scottish dress. In his article on the Highland Tradition of Scotland, Hugh Trevor-Roper mentions that the kilt as it is known today is in fact an 18th century invention. According to Trevor-Roper, the kilt came into existence a few years after 1726, and its inventor was an English Quaker from Lancashire, by the name of Thomas Rawlinson.
[583] Parker, *The military revolution*, p. 50.

on, the presence of a uniform that was not Dutch, but British, indicated that the Brigade had a separate status and was still closely associated with Great Britain.

Also regarding armament, the specific Scottish character revealed itself. In 1599, as part of the changes in the Dutch army, uniform equipment was prescribed for the troops serving the States and the authorities seem to have been strict regarding the approved weapons. In the Resolutions of the States of Holland of 28 December 1605, it is stated that the muskets of the recruits had to be "*of full length and four feet long, shooting balls of 12 in pound*". In a letter to the Council of State dated the 25 April 1612, a comment is made on the fact that the Scottish recruits are "*both being fine bodies of men, but armed after the manner of their nation, contrary to the resolution passed some time ago by your Lordships, regarding the arming of the soldiers.*"[584]

In a commission granted to Bartholomew Balfour by the States General, mention is made of the various soldiers involved in his company, and it, again discloses the distinctiveness of the Scottish armament. Besides 27 musketeers, 73 harquebusiers and 63 pikemen, there were also three buckler men and a piper.[585] The buckler, a small round shield, was part of the standard armament of the Scottish warrior. According to Shurmer, the buckler men were responsible for the protection of the higher officers on the battlefield.[586]

In another commission granted by the States General, this time to Captain Alexander Murray, another typical Scottish armament is mentioned. Besides 36 pikemen, 9 halberdiers, 15 musketeers and 48 harquebusiers, there were additionally 4 broadsword men. The broadsword was highly favoured as a weapon by the Scottish, but what its particular function was in the Dutch Republic is not known. It is likely that it only had a ceremonial function, considering the low number of broadsword men. They could very well have preformed a similar task to the buckler men.

The mentioning of the piper in Bartholomew's company may lead to confusion, since the word 'piper' can refer to someone who plays the (bag) pipes, but also to someone who plays

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[584] Letter to the Council of State, 25 April 1612, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 272.
[585] Commission granted to Bartholomew Balfour, the Hague, 26 June 1588, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 84.
[586] R.M. Shurmer, *Scottish mercenary forces*, p. 106.

the flute. According to Trevor-Roper, the bagpipe as it is known today was developed after the Union with England in 1707, as a form of protest against that Union. Trevor-Roper says that before the Union, the bagpipe already existed, in vestigial form, "...but that form was regarded by the large majority of Scotchmen as a sign of barbarism." He continues that "even in the Highlands, even in that vestigial form, it was relatively new: it was not the original, or the distinguishing badge of Highland society."[587] However, if the word 'piper', as mentioned in the commission granted to Captain Balfour, does refer to 'bagpiper', than that would mean that, long before the Act of Union in 1707, bagpipes were used on the battlefield, and that they were not considered at all to be a "sign of barbarism".

A final important aspect that helped to construct a common Scottish military identity was the fact that most Scottish officers and soldiers spoke English or Gaelic[588]. Especially in the 17th century, very few Scottish officers spoke Dutch. While most of the correspondence between Scottish officers of high rank and the Dutch authorities would be in French, the matter of language could present itself as a practical difficulty when the Dutch authorities had to deal with Scottish officers of lower rank or with common soldiers. In 1576, for example, a Dutch committee had to talk to a Scottish captain by the name of Michiel regarding "*the affair and faults of certain Scotchmen at Crimpen and Elshout*". Because of the language barrier the States of Holland allowed the committee to have an interpreter present.[589] However, the language barrier was not always between Dutch and English. In 1747, orders had to be explained to some of the men of Lord Drumlanrig's regiment in their own language, because they did not understand English.[590] Another example was given in the Resolutions of the States General: "*The Scots were given the choice that same day (16 December 1576), to be mustered at the place they came from their colonel would receive 2000 écus in the land of Overmaze. To which they were transported by Jean Laurens, who understood the English and Scots language, instead of Melchior Schwartzenburg.*"[591] Even from the Scottish side there were complaints regarding the inability to speak another language. Henry Erskine wrote in 1617 to John, Earl of Mar, concerning the troops stationed in Bruges, that "*we could not have lernit the Frence, in respect of the great number of Scotsmen that is ther for the present, for*

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[587] Trevor-Roper, *Highland tradition*, p. 15.
[588] For more detail on the presence of Scots Gaelic, see the section on the lists of conduct and appendix 1.
[589] Resolutions of the States of Holland, military affairs, 7 August 1576, Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 39.
[590] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. xviii.
[591] RSG 26, Resolutions of the States General, 16 December 1576.

we met every day together at our exercise, so that it was impossible to us not to speake Scotis."[592] Also for court cases, the language barrier posed a serious inconvenience. In 1728, the commanding officer in Willemstad requested of the Council of State that a court-martial to be held in Willemstad be transferred to Breda, since the accused "*are Scots, to whom they could not say a word.*" In Breda, a Scottish regiment was stationed who could trial the Scottish soldiers without any difficulties with the language.[593]

[592] Letter from Henry Erskine to John, Earl of Mar, 22 December 1617, in: *Hist. Mss. Commission, supplementary report on the manuscripts of the Earl of Mar & Kellie*, preserved at Alloa house, Clamannanshire (ed. rev. H. Patton) (London 1930).
[593] Resolution of the Council of State 1728, September 27, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 198.

Scottish Masonic lodges[594]

A peculiar phenomenon that further consolidates the idea of a specific Scottish military identity is the existence of Scottish Masonic lodges in the Netherlands in the 18th century which were founded by Scottish soldiers. Their specific identity was expressed by the several conflicts they had with the Dutch lodges.

There were two Scottish Lodges founded by Scottish soldiers serving in the Dutch army. The first, the Union Lodge, was founded in 1764 in the regiment of Lieutenant General Alexander Marjoribanks when it was stationed in Namen. The second, the St. Andreas lodge, was founded in 1785 in Sluis.[595] Of the two Scottish lodges, the Union Lodge was the one with the oldest tradition and with the most outspoken Scottish character. The Union Lodge used the so-called 'Antients' method of gradation, while most other lodges in the Dutch Republic followed the 'Moderns' method.[596] The Union lodge also used English as its language, while most Dutch lodges would have employed French. Despite these two Scottish aspects of the lodge, the real facet of their Scottish identity was revealed by their conflict with a Dutch lodge by the name of 'La Constance'. The conflict began in 1781 when Robert Bruce, Francis Sutherland and Alexander Gordon, all three members of the Union Lodge, paid a visit to La Constance. When the members of La Constance wanted to return the favour, however, they were denied entry to the Union Lodge. In turn, the members of La Constance denied entry to the members of the Scottish lodge when they sought to return.[597]

The situation remained unchanged until 1783, when Frederik Lodewijk Christiaan, Count van Rechteren Limpurg, decided that the situation was intolerable and that it was a sign of the

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[594]Most of my information regarding Scottish military Masonic lodges came from the article of A.M.M. van den Brand, *A double Scotch'. De Vrijmetselarij binnen de Schotse Brigade*, Thoth, no. 5 (1999), who most kindly provided me with his article.

[595] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 178.

[596] Because of the publication of a book called 'Masonry dissected' in 1730, the English Grand Lodge decided to alter the password and some of its rituals in order to distinguish between real masons and pseudo-masons (those who had just read the book). Not all the lodges agreed with this decision and in 1752, six English lodges together with the Irish and the Scottish Grand Lodge founded a new English Grand Lodge. They called themselves the 'Antients', since they upheld the old traditions, in contrast to the 'Moderns' who had accepted the new changes. A.M M. van den Brand, 'A Double Scotch', p. 181.

[597] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 180.

superiority of the Scottish lodge over the Dutch Grand Lodge. Van Rechteren had a high position in the La Constance lodge and clearly saw the Union Lodge as a competitor. By presenting the Scottish lodge as being superior to that of the Dutch Grand Lodge, van Rechteren assured himself that the Dutch Grand lodge would put pressure on the Union Lodge.[598] The Grand Lodge wrote to the Scottish lodge that, according to an agreement in 1771 with the English Grand Lodge, it was decided that no charters were to be given to lodges that were established on the other lodge's territory. The Scots replied that they were a Scottish lodge and not an English one and that they belonged to the 'Antients' and not the 'Moderns'.[599]

There was also a financial aspect to this affair. The members of La Constance had to pay a contribution before they could enter the Union Lodge. There were some exceptions however. Lieutenant David Bruce, who was a member of La Constance and who was equally denied entry to the Union Lodge, could become a member of the Union Lodge without paying the full contribution, because two of his brothers (Robert and John Bruce, both captains in the regiment of Houston[600]) were already members of the Union Lodge. However, David refused to become a member and chose to remain with La Constance.

Because of the outbreak of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784) and the resulting complete absorption of the Scots Brigade into the Dutch army, the relation between the Scottish Union Lodge and that of the Dutch Grand Lodge changed accordingly. The Dutch Grand Lodge was tired of the conflict and offered the Scottish lodge a choice: either they could place themselves under the authority of the Dutch Grand lodge or they were to be declared illegal. The Scottish responded that they needed more time, but it is unknown whether or not they bowed to the demands of the Dutch Grand Lodge.

The second Scottish military Masonic Lodge was called St. Andreas, its name revealing a Scottish dimension.[601] St. Andreas was founded in 1785 in the Scottish regiment Stuart, which was at that time stationed in Sluis. While the Union Lodge had a charter from the Scottish Grand Lodge in Edinburgh, St. Andreas worked with a Dutch charter. Most of its members,

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[598] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 182.
[599] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 183.
[600] Marjoribanks regiment was now called Houston, after its new commander General John Houston.
[601] St. Andreas, or St. Andrew, is of course the patron saint of Scotland.

however, were Scottish officers from the regiment Stuart and for the entire history of the lodge, most of the positions, with the exception of that of Chairing Master, was in the hands of people with Scottish sounding names like Campbell and Macdonald.[602] A. van den Brand states that the leaders of St. Andreas had probably previously been members of the Union Lodge because, between 1782 and 1784, both regiments were stationed in Maastricht. It was also known that several persons had been initiated by the Union Lodge. According to van den Brand, it is reasonable to assume that because the Scottish character of the regiments at that time became threatened by the political developments in the Dutch Republic –due to the fourth Anglo-Dutch war- various Scottish officers tried to maintain elements of their Scottish character by turning to a Scottish lodge instead of a Dutch one.[603]

Like the Union Lodge, St. Andreas also had a conflict with a Dutch lodge. The lodge L'Amitié Sans Fin complained to the Dutch Grand Lodge in 1785 about the fact that the ambulant lodges (that is the non-fixed lodges like the Scottish military lodges) "could accept as a member people who were outside of the same regiments."[604] The reason for this complaint was probably financial. The lodge in Sluis was small and Sluis itself was a very small town. When ambulant lodges accepted new members, the Dutch lodge in Sluis lost the contributions it so desperately needed. Another important point of conflict was the political struggle that took place in the Dutch Republic at that time between the two political factions, the Orangists and the Patriots.[605] While normally the Orangist party was associated with the military because of its natural affiliation with the House of Orange, and the Patriots had more support within the civil community, in the conflict between the St. Andreas and L'Amitié Sans Fin the opposite was true. Within the officer-corps of the regiment of Stuart that was stationed in Sluis, there was a strong sympathy for the patriotic cause, while the lodge L'Amitié Sans Fin was mostly Orangist. Needless to say, this further contributed to the mutual animosity.[606]

These two different lodges, while not completely Scottish in their membership, can be seen as clear examples of the mixed identity of the Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic. Whereas one of the lodges was more Scottish in its nature than the other one (St. Andreas did not have

[602] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 190.
[603] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 186.
[604] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 186.
[605] See also chapter 1, p.42-44.
[606] A.M.M. van den Brand, 'A double Scotch', p. 186.

a Scottish charter and the language spoken was Dutch instead of English), both lodges were characteristically different from their Dutch counterparts, as can be seen from the conflicts between them and the Dutch lodges. These conflicts can be perceived as conflicts between ambulant and fixed lodges, or even between military and civilian lodges, but the fact remains that the conflict between the Union Lodge and La Constance was distinctively a clash between a Scottish and a Dutch lodge. To a lesser extent, the same can be said of the conflict between St. Andreas and L'Amitié Sans Fin. Both the Scottish lodges were a point of reference for Scottish officers that were stationed in Scottish regiments. Although there was most definitely an ambiguity concerning the purity of the 'Scottishness' of the lodges, it is clear from the fact that most of the members were Scottish officers and that these lodges provided a separate context in which Scottish identity could be preserved.

The Scottish connection

Although the focus of this chapter is on the construction and perception of a Scottish *military* identity, it is impossible to regard this concept as being completely singular. On the contrary, the interaction between the Scottish military community and the Scottish civil community in the Dutch Republic, and the connection with Scotland itself was crucial, not necessarily for the construction of a Scottish identity, but more importantly for the continuation of a particular Scottish identity. This could especially be the case for soldiers who had left the army and maintained no further direct contact with the Brigade. Not only did civil communities assist in establishing and maintaining contact with Scotland, but also through their relation with the Scottish regiments, the ex-soldier was never completely cut off from the Scottish military environment.

In the Dutch Republic, especially in the provinces of Zeeland and Holland, there was a large Scottish presence. In Bergen op Zoom, for example, there existed a Scottish quarter that was established by Scottish merchants at the end of the 15th century. Other towns like Rotterdam, Veere and Middleburgh had large and influential Scottish communities that maintained strong ties with Scotland. In the proceedings of the Caledonian Society, an example is given that clearly illustrates not only the relationship between the Scottish regiment and the Scottish Kirk –the core of the Scottish civil community- but also between the Scottish community and

the Dutch authorities as represented by the municipal council. In 1744, the Kirk of Campveere was asked to take in five orphans abandoned by a Scottish battalion. Because the financial burden proved too much for the Scottish Kirk, the Kirk council decided to ask the municipal council of Campveere for aid. The request was accepted, although, in 1748, another request was made to send the children back to Scotland.[607]

The Kirk often took responsibility for children who were either abandoned by the Scottish military or who were made orphans. In 1750, for example, the Kirk council of Campveere managed to find a place for two orphans in the poorhouse in Edinburgh. In addition, when the Scottish regiments themselves were in need of aid the Kirk would assist them. When the first battalion of the regiment Marjoribanks was stationed in Campveere, in 1757 an epidemic broke out and the Kirk council, after discussing the situation with the regimental surgeon, decided to give thirty guilders in aid. Additionally, the Kirk took care of the women and children who were with the regiment and had expressed a desire to return to Scotland.[608] What do these examples demonstrate? First of all that the regiments were in close contact with the Scottish communities (represented by the Kirk), but more importantly that they could turn to them in times of need. Only when required would they ask for help from the Dutch authorities. Furthermore, the Scottish community - as can be seen from the example of the two orphans in 1750- had strong ties with Scotland and often functioned as a mediator between the regiment and Scotland, thereby strengthening the aspect of a Scottish identity.

The dissolution of the Scots Brigade

The Scottish military identity comes clearly to the fore when, paradoxically, the Dutch Republic decided to terminate the separate status of the Scots Brigade as a non-Dutch military entity. In the history of the Scots Brigade there were two separate events where the Scottish regiments were incorporated in the Dutch army and where the unique status of the Scots Brigade was terminated.

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[607] G. Grevers-Lieth, 'De Schotse kerk in Veere (Campvere)', *Caledonian society*, 20, no. 1 (1996), p. 16.
[608] Ibid, p. 17.

The Second Anglo-Dutch war

During the second Anglo-Dutch war (1665-1667), tensions between England and the Dutch Republic ran so high that in the spring of 1665, the Dutch State decided to disband the four English and the three Scottish regiments which at that time were employed by the Dutch army, and to reconstruct them as 'Dutch' regiments. The most efficient and trustworthy officers were to be re-appointed and had to vow allegiance to the States. The result was that the three Scottish regiments were converted into three separate Dutch regiments and that one Dutch regiment replaced the English regiments.[609] Ferguson comments that it was likely that most of the English officers went back to England (because four regiments were reduced to one), while most of the Scottish officers stayed, since they came from families which had been settled in the Dutch Republic for two or three generations.[610] A few English officers received posts in the Scottish/Dutch regiments, to fill up any remaining vacancies. There were some profound changes regarding the Scottish regiments. First of all, the 'Scots March' was to be replaced by the 'Holland March'. Secondly, the Scottish regiments were no longer allowed to carry their specific colours. The uniforms stayed the same, however, with the only exception that the officers had to wear orange sashes and Dutch badges.[611]

The effects of the incorporation of the Scots regiments in the Dutch army had important consequences for the Scots element within the Brigade. Ferguson mentions that in 1673 (six years after the war) there were only three field officers and three captains with Scottish surnames in Colonel Scott's regiment. For the regiment of Kirkpatrick it was even less, only three field officers and one captain had Scottish surnames. The third regiment, which belonged to Colonel Erskine, had only three field officers with Scottish surnames. In Scott's regiment there were two or three captains with a Scottish name, and Erskine's regiment also had two captains with a Scottish surname, while the rest of the officers were non-Scottish.[612] The situation was not permanent. With the peace of 1674, Scotland was once again open as a recruiting ground for the Dutch State and the arrival of a Scottish officer by the name of Hugh Mackay of Scoury helped to re-establish the Scots element in the Brigade. In the *Strictures on Military Discipline*, one passage further illustrates the poor situation of the Scottish regiments.

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[609] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 468.
[610] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p.468, note 2.
[611] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p.468-469.
[612] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p.469.

Despite the fact that the Scots Brigade had been reinstated, William of Orange was unsatisfied with the low morale and standards of the Scottish regiments. The Scottish commanding officer, Hugh Mackay, offered the following advice: "*the only way to recover these regiments and bring them to their former state is by dispersing all these Dutch and foreign officers, under-officers, and soldiers into the national and newly levied or other regiments; replace the officers with Scotch gentlemen of family and merit, raise Scotch recruits, and henceforth let officers, under-officers, and men be only Scots.*"[613] Mackay's advice was taken and the regiments were reorganised, resulting in the gradual disappearance of the foreign officers.

The Fourth Anglo Dutch war

In September 1780, an American packet was intercepted by the British government. This event was not in itself very particular, although its content proved that the Dutch had been secretly involved in the struggle between Great Britain and their rebelling colonies in America. The documents demonstrated that the city of Amsterdam had, since 1778, been conducting a clandestine correspondence with the American rebels despite the fact that the Dutch State was officially allied with Great Britain. The reply of the Dutch government was so unsatisfactory that the British government decided to declare war on the Republic of the United Provinces in December 1780.

The beginning of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war also meant an end to the Scots Brigade in Dutch service. Since George III was officially the sovereign of the Scottish soldiers in the Dutch Republic, the upcoming war would severely complicate matters such as loyalty and authority. Therefore, the Dutch government decided to dissolve the Brigade and to integrate it in the Dutch army by demanding an oath of absolute loyalty from the officers, and by removing the symbols of identity that were represented the character of the Brigade. Thus, they managed to bring to an end a tradition that had existed for more than two hundred years.

Before the official declaration of war in 1780, the relationship between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain had become increasingly strained. Through the island of St. Eustatius, which was part of the Dutch colonies, American rebels were supplied with weapons. In 1777

[613] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p.471-472.

alone, upwards of 2,400 ships were cleared in and out of the island's port. Ships arrived every day in America's eastern seaboard ports, the majority of them carrying gunpowder and weapons.[614] An additional factor that further deteriorated the relationship between the Dutch and the British was the fact that Great Britain exercised its self-proclaimed right to search Dutch ships. In addition, the refusal of the Dutch Republic to allow the British government to borrow the Scots Brigade to fight in North America was a cause of vexation for the British, especially because seven years earlier the Dutch government had denied a similar request.

In November 1775, George III had sent a request to the States General saying that "*in exchange for the British troops in Dutch service, he would return an equal number of Hanoverian troops and to bear the expenses incurred by the States in levying an equal number of national troops, to give the States full power to reclaim the Brigade or not on the conclusion of peace, and to grant permission to recruit in Scotland if recalled.*"[615] The Stadtholder and all the provinces agreed, but the States of Holland imposed some extra conditions. According to Holland, the crown had to pay for the transport and return of the troops, and more importantly, it was not allowed to use the troops anywhere outside of "His Majesty's kingdoms and possessions situated in Europe". Additionally, the King had to grant permission to recruit in Scotland.[616] Unsurprisingly, Great Britain refused.

Overall, the Dutch had little sympathy for the British cause in America. After all, they felt more related to the American side, since the Dutch Republic had been in an almost similar situation approximately two centuries earlier against their former oppressor, Spain. It was not only for ideological reasons that the Dutch were sympathetic to the American cause. The new state needed arms for the struggle, and Amsterdam was one of the world's principal arms markets. The commercial jealousy of the Dutch with regard to British trade was an added incentive not to be supportive of the British in their conflict with the American colonies.

The outbreak of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war had great repercussions for the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Republic. Since officially the Scots regiments were a loan from the King of Great Britain – albeit for more than two centuries – the idea of a war with Great Britain severely complicated matters for the Scots troops in the Netherlands and, of course, for the Dutch

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[614] http://www.netherlands-embassy.org/c_story.html#4.
[615] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 396.
[616] Secret Resolutions of the States General, 5 April 1776, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 480-1.

government. The first reaction of the Dutch government to the declaration of war was to remove the regiments from the more vulnerable towns near the Dutch seacoast, to the inland fortresses along the Maas (Grave, Venlo, Maastricht, and Namen). The second reaction was that,on the 18 November 1782, the States General decided that the Scottish officers should be required to take the oath abjuring all allegiance to the British Crown, on pain of forfeiture of their commissions. Furthermore, the regiments were obliged to wear the Dutch uniform instead of the red coats of the British army, and the officers should provide themselves with orange sashes and Dutch forms of gorgets and spontoons. The regimental colours were to be replaced so that their ensigns "shall no longer flaunt with the enemy's coat of arms." The orders and commands would from now on be given in Dutch, and the famous Scottish March was no longer to be beaten. [617] On the 8 December, the Prince of Orange wrote that blue uniforms were to be provided instead of red. The colonels of the three regiments, generals Houston, Stuart, and Dundas, were allowed to enjoy their pay for the rest of their lives because of their long service, and their regiments continued to be called by their names.[618]

How the Scots troops actually felt about the changes imposed on them by the Dutch government is probably best expressed in a song that was popular in the Brigade. One verse ran:

> *"Our Brigade still for valour and bravery renowned,*
> *Whose battles were always with victory crowned,*
> *Now depressed and forlorn greatly mourns that sad day*
> *When they in their kilts came o' this side the sea."*[619]

Already since 1763, the Scots Brigade had expressed the desire to return to Great Britain and to leave the service of the States, because of 'indifferent usage' by the Dutch government.[620] In 1779, they made another offer to the British government, saying that they were not willing to stay in the garrison towns of the Dutch Republic doing nothing while Great Britain was involved in a war.

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[617] Resolution of the Council of State, 22 November 1782, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 496-7.
[618] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 401.
[619] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 400, note 2 Brankston Grange Papers.
[620] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 398.

According to James Ferguson, the nationalisation of the Scots Brigade put the officers in a difficult situation since, although officially they were still subjects of the King of Great Britain, they received payment from the Dutch State. What further complicated the situation was the fact that most of the Scots officers had lived in the Dutch Republic for a long time, were married to Dutch women and had children who were born and baptised in the Republic. The Scots officers sent deputies to Lord Grantham, the Secretary of State in London, regarding their situation and the "annihilation of the Brigade" and to ask advice on what course they should follow.[621] Grantham replied that the King was aware of the close ties that had formed between the officers and soldiers of the Brigade and the Dutch Republic and that whoever decided to return to Great Britain would be welcomed, while those who decided to remain would not lose the regard of the King.[622] In the end, one colonel, five lieutenant colonels, three majors, eleven captains, five lieutenants, twenty-three ensigns, one adjutant, one chaplain, and three surgeons, refused to take the oath of allegiance, and decided to return to Great Britain[623].

So, with the incorporation of the Scots Brigade by the Dutch government, did the Scots regiments simply cease to exist? What happened to the distinctive traits that constituted the cultural identity of the Brigade? To what degree is it accurate to state that by changing the uniforms, colours, and language, and by demanding an oath of allegiance, the Scots identity was effectively annihilated?

The events that took place after the Fourth Anglo Dutch war were, however, different from the ones that occurred more than a century before with the ending of the Second Anglo Dutch war. Unfortunately, for the officers of the Scots Brigade at the end of the Fourth Anglo Dutch War, there was no longer a Hugh Mackay of Scoury or a William of Orange who could help to restore the Scots Brigade. Ferguson proffers William V's lack of political prowess as one possible reason why the Brigade remained dissolved. In Ferguson's words, "*honourable as was to be his career in times of difficulty and disaster, [William V] was not as the first or*

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[621] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 401.
[622] Belsyde Papers, Letter of Lord Grantham, 20 December 1782; Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 518.
[623] This list is taken from the Belsyde Papers (Papers belonging to Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrier of Belsyde) and differs slightly from Dr. Portneous's Account (1795), which gives six or eight field-officers, twelve captains and thirty subalterns, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 402, note 3.

second of his name."[624]. Ferguson overlooks the difference between the political situation in the late 18th century and that of the 17th century. In 18th century Europe, there was a growing equalisation between 'nation' and the so-called 'us-feeling' that expressed itself in words and actions of increasing nationalism.[625] Therefore, the idea of having a more or less separate military unit that officially belonged to a foreign sovereign in one's own state army would have conflicted with this particular attitude of the 18th century. This could help to explain the decision to keep the Brigade Dutch. The unstable political situation in the Dutch Republic after 1783, with its different conflicting political factions, and the Prussian invasion of 1787, may have been an additional factors that prevented the reestablishment of the Brigade.[626]

Because of these circumstances, the Brigade was never restored to its old status, even though the original reason for disbanding it had ended with the signing of a truce between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic in 1783. This did not imply that there were not appeals from certain quarters to reinstate the Brigade in the Dutch Republic. A letter from Lieutenant Colonel W.P. Colyear Robertson, dated 6 June 1790, clearly shows the sentiments of the Scottish officers to the decision to terminate the Scots Brigade. He writes that "*...those in the Dutch government who have no other views than the real Interest of the Republic, would prefer a Body of well disciplined British Troops to either German or Swiss, being able to judge of the matter from two hundred years experience.*"[627] He concludes his letter with the remark: "*I would rather see the Revival of that Corps in which I past a great part of my life and the military Reputation of which has been equal'd by few in Europe.*"[628]

Three years later, Colyear still had not given up on the idea of a re-instated Scots Brigade. He wrote in 1793 that "*the officers of the six battalions late employed by the Crown of Great Britain in the service of the Dutch Republic entreat the right honourable Henry Dundas to take their case into consideration before the present still favourable conjuncture passes, hoping he will think it a measure worthy of his patronage to save from extinction three Scotch regiments, amongst the oldest and most distinguished of any in Europe. The equality that has been observed for some time past with regard to the two United kingdoms gives them room to*

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[624] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. XXII.
[625] Frijhoff, 'Identiteit en identiteitsbesef', p. 616.
[626] See chapter three for further details on the political environment in the Dutch Republic in the 18th century.
[627] Letter from W.P. Colyear Robertson, 6 June 1790, Public Record Office, London, no. 89, H.O. Scotland, Bundle 1711-1712.
[628] Letter from W.P. Colyear Robertson, 6 June 1790, Public Record Office, London, no.89, H.O. Scotland, Bundle 1711-1712.

hope that a fate which English regiments in similar cases have never experienced will not befall the oldest regular troops that ever belonged to Europe."[629] This letter expresses not only the hope of re-establishing the Brigade, but also demonstrates the importance of the Brigade for Scotland and the Scottish reputation abroad. The Brigade represented the "oldest regular troops in Europe." The promotion campaign of Colyear Robertson remained unsuccessful and the Brigade -both as the bulwark of the Republic and as the export commodity of Scottish bravery on the continent- remained integrated in the Dutch army.

The Final Days of the Brigade

An important source that might help to shed some light on the question of whether the annihilation of the Brigade in 1782 also meant the destruction of the Scottish elements in the regiments, is the lists of conduct of the officers of the Scots Brigade found in the archives of the Council of State.[630] These lists were for the first time drawn up in 1773, and continue until 1789. I have researched six different lists of conduct, belonging to the regiments of Gordon, Marjoribanks, Stuart, Mackay, Dundas and Houston. They are important because they give a very good indication of the extent of Scottish identity within the regiments before and after their full incorporation within the Dutch army. It needs to be said that the lists only provide information about officers with the rank of captain, lieutenant and ensign. The officers of higher and lower ranks are not represented in the lists. The lists reveal the conduct or behaviour of an officer and whether he was liable for promotion or not. The particularly interesting feature is that additional information is given on religion, language and place of birth, which facilitates demonstration of the Scottish elements within the regiments. It is important to be aware of the fact that these are not recruitment lists. This explains a reoccurrence of the same names, for example when an officer would move to a different regiment when a higher position became available, or when someone who served as an ensign or lieutenant in 1773 appeared as a lieutenant or captain in 1775. For the ranks of captain and lieutenant, there were not many new recruits; besides the few that came directly from Scotland, most officers would be from other regiments in the Scots Brigade or from lower

[629] Letters from Colyear Robertson, 1793, NAS, Edinburgh, GD38/1/1136.
[630] Algemeen Rijksarchief, archief van de Raad van State (1.01.19), nrs. 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1943.

ranks. For ensigns, however, the situation was different; being the lowest rank on the list, most new recruits did not come from other regiments or even from lower ranks. Therefore, although these sources do not tell us much about the in-flow of soldiers from Scotland, they do provide a clear picture of the changes in the Scottish character of the regiments. Until 1784, all of the officers present on the lists are by and large Scottish, with a few English officers. In 1784, in contrast, one sees an influx of Dutch and German officers for the first time.

The first conduct list available is that of the regiment of General-Major Gordon. The regiment was garrisoned in 1773 in Den Briel. There were nine captains, of whom five were born in Scotland. The other four were born "in the regiment", meaning that they were born in the town where the regiment was stationed at that moment. All the captains had Scottish surnames, were Reformed Protestants and spoke both English and Dutch. Two of the captains spoke Scots-Gaelic. As regards the lieutenants, the number born in Scotland was even higher; of the thirteen lieutenants, eight came from Scotland. The five officers born in the Republic were also Scots. As with the captains, all the lieutenants bore Scottish surnames, all of them were Reformed Protestants and spoke both Dutch and English. Only one officer spoke Scots-Gaelic. The same situation applied to the lowest rank in the conduct lists, that of ensign. Of the fifteen ensigns, thirteen were born in Scotland, all the ensigns had Scottish surnames and were Reformed Protestants. They all spoke English and Dutch, while four ensigns also spoke Scots-Gaelic. It is interesting to observe that the final command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Buchanan (the officer who signed the conduct list) is written in English and not in Dutch, even though it was addressed to the Prince of Orange.

The conduct list of the same regiment in 1775, at that time stationed in Venlo, gives more or less the same picture. Of the nine captains, four were born in Scotland. All the captains had Scottish names, were Reformed Protestants and spoke English and Dutch. Two of the captains spoke Scots-Gaelic. Of the thirteen lieutenants who belonged to Gordon's regiment in 1775, eleven came from Scotland. The other two were also Scottish, but were born in the Republic. All of them were Reformed Protestants and spoke English and Dutch, while two also spoke Scots-Gaelic. Finally, of the fourteen ensigns present on the list, twelve were born in Scotland. All ensigns bore Scottish names and all were Reformed Protestants. Every one of them spoke English and Dutch and three ensigns spoke Scots-Gaelic. As with the conduct list

of 1773, among the rank of captain, lieutenant and ensign, there were no non-Scots officers present.

For the year 1773 a conduct list of the regiment of Lieutenant-General Marjoribanks, stationed in Doornick, is available, but unfortunately it is the only list for this regiment. There are eight captains present on the list, four came from Scotland, and the others were born in garrison towns in the Dutch Republic (Breda, Doornik and Den Bosch). All of the captains were Reformed Protestants and bore Scottish surnames. They all spoke Dutch and English, while one captain in addition spoke Scots-Gaelic. The lieutenants present on the list were twice as numerous as the captains. Of the sixteen, eleven came from Scotland. Not all of them were Scottish, though two of the lieutenants were English. Nevertheless, they were all Reformed Protestants and both English and Dutch speaking. Six of the lieutenants also spoke Scots-Gaelic. For their part, the ensigns counted fourteen among their ranks, eight of whom came from Scotland and six of whom were born in the Dutch Republic. All of them were Reformed and spoke English, nine ensigns spoke Dutch and three spoke Scots-Gaelic.

The conduct lists of the regiment of General-Major Stuart that was stationed in Zutphen in 1773 yielded almost exactly the same information with regard to the Scots influence among the officers. There were no non-Scots officers on the list. From a total number of twelve captains, seven were born in Scotland. All of the Scottish captains were Reformed Protestants and spoke English and Dutch. Additionally, five captains spoke Scots-Gaelic. Of the thirteen lieutenants, seven came from Scotland, they were all Reformed Protestants and spoke both English and Dutch. Two lieutenants spoke Scots-Gaelic. Among the fourteen ensigns, nine came from Scotland, all were Reformed Protestants and spoke English and Dutch, four ensigns spoke Scots-Gaelic. For the year 1775, when the garrison was still stationed in Zutphen, there is no recorded change in the pattern. All the officers present were Scots and the majority were born in Scotland. They were all Reformed Protestants and spoke English and Dutch. Five captains, two lieutenants and four ensigns spoke Scots-Gaelic.

In the lists of conduct of the regiment of Lieutenant-General Mackay stationed in Doornik in 1775, we encounter an identical situation. All the names of the officers on the lists are Scots. Of the thirteen captains, seven were born in Scotland, all were Reformed Protestants and spoke both English and Dutch. Three captains also spoke Scots-Gaelic. Of the thirteen lieutenants, seven were also born in Scotland, all of them were Reformed Protestants and like

the captains, spoke both English and Dutch. At least five lieutenants spoke Scots-Gaelic. Finally, of the seventeen ensigns, thirteen were born in Scotland, all of them were Reformed Protestants, spoke English and Dutch and three ensigns spoke Scots-Gaelic. Up to the year 1775, judging from the conduct lists, there were no non-Scots officers among the Scots regiments, all of them were Scots and Reformed Protestants, the majority of the officers having been born in Scotland. Also, in relative terms, there was a significant element that spoke Scots-Gaelic. To find out whether any changes occurred regarding the number of Scottish officers in the regiments, it is instructive to consider the lists of conduct after 1782.

The first conduct list is dated 1 January 1784, and belongs to the regiment of General-Major Dundas, who was the successor to the regiment of General-Major James Gordon. In 1784, the regiment was stationed at Brielle. There are fourteen captains present on the list, of whom nine were Scots. Of the nine captains, four were born in Scotland. All the captains except one, who was Roman-Catholic, were Reformed Protestants. Nine captains spoke Dutch and English, but no mention is made of a captain who spoke Scots-Gaelic. In the cases where English was not mentioned on the list as a spoken language, it was replaced with Hoch-Deutsch and French. In relation to lieutenants, the number of Scots officers was higher. Of the twelve lieutenants on the list, nine bore Scottish names. Of these nine, three were born in Scotland, while the others were born in the Dutch Republic and Saxony. All three of the Scottish officers who were born in Scotland were placed 'by d'Armeé' which meant that they were no longer on active duty, but still received payment. The officers were respectively 61, 60 and 55 years old. All the younger lieutenants were born in the Dutch Republic and one in Saxony. The Scottish lieutenants were Reformed Protestants just like the Dutch officers, while the German lieutenant from Saxony was Lutheran. The Scottish lieutenants spoke both Dutch and English, the two Dutch lieutenants spoke only Dutch, and the German lieutenant spoke Dutch, French and Hoch-Deutsch. Of the thirteen ensigns present on the list, six had Scottish names but none of them were born in Scotland. All the Scottish ensigns were Reformed Protestants and their average age was twenty years and six months. Three Scottish ensigns bore the same surname, Jackson. They all spoke English and Dutch, but there is no mention of Scots-Gaelic as a spoken language.

For the same year, there is also available the list of conduct of another Scots regiment. It concerns the regiment of General Major Houston, who was the successor to the regiment of Lieutenant-General Mackay. The regiment of Houston was stationed at Veere in 1784. Most

of the captains mentioned on the list were still Scottish. In total, there were twelve captains, of which at least six were Scottish with Scottish surnames. There was also an English captain present, his place of birth stated as London. Of the Scottish captains, four were born in Scotland (Kildonan, Strathfay, New Tarbot and Forfar). While, the other Scottish captains were born in the Dutch Republic (Breda, Terveer and Coevoorden). Two captains spoke Scots-Gaelic. All of the British officers (including the one English captain) spoke English and Dutch and were Reformed Protestants. It needs to be said that two of the Scottish officers were not on active-duty anymore and placed "by d'Armeé". The age of the Scottish captains ranged from 27 to 59 years old. Among the lieutenants, an even larger amount of Scottish officers can be discerned. Of the ten lieutenants on the list, we find at least eight Scottish officers. Four of them were born in Scotland (Stirling, Loch Broom, Perth and Fain), the others having been born in the Dutch Republic (Nijmegen, Doornik, Oosterhout and Sluys). All the officers were Reformed Protestants and spoke both English and Dutch. Three lieutenants additionally spoke Scots-Gaelic (Charles Nairn, John Rofs and James Mackenzie), but Charles Nairn and John Rofs were no longer on active duty. James Mackenzie was also the only officer on active duty who was born in Scotland (Lochbroom). The age of the lieutenants present on the list ranges between 18 and 63 years old. The picture presented by the ensigns does not coincide with the previous results. Only four of the fifteen ensigns were Scottish, none of whom were born in Scotland. All of the ensigns spoke English and Dutch, but none spoke Scots-Gaelic. All were Reformed Protestants like the Dutch officers, and their average age was twenty-one.

It is interesting to investigate whether with the lesser number of Scots among the rank of ensign, a start of a trend can be distinguished wherein the presence of Scots among the ranks of the Scots Brigade begins to dwindle. To find out whether such a new trend was set, we will look at the last available list of conduct for the regiment of General Major Houston. It dates from 1 January 1788, the regiment at that time being stationed in 's Hertogenbosch. The total number of captains present on the list was ten. Six of the ten were Scottish, the same as the ones present on the list of conduct of 1784. No change has thus occured in the intervening period. As for the lieutenants, little change also occurred, given that there were eleven lieutenants present of whom at least eight or nine had Scottish surnames. Seven of them were already present on the list of 1784 (Charles Nairn, John Rofs, James Thomson, John Bruce, William Charles Gordon, James Mackenzie and Charles Stewart). The two lieutenants who were new, Donald Clark and Robert Thomson, were both born in the Republic (respectively

Gorinchem and Nijmegen), they were both Reformed and spoke English and Dutch. Of the fourteen ensigns, five had Scottish surnames. Three of them were also present on the list of 1784. In total, there were six new ensigns added to the list, two of whom had Scottish names, while the others were Dutch.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to look at the conduct list of the regiment of Dundas stationed in Zwolle one year later, in 1788. On the list of 1788, there were ten captains. Seven of them had Scottish surnames, of whom four where born in Scotland; additionally there were two Dutch captains and one Saxon captain. All the captains spoke Dutch, seven spoke English, but none spoke Scots-Gaelic. Eight captains were Reformed Protestants, one was Roman-Catholic and one was Lutheran. Of the thirteen lieutenants on the list, eight were Scottish and two of them where born Scotland, but these two (Alex Smith and Adam Hay) were no longer on active duty and of advanced age (65 and 59). Eight lieutenants spoke English, twelve spoke Dutch and none spoke Scots-Gaelic. Eleven were Reformed Protestants and two were Lutheran. The picture is bleaker when we look at the rank of ensign; of the fifteen ensigns, only five had Scottish names, but of whom none came from Scotland. Everyone spoke Dutch, but only five spoke English, and none spoke Scots-Gaelic. Apart from the two ensigns who were Roman-Catholic, they were all Reformed Protestants.

The changes in the Scottish presence among the ranks apparent on the lists are far more evident one year later. Dundas was at that time still stationed in Zwolle. On the list of 1789, there were eleven captains, but there were only two captains with Scottish surnames, John Scott (who was also present on the lists of 1784 and 1788) and Robert Jackson (who was present on the list of 1788). They were both Reformed Protestants and spoke English, Dutch and French. There was also one other officer who spoke English, but he was of Dutch nationality. As for the lieutenants, the result is slightly more positive. Of the fourteen lieutenants present on the conduct list, seven officers had Scottish surnames, three of them came from Scotland, but they were no longer on active duty (the same officers that appeared on the list of 1784 and 1788). The other four were between the ages of 24 and 30, and were born in the Dutch Republic. All the Scots lieutenants except one spoke English, Dutch and French. They were all Reformed Protestants, like most other officers. Among the non-Scottish lieutenants, there is one Roman-Catholic and one Lutheran officer. The consequences of the nationalisation of the Brigade are most apparent when we look at the ensigns that are present

on the list. Unlike the regiment of General Major Houston in 1788 or that of Dundas in 1788, there is not one Scottish surname among the thirteen ensigns who are listed.

So what do the conduct lists finally tell us with regard to the disappearance of the Scottish influences in the Brigade? From the conduct lists of the year 1784, we see that just two years after the nationalisation of the Scots regiments, important changes have occurred. There has been a strong decline in the number of Scottish officers in the conduct lists, of whom an even smaller number were actually born in Scotland. This decline is even more apparent among the ensigns who were invariably of a younger age than the captains and lieutenants. While in 1773, 13 of the 15 ensigns were born in Scotland, in 1784 no ensigns came from Scotland, and all of them were born in the Republic. The Scottish officers were still speaking English, but no mention was made any longer of Scots-Gaelic, except for the ones who were no longer on active duty. In addition, the fact that the specific place of birth in Scotland is no longer mentioned indicates that a distance is created between Scotland and the Dutch Republic. The effects of nationalisation were even more apparent in 1788/9. Of the 14 ensigns on the list of General Major Houston, five had Scottish surnames, but three of them were also present on the list of 1784. For the regiment of General Major Houston it was even worse. Of the 13 ensigns, not one Scottish surname appears on the list. With regard to the list of conduct, it can be said that the actions of the Dutch government aimed at absorbing the Scots Brigade into the Dutch army and, consequently, wiping out the Scottish identity of the Brigade, were successful.

By changing the symbols and absorbing the regiments into the Dutch army, the Dutch government managed to destroy the identity that had been two centuries in the making. Does that mean, however, that their individual identity also came an end to? Certainly the influx of Scottish troops would almost have disappeared after 1782, but what happened to the soldiers and officers who were still serving in the regiments, or the ones who had left the service of the army, but were still living in the Dutch Republic? The fact that the Brigade no longer existed did not mean that the influence of the Scottish communities in the Republic or the family connections was similarly wiped out. Furthermore, the Scottish military identity in the Dutch Republic had always been ambiguous, and it could never be said that it was exclusively Scottish. The Scottish soldiers and officers had always been successfully integrated in Dutch society, marrying, as the following chapter will demonstrate, Dutch women and entering the upper echelons of Dutch society. While the Scots Brigade had most definitely a separate

status in the Dutch army, they were still controlled by the States General. The annihilation of the Brigade in 1781 ended that separate status, but it did not make the Scottish soldier Dutch by definition.

Because of the lack of sources regarding the Scottish soldiers after they had left the army, it is almost impossible to answer with any degree of authority the question of individual identity after 1782. What is certain is that, until 1789, there were still Scottish officers in the Scots Brigade. The specific Scottish element, however, had disappeared from the Brigade and the Scottish soldiers were now officially part of the Dutch army, obeying Dutch commands and wearing Dutch uniforms. The Scottish officer and soldier as part of a particular Scottish military unit now became a Dutch officer and soldier.

Chapter 7 The settlement process of Scottish soldiers in the Republic of the United Provinces

The problem of social integration

Before the formal formation of the Scottish regiments within the territory of the Republic of the United Provinces, there had already been a close cultural and economic connection between the Dutch Republic and Scotland. In Veere, Middelburgh and Bergen op Zoom, important Scottish trading communities had been established since the 16th century.[631] Veere itself functioned from 1541 until 1799 –with a few interruptions- as the centre for the Scottish staple market in North Sea trade.[632] Scottish churches were founded in both Veere and Rotterdam. Rotterdam in particular had an extensive Scottish population. According to Houston the Scottish congregation of Rotterdam had around 1000 members in the 1690s and was "the largest expatriate *gemeente* in the Netherlands and probably the biggest British congregation anywhere in Europe".[633] Taking into account that the Scots Brigade that had around that tim about 1500 soldiers, it was indeed a large community.[634] There were also strong sympathies between Dutch Calvinism and Scottish Presbyterianism, which in the case of the Kirk in Rotterdam was expressed through financial aid given by the Dutch authorities to the Kirk.[635] It is evident that the Scots who were working and living in Rotterdam (or, for example, in Veere) had to a large extent been interacting with the Dutch community within their town. On the other hand, as the work of Douglas Catterall demonstrates, the Scottish community consisted of strong social networks[636].

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[631] T.C. Smout 'Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' 77, in: N. Canny (ed.) *Europeans on the move. Studies on European Migration 1500-1800.*

[632] K.H.D. Haley *The British and The Dutch. Political and Cultural Relations through the Ages* (London 1988), p. 23 and 157.

[633] R.A. Houston, 'Elders and Deacons. Membership of the consistory of the Scots church Rotterdam (1643-1829) and the kirksession of Tolbooth parish, Edinburgh (1690-1760)', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis*, 20, (1994), p. 284.

[634] State of War 1700, Ferguson, *Papers*, II, p. 24.

[635] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhi...rope/features_Europe_lowcountries.shtr

[636] D. Catterall, *Community without borders: Scots Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the Dutch Republic, c. 1600-1700* (Leiden 2002).

The Scottish community also maintained strong connections with their mother country, as is demonstrated by the fact that the central element within the Scottish community in the Dutch Republic -the Kirk- took its spiritual guidance from Edinburgh.

Not only in the field of trade and commerce was there a link between Scotland and the Dutch Republic. On the educational level, there were also strong contacts between the two countries. The University of Leiden was one of the preferred places of education for Scottish students. In the period 1572-1800, about 1460 Scottish students were registered there. The faculties of Law and Medicine were especially popular, and more than half of the Scottish students at Leiden studied law. The education received at Leiden had a great impact on the cultural developments in Scotland. Many lawyers who received their degree in Leiden returned home and went on to dominate the Faculty of Law in Scotland. On a medical level, Leiden also had an impact, Alexander Munro, the founder of the Medicine faculty of the University in Edinburgh had received his education in Leiden, as had four of his predecessors. Furthermore, the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh was modelled on a hospital in Leiden.[637]

The Scots Brigade, to a not inconsequential degree, presented a strong example of the relation between Scotland and the Dutch Republic, but despite the fact that the Scots Brigade was active for more than two centuries, it retained a strong Scottish dimension. Discussing the social integration of the Scottish soldier in "Dutch society" is at best well founded speculation; the source material reveals enough data in order to come to general conclusions regarding the settlement behaviour of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic, but when the process needs to be studied in more depth, many problems arise. [638]

Firstly, it is important to realise that not until 1579, with the Union of Utrecht, were the beginnings of the Republic of the United Provinces laid out. Of a Scottish soldier who married a woman who was living in and originating from the territory of the pre-Dutch Republic, it cannot be said, therefore, that he was integrating in "Dutch society". The Scottish

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[637] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhi...rope/features_Europe_lowcountries.shtr.

[638] There are the occasional clear examples of Scottish soldiers who succeeded in entering in the higher levels of Dutch society as for instance in the case of Robert Baird, an officer of the Scots Brigade, who was the first governor of Surinam, when it became a Dutch colony in 1667. J. Grant, *The Scottish soldier of fortune. Their adventures and achievements in the armies of Europe* (London 1890), p. 157.

soldier was integrating into a closed urban society, not into a nation with one particular cultural and political identity. For the early modern period, it is thus impossible to define a "Dutch society" as such. In this context, and considering the fact that Scottish soldiers exclusively married in towns, it is more advisable to speak of integration within the Dutch town rather than "Dutch society".

Secondly, the term "social integration" itself poses many difficulties. According to Erika Kuijpers who researched immigrants in 17th century Amsterdam, 'integration' means a number of processes, which in the end result in a situation where the social, cultural, political and economical characteristics of an immigrant can no longer be distinguished from the native population.[639] In other words, the cultural specifics of a group are no longer explicit for that particular group. 'Social integration' is, therefore, strongly related to another controversial term, that of 'cultural identity'; defined as a unifying set of characteristics that can be seen as specific for a particular group which sets one group (in this case the Scottish soldier) apart from the other. This submergence in a foreign culture is not all that apparent for the soldiers and officers serving in the Scots Brigade. For example, many of those who derived from families where one of the parents was Dutch considered themselves not solely Dutch but also Scottish and (from 1707 onwards) British.

John Gabriel Stedman, born of a Scottish father and a Dutch mother, took two oaths of loyalty, one to the States General of the United Provinces and the other to King George II[640]. The fact that his diary was written in English and not Dutch meant that being born in the Dutch Republic did not automatically mean he considered himself "Dutch". This non-Dutch aspect became evident within the social sphere of the Scots Brigade, where even though the higher officers spoke Dutch, the commands were given in English. Until the end of the Scots Brigade, the character of the Scottish regiments remained strongly Scottish and non-Dutch. Therefore, it is impossible in this context to accept the 'social integration' of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic as a submergence in another culture. It is preferable to speak of the Scottish military settlement behaviour, which reflects the fact that Scottish soldiers settled

[639] E. Kuijpers 'Immigrants in 17th century Amsterdam. Marriage patterns and family ties', p.3 footnote 7 (unpublished).
[640] Stanbury Thompson (ed.), *The journal of John Gabriel Stedman*, p. 33; See also chapter 1, p. 40.

in the Dutch Republic and interacted with "Dutch" culture, but without the consequential loss of a cultural identity.

In the case of the Scots Brigade, it is evident that when the soldier was part of his military unit, he retained many specific characteristics of Scottish identity even though he was in a foreign country and had connections with the native population and culture. When the soldier stepped out of his group and no longer retained contacts with the unit through family and/or social networks, the possibility existed that he slowly assimilated into Dutch society. Unfortunately, there is no source material on the "ex-Scottish soldier" and his social integration, but only on the soldier when he was actively part of the Scots Brigade. When is it therefore justified to speak of social-cultural integration? When can we establish whether a group is successfully assimilated into a certain society? The exact difficulty here is twofold. First of all, in order to indicate that integration has occurred satisfactorily, it is important to have in-depth data of the subject that has immigrated. That means that it is not sufficient to look at the first generation or the second, but subsequent generations must also be considered. A number of indicators can be identified in order to measure the degree of integration, like marriage behaviour, citizenship of a town, whether or not the subject is registered under a Dutch name, his occupation and whether he belonged to an established religious community. According to Smout, the way in which a name is written is a clear indication of integration. He mentions as an example the 1650 tax list of Scots who had settled in Poland. The list mentions a name Czarmas, which according to Smout is "clearly a Fife Chalmers on the way to assimilation."[641] However, the fact that "Chalmers" is written down as "Czarmas" does not reveal in itself much about the degree of integration. Most Scottish names that appeared on Dutch marriage lists were Dutch versions of Scottish names. For example, Ensign Robert Schathowie became Robbert Scheddewij and Thomas Maclean was written down as Thomas Machlijn. At a time when most people were illiterate and incapable of writing their names, the Dutch clerk responsible for registering the migrant's name would write it down according to his own phonetic interpretation.

The third problem concerns the professional character of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic. An important aspect of the military profession in the Dutch Republic was the need for mobility, and units were constantly moving around in order to spread the high expenses

641 T.C. Smout (a.o.), 'Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' p. 82,

over various provinces. This constituted an obstacle for raising a family in a stable environment. This actually never seems to have posed a problem for intermarriage. During the 17th and 18th centuries, there were many registered weddings between Scottish soldiers and Dutch women. What happened then with the family after the father/husband was transferred to a different region? Nothing concrete can be said regarding the behaviour of the family. In some cases, they followed the father/husband, but they often remained behind as well, where the father/husband would visit them when he was on leave. In the case of the Scottish an extra problem occurred, namely that of the return to Scotland. Not every Scotsman who married a Dutch woman remained in the Republic and often the wife went with him. Furthermore, when the husband was deceased, what happened to the wife who had migrated with her husband? Did she remain in her husband's native country, or would she prefer to return home? Social integration was, as a result, not always permanent.

Because of the specific character of the source material (marriage lists, baptism records, letters) that reveal mostly quantitative data, and not much qualitative information regarding the social process that accompanied integration, it is only possible to outline the beginnings of the integration process of the Scottish soldier. While much of the data is derived from marriage lists of Scottish soldiers, these lists alone cannot suffice as a sole indicator of social integration. For example, many Scottish women followed their husbands to the Dutch Republic, but did that mean that this group of soldiers, as a result, did not integrate in Dutch society? Other indicators of integration such as the use of witnesses during weddings and baptisms, the use of language, the admittance to Dutch nobility and Dutch universities, are all examples that further help to clarify the social integration process. In this chapter, quantitative material will thus be substantiated with genealogies of important Scottish-Dutch families, which reveal interesting insights into how social integration for the officers corps and for the Scottish nobility took place in the Dutch Republic. For example, that social class distinctions were often greater than "national" ones. In these cases, it is also possible to penetrate deeper into the social acculturation process, since these sources reveal more about the character of the process than the raw statistical material does. However, it is important to observe that the more personal data such as, for example, letters, refer to people of a higher social status, including but not exclusively the nobility. Thus while they shed a lot of light on the integration of the officer class, for the common soldier, we are still left in the dark.

Intermarriage

The most obvious indication of the settlement process and possible social integration is that of intermarriage. The data can be divided into two parts. For the 16th and 17th centuries most of the data comes from the lists of the Reformed churches of the various towns in the contemporary Netherlands. For the 18th century, there are some records from the Reformed churches, but overall the data comes from regimental ministers within the Scots Brigade who kept their own records of baptisms and weddings, which are unfortunately not complete. It is important to point out that the data provided by the sources is not completely accurate for several reasons. First, it is not always apparent whether a soldier was Scottish, because his place of origin is not always mentioned and the fact that many of the names are Dutch versions of Scottish names. Second, this same difficulty also applies to the potential wife, and on occasion, it is difficult to distinguish whether she was of Scottish, Dutch or of another origin. As with Scottish soldiers, their names are Dutch versions of the original names (Scottish, Flemish, German or French). For example, Margriet Jongh, a woman who was married in Alkmaar, was a widow from Scotland. I decided to include such women and soldiers as Scottish where there is specifically mentioned that they came from Scotland. In other cases, I consider them Dutch unless of another nationality or their names are evidently Scottish. It is also relevant to remark that a marriage could take place in a different town than the town of residence, which can result in confusions over the place of integration. Nevertheless, the wedding lists yield considerable information regarding the attempts of Scottish soldiers and officers to integrate. When discussing the problem of intermarriage the data of the following Dutch towns and towns will be looked at: Alkmaar, Bergen op Zoom, Breda, Delft, Dordrecht, Gorinchem, Grave, Groningen, Haarlem, 's Hertogenbosch, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Utrecht and Zwolle.

I have made this distinction based on the frequency of Scottish soldiers who got married within these towns. The results of the wedding lists also concur with the image that in the late 16th and early 17th centuries there was a strong presence of Scottish soldiers north of the rivers Maas and Waal. Later in the 17th century, when the Dutch Republic undertook an offensive against Spain, the presence shifted from the northern parts of the Dutch Republic towards the south. This trend is illustrated by the marriage lists of the 17th and 18th centuries. When discussing the marital records of these towns I decided to make the following chronological

distinction. Firstly, the 16th and 17th centuries will be looked at. In order to get a better impression of the relative amount of soldiers who married in relation to their geographical distribution and to reveal any changes in marriage patterns, I have decided to distinguish between three separate periods The chronological division is based on the availability of data from the marriage books in the municipal archives of the various towns and have no (apparent) political context. The first period (1575-1611) features more prominently towns inside the official territory of the Dutch Republic. The second period (1612-1632) includes towns like Breda, Den Bosch, Dordrecht and Grave, some of which also appear in the first chronological category, but whose emphasis regarding marital records is placed on the later part of the 17th century. The third period (1633-1670) is mainly a continuation of the second period, whereby the majority of Scottish soldiers signed their marriage certificates in towns bordering the Southern Netherlands. Most of these towns overlap the three different periods and their records continue into the late 17th century. Bergen op Zoom, for example, had Scottish military weddings from 1585 until 1671 (and even into the 18th century); the same goes for Breda (1592-1622 and 1637-1665), Nijmegen (1592-1665) and Utrecht (1590-1653). Therefore, these towns will be represented in all three chronological categories.

The second stage of the intermarriage process of the Scottish soldier focuses on the 18th century. Considering the lack of data, I have decided to make no chronological separations as I have done for the 16th and 17th centuries. I will, however, make a distinction between the late 16th and the 17th centuries on the one hand, and the 18th century, on the other, in order to investigate whether the statement of Johannes Mac Lean concerning the lesser frequency of Scottish-Dutch marriages in the 18th century in comparison to the 17th century holds true.[642]

[642] Mac Lean claims that in the 18th century about 3% of the total number of Scottish soldiers married in the Dutch Republic, due to the high casualty rate and the remigration to Scotland and England; J. Mac Lean, *De huwelijksintekeningen van Schotse militairen (1574-1665)*, (Zutphen 1976), p. 11.

The first stage: the 16th and 17th centuries

1575-1611

Four years after Scottish soldiers were employed for the first time during the defence of Haarlem in 1572, the first marital announcement was registered. It concerned Jan Tammesz. a 'soldier from Scotland' and Annitge Pieters from Leiden; the sister of Annitge was witness to the wedding, but no mention is made of her name.[643] It is not strange that the first marriage announcement took place in Leiden. First of all, the marital records of Leiden are the oldest in the Netherlands -they date back to 1576- while, for example, the records of Haarlem begin only in 1587. Secondly, Leiden was under siege by Spanish forces in 1574, and part of the force that was used to break the siege consisted of Scottish companies.

For the first researched period of intermarriage, between the years 1575 and 1611, I used the data of the marital records of the Reformed churches of fourteen different towns. The most prominent feature of the first period of intermarriage is that the towns north of the rivers Maas and Waal are over represented; additionally there is a higher amount of non-military Scotsmen among the marital records. Of the fourteen towns investigated, seven were located in the province of Holland (Alkmaar, Delft, Dordrecht, Gorinchem, Gouda, Haarlem and Leiden), while only two towns (Breda and Bergen op Zoom) were located south of the two rivers. Compared to later periods, the marriages announced in Breda and Bergen op Zoom were few. The data[644] suggest a number of conclusions. There were about 875 Scottish soldiers who got married or were planning to get married. A relatively small amount, but considering the high casualty rate and the fact that a second regiment was not employed on a permanent basis until 1603, not that insignificant. Already in the first stages of the military migration, the largest group marrying Scottish soldiers –or about to do so- were Dutch women from the same town where the wedding was announced (33%). The second largest group (26%) were Dutch women from other parts of the Dutch Republic, but not specifically the town where the wedding took place. The third group consisted of Scottish women (19%) from Scotland. Fourteen percent of women about to marry a Scottish soldier came from outside the

[643] J. Mac Lean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 194.
[644] I have decided not to include the data directly in the text, but to have them as a separate appendix at the end of the dissertation. See table 3.1.1, appendix 2 for the data for the years 1575-1611.

Dutch provinces, mainly parts of the Holy German Empire, England and Scandinavia. The total percentage of Dutch wives was 59% while the percentage of non-Dutch women (including Scottish) was 33%, the remaining 8% being women from unknown origin.

The so-called sex ratio, by which is meant the number of marrying young women per 100 marrying young men, is important when looking at the wedding lists. Charles de Mooij researched the sex ratio of immigrants marrying in Bergen op Zoom in the 18th century. He concluded that the sex ration for non-military couples was 108, while for military couples it was 88.[645] This shows that among the military there was a stronger tendency to marry a widow. For the Scottish soldier it was not any different, but it is important to realise that it is not a rule set in stone. Considering the data from the wedding lists between the years 1575 and 1611, there is, first of all, great diversity between the different towns: Alkmaar, Bergen op Zoom and Breda have the highest percentage of widows who remarried (between 50 and 60%). The other towns range between 12.5% (Zwolle) and 48% (Nijmegen). There are two apparent exceptions: Gorinchem where there was only one widow among the 34 wedding announcements and Gouda where there was no widow present. It is impossible to find out the reasons why these figures differed so much. All these towns had a Scottish garrison at some point, Breda and Bergen op Zoom even continuing to receive Scottish soldiers well into the 18th century. The percentage of widows does not differ much between the different types of nationality: 21% of the total amount of widows were Scottish, 30% were Dutch and came from inside the town or city, while 23% were Dutch and came from outside the town or city. 9% came from countries other than the Dutch Republic and Scotland, and for 17% of the widows, it is not known whether they were either "Scottish" or "Dutch". I realise that without looking at the marriages for civilians these statistics give an incomplete picture. Nevertheless, when we compare the number of widows with the total amount of marriages that involved Scottish soldiers in this period, 38% of the women that married were widowed, most of them being previously married to a soldier.

[645] C. De Mooij, 'Geloof kan bergen verzetten : reformatie en katholieke herleving te Bergen op Zoom, 1577-1795', p. 125.

1612-1635

Thirty-six years after the wedding announcement of Jan Tammesz. in 1576, many changes become apparent in the marital behaviour of the Scottish soldier. Although the shift to the south is yet not that evident –Alkmaar, for example, still has one of the highest numbers of wedding announcements of Scottish soldiers- indications of this tendency can already be distinguished. Delft shows a sharp decline in marriage announcements from 135 to 7, Grave an increase from 20 to 122, Den Bosch which had no Scottish wedding announcements between 1575-1611 has now 27 -which can be explained by the fact that until 1629 the city was in Spanish hands- and Haarlem no longer appears to have any marriages of Scottish soldiers. On the other hand, Bergen op Zoom remains almost the same with 91 announcements (97 between the years 1575-1611) while Groningen experienced a small decline in wedding announcements (from 38 between 1600-1611 to 33 between 1612-1635). Overall, a strong increase in the number of Scottish soldiers wanting to get married can be distinguished. When the two periods are compared we see that in the 23 years of the second period, 928 soldiers got married or were about to get married. In comparison, in the first period encompassing 36 years, there were 875 potential marriages. Furthermore, the second period included as well the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621), a period of relative peace except for the campaigns in the duchies of Juliers and Cleves in 1610. After 1621, the war recommenced and the Scots Brigade is increased with one extra regiment in 1628. The second period marked several large campaigns: the siege of Bergen op Zoom by the Spanish and the successful defence by the Dutch army (1622), the taking of Breda by Spinola (1624), the taking of Groll (1627), Den Bosch (1629), Maastricht (1632), Roermond (1632), and Venlo and Stralen (both 1632) by Frederick-Henry of Nassau. This increase in military activities meant that the demand for Scottish soldiers increased. During the campaign of 1629, a temporary fourth Scottish regiment was formed, which was later disbanded.[646]

Most interesting is that the tendency of the Scottish soldier to marry Dutch women who were living in, or who originated from, the city or town where the wedding was announced, increased significantly. Where as in the first period the percentage of native Dutch wives was 33%, in the second period the percentage rose to 47%. The percentage of Dutch women outside the town where the wedding was announced remained the same at 26%. There is,

[646] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 311.

however, a drastic decrease in the number of Scottish wives, from 19% between 1575 and 1611 to 12% between 1612 and 1635. In addition, the percentage of non-Dutch and non-Scottish women decreased from 14% to 5%. How can this change in marital behaviour be explained? In effect, the results are a continuation of the previous period given that, since the beginning of the Scottish military service, the majority of the weddings were with Dutch born women. Utrecht, for example, had 46 Dutch-Scottish marriages out of the total of 131 (35%) marriages in the first period, while in the second period there were 173 Dutch-Scottish marriages out of the total of 274 (63%). The effects of continuing successful service in the Dutch Republic helped to promote the Scots Brigade in Scotland and to establish a reputation. For many Scots, the Brigade was considered a highly specialised training school in the art of war. Additionally, the prospect of regular payment and the fact that there was more opportunity for promotion in the Dutch army than in other armies in Europe due to the absence of a nobility dominated military, made it more desirable to remain for a longer period of time in the service of the States, which in turn resulted in the trend to settle down in the Dutch Republic. Therefore, marrying a Dutch woman (especially from the same town where the soldier was stationed) would strongly aid the process of integration, since the Scottish soldier had the opportunity to take part in the social network of his native Dutch wife.

The role of the Dutch widow was in this context very important. Many widows were owners of small businesses, had money and, because they had often been married to soldiers and officers, were well wedged between civilian and military culture. The percentage of Dutch widows from inside a town who got married to Scottish soldiers illustrates this phenomenon. While in the first period, the percentage of Dutch widows was 30%, in the second period this increased to 49%. Almost half the Dutch marriage partners were thus widowed. As a result, there is a decline in the percentage of Scottish widows: 10% of the total number of widows was Scottish, while between the years 1575 and 1611, the percentage had been 21%. The percentage of Dutch widows from outside the town equally declined, from 23% in the first period to 15% in the second.

1636-1670

The third and final period of the 17th century clearly demonstrates the shift towards the south. The number of towns where Scottish soldiers got married decreased and, as a result, the amount of marriages decreased as well. Since the Scottish soldier was now stationed in towns in the south of the Dutch Republic, there are no more marriage announcements in the towns within the province of Holland. In the other parts of the Dutch Republic there is a total of 705 marriage announcements, this decline can be explained by the fact that after the Peace of Munster in 1648, the States General decided to reduce the state army substantially. The demand for Scottish soldiers declined accordingly. After the Peace of Munster most soldiers were assigned to perform garrison duties, which is confirmed by the fact that Bergen op Zoom, Den Bosch, Grave and, to a lesser extent, Breda are well represented in the lists.

Nevertheless, the trend of Scottish-Dutch intermarriage from the early 17th century continued, albeit in a more moderate way. The percentage of Scottish wives remained the same as before (12%), but many of these women no longer came from Scotland, but were actually born in the Dutch Republic. Since their family name was still Scottish, I decided to include them in the category of Scottish women, but they were most definitely second-generation immigrants, usually daughters of soldiers and officers connected to the Brigade. The majority of the wives were Dutch women from within the town (50%). The percentage of Dutch women from outside the town remained almost the same (25%).

While the percentage of Scottish widows among the total number of widows remained almost the same (10% in 1611-1632 and 12% in 1636-1670), there was a noticeable increase in the percentage of Scottish widows among Scottish wives (from 35% to 45%). In addition, the percentage of Dutch widows from within the town among Dutch wives increased equally (from 43% to 49%) and the same applied to the Dutch widows from outside the town (from 24% to 34%). It is difficult to find any general explanations for the increase in the number of widows among potential marriage partners. The most logical explanation would refer to the fact that after 1648, the soldier was for a longer period based in one location, performing mostly garrison duties, which resulted in more interaction with the local community. For the increase in the percentage of Scottish widows, an explanation could be that they were Dutch-born Scottish women who were part of the social network of the Brigade through their family

or husband. The same situation applied to the Dutch women, a large part of the widows having been married previously to other Scottish soldiers and officers. In this context, the social network facilitated the remarriage and it was not uncommon, for example, for a widow to marry the brother or cousin of her deceased husband.

The absolute data as revealed by the wedding lists in the garrison towns, however, are ambiguous regarding the number of widows that remarried. When we look at some specific garrison towns, an ambivalent image emerges. In Grave, an important garrison city, of the 41 Dutch brides only five were widowed. The same situation applies to Nijmegen where only two of the 23 potential wives were widowed. On the other hand, in Den Bosch –also a garrison city- 45 of the 63 wives were widowed, Bergen op Zoom registered 55 Dutch brides to be, of which 22 were widowed, and in Breda 17 of the 38 future wives were widowed. In Utrecht, which since the beginning had a large number of Scottish marriages, the following trend can clearly be distinguished. In the first period the percentage of Dutch widows was 37%, in the second it increased to 47%, while in the final period of the 17th century out of the 79 Dutch brides, 50 were widowed (63%). Therefore, it is clear that while there was a relative increase in the numbers of widows who remarried, the presence of widows in the marriage register differed greatly from city to city and there was no even dispersal. It is also noteworthy that in relation to the number of weddings, the overall percentage of widows increased slightly compared to the previous period (from 41% to 46%).

Several changes took place in the first century of Scottish military presence in the Dutch Republic. While in the beginning the soldiers were more spread out over the territory of the potential Dutch State, in later periods the shift towards the southern parts becomes more apparent. Additionally, it is clear that from the beginning the majority of weddings took place between Scottish soldiers and Dutch women who were either from the town where the soldier was stationed, or from other parts of the Dutch Republic. This phenomenon strongly increases markedly after 1648. This tendency indicates a potential desire of the Scottish soldier to remain in the Dutch Republic and is further illustrated by the increase in the overall percentage of widows towards the end of the 17th century (46% in the third period in comparison to the 38% of the first period and 41% of the second period). While the number of Scottish wives declined, it did not entirely disappear during the 17th century. It is, however, important to realise that during the course of the 17th century, many Scottish wives were second generation immigrants who were Scottish but were born in the Dutch Republic.

The second stage: The 18th century

In absolute terms the number of marriages recorded in the 18th century (1674-1784) numbered about 846[647], a small number if we compare that to the 2400 recorded marriages in the 17th century (1575-1670). To establish the general number of Scottish soldiers during the 18th century is quite difficult since it was the habit of the Dutch State to increase the number of the Brigade at the start of a war and to reduce it after the conclusion of a peace (Utrecht 1713, Aix la Chapelle 1749). Overall, the Brigade consisted of three separate regiments, each regiment divided into two battalions, which in turn were subdivided into several companies, the precise number of which varied between the twenty and fourteen. For example, in 1758 there were three regiments (Halkett, Marjoribanks, Stewart) consisting of two battalions each, which were further divided into 14 companies, a total strength of 2346.[648] If we use this number as a guideline for the amount of Scottish soldiers employed in the 18th century, and also take into account the casualty rate and the potential remigration to Great Britain, 846 marriages is indeed a poor number, especially since between 1749 and 1782 there was a period of relative peace and stability for the Dutch Republic which would have facilitated intermarriage. As a result, the number of marriages would indicate that in the 18th century, fewer Scottish soldiers settled in the Dutch Republic.

On the other hand, after 1749 the Scottish regiments were no longer involved in any major military campaigns and instead were consigned to a perpetual watch duty in the garrison towns. As a result, many of the soldiers and officers felt misplaced in the Brigade, which could have contributed to the fact that some of them –who still felt a strong connection to Great Britain- preferred to settle there instead of in the Dutch Republic. The most important reason for the numerical lack of potential marriages is the paucity of source-data. The best source for the marital behaviour of the Scottish soldier in the 18th century were the records kept by the regimental minister. Unfortunately, they are not as detailed as the records of the

[647] This number concerns the potential marriages in the towns of 's-Hertogenbosch, Breda, Bergen op Zoom, Maastricht, Sluis, Grave, Gorinchem, Nijmegen and Tiel: the most prominent garrison towns. There were other towns as well, like for example Heusden, Geertruidenberg and Willemstad, but the number of marriages there is according to the sources to be neglected. This means that the 846 marriages only counted for the researched towns. Due to the fact that most of these towns were also mentioned for the 17th century it is possible to determine whether the marital pattern changed or remained the same.

[648] Ferguson, *Papers*, II, 416; ARA, Archive of Council of State, Military Affairs, Portfolio 25.

Reformed churches for the 17th century. On some occasions, additional records from the Reformed churches are available, but the data they reveal is also sparse. For example, according to these sources, the garrison towns of Sluis and Grave together have a total amount of nine marriages over a time span of 110 years. This number seems impossibly low, as Grave and Sluis had been important garrison towns since the early 17th century. Similarly, for other towns, like Nijmegen and Maastricht, the number of marriages (84 and 37 respectively) are too low.

Taking into account the fact that not all the data can be retrieved, the huge difference with the 17th century numbers suggests that the number of marriages declined in the 18th century, although in all probability not to the extent suggested by Mac Lean. T. Kappelhof offers a possible explanation for this decline in marriages. Kappelhof looked at the city of Den Bosch and states that the garrisons in the 18th century became increasingly smaller, a fact he concludes from the declining baptism rate in Den Bosch, resulting from the fact that many marriages were postponed. According to Kappelhof, between the years 1704 and 1730 there was a strong decline in the number of baptisms. After 1730 the rate increased, but it dropped again after 1750, to reach a record low around 1775. In Breda, Kappelhof encounters a similar pattern. The number of civil marriages remained the same, but the number of civil-military marriages dwindled strongly after 1730.[649] Another explanation for the low rate of civil-military marriages in the 18th century was the high death rate. According to an 18th century medic by the name of Abraham Walkart between the years 1770 and 1779 for every 100 baptisms there were 114 funerals and the death rate was especially high for soldiers.[650]

There is, however, no break with the pattern that showed an increase in Scottish-Dutch marriages within the town. Of the 846 weddings, 530 were with Dutch women living within the town, 63% of the total. The number of Scottish wives strongly declined, from 12% at the end of 17th century, in the 18th century it further decreased to 6%. For Dutch women outside the town but within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic, the percentage remained more or

[649] T. Kappelhof, 'Laverend tussen Mars en Mercurius. Demografie en economie', in: *'s-Hertogenbosch. De geschiedenis van een Brabantse stad 1629-1990* (ed. Bosmans, Prak, van de Sande, van de Veen), p. 56.
[650] Ibid.

less the same (24%). The percentage of widows re-marrying changed dramatically. Only 26% of brides were a widow, the largest number of whom came from within the town (202 of the 218), with 5% of widows being Dutch women born outside the town but within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic. For Scottish women, the percentage of widows was about 6%, small compared to that of the Dutch women originating from within the town, but 28% of the total amount of Scottish wives. The percentage of widows who remarried is to an extent misleading: 62% of the total number of widows were remarried in Den Bosch, 11% got married in Breda, 10% in Bergen op Zoom, 10% in Nijmegen, 3% exchanged their wedding vows in Tiel, 2% in Gorinchem and 1% in Maastricht.

It is important to realise that in the 18th century many of the so-called Scottish soldiers were most definitely born in the Dutch Republic. Care must be taken, however, not to consider this group as already properly integrated. As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that a Scottish soldier had a Dutch mother did not mean he considered himself to be "Dutch". Furthermore, the national awareness of contemporary times was not that apparent in the early modern period. John Gabriel Stedman, born in the Dutch Republic, was educated in Scotland, served in the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Republic, went to Surinam to fight against the slave rebellion, and then left for England with his Dutch wife Adriana Wierts van Coehoorn[651], where he finally settled down and died. Stedman was one of the sixty-one officers who returned to Great Britain after the Scots Brigade became permanently integrated into the Dutch army, an important fact which suggests that a number of officers when confronted with the choice between the two nations, preferred to return to Great Britain even though they were born in the Dutch Republic. In the end, one of the most important results of intermarriage in relation to the Scots Brigade was that, by marrying a Dutch woman in the Republic, ties were created between the Brigade and Dutch society, whereby a generation was formed that was in a sense Dutch but at the same time very Scottish.

In addition, these weddings consolidated the cultural and social ties between Scotland and the Dutch Republic. A good example of this is that of Hugh Mackay of Scoury who married Clara, a daughter from the Dutch family de Bie tot Waeyersteyn and whose father was burgomaster of the city of Zaltbommel. Her mother's maiden name was Bicker, a famous burgomaster family from Amsterdam. After Hugh Mackay had married Clara, the young

[651] Stedman and Adriana were married in 1782, she was a direct descendant of Menno van Coehoorn the Dutch military engineer.

couple was faced with a choice that many of the Scottish-Dutch couples must have faced, namely whether to return to Scotland or to remain in the Dutch Republic. In the case of Mackay, the choice was not difficult; his connections with Scotland had become less and less intense because of his long years of service abroad. The family link with Scotland must have remained intact, however, because two of Hugh's nephews, Aeneas and Robert Mackay, came over to the Dutch Republic and joined their uncle in the Scots Brigade. They both settled in the Dutch Republic, also married Dutch women, and their sons continued the tradition of serving as officers in the Scots Brigade. The marriage of Hugh Mackay of Scoury and Clara de Bie demonstrates well how closely the family network and the social network of the Brigade were connected.

The problems of intermarriage

It was common procedure in the Dutch Republic that once the potential husband and wife had become engaged to be married, they agreed to a public announcement of their wedding in a Reformed Protestant church or from the steps of the town hall. Anybody could voice their objections during the three Sunday announcements following the initial announcement.[652] Being part of a military structure with a strict hierarchy -even when the wedding took place before a civil and/or ecclesiastical authority meant that the final authority regarding a marriage resided with the commanding officer. In the case of the Scottish soldier it was usually the captain who could voice a complaint and who could prevent a wedding. The most common reason for not giving permission to marry was that the soldier had not mentioned that he was already married. In the case that this fact was discovered after the wedding had taken place, the wedding would be nullified, as, for example, was the wedding between Joan Johnston and Christina Merrai which had taken place in 1635. A note from 1637 records that the marriage was invalidated because Joan Johnston already had a wife in Scotland. [653] Sometimes, however, no apparent reason was given as to why a marriage could not proceed. For example, Robbert Oerij (Urie), was serving in the company of Captain Hamilton, and was supposed to marry Mayecken Ariaens from Gorinchem until his captain intervened.[654] On

[652] Kuijpers 'Immigrants in 17th century Amsterdam', p. 6.
[653] Maclean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 48.
[654] MacLean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 100.

other occasions, however, it was the bride who was responsible for problems. The wedding announcement of Robert Jacq and Mariken Jansz in 1626 was suspended until the bride-to-be delivered proof that her previous husband was deceased. They performed their wedding announcements for the second time in 1627, indicating that she was indeed a widow.[655]

A more frequent problem arose when the wife or husband was not protestant, in particular where the upbringing of the children was concerned. When the daughter of James Gerrets and Marien Schaars was born and baptised, the baptism records of the second regiment of Colonel Stuart in 1776 mention that "*the mother being sponsor to train up the child in the Protestant Religion*".[656] James Gerrets was not of protestant religion and therefore it was important that the child was to be raised in a protestant fashion. The edict of the States General that was prefixed to the marriage register of Stuart's regiment clearly shows the opinion of the Dutch government regarding marriages of mixed religion and the fear of the Dutch government that the child would be susceptive to "the Romish errors".[657]

This edict drew up several rules regarding the intermarriage between people of Roman-Catholic and of Protestant religion. First, no permission to marry would be granted to any person belonging to the military of any rank who desired to marry a Roman-Catholic until the men "*have attained the age of twenty-five years, and the women that of twenty years*"[658], that is, until they were legally adults. Second, that "*all engagements of marriage between the persons aforesaid, on either side, whether these engagements have been, or are about to be, entered into verbally or in writing, shall be worthless and ineffectual, and that accordingly, it shall be permitted to all the said persons, on either side, at all times, not only before registering the proclamations of marriage, but even after these proclamations have been read, to cancel and depart from the said engagements; nor shall it be permitted to any judge to administer justice to those described above, much less to constrain any one to execute such promises of marriage.*"[659] Thirdly, the proclamations of marriage were not to take place every week but once every six weeks. The government was also concerned with the fact that the Protestant partner would convert to the Catholic faith in order to avoid the issues of a mixed-

[655] Maclean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 88.
[656] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. 190.
[657] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. xiii.
[658] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. 198-199.
[659] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. 199.

religion marriage. Therefore, the States General decided that no permission should be granted until a year after the person had left the Protestant church.[660]

The attitude of the Dutch government regarding the marriage of a couple of mixed religion, or the fact that a soldier could have been married before, were problems that could affect non-military persons as well. A typical problem specific to a (Scottish) soldier was the fact that the military unit was very mobile and was not permanently stationed in one place. This makes the possibility for a soldier to stay in a city for a long period and thus integrate, very difficult. The wife usually travelled with the husband, but in some cases had to stay behind. The example of Daniel Mackay, who married Arnolda Margaretha van der Steen in 1732, daughter of Mr. Arent van der Steen, Lord of Ommeren en Wadesteyn and Geertruid Cornelia Verbolt, shows clearly this particular aspect of a Scottish-Dutch military marriage. Daniel was stationed from 1737 to 1741 in Doornik, away from his family who at that time lived in the Betuwe area. In 1741, his regiment was transferred to Meenen and the family moved with him. When in 1744 the regiment moved once more, this time to Ath, the family followed him again. Unfortunately, because of the outbreak of the Austrian War of Succession, it was no longer possible for the family to stay together and Daniel had to leave for Doornik to be part of the garrison there. Daniel died on 18 May 1745 whilst fighting against the French; his family could have heard the news in Ath (where the youngest son Daniel was born), or possibly in Tiel, where Arnolda Margaretha lived with her six children after the death of her husband.[661]

Unfortunately, the marriage register reveals nothing with regard to the mobility of spouses, since it only mentions where the wife lived. The geographical advantage of the Dutch Republic was that the soldier was never completely out of reach of his family. He had sufficient opportunity to receive leave in order to visit them and, if we are to believe John Gabriel Stedman's diary, it was not that difficult to wander off in order to visit one's family. It seems, therefore, that the frequent relocation of the Scottish companies did not interfere with intermarriage or with the settlement process. Also, the fact that –particularly in the 18th century- there was a fixed set of garrison towns that rotated their companies, meant that there was most definitely a pattern in the relocation of the soldiers and officers. For example, the second Scottish regiment was stationed in Bergen op Zoom from 1714 to 1719, then again

[660] Ferguson, *Papers*, III, p. 200.
[661] Daniel Mackay, p. 181.

from 1731 to 1737, and again between 1753 and 1758.[662] However, these were small comforts and, overall, it remained difficult to maintain a structured family life.

A different problem arising from the mobility of a soldier and the fact that wives (and children) stayed behind related to the dilemma this could create for the municipal authorities. A pamphlet was published in Den Bosch in 1719 against the fact that soldiers' wives and children would often remain when the soldier was relocated. The pamphlet mentioned that "*The lords governor, bailiff and the city magistrates daily encounter that with the changing of the garrison the wives and children of the soldiers do not accompany their husbands, respectively their fathers when they move out, resulting in the fact that from time to time this city is so burdened with poor that if this continues it will inevitably result in negative consequences of which the examples are known. That the so-called soldier's wives who died here left behind little and needy children whose fathers cannot be found and who as a result become a burden to the authorities that deal with the poor.*"[663] The city authorities managed to find a solution for this growing problem since "*...we agreed* [...] *to warn and to order women and children* [...] *when the garrison is moving out to follow their husbands and respectively their fathers on pain of negligence the same shall be escorted out of the city and publicly be punished.*"[664] The municipal authorities warned "*...all the inhabitants not to accommodate the aforementioned women or any other strange beggar after the third day after the garrison has left or to rent out any kind of room or attic on pain of that for every person they have accommodated a fine of 25 guilders will be given...*"[665]

For garrison towns such as, for instance, 's-Hertogenbosch, the burden of women and children without a social and economic status and who were dependent for their survival on the municipal authorities, must have been particularly great. In 1747, for example, they constituted about ten percent of the city population (excluding the military).[666] While most qualitative sources deal with the officer class and their wives, this particular pamphlet illustrates the often dire position the family of the common soldier found itself in and the

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662 J. Mac Lean, 'Huwelijken van militairen, behorende tot het tweede regiment van de Schotse Brigade in Nederland, ontleent aan de gereformeerde trouwboeken vanaf 1713 tot 1784', in: *Jaarboek van het Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie*, XIX (1965), p. 102.
663 Municipal archive 's-Hertogenbosch no.71.
664 Municipal archive 's-Hertogenbosch no.71, 20 May 1719.
665 Ibid.
666 T. Kappelhof, 'Laverend tussen Mars en Mercurius', p. 58.

problems they posed for the civil authorities. An officer's family often had a social network to fall back on, or was in a position to follow their husbands to their new location, unlike the wives of common soldiers. It is also noteworthy that in the pamphlet the Dutch word 'vrouw' is used, which could mean wife, but also woman. It is possible that many of these women were unmarried and as a result were without a legal status.

A resolution of the States General of 1756 concerned in particular the fate of the children of soldiers who were orphaned or abandoned. The resolution gives a guideline for municipal authorities as to when they should take responsibility for a child and when not. "*...The civil authorities could suffice to feed soldier's children, whose fathers were stationed in the garrison of Den Bosch and who have died in the same city, they were not responsible for the children who were born in Den Bosch, but whose fathers (or mothers) died elsewhere.*"[667] In the margin of the text is written that "*children who are left behind by deserters should be considered as without parents.*"

An aspect of spatial mobility which concerned the Scottish soldier specifically, was the possibility of re-migration to Scotland. When, for example, William III crossed over to England in 1688, many Scottish soldiers went with him, together with their Dutch wives. After the battle of Killiecrankie in 1689, where many officers and soldiers of the Scots Brigade died, their widows preferred to return to the Dutch Republic and their families rather than stay behind. The same situation occurred for Scottish women who followed their husbands to the Dutch Republic; they often felt abandoned without their husband and lacked the social connections of their home country. For them, the only logical step was to return to Scotland. The example of Elizabeth Ogilvie displays clearly the sentiments of a widow in such a position. In 1709, Elizabeth sent a letter to her son who lived in Scotland, James Ferguson, informing him of the death of his father, her husband Captain William Ogilvie. She wrote in very clear terms: "*...I cannot write to you the sad & melancholy news of my poor husband death, who was wounded with a musket shot in the thigh in that bloody battle near Mons on the 11 of last month, having been transported some days after to Brussels, a fever carried him of on the 25th. This is a very sad & melancholy streak to me now here in a strange country...my husband was to be lieutenant-colonel if he had lived, but it has pleased God to*

[667] Municipal archive 's-Hertogenbosch no.99, 27 November 1756.

call him away & blast all my hopes that way."[668] In the next part, she explains to her son that she wants to come home to Scotland "*with the first fleet that sails.*" Furthermore, she continues that "*I resolve to go & live with you at Craigdarroch even this winter if possible*".[669] She asks her son also to write to her sister and her daughter who live in Scotland to tell them the news of the death of their brother-in-law and father. For a woman who had left all of her family behind and had followed her husband to "a strange country", the decision to return must not have been difficult after, as she so honestly put it, all her hopes were blast away.

Marital motivations

For many migrant groups who moved to the Dutch Republic and settled there, there were in general strong motivations for intermarriage, but not all the migrant groups followed this pattern. For example, 43.4% of the male migrants from Antwerp who settled in Amsterdam between the years 1585-1592 married within their own social circle.[670] One reason for this may be that the migrants from Antwerp migrated in groups, relocating their close social network to Amsterdam after the fall of Antwerp in 1585 instead of arriving individually. Additionally, the attitude of the native Amsterdam population may also have played a part. According to Erika Kuijpers, the attitude of the Amsterdam population towards marriage was geographically specific. In the case of Dutch migrants from outside Amsterdam, the tendency seemed to be that the further away from Amsterdam the bride or groom originated, the less likely he or she was to find a local marriage partner.[671] For most immigrants, the need to intermarry was evident. In many towns, a non-Dutch inhabitant could often only with great difficulty achieve citizenship, whereas it was possible to achieve it straightaway by marrying the daughter of a burgher. Being a burgher of a town enabled an artisan to operate within the

[668] Elizabeth Ogilvie to her son James Ferguson, The Hague, 1 October 1709. Ferguson of Craigdarroch muniments, National Archives of Scotland, GD77/200/1.
[669] Ibid.
[670] E. Kuijpers, 'Immigrants', p. 10.
[671] E. Kuijpers, 'Immigrants', p. 9; M. 't Hart, 'Geschrift en getal', p. 180.

local economy, whether by opening shop or being member of a guild.[672] Many widows were responsible for small enterprises in which the foreign husband could step in.

For the Scottish soldier the decision to marry a Dutch woman did not necessarily arise from economic need since they had a reasonably stable income while serving in the Dutch army. Only when they left the service of the army, did it become (if they had no pensions) profitable for them to marry. However, most of the soldiers married while serving in the Dutch army (they were allowed to marry after one year of service) thereby ensuring the (relative) financial security that was, for so many immigrants, so important to achieve. Furthermore, the Scottish soldier was very self-sufficient and often operated within the local labour market while even competing with the local guilds. According to De Mooij, access to the local labour market was indeed a valid incentive for intermarriage, and that it was not uncommon that a soldier took over the business of his father or mother-in-law after finishing his service.[673] This suggests that many Scottish soldiers may have married with the conscious intention of settling down in the Dutch Republic and were thus aware of the fact that they would need financial security after their service. At the same time, it implies that all the Dutch women who got married were in possession of some form of a business. Although for some Scottish soldiers this might have been the case, it does not explain sufficiently the extent of intermarriage that occurred between the Scottish soldier and the local Dutch woman. Furthermore, for the Scottish officer the motivation of entering the local labour market does not hold the same importance as for the soldier since many of the officers would remain with the Brigade until they died or were discharged from service. William Brog, for example, who had been the commander of the first Scottish regiment from 1609 to 1639, had served in the Dutch army for almost fifty years. Additionally, many officers received pensions from the States General after their retirement. As a result, for officers the financial motivation for intermarriage could not have been that strong. The economic factor as a possible motivation for marriage is, however, extremely difficult to establish. Firstly, there is a lack of substantial data that tells us how many Scottish soldiers married women who owned businesses. Secondly, no information is available as to whether those soldiers left the Brigade to become part of civilian life, indicating that they married in order to leave military life.

[672] E. Kuijpers, 'Immigrants', p. 7.
[673] C. De Mooij, 'Geloof kan bergen verzetten', p. 139.

From the marriage register, it is evident that during the period the Brigade was active in the Dutch Republic, there was a steady rise in the percentage of intermarriages with women from the local town. While at the beginning of the 17th century it was around 40%, at the end of the 17th century it was 50% and in the 18th century, it increased to more than 60%. A possible explanation from the Dutch side could be the surplus of women in the early modern towns in the Dutch Republic because of men leaving for the East Indies trade (the so-called "Indian-leak).[674] The surplus of Dutch women and the lack of Scottish women, who were more numerous in the beginning of the military migration (20% of the brides were Scottish between 1575-1611, compared to 12% at the end of the 17th century and 6% in the 18th century) was probably a reason for the fact that so many intermarriages occurred. However, if only a matter of "supply and demand" one would expect the same results when looking at other groups of immigrants, which is not exactly the case. Therefore, we must look for another explanation. Many of the brides were widows but with strong connections to the army and in particular to the Scots Brigade. When their husband died, their financial security was gone, as can be seen from the many petitions to the States General requesting widows' pensions, and as a result, remarriage was often crucial. The appearance of a social network within this social group facilitated the chances of remarriage.

The social network

In general, the existence of a social network is considered important in the integration process. The social and economic ties between "veteran" migrants and their native country facilitated the migration and settlement process for the "fresh" migrant. This was very true for the Scottish soldier and (especially) officer. Family relations, a strong feature of the structure of the Scots Brigade, enabled and encouraged relatives from Scotland to migrate to the Republic and join the Brigade. The fact that family members were already settled in the Republic and married to Dutch women aided the new migrants in participating in local Dutch society. The Brigade formed, in a sense, the connection between Scotland and the Dutch Republic whereby, on the one hand, it attracted new Scotsmen and, on the other, Dutch

[674] Kuijpers, 'Immigrants', 7 note 14.

women. Dutch women were part of the social sphere of garrison towns and, as a result, were often familiar with the military whether or not through family relations. Once a Dutch woman was married to a Scotsman, the social network tightened and the marriage register indicated that women who were once married to Scottish soldiers would usually remarry Scottish soldiers. Matthew Glozier gives an example of how the marriage behaviour within this social circle worked. Anneken Tweedie was a daughter of a Scottish soldier stationed in the garrison at Tiel. In 1644, Anneken married George Swaen, a Scottish soldier in the company of Captain Kerr, in Grave. In 1667, she was mentioned as a widow and was remarried to Daniel Buchanan, another Scottish soldier.[675] The fact that Anneken had a Scottish father who was a soldier could be an important reason why she married Scottish soldiers; as such, Anneken had been a close member of two different social networks, one related to her cultural origin and the other to the military.

The baptism records of Bergen op Zoom give a further indication as to how the social network functioned. In the 17th century, a number of important Scottish families -for example, those of Balfour and Murray– not only had witnesses who were Scots and possibly blood-relatives, but also witnesses who were related to the Scots Brigade. For instance, on the 3rd of January 1613, Captain David Balfour and Anna Bax had a son, Marcel-Robert Balfour. Their witness at the baptism was Robert Henderson, also a Scottish captain. David Balfour was himself witness at the baptism of Henric Jacob Balfour, son of Henry Balfour, on the 26th of July 1615, and again at the baptism of his grandchild Anna Margriet Balfour, the daughter of Jems Michel Balfour and Agnes Stuwaert (Stewart) in 1637. Pieter Stuwaert (Peter Stewart), the father of Agnes, was also a witness and, in addition, a captain in the Scots Brigade. [676]

The social network was therefore not only limited to the familial sphere, but could also include the professional sphere. Potential spouses of Scottish soldiers were professionally involved in the Brigade, often as serving girls to higher officers. In 1629, for example, Jason Douglas, an equestrian, announced his marriage to Geesien, the daughter of Henrick Hermesens, and who had been serving as a maid to Lieutenant Douglas.[677] The same

[675] M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years War', in: S. Murdoch (ed.) *Scotland, and the thirty years war, 1618-1648* (Brill 2001), p. 16.
[676] From the wedding and baptism records of the municipal archive of Bergen op Zoom, 1612-1617 and 1634-1641.
[677] J. Mac Lean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 331.

happened to another horseman by the name of Joris (George) Pirson (Pearson?) who married Geesken in 1629, the serving maid of the Master of Horse, Urri.[678]

Although the social network within the Brigade was an important (although not an exclusive) factor in the wedding behaviour of the Scottish soldier, for the Scottish officer, another form of social network played an equally important role. Glozier remarks that the officer corps tended to marry women designated by the title 'juffrouw', indicating a higher status. In the marriage register, there are many examples of higher officers marrying women of similar status, which indicates that class awareness played an important role when marriage was concerned. This aspect can be illustrated by various examples. For instance, Captain Francois Henderson married Anna Vijch, the widow of Jonkheer Jan van Egmondt, on the 28th of August 1613. In 1607, Captain David Balfour and juffrouw Anna Bacx, the daughter of Sir Paulus Bacx, governor of Bergen op Zoom, had the received permission to marry. In the same year, Joncker Walter Bruys (Bruce), captain in Sluis and Marie Beuvrij, daughter of Jacques Beuvrij (Bouvry?), Colonel and governor of Lilloo, were engaged[679]. The last two examples indicate that two social networks, one class/status related and the other more associated with a specific professional circle (in this case the army), often overlapped and could enhance the opportunities of intermarriage. The fact that Scottish officers intermarried with Dutch women of high social status or even nobility reinforces the argument that many Scottish officers, instead of seeing Dutch service as a transitory career, clearly regarded the Dutch Republic as a permanent place of residence.[680]

A letter written by Constantijn Huygens demonstrates how far the social network could go. In 1652, he wrote that the "*late Captain Balfour, a relative of mine on my mother's side, has left a son*[681] *behind with his wife -a daughter of the old Captain Stuart. They have requested me to do my best with His Highness that the young man becomes an ensign in one of the regiments repartitioned by Friesland.*"[682] Clearly, as a result of the marriage of Captain Balfour to a

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[678] Ibid.
[679] Mac Lean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 37.
[680] M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years' War', p. 15.
[681] Probably Patrick Balfour; J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1663-1687', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 32* (Den Haag 1917), 329, note 6.
[682] Letter from Constantijn Huygens to Ph. E. Vegelin van Claerbergen, Den Haag 3 August 1652, in: J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1649-1663', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 28* (Den Haag 1916), p. 149-150.

female relative of Huygens, this Balfour became part of an extensive social network that even included the Prince of Orange. As a result of being part of this network, Balfour, even despite his death, could arrange an officer post for his son. Furthermore, the son descended from the Bacx-Balfour family, his grandmother having been Anna Bacx, the daughter of Paulus Bacx, governor of Bergen op Zoom, while his grandfather had been Captain David Balfour.

Another example of the family related social network concerning Constantijn Huygens was the request of Agnes Stewart, who addressed Huygens as her cousin and asked him to assist her nephew in his military career. Her request is straightforward and leaves little doubt as to her desire: "*Could you help to advance the career of my nephew Steuwaert, who is a soldier?*"[683]

The social network was, however, not always related to the family. In 1639, Elisabeth Balfour -born Bacx- sent Huygens the following request: "*Could you think once more of me? If my husband is not reinstated in his commission, I will be without income, because the small heritage of my parents will be finished soon. Could you, on behalf of the friendship, which already existed between our parents and our ancestors, not be our spokesman with His Highness?*"[684] The fact that her family and the family of Huygens had maintained friendly relations for a number of generations was a reason for Elisabeth to appeal to Huygens on behalf of her Scottish husband.

An important aspect of the social network was the exchange of gifts. In 1624, Huygens wrote to Thomas Edmond, a Scottish captain, concerning a gift that Huygens had given to Edmond. "*I received your letter from 1 March and I conclude from it that you did not understand me correctly. In exchange for the watch that I gave you, I do not want any money; I gave it to you as a gift. However, if you will not accept it, without presenting me with a gift in return, give me a rapier as I have recently seen one in your room, and a pair of spurs. I will keep the*

[683] Letter from Agnis Steuwaert to Constanijn Huygens 31 July, in: J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1663-1687', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 32* (Den Haag 1917), p. 482.
[684] Letter from Elisabeth Balfour to Constantijn Huygens, 8 June 1639, in: J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1634-1639', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 19* (Den Haag 1913), p. 457.

rapier prepared for your service and I will not consider it as a reward for my gift, but as proof of our friendship."[685]

Another example whereby gift exchange played a role in establishing or strengthening personal relations concerned George Lauder[686], a Scottish officer. Lauder gave some of his poems as a present to Huygens. In a letter to Lauder, Huygens comments on the gift a follows "*I was at Oosterhout when your excellent Poems brought to my lodging. If I had been at home, I would not have fayled to return you instantly the heartie thankes I owe you for so worthy a present. When I shall have perused every part of it, as indeed I have a mind to doe with as much attention as I perceive every one of them doth deserve and require, I will be bold to acquaint you with my true opinion, if a perpetual admiration, I am foreseeing, doe not make me an incompetent judge of workes so far beyond the reach of my capacitie...*"[687]

Scottish-Dutch families

Even when the first generation of Scottish migrants did not intermarry, that did not mean that social integration did not take place. There are many cases of families where both the father and mother was Scottish and where the children married Dutch partners. These children were part of a new social structure that was half Scottish and half Dutch. A direct result of the fact that the service of the Brigade lasted for such a long period was that in the marriage register, Scottish soldiers were present who no longer came from Scotland but from within the Dutch Republic. In Bergen op Zoom, for example, between the years 1585 and 1670 there were twenty Scottish soldiers who came from the Dutch Republic and not from Scotland. There is an increase to be distinguished towards the second half of the 17th century, which corresponds with the fact that the first military migrants must have been settled by that time in the Dutch Republic for a generation.

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[685] Letter form C. Huygens to T. Edmond, Utrecht, 27 March 1624, in: J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1608-1634', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 15* (Den Haag 1911), p. 155.
[686] George Lauder was colonel of the second Scottish regiment from 1689-1716.
[687] Letter from C. Huygens to G. Lauder, Breda, 12 July 1669, in: J.A. Worp, 'Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens 1663-1687', *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 32* (Den Haag 1917), p. 251-252.

In order to illustrate further the settlement process of the Scottish military in the Dutch Republic and to sketch a more comprehensive picture of the migrants, five different Scottish families that settled in the Dutch Republic will be analysed in greater detail. The genealogies of these families clearly demonstrate the central role the Scots Brigade fulfilled in the settlement process and, furthermore, helps additionally to understand the complexities of intermarriage better. The importance of the Scots Brigade in the settlement process is further underlined by Johannes Maclean, who stated that about 70% of Scottish families in the Netherlands came to the Dutch Republic by way of the Brigade.[688] The following five families will be discussed: Stewart (Stuart), Colyear Robertson, Graham, Gordon and Mackay.

Stewart

The Stewart family was located in the southwest part of the Dutch Republic. The first Stewart that came to the Dutch Republic was Jacques Stewart (at around 1580). After first making a living as a soldier, he later settled in Bergen op Zoom where he married Janneken Antonis of Bergen op Zoom in 1586. It was mentioned in 1622 that he had a business as a *vettewarier*[689]. Jacques remarried twice in his life; after the death of his first wife, he married Maeyken Jans van Liere in 1589, also known as Mayken Brouwers, and Mayken Cornelis van den Brande in 1591. In 1621, Jacques died and his last wife survived him and probably kept the shop, since in 1627 she is mentioned as the owner of a grocery shop in Bergen op Zoom.[690] Jacques's case is typical of the Scottish migrant-soldier. He came to the Dutch Republic upon joining the Scottish regiments (his motivations are unknown) and decided to settle down, married three times to Dutch women and set up shop as a grocer in Bergen op Zoom. Regretfully, it is unknown whether he started as a shopkeeper before or after his marriage to Janneken Antonis, so that it is impossible to know whether this was a motivation for marrying his Dutch wife. Nevertheless, it is evident that his being married to a Dutch woman from the local community enabled his integration within this community and generated new possibilities for participation in the local economy. His children all married Dutch people and remained in the Republic, although his sons did not join the Brigade as their father had done. However, the grandchild of Jacques Stewart, Cornelis, is mentioned in the marriage register of Breda of

[688] J. Maclean, *Huwelijksintekeningen*, p. 417.
[689] A shopkeeper specialised in the sale of fats.
[690] J. Mac Lean, 'Het geslacht Stewart (Stuart)', in: *De Nederlandsche Leeuw* (1974), p. 136.

1660, where he signed the marriage permission with Alexandrina Susanna Caluaardt (Calwart). In the register, he was mentioned as ensign in the company of Alexander Hum in the garrison of Breda. Later becoming a captain in the regiment of Colonel Kirkpatrick of the Scots Brigade. He died in 1677.[691] The son of Cornelis and Alexandrina, Alexander, became a lieutenant colonel in the Scots Brigade and died in the battle of Kaiserswerth in 1702; he was married to Geertruy van Herrewaarden, who was born in Driel.[692] The son of Alexander, Carel Willem Stewart, became a general major and a colonel of a Scottish infantry regiment; he was married to Maria Scholastica Charlotte de Fontaine in 1698. The latter was the daughter of Louis de Fontaine, the lieutenant of General Major Fagel, and Isabella Scholastica de Vos van Steenwijck. The Stewart male line died out in 1760.

Colyear Robertson

The Scottish family Colyear Robertson serves as another good example of how Scottish military migrants integrated into Dutch society. Among their family were not only soldiers and officers (all connected with the Scots Brigade), but also diplomats and ambassadors. The family's history in the Netherlands starts with David Colyear Robertson who was the first to settle in the Dutch Republic and who was, according to a court regulation, a chamberlain to the Prince of Orange in 1624.[693] In 1625, David Colyear got a commission as a captain in the Scots Brigade[694] and in 1649 became a sergeant major of the regiment of Sir William Drummond[695]. He was married twice, first to Clara van der Poll (1625) and later to Jean Bruce (1643). There is mention of a possible third wife by the name of Johanna Boudry, but this could very well be his second wife, Jean Bruce.[696] From his first marriage, he had a son, Justinus Colyear, and probably two daughters, one of which was called Aletta.[697] Justinus was an advocate in The Hague and became resident in Constantinople in 1667. In 1680, he was

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[691] J. Mac Lean, 'Het geslacht Stewart (Stuart)', p. 143-144.
[692] J. Mac Lean, 'Het geslacht Stewart (Stuart)', p. 144; According to Ferguson, Alexander Stewart was in 1688 and 1689 in the regiment of colonel Balfour (Ferguson, *Papers*, I, 511 and 514) In 1693 he was given by the English government the position of lieutenant-colonel within the regiment Lauder, in 1698 the Council of State gave him the same commission (*Het Staatsche Leger*, VII, p. 328 and 330).
[693] *Scots Peerage* vol. VII (Edinburgh 1910), p. 88.
[694] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 319, footnote 6.
[695] *Scots Peerage* vol. VII (Edinburgh 1910), p. 89.
[696] J.H. Hora Siccama, 'Het geslacht Colyear' in: *De Nederlandsche Leeuw* (1902), p. 151.
[697] The other daughter is unknown, but according to Siccama she could be the same daughter Aletta.

made ambassador there. In addition, his son Jacob (born in 1657) became ambassador in Constantinople in 1688.[698] Justinus had nine children, two daughters and seven sons, of whom two died at an early age. His son Johan became a sergeant major in the army and married Hester de Beverre, but died in the battle of Saint-Denis in 1678. His eldest daughter, Catharina-Clara, married Daniel Jean de Hochepied, the latter being made consul in Smyrna in 1687. The other daughter, Maria, married twice, both times to Dutchmen. First, she married Abraham de la Fontaine, a merchant in Constantinople, and between 1677 and 1680, the Dutch consul in Livorno. After his death in 1688, she remarried Isaac Rombouts, also a merchant in Constantinople. The aunt of Maria, the nameless daughter (or Aletta?) of David Colyear, was also married to a de Hochepied, namely Daniel de Hochepied, director of the Levant trade in Amsterdam, although unfortunately no mention is made of the wedding date. From David's second marriage to Jean Bruce, he had four children of whom his only son, Alexander, followed in his father's footsteps and became a colonel of a Scottish regiment in 1675[699]. This Alexander was also adjutant-general to Prince William III. However, these conditions did not mean that there was a complete estrangement from the British Isles, since in 1677, Alexander Colyear was rewarded a Baronet of England by Charles II. Alexander married a Scottish woman called Johanna (Jean) Murray, who was the daughter of Lieutenant Colonel Walter Murray, around 1655. Jean was at that time living in Bergen op Zoom. One of the most prominent children of Alexander and Jean was David Colyear who was first married to Arnolda de Beyer from Nijmegen, and later to Catherine Sedly, countess of Dorchester.[700] David was, in 1660, captain in the Scots Brigade under his father, and in 1683, he became lieutenant colonel of the Mackay regiment. In 1688, he crossed with William to England. David was made Baron of Portmore and Blackness in Scotland in 1699, becoming Earl of Portmore in 1703.[701] The second son of Alexander Colyear was called Walter Philip and he became one of the longest serving officers in the Scots Brigade. Walter was married in 1681 to Alida Rhijnburg van Leyden van Leeuwen, daughter of Diederik van Leyden van Leeuwen, the burgomaster of Leiden and envoy of the States General to England. Walter joined the Brigade at the age of 17 and became captain two years later, in 1677. In 1704, he was made

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[698] J.H. Hora Siccama, 'Het geslacht Colyear', p. 151.
[699] Ferguson, *Papers*, I, p. 473, note 2.
[700] In Burke's Scots Peerage no mention is made of Arnolda de Beyer, but according to the genealogy of the family de Beyer, David was married to Arnolda. Furthermore in the Journal of Huygens is mentioned that "Joffr. Vijgh -a lady in waiting- said that sir David Colyear did not know how he could get rid of his wife Joffr. Beyers of Nijmegen." (Siccama, 148; Note on 22 January 1692, D. II, 9).
[701] J.H. Hora Siccama, 'Het geslacht Colyear', p. 152.

general major and was appointed governor of Bonn in 1707 and of Namen in 1708. In 1725, he became lieutenant general and, in 1727, general. In 1746, he resigned after 71 years of service in the Scots Brigade. He died the year after his resignation. He had one son, Alexander, and seven daughters. With the son, the male line of Colyear Robertson died out in the Dutch Republic.

Graham[702]

The Graham family was one of the most prominent families connected to the Scots Brigade, providing two colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and three captains in the period 1644-1781. The first officer to settle in the Republic of the United Provinces was Henry Graham, who became captain in 1644 and colonel in 1673. He was married to Henrietta Beyhart in 1640, who was probably Roman-Catholic judging from her tombstone in the Roman-Catholic church in Oisterwijk. She was the daughter of the bailiff[703] of Oisterwijk. They had eleven children, of whom one daughter, Louisa Johanna Graham, married a captain of a Scottish company, James Boyd. Two of Henry's sons followed in their father's footsteps. Sir Charles Graham became colonel of the third Scottish regiment in 1691, and announced his marriage to Johanna van Rielen, the daughter of Daniel van Rielen secretary of Brielle, in Gorinchem in 1683. The other son of Henry (Hendrik) Graham became lieutenant colonel of the Scots Brigade. He was married first to Maria Groenhoff, from Den Bosch, the daughter of Adryaen Groenhoff, *auditeur-militair* over the garrisons and forts in the surroundings of Den Bosch. His second marriage was to Aegidia Adriana van Schoonhoven, daughter of Sir Philips and Leonora van Stepraet. Their son, Philip Willem Graham, was a captain of a Scottish company, but died childless in 1719. Hendrik's brother, William Louis Graham, Lord of Avesteyn (in 1695), was a lieutenant-colonel in 1695, and he purchased *Avestein House* and the *Ridderhof ten Bogaerde* in Den Bosch. In 1715, he became a magistrate of Den Bosch, and then of Dinther in 1728. William Louis married Sara van Kouwenhoven, daughter of Jacob, Lord of Streuyt, around 1690. William Louis had ten children, six sons and four daughters. All the sons except two became officers in the Scots Brigade; of these two Charles Graham went to the Dutch Indies and died in 1726, while Henry Graham was a lawyer in Den Bosch in 1693. Two of William Louis's daughters married: Sara Jacoba Graham married Jan Baptiste

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[702] J. Mac Lean, 'Het geslacht Graham' in: *De Nederlandsche Leeuw* (1973), IX, p. 49-67.

[703] In Dutch the function was called "Baljuw", the local magistrate responsible for upholding the law.

Marchamp, a Walloon, in 1737, and Maria Graham married Egmondt David van Thielen in 1724.

Gordon[704]

Robbert (Robbrecht) Gordon is a good example of a Scottish "self-made man". He was born in Aberdeen around 1626 and later went to the Dutch Republic, most probably as a soldier. In 1648, he married his first wife, Liesbeth van Dalen, in Schiedam, and in the marriage register of Schiedam, he is mentioned as an adelborst in the company of Sir William Drummond. The interesting fact about Robbert Gordon is that he successfully integrated into the community of Schiedam, becoming head of the shoemaker's guild in 1662 and a sergeant of the city militia of Schiedam in 1675. Later on, Robbert specialised in the business of parchment making, which was responsible for his fortune. In total, he was married three times, all with women from Schiedam. His son from his second marriage -also called Robbert- was Lord of Nieuwland, Kortland and 's-Greveland, and he took over his father's parchment making business. He became a member of the *vroedschap* of Schiedam in 1687, burgomaster in 1699, 1701-02, 1705, 1717-18 and in 1722. He was also *baljuw* (in 1706, 1712, 1718, 1723) and captain of the civil militia (1698). He was married to Maria van Reyn in Rotterdam in 1687. His children equally fulfilled important roles, either within the civil community of Schiedam or within the Scots Brigade. His son Joan, for example, became secretary of Schiedam in 1717, and regent of the orphanage from 1723 to 1769. The second son, James Gordon, became a captain in the regiment of Colyear in 1724 and finally became general major in 1766. James married Johanna Maria Heydenrijck, daughter of Ds. Menso Heydenrijck, preacher in Maastricht, in 1726. They had ten children. One of these children Joan Gordon became Mayor of Wageningen in 1791 and of Harderwijk in 1795. He married Johanna Maria Abrech in 1737. Another of James Gordon's sons, Robert James Gordon, was an ensign in the Scots Brigade. He became commander of the Dutch garrison in the Cape of Good Hope in 1780, and in the same year married Susanna Margaretha Nicolett. He also was a fervent traveller in Africa, discovering and naming the Oranje River in South Africa. Interestingly, the dual loyalty that was often apparent among Scottish officers serving in the Dutch army was completely absent in the case of Robert James Gordon. He committed suicide after the transfer of authority over the Cape of Good Hope to Great Britain in 1795.

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[704] J. Mac Lean, 'Het geslacht Gordon' in: *De Nederlandsche Leeuw* (1970), p. 65-80.

Mackay

The last and probably most famous example of a Scottish-Dutch family is that of Mackay. In 1854, Berthold, Baron Mackay van Ophemert, died in his castle of Ophemert in Gelderland at the age of 81. According to the description that exists of him, the Baron was the descendant of Hugh Mackay of Scoury who fell at Steinkirk. The second son of Lord Reay, Aeneas (Angus) Mackay resided with his family at The Hague "where they had obtained considerable possessions and formed alliance with several noble families." The Baron married the Baroness Van Renesse Van Wilp and died after a long life "of great piety and usefulness."[705]

How the social integration of the Mackay family was expressed is demonstrated best by the example of Daniel Mackay, the son of Aeneas Mackay, nephew of Hugh Mackay of Scoury, and Margaretha Pulcher, the daughter of Francois Pulcher[706] and Jacoba de Bie. Daniel was a classical example of a child of mixed nationalities. In 1717, he became a student at the "Hogeschool" in Utrecht, which meant that his social life was not only restricted to the Scottish military, but that his social circle must also have included family members from his mother's side and academic friends. In 1724, he became a captain in the Scots Brigade and, as such, continued the family tradition.[707]

Daniel's wife, Arnolda Margaretha, left behind a large bible that constitutes an interesting source relating to 18th century family life. Daniel's annotations in his bible, give an impression of the people that were close to the family. One example recalls the baptism of his son Aeneas. The baptism was undertaken by the minister of the Lannoy regiment, while the witnesses were his sister Barbara; Mr. Jacob Massing, president of 's Hertogenbosch; Sirs Frans and Cornelis Annaeus van den Steen, his brothers-in-law; the Colonel Lannoy of Dunkenny; Major Marjoribanks; and the Captains Pieter Macleane, Alexander Mackenzie, James Ross, Hugh Mackay[708], David Erskine, Charles Lyon, and Donald Mackay.[709] Both the Dutch Mackays and the Mackays of Scoury intermarried with Dutch houses from Nijmegen and the Betuwe. Daniel Mackay's oldest sister, Francoise Jacoba, married Jan Vijgh in 1727.

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[705] J. Grant, *The Scottish soldiers of Fortune. Their Adventures and Achievements in the Armies of Europe* (London 1890), p. 160-161.
[706] The Pulcher family was originally Austrian, but both the grandfather and the father of Margaretha had been serving in the Dutch army.
[707] Daniel Baron Mackay, 'Geschiedenis van het geslacht Mackay' (published by the *Koninklijke Nederlandse Genootschap voor Geslacht en Wapenkunde* VIII Zutphen 1984) p. 177.
[708] This Hugh was the grandson of Hugh Mackay of Scoury and belonged to a different branch of the family than Daniel Mackay.
[709] Daniel Mackay, 'Geschiedenis van het geslacht Mackay', p. 179.

The latter was the youngest son of Arent Vijgh, Lord of the Snor and the Appelenburg. The Vijgh family became important in Betuwe through the marriage of Nicolaas Vijgh to Anna van Egmond, the illegitimate daughter of Karel van Gelre.[710] The Mackay van Ophemert family continued to play a role within Dutch society, producing a prime minister at the beginning of the 20th century.

Clearly, these five examples cannot be taken as representative of every aspect of the social integration process. These families represent the higher social strata of Scottish and Dutch society, whereby social status contributed clearly to this process of settlement and, as such, cannot be representative for the general Scottish soldier. Nevertheless, these cases, when accepted for what they are –as some examples of integration- do help to shed some light on how some members of the Scots Brigade integrated. Their experiences are not anomalous, but rather concur with the data revealed by the marriage lists concerning intermarriage among certain social classes. These examples, also convey the importance played by the Scots Brigade in attracting officers from Scotland, who considered the Brigade as a career possibility, whereby the social network of the Brigade -and to a larger extent that of the Dutch army- further facilitated the process of intermarriage. The children of the first generation of "military migrants" seemed to be well adjusted to society in the Dutch Republic, undertaking achieving political functions on local and state level. These cases also show the complexity of this settlement process. For example, the prolonging of the Scottish identity because of the continuing participation of successive generations within the Brigade, and the sometimes apparent connection with Great Britain where some of the families continued to play an important role, while at the same time attempting to integrate in Dutch society.

In conclusion, the following remarks can be made regarding the settlement process of the Scottish soldier in the Dutch Republic. Firstly, over the period of their service in the Dutch army, many Scots decided to marry and settle on Dutch soil. The marriage lists clearly demonstrate an increase in such practice during the 17th century, with the majority of wives being Dutch and mostly from the same town as where the soldier was located. The role of the Scots Brigade proved to be crucial for the process of intermarriage and integration, a paradox, since the Brigade also helped to preserve a distinctive Scottish military identity[711]. These two factors were not, therefore, mutually exclusive; in other words, a cultural identity preserved

[710] Ibid, p. 181.
[711] See chapter 6.

by the social sphere of the Brigade did not prevent either a soldier from intermarrying or his children from acquiring positions in the civil (Dutch) sphere. On the contrary, the social network connected to the Brigade helped the soldier to intermarry more easily and, at the same time, gave him an opportunity to expand his social circle by participating in the social network of his Dutch wife. For the children, the benefits were even clearer since they could participate equally in both social circles, even though the social network of the Brigade was often dominant and encouraged sons to follow their father into the army. Unfortunately, these remarks can only refer to the social elite constituted by the officer class. For the common soldier, only limited quantitative data is available to illustrate the phenomenon of intermarriage, from which we can deduce that they settled in the Dutch Republic, a practice confirmed by baptism records. After their resignation from the army, they would resume a former trade or would participate in the socio-economic network of their wife and family-in-law. However, the fact that they no longer remained in contact with the Brigade, makes it virtually impossible to reconstruct the settlement process.

Conclusion

This dissertation began by explaining the motivation for choosing Scottish soldiers as an example of researching the social aspects of the Dutch army. Now, at the end of the dissertation, it has become clear that, more than ever, Scottish soldiers constitute a unique category. There are two main reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, belonging to a military structure with its own social value system, rules of conduct and jurisdiction, studying the Scots Brigade contributes to the research of social aspects of the Dutch army. Through the focus on Scottish soldiers, many insights are revealed into the living conditions in the Dutch army, the relationship between soldiers and officers, social networks, civil-military interaction, and the relationship between army and State. Furthermore, the fact that these soldiers were Scottish brings other aspects into focus regarding, for example, the political status of a foreign soldier and the extent of his autonomy within the Dutch army. The second reason why Scottish soldiers have proven to be a valuable research topic is that they were at the same time migrants who sometimes temporarily, but often permanently, settled on Dutch soil. The Scottish soldier, in fact, brings these two different lines of enquiry together. It is therefore crucial to consider the Scottish soldier not as a soldier of fortune who moved on when his contract was over, but truly as a migrating, professional soldier who not only sought a career, but also a life, abroad. The Scottish military migrant was, however, not like most other migrants. Throughout his existence in the Dutch Republic there was a constant interaction between the soldier's cultural awareness, the Scottish military identity as constructed by the Scots Brigade and integration into Dutch society.

From the beginning of the history of the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Republic, the position of Scottish soldiers and officers was ambiguous and complex. They were in the service of the Dutch Republic, but their rightful sovereign was a British king. The Scottish soldier was part of a military unit that was highly Scottish in its appearance, but was a crucial component in a Dutch army. British kings, trough treaties and diplomacy, tried to influence Dutch policy regarding the Scottish soldiers, but while both countries acknowledged the status of the Scots Brigade as a loan from the British government, in practice, the Dutch authorities were in control. The Dutch were responsible for payment, the appointment of higher officers, augmentations and reductions of military units, pension systems and military policy.

However, their authority was not absolute; the Scots Brigade remained distinctively Scottish and the Dutch remained uncertain of their loyalty. During the second Anglo-Dutch war, a war between a Stuart monarch and the Dutch Republic, the Dutch took no chances with the Scottish troops and temporarily severed the Scottish connection by integrating the Brigade in the Dutch army. Regarding the question of loyalty, the position of the Scottish soldier was very important, and despite the attempts of both states to exert authority over the regiments, it was the Scottish soldier and officer that ultimately decided were his loyalties lay. The principal responsibility of the Scottish soldier was firstly towards the Brigade and Scotland. When, for example, Charles I invaded Scotland to impose his Episcopal system, the Scots abroad answered the call to arms to defend Scotland against their own monarch, because Charles was threatening the integrity of the Scottish Kirk and with that, the integrity of Scottish society. Additionally, when James II became Catholic, the Scottish regiments sailed with William III across the Channel to fight against their own sovereign. Equally, during the second Anglo-Dutch war there were a number of Scottish officers in the Dutch Republic who refused to be at war with their rightful sovereign and returned to Britain. It is important to note that because the Dutch government considered the Scottish regiments to be a loan from Britain, they were more lenient regarding the independence of the Scottish soldiers, as long as it did not interfere with State policy. Therefore, when a soldier or officer expressed his desire to return to Scotland or to England, his contract was simply terminated. On the other hand, the Dutch authorities made sure -through different persuasive tactics- that the majority of the officers would remain in Dutch service.

The Scots Brigade began its existence as one regiment of seasonal troops, but as the Brigade continued its service in the Dutch Republic, it gradually expanded into a military institution with a strong social network and an impressive military reputation. The Scots were like no other group of foreign soldiers. By being part of the Scots Brigade, they were part of a specific non-Dutch military unit with a very strong Scottish character and with its own particular set of non-Dutch military symbols. They wore British uniforms, carried the British colours, played the Scottish march, obeyed either English or Scottish commands, and swore an additional oath to the British sovereign. The Scottish soldiers saw themselves, despite the fact that they fought and lived in the Dutch Republic, as British. Related to these symbols was the less concrete aspect of a certain military reputation, a pride in the soldier's profession. Of course, it can be argued that pride in a military profession cannot be identified with a specific cultural identity; however it must also be said that regarding the Scots Brigade, the concept of

the "courageous Scotsman" did indeed have a special value. Not only was it part of an intellectual movement that distinguished Scotland from England, and stressed the fact that Scotland's place was unique in history, but more importantly due to the close ties with Scotland the martial reputation of the Brigade was crucial for the social network and consequently for the recruitment of new soldiers and officers.

This unique and rather exclusive status did not, however, prevent the Scots from settling in the Dutch Republic and integrating into Dutch society. Scottish soldiers were stationed in garrison towns where they were billeted with civilians and often messed with them. Close contact with civilians was thus inevitable. By being stationed close to civilians there was much opportunity for positive interaction and marriage, but it was also a source of tension and conflict. The Scottish soldier and officer was part of a different social structure than that of the civilian population. The soldier belonged to a specific military unit, with its separate and distinctive rules of conduct that strongly differed from other social (that is civic) structures. In order to prevent these social differences from disrupting the social order there was a carefully constructed symbiosis whereby the Scottish soldiers could provide cheap labour for the civilians, and the civil community in turn provided the soldiers with loans when their wage payments were in arrears. This symbiosis had a strong financial character, and the loans provided by civilians were expected to be repaid in full. Additionally, by granting these loans, the civil authorities prevented the soldiers from plundering and damaging the town economy. It should be noted, however, that the fact that the soldiers were Scottish was of no importance, for in the eyes of the civil community the Scottish were military like any other group, and the behaviour of the Scots towards the civilians did not differ than that of Dutch soldiers.

The civil-military interaction in the garrison towns did have an important aspect for the Scottish soldiers and officers that was not that apparent for Dutch soldiers, in that it strongly facilitated Scottish-Dutch intermarriage. From the marriage registers of various garrison towns, it becomes apparent that Scots had a preference for Dutch women and, in particular, for Dutch women deriving from the town itself. This is a strong indication that despite the Scottish character of the Brigade, there was a genuine desire to interact with Dutch society. Interestingly enough, these inter-marriages did not mean that the Scot was absorbed in Dutch culture; there was more a reciprocity between both cultures. The Dutch woman would become part of the social network of the Brigade, and often would remarry another Scottish soldier if she became a widow. While such a social network enabled Dutch women to become part of

the Scots Brigade, it also provided Scottish officers with easier access to Dutch society. Many Scottish officers married Dutch women of high status who were often connected to the military. The children from these mixed marriages, while not being exclusively Scottish or Dutch, often succeeded in obtaining high positions in Dutch society.

The expanding social network of the Scots Brigade not only provided an opportunity for cultural integration, but it was also very important with regard to recruitment. It had a dual function concerning the levying of new troops. Firstly, through kinship ties, it enabled new recruits from Scotland to join the Scottish regiments, and secondly, it provided the Brigade with a constant stream of new officers from the Dutch Republic. These new officers came from Scottish Dutch families which often had a very strong tradition whereby the son would follow the father's example by also becoming an officer in the Brigade.

The Scots Brigade fulfilled a crucial function as a mediator between Scottish and Dutch culture. On the one hand, it used its military reputation and social network to attract new Scottish recruits and migrants; on the other hand by also being part of Dutch society, it helped to facilitate social integration. While the Scottish regiments retained their specific Scottish character until the late 18th century, paradoxically, they provided many soldiers and officers with the opportunity to settle on Dutch soil and to become part of early modern Dutch society. How well integrated the Scots Brigade actually was, despite their separate non-Dutch status, is best illustrated by the events of 1782 when the Brigade was fully incorporated in the Dutch army and its distinctive Scottish identity was destroyed. While many Scottish officers lamented the destruction of the Brigade, they complained about the destruction of a two centuries old tradition, rather than the fact that the regiments were becoming Dutch. Additionally, the protests of Scottish officers during the second half of the 18th century regarding the way the Scottish regiments were treated by the Dutch should be seen not as a conflict with the Dutch State about Scottish identity, but concern over the honour of the Brigade. The fact that the Scots Brigade had been active almost continuously for two centuries in the Dutch Republic and was closely affiliated with Dutch society, had had its consequences for social integration. When Scottish officers and soldiers were given the choice after the dissolution of the Scots Brigade to return to Great Britain, which had created a new Scots Brigade, the majority of the officers chose to remain in the Dutch Republic and to continue as Dutch officers and soldiers. In the end, the relationship with the Dutch Republic weighed heavier than the cultural uniqueness of the Scots Brigade.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Lists of conduct

Gordon Regiment, Brielle 1773

Captains: 9	Scottish surnames: 9	From Scotland: 5	Languages: Dutch: 9 English: 9 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 9
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 8	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 1	Reformed: 13
Ensigns: 15	Scottish surnames: 15	From Scotland: 13	Languages: Dutch: 15 English: 15 Scots-Gaelic: 4	Reformed: 15

Gordon Regiment, Venlo 1775

Captains: 9	Scottish surnames: 9	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 9 English: 9 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 9
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 11	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 13
Ensigns: 14	Scottish surnames: 14	From Scotland: 12	Languages: Dutch: 14 English: 14 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 14

Stuart Regiment, Zutphen 1773

Captains: 12	Scottish surnames: 12	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 12 English: 12 Scots-Gaelic: 5	Reformed: 12
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 13
Ensigns: 14	Scottish surnames: 14	From Scotland: 9	Languages: Dutch: 14 English: 14 Scots-Gaelic: 4	Reformed: 14

Stuart Regiment, Zutphen 1775

Captains: 12	Scottish surnames: 12	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 12 English: 12 Scots-Gaelic: 5	Reformed: 12
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 13
Ensigns: 14	Scottish surnames: 14	From Scotland: 9	Languages: Dutch: 14 English: 14 Scots-Gaelic: 4	Reformed: 14

Marjoribanks Regiment, Doornick 1773

Captains: 8	Scottish surnames: 8	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 8 English: 8 Scots-Gaelic: 1	Reformed: 8
Lieutenants: 16	Scottish surnames: 14	From Scotland: 11	Languages: Dutch: 16 English: 16 Scots-Gaelic: 6	Reformed: 16
Ensigns: 14	Scottish surnames: 14	From Scotland: 8	Languages: Dutch: 9 English: 14 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 14

Mackay Regiment, Doornick 1775

Captains: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 13
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 13	From Scotland: 7	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 13 Scots-Gaelic: 5	Reformed: 13
Ensigns: 17	Scottish surnames: 17	From Scotland: 13	Languages: Dutch: 17 English: 17 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 17

Dundas Regiment, Brielle 1784

Captains: 14	Scottish surnames: 9	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 9 English: 9 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 13
Lieutenants: 12	Scottish surnames: 9	From Scotland: 3	Languages: Dutch: 12 English: 9 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 11
Ensigns: 13	Scottish surnames: 6	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 6 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 11

Houston Regiment, Veere 1784

Captains: 12	Scottish surnames: 6	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 12 English: 10 Scots-Gaelic: 2	Reformed: 12
Lieutenants: 10	Scottish surnames: 8	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 10 English: 10 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 10
Ensigns: 15	Scottish surnames: 4	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 15 English: 15 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 15

Houston Regiment, Den Bosch 1788

Captains: 10	Scottish surnames: 6	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 10 English: 9 Scots-Gaelic: 1	Reformed: 10
Lieutenants: 11	Scottish surnames: 9	From Scotland: 3	Languages: Dutch: 11 English: 10 Scots-Gaelic: 3	Reformed: 11
Ensigns: 14	Scottish surnames: 5	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 6 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 13

Regiment Dundas, Zwolle 1788

Captains: 10	Scottish surnames: 7	From Scotland: 4	Languages: Dutch: 10 English: 7 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 8
Lieutenants: 13	Scottish surnames: 8	From Scotland: 2	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 8 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 11
Ensigns: 15	Scottish surnames: 5	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 15 English: 5 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 13

Dundas Regiment, Zwolle 1789

Captains: 11	Scottish surnames: 2	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 11 English: 3 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 8
Lieutenants: 14	Scottish surnames: 7	From Scotland: 3	Languages: Dutch: 13 English: 7 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 11
Ensigns: 13	Scottish surnames: 0	From Scotland: 0	Languages: Dutch: 12 English: 1 Scots-Gaelic: 0	Reformed: 11

Appendix 2: Intermarriage lists

Scottish military marriages 1575-1611

Location	Scottish women	Dutch women (internal[712])	Dutch women (external[713])	Non-Dutch women[714]	Unknown[715]	Total marriages
Alkmaar (1600-1605)	1 (1[716])	9 (4)	1	1 (1)	0	12 (6)
Bergen op Zoom (1585-1611)	31 (21)	22 (10)	23 (13)	18 (12)	3 (2)	97 (58)
Breda (1592-1602)	23 (14)	7 (4)	7 (3)	2 (1)	2 (1)	41 (23)
Delft (1586-1611)	21 (7)	74 (25)	18 (9)	17 (5)	5 (3)	135 (49)
Dordrecht (1586-1611)	17 (9)	7 (2)	22 (13)	13 (4)	2 (2)	61 (30)
Gorinchem (1595-1601)	15	8	6	5 (1)	0	34 (1)

[12] Internal: women from inside the town where the wedding vows were taken.
[13] External: women from outside the town where the wedding vows were taken.
[14] This also includes women from the Spanish Netherlands, as well as parts of the German Empire, England and Scandinavian countries. The majority were Flemish women.
[15] This category indicates women in the marriage lists where it is not specified whether they were Scottish, Dutch or from a different country.
[16] The number in brackets indicates the percentage of widows amongst the new wives.

Location	Scottish women	Dutch women (internal)	Dutch women (external)	Non-Dutch women	Unknown	Total marriages
Gouda (1595-1610)	10	23	32	27	0	92
Grave (1604-1611)	2 (1)	7	8 (6)	3	0	20 (7)
Groningen (1600-1611)	0	36 (10)	2	0	0	38 (10)
Haarlem (1587-1610)	2 (2)	19 (9)	11 (2)	3 (2)	0	35 (15)
Leiden (1576-1608)	1	12 (4)	5 (2)	10 (1)	0	28 (7)
Nijmegen (1592-1611)	32 (7)	18 (14)	47 (18)	12 (2)	22 (22)	131 (63)
Utrecht (1591-1611)	10 (8)	46 (17)	30 (8)	9 (1)	24 (22)	119 (56)
Zwolle (1588-1611)	2	5	16	2	7 (4)	32 (4)
TOTAL:	167 (70)	293 (99)	228 (75)	122 (30)	65 (57)	875 (331)
%	19% (42%)	33% (34%)	26% (33%)	14% (25%)	8% (88%)	100% (38%)

Scottish military marriages 1612-1635

Location	Scottish women	Dutch women (internal)	Dutch women (external)	Non-Dutch women	Unknown	Total marriages
Alkmaar (1619-1626)	21 (10)	59 (32)	19 (11)	3 (2)	0	102 (55)
Bergen op Zoom (1612-1635)	20[717] (6)	28 (16)	27 (8)	7 (2)	9 (6)	91 (38)
's-Hertogen-bosch (1630-1635)	3 (3)	5 (3)	10 (2)	3 (2)	6 (4)	27 (14)
Delft (1612-1626)	0	6 (6)	1 (1)	0	0	7 (7)
Dordrecht (1612-1632)	8 (6)	19 (3)	12 (5)	7 (6)	9 (2)	55 (22)
Gorinchem (1614-1635)	3 (1)	13 (4)	25 (8)	5 (1)	1	46 (14)
Grave (1612-1635)	14 (3)	32 (1)	28 (4)	6 (4)	41 (41[718])	122 (53)

[717] Even though these women were Scottish, not all of them came from Scotland; many of them were already living in Bergen op Zoom or in other towns. The same goes for Scottish men. Towards the second half of the 17th century and into the 18th century, this trend increases.

[718] Many of the 'unknowns' had seemingly Dutch names, but since the place of origin or the place of residence was not mentioned they have been included in this category. In the end, it does not interfere with the final results.

Location	Scottish women	Dutch women (internal)	Dutch women (external)	Non-Dutch women	Unknown	Total marriages
Groningen (1612-1635)	0	28 (11)	5 (0)	0	0	33 (11)
Nijmegen (1612-1635)	12 (5)	20 (6)	27 (10)	8 (3)	17 (17)	84 (41)
Utrecht (1612-1635)	25 (4)	173 (82)	63 (5)	8	5 (2)	274 (93)
Zwolle (1612-1632)	4	53 (23)	21 (3)	3 (1)	6 (4)	87 (31)
TOTAL	110 (38)	436 (187)	238 (57)	50 (21)	94 (76)	928 (379)
%	12% (35%)	47% (43%)	26% (24%)	5% (42%)	10% (80%)	100% (41%)

Scottish military marriages 1630-1675

Location	Scottish women [719]	Dutch women (internal)	Dutch women (external)	Non Dutch women	Unknown	Total
Bergen op Zoom (1636-1670)	12 (4)	55 (22)	17 (7)	3 (1)	8 (7)	95 (41)

[719] This also includes Scottish women who lived in the Dutch Republic and did not come from Scotland.

Location	Scottish women	Dutch women (internal)	Dutch women (external)	Non-Dutch women	Unknown	Total marriages
Breda (1637-1665)	5 (3)	38 (17)	8 (3)	1	4 (4)	56 (27)
's-Hertogen-bosch (1636-1670)	24 (10)	63 (45)	34 (5)	9 (1)	0	130 (61)
Gorinchem (1636-1675)	10 (8)	36 (18)	28 (11)	14 (6)	0	88 (43)
Grave (1636-1666)	6 (2)	41 (5)	20 (5)	4	10 (10)	81 (22)
Groningen (1636-1666)	0	3 (3)	1 (0)	0	0	4 (3)
The Hague (1636-1659)	2	14 (11)	4	1	1	22 (11)
Nijmegen (1636-1665)	9 (6)	23 (2)	49 (28)	1	28 (28)	110 (64)
Utrecht (1636-1653)	17 (5)	79 (50)	16	7	0	119 (55)
TOTAL:	85 (38)	352 (173)	177 (59)	40 (8)	51 (49)	705 (327)
%	12% (45%)	50% (49%)	25% (34%)	6% (20%)	7% (96%)	100% (46%)

Scottish military marriages 1674-1784 [720]

Location:	Scottish wives	Dutch wives internal	Dutch wives external	Non-Dutch wives	Unknown	Total
's-Hertogen-bosch	12 (1)	255 (131)	109 (3)	26	1	403 (135)
Breda	16 (5)	83 (21)	35 (4)	4	2	140 (25)
Bergen op Zoom	6 (2)	75 (21)	24 (1)	8	2	115 (22)
Maastricht	7	11 (2)	10	6	3	37 (2)
Sluis	0	1	1	1	1	4
Grave	0	3	2	0	0	5
Gorinchem	2	20 (5)	7 (1)	0	1	30 (5)
Nijmegen	7 (6)	60 (15)	14 (1)	1	3	85 (22)
Tiel	0	23 (7)	5	0	0	28 (7)
TOTAL	50 (14)	530 (202)	207 (10)	46	13	846 (218)
%	6% (28%)	63% (38%)	24% (5%)	5%	2%	100% (26%)

[720] For the 18th century the marriage pattern becomes more complex. Many so-called 'Scotsmen' no longer came directly from Scotland, but from other places in the Dutch Republic, born of families where the mother was often Dutch. Thus even though part of a Scottish context (the Brigade) they were nevertheless half Dutch. Furthermore, towards the end of the 18th century, the number of non-Scottish soldiers within the Brigade increased, thereby diminishing the Scottish element of the Brigade. For Scottish women it was the same principle as for the Dutch born Scottish soldier. For example, Robert Moor, a soldier belonging to the company of captain Mackenzie, married Margrite MacLeon (an apparently Scottish surname) in Breda. She is mentioned as "a young woman from this town", indicating that according to the Scottish chaplain she was part of the civilian community of Breda.

Appendix 3: Lists of the colonels of the Scottish regiments.

I-The fixed regiments (1572-1688):

	First regiment	Second regiment	Third regiment
1573	Ormiston		
1574-1580	Sir Henry Balfour		
1585	Cunningham		
1586	Bartholomew Balfour		
1594	Alexander Murray		
1599	Sir William Edmond		
1603		Walter Scott Lord of Buccleuch	
1606	Sir William Brog		
1612		Sir Robert Henderson	
1622		Sir Francis Henderson	
1628		Sir John Halkett	
1629		Sir David Balfour	Walter Scott, Earl of Buccleuch
1633			Sir James Livingstone, Lord Almond
1636	Sir James Sandilands		
1639	James Erskine	Sir Archibald Douglas	
1639		John Kirkpatrick	
1640			Sir Philip Balfour
1646			Sir William Drummond
1655	Walter Scott of Balwaery		
1660			John Henderson
1662			Louis Erskine
1673	Henry Graham		Jacques de Fariaux, Lord of Maude
1675			Sir Alexander Colyear

1677	Hugh Mackay of Scoury		
1680			James Douglas
1684		Bartholomew Balfour	
1685			John Wauchope
1688			George Ramsay

After William Drummond and after Louis Erskine there was a break in the continuity of the regiments. In 1655, the three regiments were formed into two. In 1675, Colyear was appointed first colonel of a new regiment raised during the preceding year to replace Louis Erskine's, which under de Fariaux had lost it distinctive Scottish character

II-The fixed regiments (1688-1782)

	First regiment	**Second regiment**	**Third regiment**
1689		George Lauder	
1692	Aeneas Mackay		Sir Charles Graham
1698	Robert Murray		Walter Philip Colyear
1716		Alexander Halkett	
1719	John Cunninghame		
1730	James Cunninghame		
1733	John Lamy of Dunkenny		
1741		George de Villegas	
1742	Donald Mackay		
1745	Alexander Marjoribanks		
1746		Charles William Stuart	
1747			Charles Halkett
1754		John Stuart	
1758			James Gordon
1773	Hugh Mackay		

1775	John Houston		
1776			Ralph Dundas

(From: James Ferguson, *Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, vol.1, p. XXXIV-XXXV)

III-Temporary regiments

157-	William Stuart		
1586	Aristotle Patton[721]		
1629	Earl of Morton's (commanded by Lord Hay of Kinfauns)		
1697-99	James Ferguson[722]	John, Lord Strathnaver[723]	George Hamilton
1701	Sir David Colyear, Lord Portmore	John, Lord Strathnaver	George Hamilton[724]
1702		John, Marquis of Lorn, Duke of Argyll	
1703	John Dalrymple		
1706	William Borthwick, John Hepburn	John, Marquis of Tulli-Bardine	
1709	James Douglas		

[721] This Colonel Patton figured among the ranks of the army of the Duke of Parma in 1588.
[722] James Ferguson was commander of a temporary fourth regiment employed during the Nine Years War. The regiment was disbanded in 1699, but reinstalled in 1701 with the beginning of the Spanish War of Succession. The regiment was finally disbanded in 1717.
[723] John Strathnaver was the first commanding officer of the temporary fifth regiment that was, as were the fourth and the sixth regiments raised during the wars with France. The fifth regiment was disbanded in 1717.
[724] George Hamilton was the only commander of the sixth Scottish regiment that was in temporary service in the Dutch army from 1697-1698 and from 1701-1714.

1710		James Wood	
1747-1753	Henry Douglas, Earl of Drumlanrig		

(From: James Ferguson, *Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, vol.1 p. XXXV; H. Ringoir, 'Hoofdofficieren der infanterie van 1568 tot 1813', *Bijdragen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, no. 9* (Den Haag 1981), p. 107-118).

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