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External financing of NGOs and the construction of civil society:

The case of Algeria and the EU

Jessica Ayesha NORTHEY

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

Florence, June, 2013 (defence)

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Summary

This thesis examines the EU's aims to try to construct civil society abroad together with its more modest actions targeting associations in the case of Algeria. Over the last decade, the EU has committed millions of Euros for civil society actors, essentially NGOs, in the Middle East and North Africa. However there are great disparities, both in its budgets and in its approaches. Following the political transformations in North Africa in 2011, the EU has increased even further its budget for funding civil society.

Algeria is a context with low levels of foreign donor funding. However, with 93,000 associations registered in 2012, it has more associations than any country of the Arab world. At grass roots level, Algerian associations and their relations to the state and to donors have undergone transformations over the last two decades. The thesis explores a number of these associations and relationships across different sectors and regions of Algeria. It asks whether associations are co-opted by state or by donors, as has been suggested, or whether they can be actors in their own right, either in contestation, or in co-operation with institutions. The thesis takes two sector studies to analyse this. Firstly, it explores how heritage associations both challenge the state's vision of Algeria's history and propose alternatives. Secondly, it examines how social associations, in responding to the population's needs, identify problems in social policy and transform people's expectations about how social care should be managed. As this involves risk-taking, associations cannot, it is argued, be seen as simply reacting, either to donors or to the state.

The thesis analyses the EU's presence in Algeria, historical difficulties and its absence during Algeria's conflict. It explores the resulting adaptations, notably in the EU's language in Algeria, which appears comparatively less value laden than in other contexts. It concludes on the interplay between associations and external actors, not only in terms of funding, but also in terms of language and perceptions of what constitutes, or hinders, the construction of a national civil society.

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This thesis is dedicated to Ahmed Bouchetata, Allah Yerhamou, and to those like him who work to improve the lives of others expecting nothing in return.

اهدى هذه الرسالة إلى السيد أحمد بوشطاط، رحمه الله عليه.
وإلى كل الذين يعملون، مثله، لتحسين حياة الآخرين دون انتظار شيئاً في المقابل .

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Introduction

The recent political revolutions in 2011 have transformed the Arab world, and challenged western donor perceptions of the capacity for mobilization, of the potential and desire for democratization, and of the real actors behind such demands for change in the region. These uprisings are not the first attempts within North African societies to demand democratization through mass mobilisation and political reform. In 1989, following country-wide riots in the previous year, Algeria launched an impressive democratisation project, revising the Constitution and the laws on political parties and associations. These reforms allowed for political pluralism, freedom of the press and freedom of association. The cancellation of the 1991 elections, and the subsequent coup d'état by the military, brought to a tragic close this ambitious democratic reform programme. Anna Bozzo remarks in her recent book *Les Sociétés Civiles dans le Monde Musulman*, concerning the revolutions in 2011, 'of all these movements, it has not escaped informed observers that October 1988 in Algiers, was, despite its failure, the first, that which opened the way for this new series of demonstrations' (Bozzo, 2011:10)¹.

The decade-long conflict which followed in Algeria, between Islamist insurgents and the military regime might have been expected to result in decreased levels of civic engagement (Pearce, McGhee, Wheeler, 2011). Yet the previous reforms, notably the 1990 Law 90-31 on Associations, actually brought about a significant increase in the number of registered associations. Algeria now has more associations than any other country in the region. During the conflict of the 1990s, despite severe restrictions to public spaces, certain sectors of civil society flourished.

Initial optimism over this development, amongst academia and policy makers, has been replaced, however, by an increasingly sceptical view of these newly created associations. This is both in terms of their potential to contribute, as actors within democratization processes, to political change, but also as viable actors within local development processes, such as in the cultural heritage sector or in social care work in Algeria.

The role of associations and civil society actors in the political landscape in Algeria is still evolving. Despite different socio-economic climates, political contexts and recent histories in North Africa, the

¹ (All translations are the author's unless otherwise stated). 'De tous ces mouvements, il n'a pas échappé aux observateurs avertis qu'octobre 1988 à Alger a été, malgré son échec, le premier, celui qui a ouvert la voie à cette nouvelle série de protestations.' Bozzo, 2011: 10

impacts of the revolutionary movements that have occurred across the region, in neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Libya in 2011 have inevitably affected the Algerian system. Civil society organizations, various social movements and new groupings have brought new voices to the political sphere since 2011 across the region. External actors had already been financing and co-operating with some of these civil society organizations, over the last decades, and their role has been a controversial and highly criticized one (Liverani, 2008; Challand 2010).

In the case of Algeria, since 2011, networks of associations have been challenging legislative reform proposals. Whether such actions are sufficient to bring about political change has been disputed. Until 2011, researchers have argued that the answer to this question is negative. Scholars and political actors, both inside and outside of Algeria, suggest that the associational movement remains too weak (Roberts, 2005, Derras, 2006) or too divided (Cavatorta, 2008) to be able to enact real change.

One of the most recent critiques of the view that civil society could be a force for political change is posed by Andrea Liverani (2008), in his book *Civil Society in Algeria, the Functional Politics of Associational Life* (2008). He questions the independence of Algerian civil society from the state, arguing that 'associational life has hindered – rather than boosted – Algeria's democratization process' (2008: 9). He argues equally that the intervention of international donors, in supporting such civil society organisations, also hinders democratisation processes. For Liverani, such external support contributes to the legitimizing of the state internationally, and to the conservation of an authoritarian order within Algeria.

One challenge for Liverani (2008), and other researchers (Roberts, 2005, Derras, 2006), is that their work is based upon empirical studies of non-governmental organizations at a very fragile point in Algerian history, at the end of a decade of violent conflict. The tendency to view negatively any possibilities for social or political reform may have been very understandable in such a period. Comparisons might be made with Albert O Hirschman's work on Latin America in the 1980s. Hirschman worked with the concept of 'fracasomania' or the 'failure complex'. The categorization of most political and social reform experiences as 'utter failures,' he argued, was a 'highly damaging tendency' which 'may itself lead to real failures' (Hirschman, 1984: 55). The language of internal and external actors arguably shapes the perceptions of and possibilities for action and reform, in Algeria and the Arab world, as in South America. The English philosopher J.L. Austin developed the idea of the 'performative' effect of words, implying that they have the power to create reality. The thesis explores to what extent the language of actors can have a mirror effect, creating civil society, in their own image, taking the European Union as a prime example of such an actor.

There is a more positive strand, in alternative analyses of Algerian civil society organisations. Cavatorta and Durac argue in their recent book *Civil Society and Democratisation in the Arab World, The Dynamics of Activism*, that, although divided, Algerian NGOs, in the absence of political parties, do indeed now form a powerful framework within which politics happens (2011). In order for associations or civil society organizations (CSOs)² to have an impact, with a voice of their own, they need to have had time and appropriate support, to stabilize and flourish.

The thesis focuses on specific associations in Algeria that have had this time to flourish and have received some form of specific external, national or local support for their work. The investigation was carried out in a period when Algeria had experienced almost a decade without armed conflict, when the language and perceptions were gradually changing. It was equally a time of significant change and development in society and politics across the region as a whole.

This research focuses its investigation on over 200 Algerian CSOs, many of which I had the privilege of working with between 2007 and 2009, in the framework of the EU's support programme. Employed by this programme, based in the National Ministry of Solidarity and the Social Development Agency in Algiers, I spent a period of two years, within a mainly national technical team responsible for assisting the Ministry. It was the exceptional energy and commitment of my Algerian colleagues, and of the associations, in successfully implementing this programme, that inspired me to return (seven times) to Algeria between 2009 and 2012, to research further. I wanted firstly, to explore the impact of Algerian associations on their political environment, and secondly, to assess the role of external actors supporting them.

Since 2003, two significant programmes have been implemented by the European Commission, funded by the MEDA programme, to support civil society in Algeria. These programmes have supported over 1000 local Algerian associations, but with small measures (the EU's global budget for CSOs in Algeria is one of the lowest in the region). The majority of these organizations were created in Algeria during the period of conflict, the result of endogenous processes, independent of external support. The trauma of conflict not only prevented the proper functioning of Algeria's numerous associations, but also meant that associational life in the 1990s grew in a vacuum. Away from donors, activities were often directly linked to the needs of the population, arising from abuses and tragedies, consequences of one of the most painful conflicts in recent history. It is these isolated conditions, the modest support of external actors, the reform process, followed by the conflict, which make Algerian associations an interesting and inspiring area of research.

² The thesis uses the term association and civil society organisation interchangeable, the term NGO in the Algerian context is generally considered to refer to something else, generally an external organisation

Whilst avoiding over ambitious expectations of the civil society in democracy perspective of the early 1990s, the thesis nevertheless challenges certain critiques and the scepticism in the academic literature against civil society as a force for political change. In Abu-Sada and Challand's recent research into civil society in the Arab world, they argue that it is important to avoid these extreme visions of associations, as either a panacea for all political problems on the one hand, or as a privileged instrument manipulated by states and donors on the other. They write :

Associations are, depending on the case, seen as places of innovation, free from the bureaucracy of administrations which have for years claimed the monopoly on development, as a place of dissent, a counter-power, a laboratory for an alternative society, for democratisation of Arab regimes and societies, a place of local and political mobilisation. Almost inversely, they have also been considered a privileged instrument at the service of development policies, to be mobilised by the authorities as by donors, to promote their policies: as key institutions, new development policies, even as 'Governmental NGOs.' It is in-between of these two visions, the real effects they produce, that needs to be examined.. (Abu-Sada and Challand, 2011 :17)³

This thesis aims to examine these effects at the micro level. Using some of the ideas developed by Philippe Schmitter in the early 1990s (Schmitter, 1993), it seeks to discuss whether, and under which conditions, such organisations may contribute to political change.

Overall, this research project aims to discuss and challenge the following two assumptions found in the recent literature on civil society in the Middle East and North Africa :

- Firstly, that the associational movement in the Arab world has in the main proved to be a conservative force which serves to legitimize and reinforce authoritarian regimes (Liverani, 2008; Wictorowicz 2000; Carothers, 1999)
- Secondly, that the role of donors has, in the main, supported this process, of reinforcing authoritarianism. In trying to 'construct' civil society from the outside, through their language, donors create an artificial civil society (Roy, 2005), a corrupted one (Henderson, 2002), and one which, as such, serves to reinforce authoritarianism (Liverani, 2008).

³ L'association est, selon les cas, appréhendée comme un lieu d'innovation, libre des pesanteurs bureaucratiques des administrations centrales qui ont longtemps revendiqué le monopôle du développement légitime, comme un lieu de dissidence, de contre-pouvoir, un laboratoire pour le développement d'une contre-société, pour la démocratisation des sociétés et des régimes arabes, un lieu de mobilisation locale et politique. Quasiment à l'inverse, elle est aussi considérée comme un instrument privilégié au service des politiques de développement, mobilisable tant par les autorités centrales que par les bailleurs internationaux, pour promouvoir leurs politiques : comme des institutions clés, des nouvelles politiques de développement, voire comme des « Gouvernemental NGO ou GONGO ». C'est cet entre-deux, et les effets de réels qu'ils produisent, qu'il s'agit d'examiner.. (Abu-Sada and Challand, 2011 :17)

These hypotheses will be developed, challenged, applied and questioned in the case of Algeria, seeking to avoid the extremes, as suggested by Challand, and aiming to analyse the 'real effects' through the criteria proposed by Schmitter, in order to assess the political roles and potential of civil society organizations.

The thesis will explore how lessons from more modest approaches could inform and reform the EU models. In Algeria, for historical and political reasons, the EU has been obliged to work more directly and consciously with existing dynamics and national structures. Paradoxically, the 'weaker' EU stance, taken in the Mediterranean region (compared to sub-Saharan Africa for example), and in Algeria in particular, with regard to democratization and civil society, may have actually generated more promising results.

Thesis structure

The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part (the first two chapters) introduces the general context and theoretical debates concerning the concept of civil society and donor development policies which target it, focusing on the EU and the Arab world. The second part (chapters three and four) explores in greater detail the context of Algeria. The final part examines donor policies and programmes, and the impact of their language on associations.

More specifically, the thesis builds upon the current literature and scholarly debates about civil society in Algeria and in the MENA region (chapter one). It begins by looking at the recent growth in the numbers of associations across the Arab world and then assesses how such developments have been perceived in academic writing. Chapter one sets out the main questions and assumptions of the thesis and places the research within the theoretical debates about civil society and its potential to contribute to political change.

Subsequently, EU civil society and democratisation models are examined. Chapter two looks at their application in the field in Algeria and in the MENA region. The chapter identifies when the concepts of civil society and democratization entered into development policy literature, showing how these paradigms influenced EU models of development. A comparative approach looks at the different levels of funding the EU provides to civil society actors, and which types. Three different cases in the region are examined: Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon.

The second part focuses solely on Algeria. Chapter three presents a detailed analysis of the evolution of Algerian state-society relations. It looks at how the difficulties in constructing both the nation

itself, and an Algerian identity, contributed to difficulties in achieving plural opposition in Algerian politics. The chapter discusses associations in their historical perspective, looking at the evolution of the legislative framework and at how language choices and policies affected civil society and the public sphere. Chapter three also looks at the impact of the Arab revolutions on Algeria, with the political and legal reforms launched in 2011. It assesses the associative responses to these reforms and analyses a number of particular cases which highlight the changing state-society relations.

The thesis continues with a case study approach, using the field data to provide a new broad typology, and also to provide a detailed picture of the functioning of a number of associations (chapter four). Cases are selected within two sectors, the heritage and the social sector, to identify different trends, across the regions of Algeria. This sectoral approach firstly explores heritage associations, examining how they respond to the challenges of redefining national and regional identity, through protecting historical monuments and sites, and by going beyond the previous boundaries established or promoted by the state. The chapter then examines a number of social associations, which in their own ways challenge or interact with the state to provide social services, thereby redefining roles, expectations and responsibilities. Placing the associations within the national typologies and classifications, the chapter also examines the role of external financing, or the lack of it, within certain areas of particularly dense associative life.

The third part focuses on donors and on the question language. The thesis examines the role of the EU within Algeria as an actor for civil society, for NGOs and for associations. The overview given in chapter two is consolidated with a more detailed analysis in chapter five of the specific programmes and policies the EU has pursued in Algeria in the last decades. The chapter explores the actions and the language of EU officials, and how the EU finances associations. It examines how the EU interacts with national authorities and the impact of this relationship on the resulting funding programmes. Lastly, chapter five examines the impact of the EU's language on civil society actors, through its calls for projects.

Chapter six finally seeks to draw together the different elements of the thesis concerning language, donors and civil society in Algeria. Taking the second assumption discussed above, concerning the role of donors, and the risks of creating an artificial civil society, it asks about the performative effect of donor language. It discusses whether donors impose priorities in Algeria, and whether there is an adverse, mirror effect. Does the EU in Algeria ignore the real traditional structures in place, seeking to construct its own vision of civil society, or does this prove impossible in the Algerian context? The chapter also asks about the role of associations themselves in challenging the language of historical narratives of the state, and what impact this has on their role in the public sphere. Finally language

policy itself within Algeria, at the national level, may have in some ways prevented attempts to construct civil society from within. Restrictive linguistic policies of the 1960s stigmatized the vernacular languages which could be used in this public sphere. The chapter will examine how associations have defined new needs and lobbied for change in terms of language practices within the education system, the media and the cultural sphere. It examines how the dominance of external actors and their language choices could impact upon such processes.

Method and Data

Overall, this research draws heavily on previous personal experiences working with the EU development programmes, which targeted civil society in the Maghreb and in Africa. I have carried out one long-term field mission in Algeria between 2007 and 2009. This was based in Algiers and involved working with associations in twenty three out of the forty eight regional wilayas of Algeria. During several shorter field missions, between 2010 and 2012, I conducted interviews with a large number of other local associations in different regions (some financed by the EU, others not). I also participated in a number of regional forums and activities of the associations and followed their work via the internet. Data comes from field research with the Algerian institutional structures of the Ministry of National Solidarity and the Social Development Agency, the European Union office in Algiers, as well as a significant number of civil society organisations in Algeria. A number of missions between 2010 and 2012, as an independent researcher, to the neighbouring country of Mauritania, and to Lebanon, have provided secondary case material and the possibility to verify the assumptions concerning the Algerian context. The field missions have allowed me to develop an in-depth knowledge of these associations and of institutional actors in Algeria and across the region. This knowledge comes from the openness and trust that these actors have given me, and for which I am very grateful.

There is now significant financial and technical data from over 200 associations financed by the Support to Algerian Development Associations Programmes. This includes the statutes, financial and technical reports, and objective evaluations from a number of different actors in the various monitoring processes (both institutional and external). Similar data from non-EU financed associations has been obtained from within Algeria.

An in-depth study of twenty five associations (listed in the annexes), covering the different categories and regions, uses structured and semi-structured interviews with the presidents, boards and members. Significant time spent in the field with these associations and with the populations

identified as beneficiaries of their actions is complemented by interviews which target the partners (institutional and associative) with whom they work, in formal or informal networks. This was in order to evaluate their influence on the political culture and mobilisation within Algeria and their perceptions of their role, in particular in relation to the state. This research provides the material for the case studies (primarily the first eight associations listed) and for chapters one, three, four and six, which explore more specifically Algerian civil society.

Interviews and field visits sought to determine the degree of independence the associations have from the state and from private spheres and to gauge the effectiveness of associations in creating viable, alternative public spaces to which citizens have access. The level of cohesiveness of the different parts of the associational movement, within different networks (generally sector focused ones) is assessed, to see whether such divisions may, as has been argued by Cavatorta (2008), limit the potential of associations to challenge the state.

The thesis examines Algerian associations and the associational movement itself, their role, their relations with the state and their influence in local and national politics. It assesses associations' impressions of working with an external actor such as the EU and the impressions that the EU has of working with civil society in the Algerian context. It concludes by looking at language, and how the EU democratization and civil society models fit in the Algerian context, and what lessons this can provide for the future.

PART I - The civil society concept and donor development policies

Chapter 1. Civil society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and in Algeria

Summary

In the build up to and in light of the Arab revolutions of 2011, the associational movement in Algeria, North Africa and the Middle East has been the focus of increasing interest for academics, legislators and for policy makers both within and outside of the region. Significant transformations have occurred in associative life over the last twenty years. The greatest increases in numbers of associations in relation to population figures are now found respectively in Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco. In Algeria, the surge in associations, founded in the 1990s in parallel with the civil conflict, provoked much debate on the capacity of that movement to bring about political change, to respond to it and to challenge political practices. During this period Algeria became by far the most association dense country in the region. Recent academic debates tend to suggest however, that this new freedom of association, in the region as in Algeria, has been in the main, an illusory one. This chapter introduces the specific problems dealt with in the thesis concerning the concept of civil society and its application in the MENA region and the role and importance of associations within this framework. It introduces the literature on civil society in the Arab MENA region in general, in Algeria in particular, and looks at the history of associations, the impact of the conflict and the challenges to achieving political pluralism.

Political concepts such as civil society can travel across cultures. But they are only meaningful, if they can be rooted in the historical experiences which shape the collective memory of the individual societies to which they are being applied. The recurrent violent confrontations experienced in almost all post-colonial regimes, have undermined the potential for building sustainable civil society. Such confrontations, experienced across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, were described by Mohammed Arkoun as 'politically-programmed collective tragedies,' (Arkoun, 2004:39). Under the stress of rolling back the colonial state, nation building in the Maghreb has not always permitted the existence of autonomous spaces or organisations (Filal-Ansary, 2004:309). Ben Nefissa writes of how 'the construction of modern states after independence was a period of rupture for associative life in Arab countries' (Ben Nefissa, 2002: 17).⁴ Today, faced with contemporary realities of rapid urbanization, growing social exclusion and the precarious position of the middle classes, the difficult task of building civic culture is left to citizens, under the control of often unaccountable institutions.

Nowhere are these challenges as important and as pressing as in the case of Algeria. Despite the long civil conflict of the 1990s, Algeria is one of the more open regimes in the North African region in terms of freedom of association and the press. At the same time, for both historical and political reasons, Algeria has remained relatively isolated from, or closed to western donors over the last decades.⁵ In its struggles with the legacy of colonialism, with religious extremism, with political violence, and with increasing economic and social inequalities, Algeria represents an important case for the postcolonial nation. Evans & Phillips describe Algeria as a 'microcosm of the contemporary world' (2008:xv). It is also an interesting example of how, despite unpromising conditions, internal processes can evolve to allow civic actors the means by which to deal with some of these challenges.

In Algeria, as across the MENA region, there has been a surge in the number of registered independent associations. By 2012, there were over 93,000 officially registered Algerian associations; compared to 10,000 in the late 1980s and to almost none under the single party system of the 1970s.⁶ This makes Algeria the most association dense country in the region. The following diagrams illustrate the numbers of associations registered in MENA countries based on available information from recent studies (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011, ICNL NGO Law monitor⁷), field work and government websites.


⁴ La construction des Etats modernes après l'indépendance a été une période de rupture pour la vie associative des pays arabes.

⁵ Many international actors withdrew from Algeria during the decade of violence; also Algeria's new economic wealth and renewed foreign policy has enabled it to challenge its foreign interlocutors (See Darbouche, 2008).

⁶ Since 1987, registered associations went from 10.000 to 93.000 www.interieur.gov.dz/Associations/


⁷ <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/>

Figure 1 : Registered Associations in MENA countries



Even taking into account the considerable differences in population, there are significantly more associations officially registered in Algeria, than in neighbouring countries. The next diagram shows Algeria has the most associations per capita, followed by Lebanon.

Figure 2 : Registered Associations by population



The following table gives details concerning the data, identifying the number of associations in each country and indicates the reliability and availability of the data. The data does not show the number of members and thus cannot be a full indicator of the associative life. However it identifies the facility with which an association can be created in each context.

Table 1 : Associations in the MENA countries

Country	Pop. in millions 2012	Registered Associations	Associations / million inhabitants	Sources
Algeria	35	93 654	2 676	Ministry of Interior figures showed 78 000 for 2007. 92 627 local and 1 027 national associations were registered in 2012. The figures are published on the Ministry of Interior website : www.interieur.gov.dz/ Dynamics/frmlItem.aspx?html=2&s=29
Morocco	32	35 000	1 094	CEPS indicates between 30 and 80 000, Amnesty International (AI) indicates 40 000 in 2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/C_AFRAD/UNPAN016617.pdf ; Interview with the PCPA programme in Rabat (Oct 2011) indicated 35 000 but that it is 'very difficult to have correct figures'. ICNL indicates the figure is unknown.
Egypt	82	24 500	299	ICNL indicates these 2007 estimates from the Ministry of Social solidarity. www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jegypt.html
Tunisia	10	9 700	970	Amnesty indicates 8 444 in 2004 www.ifeda.org.tn/francais/statistiques.php In 2011 IFEDA Association indicates 9 700, after the revolution. www.tunivisions.net/28266/152/149/ plus-de-9700-associations-en-tunisie.html
Yemen	24	6 000	250	Cavatorta, 2011, quotes USAID figures in 2007, of 5 632. ICNL indicates 6 000 associations registered with the Ministry of Labour and Social affairs in 2012 , following the new law on Associations of 2001. www.icnl.org/research/monitor/yemen.html
Lebanon	4	5 523	1 381	Cavatorta, 2011 gives figures for 1999 - indicating 1 100. A recent increase, (following a Ministerial Circular in 2006 to improve implementation practices) is reported by ICNL which indicates 5 523 national associations in 2012 www.icnl.org/research/monitor/lebanon.html
Palestinian Territories	4	2 999	750	ICNL indicates 2 999 associations registered with the Ministry of Interior, NGOs dept. West Bank : 2 100 Gaza Strip: 899 (2009 est.) www.icnl.org/research/monitor/palestine.html
Jordan	6	2 000	333	Cavatorta, 2011 - study by Kassim in 2006 indicated 1 000 NGOs. ICNL indicates 2 000 in 2012, registered with the Ministry of Social Development www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html
Mauritania	3	800	267	European Union Delegation in Nouakchott, 2010

The figures and the sources, (Ministry data, NGO monitoring programmes and academic research) show significant increases in the number of registered associations across the region. The sources also indicate important legislative reforms in many of the countries which have enabled these developments (such as Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen). In the region, for the countries with available information, Algeria has the greatest number of associations per population, followed by Lebanon and then Morocco. The least associative countries are Yemen, followed by Mauritania then Egypt. Algeria represents a unique case in the region, in the sheer numbers of associations. Some of the NGO monitoring websites (ICNL) have criticised a lack of freedom to register organizations in Algeria. Yet the figures show that the Algerian authorities have registered more than double the number of associations than in the nearest competing country, Morocco, for which the figures are not published. Algeria has roughly the same number of registered associations (per capita) as England & Wales have registered charities.⁸

It would seem then, that it matters, what happens at the micro level of this associative phenomenon in Algeria and in the MENA region. What roles do these associations play and what of their interactions with the state? Do associations constitute a new form of the public sphere for political dialogue or making claims? If so, do they have any impact on policy making? Do they have contacts with external actors, or have transnational or trans-regional networks and identities? Do they constitute (at least a part of) an active civil society? Or are they co-opted by the state or external donors? Exploring these questions in this chapter and throughout the thesis, can hopefully shed light on whether there are qualitative changes in state society relations due to increasing associational activity.

The role of Algerian associations in the recent demonstrations and contestation in early 2011 has been minimal. Yet their role has also been criticized, both by the state and parliamentarians as not having prevented trouble⁹, and by external actors as not having been real actors capable of providing a coherent platform of opposition (Bozzo, 2011). The expectations of and the controls upon associations appear to be high and sometimes contradictory. Lessons from the Algerian democratization process of the early 1990s, and others such as the Mauritanian transition experience of 2005, when (in both cases) there was a massive increase in associative action, could prove useful when considering realistic expectations, potential roles and risks for associations in transition processes.

⁸ 161,000 charities are registered with the Charities Commission in 2011, (for a country with almost double the population of Algeria) www.charity-commission.gov.uk, accessed 29.11.11

⁹ Les députés relèvent des ambiguïtés et des atteintes à la liberté d'association, 28.11.11, Nabila Amir, Watan

This chapter will begin by (i) examining the concepts of civil society and associations as they have been applied in the literature for the MENA region. It will discuss the relevance and the risks of comparing cases. Then, (ii) a brief history of Algerian civil society will be discussed, looking at how the associative sphere in the 20th century framed the Algerian liberation movement, making associations a space for socialization and politicization. Finally, (iii) different potential roles of associations will be discussed, looking at theories of the early 1990s about the role of civil society in political life and in reconciliation processes.

i.) The concept of civil society and its application in the MENA region

The cultural, historic, linguistic and religious ties that bind the countries of the Maghreb to the Middle East are strong. The concept of civil society has been debated as to its relevance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)¹⁰ region as a whole. Many definitions of civil society have been proposed. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the Egyptian American sociologist, defines civil society as the ‘freedom of human beings to associate’. In his article in 1998, ‘The Troubled Triangle: Populism, Islam and Civil Society in the Arab World’, he identifies a working definition of civil society as

the totality of self-initiating and self-regulating volitional social formations, peacefully pursuing a common interest, advocating a common cause, or expressing a common passion; respecting the right of others to do the same, and maintain their relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state, the family, the temple and the market. (Ibrahim, 1998:374)

It is generally accepted then that civil society thus includes the press, trade unions, teachers, academia, intellectuals, artists and charitable associations. The arena of civil society is an independent one primarily from the state and the market (Ibrahim adds the temple and the family). The main focus of this study is one important part of civil society, the associational movement, made up of formal and registered associations. This is a defined and identifiable target group, for which official figures exist (although they are not always public as the tables in the introduction show). It includes trade unions, to a certain extent the media (as represented by professional associations), and religious groups which are also regulated either by charities law or by a similar legislative framework in the MENA countries.

¹⁰ an Anglo-Saxon regional definition taken on increasingly by the EU since the early 1990s (Philippart, 2003:14)

Ibrahim argued in 1998, that civil society in the Arab world had revitalized itself. He argued that new socio-economic formations 'have been growing' and that weakened states have 'less capacity to repress' them. He wrote that: 'despite notable distortion and time lags, the Arab world is currently going through civil society building and democratization' (Ibrahim, 1998).

To avoid the difficulty of distinguishing between independent or dependent organizations, and to avoid the normative questions related to Ibrahim's conception of 'peaceful' and 'respecting' organizations, a more functional, neo-Toquevillian conception of civil society has also been suggested by other authors. Liverani describes this as the 'functional role played by the associative sphere,' which he defines as a 'precondition of democracy' (2008). Associational life can be a way of increasing freedom in the political sphere, through 'empowerment and popular participation.' In contrast to this, Cavatorta and Durac suggest that,

A positive perception of the pro-democracy role that civil society plays is misplaced...[and that it is perhaps more useful for civil society to] be construed as a neutral analytical category. (Cavatorta and Durac 2011: 2)

They seem to seek to go beyond a normative or a functional role for the civil society concept, to focus more on the practical characteristics of associational life in different contexts. In his research on the Middle East and Palestinian NGOs, Benoit Challand also considers it important to define contextually the concept of civil society, in 'spatial' terms. Challand defines civil society as a

space (as independent as possible from the direct interventions from the state, private business and family realms) for voluntary collective deliberations and actions that function as a source of autonomy (Challand, 2008, 399).

Civil society actors must be autonomous from external actors, in order then to have the freedom to define a common political project. For Challand one of the impediments to this autonomy is the dominance of external donors. The imposition of external agendas on national actors limits civil society. For him, it is this 'autonomy' of actors to create spaces for dialogue, to define their agendas and objectives, to contribute to policy dialogue, which allows us to define civil society.

Much of the recent literature on the region's associations and civil society presents, however, a rather sceptical view as to the autonomy of these organizations and their capacity to bring about change. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that there cannot be any Arab Muslim civil society,

and that this absence implies that Arab society and culture is inhospitable to democratization (see Challand, 2008, 400). Within the Maghreb, Filal-Ansary writes that,

Most scholars have offered negative judgements on this particular strain of nascent civil society. In their view it is artificial, its role marginal and often manipulated by state (secret) services. It is, for them, either an elite operation, a kind of fashion, or an outcome, a product of foreign influence. Elite strata are seen to continue manipulating society to serve their interests. Even if most of these accusations are exaggerated, or lack foundation, the 'outburst' of civil society activity does not appear to have imparted durable and dependable strength, or meaningful autonomy to society. (Filal-Ansary, 2004:309).

For other scholars, civil society in closed political systems is often more likely to ensure the durability of authoritarian regimes, rather than lead to a more open society (Wictorowicz 2000, Liverani, 2008).

Vickie Langhor develops Thomas Carothers' strong critique on NGOs, questioning the capacity of NGOs as opposition actors, in the title to her article, claiming there to be 'too much civil society, too little politics' (Langhor, 2004). The focus on specific interests such as human rights makes them 'ill equipped to mobilize a much broader set of constituencies' for goals such as regime change. Their dependence on foreign aid reduces their legitimacy at home. The article recommends focusing policy and academic analysis on political parties rather than on NGOs (Langhor 2004).

Summarizing the literature about civil society in the Arab world, Cavatorta and Durac (2011:21) identify three visions of Arab civil society as :

- An exclusively liberal, secular model, and thus very weak and unable to challenge regimes,
- Strong and uncivil, not necessarily adhering to liberal values (predominantly Islamist),
- Massively increasing, but as the co-opted product of regimes, and therefore artificial. In both Islamist and secular models it has only a marginal role, providing social services, responding to the secular state's inability to do so.

The authors reject the three visions as inaccurate, including the assumption of an artificially 'created civil society', to appease foreign donors and to tame society. They write that it is

misleading to consider that all civil society groups lack autonomy and independence from the regime. It might be argued on the contrary that the increased number of civil society organisations throughout the Arab world truly constitutes an attempt from sectors of society to reclaim the public sphere and to introduce changes in the ways in which governance is

implemented. While the outcome of their work and activism might not have been translated into significant political change at the institutional macro level, the picture of a society which is held hostage by the regime may be misleading. (Cavatorta and Durac 2011: 28).

This, they argue is for three reasons. Firstly, a strong repressive apparatus indicates that there is a real opposition. Secondly, globalisation and the internet make it hard for any regime to control all of society and all information. And finally, state sponsored civil society has been far more 'reactive than proactive.' The associations created by the state are usually in response to real and effective autonomous ones in society, rather than the other way round. The authors go on to quote Jamal (2007) to argue that that under authoritarian regimes however, associations are obliged to play by the rules of the game, and work within corrupt systems, which do not encourage democratic practices.

In the specific case of Algeria, there had also been previous optimism (such as Ibrahim's for Arab civil society) but much of the recent literature has also been fairly sceptical as to the independence and effectiveness of civil society. Previously, in the 1990s, according to Kazemi and Norton, Algerian associations constituted, an 'impressive array of rights oriented groups' (1996). Others went further to claim that 'the indisputable existence of an increasingly resolute civil society provides the potential for genuine democratisation' (Zoubir, 1999 quoted in Liverani 2008 p5). In her book *Pouvoirs et Associations dans le Monde Arabe*, whilst not specifically focussing on Algeria, Sarah Ben Nefissa recognises that :

Algeria seems to be the only Arab country which, in its legal system, has the system of declaration and not authorisation [for registering associations]. Today, it is possible to speak of a real explosion of associations. The social categories which feel most threatened by Islamist extremism and the Algerian state have been the first to organise. This is mainly women and Berbers. Currently, it is possible to say that the associative form, more than political parties or the press, constitutes one of the main modes of expression for Algerian society which seeks to avoid being imprisoned in the binome State/Islamists. (Ben Nefissa, 2002)¹¹

¹¹ L'Algérie semble être le seul pays arabe qui, sur le plan juridique, connaît la procédure de la déclaration et non celle de l'autorisation. Aujourd'hui, il est possible de parler d'une véritable explosion associative. Les catégories sociales qui se sont senties les plus menacées par l'extrémisme islamiste et l'Etat algérien ont été les premières à s'organiser. Il s'agit principalement des femmes et des Berbères. Actuellement, il est possible de dire que la forme associative, plus que le parti politique ou la presse, constitue l'une des principales voies d'expression de la société algérienne qui cherche à ne pas se laisser emprisonner dans le binôme Etat/islamistes.

An increasingly sceptical view of Algerian civil society, however, has since developed. In the conclusions of their book *Algeria: anger of the dispossessed*, Evans and Phillips quote the national newspaper *Liberté* in 2006, which argued that the electoral apathy, directionless violence, juvenile delinquency and the ongoing riots across, were ‘a telling comment on the lack of a civil society’ (Evans & Phillips, 2007: 299). Hugh Roberts, the British academic and North Africa expert, stated in 2005,

I personally do not think that this development [of the huge increase in associations] for the time being translates into something that is politically significant other than a factor that helps to stabilize the State and defend and reproduce it¹² (Roberts, 2005)

Andrea Liverani’s in-depth research into Algerian associations, published in 2008, also presents one of the strongest critiques. He argues that Algerian civil society is in reality strongly controlled by the state bureaucracy. Liverani questions both the current capacity for change and the degree of independence of Algerian civil society from the state. For Liverani, many of the associations are still inherently weak and essentially tied to the state for funding and for access to opportunities. In turn, he feels, they support the state politically, at key moments, such as electoral campaigns, representing, in a way, state corporatism over the associative sector.

Cavatorta & Elanza argue to the contrary however, that civil society *can be* an agent for change in Algeria and in the region. In contrast to Langhor and Liverani, they suggest that it is the absence of effective political parties, which makes the civic arena the space in which politics often takes place.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is within the realm of a growing politicized “civil society” that demands for radical change to the political, economic and social structures are articulated (Cavatorta & Elanza 2008).

For them, it remains the internal divisions in Algerian civil society, between secular and religious organisations, which prevent it from being a real actor for regime change. The radically divergent demands concerning the status of women and the family code for example, are articulated in the associative movement, but are irreconcilable according to Cavatorta. In his recent book written with Vincent Durac, Cavatorta (2011) further argues :

the divisions within civil society dating back to the conflicts of the 1990s and .. relations between different sectors of civil society, namely the Islamist camp and the secular one, are

¹² Speech to the Forum on the Middle East and North Africa, (FRIDE Madrid) 3 February 2005

fraught with tensions and suspicions which allow the regime to divide and conquer the opposition through a careful process of co-optation and marginalization (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011: 4)

For the authors, civil society in Algeria is vibrant and autonomous, but the inability to build effective coalitions often allows the state to 'divide and rule,' thus ensuring its own survival. Civil society replaces active politics, but its efficacy in this role is questionable, due to the fragmented nature of the organizations and, arguably, of society as a whole.

There are clearly divisions in the Algerian context, ones which were exacerbated by the conflict of the 1990s. However, it remains unclear whether these divisions really diminish the potential of Algerian civil society to demand and bring about change. Indeed, whilst Cavatorta & Elanza point to 'the problematic relationship between the secular and Islamist opposition' (2011:5), they also acknowledge cases of co-operation (ibid: 33). Associations appear to have overcome this divide, in the example they cite, in which Islamist and secular associations both challenge the state policy of reconciliation, (which they both argue does not provide justice for the families of all the victims of the 1990s). In this case they describe, it is in the associative sector, that difficult political claims are debated and formulated. The thesis will discuss similar examples in more detail in the specific case studies in chapters 3 and 4.

Whilst conflicts certainly exist, it is not uniquely a relationship of conflict between religious and secular organisations. Conflict also exists within secular movements, and within Islamist movements. This is a challenge for all sections of Algerian society, following the traumas of ten years of bitter conflict. Yet, conflicts do not necessarily limit the potential of organisations to challenge state policies. Many associations do challenge policies for reconciliation, health, education, heritage, social policy and much more. They do so vocally, in the press and online, taking risks as they do. Whilst Cavatorta and Elanza identify reform as 'regime change' from authoritarianism, they also recognise there is currently no viable alternative to the current regime. If associations do not seek to overthrow the regime, as this is not their chosen or desirable immediate goal, then their contributions to gradual change should nonetheless also be explored and valued.

The explosion in the number of associations in Algeria, the fragmentation and the lack of autonomy and ways of overcoming divisions, pose interesting questions about civil society for political analysts in the region and for Algerians themselves. Algeria has had two centuries of repression, and is still under FLN rule (the only party since independence). How does a population of increasingly active citizens interact with the regime in such a tense political environment? As Evans and Philips noted in

2007, the country's problems have not been resolved. Algerians 'still want to be treated as citizens.' The population wants 'good government, the rule of law and use of oil and gas wealth for the benefit of the majority' (Evans & Philips, 2007). Civil society, whilst vibrant, remains fairly weak and operates in a difficult environment. The majority of Algerians seek peace and stability, over upheavals, and fear a return of the insecurity and violence of the 1990s. This needs to be taken into account in the expectations of what civil society can achieve in the Algerian context, in terms of political change and of the time frames required for such change.

It is suggested then, that whilst associations are sometimes divided, they have also overcome divisions. And that whilst there is scepticism concerning civil society in the Arab world and in Algeria, there have also been transformations over the last twenty years. Examining in detail the legislation and the micro-level activities of organisations can provide a clearer understanding of how the concept of civil society is perceived in North Africa and Algeria. The thesis will seek to do this over the next chapters. To see whether this could provide interesting findings for the regional level, it is important to first identify the risks of comparing countries.

Relevance and risks of comparing cases in the MENA region

The societies of the MENA region have faced some similar political trajectories in the last decades. Many have undergone liberalization processes, whilst maintaining a strong military dominance over the state. Longevity of their rulers, violent internal conflict, failed democratic transition and incomplete reconciliation processes have characterized a number of states. Other common challenges persist, such as common porous borders, high unemployment, rural poverty as well as rapid urbanization. In many countries, there is frustration with the political institutions, due to a lack of accountability of the regimes. As a result of this, and of changes in legislation, many countries have witnessed significant increases in civil society organizations. Comparisons can thus be drawn, as to whether and how the associative spheres may influence reform.

Yet, despite similarities between the states, the possibility for misleading comparisons remains. The historical contexts vary hugely, including the colonial legacies. Socio-economic development levels and the structures of civil society vary greatly. The timing, scale and impact of the political upheavals differ. Conflicts such as that of the Western Sahara mean that co-operation between countries is limited. All this implies different relations and negotiating positions between MENA countries and external donors. This results in different co-operation programmes, including interventions which

target civil society actors. In such negotiations, the Algerian position, as a major energy supplier to the same external donor countries, is a rather specific and fairly powerful one.¹³

The economic and political costs of limited co-operation between the MENA states remain high (Ghiles, 2010¹⁴). Lessons from the individual contexts may be lost. Whilst there have been comparative analyses of civil society in the region, the situation is changing rapidly. Algeria could provide an important case study for similar contexts in transition. The democratization project in Algeria (and its reversal) was one of the more far reaching processes in the region, prior to 2011. The figures from the tables in the introduction show how the Algerian reforms of the 1990s have significantly impacted on the associational movement and the public space over the last twenty years.

Associations deserve attention, alongside political parties, when analysing how the political and public sphere is evolving at the local level. The following sections introduce the role of associations and civil society in Algeria, and then the political roles associations can play, as discussed in the literature, in Algeria and across the region.

ii.) Civil Society in Algeria

Whereas both Morocco and Tunisia had experienced state building impetus respectively since the eleventh and eighth century, Algeria has only truly existed as a unified territory since the sixteenth century. This was when the Ottoman Regency was present in North Africa, at the request of the Muslim populations, to prevent the expansion of the newly united Spanish Kingdom in its reconquest of the Mediterranean (Evans & Philips, 2007). Prior (and subsequent) to this, successions of invasions and migrations, from the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, Almoravids and Almohads to the French invasion of 1830, had made 'Algeria' an unstable area where the small family, the village and the tribe were the basic units of society. The original Berber population was defined by clan, lineage, tribe and family, with a strong emphasis on self-reliance as a response to insecurity and weak government (Evans & Philips, 2007; Horne, 1987). Algerians continued to follow

¹³ See chapter 5 for a history of EU cooperation and negotiations with Algeria

¹⁴ *Le « non-Maghreb » coûte cher au Maghreb*, Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 2010

customary law, the village came together to decide important matters through village councils, and these were naturally egalitarian.¹⁵

Associative life in Algeria fits into this evolution of state and society. It was a difficult context, given the historical weakness and distrust of the central state. Some writers go further to show how the Ottoman regency indeed transformed the state into an object for enrichment. Profiteers could gain access to easy wealth through links to the state, a practice which continued under French rule (Evans & Philips 2007, Martinez 1998). Andrea Liverani's research in 2008 holds strongly that the 'weak' Algerian state lies at the heart of the problems of civil society in Algeria today (although his hypothesis is questioned even in Jean Leca's introduction to the book).

The evolutionary paths described by Ibrahim (1998) and Hawthorne (2004), in their similar analyses of traditional Arab civil formations and civil society development in the Arab world, could also be applied to Algeria. Both Ibrahim and Hawthorne describe how pre-modern society was based around a public space shared by ulama, merchants' guilds, Sufi orders, and sects running their collective affairs through elected or appointed leaders. The Sufi brotherhoods of the zaouias and the village councils both had strong impact on the collective decision making in Algeria. These consensual approaches even influenced the type of government proposed by President Houari Boumediene.¹⁶

Yet the reality throughout much of nineteenth and twentieth century Algeria was one of high levels of repression and restriction of any oppositional civic, religious or traditional structures seeking to play a role in the country's development and political life. A centralising, state-lead vision of development was imposed upon society, firstly by the colonial administration, then, after independence, by the single party state. This was achieved through legislation and through intervention in the functioning of any autonomous grouping.

It had been a deliberate policy of the French colonial administration to break up the traditional Muslim structures and families in Algeria. As early as 1894, Governor General Cambon regretted this strategy of 'suppressing the forces of resistance,' the result of which meant that the French subsequently had no means of action or of knowing with whom to negotiate. Their complete success in preventing any form of Muslim opposition body meant that they were left with what Cambon

¹⁵ Chapter 6 discusses how the history of the Algerian nation has been in flux and redefined by successive regimes for political purposes

¹⁶ After taking power from Ahmed Ben Bella, through the coup in 1965, Boumediene recognized the importance of having an egalitarian, consensual type of leadership which Roberts links to the traditional village council form of governance, and to avoid the cult of personality of his predecessor. (Roberts, quoted in Evans & Philips, 2007 : 82)

described as 'a sort of human dust on which we have no influence', and when opposition took them by surprise, they had no means of understanding or interacting with it (Horne, 2006 : 37).

A more politically active civil society did nevertheless evolve during the colonial period, particularly following the 1901 French law on associations. Professional associations, trade unions, cultural clubs, the scouts, secular charities, the *nadis* (circles), *cafés* and Islamist organizations emerged. Many of these structures played an important role in the nationalist, independence struggle. Associations such as the *Etoile Nord Africaine* and Messali Hadj's PPA, were fundamental in framing the independence movement and in politicizing the Algerian population. The Association of Muslim Ulama founded in 1931 by Ben Badis managed to unite different strands of Muslim actors and structures to present a clearly united nationalist agenda. Their repression in Algeria and in France was significant proof of their capacity to mobilize and to invoke fear in the colonial administration. As Cavatorta and Durac propose (see above) the existence of a repressive apparatus indicates the reality of the opposition (2011:28).

Such associations managed to create local, national and transnational spaces for the socialization and politicization of Algerians during the 1930s and 1940s. An 'illegitimate' public sphere under colonial rule, they articulated the nationalist movement, which was strengthened following the massacres and tragedy of Setif in 1945. The repression by the state, and the split in the nationalist movement contributed to the creation in March 1954 of the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'unité et d'action* (CRUA), the secret revolutionary *avant garde* group, which would subsequently form the the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) and launch the independence struggle on the 1st November 1954. The FLN clearly sought to bring about mass participation in the war of independence, and not only in the major cities. Omar Carlier describes the processes of mass mobilisation of the nationalist struggle, and the defining role of the 'intermediary' towns, which had perhaps better preserved their links to traditional or to rural life, as well as their spaces of socialization (Carlier, 1995). Within these spheres the FLN succeeded in uniting the rural and urban, the masses and the intelligentsia, through the *cafés* and *nadis* across the country. The work of the transnational, underground associations in France and Algeria permitted the financing and moral support for the liberation struggle, in Algeria and internationally, between 1954 and 1962. So both formal and underground associations played an important part in the mass mobilisation for the nation.

As a newly independent state, Algeria suffered severe problems and challenges from within and without, from artificial borders to the outside world, to weak institutions within Algeria itself. The difficulty of constructing a national united identity meant there was little room for pluralism. One of the constraints of the FLN narrative was that it had been in response to a colonial one (Evans &

Philips, 2007:8). The FLN narratives had emphasized the dichotomy of the good versus bad, colonizer versus colonized, enemy or traitor versus the insider. The enemy had now gone however and there was a need to construct a new strong heroic narrative and a single conception of what Algerian identity and the nation should be. The re-adaptation of historical texts and language played an important part in this process.¹⁷

In the postcolonial period, particularly under the first President Ben Bella, associations were originally tolerated. However, the fear of the independent, mobilising and divisive forces that might stem from the Islamic associations, and other powerful actors, increasingly led subsequent President Boumediene's regime to channel all popular civic participation through the mass organisations steered by the FLN itself. The state controlled most social and economic activity in society through the nationalised industries, collective farms and the mass associations. Professional unions and corporations were created by the FLN with the sole objective of giving unconditional support for the single party and for the Algerian revolution. The legal apparatus reinforced this deep level of control.¹⁸

The fragility of national unity and the importance of consolidating the revolution, were the implicit reasons given by the FLN for their domination over the social, economic and political life of the nation. Whilst it strengthened the state and embedded the revolution in everyday life, it also resulted in 'an impoverished and anaemic associative life, void of any real anchorage in society' (Derras, 2007). This repression of associational life for Algerians was also mirrored in France – the ban on Messali Hadj's association of the 1930s was never reversed with independence. Algerian immigrant associations in France were only legalised by President Mitterrand's government in 1982.

On both sides of the Mediterranean, such repression proved unsustainable. Intense nationwide riots were witnessed across Algeria in 1988. In response to the riots, and in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1989 Algeria launched an impressive democratization project of its own. Influenced by the transition processes post 1989, yet to a certain extent independent from external pressures, Algeria's President, Chadli Benjedid, revised the Constitution and brought in legislative reforms to open up the political scene to voluntary associations and to political parties.¹⁹ This reform programme very quickly allowed for a degree of political pluralism, for freedom of the press and for a considerable degree of freedom of association. Following the 1990 Law on associations, the number

¹⁷ Chapters 4 and 6 analyse how this was done and the impact upon civil society, associations and society in general

¹⁸ see chapter 3 for a more detailed history of the legal apparatus

¹⁹ Constitution of 1989 and the Loi 90-31 of 1990 on the Freedom of Association

of registered associations soared as national and local groupings formed and registered their status officially.

During the first free presidential elections held in 1991, the FLN – after having dominated post-colonial Algerian politics - suffered a massive defeat at the hands of the Islamic opposition party, who fought and won on what was essentially an anti-democratic programme. Following this defeat, in the first round of the elections, a military coup d'état was orchestrated, halting the electoral process, removing President Chadli and preventing the Islamic party of the Front Islamique du Salut from taking power. The succeeding bloody and prolonged conflict between Islamist insurgents and the military regime resulted in the deaths of an estimated 200,000 Algerians. The coup, the conflict, and the resulting state of emergency imposed upon society, all contributed to reversing the democratization process launched by the Algerian state in 1989. Algeria returned to a seemingly unavoidable state of authoritarian control.

Despite the retracted democratization process, the 1990s witnessed a continued increase in formally registered, civil society associations. By 2007 the number of associations registered at local and national level grew to 78 000 and by 2012 to 93 000, making Algeria the most active country in the Middle East and North Africa region in terms of civic life. Many associations were active in the social, charitable and medical sectors, but there are also a number active in promoting human rights, protecting victims of the violence, fostering religious and linguistic education, preserving Algeria's cultural heritage, and safeguarding the environment.

To set out a framework which enables an evaluation of the importance of this phenomenon and of the role of associations as part of civil society, the next section discusses the literature and theoretical debates about the political role of associations.

iii.) The political role of associations and reconciliation

A number of theoretical debates in the early 1990s identified certain conditions under which associations and civil society can contribute to political life and even to democratisation processes. These frameworks are still relevant, and can help to determine whether civil society should be taken as a neutral analytical category, interesting to study in itself (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011), or whether a more functional role in terms of democratisation should be attributed to it, as suggested (but rejected in the case of Algeria) by Liverani (2008). Alternatively, the framework suggested by Putnam could be useful to develop, namely that associations increase social capital and thereby improve

governance, as his research findings on Italian regions showed. These theoretical frameworks allow ways to measure whether and how the associations discussed throughout the thesis contribute to political life.

In *'Some propositions about civil society and the consolidation of democracy,'* Philippe Schmitter outlined five ways in which the promotion of civil society organisations might consolidate democracy (1993). The role of civil society could be positive in that: it stabilizes expectations and regroups information; it inculcates civic and democratic behaviour; it provides closer channels for expression; it governs members towards collective commitments; and it provides a source of resistance to tyranny.

However, Schmitter cautions that civil society could also present risks for democracy, depending on the specific characteristics of individual organizations and on the legal and political systems in which they function (Schmitter 199: 15). Civil society can negatively impact on democracy if: it makes the formation of majorities difficult; it biases the distribution of influence (e.g. becomes class based); it gives rise to policies no one wanted; or it brings pork barrel solutions, each association satisfying its own interests at the expense of the whole. There is also the risk that civil society organisations divide along ethnic, linguistic or cultural grounds, or exclude certain groups. In such cases they would be a negative influence on democracy.

According to Schmitter, the potential success of civil society organisations in their contribution to democratic processes depends on the nature of the organisations. Particularly, it depends on whether they are broadly encompassing enough in their domains, balanced in their capabilities, and able to be well governed. If such conditions are met, then there is a chance for genuine social dialogue. Otherwise, the promotion of civil society groupings may simply reproduce 'squabbling, self interested organizations' which are 'incapable of agreeing' on a common cause (Schmitter, 1993: 15). These are the factors that emerge during regime changes and are crucially important. They need to be seen and measured in the individual civil society associations and in the broader political systems which govern them, to determine any causal link to democracy.

Schmitter's framework does not claim to offer proof of a causal link between civil society and the consolidation of democracy. However, it suggests that civil society organizations may contribute to genuine social dialogue, to building a 'public sphere' in the sense of the theory developed by Habermas (1989), in terms of a public space for rational critical debate, which can contribute to democratic governance.

Another influential framework was put forward by Robert D. Putnam in 1993. His comparative research into twenty Italian regional governments, analysed the links between the density of civic life and the quality of regional government in Italy. His findings showed that variations in government performance were related to the intensity of associational life, the number of associations, in the different regions. In the north, where there were far more sports clubs, choirs, cultural associations, governments were more efficient and creative in policy choices and their implementation (Putnam, 1993). In the south where associative life was much weaker, so was the quality of government which tended to be less efficient and prone to corruption. He explains this phenomenon as arising from the trust which grows between members of associations due to their interaction. This network of participation and governance is explained as social capital.

This thesis does not claim to measure the quality of governance or of government policies in Algeria or the MENA region. However, it will discuss the aims and the actions and the nature of the functioning, as suggested by Schmitter, of a number of Algerian civil society organizations and networks throughout the different chapters. It will look at their interactions with the state in different regions and in different sectors. This will hopefully give an indication as to their social and political roles.

In Algeria, associations also have a specific role in post-conflict reconstruction. Within the reconciliation process and the consolidation of peace, the function of associations in Algerian society has become increasingly important (and contested, see Liverani 2008). Since the 1990s, certain associations have shaped their role in response to the needs of the population after the conflict. Although their role, for a long time, was limited by the state of emergency imposed in the early 1990s and by the Reconciliation Charter, it is nonetheless an important role, and the final section will assess in what ways associations were influenced by and responded to the conflict.

Associative activism in a post conflict environment

The conflict of the 1990s plays a defining role in the evolution of the Algerian associative movement and of its potential autonomy from the state structures. The intensity of the suffering of the Algerian population has generated a more fearful, strained and cautious social culture. The fragility caused by violence, in any state, creates a difficult context in which civil society can develop, and be supported. Yet, at the same time, the rapid growth of civil society organizations in Uganda, Lebanon and in Algeria during periods of conflict perhaps also signals the power of endogenous forces for recovery. This has been noted by Hirschman and others. (Venesson 2010, Hadenius & Ugglå 1996, Addi 1994)

Hadenius and Uggla write that :

If the situation is one in which the central power has been virtually absent as in Uganda during the civil war, a great number of organizations tend to emerge in its stead. Under such conditions, the population must turn to nonstate institutions for support. In Uganda and in Lebanon, the result was that the emerging regime faced an array of independent organizations. Not all these qualified as democratic and they were certainly not of an integrative bent, even so they could not be disregarded politically. (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996: 1629)

In the Algerian context, it is difficult to argue that there was an absence of the state power. However, in the eyes of the population, there was a loss of state legitimacy during this period. There was also the common experience of injustice, which in some cases created the framework for collective action. Hirschman writes that

Occasionally it happens then that the common experience of having been taken advantage of, swindled or otherwise hurt will lead to some collective reaction that takes the perpetrators by surprise. This is also true for aggression by powerful individuals or by the State. The poor are used to their poverty which they bear in silence and isolation, but the fact of being treated with *injustice* can bring out unsuspected capacities for indignation, resistance and common action. (Hirschman, 1984: 33)

The sense of injustice that Algerians felt throughout the 1990s contributed to the creation of many different kinds of associative initiatives. National organisations were created with the aim of seeking information and justice for families of the disappeared. Foundations were created to commemorate politicians, intellectuals and artists who were assassinated. Further charitable associations were set up for the psychological care of orphans, youth and families who had suffered. Such associations are important just by their very existence, in that they commemorate and shape the narrative history of Algeria. They also play a practical role in reconciliation.

From many of the interviews conducted with associations, the main motivation of the actors appeared to be that of being involved in a project of importance to Algerian society. The personnel of the organizations indicated their wish to bring positive and visible changes for the future rather than focusing on the conflict or contestation of the past. One such association is the Boucebci Foundation in Algiers which commemorates the life and work of internationally renowned psychiatrist, Professor Mahfoud Boucebci, assassinated by Islamist insurgents on the 15th June 1993 in front of his hospital in Kouba, Algiers. The *Fondation Mahfoud Boucebci* (FMB) continues the work along the lines of Professor Boucebci, with a multidisciplinary social project,

Given the psychological, social and cultural concerns, and the mental suffering of a society in transition, the Foundation would like bring a new dynamic, stating clearly its commitments and giving its contribution in the cultural and scientific domains. (Objectives of the FMB, as published on the website, 2012)²⁰

To achieve this, the foundation has a number of key activities, a centre, a small team of permanent staff and volunteers. The organization houses the library of Professor Boucebcici which is open to students, researchers and professionals. It also trains and employs, mainly on a voluntary basis, twelve psychologists who take care of over a thousand children on an annual basis through short and long term counseling, cultural and educational activities and outings. In partnership with the local authorities and now with a small EU grant, the organization has launched a research and training initiative to assess and tackle violence in schools.

Interviews with the voluntary and paid staff indicate the importance of the practical role of the association in its legitimacy and success. Young staff members, interviewed at the Boucebcici Foundation, working as psychologists with young victims of violence, highlight this role and their feelings about their work:

I really like working in an association, one feels free, and there is the possibility to progress. Furthermore, it corresponds to my own research work looking at orphans and the question of self esteem. I try to get interviews in orphanages and associations working with orphans and it is very difficult. People fear researchers; you have to gain their confidence. Yet, here people give us their trust. (Interview, psychologist in the Boucebcici Foundation, Algiers 16 October 2011)²¹

On the personal reasons for choosing to work in such an organizations, another staff member also pointed out how voluntary work could help her own research :

I worked previously in the private sector, in communication, but I didn't believe in what I was doing. I had a good salary but money is not everything. I wanted to do a doctorate in psychology, here in Algiers but with a French university in a partnership, my theme was

²⁰ www.fmboucebcici.com, last accessed 31 January 2012 Aux abords de toutes les préoccupations psychosociales et culturelles, voire de l'affleurement de la souffrance mentale d'une société en phase de transition, la Fondation veut impulser une nouvelle dynamique en témoignant de ses engagements et apporter sa contribution spécifique en agissant tant dans le domaine culturel que scientifique.

²¹ Ca me plait de travailler dans une association, on se sent libre, il y a une progression. En plus ca correspond avec mes travaux de recherches, sur les enfants assistés, les orphelins, sur la question de l'estime de soi. Je cherche à entrer dans ces domaines pour des informations pour mes recherches et c'est difficile. Les gens craignent des chercheurs. Il faut leur confiance. Ici les gens se sentent en confiance.

family therapy. So I started to work voluntarily with the Foundation on top of my research, to have practical experience. From there I was recruited to work part time on the Foundation's research project on violence in schools. I love the fact that I can now combine research with practice. It is rich. There is a real demand in Algeria and many needs, above all for family therapy which is relatively new. There is violence in schools as there is in the family and there is work to be done. (Interview, psychologist in the Boucebci Foundation Algiers, 16 October 2011)²²

Explaining the rationale behind the work of the organization and how it encourages both the members and beneficiaries, a new member explained :

I worked previously as a psychologist, but the atmosphere at work was not like here. I am here because I believe in the global approach of what we are doing in terms of care for the children, workshops, outings, and psychological counseling, all free. I believe in the person who is commemorated by this foundation, who has made a mark in Algeria and in mental health. I wanted to do voluntary work and maybe work part time. I have had training from another association, the SARP, which trains psychologists here in Algiers. The team is good and there is a real need for our work. The teachers want to see our psychologists in the schools. (Interview with psychologist, Algiers 22 October 2011)²³

Whilst still facing numerous challenges, such organisations appear to provide new, interesting spheres in which motivated and qualified personnel are involved. In the Algerian cases examined for this thesis the personnel was often voluntary (in the FMB, the majority of the psychologists were young graduates or retired). Such associations directly touch the lives of ordinary people and work with the local structures of Algerian society (town halls, education and health authorities) in policies which concern reconstruction. They also create legitimate spaces in which people can act, exchange,

²² J'ai travaillé auparavant dans le secteur privé, dans la communication, mais je n'y croyais pas, l'argent n'est pas tout dans la vie. Je voulais faire un doctorat en psychologie, à Alger mais avec une université partenaire en France sur la thérapie familiale. J'ai commencé à travailler bénévolement à la fondation en complément de ces recherches, pour avoir la pratique. Et par la suite j'ai été recruté pour le projet de recherche sur la violence dans les écoles. J'aime faire ce travail de recherche en plus de la prise en charge des enfants et des familles, en tant que bénévole. C'est riche. Il y a une grande demande en Algérie et il y a beaucoup de besoins, surtout pour la thérapie familiale qui est nouvelle. Il y a beaucoup de violence dans l'école comme dans la famille il y a un grand travail à faire.

²³ J'ai travaillé auparavant en tant que psychologue, mais l'ambiance de travail n'était pas comme ici. Je suis ici parce que je crois dans l'approche globale de prise en charge des enfants, avec des ateliers, des sorties et la prise en charge psychologique, tout dans la gratuité, et je crois dans la personne qui est commémorée par cette fondation qui a marqué l'Algérie et la santé mentale. Je voulais faire du bénévolat et peut-être travailler à mi-temps. J'ai reçu des formations d'une autre association qui forme des psychologues ici à Alger. L'équipe est bien et il y a un fort besoin pour notre travail. Les enseignants veulent voir nos psychologues dans les écoles.

criticise and propose. In his work on cultural representations of trauma, Patrick Crowley discusses the impact and the role of associations, as well as artists, in post conflict resolution. He writes,

in a society where justice has been deferred the only escape from trauma's hold is either ethical, as in the case of the Fondation Mahfoud Boucebci, or aesthetic – points of recovery, resistance to the spread of trauma's hold upon the present (Crowley, 2012:8).

Despite continuing fears that certain elements of the state may seek to control such autonomous spaces, due to the importance of such actions for reconciliation processes in Algeria, these spaces do now exist. The personnel find fulfilment in their new roles, which are perhaps not available so readily in the public or private sector. Following the decade of conflict and the suffering of the population, collective solutions through civic activism continue to grow and adapt to the evolving needs of the communities they serve.

Conclusion

This first chapter has discussed the concepts of civil society and of associational life in the Middle East and North Africa and in Algeria. As a transposed concept, evaluating civil society needs to take into account the problems of state building and of the violence suffered in many of the post-colonial contexts of the region, which make for more challenging environments for the development of autonomous organisations. The chapter has looked briefly at the historical importance of associations in the formation of the Algerian nation, and at how associations, traditional and religious structures, have been actors for change in Algeria, despite a history of repression.

From a comparison of the figures concerning associational life across the region, Algeria has been identified as a unique case, with by far the highest number of registered associations in the MENA region. There appears to have been significant developments and growth of the associative movement in Algeria and across the region since the mid-1990s, despite a disabling security, political, economic and social environment. Despite differences in the numbers of associations, there are also many similarities between the countries. Institutional reform, transition and conflict mean that the experience of Algeria is relevant for countries facing similar challenges.

The chapter has shown how the recent theoretical debates and literature have been sceptical about the potential of civil society to contribute to political change in the MENA region and in Algeria. Authors such as Challand identify the interference of external donors as one of causes of this.

Cavatorta further identifies divisions between religious and secular groups as one of the main causes. Yet the chapter challenges these assumptions given that there are increasing examples of co-operation which transcend such divides.

Using some of the theoretical frameworks of the early 1990s (Schmitter and Putnam) and more recent studies from 2011 (Cavatorta and Durac) the chapter suggests that it is necessary to assess at the micro level, and in each context, the work, the objectives and capacities of associations so as to define their importance and potential in the public sphere and in political life. The criteria set out in these frameworks (notably Schmitter's) can be used to assess how associations can contribute to political life and democracy. The chapter also identified the importance of the role of associations, in the Algerian case, in post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, referring to field interviews with an active association working in this area.

Chapter one has set out some of the main questions addressed by the thesis concerning the role of civil society in the MENA and in Algeria and the frameworks that can be used to evaluate this role. This leads on to the next major component of the thesis, which concerns the role and impact of external donors upon civil society, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Chapter 2. European Union Models of Democratization and civil society support

Summary

This chapter analyses EU models and mechanisms used to support civil society. It asks about their evolution, and identifies certain inconsistencies in their application, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since the early 1990s. Different theoretical approaches have underpinned donor programmes, based on the assumption that civil society can be a tool to promote democratization. These approaches and shifting paradigms in development policy choices are examined through a study of the scholarly literature. Subsequently, the chapter explores the reasons behind the EU's drive to invest resources in developing or trying to construct civil society in different parts of the world. It analyses the exception made for countries of the MENA region, in the co-operation agreements and in the EU's discourses. The chapter then examines the EU tools to support civil society in Algeria, comparing such interventions with those in Palestine and in Lebanon. Finally, it introduces the paradox, (explored later in the thesis) that the more modest EU budget for civil society in Algeria may have generated in fact more promising results, than in other countries in the region.

The EU and its Member States act in support of democracy drawing on strong parliamentary traditions... Locally driven processes can be supported by an appropriate mix of financial and political instruments tailored to the specific situation of each country. EU democracy support should therefore aim at assisting efforts and strengthening the capacity of Governments, Parliaments and other state institutions, political actors, civil society organisations and other actors.

Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations – Towards Increased Coherence and Effectiveness 16081/09 Brussels, 18 November 2009²⁴

Too many meetings and seminars see Europeans peddle their democratic wares and lecture the Maghreb on women's rights while official representatives of the Maghreb ask northern rim countries to atone for their colonial sins and give them more money.

GHILES, Francis, 2008. **'A Unified North Africa on the World Stage'**

Over the last two decades, external actors, such as the European Union, have increasingly sought to invest resources in ambitious civil society and democracy promotion programmes in foreign countries. Sheila Carapico explains the theory behind such programmes:

[The] standard template for democratization projects worldwide assumes a "natural sequence" whereby a loosening of authoritarian controls is followed by breakthrough elections and a transfer of power to liberal-democratic forces. The monitoring of "breakthrough" elections in a number of Arab countries in the early and mid-90s was followed by a host of projects designed to stimulate "demand" for democracy from civil society by explaining democratic rights and responsibilities to political opinion-leaders. The premise was that politically active women, parliamentary candidates, judges, law students, journalists, teachers, and non-governmental organization activists would then lobby governments and rally public support for gradual reform and a liberal agenda. (Carapico, S, 2002: 381)

These policy goals, to promote universal values of democracy and freedom of association in other countries, may be examined chronologically and in context, to determine when, where and how the desire to cultivate democracy evolved. What were the key aims, and what did external actors such as the EU actually do in different regions of the world to fulfil these ambitions?

This chapter explores the underlying motivations of the principal actors, from the altruistic belief that fostering democracy across the world is a 'good in itself', to more covert agendas, such as the

²⁴ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16081.en09.pdf>

promotion of political stability, or the expansion of trade liberalization (Roberts, 2002, Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011). European fears about migration and fundamentalism appear to have been factors motivating the efforts to promote civil society, particularly in the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa, despite there being no evidence that the promotion of civil society would necessarily provide any significant counter balance to either phenomenon (Youngs, 2002). Federica Bicchì, in her article *Our size fits All*, discussed the EU's desire to diffuse its own political solutions abroad. She writes that European foreign policy can be seen as 'an unreflexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief that Europe's history is a lesson for everybody' (Bicchì, 2006 : 287).

Significant differences do exist in the EU's approach in different parts of the world (Youngs, 2002, Darbouche 2008), including inconsistencies in regional partnerships and in democracy promotion strategies, both in geographical and policy terms. Youngs asks, for example, why the EU's democracy promotion objectives appear more important in Africa, than in the Arab world. He notes that trade liberalization appears to have been far more important than political liberalization in the EU's North Africa policies. Until 2011, there seems to have been a Mediterranean exemption from the promotion of universal values of democracy and the freedom to associate, as advocated by the European Union in other parts of the world.

Large-scale donor funding, even if apparently from non-governmental sources, is of course rarely neutral, and never purely altruistic. Behind noble development objectives are often the more political or economic interests of donor states which may limit the impact of development policy interventions (Challand, 2008: 410). Similarly, Carapico argues that donor aid programmes are 'an industry heavily reliant on public funds administered through grants and contracts, linked to great powers' foreign policy, and only quasi-non-governmental' (Carapico, 2002 :383). This does not necessarily imply that the actors or actions are rendered ineffective as a result. However, as demonstrated by Challand, in his examination of Palestinian civil society, more modest approaches to promoting social and political change can sometimes have unexpected, positive results. The imposition of donor agendas through large scale funding, on the contrary, can limit the autonomy of local actors.

Three key questions will be explored in this chapter. These concern, firstly, (i) the theoretical arguments which have guided external actors' understanding of how civil society promotes democratization; secondly, (ii) why the European Union invests resources in foreign civil societies and why there are regional differences; and finally (iii) the principal tools used by the EU to implement its

democratization aims in the southern Mediterranean, comparing the cases of Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon.

i.) Donors, civil society and democratisation

The idea of promoting civil society as a means of fostering democracy was part of the post-cold war democratic paradigm. Civil society, as a neo-Toquevillian concept, re-emerged in political and academic discourse with the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. It was quickly integrated into the democracy promotion policies of all major donor organizations (Raik, 2006). The major assumption was that associational activity automatically brings about democracy. Civil society was seen as a vehicle to pursue common, universalist goals which were thought to be 'good in themselves'. Civil society organisations provided a space in which to practise values of tolerance, consensus and democratic debate and after successful transformations in Eastern Europe, these were thought to be applicable to all peoples in all situations. Civil society became a framing strategy for political reform, in Eastern Europe and beyond (Glen, 2001).

The drive for this came from the top of the policy-making bodies with the publication by Boutros Boutros-Ghali of *An Agenda for Democratization* in 1996, and with the inclusion by the World Bank, USAID and the Canadian Development Agency of democracy promotion as part of their portfolios (Carapico, 2002). These were in addition to the EU's new approach in the ACP countries which explicitly included civil society and democracy promotion objectives, and to the Euro-Med initiative from the Barcelona Conference of 1995, which similarly included a drive for democracy promotion in its aims for support in the arts, the environment and academic research. Consequently, there was a very substantial growth across Europe and North America of what Carapico terms 'democracy brokers'. These were the think tanks, research groups, NGOs, academic groupings etc which sprang to life during the late 1980s and early 1990s as a response to the changed world circumstances after the fall of the Berlin Wall. All the major western players set up such groupings. In Britain, Parliament established in 1992 the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which claimed to be a "non-partisan independent public entity" to "provide assistance in building and strengthening pluralist democratic institutions overseas."²⁵

²⁵ See the Westminster Foundation for Democracy Ltd. Annual Report 2006 available at www.wfd.org/upload/docs/Report%20and%20Accounts%20@%2031%2003%2006%20-%20minus%20last%20page.pdf last accessed 29 October 2012.

Similar groups were set up in the US, Canada, Germany, France, Austria and Sweden. The ultimate justification for these groups was, according to Stefan Mair, in *The Role of the German 'Stiftungen' in the Process of Democratisation*, to

support partners in developing countries which make a structurally effective contribution towards the realization of social justice, toward the widening of political participation, and toward the framework of goals laid down by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. (Quoted in Carapico, 2002: 285)

This drive changed certain models of resource transfer from western nations to developing nations. There was not only the traditional structure of government to government transfer of funds; there was now an alternative model, which allowed western donors, to a certain extent, to bypass the executive arms of foreign governments for a small (but politically important) percentage of development funding. Foreign governments often resented this, due to the political importance of the nature of such funding and the perceived breach of sovereignty it implied.

Certain ideas underpinning these policy goals of supporting civil society, were developed from the academic frameworks of the influential scholars such as Schmitter and Putnam, discussed in chapter one. Schmitter and Putnam's frameworks did not claim to prove a causal link between civil society and democracy. However, under certain conditions, they suggest that civil society organizations may contribute to genuine social dialogue, or social capital, which of itself contributes to democratic governance.

Building on such research, different approaches applied these findings to external actions to support democratization through civil society. Hadenius and Ugglå, in *Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What can States and Donors Do* (1996) wrote that external factors may facilitate the development of civil society, but the trust necessary for such development is 'inherently internal' and the social capital it represents varies greatly in different settings. According to Hadenius and Ugglå, an 'active civil society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy,' due to its pluralist and educational functions. The role of external donors could create the energy for new co-operation initiatives. Material incentives lower the costs of co-operation, where such co-operation has previously not existed, and infrastructure support, or 'facilitators' for example, could help spark co-operation initiatives.

In the last decade, the assumed link between civil society and democratization has been increasingly questioned in academic literature (Carothers, 2003, Langhor, 2004) as discussed in chapter one. The weaknesses and sometimes 'uncivic' nature of civil society organizations, have been cited as reasons for the failure of civil society to promote democratization processes in a number of authoritarian regimes, notably in the Middle East and North Africa (Liverani, 2008, Roberts 2005, Wictorowicz, 2000).

Sarah Henderson's research into the external financing of Russian civic organizations provides an insight into the potentially negative impact of donor funding on civil society, placing the responsibility for this firmly with the donor funding mechanisms (Henderson, 2002). In Russia, she argues, client patron relations, vertical (donor dominated) networks, lack of clear constituencies and the divisive, uncivic and corporate nature of funding, all limit the potential for civil society to contribute to democracy in any meaningful way. She describes how grants are often 'duplicated', like 'winning the lottery', and how selection of projects can be corrupted from within the American funding system of USAID (Henderson, 2002:152). The way in which donors frame and then manage such programmes would seem to impact on the quality of the outputs and on the trust, co-operation, solidarity and public spiritedness that, according to Henderson, link civic groups to democratic stability. She writes that the 'tragedy is that those involved in building the civic sector were doing their best' (Henderson, 2002 :163). However noble the donor motives might be, they may simply not work if the context and framework models are not appropriate.

In his research in Central Asia and the Middle East, Olivier Roy puts forward a more nuanced critique towards some of the short comings of such types of policy initiatives promoted by actors such as the EU (2004, 2005 & 2008). Roy identifies the gap between the 'civil society concept' and real life (Roy, 2008:41). He points out how the accepted Western notion of civil society, as 'networks of free citizens – professional associations, unions, political parties, public interest groups – that create political space as a prerequisite for building democracy' (Roy, in Sajoo, 2004), fails to take into account traditional or religious structures that may exist in the receiving communities. He contrasts this to the Islamist and traditionalist notions of civil society.

In his assessment of the central Asian case of Tajikistan, the problem is precisely that of ignoring of the indigenous civic associations and their pre-existing structures and potential. He concludes that the Western concept of civil society, perceived as 'an abstract and idealized paradigm that stems from modern western experiences', has fall-out effects when applied in other contexts by external actors. When donors create material incentives to spark new co-operation initiatives this could lead

to overlooking the already-existing co-operation structures on the ground. By creating such incentives, Roy shows how donors can create a 'mirror effect', whereby initiatives simply reflect what a donor wishes to see, with no anchorage in society.

In *The predicament of 'civil society' in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East*, Roy suggests that 'Democracy is not a consequence of the imposition of human rights and a state of law, it is a precondition for the establishment of both' (Roy, 2005:p1001). He continues that 'the issue of the state is central: one cannot just develop a civil society to promote democracy.' Equally, anthropology, tradition and religion are not 'obstacles', hindering the build-up to a modern, democratic society. For certain donors, a focus on 'civil society' is often an excuse to ignore the political constraints and demands of a given society (this argument is also made strongly by Challand in the case of Palestine). Taking into account the real political actors and addressing what political legitimacy means is far more difficult, but is a prerequisite for democratization (Roy, 2005: p1002). The state and the political legitimacy of the state and non-state actors are therefore central to any effort to promote democracy. Such legitimacy presupposes the rooting of actors in the history and traditions of a society. Any external initiatives failing to take this into account, would seem to have limited potential to succeed.


On the link between civil society development and democratization, Robinson and Friedman, (2005) develop a critique of Hadenius and Ugglå's work. Following their empirical tests in three African countries, they suggest that civil society, in fact, very rarely impacts upon policy, and that donors do not have much impact on the process when it does. They formulate reservations about creating new civil society organisations, arguing that democracy support works better in cases when external donors support already existing trends. They argue that 'the contribution of civil society organisations to democracy is not limited to their capacity to influence public policy; they also foster voice and participation', (Robinson & Friedman, 2005)

Within the scholarly debates on how civil society can contribute to the consolidation of democracy, it seems that civil society was seen neither as an unmitigated good nor as consistently a force for democratization. Specific conditions need to be fulfilled for it to contribute in such a way (see Philippe Schmitter's positive and negative criteria discussed in chapter one). Yet, many donors appeared to have overlooked these conditions. The existence of grass roots organisations became regarded as a precondition for democracy, regardless of the aims, their mission, or any anchoring they may have had in local society (Carothers 2003, Langhor 2004, Roy, 2005, 2008). After the successful transitions in Eastern Europe, constructing civil society elsewhere seemed to become an

'end in itself' (Liverani, 2008). For western policy makers and academics, civil society, according to Thomas Carothers, simply 'became a mantra' (Carothers, 1999). Policy makers in the international donor institutions placed civil society at the centre of democratization programmes without sufficiently considering how to work with the real associations on the ground. In line with these trends, the EU also launched many new regional dialogues and individual country programmes targeting civil society.

It is possible to identify when the concepts of civil society and democratization entered into academic language over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Both concepts were previously absent from the academic articles and scholarly debate about development policy. In international academic development policy journals, the concept of civil society appears in the titles of academic articles in the late 1980s and democratization increasingly in the period around 1992. The following diagram represents the number of times either concept appears in a selection of six major development policy journals over a period of thirty years.

Figure 3 : Civil society and democratisation in academic journals ²⁶



²⁶ Table shows citing of the words civil society, or democratisation in the monthly or periodical titles six major development policy journals : Revue Tiers Monde, Development and Change, World Development, Third World Quarterly, Development Policy Review, International affairs were consulted.

The diagram shows a recent reduction in the use of the terms in the journal titles, particularly concerning the concept of civil society. After the period of 'civil society romanticism' (Liverani, 2008), there appears to be less interest from the academic community and increasing scepticism as regards to the theories of the link between civil society and democratisation. The next chapters will show how donors, on the contrary, are increasing funding and programmes for civil society.

Finally, also concerning donor language, concepts and development paradigms, Challand questions the framing of civil society, as a European concept. Challand's work on the language of international donors illustrates the negative outlook often adopted towards the Arab region. The language of external actors may have diminished the very existence of Arab Muslim civil society

He argues that

the over-concentration of much of the literature on 'what went wrong' by spotting the absence of some local prerequisites further contributes to the impoverishment of the theoretical content of civil society in the region. (Challand, 2008:411)

Challand argues that questions in academic literature such as 'is there an Arab civil society?', and 'can there be a Muslim civil society?' (Gellner clearly replies negatively to the question, Gellner 1994) particularly by external actors, contribute to the failure of civil society to flourish in the Arab world. Western scholars and policy makers deny the variety of Arab civil society, and the richness of the Muslim public sphere, because it fails to correspond to current western limited conceptions of the term 'civil society'. Regarding local recipients as lacking forms of democracy, and purporting that such norms and values have to be exported, creates negative local realities, in the same way as the vocal support by western governments for revolutions in Eastern Europe contributed to their positive success.

This section has discussed a range of scholarly debates about external actors seeking to support civil society and democratization over the last decades. Despite an increasingly critical evaluation of external support to civil society (Henderson, 2002; Liverani, 2008) there has not been any reduction in donor funding programmes. On the contrary, following the Arab Spring, donor support to civil society has considerably increased.²⁷ It is therefore important to carefully assess what the EU interventions for civil society promotion actually do in different regions across the world.

²⁷ This is confirmed by interviews with EU officials October 2011 and the British Embassy June 2012 in Algiers.

ii.) EU support to civil society in different regions

The European Union has undoubtedly become one of the most important actors in international politics, supporting and consolidating transitions, particularly with regards to its neighbouring regions of Eastern Europe (Triscritti, 2008). Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has embarked on a series of civil society and democracy promotion policies in countries across the world. The argument in favour of such interventions was supported by a number of factors, including the theoretical assumptions, discussed in the previous section and the empirical evidence from the role that non-state actors had played in the democratic transitions of the 1990s in Eastern Europe. This clearly influenced EU policies in the rest of the world. It encouraged interest in the new actors and associations in the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and in the Middle East and North African countries.

The EU's global strategies for the promotion of democracy through investment in civil society, have had their critics. In the case of Algeria, Hugh Roberts has argued that:

the EU has never been serious about promoting democracy in Algeria. The EU ... ha(s) not merely failed to promote democratic principles and respect for human rights., they have even been accessories in the Algerian army's flouting of these things. And they have debased the very idea of democracy by pretending to promote it. (Hugh Roberts, 2002 : 127-128)

Robinson and Friedman were similarly sceptical following their field work looking at civil society support programmes in three African countries:

Donor funding for civil society policy advocacy has not made a major impact (...) Foreign aid can facilitate access to the policy process and strengthen capacity where there are opportunities for engagement and strong organisations already in place but it is not the most critical determinant of successful policy engagement. (Mark Robinson & Steven Friedman, 2005 :)

Given such criticism of its strategies to promote democracy and civil society, it is important to ask why the EU continues to pursue them, if it is not for more implicit objectives (Challand, 2008, Youngs, 2002). To assess this, the following sections take a more detailed look at the varying regional approaches to examine the reasons that such variations should be necessary, for what are claimed to be universal principles.

In the democratic transitions of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, organisations, such as the Catholic Church and free trade unions in Poland, or the literary movements and theatre practices in Czechoslovakia seemed to be agents which loosened the bonds of non-democratic regimes (Glen, 2001). Following the end of the Cold War, as a result, the European Union invested substantial funds in programmes such as TACIS and PHARE. Through these programmes, they promoted local NGOs in Eastern Europe, often creating new structures from scratch (see Atlani-Duault, 2009 for a detailed discussion of the risks of such processes). The promise of the benefits of accession enabled the EU to impose significant structural changes on the institutions and on civil society in its eastern partners. Güney and Celenk argue that in Eastern Europe, the 'interaction between supranational organizations and nation-states became quite significant in bringing about change in their political systems' (Güney & Çelenk, 2007: 115).

With these processes of democratic transition, the civil society concept became embedded in political discourse. Through their experiences in the East, the EU and western donors were comforted that their assumptions were correct. Raik writes that 'the central role of peaceful civic activity in bringing about political change was reaffirmed by the recent transitions in Georgia and Ukraine' (Raik, 2006). The concept of civil society as a tool or a master frame (Glen, 2001) to promote democratization, was increasingly integrated into the democracy promotion policies of the EU.

As a result, in its relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States, signatories to the Lomé convention and then to the Cotonou Agreement from 2000, the EU increasingly insisted on the importance of the role of civil society in all aspects of the co-operation agreements. The Cotonou Agreement outlines a role for non state actors, including civil society 'in all its forms' as long as organizations 'address the needs of the population' and are 'organised and managed democratically and transparently' (article 6). Article 4 states that these actors will 'be informed and involved in consultation on co-operation policies and strategies' and 'provided with capacity building' and 'financial resources'. These articles impact on the internal governance structures of ACP states. Governments are obliged to consult non-state actors in the adoption of international agreements and programmes signed with the EU. The reference to civil society actors, democratic principles and the rule of law, has in this way progressively entered into the EU-ACP co-operation agreements. The essential role of non-state actors and the *obligation* to consult with civil society in all domains of co-operation, national policy making and political dialogue are enshrined in the legally binding Cotonou Agreement. Article 96 of the Agreement is a key example of the coercive nature of the EU's

instruments for co-operation with the ACP countries.²⁸ According to one EU technical consultant specialising in civil society support, despite there being problems in the practical management of the EU's civil society programmes, the very fact of including this obligation within the Cotonou Agreement has had significant impact on African civil society.

Twenty years ago the main actors and beneficiaries of this type of EU aid in ACP countries were only European NGOs, primarily the Christian ones. Now there exists an important number of capable African NGOs with ambitions to play a greater role in political life (Interview with Pierre Nicolas Meido, EU consultant, Paris, 2013)

Under the 9th European Development Fund, the EU financed 42 programmes that directly supported civil society organizations in 38 ACP countries, at a cost of 200 million euros.²⁹ The limited success of the EU's other development programmes in the ACP countries, lead to certain commentators increasingly targeting the African state as the source of the problem. The eastern experience, and model of civil society support for reform, conveniently allowed the EU to increasingly target NGOs, rather than purely engaging with the national governments. This coercive, all-encompassing co-operation with the ACP states, concerning civil society and democracy promotion, contrasts however, with the weaker position taken by the EU as regards the MENA region.

In its relations with the southern Mediterranean countries, the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has stood accused of having allowed its implicit objectives to override legitimate socio-economic needs which could have been targeted. Darbouche describes how the EU had managed to incarnate 'a form of 'Euro-Arab dialogue based on reform and governance in response to European fears rather than to address the region's socio-economic preoccupations,' (Darbouche, 2008 : 377). Underpinning this regional dialogue was the fear of Islamism and a preference for stability over real democratic reform (Youngs 2002, Darbouche 2008, Celenk 2009). Trade and economic liberalization (Roberts, 2002), guilt over the failure of past policies (Liverani, 2008) security interests and the fear of terrorism, immigration controls, as well as, in certain cases, national foreign policy interests (Celenk, 2009) were also factors underpinning the ENP.

Moreover, a desire for a hub spoke relationship with its partners (Darbouche 2008, Youngs 2002) meant that standardization was implicit in many of the EU's programmes of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument. Ironically, the difficulty of engaging in democratic debate in the

²⁸ This specifically provides for the suspension of aid should the basic conditions of democracy, human rights and the rule of law not be respected by one of the parties.

²⁹ 'Capitalisation Study on Capacity building support programmes for Non State Actors under the 9th EDF,' Floridi, M, Sanz-Corella, B, Verdecchia, S 2009 p20

EU institutions, meant that one solution, after difficult internal negotiations, had to be accepted by all external partners. This hub spoke or top down approach to external relations, (Darbouche 2008, Celenk 2009,) meant that only reactive rather strategic responses could be expected and developed by the negotiating partners.

There are of course legitimate, regional variations between the different partnerships in which the EU engages. These respond to the negotiations and political priorities of the different sides. Variations in what are argued to be universalist moral values promoted by the European Union, such as democracy, human rights and freedom of association, would seem surprising however. Yet, there appear to be significant inconsistencies in EU democracy promotion strategies in geographical terms (Youngs, 2002). Over the last twenty years, the Mediterranean appears to have been exempted from the prioritization of democracy promotion. This can be seen in the EU discourse, the absence of conditionality measures (such as those with the ACP countries) and in the more modest nature of many development funding programmes. To understand these differences in approach in the MENA region, it is important to look at the various policy agreements of the EU with its neighbours.

In the renovated Mediterranean Policy adopted in 1990, and even up until 1995, civil society and democracy were conspicuously absent from Euro-Mediterranean dialogue (Youngs, 2002). A change of approach seemed to be signaled with the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched by the Barcelona Process in November 1995. In this, the 12 Mediterranean partners were required to sign up to principles of pluralism. The partnership aimed to 'encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for strengthening of the rule of law and civil society' (Barcelona Declaration, 1995), yet one had to scroll down to page 8 of the declaration to read this first mention of civil society. These political intentions remained vague, compared to the highly detailed parts of the document which dealt with economic liberalization. The late inclusion of democracy promotion suggested an element of document standardization (Youngs, 2002). Or perhaps an afterthought.

In the association agreements, and in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which replaces the Barcelona Process with the Union for the Mediterranean, there is no mention of civil society and the primary initiatives relate mainly to the environment and the business sector. It was designed from an EU perspective, stating that 'the Union for the Mediterranean promotes economic integration and democratic reform across 17 neighbours to the EU's south in North Africa and the Middle East.'³⁰ From this language, it appears to be less about a Union across the whole region and more about the EU promoting certain policy objectives in the south. No real assessment of the needs of the southern neighbouring region was made, and there seems little linkage of the different strands of the policy in

³⁰ http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm

order to achieve the primary goals. The priorities remained broadly economic and environmental, rather than those of political reform.

Inconsistencies in the EU's discourse about civil society and democracy in the Mediterranean region, and in particular in Algeria, have been noted in academic literature, along with the accusation that the EU never really supported indigenous democracy (Roberts 2002, Celenk, 2009). In Algeria the EU's goals have been limited by the diminishing trust between the two sides due to troubled historical relations (detailed in chapter 5). Algeria's conflict created a difficult environment for external actors to understand and this limited their presence for a number of years. The EC closed down its offices between 1993 and 1998.

Furthermore, for the Algerian state, the posture of the EU throughout the conflict was 'problematic at best' (Darbouche, 2008, Roberts 2002). There was a lack of co-operation concerning the presence of wanted Islamist terrorists sheltering in European capitals and a failure to support Algeria at key moments when democratic reform was possible (Roberts, 2002). Overall, this meant that the EU, from the perspective of the Algerian state and population, was part of the problem, not the solution. As a result, a kind of 'indigenous democracy' was increasingly valued by the Algerians. External actors, who displayed little understanding of the realities of Algerian politics, were kept out of it. Like Moscow, and many other neighbouring capitals, Algiers clearly disliked being given lessons in democracy from the relative comfort of EU capitals (Darbouche 2008). Entelis had also earlier pointed to Algeria's unique and brutal history which had led to a political culture in which there was a sense of an 'Algerian nationalist consciousness and political community' unique within the Arab world and at the same time a 'distrust of all things foreign' (Entelis, in Norton, 1995: 53).

Another barrier to the EU's democracy promotion aims in the Maghreb, is said to be the overbearing presence of French politics, again particularly in Algeria (Roberts, 2002, Hadj Ali, 2003) in the 1990s. This shaped the perceptions of the actors and prevented more balanced reflections on the situation in Algeria. Youcef Hadj Ali points out that :

The overbearing presence of France has been an obstacle to the production of innovative analyses, capable of explaining the complex socio-political processes and new ways in which a society can achieve democracy and through this put in place the constitutive elements of a modern nation state at its own pace and with its own historical specificities. (Hadj Ali, 2003 :278 – author's translation)³¹

³¹ *Imprégnant profondément les esprits, le franco centrisme a été un obstacle à la production d'analyses novatrices, audacieuses et donc susceptibles de rendre compte des processus socio-politiques complexes et des voies inédites par lesquelles une société peut cheminer vers la démocratie et ce faisant asseoir les éléments constitutifs de la nation moderne avec son propre rythme et ses spécificités historiques. (Hadj Ali, 2003 :278)*

Hadj Ali continues arguing that

the refusal – by ideology or interest – to consider Algeria as a sovereign state fed a certain paternalism and interference. For many observers, Algeria could not enter into democracy without the counsel, recommendations and help of France. (Hadj Ali, 2003 :284– author’s translation)³²

All this implies that despite the Algerian regime’s far from exemplary democratic credentials, ‘meaningful dialogue on democracy promotion is notably absent from the agenda of any EU-Algeria official interaction (Darbouche, 2008:380). The strong economic position of Algeria also means that Algeria now no longer needs financial assistance from external actors.

If the EU indeed became part of the problem, through lack of understanding, then its decision to withdraw backstage could be understood in this context. Standardisation, necessarily following suit by the logic of its policies, meant paying lip service to the ideals it prevailed to promote, but with no real will to find policy tools to implement them – in its financial assistance, in its conditionalities and in its co-operation agreements in general.

Barbé and Herranz point out that following the 2011 regime changes in the Arab world , the EU was once again obliged to renew its Mediterranean policy. According to them, this came from ‘its sense of failure and embarrassment for not having appropriately gauged and contributed to the winds of democratic change in this area’. They quote the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner Füle, stating that

Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability (2012:1)

The weaknesses and inconsistencies recognized in the scholarly discussions about the EU’s role in the region have undermined the seriousness of its intentions to support civil society and ‘promote democracy’. Yet the more modest approach, in Algeria in particular, does not mean that the EU has

³² *Le franco centriste et le refus — par idéologie ou par intérêt — de considérer l'Algérie en tant qu'État souverain ont de surcroît nourri un certain paternalisme et des positions qui relevaient souvent de l'ingérence. Pour une majorité d'observateurs, en effet, l'Algérie ne pouvait entrer dans la démocratie sans les conseils, les recommandations et l'aide de la France. (Hadj Ali, 2003 :284– author’s translation)*

been entirely absent. It is necessary to explore in greater detail the EU's actual support to civil society to understand how this compares across the region

iii.) EU support in Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon

The previous sections have looked at how supporting civil society, since 1991,³³ has become an important, if sometimes inconsistent part of the EU's development policy. Despite the regional variations and the exceptions described above, the EU's civil society and democratization objective still underpins the Neighbourhood Policy (ENPI) in the Mediterranean region. What then is the EU 'model' for civil society support and democracy promotion? Which type of interventions has the EU put in place and in which contexts? What are the legal instruments and budgets for these programmes and how has the Mediterranean exception impacted on their implementation? To answer these questions, it is useful to give an overview of the EU's tools and to look at specific support in different contexts in the Mediterranean.

The EU has developed a number of different instruments through which it may implement its policies. These policies are budgeted globally. In the framework of the MEDA programmes, which are now replaced by the ENPI, the EU signs National Indicative Programmes (NIP) with each country. Within these national programmes, budgets and priority sectors are identified. Within these priority sectors, the EU, together with the national authorities, put in place individual programmes, technical assistance, grant schemes, or budget support to the state to help them to achieve their objectives. The EU often develops specific civil society support programmes with grants, training and an institutional support component. Equally, within sectoral programmes, from road building to prisons support programmes, the EU can often include a component which should target associations in that sector. These actions are complemented by other regional or global funding initiatives of the EU. They include the European Instrument for the Defence of Human rights (EIDHR), or the Non State Actors (NSA) in Development programmes and are managed either by Brussels or the delegations. These programmes can support civil society initiatives and finance European or national NGOs or local authorities. The national allocations of funding are not based on need or population, but rather on a competitive basis, on political negotiations, and on the partner country's capacity to absorb funds and the capacity of the EU delegation in place.

³³ The EU's commitment to promote democracy was made explicit in the 1991 Development Council resolution and incorporated subsequently into the foreign policy objectives of the EU in Maastricht Treaty (Güney & Çelenk, 2007: 115).

Algeria

In the Country Strategy and National Indicative Programme for Algeria, elaborated with the national authorities for 2002-2006, the EU committed to 'improving competition between the peoples of the region and the development of an active civil society'. In the NIP 2007-2010, it committed to supporting three priority axes: justice reform, economic growth and employment and reinforcing basic public services.

In the framework of the national programmes up until 2006, the EU launched in Algeria two significant programmes to support civil society : *programme d'appui aux associations algériennes de développement* 1 and 2.³⁴ The first programme represented 5million euro over a five year period, and the second programme 11 million euro (of which 1 million euro was financed by the Algerian state). The overall EU budget, for the 2007-2010 period, is 220 million euro for Algeria (an average of 55 million euro per year), so the amount reserved for civil society support remains a small fraction.

These programmes financed respectively 76 and 131 local Algerian NGOS with short term grant contracts for social, heritage, environment, gender, youth, culture and community development projects. The programmes also financed training schemes to accompany the NGOs in the implementation of their projects. Monitoring and coaching visits were financed, as well as exchanges of experience and sectoral trainings to encourage networking opportunities and fora for dialogue.³⁵

Under the different budget lines coming directly from Brussels, the EU financed around 25 projects in Algeria with relatively limited budgets (maximum 1 million € over three years, the majority much lower sums) for Non State Actors and under the European Initiative for the Defence of Human Rights.³⁶ These support grants targeted Algerian and European NGOs working on projects ranging from victims of the terrorism to cultural and social issues.

It remains difficult to calculate precisely the allocations by year to civil society organizations, especially as the EU co-operation programmes and promises of programmes, have been increasing significantly, particularly since 2011. However, it is estimated that, in recent years, just over 2 million euro per year is allocated to civil society organizations and NGOs in Algeria by the European Union.

³⁴ Implemented respectively from 2001-2006 and 2006-2010

³⁵ The details of these programmes will be explored in greater detail in the following chapters.

³⁶ The Algerian Government initially refused to approve the EU's human rights call to NGO's amid public and private claims that the EU had little moral authority to claim to teach Algerians about human rights.

Figure 4 : EU development spending in Algeria

EU Development Spending in Algeria (in millions €)	
Overall support to Algeria - MEDA programme/2008 (average per year: 2007-2010 NIP is 220 million €)	55
Financing for NGOs in Algeria :	
- Support Programme to Algerian NGOs (ave)	1
- ONG/PVD (sust. dev/refugees /handicap)	0,6
- Non state actors /Local authorities:	0,0
- EIDHR	0,6
- Human ressources/youth & victims terrorism	0,2
TOTAL	2,4
In millions of € - annual averages for 2008, EU Delegation Algiers	

Other donor initiatives remain equally humble in Algeria. Despite policy statements, most donors find it difficult to identify partners, and to find the appropriate structures with whom to contract.³⁷ The Algerian legislation does not encourage foreign involvement, which is seen as interference in Algerian civil society. Such foreign involvement is also (perhaps legitimately) seen as a threat, in that there is the potential for external financing of extremist groups under the cover of legitimate associations.³⁸ There is a limited legal framework for foreign NGOs and actions remain sporadic.³⁹ The main actors working with Algerian civil society organizations are the French Embassy, the German Embassy and the German development foundations, Spanish, Dutch, Canadian and Swiss Embassies, the World Bank and the United Nations, the latter on a very limited scale.⁴⁰ It is estimated that no more than 4 million euro are disbursed to civil society organizations by external donors per year. This figure is strikingly low compared to other countries in the region and impacts upon any conclusions which may be drawn about the Algerian context for external support for civil society.

³⁷ Interviews with the British Embassy, 2005, US Embassy 2006 and NDI, 2010, also see Liverani 2008
³⁸ Interview with the British Embassy, 2012
³⁹ Final Evaluation of the Programme to support Algerian Associations, EU, 2010
⁴⁰ The UN appears to retain still a limited presence in Algeria since the bombings of the HQ in 2007

Palestine

In the case of Palestine, with only a tenth of the population of Algeria, the EU's financial commitments are considerably higher, both to the authorities, and to civil society. The EU finances a significant number of European or international NGOs, which manage large scale, expensive programmes. These are contracted again through calls for proposals under regional and country specific programmes for NGOs. These calls are in the main, aimed at European NGOs with the capacity to manage large grants which may trickle down to national organizations. Benoit Challand's detailed research in 2005 estimated that, in total, aid to NGOs in Palestine could reach between 300 million and 400 million dollars per year (Challand, 2009: 93). This is one hundred times the estimated amounts given to Algerian NGOs, to a population a tenth of the size, thus making the distortion, 1/1000 if we take into account population.

Emerson confirms these figures, writing that 'Indeed the EU's Neighbourhood Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority is more precisely demanding, and grants more financial assistance per capita than for any of the regular neighbourhood states' (Emerson, 2005:9). Challand's investigations in 2010 identified that the EU's interventions, motivated by guilt and shaped by lack of sensitivity, have potentially fed the conflict by supporting civil society in such a way. Identifying cases of violence against NGOs, he writes 'that people turn violent against their own CSOs trying to promote reconciliation speaks abundantly about the resentment that external aid can generate' (Challand, 2010:3). A survey he quotes from 1997, identified 40% of the population as believing that foreign funding had a negative or very negative effect in the Territories (ibid:4).

In her article, *Missionaries of the new era*, Merz quotes Ava Leone who writes that in Palestine, and particularly in Ramallah, 'virtually no space, physical or imagined has been untouched by some aspect of foreign aid' (Merz 2012:51).

Concerning the EU's contributions to civil society, democracy and the government of the Palestinian Authority, the following figures are quite significant:

Figure 5 : EU development spending in Palestine

EU Development Spending in Palestine	
Direct support to Palestinian Authority/2008	486
Support programmes to NGOs in Palestine :	
- NSA programme :	4
- Food security programme :	10
- Partnership for peace	7.5
- Investing in People	0,5
- Culture	0,4
TOTAL	22.4
In millions of € - based on annual averages for 2008, EU Delegation West Bank website & Challand, 2010:14	

The European Union dedicates annually an estimated 22 million euro to NGOs in Palestine, compared to an estimated 2 million euro to NGOs in Algeria (a country which has also witnessed violent conflict and a number of environmental disasters having devastating effects on the population). In Palestine, CARE International NGO’s budget alone rose from 4 million dollars for 2001, to ‘an incredible 15.5million dollars in 2003’ (Challand, 2009: 91). The presence of multiple international donors contributing up to 400 million euros per annum to civil society in Palestine as suggested by Challand, would question the efficiency of such funding, given the continuing difficulties for Palestinians. It could also signify the impossibility of coordination of such numerous programmes and actions.

Lebanon

In between the two preceding cases, lies the EU’s development programme in Lebanon. Lebanon has historically been relatively open in its foreign policies and partnerships with EU and other actors. Since the end of the civil war in 1990 the EU has been actively supporting reconciliation measures, often through the NGO sector. In the last decade, two important programmes directly targeting civil

society have been financed, AFKAR 1 and 2⁴¹, which have trained NGOs and financed 40 small projects, mainly focusing on rule of law, human rights and civil society dialogue. NGOs respond to the classic calls for projects from Brussels, and recently two local calls have been launched by the EU Delegation, for human rights and culture.

Figure 6 : EU development spending in Lebanon

EU Development Spending in Lebanon	
Overall support to Lebanon - ENPI programme/2008 (average per year: 2007-2010 NIP is 187 million €)	47
Support programmes to NGOs in Lebanon :	
- AFKAR (4m/4 years)	1
- Estimated commitments for EIDHR	
Local and central calls to NGOS :	9
TOTAL	10
In millions of € - based on annual averages for 2008, EU Delegation Beirut and website	

Cavatorta and Durac write that

the relative ease with which civil society can organize in Lebanon makes it a place of considerable activity on the part of international donors. Unlike most other countries in the region, limitations on access to foreign funding do not really exist and a significant number of organizations receive some sort of assistance from international donors (...) The liberal nature of the country and the relative autonomy of civil society actors from the government make it possible for external donors to pursue their agendas of change. (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 138-139).

He continues:

The problem, however, is that this influx of foreign money creates a very competitive environment for civil society groups, which tend to try to appease donors thereby reinforcing patterns of patronage. (Ibid: 139).

⁴¹ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/lebanon_intitutional-reform_afkar_en.pdf

He describes the divisive nature of funding: accepting UK or US funding at a time where their support of Israel's war against Lebanon made them highly unpopular alienates one sector of civil society. Receiving funds from the West, including the EU, means accusations from the Islamist sector of civil society of 'doing the West's bidding.' Shiite and Sunni groups have to respectively look to Iran and the Gulf States for support. All this further divides along sectarian grounds, rather than supporting Lebanese citizenship through civic organisations.

In Lebanon, the European Union commits roughly 10 million euro annually to NGOs, for a country with a population of just over 4 million inhabitants (interview with EU official in Beirut, 22/12/2011). Interviews with EU officials in Beirut identified awareness within the EU structures of the problems identified above. EU officials acknowledged that external financing can have negative impacts on organizations. It can encourage opportunism, or create projects which pander to European wishes rather than the real priorities of national civic organizations and local communities.

In Lebanon, EU officials noted a tendency to opportunism in the responses to calls for projects, but clearly attributed the blame for this to the donors themselves

If the projects proposed by NGOs are mediocre or seem to be opportunistic, as exists everywhere in the world, often they are corrupted by the call itself – and that is our problem! We need to better design the project calls to inspire the NGOs and to respond better to the real needs of civil society so that they contribute and not just seek financial support. (Interview with the EU Delegation in Beirut, 22 December 2011, own translation)

Palestine and Algeria may be the two ends of the spectrum, with Lebanon somewhere in the middle in terms of EU support to NGOs. The EU's investment in Palestine is immense, and investment in Algeria represents the minimum. What are the results or outcomes of such different approaches, and what can be deduced from each context?

Comparing EU financing across the region

Benoit Challand's in-depth work on donors and NGOs in Palestine and Andrea Liverani's work on NGOs in Algeria both leave a rather negative impression of the role of donors and external actors in civil society promotion.

Liverani writes that

The international euphoria over Algeria’s associative sector soon turned into a plethora of civil society assistance programmes administered by official aid agencies, international NGOs and foundations, and aimed at encouraging Algeria’s democracy. Liverani, 2008: 153).

It can be argued however, that Liverani perhaps overestimates the actual presence of donors in Algeria. There have been communications to this effect, but the real figures committed and spent in Algeria from the earlier 1990s up until the early 2000s were very low, due to the difficulty of re-launching both programmes and Embassies which had been shut down for a number of years during the worst periods of terrorism. Compared to other countries in the region, the figures seem to show that the EU (and it seems other donors too) had a very low profile and budget for all its development programmes in Algeria. This is illustrated in the spending levels shown in the following tables.

Figure 7 : EU spending on NGOs in 3 MENA countries




Table 2 : EU Development spending on NGOs in 3 MENA countries

Annual EU development spending on the NGO sector in three MENA countries			
Figures for 2008	Algeria	Palestine	Lebanon
EU budget for NGO sector in m €	2	20	10
Budget represented as amount per inhabitant in €	0,057	5	2,5
Population	35	4	4

sources : estimates from interviews with EU Delegation officials and websites

This may be changing now, with the EU increasingly looking to Algeria as a stable partner in an unstable region. The EU has now significantly increased funding commitments to Algeria. The following chapters will examine this in greater detail, looking at Algerian civil society organizations, the impact of external support and the evolution of the EU's programmes. It can be initially noted however, at the global level, that the approach of the EU in Algeria over the last decade, has been more modest, both in financial and technical terms. It has focused more on national institutions and organisations, human resources and embedding civil society initiatives in national structures. The first EU civil society support programme was managed by an Algerian Research Centre, and the second by a national Ministry. Comparing the figures, it appears that the EU in Algeria supported far more organizations than it has supported in other countries in the region. This has been done with much lower grants, using primarily national structures to implement the programmes, in the practical absence of any international or European NGOs. External monitoring and evaluations have been positive about the results of the EU's support to Algerian NGOs.⁴²

Another difference, when comparing Algeria to Lebanon and Palestine, is the non-political bias of the EU's NGO financing in Algeria. Only few Algerian organizations work on human rights or political issues; the majority concentrates far more on social sector needs (See Derras study, 2007). In Lebanon and Palestine, project calls published on the Delegation websites often directly target human rights, rule of law and other more politicized objectives, leading NGOs into such domains. The more reserved approach in Algeria is criticized by academics as limiting the possibility to encourage change (Liverani, 2008). Yet, at the same time, such an approach encourages a less divisive approach to financing, than that witnessed in the Lebanese case. Charities coming from a more Islamic background, providing social care or educational programmes, are not excluded from the EU's Algerian programmes and work alongside secular associations of all sectors. The greater barrier, as argued by most associations interviewed, would seem to be one of (European) languages, not political position or religion.

Conclusion

The preference in Algeria for financing a far larger number of associations, with smaller grants (thus targeting grassroots organizations) could contribute, as Albert O Hirschman states, to changing the character of society. With increasing associative activism, social relations become more caring and

⁴² EU External Monitoring Reports of 29.06.2006, of 04.07.2007, 24.12.2009, and Final Evaluation of the Projet d'Appui aux Associations Algériennes de Développement, ONGII, Z. Ould Amar and E. Taib, Jan-Feb 2010.

less private (Hirschman, 1984:97) and there is the potential to create social capital (Putnam 1993). For Hirschman, contrary to Putnam, there is no logical connection which can be proved between collective action and political change. Hirschman argues nevertheless that civic action has the potential to be a Trojan horse. Once a right is proclaimed, this is a significant step in securing it.

Hirschman looked at how 'social energies' from previous experiences, can provide the basis for future reform. Whilst earlier attempts at collective organization may have failed, they increased the likelihood for renewed attempts. With success, the number of organizations tends to grow, as does the social area they cover. The 'growth of civil society is thus a process marked by the furnishing of successful examples' (Hadenius & Ugglå, 2006: 1624).

This framework could be useful to help understand how the EU's more modest approaches in Algeria may have been able to impact upon societal change, and support processes of change already initiated. The alternative, flooding of civil society with funds, would seem to diminish the autonomy of local actors to take initiatives and develop local actions.

Through their practical experience of implementing programmes, donors increasingly reflect on the types of intervention and how these provide responses in the local context. As shown in the case of Lebanon described above, EU officials noted the problems of opportunism in the responses to calls for projects, and clearly attributed this to themselves.

Donors have also recognized the macro problems of achieving a coherent global strategy (EU Council conclusions, 2009, Youngs, 2002) as well as the micro problems of over dependence on foreign aid, capacity constraints, opportunism and the uncivil nature of some NGOs (Carothers, 1999, Robinson and Friedman, 2005). Whilst in part this is due to the difficult nature of intervening in foreign contexts, such weakness in strategic terms, perhaps relates also to the implicit objectives of funding and to problems of coordination with a plethora of different actors working in the same field, each with their own interests. As Grimm and Leininger write :

Any target country of democracy promotion will find itself facing a multitude of international actors pursuing divergent interests and goals. Consequently, the objective of democratization is likely to compete with alternative objectives of foreign policy of the various international actors. At times, the same actor can simultaneously attempt to pursue competing objectives. (Grimm and Leininger, 2012).

Each context is different. Whilst there are standard templates, each donor and each recipient country shape the programmes differently. The EU negotiates with actors who accept, reject, adopt, re-model the approaches. The size of the vastly different donor budgets in the region for civil society,

as shown in the cases, does not seem to be an indicator of success. Success seems to come rather from the existence of a dialogue, a more balanced partnership and a space and autonomy for innovation for national NGOs. To avoid donors being ‘part of the problem’ (Challand 2008, Liverani 2008), greater understanding of existing structures could help widen conceptions of what constitutes civil society and of how an external actor can support it. The ‘furnishing of successful examples’ could allow a more functional way to support democratization processes and local civil societies’ role within them.

Overall this chapter has identified a number of inconsistencies in the EU’s support to civil society and introduced the hypothesis that more modest approaches could have more successful outcomes. The specific case of Algeria, in which the EU has been obliged, due to the security situation and to the firm Algerian negotiating position,⁴³ to reduce its interventions, and adapt to the local context, has led the EU to target existing structures, smaller grass roots associations and national structures. The next section, focussing on the case of Algeria, will seek to assess developments in the associational movement and the impact of external support, taking specific cases. To proceed, the following chapter will first examine the state–civil society relationship in the Algerian context. It will look at how associations have historically interacted with the state in national development processes, in order to assess and to put into context any external impact.

⁴³ This will be discussed in chapter five

PART II - Algerian civil society and relations with the state

Chapter 3. The state and civil society in Algeria

Summary

This chapter examines the boundaries between the state and civil society, in the case of Algeria. Both the state and civil society, in many ways, often depend on each other for their existence and legitimacy. For Algeria, with its difficult history of nation building, this relationship is even more complex. The chapter explores how state-society relations and the institutional framework were affected in the past by such challenges, including the difficulties of choosing a new language policy . It examines how the Arab revolutions and the on-going changes in the region impact upon state society relations in Algeria. Motivations for state repression include the fear of foreign actors and the wish from all sides to redefine relations between civil society, the state and external actors. The chapter takes three case studies to show how networks and individual associations are affected by changing relations with the Algerian state and with external actors, and by the transformations across the region.

The first two chapters explored the concept of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa, and the civil society paradigms taken up by the EU in its development policy. Building on this, the current chapter analyses the specific relationship between civil society and the state in Algeria, the main case study of this thesis. Understanding this complex, close, often conflicting relationship can help evaluate the difficulties that can emerge when external actors intervene, especially if either party (state or civil society) is ignored. The boundary between the state and civil society is a blurred one and both depend on the other for their legitimacy.

The specificities of the Algerian institutional setting and state-society relations have contributed to making it difficult for external actors to engage with the Algerian state, compared to other states in the region. Chapter two showed how actors such as the EU have much lower budgets for civil society in Algeria than in other countries of the MENA region. The high number of national associations and the absence of European NGOs both contribute to a stronger position for the Algerian state when negotiating with the EU about civil society. With its more limited presence, the EU has less information about Algeria. This more distant relationship with the state has led to a more rational approach from external actors. To engage with civil society in Algeria, foreign actors are obliged to grapple with the complexity and the boundaries of state-society relations, and to understand the law and practices which regulate both these relations and their own presence.

The precise interface between what constitutes the state and what constitutes society is very difficult to define in any context. Mitchell argues that elusive state-society boundaries are erected internally, through complex power relations (Mitchell, 1991). The power to regulate is not simply a capacity stored within the state, which extends out into society: it is much more complicated. He writes that the 'apparent boundary of state does not mark the limit of the processes of regulation. It is itself a product of those processes' (Mitchell, 1991:90).

There are always conflicts between the state and organizations, just as there are between different government agencies within the state, or between organizations themselves, or within each of them as separate organizations. This implies that 'we should not be misled into accepting the idea of the state as a coherent object clearly separate from society' (Mitchell, 1991: 90).

For Mitchell, the state is the cumulative 'effect' of a great number of processes and practices; it requires a subjective belief from citizens that legitimate authority lies in the governing structures. The state is then embodied in visible forms such as symbols, uniforms and public buildings. It emerges from the continuously fluctuating mechanisms and historical processes that exist within

society. It is the dynamic processes of regulation, and the conflicts that arise from it, that enable an understanding of the essence of the state and its effects on the organisations within society. These processes of regulation take place in a given institutional context with distinct sets of organizations over time. 'Specific legislative and institutional constraints,' as the product of these regulatory processes, 'impact on how civil society organizes and operates.' (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011:2).

Relations between state and civil society can be defined as requiring a certain degree of mutual recognition and trust. It has been argued that there must be a reciprocal recognition of legitimacy, between the state and civil society, for the latter even to exist. Jean Leca argues that 'civil society cannot be constructed against the state'⁴⁴ (Jean Leca, in Bozzo and Luizard, 2011 : 20). It also needs the state's recognition for its own existence and legitimacy.

In the Algerian context, as in many post-colonial states, there is a 'refusal to accept politics and conflict' and a denial of 'plurality' (Addi, in Bozzo, 2011:375).⁴⁵ This denial of plurality is what made the beginnings of civic life so difficult in Algeria. It also blurred the boundary between state and society. For Addi, this historical process of non-recognition of oppositional politics implied that opposition had to be expressed outside legitimate state channels. The lack of legitimate channels meant that, historically, this opposition has been expressed in a violent way against whatever was the prevailing nature of the state at the time.

The aim of this chapter is to examine these questions about the Algerian state and its relations to civil society, and how this has evolved over time. Firstly, (i) the history of state civil society relations will be addressed; including the evolution of the legislative framework which regulates state–society relations. It will also discuss the language choices by the Algerian state in 1962 and their impact on civil society actors. The chapter then asks (ii) how that relationship, and its institutional context, has been affected by the Arab revolutions in 2011 and the on-going changes in the region. This includes new legislative reforms recently put in place by the state, and the responses from associations. It will discuss the motivations for repression and the state's fear of foreign actors. Finally, (iii) a number of case studies will be assessed to frame the impact of this changing situation on specific organizations and networks, all of which have received external support over the last few years.

⁴⁴ 'La société civile ne peut être construite contre l'Etat'

⁴⁵ 'c'est le refus du politique et de sa conflictualité qui caractérise le projet populiste niant la pluralité pour ne pas avoir à l'institutionnaliser'

i.) The history of Algerian state-society relations, legal frameworks and language choices

There have always been legal, political and linguistic challenges to constructing a unified Algerian nation and a unified Algerian identity, both prerequisites for consolidating the state and allowing plural opposition. Salhi (2011) reminds us that citizenship and belonging in Algeria were based upon the creation of a *communauté de résistance*, against colonial domination. This *communauté de résistance*, the Front de Liberation National, and ultimately the future state, were in many ways the product of associational life and mobilisation in Algeria from the 1920s onwards. For the same actors, once in power in the post-colonial, socialist period of the 1970s, the position was also uncomfortable. To avoid contestation of the new state's legitimacy, the symbiotic nature of state-society relations was further strengthened under the single party system.

The violence of recent Algerian history has intensified this implicitly antagonistic state-society relationship. In *Islam and Democracy, the failure of dialogue in Algeria*, Volpi (2003) concludes that, given its specific history, only a new generation of political activists could advance the participation of the demos in the Algerian political system. Such political dialogue could be achieved through real actors (such as the Berber associations he praises) making 'a case for it at the ground level.' The 'democratization' of violence,' during the 1990s and the difficult reconstruction of civil society structures were the consequences of the failure of political dialogue. Despite popular support for associations, the failure of political dialogue meant that, for Volpi, associations were always inherently in contention with the state. 'Associative networks are grounded in a repressed counter-culture,' and, whatever gains or positive contribution they could make,

their discourses invariably contribute to the popular resentment against the ruling elite. (...)Unwittingly, and despite their effective social work, they frequently constitute an additional hindrance to the success of the socio-economic and political reforms tentatively proposed by the state. (Volpi, 2003: 99).

The unsustainable nature of the all-encompassing state is reflected in the term used today in Algeria of 'hogra', the idea of contempt, between government and society. The term defines the rupture between the state and the people. It is one of the major underlying causes of the on-going political mistrust, heightened by a lack of communication between the rulers and ruled (Roberts 2002, Silverstein 2008, quoted in Liverani 2008). Civil society organizations have worked within such an

oppositional context to the state for over a century.⁴⁶ The following section examines this history of opposition, the legislation and the language which frames the state-society relationship.

The history of associations and the state

The period of the 1920s represented the beginning of a new organized political opposition to the French colonial state, with opposition coming from structured organizations within France and Algeria. The *Etoile Nord Africaine* was created by the nationalist politician Messali Hadi in 1926, an association which would be of key importance in uniting the liberation movement across Algeria and across the Mediterranean. The ENA, it can be argued, was the first Algerian political party. By 1933 it had a very clear political programme for independence through non-violent means.⁴⁷ It was dissolved by the French authorities in 1937, upon which Messali Hadj created the PPA, the Algerian People's party which was also suppressed. The *Etoile Nord Africaine* association provided one of the bases of popular support which later develop within the revolution and liberation movement, (united under the CRUA for the armed liberation struggle). It was within this associative sphere, that peaceful contestation and demands for justice were framed against, at the time, the French colonial state. However, such contestation meant that civil society actors, even if peaceful, had to construct their identities and programmes against a state which refused to recognize them. The lack of reciprocal recognition of legitimacy, Anna Bozzo reminds us, makes it difficult for civil society to exist. The ENA symbolizes the origins of the difficulties of achieving a plural oppositional society and also the elusive nature of state-society boundaries: the ENA went from illegitimate organization, to founding the political basis (and many of the actors) of the future Algerian state.

In the postcolonial period under Presidents Ben Bella and Boumédiène, state-associational relationships once again became a question of inherent importance to the legitimacy of the Algerian state. The threats to the stability of the new nation meant that the regime sought to incorporate as much as possible any form of opposition or non-oppositional grouping within the single party FLN structures. In this socialist period, the fusional nature of state-society relations was thus further ensured. The populist project, Addi writes,

did not want Algeria to be a civil society with its conflicts and diverging individual or group interests, wishing rather that Algeria be a national family, unified by the memory of the ancestors and the martyrs. (Addi in Bozzo, 2011 : 376)⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Since the 1901 French legislation first enabled the setting up of associations

⁴⁷ See www.marxists.org/archive/messali-hadj/1933/program.htm last accessed 5 february 2012

⁴⁸ Le projet populiste ne voulait pas que l'Algérie soit une société civile avec ses conflits et ses divergences d'intérêts individuels ou de groupes, souhaitant que l'Algérie soit une famille nationale unie par la mémoire des ancêtres et des martyrs'

A rather ambivalent situation existed in the early years of independence, with the maintaining of the French 1901 legislation. In practice, a more restrictive approach was put in place, with the blocking of any social organization outside of the state (Derras, 2007:18). Omar Derras quotes the ministerial circular of 1964 which requested the regional Prefects to

prevent the constitution of associations which, under the cover of a social, cultural or artistic activity, try to pursue political activities which would bring prejudice to the internal or external security of the state' (Circular of the Interior Ministry n°40/DGAPG/AG 2/03.1964 quoted in Dahak, 1982 and Derras 2007: 10)

Under Boumedienne, only the FLN affiliated associations were truly able to exist and function. With the legislation of 1971, the restrictive practices were legalized in the texts which limited or rendered extremely difficult the creation and running of any independent organization. At the same time, new 'state associations' were set up.

In parallel to the process of cleaning up the spaces of socialization (...) the state begins progressively the creation and diffusion, across the country and institutional levels, of an ensemble of state partisan associations which would have for their role the creation of unconditional support structures, and also an effective means to frame, control and manage society.(Derras 2007:21)⁴⁹

Once the real nature of such associations became apparent, the gap between state and society grew wider. The controls proved to be unsustainable and state society relations worsened throughout the 1980s, along with the economic transformations and upheavals, culminating in the uprisings in 1988. State society relations had broken down over the preceding decade and were increasingly defined in antagonistic terms such as 'hogra,' the contempt or disregard for the masses, by *le pouvoir*. This climate of mistrust, symbolized by the penchant for conspiracy theories (Silverstein 2008, quoted in Liverani 2008,) led to total breakdown in the relations, the explosion of contestation and ultimately to the launching of a radical and ambitious reform programme in the late 1980s.

In this reform process, the state and civil society (which participated in drafting the new legislation) sought to redefine the limits of public space, through the Constitution and legislation. In 1987, 1989 and 1990 state-society relations were reformed in terms of freedoms of association, the press and political parties. Professor Salhi, in his detailed analysis of associational life in his work on citizenship and identity in Algeria (2011) writes that 'the 1990 law can be considered as founding an associative

⁴⁹ Parallèlement au processus d'assainissement des espaces de sociabilité (..) l'Etat entame progressivement la création et la propagation, à travers le pays et à différents niveaux institutionnels, d'un ensemble d'associations étatiques et partisans qui auront pour rôle la création des structures de soutien inconditionnel, et aussi un moyen efficace d'encadrement, de contrôle et de quadrillage de la société.

movement free from political and administrative constraints and interference from a heavy administrative machine.’ (Salhi, 2011: 268)

Having already noted the effect of the opening up in 1987, which had inspired a ‘very strong associative dynamic,’ Salhi acknowledges that it is the context, more than the text, which enables or disables civil society. Whereas 1988-1992 had favoured a liberal opening up of society, the context of the 1990s, despite more progressive laws, favoured ‘the return to greater rigidity and powers for the administration,’ (Salhi, 2011: 280). Whilst bringing in a new climate of associative freedom and action, the reforms of the 1990s, followed by the decade of violence, could not lead to clearer boundaries, or to more constructive relations between the state and society. Associations were no longer purely those attached to the state. Yet despite the huge increase in bona fide actors, the climate of mistrust between the state and newly created organizations remained. As Volpi points out,

‘whether they contribute to a patient work of social reconstruction or whether they chose to challenge the regime directly, these associative networks reinforce the mutual defiance that exists between civil society and the state apparatus. (Volpi, 2003: 99)

Despite the opening up in 1990, to allow for opposition, the conflict of the 1990s and the state of emergency, further reinforced the processes and state dynamics which sought to control rather than enable civil society and opposition politics.

Since 2011, in the wake of the Arab revolutions, the Algerian state and civil society have once again been locked into a negotiation process in order to redefine the limits of each other’s competences, rights and obligations. To assess this, it is first essential to explain the laws, in place beforehand, to regulate associative life in Algeria.

The institutional and legislative framework

In 1962, the new Algerian regime maintained the French legislation for associations, the Law of 1901, which guaranteed freedom of association. The Algerian government’s reserves however, were made clear in the circular of 1964, mentioned above, in the political statements of the regime and in the actual application of associative freedom laws in the new state. This ambiguity was lifted in 1971, when the law was changed. The new legal apparatus, under President Boumedienne, reinforced a deep level of control over independent organisations. The ordinance 71/79, passed in 1971, instituted an obligatory double ministerial authorisation for an association to gain legal status. Model statutes were imposed and the state gained strong powers to dissolve any association, thus strictly

limiting the associative sector. This effectively prevented the development of any real autonomous organisations outside the official state controlled channels.

In 1987, with the oil crisis and mounting tensions, from all echelons of society and from all across the country, President Chadli introduced a new law which was passed, despite reticence from the more conservative branches of the FLN. Under the new, more liberal law, the need for prior authorization was removed, and replaced with an automatic approval after a 60 day period.

Following on from this, the 1990 Law on associations (Loi 31/90), removed even more of the restrictions and further enshrined a declarative rather than an authorization regime. An association could either register at the district level (the regional wilaya), or with the Ministry of Interior (for associations with national ambitions). The administration had to deliver a receipt of registration, again within 60 days. Should the association be considered contrary to the dispositions of the law, the administration must launch a legal enquiry within 52 days following the deposit of registration, otherwise the association was automatically considered to be officially constituted.

It has been argued, that, as in Morocco, the declarative regime existed only on paper (Dahak, 2007). Due to lack of knowledge by ordinary people of the legal regime, or through diverse local interpretations by officials, the administration still sometimes blocked associations in registering, in modifying their statutes, or in carrying out their activities and accessing funds. Different regions showed very diverse situations in institutional terms, in interpretations of the legal system, in the types of actors and in local needs. Whilst there were national trends, there was also a very diverse associative life in different regions (as discussed in chapter 4) and over different time periods. This indicates perhaps the fragility of the institutional memory and structures, the importance of the individual actors, the role of governors (walis), mayors and ministers, rather than of the institutions themselves. As suggested by Mitchell in the chapter introduction, the state is not 'a coherent object separate from society.' Professor Salhi quotes the frustration of associative members at this fact, that 'there is not one State in Algeria, but States. Each wilaya, each daïra, each commune interprets the law to its will'. (Salhi 2010: 288).

Despite the possibility of this kind of obstructionism, the law (Loi 31/90), nonetheless resulted in the number of registered associations soaring after 1990, as national and local groupings formed and officially registered their status. The originality of the new national organizations created, following the new law in 1990, writes Derras, was in the domains of intervention and the populations mobilized (for the first time), such as: human rights, women's rights, and environmental protection. This was due to the 'very strong demand for social emancipation' engendered by the 'frustrations of specific social categories' (Derras 2007 : 26).

No legal framework existed however to recognize and regulate international NGOs in Algeria. A few organizations have been present since the early 2000s and operate in rather precarious circumstances, often unrecognized by the government and without the oversight of the relevant ministry. The lack of clarity of information and fear of the state's response makes it difficult for Algerian associations to collaborate with these NGOs, to exchange information and skills or to receive funds.

The historical reluctance of the Algerian state to external interventions and its fear of foreign intervention have always been clear. President Houari Boumediene, stated in 1964, 'I prefer to work with Algerians, however late they may have joined our revolution, rather than with foreign experts' (quoted in Evans & Phillips 2007:83). There remains a high degree of distrust of foreign actors today, which has been subsequently translated into the legal texts for civil society. This reticence, to a certain extent, may have protected the Algerian context from the domination or negative impacts which are related to external aid, donors and NGOs (see Challand, 2005) which has been discussed in more detail in the preceding chapter. Whilst the Egyptian regime in 2012 is challenging American NGOs in the court system for interfering in national politics of the country, the Algerian regime had always been clear on the limited space it had for foreign interventions. However in 2012, the legal context has changed again. And the rules for foreign NGOs have been laid out in the new Law on Associations of 12-06 of 2012.

The language choices of the Algerian state

In 1962 Algeria faced difficult decisions concerning language, notably which one to adopt for the newly independent country. Although modern standard Arabic was viewed as a unifying force, the immediate post-colonial difficulties in creating a new language policy and in implementing it, resulted in the imposition of a language foreign to the majority of the population (Scheele, 2009: 40). Along with this choice of Arabic came the rejection of the French and Berber languages (the latter spoken by third of the population). This linguistic policy in fact marginalised a significant part of the population. Whilst huge improvements were made in literacy and education, the linguistic policies excluded much of the population from the public sphere. It stigmatised and repressed the vernacular languages of Algeria, and created barriers and confusion (see Gafaiti, in Berger, 2002: 29). According to Taleb-Ibrahimi, it prevented 'the emergence of an Algerian intelligentsia' which would play a role

in civil society and the public sphere, now split between two languages, neither of which were truly mastered by the majority (Taleb Ibrahim, 2012).⁵⁰

Language remains a key unresolved question for the political life of Algeria and for state society relations. The modifying of the Constitution to include Tamazight as a national language in 2002, through the Law n°02-03 of 10 April 2002 modifying the Constitution, and the relaxing of the obligations to use Arabic in associations, through the Law on Associations n°12-06 of 12 January 2012,⁵¹ imply that there appears to be recognition of the linguistic diversity of Algeria and a softening of the State's approach in this respect.⁵²

ii.) **The Arab Spring: associative action, state responses and legislative reform**

Evans and Philips write that 'the anger of the post-colonial dispossessed will not go away'. Yet, the language of 'anger' and 'fury' they use to describe the Algerian population, should perhaps have led to more violent uprisings in 2011, more concerted demonstrations, and a stronger challenge to the regime. Whilst the recent demonstrations were heavily repressed, they were also fragmented before they even began. And though fearing an open dialogue on Algeria's problems, the regime has attempted certain reforms and consultation processes. The preference for the status quo appears to be due to the desire of the vast majority of Algerians for peace and stability, rather than violent upheavals. They desire change, but not at the cost of more human life. Indeed, Bozzo writes that the Algerian demonstrations, two decades earlier, were the very first of all the demonstrations in the Arab world, yet now, 'atomised, divided, traumatized, Algerian society has shown itself apparently to be in retreat compared to the wave (of protest)' (Bozzo, 2011:10).⁵³

The relationship between the state and society in Algeria, including the institutional context framing civil society, has nevertheless been influenced by the Arab revolutions in 2011, and by the profound, ongoing changes in the region. There have arguably been more subtle and ongoing changes, less

⁵⁰ *Khaoula Taleb Ibrahim dénonce la politique linguistique des cinquante dernières années «L'opposition du français et de l'arabe a cassé l'intelligentsia algérienne»* El Watan, 9 juillet 2012

⁵¹ Article 19 of the Law n° 90-31 previously imposed Arabic as the reporting language of Algerian associations.

⁵² See chapter 6 on language

⁵³ 'Atomisée, divisée, traumatisée, la société algérienne s'est montrée apparemment en retraite par rapport à la vague'

visible than the anger demonstrated in the streets of Algiers in early 2011. New legislative reforms by the Algerian government, although perhaps already planned (Salhi, 2010), have been introduced to regulate interactions with associations, political parties and the media. More significant, or what has changed, is the process of implementing such reforms. Whilst the outcomes may be contested, the impact of the consultation processes cannot be ignored.

The new legal texts also seem to highlight a wish to redefine relations between civil society, the state and external actors. In the current context, there is considerable fear and mistrust of external interventions from European, American and Middle East actors, who are seen as potentially destabilizing. At the same time, there is a recognition of the need to act, faced with an increasingly dissatisfied population, in a rapidly changing socio-economic, demographic and security situation. The following sections will outline initial societal responses in terms of demonstrations since January 2011, the role of associations, and finally the state's responses and the fear of foreign intervention or 'conspiracy'.

Since January 2011...

Between December 2010 and March 2011, Algeria experienced significant social unrest and demonstrations related to unemployment, housing, food prices, inflation, lack of political dialogue and corruption. These protests happened in parallel and were fuelled, at least to a certain extent, by the successful movements for change in Tunisia and in Egypt. As distinct from Volpi's analysis of the social protests a decade earlier, these protests were of a global nature; they were neither Islamist, nor organised on ethnic lines. Yet they did appear to be the natural expression of frustration at the same issues at the heart of the Islamist and the Berber demonstrations of the past: the role of the security apparatus, the arbitrary character of many state policies and the lack of accountability of state institutions (Volpi, 2003:105). Social exclusion and unemployment clearly triggered fragments of the unrest but, similar to the regional discontent, one of the main problems was that Algeria still represents 'a population frustrated by an unresponsive state administration' and the lack of 'a meaningful political debate' (Volpi, 2003: 101,135). Whilst socio-economic problems underpinned much of the frustration, this was arguably less so than in Algeria's neighbouring countries.

On the 21 January 2011, at a meeting of a number of associations and political parties, the 'National Coordination for Change and Democracy,' was created. This new movement was created to act as a platform which sought systemic political change and to pilot mobilisation and marches. However, the movement did not appear to have a united overall plan or loyal enough broad based following, and this fairly weak coalition of left leaning opposition groups seemed rather quickly to fall apart. In February 2011, one of the main (Kabyle) parties, the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), thanked the

NCCD and praised the joint analysis of the political problems in Algeria but stated that it currently did not prioritize participating in a march, though it supported the right of other actors to do so⁵⁴ (blog of the FFS, February 2011).

As a reaction from the state, in February 2011, President Bouteflika lifted the 19 year State of Emergency laws which had been a source of much frustration for those demanding the right to protest. With continuing fragmented unrest across the country, and legislative elections due the following year, in April, the President announced a series of further reforms. These would revise the Constitution to re-establish presidential limits, and revise the laws on political parties, the media and associations. However, many opposition parties considered this to be an inadequate and insufficient response, and argued that the genuine application of the current laws was what was really needed rather than any tinkering with new ones (Boubekeur, 2011).

According to Hugh Roberts, the invasion of neighbouring Libya by a former colonial power, also had an important impact in North Africa. Roberts points out that this was the first NATO intervention in North Africa since the FLN defeated the French in 1962.⁵⁵ Such perceived possible threats to the stability and security of the Algerian state became increasingly the subjects of popular debate. Fear and outrage at the possibility of invasion by western nations or by the former colonial power helped distract a still antagonistic population and channel discontent away from the internal structures of the state and towards foreign actors.

Seeking all opportunities to diffuse the frustration of the population, at the same time, the state also put in place further price subsidies, accelerated public works programmes, attributed grants and increased loans schemes. Whilst this diffused or reduced certain tensions, it did little to fully tackle the underlying causes of discontent, of social exclusion, unemployment and the desire for a more meaningful political debate. In the slightly calmer political environment in spring 2011, the state began a process of political dialogue.

A wide consultation process was launched in April 2011 at national and local levels to discuss reform. This was piloted by the Conseil National Economique et Sociale (CNES) and was described by one of the EU officials in Algiers as “by far one of the more progressive responses to the wave of discontent in the region” (interview with EU Delegation officials, October 2011). In June 2011, the *Assises de la Société Civile* regrouped a considerable number of actors in Algiers. At the national level too, in October, the Ministry of National Solidarity, together with its Social Development Agency, organized

⁵⁴ <http://ffs1963.unblog.fr/2011/01/22/le-ffs-estime-que-la-concertation-doit-sapprofondir-et-eventuellement-selargir-a-lavenir/>

⁵⁵ <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n22/hugh-roberts/who-said-gaddafi-had-to-go>

a large conference on local development and the future of social policy in Algeria. This invited a significant number of active associations (some of whom had had considerable difficulties with the authorities in the past) to participate in a national debate (interview with Ministry officials, November 2011). One association which presented their work to the conference described it as “the opportunity to air our grievances, show what we have achieved and ask for support to prevent interference from the regional level in our functioning. We seek to return to better relations with the authorities.” (Interview with a regional social sector Association, November 2011)

At a more local level, the consultation processes were carried out across the country and were received with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the respondents. In Oran, some associations indicated that they were consulted by the local authorities through written questionnaires which asked for recommendations for the new law. However, these consultation processes were received with certain scepticism. Some associations considered them to be rather pointless, and their opinions unlikely to be considered if they were considered as contravening the will of the state. Consequently, a number of associations chose not to respond. Public consultation meetings with organisations were limited to the rather weaker associations. A member of one association qualified the State, in this consultation process, as ‘autistic, unable to communicate and therefore dialoguing only with itself’ (interview with regional associations in Oran, October 2011).

In contrast, at the same time, in Laghouat, 400 actors from 8 different regions (wilayas) were invited by the CNES to participate in a large consultation process on local development.⁵⁶ The associations themselves, and the local authorities which participated, gave reports which were rather more positive: ‘it was quite emotional to find all the associational actors who had worked together over the last years, come together to discuss with the authorities for two days local development plans for the region’ (Interview with the former regional animator of the EU support programme, November 2011).

These consultations were followed by a massive communication campaign. Ministers were increasingly seen to ‘be visible’ in public settings with constantly organized inaugurations. Public grants and loans were hastily signed with little control on the quality of the dossiers presented. The message from the state appeared to be, ‘we have understood the problem and are acting’. This, in some ways, further exacerbated the problems of disconnection between state and people, and the general feeling of cynicism and contempt at the lack of real opportunities for the increasingly qualified young population. Huge mobilizations were required for flash ‘ministerial appearances’ and these were highly disapproved of by many. People were taken away from their jobs, and then made

⁵⁶ ‘Assises régionales sur le développement local’, organised and facilitated by the CNES, November 2011

to wait pointlessly in order to assist once the dignitary appeared. One interviewee complained: “we were requested to travel 4 hours to participate in the inauguration, which lasted five minutes, for the cameras. We had to show all the work which had been done by us, and there was no interest in exchanging or even speaking with us” (interview with associations in Algiers, October 2011).

The state’s reaction, therefore, did not always succeed in improving the strained relationship it has with civil society and associations. Nor has it remedied the ‘listening deficit,’ as one EU official framed the problem. As well as the consultation process, the state promised, however, concrete, legal reforms, together with a new dialogue process.⁵⁷ The new associative law of 2012, discussed in the next section, has perhaps resulted in a more restrictive environment for associations and has also clearly defined the framework for involvement of foreign associations, donors or other actors. It has been clear, not only in the Algerian context, that there is an increasing fear of foreign intervention in North African societies.

State Motivations to control and fears of the foreign conspiracy: Le complot étranger

The state’s motives for increasing repression, at a time when it was promising (in its official texts) the contrary, seem related to state fears of both internal and external forces of change. The new law appears to legitimize a certain level of repression which had progressively entered into the application of the law by the administration. Rather than reversing this cynical perception or reality of the state-associations relationship, the new law seemed in some ways to institutionalize it. Yet, this urge to control did not seem to come directly from any real risk or threat from associations, which have been often described by Algerian and external actors as weak, fragmented or as co-opted by the regime (Cavatorta, 2011; Liverani 2008). This repressive state response, as later shown in the individual cases, seems to come in many ways from feelings of competition. There seemed to be a certain jealousy, of active associations, even a fear of both indigenous social actors as well as foreign actors within the state structures.

Algerian associations which manage cultural, heritage, social and youth projects in collaboration with local authorities sometimes find that instead of encouraging or enabling them, institutional actors often wish to take over, appropriate or restrict initiatives. All associations have therefore to tread a diplomatic fine line to maintain their existence and avoid a number of problems.

⁵⁷ The new law is discussed in the case studies in the final section of this chapter (s.iii)

This is particularly so for (but not limited to) associations which question the role of the security services in the conflict of the 1990s. These are the groups which demand answers to human rights abuses linked to either of the factions in the conflict. Such actors challenge the fragile and unhappy equilibrium the state tries to maintain.

Associations also share the government's fears about foreign investment, or interference. The argument about the need to control external funding has been justified and successfully adapted according to different audiences. It is felt within many associations that limits to external funds are there to prevent extremist salafist groups, and risks of destabilizing Algerian society on religious grounds (interviews in Djelfa, November 2011). Both secular and Islamist associations argue that there is a need to prevent meddling from European and American sources. Suspicions are reinforced by nationalist discourses and contempt for European discrimination against Algerians, particularly in immigration and visa regulations. Yet, on the other hand, the majority of active associations argue that they should have access to external funding opportunities, especially if the state is incapable of providing and monitoring any reasonable funding programmes for social actors (interviews Oran, Algiers, Tiaret, Ghardaia, Djelfa 2011) .

Aliboni argues that, in the region in general, Arab governments have 'limited the participation' of national NGOS in EU funded activities and have 'prevented their NGOs from receiving funds' coming from the EU. (Aliboni, 2011:6). This appears to have been the case, in Algeria. Nevertheless, the state has allowed the EU to finance over 250 associations during the last decade, in a number of different programmes. (The number of European NGOs in Algeria is still comparatively small and the recent new law should ensure it remains this way). The EU in Algeria works almost entirely with national associations and, in the main, through conventions signed with the Algerian state.

There has been no role for the EU in the recent process concerning the proposed law. What the EU has contributed is a certain level of support and opportunities for networking, provided by its programmes⁵⁸. The impact of these programmes will be assessed in further chapters of the thesis. Contrary to what might be expected, the Algerian state has not entirely rejected support from external actors such as the EU. However, it requires a role in managing such programmes alongside the EU. The new law institutionalizes this requirement. However, the debates in the Parliament and with the different national actors show that there is still considerable fear and distrust of all foreign actors intervening in Algeria in any way.

⁵⁸ 9 out of the 19 associations in Oran, involved in lobbying against the law, had previously participated in the EU's programme to support Algerian Associations from 2007-2009

iii.) **Cases of state-civil society interactions and the new Law on Associations 2012**

The following findings on one national networking initiative and on two active local associations in two regions of Algeria, show some of the current developments and challenges in the relations between the state and associations. The first networking initiative concerns the framework in which associations function, namely the new law of January 2012. The second case concerns an association active in the health sector and the last one is about an association active in environmental and heritage protection. Their interactions with the local state structures highlight the diverse state responses and varying application of the legal framework by different actors.

The Associative lobby and networks created to deal with the new law on Associations 2012⁵⁹

In the framework of on-going consultations about reform since the beginning of 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab revolutions, in the month of September 2011, the Algerian state drew up a new draft law on associations and launched a restricted national consultation process. A number of significant associations were consulted and received the draft text, notably those from which the state feared a strong reaction might be expected (the eloquent and highly critical Federation of Handicapped Persons for example).

These associations in turn disseminated the text as widely as possible, so as not to appear to have dominated the debate and outcome, whatever that might be. A number of network events and large meetings were used to discuss the proposed reforms. Through these meetings, the draft law was analysed in detail and assessed in comparison to the current Law on Associations n°31 of 1990. (interviews with a number of associations including the FAPH, in Algiers November 2011)

In the draft text, the associations felt that there appeared to be a significant level of self-awareness on the part of the legislators, who openly acknowledged the failures of the 1990 law's application. The preamble to the new draft law itself states:

In truth, the current legislation has finished, and this is an acknowledged fact, by being perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the expression of a wish to hamper any initiative and to close down the spaces of the associative movement⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Loi 12-06 of 12 January 2012*, Official Journal of the Algerian Republic, 2012, n°2, 15 January 2012: p28

The stated objectives in the preamble of the draft, outlined the wish to facilitate, simplify, reduce the administrative burden on associations. The new law would :

1. lighten the conditions to constitute an association taking into account the territorial and diverse nature of associations; 2. Enlarge the field open to associative action and access to justice to protect their rights and interests; 3. Simplify the organization and the transparency needed for the functioning of any association; reduce the excessive and inoperative controls and complex and constraining procedures, which come from an unacceptable mistrust of associations..... (Draft Law on Associations, September 2011: p3)

It proposed a facilitation of the creation of associations by giving powers to the local level of the town halls (to register associations) and reducing the number of founding members required.

The articles that followed, however, also significantly increase the administrative burden and the controls by the executive. It appears that some of the motivations in framing the law were the fear of external actors (articles 24, 31, 39, 44), a desire to maintain power in the hands of the executive (article 9) and equally a desire to control or repress certain actors (article 44). If embodied in statute, the state could then maintain a legitimized form of repression through the legal framework rather than having to rely on more vague interpretations of the 1990 law.

In response to these proposals, a group of associations in Oran⁶¹ took legal advice and then launched an in-depth reflection process to assess the likely impact of the law. After consultation, they judged the law to be far more restrictive than the current situation. They felt it represented a step backwards from the regime which had opened up the associational movement in 1990. In the minutes of the final sitting of the Inter-associative meeting concerning the New Draft Law on Associations, they noted :

In this new draft law, there is a fundamental flaw which appears from the first articles, notably article 9. In effect, it is the administration (wilaya) which accords itself the right to decide whether or not an association can or cannot exist. However, the administration is an executive power at the service of the citizen, it is for the judicial system to take such a decision. In a democratic state, it is not the executive which judges or which decides the non-existence of an association. The normal procedure would be to inform the administration, which can then consult with the judiciary in a case of non-conformity.⁶² (Minutes of the

⁶⁰ En vérité, la législation actuelle a fini, et cela est un fait admis, par être perçue, à tort ou à raison, comme l'expression d'une volonté de « brider » les initiatives et de « verrouiller » les espaces de prédilection du mouvement associatif.

⁶¹ See Annexe 1 for the Communiqué and list of Associations.

⁶² Dans ce nouveau projet de loi, il y'a une transgression fondamentale qui apparaît dès les premiers articles, notamment l'article 9. En effet, c'est l'administration (Wilaya) qui se donne le droit de décider si une association peut exister ou pas. Or, l'administration est un pouvoir exécutif au service du citoyen, c'est à la justice de prendre ce genre de décisions. Dans un état démocratique, ce n'est pas le pouvoir exécutif qui juge

inter-associative meeting concerning the new draft law on associations, 29 October 2011, Oran)

Identifying a series of anomalies, they launched a petition for the withdrawal of the new law on the grounds that it re-instated an authorization rather than a declarative regime.⁶³ A common communiqué was drawn up pointing out that the law was anti-constitutional and would also be contrary to Algeria's international commitments on the freedom of association. They called for a common and national fund, a tax system to favour civic action and volunteering, and a rapprochement between civil society and the state. They demanded the right to be consulted in any new legal framework discussions.

Similar lobbying campaigns and ad hoc networks came together across the country. Communications were issued by these networks, or by their lead associations such as one transmitted by Amusnaw in Tizi Ouzou, arguing that the new law would represent 'a programmed death of civil society'. The Algerian League of Human rights (LADDH), within the Euro-méditerranéenne Network of Human Rights (REMDH), issued a memorandum stating the fears that the new law would not guarantee freedom of association, as enshrined in the Constitution and in international conventions which Algeria had signed.

Following these lobbying campaigns and the diffusion of the communiqué to a significant number of deputies, (particularly in Oran), the Law was then debated in Parliament on Sunday 27th November 2011. The deputies highly criticized the law, arguing it was not constitutional and went against the spirit of partnership with civil society organizations.⁶⁴ They also used the opportunity to frame a number of grievances, regarding different treatment of religious associations (these comments came mainly from the religious oriented MSP, ex-Hamas party) and the interference and plotting of foreign actors against Algeria's national interests.⁶⁵ For the moment, therefore it seemed the draft law had been blocked and could not pass as currently drafted. It also appeared that the Parliament had somehow asserted its role in the democratic and legislative processes of government. It had, moreover, responded to the lobbying efforts of the associations and networks.

ou qui décide de la non-existence d'une association. La procédure normale, serait d'informer l'administration, et c'est à elle de saisir la justice en cas de non-conformité. (my translation)

⁶³ www.petitionpublique.fr/?pi=P2011N17181

⁶⁴ www.elwatan.com/actualite/les-deputes-relevant-des-ambiguites-et-des-atteintes-a-la-liberte-d-association-28-11-2011-148916_109.php

⁶⁵ www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/les-deputes-redoutent-le-complot-de-l-etranger-financement-des-associations-166883

Yet, on the 14 December 2011, the law was passed by the Popular Assembly, as it stood, and subsequently adopted by the Conseil de la Nation. It is published in the official journal of 15 January 2012, as the Law -12-06 of the 12 January 2012.

This is perhaps a striking comment on the limited role of the Parliament. Amel Boubekeur has pointed out previously, that in the past significant pay rises (300% wage increase for deputies in 2008) have contributed to co-opting the parliament :

It is rare that a law proposed by the government is rejected. Lack of independence from the government inhibits members from fulfilling their basic responsibilities as lawmakers and acting in their role as mediator between institutions and citizens. (Boubekeur, 2011 :4)

Whilst this outcome seemed a regression, there is significance in the consultation process which had gone on. Algerian associations initiated a political dialogue and a lobbying campaign which resulted in the questioning of the law in Parliament. This campaign is on-going. On the 7 January 2012, the network of associations from Oran published a communiqué criticising the unconstitutional nature of the law and proposing solutions to achieve the stated objectives of the Presidency.⁶⁶ Pointing out the contradiction with Algeria's international commitments on civil and political rights, the petition notes that the law 'puts into question the declarative system in place in all democratic countries and creates multiple obstacles to voluntary associative action.'⁶⁷ Whilst the introduction of the new legislation appears to have done little to reverse the negative effects or ambiguities of the law outlined by Brahim Salhi in his work on citizenship and identity (2010), it has nevertheless launched a debate. It has at the same time officially recorded many of the reasons to be optimistic about the associative movement which, professor Salhi has argued, is a necessary process (2010:307).

The preamble to the draft law states the achievements of associations: 'despite all the difficulties met with in the management of their activities, they have nonetheless managed to give meaning to associative life, a level and dimension of which the reality is undeniable.'

And outlining the goals for the associative movement, the preamble continues :

Recognised in its work, re-established in its mission and role, supported in its goals and objectives to support the common good, the associative movement will contribute by its vitality and vigour to participative democracy, of which it is an essential part, more meaning

⁶⁶ www.petitionpublique.fr/PeticaoVer.aspx?pi=loiasso

⁶⁷ , elle remet en cause le système déclaratif en cours dans tous pays démocratiques et crée de multiples obstacles à l'action associative bénévole.

and reality.⁶⁸ (Preamble draft Law associations 2011, quoted in the Petition for the withdrawal of the new law on associations,⁶⁹).

Consulted in early 2012, a number of associations which had participated in this networking initiative, stated that, whilst deeply disappointed, they had experienced, despite everything, more positive interactions with state actors, when trying to understand the new obligations coming with the new law. For them, it remains now to be seen how the law will be implemented in practice and how the different political levels of the Commune, Region and Ministry, now responsible for associations, (since the January 2012 Law) will interact with associative life.

A Socio-Medical Support Association in Medea

Across Algeria, many actors involved in religious charitable organizations encountered difficulties in their work during the tense political situation of the 1990s. Some associations continued, and some actors used their previous experience to set up new, single issue or sector oriented associations to deal with social questions, issues of public health or problems related to personal grievances.

The city of Medea suffered more than most in terms of grievances, trauma, and suspicions during the conflict of the 1990s. This was not only in terms of specific grievances and violence suffered by the population, but the insecurity also contributed to a weakening of the provision of services to the population.

In Sidi Fredj, in 2003, two men from Medea met in a health centre. They both suffered from spinal problems. They had had to travel for hours by road to reach the centre, in severe pain, and thus began to question the lack of services and of information in their home town. On their return, they spoke with other friends and contacts, particularly parents of handicapped children suffering from similar problems. The following year, drawing on practical experience of charitable work in religious organizations, they set up an association named Echifaa, meaning 'healing' in Arabic. The goals of the association were :

⁶⁸ « ... Malgré toutes les difficultés rencontrées dans la gestion de leurs activités, elles ont tout de même réussi à donner à la vie associative un sens, un élan et une dimension dont la réalité quelle qu'elle soit est incontestable... » « ...Reconnu dans sa vocation, rétablie dans sa mission et son rôle, soutenu dans ses buts et ses objectifs au profit de l'intérêt général, le mouvement associatif contribuera par sa vitalité et sa vigueur à donner à la démocratie participative dont il est l'un des ferments essentiels plus de sens et de réalité... ».

⁶⁹ www.petitionpublique.fr/PeticaoVer.aspx?pi=loiasso last accessed 14 February 2012

To create a space to meet and think about the ways and means to accompany patients who suffer from different pathologies of the spine, in their search for health care, and above all to intervene to prevent such illnesses which can be avoided through certain changes in lifestyle and daily practices and behaviour, changes which could be easily available for everyone. (Presentation document, ADS Conference Algiers, Oct 2011)⁷⁰

Following its creation, the group organized information and sensitization campaigns, and an annual conference. They organized the distribution of wheelchairs, crutches and medicines to those in need of support. With the help of an EU financed project, co-sponsored by the authorities and Sonatrach, the national petrol company, a medical centre was set up in 2008. Through the centre, those suffering could be treated locally, for a symbolic membership fee. In 2006, there were already almost 500 members of the association. By 2011, there were almost 5000 members. The centre is operational and all the basic service activities continue or have been scaled up. A website and facebook page communicate the activities of the association to members and beyond, and they are supported across Algeria and by a number of international friends of the association, in France, England and Sweden.

The association provides a service to the population with a functional centre working 6 days per week (3 days for female patients and 3 days for male patients). It has a staff of over 20 (supported by social development authorities) whose wages support approximately 30 families. Procuring much of the services and supplies as locally as possible, and recruiting regionally, the association in its own way also contributes to the local economy. In its more international outlook, the association made a request to recruit a Palestinian doctor who, resident in Medea, had asked to help.

In terms of any political role, or ties to the Algerian state, the association was asked to and did support the presidential electoral campaign in 2008 in its logistics, distributing posters, and transmitting information about communal events. Last year the governor of Medea promised the association a disused swimming pool which could be rehabilitated for the use of the association to treat its patients. On a number of occasions, the association has been able to present its work and activities at national level :

⁷⁰ de créer un espace pour s'y rencontrer et réfléchir les voies et moyens à mettre en œuvre pour accompagner les malades atteints de différentes pathologies de la colonne vertébrale dans leur quête de soins et aussi et surtout d'intervenir dans le domaine de la prévention de ces maladies qui peuvent être évitées grâce à une hygiène de vie et à des pratiques quotidiennes aisément accessibles à tout un chacun.

In the national seminar in October 2011 in Tipaza, under the patronage of the Minister of National Solidarity, under the theme : Social Development Agency, experiences, risks and challenges, we were invited to participate to explain how our project has been able to self-finance itself and be sustainable. This is thanks to the participation of the members who multiply day by day; today they are 4942. Furthermore, this summer we extended the centre by 12m2. (Exchange with the Association October 4, 2011)⁷¹

By a combination of local initiative and modest outside help, it was, on many fronts, a clear success story which served genuine local needs.

However, today the association is uncertain as to its future. There has been a change of regional Governor, and suddenly the association has started to receive letters and convocations from the authorities. They have been summoned to present their case to the regional authorities, where the association has been accused of making profit, charging patients, and of acting outside the wilaya of Medea (for treating patients from Algiers). This, it is implied, has affected its regional status. A police enquiry has been sent to the association. The statutes, which were updated due to the rotation of the President, and presented to the authorities, were withheld at the Wilaya.⁷² It was made clear that there was a problem and that they would perhaps not be 'approved'.

The association's team is seriously affected by the interference and accusations to which they have been subjected, but still continue to operate the centre and to seek solutions to the problems resulting from the conflict or misunderstanding with the regional authorities :

(We are disappointed that) our false problems are still not resolved, we received last Thursday a visit from an inspector sent by the Minister of Health, but he was unable to do anything due to the matter being in the hands of the justice system. He even spoke with the Wali, but it is the same story. As a result, the Health directorate has broken its convention which allowed the detachment of two doctors to our organization. We are trying to recruit now a doctor specialised in re-education who could be the medical director of the centre and paid by the association. We have already contacted two doctors and await the response.

⁷¹ Dans le séminaire national qui aura lieu le 16/17 octobre 2011 au grand bleu à Tipaza, sous le haut patronage de Monsieur le ministre de la solidarité nationale et de la famille sous le thème, l'Agence de Développement Social entre vécu, enjeux et défis, nous sommes invités à participé avec une intervention pour expliquer comment notre projet à réussi a s'autofinancer et maintenir sa périnatalité et durabilité, et ce grâce à la participation de ses adhérant qui se multiple de jour à jour, à ce jour leur nombre est de 4942. De plus on a fait cet été un petit aménagement à notre centre avec une extension de 12 mètre carrée.

⁷² Contrary to a number of articles of the Algerian Law on Associations, which enshrines the freedom of association through a declaratory regime

Hopefully we can recruit one as soon as possible. (Exchange with the Association December 6, 2011).⁷³

The association's key members feel they have to invest all their energy in responding to negative, intrusive requests from the authorities, to present their accounts and activities, whilst at the same time having been recognized by the state as a success story. After two years of investigations, audits and questions, the reduction of their activities to a minimum, in October 2012 the association was finally acquitted of all accusations by Tribunal in Medea. Their experience provides a not uncommon example of a soured relationship between the associative sector and the state authorities. It also demonstrates the fragility of associations, vulnerable to accusations, jealousy and the complexity of apparently arbitrary relations between the state structures internally and with civil society actors.

Environmental and heritage protection Association in Ghardaia

About 500 km south of Medea, in the Ghardaia region of Algeria, the Association for the Protection of the Environment of Beni Isguen (APEB), was created in 1989 to respond to the needs of local populations and to restore oases. It currently groups together a number of teachers, biologists, agronomists and citizens of Beni Isguen. The association set out to mobilize funds to carry out projects to protect the palm groves, its local traditions and agriculture. It targeted notably the ancient water systems which protect Beni Isguen from the flooding of the desert riverbed, the oued.

One of the larger projects carried out by the association was to rebuild the walls which channel the waters, in the case of floods. When the rains arrive, these water channels protect the town, irrigate the different terrains within the oasis, and fill the wells. This sustains the agricultural activities and livelihoods of many citizens. It also saves lives and infrastructure, diffusing the pressure of intensive flood waters, gradually channelling them to safe reservoirs. Such systems have worked for thousands of years in the oasis towns of the Sahara and for six centuries since the creation of Beni Isguen. It has historically been managed and maintained communally by the local population.

⁷³ (nous sommes déçus que) nos faux problèmes ne soient pas encore résolus, on a reçu jeudi passé une visite d'un inspecteur envoyé par Mr le Ministre de la santé, mais il n'a rien pu faire car l'affaire est entre les mains de la justice. Il a même parlé avec Mr le Wali, mais toujours la même chanson. Par conséquent la direction de la santé nous a rompue la convention qui permet le détachement des deux médecins à notre association. On est en train d'essayer de recruter un médecin rééducateur pour qu'il soit directeur médical spécialement pour notre centre et qu'il soit payé par l'association. On a déjà contacté deux médecins et on attends toujours la réponse, espérant qu'on trouvera un Médecin le plutôt possible.

Today, many of the oases face ruin, with a population continuously migrating towards the capital. The association is trying to salvage and recreate the maintenance of the irrigation systems as a communal project. They have worked largely with a Spanish association, and once with the EU. The association's latest project was the construction of a training centre for agriculturalists, coming from oasis towns across Algeria and the Maghreb region. A programme has been drawn up, taking into account the specificities of the target students, and the training programmes are about to be launched.

The association is now a key player in the RADDO network, which links up associations working on development issues related to oases, representing associations in the south of Europe, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria.⁷⁴ Eleven Algerian associations are members, and APEB is now trying to work on the national network of these organisations.

There is a particular density to associative life in Ghardaia. The Mozabite population in Algeria is known for its solidarity and its structured organization at local level. For APEB, the town hall has offered a building in which activities can be managed (in addition to the training centre built by APEB in the palmary). APEB's president reports that the wilaya is now far more open towards the association. The last renewal of statutes went smoothly. Today, the minister for the environment recognizes the work of APEB and has suggested drawing up a convention with the association.

In Ghardaia, many associations were registered in the late 1980s, at the beginning of the opening up of civil society in Algeria, with the more relaxed laws on association in 1987 and 1990. Associations thus have had a longer lifespan than elsewhere in the country and also suffered less during the conflict of the 1990s. Energy from Ghardaia has inspired trends elsewhere in the country, and APEB, now works with other associations across Algeria. APEB's successful management of their relationship with the state is in marked contrast to the misfortunes of the health association in Medea and illustrates the difficult and varied experience that associations encounter, as they interact with the state in different parts of the country.

Conclusion

This complex relationship between the state, civil society and external actors, is one of the significant challenges facing Algeria and societies across the region, which now have to manage political change

⁷⁴ <http://raddo.org/> Réseau Association du développement durable des oases

and socio-economic crises. The role of civil society actors: associations, religious leaders, the press, academia, artists and intellectuals, as well as the private sector, is an important one in framing and accompanying political, social and economic change (Glen, 2001).

This chapter has looked at how, historically, Algeria's specificities have made it especially difficult to accept plural opposition. Entrenched fears of division, betrayal and fragmentation linked to the collective memories of struggle and conflict impact upon the possibilities of changing the language and perceptions of contestation. Previous political decisions did allow for openings, and one of the most progressive democratization processes in the region in the late 1980s. The opening up of the associative sphere did lead to a vibrant civic life and to a more collaborative co-existence. But the context of the 1990s meant the progressive texts were adapted to the hard realities of conflict.

In 2011, the Arab revolutions have significantly impacted upon the Algerian state and civil society. Described by one EU official as one of the 'most progressive responses' in the region, the wide public consultation on political reform, was one of the results. There has been optimism as to the potential for change. Yet fear and distrust appear to have limited this opening, as shown in the case studies. This is particularly so in the first case study of the new Law on Associations discussed, voted on and passed in 2012. A less enabling legislation appears to have been put in place. The experiences of the associations in the second and third case studies show the arbitrary nature of the authorities' interactions with associations. The third case shows that there are examples of improved co-operation, transnational networks and recognition of an association's achievements by the state.

The debates launched in 2011, despite whatever scepticism invoked on either side, nevertheless contributed to opening up a potential to tackle what Volpi describes as the heart of the Algerian predicament, the need for political dialogue and the implication of the demos in the political debate. Algeria is undergoing a consultation and reform process in which many actors are participating. The role of the associations in Oran, in analyzing and challenging the new Law on Associations in Parliament implied a significant change in state-society relations. As Mitchell argues, the state and society do not have fixed boundaries. These limits are created by a dialogical process in which both sides have the capacity to frame the debate and influence the context and processes of regulation. To understand further these dialogical processes from the perspective of associations, the next chapter takes an in-depth look at the make-up of Algerian civil society.

Chapter 4. Associations in Algeria

Summary

The previous chapters have focused on civil society in the MENA region, the EU's development philosophy for this area, and the specific case of the Algerian state and its relations with civil society. Following on, this current chapter examines in greater detail civil society associations on the ground across Algeria. A modified typology is proposed, which challenges previous categorizations of associations. An analysis of recent figures from the Ministry of Interior gives an overview of the sector focus and of regional concentration of associations. The mapping of these figures shows a more dense associative life in the south of the country. This is in contrast to the EU's donor map of its support to associations in Algeria, which has targeted mainly the north. The chapter explores, through case studies, the functioning and activities of a number of organizations within specific sectors and in different regions. It examines how previous conceptions of identity, nationhood and history have been challenged by heritage and cultural associations; and how social sector associations interact with the state structures, redefining the roles, responsibilities and expectations for social care. An examination of both national figures and individual cases offers different perspectives on the interactions between associations, government and donors, giving a fuller, if more complex, view of Algerian political life at grass roots level.

The first chapters of the thesis have explored the regional context, the philosophy underlying the EU's interventions in civil societies and, lastly, the specific nature of state-society relations in the case of Algeria. The current chapter follows on to examine in detail the nature of Algerian civil society, as represented by officially registered associations.

To do this, it is useful to draw up a typology of associations in Algeria, building on or challenging parts of current typologies by researchers such as Andrea Liverani (2008), Ammar Belhilmer 2009, Omar Derras (2007), Essaid Taib and Brahim Salhi (2011). Such a typology, in which the work and role of associations can be discussed, fits into the original theoretical framework designed by Philippe Schmitter, to assess the conditions under which it is possible for civil society to contribute to political change and democratization.

Recently published, detailed, official figures from the Ministry of Interior show a strong predominance of local associations (*de quartier*), religious actors, parent teacher associations, social associations and sports associations. These categories are followed, in numerical importance, by associations dealing with culture, heritage and youth. Using these figures, in combination with recent research studies on 'active associations,' to guide the case selection, the chapter explores a number of case studies. These examine the main actors, the founding members, their goals, profiles, motivations and experiences, and the impact of support, if any, from external donors. The figures and cases allow an overview of how these factors differ across regions, across sectors and over time.

Building also on Brahim Salhi's detailed quantitative study in 2003, and on Omar Derras' research in 2007, into the makeup and profiles of associational actors, these qualitative case studies highlight the wide range of backgrounds from which actors emerge, and the new roles they assume. They seek to examine how associations and their main activists participate in and dialogue with local politics at the communal and regional levels.

To better understand these phenomena, and the nature of associations and their work in Algeria, this chapter presents firstly (i) a general overview, a typology to describe the different types of associations that exist. This draws on the official sources and previous research to identify the regional and sectoral breakdown of associations. The chapter then investigates in more detail, through a sector approach and case studies: (ii) associations in the cultural heritage sector and then (iii) social sector associations.

i.) Typologies, the regional breakdown and sector focus of associations

As discussed in the first chapter, in *Some propositions about civil society and the consolidation of democracy*, Phillipe Schmitter argues that at a general level, civil society can have a positive role in *consolidating* democracy, in that (1) it stabilizes and regroups information, (2) it inculcates civic and democratic behavior, (3) it provides closer channels for expression, (4) it governs towards collective commitments, and (5) it provides a source of resistance to tyranny. However, civil society can also present risks for democracy, depending on the specific characteristics of organizations and the governing system. Civil society can negatively impact on the functioning of democracy if (1) it makes the formation of majorities difficult, (2) it biases the distribution of influence (e.g. class based), (3) it brings obscure compromises to political life, (4) it brings 'pork barrel' solutions (e.g. where legislation authorizes public works in certain districts, in excess of what allocation of resources to needs would justify), or (5) it divides along ethnic, linguistic or cultural grounds (Schmitter 1993).

Success therefore depends on the nature of the organizations, particularly whether they are broadly encompassing enough, balanced in their capabilities and able to be well governed. If such conditions are met, then there is a chance for genuine social dialogue. Otherwise, Schmitter suggests, the promotion of civil society groupings may simply reproduce 'squabbling, self interested organizations,' incapable of agreeing on a common cause. In line with Schmitter's framework, it is therefore interesting to study, at the grass roots level, the nature and functioning of specific organizations, or networks of associations, and to attempt to regroup, in a new typology, different types of associations.

Such an examination can help identify whether, and if so which associations are able to regroup information, to inculcate democratic behavior, to channel expression, to mobilize and bring collective commitments and to provide sources of resistance or oppositional politics (see Cavatorta 2011). A sectoral, regional and motivational analysis could also measure whether there is a class or group bias, or a divisive element, along, say, ethnic or cultural grounds, and whether this is important. For example, in Algeria, the strong presence of associations in the Berber regions of Kabylia or the M'zab could imply such divisive forces. Yet, the case discussed in chapter 3, of the environmental NGO in the M'Zab would seem to refute this. The federating methods of the organization seem to imply a more inclusive nature. Equally, Frédéric Volpi's research, on Kabyle associations would seem to confirm the more consensual, bridge building approaches of associative life in Kabylia. He describes

their ability to build the 'organic connection between rulers and ruled', and more structured approaches, rather than a divisive or purely regionalist perspective (Volpi, 2003:134).

To examine the potentially negative impact of associations on democracy, as suggested by Schmitter's framework, it is important to examine the motivations, the goals and the profile of the founding members, the mobilisation capacity and the number of (active) members, and how the association enables expressive forms. Equally, the regional bias, the sector preferences, and the role of religion, of language, ethnicity and politics in the objectives and in the methods of the activists or members of associations can shed light on the potential success of associations.

To different degrees, previous research typologies have classed Algerian associations, rather negatively, in what appears to be a line, measuring their usefulness in terms of altruism and independence from the state. Ammar Belhimer for example identifies three categories of associations: (1) those which are created purely by the state; (2) those which are created by independent actors but are then co-opted by the state; and (3) those which appear to be mainly opportunist in a situation of scarce resources, seeking financial or personal gain (see Ammar Belhimer, 2009:41). Other research (Volpi, 2003, Derras, 2007, Cavatorta, 2011) also adds, at the other end of the scale, a more positive, ideal type, a category of associations which are politically active, motivated by the real needs of the population through militant activism or socially inspired actions. Derras categorizes these as associations of contestation. For Cavatorta, many associations qualify as fitting into this category. However, for him, these associations, whilst not co-opted by the state, are limited by difficult relations with the state and with each other, and this prevents independent and effective action.

Co-optation in Algeria, is seen as being 'tied to the regime'. Such ties are demonstrated when associations mobilize presence for political rallies and ministerial visits as the obligatory return for freedom of action and small grants. Associations under the single party were indeed attributed such a role, namely to mobilize the population and support for the regime. Despite the changes in the political configuration in Algeria since 1987, this practice of involving associations in political life continues. As elsewhere, associations are called upon to invite participants when state actors are visiting, or to mobilize support for electoral campaigns. It is not clear, however, how significant or effective (in reality, rather than in perceptions) this practice actually is. Neither is it clear, how associations' members (at least 1.4 million persons⁷⁵) actually feel about this practice when and if it happens. Examining co-optation does not tell us enough about the nature or role of the association,

⁷⁵ The 1990-30 Law requires 15 founding members, so in principle 93,000 associations in 2012 would mean that a minimum of 1.4m Algerians are members (at least on paper) of an association, this represents c.7% of the adult population.


or the significance of this practice. And if associations are co-opted, in the way described above, what do they do, if anything, outside of (often not so interesting) electoral campaigns or sporadic ministerial visits?

Recognising the more critical vision of associations as well as the ideal-type, the following criteria and typology are proposed. Associations can be divided into three different categories:

- Partisan associations which seek personal gain, or which are sleeping 'briefcase associations' with no real permanent activity or anchoring in society (Taib, Ammar Belhimer 2009) This category would include both the 'assisted associations' and the 'collaborating associations' Derras describes, (2007) as both would seem to fit into the same optic.
- Associations created for more personal reasons, for personal grievance, loss, injustice, maybe recognition either of a cause, a person or trauma, and which may become a life project (see Cavatorta, 2011 on associations working for families of the disappeared)
- Associations which are created from altruism, political will or militant goals, to improve (along ideological or religious lines, or not) social, cultural or environmental wellbeing (this includes and goes beyond Derras' 'associations de contestation'.)

Such a typology can be visualized in the following diagramme.

Figure 8 : Typology of associations, reasons for creation and levels of autonomy



Such criteria are not static and an organization, and its members, could move between categories or belong to more than one over different time periods. The thesis argues that previous typologies and analysis have focused too much on the first box, and that the predominance of such associations and their influence is perhaps overstated in the language of academia, policy makers, the media and donors, for a number of reasons.

Omar Derras' typology, drawn up in 2007, is detailed and insightful. It clearly describes a whole range of different types of associative actors, from social, humanitarian, politicized, self interested, to youth oriented organizations. It acknowledges a real role and independence however, only for associations of contestation. These in turn, for Derras, 'are marginalized and controlled by the state'. Before assessing more closely Derras' findings about the roles of these different structures, through specific case studies, the next sections firstly assess ministry figures, and previous research, which can shed light on the regional and sectoral breakdown of associations.

The regional distribution of Associations in Algeria


In early 2012, the Ministry of Interior published online a detailed typology, by sector and by region, of all registered associations in Algeria.⁷⁶ Whilst it is not clear whether all the associations are active, the figures are nonetheless instructive. They indicate, at the very least, the will of the population, across different regions, to act in the public sphere, in a particular sector, in the form of an association (i.e. to unite twelve founding members,⁷⁷ define objectives and agree on statutes, manage a bank account and present the association's dossier to the regional authorities).

From interviews with donor agencies and ministry officials in Algiers, it is presumed that the south is relatively less represented in terms of associative life. Or at least, that the south is deprived of the national or international support mechanisms for associations. Analysis of the recent figures from the Ministry of interior shows that, on the contrary, per capita, the south is far more densely populated with associations than the north. This can be demonstrated in the following diagram:

⁷⁶ www.interieur.gov.dz/Dynamics/frmltem.aspx?html=2&s=29 last accessed 19/05/2012

⁷⁷ This was the requirement under the 1990 Law, 90-31, the 2012 law has different requirements depending on the type of association created.

Figure 9 : Density of associations by Wilaya




The regions with the most associations registered (per capita) are almost all in the southern Sahara regions. Those with the least associations are the more urban, populated regions of the North, Relizane, Annaba Oran, Setif, Djelfa and Tiaret.

Oran, due to the visibility of its associations, is often seen as the best example in terms of associative activism. And yet, from the figures, it is the lowest in terms of numbers of registered associations per population in the wilaya. Overall, the population of Oran has created far fewer associations than in other regions. It is perhaps the environment in Oran, better connections, being an economic capital, the linguistic presence of French, all contributing to better access to external funding opportunities, which has meant that the newly created associations could flourish more than in other contexts. It is unclear why fewer associations have been created in Oran.

Equally, reasons for the density of the south could be many. In the south, many associations work on cultural issues, and are thus perhaps easier to set up and are less conflictual. The needs are perhaps greater than some of the northern regions, and distances are longer, indicating a need for localized organizations. The long history of associative or community action in the south, is arguably stronger than in the north.

The following map reflects this density of associations by region, in terms of the populations of the different wilayas.


Figure 10 : Association Density Map of Algeria by Wilaya and population



N° of associatins per 100,000 inhabitants by region	
1000+	
600-800	
400-600	
200-400	
0-200	

In contrast, the next map highlights areas in which associations successfully competed for grants under the EU’s support programme to associations of 2006-2010.

Figure 11 : Map of EU financed NGO projects in Algeria



The two maps: of associative density, and of donor funded associations, appear to be directly opposed. Whereas the densest area of associations (per inhabitant) is in the south, the majority of funding is in the north. Whilst a large proportion of the population resides in the north, there is nonetheless a large proportion of associations in the south. Conclusions from these figures about the regional distribution and the stronger associative activism in the south, far from the sources of funding, could be multiple. It could be that there is no link between the presence of donors and the

existence of associations. Or it could be that the donor has reached associations in proximity to the capital (due to logistical difficulties related to the geographic size of the country). Or it could be that for linguistic reasons one part of the country's associations has been more successful in obtaining grants. Or it could be that there is a greater reticence to work with foreign actors in certain regions than in others.

Derras' study shows how the 'lack of means' is one of the main factors for abandoning or disillusionment with associative life (2007:82). Yet, in a parallel with Algeria's position in the MENA region (as the smallest consumer of EU 'civil society support,' see chapter 2) it appears again that lower funding and greater isolation, does not necessarily mean that civil society is less present.


The sector focus of Associations in Algeria

Several studies have analysed the sectoral bias and distribution of the associational phenomenon across Algeria (Salhi, 2003 & 2011, Derras, 2007). The vast majority of organizations created between 1990 and 1997 (46,000 according to Salhi) were, in order of their representative weight and importance, parent teacher associations, followed by mosques and religious associations, then sporting, cultural, humanitarian, local, youth, rural, handicapped and women's associations.

In 2007, Omar Derras carried out his extensive, nation-wide research project on the associative phenomenon in Algeria, financed by the German foundation, Frederick Ebert Stiftung. Derras' research selected 'active' associations along a set of criteria. These included the existence of a permanent office, space or address from which the organizations activities were run, a programme of previous and ongoing activities and the presence and relative stability of the members of the board (2007:9). In his study of 446 'active' associations in 2007, Omar Derras notes 43% in the social sector, followed by 28% in the cultural sector. Youth represents 14%, health 5% and religious, women's and rural associations represent a small fraction of active organizations (Derras 2007:34).

The 2012 Ministry of Interior typology, by sector and region, indicates a slightly different breakdown. For the sectors of activity of the 92,627 'local' associations registered at regional level, 22% are comités de quartiers, 16,5% are religious and 16% are sports associations, while 16% are parent teacher associations. The next significant group is cultural associations, which represent 10% of officially registered associations. The remaining associations represent, in much smaller proportions, a number of sectors (professional, environment, youth, old age, health, handicap, solidarity, women, tourism, humanitarian). These figures are presented in the following diagram :


Figure 12 : Local associations in Algeria and their sector focus



Source : figures from the Algerian Ministry of Interior website, 31/12/2011
www.interieur.gov.dz/Dynamics/frmlItem.aspx?html=2&s=29 last accessed 09/04/2012

At the same date, 1,027 ‘national’ associations were registered with the Ministry of Interior in Algiers. They are deemed, by their registration at this central level, to be competent to work right across the national territory. The areas and priorities of the national associations differ slightly from those of the local associations. The main areas of activity are the representation of the professions, through the professional national trade unions, which make up 21% of national registered associations, followed by health associations (15%) and cultural associations (14%). Of these 143 cultural associations, (14%) deal with art, culture, education and a further 21 (2%) tackle national heritage. This breakdown can also be visualized by the following diagram:

Figure 13 : National associations in Algeria and their sector focus



Source : figures from the Algerian Ministry of Interior website, 31/12/2011
www.interieur.gov.dz/Dynamics/frmltem.aspx?html=2&s=29 last accessed 09/04/2012

The high number of registered associations in Algeria reflects this wide variety of actors. Many have a specific and well-defined role, such as the management of a school or the charitable actions of the Mosque. The following sectoral studies seek to understand the nature of associations which go beyond these well-defined roles and act within the community. The next sections detail the experiences of associations working firstly in the heritage sector, followed by social associations, with a focus on those working in the domain of both providing services and representing people with disability. These sectors are those most represented by the ‘active’ associations studied by Omar Derras in his 2007 research project.

ii.) Associations in the heritage sector

Cultural heritage associations target the promotion, protection and diffusion of heritage. This is defined as both the tangible historical monuments and objects, and also the intangible heritage, enshrined in living cultural expressions and traditions. Heritage associations deal with questions of identity, state-society relations and national history, including the Berber, Roman, Jewish, Arab, Ottoman and European cultural heritage which is part of the complexity of the Algerian nation.

Since the 1990s, the Algerian state has attributed a role to cultural associations in the protection of cultural heritage, through its legal reforms, in response to demands by associations. The Algerian Law for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Loi-98-04) identifies as national heritage all tangible and intangible artifacts, buildings, monuments and traditions, upon and in the Algerian soil, from pre-history to the current day. Article 4 of this law allows the possibility that such goods be managed by associations under the prescriptions of the 1990 Law on Associations (Loi-90-31).

The recent statistics published by the Ministry of Interior in 2012 described above, on the numbers and sectors of registered associations, show that cultural associations represent over 10% of regional (wilaya level) associations in Algeria, and 16% of national associations. In Omar Derras' study, of the truly active associations, the figure is even higher, at 28%.

For its next funding cycle in Algeria (2011-2013) the EU is directly targeting the heritage sector and heritage associations as one of its key funding priorities in the National Indicative Programme for the country within the ENPI.


In a similar pattern to the regional distribution of all associations in Algeria, the areas in which cultural and arts associations appear to be most prominent are in the southern regions of Algeria, in Illizi and the Adrar in the Sahara, but also in the northern Berber regions of Kabylia. The ten regions with the most registered art and cultural associations (per capita), according to the Ministry's figures, are shown in the following table:

Table 3 : Association density - cultural associations per 100,000 inhabitants (ten densest regions)

	WILAYA	Culture & heritage associations	population	N° associations per 100,000 inhabitants
1	Illizi	96	52 333	183
2	Adrar	498	399 714	125
3	Tamanrasset	206	176 637	117
4	Béchar	311	270 061	115
5	Ghardaïa	401	363 598	110
6	El Bayadh	191	228 624	84
7	Tindouf	39	49 149	79
8	Tizi Ouzou	801	1 127 607	71
9	Béjaïa	513	912 577	56
10	Naama	89	192 891	46

This can also be visualized in the following diagram :

Figure 14 : Regions with the most cultural heritage associations per capita



The regions with the lowest densities of cultural associations are Chlef, Oran, Annaba, Targuiya and the lowest Relizane. However, the following case studies will show how this does not necessarily reflect the quality of the work carried out by associations in these areas.

The role of cultural and heritage associations has been a rather understated one in previous studies. Derras is somewhat pessimistic as to their potential to contribute to associative life. His study confirms that the most southern regions (Tamanrasset and Adrar) are the densest in terms of cultural associations. But he qualifies these figures arguing that these associations are mainly artistic associations with more limited ambitions:

One should put such high figures into context, the majority of these associations do traditional or folk music when there are local festivities, they are local associations (de quartier) which deal with everyday problems, social solidarity and preserving the communitarian and social links. (Derras, 2007 : 41, author's translation⁷⁸)

It is true that, as regional associations, the majority of their actions focus on their immediate environment, or one particular form of cultural expression. However, networks and communication activities (press articles, conferences, events) also enable some organisations to interact with a wider audience. According to Derras, 30% of associations in his study maintain relations and networks with other associations (Derras, 2007: 85). Being part of an association also has significant meaning for the members. Derras documents this clearly in his chapter on the reasons for joining associations (ibid: 79). One of the major factors inciting people to join associations is the desire to find a framework within which to defend certain values, to contribute to the construction of the country, to protect religion or national heritage or to defend a certain identity (ibid 82-83). At the regional level then, heritage associations, since the 1990s, have become one of the frameworks in which people may raise questions about identity, belonging, modernity, heritage and urbanism. They allow a space within which to develop methods of diffusing, protecting and promoting these ideas.

The following examples seek to highlight how this happens. The information comes from interviews and discussions with heritage associations from different towns across Algeria. These are associations which have received limited external support, including from the EU. These regions include Oran, Chlef, and Tiaret and represent, in the main, areas of lower densities of cultural associations. Each case seeks to identify the reasons for the creation of the association. It then asks a series of questions: what has been done, since when, who are the members, how do they take

⁷⁸ 'il faut relativiser ces chiffres car la majorité de ces associations font de la musique traditionnelle et folklorique à l'occasion des fêtes, les associations de quartiers qui se chargent des problèmes de la quotidienneté, de solidarité et de préservation du lien communautaire et social.'

decisions, what are the relations with the local authorities and other state actors, what are the problems for protecting heritage sites, monuments or objects of the region, how do they interact with other civil society actors, such as other associations, schools, universities and artists, and what has changed as a result of their actions.

Case studies of heritage associations:

Bel Horizon Heritage Association in Oran

In 2001, the association Bel Horizon was created in Oran in the context of the centenary celebrations, commemorating 1100 years since the foundation of the city. Oran was founded in 901, thereby one of the oldest cities in North Africa, predating the cities of Algiers and of Cairo and is also the site of prehistoric settlements. The association was created by a group of activists, passionate about history and heritage, who wanted to preserve and restore the history and heritage of Oran. One of the first main projects and goals, was the restoration of the Spanish Santa Cruz Fort, dating from the sixteenth century, which would become a museum of Oran's history.

From modest origins, a decade on, the association now has a significant capacity for mobilisation and action. It manages a team of 50 permanent volunteer members, plus 20 associate members (who mainly use the specialized library). It has trained 3500 young people in heritage issues in the protection of natural sites, editing books, photography, filming heritage and environment. A number of these volunteers now make a living as local guides, after participating in the trainings, and they are still strongly attached to Bel Horizon. The association has produced and published a number of books on the heritage of Oran, and renovated a number of historical sites. The leaders organize regular mass popular activities related to heritage protection and awareness, notably the 1st of May heritage trek, which now attracts over 20,000 people.

Cultural events such as music festivals (like the fete de la musique) are regularly launched and attract bands and large audiences of young people. The managing team works on a non-paid basis; there are no permanent staff. Students of architecture from the University of Oran participate in a number of projects piloted by the association. These include rehabilitation of Roman, Arabo-Muslim, Ottoman, Colonial and Spanish vestiges across Oran. The students are able to propose new projects, receive support in their academic and field work, but also contribute to vigorous debates in the daily meetings about the meaning and concept of heritage and Oran's history. The average age of the association is now 25.

Relations with the authorities are not always straightforward. This could be expected for an organization capable (so quickly) of mobilizing such mass support through its activities. Defining heritage also questions local urbanization policies, as well as the authorities' capacity to manage development and protection of the past. A number of conflicts have emerged, particularly concerning the status of colonial historical buildings, and visions for Oran's future.

In an interview with El Watan newspaper, the President of the Association explained the reasons for certain conflicts. He also outlined the association's motivations for the book publications and its investment in promoting the local heritage of the city of Oran.

In Europe, in the last 40 years, over a hundred books have been published about Oran, whereas only two have been published in Algeria! This lack of interest shows the distance between the inhabitants and their elected leaders, and the city, over a long period.'(14.04.2005⁷⁹).

The article continues to explain the political and ideological reasons for this denial of local and collective narratives of culture and identity, across Algeria and particularly in the west in Oran. The city's distinct cultural identity and its narrative history, have suffered, due to the unified, homogenous national identity, which the FLN has striven to cultivate since independence.

In the minds of a culturally conservative authority, Oran was the bad example. Viewed as being 'Spanish', or 'colonial,' (was it not the most European town of Algeria?) it represented unsettling values. A blaming policy was thus put in place, claiming that Oran had shown only a luke warm participation in the war of liberation, and now had permissive moral values. As a result, elites and local nobility took on such complexes and thus were able to be strategically neutralized. The success of Rai music just confirmed the image of lax moral values (Ibid, authors translation).

Similar attacks on collective memory have occurred in other regions of the country. In Oran's case, it drove the association to reconstruct the historical narratives of the city. This reconstruction has now been successfully launched. It continues, despite ongoing discussions with the authorities and debates about how to promote both the modernization and also the historical richness of the city's different cultures.

During a planning meeting in Oran, one of the younger activists asserted, in reaction to negative responses from the administration about protecting colonial vestiges, that: 'Oran is our city, despite the external influences, we speak in the language of colonization, we need to value all the different

⁷⁹ Pages hebdo arts et lettres quoted in the special ed. of Bel Horizon's bulletin '*10 ans au service du patrimoine*' p12

cultures which make up the richness of our city!’ (Interviews, discussions with Bel Horizon, 23/10/2011)

The president of the association encourages constructive debate with the authorities. Recognizing the limits and personalization of relations, he advises the team to first of all listen to the authorities; and to focus on the positive responses, rather than fixing on the negative ones. Continuing a constructive and informed debate is the strategy which seems to work best. Modestly acknowledging his own role as an elected member of the Communal Council (APC), through this, the association seems to have been able to gain more respect, logistical support, recognition of their work, access to information and more constructive relations with the authorities. This also applies to a number of other associations in Oran of the same affinity, and Bel Horizon has invited some of these associations to share office space and access to local authorities. Such informal networks exist, as well as more formal ones, regrouping heritage associations across the country, and in which Bel Horizon is a lead actor.

Between 2004 and 2009, Bel Horizon received two small grants from the EU, through which they acquired the necessary equipment to launch the training programmes for the guides, publish a number of books, produce short films about the city of Oran and co-operate with heritage associations and archives in Spain and France.

Castellum Tingitanum heritage association in Chlef

The association ‘Castellum Tingitanum’, was named after the Roman town, previously standing on the site of current day Chlef, in the West of Algeria. The organisation was created in 2001 by the current president, a journalist and businessman committed to working for the protection of the region’s heritage. The association was set up during the Algerian heritage month (April-May) with the goal of identifying, codifying and then restoring all the cultural and historic heritage sites of the region of Chlef. It was as a journalist himself, in the early 2000s, that the founder had felt a certain responsibility to protect the heritage of the region and had been upset by the lack of interest or care in maintaining sites which he considered of such importance to the Algerian collective memory.

In co-operation with the museum of Chlef, the association began to collect ancient texts, documents, geographical maps, post cards etc. in order to set up and develop a database of the local heritage sites. The goal of this work is to integrate the sites in international classifications such as that of UNESCO and to then gain recognition at local, national and international levels, so as to carry out restoration work.

The association has carried out an exhaustive census and audit of all historical vestiges, sites, objects and ruins across the region. These include artifacts from the prehistoric, Phoenician, Roman, Islamo-mauresque and the colonial periods. The members of the association have also implemented communication strategies and awareness campaigns aimed at the local authorities and the general population concerning the degradation of the sites, and have organized visits and debates with professionals, so as to launch restoration programmes. The association also carries out education initiatives for the younger generations, to raise awareness about the importance of the historical sites around them. Excursions and creative activities such as photography competitions are organized for school children of all ages. The association's website now details all the sites of historical interest and concern across the region, and identifies the progress made in ensuring their protection.⁸⁰

The association received limited financial support from local sources, and functioned mainly on the personal commitment of the team, until an EU grant allowed them to develop the work significantly in 2008. This was followed by support from Sonatrach, the national energy company, whose partnership was necessary in order to co-finance the EU funded activity.

The President himself admitted to a degree of real surprise at the success he encountered in 2008, when the association's work truly took off. For him, this was due to the dynamism of a number of the younger members, experienced in the communications sector, who enjoyed designing and implementing the visibility materials, and generating publicity for events. Others were more interested in the restoration work, and as a team, their impact was much greater due to their successful co-operation and communication work.

At present, the practical work has slowed down to some extent – but the database is protected within the association and publically available via the website. The work of protection and restoration is however still ongoing and the need for this work appears to be still significant. The association has carried out the first important steps: those of identification and recording, and continues to work with the different actors on issues of protection.

Relations with the authorities appear to be relatively smooth and cooperative. In many ways this would seem to be due to the respect for the person and position of the President, as a successful entrepreneur, in the community. Decisions are taken mainly at his level, but the younger members propose new ideas which are often implemented. The levels of self confidence of the younger volunteers therefore appear to have risen. Equally, all members' knowledge about public affairs, the role of the state, local authorities and associations in the protection of national heritage has

⁸⁰ www.castellum-tingitanum.org last accessed 09/04/2012

increased. This is due to the practical role of the association in the public sphere and also to the networking activities and participation in training initiatives, alongside other associations in neighbouring regions, such as those launched by APPAT in Tiaret.

Association for the Protection of the archaeological heritage of Tiaret (APPAT)

The heritage association APPAT was created in 1992 thanks to the will and dynamism of a now retired teacher, who is president of the association. The organisation is registered as a regional association with the Wilaya of Tiaret. Over the last twenty years APPAT has sought to develop listings of all the archaeological sites of the region. 452 monuments are listed, of which five are now classified by the Algerian state as national heritage.⁸¹ The members of APPAT are passionate about the historical heritage of their region, and with reason. The region of Tiaret has numerous heritage sites dating back to pre-history, including a necropole from six millennia ago. The ancient tombs of the thirteen impressive 'Djeddar' monuments (which APPAT considers should be classed as world heritage sites by UNESCO) date back two millennia to the rule of the Berber Kings of North Africa. Near to the neighbouring town of Frenda, is the site and the cave used by the philosopher Ibn Khaldoun to write one of the Arab world's most important historic works, the Muqaddimah, in the 14th century.

The region also hosts the site of Tihert, from where the Rostimid dynasty ruled, from 761. Tihert became the capital of the most important kingdom in the Maghreb. The beautiful site of Tagdempt, another state capital, under the Emir Abdelkader, was the military, political, economic and cultural capital for seven years from 1835 and 1841, holding particular symbolic importance for Algerian history. The ruins of the Emir's house are still visible, and the association can explain the history of the sites where the gunpowder was made and the first coins of the Algerian state were minted. More recent, is the 'Jumenterie', the largest stud farm in North Africa, dating from the mid 19th Century, the colonial period, and still an important site for the breeding of horses today.

Yet, knowledge and recognition of the importance of these sites, according to the association's members, is insufficient in the local population and amongst Algerians. This is also the case for the state structures; even the sites of symbolic importance are unprotected, let alone promoted. It is this need for civic education, communication and urgent protection which motivates their work. They consider civic education and training to be vital in order to ensure that these sites gain the necessary protection and then their rightful place within Algeria's national heritage. They want to ensure that

⁸¹ www.djazairess.com/fr/lqo/5144675 and www.djazairess.com/fr/elwatan/299284 last accessed 09/04/2012

the historical importance of the region is both recognized and passed on (Interview with the President of APPAT and discussions with the association's members, 31/10/11).

With a small grant from the EU funded programme in 2008, APPAT launched a network of heritage actors, to promote a co-ordinated approach across the region, to carry out common training programmes concerning the legislation and methods of identification and protection of historic sites. They have also initiated a new training programme for young university students seeking to work in the tourism, heritage or archaeological sectors.

Working with a former Director from the Ministry of Culture, the association regrouped a number of different associations from the different neighbouring regions and this resulted in the completion of common dossiers of the various sites, from prehistory to the present day. In collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce, the training programmes now seek to launch a more comprehensive distant learning diploma for young people. Trained as heritage guides, and in methods of protection of the different sites, the trainees spent short periods in different sites across the region, learning about the historical backgrounds and about guiding techniques. The association's younger members seem inspired by the possibility of professional training, in a sector which promises interesting potential career opportunities. The skills of public speaking and group management were also valued.

The main needs of the association as identified by the President would be some form of transport.

The authorities regularly contact us. If any ruins or archaeological sites are discovered we are the first organization contacted. The last time we had to find a taxi and travel to a rather isolated spot. It's a shame as with greater means we could do so much more. Relations with the authorities are generally good, above all thanks to the personal support from the Director of the Chamber of Commerce, who gives up much of his personal time and commitment to helping our association and others. His moral support gives credibility to our work and his personal support allows the associations to professionalize. (Interview with the President of APPAT, 31/10/2011)

The association has been lobbying for a museum to promote the history and archaeological wealth of the region. At present, the region has recently inaugurated a museum commemorating the Moudjahid and the history of the Algerian liberation war. As in Oran, there is a debate between the state and associations concerning the representation of history and national heritage.⁸² The state narratives of national identity are often in conflict with those of the regional level, where individuals and associations seek to promote their histories, monuments and traditions. Yet in Tiaret, the neglect

⁸² The region's official website, for example, elaborates a detailed history of the region, but one which begins only with the Muslim era, and ends with the Ottoman period. www.wilaya-tiaret.dz/historique.html accessed 19/05/12

by the institutional structures is of all the heritage sites, including those which would seem to be of key importance to Algeria's national identity, those concerning nationalist struggle, lead by the Emir Abdelkader. As a result, associations fill these gaps and provide new solutions to promote Algeria's heritage. One of the achievements of associations such as APPAT is in insisting on broader historical narratives to include all the periods which have played a part in the region's history. This includes the nationalist struggle, and Islamic heritage, but also pre-history and colonial history, recognition of which could enrich the life of the town and its citizens. APPAT has managed to achieve the first steps towards such recognition of this wider history, taking a constructive approach rather than one of contestation. With limited means, the organization is nevertheless an actor recognized by the population and by institutions for its work on the region's heritage.

To briefly conclude on heritage associations..

The heritage associations examined appear to have a certain degree of autonomy and have their roots in the local communities in which they work. These associations appear to have been created from desires of the population and framed by particular individuals, for reasons of either social justice, or protection of national heritage. Equally, whilst they may fit into individual life projects of the key actors within the association, they appear to be more about public, shared grievances than personal ones. These associations do not seem co-opted by the state. They challenge public policy choices and narratives, in the cultural sector and in urban policies, whilst also dialoguing with institutional structures.

From the national figures and from the case studies, it appears that there are now a number of organizations with this potential to engage in public debate about national identity and history. The legitimacy of the actors comes from their autonomy, from individual convictions, proven success on the ground in the protection of local sites, training young people, and often in the person and position of the president. Differences in visions of national heritage, between the state and associations, are still sometimes difficult to manage. These are part of the ongoing twentieth century "profound conflicts over those 'multiple and contradictory meanings' concealed behind the apparently singular (whether denied or affirmed) 'Algerian nation'" described in James McDougall's *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (2006: 86).

Yet, despite the static, 'changelessness' and 'unitary selfhood' of twentieth century discourses, there is now a multiplicity, of information and histories, that different actors are able to explore within the associative arena. There is an ongoing discussion between associations and the state. Each side has

to co-operate with the other to achieve its own ends. Since the 1990 law on associations, and the opening up of the associative realm, it seems, as McDougall writes, that for Algerians in the 21st century, there is a small space for 'creating new, and freer, histories' (McDougall, 2006:238). Whether such co-operation also occurs in different sectors of associative activity may now be assessed, by examining the work of social sector associations.

iii.) Associations in the social sector

Associations working on social sector issues, in contrast to the heritage associations, are often created to deal with personal grievances affecting a family or a community, for which the existing solutions are either inadequate or inexistent. In Algeria, as in any context, they often exist to fill the gaps, which the state's social services are unable to fill, in caring for vulnerable sections of the population. Their importance is high, for the target populations, families and communities which depend upon them, as is the potential for conflict or competition with a state which sees its role from an all encompassing perspective.

According to the Ministry of Interior's figures, those involved in social work are classed under the following criteria: children, youth, handicap, retired persons and the elderly, health, social solidarity and humanitarian organizations. At the local level, it seems relevant also to include religious associations (which represent 16% of the total), which often carry out important charitable, health and education work. Combining these figures, it can be seen that roughly a quarter of the total registered associations in Algeria, at both national and local level, deal with some aspect of social policy or work.

At the local level, there are 20 178 associations, created to work in fields related to the social sector (if we include all religious associations). This represents 22% of the total number of associations in the country, as represented in the following table:

Table 4 : Local social sector associations

Sectors of Local Social Associations	Number	% of total local Associations
Religious	15 304	16%
Childhood & Youth	2 677	3%
Handicap	1 234	1%
Retired & Elderly	152	0,2%
Health	644	1%
Humanitarian	167	0,2%
Total	20 178	22%

Source : figures from the Algerian Ministry of Interior website, 31/12/2011

www.interieur.gov.dz/Dynamics/frmlitem.aspx?html=2&s=29 last accessed 09/04/2012

At the national level, there are 269 associations, which have been created in order to work in fields related to the social sector. This represents 26% of the total number of national associations in the country, as represented in the following table :

Table 5 : National social sector associations


Sectors of National Social Associations	Number	% of total national associations
Childhood & Adolescence	14	1%
Youth	50	5%
Handicap	18	2%
Retired & Elderly	8	1%
Health	151	15%
Solidarity – humanitarian	28	3%
Total	269	26%

Source : figures from the Algerian Ministry of Interior website, 31/12/2011

www.interieur.gov.dz/Dynamics/frmlitem.aspx?html=2&s=29 last accessed 09/04/2012

The above figures are demonstrated in the following diagram :

Figure 15 : Social associations in Algeria



Such figures are difficult to qualify. Those associations from Omar Derras’ study, which were directly asked to define their sector, provided the evidence that in fact 47% of active associations saw themselves as ‘social sector’. This could imply that associations prefer to describe their work as social.

The Law on Associations allows associations to work in the social sector, to receive public grants for works of public interest and to acquire goods and property in order to implement their goals. Furthermore, many of the associations working with handicapped children receive the ‘prix journalier’ from the CNAS, the national insurance scheme. This is a state contribution of 300 Dinars (around 3 euros) per child who receives full day care from an association. Such support is in recognition of the work of the association and the fact that the national education system does not then provide for that child. This appears to represent, in a way, a national recognition of the organization as a professional, qualified service provider. Not all associations working in the disability sector receive this (interview with disability association from Constantine, 28/10/2011), and some claim that the selection criteria are not systematically applied across the country.

In terms of the regional distribution of social sector associations, as for the cultural ones, the south once again figures prominently in the number of registered social associations. Yet the more northern urbanized regions of Saida and Bordj Bou Arreridj also figure amongst the densest regions


in terms of social associations. The ten regions with the most registered social associations (per population), according to the Ministry’s figures, are shown in the following table:

Table 6 : Association density - social associations per 100,000 inhabitants (ten densest regions)

WILAYA	social associations	population	Number of social associations per 100,000 inhabitants (ten regions with highest density)
Illizi	128	52 333	245
Adrar	710	399 714	178
Tamanrasset	297	176 637	168
Naama	262	192 891	136
Saïda	429	330 641	130
Bordj Bou Arréridj	732	628 475	116
El Oued	739	647 548	114
Ghardaïa	411	363 598	113
Tizi Ouzou	1169	1 127 607	104
Béjaïa	922	912 577	101

This can also be seen in the following diagram :

Figure 16 : Regions with most social associations per capita



The regions with the lowest densities of social associations are Tiaret, Blida, Annaba, Oran and the lowest, once again, is Relizane. However, the case studies will show, once again, that this does not necessarily reflect the quality of the work carried out by social associations in these regions.

The importance of social associations to the population they serve often depends on whether the latter look to such organizations for support for vulnerable members of a family. Personal experiences often guide individual judgments as to the utility and relevance of such associations to people's lives. Their importance to the state also depends on experiences of co-operation that may occur over time. Social associations are significant, not only in the services they provide, but also as they represent channels for exchange of information between the state and the population. Whilst this relationship remains strained and sometimes competitive, a complex process of recognition by the state is on-going. The Social Development Agency, for example, is slowly developing tools to integrate associations into the work of its regional branches and to co-operate in the provision of social services. The fact that the national insurance scheme finances the running costs of certain associations taking care of handicapped children, is a step in formalizing this relationship.

The following case studies describe the work of two social associations in Oran and in Tizi Ouzou, their relationships with the population, with other associations and with state actors.

Case studies of social associations:

Association NOUR, for children with Cerebral Palsy (IMC), in Oran

Nour was set up in Oran in the year 2000, by two parents of a child suffering from cerebral palsy. Having witnessed the achievements of an association in France, helping children with cerebral palsy, they decided there was no reason why this could not be replicated in Oran. Commencing with two children in 2000, they now care for 80 children on a daily basis, in two centres. The association is made up of the children, their parents the board and the professional staff. The children participate in different workshops, including painting, pottery, craftwork and music, developing different skills with the help of the staff members.

Outlining the regular activities of the association, and its progression over the last decade, the President described her usual daily programme :

We now manage two programmes in Oran with 39 children and 46 adolescents in daily workshops. Each centre has a Head of the centre, a psychologist and facilitators. We begin work at 7h30 in the morning, opening the first centre, then we move on to the second. We

are volunteers, and we manage all the administrative side. The other members of the team here are professionals and so are paid a salary. There is now a waiting list of 50 children. We look after them for free. The parents have very little means. (Interview with the President, 24/10/2011, Oran, author's translation)⁸³

The association functions with the financial support of the Algerian social insurance scheme which pays the daily grant per child of 300 Dinars. This allows them to ensure reasonable salaries for the staff whom they seek to maintain and treat well over a long term period. All the children attending the centres are the responsibility of the state and education system. The president argues, therefore, that it is justified that the state contributes to covering these basic running costs, through the daily grant, as the association takes on this particularly difficult task. The board applies for project finance (from various donors) to renew the equipment and to implement training programmes, both for the staff, and the parents, in how to care for the children.

Nour is the only structure in Oran caring for children with cerebral palsy. For the association's leaders, it is unthinkable that they should stop their activities. It is also highly important that the state support them, and that they in turn work in co-operation with the state. The president pointed out :

Cerebral palsy is often related to problems in the medical follow up during pregnancy. It is therefore linked to the health care system. It is an issue which therefore falls within the responsibility of the state. These children are the responsibility of the state, and the state must do its best to take care of them, and support us in this task. (Ibid)⁸⁴

Concerning their interactions with the institutions, the association suggested that, despite seeking to work for the general interest of the Algerian population in the field of social welfare, associations in the past were continuously blocked. For them, the changes brought in by the 1990 law have improved the situation. Associative actors in the social sector now hope that changes in the new

⁸³ On gère aujourd'hui deux centres à Oran avec 39 enfants et 46 adolescents dans des ateliers journaliers. Chaque centre a un Chef de centre et un psychologue et des animateurs. On commence le travail à 7h30 pour ouvrir le premier centre, puis on se déplace vers le deuxième. On fait de bénévolat pour tout ce qui est administrative. Les autres membres de l'équipe sont des professionnels qui sont rémunérés. Il y a une liste d'attente de 50 enfants aujourd'hui. La prise en charge de l'enfant IMC est gratuite au centre. Les parents n'ont peu de moyens.

⁸⁴ L'IMC est un problème de suivi médical de la grossesse. Il est donc lié au système de santé. Il est donc lié à la responsabilité de l'état. Ces enfants sont de la responsabilité de l'état et il faut que l'état fait de son mieux pour les prendre en charge, et nous appuyer dans cette démarche.

legislation in 2012 concerning associations could lead to greater recognition of the status of a public interest association, with greater support from the state.

Relations with the authorities have not always been smooth. There was much concern that the association chose to work with the EU, in the early 2000s. This was not seen positively by the authorities. However, the fact that the EU chose to implement its next programme in collaboration with the Algerian authorities very much facilitated the work for Nour. According to the president, there was less distrust the second time around.

The implementation of a number of projects over the last decade has helped to structure the association, in terms of financial management, communication and professional support to the children, their parents and teachers. Furthermore, common training programmes have helped reinforce exchanges and networks between the different actors in the region, and in the sector :

the training programmes have put us into local and national networks of organizations working on the same sector. Today there are links which exist. It is possible to have a debate about the new legislation proposals, because we know the other associations. (Interview with the President, 24/10/2011, Oran) ⁸⁵

For Nour, the relationship with the state has improved due to efforts on both sides. This improvement, on the part of Nour, is due to the lobbying, awareness raising and networking carried out to advance their cause within the state structures. Today the association reaches out to the administration. The civil servants are invited to the training programmes, which are now respected at all levels (state and civil society actors) and seen as innovative. There is an opening up towards associations, within the state, despite certain competitive tendencies. Yet associations still need 'to strive to be a source of new ideas, initiatives and proposals' argues the president (Interview with the President, 24/10/2011).

According to the association's leaders, a less critical and more structured, co-ordinated approach would better serve the interests of the vulnerable populations and lead to a real civil society. This remains difficult, as certain subjects are difficult for Algerian society. There are a number of opportunities for associations to work together in networks such as the PCPA, FES, CIDEF, WASSILA and NADA networks of associations. The president still feels that, whilst useful, these networks could

⁸⁵ Les formations nous ont mis en réseau du secteur local et national. On a des liens aujourd'hui. Pour un débat sur la loi on peut le faire parce qu'on connaît les autres associations.

function better. Associations with heavy workloads on the ground, often do not have the time to participate.

Nour participates in a number of networks for different reasons. Handicap International provides specific sectoral support, the PCPA allows a national framework in which Algerian actors can come together. NADA, the network of associations working with children is also an opportunity to exchange information and co-ordinate, even if the members do not agree on all aspects. The president of Nour is now on the board of the PCPA network of Algerian associations and this has enabled the association to have a national vision of the role and potential of the associative movement. From this perspective, she feels that associations are 'not even aware of the importance they have'. Whilst it is easy to get absorbed in the daily activity of the association, the president acknowledged that at the same time 'we now realize that we have all actually gained financial support, knowledge, training, and ideas. Now, for networks to develop, there needs to be a real desire to work together.'⁸⁶

Overall, the association feels that a constructive approach is necessary. The political situation in Algeria is still fragile, the association has no desire to destabilize or create controversy. The main goal is to be able to continue the work for the vulnerable populations in Oran. Apart from that, there is the hope that the political and legal framework, in which social associations work, develops in a way which would encourage greater co-operation.

Association of Parents of Handicapped Children in Tizi Ouzou

This association was created in the capital of the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, five years ago to provide a space, education and support for children and young people with mental disabilities. It was created by the founding members, and thanks to the inspiration and dynamism of the president. The key members are parents of handicapped children, who suffered from the absence of structures to effectively care for their children in the region.

After slowly building up the capacity of the association over the last few years, with limited means, the association now takes care of 72 children and young people from Tizi Ouzou with different degrees of handicap. The association has set up a carpentry workshop and formal classes. The

⁸⁶ On se rend compte qu'on accède à de financements, des connaissances, des formations et des idées. Pour le réseau, il faut une véritable envie de travailler ensemble.

conditions are basic but the work is clearly carried out with great commitment and kindness towards the children in their care.

Describing the functioning and financing of the association and the relationship with the regional authorities, the President explains,

It is difficult to function with the means we have. We are not recognized as a centre, just as an association. We receive the daily grant from the state of 300 dinars per child, but this does not cover our running costs as we need a number of specialized staff to care for the children. We visited the social development agency but promises of support do not seem to become reality. Not one member of the regional office of the agency, nor anyone from the wilaya, has been to visit us to see the work we carry out. (Interview with the President, Tizi Ouzou, 13/11/2012, author's translation)⁸⁷

Building on positive experiences of allowing the young adults to participate in income generating activities, the association set up the workshop in 2008, with a small grant from the EU support programme. The workshop continues to function well four years on, and the President and his team have different ideas as to how to further develop the work and care of the beneficiaries.

The association's activities appear to function well and are appreciated by the children and their parents. All energies are invested into the daily functioning of the centre. The centre is split between two localities, the carpentry workshop, and a few hundred metres away, the formal classes. The classes take place in a number of different classrooms in part of a school, given by the education authorities for use by the association.

Despite their experience, the association's leaders feel they do not have time at present, between their own professional lives and voluntary commitment to the association, to participate in wider debates or networks related to the issues of disability. They prefer to invest time within the centre and in trying to engage with the authorities to ensure the sustainability and quality of the care of the children :

Our work functions as well as, if not better than the state run centres, with fewer means. This is because we are a family for these children. I am here because of my personal commitment

⁸⁷ C'est difficile de fonctionner avec les moyens, nous ne sommes pas reconnus en tant que centre, juste en tant qu'association. Nous recevons le prix journalier, mais ca ne couvre pas les coûts récurrents, on a besoin de personnes spécialisées pour les enfants. Nous nous sommes déplacés vers la Direction de l'Action Sociale mais les promesses ne se concrétisent pas. Personne n'est venu ici voir le travail que nous faisons.

as a parent of a handicapped child. I am not specialized in a social profession. But I seek to learn. (Interview with the President, Tizi Ouzou, 13/11/2012, author's translation)⁸⁸

From the state, they seek not only financial support, but professional advice, training and support. The association's members argue that they would ideally like to see a more collaborative approach, from both the state and also the donors, who also only rarely visit the associations which receive grants in Tizi Ouzou. They question whether either actor, state or donor, ever really carries out a follow up or evaluation of their support given to associations.

The association's members feel that, despite limitations, there have been achievements over the last decade. A number of other associations in the region also work in the disability sector. However, they worry that children's needs are much greater than the services offered by both the state and associations. Many children cannot be taken care of due to the lack of space and facilities. A greater capacity to respond to these needs is essential. For them, this is both 'a moral obligation and feasible' given the means available in Algeria. Better care for these children, specialized staff, training, and greater co-operation between the state and associations is, for them, what is yet to be achieved.

Association TEJ pour la Santé

Association Tej was created in 2005 by a group of health care professionals, doctors and paramedics who wanted to deal with the lack of health services for poorer sections of the community, for nomadic populations, often in the south of their region, and for those suffering from a disability. The association is based in the town of Guemar, in El Oued province in the east of Algeria near the Tunisian border. Guemar is a Saharan oasis town and the population targeted by the association includes many nomad communities which travel across the province of El Oued and which are sometimes unable to access health facilities.

The reasons behind the creation of Tej are in line with the religious, Islamic convictions of the founders, and much of the support also comes from religious donations and from anonymous benefactors. The goals of the association are to help those in need who are sick, to offer medical training and to organise communication campaigns about health issues, particularly for those with limited access to health care and information. Tej means 'crown' in Arabic, and the motto of the

⁸⁸ Notre centre fonctionne aussi bien que, sinon mieux que les centres étatiques, avec moins de moyens. Ceci est du au fait que nous sommes une famille pour ces enfants. Je suis ici par ma conviction en tant que parent d'un enfant handicapé. Je ne suis pas spécialisé dans le domaine social, mais je voudrais apprendre.

association is the saying that ‘health is a crown upon the heads of the healthy, only visible to those who are sick.’ The association is managed by volunteer doctors and paramedical staff who are the key members. There is also a small number of professional staff paid by the association to manage the centres and a number of permanent activities and services are provided by Tej. Non qualified volunteers receive training.

Since its creation, the association has so far organised blood donation campaigns, organised mobile campaigns for small operations (hernias, cataracts) in the desert, delivered psychological support to patients, organised medical caravans for communicating about health issues, and held a number of training and information days for doctors and paramedical staff in El Oued. They co-operate with other Algerian local and national associations, and with Franco-Algerian associations such as Solimed. Despite the key members being mainly Arabophone, the association co-operates with donors such as the EU, the PCPA (French financed support programme and network) and the Belgian Embassy, which all require documents to be translated into French. They run a centre for children with hearing difficulties, a pharmacy, a system of support to patients needing medical advice, and loans of paramedical equipment such as wheel chairs. On religious holidays they ensure hospital visits and gifts for the patients, mainly sick children, in the region of El Oued.

In 2008, Tej was selected amongst the top twenty-five per cent of associations competing for support from the EU’s associations’ programme.⁸⁹ The association was attributed a contract with a grant of just over 30,000 euros. Tej had proposed a project to put in place a centre for deaf children where the children would receive very specific professional care. The centre also included support mechanisms for the integration of deaf children in the education system, information about rights for the families, support and training for the parents and help to individuals seeking to create associations for the deaf. In this way they would be able to support the creation of further initiatives, to share Tej’s experiences.

For its decision making, the association has a rotating presidency, decided on the basis of elections, and decisions are taken in regular meetings of the administrative council. The association has now over a hundred members. The president of Tej described relations with their partners as ‘very constructive.’ In turn, the Paris based Franco-Algerian NGO, SoliMed, described the association as ‘very dynamic,’ a ‘reliable partner’ and ‘a pleasure to work with.’⁹⁰ The regional animator of the EU financed support programme, described the work and management of the association ‘as extremely

⁸⁹ Ranked 15 out of 108 associations which applied for grants in the first call for projects

⁹⁰ <http://www.solimed.net/tous-nos-projets-realises/70-les-journees-de-formation-a-la-prise-en-charge-precoce-des-enfants-autistes> confirmed by discussions with representative of SoliMed, 29/10/10 and separate discussions with members of the association Tej, 28/10/10 in Tipasa, PCPA mid term review

professional, committed and transparent.⁹¹ The association pointed out that successful evaluations of their work with deaf children between 2008 and 2009, and the creation of an educational centre for them, lead to a positive response from the Belgian co-operation, which then agreed to finance mobile operations to carry out 77 cataract operations across the wilaya of El Oued. This was an action of which they were particularly proud. One key member explained that 'it is our proximity campaigns, for which we now have the material and logistical equipment necessary, which really make a difference and are needed by the populations' (interview with member of Tej, 30 October 2011, Tipasa).

The Association Tej has positive and co-operative relations with both the secular authorities and religious structures of the region. They indicate that the town hall, and regional direction of the social development agency all give moral support to the organisation, and that the Ministry of Solidarity has promised financial support.

According to the association's members, there are gaps in the provision of care for vulnerable populations, particularly the disabled, poor families, and nomad communities. The association believes it has found new, innovative ways to respond to these gaps and provide a more personal response, supported by the religious structures of the region, to the problems in the health sector at the regional level. Whilst identifying such gaps in the public sector provision of care, the association does not appear to be in an contestational position against the authorities. The members seem to be less critical than the Association for the Parents of Handicaped Children of Tizi Ouzou discussed above for example.

Compared to the previous social associations, Tej differs in that it appears to perhaps be more the religious or moral convictions, rather than personal motivations, which drove the key actors to create and continue to manage the association. Equally, Tej appears to have both a wider range of activities, and also a wider support network, receiving financial and material help from both religious and secular sources, and foreign and national ones, making the association less dependent on the state, or on any one donor. In any case, their proven track record has evoked interest by the authorities, who have promised further funding for the future. Its members contribute to dialogue with other associations and with the authorities, to identify opportunities, and to co-operate to improve health care in the region.

⁹¹ Interview with Faycal Hattab January 2010, Algiers

To briefly conclude on social associations

From the findings discussed above, from the official figures, and from the case studies of the Algerian social associations, it seems that, since the 1990 Law on Associations, a number of active associations have been able to come into existence. These associations, if well managed, gradually professionalize to provide services to vulnerable populations. In some ways, they fill gaps left by the state. However, they arguably also play a role which could not be provided by the state in any context, given the personal nature of the commitment of the associations' leaders. It appears that these organizations are perhaps less engaged in public debate, than the heritage associations, as their position is weaker, often labour intensive and therefore necessarily dependent on the state for support. Yet, even principally 'service providing' associations, such as Nour, have become active in the public sphere. They also seek a more constructive dialogue with the authorities and recognition by and accountability to the state institutions. There is not necessarily a conflict of vision, but a desire for a more structured interaction and ultimately for a capacity to care for the population. The legitimacy of the actors also comes from the individual convictions, and proven success in managing centres and activities, rather than from the personality and position of the president.

Within the typology of associations, presented in section one (i), (which suggests that associations can be seen as on a scale between dependence and autonomy), it would seem that these social associations would also fall at the end of the scale towards autonomy. These associations appear to be created from needs rising from the population, from often personal reasons, for the protection of vulnerable populations, often including a family member. Whilst the original motivation may have been personal, they act at the community level, supporting a significant number of children and their families. They often necessarily become the life projects of the key actors within the association, yet they are still far more about public, shared grievances than personal ones. These associations also openly challenge the state structures, despite needing their support, and question public policy choices, in the social sector. They co-operate with the state structures and seek dialogue, both to fulfill their aims, but also to pursue their ambitions for a different vision or ideal of how Algerian social service provision should function.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an overview of associational life in Algeria, breaking it down into different typologies including the geographic and the sectoral distribution. The findings from this research,

including the more detailed case studies of associations, suggest that, as Omar Carlier described for the processes of mobilisation in the nationalist struggles of the 1950s, it is not necessarily the big cities where profound (and unexpected) changes can take place, and where a defining role in structuring the mobilisation happens (Carlier, 1995). 'Intermediary' towns, which may have managed to better preserve their links to traditional or to rural life, as well as their spaces of socialization, should not be overlooked. Although there are the more dramatic experiences of the associations in Oran, exemplified by the mass mobilisation around heritage questions carried out by, for example, Bel Horizon, the research actually shows that there is a far greater concentration of smaller organizations in the south of Algeria, and in Kabylia, and generally far from the urban centres.

When the maps of association density and of the donor programmes are compared, it also appears that there is no clear relation, in Algeria, between financial opportunities and the creation of associations. People create associations to respond to their own individual or communal preoccupations, which have in many cases been created (or exacerbated) by over a decade of insecurity and violence.

In the heritage sector, associations are not only contributing to the protection of Algerian heritage sites and of the collective memory, but are also participating in wider debates about the interpretation of Algerian history. This debate takes place with regional and national authorities, and whilst criticizing the static narratives and 'changelessness' described by McDougall (2006), these associations are also offering alternative, more inclusive interpretations.

In the social sector, the figures and associations discussed in the chapter present a more complex picture of the problems facing Algerian society and the responses that different actors have been able to draw up. More sensitive perhaps than the heritage sector associations' work, in some ways, the creation of health centres can be seen as reflecting on the failure of the state to care for its population. Yet, this is not the overriding discourse which is emerging. The work of the associations can also be seen, conversely, as reflecting the will of the population to participate in social care, in volunteering, in charitable work. The state does clearly accord the possibility for associations (since 1990) to take an active role in the social sector, and through the national insurance scheme (CNAS) it supports this work financially. This appears to demonstrate a relationship which, whilst clearly contentious, maintains several bridges for mutual recognition, co-operation and dialogue for improvement in the future.

Whilst donor interventions may give short term project support or grants to such associations (in any of the sectors), their absence from the chapter is notable. It is the relationship with the state and

with the members and beneficiaries which matters most and which either breaks or creates the dynamic of the actors (as discussed in more detail in chapter 3).

All the associations examined appear to be engaging in a public debate. This appears to be one which is not always easy to manage, as it touches on questions of national identity (heritage sector) and on state capacity (social sector). The fact that this debate occurs seems to indicate that such organizations are not simply co-opted actors, nor are they regrouped family structures seeking personal gain.

The actors involved in the associations are often qualified, retired, public sector officials (teachers, managers) and with reasonable pension schemes and early retirement, they have the energy and the means to dedicate to associational life. They also feel perhaps more strongly the frustrations of the last 50 years of independence and the expectations of Algeria in the 1960s, which were gradually eroded over the following decades. For such reasons, they seek to create projects which directly target young people, with jobs and opportunities (heritage, but also social sector). It is this (job creation, vision, and new dialogues with the state) which underpins the legitimacy of the actors : their individual convictions, proven success on the ground (in protecting sites or managing health centres) and providing new opportunities for the population.

Differences of vision, of national heritage, and of social protection, between the state and associations, and between associations themselves, remain difficult to manage. In the twentieth century, there have been “profound conflicts over those ‘multiple and contradictory meanings’ concealed behind the apparently singular (whether denied or affirmed) ‘Algerian nation’” (McDougall, 2006: 86) and the role of the state. These conflicts still exist and are played out in the associative realm. Yet nothing is predetermined; nor can these conflicts be decided by any one actor. With the explosion of associations in the 1990s, following the new law, it seems, and would be reasonable to hope, that indeed, as McDougall suggests, it may be that ‘their futures, too, are open, can still be conquered in a new polyphony of expression, in newly creative words creating new, and freer, histories’ (McDougall, 2006:238). The following section and chapters will seek to analyse how an external actor, at another level, has been able to enter this complex situation of state society relations. The final chapters will explore both the language of the external actor and its interaction with these new associations in Algeria.

PART III - Donors and their language in Algeria

Chapter 5. EU civil society support in Algeria

Summary

Chapter five focuses specifically on EU development co-operation in Algeria. It includes the history of its diplomacy and examines the programmes overseen by the EU Delegation, with a focus on those which fund associations. In contrast to its ambitious policy statements, this chapter shows that the EU's engagement in Algeria was, and remains limited. Negotiations between the parties and implementation of co-operation programmes are often strained and difficult. A number of factors impact on the balance of power between Algeria and the EU. These include the weight of colonial history and anti-colonial narratives in the collective memory of Algerians, the economic power of Algeria as a major energy supplier and the closure of the EU delegation in the 1990s. Despite difficulties, the EU programmes supporting civil society actors have been identified, in external evaluations, as successes in comparison to programmes in other sectors in Algeria, and to other civil society programmes in the region. The less normative approach, lower funding levels and more open scope for project proposals (due to the EU's weaker position) enabled the EU to work more effectively with associations in Algeria. Through this experience, the EU gains insight, both into the capacities and limitations of associations (as actors, rather than just the expression of civil society) and also into structural questions related to its development co-operation, and the language and paradigms which frame it.

This chapter focuses on how the EU has supported Algerian civil society. It examines which kinds of organisations have been supported, by which mechanisms, and with which national partners. It analyses the perceived impact and success of the EU's approach and asks why and how the EU's approach in Algeria differs from that in other countries. The context of the EU's co-operation with Algeria, and particularly the more sensitive programmes targeting civil society, is conditioned by the difficult historical relations between the EU and Algeria. The origins of these difficulties stem from tensions between Algeria and Europe, notably with France, the former colonial power. For Algerians, Europe had shown an equivocal commitment to human rights during the Algerian War of Independence and more recently, there was a lack of European support to Algerians during the conflict of the 1990s. This, coupled with the closure of the EU Delegation in this latter period, further complicated the potential for a cooperative relationship. It weakened the presence and influence of the EU in Algeria.

The actors within the EU delegation and member state embassies, and the tools the EU had at its disposal, also influenced the EU's capacity to intervene effectively. Civil society support programmes, and indeed all of the EU's technical programmes, depend on a tangible diplomatic presence of the EU in Algiers for their successful implementation. This diplomatic presence had been weakened due to the EU's absence during the 1990s. Algeria is now a significant energy supplier for Europe, is an increasingly important military power in North Africa, and has more recently renewed its foreign policy ambitions (Zoubir, 2004; Darbouche, 2008). These different factors have all contributed to re-balancing power relations between the two parties. The partnership with Algeria thus became one in which the EU, was relatively weak, and the Algerian state relatively strong, in the negotiations which underpinned the development of the EU's co-operation programmes.

The chapter explores whether such factors limited the opportunities for European actors to impose the rather one sided, 'hub and spoke' dialogue model in Algeria. This is the model described by scholars such as Darbouche (2008) and Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005), as the EU approach in the region in general. The mechanisms through which the EU normally supports civil society - the programmes and grants - are different in their approach in Algeria, compared with neighbouring countries. The earlier chapters identified some of the significant differences in funding levels for such programmes across the region. In the Algerian context, it is also necessary to analyse their relative importance, the nature of the programmes themselves, what activities they actually fund and how their perceived success is evidenced. Above all, perhaps, one has to account for their symbolic potential in this particular context. The impact of the EU's interventions will be assessed focusing on the relations between the state, associations and the EU, and the possible significance of the Algerian experience for the North African region. In response to the Arab revolutions of 2011, the EU

announced its intention to reform its policy in the neighbourhood region, particularly towards civil society.⁹² The proposals imply that there will now be greater differentiation, conditionality and larger funds for countries which adhere to what seem to be EU sanctioned reform processes.

Aliboni, in *Societal change and political responses in Euro-Med relations (2011)*, identifies key problems of EU funding for civil society in North Africa. He points to the normative, valued laden and euro-centric language of EU institutions, as well as the rigidity of the procedures, the programmes, and the (often not so independent) European NGOs. The result is that:

Arab governments have limited the participation of nationally-based NGOs in EU programmes as much as possible and most of all have prevented their NGOs from receiving funds from the EU. Many sectors of society (...) rejected the offer of co-operation which they regarded as gross political interference. (Aliboni, 2011:6)

This rejection of EU co-operation was equally the case previously in Algeria. Interviews conducted with associative actors between 2008 and 2011 identified the perception, from the Algerian side, of an imperialist approach and neo-colonial agenda on the part of the EU. This had prevented them from seeking EU support. Yet, many of these same actors acknowledged that their perceptions had changed over the last few years. In the last decade, the Algerian Government itself has also modified its position towards the EU and has accepted funding from the EU for a significant number of national NGOs. In its first specific 'associations support programme' from 2000-2004, the EU financed 76 associations. Under the second, more recent programme from 2006-2010, a further 127 associations (a 67% increase) were supported through small projects. Training opportunities were also widened to include not only associations but also a number of other institutional actors as well. This increase in the take-up of the EU's intervention was noted in the final evaluation :

127 associations have benefitted from grants of the programme through three calls for proposals, 502 associations and 204 institutional actors have benefitted from trainings. (Final Evaluation of the Support to Algerian Associations Programme, Dr. Z.Ould Amar, 2010 : 5)

⁹² European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2011), *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels: 8 March 2011; and European Commission and High Representative of the of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2011), *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, COM(2011) 303, Brussels: 25 May 2011.

In initial discussions with EU actors in 2008, it emerged that the Algerian position was to block NGO funding programmes coming from the budget line entitled 'European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.' This, it was felt, was on the grounds that Algeria would not accept such a normative approach from the EU. Algerian associations also confirmed this, arguing that they had nothing to learn from the EU about human rights' protection, given that Europe had condoned torture and given amnesty to its perpetrators.

Yet, during the same discussions, with associations, EU and Algerian officials, it became clear that the Algerians did in fact seek technical and capacity building support for institutions and for associations. They sought the opening up of Algeria to greater contacts with the neighbouring region, and wished for increased exchange of information. However, this had to be on their terms, and with respect to national legislation, traditions and customs, and in concordance with the capacities of Algerian associations (interviews with EU and Algerian officials October 2011).

Algeria's firm position did not change the wording of the EU's worldwide budget-line for human rights and democracy. Indeed, that budget-line itself was later accepted by the Algerians and under it many of the 22 ongoing NGO projects in Algeria are financed. However, it did mean that any programme financed by the EU had to adapt to the national context. They had to focus on the more concrete, technical needs of the Algerian associations, rather than imposed EU values, which were seen by the Algerians to be at best mere rhetoric and, at worst, hypocritical. Faced with such an open critique from a key strategic partner country, the EU was obliged to adopt a more nuanced, modest negotiating position. By contesting the language, the Algerian side had managed to change the attitudes or negotiating position of some of the actors.

Overall then, the chapter aims to assess the impact of the EU's development aid in supporting civil society in the unique context of Algeria. It presents firstly (i) an overview of the history of EU-Algerian co-operation and diplomacy. The chapter then (ii) investigates the EU co-operation since the 1970s and finally (iii) it assesses the programmes the EU has launched to support associations. It focuses on the mechanisms, methods, the actors involved. It assesses how these programmes depend upon and impact upon relations between the EU, the state and associations. The chapter draws on official sources, previous research and interviews to identify challenges that the EU faced. It concludes by analyzing the prospects for the EU's co-operation with Algeria and how the EU might seek to support civil society in the light of reforms post the Arab revolutions.

i.) A History of EU diplomacy in Algeria

The European Union's relations with Algeria date even from before the country's independence from France in 1962. Whilst Tunisia and Morocco were already independent in 1957, Algeria, though fighting a bitter anti-colonial war, remained a French territory at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. It left the EEC on acceding to independence, and signed up to separate trade agreements to ensure continuity for trade in certain goods. This, coupled with piecemeal decisions from the EEC, member states, and the Algerian Republic, meant that adaptation was possible, but it also created 'discrepancies, which in the long-term, lead to an anarchical, juridical situation' (Sekkou, 1971)⁹³ between the parties from the start.

Because of these complex beginnings, the EU faced many further difficulties in establishing a broader and functioning co-operation with Algeria, stemming from the ongoing historical tensions. Entelis writes:

Algeria's 132 years of colonial domination were unique in their brutality and destructiveness.. [Algerian culture], was violently abused and disfigured to the point of almost entirely losing its identity. The continuous struggle for physical, moral and cultural survival (..) created a distinctive Algerian identity and political culture – one nurtured in an environment of fear, suspicion, and distrust of all things foreign while reaffirming the primacy and pride of all things nativistic. (..) this colonial experience naturally engendered hostility to France and the West.. (Entelis in Norton, (ed.)1994 : 52-53)

Yet despite, and perhaps because of this hostility, the French authorities according to Daguzan, (2000) sought to create 'a new form of post colonial co-operation', one which would be 'exemplary in the eyes of the world'. Van Reisen writes that, after losing its colonies, 'the driving force of France's policy in the developing world was the desire of its leaders for the country to be a global power' (Van Reisen, in Mold, 2007: 35). France would use 'European integration to achieve this objective' (ibid:36). Relations with Africa were the frame within which France could remain 'a global power,' and deal with (and perhaps attempt to make reparations for) the traumas of its recent history in Algeria. France would therefore remain an essential actor, within European integration, and in particular, in its relations with Africa.

⁹³ 'discordances qui, à la longue, ont conduit à situation juridiquement anarchique.'

After independence, France continued to dominate relations with Algeria. Up until the end of the 1990s France was reluctant to allow any form of European co-operation with its former colony (Roberts 2002, Daguzan, 2002). Daguzan writes :

The exemplarity which France made of its interactions with Algeria transformed this into an exclusive relationship. This led, as a result, to the French Authorities keeping the European Union well away from any political interventions concerning the country. (Daguzan, 2002).⁹⁴

The Algerians, from their side, struggled to deal with their European partners in the aftermath of the bitter war of liberation. Human rights, such as the protection of prisoners, enshrined in international law, had been violated by the French authorities. The systematic, state sponsored use of torture was evident. If Algerians individually had not witnessed atrocities first-hand, there were enough reminders made public by many of the victims, such as Henri Alleg in 1958, and even from the French side with admissions from the perpetrators (Gen. Massu in 1972, and Gen. Aussaresses in 2000). French denial, censorship and amnesty concerning the atrocities and war crimes committed, continued to feed the animosity and the 'environment of fear, suspicion, and distrust' Entelis describes. Heartfield writes of the 'contradiction between humanism and imperialism,' whereby the colonial power actually 'denied Algeria its freedom *in the name* of the Rights of Man' (Heartfield, 2002). Despite winning the war of independence, it remained difficult for Algerian leaders and their diplomats, to manage relations with France and Europe. The injustice of the war crimes was exacerbated by the limited form of debate in France, with the censorship of books and films which dealt with the war.⁹⁵

The Algerian government also questioned the sincerity of European interests in Algeria, whether these were motivated primarily by economic interests, particularly in the energy sector. Despite the legal, historical and diplomatic complexity of these initial relations, in the 1970s, the Europeans did manage to establish a more formalized co-operation with Algeria in the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy. Van Reisen points out, however, that this also coincided with the oil embargo following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the ensuing increase in oil prices. She writes that in the 1970, 'One of the few options the EC had to secure energy imports was to urgently intensify its relations with the southern Mediterranean and Arab countries, with Algeria and Libya' (Van Reisen, in Mold, 2007: 38).

⁹⁴ 'l'exemplarité que la France se faisait de ses rapports avec l'Algérie transforma ceux-ci en une relation exclusive. Cela conduisit donc les autorités françaises à tenir l'Union européenne à l'écart de toute intervention politique à l'égard de ce pays.

⁹⁵ Such as Henri Alleg's book *The Question* of 1958, and Gillo Pontecorvo's film of *The Battle of Algiers* of 1966)

Within this context, Algeria continued to negotiate with the EC, but with certain reservations as to its underlying motives. It is such long standing suspicions, which may underpin the failures of the European Mediterranean Policy (EMP) generally, and the reluctance of all southern Mediterranean countries to fully cooperate with the EU :

The EU's tendency of giving a far greater importance to its own economic and security interest than to the liberal principles of the EMP inevitably nurtured the suspicion of neo-colonialism in many EMP partners, most of whom experienced European colonialism in the past. (Del Sarto, 2006 : 230)

Algeria eventually signed a Co-operation Agreement in 1976 and the first Delegation to Algeria was opened in 1979. The first two Heads of Delegation were British, followed by a French delegate in 1987, at which point the status of delegate was promoted to Ambassador level. The following table outlines the history of EU diplomacy, diplomats and specific events of EU-Algeria co-operation.

Table 7: History of the EU Delegation in Algiers

Date	Head of Delegation	Nationality	Localisation of the Delegation	Specific events
1979-83	Sir Samuel Fall	British	Cheraga	2nd Financial Protocol adopted
1983-86	Graham Kelly	British	El Biar	3rd Financial Protocole adopted
1987-90	Jean-Paul Jesse	French	El Biar	Renewed Mediterranean Policy; increase in staff, title of Ambassador for Head of Del.
1990-94	Agostino Trapani	Italian	Hydra	4th Financial Protocole adopted
1994-98	Technical Closure	X		National team remains, MEDA I launched at the regional level
1999-02	Lorenzo Sanchez	Spanish	Ch.Poirson & Bvd 1960 El Biar	Increase in Staff
2002-06	Lucio Guerrato	Italian	El Biar	Meda II launched, Algeria signs Association Agreement 2002
2006-08	Wolfgang Plasa	German	El Biar	
2008-12	Laura Baeza	Spanish	El Biar	Strengthening of political dialogue

Algeria in the late 1980s entered into a period of deep reforms in state society relations and the opening up of the political sphere, with the creation of many political parties and associations.

Following this, in the early 1990s, the EU renewed its Mediterranean Policy and substantially increased its budget to the region. The Algerian coup d'état of 1992, however, with its cancellation of elections and declaration of a state of emergency, changed everything. The bloody conflict of the 1990s, with the constant threat of terrorism, had profound consequences, both domestically and on Algeria's external relations. With the direct targeting of foreigners by the Islamist insurgency, many of the Embassies and international organizations withdrew. Between 1994 and 1998, the EU Delegation 'technically' closed down due to the security situation. Some co-operation is said to have continued behind the scenes, with the maintenance of the national team and the continuation of some ongoing projects.

Relations between Algiers and European capitals however were strained. Because of the closure of embassies and delegations, the Europeans had great difficulty even understanding what was happening on the ground, let alone knowing what action to pursue. Hugh Roberts quotes European Member of Parliament, Gary Titley, in 1997 as stating in the parliamentary debate on Algeria: "Madame President, if we are absolutely honest with ourselves, we do not actually know what to do about Algeria." (Roberts, 2002). Europe was largely absent from the field in Algeria, except for a few contested missions from parliamentarians, which lasted for few days and were limited geographically to the capital (Spencer, 1998, Roberts, 2002). The EU therefore had limited information throughout the 1990s concerning the needs of the country for reconstruction, institution building, or supporting any of its new civil society organizations.

Returning to Algeria after the 'black decade' was highly challenging for the EU. The logistical structures were absent, as were the diplomatic and informal mechanisms, such as the presence of European associations or businesses in the country. The EU turned to consultants, who could assist them but not necessarily replace programme officers and diplomats on the ground. The human resource structure of the Commission, its bureaucracy and rigidity, described by Aliboni (2011:7), did not help. The constant reforms within the Commission meant a high turnover of staff, leading to less experienced personnel on the ground. As a result, there was a very slow take-up of the EU-Algeria co-operation programmes. The figures and programmes which will be discussed below show limited expenditure, despite the significant need for Algeria to re-construct.

The limitations of the EU within this context, were also matched by equally challenging positions from the Algerian state. Darbouche and Denison write,

From the bilateral co-operation agreements of the 1960s to the Global Mediterranean Policy of the 1970s and the more recent European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Algeria stood out from its neighbours either by showing much less enthusiasm or by refusing to sign up to the EU's policies in the region. This has meant that, in

Brussels, Algeria has had the reputation of being the EU's most difficult partner in the central Maghreb, though, if asked, decision-makers in Algiers would put this lack of convergence down to what they describe as the EU's "autistic" foreign-policy attitude – in other words, its failure in some cases to fully appreciate the interests and specificities of third countries. (Darbouche & Dennisson, 2011)

Accusations of neo-colonialism in the EU certainly fit with the narratives of the FLN, seeking to improve its own weak legitimacy. However, according to Darbouche's in-depth interviews with the Algerian diplomats and officials negotiating with the EU, there was also a real blockage which came from the EU's inability to listen to, to negotiate and to understand the specificities of other countries.

In light of these challenges to relations, it is useful to remember what actually was implemented and achieved by the EU in Algeria over the last decade. What did the EU actually fund and how was this managed? Algeria, as 'the EU's most difficult partner,' did succeed in negotiating a significant number of technical assistance programmes, including some in more sensitive areas such as the justice sector, prisons, and its growing associational movement.

ii.) Co-operation and funding, 1970 to 2000s

On achieving 30 years of co-operation, the EU Delegation recently published information about its relationship with Algeria, since 1979 (*30 ans de co-operation, 1979-2009*).⁹⁶ In addition to the initial commercial agreements, the EU also had four five-year protocols between 1976 and 1995. (A social component was also developed but is said never to have come into force (ibid: 15).) The document outlines the different areas which the protocols supported. (ibid:16). From the graphs, it appears the sectors of concentration changed with each protocol. Over time the number of sectors targeted reduced, and infrastructure support became the most significant sector for intervention. Civil society, governance, justice were never specifically targeted (as was the case in all the EU's co-operation in this period).

The following table indicates the sector priorities financed by the EU over this twenty year period.

Table 8 : EU Support to Algeria between 1976 and 1996

⁹⁶ Bulletin de la Délégation de l'UE en Algérie : 30 ans de coopération, 1979 – 1999
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/algeria/documents/ue_algeria_30years_cooperation_fr.pdf last accessed 8 november 2012

Period	Protocol	Sector	% of the co-operation
1976-1981	1	rural development	34
		Environment	31
		Transport	24
		Training	6
		Industry	3
		scientific co-operation	2
1981-1986	2	Infrastructures	70
		Energy	18
		scientific co-operation	9
		Infrastructures	2
		Industry	1
1986-1991	3	Infrastructures	50
		Irrigation	30
		Agriculture	8
		Industry	7
		scientific co-operation	5
1991-1996	4	Infrastructures	68
		Agriculture	21
		structural adjustment	10
		Industry	1

The four protocols made up 214 million euros (supplemented by 95 million euros for structural adjustment and 640 million in loans from the European Investment Bank). Given the period of twenty years over which these funds were committed, the reduced team size and the frequent changes of office, it appears that the co-operation with Algeria was relatively low level.

Following on from these protocols, after 1996, the EU renewed its Mediterranean Policy, and launched the Barcelona Process. This significantly increased EU ambitions for its co-operation with the southern Mediterranean. The Barcelona Process began in 1995 and in 1996 MEDA I was launched. Negotiations began with Algiers, although many meetings took place outside Algeria.

Despite the early difficulties, the EU still managed to programme 164 million euros to be spent in the country in the EU's programme cycle of MEDA I (1995-1999). These funds targeted 'developing the private sector and the country's socio-economic balance' (CSP & PIN Algeria 2007-2013: p13). Algeria's share represented 6.5% of the EU funds committed in the region. Of this sum, only a small fraction was actually spent.

After difficult negotiations, Algeria signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2002 and this entered into force only in 2005. There is no mention of civil society in the main components of the Association Agreement.

The EU reformed its co-operation programmes with its neighbouring countries in 2007, creating the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the European Neighbourhood Policy. This combined the southern and eastern neighbouring countries under one framework policy. It replaced the EuroMed partnership in the south and the Tacis programmes in the east. Algeria has not signed an Action Plan, as requested for the ENPI countries, and continues to refuse to fit into the mould of a 'hub and spoke' relationship (Darbouche 2008).

The subsequent National Indicative Programme and Strategy Paper 2007-2013 explains that the previous limited uptake of funding programmes was due to the 'security situation, the poor administrative capacity and delays in the economic reforms' (ibid). This appears to attribute the blame to the Algerian side of the co-operation. There is no assessment of the challenges internal to the EU's own structures or the (understandable) difficulties the EU faced in re-launching its programmes in a post conflict state.

The EU Delegation recognises the problems its programmes face. The less than self complimentary text in its national indicative programme (NIP), indicates that its co-operation programmes are amongst the least operationally successful in the southern neighbouring region. The following paragraph from the 2011-2013 NIP asserts :

The implementation of the co-operation has progressed, which is shown by an improvement in the disbursement rates, which remain nonetheless, amongst the lowest in the southern neighbouring region.. Apart from certain difficult cases, the majority of programmes are implemented normally and the operations respond to the expressed needs of the Algerian partners. (EU National indicative Programme for Algeria, 2011 – 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_algeria_en.pdf PIN 11-13

Interviews conducted with project management teams in Algiers between 2009 and 2012 indicated possible reasons for these blockages. Despite a will from the highest level to increase the EU's co-operation in Algeria, structural difficulties on the ground made it problematic. In the early 2000s, few European officials or consultants knew the context in Algeria. Few Algerians knew the EU and its procedures and methods of working. The problems identified by those managing the EU's programmes, include difficulties in project design, in terms of identifying the appropriate beneficiaries, finding the right management expertise and human resources, and as a result, complexities in managing relations with the national authorities.

Difficulties were also experienced by the Delegation in monitoring project implementation in the field :

We are overwhelmed here. We don't manage to leave the offices to follow up on the projects we are supposed to be responsible for. Even if we had the time, the security conditions for expatriates and diplomats in Algeria mean that we cannot travel without an escort which makes field visits difficult, so they are rare. (Official of the EU Delegation based in Algiers, October 2011)

Chapter 2 assessed how Lebanon and Palestine show significantly higher external donor commitments to NGOs than is the case in Algeria. The increased interest in Algeria towards the end of the 1990s, meant that significant commitments were made for programmes in all sectors. Yet the statements and commitments were not followed up by effective programmes. Even when programmes were drawn up, they were not necessarily even contracted, let alone implemented. The figures reported back by the EC show that many planned programme budgets were simply not spent. Of 164 million euros programmed under MEDA I from 1995-1999, only 18% was actually paid out.

Table 9 indicates that EU sought to commit and disburse 164 million euros in Algeria between 1995 and 1999 but only in fact spent 30,2 million.

Table 9 : EU support to Algeria between 1995 and 1999 (MEDA I)

MEDA I (1995-1999)			
YEAR	COMMITMENT (EUR million)	ACTUAL PAYMENT (EUR million)	PAYMENT: COMMITMENT (%)
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	41	0	0
1998	95	30	31,6
1999	28	0,2	0,7
TOTAL	164	30,2	18,4

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_algeria_en.pdf (CSP 2007-2013). p 13

The figures for the next programming cycle are equally low, but an improvement on MEDA I.

Table 10 : EU support to Algeria between 2000 and 2006 (MEDA II)

MEDA II (2000-2006)			
YEAR	COMMITMENT (EUR million)	ACTUAL PAYMENT (EUR million)	PAYMENT: COMMITMENT (%)
2000	30,2	0,4	1,3
2001	60	5,5	9
2002	50	11	22
2003	41,6	15,8	38
2004	51	42	82,4
2005	40	39,4	98,5
2006	66		
	338,8	114,1	33,7

Overall, in the period, the EU spent over 33% of its planned funding, and also reduced its ambitions in terms of annual targets. The above table shows that it took the EU roughly 5 years, after its re-opening, to return to relatively normal programming levels (and disbursements/commitments percentages).

iii.) EU support to associations

The previous section identified the challenges, limits and weaknesses of past co-operation. Earlier chapters focused on the global trends in development policies and the increasing attention paid to civil society. How does this global trend, then, fit with the unique situation in Algeria, which has the most dynamic and numerous associations in the region⁹⁷? At the same time, Algeria had particularly strained relations with the EU. If the Algerian side refused to take lessons in human rights from Brussels, what did the EU actually achieve in Algeria to support civil society?

On re-opening its offices in 1999, the EU's ambitious programmes sought to cover a huge number of sectors in Algeria. These included infrastructure development, education, health, professional training and other key sectors. However, as shown above, not all of these commitments were successful. Many programmes were simply not implemented. Andrea Liverani describes the '... plethora of civil society assistance programmes' (Liverani, 2008: 153) from all donors in the early

⁹⁷ See the figures and table in chapter 1

2000s. He attributes this to the euphoria at the initial increase in associations, the return to peace and stability and the role of associations in legitimizing the state in Algeria. There was certainly the will, and clearly also public commitments, to launch such programmes. However, research interviews conducted with associations between 2007 and 2012, tend to suggest there was only a limited number of programmes, which actually became reality in the early 2000s. However 'euphoric' international actors were about the potential of civil society, the structural difficulties identified above, the targeting of foreign actors (including the bombing of the UN offices in Algiers in 2007), the restrictions on foreign actors by the government, time delays by donors, - all these factors limited most of the externally financed programmes in Algeria.

Thus the EU programme targeting civil society, associations and NGOs was one of the first few cases over the last decade of organized, external financing to NGOs in Algeria. Today, there are increasing numbers of similar programmes, notably from the French, Spanish, British and the UN. These remain however, small in financial terms, compared to the programmes financed in the neighbouring region. Yet in terms of approach, national ownership, and the diversity of the actors supported, the EU's intervention in Algeria was highly significant.

The evaluation of the first EU programme supporting Algerian associations, was carried out in 2004, at the end the programme, by a team of European and Algerian consultants. Concerning the setting up of this programme, it asserted:

This programme was conceived in 1999 in a context of very limited information, on the nature and size of the Algerian associative movement, and in a political climate which was still uncertain concerning the relations between the state/civil society/ private sector.

This initiative from the EC had then – and still has – high stakes for Algeria, and this justified a prudent and open approach ; the CE opted for a wide definition of terms such as civil society, development, poverty, excluding only religious or political organisations. (Evaluation of support project to associations, 2004, Final Report: 51)⁹⁸

As the first programmes launched after the re-opening of the EU offices, the support to civil society programmes were highly sensitive. It was important, to the EU actors, to the Algerian government,

⁹⁸ Ce programme a été conçu en 1999 dans un contexte de rareté de l'information, tant sur la nature que sur l'étendue du monde associatif algérien, et dans un climat politique encore incertain sur les rapports Etat/ société civile/ secteur privé. Cette initiative de la CE avait donc- et a toujours- des enjeux importants pour l'Algérie, ceci justifiant une approche prudente et ouverte ; la CE a opté pour une définition très large de termes comme société civile, développement, pauvreté, n'excluant que les organisations à caractère religieux ou politique. (Evaluation du projet d'appui aux associations, 2004, Rapport Final : 51)

and also to the associations which would be key actors and which had both high expectations and needs. The historical backdrop and complexity of EU – Algerian relations, framed the programmes in a way which would allow for national ownership, and appropriation, and possibly even improve the image of the EU in Algeria. The programmes also made a significant contribution to improving the conditions for associations and civil society in the country. The next sections describe two such successive programmes, financed by the EU, over the last decade.

Programme to Support Algerian Associations, 2001-2005 (ONG1)

The Support to Algerian Associations (programme ONG1) was signed in 2001, for a duration of four years with a budget of 5 million euros. The objectives of the programme were to promote the role of Algerian civil society in development processes in Algeria, and more specifically to reinforce development associations. It aimed to improve the functioning of associations by providing small grants, by supporting networks of associations, by helping clarify the institutional context for associations and by training institutional actors (these are the objectives identified in the programme's contractual documents).

A programme management team was set up within the Centre National de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle (CRASC) based in Oran, and one of Algeria's most dynamic research centres. An independent financial and procedures expert was recruited one year later to monitor and accompany the project's implementation. Four local coordinators were recruited to monitor the projects and coach the associations, in the different regions, North, East, South and West of Algeria. All members of the project staff were Algerian. At the end of the project, 76 associations (compared to previsions for 40) had received small grants (of around 30,000 euros) and co-financed their own local development projects. 151 associations had responded to the call for proposals launched by the project and had been evaluated by external evaluators.

Whilst there were a few initial delays, the project was, in the end, successfully implemented, with a slightly prolonged time-frame. It respected the EU's (rather complex) contracting procedures used to finance associations. Calls for proposals (with a wide remit in their objectives) were drawn up, approved by the EU Delegation, and publicized to a maximum number of associations. These, after receiving training in project conception, could respond through drawing up small development projects in a wide field of local development, culture, social protection, heritage, human rights or environmental protection. The following projects selected, might serve as examples of the kinds of organizations and activities financed:

- a) Association Bel Horizon in Oran (described in more detail in chapter 4) launched their school to train heritage guides, and instigated the recuperation of the area entitled Santa Cruz, the mountain dominating the city of Oran. This had been a zone, completely off limits during the period of terrorism, throughout the 1990s. With the help of the local population, and civic authorities, the association ensured that the area was now once again a secure open public space and available to the citizens of Oran.
- b) Association Nour in Oran (also described in chapter 4) established, from scratch, their centre to care for handicapped children, and financed the initial equipment and training for the staff and volunteers.
- c) Maissa Bey, one of Algeria's most celebrated contemporary writers, equipped, launched and animated a library for children in Sidi Bel Abbess, through the women's association she presides, Parole et Ecriture.
- d) Le Petit Lecteur in Oran, active since 1993 with mobile libraries for schools and local quarters, created a space for reading, literary creation, and events based around books (festivals and writing competitions). The association edited two children's books in Arabic, the product of one of the locally launched writing competitions.

These projects were all selected on a competitive basis, by independent evaluators, judged on their relevance and feasibility, along the EU's usual evaluation grids. As well as the variety of sectors covered by the associations, the projects also covered a geographical zone from Oran in the north west, to Tamanrasset in the deep south, to Annaba in the north east. These are huge distances from any perspective. Highly diverse objectives were targeted. Both implicitly and explicitly, the projects touched some of the most vulnerable sections of the population, and raised sensitive questions related to history and cultural identity.

The final evaluation stated that the programme :

Had rendered more visible the commitments of the European Union and above all promoted the plurality of an associative movement which is inventing multiple strategies for inserting itself into a public space which is, in itself, in transformation.

The European support also increased the legitimacy of associations in their institutional environment as well as within the population, and in this sense, has reinforced civil society.

It would be useful to diffuse the concrete results of a programme whose very existence provoked much scepticism; the confidence of the population and associations in the national

process of opening up and reinforcing the rule of law would be raised. (Evaluation report : 51)⁹⁹

Programme to Support Algerian Associations II, 2006-2010 (ONG2)

Following the positive experience with the first Support to Algerian Associations Programme, a second programme was signed in 2000. It was to last for a duration of four years, with a budget of 10 million euros, and with a contribution of 1 million euros from the Algerian government. The objectives of the programme were again relatively open, to promote the role of Algerian development associations, and it stipulated no normative conditions or claims. It again aimed to improve the functioning of associations through providing small grants, support networks of associations, by supporting the institutional context for associations and by training institutional actors.

The main difference, besides the significant increase in the funds available, was the role of the state in the implementation of the programme. The management team was set up within the Ministry of National Solidarity, and the Social Development Agency. The EU signed a service contract with a French Institute, the International Institute for Comparative Studies (IIPEC) for the technical assistance (recruited along EU procurement rules and in an open competition). This established a programme support unit to be based alongside the Ministry's team in Algiers. Almost all the staff were Algerian. Short term European technical assistance was integrated, particularly to support the Ministry in ensuring the smooth running and respect of EU procedures for the evaluation of the projects and contracting with the associations.

Despite significant delays in the start up of the programme, and the difficulties of finding the balance between many different actors (EU, Ministry, Agency and a European Institute) involved in the implementation, the programme nonetheless fulfilled, and in many aspects surpassed, its stated aims. Following the procedures prescribed by the EU for contracting grants with NGOs, 3 calls for projects were launched over the programme's duration. 131 projects were supported, including 13

⁹⁹ Ceci a permis de rendre plus visible l'engagement de l'Union Européenne et surtout de favoriser l'expression de la pluralité d'un « mouvement » associatif qui invente de multiples stratégies d'inscription dans un espace public lui-même en transformation. Le soutien européen a aussi accru la légitimité des associations dans leur environnement institutionnel comme auprès des populations, et en ce sens, renforcé le rôle de la société civile. Il serait utile de faire connaître les résultats concrets d'un programme dont l'existence même a suscité beaucoup de scepticisme ; la confiance des populations et des associations dans le processus national d'ouverture et de renforcement de l'Etat de droit en sortirait grandie. 51

networking projects between two or more associations. The work of six regional co-ordinators assisted associations in identifying needs and beneficiaries. They prepared the documents and the working methods, accountability requirements and management questions. They filtered the bureaucracy and assisted the associations in considering the impact of their actions for the population, and for relations with stakeholders such as the authorities.

Through the EU's short term grant contract mechanism, again, after public calls for projects, the programme financed social, heritage, environment, gender, youth, culture and community development projects. These were managed by local (the vast majority were regional) associations. The programme put in place training cycles to accompany the NGOs in the implementation of their projects. Monitoring and coaching visits were organised, as well as exchanges of experience and sectoral training, to encourage networking opportunities and spaces for dialogue.

More detailed case studies of associations are given in chapters 3 and 4. However, apart from these, other associations which participated in the EU's second programme include:

- a) Association Forum des Educateurs in Beni Isguen, Ghardaia, in the M'Zab region of Algeria. This association set up an after school centre for reading, language support (English, French and Arabic) and IT skills for primary school learners. They had little problem finding the counterpart funding of 20%, which was necessary to receive the grant, from private donors in Ghardaia. They were even allocated a beautiful building in the palmary of Beni Isguen by an anonymous benefactor.
- b) In Djelfa, the association Assala, launched a project to help 25 vulnerable women to set up micro-businesses with a minimum training requirement. The association provided the basic equipment to set up the programme (coffee grinders, sewing machines, materials, livestock, or a computer). They facilitated training in marketing, management, and communication, and coached the women for the first year of their initiative. The success of the project, through careful budgeting, and the return (via the beneficiaries) of a part of their first products to help other women, meant by the end of the project the association could support 43 individual micro-businesses.
- c) In Annaba, Association Hippone Sub, an environmental organisation working on coastal protection, managed an ambitious project to clean up the coast around the city of Annaba and to sensitize the population and authorities about the seriousness of the degradation to the marine bed and sea-life. They targeted 1000 school children, 3000 tourists and fishermen for the communication programmes and activities. They themselves cleaned 50Ha of the seabed, (providing often shocking photos of the operations needed to remove the debris

polluting the seabed). The association trained 10 similar associations in such operations, and offered the possibility to 40 biologists and 50 young boys and girls to train in diving.

Similar environmental associations, not financed by the EU, although perhaps encouraged by the actions of associations such as Hippone Sub, were also identified in the interviews conducted across Algeria in 2011. Many of these were increasingly active due to networking with other associations and through contacts with the national radio. A national day of cleaning the beaches (Les Ebouers de la mer) was launched in 2007, by an Algiers association, Recif. This association also works on protecting the seabed, and training marine researchers and divers. The president is also a radio journalist. In June 2011, over 28,000 people participated in this joint operation, to clean up Algeria's beaches, co-ordinated by various local radio stations across the country. Over 100 environmental associations, including Hippone Sub in Annaba, were involved in cleaning the beaches and seabed in the 14 coastal regions of Algeria. The president of the association seeks to broaden the operation to the Mediterranean in the coming years.

Despite the wide range of sectors which could be targeted by the associations under the EU's programme, the vast majority of associations sought to implement projects in the social sector. Yet a significant number of projects were also carried out targeting environmental protection, heritage, culture, sport, and local development issues. The following table outlines the different sectors and where the main concentration of projects falls.

Table 11 : Sectors of the EU's second Support to Algerian Associations Programme (ONG2)

Themes	Number of projects	Percentage
Social (inc women and young people)	60 ¹⁰⁰	46%
Culture and sport	24	18%
Environment and eco-tourism	18	14%
Heritage	15	11%
Community and sustainable development	14	11%
Total	1 31	100%

¹⁰⁰ 24 exclusively target women, 18 for handicapped persons (mainly children) and 18 mainly target youth

The EU launched a number of audits, external monitoring, and a final evaluation of the whole programme. All of these assessments noted the success of the projects; they approved the financial and technical management and monitoring carried out by the Ministry and the Social Development Agency staff.

The final external evaluation, carried out by Dr. Zakaria Ould Amar of Particip, a German consulting firm, interviewed 115 members of associations supported and not supported by the programme. It acknowledged the fragility of the Algerian associations and the support structures, but remarked upon the integrity in the management and implementation by the vast majority of the associations. Out of 131 initially inexperienced associations, only 3 contracts were cancelled due to inability to manage the projects and these funds were returned to the EU.

The evaluation identified risks for the sustainability of the dynamic encouraged by the project, if the national authorities did not seek mechanisms to continue it. Short term improvements and individual successes at the level of the different organisations were noted:

The associations are very satisfied with the multiform support given by the programme ONG2. .. The beneficiaries are now able to ensure.. a greater efficacy and greater rigour and transparency in their activities. .. A greater credibility has also been attained thanks to the programme which has resulted in a sort of label from the nature of the grants accorded that the associations have been able to manage with results which are more than satisfactory. (Final Evaluation of the Support to Algerian Associations Programme, Dr. Zakaria Ould Amar, 2010 : 9)

Other EU support to Associations and Civil Society

The evaluation of ONG1, in 2005 indicates that roughly ten micro-projects of Algerian associations were directly financed by the Delegation, under the European Instrument for democracy and human rights and the Culture budget lines (ibid:14). It notes that the projects financed would have benefitted from the technical support and monitoring of the support programme. In 2011, during interviews at the Delegation, officials indicated that 22 NGO projects were then underway. These were financed via the EIDHR, Non-State Actors, Gender and Migration budget lines, and the general NGO calls from Brussels. The delegation suggested that the main obstacles were administrative and bureaucratic, and related to the precarious situation of European NGOs in Algeria.

The EU Delegation indicated that a group had been established recently, to coordinate donors, including the French, Spanish, Dutch and Belgian embassies, the UNDP and the GIZ. This was open to other donors, financing associations and civil society. From discussions with different donors in Algiers, it seems that there exists also, at least, British, Italian, Canadian and US support to

associations. Co-ordination was said to be complicated, and there was only limited sharing of information in a systematic way between the different actors. In 2010 and 2011, a project for a common resources centre for Algerian associations had been negotiated by different donors, which finally, it appeared, the EU would seek to launch.

All in all, it appears that both the programmes and other support to associations in Algeria allowed a fairly wide remit for the language of the calls for projects (this will be discussed further in the next chapter). In Tunisia for example, it appears that the calls for projects quite clearly defined what the associations could and could not do if they wished to be funded by the EU. As an example, in a EuroMed Youth IV call for projects in Tunisia, national priorities were fixed, on top of the regional 'youth' priorities.¹⁰¹ Associations 'had' to 'support the national electoral process,' develop local democracy, or support the 'employability of young people.' Many calls impose the priorities rather than leaving the remit open so that associations own priorities could be taken into account. It is also interesting to note that in ten grant contracts published on the EuropeAid website in 2011 for Algeria, six are attributed to Algerian organizations, three are with French organisations and one with an Italian organization. In Tunisia for the same year, six contracts are attributed to French organizations, one to an Austrian, one to a Dutch NGO and only two to Tunisian ones.¹⁰²

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, after a difficult initial period, and after taking a more modest approach, the EU was able to improve its co-operation, working with the associative sphere in Algeria. At the final conference to close the activities of the EU's support to Algerian Associations, in 2010, the Ambassador of the EU, Laura Baeza, praised the success of the EU funded programme. In a joint publication with the Minister of Solidarity, they summarized the results of the different projects supported :

This programme is above all an indicator of the formidable potential in terms of energy, creativity and commitment of the associative movement. This publication bears witness to the vitality of Algerian associative life. (S.E. Laura BAEZA, Head of Delegation and H.E. Said Barkat, Minister of Solidarity, Avant Propos Recueil du Programme d'Appui aux Associations Algériennes de Développement « ONGII » 2012)

¹⁰¹ Call for proposals EuroMed Jeunesse, 8 November 2012, available at <http://tunisie.euromedyouth.net/>

¹⁰² Data available on the EuropeAid database

<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/funding/beneficiaries/index.cfm?lang=fr&mode=SM&type=grant>

This joint declaration by the EU and the Minister, could be seen as giving weight to previous hypotheses, such as those by Liverani (2008), that the EU supports civil society and thereby reinforces and legitimizes the state. Yet, perhaps to the contrary, in supporting ways in which the state can work in co-operation with associations in a more constructive way, the EU does not necessarily legitimize the status quo, but enables new possibilities for reconciliation and development. It is, in this way, maybe, that the EU could support, as Addi writes, this 'passage towards the public sphere which Algeria struggles to achieve'¹⁰³ (Addi, in Bozzo, 2011 :374) in a context where the expectations of the state are high (ibid :373). Many of the associative and the institutional actors interviewed, highlighted that it was Algerian institutions which most needed assistance, for state society relations to improve. In an interview with the Project leader in Algiers at the end of the project, she stated

Today there is a good team in the EU in Algeria. The Ambassador recognizes that it is necessary to work with the state and the national authorities to support civil society sustainably, even, and perhaps more so, in authoritarian contexts. The state and its institutions have been weakened in Algeria. Competent persons have left, or are sidelined. There is poor human resource management. We need to start with the institutions. (Team leader of the technical assistance team of the EU programme, based in Algiers, October 2011)

The experience of the EU as a weaker donor in Algeria, could prove useful in light of the EU's stated aims to provide a differentiated approach following the Arab revolutions (see Commissioner Füle statements quoted in Barbé and Herranz, 2012:1). Simply increasing the budgets for countries which appear to abide by EU sanctioned reform processes, could in practice prove counterproductive. Flooding countries with civil society funding programmes is in the long-term unsustainable and carries with it the risk of corrupting and deforming the general labour market if they are not carefully managed. It may distract local elites, who could otherwise potentially be integrated into the political and institutional life of a country (see Roy's discussion of this in the case of Tajikistan, 2005). The Algerian case demonstrates that it is not the actual amount of funding which may lead to success or failure in a policy area.

Many of the donors interviewed in Algeria indicated that there had been a substantial increase in their budgets for civil society, due to the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the EU has financed huge NGO spending programmes in a remarkably fast time frame, to support civil society, since the 2011 uprisings. In total, just over seven million euro was awarded to twenty four NGOs, of which roughly

¹⁰³ 'C'est ce passage vers la sphère publique que l'Algérie peine à réaliser.'

half are European (figures taken from *Rapport de diagnostic sur la société civile tunisienne*, 2012: 34).¹⁰⁴ This comes after a period of limited support to national NGOs, and prior to in-depth studies of the needs of the organisations (ibid). The former EU ambassador to Algeria, Laura Baeza, is now in post in Tunisia from 2012, so it would seem that there could be a significant chance that the experiences from the Algerian context would influence the EU's approach to supporting associations in Tunisia.

There are no new prospects for a future EU programme to specifically support associations and civil society in Algeria. Any new initiative will depend on diplomatic relations between the EU and Algeria. As Del Sarto argues for the region in general, negotiations between the EU and MENA countries will necessarily be influenced by '*mainly domestic reasons*' (2006: 221). There is reason to believe, particularly in Algeria, that it will be the domestic situation which will determine whether the EU may intervene or not in the future. The Algerian government has nevertheless signed up to a significant programme, financed by the EU, to support the heritage sector, mainly targeting the ministries, but with a component for associations.

The historically difficult context, lack of trust, and poor track record of co-operation, combined with the absence of the EU during the conflict of the 1990s, has meant that the EU's funding programmes for civil society in Algeria, including in financial terms, have been modest. The overall EU budget for Algeria, for the 2007-2010 period, was 220 million euros. The budget for the associations support programme, financed in this period, was only 10 million euros. That represented less than 5% of the total EU budget in Algeria. The amount reserved for civil society support still remains only a small fraction of overall spending. Yet the programmes were important for the actors. They appear to have had an impact on the EU's co-operation outcomes and for the presence of the EU in Algeria.

The success of the EU programme in Algeria, in the eyes of the associations, was due, it seems at least in part, to the EU allowing (or being obliged to allow) the appropriation of the activities by local actors. Overall, in the Algerian case, the associations themselves defined the priorities of the programme. In the Tunisian example described above, it is assumed that the Tunisian NGOs would adapt their activities to carry out 'electoral support' and 'local democracy' because the EU had decided to fund that as a priority. In Algeria, on the contrary, there was a less normative and restrictive language, in the main EU tools for associations (the support programmes). As a result each association developed projects as a response to the problems they themselves identified in their region and in function of their skills, rather than having priorities decided for them by the EU. How

¹⁰⁴ See the *Rapport de diagnostic sur la société civile tunisienne*, mars 2012
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/projets/rapportdiagnostic_stecivile_mars2012_fr.pdf
last accessed 19/11/2101

the EU identifies and directs (or not) associations, through the language of its calls for projects, impacts upon implementation of the programmes and on the actors. The impact of language, through concepts such as civil society and the way language shapes the reality on the ground will be explored in the next chapter in more detail.

Chapter 6. Language and the construction of civil society

The final chapter examines language use in Algeria. It looks at how language has been used to manipulate history and how linguistic policies have impacted on access to the public sphere. Drawing on the different arguments throughout the thesis, the chapter assesses how the performative language of donors can influence civil society actors, through creating a mirror effect, through their policy analyses or through the wording of their funding programmes. In the second part, the chapter explores how heritage associations have challenged historical narratives concerning the Algerian past, contributing to new visions of what the nation could be. Finally, it examines how linguistic choices in newly independent Algeria sometimes lead to exclusionary tendencies in the education system and in the public sphere. Recent developments however, inspired by mass mobilisation and strikes but also by associative demands, have led to reforms in education and in laws concerning language policy. Article 3 of the Constitution now includes Berber as a national language and it is also taught in the school systems of ten regions. The role of associations in defining needs and ambitions, successfully campaigning for them and also providing practical solutions (such as language schools and libraries), appears to contribute to these more open language policies. There is also greater recognition of Algeria's linguistic diversity and potential, a trend of which donors should be increasingly aware.

Dynasty and government serve as the world's market place, attracting to it the products of scholarship and craftsmanship alike.(..) In this market stories are told and items of historical information are delivered.(..) whenever the established dynasty avoids injustice, prejudice, weakness, and double dealing, (..), the wares on its market are as pure silver and fine gold. However, when it is influenced by selfish interests and rivalries, or swayed by vendors of tyranny and dishonesty, the wares of its market place become as dross and debased metals.

(Ibn Khaldoun, *The Muqaddimah an Introduction to History* [1377] 1967 : 47)

Written in the fourteenth century, in the west of Algeria, Ibn Khaldoun's *Muqaddimah* introduces the idea that governments can manipulate and condition the validity and quality of historical data. Five centuries later, Ibn Khaldoun's work itself was subjected to the bias of translation, under a European colonial government. Hannoum writes that 'translation was a part of the whole enterprise that the early colonial administration in Algeria set in place' (Hannoum 2003:61). For example, the introduction to the De Slane translation of Ibn Khaldoun in 1863 clearly widens the role of the translator to one which 'rectifies the errors of the message.' Hannoum continues that, in a colonial context, 'this means that the translator converts the original text into a colonial one' (Hannoum 2003:69). The colonial rulers found support for their *mission civilisatrice* and wider colonial project in the use of language and in the re-interpretation of historical texts. Thus Ibn Khaldoun was himself categorized by orientalist scholars, not as part of a long tradition of Arab learning but as a solitary genius, standing out from an Arab civilization, which was described, using the Hobbesian phrase, as 'nasty, brutish and short' (Issawi, 1987 quoted in Hanoum, 2003: 69).

Six centuries after the *Muqaddimah* was written, in the context of the Algerian war of liberation, Frantz Fanon provided a counter balance to the European supremacist rhetoric which had defined colonialism. His use of a new performative language, as well as challenging colonial injustice, contributed to shaping Algeria's foreign policy and diplomacy at the start of the post-colonial period. He also changed perceptions as to what development aid (or, as he saw it, reparations) would be, in the aftermath of liberation. He wrote:

So when we hear the head of a European state declare with his hand on his heart that he must come to the aid of the poor underdeveloped peoples, we do not tremble with gratitude. Quite the contrary, we say to ourselves: "It's a just reparation which will be paid to us." (Fanon, 1963: 102)¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ The re-edition of Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* with a preface by the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 2006 shows the continued significance of Fanon's words to Algerian political life.

Yet however it is defined, whether as charity or as reparation, external aid and the actors who manage it remain an intrusion into the institutional and political systems of another country: their involvement, through their language and actions, affects local political life. As Abu-Sada and Challand (2011:26) point out, international donors, 'through their institutional or discursive implication', can cause the 'redistribution of symbolic and relational capital'.¹⁰⁶ Rather than being well intentioned, development facilitators, as they are often considered to be, their presence and language can, according to Abu-Sada and Challand 'prevent a real local political autonomy' in recipient countries (2011:26). The paradigms or priorities set out by donors impact upon local actors. They can determine their paths and their access to the political sphere (ibid: 29). The language of donors is rarely neutral. Hannoum reminds us that this is even more the case in former colonial contexts

Colonizing the imaginary also means that colonial judgments, whose birth and formulation are linked to a specific context, continue to be reproduced, passed on uncritically, even in the postcolonial period, carrying with them their original myths, and perpetuating colonial relations. (Hannoum, 2003:69)

The question of how language has been used by international donors, by nationalist movements, and by Algerian associations has been a recurrent theme throughout this thesis.

The first chapter explores the denial of the existence of an Arab-Muslim civil society, in academic writing and the language of donors. Benoit Challand investigated this issue in his study of NGOs in Palestine (2005, 2009). He explored how, using this assumption that civil society did not exist, donors justified their attempts to construct civil society from scratch. In order to do this they needed to impose a new language and new concepts on recipients. Olivier Roy analyses how this was done by the American administration under Bush in the Greater Middle East Project (Roy, 2005). This project ignored the traditional structures and networks already in place in the Middle East. Creating civil society, as donor language required it to be, meant that the legitimate claims of the real political actors were bypassed. These actors were either ignored, or 'civilized', by 'recasting their agendas in terms compatible with western thinking' (Roy, 2005 :1003).

The second chapter explores how the conceptual paradigms adopted by international development agencies changed over the years, impacting upon the recipients of development aid. The more recent revival of the concept of civil society is an example of such a change. In Eastern Europe the

¹⁰⁶ « en effet sont souvent tout simplement considérés comme des acteurs bienveillants ou comme des facilitateurs de développement, alors qu'en réalité leur implication institutionnelle ou discursive induit une redistribution des capitaux symboliques et relationnels, ou peut empêcher l'éclosion d'une véritable autonomie politique locale. » (Abu Sada & Challand 2011 :26)

idea of civil society was used as a frame for the peaceful political transitions (Glen, 2001). Because of its clear success in that context, the civil society concept, as a development paradigm, was then uncritically transposed to the Middle East and to Africa, by actors such as the European Union.

Chapter 3 elaborates upon the relationship between the state and associations in Algeria. It indicated that the state's language policies influenced who had access to the public sphere and excluded certain segments of society (Taleb-Ibrahimi 1995). Chapter 4 looks at how different associative actors, particularly in the heritage sector, have challenged the existing language and discourses around the historical narratives and the claims to control these narratives, by both the state and external actors. The following chapter (chapter 5) shows how, as a result of its weak position, the EU was obliged to modify its language in Algeria, to become less normative and intrusive. Consequently, the possibilities for co-operation between the two parties changed.

This current chapter seeks to bring together some of these different strands and arguments concerning the impact of language, as seen through the experience of the Algerian associations. It is within these alternative political spheres, such as associations (Cavatorta, 2011) or alternative artistic and cultural forms,¹⁰⁷ where expression is less restricted by linguistic barriers, that new voices have been able to enter into political life. The chapter explores how the language of external donors, the language of recorded history and national linguistic policies, all impact on these spheres. It explores how performative language may create new realities, or, on the contrary, impede internal processes of change. Algeria can again provide a useful and timely case study, as both the state and associative actors continue openly to contest the dominance of western donors. This is now a position increasingly adopted in other North African countries, particularly since the uprisings of 2011 (O'Sullivan, 2012). In response, the EU, which increasingly values its relations with Algiers, seems to have moderated its language (becoming more self-critical,¹⁰⁸ and admitting failures) and its responses (becoming more conservative¹⁰⁹).

¹⁰⁷ See Patrick Crowley's IRCHSS funded project on recent literary and cinematic representations of the Algerian nation and transnationalism, 1988-2010, and also the work of Luc Chauvin, PhD Researcher at the European University Institute, working on the relationship between hip hop, language and politics in Algeria.

¹⁰⁸ Commissioner Fule himself publicly stated the failure of the EU to support democratic change and promote human rights (see Barbé & Herranz-Surrales, 2012:1)

¹⁰⁹ The Secretary General of the European External Action Service (EEAS), David O'Sullivan, has recently pointed out that 'during the Arab Spring, we understood that the last thing which was wanted was interference, or outside advice. We stood back and tried to respect that.' Debating Europe Series conferences at the European University Institute, Florence, - "Setting up the European External Action Service (EEAS): Experiences and Perspectives" 28.11.2012

The chapter will examine three questions. Firstly (i), it will explore donor language, focusing on the work of JL Austin, Searle and Hirschman, on the performative power of language to create social change. It will try to show how donor language can create a mirror effect in the receiver, whereby terms imposed by donors are taken up and internalised by the recipients. This is exemplified in the way in which the language of calls for proposals can influence local actors. It will further examine why this approach failed to take effect in Algeria. Secondly, (ii) the role of language in the reworking and re-interpretation of Algerian history will be explored, from colonialism, to the nationalist project of the 1960s, finally dealing with current redefinitions of Algeria's heritage. The final section (iii) will assess how linguistic policies shape and underpin relations between the state and civil society actors and how donors (with their linguistic hegemony and choices) fit into this relationship.

i.) The performative effect of donor language

J.L.Austin's work (1975) on the performative effects of language initially received little attention, but was later developed by other philosophers and linguists to provide a framework through which we may assess the 'reality effect' – of how words may create a new reality in local contexts. In his book *How to do things with words*, Austin developed a theory of the performative. The performative utterance, he claims, is different from the constative utterance, which simply describes something. The performative utterance is instead an action in itself. He gives the example of someone stating 'I do' 'as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony,' to transform the state of the persons uttering the words to one of being married. He also gives the example of the speech act 'I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*' as constituting a new reality in the external world (Austin, 1975: 5).

Under the appropriate conditions, these 'felicitous' performatives can and do create and change external reality. Austin also reminds us how a sentence can entail, presuppose or imply another pre-existing, hidden meaning. The truth of one statement may entail, or presuppose the truth of another (ibid:48-50). The 'cat sat on the mat' presupposes that there is a cat to do the sitting.

Austin asks, 'how many senses are there in which to say something *is* to do something, or *in* saying something, and even *by* saying something we do something'. (Ibid : 94)

In posing this question Austin introduces the idea of the performative effect of language, for those uttering the words and for the recipients.

Linguistic philosopher John Searle built on Austin's theory in his work *Mind, Language and Society, Philosophy in the Real World* (1998). He argues that abstract social and institutional realities – 'money, language, property, marriage, government, universities' and, say, civil society, come into being and are accepted through language (Searle, 1998: 113). It is, in his view, the performative speech act which creates institutional and social reality.

The performative effect of language can have both positive and negative implications. The work of Albert O Hirschman analysed how negative statements concerning a policy or a reform can result in creating the expectation, and reality, of its failure. Hirschman explored an example of this in Latin America, where he observed the repeated categorization of reforms as 'utter failures' by external actors thereby leading 'to real failures' (see Hirschman's *fracasomania* concept, 1984: 55).

Austin, Searle and Hirschman's ideas about language and reality might be used to explain how donors, such as the EU, may influence social reality, through the language they use. Donor language can have an influence in three ways: through their technical language, paradigms and jargon; through their assessments of national policies or institutions; and through the wording of their funding mechanisms.

Firstly, donor influence can occur through the donor's technical language, creating a mirror effect, whereby the terms used in documents and forms are imposed upon the recipients and absorbed by them as part of their own language. At its worst, this can produce an artificial civil society, where EU terminology is simply mirrored in order to access funds. The language of civil society actors thus becomes distorted through the need to design projects which target and mirror the donor's criteria. Problems can arise with such an approach of this type. For example, donor paradigms such as gender equality may not be the main priority for an organisation which applies for the funds. In the case of an Algerian association from Bordj Bou Arreridj for instance, interviews with this organisation highlighted the frustration of Algerian NGOs working with external donors, who imposed their own terminology and language. The association explained that the donor expected it to change the descriptions of almost all its planned activities, so as to be seen as entering into and complying with the category of gender equality, as defined by the donor agency. The association sought to support the poorest rural women of the region by promoting income generating activities. The donor agency, however, wanted them to frame their project in a broader political language, targeting women's rights in general, rather than giving specific practical support to women in their region. After having re-written their project several times, and translated the entire text into English each time, the association was ready to abandon their proposal, which had been selected as one of the best (following a call for projects in 2012). At the time of the interview, it was not clear whether the

project would go ahead. The association felt that, under the conditions about to be imposed, the project would no longer be theirs.¹¹⁰ As one of their leaders argued, ‘they should be satisfied with good monitoring of our activities, not imposing upon us their own’ President of the Association El Ghaith, December 2012

Secondly, at a higher level, donors can influence the success or failure of even national reforms by their assessments of countries, through country reports, statements in the press or other publications. This could be, for example, by simply ‘presupposing’ the existence (or absence) of civil society itself, through their use of language, as Austin’s argument suggests. Alternatively, donors can presuppose the failure or improvement in one particular policy field. The assumption, for example, that women do not have rights or that there is gender imbalance in a given context, and that the EU can solve this (by providing money), may actually in itself, as Hirschman has argued (1984), create that very imbalance. In line with Hirschman’s ideas of *fracasomania*, and the external agents’ capacity to create a failure complex, McDougall (2009) develops the idea that reformists can create the ‘need for reform’. That is, they can create the state of backwardness through their own language, thereby justifying their own reform. He writes:

We must first avoid presuming, like the reformists, that there is a reform movement in a given society because the society is afflicted with backwardness (...) that an external action is necessary to operate change. In this schema, the backwardness (in whatever measure) would pre-exist and render necessary the reform. (...) However, it could be that the inverse is the case, that is to say, we begin by remarking the ‘state of backwardness’ only from the moment when there is a reform movement. It would be then the reformers which create the state of backwardness as a thought in itself. (McDougall, 2009:283)¹¹¹

In this way, in the Algerian context, the Algerian state and associations may themselves take on negative perceptions and the expectation of failure as stated by the external actors and academic writing about Algeria. The President of the association SARP (specialised in psychological care), has noted this internalisation. In 2009, in a Frederich Naumann sponsored workshop, she publicly spoke out against this, and :

the overly negative vision of associations. There are active and effective associations in Algeria, for example very courageous women’s movements. Associations work in hostile and

¹¹⁰ Interview with the President of El Ghaith Association of Bordj Bou Arreridj, 29 December 2012

¹¹¹ Il faut, tout d’abord, éviter de présumer, avec les réformistes eux-mêmes, qu’il existe un mouvement de réforme dans une société donnée parce que cette société serait affligée d’arriération(...) qu’il devrait y avoir une action externe ou d’en haut pour opérer ce changement nécessaire. Dans ce schéma, le retard (quelle qu’en soit la mesure) préexisterait et rendrait nécessaire la réforme. (...) Or il se peut que l’inverse se produise, c’est-à-dire que l’on commence par constater un “état d’arriération” seulement à partir du moment où il y a un mouvement réformiste. Ce serait donc le réformisme qui crée l’arriération, pensée en tant que telle.

arbitrary climates, it is necessary to recognize and valorize the work which has been achieved. (President of the Association SARP, 2009, Algiers)

Donors can (arbitrarily) recognize, or not, the existence of civil society in a given context. They can make judgments about the effectiveness or otherwise of the associations which constitute part of this civil society. External donors can influence internal perceptions.

However, it is these internal perceptions which matter most. The domestic context matters, and it influences the donor position. As Del Sarto writes concerning the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations,

Domestic factors often impact on whether the incentives, policies, and values promoted by the “West” are acceptable. In other words, domestic factors related to political identity may be decisive for the success of the EU’s normative power (Del Sarto, 2006: 233).

Critical perceptions may create the expectation of failure, as Hirschman writes. Yet the performative language must originate from the actors who matter (who have an audience and are trusted or believed). In Algeria, external actors are not generally trusted. Thus change could probably only be initiated through the language of the domestic actors and associations themselves. This thesis has argued that, generally, the performative effects of donor language have been resisted in Algeria, where both the state and associations were highly sceptical of donor intentions. At the micro-level, in the case of El Ghaith discussed above, the association indicated quite clearly that they would prefer to abandon the donor funding if it involved adopting a new language, just for the sake of filling the donor criteria (exchanges with the president of El Ghaith association, December 2012). Nevertheless, at the macro-level, donor language still carries significant weight. When representatives of the EU, during the EU Algeria Association Committee meeting in Brussels, present ‘new instruments for democratisation and civil society’, or indicate that ‘funds will be available for Algeria under the civil society facility package 2012’¹¹² this then ‘implies,’ (in Austin’s terms) that Algeria has a civil society compatible with the EU definition of what this should be.¹¹³

¹¹² ‘L’UE a présenté les nouveaux instruments pour soutenir la démocratisation et la société civile tout en indiquant que les allocations finales sont en cours de discussion et que des fonds seront disponibles pour l’Algérie au titre de la facilité société civile en 2012, Bulletin de l’UE en Algérie jan 2012, p5 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/algeria/documents/newsletters/janv_fev_2012_fr.pdf accessed 05/12//12

¹¹³ Algerian associative actors, intellectuals, the press and the media, or the state, perhaps might not acknowledge the existence of civil society in Algeria. Omar Derras, for example, from the University of Oran, entitled his book, the ‘associative phenomenon’ in Algeria, as he felt unable to acknowledge an associative movement in 2007.

Thirdly, EU language impacts upon the social reality of other countries, through its calls for proposals for NGOs. The EU calls, written by EU officials and mainly European consultants, establish the criteria which define what they consider to be civil society. They also outline the objectives the officials and consultants consider worthy of funding. It matters therefore how the EU categorizes the actors it chooses and the objectives it funds. If, for example, the EU has now decided (particularly since the Arab Spring) to fund what it defines as 'civil society' organisations whereas previously it categorised the same organisations as 'development associations', this has implications for both external and domestic perceptions about Algerian associations and civil society.

There has been some improvement in the relations between the EU and Algiers over the last two years. In April 2012, Algeria signed up to the EU's renewed Neighbourhood Policy, a turnaround from the Algerian government's previous refusals to participate.¹¹⁴ As a result of these improved relations, the EU has now committed significant funds to support civil society in Algeria, as well in the North Africa region as a whole, following the Arab uprisings. These funds are to be channelled through new calls for proposals to NGOs.

These developments and the significant increase in funding proposed render it increasingly important to foresee the risks which may occur when donors intervene in civil society, through their language and their funding. If donor funding is not carefully managed so that it responds to the real actors and their needs, donors potentially create the mirror effect described above. Organisations may simply be encouraged to manipulate, or re-word their proposals, so as to be able to gain funding (see Challand, 2009). Selective funding can risk destabilising the real, traditional autonomous groups and networks. For these reasons, the EU language used in its reports, forms, and in its calls for proposals can and does have a significant (and potentially negative) impact and therefore needs careful assessment.

So far, the EU's impact and language in Algeria, like its programmes, has been modest. Its programmes have been tentative, aimed at small scale support to grass-roots organisations. The EU

¹¹⁴ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/algeria/documents/newsletters/avril_mai_2012_fr.pdf This was described by the Head of the EU Delegation as 'the fruit of common work' and 'our determination to overcome misunderstandings, unspoken words, and bypass the obstacles and our differences' (Ceci est le fruit de notre travail commun, de notre obstination à dépasser les malentendus et les non-dits, de surmonter les obstacles et nos différences). The new geo-strategic importance of Algeria perhaps also underpins the EU's interest in maintaining good relations and its willingness to change some of its language use(see chapter 5).

does not appear to have imposed its language, jargon and normative conditionality in Algeria quite as much as in other countries. As such, Algeria has been able to avoid the rigid imposition of donor paradigms, such as gender equality, good governance, democratisation and human rights, and has been able to exercise a degree of flexibility. In many of the EU's programmes, indeed, the language has been left loose, so that the actors on the ground could respond as they wish. Moreover, a wide range of development paradigms, have been included so as not to oblige associations to adopt one single approach.

For example, in the first call for proposals of the latest EU support programme, the following sectors were targeted:

- The social sector, including the promotion of women's and young people's rights,
- The protection of the environment and the promotion of ecotourism ;
- Culture and sport;
- Protection of and safeguarding archaeological heritage;
- Community development and promotion of sustainable development.¹¹⁵

Projects which targeted vulnerable populations (women, youth, children), poverty reduction or the objectives of the Algerian Social Development Agency would be prioritised. These parameters were wide enough to allow almost any association to apply. The only restriction appeared to be for projects which were explicitly religious or political. However, even these restrictions were overcome to a certain extent. The EU did finance religious organisations working in the social sector, fulfilling the criteria of the first line above, as well as associations working on the protection of religious manuscripts, by regarding these as a question of heritage. It also financed politically active associations which challenged certain state policies, such as the contested reconciliation charter, which established Algeria's peace and reconciliation after the conflict of the 1990s.

The mirroring effect of EU language, therefore, appears to have been minimised in Algeria. The EU's funding appears to have responded to the demand, rather than the demand adapting itself to the supply of donor funds. This is reflected in the language of the EU and in the wording of its calls for proposals, as demonstrated above, and in the wide criteria of the EU calls.

Given the history of reticence and suspicion towards the EU, by both the public as well as state actors, the EU's language was always going to be especially important in the Algerian context. The

¹¹⁵ Lignes directrices à l'intention des demandeurs dans le cadre de l'appel à propositions 2007, Projet d'Appui aux associations Algériennes de Développement, MED/2005/017-201 ref : AP 01/2007

state and associations openly contested the language of Western donors in their quest for influence. According to a perceptions survey carried out by the ENPI information centre, which consulted 80 leaders of opinion and 400 members of the public, Algerians, much more than in any country in the region, were sceptical the EU's role in the country. In the survey, the major descriptions attributed to the EU were 'powerful, strong and big', 'aggressive and predatory' and 'we cannot trust it'.¹¹⁶ Whilst a greater involvement by the EU in Algeria might be wished for by all participants, there were clearly negative perceptions associated with the EU when it came to such values as honesty and tolerance. These were virtues rated highly as personal values for Algerians in the survey. The EU's language, when operating in Algeria, therefore, maybe had only limited impact, since there was an existing reluctance to take on and interiorise the language of the donor.

The mirror effect requires certain conditions for external actors to impose new realities on other contexts. The doubts of the Algerian public and, until recently, the reticence of the Algerian state to engage with the EU, have tempered the EU's language. This has in some ways protected Algeria from one way, donor-imposed funding programmes and language. The recently improved relations and increase in funding may risk reversing this situation. Yet, throughout the thesis it has been shown that in the Algerian context, changes come essentially through the language of domestic actors. In the terms suggested by Austin, Searle and Hirschman, external actors, through their language, can impact and change social reality, for example through the creation of negative self perceptions. However, in response, domestic actors (such as the President of the SARP association), do publicly contest and question this.

ii.) The language of history

Moving on from the language of donors, it is now useful to explore, from the state and associative perspective, the successive phases of the re-writing of Algeria's history. This was done firstly under colonialism, then through the processes of decolonization, and lastly today with the re-examination of historical narratives by heritage associations (such as those examined in chapter four).

Under the colonial period, the re-translating of Ibn Khaldoun (mentioned in the chapter introduction) was part of a strategy of domination, during which, McDougall writes, 'people's imaginations' were

¹¹⁶ OPPOL Project, survey - *L'UE telle qu'elle est perçue dans les pays partenaires de la Politique européenne de voisinage – Algeria*. Last accessed 7 december 2012, available at : <http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/interview/a110069%20ENPI%20Algeria%28EU%20perceptions%29fr.pdf>

altered. The colonial experience transformed 'people's views of themselves' (McDougall, 2006: 7). Such profound change was achieved through the 'seizure of symbolic power in the cultural realm' in the aim to 'reinvent Algerians' historical imaginations' (ibid: 8). Aiming to annihilate an independent Algerian identity and history, this process created complex local struggles over the meaning of past and future. By the 1930s, there were bitter conflicts, for example, over whether the Algerian nation itself existed (ibid: 86). Concerning this question, McDougall writes,

None of the three answers offered in 1936 to the apparently crucial question of whether or not 'the Algerian nation' existed – Abbas's, that it did not; Al-Shibab's, that it did; and the PPA's that even if it hadn't (an inadmissible proposition), it would if Algerians wished it – can be regarded as having been 'correct'. (McDougall, 2006: 88)

From the 1930s on, the historical self perceptions of Algerians were revisited in the framework of the national liberation struggle. Scheele writes, that as 'colonial injustice was increasingly understood in terms of democracy, socialism, Islamic reform, or all three at once, first attempts were made to rewrite Algerian history according to nationalist standards (Scheele, 2009: 32).

With the revision of 'French supremacy and readings of history', Algerian history was re-drawn as a long series of foreign invasions. However, in this revised Algerian nationalist history, it was 'the Eastern invaders who were seen as 'civilising', as opposed to the Europeans who had come merely to occupy and destroy' (Scheele, 2009:33, McDougall 2006; cf. alHafnawi 1907; al-Mili 1963 (1929).

This re-writing of Maghrebi history was part of the cultural decolonization process and Taoufik El Madani was one of the main protagonists. James McDougall describes how Al Madani, in his histories, re-attributes the discovery of America to the Carthaginians (2006: 155) nearly 2000 years before Columbus. This assertion was based on the finding of a Punic language text on a stone in Brazil. Al Madani managed to create the ancestor hero of the Maghreb, and to contribute to a process of building a new historical imagination. The impact of this assertion in the 1930s, when al-Madani wrote, may have been limited, McDougall acknowledges. Nonetheless, he argues, it is of high symbolic importance, as

the narrative of progress and civilisation instantiated in this story is the product of a profoundly new way of imagining the world, the past and the community. The 'ideological cohesion' of this new form of community is expressed through entirely new iconic ancestors, defined not by religion and Arabic as its language, but by a racial and civilisational 'genius', (McDougall, 2006 : 156)

The rewriting of history in the 1930s was necessary to challenge the colonial paradigm of Europe as the civilising mission and to lay the foundations for a new political imagination in Algeria. As well as

the new iconic ancestors, the history of Rome and Carthage was revised. Rome was redefined as the 'barbarian destroyer' of Carthage, thus re-framing the role of France in Algeria:

The polemic against Rome is aimed less at historical Rome itself than at modern Europe in general as Rome's heir, and France-in-Algeria, in particular, as the self-proclaimed bearer of a renewed mission of civilisation in 'Latin Africa' (McDougall, 2006 : 157-8).

Al Madani switched the polarities of the 'opposed centres of gravity of world history'. Rome (representing Europe) became the barbarian and Carthage (representing North Africa) became the enlightened civilisation.

Another 'radical departure from previous self conceptions' (ibid :166), was the rediscovery of the first independent Islamic kingdom, in North Africa in Tahert, Tiaret, under the Ibadi Kharajite dynasty of the Rustamids. This had clear implications for ideas of the Algerian nation at the time of Al Madani's writing, in the 1930s. However, it is also an important factor today, both for the Mozabite descendents of the first Algerian state, and in terms of recognising the importance and wealth of history across the different regions of Algeria.

Al Madani's project for 'the creation and institutionalisation in a new legitimate language of history and culture, of a 'rediscovery of ourselves', forging individual and collective nationalist subjectivities,' (ibid: 230) is still an important one, and one which many of the heritage associations interviewed for this research project would adhere to.

In the post-colonial period, the language of history and the collective memory remained a powerful tool in the consolidation of the Algerian nation. History was once again used to forge power relations, and to control the population who sought solutions for reconciliation after years of conflict. Scheele describes the impact of the war of independence, and the liberation struggle lead by the FLN, upon the nature of governance, on the need for secrecy and fidelity, the suspicion of traitors and the lack of trust. She writes,

The need for secrecy among the guerrillas, the fear of French infiltrations and internal conflict with the FLN and between the FLN and the MNA (former MTLD) caused constant suspicions of internal enemies (...) Even now, the shadowy figure of the 'fake *mujâhid*' or traitor is one of the most central mythical ideas around which political argument – for or against the government – is constructed. (Scheele, 2009:36).

Defining who was a martyr, or at what point one had joined the liberation struggle, defined one's place in society. Power relations were decided in accordance to the history of the war. Yet, at the

same time, history was now felt to be manipulated, controlled and hidden. Access to history was blocked or controlled. In her field work with the inhabitants of a village in Kabylia, Scheele describes their feelings on the theft of history, and the paradox of the 'general consensus' of the villagers that 'history is all-important' and yet, is 'totally absent from the village itself'.

Many villagers clearly perceived this absence of history as the direct result of an unequal power relationship between the village and the history-producing world, or on a lower level, between various groups of villagers themselves. (Scheele, 2009:75).

For the villagers, the victims of the official FLN history, and the confusion and obscurity which necessarily surrounded it, included the PPA, the Berbers, and the harkis (Ibid:86). It was felt that there was a theft of history by the new elite. History was a source of power (to decide who was a martyr and who was a traitor). History therefore was locked away. The privileged class claimed to have this knowledge and it would not be shared on an equal basis,

true historical knowledge was confined to locked shelves, the knowledge of local events became either 'dangerous' or 'forgotten': the gap between what had actually happened at village level and the 'official' history was too large to be bridged. (Ibid:86).

As a result, at the local level, history was felt to be totally absent.

Still now, truth and reconciliation over historical events in Algeria over the last century remains a central problem, internally, and also in Algeria's relations with external actors, notably the Europeans (see chapter 5). There has been no official apology for the crimes committed under colonial rule and during the war of independence. This includes state sponsored crimes such as the institutionalized use of torture by Europeans in Algeria in the first half of the century. Although many writers and film makers have recorded them, the lack of official recognition makes their occurrence intangible and the grieving process incomplete. As Florence Beaugé writes, 'Algerians need words to be given to their suffering. Forgiveness is possible, but not denial' (Beaugé, 17 mars 2012 Le monde).¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ 'Les Algériens ont besoin que l'on mette des mots sur leurs souffrances. Le pardon est possible, mais pas le déni.' http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/03/17/le-monde-relance-le-debat-sur-la-torture-en-algerie_1669340_3212.html Florence Beaugé, 17 mars 2012 Le monde

On the 23rd December 2011, in response to the French law criminalizing the negation of the Armenian genocide, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly accused France of having perpetrated genocide in Algeria. Immediately reported in the press on both sides of the Mediterranean and beyond, the Turkish Prime Minister declared that an estimated 15% of the Algerian population had been massacred by the French from 1945 onwards, stating, 'This was a genocide.'¹¹⁸ In Austin's terms, this could potentially change the reality of what happened in Algeria 50 years ago, in internal and external perceptions. It also changes the present reality of relations between France and Algeria.

The reports in Algeria were mixed, the FLN spokesman declaring the FLN had continually requested recognition from France for the colonial crimes, that the words of the Turkish Prime Minister had only expressed a historical necessity. Other articles claimed that the FLN had not requested repentance from France so strongly. In any case, international recognition by the Turkish Prime Minister of 'genocide' committed by France in Algeria certainly impacts upon the political relations between the three countries and on the historical imaginations of all sides. It makes the French avoidance of the question less tenable, and also creates greater pressure on the Algerian authorities, with new expectations from the population, because of these spoken words, for a more truthful account of the war.

As a result, the last French Presidential visit to Algeria, a year later in December 2012,¹¹⁹ acknowledged the suffering and the 'brutal and unfair system' of colonial rule. The new French President, François Hollande, speaking to the Algerian Parliament, stated that, the truth must also be spoken about the circumstances in which Algeria was delivered from the colonial system, in this war whose name was not mentioned in France for a long time,' (Hollande, 19 December, 2012¹²⁰).

He stopped short of acknowledging fully France's responsibility, as requested by the Algerians, as he refused to issue an apology.

¹¹⁸ http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/12/23/pour-le-fln-erdogan-a-exprime-une-exigence-historique-en-evoquant-un-genocide-en-algerie_1622544_823448.html ; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/23/turkey-accuses-france-genocide-algeria> ; <http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/erdogan-sarkozy-et-le-genocide-algerien-la-turquie-rappelle-a-la-france-ses-crimes-coloniaux-168542>

¹¹⁹ 19 December 2012, French President, Francois Holland's first state visit was to Algiers <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/19/uk-algeria-france-idUKBRE8BI17M20121219>

¹²⁰ Quoted in Al Jazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/12/201212209928683335.html> ' France recognises Algeria colonial suffering' 20.12.12

There is also an impact on the lack of information and recognition concerning the crimes committed during the 1990s. The same amnesty for the perpetrators of the armed Islamist groups as well as for the state security services, means Algeria struggles to move forward. There is no official recognition of the suffering, despite some indemnities having been paid to some of the victims. It is concerning these crimes that Algerians, the population and certain associations and civil society actors (writers, journalists), now seek truth and reparation. And it is a more difficult question for the state to answer. Concerning both the war of independence and the conflict of the 1990s, the language of external, state and associative actors could make a difference and could potentially create a new liberating reality on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Whilst there is a strained *official* discourse on this aspect of Algerian history, in the associative sector, there *are* words given to the suffering of the Algerians, by associations such as Djazairouna and SOS disparus. These organisations record, and speak on behalf of the victims of the conflict of the 1990s and make claims for a more honest approach to history. In discussions with the association Djazairouna, and other associations working with victims of terrorism, in Algiers in 2009, associations from different perspectives all denounced the absence of the right to speak out about the reconciliation charter. The charter gave amnesty to fighters and reparations to families of the victims in order to the end the years of terrorism. The president of Djazairouna claimed justice, truth and the rule of law, without discrimination, for the families of the 15 000 victims who disappeared in Algeria in the 1990s, at the hands of terrorists and of the security services. Other associations interviewed, which were not directly working with the victims, also highlighted their role in creating the spaces in which reconciliation can happen (Discussions with the President of Djazairouna, 2008 and 2009). The President of the Muslim Scouts pointed out that, within his association, children of terrorists and children of the victims of terrorism are taken care of across the whole country. He explained that it is within associations that this can happen, and it is the role of the association, to create the necessary conditions, language and atmosphere of fraternity which will allow these children to have a future (Discussions with the President of the Muslim Scouts, 2009 and 2011).

Associations such as Djazairouna and Bel Horizon (described in chapter 4) have the capacity and legitimacy to challenge the language of history, in practical ways. This is done mainly at the city and regional level, but such actions often also have an impact nationally. In questions of heritage and national identity, certain associations have become an alternative voice, challenging the previous state sanctioned histories of Algeria. They provide a new and more inclusive vision of what makes up Algeria's heritage. Whilst their membership might represent a limited section of the population, their work remains an independent reflection about the past and its impact upon the present. Furthermore, chapter four showed how they deliberately seek a large target audience, through their

different cultural activities, using an inclusive approach (almost 30,000 people participated in the heritage walk in 2011 in Oran). Associations such as Bel Horizon have legitimacy to speak for the population of the city. It is their language, and that of some of the other Algerian associations discussed in the preceding chapters, which appears to impact upon current social reality through re-visiting previous conceptions of the past.

iii.) Linguistic policies, associations and the public sphere

For the State, associations and the general population, it is acknowledged that in 1962 Algeria faced a difficult choice as to which language to adopt for the newly independent nation. With the choice of modern standard Arabic, hoped to be a unifying force, came the subsequent barriers, confusion and stigmatisation of Algerian Arabic, French and Berber. The current ongoing reforms, making Tamazight a national language in 2002 (Law n°02-03 of 10 April 2002 modifying the Constitution) and the relaxing of the obligations to use Arabic in associations (Law on Associations n°12-06 of 12 January 2012),¹²¹ show to what extent language remains an essential and unresolved question in the political, social and cultural life of Algerians.

Scheele's research looked back to the immediate post colonial difficulties in creating a new language policy and practices in Algeria (Scheele, 2009: 40). The imposition of a form of Arabic which was foreign to the majority of the population, the rejection of the French language, despite its dominance in many aspects of life, and the rejection of Berber (spoken by an estimated 25-30% of Algerians¹²²) meant that the post colonial linguistic policy would necessarily be complex and challenging. Gafaiti confirms this, arguing that the:

unilateral imposition of Modern Standard Arabic as the country's sole official language and its repression of Tamazight and Algerian Arabic, the vernacular languages of the country, and of French language... is an act of linguistic 'purification' that marginalizes significant segments of Algerian society. (Gafaiti, in Berger, 2002 : 29)

¹²¹ The reform of the law on associations in 2012 has resulted in the changing of the article which previously imposed Arabic as the reporting language of Algerian associations (Article 19 of the Law n° 90-31). This appears to be recognition of the linguistic diversity of Algeria and a softening of the State's approach in this respect.

¹²² Taleb Ibrahim points out that the last census including the language question, was carried out in 1966 ! See the conference given at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Lyon: www.canal-u.tv/video/ecole_normale_superieure_de_lyon/26_les_algeriens_et_leur_s_langue_s_de_la_periode_colonial_e_a_nos_jours.4351

Concerning language within the education system, and the place of the Francophone writers, Assia Djebar, in her novel *Algerian White*, writes

The institutionalised mediocrity of the educational system since 1962 - despite a clear effort toward making the population literate: literacy has almost tripled in thirty years – was practiced on two levels: promoting the “national language” by officially restricting the living space of the other languages; then, in addition to this sterilizing monolingualism, the diglossia peculiar to Arabic (the structure’s vertical variability that can give the child who is being educated a precious agility of mind) was handled badly by comparison with other Arab countries, by banishing a dialect that was vivid in its regional iridescence, subtle in the strength of its challenge and its dream.

Thus, the denial of an entire people’s genius went hand in hand with the mistrust of a minority of French-language writers whose production, in spite of or for lack of anything better, continued in exile. (Djebar, 2003: 228)

Language policy, and the practices involved in managing numerous languages in Algeria, has been examined by the linguist Khaoula Taleb-Ibrahimi.¹²³ In line with Assia Djebar’s critique of the ‘sterilizing monolingualism’ imposed on Algerians, for Taleb-Ibrahimi, it is the linguistic complexity of Algeria which continues to obstruct the development of a public sphere. This is particularly so for the younger generation, who struggle to master both Arabic and French. She researches and discusses, both in the press and in academia, the impact of the regime’s denial, since independence, of the linguistic reality and complexity of Algeria. She writes in the *El Watan* newspaper :

There is today a chasm between our education system, globally arabised, and professional economic life, which is undeniably francophone; this prevents the emergence of an Algerian intelligentsia which could work for the development of the country (Taleb Ibrahimi, 2012).¹²⁴

Scheele laments this, pointing to the potential capacity of Algerian society to confront its demons and history and to reconcile itself with them. Scheele implies that there could have been a more tolerant, open, inclusive and diverse language policy for Algeria, had the political will been there to implement it.

¹²³ The title of her book indicates the plurality of Algerian language : *Les Algériens et leur(s) langue(s). Éléments pour une approche sociolinguistique de la société algérienne*, Alger, Dar El Hikma, 1995, réédition 1997.

¹²⁴ «Nous assistons aujourd’hui à un hiatus entre le monde de la formation, globalement arabisé, et le monde professionnel et économique, indéniablement francisé, ce qui a empêché l’émergence d’une intelligentsia algérienne au service du développement du pays.» *Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi dénonce la politique linguistique des cinquante dernières années «L’opposition du français et de l’arabe a cassé l’intelligentsia algérienne»* *El Watan*, 9 juillet 2012

The ongoing stigmatisation of Algerian Arabic and of French, creates barriers and reinforces divisive and exclusionary tendencies. Berger writes that,

the double scarring of dialectical Arabic and French in Algeria, the mutual, albeit unequal historical cross-inscription of languages, the symbolic and literal wounding of Algerian speakers, split as they are by each utterance, may indeed reveal something about the experience of language. (Berger, 2002, 15)

Across generations, then, this linguistic wounding and the obstacles it creates for the public sphere, also contribute to the difficulties in formulating coherent political demands. These difficulties are reinforced by the lack of institutions designed to allow it (Volpi, 2003:136), a lack stemming from the longstanding state fears of political contestation (Addi, in Bozzo, 2011: 375). It is this failure to build institutionalised political dialogue (ibid; Volpi, 2003) and the weaknesses in language and education policies, which, for some writers, leads to autocratic and violent contestation as the main form of interaction between citizens and the political regime (Volpi, 2003).

Yet since the 1990s, a more tolerant and inclusive approach to language policies and education has developed. The original hostility towards Tamazight in the newly independent nation has been replaced with a more inclusive and supportive approach towards its place in the Algerian public sphere and education system. This was in response to increasing popular mobilisation, through the Berber Cultural Movement and associations, which demanded it. Following strikes in the early 1990s, the government introduced reforms of the education system to include education in Tamazight (originally in 16 wilayas, and today in 10 wilayas). This was accompanied by the creation of the High Commission for Amazighté, attached the Presidency in Algiers in 1995 (by presidential decree, 95-147). The revision of the Constitution in 2002 amended Article 3, enshrining Tamazight as a national language, and ensuring the State should work for its promotion and development in all its varieties within the national territory.

Researcher and teacher Nacera Abrous writes that the introduction of Tamazight into the education system from 1995 was a historic event. Whilst the universities of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia had already integrated diplomas in 1990 and 1991, she writes that ‘until then Tamazight had always been maintained far from the official sectors and stigmatised despite the fact that it is practiced by millions of speakers’¹²⁵ (Abrous, 2010: 12).

¹²⁵ ‘jusque-là le Tamazight avait toujours été maintenu loin des secteurs officiels et stigmatisé malgré le fait qu’il est pratiqué par des millions de locuteurs’

She argues that the tone of negation and stigmatisation has definitively changed. Whilst the absence of a clear linguistic policy and the lack of pedagogical tools remain obstacles, the clear motivation and mobilisation of both students and teachers, notably in Kabylia, lead her to be optimistic. She reiterates the belief of Salem Chaker in 1996, that Berber will consolidate its status as a taught language, to become a language of education in the future (ibid: 26).

The constitutional reforms, and the reform of education to include Berber in the school curriculum, result from the demands made by organised mobilisation, notably from Kabyle associations. Associations have had a role in the changes in language policy in Algeria, and have had successes. There is impatience with the pace of reform and disappointment with the speed of implementation of the policy to include Berber. Yet, this is also balanced with both realism concerning the difficulties and the ambitions of such a policy, and optimism for its future success (Abrous, 2010; Chaker, 1996). As Addi writes, in Algeria, concerning state and civil society, 'the relationship to the state is intense, and the expectations too high' (Addi in Bozzo, 2011 373)¹²⁶. Whilst the financial means are present, the technical skills and capacity to implement such a reform are not necessarily available. The difficulty of training teachers, elaborating a curriculum for a language which changes across the regions, implies a decentralised, coordinated approach. This would not be an easy reform for any system to implement. Yet in Algeria, the tertiary level education reforms mean that Berber is taught in the universities of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia. This will impact upon the potential future teaching staff in the education system, and so Abrous' optimism could be well founded.

Concerning the French language, the position of Francophone Algerian writers mentioned above, in Algeria or in exile, and French writers of Algerian descent, mean there remains a vibrant Algerian francophone literature and public sphere. These actors are increasingly present in Algerian literary life and debate, and in the increasing number of international book fairs in Algiers. A more tolerant approach appears to have developed with recognition of the importance of French as a language in Algeria. Unlike Morocco, French is not recognised as a national language, and Algeria is not a member of the International Organisation for *La Francophonie*, yet it is possibly the second largest Francophone country in the world after France. The relaxing of the law on associations (so that any language can be used for publications, reversing Article 19 of the Law n° 90-31) is recognition that the working language of Algerian institutional life is still often French. It is also recognition that achieving a more open linguistic policy could be to Algeria's advantage, rather than representing a problem or a threat.

¹²⁶ 'le rapport à l'Etat est intense, et les attentes trop grandes'

Within associations, rational solutions or pragmatic explanations are provided for the linguistic complexity facing the Algerian population. As a younger member of Bel Horizon association remarked during a meeting in Oran, in reference to the protection of colonial architecture, which the state was reticent to accept, 'it is like French, French is our language – we speak the colonial language, but it is ours' (Bel Horizon, October 2011). The burgeoning number of private and charitable language schools and multilingual libraries form part of the response from the local level to the need for a more open linguistic approach in Algeria.

The risks of a closed language policy are increasingly acknowledged by the different actors, from either donors or the state (interviews with Algerian and EU officials, October 2011). There is a risk of creating a divisive impact. For the EU, bypassing actors who do not necessarily possess the EU linguistic competence required (in Algeria's case French; sometimes English is also imposed in calls for projects), can reinforce exclusionary tendencies between different groups. Furthermore, if funding from Gulf States targets Arabophone Islamic organisations and Western donors target secular, francophone ones, this could contribute to reinforcing the divisions in Algerian society along linguistic and religious lines.¹²⁷

The last decade has seen developments concerning Algeria's linguistic complexity which impact on the education system, the public sphere, civil society, artistic life and the role of associations and donors. Despite the difficulties and challenges identified above, the opening up of Algeria's linguistic policies and of the education system, appears to indicate the diminishing of linguistic barriers which may previously have prevented the development of an inclusive Algerian public sphere and civil society. It would seem important that external actors and donors be aware of these evolutions and support multilingual, and more open approaches, so as to minimize the risk of dividing groups along linguistic lines.

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn together the different arguments emerging from the thesis that are related to language, donors and civil society in Algeria. It first explored the performative effect of donor language, and the risks, if language is too dogmatic, of creating a mirror effect, distorting local associations and damaging local political autonomy. It showed how this has been avoided so far in

¹²⁷ Interviews with the British Embassy, confirmed by interviews with Algerian experts, in June 2012 indicated that increased funding from the Gulf States was one of the reasons which the Algerian government sought to monitor external funding to associations in the new Law on Associations.

Algeria, but identified potential risks, with the present increase in civil society funding across North Africa. The second part identified how language can be used to manipulate or re-interpret history to favour particular political objectives. Algerian associations now appear to have an important role in questioning language, history and narratives, allowing for more open and inclusive representations of Algerian history.

Finally the chapter examined the impact of Algeria's linguistic complexity on civil society and the public sphere. It explored political developments and linguistic policies since 1962 and the recent evolutions to a more inclusive linguistic policy. Whilst difficult to implement, particularly the reform of the education system (to include Berber language education), there have been serious attempts to take into account the linguistic reality of Algeria. It remains unclear what place modern standard Arabic, Algerian Arabic, French, Berber, and other European languages will all take in the Algerian education system and in political life, given Algeria's evolving and increasingly important place in the region and in the world economy. Yet it is clear that there are passionate ambitions with regards to language learning, because of questions of identity and because of desire for professional development.

Algerian associations play a role in defining and vocalising these needs and ambitions, campaigning for them (with success in the case of the inclusion of Berber in the education system) and also providing the practical solutions through language schools, literacy support and multilingual libraries and centres. These successes incite new reflections and create the desire in the population to have the 'right' to greater linguistic opportunities, and to know (and to feel proud of) the fuller history of their cities and country. As Hirschman writes, people will engage in collective action, a new and perhaps risky course to improve conditions, when they consider this not just desirable, but '*a thing rightfully theirs*'. For this reason, 'the proclamation of a right has so often been, if not automatically self-fulfilling, at least the first step to any serious attempt to secure that right' (Hirschman 1984:101). The work and words of these associations in repeatedly affirming this right would therefore seem to have an impact, beyond their immediate environments, to change social reality.

Conclusion

Two interrelated questions were posed at the beginning of the thesis. The first concerned the hypothesis, in much of the recent literature, that civil society in the Middle East and in North Africa has often been a conservative force which has served to legitimize and reinforce authoritarian regimes (Wictorowicz 2000, Liverani, 2008, Carothers, 1999). The second question concerned the role of donors in these processes. In supporting civil society in the MENA region, the hypothesis has been put, that by trying to 'construct' civil society from the outside, because of the language of the donors use, this becomes an artificial civil society (Roy 2005), a corrupted one (Henderson, 2002), which as such serves only to reinforce authoritarianism (Liverani, 2008). These hypotheses have been developed and challenged, and also applied and questioned, in the case of Algeria, throughout the thesis.

Concerning the first hypothesis, Schmitter's framework (1993) for measuring how civil society organisations can contribute to political change and democratisation (or on the contrary to authoritarianism), outlined in chapter one, has proven to be still relevant. The framework can be used to test this first hypothesis in the case of Algeria. According to Schmitter, and also later to Abu Sada and Challand (2011), examining organisations at the micro level can provide an indication as to the capacity of civil society to bring about political change. The associations examined throughout the thesis provide evidence that Algerian associations, in line with Schmitter's criteria (1993), do in reality 'stabilize expectations' and re-interpret information (such as the social organisations examined in chapter four which inform, create networks and provide health services). They 'inculcate civic and democratic behaviour' (as seen in the heritage and environmental organisations, examined in chapters four and five). Inculcating democratic behaviour is not limited to the mainly secular associations. From the interviews with associations coming from a more religious background, and also according to Cavatorta's research into Algerian associations, it is the Islamist organisations whose 'surprisingly democratic' structures inculcate civic behaviour (2011: 27). Civil society organisations also appear to provide 'closer channels for expression'; they steer members towards 'collective commitments'; and provide 'a source of resistance to tyranny' as Schmitter's framework suggests is necessary for them to contribute to political change. This is exemplified in the networks of associations examined in chapter three which challenged the 2012 law.

Schmitter also identified characteristics which would mean that civil society could also present 'risks' for democracy (Schmitter 199: 15). Such characteristics could include those which make the formation of majorities difficult; or 'bias the distribution of influence' and become class based. In

Algeria, the socio-professional background of associations' leaders across the country varies widely, from retired teachers, to parents of children with a disability – it does not seem primarily class based. Schmitter also suggests that associations can give rise 'to policies no one wanted.' Algerian associations intervene, however, only tentatively in policy formation, usually due to specific sector expertise or representative functions. Lastly Schmitter warns of the possible risk that civil society organisations divide along ethnic, linguistic or cultural grounds, or exclude certain groups. In such cases associations could become negative for democracy. This last point has also been made by Cavatorta, who argues that associations divide along religious/secular lines in Algeria. However the associations interviewed for this thesis and even those interviewed by Cavatorta himself, showed clear cases of co-operation, across this divide.

Taking Schmitter's criteria to measure how certain characteristics of associations can contribute (or not) to political change, it seems difficult to argue that Algerian associations simply reinforce authoritarianism. Following his field research up to 2006, Liverani felt that the main problem for Algerian civil society was the internal 'structural constraints and incentive system' which produced a neutralizing effect and pushed associations to perform 'legitimacy maintenance functions' for an authoritarian state. (Liverani, 2008:169). This may occur in some cases, where associations are entwined in political life through co-optation measures by the state. However, the examples taken in this research project show that it is not true for all. To characterise them as serving only to maintain state legitimacy is far from a true representation of the roles of the associations interviewed.

In chapters three and four, when looking at the micro-level of associations, as suggested by Schmitter, it was seen that many of the associations do now contest the state. They are also often challenged by the state, and yet do not desist in their activities. As Mitchell argues, the boundaries are blurred. The limits are created by a dialogical process in which both sides can frame the debate and influence processes of regulation. There are many blockages for Algerian associations, and the 'structural constraints' do exist. The thesis acknowledges the significant administrative and bureaucratic burden on associative actors, which sometimes leads to them abandoning their associations. Yet, the cases examined show that there is also an increasing number of associations which overcome such burdens, which challenge the bureaucratic structures and interact with institutions in new ways. The new consultation processes launched in 2011, following the Arab revolutions (discussed in chapter three), are examples.

In Abu-Sada and Challand's recent book on associations and NGOs in the region, *Le Développement, une affaire d'ONG ? Associations, Etats et Bailleurs dans le Monde Arabe* (2011), they hypothesize

that involvement of associations in public life, thereby removing the state monopoly, has led to the 'emergence of new forms of contestation' in a process of 're-politicisation', and not de-politicisation, of associative actors (2011: 12-13). New associative actors across Algeria have also been identified as having the potential to participate in public life and policies, at least at local level. A number of the organisations interviewed have already done this, with the health authorities (Nour in chapter four), with town halls (APEB in chapter three) and with education authorities (Fondation Boucebci in chapter one). This is relatively new, yet as a result of their actions, they do appear to have impacted upon public policies and services. This has been noted elsewhere in the region. Challenging the distinction between lobbying associations and 'depoliticised' service providers, Abu-Sada and Challand show an associative movement 'participating in public policies', particularly on the question of 'public services' (ibid:22)¹²⁸ They write that it is no longer simply a control by the state over associations, but that there is also an impact of associative changes upon political life (ibid:23).¹²⁹

Within the heritage sector in Algeria, associations have been able to make significant progress. In doing so, they have contested the state in a number of ways. This includes challenging the national identity - that of Algeria as a purely Arab-Muslim nation - previously presented by the state as the only legitimate identity. In her discussion of the practices of converts, Nadia Marzouki identifies how 'the practices and narratives' have been 'significantly influenced by an attempt to redefine the past and future of the Algerian nation' (Marzouki, 2012:73). She writes that there is 'a significant interest in rewriting this national culture' (Ibid: 102) and in reconstructing Algeria's identity as 'a specifically Maghrebi one, or as an African one' (Ibid: 100). This desire and motivation to re-write and redefine national history was seen at a number of levels throughout many of the associations, not uniquely those working on heritage. The discourse was however strongest in the heritage associations. Actors such as Bel Horizon deplore the 'lack of interest' in history from the authorities and from citizens, and seek to rediscover and valorize the city of Oran, as discussed in chapter four. APPAT in Tiaret sought to promote the Berber, Phoenician, Roman, colonial, as well as the Arab-Muslim history of the region. They even had to include sites pertaining to the history of the Emir Abdelkader, which

¹²⁸ Les études auparavant séparent 'les associations de plaidoyer, faisant partie d'une société civile de contestation, comme opposée aux associations de « services » associations caritatives 'peu dissidentes'. Cette étude montre l'inverse : 'un monde associatif participant (sur des modes d'action très divers) aux politiques publiques, en coopération avec les agences internationales et avec les administrations, notamment dans le domaine de la production de services publics.'

¹²⁹ 'nous n'avons pas à faire non plus « simplement » à un contrôle de l'Etat sur les associations, mais aussi à un impact des changements associatifs sur le tissu politique national'

had not been protected, despite the apparent importance attached to that particular period of history by the state.

The case studies throughout the thesis highlighted a number of Algerian associations, all independent, some in contestation, others in co-operation with the state, carrying out social sector initiatives, or protecting heritage sites. In doing this, they often challenge national narratives, and they often work in extremely difficult conditions. Whilst still modest, these developments nevertheless have an important impact upon Algerian society and politics. Liverani wrote of his research project in 2008, that 'one of the main omissions of this study has been the acknowledgement of the positive contribution that a variety of associations provide to Algeria's social, political and economic landscape.' (Liverani, 2008: 169)

His work had focused only on the impact of the associative field on Algeria's 'political development.' However, it is also this contribution to social and economic life, as well as political life, which makes Algerian associations, in their own right, even without contesting the state, an important development. The associative sphere, and freedom of association, in itself, is a part of democratic governance and culture. Perhaps this should of itself be worthy of support, without requiring a 'democratising' or 'contestational' role for it, particularly from external donors.

The findings of the thesis challenge the hypothesis that civil society in the MENA region reinforces authoritarianism. At the same time, as also argued necessary by Abu-Sada and Challand, the thesis seeks to go beyond the studies which only seek to see associations as 'conveyors of democracy' (2011). Abu-Sada and Challand write that it is important to look at the impact of bureaucratization, of professionalization, and of politicization of associative actors, on their interactions with the state and donors (2011: 26). These professionalization processes, whether or not due to the changes in donor developmental paradigms, clearly do have an impact upon associations' access to the public and political sphere (ibid: 26). This leads on to the second hypothesis of the thesis.

Concerning the second hypothesis, about the role of donors, previous research has shown how donor language and programmes, across the region, under certain conditions, *have* clearly resulted in a lack of autonomy for local actors (Challand, 2008). Weak, badly managed donor mechanisms have turned civil society support initiatives into 'winning the lottery' scenarios (Henderson, 2002), resulting in animosity, corruption, labour market distortion and ultimately violence (Challand, 2010). This is particularly so in contexts where donor budgets are extremely high, such as in Palestine, where Challand estimates that as much as 400 million dollars each year is given to NGOs. Taking the case of Algeria, the thesis explored a country with the highest density of associative life and the lowest density of donor funding. Compared to Palestine, Algeria is at the other end of the scale, with

an estimated only 4 million euro each year given to associations. With a significantly higher number of NGOs (93,000 registered associations in 2012), the impact of donors is seen to be far weaker. Chapter four showed how the densest areas of associative life (the south and Kabylia) are furthest from donor interventions (mainly in the north).

Chapter six explored how the performative effect of donor language risks creating an ‘artificial civil society.’ Imposing donor priorities can have an adverse mirror effect, of constructing a civil society as donors wish it to be, ignoring the real traditional structures in place. As a result, this *would* seem to reinforce authoritarian structures, as argued in the recent literature. Due to the restrictions placed on donors in Algeria, however, the thesis argues, that this has not been the case in Algeria. Modifying donor language can have a positive effect.

Chapter five examined how historically complex relations, and the weak position of the EU in Algeria, meant that the dominant and normative language of the EU had to be transformed into a more modest one. As a more modest partner, within national development processes, the EU could actually work more efficiently in Algeria. Otherwise, the programmes could well have been set up, but not a euro spent (as was the case for much of the MEDA I funding, as shown in chapter five).

The wording of the calls for proposals from Algerian NGOs was much more open than in neighbouring countries (such as Tunisia and Mauritania). In other contexts, the EU often obliges NGOs to promote democracy, human rights, and gender equality, in order to gain funding. Such demands were also made by other donor agencies in Algeria, such as the case of the funding to El Ghaith association in Bordj Bou Arreridj, examined in chapter six. In many countries of the region, the prime example being Palestine, significant budgets have been awarded to sometimes inexperienced organizations. The goal of promoting democracy, human rights or gender equality, is accompanied by often limited support for or monitoring of the management of those budgets and projects. In Algeria, the budgets were much lower, and the more open language in the calls for proposals meant that organizations’ own ideas for development initiatives could take priority.

As suggested with regards to the first hypothesis above, associations do not necessarily have to ‘promote’ democracy, either within the state or by contesting the state; this is not necessarily their role. They are themselves a part of the democratic system. Being told to promote democracy by western donors risks being counter-productive and could prevent them from fulfilling more important roles. Indeed, in Algeria for example, one of the more unexpected and interesting roles taken on by associations is that of challenging the historical narratives of the state. They are asking for more inclusive representations of Algerian history (as seen in the work of Bel Horizon in Oran, and

APPAT in Tiaret). In this way, and in difficult contexts, they become part of internal dynamics, trying to construct civil society and a public sphere for critical debate.

Linguistic policy has sometimes blocked such attempts to build civil society from within (chapter six). The restrictive linguistic policies of the 1960s prevented Algerians from developing an inclusive public sphere, by stigmatizing the vernacular languages which could have been used within it. Another unexpected role of associations is, then, that of defining and vocalizing these needs and problems, related to language. Associations have been campaigning (with success in the case of Berber education in schools) for change. They provide practical solutions, challenge and prevent the dominance of external actors, and incite new reflections about future language policy and the public sphere in Algeria.

By limiting support through imposing a specific (European) language, or sector (such as human rights), donors can have the counter-effect of dividing civil society along sectarian grounds or by diverting associations from their real potential or priorities. More inclusive approaches, such as those in Algeria, whilst appearing to be less politicized, may have more far reaching impacts. Associations and civil society cannot be primarily a product of foreign influence, as has been suggested to be the case elsewhere in the region, and as was the aim of the Bush GME project (Roy, 2005). Algeria provides a useful case for donors, one in which this approach has been avoided, and where the EU has been able to provide a more modest but perhaps more relevant mechanism for support.

Civil society in Algeria

Given the persistent weakness of political parties in Algeria, it remains within civil society that political and social demands are articulated (Cavatorta & Elanza 2008). Associations create spaces in which people can act, criticize and propose. Chapters three and four explored the new autonomous spaces which do exist, despite fears of state controls, in addition to the traditional spaces of socialization. Whilst the Algerian Government has tried to rely on civil society politically, co-opting certain organisations for support, associations are sceptical of being entwined into electoral politics, which have limited relevance to the majority of the population. Associations prefer to work with the state on the real issues which are at stake : such as the provision of public services, the right to education, the right to justice and the rule of law, and the history and meaning of the Algerian nation.

Associations are not necessarily always in contestation with the state, but this does not mean they are compromised. Their legitimacy comes from their members, and from how they are perceived in the public sphere, and by the press. As the regional health sector association (discussed in chapter three) indicated, the greatest success of the association was 'reaching a membership of 5000 members after five years.' This reinforced their legitimacy, independently of their relations with the state (interviews with Echiffaa, June 2012). This, along with the fact of their now being part of a larger informal network of associations, had effectively begun to 'shift the balance of power' between the authorities and the association. ACEC Students Cultural Association in Adrar also confirmed such a shift. Over the last two years, the significant increase in the number of members, meant that the local authorities now came to the association, rather than the other way round (interview with the President of ACEC, December 2009). Associations whose objectives are more in confrontation with the state, such as associations questioning the Reconciliation Charter, seeking justice for families of the disappeared, seek similar means (membership, networks) to reinforce their legitimacy and to protect themselves from arbitrary measures.

There are still many challenges facing civil society in Algeria. There is fragmentation and there is frustration about the slow pace of reform. With the transformations and instability in the region, the situation in Algeria is tense. Associations are often divided, and unsure of a common line. They can also disintegrate or easily be repressed by state structures. Yet, at the same time, they are capable of launching impressive mobilisation initiatives, as the case studies have shown. In his 2007 study on Algerian associations, Omar Derras wrote that it is the search for the appropriate reforms and support, which is needed to anchor such processes and developments in Algerian political, social, cultural and economic life. If these are found, he writes

At this stage, the associative tissue will become a rampart against the arbitrary and against authoritarianism, allowing the emergence of an important part of civil society, not simply placing itself in a strategy of confrontation, but one of mediation, in essential partnerships (Derras, 2007).¹³⁰

Derras' words indicate the potential for a new reality, lying within reach of associations and of the state (and possibly donors). The dialogue is less confrontational now, and there are cases of co-

¹³⁰ À ce stade, le tissu associatif va devenir un rempart à l'arbitraire et à l'autoritarisme, et faire émerger un segment important de la société civile, non pas pour s'inscrire dans une stratégie de confrontation, mais de médiation et de partenariat indispensables. http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/div/mvt_associatif.htm

operation. Equally, the associative movement has trained significant numbers of qualified and committed personnel (FMB, Aechiffa, APEB, Bel Horizon, Castellum, APPAT, Nour, APE, El Ghaith) who now have different expectations about the future. With an increasing number of successful examples, and if the appropriate reforms and support are provided, then, as Derras argues, under such conditions, the associative movement could become a force for change within the public sphere, involving the population in the struggle for development, alongside institutional structures.

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5. The High Commissariat for Amazighté

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4. The World Bank

Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria/overview>

ANNEXE 1 : PRINCIPAL MISSIONS UNDERTAKEN IN ALGERIA

(Visits supported by the SPS dept. of the EUI)

1. October - November 2011 Research visit to Algeria

Date ¹³¹	Place	Interviews (person, organisation)
Sat 15/10/2011	Arrive Algiers	
16/10/2011	Algiers	Malika Ghebbi, Chef Projet, Fondation Mahfoud Boucebci (FMB)/ interviews with 2 psychologists (UE financed project)
17/10/2011	Algiers	Assia Harbi - UAP Projet leader EU support to associations
18/10/2011	Algiers	Sophie Guerriche, Nadia Boukkhebaache, EU Delegation, Programme Officers Mohamed Hammouda, CIDEAL Spanish NGO - feminine associations project
19/10/2011	Algiers	Ferial Selhab, PCPA associations support programme and network financed by French Embassy
20/10/2011	Algiers	Mokhtar Guerriche, Programme Officer, French Embassy Belkacem Messaoudi former regional animator in the south west regions with the EU support programme M Brahami, Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale
21/10/2011	Algiers	
22/10/2011	Algiers	<i>Colloquium on epilepsy</i> : Library of Bab Ezzouar (organised by the FMB, APC for public sector teachers) Interviews with the psychologists and Vice President.
23/10/2011	Oran	Kouider Metair, President Association Bel Horizon - participation in work meetings with members (architecture students from the university of Oran on heritage in the oranais region and future activities of the association Presidents of Associations Izdihar, SIGA of Beni Saf (network of heritage associations in Oran) Mohamed Baglab, President of Association for Development Saoura of Bechar
24/10/2011	Oran	Houaria Djebarri, President Association Nour, Association Bara'a (innocence) Handicap et enfance.

¹³¹ The Algerian weekend is on Friday-Saturday

		Omar Derras Researcher and Lecturer University of Oran Abdelhafid Gersallah, researcher with the CRASC
25/10/2011	Oran Alger	ORAN – ALGER
26/10/2011	Alger	ALGER
27/10/2011	Alger - MEDEA	Khelil Moussaoui, communications officer, social Association Echiffaa (financed by the EU support programme)
28/10/2011	Tipasa	Participation in the mid term evaluation of the PCPA programme for Associations, financed by the French Embassy
29/10/2011	Tipasa	President social association TEJ, President association Wafa for handicaped childrend in Constantine, President of the Fédération Algérienne pour les Personnes Handicapées, association AEFAB Algiers, Association Bouzeguene Kabylie, President of the NADA network for youth associations, Association Franco-Algerian SoliMed
30/10/2011	Tipasa – Tiaret	Ahmed Djebara, former regional animator with the EU support programme for associations. Presidents Association Rostomid Artisanat and Association APME, (not financed by the EU); Mohamed Abed, President, Association Enfance en detresse, (financed EU)
31/10/2011	Tiaret	Ahmed Daoud, Association APPAT (heritage, EU financed), national youth organisation ODEJ, Association AIPDDF, Association Salaam Al Akbar (greenpeace) Jumenterie, Director of the regional social development agency,
01/11/2011	Tiaret - Ghardaia	TIARET – GHARDAIA (national day)
02/11/2011	Ghardaia	Mohamed Hamouda, former regional animator with the EU support programme for Associations South East (Ghardaia). Mohamed Ider, member, Association APEB, Etudiants de ben isguen, Association for travel agencies of Ghardaia
03/11/2011	Ghardaia	Associations Ghardaia : Saleh Tichirine, president of the Forum des educateurs, Association de femmes Timkhress (visit of the museum created by the association), APEB
04/11/2011	Ghardaia – djelfa	
05/11/2011	Djelfa	Belkacem Messaoudi, former regional animator with the EU support programme for Associations South west, member of the consultation committee for the new Law on Associations. Zohra Baameur, President of Association Assala,

06/11/2011	Medea	Eid - with members of Echifaa association in Medea
07/11/2011	Medea	Visit of Thibirine Monastery with the association Echifaa
08/11/2011	Alger	MEDEA – ALGIERS
09/11/2011	Alger	ALGIERS
10/11/2011	Alger	Fondation Boucebci, session on the EU programme Mr. Rachda, Director General of the social development agency
11/11/2011	Alger	
12/11/2011	Alger	Tarik Loumassine, journalist National Radio and television. Meeting with artists paintings - art exhibition in Sacré Cœur area. Participation with Association SOS Bab el Oued for the commemoration of 10 years after the flooding of Bab el Oued
13/11/2011	Tizi Ouzou	Pr. Brahim SALHI, sociologist, Dean of the University of TO. Association of Parents of handicaped children, professional training centre.
Monday 14/11/2011	Alger - Florence	

2. June - July 2012 Research visit to Algeria

Date	Place	Interviews (person, organisation)
Wed 13/06/2012	Algiers	Assia Harbi, former Head of the EU associations programme
14/06/2012	Algiers	Annette Boucebci, honorary president, Boucebci Foundation (FMB)
15/06/2012	Algiers	Marie Thérèse Brau, Association pour les enfants handicapés
16/06/2012	Algiers	
17/06/2012	Algiers	Smain Himi, President Association Inchirah (Andalous music), Chadli Boufaroua, Director, international relations, Algerian Radio Ch3
18/06/2012	Algiers	Barry Peach and Faycal Ezziane, Programme Officers, British Embassy
19/06/2012	Algiers	Youcef Rahmi, Former Director of the EU associations programme, Ministry of National Solidarity
20/06/2012	Algiers	Hamid Belkacem, Radio journalist (Ch3) and President of RECIF association
21/06/2012	Algiers	Psychologists and Mr. Chibane (auditor) of the FMB
22/06/2012	Algiers	Anouar BenMalek, Yahia Belaskri, writers participating in the international book festival, Maissa Bey, writer and president of Association Parole et Ecriture
23/06/2012	Algiers	
24/06/2012	Algiers	Mohammed Hammouda, Director, Ferial Selhab, Programme officer, PCPA French support to associations)
25/06/2012	Algiers	Karima Slimani, EU SME support programme
26/06/2012	Medea	Khelil Moussaoui, Abdeljelil Slama, Association Echifaa, (social sector) Medea
27/06/2012	Tiaret	Travel
28/06/2012	Tiaret	Ahmed Djebara, former regional animator for Tiaret, EU associations programme
29/06/2012	Tiaret	Association des MicroEntrepreneurs, visit of sites targeted by APPAT, (Tagdempt, Djedars, Frenda)

30/06/2012	Tenes	Mme Meslim, President, Archaeological Association of Tenes
01/07/2012	Algiers	Dr. Youcef Hadj Ali, independent consultant for the EU and Social Development agency
02/07/2012	Algiers	Telephone interviews, Ahmed Cherifi, President of Association Castellum Chlef, President Association for the Casbah Algiers
03/07/2012	Algiers	Field trip with the FMB and the Rotary Club of Algiers (jardin d'essaie)
04/07/2012	Algiers	Sophie Guerriche and Silvia di Santo, Programme Officers, EU Delegation
05/07/2012	Algiers	Mr. Rachda, Director General Social Development Agency, Ministry of National Solidarity
06/07/2012	Algiers	
Sat 07/07/2012	Algiers	

ANNEXE 2 : PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONS MET FOR THIS RESEARCH

1. Key Associations interviewed and researched for the case and sector studies

N°	Place	Representative and organisation
1	Algiers	Annette Boucebci, honorary president, Fondation Mahfoud Boucebci (FMB) mental health and cultural sector
2	Medea	Khelil Moussaoui, communications officer, Abdeljelil Slama, member, Association Echifaa, (social sector - health)
3	Ghardaia, Beni Isguen	Saleh Baali, president, and Mohamed Ider, member, Association pour la Protection de l'Environnement de Beni Isguen (environmental heritage sector)
4	Oran	Kouider Metair, president, Association Bel Horizon, (Cultural heritage sector)
5	Chlef	Ahmed Cherifi, president, Association Castellum Tingitanum (heritage sector)
6	Tiaret	Ahmed Daoud, Association pour la Protection du Patrimoine Archéologique de la Wilaya de TIARET (APPAT) (Cultural heritage, training and education)
7	Oran	Houaria Djebbari, president Association Nour, (disability NGO, two education and training centres in Oran)
8	Tizi Ouzou	Boumaza Messaoud, président, Achour Antitene, member, Association des parents d'enfants inadaptés mentaux (disability NGO, education and training centre in Tizi Ouzou)
9	Beni Isguen	Salah Tichirine, president, Aoumeur Bahriz, member, Le Forum des Educateurs de Beni-iguen (education, languages)
10	Annaba	Mohamed Lyes Ba-Said, president, Association HIPNONE SUB (marine heritage, environmental protection, education)
11	Algiers	Hamid Belkacem, president, Association RECIF, (marine heritage, environmental protection, education)

12	Djelfa	Zohra Baameur, President of Association Assala (feminine association, training)
13	Bordj Bou Arreridj	Smail Izerrouken, president, Association El Ghaith (local development, youth, women, training)
14	Tenes	Mme Meslim, president, Archaeological Association of Tenes (heritage)
15	Algiers	Marie Thérèse Brau, Association pour les enfants handicapés
16	Algiers	Smain Himi, president Association Inchirah (Andalous music),
17	Bechar	Mohamed Baglab, vice president, Association pour le développement de la Saoura (environment, local development)
18	Oran	Djamila Hamitou, president, Association Petit lecteur (children, culture)
19	Tiaret	Mohamed Abd, president, Association enfance en détresse, (youth, education)
20	Constantine,	Boufama Badia, president, Association 'Wafa' des parents d'enfants en difficultés mentales, (health, mental disability)
21	Algiers	Attika El Mamri, president, Fédération Algérienne pour les personnes handicapées (health and disability)
22	Algiers	Belkacem Babaci, president, Association for the Casbah Algiers (heritage)
23	Oran	Raja Alloula, president, Fondation Alloula (cultural heritage, in memory of Abdelkader Alloula)
24	Guémar , El Oued	Noureddine Louetri, member, and Dr Ahmed Chékiri'president, Association TEJ pour la Santé (health)
25	Sidi Bel Abbess	Maïssa Bey, president, Association Parole et Ecriture (culture, literacy and youth)

2. Key donor and national organisations interviewed

Donor Organisations, national institutions and persons met			
	Organisation	Date	Comment
1	Delegation of the European Union in Algeria : Klaus Körner, Gérard Braun, Sophie Guerriche, Silvia di Santo, Nadia Boukhebbache, Luz Estupinan Felipe	September 2009, October 2011 and June 2012	
2	Social Development Agency (ADS) : Mr. Rachda, Director General, M. Challal, President of the Evaluation Committee for associative projects M. Bouchefer, Secretary of the Committee	November 2011 and July 2012	
3	Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale (MSN), Mr. K. Bouchenak, Secretary General, Mr. M. Lakhlef, Director for the Associative movement, Youcef Rahmi, Director 'Projet d'Appui aux Associations, ONG2' (UE/MSN) Djamel Brahami	June 2010, July 2012	
4	EU financed Unité d'Appui au Projet, Assia Harbi, Chef d'équipe de l'UAP 'Projet d'Appui aux Associations, ONG2', Teric Boucebci, Ahmed Bouchetata,	June 2010, July 2012	
5	French Embassy, Mokhtar Guerriche	October 2011	
6	British Embassy, Barry Peach, Faycal Ezziane	June 2012	
7	French support programme PCPA: Ferial Assia Selhab	June 2012	Former Regional animator for the zone of Algiers with EU support programme
8	CIDEAL Spanish NGO : Mohamed Hamouda	November 2011	Former Regional animator for the zone of Ouargla with EU support programme
9	Chamber of commerce of Tiaret, ONG2, Ahmed Djebbara	June 2012	Former Regional animator for the zone of Tiaret with EU support programme
10	German Co-operation, (formerly) GTZ : Zoubida Kouti	October 2012	Former Regional animator for the zone of Sidi Bel Abbess with EU support programme

11	National investment support programme in Djelfa : Belkacem Messaoudi	November 2011	Former Regional animator for the zone of Becharwith EU support programme
15	Touiza Solidarity Franco Algerian NGO : Mohamed Khandriche SG and Faycal Hattab	September 2009	FH was Former Regional animator for the zone of Annaba with EU support programme
16	Regional Direction of the Social Development Agency in Tiaret : DG. Yazid Benaissa	October 2011	
17	EU consultants : Dr . Youcef Haj Ali, Dr. Zacaria Ould Amar	June - July 2012	YHA: Study,ADS in relation with the associative movement. ZoA : Evaluation of the EU associations support programme
18	Office des établissements de jeunes, wilaya de Tiaret : Mourad Benameur	October 2011	
19	EU Delegation in Mauritania : Massimo Scalorbi, Audrey Maillot, Programme Officers for Civil Society Support	July - 2010	Independent mission in Mauritania
20	PCPA (French Support programme for Associations) in Morocco, Rabat. Programme Coordonnateur National, Driss Ajjouti	October 2011	(meeting in Algiers, in the PCPA mid term review)
21	EU Delegation in Lebanon : Bruno Montariol, Programme Officer for Civil Society Support	December 2011	Independent mission in Lebanon
22	EU consultant and evaluator, manager of the EU civil society support programmes in Benin and Mali: Pierre Nicolas Meido	January 2013	Meeting in Paris