Parties and Protests in Crisis-Hit Europe:

Continuity and Change in the Structure of Political Conflict

Endre Borbáth

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

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Department of Political and Social Sciences

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I Endre Borbáth certify that I am the author of the work Parties and Protests in Crisis-Hit Europe: Continuity and Change in the Structure of Political Conflict. I have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

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Statement of inclusion of previous work:

I confirm that chapter four was jointly co-authored with Swen Hutter and I contributed 50% of the work.

I confirm that chapter five was jointly co-authored with Theresa Gessler and I contributed 50% of the work.

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September 28, 2018

Abstract

Post-2008 developments in European politics have reopened the debate on the extent to which we are witnessing a fundamental transformation of patterns of party competition and protest mobilization. Two phenomena in particular have drawn attention: the success of new parties and the rise of movement-like mobilization. Despite the attention devoted to them, it is unclear whether these developments have transformed the underlying programmatic structure and patterns of mobilization in European societies. Therefore, the dissertation examines the structure of political conflict in countries from northwestern, southern and eastern Europe, from the perspective of: (1) party system stability and; (2) the interaction between electoral and protest mobilization. The article-based dissertation is composed of four chapters, each with a separate empirical analysis of one aspect of the over-arching theme of the changing structure of political conflict.

The first two empirical chapters examine party system stability by distinguishing between the programmatic and organizational dimensions. The first examines the interaction between the programmatic and the organizational dimensions of party system stability through a comparative analysis of fifteen European democracies across the three regions. The chapter presents four ideal-typical scenarios: stable systems, instability, systems with ephemeral parties and systems with empty party labels. The second empirical chapter offers a case study of party competition in Romania, to show the role played by political issues centred on reforming democracy and fighting corruption in maintaining programmatic instability and helping mainstream parties survive. Both chapters rely on similar methods and are based on 'core sentence analysis' of issue salience and party positions as presented by two national newspapers.

The third and the fourth chapters challenge the conventional approach of examining electoral competition as a self-contained arena of mobilization. Both chapters provide a comparative analysis of political conflict in light of the interaction between the electoral and the protest arena. The third chapter focuses on party sponsored protests and presents the type of parties which most frequently rely on protest mobilization. The chapter relies on an original large-n protest event dataset collected by the POLCON project across 30 European democracies, a subset of which contains events linked to political parties. The chapter shows that the typical protest party is: in opposition; ideologically on the economic left and cultural right; belongs to a radical party family and; has a mass-party organization. Protest parties are shown to be mostly present in new democracies and thrive in the context of a weak civil society.

The fourth empirical chapter examines the interaction between the two arenas from the perspective of protest participation. Based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey and hierarchical logit models, the chapter shows that unlike in countries from northwestern and southern Europe, in eastern European countries right-wing citizens are more likely to protest than their left-wing counterparts. This ideological difference is explained by regime access, both historically and in the present. The chapter finds that partisanship and government ideology contribute to differences in the composition of protest.

Keywords: *party system stability, protest politics, programmatic structure, economic crisis*

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1. Introduction

The last ten years have been among the most eventful in European politics for a long time. Since 2008, Europe has simultaneously endured an economic and a migration crisis. Time and time again, we are told that in these times of crisis, the old rules of politics no longer apply, new parties crowd out the established ones and citizens turn to protest to voice their discontent. The era of long-term stability is said to be over, the future hard to predict, but most likely to favour the rise of populist leaders disloyal to the principles of liberal democracy.

Yet amidst change, we observe enduring stability in many parts of Europe. Take the example of Hungary. Since the 'earthquake election' of 2010 (Enyedi & Benoit 2011), Viktor Orbán and Fidesz have won comfortable victories in every election: local, national and European. The stability in support for Fidesz emerged in the aftermath of an economic crisis, a critical event leading the Socialists to give up power and appoint a technocratic cabinet. One has to turn to southern Europe to find examples of countries fundamentally transformed by the economic crisis, the main driver of instability. Nevertheless, even in southern Europe, change has been limited. In Spain, Partido Popular has been in government since the peak of the Eurocrisis in 2011 and was brought down in parliament because of corruption charges, not because of the policies it implemented in response to the economic crisis. In Greece, New Democracy – a party advocating austerity – has led comfortably in every opinion poll since the beginning of 2016 and it is considered the favourite to win the next election.

An obvious question therefore arises: how systematic and fundamental is the political instability we are witnessing? To evaluate and qualify the 'Europe in crisis' narrative, this dissertation examines variation in the structure of political conflict across the continent in the shadow of the Great Recession. Bridging the party competition and the protest politics literature, the

dissertation studies the two arenas of competition and their interaction through a comparative analysis of political conflict. Protests/social movements and political parties provide the two most important channels of democratic representation. Yet, despite the role these two strands of literature play in our understanding of social transformations, they have developed independently, and research on the structure of political conflict seldom takes both into account.

The Structure of Political Conflict

Before I specify the research questions, it is important to define the components of the 'structure of political conflict'. As opposed to 'party system dimensions', 'programmatic linkages', or 'claims of protest movements' the idea of an overall structure of 'political conflict' assumes that the sources of contention in a given society lie with fundamental divisions and are mobilized in the electoral and the protest arenas. These arenas thus provide different lenses through which the programmatic structure of contention can be examined. While the programmatic structure might be selectively mobilized and shaped by the actors involved, their influence is limited by the societal divisions responsible for the emergence of any particular line of conflict.

To examine the elements of political conflict and how they interact, I rely on the distinctions between the three components of cleavages introduced by Bartolini and Mair (1990, p. 215). They distinguish between (1) the sociological element as "the empirical referent of the concept and which we can define in socio-structural terms"; (2) the collective identity element as "the set of values and beliefs that provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element and reflects the self-awareness of the social group(s) involved" and; (3) the organizational manifestation as "the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, that develop, as part of the cleavage". While Bartolini and Mair define all three elements as a necessary condition of cleavages, Deegan-Krause (2013) distinguishes

'census-', 'issue-' and 'position-divides' from 'full cleavages' depending on whether the three elements align with or cut across each other.

The dissertation focuses primarily on the distinction between the elements of collective identity and organizational manifestation. The first layer refers to the programmatic component and the scope of conflict, often defined in ideological terms. Left–right, conservative, socialist, libertarian, communist, ethno-nationalist etc. are some of the politically relevant ideological labels. The ideological perspective assumes that political opposition revolves around economic and cultural issues, representing the conflicting interests and convictions of large groups of citizens. This dissertation, particularly chapter 3 (a case study of the Romanian party system), challenges this assumption of opposition reduced to economic and cultural conflicts. The chapter shows the role issues such as 'fighting corruption' and 'reforming democracy' play in defining collective identities and mobilizing the electoral base of one party or the other. In this regard, by introducing the concept of 'programmatic structure' the chapter expands the range of issues around which the citizenry is mobilized to include also those that concern the functioning of the political system, next to those revolving around resource allocation and cultural beliefs.

The second layer – the organizational component of cleavages – refers to the actors that mobilize the programmatic structure, the vehicle of mobilization. The organizational component is most often narrowly understood to mean parties in the electoral arena and social movements in the protest arena. However, the boundaries of the two arenas are often fuzzy, with social movements turning into parties and parties organizing protests. This dissertation takes up the idea of fuzzy cross-arena boundaries and examines when the most important actors in the electoral arena – i.e., political parties – mobilize in the protest arena. By showing that some parties are more likely to do so than others, the dissertation points to a less essentialist understanding of the organizational element of 'cleavages'.

Variation in the Structure of Political Conflict

There are two components in the variation of the programmatic structure and its interaction with the mobilizing actors: cross-sectional and longitudinal. In terms of cross-sectional differences, the dissertation proposes to group European countries into three regions – northwestern, southern and eastern. Hutter and Kriesi (2018), Kriesi et al. (2018) have shown that the underlying historical and socio-economic similarities including in the cleavage structure of component societies result in different 'worlds of contention' across the three regions. Similar regional differences have also been found by other scholars (e.g., Wineroither & Seeber 2018). Notwithstanding within-region, country-level differences, the distinction between the three regions forms a heuristic device to map cross-sectional differences in the structure of political conflict. In this regard, the three regions stand for fundamental differences in the evolution of historical oppositions (chapter 5), the timing of democratization (chapter 4), state capacity (chapter 3), organizational and programmatic turnover (chapter 2). In terms of longitudinal differences, the dissertation proposes to examine the effects of the post-2008 economic crisis. Both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal components are necessary to understand the direction in which political conflict develops.

Most theories and empirical evidence in the study of parties, party system and protest politics comes from northwestern Europe. Yet, these countries represent a rather unique pattern of development which does not necessarily generalize well to the rest of Europe (Lipset & Rokkan 1966). In the aftermath of the Second World War, societies in northwestern European emerged as a model of democratic development, with highly developed welfare states, political stability and citizen participation. This model status became highly attenuated with the decline of party identification (Dalton 2000), turnout, party membership (Mair 2013), and the rise of new parties. Scholars disagree over the extent to which these developments represent a

pattern of dealignment (i.e., withdrawal of the masses from politics) or realignment of previous patterns of competition, driven by the mobilization of the 'losers of globalization' by the (populist) radical right (Häusermann & Kriesi 2015; Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). Nevertheless, these changes are rooted in the specific historical development of countries in northwestern Europe and do not necessarily apply elsewhere.

Distinguishing the three regions allows theorizing and testing hypotheses regarding contextual limits of theories developed to help understand the dynamic of conflict in developed democracies. In fact, differentiating between eastern and western European countries has been the standard practice in political science since the transition of post-communist countries towards democracy after 1989. These comparisons converge on a view of eastern European politics characterized by low party system institutionalization (Enyedi & Casal Bértoa 2018), high volatility (Powell & Tucker 2013), low turnout (Kostadinova & Power 2007) and rare protests (Rucht 2007). Scholars disagree over the extent to which the instability of eastern European politics reflects predictable patterns of change (Deegan-Krause & Haughton 2018; Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2015), with regard to the stability of underlying structure (Rovny & Polk 2017). Many of the differences of eastern European countries as compared to northwestern Europe have been explained as a legacy of communism (e.g., Rovny 2014), although similar legacies have only recently been linked to individual-level behavioural and attitudinal outcomes (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017).

The creditor-debtor distinction introduced by the bailout packages during the Eurocrisis refocused scholars' attention on southern European countries and led to an inquiry into their differences compared to northwestern Europe (e.g., Hutter et al. 2018; Roberts 2017). If southern European countries have seen the most widespread changes since 2008, the specificity of the structure of political conflict in the region has deeper historical routes. Except for Italy, southern European countries were part of the 'third-wave' of democratization and struggle with the

legacy of right-wing authoritarianism. Moreover, for a long-time they were characterized by mass emigration (Kriesi 2016). These factors set them apart and led to the development of a cleavage structure different than in northwestern Europe.

From a longitudinal perspective, the post-2008 economic crisis is the defining set of events during the period of observation. In extraordinary times, such as the Great Recession and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, governments have limited capacity to influence the state of the national economy and to implement policies congruent with their voters' preferences (Bohle 2014; Mair 2009). Under such circumstances, established networks of representation can be expected to weaken with voters turning to radical (Hobolt & Tilley 2016) or new parties (Hernández & Kriesi 2015) and increasing their activity in the protest arena (Kriesi et al. 2018). Parties might not only invest in policy innovation (Bohle & Greskovits 2015), but may also search for new forms of linkages with society by, for instance, taking politics to the streets and sponsoring protests.

Inspired by the crisis dynamic, this dissertation examines, in a few selected cases, the extent to which these developments affected the programmatic structure, beyond the range of actors mobilizing political contention. The first empirical chapter zooms in on the dynamics of six European party systems from all three regions (Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and the United Kingdom) while the second examines the dynamic of the economic and political crises in Romania. These developments are analysed in a more general conceptual framework to provide a comparative perspective on the potentially transformative effects of the different crises.

Protest and Parties

The literature on parties and party systems developed independently from the literature on protest politics, despite the fact that the electoral and protest arenas form the two main arenas of direct citizen involvement. This dissertation takes up the term 'arena' to discuss conflict in each of these sites of mobilization as well as their interaction. Following Ferree et al.'s (2002, p. 10) definition of arena as a "place where participants engage in speech acts of various sorts", Hutter (2011) defines arena as the "place where one can observe those who are actively engaged". He distinguishes between five components differentiating the protest and the electoral arenas: (1) the modal form of participation; (2) institutionalization; (3) the main organizations involved; (4) sites of mobilization, and; (5) the degree of issue linkage. The distinction between the modal forms of participation defines the arena under scrutiny: do citizens participate in protest events, or in elections?

In the case of the protest arena, the degree of institutionalization is relatively low, social movements are the main organizational vehicle, the streets and mass media the main site of mobilization. In contrast, the electoral arena is relatively highly institutionalized, political parties are the main organizational vehicle, the legislature and mass media are the main site of mobilization. One key difference between the two arenas is the degree of issue linkage. As one of their main roles, political parties simplify trade-offs in the political realm by bundling together issue positions and presenting a consistent program to win elections (Aldrich 2011). In forming these programs, parties distinguish themselves on the major issues and therefore define the 'menu of choices' citizens face (e.g., Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012). In contrast, the claims of protest movements are issue specific, which allows citizens to gain concessions in particular areas and pressure decision-makers to create policies which reflect their preferences.

The extent to which the two arenas of competition are differentiated depends on the learning processes of political entrepreneurs and their followers (Borbáth & Hutter 2018; Kitschelt 2003). Kitschelt (2003) distinguishes between three types of interest mobilization, those undertaken by political parties, interest groups and social movements. According to his argument, the post-war period was characterized by fused patterns of political mobilization, while the various arenas have become increasingly differentiated since the 1970s. He aims to capture the dynamics of shifts in the balance of interest mobilization across arenas in established democracies of northwestern Europe, which do not necessarily apply to 'third-wave democracies' in southern and eastern Europe. As he notes (p. 101), in contrast to the established democracies of northwestern Europe "in most of these [southern and eastern European] countries, political entrepreneurs have been unable to make investments in organizational infrastructures and modes of solving social choice problems that would solidify fused networks of interest intermediation". In his view, southern and eastern European countries did not go through the same development of differentiation between modes of interest mobilization as northwestern Europe. Therefore, in these countries the electoral and the protest arena can be expected to follow a similar dynamic.

Research Questions

The dissertation consists of four empirical studies that build on the concepts introduced in this present chapter. Each of these studies explores the structure of political conflict in the electoral and the protest arenas. The first two focus on the electoral arena. The next chapter distinguishes between the programmatic and the organizational components of party system stability to examine the level and type of instability in fifteen European democracies. The research question in chapter 2 concerns the relationship between the stability of party organizations and the stability of programmatic structure in a cross-national setting. The analysis in-

cludes seven northwestern European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); four from southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal); and four from eastern Europe (Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania). In each of these countries the analysis extends to one pre-crisis (2008) election and all the ones afterward, until the end of 2017.

Chapter 2 sets out to compare party system stability both within and between regions. As the chapter argues, the stability of party organizations and the stability of the programmatic structure form distinct dimensions in all three regions. In some southern European countries (e.g., Portugal) the stability of the organizational structure hides programmatic instability, while in others (e.g., Italy) the instability of the organizational structure hides programmatic stability. In this regard, party system instability is not a phenomenon specific to eastern Europe, and as the chapter argues, the distinction between the programmatic and the organizational elements helps us understand patterns of change in the other two regions as well.

The third chapter zooms in on one case – Romania – to show in detail the events, issues and institutions that facilitate party system change. This builds on discussion in the second chapter, which identifies the Romanian case as the party system where both programmatic and organizational instability reach relatively high levels. The third chapter shows that, in fact, the main parties survive relatively long due to their ability to shift their programmatic positions over time. The advantage of a single case study allows us to differentiate among the issues that contribute to programmatic instability, as well as to discuss in detail the role of the post-2008 economic and political crisis. The chapter focuses on Romanian politics in light of four parliamentary elections between 2004 and 2016. The chapter argues that the institutional environment, linkages and the issue repertoire of Romanian politics were central in assisting the party system to survive the twin challenges of economic and politics crisis.

The second part of the dissertation (chapters 4 and 5) examines the interaction between the electoral and protest arenas with a focus on the protest arena. The fourth chapter focuses on the question of what the typical protest-sponsoring party in Europe looks like. Under what conditions are political parties most likely to sponsor protest events? With these questions in mind, the chapter examines protest involvement by the main agent of electoral mobilization. It relates to the previous two chapters through its conceptualization of protest sponsorship. Sponsorship is broadly defined and means that parties (co-)organize, take part in and/or call for the participation in a protest event (Ruch 1998, p. 41). By taking politics to the 'streets', parties leave their home arena of electoral politics to directly engage and mobilize their supporters. Therefore, as the dissertation argues, protest sponsorship is a strategic investment by parties to reach out and form stronger linkages with the electorate. Parties decide to sponsor protest as a survival tactic. Similar dynamics are more likely under conditions of organizational instability in the party system and – as the chapter shows – the losing party in an election is the most likely candidate to pursue a protest sponsorship strategy.

The fifth and final empirical chapter focuses on the spread of protest in the three regions among citizens with different ideological beliefs. The chapter examines the extent to which protest is normalized as a form of political participation for citizens. This chapter directly links to the previous one by showing that mobilization by parties is one of the factors that explain the different ideological composition of protest in the three regions. In contrast to northwestern and southern Europe – where protest politics is dominated by left-wing mobilization – in eastern Europe extreme right individuals are more likely to protest. The chapter argues that, next to partisanship, the legacy of the former regimes and the role of government ideology explain regional differences.

Data and Methods

The four empirical studies of the dissertation rely on four different datasets. Chapter 2 on party system stability employs two datasets. The first dataset includes electoral results to calculate extra-system volatility scores for all elections in the sample and codes the novelty of parties in light of mergers, splits and joint lists. The second dataset is based on core sentence coding of parties' positions and salience from two national newspapers across the electoral campaigns from the fifteen countries (Hutter & Kriesi 2018), collected by the 'Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)' ERC project. The procedure is similar to the one described by Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) with an updated codebook to incorporate issues in southern and eastern European party competition as well as conflicts which arose during the economic crisis. The second chapter provides an extensive review of this dataset in comparison to alternative datasets from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2017) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey or CHES (Bakker et al. 2015). The third chapter utilizes the Romanian subset of the same dataset. Both chapters rely on multidimensional scaling and other descriptive analysis.

The empirical analysis in chapter four is based on a dataset that captures the number of protest a party sponsored during the term of each government in 26 countries between 2000 and 2015. The dataset is based on the protest event dataset collected by the POLCON ERC project (Kriesi et al. 2018). Party details and other context-specific variables were added to create a dataset of party sponsored protests where the units of analysis are the individual parties. The dataset is analysed using multilevel modelling techniques.

Finally, chapter five is based on the cumulative dataset of the European Social Survey (ESS). The cumulative dataset has been appended with the recently released wave (2016) and therefore captures citizens' attitudes and protest behaviour between 2002 and 2016. The chapter

focuses on the relationship between ideological self-placement and protest in the three European regions. The dataset is analysed using multilevel modelling techniques. Table 1.1 summarizes the datasets, methods, the period, and the country coverage that the analysis in each of the four empirical chapter relies on.

Table 1.1: Overview of the empirical coverage of the dissertation

Chapter	Datasets	Countries	Period	Methods
2 - Two Faces of Party System Stability	1. Organizational stability of party systems 2. POLCON core sentences	AU, CH, DE, ES, GR, HU, FR, IE, IT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, UK	2004-2017 (country specific)	1. descriptive analysis 2. multidimensional scaling
3 - Romania	1. POLCON core sentences (Romanian subset)	RO	2004-2016	1. descriptive analysis 2. multidimensional scaling
4 - Protesting Parties	1. POLCON protest event dataset 2. ParlGov dataset 3. Other, country year level datasets	AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK	2000-2015	1. descriptive analysis 2. multilevel models
5 - Left and Right Protest	1. ESS 2. Other, country year level datasets	AT, BE, BG, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK	2002-2016	1. descriptive analysis 2. multilevel models

Additional Remark

This dissertation has been prepared as a collection of three articles and one book chapter. Therefore, the four empirical chapters can each be read as a standalone piece of analysis. Nevertheless, each captures different facets of the evolution of the structure of political conflict in the three European regions over time. Taken together, they examine the dynamic of conflict over time in the electoral and protest arenas during the last decade of European politics.

Chapter 2. Two Faces of Party System Stability

Introduction

Party system stability is most often considered a one-dimensional phenomenon with the stability of programmatic positions following the stability of party organizations. However, comparative research shows this is not always the case. Latvia is commonly cited as a party system that is extreme in terms of volatility, effective number of parties, and party age (e.g. Enyedi & Casal Bértoa 2018). As Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015, p. 68) summarize, in Latvia "new parties of previous elections lose to even newer entrants, resulting in an essentially new party system every four to eight years". Yet, the newer and newer formations mobilize a relatively stable cleavage structure. On the other end of the spectrum, Ireland is characterized by "more or less the same parties competing and with more or less the same degree of success, through election after election, through decade after decade, and through generation after generation" (Mair 1997a, p. 15). Yet, as Mair argues, Ireland is characterized by the lack of a strong cleavage structure and a relatively open electoral market. In the first case, the lack of programmatic change in the face of organizational turnover, in the second case, the lack of organizational change, despite social transformations show the importance of distinguishing these two dimensions of party system stability.

Despite a recent increase in scholarly interest in party system instability, studies that examine the interaction of organizational turnover and programmatic change are lacking. Most studies focus on one of these dimensions (Ibenskas & Bolleyer 2018; Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012; Sikk 2005; 2012), provide measures of programmatic (Rovny & Polk 2017) or organizational change (Marinova 2015; Powell & Tucker 2013), study party system institutionaliza-

tion with an exclusive focus on government formation (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014; Grotz & Weber 2016) or study these dimensions at the level of the individual parties (Ibenskas & Sikk 2017; Litton 2015). This chapter argues for systematically incorporating both the organizational and the programmatic dimensions into theoretical and empirical models of party system stability. The two follow a different dynamic and even in party systems where party organizations frequently collapse, programmatic choices might stay constant.

The literature on programmatic positions at the party or party system level traditionally studies change as a reaction to structural transformations of society (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012), public opinion (Adams et al. 2004) or the entry of new parties (Sikk 2012). From this perspective, the evolution of issue positions is normatively desirable, provides 'responsiveness', and is seldom considered to be a dimension of instability. Perhaps not surprisingly, this literature primarily examines established democracies, where low levels of organizational instability make concerns about the overall stability of party systems less pressing. A slightly different view dominates the literature on new democracies. Given the high levels of electoral volatility in new democracies, scholars share more concern regarding programmatic shifts and parties' ability to provide stable choices (Mair 1997a; Rovny & Polk 2017; Whitefield & Rohrschneider 2009). In a recent contribution, Marinova (2016) examines 25 democracies from both regions and finds a negative effect of organizational turnover on voters' ability to navigate the complexity of parties' programmatic offer. In contrast, authors like Piñeiro Rodríguez & Rosenblatt (2018) who focus on the supply side, consider instability a property of the system which indicate its ability to incorporate new social demands. In this regard, instability is normatively desirable, since it allows the party system to adapt to changing societal conditions.

While some level of stability is desirable, 'responsiveness' remains an important norm to follow. In this regard, the debate is not yet settled. To set a normative threshold of the optimal level of stability, Rohrschneider & Whitefield (2012) suggest examining the ability of the sys-

tem to provide the preconditions of electoral accountability. However, they exclusively focus on the programmatic dimension, while – as the chapter argues, – it is the combination of organizational and programmatic instability that provides the most worrisome conditions of electoral accountability. Asking how the stability of party organizations and the stability of programmatic positions relate in a cross-national setting, the chapter discusses the conceptual distinction between the two dimensions of party system instability. I present four ideal-typical types to illustrate their interaction: (1) *stable systems* with a recurring programmatic offer represented by the same parties; (2) *systems with empty labels* where the programmatic positions of parties are in a constant state of flux, even though the parties endure organizationally; (3) *systems with ephemeral parties* where programmatic positions are stable even though parties turnover quickly, and; (4) *instability* where neither programmatic positions, nor party organizations, remain stable over time.

Beyond the conceptual distinction, the chapter introduces a methodological innovation. I introduce a new measure of programmatic stability which takes into account change on four factors: (1) the salience of issues in the overall campaign; (2) the ability of parties' to influence the overall campaign; (3) the salience of issues for individual parties; and (4) the issue positions of individual parties. While these elements are partly present in datasets of party manifestos or expert surveys, only media data is able to provide estimates of all four of them. Aggregating them allows examining programmatic stability at the party system level, as opposed to the party level (Mair 1989). In addition, the focus on the consistency of parties' issue positions in their electoral campaign – a heightened period of conflict – allows observing parties as seen by voters through the lens of the media.

The chapter starts by detailing a conceptual model of the two faces of stability: party organizations and programmatic positions. It reviews the literature on party system stability in Europe to provide an integrated framework of analysis across northwestern, southern and eastern

Europe. The empirical analysis maps party systems stability in a comparative framework and provides an in-depth discussion of the party systems of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and the United Kingdom. The concluding section argues for the importance of not equating the stability of party organizations with the stability of parties' programmatic positions.

Theoretical Considerations

Organizational and Programmatic Stability

Ever since Lipset and Rokkan's (1966) famous 'freezing hypothesis', stability has been recognized as an important attribute of any party system. Whether discussed in the context of institutionalization (Piñeiro Rodríguez & Rosenblatt 2018), electoral volatility (Powell & Tucker 2013), the transformative role of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012), or the consolidation of democracy (Mair 1997a), scholars tend to agree on the importance of party system stability as a defining characteristic of parties' interaction with each other and with their voters. An optimal level of stability that does not hinder the ability of party systems to adjust to changing circumstances (Piñeiro Rodríguez & Rosenblatt 2018) is considered important for representing diverse groups, and for ensuring cooperation among different actors.

However, the way stability is conceptualized does not always follow this normative intuition. There are several indicators used, such as the Pedersen index of electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979), the effective number of parties, or aggregated party age weighted by vote shares. Despite warning by Mair with regards to equating social and political change (1993), especially when interpreting changes in the Pedersen index (1989), the indicator is the most commonly used (most recently: Emanuele et al. 2018). The index conflates changes in voters' preferences between existing parties with the 'mechanic effect' of voters having to face a different party offer (Mainwaring et al. 2010; Powell & Tucker 2013). To calculate its values, parties

need to be traced back across elections, a non-trivial task in unstable systems. Often researchers who are unaware of the trajectory of parties in national systems rely on party labels and face difficult choices in coding coalitions, mergers, splits and alike. Not surprisingly, the index has a wide range of values, depending on the rules of equating parties across elections (Casal Bértoa et al. 2017).

The Pedersen index, the effective number of parties and party age measure organizational change and assume a one-to-one correspondence between organizational continuity and programmatic stability. As the chapter argues, the two are distinct dimensions, and a measure that relies on organizational continuity provides only limited information about the broader concept of party system stability. High organizational continuity without programmatic stability only reflects the extent to which parties survive, independent of what they represent. If one is interested in the extent to which the system allows all views to be represented in decision-making forums, the stability of party organizations as an indicator fails to deliver.

Lewis (2006, p. 580) argues that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the temporal dimension of party system development, specifically in the eastern European context. To my knowledge there are only two comparative studies that analyse programmatic stability at the party system level in western or in eastern Europe. Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009) distinguishes between menu-, source-, programmatic- and dynamic consistency. The first two of the four apply at the party system level, and measure the extent to which parties emphasize/position themselves on relevant cleavages over time and the extent to which the same parties offer similar positions/emphasize similar issues over time. Rovny and Polk (2017) conceptualize the programmatic structure of party competition as separate from the organizational component. They provide measures for dimensional cohesiveness, expert uncertainty in party placement, the relationship between the economic and the cultural dimension as well as the impact of the economic over the cultural dimension in voting behaviour. Both studies aim

to contribute to the debate on party system instability in eastern Europe, and they both find remarkable programmatic stability in that region. However, they both face two important limitations.

First, the empirical analysis of both studies is based on expert surveys of party positions and, in the case of Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009), party-level issue salience. Expert surveys have several advantages. For instance, they provide direct measures for relatively abstract concepts like party positions on underlying issue dimensions. However, they also have several limitations, including in their ability to capture changes over time. In their review of measurements of party positions, Bakker and Hobolt (2013) show that when experts are asked to evaluate party positions, they tend to take a long-term perspective and underestimate the impact of more recent developments. The problem is especially acute in the case of the studies by Rohrschneider & Whitefield (2012; 2009) who rely on two relatively closely timed expert surveys (2003-2004 and 2007) which limits their ability to capture over time change. In addition to underestimating change, the most widely used expert survey on party positions – the CHES (Bakker et al. 2015) – comes with the additional issue of not being linked to national elections. As a consequences of its uniform timing, the extent to which the survey is able to estimate change in parties' programmatic appeal during the campaign – a crucial period for forming and informing voters' choices – is country specific and close to random.

Second, neither of the two studies conceptually delineate nor empirically measure organizational turnover as a separate dimension. Rovny and Polk (2017) discuss programmatic instability as a separate component of party system instability, but do not specify their understanding of organizational turnover. Whitefield & Rohrschneider (2009) test the robustness of their findings against parties 'falling out' or entering their sample, but despite the magnitude of the phenomenon (22 and respectively 28 percent) they do not conceptualize organizational turnover as a separate dimension.

Given the limited geographical scope of both studies, it is an open question as to what extent the findings apply outside of eastern Europe. Most evidence of stability in northwestern and southern European countries is based on low electoral volatility. Although, recent values of volatility came close to the eastern European benchmark (Emanuele et al. 2018), without a measure of programmatic instability they provide an incomplete assessment of change. Therefore, the overall level of instability in both the northwestern and the southern European regions is unknown. Unlike countries in eastern Europe, which are becoming more stable over time, countries in these two regions move from stability to instability (Enyedi & Casal Bértoa 2018).

Beyond these two contributions, the stability of the programmatic structure has yet to be accepted and incorporated into a more general, cross-national model of party system stability. The distinction is even more important when organization and programmatic stability point in different directions and for instance, parties change while the programmatic structure stays the same. In such a situation, the party system shows signs of stability scholars should not overlook. Programmatic stability is a conceptually distinct dimension and complements our understanding of party system stability. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the four different forms of stability that the two dimensions define.

Table 2.1: Conceptual distinctions between organizational and programmatic stability

		Organizational stability	
		High stability	*Low stability*
Programmatic stability	*High stability*	Stable systems	Ephemeral parties
	Low stability	Empty labels	Instability

Although one should think of both dimensions as continuums, the two-by-two table introduces four ideal-typical categories defined by the relationship between the stability of party organizations and of programmatic positions. Between the most stable systems where the same parties survive with reasonably consistent programmatic positions and general instability when neither parties nor the programmatic structure survive, two new categories appear. In systems where party organizations are highly stable, but their associated programmatic positions are highly volatile, party labels become empty signifiers. From a normative perspective, the lack of clear alternatives incentivizes voters to make their choices on non-programmatic grounds and hurts the chain of electoral accountability. In the opposite situation – ephemeral parties with relatively stable ideological structures – voters' demands find representation, though the representatives change which creates difficulties in forming lasting attachments. Systems which score low on both dimensions provide the most concern, but empirically might not appear. Instability does not provide the preconditions of the type of interactions which party systems – as conceptualized by the literature (Sartori 1976) – necessitate. Defined as the lack of programmatic and organizational stability, instability implies a radical rupture between any two elections. In this regard, it is not a state of equilibrium and its temporary emergence might signal party system collapse rather than a more permanent characteristic of a functioning system.

As the typology suggests, it is unlikely that the two forms of stability consistently co-vary and align on a single dimension. Therefore, I expect the stability of party organizations and the stability of programmatic positions to constitute two different dimensions of party system stability.

European Party Systems

The comparative literature on party system stability in European countries is strongly influenced by the geographical focus of the analysis. Two strands can be distinguished, one focusing on Western – understood as northwestern and southern – Europe and the other on eastern European countries. The first and older strand of the literature is primarily concerned with patterns of dealignment and realignment, especially of social democratic parties. The second and newer strand studies the structure of conflict and the patterns of instability in post-communist countries. Since the Great Recession, southern European countries have more often been considered as a separate object of inquiry, given the transformative role of the crisis in that region. Most analyses stay at the level of the regions – dynamics at the country and election level are rarely compared (for an exception, see: Hutter & Kriesi 2018).

Countries in the northwest of Europe are the oldest and the most consolidated democracies of the European Union. Since the aforementioned 'freezing hypothesis' of Lipset and Rokkan (1966), the relative stability of the northwestern European party systems has been well-documented and only questioned by trends of realignment and dealignment. The two perspectives disagree on the wider trends of voting behaviour and party system development. Scholars of the realignment tradition argue that northwestern European party systems are going through a structured and therefore predictable transition, driven by the mobilization of the losers of globalization by radical right parties (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). As part of this transformation, traditional mainstream parties are increasingly challenged by parties that belong to the populist radical right. In contrast, according to scholars of the dealignment tradition, the change is unstructured and is characterized by a universal withdrawal of masses of voters from politics, parties decreasing ability to represent voters (Mair 2011), and a convergence of programmatic positions (Abedi 2002).

Even though southern European countries democratized later than their northwestern counterparts (with the partial exception of Italy), the development of their party systems was long considered to follow the northwestern European path. While it is important not to overstate their pre-crisis stability, the pattern of competition in these party systems was to a large degree predictable, differing from northwestern Europe in degree but not in kind. However, the magnitude of recent changes has led scholars to consider these party systems a separate object of inquiry and to map their specificities (e.g., Hutter et al. 2018; Roberts 2017). The once stable southern European party systems were the least able to survive the shock of the crisis, and it is here (e.g., in Spain) that some of the most successful new parties arose in its wake.

In contrast to the literature on Western European countries, which can be characterized as the study of *change amidst stability*, the literature on eastern European countries has long been concerned with searching for *stability amidst change*. Not surprisingly, most of the literature on party system instability, especially prior to the Great Recession, discussed the development of party competition in post-communist countries. These systems are characterized by much higher electoral volatility than established democracies (Powell & Tucker 2013). Nevertheless, from the perspective of party system stability, the debate is not yet settled. While the region is often considered a place where parties compete without being institutionalized (Rose & Munro 2009), and new parties enter without representing a programmatically different alternative (Sikk 2012), some studies revealed systematic patterns. Beyond the aforementioned studies on programmatic stability, Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015) show that new parties appeal to a specific segment of the electorate with an appetite for newness across elections. Their analysis shows that these parties form a party subsystem, which in turn contributes to organizational instability. In contrast to Sikk (2012), Tavits (2008) argues that new party entry is predictable based on existing ideological positions, since these parties represent programmatically different alternatives than established formations.

The previous literature expects that the two dimensions – the stability of party organizations and the stability of programmatic positions – are most clearly distinct in the eastern European context of high organizational turnover. Nevertheless, as analyses of eastern European party systems reveal (most clearly: Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2015), stability is a country-level phenomenon, with considerable within-regional variance. Given the long-term transformation of northwestern European countries and the recent rise of party system instability in southern Europe, I expect that the stability of the programmatic structure and the stability of the organizational structure constitute two separate dimensions in all three European regions, with considerable differences between countries.

Data

Programmatic Stability

As a systemic property, party system stability goes beyond the stability of individual parties and concerns their interactions (Mair 1989; Sartori 1976). Therefore, any estimate of programmatic and organizational stability should not simply sum the properties of individual parties. Assessing programmatic stability implies going beyond the sum of changes in issue salience and positions of individual parties, even if these form core elements of the concept.

For this reason, a valid measure of programmatic stability needs to rely on datasets which capture the overall dynamic of party competition beyond the position of individual parties. Parties compete by shifting (1) the salience of issues or (2) their position relative to what they previously represented. When aggregated at the party system level, there are two additional elements to consider: (3) the ability of the party to influence the overall campaign and; (4) the overall salience of the issue. Not all parties are equally important and not all issues are dis-

cussed to a similar extent. An internally valid measure of programmatic instability must consider all four components.

Parties' programmatic offer is most often measured based on expert surveys, party manifestos or media data. The three most commonly used datasets are the previously introduced CHES (Bakker et al. 2015), the Comparative Manifesto Project or CMP (Volkens et al. 2017), and Kriesi et al.'s (2008; 2012) core sentences dataset. These datasets are partly complementary but also make different choices on trade-offs which "cannot be simultaneously optimized" (Bakker & Hobolt 2013, p. 30). Rather than providing a gold standard, they fit differently depending on the research agenda; in this case, in their ability to capture programmatic stability.

The previous section already introduced the advantages and disadvantages of the CHES. The main strength of this expert survey lies in its measures of parties' issue positions. Unfortunately, it does not cover issue salience at the party level[1] or the systemic salience of issues. The importance of parties is measured by parties' vote share.

One advantage of the CMP dataset is that it contains information that reflects the preferences of parties in their 'own words'. It covers a long time-series and is linked to national elections. Unfortunately, CMP does not allow us to distinguish between programmatic and organizational stability, due to parties in pre-electoral coalitions not issuing separate manifestos. Since many parties enter similar coalition agreements, over time change in their programmatic offer is conflated with change in their organizational basis.

CMP codes party-level salience and it does not directly code party positions. Party position estimates are indirectly available by aggregating the salience of mutually exclusive issues. However, as a voluminous literature shows (e.g., Gemenis 2013), the procedure is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. Additional difficulties arise with extending coverage to

[1] In the 2014 wave, party-level salience was included but the indicator is not available over time

the post-communist region. CMP has an adjusted issue scheme to accommodate this region. Nevertheless, position estimates become more problematic since parties combine their issue positions differently than in Western European democracies. Like CHES, CMP does not cover the systemic salience of issues. The importance of parties is measured by their vote share.

The media dataset by Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) relies on *core sentence coding*, a relational type of content analysis (Hutter & Gessler 2018) where each grammatical sentence is reduced to its 'core sentence', which contains a subject's relation to an object. The direction of this relation is coded from -1 to 1, where -1 is full opposition while +1 is full support (see appendix A.2 on data collection and the coding procedure).

This has the advantage of offering a direct measure of all four components of party system stability. Party level salience is measured by the number of core sentences of a party on an issue, as a share of the overall number of core sentences on that issue. Direction is measured with the average position of each political party on an issue. Systemic issue salience is measured by the number of core sentences on each issue as a share of the total number of core sentences per campaign. The ability of parties to shape the overall campaign is measured by the number of core sentences by each party as a share of the total number of core sentences per campaign.

The core sentences data covers the campaign dynamic of parliamentary elections,[2] critical moments of heightened conflicts when voters face the supply of choices offered by political parties. The data is generated from two daily national newspapers in each country[3] (see appendix A.3). As media data, it does not capture the unmediated preference of political parties

[2] Except for France, where the data maps the campaign of parties before the first round of presidential elections.
[3] In northwestern Europe one quality and one tabloid newspaper has been selected. Given the more polarized media systems in southern and eastern Europe, in these two regions a left and a right leaning newspaper has been selected. In the case of Latvia, the data includes core sentences from a third, Russian language newspaper.

but their media representation and the way they were accessible to the public. Merz (2017a) shows that voters primarily react to parties' position as captured by the Kriesi et al. dataset.

The coverage of the original Kriesi et al. dataset has been extended by the ERC project, 'Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)', with the aim of situating the changes brought by the Great Recession in the long-term evolution of northwestern European party systems (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012) and to extend the analysis to southern and eastern Europe (Hutter & Kriesi 2018). The extended dataset added Ireland to the original six northwestern European countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); four from southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) and four from eastern Europe (Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania). In each of these countries there was one pre-2008 election coded and the ones after, until the end of 2017.[4]

One concern for external validity is the extent to which estimates from media data converge with estimates of expert surveys or party manifestos. Helbling and Tresch (2011) compare the data of Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) with CHES and CMP on the European issue and conclude that party positions reflect the same dimension while issue salience at the party level diverges. When all issues are compared, Merz (2017b) shows that the Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) datasets capture both salience and positions as reflected in party manifestos. Hutter and Gessler (2018) compare the updated dataset with CMP. They find high a correlation between parties' issue positions, as well as salience of broader issues. However, the correlation is lower when party-level issue salience is compared on more detailed issues. While parties need to address many issues in their manifesto, only a few are discussed during the campaign. Hutter and Gessler interpret their results as a sign of the ability of the media to influence the salience of individual issues, although the broader issue agenda and parties' issue positions are outside of their

[4] In four cases that held general elections in 2008 (Austria, Italy, Spain, and Romania), the data includes the pre-2008 elections. The first data point is Spain (2004) and the last one is Austria (2017). Spain (2016) is missing.

control. Given these results, it is even more important to consider the systemic salience of issues in each campaign. Table 2.2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using CHES, CMP and the core sentences datasets to measure programmatic stability.

Table 2.2: Evaluating different sources for measuring programmatic stability

Dataset	Advantages	Disadvantages
CHES	1. Face validity 2. Direct measure of dimensionality 3. covers individual parties, instead of coalitions	1. Coverage: party level issue position 2. Limited ability to capture change over time (Bakker & Hobolt 2013) 3. Not linked to elections
Party manifestos	1. Captures parties 'true', unmediated preferences 2. Long time-series 3. Linked to national elections	1. Coverage: party level issue salience 2. Coalitions are often coded as a single actor with no separate estimates for the member parties
Core sentences	1. Coverage of both systemic and party level salience of issues, salience of parties, party level position 2. Reflects the 'public face' of parties, as seen by voters 3. Ability to capture short-term changes	1. Limited time-series 2. Limited number of countries 3. Work intensive/ expensive coding process

Since the core sentences dataset covers all four components and it captures the ‘public face’ of parties, the empirical analysis relies on this data source. To only consider comparable cases, the analysis includes one election from before the Great Recession and all afterwards, a total of 56 campaigns, three to six per country (see appendix A.1). While this period is often discussed as time of heightened conflict, recent contribution show a limited amount of transformation, often reduced to the punishment of incumbent parties (Beissinger & Sasse 2014; Hutter & Kriesi forthcoming). Therefore, as the empirical analysis demonstrates, the way organizational and programmatic instability interact follows longer time trends in most party systems under consideration.

Organizational Stability

To measure organizational stability, I rely on a second dataset which codes each competing formation in the 56 elections under consideration based on the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow 2012) This includes all parties which gained more than 1% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election in the sample. For each of these parties and coalitions I coded the following variables: (1) genuine newness; (2) splinter party; (3) merger or (4) joint list with a new name; (5) merger or (6) joint list without a name change and whether the party; (7) did not run or (8) has been disbanded. The list of relevant organizational changes have been compiled based on the measures produced by Marinova (2015) and Ibenskas & Sikk (2017)

One concern relates to the definition of 'newness', with a relatively large literature on how to identify disruptive changes. Sikk (2005) aims to identify the dichotomous distinction and defines the concept of 'genuinely new parties'. He formulates three criteria for parties to be considered genuinely new: (1) they are not successor to any previous parliamentary party; (2) have a novel name and structure and; (3) do not have an important figure from the past democratic politics among their major members. The concept of 'genuinely new' provides considerable conceptual clarity, but remains restrictive with regards to come of the changes witnessed in European politics. For instance, the Slovakian SMER (Direction – Social Democracy) would not be considered genuinely new, given the role of the leader, Robert Fico in the Party of the Democratic Left. Alternative measures, for instance the one Litton (2015) suggests abandon the dichotomous distinction and introduce two continuous dimensions: novelty in party attributes and structural affiliation. These measures have the advantage of incorporating a wealth of information, but the weights to aggregate the different components remain arbitrary. Moreover, the interpretation is less intuitive than the dichotomous distinction. Given its conceptual clarity, I rely on the three criteria identified by Sikk (2005) and code parties as genuinely new if in addition to a new name and lack of links to existing parties, the party has

a leader who did not ran at an election before. Since ParlGov carries party identifiers across these changes, I rely on country-specific secondary literature and online resources to code each electoral formation (see the list of new/old in appendices A.5 and A.6).

Measuring Instability

Organizational Instability

To estimate organizational instability, I rely on extra-system volatility, the extra-systemic component of electoral volatility. The index was introduced by Mainwaring et al. (2010) and Powell and Tucker (2013) with the aim to disaggregate electoral volatility into two components. One component, what Mainwaring et al. call 'extra-system volatility' and Powell and Tucker call 'Type A volatility' capture changes in voters' preferences driven by supply-side shifts. The index is a function of the vote share of parties that disappear or newly enter from one general election to the next. [5] The index relies on the Pedersen formula and is calculated as:

$$\text{Organizational Instability: } \frac{|\sum_{o=1}^{n} vote\ share_{ot} + \sum_{g=1}^{n} vote\ share_{g(t+1)}|}{2}$$

where o refers to old parties which only contested the election at time t and g refers to new parties which only contested the election at time $t+1$ (Powell & Tucker 2013, pp. 126–127).

As a measure of supply side changes, weighted by the corresponding vote shares, extra-system volatility captures organizational stability in the party system. The closer the values of the index are to zero, the more established formations are able to survive, and secure voter

[5] The sum of extra-system and within-system volatility – which measures fluctuations of voters' support between established parties – equals the Pedersen index of total volatility.

support. The higher the index value, the more support organizationally new parties have and the more difficult it is for established formations to survive.

Operationalizing the index implies a number of conceptual decisions. Casal Bértoa et al. (2017) identify two important factors: the threshold of inclusion and party continuity over time. The threshold I use corresponds to the 1% guideline. Any party which gained at least 1% during one of the elections is included in the analysis. The question of continuity is less straightforward, since – as Casal Bértoa et al. also note (p. 152) there are good reasons for alternative ways of tracing parties over time, each with internally coherent arguments. Each way proposes a different definition of organizational newness with implications on how to treat party mergers, joint lists, or splits. If these forms of cooperation are accompanied by party labels they appear as alternatives previously not present on the ballot. Nevertheless mergers, joint lists, or splits carry less 'novelty' than the entry of a genuinely new party (Marinova 2016; 2015).

Figure 2.1 presents extra-system volatility scores calculated by treating continuity in two different ways. Either by considering new all mergers, joint lists, or splits with a new name, or by only counting as new the entry of a genuinely new party. Next to the scores of individual elections at the 'election level' the figure presents the averages of all elections at the 'country level'.

Figure 2.1: Extra-system volatility calculated using two different rules of continuity



As the figure shows, at the country level the two differently calculated extra-system volatility scores are strongly related. Nevertheless, there are important differences. In countries above the line, most notably in Italy, Romania, France, parties frequently enter into mergers and coalitions, whereas in other cases, e.g., Austria, similar forms of cooperation are rare.

As the election-level figure shows, there are two outliers: Italy (2008) and Romania (2012). In the Italian case, the two largest formations changed their previous (2006) name. Berlusconi's Forza Italia joined forces with the National Alliance and established The People of Freedom. The centre-left parties, mostly members of the previous Olive Tree coalition, merged into a new formation, the Democratic Party. These two new mergers secured 72% of the vote, increasing extra-system volatility without the entry of a genuinely new party. In the Romanian case, the Social Democratic Party joined forces with the National Liberal Party under a new joint list called the Social Liberal Union. In response to this, the centre-right Democratic Liberal Party formed a new joint list with smaller parties called the Right Romania Alliance. The two joint lists won 75% of the vote, and additionally the genuinely new People's Party – Dan Diaconescu – also entered parliament with 14% of the vote.

Both examples show how little these new forms of cooperation mattered for the electorate which voted for the new mergers in similar numbers as they previously voted for their component formations. The high electoral support these mergers secured is a sign of the survival of the existing parties and not of their decline. Therefore, I rely on extra-system volatility calculated with the entry of genuinely new parties, as it reflects organizational changes which are not controlled by the elites of existing parties and go beyond a temporary cooperation between established formations.

Programmatic Instability

Given the exceptionally high number of issues in the core sentences dataset (see appendix A.4), I take an issue-based approach to measure programmatic instability. I take the previous election as the reference value to estimate change from one election to another. Following Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009), I take both issue salience and position shifts on the party level as necessary conditions of programmatic instability and rely on the multiplicative term which Hutter and Kriesi (2018) identify as an index of politicization. The politicization values are centred on the party system mean, to account for the systemic component of party system change (Sartori 1976) and estimate shifts in relative terms. The average change on individual issues is weighted by the systemic salience of the issue. The election-level measure is additionally weighted by the salience of each party. The programmatic instability within-system index is calculated as:

$$\mathrm{PI}_{within-sys.}: \sum_{j=1}^{n} w_j * \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i |mc(salience_{ijt} * position_{ijt}) - mc(salience_{ijt+1} * position_{ijt+1})|}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}$$

Where w_i stands for systemic issue salience, w_j stands for parties' salience and *mc* stands for mean centring on the weighted mean of politicization by all other parties. The index is applicable if the same parties exist in two consecutive elections, and therefore calculates a form of

programmatic within-system volatility. Following on the previous discussion, in the case of joints, mergers, and splits I rely on salience and position as represented by the predecessor organization.

In two cases, continuity cannot be established: when a party disappears and when a genuinely new party enters. In these two cases, a form of programmatic extra-system volatility needs to be calculated, analogous to the measure of organizational stability. Therefore, I compare the issue salience and position in the campaign of the disappearing/genuinely new party with what the party system represented on that specific issue. The comparison is relative to the previous or subsequent time point, depending on whether the party is newly formed or disappearing. This way, the first part of the formula captures the extent to which new parties broaden the programmatic offer previously available in the party system. The second part of the formula captures the extent to which the disappearance of an established party leads to a more limited programmatic offer in the party system. The corresponding formula builds on the formula of within-system programmatic instability:

$$\mathrm{PI}_{\mathrm{extra-sys.}}: \sum_{g=1}^{n} w_g * \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \left| salience_{igt+1} * position_{igt+1} - \overline{salience_{it} * position_{it}} \right|}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i} +$$

$$\sum_{o=1}^{n} w_o * \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \left| \overline{salience_{it+1} * position_{it+1}} - salience_{iot} * position_{iot} \right|}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i}$$

where g stands for genuinely new parties, which only competed during the election at time $t+1$ and o stands for old parties, which only competed during the election at time t. The two terms with the vertical bar represent the issue specific party system mean of politicization in time t or in time $t+1$. The measure estimates the change in politicization caused by the entry or the disappearance of parties.

The total level of programmatic instability is a sum of both components: change by established formations (within-system) and programmatic change driven by the death/ entry of parties (extra-system).

Results

Party System Stability Across Europe

Since the measure of programmatic and organizational instability take the previous election in each country as the baseline, both shows change relative to the party system itself and not in relation to an absolute value. With that caveat in mind, figure 2.2 presents a scatter plot of country averages and election level scores of the two measures. The reference lines show the median values of organizational and programmatic stability drawn to illustrate the four ideal types of party system stability.

Figure 2.2: Programmatic and organizational party system stability



The figure suggests that there is no linear relationship between the two dimensions. To formally test their independence, I rely on Kendall's rank correlation coefficient, since it makes

no distributional assumptions about the measured scales and is less vulnerable to outliers. Kendall's tau ranges between -1 (indicating a negative relationship) and 1 (indicating a positive relationship), with zero indicating no relationship. For the analysis, I rely on the 41 elections for which I was able to calculate both measures.[6] Kendall's tau coefficient for the two forms of instability equals 0.01, which indicates no relationship. Alternative measures of correlation corroborate this finding.

As the figure shows the relationship between the two dimensions reflects the four ideal typical scenarios presented in table 2.1. The results point to the importance of distinguishing the categories of 'empty labels' and 'ephemeral parties', and they show that – as expected – conditions of instability are relatively rarely materialized. Among the fifteen countries under consideration, Romania comes the closest to scoring high on both programmatic and organizational instability. Spain is also relatively high on both dimensions, but this result is almost entirely driven by the 2015 election and the breakthrough of Podemos and Ciudadanos. Italy and Latvia have organizationally unstable party system but score low on programmatic instability. The Irish and the Portuguese systems are examples of high programmatic and low organizational instability. The United Kingdom provides the most stable party system in the sample.

Figure 2.2 speaks to the expectation regarding instability beyond eastern Europe, in all three regions. As the literature documents, the four eastern European countries, in pair with Italy, exhibit the organizationally most unstable party systems in the sample. However, except for Romania, the other three east European countries (Latvia, Hungary, and Poland) are programmatically relatively stable systems. Note that in the case of Poland, the first data point comes from 2007 and therefore the data does not capture the collapse of the post-communist left and the Solidarity blocks. In Hungary, despite the electoral collapse of the Socialist party in 2010, the structure of competition hardly changed: Jobbik and Fidesz represent similar po-

[6] Note, that in each country I 'lose' the first observation to calculate the measure of programmatic stability.

sitions, opposed by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and other, programmatically similar, new parties of the left.

Northwestern European countries have the most organizationally stable party systems, except for France. These countries rarely experience the entry of a genuinely new party or the disappearance of an old one. At the same time, these party systems represent the whole range of programmatic instability with the most stable British and German systems, and the most unstable Irish system. The relatively high programmatic instability in Switzerland and Austria are due to a shift of party positions on some of the most salient economic issues.[7]

Southern Europe stands out for the similarity of the component countries in terms of programmatic stability and their diversity in terms of organizational stability. While Italy is a partial exception, Greece, Spain, and Portugal share a party system with a relatively high level of programmatic instability. Nevertheless, these countries have very different levels of organizational stability. Portugal occupies one end of the spectrum, with an almost complete lack of the entry of genuinely new parties, and Italy the other end, with the highest level of organizational turnover. In Greece, most new parties are linked to those that existed before the crisis, but both the power-balance and the issue repertoire radically changed.

Despite the similarities of countries from the same region in terms of organizational *or* programmatic instability, the two constitute distinct dimensions in each region. The results point to the importance of examining the country-specific patterns. In what follows, I zoom into the dynamic in six countries, representative of the four possible combinations of organizational and programmatic stability previously identified (table 2.1).

[7] During the 2011 campaign, the Swiss FDP proposed an aid package to alleviate the effects of the strong currency which blurred the traditionally economically liberal position of the party. Moreover, CVP often represents conflicting positions on economic issues, with support for family allocations, and retirement benefits, coupled with support for a neo-liberal reform of the healthcare system in 2007 and promising budgetary rigour in 2015. In Austria during the 2008 election with the economy in focus, ÖVP ran a campaign on additional childcare facilities, increase of retirement provisions, better healthcare for the elderly and increase in family allocations. All these resulted in a stronger ÖVP support for pro-welfare positions than before or after.

Forms of Instability

To illustrate programmatic and organizational instability, I rely on weighted multi-dimensional scaling (Hutter et al. 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). Similar to factor analysis, the non-parametric method reduces the number of dimensions to a minimum, calculates the proximity of the objects (parties and issues) based on their similarities, and results in a graphical representation (see appendix A.7 on the method).

A Stable System: the United Kingdom

Figure 2.3 presents the results of the MDS analysis based on four UK general elections (2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017). To estimate the movement of parties, the issue repertoire of the party system is fixed across elections and marked with crosses. Left–right on the economic axis (welfare; economic liberalism) constitutes the horizontal dimension, cultural gal-tan constitutes the vertical dimension. The divergence from the right angle between the economic and the cultural dimension shows that in the case of UK the two dimensions correlate.

Parties' proximity to an issue is a function of their support for it. To show changes over time, each party appears as many times as the number of elections it contested, provided the sample includes enough observations to estimate its position. The two-digit numbers behind the party names correspond to the year of the election. The shape of the symbol distinguishes between parties. The arrows show movements by three major parties: the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats.

Figure 2.3: MDS analysis of the political space in the United Kingdom (2005-2017)



Next to the economic dimension, the second dimension of UK politics is constituted by the issues of Europe and immigration. Pro-European issue positions tend to align with support for cultural liberalism, whereas anti-immigration tends to align with support for defence and security.

With the two main British parties being among the oldest in Europe, the UK shows a remarkable level of organizational stability. Partially due to the de facto threshold that the 'first past the post' electoral system engenders, new parties achieve poor electoral results in general elections. Nevertheless, in line with the west European pattern of realignment, two new parties have entered since the mid-1980s: the Greens and the radical right-wing UKIP.[8] The im-

[8] Due to their poor media coverage, I am only able to map the position of these two parties for some elections.

pact of the former has been limited in recent times[9], whereas the latter contributed to shift of the Conservative Party towards an EU-sceptic position. In the aftermath of UKIP's victory during the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections, prime minister David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum on EU membership further shifting the Conservative Party towards UKIP. In contrast, the Labour party adopted similar positions to the Greens, the Liberal Democrats, and the SNP. Interestingly, the largest shift by the Labour party occurred during the 2015 election. While in 2017 the party moved further to the economic left, it retained its culturally progressive agenda. Although these movements by the main parties in the UK are not negligible, they do not blur the programmatic differences between the competitors and the choice between Labour and the Conservatives remains stark at every election in the sample.

In addition to realignment, the UK represents the west European pattern of dealignment and increased fragmentation. For the first time since the Second World War, the 2010 elections brought to power a coalition government between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. By the end of the legislative period, the Liberal Democrats had adopted many of the positions of the Conservative party, producing the largest programmatic shift in the UK sample and exemplifying the hard time junior coalition partners have in preserving their programmatic identity. After their 2015 collapse, the Liberal Democrats returned in 2017 to their pro-European and culturally liberal positions.

Instability: Romania

Figure 2.4 shows the MDS analysis of the Romanian party system based on four parliamentary elections (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016). The first, horizontal dimension is the economic left–right dimensions, and it is highly integrated with a second dimension. The content of the second dimension mostly relates to issues of institutional reform and the fight against corrup-

[9] Although, it significantly affected the programmatic positions of mainstream parties in the past (Meguid 2008)

tion. The latter issue dominates party competition, with a third of all observations, and plays a major role in maintaining programmatic instability. In terms of parties, the Romanian pattern is the opposite of the structure observed in the UK. Although the main parties are linked to post-communist elites and some are relatively old, their issue positions show extreme variation over time.

Figure 2.4: MDS analysis of the political space in Romania (2004-2016)



During the period of observation, the centre-left Social Democratic Party (PSD) party was the most electorally successful formation and is often regarded as the anchor of party competition. There were two main parties on the centre-right: the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) (Democratic Party (PD) until 2004), and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The previously largest centre-right party PDL gave up its organization and merged with PNL before the 2016

elections. Furthermore, several small parties existed, some relatively old (e.g., Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania UDMR, Conservative Party PUR/PC, Greater Romania Party PRM), some parties were formally new but linked to politicians which previously were part of other parties (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats ALDE, Civic Force FC, People's Movement Party PMP, United Romania Party PRU, National Union for the Progress of Romania UNPR), and two parties were genuinely new (People's Party – Dan Diaconescu PPDD, Save Romania Union USR). From the latter two, PPDD did not survive after its breakthrough in 2012.

The three main parties, PSD, PDL, and PNL, radically changed their position vis-à-vis one another and the issues at stake. In fact, the centre-left PSD, the centre-right PNL, and PDL competed in a relatively narrow space and repeatedly leapfrogged – that is, changed their relative order on a given axis of competition. Even the 'anchor' PSD substantially changed its programmatic positions from one election to another. This is partly due to the relatively weak positional character of the most salient issues of the second dimension of party competition (see chapter 3).

The survival of many of the Romanian parties shows the limited empirical validity of the category of 'instability', at least in a European sample of electoral democracies. In this regard, – as the next chapter illustrates – Romania comes close to the dynamic in systems with empty party labels.

Empty Labels: Ireland and Portugal

Figure 2.5 shows the MDS analysis of the Irish (a) and the Portuguese (b) party systems based on three (2007, 2011 and 2016) and four (2005, 2009, 2011 and 2015) national elections, respectively. In Ireland, a perpendicular cultural dimension intersects the economic, horizontal dimension. In Portugal, the content of the second dimension is less clear, and it is highly inte-

grated with the economic dimension. As both countries were heavily exposed to the economic crisis, issues related to economic and wider democratic reforms appear salient. Interestingly, in neither of the two cases did parties mobilize on the fight against corruption.

The most important parties in Ireland are the almost permanent government party Fianna Fáil (FF) and the "near-permanent opposition" Fine Gael or FG (See O'Malley & Kerby 2004, p. 54). Their polarity is usually traced back to the Irish civil wars (1916 and 1922-23) and, they are considered programmatically extremely flexible. Their challengers come from the electorally relatively weak mainstream left (Irish Labour Party), the economically radical left (Socialist Party, People Before Profit, and the Anti-Austerity Alliance), cultural left/liberal parties (Greens, Progressive Democrats), and the republican left (mostly Sinn Féin – SF). New parties that entered the Irish party system, like the People Before Profit Alliance, remained electorally marginal. Part of the reason for their lack of success lies in the ability of FG and FF to radically change their programmatic positions. For instance, during the last election, with its shift towards the economic left, FF's programmatic offer was very similar to the previous program of SF as well as to the program of the new challenger Social Democrats. Similarly, FG with a culturally more conservative agenda, provided a programmatic appeal like that of the new right-wing challenger, Renua Ireland, and occupied the same position as its main competitor FF during the previous election in 2011. In response to the two large parties' shifts, SF distinguished itself with a culturally left programmatic appeal, representing a substantial shift of its position relative to its previously culturally centrist, economically left agenda (Hutter & Malet 2018).

Figure 2.5: MDS analysis of the political space in Ireland and Portugal

a) Ireland (2007-2016)



b) Portugal (2005-2015)



Programmatic instability in Portugal plays out somewhat differently than in Ireland. The two largest Portuguese parties, the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the centre-left Socialist Party (PS) frequently shift their programmatic positions, whereas the radical-left pole of party competition, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Left Block (BE) stay remarkably consistent (da Silva & Mendes 2018). Not surprisingly, as Freile (2006, p. 385) notes, the Portuguese party system is among the least polarized when only the positions of PSD and PS are considered and among the most polarized when PCP and BE are included. The largest shifts by PSD and PC occur on the second dimension, the content of which varies between elections.

In 2015, the crisis brought a stronger level of economic polarization, with the marked shift of PS towards welfare and PSD towards economic liberalism. Surprisingly, the election ended with a PS government, supported by the PCP, an unprecedented coalition in Portuguese politics. In this regard, the crisis seems to have brought an end, or at least a halt, to the dynamic of mainstream parties competing on the mantra of "no left or right, only good or bad management" (Jalali 2007, p. 55). During the period of observation, there were no successful genuinely new parties in Portugal. There were two attempts to enter the party system, one by the Green party People–Animals–Nature (PAN) and one by the liberal Democratic Republican Party (PDR). Both achieved less than 2% of the vote.

The development of the Irish and the Portuguese party systems is instructive regarding the interaction between organizational and programmatic stability. In both countries, support for new parties is undercut by the programmatic flexibility of larger formations. In Irish politics "without social basis" (Whyte 1974), large parties show remarkable resilience even in times of economic hardship and new parties remain small and marginal. Similarly, in Portugal the programmatic flexibility of both parties, particularly of the PS, has limited the support for existing radical-left parties and the emergence of new ones. Therefore, Portugal did not see the

rise of a new radical-left party, one of the hallmarks of post-crisis party competition in southern Europe. The increase in the vote share of the PCP and BE was also moderate. The remarkably high-level of organizational stability in Ireland and Portugal shows the difficulties new parties face in a context of programmatic instability due to their inability to programmatically distinguish themselves.

Ephemeral Parties: Latvia and Italy

Figure 2.6 shows the MDS analysis of the Latvian political space (a), based on four parliamentary elections (2006, 2010, 2011 and 2014), and that of Italy (b), based on three parliamentary elections (2006, 2008 and 2013). To show programmatic stability in the face of ephemeral parties, I rely on circles instead of arrows, since they are better fit to illustrate clusters of parties in these party systems.

In both countries, the cultural dimension with anti-immigration and cultural liberalism is perpendicular to the economic dimension. Despite the post-communist context, the dimensions of competition in Latvia are remarkably similar to Western European party systems – with a higher salience of nationalism, security, and defence – formulated in opposition to the party of the Russian-speaking minority. As Hutter et al. (2018) show, in Italy general economic and democratic reform demands are also part of the second dimensions. In both countries, fighting corruption is salient and plays an important role.

Figure 2.6: MDS analysis of the political space in Latvia and Italy

a) Latvia (2006-2014)



b) Italy (2006-2013)



In terms of parties, both countries are among the extreme examples of the instability of party organizations. Latvia has the highest number of parties among the fifteen countries in the sample. Italy has the highest extra-system volatility score, driven by the results of the 2013 elections and the successful entry of two genuinely new parties. Nevertheless, they are both characterized by a high level of programmatic stability, due to the anchor of socio-cultural cleavages (in Latvia) and ideological blocks (in Italy).

The most important divide in Latvian politics is the ethnic cleavage, with Harmony being the main representative of the Russian minority. As the figure shows, most parties take a clear position on this divide, except for the various alliances formed around the religious, conservative Latvia's First Party (LPP/LC). LPP/LC is traditionally seen as the most Russian-friendly Latvian party, with its leader even joining forces with Harmony at the local level. The party is associated with homophobia and the No Pride Movement, one of the few issues equally supported across the ethnic divide (Auers & Kasekamp 2009; Eihmanis 2018).

As figure 2.6 shows, many parties compete in a narrow space defined by renewing/reforming democracy, fighting corruption and defence/nationalism. Within this space, parties' stances toward corruption and the role of oligarchs in politics structure competition and contribute to the limited movement of the main parties. The electorally most popular formation during the period of observation, New Era (part of the Unity merger from 2010 onwards), is a party of anti-corruption politics. As the figure shows, the programmatic appeal of the party stayed relatively stable over time, mostly shifting in its stances on a general reform of democracy. This has also been the issue on which one of the most successful genuinely new parties mobilized and entered politics, Zatler's Reform Party (ZRP). Other more radical parties like the far-right National Alliance (NA) stay stable within this confined space. The largest movements are produced by one of the parties linked to a Latvian oligarch, the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS). This party shifted towards a socially conservative agenda over time.

The rigidity of the structure of competition is more pronounced in the Italian case, due to higher levels of programmatic polarization. In Italy, the centre-right People of Freedom (PdL) and the Union of the Centre (UdC) represent the pole associated with gradual changes and limited reform, primarily in terms of ensuring economic growth. Their position is coupled with a reluctant support for economic liberalism. The centre-left Democratic Party (PD) forms their main opposition with a more technocratic appeal, support for pro-welfare positions and more-encompassing reforms. This agenda overlaps with a wider, although primarily anti-Berlusconi call for the renewal of democracy (Karremans et al. 2018). In 2013, two genuinely new parties, the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Civic Choice (SC) joined PD in opposing PdL and called for a radical renewal of democracy. Both camps are challenged by radical left parties which rather campaign on cultural liberalism and anti-corruption than on an economic agenda.

One important shift worth highlighting concerns the transformation of the Northern League (LN). As part of the government coalition of Berlusconi 2001-2006 and 2008-2011, the party represented an agenda similar to PdL during the 2006 and the 2008 campaigns. As a party of Northern Italians, it campaigned with an anti-Rome rhetoric to mobilize around the centre–periphery cleavage. During the crisis, as a result of a change in leadership, LN radically transformed its programmatic stance. In 2013, the party did not run on its traditional anti-Rome agenda and adopted a catch-all strategy of proposing a radical renewal democracy. In this regard, by 2013, LN campaigned on similar issues as M5S and SC.

The Latvian and the Italian cases exemplify the problem of using organizational stability as the sole measure party system stability. The ethnic, the anti-corruption divide, as well as the division over the pace of reforms, and old/ new politics continue to structure party competition in Latvia and Italy. The extreme volatility of party organizations hides this underlying stability.

Conclusion

Although party-system stability is often reduced to the stability of organizations, this chapter has argued that programmatic stability provides an often-neglected dimension for understanding patterns of party competition. I conceptualized the stability of party organizations and programmatic positions as two distinct dimensions of party system stability. While stable party organizations provide cues to voters about the political supply and allow researchers to trace long-term developments in the party system, they are only meaningful if accompanied by programmatic stability. As the empirical analysis shows, the two are separate dimensions that do not always align.

The chapter makes two key contributions. On the one hand, recognizing that both programmatic and organizational stability form a continuum, the chapter introduced a conceptual two-by-two table to distinguish between: (1) stable systems; (2) systems with programmatic stability and ephemeral parties; (3) systems with stable but programmatically empty labels; and (4) instability. On the other hand, the chapter has operationalized and proposed a novel quantitative measure of the programmatic and the organizational dimensions of party system stability. The chapter demonstrates that when programmatic stability is also considered, some cases from northwestern, and southern Europe show similar levels of instability to the eastern European examples. Based on the dynamic in the United Kingdom, Romania, Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, and Italy, the chapter has offered examples to the empirical manifestations of the four ideal types of party system stability.

The chapter has shown that party system stability manifests differently between regions and countries. One avenue for future research concerns identifying the causes and consequences of programmatic and organizational instability. In this regard, classifying and measuring reactions of the party system to short-term shocks, long-term transformations – as well as the

emergence of populist parties – constitute the next step of this research agenda. As far as the Great Recession represents one of the short term shocks, the results suggests that European party systems 'weathered the storm'. With the exception of Italy, in other Southern European countries most parties survived. At the same time, these systems experienced considerable levels of programmatic instability, which, given the severity of the crisis signals electoral accountability at work, rather than its failure.

From a normative perspective, the chapter has a mixed message. In stable systems, change is accommodated (within limits), nevertheless, choices are meaningful, the same parties survive, and the conditions of accountability are met. Under conditions of instability, both the parties and their programmatic agenda radically change. Although, as the empirical analysis demonstrated, these conditions – at least in the ideal-typical sense – are rarely observed. In systems with ephemeral parties, choices are consistent but individual parties have no incentive to stick to their program, given the uncertain fate that awaits them – in most cases, they will not survive the next election. These systems do not allow the formation of long-term ties between voters who identify with a party. Another worrisome scenario is empty party labels where parties survive but radically shift their programmatic agenda. In this case, stable labels deceive voters, since the conditions of accountability are only seemingly met. Depending on how they align, the interaction between organizational and programmatic instability potentially undermine the chain of electoral accountability. In this regard, the most recent Portuguese election provides reasons for hope: it shows that party systems might move in the direction of meaningful choices in so far as mainstream parties take on a clearer programmatic profile.

Chapter 3. Resilience of Mainstream Parties: the Case of Romania

Introduction

Among the 15 countries examined by the previous chapter, the Romanian case stands out for two reasons: a dominance of political issues and a relative instability of the ideological structure. Political parties in Romania show much flexibility in adjusting their issue positions from one election to another, which results in a relatively fluid ideological structure. Although the large swings of the parties' issue positions indicate a low level of party system institutionalisation, parties show considerable resilience. The extent of this stability is surprising given the generally high volatility in the CEE region (the previous discussion of Latvia is illustrative of this phenomenon). Nevertheless, the economic and the accompanying political crises left their mark on the stability of the parties and resulted in a high level of extra-systemic volatility. This chapter examines the dynamics of party competition in the light of the two forms of crisis in a comparison of four electoral campaigns over time (2004-2016).

As the chapter argues, the salience of issues related to the functioning of the political system are instrumental for the survival of mainstream parties. Narrowly defined, 'political issues' concern the functioning of the political system and include the narrower issues of fighting corruption, democratic renewal, democratic reform (vague), regionalism, and Europe. Political issues are distinguished from economic and cultural issues. The latter two are frequently studied by scholars of party competition. Economic issues include the categories of welfare, economic liberalism, economic reforms (vague). Cultural issues concern the issues of new

social movements and cultural diversity, such as cultural liberalism, environment, immigration, nationalism, and historical legacies.[10]

On issues like reforming democracy or fighting corruption, parties can switch positions from one election to another without losing their electorate to their competitors. There are three background conditions which contribute to the high share of political issues and to the survival of mainstream parties: (1) the electoral system, (2) the semi-presidential institutional design, and (3) a clientelistic resource allocation. First, the relatively restrictive electoral system keeps new parties outside the system and helps established parties survive. Second, the semi-presidential constitutional set-up heightens animosities between the prime minister and the president by splitting government responsibilities between the two offices. Third, established networks of clientelism contribute to the survival of the mainstream parties independently of their programmatic appeals.

Given the severity of the recession in Romania, one might expect that the economic crisis will have had a profound impact on party competition. Adding in the blurred programmatic appeal of parties and the important role played by clientelism, it would seem as if all the preconditions were met for popular anger, fuelled by economic problems, to drive out the mainstream parties. When a political crisis followed the economic crisis and led to a failed attempt to suspend President Băsescu, one might have expected the electorate to lose all its trust in the parties. However, the 2016 election brought a landslide victory for the post-communist left in a regional context where such parties are generally in decline. Even though new parties entered parliament, established parties kept their dominant positions and muddled through the crises.

[10] 'Old' cultural issues related to conflicts over law and order (security and defense) are excluded from the analysis since parties do not formulate any statement on these.

The reaction of the party system to the economic and political crises reveals important mechanisms in the dynamics of party competition. On the one hand, the post-communist left and one of its main adversaries on the right managed to survive the crises and are still the most popular parties. On the other hand, new parties entered parliament and for the first time the mainstream parties were faced with serious challengers. I suggest that the survival of the mainstream parties is linked to their ability to shift their positions on issues related to the functioning of the political system, the most salient conflict in the party competition.

I start the chapter with a review of the traditional conflicts which characterise politics in Romania. Then, I introduce the institutional framework and the main parties in the party system. Against these background conditions, I discuss the parties' reactions to the economic and political crises. Next, I use the parties' issue positions as reported in two newspapers to map and explain party competition during four parliamentary election campaigns from 2004 to 2016. The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the nature of the party competition and the effects of the political and economic crises.

Cleavages, Census, and Issue Divides

Although some patterns of electoral behaviour are fairly consistent over time, the underlying electoral coalitions in Romania do not correspond to all three elements in Bartolini and Mair's (1990: 215) definition of cleavages. Conflicts either (1) are not rooted in socio-structural differences, (2) do not distinguish between normative identities, or (3) are not mobilised by parties. Therefore, I employ Deegan-Krause's (2013) framework, which distinguishes between census and issue divides. As this section explains, the lack of 'full cleavages' provides the supply-side condition for the parties to be able to shift their programmatic appeals and to rely on clientelism.

In terms of its consequences for citizens' lives, the most important conflict in Romanian politics has been an overlapping class and periphery *census* divide. The underlying conflict is rooted in demographic and behavioural elements in terms of support for parties, but it does not involve a consciously articulated group identity (Deegan-Krause 2013, 42), which is why it is called a 'census' divide. As surveys show, around 40% of the Romanian electorate, primarily the lower socio-economic groups, are not able to place themselves on a left-right axis (Marian 2013: 112). The underlying socio-economic divide is exploited by parties, but it hardly appears in terms of class identities. As one of the most neoliberal market economies (Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 182–223), Romania struggles with the highest level of income inequality within the EU (European Commission 2017: 78), with 40% of citizens' living in poverty or social exclusion. A considerable share of these citizens rely on welfare benefits and services provided by the state (e.g. healthcare). In contrast, those who are somewhat better off and can be considered the relative 'winners' from the transition expect the state to improve the quality of services, to 'clean' up corruption and to increase efficiency. Parties cater to the marginalised segments of society with clientelistic transfers without adjusting their programmatic appeal. A range of studies based on experimental (Mares & Muntean 2015) and observational (Kitschelt et al. 2012) evidence show a high prevalence of clientelism in Romania relative to other eastern European countries. In this regard, party organisation and the local elite play a crucial role. Accordingly, the participation rate follows a surprising pattern: poorer regions record *higher* levels of electoral participation. Clientelistic practices fostered by the lack of economic group identities allow parties to gain the support of marginalised voters without pressure to formulate clear positions on the economy in their programmatic appeals. The most easily observed implication is a relatively stable electoral map from one election to another (King & Marian 2011 2014).

In addition to the conflict around 'economic' issues, there are three 'cultural' *issue divides* with a consistent albeit less important influence on party competition. In the nineties, as in other east European countries, Romania experienced the emergence of a mostly symbolic divide between communists and anti-communists, which was linked to the lustration process and to property restitution. The relevance of this divide declined over time, partly because the communist successor party consolidated its position and partly because former communist officials penetrated all the major parties (Pop-Eleches 2008). A further divide originates from the interplay between ethnic nationalism and religiosity. The contentious demands of the Hungarian minority, represented by one of the most successful (ethnic) parties (Kiss et al. 2013), strengthen nationalism. The divide is reinforced by a religious distinction between Hungarians (who are mostly Roman Catholic or Calvinist) and Romanians (who tend to be Orthodox or Greek Catholic). However, despite the high level of religiosity of Romanians and the financial support of churches, the party structure does not represent a secular-religious cleavage. In fact, parties rely on the churches to mobilise the electorate. To the extent to which anti-communism, nationalism and religiosity form a loosely defined 'cultural' dimension, it relates to the pace of modernisation/Europeanisation. Although these positions are often unclear, modernisers expect the 'westernisation' of Romania to further what they consider progressive politics. By contrast, traditionalists identify with defensive nationalism and aim to protect the ethnic Romanian way of life from its internal or external enemies. This links political issues to the cultural dimension. Penescu (2002), for instance, argues that apart from the conflict between the two ethnicities nationalism mostly concerns the extent to which it is desirable for Romanians to politically self-organise and not blindly adapt to the requirements of transnational bodies like the EU.

The Institutional Framework

The political mobilisation of these divides is shaped by the institutions Romania adopted during its transition to democracy. Two institutions have a particularly strong influence on the issue repertoire of party competition and they played an important role in shaping the parties' reactions to the economic and political crises: semi-presidentialism and the electoral system. As this section describes, both semi-presidentialism and the electoral system contribute to blurred accountability and allow parties to shift the blame for policy failures and to adapt issue positions to the power relations of the moment.

After 1989, Romania adopted a semi-presidential institutional structure with a directly elected president who has similar but somewhat weaker prerogatives than his/her French counterpart. After consulting with the parties in parliament, the president nominates the prime minister, who shares his/her role as leader of the executive. The prime minister chairs the government, which formulates and implements public policies. The prime minister is accountable to parliament and most often comes from the party with the highest share of the vote. Even though the prime minister has the greatest power in formulating public policies, the president can veto the parliament's decisions and make it difficult for the government to implement its programme. In turn, parliament can suspend the president, but this is conditional on approval by a popular referendum, which in order to be valid requires a turnout of more than 50% of the electorate.

The system requires close cooperation between the two offices. Cohabitations, i.e. when the president and the prime minister come from different political parties, considerably sharpen political conflict. In such situations, the partisan conflict penetrates the executive branch, with the government and the president often working to undermine each other's position. Although the president is supposed to stand above party lines, all elected presidents have tried to help

their own party gain power. Therefore, conflicts arising from cohabitation tend to escalate beyond regular political debates and target the institutions themselves. In the nineties, conflicts between President Iliescu and Prime Minister Roman led to violent protests, although both were members of the same party. In the period under examination, President Băsescu tried to undermine parliament, while Prime Ministers Ponta and Tăriceanu tried to curtail the powers of the president.

Given that the Romanian constitution is particularly difficult to revise, semi-presidentialism can hardly be changed. Since the 1989 regime change there has only been one constitutional reform (2003). This was driven by external pressure to comply with some of the requirements of the NATO and the EU accession processes. During the constitutional reform, the term of the president was prolonged to five years to avoid overlapping parliamentary and presidential elections. While in other semi-presidential countries cohabitation is often seen as a problem to avoid, in Romania the *lack* of cohabitation was perceived as a problem (Gherghina & Hein 2016, p. 183). The constitutional reformers attempted to strengthen the checks and balances by increasing the chances of non-aligning majorities. Therefore, the last time that the president and parliament were simultaneously elected was the 2004 election.

In practice semi-presidentialism creates a split executive, with the prime minister as the "biggest loser of the constitutional system" (Gallagher and Andrievici 2008: 146). Despite the policy-making powers of the prime minister, the president is often able to take credit for popular decisions. The president's ability to dominate the political landscape is reflected by higher levels of turnout in presidential elections compared to parliamentary ones. Even though the constitutional change was designed to give a direct mandate to the prime minister's party, the differential turnout continued and the president is often seen as more legitimate. Nevertheless, the president is not able to design or implement policies without the prime minister. There-

fore, the split executive and blurred incumbency allows parties to mutually blame their opponent for policy failures whether they are in government or delegate the president.

Next to semi-presidentialism, the second component which facilitates shifting issue positions and helps established parties survive is the electoral system and the law on political parties. During the period examined here, these laws changed frequently. In the 2004 election the parliament was elected using a closed list proportional system with a 5% threshold and 41 electoral districts (all the counties plus Bucharest). After an extensive debate with President Băsescu and civil society organisations pushing for a majoritarian system and some of the parties insisting on keeping the system proportional, a 2008 reform established a compromise. The new system kept the closed party list and introduced a two-tier redistribution allowing for proportional seat allocation. It granted a direct mandate to candidates who won an absolute majority of the vote in their district. The reform did not lead to partisan effects, but made the election of individual candidates less predictable (both for voters and parties) and increased the role of individuals as opposed to parties (Marian and King 2010; Marian 2013: 31-42). Therefore, the new system contributed to blurring party positions by making the national campaign less visible relative to the campaigns of individual candidates. In 2015, the changes introduced in 2008 were mostly withdrawn and the 2016 parliamentary election was conducted according to similar rules to those in place in 2004.

Throughout the history of democratic elections, the electoral system and the regulations on political parties have been successfully used by established parties to facilitate cartelisation and create a legal barrier against outsiders entering parliament (Popescu & Soare 2014). According to the law on parties, to establish a new party 25,000 signatures needed to be collected from citizens residing in at least half of the counties. This provision made it extremely hard to register new parties. Moreover, the threshold kept them outside of parliament even if they were registered. Therefore, small parties often became satellite organisations of more estab-

lished formations and ran in coalition with them to ensure their presence in parliament. The law was changed in 2015 and made it possible to register a new party with 3 founding members. Nevertheless, the reform maintained a high barrier for newcomers by requiring them to collect the signatures of 1% of the electorate to put up candidates (180,000 signatures in 2016). As a result of this reform, seven new parties contested the 2016 election (Dumitru and Voicu 2016: 18), one of which entered parliament (USR). Two additional new parties entered parliament but they were registered before the 2015 reform. In comparison to other eastern European countries, these dynamics have created a party system with relatively stable party labels (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015), which nevertheless frequently form pre-electoral coalitions.

The Party System

Table 3.1 presents the election results for the different parties in the period 2000-16 along with statistics on the Romanian party system. As the table shows, the Romanian party system does not really follow a linear development over time. During the period 2000-2012 it seemed as if the system had stabilised, and Romania was regularly cited as an example of a system in which new parties had little chance of entering (e.g. Engler 2016: 281). Nevertheless, the 2016 election showed a sharp increase in extra-system volatility and in fragmentation. In 2016, a previously important party disappeared (PDL) and three new parties entered parliament (ALDE, PMP, USR). Despite these changes, the combined vote share of mainstream parties did not fall and stayed at the relatively high level of 80.5%. Across the four election campaigns turnout declined and polarisation remained relatively low.

Table 3.1: Election results and party system features: percentages and index values

	Election	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Election results (vote shares)	*Mainstream left*	*36.6*	*36.6*	*33.1*	*58.6*	*49.6*
	PSD	36.6[11]	36.6[12]	33.1	58.6[13]	44.1
	ALDE	-	-	-	-	5.5
	Mainstream right	*22.9*	*33.2*	*51.0*	*16.5*	*24.7*
	PNL	6.9	31.3[14]	18.6	-	19.5
	PD/PDL	7.0	-	32.4	16.5[15]	-
	PMP	-	-	-	-	5.2
	PNTCD	5.0	1.9	-	-	-
	ApR	4.0	-	-	-	-
	Ethnic Hungarian	*6.8*	*6.2*	*6.2*	*5.1*	*6.2*
	UDMR	6.8	6.2	6.2	5.1	6.2
	Radical right	*19.5*	*15.2*	*5.5*	*1.3*	*3.7*
	PRM	19.5	13.0	3.2	1.3	1.0
	PNG	-	2.2	2.3	-	-
	PRU	-	-	-	-	2.7
	Anti-establishment reform parties	-	-	-	*14.0*	*8.6*
	PPDD	-	-	-	14.0	-
	USR	-	-	-	-	8.6
Party system features	Turnout (Chamber of Deputies)	65.3	58.5	39.2	41.8	39.5
	Volatility Extra-system	10.2	6.0	5.9	7.0	26.6
	Volatility Within-system	27.2	12.4	11.6	11.9	4.0
	Volatility Total	37.4	18.4	17.4	18.9	30.6
	Effective no. of parties	5.2	3.9	3.93	1.6	3.7
	Mainstream party vote	69.1	76.0	90.3	80.2	80.5
	Asymmetry[16]	18.9	5.3	-17.83	42.1	24.9
	Polarization (0 to 1)	-	0.12	0.17	0.08	0.19

According to their own characterisations, the mainstream political parties can be grouped into four families. Most of them have been present since the founding election in 1990: Social Democratic, National Liberal, Christian Democratic and ethnic Hungarian parties. Even though these parties have organised themselves into all the possible government coalitions, I

[11] The party ran as PDSR, PSD was established from the merge of PDSR and the minor party of PSDR.
[12] In 2004 and in 2008 PSD ran in coalition with PUR, the party which subsequently turned into PC
[13] PSD ran in coalition with PNL, PC and UNPR, a small splinter party, as the Social Liberal Union (USL). I include the results of USL under PSD given PNL was the junior partner in the coalition
[14] PNL ran in coalition with PD, the party which subsequently turned into PDL
[15] PDL ran in coalition with two small parties, FC and PNȚCD
[16] Vote share of mainstream left minus vote share of mainstream right

treat the National Liberal and Christian Democratic parties as the mainstream right in opposition to the mainstream left, the Social Democrats. In addition, I introduce two types of challenger parties which have never been in government: radical right and anti-establishment reform parties.

As the asymmetry indicator in Table 3.1 shows, in Romanian politics the mainstream left is more popular than the mainstream right. The main party on the left has been the post-communist Social Democratic Party (PSD). It was even the most popular party in 2008, when the mainstream right collectively won more votes than the mainstream left. The PSD has often run in coalition with the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR), later renamed the Conservative Party (PC), a minor political force which has never entered parliament independently of the PSD. In 2016, the PC merged with a liberal faction to form ALDE and entered parliament. In the nineties, another influential party had competed in the Socialist camp, the Democratic Party (PD). Following the tradition of the Romanian Communist party, which combined ethnic nationalism with communist ideology, these parties represent a leftist position in terms of 'economic' issues and a more conservative position in terms of 'culture.'

In contrast to the dominance of PSD on the mainstream left, the mainstream right is more fragmented. In 2004, the Democratic Party (PD) changed its leader to Traian Băsescu, a charismatic politician who recognised the ideological space in the Christian Democratic camp and gradually switched the party to the right. The PD took on a new name and under the leadership of Băsescu, renamed as the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) it became the main competitor in the Christian Democratic camp. As old conservative formations disappeared (ApR, PNTCD), PDL emerged as the most popular party on the right, with the National Liberal Party (PNL) as the second largest formation. PNL is a 'historical party' with links to the inter-war period and was re-established after 1989. In 2012, the PNL ran in coalition with PSD, forming an electoral alliance across the left-right divide. Despite its popularity, the PSD-PNL

coalition did not prove stable and in 2016 PNL merged with PDL, re-establishing the left-right poles. After a poor PDL electoral performance in 2012, and the departure of its founder, Băsescu, the merger between PNL and PDL was regarded as the end of PDL. Traditionally parties on the right represent somewhat liberal economic positions with an anti-communist ideology. In terms of their programmatic appeal there is hardly any consistent difference to distinguish between them.

In 2016 two new parties entered parliament and joined the mainstream. Although new parties are often contrasted with the mainstream, both parties were linked to established formations and were founded by politicians who had previously served as prime minister (Călin Popescu Tăriceanu – ALDE) or president (Traian Băsescu – PMP). Therefore, even though they were technically new, they were different from challenger parties due to their links to the existing political elite. The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), a left-wing liberal party, joined forces with the remains of PC/PUR and entered parliament with a promise to help PSD form a government. The People's Movement Party (PMP) ran on a platform previously associated with PDL and promised to oppose PSD "at all costs."

As the table shows, the mainstream parties are popular and even at their worst are able to secure 70% of the vote. The remaining 30% is relatively volatile and has served as a breeding ground for challenger parties forming a 'new party subsystem' in the Romanian context. Up until 2008, the main challenger party came from the radical right. The largest radical right party was the Greater Romania Party (PRM), the leader of which entered the second round of the presidential election in 2000. While the radical right was the main challenger from 1989 to the 2000s, the strength of these parties sharply declined in the period under study and in 2008 they failed to enter parliament. As the table shows, the decline in their popularity was partly due to fragmentation and the emergence of new competitors. First the New Generation Party (PNG) and then in 2016 a new radical right party, United Romania (PRU), competed and ran

a relatively visible campaign but failed to enter parliament. When in parliament, the radical right has spoken out against the political class and the Hungarian minority. The Hungarian minority party (UDMR) has been present in parliament since 1990 and has served as a coalition partner of governments of parties from both the right and the left.

The 2012 and the 2016 elections saw the rise of a new type of challenger: anti-establishment reform parties, as defined by Hanley and Sikk (2016: 523). These authors note the lack of such parties in the Romanian context (p. 524), but their analysis does not include the People's Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD) and the Save Romania Union (USR). Both PPDD and USR mobilised on an anti-establishment platform and built on genuinely new organisations. As opposed to the 'old' challengers from the radical right, these parties were less nationalistic. As the first new party to enter parliament on its own since 1989, PPDD achieved a stunning 14%, while USR gained 8.6% of the vote. However, PPDD did not manage to endure the test of time. After its leader failed to enter parliament, the party was faced with heavy intra-parliamentary party switching and disappeared during the 2012-2016 legislative term. In contrast, USR benefitted from a wave of anti-corruption protests and has managed to survive until the time of writing.

Crises and Crises Dynamics

In the Romanian case, the party competition dynamics in economic and political crises have partly diverged from the step-wise pattern of electoral accountability observed in other European countries. While in other European countries in the aftermath of the economic crisis voters first turned to the mainstream opposition and then to challenger parties, in Romania the vote for mainstream parties did not decline. As in the Hungarian case, the mainstream opposition PSD party won the first (2012) and the second (2016) post-crisis elections. Weak institutions and a high share of political issues allowed the mainstream parties to shift their pro-

grammatic appeal and avoid punishment for the crisis. An important pre-condition in this regard was the role played by the incumbent president, Traian Băsescu. This section details the development of party competition since the 2004 election and the facilitating role played by institutions, which ultimately led to the survival of the mainstream parties.

In 2004, Traian Băsescu (PDL) was elected as president. He was a polarising figure who did not shy away from using his power to bend institutions to serve his own political goals. His actions defined the political conflicts in the period of his ten-year presidency (2004-2014), and his two terms re-shaped the role of presidents in Romanian politics. Băsescu fostered an image of being the president of the people fighting against a corrupt elite. The fight against corruption had long been seen as a major issue in Romanian party politics, but before Băsescu it was mostly an issue of the radical right. He was the first candidate from a mainstream party to compete with a programme of fighting corruption. This led to his successful election and re-election (2004, 2009) on the most populist platform in Romanian politics at the time (Hawkins 2013).

Apart from his advocacy for the fight against corruption, Băsescu used his power to nominate the prime minister to influence government formation. He used this prerogative on two occasions to split parties and form a new parliamentary majority made up of parties from the mainstream right. The first time this occurred was in the aftermath of the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections, when instead of choosing the candidate supported by PSD-PUR, Băsescu nominated his political ally Tăriceanu (PNL). The second time was in the midst of the shock period of the financial crisis before the 2009 presidential election, when he refused to nominate Klaus Iohannis, then the PSD-PNL candidate. Instead, and this proved to be a consequential step for the long-term development of party competition, he helped Emil Boc (PDL) form a slim parliamentary majority with UDMR and collaborated with Boc to implement austerity measures in response to the shock of the financial crisis. On both occasions, he

was successful in forging a new alliance due to intra-parliamentary party switching and party splits. Before his term, the president's role in nominating the prime minister had been seen as a formality and no other president had used his power to change the majority in parliament.

Political parties (apart from PDL) regularly accused Băsescu of abusing his mandate and perceived his actions as direct threats to their decision-making autonomy. To fight the challenge of Băsescu, they twice initiated the procedure to suspend the president from office. Both times parliament voted for his dismissal but, as mentioned, suspension from office is conditional on a mandatory popular referendum which in both 2007 and 2012 allowed Băsescu to stay on. The second suspension came close to succeeding with the support of an overwhelming majority of voters, but ultimately it failed due to the 50% turnout provision.

By the time of the second suspension attempt, Băsescu's popularity had declined markedly, not the least due to his role in the management of the economic crisis.[17] This crisis first entered party competition in June 2009, when the PSD-PDL government turned to the IMF for a 20bn euro credit but postponed austerity measures until after the 2009 presidential election. To compete in the presidential election, PSD left the government and all the austerity policies had to be implemented by a narrow centre-right PDL-UDMR coalition. These measures were announced by the re-elected President Băsescu and included a 25% cut in the salaries of public officials, a cut of thousands of state jobs and an increase in VAT from 19 to 24%. Most of the austerity policies were justified by IMF demands and were implemented in close cooperation between President Băsescu and the PDL-UDMR government. Following these measures, the unpopular centre-right Boc government survived seven motions of no confidence and continued in office until the beginning of 2012. In the 2012 election PDL lost most of its voters,

[17] In Romania the euro crisis slowed growth but its economic and political effects were minor relative to the shock period of the financial crisis. Therefore, throughout this chapter 'economic crisis' refers to the shock period.

and in 2014 what remained of it merged with PNL, making it one of the few former government parties to completely disappear.

The 2012 PSD-PNL grand coalition played an instrumental role in the collapse of PDL. Even though parties from the left and the right often formed coalition governments, PSD and PNL were the first to form a pre-electoral coalition across the left-right divide. The dramatic loss of PDL's popularity and Băsescu's involvement in keeping Boc and PDL in power forged this unusual alliance. Even though Băsescu's election in 2004 was supported by PNL, in 2007 he made a successful attempt to break up PNL and form PDL. PNL survived, but the traditionally anti-communist party ended up in a joint platform with PSD, Băsescu's main adversary. The two parties were reluctant to form a coalition, but between 2007 and 2008 PSD supported the minority PNL-UDMR government. In 2012 they formed the PSD-PNL coalition government, which as its first act initiated the suspension of Băsescu.

Before the suspension, fearing a low turnout the PSD-PNL amended the regulation to remove the turnout threshold for a valid referendum. Although this amendment was struck down by the constitutional court, it intensified President Băsescu's attacks on PSD-PNL, accusing them of dismantling existing democratic institutions in a "coup d'etat" against the "rule of law." As a reaction to the attempt by PSD-PNL to change the threshold, European leaders expressed concerns over the rule of law in Romania but these concerns were criticised as partisan pro-Băsescu interventions. Fearing defeat, Băsescu called on his supporters to not turn out and the referendum failed by being declared invalid. Nevertheless, PSD-PNL went on to campaign against an "illegitimate" president in the 2012 parliamentary election. Given the way institutions fell prey to party interests, the 2012 procedure to suspend the president stands as a textbook example of a political crisis.

In 2014 a new president, Klaus Iohannis (PNL), was elected on a platform of resetting and "normalising" Romanian politics. Similarly to Băsescu, Iohannis ran with an anti-corruption message, which by this time had become the most salient issue. Even though it was less controversial, Iohannis followed Băsescu's legacy and used his power to nominate the prime minister to block the PSD candidate after the 2016 election. Somewhat paradoxically, his term coincided with both a strengthening of PSD and the rise of a new type of challenger, the anti-establishment reform parties. To explain the former, Ban (2016) partly attributes PSD's 2016 victory to the party's opposition to PDL's austerity measures. In this perspective, the austerity measures implemented by the centre-right PDL-UDMR government contributed to an ideological crystallisation of parties. In this view, the economic and political crises had not yet ceased to shape Romanian party competition.

Structure, Content, and Stability in Party Competition

The four electoral campaigns cover the period before the Great Recession (2004), the start of the economic crisis (2008), the time of the political crisis (2012) and the first post-crisis election (2016). I start by presenting the development of issue salience and politicisation. Then, I explore the ways in which the mainstream parties took positions on the issues. Finally, I conclude by examining the political space in the four elections under consideration. The results presented are based on the coverage of two daily national newspapers. One represents views associated with the center-right, Adevărul, the other is more sympathetic towards center-left arguments, Jurnalul Național.

Issue Salience and Politicization

Figure 3.1 presents the development of the salience and politicisation of issues related to the economy, culture, political competition/institutions and the fight against corruption.[18] Overall, as the figure shows, issues related to the economy and the fight against corruption were the most salient in Romanian party competition. For instance, in 2008 over 50% of the campaign revolved around economic issues, while in 2016 a similar share revolved around the fight against corruption. Issues related to political competition and institutions were almost as salient as the previous two categories, and they were the most salient in 2012. Unlike the regional pattern, issues related to the cultural dimension are less salient in Romanian politics: the salience of issues like nationalism and anti-communism stayed at around 10% across all four elections.

Figure 3.1: Salience and politicization by issue area and election



[18] There is hardly any competition on issues related to security and defence. Therefore, I only include 'new' cultural issues.

However, when we account for the different levels of polarisation and calculate the overall score for the politicisation of conflicts over these issue categories, their importance changes. Conflicts over economic and political/institutional issues were the most politicised, while the level of politicisation of the fight against corruption and cultural issues lies lower. The level of politicisation of all four issue categories varies over time. In the pre-crisis period (2004), we observe a low level of politicisation across all the categories. At the beginning of the economic crisis (2008) the politicisation of economic issues increased dramatically, and cultural issues also became more politicised. During the political crisis (2012), the politicisation of economic and cultural issues declined while in relative terms, the politicization of political issues increased. In the first post-crisis election (2016), all types of issue were more politicised and the fight against corruption became the most politicised.

Although the above analysis suggests a party system dominated by economic issues, there are three important caveats to consider. First, if one is to combine political/institutional issues with fighting corruption, the salience of these categories is higher than that of economic issues. This suggests that party competition in Romania was mostly related to 'polity contestation' and the fight against corruption. However, these issues are less polarising, partly because of the valence character of fighting corruption: everybody promises to do so. Second, competition on economic issues was to a considerable extent driven by promises to increase wages, either for everyone or for workers in a specific sector (e.g. in education). Opposition parties tried to outbid the government and promise higher spending if elected. Whereas electoral outbidding often served as a substitute for a strong welfare net and drove electoral participation, it did not produce the ideological debate one might expect on issues related to regulation of the economy. Third, cultural issues like nationalism were not salient but polarising and therefore politicised. Thus, next to the economic and the political, a more latent cultural dimension appears in Romanian politics.

The plots in Figure 3.1 clearly show the effects of the crises. At the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 party competition became dominated by economic issues. If one takes a closer look, many of the economic issues were related to the positive economic record of the first Tăriceanu government and to demands for wages in certain sectors (e.g. education). By contrast, issues related to austerity or management of the economic crisis were not discussed. It was only in 2012 that management of the economic crisis appeared more forcefully on the agenda, with PSD-PNL accusing the outgoing PDL government of presiding over an economic/social disaster. Nevertheless, the 2012 campaign – as one would expect in the midst of a political crisis – was dominated by political issues. The reason why political issues were not more politicised is related to their low level of polarisation. Both PSD-PNL and PDL claimed they would save democracy from its enemies and promised to renew state institutions to serve the citizens and not a corrupt elite. In the post-crisis election in 2016 the issue of fighting corruption was the most salient and for the first time it became more polarised, partly due to the emergence of anti-establishment reform parties. Cultural issues also appeared more clearly in 2016 among the most politicised ones. Overall, a comparison with the pre-crisis period (2004) shows that party competition became more politicised during the crisis.

Party Positions

As the previous section might suggest, most of the issues in Romanian politics do not provide for a high level of polarization. Figure 3.2 presents the position of the three largest parties (PD/PDL, PNL, PSD) as well as one of the new challenger parties (USR)[19] on issues related to the economy, politics, culture and fighting corruption during the four electoral campaigns[20].

[19] Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to map the positions of PRM or PPDD. In the case of the latter this is due to the party's almost exclusive reliance on its founder's TV channel to communicate with its voters.
[20] To calculate these positions I exclude issue positions related to electoral outbidding.

Figure 3.2: Party positions by issue area and election



Note: The positional measures exclude the two 'vague' categories referring to the need for economic and political reforms in general.

As the figure shows, parties are characterised by relatively large swings in their issue positions depending on the conflicts of the day. In terms of those taken by the mainstream parties, the PSD is commonly seen as the anchor of party competition (Florescu 2016). However, it changed its issue positions substantially during the period we examine. In 2004, the party combined a pro-welfare stance with cultural conservatism and was generally reluctant to fight corruption or invest in reforming the democratic institutions. This changed during the crisis. The party moderated its pro-welfare stance as it entered the 2012 coalition with PNL and by 2016 it had switched to an economically liberal position. In cultural terms, PSD generally assumed a conservative position, except in 2008 when it tried to distance itself from being seen as the party of the former regime. However, its largest swings occurred with respect to issues related to democratic renewal. In 2008 PSD became the fiercest advocate of democratic renewal, driven by its opposition to what it considered to be the authoritarian tendencies of

President Băsescu. The party moderated its stance on this issue in 2012 and although it tried to attack President Iohannis with pro-democratic rhetoric in 2016 by that time it was seen as the party most reluctant to invest in renewing democracy.

The parties of the mainstream right, PD/PDL and PNL, tended to oppose positions associated with the PSD, except during the 2012 PSD-PNL coalition. Thus, from 2004 to 2012 PD/PDL assumed an economically liberal position, reluctantly embraced cultural liberalism and tried to distinguish itself by fighting corruption. The parties most obviously changed their position with respect to democratic renewal. In 2004, the PDL-PNL coalition called for democratic renewal but in 2008 PDL was mostly associated with maintaining the status quo and avoiding any reforms. During the 2008 and the 2012 campaign, PDL had to defend President Băsescu against the PSD and PNL accusations that he was undermining democracy. Initially, PDL could count on some support from PNL for its economic stance and partly for its political stance, but this changed in 2012. As PNL entered the coalition with PSD, it assumed a pro-welfare economic position, radicalised in terms of cultural conservatism and joined the PSD's call to renew democracy. In the 2016 campaign, following the fusion of PNL/PDL the new PNL tried to take a pro-welfare position against the by now economically liberal PSD, remained culturally conservative but more liberal than the PSD and attacked the latter by promising to renew democracy.

Figure 3.3 also illustrates the relevance of political issues and fighting corruption in the challenge mounted by anti-establishment reform parties to the established formations. USR broke into the party system by mobilising on fighting corruption and reforming democracy. The party combined fighting corruption with a call for democratic renewal and culturally progressive positions.

The Political Space in Romania

Figure 3.3 presents the most popular parties' positions in the programmatic space during the four electoral campaigns to show how conflicts on the economic, cultural and the political dimensions played out in party competition.

Figure 3.3: The structure of the Romanian political space by election



While the issue repertoire stayed relatively constant, with issues related to the economy (economic liberalism/welfare), politics (democratic renewal/reform, fighting corruption) and culture (anti-communism, nationalism) re-emerging in each of these campaigns, the dimensions of the political space and the party positions fluctuated. In terms of the dimensionality of the political spaces, we can distinguish between the two pre-crisis elections (including 2008) when cultural issues – nationalism in particular – did not yet structure the competition between the mainstream parties and the post-crisis elections when it did.

In 2004 we observe the lowest level of dimensionality. Economic issues play a central role in this election, but all three mainstream parties were very close to welfare with similar positions. As Figure 3.2 already indicated, this clearly changed by 2008, when PD/PDL took a more neoliberal economic position. In both elections, the second dimension opposed the mainstream parties to the radical right PRM. Instead of cultural issues, PRM campaigned with promises to fight corruption and in 2008 with an anti-communist discourse. While in 2004 PNL and PD/PDL ran on similar platforms of reforming democracy against the incumbent PSD, in 2008 PDL attacked the incumbent PNL on the issue of increasing salaries for teachers and university professors. In 2008 democratic reform gained an anti-Băsescu dimension and, as we have already seen, the PSD was now the most supportive of the issue.

In 2012 and in 2016, nationalism came to play a central role in party competition. During the political crisis in 2012 the campaign was fought in a unidimensional space as a clash between two camps: PSD-PNL and PDL. The single dimension aligned economic and political/cultural contentions in terms of welfare vs. neoliberalism and nationalism vs. pro-EU stances. In the context of the 2012 election pro-EU meant PDL accusing PSD-PNL of Euroscepticism, while PSD-PNL accused EU leaders of intervening in domestic affairs to save their ally, Băsescu. At the time, PSD-PNL was running a nationalist campaign with slogans like “We are proud to be Romanians” and “A strong Romania in Europe” to mobilise supporters. Even though much

less clearly than in previous campaigns, PSD-PNL took a pro-welfare stance at least with regards to PDL's austerity policies and promised to renew/reform democracy.

The 2016 election unfolded in a similar atmosphere except that economic issues played a much less important role compared to 2012. The two polar issues on the economic dimension were very close together and had little/no impact in structuring the political space. To some extent PNL assumed pro-welfare positions to distinguish itself from PSD. The second dimension opposed nationalism to anti-corruption. PSD, PMP and the radical-right PRU relied on a nationalist rhetoric against the incumbent ethnic German President and politicians with a foreign background in USR. USR attacked the nationalism of PSD, PMP and PRU with a discourse on fighting corruption and renewing democracy. While PNL promised to reform democracy, the USR proposed a more concrete plan of institutional reforms. As opposed to 2004-08, in 2016 USR took over the radical right's issue of fighting corruption. As the plot shows ALDE acted as the satellite organization of PSD, similarly to PUR/PC in previous campaigns.

In all the elections, the second dimension related to political or cultural issues polarised political parties more than the economic dimension. Nevertheless, party positions fluctuated to a much greater extent on the political dimension than on the economic one. Party positions on political issues seem to have followed power relations in politics more closely than those on other dimensions. The party in government and the party of the sitting president defended the status quo, while opposition parties campaigned on reforming/renewing democracy. The crisis led to a rise in the relative importance of cultural issues in structuring the political space. As opposed to 2004-08 in 2012-16 cultural issues not only discriminated between mainstream and challenger parties but also structured the competition between the mainstream parties as well.

Conclusions

Party competition in Romania as revealed by this analysis is characterised by a rather fluid political space, which allows shifting issue positions from one election to the other. Positions on political issues seem to closely follow parties' incumbency status and change according to shifts in political majorities. Nevertheless, like other countries in CEE, we have observed a cultural dimension on which parties take relatively clear positions. However, cultural issues are the least salient, and campaigns are primarily fought on political issues or on fighting corruption. Given that parties change their positions the most often on these types of issue, the extent to which voters can distinguish between competing party formations on programmatic grounds is doubtful.

Nevertheless, Romanian parties are generally considered remarkably stable and able to survive over time. From this perspective, the economic and political crises were challenging for parties. However, as the election results show, with the notable exception of PDL the mainstream parties managed to survive. A key component of their resilience was their ability to avoid electoral accountability by shifting their issue positions. In this regard, the crisis did not break the existing pattern of party competition, and in fact, it contributed to a certain level of consolidation.

While the primary issues which allowed the mainstream parties to change their appeal were on the political dimension, the crisis led to the appearance of cultural issues, primarily nationalism. In the post-crisis election, it was not only the radical right which campaigned on nationalist ideas, but mainstream parties – PSD in particular – too. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the strength of the radical right parties is in decline: the mainstream parties are taking up their primary issue. It has yet to be seen whether this dynamic will lead to a more salient cultural dimension or whether political issues will continue to dominate party competition.

The new parties which emerged during the crises do not provide a substantially different alternative. As the example of PPDD and USR shows, political issues played a crucial role in the emergence of these parties. Unlike new parties in southern Europe which emerged during the crisis, the new parties in Romania do not formulate a programmatic appeal to reform the economy or substantially change certain policies. As anti-establishment reform parties, their main programmatic appeal is formed around their issue positions on the political dimension and on the fight against corruption. However, these are the same issues which allow mainstream parties to exploit a fluid ideological structure and shift their issue positions.

The institutional set-up facilitates this dynamic. The semi-presidential structure imposes a conflict between the president and the prime minister on the issue repertoire of parliamentary elections. Despite changing the electoral calendar and eliminating overlaps between presidential and parliamentary elections, the two are clearly connected. In contrast to scholars who argue for a semi-presidential institutional design (Sartori 1994, pp. 135–137), the Romanian case clearly shows that such a system damages the parties' role of providing clear electoral alternatives. By blurring responsibility and splitting incumbency between different parties, semi-presidentialism facilitates a dynamic where parliamentary campaigns are centred on parties competing over animosities and proposals for institutional reforms instead of policy alternatives. Moreover, the incentives for mainstream parties to invest in their programmatic appeals are rather low as long as they are able to capitalise on the lack of economic group identities with clientelistic resource allocation and the electoral system keeps newcomers away.

This analysis underlines problems of electoral accountability in Romania. Despite a long list of pressing problems involving economic and social inequality, a high level of corruption and unstable institutions, voters do not have clear choices between the competing party formations. As the dynamic of competition during the economic and the political crises shows, parties tend to focus on issues detached from voters' concerns. Nevertheless, the facts that

voters punished PDL and that two genuinely new parties (PPDD, USR) entered parliament show signs of party system change.

Chapter 4. Protesting Parties in Europe[21]

Introduction

Party systems in established democracies are in flux, as indicated by both functionalist and structuralist perspectives on party competition. The former focus on indicators such as massive declines in party membership, increasing electoral volatility, declining party identification and voter turnout (e.g. van Biezen et al. 2012; Dalton & Wattenberg 2002; Poguntke et al. 2016; Mair 2013). The latter emphasize the decline of old lines of conflict and the emergence of new ones and the rise of new challenger parties as driving forces of change (e.g., Hooghe & Marks 2018; Kitschelt & Rehm 2015; Kriesi et al. 2008). Scholars therefore almost uniformly agree that party systems and organizations are changing. However, the shape of the new alignments between parties and voters is contested. As Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) aptly summarize it, there are three major rival arguments about party system change – focusing on post-industrial realignment, post-industrial dealignment, and cartel party detachment, respectively – and all are consistent with the basic trends listed above. The jury is still out on which of the three is right. However, all three arguments point to an ever more differentiated and complex partisan landscape composed of diverse types of parties and party–voter linkages.

At the same time, it is important to stress that empirical research on political parties and party systems still primarily focuses on parties' activities in institutionalized political forums, primarily the electoral, governmental and parliamentary arenas. This neglects the fact that political parties – especially in increasingly differentiated party landscapes – may also get active in other, less institutionalized political arenas. Most importantly, we think, it neglects crucial

[21] The chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Swen Hutter. Both authors have contributed equally. This is one of several joint works.

interactions between political parties and protest politics. As several recent studies in social movement research have highlighted (Della Porta et al. 2017; Heaney & Rojas 2015; McAdam & Kloos 2014; McAdam & Tarrow 2010; 2013; Schlozman 2015), these interactions are manifold and can have important repercussions on both party competition and social movements. In this chapter, we add to this expanding literature by through a comparative, cross-country analysis of activities of political parties in the streets. That is, we take the main collective actors engaged in electoral competition but look at their involvement in a major form of non-electoral mobilization. More specifically, the chapter concentrates on political parties that sponsor protest events. Sponsorship is broadly defined and means that parties (co-)organize, take part in and/or call for the participation in a protest event (Ruch 1998, p. 41). We refer to our research object as protesting parties.

Our main questions are as follows: What does the typical protest-supporting party in Europe look like? Under what conditions are political parties most likely to sponsor protest events? These questions are at the core of our theoretical considerations. At first, we introduce three sets of explanatory variables on the party level: ideological, strategic, and organizational factors. All three factors are expected to influence the likelihood of whether (and how much) political parties take it to the streets. These factors are often used in the literature on party competition to explain whether and how parties respond to changes in their environment, be it the rise of new issues, challenger parties or media attention. By taking these factors to predict protest sponsorship, we aim to analyse whether party protests are driven by similar dynamics as other party activities. Apart from party-level characteristics, we introduce two main contextual factors – the age of democracy and the strength of civil society – to explain the differing levels of party protests across countries.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study party protests in a large-scale comparative setting. More specifically, our analysis is based on original protest event data

based on English-language newswires for 26 European countries over a 16-year period (2000–2015). In our opinion, it is important to map out the big picture of parties' involvement in the streets of Europe as it relates back to the fundamental questions about the emerging (new) shape of party systems, party linkages and responsiveness to citizens' demands. The focus on party protests highlights how willing political parties (still) are to leave their home arena and the extent to which their presence in protest politics blurs the neat analytical distinctions between the two arenas of electoral and protest politics.

Overall, our results indicate that the standard variables used in party research also go a long way to explain protest sponsorship. The typical protest party in Europe is in the opposition, left-wing, belongs to a radical party family, and adopts a mass-party organization. Moreover, parties are more likely to sponsor protest in new(er) democracies and where they face a comparatively weak civil society.

Theory and Expectations

Types of Protesting Parties: Ideology, Strategy, and Organization

To begin with, the literature on party competition emphasizes *ideological affinity* as a crucial explanatory variable. That is, political parties are more likely to respond to signals and activities by actors from the same ideological camp (e.g., Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2015; Heaney & Rojas 2015; Hutter & Vliegenthart 2016; Spoon et al. 2014). Regarding shifts in issue positions or emphasis, the scholarly literature argues that parties from the same camp pose more of an "electoral threat" (Spoon et al. 2014, p. 363) to each other. However, one can also argue that shared preferences make collaboration and common mobilization efforts more likely. This is important in our context as we know that protests usually raise criticism and come with a 'political bias.' At least in Western Europe, participa-

tion in and support for protest activities is associated with left-wing orientations by citizens and representatives (e.g. Dalton et al. 2010; Flanagan & Lee 2003; Inglehart 2008; Torcal et al. 2016; van der Meer et al. 2009) – most clearly regarding the traditional economic understanding of the term but also regarding its more cultural understanding of pitting libertarians against authoritarians. In view of party protests, it is thus important to stress that parties from the left are more likely to share the demands of protesters, their constituencies might be more likely to get involved in protests, and they might also risk more in electoral terms if they ignore the 'likeminded' signals from the streets (Hutter & Vliegenthart 2016). If we assume that the involvement of parties in the protest arena mirrors such programmatic alignments, parties from the left are expected to be more likely to sponsor protests than parties from the right.

Moreover, protests should correspond to the preferences of *radical political parties*. As March and Mudde (2005, p. 24) rightly state, both the left–right distinction and the term 'radical' are "a potential terminological minefield." However, following their suggestion, we use the term radical to label "an ideological and practical orientation towards 'root and branch' systemic change of the political system." Thus, as Mudde (2007, p. 26) highlights in his book on the populist radical right, the term radical is defined as "opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy." While radical parties are thus opposed to liberal democracy, they are not anti-democratic per se. However, they advocate profound political change and are usually more critical of the existing representative channels of interest intermediation than moderate parties. Based on these considerations, we expect that radical parties (from both left and right) should also be more likely to adopt a more contentious action repertoire and thus show more involvement in protest activities than moderate parties.

Apart from ideological affiliations, work on party competition emphasizes strategic factors that result from the configuration of power in the electoral arena (for a recent formulation, see Hobolt & de Vries 2015). Parties face different strategic incentives depending on whether

they are in *government* or *opposition*. On the one hand, opposition parties are not as much constrained by their past activities or external constraints. Government parties, by contrast, are often constrained by established policies and the diverse societal needs that they need to consider in their activities. On the other hand, opposition parties have more incentives to respond to citizens' demands and to build broad social coalitions to (re)gain control of the government. For example, Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011, p. 324) show how opposition parties are more likely to respond to media attention using it as "potential ammunition" to challenge the government. Klüver and Spoon (2016) highlight that opposition parties respond more strongly to shifts in voters' issue priorities than government parties, while Hutter and Vliegenthart's (2016) results indicate that opposition parties are more likely to respond to the signals from protesters in their parliamentary activities than government parties. Thus, we also except that opposition parties are more likely to join forces with less institutionalized actors and to directly mobilize on the streets to challenge the government.

To some extent, the government-opposition dynamics can be interpreted as a 'sore loser effect' because opposition parties – especially large ones – have been close to power without managing to gain office (on the winner–loser gap, see Anderson 2005). Thus, they may use the street to challenge the newly elected government or one or more of its specific policies. More generally, regardless of whether parties are more office- or policy-seeking, their success depends to a considerable extent on their vote share. Therefore, thinking about party protest as a reactive strategy to (re-)connect with society and to increase vote shares, we can expect that parties sponsor protests in response to fluctuations in their electoral fortunes. Thus, for both parties in government and opposition, substantial changes in votes should affect the likelihood of protest sponsorship. More precisely, we expect that political parties that have lost a relatively large share of their electoral base will be more likely to sponsor protests. Again, this

effect might be amplified for large parties as their activities seem to depend more on strategic factors in general and their relative losses translate in larger absolute figures of 'lost' voters.

Finally, party scholars also focus on *organizational factors* to explain parties' differing behaviour. As stated in the introduction, this is ever more important in an era when parties seem in decline – as documented by decreasing party membership and party identification (Dalton & Wattenberg 2002; Poguntke et al. 2016; van Biezen et al. 2012) – and when we observe a more differentiated organizational landscape composed of parties that have abandoned the mass-party model and those that still adhere to it (e.g., Katz & Mair 1995; Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012). As Katz and Mair (1995, p. 8) highlight, the ideal-typical *mass party* is considered part of civil society aiming at "breaking into the state and modifying public policy in the long-term interests of the constituency to which it is accountable." To do so, mass parties, rely on own channels of communication and adopt a bottom-up organizational approach as party elites are accountable to party members which also provide the principal resources by means of fees and contributions. In their conceptualization of 'mass parties', Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012, p. 118) add relations with civic associations to Duverger's (1959) original focus on a large membership base and complex organizational apparatus. Their empirical analysis of party–voter congruence indicates that, in Western (but not eastern) Europe, parties with mass organizations are ideologically closer to partisan and independent voters than parties without such organizational features (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012, p. 134). In a recent article, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2017) show that mass parties, i.e. parties with a large membership base, a strong organizational structure, and close ties to civic associations tend to more positively evaluate the way democracy works in all countries under study. Relatedly, we expect a positive relationship between mass-party organizations and our dependent variable of party sponsored protests given the stronger linkages of mass parties to other civic

associations, their stronger reliance on members, and their stronger organizational capacities more generally.

To sum up, we expect that the *typical protest-supporting party* in Europe to be left-wing, radical, and in opposition. Also, it has probably lost massively in the last election and it adopts a mass-party organization.

Levels of Party Protests: Differentiation of Interest Intermediation and its Scope Conditions

So far, we have focused on potential party-level variation. However, we also assume that the broader national context affects the level of party protests. To deduce our hypotheses, we depart from Kitschelt's idea (2003) that we have witnessed an increasing *differentiation* in the patterns of interest mobilization since the end of the 'Golden Age' of Western capitalism, i.e., since the 1970s. As Kitschelt (2003, p. 89) puts it: "The progressive differentiation of modes of collective interest mobilization and growing separation of political entrepreneurs in movements, interest groups, and parties from each other is the big story of the last third of the twentieth century in European democracies."

In a theoretical tour de force, Kitschelt (2003) explains this development as a product of the learning processes of political entrepreneurs and their followers, which have been underpinned by economic, social, and political–institutional changes. Two challenges faced by political entrepreneurs are of crucial importance for the argument: problems of collective action and social choice. In contrast to social movements and interest groups, political parties are portrayed as the actors that have invested the most in solving both types of problems. On the one hand, political parties frame their stakes as long-term, durable, and encompassing programs. On the other hand, parties have invested most in techniques of collective preference alignment (e.g., formal rules for aggregating individual preferences into organizational pur-

poses). In the long-run, political actors that have invested differently in solving the two problems and are better equipped to compete in specific political arenas. Importantly for party protests, Kitschelt (2003, p. 97) argues:

> "Parties focus increasingly on electoral competition, at the expense of interest group representation or social movement protest actions […]. Social movements, finally, concentrate on public actions outside institutionalized arenas of bargaining to affect public opinion and political elites through the media."

In general, the differentiation argument lets us expect that party protests are rather rare (for details, see Borbáth & Hutter 2018)). However, regarding cross-national variation – the key focus here – two scope conditions are important: a *long democratic history* and the *strength of civil society*. Both conditions seem crucial for the establishment of functionally differentiated arenas that are populated by specialized political actors. As argued before, Kitschelt (2003) highlights a long-term process since the 1970s that has resulted in a two-fold transformation of European party systems: a first wave driven by the mobilization of new social movements and left-libertarian parties in the 1970s and a second wave driven by the mobilization of the populist radical right since the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). Based on the scholarly literature, we know that these transformations have been much less pronounced in the so-called third wave democracies in southern and central-eastern Europe and the structure of political conflict differs to the pattern in northwestern Europe (Coman 2015; Haughton 2014; Rovny 2014). In addition, the party systems are much less institutionalized – especially in central-eastern Europe (e.g., Enyedi & Casal Bértoa 2018). The very high level of volatility in these systems since the democratic transition is the most important empirical evidence for their lack of institutionalization (e.g., Powell & Tucker 2013). Overall, we expect that party protests are more likely in countries with a shorter democratic history given that the learning processes at

the core of the differentiation argument take time and seem to depend on a democratic context.

The second and closely related condition of the differentiation story seems the development of a strong and independent civil society. Even if we expect that the traditionally dominant mass parties might withdraw from certain sites of mobilization, there need to be other collective political organizations with the capacity to fill the void. The strength of civil society overlaps to some extent with the age of democracy. There is a nearly universal consensus in the literature on post-communist civil society about the weaknesses of these organizations in the younger democracies of eastern Europe. A weak civil society is often considered to be the result of low levels of social and interpersonal trust in these societies, originating from the totalitarian past, as well as of the non-transparent and elite-driven transition processes (Bernhard 1996; Howard 2003). However, the differences between countries within eastern Europe are considerable as well. In some countries (e.g., Poland, Hungary) democracy came about partly because of mobilization by civil society actors. In other countries, for instance in Romania, civil society was less developed in 1989 and instead of organized mobilization, a spontaneous protest started the regime change. Moreover, as the literature on the rise of transnational civil society shows (Florini 2012), the strength of civil society does not always develop in a linear fashion with the age of democracy. Thus, we expect that party protests are more likely in contexts where civil society is weaker even when taking the age of a democracy into account.

To conclude, we expect that both context conditions (age of democracy and civil society strength) negatively affect the general *level* of party protests. By contrast, they are not expected to change the *type* of parties that sponsor protests. The only exception might concern the strategic factors introduced above. That is, the 'loser effect' (as indicated by government/opposition dynamics and electoral fortunes in general) may be stronger in countries with a younger democratic history. This expectation mirrors Anderson et al.'s (2005, p. 28f.) initial

idea that the losers' consent depends on electoral experience since in new democracies parties and citizens might not yet be used to losing.

Data and Methods

One of the main reasons why party protests have not yet been studied comparatively is the lack of large-scale protest event datasets covering multiple countries over time. For this reason, we collected an original protest event dataset based on the coverage from English-language newswires. In general, protest event analysis – as a type of content analysis of media sources – has been one of the major advances in the field of protest and social movement research as it allows for a quantitative analysis of protest in a cross-sectional and longitudinal setting (for reviews, see Hutter 2014; Koopmans & Rucht 2002).

The data was collected with semi-automated tools in a joint effort by the ERC project 'Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)' at the European University Institute and the SNF project 'Years of Turmoil' at the University of Zurich. It is based on the coverage of ten English-language newswires (on the data collection, see Lorenzini et al. 2018 and appendix B.1). The original data covers protests in 30 European countries: all EU member states (apart from Croatia), Iceland, Norway and Switzerland during a sixteen years period from 2000-2015. The dataset covers 16,897 protest events with an organizational sponsor which involved around 268 million participants (for a detailed analysis, see Kriesi et al. 2018). Given our focus on party-sponsored protests and the merging with additional datasets for the party- and country-level predictors (see below), the analysis in this chapter is based on information from 26 countries (with some exceptions all EU members[22], plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland).

[22] We do not cover Croatia, Finland, Iceland, Luxemburg, and Malta.

As stated initially, we adopt a rather broad definition of sponsorship referring to instances when parties (co-)organize, take part in and/or call for the participation in a protest event. Such a definition goes clearly beyond support of the *claims* of protests and includes also support of the action form. However, it does not allow to differentiate whether parties play a significant role in the organization of the protest event or not. As Rucht (1998, p. 41) highlighted some time ago, such fine-grained measures are also used beyond the scope of a protest event analysis based on media reports.

In line with our expectation, party protests are a rare phenomenon and only a relatively small share (14%) of the protest events have been sponsored by parties. More than three quarters of these are demonstrations, followed by petitions, symbolic actions and some blockades or violent events (for details, see Borbáth & Hutter 2018).

We matched each of the sponsoring parties with the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow 2012) to gain further information about the vote share, ideology, party family as well as opposition/government status of each party. More specifically, we rely on three ideological scales: a general left–right scale, an economic left–right scale, and a cultural libertarian-authoritarian scale.[23] We code parties as radical if they were classified by ParlGov as communist, Green or radical right. In addition to ParlGov, we rely on the expert surveys conducted by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012; 2017) in 2008/2013 and use their additive index to measure mass-party organizations.[24] The index is based on four indicators as experts are asked to evaluate how strong (1) the party apparatus and (2) the party membership is in determining policy (7-point scale). They also evaluate (3) whether the party has a 'significant membership base' relative to the other parties in the system (dichotomous) and are asked to indicate (4) whether the party is organizationally affiliated with any interest/civil society group, including (but not

[23] ParlGov relies on expert surveys – for the most recent periods, they rely on CHES data (Bakker et al. 2015)
[24] Given party organizations are relatively stable over time, we take the party specific mean in the case of parties covered by both surveys and the individual survey estimate in the case of parties covered by one of the surveys.

limited to) trade unions, business associations and church groups (dichotomous). Finally, to measure the two contextual factors, we rely on the age of democracy using the cut-off points defined by Boix et al. (2013)[25] included in the Quality of Government dataset (*bmr_demdur*, see Teorell et al. 2018). To measure the strength of civil society we rely on the expert survey-based 'core' civil society index of V-Dem (*v2xcs_ccsi*, see Coppedge et al. 2017). The measure is an aggregate index of three indicators: civil society entry/exit, civil society repression and civil society participatory environment. The index was designed to reflect the robustness of civil society understood as an autonomous sphere where citizens are active and free to pursue their political and/or civic goals, however conceived.

To reduce the sample to relevant observations and eliminate very small party formations, we excluded parties that did not sponsor any protest events during the whole period of observation.[26] We tested all hypotheses without excluding any parties, and the results were substantively the same (available from the authors). In the final dataset, parties are nested in country/government combinations, since government formation does not always follow the electoral calendar.[27] We dropped about one third of all governments, selecting those during whose term there were no party sponsored protests. These are relatively short-lived cabinets formed around election time.[28] By dropping such periods, we minimize problems of underreporting party sponsored protest events in some countries and periods. In addition, we control in the models for the length of the government. Overall, the empirical analysis is based on 266 parties from 26 countries.

[25] The index measures the age the current regime which in most cases is the same as the age of democracy. However, in the case of Germany the variable 'resets the clock' in 1990. We have changed this to indicate continuity with West Germany and thus measure the age of German democracy from 1948.
[26] ParlGov includes small parties only if they gained 1% of the vote or two seats in parliament.
[27] ParlGov codes a government as new if: (1) the range of parties which are part of the government change or; (2) the prime minister changes or; (3) there is a general election.
[28] The average of length of a cabinet we keep in the dataset is 2.7 years. The average length of a cabinet we dropped is 1.2 years. Dropping these cabinets does not change the results.

The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the number of sponsored protests by party during the term of each government. The variable has a value of zero in the case of parties that did not sponsor any protests during the term of the particular cabinet and a maximum of 17.[29] The dataset violates the assumption of independent observations, since party sponsored protests likely cluster by countries and correlate over time. Since part of our expectations refer to the effect of contextual characteristics and cross-level interactions we report the results of random-intercept three-level multilevel models with parties nested in country*year and country clusters.[30] Country*year clusters control for the linear trends in some of our independent variables (e.g., all democracies get older with one additional year at the same time).[31] In addition, the three level structure ensures that we do not treat the country*year clusters as independent observations (Fairbrother 2014a).

Empirical Results

Before presenting the results of our regression analysis, figure 4.1 shows some descriptive data on the number of party protests by the ideology of the sponsoring party, incumbent status, and party organization. As the results suggest, most protests are sponsored by parties from the left if we group parties according to their stance on the economic left–right dimension. By contrast, if we group parties according to their stance on the cultural dimension, the results are less clear-cut. We find equally high numbers on the extreme left and right. In addition, we observe the highest average number for those parties rated by the experts as holding a

[29] We also ran the analysis with a dichotomous measure of whether a party sponsored a protest during the term of a government or not. The results are substantively the same.

[30] The multilevel models cannot account for all timeseries induced autocorrelation. The country*year level accounts for the correlation within party protests in the same year but treats party protests in a subsequent year as an independent cluster. Therefore, we also ran Prais–Winsten models, which are regularly used in political science with similarly structured datasets (e.g., Spoon et al. 2014). The party-level results were the same (see robustness check in appendix B.2).

[31] The alternative specification, government*country combinations nested in countries does not change the results, and since it does not account for overall time-trends in our variables (government change in different time in the different countries), we opted for country*year clusters nested in countries. The difference is marginal: from 161 country*year combinations there are only 8 cases with a government shorter than one year.

centrist position on the libertarian-authoritarian scale. A closer look at the data suggests that these are mainly parties from central and eastern Europe that are coded as economically left-wing but somewhere in the middle on cultural issues. Moreover, the plot on the bottom-left in figure 4.1 strongly supports the claim that parties in opposition stage most party protests. Similarly, we observe a clear-cut increase in sponsored events, the more a political party adopts a mass-party organization.

Figure 4.1: Type of parties sponsoring protests



Note: The y-axis shows the average number of coded protests for a given party type. The ideological scales are based on the ParlGov dataset. The original 11 points scales have been recoded into five categories: extreme left (0-2); left (2-4); center (4-6); right (6-8); and extreme right (8-10). In the mass party window, the quintiles of the continuous scale are represented on the x-axis.

The descriptive findings seem to support our expectations on the typical protesting party, but they do not account for possible confounding factors and for the relationship between variables. For this reason, we conduct the multilevel regression analysis as described in the previous section. Table 4.1 presents the results. The first three models test our expectations about ideological differences. In model 1, we only include the ideological position of the party on a general left–right dimension. The model indicates a lack of differentiation and suggests that parties across the left–right divide are willing to sponsor protests. However, as model 2 shows, once we account for the two dimensions of party competition, ideology becomes an important predictor of party protests. Parties which are economically on the left and/or culturally on the right are the most likely to sponsor protests. The latter effect is weaker than the effect of the economic dimension, but its size stays relatively constant across the different models. Moreover, model 3 also shows that radical parties are significantly more likely to sponsor protests than their moderate counterparts. The effect is relatively large even when we account for the positioning of parties on the two ideological dimensions.

Table 4.1: The effect of party level characteristics on party sponsored protests

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
Left–right	-0.05							
	(-1.00)							
Economic left–right		-0.27***	-0.21***	-0.17**	-0.20***	-0.16*	-0.18**	-0.17**
		(-5.36)	(-3.74)	(-3.06)	(-3.59)	(-2.38)	(-3.14)	(-3.05)
Cultural left–right		0.19***	0.15**	0.13*	0.14**	0.05	0.13*	0.13*
		(3.59)	(2.81)	(2.42)	(2.70)	(0.81)	(2.53)	(2.37)
Radical (base: moderate)			0.33**	0.39**	0.43***	0.47**	0.42***	0.39**
			(2.91)	(3.07)	(3.33)	(3.09)	(3.30)	(3.03)
Opposition (base: gov.)				0.40***		0.46***	0.30*	0.37**
				(3.32)		(3.59)	(2.41)	(3.10)
Vote Share				0.15**	0.09	0.13*	-0.00	0.16**
				(2.71)	(1.66)	(1.99)	(-0.05)	(2.73)
Delta Vote Share					-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	0.01
					(-0.39)	(-1.30)	(-0.25)	(0.20)
Mass Party Org.						0.23***		
						(3.53)		
Opposition (base: gov.) * Vote Share							0.27*	
							(2.54)	
Delta Vote Share * Vote Share								-0.11
								(-1.85)
Length of gov. in office	0.26***	0.26***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.29***	0.26***	0.25***
	(4.09)	(4.14)	(4.01)	(3.94)	(4.02)	(4.14)	(4.15)	(3.94)
Constant	0.75***	0.74***	0.61***	0.30*	0.57***	0.26	0.41**	0.34*
	(7.24)	(7.11)	(5.49)	(2.16)	(5.03)	(1.81)	(2.76)	(2.37)
Country: sd(Const)	0.42***	0.43***	0.42***	0.41***	0.42***	0.35***	0.42***	0.41***
	(-4.10)	(-4.03)	(-4.02)	(-3.97)	(-4.00)	(-3.54)	(-3.94)	(-3.94)
Country*Year: sd(Const)	0.33***	0.35***	0.35***	0.37***	0.36***	0.42***	0.37***	0.37***
	(-4.32)	(-4.51)	(-4.56)	(-4.71)	(-4.59)	(-4.27)	(-4.73)	(-4.71)
sd(Residual)	1.49***	1.46***	1.46***	1.44***	1.45***	1.39***	1.44***	1.44***
	(16.41)	(15.64)	(15.44)	(15.08)	(15.38)	(11.39)	(14.94)	(15.02)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	726	990	990
Countries	26	26	26	26	26	23	26	26
Country*Year	157	157	157	157	157	144	157	157
AIC	3680.68	3652.12	3645.72	3636.21	3646.99	2634.15	3633.68	3636.69
BIC	3710.06	3686.40	3684.90	3685.18	3695.96	2689.20	3692.45	3695.46

Note: t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; all continuous variables have been standardized so the effect sizes are directly comparable.

Models 4 and 5 in table 4.1 present the results for our expectations on the strategic factors. In model 4 we introduce opposition status, while controlling for the size of the party. As the model indicates, opposition parties are more likely to sponsor protests than government parties. The effect is similar in size to the difference between radical and moderate parties. Vote share does not have an effect (results not shown) and only becomes statistically significant when we control for incumbency status. Based on these results, it seems that small and large parties are equally likely to sponsor protests. Relative loss of parties seems relatively unimportant in predicting protest sponsorship. The effect points in the expected direction but it is substantively small and statistically non-significant. We take these results as indicating that opposition–government dynamics are key to understanding party protests but that there is no general 'loser effect.'

In model 6, we introduce the mass-party organization as an independent variable. Unfortunately, we do not have this information for all parties, and therefore we test the hypothesis on a subsample of our dataset (the sample size shrinks by about 27%). Most of the parties we lose have a conservative position on the cultural dimension of party competition. Nevertheless, the results show that parties which have organizations approximating the mass party model are significantly more likely to sponsor protest. Substantively the effect size is relatively large and approximates the robust ideological differences of party positions on the economic dimension as uncovered in model 2.

The last two models 7 and 8 in table 4.1 test our hunch that large parties might be especially likely to respond to power relations in the electoral arena, either because they are in opposition or because they have lost a great share of their vote. The results show that the interaction between opposition and size is substantively large and statistically significant, whereas the interaction between relative loss and opposition is substantively smaller and statistically not significant. To have a better sense for their substantive importance, figure 4.2 shows the mar-

ginal effects from model 7 and 8. As the figure shows, among parties in opposition, the larger ones are most likely to sponsor protests. This interaction effect is larger than the interaction effect between relative loss and vote share. Compared to smaller formations, large parties seem only marginally more likely to respond with sponsoring protests to fluctuations in their voter share.

Figure 4.2: Marginal effects of opposition status and relative losses across vote shares



Note: The marginal effects are based on the interactions presented in model 7 and 8 in table 4.1. The interaction effect in the case of relative loss is plotted at the 10th and 90th percentiles of vote change. These cut-off point correspond to -47 and 57 percentage points relative to the previous vote share of the party.

Party Protests in Context

The previous analysis only modelled the party-level variance without considering the influence of the social and political context on parties' willingness to sponsor protests. Figure 4.3 shows the level of protest by parties in different types of democracies and under varying strength of civil society. As the figure shows, parties are more likely to protest in third-wave democracies of central and eastern and southern Europe. In line with our expectations, in the relatively old democracies of northwestern Europe, where the two arenas are expected to be more differentiated, parties are less likely to sponsor protests. The effect of the strength of civil society is less clear-cut. Until a threshold is reached, parties are more likely to sponsor protest, the stronger civil society is. However, once this threshold is passed, parties are crowded out and their willingness to sponsor protests drops dramatically. Even though the effect is less linear than assumed, the figure points out that the largest difference is between a context with a very strong civil society and the rest.

These descriptive results suggest that parties' decision to sponsor protests is also affected by characteristics of the broader context in which they operate. Indeed, when we run the empty three-level hierarchical model – as set out in the data and methods' section – the intraclass correlation coefficient indicates that while most of the variance is on the party-level, we observe about 13.8% of the variance at the level of country*year clusters in addition to 6% at the country level. In the current section, we explore this variance with two contextual indicators: the age of democracy and the strength of civil society. Unsurprisingly, the two are somewhat correlated (Pearson r=.36). Therefore, we include them sequentially.

Figure 4.3: Protesting parties by the type of democracy and the strength of civil society



Note: The figure shows the average number of sponsored protests by a party across types of democracies and civil society strength (for the latter, we split the index into its quartiles).

In model 1 in table 4.2, we include the age of democracy. The model supports the descriptive findings: the longer the democratic experience of a given country, the less party sponsored protests are observed. In model 2, we include the strength of civil society. The effect has the same size as the effect of the age of democracy. If civil society is strong, parties are crowded out from the protest arena and – in line with expectations – they are less likely to sponsor protest. In model 3 we include both indicators simultaneously. Their effect size decreases, but the results show that when holding the age of democracy constant, parties are still less willing to sponsor protest if civil society is strong. Put differently, even if a democracy is relatively young, parties are less willing to sponsor protests if civil society is strong.

Table 4.2: The effect of context level characteristics on party sponsored protests

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Economic left–right	-0.16**	-0.18**	-0.17**	-0.15**
	(-2.89)	(-3.13)	(-3.00)	(-2.72)
Cultural left–right	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.11*
	(2.27)	(2.30)	(2.22)	(2.09)
Radical (base: moderate)	0.44***	0.41**	0.44***	0.49***
	(3.48)	(3.23)	(3.46)	(3.80)
Opposition (base: government)	0.38**	0.39***	0.38**	0.40***
	(3.22)	(3.30)	(3.25)	(3.35)
Vote Share	0.17**	0.16**	0.17**	0.17**
	(2.90)	(2.81)	(2.92)	(3.04)
Delta Vote Share	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(-0.46)	(-0.40)	(-0.47)	(-0.30)
Age of democracy	-0.27**		-0.19*	-0.03
	(-3.16)		(-1.99)	(-0.28)
Civil Society		-0.29***	-0.21*	-0.20*
		(-3.40)	(-2.49)	(-2.40)
Opposition (base: government) * Age of democracy				-0.24*
				(-2.41)
Length of gov. in office	0.27***	0.26***	0.27***	0.27***
	(4.32)	(4.26)	(4.41)	(4.39)
Constant	0.33*	0.29*	0.32*	0.29*
	(2.54)	(2.08)	(2.35)	(2.13)
Country: sd(Const)	0.32***	0.43***	0.37***	0.37***
	(-4.27)	(-3.99)	(-4.08)	(-4.09)
Country*Year: sd(Const)	0.36***	0.32***	0.32***	0.33***
	(-4.67)	(-4.39)	(-4.38)	(-4.47)
sd(Residual)	1.44***	1.44***	1.44***	1.44***
	(15.08)	(15.08)	(15.08)	(14.92)
Observations	990	990	990	990
Countries	26	26	26	26
Country*Year	157	157	157	157
AIC	3631.18	3629.01	3627.45	3623.69
BIC	3689.96	3687.78	3691.12	3692.26

Note: t statistics in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; all continuous variables have been standardized so the effect sizes are directly comparable

Beyond the direct effect of the age of democracy and the strength of civil society, our theoretical framework pointed to the conditional effect of these contextual factors in incentivizing electoral losers – either parties in opposition or those that have lost a large share of their vote – to sponsor protest. We expected electoral losers to be more likely to mobilize on the streets when democracy has been in place for a shorter period or civil society is weaker. Given that we find no direct effect of the relative loss variable, we concentrate on the government/opposition difference. Model 4 in table 4.2 presents the cross-level interaction effects. Parties in opposition are more likely to mobilize on the streets in newer democracies, holding the strength of civil society constant (model 1). Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effects based on the interaction terms. As the figure suggests, the age of democracy decreases opposition parties' presence in the protest arena.

Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of opposition status across the age of democracy



Note: Marginal Effects based on the interaction in model 4 in table 4.2.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have presented the first large-scale analysis of party protests. More specifically, we focused on protests reported in ten English-language newswires that took place in 26 European countries in the period from 2000 to 2015. By doing so, we have aimed to contribute to the literature on party system change. This literature highlights the pronounced transformations that party organizations and systems have witnessed since the 1970s and that we are faced with an ever-more differentiated and complex party landscape. However, it tends to give short shrift to parties' activities outside the electoral arena. This is unfortunate as the changing landscapes of political contention might give rise to differing incentives for political parties to become active in other arenas of contention – in particular, in protest politics. As case studies highlight parties' decision to bridge the two arenas might have important consequences for party competition and social movement activities alike (on the US case, see Heaney & Rojas 2015; McAdam & Kloos 2014; Schlozman 2015).

We have aimed in this chapter to provide a first cut at the topic by mapping the 'big picture' on how regularly political parties get involved in protests, what defines the typical protesting party in Europe, and which contextual features make parties more likely to protest. Overall, our first results suggest that similar kinds of factors explain protest sponsorship as other party activities, such as their responses to competitors or media attention. More precisely, we highlight the role of ideological, strategic, and organizational explanations. The typical protest party is ideologically situated on the economic left and belongs to a radical party family. Controlling for economic left–right positions, we moreover find that parties located closer to the authoritarian pole of the cultural dimension of the political space are more likely to sponsor protests. Regarding more strategic factors related to the configuration of power in the electoral arena, we find a strong effect of being in opposition, while we only find a more general

'loser effect' for larger opposition parties. Thus, larger parties seem to be more likely to enter the protest arena after massive electoral losses and to withdraw from it in case of major gains in national election. Finally, we observe that parties are more likely to protest if they (still) adopt a mass-party organization, with a large membership base, a strong organizational structure, and close ties to civic associations.

Regarding contextual variation, we started with Kitschelt's (2003) argument that established democracies have seen the emergence of ever more differentiated landscapes of political interest intermediation, i.e., a kind of division of labour between political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Our study confirms this expectation as party protests are a rather rare phenomenon in the universe of protest events. At the same time, we point attention to two important scope conditions of the argument: a long democratic history and a strong civil society. As our results show, parties are more likely to take it to the streets in new(er) democracies and in a context when civil society is not very strong. In such contexts, we also find that strategic government/opposition dynamics are more important in explaining the protest activities by parties than in countries with a longer democratic history.

As stated, this chapter has presented only a first cut at a more complex story. Nonetheless, we think that by showing what type of parties choose to sponsor protests and under what conditions, it provides a useful approach for reconnecting party and social movement research. One limitation of our study is the lack of a typology and empirical measure of specific forms of interactions between political parties and social movements. In a next step, it would be interesting to study these interactions and their consequences for both the electoral and protest arenas as well as to follow the ups and downs of parties' activities in the streets in a more dynamic way than the present study does.

Chapter 5. Different Worlds of Contention?[32]

Introduction

More than twenty years ago, Klingemann and Fuchs (1995) noted a universal rise in non-conventional forms of participation, which they considered the most important transformation Western democracies had undergone since the Second World War. They argued that the rise of protest has changed the informal rules of interaction between citizens and their representatives (also see: Dalton 2008). Citizens learn to rely on protest to scrutinize their representatives and keep political parties in check. Since then, protest developed from a marginal form of participation to one of the main arenas of mobilization. The spread of protest became the subject of a voluminous literature on the 'normalization of protest'. Outlining this development, Meyer and Tarrow (1998 p. 4) name three important aspects. Protest has evolved from a sporadic to a perpetual element of politics, it is used by a more diverse constituency for wider claims and social movements themselves have become professionalised and more conventional.

Our study aims to revisit the spread of protest from a comparative, European perspective. While we are also interested in the level of protest, we focus on a specific aspect of 'normalisation', namely, whether citizens who identify as left-wing are as likely to participate in protests as citizens who identify as right-wing. This is interesting in its own right (Hutter & Kriesi 2013; Soule & Earl 2005, p. 347), given the characteristic predominance of the left in protest found in previous literature. Thus, we focus on the ideological component of normalisation as a widening of the constituency of protest. We follow recent studies of electoral and

[32] The chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Theresa Gessler. Both authors have contributed equally. This is one of several joint works.

protest politics (Hutter & Kriesi forthcoming; Kriesi et al. 2018) that examine differences across the European regions. Regarding party systems, this literature has confirmed differences in patterns of competition and the degree of institutionalization across Northwestern, Southern and Eastern Europe; leading to different forms of linkages between citizens and their representatives (Wineroither & Seeber 2018). For protest, the take-away message is more ambiguous. Though some studies point out the particularities of protest in Southern and Eastern Europe (Altiparmakis & Lorenzini 2018; Ekiert & Kubik 2018), Europe-wide comparisons still tend to universalise the Northwest European protest experience.

In this regard, the link between ideology and protest is particularly interesting, since arguments for the development of 'social movement societies' as well for a predominance of the left have both been derived from the impact of the New Left (e.g. Hutter 2014; Meyer & Tarrow 1998; Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001). This experience, however, is specific to Northwestern Europe. Other countries tend to be omitted in similar studies, not least since population surveys, a standard instrument for the study of protest participation, are more widely available and cover a longer time horizon for Northwestern Europe. Moreover, studies that include post-communist countries (e.g., Torcal et al. 2016) often solely focus on differences in the level of protest rather than on the different character of protest participation across regions (for an exception, see e.g., Vráblíková 2017). In fact, there is no reason why countries with different political systems and histories should reproduce the left–right pattern observed in Northwestern Europe. On the contrary, cross-sectional evidence from the 1990s suggests the opposite may be the case (Bernhagen & Marsh 2007).

We think that our understanding of protest in Europe as a whole – and particularly in Southern and Eastern European countries – benefits theoretically and empirically from a closer look at cross-regional differences in protest patterns. We argue that the relation between left–right orientations and protest is highly context-dependent and shaped by historical and present-day

regime access. Groups that have been excluded from power historically or whose ideological views are not represented in current politics are more likely to protest. We rely on regime access to explain cross-regional differences in the relationship between personal ideology and protest.

To present our argument, we begin by outlining the previous literature on the role of left–right orientations and normalisation. We proceed by examining two facets of regime access to explain differences in protest participation: historical legacies and current political opportunity structures. We then introduce our data and methodological approach, after which we present our results. We find little participation by the left in protest in Eastern Europe, and widespread protest especially by left-wing citizens in Southern Europe. On exploring this further, we encounter a different influence of ideology as a function of exposure to the former regime, partisanship and the ideological stance of the government.

The Northwestern European Experience: Predominance of the Left or Normalisation of Protest?

Most of the evidence we have regarding the relation of left–right placement and protest stems from the two strands of literature mentioned before: the normalisation of protest and the argument about the continued predominance of the left. The normalization of protest literature documents that over the past decades, non-violent demonstrations have become part of the conventional repertoire of politics in northwestern European societies. This is due to the post-1968 trend of increasing protest in which new social movements played a crucial role. The rise of new social movements had two consequences. Firstly, it widened the issue repertoire of the protest arena. With mobilizing for the environment, peace, women and LGBTQ rights, protests over traditional ‘bread and butter’ issues lost their dominance (Hutter 2014b). Secondly, partly as a result of mobilization on these issues, new social movements mobilized

groups previously unlikely to protest (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001, p. 462). In particular, the success of New Left movements potentially attracts counter-mobilization by the right on issues such as immigration and European integration (Gessler & Schulte-Cloos 2018). Hence, protest became available to (almost) all citizens to express their grievances.

Diverging from this, studies of protest behaviour have argued that the left continues to dominate the protest arena. Though ideology has a small impact on participation in conventional politics, protest seems to be the one field in which the left is more strongly represented (van der Meer et al. 2009). One reason for this is a difference in the arenas preferred by the political left and right. Hutter and Kriesi (2013, p. 282) summarise this as follows: "Whereas movements of the right tend to mobilise in the electoral channel, the mobilisation of public protest has been dominated by the left since the rise of the new social movements." Thus, participation by the two camps follows a different logic with the right opting for orderly forms of mobilisation. Although parties may play an intermediary role, most authors, including Hutter and Kriesi (2013), explain this difference with citizens' attitudes and issue positions. According to this view, citizens on the right prefer conventional forms of participation, while citizens on the left endorse social change by all available means.

These theories are not necessarily contradictory. The entrenchment of these patterns of participation in personal values means that ideological differences persist, although they might shrink over time. A pan-European assessment of normalisation should move from a *static view* of citizens' protest proximity towards evaluating the *process* of convergence over time.

Beyond Northwestern Europe: Economic Backwardness or Different Logics?

While initial outlines of the social movement society argument explicitly dealt with post-transition societies (Hipsher 1998; Kubik 1998), attention to circumstances that are different to those in northwestern Europe has faded. Instead, in assessing the development of social movement societies, most comparisons take northwestern Europe as a standard and focus on participation levels, rather than differences between ideological groups. Southern Europe is usually included in the range of potential social movement societies (despite the absence of the New Left protest wave there in the 1970s) since the level of protest in these countries matches or even exceeds northwestern Europe. In contrast, as Gagyi (2015) has argued, differences between northwestern and eastern European social movements are typically understood in terms of inadequacy or backwardness (of the latter). In comparative studies, eastern Europe is frequently equated with 'less developed' countries that exhibit lower protest participation (Rucht 2007, p. 713). For these countries, normalisation and the conventionality of protest is assumed to increase with modernisation.

Beyond the level of protest, we know little about its ideological composition outside of northwestern Europe. The social movement society argument implies that over time, an equal distribution emerges as protest becomes increasingly common. In contrast, Dalton and colleagues (2010) have argued that the effect of left–right placement and the relation between post-materialist values and protest strongly depends on the openness of the political context and the level of economic development. They suggest that it is primarily in politically and economically well-off societies that ideology shapes individuals' propensity to protest. In politically less open countries, citizens have fewer opportunities to mobilise, leading to a weaker effect of ideological polarisation on protest.[33] Unfortunately, Dalton and colleagues rely on

[33] This is supported by empirical evidence from central and eastern Europe that argues protest participation is 'less biased' in terms of left-right composition in this region (Kostelka 2014).

differences that are far larger than the differences within Europe to show the influence of economic and political development. Furthermore, in line with the social movement society approach, they suggest normalisation is merely a question of progress in institutional development.

We contest the implicit assumption of a linear developmental process of modernisation. Instead, we suspect the relation between ideology and protest as well as the level of protest are affected by historical and present-day regime access. In what follows, we develop our argument about the legacies and the political opportunity structure that influence patterns of protest.

Historical Legacies and Protest in Southern and Eastern Europe

In the original formulation of both arguments we have reviewed – the predominance of the left and the normalisation of protest – historical experiences were central. In northwestern Europe, the nexus between protest movements and the left is linked to the cultural revolution and to the emergence of the new social movements of the 1970s (Kriesi et al. 1995). Similarly, the social movement society argument relies on the spread of the New Left's ideas across society. In this sense, the 1970s and 1980s still form the decisive protest experience for northwestern European countries (Hutter 2014b).

However, the New Left has been absent or at least more fragmented in other regions of Europe. In southern Europe the left has been split between a dominant communist and a moderate social democratic group. The dominance of the communist ideology on the left contributed to the lack of appeal of the critical movements of 1968 and the following decades. In addition, three southern Europe countries – Greece, Portugal, and Spain – were ruled by right-wing authoritarian regimes, which persecuted left-wing ideas, forcing left movements to

abandon institutional politics. Italy is a partial exception, given that elections were regularly held and that since the 'apertura a sinistra' in the early 1960s, the non-communist left has been increasingly integrated into the government. Nevertheless, similar to the other three countries, the electorally strong Italian Communist Party was systematically excluded from government until the 1992/93 collapse of the First Republic. In the absence of large new social movements, the left in these countries remained radical or social democratic without a significant turn towards new cultural issues (Kitschelt 1988; Borbáth & Hutter 2018). For a long time, the protest arena and unconventional politics were the only opportunity for the left to express itself politically. Hence, while protest became a normal means of doing politics, it stayed on as a domain of the left with little normalisation.

Even more than in southern Europe, the politics of the transition and the state of democracy remains a central theme in political competition in eastern Europe. The 'regime divide' described by the seminal study of Kitschelt et al. (1999) pits those in favour of an open economic and cultural system against those who favour more state intervention in both issue areas. The resulting configuration forms a combination of issue positions which mirror the Western European 'axis of competition' (Rovny & Edwards 2012). Whitefield & Rohrschneider find an increasing importance of fights about the communist past of politicians (2009, p. 676) which together with restitution of former state property remain part of the issue repertoire of party competition (Appel 2005; Williams et al. 2005). However, the Easter European regimes' ideological orientation was different from those in southern Europe. The continued fight against domestic and international 'fascism' was an important element of the communist regimes' legitimation. Despite some rulers like Ceaușescu that incorporated nationalism into their appeal, liberal, Christian–Democratic, and right-wing citizens often had to organise below the state's radar. During their four-decades-long rule, the communist regimes appropriat-

ed the symbols of left-wing politics and kept these countries isolated from the influence of New Left ideas.

With the 1989 regime changes, eastern European societies experienced the rise of mass protests and the de-legitimization of left-wing ideas. Mobilization in the name of social justice was associated with the communist past and parties on the left were reluctant to challenge the neoliberal character of the socio-economic transition (e.g., Tavits & Letki 2009). Individual liberty, free markets, and other right-wing ideas seemed like a progressive break with the past. According to comparative analyses of protest in Poland (Ekiert & Kubik 1999, p. 184) economic protests focussed on pragmatic 'everyday concerns', and did not feed into a comprehensive ideological challenge of the existing order. When links to ideology were explicitly made, it was often by the right. Until today, a substantive part of civic activism in eastern Europe occurs in contexts that scholars have labelled as 'uncivil society' (Kopecky & Mudde 2002).

Given the historically limited access to the regime of citizens with left-wing ideas in eastern Europe and right-wing ones in southern Europe, as well as the dynamic of the post-transition period, we hypothesize that:

H1: In northwestern and southern Europe, respondents who identify as left are more likely to participate in protest than those who identify as right. In eastern Europe, the opposite applies.

Taking these regional differences into account, we can specify our expectation regarding the development over time of protest by citizens with different ideological views. In line with our previous discussion of the dynamic view of normalization, we expect convergence with the most protest prone group in each region. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H2: *Over time in northwestern and southern Europe, respondents with different ideological views converge with the left in their protest participation. Over time in eastern Europe, respondents with different ideological views converge with the right in their protest participation.*

Historical Legacies and Individual Level Behaviour

Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) distinguish two ways to conceptualize the effect of post-communist legacies on individual-level attitudes and behaviours. Citizens may behave differently because they 'live in a post-communist country' or because they 'lived through communism'. They argue that rather than the mere fact of living in a post-communist country, it is having lived through communism with its education system that leaves a lasting impact on citizens. The post-communist legacy is then not primarily the current economic or political situation of the country, but the past socializing experience individuals living in this country have been exposed to. Indeed, the literature has provided evidence that the grievances of citizens who were socialized under communism may be different than those of subsequent generations; having lived under communism brings a comparative perspective to citizens' evaluations of regime performance. When a political regime does not meet the expectations of citizens, they may engage in protest, which in many countries was the dominant form of public participation during the transition period (Ekiert 1993).

Turning towards the relationship between left–right positioning and protest, we expect that exposure to communism results in left-wing citizens being less likely to participate in protest for two main reasons. First, because most mass-mobilization under the former regime was framed according to left-wing ideas and traditions. May 1st marches may be the textbook example of such state-organized glorifications of the working class. This may taint protest mobilization for left-wing ideas in the minds of citizens, leading to hardly any mass-mobilization

for social justice or tolerance in the immediate post-communist period (Bohle & Greskovits 2006). Second, commemorations of historical events, the memory of which was censored by the communist state, provide ample opportunities for right-wing actors to formulate an exclusive claim, according to which they alone represent the national identity of each of these countries. Such occasions help right-wing actors frame anti-communism in terms of resistance to foreign powers and ideas, a narrative in which the transition appears as a moment of national awakening. For instance, the largest right-wing protest wave in the region, the Hungarian anti-government rallies in 2006, explicitly referenced the 1956 uprising in anti-communist and nationalist terms. Greskovits (2017, p. 15) highlights the importance of different patriotic and nationalist frames in the Hungarian context for mobilizing citizens in the civic sphere. Such events target those with direct exposure to the former regimes and succeed by calling for solidarity with their past experiences.

Even though most of the literature, including Pop-Eleches and Tucker, aims to understand the effect of communist legacies on individual-level behaviour, we believe the conceptual framework is similarly useful in understanding the legacies of past regimes in southern Europe. Della Porta et al. (2018) examine how the legacy of the former regimes and the transition is instrumentalized by Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Greek protest movements to mobilize for their goals. Although they do not focus on individual-level differences, mobilization against the legacy of the former right-wing regimes might primarily rally those who have direct experiences with right-wing authoritarianism and were persecuted due to their left-wing ideas. Similar to communism, the legacy of right-wing oppression might taint protest participation for conservative goals in the minds of citizens. As Della Porta and colleagues show, historical legacies shape the protest scene in fundamental ways and impact the interaction of social movements and the state. Therefore, we expect that in the two regions, a similar mechanism leads to a different conditional effect of exposure:

H3A: Past exposure to communism deters citizens on the left from protest participation. H3B: Past exposure to right-wing authoritarianism deters citizens on the right from protest participation.

Electoral Politics and Partisanship

Notwithstanding the importance of direct exposure to the former regimes, its role in explaining cross-regional differences might prove transitory as it wears off with generational replacement. However, we have highlighted regime access as the mechanism behind the effect of historical legacies. Even though the transition to democracy changed the character of this mechanism, it continues to influence protest behaviour in the post-transition period, independently of generational replacement. With reasonably free and fair elections, government composition becomes the most important determinant of access. Therefore, we introduce a second set of factors explaining regional differences in the ideological composition of protest: the interaction between the protest and the electoral arenas. We focus on two factors in particular: the moderating effects of partisanship and the ideology of the government.

In social movement studies, the interaction between the electoral and the protest arenas is analysed as part of the political opportunity structure framework. While it is often unclear whether the political opportunity structure framework refers to one or many variables (Rucht 1996, p. 26), it has almost always included some reference to the power relations in the party system. Using labels such as ‘configuration of actors’ (Kriesi 2008), ‘alliance -’ and ‘conflict structures’ (Rucht 1996), or ‘elite allies’ and ‘divisions within the elite’ (Tarrow 2011), scholars have argued that the interaction with the electoral arena is key to understanding both the emergence and the development of social movements (McAdam et al. 1996).

At the individual level, numerous studies have shown that participation in the electoral and the protest arena are complementary (e.g., Teorell et al. 2007, p. 354). First, voters who identify with parties are among the most efficacious citizens who are interested in politics, are part of politically mobilized networks, follow the news, and know the most about political issues. Second, political parties directly mobilize supporters in the protest arena. Though not all parties venture outside the electoral arena, the previous chapter has shown that a diverse subset of parties regularly organize or sponsor protests. Consequently, party identification is among the best predictors of protest (van Aelst & Walgrave 2001).

However, the literature documents important east–west differences in the role of parties in mobilizing protest in Europe. When protest is supported by parties in northwestern and southern Europe, it is mostly left-wing parties (and occasionally the extreme right) that mobilize. Conservative or Christian–Democratic parties have been reluctant to organize in the streets (see the previous chapter). In contrast, political parties have been identified as the main mobilisers for all kinds of participation in eastern Europe, including protest (Teorell et al. 2007, p. 351). Studies of single countries and some comparative evidence suggest that right-wing parties have been more active in sponsoring protest in eastern Europe. For instance, Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland have successfully used protests to mobilize their supporters (Gerő & Kerény 2017; Greskovits 2017). Coupled with the weakness of Green and New Left parties and the reluctance of post-communist left parties to mobilize protest, we argue this contributed to different patterns of protest participation in eastern Europe where citizens on the right are more likely to protest. Therefore, we expect that partisan identification enhances the effect of ideology on protest:

H4A: In northwestern and southern Europe, party identification strengthens the effect of left-wing ideology on respondents' propensity to protest.

H4B: In eastern Europe, party identification strengthens the effect of right-wing ideology on respondents' propensity to protest.

The Moderating Effect of Government Ideology

Beyond partisanship, we expect that government ideology influences the composition of protest. The 'winners' vs. 'losers' dichotomy captures the mechanism behind the effect of government ideology. Following the initial formulation of this argument, individuals who voted for parties that do not enter government have higher incentives to participate politically and contest the government in power. Anderson et al. (2005, pp. 45–47) confirm the winner–loser gap with survey data in people's predisposition to engage in protest activities. Although Anderson and colleagues measure the winner-loser status with party preferences, (van der Meer et al. 2009, pp. 1432–1433) make a compelling argument as to why ideological labels are a better fit to capture the underlying dichotomy. Citizens' perceptions of discrepancies between their own and the government's ideological position are better predictors of their attitudes and behaviour than the identity of the party in government. Especially in volatile party systems where parties as organization may disappear while the programmatic structure stays constant over time (see chapter 2), ideology serves as an important cue of where parties stand. Accordingly, van der Meer et al. (2009) find that citizens who are ideologically most distant from the government in office are more likely to protest.

The extent to which the electoral arena is able to contain conflict depends on the willingness of losers to accept the outcome of elections. As Anderson et al. (2005; 2006) argue, losers are less likely to consent in new democracies. The difference between old and new democracies is driven by two factors. First, as Mair (1997) notes in an influential essay, elections in newer democracies often carry higher stakes than in older, more established democracies. For instance, in these countries, shaping and re-shaping the institutional arrangement may be part of

the issue agenda. Therefore, any election might have grave consequences for those who end up losing. Second, the electorate in newer democracies has not yet become accustomed to losing. For instance, the frustration of the supporters of Fidesz after the party elite accepted the outcome of the 2002 election resulted in violent street protests and influenced the formation of a competing party, Jobbik.

The results of Anderson and Mendes (2006, p. 105) indicate that after about twenty years, the difference between old and new democracies shrinks noticeably. Therefore, as far as regional differences exist regarding the protest propensity of election losers, these may be specific to eastern Europe only. Given the impact of the ideology of the government on protest, particularly in new democracies, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H5A: The more ideologically distant citizens are from the government in office, the more likely they are to protest.
H5B: The ideology of the government has the strongest moderating effect on the relationship between the ideology of the respondent and protest in eastern European countries.

Data and Methods

We use all available eight waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), covering the period 2002 to 2016. The dataset is regularly used in the literature on protest and is collected biannually across European countries. Previous studies that use a similar dataset (e.g., Torcal et al. 2016) do not model the cross-classified nature of the observations and assume their independence over time. We improve on their modelling strategy by accounting for the cross-classified nature of responses, within countries and within waves (years). Following recent literature on cross-classified models with cross-national survey data collected over time (Fairbrother 2014), we recognize that the resulting country*year combinations are not independent and are

additionally nested in countries. Hence, we rely on three-level models, with respondents nested in country*year groupas and in countries.[34]

While some studies have considered protest within the context of other forms of political participation (van der Meer et al. 2009) , we only use the survey question regarding participation in lawful demonstrations. Our expectations regarding normalization only affect political protest (and not conventional participation). The dependent variable is respondent participation in a lawful demonstration in the past 12 months. The respective question is included in every survey; it is part of a wider battery of questions on political participation with a response rate of over 99%. Answers are heavily skewed towards respondents who have not participated in a demonstration during the last year. Figure 5.1 presents the share of protesters in each of the 25 countries we analyse. Across Europe, less than 7% of respondents went to demonstrations. Only in Spain, France, and Italy, did more than every tenth respondent participate in lawful protests. In ten countries, seven of which are from eastern Europe, the percentage of respondents who have participated in a demonstration is below 5%. Hence, the regional average participation rate is 12.8% in southern Europe, 7.3% in northwestern Europe and 3.5% in eastern Europe.

[34] To ease the convergence of these relatively complex models, all continuous variables have been rescaled to a range between 0 and 1.

Figure 5.1: Share of protesters across Europe



Note: Darker shades reflect higher average share of protesters in each country, across all ESS waves. The share is calculated from all respondents who indicated that they have participated in a lawful demonstration in the previous 12 months in the respective country.

While we argue with structural differences between the three European regions, we recognize the importance of the country-level variation. The interclass correlation shows that 13.3% of the variance in protest behaviour is due to differences between country*years, and an additional 11.2% is due to differences between countries. According to our theoretical framework, these differences not only affect the level of protest, but also the varying ways the causal

mechanism behind the relationship between personal ideology and protest unfolds. Therefore, we add a random slope for ideology to our three-level models.

Independent Variables

Our two key independent variables are left–right self-placement and regions. To avoid assuming a linear effect of ideology on protest, we use the 11-point scale to group respondents into extreme left (0-1), left (2-4), centre (5), right (6-8), and extreme right (9-10).[35] We group respondents from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom into northwestern Europe; respondents from Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal into southern Europe; and respondents from Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into eastern Europe.

To assess the impact of exposure to previous regimes on the individual level, we follow Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) and introduce the number of years an individual lived under these regimes. In line with their operationalization, we do not consider the first six years and only code the variable for respondents who were born in the respective country. Since the measure is a function of the respondents' age, we follow their modelling strategy and always control for age when we assess the effect of exposure. Naturally, this variable is only available for eastern and southern Europe. In the former case we count the period between 1945-89 as communist years; in the latter case we code country-specific periods for the Franco regime in

[35] Since we model the effect of ideology as a categorical measure, we can safely exclude respondents who did not answer about their ideological beliefs. We ran all models without excluding this group and the results are the same (available from the authors).

Spain (1939-75), the Estado Novo regime in Portugal (1933-74), and the rule of the military junta in Greece (1967-74).[36]

We measure the strength of party identification with two survey items. First, respondents were asked whether they "feel closer to any particular political party than all other parties". Those who answered affirmatively were asked to indicate on a four points scale how close they feel to this party. The combination of the two results is a five-point scale ranging between 'no party identification', 'not at all close', 'not close', 'quite close' and 'very close'.

To estimate the impact of government ideology, we rely on the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow 2012). Since the dependent variable refers to protest participation in the previous 12 months, we measure the ideological stance of the government with the ideological position of parties that were part of the cabinet during the year prior to the ESS fieldwork. We calculate the average left–right position of government parties, weighted by their seat share.

Concerning control variables, we follow previous studies of ideology and protest to enhance comparability. To control for what Schussman and Soule (2005) call 'biographical availability', we include age and unemployment. We include gender, following the finding that men typically protest more. Personal resources are measured with the respondents' years of education, and the size of the municipality where the respondent lives, ranging from a big city to the countryside. To capture organizational mobilization, we control for union membership next to party identification. At the country*year level, we follow Dalton et al. (2010) by introducing controls for economic and political development alongside the ideology of the government. Economic development is measured by GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity in 2011 international dollar, political development is measured by the World Bank estimate of voice

[36] Since in the post-Second World War history of Italy does not fit our conceptualization of an authoritarian regime well, we do not code the measure for respondents from Italy. Excluding Italy does not change the substantive results.

and accountability (Welzel & Deutsch 2012). The latter accounts for general differences in the organizational structure of protest across societies. If the alternative explanation that Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) call 'living in a post-communist country' (as opposed to having lived under communism) explains regional differences, the region variable should have no additional effect after controlling for economic and political development.

We also conducted extensive robustness checks to assess if the differences in the effect of left–right ideology on protest we find are indeed due to historical and present-day regime access. Our alternative models in appendix C.2 assess to which extent ideological labels systematically vary between countries and respondents because of differences in value orientation, issue positions, the embeddedness in social cleavages, and the importance of political parties. The results confirm the conclusions of the more parsimonious specification presented below.

Results

Normalisation and Regional Patterns of Protest

The three regression models presented in table 5.1 speak to our baseline expectations. The first model includes our two key variables of interest – personal ideology, and European regions – as well as the individual and aggregate control variables previously introduced. The second model includes a two-way interaction between personal ideology and region to examine whether the effect of ideology on protest varies between the three regions. The third model includes a three-way interaction between personal ideology, region, and the year of the survey to consider our expectation of normalization as a process of the different ideological groups converging in their protest participation over time.

Table 5.1: Normalization of protest in the three European regions

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-2.48 (0.38)***	-2.41 (0.38)***	-2.28 (0.40)***
Ideology			
Extreme left (base: left)	0.46 (0.04)***	0.68 (0.04)***	0.63 (0.08)***
Center	-0.51 (0.03)***	-0.60 (0.03)***	-0.61 (0.05)***
Right	-0.65 (0.05)***	-0.90 (0.04)***	-1.01 (0.08)***
Extreme right	-0.50 (0.07)***	-0.86 (0.09)***	-0.88 (0.15)***
Union membership, party identification			
Union member (dichot.)	0.50 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	0.93 (0.02)***	0.93 (0.02)***	0.93 (0.02)***
Socio-demographics			
Male	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.41 (0.06)***	-2.39 (0.06)***	-2.40 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.51 (0.12)***	3.52 (0.11)***	3.52 (0.11)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.23 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.39 (0.02)***	-0.39 (0.02)***	-0.38 (0.02)***
Village	-0.63 (0.02)***	-0.63 (0.02)***	-0.63 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.51 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Gov. Ideology and Aggregate Controls			
Gov. L-R	0.29 (0.10)**	0.25 (0.10)*	0.27 (0.10)**
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.47 (0.43)	0.50 (0.43)	-0.23 (0.55)
Voice & Accountability	-1.15 (0.32)***	-1.14 (0.32)***	-0.71 (0.35)*
Region, Year of Survey			
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.58 (0.30)	0.60 (0.30)*	0.37 (0.33)
Eastern Europe	-0.87 (0.31)**	-1.15 (0.30)***	-1.79 (0.36)***
Year of Survey			-0.05 (0.12)
Interaction Terms			
Ext Left*SE		-0.22 (0.08)**	-0.30 (0.16)
Center*SE		-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.12)
Right*SE		0.05 (0.10)	0.36 (0.16)*
Ext Right*SE		0.23 (0.17)	0.20 (0.29)
Ext Left*EE		-0.67 (0.09)***	-0.62 (0.22)**
Center*EE		0.38 (0.07)***	0.61 (0.15)***
Right*EE		0.86 (0.09)***	1.24 (0.18)***
Ext Right*EE		1.11 (0.14)***	1.59 (0.27)***
Ext Left*Year			0.11 (0.13)
Center*Year			0.04 (0.09)
Right*Year			0.24 (0.13)
Ext Right*Year			0.05 (0.26)
SE*Year*Ext Left			0.17 (0.26)
EE*Year*Ext Left			-0.12 (0.34)
SE*Year*Center			-0.03 (0.20)
EE*Year*Center			-0.42 (0.24)

SE*Year*Right			-0.64 (0.28)*
EE*Year*Right			-0.71 (0.28)*
SE*Year*Ext Right			0.04 (0.49)
EE*Year*Ext Right			-0.89 (0.44)*
AIC	116225.24	116107.32	116098.76
BIC	116602.92	116568.93	116717.73
Log Likelihood	-58076.62	-58009.66	-57990.38
Num. obs.	265927	265927	265927
Country*Years	169	169	169
Countries	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.12	0.11	0.09
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.14	0.02	0.05
Var Country*Years: Center	0.05	0.02	0.02
Var Country*Years: Right	0.24	0.10	0.09
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.53	0.30	0.29
Var Country: Intercept	0.20	0.20	0.24

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

As the first model shows, we indeed witness the continued predominance of the political left, whether extremist or moderate. Hence, in line with previous studies (Torcal et al. 2016), we find little support for the movement society argument regarding the ideological component of normalisation. Additionally, the model predicts a slightly higher level of protest in southern Europe and a lower level of protest in eastern Europe, compared to northwestern Europe. With a few exceptions, all control variables are statistically significant and point in the expected direction. Protest is positively associated with union membership, party identification, being male, being younger than average, education, size of the municipality, right-wing governments and living under an institutional arrangement which is less effective in ensuring 'voice and accountability'. Controlling for these factors, unemployment and the GDP of the country do not play a role.

The second model shows that the three European regions differ not only in the level, but in the type of protest they experience, even after controlling for the aggregate-level factors previously introduced. The cross-level interaction between the three regions and respondents'

personal ideology shows that the effect of ideology is the most different between eastern and northwestern Europe. Figure 5.2 presents the corresponding marginal effects.

As the figure shows, the difference between northwestern and southern Europe primarily consists in the level of protest and is much less important for the ideological composition. In both regions, we observe the well-established pattern of left-dominated protest. Citizens who identify as right-wing or extreme right-wing are less likely to protest. As expected, eastern Europe exhibits a different pattern: the level of protest is substantially lower than in the other regions. Moreover, within eastern Europe, extreme right-wing citizens seem somewhat more likely to protest than citizens on the left. While we present results on the regional level, the bivariate relationship between ideology and protest as well as the random effect estimates of the model confirm that the left is reluctant to protest in all eastern European countries in our sample.[37]

These results allow for interesting inter-regional comparisons. The propensity of an extreme right-wing individual from eastern Europe to take part in a lawful demonstration is very similar to their ideological counterparts from northwestern Europe. We can interpret the eastern European pattern, either as a generally lower level of protest coupled with an extreme right that favours protest, or as a curious absence of left-wing protest. Overall, the results confirm hypothesis H1 that suggests the comparative weakness of the left in eastern Europe.

[37] For this purpose, appendix C.1, figure 1 presents a map of protest by left-wing citizens in the different European countries. Notwithstanding the importance of the country-level variation, the map reinforces our conclusion of structural differences across the three regions. The random effects structure of the multilevel models presented by appendix C.1, figures 2 and 3 leads to a similar conclusion. Hungary 2006 is the country*year group with the largest effect of right-wing beliefs on protest.

Figure 5.2: Ideological composition of protest in the three European regions

Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on Model 2, Table 5.1

The third model shows that the three-way interaction between region, personal ideology of the respondent, and the year of the survey is not statistically significant. These results seem to suggest that across the fourteen-year period we examine here, there is no clear trend of convergence in protest by the different ideological groups in the three regions.[38] To ease its interpretation, figure 5.3 presents the corresponding marginal effects.

[38] The normalization argument refers to consistent over time trends, therefore we model the year of the survey as a continuous variable. However, once we include year dummies the results reveal that changes are driven by non-linear waves of protest. We include the corresponding table and marginal effect graph in appendix C.1 (table 1, figure 4).

Figure 5.3: Ideological composition of protest in the three regions over time



Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on Model 3, Table 5.1

As the figure shows, the development over time of ideological patterns of protest follows a different dynamic in the three regions. In northwestern Europe, the ideological composition of protest is remarkably stable. The extreme and moderate left dominate the protest arena. Extreme or moderate right-wing individuals rarely protest. During the period we examine, the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis in southern Europe witnessed the largest changes over time. Except for the moderate right, all ideological groups in southern Europe increased their presence in the protest arena. However, greater mobilization did not result in smaller differences between the ideological groups. The extreme left remained dominant, increasing its presence over time relative to other ideological groups. Only the eastern European pattern shows convergence of protest between the different ideological groups over time. Although at a very low level, moderate and extreme left-wing groups draw level in their protest participation with the extreme right. By 2016, even those who belong to the moderate right or are in

the centre, approximate the level of protest of the extreme right. Given the lack of convergence in citizens' protest participation in northwestern and southern Europe, we reject H2.

Based on the results above, in none of the three European regions is protest normalised to the extent that we would observe an equal level of participation between the ideological groups or a clear convergence over time. In northwestern and southern Europe, the dominance of the left is entrenched, while in eastern Europe protest is mostly associated with the extreme right. Differences over time remain stable in northwestern Europe, the left increases its relative presence in southern Europe, and we observe convergence between the extreme right and other ideological groups in eastern Europe. Nevertheless, protest in eastern Europe remains a rare form of political participation, leading us to conclude that most citizens do not consider protest an integral part of the 'normal' repertoire of political mobilization.

At this point, we introduce additional variables to assess if individual exposure to the former regimes, differences in the effect of partisanship, and government ideology explain the varying effect of ideology on protest in the three regions.

Individual Level Exposure to the Previous Regime

Given our primary explanation for the diverging patterns in the three regions rests on the impact of historical legacies, we estimate the impact of being exposed to the previous regime among citizens who live in these countries. As this introduces a comparison within eastern and southern Europe, it provides an additional test for the validity of our argument by examining whether differences are indeed due to living *through* these regimes, rather than living *in* a transition/post-transition society. We estimate the direct effect of exposure to the previous regime on protest (model 1), its differential effect in the two regions (model 2) and its moderating effect on the ideology of the respondent in the two regions (model 3). Table 5.2 shows the results.

Table 5.2: The effect of exposure to the former regime

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Extreme left (base: left)	0.12 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.43 (0.10)***
Center	-0.32 (0.06)***	-0.33 (0.06)***	-0.66 (0.08)***
Right	-0.31 (0.09)***	-0.32 (0.08)***	-0.97 (0.11)***
Extreme right	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.84 (0.22)***
Exposure	0.01 (0.13)	0.56 (0.18)**	0.51 (0.21)*
Eastern Europe (base: southern Europe)	-1.23 (0.31)***	-1.15 (0.30)***	-1.40 (0.29)***
Exposure*EE		-0.58 (0.12)***	-0.84 (0.20)***
Ext Left*EE			-0.16 (0.18)
Center*EE			0.27 (0.13)*
Right*EE			0.73 (0.15)***
Ext Right*EE			0.73 (0.27)**
Ext Left*Exposure			0.04 (0.28)
Center*Exposure			0.02 (0.22)
Right*Exposure			0.22 (0.23)
Ext Right*Exposure			0.23 (0.42)
EE*Ext Left*Exposure			-0.49 (0.38)
EE*Center*Exposure			0.50 (0.29)
EE*Right*Exposure			0.24 (0.29)
EE*Ext Right*Exposure			0.50 (0.47)
Individual Level Control Variables	✓	✓	✓
Aggregate Level Control Variables	✓	✓	✓
AIC	35623.22	35602.81	35559.08
BIC	35963.60	35952.64	36022.38
Num. obs.	94367	94367	94367
Country*Years	73	73	73
Countries	12	12	12

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Notes: All estimates in Table 2 in Appendix C.1

As model 1 shows, exposure to the previous regime has no direct effect on respondents' decision to participate in protest. However, the lack of a direct effect is due to the opposite direction of the effect in the two regions (model 2). While in southern Europe, exposure to right-wing authoritarianism mobilizes protest, in eastern Europe exposure to the former communist regime does not. To clarify the eastern European pattern and test our hypothesis, model 3 introduces the three-way interaction between region, personal ideology, and exposure. Figure 5.4 presents the marginal effects.

Figure 5.4: Marginal effect of exposure to the former regime on the ideological composition of protest in southern and eastern Europe



Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on Model 3, Table 5.2

Whereas in southern Europe the ideological differences are not significant – and all groups are equally mobilized by greater exposure – in eastern Europe, the reaction of respondents to exposure is moderated by their ideological views. Respondents on the extreme right are more likely to protest the more they lived under communism. In contrast, respondents who share extreme or moderate left positions are less likely to protest the more they lived under communism.

The three-way interaction does not reach the conventional threshold of statistical significance due to the lack of differences in southern Europe and the small effect sizes in eastern Europe. The latter makes it difficult to identify any effects specific to eastern Europe, despite the relatively large sample. Nevertheless, the pairwise contrasts between extreme or moderate left and extreme or moderate right across different levels of exposure in eastern Europe are all

significant at the $p<0.05$ level. To the extent that eastern Europeans protest, they seem to behave according to our expectations. Therefore, we take these results to confirm our hypothesis H3A regarding eastern Europe, but not H3B regarding southern Europe.

Partisanship and the Ideology of the Government

We now turn to the effects associated with the political opportunity structure framework, the role of partisanship, and the ideology of the government. The results previously presented in table 5.1 confirm our expectation that stronger party identification and right-wing governments contribute to a greater proximity to protest. However, our hypothesis referred to the moderating effect of these factors on the composition of protest in the three regions. To test the hypothesis, we estimate interaction effects between personal ideology, region, and party identification, and personal ideology, region, and government ideology. Table 5.3 presents these results.

Table 5.3: The effect of partisanship and the ideology of the government on the ideological composition of protest

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Extreme left (base: left)	0.46 (0.04)***	0.39 (0.07)***	0.65 (0.09)***	0.79 (0.09)***
Center	-0.51 (0.03)***	-0.54 (0.04)***	-0.39 (0.06)***	-0.45 (0.07)***
Right	-0.65 (0.05)***	-0.65 (0.06)***	-0.44 (0.09)***	-0.61 (0.09)***
Extreme right	-0.50 (0.07)***	-0.91 (0.15)***	0.03 (0.14)	-0.43 (0.16)**
Party ID (cont.)	0.85 (0.03)***	0.94 (0.05)***	0.93 (0.02)***	0.93 (0.02)***
Gov. L-R	0.29 (0.10)**	0.25 (0.10)*	0.60 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.15)*
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.45 (0.30)	0.46 (0.31)	0.59 (0.30)	0.52 (0.34)
Eastern Europe	-0.93 (0.31)**	-1.07 (0.31)***	-0.86 (0.32)**	-1.48 (0.33)***
SE:Party ID	0.27 (0.06)***	0.30 (0.09)**		
EE:Party ID	0.14 (0.06)*	-0.18 (0.12)		
SE:Ext Left		0.02 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.18)
EE:Ext Left		-0.57 (0.18)**		-0.38 (0.20)
SE:Center		0.05 (0.08)		-0.16 (0.13)
EE:Center		0.18 (0.10)		0.52 (0.15)***
SE:Right		-0.09 (0.12)		0.06 (0.18)
EE:Right		0.52 (0.12)***		0.76 (0.18)***
SE:Ext Right		-0.03 (0.29)		0.22 (0.32)
EE:Ext Right		0.85 (0.22)***		1.50 (0.25)***
Ext Left:Party ID		0.47 (0.10)***		
Center:Party ID		-0.14 (0.07)		
Right:Party ID		-0.50 (0.08)***		
Ext Right:Party ID		0.07 (0.19)		
SE:Ext Left:Party ID		-0.45 (0.20)*		
EE:Ext Left:Party ID		-0.12 (0.26)		
SE:Center:Party ID		-0.21 (0.15)		
EE:Center:Party ID		0.57 (0.17)***		
SE:Right:Party ID		0.26 (0.17)		
EE:Right:Party ID		0.71 (0.17)***		
SE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.28 (0.35)		
EE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.46 (0.28)		
Ext Left*Gov. L-R			-0.36 (0.15)*	-0.21 (0.16)
Center*Gov. L-R			-0.22 (0.10)*	-0.29 (0.12)*
Right*Gov. L-R			-0.42 (0.15)**	-0.56 (0.16)***
Ext Right*Gov. L-R			-1.03 (0.23)***	-0.84 (0.29)**
Gov. L-R*SE				0.23 (0.29)
Gov. L-R*EE				0.70 (0.26)**
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Left				-0.12 (0.29)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext				-0.54 (0.33)

Left				
SE*Gov. L-R*Center				0.22 (0.21)
EE*Gov. L-R*Center				-0.22 (0.23)
SE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.01 (0.31)
EE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.21 (0.28)
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				0.02 (0.53)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				-0.69 (0.41)
Individual Level Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
Aggregate Level Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
AIC	116206.02	116004.51	116201.99	116069.56
BIC	116604.67	116612.99	116621.63	116678.04
Num. obs.	265927	265927	265927	265927
Country*Years	169	169	169	169
Countries	25	25	25	25

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Notes: All estimates in Table 3 in Appendix C.1

Model 1 confirms the expectation that party identification is associated with higher protest participation in all three regions. Model 2 shows that this effect varies according to the ideological group of the respondent. The model shows that party identification influences the ideological composition of protest. Figure 5.5 presents the corresponding marginal effects.

Figure 5.5: Marginal effect of party identification on the ideological composition of protest in the three European regions



Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on Model 2, Table 5.3

Party identification disproportionally increases radical and moderate left-wing protest in northwestern and southern Europe as compared to eastern Europe. Particularly protests in northwestern Europe are to a greater extent dominated by extreme-left party identifiers than protests in other parts of Europe. We take this to confirm our hypothesis H4A. In contrast, in eastern Europe protests are to a greater extent dominated by extreme-right party identifiers than protests in the other two regions. We take this as evidence of hypothesis H4B.

Taken together, these results point to the importance of direct mobilization by parties. In northwestern and southern Europe – where extreme and moderate left parties are more likely to sponsor demonstrations – respondents who identify with these parties are also dominant in the protest arena. In contrast, in eastern Europe where right-wing parties are more likely to organize demonstrations, partisanship leads to a higher share of right-wing respondents in protest.

To test our hypotheses regarding the effect of the ideology of the government, we examine whether this effect varies by the ideology of the respondents (model 3) and consider differences in its moderating role in the three regions (model 4). Model 3 confirms our expectation that the direct effect of government ideology is driven by the differential response of the ideological groups which respondents belong to. The role of regions is more limited, none of the three-way interactions reaches the standard threshold of statistical significance (model 4). Figure 5.6 presents the marginal effects.

In northwestern and southern Europe, left-wing respondents are always more likely to protest but their relative presence increases under right-wing governments. Following the framework of differential protest participation in the electoral and protest arena (Hutter & Borbáth 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2013), in these regions, right-wing respondents protest primarily under left-wing governments. Nevertheless, even under these conditions protest by left-wing citizens remains dominant.

Protest in eastern Europe resembles similar patterns. The main difference is that extreme right-wing participants dominate the protest arena under left-wing governments. Respondents with moderate left and other ideological views only surpass the extreme right in their protest participation under right-wing governments.

Figure 5.6: Marginal effect of the ideology of the government on the ideological composition of protest in the three European regions



Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on Model 4, Table 5.3

These results only partially confirm our expectations. As expected, we find that citizens who share ideological views that are opposed to the government are more likely to protest. We take this as evidence of H5A. Concerning cross-regional differences, we only find traces of the expected close interaction between the electoral and the protest arena in eastern Europe. In eastern Europe, the ideology of the government is indeed important, as it may turn a protest arena dominated by the extreme right into one where all ideological groups are present. The pairwise contrast between extreme right-wing and moderate or extreme left-wing citizens is statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level. Nevertheless, the effect sizes are too small for the three-way interaction to reach statistical significance.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the 'normalization of protest' across Europe. While taking part in demonstrations has become an important avenue for citizens to influence policies between elections, major differences remain in the extent to which citizens rely on protest participation. In northwestern Europe, our results confirm the established finding of relatively widespread protest dominated by the left. In this region, both the level and the composition of protest are stable with no clear trend over time. In southern Europe, taking part in demonstrations became a more widespread phenomenon during our period of observation. In line with the findings of Kriesi et al. (2018) we believe the exposure of these countries to the economic crisis has driven the increase in protest. Nevertheless, the more widespread protest mobilization did not result in smaller ideological differences. The radical and moderate left continue to dominate protest in southern Europe. Protest in eastern Europe is markedly different than in the other two regions. There, protest is a rare form of political participation, dominated by the extreme right. While we found evidence of increasing mobilization of other ideological groups, protest did not become more prevalent over time. Although protest undoubtedly gained in importance across Europe, citizens with different ideological beliefs do not take part in demonstrations as much as the normalization argument would lead us to expect.

We suggested that the mechanism of historical and current regime access explains regional differences. With the legacy of right-wing authoritarian regimes in southern Europe and left-wing communism in eastern Europe, we expected that citizens who have historically been in opposition are more likely to protest. The results confirm our expectation that in eastern Europe, more exposure to communism leads to a decrease in the propensity to protest on the left and a corresponding increase on the right. In southern Europe, we found that exposure has no effect on the ideological composition of protest and increases the likelihood of protesting

across the board. While we can only speculate, we believe that these differences are driven by the way legacies are politicized in the two regions. While in eastern Europe, issues like nostalgia, lustration, and property restitution cause contentious debates, party competition in southern European sees less politicization of the relationship toward the former regime.

Moving beyond legacies, we have shown that regime access continues to play a role in shaping patterns of protest. Those who identify with parties that actively mobilize protest are more likely to take part in demonstrations in all three regions. Moreover, citizens who identify with a different ideology than the government are more likely to protest. Contrary to Anderson and Mendes (2006), we find only partial evidence of the gap between old and new democracies in the mobilization of 'losers'. The limited differences shown by our results – as well as the similar patterns of protest in northwestern and southern European countries – lead us to expect that the three regions converge over time regarding the ideological composition of protest. However, as our results highlight, such processes of convergence are far from linear and depend on contextual features. Differences stem from ideological legacies (namely the history of communism, the New Left and the possibility of voicing divergent opinions) rather than economic or political development. In our view, as long as structural differences remain between the three regions of Europe, they will also be reflected by mobilization in the protest arena.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

I started the dissertation with the idea of qualifying the 'Europe in crisis' narrative – namely, the belief that we are living through an exceptional period of change, in which previously familiar forms of organizing political conflict no longer apply. In the aftermath of the economic crisis, both the programmatic and the organizational components of the structure of political conflict potentially transformed. The dissertation has examined these changes through the lens of the dynamic of conflict in the electoral and protest arenas. The findings point towards limited and mixed forms of change, as shown by the variation across the three European regions.

Selected Findings and Contribution to the Literature

The changing role of political parties and party systems provide a central theme of the dissertation. Chapter 2 has reviewed the literature on party-system instability. As the chapter argues, the literature lacks studies which examine the interaction between programmatic and organizational stability and mostly focuses on party system change as captured by organizational instability. The chapter shows the limits of this approach in a cross-country perspective based on elections organized in the period of the economic crisis. While, the dynamic of the party system of the United Kingdom and Romania exemplify party competition under conditions of party system stability and instability, as the chapter argues, it is not a one-dimensional phenomenon.

Parties in all three regions changed their programmatic appeal over time. The examples of Ireland and Portugal show the dynamic of an organizationally stable party system, where programmatic position change to the extent to which party labels become empty signifiers. In contrast, Latvia, and Italy illustrate party systems where the programmatic structure stays sta-

ble amidst conditions of ephemeral parties. The stability of the programmatic structure complements our understanding of organizational change.

In light of these results, it is worth re-examining some of the established findings in the literature. For instance, the Latvian party system is regularly characterized by the highest electoral volatility scores across Europe. Nevertheless, as the analysis shows, Latvia records one of the highest levels of programmatic stability, even in comparison to countries from northwestern and southern Europe.

From a normative perspective, both forms of stability are necessary conditions of electoral accountability. Without programmatic or organizational stability voters are not able to punish or reward parties in office. Therefore, the conceptual distinction helps understand failures of accountability. One normatively worrisome case is organizationally stable party systems where parties survive but represent programmatically different positions over time. In this case, the dynamic of party competition creates the impression of an institutionalized party system where the competing formations survive, voters' preferences appear represented and – at face value – the conditions of accountability are met. In fact, with the possible exception of having a recurring governing formula, such a system appears to fulfil all requirements of an institutionalized party system, as defined by Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014). Nevertheless, voters are not able to hold parties accountable for electoral promises made during the campaign that helped them gain office. In such an environment, the set of issues and trade-offs the electorate faces radically change over time. This lack of consistency leads to a failure of accountability.

In terms of the survival of mainstream parties, the case of Romania comes close to an example of a system with similar problems of electoral accountability. Even though new parties regularly appear, these are often linked to mainstream formations. The set of mainstream par-

ties which have access to government survive but represent radically different positions over time. Following in the footsteps of the previous chapter, chapter 3 zooms in on this crucial case. The case study adds to the analysis of the previous chapter in some important ways.

Firstly, the case study shows that even though in a cross-national setting Romania appears as one of the organizationally most unstable party systems, mainstream parties survive. This survival is even more puzzling in light of the deep economic recession and accompanying political crisis Romanian politics has experienced over the last ten years. Many of the new parties that appeared during the period of observation were linked to members of the former elite who decided to split from their previous formation. Nevertheless, PPDD and USR, two relatively successful anti-establishment reform parties appeared and one of the former government parties, PDL disappeared.

Secondly, the chapter sheds further light on the relationship between organizational and programmatic stability. As the chapter argues, the survival of mainstream parties is partly due to their ability to shift their positions on some of the most salient issues in party competition. In Romania the most salient issues revolve around fighting corruption, reforming democracy, and changing the institutional framework of party competition. These are the type of issues on which a change in incumbency or a shift in the parliamentary balance of power allows mainstream parties to shift their positions and avoid electoral punishment.

Thirdly, the chapter highlights the importance of two contextual factors that potentially explain some of the country specific patterns identified by the cross-national analysis – namely, the institutional setup and the forms of linkages between citizens and their representatives. As the chapter argues, the semi-presidential setup with the in-built tension between the prime minister and the president – as well as the prevalence of clientelistic linkages – contributes to the survival of mainstream parties.

Linkage mechanisms explain the difference between the two new anti-establishment reform parties which emerged during the period under scrutiny. One of these parties, PPDD did not survive by the time of writing. Established as an electoral vehicle for a charismatic media personality and news anchor Dan Diaconescu, the party disintegrated after its leader failed to enter parliament (Gherghina & Soare 2013). The other anti-establishment reform party, USR, survived and continues to grow. Despite internal disputes and the lack of clear programmatic stances beyond fighting corruption and reforming democracy, USR managed to build a close link with the protest scene. As large-scale anti-corruption demonstrations made the headlines across Europe, USR emerged as the parliamentary representatives of the movement. The party welcomed the protest movement and tried to benefit from the increasing mobilization on its core issue. In 2018, in the year when Romanian voters are called to the polls to vote on the PSD-sponsored constitutional amendment to outlaw same-sex marriage, USR collected enough signatures to initiate a second referendum on the right of convicts to take public office. As a parliamentary formation, USR parliamentarians have the right to initiate a change in the legal system without having to turn to the citizens. Nevertheless, the party decided to collect signatures in order to increase the perceived legitimacy of their proposal and to strengthen their link with social movements/civil society groups. The dynamic is one example of a party strategically using protests to change the legal system and to strengthen its roots in society.

Chapter 4 takes up this idea and sets out to draw the profile of a typical protesting party across Europe. The chapter provides the link between the first and the second part of the dissertation which shifts the focus from the electoral to the protest arena. The chapter illustrates the involvement of the main agent of electoral mobilization in protest politics. As it argues, the involvement of parties in the protest arena constitutes an investment into direct forms of linkages between parties and their electoral base. In times of crises in institutional politics, citizens contest established channels of representation, trust in parties declines, and in some cases sat-

isfaction with democracy decreases. Therefore, the importance of protest arena as a field of political mobilization potentially increases. The protest arena allows for a direct form of citizen participation, outside of the institutional realm. To the extent that parties mobilize their electorate in the protest arena, they 'ride the storm' and benefit from greater citizen mobilization.

As the chapter shows, the typical protesting party is economically left-wing, culturally right-wing, is in the opposition, invested into building a mass-party organization and relies on protest in response to electoral loss. Some of these effects are context dependent. In new democracies and in the context of weak civil society, parties sponsor protests more frequently. As the chapter argues, protest sponsorship in response to electoral loss is a phenomenon characteristic to younger democracies in eastern Europe.

One reason why protest sponsorship by political parties is more widespread in the new democracies might have to do with parties increased ability to shape the cleavage structure of these societies. Empirically, the chapter cannot distinguish between top-down and bottom-up mobilization efforts of protest sponsorship. Nevertheless, many of these events might be called and organized directly by political parties, instead of having parties join as an 'add-on'. While the literature on agency in cleavage formation clearly identifies the ability of parties to shape the socio-economic profile of their electoral base (e.g., Enyedi 2005), the mechanisms of cleavage formation are understudied. Creating alliances with other social movements/civil society groups, mobilizing their supporters outside of the realm of institutional politics, and taking conflict to the 'streets' helps parties efforts to shape the identity of their electoral base. The pro-government 'Peace Marches' sponsored by the Hungarian Fidesz provide one example of how a party is able to create a system of symbols and metaphors that supporters take up and reproduce in subsequent collective events. Case studies of single countries in the eastern

European region might confirm the hypothesis that part of these events constitute a conscious attempt by parties to shape the political identity of their supporters.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that protest by political parties is a rare occurrence and forms a relatively small subset of all protest events. Nevertheless, a diverse set of parties engage in mobilizing their supporters on the 'streets', outside of the electoral realm. Similar variables predict protest sponsorship as the ones which are associated with other party activities, for instance with parties' response to media attention or to their competitors. Therefore, protest mobilization by political parties might become more widespread as public disapproval of institutional politics increase. Mobilizing in the protest arena seems to be one of the most immediate ways for parties to reach out to their electorate under conditions of decreasing turnout and declining figures of party membership.

The last empirical chapter of the dissertation stays with the topic of mobilization in the protest arena. The chapter examines the extent to which we observe a normalization of protest in terms of increasing participation and more widespread ideological groups organizing on the 'streets'. As the chapter argues, the increasing importance of citizens' protest participation does not benefit all ideological groups equally. As the literature on protest in northwestern Europe has shown, protest seems to be the one field in which the dominance of left-wing mobilization is entrenched. The chapter examines whether these ideological patterns stay consistent over time and apply outside of northwestern Europe, i.e., in southern and eastern Europe as well.

The results show that while southern and northwestern Europe differ primarily in the level and not in the ideological composition of protest, protest in eastern Europe is not only much less frequent but it is associated almost exclusively with the radical right. As the chapter argues, in none of the three regions is protest normalized. In northwestern Europe, protest is

dominated by the radical and moderate left with little or no increase over time of protest by other ideological groups. In contrast, there has been an almost universal increase in protest in southern Europe in the shadow of the economic crisis. However, the increase in protest does not affect ideological differences, which stay relatively stable over time, with the radical and the moderate left being the most likely groups to protest. Only in eastern Europe do we find that the different ideological groups draw level in their protest presence, with an increase over time in protest by radical- and moderate-left citizens. Nevertheless, far from being a 'normal' element in citizens' repertoire of participation, protest in eastern Europe remains rare.

The chapter identifies three factors contributing to regional differences in the ideological composition of protest: exposure to the previous regimes, ideology of the government and mobilization by political parties. In this regard, the chapter directly links to the previous analysis, by showing that mobilization by political parties is one of the factors behind ideological differences in the protest arena of the three regions. Mobilization in the protest arena complements rather than replaces participation in the institutional realm of politics. The chapter shows that important differences remain in the extent of protest mobilization by the different ideological groups across the three regions.

Future Research

I consider the results of the analysis presented by the four empirical chapters to be first steps in exploring the larger theme of cross-regional differences in the structure of political conflict. In this regard, the dissertation has the intention of identifying and providing initial analysis on some of the most pressing gaps in the literature. There are at least three themes the dissertation identifies as worthy for further research.

The first relates to the scholarly understanding of the transformation of political parties. While much has been written on the inability of parties to fulfil their functions (e.g., Schmitter 2001), the type of analysis examining their role in the electoral and the protest arenas remain rare. The gap is even more striking, given potential alternatives to political parties is often thought to rise from their interaction with social movements. For instance, the rise of 'movement parties' (Della Porta et al. 2017; Kitschelt 2005) is seen as a new form of organization with the potential to redefine not only the interaction between parties and their voters but the role of parties in society. While some authors worry about cartelization and the withdrawal of parties from society to the state (Katz & Mair 1995), parties continue to look for a competitive advantage to rely on against their opponents. The ability to sponsor large-scale demonstrations is one such advantage since it helps parties harness popular support in service of their political goals. Moreover, parties' involvement in the protest arena leads to more durable partnerships with social movements and other civic organizations (Heaney & Rojas 2015), which in turn might lead to a more diverse set of stakeholders to express their view in the policy-making process. In this regard we might be experiencing a period of de-differentiation of interest representation in the aftermath of the economic crisis (Borbáth & Hutter 2018). Chapter 4 provides an initial take on the subject, but further research is needed to explore the diverse set of implications of the transformation of political parties.

One example of a similar implication concerns the transformation of member-based party organization and internal party democracy. To the extent that we expect individual parties to represent a diversity of opinions and identities, the old organizational structure need to be revisited. While much has been written on the decline of party membership (e.g., van Biezen et al. 2012) and the transformation of party organizations (e.g., Poguntke et al. 2016), these developments are rarely examined in light of parties interaction with protest movements. With the volatility of protests, parties need decision forums which reflect the pace of change in

their social/political environment. The personalization of politics and the increasing importance of charismatic politicians for political parties threaten to create structures which allow these leaders to circumvent the internal democratic structure of the parties they lead. Without stable membership, in an environment where – between elections – parties mainly connect with society by sponsoring protests, charismatic leaders benefit from the non-institutionalized nature of protest politics. Volatile majorities on the 'streets' provides an opportunity for party leaders to instrumentalize their alliances in internal power struggles, circumvent institutional forums and further concentrate power inside parties. Adopting institutional structures to directly involve social movements and protest groups in the decision-making process allows keeping similar tendencies in check.

Secondly, the causes and consequences of party-system instability need a systematic analysis. In this regard, both chapters 2 and 3 touched upon the role of different linkage mechanisms between voters and parties, and the role of corruption as a political issue. I believe both the theme of linkages and corruption needs further research. While writing chapter 2, I entertained the hypothesis of the four ideal-typical types of party system instability being characterized by different forms of linkages between voters and their representatives. As the Romanian case suggests, parties competing under conditions of instability and in systems with empty labels benefit from clientelistic linkages. Furthermore, I suspect that in systems with ephemeral parties, charismatic linkages play an important role. The interaction between patterns of party system stability and linkages between voters and representatives is yet to be explored.

Furthermore, there is little known on how different linkage mechanisms change over time. Often parties start out on programmatic basis and evolve into an organization that mostly acts as an electoral vehicle of a charismatic leader. To some extent, Fidesz is one such example. Similarly, some parties turn from ethnic or clientelistic organizations to programmatic for-

mations. For instance, during the crisis the Latvian Harmony Centre made a conscious effort to appeal to a broader segment of the electorate, beyond the Russian speaking minority. Even though with limited success, the party strengthened its social democratic profile to target Latvian voters (Auers 2013; Eihmanis 2018). The dynamic framework highlights the limits of the three-fold distinction between charismatic-clientelistic and programmatic linkages introduced by Kitschelt et al. (1999). The previously discussed rise of protesting parties is one example of change of linkage mechanisms which do not fit this conceptualization. Moving from a static to a more dynamic model of the transformation and the development of linkages between parties and voters would greatly benefit both the party politics and the voting behaviour literatures.

I consider the role of fighting corruption to be closely related to the issue of linkages between voters and their representatives. Often seen as a valence issue, the fight against corruption became the single most important factor to help explain the entry of genuinely new parties across southern and eastern Europe (Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2014; Stanley 2017). Following Romanian politics, one cannot avoid the impression that the politics of fighting corruption builds on generational and class divides. Preferences regarding the issue follow socio-economic inequalities. To a certain extent, fighting corruption gains a positional character. For instance, in the Romanian context, voters who rely on selective resources from the party apparatus easily realize that the anti-corruption agenda does not represent their interests. A more detailed typology of the way corruption is being politicized might help shed light on the conditions under which it helps facilitate widespread party-system change. For instance, Klašnja et al. (2016) distinguish between pocketbook and sociotropic corruption voting, but they conceptualize the latter as a purely valence issue. Both research on linkages and the fight against corruption lie at the intersection of the literature on party competition and voting be-

haviour. I believe the intersection of the two strands of literature provide a fruitful avenue to understand causes and consequences of party system instability.

Thirdly, comparative research on the structural differences between the protest arenas of the three European regions is still relatively rare. In recent years southern Europe has experienced protest movements that have often turned into political parties. This has had transformative effects: in Spain, for example, it has changed the relatively stable two-party system. Based on impressionistic examples from Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian politics, eastern Europe might be going through a similar transformation. Perhaps it is too early to see its consequence across large cross-sectional datasets, but I believe protest in eastern Europe is becoming more widespread, and less stigmatized. In some cases, protest has triggered transformative events. For instance, in the case of Romania two recent governments resigned because of street protests (Boc in 2012; Ponta in 2015). In the case of Hungary, the internet tax demonstration achieved policy concessions from the Orbán government which generally remains unresponsive to the demands of the EU or of domestic opposition parties (Ferrari 2018). If the thesis of protest gaining increasing importance as a terrain of citizen mobilization stands, the identity and concerns of the groups which mobilize in the protest arena is a key dimension. Chapter 5 takes up the issue based on large-scale population surveys. I plan to continue this line of research with case studies and comparative evidence from protest event datasets.

Generally speaking, inter-regional analyses in comparative politics often take Western European development patterns as a standard of comparison. Even if one avoids the risk of exposing northwestern Europe as a normative standard to follow, I believe the empirical strategy carries another, often overlooked risk. Taking the literature and conceptual framework which originates from the need to understand Western Europe to hypothesize about the eastern European region might miss important developments. For instance, party-sponsored protest is

understudied by the Western European literature on party competition or protest politics which leads to expect that the phenomenon is less important to understand patterns of party competition. Eastern European scholars study the involvement of parties in civil society (Greskovits 2017) and cleavage formation (Enyedi 2005) but their results could be missed if one only tests hypotheses inspired by the literature on Western European countries. Considering the results of the eastern European literature might help understand phenomenon in Western European countries as well. For instance, the concept of 'centrist populism' developed to explain the emergence of parties like SMER or ANO in Slovakia (Učeň 2007) might help us to categorize Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy and compare the party with similar formations. I believe cross-regional comparisons that go beyond theory-testing and aim for theory-building benefit our understanding of party competition and protest politics in northwestern, southern and eastern Europe. Such comparisons help identify puzzles, research questions, and hypotheses that scholars who study each of these regions separately might miss.

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Appendix A

A.1 List of Elections

	Pre Crisis1	Pre Crisis2	Post Crisis 1	Post Crisis 2	Post Crisis 3	Post Crisis 4	Post Crisis 5
Austria	1-Oct-06	28-Sep-08	29-Sep-13	15-Oct-17			
United Kingdom	5-May-05		6-May-10	7-May-15	8-Jun-17		
France	22-Apr-07		22-Apr-12	23-Apr-17			
Germany	18-Sep-05		27-Sep-09	22-Sep-13	14-Sep-17		
Netherlands	22-Nov-06		9-Jun-10	12-Sep-12	15-Mar-17		
Switzerland	21-Oct-07		23-Oct-11	18-Oct-15			
Ireland	24-May-07		25-Feb-11	26-Feb-16			
Greece	16-Sep-07		4-Oct-09	6-May-12	17-Jun-12	25-Jan-15	20-Sep-15
Italy	9-Apr-06	13-Apr-08	25-Feb-13				
Portugal	20-Feb-05		27-Sep-09	5-Jun-11	4-Oct-15		
Spain	14-Mar-04	9-Mar-08	20-Nov-11	20-Dec-15			
Hungary	9-Apr-06		25-Apr-10	6-Apr-14			
Latvia	7-Oct-06		2-Oct-10	17-Sep-11	4-Oct-14		
Poland	19-Oct-07		9-Oct-11	25-Oct-15			
Romania	28-Nov-04	30-Nov-08	9-Dec-12	11-Dec-16			

A.2 Data Sources and Coding Strategy of the Core Sentence Dataset

As stated in the data section, the core sentences dataset is based on articles from two newspapers per country. Table A.3 lists the sources for all fifteen countries covered by the study. As an update to the data by Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) for the six northwestern European countries (i.e., Austria, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) the major quality and boulevard newspaper were sampled. The data collection strategy in Ireland has been the same. However, in the case of the four central-eastern European countries and the four southern European countries there was a different sampling strategy implemented. For those countries, the main center-left and center-right newspapers were sampled. The data collection followed a different sampling strategy for two reasons: (a) the media systems in some of these countries tend to be more polarized and, therefore, even quality newspapers carry an 'ideological' bias; (b) the distinction between quality and tabloid newspapers is much less clear-cut than in the six northwestern European countries studied before. In the case of Latvia, the dataset included an additional sample from one of the Russian language newspapers to reflect the issue space from the perspective of this structural minority.

All news articles that were published within two months before the national Election Day and which reported on the electoral contest and national party politics more generally were selected. Editorials and commentaries were excluded from the selection. The selection was done by an extensive keyword list including the names and abbreviations of political parties and key politicians from each party. In the case of early elections, the period from the announcement of the election until Election Day was selected. Then a sample of the selected articles using core sentence analysis (CSA) has been coded. Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic 'core sentence(s)' structure, which contain(s) only the subject, the object, and the direction of the relationship

between the two. The core sentence approach was developed by Kleinnijenhuis and colleagues (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis, et al. 1997). This type of quantitative content analysis allows to distinguish issue positions and salience. The direction between actors and issues is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, with three intermediary positions. For example, the grammatical sentence "Party leader A rejects calls for leaving the Eurozone but supports a haircut on the country's debt" leads to two coded observations (Party A +1 Eurozone membership; Party A +1 haircut). In the analysis only core sentences which capture the relation between party actors and political issues were included, that is, the ones which neglect relations between different actors. The dataset included the function, party affiliation, and (if available) name of actors. Overall, the analyses are based on around 62,729 of these actor-issue sentences (an average of 1,324 per campaign). For the present analysis, the actors were grouped according to their party affiliation. The issues were coded in even more detail (with more than 200 coded categories per election campaign). However, based on the list proposed by Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) and Hutter et al. (2018) they were aggregated into 18 categories that allow to (a) capture the broad conflicts described in the previous sections, (b) enable comparisons across countries and elections. These categories are: welfare, economic liberalism, economic reform, anti-corruption, renewing the institutions of democracy, reforming democracy, media, regionalism, Europe, the Euro, cultural liberalism, nationalism, immigration, security, defense, education, the environment, and infrastructure. Table A.4 presents the way narrower issues were aggregated into these categories.

A.3 List of Newspapers

	First Source	Second Source	Third Source
Austria	Die Presse	Kronenzeitung	
United Kingdom	The Times	The Sun (English ed.)	
France	Le Monde	Le Parisien	
Germany	Sueddeutsche Zeitung	Bild	
Netherlands	NRC Handelsblad	Algemeen Dagblad	
Switzerland	NZZ	Blick	
Ireland	The Irish Times	The Sun (Irish ed.)	
Greece	Ta Nea	Kathimerini	
Italy	La Repubblica	Corriere della Sera	
Portugal	Público	Diário de Notíci	
Spain	El Mundo	El Pais	
Hungary	Nepszabadsag	Magyar Nemzet	
Latvia	Latvijas Avīze	Diena	Vesti segodnya
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza	Rzeczpospolita	
Romania	Jurnalul National	Adevarul	

A.4 Issue Aggregation in the Core Sentence Dataset

Categories	Description (a position of +1 stands for ...)
1. Welfare	support for an expansion of the welfare state; objection to welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programs
2. Economic Liberalism	opposition to market regulation, economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy; support for deregulation, more competition, and privatization; support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit and taxes without direct redistributive effects
3. Economic Reform (vague)	support for general economic reforms without clear direction (e.g., fighting economic crisis; fighting unemployment)
4. Education	support for education and research
5. Infrastructure	support for improving the country's roads, railways, and other physical infrastructure
6. Democratic Renewal	support for institutional reforms to make political system more democratic or transparent; opposition to corruption and political class
7. Democratic Reform (vague)	support for general reforms of the political system without clear direction, condemning the fascist or communist past
8. Media	support for media; fair and equal access to media
9. Anti-Corruption	Accusations of corruption, obstruction of justice, abuse of power.
10. Regionalism	support for regional autonomy or independence
11. Europe	support for European integration in general, deepening and widening
12. Euro	for the euro as a common currency, opposition to leaving the Eurozone
13. Cultural Liberalism	support for cultural diversity, international cooperation, gender equality, homosexuals; opposition to national traditions and traditional moral values.
14. Anti-Immigration	support for restrictive immigration and integration policies
15. Nationalism	support for nationalist ideas; opposition to rights of ethnic minorities (e.g., Roma)
16. Environment	support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy

17. Security	support for more law and order, fighting crime (except tax fraud and corruption)
18. Defense	support for military interventions, the armed forces, a strong national defense, and nuclear weapons

A.5 List of Genuinely New Parties

Country	Election	Genuinely New Party
Austria	2008	The Citizens' Forum Austria
	2013	Team Stronach
Germany	2009	German Pirate Party
	2013	Alternative for Germany
Greece	2012	Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left
	2012	Peoples Association -- Golden Dawn
	2012	Recreate Greece
	2015	Dot -- Apostolos Gkletsos
	2015	The River
Hungary	2010	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary
	2010	Politics Can Be Different
Ireland	2016	Independents 4 Change
	2016	Renua Ireland
Italy	2013	Civic Choice
	2013	Five Star Movement
	2013	Stop the Decline
Latvia	2011	Reform Party
	2014	For Latvia from the Heart
Netherlands	2012	50PLUS
	2017	Forum for Democracy
Poland	2011	Real Politics Union Congress of the New Right
	2015	Kukiz'15
	2015	Modern
	2015	Together Party
Portugal	2011	Party for Animals and Nature
	2015	Republican Democratic Party
Romania	2012	People's Party -- Dan Diaconescu
	2016	Save Romania Union
	2016	United Romania Party
Spain	2008	Animalist Party Against Mistreatment to Animals
	2008	Union, Progress and Democracy
	2015	Citizens -- Party of the Citizenry
	2015	We Can

A.6 List of Disappearing Parties

Country	Election	Disappearing Party
Austria	2008	Martin
	2013	Fritz
	2013	LIF
	2017	BZO
	2017	TS
France	2012	MF
	2017	PCF
	2017	UDFMD
	2017	V
Greece	2012	D-FS
	2012	DISY
	2015	DX
	2015	DIMAR
	2015	DISY
	2015	KIDISO
	2015	LAOS
	2015	Tel
Hungary	2010	MIEP
	2010	SzDSz
	2014	MDF
Ireland	2011	PD
	2016	PBPA
Italy	2008	AN
	2008	LUP
	2008	UDEUR
Latvia	2010	JD
	2010	JL
	2010	LSDSP
	2010	SDLP
	2010	VL
	2011	PLL
	2014	LPP/LC
Poland	2011	LPR
	2011	LiD
	2015	PjN
Romania	2008	PNT-CD
	2012	PNG-CD
	2016	PD-L
	2016	PP-DD
Spain	2015	CiU
Switzerland	2011	LPS

A.7 Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS)

The aim of MDS is to obtain a graphical representation of the relative locations of a set of objects in a low-dimensional space. Starting from information on the proximities between pairs of objects, MDS finds the optimal space in which these objects can be located while distorting as little as possible the original proximities. In the present analysis, the distances between parties at different time points are considered, which were determined with the help of content analyses, and use MDS to construct a representation of the locations of these parties and issues in a (two-dimensional) space.

It is not the purpose of this short review to explain all details of MDS. Overviews of this statistical method can be found in Borg and Groenen (1997), Cox and Cox (2001), or Kruskal and Wish (1978). Rabinowitz (1975) also presents a good and simple introduction to the topic but limited to the case of nonmetric MDS. Rather, to review some of the peculiarities of the analyses performed, which differ from a 'standard' MDS. Most important among these are the unfolding technique and the use of weights.

Unfolding models are special cases of MDS where information is available on the proximities between objects of two different sets, but not on the proximities between objects within each of the two sets. In my analyses, I have used information on the distances between parties and issues. However, there is no comparable measures of the distances between pairs of parties or between pairs of issues in the dataset. Such data can be analysed with standard MDS techniques, but it means that at least half of the cells in the proximity matrix have missing values. When such data are analysed with nonmetric MDS (which for instance implies a transformation of the original proximities into rank orders), the solutions 'are subject to many potential degeneracies' (Borg and Groenen 1997: 231). Metric MDS, however, is more robust and

avoids the problems linked with nonmetric MDS in the case of unfolding (Borg and Groenen 1997: 245ff.).

The second particularity of our MDS analyses is the use of weights. As explained above, MDS locates the objects in a space while keeping the distances between them as close as possible to the original proximities. However, as the aim is to obtain a representation of the objects in a low dimensional space, some distortion of the original distances is unavoidable. The degree of distortion is measured by a 'Stress' statistic, which is based on the sum of the squared distances between the original proximities and the proximities obtained in the solution. The higher the value of the Stress statistic, the worse is the fit between the solution and the data. The aim is thus to find the solution that minimizes the value of Stress. In the case of the present analysis the aim is to obtain a configuration of parties and issues where the distances between them are as close as possible to those in the original data. The Stress statistic in the MDS analysis of the six countries were:

Country	Normalized Raw Stress
Ireland	0.12
Italy	0.09
Latvia	0.16
Portugal	0.08
Romania	0.02
United Kingdom	0.06

By using weights, the analysis allows for the possibility that some distortions of original distances have a larger impact on the value of Stress than others. In other words, it gives more importance to representing some distances faithfully and less importance to the degree of distortion affecting other distances. The rationale for this is that not all relations between parties and issues have the same importance. In a campaign, parties address some issues very frequently while other issues play a minor role in their statements. Similarly, not all parties are

central actors in a campaign. I account for such variation by computing weights that reflect the salience of a given party × issue relationship. These weights are calculated as the number of core sentences corresponding to a given party × relationship, expressed as a proportion of the total number of relationships between parties and issues.

As in any spatial analysis, it is important to note that the focus on dimensions comes at the expense of details. That is, MDS allows identifying main lines of opposition in the party system like under a magnifying glass. The trade-off is that less salient issues and actors are less accurately represented. MDS configurations can only be interpreted regarding distances between objects. The orientation of a configuration is arbitrary, which implies that it can be freely rotated. To facilitate comparison of the spaces shown in the manuscript, is rotated in such a way that the issues ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ are situated on a horizontal line.

Appendix B

Appendix B.1 Generation and Evaluation of our Protest Event Database

The protest event database was jointly created by political scientists and computational linguists at the European University Institute and the University of Zurich (for details, see Kriesi et al. 2018). The database includes more than 30,000 protest events and covers 30 European countries over a six-teen year period. The countries covered by the dataset are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. The protest events were retrieved from ten European news agencies that public English-speaking newswires and coded using semi-automated content analysis.[39]

We got access to the relevant newswires from the Lexis Nexis data service by using a list of more than 40 keywords that describe different protest actions in the search query. Still, we were left with an extremely large corpus of 5.2 million documents and, hence, we developed natural language processing (NLP) tools to identify newswires that report about protest evens in the countries and during the time period that we are interested in. First, we removed documents that were exact or near duplicates and used a meta-data filter that discarded documents not reporting about any of our countries of interest. Afterwards, we developed tools to attribute a probability score to each document, indicating whether this document actually reports about protest events. For this purpose, we combined two different classifiers (i.e. algorithms that identify documents or words as probably indicators of a protest event): a supervised document classifier that uses a bag-of-words approach and a supervised anchor classifier that uses event-mention detection tools.

[39] The following news agencies were included: AFP, AP, APA, BBC, BNS, CTK, DPA, MTI, PA, and PAP. The goal was to include not only the major news European agencies (AFP, DPA, PA) but also regional ones covering eastern and southern Europe in more depth.

A detailed evaluation of these classifiers by Wüest and Lorenzini (2018) shows that the classifiers are reliable and, thus, we used them to calculate a single probability score for each document. This score indicates the likelihood that both classifiers indicate that a document is relevant. Afterwards, we manually coded a sample of documents to establish the optimal threshold for the probability score above which we are relatively confident that a document reports about protest without excluding too many relevant documents. In other words, we attempted to find the optimal level of the probability score, which would reduce the number of documents that are false positives and false negatives. In the end, we classified slightly more than 100,000 documents as relevant, thereby substantially reducing the number of documents that are relevant for our analysis.

Afterwards, we employed manual coding to retrieve information on all protest events in our selected countries and time period. For this purpose, we used a simplified version of the protest event analysis (PEA) approach that was first established by Kriesi et al. (1995). An important advantage of the semi-automated process was that it significantly reduced the amount of time and resources required for coding protest events. By using the classifiers, we were able to provide coders with documents that were more likely to report about protest event. In total only 22% of the documents that we submitted to coders were irrelevant (compared to 95% of documents from our entire corpus that are irrelevant). Tests to evaluate the content of the documents that we excluded from the analysis show that most of the documents that we excluded do not contain any protest events. Moreover, when documents report protest events, these events have the same attributes as the events included in the sample. Thus, we are confident that the articles, which we coded manually, are a good representation of all articles published by the ten newswires.

However, to implement PEA we still relied on an additional sampling strategy because the corpus of relevant documents remained too large to be coded manually. Therefore, we catego-

rized countries into three group: for countries with a large sample of documents, we coded 25% of the relevant documents; for countries with an average number of documents, we coded 50%; and for small countries with only a few hundred news reports, we coded all the documents identified as relevant by our classifiers. Afterwards, coders were asked to identify all mentions of protest events in the documents. To this end, coders did not rely on a theoretical definition of relevant protest actions, which might be conceptually precise but practically very difficult to implement. Instead, coders identified relevant events based on a detailed list of unconventional or non-institutionalized action forms. In addition to demonstrative, confrontational, and violent actions, coders were asked to also identify strikes and other forms of industrial action as protest.

A document may contain references to one or to more than one protest event and coders recorded the following variables for each event: date, location, action form, issue of the protest, the actors participating or organizing the protest, and the number of participants. To measure the level of inter-coder agreement, we presented fourteen coders with the same 65 documents at different times during their coding. For the identification of the events – assessing whether two coders agree on the data, country, and action form of all the events that they identify in the same document – the averaged F1-score was 0.60 with a standard deviation of 0.06. For the identification of event attributes, the average Cohen's Kappa varies by event attribute. It was 0.57 (with a standard deviation of 0.13) for actors, 0.53 (with a standard deviation of 0.45) for issues and 0.45 (with a standard deviation of 0.06) for the number of participants. These values show that our coders have a relatively high level of agreement given that values from 0.40 to 0.60 are commonly defined as fair to good.

Appendix B.2 Robustness Check with Alternative Model Specification

In the multilevel models presented in the chapter, the country*year level accounts for the correlation within party protests in the same year but treats party protests in a subsequent year as an independent cluster. Therefore, we ran Prais-Winsten models, regularly used in political science with similarly structured datasets, to account for the longitudinal structure of our dataset. We also ran these models with country fixed effects (not shown) with the same results.

Table 1: Prais-Winsten Model - The Effect of Party Level Characteristics on Party Sponsored Protests (same as Table 1 in main text)

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
Left-right	-0.03							
	(-0.29)							
Economic left-right		-0.25***	-0.17**	-0.14*	-0.17**	-0.14	-0.14*	-0.14*
		(-3.06)	(-2.13)	(-1.70)	(-2.09)	(-1.60)	(-1.79)	(-1.75)
Cultural left-right		0.19*	0.15*	0.13	0.15	0.08	0.14	0.13
		(1.91)	(1.66)	(1.48)	(1.64)	(1.00)	(1.57)	(1.49)
Radical (base: moderate)			0.38**	0.38**	0.42***	0.50***	0.42**	0.36**
			(2.21)	(2.32)	(2.63)	(2.99)	(2.59)	(2.29)
Opposition (base: gov.)				0.40***		0.43***	0.29***	0.37***
				(3.94)		(3.93)	(3.92)	(3.60)
Vote Share				0.11	0.04	0.11	-0.05	0.11
				(1.36)	(0.58)	(1.09)	(-1.02)	(1.34)
Delta Vote Share					-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	0.01
					(-0.49)	(-1.52)	(-0.28)	(0.18)
Mass Party Org.						0.22***		
						(2.64)		
Opposition (base: gov.) * Vote Share							0.29***	
							(2.61)	
Delta Vote Share * Vote Share								-0.13*
								(-1.74)
Length of gov. in office	0.25***	0.25***	0.24***	0.24***	0.24***	0.27***	0.25***	0.23***
	(5.01)	(5.02)	(4.81)	(4.71)	(4.83)	(4.68)	(5.02)	(4.77)
Constant	0.81***	0.81***	0.67***	0.38***	0.65***	0.34***	0.50***	0.43***
	(10.60)	(10.98)	(9.10)	(5.12)	(9.39)	(3.93)	(7.18)	(5.06)
N	990	990	990	990	990	726	990	990
r2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.07
aic	3641.45	3629.18	3624.61	3617.72	3628.50	2640.99	3613.93	3617.28
bic	3656.15	3648.77	3649.09	3652.00	3662.79	2682.28	3658.01	3661.36

Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; all continuous variables have been standardized so the effect sizes are directly comparable

Figure 2: Prais-Winsten Model - Marginal effects of opposition status and relative losses across vote shares (Same as Figure 2 in main text)



Note: The marginal effects are based on the interactions presented in model 7 and 8 in Table B.1. The interaction effect in the case of relative loss is plotted at the 10th and 90th percentiles of vote change. These cut-off point correspond to -47 and 57 percentage points relative to the previous vote share of the party.

Appendix C

Appendix C.1 Descriptive Statistics and Additional Models

Figure 1: Bivariate relationship between ideology and protest at the country level



Note: The map shows the average share of protesters among those who identify as radical or moderate left across the different surveys from the respective country. Darker shades reflect higher average share of left-wing protesters relative to left-wing citizens in each country.

Figure 2: Random effects by country*year groups



Figure 3: Random effects by countries



Notes: Both the country*year and the country level random effects are from model 1 with aggregate controls and region, presented by table 1 in the chapter. The regional averages are very similar across all random effect plots.

Table 1: Categorical estimates of year of the survey X personal ideology X region

	Model 1
Intercept	-2.22 (0.38)***
Extreme left (base: left)	0.60 (0.11)***
Center	-0.61 (0.08)***
Right	-0.99 (0.11)***
Extreme right	-0.80 (0.20)***
Union member (dichot.)	0.50 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	0.93 (0.02)***
Male	0.10 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.40 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.52 (0.11)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.23 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.38 (0.02)***
Village	-0.63 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.50 (0.04)***
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.25 (0.09)**
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.01 (0.54)
Voice & Accountability	-0.87 (0.42)*
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.27 (0.35)
Eastern Europe	-1.89 (0.38)***
2004	0.10 (0.13)
2006	-0.22 (0.13)
2008	-0.14 (0.13)
2010	-0.28 (0.13)*
2012	-0.18 (0.13)
2014	-0.01 (0.13)
2016	-0.04 (0.14)
Ext Left*SE	-0.30 (0.23)
Center*SE	0.08 (0.17)
Right*SE	0.10 (0.23)
Ext Right*SE	-0.10 (0.42)
Ext Left*EE	-0.14 (0.32)
Center*EE	0.93 (0.24)***
Right*EE	1.63 (0.26)***
Ext Right*EE	1.97 (0.36)***
SE*2004	0.11 (0.25)
EE*2004	0.41 (0.29)
SE*2006	0.18 (0.30)
EE*2006	0.20 (0.31)
SE*2008	0.07 (0.27)
EE*2008	0.64 (0.28)*
SE*2010	0.66 (0.27)*
EE*2010	0.70 (0.28)*
SE*2012	0.78 (0.28)**
EE*2012	1.07 (0.28)***

SE*2014	0.21 (0.30)
EE*2014	0.80 (0.29)**
SE*2016	0.17 (0.27)
EE*2016	0.99 (0.29)***
Rad Left*2004	0.05 (0.15)
Center*2004	-0.06 (0.11)
Right*2004	-0.13 (0.16)
Ext Right*2004	-0.25 (0.30)
Rad Left*2006	0.26 (0.15)
Center*2006	-0.01 (0.12)
Right*2006	0.10 (0.16)
Ext Right*2006	0.13 (0.30)
Rad Left*2008	0.02 (0.16)
Center*2008	0.10 (0.12)
Right*2008	0.20 (0.16)
Ext Right*2008	-0.02 (0.31)
Rad Left*2010	0.05 (0.16)
Center*2010	0.04 (0.12)
Right*2010	0.10 (0.16)
Ext Right*2010	-0.30 (0.33)
Rad Left*2012	-0.03 (0.16)
Center*2012	-0.04 (0.12)
Right*2012	0.15 (0.16)
Ext Right*2012	0.04 (0.30)
Rad Left*2014	0.11 (0.15)
Center*2014	0.01 (0.11)
Right*2014	0.14 (0.15)
Ext Right*2014	-0.20 (0.30)
Rad Left*2016	0.25 (0.15)
Center*2016	0.03 (0.11)
Right*2016	0.22 (0.16)
Ext Right*2016	0.13 (0.30)
SE*Rad Left*2004	-0.02 (0.32)
EE*Rad Left*2004	-0.53 (0.43)
SE*Center*2004	-0.09 (0.24)
EE*Center*2004	-0.59 (0.32)
SE*Right*2004	0.28 (0.32)
EE*Right*2004	-0.90 (0.36)*
SE*Ext Right*2004	0.73 (0.57)
EE*Ext Right*2004	-0.70 (0.51)
SE*Rad Left*2006	-0.03 (0.37)
EE*Rad Left*2006	-0.63 (0.47)
SE*Center*2006	-0.08 (0.27)
EE*Center*2006	0.03 (0.34)
SE*Right*2006	0.52 (0.37)
EE*Right*2006	-0.18 (0.37)
SE*Ext Right*2006	0.51 (0.72)
EE*Ext Right*2006	-0.39 (0.53)
SE*Rad Left*2008	0.05 (0.34)

EE*Rad Left*2008	-0.84 (0.42)*
SE*Center*2008	-0.18 (0.25)
EE*Center*2008	-0.86 (0.30)**
SE*Right*2008	0.01 (0.34)
EE*Right*2008	-0.98 (0.33)**
SE*Ext Right*2008	-0.18 (0.66)
EE*Ext Right*2008	-1.11 (0.49)*
SE*Rad Left*2010	0.34 (0.33)
EE*Rad Left*2010	-0.72 (0.41)
SE*Center*2010	-0.42 (0.24)
EE*Center*2010	-0.56 (0.30)
SE*Right*2010	-0.19 (0.34)
EE*Right*2010	-0.72 (0.33)*
SE*Ext Right*2010	0.55 (0.64)
EE*Ext Right*2010	-0.69 (0.50)
SE*Rad Left*2012	0.26 (0.32)
EE*Rad Left*2012	-0.18 (0.38)
SE*Center*2012	-0.04 (0.24)
EE*Center*2012	-0.56 (0.29)
SE*Right*2012	-0.28 (0.34)
EE*Right*2012	-0.88 (0.32)**
SE*Ext Right*2012	-0.12 (0.62)
EE*Ext Right*2012	-0.99 (0.47)*
SE*Rad Left*2014	-0.01 (0.34)
EE*Rad Left*2014	-0.56 (0.41)
SE*Center*2014	-0.03 (0.26)
EE*Center*2014	-0.64 (0.30)*
SE*Right*2014	-0.01 (0.37)
EE*Right*2014	-0.85 (0.34)*
SE*Ext Right*2014	0.52 (0.68)
EE*Ext Right*2014	-0.83 (0.50)
SE*Rad Left*2016	0.09 (0.32)
EE*Rad Left*2016	-0.71 (0.41)
SE*Center*2016	-0.09 (0.24)
EE*Center*2016	-0.68 (0.30)*
SE*Right*2016	-0.60 (0.35)
EE*Right*2016	-1.17 (0.34)***
SE*Ext Right*2016	0.35 (0.60)
EE*Ext Right*2016	-1.52 (0.51)**
AIC	116183.32
BIC	117746.47
Log Likelihood	-57942.66
Num. obs.	265927
Cntry*Yrs	169
Countries	25
Var Cntry*Yrs: Intercept	0.07
Var Cntry*Yrs: Extreme Left	0.04
Var Cntry*Yrs: Center	0.02
Var Cntry*Yrs: Right	0.08

Var Cntry*Yrs: Extreme Right	0.26
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Intercept, Ext Left	-0.02
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Intercept, Center	-0.01
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Intercept, Right	-0.03
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.06
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Ext Left, Center	0.00
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Ext Left, Right	-0.01
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.01
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Center, Right	0.03
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Center, Ext Right	0.03
Cov Cntry*Yrs: Right, Ext Right	0.12
Var Country: Intercept	0.23

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 4: Marginal effects of categorical estimates of year of the survey X personal ideology X region



Notes: The calculated marginal effects are based on the model called Model1 in Table 1, C.1.

Table 2: All estimates in table 5.2 in the chapter (only southern and Easter Europe)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-3.06 (0.46)***	-3.08 (0.44)***	-2.86 (0.43)***
Extreme left (base: left)	0.12 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.43 (0.10)***
Center	-0.32 (0.06)***	-0.33 (0.06)***	-0.66 (0.08)***
Right	-0.31 (0.09)***	-0.32 (0.08)***	-0.97 (0.11)***
Extreme right	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.84 (0.22)***
Union member (dichot.)	0.53 (0.04)***	0.57 (0.04)***	0.57 (0.04)***
Party ID (cont.)	1.03 (0.04)***	1.02 (0.04)***	1.03 (0.04)***
Male	0.14 (0.03)***	0.14 (0.03)***	0.14 (0.03)***
Age (cont.)	-2.39 (0.24)***	-2.78 (0.26)***	-2.78 (0.26)***
Years of education (cont.)	4.42 (0.20)***	4.64 (0.21)***	4.64 (0.21)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Small City	-0.29 (0.04)***	-0.29 (0.04)***	-0.28 (0.04)***
Village	-0.60 (0.04)***	-0.59 (0.04)***	-0.59 (0.04)***
Countryside	-0.52 (0.13)***	-0.51 (0.13)***	-0.51 (0.13)***
Unemployed	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Gov. L-R	0.51 (0.16)**	0.50 (0.17)**	0.47 (0.17)**
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	1.80 (0.87)*	1.85 (0.86)*	1.88 (0.84)*
Voice & Accountability	-0.95 (0.53)	-1.02 (0.52)*	-0.86 (0.52)
Exposure	0.01 (0.13)	0.56 (0.18)**	0.51 (0.21)*
Eastern Europe (base: southern Europe)	-1.23 (0.31)***	-1.15 (0.30)***	-1.40 (0.29)***
Exposure*EE		-0.58 (0.12)***	-0.84 (0.20)***
Ext Left*EE			-0.16 (0.18)
Center*EE			0.27 (0.13)*
Right*EE			0.73 (0.15)***
Ext Right*EE			0.73 (0.27)**
Ext Left*Exposure			0.04 (0.28)
Center*Exposure			0.02 (0.22)
Right*Exposure			0.22 (0.23)
Ext Right*Exposure			0.23 (0.42)
EE*Ext Left*Exposure			-0.49 (0.38)
EE*Center*Exposure			0.50 (0.29)
EE*Right*Exposure			0.24 (0.29)
EE*Ext Right*Exposure			0.50 (0.47)
AIC	35623.22	35602.81	35559.08
BIC	35963.60	35952.64	36022.38
Log Likelihood	-17775.61	-17764.40	-17730.54
Num. obs.	94367	94367	94367
Country*Years	73	73	73
Countries	12	12	12
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.21	0.21	0.17
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.10	0.09	0.05
Var Country*Years: Center	0.11	0.10	0.04
Var Country*Years: Right	0.33	0.33	0.12
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.78	0.78	0.49
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.04	0.04	-0.01

Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.10	-0.09	-0.04
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.16	-0.16	-0.06
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.29	-0.29	-0.18
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.09	-0.09	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.14	-0.14	-0.04
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.06	-0.06	0.05
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.18	0.17	0.05
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.17	0.17	0.01
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.39	0.39	0.14
Var Country: Intercept	0.12	0.12	0.12

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 3: All estimates in table 5.3 in the chapter

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	-2.44 (0.38)***	-2.41 (0.39)***	-2.64 (0.40)***	-2.59 (0.39)***
Extreme left (base: left)	0.46 (0.04)***	0.39 (0.07)***	0.65 (0.09)***	0.79 (0.09)***
Center	-0.51 (0.03)***	-0.54 (0.04)***	-0.39 (0.06)***	-0.45 (0.07)***
Right	-0.65 (0.05)***	-0.65 (0.06)***	-0.44 (0.09)***	-0.61 (0.09)***
Extreme right	-0.50 (0.07)***	-0.91 (0.15)***	0.03 (0.14)	-0.43 (0.16)**
Union member (dichot.)	0.50 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.02)***	0.50 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	0.85 (0.03)***	0.94 (0.05)***	0.93 (0.02)***	0.93 (0.02)***
Male	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.41 (0.06)***	-2.39 (0.06)***	-2.41 (0.06)***	-2.39 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.53 (0.12)***	3.53 (0.12)***	3.52 (0.12)***	3.52 (0.11)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.23 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.39 (0.02)***	-0.39 (0.02)***	-0.39 (0.02)***	-0.38 (0.02)***
Village	-0.63 (0.02)***	-0.63 (0.02)***	-0.63 (0.02)***	-0.63 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.51 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.51 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.29 (0.10)**	0.25 (0.10)*	0.60 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.15)*
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.48 (0.43)	0.51 (0.44)	0.50 (0.44)	0.50 (0.43)
Voice & Accountability	-1.16 (0.32)***	-1.15 (0.33)***	-1.16 (0.33)***	-0.99 (0.33)**
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.45 (0.30)	0.46 (0.31)	0.59 (0.30)	0.52 (0.34)
Eastern Europe	-0.93 (0.31)**	-1.07 (0.31)***	-0.86 (0.32)**	-1.48 (0.33)***
SE:Party ID	0.27 (0.06)***	0.30 (0.09)**		
EE:Party ID	0.14 (0.06)*	-0.18 (0.12)		
SE:Ext Left		0.02 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.18)
EE:Ext Left		-0.57 (0.18)**		-0.38 (0.20)
SE:Center		0.05 (0.08)		-0.16 (0.13)
EE:Center		0.18 (0.10)		0.52 (0.15)***
SE:Right		-0.09 (0.12)		0.06 (0.18)
EE:Right		0.52 (0.12)***		0.76 (0.18)***
SE:Ext Right		-0.03 (0.29)		0.22 (0.32)
EE:Ext Right		0.85 (0.22)***		1.50 (0.25)***
Ext Left:Party ID		0.47 (0.10)***		
Center:Party ID		-0.14 (0.07)		
Right:Party ID		-0.50 (0.08)***		
Ext Right:Party ID		0.07 (0.19)		
SE:Ext Left:Party ID		-0.45 (0.20)*		
EE:Ext Left:Party ID		-0.12 (0.26)		
SE:Center:Party ID		-0.21 (0.15)		
EE:Center:Party ID		0.57 (0.17)***		
SE:Right:Party ID		0.26 (0.17)		
EE:Right:Party ID		0.71 (0.17)***		
SE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.28 (0.35)		
EE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.46 (0.28)		
Ext Left*Gov. L-R			-0.36 (0.15)*	-0.21 (0.16)
Center*Gov. L-R			-0.22 (0.10)*	-0.29 (0.12)*

Right*Gov. L-R			-0.42 (0.15)**	-0.56 (0.16)***
Ext Right*Gov. L-R			-1.03 (0.23)***	-0.84 (0.29)**
Gov. L-R*SE				0.23 (0.29)
Gov. L-R*EE				0.70 (0.26)**
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Left				-0.12 (0.29)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext Left				-0.54 (0.33)
SE*Gov. L-R*Center				0.22 (0.21)
EE*Gov. L-R*Center				-0.22 (0.23)
SE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.01 (0.31)
EE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.21 (0.28)
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				0.02 (0.53)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				-0.69 (0.41)
AIC	116206.02	116004.51	116201.99	116069.56
BIC	116604.67	116612.99	116621.63	116678.04
Log Likelihood	-58065.01	-57944.26	-58061.00	-57976.78
Num. obs.	265927	265927	265927	265927
Country*Years	169	169	169	169
Countries	25	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.10
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.14	0.01	0.13	0.05
Var Country*Years: Center	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02
Var Country*Years: Right	0.24	0.09	0.22	0.08
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.53	0.29	0.46	0.21
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.02	-0.00	0.03	-0.00
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.09	-0.04	-0.08	-0.04
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.14	-0.08	-0.12	-0.06
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.00
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.11	-0.02	-0.13	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.12	0.00	-0.15	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.03
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.01
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.31	0.13	0.28	0.10
Var Country: Intercept	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Appendix C.2 Robustness Checks

One methodological concern with regards to the ideological composition of protest refers to the extent to which left-right is understood in systematically different ways across Europe. Our theoretical framework postulates that past and contemporary regime access influences the effect of left-right ideology on protest. However, evidence shows that east-west differences exist in the value preferences of respondents who identify with these labels (Thorisdottir et al. 2007). Moreover, the voting behaviour literature shows that the embedding of left-right in the cleavage structure of different societies as well as the extent to which it reflects partisan preferences varies between countries (Vegetti & Širinić 2018). We propose two different strategies to test the robustness of our findings against these objections. First, we introduce several control variables both at the individual and at the country year level to check the robustness of the effects we uncover in the chapter. Second, we model separately the effect of economic and cultural issue preferences, going beyond the general left-right measure.

Turning to the first strategy, at the individual level we follow the operationalization of Torcal et al (2016) and construct three additive index to control for the value preferences which they have shown to influence protest behaviour (universalism, conformity, security). For universalism, we rely on the importance respondents attribute to people being treated equally and having equal opportunities as well as the importance they attribute to caring for nature and the environment. To assess conformity, we rely on the importance respondents attribute to doing what is told/following rules as well as the importance they attribute to behaving properly. To assess security, we rely on the importance respondents attribute to living in secure and safe surroundings as well as the importance they attribute to a strong government that ensures safety.

We also include the two economic and cultural issue preferences available in all waves of the ESS. These are five point agreement scores in response to the statement "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" and "gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish". At the country*year level we include the average level of conformity, security and universalism. The aggregate share of values have been shown to have an effect on protest participation both at the individual and at the societal level (Welzel & Deutsch 2012).

We follow the standard approach in voting behaviour and conduct OLS regression models in each country*year cluster to measure the extent to which variables associated with social cleavages explain left-right self-placement. In these models we control for age, gender, education, unemployment, church attendance, religiosity, income, class, place of residence, preference with regards to income inequality, gay rights. Our measure of class is based on the eight categories introduced by the scheme of Oesch (2006). We take the adjusted R squared of these regression models and introduce in the multilevel models as one of the country*year level control variables. In addition, following the idea that in some contexts left-right primarily reflects partisan identities, we replicate Vegetti & Širinić (2018) and include their indicator of the relative importance of party preferences in left-right self-placement.

Since in four country*year groups some of the variables were missing, the sample is somewhat smaller than the one reported in the chapter. Specifically, in 2002 Italy the measures to construct the indexes for values are missing. In 2002, 2004 France and in 2004 Hungary the occupational categories to construct our indicator of class are missing. In the case of 2002, 2004 France subjective income is also missing. Similarly, to the models reported in the chapter, to ease the convergence all continuous variables have been rescaled to a range between 0-1.

With small changes, the results underpin our conclusions based on the more parsimonious models reported in the chapter.

Turning to the second strategy, we replicate table 5.1, figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 with using economic and cultural preferences instead of a general left-right measure. Economic preferences are measured by the survey item asking respondents to indicate on a five point scale the extent to which they agree with the following statement: *"Government should reduce differences in income levels"*. Cultural preferences are measured by a survey item asking respondents to indicate on a similar five point scale the extent to which they agree with the statement: *"Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish"*. In both cases those who "fully agree" were coded as extreme left; those who "agree" were coded as left, those who "neither agree, nor disagree" were coded as center, those who "disagree" were coded as right, and those who "strongly disagree" were coded as extreme right. These are the only two items repeated in each wave of the European Social Survey which tap into issue preferences beyond the general left-right measure.

Tables 4 and 5, and figures 6-9 present the results of modelling protest as a function of economic and cultural preferences. These more specific issue preferences have a smaller effect on protest than the more general left-right predispositions (see figures 6 and 7). In northwestern Europe, protest is driven by radical left cultural and economic preferences and radical right cultural preferences. In southern Europe, protest is driven by radical left cultural and economic preferences, and radical right economic preferences (however, note the large confidence intervals – Figure 6). In eastern Europe protest is driven by radical left cultural preferences, and radical right economic preferences.

Depending on the region, the over time composition of protest in terms of economic or cultural preferences varies (figure 7 and figure 9). In northwestern Europe, the overall pattern of

stability is somewhat altered by an increase in the importance of right-wing cultural preferences in explaining protest. In southern Europe, citizens with right-wing economic preferences mobilize over time, in addition to those who are more likely to protest as a result of both economically or culturally left preferences. In eastern Europe, radical and moderate left-wing cultural preferences became more important as well as radical right economic preferences in explaining protest.

Independently of the type of preferences, the results show an unequal distribution of protest in the three regions by citizens with different ideological views and the lack of convergence over time in the level of protest. Therefore, the additional analysis strengthens our interpretation with regards to H1 as well as H2, and show that protest is not yet normalized in either of the three regions.

Table 1: Replicating Table 5.1 in the chapter

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-1.99 (0.85)*	-1.99 (0.92)*	-1.48 (0.90)
Extreme left (base: left)	0.40 (0.04)***	0.59 (0.04)***	0.55 (0.08)***
Center	-0.43 (0.03)***	-0.48 (0.03)***	-0.51 (0.06)***
Right	-0.49 (0.04)***	-0.67 (0.04)***	-0.77 (0.08)***
Extreme right	-0.28 (0.07)***	-0.56 (0.09)***	-0.56 (0.16)***
Union member (dichot.)	0.49 (0.02)***	0.49 (0.02)***	0.49 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	0.88 (0.02)***	0.88 (0.02)***	0.88 (0.02)***
Income diff. (cont.)	-0.45 (0.04)***	-0.45 (0.04)***	-0.45 (0.04)***
Gay rights (cont.)	-0.31 (0.04)***	-0.30 (0.04)***	-0.30 (0.04)***
Conformity (cont.)	-0.71 (0.04)***	-0.71 (0.04)***	-0.71 (0.04)***
Universalism (cont.)	1.28 (0.06)***	1.27 (0.06)***	1.27 (0.06)***
Security (cont.)	-0.78 (0.05)***	-0.78 (0.05)***	-0.78 (0.05)***
Male	0.13 (0.02)***	0.13 (0.02)***	0.14 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.21 (0.06)***	-2.20 (0.06)***	-2.20 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	2.78 (0.12)***	2.78 (0.12)***	2.78 (0.12)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.22 (0.03)***	-0.22 (0.03)***	-0.22 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.37 (0.02)***	-0.36 (0.02)***	-0.36 (0.02)***
Village	-0.61 (0.02)***	-0.61 (0.02)***	-0.61 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.27 (0.11)*	0.26 (0.11)*	0.25 (0.11)*
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.62 (0.44)	0.62 (0.46)	-0.13 (0.58)
Voice & Accountability	-0.90 (0.34)**	-0.87 (0.35)*	-0.60 (0.37)
Adj R sq. of soc. structure for L-R	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.14 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.22)
Rel.imp. of parties for L-R	-0.49 (0.30)	-0.48 (0.30)	-0.37 (0.30)
Avg. universalism	-0.51 (1.16)	-0.58 (1.52)	-0.13 (1.06)
Avg. conformity	-1.92 (0.92)*	-1.94 (1.27)	-1.99 (0.92)*
Avg. security	1.87 (1.03)	1.99 (1.60)	1.09 (1.04)
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.78 (0.33)*	0.81 (0.34)*	0.70 (0.37)
Eastern Europe	-0.56 (0.33)	-0.81 (0.34)*	-1.42 (0.38)***
Year of Survey			-0.02 (0.13)
Ext Left*SE		-0.20 (0.09)*	-0.30 (0.17)
Center*SE		-0.09 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.12)
Right*SE		-0.03 (0.10)	0.28 (0.17)
Ext Right*SE		0.10 (0.18)	0.08 (0.31)
Ext Left*EE		-0.61 (0.10)***	-0.60 (0.23)**
Center*EE		0.28 (0.07)***	0.54 (0.16)***
Right*EE		0.70 (0.09)***	1.09 (0.18)***
Ext Right*EE		0.88 (0.14)***	1.27 (0.28)***
Ext Left*Year			0.07 (0.13)
Center*Year			0.06 (0.09)
Right*Year			0.19 (0.13)
Ext Right*Year			0.01 (0.26)
SE*Year*Ext Left			0.19 (0.26)
EE*Year*Ext Left			-0.02 (0.35)

SE*Year*Center			-0.05 (0.20)
EE*Year*Center			-0.46 (0.24)
SE*Year*Right			-0.62 (0.28)*
EE*Year*Right			-0.70 (0.28)*
SE*Year*Ext Right			0.02 (0.51)
EE*Year*Ext Right			-0.74 (0.44)
AIC	105621.45	105525.28	105531.66
BIC	106099.71	106086.71	106249.04
Log Likelihood	-52764.73	-52708.64	-52696.83
Num. obs.	242037	242037	242037
Country*Years	165	165	165
Countries	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.11	0.10	0.09
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.10	0.04	0.03
Var Country*Years: Center	0.04	0.02	0.02
Var Country*Years: Right	0.18	0.09	0.08
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.42	0.28	0.28
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.02	-0.00	-0.00
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.12	-0.08	-0.07
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.07	0.02	0.02
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.07	0.03	0.03
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.06	0.02	0.02
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.23	0.12	0.12
Var Country: Intercept	0.20	0.21	0.24

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Figure 1: Replicating Figure 5.2 in the chapter

Figure 2: Replicating Figure 5.3 in the chapter



Table 2: Replicating table 5.2 in the chapter

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-2.97 (1.50)*	-3.05 (1.59)	-2.93 (1.46)*
Extreme left (base: left)	0.09 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.33 (0.10)**
Center	-0.29 (0.06)***	-0.29 (0.06)***	-0.59 (0.08)***
Right	-0.24 (0.08)**	-0.24 (0.08)**	-0.82 (0.11)***
Extreme right	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.61 (0.22)**
Union member (dichot.)	0.52 (0.04)***	0.56 (0.04)***	0.56 (0.04)***
Party ID (cont.)	1.02 (0.04)***	1.02 (0.04)***	1.02 (0.04)***
Income diff. (cont.)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)*	-0.14 (0.07)*
Gay rights (cont.)	-0.32 (0.06)***	-0.31 (0.06)***	-0.30 (0.06)***
Conformity (cont.)	-0.80 (0.08)***	-0.81 (0.08)***	-0.80 (0.08)***
Universalism (cont.)	1.06 (0.11)***	1.05 (0.11)***	1.04 (0.11)***
Security (cont.)	-0.83 (0.09)***	-0.82 (0.09)***	-0.81 (0.09)***
Male	0.17 (0.03)***	0.16 (0.03)***	0.16 (0.03)***
Age (cont.)	-2.17 (0.25)***	-2.58 (0.27)***	-2.58 (0.27)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.84 (0.21)***	4.07 (0.22)***	4.08 (0.22)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Small City	-0.28 (0.04)***	-0.28 (0.04)***	-0.28 (0.04)***
Village	-0.56 (0.04)***	-0.54 (0.04)***	-0.54 (0.04)***
Countryside	-0.51 (0.13)***	-0.50 (0.13)***	-0.50 (0.13)***
Unemployed	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Gov. L-R	0.38 (0.18)*	0.38 (0.18)*	0.37 (0.18)*
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	1.22 (0.87)	1.29 (0.88)	1.32 (0.86)
Voice & Accountability	-1.00 (0.52)	-1.11 (0.52)*	-1.05 (0.52)*
Adj R sq. of soc. structure for L-R	0.26 (0.40)	0.29 (0.40)	0.33 (0.40)
Rel.imp. of parties for L-R	-0.75 (0.47)	-0.74 (0.47)	-0.73 (0.47)
Avg. universalism	-1.77 (2.23)	-1.73 (2.35)	-1.93 (2.18)
Avg. conformity	-1.77 (1.69)	-1.77 (1.62)	-1.84 (1.69)
Avg. security	4.52 (2.63)	4.56 (2.33)	4.91 (2.49)*
Exposure	0.08 (0.14)	0.66 (0.18)***	0.63 (0.21)**
Eastern Europe (base: southern Europe)	-1.34 (0.33)***	-1.26 (0.33)***	-1.49 (0.32)***
Exposure*EE		-0.61 (0.13)***	-0.89 (0.21)***
Ext Left*EE			-0.10 (0.19)
Center*EE			0.24 (0.13)
Right*EE			0.65 (0.16)***
Ext Right*EE			0.58 (0.28)*
Ext Left*Exposure			0.14 (0.29)
Center*Exposure			-0.01 (0.23)
Right*Exposure			0.16 (0.24)
Ext Right*Exposure			-0.14 (0.47)
EE*Ext Left*Exposure			-0.54 (0.40)
EE*Center*Exposure			0.52 (0.30)
EE*Right*Exposure			0.28 (0.31)
EE*Ext Right*Exposure			0.82 (0.52)
AIC	33083.16	33061.28	33029.10
BIC	33513.37	33500.85	33580.89

Log Likelihood	-16495.58	-16483.64	-16455.55
Num. obs.	85174	85174	85174
Country*Years	72	72	72
Countries	12	12	12
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.20	0.19	0.16
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.07	0.07	0.04
Var Country*Years: Center	0.10	0.09	0.04
Var Country*Years: Right	0.30	0.30	0.13
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.69	0.71	0.49
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.04	0.03	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.08	-0.08	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.13	-0.13	-0.06
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.27	-0.27	-0.18
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.08	-0.07	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.13	-0.11	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.07	-0.04	0.06
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.15	0.15	0.06
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.13	0.14	0.03
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.34	0.35	0.16
Var Country: Intercept	0.12	0.11	0.11

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 3: Replicating figure 5.4 in the chapter



Table 3: Replicating table 5.3 in the chapter

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Intercept	-1.96 (0.86)*	-1.95 (0.92)*	-2.15 (0.96)*	-2.27 (0.80)**
Extreme left (base: left)	0.39 (0.04)***	0.31 (0.08)***	0.57 (0.08)***	0.68 (0.09)***
Center	-0.42 (0.03)***	-0.47 (0.05)***	-0.34 (0.06)***	-0.37 (0.07)***
Right	-0.49 (0.04)***	-0.49 (0.06)***	-0.32 (0.09)***	-0.43 (0.09)***
Extreme right	-0.29 (0.07)***	-0.71 (0.16)***	0.19 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.16)
Union member (dichot.)	0.49 (0.02)***	0.48 (0.02)***	0.49 (0.02)***	0.49 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	0.79 (0.03)***	0.83 (0.05)***	0.88 (0.02)***	0.88 (0.02)***
Income diff. (cont.)	-0.45 (0.04)***	-0.44 (0.04)***	-0.45 (0.04)***	-0.44 (0.04)***
Gay rights (cont.)	-0.31 (0.04)***	-0.30 (0.04)***	-0.31 (0.04)***	-0.30 (0.04)***
Conformity (cont.)	-0.71 (0.04)***	-0.70 (0.04)***	-0.71 (0.04)***	-0.70 (0.04)***
Universalism (cont.)	1.29 (0.06)***	1.27 (0.06)***	1.28 (0.06)***	1.27 (0.06)***
Security (cont.)	-0.79 (0.05)***	-0.78 (0.05)***	-0.78 (0.05)***	-0.78 (0.05)***
Male	0.13 (0.02)***	0.13 (0.02)***	0.13 (0.02)***	0.13 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.21 (0.06)***	-2.20 (0.06)***	-2.21 (0.06)***	-2.20 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	2.79 (0.12)***	2.79 (0.12)***	2.78 (0.12)***	2.78 (0.12)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.22 (0.03)***	-0.22 (0.03)***	-0.22 (0.03)***	-0.22 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.37 (0.02)***	-0.36 (0.02)***	-0.37 (0.02)***	-0.36 (0.02)***
Village	-0.61 (0.02)***	-0.61 (0.02)***	-0.61 (0.02)***	-0.61 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***	-0.50 (0.04)***
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.27 (0.11)*	0.26 (0.11)*	0.53 (0.12)***	0.30 (0.15)*
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.63 (0.44)	0.64 (0.44)	0.64 (0.46)	0.66 (0.45)
Voice & Accountability	-0.91 (0.34)**	-0.89 (0.35)*	-0.92 (0.35)**	-0.78 (0.34)*
Adj R sq. of soc. structure for L-R	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.23)
Rel.imp. of parties for L-R	-0.51 (0.30)	-0.50 (0.30)	-0.49 (0.31)	-0.46 (0.30)
Avg. universalism	-0.45 (1.08)	-0.56 (1.02)	-0.48 (1.12)	-0.16 (0.95)
Avg. conformity	-1.92 (0.92)*	-1.96 (1.03)	-1.82 (1.04)	-1.98 (0.93)*
Avg. security	1.82 (1.00)	1.97 (0.98)*	1.78 (1.14)	1.77 (1.01)
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.65 (0.33)*	0.65 (0.33)*	0.78 (0.33)*	0.71 (0.36)*
Eastern Europe	-0.64 (0.33)	-0.78 (0.33)*	-0.56 (0.34)	-1.13 (0.35)**
SE:Party ID	0.28 (0.06)***	0.34 (0.10)***		
EE:Party ID	0.19 (0.07)**	-0.07 (0.13)		
SE:Ext Left		0.07 (0.15)		-0.14 (0.18)
EE:Ext Left		-0.60 (0.20)**		-0.34 (0.21)
SE:Center		0.03 (0.09)		-0.17 (0.13)
EE:Center		0.14 (0.10)		0.44 (0.16)**
SE:Right		-0.12 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.18)
EE:Right		0.43 (0.12)***		0.65 (0.18)***
SE:Ext Right		0.02 (0.30)		0.05 (0.32)
EE:Ext Right		0.77 (0.23)***		1.25 (0.25)***
Ext Left:Party ID		0.46 (0.11)***		
Center:Party ID		-0.04 (0.08)		
Right:Party ID		-0.37 (0.08)***		

Ext Right:Party ID		0.24 (0.20)		
SE:Ext Left:Party ID		-0.51 (0.21)*		
EE:Ext Left:Party ID		0.02 (0.28)		
SE:Center:Party ID		-0.24 (0.16)		
EE:Center:Party ID		0.45 (0.18)*		
SE:Right:Party ID		0.18 (0.17)		
EE:Right:Party ID		0.59 (0.18)**		
SE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.02 (0.37)		
EE:Ext Right:Party ID		0.20 (0.29)		
Ext Left*Gov. L-R			-0.34 (0.14)*	-0.19 (0.16)
Center*Gov. L-R			-0.17 (0.10)	-0.21 (0.12)
Right*Gov. L-R			-0.34 (0.15)*	-0.47 (0.16)**
Ext Right*Gov. L-R			-0.93 (0.23)***	-0.83 (0.30)**
Gov. L-R*SE				0.29 (0.30)
Gov. L-R*EE				0.71 (0.26)**
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Left				-0.10 (0.29)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext Left				-0.46 (0.34)
SE*Gov. L-R*Center				0.15 (0.22)
EE*Gov. L-R*Center				-0.23 (0.24)
SE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.00 (0.31)
EE*Gov. L-R*Right				0.13 (0.28)
SE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				0.10 (0.55)
EE*Gov. L-R*Ext Right				-0.62 (0.43)
AIC	105601.26	105459.38	105604.54	105508.73
BIC	106100.31	106166.37	106124.38	106215.72
Log Likelihood	-52752.63	-52661.69	-52752.27	-52686.37
Num. obs.	242037	242037	242037	242037
Country*Years	165	165	165	165
Countries	25	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.09
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.11	0.03	0.10	0.03
Var Country*Years: Center	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02
Var Country*Years: Right	0.18	0.09	0.17	0.07
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.42	0.28	0.36	0.20
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.00
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.07	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.12	-0.08	-0.10	-0.06
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.09	-0.01	-0.10	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Ext	-0.07	0.03	-0.10	-0.01

Left, Ext Right				
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.03
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.01
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.23	0.12	0.21	0.09
Var Country: Intercept	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.21

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 4: Replicating figure 5.5 in the chapter



Figure 5: Replicating figure 5.6 in the chapter



Table 4: reproducing table 5.1 with economic left-right

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-2.97 (0.39)***	-2.91 (0.38)***	-2.71 (0.39)***
Extreme left (base: left)	0.31 (0.03)***	0.44 (0.03)***	0.39 (0.05)***
Center	-0.18 (0.03)***	-0.27 (0.03)***	-0.21 (0.06)***
Right	-0.31 (0.04)***	-0.45 (0.04)***	-0.49 (0.07)***
Extreme right	-0.25 (0.07)***	-0.51 (0.08)***	-0.40 (0.13)**
Union member (dichot.)	0.54 (0.02)***	0.54 (0.02)***	0.54 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	1.07 (0.02)***	1.07 (0.02)***	1.07 (0.02)***
Male	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.62 (0.06)***	-2.61 (0.06)***	-2.62 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.82 (0.11)***	3.82 (0.12)***	3.81 (0.12)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.26 (0.03)***	-0.26 (0.03)***	-0.26 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.43 (0.02)***	-0.42 (0.02)***	-0.42 (0.02)***
Village	-0.69 (0.02)***	-0.69 (0.02)***	-0.69 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.59 (0.04)***	-0.59 (0.04)***	-0.59 (0.04)***
Unemployed	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.27 (0.09)**	0.26 (0.09)**	0.22 (0.09)*
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.61 (0.44)	0.59 (0.43)	0.02 (0.53)
Voice & Accountability	-1.08 (0.33)***	-1.13 (0.33)***	-0.85 (0.35)*
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.64 (0.32)*	0.61 (0.32)	0.49 (0.33)
Eastern Europe	-0.74 (0.31)*	-0.81 (0.31)**	-1.24 (0.35)***
Year of Survey			-0.06 (0.12)
Ext Left*SE		-0.23 (0.06)***	-0.36 (0.10)***
Center*SE		0.12 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.14)
Right*SE		0.26 (0.11)*	0.23 (0.19)
Ext Right*SE		0.60 (0.21)**	0.46 (0.36)
Ext Left*EE		-0.35 (0.06)***	-0.26 (0.13)*
Center*EE		0.34 (0.08)***	0.36 (0.16)*
Right*EE		0.51 (0.09)***	0.29 (0.19)
Ext Right*EE		0.89 (0.14)***	0.46 (0.29)
Ext Left*Year			0.10 (0.08)
Center*Year			-0.12 (0.10)
Right*Year			0.09 (0.12)
Ext Right*Year			-0.23 (0.23)
SE*Year*Ext Left			0.26 (0.17)
EE*Year*Ext Left			-0.17 (0.20)
SE*Year*Center			0.36 (0.24)
EE*Year*Center			-0.03 (0.25)
SE*Year*Right			0.06 (0.32)
EE*Year*Right			0.36 (0.30)
SE*Year*Ext Right			0.29 (0.62)
EE*Year*Ext Right			0.81 (0.47)
AIC	117333.61	117255.98	117255.01

BIC	117710.91	117717.12	117873.37
Log Likelihood	-58630.80	-58583.99	-58568.50
Num. obs.	263189	263189	263189
Country*Years	169	169	169
Countries	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.09	0.09	0.08
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.05	0.02	0.02
Var Country*Years: Center	0.03	0.01	0.01
Var Country*Years: Right	0.09	0.05	0.04
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.24	0.06	0.07
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	0.00	0.00	0.00
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	-0.08	-0.03	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.04	0.01	0.02
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.08	0.02	0.02
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.10	0.01	0.01
Var Country: Intercept	0.23	0.23	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 6: reproducing figure 5.2 with economic left-right

Figure 7: Reproducing figure 5.3 with economic left-right



Table 5: reproducing table 5.1 with cultural left-right

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Intercept	-2.97 (0.37)***	-3.05 (0.41)***	-2.92 (0.40)***
Extreme left (base: left)	0.48 (0.02)***	0.52 (0.03)***	0.51 (0.04)***
Center	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.16 (0.08)
Right	-0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.28 (0.11)*
Extreme right	0.11 (0.06)	0.20 (0.09)*	0.04 (0.14)
Union member (dichot.)	0.56 (0.02)***	0.56 (0.02)***	0.56 (0.02)***
Party ID (cont.)	1.05 (0.02)***	1.05 (0.02)***	1.05 (0.02)***
Male	0.11 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.02)***
Age (cont.)	-2.28 (0.06)***	-2.27 (0.06)***	-2.27 (0.06)***
Years of education (cont.)	3.19 (0.12)***	3.18 (0.12)***	3.18 (0.12)***
Suburbs (base: big city)	-0.26 (0.03)***	-0.26 (0.03)***	-0.26 (0.03)***
Small City	-0.41 (0.02)***	-0.41 (0.02)***	-0.41 (0.02)***
Village	-0.66 (0.02)***	-0.66 (0.02)***	-0.66 (0.02)***
Countryside	-0.55 (0.04)***	-0.55 (0.04)***	-0.55 (0.04)***
Unemployed	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Gov. L-R	0.25 (0.09)**	0.25 (0.09)**	0.24 (0.09)**
GDP (ppp, 2011 US$)	0.37 (0.41)	0.40 (0.42)	0.06 (0.54)
Voice & Accountability	-1.09 (0.32)***	-1.08 (0.35)**	-0.86 (0.35)*
Southern Europe (base: northwestern)	0.64 (0.31)*	0.76 (0.32)*	0.58 (0.34)
Eastern Europe	-0.72 (0.30)*	-0.55 (0.32)	-1.05 (0.35)**
Year of Survey			-0.18 (0.13)
Ext Left*SE		-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.09)
Center*SE		-0.13 (0.09)	0.10 (0.15)
Right*SE		-0.16 (0.13)	0.17 (0.21)
Ext Right*SE		-0.36 (0.18)*	-0.12 (0.29)
Ext Left*EE		-0.27 (0.06)***	-0.19 (0.14)
Center*EE		-0.12 (0.08)	0.10 (0.17)
Right*EE		-0.09 (0.11)	0.51 (0.20)*
Ext Right*EE		-0.17 (0.13)	0.39 (0.25)
Ext Left*Year			0.02 (0.07)
Center*Year			0.30 (0.14)*
Right*Year			0.63 (0.19)**
Ext Right*Year			0.32 (0.25)
SE*Year*Ext Left			0.01 (0.16)
EE*Year*Ext Left			-0.15 (0.22)
SE*Year*Center			-0.50 (0.27)
EE*Year*Center			-0.45 (0.27)
SE*Year*Right			-0.73 (0.39)
EE*Year*Right			-1.18 (0.33)***
SE*Year*Ext Right			-0.51 (0.53)
EE*Year*Ext Right			-1.06 (0.41)**
AIC	117180.20	117175.41	117179.54

BIC	117557.08	117636.04	117797.21
Log Likelihood	-58554.10	-58543.70	-58530.77
Num. obs.	260137	260137	260137
Country*Years	169	169	169
Countries	25	25	25
Var Country*Years: Intercept	0.12	0.11	0.10
Var Country*Years: Extreme Left	0.01	0.01	0.01
Var Country*Years: Center	0.04	0.04	0.03
Var Country*Years: Right	0.12	0.11	0.09
Var Country*Years: Extreme Right	0.23	0.20	0.19
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Left	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Center	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Right	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03
Cov Country*Years: Intercept, Ext Right	-0.10	-0.09	-0.07
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Center	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Right	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Cov Country*Years: Ext Left, Ext Right	0.01	-0.00	0.00
Cov Country*Years: Center, Right	0.05	0.05	0.04
Cov Country*Years: Center, Ext Right	0.07	0.05	0.05
Cov Country*Years: Right, Ext Right	0.13	0.11	0.10
Var Country: Intercept	0.22	0.22	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure 8: reproducing figure5.2 with cultural left-right



Figure 9: Reproducing figure 5.3 with cultural left-right