

Starvation and Violence amid the Soviet Politics of Silence 1928–1929*

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This study analyzes the Soviet politics of silence during Stalin's collectivization campaign in the context of peasant resistance, state violence, and the famine in 1928–1929, and illuminates the primary function of strategic silence—an information blockade which creates a space for violence and human suffering. Only in silence does the landscape of violence emerge and its spiral dynamics consume everyone, assailants and victims, proceeding swiftly to the eventual destruction of this landscape. In Ukraine, strategic silence and the relatively hermetic information blockade highlights the intentional nature of state violence: it produced a ghetto of exclusion that helped crush peasant resistance to collectivization and prevented Ukraine's potential secession from the Union. More profoundly, the politics of silence is analyzed as "cultural" violence and one of the most important building blocks in the foundation of genocide that routinely provokes and escalates direct violence, a phenomenon which culminates in massacres, repressions, and famines, as happened in the Ukrainian case.

Key words: violence, Soviet politics of silence, secrecy, starvation, resistance

The discovery of an important archival document about the Soviet past has always been an event celebrated by historians. New findings help us construct a more nuanced picture of the past, contextualize the existing knowledge about historical events, and add conceptual clarity to this knowledge. In the case of the Holodomor,¹ it is even more so because the Soviet politics of silence systematically attempted to erase the narrative about mass killings by hunger from Soviet history books, textbooks, and thus from the national memory of several generations of people in Ukraine and the USSR.² In the past 30 years, new archival studies allowed historians to speak of the cluster of Soviet famines in Ukraine during the collectivization campaign of 1928–1933 and analyze their man-made nature. Starvation was used as a political tool to tame the Ukrainian peasantry, and to prevent the crystallization of the Ukrainian nation and the consolidation of a competing power center in Ukraine.³ For example, the declassification of documents in 2006 located in the former KGB archive in Kyiv (HDA SBU)—*chekist* directives, reports about the situation in the Ukrainian countryside, statistics, diaries, and memoirs—served as the evidential base for a variety of analyses about the dynamics, the scale, and the instrumentality of the famine in suppressing the Ukrainian peasantry who rebelled against state violence in the late 1920s.⁴

Importantly, these documents, as many others, confirmed the relevance and accuracy of James Mace's observations and research that he conducted before the Soviet archives opened their doors to researchers.⁵ Mace's provisions and conclusions that appeared in the US Commission's Report to Congress in April 1988 and spelled out the genocidal

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thesis of the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933 offered conceptual clarity to the matter concealed by the Soviet regime for decades and identified research agenda for subsequent generations of scholars. His definitions of intent and the methods through which Moscow eliminated the nationally-oriented and most conscious Ukrainian segment of society are still valid, and current studies on the Holodomor add incremental, yet enormously important, nuances to his original interpretation.

Although a breakthrough and radical change in the way we think about historical events are critically important, the power of incremental change and additions to the master narrative occurring through systematic research and a discovery of new archival documents should not be underestimated. The general story of the Holodomor, the preceding famines, and those that followed the Holodomor has been told. Yet a general scholarly consensus about the intentionality and the uniqueness of the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933 did not emerge until a great many studies offered sufficient archival evidence. Due to the efforts of many historians, incremental change and adjustment of the historical record of Ukrainian famines led to a “tipping point” (Malcolm Gladwell’s term) or to a “paradigm shift” (Thomas Kuhn’s term) when it became extremely difficult to move forward with the thesis of commonality between the Holodomor and other Soviet famines.⁶ Conceptually, three major intrinsically interconnected factors contribute to the uniqueness of the Holodomor: time, space and place, and an unprecedented number of deaths caused by starvation that occurred within a brief period of time in Ukrainian territories.⁷ Starvation was clearly a political tool for Stalin, but what makes this argument even more convincing is the politics of silence which was advanced in late 1928 and which created the possibilities for escalating violence and crushing peasant resistance to collectivization.

The discovery of the 1928 archival document, Circular no. 984, which was issued by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow (*Narkomindel*) and explicitly ordered the Ukrainian authorities to deny any information or assistance to foreign guests and journalists in traveling to the countryside, helps illustrate this point.⁸ In conjunction with another important document received by Ukrainian leaders, the 1928 Statute about Secrecy which was issued by the secret police administration in Moscow and helped to narrow the circle of individuals who could potentially have access to such top secret documents, the Circular reveals the ultimate rationale for and meaning of concealment of the extraordinary measures, a euphemism for violence through which grain procurements were conducted by the state.

Most importantly, beyond concealing coercion and hiding its consequences, starvation, impoverishment, and the Ukrainian peasants’ resistance and hostility toward Soviet power, this document illuminates the essence of strategic silence (*polityka zamovchuvannia* in Ukrainian) which served as a tool of demarcation and isolation of the Ukrainian peasantry and prepared the grounds for escalating violence in 1932–1933. Strategic silence is one of the most important building blocks in the foundation of genocide, no matter how it is achieved, through starvation or massacre. In isolation resistance is always difficult and slavery is always easy, as one intellectual has stated. The evidence and literature that have been discussed in this text support exactly this conclusion. Only in silence does the landscape of violence emerge, and its spiral dynamics consume everyone, assailants and victims, proceeding swiftly to the eventual destruction of this landscape.⁹ We have seen what was left of it in 1932–1933, a Kafkian blank, lifeless, and frozen space.

In order to contextualize this archival document, its analysis will be preceded by three sections that will briefly analyze the notion of silence as “cultural” violence, clarify the mode of secrecy which helped promote violence, and offer a brief historical background illuminating the Soviets’ efforts to collectivize the Ukrainian peasantry in 1928–1929.

Silence as Cultural Violence

To begin, what meanings did the Soviet politics of silence convey? Cheryl Glenn has persuasively shown that there are numerous meanings and definitions of silence and silencing.¹⁰ Silence means both a state of nature (the absence of sound or noise) and a social phenomenon that exists when humans do not communicate. The reasons for people’s silence may vary: they want to be silent, they need to be silent, or they are forced to be silent.¹¹ Importantly, John Gerring and Alexander J. Motyl remind us that all definitions are imprecise and imperfect.¹² The definitions of silence are no exception. For the sake of conceptual clarity, silence is used here as “political strategic silence” used by the state as an intentional tool for the concealment of realities.¹³ The politics of silence and withholding information are critical elements of authoritarian regimes. Beyond other functions, they help conceal the truth about violence and atrocities committed by the state. Political strategic silence and the pandemic secrecy associated with it shape the history and the aesthetics of state political practices,¹⁴ and through their analysis we can better understand the modes of thinking and motivations of state leaders, and the roots of state violence.

The strategic goal of silence in a place like the Soviet Union was the distortion of realities by concealing or withdrawing information about people’s experiences and state practices at a given time and in a specific location. The alteration of people’s consciousness and perceptions (whether they were insiders or outsiders) about the socialist paradise was a constant hope of Soviet leaders throughout the history of the USSR. To legitimize the existence of this paradise, they engaged in sanitizing realities so that they seemed better than they were. Marginalization, demarcation, and isolation were used to cope with those who resisted the deception and actions associated with abuse and violence.

Accordingly, silence in the Soviet case is meant to be understood as the “violent silence imposed on the experiences of others”¹⁵ and as a tool of violence, practices that Johan Galtung has identified as “cultural or symbolic violence.” Typically, cultural violence is employed to rationalize and defend the other two types of violence, defined by Galtung as “direct” and “structural” violence.¹⁶ Galtung’s cultural violence seems to be consistent with the notion of “systemic violence,” introduced by Slavoj Žižek, a phenomenon that is less perceptible than direct violence. Pierre Bourdieu referred to this type of violence as “symbolic” violence.¹⁷ Cultural violence, however, is a more fundamental, pervasive, and long-lasting form of violence than “direct” violence, because it is inscribed into our language and everyday practices, thus smoothing the functioning of political systems, a notion that perfectly describes and explicates the Ukrainian case in question. The creation of conditions for manipulation through language and hate speech aimed at “enemies,” for instance, serve as examples of cultural violence, whose ultimate goal is to exert control and to manage the situation. Glenn has noted that

silence originates with the dominant party, stimulating the subordinate party to explore options for breaking the silence, for rousing speech from the other To maintain control of the situation, the dominant party must wield silence as a means to press the subordinate into taking on the burden of silence¹⁸

Consequently, Soviet strategic silence is discussed here as a political tool that perpetuated state violence and its consequences (people's starvation and physical and psychological suffering) by demarcating and isolating them as a group who remained unspoken and unheard by a broader international community. The British scholar Ken Booth has maintained that all silences are "*against* some body or *against* some thing. . . . Such silences are not natural, they are political."¹⁹ By not letting foreign and independent observers visit the Ukrainian countryside, which in 1928 was rampant with starvation and at war with the regime, the Soviet government considerably limited the peasants' chance to be heard and helped. In other words, they were prevented from becoming citizens worthy of consideration, empathy, assistance, or protection—they were politically silenced and thus excluded. The politics of silence in Soviet Ukraine gains an especially sinister meaning when considered in the context of oral histories that illuminate state brutality and people's suffering as a result of starvation and psychological abuse.

To promote the state's interests, the politics of silence was allotted a special place in the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks did not invent this tool of control, but as the Soviet regime and its key agency, the secret police, matured, the politics of silence was refined and advanced.²⁰ Its essence was rather simple: in the hands of empowered party leaders, silence prevented the witnessing of state violence and non-democratic methods of governing, thereafter eliminating possibilities of critical observation and distribution of information. Significantly, silence often prevented ordinary people from detecting deception and state violence. Charles de Gaulle once stated that silence served as the ultimate weapon of power and control. Similarly, Ievgenii Ievtushenko has observed that when truth was replaced by silence in the Soviet Union, the silence became a lie.

As mentioned earlier, cultural violence prepares the grounds for direct violence and facilitates its daily escalation. Ultimately, as practice has shown, cultural violence produces hidden or forgotten genocides,²¹ such as the Holodomor. Scholars often identify the Ukrainian famine as "the hidden famine of 1932–1933."²² A famine that cannot be discussed simply does not exist, as Robert Kindler has stated.²³ Yet many commentators have noted that it was not silence, but "actual denial by the Soviet authorities" and the subsequent cover up that elevated the famine to a dominant position in Ukrainian national history and cultural identity.²⁴ The Soviet government considered any mention of famine as anti-Soviet propaganda,²⁵ and even after the threat of direct violence was removed, the principle of cultural violence was at work, hijacking popular memory and "depriving the large majority of people of any meaningful cognitive mapping."²⁶

For some, the continuity of Soviet politics in Ukraine and a direct connection between the politics of silence advanced in 1928 and the genocide of 1932–1933 might seem illusory. Sceptics might also suggest that the notion of continuity applied to the Soviet regime is also illusory. Indeed, continuity can be more accurately measured and perceived in electronics by using the continuity test to check an electric circuit and to see whether current flows. Nevertheless, in social science and historical dialectics, continuity can be identified by analyzing its alternative—discontinuity.²⁷ Was discontinuity an intrinsic feature of the Soviet regime? Slavoj Žižek has suggested that it was

extremely consistent in its inconsistencies and its radical self-contradiction. The regime constantly murdered itself through terror and repression. The escalation of violence and constant purges were necessary not only “to erase the traces of the authentic revolutionary past” of the regime but they were also a reminder of the betrayal of the Revolution.²⁸ The continuity and logic of the regime’s history, Zizek has argued, are in its violent policies and purges—the “very form in which the betrayed revolutionary heritage survives and haunts the regime.”²⁹ In this logic, the politics of silence served multiple purposes. Among others, it helped mask the regime’s impotence, suicide, and murder altogether.

Masking and silence were animated by secrecy, the hallmark of the Soviet state.

Secrecy

Secrecy commonly emerges and develops during the establishment of new states when international skepticism about their legitimacy is most pronounced. In the Soviet Union from its inception, secrecy accompanied state violence. The Red Terror institutionalized by the Bolsheviks in 1918 seemed to them the only solution for suppressing competing parties, *kurkul* revolts, and dissenters.³⁰ A legal and institutional basis for terror was needed to justify the almost unrestricted power of the secret police.³¹ However, despite the terror’s legal status, executions and violent grain requisitions from “saboteurs” were conducted as secret operations and were treated as such in the Cheka³² and party documentation. In 1918–1919 the center (the Kremlin) introduced full-scale state terror to fight the peasants who were labeled as internal enemies, and subsequently Moscow continued to utilize secrecy to prevent international exposure.

Spy hysteria and the threat of war motivated the government to design a set of norms that all governmental agencies had to follow in order to prevent leaks of any information that might be used by internal and external enemies. As Niels Erik Rosenfeldt has pointed out, “external and internal enemies and their mutual scheming constituted one of the most prominent themes in the Bolsheviks’ political philosophy,” and secretiveness was “gradually developed into pure obsession,” which incited the agencies to classify any information, even the most innocent.³³

The code of conspiratorial behavior was prescribed in detail in various instructions issued by the party and reproduced in tens of thousands of copies that were distributed among various governmental offices and organizations. These brochures were routinely edited and issued almost every two years beginning in 1922. Materials considered top secret were “reduced to a minimum,”³⁴ while the circulation of secret instructions about the eligibility of those who might read these materials reached thousands of copies. The thorough and detailed pattern of regulations was characteristic of the Soviet bureaucratic system, and each rule was elaborated, clarified, and often altered in subsequent editions exhibiting the strict secret procedure that Soviet bureaucrats had to follow in the localities.³⁵ Ironically, various instructions and regulations about matters of secrecy were of course secret, and a special secret procedure was to be followed to review them to keep up with the injunctions that emanated from the Kremlin. The rotation of those who had access to secret documents was constant, and often individuals who finally passed a routine secret background check for eligibility to read secret materials were dismissed from their positions before they had an opportunity to study the conglomeration of secret instructions. Instead of their status as “authorized persons” determined through training and exhaustive GPU checks, they immediately

acquired the status of “unauthorized persons” that was fraught with repression. Because of Soviet personnel policies, it was extraordinarily difficult for state bureaucrats to become experts in conspiratorial practices, to be deemed senior members of the secret apparatus, or to pass their experience to newcomers. In a sense, everyone was a newcomer, and the state preferred to keep it this way.

The GPU was intimately involved in the process of screening “specialists” in secret departments, and clandestinely gathered information about their personalities, habits, social and political behavior. The agency valued any information, no matter how it was obtained, especially that which negatively characterized an individual. The verification procedure of this information was generally poor. Positive evaluations were frequently ignored and were considered not worth mentioning. For the GPU, information became a commodity that could be used for the benefit of or against rivals or friends, supervisors or subordinates, strangers or relatives, political opponents or associates, women or men, children or adults. Information could be bought, sold, obtained in return for future favors, stolen and fabricated, but it could not be given away. The motto of the agency was: “We are not an agency for inquiries. We receive information, we do not give it away.”³⁶

In an atmosphere of paranoiac secrecy, in 1927 the center ordered the return of all top secret documentation to Moscow after their careful scrutiny by the local authorities, and no copies were allowed to be kept in regional agencies or archives. Subsequently, the purges of national archives became a routine practice, resulting in displaced official records and the disrupted integrity of archival collections (*fondy*) in Ukraine.³⁷ In light of these realities, the discovery of the 11 December 1928 top secret Circular no. 984 in the State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast, a document that emanated from the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, came as a surprise.

There might be several reasons for its survival. Three waves of purges of Ukrainian archives destroyed thousands of documents. The first massive destruction of archival documents associated with Soviet collectivization policies occurred in 1929–1930. Apparently, documents dated earlier than 1 January 1929 may not have been allocated for destruction.³⁸ Or, for some unknown reason these documents were never returned to Moscow, as was prescribed. It seems rather unusual that the recipient kept the Circular issued by the Narkomindel despite the center’s 1927 resolution about the mandatory return of conspiratorial documents, especially those issued by agencies such as the Narkomindel and the secret police.³⁹ The explanation might be found in growing manifestations of sloppiness that became increasingly common among the members of secret departments and authorized personnel, a phenomenon that was contingent upon the amount of work which the agents were assigned and on the general growth in secrecy and secret instructions that overwhelmed bureaucrats in the localities. An alternative explanation might be informed by the document of the Secret Bureau of the Kharkiv Okruha Executive Committee (*Okryvkonkom*) discovered in the State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast.⁴⁰ In the late 1920s there was a deficit of sealing wax typically used for secret correspondence. Therefore, there might have been delays in mailing correspondence or negligence in following through with responses.⁴¹ The substantial rotation of the cadres in 1928–1929 might have contributed to the confusion and chaos in paper work. Regardless of how this document slipped through archival cleansing operations, its existence sheds light on the politics of silence which helped obscure the dynamics of collectivization and the 1928–1929 famine for foreign observers.

A brief historical background will clarify this point and explicate the Soviets' pressing need for the obfuscation of the situation in Ukraine.

Peasant Resistance and State Violence in Ukrainian Villages

As many scholars have demonstrated, "leader-centered regimes are ... brittle,"⁴² and hyper-centralization is fraught with political crises, such as insurrections, rebellions, and revolutions. The consolidation of Stalin's power in 1928–1929 and state violence led to exactly this result. Unbearable taxation and grain procurements plans, impoverishment, disfranchisement, cultural disruption, starvation, and social uncertainties placed the majority of the Ukrainian peasantry in opposition to the Soviet regime in the 1928–1930.

According to the GPU, leaflets that had been distributed in the countryside by an unknown group of conspirators from Kyiv became a widespread phenomenon in all Ukrainian okruhy in 1926. The leaflets called for the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Peasant Republic that would unite the Ukrainian peasantry against the draconian economic measures employed by the state.⁴³ This propaganda, the GPU claimed, was very effective, and peasants discussed the creation of unions to resist Soviet power that had deceived them. The secret police registered 23 cases of active resistance and anti-Soviet propaganda in the countryside in 1926: "Soviet power is the power of a gang of criminals," stated a peasant.⁴⁴

The disrespect seems to be mutual. For Stalin, the peasants were backward, reactionary, and "not socialistic by their position."⁴⁵ In his 1926 work *Problems of Leninism*, dedicated to the Leningrad Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was purged during the Great Terror, Stalin explained his perception of what the peasantry should generally want:

Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. As far as the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms is concerned, peasant economy is petty commodity economy. And what is petty commodity peasant economy? It is an economy standing at the cross roads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as is now happening in capitalist countries; or it may develop in the direction of socialism as should happen here in our country under the dictatorship of the proletariat Because our Party was able to discover to what extent the specific interests of the peasantry (the overthrow of the landlords, peace) could be joined with and subordinated to the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous to the peasants. And so the peasants, at that time, in spite of their being non-socialistic, followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.⁴⁶

Stalin continued:

The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the peasantry into the stream of this construction. The peasantry are not socialistic by their position. But the peasants must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist development, for there is no other way nor can there be any other way of saving them from poverty and ruin than the bond with the proletariat, by the bond with socialist industry, than by including peasant economy in the general stream of socialist development, by the widespread organization of the peasant masses in cooperative societies.⁴⁷

On these two pages Stalin repeated the word "advantageous" three times, yet beyond the point that the peasants would be enlisted in "the work of socialist construction" and

would be drawn into “co-operative organization,” Stalin provided no explanation about how this plan would be implemented and what concrete advantages the peasants could expect as a result of this plan. Instead, the emphasis focused on the shortsightedness of opposition within the party. In Stalin’s view, it did not “understand the inevitability of this path [for the peasantry] under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”⁴⁸

The decision to launch a new collectivization campaign was initially publicly denied by Stalin. In 1926 he created a commission within the Politburo of the Central Committee VKP(b), which on 30 December 1926 prepared a resolution “About the Results of Collective (*radhosp* and *kolhosp*) Construction.” In 1927, however, at meetings with foreign workers’ delegations that arrived in Moscow on the eve of the 10-year anniversary of the October revolution, Stalin refuted the “rumor” of the state’s intention to collectivize the peasantry. Following Lenin’s thesis of “cooperative socialism,” Stalin emphasized the voluntary nature of the cooperative movement and the engagement of broad strata of individual peasant households in it. He rejected all-embracing collectivization as an ineffective method which contradicted the interests of the peasants. A few weeks after Stalin’s speeches before the foreign workers, the implementation of “all-embracing collectivization” began.⁴⁹

In late 1927, the artificially created imbalance between the prices of manufactured goods and agricultural products discouraged peasants from selling bread to the state. State granaries were immediately emptied. Forcing the peasants to sell their grain, or giving it to the state on the state’s conditions, seemed like a reasonable solution to Stalin.⁵⁰

The mechanisms of pressure differed. Among others, disfranchisement of the peasants (*pozbavleniia vyborchykh prav*) and fiscal mechanisms of control were rather effective. In 1928, the slightest expressions of displeasure with Soviet policies or practicing entrepreneurial activities (selling a surplus of grain for cash) were identified as anti-Soviet propaganda and speculation, and were severely punished.⁵¹ For example, during the election campaign of 1928–1929, there were 869,111 people in the UkrSSR who were deprived of voting rights, which constituted approximately 6% of all voters.⁵²

To pursue industrialization and militarization projects and to preserve state power, state ownership, and party control, a system of coercion and exaction in the form of unbearable taxes was installed.⁵³ Whatever the key objectives were at a given time, the 1919–1920 assault on the peasantry served as the experiential foundation for further enforcement of draconian taxation policies. The zigzag-like maneuvers of the state during the 1920s, concessions to the peasants and again full state control over them, ceased in 1926 when the state consolidated its power and taxed peasants heavily for failing to be active members of the new Communist reality, swiftly approaching the Great Turn of 1929.⁵⁴

The Bolsheviks taxed peasants’ income, and all they needed was information about the peasants’ households, land, animals, potential income, and the like, which allowed the authorities to evaluate peasant capacities.⁵⁵ These assessments were inaccurate and often driven by personal and ideological biases. There was a “growing concern that the peasants were poorly integrated and contributing too little to the new regime.”⁵⁶ The agricultural tax was “flat and apportioned,” and could be increased for the needs of industrialization arbitrarily, as happened in 1928 in Ukraine on the eve of the new Five-Year Plan (1928–1932).⁵⁷ The tax was so high that peasants flooded the district tax offices with petitions asking to reduce their tax because they could not pay it.⁵⁸ Private

households paid twice as much tax as collectivized households, those that were coerced into joining collective farms.⁵⁹ Most petitions were written by poor peasants who claimed that they had no property, and rented apartments in residential buildings that belonged to the Soviets. Many petitioners were denied assistance, unless they were servicemen, soldiers in the Red Army or relatives of servicemen.⁶⁰

The new course of collectivization in 1928,⁶¹ unbearable agricultural taxation, religious persecution, bad weather conditions, starvation, diseases, and an increasing scale of terror against peasants exacerbated their suffering and provoked fierce passive and active resistance to coercion and Soviet collectivization policies: “violence fed on violence, state terror provoked and reacted to anti-violence,” complicating Stalin’s task to mobilize the funds for the Five-Year Plan.⁶² Growing anti-collectivization protests in Ukraine presented an existential threat to the Soviet regime and its survival. To remove the obstacle, Stalin had to bastardize the behavior of the wealthiest part of the peasantry and dehumanize the enemies of Soviet power, justifications for a cascade of cleansing operations that followed.

Almost a decade after Soviet power was established in Ukraine, the threat of Ukraine’s secession seemed to be serious and real. Moreover, the state perceived that this threat was of a magnitude that required extraordinary measures, when normal everyday rules and codes of behavior had to be suspended. A sharp turn toward repression in the middle of 1928 is not surprising, because in June 1928, Vsevolod Balyts’kyi, head of the GPU in Ukraine, sent a report to Lazar Kaganovich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, about the escalating activities of Ukrainian counterrevolutionaries’ and kurkuli of all kinds, who, according to Balyts’kyi, hoped that the days of the USSR were numbered, a war with the West was inevitable, and Ukraine could gain independence.⁶³ In light of the preceding 1926 report “On Ukrainian separatism,” Kaganovich and Stalin understood this document as a signal to centralize power, to eliminate the threat emanating from the Ukrainian countryside, and to intensify propaganda for collectivization.⁶⁴ The peasant and the Ukrainian questions overlapped, and they needed a more fundamental hands-on rule, preferably by one person, to be solved.

After the failure to collect sufficient grain supplies in 1927, Stalin persistently returned to discussions about a necessary shift in Soviet agricultural policies and advocated the introduction of extraordinary measures to combat the kurkuli and to conduct effective grain procurements. Yet he was extremely cautious in asserting himself as the leader of the Central Committee. His opponents were other prominent party members Aleksei Rykov, Nikolai Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky, Mikhail Kalinin, and Nikolai Uglanov who supported the principles of collective leadership in the Central Committee, and opposed the rise of Stalin and the extreme measures and violence he advocated.⁶⁵

Stalin’s trip to Siberia in mid-January 1928 solidified his position. According to several scholars, it was strategic for personal and political reasons.⁶⁶ According to Oleg Khlevniuk, Stalin was eager to demonstrate that he was capable of solving grain and other crises in the country on his own. The effectiveness of extreme measures which always remained an option for Stalin could kill two birds with one stone: he could defeat his impotent opposition who failed to deliver sufficient grain to the state in 1927, and legitimize his exclusive and leading position in the Politburo, if the terror in Siberia succeeded.⁶⁷ And it did.

Stalin's superb skills at manipulation, blackmail, and scheming, and his ties to the GPU that was under his control helped him discredit his opponents, and he moved forward with the plan of extraordinary measures in Ukraine.⁶⁸ Even before his departure to Siberia (he left on 15 January 1928), on 5 January 1928, the Ukrainian party organs received a new document from the Central Committee of the VKP(b) signed by Stalin, the directive "To Party Organizations about Bread Procurement" which encouraged the local authorities to employ the severest measures of punishment and repressive methods to those who sabotaged the collection of grain and taxes.⁶⁹ Rightfully calculating and anticipating glorious success in Siberia, Stalin signed and sent another document to the party leadership in Ukraine, the 14 January 1928 directive, "About the Intensification of the Measures to Procure Bread." The extreme measures spelled out in the directive and to be applied to the "recalcitrant" in the countryside further dramatized the events of 1928–1929.⁷⁰

The War Communist rhetoric, intimidating and militant, once again became popular among party chiefs and village officials who got to work immediately. In May 1928 at a closed meeting of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, Balyts'kyi alerted the party about the increasing danger emanating from the periphery, and the Ukrainian party leadership was ordered to intensify surveillance in the countryside and to broadly employ repression against the rebels.⁷¹ They were defined in class and national terms, "kurkuli" and "petliurovtsi" ("Petliurites"), and were criminalized using a broader definition, "*spekulianty*."⁷²

The crushing of the "left opposition" in late 1928 meant not only a personal victory for Stalin that boosted his popularity in the party but was also a vital necessity for the regime to continue. Precisely during this time, the hands of the secret police were untied: special operations and the arrest of members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and groups followed one after another.⁷³ The extraordinary measures and their direct result, starvation, guaranteed the peasants' long-term hostility toward the authorities.

By late 1928, the peasants began to organize: passive peasant resistance was transformed into open protests, terrorist attacks, mass disturbances, and armed riots. The majority craved self-governing and called for action to get rid of the Bolsheviks. Stalin kept insisting that only an insignificant section of the Ukrainian peasantry, kurkuli, caused trouble in the villages, a line for domestic and foreign consumption.⁷⁴ He, however, was informed by the GPU that the opposite was true. The entire Ukrainian countryside was in turmoil. According to Liudmyla Hrynevych's calculations, Stalin could rely only on 5% of Ukrainian society who could be characterized (and only conditionally) as a conscious pro-Soviet group of people.⁷⁵ Therefore, the extraordinary measures were essentially the only solution to the crisis, a solution he kept promoting vigorously.

Their implementation became possible because of the formation of a new Politburo under Stalin's management. By early-mid 1929 the "right" opposition was conquered, and Stalin's command-repressive system was installed. By late 1929 to early 1930, as one scholar has stated, the "entire Politburo became a sort of Stalin faction."⁷⁶ This shaped the second wave of terror in the countryside during the first months of 1929, which was even more severe.⁷⁷

In April 1929, Stalin advised the local party cells to press the kurkul. His thesis about the mobilization of the poorest Ukrainian peasantry against kurkuli was reflected in his speech delivered at the April 1929 Joint Plenum of the TsK and TsKK VKP(b).

Shortly thereafter, the Ukrainian party leader Stanislav Kosior reported that in 22 okruhy (out of 40) 18,000 kurkul households were auctioned off or confiscated as punishment for hoarding grain. The kurkuli were found guilty of sabotage, and were sentenced to one year in prison. Their personal property was also confiscated. Violence and the prohibition of the free grain market produced hunger and mass exodus from the villages.⁷⁸ In autumn of 1929, 15,000 more peasant households were destroyed (*de-kurkulized*).⁷⁹

Although the GPU systematically confiscated firearms left over from the Civil War from the peasantry, political activism among the peasants was growing. In Kirovohrad oblast, for instance, Serhii Bilenko and Davyd Baden, residents of the village of Pishchanyi Brid (Novoukrains'kyi raion or district), organized meetings to sabotage grain procurements, arguing that Soviet power choked them by unbearable taxes and took all their bread.⁸⁰ They were arrested by the GPU on 3 April 1929 for anti-Soviet propaganda, and exiled to the North for three years. Ivan Hruznyts'kyi, Mykhailo Todorenko, and the Vovchenko family (Pavlo, Semen, and Taras) of the village of Novomykolaiivka (Novoukrains'kyi district) called for disobedience to free Ukraine. Taras organized a protest against the representatives of *sil'rada*, demanding they cease populating his land with migrants, and Ivan called for change of the regime. All were arrested on 20 September 1929. Pavlo and Semen were sentenced to three years, Taras and Mykhailo to five years, and Ivan to 10 years in concentration camps.⁸¹ The protests in the village Haiivka (Zinov'ivs'kyi district) resulted in the arrest of several individuals. Among them were Huriï Hraliuk who openly identified Soviet leaders as a group of criminals who should not lead the country, Fedot Smykodub who systematically conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and refused to pay taxes, and Andrii Katerynych who argued that the Communists intended to use starvation as a weapon against the peasants.⁸² They were arrested on 15 January 1929 and sentenced to three years in exile in the North.

Moreover, environmental factors, such as bad crop in 1928–1929 (*nedorid*) in Southern Ukraine, and Soviet plans to procure as much bread, meat, eggs, butter, and other foodstuffs as possible to supply non-Ukrainian regions exhausted the Ukrainian peasants' households.⁸³ From mid-1928, they began to starve, exhibiting symptoms of serious malnourishment, such as swelling. By early 1929, the famine affected thousands of people in Ukraine. For instance, according to the February 1929 reports of the secret organs, in the village of Derezovatsi (Dnipropetrovs'ka okruha) alone, 50 households were systematically starving, and in eight villages of Kutsevolivs'kyi district (Kirovohrads'ka okruha) 1,963 children and 3,793 adults out of 35,640 residents suffered from hunger.⁸⁴ April and May of 1929 were especially difficult months for the peasants, when their winter reserves were gone. The GPU informed the center about mass starvation in the villages, and the discrepancy between state aid and people's needs.⁸⁵ According to Hrynevych, during the famine of 1928–1929 the direct demographic losses of Ukraine's population constituted approximately 23,000 people, and indirect losses of approximately 80,000 people.⁸⁶ Whether the Soviet leadership used the famine of 1928–1929 as an effective weapon against peasant protests is a matter for conjecture. However, the idea clearly has some currency, since the Bolsheviks had a "formative experience" in crushing the resistance of kurkuli in the Ukrainian countryside in 1919–1920. The violence of collectivization in 1919–1920 and people's starvation in 1921 remained

part of their horrible memories about the regime.⁸⁷ One scholar has noted that the famine of 1921–1922 had certainly “opened up new possibilities for the Bolsheviks.”⁸⁸

Importantly, because of the famine, the hostility toward Soviet power became pandemic. Neither the rotation of the party leadership in Ukrainian villages, nor the March 1928 GPU operation which resulted in the arrest of 400 party functionaries, alleviated the political crisis in the republic.⁸⁹ The exponential growth of anti-Soviet peasant revolts during the second part of 1929 provoked the government to consider more severe punishments for the most active and recalcitrant individuals who openly called for resistance. The death penalty became a more common sentence.⁹⁰ The December 1929 directive of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) was very clear about this group of people and identified them as counterrevolutionary activists (*kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv*).⁹¹ Their cases were “investigated” by OGPU troikas, and the luckiest were sentenced to 10 years in exile. In the late 1920s, 850,000 Ukrainian peasants were exiled to the uninhabited regions of the Kola Peninsula and Siberia. Although Moscow relied on Ukrainian GPU resources in implementing this operation (the liquidation of *kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv*), the deputy head of the counterintelligence department of the OGPU of the USSR S. V. Puzyts’kyi thoroughly supervised the logistics of the operation.⁹² By late 1930, at a Union level, 20,201 people were executed by the GPU for participating in mass disturbances.⁹³

The “nationalist” profile of the *kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv* in Ukraine, shaped by the rhetoric of the campaign against kurkuli and Ukrainian nationalists which was launched by the center and masterminded by the secret police, exacerbated their guilt before the state. Through official and non-official channels, the rhetoric of verdicts and newspaper articles overlapped and enriched one another, and *kontrrevoliutsiinyi aktyv* and instigators of political unrest in the countryside were identified in nationalist terms—Petliurites. For instance, Moisei Ivanets’ of the village of Skaleva (Novoarkhanshchynskiy district), who inspired his neighbors to rebel against the authorities, was one of them. He was arrested on 19 November 1929 and after a brief investigation he was accused of close connections to Petliurites, identified as a nationalist and a Petliurite, and shot on 27 February 1930.⁹⁴ In GPU individual and group criminal files, three terms are blended—kurkuli, political gangs, and nationalists. Interrogators employed them together, separately, and interchangeably. For instance, in villages like Skaleva, “political gangs of nationalists” under the leadership of locals Zalizniak and Lysovenko recruited new members, agitated against Soviet power, and distributed anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets. Petro Riabuha and Davyd Sidun, residents of Skaleva, were arrested on 21 November 1929 and were shot on the same day with Ivanets’ in February 1930.⁹⁵ The village of Tsybuleve (Ielysavethradkivskiy district) had its own share of nationalists and kurkuli who were sentenced to death.⁹⁶

In 1929, the peasants resisted the Soviet regime’s violence and coercion individually and in groups, using various tactics. Among others were clandestine activities, such as arson of the Soviet activists’ properties and distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets that called for resistance to collectivization;⁹⁷ open verbal attacks against the village authorities; and mass disturbances and violent beatings and murders of Soviet activists. For instance in the village Velyki Babtsi under the leadership of Starikov, the villagers armed themselves with stones, sticks, and pitchforks, and chased the Soviet village administration and militia out of the village. The fight lasted 10 hours, and 1500 people participated in the riot. Soviet power in the village ceased to exist for a day but

was restored when an armed militia detachment was sent to the village.⁹⁸ Local militia men were vulnerable and complained to Kharkiv authorities that they could not control the situation, and they demanded to be provided with the sufficient amount of guns, ammunition, and incentives, similar to that of the Red Army soldiers.⁹⁹

From Lynne Viola's studies of peasant resistance, we learned that women were an inseparable part of peasant riots.¹⁰⁰ The children's participation in riots and attacks against village authorities was also prominent, and may be welcomed as a new avenue of research on violence in the Ukrainian countryside during Stalin's collectivization campaign. For instance, in the village Pavlivka (Kharkiv'ska okruha), children systematically participated in clashes with the local authorities. Women attacked the wives of the village administration and encouraged their children to beat them severely.¹⁰¹ In April 1929 the GPU arrested a group of individuals for anti-Soviet propaganda from the Karl Marx commune (Pervomais'ka okruha) whose influence spread far beyond their commune.¹⁰² Among those who actively participated in the group's activities were children. Moreover, children's bravery and political activism extended beyond their participation in riots and mass disturbances. They wrote letters to Stalin about their hardships in despair and doom.¹⁰³

In the midst of cleansing GPU operations that eliminated kurkuli and nationalists in the Ukrainian countryside, Moscow never gave up on propaganda methods.¹⁰⁴ The propagandists dug out Lenin's article "How should one organize a competition?" that he wrote in 1918 in which he explicated his idea about socialist competition and the creativity of the masses helping the state build a strong and resilient economy. The time was right to remind the peasants about their duty to be part of socialist construction and to prove self-conscious and long-standing commitment to the revolution. The article was published on 20 January 1929 in *Pravda*, detailing an array of party directives about who should compete with whom and why. The urban regions adopted the innovation first. Now it was time for the countryside to be included in the all-Union movement of socialist competition.

In July 1929, when Ukrainian rural regions were in turmoil, Moscow ordered the Ukrainian authorities to sign an agreement about "agricultural" socialist competition (*sotszmahannia*) among Moscow, Kharkiv, and the Don region to distract and to pacify the peasantry. The authorities enthusiastically supported the idea and such an agreement was signed. However, the center's plans were not working very well. Most peasants were skeptical about Moscow's promises about *sotszmahannia* that would allegedly facilitate the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan and ultimately deliver prosperity to each household. Those who saw through the center's propaganda maneuver were rather vocal: "Ukraine sold itself out to Moscow; the agreement about *sotszmahannia* is a new type of slavery."¹⁰⁵ In August 1929, Russian propagandists, Moscow plenipotentiaries in Kharkiv, and local party bosses came up with a directive which denounced this kurkul interpretation of *sotszmahannia* and ordered the rural party organs to popularize the agreement in villages by allocating several hours per week for studying its text and educating the peasants in the socialist spirit. Each village council was supposed to display the text of the agreement about *sotszmahannia* at the council's headquarters near another important document, the Constitution of the USSR.¹⁰⁶ People's participation in the competition was mandatory, and a lack of enthusiasm, let alone their refusal to compete, was punishable by exile. The gap between Lenin's suggestion about people's self-conscious and voluntary participation in competition, its premises and objectives,

and state practices of coercion and violence further aggravated the starving men and women. These realities made Stalin realize that the Ukrainian peasants were a politically dangerous phenomenon, more dangerous than their counterparts in the Russian Federation.¹⁰⁷

According to the official data, over the course of 1927–1928, 538 terrorist acts were registered in Ukrainian villages. In 1928–1929 this number more than doubled to 1266, and from 1927 to 1929, 318 representatives of Soviet power in villages were attacked and murdered.¹⁰⁸ In late 1929 to early 1930, the Ukrainian GPU managed to establish control over eight okruhy, Poltav's'ka, Izium's'ka, Kharkiv's'ka, Sums'ka, Proskuriv's'ka, Kam'ianets'ka, Odes'ka, and AMRSR, although mass *bab'i bunty* still erupted in Shepetivka, Starobils'k, and Kup'ians'k.¹⁰⁹ By October 1929, the GPU had arrested 3,705 individuals in Ukraine.¹¹⁰ However, the riots continued to grow in 1929 and reached their peak in 1930.¹¹¹ They absorbed four large okruha, Kyiv's'ka, Bilotserkiv's'ka, Mohyliov-Podils'ka, and Vinnyts'ka. Karl Karlson reported that from 1 March to 15 March 1930, the GPU arrested 25,000 people, liquidated 36 counterrevolutionary organizations and 256 counterrevolutionary groups, shot 655 individuals, sent 3,673 men to concentration camps, and exiled 5,580 people. In total, the operation resulted in the displacement of 88,656 peasants and the next goal, according to Karlson, was to cleanse Ukraine's near-border territories by exiling 15,000 people.¹¹²

This discussion of the events of 1928–1929 in Ukraine provides us with the foundation for a more careful understanding of the reasons behind advancing the politics of silence in Ukraine. A close analysis of Circular no. 984, issued by the Narkomindel in Moscow at the dawn of the collectivization campaign, will help establish the connection between Soviet politics of silence, state violence, and its intentionality.

1928: Institutionalizing the Politics of Silence

Cultural or symbolic violence creates a situation when domination is “soft” and “invisible,” and is a constant, effective and, perhaps, more brutal means of oppression than direct violence, as Pierre Bourdieu has posited.¹¹³ It isolates people and makes them a part of the “secret” space of a lie, subversion, and cynicism, masked as a space of freedom and justice. Subversion and cynicism can achieve both the invigoration of political resistance and the destruction of beliefs and hopes. In Ukraine in 1928–1929, besides direct violence, the demarcation of rebellious villages was achieved through information blockades and deception. To a potential foreign observer, the brutality of Soviet collectivization would present a drastic departure from the noble goals and credos of socialism proclaimed by the Bolsheviks. Therefore, routine cover-ups of the discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the regime became an essential and inseparable part of power politics, and secrecy was an operative mode prescribed by the party and controlled by the Soviet secret police.¹¹⁴

Foreign journalists were carefully managed on Soviet soil.¹¹⁵ They were obliged to inform the authorities about their travel plans in advance, so that they were thoroughly monitored by the secret police in the territory of the USSR. Secret agents followed foreigners like shadows, as a worker of the VOKS (the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad) suggested.¹¹⁶ Moscow's fundamental task was to show foreigners “model institutions,” which would create a favorable view about the Soviet experiment.¹¹⁷ This selectiveness provided an opportunity to strengthen existing sympathies toward the Soviet state among Sovietophiles, and to convert the critics of the socialist system into

supporters.¹¹⁸ For foreign travelers, a necessary precondition for their pleasant trip and safe return home was public praising of Soviet approaches and policies.¹¹⁹

From late 1928, despite massive anti-kurkul propaganda, it became increasingly difficult to find model collective farms and to conceal social unrest in villages because there was a true war in the Ukrainian countryside.¹²⁰ The party leadership urgently decided to take precautions to make the conflict and its consequences invisible for foreigners, obstructing their desire to travel to the Ukrainian countryside.

In December 1928 the head of the Kharkiv Okruha Executive Committee, Panas Butsenko, received Circular no. 984 from the Narkomindel instructing the local authorities in Kharkiv to prevent foreigners' trips to the countryside.¹²¹ The Circular was directed exclusively to Ukraine and was defined as "strictly secret" (*tsilkom taiemno*), reinforcing the sense of the seriousness of conspiratorial matters among local party bureaucracy, especially regarding collectivization in Ukraine that went far from smoothly.¹²² Importantly, only eight copies of the Circular were issued. Identifying the other seven recipients of the Circular appears problematic. Likely, they were heads of okruhy executive committees in other large industrial and cultural centers in Ukraine, such as Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa or others, where visits of foreign journalists would be most probable. What is certain is that, as a key player in monitoring foreigners in Ukraine, the Kharkiv GPU should also have received a copy of this document.

It appears Narkomindel officials created the text of the Circular. However, it is possible that this was a collective effort of diplomats and top-ranking party members. In the late 1920s, the Narkomindel had little autonomy and was fully subordinate to high party organs' decisions. Rikke Haute has argued that "the political leadership formulated foreign policy strategy independently of the *Narkomindel* and could at any point, where they found it appropriate, interfere in the concrete decision-making process within the *Narkomindel*."¹²³

Moreover, the Narkomindel received special secret instructions about the secrecy of all information that originated within the Politburo and went through the Narkomindel. Its first Commissar, Georgy Chicherin, was advised that the content of any foreign policy discussions held by any high party organs, such as the Central Committee, the Politburo, or the Organizational Bureau, should not be revealed even to the Narkomindel's own board, the Collegium. The procedure of voting and stenographic reports about the meetings held in the Narkomindel and party organs (separate and joint), reports from which it was clear "who said what," had to be classified, and access to these materials was to be extremely limited.¹²⁴ Chicherin and his deputy Maxim Litvinov were personally responsible for potential information leaks to unauthorized individuals or agencies, and they knew perfectly well what sort of sanctions would be applied to them for any failure to protect sensitive information from "foreign" eyes.¹²⁵ Not surprisingly, the document in question contains no references to the corresponding directives of the leading party organs.

The stenographic minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee typically revealed "the truth about who really took the initiative and pulled the strings."¹²⁶ This information was top secret, especially when a new party directive contradicted official legislation. As early as 1921, the Politburo advised all People's Commissariats and the secret police to avoid mentioning previous secret party resolutions in their documents. The avoidance of such references in Circular no. 984 created

an illusion that the Politburo had little to do with it, and that the document was the product of the Narkomindel.

Keep in mind that by late 1928, Stalin manipulated most major decisions, although the pretense of the collective decision-making process was intact. As some scholars have argued, the term “discussions” that occurred at the high party level would be an over-exaggeration. Archival evidence indicates that even individuals who constituted Stalin’s inner circle within the Politburo, which originally consisted of the “group of six” (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov, and Zhdanov), did not equally contribute to discussions of foreign policies. Rather, most were listeners who “were simply kept informed.”¹²⁷

Nor were Ukrainian party leaders active participants in discussions about foreign policies that directly concerned Ukraine.¹²⁸ Khrystyian Rakov’skyi who simultaneously headed the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Council of People’s Commissars in Ukraine was extremely busy and largely disengaged in foreign affairs. Moreover, Moscow took measures to limit Ukrainian diplomatic representation abroad, and by 1922, Ukraine was diplomatically represented only in Germany and Poland. The chief leadership in foreign affairs was implemented in the center, Moscow. Soviet diplomat Grigory Bessedovsky noted that “the Ukrainian Commissariat [could] undertake nothing without previous assent from Moscow.”¹²⁹ On 6 July 1923, Moscow officially created the Narkomindel, and its Ukrainian satellite was abolished. The Narkomindel became one of the most important Soviet propaganda agencies, functioning also as an intelligence-gathering agency.¹³⁰

Subsequently, the structural and interpersonal specificity associated with the Narkomindel and the Politburo permits a reasonably secure conclusion that the Politburo “supervised” the creation of the Circular for Ukraine. The Narkomindel, however, managed the surveillance logistics and procedures of preventing foreigners from traveling to Ukraine who might witness the conflict and realize that the integrity of the USSR was threatened.¹³¹

The text of the Circular seems to have been shaped by the Narkomindel’s and the GPU’s understanding that there were two possible scenarios for dealing with this matter: first, to deny an entrance visa to as many visitors as possible; and second, if the visa to the USSR was granted, and a foreigner wanted to visit Ukrainian villages, the local authorities would make it impossible for a foreigner to travel there. Despite uneasy and competing relations between the Narkomindel and the secret police,¹³² the two agencies had to cooperate to implement these tasks. The individual personal and professional characteristics of a visitor mattered, hence the Narkomindel, assisted by the secret police and the VOKS, took the lead in gathering relevant information about those who applied for Soviet visas.¹³³

The risk of exposing Ukrainian villages in disarray was too great. The exposure of coercion and subversion to a foreign eye would undermine the image of the Soviet state as a state of justice and equality, and might provoke a foreign invasion, a fear which the Kremlin constantly instigated and reinforced.¹³⁴ On 11 December 1928, Fiodor Rotshtein, a member of the Collegium of the Narkomindel and the head of its Press Bureau that was responsible for shaping international attitudes toward Soviet developments, issued official secret instruction no. 4860 about foreign visitors and their trips to the countryside. Rotshtein’s instruction was sent to the Kharkiv Executive Committee and was registered as Circular no. 984.¹³⁵ It restricted foreigners’ mobility in Ukraine,

and ordered the local authorities to inform the secret police about the movements of foreign journalists within the republic.

Rotshtein's instruction appears to be the result of intensive analytical work conducted by the secret police and the Narkomindel. By late 1926, the Informational Operational Department of the Ukrainian GPU provided the Narkomindel with a comprehensive report about the deplorable situation in Ukrainian villages. Within a year, the secret police had been gathering information about the peasants' moods, their attitudes toward Soviet power, and their political activism and participation in mass disturbances.¹³⁶ Importantly, secret agents emphasized that there was discontent with Soviet policies among all social strata, including the poor peasantry. The peasants agitated to obtain weapons to resist the Bolsheviks' robbery. Hardships and dissatisfaction with the state, the report claimed, produced mass alcoholism and banditry in the villages: the peasants were depressed, demoralized, and aggressive.¹³⁷ As discussed earlier, within a year the situation escalated. Stalin was very well informed about it. From autumn 1929 to spring 1930, he received 50,000 letters of complaint from the peasants; Mikhail Kalinin, head of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, received approximately 85,000 letters of complaint.¹³⁸ The measures undertaken by Moscow were supposed to create a dome of silence over these realities. Rotshtein's Circular seemed a necessary step for the state to isolate the Ukrainian countryside from foreign attention.

Interestingly, the document, however, did not disclose the rationale for preventing foreign journalists from traveling to Ukrainian villages. The reason behind this was purely pragmatic and consistent with routine practices of the Narkomindel and the Politburo. Analyzing the decision-making process in the Soviet Union, Russian scholar Irina V. Pavlova has perceptively noted:

[The] concealment of motive was entirely deliberate. Party and state officials acted in accordance with a Politburo decision dated 12 April 1923, the gist of which was that "in laying extraordinarily secret matters before the Politburo, the People's Commissariats (the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat of Military Affairs, the OGPU and others) should not give reasons for their proposals in writings, but introduce their recommendations through preliminary confidential agreement (*sgovor*) with the Central Committee Secretariat."¹³⁹

Instead, the Circular camouflaged the true reasons behind the restrictions of foreigners' movements in Ukraine by expressing concerns about the safety of foreigners who might secretly travel to villages. The Narkomindel claimed that in cases when foreigners failed to inform the GPU about the itinerary of their trips, it would be impossible for the state to protect them against potential dangers in the countryside, and that travelers had to bear full responsibility for their poor decision.¹⁴⁰

The Circular also condemned the extraordinarily lavish treatment that foreign journalists received from the Soviet authorities in the localities. Travelers were usually provided with a car, were invited to give press conferences, and attend banquets arranged by the local party elite. In the Narkomindel's view, local party leaders engaged in sycophantic and ingratiating behavior, "damaging state prestige." Moscow officials assured their Kharkiv counterparts that foreign citizens were certainly not treated like royalty in their own "capitalist country."¹⁴¹ Hence, the Kharkiv authorities were instructed to stop these shameful ostentatious displays unworthy of Communists.

Quite cynically, the Narkomindel warned the local Soviet and party organs in Kharkiv that they would bear full responsibility for any failure to monitor foreigners' movements in Ukraine. In other words, Moscow granted visas but Kharkiv was responsible for approving the candidates for visas and for not allowing these guests to travel to the zones of conflicts. Point 2 of the Circular stipulated that the Narkomindel would provide the details about the pending trip of a foreign journalist, and if the Kharkiv Okrvykonkom was interested in this trip and approved its itinerary, it should inform the Narkomindel and the GPU accordingly. Ultimately, this obfuscated the initial responsibility of the Narkomindel to make the final decision about granting permission to a foreigner to travel to Ukraine. The center considered the potential "disloyalty" of a foreign journalist a local responsibility with appropriate punitive measures aimed at punishing local party and Soviet agencies' bosses for their political shortsightedness.¹⁴² Moscow officials' attempt at protecting their positions and masking the real reasons behind the Circular were not simply the concealment of the realities, but it reflects the very essence of the politics of silence: deception, manipulation, distortion, and non-accountability which help change reality into another kind of reality for "brutal claims to power."¹⁴³

Significantly, December 1928, when the Circular was issued, marked an important transitional period between collective leadership and personalized leadership in the Politburo. The principle of collective leadership rejected authoritarian decisions, but at the same time obscured the individual responsibility of high party officials. Prior to early 1928, Stalin "appeared as the epitome of collective leadership," and he was extremely cautious in affirming his authoritarian position.¹⁴⁴ Yet after April 1929, when the "right opposition" was defeated, Stalin strengthened his position and his circle made attempts at erecting Stalin's cult. The consolidation of his position required the reduction of his personal responsibility for the most crucial decisions, and Stalin strategically designed several approaches to delegate this responsibility to other individuals or agencies, often in localities. Preserving the illusion of the collective principle, Stalin was able to put blame on local party leaders for the failures of his policies, or to reward them in case they managed to successfully implement them.¹⁴⁵ The symptoms of this conceptual arrangement are evident in the Narkomindel document.¹⁴⁶

As noted earlier, the secret police played a crucial role in handling "unreliable" foreigners who wanted to see for themselves whether the state employed starvation as a tool to tame peasant resistance. The Circular is very specific about what was to be done in a situation when a trip by foreign visitors "was undesirable" for the Soviet state but inevitable because the Narkomindel granted them a visa. Moscow advised the Kharkiv Okrvykonkom to limit contacts to a bare minimum with those individuals who were not willing to inform the local authorities about their intentions. Moreover, the Circular instructed Kharkiv to obstruct visitors' attempts to obtain any information about local developments. Any assistance in organizing their trips to border regions, factories, and villages was strictly forbidden.¹⁴⁷ The Okrvykonkom was supposed to transfer the responsibility for visitors in this category to the local departments of the GPU.¹⁴⁸

Unquestionably, the Politburo tried to prevent interventions from the West in the political and economic campaigns of 1927–1928 when the procurement of grain became one of the most important tasks for the regime to support its industrialization, and to keep internal problems secret. This period was characterized by heightened

internal security, justified because of the threat of war, and the demand for building a powerful defense industry. From mid-1927, the various people's commissariats labored to facilitate the process of constructing an efficient Soviet military economy. The mobilization of the population was constantly fed by the fear of war, intentionally escalated by the government, and any external intrusion in the anatomy of the scheme had to be prevented. Ultimately, the chief responsibility of the Narkomindel and the GPU was to maintain the myth about the first successful socialist egalitarian society by preventing truthful journalist accounts that could reach the international community and to keep the Soviet scheme secret.

The 1928 Statute about Secrecy, signed by the head of the OGPU Special Department, Gleb Bokii,¹⁴⁹ was designed to accomplish exactly that, and reflects the intensity of discussions about foreigners at the highest level in 1928 when the politics of silence became instrumental to the success of collectivization and the concealment of its unavoidable "side effects." Interestingly enough, this document has a specific point of reference to foreign visitors, which places the Statute and the Circular in the same conspiratorial and political contexts. For instance, point 8 of the Statute (Section III "Political and Procedural Questions," sub-section "Top Secret") emphasized that any secret documents or inter-institutional correspondence about foreigners who resided in the territory of the USSR, and specifically about their possible arrest, deportation, or exchange for Soviet citizens, had to be strictly secret which meant that access to these documents had to be limited to persons directly involved in these affairs.¹⁵⁰ Clearly, the OGPU neither excluded the worst case scenario, the arrest of a foreigner who violated the code of "appropriate" behavior in the territory of the USSR, nor was reluctant to apply the strictest measures to a foreign citizen under one condition: the information about the incident should be classified.

Significantly, the time when the OGPU Statute was revised and approved by the Politburo (early January 1929), and when Circular no. 984 was issued (late December 1928) dovetails neatly with the time when the state advanced the brutal system of bread procurements that lasted until late 1932. Most importantly, the state displayed an amazing ability to keep its general populace and the international community in the dark for quite some time about the Kremlin's policies that devastated Ukrainian villages. As Rosenfeldt has posited, "as the system was constructed, there was certainly no possibility that the 'disclosed secrets' could circulate freely in the bureaucracy or among the population as a whole."¹⁵¹ The Central Committee and Stalin personally relished secrecy, and their entire production was built on the basis of written and unwritten statutes about secrecy and conspiratorial practices, which cloaked the consequences of the Soviets' governing.

Conclusion

The Soviet politics of silence constituted an invisible and "unperceived form" of cultural violence, or what Pierre Bourdieu and Slavoj Žižek identified as symbolic or systemic violence, which prepared the foundation for the direct violence of 1932–1933.¹⁵² Scholars of Genocide Studies and the Holodomor have been familiar with the concept for quite some time: it is now common knowledge that the Soviets attempted to conceal the information of the brutalities associated with the collectivization campaign in Ukraine. Yet documents, such as Circular no. 984, that would explicitly outline the course of action that would prevent foreigners from observing mass disturbances, riots, and the

famine of 1928–1929 in the Ukrainian countryside have been discovered for the first time. The tangible evidence of concealment, a practice that the Kremlin used in Ukraine in 1928–1929, reveals the intentionality of actions that were inconsistent with the lofty humanistic rhetoric of the Soviet regime and its ideology of egalitarianism.¹⁵³

Indeed, the Marxist-Leninist ideology imposed constraints on the Soviet government: systematic coercion, violence, and mass killings could undermine the Bolsheviks' claim to be legitimate followers of Marx and Lenin for Westerners and for insiders. The state's effort was focused on "the manipulation, adaptation, and selective interpretation of the ideological heritage,"¹⁵⁴ which helped the center conceal doubtful practical applications of Marxism to avoid negative publicity, especially in the West. In the context of what happened after 1928–1929 in Ukraine—the Soviet genocide of 1932–1933—the Circular permits us to better understand the destructive capabilities of silence. The bond of the peasantry with the proletariat and its dictatorship that Stalin proclaimed in 1926 was not only disadvantageous but also deadly for millions of people in Ukraine, as subsequent events have demonstrated, and its consequences were hidden for quite some time.

The politics of silence strategically demarcated and isolated Ukrainian villages from the proper attention of their fellow citizens in the Union and internationally. Silence was an effective political strategy that made resistance and political mobilization difficult, but made it possible to identify and personalize the "transgression."¹⁵⁵ More profoundly, silence and the relatively hermetic information blockade created a space for direct state violence that crushed the subsequent, more numerous and large-scale, peasant rebellions in 1930–1931, producing a ghetto of exclusion. Cloaked by silence, this opaque space did not simply exclude and isolate people's experiences and suffering from the rest of society, it fundamentally negated their existence, "making them inadmissible for consideration."¹⁵⁶ In this landscape, people's experiences became a public secret that muddied the truthful record about their disobedience and resistance, and the state's violent attempts to suppress them. Using August Comte's term, in a "conspiracy of silence," coercion and starvation were used as political tools, and strategic silence helped maintain the fictitious narrative about the successes of socialist construction promoted by Soviet propaganda.¹⁵⁷

Domestically, talk about the famine and state terror was criminalized, and the actual tragedy of Ukrainian peasants fell into a catacomb of myths and rumors. In addition, documents, such as Circular no. 984, cultivated xenophobia among local party bosses and shaped their attitudes toward foreigners as potential enemies. These attitudes migrated into the public sphere, instigating popular suspicion of foreigners and generating people's commitment to follow instructions from above which were based on deception and sham. Moscow's expectations were informed by hope that the conspiracy of silence would become for Ukrainians as natural and habitual as their xenophobia.

Although over the last decade thousands of documents have been discovered that unequivocally demonstrated the center's conscious nature of repressive and extraordinary measures in Ukraine, top secret Circular no. 984 best reflects its intention to implement and to hide the terror to which Ukrainian peasants were subjected in 1928–1929. Importantly, recent scholarly studies have provided grounds to suggest that Soviet authorities attempted to conceal more than the famine and state violence. They attempted to camouflage the political and economic subversion of Ukraine, the Ukrainians' anti-Soviet and anti-colonial attitudes toward the state, and the inevitable

ethnic changes, resulting from routine national operations in this geographical region.¹⁵⁸ The plan was designed to exceed the political course attempted in the early 1920s to win Ukraine and to transform it into a solid and long-lasting source of cash for industrialization. Ukraine, as a frontier region southeastward and as a granary of the Soviet Union, had to bear the burdens of increasing political and military centralization, and had to serve the Soviet political system as an economic support of its power. Silence became a strategic technique that helped achieve this goal.

In the Gulag (Vorkuta), Panas Butsenko, the recipient of Circular no. 984, ruminated about the total political and economic subversion of Ukraine in the 1930s:

The reason is in ourselves. We lost the battle. We turned out to be mediocre politicians. We failed to guarantee safety to our nation We perceived false assurances of friendship as a reality. We were satisfied by power without power We did not defend ourselves. We voluntarily entered the mouth of a boa Perhaps, a new clever generation will come after us. It won't repeat our mistakes.¹⁵⁹

The “boa” swallowed millions of the Ukrainian peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the clergy, without the possibility of restoring its initial ethnographic and cultural reserves. Only after the collapse of the USSR and subsequent new archival findings, have historians begun to realize the scale of this catastrophe.

From the inception of the USSR to its very end, Soviet national, social, cultural and economic policies were shielded by the politics of silence which helped obscure their essence and consequences. These policies were an array of crimes against humanity at many levels. As mentioned earlier, definitions are important, although they are not inclusive and never fully explain a phenomenon. The incredibly large number of the regime's victims, coupled with state violence and brutality, magnify its intrinsic inhumane nature and place Soviet collectivization policies and their direct consequences, such as famines, mass killings, and exile, squarely in the category of crimes against humanity.

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Notes

- * Dedicated to the memory of Margaret Siriol Colley, niece of the Welsh journalist Gareth Jones.
1. The Holodomor, a Ukrainian term for the famine, consists of two words, *holod* and *mor* which, when combined, literally mean killing by hunger. It was the Soviet government-driven famine in Ukraine that occurred in late 1932 to early 1933.
 2. Frank Sysyn, “Thirty Years of Research on the Holodomor: A Balance Sheet,” in *Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies*, ed. Andrij Makuch and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015), 7–8; Nikolia Vert (Nicolas Werth), “Velikii golod 1932–1933 gg. na Ukraine,” in *Terror i besporiadok*, http://krotov.info/libr_min/03_v/er/t_2010_8.htm (accessed 15 Feb 2017).
 3. Andrij Makuch and Frank E. Sysyn, eds., *Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies* (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015); Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn, eds., *After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: HURI, Harvard UP, 2013); Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds., *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine* (Edmonton; Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012); Liudmyla Hrynevych,

- Khronika kolektyvizatsii ta Holodomoru v Ukraini, 1927–1933*, vol. 1, books 1–3 (Krytyka: Kyiv, 2012); Andrea Graziosi, “Stalin and Starvation as a Tool to Tame the Ukrainian Peasantry” (conference lecture, Starvation as a Political Tool from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, Holodomor Research and Education Consortium, October 22, 2015), <http://holodomor.ca/starvation-as-a-political-tool-symposium/> (accessed Feb 2017); Olga Bertelsen and Myroslav Shkandrij, “The Secret Police and the Campaign against Galicians in Soviet Ukraine, 1929–34,” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 42,1 (2014): 37–62; Myroslav Shkandrij and Olga Bertelsen, “The Soviet Regime’s National Operations in Ukraine, 1929–1934,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, LV,3–4 (2013): 417–47.
4. On the significance of HDA SBU documents to analyses of the Holodomor that have been declassified in 2006, see Iurii Shapoval, “Znachennia novovidnaidennykh dokumentiv DPU-NKVS dlia hlybshoho rozuminnia holodu 1932–1933 roki,” in *Rozsekrechena pam’iat’: Holodomor 1932–1933 roki v Ukraini v dokumentakh HPU-NKVD*, ed. Serhii Bohunov et al. (Kyiv: Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy; Mizhnarodnyi blahodiinyi fond “Ukraina 3000,” 2008), 45–46.
 5. Olga Andriewsky, “Towards a Decent History: The Study of the Holodomor and Ukrainian Historiography,” in *Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies*, ed. Andrii Makuch and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton; Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015), 22–23.
 6. Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000); Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1962).
 7. Omelian Rudnytskyi et al., “Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933,” *Canadian Studies in Population* 42,1–2 (2015): 53–80.
 8. This document has been recently discovered in the DAKhO (State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast). Although we generally know that the Soviets always prevented foreign journalists from visiting the USSR, to my knowledge, prior to this discovery, there was no tangible evidence or documents (i.e., a written/signed order/orders from Moscow’s institution/institutions of power) in which Moscow would specifically dictate to the local authorities that foreigners were to be prevented from traveling to the Ukrainian countryside.
 9. On the metaphor of violence as landscape, see Frederick J. Hoffman, *The Mortal No* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 181.
 10. Cheryl Glenn, *Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2004). See also Jacques Ranciere, “Ten Theses on Politics,” *Theory & Event* 5,3 (2001): 1–16; Jahmese M. Fort, “Politics of Silence: Theorizing Silence as Altered Participation,” *Kinesis: Graduate Journal of Philosophy* 40,2 (2015): 65–74.
 11. See also an analysis of various meanings of silence in more elaborate detail, from cultural, literary, and political perspectives, in Mikhail Epshtein, “Slovo i molchanie v russkoi kul’ture,” *Zvezda* 10 (2005), <http://zvezdaspb.ru/index.php?page=8&nput=399> (accessed 12 May 2016).
 12. John Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences,” *Polity* 31,3 (1999): 357–93; Alexander J. Motyl, “Putin’s Russia as a Fascist Political System,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49,1 (2016): 25–36.
 13. For a definition of “political strategic silence,” see Barry Brummett, “Towards a Theory of Silence as a Political Strategy,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66,3 (1980): 289; William Forrest Harlow, “The Rhetoric of Silence and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire,” *American Communication Journal* 16,2 (2014): 52–66.
 14. Nomi Dave, “The Politics of Silence: Music, Violence and Protest in Guinea,” *Ethnomusicology* 58,1 (2014): 18.
 15. Sophia Dingli, “We Need to Talk about Silence: Re-examining Silence in International Relations Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 21,4 (2015): 732.
 16. Johan Galtung, “Cultural violence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27,3 (1990): 291; Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6,3 (1969): 170–71. According to Galtung, “direct violence” is associated with the deliberate action of one person in the form of physical or psychological abuse aimed at another person, and “structural violence” means systematic measures and techniques that the regime uses against people/communities/national groups to prevent them from achieving their full potential, which becomes possible due to the misbalance of power.
 17. See “Doxa and Common Life: An Interview. Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton,” in Slavoj Zizek, *Mapping Ideology* (London; New York: Verso, 1994), 270.
 18. Glenn, *Unspoken*, 32.
 19. Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 160.

20. Of course the politics of silence, as well as secrecy, was not an innovation of the 1930s. Moreover, it goes without saying that historically, neither Tsarist Russia nor the early twentieth-century Civil War in this region serve as points of departure for discussions about the politics of silence and secrecy. For several thousand years, people governed societies using information as a tool of control, deliberately keeping their subjects oblivious to realities.
21. On hidden and forgotten genocides, see Riccardo Armillei, Nikki Marczak, and Panayiotis Diamadis, "Forgotten and Concealed: The Emblematic Cases of the Assyrian and Romani Genocides," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 10,2 (2016): 98–120.
22. Roman Serbyn, "Editor's Foreword," *Holodomor Studies* 2,1 (2010): viii.
23. Robert Kindler, "Famines and Political Communication in Stalinism. Possibilities and Limits of the Sayable," *Jahrbuecher fuer Geschicthe Osteuropas* 62,2 (2014): 261.
24. Christian Noack, Lindsay Janssen, and Vincent Comerford, eds., *Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland* (New York: Anthem Press, 2012), 5–6; Stanislav V. Kulchytskyi, "Holodomor in Ukraine 1932-1933: An Interpretation of Facts" in *Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland*, ed. Christian Noack, Lindsay Janssen, and Vincent Comerford (New York: Anthem Press, 2012), 20.
25. Roman Serbyn, "Photographic Evidence of the Ukrainian Famines of 1921–1923 and 1932–1933," *Holodomor Studies* 2,1 (2010): 66.
26. Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (New York: Picador, 2008), 79.
27. For discourses about continuity, discontinuity, and the theory of continuity and its application in politics and social sciences, see, for instance, Hans S. Falck, "Social Continuity and Social Discontinuity: Social Work and, in, against and Separate from Society," *The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare* 5,5 (1978): 723–30; James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990); Stephen Padgett and Thomas Poguntke, eds., *Continuity and Change in German Politics: Beyond the Politics of Centrality? A Festschrift for Gordon Smith* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002); Henk E. S. Woldring, "On the Purpose of the State: Continuity and Change in Political Theories," available at <https://maritain.nd.edu/ama/Sweetman/Sweetman12.pdf> (accessed 30 Dec 2016).
28. Žižek, *Violence*, 210–11.
29. *Ibid.*, 211.
30. *Kurkul* (plural: *kurkuli*) is a Ukrainian term for what the Russians called "*kulak*," a seemingly wealthy peasant who, in the Bolshevik world, was an enemy of the Soviet state, and had to be de-kurkulized or eliminated.
31. I. S. Rat'kovskii, *Krasnyi terror i deiatel'nost' VChK v 1918 godu* (S.-Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo S.-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2006), 3, 43, 62. Moscow managed to create a united and all-pervasive system of the Cheka only after 9 March 1918, when the Bolshevik government together with the secret organs moved from Petrograd to Moscow.
32. *Cheka* is an early term for the Soviet secret police, afterwards GPU, an acronym for the Soviet secret organs.
33. On the meaning of secrecy and its applications, see Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World: Stalin's Power Apparatus and the Soviet System's Secret Structures of Communication*, trans. Sally Laird and John Kendal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2009), 1:65, 66–108. On control of information by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 1930s, see Jonathan Bone, "Soviet Controls on the Circulation of the Information in the 1920s and 1930s," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 40,1–2 (1999): 65–89. Although some Western scholars, including Rosenfeldt, use the terms *konspiratsiia* and conspiracy interchangeably, they are not identical. These two notions have different meanings. *Konspiratsiia* (or *konspirativnost'*) in Russian refers to the principle of secretiveness/secrecy that helps maintain secrecy about the matter, one of the principles of the secret police, and should be translated into English as secrecy or secretiveness. Conspiracy is a specific secret plan conceived by a group of individuals or institutions to do something unlawful. This essay focuses on the former, not the latter.
34. Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World*, 1:70.
35. The regulations about secrecy were issued, edited and printed in 1922, 1924, 1927, and 1929. See Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World*, 1:70.
36. According to Stuart Kahan, this was also Lazar Kaganovich's favorite expression that he learned from his colleagues in the secret police. See Kahan's *The Wolf of the Kremlin* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), 160. This source is compromised by several inconsistencies, and hence it cannot be treated as reliable. However, interestingly enough, this sentiment was conveyed by many

- GPU lieutenants in interrogation rooms in one form or another. See, for instance, AU SBUKhO (Sectoral Archive of the Ukrainian Security Services in Kharkiv Oblast), spr. 010318; AU SBUKhO, spr. 035261. On methods of gathering and manipulating information by the GPU, see Volodymyr Iurynets's *obzornaia spravka* in DAKhO, f. R6452, op. 4, spr. 724, ark. 149–56.
37. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire: The Archival Heritage of Ukraine, World War II, and the International Politics of Restitution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 2001), 70–72.
 38. There were three waves of destruction of Soviet secret documents: in 1929–1930, 1937–1938 (the Great Terror), and during the summer of 1941 on the eve or immediately after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For more details, see Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World*, 1:88–93. However, this notion probably should be reconsidered in light of information, as yet unverified, about archival “bonfires” in the internal yards of regional SBU archives in 1991, and during the Orange Revolution in 2004–2005 and Euromaidan in 2013–2014.
 39. Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World*, 1:99. On the rules of storage, copying, and return of secret and top secret documents to Moscow, see the instructions issued on 30 May 1928 and signed by the member of the collegium of the OGPU and the head of the Special Department Gleb Bokii in DAKhO, R857, op. 1, spr. 12, ark. 15–17.
 40. *Okruha* (plural: *okruhy*) refers to an administrative-territorial unit of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The system of *okruhy* existed from 1923 to 1930 and was replaced by the *raion* (district) system. Where the term “district” is used, it means that a reference is associated with events that occurred before 1923, in 1930, or shortly thereafter.
 41. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 134.
 42. See, for instance, Alexander J. Motyl, “Fascistoid Russia: Whither Putin’s Brittle Realm,” *World Affairs* (1 March 2012): 56.
 43. TsDAHOU (Central State Archive of Civic Organizations in Ukraine), f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2316, ark. 10–11. See also Oleg Mozokhin, *VChK-OGPU: Karaiushchii mech diktatury proletariata* (Moskva: Iauza and EKSMO, 2004), 31.
 44. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2316, ark. 12, 74.
 45. Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1934), 82. On Bolshevik and Stalin’s policies, actions, and hostile attitudes toward the Ukrainian peasantry, and Stalin’s views on the nationality question, see also Andrea Graziosi, “The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933,” *Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1996); Klid and Motyl, *The Holodomor Reader*, xxxviii, xliii.
 46. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 80, 82. The book was published on 25 January 1926.
 47. *Ibid.*, 82–83.
 48. *Ibid.*, 84.
 49. Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr. iak henotsyd: Trudnoshchi usvidomlennia* (Kyiv: Nash chas, 2008), 101–02, 107. On 14 December 1927, the TsK VKP(b) issued a directive that prescribed forcible methods of solving the economic problem in the USSR. See V. Danilov et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoï derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivaniie: Dokumenty i materialy, 1927–1939* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia politicheskaiia entsyklopediia, 1999), 1:114.
 50. Serhii Kokin, “Holodomor v Ukraini i DPU,” in *Rozsekrechena pam’iat’: Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraini v dokumentakh HPU-NKVD*, ed. Serhii Bohunov et al. (Kyiv: Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy; Mizhnarodnyi blahodiinyi fond “Ukraina 3000,” 2008), 65.
 51. DAKhO, R-408, op. 6, spr. 375, ark. 1, 3, 5.
 52. L. V. Hrynevych, “Osoblyvosti proiaviv politychnoi aktyvnosti naselennia USRR v umovakh nedorodiv i holodu 1928–1929,” in *Storinky istorii: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats’, vypusk 37* (Kyiv: Ministerstvo osvity i nauky Ukrainy, Natsional’nyi tekhnichnyi universytet Ukrainy, 2014), 92.
 53. Yanni Kotsonis, *States of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship in the Russian Empire and Early Soviet Republic* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: U of Toronto P, 2014), 296–97. The Soviet state had not started with a blank slate but it rather inherited these mechanisms of control from Tsarist Russia.
 54. *Ibid.*, 301.
 55. *Ibid.*, 319, 337–38.
 56. *Ibid.*, 344.
 57. *Ibid.*, 345.

58. See, for instance, the 21 October 1929 petition of Ivan Bondarenko to the Andriivs'kyi tax office (Iziiums'kyi okruh). DAKhO, R1963, op. 2, spr. 73, ark. 2. See also DAKhO, R1963, op. 2, spr. 73, ark. 24.
59. DAKhO, R1963, op. 2, spr. 65, ark. 9.
60. DAKhO, R1963, op. 2, spr. 73, ark. 3, 5, 20, 22, 25, 27, 27, 31, 55, 102.
61. The course for total collectivization was officially announced at the November 1929 Plenum of the Central Committee the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik).
62. Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 100. It should be noted here that peasant discontent began to grow in 1926–1927: there was a wave of militant peasant uprisings across the country (Khlevniuk, 2015; Kokin, 2007). According to the official statistics, on the Union level, the authorities registered 63 large-scale anti-government rebellions in rural areas. In 1929, there were more than 1,300 reported incidents that involved 244,000 participants (Khlevniuk, 2015, 113). The lion's share of this information came from Ukraine. According to Hrynevych, in the late 1920s, Stalin could rely on only 5% of the Ukrainian society; the rest were hostile to Soviet collectivization. Considering the fact that the rural population of the UkrSSR in 1926 constituted approximately 24 million people, one can imagine the scale of peasant resistance. In 1928–1929, they rebelled against the regime, using various forms of resistance—passive, active, armed, and so forth (Viola, 1996; Danilov et al., 2002). By late 1929, mass riots involved hundreds of thousands of people, and the Ukrainian GPU lost control over eight okruhy which was restored with great difficulty in early 1930. The official statistics on mass resistance in Ukraine, provided by Hrynevych and other scholars for 1928–1929, are far from complete. More comprehensive studies are needed to illustrate the scale of social and political discontent in Ukraine in the late 1920s.
63. Kokin, “Holodomor v Ukraini i DPU,” 67.
64. Iurii Shapoval, “On Ukrainian Separatism: A GPU Circular of 1926,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18,3–4 (1994): 275–302.
65. Oleg V. Khlevniuk, *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*, trans. Nora Seligman Favorov (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2015), 105.
66. On Stalin's Siberian trip, see, for instance, James Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 2003), 128–33.
67. Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 102–04.
68. Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Stalin: Profiles in Power* (London; New York: Pearson, Longman, 2005), 82–84; Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 107. On the same day Radek and several other of Stalin's opponents were forcibly removed to the Urals, and a couple of days later Lev Trotsky was deported to Alma Ata. See Hughes, *Stalin*, 132.
69. Hanna Kapustian, “Peredvisnyky holodu pochatku 30-kh rokiv XX st. v Ukraini,” in *Henotsyd ukrains'koho narodu: istorychna pam'iat ta polityko-pravova otsinka*, ed. V. A. Smolii et al. (Kyiv; New York: Vydavnytstvo M. P. Kots', 2003), 278.
70. *Ibid.*, 279.
71. See the 4 May 1928 directive of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U in TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 4, ark. 50–52. Also available in Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, Vadym Zolotariov, *ChK-GPU-NKVD v Ukraini: Osoby, Fakty, Dokumenty* (Kyiv: Abris, 1997), 268–69.
72. “Petliurites” is a derogatory term for Ukrainian nationalists. It originated from the last name of Simon Petliura, head of the Ukrainian Directory, the Ukrainian People's Republic's executive organ founded in 1917, and military commander of the Directory's armed forces. “Spekulianty” is a term that characterized entrepreneurs who operated in the black market selling foodstuffs and consumer products for profit.
73. For a detailed discussion about these operations see Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, “*Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy*”: *Nevidomi dokumenty i fakty* (Kyiv: Intel, 1995); Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i GPU-NKVD: trahichne desiatylittia 1924–1934* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo “Ukraina,” 1996); Serhii Bilokin, *Masovyi teror iak zasib derzhavnoho upravlinnia v SRSR (1917–1941): Dzhereloznavche doslidzhennia* (Kyiv: Fundatsiia “Volia,” 1999); Shkandrij and Bertelsen, “The Soviet Regime's National Operations in Ukraine”; Bertelsen and Shkandrij, “The Secret Police.”
74. Hrynevych, “Osoblyvosti proiaviv,” 86–87.
75. *Ibid.*, 88.
76. Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 108. See also Francoise Thom, “Reflections on Stalin and the Holodomor,” in *Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies*, ed. Andrii Makuch and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015), 76, 78.

77. V. P. Danilov, "Vvedeniie (Istoki i nachalo derevenskoi tragedii)," in *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivaniie. Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 1, Mai 1927—Noiabr' 1929, ed. V. P. Danilov, R. Manning, and L. Viola (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 1999), 32–36.
78. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr.*, 109–10, 114–15. See also Valery Vasil'ev, "Vinnitsa Oblast," in *Centre-Local Relations in the Stalinist State, 1928–1941*, ed. E. A. Rees (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 169.
79. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr.*, 109, 114.
80. See criminal files of Bilenko and Baden in DAKO (State Archive of Kirovohrad oblast), f. FR 5907, spr. 4182; DAKO f. FR 5907, spr. 4217. Here, the term "district" is used, as it was employed by those who created these criminal files, likely in early 1930 when the system of okruhy was replaced by the system of raiony/districts.
81. See their group criminal file in DAKO, FR 5907, spr. 14142. *Sil'rada* refers to the Village Council.
82. See Hraliuk's criminal file in DAKO, FR 5907, spr. 4172.
83. For a discussion about "mobilization" of foodstuffs from Ukraine to other regions of the USSR, see Liudmyla Hrynevych, *Khronika*, vol. 1, book 3, 18–31; Liudmyla Hrynevych, "Metody khlibozahotivel' 1928/29 r. po-stalins'komu," in *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraini: prychny ta naslidky* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003), 294.
84. This data is available in TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 502, ark. 125, and was collected immediately after 1991. See, for instance, Kapustian, 284.
85. For a discussion about the functions of the Ukrainian State Commission and state aid to those who suffered from the famine of 1928–1929, see Hrynevych, *Khronika*, vol. 1, book 3, 66–85 (esp. 72).
86. *Ibid.*, 73.
87. Kindler, 258; See Kulchytskyi, "Holodomor in Ukraine," 24. On the basis of the third Land Decree issued by the Soviet People's Commissariat (Radnarkom) in late 1918, the Ukrainian Soviet government began to collectivize the Ukrainian peasantry in March 1919, which resulted in armed rebellions. In early April 1919, the Red Army burned to the ground the rebellious villages Romanivka and Khydovtsi (Fastov district). Because of the catastrophic failure of collectivization in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks rejected its forcible implementation at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920, and decided to proceed more cautiously, employing systematic individual requisition of agricultural products. See Kul'chyts'kyi, *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr.*, 30–35.
88. Kindler, 258.
89. Hrynevych, *Khronika*, vol. 1, book 3, 145–46; Hrynevych, "Osoblyvosti proiaviv," 99.
90. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 109; Liudmyla Hrynevych, "Chervona armiiia i ukrains'ke suspil'stvo pid chas kampanii likvidatsii kurkul'stva iak klasu (zymo-vesna 1930 r.): istorychnyi analiz sotsial'noi psykholohii ta povedinky," in *Henotsyd ukrains'koho narodu: istorychna pam'iat ta polityko-pravova otsinka*, ed. V. A. Smolii et al. (Kyiv; New York: Vydavnytstvo M. P. Kots', 2003), 341.
91. Vadym Zolotariov, *ChK-DPU-NKVS na Kharkivshchyni: liudy ta doli. 1919–1941* (Kharkiv: Folio, 2003), 172.
92. Zolotariov, *ChK-DPU-NKVS*, 172–73. The families of the transgressors were also exiled to the Northern regions of the USSR and their private property was confiscated.
93. R. W. Davies et al., eds., "Introduction," in *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence. 1931–36* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2003), 4–5.
94. See a group criminal file in DAKO, FR 5907, spr. 10030, ark. 1–10.
95. *Ibid.*
96. See, for instance, Ivan Strilets's criminal file in DAKO, FR 5907, spr. 14189, ark. 1–5, 18–25. Their property was confiscated.
97. Leaflets and proclamations in Ukraine differed from those in Russia. Many called for a free and independent Ukraine, free of the Bolsheviks and Communist *zhidy*, a pejorative term for Jews. See Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, 120.
98. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 258.
99. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 303.
100. On *bab'i bunty*, women's riots, see Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, 181–204.
101. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 301.
102. Viktor Pryluts'kyi, "Represyvni zakhody proty molodi v USRR u period formuvannia totalitarnoho ladu (1920–1936 rr.)," in *Henotsyd ukrains'koho narodu: istorychna pam'iat ta polityko-pravova otsinka*, ed. V. A. Smolii et al. (Kyiv; New York: Vydavnytstvo M. P. Kots', 2003), 231.

103. See, for instance, Panasyk Perederii's 25 January 1929 letter to Stalin in DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 589, ark. 15–21.
104. On Soviet propaganda and collectivization, see Liudmyla Hrynevych, *Holod 1928-1929 rr. u Radians'kii Ukraini* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, NAN Ukrainy, 2013), 251–74.
105. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 53.
106. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 53–53 zv.
107. Kuromiya, *Stalin*, 112.
108. Hrynevych, "Osoblyvosti proiaviv," 93; for the GPU's statistics, see Vasil'ev, 171–72. For more specific categories of terrorist acts, see Hrynevych, *Holod 1928-1929 rr. u Radians'kii Ukraini*, 310.
109. DAKhO, R846, op. 4, spr. 44, ark. 124.
110. A. Berelovich et al., eds., "Vvedeniie," in *Sovetskaiia derevnia 1923-1929 gg. po informatsionnym dokumentam GPU/Sovetskaiia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. 1918-1939 gg. Dokumenty i materialy 4,2* (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2000), 23.
111. In late 1929 to early 1930, people organized in groups (500–600), beating the militia and in the villages of Kharkiv okruha. See, for instance, DAKhO, f. R845, op. 8, spr. 164, ark. 4. One of the largest organized riots in Ukraine occurred in Pavlohrad. It was suppressed on October 5–6, 1930. See Vasil' Danylenko, ed., *Pavlohrads'ke povstannia. 1930. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv: "Ukrains'kyi pys'mennyk," 2009). At the Union level, in January 1930, the GPU registered 402 mass disturbances; in February 1,048; and in March 6,528. In all, there were 13,754 mass disturbances, in which approximately three million people participated. See R. W. Davies et al., *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, 4; Mykola Doroshko, *Nomenklatura: Kerivna verkhivka Radians'koi Ukrainy (1917–1938 rr.)* (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2008), 302.
112. Zolotariov, *ChK-DPU-NKVS*, 173.
113. "Doxa and Common Life," 270.
114. This study does not delve into the differences between the grain procurement policies of 1928 and 1932 and the scale of violence associated with them, nor does it argue that the politics of silence prevented or eliminated trips of foreigners to Ukraine or to the Ukrainian countryside. Rather it illuminates the intent of human actions and examines the extent of the Soviet politics of silence that helped isolate specific groups of people and perpetuate violence, using the information blockade.
115. During the interwar period, approximately 10,000 foreign visitors and tens of thousands of foreign residents lived in the Soviet Union. The desire to witness the achievements of the Bolsheviks attracted writers, journalists, businessmen, economists, politicians, and private citizens of foreign states. See Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32–33, 46.
116. F. Beck and W. Godin, *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession*, trans. Eric Mosbacher and David Porter (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 166; David-Fox, 59. For more details about the VOKS and the fate of its directors, see Beck and Godin, 131–33.
117. David-Fox, 98–99, 101, 111. The rumors about "Potemkin villages" were circulated from the mid-twenties among foreign visitors, and many were aware of the Soviets' tactics of following a scheme of "pre-planned visits" and selected places for excursions.
118. American writer Theodor Dreiser was among those who fully experienced the Soviets' "friendly" grip during his journey to Soviet Russia in 1927–1928. See Thomas P. Riggio and James L.W. West III, eds., *Dreiser's Russian Diary* (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1996), 29, 220; David-Fox, 3–4.
119. David-Fox, 3.
120. From late 1928, mass disturbances and riots in Ukraine forced the state to mobilize the militia, the Red Army, and GPU troops to put down the uprisings with force, using weapons and even artillery, as Grigorii Ordzhonikidze who was dispatched to Ukraine to alleviate the situation noted in his diary. See Vasil'ev, 172.
121. DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 439, ark. 11–11zv. From 1923 to 1929, Panas Butsenko headed the Kharkiv okruha executive committee. In 1929, he was sent to the Far East (Vladivostok) to head the local executive committee, but in the early thirties he was transferred to Moscow to work for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry where he was arrested as a member of a Ukrainian fascist organization and exiled to Vorkuta. He miraculously survived the exile and died in Moscow in 1965. For more details about Butsenko, see V. A. Smolii et al., eds., *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo "Naukova dumka," 2003), 1:688; Hryhorii Kostiuik, *Zustrichi i proshchannia: Spohady u dvokh knykhakh* (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2008), 1:80, 81, 103, 563–67, 623.

122. The Soviets established a system of organizing classified materials, according to which documents were designated as “confidential,” “secret,” and “strictly secret” (or “top secret”). For details, see Rosenfeldt, *The “Special” World*, 1:71.
123. Rikke Haute, “Room for Discussion: the Correspondence of Narkomindel and the Soviet Embassy in Denmark,” in *Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union*, ed. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, and Erik Kulavig (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 173–74.
124. Rosenfeldt, *The “Special” World*, 1:68.
125. Routine quarrels between Chicherin and Litvinov jeopardized the smooth enforcement of conspiratorial principles, which fragmented the Narkomindel into groups and in many respects paralyzed the normal work of the agency. For details see Grigori Besedovskii, *Na putiakh k Termidoru* (Moskva: Sovremennik, 1997), 146. Chicherin held the position as its Commissar for seven years, from 6 July 1923 to 21 July 1930. On Stalin’s order, his successor Maxim Litvinov was removed from the office on 3 May 1939, and replaced by Viacheslav Molotov who led the Commissariat until its reorganization in March 1946.
126. Rosenfeldt, *The “Special” World*, 1:74, 76, 88. In 1927, a general rule was established that important questions discussed in the Narkomindel and the OGPU were to be approved by the Politburo. These joint discussions were held at the Politburo’s closed sessions. Of course, there is little doubt that the Narkomindel and the OGPU fulfilled the will of the members of the Politburo. Intense secret correspondence between the central party organs and the Narkomindel and the OGPU, as well as regular joint meetings, occurred monthly and even weekly.
127. Kathryn Weathersby, “Foreign Policies under Stalin: The Case of Korea,” in *Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union*, ed. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, and Erik Kulavig (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 228. Current scholarship on Stalin’s power politics does not argue that from 1928 Stalin made major political decisions alone. Instead, it explains how decisions were made in favor of one person, Stalin, under the guise of the principle of collective leadership that was allegedly enforced in the highest institutions of power in 1928–1929. It suggests that through political manipulation and intrigue, Stalin managed to control the “vote” in the Politburo (his opponents were discredited and the majority in the Politburo became Stalin’s majority, people who were subservient to him). Arguments positing that Stalin controlled the decision-making process only after WWII are inconsistent with recent scholarship on the Politburo’s internal politics and Stalin’s role in it. According to the majority of scholars, the process of consolidation of Stalin’s power occurred precisely in 1928–1929, which allowed him to have a decisive voice in all major decisions, including those of the early and late 1930s (the Holodomor and the Great Terror). For evidence of Stalin’s central role in the major political decisions made from late 1928, see Kuromiya, 2005; Khlevniuk, 2009; Khlevniuk, 2015; Harris, 2016; Thom, 2015.
128. Ukraine was sovereign only on paper. All state institutions were subordinate to the central institutions in Moscow. Ruslan Pyrih, “Introduction,” in *Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials* (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2008), 10–11.
129. See Grigory Besedovsky, *Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat*, in the Series of Russian Studies, trans. Matthew Norgate (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1977), 10, 12, 118.
130. David-Fox, 34; Leonid Naumov, *Stalin and NKVD* (Moskva: Novyi Khronograf, 2010), 342.
131. As previously mentioned, as early as 1923, one of its chief responsibilities was to evaluate foreigners’ attitudes toward the USSR, and to establish in detail their travel dates and itinerary in order to impose as much structure as possible to prevent the travelers from seeing the sites of conflict and state violence. See David-Fox, 48–49.
132. The Commissariat and its foreign embassies were infiltrated by GPU agents who kept the party leadership informed about activities within these institutions. Usually the chiefs of Press Bureaus were working for the secret police. For details about the relations between the *Narkomindel* and the secret police, see Besedovskii, *Na putiakh k Termidoru*, 359; Besedovsky, *Revelations*, 13–14, 70.
133. David-Fox, 52, 57–60, 295. The communication channels among these agencies, including their regional branches, were established through telegraph and the OGPU’s Field Courier Corps. See Rosenfeldt, *The “Special” World*, 1:93–94, 261.
134. On the threat of war and Soviet propaganda, see Nikolai Vert (Nicolas Werth), “Porazhencheskiie slukhi i nastroiienia v SSSR v 1920-1930-ie gody,” in *Terror i besporiadok*, http://krotov.info/libr_min/03_v/er/t_2010_8.htm.

135. DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 439, ark. 11zv. For more details about Rotshtein, see Bessedovsky, *Revelations*, 101, or Besedovskii, *Na putiakh k Termidoru*, 146. The center appointed Volin as Rotshtein's deputy. Volin was in charge of a spy ring in Paris, while serving as a secretary at the Paris Embassy.
136. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2316, ark. 1–195 (esp. 3, 4, 6). Pessimism and frustration with the Soviets were characteristic of most regions in Ukraine: the peasants expressed concerns with high prices for manufactured goods and low prices for grain established by the government. The GPU reported that at collective meetings, the peasants reached an agreement to sow as little as possible to harvest just enough to sustain only their families for a year. A peasant from Uman' okruha proclaimed: "I'll be naked and barefoot but I won't surrender my bread for nothing." By late 1926, a *pud* of rye grain cost 50–60 kopeks while a pair of boots was priced at 12–25 rubles (*pud* is a dry measure usually used in tsarist Russia for grain and flour; 1 *pud* equals 16.38 kilograms). According to secret GPU reports, the talks in the villages revolved around a second revolution that had to occur to demolish the coercive Soviet power.
137. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2316, ark. 27–28, 98, 105–07. According to GPU statistics, from 15 September to 1 November 1926, there were 6,048 robberies, 351 murders, and 999 arsons in the Ukrainian countryside. The report is signed by the deputy head of the Ukrainian GPU Karl Karlson, the head of the Statistical Operational Administration of the GPU Vasilii Ivanov, and the head of the Informational Operational Department of the GPU Genrikh Liushkov. For more details on Karlson, see V. A. Zolotar'ov and I. I. Shapoval, "Kolyvan' u provedenni linii partii ne bulo" (Storinky biohrafii K. M. Karlsona)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* no. 1 (1996): 91–105; on Ivanov, see Vadym Zolotar'ov, "Komisar derzhavnoi bezpeky 3-ho ranhu: Storinky biohrafii Vasyliia Ivanova," *Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB* no. 1–2 (1999): 367–87; on Liushkov, see Vadym Zolotar'ov, "Prozrenie' chekista Liushkova," *V mire spetssluzhb* no. 3 (2004): 66–69.
138. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Holodomor 1932-1933 rr.*, 124, 130.
139. Irina V. Pavlova, "The Strength and Weakness of Stalin's Power," in *Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Power*, ed. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, and Erik Kulavig (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 35–36.
140. DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 439, ark. 11.
141. *Ibid.*
142. *Ibid.*
143. On cynicism as a form of ideology and the creation of a distorted reality, see Slavoj Zizek, "How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?" in *Mapping Ideology*, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London and New York: Verso, 2012), 312–14.
144. For more details about the principles of collective and personalized leadership in the highest party organs in the late 1920s, see Graeme Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge UP, 1990), 193–94.
145. *Ibid.*, 206–07, 211–12.
146. DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 439, ark. 11.
147. *Ibid.*
148. DAKhO, f. R845, op. 2, spr. 439, ark. 11zv.
149. DAKhO, f. R857, op. 1sch, spr. 12, ark.17. Gleb Bokii (1879–1937) was a Ukrainian who was born in Tiflis. From 1921 to 1934, he headed the special (coding) department in the VChK/GPU/OGPU of the USSR. Until 1937, Bokii was a member of the NKVD Collegium in the RSFSR, a member of the Supreme Court, and the head of the special department and the 9th department in the GUGB NKVD in the USSR. He was arrested on 16 May 1937, and was shot on 15 November 1937. For more details about Bokii, see N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, *Kto rukovodil NKVD: 1934-1941*, ed. N. G. Okhotin and A. B. Roginskii (Moskva: "Zven'ia," 1999), 114; Rosenfeldt, *The "Special" World*, 2:34–35.
150. DAKhO, f. R857, op. 1sch, spr. 12, ark. 33zv.
151. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, "The Importance of the Secret Apparatus of the Soviet Communist Party during the Stalin Era," in *Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Power*, ed. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen, and Erik Kulavig (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), 60.
152. "Doxa and Common Life," 266.
153. Yet, Marx and Lenin never denied the importance of coercion and violence at the initial stage of the revolution. For a discussion about "selective interpretation of the ideological heritage," see Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 77. For various analyses of Lenin's views about state violence and his disposition to violence, see James Ryan, *Lenin's*

- Terror: The Ideological Origins of Early Soviet State Violence* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Rat'kovskii, *Krasnyi terror*; Christopher Read, *Lenin: A Revolutionary Life* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Richard Pipes, ed., *The Unknown Lenin: Revelations from the Secret Archive* in *Annals of Communism Series* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998), 1–11; Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life*, vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995); George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police* (New York: Oxford UP, 1981).
154. Linz, 77.
155. On the potential of silence to internalize and individualize threats and curtail political mobilization, see Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* 29,2 (2000): 306.
156. For a more extensive discussion about silence's capabilities, see Dingli, 726.
157. See an interesting discussion about strategic and public silence in John Keane, "Silence and Catastrophe: New Reasons Why Politics Matters in the Early Years of the Twenty-first Century," *The Political Quarterly* 83,4 (2012): 660–68.
158. Vasyl' Danylenko, ed., *Ukrains'ka intelihentsiia i vlada: Zvedennia sekretnoho viddilu DPU USSR, 1927–1929 rr.* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2012); Klid and Motyl, *The Holodomor Reader*; Hrynevych, *Holod 1928–1929 rr. u Radians'kii Ukraini*; Bertelsen and Shkandrij, "The Secret Police."
159. Kostiuk, 1:566. Unfortunately, Butsenko survived the Gulag only to see a new wave of repression of Ukrainian intellectuals in the sixties, and to witness new secrecy that accompanied the KGB's arrests.