



European Integration and the Surge of the Populist Radical Right

Julia Schulte-Cloos

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

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European University Institute
Department of Political and Social Sciences

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Examining Board

Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute (Supervisor)
Professor Elias Dinas, European University Institute
Professor Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Professor Kai Arzheimer, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

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Abstract

Does European integration contribute to the rise of the radical right? This dissertation offers three empirical contributions that aid understanding the interplay between political integration within the European Union (EU) and the surge of the populist radical right across Europe. The first account studies the impact that the European Parliament (EP) elections have for the national fortune of the populist right. The findings of a country fixed-effects model leveraging variation in the European electoral cycle demonstrate that EP elections foster the domestic prospects of the radical right when national and EP elections are close in time. The second study demonstrates that the populist radical right cannot use the EP elections as a platform to socialise the most impressionable voters. The results of a regression discontinuity analysis highlight that the EP contest does not instil partisan ties to the political antagonists of the European idea. The third study shows that anti-European integration sentiments that existed prior to accession to the EU cast a long shadow in the present by contributing to the success of contemporary populist right actors. Relying on an original dataset entailing data on all EU accession referenda on the level of municipalities and exploiting variation within regions, the study demonstrates that those localities that were most hostile to the European project before even becoming part of the Union, today, vote in the largest numbers for the radical right. In synthesis, the dissertation approaches the relationship between two major current transformations of social reality: European integration and the surge of the radical right. The results highlight that contention around the issue of European integration provides a fertile ground for the populist radical right, helping to activate nationalistic and EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European public.

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Preface

At the core of this dissertation lies the interest to understand the interplay between two major current transformations of social reality – political integration within the European Union and the surge of the populist radical right across European member states. The dissertation is an attempt to unwrap the potential effects that the European project had for the surge of the radical right, while unintended in nature, yet potentially favourable for the rise of these antagonists of the European project. It is an attempt to understand to what extent the European idea has potentially fuelled those nationalistic sentiments that it aspired to leave behind as part of its dark past.

The years of writing this dissertation (2015 – 2019) were ones of political ruptures and uncertainty for many European countries. The final words of this dissertation are written only three months ahead of the ninth round of European Parliament (EP) elections. It is still unclear whether the United Kingdom, as part of the European Union at the time of the supranational elections, will convey these elections. Following the outcome of the British referendum in June 2016 and the decision to withdraw European Union membership, the future of the country's relationship with the EU is still uncertain. It is more certain, however, that populist radical right parties will perform outspokenly well in the upcoming EP elections within many of the European countries.

There is, of course, no lack of empirical and theoretical accounts on the surge of the radical right across Europe and even less so on the political integration of the European Union. This dissertation contributes to the vast body of existing studies by contending that the progressing level of European integration has offered populist

radical right actors a particularly fruitful opportunity to make their core demands publicly salient and to gain political visibility when mobilising citizens based on one of their principal causes: the protection of national identity in times of an ever greater ethnic plurality within European member states and in times of their ever growing exposure to cultural and economic globalisation. This works to accentuate their electoral prospects particularly at such moments in time in which European issues are salient in domestic discourse and works to magnify their electoral fortune among such parts of Europe that carry deeply entrenched EU-hostile sentiments.

Developing the conceptual framework of this dissertation, Chapter 1 draws attention to the antagonistic nature of political integration within the EU, designed to constrain aggressive nationalism across Europe, and the surge of the populist right, which, in contrast to the original objectives of European integration, has arguably largely benefitted from the supranational enterprise. I contend that the European project offers a multitude of opportunity structures for the populist radical right from an ideological, discursive and institutional perspective. As part of a broader set of culturally conservative and nationalistic demands, the issue of European integration belongs to the core ideology of the radical right. Carrying a highly technical, complex and abstract character, the issue of European integration further lends itself well for the discursive strategies of the populist radical right. In addition to these two aspects that offer chances for to radical right to successfully mobilise against further European integration, the EP direct elections by universal suffrage offer a favourable institutional opportunity structure. Chapter 2 argues that populist radical right actors gain momentum in EP elections and offers a comparative empirical account of the impact of the supranational elections for the national electoral fortune of challenger parties. Chapter 3 studies whether the EP elections, which by design augment the electoral prospects for the populist right, instil partisan bonds to those parties among impressionable voters. Chapter 4, finally, investigates the historical antecedents of EU hostility. It asks whether anti-integration sentiments that are independent from any disenchantment with the suprainstitutional structure, the technocratic character of policy-making, or the workings of European politics also function as a correlate of radical right success, acting as a reminder that we should not readily conclude that widespread popular resentment evident in radical right success testifies a failure of the European idea.

Understanding the interplay between these two major transformations of social reality across Europe, political integration within the EU and the surge of the populist radical right, is a pressing social concern in times when policy-makers and scholars alike are looking to grasp the roots of popular resentment, in times when political

commentators and journalists are trying to understand the long-run implications of the current crises for the European project, in times when citizens' commitment to a liberal democratic conception of European nation states appears to be fading. The questions addressed in this dissertation, therefore, may be of current concern and interest to an audience that extends beyond a small circle of social scientists. Just as wide an audience might be searching for answers to these questions, however, just as difficult, at times, it appears to even accurately describe, capture and document the variety and multilayeredness of political challenges that European societies are facing. Trying to provide answers to these questions, it appears, comes with an ever greater responsibility for caution and an ever greater responsibility to refrain from drawing conclusions too hastily when we cannot disentangle cause and effect, when counterfactuals reach beyond the limits of our imagination, or when social reality is too complex to be condensed into a linear function. Trying to provide answers to these questions, it appears to me, comes with an ever greater responsibility for methodological consciousness, a nuanced understanding of the shortcomings of a given methodological technique over another and a recognition and appreciation of the limits of gaining statistical and causal inference. Therefore, the three empirical chapters of this doctoral dissertation have carefully tried to rely on data, designs and methods that are adequate and appropriate in the study of the questions at stake. While the discussions of the choices of these designs and methods, at times, may appear overly lengthy or technical to the reader, they are a reflection of my consciousness of the aforementioned challenges and of my attempts to contribute to the study of these socially relevant questions within the given limits and boundaries of gaining inference in the field of social sciences.

This doctoral thesis should also be situated in a wider context of changing norms within the social sciences. It is written in times in which the social sciences are confronted with serious shortcomings of academic practice. These are not only rooted in academic misconduct and serious violations of research ethics. They are also rooted in an academic day-to-day research practice that does not rely on an infrastructure capable of reproducing the respective results. Acknowledging the importance of these debates from a computational, statistical and an ethical point of view, I have tried to contribute to the spreading of these norms by generating three reproducible empirical accounts and a reproducible dissertation written in R Bookdown (Xie 2018), relying on the R language and the related open source programming environment R (R Core Team et. al. 2019) for the statistical analyses and on R Markdown and the knitr package to integrate the statistical analyses into the actual reporting and presentation on the results.

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I would like to thank my supervisor, Hanspeter Kriesi, for his enormous level of confidence in every single of my research endeavours, many of which are not even part of this thesis, and above all for his sharp, precise, analytical and always inspiring criticism and feedback. There is no doubt that this dissertation has immensely gained from working under his supervision and I feel most honoured for having been one of his students. I found the discussions and conversations with him extremely valuable and I have truly enjoyed all of our stimulating and engaging exchanges that we had particularly over the last and final months of writing this dissertation. I would like to express my deep gratitude to him for having been such a fantastic supervisor over the last years.

I feel extremely privileged to have been surrounded by engaged, committed and creative people throughout the course of this project. While the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence has been my academic home throughout the PhD, this research project has tremendously benefitted from my academic research stay at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), where Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks have most warmly integrated me into the wonderful academic community of UNC. I am indebted to Liesbet Hooghe for her inspiring and immensely helpful feedback on an early draft of the second chapter of this dissertation, which was highly beneficial for strengthening my arguments. During my stay in North Carolina, I have greatly appreciated the chance to attend a class of Herbert Kitschelt at Duke University and I am indebted to him for his constructive feedback on my work.

This thesis has also substantially benefitted from an extremely fruitful research visit at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), which was made possible thanks to the generous support of Marc Debus. During my stay in Mannheim, I was fortunate enough to regularly engage with Hermann Schmitt and to receive extremely constructive feedback on the second chapter of this dissertation from Thomas König who shared very helpful insights with me from his perspective as American Political Science Review (APSR) editor. Sara Hobolt has hosted me at the London School of Economics (LSE) during my third year of the PhD, and I am indebted to her for the extremely valuable feedback on my work and for having introduced me to the diverse academic community at the European Institute at LSE. I would like to express my gratitude to the participants of the Political Behaviour Seminar Series at LSE where I had the chance to present parts of this dissertation.

I can hardly imagine any place more favourable to the completion of a PhD in the social sciences than the European University Institute in Florence, offering a forum

for ongoing intellectual exchange within the active, vibrant and diverse intellectual community of professors, researchers, Max Weber fellows, visiting fellows and internationally renowned scholars coming to participate in the numerous conferences and events organised at the EUI. In this regard, I owe a very special thanks to Elias Dinas, who was the first to excite me about the EUI at a time when I was fortunate enough to work under his supervision in Oxford. While my decision to apply to the EUI may be the most direct outcome of the influence that he had on me, there are countless other ways in which I have learnt from his work, his criticism and his ideas and all of them have undoubtedly contributed to the success of my projects, which is why I wish to express my profound gratitude to him.

Being exposed to the fantastic intellectual community at the EUI provides opportunities for many valuable exchanges and stimulates continuous cognitive engagement, which leaves me most glad and grateful for having had the chance to study in this environment at the EUI and for all the thought-provoking conversations and discussions that have decisively shaped my studies. In this spirit, I would like to express my particular gratitude to Paul C. Bauer, Mark Franklin, Theresa Gessler, Sophia Hunger, Swen Hutter, Giorgio Malet, Florian Stöckel and Vicente Valentim as much as to all of the various participants of the Political Behaviour Colloquium and of the Quantitative Methods Working Group and to the fabulous team around Hanspeter Kriesi's European Research Council funded project 'Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis' (POLCON). For comments, exchanges and discussions related to the various parts of this dissertation, I am also indebted to Tarik Abou-Chadi, Argyrios Altiparmakis, Veronica Anghel, David Attewell, Fernando Casal Bértoa, Abel Bojar, Endre Borbáth, Björn Bremer, Reto Bürgisser, Alexander Coppock, Alejandro Ecker, Cees van der Eijk, Catherine de Vries, Martin Gross, Florian Foos, Simona Guerra, Louise Hoon, Bjørn Høyland, Sebastian Koehler, Corinna Kröber, Brigid Laffan, Wilhelm Lehmann, Arndt Leininger, Julian Limberg, Jasmine Lorenzini, Francesco Nicoli, Fred Paxton, Stefanie Reher, Line Rennwald, Tobias Rüttenauer, Gerald Schneider, Lukas Stoetzer, Cyrille Thiebaut, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Guillem Vidal, Till Weber and Jonathan Zeitlin and I wish to thank all of them for their valuable ideas. I wish to thank also Maureen Lechleitner for being most helpful and most supportive when I was struggling with any administrative questions, I have appreciated her support tremendously over the past years at the EUI.

The writing of the dissertation was only possible thanks to countless exchanges, conversations and discussions, academic and non-academic nature alike. I could have certainly not accomplished this project without the unconditional support of my parents, family and friends – despite my notoriously nomadic lifestyle. Without the

countless stimulating encounters and numerous friendships made throughout this notoriously nomadic journey – be it in Oxford, Chapel Hill, Mannheim, London, Pristina, Istanbul, the Badia Fiesolana or in my Florentine everyday life in Rifredi, I am most confident this project would have not been nearly as vibrant, engaging, and rewarding.

CHAPTER 1

A Paradox of European Integration?

"Why has the European concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus? I believe that over the years the European public has lost a guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it. We must first of all restore this common vision if we wish to have European Union. The European idea is partly a victim of its own successes."

(Tindemans 1975, p. 3)

Europe was built on the grounds of the fundamental promise to secure peace among its citizens. The European project was an attempt to bring to an end the bloody and traumatic conflicts that had divided its citizens. European integration was a moral imperative understood to prevent the resurgence of nationalistic sentiments within the nation states, a moral imperative understood to hold sway over those forces that had given urgent rise to supranational cooperation, a moral imperative understood to tame and constrain the aggressive nature of nationalism. As the founders of the European community laid out most prominently in the preamble of the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European integration was an ambition to create a 'common destiny' among the people of Europe.

Conceptions of a common destiny and a common European future may have long lost their narrative power in legitimising integration efforts as sorrowfully noted by

a visionary European enthusiasts as early as in 1975 – at a time when the European Union (EU) was only to become political reality for most countries across Europe.¹ Conceptions of a common destiny and a common European future, however, have never been so profoundly shaken up in their entirety as they are shaken up today, they have never been called into question with such irrevocable consequences for the European idea as they are called into question today, they have never been reinterpreted so drastically to be a threat more than a prospect for European citizens as they are reinterpreted today by nascent political actors who are determined to put a forceful end to the European project.

Across all parts of Europe, populist radical right actors have gained electoral grounds.² Not too rarely, their electoral success seems to have its origins in the European elections, which appears paradoxical in view of the original objectives of European integration. Put in the spotlight of public attention, these EU opponents attack the commitment to widen and deepen political, economic and social integration, calling long-standing established norms regarding a shared European future into question and challenging those principles that used to define the European spirit. While European integration had always been contentious in the struggles of a continuously widening and deepening following the crafting of the Rome treaties and the absence of a popular European spirit has a long history (Sternberg 2013; Commission 1973), it appears that the scope of current contestation has reached an unprecedented level (de Vries 2018, p.35). Until recently, disputes used to revolve rather around the ‘how’ of further integration. European delegates used to quarrel over the power distribution among the supranational institutions. Critics used to call in question the pace of the enlargement and expansion of the European Union. National executives used to fight about the need for European political symbolism. This is the case no longer. Disputes, it appears, have reached perilous grounds for the European idea. What used to be unconceivable until recently has become part of social reality, or even normality, in many member states and in every single one of the six EU foundation members: political actors campaign on the grounds of ‘whether’ to advance European integration. The decision of British citizens to leave the Union has further stoked fears that the Union has started to disintegrate (e.g. Jones 2018; Rosamond 2016). The prevailing norms governing the playing field on how to debate the future of Europe seem to have been lastingly affected: the ‘whether’ is no longer a political taboo. Disenchantment with the workings of European politics seems to have fuelled ‘exclusive nationalism’ (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2015) across the member states, even more so at a time when the supranational project cannot maintain to deliver the previous positive levels of economic growth (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Polyakova and Fligstein 2016).

Over the course of the European financial crisis and the following influx of large numbers of asylum seekers, the issue of European integration became only more heavily contested, exposing the technocratic character of its institutions, laying bare the varieties of democratic decision-making deficits and lending the bureaucrats' appeals to a common European identity in the view of some citizens an elitist, utopian character, thereby ultimately exacerbating the confrontational lines between those who are ready to appreciate the cultural and economic benefits resulting from political integration and those who lack the capabilities to do so.

In parallel to the saliency of issues related to European integration rose also the support for those party actors who most vehemently call for a return to the nation state as to regain authoritative power over key policy decisions. It appears that the European project has nurtured its own backlash, having acted as a catalyst for exactly those radical sentiments that it aimed to overcome: nationalism is back in vogue. The most serious threat to the future of the European project, today, seems to lie within the Union, which truly appears like a paradox. Did the supranational project fuel the ascendancy of those anti-integrationist and nationalistic political forces which the European idea exactly aspired to leave behind as part of its dark past? Did the populist radical right gain from the character of the supranational elections and the discursive opportunities created by the technocratic nature of decision-making in Brussels? Did the rapidly progressing integration and the efforts to socially engineer Europe³ propagate feelings of a loss of national identity among citizens?

The present dissertation offers an empirical account tackling these questions from complementary angles: Chapter 2 studies the particular impact of the supranational elections, the possibly most ambitious institutional project created by European political elites that has sparked the potentially greatest disenchantment regarding its real-world performance and has repeatedly facilitated the fortune of the populist right in these elections. The analysis shows that the supranational contest offers populist radical right actors an opportunity to make their core demands publicly salient and to gain national visibility when articulating their demands against further integration. Chapter 3 shows that the reasons for the success of this mobilisation strategy, however, lie not in the fact that the elections lastingly socialise voters into radical right partisans. Evidently, the supranational contest *per se* does not instil lasting partisan bonds to anti-European forces. Echoing the argument that the mobilisation of the radical right is successful rather because of an increased public salience of culturally conservative demands, chapter 4 shows that initial hostility towards the EU, which predates membership, strongly predicts current populist radical right success. It investigates whether pre-existing hostility towards the EU, which is independent from a potential

disenchantment with the suprainstitutional structure, the technocratic character of policy-making, or the elitist nature of decision-making in Brussels, also works as a correlate of radical right success. To understand whether such hostility towards the EU likewise relates to the contemporary success of radical right actors is critical as it helps to delineate the limits of responsibility that can possibly be attributed to the EU for having nurtured the ascendancy of the greatest antagonists of the European idea. In synthesising the main empirical findings, chapter 5 contends that political integration within the European Union and the surge of the radical right across Europe are to be understood as correlates of larger, structural processes of societal transformation unfolding across Europe that carry a globalising or de-nationalising character. These structural processes work to heighten the salience of culturally conservative policy demands like the populist radical right's antagonism towards European integration. The inevitably increasing saliency and concreteness of questions of European integration coupled with the considerable complexity and abstractness of European politics has arguably provided an extremely fertile ground for the populist radical right, helping to activate and exacerbate nationalistic, anti-integrationist and EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European public.

Before moving to the empirical studies of this dissertation, in the following, I offer a comprehensive framework to understand the impact of political integration within the European Union for the rise of the radical right. I first discuss that the issue of European integration and opposition towards the EU overlap with other substantive demands of the radical right related to culturally conservative policies. These policy demands have become an important dimension of party competition across Europe thanks to long-term processes of structural transformations of political conflict. I further contend that the complex and abstract character of technocratic multi-level governance in the EU offers a favourable discursive opportunity structure that aligns with the rhetorical, anti-elitist style of the radical right.

I then move to engage with a third beneficial opportunity created by European integration, which will play a central role in the empirical designs of chapter 2 and 3: the institution of EP direct elections. I situate this particular institution along with its peculiar characteristics within both the history of European integration and the scholarly engagement with this political institution, which is critical as to grasp the nature of this political institution that, by construction, offers very favourable conditions for the success of the radical right. I contend that due to the simultaneous organisation of the EP elections across member states this institution is particularly well suited to study the effects it entails for domestic party competition and voting behaviour, which has not yet been appreciated by most existing accounts that have rather been

concerned with understanding the character of the European contest more than its resulting consequences.

Culturally conservative mobilisation and discursive opportunities

To comprehend the potential impact of political integration within the EU for the rise of the radical right, it is first critical to understand that anti-European stances form a coherent set of culturally conservative policy demands together with other nationalistic and anti-immigration proposals. Therefore, anti-European stances serve the substantive demands that populist radical right actors advance as part of their ideological and programmatic proposals.

Over the last decades, accelerating processes of economic, political and cultural globalisation have contributed to the opening-up of national boundaries, which has affected citizens' lives and living conditions across Europe in different ways. Some citizens feel they benefit from this opening-up of national boundaries and generally appreciate the opportunities that international integration and globalisation creates for them. Other citizens, in contrast, feel they lose from this opening-up of national boundaries and perceive of the changes generated by international integration and globalisation more as a risk to them personally and their environment more generally (Kriesi et al. 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2018). This conflict has mostly been emphasised and mobilised by non-mainstream political actors and has contributed to the emergence of populist radical right challenger parties, who incite public and political discourse about the extent to which national borders should be permeated by flows of capital, goods or people from foreign countries (Zürn and de Wilde 2016; Kriesi and Hutter 2019; Mudde 2016). Arguing that such capital, good and migration flows present a threat to the national identity, the national culture and the national traditions of their respective state, they advocate a return to national authoritative power over key decisions in these matters. A number of scholars argue that these discourses and political debates tend to occur along a 'new', cultural dimension of political conflict that is distinct from the traditional left-right dimension of politics. This new cleavage has been called the 'integration-demarcation' (Kriesi et al. 2008), 'GAL-TAN' (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), or 'universalism-communitarianism' cleavage (Bornschieer 2010) and cuts across left-right ideological loyalties. The issue of European integration is to be situated as one of the political issues that pertains to the new cleavage (e.g. Inglehart and Reif 1991). Issues of supranational integration are de-

bated in close connection to other issues pertaining to cultural or identitarian politics, like the issue of immigration, the ‘twin issue’ of European integration (Hoeglinger 2016; van der Brug and van Spanje 2009).

In addition to aligning well with their principal substantive demands for culturally conservative and identitarian policies from an ideological point of view, questions of European integration, secondly, also lend themselves well for the discursive strategies and the rhetorical style of the populist radical right in carrying a very technical, complex and abstract character. Owing to the nature of technocratic policies implemented on the European level, to the complex decision-making structure in the multi-level framework of governance and to the elitist character of European bureaucracy in Brussels remote from the everyday lives of citizens, the supranational project is an ideal target for the discourse advanced by the populist radical right. It is sufficiently abstract, sufficiently unpoliticised by most mainstream parties and sufficiently encompassing with respect to the range of policy fields concerned as to offer a multitude of chances for broad political mobilisation against the EU.

European policy-making has a history of creating perceptions of abstract remoteness among citizens. In the early phases of European integration, the often complex decisions taken at the European level did also hardly touch upon citizens’ everyday lives in a visible, perceptible way (Wallace and Smith 1995). This has changed at least in the wake of the debates about the introduction of a common European currency (Risse 2003). The multi-level governance in the EU, however, has largely maintained its technocratic character (Caramani 2017) and policy-making often leads to procedural agreement among the EU members, which is conflicting with the style of policy-making envisioned by the populist right (Bornschieer 2010, p. 29). The recent experience of the financial crisis across Europe has only entrenched this perception of elitist, technocratic EU decision-making and the level of technical complexity related to these multi-level decision-making processes has further grown (Offe 2015; Schimmelfennig 2018; Henning 2017).

This offers a favourable opportunity for the discourse of populist radical right actors who appeal to voters by emphasising an anti-elitist political style of decision-making that aims to relocate control in the hands of citizens and in the realm of the nation state. The increasing saliency and concreteness of questions of European integration in the everyday reality of citizens coupled with the considerable complexity of decision-making in Brussels provides a beneficial discursive opportunity for populist radical right actors to portray themselves as anti-elitist, tangible political alternative that lies within the direct reach of citizens. The encompassing range of different policy fields concerned by decisions taken on the European level further renders the issue

of European integration sufficiently flexible to fit a broad mobilisation strategy based on opposition towards the EU.

The institution of European Parliament elections by universal suffrage

A third particularly promising opportunity structure for the populist radical right lies in the institution of European direct elections: not only are pro- and anti-European stances salient in these elections, by its nature and construction, the institution also offers an easily accessible and permeable arena for populist radical right actors. As to understand this specific nature of the institution and the reasons why the European elections work to increase the electoral prospects of the populist radical right across Europe, in the following, I briefly situate the European direct elections by universal suffrage in the history of integration attempts on the one side and in the scholarly engagement with this institution on the other side.

The idea of introducing direct European Parliament (EP) elections by universal suffrage had already been part of the Treaties of Rome, but would only much later become political reality among the nine member states at that time. The early debates about the institution of European Parliament elections revolved around the central assumption that a direct legitimisation of the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) would spark greater power of the assembly vis-à-vis the other European institutional bodies. The majority of members of the Commission concerned with the 'Draft Convention for the Introduction of European Direct Elections by Universal Suffrage' largely endorsed the idea. The institution of direct elections seemed to constitute the missing puzzle as to complete the creation of a supranational political regime. Adding this missing piece of the puzzle to the broader picture of European integration, so the proponents believed, would inevitably set in motion an effortless, enduring and continuously evolving progress of further integration, working to 'impart a strong impetus to the spiritual integration of Europe' (Committee on Political Affairs 1960), designed to prevail throughout the future of the European continent.

Their visionary ideas about the direct elected governing body, however, would only materialise much later in the political reality of the supranational institutional structure owing to the initial passivity of the European Council in responding to the Draft proposal (Lodge 1973, p. 63). Consequentially, the so-called 'Parliamentary Assembly' would remain an indirectly elected body, composed of national delegates that held a national political mandate, for more than fifteen years after the early debates.

Only in 1979, the first European direct elections were conveyed across the then nine member states.⁴ Since these first direct elections in 1979, the timing of the direct elections is set to be the same across all member states with a stable electoral cycle of five years.⁵ To date, there have been no deviations from this electoral cycle and every single EU member state has participated in every round of the EP elections. In particular thanks to this fixed electoral cycle, the supranational institution carries a somewhat exogenous character with respect to national party competition, that makes it particularly well suited to study the effects of European political integration for the potential surge of the radical right, a point which will be important in chapter 2.

Since the onset of this supranational political ‘experiment’, the EP elections have received large amounts of scholarly attention, set in motion by the seminal piece published by Reif and Schmitt (1980), only a year after the first supranational electoral contest. Drawing on theoretical ideas proposed by a less well-known German scholar Reiner Dinkel and his take on the relationship between electoral outcomes in the German multi-level system conditional on the timing of the respective elections (Dinkel 1977), Reif and Schmitt (1980) showed that the EP elections fell short in achieving the same popular participation levels and that the election outcomes differed markedly from the election outcomes observed in the previous national elections of member states (Reif and Schmitt 1980, p. 6). They concluded that the EP elections should be understood as secondary to the national elections, offering both voters and parties an electoral playing field that is governed by markedly different rules and norms, creating an incentive structure that prompts markedly different voting behaviours and campaign efforts.

The fact that national issues dominate the European campaigns may not seem too surprising in absence of a transnational party system. To the extent that the same national political actors contest the EP elections who also contest the respective domestic contests, it can be expected that these actors campaign on the respective European issues, at best, with respect to their national agenda more than with respect to a trans- or supranational agenda. Traveling back in time, the dominance of national campaigns and national issues over European ones appears even less surprising: before the arrival of the digital era, citizens and media across Europe were also linguistically, spatially and technically less interconnected as they are today (Fligstein 2008) and, as a consequence, more occupied with the respective national issues (Downey and Koenig 2006; Semetko et al. 2000; Schlesinger 1999). National media continue to remain the dominant information channel transmitting European issues and issue agendas to the different European publics, thereby contributing to the so-called ‘media deficit’ of the European project (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2011).

Reacting to the seminal account of Reif and Schmitt (1980), however, much of the literature has subsequently been occupied with arguing that European campaigns are not only and not always dominated by national issues and are instead to different degrees also ‘about Europe’, evident in ‘EU issue voting’ behaviour among citizens (Weber 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). The scholarly debate about the national vs. European character of the EP elections was clearly facilitated by broad data availability paving the way for related academic controversies. Electoral data related to the EP elections is *per definitionem* comparative in nature and survey items related to voting behaviour in the EP elections could conveniently be compared across a range of countries. The (possibly misleading) theoretical distinction between the European or national nature of the EP campaigns and related voting behaviours, however, has arguably contributed to the fact that scholars have almost exclusively been concerned to study the EP elections and related political variables as outcome variables and have tended to overlook their *consequences*. A similar observation can be made regarding their potential nurturing consequences for the surge of the populist radical right across member states. In light of the evidently antagonistic nature of those parties’ positions on European integration, scholars have mostly dedicated their attention to the respective parties’ behaviour in the supranational governing body and their rather unsuccessful attempts to form pan-European party groups (Almeida 2010; Veen 1997; Pollmann, Fennema, et al. 1998). This dissertation, instead, aims to understand whether the EP elections and political integration in the EU, more generally, have consequences for shaping domestic party competition and possibly fuelling the success of the radical right.

Political integration in the EU and the surge of the populist radical right

I have argued that Europe was built on the premise to constrain aggressive nationalism and to prevent the resurgence of nationalistic forces. With the growing saliency of European integration in domestic politics and with growing levels of political contention around central questions related to the widening and deepening of European integration, however, rose the success of those political forces that the European idea aspired to overcome. As part of a broader set of culturally conservative and nationalistic demands, the issue of European integration belongs to the substantive core ideology of the radical right. Moreover, carrying a highly technical, complex and abstract character, questions of European integration further lend themselves well for the discursive strategies advanced by the populist radical right. In addition to these

two aspects that offer a variety of chances for the radical right to successfully mobilise against further European integration, the EP direct elections by universal suffrage offer a favourable institutional opportunity structure. To understand whether these beneficial opportunities related to European integration have nurtured the rise of the radical right across Europe, this dissertation offers three empirical accounts, which I introduce in the following.

In chapter 2, which has been published in *European Union Politics* (Schulte-Cloos 2018), I ask whether the EP elections have worked to foster the surge of challenger parties, broadly understood as non-mainstream parties, i.e. populist radical right, Green and populist radical left parties. Condensing and integrating the various theoretical arguments advanced within the literature on the ‘second-order’ or ‘truly European’ character of the EP elections, I arrive at the notion that all of these challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP elections for three reasons. First, they enjoy advantages in EP elections because voters apply a different voting rationale in these elections. As the elections do not lead to government formation, voters are more likely to ‘vote with their heart’. Thus, citizens may be inclined to cast a vote that most closely matches their policy preferences, disregarding any strategic calculations on whether their chosen party will make it into government. Given that there is so little at stake in the elections, they may also take the elections as an opportunity to punish the mainstream parties and express their disapproval of the domestic government performance. Second, challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP elections because the issue of European integration is more salient in the EP elections than in national elections. As mainstream parties tend to be more pro-European than the average voter is, those challenger parties who oppose further integration enjoy systematic advantages over their mainstream competitors. The European direct elections offer an arena to register discontent with the EU and to attract votes from those citizens who share this discontent. Finally, the electoral system applied in the EP elections further helps to augment the chances for challenger parties in European member states. Since 1995, all member states have to apply a system of proportional representation in the supranational elections, rendering the electoral formula more permissive than, for instance, the first-past-the-post system applied in the United Kingdom.

Based on these arguments, chapter 2 asks for the resulting consequences for challenger parties in national elections. It shows that the institution of EP elections has helped to foster populist right parties’ success on the national level by increasing their visibility and offering an opportunity structure for domestic politicisation of Europe. Leveraging the exogenous timing of the EP elections along with the variation in national electoral cycles since 1979, I show that the event of the European elections

augments populist right actors' domestic electoral prospects, which is not the case for either Green parties or populist radical left actors. The comparison with Green and populist radical left actors can be instructive as the populist radical right is the only challenger actor that benefits from all three different opportunities related to European integration. Political integration within the EU offers fruitful opportunity structures for radical right actors to articulate their nationalistic demands that belong to their core ideology, to criticise the technocratic and complex EU policy-making that feeds into their central anti-elitist discourse and to capitalise from the institutional set-up of European direct elections. The results demonstrate that these opportunities at the European level help the populist radical right to succeed in national elections. This is particularly the case when the national election and the European elections fall close in time. The temporal proximity to the European contest boosts the electoral prospects of those party actors who mobilise most fiercely against European integration, suggesting that populist radical right actors benefit from an increased visibility of their opposition to the supranational project. This visibility is enhanced whenever a national election takes place in temporal proximity to a European contest. Pointing to this unintended consequence of the direct elections that has received little attention before, the chapter makes an innovative and original contribution to our understanding of the implications of the supranational elections.

Chapter 3, which has been published in the *Journal of European Public Policy* (Schulte-Cloos 2019), sets out to understand another effect that the EP elections may have in lastingly affecting socio-political reality within the member states. It studies the effect that the EP elections have for the political socialisation of first-time voters. Just like chapter 2, it departs from the notion that the electoral context of the EP elections is structurally different from national elections: the elections do not result in government formation and campaign and mobilisation efforts are less pronounced than in national elections, decreasing the incentives for individuals to participate. Strong incentives to participate in a given election are, however, particularly important to mobilise first-time voters as they lack previous voting experience or voting habits. A large body of literature shows that individuals' first electoral participation is relevant in setting in motion a life-long political engagement (Abramson et al. 1998; Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004). Considering that the characteristic voting logic of EP elections favours non-strategic voting for challenger parties and considering that the European campaign offers political actors an opportunity to mobilise against further integration, moreover, first-time voters may develop lasting partisan bonds to such challenger parties (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017). This could contribute to fuel anti-European sentiments among the European youth. Chapter 3

therefore investigates whether the EP elections and the structurally different electoral context of these elections inculcate a lasting political disaffection or instil partisan ties to anti-European challenger parties among young voters.

The study uses an innovative quasi-experimental research design that uses a cross-national survey dataset to compare two very similar groups of young voters coming from six different European countries. These young voters differ from each other only with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections. The fact that some of the voters happen to turn eligible just before election day and some others happen to reach legal voting age slightly later creates a natural discontinuity among the adolescents. Half of them had the chance to participate on election day and cast their first ever vote in the EP elections, while the other half of them did not. Based on the precise measure of their birth dates, the identification strategy of this chapter exploits the exogenous variation in first-time eligibility for the EP election. This measure of their birth dates is available as part of a cross-national youth survey that also entails questions on the political interest and partisan preferences of young respondents. The findings of the study demonstrate that there are no adverse effects of the European elections in generating partisan ties to anti-European parties. Instead, political participation in the supranational contest results in a greater level of political interest among young individuals, an effect that is substantive in its size. In addition, the estimated effect appears to be long-lasting and can be detected among respondents in the dataset more than five years after the time of their first enfranchisement in the EP elections. The results of this study speak to a broad literature: the low-key EP elections can be understood as a conservative test of the hypothesis that the act of voting affects young individuals' political interest. Many studies have convincingly shown that individual turnout carries a habitual character (Coppock and Green 2016). Citizens that are incentivised to participate in a given election, for instance, in a 'Get Out the Vote' campaign, tend to vote in larger numbers even in consecutive elections, suggesting that the act of voting affects certain political attitudes that are conducive to voting. In providing cross-national and causal evidence showing that participation in the EP elections results in a greater political interest among first-time voters, the findings of the third chapter of this dissertation, thus, offer a mechanism that may account for the well-documented character of the persistence of political participation. The study also shows that the elections do not entail socialisation effects with respect to partisan identification with challenger parties. This finding is not only important in highlighting that such a potential socialisation mechanism cannot account for the fact that the EP elections work to foster the domestic success of populist radical right actors as shown in the second chapter of the dissertation. It is also important

in stressing that voting in the EP elections does not in itself create EU-hostile political preferences, which in the long-run could work to undermine the prospects of further European integration.

If not a process of socialisation through participation in the European elections is responsible for instilling partisan ties to anti-European forces, what are, then, the roots of anti-European attitudes among European citizens? Chapter 4 contributes to understanding the nature and origins of anti-integration sentiments by showing that initial hostility towards the supranational project strongly predicts current radical right success. Relying on a novel and original dataset entailing municipality-level data of all historical EU accession referenda linked to data on current populist right success within the same geographical units, I show that mass support for anti-European forces is rooted in a historical rejection of EU membership. By exploiting the within-regional variation of support for accession, the results demonstrate that those localities that initially opposed accession to the European Union most strongly, today, show significantly higher levels of radical right success than such localities that were favourable towards the European idea. In predating the actual exposure to membership, substantive opposition towards integration appears to carry a persistent character that works to exacerbate preferences for national demarcation. The results of the fourth chapter of this dissertation contribute to a nascent literature on the persistence of political attitudes within local communities.

In synthesising the empirical findings of the three empirical studies, chapter 5 concludes that political integration within the European Union and the surge of the radical right across Europe should be understood as elements of larger, structural transformations of European societies, which are sustained and promoted by processes of globalisation. In approaching the complex interplay of two major aspects of a changing social reality across Europe, European integration and the surge of the radical right, the dissertation helps to unwrap the potential effects that the European project had in offering a favourable opportunity structure for mobilisation against integration.

Notes

1. After the Paris summit in December 1974, the European Council asked Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans to specify what was meant by the term 'European Union', which gave him the occasion to develop a vision on Europe in a report transmitted to the Council in December 1975.

2. I use the terms populist radical right and radical right interchangeably throughout this chapter. For the respective parties included in the empirical analyses see the Appendices A, B and C.

3. The European Council adopted, for instance, a 'Declaration on European Identity' as early as in 1973 (Commission 1973) and the first round of the Eurobarometer series, understood to calibrate the success of instilling such a potential European identity, would be run a year later in 1974. It had been an early objective of Europhile and cosmopolitan political elites to create a 'citizen's Europe' (Tindemans 1975).

4. The institution of direct elections within the framework of a politically integrated Europe had already been enshrined in the Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (Article 21), stating that a European 'Assembly shall consist of delegates who shall be designated by the respective Parliaments once a year from among their members, or who shall be elected by direct universal suffrage.'

5. It is worth to emphasise that the initial debates about the EP elections included the policy option of using different electoral cycles, a scenario that was discussed along with the proposal to let member states decide individually whether their European delegates should hold a direct democratic mandate or maintain their indirect mandate. Critics argued that such a non-uniform procedure would 'not be conducive to the creation of European parties and would not mobilize public opinion at a European level' (Vedel Report 1972).

CHAPTER 2

Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger Parties' Success on the National Level?

Only eight months after having narrowly missed the five percent threshold in the German Federal Election in 2013, the populist right 'Alternative für Deutschland' (AfD) gained more than seven percent of the German votes in the European Parliament (EP) elections. Immediately after this success, nation-wide opinion polls reported a surge in public support to eight percentage points, indicating that the party would pass the national threshold if elections were to take place. Meanwhile, the 'Sverigedemokraterna' (SD) doubled their result in the Swedish 'Riksdag' election four months after their unexpected success in the 2014 EP elections. Born only a couple of months prior to the EP elections 2014, also the Spanish 'Podemos' movement drew crucial momentum from the broad media coverage related to their European success, helping the young party to become the third largest party in the Spanish general election a year later.

According to the second-order elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), challenger parties are likely to be successful in European elections. While the EP election is *supra*-national in nature, the related campaigns still take place on the national level, and national parties run for office in the European contests. Within each country, the party system, media, and electorate are virtually identical in the domestic and European arena. Offering structural advantages to challenger parties, the institution of EP

elections may have unanticipated consequences for national party competition (van der Brug and de Vreese 2016). Although the literature has established that second-order elections facilitate the success of challenger parties (Hix and Marsh 2007), it is not fully understood how their success in the second-order arena relates to their national performance (Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014). Despite low levels of voter turnout, the very institutional existence of the EP elections offers challenger actors a forum to promote their policy-demands and to attract national attention.

This article argues that challenger parties gain momentum in EP elections. Building on the second-order elections theory, it posits that the EP elections foster challenger parties' success on the national level. I test this proposition by exploiting the variation in national electoral cycles and the quasi-exogenous timing of EP elections since 1979. The results show that particularly populist radical right parties draw crucial momentum from the supranational contest. Their national gains are greatest when the European and the national election are close in time. By changing the focus from the European to the *national* arena, the chapter contributes to an emerging research agenda on the national implications of EP elections (van der Brug and de Vreese 2016; Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017; Markowski 2016; Franklin and Hobolt 2011). The study disentangles the spillover effect from alternative explanations and sheds light on the underlying mechanisms of the spillover, establishing that: (a) the impact of EP elections on the national fortune of the radical right does not only stem from congruent voter preferences across governance levels; and that (b) the mere event of the EP contest benefits radical right actors when the national election is close in time. The EP elections offer an opportunity structure for the populist right to make their antagonism towards further integration domestically salient, potentially imperilling the European project.

In times of growing nationalism and the rise of populism across Europe, it is important to understand the implications that EP elections have for challenger parties' national success. Shedding light on the mechanisms that augment the domestic prospects of challengers, this chapter contributes to uncover the unintended, disintegrative consequences of the European direct elections.

Electoral success for challenger parties in EP elections

Existing research shows that challenger parties have higher chances for electoral success in EP elections than in national elections because of: (a) the secondary character of the EP elections; (b) their stances on Europe in their policy proposals; and (c) the

permissiveness of the electoral system in the European arena.

First, according to the seminal second-order elections theory, challenger parties have better prospects to succeed in EP elections since the elected representatives in the European arena do not decide about government formation and no immediate policy-implications accrue out of the EP result. This renders the EP elections secondary to the national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; van der Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh 1996), which bears implications for citizens' voting rationale. Voters use the supranational elections instrumentally to express dissatisfaction with their national governments (Hix and Marsh 2007). Moreover, voters are likely to defect from their national party choice due to the lack of parties' mobilisation efforts during European campaigns (Weber 2007). Second, the EP elections are favourable to challenger parties as some voters engage in EU-issue voting. Those voters, in turn, are inclined to support a challenger in the EP elections since mainstream parties are commonly more pro-European than their average supporters are (Hobolt, Spoon, et al. 2009; Irwin 1995; Reif and Schmitt 1997). Many radical parties have a particularly strong anti-European position (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), contributing to the politicisation of Europe (Grande and Hutter 2016; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Considering that they are not internally split on European stances as many mainstream parties are, they systematically perform better in EP elections (Ferrara 2004). With voters being less supportive of European integration than mainstream political elites are, radical parties representing anti-European attitudes and making European issues salient enjoy an advantage (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; van Egmond 2007). Third, EP elections augment challengers' prospects based on the proportional electoral system applied. While some of the member states use a majoritarian electoral system nationally, as of 1999, all European representatives are elected proportionally. Thus, challenger parties enjoy also 'mechanical' advantages in European elections as opposed to some national contests (Oppenhuis et al. 1996).

In sum, the distinct subordinated character and the salience of European policies prompt a different voting rationale among voters who turn out in European elections.¹ Many of these voters express their dissatisfaction with their national governments or align their vote closely with their policy preference (being European, domestic, or Eurosceptic in nature). For both reasons, challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP elections, which may be further amplified by the permissive electoral system in EP elections. In the following, I contend that the benefits for challenger parties in the European arena also boost their domestic prospects. European electoral successes may heighten a challenger party's visibility in the domestic arena – in particular, if the temporal proximity between both elections increases the domestic salience of European

integration.

Domestic momentum and the effect of electoral timing

I argue that challenger parties gain momentum (Holbrook 1996, p. 130; Mutz 1997) through successful performance in EP elections. Virtually the same *national* parties and major *national* actors contest both elections (van der Eijk and van der Brug 2007, p. 7), even if the results in the respective elections are determined by a different voting rationale. Therefore, competing parties and media may consider a challenger party's success in the EP arena an indicator for its likely next national performance. Success of a challenger party in the second-order arena leads to increased national media attention, a heightened domestic visibility of the party, and greater attention levels by party elites (Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 302). This reaction of media and competitors is particularly pronounced if the supranational performance has domestic significance in potentially polarising national party competition (Vasilopoulou 2017).

A strong EP performance coupled with an increased visibility of the party may heighten the chances that individuals vote for the party in the next national election. Research on United States (US) primary elections shows that information on mass support for a certain candidate does not only impact strategical vote considerations (Zech 1975), but even evokes attitudinal change among some voters (Mutz 1997). Confronted with information on high support levels for a certain candidate, so-called 'consensus cues', individuals re-evaluate the candidate based on this information. They rehearse their political views in light of the arguments that they deem explanatory for the high mass support levels. Importantly, this process involves priming of the perceived others' political views and cognitive engagement with arguments that 'would not otherwise have come to mind' (Mutz 1997, p. 105). After successfully competing in the EP elections, a challenger party and its policy positions are primed in the minds of voters.

Yet, the proposed effects presume that the EP election is cognitively available to voters and national party actors. European politics, however, tend to take place in the shadow of national politics (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016). Only when the temporal distance between both elections is short, European issues enjoy some prominence in national elections. Analysing the impact of exogenous events on EU news coverage across seven EU members, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, et al. (2010) find that media coverage increases strongest during the EP elections and the following installa-

tion of a new EU commission. Rauh (2015) points towards greater levels of domestic politicisation of EU affairs in parliamentary debates around the period of national and European elections. The character of the EP election as exogenous event prompts partisan competition and draws domestic actors' attention to this issue, resulting in a potential contention around the issue. Media and party elites are more attentive to the supranational contest when the two elections are close in time (Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 301; Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014), which should increase the momentum that challenger parties draw from their European success. Temporal proximity between the two elections encourages evaluations and political judgements of challenger parties based on the information pertaining to this European campaign. This should increase the chance that individuals base their vote decision on the 'consensus cues' taken from the supranational campaign. Importantly, voters gain such cues and may accordingly rehearse their domestic vote choice irrespective of their actual participation in the EP elections, which is important in light of the low turnout levels at those secondary contests.

Consequently, I posit that the momentum effects of success in the EP arena are greatest when the two elections are close in time. Domestic campaigns that coincide with the event of EP elections are more permissive to the issue of European integration and authority transfer to the supranational level. I expect that the potential for spillover of electoral success depends on the domestic attention levels towards the European performance of a challenger party and on the general salience of European integration during a national campaign. Both the former and the latter are greatest when the temporal distance between both elections is small.

H1: The higher the vote share of a challenger party in the EP elections, the greater the increase in national electoral gains.

H2: The closer in time national and EP election take place, the stronger the effect of the vote share in the EP election on the increase in national electoral gains.

Design and data

If EP elections foster the success of challenger parties, a strong EP electoral result should be associated with an increase in the national performance, in particular if the two elections are close in time. To test this, I create a dataset including the national election results of European member states² since the first EP election on 10 June 1979,

the respective European election results, the dates of both elections, and the temporal distance between them (Döring and Manow 2016; European Election Database 2016).

Electoral results and the European cycle

The analysis considers the national performance of all challenger parties in European member states starting from 1979. Challenger parties are broadly defined as non-mainstream parties, i.e. Green, radical left and populist radical right party actors (e.g. Hernández and Kriesi 2016). The classification follows expert surveys (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006; Bakker et al. 2015). Given different degrees of party (system) institutionalisation across the European member states and corresponding different lengths of party survival, the main analysis considers the respective party family within each national election of a country as the unit of observation (see for a similar approach Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 291). Table 2.1 indicates the robustness of the respective results to using the individual parties within each election as the unit of analysis. The position of a national election within a European electoral cycle is the difference in days between the national and the European election divided by the overall length of the European legislation period. EP elections are held every five years, which means that the denominator is approximately equal to 1825 days. As discussed above, European issues are most salient in national campaigns that coincide with an EP campaign. Hence, I expect the effect of EP performance on subsequent national gains to be moderated by the temporal proximity of the two elections.

$$Cycle = \frac{NE_t - EP_t}{EP_{t+1} - EP_t} \quad (2.1)$$

where NE_t is the national election date, EP_t the date of the preceding EP election, and EP_{t+1} the date of the next EP election.

There are some factors that facilitate challenger parties' success, which vary across the 27 European member states in the analysis, particularly the degree of party system institutionalisation or authoritarian legacies (Kriesi 2016). This kind of heterogeneity between countries may systematically relate to challenger parties' success on both the European level and the national level and bias the point estimates. Country-fixed effects hold observed and unobserved variance between countries constant if this variance is stable over time. We assume that authoritarian legacies and the institutionalisation of a party system are time-constant after conditioning on decade dummies. All country-specific covariates that do not vary within decades and might both influence the vote share of a challenger party in the national and in the European

context are controlled for by cluster ‘de-meaning’ the data in the fixed-effects model. The model estimates the national performance of challenger parties as a function of the interaction between the EP electoral result, the cycle variable, and the respective constitutive terms. The interaction coefficient can thus be interpreted as the impact of the EP performance moderated by the position of the cycle variable. The model equation can be formalised as follows:

$$\ddot{y}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ddot{x}_{is} + \beta_2 \ddot{c}_{it} + \beta_3 (\ddot{x}_{is} * \ddot{c}_{it}) + \beta_k \ddot{z}_{it} + \ddot{u}_{it} \quad (2.2)$$

for $i = 1 \dots 27$ EU member states; $t = 1 \dots n$ national elections in EU member state i , and $s = 1 \dots 8$ EP elections preceding the national elections; where $\ddot{y} = y_{it} - \bar{y}_i$ (correspondingly for x, c, z, u); y = vote share of respective party in national election, x = vote share in EP election, c = position of the national election within a European electoral cycle (see equation 2.1), z = vector of control variables. Unit of analysis is the country-election level, regression estimation per party family (variance of the residuals varies across party families).

The vector of control variables includes time-variant covariates that may systematically relate to the performance of challenger parties at both levels of governance. The analysis accounts for the permissiveness of the electoral system by including the logarithm of the average district magnitude in each country’s national elections (Johnson and Wallack 2010) and the logarithm of the average district magnitude in the EP elections. While the national electoral thresholds have not changed within EU member states,³ the model takes the country-specific EP electoral threshold into account, which in some countries is not time-constant. The literature shows that the extent of ‘second-orderness’ of a European election varies depending on whether or not the EP election was a ‘midterm’ election and on the experience that countries have with EP contests, i.e. the number of EP elections a country has participated in (Hix and Marsh 2011, p. 6; Marsh 1998, p. 597). The character of the EP elections and the legislative power of the EP itself have changed since the introduction of the EP elections in 1979. To account for these changes and for other time-specific unobserved heterogeneity within the observation period, I introduce four decade dummy variables. Yet, they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the models. To confront the fact that some of the challengers might themselves get punished in the EP elections if they were in government before, an indicator variable measures whether the parties were part of the national executive at the time of the respective EP election. The variable, however, remains insignificant throughout all models (see Table 2.1). The results are robust to excluding all challenger populist left, Green and populist right actors that have been in government (see Table A.6). Finally, the model

Table 2.1. Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle

	Populist Radical Left Linear	Green Parties Linear	Populist Radical Right Quadratic
EP Vote	0.636*** (0.078)	0.377*** (0.081)	0.905*** (0.133)
Cycle	2.360* (1.223)	1.840** (0.809)	0.767 (4.798)
Cycle ²			2.106 (5.070)
EP Vote * Cycle	-0.412*** (0.130)	-0.209** (0.100)	-2.302*** (0.659)
EP Vote * Cycle ²			2.295*** (0.739)
Government at EP election	2.432 (2.503)	0.535 (0.831)	2.469 (1.664)
Midterm EP	0.655 (0.597)	-0.799** (0.365)	1.278* (0.726)
Unemployment	0.407*** (0.088)	0.009 (0.051)	0.272*** (0.091)
EP Elections Participated	1.254** (0.487)	0.456 (0.295)	0.405 (0.533)
EP Threshold	3.003*** (0.520)	-0.314 (0.324)	-0.600 (0.557)
National District Magnitude	-0.284 (0.933)	0.079 (0.569)	0.775 (1.066)
European District Magnitude	1.036 (0.791)	0.468 (0.484)	-0.050 (0.850)
p-value Wald test (LIE)	0.789	0.430	0.001
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term			
Cluster Robust SE	✓	x	✓
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE	✓	x	✓
Jackknife Parties	✓	x	✓
Party Fixed-Effects	✓	x	✓
BIC	901.136	730.484	936.139
N	174	174	174

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size. Jackknife reruns analysis while omitting one party each regression. Party-fixed effects uses party-specific dummies instead of country dummies.

controls for the state of the economy (unemployment rate) that might contribute to a high number of protest or anti-government votes in EP and national elections (International Monetary Fund 2016).

The analysis consists of 174 national elections of EU member states. EP elections take place every five years, while most European member states hold elections every four years. Every fourth observation in the data (24.71%) refers to the same EP election result as the previous country-specific observation. Yet, while the EP vote share is equivalent for these cases, the cycle values are necessarily different from each other. This introduces greater variation among these observations and renders the central interaction term of interest independent from the previous observations. The cycle variable is very equally distributed (L-Kurtosis: 0.0116), facilitating the interpretation of the conditional marginal effects.⁴ The analysis of the central interaction term proceeds as follows. As suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016), I first test whether the moderating effect of the cycle variable follows the linear interaction effect (LIE) assumption, which is relevant to assess hypothesis *H2*, positing that the marginal effect of the EP vote share is conditional on the temporal proximity between both elections. The functional form of the conditioning effect of the cycle variable does not necessarily need to be linear. To test the LIE assumption, I visualise the conditional marginal effects within four equally spaced intervals of the cycle variable using the mean conditional marginal effect of the EP vote share in each interval. To obtain these estimates, the proposed binning estimator by Hainmueller et al. (2016) jointly fits the central interaction to all four individual intervals, while allowing the marginal effects to freely vary within each interval. A simple Wald test statistic reports whether the linear interaction model and the binning model are statistically equivalent. Based on the results of the Wald test, I present the respective country fixed-effects regression results with the corresponding polynomial specification of the cycle variable. Appendix A includes semi-parametric kernel smoothed estimates to allow for a fully flexible functional form of the marginal effect of the EP vote share with respect to the position in the electoral cycle. Those semi-parametric estimates further support the respective lower and higher-order polynomial specifications reported in the main analysis.⁵ The marginal effect plots show a histogram at the bottom of the figure to help readers assess whether the estimates are supported by data of the moderating cycle variable.




Figure 2.1. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties)

Results

For Green parties, we find a linear interaction effect. The p-value of 0.43 indicates that the flexible binning estimates are statistically equivalent to a simple linear interaction model (see column 2 in Table 2.1). The conditional marginal effect size is substantively speaking rather small (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2). A one-percentage point increase in the European arena improves a Green party's national result only by a maximum of 0.37 percentage points when the national election follows very shortly after an EP election. Yet, the interaction term of the European result and the temporal distance to the EP election is not robust to using bootstrapped or cluster robust standard errors. It also turns insignificant when using party-fixed effects and when jackknifing parties. This indicates that the European result does not serve as a domestic 'marker' for these party actors. Scholars have argued that voters are more likely to defect from their national vote in the supranational elections by switching to Green parties if they prefer the environmental issue to be instituted at the EP level (Carrubba and Timpone 2005, p. 273; Gabel 2000). For the same underlying reasons, they might not be inclined to cast a congruent vote at the next national election even if they just had supported a Green party at the previous EP election. The result suggests that the (transnational) policy agenda of Green party actors mitigates a spillover. While Green parties' policy platform may lend itself well for a ballot on the European level, supranational success of these actors contributes only little to their domestic significance. The results show that the performance of Green parties in the European arena does not encourage band-




Figure 2.2. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties)

wagon effects in the next domestic electoral contest. On the one hand, this might be because of their environmental policy-agenda, which voters perceive to be located in the supranational arena as argued in the previous literature. On the other hand, Green parties' European success may also not attract enormous national attention because of their mostly non-radical policy stances.

For radical right party actors, in contrast, we find considerable empirical support for a non-linear conditional marginal effect of the EP election result on national gains. The binning estimates indicate that the cycle does not monotonically moderate this marginal effect, but rather follows the u-shape of a second-order polynomial (see Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Relying on the Wald test, we reject the null that a naïve linear interaction model and the binning estimates are statistically equivalent (p-value: 0.001).

As opposed to Green parties, the effect size of the electoral spillover is also substantively large. During national campaigns that are close in time to an EP election, a strong second-order result provides the populist radical right with domestic advantages. Whenever the distance to an EP election is less than a year, those party actors substantially benefit from a one-percentage point increase in their European fortune by nationally gaining close to the equivalent (around 0.8 percentage points). Yet, if the temporal distance to an EP election is large and a national election falls in the middle of a European electoral cycle, a populist radical right party retrieves only small marginal gains out of its European success (around 0.3 percentage points, comparable to the size of the spillover for Green parties).⁶




Figure 2.3. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)

The temporal variation in the spillover effect suggests that the salience of European issues in domestic campaigns brings to the fore a ‘highly symbolic issue that fits [radical right parties’] traditionalist-communitarian ideology’ (Bornschieer 2010, p. 63). When the EP contest comes close in time to a national election, the radical right can successfully mobilise their opposition against the European project in the domestic arena. For the populist radical right, the empirical results give support to hypotheses *H1* and *H2*. The closer the temporal distance between a first-order and a European second-order election, the higher the chances that a strong EP result of these party competitors leaves an imprint on their national fortunes.

For the radical left, these hypotheses are, in contrast, only partially corroborated (see Figure 2.5 and 2.6 and column 1 in Table 2.1). The Wald test of the binning estimate (p-value: 0.789) indicates that the moderating effect of the cycle variable follows a linear pattern. The decreasing effect size over time shows that a strong EP result provides radical left actors with a one-time, quickly evaporating increase in national visibility rather than with a heightened salience of their policy issues even in proximity to the next second-order election. While the radical left is positionally distinctive on the traditional left-right political dimension related to redistributive issues, their positions on the cross-cutting national demarcation vs. European integration dimension are less clear-cut. Thus, success in EP elections might make some radical left actors more visible in the short run, but it may not be likely to change the salience of their core issues in the domestic arena.

The latter finding is only valid for populist radical right party actors and is robust




Figure 2.4. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)

to: (a) the exclusion of single parties from the analysis (jackknife procedure);⁷ and (b) to the estimation of party-fixed effects instead of country-fixed effects to account for unobserved organisational differences between parties that might determine both their EP electoral success and subsequent national gains. The results are also not sensitive to (c) bootstrapping the standard errors to confront a possible overconfidence due to the small cluster size within the sample.⁸ The findings are (d) robust to other correlates of populist radical right success frequently discussed in the literature, which might impact these actors' success on both governance levels, namely the influx of asylum seekers, the turnout rate in a given election, or potential party-strategic advantages for radical right parties determined by the left-right position of the largest conservative mainstream competitor. Finally, the results remain unchanged if those elections that follow a first national election within the same EP electoral cycle and those elections that are held concurrently with an EP election (cycle = 0) are excluded from the analysis. The various robustness tests are reported in Appendix A. Among the vector of controls, in contrast, most of the variables do not significantly affect challenger parties' electoral fortune across different model specifications. While some of the measures do have a significant effect in the main model reported in Table 2.1, they fail to reach statistical significance when pair-clustering standard errors and estimating the various alternative model specifications, like party-fixed effects (see Table A.6). The only variable that stands out among the vector of controls is the unemployment rate that contributes to an increase in populist radical right success on the national level, confirming previous research on the macro-correlates of populist right success




Figure 2.5. Binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)

across Europe (e.g. Arzheimer 2009). For the populist radical left, in turn, high unemployment does not feed into electoral success robustly across models.

In the following, I investigate the underlying mechanism driving the spillover effect for the populist right by: (a) showing that the spillover does not stem from similar levels of support for the populist right across the European and the national arena; and by (b) showing that the salience of European integration in domestic campaigns drives the spillover.

Congruence of voters' party preferences across arenas?

To identify a spillover effect of EP electoral success, I propose a placebo-test assessing whether both national and EP results are affected by the same unobserved factors rather than by European success feeding into national success. To the extent that election results measure voters' party preferences and a party's current popularity, the closer to (or further apart from) each other two elections take place, the greater (lower) the association between the results to be expected. The voluminous empirical evidence from the second-order literature suggests that different voting calculi apply to both kinds of elections, which is supported by parties' different results at concurrent national and European elections. Yet, if we still assume that voters' party preferences are partially congruent across the national and supranational arena, an alternative explanation for the cyclical spillover effect is given by potential similar popularity levels of populist radical right parties in the EP and national elections.⁹ If




Figure 2.6. Marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)

this were the case, however, we should find the same cyclical pattern when predicting the success of radical right parties in the *European* election (dependent variable) conditional on the interaction between temporal distance to the last *national* election and the respective electoral result.

However, the placebo-test does not give any support to a similar cyclical spillover effect. The binning estimate first suggests a linear functional form of a national spillover to the European area (p-value of the LIE assumption: 0.428). Second, the interaction term between the position of the European election in the national election and the national vote share is insignificant (and marginally positive). The full results of this placebo-test are reported in the Table A.4 and Figures A.4 and A.5.

Supposing that the spillover from the second-order arena to the domestic one were only driven by a high congruence of voters' preferences across governance levels, we should, however find the same *decreasing* strength of association the greater the temporal distance between both elections. Yet, the placebo-test shows a different pattern. This indicates that the institution of the EP elections and the salience of European integration in itself fosters the spillover of populist radical right success rather than a high correlation between voters' preferences spanning the different governance levels.

EP elections as quasi-exogenous event

It is worth to exploit the quasi-exogenous nature of the EP contest as a political event. To date, any given member state has consistently participated in the EP elections, rendering the existence of this political institution and its timing largely exogenous to party actors' strategic short-term influence. Hence, a conservative test to assess whether the institution of the EP elections in itself prompts the salience of populist radical right parties' issues and fosters their visibility in the national arena, is given when we reassess the mere impact of the EP elections as an event, not considering a party's actual performance therein.

When re-estimating the model and only including the continuous cycle variable as predictor of a challenger party's national success instead of the interaction term, the quadratic cycle variable maintains its statistical significance for the radical right (see Table 2.2).¹⁰ The coefficient indicates the same u-curved relationship between temporal proximity of the two elections and marginal gains in the national vote shares of populist radical right parties. Exploiting the quasi-exogeneity of the temporal proximity to the EP contest, we find that the *event* of the EP election in itself augments the electoral prospects for populist radical right parties. This is not the case for populist radical left and Green parties whose national performance is not significantly affected by a temporal proximity to the European contest. Previous research shows that individuals feel particularly negative about the EU in the year of an EP election (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016). Hence, when the European campaigns coincide with the national electoral campaigns, the salience of Europe in domestic politics accentuates radical right actors' electoral gains. It appears that such domestic contests are particularly favourable to increase the radical right's mobilisation on anti-EU stances and 'pulling voters' who might not have supported them on the basis of their left-right concerns (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, p. 47). The European contest seems to offer party actors who represent both the anti-European and authoritarian-nationalistic attitudes of many voters a permeable forum to politicise these issues domestically. The pace of further deepening and widening of the EU has not always been accompanied by an increase of citizens' level of support for further integration. On the contrary, citizens' Eurosceptic attitudes have increased over the years (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Whenever the European and the national campaigns coincide, issues relating to further European integration make their way into the domestic arena. This affects party competition and creates opportunities for such challengers who favour demarcation as opposed to further integration, namely actors from the populist right-wing end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007).

Table 2.2. Fixed-effects regression results of EP electoral cycle on national vote share

	Populist Radical Left Linear	Green Parties Linear	Populist Radical Right Quadratic
Cycle	0.831 (1.052)	-0.021 (0.720)	-11.591** (5.477)
Cycle ²			15.095** (5.811)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term			
Cluster Robust SE	✓	✓	✓
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size.

Conclusions

Recently, scholars contended that the European direct elections are not working as elections ‘are supposed to perform’. They are second-rate in failing to achieve their supposed objectives – to provide direct policy consequences (Franklin 2017). This different character of the European contest leaves the Union merely with the intended consequence of decreasing its ‘democratic deficit’. Following the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980), there is a voluminous literature on the character of the supranational contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved therein. Yet, ‘in reality, we find influences running in both directions’ (van der Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh 1996), and the secondary elections themselves impact *domestic* party systems. This analysis highlights that a ‘vote against Europe’, particularly once made visible in European elections, may decisively shape domestic elections. The supranational contest offers populist radical right actors an opportunity structure to mobilise voters based on their antagonism towards the elite-consensus on European integration. By shifting the focus to the national arena, this chapter first shows that the direct second-order elections have important national consequences. While anecdotal evidence holds that the EP elections provided parties like AfD, Front Nationale or the Sweden Democrats with the first favourable opportunity for gaining momentum and translating their success into national power, the present analysis offers a systematic analysis of such spillover effects across all European member states and national elec-

tions since 1979. Second, the study disentangles the mechanisms behind these electoral spillover effects, corroborating the idea that populist radical right parties draw crucial momentum from EP success. If national and European elections are close in time, the salience of European integration boosts the domestic electoral prospects of radical right parties.

Future research is necessary to explore the potential variation in the European spillover effects across different party systems. Mainstream parties' responses to European success of a populist right challenger, the policy-influence of those actors within a country, and country-specific variation in the evolution of saliency of European integration might crucially mediate the cyclical spillover effect. This might put in motion or prevent further spillover effects from the national to the European arena. Future research should also address the underlying micro-level mechanisms. Individual-level panel data across European countries could help to assess whether individuals who turn out for a challenger party in the EP elections are also more likely to cast a similar 'habitual' ballot in the following national contest. If this were the case, the EP elections would contribute to individual partisan re- or dealignment, working as a 'virtual pump' that may pull impressionable voters from mainstream parties (Franklin 2017). Dinas and Riera (2018) show that individuals who first became eligible for a European election are more likely to support a small party than individuals who became eligible for a national election, arguing that the act of voting socialises individuals into such voting patterns (Dinas and Riera 2018). In light of the comparatively low turnout levels in EP elections, such habitual voting may only partially account for the electoral spillover of populist radical right success. The experimental evidence from the bandwagon literature and the empirical results in this chapter support the idea that also individuals who did not participate in the European contest are encouraged to cast a ballot for a populist radical right party after its success in the supranational arena, based on the consensus cues they take from mass support levels in the supranational arena. This hypothesis should be empirically addressed by future research.

The salience of European integration seems decisive in explaining the populist right spillover effects to the domestic arena. This salience is augmented when the national election occurs in close temporal proximity to the EP contest. Neither Green nor populist radical left actors are able to similarly capitalise on European success. While populist radical right parties do play a part in politicising Europe, they are also among the most hostile actors towards further European integration. In view of their opposition to an integrative Europe, it seems rather ironic that the supranational contest fosters the ascendancy of just these opponents of the European idea.

Notes

1. The different turnout levels in European and national elections, however, seem to relate mostly to the timing of the EP elections on the structural level and to patterns of habitual voting on the individual level (Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991; Franklin, van der Eijk, et al. 1996). Thus, the difference in participation levels in the EP and the national contest does not evoke systematic benefits for challenger parties in EP elections.

2. The sample includes 27 country-clusters since Croatia does not have sufficient observations to perform the within-estimation, i.e. two national elections each following an EP election.

3. One exception is a single election in France (1986); the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the national electoral threshold as a covariate.

4. The low value of the L-Kurtosis indicates that the distribution and the shape of the cycle variable is not characterised by strong outliers, safeguarding against extrapolation of the marginal effects based on little supporting data (Hosking 1990).

5. The semi-parametric estimates result from a series of locally linear regressions using kernel re-weighting based on the distance between each value of the cycle and each evaluation point.

6. This small improvement differs statistically significantly (on the 95% level) from an electoral spillover in a national election being held up until half a year after a European election and (on the 90% level) from an electoral spillover in a national election being held half a year ahead of a European election.

7. The results are also robust towards the inclusion of contested cases, like the Dutch List Pim Fortyn, the United Kingdom Independence Party, and the True Finns.

8. The p-values are estimated using pairs cluster bootstrapped t-statistics for fixed effects panel linear models, see Esarey and Menger (2016) for a detailed discussion.

9. Based on the previous findings for the radical left and the Greens, this alternative explanation would imply that: (a) voters' party preferences generally have a higher congruence for the radical right across governance levels than for the two other actors; and that (b) that those preferences are less stable across time. I remain agnostic about the likelihood of those assumptions and strengthen the argument for a 'momentum effect' by rejecting the potential alternative explanation.

10. The respective linear or quadratic cycle specifications, which did not find empirical support based on the binning estimates are omitted from the table. When considered, they all yield insignificant results.

CHAPTER 3

The Effect of European Parliament Elections on Political Socialisation

While the founders of the European Parliament (EP) elections aspired to actively engage citizens in building Europe (Committee on Political Affairs 1960), even 40 years after their introduction, the elections invigorate little interest among the public and turnout rates tend to be low. Recently, scholars have argued that the second-order EP elections do not only fall short of achieving their original objectives, but, to make matters worse, do even have adverse effects on individuals' future political engagement. These concerns regard particularly young and impressionable voters who have not yet been socialised into voting habits. In contrast to most of the US literature that assumes a genuinely positive and habit-forming effect from past-voting experience on future political participation, even induced in low-salience elections, these scholars caution against the unanticipated impact of the European elections. They fear that the EP contest contributes to a decline in attitudes that are conducive to voting, possibly depressing their interest to participate even in other elections (Franklin and Hobolt 2011). In addition, scholars suspect that the elections might increase first-time voters' attachments to challenger parties. The characteristic voting logic of EP elections favours non-strategic voting for challenger parties and the campaign offers political actors an opportunity to mobilise against further integration, which tends to benefit populist right challengers (Schulte-Cloos 2018). Guided by this second-order election

logic, first-time voters may develop lasting partisan bonds to such challenger parties (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017), which could contribute to fuel anti-European sentiments.

This study examines the effect of EP elections on political socialisation. Relying on a quasi-experimental approach, namely a regression discontinuity design (RDD), I identify the effect that first-time eligibility for the EP elections has for political attitudes and behaviour. To do so, I exploit the exogenous variation in first-time eligibility among respondents of a cross-national youth study (EUYOUPART) fielded in 2004. The design compares two groups of adolescents that are indistinguishable from each other but differ with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections. The fact that some of the adolescents happened to turn eligible just before election day and some others happened to reach voting age slightly later creates a natural discontinuity among the young respondents: half had the chance to participate on election day and cast their first ever vote in the European Parliament elections, while the other half did not. This identification strategy effectively isolates the electoral socialisation effect since the comparison group consists of individuals who were ineligible at the time of the EP election. Relying on the discontinuity generated through respondents' eligibility, the study is able to causally identify the effect of EP elections for (a) young individuals' interest in politics, and (b) their partisan attachment to challenger parties.

The results show that voting in the EP elections has a positive effect on attitudes that are conducive to voting. Instead of becoming politically disaffected after having participated in the supranational contest, young individuals receive positive feedback from voting and express a stronger interest in politics in general and European politics in particular. This indicates that even in the second-order EP elections, voting has a positive impact on political engagement among first-time voters, a finding consistent with classical accounts on 'participatory democracy' and research into habitual voting in the US. The positive effect of the European contest on first-time voters' political interest is substantive in magnitude and can still be detected more than five years afterwards. The results show no evidence, in contrast, that first-time eligibility and participation in the European elections strengthen young voters' partisan bonds to anti-European challenger parties. These findings bear crucial relevance since individuals are most receptive towards political socialisation stimuli during early adulthood. Individuals' level of political interest has been found to be remarkably stable once formed during early adulthood (Prior 2010). In view of the previously suspected inertial or disintegrative effect of the EP elections on young voters' future political behaviour, the results of this study appear encouraging for those who expect that participation in EP elections may promote positive engagement with the EU.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I integrate the arguments from the second-order elections theory with the literature on political socialisation and action-induced attitude formation, deriving a set of theoretical expectations to be tested. I then move to discuss the difficulties in isolating the causal effect of participation in EP elections among young voters and introduce the quasi-experimental design of this study that overcomes those problems. Subsequently, I present the empirical findings demonstrating that the supranational contest has integrative potential in fostering the political interest of first-time voters. This effect is long-lasting and persists for more than five years. Placebo tests and various robustness tests corroborate the results. The final section concludes.

First-time eligibility and electoral participation in second-order EP elections

The electoral context of the EP elections is structurally different from national elections as (1) there is no resulting government formation, and (2) the campaign and mobilisation efforts are minimal. Both of these factors work to decrease the incentives for individuals to participate. Strong incentives to participate in a given election are particularly important to mobilise first-time voters as they lack previous voting experience or voting habits. As the first electoral participation is important in setting in motion a life-long political engagement (Abramson et al. 1998; Plutzer 2002; Franklin 2004), the structurally different electoral context of the EP elections may inculcate a lasting political disaffection among young voters.

In his seminal piece on political apathy, Rosenberg (1954) argues that in the absence of ‘spurs to action’ individuals are more likely to become politically disengaged and uninterested. The political consequences resulting from the EP elections are less obvious to voters than in domestic elections as the EP elections do not result in government formation nor in immediate consequences for policy (Franklin 2017, p. 246; Reif and Schmitt 1980). In addition, European campaign and mobilisation efforts by parties tend to be lower than in the national contests (Weber 2007, p. 480; de Vreese, Banducci, et al. 2006), decreasing the competitiveness of the elections and respective stimuli to participate (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, p. 249).

The presence or absence of the stimuli generated by a given electoral context affect the newly enfranchised group of young voters most strongly (Franklin 2004, p. 80; Kogan et al. 2018). As adolescents lack an ‘experiential base’ of repeated political behaviours, their political attitudes and orientations are particularly suscep-

tible to influence (Jennings 1990, p. 315). Young individuals who experience their first voting during EP elections, which were characterised by low competitiveness, a low-salience campaign and few mobilisation efforts, may not receive ‘positive feedback’ (Plutzer 2002, p. 43) from electoral participation. Given that their first electoral experience pertains to a modestly competitive election marked by lacklustre party mobilisation efforts, it may be less likely that they engage with the electoral contest or develop a sense of being a political citizen in forming attitudes that are conducive to voting even in future elections. Thus, first-time eligibility and voting in the European elections may leave newly enfranchised adolescents disillusioned with the workings of politics. Given that the first electoral experience is crucial in instilling a ritual, life-long political engagement, the nature of the EP elections might politically disengage adolescents and depress their interest in politics in the long-term.

H1 Adverse effects: First-time eligibility and first-time voting in the European Parliament elections depresses individuals’ interest in politics.

Theories of ‘participatory democracy’ (Pateman 1970; Finkel 1985; Thompson 1970), in contrast, suggest that the EP elections may have a *positive* effect on individuals’ political interest even if the European contest holds a low-salience character. When coming of age and receiving the opportunity to cast a vote for the first time, young individuals are encouraged to vote due to their eligibility for the election. Having reached voting age, they are more likely to engage with parties’ statements, their election campaigns, or exchange political views with adults (Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass 2016, p. 153). Given that the socio-psychological reward of voting is particularly high during first time enfranchisement, adolescents try to follow the campaign more closely and acquire relevant information in anticipation of the imminent first chance to ever cast a vote (Grill and Boomgaarden 2018; Konzelmann et al. 2012; Bhatti and Hansen 2012; Shineman 2018). Thus, being incentivised to vote for the first time in their lives should raise young voters’ interest in and receptiveness to the relevant European political issues at stake.

Feeling encouraged to participate due to first-time eligibility, some of the adolescents decide to take on their newly acquired civic right even if the elections do not result in the formation of a European government. Once they have participated in the EP elections, these young voters may become even more curious about politics in an attempt to align their attitudes with their decision to cast a vote. Socio-psychological research shows that individuals adjust their attitudes after choosing between two alternatives, i.e. to vote or to abstain (Festinger 1957; Brehm 1956). After having

chosen one of the two alternatives, individuals increase their preference for the selected option. This socio-psychological mechanism may account for the fact that many citizens either vote or abstain in a rather consistent manner throughout their lives and mobilisation efforts ('Get Out the Vote' campaigns) have long-term effects in generating voting habits. Coppock and Green (2016, p. 1046) show that such habit effects are particularly strong in low-salience elections where there is the greatest need to reduce a potential dissonance between previous behaviour (turnout despite the low salience of the election) and attitudes. Thus, those young individuals who participated in the EP elections are likely to justify their turnout by changing relevant cognitions towards politics. In an attempt to support their choice to vote in the supranational contest despite of its second-order character, they might rationalise their participatory effort by developing a 'taste' for politics. As to avoid any potential cognitive discomfort arising out of their decision, they may develop a particular interest in politics in general and European politics in particular.

H2 Participatory effects: First-time eligibility and voting in the European Parliament elections increases individuals' interest in politics.

Related to these socio-psychological arguments of action-induced attitude formation, *vote choice* may also impact individuals' ties to parties as the act of voting itself reinforces pre-existing partisan preferences. Taking on a classical argument by Converse (1969), studies convincingly show that voting for a certain candidate brings about a cognitive change towards better valuing the differences between available candidates (Mullainathan and Washington 2009) and towards feeling closer to the chosen candidate (Meredith 2009; Dinas 2014; Beasley and Joslyn 2001). Thus, after committing to a certain candidate over an alternative one on election day, individuals engage in cognitively supporting this commitment by increasing their preference for the chosen option. Dinas and Riera (2018) argue that the same may hold for vote choice in multi-party systems as in the EP elections. In light of the structurally different nature of the EP elections discussed before and as shown in numerous studies documenting their 'second-order character' (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin 2009; Schmitt 2005), challenger parties have better prospects of success in the supranational contest than in other elections. Given that the EP contest holds a low saliency and does not lead to government formation, individuals who participate are inclined to support a challenger party that corresponds closely to their policy-preferences (Hix and Marsh 2007) or mobilises their latent Euroscepticism (van Egmond 2007). In particular, young voters who have not yet developed stable

partisan ties because they lack previous electoral experience, should be most inclined to be guided by these second-order incentive structures of the EP elections and, accordingly, support a challenger party in the EP elections. In line with action-based models of preference formation, the act of voting for a party should subsequently intensify adolescents' bonds to the party in question. Given the second-order character of the European elections, on average, such a process of habitual preference formation should work to strengthen their partisan ties to challenger parties.

H3 Challenger ties: First-time electoral participation in the European Parliament elections increases individuals' proximity to challenger parties.

In summary, regarding the effect of the EP elections on adolescents' interest in politics, I propose two competing hypotheses, namely the 'adverse effect hypothesis' (H1) and the 'participatory effects hypothesis' (H2). Concerning an impact on young individuals' partisan preferences, I formulate the 'challenger ties hypothesis' (H3).

Identifying the causal effect of EP elections for political socialisation

Previous empirical studies that argue EP elections may have adverse effects in depressing future turnout among young voters (Franklin and Hobolt 2011, p. 75), or in strengthening their partisan ties to challenger parties (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin 2017) have greatly advanced our theoretical understanding of the potential impact of EP elections on the electoral behaviour of young voters. However, there are two limitations of existing empirical designs, which I briefly discuss before moving on to present the identification strategy proposed in this chapter.

First, existing work relies on a noisy measure of the treatment variable, i.e. individuals' first eligibility for EP elections by relying on their year of birth. As those studies need to exclude all individuals who came of age in the respective year of the EP elections, the age difference between young voters in treatment and control group increases substantially. This magnifies chances that the exclusion restriction is violated and adolescents' age difference relates to the outcome variables through a mechanism other than being eligible for the EP elections (e.g. Angrist and Keueger 1991, p. 1004). Second, this data is censored and includes only respondents that were at least 18 years old and eligible to vote in the EP elections. Thus, the designs include only treated individuals and no control units that have not been eligible in the EP elections. The

control group in these studies consists of young adolescents that already came of age in an earlier national election and have also experienced the treatment of the EP elections. Considering the persistence of voting habits as discussed before, this ‘control’ group has furthermore received another treatment (being eligible to vote in a national contest). This conflates the effects of (a) first-time eligibility for the European ‘little at stake’ elections, and (b) political socialisation due to earlier eligibility.¹

To estimate the causal effect of the EP elections on political interest and first-time voters’ closeness to challenger parties, an ideal experiment would randomly assign whether or not young voters are eligible and/or cast a vote in the EP elections. While I cannot resort to this ideal experiment, the exogenous date of the EP elections and the exogenous variation in young voters’ eligibility offers a quasi-experimental approach that comes close to this ideal experiment. To identify the causal effect of first-time eligibility in EP elections on political socialisation among young voters, I first compare those individuals who are newly enfranchised to those individuals who come of age a few months after the EP elections and are not experiencing the secondary European elections as enfranchised voter. If the EP elections have any effects in politically (dis-)engaging young individuals, the first-time enfranchisement for the second-order EP elections should, on average, impact young individuals’ political interest.² This effect is independent of whether adolescents vote in the second-order contest, which is key as it has been argued that the low saliency of the elections, i.e. the nature of the EP elections itself, might contribute to depress political engagement among young voters (Franklin and Hobolt 2011). I further identify the effect of actual electoral participation in the EP elections on political interest and young individuals’ partisan attachments to challenger parties. To do so, I consider participation in the EP elections among eligible individuals as a one-sided non-compliance with the treatment and estimate the so-called ‘complier average treatment effect’ (CACE) using instrumental variable regression.³ By using the precise age of young voters as an instrument for voting in the EP elections, I construct the unobserved potential turnout among the control group, i.e. ineligible individuals.⁴

Data and validity of the identification strategy

The study relies on a cross-national dataset (‘EUYOUPART’) containing information regarding party preferences, political interest and participation of adolescents surveyed in 2004 (Ogris et al. 2008). While being quite dated, this dataset has several important advantages that make it well suited for studying the socialising effect of

the EP elections within the framework of a causal design. First, it overcomes the problem of data truncation at the age of 18 as it includes individuals between 15 and 25 years; thus, it includes ineligible individuals who did not yet receive other socialisation stimuli from earlier enfranchisement. Second, the dataset entails the birth month of respondents, allowing us to exploit the variation in first-time EP eligibility among otherwise similar respondents so as to study the causal effects of the EP elections for political socialisation among impressionable first-time voters. Third, the dataset includes countries from the major three politically different regions within Europe, i.e. Southern Europe, Northwestern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe (Kriesi 2016). These countries are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.⁵ Finally, individuals were interviewed six months after the European elections (in December 2004). The results presented here can therefore be understood as *lasting* socialisation effects that are different from potential priming effects stemming from a recent exposure to the European election campaigns. The major shortcoming of the dataset is that it dates from 2004. While the institutional design of the EP elections has slightly changed since then, most notably with the introduction of the *Spitzenkandidaten* (lead candidates) in the EP elections campaign 2014, scholars have documented that this new institutional feature has largely remained unnoticed by voters (Schmitt, Hobolt, et al. 2015, p. 357). Another concern relates to changes in the party landscape, most notably with the establishment of relevant challenger actors in two of the countries included in the study, namely the Five Star Movement in Italy and the Alternative for Germany in Germany. While other currently relevant populist right challenger parties within the countries included in this study, like the French National Front, the Italian Lega, the Finnish True Finns, and the United Kingdom Independence Party and other currently relevant radical left actors, like the French Communist Party, the German Left Party, the Finnish Democratic Left Alliance, or the Italian Communist Refoundation Party and the various Green party actors already contested the EP elections in 2004, we should keep the potential constraints to external validity in mind when interpreting the socialising effects of the EP elections on the attachments to the challenger parties that are included in the EUYOUNG dataset. For a full list of those challenger parties see Table B.2 in Appendix B.

When regarding the discontinuity in eligibility for the EP elections a clean and quasi-random design, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that individuals are not able to manipulate their treatment status.⁶ Considering that individuals do not have control over the precise month in which they turn 18, this first assumption seems reasonable. Second, we assume that their treatment status does not selectively affect the likelihood of responding to the survey, i.e. the study should not be affected

by differential attrition. The monthly distribution of young respondents who either receive the treatment or control condition does not vary from the monthly distribution of respondents in the respective non-EP years of the study (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). This makes it reasonable to expect that the treatment status does not selectively affect individuals' likelihood of responding to the survey.

Adolescents in the treatment and control group are highly similar to each other with respect to key socio-demographic variables and such variables that the literature has identified to predict turnout among young voters, like parental status transmission or political reproduction (Bhatti and Hansen 2012; Gidengil et al. 2016). The balance statistics show that the mean differences on respondents' gender, education level, standard of living, rural origin, religiousness, civic engagement in school, parents' political interest and parents' higher education are not statistically different from a distribution resulting from random permutation of the treatment variable within country strata (see Table B.4 in Appendix B). Individuals in the treatment group are, however, slightly less likely to live with their parents than individuals in the control group. This should make it less likely to detect a potential treatment effect on the political interest of young voters as previous research has argued that young adults tend to be exposed to political discussions more frequently when living at home with their parents (Bhatti and Hansen 2012, p. 386; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012).⁷ Further, the parents of treated adolescents vote somewhat less frequently than parents in the control group. As the treatment assignment is independent of potential outcomes, I present both simple differences in means without adjusting for covariates (allowing for country-specific baselines), and fully specified models controlling for the variables presented in Table B.4.

The relevant outcome variables are individuals' political and European political interest, measured on a one to four scale (ranging from 'not at all interested' to 'very interested'), and individuals' closeness to the respective parties in question, measured on a one to five scale (ranging from 'very distant' to 'very close').

Results

I first present the estimates of an impact of the EP elections on young individuals' interest in politics.⁸ While the effect of eligibility (column 1 and 2 of Table 3.1) considers all individuals who had the chance to cast their first vote in the second-order contest and compares them to their highly similar but slightly younger and ineligible individuals, models 3 and 4 focus only on the effect of actual voting.

Table 3.1. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics

	Dependent variable: political interest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eligible	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)		
Voting			0.24*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.06)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.04	0.01		
Age	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]
Method	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	x	✓	x	✓
Observations	747	747	698	698

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting CACE estimates.

There is no support for the adverse effect hypothesis (H1), positing that young voters might become politically disengaged due to the low-salience and second-rate character of the supranational contest. Instead, we find support for the ‘participatory effects’ hypothesis assuming that the EP elections and the encouragement to vote in the supranational contest makes young individuals more interested in political matters. Both the ITT estimate in models 1 and 2 (the overall effect of experiencing the EP elections and related campaigns while having reached voting age) and the CACE estimate in models 3 and 4 (actual electoral participation) show a positive and from zero statistically distinguishable effect of the EP elections. Eligibility for the EP elections instils a greater political interest among young individuals and this effect is further augmented when they participate in the supranational contest. Compared to their slightly younger counterparts who would have cast a ballot in the elections had they been eligible, first-time voters report a 0.24 point higher interest in politics. This corresponds to an increase of a third of a standard deviation on the one to four scale. Importantly, I find the same substantial effects when focusing on first-time voters’ interest in European politics (see Table B.5 in Appendix B).⁹ These results are in line with recent field-experimental evidence by Shineman (2018), showing that individuals who were mobilised and incentivised to vote in highly complex and low-salience local elections in the U.S. acquired more political information. The encouragement to vote in the EP elections that individuals receive from being eligible for the first time in their lives seems to arouse their sense of being a political citizen. Coming of age for the supranational contest prompts a greater level of political interest.

Table 3.2. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to challenger parties

	Dependent variable: closeness to challenger parties			
	Rad. Left	Green	Rad. Right	Anti-EU
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eligible (OLS)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.13)
Voting (IV)	-0.02 (0.19)	0.24* (0.14)	-0.09 (0.37)	-0.21 (0.35)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.89	0.16	0.62	0.20
Age	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	524	533	533	546

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed tests based on randomisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting CACE estimates.

Next, I assess whether first-time voting in the EP elections strengthens individuals' ties to challenger parties. I use the exogenous eligibility of young respondents as an instrument for voting in the EP elections to obtain the causal effect of participation in the EP elections on the partisan ties to challenger parties. Respondents were asked how close they feel to the main political parties within their countries on a one to five scale. I consider adolescents' proximity to challenger parties, classified according to four different party families following expert surveys (for details and alternative classifications see Appendix B): populist radical left, Green, populist right, and Eurosceptic parties.

The results show that voting in the EP elections does not intensify young voters' attachment to challenger parties (see Table 3.2). I do not find any evidence that first-time participation increases voters' ties to either Eurosceptic, radical left or right challenger parties. As radical left and radical right parties tend to oppose European integration most strongly (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), this finding suggests that the EP elections do not accentuate first-time voters' policy preferences against further European integration in strengthening their partisan ties to such parties that are mobilising against the supranational project. The coefficient of voting in the European elections on the closeness to populist radical right and anti-European actors is even negative though it does not reach statistical significance. The coefficient for Green parties, in contrast, is positive, and compared to the other coefficients largest in size. However, the coefficient could also result by chance as indicated by the in-

significant p-value when relying on randomisation inference. Thus, the evidence that the EP elections socialise first-time voters into support for Green parties remains only suggestive. Importantly, the second-order elections do not arouse Eurosceptic or nationalistic policy preferences in fostering ties to radical left, populist radical right or anti-European party actors.

Placebo-tests and robustness of the results

While the balance statistics show that individuals are very similar to each other across treatment and control groups, by construction, the age of individuals is not balanced. Should the difference in the political interest between adolescents in the treatment and control group only result from the slight difference in age, we would find the same positive and statistically significant coefficient when analysing the effect of *fictive* EP elections while keeping the difference in age between the respective ‘pseudo-treatment’ and ‘pseudo-control’ groups constant. I analyse the effect of eligibility for fictive EP elections in the four years prior to the actual EP elections in 2004 and in the year after, which is a pseudo-treatment in the future at the time of the interview. The results show no significant effect for any of the possible placebo years neither regarding the eligibility (ITT) nor the effect of participation in the elections (CACE), as instrumented through an indicator of having reached the legal voting age for the respective placebo elections. All coefficients are indistinguishably close to zero (see Table 3.3). The placebo EP elections yield also no statistically significant results for adolescents’ interest in European politics (see Table B.6 in Appendix B). To the extent that the effect between individuals assigned to either eligibility or ineligibility for the European elections could be explained by the fact that eligible young voters are on average nine months older than their ineligible counterparts, we should, however, detect the same difference when analysing the effect of fictive treatment conditions in the placebo EP elections.

I also rerun the analysis using a much smaller bandwidth, thereby substantially limiting the number of observations in the sample. By decreasing the window around the eligibility cut-off, individuals within the treatment and control group are even less distinguishable regarding their precise age in months.¹⁰ The main results regarding young individuals’ interest in politics remain unchanged when minimising the difference between treated and control individuals to a tiny window of only four months around the cut-off (see column 1 and 2 in Table 3.4). Table B.7 in Appendix B further shows that the findings are highly robust across other bandwidths around the cut-off.

Table 3.3. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP elections on interest in politics

	Dependent variable: political interest				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Eligible (OLS)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Voting (IV)	0.05 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.10)	0.11 (0.07)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	798	815	871	893	1,026

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting CACE estimates.

Long-run effects

The results shown in the previous section present a sizeable increase in first-time voters' political interest after participation in the European supranational contest. The measurement of individuals' political interest takes place six months after the EP election, meaning that the difference in the level of political interest between treatment and control group cannot be attributed to mere priming effects of the European campaign. Instead, eligibility and voting in the EP elections has a lasting effect going beyond the exposure to the supranational electoral campaign. However, once those who used to be ineligible for the EP contest reach voting age for national elections just like their slightly older counterparts who had already come of age for the European elections, the difference in the level of political interest may fade away. To understand whether this is the case or whether, to the contrary, being a first-time voter in the EP elections creates long-run effects, I analyse the difference in the level of political interest among previous first-time voters more than five years after the EP election. To do so, I focus on the difference in political interest among those young voters in the dataset who came of age for the EP elections 1999 and those who reached legal voting age slightly later. The results show that the positive impact of being eligible and casting a vote persists for more than five years. Importantly, by the time of the interview five years after the EP elections, these individuals had experienced the same number of national elections that may also have a socialising impact in arousing their political interest. The control group of individuals in this comparison, however, came of age for a national election, suggesting that the size of the positive socialising impact of

Table 3.4. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics (tiny bandwidth and long-term effects)

	Dependent variable: political interest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eligible	0.22*** (0.03)		0.14*** (0.03)	
Voting		0.40*** (0.12)		0.23*** (0.05)
Random. Inf. p	0.01		0.04	
Age	[17.67-18.33]	[17.67-18.33]	[22.25-23.75]	[22.25-23.75]
Method	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	332	321	443	443

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output. Model 2 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as instrument. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed tests based on randomisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks.

the EP contest is large enough to be detected when comparing first-time EP voters to those who had already been enfranchised in ‘meaningful’ national elections.

Conclusions

Do European Parliament elections socialise young voters into political disaffection or strengthen party bonds to Eurosceptic parties? In light of the low saliency of the contest and challengers’ attempts to mobilise against further integration, scholars have cautioned against unanticipated or disintegrative consequences of the European elections. These concerns regard particularly young voters who are suspected of being most vulnerable to the context of the elections given that they lack prior voting habits (van der Eijk and Franklin 2009, p. 91).

This study is the first to estimate the causal impact of the EP elections for political socialisation by relying on a quasi-experimental design that is able to isolate the socialising effect of the EP elections for adolescents’ interest in politics and their attachment to challenger parties. Relying on a cross-national European dataset from 2004 that includes six different countries from all three political European regions (Kriesi 2016), the design exploits the exogenous variation in the precise birthdates of young individuals. Some of the adolescents happen to come of age in time for the EP elections while some others happen to reach legal voting age slightly later, creating a

natural discontinuity among the adolescents who are otherwise very similar to each other. In 2004, the issue of European integration had come under spotlight of public contestation, bringing an end to the ‘permissive consensus’ that had dominated the previous decades (Hooghe and Marks 2009). At the same time, the elections were still marked by their second-order nature in bringing about losses for big parties and gains for small parties (Schmitt 2005). While this study shows that the second-order contest does not socialise young voters into supporting radical and anti-European parties, it calls for replicating this finding with more recent data. Future research should use a similar identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of the upcoming EP elections in 2019, which may see an unprecedented success of challenger parties. This could help to understand whether the EP elections have a differential socialising effect in times of a quickly changing European party landscape.

The results of this chapter indicate that the EP elections do not have adverse effects on the political engagement of young individuals. On the contrary, the results show that the supranational contest lastingly stimulates first-time voters’ political interest. The effect of first-time voting in the EP elections is persistent and can be detected more than five years afterwards. In highlighting the action-induced component of preference formation, this study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between mobilisation and political interest. In the tradition of classical accounts on participatory democracy holding that individuals ‘do learn to participate by participating’ (Pateman 1970, p. 105; see also Finkel 1985), scholars have begun to rethink the causal direction between electoral participation and political sophistication (Shineman 2018). Research shows evidence that the latter may be an outcome of being mobilised for an election through, for example, enfranchisement (Wagner et al. 2012; Quintelier and Hooghe 2012; Zeglovits and Zandonella 2013), which is in line with classical accounts of democratic theory. Finkel (1985) argues that electoral participation brings about a greater familiarity and confidence with the election process, which, in turn, increases the individual sense of political efficacy. This study shows that even the European second-order elections contribute to inculcate a greater political interest in first-time voters, both regarding their general political interest and their particular curiosity for European politics. In doing so, the EP contest brings about positive effects for the socialisation of impressionable voters. This positive impact of the EP elections on arousing young voters’ interest bears crucial relevance as individuals’ level of political interest has been found to be remarkably stable once formed during early adulthood (Prior 2010). Shedding light on the participatory consequences of the European elections, the results of this study appear encouraging for proponents of further European integration.

Notes

1. Other studies concerned with attitudinal change regarding partisan preferences due to the act of voting have somewhat circumvented this problem by comparing previously ineligible and eligible individuals ahead of the next election (Elinder 2012). This design substantively uncouples measurement from treatment as a full electoral cycle lies in between both respective points in time.

2. I rely on the potential outcomes framework notation (Rubin 1974) to describe the causal parameters of interest, invoking the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA) assumption that an individuals' treatment condition is not affected by the treatment condition of others units (no interference). This effect is given by the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimator: $\tau_{ITT} = E[Y_i|Z_i = 1] - E[Y_i|Z_i = 0]$, with Y_i the potential outcome we would observe for unit i and Z_i measuring the treatment of first-eligibility in the EP elections.

3. Non-compliance with treatment assignment is one-sided as ineligible individuals in the control group are prohibited from receiving the treatment (participation in the EP election) through the legal eligibility at the age of 18. Thus, always-takers and defiers do not exist, or formally speaking $D_i(0) = 0$ for all i . I then estimate the complier average treatment effect (CACE) using instrumental variable regression:
$$\widehat{CACE} = \frac{\widehat{E}(Y_i|Z_i=1) - \widehat{E}(Y_i|Z_i=0)}{\widehat{E}(D_i|Z_i=1)}.$$

4. Formally speaking, only the assignment to treatment is random and determined by a binary indicator Z_i , measuring whether the respondent had reached full age at the day of the EP elections while $D_i(Z)$ is a binary indicator for the compliance with the treatment under assignment, or actual voting in the European contest. We can estimate the effect of voting by instrumenting the endogenous electoral participation of first-time voters. The ITT estimates (see Table 3.1 column 1 and 2) have a slightly larger number of observations due to missing values on the endogenous variable of voting in the EP elections. The ITT estimates correspond to the first stage of the IV regression and do not change substantively when considering the slightly smaller sample of the CACE estimates. The instrument is not a weak-instrument ($p < 0.01$), i.e. the instrument has a sufficient correlation with the endogenous explanatory variable.

5. The EUYOUNG dataset also includes Slovakia and Austria, which are, however, excluded from the analysis in this study as both countries held another national election, namely a presidential election, during the months leading up to the EP elections, leaving only 10 (Slovakia) and 6 (Austria) treated first-time voters in the sample.

6. Formally, their eligibility is expected to be exogenous to the relevant outcome variables, $(Y_i(1); Y_i(0)) \perp D_i$, leaving us confident that the variation in treatment

and control around the cut-off quasi-randomly splits the sample into treatment and control (Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 283).

7. Table B.8 in Appendix B shows that the results are robust to genetic optimal matching, maximising the balance between treatment and control group.

8. All standard errors and confidence intervals for the different point estimates of the treatment are constructed using the Bell-McCaffrey (BM) bias adjusted robust variance estimator as recommended by Imbens and Kolesar (2016) taking the small numbers of country-clusters into account. The adjustment combines a bias-reduced form of the cluster robust standard errors with a Satterthwaite approximation for the degrees of freedom of the t-distribution, see Imbens and Kolesar (2016) for a detailed discussion.

9. The small number of individuals in treatment and control group within each country does not allow for exploring country-specific differences of the effect size.

10. At the same time, the smaller sample size makes it more likely that imbalance between treatment and control increases by chance. Therefore, the main analysis relies on a larger bandwidth.

CHAPTER 4

The Persistence of Anti-Integration Sentiments

Introduction

When Austria decided to join the European Union (EU) in 1994, a large majority of Austrian citizens endorsed the idea to become part of the supranational integration project. Asked in a popular referendum whether they would approve of Austria's accession to the EU, two out of three Austrians happily wanted to join the EU. There was, however, also a small minority of Austrians expressing a remarkable opposition towards the Union. In some Austrian villages, more than eighty percent of voters did not want their country to become a member state. More than twenty years later, during the Austrian election campaign in 2017, the populist radical right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) spells out what many Austrian citizens truly seem to have at heart today: 'The existing competence structure of the EU ought not to be further extended, it ought to be cut down to a reasonable amount.' Public opinion, it appears, has shifted in Austria, testified by the unprecedented levels of mass support for the populist radical right. Those who used to belong to the early EU enthusiasts seem to have turned their back against the Union, overtaken by the integration efforts of the elites in Brussels, left out in midst of the technocratic decision-making procedure, left behind in an increasingly culturally diverse and internationally integrated Austria. The sentiments that find expression in support for the populist right FPÖ in Austria find expression

in support for the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, for the Front National in France and for the Law and Justice Party in Poland. Across Europe, it appears, citizens who fear to lose national control are turning to populist right parties who advocate a defense of the nation state against the EU (de Vries 2018, p. 151).

With a wave of unprecedented populist right success sweeping across all parts of Europe, political scientists are trying to grasp the roots of mass support for the populist right. At the heart of the populist right discourse lies the demand for national demarcation and the demand for regaining national decision-making power. With an increasing transfer of policy-making authority to the European Union, the question of European integration has undoubtedly gained salience within national political discourse, fostering public contestation around the issue and seemingly fuelling the success of anti-European populist right actors. Scholars argue that populist right demands originate in discontent with the European Union, in grievances born from a steady growing authority transfer of decision-making power to the EU and in feelings of loss of national sovereignty (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007, p. 268; Serricchio et al. 2013). Frustrated and disenchanted with the technocratic elites in Brussels who are perceived to deliver cultural and economic benefits only to parts of the European population (Gabel and Palmer 1995), some of the citizens ‘turn their back’ towards the supranational project (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). They channel their grievances into support for the populist radical right, who appear successful in tapping into citizens’ discontent about the differential benefits of European integration.

The present chapter adds to the understanding of the relationship between opposition towards the EU and the rise of the populist right by drawing attention to important antecedents of contemporary populist right support: persistent anti-integration sentiments. Bridging studies on public support for the EU with theories on the persistence of political attitudes, it argues that anti-EU sentiments that find expression in support for the populist right predate grievances related to the actual breadth and pace of European integration. These grievances seem to be rooted in a culture of opposition towards European integration that accounts for contemporary mass support for such parties that are calling for a return to the nation state. Consider the small Austrian settlement of Wattenberg, situated in the remoteness of Tyrol somewhere half way between Innsbruck and Kufstein. In contrast to the overwhelming majority of Austrians, 65% of the few hundred inhabitants voted against the proposal to join the referendum in 1994. During the most recent national election in 2017, the populist right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) almost came in first in Wattenberg, outperforming its own vote share in almost every single other municipality across the country. Just a little more

than a one hour drive away from Wattenberg, citizens of Fendels, still part of the Tyrolean remoteness south-west of Innsbruck, in turn, were extremely favourable of Austria's EU accession back in 1994 – the village ranked among the top two percent of all Austrian municipalities with the lowest share of 'No' votes. Is it a mere coincidence that in the most recent national election, in Fendels, the populist radical right ended up performing worse than in 97 percent of all other Austrian municipalities?

In this chapter, I advance the argument that anti-integration sentiments carry a persistent character, predate the actual experience of EU membership and are a strong predictor of contemporary mass support for radical right parties calling for a return to national sovereignty. To systematically test this proposition, I create an original and novel database comprising data of all historical EU accession referenda on the municipality level and link it to current election outcomes within the same localities. Leveraging the considerable variation of support for accession to the EU across municipalities, the analysis shows that initial opposition towards joining the EU is a strong predictor of contemporary populist right success. Those localities that display the highest share of populist right support today were the ones voicing their opposition towards joining the EU most loudly before even becoming part of the integration project. In highlighting that certain anti-EU sentiments are historically entrenched in a fundamental opposition towards Europe, the study contributes to a growing body of literature studying the persistence and the long-run effects of political attitudes.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the literature on public support for the EU and politicisation of European integration, highlighting that many theoretical accounts attribute popular anti-integration sentiments to popular disapproval of the breadth and pace of EU integration and to popular discontent with EU-performance during the multiple crises that the Union has experienced over the last decade. Drawing on theoretical accounts of the long-term persistence of cultural and political attitudes, I propose that contemporary radical right support has historical antecedents in a fundamental rejection of EU membership that predates citizens' actual experience of being part of the EU. I then move to present the original database containing the locality results of all historical EU referenda and introduce the research design exploiting municipality-level variation within regions. The results show that initial anti-EU sentiments strongly predict contemporary radical right support, suggesting that they are rooted in a persistent culture of opposition towards the EU. The findings of this study, thus, speak to the literature on the persistence of political attitudes. I conclude by discussing the possible local underpinnings of populist right success.

Public support for the EU and politicisation of European integration

Earlier studies on popular support for the EU largely departed from the assumption that most individuals hold stable views on the supranational project which depend only to a very limited extent on citizens' actual experience with the supranational institutions. In absence of a direct experience with the EU and in absence of saliency of the issue of European integration in domestic discourse (Scheingold 1970, 38ff), instead, citizens' support or opposition to integration was assumed to be 'weakly structured' (Marks and Wilson 2000) and embedded in broader value orientations like their nationalistic attitudes (Inglehart and Reif 1991, p. 152; Duchesne and Frogner 1995).

European issues, however, became more contested within domestic media and party discourse (Kriesi 2016; Vliegthart et al. 2008) in the course of a steadily progressing level of European integration and with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as decisive turning point (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007).¹ Consequently, scholars came to agree that the issue of European integration had become politicised over time and that the period of a prevailing 'permissive consensus' (Scheingold 1970) had come to an end (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The mass public was assumed to have become more attentive and more critical about the continued integration process, ready to engage in European issue voting to express their (dis-)approval of the respective policies in the European Parliament direct elections (van Spanje and de Vreese 2011) or national elections (de Vries 2010) and ready to evaluate the EU institutions based on their performance and the perceived economic and cultural (in-)utility derived from EU membership (Boomgaarden, Schuck, et al. 2011).

With the rising saliency of European integration rose the electoral support for those party actors that are most vehemently advocating the return to the nation state: the populist radical right. Already in the 1990s, the radical right was the single actor making the issue of European integration most salient among all party families, mobilising citizens against further EU integration (Kriesi 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005, p. 424; Vasilopoulou 2018). With recent landmark successes of radical right actors across Europe and with the consequential success of UKIP in the 2014 EP elections triggering the popular referendum on Britain's membership in the Union ('Brexit'), within public and within academic discourse, the suspicion spread that the success of the radical right accrues also from citizens' dissatisfaction with the expanding scope of European integration (Weßels 2007, p. 288; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). A number of

scholars argue that populist right, nationalistic and anti-European demands for European disintegration originate in discontent with the European Union (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hainsworth 2008), in grievances born from a steadily growing authority transfer of decision-making power to the EU, in perceived threats to the national interests (Christin and Trechsel 2002) and in feelings of loss of national identity in face of advancing integration levels (Carey 2002; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2002). The unprecedented high levels of populist right support in all of the three major socio-politically different European regions seem to reflect that large parts of the European citizenry have ‘turned their back’ to the EU (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). The progressing authority transfer to the EU and the level of European integration seem to have asked ‘too much too soon’ (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) from citizens. The EU, so the unsettling assertion, has ‘left behind’ some of its citizens who ‘turn against the Union’ (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), frustrated and disenchanted with the technocratic elites in Brussels who deliver cultural and economic benefits only to parts of the European population. Populist radical right actors seem to benefit from growing levels of popular opposition to the EU. In possibly having nurtured these anti-European sentiments, the expanding scope of European integration appears to have contributed to the success of populist right actors who mobilise against further European integration (Vasilopoulou 2011).

This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between growing levels of popular discontent with the European Union and mass support for the populist right. Drawing on theoretical accounts of the long-term persistence of cultural and political attitudes, I argue that contemporary radical right support has deep-seated roots that are embedded in a principal rejection of EU membership which predates citizens’ actual experience with the EU. In the following, I review theoretical explanations concerned with the study of the persistence of political attitudes, deriving the theoretical expectations to be tested in this chapter.

Persistence of anti-integration attitudes

There is a growing interest within economic history to study and document the persistence of cultural and political attitudes on the local level. Studies show that (quasi-) exogenously created historical events or shocks that certain geographic areas experienced in the past tend to have long-term legacies on individuals’ attitudes and, more generally, on social structure within the affected communities. The level of prevalent social capital within locally concentrated communities reflects historical events

like the exposure to free-city-state trade (Guiso et al. 2016) or slave trade (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Fouka and Voth (2016) show that during the Eurozone crisis and the related austerity measures imposed by creditor countries like Germany, German car sales fell differentially in Greece. The drops were significantly greater within areas that were affected by German massacres during WWII, suggesting that feelings of aversion towards Germany had been transmitted intergenerationally and, once activated during the financial crisis, were responsible for the politically motivated consumer boycott. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) draw attention to the historical antecedents of local anti-Semitism before the Nazi party seized power. They show that German localities with the greatest share of anti-Semitic behaviour (electoral behaviour, hate crimes, related media consumption) were the same ones that saw peak levels of violence directed against Jews during medieval times. Radical right-wing ideology has also been found to be persistent during Germany's more recent history, as seen in a strong relationship between the strength of local electoral support for the populist right 'Alternative for Germany' (AfD) and historical vote shares for the Nazi party (NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s (Cantoni et al. 2017).

These findings reflect central assumptions about the evolution of individual belief systems and processes of political socialisation, which have been subject of many classical political science accounts (e.g. Converse 1964; Easton 1968). Cultural traits and political attitudes are directly transmitted from one generation to the next through family socialisation (vertical transmission), but are also indirectly transmitted via imitation and learning processes from individuals' immediate social environments (horizontal transmission) (Bisin and Verdier 2008; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). The transmission of cultural traits contributes to the persistence of norms over long periods of time, the formation of a collective memory within communities, and the resilience of local culture. Their immediate social circumstances substantively impact on individuals' political beliefs and behaviours (Zuckerman 2005, p. 26).

I argue that anti-integration sentiments and contemporary support for radical right parties reflect deeply held political values corresponding to a broader belief system favouring nationalism and opposing international integration. Carrying a defensive character (Fitzgerald 2018, p. 26) that tries to shelter it from global and multi-cultural influences, such a belief system and related type of identity is particularly prone to being reproduced within a local community by its members and prone to being even passed on from one generation to the next (Fox et al. 2019). Perceived existential threats to group identities brought about by social developments like EU integration trigger negative attitudes towards those social developments, contributing to an increased motivation to maintain and defend a group identity (Smeekes and

Table 4.1. Year of EU referendum, year of most recent parliamentary election and initial minimum and maximum share of opposition towards the EU by country

Country	Year		Opposition	
	Referendum	Election	Max	Min
Austria	1994	2017	88.6	13.52
Croatia	2013	2016	63.7	15.62
Czech Republic	2003	2017	75.0	0.00
Denmark	1972	2015	55.6	20.01
Estonia	2003	2015	76.1	21.95
Finland	1994	2015	78.2	12.21
Hungary	2003	2018	65.2	0.00
Latvia	2003	2018	84.9	10.59
Lithuania	2003	2016	44.8	1.31
Poland	2003	2015	87.7	8.33
Slovakia	2003	2016	67.2	0.57
Slovenia	2003	2018	59.0	0.00
Sweden	1994	2018	81.8	18.97

Verkuyten 2015). This facilitates the persistence of strong nationalistic belief systems among those who perceive of European integration as a threat to their identity.

By extension, current levels of mass support for the radical right may not only reflect disenchantment with the workings of the EU or dissatisfaction with the breadth and pace of European integration. The sentiments that find expression in a vote for the radical right may also reflect the prevalence of a persistent nationalistic belief system that is less open to cultural change or the adoption of a global identity (Arnett 2002). I contend that *anti-integration sentiments carry a persistent character and predate the actual experience of EU membership*. To test this proposition, I assess whether a locally prevalent initial opposition towards the EU, preceding actual membership, predicts contemporary mass support for radical right parties.

Data and operationalisation

To test the central proposition of this chapter, I undertake an enormous data collection effort and create a novel and original database entailing data from all historical EU accession referenda that have been held by current member states prior to joining the EU.² To assess whether anti-European sentiments have a persistent character, I focus only on *accession* referenda, which elicit citizens' hostility towards the EU predating




Figure 4.1. Distribution of initial opposition towards the EU across countries

their country's actual membership within and their exposure to the supranational project. I collect this data on the spatially small level of municipalities, resulting in a dataset comprised of 23822 observations of 13 EU accession referenda in a period between 1972 and 2013 (for details see Table C.2 in Appendix C). I link this data to electoral results from the most recent parliamentary elections within the same geographical areas and leverage the considerable within-regional variation of initial opposition across municipalities to estimate the effect of persistence. Table 4.1 indicates the year in which citizens decided about their country's EU membership in a popular referendum, the year of the most recent parliamentary election and the respective highest and lowest share of initial opposition towards joining the EU within each country.

As seen in the minimum and maximum share of initial opposition towards the EU across countries in Table 4.1 and as shown in Figure 4.1, the initial opposition towards joining the EU is rather differently distributed across countries. The north-western European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) display a greater variation across municipalities of the 'No' vote shares than some of the Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania). Other Eastern European countries, in turn, do display a remarkable variance across municipalities regarding the level of opposition to becoming a member state (Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland).³




Figure 4.2. Deviation of municipality level populist right vote share and initial opposition towards the EU from respective regional mean.

Thus, while a majority of citizens of all countries voted to join the EU, among some parts of the electorate, there was already substantial scepticism regarding their nation's membership prior to becoming part of the European integration project. This initial hostility towards the EU may persist until the present day and *inter alia* account for high mass support levels of those party actors that most fiercely demand the end of supranational integration. In the following, I discuss the proposed estimation strategy to systematically test this hypothesis.

The dataset includes a large number of localities from 13 different countries and may be the first comparative dataset entailing electoral results on the level of municipalities extending to such a broad range of nations. In addition to variation between the countries in the analysis, there are also large disparities between subnational units within the single countries found even in small countries like Estonia (Heydemann and Vodička 2017, p. 23-24; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). These may substantially impact the (anti-)European sentiments that citizens hold. Studies concerned with the geography of the vote document the presence of regional electoral strongholds of certain parties. To account for such regional differences, I rely on region fixed-effects when estimating the effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right support, which gives us a lower boundary of any effect of historically persistent political attitudes. As the analysis leverages the variance across municipalities regarding their deviation from the specific regional mean of anti-EU sentiments and populist radical right support, it is less likely to find any effect of persistence net of these region-specific means. Thus, the analysis effectively makes a




Figure 4.3. Structure of the data: municipality level and regions (Poland). Standardised raw data and standardised deviation from the regional mean of initial opposition towards the EU (region-fixed effects).

comparison between municipalities located within the same region, as sketched in the beginning of this chapter with reference to the Austrian localities of Wattenberg and Fendels both situated in the region of Tyrol. In total, there are 158 different regions in the dataset and all estimates use robust standard errors clustered at the region to account for the likely common structure of error terms of municipalities within the same region. The distribution of both the deviation of contemporary populist right share from the regional mean and the deviation of initial opposition towards joining the EU from the respective regional mean resemble a normal distribution (see the respective kernel densities in Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3 visualises the data structure of the municipality-level observations for the case of Poland,⁴ highlighting that most of the variation of opposition towards the EU between the municipalities comes from regional differences (left panel). Next, I move to assess the impact that initial hostility towards joining the EU has on contemporary mass support for the populist radical right net of regional disparities.

The effect of initial opposition on contemporary radical right support

Table 4.2 presents the results of the effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right success.⁵ With an increase of one percent in the initial level

of opposition towards the EU, on average, we observe an increase in almost half a percentage point of contemporary support for the radical right (see model 1 in Table 4.2). Model 3 shows that we find the same substantive effect when standardising the variable with respect to a country's respective mean. Comparing a municipality which displayed a one standard deviation higher than average hostility towards the EU to a municipality within the same region which displayed an average-level initial opposition, we find that the former municipality offers radical right parties significantly better chances to succeed in current national elections (by 0.35 standard deviations). The initial hostility towards the EU also significantly predicts current populist right support when giving equal weight to each country within the analysis (in addition to the weights adjusting for the size of the electorate), even though the size of the effect is slightly smaller (see model 2 and model 4 in Table 4.2). Table C.3 in Appendix C shows that we draw the same statistical inference when relying on a non-parametric method to obtain the standard errors (bootstrap). The level of initial hostility towards the supranational project strongly predicts the electoral prospects of radical right actors in current national elections. It is worth to emphasise that when including 158 region-dummies in all models (omitted from the output), a substantive share of the dispersion in the data is reduced, which finds reflection in the high share of explained variance as indicated in the adjusted R-squared values. As mentioned earlier, this should make it least likely to find any effect of persistent initial EU hostility on current radical right success. The fact that historical anti-integration sentiments prior to acceding the EU still systematically predict current radical right support, therefore, indicates that those anti-integration sentiments cast a long shadow into the present day and find their expression in mass support for the radical right.⁶ Those municipalities that used to express the strongest opposition towards joining the EU in the first place are the very same ones that offer the best electoral prospects to radical right actors today. This finding indicates that anti-European sentiments are entrenched in a fundamental rejection of the supranational integration project that predates citizens' actual experience with the Union. This is important in highlighting that contemporary populist right success does not only originate in citizens' disapproval of the performance of the EU during the more recent crises or in citizens' potential sense of losing their national identity in face of a politically, economically and culturally rapidly integrating Europe. Instead, a substantial share of anti-integration sentiments appear to have a long-term persistent character. This finding contributes to the literature on support for the EU in emphasising the fact that a relevant portion of those anti-integration sentiments that manifest themselves in support for the arguably most vehement antagonists of European integration, the radical right, is explained by a pre-existing

Table 4.2. Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right support

	Populist right support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
No Share	0.41*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.04)		
No Share (std)			0.35*** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.05)
Number of Regions	158	158	158	158
Country Weights	x	✓	x	✓
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	23,822	23,822	23,822	23,822
Adjusted R ²	0.93	0.92	0.55	0.48

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Country weights give equal weight to all countries in the analysis by down-weighting countries with more observations. Model 3 and model 4 report the estimates after standardising the variables with respect to country-specific moments. All models report robust standard errors clustered in regions.

hostility towards the EU. This result shall be highly informative to the literature concerned with the study of popular anti-EU sentiments: it demonstrates that resentment with the European Union is not only rooted in a frequently asserted failure of the EU or malperformance of the Union during the more recent crises.

Local foundations of anti-integration sentiments

If it is not a genuine failure of the EU that is responsible for instilling radical right sentiments across Europe, what are, then, the local underpinnings of radical right sentiments across Europe? Providing a conclusive answer to this question appears to be of great importance to social scientists and policy-makers alike. There are numerous socio-structural factors that may help to nurture radical right sentiments within local communities, like the structure of the local economy, the socio-structural marginalisation of certain municipalities (Arzheimer, Evans, et al. 2019), the local power of the church, or even the local strength of civic organisations. Comparative research in this area is made difficult due to the sparse availability of related data entailing such indicators on the level of municipalities. It is a surprisingly difficult endeavour to even obtain electoral data from recent parliamentary elections on the level of municipalities, let alone to obtain such electoral data from elections dating back in time. Existing work concerned with explaining local variation in the level of radical right success has for this reason, unfortunately, been limited to non-comparative studies, which, in turn, have been outspokenly inconclusive with respect to the influence of

local socio-structural and community characteristics on the vote for the radical right (e.g. Bowyer 2008; Coffé et al. 2007; Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011; Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Halla et al. 2017).

Offering a comprehensive account of the empirical variation in contemporary radical right support across municipalities – that simultaneously may account for the variation in initial EU hostility, is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this chapter. Research on the antecedents, the socialising factors, agents and contexts of citizens' opposition towards the EU is still limited (Fox et al. 2019; Boomgaarden, Schuck, et al. 2011), making it difficult to even assess whether a deeply held hostility towards the EU and current populist radical right support do possibly have the same local underpinnings. The findings of this chapter, thus, point to a variety of promising future avenues of research that investigate the mechanisms that account for the persistence of anti-integration sentiments. Among those future research avenues, it appears particularly interesting to study the characteristics of such local contexts, in which the effect of initial EU hostility on current populist right support is particularly weak or particularly strong. Relatedly, it seems fruitful to explore the characteristics of such local contexts, in which initial hostility to the EU is not accompanied with a high radical right share today and the characteristics of such respective local contexts, in turn, in which high levels of initial support for EU membership are coupled with a strong local radical right performance today. In addition, survey panel data could help to establish the role of the family in possibly transmitting affective values to the EU across generations. Relying on data from the UK Household Longitudinal Survey, Fox et al. (2019) find evidence that the family is critical in fostering particular views towards the EU and in explaining an opposition towards membership. Similarly, Rico and Jennings (2012) show that place identities are reproduced within the family. Both findings suggest that a locally prevalent EU-hostile culture persists over time due to intergenerational transmission.

The precise mechanisms accounting for the persistence of EU hostility need to be addressed by future research. Importantly, however, contemporary radical right success has historical roots in an initial rejection of EU membership. This initial rejection predates a potential later disillusionment with the workings of the EU, a potential later disenchantment with the supranational project in face of the erosion of national sovereignty, or a potential later dissatisfaction with the EU in face of its performance during the more recent crises. Thus, the findings of this chapter do at least suggest that a local political culture which harbours deep-seated anti-integration sentiments and opposition towards globalisation or cultural openness is a particularly fertile ground for the populist radical right.

Conclusions

With an increasing level of supranational integration and in the course of multiple crises that the European Union has experienced over the last decade, the issue of European integration has come under spotlight of political and public debate, heightening its salience within national political discourse and fostering political contestation around the issue. With the increasing saliency of the question of European integration rose also the support for those party actors most vehemently calling for national demarcation. Scholars have suggested that the growing populist right demands among parts of the European electorate reflect a quickly spreading popular discontent with the European Union, born in grievances about a steadily growing authority transfer to the supranational institutions and rooted in citizens' fading support for the EU. The present chapter, in contrast, draws attention to the antecedents of contemporary populist right support: persistent anti-integration sentiments. Building on theories of the persistence of political attitudes, I contend that anti-EU sentiments predate grievances related to the actual breadth and pace of European integration, and are instead deeply entrenched in a resilient local culture of opposition towards European integration.

To systematically test this proposition, I have drawn on an original dataset of historical municipality-level data that entails information on initial opposition levels towards joining the supranational project, *prior to membership in the EU*, and have linked this dataset to electoral data of the most recent parliamentary elections within the same geographical units. Exploiting the variation of historical opposition towards the EU within regions, the findings show that the very same localities that were most hostile towards the Union before even becoming part of the supranational project display the highest share of radical right support today.

Anti-integration sentiments appear to be rooted in a principal and affective rejection of Europe and in a culture of hostility towards the EU that persists over several decades. The findings of this chapter, thus, contribute to an emerging strand of literature studying the longevity and persistence of political attitudes. In drawing attention to the antecedents of contemporary populist right support, that predate citizens' possible disillusionment with the EU in face of the advancing scope of integration and supranationalisation, the results presented here have important implications for our understanding of anti-integration sentiments across Europe.

Notes

1. Others have precisely pointed to the negative result of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 (Franklin, Marsh, et al. 1994, p. 456), when the Danes disapproved of the Treaty in an outspokenly close popular vote.

2. There are two cases that cannot be integrated into the database as the countries did not count the votes on a level below the electoral districts. These two cases are Ireland (1972) and Malta (2003). While the analysis cannot even resort to using the higher aggregated (electoral district level) results because of a large district reform in the former case, the country used a single constituency for the referendum in the latter case.

3. To account for these differential distributions of initial opposition towards the EU across countries, I standardise the variables with respect to their country-specific moments and report the estimates of both the unstandardized and standardised variables.

4. The example of Poland is chosen because of data availability of georeferenced data for Poland. Given that shapefiles are not available for other countries, the analysis, unfortunately, cannot model the spatial nature of the data and a potential remaining spatial dependence among municipalities after region fixed-effects.

5. All models account for the different sizes of the respective 23822 observations by giving more weight to those observations that correspond to a larger share of the respective electorate. This weighting procedure is useful to avoid that citizens' voting behaviour within larger municipalities has a smaller impact on the results than citizens' voting behaviour within smaller municipalities (Arzheimer and Carter 2009).

6. Placebo-tests show that a strong initial opposition towards joining the EU, in turn, does not predict contemporary mainstream party success nor populist radical left success.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Has European integration created its own backlash in fuelling the ascendancy of those nationalistic political forces which the European idea exactly aspired to leave behind as part of its past? This dissertation aids understanding the interplay between the steadily progressing level of political integration on the European level and the surge of the radical right across European member states. At the heart of the populist right discourse lies the demand for national sovereignty and demarcation, the quest to regain national decision-making power in an increasingly globalised world order and the desire to take back authority over the degree of cultural and ethnic plurality within the borders of nation states. In the process of a continuous widening and deepening of the level of supranational integration, the issue of European integration has arguably gained salience within national political discourse. The full labour market integration of the Eastern European member states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007, the experience of the deep European financial crisis, the recent challenges posed to the EU by the large influx of asylum seekers, or the outcome of the British referendum on the country's withdrawal from the Union, have only further put the EU into spotlight of contestation, exposing the variety of current and future challenges related to political and economic integration among European member states.

This dissertation has taken on the challenge to understand the complex interplay between European integration and the surge of the radical right across Europe. The central argument that I have advanced in this dissertation is that the progressing level

of European integration has offered populist radical right actors an opportunity to make their core demands publicly salient and to gain political visibility when mobilising citizens based on one of their principal causes: the protection of national identity in times of an ever greater ethnic plurality within European member states and in times of their ever growing exposure to cultural and economic globalisation. Political integration within the EU offers fruitful opportunity structures for radical right actors to articulate their nationalistic demands that belong to their core ideology, to attack the technocratic EU policy-making that feeds into their central anti-elitist discourse and to capitalise from the institutional feature of European direct elections that bolsters their national electoral success. The differential extent to which their mobilisation against the European idea feeds into their national success appears to be contingent on the level of saliency of Europe in domestic discourse as much as on pre-existing EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European citizenry. It appears that the issue of European integration lends itself very well for the cause of the radical right in being sufficiently abstract, sufficiently unpoliticised and sufficiently complex for broad political mobilisation strategies against further integration. These strategies are successful more because they incite nationalistic sentiments among parts of the European public than because they reflect the possible negative experiences citizens have made as being part of the EU or as being voters in the EP elections. The supra-national contest and voting in the European elections does not socialise young voters into support for radical right parties that tend to perform well in these markedly different elections. Neither is citizens' disenchantment with the actual experience in the EU the main driver of radical right support: the radical right is performing best within those parts of Europe that were most hostile to the EU before even becoming part of the project. Profiting from the increased salience of questions related to European integration, the populist radical right is particularly successful in mobilising deeply entrenched, pre-existing nationalistic and culturally defensive sentiments among parts of the European electorate who conceive of the European project as an existential threat to their identity.

To advance these arguments, Chapter 1 laid out the analytical framework for this dissertation. It departed from the observation that success of radical right actors has grown with rising levels of contestation around European integration, suggesting that a growing popular resentment with the EU has contributed to fuel the success of those nationalistic political forces that the Union initially tried to tame and constrain. It then argued that to grasp the potential impact of the EU on the rise of the radical right, it is critical to understand the relevance of anti-European stances for the mobilisation of culturally conservative demands and resulting ideological and discursive

opportunity structures created for the radical right. A particularly promising institutional opportunity structure for the articulation of nationalistic demands lies in the European direct elections. To understand the specific character of the institution and the reasons why the European elections possibly work to fuel the surge of the populist radical right across member states, chapter 1 situated the European direct elections by universal suffrage in the history of integration attempts on the one side and in the scholarly engagement with this institution on the other side. To date, the European Parliament elections may be the most ambitious institutional invention of European elites, carrying the greatest ‘in vitro’, experimental character and the largest amount of imponderability with respect to their effects in actual interaction with those who were the principal targets of this institution – the European citizens. As early as after the first round of EP elections in 1979, scholars and policy-makers alike have understood that the real-world performance of the long-aspired European direct elections by universal suffrage did anything but contribute to creating a ‘citizen’s Europe’ as their proponents had hoped. Situating this institution in the broader context of integration efforts, chapter 1 made a case that the institution, by construction, provides structural conditions that favour the success for the radical right. It also argued that the institution, thanks to the simultaneous organisation across member states, is particularly well suited to study the effects that political integration within the European Union entails for domestic party competition and voting behaviour. This task, however, has largely been neglected by existing accounts that have mostly been concerned to understand the character of the European contest more than its resulting consequences. Synthesising these arguments, chapter 1 provided the analytical framework for the study of the possible effects of political integration within the EU for the surge of the radical right. Building on this analytical framework, chapter 2 and chapter 3 offered two empirical accounts for understanding such effects of the European elections with respect to two potential implications that are of great concern for students of European party politics and political socialisation.

Chapter 2 argued that populist radical right actors gain momentum in EP elections. Following the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980) and the so-called second-order elections theory, scholars have extensively studied the character of the supranational contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved therein. Less scholarly effort, however, has been devoted to understand the *consequences* of the EP elections which are characterised by a markedly different nature than national elections. Departing from the notion that both the structurally different party competition and the structurally different voting behaviour in the EP arena may create repercussions for national electoral outcomes, the chapter posited that the EP elec-

tions foster challenger parties' success on the national level. I tested this proposition by exploiting the variation in national electoral cycles and the quasi-exogenous timing of EP elections since 1979. The results highlighted that a 'vote against Europe', particularly once made visible in European elections, decisively shapes domestic election outcomes. The supranational contest offers populist radical right actors an opportunity structure to mobilise voters based on their antagonism towards the elite-consensus on European integration. By disentangling this momentum effect from alternative explanations, the study established that the impact of EP elections on the national fortune of the radical right does not only originate in congruent voter preferences across governance levels. Instead, the mere event of the EP contest benefits radical right actors when the national election is close in time. It appears that the EP elections offer an opportunity structure for the populist right to make their antagonism towards further integration domestically salient, potentially imperilling the European project.

Chapter 3 investigated another consequence of the EP elections, potentially not less perilous in nature. It examined the effect of the rather uncompetitive and rather insalient European contest on political socialisation among adolescents. Asking for these socialising consequences appears important as the different nature of the elections may have adverse effects on individuals' future political engagement, particularly among young and impressionable voters who have not yet been socialised into voting habits. Relying on a quasi-experimental approach, I identified the causal effect that first-time eligibility for the EP elections has for political attitudes and behaviour. The design exploited the exogenous variation in first-time eligibility among respondents of a cross-national youth study from 2004 that includes six different countries from all major three politically different regions (Kriesi 2016). The study then compared two groups of adolescents in the survey that are indistinguishable from each other but differ with respect to whether they came of age for the EP elections by making use of a precise measure of the birth dates of adolescents. Some of the adolescents in the survey happened to turn eligible just before the European election day and some others happened to reach voting age slightly later. Consequently, half had the chance to participate on election day and cast their first ever vote in the European Parliament elections, while the other half did not. This creates a natural discontinuity in the data that could be fruitfully used in the empirical design to capture the effects of first-time eligibility in the secondary EP elections for political socialisation. The results showed that the EP elections are not responsible for creating partisan bonds to anti-European challenger parties among first-time voters. Instead, the findings demonstrated that the supranational contest lastingly stimulates first-time voters' political interest. The estimated effect appeared to be long-lasting and could be detected among respon-

dents in the dataset more than five years after the time of their first enfranchisement in the EP elections. The results of this study therefore contribute to understanding the relationship between political mobilisation and political interest, echoing the notion that the latter may be an outcome of being mobilised for an election through, for instance, enfranchisement. Thus, the findings reflect central assumptions of classical democratic theory in showing that even the European second-order elections contribute to inculcate a greater political interest in first-time voters, regarding both their general political interest and their particular curiosity for European politics. The European contest brings about positive effects for the socialisation of impressionable voters, which seems highly relevant as individuals' level of political interest has been found to be remarkably stable once formed during early adulthood (Prior 2010).

In an attempt to understand the origins of anti-integration sentiments across Europe, chapter 4 demonstrated that contrary to much emphasis in public and academic discourse, these sentiments are not genuinely rooted in disenchantment with the workings of the EU, but had already existed before a country became part of the EU: anti-integration sentiments appear to have a strong affective character in pre-dating citizens' actual experience with EU membership. Building on theories of the historical persistence of political attitudes, I contended that the same anti-EU sentiments that prevailed across certain parts of Europe before the breadth and pace of European integration found their way into citizens' everyday lives, today, are giving rise to contemporary mass support for the radical right, the most EU-hostile political actors. The issue of European integration did arguably come under spotlight in the course of supranational integration and in the course of multiple crises that the European Union has experienced over the last decade. This has not only increased the saliency of European integration, it has also fostered political contestation around the issue. In parallel to the saliency of European integration rose also the support for those party actors who most vehemently call for national demarcation. Consequently, scholars have proposed that the growing populist right demands among wide parts of European citizens reflect their discontent with the European Union, their grievances about a steadily growing authority transfer to the supranational institutions and their fading support for the EU. Building on theories of the persistence of political attitudes and the longevity of local political culture, I contended, in contrast, that contemporary populist right support has significant antecedents in a hostility towards the EU that predate a potential later disillusionment with the performance of the European Union. To systematically test this proposition, I drew on an original and novel dataset that entails information on initial opposition levels towards joining the supranational project. To create this dataset, I collected the results from all EU accession referenda

on the level of municipalities. Leveraging the considerable within-regional variation of support for accession to the EU across municipalities, the analysis showed that initial opposition towards the EU is a strong predictor of contemporary populist right success. Those localities that display the highest share of populist right support today were the ones voicing their opposition towards joining the EU most loudly before even becoming part of the integration project. It appears that anti-integration sentiments are deeply entrenched in a locally persistent culture of opposition towards European integration. In stressing the legacy of initial EU hostility, the study contributes to a nascent literature on the persistence of local culture.

In synthesis, the dissertation provides an empirical approach to the relationship between two major current transformations of social reality – European integration and the surge of the radical right, aiding the understanding of the interplay between them through the lenses of political behaviour, political sociology, political communication and political psychology. Grasping the potential effects that political integration within the EU had for the surge of the radical right, while unintended, yet potentially conducive to its rise in nature, appears critical as to comprehend to which extent the European idea has fuelled those nationalistic sentiments that it aspired to leave behind as part of its past. The results of the different studies suggest that political integration within the European Union and the surge of the radical right are to be understood as elements of larger, structural transformations of European societies that are sustained and promoted by processes of globalisation. The increasing level of contention around the issue of European integration acts as fertile ground for the populist radical right, helping to activate nationalistic and EU-hostile sentiments among parts of the European public.

APPENDIX A

Supplementary Material: Do European Parliament Elections Foster Challenger Parties Success on the National Level?

A.1 Parties in the analysis

Table A.1. Parties in the analysis

Country	Party	Abbr.
Populist Radical Left		
Austria	Communist Party of Austria	KPÖ
Belgium	Communist Party	KPB-PCB
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium	PA-PTB
Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People	AKEL
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM
Germany	Peace alliance	Fr
Germany	The Left / PDS	Li/PDS
Denmark	Left Socialists	VS
Denmark	People's Movement against the EU	Fobe
Denmark	Communist Party of Denmark	DKP
Denmark	Common Course	FK
Denmark	Red-Green Alliance	En-O

Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Spain	United Left	IU PCE
Spain	United People	HB
Spain	Workers' Party of Spain	PTE-UC
Spain	Galician Nationalist Block	BNG
Spain	Podemos	P
Spain	It is time	EeM
Spain	In Tide	EM
Spain	In Common We Can	ECP
Finland	Democratic Union Left Alliance	DL VAS
Finland	Communist Party of Finland	SKP-Y
France	Workers' Struggle	LO
France	Party of Presidential Majority	MP
France	Citizens' Movement	MDC
France	Revolutionary Communist League	LCR
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	KKE
Greece	Democratic Social Movement	DIKKI
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA
Greece	Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left	AASA
Greece	Popular Unity	LE
Hungary	Hungarian Workers' Party	MMP
Ireland	Sinn Fein The Workers' Party	SFWP
Ireland	Democratic Left	DLP
Ireland	Socialist Party	SP
Ireland	United Left Alliance	ULA
Ireland	People Before Profit Alliance	PBPA
Italy	Proletarian Democracy	DP
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC
Italy	Party of the Italian Communists	PdCI
Italy	Left (Ecology) Freedom	SL
Italy	Anticapitalist List	LA
Italy	Five Star Movement	M5S
Italy	Civil Revolution	RC
Lithuania	Socialist People's Front	SPF
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	KPL
Luxembourg	The Left	DL
Latvia	Socialist Party of Latvia	LSP
Latvia	For Human Rights in a United Latvia	PCTVL
Netherlands	Communist Party of the Netherlands	CPN
Netherlands	Pacifist Socialist Party	PSP
Netherlands	Socialist Party	SP
Portugal	Popular Democratic Union	UDP
Portugal	Unified Democratic Coalition	CDU

Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Portugal	Revolutionary Socialist Party	PSR
Portugal	Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers	PCTP/MRPP
Portugal	Bloc of the Left	BE
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	KSS
Slovakia	99 Percent – Civic Voice	.99
Slovakia	Law and Justice	PaS
Slovenia	United Left	ZdLe
Sweden	Left Party	V
United Kingdom	Sinn Fein	SF
Green Parties		
Austria	The Greens – The Green Alternative	Gruene
Belgium	Confederated Ecologists	Ecolo
Belgium	Agalev – Green	AGL-Gr
Cyprus	Ecological and Environmental Movement	KOP
Czech Republic	Green Party	SZ
Denmark	Socialist Peoples Party	SF
Denmark	Greens	Gron
Denmark	The Alternative	A
Estonia	Estonian Greens	EER
Finland	Green League	VIHR
Finland	Ecological Party	Eko
France	Greens	V
France	Ecology Generation	GE
Germany	Alliance 90 / Greens	B90/Gru
Greece	Alternative Ecologists	OE
Greece	Ecologist Greens	OP
Hungary	Politics Can Be Different	LMP
Ireland	Green Party	Green
Italy	Green Lists	FdLV
Italy	Rainbow Greens	VA
Italy	Federation of the Greens	FdV
Latvia	Green and Farmers' Union	ZZS
Luxembourg	The Greens	Greng
Luxembourg	Green Left Ecological Initiative	GLEI
Luxembourg	Green Alternative	GAP
Malta	Democratic Alternative	AD
Netherlands	Radical Political Party	PPR
Netherlands	GreenLeft	GL
Netherlands	The Greens	Groen
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	PAN
Portugal	Earth Party	MPT

Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Slovakia	Green Party	SZS
Slovenia	Youth Party of Slovenia	SMS
Spain	Greens Ecologists	LVE
Spain	Confederation of the Greens	CV
Sweden	Greens	MP
United Kingdom	Green Party	GP
Populist Radical Right		
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ
Belgium	National Front	FN
Belgium	Flemish Block	VB
Bulgaria	Attack	Ataka
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	NFSB
Bulgaria	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement	VMRO
Cyprus	National Popular Front	ELAM
Czech Republic	Workers' Party of Social Justice	DSSS
Czech Republic	Sovereignty – Jana Bobosikova Bloc	S-JB
Denmark	Danish Peoples Party	DF
Estonia	Future Estonia Independence	TEE
France	National Front	FN
France	National Republican Movement	MNR
Germany	The Republicans	Rep
Germany	German People's Union	DVU
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS
Greece	Independent Greeks	AE
Greece	Golden Dawn	LS-CA
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIEP
Hungary	Jobbik Movement	Jobbik
Italy	Fiamma Tricolore	MSFT
Italy	North League	LN
Latvia	For Fatherland and Freedom	NA/TB/LNNK
Latvia	All For Latvia!	VL
Lithuania	Young Lithuania	JL
Luxembourg	National Movement	NB
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	AR ADR
Netherlands	Centre Democrats	CD
Netherlands	Centre Party	CP
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	PVV
Poland	League of Polish Families	LPR

Table A.1. Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Romania	Greater Romania Party	PRM
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNS
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	SNS
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD
United Kingdom	British National Party	BNP

A.2 Empirical extensions

Descriptive statistics and marginal effects

Table A.2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD.	p25	p50	p75	Min.	Max.
National Vote (Radical Left)	174	5.84	7.82	0.49	3.33	8.21	0	43.87
EP Vote (Radical Left)	174	6.64	7.65	0	4.62	9.30	0	34.90
Prev. Government (Radical Left)	174	0.01	0.11	0	0	0	0	1
National Vote (Green)	174	4.08	4.45	0	2	7.30	0	20.11
EP Vote (Green)	174	5.13	5.07	0	3.49	9.05	0	19.91
Prev. Government (Green)	174	0.06	0.23	0	0	0	0	1
National Vote (Radical Right)	174	4.52	6.16	0	1.18	8.64	0	28.24
EP Vote (Radical Right)	174	4.22	5.97	0	1.09	6.80	0	29.82
Prev. Government (Radical Right)	174	0.05	0.22	0	0	0	0	1
EP Electoral Cycle	174	0.44	0.28	0.19	0.45	0.66	0	0.98
EP District Magnitude (Log.)	174	2.78	0.96	2.08	2.77	3.22	0	4.60
EP Threshold	174	1.81	2.26	0	0	5.00	0	5.80
District Magnitude (Log.)	174	2.24	1.18	1.69	2.31	2.71	0	5.01
Number of Country's EP Elections	174	3.56	2.12	2	3	5	1	8
Midterm EP Elections	174	0.32	0.47	0	0	1	0	1
Unemployment	174	8.97	4.68	5.98	7.90	10.43	0.72	25.00
1st EP Decade	174	0.17	0.38	0	0	1	0	1
2nd EP Decade	174	0.20	0.40	0	0	1	0	1
3rd EP Decade	174	0.31	0.46	0	0	1	0	1
4th EP Decade	174	0.32	0.47	0	0	1	0	1

Table A.3. Marginal effects of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle

	Populist Radical Left	Green Parties	Populist Radical Right
Cycle	Linear	Linear	Quadratic
0	0.636 [0.483; 0.789]	0.377 [0.218; 0.537]	0.905 [0.645; 1.165]
0.1	0.595 [0.456; 0.734]	0.356 [0.209; 0.504]	0.698 [0.521; 0.875]
0.2	0.554 [0.425; 0.682]	0.335 [0.198; 0.472]	0.536 [0.393; 0.68]
0.3	0.512 [0.39; 0.635]	0.315 [0.185; 0.444]	0.421 [0.276; 0.565]
0.4	0.471 [0.35; 0.592]	0.294 [0.17; 0.417]	0.351 [0.198; 0.504]
0.5	0.43 [0.305; 0.556]	0.273 [0.151; 0.394]	0.328 [0.174; 0.482]
0.6	0.389 [0.255; 0.524]	0.252 [0.13; 0.374]	0.35 [0.199; 0.501]
0.7	0.348 [0.2; 0.495]	0.231 [0.105; 0.357]	0.418 [0.254; 0.582]
0.8	0.307 [0.143; 0.47]	0.21 [0.077; 0.343]	0.532 [0.317; 0.748]
0.9	0.266 [0.084; 0.447]	0.189 [0.047; 0.331]	0.692 [0.379; 1.005]
BIC	901.136	730.484	936.139

Table A.3 displays the marginal effect of the European vote share conditional on the exact position within the European cycle (in distances of 0.1, which corresponds to roughly half a year), starting from concurrent EP and national elections (cycle=0) to the occurrence of national elections right before the next EP election at the very end of the cycle (cycle=0.9). As the marginal effect of interest (EP vote share on the national vote share $\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X}$) and its standard error is conditional on the position within the cycle (C)¹, the table also reports the confidence intervals around the point estimates.

Semi-parametric kernel smoothed varying coefficient models

The semi-parametric estimates result from a series of locally linear regression using kernel re-weighting based on the distance between each value of the cycle (the moderator) and each evaluation point as suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016). The following figures present smooth marginal effects of the treatment (EP vote share) on the outcome variable with respect to the position in the electoral cycle that are in-




Figure A.1. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical left parties)

dependent from any functional specification of the moderating variable. The bandwidth is obtained by using a 5-fold cross-validation procedure, while standard errors and confidence intervals are computed using a bootstrap. Moreover, the plot shows a histogram at the bottom of the figure to help readers assess the common support assumption based on the distribution of the moderator.

Figure A.5 shows a *vice versa* placebo-test predicting the success of radical right parties in the European election (dependent variable) conditional on the interaction between temporal distance to the last national election and the respective electoral result.

Alternative model specifications

The following tables present the alternative model specifications discussed in the main text of chapter 2.

Table A.4. Placebo test: fixed-effects regression results of vote share in national election on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle

Placebo: Populist Radical Right	
National Vote	0.587*** (0.131)
National Cycle	0.974 (1.613)
National Vote * National Cycle	0.215 (0.202)
Government at EP election	-6.796*** (2.214)
Midterm EP	-0.168 (0.817)
Unemployment	-0.034 (0.124)
EP Elections Participated	0.841 (0.672)
EP Threshold	-0.051 (0.513)
National District Magnitude	-0.875 (1.494)
European District Magnitude	-0.340 (0.960)
p-Wald test (LIE)	0.428
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓
Robustness of Non-Significance of Interaction Term	
Cluster Robust SE	✓
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE	✓
Jackknife Parties	✓
Party Fixed-Effects	✓
BIC	827.667
N	147

Table A.5. Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (alternative model specifications I)

	(1)	(2)
	Inclusion of Populist Radical Right Correlates	Inclusion of Contested Pop. Radical Right Parties
EP Vote	0.926*** (0.137)	0.848*** (0.149)
Cycle	0.993 (4.896)	5.028 (5.494)
Cycle ²	-2.373*** (0.668)	-2.308*** (0.753)
EP Vote * Cycle	1.889 (5.183)	-3.002 (5.802)
EP Vote * Cycle ²	2.381*** (0.752)	2.354*** (0.844)
Government at EP election	2.565 (1.682)	2.158 (1.902)
Midterm EP	1.360* (0.739)	0.744 (0.833)
Unemployment	0.239** (0.099)	0.239** (0.103)
EP Elections Participated	0.351 (0.550)	0.408 (0.618)
EP Threshold	-0.589 (0.573)	-0.619 (0.634)
National District Magnitude	0.936 (1.096)	0.812 (1.216)
European District Magnitude	-0.140 (0.914)	-0.827 (1.006)
Number of Asylum Applications (in 1000)	-0.014 (0.019)	
Turnout	-0.051 (0.078)	
L-R Position of Mainstream Conserv. Competitor	0.091 (0.437)	
p-value Wald Test (LIE)	0.001	0.002
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓
BIC	950.365	981.975
N	174	174

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 includes correlates of populist right success that might affect the parties' electoral success on both governance levels simultaneously, namely the influx of asylum seekers, the turnout rate in a given election, or potential party-strategic advantages for radical right parties determined by the left-right position of the largest conservative mainstream competitor. Model 2 includes parties that have been classified as populist radical right parties by some authors but not by others, namely the Dutch List Pim Fortyn, the British United Kingdom Independence Party, and the True Finns.




Figure A.2. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (Green parties)




Figure A.3. Semi-parametric estimates of marginal effect of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)




Figure A.4. Placebo test: binning estimates of marginal effect of vote share in national election on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)




Figure A.5. Placebo test: marginal effect of vote share in national election on EP vote share conditional on national electoral cycle (populist radical right parties)

Table A.6. Fixed-effects regression results of vote share in EP elections on national vote share conditional on EP electoral cycle (alternative model specifications II)

	Excluding Concurrent Elections			Excluding Government Parties			Party-Fixed Effects		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Pop. Rad. Left	Green Parties	Pop. Rad. Right	Pop. Rad. Left	Green Parties	Pop. Rad. Right	Pop. Rad. Left	Green Parties	Pop. Rad. Right
EP Vote	0.600*** (0.085)	0.208** (0.096)	0.997*** (0.154)	0.562*** (0.096)	0.350*** (0.108)	0.994*** (0.129)	0.694*** (0.208)	0.320** (0.131)	0.933*** (0.114)
Cycle	2.683** (1.353)	1.110 (0.877)	2.531 (5.668)	2.333 (1.512)	2.277** (1.071)	1.195 (4.679)	0.949 (0.727)	1.020 (0.607)	4.270 (2.649)
Cycle ²		0.934 (5.741)				1.184 (4.944)			-3.124 (2.763)
EP Vote * Cycle	-0.368*** (0.137)	-0.015 (0.125)	-2.910*** (0.760)	-0.421*** (0.161)	-0.181 (0.133)	-2.169*** (0.643)	-0.297** (0.134)	-0.155 (0.136)	-3.359*** (0.576)
EP Vote * Cycle ²			2.913*** (0.828)			2.252*** (0.720)			3.383*** (0.582)
Government at EP election	2.527 (2.544)	0.683 (0.834)	2.188 (1.682)				0.814 (0.739)	0.656 (0.575)	0.300 (2.460)
Midterm EP	0.700 (0.617)	-0.766** (0.369)	1.303* (0.737)	0.750 (0.737)	-0.405 (0.485)	1.461** (0.705)	-0.091 (0.404)	-0.250 (0.249)	-0.196 (0.453)
Unemployment	0.471*** (0.094)	-0.016 (0.054)	0.320*** (0.096)	0.477*** (0.108)	-0.083 (0.067)	0.234*** (0.089)	0.117* (0.061)	-0.029 (0.048)	0.119*** (0.032)
EP Elections Participated	1.401*** (0.520)	0.540* (0.308)	0.524 (0.560)	1.786*** (0.599)	0.481 (0.392)	-0.171 (0.513)	0.160 (0.324)	0.256 (0.191)	0.121 (0.284)
EP Threshold	3.050*** (0.561)	-0.250 (0.340)	-0.877 (0.593)	3.036*** (0.642)	0.049 (0.425)	-0.573 (0.543)	-0.535* (0.272)	-0.014 (0.264)	-0.416 (0.358)
National District Magnitude	-0.242 (0.963)	0.033 (0.577)	0.763 (1.100)	-0.478 (1.153)	0.224 (0.754)	1.893* (0.979)	0.593 (0.644)	-1.553 (1.794)	1.241* (0.604)
European District Magnitude	1.150 (0.811)	0.459 (0.486)	-0.046 (0.861)	1.086 (0.978)	0.470 (0.642)	-0.046 (0.829)	0.052 (0.215)	0.545** (0.215)	-0.241 (0.291)
p-value Wald Test (LIE)	0.862	0.754	0.001	0.898	0.052	0.001	0.707	0.146	0.001
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BIC	838.906	674.461	868.081	971.094	825.115	923.566	1298.799	700.428	898.449
N	161	161	161	174	174	174	291	179	205

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

APPENDIX B

Supplementary Material: The Effect of European Parliament Elections on Political Socialisation

Table B.1 lists the countries in the analysis along with the total number of adolescents and those treated, i.e. those who were eligible for the EP elections 2004. It also reports the mean and standard deviation of political interest by country. The EUYOUNG survey includes also Austria and Slovakia. As both countries held another state-wide election closely before the EP contest (presidential elections on 3 April 2004 in Slovakia and on 25 April 2004 in Austria), there are too few respondents left that came of age for the EP elections (10 respondents in Slovakia and 6 in Austria). Consequently, the analysis does not include both countries.

B.1 Countries and parties in the analysis

Countries and parties in the analysis

The EUYOUNG survey provides a measure of adolescents' partisan attachment to all significant parties within a country that competed for votes in the EP elections 2004 and/or the respective last national election within each country. Young individuals were asked: 'How close or distant do you feel to each of the following parties?'. The classification of parties for the analysis follows expert surveys as integrated in the

Table B.1. Descriptive statistics of political interest across countries

Country	N	Eligible	Mean Pol. Interest	SD Pol. Interest
Estonia	126	52	2.25	0.64
Finland	130	62	2.25	0.75
France	103	47	2.17	0.93
Germany	169	85	2.47	0.77
Italy	116	56	2.48	0.80
United Kingdom	103	54	1.90	0.76

ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2018). Anti-European parties are all parties that are classified with values below 4, on the scale from 1-10. If there are two or more parties of the same party family within one country, I consider the respective party that is closest to an individual.

Table B.2. Parties in the analysis

Country	Party	Abbr.
Populist Radical Left		
Finland	Democratic Union Left Alliance	DL VAS
France	French Communist Party	PCF
France	Citizens' Movement	MDC
France	Revolutionary Communist League	LCR
Germany	The Left / PDS	Li/PDS
Italy	Proletarian Democracy	DP
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC
Italy	Party of the Italian Communists	PdCI
United Kingdom	Respect – The Unity Coalition	R
Green Parties		
Finland	Green League	VIHR
France	Greens	V
Germany	Alliance 90 / Greens	B90/Gru
Italy	Federation of the Greens	FdV
United Kingdom	Green Party	GP

Table B.2. Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Populist Radical Right		
Finland	Finnish Party – True Finns	TF
France	National Front	FN
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD
Italy	North League	LN
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP
Anti-EU		
Finland	Christian Democrats	CD
Finland	Finnish Party – True Finns	TF
France	French Communist Party	PCF
France	Citizens' Movement	MDC
France	Revolutionary Communist League	LCR
France	National Front	FN
France	Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Tradition	CPNT
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD
Italy	North League	LN
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC
United Kingdom	Conservatives	T
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP

B.2 Empirical extensions

Interest in European politics

Table B.5 shows the effect of first-time EP eligibility (model 1 and 2) and first-time EP voting (model 3 and 4) on European political interest of young respondents.

Table B.3. Descriptive statistics of covariates

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Eligible	747	0.48	0.50	0	1
Political Interest	747	2.28	0.79	1	4
European Political Interest	747	2.25	0.82	1	4
Voted in EP	698	0.22	0.41	0	1
Closeness Radical Left	524	2.37	1.11	1	5
Closeness Green Parties	533	2.67	1.13	1	5
Closeness Populist Right	533	1.91	1.06	1	5
Closeness Anti-EU Parties	546	2.36	1.18	1	5
Gender	747	0.52	0.50	0	1
Urban-Rural	747	2.88	1.09	1	5
Standard of Living	747	3.19	0.71	1	5
Religiousness	747	3.05	0.93	1	4
Higher Education Parents	747	2.69	0.99	1	4
Household with Parents	747	0.87	0.33	0	1
Education	747	0.79	0.40	0	1
Voting Habits Parents	747	4.22	1.15	1	5
Political Interest Parents	747	2.69	0.76	1	4
Civic Engagement in School	747	1.86	1.61	0	6
Estonia	747	0.17	0.37	0	1
Finland	747	0.17	0.38	0	1
France	747	0.14	0.35	0	1
Germany	747	0.23	0.42	0	1
Italy	747	0.16	0.36	0	1
United Kingdom	747	0.14	0.35	0	1

Selective attrition

As discussed in the main text of chapter 3, the quasi-experimental design should not be affected by differential attrition in the survey, i.e. the treatment condition of adolescents in the sample should not affect their likelihood to participate or respond to the survey (Mutz et al. 2019). To corroborate this assumption, I visualise the distribution of respondents who come of age in the year of the EP elections (and either receive the treatment or control condition) along with the distribution of respondents that came of age in other years covered in the study and are not affected by the treatment conditions (see Figure B.1). Visualising the deviation from the expected value of the number of respondents born in each month, we find that there is some seasonality in

Table B.4. Balance statistics between EP eligibles and EP ineligibles

	Control	Treatment	Diff. in Means	Std. Diff.	
Urbanisation	2.89	2.84	-0.05	-0.05	
Gender	0.50	0.55	0.05	0.11	
Standard of Living	3.21	3.16	-0.05	-0.07	
Religiousness	3.07	3.04	-0.03	-0.04	
Parents' Higher Education	2.68	2.66	-0.02	-0.02	
Living with Parents	0.90	0.83	-0.07	-0.21	**
Education	0.81	0.77	-0.04	-0.09	
Voting Habit of Parents	4.35	4.06	-0.29	-0.25	***
Political Interest of Parents	2.67	2.64	-0.04	-0.05	
Civic Engagement in School	1.81	1.79	-0.02	-0.01	
Observations	391	356			

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Tests for conditional independence of the treatment variable and the covariates within strata. Standardized differences in means stratified by countries.

the months of birth as more respondents reach full age during summer months. Importantly, however, the mean deviations from the expected value between the analysed quasi-random group of individuals in the study and individuals born in other years are not statistically different from each other (see Figure B.1). This leaves us confident that the treatment or control condition did not prompt a differential attrition in the study and individuals' likelihood to participate in the survey was not affected by their treatment.

Relative age effect

A number of studies in sociology and sports studies have documented that individuals who are born in the winter months of a year are less likely to perform as well in various disciplines as their peers who have been born in summer months (I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this literature). Given that the EP elections are held in June, and the main study relies on bandwidths of nine months while excluding the month of the EP elections (June), the sample of treatment first-time voters includes the month of July, August, September, October, November, December, January, February, March, while the sample of control individuals consists of the birth months of September, October, November, December, January, February, March, April, May. Thus, for the share of 7/9 of all months included in the study, treatment and control condition are identical. The only difference between the set of

Table B.5. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on European interest in politics

	Dependent variable: European political interest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eligible	0.09*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)		
Voting			0.19* (0.11)	0.20* (0.11)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.098	0.072		
Age	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]
Method	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	x	✓	x	✓
Observations	747	747	698	698

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output. Model 3 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as instrument. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. P-values of two-tailed tests based on randomisation inference (permutation within countries). Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks.

months included in the treatment and control group relates to the fact that a fraction of the treated young individuals are born in July/August, while a fraction of the control young individuals are born in April/ May (all other birth months are represented both in treatment and control group).

Should this difference relate to unobserved characteristics between treatment and control individuals that could account for the higher level of political interest in the treatment group, we would find the same effect when analysing fictive EP elections in the non-EP years included in the study. The respective placebo test (see Table 3.3 in chapter 3 and Figure B.2) shows that this is not the case. The same sets of birth months for placebo-treatment and placebo-control respondents in the respective non-EP years covered in the EUYOUNG study do not yield the same results. The same holds for analysing a potential similar difference regarding European political interest, see Table B.6.

Placebo EP elections

Figure B.2 graphically visualises the different coefficients of the ITT and the CACE estimates presented in Table 3.3 in chapter 3. As can be seen in Figure B.2, none of the fictive EP elections has a significant positive impact on young individuals' interest in politics. Should the greater level of political interest among first-time EP voters only arise out of the fact that those young individuals are slightly older than their ineligible counterparts, we should, however, detect a statistically significant difference when




Figure B.1. Mean deviation of actual number of respondents coming of age from expected value

analysing these placebo EP elections. The ITT and CACE estimate from the actual EP elections is also substantively larger in size (0.12 and 0.24, respectively).

Table B.6. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting in placebo EP years on interest in European politics

	Dependent variable: European political interest				
	2000 (1)	2001 (2)	2002 (3)	2003 (4)	2005 (5)
Eligible (OLS)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)
Voting (IV)	0.10 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.001 (0.14)	0.05 (0.12)	0.10 (0.11)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	798	814	870	895	1,018

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting present CACE estimates.




Figure B.2. Coefficient plot of effect of first-time placebo EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics

Effects across bandwidths

Table B.7 shows that the findings are robust across other bandwidths around the cut-off.

Table B.7. Effect of EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics across different bandwidths

	Dependent variable: political interest									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Eligible	0.12*** (0.03)									
Voting		0.24** (0.10)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.21* (0.11)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.09)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.12)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.052		0.076		0.034		0.02		0.01	
Age	[17.33-18.67]	[17.33-18.67]	[17.42-18.58]	[17.42-18.58]	[17.50-18.50]	[17.50-18.50]	[17.58-18.42]	[17.58-18.42]	[17.67-18.33]	[17.67-18.33]
Method	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	664	642	582	562	495	479	433	419	332	321

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting present CACE estimates. Age intervals rounded to two digits after decimal point.

Table B.8. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on interest in politics (matched dataset)

	Dependent variable: political interest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eligible	0.11*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)		
Voting			0.40* (0.22)	0.36** (0.16)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.048	0.034		
Age	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]
Method	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	x	✓	x	✓
Observations	736	736	630	630

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Constant and country fixed-effects omitted from output. Model 3 and 4 show the causal average complier effect (CACE) from using the eligibility as instrument. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks.

Genetic optimal matching

I use a genetic optimal matching procedure (Diamond and Sekhon 2013) to maximise balance between the treatment and control units on those characteristics that may systematically relate to both the treatment variable (eligibility for the EP elections) and the outcome variable (political interest). In contrast to a simple multivariate regression, this approach has the advantage that we control for any differences between the groups in a non-parametric way. Hence, we do not need to specify how observable control covariates relate to the outcome (functional form) and, thus, avoid potential bias due to model dependence. I perform one-to-one matching as to obtain a control group of individuals that mirrors the treatment group in size. Table B.8 show the estimate for the ITT and the CACE on the matched data.

Alternative classification of challenger parties

As to make sure that the results are not sensitive to the party classification used in the main analysis, Table B.9 presents the respective effect of the EP elections on young voters' attachment to challenger parties according to three different classifications, namely parties that were not in government parties at the time of the 2004 EP elections, small parties that achieved less than ten percentage of the popular vote and small parties that were not among the two biggest parties. This classification corresponds to the one used in Dinas and Riera (2018).

Table B.9. Effect of first-time EP eligibility and voting on partisan ties to challenger parties (alternative classification of challenger parties)

	Dependent variable: closeness to challenger parties		
	Non-Government Parties	Small Parties I	Small Parties II
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Eligible (OLS)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)
Voting (IV)	0.11 (0.15)	0.03 (0.21)	0.04 (0.15)
Random. Inf. (p-value)	0.43	0.866	0.824
Age	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]	[17.25-18.75]
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	650	648	651

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Constant and country-fixed effects omitted from output. Bell-McCaffrey bias adjusted robust SE in parentheses. Inverse probability weights accounting for different probabilities of assignment to treatment and control conditions between country blocks. Entries of eligibility present ITT estimates, entries of voting present CACE estimates. Non-government parties are all parties who were not in government at the time of the EP election, Small I includes all parties with less than 10 percent of the popular vote while Small II includes all parties that were not one of the two biggest parties as operationalised in Dinas and Riera (2018).

APPENDIX C

Supplementary Material: The Persistence of
Anti-Integration Sentiments

C.1 Populist radical right parties across countries

Table C.1 lists the different populist radical right actors that have contested the respective most recent parliamentary election within each country as reported in Table 4.1 in chapter 4.

Table C.1. Populist radical right parties across countries

Name of the party	Country
EU Exit Party	Austria
Freedom Party of Austria	Austria
Autochthonous Croatian Party of Rights	Croatia
Croatian Party of Rights 1861	Croatia
HDSSB Coalition	Croatia
Homeland Coalition	Croatia
Shift Coalition	Croatia
Freedom and Direct Democracy	Czech Republic
Party of Common Sense	Czech Republic
Workers' Party of Social Justice	Czech Republic
Estonian Independence Party	Estonia
Finns Party	Finland
All for Latvia	Latvia
Latvian Nationalists	Latvia
Ricibas Party	Latvia
Who owns the state	Latvia
Lithuanian People's Party	Lithuania
Order and Justice	Lithuania
Fidesz	Hungary
Hungarian Justice and Life Party	Hungary
Jobbik	Hungary
Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic	Poland
Law and Justice	Poland
Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovak National Party	Slovakia
Forward Slovenia	Slovenia
Slovenian Democratic Party	Slovenia
Slovenian National Party	Slovenia
United Slovenia	Slovenia
The Sweden Democrats	Sweden

C.2 Empirical extensions

Municipalities and regions across countries

Table C.2 lists the number of regions within each country that are included in the dataset, the absolute number of votes cast within each country in the most recent parliamentary election, the relative share that these votes correspond to among all votes in the dataset, and the number of municipality observations per country.

Table C.2. Number of regions and number of votes per country

Country	No. of regions	Total votes (in mill.)	Total votes (in %)	Observations
Austria	9	4.232	8.35	2069
Croatia	20	1.505	2.97	553
Czech Republic	14	4.686	9.24	6294
Denmark	5	3.560	7.02	99
Estonia	5	0.574	1.13	220
Finland	13	2.968	5.85	317
Hungary	20	5.564	10.97	3166
Latvia	5	0.818	1.61	517
Lithuania	10	1.222	2.41	1950
Poland	16	15.595	30.75	2478
Slovakia	8	2.646	5.22	2919
Slovenia	12	0.819	1.61	2952
Sweden	21	6.517	12.85	288
Total	158	50.705	100.00	23822

Bootstrapped standard errors

I use the bootstrap to build a model of the sampling distribution. By treating the observed municipalities as population from which we resample 1000 times, we obtain the bootstrapped standard errors for the effect of the initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary mass support for the populist right. Table C.3 shows that we draw the statistical inference when relying on non-parametric assumptions about the sampling distribution.

Table C.3. Effect of initial opposition towards the EU on contemporary populist right support (bootstrap)

	Populist right support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
No Share	0.41*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)		
No Share (std)			0.35*** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.06)
Number of Regions	158	158	158	158
Country Weights	x	✓	x	✓
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	23,822	23,822	23,822	23,822

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Country weights give equal weight to all countries in the analysis by down-weighting countries with more observations. Model 3 and model 4 report the estimates after standardising the variables with respect to country-specific moments. All models report robust standard errors clustered in regions.

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