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RSCAS 2019/61

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

euandi2019: Project description and datasets  
documentation

Elie Michel, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Frederico Ferreira Da  
Silva and Alexander H. Trechsel



European University Institute

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## **Abstract**

In occasion of the European Parliament elections of 2019, the EUI in collaboration with the University of Lucerne in Switzerland launched euandi2019 (reads: EU and I). The academic relevance of the euandi2019 endeavour lies primarily in its choice to stick to the party positioning methodology already employed by the EU Profiler in 2009 and by euandi2014, as well as in the choice to keep as many policy items as possible in the 2019 questionnaire in order to allow cross-national, longitudinal research on party competition and voting behaviour in the EU across a ten-year period. In this paper, we present the euandi2019 project in a nutshell, the making of the questionnaire and the way in which political parties have been coded. Then, we illustrate the functioning of the application and the specifics of the resulting user dataset, comprising the opinions of over 1.2 million users that completed the euandi2019 questionnaire during the four weeks preceding the EP elections.

## **Keywords**

European elections, party placement, Voting Advice Applications





## Introduction

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are web-based tools that provide information to users in view of voting, by comparing their own policy preferences on major issues with the programmatic stances of political parties on such issues (for comprehensive overviews of VAAs in a comparative perspective, see: Garzia and Marshall, 2012; 2014; 2016; 2019).

Respondents answer a questionnaire on the degree of (dis)agreement with a wide range of concrete and relevant policy statements. The VAA compares the user's profile with the political parties competing in the election; it then provides an illustration of the degree of proximity between the user and parties. In other words, VAAs reveal to the user the structure of the political competition in light of her own preferences. The ability of VAAs to reduce the costs of information at election time is one of the keys to understand their growing success among voters (Alvarez et al., 2014). To mention just a few examples, the pioneering Dutch VAA *Stemwijzer* has been used almost seven million times during the parliamentary election of 2017. The German VAA *Wahl-O-Mat*, developed for the federal election of the same year, peaked with over 15.6 million users. Garzia and Marschall (2016) found almost complete coverage of Western democracies (in many of which multiple VAAs are simultaneously operating) as well as a growing penetration of VAAs in Asia, Central and Southern America, and North Africa. In Benelux countries and all Scandinavian democracies, the proportion of eligible voters resorting to VAAs at election time ranges between 30 and 50 per cent (Garzia and Marschall, 2019).

VAAs also exist at the transnational European level, and teams of researchers mainly based at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence have developed VAAs for the European Elections since 2009. In that year, almost a million users received a voting advice by the *EU Profiler*. As the first truly transnational VAA, *EU Profiler* was awarded the World e-Democracy Forum Award for its "commitments to carry out meaningful political change through the use of internet and new technologies". Building on this success, the 2014 follow-up VAA – this time called **euandi** – gathered over a million users. European voters could access euandi again in 2019. The application was developed by the EUI in close collaboration with the University of Lucerne (Switzerland). Available in 23 languages, euandi2019 invites users to react to 22 policy statements covering a wide range of contemporary policy issues and political values in European politics. It then provides users with information on partisan proximity with the parties running in their country, but also in every other member state of the European Union. Therefore, euandi2019 provides users with a clear view of issues of the European electoral campaign, and of how parties overlap with their individual positions.

euandi2019 has both social and scientific objectives. First, it reaches out the wider public by providing a politically neutral source of information to European voters, detailing parties' positions while explicitly not favouring any political party or group of parties. euandi2019 relies on independent academic expertise, it is entirely free and can be used by all interested persons, organizations, or institutions<sup>1</sup>. In addition to offering a tool to voters (and parties) for the campaign of the EP elections, euandi2019 produces highly relevant scientific data for researchers on political parties and elections. The coding of the positions of 272 parties that competed in the 2019 elections produces one of the largest databases of party preferences in Europe. Furthermore, this dataset allows comparing most European parties with each other, but also over time, as a majority of issue statements are replicated from the 2009 and 2014 EP VAAs. In addition, users' data have generated some of the largest datasets on European voters' attitudes and behaviour.

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<sup>1</sup> The code of the software on which euandi2019 is based was originally developed by the Zurich (Switzerland) based company xUperry Ltd. under the name "Societyly". Societyly is a functioning VAA software that is available for free, under an MIT licence, on [www.GitHub.com](http://www.GitHub.com).

This paper presents the euandi2019 project and gives an overview of the different data it generated. The following section presents the making of euandi2019: the interface, the making of the questionnaire, and the coding of the party positions. Then, the paper presents the resulting dataset on party positions across Europe. The following section describes the experience of euandi2019 users: presentation of individualized results and methodology for computing party proximity. Finally, the paper gives an overview of the data generated by euandi2019 users.

## **The making of euandi2019**


euandi2019 was the only transnational VAA for the 2019 European Elections. euandi2019 allows voters to gain an unobstructed view of the European political space, and where they place themselves within it. This political space is defined by the policies and preferences of the parties competing in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament (EP). euandi2019 provides users a political profile based on their responses to a list of twenty-two policy statements. Users can react to each issue statement by stating their level of agreement on a standard five-point scale ranging from ‘completely agree’ to ‘completely disagree’, and a ‘no opinion’ option. They can also assign saliency to issues by indicating to which extent they regard each issue as personally important to them. The VAA then uses a mathematic algorithm to match voters’ and parties’ positions, giving greater emphasis to the positions weighted by the user as being ‘more important’, and less emphasis to those weighted as ‘less important’ (see methodology section later). The user’s political profile can be compared to the political parties of a given nation as well as with parties from the entire European Union.

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy, piloted euandi2019 in close collaboration with the University of Lucerne, in Switzerland. The project was led by Prof. Alexander H. Trechsel (University of Lucerne and EUI) and by Dr. Diego Garzia (University of Lucerne and EUI). Statlab and Mobilab, based in Estonia, were the main technical partners. 28 country teams (in each Member State) constitute the backbone of the euandi2019 endeavour. The country teams constituted of 133 country experts: doctoral, postdoctoral or senior researchers that have coded the positions of all parties featured in the VAA<sup>2</sup>. A majority of the country team members is currently affiliated with the EUI, but many collaborators are working in other European universities (a majority of country team leaders, as well as, many coders have been parts of either the 2009 EU Profiler or euandi2014). For the full composition of the euandi2019 team, see Appendix A.

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<sup>2</sup> The gender breakdown of the country team experts counts 79 male coders (59 percent) and 54 female coders (41 percent). Overall, 17 percent of coders have already took part in the euandi2014 project.

Figure 1 – the euandi2019 homepage



euandi2019 set itself an ambitious objective in terms of diffusion and number of users. Media coverage is decisive to reach as many citizens, and potential users, as possible. euandi2019 was launched online on April 29<sup>th</sup> 2019, and it was active until the elections of May 26<sup>th</sup> 2019<sup>3</sup>. It managed to attract over 1.3 million users thanks to its media partnerships. Indeed, euandi2019 featured on the homepage of numerous newspapers and news agencies in the six weeks preceding the election (see Figure 2). The application was also advertised in multiple articles, press releases, and TV interviews in national media across Europe.

<sup>3</sup> Note that the euandi2019 website is still functional and online, but the data collection has ceased on the day of the elections to the European Parliament.

**Figure 2 – the euandi2019 homepage – media partners**



### *The euandi2019 questionnaire*

As for all VAAs, the selection of the statements on which users and parties are placed is decisive, and it largely determines the quality of the tool (Walgrave et al., 2009; Lefevere and Walgrave, 2014; van Camp et al., 2014). The project leaders of euandi2019 have carefully selected the statement to be included in the VAA, following a series of criteria. The first criterion is political relevance: the issue raised in the statement has to be political significant. Second, parties need to have different positions on statements. It is essential that (at least some) parties disagree on each statement, in order to produce variance that will reflect in the users proximity to parties. Third, euandi2019 sets to cover the issues at stake in the 2019 EP campaign as broadly as possible. In order to determine which issues were the most salient across Europe, the project leadership relied on opinion polls, earlier manifesto coding, experts, academics, and journalists. Finally, the selection of statements in euandi2019 tries to maximize the proportion of longitudinal data, despite the more ephemeral saliency criteria. We therefore tried to include as many statements as possible from the questionnaires of the previous transnational VAAs from the 2009 and 2014 EP elections.

euandi2019 ultimately features 22 statements, which encompass a highly balanced set of political issues that cover most politically salient issues for parties and voters in the EU. Out of the 22 statements, 14 are consistent with both EU Profiler 2009 and euandi2014, while four statements are only replicated from the 2014 version (see Table 1).

**Table 1 – the euandi2019 questionnaire**

1. Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes\*\*
2. Asylum seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States through a mandatory relocation system
3. Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive\*\*
4. Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values\*\*
5. The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing\*\*
6. The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed\*\*
7. Euthanasia should be legalised\*\*
8. Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes\*\*
9. The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers\*\*
10. Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily\*
11. The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers\*
12. The EU should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules
13. The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)\*\*
14. Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs\*\*
15. Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons\*
16. Criminals should be punished more severely\*\*
17. The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy\*\*
18. On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice\*\*
19. European integration is a good thing\*\*
20. The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing\*
21. Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power\*\*
22. In European Parliament elections, EU citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party of candidate from any other Member State

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*Note:* Items replicated from the *EU Profiler 2009* and *euandi2014* questionnaire are marked with \*\*. Items that are replicated from euandi2014 only are marked with \*.

## **The party positions dataset**

### ***Party positioning: the iterative method***

There are multiple – and competing – techniques to position parties on ideological and policy/issue dimensions (for a comprehensive overview, see: Marks, 2007). However, none of these techniques has established a *gold standard* in party positioning endeavours (Pennings, 2011), and most approaches face severe shortcomings to place political parties across countries and time (Mair, 2001). This is a critical challenge for a project such as the euandi VAAs, which aim at comparing party positions across Europe, but also in a longitudinal perspective.

Early approaches to positioning parties on issues and policy dimension largely relied on ‘internal party expertise’. Yet, most research endeavours have gradually shifted towards academic methodologies, and most notably *expert surveys* (Castles and Mair, 1984; Ray, 1999; Benoit and Laver,

2006; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker et al., 2015) and *manifesto coding* (Budge, 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). In both cases, professionals outside the parties (respectively qualified researchers or expert coders) established the party positions. However, both techniques bear advantages and drawbacks (Benoit and Laver, 2007). Indeed, experts position parties in expert survey based on knowledge in the field, but they are usually not required to justify their decisions, nor to provide any evidence for their choices. Consequently, experts tend to converge in establishing the positions of large and mainstream parties, but the placement of smaller, or more radical, parties remains less consensual (Marks et al., 2007). Additionally, the longitudinal placement of parties by experts is problematic when experts need to place parties in the present as well as in the past (Krouwel and Elfinkhof, 2013). While the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) addresses this problem by asking experts to place parties every four years, it also impedes the comparability of the results as it disconnects the placement of parties from the national election cycles (and by extension from the update of party positions). On the other hand, approaches to coding party positions based on manifesto coding are essentially salience-based. The *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP) is the most notable example in this respect. It relies on the assumption that position can be inferred through saliency; in short, the more a party devotes sections of its manifesto to an issue, the more it is considered to support it. Consequently, two parties placing a similar emphasis on a given issue are assigned the same positions (Gemenis, 2013). Moreover, the CMP's longitudinal dimensions (an asset in itself) is also problematic, as it imposes issue categories, which were conceptualized in the 1970's, while the issue configuration of European politics has largely evolved – although some issues have been recently added to the codebook.

Early VAAs have usually relied on similar methods to place party positions, resorting to elite surveys (e.g. Dutch *Stemwijzer*, German *Wahl-O-Mat*), or occasionally to large-N surveys of social and political scientists (e.g. Irish *Pick Your Party*, Italian *Itanes VoteMatch*). Recently, VAA researchers have designed a novel methodology for placing political parties, which avoids most drawback of earlier party placement approaches. The Dutch VAA *Kieskompas* pioneered the *iterative* method.. This method has then been successfully applied in many European countries and beyond (Krouwel et al., 2014) as well as in supranational contexts (Sudulich et al., 2014). The iterative method attempts to combine the strengths of consolidated methodologies, while addressing their shortcomings. To put it simply, expert coding and party self-placement of positions take place independently. Both experts and parties are required to justify their placement with supporting evidence. The respective results are compared, in order to introduce a control mechanism. When country experts and the parties themselves disagree on where to place precisely a party on an issue, they interact in a so-called “calibration phase”, which usually results in an agreement (Trechsel and Mair, 2011; Garzia et al., 2017). In doing so, the iterative method combines evidence-based expert coding with interaction with political parties themselves during a campaign period.

Along the lines of its predecessors, euandi2019 resorted to the iterative method of party positioning. Each country team coded party positions, and interacted with the parties themselves between March and April 2019. Both sides had to provide supporting evidence for each coded party position. Experts had to support their party placement with reliable documentation. The sources provided by country experts followed a hierarchical order of preference to insure accuracy and reliability: (1) EU Election Manifesto 2019 of national party; (2) Party Election Platform; (3) Current/latest national election manifesto; (4) EU Election Manifesto of Europarties; (5) Other programmatic and official party documentation; (6) Interviews, press releases and social media communication by party leader and leading candidates; (7) Older Election Manifestos; (8) Other sources.

In order to ensure the highest possible level of reliability among coders, crosschecks were organised within each team, while country team-leaders ran additional checks before finalising the process of party placement. Party self-placements and the expert coding were compared; and in cases of discrepancies, the party was asked to provide more support for its declared position for the country team to identify a final position. Where parties declined the invitation, country teams took care of positioning the parties based on the available documentation. While the parties themselves were consulted, the final decision

on positions always lay with the country team, offering the tool a complete impartiality and independence.

The euandi2019 team tried to be as inclusive as possible when selecting the parties to be included in the VAA. Indeed, not all lists running for the EP could be realistically included, as many candidate lists are put together by micro-parties or for the purpose of the EP election only, and put out very limited documentation. Additionally, some of the smaller parties/lists of candidates declare their intention to compete in the election late in the campaign – not allowing country teams to include them in the VAA (which had to be functional and online one month before the election). euandi2019 thus includes every party that held a seat in the 8<sup>th</sup> European Parliament (2014-2019) or in a national parliament, as well as every party considered able to win at least a seat in the EP election - based on multiple opinion polls.

On these basis, euandi2019 featured 272 parties that ran in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament (M=9.4 per country) coded on 22 statements. The number of coded parties is in line with the 2009 EU Profiler (N=274) and with euandi2014 (N=242), and substantially higher than the number of parties that actually obtained a seat in the 9<sup>th</sup> European Parliament (N=202). The full list of political parties included in the application is in Appendix B. Table 2 presents the number of parties coded in each country, and the proportion of parties who interacted with the expert coders and place themselves on the euandi2019 statements. More than half of the parties provided the euandi2019 team with self-placement on the statements (54.3%)<sup>4</sup>. However, the country variation is very high: while in five cases all parties responded, in nine cases only one (or no) party engaged with the country teams. Familiarity and popularity of VAAs in the respective countries seems to be the main explanation for these differences in self-placement patterns. Indeed, the highest shares of party self-placement with euandi2019 originate from countries that have long tradition of VAA use, and where substantial shares of the voters know and use similar tools (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden).

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<sup>4</sup> Due to ongoing Brexit negotiations in March and April 2019, the participation of British parties to the 2019 EP elections has been long uncertain. Since the euandi2019 British team could only start coding late in the process, they were not able to contact parties for self-placement. British parties are therefore excluded from calculation of party response rates.

**Table 2 – Degrees of party cooperation, 2019**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Total parties</b>	<b>Self-placed parties</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Austria	6	6	100.0%
Belgium – Flanders	7	7	100.0%
Belgium – Wallonia	7	1	14.3%
Bulgaria	9	0	0.0%
Croatia	12	6	50.0%
Cyprus	7	7	100.0%
Czech Republic	8	7	87.5%
Denmark	10	9	90.0%
Estonia	8	4	50.0%
Finland	12	10	83.3%
France	12	1	8.3%
Germany	15	15	100.0%
Greece	12	1	8.3%
Hungary	7	1	14.3%
Ireland	10	5	50.0%
Italy	7	1	14.3%
Latvia	10	9	90.0%
Lithuania	7	1	14.3%
Luxembourg	10	10	100.0%
Malta	3	0	0.0%
Netherlands	12	10	83.3%
Poland	6	1	16.7%
Portugal	12	3	25.0%
Romania	7	1	14.3%
Slovakia	10	3	30.0%
Slovenia	15	11	73.3%
Spain	8	2	25.0%
Sweden	9	8	88.9%
Total EU27	258	140	54.3%
UK	14	n/a	n/a

The trends of party cooperation in euandi2019 are consistent with the party self-placement of euandi2014, and overall much higher than for EU Profiler 2009 (see Table 3). Although individual country variation over time can be important, the response rates in Eastern and Western Europe are largely comparable in 2014 and in 2019.



**Table 3 – Trends of party cooperation, 2009-2019**

	<b>2009</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2019</b>
	%	%	%
Austria	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%
Belgium	76.9%	91.7%	57.1%
Cyprus	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%
Denmark	66.7%	50.0%	90.0%
Finland	83.3%	70.0%	83.3%
France	12.5%	30.0%	8.3%
Germany	50.0%	61.5%	100.0%
Greece	42.9%	33.3%	8.3%
Ireland	14.3%	66.7%	50.0%
Italy	12.5%	63.6%	14.3%
Luxemburg	37.5%	87.5%	100.0%
Malta	50.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Netherlands	81.8%	91.7%	83.3%
Portugal	8.3%	12.5%	25.0%
Spain	63.6%	75.0%	25.0%
Sweden	72.7%	90.0%	88.9%
United Kingdom	8.3%	23.1%	n/a
<b>Total West</b>	<b>49.9%</b>	<b>61.3%</b>	<b>60.4%</b>
Bulgaria	37.5%	25.0%	0.0%
Croatia	14.3%	57.1%	50.0%
Czech Republic	22.2%	50.0%	87.5%
Estonia	50.0%	85.7%	50.0%
Hungary	66.7%	83.3%	14.3%
Latvia	0.0%	14.3%	90.0%
Lithuania	0.0%	57.1%	14.3%
Poland	22.2%	37.5%	16.7%
Romania	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Slovakia	0.0%	30.0%	30.0%
Slovenia	44.4%	66.7%	73.3%
<b>Total CEE</b>	<b>23.4%</b>	<b>46.1%</b>	<b>44.4%</b>
<b>Total EU28</b>	<b>39.5%</b>	<b>55.0%</b>	<b>54.3%</b>

***The issue space of political parties in 2019***

272 parties have been coded on the 22 selected statements, generating 5984 unique party positions. Whenever country teams could not find any reliable source to place a party on a given position, it was coded as “no opinion”. The last column in Table 4 reports the share of parties that were coded with a substantial position on each of the 22 statements. Overall, at least about 80% of all political parties have an established position on 21 out of 22 statements. We found that only 61% of parties in Europe positioned themselves on the option of the statement on the possibility to vote for parties from other members in European elections. It seems that fewer parties position themselves on an issue that was mostly only debated within the European Parliament (i.e., the constitution of transnational lists), and which was largely postponed by this institution. While the 22 statements are unevenly polarizing, euandi2019 does not include any valence issue (a necessary condition for parties to be distinguishable in the application’s algorithm). On each issue, at least 20 percent of the parties either take a side, i.e. at

least one fifth of the parties either agree or disagree (whether they “tend to” or they do “completely”) on each of the 22 statements.

**Table 4 – Party positions on 22 issue statements: descriptive analysis**

Item (short description)	Completely Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Neutral	Tend to Agree	Completely Agree	N	% of total
1. Maintain social programmes	9%	19%	15%	<b>30%</b>	26%	263	97%
2. Stronger support for unemployed	10%	24%	9%	27%	<b>30%</b>	257	94%
3. EU punish deficit	<b>27%</b>	21%	13%	24%	15%	217	80%
4. Proportional distribution of asylum seekers	<b>32%</b>	11%	3%	23%	31%	245	90%
5. Restrictions to immigration	23%	24%	8%	19%	<b>26%</b>	261	96%
6. Immigrants should accept our values	13%	13%	9%	26%	<b>39%</b>	242	89%
7. Legalisation of same-sex marriage	23%	8%	10%	12%	<b>47%</b>	261	96%
8. Legalisation of soft drugs	<b>34%</b>	15%	14%	16%	22%	240	88%
9. Legalise euthanasia	<b>32%</b>	14%	16%	15%	23%	198	73%
10. Reduce government spending	19%	<b>25%</b>	9%	28%	18%	249	92%
11. EU tax raising powers	<b>39%</b>	15%	8%	21%	17%	233	86%
12. Tax stock market gains	8%	18%	6%	<b>27%</b>	41%	236	87%
13. Promote public transport	12%	19%	14%	<b>34%</b>	21%	233	86%
14. Support renewable energy	10%	20%	8%	<b>40%</b>	22%	250	92%
15. Accept privacy restrictions	30%	<b>35%</b>	10%	22%	3%	216	79%
16. Punish criminals more severely	9%	24%	18%	<b>27%</b>	23%	238	88%
17. Strengthen EU defence policy	19%	13%	7%	25%	<b>37%</b>	260	96%
18. One voice for EU foreign policy	16%	13%	11%	20%	<b>40%</b>	249	92%
19. European integration is good	14%	10%	10%	20%	<b>47%</b>	270	99%
20. Euro is a bad thing	<b>44%</b>	17%	11%	12%	17%	254	93%
21. Less veto power for member states	<b>31%</b>	27%	6%	21%	15%	218	80%
22. Vote for parties from other member states	<b>42%</b>	14%	8%	15%	21%	165	61%

The descriptive analysis of party positions in the euandi2019 also show that the statements related to the EU (statements 17 to 22) tend to feature higher shares of support. Note that while the “neutral” position tends to indicate centrist stance on issues, it is always the positions adopted by the smallest proportion of parties. This would indicate that the euandi2019 statements do produce different polarized political dimensions. The remainder of this section looks at the euandi2019 issue space, and investigates to what extent the dimension that emerge from party positions reflect the established political cleavages in Europe.

Table 5 shows the results of a factor analysis of the positions of the 272 parties on the 22 statements of euandi2019 (varimax rotation of principal component analysis). Most statements included load on four major factors, which correspond to existing political conflict dimensions in Europe: pro-anti EU continuum (Factor 1), socio-economic left-right (Factor 2), socio-cultural conflict (Factor 3), and a broader post-materialist dimension (Factor 4). The first dimension of the euandi2019 issue space corresponds to the specific stake of the European election. Yet, it is noticeable that the Factor 2 (socio-economic issues), and Factors 3 and 4, constitute the two dimensions of the largely established bi-dimensional political space in Europe (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012). Yet, our results show that the socio-cultural conflict is actually divided into two dimensions: on the one hand, law and order and immigration

(together with gay marriage), and on the other hand, post-materialist values including legalisation of drugs and euthanasia and the proposal for transnational voting rights. Notably, environmental issues tend to load on the socio-economic dimension, confirming findings of recent and similar analyses (Lachat and Michel, 2019)<sup>5</sup>.

**Table 5 – Factor analysis of euandi issue statements (party dataset)**

Item (short description)	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4
1. Maintain social programmes	0.01	0.79	0.22	0.05
2. Stronger support for unemployed	-0.01	0.68	0.36	0.07
3. EU punish deficit	0.58	-0.43	-0.15	-0.17
4. Proportional distribution of asylum seekers	0.22	0.23	0.53	0.21
5. Restrictions to immigration	-0.17	-0.29	-0.75	-0.19
6. Immigrants should accept our values	0.07	-0.40	-0.64	-0.17
7. Legalisation of same-sex marriage	0.20	0.20	0.64	0.28
8. Legalisation of soft drugs	0.01	0.24	0.35	0.59
9. Legalise euthanasia	0.07	0.15	0.30	0.63
10. Reduce government spending	0.09	-0.68	-0.29	-0.14
11 EU tax raising powers	0.46	0.42	0.15	0.47
12. Tax stock market gains	-0.16	0.70	0.04	0.20
13. Promote public transport	0.36	0.54	0.17	0.25
14. Support renewable energy	0.25	0.54	0.35	0.16
15. Accept privacy restrictions	0.25	-0.18	-0.30	-0.23
16. Punish criminals more severely	-0.20	-0.34	-0.46	-0.30
17. Strengthen EU defence policy	0.86	-0.10	-0.09	0.01
18. One voice for EU foreign policy	0.82	0.04	0.10	0.10
19. European integration is good	0.81	0.10	0.24	0.10
20. Euro is a bad thing	-0.83	0.03	-0.11	-0.08
21. Less veto power for member states	0.53	0.14	0.22	0.41
22. Vote for parties from other member states	0.29	0.12	0.24	0.56
<i>Variance</i>	<i>4.11</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>2.83</i>	<i>1.98</i>

## The user experience

Entering the euandi2019 website, individual users are given the option to select their country and the language of their choice (the VAA is accessible in 23 official languages, as well as in English for every Member State). Users could then position themselves on the 22 issues statements included in the tool by indicating their level of agreement on a standard five-point scale ranging from ‘completely agree’ to ‘completely disagree’, and a ‘no opinion’ option (see Figure 3).

<sup>5</sup> One statement does not load on any factor (statement 15 on privacy restrictions on internet), since it does not meet our criteria of coefficient (i.e., >.40).

**Figure 3 – Example of a euandi2019 issue statement (user's view)**

The image shows a screenshot of the euandi2019 user interface. At the top left, there is a logo with the text "euandi 2019" and a circular arrangement of yellow stars. Below the logo, there is a horizontal bar with numbers 1 through 22, where the number 1 is highlighted. The main content area displays the statement "Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes" in a light blue box. Below the statement, there is a response scale with six options, each marked with a checkmark in a white box: "Completely agree", "Tend to agree", "Neutral", "Tend to disagree", "Completely disagree", and "No opinion". The background of the interface is dark blue with faint, larger yellow stars.

Users who answered the 22 statements of euandi2019 were offered the possibility to attribute a score of importance to each of the issues (marking it as a “less important” or “more important” issue; see Figure 4). The saliency each user gives to an issue matters in the final calculation of his/her proximity score with parties.

**Figure 4 – Assigning saliency to the issue statements (user’s view)**

### Add weights

All 22 statements might not be of equal importance to you. To reflect your preferences, you can weight the importance of every statement: (-) less important and (+) more important.

Skip

1. Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes	- = +
2. The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers	- = +
3. The European Union should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules	- = +
4. Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among European Union Member States	- = +
5. Immigration into Germany should be made more restrictive	- = +
6. Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values	- = +
7. The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing	- = +
8. The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed	- = +
9. Euthanasia should be legalised	- = +
10. Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes	- = +
11. The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers	- = +
12. Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily	- = +
13. The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)	- = +
14. Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs	- = +
15. Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons	- = +
16. Criminals should be punished more severely	- = +
17. The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy	- = +
18. On foreign policy issues the European Union should speak with one voice	- = +
19. European integration is a good thing	- = +
20. The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing	- = +
21. Individual member states of the European Union should have less veto power	- = +
22. In European Parliament elections, European Union citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party or candidate from any other Member State	- = +


Continue

Once the user has completed the questionnaire and (possibly) attributed a degree of importance to each of the issues, the algorithm calculates the degree of proximity, or match (in percentage points) between the positions of the user and of the parties included in the VAA. Users can explore their proximity to

the parties in the country they selected in the beginning of the questionnaire (Figure 5a), but they are can also consult their degree proximity with parties of the entire European Union (Figure 5b).

**Figure 5a – “Party Matching” visualization: national parties**



**Figure 5b – “Party Matching” visualization: All parties in the EU**

euandi2019 shows the overlap between the political parties' positions and the user's preferences. In order to simplify the interpretation of the results, the latter are expressed in terms of a percentage of overlap. 0% indicates that a political party and a user's preferences do not overlap at all, 100% indicates that they completely overlap. In addition to these simple proximity scores, euandi2019 provides users with further possibilities of exploring how they are situated in the political space, and how close or distant they are to political parties. The next sub-section presents these different visualizations of where users and parties are located in the political space and details the algorithm behind euandi2019.

#### *Calculating the nearest political parties: The euandi2019 algorithm*

The calculation of a user's proximity to parties relies on the so-called “Manhattan (or city-block) distance”, which expresses how close two respective points are one from another in an n-dimensional space. Users can choose to indicate their degree of agreement with each statement on a five-point scale (with a “no opinion” option). The positions taken up by the political parties follow the same scale. In order to calculate the overlap between users and parties, answer options transform into numbers, using the following key:

'I completely disagree' = 0,

'I tend to disagree' = 25,

'I am neutral' = 50,

'I tend to agree' = 75,

'I completely agree' = 100

We can therefore calculate the distance ( $k$ ) between the positions ( $P$ ) of each user ( $i$ ) and political party ( $e$ ) on every statement ( $v$ ). Expressed as an equation, this looks like this:

$$k_{i(v,e)} = |P_{iv} - P_{ie}|$$

Users could indicate how important they consider each issue statements. The proximity score between users and parties therefore includes the weights users give to their position.

The distance between a user's positions and the positions of the political party is multiplied by a weight ( $W$ ): for issues that are given less weight (importance) by a user, the distance is multiplied by 0.5. When no particular importance is indicated, the weighting remains neutral (multiplication by 1). When a statement is given more weight (importance), the distance is multiplied by 2. Therefore, the weighted distance is:

$$k_{i(v,e)} = |p_{iv} - p_{ie}| * W$$

The sum of weighted distances for all statements is divided with the sum of weights to normalise the results to 100%. The resulting value is the weighed distance between users' and parties' answers. Overlap with positions on the statements is the inverse of the obtained distance:

$$K = 100 - \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n k_{i(v,e)}}{\sum_{i=1}^n W_i} \right)$$

In order to present the user with finer grained results about his overlap with parties, euandi2019 also projects the user's overlap with parties on an seven-dimension radar (see Figure 6). In this interactive tool, users can compare their positions with parties that they can manually select, showing on what type of issues they overlap (or differ) with each party.



**Figure 6 – Party matching “radar”**



The euandi2019 radar shows seven different political dimensions, and each of the 22 statements has an effect on one or more radar dimension. Scores on each radar dimension are calculated based on answer categories, through scores of polarity. Each statement position results in a score of 1 (positive polarity) or of -1 (negative polarity). Positive polarity increases the dimension score as the result of support for a statement (answer key of 50-100), while negative polarity decreases the value of the dimension score for “not supporting” a statement (answer key 0-50). The resulting value for all statement positions ( $S_d$ ) for parties or users thus varies from 0 to 100, where 100 means total agreement. In formal terms, this translates into:

$$S_d = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (T_{id} * 2)}{n}$$

Where:

$$T_{id} = (P_{id} - 50) * p_{id}$$

And:

$$\text{if } T_{id} < 0 \text{ then } T_{id} = 0$$

$$\text{if } T_{id} > 0 \text{ then } T_{id} = T_{id}$$

For example, if two statements describe the radar dimension "Liberal society", the first one has polarity value of 1 for the dimension and the other has polarity of -1, the user has to answer "Completely agree" for the first and "Completely disagree" for the second statement to get maximum score on the radar dimension. Note that the weights user give to their positions are not included in the calculation of the radar scores. Table 6 details the statements loading on each of the seven radar dimensions, as well as their polarity.

**Table 6 – Statements included in the seven radar dimensions**

#### **LIBERAL SOCIETY**

Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States (+)  
 Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive (-)  
 The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing (+)  
 The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed (+)  
 Euthanasia should be legalised (+)  
 Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons (-)  
 Criminals should be punished more severely (-)

#### **ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION**

The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) (+)  
 Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs (+)

#### **EU INTEGRATION**

The EU should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules (+)  
 Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States (+)  
 Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes (-)  
 The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers (+)  
 The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy (+)  
 On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice (+)  
 European integration is a good thing (+)  
 The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing (-)  
 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power (+)  
 In European Parliament elections, EU citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party or candidate from any other Member State (+)

#### **ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION**

Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes (-)  
 The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers (-)  
 Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes (+)  
 The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers (-)  
 Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily (-)

The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) (-)  
Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs (-)

**RESTRICTIVE FINANCIAL POLICY**

Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes (-)  
The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers (-)  
The EU should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules (+)  
Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes (+)  
The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers (-)  
Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily (+)

**RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY**


Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive (+)  
Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes (+)

**LAW AND ORDER**

Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive (+)  
The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed (-)  
Euthanasia should be legalised (-)  
Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons (+)  
Criminals should be punished more severely (+)

euandi2019 also provides users with a simplified political landscape, which is based on similar conceptualisation as the seven-dimension radar (see Figure 7). The political landscape reduces the complexity for users by placing them and parties on two major dimensions: socio-economic issues and socio-cultural issues. The political landscape representation is based on the assumption that, in most political systems, citizens' and political parties' opinions on individual issues can be aggregated to coherent issue dimensions. These dimensions spur from the established bi-dimensional structure of political cleavages in Europe (Kreisi et al., 2008; 2012).

**Figure 7 - Political Landscape**



In order to determine the position of political parties and users in this two-dimensional space, we need to calculate their respective coordinates on the X and Y axes. Both axes are based on a score ranging from 0 to 100. In a first step, each VAA statement has been assigned to one dimension. Additionally, positions on the statements have been assigned a direction, which follows the structure of political attitudes in most European countries (see Table 7). Socio-economic attitudes can be either left or right, while cultural attitudes are divided between a liberal/pro-EU and a conservative/anti-EU side<sup>6</sup>.

The initial position of a political party on an axis is 50 (neutral). Its position on an axis is calculated over

$$paramValue = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (paramPolarityOfQuestions_i * (answer_i - 50))}{n} + 50$$

all statements using the following formula: where  $paramPolarityOfQuestions(i)$  indicates the polarity (direction) of the position (either 1 or -1, in a similar way as the calculation for the radar). Statements with a polarity of 0 (neutral position given by parties or respondents) are not included in a landscape dimension calculation. Note that this calculation does not take the saliency of issues into account; and there is no party-specific weighting of the issues for each of the parties. It must be noted that the bidimensional political landscape is independent from the overall “party match” the users receive (see Figure 5).

<sup>6</sup> Note that the two statements pertaining to the environment (“The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)” and “Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs”) are included in both dimensions.

**Table 7 – Statements included in the two dimensions of the political landscape**


<p><b>ECONOMIC DIMENSION: LEFT vs. RIGHT</b></p> <p>Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes (left)</p> <p>The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers (left)</p> <p>Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes (right)</p> <p>Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily (left)</p> <p>The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) (left)</p> <p>Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs (left)</p> <p><b>CULTURAL DIMENSION: LIBERAL/PRO-EU vs. CONSERVATIVE/ANTI-EU</b></p> <p>The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>The EU should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive (conservative/anti-EU)</p> <p>Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values (conservative/anti-EU)</p> <p>The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>Euthanasia should be legalised (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons (conservative/anti-EU)</p> <p>Criminals should be punished more severely (conservative/anti-EU)</p> <p>The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>European integration is a good thing (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing (conservative/anti-EU)</p> <p>Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power (liberal/pro-EU)</p> <p>In European Parliament elections, EU citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party or candidate from any other Member State (liberal/pro-EU)</p>
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### The euandi2019 user dataset

euandi2019 was launched to the public on April 29<sup>th</sup> 2019, about a month before the European Parliament elections were held. It stopped registering users on May 26<sup>th</sup> 2019, when all polling stations in EU Member state closed down. euandi2019 attracted a total of 1.277.795 users throughout Europe, further increasing the number of users of euandi2014 (see Figure 8).<sup>7</sup> Over time, euandi attracts more and more users, despite having to face increased competition from a growing number of national VAAs all over the continent.

<sup>7</sup> This figure only includes completed user profiles (i.e., users that have completed the VAA questionnaire).

**Figure 8 – Completed user profiles, 29 April–26 May 2019**



The users of euandi2019 are disproportionately distributed among EU Member states (see Table 8). These country variations are attributed mainly to two factors. First, countries in which euandi2019 featured on the homepage of prominent news outlet for the longest have attracted the most users (e.g. Portugal, Italy). Second, countries which have longstanding traditions of VAA usage and well established national VAA have been less receptive to euandi2019 and attracted fewer users (e.g. Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, and Denmark).

**Table 8 - Completed user profiles per country**

Country	Freq.	%		Freq.	%
Portugal	392599	30.7%	United Kingdom	9924	0.8%
Italy	378491	29.6%	Bulgaria	8429	0.7%
France	96087	7.5%	Malta	6238	0.5%
Slovakia	83239	6.5%	Spain	5944	0.5%
Czech Republic	63536	5.0%	Belgium - Flanders	2990	0.2%
Greece	47724	3.7%	Netherlands	2178	0.2%
Poland	37497	2.9%	Finland	2127	0.2%
Germany	27407	2.1%	Belgium - Wallonia	1824	0.1%
Estonia	21145	1.7%	Sweden	1029	0.1%
Romania	20279	1.6%	Denmark	838	0.1%
Hungary	17316	1.4%	Luxembourg	618	0.0%
Austria	13943	1.1%	Latvia	473	0.0%
Slovenia	12686	1.0%	Cyprus	323	0.0%
Ireland	11938	0.9%	Lithuania	316	0.0%
Croatia	10656	0.8%	TOTAL	1277795	100%

euandi2019 users tend to favour post-materialist issue statements (e.g., legalization of same-sex marriage, soft drugs, and euthanasia), they are support of pro-environment positions (e.g., public transport and renewable energies), and over 60 percent of users adopt pro-EU positions (see Table 9).

**Table 9 – Users' positions on the euandi2019 statements**

Item (short description)	Completely Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Neutral	Tend to Agree	Completely Agree	N	% of total
1. Maintain social programmes	12%	21%	13%	<b>36%</b>	18%	1 272 890	98%
2. Stronger support for unemployed	15%	25%	17%	<b>28%</b>	15%	1 257 392	98%
3. EU punish deficit	8%	16%	17%	<b>38%</b>	21%	1 244 122	97%
4. Proportional distribution of asylum seekers	16%	14%	12%	<b>32%</b>	27%	1 241 931	97%
5. Restrictions to immigration	17%	18%	13%	20%	<b>33%</b>	1 258 545	98%
6. Immigrants should accept our values	18%	16%	11%	24%	<b>31%</b>	1 261 364	99%
7. Legalisation of same-sex marriage	17%	9%	13%	18%	<b>43%</b>	1 257 551	98%
8. Legalisation of soft drugs	15%	11%	15%	22%	<b>36%</b>	1 255 211	98%
9. Legalise euthanasia	12%	8%	13%	29%	<b>37%</b>	1 244 988	97%
10. Reduce government spending	8%	11%	13%	30%	<b>38%</b>	1 242 251	97%
11 EU tax raising powers	<b>25%</b>	23%	19%	21%	13%	1 188 842	93%
12. Tax stock market gains	10%	12%	18%	<b>31%</b>	30%	1 172 693	92%
13. Promote public transport	10%	13%	15%	<b>35%</b>	27%	1 210 329	95%
14. Support renewable energy	9%	12%	10%	<b>36%</b>	33%	1 255 501	98%
15. Accept privacy restrictions	19%	18%	11%	<b>29%</b>	23%	1 249 032	98%
16. Punish criminals more severely	8%	12%	16%	29%	<b>35%</b>	1 238 376	97%
17. Strengthen EU defence policy	5%	10%	17%	33%	<b>35%</b>	1 237 532	97%
18. One voice for EU foreign policy	7%	12%	15%	<b>34%</b>	33%	1 225 821	96%
19. European integration is good	5%	6%	12%	34%	<b>43%</b>	1 227 268	96%
20. Euro is a bad thing	<b>36%</b>	19%	10%	13%	22%	1 245 895	98%
21. Less veto power for member states	<b>30%</b>	22%	22%	18%	9%	1 157 552	91%
22. Vote for parties from other member states	21%	20%	19%	<b>24%</b>	15%	1 165 736	91%

A stable share of around 80 percent of users have not attributed specific levels of salience to individual statements (see Table 10). Most issues are deemed “important” for about 12 to 20 percent of euandi2019 users. Notably, the only three statements that are considered important for less than 10 percent of users relate to EU institutions and the way they work: “EU tax raising powers”, “veto of Member States”, “possibility to vote for parties in other Member States”.

**Table 10 – Users attributed salience on the 22 euandi2019 statements**

Statement (short description)	-	=	+
1. Maintain social programmes	5.1	77.4	17.5
2. Stronger support for unemployed	6.3	79.4	14.3
3. EU punish deficit	7.0	80.6	12.5
4. Proportional distribution of asylum seekers	6.0	79.0	15.0
5. Restrictions to immigration	5.7	76.9	17.4
6. Immigrants should accept our values	6.1	77.4	16.5
7. Legalisation of same-sex marriage	7.0	74.1	18.8
8. Legalisation of soft drugs	8.6	75.9	15.5
9. Legalise euthanasia	6.7	76.3	17.0
10. Reduce government spending	3.7	78.1	18.2
11 EU tax raising powers	7.6	83.0	9.4
12. Tax stock market gains	5.6	80.3	14.2
13. Promote public transport	5.4	79.4	15.2
14. Support renewable energy	4.0	76.1	19.9
15. Accept privacy restrictions	5.0	79.0	16.0
16. Punish criminals more severely	6.4	80.4	13.2
17. Strengthen EU defence policy	5.6	81.1	13.3
18. One voice for EU foreign policy	5.7	82.3	12.1
19. European integration is good	3.8	79.4	16.8
20. Euro is a bad thing	5.2	79.1	15.7
21. Less veto power for member states	6.7	84.3	9.1
22. Vote for parties from other member states	9.1	84.7	6.2

## Concluding remarks

As already argued, the scientific relevance of the euandi2019 project lies above all in the choice to stick to the iterative method of party positioning already employed in the EU Profiler 2009 and euandi2014 projects. The choice to keep as many as 14 policy items in the 2019 questionnaire, in order to allow for cross-national, longitudinal research on party competition and electoral behaviour, in the European Union member states is the second strongpoint of euandi2019

We have reasons to believe that the use of the iterative method in connection with the recent VAA development represents a promising way for studying party positions across time and space. Users' electoral behaviour is affected by VAAs, as shown by several studies (see Alvarez et al., 2014 Garzia, 2010; Garzia et al., 2014; 2017; Pianzola et al., 2019) and parties appear to be progressively more aware of it. More systematic interactions between parties and increasingly skilled teams of VAA developers aiming to produce the best application possible in an ever more crowded VAA market presages ever more accurate datasets on party positions. The possibilities of the iterative method for party positioning



will unfold at their maximum in conjunction with the making of further transnational VAAs willing to value the replication of issue statements across time.

In terms of potential applications, VAA-generated data represents a fantastic source to conduct research on party competition and political representation. Traditional analyses of mass-elite congruence commonly resorted to traditional survey designs. In this respect, VAAs would seem to feature a number of advantages. As a matter of fact, VAAs are able to attract millions of respondents during an election campaign and, even more importantly, they allow comparisons of the issue positions of voters and parties using the same data source. As a result, measurement of the extent to which parties and voters are mutually congruent is strongly facilitated. The rise of supranational VAAs will also allow researchers to develop and test empirically-driven theories of party competition across levels of governance; but also to dig deeper into the dynamics of multi-level representation; and ultimately to empirically assess the opportunities and pitfalls stemming from the construction of a truly transnational voting space (Bright et al., 2016) in the EU and beyond.

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## **APPENDIX A: The euandi2019 team**

### **Project leadership**

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Ingo Linsenmann, EUI (financial and administrative coordinator)

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Elena Torta, EUI (media and outreach coordinator)

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Martina Popova, EUI (media and outreach support)

Joanna Zofia Wielgo, EUI (administrative and financial support)

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### **Belgium - Flanders**

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## APPENDIX B: List of parties included in euandi2019

Country	Party name (English)	Party name and acronym
Austria	Austrians People's Party	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
Austria	NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum	NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS)
Austria	Austrian Green Party	Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE)
Austria	Initiative 1 Europe	Initiative 1 Europa (1EUROPA)
Belgium - Flanders	Workers' Party of Belgium	Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA)
Belgium - Flanders	Socialist Party Differently	Socialistische Partij Anders (sp.a)
Belgium - Flanders	Green	Groen (Groen)
Belgium - Flanders	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open Vld)
Belgium - Flanders	Christian Democratic and Flemish	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V)
Belgium - Flanders	New Flemish Alliance	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA)
Belgium - Flanders	Flemish Interest	Vlaams Belang (Vlaams Belang)
Belgium - Wallonia	Socialist Party	Parti Socialiste (PS)
Belgium - Wallonia	Reformist Movement	Mouvement Réformateur (MR)
Belgium - Wallonia	Humanist Democratic Centre	Centre Démocrate Humaniste (cdH)
Belgium - Wallonia	Ecolo	Ecolo
Belgium - Wallonia	Workers' Party of Belgium	Parti du travail de Belgique (PTB)
Belgium - Wallonia	Democratic Federalist Independent	Démocrate Fédéraliste Indépendant (DéFI)
Belgium - Wallonia	People's Party	Parti Populaire (PP)
Bulgaria	Ataka	Атака (Атака)
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	Национален фронт за спасение на България (НФСБ)

Bulgaria	Bulgarian National Movement	Обединети патриоти (ВМРО)
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Граждани за европейско развитие на България (ГЕРБ)
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party	Българска социалистическа партия (БСП)
Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Движение за права и свободи (ДПС)
Bulgaria	Will - Volya	Воля (Воля)
Bulgaria	Alternative for Bulgarian Revival	Алтернатива за българско възраждане, АБВ*
Bulgaria	Democratic Bulgaria	"Демократична България" (ДБ)
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ)
Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia	Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP)
Croatia	Human Shield	Živi zid (ŽZ)
Croatia	Bridge of Independent Lists	Most nezavisnih lista (MOST)
Croatia	Anti-Corruption, Development and Transparency Party	Stranka antikorupcije, razvoja i transparentnosti (START)
Croatia	Civic Liberal Alliance	Građansko-liberalni savez (GLAS)
Croatia	Bruna Esih – Zlatko Hasanbegović: Independents for Croatia	Bruna Esih – Zlatko Hasanbegović: Neovisni za Hrvatsku (NHR)
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party	Hrvatska seljačka stranka (HSS)
Croatia	Croatian People's Party – Liberal Democrats	Hrvatska narodna stranka - Liberalni demokrati (HNS)
Croatia	Istrian Democratic Assembly	Istarski demokratski sabor (IDS)
Croatia	Croatian Conservative Party	Hrvatska konzervativna stranka (HKS)
Croatia	We can	Možemo!
Cyprus	Democratic Rally	Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός (ΔΗΣΥ)
Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People	Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού (ΑΚΕΛ)
Cyprus	Democratic Party	Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα (ΔΗΚΟ)
Cyprus	Movement for Social Democracy	Σοσιαλιστικό Κόμμα (ΕΔΕΚ)
Cyprus	National Popular Front	Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο (ΕΛΑΜ)
Cyprus	Alliance	Συμμαχία

Cyprus	Jasmine	Γιασεμί
Czech Republic	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011	ANO 2011 (ANO)
Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party	Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD)
Czech Republic	Czech Pirate Party	Česká pirátská strana (Piráti)
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM)
Czech Republic	Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party	Křesťanská demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová (KDU-ČSL)
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party	Občanská demokratická strana (ODS)
Czech Republic	Coalition STAN and TOP 09	koalice STAN a TOP 09 (STAN-TOP)
Czech Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy	Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura (SPD)
Denmark	The Danish Social Democrats	Socialdemokratiet (A)
Denmark	The Social Liberal Party	Det Radikale Venstre (B)
Denmark	The Conservative Party	Det Konservative Folkeparti (C)
Denmark	The Socialist People's Party	Socialistisk Folkeparti (F)
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	Liberal Alliance (I)
Denmark	The Danish People's Party	Dansk Folkeparti (O)
Denmark	The Liberal Party	Venstre (V)
Denmark	The Red-Green Alliance	Enhedslisten (Ø)
Denmark	The Alternative	Alternativet (Å)
Denmark	People's Movement Against the EU	Folkebevægelsen mod EU (N)
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	Eesti Reformierakond (RE)
Estonia	Estonian Centre Party	Eesti Keskerakond (KE)
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia	Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE)
Estonia	Fatherland	Isamaa Erakond (IE)
Estonia	Social Democratic Party	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (SDE)
Estonia	Estonia 200	Erakond Eesti 200 (E200)
Estonia	Estonian Greens	Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (EER)

Estonia	Richness of Life	Elurikkuse Erakond (ERE)
Finland	Social Democratic Party	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP)
Finland	National Coalition Party	Kansallinen Kokoomus (Kok.)
Finland	Centre Party	Suomen Keskusta (Kesk.)
Finland	Green League	Vihreä liitto (Vihr.)
Finland	Finns Party	Perussuomalaiset (PS)
Finland	Left Alliance	Vasemmistoliitto (Vas.)
Finland	Swedish People's Party	Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue (RKP)
Finland	Christian Democrats	Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit (KD)
Finland	Blue Reform	Sininen tulevaisuus (Sin.)
Finland	Pirate Party	Piraattipuolue (PP)
Finland	Feminist Party	Feministinen puolue (FP)
Finland	Seven Star Movement	Seitsemän Tähtien Liike
France	The Lovers of France	Amoureux De La France (AMF)
France	Worker's Struggle	Lutte Ouvrière (LO)
France	Undomitable France	La France Insoumise (LFI)
France	French Communist Party	Parti Communiste Français (PCF)
France	Europe Ecology - The Greens	Europe Ecology - Les Verts (EELV)
France	Generation.s	Génération.s (Gs)
France	Socialist Party - Public Place	Parti Socialiste - Place Publique (PS-PP)
France	Republic Onwards	La République En Marche (LREM) // La Renaissance
France	Union of Democrats and Independents	Union des Démocrates et Indépendants (UDI)
France	The Republicans	Les Républicains (LR)
France	National Rally	Rassemblement National (RN)
France	Popular Republican Union	Union Populaire Républicaine (UPR)
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
Germany	Ecological Democratic Party	Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei (ÖDP)

Germany	Party for Labour, Rule of Law, Animal Protection, Promotion of Elites and Grassroots Democratic Initiatives	Die Partei für Arbeit, Rechtsstaat, Tierschutz, Elitenförderung und basisdemokratische Initiativen (Die PARTEI)
Germany	Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU/CSU)
Germany	Free Democratic Party	Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)
Germany	Family Party of Germany	Familien-Partei Deutschlands (FAMILIE)
Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens	Bündis 90/Die Grünen (GRÜNE)
Germany	The Left	Die Linke
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
Germany	Bernd Lucke and the Liberal Conservative Reformers	Bernd Lucke und die Liberal-Konservativen Reformer (LKR)
Germany	National Democratic Party of Germany	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
Germany	Free Voters	Freie Wähler (FW)
Germany	Alliance C – Christians for Germany	Bündnis C – Christen für Deutschland (Bündnis C)
Germany	Party Human Environment Animal Protection	Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz (Tierschutzpartei)
Germany	Pirate Party Germany	Piratenpartei Deutschland (PIRATEN)
Greece	The River	To Ποτάμι (ΠΟΤ)
Greece	Greek Solution	Ελληνική Λύση (ΕΛ)
Greece	Union of Centrists	Ένωση Κεντρώων (ΕΚ)
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (ΚΚΕ)
Greece	Independent Greeks	Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες (ΑΝΕΛ)
Greece	New Democracy	Νέα Δημοκρατία (ΝΔ)
Greece	SYRIZA	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ)
Greece	Golden Dawn	Χρυσή Αυγή (ΧΑ)
Greece	Popular Unity	Λαϊκή Ενότητα (ΛΑΕ)
Greece	MeRA25	ΜΕΡΑ25
Greece	Ecologists	Οικολόγοι Πράσινοι (Ο.Π.)

Greece	Movement for Change	Κίνημα Αλλαγής (KIN.AΛ.)
Hungary	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance with Christian Democratic People's Party	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz) with Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP) (Fidesz-KDNP)
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik)
Hungary	Democratic Coalition	Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)
Hungary	Our Homeland Movement	Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Mi Hazánk)
Hungary	Politics Can Be Different	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)
Hungary	Momentum Movement	Momentum Mozgalom (Momentum)
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party with Dialogue for Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) with Párbeszéd Magyarországért (Párbeszéd) (MSZP-Párbeszéd)
Ireland	Fine Gael	Fine Gael (FG)
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	Fianna Fáil (FF)
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Sinn Féin (SF)
Ireland	Labour Party	Labour Party (LAB)
Ireland	Solidarity/People-Before-Profit	Solidarity/People-Before-Profit (S/PBP)
Ireland	The Greens	The Greens (G)
Ireland	Direct Democracy Ireland (DDI)	Direct Democracy Ireland (DDI)
Ireland	Renua	Renua ®
Ireland	Workers Party	Workers Party (WP)
Ireland	Social Democrats	Social Democrats (SD)
Italy	The League	Lega (L)
Italy	Five Star Movement	Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S)
Italy	Forward Italy	Forza Italia (FI)
Italy	Brothers of Italy	Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)
Italy	Democratic Party	Partito Democratico (PD)
Italy	More Europe	Più Europa (+E)
Italy	The Left	La Sinistra
Latvia	"Harmony" Social Democratic Party	"Saskaņa" sociāldemokrātiskā partija

Latvia	Who Owns the State?	KPV LV
Latvia	New Conservative Party	Jaunā konservatīvā partija (JKP)
Latvia	Development/For!	Attīstībai/Par! (A/P!)
Latvia	The National Alliance “All for Latvia” - “For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK”	Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!”-“Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK” (TB/LNNK)
Latvia	The Union of Greens and Farmers	Zaļo un Zemnieku Savienība (ZZS)
Latvia	New Unity	Jaunā vienotība (JV)
Latvia	The Union of Latvia’s Russians	Latvijas Krievu savienība (LKS)
Latvia	The Alliance of Latvia’s regions	Latvijas Reģionu apvienība (LRA)
Latvia	The Progressives	Progresīvie
Lithuania	Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats	Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai (TS-LKD)
Lithuania	Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union	Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga (LVŽS)
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija (LSDP)
Lithuania	Order and Justice Party	Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas (TT)
Lithuania	Labour Party	Darbo partija (DP)
Lithuania	Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania	Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis (LRLS)
Lithuania	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania - Union of Christian Families	Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija - Krikščioniškų šeimų sąjunga (LLRA-KŠS)
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party	Chrëschtlech-Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV)
Luxembourg	Democratic Party	Demokratesch Partei (DP)
Luxembourg	The Greens	Déi Gréng
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR)
Luxembourg	The Left	Déi Lénk
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	Kommunistische Partei Luxemburgs (KPL)
Luxembourg	Pirate Party Luxembourg	Piratepartei Lëtzebuerg
Luxembourg	Volt	Volt
Luxembourg	The Conservatives	Déi Konservativ

Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesche Aarbechterpartei (LSAP)
Malta	Labour Party	Partit Laburista (PL)
Malta	Democratic Party	Democratic Party
Malta	Nationalist Party	Partit Nazzjonalista (PN)
Netherlands	50Plus	50Plus
Netherlands	Christian Democrats	Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
Netherlands	Christian Union / Reformed Political Party	ChristenUnie (CU) / Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)
Netherlands	D66	Democraten '66 (D66)
Netherlands	DENK	DENK
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
Netherlands	Green Left	GroenLinks (GL)
Netherlands	Labour Party	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
Netherlands	Animal Party	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)
Netherlands	Freedom Party	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Socialistische Partij (SP)
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
Poland	Law and Justice	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
Poland	Civic Coalition	Koalicja Obywatelska (KO)
Poland	Spring	Wiosna
Poland	Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15
Poland	Confederation – Korwin Braun Liroy Narodowcy	Konfederacja – Korwin Braun Liroy Narodowcy
Poland	The Left Together	Lewica Razem
Portugal	Social Democratic Party	Partido Social-Democrata (PSD)
Portugal	Socialist Party	Partido Socialista (PS)
Portugal	Left Bloc	Bloco de Esquerda (BE)



Portugal	People's Party	CDS-Partido Popular (CDS-PP)
Portugal	Unitary Democratic Coalition	Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU)
Portugal	Earth Party	Movimento Partido da Terra (MPT)
Portugal	Democratic Republican Party	Partido Democrático Republicano (PDR)
Portugal	People-Animals-Nature	Pessoas, Animais, Natureza (PAN)
Portugal	Alliance	Aliança
Portugal	Enough	Chega
Portugal	FREE	Livre
Portugal	Portuguese Workers' Communist Party	Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (PCTP-MRPP)
Romania	The Social Democratic Party	Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)
Romania	The National Liberal Party	Partidul National Liberal (PNL)
Romania	Alliance 2002 USR-PLUS (Save Romania Union & Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party)	Alianta 2020 USR-PLUS (Uniunea Salvati Romania & Partidul Libertate, Unitate și Solidaritate )
Romania	Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats	Partidul Alianta Liberalilor Democrati (ALDE)
Romania	People's Movement Party	Partidul Mișcarea Populară (PMP)
Romania	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (UDMR)
Romania	Pro Romania	Pro Romania
Slovakia	Direction – Social Democracy	SMER - sociálna demokracia (SMER-SD)
Slovakia	Freedom and Solidarity	Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS)
Slovakia	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OBYČAJNÍ ĽUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti (OĽANO)
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	Slovenská národná strana (SNS)
Slovakia	Kotleba - People's Party Our Slovakia	Kotleba - Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS)
Slovakia	We Are Family - Boris Kollár	SME RODINA - Boris Kollár (SME RODINA)
Slovakia	Bridge	MOST – HÍD (MOST)
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (KDH)
Slovakia	Party of Hungarian Community	Strana maďarskej komunity - Magyar Közösség Pártja (SMK)

Slovakia	Coalition of Progressive Slovakia and Together – Civic Slovakia	Koalícia Progresívne Slovensko a SPOLU - občianska demokracia (PS a SPOLU)
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS)
Slovenia	Modern Centre Party	Stranka modernega centra (SMC)
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS)
Slovenia	Party of Alenka Bratušek	Stranka Alenke Bratušek (SAB)
Slovenia	Homeland League	Domovinska liga (DOM)
Slovenia	The Left	Levica (L)
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	Demokratska stranka upokojencev Slovenije (DeSUS)
Slovenia	Slovenian People's Party	Slovenska ljudska stranka (SLS)
Slovenia	Good Country	Dobra država (DD)
Slovenia	Social Democrats	Socialni demokrati (SD)
Slovenia	List of Marjan Šarec	Lista Marjana Šarca (LMŠ)
Slovenia	Let's connect (Pirate Party of Slovenia, Youth Party – European Greens, Solidarity Party, Worker's Party)	Povežimo.se (Piratska stranka Slovenije, Stranka mladih - Zeleni Evrope, Solidarnost – za pravično družbo, Delavska stranka)
Slovenia	Unified Slovenia Movement	Gibanje Zedinjena Slovenija (ZSi)
Slovenia	New Slovenia - Christian Democrats	Nova Slovenija - Krščanski demokrati (NSi)
Slovenia	Andrej Čuš and Greens of Slovenia	Andrej Čuš in Zeleni Slovenije (ZS)
Spain	Compromise for Europe	Compromiso por Europa (CpE)
Spain	Coalition for a Solidary Europe	Coalición por una Europa Solidaria (CEUS)
Spain	Socialist Party	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
Spain	Popular Party	Partido Popular (PP)
Spain	We Can	Unidos Podemos Cambiar Europa (Ps)
Spain	Citizens	Ciudadanos (Cs)
Spain	Now Republics	Ahora Repúblicas (AR)
Spain	Vox	Vox (Vox)
Sweden	The Social Democrats	Socialdemokraterna (S)

Sweden	The Moderates	Moderaterna (M)
Sweden	The Sweden Democrats	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
Sweden	The Centre Party	Centerpartiet (C)
Sweden	The Left Party	Vänsterpartiet (V)
Sweden	The Christian democrats	Kristdemokraterna (KD)
Sweden	The Liberals	Liberalerna (L)
Sweden	The Green Party	Miljöpartiet (MP)
Sweden	Feminist Initiative	Feministiskt Initiativ (FI)
UK	Brexit Party	Brexit Party
UK	Change UK	Change UK
UK	Conservative	Conservative
UK	DUP	DUP
UK	Green Party	Green Party
UK	Labour	Labour
UK	Liberal Democrats	Liberal Democrats
UK	Plaid Cymru	Plaid Cymru
UK	Scottish Green Party	Scottish Green Party
UK	SDLP	SDLP
UK	SNP	SNP
UK	UKIP	UKIP
UK	Ulster Unionist Party	Ulster Unionist Party
UK	Sinn Fein	Sinn Fein

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