Spiritual Empire

Spanish Diplomacy and Latin America in the 1920s

Gaël Sánchez Cano

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
of the European University Institute

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European University Institute
Department of History and Civilization

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the practice of cultural diplomacy in post-imperial contexts through the study of the Spanish-Latin American case (Hispano-Americanism) during the 1920s. It advances the concept of 'spiritual empire' to make sense of the weight of imperial legacies in multilateral international relations. It highlights the intangible and imagined nature of these legacies, and examines their use in foreign policy. It thus offers broader definitions of what is usually called 'soft power', with a specific emphasis on its European roots and on its intertwinement with empire and multilateralism during the interwar period, especially in the context of the League of Nations.

The specific object of this inquiry is the set of practices of Hispano-Americanism developed under General Miguel Primo de Rivera's authoritarian regime (1923-1930). Calls for closer relations between Spain and the Spanish-speaking American countries dated back to the late nineteenth century, in the form of intellectual pleas and some political projects. Only in the 1920s, however, was Hispano-Americanism built up as a relatively coherent set of diplomatic practices. Asking why these practices emerged in the 1920s in particular, the thesis explores this decade as a key moment for both empire and diplomacy.

Building mostly on archival material from the Spanish administration, the League of Nations, and US public and private institutions, this research inserts Spanish diplomacy at the heart of the narrative of power politics in Europe and the Americas. The aim is not to prove that Spain actually mattered, but to use this specific case study to pose alternative questions about power in world politics. Rather than asking where power is, this thesis seeks to understand what power is and how it is fabricated.

The notion of spiritual empire illustrates how the imperial logics of power resist the formal end of empires and are reused in the shape of diplomatic and administrative practices. It explains how Spanish diplomats and foreign-policy makers tried to hang on to a status of power granted by Spain's imperial past. It also opens the way to diachronic comparisons between Spain's Hispano-Americanism, Portugal's politics of Lusophony, France's politics of Francophony, or the British Commonwealth, among others.

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Mais c'est à toi, Ileana, que je dédie cette thèse. Tu sais bien pourquoi.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGA	Archivo General de la Administración
AGUN	Archivo General de la Universidad de Navarra
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional
ALON	Archive of the League of Nations
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CRBML	Columbia Rare Books and Manuscripts Library
DM	Directorio Militar
LONOD	League of Nations Official Documents
NARA	National Archive and Record Administration
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

INTRODUCTION

On 29 November 1898, Ángel Ganivet García, consul of Spain in Riga, committed suicide. He was thirty-two. Only he knew the reasons behind such a radical decision. It is nonetheless clear that he was distressed about the calamitous situation of his country. Some months earlier, following a succession of military defeats against the United States, Spain had lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and the rest of its possessions in the Pacific. The events of 1898 marked a significant turning point in Spain's imperial retreat. They were soon known as *'el Desastre'*. During his lifetime, Ganivet had striven to offer some alternative to the 'decadence' stemming from Spain's loss of importance in the world. As other members of the so-called *Generación del 98* would do after his death, he had advanced ideas to 'regenerate' Spain, both within and beyond its national borders.[1] In *Idearium español*, published in 1897, he had written:

> Nuestro papel histórico nos obliga a transformar nuestra acción de material en espiritual. España ha sido la primera nación europea engrandecida por la política de expansión y de conquista; ha sido la primera en decaer y terminar su evolución material, desparramándose por extensos territorios y es la primera que tiene ahora que trabajar en una restauración política y social de un orden completamente nuevo.[2]

Ganivet acknowledged that Spain had reached the limits of what he called 'material action'. He therefore urged policy makers to undertake actions of a 'spiritual' nature instead. For him, this transformation from the material to the spiritual was a natural evolution of empire, through which every imperial power was doomed to pass. Spain, he believed, had pioneered material imperialism by means of its colonial presence in the Americas between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In the 1890s, Ganivet suggested, Spain had the 'historical role' to pioneer an intangible sort of imperialism, a spiritual empire.

This thesis shows that Ganivet was pointing in the direction that Spanish diplomacy would go on to follow in the interwar period. In 1925, the military directorate led by General Miguel Primo de Rivera authorised the repatriation of Ganivet's mortal remains

[1] Julián Marías, 'El 98 antes del 98: Ganivet', *Rilce. Revista de Filología Hispánica* 13, no. 2 (1997): 121–28.

[2] Ángel Ganivet, *Idearium español* (Granada: Tip. Lit. Vda. e Hijos de Sabatel, 1897), 137–38.

from Latvia.[3] In Madrid, Ganivet's memory was honoured by scholars and intellectuals, but also by diplomats and politicians. Among other things, Ganivet was celebrated as a Hispano-Americanist: someone who called for the *acercamiento* (the coming closer, or the rapprochement) of Spain and its former colonies in Latin America.[4] If calls for closer relations between Spain and Spanish-speaking American countries dated back at least to the 1890s, it was in the 1920s that they were given a central place in Spanish foreign policy.[5] At that time, rekindling Ganivet's plea for a spiritual shift was deemed convenient. Throughout the decade, the agents of Spanish diplomacy attempted to develop spiritual empire as a branch of foreign policy. Understanding why this happened in the 1920s in particular is the specific aim of this thesis.

The object of my inquiry is the concept of spiritual empire. Using current terminology, spiritual empire could be defined as the intangible cultural heritage of empire: the stockpile of language, religion, traditions, values, identities, and behaviours that remain once the empire has formally disappeared.[6] Of course, I do not argue that anything similar to the intangible spirit of empires ever existed. The concept that I advance does not stand for the watery soul of the imperial 'iceberg'.[7] Spiritual empire was a constructed category of imagined imperial continuity. I am interested in explaining how it shaped — and was shaped by — the acts of different sorts of state agents, not only as a somewhat teleological project of foreign policy, but also as an instrument of diplomacy and a toolbox for diplomats. I am inspired by an aphorism that is often attributed to Seneca the Younger: 'Religions are equally true to the people, false to the wise, and useful to the politician."[8] As I see it, spiritual empire plays the role of the true, the false, and the useful religion. This thesis concentrates, more precisely, on the usefulness of spiritual empire.

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[3] José María Salaverría, 'En honor de un insigne escritor: la llegada de los restos de Ángel Ganivet', *ABC*, 29 March 1925, morning edition.

[4] José Francos Rodríguez, 'Ángel Ganivet y el hispano-americanismo', *ABC*, 27 March 1925.

[5] Ángel Martínez de Velasco, 'Política exterior del Gobierno de Primo de Rivera en Iberoamérica', *Revista de Indias* 149–150 (1977): 788–98; Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, 'Primo de Rivera y la diplomacia española en Hispanoamérica: el instrumento de un objetivo', *Quinto Centenario* 10 (1986): 131–56; Susana Sueiro Seoane, 'Retórica y realidades del «Hispanoamericanismo» en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera', *Mélanges de la Casa Velázquez* 28, no. 3 (1992): 143–59.

[6] On the current notion of intangible cultural heritage, see the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UNESCO General Conference on 17 October 2003, art. 2.

[7] The comparison of empires and icebergs was suggested in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review* VI, no. 1 (1953), 1.

[8] The aphorism was famously rewritten by Edward Gibbon in the first volume of his *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. See José Álvarez Junco, *Dioses útiles: naciones y nacionalismos* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2016), x.

It explores what tangible form spiritual empire came to take for foreign policy makers, diplomats, and other public officials in the 1920s. I suggest that, in post-imperial contexts, these agents of international politics also acted as agents of empire. Spiritual empire thus consisted of practices of cultural diplomacy, arguments for the construction of post-imperial interstate communities and, not least, rhetorical tools for legitimation in the playground of the so-called great powers. It was the rationale that underpinned projects such as Spain's Hispano-Americanism, but also Portugal's Lusophony, France's Francophony, or the British Commonwealth, all of which aimed (and still aim today) to bring former metropoles and former colonies more closely together. It is therefore essential to take the notion of spiritual empire into consideration in order to understand how the imperial logics of power resist the formal end of empires. This thesis provides a narrative of transition from empire to diplomacy, focusing on the persistence of imperial practices and imaginaries in the making and implementation of foreign policy.

The specific case of Spain's Hispano-Americanism allows me to reflect on the notion of power, which modern historians are often tempted to take for granted. My aim is not to prove that Spain actually mattered. Nor do I refute that it was a minor player compared to Britain or the United States, to name but two.[9] But it is precisely because it was a minor player that Spain is interesting. When we look at the world through the lenses of Britain, the United States, or any other major player, the questions that we tend to ask are 'Where is power?' and 'Who sets the benchmark in the hierarchy of leadership?'. This often leads us to narrate the history of the world as the history of a succession of great powers. In contrast, looking at the world through the lens of Spain forces us to pose different and perhaps more important questions: 'What is power?'; 'How does it work?'; 'Where does it come from?'. In my view, international history has to be studied within the analytical framework of multilateralism, and Spain is nothing more than an observatory.

It is, nonetheless, a privileged observatory for the 1920s. Studying the Spanish practices of spiritual empire in this specific decade leads to a broader reflection on the decade itself as a key moment for the reconfiguration of empire, the transformation of power relations, and the institutionalisation of internationalism and multilateralism. The case of Spain in the 1920s forces us to reconsider how empires end and yet persist in world politics.

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[9] Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, eds., *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

Spain's 'endless empire': spiritual empire as a category of imperial continuity

Historians seem to be increasingly reluctant to establish clear-cut distinctions between the categories of empire and nation.[10] Some alternative definitions and temporalities of the imperial phenomenon are challenging the well-established idea according to which 'the nation-state proclaims the commonality of its people […] while the empire-state declares non-equivalence of multiple populations'.[11] Regina Grafe has recently argued that the modern nation state can in fact be described as 'short-distance modern empires'.[12] With this thesis, I would like to add my contribution in this same direction, asking how imperial imaginaries and practices are enacted and re-enacted in national frameworks of foreign policy-making. The study of spiritual empire as a concept of imperial legacy and continuity has led me to the conclusion that the realms of the imperial and the national are so intertwined that it would be difficult, if not unhelpful, to dissociate them from one another.

The way in which post-1898 Spain has traditionally been pictured shows the need for alternative readings of empire and nation. It reveals the limits of the prism of the national, which has enduringly characterised narratives of the ends of empire and their consequences for imperial metropoles. In the case of Spain, as well as in other cases, imperial legacies and continuities are frequently overlooked, when not subsumed into overarching accounts of post-imperial national identity crisis and 'imperial hangover'.[13] Most Spanish and Hispanist scholars tend to acknowledge that Spain suffered from a particularly severe national identity crisis after the loss of its colonial possessions in the mainland Americas in the early nineteenth century.[14] This crisis, as the dominant narrative tells, worsened during the

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[10] Pieter Judson, 'Epilogue: The New Empires', in *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 442–52. See also Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Imperial Systems and Nation-States: The Persistence of Empires', in *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 392–468.

[11] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8.

[12] Regina Grafe, 'Empires of Charity: Imperial Legitimacy and Profitable Charity in Colonial Spanish America', *New Global Studies* 12, no. 2 (2018), 138.

[13] Hugh Seton-Watson, 'Introduction', *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 1 (1980): 1–4; Seton-Watson, 'Aftermaths of Empire', *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 1 (January 1980): 197–208. On Spain's 'imperial hangover', see Martin Blinkhorn, 'Spain: The "Spanish Problem" and The Imperial Myth', *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 1 (January 1980): 5–25. See also Joseph Harrison and Alan Hoyle, eds., *Spain's 1898 Crisis: Regenerationism, Modernism, Postcolonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Juan Pan-Montojo, ed., *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998); Angel G. Loureiro, 'Spanish Nationalism and the Ghost of Empire', *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 4, no. 1 (March 2003): 65–76.

[14] Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001); Álvarez Junco, *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).

Restauración (1874-1931, between the first and the second republican regimes) and peaked right after the 'disastrous' year of 1898. Historians then depict a decadent and backward, or even failed, Spanish nation-state.[15] To a certain extent, they still dwell on the pessimistic diagnosis that different 'regenerationist' thinkers established after *el noventa y ocho*.[16]

Within this framework, practices and imaginaries of empire become disproportionate and somewhat romantic 'dreams' of nationalism. Hispano-Americanism, the intellectual and political movement that called for the convergence of Spain and its former colonies in the Americas, has been read through this grid. This is how Isidro Sepúlveda, one of the most quoted historians on the topic, defines Hispano-Americanism and explains why it has to be studied as an outgrowth of Spanish nationalism:

> Su plasmación [del movimiento hispanoamericanista] radica en la reunión de iniciativas y la propuesta de programas, ya de forma individual o colectiva, y en la participación coordinada y solidaria en la idea de una cualidad especial y superior de las relaciones hispanoamericanas, cuyo objetivo era la conformación y promoción de la comunidad cultural hispanoamericana, de cuya consolidación España obtendría considerables beneficios. Por esta razón se analiza el hispanoamericanismo como un movimiento nacionalista […].[17]

This last conclusion is quite surprising. Sepúlveda's accurate description of Hispano-Americanism resembles a set of projects of external action based on imperial legacies and aimed at imperial ambitions. Would an approach through foreign policy and imperialism not be more pertinent than the approach through nationalism, which Sepúlveda seems to present as the most obvious one? The choice of nationalism is of course legitimate: Sepúlveda is in fact interested in how the projection of Spain towards the Americas

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[15] Javier Moreno Luzón, *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902-1931* (Brighton, Portland, and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2012); Eduardo González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera: la modernización autoritaria, 1923-1930* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005); Genoveva García Queipo de Llano, *El reinado de Alfonso XIII: la modernización fallida* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1996); Eric Storm, 'The Problems of the Spanish Nation-building Process around 1900', *National Identities* 6, no. 2 (July 2004): 143–56.

[16] Javier Blasco, 'El "98" que nunca existió', in Harrison and Hoyle, *Spain's 1898 Crisis*, 121–31.

[17] Isidro Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria: hispanoamericanismo y nacionalismo* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005), 17.

reflected back questions on what sort of Spain had to be projected.[18] However, this angle also entails a risk of tautology: if Hispano-Americanism was nothing but a branch of nationalism, it stemmed from nationalism and nurtured nationalism at the same time. In the end, nationalism is explained by nationalism.

Angles from intellectual history have proven useful to overcome this problem. David Marcilhacy's work on the construction of the Hispano-Americanist movement sheds light on the intrinsically imperial nature of Spanish nationalism.[19] Marcilhacy explains how different Spanish and Latin American intellectuals and politicians made sense of an 'imagined [Hispano-American] community' that was rooted in a supposedly shared imperial past.[20] It was therefore imagined beyond the nation. Of course, Hispano-Americanism was tightly connected to Spanish nationalism, but the frame of the nation was too small to contain it, as a comparative analysis of Spanish and Latin American nation-making processes tends to suggest.[21] The Hispano-Americanist imaginary consisted of the subsumption of the nation into a broader transnational category of imperial continuity.

More precisely, as Marcilhacy argues, Spanish nationalist imaginaries progressively shifted from Spanish peninsular notions of 'people' to more transnational notions of 'race'.[22] Nationalism melded with Hispano-Americanism through the increasingly pervasive belief in the existence of a specific Hispanic race.[23] This so-called *raza* was conceived as the cultural and social expression of the transnational post-imperial community. In a perhaps 'counterintuitive' manner, as Joshua Goode puts it, definitions of race in modern Spain

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[18] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 22. See also Sepúlveda, *Comunidad cultural e hispanoamericanismo, 1885-1936* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1994); Antonio Niño, 'Hispanoamérica en la configuración nacional española de comienzos del siglo XX', in *Enemigos íntimos: España, lo español y los españoles en la configuración nacional hispanoamericana, 1810-1910*, ed. Tomás Pérez Vejo (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2011), 171–211; and Moreno Luzón, 'Reconquistar América para regenerar España: nacionalismo español y centenario de las independencias en 1910-1911', *Historia Mexicana* LX, no. 1 (2010): 561–640.

[19] David Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana: hispanoamericanismo e imaginario nacional en la España de la Restauración* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2010). See also Marcilhacy, 'Une histoire culturelle de l'hispano-américanisme (1910-1930) : l'Espagne à la reconquête d'un continent perdu' (doctoral thesis, University of Paris III, 2006).

[20] Moreno Luzón, 'Prólogo', in Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, xiv. On the notion of 'imagined community', see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[21] Tomás Pérez Vejo, ed., *Enemigos íntimos: España, lo español y los españoles en la configuración nacional hispanoamericana, 1810-1910* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2011).

[22] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 68–78.

[23] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 17–324; Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 187–210; Fredrick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 128–45. See also Antonio Feros, *Speaking of Spain: The Evolution of Race and Nation in the Hispanic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).

tended to celebrate diversity and hybridisation more than purity and homogeneity.[24] Determining the biological characteristics of a national phenotype was not a priority for the architects of the *raza hispana*. Their concerns were instead anthropological.[25] The *raza* was conceived as an overarching set of cultural elements such as the Spanish language, the Catholic religion, and a variety of traditions purportedly shared on both sides of the Atlantic. In Spain as in Latin America, intellectuals and politicians adopted the scheme of *raza* to construct different frameworks of identity that confirmed the myth of the nation, at the same time as they questioned it by calling upon transnational similarities.[26]

The transatlantic pervasiveness of the notion of *raza hispana* nurtured Spanish national imaginaries. These came to contain an allegedly 'imperial vocation' by virtue of the nation's imperial past.[27] The presence of empire at the centre of nationalism is fundamental, for it pulls down the artificial frontier between the temporality of the empire-state and that of the nation-state. Imperial imaginaries and practices do not simply vanish from one day to another. This is also the main argument of a collective volume that Alfred McCoy, Josep Maria Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson have suggestively entitled *Endless Empire*.[28] This work shares Ann Stoler's invitation to go beyond a vision of empire as a static and monolithic category, and rather see it as a set of 'macropolities in constant formation', which are 'states of becoming rather than being'.[29] In McCoy's words, the end of empires results in processes of 'metamorphosis, with each empire's eclipse eliding into imperial succession in a process that is more a comma than a period'.[30] I find the metaphor of the 'eclipse' particularly evocative: the empire becomes invisible, but it still exists behind the celestial body that covers it, which might well be the nation. To carry the metaphor further, the

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[24] Joshua Goode, *Impurity of Blood: Defining Race in Spain, 1870-1930* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009), 1–19.

[25] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 17–32.

[26] On the notion of *raza* in Latin America in particular, see Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 287–99. See also Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles Chasteen, eds., *Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Washington and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and John M. Nieto-Phillips, eds., *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 136–256.

[27] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 67.

[28] Alfred W. McCoy, Josep Maria Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, eds., *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).

[29] Ann Laura Stoler, 'On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty', *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006), 136.

[30] McCoy, 'Fatal Florescence: Europe's Decolonization and America's Decline', in McCoy, Fradera, and Jacobson, *Endless Empire*, 10.

concept of spiritual empire that I advance in this thesis stands for the radiation that the empire continues emitting in spite of its eclipse.

Radiation is, by definition, intangible. This thesis is indeed focused on an imagined intangible (or immaterial) heritage of empire and on its use by diplomatic agents.[31] In other words, it deals with practices of empire in the absence of a formal imperial polity. The notion of spiritual empire complements that of informal empire.[32] Scholars of the latter have mostly looked at imperial practices of free trade, business, industry, and resource exploitation. In their path-breaking reformulation of informal empire, Matthew Brown and others add culture as a necessary element of informal empire, but still insist on the 'economic policy roots' of the phenomenon.[33] The notion of spiritual empire that I propose regards the use of intangibility in itself as a strategy of international and imperial power. Of course, the kind of imperial re-enactment that I explore in this thesis contained practices of informal empire: Spanish agents used the material tools of migration, commerce, credit, or business. However, spiritual empire was not limited to these sorts of practices. In addition to aiming at countable benefits, the agents of spiritual empire wished to restore the world-class status granted by the uncountable elements of an imperial past: a common language, a set of supposedly shared values, and what was called *raza*.

If the empire was endless, it is not only because it went on through time from one place to another in its material form of military action, colonial settlement, and socio-political domination. Empire was also 'recycled' into administrative and political practices that were no longer explicitly conceived as imperial.[34] In spite of the formal absence of an empire, state agents undertook practices that were formally conceived as international and diplomatic, but remained based on imperial legacy. This is what Lorenzo Delgado, who analyses Spanish cultural diplomacy towards Latin America in the early years of Francisco

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[31] On the notion of intangible or 'immaterial' empires, see Gaël Sánchez Cano and Miquel de la Rosa Lorente, 'Immaterial Empires: France and Spain in the Americas, 1860s and 1920s', *European History Quarterly* (agreed for publication in 2019).

[32] The term was seminally advanced in Gallagher and Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', 1. For a review of recently studied cases of informal empire, see Barbara Lüthi, Francesca Falk, and Patricia Purtschert, 'Colonialism without Colonies: Examining Blank Spaces in Colonial Studies', *National Identities* 18, no. 1 (2016): 1–9.

[33] Matthew Brown, ed., *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 19–22. See also Luz Elena Ramírez, *British Representations of Latin America* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007); Robert D. Aguirre, *Informal Empire: Mexico and Central America in Victorian Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Fernando Coronil, 'Foreword', in *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), ix–xiii.

[34] See Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2014).

Franco's dictatorship, calls a 'paper empire'.[35] The phenomenon of endless imperialism created a specific type of diplomacy that aimed to bring the former metropole and its former colonies more closely together, as well as to construct power on the basis of an imperial past. In the case of Spain, a general intellectual and political atmosphere favoured the emergence of a Hispano-Americanist paradigm of foreign policy in the early twentieth century.[36] Spanish diplomacy quite naturally brought Latin America into play.

The scramble for Latin America: cultural diplomacy and imperialism

The history of Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries presents a striking paradox. On the one hand, the region was composed of formally independent and sovereign states. On the other, it was, continuously and perhaps *par excellence*, as post-colonial scholars argue, a subject of coloniality: the 'Latin' was understood as the 'Southern' and thus subaltern to the 'Northern', the 'European', and the 'Anglo-Saxon'.[37] Historians of the nineteenth century have approached this paradox by looking at Latin America as the birthplace of informal empire.[38] As for the twentieth century, the paradox is often more simply explained: the region is depicted as the imperial backyard of the United States, the 'workshop' where the latter developed the combination of business predation, surgical military interventions, soft-power philanthropy, and development aid that shaped the twentieth century as the 'the American century'.[39] In these accounts, imperialism wins the

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[35] Lorenzo Delgado, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992). See also Rosa Pardo, *Con Franco hacia el imperio: la política exterior española en América Latina, 1939-1945* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1994). On the construction of 'paper' or 'cardboard' empires through administrative practices in the interwar period, see also Nadia Vargaftig, *Des Empires en carton : les expositions coloniales au Portugal et en Italie (1918-1940)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2016).

[36] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 114–208; Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 275–300.

[37] Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui, eds., *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Walter D. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America* (Malden: Blackwell, 2005). See also Alain Rouquié, *Amérique latine : introduction à l'Extrême Occident* (Paris: Seuil, 1987).

[38] Brown, *Informal Empire in Latin America*. See also Edward Shawcross, *France, Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867: Equilibrium in the New World* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Aguirre, *Informal Empire*; Alan Knight, 'Britain and Latin America', in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. Andrew Porter and Louis, William Roger, vol. III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 122–45; and D.C.M. Platt, ed., *Business Imperialism, 1840-1930: An Inquiry Based on British Experiences in Latin America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

[39] Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books & Henry Holt and Company, 2006). See also, among others, Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954); Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A Hitory of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: United States Interventions in the Caribbean, 1898–1934* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2002); Marcelo Bucheli, *Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899-2000* (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Kris James

battle over sovereignty and the agency of Latin American actors is reduced to resistance and anti-imperialism.[40]

Perhaps a better manner of resolving the paradox is to overcome the imperialism-versus-sovereignty dichotomy. Studying the juridical aspects of US-Latin American relations in the early twentieth century, Juan Pablo Scarfi and Benjamin Allen Coates have both recently proven that the emergence of an inter-American international law system served the affirmation of sovereignty and the exertion of imperialism simultaneously.[41] This suggests that sovereignty and imperialism were not contradictory realities and belonged to the same dynamics of international relations. Standing between elements of US hegemony and interstate cooperation in the so-called Western Hemisphere, Pan Americanism and other inter-American projects appear as 'workshops' of a more general reconfiguration of the world order in the early twentieth century.[42] Looking at the American continent reveals that imperialism and international relations walked hand in hand.

This becomes particularly clear when we look at the interwar period. Contrary to what is usually admitted, the First World War profoundly affected the way in which some Latin American elites, especially the Brazilian and Argentinian ones, thought about the place of their own countries in the world order.[43] As a result, in the 1920s, different Latin American

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Mitchener, *Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004); Richard F. Hamilton, *America's New Empire: The 1890s and Beyond* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2010); Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011); Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest: US Scholars in South America, 1900-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Peter James Hudson, *Bankers and Empire: How Wall Street Colonized the Caribbean* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017).

[40] James F. Petras, *Power and Resistance: US Imperialism in Latin America* (Boston: Brill, 2015); Alan L. McPherson, *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Fred Rosen, ed., *Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

[41] Juan Pablo Scarfi, *The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Benjamin Allen Coates, 'International Law and Empire in Latin America, 1904-1917', in *Legal Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016). See also Scarfi, *El imperio de la ley: James Brown Scott y la construcción de un orden jurídico interamericano* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014); Scarfi, 'In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933', *Diplomatic History* (2014).

[42] Andrew Tillman and Juan Pablo Scarfi, eds., *Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: Revisiting the Western Hemisphere Idea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[43] Olivier Compagnon, *L'adieu à l'Europe : l'Amérique latine et la Grande Guerre* (Paris: Fayard, 2013); Stefan Rinke, *Latin America and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Compagnon et al., eds., *América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial: una historia conectada* (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos, 2018). See also Thomas Fischer, 'América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial', *Iberoamericana* XVI, no. 63 (2016): 259–72.

states used US-led Pan American platforms to oppose US imperialism and, more importantly, they used the new platforms of multilateralism (the League of Nations and its related organisations) to actively affirm their sovereignty.[44] As Yannick Wehrli has convincingly demonstrated, Pan Americanism and the League of Nations were two alternative frameworks wherein Latin American states played their role in the development of internationalism and multilateralism.[45] This phenomenon is better understood in light of David Marcilhacy's recent investigation of the intellectual and political reinterpretations of Simón Bolívar's legacies around the year of 1926.[46] This invites us to see Latin American political and diplomatic elites as a heterogeneous group of agents who did not share the same vision of Latina America's place in the interwar world order. In particular and perhaps surprisingly, in contrast to Pan Americanism as a continental, commercial, and post-colonial framework for international cooperation, Hispano-Americanism and spiritual empire offered 'racial', cultural, and post-imperial bonds of international solidarity that some Latin American diplomats did not at all disregard.[47]

This indicates the need to look beyond the geographical limits of the American continent in order to understand the place of Latin America in the world during the 1920s. In 1929, Salvador de Madariaga, professor of Spanish at the University of Oxford and a former official of the League of Nations, made a thought-provoking invitation to imagine alternative geographies for the American continent:

> El tamaño del mundo no se debe medir por el pueril procedimiento consistente en contar los metros que tiene. Se mide contando las horas que se tarda en ir de un punto a otro y los

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[44] David Sheinin, ed., *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 1–8; Fischer, *Die Souveränität der Schwachen: Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920-1936* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012).

[45] Yannick Wehrli, 'États latino-américains, organismes multilatéraux et défense de la souveraineté : entre Société des Nations et espace continental panaméricain, 1919–1939' (Université de Genève, 2016); Wehrli, 'Latin America in the League of Nations: Bolívar's Dream Come True?', in *Latin America 1810-2010: Dreams and Legacies*, ed. Claude Auroi and Aline Helg (London: Imperial College Press, 2012), 67–82. See also Juliette Dumont, 'Latin America at the Crossroads: the Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Pan American Union', in *Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations*, ed. Alan L. McPherson and Yannick Wehrli (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 155–167.

[46] Marcilhacy, 'Panama panaméricain. Le Centenaire bolivarien de 1926, mémoires croisées et projections transnationales' (Habilitation à diriger des recherches, Sorbonne Université, 2018).

[47] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 195; Richard V. Salisbury, 'Hispanismo versus Pan Americanism: Spanish Efforts to Counter US Influence in Latin America before 1930', in Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*, 67–78; Fischer, 'El español en el mundo: hispanoamericanismo en la Liga de las Naciones', *Iberoamericana* XIII, no. 50 (2013): 119–31.

> segundos que nuestro pensamiento pone en trasladarse. Con arreglo a este criterio, Nueva York está en Europa, y Buenos Aires, también. Y Norteamérica está más cercana a Norteeuropa (física y psíquicamente) que a Suramérica. Así como Suramérica lo está de Sureuropa más que de Norteamérica. Todo eso de «América» es un mito monroico […].[48]

This plea for global and transnational studies *avant la lettre* was part of a wider reflection on whether Latin America belonged in the League of Nations or in the Pan American framework. Madariaga had a clear opinion on the matter, as can be seen here. He affirmed that the 'Monroic myth' of the Western Hemisphere could not erase the 'psychological' (or cultural, we could say) proximity between the Americas and the rest of the world, especially Europe. This was part of a defence of world-scaled multilateralism. It was also part of an essentialist and romanticised projection of Europe towards Latin America.

In the 1920s, Latin America was the object of a myriad of practices of cultural projection coming from different European countries.[49] French, German, Spanish, and Italian public and private initiatives, among others, created transnational networks of cultural relations and favoured the creation of cultural action departments within foreign ministries.[50] Mass immigration coming into Latin America from Europe also generated private initiatives based on transnational social networks and, perhaps more interestingly, new practices of expansionist diplomacy.[51] All this is what I call the 'scramble for Latin America', an intrinsically imperial phenomenon in which cultural diplomacy played a major

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[48] Salvador de Madariaga, 'Lo ecuménico y lo hispánico', *El Sol*, 3 March 1929.

[49] Robin Brown, 'Alternatives to Soft Power: Influence in French and German External Cultural Action', in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (London: Routledge, 2017), 40.

[50] H. Glenn Penny, 'Material Connections: German Schools, Things, and Soft Power in Argentina and Chile from the 1880s through the Interwar Period', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 59, no. 3 (2017): 519–49; Michael Goebel, 'Decentering the German Spirit: The Weimar Republic's Cultural Relations with Latin America', *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 2 (April 2009): 221–45; J.P. Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French": Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires', *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 4 (December 2008): 831–864; Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, 'Presentación (La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y América Latina: memoria, políticas y acción cultural, 1907-1939)', *Revista de Indias* LXVII, no. 239 (2007): 9–14; Niño, '1898-1936: orígenes y despliegue de la política cultural hacia América Latina', in *L'Espagne, la France et l'Amérique latine : politiques culturelles, propagandes et relations internationales, XX^e siècle*, ed. Denis Rolland, Lorenzo Delgado, and Eduardo González Calleja (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2001), 23–163; Gilles Matthieu, *Une ambition sud-américaine : politique culturelle de la France (1914-1940)* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1991).

[51] Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The 'Greater German Empire', 1871–1914* (New York: Routledge, 2014); Mark I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); José C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Sepúlveda, '«Haciendo las Américas»: la emigración española como agente del hispanoamericanismo', in *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 363–91.

role. In this context, Spanish practices of spiritual empire were more typical than exceptional, notwithstanding their specific post-imperial nature. The United States was also part of this phenomenon, but the primary and secondary sources that I use suggest that it was a minor player, a 'latecomer'.[52] In the 1920s, the scramble for Latin America remained, mostly, a European phenomenon.

It echoed the Europhile mind-set of most Latin American intellectual and political elites.[53] The very idea of a 'Latin' America referred to Southern Europe, as Madariaga signalled — ultimately, it referred to the imagined spiritual legacy of the Roman Empire. The thesis according to which the Latinity of Latin America was imposed from France in the context of the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s has been enduring.[54] However, Michel Gobat has recently challenged it by arguing that Latinity was claimed by Latin American elites themselves as early as in the 1850s.[55] The idea of Latin America became, among other things, a tool of anti-imperial diplomacy.[56] What the English language calls 'Latin America' has been given different names of European origin (such as *'Iberoamérica'* or *'Hispanoamérica'*), which have all been mobilised for imperialist as well as anti-imperialist purposes, depending on who mobilised them, and when.[57]

The idea of a transnational Hispano-American community built on a common *raza* was also ambiguously used in the Americas. As an illustrative example of these ambiguities, the Mexican academic and politician José Vasconcelos, one of the main theorisers of the Hispanic race in the 1920s, opposed a 'cosmic' Ibero-American race based on intangible

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[52] Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15–40; José Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of American Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-48* (Washington D.C.: US Department of State, 1976). See also Ruth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee, *The Cultural Approach: Another Way to International Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1947), 208–29; Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 100–05.

[53] Corinne Pernet, 'Culture as Policy: Cultural Exchanges between Europe and Latin America in the Interwar Period', *Puente a Europa* V, no. 3/4 (November 2007): 121–26.

[54] John Leddy Phelan, 'Pan-Latinism, French Intervention in Mexico (1861–1867) and the Genesis of the Idea of Latin America', in *Conciencia y autenticidad Históricas: escritos en homenaje a Edmundo O'Gorman*, ed. Juan A. Ortega y Medina (Mexico, 1968), 279–298.

[55] Michel Gobat, 'The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Race', *American Historical Review* 118, no. 5 (December 2013): 1345–75. See also Aims McGuiness, 'Searching for "Latin America"', in *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America*, ed. Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 88–102.

[56] Gobat, 'The Invention of Latin America', 1348. See also Scarfi, 'La emergencia de un imaginario latinoamericanista y antiestadounidense del orden hemisférico: de la Unión Panamericana a la Unión Latinoamericana (1880-1913)', *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 39 (2013): 81–104.

[57] Miguel Rojas Mix, *Los cien nombres de América: eso que descubrió Colón* (Barcelona: Editorial Lumen, 1991).

elements of commonality to a materialistic and imperialistic Anglo-Saxon race.[58] His criticism targeted the interventions of the United States south of their border.[59] At the same time, he included Spain and Portugal in the broader 'family' of what he called the cosmic race. He claimed to be anti-imperialist against the Anglo-Saxons, while he perpetuated the imperial connection between the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas. These entanglements of imperialism and anti-imperialism are crucial in order to get a sense of the place and role of Spanish spiritual empire within the phenomenon of a scramble for Latin America. They lead me to insert specific Spanish and Latin American historical characteristics into the wider context of the world order in the 1920s, in which spiritual empire found the possibility to emerge as a strategy of world-class power.

The fabrication of power: empire, diplomacy, and the world order in the 1920s

Up to this point, I have presented Spanish spiritual empire towards Latin America as a manifestation of Spain's endless imperialism. I have also explained that, as a branch of foreign policy, Spanish spiritual empire was part of a wider phenomenon of European cultural projection, which I have identified as a scramble for Latin America. Spanish spiritual empire thus looks like a Spanish-Latin American reality, as the projection of Spain towards its former colonies in the Americas, and as a properly post-imperial and perhaps even neo-colonial set of policies. All this, of course, reflects what Spanish spiritual empire partly was: an effort to preserve, nurture, and exploit the legacy of the Spanish Empire in the Americas in order to create a more or less formal post-imperial community of states. In this sense, diachronic comparisons can be drawn between Spain's Hispano-Americanism, France's Francophony, Portugal's Lusophony, and the British Commonwealth.

However, all this is not enough to explain why the Hispano-Americanist movement transformed into a set of foreign policy practices precisely in the 1920s. Spain was an endless empire well before 1898, and the scramble for Latin America took place in the early twentieth century, before and after the 1920s. Therefore, why did practical Hispano-Americanism reach momentum in the 1920s? Why did the authoritarian regime of General Primo de Rivera feel the urge to develop a foreign policy based on spiritual empire as soon as it came to power in 1923? Posing these questions has forced me to reflect on how

[58] José Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica: misión de la raza iberoamericana: notas de viajes a la América del Sur* (Madrid: Agencia Mundial de Librería, 1925).

[59] Maike Thier, 'A World Apart, a Race Apart?', in *America Imagined: Explaining the United States in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Latin America*, ed. Axel Korner, Nicola Miller, and Adam I.P. Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 161–89.

empire and diplomacy operated and interacted in a decade during which, in the aftermath of a long total war, the world order was being profoundly transformed. What role did Spanish spiritual empire play in these transformations? Asking this drives me to more general questions about the role and evolution of cultural diplomacy and imperialism in the 1920s and, more generally, throughout the twentieth century.

At first sight, the Spanish practices of spiritual empire under Primo de Rivera reflect nothing other than the efforts of a dictatorial regime to legitimise itself. Within the dominant narrative of post-imperial nationalism, Primo de Rivera's Hispano-Americanist diplomacy is interpreted as a bunch of conservative policies that mirrored Spanish domestic concerns and were disconnected from world politics. Reflecting a general tendency to understand early twentieth-century Spain as the story of *dos Españas* (a 'liberal' one versus a 'conservative' one) ending up in the civil war, historians of Hispano-Americanism establish quite categorical distinctions between liberal and conservative approaches to the phenomenon.[60] Isidro Sepúlveda, for example, argues that Primo de Rivera's regime set up a conservative 'monopoly' over the Hispano-Americanist movement.[61] For David Marcilhacy, too, the dictatorship 'confiscated' the liberal Hispano-Americanist project and used it as part of its 'official doctrine'.[62] In my opinion, these interpretations are hasty; they overestimate the weight of Primo de Rivera's political ideas in the process of foreign policy-making. By contrast, looking into the complexities of policy-making processes points to different conclusions.

Policies can be quite simply defined as 'anything a government chooses to do or not to do'.[63] Political scientists have nonetheless insisted upon the fact that governments or, more generally, public authorities are not clearly identifiable agents. Policy-making processes rather involve a myriad of individual agents that interact within given structures.[64] Therefore, diplomatic practices of spiritual empire such as Primo de Rivera's cannot be

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[60] Pike, *Hispanismo*.

[61] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 120.

[62] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 454. See also María Dolores de la Calle Velasco, 'Hispanoamericanismo: de la fraternidad cultural a la defensa de la Hispanidad', in *Jirones de hispanidad: España, Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas en la perspectiva de dos cambios de siglo*, ed. Mariano Esteban de Vega, Francisco de Luis Martín, and Antonio Morales Moya (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2004), 151–72.

[63] Thomas Dye [1972], quoted in Michael Howlett and Ben Cashore, 'Conceptualizing Public Policy', in *Comparative Policy Studies: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges*, ed. Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 17.

[64] Pierre Muller and Yves Surel, *L'analyse des politiques publiques* (Paris: Montchrestien, 1998), 79-100. See also Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'La science politique et les trois néo-institutionnalismes', *Revue française de science politique* 47, no. 3 (1997): 469–96.

understood as the direct translation of Primo de Rivera's ideology. As Gérard Noiriel suggests, we need a sociological approach to the history of policy-making in order to avoid the 'reification of social relations' within polities and institutions.[65] A helpful manner of reading political ideas and concepts is thus to place them in the social and institutional structures within which they are created, negotiated, and reshaped, in function of the circumstances.[66] I see a clear interest for historians in following these lines. Rejecting the facile angle of ideology, and instead approaching policy-making through its socio-historical praxis is the only manner by which to preserve the agency of individuals and the historicity of formal institutions and informal social structures.[67] Ideology, nationalism, and authoritarianism do not suffice to explain Primo de Rivera's Hispano-Americanism. This thesis aims to offer a sociological narrative of Spanish foreign policy making by focusing on the practices of some of its political and diplomatic agents.

Looking inside these political and diplomatic practices requires us to contextualise them within the events that reconfigured the world order during the 1920s. Susana Sueiro Seoane has made a particularly interesting contribution to the limited literature on the diplomatic history of Primo de Rivera's Hispano-Americanism. Reading Hispano-Americanist diplomacy as a set of 'proofs of friendship' towards Spain's neighbouring countries such as Portugal, France, or Italy, she states:

> En contra de lo que pudiera pensarse, no hay en Primo de Rivera una voluntad de monopolizar la influencia sobre la América española frente a otra naciones, lo que no es solo debido a la conciencia de la inutilidad de pretender semejante cosa, sino a consideraciones de conveniencia desde el punto de vista de la política exterior española.[68]

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[65] Gérard Noiriel, *Introduction à la socio-histoire* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 3-4. See also Renaud Payre and Gilles Pollet, *Socio-histoire de l'action publique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2013).

[66] Pierre Muller, 'L'analyse cognitive des politiques publiques : vers une sociologie politique de l'action publique', *Revue française de science politique* 50, no. 2 (2000): 189–208. On the importance of ideas and concepts in political history, see Pierre Rosanvallon, *Pour une histoire conceptuelle du politique: leçon inaugurale au Collège de France faite le jeudi 28 mars 2002* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003); Reinhart Koselleck, 'Begriffsgeschichte and Social History', *Economy and Society* 11, no. 4 (1982): 409–27. For a concrete example of this approach, see Bruno Jobert, *Le tournant néo-libéral en Europe : idées et recettes dans les pratiques gouvernementales* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1994).

[67] Sandrine Kott, 'Les organisations internationales, terrains d'étude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique', *Critique internationale* 52 (2011): 9–16.

[68] Sueiro Seoane, 'Retórica y realidades del «Hispanoamericanismo» en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera', 146.

In other words, Spain was yet another participant in the scramble for Latin America. Primo de Rivera's Hispano-Americanism did not seek any sort of Spanish hegemony over the former American colonies. Sueiro Seoane supports her argument by demonstrating that Primo de Rivera's diplomacy was 'pragmatic' and wished to preserve good relations with other European powers, especially with those that could potentially help Spanish interests in Morocco, namely France, Italy, and Britain. My findings confirm this argument, but they also invite me to complete it with a broader explanation.

As a set of diplomatic practices of spiritual empire, Hispano-Americanism could not possibly seek hegemony. After the First World War, international relations saw the emergence of institutional internationalism and interstate multilateralism, which progressively strengthened throughout the 1920s.[69] The League of Nations was the most conspicuous manifestation of this phenomenon. The different policies, structures, and networks that constituted the scramble for Latin America were other manifestations of it. All this set new frameworks for foreign policy and diplomacy, which Mark Mazower has named 'the era of internationalism'.[70] For Spain in particular, this momentum within international relations opened new windows of opportunity. The rationale of international cooperation that underpinned the epoch rejected the pursuit of hegemony as a legitimate tool of power. It compelled governments to practice multilateralism and to adopt strategies of power that stood between collaboration and competition. Spiritual empire was thus used as an asset that Spanish diplomacy could wield in order to guarantee Spain's influence and bargaining capacity in this changing world order. What Daniel Gorman calls 'the emergence of international society' favoured the emergence of spiritual empire as a practice of diplomacy that championed non-hegemonic understandings of power.[71]

Spiritual empire was, moreover, an intrinsically imperial resource of power. The diplomatic practices of spiritual empire married imperialism and internationalism. This combination characterised the world order in the interwar period, as some recent contributions to the history of the League of Nations demonstrate. Both Susan Pedersen and Mark Mazower have convincingly proven the structurally imperial nature of the League

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[69] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Patricia Clavin, 'Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World Wars', in *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars*, ed. Daniel Laqua (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 1–14.

[70] Mark Mazower, 'The Era of Internationalism', in *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 1–188.

[71] See Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

of Nations and the United Nations.[72] Their works show how the 'great' imperial powers instrumentalised the League for their own interests. Although their writing is based on formal definitions of empire and realist definitions of power and leave little space to question these definitions, both Mazower and Pedersen underline the intertwining of empire and international relations as a fundamental characteristic of world order transformations in the interwar period. In particular, Pedersen's thorough analysis of the League's mandate system demonstrates that the League was a platform for imperial legitimation and that diplomats and League officials acted as agents of empire. The League, in theory as in practice, was indeed an imperial organisation.

Analysing the practices that Latin American diplomats undertook in Geneva is also very enlightening. The League was a platform of power for 'the weak', as Thomas Fischer puts it. The assertion of sovereignty as an instrument of anti-imperialism, to which I have referred above, was only part of the picture. Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico, among others, also used the League of Nations to question a world order that they judged Euro-centric and led by self-proclaimed great powers. Curiously enough, as I show in the fourth chapter of this thesis, Spanish diplomats also questioned this world order with similar arguments. At the same time, Latin American officials and diplomats took a proactive part in the different sectorial activities of the League, thereby using multilateral frameworks as means of empowerment. As Alan McPherson and Yannick Wehrli suggest, looking at the League of Nations through Latin American lenses provides a different narrative of the League 'beyond geopolitics'. More generally speaking, looking at international relations through the lenses of 'the weak' undermines the very definition of 'geopolitics'. Efforts towards empowerment are as important as the effective exertion of power. Both phenomena tell us something about what power is. From this angle, international relations are not a mere arena in which power games take place: international relations fabricate power in its different declinations.

These observations echo some recent debates amongst historians and international relations specialists.[73] Beyond a realist paradigm that bases power on the material capacity

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[72] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Mazower, *Governing the World*. See also Pedersen, 'Empires, States and the League of Nations', in *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 113–38.

[73] David Reynolds, 'International History, the Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch', *Cultural and Social History* 3, no. 1 (2006): 75–91.

of a state to exert influence and domination, a more constructivist understanding of international relations and world order is emerging. The international history of East Asia made an especially important contribution to this change of historiographical paradigm.[74] In the field of international relations studies, too, scholars and policymakers have been invited to rethink the notion of power. Joseph Nye famously advanced the concept of 'soft power' to explain a country's 'ability to get what [it] wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments', that is, through the attractiveness of its culture.[75] Nye's contribution is important insofar as it extends the understanding of power and domination from the realm of the material to the realm of the intangible. Soft power consists, indeed, in dominating communication resources and rhetorical narratives. Some of the practices of spiritual empire that I present in this thesis fit within this definition of soft power.

As Nye frames it, however, soft power is exclusively oriented towards getting what a country 'wants' from another country or group of countries. This reflects how US diplomacy has conceived cultural diplomacy, especially since the Cold War.[76] European instances of cultural diplomacy and soft power indicate a different direction. In the history of cultural diplomacy, Nye's concept of soft power is only one option among others.[77] Taking the example of French *action culturelle* and German *auswärtige Kulturpolitik* since the nineteenth century, Robin Brown proposes the notion of 'external cultural action' to name the set of foreign policy practices that translate a 'holistic perspective on [a country's] national influence'.[78] From this holistic perspective, the objective of the policy is not necessarily to obtain a concrete and immediate benefit, but rather to guarantee the country's influence, presence, and legitimacy in the world.

More than a tool for domination, then, external cultural action is a tool for the projection of a country's existence to the rest of the world. Reporting on Spain's external cultural action towards Latin America in 1926, a US diplomat described it as 'a legitimate aspiration of progress and development, which will give significance and influence to Spain

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[74] Antony Best, 'The "Cultural Turn" and the International History of East Asia: A Response to David Reynolds', *Cultural and Social History* 3, no. 4 (2006): 482–89.

[75] Nye, *Soft Power*, x.

[76] Hart, *Empire of Ideas*; Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, eds., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Boston: Brill, 2010); Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005).

[77] Charlotte Faucher, 'Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations in Twentieth-Century Europe', *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 2 (2016): 373–85.

[78] Brown, 'Alternatives to Soft Power', 43.

and the Spanish race', and he added: 'that is all as it should be, and is exactly parallel to our own efforts to get along in this world'.[79] As I show in this thesis, Spanish spiritual empire was a set of practices of external cultural action aimed to guarantee Spain's capacity to co-exist with other countries in the increasingly multilateral context of the 1920s. Of course, foreign policy efforts towards international co-existence are intimately linked to logics of power. To exist means to be legitimate, to have a say and, hence, to have power.

Power is shaped by the practice of influencing (or trying to influence) cultural imaginaries, as recent works by Naoko Shimazu and Christian Goeschel have shown.[80] As a set of practices of external cultural action, Spanish spiritual empire aimed to fabricate an imaginary of power in the context of international relations. By mobilising tools of imperial legacy, Spanish diplomats and foreign policy-makers tried to hang on to a status of power supposedly granted by Spain's imperial past. In other words, fabricating an imaginary of power by means of cultural diplomacy was a way of perpetuating the empire or, more generally speaking, of perpetuating a past of power. In this sense, explaining French external cultural action, René Girault has made a particularly evocative observation:

> La puissance d'un État ne se mesure pas exactement par la somme des diverses forces qui lui appartiennent ; elle dépend bien plus d'une sorte d'état d'âme, reposant lui-même sur la tradition d'une longue histoire de puissance. […] La France a un rayonnement ou un rang depuis si longtemps reconnu qu'il n'est pas concevable de le mettre en doute. On ne justifie pas, on n'explique pas la grandeur française parce qu'elle est aujourd'hui comme elle fut hier. Le grand passé est une garantie du présent. […] il ne peut exister une véritable décadence française.[81]

The notion of *rayonnement* that Girault advances, which is frequently associated with France's external cultural action, echoes the metaphor that I have proposed above: spiritual empire can be explained as the persistent radiation of an empire that has been eclipsed. The

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[79] The ambassador of the United States to Portugal (Fred M. Dearing), dispatch 1488, 26 May 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/39.

[80] Christian Goeschel, *Mussolini and Hitler: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Naoko Shimazu, 'Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955', *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (2014): 225–52.

[81] René Girault, *Être historien des relations internationales* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), 135. On the notion of *rayonnement*, see also Alain Dubosclard, ed., *Entre rayonnement et réciprocité : contributions à l'histoire de la diplomatie culturelle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002).

following pages are an exploration of this *rayonnement*, both as imperial continuity and as external cultural action, in the internationalist and multilateral context of the 1920s.

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This thesis is divided into six chapters, each of which interrogates the notion and practice of spiritual empire in the 1920s angle. It can be read as a compendium of six specific episodes or case studies, rather than as the complete picture of a comprehensive set of initiatives and policies. The choice of a case-study approach avoids the temptation of reconstructing a coherence that never existed. The dispersion and variety of the sources that I have analysed suggest that spiritual empire was a multifaceted phenomenon happening on different levels and in different spaces at the same time. It was only partially a premeditated policy cooked up in Madrid and then served to the Americas and the world. Of course, the important agency of General Primo de Rivera's authoritarian government and the officials of the Ministry of State (the foreign office) features prominently in the chapters. However, each of the six cases that I study involves a much more disparate group of individual and institutional agents, evolving in contexts that were much wider than simply Spanish.

The first chapter is devoted to the grand finale of Spanish spiritual empire in the 1920s. This was the Ibero-American Exhibition held in Seville in 1929-1930, which represented the most conspicuous manifestation of Hispano-Americanism of the decade. As I show in this chapter, the exhibition signalled the spiritual nature that Primo de Rivera's dictatorship imprinted upon Hispano-Americanism. Analysis of the complex decision-making processes leading to the holding of the exhibition allows me to interrogate the very nature of spiritual empire as conceived by the Spanish authorities. The Spanish government's marked preference for cultural action and external visibility appears.

The second chapter confirms this preference from a different perspective. It looks at emigration as an instrument of international power through the specific case of Argentina, where Spanish immigrants were particularly numerous and well organised. More particularly, I analyse one of the most popular successes of Spain's external action during the decade: the flight of the hydroplane *Plus Ultra* from Palos de la Frontera to Buenos Aires, in 1926. Exploring the Argentinian context, I signal the central role that migrants and, more broadly, the 'masses' played in the construction of practices of spiritual empire in Spain and in Latin America.

Building on the idea of transatlantic connections by means of diplomatic practices, the third chapter places spiritual empire in the wider context of a scramble for Latin America. It concentrates on the Ministry of State in Madrid and on its interactions in terms of competition and cooperation with its main counterparts in France, Italy, and above all the United States. This chapter is crucial in order to understand that the practices of spiritual empire underpinned the emergence of cultural external action in Spain, as one of the first and pioneering policies of cultural diplomacy in Europe and in the world.

The fourth chapter goes beyond the bilateral relation between Spain and its former colonies. It addresses the usefulness of spiritual empire in the new framework of institutional multilateralism: the League of Nations. Asking about the opportunities that multilateralism opened for Spanish and Latin American chancelleries, I present spiritual empire as a strategy of adaptation to transforming world politics. I also reflect on the intangibility of the imperial past as a resource of power within the League system. Spiritual empire was, indeed, a valuable asset in the changing world order, not only for Spain, but also for the Latin American republics.

Without leaving Geneva, the fifth chapter makes an incursion into the field of intellectual history. It examines the relationship between spiritual empire and internationalism through the writings and correspondence of Spanish and Latin American League officials. This allows me to situate the practices of Spanish diplomacy in the context of a wider reflection on the role of Spain and Latin America in the world order that was taking place simultaneously in different places and networks. The chapter suggests that spiritual empire was not a fabrication of the Spanish foreign office, but a flexible category that served to re-imagine the world.

The sixth chapter investigates the potential material consequences of re-imagining the world order through the lens of spiritual empire. Through in-depth analysis of a foreign policy action plan that combined internationalism, imperialism, Bolivarianism, and Hispano-Americanism, I show that Spanish diplomacy aspired towards a parallel League of Nations based on incremental integration via technical and economic interdependency. This was underpinned by spiritual empire and aimed to grant a status of great power for Spain through the creation of a Hispanic 'super-state'. This last chapter leads me to interrogate the legacy of spiritual empire, which is addressed in the conclusion of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1

The showcase of a spiritual great power: the Ibero-American Exhibition

INTRODUCTION

Between 9 May 1929 and 21 June 1930, the city of Seville, in southern Spain, hosted the Ibero-American Exhibition. Seville was one of the two sites of the Spanish General Exhibition, which was also held simultaneously in Barcelona. The International Exhibition of Barcelona was directed towards Europe and conceived as a world fair of industrial, scientific, and artistic novelties. The Ibero-American Exhibition of Seville, in contrast, presented more unusual characteristics. It aimed to show the bonds of brotherhood linking Spain to its former American colonies, as the joyful and memorable gathering of a post-imperial family.[1] On the day of the inauguration, along with most Spanish provinces and the two African colonies of northern Morocco and Equatorial Guinea, all of Spain's former American colonies, excepting Honduras and Nicaragua, were represented. Moreover, in addition to Spain, its colonies, and its former colonies, the exhibition of Seville also encompassed a larger 'Iberian' space with the participation of Portugal and Brazil. To the Spanish colonial exhibition of Morocco and Guinea, Portugal added the pavilion of Macao, which completed the global imperial scope of the gathering.[2] Last but not least, the United States of America also attended the meeting. All these elements, blended together, produced an eclectic result.

If read as a metonymy of Spanish diplomatic practices, this gathering reflected the complex interplay of imperialism, post-imperialism, and international relations that formed the notion and practice of spiritual empire. More than on the gathering as such, this chapter focuses on the decision-making process that led to it. It is inspired by the analytical method recently used by Nadia Vargaftig, who refuses to see international exhibitions as

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[1] David Marcilhacy, 'L'Exposition ibéro-américaine de Séville de 1929 : la recomposition symbolique de l'empire hispanique dans l'Espagne post-impériale', *Iberical. Revue d'études ibériques et ibéro-américaines* 2 (Autumn 2012): 135–50; Anthony Gristwood, 'Commemorating Empire in Twentieth-Century Seville', in *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity*, ed. Felix Driver and David Gilbert (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 155–73.

[2] On Morocco and Equatorial Guinea, see Luis Ángel Sánchez Gómez, 'África en Sevilla: la exhibición colonial de la Exposición Iberoamericana de 1929', *Hispania. Revista Española de Historia* LXVI, no. 224 (December 2006): 1045–82. On Portugal and Macao, see Nadia Vargaftig, *Des Empires en carton : les Expositions coloniales au Portugal et en Italie (1918-1940)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2016), 66–69.

mere reflections of ideologies.[3] Like any other exhibition of the kind, the Ibero-American one was just the visible output of an intricate combination of procedures, institutions, and agents that must not be taken for granted. This chapter conceives the exhibition as a product of administrative practices and presents it as an object of political history. Building on the assumption that the Ibero-American Exhibition was a manifestation of Spanish practices of spiritual empire, the chapter navigates these practices upstream to search out the specific complexities of spiritual empire.

The exhibition was, from the start, as much about the countries that participated as about two that did not. Although absent from the exhibition itself, France and Italy were present in the minds of those who organised it. It is in contrast to them that the count of Colombí, the royal commissioner and chief curator of the exhibition, conceived the importance of spiritual empire in a larger international perspective. In a report that he submitted to the government in October 1925, he wrote:

> El que suscribe ha estudiado, uno por uno, los esfuerzos que realiza Francia […] para adueñarse del espíritu de la América Española y aumentar su influencia política y comercial en aquellas repúblicas. […] No son otra cosa que la prueba fehaciente de que se pretende arrebatar una hegemonía que nos pertenece.
>
> Y no es solamente Francia, sino Italia la que, a cuenta de una latinidad en frente al concepto Hispano, habla de fraternidades y de amores, mientras pone su vista en los mercados americanos en los que pretende desplazar algunos de nuestros productos, el aceite por ejemplo, y alegando siempre sus derechos espirituales […].[4]

According to Colombí, the Ibero-American Exhibition was to be an assertive response to the immediate threat posed by France and Italy. The exhibition could be a powerful instrument in the context of a scramble for Latin America. He understood the battle in terms of spiritual influence, as a rivalry around the historical and cultural origin of the subcontinent. Moreover, behind that spiritual façade, there was a struggle for markets and economic interests. In this scramble, as he said elsewhere in the report, Spain had to seek

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[3] Vargaftig, *Des Empires en carton*, 19–27. See also Marla S. Stone, 'Staging Fascism: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution', *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 2 (1993): 215–43.

[4] Colombí (Fernando Barón), *Memoria explicativa de los trabajos realizados por el Comité de la Exposición Ibero-Americana*, October 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 3.

'its legitimate influence in the countries that it conquered and civilised'. In his mind, the spiritual legacy of the empire was just a legitimising pretext for the construction of commercial hegemony.

It would be tempting to interpret both the Ibero-American Exhibition and spiritual empire more generally along these lines. However, Colombí's voice must not be confused with that of a state actor. He did not speak on behalf of the government: his words were a call for governmental action made at local scale. France and Italy were far from being the enemies of the Spanish government. They were not present at the Seville exhibition, but they were present at the Barcelona one, and this actually served their commercial interests in the Americas much better than a presence in Seville would have. It was from Barcelona, not from Seville, that the elites of the Spanish commercial bourgeoisie had been creating commercial and economic networks with the Latin America countries. Since 1911, the *Casa de América* of Barcelona had brought together members of the Catalan business elites and served to build transnational networks of traders and industrialists.[5] Had spiritual empire simply pursued commercial objectives, it would have been smarter to place the Ibero-American Exhibition in Barcelona. Why Seville, then?

The project of an Ibero-American Exhibition was designed in Seville in the early twentieth century. It predated Primo de Rivera's 1923 coup. The first section of this chapter highlights the agency of local Sevillian elites in the decision-making process leading to the exhibition, in order to show that the exhibition did not respond to a state-level programme of commercial hegemony over a lost empire. Commerce was actually not what mattered to the central government in Madrid. The second section thus explores why Primo de Rivera's regime decided to carry on with the Sevillian project. Analysis of the archival documents of the central administration reveals the government's concern with the visibility of the exhibition abroad, as well as its interest in showcasing the intangible features of imperial legacy. This signals the spiritual imprint that was given to Hispano-Americanism once recuperated by Primo de Rivera's regime as part of its policy-making.

[5] Gabriella dalla Corte, *Casa de América de Barcelona, 1911-1947: Comillas, Cambó, Gili, Torres y mil empresarios en una agencia de información e influencia internacional* (Madrid: Editorial LID, 2005). See also Òscar Costa Ruibal, *L'imaginari imperial: el Noucentisme català i la política internacional* (Barcelona: Fundació Cambó, 2002).

AN INHERITED AGENDA: MADRID AND LOCAL SEVILLIAN EMPOWERMENT

General Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, the Andalusian fifty-three-year-old captain-general of Catalonia, carried out a successful coup d'État on 13 September 1923.[6] He suspended the 1876 Constitution and installed a Military Directorate. In December 1925, the latter was replaced by a Civilian Directorate, which lasted until the dictator was forced to resign on 28 January 1930. Over its life, the authoritarian regime counted on the essential support of King Alfonso XIII and most army officials, who were very critical against parliamentarianism and its alleged instability. Perhaps more importantly, it was also supported by a considerable part of Spanish 'public opinion' and intellectual elites, who expected him to incarnate the 'regenerationist' ideal long sought after since the colonial *desastre* of 1898.[7] The connection between regenerationism and Hispano-Americanism is evident, and the holding of an Ibero-American Exhibition need to be interpreted in light of the regime's regenerationist propaganda. However, it would be simplistic to link will and practice so expeditiously.

The authoritarian directorate led by General Miguel Primo de Rivera inherited the project of an Ibero-American Exhibition when it came to power in September 1923. The dictator decided to carry on with this project, which mostly remained a Sevillian one. The exhibition was organised with what was at hand, building on pre-existing resources and mobilising or trying to mobilise other local, regional, and national resources. At first sight, the central government seems simply to have added some rhetorical bombast to complex administrative practices that were in reality beyond it. It did not even seem to take any particular interest in the commercial benefits that the holding of such an ambitious exhibition could potentially bring to Spanish actors. The initial impression is one of administrative inertia. Between the lines, however, the government's preference for spiritual empire as an instrument of power starts to appear.

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[6] Javier Tusell, *Radiografía de un golpe de Estado: el ascenso al poder del general Primo de Rivera* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987). For transnational and comparative readings of Primo de Rivera's coup and regime, see Giulia Albanese, *Dittature mediterranee: sovversioni fasciste e colpi di Stato in Italia, Spagna e Portogallo* (Rome: Editori Laterza, 2016); José Luis Gómez-Navarro, *El régimen de Primo de Rivera: reyes, dictaduras y dictadores* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1991).

[7] Tusell, 'La Dictadura regeneracionista', in *La España de Alfonso XIII: el Estado y la política (1902-1931)* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1995). See also Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and Clarendon Press, 1983); James H. Rial, *Revolution from above: The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930* (Fairfax, London, and Toronto: George Mason University Press and Associated University Presses, 1986); Eduardo González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera: la modernización autoritaria, 1923-1930* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005); Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923-30* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

The Ibero-American Exhibition, a Sevillian project

A royal decree instituting the Ibero-American Exhibition as a matter of state was signed on 14 November 1923.[8] This was the first legal norm that recognised 'the national objective assigned to the Exhibition of Seville'. General Miguel Primo de Rivera, the newly installed dictator, made it clear that it was the central government's task to ensure the holding of the exhibition. This meant, in his words, 'to move forward with the endeavour that the whole of Spain feels and desires, […] the patriotic aspiration to tighten the bonds that by fortune exist between Spain and the countries of Portugal and the Americas'. Primo de Rivera wished to signal the new government's determination to orchestrate the exhibition at state level. On 12 October, at the Central University in Madrid, the dictator had already made a flowery speech with which he had announced the beginning of a new epoch in the relations between Spain and its former American colonies, highlighting Hispano-Americanism as one of the most important matters that his government would address.[9] In the preamble of the decree on the Ibero-American Exhibition, Primo de Rivera followed the same line:

> Partió de Sevilla esta iniciativa como en siglos anteriores habían partido de aquella Ciudad las gloriosas expediciones que conquistaron tierras americanas y las que dieron por vez primera la vuelta al mundo. Sevilla que vio edificar la primera Casa de Contratación con las Américas; que custodia el Archivo de Indias; que dio pródiga sus hombres para la colonización del Nuevo Mundo; Sevilla que llevó la Cruz a través de los mares e hizo que su Catedral tuviera por filiales a todas las Iglesias y los Obispados americanos, solicitó el honor de convocar en su recinto a esa magna asamblea cuyo espíritu es el de la más cordial y perdurable fraternidad. Auxiliar y sostener este propósito es para el Presidente del Directorio servir uno de los más evidentes intereses de la Patria […].

These bombastic and patriotic turns of phrase insisted on the central role that the city of Seville played in all matters related to the exhibition. Affirming that a project that had

[8] Royal decree, 14 November 1923, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

[9] *Sesión solemne celebrada en el Paraninfo de la Universidad Central, el día 12 de octubre de 1923, para conmemorar la Fiesta de la Raza, bajo la presidencia del Excmo. Sr. General, Marqués de Estella, Presidente del Directorio Militar* (Madrid: Imprenta Municipal, 1924), 51–54.

'departed from Seville' was now 'one of the most evident interests of the Motherland' did not erase the decades of local Sevillian empowerment that laconic state action had reinforced. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship could not possibly put an end to Spanish traditions of decentralisation and municipalism with the stroke of a pen.[10]

The exhibition was, indeed, a genuinely Sevillian project.[11] The idea of a 'Hispano-American Exhibition' first emerged in Seville at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1905, Luis Rodríguez Caso, a local military engineer, first began to argue that the holding of a prestigious international exhibition would serve to improve Seville's urban infrastructures, foster its economy, and employ its increasingly dissatisfied working class. At this stage, only a handful of prominent Sevillian personalities were enthusiastic about Rodríguez Caso's proposal. They nonetheless formed an informal *Comisión de la Exposición Hispano-Americana*. However, the local government of Seville, the representatives of the central state in the province of Seville, and the central government in Madrid initially remained sceptical about the project. The general belief was that Seville did not have the practical capacity to organise an ambitious event of this kind on an international scale.

In 1908, the city organised a modest fair to commemorate the first centennial of the 'War of Independence' against the Napoleonic troops. The proactive role of Rodríguez Caso and his informal *comisión* convinced several more members of the Sevillian elites that Seville was ready to host bigger events. Narciso Ciaurriz Rodríguez, one of the members of the *Comisión*, publicised an active propaganda campaign in the local press to mobilise the *'pueblo'* of Seville behind the cause of setting up a Hispano-American Exhibition. Different civilian associations and trade unions adhered to the project and started exerting pressure on the still sceptical local and national authorities. In June 1909, the city council of Seville decided to decorate Rodríguez Caso with a medal of merit for his efforts in promoting the city in Spain and abroad. When he received the prize, Rodríguez Caso took the opportunity to make a public speech to defend his idea of an *'Exposición Internacional Hispano-Ultramarina, Exposición Internacional España en Sevilla o Exposición Internacional Hispano-Americana'*. The project, it seems, was still vague with regard to its theme and objectives. What mattered to Rodríguez Caso was not the Hispano-Americanist ideal, but the prestige and development

[10] James H. Rial, *Revolution from above: The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930* (Fairfax, London, and Toronto: George Mason University Press and Associated University Presses, 1986), 79–102.

[11] María Teresa Solano Sobrado, 'Antecedentes históricos de la Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla', *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea* VII (1986), 164–74. See also Eduardo Rodríguez Bernal, *La Exposición Ibero-Americana de Sevilla de 1929 a través de la prensa local: su génesis y primeras manifestaciones (1905-1914)* (Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1981).

of his home city. This was not enough to convince the political authorities, however. Once again, the city council and the representatives of the central government reacted to Rodríguez Caso's idea with scepticism.

The Hispano-American nature of the project became clearer once the idea crossed the Atlantic. The consuls of Argentina, Cuba, Panama, El Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay in Seville, who were in contact with some of the members of the *Comisión*, became very interested in the possibility of organising a Hispano-American exhibition and informed their respective hierarchies about it. In parallel, the Sevillian Chamber of Commerce mobilised its networks of Spanish emigrants, who started to spread the word in the Americas and, most probably, to lobby the national authorities in different countries. Argentina, the country that counted the most numerous 'colony' of Spanish emigrants, was the first to manifest its interest in the Hispano-American Exhibition, as early as 1913. It then was the first country to build a permanent pavilion and the most conspicuous participant in the exhibition. In its beginning stages, the organisation and the publicity of the event was an informal process from which the Spanish central state was completely absent.

In the meantime, in Seville, the idea of an international exhibition had already begun to resonate with the Sevillian *pueblo*. During the second half of the year 1909, Rodríguez Caso, Ciaurriz Rodríguez, and other defenders of the project called for public manifestations of *'orgullo sevillano'*. They did not call for national pride or 'racial' Hispano-American pride, but for local Sevillian pride. The *'pueblo'*, they claimed, demanded 'its' international exposition, urban infrastructure improvements, Sevillian prestige and, perhaps more importantly, jobs. Public demonstrations were convened to show the 'massive' adhesion of Sevillians to the project, and to change the mind of the local authorities. In the name of the *'pueblo'*, the members of the *Comisión* addressed a letter to King Alfonso and asked him for his support. On 10 December 1910, the Congress of Deputies approved a subvention of three million pesetas for the organisation of the Hispano-American Exhibition in Seville.

Support from the state remained, however, tentative until the mid-1920s. The first *comisario regio*, the government's delegate in charge of the organisation of the exhibition, was only appointed in 1920, ten years after the official approval of the project in the Congress. By contrast, when the project of the International Exhibition of Barcelona had been approved in 1914, the *comisario regio* was appointed within four days. Moreover, the competences and tasks of the *comisario regio* in Seville were never clearly defined. Administrative competences and processes were unclear. Officially, the exhibition was the

Ministry of Development's responsibility, but the Ministry of Labour was also tasked with it in 1922, and documents circulated between these two departments with no clear division of responsibilities.[12] Even the decision to widen the scope of the exhibition from 'Hispano-American' to 'Ibero-American', which I explain below, was accepted upon Sevillian request.[13] It was also in Seville, and not in Madrid, that the governing organs of the exhibition were constituted: the *Comité Ejecutivo*, an assembly of about thirty men belonging to local elites and corporations, and the *Comisión Permanente*, composed of five to seven members elected from within the *Comité*. The position of *comisario regio*, who was supposed to represent the central government, was in fact held by a prominent Sevillian figure (Colombí since 1922). The exhibition remained, *de facto*, in Sevillian hands.

Therefore, the decree promoted by Primo de Rivera in November 1924 was merely programmatic. It contained no new measure to ensure centralised control from Madrid over the Sevillian project, although it did state that the government would supervise the programme and content of the exhibition, without imposing any deadlines or control procedures. A few days after the decree, Colombí sent a programme proposal from Seville, and the minister of Labour, Commerce, and Industry approved it, with no modifications, less than three weeks later.[14] The decree also granted the Sevillian authorities a yearly credit of 800,000 pesetas for the organisation of the exhibition, but this measure had already been voted through in 1920 in a law that also stated that the city of Seville would be responsible for 50% of the expenses and for any hypothetical deficit. The only definite decision that the decree contained was the date for the inauguration of the exhibition (17 April 1927), which would however be delayed by more than two years.

Primo de Rivera's government had no immediate capacity to turn a local project into a national one. The national objective proclaimed in the royal decree was still subject to the availability of financial, institutional, and human resources, and these were still essentially Sevillian. In May 1924, the central government simply approved the statutes of the governing organs of the exhibition, leaving all their members in place.[15] New members of the *Comité Ejecutivo* were formally elected in Madrid, but the initiative for their election always came from Seville. When Colombí proposed appointing two members of the

[12] Working papers, April 1926, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4, folder 33.

[13] Royal decree, 9 November 1922, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

[14] Working papers regarding the royal order issued by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce, and Industry on 21 December 1923, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4, folder 35.

[15] Royal order issued by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce, and Industry, 3 May 1924, AGA, box 51/3481, file 2 bis, folder 2.

Sociedad Colombina Onubense, the association which maintained the memory of Christopher Columbus in Palos de la Frontera, a hundred kilometres west of Seville, his letter to the government mentioned Hispano-Americanism as 'one of the objectives of the exhibition', discreetly discrediting the ambitious national scope proclaimed by Primo de Rivera.[16]

Commerce, a secondary objective

Parochial commercial interests

The commercial expansion of Spanish products in the Americas was one of the most important benefits that Spain could derive from the Ibero-American Exhibition. The members of the organising commission of the exhibition, who were mostly members of the local Sevillian political and business elites, believed that 'beyond the great affections and the friendly cordiality that will be honoured in Seville, huge commercial interests, which are the axis of the life of a people and of its international progress, will be at stake'.[17] For them, the re-encounter of a post-imperial family would be merely an excuse to face important challenges in the realm of commerce. They also believed that this was in the interest of the Spanish government and, in this sense, they emphasised their responsibility and 'measured the tremendous weight that [they] carr[ied] upon [their] shoulders when dealing with this [commercial] section of the exhibition'.

However, what they concretely proposed did not reflect the national commercial interest that they claimed to be championing. When drawing up a list of the sectors of production to be exhibited, their minds turned to small-scale Andalusian industries, such as ceramics, wood, or leather, and typically Andalusian agricultural products, such as wine, wool, or olive oil. Most of the members of the commission had personal interests in these sectors. They looked forward to wider exportation markets for their products, and they planned to use the Ibero-American Exhibition as a means to this end. They nonetheless were conscious of the high level of competition that Andalusian producers would have to face. They expected the United States, Argentina, and Brazil to dazzle visitors with the latest 'developments' in farming mechanisation, fertilisers, and intensive agricultural production. They were worried about the reputation and competitiveness of the goods that their small and not very 'advanced' Andalusian region produced. It was therefore crucial

[16] Colombí to Primo de Rivera, 20 January 1924, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

[17] *Informe de la Comisión Permanente sobre el contenido de la Exposición Ibero-Americana*, October 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 7.

for them that the exhibition as a whole gave 'an impression' of grandiosity in order for their products to 'resist the comparison'.

In Madrid, this was not read as an invitation to feature Spanish commercial *grandeur* more assertively. The central government approved the content of the commercial section exactly as proposed by the organising commission. Pursuing the interests of Andalusian sectors satisfied the dictatorial regime. Moreover, Primo de Rivera encouraged the attendance of all Spanish regions to Seville: for example, he personally intervened to allow the participation of Extremaduran economic agents in the governing organs of the exhibition.[18] Of course, the gathering of different regional producers in a specific place would also serve the interests of the Spanish economy as a whole. In Seville as elsewhere in Spain, Spanish economic actors sought to increase the number of potential buyers and to broaden the geographical reach of their production. This was enough for the government, which clearly did not pursue any ambitious goal of hegemony over the American markets.

Inter-American commercial interests

The exhibition also had practical commercial interest for the American countries. According to what Spanish diplomats reported, only Costa Rica invoked 'the ideal of Hispano-American solidarity pursued by the enlightened government of the Motherland' as a sufficient reason to attend the Ibero-American Exhibition.[19] Other responses to the invitation, even when positive, were more prosaic. In September 1923, Chile gave a first clear, though technical proof of good will in appointing a former minister of Education, Julio Prado Amor, as the special delegate who would study, in Madrid, the concrete modalities of the Chilean participation.[20] As for Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay, their governments delayed their replies while calculating the costs and benefits of their hypothetical attendance.[21] The reluctance of Uruguay worried the Spanish minister-plenipotentiary in Montevideo:

> Es opinión aquí en los centros interesados que en su aspecto material la concurrencia de la República no aportaría beneficio alguno a causa de que su exportación está formada casi

[18] Working papers, 1928, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4, folder 21.

[19] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in San José de Costa Rica, dispatch 37, 20 July 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[20] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Santiago de Chile, undated report [1925], AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[21] Working papers, 1924-1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

> exclusivamente por materias primas de universal demanda que no necesitan de tales demostraciones, que solo tienen un fin práctico en los países que alimentan su exportación con los productos de sus industrias fabriles y manufactureras.[22]

Uruguay would not attend an international exhibition if its government saw no potential commercial interest in it. In 1922, the Uruguayan government had already used the same argument to excuse its absence from Brazil's Independence Centenary International Exhibition. In the end, however, Uruguayan exhibitors would be present in Seville. I have no certainty of when or by whom the decision was taken in Montevideo. It is quite probable, nevertheless, that the Uruguayan government conditioned its reply to the attendance of other American countries, namely its neighbours Argentina and Brazil.

In Argentina, the government of Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear was enthusiastic about the exhibition from the first moment. Throughout the 1920s, Argentina maintained relations of close cooperation with Spain. The *Unión Cívica Radical*, the political party in power in Argentina between 1916 and 1930, got along quite well with Primo de Rivera's regime. Moreover, in 1925, the Spanish legation in Buenos Aires was still the only proper Spanish embassy in Latin America. Perhaps more important than this was the large number of Spanish emigrants who had chosen to settle in Argentina since the late nineteenth century. When the Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture started preparing the country's participation at the Ibero-American Exhibition, it gathered a *comisión mixta* composed of both Argentinian and Spanish-born stakeholders.[23] Along with diplomats, Spanish emigrants certainly played a major role in promoting the exhibition in Argentina.

Colombí also insisted repeatedly on 'the high importance' of the participation of Brazil, the biggest market in South America.[24] On his initiative, the executive board of the exhibition contacted Spanish emigrants in Brazil and asked them to promote the exhibition in the Brazilian press.[25] However, notwithstanding the efforts made by Spanish diplomats and influential emigrants, the sources suggest that the presence of Brazil in Seville

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[22] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Montevideo, dispatch 36, 24 April 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[23] The ambassador of Spain in Buenos Aires (Pablo Soler), dispatch 100, 27 June 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[24] Colombí to undersecretary of State (Fernando Espinosa de los Monteros), 15 May 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[25] *Propaganda, publicidad y actos realizados por el Comité*, October 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 7.

ultimately depended on the presence of Argentina. The Spanish minister-plenipotentiary in Rio reported that he would obtain 'a decent representation of Brazil at the exhibition, especially if the Argentinian Republic also attends'.[26]

There was a sort of domino effect in South America. Starting in Chile and Argentina, interest in the exhibition reached Brazil and, most probably, Uruguay. South American states had their own commercial interests in Seville. Coming closer to Spain was only one of them. Spanish diplomats were aware of this, but they did not seem to see it as a problem. The dispatches and reports that they sent to Madrid rarely included any comment on the fact that South American countries seemed more interested in trading with their neighbours than in trading with Spain. From Washington, too, Ambassador Juan Riaño informed the Spanish government that '[the exhibition] would put the United States in contact with the Spanish market, but above all with the Latin American markets'.[27] In the words of a counsellor of the Pan American Union to the commissioner of the US pavilion in Seville, 'the Exposition, as you know, is really a Pan American one, for the only country in Europe, Asia, and Africa is Spain'.[28] For US agents, the Ibero-American Exhibition was a good occasion to meet Latin American actors; Spain, in this respect, was absolutely secondary. This was not a secret to Spanish diplomats or to the Spanish government, and yet the project of the Ibero-American Exhibition carried on as planned.

This supports the argument that commercial benefits were not the priority of Spanish central authorities. The Ibero-American Exhibition was not meant to be the demonstration of the material power of Spain over its former colonies. This was not only due to the fact that Spain did not have — and could not possibly have — such material power, but also to the fact that the Spanish government intended to stage a different sort of power demonstration. A more careful look into the records of the administration in Madrid suggests that the Sevillian exhibition was recovered, reinterpreted, and instrumentalised by the Spanish government as a tool of diplomacy based on intangible imperial legacy.

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[26] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Rio de Janeiro, dispatch 89, 16 May 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[27] Riaño to the undersecretary of State (Espinosa de los Monteros), June 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[28] A counsellor of the Pan American Union (Franklin Adams) to the commissioner of the US pavilion (Thomas Campbell), 21 January 1927, NARA, registry 43, file A1.1309, box 1.

STAGING SPIRITUAL EMPIRE

When wandering about the site of the exhibition, the visitor could see the 'symbolic re-composition' of the Spanish Empire.[29] Walking from one pavilion to the other, she travelled a 'Hispanic' or 'Iberian' world that encompassed a large and diversified range of places, from Argentina to Mexico, to Morocco, to Andalusia, to Macao, to the United States, etcetera. Spain had managed to gather its past and present empire and nation on the same urban space. This successfully conveyed a message of intangible power: Spain was still respected and 'loved' on a global scale; it still enjoyed a form of *rayonnement* that mostly relied on the spiritual nature of its persistent imperial 'greatness'.

Building the showcase: publicity and visibility as the government's priority

In the mid-1920s, Spain was as 'unknown' in Europe as it was in Latin America. This problem obsessed José Antonio de Sangróniz, a career diplomat who held positions of responsibility in two branches of policy that the Spanish administration had started developing simultaneously: cultural diplomacy and tourism. Like many other Spanish officials and intellectuals of the right, Sangróniz deemed it urgent to end the 'Black Legend' of Spanish history, which conveyed the reputation of a cruel and backward country, and to replace it with the image of Spain as a 'modern' country that was, at the same time, 'the birthplace of a civilisation'.[30] Within the administration, Sangróniz was the secretary-general of the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo*, the organ in charge of promoting the appeal and the prestige of Spain within and beyond its borders, and the director of the *Oficina de Relaciones Culturales Española*, the office in charge of cultural diplomacy at the foreign office. Under both hats, he played an important role in the decision-making process leading to the Ibero-American Exhibition. He oriented and implemented the decisions taken in Madrid on what really mattered to the central government: attractiveness and visibility.

The centralisation of policy-making: the decisive year of 1926

In November 1925, Colombí resigned as *comisario regio* due to ill health.[31] To replace him, the government appointed José Cruz Conde, the mayor of Córdoba and a

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[29] Marcilhacy, 'L'Exposition ibéro-américaine de Séville de 1929'.

[30] José Antonio de Sangróniz, *Nuevas orientaciones para la política internacional de España: la expansión cultural de España en el extranjero y principalmente en Hispano-América* (Madrid and Ceuta: Editorial Hércules, 1925). On the 'Black Legend' and Spanish right-wing thinkers, see Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, 24–26.

[31] Colombí to Primo de Rivera, 30 November 1925, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

distinguished member of the Cordoban military and political elite.[32] Choosing a Cordoban instead of a Sevillian was most likely a strategic decision. An actor with non-Sevillian but still Andalusian background placed in a key position was a balanced compromise between local empowerment and central state control. This decision also reflected the turn in Primo de Rivera's approach to local policy. While, in 1924, the dictatorship's *Estatuto Municipal* had made some steps in the direction of regionalism and administrative decentralisation, the 1925 *Estatuto Provincial* was unequivocally centralist.[33] This new institutional framework helped the Spanish government to establish a more assertive and efficient control over the decision-making process leading to the Ibero-American Exhibition. Only in this moment was the programmatic royal decree of 14 November 1923 effectively implemented.

The centralisation of the decision-making process progressed by leaps and bounds during the year 1926. In March, a royal decree placed the governing organs of the exhibition under the direct control of the central government. This meant that, in practice, the *Comité Ejecutivo*, the *Comisión Permanente*, and the *Comisaría Regia* would henceforth answer to the state on all issues.[34] In April, Primo de Rivera issued a new decree requesting every ministry to forward any file or record concerning the Ibero-American Exhibition to his personal office. From that moment on, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers became the control unit of all the paperwork regarding the exhibition.[35] A final step was taken on 1 November 1928, when the *Comisaría Regia* was suppressed. José Cruz Conde then became the *'director'* of the exhibition, with the same administrative status as a director-general.[36] More importantly, he would no longer depend on any ministry in particular, but on the Presidency of the Council of Ministers directly.[37]

The most important decision was nonetheless taken in June 1926. The Ibero-American Exhibition of Seville and the International Exhibition of Barcelona were brought together under the common flag of the 'Spanish General Exhibition'. To oversee the connection of both events, a *Consejo de Enlace* was created, which would be headed by Eduardo Aunós, the

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[32] Royal decree, 21 December 1925, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

[33] Hernández Hernández, Carlos Ernesto. '¿Regeneracionismo o reconstrucción? Reflexiones sobre el Estado bajo la dictadura primorriverista (1923-1930)'. *Historia Contemporánea*, no. 17 (1998), 344–45.

[34] Royal decree, 10 March 1926, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 222.

[35] Working papers regarding conflicts of competence, April 1926, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4, folder 33.

[36] Royal decree, 1 November 1928, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 222.

[37] Royal order issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 17 April 1929, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4, folder 13.

minister of Labour, Commerce, and Industry.[38] Although it was formally autonomous, the *Consejo* never worked as an independent body. In 1931, Gabriel Maura (Aunós' successor in the ministry), trying to justify himself after a financial problem occurred during the liquidation of the exhibition of Barcelona, declared his department unaccountable for any issue regarding the exhibitions: *'el Ministerio de Trabajo no ha tenido intervención directa en las Exposiciones, ni los nombramientos de los Comisarios has sido hechos por él'*, he said.[39] Some other documents seem to confirm Maura's claim: the working papers drafted within the new institutional framework designed in June 1926 present clear traces of Primo de Rivera's personal intervention, such as handwritten instructions to his subordinate officers.[40] Political historian Carlos Ernesto Hernández Hernández has also underlined the personalist conception of power that Primo de Rivera progressively developed, labelling it as a Weberian ideal type of 'bureaucratic tyranny'.[41]

Interestingly, however, the dictator did not have a stranglehold on each and every matter related to the exhibitions of Seville and Barcelona. Both had their respective legal personalities, as well as privileges such as an account with a state guarantee at the Bank of Spain, which was actually granted in that same year of 1926.[42] The governing organs of the exhibitions continued working independently from one another, with their respective agency, which remained rooted in local elite networks. Centralisation therefore existed, but it was not all-encompassing. This leads us to the question of what parts of the decision-making process were centralised.

Centralising visibility efforts

Prior to the creation of the *Consejo de Enlace* in 1926, the local boards in Seville and Barcelona were responsible for the publicity and advertising of their respective exhibitions. As far as Seville was concerned, a report by the *Comité Ejecutivo* gives an idea of the kind of advertising activities undertaken in 1924 and 1925.[43] No money was spent in making publicity in local, national, or international journals. The members of the *Comité* rather used their 'personal connections' with directors of journals and magazines. This informal and

[38] Royal decree, 7 June 1926, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 222.

[39] Royal order issued by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce, and Industry, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 226.

[40] Working papers, 1926-1928, AGA, box 51/3481, file 4.

[41] Hernández Hernández, '¿Regeneracionismo o reconstrucción?', 353–54.

[42] Royal decree, 20 September 1926, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 222.

[43] *Propaganda, publicidad y actos realizados por el Comité*, October 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 7.

inexpensive publicity was promoted, as the members of the *Comité* affirmed, 'in both Spain and the Americas'. However, when it came to using economic and human resources, the efforts targeted mostly a domestic Spanish public. The *Comité* was limited in its capacity to publicise the exhibition on a large scale abroad, and it devoted its energy to making the exhibition attractive to potential exhibitors and visitors in other regions and cities in Spain. In 1925, some distinguished Sevillians took part in two publicity trips, to southeastern and northern Spain respectively. The international visibility of the Ibero-American Exhibition, therefore, was not among the priorities of the *Comité Ejecutivo* in 1924 and 1925.

It certainly was, however, for Spanish diplomats in the Americas. The different dispatches that these diplomats sent to the Ministry of State in the same period of 1924 and 1925 contrasted markedly with the optimism of the *Comité Ejecutivo*. From Buenos Aires, Pablo Soler, the as yet only Spanish ambassador in Latin America, insistently underlined the high importance of designing a consistent and coherent publicity campaign in all the Latin American countries.[44] He urged the minister of State and the dictator to take matters into their own hands. Other Spanish representatives in the different American states signalled the same problem. They were seriously concerned about the participation of Americans in the exhibition. In their view, if most American public authorities and private circles were not particularly enthusiastic about the idea of going to Seville, this was due to the absolute lack of decisive efforts in publicity and advertising from Madrid. Even diplomats themselves did not really know what the exhibition was supposed to be: the minister-plenipotentiary in Rio de Janeiro reported on his shame when he had been unable to answer the questions of the Brazilian minister of Commerce.[45]

The creation of the *Consejo de Enlace* in June 1926 was the first attempt by the government to change this situation. The *Consejo*'s main objective was to centralise publicity efforts. Therefore, in practice, General Primo de Rivera, as well as Minister Aunós as the formal head of the *Consejo*, were to hold responsibility for publicising the exhibitions of Seville and Barcelona to the world. The means of the administration remained nonetheless limited. The *Consejo* had to count on the cooperation of diplomats in Europe and in Latin America. It also counted on the active support of some distinguished Spanish emigrants. In a preparatory survey that it sent to the Spanish embassy in France, for example, the *Consejo*

[44] Soler to the minister of State (José de Yanguas Messía), dispatches 6 and 100, 29 January and 27 June 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

[45] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Rio de Janeiro, dispatch 89, 16 May 1925, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 4.

enquired about French travel agencies, journals, cultural institutions, casinos and clubs, sports centres, etcetera, where it could send publicity material. It also enquired about 'the influential elements of the Spanish colony […] which, by virtue of their love of Spain […], could act as voluntary promoters of the glory of the two exhibitions'.[46] Facing the limitations of their resources, the Spanish government called for free-of-charge patriotism.

All this was not enough, however. In a letter that he sent to his friend José Quiñones de León, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, Primo de Rivera allowed him to make 'the necessary expenses' on the embassy's budget in order to launch a propaganda campaign in the French press. His 'wish', as he specifically added, was that 'the widest possible publicity' was given to the exhibition.[47] The international visibility of the Ibero-American Exhibition in particular was a personal concern for the dictator. Ambassador Quiñones, however, could still see a number of persistent and important problems:

> Noto una gran incoordinación en la cuestión de propaganda y publicidad para las Exposiciones, […] he observado que para la Exposición de Barcelona se hace propaganda, pero para la de Sevilla, ninguna, y además me está pareciendo (perdóname que aventure el juicio por la oportunidad presente) que es de urgente necesidad que se unifiquen ambas en lo posible […]. Yo me acuerdo que hubo un Comité de Enlace para las dos Exposiciones al principio […], y creo modestamente que ahora, por lo menos, toda esta labor de propaganda debía llevarse con cierta unidad y en conexión con el Patronato Nacional de Turismo, para que tenga dirección completa y certera y surta los mejores efectos en lo que se refiere a propaganda y fomentación de viajes.[48]

This was written in December 1928, less than six months before the inauguration of the exhibition. The situation was not optimal. The ambassador, who spoke to the dictator as an experienced diplomat and as a friend, openly criticised the 'uncoordinated' way in which the publicity of the exhibitions had been orchestrated. The fact that the exhibition of Barcelona was more visible than that of Seville seems to suggest that the matters of publicity were still mostly in local hands. Barcelonans had, indeed, more resources than

[46] Survey launched by the Ministry of Labour, Commerce, and Industry, 6 December 1926, AGA, box 54/6213, file 1619.1, folder 1.1.

[47] Primo de Rivera to Quiñones, 14 December 1928, AGA, box 54/6213, file 1619.1, folder 1.1.

[48] Quiñones to Primo de Rivera, 29 December 1928, AGA, box 54/6213, file 1619.1, folder 1.1.

Sevillians. The action of what Quiñones called the *'Comité de Enlace'* had not been efficient or sufficient. Moreover, since 1 November that same year, the *comisarios regios* of both exhibitions had become *directores* who depended hierarchically upon Primo de Rivera's office, which diminished the significance of the *Consejo de Enlace* even more.

Quiñones also called for a more assertive involvement by the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo*. He was not yet familiar with the royal order issued by the Spanish government a week earlier. The preamble of this legal norm, penned by Primo de Rivera, conveyed a certain sense of anxiety:

> Primordial y urgentísima misión del Patronato Nacional de Turismo es, al presente, la propaganda de las grandes Exposiciones y la organización de viajes que faciliten su visita en términos que en todas las capitales mundiales se encuentre un lugar, agencia, consulado o periódico, donde baste manifestar el deseo de venir a España para recibir información completa sobre el modo y coste de hacerlo y comodidades y facilidades que hayan de encontrarse en nuestro país.[49]

The 'very urgent' nature of this sounded like a last and desperate effort to rally all possible forces in support of the international visibility of the exhibitions. It did not concern the *Patronato* exclusively, but also every 'place, agency, consulate, or journal'. In addition to the agencies that the *Patronato* had opened abroad, the biggest of them being precisely in Paris, diplomatic legations and, very especially, consulates were also expected to play a major role. In early 1929, the government virtually transformed Spanish consulates into official travel agencies. A royal order authorised consuls to sell train tickets and to advice tourists on the choice of hotels, even at risk of causing 'difficult and perhaps harmful competition' to private travel agencies.[50] The situation required some sacrifices.

In September 1929, as an epilogue to these complex and quite erratic decision-making practices, the government requested that the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo* provide the *Consejo de Enlace* with 500,000 pesetas, given 'the high convenience and even necessity of making intense publicity around the Ibero-American Exhibition of Seville and the

[49] Royal order issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 20 December 1928, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 222.

[50] Royal order issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 14 February 1929, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

International Exhibition of Barcelona, especially regarding the attraction of foreign tourists'.[51] After tasking the *Consejo* with publicity in 1926, and partially discrediting it in 1928 by calling for the participation of other public and private agents, the government asked the *Patronato* to pay for the *Consejo*'s campaigns. All this suggests the existence of conflicting interests and contradictory instructions within the administration. It also signals the central role that Primo de Rivera decided to give to the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo*.

Attracting tourists

The Ibero-American Exhibition was held during the first boom of tourism in Spain.[52] It worked, in this context, as a tourist attraction. In his letter to Ambassador Quiñones, Primo de Rivera also expressed his satisfaction in this respect:

> España ha gastado en magníficas construcciones más de seis millones de libras, reuniendo en las dos grandes ciudades toda su riqueza artística y toda su producción moderna, y todas las naciones de América, incluso los Estados Unidos, han construido grandes y artísticos palacios en Sevilla, mientras Europa acude con todos sus progresos a la Exposición de Barcelona.[53]

Here again, the Ibero-American Exhibition was depicted as more 'artistic' than that of Barcelona. Referring to the exhibition of Barcelona, Primo de Rivera mentioned 'progress'; referring to that of Seville, he mentioned 'huge and artistic palaces'. A historicist, if not decidedly traditionalist architecture was displayed in Seville. For the main pavilions, the chief architect Aníbal González chose the *neomudéjar* style, a picturesque Andalusian revival of medieval Moor and Christian building traditions.[54] Most American participants built their own palaces: some made explicit allusions to the colonial past, combining baroque, creole, and indigenous styles.[55] Like in other exhibitions of this kind, the architecture and,

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[51] Royal order issued by the Presidency of the Council of Minister, 5 September 1929, AGA, box 51/3479, file 3, folder 224.

[52] Rosa Cal Martínez, 'La propaganda del turismo en España: primeras organizaciones', *Historia y Comunicación Social* 2 (1997): 125–33. See also Javier Moreno Luzón, *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902-1931* (Brighton, Portland, and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 151–59.

[53] Primo de Rivera to Quiñones, 14 December 1928, AGA, box 54/6213, file 1619.1, folder 1.1.

[54] Eric Storm, *The Culture of Regionalism: Art, Architecture and International Exhibitions in France, Germany and Spain, 1890-1939* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 205–18; Sylvie Assassin, *Séville : l'exposition ibéro-américaine, 1929-1930* (Paris: Norma, 1992).

[55] Jean Babelon, 'L'Exposition ibéro-américaine de Séville', *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, July 1929. For a case study of architectural eclecticism, see Alfonso Braojos Garrido and Amparo Graciani García, *El pabellón de México en la Sevilla de 1929: evocaciones históricas y artísticas* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998). See also

more generally, 'the arts' attracted the curiosity of national and international visitors. Primo de Rivera was well aware of the appeal that the 'artistic palaces' of the Ibero-American Exhibition could potentially have.

Spanish central and local authorities used the exhibitions to put forward the *'Tesoro Artístico Nacional'*, the administrative construct that we would now call 'heritage'. While the revivalist approach to architecture evoked the historical 'traditions' of Spanish arts, the city of Seville took the opportunity of the exhibition to show off its most valuable artistic masterpieces. It also received works of art from all around Spain. Small-sized local institutions, such as municipal and provincial galleries, cathedrals, chapters, and parishes, seized the occasion to be more visible. In a handwritten letter to the director-general for Fine Arts, the mayor of Sigüenza, a small town in New Castile, expressed his determination to 'work in favour of the touristic flow towards this city'. He asked whether the Royal Academy of Fine Arts would be willing to send to Seville a reproduction of the gothic sepulchre that was Sigüenza's greatest pride. Four months later, the Royal Academy laconically informed the administration that it did not keep any reproductions of the sepulchre.[56] The most important museums and artistic institutions were reluctant to share parts of their collections, but provincial and municipal administrations were well aware of the economic benefits that the 'artistic' nature of the exhibition could potentially entail.

For the administration, the interest of small-sized institutions in the exhibition was an opportunity to continue itemising Spanish painting, sculpture, and architecture.[57] In those same years, the Spanish government undertook a series of measures to protect and safeguard Spain's cultural and historical heritage.[58] This was part of a larger European interest in the importance of protecting and preserving heritage: the Athens Charter for the restoration of historic monuments would only be signed in 1931, but the intellectual and political discussions on heritage were already a transnational topic in Europe during the 1920s.[59] The 'artistic' element of the Ibero-American Exhibition can be understood within this larger framework. While Barcelona would advertise industrial and commercial

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Juan José Cabrero Nieves, *Los pabellones de la Exposición Iberoamericana de Sevilla y el parque de María Luisa (Sevilla, 1929)* (Seville: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2016).

[56] File entitled *'Asunto del Sepulcro del Doncel de Sigüenza para la Exposición Ibero-Americana de Sevilla'*, December 1928-April 1929, AGA, box 31/1026, file 10137.1.

[57] Royal order issued by the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, 6 November 1928, AGA, box 31/1027, file 10137.2.

[58] Royal decree on the *Tesoro Artístico Nacional*, 9 August 1926.

[59] María Victoria García Morales and Victoria Soto Caba, *Patrimonio histórico-artístico* (Madrid: Editorial Universitaria Ramón Areces, 2011).

novelties, Seville would present an attractive façade to feature the richness and diversity of Spanish heritage. The Ibero-American Exhibition, as such, was also conceived as part of that heritage: it was the demonstration of the intangible heritage of the Spanish empire.

Intellectual cooperation and external cultural projection

The US ambassador to Spain, Irwin B. Laughlin, visited the Ibero-American Exhibition in May 1930. When he reported on his visit to the State Department, he described the pavilion of the United States as a 'simple and restrained' building that did not immediately reveal its purpose and message to the public.[60] The visitor did not find a display of manufactured or agro-industrial products. The United States had made the choice of a different kind of exhibition, as he explained:

> It is, in fact, a cultural exposition to express something of the intellectual achievements of our government and people that is presented, and in no sense an advertisement of industrial commodities, for nothing saleable of any sort is displayed, nor is there to be seen a single trade name to indicate an intention of commercial advertising.

This focus on the 'intellectual' rather than on the 'industrial' or the 'commercial' was, as Laughlin admitted, 'unusual in international expositions'.

However, the 'cultural' scope of the US pavilion met the expectations of the organisers of the exhibition, as Ambassador Laughlin remarked:

> This characteristic has been very favorably noticed by thoughtful Spaniards, some of whom have made a point of telling the [US] commissioner-general how it has impressed them and how admirably they consider the United States to have grasped the underlying Spanish purpose of the Exposition.

This last comment is eloquent about the importance that Spanish authorities, be it in Seville or in Madrid, gave to the cultural components of the exhibition. Coping with this 'underlying' rationale, US exhibitors used Seville as a platform to stage the United States beyond the usual image of a commercial, industrial, or financial big power. The commissioner-general of the US representation wished to present 'the Colossus of the

[60] Laughlin, dispatch 99, 19 May 1930, NARA, registry 43, file A1.1309, box 6.

North', as the United States was often called in the local press, as an intellectual and cultural power, and he did so in response to Spanish policies. What the US delegation had 'admirably' understood was indeed that Spain had managed to construct a showcase for intangible elements of prestige and international power. The Ibero-American Exhibition worked in fact as a 'recomposed' *lieu de mémoire* where Spain could prove to the world that the spirit of its empire was still alive in an intangible or 'symbolic' manner.[61]

Along with a collection of heritage objects and revivals of Spanish architectural and artistic 'traditions', tourists could 'see' the gathering of different nations around the same spirit of post-imperial re-encounter. This intangible element, which was indeed 'underlying' in the exhibition, was yet another part of Spanish historical heritage. In the eyes of the visitor, the Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas, as well as Portugal, Brazil, and even the United States, were there to take pride in their common 'Spanish' background. Some foreign journalists perceived this quite clearly. Among the many articles that the French press published on the occasion of the exhibition, one captured the attention of Ambassador Quiñones, who sent it to his *'querido amigo'* Primo de Rivera.[62] It was a two-column testimonial written by a young Hispanist, Adolphe de Falgairolle, who described the exhibition as the 'tactile and ocular' evidence of a genuinely Hispanic culture. He explained that the exhibition condensed bits and pieces of the 'Hispanic world'.[63] Sangróniz also compared the cultural, intellectual and, all in all, 'spiritual' legacy of the Spanish empire in the Americas to a 'spontaneous treasure'.[64] This expression, used by a practitioner of tourism policy from within the administration, complemented the notion of *'Tesoro Artístico Nacional'* that designated the administrative construct of historical heritage.

Through Sangróniz and other agents, the central administration played in fact a crucial role in orchestrating the staging of all these material and intangible 'treasures'. In marked contrast to commercial matters, which were mostly addressed by Sevillian organisers and foreign exhibitors, the matters of intellectual cooperation and cultural *rayonnement* were carefully supervised, if not decisively orchestrated from Madrid. For example, the most ambitious congress among those that the government convened was the *III Congreso Hispano-Americano de Geografía e Historia*. Although this international conference had an

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[61] Marcilhacy, 'L'Exposition ibéro-américaine de Séville de 1929'.

[62] Quiñones to Primo de Rivera, 21 November 1929, AGA, box 54/6214, file 1619.2, folder 1.3.

[63] Adolphe de Falgairolle, 'En Espagne. L'Exposition de Séville', *L'Européen. Hebdomadaire économique, artistique et littéraire*, 20 November 1929, sec. Semaine européenne.

[64] Sangróniz, *Nuevas orientaciones para la política internacional de España*, 83.

academic scope, it was designed to have a particularly wide repercussion as an instrument of cultural diplomacy. The organising board called for papers in different disciplines and in different languages (Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, English, and German), aiming to 'proclaim and speak about the greatness of Spain in every time and space'.[65] The main focus of the conference was given to the history of the Spanish conquest and colonisation of the Americas. When it appointed the organising board, the government chose two vice-presidents who were active agents of Spanish external cultural action. One was Sangróniz, who was a geographer in addition to a diplomat. The other was the reputed and respected historian Rafael Altamira.

In the 1900s and 1910s, from his chair at the University of Oviedo, Altamira gained a reputation as a convinced Hispano-Americanist thinker and activist.[66] He travelled in Latin America and created transatlantic networks of intellectual cooperation.[67] In Spain, he was also proactive in raising awareness on the need for a 'practical' Hispano-Americanist policy. In 1917, he wrote a *'programa americanista'* that he handed personally to King Alfonso. His project offered a list of concrete measures that were, according to him, *'gacetables'*, which meant that they could be immediately transposed into the official *Gaceta de Madrid*, where laws, decrees, and other legal norms were published. What he wished for, as he said, was a clear action plan and a clear set of practices that would allow the government to take concrete steps towards the construction of an international community based on the 'spiritual unity' of the Hispanic world.[68] Cooperation, he argued, needed to be structured according to peer-to-peer logic: Spain's former colonies were no longer Spain's 'daughters'; they had become Spain's 'sisters'. He did not believe in cultural hegemony, but he thought that Spain, as a *primus inter pares*, had to take the initiative and found permanent institutions for academic, scientific, and editorial cooperation.

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[65] Royal decree, 9 April 1928, AGA, box 31/1026, file 10137.

[66] Prado, Gustavo H. *Rafael Altamira, 1909–1910: historia e historiografía del proyecto americanista en la Universidad de Oviedo*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2008. See also Prado, Gustavo H. 'La estrategia americanista de Rafael Altamira tras la derrota del proyecto ovetense (1910-1936): entre el lobby parlamentario y el refugio académico'. In *De las Independencias al Bicentenario. Trabajos presentados al Segundo Congreso Internacional de Instituciones Americanistas, dedicado a los fondos documentales desde las Independencias al Bicentenario. Barcelona, 20 de octubre de 2005*, edited by Ariadna Lluís i Vidal-Folch, Gabriela Della Corte, and Ferrán Camps, 71–88. Barcelona: Casa Amèrica Catalunya, 2006.

[67] María Dolores de la Calle Velasco, 'El americanismo de Rafael Altamira', *Péndulo: revista de ingeniería y humanidades*, no. 25 (2014): 36–49. See also Rafael Altamira, *Mi viaje a América* (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1911).

[68] Altamira, *España y el programa americanista* (Madrid: Editorial América, 1917), 10.

Primo de Rivera took an important step in this direction with the project to establish a Hispano-American College in Seville to perpetuate the legacy of the exhibition. The college would have worked as a centre for scholarly cooperation between Spain and its former colonies in the Americas. On the initiative of Sevillian authorities, namely the president of the University of Seville, and with the high patronage of the king, Primo de Rivera launched the idea in May 1924 with a royal decree. This regulation foresaw that the college would function as a public foundation and depend on the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. It was expected to start functioning after the closure of the Ibero-American Exhibition and to have its premises in the *Palacio de España*, the main Spanish pavilion in the site of the exhibition. The college was meant to be a genuine centre for advanced professional and research studies, working in Spanish as a *lingua franca* 'for Hispano-American approximation, in the interest of all the nations of the Hispano-American community, and in favour of the progress of the human kind'.[69] The government sought to frame the transatlantic circulation of knowledge and ideas by establishing Seville as the centre of a Hispano-American intellectual community. This, as the royal decree stated, would demonstrate to 'the whole world' that Spain, by channelling a 'complete and well-defined expression of Hispanic thought', was capable of using the intellectual and cultural legacy of its former empire for a practical purpose.

The College, in the end, was never created. Various institutional problems within the decision-making process prevented its creation.[70] The Ibero-American Exhibition remained the only evidence of Spain's capacity to gather its spiritual empire in a specific physical place. This was a relative success, nevertheless, as the article written by Falgairolle suggested. Taking the logic a step further, the latter summarised the overall purpose of the exhibition in what I think was an accurate manner:

> Cette parenté entre Castillans et annexés [hispano-américains], l'Espagne actuelle ne veut pas y renoncer. C'est là le sens de l'Exposition de Séville, laquelle n'est qu'une déclaration de politique étrangère.[71]

This last sentence nicely summarises what I have tried to show in this chapter: the Ibero-American Exhibition was 'practical' insofar as it served the practice of Spanish diplomacy.

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[69] Royal decree, 17 May 1924, AGA, box 51/3478, file 2 bis, folder 7.

[70] Working papers, AGA, box 51/3476, file 1.

[71] Falgairolle, 'En Espagne'.

The weekly newspaper in which this article was published, *l'Européen*, was actually read by those French Europeanists who championed Franco-German reconciliation. It was thus in an internationalist publication that the Ibero-American Exhibition was described as 'nothing else than a declaration of foreign policy'. This situates the exhibition beyond the local scope of Seville and beyond the borders of Spain. It opens the way towards inserting the notion of spiritual empire into the practice of world power politics in the 1920s.

CHAPTER 2

Migrants as agents of diplomacy: Spaniards in Argentina

INTRODUCTION

In April 1926, the US State Department asked its diplomatic officers in Latin America and Europe to pay attention to any attempt by Spain to expand its influence over its former American colonies:

> You are requested to observe closely the development of the policy [of Spain] and report to the Department from time to time the efforts which may be made by the Spanish Government through its representatives abroad, or through the Spanish colony resident in the country to which you are accredited, to bring about a Spanish hegemony in Latin-America, or to affect unfavorably the prestige and influence of the United States.[1]

There is an interesting detail in this text. Undersecretary Joseph Grew saw two types of agents of Spanish influence: the formal and usual one, the diplomats, and a less expected one, 'the Spanish colony', that is, the immigrants. In the present chapter, I explore the interplay between these two categories of agents in the 1920s. I study the hypothesis that immigrants were active and useful agents of diplomacy and, more specifically in the case of Spaniards in Latin America, of spiritual empire.

From the second half of the nineteenth century into the 1930s and beyond, Spain was an 'emigrant nation'.[2] Spanish emigration was part of a larger mass phenomenon that exported more than fifty million Europeans to the rest of the world, in particular to the Americas. According to official data, 3,297,312 Spaniards embarked for the 'New World' between 1882 and 1930. Of those, 1,594,822 chose Argentina. The flow of emigrants to Argentina was strong throughout the entire period, with peaks of intensity around 1889

[1] The undersecretary of State of the United States (Joseph C. Grew), instructions to the diplomatic officers in Latin America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, 19 April 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/35.

[2] I take the expression from Mark I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

and between 1902 and 1912.[3] A large number of these migrants ultimately returned to Spain; others settled in Argentina. Throughout the 1920s, Argentina counted approximately one million Spaniards within a population of about ten million people.[4] Spanish emigration to Argentina was thus a considerable mass phenomenon for both Spain and Argentina. Moreover, Spaniards were particularly well organised in Argentina, through numerous associations of various sizes and scopes which developed networks for mutual aid, commercial expansion, leisure, or cultural and educational purposes.[5]

As Mark Choate has argued, international history must take the history of migration into account.[6] The present chapter assesses the extent to which Spanish emigration to Latin America (and to Argentina in particular) was an asset of international power for Spain. This endeavour contributes to a recent body of literature which has begun to signal the importance of migration as a driver of power logics at the crossing point of colonialism and nationalism. Sebastian Conrad has demonstrated that German emigration turned into an instrument of informal colonialism in a context of interimperial competition.[7] Emigration also served as a driving force of informal imperialism in the case of Italy. The Italian nation-building process relied, among other things, upon emigrated populations, which were used by the Italian state as advance posts of nationalism abroad.[8] In the interwar period, the Italian Fascist regime was more assertive and attempted to instrumentalise emigrants in order to spread Fascist ideology in South America and to increase the weight of Italy in an imagined 'Latin world'.[9] Emigration was a crucial way for European countries to exert power in the rest of the world during the late nineteenth and

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[3] Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, 'Análisis cuantitativo', in *Historia general de la emigración española a Iberoamérica*, ed. Pedro A. Vives, Pepa Vega, and Jesús Oyamburu, vol. 1, 2 vols (Madrid: Historia 16 and Fundación Centro Español de Estudios de América Latina, 1992), 177–200.

[4] Juan C. Elizaga, 'La evolución de la población de la Argentina en los últimos cien años', *Desarrollo Económico* 12, no. 48 (1973), 796; José C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 354.

[5] Alejandro Fernández, 'Mutualismo y asociacionismo', in *Historia general de la emigración española a Iberoamérica*, ed. Pedro A. Vives, Pepa Vega, and Jesús Oyamburu, vol. 1, 2 vols (Madrid: Historia 16 and Fundación Centro Español de Estudios de América Latina, 1992), 346–49.

[6] Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 9.

[7] Sebastian Conrad, '«Hier degeneriert der Deutsche nicht»: Brasilien, Auswanderung und der Jungbrunnen der Nation', in *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2006), 229–78. See also Conrad, *German Colonialism: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 169–85.

[8] Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 57–71.

[9] Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 79–117.

early twentieth centuries. It thus was a fundamental instrument in the scramble for Latin America.

In this context, the case of Spanish emigration presents some particular characteristics which deserve more careful attention. In Argentina as elsewhere in Spanish-speaking America, Spanish immigrants came from the former imperial metropole. They were, simultaneously, 'cousins and strangers'.[10] They were comparable to Portuguese immigrants in Brazil.[11] Spaniards and Argentinians spoke the same language, they professed the same religion, and they shared cultural codes inherited from a common imperial history. These elements constituted a stockpile of imperial legacy that underpinned the imagined transnational community of *raza hispánica* that David Marcilhacy has pictured.[12] The imaginary of *raza* and Hispano-Americanism provided Spaniards and some Argentinians with a semantic field upon which to validate their activities as part of a commonality that mitigated the negative connotations of the imperial past. Spanish immigrants in Argentina were in fact spontaneous and proactive drivers of Spanish practices of Hispano-Americanism.[13] This laid fertile ground for Spanish diplomacy to use emigrants as an instrument of spiritual empire, which is what the present chapter explores.

The first section addresses how and why Spanish immigrants performed spiritual empire as spontaneous agents of informal diplomacy. Looking into the records of the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires and of Primo de Rivera's office in Madrid, I have also sought traces of successful or failed attempts of instrumentalisation on the side of diplomats. Even though immigrant-led initiatives were relatively successful in practicing spiritual empire in Argentina, Spanish diplomatic authorities failed to exert control over them. In the second section, however, I take the argument beyond specific initiatives and look at immigrants as a whole, as part of a 'mass' public which was used by state apparatuses as both target and instrument of cultural diplomacy. Through the study of the transatlantic flight of the *Plus Ultra* from Palos de la Frontera to Buenos Aires in 1926, I

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[10] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*.

[11] José Sacchetta Ramos Mendes, *Laços de sangue: privilégio e intolerância à imigração portuguesa no Brasil, 1833-1945* (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2011).

[12] David Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana: hispanoamericanismo e imaginario nacional en la España de la Restauración* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2010).

[13] Isidro Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria: hispanoamericanismo y nacionalismo* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005), 363–91; Fredrick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1930: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 231–51.

argue that the Spanish government concentrated its efforts on worldwide prestige rather than on the effective control of Spaniards abroad.

SPIRITUAL EMPIRE AS A SPONTANEOUS PHENOMENON: A ROLE FOR DIPLOMATS?

In September 1919, Pablo Soler, the Spanish ambassador in Buenos Aires, reported on the effects of immigration in Argentina. He explained that the Argentinian government, albeit aware of the positive benefits of 'agricultural colonisation', was increasingly concerned about the potentially negative impact of more 'political' forms of 'colonies',

> es decir, como agrupaciones interpoladas dentro de la población argentina, impermeables a su sentimentalidad, a toda confusión de vida material o moral, con exclusivismos de lenguaje, verdaderos quistes de extranjerismo que en la primera ocasión se manifestarán en actitudes de resistencia huraña con las expresiones generales y uniformes de la soberanía nacional.[14]

Ambassador Soler's own opinion is absent from this report, as if he entirely agreed with the view of the Argentinian government. He advanced no argument in favour of Spanish immigrants, nor did he call for any action. He actually made no mention of Spanish immigration at all. Despite the context of incipient hostility against immigration that he was describing, Soler seemed rather calm as far as Spaniards were concerned. He probably had other 'cysts of foreignness' in mind: the Italians or the Germans, to name but two. As for Spaniards, he probably thought that they were not entirely foreigners in Argentina: they shared many 'material and moral aspects of life' with the Argentinians, and they were 'permeable' to Argentinian 'sentimentality'. Like other Spanish diplomats at the time, Soler was probably convinced that Spaniards and Argentinians belonged to the same 'race'.[15]

Between the lines of his report lay the certainty that the spirit of the Spanish empire was still alive. In Argentina, Hispano-Americanism was a vivid social phenomenon that involved Spanish as well as Argentinian agents, mixing private and public initiatives coming from both sides of the Atlantic. The Spanish state, the foreign office, and its diplomats were only agents among others. Madrid never had a centralised programme to construct or guide Hispano-Americanism through migration.[16] In comparison, Italian and German

[14] Soler, dispatch 217, 13 September 1919, AGA, box 54/9156, file 292.

[15] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 225–71.

[16] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 384–85; Pike, *Hispanismo*, 248–51.

emigration policies were more openly colonial: they were carefully institutionalised in Rome and Berlin, and admittedly based on the idea of enlarging the nation by sending emigrants abroad.[17] As for the Spanish case, Ascensión Martínez Riaza has even pictured Spanish immigrants in Peru as agents of Spanishness 'in spite of the government'.[18]

Proactive immigrants

Spanish immigrants were proactive. They organised themselves in societies and took initiatives to establish connections between Spain and Argentina. They acted as informal agents of Hispano-American relations.[19] In this context, diplomats and, more generally, the Spanish state often appear as mere observers of what immigrants did. The records of the Spanish Embassy in Buenos Aires and the existing literature suggest two main groups of immigrant-led Hispano-Argentinian initiatives: the 'practical' and the 'sentimental'. The first one was directed towards the establishment of commercial and economic relations that were expected to generate concrete benefits for Spanish traders and entrepreneurs on both sides of the Atlantic. The second group encompassed initiatives that aimed to forge or maintain cultural bonds between Spain and Argentina. Spanish authorities seemed to take cultural or 'sentimental' aspects into more careful consideration than the commercial or 'practical' ones. This signals a preference for cultural over commercial diplomacy.

Commercial initiatives

Commercial benefits were among the main objectives of those who, in Spain, called for more active Hispano-Americanist policies.[20] On 5 April 1921, the Spanish liberal deputy José Francos Rodríguez addressed his fellow congressmen.[21] He was back from Chile, where he had been sent as part of a delegation to the ceremonies organised for the fourth centenary of the 'discovery' of the Strait of Magellan. He described the warmth with which the delegation had been received, but he also lamented the 'cold, vague, hesitant, and purely bureaucratic' terms in which Spaniards had responded. He accused all politicians,

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[17] On Italy, see Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 21–56 and 57–71; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 15–51 and 79–117. On Germany, see Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The 'Greater German Empire', 1871-1914* (New York: Routledge, 2014); Conrad, *German Colonialism: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 169–85.

[18] Ascensión Martínez Riaza, *«A pesar del gobierno»: españoles en el Perú, 1879-1939* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006).

[19] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 363–92.

[20] Pike, *Hispanismo*, 209–30.

[21] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1921*, vol. IV, no. 32 (5 April 1921), 1076–81.

the conservatives in the government and the liberals in the opposition, of having limited Hispano-Americanism to 'sentimentalism'. He was not opposed to the use of sentiments in politics, but he considered it meaningless to use them if this was not aimed at 'practical' results. He gave some examples of these results, as he desired them: the importation of saltpetre from Chile to boost Spanish agriculture, the exportation of Spanish books to Argentina or, more generally, the satisfaction of seeing the Spanish flag fluttering, along with the German, the French, or the US ones, in the commercial harbours of South America. For him, the ultimate goal of Hispano-Americanism was trade and, more generally, economic dynamism.

Among the economic opportunities that South America offered to Spain, Argentinian markets held particular importance. Since 1916, Argentina had been going through a period of exponential commercial expansion, slightly slowed after the First World War, but resumed with strength after 1924, up until the recession of the 1930s.[22] In this favourable context for business, economists and politicians such as Francos Rodríguez started spreading the idea that Spanish migrants in Argentina could be the driving force of Spain's market and economic development. This idea of an 'ethnic market' emerged in liberal as well as conservative circles in the early twentieth century, in order to take advantage of the post-war economic and trading context. It echoed the Italian project to mobilise the mass of migrants for commercial benefits, which had quite successfully enabled the international projection of Italian businesses since the last decades of the nineteenth century.[23] In the Spanish case, however, the idea of an 'ethnic market' made up of Spanish migrants merely translated into scattered public and private initiatives that did not manage to palliate the structural problems of the Spanish productive and commercial industries.[24]

During the 1890s, while Spain's colonial system became increasingly unstable, the Spanish government encouraged the creation of chambers of commerce abroad. The latter became corporations under Spanish public law in 1911, which gave them an official character. However, the members of these chambers were not directly appointed by the Spanish government. The chambers were essentially composed of migrants. Their mission was to support the development of trade relations between Spain and the given country by

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[22] Pedro A. Vives, Pepa Vega, and Jesús Oyamburu, eds., *Historia general de la emigración española a Iberoamérica*, vol. 1, 2 vols (Madrid: Historia 16 and Fundación Centro Español de Estudios de América Latina, 1992), 142–46.

[23] Fernández, *Un mercado étnico en el Plata: emigración y exportaciones españolas a la Argentina (1880-1935)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004), 21–54.

[24] Fernández, *Un mercado étnico en el Plata*, 245–59.

creating networks for business. Among other things, they organised exhibitions of certain goods, they provided information to importers and exporters, and they mediated in conflicts among businessmen and societies. In their activities, they were expected to cooperate with Spanish consular authorities.[25] However, their status of 'official' chambers did not imply that they were agents of the state. In practice, the members of these chambers enjoyed considerable liberty: they took initiatives, sometimes beyond the limits of their narrow budgets, and they even made concrete proposals to the Spanish government.[26]

So did, for example, the members of the Spanish Official Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation of Rosario, founded in 1920. Rosario was an important commercial port in the Argentinian province of Santa Fe, the heartland of the agricultural sector. The chamber of commerce was the second of its kind in Argentina. The first one, in Buenos Aires, had existed since 1887. In Rosario, Miguel Monserrat, a local banker and hardware importer of Balearic descent, was the president-founder of the chamber. His fellow chamber members were, for the most part, food importers of Catalan origin. The leading role of Balearics, Catalans, and other Spaniards 'of the periphery', in Frederick Pike's words, is not surprising.[27] In Rosario, Monserrat and his fellows kept in assiduous contact with Barcelona, where the private society *Casa de América* had been working for the improvement of commercial relations between Spain and its former colonies since 1911.[28] Like Catalan bourgeois elites in Barcelona, the members of the chamber of commerce in Rosario also opposed the protectionist commercial policies that Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was putting in place in the early 1920s.[29] In their documents and reports, they used the term *'hispano-americanismo práctico'* to qualify routine activities, in support of their

[25] On the role of consuls for the development of business and trade relations, see Ferry de Goey, *Consuls and the Institution of Global Capitalism, 1783-1914* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2014).

[26] Fernández, *Un mercado étnico en el Plata*, 127–30. See also Antonio Sempere, *Historia de la Cámara Española de Comercio de la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Cámara Española de Comercio de la República Argentina, 1998).

[27] Pike, *Hispanismo*, 211–14.

[28] Gabriella dalla Corte, *Casa de América de Barcelona, 1911-1947: Comillas, Cambó, Gili, Torres y mil empresarios en una agencia de información e influencia internacional* (Madrid: Editorial LID, 2005). See also Òscar Costa Ruibal, *L'imaginari imperial: el Noucentisme català i la política internacional* (Barcelona: Fundació Cambó, 2002).

[29] Eduardo González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera: la modernización autoritaria, 1923-1930* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005), 229–32.

anti-protectionist arguments.[30] While bringing forward their own agenda, they also enacted the role of sentinels of Hispano-Americanism in the Santa Fe Province.

They did not wait for the opinions of Spanish authorities before undertaking some of their most important initiatives. In 1925, for example, they decided to appoint delegates in other cities of the province, in order to attract potential new members of the chamber among Spanish immigrants. For this and other matters, they counted on the assiduous logistical support of different associations of Spaniards and of the local newspaper *La Capital*, which publicised their activities and calls for cooperation. Moreover, chambers of commerce could count on the support of other Spanish migrant societies that trained young men in the arts of commerce. One of the latter was the reputed *escuela comercial* that the *Asociación Patriótica Española* ran in Buenos Aires, which was 'crowded with the children of Spaniards'.[31] In its annual report, the chamber of Rosario thanked different local Spanish and Argentinian institutions in more glowing terms than the ones they used to thank the Spanish consul.[32] This suggests that Spanish authorities were not particularly active in their efforts to promote Spanish commercial activities in Argentina.

Chamber members actually felt hampered by Spain's commercial, industrial, and navigation policies. Making use of the liberty that they enjoyed according to their statutes, they openly criticised the decisions and the inaction of the Spanish government, and they called for concrete action in the direction that they considered most appropriate. Regarding olive oil, in particular, they urged the government to eliminate any export customs in order to lower the prices. By 1925, Spanish olive oil was less competitive than Italian.[33] This was only partially due to a question of prices. It also stemmed from the fact that Italian olive oil had 'a softer taste and a smoother body' than the Spanish one, and was therefore more appreciated in the Argentinian market. From Rosario, the members of the chamber of commerce invited the Spanish government to launch a campaign to change the methods of

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[30] *Memoria de la Cámara Oficial Española de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Rosario de Santa Fe, correspondiente al cuarto ejercicio comprendido del 1 de abril de 1924 al 31 de marzo de 1925* (Rosario: Talleres Gráficos Romanos Hermanos, 1925), 10.

[31] Anonymous draft document prepared at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires in response to a questionnaire sent by the Ministry of State, June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

[32] *Memoria de la Cámara Oficial Española de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Rosario de Santa Fe, correspondiente al cuarto ejercicio comprendido del 1 de abril de 1924 al 31 de marzo de 1925*, 22.

[33] Ramon Ramon i Muñoz, 'El comercio exterior de aceite de oliva en Italia y España, 1850-1936', in *Las industrias agroalimentarias en Italia y España durante los siglos XIX y XX*, ed. Antonio Di Vittorio and Carlos Barciela López (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2003), 497–555.

oil production in Spain.[34] This echoed the need to 'improve' Spanish products, one of the conclusions that the *Congreso del Comercio Español de Ultramar* had drawn in 1923. Two years after the congress, as it seems, Spanish producers had not yet managed to catch up, at least not to the satisfaction of the members of the chamber of commerce of Rosario.

In contrast to Italian producers, Spanish ones never seized the opportunity that massive emigration offered to commerce, not to speak of the multiplier effect that commercial expansion could have had, as it did have for Italy, in terms of cultural visibility. Spanish policymakers never gave incentives to Spanish agro-industrial producers in order to export 'authentic Spanish cuisine' to Spanish emigrants abroad. In late-nineteenth-century Italy, emigration created a mass of consumers for new products such as the dry pasta created by Buitoni and Barilla.[35] There was no equivalent to this in Spain. The case of olive oil is one illustration of this phenomenon, and the members of the Spanish chamber of commerce in Rosario deplored that many Spanish immigrants consumed Italian olive oil. In reality, as Alejandro Fernández argues and my archival findings seem to confirm, Spanish markets had no real capacity to counter the commercial competition coming from Italy and other European countries, as well as from the United States. Perhaps more importantly, Spanish authorities did not really seem concerned about commercial expansion at all, notwithstanding the proactive nature of Spanish migrants.

Cultural initiatives

One commercial sector that the Spanish government was very interested in boosting was the editorial one. The exportation and promotion of Spanish books, magazines, scientific journals, and newspapers to the Americas were among the main priorities of the Hispano-American agenda in Madrid. Spanish emigrants to Argentina were seen as particular key targets for the exportation of Spanish editorial products.[36] Spanish authorities wished their subjects in Argentina to maintain a 'sentimental' link to their mother country through the written word. Books were a way through which Spaniards could remain attached to Spain. From the perspective of linguistic imperialism, Spanish editorial

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[34] *Memoria de la Cámara Oficial Española de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Rosario de Santa Fe, correspondiente al cuarto ejercicio comprendido del 1 de abril de 1924 al 31 de marzo de 1925*, 13–15.

[35] Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 225.

[36] María Fernández Moya, 'La lengua y la cultura como barreras de entrada: la inversión exterior en el sector editorial argentino, mexicano y español (1900-2009)', *Anuario del Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Empresa y el Desarrollo*, no. 2 (2010): 41–93; Ana Martínez Rus, 'La industria editorial española ante los mercados americanos del libro, 1892-1936', *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia* 62, no. 212 (2002): 1021–58.

products also served as reminders that the birthplace of the language spoken in Argentina was Spain. Similarly, in the 1910s, the *Real Academia Española* had made considerable efforts to maintain the unity of the Spanish language in Spain and in Argentina.[37]

In the end, Spanish and 'Argentinian' were officially recognised as the same language in an ambiance of growing Hispanophilia that José Moya has described in depth. Moreover, this Hispanophilia coincided in time with a decrease in the influential capacity of other immigrant communities. While Argentinian elites had been very receptive to French and Italian inputs throughout the nineteenth century, the influence of these 'Latin' cultures was already on the wane around 1900.[38] In 1910, when Argentinians commemorated the first centennial of their independence from Spain, Hispanophilia peaked. One of the most conspicuous events of the centennial's festivities was King Alfonso XIII's aunt's visit to Buenos Aires. *La Chata*, as she was known, was warmly welcomed by 100,000 Spaniards (including some republicans) and, more importantly, by the Argentinian government.[39]

This phenomenon can be explained by the powerful lobbying of Argentinian elites that Spanish immigrants had been carrying out since the end of the nineteenth century. In Moya's words, 'the organized immigrant community boosted its efforts to promote Spanish culture in Argentina'.[40] Similarly to what I have observed in the case of Rosario regarding commercial matters, although with more successful results, Spanish associations tended to take the lead in cultural matters. This happened in the city of Buenos Aires, which is the main focus of Moya's study, but also in the provinces. At the same time as Spanish immigrants intensified their lobbying, diplomatic authorities seem to have been relegated to the role of variously satisfied observers.

In February 1923, the Spanish Ministry of State prepared a questionnaire regarding the cultural presence of Spain abroad, and sent it to different embassies around the world.[41] The document contained ten questions about the education of Spanish children and the presence and role of Spanish cultural institutions. In June, the embassy in Buenos Aires had not yet responded, and the minister felt the need to send a reminder that it was urgent

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[37] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 354.

[38] J.P. Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French": Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires', *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 4 (December 2008), 847–48.

[39] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 352.

[40] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 353.

[41] Circular royal order issued by the Ministry of State, 12 February 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

to do so.[42] The embassy then hastily prepared a response, which has led me to distinguish between two sets of immigrant-led cultural initiatives.[43] While those regarding the education of new generations of immigrants were scarce and timid, those regarding the institutionalisation of cultural relations between Spain and Argentina were dynamic and organised in a more structured way. Such a distinction cannot however be reduced to a schema of failure and success.

Regarding the education of immigrant children, the case of Italy serves again as a point of comparison. The Italian government strongly supported Italian immigrants in their educational initiatives. As a result, Spanish-Italian bilingualism was promoted through the creation of schools and, above all, through the inclusion of Italian language courses in Argentinian programmes. In 1899, learning Italian as a foreign language was made compulsory in every school in Argentina.[44] Spanish children who attended Argentinian schools thus had to learn Italian. Nonetheless, of course, the fact that children learnt Italian did not mean that they developed a sense of *italianità*. Rather to the contrary: in 1912, the Italian educator Luigi Rava recognised that Italians '[had] fooled [themselves] for a long time' thinking that children learning Italian would have felt 'love for Italy'. In reality, Argentinian schools '[had] taught them to consider Argentina as their only fatherland'.[45]

'Paris has replaced Rome', he added. More efficient than the Italians, the French had indeed been taking part in the construction of the Argentinian educational system since the early nineteenth century, importing French methods and materials into schools, high schools, and universities.[46] France gave public financial support to both religious and non-religious schools, and continued to support religious institutions even after the official separation of the state from churches in 1905. This reflected a strategy of 'Latinity through schools', which was being played out rewardingly, as the Spanish embassy's draft report of June 1923 explained:

> Los naturales […] prefieren los Colegios franceses, parte por adquirir el idioma francés, parte por la ayuda material o moral prestada por los Gobiernos de Francia, aun a los colegios

[42] Royal order issued by the Ministry of State, 6 June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

[43] Anonymous draft document prepared at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires in response to a questionnaire sent by the Ministry of State, June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

[44] Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 115–19.

[45] Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 124.

[46] Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French"', 839.

> religiosos franceses, y parte por lo mucho que trabajan los franceses en presentar a su nación como un gran pueblo, el principal de la raza latina.[47]

Argentinian parents, especially among the upper classes, preferred a French education for their children. The importance and prestige of French schooling abroad has not yet been thoroughly studied by historians.[48] We nonetheless know that France set the bar for educational *rayonnement* as early as 1883, with the foundation of the *Alliance française*, quickly followed by that of the *Mission laïque française* in 1902.[49] In addition to being path-breaking, the French model was also rather successful. In Spain, it was observed with envy by those who wished to 'regenerate' the Spanish education system and Spanish cultural relations abroad.[50] In Argentina, the receptivity of Argentinian elites to anything 'French', from language to taste to urbanism, was nurtured by active imperialist policies which, from Paris, aimed to construct the image of France as a Latin *mère patrie* for Argentinians.[51] As a consequence, giving a 'French' education to one's children was a mark of social distinction and could help in climbing the social ladder.

Spain, by contrast, was absent from these 'Latin' battles for pre-eminence in children's minds. Spaniards did not lobby the Argentinian educational authorities. Neither did they found many schools. Some religious schools for boys were directed by Spanish friars, and a limited number of Spanish sisters directed schools for girls. As for non-religious schools, Spanish establishments were rare and small. In the mid-1920s, Spanish immigrants did not seem concerned about educating their children in the 'Spanish' way, and the Spanish embassy did not seem concerned about this situation. Its report, in 1923, gave information about Italian and French schools in a neutral tone of detachment.[52]

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[47] Anonymous draft document prepared at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires in response to a questionnaire sent by the Ministry of State, June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

[48] Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French"', 834. See also Gilles Matthieu, *Une ambition sud-américaine : politique culturelle de la France (1914-1940)* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1991), 73–168.

[49] François Chaubet, *La politique culturelle française et la diplomatie de la langue : une histoire de l'Alliance française (1883-1940)* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2006).

[50] Antonio Niño, '1898-1936: orígenes y despliegue de la política cultural hacia América Latina', in *L'Espagne, la France et l'Amérique latine : politiques culturelles, propagandes et relations internationales, XX^e siècle*, ed. Denis Rolland, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Eduardo González Calleja (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2001), 30–33.

[51] Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French"', 837–45.

[52] Anonymous draft document prepared at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires in response to a questionnaire sent by the Ministry of State, June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

It must not be forgotten that, even if they went to Argentinian schools, most Spanish children did not learn a different language than the one they spoke at home. While Italian or German parents may have seen education in Spanish as a threat to their children's 'original' identity, for Spaniards this was rarely a problem. As I illustrate below, some Basque and Catalan parents may also have felt the 'threat' of Spanish, but the embassy's report mentioned only one 'regional' institution, *Euskal Echea*, a school for Spanish and French Basque boys in Llavallol, in the suburbs of Buenos Aires, where only some courses were taught in Basque. What the embassy's report did underline was that Spaniards did not send their children to French, Italian, or other foreign schools. This was probably mostly due to the fact that Argentinian schools were felt to be good enough. This feeling rested on the basis of economic criteria for the poorest families, who could not afford a private foreign school, but also on the basis of linguistic and cultural similarities between Argentina and Spain. Spanish immigrants sent their children to Argentinian schools for the same reasons that sustained the idea of the 'Hispanic race'. Not to lobby for Spanishness in Argentinian schools was not contradictory to the underpinning logic of Hispano-Americanism. Rather to the contrary, it reinforced it.

Rather than trying to convince children that Spain and Argentina were different, they preferred to spend their efforts in persuading adults that Spain and Argentina were similar. In 1910, the University of La Plata invited Professor Adolfo González Posada to visit Argentina. A lawyer at the University of Oviedo, Posada was also a member of the *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*, founded three years earlier in Madrid. The *Junta* aimed to 'regenerate' the cultural and academic life of Spain, including its foreign projection.[53] Among other things, it was tasked with the consolidation of academic relations with the Americas. The *Junta* therefore seized the opportunity of the invitation by the University of La Plata to appoint Posada as its official representative for Hispano-American relations. Under this hat, Posada met the most influential personalities of the Spanish community, including Avelino Gutiérrez, a well-known Spanish surgeon who intended to found a Spanish cultural institution in Buenos Aires.[54]

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[53] Naranjo Orovio, 'Presentación (La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y América Latina: memoria, políticas y acción cultural, 1907-1939)', *Revista de Indias* LXVII, no. 239 (2007), 9–14.

[54] José María López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista: la Institución Cultural Española en Buenos Aires', *Revista de Indias* LXVII, no. 239 (2007), 86–87. See also Adolfo González Posada, *En América, una campaña: relaciones científicas con América, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay* (Madrid: Librería de F. Beltrán, 1911).

The *Institución Cultural Española* was eventually set up in May 1912 on the initiative of Gutiérrez and another 400 Spanish and Argentinian wealthy and influential personalities.[55] Gutiérrez used his contacts to connect his *Institución* to the most important Spanish societies in town. Among the governing members were the presidents of the *Asociación Patriótica Española*, the *Club Español*, the chamber of commerce, and the most important associations of mutual social care and charity, which were the *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos* and the *Sociedad Española de Beneficiencia*.[56] Gutiérrez also forged partnerships with his *alma mater*, the University of Buenos Aires and, perhaps more importantly, with the *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*. By virtue of the wealth of its members and of its partnerships in Buenos Aires and Madrid, the *Institución* was able to found a chair of Culture that welcomed its first occupant, the prestigious historian Ramón Menéndez Pidal, in August 1914. From then on, year after year, the most reputed Spanish intellectuals and scholars held the chair.[57]

The partnership between the *Institución* in Buenos Aires and the *Junta* in Madrid was strengthened after Gutiérrez travelled to Spain in 1920. This partnership was not piloted from Madrid, but rather from Buenos Aires and by Spanish migrants. Not only did the *Institución* function in total autonomy, but it was also particularly rich and generous. During the second half of the 1920s, under Federico Iribarren's presidency, the *Institución* contributed a substantial amount (5,000 pesetas) to the construction of the new *ciudad universitaria* in Madrid, and supported other academic initiatives, namely the creation of chairs for scientific research in Spain as well as in Argentina.[58] Although the *Institución* was founded relatively late in comparison to the Italian Dante Alighieri Society (1910) and the French *Alliance* (1893), its activity ended up being very efficient beyond the strict framework of the cultural life of Buenos Aires.[59] It was a world-class cultural institution that served as a proactive agent of Spanish cultural and education policy-making. The initiative of Spanish emigrants was indeed a decisive element in the fabrication of cultural policies in Madrid.

This success inspired Spanish migrants in other cities of the Americas to found similar institutions. In August 1919, the *Institución Cultural Española de Montevideo* opened its doors, and similar cultural centres were created in Santiago de Chile, Asunción, Havana, Mexico

[55] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 353.

[56] López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista', 89.

[57] López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista', 90.

[58] López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista', 91–92.

[59] On the Dante Alighieri Society, see Choate, *Emigrant Nation*, 101–28.

City, San Juan, and Santo Domingo throughout the 1920s. All these institutions in the Americas and the *Junta* in Madrid viewed Buenos Aires as the reference point for Hispano-American cultural relations.[60] In other Argentinian cities, groups of Spanish immigrants founded 'delegations' of the *Institución*, such as in Rosario in 1927.[61] The report drafted at the Spanish embassy in June 1923 informed the Ministry of State that there was virtually no city in Argentina without a Spanish cultural centre, even if sometimes they worked with very limited means.[62] The cultural aspects of Hispano-Americanism were thus ensured by the proactive initiatives of immigrants, which might suggest that Spanish diplomats could simply rest on the laurels won through immigrant-led informal diplomacy.

However, another document from 1923 throws a different light on this perhaps too positive picture. In March, the Spanish ambassador, the marquis of Amposta, warned the minister of State about the potentially pernicious effects that uncontrolled or unguided cultural initiatives could have:

> Es costumbre, ya arraigada, en los intelectuales españoles, el aprovechar sus visitas os sus correspondencias al extranjero, para insistir y dolerse, en términos efectistas y de seguro aplauso, contra todos los males y vicios que aquejan a nuestra patria, por culpa de los gobiernos que rigen sus destinos, sean aquellos los que fueren.
>
> Mientras los catedráticos o escritores franceses, italianos y norteamericanos, que aquí llegan, se valen de sus respectivas misiones para enaltecer a sus respectivos países ocultando o disimulando sus faltas y errores con plausible esmero, los españoles, aun los más serios y especializados en una rama del saber, parece que no cumplieran con su obligación, si en el curso de sus conferencias o artículos no saliere a relucir la nota virulenta y descomedida que presente a España como la nación peor gobernada del mundo.[63]

In Amposta's view, supporting and encouraging the cultural initiatives of Spanish immigrants was certainly a positive thing to do. However, the foreign office in Madrid

[60] López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista', 91.

[61] López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista', 93.

[62] Anonymous draft document prepared at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires in response to a questionnaire sent by the Ministry of State, June 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

[63] Amposta (Eugenio Ferraz), dispatch 70, 17 March 1923, AGA, box 54/9176, file 383.

needed to exert more exhaustive control over the sorts of information and images that travelled from Spain to Argentina via these cultural initiatives. Amposta openly accused those who, 'sure of their impunity, sustained this propaganda from Madrid'. He most probably had in mind the *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*, with its 'liberal' tendencies, and he indirectly urged the Ministry of State to be more vigilant. In September of that year, General Primo de Rivera took power in Spain and installed an authoritarian regime that started to take decisive action to control the cultural relations of Spain abroad, as I explain in more detail in Chapter 3. Regarding Argentina, the sources that I have consulted show that Primo de Rivera's regime did try to exert some sort of control over Spanish migrants. However, as a complex phenomenon made up of different agents on Argentinian ground, Hispano-Americanism was not so easy to control.

Uncontrollable emigrants

Spanish immigrants and Spanishness: nationalism(s) without an agenda

In Argentina as elsewhere, solidarity amongst Spanish immigrants was mostly based on economic rather than nationalist considerations. One expression of this was the *sociedades de socorros mutuos*, societies of mutual assistance that had mushroomed everywhere on the American continent.[64] In a document listing the eighty-three 'most important Spanish associations' in Argentina in 1920, forty-eight were *sociedades de socorros mutuos*.[65] The state also approached emigration through this social lens, as the evolution of Spanish legislation on emigration during the first few decades of the twentieth century also reflects. The first law on emigration (21 December 1907) was concerned with 'protecting' emigrants during their journey.[66] Its revision under Primo de Rivera's regime (20 December 1924) extended the scope of 'protection' to the country of destination by involving consulates.[67] This consolidated the tendency to address emigration through the angle of labour and social 'protection'. In this sense, too, the Directorate-General of Emigration was renamed as 'of Social Affairs and Emigration' in 1927.[68] In the context of the dictatorship, these changes

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[64] Fernández, 'Mutualismo y asociacionismo', 331–33.

[65] *Boletín de la Federación de Asociaciones Españolas en la República Argentina*, no. 1, 27 November 1921, 3–4.

[66] Consejo Superior de Emigración, ed., *Ley de Emigración de 21 de diciembre de 1907, reglamento provisional para su ejecución de 30 de abril de 1908, y disposiciones complementarias* (Madrid: Imprenta de la Sucesora de M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1908).

[67] 'Se crea la Dirección general de Emigración y se reforma la vigente Ley', *La Emigración española*, no. 19, 15 October 1924, 169–73.

[68] For more details on Spanish legislation regarding emigration between 1880 and 1930, see Vives, Vega, and Oyamburu, *Historia general de la emigración española a Iberoamérica*, vol. 1, 135–48. See also Axel

can legitimately be interpreted in light of Primo de Rivera's wish to control the emergence of 'socialist' ideas among emigrants — although a discussion of this aspect would go beyond the framework of this thesis.

In parallel to the somewhat pragmatic evolution of the Spanish legislation on emigration, Spanish immigrant associationism took an 'ethnic turn' that Spanish authorities did not take into particular consideration.[69] Notwithstanding the importance of social mutualism, a considerable number of Spanish societies founded in Argentina from 1900 onwards had an 'ethnic' focus, offering leisure activities to middle- to upper-class men sharing the cultural background of a specific Spanish region or town, as platforms for sub-state ethnicity. Improvements in the social conditions of certain urban migrants had reshaped the composition of immigrant associative networks by 1920. Out of the eighty-three Spanish associations to which I have referred, eighteen were composed of migrants who identified with a particular Spanish region or town. Not surprisingly, Galicia was the most represented region, with five associations, followed by Asturias (three), Aragon, Castile, Catalonia, León (two each), Andalusia, and Valencia (one each). These societies reflected the cultural diversity of Spanish society. Albeit often 'subnational', these 'ethnic' societies did not necessarily reject Spanish nationalism. Rather to the contrary, while some, especially some Basque and Catalan societies, had been conceived in reaction to Spanish nationalism, most of them, in particular the numerous Galician ones, endeavoured to construct a visible and prestigious vision of Spain in Argentina.

An illustration of this can be seen in the incident that opposed the Basque and Galician societies of Comodoro Rivadavia in 1928. Like many other municipalities, this coastal town of the Chubut National Territory celebrated the Argentinian national holiday of 25 May with a parade where representatives of the different immigrant communities marched behind their respective national flags. The representatives of the *Euskal Echea* ('Basque house'), however, marched behind the Basque nationalist flag, made of seven convergent bars representing the union of the seven Basque provinces of Spain and France. The president of the *Centro Gallego* denounced this *'atentado'* against 'national unity' and the 'sacrosanct' Spanish flag to the municipal authorities, which nonetheless authorised the Basque immigrants to march with the Argentinian and Basque nationalist flags. In an act of

Kreienbrink, 'La política de emigración a través de la historia de la Instiuto Español de Emigración', in *Historia del Instiuto Español de Emigración: la política migratoria de España y el Instiuto Español de Emigración del Franquismo a la Transición*, ed. Luís M. Calvo Salgado et al. (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Subdirección General de Información Administrativa y Publicaciones, 2009).

[69] Fernández, 'Mutualismo y asociacionismo', 333–36.

protest, the *Centro Gallego* and the local *sociedad española de socorros mutuos* refused to participate in the parade and wrote letters of complaint to local newspapers and to the Spanish ambassador.[70]

In reality, this Basque society was an exception to the norm. Most frequently, the 'ethnical' diversity of Spain was represented in folkloric terms and subsumed into Spanish nationalist practices. In January 1923, for example, the *Federación de Asociaciones Españolas en la República Argentina* organised celebrations on the Epiphany of 1923 to 'welcome' the Three Kings (*Reyes Magos*) at the port of Buenos Aires. These festivities, which were meant to perpetuate a Spanish 'tradition' with Spanish and non-Spanish families, included various dance and music performances of Galician chants, *jotas* and *rondallas* from different regions, as well as more 'modern' *tonadillas* and *cuplés* that were very fashionable in Spanish cities at the time.[71] Together with the rest of the *sociedades españolas*, the regional associations concentrated their efforts on constructing a positive image of Spain in Argentina.

Spanish immigrants also often shared Argentinian post-colonial nationalism, and Spanish diplomats supported it. In May 1923, the president of the *Hogar Gallego* in Buenos Aires invited Ambassador Amposta to commemorate the Argentinian 'revolution of independence' against Spanish imperial rule, the 'May Revolution' of 1810. Amposta, as the highest-ranked representative of Spain in Argentina, accepted 'with pleasure'.[72] The fact that immigrants and diplomats from the former imperial metropole joined the Argentinians to celebrate an anti-imperial national commemoration was less extraordinary than one might perhaps expect. In the early twentieth century, Argentinian society went through a moment of Hispanophilia, which was due, in large part, to the lobbying action of Spanish immigrants. In this context, the memory of the May Revolution had lost its anti-imperial connotation, at least in its official form as practiced by state authorities. The all-embracing imaginary of *raza* also encompassed Argentinian nationalism. The May Revolution was thus

[70] The president of the *Centro Gallego* of Comodoro Rivadavia to the ambassador of Spain in Buenos Aires (Ramiro de Maeztu), 17 June 1928, AGA, box 54/9211, file 526.

[71] The president of the *Federación de Asociaciones Españolas en la República Argentina* to Amposta, 4 January 1923, AGA, box 54/9180, file 388.

[72] Letter from the president of the *Hogar Gallego* of Buenos Aires (Eugenio Rodríguez) to Amposta, 21 May 1923, AGA, box 54/9180, file 388. Amposta's response was copied on Rodríguez' letter.

celebrated as a mere 'emancipation' from the *'Madre Patria'*, as a passage into the 'adulthood' of a nation.[73]

As for Spaniards, they were not impervious to Argentinian nationalism. They even shared it, to a certain extent. More frequently than diplomats, Spanish immigrants seized the opportunities offered by Argentinian Hispanophilia to connect Spanish and Argentinian nationalist practices. The most telling instance of this was the celebration of 12 October as the *Fiesta de la Raza*. On this day, the 'Discovery of America' in 1492 was commemorated in Spain as in the Americas.[74] This was a controversial date, however. Italian immigrants also lobbied local authorities to pay tribute to Columbus, but as a 'Genoese' sailor. In Italy, the Fascist regime was actively broadcasting propaganda which used the memory of Christopher Columbus as the link between the Americas and the 'Latin world'.[75] Spaniards, in turn, underlined the 'Spanish' nature of Columbus' expedition and wished to commemorate the 'Hispanic race' of language, religion, and history that Spain and Argentina had in common. In some places, such as Peru, 12 October was instituted as a national holiday in honour of both Italian and Spanish communities. In Argentina, by contrast, and as early as 1917, the Argentinian president Hipólito Yrigoyen declared 12 October *Fiesta de la Raza*, a national holiday, making explicit references to Spain as the *'Madre Patria'*. The different governments of the Radical Civic Union, in power between 1916 and 1930, were happy to pay tribute to the memory of the Spanish empire and to acknowledge the Spanish descent of the Argentinian nation.[76] As the social basis for this, the particularly well-organised networks of Spanish immigrants in Argentina played their role as advocacy groups in the process that led President Yrigoyen to take his decision.[77]

The proactive lobbying role of Spanish associations towards practices of shared Spanish-Argentinian nationalism was also evident, on a smaller scale, at the municipal level. In 1923, for example, the municipal authorities of Avellaneda, a small town in the Buenos Aires Province and today part of Great Buenos Aires, following 'a simple insinuation' by

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[73] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, 'Españoles y «gallegos» en la Argentina del primer centenario', in *Enemigos íntimos: España, lo español y los españoles en la configuración nacional hispanoamericana, 1810-1910*, ed. Tomás Pérez Vejo (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2011), 273–308.

[74] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 325–584.

[75] Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 86–90.

[76] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 334–47.

[77] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 354.

the local *Centro Gallego*, decided to name one of its main streets *'Doce de Octubre'*.[78] Reporting on more remote areas in 1925, the Spanish consul in Bahía Blanca wrote of visiting Castex, General Pico, and Bernasconi, in La Pampa, where municipal authorities had decided to name their main avenues *'España'* — *'el nombre de la siempre amada Patria'*, as the intendant of General Pico underlined.[79] This had resulted from the initiative of the few Spanish immigrants who lived in these small towns. Moreover, while considering this a significant and 'highly political' phenomenon, the consul described how 'our compatriots mixed with the Argentinians and the Italians in an emotional manner'. There was no clear-cut opposition between all these coexisting nationalisms. Spanish immigrants seemed to privilege small-scale practices of 'approximation' between different communities rather than more 'arrogant' demonstrations of Spanishness. This signals the dynamism of immigrant-led practices, which mirrored the all-embracing imaginary of *raza hispana* as a transcontinental community of people. As imagined by Spanish immigrants in Argentina, this community was not only composed of Spaniards, but also of Argentinians and even Italians. Spanish immigrants spontaneously served the interests of spiritual empire.

The president of the *Centro Gallego* of Avellaneda, nevertheless, lamented that Spanish authorities did not give enough 'splendour, solemnity, and transcendence' to these immigrant-led practices:

> La colectividad española de Avellaneda cree, Excmo. Sr. Embajador, que estos actos de acercamiento espiritual que tanto nos honran contribuyen, sin duda alguna, a vigorizar entre nuestros compatriotas el sentimiento de orgullo por la nacionalidad, tan digno de ser estimulado, y por lo tanto deben estar rodeados de todos aquellos elementos que, por su valía y representación, puedan darles mayor esplendor, solemnidad y trascendencia.[80]

The president of a regional association in a suburban town was reminding the ambassador about the suitability of promoting Hispano-Argentinian 'spiritual rapprochement'. This was

[78] The president of the *Centro Gallego* of Avellaneda to Amposta, 4 October 1923, AGA, box 54/9180, file 388.

[79] Royal order 159 from the Spanish undersecretary of State (Fernando Espinosa de los Monteros) to the chargé d'affaires in Argentina (Eduardo Danvila), attaching three dispatches from the consul in Bahía Blanca, 1 December 1925, AGA, box 54/9190, file 427.

[80] The president of the *Centro Gallego* of Avellaneda to Amposta, 4 October 1923, AGA, box 54/9180, file 388.

on 4 October 1923, three weeks after General Primo de Rivera's coup. The newly installed regime had not yet started to develop a more assertive Hispano-Americanist diplomacy. In reality, as I explain in the next chapter, the hardest push for spiritual empire as a practice of foreign policy would not happen until late 1925. Two years earlier, in Avellaneda, the president of the *Centro Gallego* was calling upon the Spanish ambassador to shoulder his 'spiritual' responsibilities. This indicates quite explicitly that Spanish authorities were not striving to guide the initiatives that Spanish immigrants took. The Spanish foreign office did not have a monopoly on them and, therefore, could not possibly control them.

Spanish diplomacy and emigration: facing the 'disunion' of Spaniards

Spanish immigrants asked for a more effective official Spanish presence in Argentina. The 'patriotic' initiatives undertaken by Spanish immigrants in La Pampa in 1925 also aimed to call the attention of Spanish authorities to the convenience of opening an honorary consulate of Spain in Castex. Be it for nationalist reasons or, more often, because they hoped for some sort of social services or assistance from the Spanish state, Spaniards in Argentina wished to preserve institutional contact with Spain. Throughout the 1920s, the Spanish government increased the numbers and the budgets of embassies and consulates in Latin America. Between 1919 and 1929, the high-level representation of Spain went from one ambassador, nine ministers-plenipotentiaries, and twenty-nine consuls to three ambassadors, eleven ministries-plenipotentiaries, and fifty-two consuls. The embassy in Buenos Aires, established in 1917, remained the only Spanish embassy in the region until 1927, when the legation in Havana was also promoted to this rank. Consulates went from two to seven in Argentina, four to five in Cuba, four to seven in Brazil, and one to four in Chile. These were the countries with the highest numbers of emigrants. Throughout the decade, the budget allocated to diplomatic and consular representation also increased dramatically: by about 212% in Argentina, 173% in Cuba, 124% in Brazil, and 293% in Chile. This augmentation of consular means was particularly strong under Primo de Rivera.[81] The figures illustrate the interest of Primo de Rivera's government in Hispano-Americanist diplomacy. They do not necessarily imply that the Spanish state intended to exert a more centralised control over Spaniards in Latin America. A look into the archival records of the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires indicates that neither diplomats on the

[81] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 460–506.

spot nor the Ministry of State in Madrid sought to control Hispano-Americanism through migration.

There was, however, one noteworthy exception. In 1928, General Primo de Rivera appointed a new ambassador to Argentina. This was Ramiro de Maeztu, an intellectual who was famous for his particularly nationalist positions.[82] During his two years as ambassador to Argentina, between 1928 and 1930, 'the Spanish Embassy became a hub for young, right-wing Argentinian nationalists', who had an impact on the formation of Argentinian proto-Fascist nationalism.[83] Maeztu has been described as the epitome of Catholic, 'right-wing', and 'reactionary' Hispano-Americanism.[84] In 1934, he would publish *Defensa de la Hispanidad*, a traditionalist manifesto in which he conceived Hispano-American relations as 'Spanish, Catholic, and transcendental, rather than cosmopolitan, secular, and utilitarian'.[85] It is well known that Maeztu coined the notion of *'Hispanidad'* during his tenure as ambassador, under the influence of Zacarías de Vizcarra, a Basque priest who lived in Argentina. The archives of the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires also show the construction of Maeztu's Hispanist ideology. His agenda included the 'union' of Spanish migrants with the explicit aim of fostering the Hispano-Americanist project.

Maeztu's reputation as an intellectual preceded his arrival in Buenos Aires, as the president of the *Centro Gallego* expressed it:

> Queremos dejar constancia de que las puertas de este hogar magno de los hijos de Galicia se hallan abiertas, no sólo para el Embajador de nuestra Patria, sino de un modo especial para don Ramiro de Maeztu, digno, por tantos títulos, de la estimación de los gallegos y de todos los españoles.[86]

Appointing a respected conservative intellectual such as Maeztu was, for Primo de Rivera's regime, a manner of correcting the 'anti-Spanish' attitude of some Spanish intellectuals, which Ambassador Amposta had bitterly denounced in 1923. His appointment was,

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[82] Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Maeztu: biografía de un nacionalista español* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).

[83] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 357. See also Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 145–47.

[84] Alfonso López Quintás, 'Ramiro de Maeztu: la defensa del Espíritu y de la Hispanidad', *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas*, no. 79 (2002): 61–86; Alistair Hennessy, 'Ramiro de Maeztu: "Hispanidad" and the Search for a Surrogate Imperialism', in *Spain's 1898 Crisis: Regenerationism, Modernism, Post-Colonialism*, ed. Joseph Harrison and Alan Hoyle (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 105–17; Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 265–69.

[85] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 356.

[86] The president of the *Centro Gallego* of Buenos Aires (Luis Losada) to Maeztu, 16 March 1928, AGA, box 54/9211, file 526.

therefore, a sign in favour of 'sentimental' Hispano-Americanism. The government certainly thought that Maeztu would be able to improve the image of Spain and Spanish culture in Argentina.

Upon his arrival in March 1928, Maeztu received a dispatch from the Spanish consul in Bahía Blanca, in the south of Buenos Aires Province. The latter reported that republicanism was finally on the wane among the approximately 22,000 Spaniards who lived under his jurisdiction. The consulate had re-established relations with the *Club Español*, which had previously been ruled by republicans and 'separatist' Catalans who had broken relations with Spanish authorities and acted in total independence. In 1927, the *Club* had even celebrated the *Fiesta de la Raza* or King Alfonso's birthday. As the consul said, the 'events that give prestige to our nation' were finally being 'respected' in Bahía Blanca. This 'improved' Spanish community was also going to take part in local events, such as the celebration of the city's centenary. On this occasion, the foundation stones of a Spanish hospital and of a Spanish monument were going to be laid. However, the consul remained concerned about the efforts that still needed to be made:

> Todas las colectividades extranjeras ofrendan regalos a esta ciudad: los ingleses, una artística fuente en la plaza Rivadavia; los hebreos, un monumento; los italianos, una estatua de Garibaldi y un pabellón en el Hospital Municipal; los sirios, otro pabellón. Y todos los referidos donativos están ya terminados o próximos a terminarse. Es de lamentar que la colectividad española vaya a colocar solo las piedras fundacionales del monumento y del hospital.[87]

The consul lamented that Spaniards were too late and too modest compared to other immigrant communities. The main reason for this was, according to him, the persistence of political and regional 'disunion' among Spaniards. This consular dispatch can be understood as a call for the new ambassador to take action. Looking for more encouraging examples, Maeztu visited La Plata, the capital of Buenos Aires Province, in June 1928. He was warmly received at the *Casa de España* by the local federation of Spanish societies, and reported with satisfaction on the level of 'national cohesion' that existed among Spaniards

[87] The Spanish consul in Bahía Blanca to Maeztu, 25 March 1928, AGA, box 54/9211 file 526.

there.[88] He also encouraged the president of the local federation of Spanish associations to pursue his 'exemplary' efforts.[89] On this and other occasions, Maeztu invested his personal efforts in trying to mobilise Spaniards.

He was also very explicit about his ultimate goals, which coincided with those of the Ministry of State in Madrid: the 'spiritual' union of the former Spanish empire. In June 1928, he praised the president of the *Centro Gallego* of Comodoro Rivadavia for his reaction against the *Euskal Echea*:

> Hechos como los que Vds. me revelan son los que más me preocupan desde que tomé posesión de este cargo. Nada me duele tanto como el empeño de algunos españoles de hacer actos que hieren los más santos sentimientos de todos los demás compatriotas. […] Por su parte, espero que mantendrán su decisión de no tolerar que sea agraviada la unidad de los españoles, que es la base de la unión futura de todos los pueblos hispano-americanos.[90]

To the proactive nationalist initiative of the Galician immigrants, Maeztu added an element of militant Hispano-Americanism: immigrants, he believed, had to lead by example and 'unite', as the first step towards the bigger 'union' of all Hispano-Americans. He reiterated the same points in March 1929 to the president of the regional federation of Spanish societies of Bahía Blanca, in a bold, and yet pedagogic manner:

> La unión de todos los españoles en la Argentina me parece necesaria:
>
> a) Para un mutuo auxilio en cuestiones de trabajo, derechos, etc.
>
> b) Para el prestigio de España
>
> c) Para la unión ulterior de todos los pueblos de nuestra habla[91]

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[88] Maeztu, unnumbered dispatch, 20 June 1928, AGA, box 54/9211, file 526.

[89] Maeztu to the president of the *Federación Regional de Asociaciones Españolas de Bahía Blanca* (Eduardo Barbosa), 22 June 1928, AGA, box 54/9211, file 526.

[90] Maeztu to the *Centro Gallego* of Comodoro Rivadavia, 27 June 1928, AGA, box 54/9211, file 526.

[91] Maeztu to the president of the *Federación Regional de Asociaciones Españolas de Bahía Blanca* (Adrián M. Veres), 26 March 1929, AGA, box 54/9204, file 496.

Maeztu had a rather clinical approach to the connection between Spanish immigrants and Spanish spiritual empire. For him, the 'union' of Spaniards was merely instrumental to the ultimate 'union' of all Hispano-Americans.

With this aim in mind, he strove to give shape to one unique federative and representative institution for all Spaniards in Argentina. However, 'uniting' Spaniards turned out to be much more difficult than he expected. The project of federating all Spanish associations under one centralised body predated the appointment of Maeztu. When the latter took office, Spanish circles and networks among Spanish societies were already organised more or less formally. Most of these societies belonged to federative structures that had been created for solidarity and networking. Some of these federations had a regional scope, such as that of Bahía Blanca. At the national level, in Buenos Aires, two associations competed in their aspiration to federate all Spanish societies in Argentina: the *Asociación Patriótica Española,* founded in 1896, and the *Federación de Asociaciones Españolas en la República Argentina*, founded in 1920.[92] Throughout the 1920s, each of these associations wished to emulate the *Junta Patriótica* of Montevideo, which had managed to federate the entire network of Spanish societies in Uruguay in 1915.[93] For reasons that I have not elucidated, but which probably had to do with Maeztu's personal networks, the ambassador took the side of the *Patriórica*. In January 1929, he asked every Spanish society in Argentina to adhere to the *Asociación Patriótica Española* of Buenos Aires.[94] Many societies did so.

Many others did not. Some of the latter were regional federations of Spanish associations that cherished their independence. A salient example of this was the *Federación Regional de Sociedades Españolas de Bahía Blanca*, which sent instructions for its members not to adhere to the *Patriótica* in Buenos Aires, thus openly contradicting the ambassador's injunction. From Bahía Blanca, the president of the *Federación* sent an angry letter to Maeztu. He reminded him that, since its foundation in 1922, the *Federación* had been endeavouring to 'commemorate [Spain's] historical splendours', with successful results in the more 'practical' terms of 'Hispano-American fraternity' in the sectors of 'banking, commerce, and industry'. In other words, it did not need the tutelage of any centralised organisation to undertake the endeavour of Hispano-Americanism. This letter from Bahía

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[92] *Boletín de la Federación de Asociaciones Españolas en la República Argentina*, no. 1, 27 November 1921, 5–6.

[93] Sepúlveda, *El sueño de la Madre Patria*, 455.

[94] Maeztu to the Spanish societies in Argentina, 9 January 1929, AGA, box 54/9204, file 496.

Blanca illustrates how scattered, unguided, and uncontrollable immigrant-led initiatives remained the main driver of Hispano-Americanism and spiritual empire on the Argentinian ground. The personal efforts that Maeztu had invested failed by the end of the decade. It was his personal failure, however. It cannot be extrapolated to a general failure of Spanish practices of spiritual empire as a whole. As I now demonstrate, the Spanish government had other ways of mobilising the demographic factor as an instrument of diplomacy.

MIGRATION AND THE IMAGE OF POWER: THE *PLUS ULTRA* FLIGHT, 1926

On 22 January 1926, the hydroplane *Plus Ultra* departed from Palos de la Frontera, in southern Spain. After stopping in Gran Canaria, Cape Verde, Fernando de Noronha, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo, it reached its final destination, Buenos Aires, on 10 February. This was the first time that a single aircraft crossed the southern Atlantic. Four years earlier, the Portuguese pilots Sacadura Cabral and Gago Coutinho had flown from Lisbon to Rio, but they had had to do it on board different planes. In 1926, the Spanish aviators Ramón Franco, Julio Ruiz de Alda, Juan Manuel Durán, and Pablo Rada broke the record in one single plane and over a longer distance.

The Spanish government wanted the hydroplane to reach Buenos Aires as directly as possible. From Rio, Captain Franco asked for permission to land in Montevideo, the capital of the Uruguayan 'sister nation', before reaching Buenos Aires.[95] In response, he was asked to execute the government's 'strict order' to land in Buenos Aires without further delay. Only after that would he be allowed to fly to Montevideo.[96] For reasons that remain unclear, the *Plus Ultra* did stop at Montevideo before reaching Buenos Aires, which personally angered General Primo de Rivera.[97] Why did the Spanish authorities privilege Buenos Aires over any other city?

Given the number, significance, and proactive nature of Spanish immigrants in Argentina, the choice of Buenos Aires seems rather obvious. Buenos Aires was also the largest city in South America, the capital of the most prosperous economic power in the region and, very importantly, one of the most important hubs for journalists, diplomats, and other opinion-makers in the American continent. The success of the flight as a

[95] The Spanish minister-plenipotentiary in Brazil (Antonio Benítez) to the minister of State (José de Yanguas Messía), telegram 20, 7 February 1926, AHN-DM, box 346.

[96] Yanguas to Benítez, telegram 16, 9 February 1926, AHN-DM, box 346.

[97] Pilar Cagiao Vila, 'La «emoción de Montevideo»: de la visita inesperada al homenaje oriental al Plus Ultra', in *De Palos al Plata: el vuelo del Plus Ultra a 90 años de su partida*, ed. Rosario Márquez Macías (Seville: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 2016), 157–80.

genuinely Spanish accomplishment depended to a large extent upon the number and the 'quality' of people who could witness it. 'The masses' were a target and, perhaps more interestingly, an instrument of propaganda and cultural diplomacy.[98] The case of the *Plus Ultra* flight situates Spanish migrants, as part of the masses, within the broader framework of Spanish external action and visibility efforts.

The airborne 'feat' was a particularly successful and bombastic instance of the new sort of cultural diplomacy that Primo de Rivera's authoritarian regime had just started putting in place, as David Marcilhacy has argued.[99] This section confirms Marcilhacy's interpretation, insisting on its link to Spanish migration and on its consequences in terms of Spain's power position in the world. A considerable amount of archival material regarding the *Plus Ultra* is kept in the records of the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires and in those of Primo de Rivera's office in Madrid. All this seems to signal that, albeit unable to develop spiritual empire through the mobilisation of Spanish migrants on the ground, Spanish authorities still managed to mobilise migrants in a different manner, granting Spain 'practical' benefits on the broader scale of world politics.

Jubilance in Buenos Aires: the masses as target

When they reached Buenos Aires, the aviators were acclaimed as heroes, to the utmost satisfaction of the Spanish chargé d'affaires, Eduardo Danvila:

> Cualquier explicación o relato, por más detallado que fuera, que me propusiese hacer para llevar las realidades de lo ocurrido al ánimo de V.E. sería una pálida e incompleta demostración del vivísimo entusiasmo que en esta república han hallado nuestros heroicos compatriotas y de las infinitas demonstraciones de afecto que han prodigado a España, cuyas vitalidad y glorias se puede decir es el tema de todas las conversaciones.[100]

The archival evidence of this fervour and enthusiasm is indeed immeasurable.[101] Spanish immigrants took, of course, a considerable part in it. The aviators transported an official

[98] For an inspirational case study on the role of masses in diplomacy, see Naoko Shimazu, 'Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955', *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (2014): 225–52.

[99] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»: el vuelo transatlántico del Plus Ultra (Palos-Buenos Aires, 1926), preludio a una reconquista espiritual de América', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 213, no. 28 (2006): 213–41.

[100] Danvila, dispatch 25, 28 February 1926, AGA, box 54/9193, file 439.

[101] Franco's official and private correspondence, AGA, box 54/9191, file 432.

message with 'fraternal greetings' from the king and the government of Spain to all Spanish migrants in South America.[102] To receive it, a group of Spaniards from different backgrounds created a 'patriotic' and 'democratic' *comisión popular*. Although it enjoyed the official support of the embassy, this *comisión* was far from being the only society organising parties and *agasajos*: the *Asociación Patriótica Española*, the *Comisión de la Juventud Hispano-Argentina*, and practically all the regional *centros* in Buenos Aires invited Captain Franco and his companions to different sorts of events. The aviators even had to refuse invitations from Spanish societies in Bahía Blanca, Rosario, and other cities in Argentina. Messages of national and 'racial' pride also came from Spanish immigrant societies in almost every corner in the Americas.

The expressions of joy did not only come from Spanish immigrants, however. Other immigrant communities in Buenos Aires also paid tribute to the 'intrepid' aviators. The *Federazione Generale delle Società Italiane nella Repubblica Argentina*, in particular, organised an *agape* in their honour. The impression that archival evidence leaves is that the entire Argentinian society was exultant. Pictures of the police escorting Captain Franco and his companions through the streets of Buenos Aires show a compact mass of people waving flags, hats, and handkerchiefs.[103] President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear received the 'heroes' with pomp and circumstance at the Presidential Palace, and they saluted the *'muchedumbre'* from the balcony, together with diplomats, politicians, and different personalities.[104] Popular celebrities also played a role in shaping collective emotions. The star actress Lola Membrives cried conspicuously when President Alvear hugged Captain Franco, while the internationally famous singer Carlos Gardel composed a tango for the occasion.[105] The lyrics of *'La gloria del águila'*, as this tango was entitled, provide a nice illustration of the messages that the flight of the *Plus Ultra* conveyed to the masses.

Modernity, virility, and colonial militarism: the image of a new Spain

The tango started by praising *'la proeza de cuatro hispanos / que son un timbre más de gloria para España'*. The 'feat' that Franco, Ruiz de Alda, Durán, and Rada had accomplished was indeed a 'sportive' performance that deserved the admiration of the public at the time. The early twentieth century saw the progressive development of sports as a mass leisure activity,

[102] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 217.

[103] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 221.

[104] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 220–22.

[105] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 222 and 238.

not only for those who practised it, but also and especially for those who watched it as spectators. In Spain, Primo de Rivera's regime instrumentalised sports as 'a symbol of modernity'.[106] The flight of the *Plus Ultra* showed the ability of *'cuatro hispanos'* to compete in the international championship towards aircraft mastery that was being held, informally, among different 'pioneers of aviation'. The press and the radio insisted upon the fact that the Spanish 'raid' had beaten the record that the Portuguese aviators Sacadura Cabral and Gago Coutinho had established in 1922. Franco and his companions also outpaced Italian projects of flying from Rome to Buenos Aires.[107] The message to the masses was that these four Spanish 'sportsmen' and, along with them, the entire nation were 'modern' and competitive. The fact that the *Plus Ultra* was a German hydroplane assembled in Italy with British engines did not tarnish the genuinely Spanish nature of the flight.[108] What mattered was the nationality of the athletes who piloted it. As Captain Franco himself explained: *'Lo que ha sido esencial fue la idea y su realización, idea española, voluntad y corazones españoles, para realizarla a través de todos los peligros y de todas las dificultades.'*[109]

All this was of course connected to a sense of virility that walked hand in hand with an *avant-garde* fascination for machines, speed, and 'progress'. In that same month of February 1926, French pilot Antoine de Saint-Exupéry launched his career as a writer with a short story where he depicted *l'Aviateur* as a new sort of man that 'felt himself grow' by virtue of the plane, which became a tool for man to surpass himself.[110] The idea of the aviator as an *'uomo nuovo'* was taken to its paroxysm by Italian Fascism, which used aviation as a means to sell its ideology in South America, and to nurture the nationalism of Italian emigrants in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s.[111] The flight of the *Plus Ultra* can also be interpreted through this grid. It was part of the efforts of an authoritarian regime to legitimise itself, in the eyes of Spaniards abroad, as a driving force of virile, rapid, and effective change. This message was heard in Buenos Aires. In such diverse documents as press articles, public speeches, and diplomatic correspondence, the flight of the *Plus Ultra* was referred to as a

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[106] Javier Moreno Luzón, *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902-1931* (Brighton, Portland, and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 159. See also Juan Antonio Simón Sanjurjo, 'Conquistando a las masas: el impacto del deporte en la prensa española, 1900-1936', *Recorde: Revista de História do Esporte* 5, no. 1 (June 2012): 1–40.

[107] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 217.

[108] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 233.

[109] Franco quoted in Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 233–34.

[110] Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, 'L'Aviateur', *Le Navire d'argent : revue mensuelle de littérature et de culture générale*, February 1926.

[111] Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 90–94.

'raid'. This word conveyed a sense of speed, unexpectedness, and efficiency. As Gardel sang it, *'[el* Plus Ultra*] da con su raid al mundo la impresión más honda'*.

Perhaps more importantly, the word 'raid' was connected to military action. It must not be forgotten that modern aviation was intimately linked to war in the early twentieth century. Air raids had proved their efficiency during the First World War. In the Spanish case in particular, the Rif War for colonial control over northern Morocco had favoured the development of a Spanish air force. Captain Franco and his comrades had in fact won their reputations as aviators during this war. References to their wartime 'feats' can be found in most of the documents that I have consulted. In late 1925, when the project of a transatlantic flight was initially conceived, the Rif War had just started to turn in the favour of Spain, after years of 'disastrous' defeats. In February 1926, the four 'victorious' aviators paraded through the streets of Buenos Aires wearing their military uniforms. As Marcilhacy argues, the flight of the *Plus Ultra* was part of a propaganda campaign to persuade Spaniards, in Spain as in the Americas, that Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was successfully managing to restore Spain's military and colonial power.[112]

Columbus' trip revisited: the instrumentalisation of imperial legacies

The *Plus Ultra* was only one of three air 'raids' that the Spanish military aviation authority undertook in 1926. On 5 April, the *Elcano* departed from Madrid and headed east towards Manila, which it reached on 11 May. Between 10 and 25 December, the *Atlántida* flew between Melilla, in Northern Africa, and Santa Isabel, in Equatorial Guinea. As Marcilhacy argues, these three flights were part of the same propaganda campaign that aimed to remind the masses about Spain's present position in the world, which rested to a large extent on Spain's former empire.[113] While Northern Africa and Equatorial Guinea were Spain's colonial possessions, the Philippines and South America only maintained a 'spiritual' connection to their former imperial metropole. In this context, the flights of the *Elcano* and the *Plus Ultra* conveyed a clear imperial message that went beyond the strict materiality of empire. They proved the existence of Spain's spiritual empire in a material and eye-catching manner that was quite successfully publicised to the masses.

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[112] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 232. See also Stephen Jacobson, 'Imperial Ambitions in an Era of Decline: Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858-1923', in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Josep Maria Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 74–91.

[113] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 232.

Among the three flights, that of the *Plus Ultra* monopolised most of the media attention. Not only was it the first flight, chronologically speaking, but it also targeted the largest possible audience of Spanish emigrants. In addition to this, it was particularly well staged. Palos de la Frontera, where the journey of the *Plus Ultra* started, had not been chosen by chance. The hydroplane took off from the waters of the Odiel River, at the foot of the Franciscan friary of La Rábida, the very same place from whence Christopher Columbus' own 'feat' had begun in 1492. Before their departure, here again like Christopher Columbus, the aviators prayed to the Virgin of La Milagrosa, in Saint George's Church, in Huelva. An emotive ceremony also took place at La Rábida Friary, where the president of the *Sociedad Colombina Onubense*, the local association in charge of honouring the memory of Columbus, compared the *Plus Ultra* to one of Columbus' *carabelas*, calling it *'la* Santa María *de los aires'*.[114] Every detail had been carefully planned to perform a 'modern' repetition of the 'Discovery of America' through which Spaniards and South Americans could revisit their 'glorious' shared history. The festive reception that the *Plus Ultra* had in Buenos Aires resembled a *Fiesta de la Raza* during which, like on 12 October, Spaniards and Argentinians celebrated the transatlantic link that brought them together.

This message also reverberated in Carlos Gardel's tango. The very title of the song, *'La gloria del águila'*, sounded like an explicit metaphor evoking Spanish imperial power, where the image of the eagle echoed the coat of arms of the Spanish Empire. The lyrics then confirmed this imperial idea:

> Desde Palos, el águila vuela
> y a Colón con su gran carabela
> nos recuerda con tal emoción
> la hazaña que agita todo el corazón.
> Franco, Durán, Ruiz de Alda, los geniales,
> los tres, con Rada, son inmortales.

Using a fashionable genre such as tango, Gardel made an explicit and transparent reference to the link between Christopher Columbus and the four 'immortal' aviators. The persistence of a spiritual legacy of empire was admitted as an almost trivial reality in the mouth of this popular singer. More importantly, the spirit of empire was shared by Spaniards and by Argentina as a whole, as the tango's refrain continued:

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[114] Marcilhacy, «La Santa María del aire», 230–31.

Los españoles van con razón contentos
al ver el galardón de su nación.
Y en tal clamor surge un tango argentino
que dice a España: «¡Madre Patria de mi amor!»

In the context of Buenos Aires, where this tango was sung, the mention of *'los españoles'* can arguably be understood as a reference to Spanish immigrants. At the same time, as the lyrics suggested, the *'galardón'* of these Spaniards' nation was also 'felt' by Argentina as a whole, which saluted Spain as their *'Madre Patria'*, the former imperial metropole to which Argentina, its 'emancipated daughter', was born. All these images of imperial history and family re-encounter constituted a semantic field of spiritual empire that was transmitted to a mass of Spaniards, Argentinians and, more generally, Latin Americans. The mere existence of this tango suggests that these masses did receive and appropriate the message.

Rayonnement in the world: the mass as instrument

The first two verses of Gardel's tango also point in the direction of a different level of interpretation: *'El rey del aire tendió sus alas / y fue radiando como el sol que al mundo baña.'* The comparison of the flight of the hydroplane to the radiation of the sun is an evocative one. It seems directly linked to the notion of *rayonnement* (meaning 'radiation' in French), which was used, and is still used today, in diplomacy and international relations to describe the cultural projection of a country towards the rest of the world.[115] The flight of the *Plus Ultra* was not just a festive event. As the objective of a propaganda campaign widely broadcasted, it constituted a practice of cultural diplomacy. Through this lens, the mass of Spaniards and Argentinians or, more generally speaking, 'public opinion' were used as instruments. They played the role of a legitimising tool that supported the success of the flight as a practice of *rayonnement*. The *Plus Ultra* granted Spain with material as well as intangible benefits in the arena of international relations.

Material benefits based on spiritual empire: a relative failure for Spain

During their stay in Argentina, the aviators acted as ambassadors of Spain's industrial and technological 'modernity'. In early March 1926, Julio Ruiz de Alda, one of the four 'heroes', gave a series of conferences at the *Círculo Militar y Naval* in Buenos Aires, where he

[115] Robin Brown, 'Alternatives to Soft Power: Influence in French and German External Cultural Action', in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 42–44. See also Alain Dubosclard, ed., *Entre rayonnement et réciprocité : contributions à l'histoire de la diplomatie culturelle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002).

addressed a crowded audience of military officials, industrialists, financiers, and other businessmen. These people were particularly interested in listening to him in the atmosphere of massive enthusiasm that followed the arrival of the hydroplane in Buenos Aires. In his talks, Ruiz de Alda presented the history and 'progress' of the Spanish aeronautical industry, inscribing it in the general context of economic development which Spain was undergoing in the mid-1920s.[116] For the Spanish chargé d'affaires, Ruiz de Alda's performance was yet another opportunity 'to counterbalance the propaganda that France, Italy, and other industrial powers [were] so efficiently making'.[117] Although it was insufficient, the Spanish industrial propaganda that Spanish authorities broadcasted around the flight of the *Plus Ultra* proved, nonetheless, relatively effective.

Ruiz de Alda and his companions crossed the Atlantic in a context of increasing international competition for the establishment of regular air connections between Europe and the American continent. The First World War had proven the utility of aviation, not only for warfare, but also for postal services. The 1920s saw the progressive development of civil aviation for the transportation of mail, trading goods and, more timidly, also passengers. As early as 1921, the Spanish government explored the possibility of establishing a regular air connection between Seville and Buenos Aires. This effort responded to the lobbying campaign of *Luftschiffbau Zeppelin*, the leading German company in the fabrication of rigid airships. In 1922, the Spanish parliament approved the launching of a call for proposals for the establishment of the line and allocated a budget for that purpose. The Spanish engineer Jorge Loring Martínez, in cooperation with *Luftschiffbau Zeppelin*, founded the *Compañía Transaérea Española Colón* and sent his proposal to the government in December.[118] During the last months of the liberal government and the first months of the military dictatorship, the proposal went through 'laborious procedures' and was approved by the Military Directorate in November 1924.[119]

However, the matter was still addressed by different ministries with inconsistencies and contradictions.[120] The royal decree that launched the implementation of the proposal was

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[116] González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera*, 213–58.

[117] Danvila, dispatch 30, 8 March 1926, AGA, box 54/9193, file 439.

[118] Loring Martínez to the president of the Council of Ministers (José Sánchez Guerra), 6 December 1927, AHN-DM, box 224/2, file 10583, folder 1.

[119] Report by the member of the Military Directorate in charge of aviation (Antonio Mayandía Gómez), 10 November 1924, AHN-DM, box 224/2, file 10583, folder 1.

[120] Different documents regarding aviation received at the Presidency of the Military Directorate, September 1923 to November 1925, AHN-DM, box 224/2, file 10583, folder 1.

only issued in February 1927.[121] In response to the Spanish initiative, moreover, the Argentinian authorities were 'ambiguous and reserved'.[122] In early 1927, they had already been approached by the French society *Latécoère*, which offered to deliver aeroplane connections between South America and Europe via French Western Africa. Aeroplanes had already proven to be faster and safer than the rigid airships that *Colón*, together with *Zeppelin*, intended to use.[123] The 'feat' of the *Plus Ultra*, albeit massively acclaimed and mediatised, could not compete against the attractiveness of French industrial and financial capacities.

Beyond the aviation sector, nevertheless, the *Plus Ultra* did grant Spain with some benefits in the aeronautical sector. An important element of the Spanish propaganda operation focused on the industrial capacity of Spain in terms of naval construction. Indeed, during its journey, the *Plus Ultra* was escorted by the destroyer *Alsedo*, a military ship built in 1920 in Spain by the *Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval*. The boat remained moored for several days in the port of Buenos Aires, where it was a major popular attraction, as the Spanish chargé d'affaires reported to Madrid.[124] The boat worked as a floating exhibition of Spain's industrial advancements. Among the Argentinians who visited the *Alsedo*, the most prestigious was President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear. Spanish authorities invited Alvear on a trip to Mar del Plata on board the destroyer. The Argentinian president was manifestly interested:

> La admiración del Sr. Alvear lo llevó a recorrer íntegramente el buque haciendo explicar detalladamente los pormenores de su construcción y el funcionamiento de las diversas instalaciones, quedando maravillado del adelanto y potencialidad alcanzado por los astilleros españoles, que permiten no solo atender las necesidades de la nación, sino también las del extranjero.

This last sentence is interesting. What the public and the Argentinian authorities could see when they visited the destroyer was the capacity of Spain to build and, more particularly, to

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[121] Yanguas to the ambassador of Spain in Argentina (Antonio de Zayas, duke of Amalfi), telegram 16, 16 February 1927, AGA, box 54/9214, file 539.

[122] Amalfi, dispatch 66, 28 February 1927, AGA, box 54/9214, file 539.

[123] Different documents regarding *Latécoère* in Argentina, AGA, box 54/9196, file 456.

[124] Danvila, dispatch 25, 28 February 1926, AGA, box 54/9193, file 439.

export warships such as the *Alsedo*. The strategy bore fruit. A year later, in May 1927, Spain sold two destroyers to Argentina.[125]

This commercial transaction was also broadcast in the media. It was in fact presented as much more than a commercial transaction. The Spanish government publicised it as a material manifestation of 'spiritual and cultural bonds that are to be eternal'.[126] The transaction was made public and official on 25 May, the anniversary of Argentina's independence from the Spanish Empire, as General Primo de Rivera explicitly underlined.[127] In a similar chord of 'spiritual fraternity', the Argentinian navy re-baptised the destroyers as *Cervantes* and *Juan de Garay*. Naming the boats after the symbolic figure of the 'universal value' of the Spanish language and the Spanish *conquistador* who had founded Buenos Aires in 1580 was an obvious reference to the legacy of the Spanish empire. With this choice, Argentina publicly conceded to the existence of a Spanish spiritual empire.

Intangible benefits: the spirit and the race as elements of world politics

In Europe, the idea that Spain and its former American colonies still maintained spiritual bonds also seemed to gain momentum thanks to the *Plus Ultra*. In March 1926, some days after the return of the aviators to Spain, the US chargé d'affaires in Madrid deemed it useful to write a very detailed dispatch on the Hispano-Americanist foreign policy that the Spanish government had been implementing since Primo de Rivera's coup.[128] The writing of this document at that precise moment is in itself revealing of the importance that the flight of *Plus Ultra* and its massive reception had had in the realm of international relations. As the chargé d'affaires argued to the State Department, the flight had just been a very visible manifestation of what he called the 'Spanish Doctrine'. In his opinion, Spain was attempting 'to instill into her European neighbors the belief that Spain [was] the doorway to Latin America'. He was worried by the fact that some European countries had started subscribing to this 'doctrine'. Belgium and Austria, for example, had signed commercial agreements with Spain, in which they committed to respect the benefits of preferential treatment that Spain accorded to some imports from Latin America. Like the Argentinian-Spanish contract on warships, the Austro-Spanish and Belgo-Spanish agreements were not based on the material capacity of Spain to monopolise Euro-Latin

[125] Royal decree, 25 May 1927, in *ABC*, 26 May 1927, 15.

[126] Preamble to the royal decree of 25 May 1927, in *ABC*, 26 May 1927, 15.

[127] Press release by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, in *ABC*, 26 May 1927, 15.

[128] The US chargé d'affaires ad interim in Madrid (John F. Martin), dispatch 854, 22 March 1926, NARA, RG 59, box 6504, file 710.52/35.

American commerce, but rather on the acknowledgment of Spain's spiritual empire. To a certain extent, Spain was indeed seen as 'the doorway to Latin America'.

Here again, a look at the rhetorical consequences of the flight of the *Plus Ultra* and of its massive publicity helps to explain this phenomenon. The message that the legacy of the Spanish empire was a persistent and concrete reality had underpinned the entire propaganda campaign that had surrounded the air 'feat'. This conveyed the idea that the 'spirit' of Spain spilled over its national borders. Spanish propaganda successfully managed to include Portugal and Brazil in the scope of Spanish spiritual empire. Not only did the hydroplane make technical stops in the Portuguese colony of Cape Verde and in three Brazilian cities (Fernando de Noronha, Recife, and Rio de Janeiro), but the aviators and the Spanish government also took special care in presenting the Spanish transatlantic journey as the culmination of the Portuguese one of 1922.[129] Spanish spiritual empire did not compete with the Portuguese one; it encompassed it.

The 'feat' of the four Spanish aviators served the cause of the Spanish 'race' in international relations. In May 1926, as I explain in Chapter 4, the 'diplomatic battle' of Spain for a permanent seat at the Council of the League of Nations was at a critical moment, and the Spanish delegations had put on the table the threat of withdrawing from the League if their demands were not satisfied. Seeking to persuade the Spanish government not to leave the League and to be 'patient', King George of England wrote to King Alfonso of Spain, his 'cousin', as he called him. In a smart turn of phrase, King George linked the military victories of Spain in Morocco and the 'feat' of the *Plus Ultra*, connecting both manifestations of colonial and spiritual imperialisms under the common flag of 'virility and greatness', which were not only the virtue of the soldiers or the aviators, but of Spain as a whole, as a nation 'which [had] guaranteed its position in the world'.[130] As it seems, the resonance of the *Plus Ultra* as a massive event made naming the *raza* as a reality of foreign policy inevitable. The racial argument was mobilised as a rhetorical instrument of diplomacy, not only by Spanish diplomats and officials in order to support Spain's policies, but also by those who opposed Spain's policies, such as Britain in this case.

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[129] Marcilhacy, '«La Santa María del aire»', 217–18.

[130] George V to Alfonso XIII, 31 May 1926, in Fernando María Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', in *Una batalla diplomática (1918-1926): discurso de recepción del académico de número Excmo. Sr. D. Fernando María Castiella y Maíz, y contestación del Excmo. Sr. D. José María de Areilza, conde de Motrico: sesión del día 25 de mayo de 1976*, ed. Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas (Madrid: Artes Gráficas Benzal, 1976), 177–78.

The 'heroic' flight compelled the 'racial' admiration of Latin American diplomats as well. From Paris, the minister-plenipotentiary of Panama, Belisario Porras, wrote a friendly and emotive letter to the Spanish ambassador, in which he highlighted the positive impact that the *Plus Ultra* could have for Hispano-American relations:

> […] como formo también parte de esa raza que tan repetidas veces ha dado ejemplo de valor y abnegación, me siento orgulloso del bien merecido triunfo del insigne aviador. Nuestra Madre Patria no necesita ningún esfuerzo para vincularse con sus hijos de América. Nuestra sangre, nuestra lengua, nuestra religión y nuestra civilización son lazos indestructibles que nos unen, y la heroica acción del Comandante Franco atravesando el inmenso Atlántico representa más bien el beso que la Madre Patria envía a sus hijos de América.[131]

Porras was a prestigious Panamanian politician, diplomat, and poet. His words to the Spanish ambassador were flowery and pompous, but they were very significant. The minister-plenipotentiary of Panama took the time to write them to the ambassador of Spain, and the ambassador judged this urgent enough to copy it to Madrid in a telegram. The rhetoric of *raza* took a concrete diplomatic and political shape: the material capacity of Spain to connect Europe to the Americas by plane meant nothing but the confirmation of a transatlantic *raza* as a meaningful reality of international relations.

Perhaps more importantly, the fact that this 'racial' pride came from a representative of Panama is interesting.[132] Panama was a young country that had gained its independence from Colombia in 1904 thanks to the assertive support of the United States. It was, one could argue, a 'client' of the United States, and yet its ambassador in Paris, one of its most important and prestigious diplomats, did not hesitate to effusively insert his country into the framework of Spain's spiritual empire. This calls for paying more careful attention to the complexities of Euro-Latin American relations and inter-American relations altogether.

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[131] Porras to the ambassador of Spain in Paris (José Quiñones de León), copied in Quiñones' telegram 49 to Yanguas, 7 February 1926, AHN-DM, box 346.

[132] On Panama's complex international position in the Latin American context, see Marcilhacy, 'Panama panaméricain. Le Centenaire bolivarien de 1926, mémoires croisées et projections transnationales' (Habilitation à diriger des recherches, Sorbonne Université, 2018), 57–64.

CHAPTER 3

The scramble for Latin America and Spanish cultural diplomacy

INTRODUCTION

The year of 1926 was crucial for the consolidation of spiritual empire as a branch of Spanish diplomacy. On 23 June of that year, the minister of State, José de Yanguas Messía, gave instructions to all Spanish diplomats holding office in Spain's former colonies in the Americas.[1] This was meant to be the first step towards a coordinated diplomatic action. At the end of the text, Yanguas encouraged diplomats by insisting on the sense of the policy:

> Procurará usted inspirarse, para realizar esa delicada labor —que siempre tendrá carácter reservadísimo—, en el principio de que a toda costa debemos conservar en América nuestro vasto imperio espiritual, que un día proclame ante el mundo la gloria de nuestro pasado y al mismo tiempo nos prepare la grandeza para el porvenir.

This was a diplomatic document; it was no less imperial. Yanguas clearly and explicitly placed Spain's diplomatic action in the framework of imperialism: it was necessary to 'preserve' Spain's empire, he underlined. This is illustrative of the fact that Spanish diplomacy conceived Spain as an endless empire that persisted via diplomatic practice.

Yanguas indeed labelled this empire as 'spiritual', referring to the intangible legacy of the 'empire' polity. What Spanish diplomats had the mission to 'preserve' was, as he said in his instructions, the *'patrimonio espiritual'*. This word *(patrimonio)* has two different meanings in Spanish. On the one hand, it refers to 'patrimony', a possession; in this case, something that Spain owned in property and had rights over. On the other hand, it also refers to 'heritage', historical heritage, something that needs to be conserved in order to transfer it to future generations. In Yanguas' mind, therefore, Spain enjoyed some sort of intangible rights of property over its former imperial possessions in the Americas, precisely because they had been bequeathed as a legacy after the end of the empire. The role of Spanish diplomacy was thus to guarantee the endlessness of the empire and of its intangible legacy. This chapter seeks to explain why Spanish diplomacy took this particular orientation

[1] Yanguas, instructions to Spanish diplomats in Latin America, 23 June 1926, copy kept in the records of the Spanish embassy in Rome, AGA, box 54/16724.

precisely in the 1920s. The case of Spain suggests that, in the 1920s, intangible and cultural elements were increasingly seen as assets of world power.

As a congressman, in 1921, Yanguas had already used the term *'patrimonio espiritual'*.[2] On that occasion, he argued that Spain's *patrimonio* had to be put forward, 'not because of past glories, which would weigh quite little in the international order, [but] for this *patrimonio* to be heard and respected as an objective moral value in international relations'. The category of spiritual empire thus had the ability to be used as a legitimate and valid instrument of diplomacy. In Yanguas' opinion, *patrimonio espiritual* had to become a tool of power in itself. There was something subversive in this idea: Yanguas wished to give an 'objective' or 'practical' value to an intangible aspect based on the legacy of a dissolved polity. Transforming spiritual empire into a category of foreign policy was a way to give credibility and substance to intangibility in the arena of international relations. It was also a manner of situating Spain among the 'big powers' of world politics. Through the practice of spirituality, Spain was to play its own specific role in the transformation of the world order that was taking place in international relations after the First World War.

During the interwar period, foreign cultural policy acquired an increasingly important status among the diplomatic practices of European countries.[3] Spain was among the first to institutionalise a system of external cultural action, doing so from the turn of the twentieth century onward, and especially during the 1920s.[4] Primo de Rivera's authoritarian regime played a major role in this process of institutionalisation. Spain's power was, according to Yanguas, 'cultural and sentimental'. Spain, he said, could count on 'the magnificent instrument of the language', as well as on its leadership in a 'community of origin, race, civilisation, blood, religion, and mentality'. Crystallising all these assets called for the systematisation of cultural external action. Historians and international relations specialists speak of a 'French model' of *rayonnement culturel*, comparable to the German model of

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[2] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1921*, vol. IV, no. 37 (13 April 1921), 1281.

[3] Tamara van Kessel, *Foreign Cultural Policy in the Interbellum: The Italian Dante Alighieri Society and the British Council Contesting the Mediterranean* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016).

[4] Antonio Niño, '1898-1936: orígenes y despliegue de la política cultural hacia América Latina', in *L'Espagne, la France et l'Amérique latine : politiques culturelles, propagandes et relations internationales, XX^e siècle*, ed. Denis Rolland, Lorenzo Delgado, and Eduardo González Calleja (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2001), 23–163. See also Lorenzo Delgado, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992), 9–70.

auswärtige Kulturpolitk and to the latecomer US model of soft power.[5] The present chapter provides some elements for the historical analysis of a 'Spanish model' of cultural diplomacy. This was, essentially, that of spiritual empire, as Blas Cabrera, a reputed physician who advised policymakers and diplomats, eloquently expressed:

> El conjunto de las naciones que nacieron del antiguo imperio español forman una unidad espiritual que no desempeña en la humanidad el papel que le corresponde por abandono colectivo y no por falta de capacidad. Es imprescindible aunar los esfuerzos de todos para que los pueblos de raza española vuelvan a ocupar el lugar que en otros tiempos ocuparon, y dejen de ser materia adecuada para explotación por otras razas mejor preparadas.[6]

This paragraph nicely summarises the logic that underpinned cultural diplomacy under Miguel Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. It contains all the elements that characterised its rationale: the former empire, the spirit, and the 'race', understood as a cultural construct which had resulted from the Spanish Empire. For Cabrera and for other agents of policy-making, these elements formed a cultural stockpile that Spain and its former colonies had to use if they wished to play a more important role in world politics. Here the ungraspable concepts of 'race' and 'spirit' took the concrete shape of diplomatic practices.

Indeed, Cabrera remarked that Spain had to act in a context of competition between the 'races' that wished to influence Latin American countries. This phenomenon of 'interracial' competition, which I call 'the scramble for Latin America', in fact consisted of different sets of more or less successful practices of cultural diplomacy and external cultural projection. Spain entered this international game as yet another actor, using its particular stockpile of 'spiritual' resources. Yanguas, in his instructions to diplomats, identified the two main 'dangers' that this scramble posed to Spain:

> la formidable invasión económica de los Estados Unidos en la vida interna de las naciones hispano-americanas (con su natural

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[5] Robin Brown, 'Alternatives to Soft Power: Influence in French and German External Cultural Action', in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 37–47; Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 100–05. See also Kessel, *Foreign Cultural Policy in the Interbellum*, 19–62.

[6] Cabrera, report, in a report by the chief of the *Oficina de Relaciones Culturales Españolas* (José Antonio de Sangróniz), December 1923, AHN-DM, box 4, file 2441.

> derivación de carácter político) y la influencia de orden espiritual cada día más penetrante que sobre ellas ejercen Francia e Italia.

None of these 'dangers' was endogenously Latin American. Latin America was conceived as an object for diplomatic practices. This reveals the intrinsically imperial nature of the scramble for Latin America. Moreover, each of the 'dangers' touched upon different realms of empire: the material and the intangible.

This chapter shows that Spanish diplomacy adapted to the scramble for Latin America by choosing to compete in the realm of the intangible. The first section explores how Spain tried to counter the capacity of France and Italy to have an influence over the intellectual and cultural life of the Latin American countries. This places the scramble for Latin America as a European, Mediterranean, and 'Latin' phenomenon that connects cultural diplomacy to imperialism. I nonetheless argue that Spanish diplomacy did not see imperial hegemony as Spain's final goal in the scramble for Latin America. Yanguas himself conceded that there existed an 'admissible and normal' sphere for French and Italian 'spiritual' influence in Spain's former colonies. He also admitted that it was 'sterile' for Spain to even try to compete with the United States on an equal footing of materiality. In the second section, I explore the ways in which Spanish practices of intangibility penetrated the relations between the United States and Latin America. Looking at spiritual empire from the US perspective is indeed crucial in order to understand the increasing importance that intangible assets of power gained in the 1920s. This chapter pictures spiritual empire as a transnational phenomenon that spilled over the frames of Spanish diplomacy and characterised the world order of the period.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR LATIN AMERICA AS A EUROPEAN PHENOMENON

This section must start with an obvious question: what about Portugal? The absence of the Iberian neighbour from Yanguas' instructions is indeed noticeable. Portugal was, like Spain, a former imperial power in the Americas, and its former imperial dominion, Brazil, had also been independent since the early nineteenth century. More importantly, the Portuguese government was also trying to improve its relations with Latin America. On 26 May 1926, the US ambassador in Lisbon reported on the planned creation of 'a commission in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote closer relations between

Portugal and Ibero-American nations'.[7] As the ambassador explained, Portugal, just like Spain, Italy, or France, also had 'the cordial presumption' to lead the 'Latin bloc'. He added, ironically:

> It is amusing to see […] how readily all the Latin nations in Europe assume that Latin American nations, which have probably many times their vigor and resources, will meekly come tagging after.

Portugal and Spain were thus part of the same 'amusing' group of 'Latin' countries that wished to have an influence over Latin America. However, Spanish diplomacy seemed to be considering the French and Italian 'dangers' while ignoring Portuguese undertakings.

A certain sense of Spanish condescendence vis-à-vis Portugal partially explains this phenomenon. Spanish thinkers and policymakers often encompassed Portugal and Brazil into a wider idea of 'Ibero-Americanism'. The most influential Hispano-Americanist society was the *Unión Ibero-Americana*, the grand gathering of the Spanish spiritual empire was to be the Ibero-American Exhibition, and Primo de Rivera and Yanguas were often ambiguous in their references to the 'Iberian' or 'Hispanic' foundations of their policies.[8] A section of the Spanish political elite had also been nurturing more or less explicit imperial ambitions over Portugal since the second half of the nineteenth century.[9] Moreover, only two days after the US ambassador wrote his dispatch, a military coup installed an authoritarian regime in Portugal. General Óscar Carmona, who came to power in July, quickly established good relations of *'amizade peninsular'* with his Spanish homologue, Primo de Rivera.[10] This new political situation could also explain why Spanish officials were so little concerned about Portuguese Ibero-Americanist ambitions.

However, on the basis of my archival findings, I would like to formulate a complementary hypothesis. As both Mediterranean and 'Latin' countries, France and Italy

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[7] The ambassador of the United States to Portugal (Fred Morris Dearing), dispatch 1488, 26 May 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/39.

[8] Encarnación Lemus López, 'El sentimiento hispanoamericano en la dictadura de Primo de Rivera: el estudio del uso de los vocablos «Hispano-americano», «Latinoamericano» e «Iberoamericano»', in *La influencia andaluza en los núcleos urbanos americanos*, vol. 2 (VII Jornadas de Andalucía y América, La Rábida: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 1990), 293–303.

[9] Hipólito de la Torre Gómez, *El imperio del Rey: Alfonso XIII, Portugal y los ingleses, 1907-1916* (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2002); José Antonio Rocamora Rocamora, 'Un nacionalismo fracasado: el iberismo', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* V, no. 2 (1989): 29–56.

[10] Torre Gómez, *Do perigo espanhol à amizade peninsular: Portugal-Espanha, 1919-1930* (Lisbon: Estampa, 1985); Eloy Fernández Clemente, *Portugal en los años veinte: los orígenes del Estado Novo* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1997), 45–48.

competed with Spain on two fronts from which Portugal was absent. One was the Mediterranean. In the first part of this section, I show that the construction of spiritual empire as a category of Spanish cultural diplomacy was closely connected to the evolution of colonial military and diplomatic undertakings in northern Morocco. Primo de Rivera's Spain sought to have its particular 'place in the sun' in the Mediterranean, and so did France and, very saliently, Fascist Italy.[11] Portugal, in turn, had no ambitions in the region. It was also a minor player on the second front, which was that of cultural diplomacy. Like Spain but unlike Portugal, France and Italy developed ambitious programmes of cultural diplomacy towards Latin America. As I explain in the second part of this section, what pushed Spain into the scramble for Latin America were these French and Italian policies.

Spanish cultural diplomacy as imperialism: the Moroccan connection

Until 1921, Spanish cultural action was mainly 'receptive' to foreign influence.[12] This responded to the initiatives undertaken by different academic and intellectual figures who wished to 'regenerate' Spain's 'backward' education, science, and arts. Under the umbrella of the Ministry of Public Instruction or of specific universities, these personalities used their networks to foster scholarly exchanges and the circulation of published material. Even the *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*, the first organ for Spanish cultural action abroad, founded in 1907 within the Ministry of Public Instruction, had a passive scope of action. As I have shown in Chapter 2, the 'Americanist projection' of the *Junta* relied much more on initiatives taken in Buenos Aires than on decisions taken in Madrid.[13] This took quite a radical 'expansive' turn in November 1921, when a philologist working in the *Junta*, Américo Castro, a convinced Hispano-Americanist born to a family of Spanish immigrants in Brazil, founded the *Oficina de Relaciones Culturales Española (ORCE)* within the Ministry of State. The aim of the office was to assist Spanish diplomats in spreading knowledge of the Spanish language, history, and traditions around the world.

This turn towards 'projection' in contrast to 'reception' came only four months after the battle of Annual, in northern Morocco. There, the Riffean anti-colonial rebels had calamitously defeated the Spanish troops, in a bloody fight that was soon known as *'el*

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[11] Susana Sueiro Seoane, 'La política mediterránea de Primo de Rivera: el triángulo hispano-ítalo-francés', *Revista de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia*, no. 1 (1987): 183–223; José Luis Neila Hernández, 'La mediterraneidad de España en las relaciones internacionales del periodo de entreguerras, 1919-1939', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 19 (1997): 15–54.

[12] Delgado, *Imperio de papel*, 14–15.

[13] José María López Sánchez, 'La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios y su proyección americanista: la Institución Cultural Española en Buenos Aires', *Revista de Indias* LXVII, no. 239 (2007): 81–102.

Desastre de Annual'. Since the early 1910s, Spanish cultural and educational institutions had attempted a 'pacific penetration' of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, until the Riffean guerrilla led the army to launch a military 'campaign of pacification'.[14] As Lorenzo Delgado has shown, the immediate precedents of the *ORCE* were these first attempted practices of a Spanish 'civilising mission' in Morocco.[15] From the beginning of its journey, Spanish cultural diplomacy was thus connected to conquest imperialism.

With the installation of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1923, the *ORCE* was progressively anchored into a certain vision of Spain's 'cultural mission' in the world. Here again, the imperial *'cuestión marroquí'* played an important role. In December of that year, the new military directorate chose José Antonio de Sangróniz to replace Castro at the head of the office. Earlier in 1923, Sangróniz, as a diplomat, had been involved in some important negotiations regarding the statute of Tangier.[16] Due to its geostrategic position across the Strait of Gibraltar, Tangier had been sought after by Spaniards, French, and Britons since the early modern period. During the nineteenth century, different conventions had expressed the need to 'internationalise' the city, but the real meaning of this internationalisation had remained undefined. On the eve of the First World War, a tripartite convention had gathered to draft a consensual statute for the 'international' city. Spanish authorities, however, had not signed that document, considering that it was contrary to Spain's interests and to the interests of the numerous Spaniards who lived in Tangier.[17] After the war, the peace treaties had not addressed the issue of Tangier, but the Cannes Conference of early 1922 had called for the three parties to reach an agreement. At the international conference held in London, the Spanish delegation, of which Sangróniz was part, had failed to convince its French and British counterparts to include Tangier within the Spanish protectorate in northern Morocco, and the solution of 'internationalisation' had been retained. As soon as he came to power, General Primo de Rivera denounced 'the fallacy of internationalisation' that, according to him, could barely

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[14] On the military nature of Spanish imperialism in Morocco, see Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 183–85. See also Stephen Jacobson, 'Imperial Ambitions in an Era of Decline: Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858-1923', in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Josep Maria Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 74–91.

[15] Delgado, *Imperio de papel*, 20–22.

[16] List of members of the Spanish delegation to the conference of experts on the Tangier question, October 1923, AHN-DM, box 236/1, file 2.

[17] Bernabé López García, 'Los españoles de Tánger', *Awraq: revista de análisis y pensamiento sobre el mundo árabe e islámico contemporáneo* 5-6 (2012): 1–45. See also Graham H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955); Alberto España, *La pequeña historia de Tánger: recuerdos, impresiones y anécdotas de una gran ciudad* (Tangier: Distribuciones Ibéricas, 1954).

hide the 'hegemony' that France enjoyed over the Tangier International Zone.[18] As the chief of the *ORCE* in late 1923, Sangróniz embodied the link between this Tangier issue and cultural diplomacy.

It was in this context that the notion of 'spiritual empire' made its way, as a political, administrative, and diplomatic instrument, into Spanish practices of cultural diplomacy. In a report submitted in December 1923, Sangróniz urged the newly installed directorate to foster the cultural potential *'de una nación en cuyos dominios intelectuales no se ha puesto todavía el sol'*.[19] This phrase was a clear reference to the 'golden age' of Spanish imperialism, around the turn of the seventeenth century, when 'the sun never set' on the transcontinental dominions of the Iberian Monarchy. According to Sangróniz, the 'intellectual' part of the empire had not yet come to an end in 1923. Following the metaphor that I used in the Introduction of this thesis, the imperial sun continued to radiate in spite of its eclipse: intellectually — or spiritually — speaking, the Spanish empire was endless. According to Sangróniz, it was the task of the *ORCE* to stimulate this endlessness through cultural diplomacy. In his report, Sangróniz recommended concentrating most of the efforts of external cultural projection on Spain's former colonies in the Americas. The published version of this report, which came out two years later, placed 'the new orientations of Spanish foreign policy' under the label of 'cultural expansion' in Hispanic America.[20] Cultural diplomacy was thus presented, explicitly, as a form of expansionism.

The imperial turn of the rationale underpinning Spanish cultural diplomacy continued to walk hand in hand with military developments in the Spanish protectorate in Morocco. Sangróniz' book was published in 1925 in Madrid as well as in Ceuta, a Spanish city in northern Morocco that was an important base for the Spanish army. The year of 1925 was also crucial in the advancement towards the end of the Rif War. The fundamental support of French troops and the landing of a substantial number of Spanish soldiers in Alhucemas in September led to the final 'pacification' of the Rif area. In the aftermath of this 'glorious' event, in November, Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was legitimised and consolidated with the instalment of a civil directorate that replaced the military one. Yanguas was then appointed minister of State. Very quickly, he reorganised the department and the *ORCE*

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[18] Sueiro Seoane, 'La incorporación de Tánger, una batalla perdida de la diplomacia primorriversita', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* V, no. 2 (1989): 69–87.

[19] Sangróniz, report, December 1923, AHN-DM, box 4, file 2441.

[20] Sangróniz, *Nuevas orientaciones para la política internacional de España: la expansión cultural de España en el extranjero y principalmente en Hispano-América* (Madrid and Ceuta: Editorial Hércules, 1925).

was subsumed into the Section of American Affairs in December. On 11 January 1926, a royal decree renamed this section as the *'Sección de América y Relaciones Culturales'*. To chair this new section, Yanguas chose the marquis of Torrehermosa, Maurico López-Roberts, who had served as head of the Spanish delegation to the conference on Tangier in 1923. Yanguas thus continued the logic of connecting cultural diplomacy and imperial ambitions.

Like Sangróniz, moreover, Yanguas was also convinced of the need for a 'spiritual' turn in Spanish cultural diplomacy. Spiritual empire was in the *air du temps*.[21] The idea of a 'spiritual empire' as a practicable concept, promoted by Ángel Ganivet in 1896, made its way among right-wing intellectuals and politicians in Madrid, especially after 1920, when the Mexican intellectual Alfonso Reyes, who was in exile in Spain, called for a 'decisive spiritual offensive' against the hegemony of the United States.[22] When these ideas were transposed into policy-making practices, however, they took a 'defensive' rather than 'offensive' form. Sangróniz brought the notions of *'dominios intelectuales'* and *'espontáneo tesoro'* into an administrative report in December 1923, and Yanguas included the concept of *'patrimonio espiritual'* in his diplomatic instructions in June 1926. Notwithstanding Sangróniz' 'expansionist' understanding of cultural diplomacy, these expressions, which all referred to Spanish heritage in the Americas, placed the mission of Spanish spiritual empire within a logic of preservation. Sangróniz aimed to expand Spanish cultural influence worldwide on the basis of what Spain would be able to preserve from its imperial 'treasure'.

This choice of a preservationist policy was based on the belief that Spain did not need to make any specific effort to undertake a successful campaign of cultural diplomacy in its former colonies. As Spanish policymakers understood it, spiritual empire was a latent resource and Spain just needed to take the decision to exploit it. Some historians have interpreted this apparently unassertive attitude as 'the imperialism of the poor', especially when compared to the proactive and pioneering practices of cultural diplomacy that France is assumed to have developed.[23] The Moroccan connection, however, suggests a different interpretation. In the context of competition with France and Italy in the Western Mediterranean, Spain was unable to assert its imperial presence successfully. In the field of cultural diplomacy, by contrast, being the former imperial hegemon in eighteen sovereign

[21] On the notion of *'air du temps'* for decision-taking in the policy-making process, see Pascale Goetschel, 'Les politiques culturelles : un champ neuf pour l'histoire culturelle ?', in *L'histoire culturelle en France et en Espagne*, ed. Benoît Pellistrandi and Jean-François Sirinelli (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2008), 14.

[22] David Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana: hispanoamericanismo e imaginario nacional en la España de la Restauración* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2010), 172–78.

[23] Niño, '1898-1936', 55–67; Delgado, *Imperio de papel*, 18.

countries across the Atlantic provided Spain with a real comparative advantage. In the mind of Spanish officials, spiritual empire was a 'spontaneous treasure' precisely because France and Italy lacked it. However, based on a certain idea of 'Latinity', both France and Italy attempted to construct their own 'spiritual premises' in the Americas. This forced Spanish cultural diplomacy into a defensive 'preservation' of its *'patrimonio'*.

The Spanish strategy of independence: a relative success

In December 1925, in Paris, a minor Latin-Americanist private society called *Paris-Amérique latine* organised an exhibition of engravings by the Spanish artist Manuel Castro Gil. They requested the presence and the official support of the Spanish ambassador, José Quiñones de León. In spite of the banal nature of the matter, Quiñones deemed it important enough as to address a private letter to Minister Yanguas:

> Sé cuán especial cuidado e interés inspira a V.E. una política de acercamiento con América, con nuestra América, en la cual yo comulgo y persevero siempre; pero sucede que, por lo que respecta a las asociaciones que en París existen […], es preciso, si no quiere hacérseles el juego y que con nuestra intervención se aprovechen y beneficien de la fuerza moral que podemos darle para crearse una importancia mayor […], apareciendo que nosotros la sancionamos y colaboramos a ella, resignándonos a un papel de subordinados; es preciso obrar con cautela, no conviniendo prestarnos a ello; tal es el caso presente.[24]

A French Latin Americanist society was offering space for a Spanish artist to exhibit his work. As Quiñones interpreted it, this amounted to including Spain within a wider 'Latin' space that would appear 'subordinated' to France. It was therefore necessary to be 'cautious', he argued, if Spain wished to preserve its position with regard to 'its' America. Facing French proactivity, Quiñones advocated a 'strategy of independence' that consisted of refusing to give ostensible support to private or public initiatives that could benefit France's cultural ties to Latin America and thus damage the position of Spain as a guardian of spiritual empire. Yanguas was 'very pleased to coincide with the idea'.[25] This strategy was indeed followed throughout the decade, in Paris as well as in Rome.

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[24] Quiñones to Yanguas, 29 December 1925, AGA, box 54/6164, file 1524.

[25] Yanguas to Quiñones, 9 January 1926, AGA, box 54/6164, file 1524.

Difficult independence from France

In the wake of the successful flight of the *Plus Ultra*, the Spanish government founded an eponymous press agency in March 1926.[26] The *Agencia Plus Ultra* was based in Madrid, but it had its main offices in Paris. Administratively speaking, it reported directly to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and its statutes stated that it would not interfere with the labour of diplomats and consuls. In reality, however, it was designed to complement Spanish cultural diplomacy. Yanguas, the head of the foreign office, was actually one of the two ministers who proposed the creation of the agency to the Council of Ministers, together with his colleague Eduardo Callejo, head of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. The agency pursued the obvious political aim of countering the campaigns that some dissident intellectuals and politicians were conducting against Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, but the Hispano-American nature of the agency was not instrumental to this authoritarian agenda. The choice of Paris as a main focal point was not made by chance.

France, as the proposal drafted by Yanguas and Callejo acknowledged, 'organised, to some extent, the path of progress of the Latin and Hispanic peoples'.[27] Paris gathered intellectuals, journalists, scholars, and diplomats coming from all Latin American countries.[28] In the entrance door of the *Agencia Plus Ultra*, located in the elegant *avenue de l'Opéra*, an explicit advertisement targeted these Latin Americans: *'Américains, visiter l'Espagne est un devoir envers vous-mêmes et envers la Race'*.[29] Attracting Latin American tourists to Spain was one of the main goals of the agency. Moreover, the explicit mention of the 'race' in the centre of Paris placed this call for tourists in the context of the 'interracial' competition between Hispanism and Latinism. The document drafted by Yanguas and Callejo explicitly mentioned that the agency would have to work for 'the spiritual hegemony of the race'. The Spanish government wished to use the privileged connections that France had with Latin American opinion-makers and diplomats in order to serve a diplomatic objective. Far from seeking the role of a direct competitor, Spanish authorities chose to underline the

[26] Rosa Cal Martínez, 'La Agencia Plus Ultra: un instrumento de propaganda de Primo de Rivera', *Mélanges de la Casa Velázquez* 31, no. 3 (1995): 177–95.

[27] Yanguas and Callejo, report, in Cal Martínez, 'La Agencia Plus Ultra', 181–87.

[28] Amotz Giladi, 'Rayonnement et propagande culturels français autour de la « panlatinité » : les échanges entre intellectuels français et hispano-américains au début du vingtième siècle', *French Politics, Culture and Society* 31, no. 3 (2013): 93–113.

[29] Cal Martínez, 'La Agencia Plus Ultra', 181.

'racial' independence of the Hispanic world vis-à-vis the all-embracing category of *latinité* that France had long been trying to put forward.[30]

It would have been difficult for Spain to openly compete with France. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the French administration had been developing strong structures of cultural diplomacy based on decisive support for private initiatives.[31] Among the latter was the *Alliance française*, founded in 1882, which managed to legitimise the 'defence' and 'expansion' of language as a valid tool of diplomacy and world power.[32] The idea that French, in spite of the advancement of English, remained the language of culture and refinement permeated elite circles worldwide, very particularly in Latin America.[33] Moreover, in 1920, a *Service des Œuvres françaises à l'étranger* was founded within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[34] The main objective of this administration was to monitor and support the different sorts of initiatives that French individuals and societies had taken in such fields as education, intellectual exchanges, or artistic production. The widely held belief that France was the head of a 'Latin' bloc of countries favoured the mushrooming of French educational and cultural initiatives in Latin America.[35]

Therefore, from its creation in 1921, the *ORCE* was placed on the path of reaction and emulation. Américo Castro, the founder of the *ORCE*, was an admirer of the French model.[36] The system that he conceived for Spain was strongly inspired by the French idea that diplomacy had to provide support to pre-existing private initiatives. Like their French colleagues, Spanish scholars and intellectuals had also been constructing transatlantic

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[30] J.P. Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French": Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires', *Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 4 (December 2008): 831–64; John Leddy Phelan, 'Pan-Latinism, French Intervention in Mexico (1861-1867) and the Genesis of the Idea of Latin America', in *Conciencia y autenticidad históricas: escritos en homenaje a Edmundo O'Gorman*, ed. Juan A. Ortega y Medina (Mexico City, 1968), 279–298. See also Paul Edison, 'Latinizing America: The French Scientific Study of Mexico, 1830-1930' (Columbia University, 1999).

[31] François Roche and Bernard Pigniau, *Histoires de diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1995* (Paris: La documentation française, 1995).

[32] François Chaubet, *La politique culturelle française et la diplomatie de la langue : une histoire de l'Alliance française, 1883-1940* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2006).

[33] Daughton, 'When Argentina Was "French"', 836. See also Vincent Laniol, 'Langue et relations internationales : le monopole perdu de la langue française à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919', in *Histoire culturelle des relations internationales : carrefour méthodologique*, ed. Denis Rolland (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2004), 79–116.

[34] Antoine Marès, 'Puissance et présence culturelle de la France : l'exemple du Service des œuvres françaises à l'étranger dans les années trente', *Relations internationales*, no. 33 (Spring 1983): 65–80.

[35] Gilles Matthieu, *Une ambition sud-américaine : politique culturelle de la France (1914-1940)* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1991).

[36] Niño, *Cultura y diplomacia: los hispanistas franceses y España, 1875-1931* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988), 332.

networks of intellectual cooperation since the late nineteenth century. I have already mentioned the work done by Adolfo Posada or Rafael Altamira. The *JAE* and the *ORCE* sought to strengthen these networks, and managed to do so quite effectively.[37] Also, similarly to the French *Service des œuvres*, which dedicated 90% of its budget to schools and academic exchanges, most efforts of Spanish cultural diplomacy went towards promoting the circulation of students, professors, books, and reviews.[38] The French and the Spanish systems of cultural diplomacy were fairly similar, although the Spanish one came slightly later and counted on fewer financial and human resources than the French one.

Spanish efforts, however, did not amount to the global dimensions of French cultural *rayonnement*. The context of institutional multilateralism that emerged after the world war offered new opportunities for cultural action, which French diplomacy successfully managed to seize. French diplomats brought the issue of scientific, academic, and artistic cooperation onto the agenda of the League of Nations. In 1922, the French government encouraged the creation of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation as an advisory body of the League of Nations.[39] First established as a tentative structure, this committee was chaired by the French philosopher Henri Bergson and had its headquarters in Paris. In 1926, the League Assembly decided to consolidate the French idea and created the International Institute of Cultural Cooperation as the specialised League organ in charge of cultural multilateralism. As is still the case with UNESCO today, the institutional heart of all cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation within the international system of governance remained the city of Paris. It was therefore to Paris, not to Seville or Madrid, that the Latin American governments sent their most prestigious scholars and artists as members of the international committee.[40]

France was a step ahead in the scramble for Latin America. Its cultural influence complemented the economic importance of the United States. Sangróniz admitted this:

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[37] Niño, '1898-1936', 97–115.

[38] Yanguas, speech to the Latin American diplomatic corps in Madrid, 12 October 1926, in 'La Fiesta de la Raza en Madrid: discursos pronunciados en la función de gala celebrada en el teatro de la Zarzuela, de Madrid, el 12 de Octubre de 1926', *Revista de las Españas*, December 1926, 254.

[39] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'Unesco oubliée : Société des Nations et coopération intellectuelle* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999).

[40] Juliette Dumont, 'Latin America at the Crossroads: The Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Pan American Union', in *Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations*, ed. Alan L. McPherson and Yannick Wehrli (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 155–167. See also Dumont, *Le Brésil et l'Institut international de coopération intellectuelle (1924-1946): le pari de la diplomatie culturelle* (Paris: Éditions de l'IHEAL, 2009); Fabián Herrera León, 'México y el Instituto Internacional de Cooperación Intelectual, 1926–1939', *Tzintzun. Revista de Estudios Históricos* 49 (June 2009): 169–200.

> En resumen: Norteamérica cultiva la fuerza creadora de dinero y explotadora de las grandes riquezas naturales que atesoran casi intactas todas las repúblicas hispánicas; Francia cultiva el modo de gastar sabia y refinadamente estas riquezas.[41]

Minister Yanguas was also aware of the difficulty of competing with France. In his instructions of June 1926, he hoped that Spain would *'tal vez'* be able to counterbalance 'the intense endeavour of a spiritual nature that France is achieving'.[42] He therefore chose to focus on a weaker competitor.

The battle for the spirit: Italian Latinism versus Spanish Hispanism

The count of Viñaza, ambassador of Spain to Italy, studied the Italian system of cultural policy in early 1926. In June, he reported from Rome that, 'among the official organs of Italy, none is especially tasked with foreign cultural relations'.[43] This reassuring message was only based on the administrative aspect of the question, however. From a more widely political perspective, the Fascist regime used cultural propaganda and emigration as instruments to spread its ideology abroad.[44] This was especially true in South America, more particularly in Argentina, where Italian emigrants were more numerous.[45] The Fascist regime mobilised administrative and non-administrative actors to launch a number of ambitious initiatives that aimed to influence the culture and the intellectual life of Latin Americans. These policies were based on a certain idea of Italy as the birthplace of *latinità*, and Benito Mussolini wished to counterbalance *'il movimento spagnolo di espansione verso l'America latina, ch'è chiamato col nome pomposo di ispano-americanismo'*.[46] More explicitly than the French government, the Italian one sought to subsume Spain into a transatlantic 'Latin' world. To this end, Mussolini tried to build a Rome-Madrid axis.

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[41] Sangróniz, *Nuevas orientaciones para la política internacional de España*, 90–91.

[42] Yanguas, instructions to Spanish diplomats in Latin America, 23 June 1926, AGA, box 54/16724.

[43] Viñaza (Cipriano Muñoz y Manzano), dispatch 93, 26 April 1926, AGA, box 54/16742.

[44] Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, *Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-Fascist Network* (London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 15–18; Rubén Domínguez Méndez, 'Dos instrumentos en la propaganda exterior del fascismo: emigración y cultura', *Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, no. 10 (2012).

[45] Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

[46] Mussolini to the Italian ambassador in Madrid (Raniero Paulucci di Calboli), 15 November 1923, in Gustavo Palomares Lerma, *Mussolini y Primo de Rivera: política exterior de dos dictadores*, Eudema Universidad (Madrid: Eudema, 1989), 265.

The sources suggest that the Italian government tried to build a 'Latin' axis for culture in the 1920s.[47] In Mussolini's mind, this axis was meant to have a clear anti-French connotation. Gustavo Palomares Lerma and Susana Sueiro Seoane have provided a first analysis of this attempted axis, suggesting that Mussolini's regime tried to use Spanish agents, structures, and networks in order to have an impact in Spain and in Latin America.[48] In other words, Mussolini tried to co-opt Primo de Rivera's Hispano-Americanism and spiritual empire into a Fascist Italian sphere of influence. The archival material that I have consulted confirms this hypothesis. It also makes it clear that Spanish diplomats and officials were perfectly aware of Mussolini's ambitions and tried to play the card of independence, in line with what Quiñones and Yanguas advocated. In the following paragraphs, I present only one example of this.

In March 1923, the president of the Hispano-Italian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Luigi Bacci, wrote to the Spanish ambassador, Francisco Reynoso.[49] As usual, he wished to establish better commercial relations between Spain and Italy, which were, as he said, 'two sister nations'. This time, however, Bacci was writing on behalf of Benito Mussolini. The *Duce* was ready to sponsor the creation of an *Instituto Ítalo-Hispano-Lusitano y Latino-Americano*, and institution that would soon be known as the *Istituto Cristoforo Colombo*:

> Las dos naciones [Italia y España], ligadas estrechamente por la comunión de la noble sangre latina y afines por su lengua y caracteres étnicos, hermanas por la analogía de su posición geográfica como por el grado de desarrollo industrial, deben, por su interés común, ir de acuerdo y parejas en los próximos certámenes internacionales en los mercados del mundo, apoyándose, sobre todo, en las juveniles y fuertes energías materiales y morales de la América Latina.

Through the intermediary of Bacci, Mussolini presented the project of an institute as the first step towards a commercial and industrial alliance on a global scale. This alliance was meant to be Mediterranean, since Bacci mentioned the 'analogy' of Spain and Italy's

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[47] For an analysis of the Nazi-Fascist axis from the perspective of cultural diplomacy, see Benjamin G. Martin, *The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).

[48] Palomares Lerma, *Mussolini y Primo de Rivera: política exterior de dos dictadores*, Eudema Universidad (Madrid: Eudema, 1989); Sueiro Seoane, 'Primo de Rivera y Mussolini: las relaciones diplomáticas entre dos dictaduras (1923-1930)', *Prosérpina: Revista de la Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Centro Regional de Extremadura-Mérida*, no. 1 (1984): 23–34.

[49] Bacci to Reynoso, 27 March 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

geographical situations. More importantly, it was meant to be 'Latin'. Very explicitly, the Fascist regime was seeking material advantages 'on the world's markets' out of such intangible realities as 'blood', 'language', or 'ethnic characters'. This was moreover conceived in an imperialistic mind-set based on the exploitation of the 'young and strong material and moral energies of Latin America'. The Italian proposal was based on a logic of spiritual empire, in which the importance of the *Mare Nostrum* and some items of *'razza latina'* were the endless elements of the Roman Empire. With this invitation for cooperation, Bacci prepared a fertile field for competition with similar tools. This happened only some months before Sangróniz chaired the *ORCE*, while the idea of a spiritual empire was in the air in Madrid. As it seems, it was also in the air in Rome.

Ambassador Reynoso was sceptical about the Italian proposal. He responded to Bacci in early April, assuring him that he would write to Madrid as soon as possible, 'in order to be able to provide my support for such a noble objective'.[50] He still waited for two days, however, to forward Bacci's documents to the minister of State, Santiago Alba y Bonifaz.[51] Moreover, he made no comment to the proposal, probably showing his lack of interest in the question. In Madrid, the Italian project was not treated with the utmost urgency: a month after receiving the documents, Alba asked Reynoso to 'give an opinion on the matter, for its consideration when necessary'.[52] Yet another month later, Minister Alba had to insist.[53] Finally, on 19 June, Reynoso reported. Surprisingly, he did not provide his personal opinion, but that of the minister-plenipotentiary of Argentina to Italy:

> El criterio de la legación argentina es de no dar el concurso oficial a las sociedades o institutos que en Roma se formen y que abarquen más naciones que la República Argentina e Italia, por creer muy difícil las expansiones intelectuales y económicas cuando son varios países los que se unen en sociedad, como es el caso presente. […] El Señor Ministro de la Argentina me dijo claramente que no pensaba dar acogida a los ruegos que en este asunto se le solicitasen por tener él la misión de llevar una política

[50] Reynoso to Bacci, 4 April 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

[51] Reynoso to Alba, dispatch 56, 6 April 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

[52] Alba to Reynoso, royal order 115, 4 May 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

[53] Alba to Reynoso, royal order 168, 10 June 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

> personal de aproximación ítalo-argentina, y que toda otra influencia podría ser nociva a los intereses de ambos países.[54]

Aware of the risks of becoming imperial subalterns in a broader 'Latin' context driven from Europe, the Argentinian diplomat privileged bilateral relations with Italy. Reynoso did not comment on the Argentinian position. He probably agreed with its principles. In Madrid, Minister Alba 'acknowledged' the Argentinian position, but he nonetheless asked Reynoso to endorse and support the Italian project.[55] When this decision was taken, in the summer of 1923, the French and British governments were advocating the internationalisation of Tangier, which undermined Spanish colonial ambitions in northern Africa. Minister Alba thus sought 'the solid and firm amity' of Italy 'for the defence of the Mediterranean'.[56] The moment was not propitious for an outburst of 'Hispanic' pride. In the context of political instability that immediately preceded Primo de Rivera's coup, the Spanish government prioritised material imperial ambitions over the affirmation of spiritual empire.

The situation changed after Primo de Rivera came to power. A new ambassador, the count of Viñaza, was appointed to Rome. As a historian of Spanish language and a specialist of American indigenous languages, Viñaza enjoyed some fame among Latin American scholars.[57] As a diplomat, he had headed the Spanish delegation to the celebration of the first centenary of Peruvian independence, in 1921.[58] He thus was a Hispano-Americanist agent in the intellectual and diplomatic sense of the term. When he arrived in Rome, Bacci welcomed him with a letter in which he insisted on the Mediterranean and 'Latin' nature that Spain and Italy shared:

> Pero no solamente debe unir a ambos pueblos allende el océano la comunión de ideales e intereses, sino también en nuestro mar latino, que no divide a nuestras tierras, sino que las une, ha de afirmarse la fraternidad antigua, bajo el nombre de la gran madre Roma.[59]

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[54] Reynoso to Alba, dispatch 152, 19 June 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

[55] Alba to Reynoso, royal order 223, 28 July 1923, AGA, box 54/16794.

[56] Sueiro Seoane, 'La política mediterránea de Primo de Rivera', 187.

[57] See, for example, Cipriano Muñoz y Manzano (count of Viñaza), *Bibliografía española de lenguas indígenas de América* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1892).

[58] Ángel Martínez de Velasco, 'Relaciones hispano-peruanas durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera: el centenario de Ayacucho', *Quinto Centenario*, no. 2 (1981): 175–96.

[59] Viñaza to Bacci, 14 April 1924, AGA, box 54/16794.

Just as Spain claimed imperial maternity over Latin America, Italy claimed imperial maternity over the Mediterranean, which Bacci called the 'Latin sea'. Very diplomatically, but very explicitly, Bacci reminded Viñaza that Spain was to be subsumed into the Latin world. As he imagined the Italian spiritual empire, the Roman Empire was to serve as the common ancestor of all the Latin peoples, including Spain and its former American colonies. Viñaza would respond to these rhetorical games in kind.

In 1926, the *Istituto Cristoforo Colombo* organised an international congress of Americanist scholars in Rome. Having initially ignored the numerous requests of the Italian organisers, Ambassador Viñaza finally appointed Manuel Carrasco Reyes as the official representative of Spain to the congress. Carrasco was the director of the *Real Colegio Mayor de San Clemente de los Españoles*, a college of the University of Bologna, founded in 1364, and the most prestigious Spanish cultural institution in Italy. At the congress, a famous historian of the conquest of America, Ángel Altolaguirre, was expected to give a paper on Christopher Columbus. He intended to provide evidence that Christopher Columbus was born in Italy. Ambassador Viñaza and Director Carrasco promptly intervened:

> El Sr. Carrasco, de acuerdo conmigo [Viñaza], tuvo una entrevista previa con el citado Sr. Altolaguirre, leyó la memoria en cuestión y obtuvo de él que esta fuese despojada de toda apreciación en uno u otro sentido acerca del nacimiento de Colón y reducida a la mera exposición objetiva de su investigación histórica con relación al documento que la motiva. […] Al día siguiente a la apertura de aquel [congreso], [Altolaguirre] presentó su trabajo, defraudando a los que esperaban explotar patrioteramente sus esperadas declaraciones probatorias de la italianidad indiscutible del nacimiento de Colón.[60]

Historiography was a practice of empire and a practice of diplomacy. In the spiritual fight for imperial predominance over Latin America, the use of history was a powerful tool.

Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has demonstrated how, in the nineteenth century, Spanish historians and officials constructed new historiographies of the Spanish empire.[61]

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[60] Viñaza to the secretary of the Section of Policy at the Ministry of State (Antonio Caro del Arroyo), 30 September 1926, AGA, box 54/16724.

[61] Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

He has noted this as an imperial practice within the Spanish colonial empire, in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. The case of the *Istituto Cristoforo Colombo* shows that these practices of interaction between historians and public agents continued, even in the absence of an empire. The phrase 'conquest of history', used by Schmidt-Nowara as the title of his book, is not exaggerated. Viñaza indeed denounced Bacci's 'barely disguised warrior spirit'.[62] In Italy as in Spain, foreign policy officials acted as agents of empire who conquered areas of spirit, such as historiography.

The Catholic spirit

Religion was another battlefield. In November 1923, King Alfonso and Queen María Eugenia of Spain made an official trip to Italy. Primo de Rivera, the newly installed dictator, travelled with them. One of the objectives of the visit was to give an image of Hispano-Italian approximation right after Britain and France had curbed Spanish imperial ambitions over Tangier. The visit indeed worried European observers, especially in the French press, who feared the formation of an anti-French Mediterranean coalition.[63] The nature and ambitions of Primo de Rivera's regime were still unclear only a month after his coup, and some perceived the visit as the tribute of the new dictatorship to the Fascist regime. Exaggerated importance was given to a joke made by the king of Spain, who presented Primo de Rivera as *'mi Mussolini'* to the king of Italy. During this trip, however, no major agreement was reached. A treaty of amity between Spain and Italy would be signed in August 1926, but would not contain any specific measure regarding the creation of a 'Latin' rapprochement in the Mediterranean, nor on cooperation in Latin America.[64] The Hispano-Italian axis was never a reality.[65]

The royal trip of 1923 was not a mere smokescreen, however. The US chargé d'affaires in Rome indicated another reason for it: 'to kiss the feet of the Pope'.[66] Indeed, even before meeting the king of Italy or Mussolini, King Alfonso and Primo de Rivera went to the Vatican. Since the very beginning of his dictatorship, Primo de Rivera had made the choice

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[62] Viñaza to Primo de Rivera, dispatch 237, 14 March 1928, AGA, box 54/16724.

[63] Sueiro Seoane, 'La política exterior de la dictadura de Primo de Rivera en el contexto autoritario de los años 20', in *Coyuntura internacional y política española (1898-2004)*, ed. Salvador Forner Muños (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2010), 70–74.

[64] *Tratado de Amistad, Conciliación y Arreglo Judicial entre el Reino de Italia y el Reino de España*, 7 August 1926, AGA, box 54/16724.

[65] Stanley G. Payne, 'Fascist Italy and Spain', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 13 (1998): 99–115.

[66] The chargé d'affaires ad interim of the United States to Italy (Franklin M. Gunther), dispatch 841, 24 November 1923, NARA, registry 59, file 752.65/3.

to maintain 'peaceful' relations with the Holy See.[67] The royal visit to Rome can legitimately be interpreted as a tribute to the Papacy, rather than as a tribute to the Fascist regime. Moreover, having good relations with the Church also served the cause of spiritual empire. One of the main legacies of the Spanish empire was precisely Catholicism, which Spanish *conquistadores* and missionaries had spread in the Americas. In the mind of Spanish officials, this idea was far from being abstract or romantic.[68] It had very concrete results for the implementation of spiritual empire in Latin America.

King Alfonso XIII was a key figure in the practice of Spanish diplomacy. He was, more generally speaking, personally committed to the cause of Hispano-Americanism as one of the most important elements of Spanish diplomacy.[69] Far from being symbolic, the king's interventions in foreign affairs helped diplomatic action on many occasions. As a practitioner of rhetorical diplomacy, Alfonso XIII appeared as the supreme ambassador of spiritual empire. If not as emperor, he at least appeared as the curator of Spain's *'patrimonio espiritual'*. He gave consistency to diplomatic action, behaving as the repository of a long history of empire, of which the monarchy was the natural inheritor.[70] In Rome, in 1923, he performed a practice of spiritual empire that diplomats would have never been able to perform on their own: he embodied the Catholic essence of the Spanish spirit.

In this sense, he pronounced a magniloquent speech before Pope Pius XI.[71] He described himself as 'the' Catholic king, at the same time as he presented Spain as 'the' Catholic nation. He also defined the conquest and colonisation of the Americas as a *'misión confiada por Dios'*. Even rhetorically, his presence in the Vatican continued this mission, and he felt entitled to speak on behalf of Latin America:

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[67] Josefina Martínez Álvarez, 'Un paréntesis «apacible»: las relaciones bilaterales entre España y el Vaticano durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera', *Aportes* 30, no. 88 (February 2015): 79–114. See also Francisco Martí Gilabert, 'La Iglesia y la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera, 1923-1929', *Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia* 2 (1993): 151–178.

[68] On the practical significance of Catholicism in Spanish politics, see Alejandro Quiroga, *Los orígenes del nacionalcatolicismo: José Pemartín y la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera* (Granada: Comares, 2006).

[69] Niño, 'El rey embajador', in *Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono*, ed. Javier Moreno Luzón, Memorias y Biografías (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 239–76; Richard V. Salisbury, 'Hispanismo versus Pan Americanism: Spanish Efforts to Counter U.S. Influence in Latin America before 1930', in *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs*, ed. David Sheinin (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 74.

[70] Javier Moreno Luzón, 'Alfonso el Regenerador: monarquía escénica e imaginario nacionalista español, en perspectiva comparada (1902-1913)', *Hispania. Revista Española de Historia* LXXIII, no. 224 (August 2013): 319–48.

[71] Alfonso XIII, speech to the Pius XI, 19 November 1921, in *ABC*, Madrid, 20 November 1923, morning edition, 10–11.

> Y como ruego, donde pongo mi corazón, y con el cual creo recoger los anhelos todos de la raza, a impetrar me atrevo de Vuestra Santidad que el mundo americano, que forma casi un tercio de los católicos del orbe, tuviera representación más numerosa en el Sacro Colegio, petición que hago, Santísimo Padre, en este lugar, uno de los más augustos de la tierra, para proclamar la aspiración vehementísima de España de fundirse en apretado abrazo de cariño con las que antes fueron sus colonias del Nuevo Mundo; para que, unidos los españoles todos, los de allende y los de aquende el Océano, la raza hispano-americana llegue al cénit de la grandeza que en el mundo le corresponde por haber sido la propulsora de los más altos ideales de la Humanidad y por haber cobijado todas sus glorias bajo los brazos redentores de la Cruz.

Taking a lyrical tone that underlined imperial continuity, the king presented himself as the ambassador of all the Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas. He endorsed, *motu proprio*, the call that some Latin American countries had made for the nomination of more Latin American cardinals to the Curia. The imperial nature of the speech was indeed perceived as such by some Latin American diplomats, who were seemingly discontented by the situation, as the US ambassador to the Holy See reported.[72] However, other Latin American diplomats tried to take advantage of the situation. The Peruvian Chargé d'affaires to the Holy See, following instructions received from Lima, sought Spanish support for the nomination of Peruvian cardinals.[73] The Vatican was the hub of a very particular sort of multilateral diplomacy and, in this framework, Spain was an important player.

The king's speech must not be interpreted as a mere burst of lyricism and rhetorical bombast. As the king himself explained to the nuncio when he went back to Madrid, he lamented that so few Spanish-speakers were present in the Vatican, while Italian-speakers were so numerous.[74] He was worried about the consequences that an 'Italianisation' of the Holy See could have for papal diplomacy in the post-war context of 'peace-building'. The

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[72] The chargé d'affaires ad interim of the United States to Italy (Franklin M. Gunther), dispatch 935, 8 March 1924, NARA, registry 59, file 752.65/10.

[73] The Spanish ambassador to the Holy See (Luis Valera Delavat, marquis of Villasinda) to Primo de Rivera, telegram 102, 2 December 1923, AHN-DM, box 244/1.

[74] The Apostolic nuncio to Spain (Federico Tedeschin), report, 1924, in Domínguez Méndez, 'El viaje del Cardenal Benlloch por Iberoamérica en 1923: los intereses de España e Italia en la correspondencia diplomática del Archivio Segreto Vaticano', *Confluenze* 5, no. 1 (2013), 230.

speech was part of a broader strategy to use Catholicism as an element of cultural diplomacy and spiritual empire. In the report that he submitted in December that same year, Sangróniz explained the 'eminently practical' utility that Catholicism could have.[75] In his opinion, religion was an efficient channel for enlarging the scope of diplomacy: Spain's assertive defence of Catholicism, he argued, could reach and seduce a larger public, beyond the cultured elite of intellectuals and politicians that had hitherto been the *ORCE*'s target.

In Latin America, Spanish ecclesiastic diplomacy was also working in this direction. Parallel to the royal visit to Rome, the archbishop of Burgos, Cardinal Juan Bautista Benlloch, toured Latin America between September 1923 and January 1924.[76] He visited, in this order, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba. His trip continued the work that he had been undertaking from Burgos, on behalf of Pope Benedict XV, during the 1910s: developing the missionary 'vocation' of the Spanish church. The trip, ordered by the pope, aimed to encourage the foundation of new missions in the Americas, 'following the action that French and Italian missionaries had been undertaking in their colonial territories'.[77] This placed the trip in a logic of practical imperial continuity, not only because the comparison to colonial religious missions was explicit, but also because it perpetuated the practice of the mission, which had been one of the most important practices of Spanish imperialism in the early modern period. The Catholic Church was an active actor of imperialism in the twentieth century, and this included Latin America. It was, indeed, an active actor of Spanish spiritual imperialism.

Cardinal Benlloch represented the pope, but he also represented the king of Spain. In addition to messages from the pope, he bore personal letters from King Alfonso to the presidents of the different republics that he visited. Under this double papal and Spanish hat, he made a special effort to have a successful stay in Chile, which happened in October. There he spent the *Fiesta de la Raza*, on 12 October. In a speech to the Chilean president, Arturo Alessandri, Cardinal Benlloch recalled the 'maternity of Spain' and the 'magnitude of the colonial endeavour'.[78] Some days later, he made a speech before the Chilean Senate, in which 'he recommended the union of the Ibero-American nations for world equilibrium

[75] Sangróniz, report, December 1923, AHN-DM, box 4, file 2441.

[76] Domínguez Méndez, 'El viaje del Cardenal Benlloch por Iberoamérica en 1923', 218–33.

[77] Domínguez Méndez, 'El viaje del Cardenal Benlloch por Iberoamérica en 1923', 226.

[78] The ministry-plenipotentiary of Spain to Chile (Bernardo Almeida) to the undersecretary of State (Fernando Espinosa de los Monteros), telegram 66, 15 October 1923, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3.

and universal peace'.[79] From the realm of religion and spiritual empire, he jumped into the realm of world politics. More importantly, he jumped into the realm of international cooperation, only some months after the Fifth Pan American Conference had met precisely in Santiago. This raises the question of the relationships that Spanish spiritual diplomacy maintained with inter-Americanism and with the United States as a hegemon in the so-called Western Hemisphere.

SPIRITUAL EMPIRE SEEN FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

It is often argued, perhaps too quickly, that the United States was the undisputed hegemon of the American continent throughout the twentieth century. This interpretation echoes the logic underpinning the foreign policy doctrine advanced in the 1820s under James Monroe's administration. The 'Monroe Doctrine' was based on the idea that the American continent, called the 'Western Hemisphere' in contrast to the 'old' Eurasian world, had to remain protected from any imperialist intervention coming from Europe, and that it was the mission of the United States to guarantee this independence.[80] The doctrine contained an evident imperialist side, upon which the US government justified interventions in the Latin American countries, especially after President Theodore Roosevelt complemented it with a 'corollary' that was meant to preserve US economic interests south of the border.[81] It also contained, however, an anti-imperial principle that was shared and invoked by the Latin American republics.

Scholars are now paying increasing attention to this other side of the coin. Some have just started exploring the elements of continental cooperation embedded in the diplomatic practices of the Western Hemisphere idea.[82] Long seen as a US-driven masquerade that barely veiled hegemonic ambitions of domination, inter-American frameworks of cooperation, namely the Pan American conferences and the Pan American Union, are

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[79] The ministry-plenipotentiary of Spain to Chile (Bernardo Almeida) to the undersecretary of State (Fernando Espinosa de los Monteros), telegram 69, 24 October 1923, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3.

[80] Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011); Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954).

[81] Kris James Mitchener, *Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary* (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004); Richard H. Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990).

[82] Juan Pablo Scarfi, 'In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933', *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 2 (2016): 189–218; Andrew Tillman and Scarfi, eds., *Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: Revisiting the Western Hemisphere Idea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). See also some contributions to Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*.

being revised from a Latin American perspective. Juan Pablo Scarfi and others have shown that Latin American diplomats encouraged Pan Americanism and used it to pursue their own agendas, often in open confrontation with the United States. This calls for attention to the agency of Latin American actors in early-twentieth-century world politics. The scramble for Latin America took place in a context in which Latin American and US intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats were recalibrating the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere idea on which it was founded. The role that Spanish policies of spiritual empire played in this context can be explained by looking at them from the perspective of US diplomacy.

Spiritual empire as a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine

In the wake of the general enthusiasm that the transatlantic flight of the *Plus Ultra* generated, the US *chargé d'affaires* in Madrid, John F. Martin, analysed Spain's Hispano-American policies meticulously. He sent a comprehensive dispatch to Washington, in which he urged the US government to take Spain seriously:

> Spain has not been a conspicuous success in Latin American fields of industrial development, communications, mining, or finance. There is a general tendency, therefore, to underestimate her influence there and to overlook certain hidden forces which are working through Spain for her advancement of European interests in Ibero-America at the expense of those of the United States. […] Far from being negligible, Spain's influence in Latin America is increasing each year.[83]

Martin's fears concerned Spain's capacity to broadcast 'propaganda' against the United States. He drew up a list of policies and personalities that, according to him, aimed to build a negative image of the United States in Latin America. He claimed that there was a 'meticulous campaign' orchestrated from Madrid that counted on the connivance of 'the entire Latin American diplomatic corps in Madrid', which he considered 'anti-American'. At first sight, his concerns were mere routine diplomatic activity: he wished to guarantee the good image and prestige of the country that he represented. His comments, nonetheless, are better understood in the framework of the Monroe Doctrine.

[83] Martin, dispatch 854, 22 March 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.53/35.

Martin underlined the 'penetration' of Spain into Latin America. In its 'anti-colonial' dimension, the Monroe Doctrine aimed to prevent 'the advancement of European interests' in the American continent. Spanish policies, as Martin highlighted, posed a new sort of challenge to this principle. On the one hand, Spain lacked the material capacity to 'penetrate' the Americas: it was weak in trade, industry, and finance. On the other hand, nonetheless, Martin observed that the ties between Spain and Latin America were 'mainly cultural'. The challenge that Spanish policies posed to the ideological rationale of the Monroe Doctrine was mainly intangible. In other words, it was spiritual. Martin indeed observed that the Spanish Hispano-Americanist 'propaganda' was based on a re-enactment of the imperial and 'Iberian' roots of the American continent, and he was worried about the fact that this spiritual imperialism was finding a positive echo

> in a number of quarters in the New World, where until lately there has been little disposition to perpetuate the memory of Spain, and where monuments reminiscent of Spain's domination are rare. A statue of Isabel the Catholic has been erected at San Salvador. Another will soon be dedicated to Balboa at Panama. Peru has just approved the plans of two Spanish artists for the erection at Lima of the monument to the Spanish soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in the War of Independence and at the battle of Callao. […] By order of President Alvear, Argentine troops paid homage two years ago, before the Spanish monument in Palmero, to the memory of the Spanish conquistadores. […] Histories and textbooks are being revised.

Like in Italy, Spanish practices of spiritual empire were successfully managing to change the historical narrative of the Spanish empire. The national and international imagination of Latin American societies was being altered. The 'hemispheric' imagination of independence from Europe that underpinned the Monroe Doctrine was also at risk.

In Washington, the State Department heard Martin's call for action. On 19 April, the undersecretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, forwarded Martin's dispatch to all US embassies in Latin America, London, Paris, Rome, Lisbon, and Berlin.[84] He asked US diplomats to report on any Spanish practice that could possibly undermine the 'prestige' of the United

[84] Grew, instructions to US diplomats in Latin America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, 19 April 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/35.

States in Europe or in Latin America. More than 'prestige', however, what Grew was most worried about was the United States' 'influence' and 'hegemony' in the American continent. This placed the issue in a realm of interimperial competition. From that moment on, a cascade of reports reached Washington from most of Latin American capital cities, from Quito to Buenos Aires to Mexico City to Lima to Rio de Janeiro.[85] They gave an eclectic picture of the different ways in which Spanish diplomats, Spanish immigrants, or Spanish journalists participated in the endeavour of spiritual empire. Most reports conveyed a certain sense of anxiety, as if US agents did not have the means to monitor, let alone control, the influence that Spain was able to exert over Latin America.

Writing from Rome, Ambassador Henry Fletcher was in a privileged position to measure the extent to which Spanish spiritual empire could jeopardise the hegemonic position of the United States in the Americas. A former delegate to the fifth Pan American Conference, held in Santiago between March and May 1923, some months before Cardinal Benlloch's visit, he recalled a telling episode:

> At one of the meetings, while we were discussing program, etc., the delegate of San Salvador, I think it was, proposed that the Spanish minister to Chile be specially invited to the formal opening session of the conference, on the ground that he represented the Mother Country of most of the States represented. […] The move failed, but it had evidently been prepared beforehand in Madrid.[86]

Latin American diplomats were also taking an active part in the spiritual aspects of Spanish diplomacy. They did so in their own interests, of course. In the early 1920s, Latin American governments started raising their voices against Pan Americanism as an institutional framework that barely veiled US hegemonic aspirations. Explaining this phenomenon, David Sheinin has invited historians to understand Pan Americanism 'beyond the ideal', an expression that he has taken directly from a speech that the Chilean delegate delivered at that same Pan American conference of 1923.[87] This was parallel to the opening of new opportunities for multilateral cooperation in the framework of the League of Nations. As

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[85] Different dispatches coming from Quito, Mexico City, Panama City, Montevideo, Bogotá, Santo Domingo, Lima, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, San José, and Buenos Aires, 1926-1927, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, files 710.52.

[86] Fletcher, dispatch 935, 16 July 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/45.

[87] Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*.

Yannick Wehrli has argued, the League of Nations and the Pan American Union offered distinct arenas for the insertion of the Latin American states into world politics.[88] As it seems, Hispano-Americanism, too, could become an alternative to Pan Americanism.

At the Fifth Pan American Conference as at the sixth one, held in Havana in 1928, Spain tried to take advantage of this changing context and sought observer status.[89] Although unsuccessful, these attempts prove that Spanish diplomats were confident in their capacity to challenge the idea of an independent 'Western hemisphere'. Against the Spanish 'move' of 1923, Fletcher, as he remembered three years later, had even had to restate that 'this was purely an American, as distinguished from a European, conference'. He had then invited the Latin American delegates to picture the 'absurd' situation in which Portugal, France, and Britain might also have been invited as observers to the Pan American conference, for they all were former imperial powers in the continent. Notwithstanding this ironic tone, Fletcher had not been able to simply deride the Salvadorian proposal and he had been forced to acknowledge that they 'all heartily recognized the debt of the new world to Spain'. The Spanish discourse of spiritual empire was present in the mouth of the US delegate to a Pan American conference in 1923.

Despite his recollections, Fletcher was calm regarding Spanish policies in 1926. From Rome, he believed that any attempt by Spain or Italy to exert influence over Latin America would be 'lyrical rather than practical diplomacy in the present state of world affairs'. From Montevideo, Ulysses Grant-Smith, the US minister-plenipotentiary, was also calm.[90] He even supported Spanish initiatives:

> Confident that, politically, Spain can never regain any considerable political influence in this country — or in any other Latin American country, for that matter —, I have with deliberate intent taken frequent occasion to praise Spanish painting, architecture, or literature. I have maintained that it is just and desirable that Spanish culture should be cultivated here […].

The idea that US diplomats took an active part in Spanish spiritual empire was certainly 'a bit puzzling to Spanish propagandists', as Grant-Smith himself admitted. However,

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[88] Yannick Wehrli, 'États latino-américains, organismes multilatéraux et défense de la souveraineté: entre Société des Nations et espace continental panaméricain, 1919-1939' (Université de Genève, 2016).

[89] Salisbury, 'Hispanismo versus Pan Americanism', 72–73.

[90] Grant-Smith, unnumbered dispatch, 13 December 1926, NARA, RG59, box 6504, file 710.52/59.

contrasting this document with others has led me to the conclusion that Grant-Smith and other agents did not wish to help Spain in its spiritual imperialism, but rather to confine Spain to spiritual imperialism. In his dispatch, Grant-Smith also recommended that Britain put forward its imperial legacy in the United States. For him as for Fletcher and others, the spiritual facet of imperial continuity was 'lyrical' and posed no 'practical' threat to the Western Hemisphere idea.

Spain is virtually absent from the records of the Pan American Union at the Columbus Memorial Library in Washington. In the compilation of official documents related to Pan American international meetings between 1889 and 1938, the entry 'Spain' merely appears a couple of times, always referring to the former colonial power, never to a contemporary relevant actor.[91] In the autumn of 1926, nonetheless, the *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* devoted a long article to 'Pan Americanism and its *raison d'être*', signalling a need to justify the usefulness of Pan Americanism in that precise moment.[92] The author of this article, the Mexican diplomat and historian Guillermo A. Sherwell, deemed it necessary to include a section on 'Ibero-Americanism as opposed to Pan Americanism'.

He argued that the link between Spain and Portugal and their former colonies 'should be purely one of sentiment and culture, never political'. All this seems to suggest the idea that Pan Americanists acknowledged the scramble for Latin America in the 1920s, but wished to delineate the areas of influence that each of the competitors could legitimately have: Spain would stay in the realm of the spiritual; the United States would exert a more material sort of influence. However, Pan American also dealt with intangibility.

Spiritual empire as a chance for Pan Americanism

A section for intellectual cooperation was created at the Pan American Union in 1917. The creation of a 'hemispheric' structure for intellectual cooperation had been planned since the Fourth Inter-American Conference, held in Buenos Aires in 1910, but it was not until 1928 that the Sixth Pan American Conference called for the creation of a proper Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. In Juliette Dumont's interpretation,

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[91] *Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, 1889-1936. Recopilación de los Tratados, Convenciones, Recomendaciones, Resoluciones y Mociones adoptadas por las siete primeras Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, la Conferencia Internacional Americana de Conciliación y Arbitraje y la Conferencia Interamericana de Consolidación de la Paz; con varios documentos relativos a la organización de las referidas conferencias* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938). My research in the Pan American and inter-American records of the NARA was equally infructuous.

[92] Guillermo A. Sherwell, 'Pan Americanism and Its Raison d'être (II)', *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* LX, no. 11 (November 1926): 1062–73.

this continent-scaled endeavour was inspired by the politics pursued by France, which had promoted and actively supported the creation of structures for intellectual cooperation within the League of Nations.[93] With the Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Dumont claims, the United States attempted to counterbalance the 'hegemony' exerted by Europeans over cultural influence. This included French policies, but also Italian or Spanish ones. The foremost aim of the proposed inter-American institute was 'to stimulate and systematize the exchange of professors and students, whether from universities or high primary schools [sic], of the different American countries'.[94] This focus on educational exchanges was a characteristic of inter-American as well as Hispano-American systems of intellectual and cultural cooperation. The records kept in the archives of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) show that the two systems were intertwined and that their agents cooperated more than they competed.

At the end of the world war, Leo S. Rowe urged the CEIP to find 'a system of scholarships and fellowships for Latin American students in the United States and for American students who might desire to pursue special studies in any of the Latin American countries'.[95] At the time, Rowe was the assistant secretary to the Treasury. In 1919, he would be appointed chief of the Latin America Division in the US State Department and, in 1920, he would become the director-general of the Pan American Union, a position that he would hold until 1946. Already in 1918, he was committed to inter-American cooperation, as one of the agents who were trying to reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine in terms of continental cooperation as opposed to US-led hegemony.[96] In this sense, he raised the attention of the CEIP to

> the utmost importance that the foundations of our future international relations with the countries of the American continent be laid on a firm and lasting basis. I am convinced that there is nothing that we can do at this time which will contribute largely towards the fostering of a closer understanding between the

[93] Dumont, 'Latin America at the Crossroads', 155–167.

[94] Article 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Inter-American Congress of Rectors, Deans, and Educators in General, 18 February 1928, in Dumont, 'Latin America at the Crossroads', 157.

[95] Rowe to the assistant of the director of the Division of Intercourse and Education at the CEIP (Henry S. Haskell), 2 July 1918, CRBML-CEIP, volume 171.

[96] David Barton Castle, 'Leo Stanton Rowe and the Meaning of Pan Americanism', in Sheinin, *Beyond the Ideal*, 33–44. See also Scarfi, 'In the Name of the Americas'.

> United States and the peoples of Central and South America than the establishment of such an interchange of students. This should also include a series of fellowships for teachers in universities and secondary schools.

The CEIP, however, did not seem to view educational exchanges and fellowships as an urgent priority. The members of the endowment believed that 'progress is slow' and that it was 'wiser to move slowly than to make unfortunate mistakes or waste our efforts along unproductive lines'.[97] In 1918, the CEIP was probably not prepared and preferred to wait for a more favourable occasion.

In 1923, it inaugurated its European centre in Paris. James Brown Scott, one of the most respected members of the endowment and a reputed international lawyer, travelled from New York to attend the inaugural ceremony. Before leaving New York, he wrote to the president of the CEIP, his friend Nicholas Murray Butler, in a burst of lyricism:

> After much reflection, I have come to the opinion that, if the Endowment has its home in the capital of these United States, it is — I say it without irreverence — like the Church Triumphant, which has the center of its authority in the atmosphere of peace to which we all aspire; and that the aggressive branch of the Endowment, like the Church Militant, should be firmly established, outwardly and visibly among the children of men, who most need its ministration.[98]

These ecclesiastic metaphors conveyed a certain sense of spiritual imperialism. In Scott's mind, moreover, the CEIP's 'ministration' was aimed at the creation of a genuinely 'American', understood as 'inter-American', system of international law.[99] Benjamin Allen Coates and Juan Pablo Scarfi have recently analysed this juridical endeavour as a form of US-led imperialism.[100] Both underline the role that Scott played in spreading this 'gospel'. For that he used the resources of the CEIP and the institutional framework of the US

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[97] The assistant of the director of the Division of Intercourse and Education at the CEIP (Henry S. Haskell) to Rowe, 8 July 1918, CRBML-CEIP, volume 171.

[98] Scott to Butler, 7 November 1923, CRBML-CEIP, box 60, file 2.

[99] Scarfi, *El imperio de la ley: James Brown Scott y la construcción de un orden jurídico interamericano* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014).

[100] Scarfi, *The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Benjamin Allen Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

administration. Regarding the centre of the CEIP in Paris, Scott not only considered it as a focal point in France, and not only, more broadly, in Europe, but in all the 'countries where the influence of France is a predominating influence'. This category included the Latin American countries. In order to serve their inter-American ambitions, Scott and the CEIP used Paris, the lighthouse of 'Latin' *rayonnement*, as a platform.

They also used Spain. In 1927, for example, Scott seized an opportunity to organise inter-American educational exchanges through Spanish networks. Yanguas, the then-president of the National Assembly and former minister of State, invited him to inaugurate a newly created chair of international law at the University of Salamanca.[101] Yanguas did so in his capacity as professor of international law and president of the Francisco de Vitoria Association. This was an internationalist society of scholars who promoted international law as the driver of a new post-war world order. It took its name from a Castilian theologian and jurist, considered as the founder of the current known as the School of Salamanca. In the first decades of the conquest of the Americas in the early sixteenth century, Vitoria and his school reflected upon juridical notions such as sovereignty, the law of peoples, and the law of war. In the interwar period, the work of Francisco de Vitoria was being reinterpreted as a foundational precedent to the emerging discipline of international law. One of the classical reference books on this topic is by none other than James Brown Scott.[102] An admirer of the School of Salamanca, Scott argued that international law had 'Spanish origins'. This argument served the cause of his inter-American legal system, for it connected the 'birth' of international law with the 'discovery' and conquest of the American continent. It also served the cause of Spanish policies of spiritual empire. Signalling Salamanca as the birthplace of international law placed the legacy of the Spanish empire at the heart of world order in the 1920s.

Yanguas was well aware of Scott's influence among Latin American elites. He also knew, most probably, that Scott would attend the Pan American Conference that was to be held in Havana in early 1928. Honouring Scott was an attempt to mobilise him and the prestigious CEIP as agents of Hispano-Americanism. In other words, Yanguas tried to improve the good reputation of Spain in its former colonies via the agents and structures of inter-American cooperation. The Spanish government also supported this strategy of entering the backbone frameworks of the Western Hemisphere. Primo de Rivera, as well as

[101] Yanguas to Scott, 2 September 1927, CRBML-CEIP, box 60, file 5.

[102] Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934).

the influential and 'philanthropist' duke of Alba, and even King Alfonso himself were all personally committed to reaching a long-lasting form of 'cooperation' between Spain and the United States, as the US ambassador, Ogden Hammond, reported. The *'forma más simpática'* of doing so, as the duke of Alba said, was to establish academic exchanges.[103]

The Spanish proposal was received with enthusiasm at the US embassy in Madrid and at the CEIP in Washington. Ambassador Hammond insisted on the need for the United States to make 'some kind of an expression' towards Spain:

> We in the United States have given many expressions of our sympathetic feeling towards England and France for the part that these countries have played in the formative period of our country's history. So far we have done nothing in acknowledgment of what Spain has done for the advancement of civilization and learning in the world. Our relations with Spain are most friendly, but what a splendid thing it would be if we could make some concrete expression of our sympathetic feelings towards this country!

Hammond was suspiciously insistent. He probably hoped that acknowledging 'what Spain had done' in world history would help to raise support for the inter-American 'gospel' among Latin American intellectual and political elites. This, he affirmed, would not only work for the benefit of Spain, but also for that of the US:

> I beg of you not to cease your efforts to have the cultural learning of Spain acknowledged by the world, and whatever you do, and whoever may aid you, will be performing a signal service to Spain and to our Country.

While Yanguas saw an evident interest in using 'hemispheric' networks for the sake of Spanish spiritual empire, Hammond urged Scott to use his Spanish networks for the benefit of the continental approach to US diplomacy.

Scott, as it seems, worked in this direction. Ahead of his trip to Havana for the Pan American Conference, he proposed to champion the foundation of branches of the Francisco de Vitoria Association in every Latin American country.[104] More importantly, in a

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[103] Hammond to Scott, 21 November 1927, CRBML-CEIP, volume 463, pages 1894–96.

[104] Scott to Yanguas, 3 December 1927, CRBML-CEIP, volume 463, page 1920.

letter to President Butler, he suggested that 'the scholarships [to the University of Salamanca] could be awarded to persons from the three Americas'.[105] All of this contributes to casting doubt on the supposedly 'hemispheric' nature of inter-American cooperation. The scramble for Latin America was a European as well as a US phenomenon, and Spanish agents such as Yanguas played a role in-between the two continents. In this context, Spanish practices of spiritual empire were deemed legitimate for the fabrication of a discourse of world power in the multilateral arena, as I show in the next chapter.

[105] Scott to Butler, 5 December 1927, CRBML-CEIP, box 60, file 5.

CHAPTER 4

The League of Nations and Spain's 'multilateral empire'

INTRODUCTION[1]

Article 4 of the League of Nations Covenant established the Council as the executive body of the organisation. Council members were all considered 'powers', but not all on an equal footing. Four states (Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) were permanent members of the Council; these were considered to be the 'great powers'. A permanent seat was also reserved for the 'great power' of the American continent, the United States, and two European 'great powers', Germany and the Soviet Union, later entered the League as permanent Council members. Article 4 also created a less aristocratic category of 'power': four non-permanent positions were to be periodically elected by the League Assembly. The number of these non-permanent members increased to six in 1922, to nine in 1926, to ten in 1933, and to eleven in 1937. The uneven distribution of power within the governing structures of the League generated tensions between conflicting aspirations.

Throughout the 1920s, representatives of some states, such as Brazil, China, Poland, or Spain, aspired to get permanent seats in the Council. There are only scarce and fragmentary contributions to the understanding of this phenomenon.[2] Fernando María Castiella, for example, has described the 'diplomatic battle' that Spanish representatives fought to get a permanent position on the League Council.[3] Castiella, an international lawyer and a diplomat, was minister of Foreign Affairs between 1957 and 1969, under Francisco Franco's dictatorship. His analysis poses evident problems of objectivity and cannot be considered a historical account. However, if read as a digest of sources, Castiella's book is based on a rich amount of primary material, which I have used as a starting point to trace the practices of Spanish diplomats in the 'battlefield' of the League of Nations.

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[1] I am grateful to Yannick Wehrli for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

[2] On the case of Brazil, see Eugênio Vargas Garcia, 'A candidatura do Brasil a um assento permanente no Conselho da Liga das Nações', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 37, no. 1 (1994): 5–23. See also Garcia, *Entre América e Europa: a política externa brasileira na década de 1920* (Brasilia: Editora da Universidade de Brasília, 2006).

[3] Fernando María Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', in *Una batalla diplomática (1918-1926): discurso de recepción del académico de número Excmo. Sr. D. Fernando María Castiella y Maíz, y contestación del Excmo. Sr. D. José María de Areilza, conde de Motrico: sesión del día 25 de mayo de 1976*, ed. Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas (Madrid: Artes Gráficas Benzal, 1976), 15–271. See also Gloria Solé, 'La incorporación de España a la Sociedad de Naciones', *Hispania. Revista Española de Historia* 36, no. 132 (1976): 131–174; Luis V. Pérez Gil, 'El primer decenio de España en la Sociedad de Naciones, 1919-1929', *Anales de la Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de La Laguna*, no. 15 (1998): 175–218.

The documents that I have consulted in Madrid and Geneva suggest that these practices were essentially imperial. In other words, Spanish diplomats were agents of empire. This, to a certain extent, is not surprising. Recent historiographical contributions have revealed the tight links that existed between empire and international relations in the interwar period, especially in the League of Nations as the institutional framework where the world was reordered. Focusing on the beginning of the League's life, Leonard Smith has highlighted the centrality of French and British imperial issues at the Paris Peace Conference.[4] By looking in turn at the League's long-lasting legacy in the second half of the twentieth century, Mark Mazower has signalled the imperial foundations of the United Nations system.[5] He has also made a compelling argument for historians to look beyond the apparent contradiction between internationalism and imperialism.[6] Both he and Susan Pedersen have convincingly demonstrated that the League was structurally imperial.[7] The coexistence, intertwining, and often confusion of empire and diplomacy in the institutional framework of multilateralism form the background for this fourth chapter.

The analyses provided by Mazower, Pedersen, or Smith present, however, one salient problem. They have tended to treat imperialism as the idea and international relations as the practice. Therefore, diplomacy appears merely as the means to reach imperialist objectives. Pedersen, in particular, has looked at how the 'great' imperial powers used the institutional framework of the League, namely the mandates system, to pursue their own imperialist ambitions. This approach is undoubtedly important: it proves that the League was the institutional framework of internationalism and a multilateral framework for imperialism at the same time. I inscribe my work in line with Pedersen's in this sense. This chapter nevertheless adds some elements to her conclusions by focusing on the practices of spiritual empire. The latter appear as parts of a power strategy that the emergence of post-war multilateralism made possible.

This chapter does not only tell a story of imperialism by means of multilateral diplomacy. It also explores how multilateralism opened the door to new forms of

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[4] Leonard V. Smith, 'Empires at the Paris Peace Conference', in *Empires at War, 1911-1923*, ed. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 254–76.

[5] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[6] Mazower, 'The Era of Internationalism', in *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 1–188.

[7] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

diplomatic practices that were substantially imperial and contributed to raise the power ambitions of so-called 'smaller powers', such as Spain. I argue that the simultaneously international and imperial institutions of the League favoured the appearance of spiritual empire as a practice of power diplomacy. As Pedersen and others show, one of the main attributes of 'great power' was the empire. In order to present Spain as a legitimate candidate to permanent membership at the League Council, Spanish agents had thus to mobilise resources of empire. As the chapter shows, Spanish diplomats attempted to position Spain at the head of a sort of 'multilateral empire' in the context of an international organisation made of formally sovereign states. Because it was based on intangible elements of imperial legacy, spiritual empire found a fertile ground for practical materialisation in the arena where the former metropole met with its former colonies.

In order to explore the internationalist origins of spiritual empire, the first section of this chapter is devoted to the League's early life around the year 1921. This was the moment when Spanish diplomats started undertaking practices of Hispano-Americanism in Geneva. I show that, in the early 1920s, the so-called 'diplomatic battle' for a permanent seat at the League did not start in Madrid: it started instead in Geneva, which was one of the first multilateral forums where Spanish and Latin American agents met. It was in this context that Spanish diplomats realised the significance that using Hispano-Americanism, as a set of practices of spiritual empire, could potentially have. As a result, the arguments of a shared language, a shared history, and a shared cultural stockpile labelled as 'race' became of the utmost importance and were placed at the core of Spanish diplomatic practices.

This draws our attention to the history of Latin American states and Latin American delegates within the League of Nations.[8] Thomas Fischer and Yannick Wehrli have recently signalled the importance that sovereignty, as a principle of international law and as a political ideal, had for Latin American diplomats in Geneva.[9] Wehrli, in particular, argues that the defence of sovereignty in the framework of the League of Nations was in tension

[8] Alan L. McPherson and Yannick Wehrli, eds., *Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015). For specific case studies, see Fabián Herrera León, *México en la Sociedad de Naciones, 1931-1940* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014); Garcia, *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919-1926): vencer ou não perder* (Porto Alegre: Edições da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2000); María Montserrat Llairó and Raimundo Siepe, *Argentina en Europa: Yrigoyen y la Sociedad de las Naciones (1918-1920)* (Buenos Aires: Macchi, 1997); Freddy Vivas Gallardo, *Venezuela en la Sociedad de las Naciones, 1920-1939: descripción y análisis de una actuación diplomática* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1981).

[9] Thomas Fischer, *Die Souveränität der Schwachen: Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920-1936* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012); Wehrli, 'États latino-américains, organismes multilatéraux et défense de la souveraineté: entre Société des Nations et espace continental panaméricain, 1919-1939' (Université de Genève, 2016).

with cooperation in the framework of inter-American relations. The shadow of the United States also spread to Geneva. Other competitors in the scramble for Latin America tried to take advantage of this situation. This was the case of France.[10] As for Spanish agents, they devoted their efforts to showing that Spain, as the former imperial power, was the natural bridge between Latin America and the League of Nations. The chapter's second section identifies the specificities of the practices of empire that diplomats implemented in the apex of the 'diplomatic battle', in 1926. These were, mostly, practices of rhetorical diplomacy that constructed the image and the behaviour of a great power.

MEETING HISPANO-AMERICANISM, CIRCA 1921

In 1921, the conservative deputy José de Yanguas Messía believed that a Hispano-American *'espíritu de raza'* was present in Geneva. Six years before becoming minister of State, Yanguas was a reputed professor of international law and an advocate for the League of Nations in Spain.[11] With these credentials, Yanguas served as counsellor to the Spanish delegation at the first Assembly of the League of Nations, held in the autumn of 1920. Back from Geneva, he addressed the Congress of Deputies, describing with enthusiasm what he had witnessed:

> Cuando fue votada España para el primero de los cuatro puestos elegibles del Consejo de la Sociedad de Naciones, yo os confieso, señores Diputados, que jamás en mi vida pude experimentar una más honda emoción, y que dudo yo que ningún otro español pueda sentirla más íntima y profunda. Al sonar el nombre de España, un mismo estremecimiento de amor hubo en todas las delegaciones de sangre y alma españolas, y es que aquello no era mirado por todas ellas como el triunfo de España, ni siquiera como el triunfo de la Madre Patria, sino como el triunfo de la gran familia española. […]

[10] Wehrli, 'Les délégations latino-américaines et les intérêts de la France à la Société des Nations', *Relations internationales* 2009/1, no. 137 (2009): 47–59.

[11] Universidad de Valladolid, ed., *España y la Sociedad de Naciones: conferencia de extensión universitaria pronunciada el Sábado 15 de Febrero de 1919 por el Dr. Yanguas Messía, Catedrático por oposición de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad de Valladolid. Texto taquigráfico de la misma* (Valladolid: Imp. de E. Zapatero, 1919).

> Y esa es la primera consecuencia que para España ha tenido la creación de la Sociedad de Naciones.[12]

The 'first consequence' of the League of Nations for Spain was Hispano-Americanism. Spanish diplomats did not bring spiritual empire from Madrid to Geneva; they found it in Geneva. During the parliamentary discussions that preceded the Congress' agreement on Spanish adhesion to the League Covenant in 1919, no mention was made of the potential interest of sitting at the same table as the former American colonies.[13] Some traditionalist deputies were instead sceptical about the utility that multilateralism could have for Spain at all. In 1921, after having a first-hand experience of multilateralism, Yanguas brought his testimony to the Congress.

One major manifestation of spiritual empire thus emerged as a set of practices from within the administrative and diplomatic structures of the League. Since the very beginning of the League's history, Spanish practices of Hispano-Americanism were tightly connected to, and even arose from the specific problems that the Latin American states encountered at the League. Both within the Secretariat and in the framework of Spain's 'diplomatic battle' at the Council, Spanish diplomats made use of the opportunities available to conceptualise and implement a diplomatic strategy that would position Spain, institutionally speaking, as the junction between the League and Latin America.

Within the Secretariat

From internationalism to Hispano-Americanism

In the early 1920s, the director of the League's Press and Information Section, Pierre Comert, was recruiting liaison officials to publicise the League and report on how the League was perceived in the different member states. This endeavour was especially urgent as far as Latin America was concerned. In the wake of the first Assembly, a commission of experts specifically appointed to study the organisation of the Secretariat called for 'a more intimate contact […] with the governments of Latin America, given the great distance that separates those countries from the League's headquarters'.[14] The commission therefore

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[12] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1921*, vol. IV, no. 37 (13 April 1921), 1277.

[13] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1919-20*, vol. III, no. 26 (7 August 1919), 835–37.

[14] *Report of the commission of experts appointed by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its meeting of 17 November 1920*, LONOD, document A.3.1921 (March 1921), annex IV.

recommended the creation of a liaison office in Latin America. Geographical distance between Geneva and Latin America was a problem that posed a threat to the internationalist mission of the League of Nations. In 1922, the Assembly created the Latin American Bureau.[15] From its office in Geneva, the Bureau was to be the main contact point between the League and Latin America.

The most important mission of the Bureau was to guarantee the *'rapprochement'* of the League with Latin America. This notion of *rapprochement* stemmed from the belief that creating communication channels with governments and press organs would generate commitments to internationalist ideals and practices among what was then called the 'masses', the 'public', or the 'opinion'.[16] It is therefore comparable to the notion of *acercamiento*, by which Spanish officials wished to generate commitments to Hispano-Americanism in Latin America. In previous chapters, Ambassador Quiñones de León, from his position in Paris, appeared as a practitioner of *acercamiento*; in the present chapter, from his position in Geneva, he appears as a practitioner of *rapprochement* in the institutional frameworks of the League of Nations. If the challenge was to make positive publicity for the League in Latin America, this first implied determining the nature and the content of such publicity. The sources suggest that Quiñones encouraged the creation of a Latin American Bureau that could count on the active participation of Spain and Spanish agents. Here is where the internationalist objectives of League officials generated the possibility of spiritual empire.

In the spring of 1920, Director Comert chose Luis Antonio Bolín Bidwell as the Spanish-speaking liaison official. Bolín, who was the correspondent for the Spanish journal *ABC* in London, had been "most highly recommended, among others by the Spanish Ambassador [Quiñones]".[17] It is worth wondering why Quiñones had recommended Bolín so highly. There is evidence that some sort of personal relationship existed between the two men.[18] Despite this, Bolín was most probably chosen for his address book. As a press correspondent in London, he was in contact with journalists from all around the world, including, of course, Latin American ones. To the best of my knowledge, Bolín had never been to Latin America, but he certainly knew Latin Americans and he was familiar with

[15] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt » : la liaison entre le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations et l'Amérique latine (1919-1929)' (Université de Genève, 2003).

[16] Jonas Brendebach, Martin Herzer, and Heidi J.S. Tworek, eds., *International Organizations and the Media in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Exorbitant Expectations* (London: Routledge, 2018).

[17] Comert to Drummond, 4 June 1920, ALON, box S723bis, file 4642.

[18] Comert to Drummond, 3 September 1922, ALON, box S723bis, file 4642.

Latin American journalism. Therefore, he could potentially work for the publicity of the League, not only in Spain, but also in Latin America.

Only in January 1921 did the League recruit its first Latin American official, the Uruguayan Julián Nogueira, as a member of the Mandates Section. In June of that same year, it was 'after discussion with Señor Quiñones de León' that Secretary-General Eric Drummond sent Nogueira, together with Bolín, on a scouting mission to determine the best location for the planned liaison office.[19] Drummond asked for Quiñones' advice before taking a decision. In the same document, Drummond used the expression 'we think that' (instead of 'I think that'), which suggests that Quiñones took active part in the decision-making, not only as a consultant, but also as a decision-maker. He was probably consulted in his capacity as Council member. Interestingly, however, the only Latin American Council member, the Brazilian delegate, was apparently not consulted. Drummond possibly wished to avoid the intervention of an interested party. A European delegate offered more guarantees of neutrality. And yet Drummond did not consult the British, French, or Italian delegates either; he consulted the Spanish one. As it seems, in the early life of the League Secretariat, the former colonial power was perceived as the most pertinent actor to address any issues related to the former colonies.

Between July and November, Nogueira and Bolín undertook their scouting mission in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Panama, and Peru. At the end of it, no consensus was found over the best location for the planned liaison office.[20] The fourth commission of the Assembly decided to 'temporarily' locate the office in Geneva. Quiñones, the Spanish delegate to that commission, supported the decision, probably hoping to be able to keep a certain level of control over a Geneva-based office.[21] The question of whom to choose as a chairperson for the office remained unanswered. The most suitable nationality of this person sparked debate. The committee of experts that had first proposed the creation of an office, in March 1921, had vaguely stated that 'the personnel of this Bureau *should* [emphasis mine] be of Latin American nationality'.[22] In the absence of any Latin American liaison official within the Information Section, the use of 'should' opened the door to non-Latin American nationalities. In that same month of March, Bolín, as the only Spanish-

[19] Drummond to Comert, 13 June 1921, ALON, box R1461, file 12526, document 12526.

[20] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt »', 86–91.

[21] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la Troisième Assemblée : séances des commissions : procès-cerbaux de la Quatrième Commission, questions budgétaires et financières* (Geneva: Imprimerie Berger-Levrault, 1922), 68.

[22] *Report of the commission of experts appointed by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its meeting of 17 November 1920*, LONOD, document A.3.1921 (March 1921), annex IV.

speaking liaison official in the Information Section, was asked to deliver a report on the most suitable manner of organising the projected office. Among other things, he described the ideal person in charge, who needed to be young (Bolín was twenty-seven at the time), to have good contacts among the Latin American press correspondents in Europe (Bolín did) and, most importantly, to be a Spaniard:

> For several reasons, the member in charge should be of Spanish nationality. In the first place, his knowledge of the language spoken in the great majority of the countries where he would have to work would be an invaluable asset to him. Secondly, his nationality would guarantee him a cordial reception from all Latin-American peoples, owing to racial affinities and ties of sympathy which are even more accentuated in the other than on this side of the water. Several South American delegates to the Assembly of the League told me that they preferred a Spaniard to a man of any other nationality, including their own, for any work that the Secretariat might have to carry out in their country.[23]

Bolín was quite explicitly describing his own profile for the position.[24] There is no way of knowing whether he counted on Quiñones de León's backing, and I have found no evidence that the 'several South American delegates' did tell Bolín what Bolín claims to have been told by them. Be that as it may, Bolín used the argument of 'racial affinities' to support his claim. The logic of Hispano-Americanism was used as if it were familiar and legitimate in the day-to-day work of the League of Nations administration.

In the end, Bolín was never appointed as chairperson of the Latin American Bureau. This person was actually never a Spaniard. Back from his scouting mission, in a report delivered to Drummond in December, Bolín declared tersely: 'As regards the person in charge of the office, I believe that it is of greater importance to take into account his personal qualifications than his nationality.'[25] Two months later, he announced his resignation as a League official.[26] I have not been able to discover the specific circumstances that forced Bolín to quit. His personal implication in the practices of

[23] Bolín to Drummond, memorandum, March 1921, ALON, box R1461, file 12526, document 12526.

[24] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt »', 79.

[25] Bolín to Drummond, report, December 1921, ALON, box R1589, file 14672, document 18583.

[26] Bolín to the Personnel Office of the League of Nations, 16 February 1922, ALON, box S723bis, file 4642.

spiritual empire did not end in 1922. Some years later, he worked for the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo* as the person in charge of the Andalusian region. He therefore cooperated with José de Sangróniz and took an active part in the organisation of the Ibero-American Exhibition. Soon after his departure from Geneva, Nogueira was transferred from the Mandates Section to the Information Section, where he acted as the liaison official for Latin America until the dissolution of the League.[27] In this manner, the attempt to combine Hispano-Americanist *acercamiento* and internationalist *rapprochement* in the framework of the League of Nations resulted in failure.

Hispano-Americanism meets Latin Americanism

Quiñones and Bolín had to confront the determination of some Latin American delegates to use the League of Nations as platform for Latin American cooperation. Back from the scouting mission to Latin America in late autumn 1921, Nogueira informed Secretary-General Drummond that the opinion of Latin American governments, as he had observed it, would have been rather hostile to seeing a European official heading the liaison office.[28] To his observations, he added his personal apprehensions: he was particularly opposed to offering the position to a Spaniard, a Portuguese, or an Italian, even though Spain, Portugal, and Italy were, as he said, 'the least European countries' in Europe. He also added:

> Les Espagnols et les Portugais ont été les maîtres de l'Amérique latine. Les Latino-Américains ont acquis leurs libertés après une lutte âpre qui laissa un reste de prévention. Pendant la formation des nationalités, l'immigration italienne est arrivée pour déloger fatalement une partie de l'exploitation commerciale, industrielle et prolétaire jusqu'alors dans les mains des Portugais et des Espagnols. Des sentiments de rancune réciproque sont nés entre les collectivités italiennes d'une part, espagnoles et portugaises de l'autre. Ces sentiments se continuent chez les descendants qui se sentent toujours encouragés par l'arrivée continuelle de nouveaux émigrants, qui viennent se disputer le sol et la fortune.

[27] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt »', 71–72.

[28] Nogueira to Drummond, 2 December 1921, ALON, box R1589, file 14672, document 18318.

He was therefore opposed to the appointment of a Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian head of bureau, because of the disputes and rivalries that, according to him, existed between Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian emigrants in Latin America. Moreover, as Nogueira presented them, these disputes and rivalries had an imperial backdrop: Spaniards and Portuguese had been, he said, 'the masters of Latin America', and Italians had come to 'fatally dislodge' the influence of Iberians on the region. In this context of imperial and demographic competition, which was part of the scramble for Latin American, caution advised to avoid rubbing salt in the wounds.

Nogueira was explicitly opposed to fostering the imperial undertakings of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Regarding Spain in particular, probably responding to Bolín, he believed that putting a Spaniard at the head of the liaison office of the League of Nations would only confirm the suspicions that some Latin American governments had regarding Spain's ambitions in Latin America:

> D'autre part, et quoi qu'on puisse voir d'apparent dans les réunions internationales, on rejette en Amérique latine tout ce qui peut avoir l'air d'une tutelle, et dans ces derniers temps on a beaucoup l'impression là-bas que l'Espagne veut devenir la directrice des affaires latino-américaines.

In Nogueira's vision, if Latin American governments were opposed to Spain's 'tutelage', it was because they were opposed, more generally, to 'any form of tutelage'. This, I think, needs to be understood from the perspective of the opportunities that the League of Nations offered to Latin American states. Thomas Fischer and Yannick Wehrli have demonstrated that the League provided a privileged space to assert national sovereignty, by contrast to the platform of inter-American cooperation — probably *'les réunions internationales'* to which Nogueira referred —, which were quite commonly judged as the continental expression of US tutelage.[29]

Nevertheless, rather than 'tutelage' in general, Nogueira targeted Spain in particular. It is very plausible that he targeted Bolín as a personal competitor for the position of head of the liaison office, but in any case it is interesting to note the arguments that he put forward. With the expressions *'dans ces derniers temps'* and *'beaucoup'*, he placed Spain's ambitions beyond the restricted framework of the League of Nations and in the wider context that I

[29] Fischer, *Die Souveränität der Schwachen*; Wehrli, 'États latino-américains, organismes multilatéraux et défense de la souveraineté'.

have presented in previous chapters. During his mission, from Montevideo, Nogueira had also '*confirm[ed]* [emphasis mine] that Uruguay rejected the idea that Spain become the delegate of the Americas'.[30] In September 1921, the US embassy in Madrid warned the US State Department about the growing significance of Spain's 'sentimental, historical, and social interests' in Latin America, which 'may well bear watching'.[31] As it seems, in the last months of 1921, Hispano-Americanism appeared as a relatively visible and credible project of diplomacy in different places simultaneously: Washington, Montevideo, and Geneva, among others. The sources nonetheless reveal that such simultaneity was not due to a clear centralised or consistent policy radiating from Madrid, but rather to diffused endeavours by agents on the spot. In Geneva, in particular, the specific frameworks of the League of Nations laid the ground for specific forms of practices of spiritual empire.

At the Council

The Edwards Doctrine

The League of Nations was an ideal setting for power politics. It is in this sense that Spain's 'diplomatic battle', as Castiella named it, for a permanent seat on the League Council must be understood. The official position of Spain was to oppose the very existence of permanent positions; at the same time, however, Spanish diplomats always defended Spain's 'right' to occupy a permanent seat. Other member states, notably Brazil, would adopt similarly paradoxical approaches, together with China or Poland, among others. These countries questioned the power *statu quo* of post-war agreements. This hampered the functioning of the League from the very first year of its existence.

In the autumn of 1921, the second Assembly addressed the issue of the Council's composition. Among the delegates who discussed this problem, the Chilean ambassador in London, Agustín Edwards Mac-Clure, proposed a solution. Without explicitly opposing the existence of permanent seats, he considered that the Council, as it was, did not guarantee a fair representation of the 'nations' of the world. The Covenant, he argued, had not taken into account the existence of regional groups, such as the Scandinavian states, the *Petite Entente* or, more importantly in his eyes, Latin America. To solve this problem, he suggested that the Council be composed of six instead of four eligible members, and that

[30] Nogueira to Drummond, telegram 16, 4 October 1921, ALON, box R1588, file 14672, document 16410.

[31] The US chargé d'affaires ad interim in Spain [illegible signature], dispatch 2543, 13 September 1921, NARA, RG59, box 6504, file 710.52/16.

two additional permanent seats be created. This proposal was soon known as the 'Edwards Doctrine', to which other Latin American delegations quite rapidly adhered.[32] Considering that the American continent needed to have a permanent representative at the Council, at least until the United States entered the League, as foreseen by the Covenant, Edwards recommended that Brazil occupy one of the two new permanent positions. Perhaps more surprisingly, Edwards also recommended granting a permanent seat to Spain.

Ambassador Quiñones was a member of the Spanish delegation to that Assembly. Having met Edwards, he reported that, according to the Chilean delegate, 'nobody can question Spain's right [to become a permanent member of the Council], because of what Spain represents among the big states, and because of what Spain represents among the peoples of Latin America'.[33] These words have not reached me from Edwards, but from Quiñones quoting Edwards, which of course might have distorted them. Notwithstanding this fact, it is fairly possible that Edwards considered Spain as the *Madre Patria* and, for that reason, the best fit to represent the Hispanic bloc of states, the *'Raza'*, at the League Council. He belonged to a very powerful Chilean family and, therefore, to a certain kind of Latin American elite that some historians have described as particularly prone to 'sentimental' feelings towards Spain.[34]

Be that as it may, Edwards seemed more pragmatic than sentimental, as Quiñones also reported. In his view, Spain represented a good compromise between Europe and Latin America, which could possibly appear as acceptable to the British government. A Chilean of British descent and the Chilean ambassador in London, Edwards knew British preferences perfectly well. He was most certainly aware that Britain would fiercely oppose the creation of two additional permanent positions at the Council. More specifically, Britain would not easily accept the creation of an additional permanent position for an American state, given that the Covenant already foresaw the entrance of the United States as a

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[32] Quiñones to the minister of State (Manuel González Hontoria), telegram 39, 23 September 1921, AGA, box 54/6031, file 1211A.

[33] Quiñones to the minister of State (Manuel González Hontoria), telegram 996, 18 September 1921, AGA, box 54/6031, file 1211A.

[34] On the Edwards family, see Nancy Guzmán, *Los Agustines: el clan Edwards y la conspiración permanente* (Santiago: CEIBO, 2015). On the Hispano-Americanism of Latin America elites, see Tomás Pérez Vejo, ed., *Enemigos íntimos: España, lo español y los españoles en la configuración nacional hispanoamericana, 1810-1910* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2011); Leopoldo Zea and Adalberto Santana, *El 98 y su impacto en Latinoamérica* (Mexico City: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia and Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001).

permanent Council member. In this sense, the Edwards Doctrine must be understood as a solution in two steps: first, Spain; then, perhaps, Brazil.

This was, at least, how the Spanish and the British governments seemed to understand it. On the eve of a secret Council meeting, on 27 September 1921, Quiñones and the British delegate, Arthur James Balfour, agreed to create one additional permanent position for Spain.[35] On the day of the Council meeting, however, the Anglo-Spanish agreement faced the immovable opposition of the Brazilian delegate, Miguel Gastão da Cunha, who called for a full and immediate application of Edwards' proposal. On the day after the meeting, the Spanish minister of State, Manuel González Hontoria, sent a personal telegram to da Cunha and to the Brazilian government to express how 'hurtful' the 'surprise' had been.[36] He also took the opportunity to explain Spain's position. The Spanish government, he said, would have preferred to see both Brazil and Spain as new permanent members of the Council. He insisted, however, on the fact that 'the other members' of the Council, namely Britain, were opposed to the creation of two new permanent seats. Interestingly, he also highlighted that Spain counted on the support of the Hispanic American delegates to the Assembly. He therefore invited the Brazilian authorities to consider Spain's accession to a permanent seat as a 'precedent that will later, on a favourable occasion, allow us to satisfy the government in Rio, which can always count on Spain's vote'. Edwards also mediated in this sense, as Quiñones reported.[37] A few days later, however, Ambassador da Cunha reiterated Brazil's opposition and vetoed any alteration to the composition of the Council. The aim of the Brazilian government was obvious and explicit: to represent the American continent.[38]

The aims that Spanish diplomacy pursued are, by contrast, more difficult to determine. It would be hasty to affirm that Spanish politicians and diplomats sought to represent the 'Hispanic world' in Geneva. Back in August 1919, when the Spanish Congress debated, very briefly, the adhesion of Spain to the League Covenant, no mention was made of any

[35] Quiñones to the minister of State (Manuel González Hontoria), telegram, 29 September 1921, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 49–51.

[36] González Hontoria to Cunha and the Brazilian government, 29 September 1921, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 51–52.

[37] Quiñones to González Hontoria, telegram 38, 1 October 1921, AGA, box 54/6031, file 1211A.

[38] Quiñones to González Hontoria, telegram 19, 11 September 1924, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 2.

sort of Hispano-Americanist representation.[39] Some deputies even complained that they did not know what they were giving their agreement for, and suggested that the government had no clear idea of the role that Spain could potentially play within the League. I have suggested above that, by 1921, Quiñones and Bolín had identified the potential for practices of spiritual empire within the League structures. Comparing the practices of the Spanish delegates at the first and second Assemblies, in 1920 and 1921 respectively, reinforces this idea.

Since the beginning of the League's history in 1920, the Latin American delegates had questioned the monopoly of French and English languages as the official languages of the League. They requested that the Spanish language be recognised as well. On the eve of the first Assembly, the representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay met in Paris to fix some common objectives, in particular the issue of the official languages.[40] They agreed on a common position regarding Spanish, a language which they all shared and wished to use in order to work together in the new-born multilateral institution. Quiñones, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, was absent from this meeting and was not part of the common position. At the Assembly, in Geneva, it was the Panamanian delegate, Narciso Garay, who took the floor on behalf of the Spanish-speaking members of the League to ask for the recognition of Spanish as an official language of the League.[41] Very interestingly, he praised Spanish as *'le plus beau patrimoine'* of the Spanish empire. He used almost the same expression as Minister Yanguas would use, six years later, in his instructions to Spanish diplomats.[42] He continued praising Spain and lauding its spiritual empire:

> L'Espagne s'efforce […] de conquérir nos cœurs et nos esprits par les bienfaits de la paix, de l'amitié, du commerce, par l'évocation des gloires communes de notre race et de notre langue, par nos affinités spirituelles et ethniques, par les liens du sang et de la pensée.

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[39] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1919-20*, vol. III, no. 26 (7 August 1919), 835–37.

[40] Fischer, 'El español en el mundo: hispanoamericanismo en la Liga de las Naciones', *Iberoamericana* XIII, no. 50 (2013), 129.

[41] Fischer, 'El español en el mundo', 125.

[42] Yanguas, instructions to Spanish diplomats in Latin America, 23 June 1926, AGA, box 54/16724.

This was meant to argue that Spanish was not only the language of a bunch of states on the other side of the ocean, but the natural *lingua franca* of communication between the 'old' and the 'new' worlds. It therefore deserved the status of official language of the newly established League. Coming from the delegate of Panama, a country that had been independent since 1904 thanks to the support of the United States, this understanding of Latin America beyond the framework of the Western Hemisphere is noteworthy. It is telling of the extent to which the argument of spiritual empire did not belong solely to Spanish diplomacy and was used for different purposes, including Latin Americanism.

Actually, Spanish diplomacy did not take part in this first plea for the adoption of Spanish. At the meeting of the commission that discussed the issue of official languages at this first Assembly, the Spanish representatives kept a low profile and let Latin American delegates lead the debate.[43] A year later, however, during the second Assembly, and despite the fact that French and English had remained the sole two official languages, the head of the Spanish delegation, Amalio Gimeno, a senator and a former minister of State, made a flowery speech in the plenary session.[44] After highlighting that he was the first speaker ever to address the Assembly in Spanish, he made a very explicit reference to the persistent imperial nature of Spain. He described Spain as 'the mother that has never ceased loving' its Latin American 'daughters'. When he made this speech on 12 September, Spanish delegates could not possibly be ignorant of the Edwards Doctrine, which would be publicly formulated only a few days later. While Bolín was in Latin America to deal with the creation of a liaison office, the head of the Spanish delegation took the floor in Geneva to make Spain shine as an empire of 'love' and international 'collaboration'.

It was thus in 1921 that Spanish diplomats discovered the potential usefulness of practicing spiritual empire at the League of Nations. In the context of the 'diplomatic battle' for a permanent seat at the Council, making use of Hispano-Americanism could provide Spain with the support of the Latin American states, which weighed considerably at the Assembly. Spain was systematically re-elected as non-permanent member of the Council, partly due to the vote of the Latin American delegates. Perhaps more importantly, presenting Spain as the persistent imperial 'mother' of a substantial number of League member states was certainly used as proof of legitimate belonging to a select club of 'great

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[43] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la Première Assemblée. Séances des Commissions*, vol. 1, 2 vols (Geneva: Imprimerie Albert Renaud, 1920), 28–30. See also Fischer, 'El español en el mundo', 125–26.

[44] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la Deuxième Assemblée. Séances plénières* (Geneva: Imprimerie Albert Renaud, 1921), 206–07.

powers' within the Council. Not surprisingly, then, the call for systematising a League-oriented Hispano-Americanist strategy was put out by Ambassador Quiñones, not by the minister of State. It came from the man on the spot, not from the foreign office.

The strategy of rhetoric

In the summer of 1922, like the rest of the central departments in Madrid, the Ministry of State suffered from the governmental instability that preceded Primo de Rivera's coup. Between September 1921 and July 1922, Spain had two different governments, Antonio Maura's and José Sánchez Guerra's, each with its own different minister of State, Manuel González Hontoria and Joaquín Fernández Prida. As a consequence, the efforts for a permanent seat at the Council stalled. The personal views of Minister Fernández Prida, in office since March only, were 'unknown' to Quiñones in July, and the ambassador urged the minister to 'lay the foundations of the difficult battle that we will have to fight' at the forthcoming Assembly in September.[45] The situation had changed, as Quiñones explained: Britain wished to prepare *'ipso facto'* the entrance of Germany as a permanent Council member, and it was orchestrating the redistribution of non-permanent seats without taking Spain into account. Spain was being 'completely ignored', not only for a permanent position, but also for a re-election as non-permanent member.[46]

Quiñones feared that Spain, if absent from the League Council, could suffer a diplomatic setback regarding the role of Spain in the fate of Tangier. In early 1922, the Cannes Conference had called upon France, Britain, and Spain to reach an agreement regarding the statute of the international zone. Facing the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the three parties, the British delegation in Cannes had mentioned the possibility of taking the issue to the League Council in Geneva.[47] This was why Quiñones urged his government to act decisively for Spain's presence at the Council, even as a non-permanent member. This was the only way to act and be heard 'on the same footing as France and Britain'.

In order to make sure that Spain would be re-elected and taken seriously, Quiñones proposed a practical strategy of action. Spain, he said, had to be seen as an unavoidable

[45] Quiñones to Fernández Prida, telegram 834, 11 July 1922, AGA, box 54/6046, file 1248A.

[46] Quiñones to Fernández Prida, telegram 793, 31 July 1922, AGA, box 54/6046, file 1248A.

[47] Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, 'La cuestión de Tánger en la Europa de entreguerras: España ante Francia y Gran Bretaña', *Estudios Africanos: Revista de la Asociación Española de Africanistas* 4, no. 7 (1989), 122.

actor. To that end, the French and British governments needed to be persuaded of the legitimate 'great-power' status of Spain. Quiñones therefore suggested that the Spanish prime minister, José Sánchez Guerra, have a 'frank and open' conversation with his French and British homologues, Raymond Poincaré and David Lloyd George. In a very pedagogic manner, Quiñones explained to Minister Fernández Prida that there was no need to mention Tangier, or any of the other reasons for which Spain had a particular interest in being part of the Council. Rather to the contrary, Quiñones continued, Sánchez Guerra would 'only' need to behave in a natural manner, adopting the rhetorical forms that one would expect from the prime minister of a great power: not 'begging' for a favourable treatment due to contingent reasons, but demanding what was 'right and proper'.

Quiñones therefore urged the Spanish government to make a decisive use of the Hispano-Americanist repertoire of arguments. To begin with, he proposed to link the juridical principles of the League of Nations to the 'glorious days' of the Spanish empire:

> No hay para qué hablar de los títulos que en el orden de las doctrinas podría presentar España, recordando que en la historia de sus ideas y de sus sistemas jurídicos se encuentra, antes que en los anales de los demás pueblos, el concepto fundamental de la Sociedad de las Naciones, vislumbrado y aún definido por los precursores del Derecho Internacional que ilustraron, en días gloriosos, nuestra filosofía y nuestra ciencia del derecho.

He said this in clear reference to the School of Salamanca, which, in the wake of the conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century, had generated a juridical reflexion that, in the 1920s, some scholars were starting to describe as the founding principles of international law. Quiñones wished to take this idea out of the academic sphere and to build a diplomatic argument with it, in order to assert the existence of a causal relation between the history of the Spanish empire and the League of Nations.

He also raised attention to the fundamental importance of the Spanish language, which he directly connected to Spain's 'historical and spiritual representation in Latin America':

> ¿Cabe desconocer, por otra parte, para fijar la significación que a España corresponde en el mundo, la extensión y la importancia de su lengua, que, por esa importancia y esa extensión, aun sin contar con lo que representa en la historia de la cultura humana, se

> encuentra, a la hora actual, entre las lenguas que figuran en primera línea en la lexicografía universal?
>
> Al hablar de la lengua castellana viene inmediatamente al ánimo el recuerdo de otro elemento que no puede pasar inadvertido si se ha de medir la importancia de la nacionalidad española: su alta representación, representación histórica, representación espiritual, en la América latina.

Curiously enough, Quiñones used the term 'Latin America', not 'Spanish' or 'Hispanic' as he would use later in the decade. In 1922, Quiñones was not (yet) a convinced and militant Hispano-Americanist. His discovery of Hispano-Americanism came from diplomatic pragmatism. The 'historical' and 'spiritual' significance of Spain in the Americas had a mere instrumental utility to his eyes. It only served the cause of situating Spain among the great powers of Europe and of the Mediterranean.

The originality of Quiñones' strategy lay in the fact that he wished to put admittedly 'sentimental' arguments forward as legitimate justifications of Spain's great-power status:

> Tal vez el espíritu que informa la vida moderna y las urgencias materiales de la época actual, que buscan, constantemente, en todas las cuestiones, sus aspectos prácticos, excluyan, llamándolos sentimentales, esa clase de argumentos. De mayor peso habría de parecer de todos modos, aún a los más refractarios de esta manera de razonar, el recuerdo de lo que representa España en la historia universal para la vida de la Humanidad. […] Todas esas circunstancias reunidas justificarían, en cualquier momento, que España, con expreso reconocimiento de todos, volviera a figurar en el cuadro de las Grandes Potencias. […] Esta es, sin duda, una circunstancia que expuesta, que alegada, habría de influir en el ánimo de los Jefes de los Gobiernos de Francia e Inglaterra por muy escasa que fuera su noción de la justicia […].

Quiñones was giving a practical lesson in rhetorical diplomacy to Minister Fernández Prida. Very clearly, in his opinion, spiritual empire was to be a mere rhetorical tool: while acknowledging that 'historical' or 'spiritual' arguments were mostly seen as 'sentimental' in 'the material urgencies of the present time', he called for proactive action from Madrid in order to make those 'sentimental' reasons as valid and legitimate as 'material' ones.

According to Quiñones, the Spanish prime minister would only need to 'explain' and 'plead' the special 'circumstance' of Spain. Explaining and pleading were indeed the sorts of diplomatic practices that Quiñones called for, and the elements of spiritual empire were the main part of this wider practice of rhetorical diplomacy.

In Madrid, Quiñones' arguments were heard to a certain extent. Minister Fernández Prida did not implement the idea at prime-ministerial level, as Quiñones advocated, but at ambassadorial level. In mid-August, the Spanish ambassadors in Paris, London, Rome, and Tokyo were asked to put forward the abovementioned argumentation to the respective ministers of foreign affairs.[48] In the autumn, Spain was re-elected as a non-permanent Council member. From that moment on, the rhetoric of Hispano-Americanism and spiritual empire became a recurrent practice of Spanish diplomacy in Geneva.

Practices of rhetorical diplomacy

During the fourth session of the League Assembly, in early autumn 1923, the first commission discussed, as usual, the election of non-permanent Council members. On 25 September, Ambassador Edwards restated his proposal. As he had done two years earlier, he called for creating two permanent positions for Brazil and Spain. Of Spain he said that it was 'the only great power of the European continent that does not have a permanent seat'.[49] In the minutes of that day's meeting, the meagre interventions of the Spanish delegate, Emilio de Palacios, contrast with the eloquent discourse of his Brazilian colleague. In any case, the commission adopted a text that was, to a certain extent, in line with Edwards' proposal: it invited the plenary session of the Assembly to 'make its choice considering the dominant geographical divisions, the big ethnic families, the different religious traditions, the various types of civilisation, and the main sources of wealth'. The number of permanent members, however, was not increased.

When it came to a vote, Palacios abstained, although he most probably agreed with the commission's proposal. His abstention was possibly due to the absence of clear instructions from Madrid. Two days earlier, General Primo de Rivera had pulled off a successful coup and installed a military directorate in power. In Madrid, Fernando Espinosa de los Monteros had become, *de facto*, the person in charge of the Ministry of

[48] Fernández Prida, instructions to the Spanish ambassadors in Paris, London, Rome, and Tokyo, 15 August 1922, AGA, box 54/6046, file 1248A.

[49] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la Quatrième Assemblée. Séances des Commissions. Procès-verbaux de la Première Commission (questions constitutionnelles)*, Journal officiel de la Société des Nations, special issue 14 (Geneva: Imprimerie Berger-Levrault, 1923), 37–39.

State. A career diplomat, Espinosa de los Monteros had been serving as the undersecretary of the Ministry of State since 1921. As such, he was in charge of the internal organisation of the Ministry. After the coup, the civil government was taken over by a military one: ministers were revoked, but most high officials of the administration were not replaced.[50] Therefore, Espinosa de los Monteros remained in charge of the ministry until the appointment of Yanguas in December 1925. In 1923, neither he nor the newly installed directorate had had the time to take any decisions regarding Spain's official attitude towards the composition of the League Council. Quiñones, who was also part of the Spanish delegation to the Assembly, complained, with an unusual absence of tact, that he '[did] not know anything at all' about the new government's position on the matter.[51]

The rhythms of Spanish diplomats in Geneva were nonetheless different from those of politicians and soldiers in Madrid. The absence of clear instructions regarding the Edwards Doctrine did not prevent the members of the Spanish delegation from working for Spain's re-election as a non-permanent Council member. Gimeno, as head of the Spanish delegation, reminded the Ministry of the usefulness of Hispano-Americanism:

> Trabajos míos atrayéndose delegados americanos desde primeras Asambleas que tuve honor representar nuestro país han dado resultado, que en reunión celebrada por ellos acordose unanimidad votación España. Somos agrupación muy numerosa.[52]

Gimeno highlighted with pride his efforts to 'appeal to' Latin American delegates since the early years of the League's life. In the new and somewhat unpredictable context of the dictatorship, he underlined the validity of the strategy that Spanish delegates had been implementing in Geneva since 1921. Very quickly, the new regime understood and supported the use of a Geneva-oriented strategy of spiritual empire. From October 1923 on, Hispano-Americanist arguments became more explicitly and more assertively mobilised by diplomats in key European countries. This suggests that the strategy coming from Geneva was received in the Ministry of State in Madrid and then redistributed, in the form of instructions, to different European capitals.

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[50] On the functioning of the administration under Primo de Rivera's military directorate, see María Teresa González Calbet, *La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera: el Directorio Militar* (Madrid: El Arquero, 1987).

[51] Quiñones to Espinosa, 24 September 1923, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 70–71.

[52] Gimeno to Espinosa, telegram 65, 29 September 1923, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 1.

Some of Spain's most sustained diplomatic efforts were made in Czechoslovakia, one of the elective members of the League Council. The minister-plenipotentiary in Prague, Pedro Sebastián de Erice, organised a very visible event on the occasion of the *Fiesta de la Raza*, on 12 October 1923.[53] He threw a party at the Spanish legation, to which he invited the most salient Czechoslovak personalities, as well as other diplomats, especially the Latin American ones. The anthems of Spain, Argentina, and Mexico were played. The Mexican chargé d'affaires made a speech, in which he praised the *'Madre Patria'* and lauded King Alfonso. To his words, Sebastián de Erice replied by 'highlighting the recent triumph obtained at the League of Nations [the re-election of Spain as Council member], and auguring a brilliant future for the Spanish race in world politics'. Both speeches were published in the local press in Czech and German.

Sebastián de Erice also stated that the Latin American legations in Prague had hung the Spanish flag from their façades. More surprisingly, as he reported, the Belgian and Polish legations had also done so. Belgium was, like Spain and Czechoslovakia, an elective member of the League Council. In May 1924, the Spanish ambassador in Brussels, Rodrigo de Saaverda, marquis of Villalobar, celebrated King Alfonso's birthday with exhibitions that commemorated Spain's history, with a special emphasis on the Spanish presence in Flanders.[54] As for Poland, it was a direct rival to Spain in the 'diplomatic battle' for a permanent seat at the Council. Both countries had similar land mass and population and the recent history of Poland placed it as a possible 'pacifier' of central Europe, in-between Germany and the Soviet Union.[55] Moreover, Polish diplomats also sought the support of the Latin American governments for the election of Poland as a member of the League Council. This was, at least, what the Spanish minister-plenipotentiary in Rio reported in August 1924.[56] The fact that the Latin American authorities, as well as the Belgian and Polish ones, honoured Spain in Prague on the day that commemorated the beginning of the Spanish overseas empire in the Americas gave the sense that Spain still preserved an imperial aura, which was being used as a fruitful instrument of diplomacy.

In July 1924, the Czech minister of foreign affairs, Edvard Beneš, decided to endorse Spain's claim to be re-elected as a Council member while waiting to be appointed

[53] Erice to Espinosa, telegram 28, 13 October 1923, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 1.

[54] Villalobar to Espinosa, telegram 21, 18 May 1924, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 1.

[55]Anna M. Ciencialia and Titus Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno: Keys to Polish Foreign Policy, 1919–25* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984).

[56] The Spanish minister-plenipotentiary in Rio (Antonio Benítez) to Espinosa, telegram 45, 24 August 1924, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 2.

permanent member.[57] He was opposed, in theory, to the existence of permanent seats at the Council, but he supported the Edwards Doctrine and believed that Spain was the best representative of the Hispanic 'family'. His words, as reported by Sebastián de Erice, suggest that he also supported Spanish spiritual empire:

> El señor Beneš considera que nuestra permanencia en el Consejo es de estricta justicia, no sólo por la importancia de nuestra Patria en la política europea, sino por representar, según palabras textuales suyas, una civilización, lo que le confiere indiscutible autoridad sobre sus veinte hijas de allende el Atlántico.[58]

In another telegram, partially illegible today due to material deterioration, Sebastián de Erice also quoted Beneš: '*[…] España debe estar representada en el Consejo y ninguna nación con más título que la gloriosa madre patria que las había engendrado a todas.*'[59] This *'todas'* clearly referred to the Latin American republics. According to Beneš, as Sebastián de Erice reported his words, Spain was still a sort of empire, the authority of which was based on something as intangible as 'civilisation'. To Beneš' eyes, it was this specific sort of intangible imperial quality that gave Spain the right to be re-elected to the League Council. This is telling of the extent to which international games of power were structurally imperial and, therefore, of the importance that Spanish diplomacy needed to give to legitimising the spiritual nature of its imperial power.

TWO VISIONS OF EMPIRE, 1926

In 1924 and 1925, the League Assembly re-elected Spain as a non-permanent Council member. In the wake of the Locarno Treaties of December 1925, Spanish diplomats were thus in a privileged position to take part in the different events that marked the League's life in the crucial year of 1926. Following what was agreed in Locarno, Germany entered the League of Nations, as a permanent Council member, in September 1926. The Spanish delegates initially hoped that the path to German adhesion would open the door for Spain's own permanent position, but the different meetings of 1926 progressively narrowed the opportunities. As a sign of protest, Spain withdrew from the League in September. In the tense situation that preceded Spain's withdrawal, Spanish delegates tried to make convincing claims to situate Spain as a great power.

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[57] Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 81–82.

[58] Erice to Espinosa, telegram, 1 July 1924, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 82.

[59] Erice to Espinosa, telegram 18, 24 July 1924, AHN-DM, box 244/1, file 3, folder 2.

However, there was sharp disagreement over the arguments that were to be deployed in order to make those claims convincing. In Geneva, diplomats continued using spiritual empire as a rhetorical instrument. In Madrid, by contrast, Primo de Rivera, on the crest of the success of the colonial enterprise in Morocco, called for a more assertive use of the imperial argument, understood as a material argument. The specificities of the intangible sort of empire embedded in the practices of spiritual empire revealed themselves to be in striking contrast to the manner in which Primo de Rivera and the military apparatus understood imperialism. Spiritual empire appeared to be exclusively on the side of diplomats.

Being a great power

The end of 1925 inaugurated a new phase in the history of the League of Nations. In December, the Locarno Treaties sought the 'normalisation' of Germany's situation in an international context. This meant paving the way towards the entrance of Germany as a member of the League and, most importantly, as a permanent member of the League Council. The year 1926 was marked by the so-called 'spirit of Locarno', according to which the League member states were taking a decisive step towards the definitive pacification of Europe through the overcoming of Franco-German enmity. However, this spirit of Locarno was never a reality.[60] The treaties exacerbated rivalries among League member states and generated instability within the League system. Looking at this period from the Spanish perspective adds some interesting elements to this broad narrative.

Four major meetings took place in 1926. Spain was only represented at the first three. In March, a special session of the Assembly was held in Geneva, in order to discuss the modalities of German admission. The Spanish government decided to send the recently appointed minister of State, Yanguas, as head of the Spanish delegation. In parallel to this special session, the Council members met secretly and unofficially, and Quiñones, as usual, represented Spain. This meeting was especially problematic: the admittance of Germany as permanent Council member altered the balance of representation of member states. Facing the impossibility of reaching an easy agreement on this topic, the Council appointed a special commission to try and solve the problem. This special commission met in May, and

[60] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, eds., *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Michael Dockrill, *Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy, 1920-1929* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). See also Christiph M Kimmich, *Germany and the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

decided that only one permanent seat would be created: the German one. Of course, this decision was not reached without vivid debates, in which Palacios, the Spanish delegate, took active part. The fourth main meeting of 1926 was the ordinary Assembly, which met for the seventh time in September. Spain sent no delegation this time: on 8 September, Minister Yanguas addressed a note to Secretary-General Drummond, declaring that Spain was withdrawing from the League of Nations.

The admission of Germany to the League Council reactivated the latent problem of the distribution of permanent positions. In February 1926, Quiñones was aware of the problem and warned Minister Yanguas that not only Spain, but also Brazil and Poland, would be candidates for permanent seats.[61] In May, China would also present its candidature.[62] Quiñones, however, was not particularly worried: he had received the assurance of a favourable vote from the French foreign office and from the British ambassador in Paris. He made only a brief mention of an obstacle that was not yet well identified: the German government would most probably oppose the accession of any permanent member apart from Germany itself, in order to avoid creating a precedent that would allow Poland to become a permanent member of the Council.[63] On this matter, Quiñones was nevertheless confident that France and Britain would be energetic enough to make Germany accept the Spanish claim. He was optimistic in February 1926.

He was not even worried about the fact that the Edwards Doctrine, which had hitherto supported Spain's argumentation, was fading away. There were rumours, he admitted, according to which the Latin American delegates would end up rejecting Brazil as the representative of the Americas and would look for alternative solutions based on a rotation of Latin American Council members. Those rumours were verified in the following months. Unlike Spain, Brazil was not bound by the Locarno Treaties and had made no commitment regarding Germany's admission. In March, the Brazilian delegation decided to adopt an obstructionist attitude, threatening the League with vetoing Germany's accession if Brazil did not obtain a permanent seat at the Council.[64] This attitude exasperated the rest of Latin American delegates: on the occasion of the special Assembly, the delegate from Paraguay, representing his Latin American colleagues, except of course the Brazilian

[61] Quiñones to Yanguas, telegram, 14 February 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 99–100.

[62] *Report on the Work of the First Session of the Committee Held at Geneva from May 10th to 17th, 1926, with the Minutes and Appendices*, LONOD, document C.299.M.139.1926.V (1 July 1926), 64–69.

[63] Maria Zmierczak, 'La Pologne et Locarno', in *Aristide Briand, La Société Des Nations et l'Europe, 1919-1932*, ed. Jacques Bariéty (Strasbourg: Presse universitaire de Strasbourg, 2007), 117–129.

[64] 'L'élargissement du Conseil', *Journal de Genève*, 12 March 1926: 3.

delegate, called for Brazil to abandon its obstructionist attitude, for the sake of peace in Europe and in the 'spirit of Locarno'.[65]

Unlike the Brazilian government, the Spanish one took special care to show that Spain respected the 'spirit of Locarno'. In this sense, it took the symbolic decision to send Minister Yanguas in person to the special Assembly that would decide upon the accession of Germany.[66] As Yanguas explained to the press, 'Spain is very certain of its rights, but it does not forget its duties of solidarity in the framework of the League of Nations'.[67] The reference to the 'rights' was a warning: the Spanish delegation still had the firm intention to fight for Spain's permanent position at the Council. The reference to the 'duties', though, was a reassurance: Spain would not obstruct the accession of Germany. In the privacy of the Council of Ministers, Primo de Rivera expressed this idea in more frank terms: 'Spain will not be an obstacle to the desires of France and Britain'.[68] At the special Assembly, indeed, the Spanish delegates did not raise their voices.[69]

Parallel to the Assembly, however, the Council met secretly and informally, and Quiñones also attended this meeting.[70] The way in which he described this meeting contrasts abruptly with the serene and optimistic tone that he had used only one month earlier. This was, indeed, the first occasion on which the turbulent debate over the reorganisation of the Council burst out after the Locarno Treaties. As reported by Quiñones, the meeting lasted for two and a half hours and no agreement was reached. The German government, informally represented by the Swedish delegate, remained firmly opposed to the creation of any additional permanent seat but Germany's. This position, which was targeted against Poland, indirectly closed the door to Spain and Brazil. Contrary to what Quiñones expected, Britain and France were not so eager to defend the Spanish case against the German position. As the meeting advanced, Quiñones saw Spanish possibilities vanishing. In his personal notes, he admitted that he 'tried' to speak 'with the

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[65] The Chilean, Colombian, Cuban, Dominican, Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, Paraguayan, Salvadorian, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan delegates to the League Council to Drummond, note, 17 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 138–39.

[66] Enrique Moral Sandoval, ed., *Actas del Consejo de Ministros. Alfonso XIII. Presidencia del General Primo de Rivera. Directorio Civil (1925-1930)* (Madrid: Ministerio de Relaciones con las Cortes y de la Secretaría del Gobierno, 1992), 53.

[67] Yanguas, declarations to the press, 3 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 109.

[68] Moral Sandoval, *Actas del Consejo de Ministros*, 54.

[69] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée (mars 1926). Séances plénières et séances des Commissions*, Journal officiel de la Société des Nations, special issue 42 (Geneva: Imprimerie des Presses universitaires de France, 1926).

[70] Quiñones, personal notes, 10 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 123–28.

necessary precision and energy', revealing in fact that he was not really prepared to face such an adverse situation. He did not have the presence of mind to mention any argument in favour of the Spanish candidature, and he merely entered into some legal details.

During the vivid discussions, moreover, there was a veiled debate regarding whether the candidates to permanent positions were or were not 'great powers'. Very explicitly, the Swedish delegate, Bo Östen Undén, stated that only 'great powers' could occupy permanent seats at the Council, and considered that no state, apart from Germany and those that were already permanent members of the Council, could aspire to such status. Again, this most probably targeted Poland, but it also excluded Spain from such a select club of 'great powers'. From that moment on, shifting away from Quiñones' optimism in February, Spanish diplomacy needed to demonstrate that Spain was, legitimately, a 'great power'. Imperialist argumentation was therefore requested and put at the service of the interest of foreign policy. In Madrid and in Geneva, however, Spanish officials and diplomats did not share the same vision of what kind of empire Spain was meant to be.

The soldier's empire

As early as 13 March, the 'diplomatic battle' for a permanent seat was already a 'lost cause'.[71] This is what Primo de Rivera thought in Madrid. It was clear to him that, instead of waiting for a more favourable occasion, and in order to preserve Spain's 'dignity', withdrawing from the League of Nations was the only possible solution, at least temporarily as the League Covenant allowed. The Brazilian government was also considering the same possibility, and indeed Brazil ended up withdrawing on 14 June. In the intractable situation of early March, the rumour that Spain and Brazil would soon withdraw started spreading among delegates. In this context, General Primo de Rivera tried to play what he considered to be Spain's last card. Here is the suggestion that he made to Minister Yanguas, who was then in Geneva attending the Special Assembly:

> Considerando que está perdido el asunto de la permanencia, y como juzgo muy interesadas a Francia e Inglaterra en evitar nuestra retirada, podría negociarse con estas naciones el que desistiéramos a cambio de que ellas acordaran la inmediata inclusión de Tánger y su zona en el protectorado de España. […] Esto, que compensaría y satisfaría a la opinión pública española,

[71] Primo de Rivera to Yanguas, telegram, 13 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 195.

> deben tratarlo V.E. y Quiñones de León con Chamberlain y Briand […]. Contribuirá a que España pueda ver solucionado su problema de Marruecos, de otro modo difícil y costoso.

The idea was thus to blackmail the British and French delegates, Austen Chamberlain and Aristide Briand: either Tangier and its zone were 'immediately' incorporated into the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, or Spain would withdraw from the League of Nations. Some important sectors of Spanish public opinion, through journal articles, public meetings, or pressure groups, were calling for a revision of the statute of the Tangier International Zone, signed in 1923.[72] Primo de Rivera considered March 1926 an opportune moment to 'satisfy' this opinion by requesting the annexation of Tangier into the Spanish protectorate under the framework of the League of Nations. This proposed strategy suggests that, in the mind of Primo de Rivera as a head of government, imperial matters and international matters were to be treated together.

Fernando María Castiella attributes this *confusion des genres* to Primo de Rivera's widely assumed political incompetence and lack of diplomatic tact.[73] In my opinion, however, it responded instead to the fact that imperial and international matters were structurally interrelated in early-twentieth-century world politics.[74] The same applied to the functioning of the Spanish administration: the Directorate-General for Morocco and the Colonies belonged to the Ministry of State, which meant that Minister Yanguas was formally in charge of colonial policy within the Spanish government. Susana Sueiro Seoane has even argued that Primo de Rivera's foreign policy was in fact subordinated to his imperial ambitions in northern Morocco.[75] The very existence of Primo de Rivera's regime was tightly connected to the military colonial ventures in northern Africa.[76] Primo de Rivera's coup, in September 1923, happened only two years after the 'disastrous' battle of Annual, where Spanish troops had been brutally defeated by Rifean fighters. The coup can also be interpreted as an internal coup, within the army, against the generals who had been in

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[72] Susana Sueiro Seoane, 'La incorporación de Tánger, una batalla perdida de la diplomacia primorriversita', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* V, no. 2 (1989), 70–72.

[73] Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 199–200.

[74] Pedersen, *The Guardians*; Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*.

[75] Sueiro Seoane, 'La política mediterránea de Primo de Rivera'. See also José Luis Neila Hernández, 'La mediterraneidad de España en las relaciones internacionales del periodo de entreguerras, 1919–1939', *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 19 (1997): 15–54.

[76] Sueiro Seoane, *España en el Mediterráneo: Primo de Rivera y la cuestión marroquí (1923-1930)* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1993). See also Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

charge of the colonial campaigns.[77] In 1926, the situation had changed: after almost fifteen years of war, the Spanish army, with the decisive support of French troops, was marching towards the 'pacification' of Morocco. This was a personal triumph for Primo de Rivera, who felt it legitimate to infringe upon Yanguas' administrative competences and try to link the Moroccan and the Genevan issues. This situation caused a serious confrontation between the dictator and the minister, which ended up with Yanguas' resignation in February 1927.[78] Less than a year earlier, in March 1926, after discussing Primo de Rivera's idea with Quiñones and Palacios in Geneva, Yanguas had opted for a prudent, yet somewhat ironical reply: *'La idea expresada en el telegrama de V.E. es muy interesante.'*[79]

In the end, the Tangier issue was never discussed in Geneva. Upon Primo de Rivera's request, King Alfonso was forced to propose the blackmailing deal to the British ambassador in Madrid. Susana Sueiro Seoane gives some amusing evidence of the king's embarrassment.[80] Both Britain and France rejected Primo de Rivera's arrangement categorically. This did not prevent the dictator from insisting: on 15 August, he officially requested that Tangier and its zone be included into the Spanish protectorate. Facing Spain's insistence, the British and French governments agreed with Primo de Rivera over some minor modifications to the statute of the Tangier International Zone, in 1927. I have found no concrete evidence to explain why Britain and France finally made some concessions. It is nonetheless possible to conjecture that the two main 'great' imperial powers of the League of Nations respected the role of Spain as a world-class player. In that very context, in May 1926, King George wrote to King Alfonso and praised the 'virility and greatness' of the aviators of the *Plus Ultra*, who had recently 'asserted [Spain's] position in the world', as he put it.[81] This example suggests that Spanish practices of spiritual empire were indeed quite successful in constructing an image of power that the major imperial players of Europe could not simply ignore, although they were not constrained by it. The minor concessions to Spain on the Tangier issue might well be interpreted in this same sense. While Spanish military imperialism in Morocco was no threat to Britain or France, it is possible that Spanish diplomacy played a role, in Geneva and elsewhere, in legitimising Spain as a credible imperial player, even in the realm of the intangible.

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[77] Javier Tusell, *La conspiración y el golpe de Estado de Primo de Rivera (septiembre 1923)* (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Ciencias Sociales, 1991), 11–13.

[78] Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 199–200.

[79] Yanguas to Primo de Rivera, telegram, 13 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 197.

[80] Sueiro Seoane, 'La incorporación de Tánger', 74–76.

[81] George V to Alfonso XIII, 31 May 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 177–78.

Primo de Rivera's attempt to interfere in the *batalla diplomática* contrasted very markedly with the attitude that Spanish diplomats adopted at the League. As Castiella explains, Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacios believed in a separation between colonial undertakings in the Mediterranean and the multilateral framework of the League of Nations.[82] Stephen Jacobson has read the Spanish military approach to colonialism in light of the notion of 'endless empire'.[83] What he calls 'micro-militarism' indeed marked Spanish politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Rif War and Primo de Rivera's 'solution' to it were part of this phenomenon. Although not directly linked to militarism, the way in which Primo de Rivera tried to solve the Tangier issue was connected to the way in which he tied up the Rif War. The episode of 1926 shows that Spanish colonial micro-militarism in northern Africa and Spanish diplomacy in the League of Nations were in dialogue, but also in tension. From the point of view of Spanish diplomats, colonial ambitions did not have a place in Geneva. Susan Pedersen's work on the mandates system also conveys this sense of diplomatic shame vis-à-vis colonialism. The very existence of mandates indicate that, at least formally, the League rejected the classic, military conception of conquest and colonialism. Another form of endless empire would nonetheless find its place at the League. This was spiritual empire.

The diplomat's empire

In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Yanguas, as a professor of international law, had numerous opportunities to state that he defended internationalist solutions, supported international cooperation, and believed in the benefits of the League of Nations. When he addressed the Congress of Deputies in April 1921, he defended the use of Hispano-Americanism at the League of Nations as an absolute necessity if Spain wished to carry weight in the European and international context. In his eyes, the 'isolation' of Latin America within the American continent posed a threat not only for the League, but also for Spain:

> Dentro de ese espíritu de aislamiento continental, España, aquí, en Europa, aislada del resto de la raza española, carecería de los objetivos más fundamentales de su política internacional y se vería

[82] Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 191–93.

[83] Stephen Jacobson, 'Imperial Ambitions in an Era of Decline: Micromilitarism and the Eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858-1923', in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Josep Maria Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 87–91.

> resignada a tener que girar, con personalidad subalterna, en torno a otros astros de mayor magnitud. Unidas, en cambio, aquellas repúblicas y España dentro de una sociedad universalista como lo es la Sociedad de Naciones, vienen a constituir, dentro de la dinámica internacional, una unidad racial orgánica capaz de parangonarse con todas las otras razas. Juntos debemos laborar en esa obra solidaria, sin exclusivismos nacionales españoles, sin exclusivismos raciales hispanoamericanos, con un alto sentido de la humanidad y de la justicia, pero con conciencia clara de lo que la raza española es y significa y debe pesar en el mundo. Para ello, preciso es que exista algo que no se improvisa, y es el espíritu de raza.[84]

In a diplomatic and not exclusively imperial context, the metropole needed the colonies in order to avoid a 'subaltern' position in world politics. This was what the *'raza'* and the *'espíritu'* were needed for. Yanguas spoke of 'stars' to refer to the 'great powers', implying that Spain needed to *'rayonner'*, taking the French expression, like a star, too. Also, he placed the Hispanic 'spirit of race' within the spirit of the League of Nations, which refused 'national exclusivism' and strove for 'humanity and justice'. To him, spiritual empire belonged to the same internationalist ideal that underpinned the post-war world order.

In January 1923, the *Unión Ibero-Americana*, the influential Madrid-based Hispano-Americanist society, invited Yanguas to give a lecture about the place of Hispano-Americanism at the League of Nations. Recalling the moment in 1921 when Spain had been about to become a permanent Council member, he declared:

> No nos forjemos ilusiones: si España fue propuesta para miembro permanente […] no fue simplemente por su posición continental en Europa; fue porque en España no se veía tan solo a nuestra nación, sino que se veía en ella al representante de una raza que tenía quince miembros en el seno de la Sociedad de las Naciones, siendo, por tanto, a esta raza, y no a España, a quien se quería honrar dándole una representación permanente, porque sin ella no podía decirse que la representación permanente de ese órgano de

[84] *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes: Congreso de los Diputados. Legislatura de 1921*, vol. IV, no. 37 (13 April 1921), 1277.

> la Sociedad de las Naciones reflejara los trazos fundamentales de las razas de la humanidad en sus distintos aspectos, demostrando que no es a las grandes potencias a quienes corresponde ese cargo, sino a los grandes núcleos de civilización y a las razas que más pesan en los destinos del mundo.[85]

He agreed with the Edwards Doctrine: the different 'races' and 'civilisations' of the world were not fairly represented at the League Council. It was within this framework that he understood a hypothetical Spanish permanent membership. While acknowledging that Spain did not have a particularly privileged position in European politics, he conceived Spain's place and power in the world in intangible terms. He believed that it was the Spanish 'race' and 'civilisation' that equated Spain with the rest of the great powers.

Once appointed minister of State in Primo de Rivera's civilian directorate, Yanguas was sent to Geneva to head the Spanish delegation to the Special Assembly of March 1926. There he met Quiñones and Palacios, the two well-rehearsed Spanish representatives at the League of Nations. As it became clear that Spain would not be granted a permanent seat at the Council, these three men agreed with Primo de Rivera on the fact that withdrawing, even temporarily, would be the only 'decent' manner of redressing the 'grievance' that was being made against Spain. By contrast to Primo de Rivera, however, they advocated that Spanish delegates keep a low profile until the ordinary Assembly, at which Spain would have the opportunity to spoil the party around Germany's adhesion by making a solemn declaration to explain the reasons for its own withdrawal. As described above, this idea was never implemented, since Primo de Rivera insisted on linking the Tangier issue to the League of Nations. In March, however, Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacios worked together to write the first draft of Spain's solemn declaration, which they submitted to Primo de Rivera on precisely the same date that Primo de Rivera sent them his suggestion on Tangier, 13 March.[86] On that day, two very different visions of diplomatic and imperial practices travelled between Madrid and Geneva.

In the draft, the three Spanish representatives restated the engagements that Spain had taken within the League, as well as Spain's commitment to the principles of internationalism, and especially to that of the equality of states. They recalled, in fact, that

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[85] Yanguas, 'El hispanoamericanismo en Ginebra', *Unión Ibero-Americana*, February 1923, 76.

[86] Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacio, draft declaration, attached to Yanguas' telegram to Primo de Rivera, 13 March 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 197–98 and 247–49.

Spain's official position was actually opposed to the existence of permanent positions. Paradoxically, nonetheless, 'in the current state of fact', they also restated that Spain's claim for a permanent seat was 'fair' and, most importantly, 'reasoned'. The document indeed contained the main arguments supporting Spain's 'right' to a permanent seat at the League Council. In the context created by the Locarno Treaties, the Spanish representatives began by advancing the argument of Spain's neutrality during the world war. Spain, they argued, could represent a balance between the Allies and Germany.

Moreover, this reference to neutrality had a specific resonance in the Spanish-Latin American context. During the First World War, nautral had attempted a diplomatic rapprochement to neutral Latin American states.[87] Neutrality, therefore, quite naturally led to a stronger argument. Neutrality in itself was too weak a weapon: Sweden or Switzerland, for example, could offer the same one. Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacios did not wish to present Spain as a mere neutral power, but rather as 'the neutral great power'. Legitimising Spain as a great power required a different argumentation, of an imperial nature:

> Y hemos de señalar, por último, el hecho notorio de que en el Consejo de la Sociedad de Naciones no tenga asiento permanente ningún pueblo de la familia hispanoamericana, que suma diecisiete miembros dentro de esta comunidad y que merece, por lo mismo, que el eco de su civilización, de su mentalidad y de su verbo tenga siempre y con carácter de permanencia, por lo menos, una voz y un voto dentro del Consejo, que persigue el noble fin de armonizar a los pueblos y las razas de la tierra.

Albeit evident, the argument of spiritual empire was discreet. Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacios did not consider it useful to waste too much energy displaying 'what Spain is and represents in the concert of cultured peoples', nor explaining why Spain was the 'progenitor' of a 'race'. They limited themselves to pointing out that not admitting Spain as a permanent member of the Council amounted to denying permanent representation to 'the Hispano-American family', as if Spain was the most natural and obvious representative of 'its civilisation, its mentality, and its word'. This way of presenting things made the 'endlessly imperial' nature of Spain appear obvious and natural. Going further in this line

[87] David Marcilhacy, 'España y América Latina ante la Gran Guerra: el frente de los neutrales', in *América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial: una historia conectada*, ed. Olivier Compagnon et al. (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos, 2018), 41–63.

of thought, it is interesting to see how the 'contingent' argument of neutrality was absent from the general reassessment made in the final paragraph:

> Sin orgullo, pero sin abdicación de lo que estima el Gobierno español defensa y salvaguarda de cuanto España es y significa en el concierto de los pueblos cultos, por sí y por la raza de que es progenitora, el Gobierno de Su Majestad Católica, recogiendo el sentir unánime de nuestra Nación, declara, solemnemente y con sincero dolor, que España se ve en la imposibilidad de seguir colaborando, como hasta ahora lo ha hecho, en la Sociedad de Naciones, en la que tanta fe puso y por cuyo engrandecimiento, desde un principio, tanto y tan lealmente trabajó.

With these words, the three Spanish diplomats made it clear that Spain was leaving the League of Nations because its spiritual empire had not been recognised.

This document remained a draft and was ultimately never read before the Assembly. In September, Germany alone was granted a permanent seat at the Council, and Spain withdrew from the League. In the short note of notification that Minister Yanguas sent to Secretary-General Drummond, the only mention of the 'honour' of Spain as empire or great power was made in underlining that Spain's withdrawal was Spain's 'duty'.[88] Four months earlier, however, Palacios had defended the case of Spain at the commission that had studied the problem of the Council's composition. Again, he had mobilised rhetorical resources of spiritual empire right from the beginning of his intervention:

> He did not think it necessary to expatiate at any length on the question of Spain. […] She was a country placed geographically and morally between Europe and America, and she had responded to the providential mission which had been assigned to her, and by means of untiring efforts she has been able, up to the moment, to combine her interests with her friendship on both sides of the Atlantic. As a European power, Spain maintained friendly relations with all the countries of the continent; a founder of peoples, she preserved with the deepest affection the relationship and feelings which bound her to the American continent — ties which no

[88] Yanguas to Drummond, note, 8 September 1926, in Castiella, 'Una batalla diplomática', 245.

> other country of Europe could surpass in intensity nor even reach in extent.[89]

It is interesting to note that Palacios situated Spain's relations with the Latin American states as a direct continuation of the conquest and colonisation of the Americas: whereas Spain 'maintained' good relations with its European counterparts, it had 'preserved' its relations in the Americas. This choice of wording recalled the need to 'preserve' Spain's *'patrimonio espiritual'*, as Yanguas would instruct Spanish diplomats to do only a month later.[90] All of this showed an imperial understanding of world politics and foreign policy.

In the end, Spain's withdrawal was nothing but a two-year notice, as foreseen in the League Covenant. Susana Sueiro Seoane has described it as a 'temper tantrum'.[91] In September 1928, the Spanish delegation was welcomed back to the Assembly, and Spain was re-elected as non-permanent Council member. To celebrate Spain's return, the Dominican delegate, Tulio Franco, made a speech on behalf of his Latin American fellows. His speech had different points in common with the draft declaration that Yanguas, Quiñones, and Palacios had written in March 1926. In particular, Franco made reference to 'the famous School of Salamanca', where he claimed that the philosophical roots of the League of Nations were to be found.[92] This was only some months after the Pan American Conference of Havana, where James Brown Scott, freshly back from Salamanca, had been promoting the Francisco de Vitoria Association on behalf of Yanguas. To a certain extent, therefore, Spain's practices of rhetorical and cultural diplomacy were bearing fruit, as they entered the diplomatic toolkit of the Latin American republics, too.

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[89] *Report on the Work of the First Session of the Committee Held at Geneva from May 10th to 17th, 1926, with the Minutes and Appendices*, LONOD, document C.299.M.139.1926.V (1 July 1926), 23.

[90] Yanguas, instructions to Spanish diplomats in Latin America, 23 June 1926, AGA, box 54/16724.

[91] Sueiro Seoane, 'La política exterior de la dictadura de Primo de Rivera en el contexto autoritario de los años 20', in *Coyuntura internacional y política española (1898-2004)*, ed. Salvador Forner Muños (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2010), 79.

[92] Société des Nations, ed., *Actes de la Neuvième Session ordinaire de l'Assemblée. Séances plénières. Compte rendu des Débats*, Journal officiel de la Société des Nations, special issue 64 (Geneva: Imprimerie Sonor, 1928), 84–86.

CHAPTER 5

In the spirit of Geneva: spiritual empire as internationalism

INTRODUCTION

After the creation of the League of Nations, the daily practice of institutionalised internationalism obtained a localised city landscape: Geneva. The latter was not an international metropole in the early 1920s. It remained a Swiss provincial city with poor train and telephone connections to London, Paris, and the rest of the European imperial capitals. Until the inauguration of the Palace of the Nations in 1927, League officials and diplomats remained relatively isolated in small hotels overlooking the lake and the mountains. Their circles of sociability were therefore restricted. As Glenda Sluga has argued, this particular ambiance of a cosmopolitan 'golden jail' favoured the progressive emergence of an 'international mindedness' in 1920s Geneva.[1] This translated into 'new habits of thought' that 'helped' diplomats and officials whenever they became 'too national'. League officials were thus socialised in a 'League temperament' that was soon known as 'the spirit of Geneva'. These international civil servants viewed themselves as a 'new class' that represented the new 'civilisation' of the international that had emerged after the world war.

In this context, a limited group of people spoke Spanish. Benjamín Fernández y Medina, the minister-plenipotentiary of Uruguay in Madrid and the Uruguayan delegate in Geneva, referred to Spanish-speakers at the League of Nations in a literary manner:

> Somos […], a pesar de nuestra expresión sonriente y de nuestras frecuentes salidas irónicas, caballeros de cierta Orden iniciada por don Quijote, y destinados a pasar la mitad de la vida curándonos las heridas que recibimos en nuestras aventuras ideales, para volver a emprenderlas, esperando despertar un día en un mundo hecho según nuestra aspiración, en el que reinen la paz, la libertad y la

[1] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 56–65. See also Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 141–53.

> justicia; «un mundo todo paz, todo amistad, todo concordia», como dijo el hidalgo manchego en su elogio a la Edad de Oro.[2]

An amateur scholar of literature in his spare time, Fernández y Medina associated the ideals wished for by Don Quixote in the eleventh chapter of Miguel de Cervantes' most famous novel with the daily goals of the League of Nations: peace, freedom, justice, amity, and concord. When he wrote this in 1928, Fernández y Medina was already known for his defence of internationalist solutions to international problems.[3] He believed in the utility of the League of Nations as a universal institution, which made him reject the creation of specific blocs of states, including the Latin American ones.[4] He nonetheless considered that some sort of Hispanic spirit was present at the League of Nations, and he saw it as a positive thing. This suggests that Hispano-Americanism and internationalism could be thought of simultaneously as two sides of the same coin.

According to Fernández y Medina, there was an 'Order of Don Quixote' within the institutionalised framework of internationalism and multilateralism. The 'order' was made up of Spanish and Latin American agents who worked for the practical and concrete achievement of the ideal objectives of the League of Nations. It counted four members, as Fernández y Medina described it. One was Julián Nogueira, a Uruguayan League civil servant who worked as a liaison official for Latin America at the Press and Information Section between 1922 and the extinction of the League of Nations in 1946.[5] The Spanish liaison official at the same section since 1922, José Plá, one of Nogueira's closest colleagues, was also included in the 'order'. So was Salvador de Madariaga, another Spaniard, who started working for the League at the Press and Information Section in 1921, and then served as director of the Disarmament Section until 1927, when he became professor of Spanish at the University of Oxford.[6] The fourth member of the 'order' was Fernández y Medina himself. As he presented them, the members of the 'order' were

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[2] Benjamín Fernández y Medina, 'Prólogo', in *La misión internacional de la raza hispánica*, by José Plá (Madrid: Javier Morata Editor, 1928), 1–16.

[3] Arturo Scarone, *Uruguayos contemporáneos: nuevo diccionario de datos biográficos y bibliográficos* (Montevideo: Casa A. Barreiro y Ramos S.A., 1937), 83.

[4] Yannick Wehrli, 'États latino-américains, organismes multilatéraux et défense de la souveraineté: entre Société des Nations et espace continental panaméricain, 1919-1939' (doctoral thesis, Université de Genève, 2016), 130 and 312.

[5] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt » : la liaison entre le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations et l'Amérique latine (1919–1929)' (bachelor thesis, Université de Genève, 2003), 67–73.

[6] Octavio Victoria, *Vida de Salvador de Madariaga*, 2 vols (Madrid: Fundación Areces, 1990). See also Christopher Britt Arredondo, 'Madariaga's Quixotism: The Imperial Nostalgia of an Exiled Spanish Liberal', *eHumanista/Cervantes* 3 (2014): 148–170.

among the best-suited to embody and defend the spirit of internationalism, precisely because they were inheritors of the spirit of Don Quixote. In this chapter, I ask whether there was a specific 'Hispanic' contribution to internationalism, which would better contextualise the emergence of spiritual empire as a practice of Spanish diplomacy.

This chapter is a brief incursion into the field of intellectual history. It remains, however, in the framework of political, administrative, and diplomatic practices. The appearance of the League of Nations indeed favoured the emergence of intellectual debates among practitioners of institutionalised internationalism regarding new ideas of world order. The institutionalisation of world governance supported the formalisation of transnational networks and platforms of intellectuals' exchange, as different historians have been signalling.[7] There was, additionally, a more elusive and intangible consequence: informal networks also emerged from the institutionalisation of internationalism. The League of Nations created an unprecedented environment in which diplomats, politicians, and civil servants thought about the role of the new institution, their respective countries, and themselves in the new framework of governance.[8] The League of Nations enlarged the intellectual horizons of different agents of diplomacy, policy-making, and opinion-making. These people became agents of internationalism.[9] They engaged in debates that often included internationalism, nationalism, and imperialism all mixed together. As the examples addressed in this chapter suggest, imagining the world did not require intellectual or ideological coherence.

Nogueira's correspondence throughout the 1920s, which is partially kept in the Archive of the League of Nations in Geneva, is particularly rich and varied. Sandrine Kott has recently highlighted the importance of correspondence in the analysis of international organisations as the place in which the international sphere was concretely fabricated.[10] Nogueira's correspondence has indeed allowed me to trace the thinking of the members

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[7] Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, eds., *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 10. See also Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 21–22; Régine Perron, *Histoire du multilatéralisme: l'utopie du siècle américain de 1918 à nos jours* (Paris: Presses de l'université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2014), 50–53.

[8] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*, 141–53.

[9] Patricia Clavin, 'Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World Wars', in *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars*, ed. Daniel Laqua (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 3.

[10] Sandrine Kott, 'Les organisations internationales, terrains d'étude de la globalisation. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique', *Critique internationale* 52 (2011), 15–16. See also Rodogno, Struck, and Vogel, *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 5–6.

and some associated members of the 'order' identified by Fernández y Medina. In his role as a liaison official and by virtue of his very sociable personality, Nogueira was in assiduous and enduring contact with different influential personalities in Latin America, the United States, and in Europe, especially Spain. Among his correspondents were politicians, diplomats, journalists, policy makers, and also 'intellectuals', understood as scholars or writers who had a more or less strong impact on the incipient category of 'public opinion'. In his correspondence, Nogueira gave his own opinion, commented on the opinion of his correspondents and on the opinion of others, and also gave details on the practices of intellectual exchange within the League. The study of some of this correspondence and some of these correspondents' work gives some intellectual density to Hispano-Americanism and to the notion of spiritual empire as both an idea and a political project that was present in Geneva at the same time as in Madrid.

Building on the specificities of the socio-cultural context of the League of Nations in the 1920s, the first section of this chapter provides two examples of intellectual production within the administrative structures. These were very different proposals, which nonetheless revealed that Hispano-Americanism was present in their thinking and networking practices. These imagining practices in Geneva posed the question of the role that Spain and its spiritual empire had to play in the new context of world order opened up by the League of Nations. This question, from Geneva, also reached debates in Spain, thanks to Julián Nogueira, Salvador de Madariaga, and their Spanish friends. It nurtured the ground on which Spanish practices of spiritual empire were imagined and institutionalised.

IMAGINING THE WORLD IN SPANISH IN 1920S GENEVA

Nogueira and Plá were part of the Genevan internationalist elite from the early 1920s onward. Both joined the Press and Information Section in 1922. In an unpublished memoir written in 1947, Plá described his first years at the League Secretariat as those of 'a Spaniard in the mirror of Geneva'.[11] He explained that a certain type of Spanish-speaking character emerged from this particular internationalist setting. A very small group of three civil servants spoke Spanish at the League's Press and Information Section when Plá joined it in early 1922: 'a Peruvian who soon left' (Germán Herrera), Nogueira (a 'son of Spaniards', as Plá underlined), and Plá himself.[12] Languages and nationalities remained

[11] José Plá, 'El paso de Ginebra: anecdotario español' (unpublished memoir, 1947), ALON, box S856bis, file 2869.

[12] On Julián Nogueira and Germán Herrera, see Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt », 67–75.

unevenly represented at the Secretariat throughout the League of Nations' history.[13] Most League officials spoke French or English. Moreover, Spanish was never an official or even working language of the League of Nations.[14] Nogueira's correspondence suggests that the use of Spanish in Geneva was reserved to a friendly and familiar tone that allowed for the expression of personal opinions. The anecdotes that Plá remembered in his memoir convey a certain sense of anti-great-power *esprit de clan* among the Spanish-speaking League officials. As Plá described them, moreover, the three Spanish-speaking League officials felt close to each other, not only because of their common language, but also because of their shared 'imperial background'.

Julián Nogueira, from Latin Americanism to internationalism

Nogueira was recruited in 1921 as the first Latin American official in the League Secretariat.[15] Before joining the League, he had been a journalist and taken part in different diplomatic missions for the Uruguayan foreign office. After sending Nogueira on a scouting mission to Latin American together with his Spanish colleague Luis Bolín, Secretary-General Eric Drummond personally insisted on transferring him from the Mandates Section to the Press and Information Section. There Nogueira became the liaison official for Latin America. In 1925, his superior Pierre Comert remarked that 'all his work [was] devoted to Latin America', adding that 'he [had] little time to give to the international action of the section'.[16] This apparent opposition between Latin American matters, on the one hand, and international matters, on the other, was however not reflected in the correspondence produced by Nogueira. While working on Latin American matters, Nogueira still developed some interesting reflections on world order: he arrived at internationalism through Latin Americanism. His correspondence shows a vivid interest in the matters of the world and in the relationship between Latin America and Europe, and particularly Spain.

Throughout the decade, Nogueira constantly defended the idea that the Latin American countries had to come together in the context of the League of Nations. He did not agree with Pan Americanism and he was firmly opposed to the 'absorption' of Latin

[13] Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 60.

[14] Thomas Fischer, 'El español en el mundo: hispanoamericanismo en la Liga de las Naciones', *Iberoamericana* XIII, no. 50 (2013): 119–31.

[15] Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt », 67–73.

[16] The director of the League of Nations' Press and Information Section (Pierre Comert), report on Julián Nogueira, 23 October 1926, quoted in Wehrli, '« Créer et maintenir l'intérêt », 72.

America by the United States.[17] He was a Latin Americanist. In his correspondence with the Spanish international lawyer Augusto Barcia in 1924, for example, he explained that the concept of 'Latin America' represented the linguistic and cultural diversity of his region of origin: he insisted on the importance of Brazil and he also considered Francophone Haiti as part of the group.[18] He did not champion the independence of the Latin American region as such, however. Probably to escape the influence of the United States, he acknowledged and encouraged the influence that European 'powers' such as Spain, Portugal, France, or Italy were exerting in Latin America. The existence of this European 'intellectual' and 'migratory' scramble for Latin America was actually one of the bases for his Latin Americanism. *'No olvide usted que estoy en la Sociedad de Naciones'*, he reminded his friend Barcia, by which he meant that he not only had to represent the interests of the 'Hispanic' states, but also those of the other 'Latin' states that were playing an increasingly influential role in Latin America.[19] As a League official, he had to remain neutral in the scramble for Latin America. His attitude regarding the creation of a Latin American Bureau in 1921, which I have described in the previous chapter, confirms this, especially if compared to the attitude of the Spanish League official, Luis Bolín.

Nogueira's letters to Barcia still transmit his personal opinion, beyond his strictly institutional role. Among the European competitors, Nogueira seemed to prefer Spain. He considered the relations between Spain and its former colonies as *'cosa de familia'*.[20] Not only was he of Spanish descent himself, but he also used the semantic field of family, if not those of spirit or race, to picture a transatlantic community that shared a cultural and historical background. He openly encouraged the fostering of a tighter 'collaboration' between the Latin American states and the two former imperial powers of the Iberian Peninsula.[21] In this sense, he applauded the Ibero-American nature of some Spanish initiatives, namely the Ibero-American Exhibition of Seville, of which he gathered a positive impression when he visited.[22] Regarding the influence that Italian immigration exerted in Latin America, he lamented in 1924 that Spain was not sufficiently active in countering the 'prejudice' that Italy was causing to the 'understanding between the Iberian trunk and the American branches':

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[17] Nogueira to C. Barcia, 6 May 1930, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[18] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 27 May 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[19] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 2 July 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[20] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 24 December 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[21] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 27 May 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[22] Nogueira to C. Barcia, 6 May 1930, ALON, box S515, file B1.

> Tienen Vds. en España la mala costumbre de olvidar que Italia está realizando una labor de penetración emigratoria a todas luces perjudicial para el más íntimo entendimiento entre el tronco ibero y las ramas americanas. Y digo mala costumbre porque es realmente lamentable que se esté echando a perder el idioma castellano en algunos sitios de América y especialmente en la República Argentina donde el progreso material y el aumento constante de la población determinan una fuerza conductora que un día puede adquirir caracteres de hegemonía real.[23]

Interestingly, while Italy represented a threat of 'real hegemony' for Latin America, the connection between the formerly imperial 'trunk' and the post-colonial 'branches' did not seem to pose a problem for Nogueira.

Although he officially defended the 'Latin' nature of his region of origin under his official League hat, more privately, as he wrote in a letter to a friend, he was also happy that a 'new generation' of Spaniards was progressively abandoning a rhetorical, 'empty', and 'outdated patriotism' for a more 'practical' sense of Hispano-Americanism. Uruguayan League official though he was, he still praised the turn that Hispano-Americanism had started to take, less than a year after General Primo de Rivera had taken power in Spain:

> Creo, mi estimado amigo, que no basta decir Ibero-América, sino que previamente debe España buscar los medios de sustituir esas dos influencias importantes […]. Mientras España no rivalice en los hechos con las corrientes intelectuales de Francia tanto desde el punto de vista bibliográfico como en las demás actividades y especialmente en las ciencias aplicadas, y mientras los colonos italianos que van a enriquecer las fuentes productoras de aquellos países no encuentren en sus similares españoles dignos elementos de trabajo, España perderá el tiempo dándoles a las palabras un significado que está en la historia pero no en los hechos presentes.

Here, Nogueira was in line with the Spanish intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats who were encouraging the new dictatorial regime to take more decisive action regarding Hispano-American rapprochement. He indeed pointed to two of the main directions

[23] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 2 July 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

(cultural diplomacy and emigration) that the practices of spiritual empire were starting to take with the intervention of such practitioners as José Antonio de Sangróniz at the *Oficina de Relaciones Culturales Españolas* in Madrid or, later, Ramiro de Maeztu at the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires. Nogueira's words sound more like those of a Spanish defender of *hispanoamericanismo práctico* than those of a Uruguayan champion of internationalism.

However, Nogueira changed his mind throughout the decade. In a letter to Camilo Barcia, Augusto's brother and also a reputed international lawyer, dated May 1930, his opinion regarding Hispano-Americanism had evolved.[24] He could not be clearer when he affirmed that

> el hispanoamericanismo práctico corresponde a la existencia de una organización internacional contraria al concepto y a los fines del Pacto de la Sociedad de las Naciones.

Nogueira feared that, if taken to its ultimate consequences, the project of Hispano-American approximation would lead to the establishment of a system of international cooperation that would be in competition with the League of Nations system. His main concern was not, however, the creation of a Hispano-American system of cooperation, but rather the creation of a Pan American one. He wrote his letter two years after the Pan American Congress of Havana, where the Latin American delegates had been particularly critical of US 'imperialism', the United States having intervened in favour of the conservatives in the Nicaraguan civil war of 1927, in application of the Roosevelt Corollary.[25] Nogueira understood the League of Nations to be the only possible 'ecumenical' structure for the defence of the interests of 'smaller states' against the 'big powers'. If he rejected Pan Americanism, he also had to reject Hispano-Americanism.

Moreover, Nogueira did not trust in the capacity of the spiritual concept of 'race'. To him, it meant 'nothing or almost nothing' in world politics. He argued that the United States, with their pragmatism, would be more 'agile' than Spain and would thus manage to 'swallow' Latin America. He stated that Spaniards needed to face 'facts' instead of wasting time with 'more or less fantasy-fed lucubrations'. And the facts were, as he saw them, that the material power of the United States would be more efficient than the intangible power

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[24] Nogueira to C. Barcia, 6 May 1930, ALON, box S515, file B1.

[25] Richard V. Salisbury, 'Hispanismo versus Pan Americanism: Spanish Efforts to Counter U.S. Influence in Latin America before 1930', in *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs*, ed. David Sheinin (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 67–78; Salisbury, 'Mexico, the United States, and the 1926-1927 Nicaraguan Crisis', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 66, no. 2 (May 1986): 319–39.

of Spain. He was not convinced by the strategy of spirituality that Spanish diplomacy had been putting forward since the beginning of the 1920s. In this sense, he was in open disagreement, as he admitted, with *'nuestro amigo Plá'*, his colleague in the 'Order of Don Quixote' and at the League's Press and Information Section. In 1928, Plá had indeed defended a peculiar understanding of internationalism with which Nogueira did not agree.

José Plá, from internationalism to imperialism

Plá joined the Press and Information Section only a few months after Nogueira, in 1922, on Salvador de Madariaga's recommendation and 'on the strong recommendation of Señor Quiñones de León'.[26] Nogueira and he had 'the habit of exchanging on anything related to Spain and the Americas', as Nogueira explained in 1924.[27] The ideas that these two practitioners of internationalism developed and expressed must be placed in this context of constant contact in the same language and in the same workspace. The connection between Nogueira and Plá is a clear instance of the sort of specific Hispano-American encounters that the new institutional framework of internationalism favoured. It did not mean, however, that the two colleagues followed the same lines of thought. Internationalism and multilateralism were not univocal ideologies; they rather emerged from the blending of different sorts of hypotheses and projects that came from different backgrounds.

In 1928, Plá published a book, *La misión internacional de la raza hispánica*, in which he proposed to synthesise Spain's Hispano-Americanism and the League of Nations' internationalism.[28] This book brought together some articles that Plá had written in the Spanish newspaper *El Sol*, calling for the maintenance of Spain within the League of Nations. In 1926, Spain had withdrawn from the League, and the League Covenant foresaw a transitory period of two years before a member state withdrew permanently: Spain was therefore, in 1928, about to exhaust this transitory period. Plá had repeatedly wished for the remaining of Spain within the institutional frameworks of multilateralism. Probably to keep his anonymity as a League official, Plá had used a pseudonym to write in the newspaper: he had signed as *Uno del 98*, thereby assimilating himself to the so-called *Generación del 98*, the group of fin-de-siècle authors who had lamented the decadence of Spain after the Spanish-American War and proposed alternatives for a 'regeneration' of

[26] Madariaga to the League Secretariat, 1 August 1922, ALON, box S823, file 14586.

[27] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 27 May 1924, ALON, box S515, folder B1.

[28] José Plá, *La misión internacional de la raza hispánica* (Madrid: Javier Morata Editor, 1928). When quoting excerpts from this book, I indicate the page number in brackets after the quotation.

Spanish political, social, and cultural life. In 1928, Plá published his book with his real name and did not hide his status as League official.

He situated himself in the wake of two authors who had been a fundamental inspiration for the political reasoning of early-twentieth-century notions of spiritual empire. On one side was Ángel Ganivet, who, in 1896, had called for putting an end to 'material expansion' and the start of an active policy of 'spiritual expansion'.[29] On the other was Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins, a Portuguese historian who had been a prominent proponent of Iberianism, which he had defended in his 1879 *História da civilização ibérica*.[30] In this famous and widely read book, he had argued that Spain, Portugal, and the American states of their 'descent' were independent only for contingent reasons, but still belonged to the same 'civilisation'. In Ganivet's words, they belonged to the same 'spirit'. Plá was therefore inspired by the author who had signalled the need to mobilise the 'spiritual' capacities of Spain and by the author who had theorised the specificities of the 'Hispanic spirit', understood in a broad sense as 'Iberian'. What he understood as 'the Hispanic race' was the community of men and women who shared this same spirit.

As Plá read him, Oliveira Martins had been a 'prophet', according to whom 'Spaniards will be the apostles of future ideas' [22]. By 'Spaniards' he meant the inhabitants of Spain, but also those of Portugal, the Spanish-speaking American states, and Brazil. He portrayed the 'Hispanic genius' as 'catholic' in the etymological sense of universal. In other words, the 'Hispanic race' still had a 'civilising mission' in the world [23–26]. From this point there remained only one step towards asserting that Spain was still an empire, and Plá took it, arguing that Spain's foreign policy needed to be 'markedly imperial' [30]. He did not consider the Spanish Empire extinct, but very much alive [30–32]. In an evolutionary reading of history, he understood that the Spanish Empire had reached a post-material, 'spiritual' stage of evolution. It was thus, as he affirmed it, the most evolved empire in the world. He was in the same vein as Ganivet and Minister of State José de Yanguas Messía.

He also defined the 'spirit' of the Spanish Empire: this was, according to him, the same as that of internationalism. For Plá, the 'Hispanic race' had always borne the 'spirit' of internationalism that underpinned the League of Nations, from *doctor illuminatus* Ramon Llull in the thirteenth century to *libertador* Simón Bolívar in the nineteenth, with the very important contribution of the School of Salamanca in the fifteen hundreds. In the

[29] Ángel Ganivet, *Idearium español* (Granada: Tip. Lit. Vda. e Hijos de Sabatel, 1897).

[30] Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins, *História da civilisação ibérica* (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, 1879).

teleological reading of history advanced by Plá, the Spanish Empire was destined to play a central role in the League of Nations. The League was actually a derivation of the 'spirit' of imperialism that had been gestated within the long history of the 'Hispanic race' [33]. Spain was, consequently, the most-suited power to be at the heart of internationalism, and this was possible precisely because Spain was a persistent empire. Plá was anti-imperialist, but his anti-imperialism was compatible with an imperialist notion of internationalism.

This being said, it must be underlined that Plá was not an intellectual. His book was nonetheless prefaced and lauded by the very influential and prestigious diplomat Fernández y Medina. The latter explained that, with this book, Plá was only doing his job as an official of the Press and Information Section of the League, which aimed at 'spreading among our peoples a better understanding of the League of Nations, and of its goals, which coincide with our juridical and political traditions' [2]. Then he supported Plá's argument that 'our race' had a 'mission' to accomplish in the international order. In this sense, Fernández y Medina's prologue served as a nexus between theory and practice. Plá's ideas were not merely meant to remain in the intellectual field, but to be implemented in practical terms through officials and diplomats. Perfectly aware that his thinking was subversive and unusual among Hispano-Americanist thinkers, Plá asked: *'¿Comprenderán los hispanoamericanizantes la singular oportunidad que, para valorizar su ideal, les brinda la institución de Ginebra?'* [71]. This question, however, was less targeted to thinkers than to diplomats and policymakers. He was most probably thinking of Primo de Rivera. Plá's book was indeed published in Madrid, not in Geneva. This leads us to pose the question of whether Plá was merely trying to advance Spanish interests by means of an internationalist discourse.

SPANISH THINKERS: NATIONALISM IN INTERNATIONALISM

The rise of internationalism was an ambiguous phenomenon. As Patricia Clavin has argued, nationalism was an integral part of internationalism.[31] Plá's book seems to be an illustration of this. The institutionalisation of internationalism and multilateralism did not erase nationalism from the minds of practitioners and thinkers. Internationalist and nationalist ideas and sociabilities were not contradictory. Salvador de Madariaga was very lucid about this. Once he had abandoned the League Secretariat, he wrote:

> So long as there is no Super-State, and therefore no 'international man', the international spirit can only be assured through the

[31] Clavin, 'Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World Wars', 6.

> cooperation of men of different nationalities who represent the public opinion of their respective countries.[32]

For Madariaga, who compared the 'national psychology' of Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Spaniards in an essay mostly based on his experience at the League of Nations, the League made nations meet nations; but nationals remained nationals in an *inter*-national environment.[33] Internationalist interactions, nonetheless, transformed nationalism and placed it in a different, more global dimension, which laid the ground for the appearance of a different sort of diplomatic practice.

'The Ecumenical and the Hispanic' as two sides of the same coin

Historians of the League of Nations know Salvador de Madariaga well. He served as chief and then director of the Disarmament Section between 1922 and 1927, where he gained international notoriety as a committed defender of internationalist solutions to disarmament. He is considered as a 'liberal internationalist'.[34] It is less widely known that, when the League first recruited him, it was under a temporary contract, with the specific mission to serve as a liaison officer for Bolín and Nogueira's mission to Latin America, at the Press and Information Section.[35] The traces of his work in this section confirm his internationalist convictions. For instance, when Nogueira explained the reasons why he believed that the director of the Liaison Bureau for Latin America could never be a Spaniard or an Italian, the Italian high commissioner, Bernardo Attolico, exclaimed: *'Alors le directeur pour le bureau il faut le trouver dans la lune !'*. To this ironical comment, Madariaga replied in a serious tone: *'Je ne comprends pas ta remarque. Comme si le monde se composait uniquement d'Espagnols et d'Italiens !'*.[36] Madariaga, therefore, understood Nogueira's arguments, and perhaps even agreed with them.

This does not mean, however, that Madariaga disagreed with the postulates of Hispano-Americanism. In 1923, on the occasion of a summer school at the University of Geneva, Madariaga delivered a lecture on the topic of 'contemporary Spain'. According to

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[32] Madariaga, quoted in Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 61–62.

[33] Salvador de Madariaga, *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards: An Essay in Comparative Psychology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929).

[34] Andreew Webster, 'The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations' Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920-1938', *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 4 (2005): 493–518.

[35] Madariaga to Drummond, 15 August 1921, ALON, box S823, file 14586.

[36] Handwritten notes by Bernardo Attolico and Salvador de Madariaga, December 1921, ALON, box R1589, file 18318.

an anonymous attendant who reported on that lecture for the Latin American Bureau, Madariaga talked about 'the genius of the Spanish race'. The anonymous commentator described how Madariaga depicted 'the contemporary Spaniard': as a man evolving in the international and 'polyglot' context of the period, confronting different cultures, all of which eventually revealed to him 'the unshakable bases of the race'.[37] In his essay on 'national psychology', in 1929, he concluded that the Hispano-American 'soul' was a characteristic of the Spaniard, as compared to the Frenchman or the Englishman. There was something of a Hispano-Americanist thinker in Madariaga, and it is interesting to see how he identified the existence of an interplay between internationalism or cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and Hispano-American 'racism', on the other.[38]

Regarding the compatibility of internationalism and Hispano-Americanism, the controversy between Madariaga and Camilo Barcia was also telling. In February 1929, Barcia was in New York as a visiting researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Madariaga, once he had left the League Secretariat and was a professor at the University of Oxford, travelled to the United States for a two-month-long stay, during which he delivered twenty conferences in different cities along the East Coast. Upon his arrival, Madariaga was invited by the Foreign Policy Association to give a talk on the topic of the Monroe Doctrine at the Astor Hotel, in New York, which Barcia attended. In his talk, Madariaga asserted that the idea of an American continent was a 'Monroic myth', and he accused the Monroe Doctrine of being an obstacle to 'international cooperation' and to the 'ecumenical mission of the League of Nations'.

There was, at that very same moment, a vivid debate over whether the League of Nations or the Pan American Union had to arbitrate and resolve the ongoing and escalating border conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay. This is why Madariaga defended, in New York, the importance of the League of Nations; and this is also why Barcia, in an article published in the Spanish journal *La Libertad*, criticised Madariaga's approach to the problem:

> Un solo reparo hemos de oponer a la intervención de Madariaga: su reincidente alusión a la Sociedad de Naciones. […] lo cierto es

[37] Anonymous report on Salvador de Madariaga's lecture, 20 August 1923, ALON, box S495, file 3.

[38] Arredondo, 'Madariaga's Quixotism'.

> que Madariaga aparecía ante los ojos de sus auditores, no tan sólo como europeo, sino como ginebrino.[39]

Having said this, which showed his mistrust in the role of the League, Barcia placed Hispano-Americanism as the real alternative to the Monroe Doctrine:

> [Madariaga] debió de producirse como un hispánico, concebida esta situación dialéctica como algo específico, que no es netamente europeo ni tampoco integralmente americano. España, como símbolo de encuentro que en Sudamérica adquiere el perfil de continentalismo; y, de acuerdo con esa posición, enfocar la doctrina de Monroe. […] juzgamos que en el Astor Hotel debió hablar el hispánico o, si se quiere, el panhispánico. Lo hispánico no pasa por Ginebra […]; lo hispánico es ecuménico, y no tiene tal carácter la Sociedad de Naciones.

Barcia considered Hispano-Americanism to be a 'dialectic' solution, a compromise between Europe and the Americas, and therefore an effective position with which to overcome the more or less tacit division of the world, which some American intellectuals and politicians made, between a Europe-driven League of Nations and an 'America for Americans'. Therefore, Hispanism was 'ecumenical', in the sense that it gathered all the parties together: the Europeans and the Americans.

Madariaga, however, did not see 'ecumenism' or the roles of Spain and the League of Nations in the same manner. In an article that he published in *El Sol* a month later, he responded to Barcia, reaffirming the arguments that he had raised in New York:

> Mi propósito era el de contribuir a resolver el arduo, el terrible problema del provenir de la parte más débil de la América hispánica ante la ambición y la agresividad de la parte más dura de la América ánglica. Esto, como primer objetivo. Y, como objetivo más lejano, el de colaborar en la construcción de un mundo internacional basado en la razón, el orden y la justicia […].[40]

His aim was therefore that of an internationalist, in the more liberal and idealistic sense of the term. For Madariaga, 'ecumenism' could only be on the side of the League of Nations.

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[39] Camilo Barcia, 'Madariaga, en Norteamérica. Una campaña ecuménica', *La Libertad*, 3 February 1929.

[40] Salvador de Madariaga, 'Lo ecuménico y lo hispánico', *El Sol*, 3 March 1929.

However, since Barcia had accused him of not being Hispanic enough, Madariaga developed his argument further and subsumed Hispanism into internationalism.

In his opinion, it was only within the internationalist structures of the League of Nations that Hispano-Americanism could flourish. For him, the 'Hispanic' discourse was as inefficient as the 'American' one and, alone against the American 'shark', Hispano-Americanism was merely a 'sardine'. The only manner of 'saving the Hispanic civilisation' was by inserting it into a 'harmonic whole'. To that aim, interestingly, he positioned himself as a Spaniard 'capable of thinking objectively of an ideal'. This can be understood as a rejection of rigid nationalistic frames of thinking: for Madariaga, Hispano-Americanism needed to be envisioned and implemented through the channels of internationalism, that is, through the League of Nations. Hispano-Americanism did not constitute a solution in itself, unless it was placed within internationalism. In Madariaga's mind, Hispano-Americanism was really a part of internationalism. He affirmed so in one of the most-read Spanish newspapers, *El Sol*, which was published in Madrid, a 'liberal' paper that was tolerated by the dictatorship and read by a large audience of intellectuals and politicians. Debates on the place of internationalism, Hispano-Americanism, and Spanish nationalism were not restricted to the 'cosmopolitan' frameworks of Geneva and New York. They also reached Madrid.

Internationalist sociabilities from Geneva to Madrid

Among Julián Nogueira's assiduous correspondents was Augusto Barcia, Camilo Barcia's brother. He was a reputed Spanish international lawyer and he had been a republican deputy between 1916 and 1923. In a letter dated May 1924, Nogueira, with warm and friendly enthusiasm, invited Barcia to recall a 'banquet' that they had had in *Casa Botín*, a famous restaurant in Madrid, in the company of *'el evangélico [Ramiro de] Maeztu, el inquieto [Luis] Araquistain y el agudo [Salvador de] Madariaga'*.[41] It is tempting to imagine the conversation that these men could have had around a piece of *cochinillo*, the roasted piglet for which *Casa Botín* was and still is reputed. This restaurant, opened in 1725, is located near Madrid's *Plaza Mayor*, in the centre of a neighbourhood built under the Habsburg Monarchy, during the apex of the Spanish Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its main dish, *cochinillo*, was already appreciated at the time as a typical Castilian dish, and Castile was considered by most Spanish nationalists as the 'soul of Spain': it was

[41] Nogueira to A. Barcia, 27 May 1924, ALON, box S515, folder B1.

the birthplace of Isabella the Catholic, the queen on behalf of whom Christopher Columbus had 'discovered' and started colonising the American continent; it was also the birthplace of Miguel de Cervantes, the author of *Don Quixote* and the symbolic father of the Spanish language that these men spoke.[42] It is thus evocative to picture this eclectic group of men around this Castilian and 'national' Spanish table in the urban 'imperial' heart of Madrid. One of the points of their conversation might well have been the role that spiritual empire could or had to play in the new world order. All the commensals of this table had in common their interest in Hispano-Americanism as a political endeavour, as well as their interest in the transformation of international relations that was taking place in the 1920s.

Neither Augusto Barcia nor the 'unquiet' Luis Araquistain were part of the League system, and none of them belonged to the apparatuses of Primo de Rivera's regime. Rather to the contrary, both were known for their left-wing and republican positions. During the Second Republic, both would be elected deputies under the flags of different left-wing parties, and both would serve as high officials under different left-wing governments. Barcia was a deputy of *Acción Republicana* and *Izquierda Republicana* between 1933 and 1939, and he served as minister and prime minister in 1936. He died in exile in Buenos Aires in 1961. Araquistain was a deputy of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* between 1933 and 1939, and was appointed ambassador of Spain to Germany in 1932-33, and to France in 1936-37. He also died in exile, in Geneva, in 1959. He has been described as one of the most prominent figures of the 'new left' that emerged at the end of the 1920s, which 'very clearly prefigured the Republic of 14 April [1931]'.[43] Both Araquistain and Barcia are described as 'progressive' and 'reformist' Hispano-Americanists in David Marcilhacy's intellectual history of the notion of 'Hispanic race'.[44] Marcilhacy insists on the fact that Araquistain opposed the 'nationalist' conception of the Spanish race.

It is interesting to notice, however, that both Barcia and Araquistain agreed, more or less explicitly, on the principles that underpinned Primo de Rivera's foreign policy. Araquistain was especially opposed to US interventionism in Latin America, and as such he

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[42] Mariano Esteban de Vega and Antonio Morales Moya, eds., *¿Alma de España? Castilla en las interpretaciones del pasado español* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005).

[43] Genoveva García Queipo de Llano, *Los intelectuales y la dictadura de Primo de Rivera* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988), 506–11.

[44] David Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana: hispanoamericanismo e imaginario nacional en la España de la Restauración* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2010), 110–12 and 203–04.

was being observed by the US Department of State.[45] Indeed, he was the author of a book that denounced 'the Yankee peril'.[46] In March 1926, while Spanish diplomats were defending Spain's 'right' to occupy a permanent position at the League Council in Geneva, Araquistain supported the Spanish official position in an article that he humorously entitled 'The Geneva Tavern'.[47] Like the Spanish diplomats, he considered that each 'racial group' had the same right to be represented at the Council. He therefore believed in the existence of a 'Hispanic race' and he called for Hispano-Americanism as an alternative to Pan Americanism in the institutional context of the League of Nations.

Barcia was, in turn, opposed to Latinism, and as such he defended the interests of Spain in the international context of a scramble for Latin America. In a letter to Nogueira dated May 1924, he affirmed:

> Yo soy contumaz y no cedo ni cederé jamás en mi afán de nombrar siquiera el latinismo. Si los franceses y los italianos tienen medios intelectuales y económicos superiores a los nuestros que les aseguran, por lo menos de momento, una victoria indiscutible, ¿cómo vamos a ceder en lo que podemos defender, que es por lo menos el nombre? […] franceses e italianos van a llevarse una sorpresa enorme, porque en progresión geométrica vienen hoy aquí [a España] muchos estudiantes que antes iban a Francia y a Italia. Ya les interesa más nuestra producción artística; se dan cuenta de que en nuestros laboratorios y en las salas de operaciones de nuestros hospitales, nuestros sanatorios y nuestras universidades, encuentran tanta ciencia y tanta experiencia como en Francia y en Italia. […] y están verdaderamente asombrados de ir descubriendo que España es algo más de lo que muchos se figuran.[48]

From his position as an intellectual placed outside the dictatorial regime and even opposed to it, Barcia defended the same ideas and practices that the Spanish diplomats, within the regime, were calling for, putting forward 'spiritual' relations and politics of cultural

[45] The chargé d'affaires of the United States to Spain (John F. Martin), dispatch 854, 22 March 1926, NARA, registry 59, box 6504, file 710.52/35.

[46] Luis Araquistain, *El peligro yanqui* (Madrid: Publicaciones España, 1921).

[47] Araquistain, 'La Venta Ginebrina', *El Sol*, 21 March 1926.

[48] Barcia to Nogueira, 7 July 1924, ALON, box S515, file B1.

diplomacy to fight French and Italian forms of 'Latinism' in the context of a scramble for Latin America. In the end, when looked at through the prism of internationalism, the political and ideological convictions embedded in the different visions of Hispano-Americanism, as described by Marcilhacy from the prism of nationalism, seem to vanish. This suggests that Hispano-Americanism is not well understood as a mere branch of nationalism: it needs to be put in the perspective of internationalism.

Another commensal at *Casa Botín* was the 'evangelic' Ramiro de Maeztu. This complex character is also mentioned by Marcilhacy, this time as the epitome of Catholic, 'right-wing', and 'reactionary' Hispano-Americanism.[49] In the early 1930s, Maeztu would publish *Defensa de la Hispanidad*, which many authors have described as an anti-modern and ultra-traditionalist manifesto, and one of the ideological foundations of Spain's external projection under the Francoist regime.[50] When Nogueira mentioned Maeztu to Barcia in his letter of May 1924, Maeztu had just been appointed commissioner at the League of Nations' newly created Commission for Intellectual Cooperation.[51] Four years later, Primo de Rivera's government would appoint him ambassador to Argentina. Maeztu was therefore not an outsider to the League system or to Primo de Rivera's regime. However, he ate *cochinillo* with liberals and republicans. Internationalism crystallised in multilateral institutions such as the League of Nations, but also as a transversal theme that favoured new ideas and new circles of interaction in national capital cities such as Madrid.

The international mind-set thus impacted the agents who made foreign policy in Spain. A speech delivered in Madrid by the minister of State, José de Yanguas Messía, on the occasion of the *Fiesta de la Raza* on 12 October 1926, suggests this:

> La raza ibera realizará a la vez que una obra de confraternidad entre todos sus miembros, una aportación fecunda a la organización de la paz y a la afirmación del Derecho en las relaciones entre los pueblos, si dentro del espíritu igualitario y

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[49] Marcilhacy, *Raza hispana*, 265–69.

[50] Ramiro de Maeztu, *Defensa de la Hispanidad* (Madrid: Gráfica Universal, 1934). See also Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, 'Ramiro de Maeztu: ese desconocido', in *Soldados de Dios y apóstoles de la Patria: las derechas españolas en la Europa de entreguerras*, ed. Alejandro Quiroga and Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco (Granada: Comares, 2010), 93–120; Alfonso López Quintás, 'Ramiro de Maeztu: la defensa del Espíritu y de la Hispanidad', *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas*, no. 79 (2002): 61–86; Alistair Hennessy, 'Ramiro de Maeztu: "hispanidad" and the Search for a Surrogate Imperialism', in *Spain's 1898 Crisis: Regenerationism, Modernism, Post-Colonialism*, ed. Joseph Harrison and Alan Hoyle (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 105–17.

[51] Royal order issued by the Ministry of State, April 1924, AHN-DM, box 9, file 3899.

> democrático que inspiran nuestras relaciones, intensificara cada día más, hasta llegar a la cristalización en fórmulas concretas y permanentes, las relaciones jurídicas entre nuestras naciones.[52]

This interpretation of internationalism through the lenses of Hispano-Americanism was on the basis of Spanish practices of spiritual empire, as the next chapter shows.

[52] Yanguas, speech before the Latin American diplomatic corps in Madrid, 12 October 1926, in 'La Fiesta de la Raza en Madrid: discursos pronunciados en la función de gala celebrada en el teatro de la Zarzuela, de Madrid, el 12 de Octubre de 1926', *Revista de las Españas*, December 1926, 254–55.

CHAPTER 6

The League of Sister Nations: spiritual empire as supranationalism

INTRODUCTION

At the Congress of Panama, in 1826, the military and political leader Simón Bolívar expressed his desire for the newly independent states of the American continent to found an 'amphictyonic league', in the romantic model of Ancient Greece. He called it *'sociedad de naciones hermanas'*. This has been interpreted as the Latin American corollary to the doctrine for hemispheric anti-imperial independence that had been advocated by the United States a year earlier, under James Monroe's presidency — the so-called 'Monroe Doctrine'.[1] From the perspective of interwar history, it can also be interpreted as an early effort to construct a multilateral structure for international cooperation or regional integration.[2] The expression *'sociedad de naciones hermanas'* can actually be translated into interwar English as 'League of Sister Nations'. Yannick Wehrli has even toyed with the idea, expressed by some Latin American intellectuals of the interwar period, that the League of Nations was nothing but 'Bolívar's dream come true'.[3] Bolívar indeed conceived his league as a balanced alternative between the chimeric federation of the United States of South America and an atomised bunch of independent countries.

Although such a continental league of nations never turned into reality, the idea did not completely fade away. The memory of 'Bolívar's dream' was kept and reinterpreted a century later by different agents in different contexts. David Marcilhacy has recently analysed the commemorations of the centenary of the 1826 Bolivarian congress, which were held in Panama in 1926.[4] Intellectuals, experts, journalists, politicians and, of course, diplomats attended the meeting. This served as a momentous opportunity to bring together different ways of imagining Latin American as a region and, perhaps more importantly, of

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[1] Germán A. de la Reza, 'Deseo de ser realidad: la Sociedad de Naciones-Hermanas de Simón Bolívar', in *La invención de la paz: de la república cristiana del duque de Sully a la Sociedad de Naciones de Simón Bolívar* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI & Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2009), 90–99.

[2] David Marcilhacy, 'Panama panaméricain. Le Centenaire bolivarien de 1926, mémoires croisées et projections transnationales' (Habilitation à diriger des recherches, Sorbonne Université, 2018), 252–79. See also Salvador Rivera, *Latin American Unification: A History of Political and Economic Integration Efforts* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2014).

[3] Yannick Wehrli, 'Latin America in the League of Nations: Bolívar's Dream Come True?', in *Latin America 1810-2010: Dreams and Legacies*, ed. Claude Auroi and Aline Helg (London: Imperial College Press, 2012), 67–82.

[4] Marcilhacy, 'Panama panaméricain'.

understanding the region's role and place in the world order. As Marcilhacy argues, the Bolivarian legacy was far from being univocal. On the one hand, it of course served anti-imperial reaffirmations of sovereignty and regional independence. On the other hand, however, it was also used to reinterpret Pan Americanism and internationalism through Latin American lenses.[5] In this respect, the memory of Spain as the former imperial power was also ambiguous. In the interwar period, Bolivarianism was not necessarily anti-Spanish.

The present chapter explores how Spanish diplomacy took a proactive part in these neo-Bolivarian debates. At the same time as the Spanish delegation in Geneva was preparing Spain's withdrawal from the League of Nations, a Spanish diplomat named José María Doussinague came up with a foreign policy action plan that he explicitly placed in the wake of Bolívar's amphictyonic ideal.[6] He was the consul of Spain in Bogotá when he drafted his *Programa de acción hispano-americanista,* soon abbreviated as *'Plan P'* (where *P* stood for *política*), which he submitted to the Ministry of State in Madrid in the spring of 1926. He first submitted a general outline of twenty-one pages, which the ministry received on 28 May, and then a detailed document of fifty-four pages, in early June.

The plan had probably been commissioned by the Ministry of State's Section of America and Cultural Relations. The official in charge of reporting on the document, Federico Oliván, found it difficult to hide his satisfaction.[7] A career diplomat, he had served in the Directorate-General of Morocco and the Colonies in the early 1920s; he was thus used to military failures and imperial disillusions.[8] In the spring of 1926, having joined the Section of America and Cultural Relations, he finally held in his hands what he described as 'a calculated and mature action plan that will govern and orient, in an effective and positive manner, the relations of rapprochement between Spain and the republics of the New Continent'. In his eyes, Doussinague's *Plan P* provided the long-desired solution to 'the Hispano-American problem', which he considered to be 'the most interesting and vital issue that arises from the international reality'.

His enthusiasm must be placed in the context of Spain's foreign policy in the mid-1920s. The *Plan P* did not appear as an isolated and somewhat chimeric programme. Spain

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[5] Marcilhacy, 'Panama panaméricain', 317–424.

[6] Doussinague, *Programa de acción hispano-americanista*, AHN, file H-2298, folder 26.

[7] Oliván, report, 15 June 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 26.

[8] 'Federico Oliván Bago', Euskomedia: Auñamendi Eusko Entziklopedia, accessed 11 April 2016, http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/117012. See also 'Ha fallecido Federico Oliván', *ABC*, 4 September 1973.

was taking part in the scramble for Latin America as yet another actor amongst different countries that competed for material and intangible practices of power. It was precisely in June 1926 that Minister José de Yanguas Messía sent out his instructions for Spanish diplomats in Latin America to 'preserve at any cost [Spain's] vast spiritual empire'.[9] Also in that spring of 1926, Spanish diplomats were wielding spiritual arguments to try to legitimise Spain as a great power in the framework of the League of Nations. The drafting and approval of Doussinague's *Plan P* was part of this set of diplomatic practices that aimed to claim world power by virtue of imperial legacy. Some months earlier, the hydroplane *Plus Ultra* had reached Buenos Aires amidst massive enthusiasm and, in the meantime, the Spanish administration had given a decisive push to the decision-making process leading to the Ibero-American Exhibition, the inauguration of which was then foreseen for 1927. The *Plan P* thus came to crown this momentum of enthusiasm for Spanish spiritual empire.

Consequently, the Spanish government took it very seriously. This was not the first time that a comprehensive and consistent action plan for 'practical Hispano-Americanism' had been written. Intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats had long called for a plan of this kind. In 1917, the renowned historian Rafael Altamira had presented his own *programa americanista*, which could have been, in his opinion, immediately translated into practice.[10] This never happened, however, probably because Altamira, notwithstanding his close links to certain circles of power, was not part of any state apparatus. Doussinague, in contrast, belonged to the administration. Like many other diplomats, he had possibly read Altamira, and he might have attended some of the courses that Altamira had taught at the Diplomatic and Consular Institute during the second half of the 1910s. In May 1926, Doussinague was a consul reporting to a minister through the established institutional channels. Unlike Altamira's *programa*, Doussinague's *Plan P* was not meant to be a publication: it was an administrative document and was treated as such, with discretion and confidentiality, by the Spanish foreign office. In September 1926, following the favourable opinion of Minister Yanguas, it was endorsed by the Council of Ministers, a few days after

[9] Yanguas, instructions to Spanish diplomats in Latin America, 23 June 1926, copy kept in the records of the Spanish embassy in Rome, AGA, box 54/16724.

[10] Rafael Altamira, *España y el programa americanista* (Madrid: Editorial América, 1917).

Spain had given notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations to Secretary-General Eric Drummond.[11]

From that moment on, different agents took part in the implementation of the first phase of the programme, also known as *'Plan C'*, where *C* stood for Colombia. Doussinague had recommended that Spain concentrate its initial efforts in Colombia. This was meant to dissimulate Spanish ambitions behind a supposedly 'Bolivarian' screen, but also to give a central role to the Latin American republics in a multilateral process of supranational integration. The objective that the *Plan P* pursued was indeed very clear:

> lograr la unión de las 19 naciones de habla española (y a ser posible, de las 2 de idioma portugués) en un Superestado que, respetando la independencia de cada una, las presente ante el mundo como un solo bloque, gracias a la adopción por parte de todas ellas de una sola línea política, tanto en lo interior como en lo internacional. [G1][12]

The project had the ambition to adapt Bolívar's ideal to the context of the mid-1920s, once the founding of the League of Nations had legitimised multilateral institutions as desirable structures of governance for peace keeping and international cooperation. At the same time, it deprived Bolívar's project of its post-colonial and inter-American characteristics, and included Spain and Portugal, the European former imperial powers, in the picture. The *Plan P* instrumentalised Bolivarianism for the sake of Spain's imperial re-enactment. It brought together two elements that were tightly intertwined in the 1920s: internationalism and imperialism. Moreover, it is particularly interesting because it took the further step of aiming at a 'super-state' that would gather together independent member states around a shared line of political action. In other words, the *Plan P* blended Latin American Bolivarianism and Spanish spiritual empire in a project of supranational integration.

The study of this action plan adds an important piece to the understanding of spiritual empire as a practical political programme. It shows that the Spanish government did adopt a consistent plan of action to construct an international community of states on the basis

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[11] Enrique Moral Sandoval, ed., *Actas del Consejo de Ministros. Alfonso XIII. Presidencia del General Primo de Rivera. Directorio Civil (1925-1930)* (Madrid: Ministerio de Relaciones con las Cortes y de la Secretaría del Gobierno, 1992), 97.

[12] The *Plan P* consisted of two documents: a general one that outlined the main objectives, and a detailed one. When quoting these two documents, I signal in brackets whether the quotation refers to the general (G) or to the detailed (D) one, followed by the page number as it appears in the original document. Here, the quotation is taken from the general document, page 1 (G1).

of imperial legacy. It additionally shows that Spanish diplomacy not only adapted to the transformations of the world order after the First World War, but also tried to take an active part in them. The *Plan P* was the instrument through which Spanish diplomacy attempted to subvert the international landscape of the period. Doussinague and other Spanish officials aimed to offer a genuinely 'Hispanic' alternative to the 'Genevan' League of Nations and to the 'Washingtonian' Pan American structures. More importantly, they believed that spiritual empire was a legitimate basis for the construction of a supranational organisation that would recalibrate the place and weight of Spain in international relations. Spanish diplomats had the intuition that scattered practices of spiritual empire were not sufficient. They thus used the tools provided by the rise of multilateralism and internationalism to design a system of supranational integration based on the explicit adhesion of Spain's former colonies. This chapter explores the choice of supranationalism as the *modus operandi* of Spanish practices of spiritual empire.

The first section presents the ideological background of Doussinague's action plan. It underlines the original complexity of this plan, which was not only meant to be the practical implementation of spiritual empire, but also the end of post-colonial nationalist fragmentation in Latin America. Doussinague wished for Spain to become a *primus inter pares* in a decentralised 'empire of sovereign states' based on internationalist rules that pursued the common interest of different nation-states simultaneously. At the same time, Doussinague imprinted a 'Bolivarian' mark on Spanish spiritual empire, trying to bring Bolívar's amphictyonic aspirations back onto the agenda of international relations and to insert them into Spanish Hispano-Americanist political practices.

In the second and third sections, I address the theory and the practice of the specific kind of diplomatic measures that Doussinague proposed. I label these measures as 'technical diplomacy'. They were designed as the material embodiment of the intangible sort of diplomatic practices that the policy of spiritual empire brought forward. I first address the specific means by which Doussinague intended to concretely implement his vision of Bolivarian Hispano-Americanism: his *Plan C* called for Spain's financial and material support for the development of civil engineering in Colombia. However, as I explain in the third section, the Spanish government did not manage to implement the *Plan C*, and the *Plan P* failed dismally within less than a year.

This sixth and last chapter of the thesis thus ends in a narrative of failure. It shows the material limitations of spiritual empire on Latin American soil. The scramble for Latin America also concerned the realm of the material, and Spain did simply not have the

capacity to compete. In this context, Latin American agents preferred the capital and infrastructure that the United States and other industrial and financial powers could offer, rather than the spiritual ties that linked them to their former imperial metropole. As it seems, spiritual empire went only so far. This opens the question of the pertinence of assessing the practices of spiritual empire in terms of success and failure.

IMPERIAL INTERNATIONALISM AS POST-NATIONALISM

Spiritual empire against nationalism

According to Doussinague's diagnosis, the main problem posed to Hispano-Americanism was that, paradoxically, it could not be directly implemented in Hispanic America. The common force of Hispanism was latent in Hispanic American societies, but it first needed to be stimulated. Doussinague explained why, in his opinion, Hispanic American societies were not yet receptive to Hispano-Americanism as a political programme: to his mind, the situation was less due to mistrust towards Spain than to the persistent apprehensions and recurrent disputes between Hispanic American states themselves. *'En realidad'*, Doussinague concluded, *'las naciones hispanas de América se sienten — de modo general — tan separadas unas de otras como las naciones de Europa.'* [D2]

Notwithstanding this observation, which might have sounded discouraging after the First World War that had torn Europe to pieces, the unifying potential of Hispano-Americanism was not under discussion. Doussinague drew a clear-cut distinction between 'what is natural, what is the profound and eternal truth, what is substantive, fundamental, essential in the Hispanic world', on the one hand, and 'what is secondary, very superficial, what is only visible at first sight', on the other [D14]. The first element was spiritual empire. The role of Spain was to invigorate it while annihilating the second element. Unlike spiritual empire, however, this second element, which Doussinague called *'criterio de diferenciación'*, was still pervasive among the 'masses' [D15]. Spain thus needed to target those masses in order to reunite what had been artificially pulled away 'by the efforts of Hispanic Republics to affirm their personalities after their emancipation, by the wars fought between those Republics, and by the suggestive strength of one hundred years of nationalistic and intensely chauvinistic endeavours' [D12].

Doussinague put forward a concrete international relations device: the *'principio de confraternidad'*. Designed to counter the *criterio de diferenciación*, this principle of confraternity was meant to work as a practical instrument of international rapprochement. It was conceived as a juridical principle on which to base international declarations and binding

treaties and arrangements. It thus was an internationalist tool that was supposed to facilitate agreements between sovereign states. At the same time, the etymology of 'confraternity' leaves no room for doubt: the principle was based on the assumption that there existed a Hispanic family, a sisterhood of Hispanic American nations emancipated from the Motherland and still united by the same underpinning spirit. In other words, the principle stemmed from the imperial thinking of Spanish diplomacy. Doussinague called for the implementation of a common practice of international relations (the formulation of an international law principle) in order to advance towards the political integration of a community of states that had emerged from an extinguished imperial polity. The principle of confraternity was to be the legal foundation of Spanish spiritual empire.

Like Hispano-Americanism, however, this principle of confraternity could not be directly adopted as such by every Hispanic state. Doussinague insisted on the importance of giving time to time: *'no se pierda de vista que el desarrollo del Plan P exigirá varios años, quizá muchos'* [D43]. The 'super-state' would crystallise gradually, through a process of incremental integration. A first core of states would agree upon an international arrangement to which other states, individually or in groups, by successive waves of enlargement, would progressively adhere:

> Parece lógico tratar primeramente de agrupar dos o más Repúblicas para luego ir sumando a esta primera célula las demás naciones hispanas por agrupaciones sucesivas. Se concreta por lo tanto el programa de acción hispano-americana en el propósito de crear algo así como una *Petite Entente* hispánica. [D19]

In Doussinague's opinion, the first core of states, the 'Hispanic *Petite Entente*' from which to start the integration process, had to be 'Bolivarian'. He described a group of Bolivarian states formed by Peru, Bolivia and, more importantly, the former *Gran Colombia*, the republic founded by Bolívar in 1821, which fell apart in 1831, corresponding in 1926 to Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. These six states were, in Doussinague's view, perfectly ready to integrate almost immediately, provided Spain focused its efforts on them.

Actually, Doussinague suggested that the group of Bolivarian states was already partially integrated, since they had put in practice the principle of confraternity on different occasions. He indeed claimed that this principle was present *de facto* in a customs agreement that Colombia and Ecuador, he said, had signed in 1906, a treaty in which 'mutual concessions regarding trade are so important that, to find something similar, one must go

back to the treaties celebrated between Prussia and the German states of the *Zollverein*' [D36]. I have found no reference to this treaty in the sources that I have consulted. Moreover, the Muñoz Vernaza-Suárez Treaty, by which Colombia and Ecuador mutually recognised their border, was only signed in 1916. The hypothesis that two states would sign a customs agreement before recognising their common border is not very plausible. However, although it is doubtful that the 1906 Colombian-Ecuadorian customs agreement ever existed, Doussinague strongly believed in the positive effect that the practical use of the principle of confraternity could have. In his depiction of the 1906 agreement, the reference to the German 'spiritual' system of integration (the *Zollverein*) was explicit, and so was, therefore, the plea for the utility of Spanish spiritual empire.

Doussinague was convinced that Spain would be able to stimulate the legacy of Bolivarian confraternity in order to make Colombia reach a customs agreement with Venezuela. Confraternity was, for him, the 'practical' instrument, as opposed to 'sentimental lyricism', which would allow Bolivarian states to come together through concrete achievements:

> [El éxito de un tratado comercial entre Colombia y Venezuela] tendría la más grande resonancia porque probaría la eficacia del principio de confraternidad para resolver problemas internacionales. Si esto se logra, el principio de confraternidad pasará de ser un lirismo sentimental a ser un sistema político práctico, útil, de fácil empleo y éxito seguro en las relaciones de los Estados hispanos. [D48]

Once proven *de facto*, nevertheless, the principle of confraternity would still need to be proclaimed *de jure*. To this aim, Doussinague considered that the Bolivarian states offered an optimum context: the border litigation between Peru and Ecuador. This territorial dispute was long-lasting: after two failed attempts of Spanish arbitration between 1887 and 1910, both parties reached an agreement, in 1924, to resume negotiations via their plenipotentiaries in Washington, and even to ask for the arbitration of the President of the United States, if needed. In 1926, nonetheless, negotiations had not yet started.[13] Taking advantage of this deadlocked situation, Doussinague, without mentioning the repeated

[13] Ronald Bruce St John, *The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to Settlement*, vol. 3, Boundary and Territory Briefing 1 (Durham: University of Durham, 1999); Félix Denegri Luna, *Perú y Ecuador: apuntes para la historia de una frontera* (Lima: Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 1996).

failures of Spain and ignoring the 1924 agreement on the arbitration of the United States, proposed to form an *ad hoc* commission of seven experts (one representative for each Bolivarian state and one representative for Spain) to study and bindingly solve the litigation. Interestingly, the first task of the commissioners was planned to be the making of a public 'declaration', in which they would solidify the objective of a 'Bolivarian Union', adopting the principle of confraternity as the guiding thread of their work. This declaration would therefore assert the principle of confraternity as an instrument of international law, capable of resolving international conflicts peacefully.

Doussinague was even more precise. He recalled that the declaration would need to be very specific about the applicability of the principle in three different situations: within the Bolivarian Union, in the rest of the Hispanic world, and vis-à-vis de United States:

> Esta declaración tendrá que sentar ante todo el principio de confraternidad como sistema político; tendrá que extender este principio de confraternidad a las naciones hispanas que queden fuera de la Unión; y tendrá que establecer el principio de la colaboración amistosa con los Estados Unidos. [D45]

In Doussinague's prediction, the principle of confraternity, once established as the 'political system' of the Bolivarian Union, would be the force driving the 'law of spiritual gravity' [D3], by virtue of which the Hispanic countries outside the Union would feel inevitably attracted to the Bolivarian core. More specifically, the principle would be attractive insofar as it would ensure long-lasting peace through practical devices, such as agreements upon customs or borders. At continental level, moreover, the principle of confraternity would also allow for a slightly different translation, the 'principle of friendly collaboration', which would ensure peaceful neighbourly relations between Latin America and the United States. Consequently, it was from the core group of Bolivarian states and through the principle of confraternity as a vector of interstate integration that the Americas would find the practical remedy against any potential source of instability.

Turning to Bolivarianism

Doussinague had no doubt that the principle of confraternity would find fertile ground in the Bolivarian states. This, in his mind, was mainly due to the geographical context of those countries. Situated in northern South America, they were north enough to 'feel a more vivid mistrust of the United States' [G7], which would conversely invigorate the awareness of belonging to the Hispanic family. They were also south enough to create a

'geographical pincer' around Brazil, thereby compensating the 'excessive' ambitions that the latter showed. This would eventually bring Brazil to 'bigger tolerance and compromise', perhaps forcing it to ultimately enter the enlarged Bolivarian Union that Doussinague foresaw [G7]. In reality, for Doussinague, 'if we obtained the creation of the Hispano-American Union without Brazil, the job would be incomplete' [D44].

Moreover, the Bolivarian states offered a considerable demographic advantage in comparison to the rest of the Hispanic world. They, especially Colombia, were, as Doussinague said, less influenced by European immigration. There was a relatively important Italian community in Caribbean Colombia, mainly located in the city of Barranquilla.[14] But Doussinague was right in pointing out that Colombia and the other states of the 'Bolivarian' region were not very attractive to European emigrants, including Spaniards. In 1927, the Colombian government launched a campaign to attract Spanish emigrants to Colombia. The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Bogotá was not very enthusiastic about the idea and, with irony, he warned Spaniards against the dangers of 'thoughtless' emigration after 'the beautiful tradition of El Dorado': 'horrible misery', 'absolute lack of hygiene' in an 'unhealthy […] tropical climate', and 'inhospitable places'.[15]

This situation comforted Doussinague. In the Bolivarian states, unlike what had happened in Argentina, Chile, or Uruguay, the Hispanic spirit inherited from the imperial times had not been 'erased' by non-Spanish immigration [G7]. Doussinague was well aware of the struggles that the Spanish communities underwent in Argentina to 'preserve' Hispanic identity against the competing 'Latin' identities brought in by the Italians and, to a lesser extent, the French and the Portuguese. In the Bolivarian states, by contrast, the spiritual legacy of the Spanish empire could never be so vulnerable. Doussinague claimed that Colombia remained 'the most Spanish and Hispanophile country in the Americas' [G9].

The supposedly Hispanic essence of Colombia calls for a longer explanation. In February 1927, Doussinague published an article in the *Revista de las Españas*, which was read by most Hispano-Americanist intellectuals and policymakers, including the youngest

[14] Vittorio Cappelli, *Storie di italiani nelle altre Americhe: Bolivia, Brasile, Colombia, Guatemala e Venezuela* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009); Giovanni Filippo Echeverri, *Plátano maduro no se vuelve verde: inmigración italiana en Colombia, 1860-1920* (Mompox: Gdife, 2007).

[15] The minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Colombia (Ávila), dispatch 43, 27 July 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 18.

generations of diplomats.[16] With no explicit mention of the *Plan P* or of any action undertaken by the Spanish government, the article addressed what Doussinague presented as the unavoidable guiding principle of international relations among the Hispanic American states. This was not the principle of confraternity, but an international doctrine that, in Doussinague's view, was tantamount to it: the so-called 'Suárez Doctrine', named after Marco Fidel Suárez, a respected Colombian intellectual and politician, who served as president of Colombia from 1918 to 1921.[17]

In the early 1900s, Suárez was a fairly influential conservative thinker in rural Colombia. A fervent catholic and a defender of the Spanish language, he was known and appreciated in Spain, especially among conservatives. In 1884, he was elected a member of the *Academia Colombiana de la Lengua*, the oldest academy of Spanish language in the Americas, founded in 1871, through which he became a corresponding member of the Spanish Royal Academy. Mentored by Miguel Antonio Caro Tobar, a leading figure in Colombian conservative politics, Suárez got involved in the Colombian foreign office and, after entering the conservative party, served as minister of Foreign Relations between 1914 and 1917. Those were convulsed years in Colombian external policy: in 1903, Panama had declared its independence from Colombia, with the critical support of the United States, and it had virtually become a client state of the United States. The relations between Colombia and the United States were therefore very tense. Besides this, the United States did not pay the agreed compensation of 25 million dollars to Colombia until 1921. At the same time, nonetheless, Colombia's economy still depended heavily on exporting coffee to the United States: between 1920 and 1924, coffee represented 68.5% of Colombia's exports, and the United States was Colombia's main trade partner.[18] In the midst of this uneasy situation, Minister Suárez proclaimed the first of his two famous international doctrines: '*Respice Polum*'.[19] According to it, Colombia needed to acknowledge the superiority of the United States, the '*polus*' that gave its name to the doctrine, and act in

[16] Doussinague, 'La doctrina Suárez y su posible influencia en el porvenir de América', *Revista de las Españas*, February 1927.

[17] Demetrio Moreno, 'Don Marco Fidel Suárez y Su Tiempo', Centro de Historia de Bello: para que la memoria no se olvide, 25 April 2015, http://www.centrodehistoriadebello.org.co/content/don-marco-fidel-suarez-y-su-tiempo, accessed on 15 April 2016.

[18] See James Robinson and Miguel Urrutia, eds., *Economía colombiana del siglo XX: un análisis cuantitativo* (Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007), 81–126.

[19] Teresa Morales de Gómez, 'Doctrinas internacionales de Marco Fidel Suárez', *Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades* XCII, no. 830 (September 2005): 489–514; Manuel Barrera Parra, 'Suárez, internacionalista americano', in *El derecho internacional en los «Sueños de Luciano Pulgar»: doctrinas internacionales*, by Marco Fidel Suárez, ed. Manuel Barrera Parra, vol. II (Bogotá: Publicaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1955), 5–19.

consequence, in a position that some scholars have called 'rational dependency'.[20] This doctrine was strongly contested in Colombia.

This was not, of course, the 'Suárez Doctrine' to which Doussinague referred in his 1927 article. He rather made reference to the second of Suárez' international doctrines: the '*Doctrina de la Armonía Boliviana*' [sic], which Suárez, who had been elected president of the Republic in the meantime, announced in December 1920.[21] This second doctrine has been described as 'a feeble attempt to broaden the outlook of Colombian diplomacy' after the outcry produced by the first doctrine.[22] In Suárez' conception, 'Bolivarian Harmony' would cement closer ties between the countries 'liberated' by Bolívar, especially among those that had once belonged to *Gran Colombia*. It was conceived as 'the practical implementation of Bolívar's ideas'.[23] Moreover, it aimed to recover Colombian influence over states that had once belonged to a territorially greater Colombia. Therefore, it can legitimately be interpreted as a manifestation of Colombian spiritual empire.

In Doussinague's interpretation, this doctrine was derived from the irrefutable 'sense of very special solidarity' that existed among Bolivarian states and that Spain needed to exploit [G4]. This solidarity, in Doussinague's view, was not only due to the figure of Bolívar, who surely was a 'great political and military genius', a 'romantic hero', and even 'worshipped as a semi-god', but also to the common experiences of the Bolivarian states, which had 'fought together' against Spanish domination [G4]. Doussinague, nonetheless, was serene: *'No queda, en lo que alcanza mi observación, en este sentimiento llamado «bolivarismo» ni el más pequeño asomo de hostilidad hacia España.'* [G4] He actually took this a step further:

> El paralelismo que existe entre la aspiración y la unión hispano-americana y la tendencia al bolivarismo es evidente. Ambos movimientos tienen en aquellos países el mismo propósito unitivo, se basan en la misma razón de confraternidad, se persiguen mediante los mismos procedimientos de deferencias constantes y

[20] Luis Dallanegra Pedraza, 'Claves de la política exterior de Colombia', *Latinoamérica. Revista de estudios latinoamericanos*, no. 54 (July 2012): 37–73. See also Carlos Camacho Arango, 'Respice polum: las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos en el siglo XX y los usos (y abusos) de una locución latina', *Historia y Sociedad*, no. 19 (December 2010): 175–201.

[21] Marco Fidel Suárez, 'El Sueño de la Armonía Boliviana', in Barrera Parra, *El derecho internacional en los «Sueños de Luciano Pulgar»*, vol. II, 21–42.

[22] María Teresa Calderón and Isabela Restrepo, eds., *Colombia 1910-2010* (Bogotá: Taurus, 2011), 289.

[23] Barrera Parra, 'Suárez, internacionalista americano', in *El derecho internacional en los «Sueños de Luciano Pulgar»*, vol. II, 5–6.

> extraordinarias y hasta emplean la misma fraseología y los mismos recursos retóricos derivados del mismo fondo sentimental. [G5]

As paradoxical as this might seem, Doussinague believed that Hispano-Americanism could best develop through Bolivarianism.

Interwar Bolivarianism presented some striking similarities with interwar Hispano-Americanism. Both were intellectual currents trying to re-enact extinct polities: the Spanish Empire in the case of Hispano-Americanism, and Bolívar's *Gran Colombia* in the case of Bolivarianism. Both were reactions, in a way, to the imperialist interventions of the United States: the 1898 Spanish-American War in the case of Spain, and the 1903 independence of Panama in the case of Colombia. Both counted on governmental endeavours to get 'practical' results out of them: on one side, the Suárez Doctrine of Bolivarian Harmony; on the other, the efforts of the Spanish government towards spiritual empire. Building on these similarities, Doussinague was convinced that the Suárez Doctrine could be an instrument of Spanish spiritual empire. In his view, the Bolivarian ideology embedded in the Suárez Doctrine was already a great advancement in the integration process towards a Hispanic 'super-state'. To put it another way, Bolivarianism was just the local form of Hispano-Americanism.

Among those Bolivarian states, it was Colombia that held the most privileged position in Doussinague's eyes. It was, as he said, 'the spiritual centre of Bolivarianism' or, in other words, the centre of Colombian spiritual empire [G8]. It offered the cultural, geographical, economic, and ideological skills required to be the first focal point of Spain's actions. Doussinague saw Colombia as 'the executive instrument of the *Plan P*' [D45]. Since it was the 'heart' of Bolivarianism, Colombia could put forward the principle of confraternity, thereby setting in train the 'law of spiritual gravity' leading towards a Hispanic 'super-state'. Consequently, Spain would obtain large benefits with little effort. Using the facilities that Bolivarianism offered, it would be easy 'for us to orient [Colombia's] politics' [G9].

Doussinague nevertheless added that this would only happen if 'we maximise the prestige of Spain in that republic' [G9]. The plan, thus, was only 'Machiavellian' at first sight.[24] In reality, it revealed that Doussinague was well aware of the weaknesses of Spain as a direct player in the arena of inter-American relations. Spain would need Colombia as an

[24] The term 'Machiavellian' is inspired by the expression used by the ministry-plenipotentiary of Spain in Bogotá (Ávila), who described the flow of US capital to Colombia as *'la maquiavélica penetración del dólar'* (dispatch 42, 26 July 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17).

indispensable collaborator and, even in such a 'Spanish' and 'Hispanophile' country as Colombia, it would still need to 'maximise its prestige'. Yet, to this end, as Doussinague himself admitted 'on the basis of a practice that is common to the military art and to diplomacy', Colombia was still 'the point of least resistance' [D20ter]. The Bolivarian states were considered second-rate countries on which it would be easier to exert an influence. Building his argument upon his experience as a diplomat, Doussinague recognised that countries such as Argentina or Mexico 'believed' that Spain was 'less powerful' than they were [G6–7]. Indirectly, he was recognising that Spain was indeed incapable of exerting any influence over the strongest and wealthiest of its former colonies. Showing some political pragmatism, he advised the Spanish government to concentrate its efforts on the Bolivarian states. The Bolivarian turn for which Doussinague called was also a matter of survival for Spanish spiritual empire.

Oliván, when he reported on Doussinague's action plan, picked up on this same idea:

> Hasta ahora, al hablar de política americanista, sólo nos acordamos de la Argentina, Cuba, México y Uruguay: repúblicas ricas que no necesitan de nosotros para su desenvolvimiento. En cambio, teníamos a los países bolivarianos casi olvidados. Apenas si algún brindis de banquete, pletórico de lugares comunes, turbaba de cuando en cuando la vulgaridad de una amistad internacional vagamente platónica y sin contenido sustancial ni práctico. Urgía pues adoptar una línea de conducta inspirada en un estudio meditado y sereno del problema.[25]

He was even more precise than Doussinague. To him, the Bolivarian states were indeed the 'point of least resistance', not only because they were weaker than other Hispanic American countries, but also, and principally, because they 'need[ed] us [Spain] for their development'. This reference to Spain's possible intervention in the 'development' of, say, Colombia posed the more general question of the actual role that Spain would be supposed to play in the internationalist project of a 'super-state' in which Doussinague placed his hopes. Indeed, coming back to Doussinague, Spain still needed to make the effort to 'attract' Colombia and could not simply rest on its Bolivarian laurels:

[25] Oliván to Yanguas, note, 15 June 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 26.

> No hay que creer que el bolivarismo solo y sin más ayuda puede llegar a realizar la unión hispano-americana. Esta es una tarea colosal que requerirá todos los esfuerzos de la diplomacia española durante muchos años y aun lustros: tarea que está por hacer y que presenta dificultades sin cuento que habrá que ir venciendo una a una a fuerza de inteligencia y obstinación. Sería pueril pensar que el vago e inconcreto sentimiento bolivariano, como una varita mágica, puede hacer que desaparezcan en un abrir y cerrar de ojos todas estas dificultades.
>
> No: el bolivarismo no pasa de ser el punto de apoyo para afirmar en él la palanca de nuestra acción. Esta palanca — nuestra diplomacia — y la fuerza para moverla, y la inteligencia para dirigir su movimiento, las tenemos que poner nosotros. [D23–24]

To Doussinague, the logic of spiritual empire as such was not sufficient. More concrete diplomatic efforts were necessary to materialise spiritual empire in the form of a super-state.

TECHNICAL DIPLOMACY[26]

Expertise

Doussinague, born in 1894, took his first steps in professional diplomacy in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. Some characteristics of his *Plan P* signal that he was aware of the scholarly debates that were taking place in different fields of the social sciences. The study of international relations assumed the shape of an independent academic discipline after the war, at least in Europe.[27] Like Minister of State Yanguas, who was only four years older than him, Doussinague had received a doctorate in law and believed in the virtues of treaties and international norms. Doussinague was also convinced that the mission of a diplomat went beyond mere representation: he described himself as 'a Spaniard arriving in South America with an interest in study' [D1]. He made an explicit plea for practicing diplomacy on the basis of a 'scientific' study of states and interstate relations.

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[26] I am grateful to Corinna R. Unger for her insightful comments on an earlier version of this section.

[27] For an overview of international relations as a discipline, especially during the interwar period, see Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016); Dario Battistella, *Théories des relations internationales*, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012), 81–120.

In his opinion, the only way of solving the problems posed to Hispano-Americanism was, first and foremost, to apply an 'analytical approach' to the study of Hispanic American states:

> […] el hispano-americanismo no podrá dar un paso en terreno firme mientras el concepto genérico y global que hoy se tiene de Hispano-América —concepto puramente retórico— no sea sustituido por un espíritu de análisis que empiece por hacer todas las necesarias distinciones y pase luego a estudiar paradamente cada una de las partes así aisladas. Solo mediante el empleo de este criterio analítico podrá plantearse el problema hispánico científicamente y solo cuando se plantee científicamente se le podrá encontrar solución. [D2]

Having said this, Doussinague tried to lead by example. He based his action plan on a detailed examination of each and every Bolivarian country. He assessed the specific relevance of Hispanism and Bolivarianism in the given country, and he measured the depth of the country's relations to Colombia as the future core of the Bolivarian Union and the 'executive instrument' of Spanish action. Doussinague positioned himself as an expert on the ground, claiming to present 'concrete facts directly and objectively observed' [D13].[28] In doing so, he provided precious information to the agents of the Ministry of State in Madrid: the copy of the *Plan P* that is kept in the records of the Section of America and Cultural Relations was abundantly underlined and annotated.

To target the efforts of Spanish external action efficiently, Doussinague started by analysing the different reasons for which Bolivarian states, and Hispanic states in general, still mistrusted each other [D3-9]. In first place, there was a 'political reason' nurtured by ongoing litigations over the definition of international borders. In addition to that, Doussinague blamed an 'ethnic reason' stemming from the 'black legend' that demonised the Spanish Empire: the 'Hispanic race', he argued, could have unified the entire Hispanic American region, but post-independence nationalisms had made Hispanic peoples unaware of the existence of their common 'race'. Doussinague lamented that Hispanic states, including Spain, had lacked solidarity whenever a foreign 'imperialist' intervention had

[28] To put Doussinague's 'scientific' observations in the larger perspective of Spanish diplomats observing Hispanic America, see Isidro Sepúlveda, 'La imagen de América a través de los informes diplomáticos españoles (1900-1930)', *Mélanges de la Casa Velázquez* XXVIII, no. 3 (1992): 129–42.

occurred, and he named this phenomenon the 'historical reason'. Finally, he blamed the immense size of Hispanic American national territories, which, in combination with the smallness and dispersion of populations, posed considerable obstacles to communications.

Doussinague concluded that this 'geographical reason' was actually the problem that encompassed and aggravated all the other problems (politics, ethnicity, and history). Geography caused 'a spirit of isolation, of differentiation' [D9], the *criterio de diferenciación*:

> He aquí la verdadera causa de la existencia del concepto de diferenciación en el cerebro hispano-americano. La geografía deshizo la gran obra de España fraccionándola, la geografía realizó la independencia de la América española. La geografía hizo que, después de la emancipación, cada una de aquellas repúblicas se replegara dentro de sí misma y rehuyera todo contacto con las demás; le geografía es la que se opone hoy a que las aspiraciones del hispano-americanismo se conviertan en realidad. [D12]

Geography, as the main problematic reason behind post-imperial nationalist fragmentation, was thus the most compelling issue with which Spanish diplomacy had to deal. The most obvious solution was to remove geographical obstacles. This called for technical means that would help Hispanic American states to communicate, physically speaking. Doussinague's long and 'scientific' analysis of the situation of states and international relations led him to the conclusion that, in order to achieve the practical objective of Hispano-Americanism, which was the 'super-state', Spain needed to get involved in technical undertakings: the construction of roads, railways, and navigation lines. Thanks to these, spiritual empire would triumph over the 'spirit of differentiation'.

At this point, Doussinague touched upon the core meaning of 'practical Hispano-Americanism'. The success of Spanish spiritual empire would not come from eloquent discourses, not even, or at least not exclusively, from programmes of cultural cooperation. Doussinague applauded the crucial utility of any measure in the 'cultural, intellectual, and artistic' spheres, in order to increase the prestige of Spain in Colombia [G9]. However, the practical achievement of spiritual empire as a super-state would come from civil engineering, following a model of development that was explicitly presented as European:

> Hemos encontrado en efecto que la causa del criterio de diferenciación estribaba en último término en las imposiciones geográficas. Y esto abre el camino a todas las esperanzas. Porque si

> alguna labor es capaz de realizar la civilización actual, esta labor es la de dominar los obstáculos materiales. Puede decirse que en Europa las imposiciones de la geografía han sido ya totalmente quebrantadas por la espesísima red de vías de comunicación que tejen el mapa de nuestro continente. Y esto que en Europa se hizo ya, puede hacerse, sin que quepa duda alguna, en el [continente] americano. [G17–18]

The faith in progress, modernity, and civilisation that Doussinague professed might sound like a sort of 'modernisation theory' *avant la lettre*, which stated that Western-like technological advancement was the most direct path towards social and economic prosperity.[29] Historians of development have demonstrated that the golden age of 'modernisation theory' as a device of foreign policy was during the 1950s and 1960s, when the United States undertook programmes for development in different areas of the world and in the context of the Cold War.[30]

But the 'modernisation theory' had its roots in the interwar period. In the 1920s, a Copernican revolution was at work in the British and French empires: shifting away from the exploitation of the colonies, the notions of 'colonial development' and *'mise en valeur'* conveyed the idea that European metropoles had to help their colonies become civilised. This was the technical and quantifiable version of the civilising mission that had legitimised colonialism.[31] Moreover, the interwar period also connected internationalism and development. In a similar way to what Doussinague proposed to do in Colombia, the League of Nations favoured the 'exportation' of European modernity to China, for example.[32] Doussinague wrote his *Plan P* against this background of changing paths in both colonial administration and internationalist politics. He wanted Spain to adopt a developmental diplomacy in parallel to its more ideological, cultural, or purely spiritual

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[29] Michael Adas, 'Modernization Theory and the American Revival of the Scientific and Technological Standards of Social Achievement and Human Worth', in *Staging Growth. Modernization, Development, and the Cold War World*, ed. David C. Engerman et al. (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 25–45.

[30] Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); David C. Engerman et al., eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Cold War World* (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). See also Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York & London: Routledge, 2007).

[31] Frederick Cooper, 'Writing the History of Development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8, no. 1 (2010), 9–10.

[32] Margherita Zanasi, 'Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (2007): 143–69.

strains of Hispano-Americanism. In order to overcome the obstacles that geography and post-imperial nationalisms posed to confraternity, the most rational solution was to provide developmental aid to Colombia.

Aid

Doussinague's action plan was divided into two main parts: the *Plan P*, which contained the 'political' analysis and designed the general objectives, and the *Plan C*, the 'economic' part, which presented the concrete measures that Spain had to implement in order to 'strengthen the organisation of the Colombian nation, helping the latter to solve its economic problems' [G10], that is, to develop. Reporting on the 'economic' part of the action plan, Oliván, in Madrid, was enthusiastic.[33] He was certain that Spain could take an active part in a milestone moment in diplomatic history: the fading of 'pomp and circumstance' in front of economic pragmatism. This turn, he said, was specific to 'rich and powerful nations' that set their sights on 'commercial preponderance' and 'economic influence'. The paths of international relations and imperialism met once more.

What Oliván described and desired resembled what some historians have called 'informal imperialism'. Doussinague, indeed, took the United States as a model:

> En efecto, el ejemplo de la política de los Estados Unidos en la América hispana nos demuestra que la manera práctica y eficaz de realizar la penetración pacífica de un país es intervenir en su vida económica. Toda la visible antipatía de algunos países hispanos de América hacia los Estados Unidos no basta para contrarrestar la violenta atracción económica que ellos realizan y que en último resultado hace que aquellos países acudan a Norteamérica a solucionar todas sus cuestiones (aun las no económicas) y a solicitar continuamente su ayuda, su consejo, el parecer de sus técnicos, etc. La eficacia del procedimiento empleado por Washington aparece incontestable ante estos resultados. Es lógico esperar para España resultados por lo menos iguales del empleo de los mismos métodos. [G9–10]

Here the ideal of happy confraternity suffers a certain setback. The 'peaceful penetration' of Spain into Colombia's 'economic life' begins to look like the truer, more cynical

[33] Oliván, report, 15 June 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 26.

objective pursued by Doussinague's action plan. It may even seem that the spiritual display of Hispano-American confraternity was nothing but a mere instrument utilised by Spain in order to obtain better results than the United States in the game of informal imperialism. To some extent, Doussinague did hope that the implementation of his action plan would benefit Spain in 'practical' economic terms as well. Doussinague wanted a share for Spain in the material aspects of the scramble for Latin America.

However, the objective of plans *P* and *C* cannot be reduced to 'informal imperialism'. Looking closer into what Doussinague envied in the United States, the key notion of 'prestige' stands out clearly. In fact, for Doussinague, the 'peaceful penetration' that the United States achieved was interesting insofar as 'the visible antipathy of some Hispanic states of America against the United States' tended to vanish. Doussinague believed in the virtues of commerce and economic relations in building cordiality between states. In his mind, establishing economic relations with Colombia would approximate the latter to Spain, which would enhance the prestige of Spain as that of a 'rich and powerful' nation, in Oliván's words. This mechanism would initiate the 'law of spiritual gravity', which would ultimately lead to the construction of the 'super-state'. In other words, Doussinague bet on incrementalism as a system of diplomacy, a system in which economic 'penetration', through development aid, would be only the first step in a much longer process of integration of a spiritual post-imperial nature.

With his ubiquitous 'scientific method', Doussinague assessed the situation of the Colombian economy. He signalled that Colombia was going through what Salomón Kalmanovitz has called 'the take-off of Colombian capitalism'.[34] In 1924, the prices of coffee in the US market increased, which had a positive impact on the Colombian economy. More importantly, in 1925, the public purse effectively received the compensation that the United States had paid for the loss of Panama (25 million dollars, which represented 4% of that year's GDP). This small boom had a direct repercussion in the development of infrastructure. The Colombian government invested more than 60% of the amount of the US compensation payment in building railway infrastructures.[35] Doussinague called for Spain to take advantage of this situation. Since the most important problem posed to Colombia's development was the lack of railways, Doussinague invited

[34] Salomón Kalmanovitz, 'Las instituciones colombianas en el siglo XX', in *Ensayos sobre Colombia y América Latin. Libro en memoria de Nicolás Botero*, ed. Miguel Sebastián (Madrid: Servicio de Estudios del Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 2002), 19–20.

[35] Robinson and Urrutia, *Economía colombiana del siglo XX*, 383–458.

the Spanish government to concentrate its efforts on assisting Colombia with the construction of railways.[36]

He more concretely designed a scheme in which Spain would fill Colombia's gaps in terms of capital, labour, and material. Regarding capital, a banking society, provided with a Bank of Spain guarantee, would lend 150 million pesetas (21.8 million dollars) to the Colombian state.[37] Regarding labour, Spain would commission a group of Spanish engineers and technicians who would travel to Colombia and become 'the able and cheap engineers that this country needs' [G16]. Doussinague knew that, since the late nineteenth century, Colombia had been finding it very difficult to form a consistent body of engineers.[38] He knew, in particular, that this lack of civil engineers was one of the most serious obstacles to the construction of railway infrastructures in Colombia. As for material, Spanish industrial firms would also export to Colombia at least part of the components and equipment needed to build the railways. This, of course, would be advantageous for the development of Spain's own industry. The entire *Plan C* was actually designed to be beneficial for Spain, since it was meant to ensure the interests of Spanish financiers, the prestige of Spanish professionals, and the profit of Spanish industrialists.

Respecting the requirements of Colombian law, Doussinague planned to form a Spanish construction society that would operate under a public contract with the Colombian state. He took the contract established between the Colombian state and a Belgian construction society, which was then undertaking the construction of the Bogotá-Tunja railway, as a source of inspiration. The Belgo-Colombian contract fixed a price per kilometre of railway and foresaw a payment by the state to the society for every five kilometres completed. As Doussinague explained, this system of fractioned payment was more interesting for the Colombian government, since it guaranteed low prices in the long run. In addition, the Belgians worked with 'the superior competence of European managerial staff' [G17], which ensured the success of their undertakings, as Doussinague argued. By contrast, he underlined, the railways that had been built directly by Colombian

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[36] On the problem of railway infrastructure in Colombia in the mid-1920s, see Paulo Emilio Escobar, *Los ferrocarriles de Colombia en 1925-26* (Bogotá: Imp. de M. de G., 1926). This book was actually used by the Ministry of State in Madrid: a copy of it is kept in AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[37] For the value of the peseta with respect to the dollar, see P. Martínez Méndez, *Nuevos datos sobre la evolución de la peseta entre 1900 y 1936: información complementaria* (Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios, 1990), 14.

[38] Pamela S. Murray, *Dreams of Development. Colombia's National School of Mines and Its Engineers, 1887-1970* (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1997); Frank R. Safford, *The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976).

authorities or by Colombian firms had always proved remarkable failures.[39] Doussinague thus recommended following the Belgian example.

Nevertheless, Spain still needed to perform better than Belgium or the United States. In order to reach the goal of spiritual empire, it was vital to enhance the attractiveness of the Spanish proposal. Doussinague encouraged the Spanish government to make the necessary sacrifices and even to offer more for less if necessary. The Spanish construction society would have to work on the building of a very strategic railway, such as the one connecting Antioquia to Cartagena, a road to Atlantic trade for the rich and productive region of Medellín. The Spanish society would then need to assure the 'rapid and perfect execution' of the contract, as this was in 'Spain's political interest' [G18]. In a whirlwind of optimism, Doussinague took his enthusiasm even further:

> La sociedad constructora española tendría que aspirar desde el primer momento a construir, no solo un ferrocarril, sino, a ser posible, dos o más; y, al mismo tiempo, una o varias carreteras; sin olvidar el trazado de líneas marítimas, que en un principio se podrían servir con buques de construcción española, pasando luego a levantar astilleros. De esta manera se obtendría plenamente la finalidad política que se persigue. [G18]

To achieve this ambitious objective, Spain would first need to gather 'two or three engineers specialised in the construction of railways and roads who have already completed several works of the kind, a naval engineer capable of creating navigation lines where there is no material or staff or any element for that aim, and a renowned economist to study […] the Colombian economy' [G21]. This technical commission would then be sent to Colombia. The practical implementation of the Spanish strategy of spiritual empire was, at least during its first phase, in the hands of technicians and experts.

FACING MATERIAL LIMITATIONS: A FAILURE?

On a loose leaf dated March 1929, Doussinague wrote:

> Esta segunda parte o «programa económico» enviado en 1926 no es ya viable hoy, porque: 1º Las cifras en que se basa ya son otras.

[39] Doussinague referred to the construction of the Puerto Wilches-Bucaramanga railway as particularly problematic. See Augusto Olarte Carreño, *La construcción del ferrocarril de Puerto Wilches a Bucaramanga 1870 a 1941: síntesis de una obra discontinua y costosa* (Bucaramanga: Sic Editorial, 2006).

> 2º Los trabajos que se preconizan están ya realizándose por compañías norteamericanas, alemanas, francesas, etc. 3º Los medios de que estas compañías disponen son tales que no parece posible que la compañía española superara su labor: por lo que no se obtendría el prestigio que como finalidad política se persigue.[40]

A year earlier, during a session on Hispano-Americanist policy at the National Assembly, General Primo de Rivera had recognised that the projects undertaken in Colombia had 'not crystallised'.[41] He did not explain why. Doussinague nonetheless provided two main reasons for the failure of the *Plan C*: changes in the 'figures' between 1926 and 1929, which suggests that the process of implementation was not sufficiently rapid enough to react to changing circumstances and monetary evolution; and strong competition from different 'companies' coming from different countries, which suggests that Spain was unable to contend in the material battles of the scramble for Latin America. The project of a Hispanic 'super-state' thus failed from the very first phase of its implementation.

Spaniards at cross purposes

The Ministry of State requested the minister of Development, Rafael Benjumea, to provide a technical report on the viability of *Plan C*. The Ministry had to insist up to three times before Benjumea finally handed in his report, possibly in January 1927.[42] Doussinague was asked to comment on it: he had some substantial disagreements with Benjumea. While the latter wanted Colombia to pay for the technical mission and to make commitments in advance in the form of a contract with Spain, Doussinague believed that Spain had to pay for the mission and that Colombia could not commit before having the results of that mission.[43] Doussinague was worried about diplomatic tact, while the minister of Development was concerned with economic sustainability. In any case, it is noteworthy that a diplomat and an engineer did not share the same ideas on how to implement a programme of developmental aid.

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[40] Doussinague, handwritten note, March 1929, AHN, file H-2298.

[41] *Asamblea Nacional. Presidencia del Excmo. Sr. D. José Yanguas Messía. Diario de las Sesiones*, no. 18 (28 March 1928), 687.

[42] Yanguas, royal orders, 18 June, 3 August, and 31 December 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[43] The report delivered by the minister of Development is not kept in the archival records of the Ministry of State, but Doussinague's opinion on the report is. The latter is an unsigned document, nonetheless undoubtedly hand-written by Doussinague. Although this document is also undated, it must have been written between 31 December 1926, when the minister of State requested the minister of Development's report for the last time, and 22 February 1927, when the Council of Ministers approved a loan to Colombia (AHN, file H-2298).

Moreover, Doussinague and Benjumea had not had access to the same information. Benjumea knew that the Colombian government had already agreed in principle on receiving aid from Spain; Doussinague, apparently, did not.[44] Consequently, Doussinague's specifications did not prevail: the loan to Colombia was approved by the Council of Ministers on 22 February 1927, and the negotiations between Spain and Colombia began, though no group of technical experts ever travelled there.[45] All of this suggests that leadership over the action plan was not clearly established, and every agent managed different pieces of information. Doussinague noticed and lamented this situation. In a private letter sent to the head of the Section of America and Cultural Relations, Juan Cárdenas, he wrote:

> En realidad todo cuanto se ha hecho es obra de usted y estoy muy seguro de que todo se hubiera realizado con el mayor acierto si hubiera continuado usted dirigiéndolo.[46]

This was sent from San Sebastián only ten days before the Council of Ministers met, also in San Sebastián, to approve the *Plan P*. Doussinague was there following the king during his summer vacation, together with the government and other officials. Doussinague's comment to Cárdenas might have come after conversations with Yanguas or other foreign policy officials. He seemed well informed when he complained about the fact that Cárdenas was no longer to lead the move.

In reality, both Cárdenas and Doussinague were agents among others, and their respective roles were never clearly defined. It was Oliván, within the Section of America and Cultural Relations, who first read and analysed Doussinague's text in May-June 1926. His report to Minister Yanguas had Cárdenas' endorsement. In September 1926, the action plan arrived before the Council of Ministers through Minister Yanguas, and apparently Doussinague himself, in San Sebastián. The plan was approved and placed among Yanguas' personal competences. Within his ministry, nonetheless, Yanguas let the Section of America and Cultural Relations deal with the daily work. According to Doussinague's letter, however, the head of that section did not have full power of leadership over the work. In the archival records, indeed, there are almost no traces of Cárdenas' intervention, while there are abundant traces of Oliván's, who played a decisive and proactive role.

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[44] Yanguas to Benjumea, royal order, 31 December 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[45] Moral Sandoval, *Actas del Consejo de Ministros*, 133–34.

[46] Doussinague to Cárdenas, handwritten letter, 10 September 1926, AHN, file H-2298.

Nevertheless, as far as communication with Colombia was concerned, instructions came clearly from the minister of State himself: first Yanguas and then, from February 1927, Primo de Rivera.

Until his resignation, Yanguas took particular care in controlling the amount of delicate information that was sent to the minister-plenipotentiary of Spain in Bogotá, whose family name was Ávila. In the summer of 1926, at least two draft versions of the same telegram were prepared to inform Ávila about the *Plan P*.[47] Ávila had already been vaguely informed of the existence of the *Plan C* (not the *Plan P*) and had already been asked to gather some technical information regarding civil infrastructure in Colombia.[48] The telegram drafted during the summer was meant to be much more specific: it included a clear and explicit explanation of the overall objective of a 'super-state', including details on the desired 'Bolivarian Union' and the central role that Colombia was expected to play. In Doussinague's opinion, the telegram needed to be even more detailed, 'since Ávila does not know about the project'.[49] In the end, however, such a detailed telegram was never sent to Ávila, as Oliván explained in a marginal note:

> Presentado a S.E. [Yanguas], que dispuso se suspenda el envío hasta que se defina más la situación y caso necesario que se le vaya poniendo al tanto del plan a medida que se avance en el desarrollo del plan.[50]

Yanguas himself took the decision not to inform Ávila of the ambitious objective of the *Plan P*. Ávila was only given the strict technical instructions that he needed in order to start negotiating with the Colombian authorities, along with a very general explanation of the overall objective of his action. In the telegram that he ultimately received, the *Plan P* was vaguely described as a plan for the 'attraction of Hispanic American states', but no mention of the super-state or the Bolivarian Union was made.[51] A copy of Doussinague's plan was apparently sent to him later, but no mention was made of it in ensuing exchanges. There is

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[47] The first version of the draft telegram (one handwritten document) was a very short note accompanying a copy of Doussinague's original document (AHN, file H-2298, folder 17). The second version (three typewritten documents) included a longer explanation of the action plan and of its first phase of implementation in Colombia (AHN, file H-2298, folder 17 and loose leaves).

[48] Yanguas to Ávila, royal order, 25 May 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[49] Doussinague to Cárdenas, handwritten letter, 10 September 1926, AHN, file H-2298.

[50] Handwritten note in the margins of a draft telegram from Yanguas to Ávila, probably written in August 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[51] Yanguas to Ávila, telegram 6, 17 September 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

also no way of knowing whether the version of the plan that Ávila received, if he ever received it, was the same that kept in the records of the Ministry of State, or rather an edited version. Yanguas seemingly wanted to avoid indiscretions in order to preserve the secrecy of Spain's ambitions. In fact, some information had already leaked.

As early as July 1926, the possibility that Spain might invest capital in Colombia had echoed in the press in Bogotá.[52] The rumours had had repercussions as far south as Buenos Aires: some laudatory articles had appeared in the Argentinian press, applauding 'the true purpose that guides [Spain] in establishing new bonds with southern American nations', wishing for Spanish investments in Argentina, and describing Spanish investors as 'enthusiastic collaborators' rather than 'rent-seeking lenders'.[53] When this information reached Madrid in a diplomatic dispatch from Buenos Aires, someone, possibly Oliván, wrote the familiar warning expression *'¡ojo!'* with a red pencil in the margin, highlighting the delicate nature of the matter. The fear of leaks could thus explain why Ávila, in Bogotá, had to work with carefully counted doses of information.

On the ground, the opacity of information certainly contributed to the failure of the implementation phase of the *Plan C*. Ávila obeyed the instructions that he received from Madrid, but he was also quite recalcitrant. In open contrast to Doussinague, he insistently highlighted the problems and complications that investing in Colombia could entail. He did not see Colombia as a land of opportunity either: making ironic references to the legendary quest of El Dorado, he urged the Spanish government to be careful when sending Spanish nationals to Colombia, underlining 'the inconveniences and difficulties that technicians, experts, and industrial workers from other nations are forced to endure'.[54] Similarly, when he sent technical reports on recent episodes of railway construction in Colombia, he did not forget to bring the minister's attention to 'the fact that there have been litigations and intricacies in almost all the cases, which demonstrates the considerable care that we must take'.[55] More importantly, Ávila insistently recalled the competition of the United States and the unstable situation of the dependency of the Colombian economy.[56] The influence

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[52] Ávila to Yanguas, dispatch 42, 26 July 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[53] The ambassador of Spain to Argentina (Alonso Caro), dispatch 122, 14 July 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[54] Ávila, dispatch 43, 27 July 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 18.

[55] Ávila, dispatch 89, 3 December 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

[56] Ávila, dispatch 42, 26 July 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17. Ávila repeatedly insisted on the strong competence of the United States: dispatch 61, 30 September 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 26; dispatch 82, 10 November 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

of the United States in the Colombian economy, through funding and business, was evident and important. In the 1920s, Colombia's coffee exportation started depending heavily on US markets. Colombia's specialisation in coffee production really took shape in the 1920s. In previous decades already, the proportion of other agricultural goods, especially bananas, had grown significantly, and so had the interest of US firms in them.[57] Simultaneously, US investors were becoming increasingly interested in Colombian oil.[58] In Ávila's mind, this situation was problematic insofar as resentment against the United States was progressively 'diluting'. Therefore, the material involvement of the United States represented fierce competition to the Spanish investment venture, and it also challenged the spiritual logic that was supposed to underpin it.

At the beginning of the process, however, Ávila was still patriotically optimistic. In September 1926, he still saw the competition of the United States as a challenge rather than an insurmountable obstacle. Even ignoring the detail of Doussinague's plan, Ávila had the intuition that Spain was responding to 'deep-rooted wishes for a practical linkage between Colombia and the Motherland'.[59] This suggests that the mind-set of spiritual empire was pervasive among Spanish diplomats. However, it had to cope with the practical possibilities of implementation, and Ávila's touch of optimism rapidly faded away.

Negotiation in competition

On 4 January 1927, following the clear instructions that he had received from Madrid, Ávila offered Spain's financial support for the construction of railways in Colombia: a loan of 100 million pesetas (16 million dollars), at an interest rate of 'approximately' 7%, and a 'minimum' debt issuance rate of 92%.[60] The capital would be provided by a banking society to which the Bank of Spain would give a state guarantee. A number of kilometres of railways would be determined in advance and the building would be overseen by a Spanish

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[57] Marcelo Bucheli, *Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899-2000* (New York: New York University Press, 2005).

[58] Xavier Durán, 'El petróleo en Colombia, 1900-1950: especuladores y empresas multinacionales', in *Ecopetrol: energía limpia para el futuro* (Bogotá: Villega Editores, 2011), 21–62; Bucheli, 'Negotiation Under the Monroe Doctrine: Weetman Pearson and the Origins of US Control of Colombian Oil', *Business History Review* 82 (Autumn 2008): 529–53; John D. Wirth, ed., *The Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985). See also Bucheli, 'Political Survival, Energy Policies, and Multinational Corporations: A Historical Study for Standard Oil of New Jersey in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela in the Twentieth Century', *Management International Review* 50, no. 3 (2010): 347–78.

[59] Ávila, dispatch 61, 30 September 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 26.

[60] Yanguas to Ávila, telegram 14, 30 December 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17. For the value of the peseta with respect to the dollar, see Martínez Méndez, *Nuevos datos sobre la evolución de la peseta entre 1900 y 1936*, 14.

construction society. At least 20% of the material needed to build the planned railways would come from Madrid.[61] This offer was financially interesting for Colombia, and it was not less interesting for Spain.

In February, however, the Colombian government judged the Spanish offer 'unacceptable'.[62] Spain, albeit spontaneous and generous, had arrived late. In the mid-1920s, Colombia was undertaking 'a plethora of civil engineering', in Ávila's words.[63] The scramble for Latin America also translated into technical diplomacy for development. The Colombian government had received numerous offers from different banking societies in different countries. Those coming from the United States were the most significant. In November 1926, Ávila had already warned the Spanish government about the attractive offer that a group of US financiers had made to the Colombian government: a loan of 100 million dollars (659 million pesetas), separable to suit Colombian needs — an interesting offer that had certainly attracted the Colombian authorities.[64] Competition was intense, and it did not only come from the United States:

> […] de algún tiempo a esta parte se hallaban en Bogotá varios representantes de Casas y Establecimientos bancarios de diversos países, alemanes, belgas, holandeses, ingleses y de los Estados Unidos, acosando con sus propuestas al Gobierno de Colombia. […] el Banco Franco-Italiano, Sucursal en Bogotá del Central establecido en París, había también hecho proposiciones.[65]

Ávila did not enter into the details of each and every offer that had been made to Colombia. He did comment more extensively, nonetheless, on a Belgian proposal that might look more appealing than the Spanish one. A Belgian society had indeed approached an eminent entrepreneur of the Antioquia Department with the project of building a railway between Santa Fe de Antioquia and the Magdalena River. This connexion would

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61 *Memorandum* presented by the Spanish government to the Colombian government, 4 January 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 1.

62 Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 4, 26 February 1927, quoted in dispatch 19, 7 March 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 12.

63 Ávila, dispatch 43, 27 July 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 18. See also Robinson and Urrutia, *Economía colombiana en el siglo XX*, 383–458 and 517–84.

64 Ávila, dispatch 87, 29 November 1926, AHN, file H-2347, folder 34. For the value of the dollar with respect to the peseta, see Martínez Méndez, *Nuevos datos sobre la evolución de la peseta entre 1900 y 1936*, 14.

65 Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 4, 26 February 1927, quoted in dispatch 19, 7 March 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 12.

link the region of Medellín to both Bogotá and the Atlantic Ocean.[66] Spain, following Doussinague's idea, had equally thought of opening the Antioquia Department to the Atlantic Ocean. Belgium could thus also become a fierce competitor.

Only in late February did the Spanish government start to perceive that international competition was actually a very substantial obstacle. Anticipating Colombian refusal, Ávila sent a concise, though unequivocal telegram.[67] The Colombian government was planning to issue a call for tenders to finance the construction of railway infrastructure. This call would contain concrete conditions that would be equal for every tender. Ávila feared that proposals coming from other countries could be more advantageous to Colombia than the one that Spain had prepared. He was indirectly urging the Spanish government to come up with a better offer. In Madrid, this message was immediately communicated to Primo de Rivera, who had taken over the Ministry of State after Yanguas' resignation. On 22 February, the Council of Ministers authorised the concession of a loan to Colombia, 'ending the requirement of acquiring [Spanish] material'.[68] On the next day, Primo de Rivera sent instructions to Ávila for a 'better' offer in this sense.[69] From this moment on, the tone of the correspondence between Ávila and Madrid became less enthusiastic, more prosaic, and decidedly more pragmatic. To be sure, the Colombian decision to launch an open call for tenders was disappointing news from the Spanish point of view.

The disappointment, however, was only partial. At the same time as judging the Spanish project 'unacceptable', the Colombian government gave a second chance to Spain:

> También me añadió [el Ministro de Hacienda], dentro de la mayor reserva […], que en Consejo de Ministros se había acordado redactar un Memorándum con las bases a que deberían sujetarse los solicitantes en las propuestas de empréstitos al Gobierno de Colombia. En ese mismo Consejo quedó también acordado que el memorándum en cuestión se pasaría a mi conocimiento antes que a los demás, por deferencia debida al Gobierno español, al que el de Colombia le está profundamente agradecido por el acto

[66] Ávila, dispatch 2, 8 January 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 1.

[67] Ávila to Yanguas, telegram 2, 17 February 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[68] Moral Sandoval, *Actas del Consejo de Ministros*, 133–34.

[69] Primo de Rivera to Ávila, telegram 3, 23 February 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

> espontáneo de afecto demostrado con la proposición de ayuda material que se le había hecho.[70]

Colombia would launch the call for tenders and would select the most attractive offer, but Spain would get an exclusive access to the terms of the call before it was launched. Indeed, on 14 March the Colombian government sent the *memorandum* of the call for tenders to the Spanish government, via Ávila.[71]

This sort of Hispanic influence peddling is difficult to interpret. Colombia's position was in fact ambiguous: on the one hand, Colombian authorities would choose the offer that would be the most advantageous for them; on the other, they still wanted to cosy up Spain with some doses of spiritual lyricism:

> El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores volvió a confirmarme la muy grata impresión que ha causado al Sr. Presidente de la República y a todos sus Ministros, reunidos en Consejo, la intervención de España para ayudar a Colombia y que, en igualdad de condiciones, sería la preferida, añadiéndome que fue tal el entusiasmo habido que creía firmemente podrían allanarse todas las diferencias que se presentasen y que se esforzaría el Gobierno para llegar al acuerdo con España, no sólo por el afecto que le profesa, sino por el gran significado que lleva consigo la citada ayuda. Es más, particularmente, siguió diciéndome, el conseguimiento del empréstito de España a Colombia significaría el mayor y más honroso galardón de su etapa ministerial dentro del grandioso significado que supone el acercamiento material de ambos países, puesto que ya unidos están por indestructibles lazos espirituales.[72]

The attitude of the Colombian government was, to some extent, in line with the Spanish mind-set of spiritual empire. Colombian authorities were conceding a very special privilege to Spain. Nevertheless, Colombia's Hispano-Americanism was also 'practical' and oriented towards Colombia's own benefit: by invoking spiritual amity, the Colombian government tried to lead Spain into making the best possible offer. As Ávila reported on different

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[70] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 4, 26 February 1927, quoted in dispatch 19, 7 March 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 12.

[71] Ávila, dispatch 24, 14 March 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 13.

[72] Ávila, dispatch 24, 14 March 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 13.

occasions, Colombia was at the time facing a vivid internal debate on whether to deepen their financial dependence on the United States or to look for other sources of funding.[73] In this context, the Colombian government was probably trying to test the waters of a Spanish alternative. It thus used the argument of spiritual empire as an invitation for Spain to compete more assertively with the United States, Belgium, and others.

The Spanish government, however, did not respond efficiently to such an invitation. Madrid was indeed very slow to react. Colombia sent the *memorandum* on 14 March, but only on 21 April did an official of the Section of America and Cultural Relations review it, advising that the 'competent department' report on the possibilities that the new situation left to Spain.[74] On that same date, Ávila sent a telegram from Bogotá, transmitting the hurry of the Colombian government to receive Spain's updated proposal by 28 April.[75] On 30 April, the Section of America and Cultural Relations asked General Primo de Rivera, who was in Seville visiting the future site of the Ibero-American Exhibition, for his opinion on the matter.[76] In May, negotiations resumed, but Spain was clearly in a position of weakness.

Following the terms of the call for tenders, the Spanish government made a new offer.[77] It lowered the interest rate from 7 to 6.5%, and it increased the debt issuance rate from 92 to 93%, with an amortisation period of thirty years. In addition to that, as agreed by the Council of Ministers in February, the loan was no longer associated with any requirement regarding the acquisition of material in Spain. The Colombian government nevertheless rejected this proposal, asking Spain to lower the interest rate as much as possible.[78] Madrid did lower it down to 6.25%. In this second proposal, Primo de Rivera even offered to lower the interest rate to 6% and to increase the debt issuance rate up to 95% if Colombia agreed to guarantee oil concessions to Spanish companies.[79] However, Spain did not have a large margin of negotiation: the final agreement was upon an interest

[73] Ávila, dispatch 84, 20 November 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17; Ávila to Yanguas, telegram 2, 17 February 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[74] Report on Ávila's dispatch 24, 21 April 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 13.

[75] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 7, 21 April 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 15.

[76] The Section of America and Cultural Relations to Primo de Rivera, via the Civil Governor of Seville, unnumbered telegram, 30 April 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[77] Primo de Rivera to Ávila, telegram 6, 5 May 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[78] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 9, 13 May 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[79] Primo de Rivera to Ávila, telegram 8, 13 May 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

rate of 6.25% and a debt issuance rate of 93%.[80] Once this agreement was established, the Colombian government officially launched the call for tenders on 4 June.[81] Officially, Spain only needed to respond to this call as any other candidate tender would.

The correspondence between Madrid and Bogotá was particularly unclear and disorganised during those first weeks of June. Officials in Madrid and Spanish diplomats in Colombia did not seem to understand one another. On 15 and 16 June respectively, Primo de Rivera and Ávila tried to recapitulate the situation. The dictator, for his part, was annoyed and straightforward:

> Recibidos telegramas 17, 18 y 19 algo confusos sobre estado asunto, procuro aclararlo á continuación. Primero: España no tiene ya especial interés en realizar empréstito cien millones á Colombia si no va ligado á seguro concesiones adquisición material ferroviario por valor siquiera cuarta parte de lo que prestamos. Segundo: Mantenemos condiciones de 6,50 por ciento y emisión á 93 y amortización en 33 años, solo si no se otorgan mejores á otros países y se nos concede lo del suministro del material. Tercero: Cumplidas condiciones anteriores nos conviene más entrega dinero y material en dos ó tres anualidades, si se llega á los cien millones, bastando para nuestra política alcanzar cincuenta. Cuarto: Sin llenarse las dos primeras condiciones deberá V.E. retirar nuestra proposición. Lo saludo.[82]

Suddenly, the Spanish government had taken a step back. Ignoring the agreement upon an interest rate of 6.25%, Primo de Rivera returned to 6.5%. Moreover, while Spain had always offered 100 million pesetas, now 50 million (8.6 million dollars) were judged 'enough for our policy'.[83] Even more strikingly, the requirement of acquiring at least 25% of the material in Spain reappeared as *conditio sine qua non*, even though it had been rejected by the Council of Ministers in February. There were, most certainly, discrepancies within the Spanish government that Primo de Rivera wanted to straighten out. In all probability, the Ministry of State had also been brought under pressure by Spanish industrialists and

[80] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 11, 13 May 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[81] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 14, 13 May 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[82] Primo de Rivera to Ávila, telegram 12, 15 June 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[83] For the value of the peseta with respect to the dollar, see Martínez Méndez, *Nuevos datos sobre la evolución de la peseta entre 1900 y 1936*, 14.

financiers who wished to derive maximum profit from Spain's undertakings in Colombia. Furthermore, in one of his 'somewhat confused' telegrams, Ávila had warned the government about the possibility that 'our proposal may be much more favourable to Colombia than needed'.[84] Spain risked having been tricked into Colombia's game by making too generous an offer. All these reasons could explain why, on 4 July, Spain put an end to the negotiation process *'por telegrama de la Superioridad'*, that is, by a direct order coming from General Primo de Rivera.[85]

A cartel of US societies, Hallgarten & Co. and Kissel, Kinnicutt & Co., signed a contract with the Colombian government in July 1927.[86] Faced with this, a comment made by Ávila in December 1926 may have sounded prophetic:

> […] a mi juico, Excmo. Señor, si, por ciertos temores políticos muy razonables, se hubiese dado el caso de que los banqueros y negociantes de ese país [los Estados Unidos] encontraran insuperables obstáculos para desarrollar sus actividades en esta República, a buen seguro forzarían a ésta a eliminarlos, pues nadie ignora aquí la poderosa presión con que cuentan para, en un momento dado, hacer bajar el café, que hoy tiene un precio muy alto en el mercado de los EE.UU. de Norte-América, y que bastaría cualquier combinación allá para que corriera grave riesgo la economía de Colombia, su prosperidad y su progreso. El recuerdo del acontecimiento político de Panamá […], que está en la memoria de todos, me permite consignar este comentario que ruego a V.E. con todo respecto se sirva disculpar.[87]

If Ávila begged the minister's pardon for his somewhat defeatist remarks, it is probably because they reflected a cold truth. The *Plan P* failed in front of the overwhelming material capacity of the United States and other industrial and financial powers that were scrambling for Latin America at the same time as Spain. Spain and, more particularly, Doussinague, Ávila, Oliván, Yanguas, and Primo de Rivera were confronted with the complexities of the

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[84] Ávila to Primo de Rivera, telegram 17, 12 June 1927, AHN, file H-2347.

[85] Oliván, report on Ávila's dispatch 59, 5 August 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 24.

[86] Ávila, dispatch 80, 21 July 1927, AHN, file H-2347, folder 31. See also *Republic of Colombia and Hallgarten & Co. and Kissel, Kinnicutt & Co: Fiscal Agency Contract Relating to $25,000,000 6% External Sinking Fund Gold Bonds Dated July 1, 1927, Due January 1, 1961* (New York: Evening Post Job Prtg. Office, Incorporated, 1927).

[87] Ávila, dispatch 90, 3 December 1926, AHN, file H-2298, folder 17.

American continent, about which they probably knew little before 'going to Colombia'. On the 'Bolivarian' ground, Spanish agents discovered intricate logics of material competition that nipped the Hispanic 'super-state' in the bud.

In spite of this first failure, however, the *Plan P* had a longer trajectory within the Spanish administration and went far beyond Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. In 1932, during the Second Republic, Doussinague became Director-General of Foreign Policy and, in 1933, the *Plan P* was again approved by the Council of Ministers.[88] It was nonetheless abandoned some months later. As Lorenzo Delgado has shown, some influential Spanish officials did not share Doussinague's ambition of a Hispanic 'super-state' based on multilateral cooperation, and preferred to devote resources to other practices of cultural diplomacy such as academic exchanges or the book trade. Despite this second failure during Republican years, the project of constructing a Hispanic community of nations briefly reappeared after the Civil War, during the first decade of Francisco Franco's dictatorial regime, when Doussinague was again appointed Director-General of Foreign Policy.[89] Carrying his action plan with him throughout his career, Doussinague played — or at least he tried to play — a significant role in the construction of a Spanish foreign policy of spiritual empire over a long period of time and under different political regimes.[90]

Exploring why the *Plan P* was never really abandoned, notwithstanding the profound changes through which Spanish politics went during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, goes beyond the scope of this thesis. I can nonetheless form some hypotheses. One explanation may well be Doussinague's seemingly obstinate nature, in addition to his certainly influential and lasting supporters within the apparatuses of Spanish diplomacy. The rapid succession of antithetic political regimes does not imply drastic changes in the making of foreign policy, and Doussinague's career as a diplomat is an illustration of this

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[88] Nuria Tabanera, *Ilusiones y desencuentros: acción de la diplomacia republicana en Hispanoamérica (1931-1939)* (Madrid: CEDAL, 1996), 141–50; Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Imperio de papel: acción cultural y política exterior durante el primer franquismo* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992), 47–70. See also Celestino del Arenal, *Política exterior de España y relaciones con América Latina* (Madrid: Fundación Carolina and Siglo XXI, 2011), 29; Salvador Bernabéu Albert and Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, 'Historia contra la «desmemoria» y el olvido: el americanismo en el Centro de Estudios Históricos y la creación de la revista «Tierra firme» (1935-1937)', in *Tierra firme. Revista de la Sección Hispanoamericana del Centro de Estudios Históricos. Estudio introductorio e índices*, ed. Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2008), 86–93.

[89] Rosa Pardo, 'José María Doussinague: un Director General de Política Exterior para tiempos duros', in *Cruzados de Franco: propaganda y diplomacia en tiempos de guerra (1936-1945)*, ed. Antonio Moreno Cantano (Madrid: Trea, 2013), 144–95.

[90] Different versions of the *Plan P* (1930s and 1940s) are kept in Doussinague's personal papers, AGUN, files 008/002.

phenomenon of continuity. Moreover, even though it was materially impracticable, the *Plan P* was not entirely naive and worthless. It was nothing but the material embodiment of a larger strategy of intangible tools of power, namely spiritual empire as the all-embracing category of intangible imperial heritage. The elements of intangibility that underpinned the *Plan P* were among the most solid instruments of power upon which Spanish diplomacy could count throughout the first decades of the twentieth century.

CONCLUSION

When I initially designed the research project that led me to this thesis, I chose to focus on the Spanish case because Spain was arguably the first modern instance of the end of empires. I made the hypothesis that Spain may well have pioneered a certain type of 'European post-coloniality', as the first European state to ever develop a properly post-imperial diplomacy with the institutionalisation of Hispano-Americanism as a branch of foreign policy in the 1920s.[1] I did not yet know that, in 1928, José Plá had already formulated a similar hypothesis. He had claimed that Spain had pioneered a new form of imperialism.[2] Comparing Spain to Britain, he had affirmed that the latter was still in the apex of material imperialism, whereas the former had crossed the line of intangibility.

He had not been completely accurate, however. In 1926, at the Imperial Conference in Canada, the Lord President of the Council Arthur Balfour had pronounced a famous declaration which laid the founding stone of the Commonwealth of Nations.[3] This had paved the way to British spiritual empire. In fact, the early history of the British Commonwealth dates back to the mid-1920s. It emerged in the context of the Locarno Treaties, when faith in internationalism and hopes for enduring peace by virtue of the League of Nations reached momentum. It can legitimately be interpreted as an attempt to create a 'League of British Nations', as French international lawyer Jean-Jacques Chevallier argued in 1938.[4] In this sense, the Balfour Declaration of November 1926 shared principles and objectives with José María Doussinague's *Plan P*, presented in May of the same year. Both aimed to create an institutional system of international cooperation against a shared imperial background or, in Chevallier's words, a multilateral structure that was 'much more intimate' than the 'vast' Genevan one.[5]

As we now know, Doussinague's plan did not reach its goal, while the British Empire quite successfully managed to 'become a federation of autonomous nations'.[6] It is

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[1] I am grateful to Jakob Vogel, who, during a conversation in Paris in the autumn of 2013, advised me to focus on the question of Spain as 'pioneer', which was only a detail in my very first research proposal.

[2] José Plá, *La misión internacional de la raza hispánica* (Madrid: Javier Morata Editor, 1928), 29–32.

[3] Arthur Balfour, 'Imperial Conference, 1926. Inter-Imperial Relations Committee. Report, Proceedings and Memoranda. E (I.R./26) Series', November 1926.

[4] Jean-Jacques Chevallier, 'La Société des Nations britanniques', *Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law* 64 (1938), 242–83. See also R.F. Holland, *Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939* (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1981), 190.

[5] Chevallier, 'La Société des Nations britanniques', 237.

[6] André Siegrif, quoted in Chevallier, 'La Société des Nations britanniques', 237.

nonetheless highly revealing that the ambition to create a community of states out of imperial remains was a project shared by Spain and Britain at the very same time. It seems to confirm one of the main conclusions of this thesis: the 1920s were a key moment for both international relations and empire, in its material and intangible shapes. Both coexisted, interacted, and mutually transformed each other, while contributing to construct an increasingly multilateral world order.

This thesis has presented this phenomenon as seen from the Spanish observatory. It has delved into the context in which Spanish spiritual empire emerged as a tool of diplomacy. The 1890s were a crucial decade for the transformation of Spanish imperial imaginaries. This decade say the rise of Hispano-Americanism as an intellectual and political movement around the fourth centenary of the 'Discovery of America' in 1892, the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the subsequent loss of the last overseas colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific.[7] Ángel Ganivet made his plea for a spiritual turn in Spanish politics precisely in 1897. However, only in the 1920s was Hispano-Americanism given a significant push by the Spanish foreign office, under the authoritarian regime of General Miguel Primo de Rivera. Consequently, the specific research question of this thesis arose quite naturally: why in the 1920s? This question is directly linked to a more general one, which is to know whether spiritual empire was simply the result of a dictatorship's disproportionate nationalism, or whether it could actually tell us something more interesting about the admittedly liberal world order of the 1920s.

To explore these questions, the thesis has followed a methodology that puts the practices of diplomacy and policy making at the centre of the study. It has delved into these practices from a sociological perspective, looking at the doings of specific agents who undertook them, and on the spot where they took place, be it Madrid, Geneva, Buenos Aires, Rome, Seville, or Paris, among others. It has thus privileged a bottom-up approach to the phenomenon of spiritual empire. In other words, it has examined power through the eyes of the persons who fabricated or attempted to fabricate it. More than observing power policies from the perspective of what they aimed at or what they targeted, the focus was put on what they were composed of. I thus make the choice of a constructivist approach to international relations, as opposed to a realist one. Therefore, I argue that spiritual empire

[7] Mark J. Van Aken, *Pan-Hispanism: Its Origins and Development to 1866* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959). See also Carlos M. Rama, *Historia de las relaciones culturales entre España y la América Latina: siglo diecinueve* (Mexico City, Madrid, and Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982).

was, less than an objective or something to be built, a tool of power diplomacy. This thesis presents spiritual empire as a toolbox for multiple practices of power diplomacy.

Perhaps the most interesting observation of this thesis is that different sorts of agents, in different contexts, felt the need to open this toolbox. These agents were not all Spaniards; neither were they all in Madrid. Spiritual empire was not a univocal and centralised set of policies designed in a ministry and assembled elsewhere in the world. It was born and used simultaneously in Madrid, Geneva, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Rome, Paris, or Washington, to name but some examples. Moreover, it was appropriated and instrumentalised by non-Spanish agents, in particular by different Latin Americans who whished to take some distance from US-driven Pan American structures. A Panamanian delegate in Paris, a Salvadorian delegate in Santiago de Chile, or a Dominican delegate on behalf of his Latin American colleagues in Geneva, for example, reinterpreted it. Spiritual empire did not only stem from the Spanish nation's imperial dream. It was part of internationalist thinking and diplomatic practice and served many causes in the 1920s.

Of course, it first served the cause of Spanish foreign policy at governmental level. Spanish senior officials actively played with what they thought to be their comparative advantage, which was Spain's imperial past. In his speech to the Congress of Deputies in April 1921, in his instructions to diplomats in June 1926, and in his practice as head of delegation in Geneva in May 1926, Yanguas put forward imperial *'patrimonio'* as a real and legitimate asset of power. He seemed proudly aware of his own agency in proposing something new and even subversive to the way in which the world power game had been working up to that moment. Other Spanish diplomats and agents acted on the basis on the conviction that spiritual empire and *raza* were factual realities — a 'spontaneous treasure', as José Antonio de Sangróniz put it — which only needed to be exploited more assertively. From his position as a League official, José Plá endorsed this vision and used it to describe Spain's original position in the world scene. As for Doussinague's plans, they were strikingly complex attempts to put the idea into practice: they built on the alleged existence of a Spanish *raza*, combined it with a reappropriated Bolivarian ideal, and aimed to make all of this work for the sake of a Hispanic super-state. In sum, this thesis accounts for the intrinsically imperial imaginary of Spanish diplomats and officials in the 1920s.

Interestingly, however, the Spanish government did not invent the practice of spiritual empire. It seized opportunities where it found them and tried, more or less successfully, to construct an overarching policy with what was at hand. Spanish agents fabricated diplomatic practices out of other practices and phenomena that were not diplomatic per se.

Chapters 1 and 2 are good illustrations of this. The Ibero-American Exhibition was a Sevillian project and the government decided to carry on with it, while emigration was a demographic and social phenomenon that the government attempted to instrumentalise. Perhaps more importantly, these chapters reveal how visibility, publicity, and techniques of mass communication were felt as essential features of these practices of spiritual empire. The Spanish government and Spanish diplomats on the ground found it useful and necessary to show off Spain's imperial legacy.

This is explained by the fact that there actually was receptivity towards this Spanish show. The Ibero-American Exhibition and, very saliently, the flight of the *Plus Ultra* were seen from the outside with admiration, in Europe as in the Americas. This was clear in the attitude of the 'masses' towards the landing of the *Plus Ultra* in Buenos Aires, the letter from King George to King Alfonso after this event, the messages of congratulations from different Latin American countries and, very importantly, the report drafted by the US minister-plenipotentiary in 1926. The latter saw Spain's visibility and attractiveness as possible threats to US interests in the Americas. Spiritual empire, as an asset of intangible power, was by no means irrelevant in the international context of the 1920s. Different sorts of agents, not only in the diplomatic sphere, were sensitive to behaviours of empire that did not necessarily reflect the concrete material possession of powerful means of domination. There was an acknowledged recognition of Spain's importance for what it had been in the past and for how this past echoed in the present. The world of the 1920s was open to intangible empire and intangible power.

In other words, it was open to the display of cultural elements of imperial legacy. This thesis has deliberately chosen the angle of external cultural action as a key aspect of foreign policy. Chapter 3, in particular, makes it clear that Spanish policy-makers privileged external cultural action over other fields of action, such as commerce. Within the Spanish Ministry of State, Hispano-American affairs were part of the same administrative structure as cultural external action, especially during José de Yanguas Messía's mandate, between 1925 and 1927. Of course, the preference for intangible elements did not mean that material interests were disdained. Chapters 3 and 4, among others, illustrate how spiritual empire and colonial ambitions in Morocco were tightly connected together. Similarly, Chapter 6 shows that there is no point in making clear-cut distinctions between material and intangible policies. The *Plan P* and the *Plan C* give evidence of the fact that material and intangible instruments and interests were conceived within the same framework. Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, spiritual empire had more to do with a policy of

rayonnement per se than with the concrete, material consequences that this *rayonnement* could entail. The spirit had value in itself, not just because of its potential incarnation.

In the changing international context of the 1920s, different states undertook different strategies of so-called intellectual cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and *rayonnement*. Spain, notwithstanding the authoritarian regime that ruled over it, was not an exception. Spanish agents were adapting to the transformations of the world order. The idea of a scramble for Latin America, considered in Chapter 3, substantiates this argument. Spanish diplomats did just as Italian, French, or US agents did, and Italy, France, or the United States were seen as competitors as much as collaborators. The fact that the CEIP mirrored and utilised Spain for its own cultural action is telling of the extent to which Spanish practices were part of a larger global phenomenon. *Rayonnement* served an endeavour for power recognition and legitimation. As Chapter 4 illustrates, the 'diplomatic battle' for a permanent seat at the Council of the League of Nations translated a deeper aspiration for the assertion of 'what Spain is and means' in world politics and, more importantly, in world history.

Probably the first scholar to note this was Salvador de Madariaga, who, in 1930, published a contemporary history of Spain, in which he wrote:

> The nations which opposed her [Spain's] re-election [as a member of the League of Nations Council] on the ground that permanent seats should be reserved for the Great Powers took a materialistic (and in fact militaristic) view of what a Great Power is. Morally and spiritually speaking, Spain *is* [emphasis in the original] a Great Power, i.e., a Power with universal interests — or are petrol and coal to count more than language and civilisation? To give but one example: the United States of America are interested in Nicaragua because it is a good place for a canal; Spain because Nicaragua is the fatherland of Rubén Darío, one of the greatest poets in the Spanish language.[8]

If these words translate nothing but Madariaga's opinion on Spain's position in the world, they also invite the reader to question any rigid categorisation of power in international relations. With this thesis, I would like to endorse this same invitation. The question is less to know whether power is 'great' or 'small', or whether it is 'hard' or 'soft', than to

[8] Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain* (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), 473–74.

understand how power is imagined and fabricated by given agents in a given time. This thesis has put the focus on the intangible legacy of empire as an instrument of power.

If the case of Spain does not reveal the undisputed origin of post-imperial foreign policy, it does lead us to think differently about empire and diplomacy. The fields of diplomatic history and imperial history may indeed find it useful to work with the idea of a 'spiritual empire'. I argue that this concept helps us in building a narrative of transition from empire to diplomacy. On the one hand, it does not seem convincing that the imperial moment ends where the national/international one begins. On the other hand, confining empire, be it formal or informal, to practices of colonisation, domination, or exploitation makes historians loose sight of the importance of imperial imaginaries in the making of international relations and world politics in modern history.[9] More precisely, the weight of imperial legacies must not be overlooked. This thesis has explored why and how these legacies spill over the end of empires as polities. These legacies are at the heart of the practice, performance, and understanding of power in the context of multilateral world politics. Therefore, there is interest in advancing a working concept that stands for the specificities of imperial legacies in diplomacy and world politics. This is what the notion of spiritual empire stands for.

As an overarching working concept, this notion may also be used as a key to interpret contemporary world politics. The historiographical questions that this thesis addresses remain valid even beyond the contingent timeframe of the 1920s. Since 1991, the Ibero-American Conferences of Heads of State and Government have been 'the privileged forum' wherein the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries of Europe and Latin America can 'address multilateral matters'.[10] The Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Italy, and France count among the few associated members of these conferences. Spanish diplomacy channels substantial effort into these summits: the Spanish delegation has always been headed by the king; Spain has already hosted three editions of the summit, two of which were particularly significant, on the fifth centenary of the 'Discovery of America' in 1992, and on the bicentenary of the Constitution of Cádiz in 2012; the Ibero-American General Secretariat, which is meant to ensure the continuity of the summits' commitments, has its headquarters in Madrid. All of this signals that the intangible heritage of empire still feeds Spanish understandings of diplomacy. Empire, even intangibly, has proven persistent.

[9] Gaël Sánchez Cano and Miquel de la Rosa Lorente, 'Immaterial Empires: France and Spain in the Americas, 1860s and 1920s', *European History Quarterly* (agreed for publication, 2019).

[10] 'Cumbres Iberoamericanas', Secretaría General Iberoamericana, accessed 21 December 2018.

The Spanish case is not an exception in today's world. Founded as the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation in 1970, the *Organisation internationale de la francophonie* has now evolved into a well-structured system of regular summits, ministerial conferences, and advisory agencies, which foster cooperation between France, its former colonies, and other Francophile states.[11] Similarly, Portugal and its former colonies in South America, Africa, and Asia are gathered into the *Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa*, which made its first steps in the late 1980s as the International Institute of the Portuguese Language.[12] Last but not least, the British Commonwealth remains the most studied example of the institutionalisation of post-imperialism by means of international relations.[13] All of this confirms that Spain cannot be studied as an isolated or exceptional case today or in a historical perspective. Here again, Spain is and was not different.[14]

[11] Christian Valantin, *Une histoire de la francophonie, 1970-2010 : de l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique à l'Organisation internationale de la francophonie* (Paris: Belin, 2010); Antony Andrew Marius Walsh, 'Égalité, Complémentarité et Solidarité: The Politics of Francophonie and Development Aid to Culture in Francophone Africa' (doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 1999); 'Qu'est-ce que la francophonie', Organisation internationale de la francophonie, accessed 9 July 2019.

[12] 'Histórico: como surgiu?', Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, accessed 9 July 2019.

[13] Philip Murphy, *The Empire's New Clothes: The Myth of the Commonwealth* (London: Hurst and Company, 2018); Krishnan Srinivasan, *The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Adamson, *The Last Empire: Britain and the Commonwealth* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).

[14] Regina Grafe, *Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), ix. See also Nigel Townson, ed., *Is Spain Different?* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2015).

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