# Political conflict on immigration and democracy in Europe

## Theresa Gessler

European University Institute
**Department of Political and Social Sciences**

Political conflict on immigration and democracy in Europe

Theresa Gessler

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences
of the European University Institute

**Examining Board**

Prof. Dorothee Bohle, European University Institute
Prof. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, University of Bergen
Prof. Heike Klüver, Humboldt University Berlin
Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute (Supervisor)

**Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work**
**Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme**

I Theresa Gessler certify that I am the author of the work Political conflict on immigration and democracy in EuropeI have presented for examination for the Ph.D. at the European University Institute. I also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others.

I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from other copyrighted publications.

I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297).

The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that this work consists of 70.566 words.


**Statement of inclusion of previous work:**

I confirm that chapter 2 was jointly co-authored with Endre Borbáth and I contributed 50% of the work.
I confirm that chapter 3 was jointly co-authored with Gergő Tóth and Johannes Wachs and I contributed 40% of the work.
I confirm that chapter 5 was jointly co-authored with Sophia Hunger and I contributed 50% of the work.


Signature and date:



*T. Gessler*

Theresa Gessler
20 August, 2019

# Contents

**6 Discursive change in response to new challengers: Established parties' reactions to the AfD 111**

**7 Conclusion 143**

**References 149**

**Appendix 173**

# List of Figures

# List of Tables

# Thesis abstract

This thesis is a collection of five empirical studies that analyze political competition on immigration and democracy in Europe. The thesis investigates how policy issues related to these two policy domains become politicized, both in terms of citizens' attitudes and in terms of party competition. The thesis contributes to the investigation of the driving forces of competition on cultural and political issues.

The first two chapters of the thesis analyze the dynamics of attitudinal change among citizens by asking (i) how Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy have changed since the transition to democracy and (ii) how short-term exposure to refugees influences attitudes and voting behavior. The following two chapters focus on party competition and investigate (iii) to what extent and why parties politicize democratic systems in their election campaigns, and (iv) how the refugee crisis allowed radical right parties to increase the politicization of the immigration issue. Finally, a comparative chapter adds to the previous chapters by studying (v) how the discourse on immigration and democracy of established parties changes when they are challenged by a new competitor.

To show the trajectory of competition on immigration and democratic systems, the thesis draws on a wide range of empirical evidence stemming from Eastern, North-Western and Southern Europe. To detail the parties' emphasis and positions on issues on a monthly basis, it leverages a novel dataset of 120,000 party press releases. In addition to quantitative text analysis techniques – including structural topic models and wordscores – the thesis relies on classical content analysis and on the analysis of surveys and election outcomes.

The empirical analyses reveal two different dynamics of politicization of policy issues: While attitudes and party mobilization on democracy-related issues follow long-term trends, recent change to political conflict related to immigration was shaped by the context of the refugee crisis.

# Acknowledgements

# 1 Introduction

The political fortunes of issues are volatile. While something may appear as the top policy issue and be highly salient on the agenda at a certain time, it can be overshadowed by other topics and fall into oblivion within weeks or months. In this process, we see changes in the attention citizens devote to a topic, as well as in the extent to which parties address the topic. Sometimes, even the electoral fortune of entire parties varies with the ups and downs of the issues they campaign on. Thus, changes in the salience of issues can be drastic and may have important consequences for political competition. But what drives the fate of policy issues?

Scholars have argued that we observe a rising importance of 'issue competition', that is, parties compete over which issues should dominate the political agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007; Carmines and Stimson 1993; Petrocik 1996). Whereas party competition used to be dominated by positional competition on socio-economic issues, parties' selective issue emphasis has led to a diversification of important policy issues. This has resulted in a larger and more complex political agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007, 607). Building on a common party system agenda which they have to address, parties selectively emphasize certain issues to force competing parties to address these issues and to send signals to voters (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). As parties increasingly try to distinguish themselves by the issues they put on the political agenda, understanding how topics come to be defined as political problems and why parties care about them has taken on central importance.

This holds particularly as we see a change in those issues that are at the center of conflict: Cultural issues and particularly immigration increasingly shape vote choices (Ivarsflaten 2005; Norris 2005; Abou-Chadi and Helbling 2018; De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013). Over the past years, the topic has moved from backroom negotiations to the center-stage of politics. While immigration has primarily been politicized by populist right-wing parties, a wider ideological spectrum of so-called challenger parties has problematized democratic procedures in a similar way: Issues like anti-elitism and anti-corruption that are at the core of challenger parties' appeals have been gaining importance across Europe (Polk et al. 2017). As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 95) put it when discussing populist parties, these challengers "criticize the poor *results* of the democratic regime, and, to solve this problem, they campaign for a modification of the democratic *procedures.*" Hence, previously accepted rules of the political game come under scrutiny as parties strategically criticice democratic institutions (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017).

Building on the rising importance of issue competition in general and cultural and political

issues specifically, this thesis investigates how policy issues differ in the way they become politicized. Focusing on immigration and democracy, the thesis investigates changes at the citizen and the party level: How and why do citizens increase their attention to or change their attitudes on immigration and democracy? And how do these issues become politicized in party competition, whether through rising salience or positional polarization? Given the prominence of these issues in political debates during the past years and the fortunes of populist parties that mobilize with these issues, there can be no doubt about the substantive relevance of these topics. Both of these issues are also of a fundamental normative importance, given they concern who is included in democratic decision-making and how these decisions are made.

This thesis analyzes the logic of the politicization of these issues, both internal and external to the party system. In this introductory chapter, we first describe the logic of politicization, which represents the lens through which we assess changes to the empirical relevance of policy issues. We also briefly review literature on the logiv of politicization, drawing a contrast between salience and positions and long-term and short-term dynamics that affect the trajectory of issues. Then, we turn to describing the guiding questions and the content of the following chapters in more detail.

## Conceptualizing politicization

When we attempt to understand the trajectory of policy issues, we need to address how they become mobilized in political competition. For this, we adopt the concept of *politicization*. While various uses of the term politicization exist in the literature, there are two definitions that are particularly relevant here. Scholars of party politics who use the concept of politicization refer to it as the expansion of the scope of conflict surrounding an issue (Kriesi et al. 2012; following Schattschneider 1975). Alternatively, the concept has been understood as shaping a topic into a political issue by transporting it into the field of political decision-making (De Wilde and Zürn 2012). This understanding is frequently found in social movement studies that analyze how bottom-up mobilization can politicize issues (e.g. Roberts 2017). While the latter focuses on what becomes an object of political decision making - what Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi (2016, 7) call 'external politicization' - the former focuses on processes of emphasis within the political system - 'internal politicization'.

Both understandings describe different aspects of the politicization of policy issues: On the one hand, some issues are typically not part of the political debate. Instead, a 'permissive consensus' exists to remain with the status quo on the issue. Sometimes, issues may

simply be seen as pre-political and not subject to collective decision-making. Making these issues the subject of political debate is itself a form of politicization - consider the slogan that 'the personal is political' that was used by feminist and student movements. On the other hand, issues that are already part and parcel of political debates also vary in their importance for structuring political conflict. For example, an increase in the salience of an issue may drastically change its power to structure political competition as the prominence of different issues in public debate may alter the aspects voters consider when making their choices. Similarly, a process of positional polarization may also render an issue into a distinguishing feature between parties.

Given that our research question focuses on issue competition as a mechanism of party competition, we shall focus on internal politicization and the actions of parties. However, we shall preface this by considering the dynamics of attitudinal change among citizens as a general framework for politicization by parties.

**Politicization I: Changing attention and attitudes towards issues**

Scholars that highlight politicization as shaping a topic into a political issue have argued that "[a] public debate is [. . . ] only political if it presupposes the *possibility* of making a collectively binding decision or interpretations that change the status quo." (Zürn 2016, 167) That means, politicization entails more than just a differentiation of party conflict, it first means making something an object of political decision-making. Scholars highlight that issues may become politicized in this sense without gathering mass media attention, for example through protest or through changing public attitudes. (Roberts 2017, 127)

We shall consider citizens' attitudes as a framework for political competition, stopping short of outlining a definition of politicization at the citizen level analogous to the party level as attempted by previous research (Zürn 2016, 169). We are primarily interested in citizens' attitudes to the extent that they enable or constrain party mobilization: Unrepresented grievances of citizens on an issue give parties leverage to exploit these representational gaps and may drive the success or failure of parties that campaign on these issues (Hug 2001). However, citizens' attitudes are not external to the political process: Parties' mobilization on an issue can provide important cues to citizens and even lead to attitudinal change among citizens (Harteveld, Kokkonen, and Dahlberg 2017). Specifically, political discontent may be both expressed and fueled by challenger parties from the left and right (Rooduijn, Brug, and Lange 2016; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018).

Hence, this thesis takes up politicization among citizens in two different ways: on the one hand, chapter 2 discusses changes to citizens' conceptions of democracy as an example of

long-term attitudinal change that may provide fertile ground for mobilization by parties, as studied in chapter 4 on party competition regarding democracy. On the other hand, chapter 3 discusses the Hungarian case where government mobilization against immigration has arguably led to a momentous shift in public attitudes (see also: Koltai and Barna 2019).

## Politicization II: The expansion of political conflict between parties

Most research focusing on politicization *within* political systems has studied how important an issue is for shaping party competition. That is, an issue is politicized to the extent that it structures political conflict between parties. Relating to politicization at the citizen level, politicization at the party level means studying to which extent existing conflicts are reflected in the party system. In itself, politicization at the party level operationalizes the importance of an issue at a specific moment in time.

The literature has established several dimensions along which politicization in this narrower sense of expanding conflict can occur (Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016): The first and most commonly used dimension refers to the salience of a topic - an issue needs to be discussed frequently to be considered politicized. In some cases, authors have even defined politicization "as a matter of saliency" (Green-Pedersen 2012, 117), sidelining other considerations.

Beyond salience, we shall also study the intensity of conflict on an issue based on the differences between party positions. The more political stances diverge and polarize into opposing camps, the more an issue becomes a distinguishing feature between parties and may structure political conflict. Scholars have disagreed whether differing positions between parties form a pre-condition of politicization (Green-Pedersen 2012, 117), or are an integral part of it (Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016; De Wilde 2011). However, positions are crucial when addressing individual parties' contribution to the politicization of an issue: By deviating from commonly held positions and emphasizing this positional difference, parties force their competitors to address an issue. This has also been studied as parties' issue entrepreneurship (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2015). Hence, we shall study party's issue emphasis as well as their positions as potential contributors to issue politicization.[1]

---

[1]Building on the idea of politicization as the scope of a conflict, many definitions also include the expansion of the actors involved in a conflict. However, the focus on governmental or executive actors versus all other actors that is commonly used to measure this in the literature (Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016, 9) is specific to European integration, given the inter-governmental character of EU politics. For other issues, we may sometimes see a politicization starting from government, sometimes from the opposition. Thus, while an expansion of actors may be an interesting aspect of the politicization of an

**The logic of politicization**

Having outlined citizens' attitudes and party conflict as two different levels of politicization, we may now turn to understand the logic of politicization. When addressing how policy issues become politicized, we shall consider some important distinctions. First, based on our definition of politicization as expanding conflict, a process of politicization may occur through changes to either salience or positions. Second, we can distinguish between time-horizons and mechanisms that operate within them. On the one hand, the politicization of issues may vary due to long-term social changes that alter the structure of political competition. On the other hand, changes in issue politicization can also be more volatile and in reaction to short-term developments, such as highly salient events and the reactions of parties to these events.

While not always explicitly drawing this distinction, literature on the politicization of other policy issues often relies on similar distinctions between long-term and short-term factors (e.g. Hutter and Kriesi 2019 on the economic crisis). Regarding long-term factors, previous literature has most prominently relied on the structural approach to cleavage formation, according to which new issues emerge from long-term change in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990). Additionally, processes of political change such as the transition to democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe have also caused lasting political divides that continue to structure political competition (Mair 1997) and that entrench attitudes in the socialization of citizens (Dahlberg and Linde 2018; Heyne 2019; Letki 2004; Mishler and Rose 2002; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 2014; Voicu and Peral 2014). Even without developing into full cleavages, so-called 'issue divides' can structure the political choices of citizens in a durable way by linking particular beliefs to party choices (Deegan-Krause 2013). Hence, long-term processes change the values and attitudes of voters and transform the structure of political competition (Inglehart 1997; Kriesi et al. 2012; De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013), thereyby shaping the politicization of specific issues.

In the short term, crisis-like events that are external to the cleavage and conflict structure can transform or aggravate these long-term trends (see e.g. on immigration Mader and Schoen 2018; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018; on economic issues Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Crises or other highly salient public events raise the importance of an issue for citizens and parties. When parties address salient issues to 'ride the wave' and appear responsive to citizens' priorities (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994), this increases the politicization of issues. While crises clearly affect the salience of issues,

---

issue, we shall *not* consider it a defining characteristic of politicization (see also newer work that uses the concept based on salience and positions: Hutter and Kriesi 2019).

the literature has suggested they may also change parties' positions: Crises have been heralded as moments of course correction and paradigm change for politics (Gourevitch 1986). By exposing failures of the status quo, crises open a window of opportunity for change. On the citizen level, previous research has similarly shown that real-world events have the power to affect public opinion and attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vreese 2007; Sorrentino and Vidmar 1974; Malet and Kriesi 2019).

However, both long-term structural changes and short-term factors like real-world events and crises only generate their full impact through the translation into party strategies. Party systems are based on a specific cleavage structures but voter demand alone does not explain the structure of party competition. Similarly, crises provide a window of opportunity for change, nevertheless, how crises come to shape party competition by and large depends on how parties use crises to promote political change. Whether parties choose to politicize an issue is constrained by their internal dynamics as well as their position in relation to their competitors (Abou-Chadi 2016; Greene and Haber 2015). Thus, we have to address how short- and long-term factors are translated into party strategies.

Having established long-term and short-term factors that may affect the politicization of issues as well as the importance of party strategies, we can summarize: While long-term change may put issues on the political agenda (often entailing a process of 'external politicization' that renders something into a political issue), issue salience at a specific moment in time also depends on the availability and media coverage of topical events that can be connected to political mobilization. However, these short-term changes are less likely to change positions of parties or citizens, as they are entrenched in the values and deep-seated beliefs of citizens and party members. Instead, they may often activate previously held convictions by rendering them more salient. As previous studies have mostly assumed this nature of short-term changes or measured it in rather coarse time-intervals (e.g. from one election to the next), this thesis and particularly chapters 5 and 6 make an important contribution by addressing whether we can observe effects on issue attention and positions at a more fine-grained level.

## Outline of the thesis

After having laid out the framework, we now turn to the specific outline of this thesis: First, we discuss the two issues around which the thesis is centered, namely immigration and democracy, and detail how they fit into the outlined general framework. Then, we outline the contribution of this thesis to the wider literature before we specify the general research question into specific questions for each chapter of the thesis. Finally, we map

out the individual chapters of the thesis, including the cases, data and methodology they use. Before embarking on this endeavor, it should be mentioned that this dissertation is a collection of five articles. As part of the contribution of this thesis, the five empirical studies of the dissertation draw on different country cases, datasets and methods. Therefore, each chapter can be read as a standalone piece of analysis and the wording varies slightly across these pieces.

## Immigration and democracy issues

Substantively, this thesis focuses on two topics and their trajectory as political issues: Immigration and democracy. Given their prominence in political debates during the past years, their fundamental importance to (European) democracies and the fortunes of populist parties that mobilize with these issues, there can be no doubt about their substantive relevance. Arguably, both topics are often interlinked: As outlined, populist parties legitimize their criticism of democratic procedures by objecting to their results (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 95). This criticism often stems from dissatisfaction with policy outcomes and complaints about politicians ignoring a 'silent majority'. Migration has become a core-issue which populist parties use to claim a representation gap and a failure of mainstream parties. At the level of citizens, Landwehr, Faas, and Harms (2017, 52) have argued that substantive dissensus about immigration leads citizens to question procedural democratic norms as their substantive preferences determine which decision-making procedure they prefer on polarizing issues like immigration. Hence, immigration and democracy are at the core of conflicts around contemporary democracy.

While immigration and democracy issues share their relevance for contemporary party politics, they also provide a useful contrast in terms of the outlined logic of issue politicization. As parties' overwhelmingly positive positions towards democracy show (see chapter 4), the democracy issue constitutes a valence issue (Stokes 1963; on anti-corruption – and important topic within democracy issues – as a valence issue see Curini 2018) in most European countries. That is, an issue on which parties tend to endorse the same position and compete by their competence, rather than by endorsing different positions. Among citizens, positive attitudes towards democracy are engendered through long-term processes like cultural change and socialization into democratic systems (Dahlberg and Linde 2018; Heyne 2019; Letki 2004; Mishler and Rose 2002; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 2014; Voicu and Peral 2014). Citizens' support for democracy as a political regime (rather than their evaluation of the performance of specific governments or institutions) is also relatively stable (Easton 1975; Norris 1999; Magalhães 2014). The same mechanism of habituation holds for parties, which are less likely to criticize democracy in response to electoral losses

the longer democracy has existed in a country (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017). As argued in chapter 4, democracy primarily gains importance in political conflict when its norms are violated.

In contrast, the immigration issue is far more controversial and has become central for the conflict structure in many European party systems as well as for voters' left-right identification (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2018; De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013). This increasing conflict around immigration seems to follow a 'political logic' rather than objective pressures (Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018) - parties politicize the issue out of a hope to gain from its increasing importance. While attitudes towards immigration are also linked to personal values, their role for political decision-making can change rapidly. Especially sudden changes – as caused by situations of crises – can lead to changes in the importance citizens attribute to immigration and the political choices they make based on these attitudes (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Dinas et al. 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Homola and Tavits 2018). The same holds for party stances on immigration where a whole literature assesses why and how parties change their positions on immigration, for example in response to other parties (Bale et al. 2010; Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Odmalm and Bale 2015; Ruedin and Morales 2017; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Vrânceanu 2017).

However, the argument in this thesis does not claim a general and predetermined difference in the mode of politicization of the two issues under consideration. Instead, this thesis analyzes a specific context in which the immigration and democracy issue are politicized in different ways. This allows studying changes in issue salience and positions through long-term and short-term dynamics: The immigration debate of the past years has been characterized by the 2015 European refugee crisis. This period constitutes a relatively short and highly visible moment that suddenly aggravated pre-existing conflicts on immigration policy. The low performance of democratic systems in several European countries has long posed challenges to citizens' confidence in their democratic systems and, in some cases, the consolidation of democracy. However, even in countries with severe problems with democratic quality, the embedding of changes in a longer process of deterioration has caused a more latent politicization of the issue.

While conflicts regarding democratic systems may have also gained in salience – in fact, we know very little about the salience of democracy issues over time – their politicization lacks the confrontational dynamic of the immigration issue. Even when salient political scandals question the democratic legitimacy of a government – as for example in Hungary after the 2006 election (Gessler and Kyriazi 2019) or in Romania before the 2016 election (Borbáth 2019) – the valence nature of the democracy issues means parties do not necessarily

represent different positions to voters but claim to perform better in pursuit of the democratic ideal which parties formally share. Hence, literature on protest voting suggests voters may first choose the mainstream opposition party and subsequently switch their vote to newer challenger formations (Pop-Eleches 2010; for the financial crisis also Hernández and Kriesi 2016). Thus, both conflicts follow a different dynamic for which we shall account in formulating more specific research questions for each part of the thesis.

**Contribution**

By comparing two highly relevant issues, namely democracy and immigration, this thesis contributes descriptive as well as analytical evidence to the study of issue competition. The thesis innovates by taking a comparative perspective on two policy issues, while still including the detail that is typical for case studies on the politicization of single issues.

Substantively, the study of competition on democracy and institutional reforms highlights an aspect of party competition that has been neglected by most of the literature (exceptionally Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017; on anti-elitism and anti-corruption also Polk et al. 2017). This makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of party competition, particularly in Eastern Europe where demands for political reforms are a major factor in structuring party competition (see chapter 4 as well as Sikk 2012; Engler 2016). Additionally, the importance of this issue has also been highlighted in the Southern European context over the course of the past years (Hutter, Kriesi, and Vidal 2018). In this regard, the thesis also provides new evidence on parties' emphasis on and positions regarding democracy issues with a comprehensive recoding of an existing data on party positions reported in national newspapers (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). This allows to distinguish between different aspects of democratic systems and provides a better assessment of the potential consequences of mobilization with these issues.

Furthermore, the chapters also advance the methodological debate regarding how to study the attention which citizens and parties pay to political issues: Each chapter takes a different methodological approach that improves and expands upon existing measurements. While the specific contribution and rationale is pointed out in each chapter, it is worth highlighting the focus on expanding the time horizon of existing research. Previous research on parties' issue emphasis and positions has almost exclusively focused on election campaigns, though election campaigns function differently than everyday politics (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). Additionally, the absence of systematic data on changes between elections limits our ability to identify mechanisms of change (see chapter 5). Here, the collection of a comprehensive data set of party press releases in three countries and the use of different measurements in chapters 5 and 6 makes an important contribution with

monthly measurements of the salience, position and framing for different parties. In the opposite direction, chapter 2 provides a measurement of attitudes over a longer time span through combining several surveys that expands the horizon of previous research.

In addition, this thesis also includes a substantive effort in data collection: Chapter 3 is based on a new hand-coded data on refugee sightings in Hungary. Chapter 4 includes the recoding of a large amount of media-based campaign data into specific issue categories by reconsidering issue string annotations and even annotated sentences. Chapters 5 and 6, rest on the collection of a total of 120.000 press releases by parties from Austria, Germany and Switzerland.

### Research questions

We shall translate the general research question about the rise and fall of policy issues into four more specific questions that analyze each issue on the citizen- and the party level. Additionally, chapter 6 brings together the two issues studied in this thesis to detail some of the findings of the other chapters for the German case. Table 1.1 shows the research questions of each chapter included in the thesis.

Table 1.1: Organization of the chapters

|  | **Democracy** | **Immigration** |
|---|---|---|
| **Citizens** | Chapter 2: How have Eastern Europeans' views of democracy changed since the transition? | Chapter 3: How does short-term exposure to refugees influence attitudes and voting behavior? |
| **Parties** | Chapter 4: How do parties mobilize for democratic system reforms in election campaigns? | Chapter 5: How has the refugee crisis shaped the impact of radical right parties on party competition about immigration? |
| **Discourse** | Chapter 6: How does the entry of a challenger party change established parties' discourse on immigration and democracy? | |

Taking the perspective of citizens, the first two chapters study two different scenarios of attitudinal change that may lead to a politicization of policy issues based on experiences. Chapter 2 addresses the long-term evolution of Eastern Europeans' understandings of democracy. This contributes to the over-arching research question of the thesis with an analysis of the long-term dynamics of political attitudes that may lead to a politicization of democracy. For democracy to become the object of political contention, we need to

establish a gap between citizens' expectations and evaluations of democracy. Hence, the chapter studies the evolution of citizens' conceptions of democracy over time and asks whether dissatisfaction with democracy leads to rising or declining expectations. Given a large part of the literature emphasizes cultural preconditions for democracy and processes like socialization, the chapter takes a long-term perspective. Specifically, we study to which extent Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy and the mechanisms that link them to evaluations have converged with those of Western Europeans since the transition to democracy.

Chapter 3 studies the immigration issue at the citizen level. As previously outlined, attitudes towards immigration have been said to depend on short-term dynamics and salient events. Hence, the chapter investigates how crises impact citizens' voting decisions and change or activate the underlying attitudes. Specifically, it studies how local experiences with the refugee crisis shape citizens' attitudes and parties' ability to mobilize these citizens. Hence, the chapter complements the previous chapter that considers long-term trends and contributes an analysis whether sudden shocks may impact citizens' attitudes on political issues and thereby contribute to or enable a politicization of issues.

Both chapters that focus on parties (chapter 4 and 5) address what Green-Pedersen (2007, 608) outlined as "the central question emerging from the growing importance of issue competition: what determines which issues actually come to dominate the party political agenda?" Specifically, the chapters study the trajectory of democracy issues and the immigration issue in party competition. However, the different dynamics of immigration and democracy issues again result in two slightly different research questions.

Chapter 4 asks which factors determine to what extent and how parties speak about democracy in their election campaigns. Based on the idea that party conflict regarding democracy is limited as we expect polarization on the issue to be low, the chapter focuses on showing the different logic of conflicts on democracy issues and its implications for patterns of variation in the salience of democracy issues across and within countries. Thereby, it contributes an analysis of the conditions under which parties take up existing challenges to the performance of democracy. It also analyzes the impact of party strategies, where the topic of democratic reforms provides a particularly interesting case since any changes to the status quo directly contradict mainstream parties' interests in maintaining their own access to power.

Chapter 5 addresses the politicizing impact of the refugee crisis on the issue of immigration. Hence, in the context of this thesis, the chapter studies the interaction of party strategies and short-term developments in shaping each party's contribution to the politicization of

an issue. In contrast to democracy, which is a low salience issue in many contexts, parties could hardly afford to ignore immigration due to its salience during the 2015 refugee crisis. Appropriate to the crisis-driven mode of politicization which we have outlined, the chapter asks how problem pressure through an external shock and internal pressure resulting from the actions of other parties impact the strategies of parties during a crisis. Relating to issue competition as struggle to put advantageous issues on the agenda, the chapter focuses specifically on the role of the radical right. While this party family is generally most interested in raising the issue of immigration on the party system agenda, we investigate whether the pressure of the crisis facilitates its impact on established parties.

Finally, chapter 6 directly compares party strategies in responding to political pressure exercised by a challenger on immigration and reforms of democracy. The chapter takes up findings and open questions from the previous chapters by studying the impact of the entry of a new challenger party on the two different dimensions. Taking a more qualitative approach to political speech, we also address which frames parties choose to take these issues up while attempting to limit the influence of their challengers

## Cases, data and methods

The five empirical studies of the dissertation rely on different country cases, datasets and methods. To give an overview of the work, this section describes the approach of each chapter, including a summary of the country-cases, data sources and methods in Table 1.2.

Chapters 2 and 3 both address the central role of experiences for the politicization of policy issues. To investigate the sources of citizens' understandings of democracy, chapter 2 analyzes how citizens' expectations regarding liberal, social and direct democracy have changed in twelve Eastern European countries. Adding to the literature that primarily highlights modernization theories and communist legacies, we show that citizens' evaluations of how democracy actually works have a different impact on expectations from democracy over time. While citizens grow more realistic regarding liberal democracy, we see the emergence of 'critical citizens' that maintain high expectations despite their dissatisfaction with democratic systems. This may form a potential for the politicization of democracy in party competition.

To investigate the short-term dynamics of opinion formation on immigration, chapter 3 leverages the case of Hungary where citizens with limited experiences with diversity were exposed to the refugee crisis. Given the crisis-driven nature of immigration politicization, the chapter focuses on how local experiences and anecdotes that anchor national narratives of crisis have led to changes in citizens' political behavior. We exploit a variety of

Table 1.2: Overview of Data and Methods by chapter

| **Chapter 2** | *Data* | Consolidation of democracy Survey, World Values Survey, European Social Survey |
| | *Countries* | Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany (East and West), Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine |
| | *Method* | OLS- and logit-Regression with scales based on survey items |
| **Chapter 3** | *Data* | hand-coded media-based exposure data, election results (national election, national referendum), population survey |
| | *Countries* | Hungary |
| | *Method* | OLS regression, matched difference-in-differences and logistic regression |
| **Chapter 4** | *Data* | POLCON core sentence dataset with additional issue recoding |
| | *Countries* | Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom |
| | *Method* | descriptive analyses, multilevel and OLS regression models |
| **Chapter 5** | *Data* | 120.000 party press releases |
| | *Countries* | Austria, Germany, Switzerland |
| | *Method* | dicionary-based text analysis, time series regression |
| **Chapter 6** | *Data* | 30.000 party press releases |
| | *Countries* | Germany |
| | *Method* | structural topic models, OLS regression models |

estimation strategies to study the effect of living in a town exposed to the refugee crisis compared to other Hungarian towns. Specifically, we use an OLS to explain the results of a 2016 referendum on immigration, a matched difference-in-differences design to assess the electoral impact and analyze survey data to address heterogeneity between supporters of different parties. All in all, our results highlight the role (and the limits) of crises in shaping citizens' attitudes and vote choices.

In chapters 4 and 5, we turn to the party level to address the different time horizons and degrees of change: Chapter 4 draws an explicit comparison between the variation

in the salience of the democracy and the immigration issue based on data about party statements during election campaigns covered in national newspapers. While the salience of immigration mostly varies between parties and only to a small extent across elections or countries, almost half of the variation regarding democratic reforms is at the country level. Substantively, the chapter argues that democratic systems primarily become a political issue when democratic norms are violated due to serious problems with the performance of democracy (as exemplified in many Eastern European countries). The chapter provides evidence based on the importance of cross-country differences in mobilization with democracy issues as well as country-specific patterns in the importance of different aspects of the democracy issue. Additionally, we show that in line with the assumption of an underlying normative consensus, it is political outsiders (including populist parties) that drive the politicization of democratic systems in election campaigns.

In contrast, chapter 5 focuses on inter-party and over time variation concerning how parties in Austria, Germany and Switzerland reacted to the refugee crisis. We use differences in the countries' exposure to the refugee crisis and the strength of radical right parties to study how the crisis has changed the radical right's impact on mainstream parties' emphasis on and positions regarding immigration. In line with our argument about the need for a detailed measurement of the emphasis and position change among parties during times of crisis, we develop a salience and position measure based on the analysis of party press releases. Using this measure, we show that attention to immigration radically increases for all parties during the crisis, driven by refugee numbers as well as the pressure of the radical right. However, the attention of other parties to immigration decreases with the end of the refugee crisis and position change remains limited throughout the whole time period.

Finally, chapter 6 leverages the case of Germany to address how established parties attempt to reduce the impact of challenger mobilization through issue framing. Political competition in the country was long marked by the absence of a radical right party that advocated for political and cultural demarcation (Dolezal 2008, 233; Bornschier 2012) and the emergence of the AfD provided a challenge to the political consensus on several dimensions. The chapter confirms the finding of a relative stability of immigration positions outlined in chapter 5, despite competing results regarding changes in the position of mainstream parties (e.g. Jankowski, Schneider, and Tepe 2019) by highlighting the importance of framing in responding to challengers. It also shows that German parties focused on the issue of immigration in responding to the AfD and relates this to the lack of the preconditions for a politicization of democracy as a salient issue in the country.

# 2    The Evolution of Eastern Europeans' Conceptions of Democracy[2]

## Introduction

Writing about the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe, Ralf Dahrendorf (1990) famously distinguished between the 'hour of the lawyer', 'the hour of the economist' and 'the hour of the citizen'. While the first two characterize the fast-paced changes during the transition and the years immediately after, 'the hour of the citizen' designates the ensuing long process of adaption in civil society and behavioral norms that Dahrendorf expected to take up to sixty years. Three decades after 1989, the legal and economic transformation seems to have progressed far in many countries, including the EU accession of many of them (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Sadurski 2004). Still, it is unclear how this has translated into the attitudes of citizens. With recent discussions about democratic backsliding, scholars have questioned the depth of commitment to democracy among Eastern European elites and citizens. This has renewed calls for citizen-centered perspectives on democracy in the region (Dimitrova 2018).

While there is a range of studies (primarily from the 1990s and 2000s) concerning the attitudes of Eastern Europeans towards democracy, most of this research either focuses on communist legacies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017) or adopts a political culture perspective that emphasizes modernization and cultural identities as explanations (e.g. Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka 2006). In contrast, Eastern Europeans' attitudes towards their democracies are usually not evaluated in relation to the functioning of democratic institutions. Thirty years after the regime change, the focus of research on citizens' attitudes is still on communist legacies and the transition rather than the performance of democracies.

We provide an approach that is based on what citizens think democracy means and what they expect it to deliver, to provide a better assessment of democracy in the region. Hence, we focus on different aspects of democracy and distinguish between conceptions and evaluations of democracy, rather than asking whether citizens prefer democracy in the abstract, as compared to other regimes. Specifically, we study the development of these attitudes over time to address whether the changes in political systems have also affected the citizens' understanding of democracy and whether Eastern and Western European citizens have come to share a common understanding of what democracy implies.

Given that many recent studies have followed the 'democratization by integration' (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004, 91) paradigm that posits EU accession as crucial for the success

---

[2]based on a paper co-authored with Endre Borbáth

of democratization, we place a special emphasis on the role of Europe and the European Union. We build on recent work that has established the similarities between North-Western and Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). We expand on this work by presenting an over-time perspective that shows that a common liberal-democratic model in its idealized form has been present in Eastern Europeans' understandings of democracy ever since 1989 and remains a standard to aspire to. However, we also show the limits of convergence between different parts of Europe by comparing alternative explanations of change and by showing the challenges imposed by what citizens perceive as a low quality of democracy in most Eastern European countries. With this, we highlight a growing indifference towards democratic ideals that results from persistent dissatisfaction with the performance of democracies.

## Revisiting the Long Transition

Studies of democracy in Eastern Europe and beyond have often focused on formal institutions, rather than the democratic practices that go along with it (Dimitrova 2018). This holds for the literature on Europeanization in particular, which has argued for a 'democratization by integration' into the European Union, a top-down process of rule adoption triggered by external incentives. However, the elite-centered perspective on democracy is also present in the study of democracy's unraveling: The term 'backsliding' itself, which has been at the center of recent debates (Bermeo 2016; Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018; Greskovits 2015), arguably "perpetuates an overemphasis on institutional rules and organizational structures" (Dimitrova 2018, 259). Speaking in Dahrendorf's terminology, much of the literature on the development of democracy in Eastern Europe has discussed the hour of the lawyer (namely the change of the political regime) and the hour of the economist (the transition to a market economy). However, it remains conspicuously quiet about Europe's 'hour of the citizen'. When analyzed, attitudes have typically been discussed as a constraint, assuming democratic reforms in some countries may be "more a matter of rhetoric than practice" (Klingemann et al. 2006, 2).

We part from this literature to argue that attitudes can constrain as well as support processes of reform. Most importantly, we think it is crucial to investigate not only the elite's but also the citizens' attitudes. Anchoring democracy can only succeed if a significant share of citizens supports democracy and pressures politicians accordingly. For example, previous research has found that mass and elite linkage to other European countries has a positive impact on democratic reform trajectories by promoting citizens' political activity and their capacity to demand accountability from their government (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). Researchers have also argued that the elite-based character of liberalism

may be responsible for the weakness of liberal democracy in Central Europe (Dawson and Hanley 2016). This means that how citizens conceive of democracy is important for assessing the robustness of the regime.

Transition studies often rely on a comparison of Eastern and North-Western European regimes. However, unlike the reform of institutional frameworks that followed relatively stable benchmarks across Europe (e.g. the acquis communitaire), democratic expectations are subject to change. The limited evidence we have suggests that Western Europeans are as likely to change their attitude towards democracy as Eastern Europeans (Klingemann 2014). They may do so depending on the development in their own countries as well as in reaction to the new EU member states: They may have been inspired by the 'democratic revolutions' of 1989 or may have become more realistic or indifferent in the face of the problems of democratization in neighboring countries. Furthermore, they may similarly respond to global trends. Therefore, the attitudes of citizens in Eastern and Western Europe are a moving target embedded in a causally complex process of change.

## Citizens' Conceptions of Democracy

Before we specify our expectations regarding the changing attitudes towards democracy, it is important to discuss what we mean by this. Different from other authors, we focus on how citizens understand and form expectations towards democracy, rather than on the importance they attribute to democracy in the abstract.[3] In the early nineties, there was little question that the transition from communism should be a transition to democracy. Even most of the communist regimes had called themselves 'people's democracies' and democracy stood relatively unquestioned as the most preferred form of government. What was much more unclear was what democracy would imply. In recent years, the proliferation of various versions of democracy that distort or disfigure the liberal-democratic ideal (such as illiberal democracy, post democracy or stealth democracy) has highlighted the importance of divergent conceptions of democracy. Moreover, recent literature has highlighted that support for democracy may even be detrimental to democratic development if citizens misunderstand what democracy entails (Brunkert, Kruse, and Welzel 2019). This seems particularly urgent in post-communist countries where the 'liberal consensus' is said to be fading (Dawson and Hanley 2016).

Broadly following the framework outlined by Ferrín and Kriesi (2016), we see democracy as a *multidimensional* concept with a basic liberal democratic model and two more demanding models: social democracy and direct democracy. In the basic model, we include the *liberal*

---

[3]We use citizens' conceptions and expectations interchangeably.

*principle*, which limits the power of democratically elected representatives and guarantees the fundamental rights of the citizens. Constitutionalism, the division of power, and an independent judiciary in particular ought to guarantee the lawfulness of the state's actions. In turn, the *democratic principle* refers to elections of the political decision-makers at regular intervals. Free and fair elections presuppose equal participation of all citizens, and competition between alternative options for future policy-making. The voters need to be informed about the record of the incumbents and form their will in a deliberative process. In Europe, the record of the incumbents also depends on whether or not governments have considered the views of the democratic governments of other European nation-states.

We also discuss two visions going beyond the basic, essentially procedural model of liberal democracy. The *social democratic* vision of democracy adds the substantive notions of distributive justice to the concept of liberal democracy: poverty reduction and the pursuit of social equality are considered fundamental to this complementary model of democracy. The model of *direct democracy* adds a more direct form of participation to the representative model of liberal democracy and may also be considered complementary to the basic model. Even if representative forms of democracy dominate today, direct-democratic forms of participation have become increasingly prominent in Europe in the recent past. Several countries in Central- and Eastern Europe have introduced such forms of participation in their constitution (Auer and Bützer 2001).

Building on these three models, we formulate expectations how current conceptions of democracy have evolved over time. We also specify our expectations for the different aspects of democracy and discuss individual-level causes of variation, such as having lived under communism and evaluations of democracy. Moreover, we examine whether these conceptions used to be more similar to those of citizens from non-EU member states. In short, we inquire whether the process of transition and EU accession has brought about a convergence of citizens' conceptions of democracy and whether this process has occurred in a linear fashion.

## Convergence or Persisting Legacies?

In the previous literature on the development of citizens' democratic attitudes, we can identify two strands: First, a strand arguing that communist socialization has shaped citizens in a long-lasting way. Post-communist citizens are said to be less supportive of democracy and these differences are rather "due to living through communism than living in post-communist countries" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017, 6). Insofar as differences do not depend on country characteristics (such as the low performance of democracies) but

on the experiences of individuals, the citizens' views of democracy might only converge as a result of a complete generational turnover. The political culture perspective similarly suggests that the Eastern part of former post-communist countries in particular lacks a democratic culture and that its citizens have not become demanding due to a lack of modernization (Haerpfer and Kizilova 2014; for a more optimistic and comparative perspective, see Brunkert, Kruse, and Welzel 2019). Hence, Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy should be less demanding than those of North-Western Europeans.[4] Given that this strand primarily relates to individual-level factors, we will address it in more detail in the second part of this paper.

In contrast to this rather pessimistic view, we emphasize a second strand of the literature that assumes differences between Eastern and Western Europe to be temporary. According to this strand, differences are expected to converge as a result of everyday experiences with democratic institutions and the international diffusion of democratic norms and values. Learning about democracy is a process which continues after primary socialization (Fuchs and Roller 2006). According to this perspective, with growing democratic experience, citizens in formerly communist countries are able to learn what democracy means, even if they were born under a different political system. As previous evidence shows, citizens in less democratic countries originally think of democracy primarily in terms of the electoral process, but with increasing democratic experiences their conceptions also include liberal elements related to freedom and liberty (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007), i.e. they develop a more nuanced understanding of democracy over time. Similarly, recent literature has argued that citizens shift their expectations from economic towards political performance with increasing democratic experience (Camacho 2019; on the importance of economic performance also Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta 2019). Hence, we expect convergence between both parts of Europe to occur, in response to the democratization of domestic institutions as well as the increasing linkages to democratic countries.

H1: Conceptions of democracy converge across Europe over time. (Convergence hypothesis)

While domestic 'learning by doing' is likely to depend on the quality of the democratic institutions in one's own country, two possible mechanisms may drive the process of international norm diffusion. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War, democracy has emerged as a virtually unrivaled model to organize political communities. We find this argument most bluntly in the often-cited formulation by Francis Fukuyama that history came to an end as democracy gained universal acceptance. More subtle arguments have

---

[4]Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017, 127–34) find East-Europeans to be more demanding regarding social democracy in 2009. While they generally diagnose a "democratic deficit" of post-communist citizens, they, however, find no relation between conceptions of democracy and a lack of democratic support.

been brought forward by a range of scholars, who have shown widespread and growing support for democracy across different continents, mostly building on the results of the World Value Survey. Democracy has become a quasi-universally accepted standard (Sen 1999) to which post-communist citizens aspire, similar to citizens of other democratizing countries. If the assumption of a universal trend is true, Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy should approximate those of North-Western Europeans, independently of their country's membership in the EU.

On the other hand, theories of Europeanization have suggested that an understanding of democracy requires more than adherence to an idea. In this view, specific processes of institutional change lead to modifications of citizens' attitudes. As the painful process of acquis adoption shows, the EU had a very specific vision of democracy that goes beyond regularly holding free and fair elections and includes liberal elements of democracy. The process of adopting these rules did not start with EU accession, but the EU had an influence on the post-communist countries' developmental path already before accession. This influence has been said to have operated through formal accession requirements as well as 'passive leverage,' thanks to the "magnetism of EU membership" (Vachudová 2005, 78) that led countries to emulate policies without formal pressure from the EU. Upon membership, the impact of the EU remains as the multilevel structure of governance can also provide a benchmark to which the quality of domestic democracy can be compared (De Vries 2018), thus helping citizens to develop a more demanding view of democracy. According to this view, Eastern Europeans' conceptions of democracy should have been on the rise above all in the prospective EU member states, more so than in the other Eastern European countries. Over time, the conceptions in the new EU member states should have converged with the conceptions of the citizens of the Western European member states. However, this process should be specific to the EU member states and not exist in all Eastern European countries to the same extent.

H2: Conceptions of democracy of citizens of the new EU member states, but not of the other Eastern European countries, converge with those of North-Western Europeans over time. (Europeanization hypothesis)

## Variation in Levels of Convergence

So far, we have argued that, in contrast to the post-communist deficit theory, we expect a convergence of attitudes towards democracy. Now, we proceed to qualify this expectation by specifying it with regard to the quality of democracy, which varies above all between the different dimensions of democracy. We have previously cited the ideas of linkage and

leverage as important mechanisms. We expect both to work together in causing a stronger convergence in institutions and conceptions regarding the liberal model but to have less of an effect on the other conceptions of democracy. This relates to our previous hypotheses: While the EU did not directly press for more participatory or social democracy, it forced many countries to change legislation in areas such as minority rights or independence of the judiciary. Thus, we expect conditionality-based Europeanization pressures to have been most pronounced regarding liberal democracy. We expect the same asymmetry, whether the key external driver of convergence is Europeanization or a universal value change, given that the implicit 'universal value' hypothesis also refers to the model of liberal democracy. Hence, both arguments lead us to expect convergence to have most force with respect to the liberal model.

We cannot assume the same level of convergence for social and direct democracy. Though citizens may have had high expectations in this regard, there was little external pressure for post-communist countries to develop these aspects of their political systems. As mentioned before, the EU has exercised little pressure in both domains. As a matter of fact, the costs and scope of the Union's acquis communautaire were huge, requiring the buildup of the state administration and its capacity to process these laws, which seriously limited the scope for social policy (Grzymalała-Busse and Innes 2003). Governments needed to square the circle – they had to administer a set agenda of reform and compliance, while trying to appear as electorally responsive as possible in terms of their social agenda. Governments have frequently chosen strategies of technocracy, populism and nationalism to deal with this challenge, often to the detriment of redistributive social policies (Grzymalała-Busse and Innes 2003, 67).

The lack of responsiveness of the governments in terms of social policy and the lack of direct democratic institutions is, however, unlikely to have diminished the expectations of the Eastern European citizens with respect to social justice or direct democracy. On the contrary, regarding social justice, we expect Eastern Europeans to have particularly high expectations, given the poor standard of their welfare states, the resulting growing inequalities and the related spread of nostalgia since the transition from communism. In fact, democratic expectations do not only tend to rise as a result of high-quality performance of democratic institutions as the cultural approach has argued so forcefully (Dalton and Welzel 2014; Welzel 2013), they also tend to rise as a result of poor-quality performance. Thus, as previous studies of Europeans' views and evaluations of democracy have shown (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016), in a cross-national comparison, European citizens are most acutely aware of the democratic principles and ideals when they are least able to benefit from them. The belief in basic emancipative values that is highlighted by the

cultural approach as a condition (Brunkert, Kruse, and Welzel 2019) may be important for democratic beliefs, but it is direct negative political experiences that shape the maximalist democratic conceptions of Europeans in the first place.[5]

Potential communist legacies facilitate this process: Although the communist 'people's democracies' are discredited for most Eastern Europeans, protection against poverty may still be viewed as an important part of any regime (Ekman and Linde 2005). This is an area where the minimalism of welfare states in most Eastern European countries has consistently failed citizens, especially when compared to Western Europeans. Moreover, during times of crisis such as the recent years, demands for social democracy may have risen among Eastern Europeans as their much-analyzed economic patience may have run out (Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Greskovits 1998). The same may hold for direct democracy. In a context where politics is often dominated by corruption scandals, citizens might feel more sympathetic towards direct forms of representation, without the intermediary power of party elites (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Neblo et al. 2010). Studies from various contexts have shown that economic crises diminish the tolerance for poor political performance (Brancati 2016; with some qualifications Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Royo 2014). Hence, we expect citizens to become more demanding regarding these models of democracy where problems are particularly glaring.

H3: The extent of convergence differs across models of democracy. While conceptions of liberal democracy converge, conceptions of social and direct democracy do not. (Selective Convergence Hypothesis)

**Individual-level Determinants of Conceptions of Democracy**

To provide a more compelling argument in the debate between democratic learning and anti-democratic legacies, we look into the micro-level foundations of democratic conceptions. Following our general discussion, we highlight two kinds of individual-level mechanisms that affect conceptions of democracy: one legacy-based, focused on the impact of the individuals' past experience with communism, the other performance-based, focused on the impact of the individuals' current level of satisfaction with democracy.

As mentioned above, recent research has emphasized the effect of having lived under communism rather than living in a post-communist country (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Arguably, communist socialization has caused a long-term 'democratic deficit' among citizens beyond the explanatory potential of political institutions and economic

---

[5]In the 2012 wave of the European Social Survey we are able to disaggregate evaluations of the three models of democracy we distinguish. The results presented in Figure A2.5 in the Appendix show cross-sectional differences in conceptions and evaluations in line with what we describe here.

conditions. According to this strand of research, the ambitious re-education projects under communist regimes (particularly those of the more totalitarian nature) have created subjects rather than citizens and individuals have still not been able to shake off this socialization. Nevertheless, in recent studies, the evidence for the connection between having lived under communism and attitudes regarding democracy is mixed (e.g. Klingemann et al. 2006).

While we recognize the enormous socialization burden placed on the post-communist countries, we side with those authors who have argued that democracy is a learning process with the effect of communist socialization wearing off over time (Mishler and Rose 2002). Though communist citizens had little experiences with democracy, democracy was not an alien idea to them and they were able to adapt fast. In fact, having experienced the previous regime may also have made some citizens with communist socialization value the achievements of democracy more and criticize its shortcomings more forcefully. Overall, we expect the effect of having lived through communism to wear off and we expect those who have lived through communism to become more similar to those with no or little communist experience.

H4: Over time, the effect of having lived under communism on conceptions of democracy decreases. (Fading Legacies Hypothesis)

Instead, we propose an alternative mechanism that links conceptions of democracy to the citizens' evaluations of their experience with democracy. This mechanism is performance based, building on the finding that satisfaction with democracy matters for citizens' support for democracy over time (Magalhães 2014). Previous research has shown that when assessing cross-sectional variance, there is a pattern of mutually positive influence between conceptions of and satisfaction with democracy (Kriesi and Saris 2016, 195). Thus, dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy implies that citizens pay more attention to democratic ideals and demand more democracy ("critical citizens", see Norris 1999). Conversely, the mechanism of rising aspirations suggests that those who are very satisfied with democratic institutions in their country may pride themselves in these institutions and demand more.

Building on this cross-sectional assessment, we formulate expectations for the over-time development of the democratic expectations in Eastern Europe. Generally, we expect citizens to grow more realistic in their assessments of democracy over time. In the early nineties, enthusiasm about democracy was high. Hence, we expect a pattern that corresponds to the rising expectations mechanism: At a time when evaluations were primarily based on the comparison to the previous regime, they were generally positive (see Figure A2.6 in the Appendix) and gave rise to high expectations. With growing experience,

however, citizens learned to judge democracy by what they observed in their countries, namely a democratic system which failed to deliver on these high expectations. Here, the different speed of improvements across the three aspects of democracy, partially driven by selective EU pressure, leads to different expectations: Regarding liberal democracy, we expect most citizens to grow indifferent. Over the past thirty years, they have seen different governments and multiple reforms of their political systems shape a new normal. We expect them to adjust to this new reality by being satisfied with less and lowering their expectations accordingly. In contrast, we expect some of those citizens who become dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their own country to become 'critical citizens' who maintain high demands for how democracy should work. The dissatisfaction mechanism should hold for social justice and direct democracy in particular, where improvements have been more limited with governments eschewing expansions of democracy partly due to the lack of external pressure. Hence, over time, citizens grow more 'realistic' with respect to their demands from democracy. While they settle for what their democracies have to offer on liberal democracy, they increase their demands in areas where democracy fails to deliver.

H5: Over time, citizens become more indifferent in terms of liberal democracy, and become more critical in terms of social justice and direct democracy. (Realism Hypothesis)


## Data and Methodological Approach

As previously outlined, with our choice of indicators, we diverge from the usual practice to rely on the question about the importance citizens attribute to living in a democracy. We do so because we think this indicator does not sufficiently differentiate between conceptions and evaluations of democracy, as citizens' responses about living in a democracy may depend on their own experiences with democracy. As some of the literature we have discussed has shown, citizens' conceptions and evaluations of democracy mutually influence each other, and both are a function of the political context in which the respondents live. Therefore, a question that does not differentiate between conceptions and evaluations of democracy draws on an idiosyncratic mixture of both (Alonso 2016). Given that Eastern Europeans are more critical of their regimes than citizens of other European countries but still have a differentiated understanding of democracy, it is important to assess both parts separately. Accordingly, we choose to focus on a variety of different items, allowing a more precise measure of respondents' conceptions of democracy.

This focus on the citizens' conceptions of democracy limits the range of surveys we can rely on. We start from the most recent and comprehensive data source, the 2012 special module of the European Social Survey (ESS6) on conceptions and evaluations of democracy. The

ESS6 is particularly well-suited for our research question since it measures democracy as a multidimensional concept across a wide range of aspects. It also considers the difference between views and evaluations as one set of items measures the importance of each theoretically relevant component for democracy, and another set of items measures citizens' evaluations of the different components in their country. However, it does so in a cross-national European way and hence does not allow for over-time comparisons.

To reconstruct the over-time variance of citizens' beliefs on democracy, we introduce two additional cross-sectional surveys. The first of these surveys is the 'Post-Communist Publics Study' (PCP) on the development and consolidation of democracy. This survey was fielded in two consecutive waves, in 1990-92 and 1998-2001. The second wave also includes West Germany, which we use as reference value for North-Western Europe for the early 2000s. In addition, we rely on the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which had a special battery of questions on citizens' expectations towards democracy. This wave of the WVS was fielded in 2005-2009 and includes countries from North-Western and Eastern Europe. To the best of our knowledge, the PCP, the WVS and the ESS are the only surveys that allow for mapping citizens' expectations of democracy. Though there is no perfect match between the countries included, among the EU member states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former GDR are included in at least one wave of the PCP in addition to the WVS or the ESS (see Table A2.6 and figure A2.2 for robustness checks). Among the non-member states, all surveys include Russia and Ukraine.

**Operationalization and Measurement**

We used all three data sources and established comparable items for citizens' expectations in terms of liberal democracy, social justice and direct democracy. As Kriesi and colleagues (2016) discuss, the responses to each individual question are heavily skewed as citizens consider many items as extremely important. To ensure variation, we follow their proposed approach and construct scales that reflect the number of items individual respondents considered extremely important (and therefore necessary conditions) for democracy. For our analysis, we have matched the three scales Kriesi and colleagues introduce in their analysis of the ESS6 with comparable items from the PCP and the WVS (see the Appendix on survey items). As part of this procedure, we aimed to strike a balance between comparability and availability of the different items. Therefore, in some surveys, the scales are constructed from slightly different measures, depending on what questions were asked. Nevertheless, for liberal democracy, each scale includes items referring to political liberties, equal rights and free and fair party competition. For social justice, each scale

includes items referring to social equality and items linking economic performance with democracy. For direct democracy, each scale includes only a single item, referring to the importance of citizens' participation in decision-making in general or via referendums specifically. The liberal and social democracy scale range from zero (the respondent did not consider any of the items extremely important for the particular vision of democracy) to ten (the respondent considered all items extremely important for the particular vision of democracy). We use a dichotomous indicator to measure conceptions of direct democracy.

In what follows, we descriptively present the development of the citizens' expectations of democracy in comparison to Western Europe. Then, we use OLS respectively logit regression models on the pooled samples from the Eastern European countries to test our hypotheses regarding individual-level determinants. All models we present include country fixed effects (not reported) and standard errors clustered by the country*waves of the surveys. We also include controls for interest in politics, education, age, and gender. Our key independent variables to model individual-level differences in expectations towards democracy are communist socialization, satisfaction with democracy and the year of the survey. For communist socialization, we use years lived under communism, the measure proposed by Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017). Following their suggestion, we do not count the first six years of an individual's life. The variable ranges from zero for those who were born after 1983 to 44 for an individual born in 1939 or earlier in a country where communism was established soon after 1945. In Russia and Ukraine, where communism came about earlier, the variable has a maximum value of 69. Satisfaction with democracy is measured with the standard item used in the literature: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?" We rely on the year of the survey to model over-time changes[6], and interact this variable with the number of years lived under communism and satisfaction with democracy.

## Results

### Country-level Convergence of Expectations

As outlined above, we expect Eastern Europeans to converge in their expectations regarding democracy with North-Western Europeans. In 2012, Eastern Europeans had similar expectations towards liberal democracy as North-Western Europeans. However, they were more demanding in terms of social justice and direct democracy. Citizens of non-EU countries were more demanding on all three dimensions (see figure A2.5). Treating

---

[6]The year of the survey varies within a given wave. For instance, the WVS was conducted in 2006 in Russia, but in 2009 in Hungary.

Figure 2.1: Over-time expectations regarding democracy across regions

the North-Western European values as a benchmark[7], figure 2.1 shows the over-time development of expectations of Eastern Europeans, for countries within and outside the European Union.

The figure allows us to assess our first three hypotheses. Most importantly, we do not find a general convergence of expectations towards democracy (H1), instead, the evolution of expectations follows a different pattern across the three dimensions (H3). Given the strong EU pressure in terms of liberal democracy, we expected convergence in this domain, but not in terms of social justice and direct democracy where the EU did not establish any conditionality. The figure shows Eastern Europeans' expectations of liberal democracy to be relatively stable until the late 2000s. Only in the last survey, we see a decline which may have started earlier in Western Europe.[8] Thus, Eastern Europeans' expectations regarding liberal democracy indeed seem to converge towards the North-Western European values.

However, both regions do not seem to converge in terms of social justice and direct democracy. As the figure shows, over time, both Eastern and North-Western Europeans lower their expectations with regards to liberal democracy but not with regards to social justice and direct democracy. Regarding social justice and direct democracy, we do not see the linear change that the notion of convergence (or divergence) implies. Instead, regarding social justice, we observe a very large gap between North-Western and Eastern

---

[7]As mentioned in the data section, we can only use Western Germany as benchmark in 2000 since no other Western European countries were included in the PCP.

[8]While we only have data for Western Germans in 2000, they are close to the North-Western European average in the WVS and the ESS.

Europe in the late 2000s and in 2012, though citizens of North-Western Europe and most Eastern European countries become more demanding in the last survey. Regarding direct democracy, we see a reversal with North-Western Europeans initially being more demanding. However, this might be due the lack of data in North-Western Europe, given the particularly high demand for direct democracy in Germany (the only country for which we have data in the second wave of the PCP survey) and the differences in question wording.

Whereas the idea of a model-specific convergence seems to suggest the importance of the EU, the difference between citizens from countries which have joined the EU and citizens of countries which have not joined is marginal. Contrary to what we expected (H2), the development of these two types of countries is remarkably similar, both in terms of liberal democracy and direct democracy. Only in terms of social justice, we observe some divergence with increasing expectations in countries that became EU member states[9], and a gradual stabilization of highly demanding expectations in countries that did not enter the EU.

The empirical pattern points to the limits of the Europeanization perspective which motivated H2: the development of the Eastern European citizens' expectations seems almost unaffected by EU membership. This suggests that the citizens' conceptions of democracy are rather influenced by a universal trend and the marginal effect of prospective or actual EU membership does not change their expectations towards democracy. What is more, contrary to the post-communist democratic deficit thesis, citizens in Eastern Europe have higher expectations than citizens in North-Western Europe.

In figure 2.2, we show the over-time development of expectations towards liberal democracy, social justice and direct democracy at the country-level, compared to the North-Western European values as benchmark. As the figure demonstrates, citizens of most countries expect less from liberal democracy in 2012 than in 1990. The largest drops occur in the former GDR and in the Czech Republic, two of the better functioning liberal democracies in the region. Bulgaria and Romania stand out as the two countries in which citizens have become more demanding in recent years. This could be related to the renewed fight against corruption which the EU promoted through continued monitoring of these countries after accession, based on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Particularly in the case of Romania, the fight against corruption has dominated the political agenda and, as recent waves of protest have shown, increased citizens' awareness of the importance of monitoring the decision-making process (Abăseacă and Pleyers 2019). Potentially, these citizens

---

[9]The effect is even stronger if we only include countries which were part of all waves of data collection (see figure A2.2)

A Liberal Democracy



B Social Justice



C Direct Democracy



Figure 2.2: Expectations regarding democracy across countries over-time

increased their expectations towards liberal democracy by forming a more demanding vision of the rule of law.

Social justice and direct democracy follow the opposite pattern as most countries' citizens expected more in 2012 than they did in 1990. Especially in the crisis period after 2008, citizens had higher expectations regarding social justice in some of the economically hardest-hit countries like Slovenia and Hungary. As we discussed in the regional analysis, expectations in Russia and Ukraine, the two non-EU countries that are covered by multiple surveys, did not develop very differently than expectations did in the EU member states. In both countries, citizens increased their expectations in terms of social justice and direct democracy to levels comparable to other countries and became slightly less demanding in terms of liberal democracy. Seemingly, low performance of domestic regimes made citizens in both countries adapt their expectations in terms of liberal democracy and made them more realistic. In contrast, low performance increased expectations in terms of social justice and direct democracy. To explore the two mechanisms, we rely on individual-level analysis and map the role of socialization under communism and satisfaction with regime performance in forming expectations.

**Individual-level Differences**

To model individual-level differences and over-time changes, we pool the surveys and interact the year of the survey with our key independent variables (years under communism and satisfaction with democracy). In addition, we also include the interaction between satisfaction with democracy and years lived under communism.[10] Table 2.1 presents the estimates of the interaction terms (for more detailed results see A2.1).

As Table 2.1 shows, we find a strong interaction between year of the survey and satisfaction with democracy for all three dimensions, both in statistical and substantive terms. By contrast, the interaction between year of survey and years lived under communism is statistically significant only in the case of liberal democracy, while the interaction between years lived under communism and satisfaction with democracy is not statistically or substantively significant. In order to ease the interpretation of these interaction terms, figure 2.3 presents two marginal effect plots, which show the changing effect of years lived under communism and of satisfaction with democracy on democratic expectations at the beginning of the transition (1990) and in the most recent survey (2012).[11]

---

[10]We tested for a three-way interaction model between year of survey*satisfaction with democracy*years lived under communism but the estimate was not statistically significant and had a substantively very small effect.

[11]We replicate the same figure excluding Russia and Ukraine in Figure A2.3 and include the underlying regression model in Table A2.7 in the Appendix.

A Years lived under communism



B Satisfaction with democracy



Figure 2.3: The marginal effect of years lived under communism and satisfaction with democracy on expectations towards democracy in 1990 and 2012

Table 2.1: OLS (Lib. Dem. and Soc. Just.) and Logit (Dir. Dem.) models of expectations towards democracy

|  | Lib. Dem. | Soc. Just. | Dir. Dem. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.15** | -0.064 | 0.014 |
|  | (2.75) | (-1.12) | (0.50) |
| Years under communism | 0.011 | 0.032** | 0.013* |
|  | (1.18) | (2.81) | (2.49) |
| Year of survey | -0.047* | 0.12*** | 0.052*** |
|  | (-2.64) | (5.02) | (5.80) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey | 0.00075* | -0.0011 | -0.00020 |
|  | (2.23) | (-1.96) | (-1.24) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.00025 | 0.0017 | 0.00069 |
|  | (-0.40) | (1.88) | (1.92) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.010** | -0.0066* | -0.0038* |
|  | (-3.47) | (-2.43) | (-2.44) |
| Observations | 48548 | 48548 | 48548 |
| $r^2$ | 0.10 | 0.058 |  |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ |  |  | 0.028 |

Note: All models include controls for interest in politics, age, gender, education, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country*waves. For more detailed results see Table A2.1 in the Appendix.

The empirical pattern shown by figure 2.3 provides mixed results regarding our expectation of the fading effect of years lived under communism over time (H4). With respect to liberal democracy, in 1990, everyone had high expectations, with the number of years spent under communism making virtually no difference. The negative, direct effect of the year of the survey suggests demands for liberal democracy have been weakening over time. However, over time the number of years spent under communism becomes more important, as those who had not lived under the previous regimes lowered their expectations, while those who had lived longer under communism maintained their high expectations also in 2012. As a result, contrary to our expectations, the effect of the number of years lived under communism increases over time. When we estimate the same model only with cohorts that were included in all waves of data collection, the results show a universal decrease between 1990 and 2012 in expectations towards liberal democracy (see table A2.11 and figure A2.4) with those who lived longer under communism always expecting more. We interpret this to mean that the younger generations who grew up in democracy but not the older generations who lived longer under communism have grown more indifferent to or alienated from the reality of liberal democracy in their own countries.

For the other two dimensions, there is a direct, positive effect for the year of the survey, which means that demands for social justice and direct democracy have been generally

increasing over time in Eastern Europe. In addition, we observe an (almost significant) interaction effect for social justice and direct democracy,[12] which is, however, opposite to the corresponding effect for liberal democracy. In 1990, the longer an individual had lived under communism, the higher her expectations were in terms of social justice. However, by 2012, the younger generations who had less experience with communism substantially increased their expectations in terms of social justice. For the older generation, we observe only a small change. This means that current high demands for social justice cannot (only) be attributed to nostalgia for the previous regime, since it is the members of younger generations who by now tend to be equally demanding of social justice as the older generations who have lived longer under communism.[13]

The largest over time differences are observable with respect to the effect of satisfaction with democracy on conceptions of democracy. In line with our expectations (H5), the marginal effects plot shows how citizens became more indifferent towards liberal democracy. All citizens had high expectations in 1990, but people who were the most satisfied with the new regime had by far the highest expectations. By 2012, the citizens most satisfied with democracy have, in relative terms, changed the most and have lowered their expectations to a level that is even somewhat lower than that of the least satisfied. Thus, the mechanism of rising expectations no longer seems to work. We interpret this massive change in the expectations of the most satisfied as a sign of increasing indifference towards liberal democratic ideals.

By contrast, in line with the dissatisfaction mechanism, it is the dissatisfied citizens who increase their expectations the most in terms of social justice and direct democracy. For these models of democracy, we observe the rise of critical citizens. Among those who are satisfied with democracy there is a similar level of expectations in 1990 and 2012, whereas expectations drastically increase in the group of the dissatisfied citizens. In line with our hypothesis (H5), the dissatisfied increase their expectations in areas where the regimes face the greatest challenges (social justice and direct democracy), and settle for what they "get" in areas where problems are seemingly less severe (liberal democracy).

---

[12]The interaction effect is significant if we only include cohorts surveyed in all waves of data collection (see table A2.11)

[13]Given the generally higher expectations in non-EU countries, we replicate the analysis without Russia and Ukraine in Figure A2.3. We still find a similar effect for Social Justice and Direct Democracy. However, The effect for years under communism for liberal democracy vanishes as we see a universal decline in expectations towards liberal democracy.

## Conclusion

In setting-up this paper, we have emphasized the long process of transformation that the Eastern European nations have experienced in the three decades since their transition to democracy in 1989. Following Dahrendorf, we have argued that citizens' attitudes should change at a much slower pace than political and economic institutions. Assessing the speed and depth of changes today, our conclusions provide a mixed assessment of democracy in Eastern Europe.

Across Eastern Europe, expectations of liberal democracy are the area where we observe the closest similarity between Eastern and North-Western Europeans. The fact that this convergence occurs among non-member states as well as among member states suggests that this is not so much due to EU accession but rather due to the close linkage between the EU and Eastern European countries. However, conceptions converge not by Eastern Europeans raising their expectations to a higher level observed in North-Western Europe. On the contrary, Eastern Europeans initially had higher expectations than Western Europeans have today. Hence, they lowered their expectations towards liberal democracy over time.[14] In times when a linear trajectory towards democracy seems less evident than in 1990, this may be a worrying trend, as citizens may grow indifferent to the low quality of their democratic regimes.

In contrast to the convergence of conceptions of liberal democracy, we also find evidence of divergence of conceptions of social justice and direct democracy. We interpret the pattern of selective convergence as evidence of Europeanization of citizens' expectations, since the EU put strong pressure on candidate countries in terms of liberal democracy, but not in terms of social justice or direct democracy. At the same time, we find relatively few differences in the evolution of the citizens' expectations in countries which entered the European Union and in countries which did not (yet) join. We proposed two interpretations to explain the remarkable similarity of these countries. First, democracy became accepted as a universal norm and the citizens' expectations might be driven by wider trends beyond the scope of the EU. Secondly, citizen expectations in Ukraine and Russia, the two non-member countries we examine, might be influenced by the close link these countries have with the EU, relative to which the marginal effect of membership changes relatively little.

In addition to the macro-level analysis, we examined the role played by the legacies of the previous regimes and citizens' evaluations of their regime in shaping their expectations towards democracy. Younger generations with less experience in the previous regimes lower

---

[14]Our results suggest a non-linear pattern of convergence. While there is a general tendency of citizens lowering their expectations vis-à-vis liberal democracy, we observe some outlier countries in which citizens become more demanding.

their expectations the most in terms of liberal democracy, and learn to demand higher levels of social justice. Older generations with more experience under communism are less sensitive to their experiences with democracy and hold on to their high expectations. Over time, the relation between satisfaction with and expectations of democracy also changes: By 2012, satisfaction with democracy predicts low expectations in terms of liberal democracy, social justice and direct democracy. Rising demands for social justice and direct democracy may suggest that in terms of those dimensions of democracy, we see the rise of critical citizens who are dissatisfied but foster relatively high expectations. In contrast, for liberal democracy, we see a universal decline in expectations that is most pronounced for those who are satisfied with democracy. The growing indifference towards liberal democracy, particularly among the younger generation, is part of a worrying cross-national trend, given the debate on a potential erosion of support for democracy in this cohort in other countries (Inglehart 2016; Voeten 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016).

Looking back to his initial assessment of the Eastern European transitions to democracy during the mid-nineties, Dahrendorf (1997, 144) stated his belief that "democracy is stable only when and where it is no longer identified with economic success by its citizens." Given how crucial social justice is to the conceptions of democracy that Eastern Europeans hold, they do not pass Dahrendorf's test. The low expectations of liberal democracy of those who have not experienced communism and those who are satisfied with democracy add to this. Nevertheless, his concerns also seem exaggerated: Although many Eastern Europeans have experienced economic hardship, we see the emergence of citizens who maintain the high expectations they associate with democracy despite being very critical of democracy's performance. The fact that it is also young people who emphasize social justice furthermore leads us to believe that they are not simply nostalgic of the past, but rather demand a more inclusive political system and a better welfare state for the democratic future of their country.

# 3 How short-term exposure to refugees influences attitudes and voting behavior in Hungary[15]

## Introduction

While the issue of immigration has moved to the core of the European political conversation (De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017), particularly since the 2015 European refugee crisis (Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018), it is still unclear how actual experiences with refugees influence local residents. The issue remains salient, with UNHCR (2018) estimating 4.4 million newly displaced refugees and asylum seekers world-wide in 2017 alone. Citizens' reactions to refugee arrivals are particularly important in contexts where the arrival of refugees and other immigrants is viewed negatively by authorities. When governments scapegoat immigrants instead of sanctioning positive engagement, this affects citizens' views (Ivarsflaten 2005). In this situation, polarizing rhetoric may shape the first impressions refugees make on natives. With the rise of populist and radical right parties across Europe (Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Bustikova 2017), an increasing number of governments mobilize against refugees, rendering encounters between refugees and natives problematic.

We present evidence that exposure to refugees during the 2015 European refugee crisis affected political behavior in Hungary, which was at the center of the crisis both because of the large number of refugees entering the country and its controversial politics of crisis management. Recent scholarship has provided some evidence on attitudinal consequences of proximity to refugee camps and UNHCR reception centers, referred to as hotspots in the literature (Hangartner et al. 2018; Dinas et al. 2019; Steinmayr 2016; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2018; Vertier and Viskanic 2018). The Hungarian case differs significantly from these works because refugees were passing through the country in an irregular manner and their interactions with locals were highly transient. In Greece, for example, locals living near hotspots had little opportunity to have substantive interactions with individuals because of the transitory nature of their stay (Dinas et al. 2019; Hangartner et al. 2018). Yet the presence of refugees at the hotspots in general was a long-term phenomenon as arrival numbers have remained high for years. In contrast, many Hungarians were only exposed to refugees on a single occasion. The 2015 crisis was the first time many Hungarians encountered non-European refugees and transformed the issue of migration from near irrelevance into the central question of Hungarian politics in the following years (Krekó and Enyedi 2018). The question was salient for voters as the share of Hungarians

---

[15]based on a paper entitled 'No country for asylum seekers?' that is co-authored with Gergő Tóth and Johannes Wachs

who named immigration as one of the country's most important problems increased from close to zero in mid 2013 to over thirty percent in November 2015 (European Commission 2016). Meanwhile, the movement of refugees through the country was highly volatile and uncertain, with border closures and the evolving European political situation driving the movement of people through diverse parts of the country. The country thus presents an ideal case to study the conditions under which even short-term encounters may have long-lasting consequences.

The case also provides a unique opportunity to measure the consequences of exposure to the refugee crisis on citizens: shortly after the crisis, Hungary held a national referendum on proposed EU refugee quotas. We use this data to measure the effect of short-term contact with refugees on voting behavior at the settlement level. The results of this referendum allow us to directly measure anti-refugee sentiment, in contrast with previous studies which use far-right party outcomes as a proxy (Dinas et al. 2019; Steinmayr 2016; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2018; Vertier and Viskanic 2018). As the Hungarian government mobilized against the refugees, we can study the impact of exposure during crisis in the unique context of strong anti-refugee sentiment among the elite and political leadership of the country. We find a significant backlash effect: settlements exposed to the crisis were significantly more likely to vote against the EU quota in the referendum.

Notably, both Hungary's ruling right-wing Fidesz party and the far-right opposition party Jobbik campaigned against refugees, a fact which we exploit to study potential motivations for changes in party choice. If voters exposed to the crisis express anti-refugee policy preferences, both Jobbik and Fidesz (collectively the right-wing) are likely to gain votes. If exposure induces resentment against the government, however, one would expect votes to flow from Fidesz to Jobbik. Using a difference-in-differences specification to measures changes in party vote shares in settlements across the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections, we find evidence for the latter effect in exposed settlements, while the right-wing as a whole sees no significant change in its share of the vote.

We find further evidence that exposure influences voting behavior only within the right-wing using survey data. At the individual level, only right-wing partisans are significantly more likely to express anti-refugee policy preferences and worries in exposed settlements. These heterogeneous effects indicate more specifically how voting behavior responds to exposure in crisis.

We first outline the theoretical relevance of the underlying mechanisms and review related work. After describing the specifics of our case, we present our data and modelling strategy. We then proceed to test the impact of short-term exposure to refugees in different settings:

its effect on voting in a national anti-refugee referendum, the electoral gains of two anti-refugee parties (one in government, one in opposition) in parliamentary elections before and after the crisis, and individual-level survey responses collected shortly after the crisis.

## Motivation, Theory and Related work

The so-called 2015 European refugee crisis has led to renewed interest in how natives react to the arrival of immigrants and refugees both attitudinally and in their political behavior. The crisis has drastically increased the number of arrivals to Europe and changed patterns of interactions between natives and new arrivals. Many classic studies build on the *contact theory* by Allport (1954) which posits that social interactions can lead to a reduction of prejudices (see also: Pettigrew et al. 2011). Recent work reinvigorates that this proposed virtuous outcome of contact with differences may require some qualifications (Paluck, Green, and Green 2018), for example that contact persists over some extended period of time combined with positive sanctions from the authorities.

These conditions were certainly not met in Hungary during the crisis. As in other so-called transit countries, refugees moved on as soon as they were able to, often only spending days or even hours in a country. We suggest this time was too short to overcome barriers of language and culture. While data from Eastern European countries on the route taken by the refugees is limited, evidence from other regions supports this notion: in a study of reactions to refugees in Austria, Steinmayr (2016, 23) argues that the arrival of refugees to settlements created substantial anxiety which reduced only after refugees had lived in the respective settlement for some time. Although prejudice may be moderated in the long run, short and involuntary encounters may even inflame prejudice (on the difference between short- and long-term effects: Enos 2014).

In explaining why and when citizens may perceive refugees as a threat in the US context, Hopkins (2010) shows that reactions to immigrants are most likely to be hostile when communities experience a sudden influx of immigration and when national media rhetoric presents this as a threat. He argues that citizens are typically unaware of immigration levels but that they are particularly sensitive to changes to these levels, which he finds may lead to politicization of the topic (Hopkins 2010, 42). In this case, local arrivals and hostile national rhetoric combine to produce negative reactions to refugees.

In this context Hungary provides an interesting case: a significant amount of refugees passed through the country in summer and autumn 2015 on their way to Western Europe, until the borders were sealed by a physical barrier in the fall. While Hungary fits the situation outlined by Hopkins (2010) regarding the salience of anti-immigration rhetoric

(Bocskor 2018), exposure in most places was temporary. In many cases, refugees merely passed settlements on their way out of the country. This situation provides a test of the effects observed by Hopkins with a key difference: a subsequent return to the previous level of immigrants.

We suggest that this reversion to the status quo does not change the substantive effect on political behavior of residents of Hungarian settlements exposed to the crisis. One likely contributing factor is the strong anti-refugee message in the public discourse in the years following the crisis: the manner in which governments address the issue of immigration has consequences for citizens' attitudes on the issue (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Voters are susceptible to elite opinion leaders who are skeptical towards immigration more generally (Ivarsflaten 2005). In this, Hungary is an extreme case as Hungary's governing elites actively promoted fears of refugees, for example by evoking the idea of an "invasion". The governing party and the most popular opposition party at the time espoused anti-refugee positions, while Hungarian media rarely gave refugees a voice (Bernáth and Messing 2016). As individuals interpret their personal experiences through the lens of public discourse, short-term encounters, especially with groups of refugees, will reify the framing of refugees as dangerous.

Several other studies have analyzed the political outcomes of the recent refugee crisis, albeit with different results. Evidence from France (Vertier and Viskanic 2018) and Austria (Steinmayr 2016) exploiting quasi-random refugee settlement programs find support for the contact hypothesis in the context of long-term contact. In both countries, settlements receiving refugees were less likely to vote for the far-right in subsequent elections. Short-term exposure during the crisis has been studied using data from the Greek islands. Dinas et al. (2019) find an increase in the vote share of the far-right Golden Dawn on islands exposed to the refugee crisis. Hangartner et al. (2018) find more negative attitudes towards refugees on the same islands in a survey fielded almost two years later.

The Hungarian case presents an opportunity to revisit two lines of research about the effect of short term exposure on political behavior and to address gaps therein. One issue with previous works cited above is they measure change in voting behavior using presidential or parliamentary votes for right-wing parties (Dinas et al. 2019; Steinmayr 2016; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2018; Vertier and Viskanic 2018). Though anti-immigration is a uniting element of right-wing party ideologies in Europe (Ivarsflaten 2008), citizens may vote for them for other reasons, for example because of their culturally conservative programs. As Hungary held a national referendum on a refugee related policy question shortly after the crisis, we can examine the relationship between exposure during the crisis and anti-refugee voting attitudes directly through voting behavior.

H1: Hungarian settlements exposed to refugees during the crisis are more likely to vote
    against refugee resettlement quotas in the 2016 referendum.

We assume experiences with refugees in local contexts serve as reference, tying the crisis to
everyday life. Even if refugees disappear within hours or days, it is not necessarily personal
experiences but the images and anecdotes of unfamiliar refugees in familiar places that
will later influence political attitudes on immigration. This familiarity does not stop at
the borders of individuals' own settlement but also includes their immediate surroundings
and places residents frequently travel to. The media's intense coverage of the refugee crisis
meant Hungarians also saw images of refugees in neighboring settlements, even if they and
their immediate social contacts did not directly witness the incident. All Hungarians were
exposed to the outlined negative rhetorical imagery. Whether citizens living in settlements
near the refugee routes personally saw refugees, heard about them through their social
networks, or saw what happened on state television, their familiarity with the setting
personalizes the events. Hence, we expect the effect of exposure to go beyond the location
of exposure itself and include nearby settlements.

H2: The effect of refugee exposure on political behavior extends to nearby settlements
    and decreases with distance.

A second point of interest in this line of research we reevaluate is whether exposed voters
alter their voting behavior to punish the government or to support anti-immigration policy.
So far, studies can only indirectly control for this, e.g. by looking into the electoral gains by
other opposition parties. For example, Dinas et al. (2019) argue that votes for the Golden
Dawn, a far-right opposition party in Greece, are policy-votes rather than anti-government
votes. In Hungary we can disentangle this question by comparing the change in vote shares
of Fidesz, the governing right-wing party, and Jobbik, a far-right opposition party, across
parliamentary elections from 2014 and 2018.

We suggest that the vote for the right-wing in settlements exposed to the crisis has only
a weak policy aspect. A key aspect of right parties' capacity to benefit from short-term
exposure may be due to disappointment with governing parties. A study from Italy
indicates that settlements hosting more refugees were significantly less likely to support
Matteo Renzi's proposed constitutional amendment, a referendum that had no direct
link to the refugee crisis (Bratti et al. 2017). While right-wing parties may benefit
disproportionally, studies of right-wing populist parties have shown these parties frequently
claim that governing elites prioritize the interest of immigrants above those of the native
population (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 14; Cleen 2017, 350). More generally, it is
difficult for governing parties to shift responsibility for immigration under their watch.

While Fidesz attempted to solve this dilemma by adopting a tough stance on immigrants and trying to physically constrain immigrants to few places, exposed settlements were the few places that nevertheless experienced the refugee crisis directly. Thus, citizens in these settlements may be discontent with the government's handling of the immigration crisis and cast their ballot for the opposition Jobbik instead.

H3: Jobbik, the anti-refugee party in opposition, gained votes relative to Fidesz, the anti-refugee party in government, in settlements exposed to the crisis.

Given this hypothesis of a reshuffling of voters on the right, it is natural to ask if there is heterogeneity in the effect of exposure based on partisanship. Evidence suggest that voters adjust their views on immigration to the position of their party (Harteveld, Kokkonen, and Dahlberg 2017) and individuals may resort to motivated reasoning based on partisan ideology in their interpretation of experiences with immigrants. It is unclear if the effect of exposure conforms to this observation.

In a study of extended contact Homola and Tavits (2018) find that contact with immigrants only reduces threat perceptions significantly for individuals with left-wing attitudes because of their higher openess to change. When contact is passing, we suggest that the opposite mechanism may apply. A brief experience may not impact left partisans but reinforce the perception that outsiders are threatening which is associated with resistance towards change (Homola and Tavits 2018). More generally, recent evidence suggests that inaccurate perceptions about the size of foreign-born populations are a consequence of anti-refugee attitudes, and not their cause (Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2018). Thus, citizens who are sceptical towards immigration may experience the refugee crisis as more threatening. To borrow a term from Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004), we posit that short exposure galvanizes constituencies already concerned with the topic. Given that policy on immigration and refugees in Hungary is a significantly partisan issue and has become increasingly so during the crisis, we propose that the anti-refugee reaction of citizens to exposure to refugees during the crisis is a right-wing phenomenon.

H4: The effect of refugee exposure on political behavior depends on an individual's political attitudes. Short-term contact is more likely to induce anti-immigrant sentiments in right-wing voters.

## The Hungarian Case

Hungary is more ethnically homogeneous than most other European countries. The most common immigrants to Hungary are ethnic Hungarians coming from neighboring countries. Since 1990 immigration to Hungary has functioned, both formally and informally, as a two

track system distinguishing between ethnic Hungarians and other immigrants (Nyíri 2003; Bocskor 2018). This framework reflects the negative Hungarian attitude towards refugees in particular and non-Hungarian immigrants in general (Simonovits et al. 2016; Enyedi, Fábián, and Sik 2005; Messing and Ságvári 2016). Immigration of non-Hungarians was not previously a significant topic in Hungarian politics. However, nation and nationality were salient topics in other regards e.g. the question of citizenship for ethnic Hungarians from abroad (Batory 2010). While certain ethnic groups certainly have advantages in questions of immigration in all European states, the institutionalized two-tier system in Hungary facilitates xenophobia, for example against the small Chinese and Vietnamese immigrant communities (Nyíri 2003). Indeed, in a comparative analysis using the European Social Survey, Bail (2008) finds that in Hungary symbolic boundaries, conceptual distinctions used by majority groups to construct notions of 'us' and 'them', have the strongest racial component of all 21 countries. This fertile ground of ethnic prejudice may have been amplified by media reporting about the crisis, similar to how anti-Roma discourse has entered the mainstream (Vidra and Fox 2014).

**2015 Refugee Crisis**

The importance of immigration as a political issue in Hungary changed drastically in 2015, as rising immigration numbers and attacks in western Europe led to the political mobilization of the topic on the right. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán began to frame immigration as a threat to Hungary in January 2015 in the aftermath of the attack on Charlie Hebdo. The government mailed a 'national consultation' questionnaire to each Hungarian citizen on the subjects of immigration and terrorism. The questionnaire was criticized for its leading questions and its framing of the issue[16].

While immigration numbers had been on the rise since 2014, it was only in summer 2015 that refugee traffic reached its high point and that the issue gained traction with the wider public. As Hungary was the first Schengen country before destination countries like Austria and Germany on the so-called Balkan Route, a land route taken by refugees from Greece, nearly 400,000 refugees were registered in Hungary in 2015. Most arrived in August, September and October and were not able to continue their journey at first, due to the EU's Dublin Regulation which required refugees to apply for asylum in the first Member State they reached. We visualize the number of refugees entering Hungary in 2015 in Figure 3.1. The majority of these refugees entered at the Serbian border, making this area a frequent focus of public debate.

---

[16]For example: "Do you think that Hungary could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years?" and "We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?"

Figure 3.1: Number of refugees entering Hungary daily in 2015
The Serbian border was sealed on September 18th, causing a brief, sharp decrease in entries. The Croatian border was sealed on October 17th, practically ending the inflow of refugees to Hungary. *Source: police.hu - Border information*

For the Hungarian government, decreasing migration became a central goal. This was realized through the construction of a fence along the borders with Serbia and Croatia. When the fence along the Serbian border was completed on September 18th 2015, the Hungarian authorities closed the border, diverting the refugees through Croatia. One month later, that border was closed too. Afterwards, very few refugees entered Hungary as the government drastically restricted the number of legal entries via so-called "transit zones" at the border. However, public discussion regarding how to deal with refugees and how to manage Hungary's border has continued since then as the centerpiece of the ruling party's political discourse.

**Political Consequences and the 2016 Quota Referendum**

With its restrictive immigration policy and intensive mobilization around the issue (Bocskor 2018), the governing Fidesz party created a strong link between the prevailing political cleavages and immigration. Immigration had previously been a marginal issue in Hungarian party competition with cultural competition centered around nationalism and cultural liberalism (Gessler and Kyriazi 2019). After the 2014 election, Fidesz faced increasing pressure from the right, with the oppositional far-right party Jobbik gaining popularity (Batory 2016; Bustikova 2017). As Fidesz actively competed for a far-right electorate by enhancing policies that originated from Jobbik (Pirro, n.d.; Szalai and Göbl 2015), the immigration issue (on which there was no clear issue ownership given its low salience)

provided fertile ground for an outbidding regarding restrictive policy proposals between both parties.

Originally, discussion centered around border security. After the closing of the borders, political discussion continued regarding the European level and the European Union's proposed quota-based refugee allocation scheme. According to this scheme, Hungary would be responsible for hosting 1294 refugees. A referendum on the policy was originally proposed by Jobbik in parliament in November 2015, however, the proposal was not advanced. Fidesz also opposed the quota but only announced a referendum in February 2016, to be held in October, a year after refugee arrivals to Hungary had effectively ended. The campaign was centered on presenting immigration as a risk to the Hungarian population. Since the referendum required 50% participation to be valid, opposition parties encouraged voters to stay home or to cast an invalid ballot. Ultimately, 41% of eligible voters cast a valid ballot and of those 98% voted "No", i.e. against the EU quota.

Since then, the Hungarian government has held additional "national consultations" and the topic has remained on the agenda up to and beyond the 2018 parliamentary election (Krekó and Enyedi 2018; Bocskor 2018; Gessler 2017). Competition between Fidesz and Jobbik has remained a driving force of this conflict with both espousing policies to curb immigration. In the context of our study, this means both gained different credentials on the immigration issue: while Fidesz was able to build a track-record of implementing restrictive policies, Jobbik may at times have increased its profile by attacking domains in which Fidesz did not advance new policies, e.g. the country's residency bond scheme that gives residence permits in exchange for buying government bonds (Jacoby and Korkut 2016; Halmai 2017).

## Data and Measurement

To test our hypotheses, we collected data on the presence of refugees in Hungarian settlements during the peak crisis months in 2015 from three media sources. We relate this to political outcomes while controlling for several potential confounding factors at the settlement level. When using survey data to test heterogeneity of the treatment effect on individuals, we also employ individual-level controls.

### Exposure to refugees

We collected data on the presence and movement of refugees during the crisis from three sources: MTI, the Hungarian state newswire, Index, a popular online news outlet independent from the government, and LiveUAMap (Live Universal Awareness Map), a

crowdsourced real-time social media aggregator with geographic information including pictures and videos. Though most of the activity on LiveUAMap relates to the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, there is also data on the events of the European refugee crisis. It has been used in qualitative studies of the paths taken by refugees on their way to Europe (Proglio 2018).

We coded that significant refugee contact took place in a settlement if it was reported in any of the three sources. For example, we include all the settlements along the "March of Hope", a widely reported incident often cited as the climax of the crisis in Hungary (Kallius, Monterescu, and Rajaram 2016). On September 4th, thousands of refugees at Budapest's Keleti train station, which was closed to international travel because of the crisis, began walking towards Austria along the M1 highway, disrupting traffic on one of the largest highways in the country. Later that same evening, the Hungarian government decided to bus the refugees to the Austrian border. Soon afterwards, chancellor Angela Merkel signaled that the refugees would be allowed to come to Germany. We also coded smaller scale events throughout the country, including similar marches from the V'amosszabadi refugee camp in the northwest to the Austrian border, and from the Croatian border to the train station in Nagykanizsa in the southwest. In total we label 51 settlements as treated. We visualize the geographic distribution of refugee contact in Figure 3.2.

Kilometers to Nearest Refugee Contact Settlement



Figure 3.2: Settlement distances to points of contact with refugees during the 2015 crisis Logarithmic scale. Budapest (in gray) is omitted.

Though we do not claim that we have identified every location of contact between Hungarians and refugees during the crisis, we do suggest that our data describes those locations in which Hungarians had a significantly higher likelihood of seeing unfamiliar refugees in a familiar context. Survey data from January 2016 indicates that individuals in such settlements are significantly more likely to report having encountered a refugee in the past year. This relationship holds even when controlling for whether the individual reports knowing a foreigner personally and whether he or she lives near a border, see Table A3.4 in the Appendix. Finally, we note that we have excluded Budapest as datapoint from our empirical analysis because it is an outlier in several dimensions including population, density, diversity, and wealth, and because treatment in the city itself was highly heterogeneous.

**Dependent Variables**

In our empirical analysis we analyze three different types of political outcomes: settlement-level outcomes of the quota referendum, settlement-level election results in the following general election in April 2018, and individual responses to a survey on migration-related topics conducted in January 2016. We report summary statistics of all variables used in our models in the Appendix, see Table A3.1 and Table A3.3.

We plot the distribution of our primary dependent variable, the number of no votes cast in the referendum over the eligible voting population in a settlement, in Figure 3.3. Given the boycott strategy of the opposition discussed before, we believe this is a more appropriate measure of the anti-refugee outcome than considering the share of votes against the quota. We note that there is significant variance between cities. We visualize the geographic distribution of the referendum outcomes in Figure A3.1 in the Appendix. In a second specification, we measure the electoral effects of contact with refugees on party outcomes at the settlement level. Immigration was a major topic of the 2018 election particularly for Fidesz and Jobbik, leading us to use the share of Fidesz, Jobbik, and both combined as dependent variables.

In the individual-level specification, we use data from a survey of the general population of Hungary in January 2016. Specifically, we rely on a rotating module of a repeatedly asked questionnaire of TARKI, a Hungarian social research institute. After excluding respondents from Budapest, we are left with a sample of 772 respondents, 105 of which live in treated settlements. We analyze a battery of attitudinal and policy questions that are included in the Appendix and discussed in more detail in the results section. Given the skew of the answers towards anti-refugee attitudes, we dichotomize responses into absolute rejection and more moderate attitudes.

Figure 3.3: Distribution of refugee quota referendum no votes
Share of the eligible voting population of Hungarian settlements with at least 50 voters.

**Control Variables**

We collected socio-economic data for all Hungarian settlement to rule out some potential confounding factors. Many studies have shown that economically vulnerable populations are more likely to vote for radical right and anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011). Lower levels of education have also been shown to relate to political hostility towards foreigners (Hjerm 2001). We therefore control for each settlement's income per capita, unemployment rate, and share of population with a high school degree in 2016, the year of the referendum. We also include logged population size to control for the size of the settlement.

Additionally, we consider voting data from the previous parliamentary elections in 2014 to account for prevailing local political allegiances. Because they both endorsed and campaigned for the 'no' camp, we include the share of votes received by Jobbik and Fidesz in 2014 in our models.

As we are also interested in potential spillovers of the contact effect to nearby settlements, we use a matrix of inter-settlement travel distances (in minutes by car) to calculate the distance of each settlement to the nearest point of refugee contact[17]. As issues of migration may be more salient near borders, we also note if a settlement is within 25 kilometers of a border.

---

[17]The results presented are robust to considering geographic distance instead.

**Estimation strategies**

To measure the anti-refugee sentiment at the settlement level we use the ratio of 'no' votes to the eligible voting population at the 2016 referendum as a dependent variable $Y_i$, the distribution of which we show in Figure 3.3. $T_i$ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if we code refugee contact in a settlement, $Z_i$ denotes our matrix of settlement-level control variables, including pre-referendum settlement-level party preferences, population, and socio-economic factors. $\epsilon_i$ is an independent error term, assumed normally distributed with mean 0. In the first extension of the baseline model, we introduce a geographical dummy $D_i$ for settlements within 25 kilometers of any border and county fixed effects $\psi_i$ to control for geographic effects like different settlement structures.

$$Y_i = \alpha_i + \delta_1 T_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 D_i + \psi_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

We also measure the spillover effect of the treatment to nearby settlements using continuous distance measures to the nearest treated settlement in travel minutes. In order to examine the effect of treatment in terms of distance, our final model estimating a settlement's referendum outcome bins observations into categories according to their distance in travel time from the nearest treated settlement, with treated settlements taken as the reference category.

To address the electoral effects of the refugee crises on parties we use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifically, we measure the effect of treatment during the crisis on vote shares of right-wing parties between the 2014 and 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections. The specification constructs a counterfactual estimation of the change in vote shares in treated settlements using changes in vote shares in untreated settlements over the same period. Two factors threaten a causal interpretation of the resulting estimates: 1) if the parallel trends assumption that party vote shares would have followed the same trend in all settlements had the refugee crisis not occurred, and 2) if treated and untreated settlements differ in ways that could affect their response to treatment.

To address the first concern, namely to assess whether the parallel trends assumption holds, we carry out and report a placebo test for differences in party vote shares between the 2010 and 2014 elections. To address the second concern, we use a kernel-based propensity matching strategy (d'Agostino 1998; Stuart et al. 2014) to compare settlements using the same demographic and socio-economic controls as in the ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta_1 A_{it} + \beta_2(T_{it}|\omega_i) + \delta_1[A_{it} * (T_{it}|\omega_i)] + Z_i + u_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where the dependent variable is the vote share of the two main right-wing parties, $A_{it}$ is an indicator separating time periods before the refugee crisis ($A = 0$) from the period after the crisis ($A = 1$), and $T_{it}$ is the separation of settlements according to exposure to refugees as defined above.

The key variable of interest is the interaction term between $A_{it}$ and $T_{it}$, which estimates the true treatment effect. $Z_i$ refers to the socio-economic control variables, while $\omega_i$ is the matching estimator. When using kernel matching, each treated observation $i$ is matched with several control observations, with weights inversely proportional to the distance in propensity scores between treated and control observations. The propensity scores are estimated using a logit regression using the same controls.

Finally we check for heterogeneity in the impact of treatment on individual policy preferences and attitudes using survey data. Since the answers are heavily skewed towards anti-refugee attitudes, we use logistic regression models in which the dependent variables take the value of 1 if the respondent chooses the response most critical towards refugees. We control for several individual-level attributes that have been shown to relate to anti-immigrant attitudes (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011), namely whether individual has a high school degree, if they report that they are in a precarious economic situation, their self-reported gender, and if their settlement is within 25 km of a border (collected in the matrix $W_{ij}$). We include regional (NUTS 2) fixed-effects rather than county (NUTS 3) fixed-effects because we do not have survey participants from all 20 counties, and in several counties we only have untreated or treated observations. To test our hypothesis that treatment affects right-wing voters more than left-wing or non-partisan citizens (H4), we introduce an interaction between treatment and whether the individual indicates a political preference for either Jobbik or Fidesz ($R_j$):

$$P(Y_{ij} = 1) = \alpha + \delta_1 T_i + \delta_2(T_i * R_j) + \beta_3 R_j + \beta_4 W_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

## Results

### Treatment and Referendum Voting Behavior

Table 3.1 presents our OLS models estimating results of the 2016 referendum on immigration at the settlement-level. As discussed in the previous section, our dependent variable is the number of 'no' votes in the referendum as share of the total eligible voters. We first

|  | Dependent variable: | | | |
|  | Referendum no votes over eligible voting population | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | 0.035*** | 0.017** | 0.022** | |
|  | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.008) | |
| Mins (10) to treat. | | | −0.002*** | |
|  | | | (0.0005) | |
| < 15 min to treat. | | | | −0.027** |
|  | | | | (0.011) |
| 15 - 30 min to treat. | | | | −0.031*** |
|  | | | | (0.009) |
| >30 min to treat. | | | | −0.036*** |
|  | | | | (0.009) |
| Fidesz share 2014 | 0.430*** | 0.380*** | 0.423*** | 0.429*** |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Jobbik share 2014 | 0.212*** | 0.203*** | 0.217*** | 0.212*** |
|  | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Population(log) | −0.022*** | −0.022*** | −0.022*** | −0.022*** |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Border < 25km | | −0.001 | | |
|  | | (0.003) | | |
| Constant | 0.341*** | 0.330*** | 0.359*** | 0.377*** |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.019) |
| County FE | No | Yes | No | No |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,142 | 3,142 | 3,140 | 3,142 |
| Adjusted R$^2$ | 0.367 | 0.458 | 0.372 | 0.367 |
| Resid. Std. Error | 0.073 | 0.067 | 0.073 | 0.073 |
| F Statistic | 260.602*** | 103.226*** | 233.123*** | 203.153*** |

Table 3.1: Anti-refugee voting behavior in the 2016 referendum
OLS regressions estimating the relationship between treatment and anti-refugee voting behavior in the 2016 Hungarian Quota Referendum.

estimate the model controlling only for previous election results, population, and the socio-economic controls. In this first estimation, we find that treatment leads to a 3.6 percent higher share of no votes in a settlement. In a second step (Model 2) we introduce county-fixed effects and proximity to the border to control for the different geographic effects across the country. Here we observe a reduced though still significant effect of 1.7 percent. These findings support our hypothesis that short term exposure to refugees during the crisis leads to anti-refugee voting (H1). Our estimates are similar to the 2 percent effect found by Dinas et al. (2019) in their study of far-right voting on Greek islands following the crisis.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.1 test the effect of distance from treatment. The models suggest that treatment has an effect beyond the treatment settlement itself and this effect decreases as travel time increases. Model 4 replicates this finding with binned distances. We interpret these models as supporting H1 that the effect of short term exposure on anti-refugee voting behavior spills over to nearby locations.

**Change in Party Vote Shares**

Table 3.2 presents the results of our difference-in-differences estimations of the change in Fidesz, Jobbik, and combined Fidesz and Jobbik (right-wing, for short) vote shares between the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections. The results suggest that there was no significant overall effect of treatment on votes of the right-wing as a whole. However, we see a redistribution of votes within the camp: while Jobbik gained roughly two percent in treated settlement, Fidesz lost two percent, compared to settlements through which refugees did not travel. We also report a placebo test of the same models using data from the 2010 and 2014 parliamentary elections to test the parallel trends assumption. We do not observe the same redistribution of votes from Fidesz to Jobbik across the previous elections.

These findings support our hypothesis H3 that Jobbik, as opposition party, would gain votes in treated settlements from the ruling Fidesz. They question the interpretation of previous results on short-term exposure and voting for the right as a consequence of the right-wing's issuer-ownership of immigration rather than holding the government accountable. As a whole, the right-wing did not win more votes in exposed towns. In our context, the redistribution of votes within Hungary suggests an anti-government vote as Jobbik and Fidesz were competing with each other to take the more hardline anti-refugee position.

More broadly, the flow of votes from Fidesz to Jobbik in treated settlements between 2014

| Change in vote shares of: | Fidesz | Jobbik | right-wing (F+J) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **2014-2018** | | | |
| After | 0.070*** | -0.033*** | 0.042*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.01) | (0.002) |
| Treatment | -0.040*** | -0.032*** | -0.072*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.10) | (0.002) |
| After * Treatment | **-0.021***** | **0.024***** | **0.003** |
| | **(0.005)** | **(0.003)** | **(0.004)** |
| **2010-2014 (Placebo test)** | | | |
| After | -0.090*** | 0.060*** | -0.029*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Treatment | -0.031*** | -0.033*** | -0.065*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| After * Treatment | -0.009* | 0.001 | -0.008* |
| | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| $R^2$ (2014-2018) | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.21 |
| $R^2$ (2010-2014) | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.18 |
| $N$ | 3088 | 3088 | 3088 |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.2: Changes in electoral outcomes between 2014 and 2018
Difference-in-differences estimation results and placebo tests. We analyzed the change in vote shares between 2014 and 2018 for Jobbik, Fidesz, and Jobbik and Fidesz (right-wing) together. We find a significant flow of support from Fidesz to Jobbik in treated settlements. We also report a placebo test supporting the parallel trends assumption. The regressions are run on a kernel-based propensity-score matched sample.

and 2018 contrasts with the national results. Nationally Fidesz gained over four percent, while Jobbik lost more than one percent. In other words, right-wing voters in settlements exposed to the crisis punished the ruling party at the polls by voting for an alternative anti-refugee party, while elsewhere Fidesz expanded its support. We keep this question in mind as we contrast individual attitudes among left and right voters in treated settlements.

**Survey**

Using data from a survey of the general population of Hungary in January 2016, between the peak of the crisis and the referendum, we consider how specifically contact with refugees in the crisis may have changed the political opinions and policy preferences of Hungarians. We interact treatment with respondent's party choice to see how this effect differs between

left and right citizens. While we have no information on previous vote choices, citizens are asked about their current vote preference before the topic of immigration is broached in the survey.

One serious limitation of our survey analysis is that partisanship is self-reported and recorded after the crisis: it may be that exposure to refugees during the crisis moved individuals to the right, in particular those individuals who were especially influenced by their experiences. We test whether individuals in treated settlements were more likely to report support for a right-wing party and found no significant relationship. We report these results in the appendix (see Table A3.5). We also note that recent work on Hungary suggests that partisanship is increasingly consistent and polarized over time (Angelusz and Tardos 2011), rendering defection across the left and right camp less likely.

Table 3.3 shows the impact of treatment on a battery of six different attitudinal questions. Besides the first question, we group the variables into two groups: the first relates to questions about laws or policies that should be enacted in response to the crisis (models 2, 3, and 4), and the second relates to how and why the respondent worries about the potential impact of the refugees (models 5 and 6). Our translations of the questions are available in the Appendix (Table A3.2).

Model 1 measures which respondents are more likely to reject accepting any refugees at all, regardless of their origin. While we do not see a significant interaction effect, respondents who vote for Fidesz or Jobbik are more likely to reject all refugees. Hence, there is no evidence that short-term exposure to refugees changed general attitudes towards immigration. Turning to policy-related attributes, Model 2 to 4 analyze respondents' support for different policies, namely the strengthening of border protection (2), a law obliging refugees to accept Hungarian culture (3) and additional money for integration (4). For consistency, we coded the dependent variable in Model 4 as rejection rather than support of additional money for the integration of refugees. We observe a significant and positive interaction effect for border security and the refusal to allocate more money to refugee integration. Model 5 and 6 analyze to which extent respondents are worried about the arrival of undocumented immigrants (5) and immigrants who belong to a different culture (6). Uniquely, Model 5 shows that respondents who live in treated settlements are more worried about the high number of undocumented immigrants coming to Hungary regardless of party, though the effect is stronger among right-wing voters. In contrast only right-wing voters express worry that arriving refugees come from different cultures. Arguably, left-wing voters and non-partisans also worry about changes in their settlement but draw different conclusions from this.

| | Dependent Variables: Respondent Anti-Refugee Response | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Refugees | L: Border | L: Culture | L: Money | W: Undoc | W: Culture |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | −0.25 | 0.004 | −0.24 | 0.04 | 0.96** | 0.19 |
| | (0.32) | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.38) | (0.31) |
| Right-wing | 0.31* | 0.43** | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.23 | 0.37** |
| | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.17) |
| Treatment × Rw | 0.27 | 1.52** | 0.13 | 1.07** | 1.39* | 1.43** |
| | (0.46) | (0.70) | (0.47) | (0.52) | (0.83) | (0.58) |
| Border <25km | 0.25 | 0.85** | 0.14 | −0.27 | 0.88** | 1.05*** |
| | (0.28) | (0.35) | (0.28) | (0.28) | (0.37) | (0.32) |
| Highschool graduate | −0.59*** | −0.35* | −0.36** | −0.38** | −0.41** | −0.37** |
| | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Precarious econ. situation | 0.23 | 0.37* | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.28 | −0.02 |
| | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.18) |
| Male | 0.30** | −0.16 | 0.11 | 0.02 | −0.05 | 0.01 |
| | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.16) |
| Constant | −0.07 | 0.70*** | 0.42* | −0.39 | 0.65** | 0.23 |
| | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.24) |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 727 | 752 | 726 | 737 | 764 | 762 |
| Log Likelihood | −485.41 | −406.91 | −479.17 | −471.56 | −408.24 | −474.53 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 998.81 | 841.82 | 986.34 | 971.11 | 844.48 | 977.05 |

*Note:* $^*$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01

Table 3.3: Effect of treatment on anti-refugee attitudes
Logistic regressions estimating the effect of treatment and association with the right on different anti-refugee attitudes. L indicates the dependent variable is asking about a legal or policy preference, while W indicates the question concerns general worries about impact of the refugee crisis.

Figure 3.4: Interaction between partisanship and anti-refugee attitudes
Conditional effects of interactions between partisanship and anti-refugee attitudes. In several models, there is a significant interaction effect between right-wing preferences and living in a settlement exposed to the refugee crisis when predicting anti-refugee policy preferences and worrying about refugees.

To ease interpretation, we plot the conditional effects of our interaction terms in Figure 3.4. Notably, in many of the models, the difference between treated and non-treated right-wing respondents is larger than the relatively small differences between left- and right-wing respondents in untreated settlements. We observe almost no change in model 1 and 3 which measure whether individuals reject accepting any refugees and whether they support a law that protects Hungarian culture.

Although not all interaction effects are statistically significant, we believe these results provide evidence that it was mostly right-wing citizens who hardened their position on immigration by demanding stricter policies after being exposed to the refugee crisis for a short period. Together with our difference-in-differences analysis, this suggests right-wing parties mostly competed with each other to present tougher immigration policies.

## Conclusion

In this paper we related exposure to refugees during the 2015 crisis to political outcomes in Hungary. We find that exposure to the crisis predicts anti-refugee voting in a national referendum on refugee quotas in 2016. Exposed settlements voted more for the far-right Jobbik party in the 2018 parliamentary elections, while the ruling Fidesz party, also right-wing and anti-refugee, lost votes. Overall, we see no aggregate gains by right-wing parties in treated towns. Finally, survey evidence suggests that exposure seems to galvanize anti-refugee attitudes only for right-wing partisans. This suggests, in line with recent research on Western Europe (Dennison and Geddes 2019) we see the mobilization of a pre-existing opposition to immigration instead of a change in underlying attitudes.

In contrast with previous work relating contact with refugees to electoral outcomes, our first dependent variable directly captures voting behavior on immigration issues. Hungary itself is also an interesting case as simultaneously one of the most xenophobic and least diverse countries in Europe. As Hungary has two significant right-wing anti-refugee parties, we can compare the effects of contact on the support for the anti-refugee right in government and in opposition in the same context. Our results regarding the redistribution of votes within the right also lead us to caution against over-estimating the impact of contact with refugees: While our effects are non-negligible and statistically significant, they primarily concern a shift within the right, not an expansion of the right-wing electorate. Additionally, these results ran counter to the development at the national level.

Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion of how contact theory applies to the European refugee crisis. A growing body of research suggests that the length and conditions of contact are decisive mediators in the formation of public opinion about refugees. We also note an interesting heterogeneity at the individual level based on partisanship. While Homola and Tavits (2018) suggest that left-wing voters become more tolerant with long-run exposure, we find that right-wing voters are significantly less tolerant after short term encounters.

These findings suggest some important policy implications. While most work on improving refugee integration outcomes focuses on the long-term (Bansak et al. 2018) or looks at targeted interventions (Lazarev and Sharma 2017), the finding that transient short term contact mobilizes existing anti-immigrant attitudes indicates the value of improving crisis management policy (Esses, Hamilton, and Gaucher 2017).

# 4    Taking issue with politics - party conflict regarding democracy

## Introduction

Public debates as well as recent scholarship have highlighted normative challenges to democracy (Freedom House 2019; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017), as well as problems with its quality in various countries (Lührmann et al. 2018). The debate often focuses on backsliding and the emergence of 'illiberal' democracies (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018), but concerns about the strength of the procedural consensus underlying democratic systems have also reached older democracies in North-Western Europe (Landwehr, Faas, and Harms 2017). It is often individual parties that trigger these debates, whether governing parties that engage in corrupt behavior or new parties that mobilize against existing institutions. But how do parties more generally speak about democracy? Are democratic systems actually controversial? And if so, who are the drivers of a possible process of politicization of democratic systems?

The aim of this chapter is to map and explain parties' statements regarding democratic systems across Europe since the early 2000s to assess whether democracy has indeed grown controversial. Much of this is exploratory since we know fairly little about the subject. We assess when democracy becomes a topic in election campaigns, which parties speak about it and how they evaluate proposals for reforms. Additionally, following Easton (1975), we distinguish different objects of debates around democracy: the political community, the political regime and political authorities. This provides us with a better assessment of the possible consequences of a politicization of democracy.

Beyond the literature on extreme parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 237; Sartori 1976, 117–18), political science rarely considers parties' stances towards democratic systems (except Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017). However, if and how parties talk about democratic systems is important: This is most straightforward for parties that may form governments that have the power to change democratic systems, whether by improving performance through careful reforms or by stifling institutions of democratic control. Even when not in office, parties matter for the public debate about democracy. With their electoral campaigns, parties set the political agenda and prioritize topics. Thereby, they shape citizens' perceptions of democratic systems: When parties represent citizens' preferences, also regarding the shape of the policy-making process, this can contribute to citizens' satisfaction with the political system (Allen and Birch 2015). This may reduce grievances towards the political system. On the other hand, parties may also fuel grievances by

criticizing institutions and mobilizing against political leaders they label as elites (Rooduijn, Brug, and Lange 2016).

This chapter is unique in examining not only how parties evaluate democratic systems, but also how much attention they devote to democracy and its functioning across Europe. The empirical analysis is based on newspaper coverage of parties during national election campaigns. In contrast to previous work on parties' positions towards democracy and its performance that relies on expert surveys (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017; Polk et al. 2017), this allows studying the 'public face' of parties. Parties' positions on democracy matter if and to the extent they become the subject of mobilization and are reported by mass media. Hence, this chapter presents a novel assessment of the public debate about democratic systems.

## Politicizing democracy

This chapter starts from the proposition that the logic of conflict surrounding democracy is different from that of economic and cultural conflicts. Economic and cultural conflicts are premised on the idea that democracies are open systems that are characterized by their ability to radically change course and revise policies without losing their legitimacy (see Runciman 2013, chap. 1). In contrast, democratic systems provide the rules according to which such changes are negotiated. This means, debates about reforming democracy are an exception. Typically, public discourse takes political regimes and their institutions as given. Przeworski (1991, 26) famously argued that:

"Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost."

While the literature on democratic consolidation has often interpreted this as an absence of *alternatives to* democracy, Przeworski's proposition goes beyond that. Scholars of transitions have explicitly emphasized that "disagreement not only about the value of democracy but also about the specific institutions of a democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 4) may make consolidation difficult. Thus, *alternative forms of democracy* (including criticism of democratic institutions as well as suggestions for democratic reforms) have a destabilizing potential, even if these proposals aim to improve democratic quality.[18]

The persistence of political regimes across electoral terms is also normatively valued

---

[18]for a recent review of the trade-off between democratic quality and stability in the context of democratic backsliding: Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley (2018)

in consolidated polities. This can be exemplified by the literature on electoral system reforms which emphasizes the need for stability within countries, despite the significant institutional variation across Europe: Dunleavy and Margetts (1995, 10) have summarized this consensus already in 1995, arguing that electoral systems "should not be changed except when [. . . ] political fundamentals themselves change - as in revolutionary situations or system collapses". Other studies similarly argue that there is no pressing need for regular revisions of these institutions (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 225). Even if society changes, institutions are meant to provide stability and predictability to citizens and elites.

Most of the time, the perception of democracy and its institutions as rules of the game keeps them outside the political playing field. With democracy as a norm, its definition of the political community, political regime and political authorities have to be accepted by those who wish to compete for power within the political system. Returning to the logic of political competition for reforms of democracy, this means reform proposals are exceptional and primarily occur when democratic norms are violated. Consequently, attention to democracy is more likely to vary across political contexts (depending on the quality of democracy and its acceptance as a norm) than within a context. Rather than a politicization by individual parties openly attacking the rules of the game, we may expect contestation by multiple parties in places where democratic norms are violated.

This does not mean there is no variation between different aspects of democracy and in the extent to which parties follow this norm. However, we shall postpone the question of variation between parties and across specific issues to formulate a more general argument: Borrowing from the literature on agenda-setting, we can draw on the distinction between the party system agenda and party specific issue emphasis (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). Given the foundational character of democracy, we expect a larger agenda- and a smaller party-specific component in the salience of the issue. Hence, we can formulate our first expectation as a comparison between democracy issues and other issues conditional on the context in which the parties compete:

H1: Different from other issues, party attention to democracy varies more between political contexts rather than between parties within these contexts.

We can test this expectation directly by considering the distribution of variation across and within political contexts. However, this pattern of variation due to country-level conditions has further implications that we may investigate: First, we shall assess different reasons for the politicization of democracy at the country level to understand why politicization primarily varies across countries. To the extent that parties' politicization of democratic systems is a response to violations of democratic norms, we may derive potential reasons

from the study of democratic legitimacy. This body of literature has highlighted input, throughput and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013). *Input legitimacy* may be lacking due to a failure of the representative institutions that link political decisions with citizens preferences. This is closely related to the quality of democratic institutions and citizens' opportunities to participate. *Throughput legitimacy* hinges on the implementation of political decisions and may be problematic due to corruption and administrative inefficiency. Finally, *output legitimacy* builds on the results a political regime delivers, for example in terms of economic output. Problems regarding these three aspects of legitimacy may lead to a politicization of democracy as they question the value of democracy.

H1a  The salience of democracy issues is determined by democracy's input, throughput and output legitimacy.

Second, the different democratic history and its institutionalization may lead us to expect a higher politicization of democratic regimes in certain countries. Previous scholarship leads us to expect that democracy and political institutions are more contested in Eastern and, to some extent, Southern Europe than in Northern and Western Europe (Hutter and Kriesi 2019; Mair 1997). Many North-Western European countries have a long tradition of democracy that has led to relatively stable high-quality democratic systems which undercuts mobilization for democratic reforms. Some of these countries have experienced a strong push for the expansion of direct democracy between the 1960s and early 1990s. Demands for more democracy left their mark on the transformation of cultural competition through the rise of left-libertarian and 'new politics' movements (Kitschelt 1988; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). However, North-Western European party systems were able to absorb these demands by the implementation of concrete reforms or the integration of new parties into existing party systems (Scarrow 1997, 2001).

In contrast, in some countries with younger democratic systems, democracy has not yet achieved the same level of stability and differentiation. This primarily applies to Eastern Europe. As Peter Mair has argued, after the transition, the stakes in elections were higher "with the state, in effect, being up for grabs" (Mair 1997, 172, also 195 ff.). Parties gaining power were in a position to shape the state, its bureaucracy and its institutions, potentially in a way that secures their own position. Thus, the opportunity to implement institutional reforms has been at the core of the benefits, which parties reap from governing. Despite the substantial amount of time that has passed since the transition, these issues have stayed on the agenda: With the potential for clientelistic procurement and public sector employment, political reforms have also been potential selling-points to citizens, promising at times to redistribute the spoils, at times to root out exactly these kinds of political corruption.

Arguably, dissatisfaction with democratic systems may have expanded to several countries in Southern Europe during the course of the recent economic crisis. Though the Southern European countries had developed relatively stable political regimes after their transition to democracy, the financial crisis (and along with it the curtailing of sovereignty through European institutions) has shaken confidence in the democracies of Southern Europe (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). The crisis has raised attention to long-standing problems with democracy such as systemic corruption (Royo 2014). In this context, corrupt practices that were previously widely accepted may have become a subject of debate, due to the low performance of these systems.

**H1b** Democracy issues are more salient in Eastern and Southern Europe than in North-Western Europe.

Third, to understand the variation across contexts, we may also investigate coherence across different aspects of democracy: The literature on issue competition has pointed out that parties have limited power over the political agenda and have to respond to issues salient at a specific moment in time. We may expect this mechanism to be particularly strong for democracy issues, given the topic is not usually on the agenda and parties have not staked out their positions yet.

We can address this on the level of detailed issues as well as in terms of the different objects that democracy issues may concern: Easton (1965, 1975) has established an important distinction between support for the political community, the political regime and the political authorities in his work on support for democracy. He argues that citizens distinguish between their identification with the political community, the political regime (which he identifies as the underlying order of political life) and the incumbent political authorities. Similarly, parties may criticize the democratic quality of incumbents, the architecture of the regime or the political community as a unit of decision-making.

As norm violations are usually specific to certain aspects of democracy, parties' politicization of democracy should equally be limited to certain aspects. For example, corrupt behavior by an incumbent government (or an allegation of that by other parties) does not put the political regime on the agenda. Instead, parties will criticize the incumbent authorities with charges of corruption. Only in rare cases or persistent failure of subsequent incumbents, there may be a spillover to criticism of the political regime more generally (see e.g. Magalhães 2014 for the long-term effect of government effectiveness on support for democracy; also Pop-Eleches 2010 for the changing beneficiaries of protest voting over time). Hence, we may expect political parties within a country to be highly similar in their mobilization with democracy issues.

H1c  Political parties within a party system address the same democracy issues in their
     election campaign.

## Who politicizes issues of democratic reform?

We have argued that democratic systems establish their own procedures as a norm, leading parties to bypass reform proposals in their electoral campaigns. However, incentives for individual parties to comply with this norm differ depending on their position within party competition. To formulate expectations regarding which parties mobilize for reforms of democracy beyond the party system agenda, we shall consider the costs and benefits of putting democracy issues on the agenda for different parties.

Central to understanding parties' incentives to campaign with democracy issues is the distinction between parties at the core and in the periphery of the party system. In the previous section, we have highlighted the normative value attributed to stability in the scholarship of democracy. However, stability is also a vested interest of parties that (successfully) compete within the existing regime. Political regimes shape the conditions of political competition and parties at the core of the party system tend to be invested into the status quo that allowed them to gain representation. In contrast, parties at the periphery of party systems, sometimes called 'political losers' or 'challengers', should not only be more willing to change the issue basis of competition as highlighted by the scholarship on issue entrepreneurship (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2015; Rovny and Edwards 2012), they should also be less attached to the existing 'rules of the game'. Moreover, they may be more willing to criticize incumbent authorities based on their style of doing politics (Sikk 2012), which contributes to the overall salience of democracy for these parties.

One may object that the benefits of shaping the political regime according to the parties' needs may compensate for the associated risks. However, mobilizing with democracy issues is also associated with distinct costs that go beyond the insecurity associated with change. When mobilizing by promising a better performance of political authorities, parties increase standards for their own performance and make themselves targets, based on their past record. When mobilizing with changes to the political regimes, parties equally take a gamble: Political regimes are often enshrined in constitutions and change to them requires a qualified majority. This sets campaign promises up for failure. Furthermore, when parties do pursue reforms of political regimes while in power, well-intentioned reforms may often become entangled with partisan interests and increase scrutiny of the parties that pursue them (Bull and Pasquino 2007). Thus, mobilizing for reforms of the political regime

more than other parties do presents a significant risk to parties who are well-positioned within competition.

Parties' strategic calculus also shapes their positions regarding democracy issues. We have previously outlined the expectation of a clustering of attention to democracy issues within countries. This is based on a simple idea: If democracy issues do gain traction, core parties that are interested in maintaining the status quo will have to address the issue as well. Previous research has shown that pressure on governing parties to respond to the party-system agenda is actually particularly high for governing parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010).

Then, a party's strategic position within party competition as defined by its core or periphery status should equally affect the party's position on democracy issues. Parties that are attached to the status quo should take a more negative stance on democracy issues when they do address them. Specifically, evidence from expert surveys suggests regular access to power makes parties more positive about existing political regimes (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017). Hence, they should object to reform proposals that change this status quo, just as governing parties specifically should dismiss criticism of the incumbent authorities.

Based on this reasoning, we may expect that parties' status as core or periphery in the national party system determines their emphasis and position on democracy issues: Parties with little to lose (due to their disadvantage in political competition) will emphasize democracy issues more than other parties. Parties with a stake in the current system may go along with this emphasis but are likely to take a more negative position if they do so.

H2a  Peripheral parties strive to put democracy issues on the agenda.

H2b  Core parties attempt to reduce change by taking a negative position on democracy issues.

## Data and Methods

This chapter builds on a novel dataset of political issues in election campaigns. It is based on a comprehensive recoding of democracy issues in a dataset originally generated in the context of the *Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession* Project (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). The original dataset stems from a large-scale content analysis of newspapers in fifteen different European countries. This includes four countries from Eastern Europe (Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania), seven countries from North-western Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the

United Kingdom) and four countries from Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain).[19] In each country, the dataset covers at least one election before the onset of the Great Recession as well as all subsequent elections until 2017.

The dataset was built using Core Sentence Analysis, a relational type of quantitative content analysis (Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Kriesi et al. 2008). Every grammatical sentence of a newspaper article is reduced to a relationship between a subject (a party) and an object (a political issue or another actor). The relationship can have a positive, neutral or negative direction. Core Sentence Analysis hence permits to measure actors' issue positions as well as the salience for each party. For the specific dataset used in this study, core sentence analysis was applied to a random sample of articles published in the two months before the election in two newspapers per country.[20]

In comparison to manifesto-data, the data is better at capturing parties' public face. Specifically for issues relating to the democratic system, this focus on public debates should provide more differentiated answers than an analysis of manifestos in which parties often restrict themselves to generic positive remarks (Gessler and Hutter 2019). The data provided by newspaper reports is both more differentiated and more specific, as parties have to address proposals for reforms of democratic systems rather than voice a generalized support for democracy.

The original dataset by Hutter and Kriesi (2019) includes an issue-categorization which includes nineteen policy domains. This chapter is based on a comprehensive recoding of all issue categories that broadly fall into the domain of democracy and its performance. This includes political corruption, democratic reform (both vague and when proposing 'new politics'), regionalism and media. The recoding is done based on auxiliary issue string annotations made by the coders during the original annotation and, in cases of remaining ambiguity, the originally coded sentence where available. Additionally, issues previously classified as non-relevant or non-policy-related were checked to identify potential democracy references among them.

---

[19]Given the focus of the project, the countries were selected to cover differences in the severity of the Great Recession (as well as the ensuing political crises) in each of the three regions, which additionally differ in the institutionalization of democracy and their party system.

[20]In North-Western Europe, the dataset is based on one quality and one tabloid newspaper per country, in Central-Eastern and Southern Europe on the main center-left and the main center-right newspaper. This is due to the larger ideological polarization in these countries' media system as well as the absence of a clear distinction between quality and tabloid newspapers. Further details about the selection process are outlined by Hutter and Gessler (2019)

## Measurement and Modeling Strategy

Based on the expectations we have outlined we use a two-fold modeling strategy: The first part of the analysis is concerned with variation at the level of party systems and only considers individual parties as nested within these systems. The second part of the analysis focuses specifically on deviations from election campaign averages. Hence, we shall calculate two different variants for the measurement of salience and positions: The average salience and position on an issue for a party within an election campaign and that party's deviation from the party system average.

To measure the salience an individual party $i$ attributes to democracy issues in an election campaign $e$ as party-specific salience $Sdem_{ie}$ of the issue. We define this as the number of statements that discuss democracy ($Ndem_{ie}$), as a fraction of all issue-based statements by party $i$ in election $e$ ($N_{ie}$). To measure deviations from the party system average, we calculate a party's deviation from the average salience within that party system (consisting of $m$ parties) during the specific election campaign. This constitutes our two dependent variables for salience:

$$Sdem_{ie} = \frac{Ndem_{ie}}{N_{ie}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \Delta Sdem_{ie} = Sdem_{ie} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{me} Sdem_{ie}}{me}$$

To measure positions and positional deviation, we calculate $\bar{P}dem_{ie}$ which designates the average position of party $i$ in election campaign $e$ on democracy issues. The average position ranges between the original coding limits of -1 (a rejection of a proposal) to +1 (support for a proposal). To obtain an aggregate measure, we harmonized issue positions in such a way that a positive value signifies advocacy for reforms of democracy towards more democracy and diffusion of power. Following the procedure outlined above, we also calculate a measure of positional deviation as $\Delta \bar{P}dem_{ie}$.

In assessing our first hypothesis regarding the structure and level of variation, we shall use the party specific salience and position in a hierarchical multilevel model. Calculating the intra-class correlation of these measurements as nested within election campaigns and countries allows us to study the distribution of variance. Additionally, we shall present descriptive evidence and country-year-level correlations to assess potential country level determinants. In assessing the second hypothesis, we focus specifically on the deviation from the country mean to minimize the impact of outliers, given the large variation in the salience of democracy issues. This provides us with a more suitable dependent variable for regression analysis (see also Figures A4.4 and A4.6 for a comparison of both salience and position variables). Note that for positions, we only include parties with at least 12 statements on the democracy issue in a given election campaign.[21] Additionally, we also

---

[21]Note that a t-test comparison of means reveals no significant difference between groups even though

test the hypothesis based on OLS-regression models.

**Independent Variables**

At the country level, we operationalize the role of input, throughput and output legitimacy using two measurements each: To measure democratic input, we use the quality of liberal democracy in general and participatory democracy more specifically, based on the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Lührmann et al. 2018). To measure throughput, we include government effectiveness, based on the World Bank Measure and, again drawing from the Varieties of Democracy data, a measure of political corruption. To measure the output of a democracy, we include GDP per capita and, given the context of the economic crisis, an aggregate economic misery index (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). We standardize all measures for plotting purposes but use the original scale in the analysis.

To operationalize whether a party is at the core or periphery of the system, we include measures that capture different aspects of the concept: First, we assess the visibility of a party in public, measured as the total number of statements by that party which were coded in the election campaign (previously described as $k_{i,e}$). We include this measure in a logged form in all regressions to address the right-skew of the variable. Second, we include a party's incumbency status measured as participation in government during the election campaign. Third, drawing on the literature on challenger parties, we also include a measure whether a party has ever been in government before. Fourth, we shall also include an aggregated measure of party family (dividing parties into center-left, center-right, left, right and ethnic parties) to differentiate parties at the ideological core and periphery of the political spectrum.

## The logic of competition on democracy issues

We have started this chapter by arguing that the logic of competition on democracy issues differs from other issues, given the normative status of democracy (H1). We can now evaluate this claim based on different types of evidence: First, we shall address at which level attention to democracy issues varies. Second, we shall analyze the impact of several country-level determinants on the salience of political issues to explore what drives this logic. Third, we shall flesh this out by addressing the over time trajectory of democracy issues in different European countries. Fourth, we shall see to which extent variation between different aspects of democracy issues follows a country-specific pattern to explore

---

parties that have less than 12 statements relating to the issue are more positive ($\bar{p}_{e,pol}$=0.46) compared to parties with more than 12 statements $\bar{p}_{e,pol}$=0.37. See also Figure A4.7 which suggests a decrease in the number of exclusively positive or exclusively negative statements between 10 and 20 statements.

Table 4.1: Intra-Class Correlation for different issues

|                 | Democracy | Economy | Culture | Immigration |
|-----------------|-----------|---------|---------|-------------|
| **Salience**    |           |         |         |             |
| Country-level   | 0.53      | 0.18    | 0.20    | 0.14        |
| Election-level  | 0.10      | 0.16    | 0.10    | 0.09        |
| **Position**    |           |         |         |             |
| Country-level   | 0.27      | 0.01    | 0.01    | 0.03        |
| Election-level  | 0.00      | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00        |

the robustness of this finding.

Addressing the level of variation, Table 4.1 shows the intra-class correlation of empty multilevel models predicting the salience parties give to and the position parties take on democracy, economic and cultural issues, as well as immigration. The intra-class correlation coefficient shows the similarity of observations within clusters, compared to the similarity of observations across clusters in multilevel models and thereby provides a measure of the share of total variance that is accounted for by the clustering at different levels. The table confirms that the pattern of variation in the salience of democracy issues indeed differs from the one observed for economic and cultural issues since most of the variance of democracy issues is at the country level. This also differs from the immigration issue studied in chapters 3 and 5 of this dissertation. This means that the salience of democracy issues varies more across countries than between parties. Substantively, this supports hypothesis H1 that the salience of democracy issues is a characteristic of party systems, rather than a strategic choice of individual parties. Notably, the clustering is more pronounced for the salience of issues than for party positions: There is a substantive difference in the clustering of positions on democracy issues and other issues, however, only a quarter of the variance for positions is clustered at the country-level and none at the election level. Hence, regarding positions, the logic of competition also differs from other issues (for which virtually all variation occurs at the party level), however, it includes a larger party-level component.

**Determinants of salience**

Based on this discussion, we shall discuss the determinants of the salience of democracy issues. Figure 4.1 plots the salience of democracy issues against several measures related to democracy's input, throughput and output legitimacy. Each observation represents an individual party in a specific election campaign and is plotted as a point, while party system means are marked with a cross. In its title, each graph also includes the correlation

between each indicator and the average salience of the issue at the party system level. To visualize the relation between the indicators, each graph includes a linear fit line (in red) as well as a locally smoothed fit line (in gray).[22]

We observe the highest correlation for government effectiveness, however, other political explanations also show a high correlation with the salience of democracy. Regarding input legitimacy, it is the quality of liberal democracy that has most explanatory power, roughly equal to corruption. In contrast, the quality of participatory democracy shows a lower correlation. Moreover, GDP change and economic misery are virtually unrelated to the salience of democracy issues. Overall, this suggests that while the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of the government in implementing decisions both matter for the salience of democracy, the effect of economic output is not discernible.

It should be noted that the strength of the correlations is largely based on outliers. The indicators are less good at distinguishing countries with intermediate values, e.g. regarding the quality of liberal democracy. While this means improving the input and throughput legitimacy of democracy may not lead to a linear decrease in the salience of democracy, it is in line with our assumption that a politicization of democracy is a consequence of norm violations, rather than a normal part of political competition.

Furthermore, the absence of an effect for the economic output indicators suggests politicization is not strictly a consequence of the economic crisis: parties emphasize democracy issues based on concerns with democracy, rather than its substantive outcomes. While economic downturns may sometimes highlight existing problems – a question we will assess in more detail when discussing the over time development in Southern Europe – they do not put democracy on the agenda. Similarly, democracy may also enter the political agenda while the economy is doing well. Here, genuine political factors seem to be at work.

---

[22]For a more formalized test, Tables A4.1 and A4.2 include multi-level models with each of these factors for salience and position. The relation between political indicators and the salience of democracy is weaker in the regression framework since we explain the emphasis of individual parties rather than country aggregates, however, the correlation remains significant for liberal democracy and government effectiveness. The models additionally address the effect of GDP per capita. While there is a significant and negative effect for GDP per capita (suggesting a higher GDP decreases the salience of democracy issues), this is largely due to the regional pattern of variation that we address in the next section.

Figure 4.1: Scatterplots with determinants of the salience of democracy issues

## Regional variation and country trends

We shall explore this finding further with a discussion of the regional and country trends in the salience of democracy issues. For this purpose, Table 4.2 shows the average, minimum and maxiumum salience of democracy for election campaigns in North-Western, Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. It additionally shows the salience of difference aspects of the democracy issue to which we shall return in the following section. The important thing to note for now is the sizable difference in the salience of democracy issues between European regions: Even those election campaigns where democracy was least contentious in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe were characterized by a higher average salience of the issue than the most contentious campaigns in North-Western Europe. On average, over a quarter of the issue statements in campaigns in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe is dedicated to democracy issues. Based on these results, we shall focus our analysis of country trends on Southern and Central-Eastern Europe.

Table 4.2:  Average salience of democracy issues

|                          | democracy | community | regime | authorities |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------------|
| **North-Western Europe** |           |           |        |             |
| mean                     | 8.9%      | 1.0%      | 3.8%   | 4.2%        |
| min                      | 4.6%      | 0.2%      | 2.1%   | 1.5%        |
| max                      | 12.9%     | 2.6%      | 5.3%   | 8.7%        |
| **Southern Europe**      |           |           |        |             |
| mean                     | 29.5%     | 6.0%      | 11.9%  | 11.6%       |
| min                      | 19.6%     | 0.0%      | 8.8%   | 7.3%        |
| max                      | 39.4%     | 23.2%     | 16.0%  | 17.0%       |
| **Central-Eastern Europe** |         |           |        |             |
| mean                     | 34.6%     | 2.6%      | 15.9%  | 16.1%       |
| min                      | 20.7%     | 0.4%      | 6.8%   | 10.7%       |
| max                      | 61.8%     | 4.0%      | 26.9%  | 31.0%       |

Figure 4.2 shows the weighted average salience of democracy issues by election campaign (solid points), as well as the salience for individual parties (hollow points). The size of each hollow point that represents a party is weighted by that party's share in the news coverage. Additionally, the figures include a locally smoothed fit line for the specific country with a 0.95 confidence interval. The figures also include annotations with the average position within the party system for each election.[23]

Regarding positions, Figure 4.2 shows that with the exception of Romania, parties across

---

[23]A full over time plot of the development of party positions is included in Figure A4.1 in the Appendix, along with summary statistics for positions in Table A4.3.

**A**   Central–Eastern Europe



Figure 4.2: Country trends in the salience of democracy issues

Southern and Central-Eastern Europe on average tend to endorse reforms of democracy. For salience, figure 4.2 provides additional evidence for the regional pattern of variation. The expected mobilization with reforms of democracy in Eastern Europe is visible in the high average salience of democracy issues across all countries. However, there is significant variation between the extreme points of Latvia, where democracy issues are generally less salient than in the other Eastern European countries, and Romania, where democracy issues clearly dominated every election campaign during our period of observation.

Again, the expectation of a crisis-based politicization for Southern Europe finds only partial support: The salience of democracy issues is higher than in North-Western Europe but the change we observe is limited. The strongest increase is visible in Spain, though - as we shall see in the following section - most of this is due to the resurgence of Catalan nationalism and an increasing politicization of the political community. In countries with a

more limited political conflict around the crisis like Portugal (Hutter and Kriesi 2019), the salience of democracy issues even decreased. Hence, in line with the absence of an effect for economic misery and GDP change which we found in the analysis of determinants, the crisis did not have the same politicizing effect for parties as previous literature has found on the citizen level.

**Varieties of democracy issues**

Furthermore, if we try to understand the substantive implications of mobilization with democracy issues, we have to analyze which democracy issues are actually salient. Concerns about democratic stability that are often associated with public debates about democracy (see e.g. the debate about democratic careening, Slater 2013) have less foundation if doubts concern the performance of political authorities without questioning the political regime. For this purpose, we recode the democracy issues originally included into ten more detailed categories (see Table 4.3) that can be linked to Easton's three objects of political support. Each category contains a distinct aspect of debate around democratic systems.

Regarding the political community, we find regionalism as a questioning of the polity of decision making. There are four relevant categories that relate to support for the political regime: Democratic culture, which concerns the foundations of the democratic regime, concerns with the rule of law and more positive demands for more direct democracy as well as concrete proposals for reforms of the political system. We find an additional five issues that relate to the political authorities, understood in the Eastonian sense that includes not just the government but also other members and institutions of the executive and judicial branch (Easton 1975, 438): Corruption, bureaucracy and transparency relate to the performance of political authorities in a more classical sense, while anti-elitism and renewal are more driven by party ideology and populism (Polk et al. 2017).

Returning to Table 4.2 in the previous section, we see that with the exception of Southern Europe, it is primarily the regime and the authorities that are salient in political competition. Generally, the salience of the political regime and the political authorities is at a similar level in each region. Figure 4.3 provides additional details for the ten detailed issue categories for parties that competed in at least two elections.[24] The first panel, which presents the average across countries, allows us to specify our findings regarding the salience of democracy issues. For topics with an average salience of at least two percent, the exact salience is noted in the plot. The figure shows that by far the most salient topic is corruption with an average salience of four percent across countries. However, there are

---

[24]Figure A4.2 in the Appendix replicates this figure with all parties. Differences to the included Figure 4.3 are discussed in more detail in a footnote at the end of this section.

also important regime issues related to the political regime (namely democratic culture, the rule of law and concrete reform proposals) as well as to a lesser extent, regionalism. However, there is some variation across countries that we shall consider in the next step.

Table 4.3: Detailed issue categories

| Issue | Content |
| --- | --- |
| **Political Community** | |
| regionalism | demands for the devolution of power, including separatism and independence demands |
| **Political Regime** | |
| democratic culture | demands related to the public sphere (freedom of expression and information) and a responsible political culture (e.g. against populism, government stability), as well as general promotion of democracy |
| direct democracy | demands for direct democracy, including within parties (e.g. direct election of leadership); this does not include demands for specific direct democratic votes |
| rule of law | criticism of electoral fraud, abuse of power and violations of the separation of powers, including 'defending democracy' |
| system reforms | demands for the reform of specific institutions, electoral laws and voting rights, constitutional reforms, including changes to the balance of power that do not affect its separation |
| **Political Authorities** | |
| bureaucracy | demands to reduce bureaucracy, efficiency-based demands for centralization that do not explicitly mobilize against separatist or regionalist demands |
| corruption | criticism of corruption, including fraud, nepotism and personal conflicts of interest |
| transparency | demands for accountability and government transparency, including party financing where it is not corruption-related |
| anti-elitism | criticism of elites, including policy measures that aim to limit their power, e.g. term limits or benefit restrictions |
| renewal | demands for reforms and renewal in a generic way without specific proposals |

In the following panels, the red dots represent the country average of issue emphasis while each line represents an individual party. The outlined logic of politicization suggests parties should share a similar pattern of emphasis on the different aspects of democracy issues (see H1c). Indeed, we note a pattern of similarity between parties within a country, even though there are some exceptions where individual parties emphasize or de-emphasize

specific topics.[25]

First addressing variation across countries, it is notable that within North-Western Europe, few topics exceed the two percent threshold we have set. In contrast, in Southern Europe, each of the four countries has multiple topics that are salient in political discussions. There is a remarkable salience in terms of political regime issues: System reforms exceeds the two percent threshold in all countries, democratic culture does so in three out of four Southern European countries. Regarding political authorities, corruption is also salient in all countries but several other issues also gather significant attention in other Southern European countries. Regionalism stands out with an average of 15 percent in Spain. Greece and Italy are the only two countries in the dataset where demands for renewal exceed the two percent threshold.

In Central-Eastern Europe, corruption is also salient, particularly in Romania and to a lesser extent in Hungary. However, several other issues related to the political regime are also highly salient, including the rule of law in Romania, Poland and Hungary. Additionally, bureaucracy, transparency, system reforms and democratic culture are salient in at least three of the four countries. Hence, mobilization with democracy issues concerns both the political regime and political authorities in this region. Different from Southern Europe, where demands towards the political regime are centered in the more ambiguous political culture category or regard concrete reform proposals, demands in Eastern Europe also concern the rule of law as basic element of democracy.

Turning to variation among parties within a country, the biggest diversity in parties' emphasis on an issue exists regarding the salience of regionalism in Spain: while the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) dedicated around 60% of its statements to regionalism, the center-left Socialist Party (PSOE) only spent an average of eleven percent dwelling on the issue. Most of this is due to the specific character of the PNV as a subnational party, however, a part is also an artifact of the parties' different presence in national media: Many of the subnational parties are not included for the elections during the economic crisis and regionalism especially played a major role in the 2015 post-crisis election. In the latter, PSOE also spent 26% of its statements on the issue while it had de-emphasized regionalism in previous electoral rounds.[26] In Romania, Italy and the UK where individual

---

[25]Note that we should not over-interpret small differences but instead look at the aggregate pattern which issues attract debate - the relative scarcity of democracy issues and the level of disaggregation presented in the graph means differences in the single digits may result from individual news articles that report on a topic.

[26]Figure A4.2 in the Appendix replicates this plot with all parties competing in any national election. The main differences are due to parties that compete in a single election that is dominated by a certain topic. However, we also see more variation on issues like corruption and bureaucracy e.g. in Latvia due to successive short-lived anti-corruption parties (see Engler 2016, 2017; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015)

Figure 4.3: Average salience of specific democracy issues for parties that competed in at least two elections

parties deviate in their emphasis on regionalism, this is due to explicit ethnic or regionalist parties that emphasize the issue more, namely the Hungarian Minority Party, Lega Nord and the Scottish National Party.

**Variation across parties**

Exploring variation across parties in a more systematic way, we shall now analyze differences in the salience of and positions on democracy issues in a regression framework. As mentioned, we shall use deviation from the average salience respectively the average position in a country as dependent variable to avoid over-determining the model with country-level variables.

We have argued that parties' position at the core or periphery of political competition determines their emphasis on and positions regarding reforms of democracy. Specifically, political outsiders have higher incentives to emphasize democracy issues while political insiders have incentives to take a negative position on these issues if they do address them. Table 4.4 presents the results for different operationalizations of this dichotomy. All models include the public visibility of the party, measured by the number of its statements covered by the press. Additionally, the first model includes the incumbency status, the second whether the party has ever been in government (a common operationalization of so-called 'challenger parties') and the third model includes the party's ideological orientation. The same is repeated in model 4-6 for positional deviation.

We indeed find statistically significant results for several of the indicators for parties' position within the party system, however, the results differ slightly between salience and positional deviation. We find the most consistent effect for party visibility: The more visible a party is in the national media, the less it addresses democracy issues and the more negative its position, compared to its competitors. Hence, we find support for H2a to the extent that it is smaller parties who strive to put democracy on the agenda. However, results are less consistent for current government participation: Here, we only find a significant effect on positions with opposition parties being more positive towards political reform proposals. The same holds for challenger parties, that is, parties that have never been in government: On average, they are 0.13 more positive than parties that have been in government before. This lends some support to H2b, however, the evidence for H2a is limited to the visibility of parties - governing and mainstream parties do not significantly de-emphasize democracy issues.

Including party families with the center-left as a base line allows us to draw some conclusions about how emphasis and positions regarding democracy issues varies with different

Table 4.4:  Party-level deviations in salience and positions on democracy issues

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
| | Salience (1-3) | | | Position (4-6) | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| visibility | −2.63*** | −2.57*** | −3.07*** | −0.07** | −0.07** | −0.06** |
| | (0.67) | (0.69) | (0.70) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| opposition | −0.72 | | 0.02 | 0.13** | | 0.09* |
| | (1.36) | | (1.34) | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| challenger | | −0.38 | | | 0.13** | |
| | | (1.37) | | | (0.06) | |
| center-right | | | 1.52 | | | −0.07 |
| | | | (1.82) | | | (0.07) |
| ethnic | | | 6.13** | | | 0.06 |
| | | | (3.07) | | | (0.12) |
| left-wing | | | −5.29*** | | | 0.12 |
| | | | (1.88) | | | (0.08) |
| right-wing | | | −1.43 | | | −0.13* |
| | | | (1.78) | | | (0.07) |
| Constant | 13.01*** | 12.41*** | 15.96*** | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.26 |
| | (3.79) | (3.73) | (4.35) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.19) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 | 263 | 263 | 263 |
| $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.12 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.10 |
| *Note:* | | | | | *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ | |

ideologies. As we may expect based on the importance of regionalism within democracy issues, ethnic parties emphasize democracy issues significantly more than center-left parties. In contrast, left-wing parties de-emphasize the issue with a deviation of 5.29 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the parties that deviate in the salience they give to democracy issues also deviates significantly from the average position when compared to center-left parties. Only right-wing parties are on average 0.13 points more negative towards reforms of democracy.

We can further explore the salience of democracy issues to assess some of the assumptions that motivated hypothesis H2a and H2b. Specifically, to which extent are the determinants of parties' emphasis on democracy issues specific to one aspect of the distinction we have drawn between the political community, the regime and the authorities? Table 4.5 shows the party-level deviations in the salience of issues associated with the political community, regime and authorities. Notably, our finding of a negative association between party visibility and emphasis on democracy issues is only significant for the political community and the political regime. While the coefficient for visibility remains negative, there is no statistically significant difference between parties with a low and high level of visibility. In contrast, for opposition status – which was not significant in the models in Table 4.4 –

Table 4.5:    Party-level deviations in salience of the political community, regime and authorities

| | Dependent variable: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Community (1) | Regime (2) | Authorities (3) |
| visibility | −0.89** | −1.51*** | −0.49 |
| | (0.35) | (0.46) | (0.47) |
| opposition | −0.99 | −0.46 | 1.78** |
| | (0.67) | (0.88) | (0.89) |
| center-right | 0.30 | −0.30 | 1.48 |
| | (0.91) | (1.19) | (1.21) |
| ethnic | 16.67*** | −4.46** | −4.73** |
| | (1.54) | (2.00) | (2.04) |
| left-wing | 0.03 | −2.06* | −3.16** |
| | (0.94) | (1.22) | (1.25) |
| right-wing | 0.86 | −0.98 | −1.33 |
| | (0.89) | (1.16) | (1.18) |
| Constant | 3.89* | 8.83*** | 2.40 |
| | (2.18) | (2.83) | (2.89) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| $R^2$ | 0.31 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

we now see a significant positive effect for emphasis on authorities.[27] Hence, governing parties de-emphasize democracy issues that relate to political authorities. This means they indeed avoid politicizing their own democratic record, however, we do not find that they abstain from politicizing democratic regimes, as suggested by evidence from expert surveys (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017).

Additionally, Table 4.5 lends support to our assumption that the higher emphasis of ethnic parties on democracy issues stems solely from the regionalism issue. In fact, ethnic parties de-emphasize issues connected to the political regime and incumbent authorities. Furthermore, we see that the negative effect for left-wing parties compared to the mainstream left is confirmed for the political regime as well as political authorities. Effects for other party families are statistically not significant and mostly small in size. Notable is however the sizable gap between center-right and right-wing parties regarding the emphasis on political authorities.

---

[27]This effect is confirmed and larger in size for challenger status, see Table A4.5 in the Appendix.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to map and explain the variation in mobilization with democracy issues across Europe. The most notable finding may in fact be that democracy issues are salient in party competition in Europe. While there is regional variation, a number of countries, particularly in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe, see parties paying attention to this topic and mobilizing for reforms. Based on our definition of positionality, we have also seen that overall, parties tend to endorse reforms for more democracy and a diffusion of power, though parties close to power are somewhat more hesitant in this endorsement.

Returning to the broader question of a potential politicization of democracy that guided the analysis, the results show a mixed picture: In line with studies of parties' evaluations of democratic systems (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017; on corruption also Polk et al. 2017), the results show that party attention to democracy varies sensibly with the topic gathering most attention where problems with the quality of liberal democracy and its performance in terms of corruption and government effectiveness are most pressing. Further research could explore the link between different performance problems that violate democratic norms and the specific issues that become salient. However, this link is good news, as it shows that parties' salience strategies react to the challenges democratic systems are facing rather than mobilize instrumentally.

Further, which aspects of democracy parties address most is also encouraging: Rather than anti-elitism, it is topics such as corruption and democratic culture that dominate the discussion. Pragmatic reforms of democratic systems (which we have called 'system reforms') are also at the core of debates about democracy issues in many countries. It is not that democracy as such has become contentious in party competition - rather, parties compete about how democracy should function (better), whether they address the political regime or the authorities.

Still, not all is well: A prolonged debate that does not lead to improvement may frustrate citizens and erode their support for democracy in the long run (see chapter 2 as well as Magalhães 2014). The fact that democracy issues are high on the agenda has a signaling function and exposes problems that are critical to the future of democracy in Europe, whether they concern fundamentals such as the rule of law – as in Hungary, Poland and Romania – or 'merely' problems with corrupt authorities that persist in most Central-Eastern and Southern European countries.

# 5 The Politicization of Immigration during the refugee crisis[28]

## Introduction

In 2013, immigration was a minor concern in the German elections with less than five percent of parties' media statements dedicated to the topic. During the next election campaign in 2017, 18.5 percent of parties' media statements concerned immigration (Hutter and Kriesi 2018). This story can be interpreted in various ways. Was the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) responsible – a party highly critical of immigration which entered German parliament for the first time in the wake of the 2017 election? Or is this explanation too short-sighted and should we rather attribute these developments to the broader long-term transformation of the German party system? Was it the humanitarian crisis of 2015 and Merkel's decision to relax controls at the Austrian borders that played a pivotal role here?

What determines the growing politicization of the immigration issue? Scholarly literature has established the rising salience of immigration for political competition over the past years, as well as the contribution of radical right parties to making the issue more controversial (Rydgren 2008; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Alonso and da Fonseca 2012; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008). Arguably, the humanitarian crisis of 2015 has provided right-wing parties with a further opportunity to politicize immigration (e.g. Mader and Schoen 2018). But how do events like the 2015 crisis and the pressure by right-wing parties interact? That is, how does the pressure of rising public attention to immigration change mainstream parties' responses to the pressure of the radical right in terms of salience and positional change?

In this paper, we study the dynamics of party competition on the immigration issue in the context of the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We argue that the 2015 crisis changed the 'rules of engagement' on the immigration issue as it forced all parties to address the issue, regardless of whether it is beneficial to them. Studying parties' strategic responses to this dilemma is crucial not only for understanding the politics of the refugee crisis but also to help us to understand the impact of the radical right on the politicization of immigration. Using a novel data set on parties' immigration emphasis and positions allows us to disentangle the different mechanisms in very short time intervals and to study the interaction between the external shock of the crisis and the continued pressure by radical right parties.

---

[28]based on a paper co-authored with Sophia Hunger

Most scholarly work on the politicization of immigration and the role of radical right parties has built on rather temporally coarse "snapshot data" coming from electoral manifestos and election campaign coverage. While this provides us with an understanding of the broader developments in party competition on the immigration issue, we lack a more-fine grained account of the dynamics and drivers of change. We advance research on the politicization of immigration by zooming in on smaller time units during the period of the refugee crisis. This is important for two reasons. First, the humanitarian crisis of 2015 did not coincide with elections in most European countries and hence classical election-centered approaches to studying party competition cannot gauge the full impact the crisis. Second, studying salience in very close, i.e. monthly, intervals enables us to uncover more immediate dynamics of how parties react to developments internal and external to the party system.

In order to grasp more short-term developments, we use parties' press releases to measure immigration-related salience and positions in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany. Our approach incorporates two steps. First, starting with 120,000 press releases from all major parties published between 2013 and 2018, we construct a novel dictionary to identify those releases concerned with immigration. The proportion of these immigration-related press releases provides us with an exact, monthly measurement of how much attention each party dedicated to immigration issues. Second, we estimate parties' positions on immigration using a Wordscores model. Subsequently, we use these measurements for descriptive and regression analyses to explain what drives changes in levels of salience and politicization.

Our results show that the salience of immigration increased for all parties across the three countries with the beginning of the refugee crisis. Qualifying the findings of previous manifesto- and media-based studies (Hutter and Kriesi 2018; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018) based on the period after the immediate crisis, we find that parties stop emphasizing immigration towards the end of the crisis and salience returns to the pre-crisis level for most of the parties. We also confirm previous findings on the crucial role of radical right parties: Even though all parties reacted to the refugee crisis with an increase in attention towards the immigration issue, radical right parties were by far the forerunner and managed to retain their position as issue owners during the whole crisis period. Additionally, our findings show that increasing levels of salience by radical right parties are associated with a rise in attention for immigration by mainstream parties. While we do find some positional adaptation among mainstream parties, these changes are not clearly driven by the pressure exerted by radical right parties.

# Politics of immigration and the refugee crisis

Our analysis builds on the premise that the refugee crisis radically changed the importance of the immigration issue. We do not mean to suggest that the crisis necessarily marks a turning point in the politicization of immigration.[29] Rather, we argue that highly salient public events like crises change the 'rules of engagement' on an issue. They put topics on the party-system agenda and force other parties to address an issue, whether it is beneficial to them or not. As changes in the salience of an issue may lead parties to adapt their positions (Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2019), crisis events may reshape party strategies on immigration.

Previous studies have shown that parties' salience and positional strategies respond to the public salience of issues and the issue priorities of voters (Sides 2006; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). Literature on election campaigns has argued that 'riding the wave', i.e. campaigning on issues that dominate the news cycle, provides politicians with an opportunity to appear concerned and responsive (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Given the enormous news coverage of the refugee crisis (Harteveld et al. 2018; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017) and the importance attributed to the topic by citizens (European Commission 2018), we think that parties are forced to address the issue. We can formulate this assumption as a first baseline hypothesis:

H1: With the start of the refugee crisis, the salience of the immigration sharply increases for all parties.

This situation presents a dilemma for mainstream parties. In Western Europe, immigration has been the purview of the radical right. Although parties of this family have diverse ideological appeals, they are united by their mobilization against immigration (Ivarsflaten 2008; Betz 2002; Fennema 2003). Given their strong emphasis on immigration, populist and radical right parties have become associated with the issue in the minds of voters, that is, they have developed a so-called 'associative issue ownership' (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012, 779). As news coverage affects which issues voters base their choices on (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), studies on the electoral consequences of issue ownership suggest a rise in the salience of an issue 'owned' by a party may sway voters towards that party (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Geers and Bos 2017; Thesen, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2017). Thus, increasing attention towards immigration may benefit radical right parties and puts pressure on mainstream parties.

However, other parties do not have to stand by and watch: A considerable number of

---

[29]In fact, there is evidence that higher numbers of refugees in the early 1990s similarly led to a rise in the salience of immigration which reverted to the previous level over time: Hutter and Kriesi (2018, 19)

studies has focused on the strategic reactions that mainstream parties can choose in responding to the issue agenda of challenger parties. Meguid's (2005) seminal theoretical framework for reactions to niche parties (based on the study of green and radical right parties) has outlined three possible reactions of mainstream parties to niche party success. In her terminology, parties may a) ignore the issue, b) actively mobilize against the niche party's position and stick to their position, or c) adapt the niche party's position in order to win back voters.

Studying the reaction of mainstream parties during the refugee crisis provides a new perspective on this framework: In outlining our baseline hypothesis, we have argued that, given the public attention to immigration, ignoring the issue is hardly an option. This holds particularly for mainstream parties. Literature on issue-competition has highlighted that pressure to respond to the so-called 'party-system agenda', that is, to those issues that are prominent on the agenda at a certain point in time, is particularly high for mainstream and governing parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015). But are mainstream parties actually influenced by the salience a challenger gives to the issue or do they merely address it to the extent that the public pays attention to the issue?

Beyond the outlined benefits of engaging with the concerns of voters, ignoring a salient issue also means to forgo re-framing an issue in a way that benefits the party (Jerit 2008, 3). In situations of crisis, there is additional pressure on mainstream parties to develop solutions. As Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) put it: "avoiding blame for the many unsolved policy problems is a central element of being in government." While radical right parties may be associated with the issue, mainstream parties can strive to re-gain issue ownership through showing competence in addressing the issue (Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere 2015; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012). Thus, a crisis changes the incentives of mainstream parties and makes them likely to respond to challengers in kind by engaging with the issue. Hence, we expect mainstream parties to react to pressure from the radical right by addressing the immigration issue. This should go beyond the general increase in the salience of immigration we outlined in H1 and be driven by radical right parties' issue emphasis.

H2a  Mainstream parties' emphasis on immigration increases when radical right parties emphasize immigration.

However, we may expect a differentiation between left and right parties: There is a growing literature on the differential incentives for left and right parties for addressing immigration (Abou-Chadi 2016; on specific party families also Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Alonso and da Fonseca 2012). As Abou-Chadi (2016) argues, center-right parties can potentially

gain from a higher salience of these issues by swinging the decision of cross-pressured left authoritarian voters (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014; Van Der Brug and Spanje 2009) towards the right side of the party spectrum. Addressing the immigration issue is not only a way to engage with the concerns of voters and potentially win back voters from the radical right, the associated risks are also smaller for center-right parties. Hence, we expect this salience-based contagion of the radical right to be stronger for center-right parties:

H2b  This effect is stronger for center-right parties than for center-left parties.

Returning to the framework outlined by Meguid (2005), we may further ask whether mainstream parties choose to actively mobilize against the radical rights' position or are instead tempted to adapt to their position. Much of the theoretical and case-study literature suggests that mainstream parties are more prone to adjust their position to radical right parties and refers to this as (positional) contagion (Bale et al. 2010; Bale 2003; Spanje 2010; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). However, empirical results from quantitative research are less conclusive and find inconsistent effects (e.g. Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017).

While we suggest that parties can hardly afford to ignore the immigration issue in reaction to the refugee crisis and radical right parties' behavior, they have more leeway in *how* they address it. Given mainstream parties are unlikely to benefit from a long-term politicization of immigration, we expect them to avoid anything that would increase conflict on the issues. In a multi-party system where only the radical right clearly opposes immigration, this means other parties should stick to their previous positions and maintain distance from the radical right. This is consistent with studies of the press coverage of immigration during 2015 from Austria which have primarily found a reinforcement of previous ways to address the issue in the media (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). Similarly, we expect parties to maintain their position on the issue and instead focus on the pragmatic politics of crisis management. While increasing the salience of immigration, a strategy of crisis management without positional adaptation limits a restructuring of party competition around immigration and is thus attractive to mainstream parties.

H3a  Mainstream parties will not adjust their position in response to the radical right.

Still, we may see individual parties deviate from this expectation based on the hope to gain voters from the radical right. From a theoretical perspective, it is again important to highlight differences across party families. While traditionally, West-European societies were shaped by class- and religious conflicts, the cultural dimension of the political space has been transformed through two successive waves of mobilization, first with the emergence

of green and later of radical right parties (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; Bornschier 2010). Next to European Integration, immigration has been a central element here, helping right-wing parties to mobilize previously unrepresented left-authoritarian voters (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014; Abou-Chadi 2016; Van Der Brug and Spanje 2009). With these developments, a tripolar party competition in a two-dimensional space has emerged (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), in which immigration has become the main division line between mainstream right and radical right parties as well as a point of contention between left and radical right parties.

This means that social democratic parties tend to find themselves between a rock and a hard place once immigration moves up on the political agenda (Abou-Chadi 2016; Bale et al. 2010). They have to serve two different groups of voters, trying to bridge different preferences. While the culturally liberal middle-class is in favor of universalist solidarity and egalitarianism and consequently favors liberal immigration policies, the working class might feel threatened by globalization and labor market competition through immigration (Akkerman 2012; Alonso and da Fonseca 2012; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). Alonso and da Fonseca (2012) argue that this dilemma poses a significant constraint to Social Democratic parties' ability to strategically decide on immigration stances. Hence, we do not expect social-democratic parties to adapt their positions.

In contrast, center-right parties may be tempted to adopt tougher positions on immigration. They may not only want to influence cross-pressured voters to increase the vote share of the right camp in total. Moreover, radical right parties are also a potential coalition partner whom moderate right-wing parties may want to appease (Abou-Chadi 2016, 423; also Bale 2003) and a direct competitor for immigration-critical voters. As the crisis with its increasing attention to immigration may lead voters to choose depending on parties' immigration stances (e.g. Mader and Schoen 2018) and the potentially rising electoral fortunes of far-right parties make appeasement more attractive, center-right parties may be more likely to accommodate the radical right during this period.

H3b  Center-right parties will adjust their positions in response to the radical right.

## Case selection

Given our interest in the interaction between the short-term shock of the refugee crisis and the impact of radical right parties, we shall focus on cases with different constellations of these variables. Hence, we study Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, three countries with a different constellation of crisis-exposure and pre-crisis strength of radical right parties. The focus on three countries sharing the same (majority) language also ties in well

with our approach to studying issue attention and policy positions through text analysis. Focusing on how the radical right managed to pressure mainstream parties, we expect to find similar trends in all three countries, despite their initial differences. That is, we want to highlight how common mechanisms work from a different starting point. Table 5.1 presents the differences in the three countries, which are further discussed below.

Table 5.1:  Criteria for case selection

| Country | Institutionalized RRP | Exposure to refugee crisis |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | yes | high |
| Germany | no | high |
| Switzerland | yes | low |

In two of the three countries under study, institutionalized radical right parties already played a major role in political competition before the refugee crisis. Both the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) were historical parties of the mainstream right that radicalized towards a nationalist, populist and anti-immigration position during the 1990s (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 20; Kriesi et al.  2008, 20). The SVP first radicalized on European integration and turned to immigration later on (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2005). Consequently, both were more moderate than radical right parties in other European countries during the 1990s (Akkerman 2015, 61) and had an issue-profile that went beyond a narrow 'new radical right' appeal (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 163).

In Germany, anti-immigration stances and radical right parties failed to gather a critical mass of supporters for a long time. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged only after 2013, initially starting out as a neoliberal anti-EU party, but changing its policy agenda towards immigration before the start of the refugee crisis (Bremer and Schulte-Cloos 2019; Schulte-Cloos and Rüttenauer 2018). Subsequently, the AfD established itself as an anti-immigration and anti-Islam party that entered parliament in the 2017 election. Since then, it has become a focal point of the transformation of political competition in Germany.

Additionally, the countries under study experienced the 2015 crisis to a different extent. Both Germany and Austria had a high exposure to arriving immigrants, though in slightly different constellations. Austria was more directly exposed to the dramatic events surrounding the arrival of refugees. Its proximity to Hungary, where many refugees crossed the EU border, meant Austria became the first country of arrival for many refugees. The Austrian media also extensively covered several "iconic events" that showed the human suffering involved in the journey to the country (for a more detailed analysis: Bernáth and Messing 2016; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). While many refugees that passed

Austria were ultimately heading towards Germany, the main politicizing event in the country occurred when chancellor Angela Merkel decided to relax controls at the Austrian border, declaring that 'We can do this'. Thus, Germany's experience with the refugee crisis was more directly linked to governmental actions. In comparison, Switzerland experienced only a small increase in asylum applications in 2015. Additionally, the country held several referenda on immigration and integration policy in recent years, both regarding EU countries and international immigration. Thus, attention was less focused on the specific events of the crisis.

## Data and Methods

Providing a measure of party's attention to and positions on issues at a monthly level is part of the contribution of this paper. For this, we constructed a new data set of press releases from Swiss, German and Austrian parties. We use releases published between January 2013 and March 2018, resulting in a maximum of 63 months per country and party. For each country, we include all parties that poll above the parliamentary threshold for most of our period of study and exist to the current day. We consider press releases published by the party headquarter and the parliamentary group.[30] We collect our data from party web pages and national press release archives. Table 5.2 in the next section, which presents the aggregate of our salience measures, also presents the overall number and monthly average of press releases.

Our research design follows a two-step logic. First, we identify all press releases which focus on immigration. In a second step, we take these press releases and scale them from opposition to support of immigration. Both steps are implemented using the `R` package `quanteda` (Benoit et al. 2018). The detailed approach is described below.

### A Dictionary Approach to immigration salience

We evaluate different approaches to identifying immigration-related press releases, based on a hand-annotated gold standard of more than 750 press releases. The goal is to strike a balance between identifying as many relevant press releases as possible without falsely including press releases on other topics. We draw on a novel dictionary (see Appendix), developed specifically for this paper and based on a close reading of the press releases. We restrict our dictionary to words that refer to immigration and integration, avoiding

---

[30]We hence exclude Team Stronach, a party founded by businessman Frank Stronach in 2012 that gained 5.7 percent in the 2013 elections but precipitously lost support afterwards and was dissolved in August 2017. Our focus on party headquarters and parliamentary groups additionally brings in some variation as e.g. the Left party in Germany re-publishes many press releases of individual MPs.

Table 5.2: Number of press releases

| party | N (Total) | monthly | N (immigration) | Salience |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | | | | |
| FPÖ | 7981 | 126.7 | 1601 | 20.1 |
| Green Party | 5969 | 94.7 | 872 | 14.6 |
| NEOS | 2712 | 43.0 | 306 | 11.3 |
| OVP | 7236 | 114.9 | 993 | 13.7 |
| Pilz | 221 | 27.6 | 14 | 6.3 |
| SPÖ | 11395 | 189.9 | 1287 | 11.3 |
| **Germany** | | | | |
| AfD | 1736 | 28.9 | 598 | 34.4 |
| CDU | 3475 | 55.2 | 503 | 14.5 |
| CSU | 1463 | 21.5 | 294 | 20.1 |
| FDP | 973 | 27.8 | 228 | 23.4 |
| Green Party | 3403 | 55.8 | 556 | 16.3 |
| Left Party | 5165 | 82.0 | 917 | 17.8 |
| SPD | 3875 | 61.5 | 416 | 10.7 |
| **Switzerland** | | | | |
| BDP | 331 | 5.3 | 75 | 22.7 |
| CVP | 1294 | 19.3 | 291 | 22.5 |
| FDP | 432 | 8.6 | 107 | 24.8 |
| Green Liberal Party | 259 | 4.0 | 46 | 17.8 |
| Green Party | 962 | 14.4 | 140 | 14.6 |
| SPS | 803 | 11.8 | 151 | 18.8 |
| SVP | 544 | 8.1 | 291 | 53.5 |

overly specific terms as well as frequently used concepts that might lead to a conflation with diversity, e.g. 'minaret' and 'christian'. This allows us to create a rather parsimonious dictionary following the suggestions by Muddiman and colleagues (2018).

Tables A5.1, A5.2, and A5.3 in the Appendix present the sensitivity, specificity, balanced and overall accuracy of our dictionary based on a hand-annotated gold standard. We also compare the performance of our dictionary to a support vector machine classifier and two dictionaries used in previous research (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Ruedin and Morales 2017). As visible in the tables, our parsimonious dictionary outperforms the ones developed by Ruedin and Morales (2017) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and performs on par with the SVM classifier. Given the computational efficiency and clearer decision-rules of the dictionary solution, we opt for our small dictionary rather than the SVM classifier. Overall, we believe this offers the best compromise in terms of accuracy, interpretability, and computational efficiency. Table 5.2 presents the results of this classification.

**Measuring party positions with Wordscores**

In a second step, we use these immigration-related press releases to scale each parties' positions on the issue with Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). Wordscores are a scaling technique that estimates political positions based on the similarity of word usage between a set of unknown texts and a set of texts with a known policy position.

Our pre-processing strategy follows the suggestions for Wordscores by several other authors (Lowe 2008; Ruedin 2013). In a first step, we remove stopwords, i.e. words that are used frequently, such as 'and' and 'the'. We also stem the words and use trimming, i.e. we remove words that occur less than four times in our documents. We have tested other pre-processing steps, such as removing names[31] or relying exclusively on nouns, based on a parts-of-speech tagging pipeline. As results were not substantively different, we decided to use the full text (as done in most previous applications of Wordscores) in order to avoid problems with the low accuracy of parts-of-speech tagging in German. Finally, to calculate party positions based on words that are substantively meaningful regarding immigration, we compare immigration-related and other texts to calculate keyness-statistics for each word. For estimating the Wordscores model, we only keep words with a $Chi^2$ higher than zero.

As input for our Wordscore model, we rely on a data set on party positions in national elections campaign from the POLCON Project (Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession). This data is particularly suitable for our purposes since it covers party positions at a specific moment in time, rather than expert surveys where scores may be influenced by past positions of a party. The POLCON data is generated through core sentence coding, a relational content analysis described in more detail in the related publications (Dolezal 2008; Hutter and Gessler 2019).

For the measurement of positions, we only include parties with more than 100 immigration-related press releases (see Table 5.2). As Wordscores are systematically biased if the word distribution across the different reference texts is insufficient, we assign our reference scores to a larger set of texts, namely an entire month of press releases. This is also roughly the same period for which our reference scores from the POLCON project are coded.

**Additional Data and Modelling Strategy**

Based on our classification and the scores generated with Wordscores, we obtain all indicators necessary to address our hypotheses. First, we calculate salience as the share of

---

[31]Based on a list of members of parliament, common names in each country and frequently quoted politicians of each party, compiled from POLCON media data.

press-releases that we classify as immigration-related for a party within each month. Based on these press releases, we estimate parties' positions through Wordscores. While we first use our measures for descriptive analyses, we additionally carry out regression analyses in order to strengthen our contribution. This section discusses our control variables and their operationalization as well as our modelling strategy.

In our modelling strategy, we employ Arellano-Bond models (Arellano and Bond 1991). This dynamic panel model estimator allows for including lagged dependent variables and thus takes autoregression of the dependent variable (DV) into account. Static models, e.g. fixed or random effects panel models, are biased when including lagged DVs due to various endogeneity problems. Arellano-Bond models use a Generalized Method of Moments which includes deeper lags of the dependent variable as instruments for endogenous lags of the dependent variable. The main assumption of this model concerns the serial correlation structure of the used data: while the first order lag of the dependent variable is serially correlated to the DV, there must not be second order serial correlation, i.e. the second lag of the dependent variable may not be correlated with the DV. We tested this assumption for both DVs in our models, i.e. parties' issues emphasis and positions regarding immigration using the Arellano-Bond test for serial autocorrelation (see appendix table A5.4) in the first differenced residuals. For both dependent variables, we could not reject H0 of no correlation for the first-order lags, while we could reject it for the second-order correlations. Hence, the model assumptions are satisfied. This allows us to control for the autoregressive component of our dependent variables, while also providing us with unbiased estimates. As we assume that there might be an upward trend of salience and positions during the crisis, these models complement our theoretical assumptions with methodological rigor.

Our regression models aim at assessing to what extent parties' salience and positional strategies are affected by the refugee crisis and by radical right parties' pressure. Hence, we limit these analyses to non-radical right parties. We calculate models using the whole sample as well as different sub-samples, splitting by countries, time periods, and including interaction terms for center-right parties (i.e. all parties right of the center). In total, our sample consists of 209 party-months for Austria, 299 party-months for Germany, and 138 party-months for Switzerland.

We use measures of radical right parties' issue emphasis and position regarding immigration as main independent variables. As control variables, we include the electoral pressure of radical right parties as well as a country's exposure to the refugee crisis. As discussed, previous literature has often assumed the strength of radical right parties might affect mainstream parties' motivation to address immigration. Given that our research design focuses on dynamics, we include radical right parties' strength by using monthly polls of

the FPÖ, AfD, and SVP.[32] To also control for exposure to the crisis, we use the monthly number of asylum applications. Typically, research assumes that the arrival of immigrants and the state's capacity to deal with their arrival determines the problematization of immigration in public discourse.[33]

In order to distinguish between "normal" times and the crisis period, we use data on public attention towards immigration to calculate a crisis dummy. The rationale behind this is that not just the increase in refugee numbers, but the public attention paid to the immigration issue could be driving parties' behavior. Though the crisis brought many countries to the limits of their administrative capacity, what mattered could be rather *the perception of a crisis* rather than the absolute number of refugees. Arrival numbers may increase and decrease without the public noticing.

In fact, public attention during the crisis often lasted beyond the migration crisis in the narrow sense and became disconnected from actual events. Given the scarcity of public opinion data over time, we rely on Google Search Trends to measure public attention to immigration.[34] Specifically, we use the Google Knowledge Graph technology to track the frequency of a search query *topic* rather than individual search strings (Siliverstovs and Wochner 2018). After careful comparison with Eurobarometer results for the salience of immigration as most important problem in a country, we use the Google trend for 'refugee' which correlates at .87 respectively .86 with the Eurobarometer values in Germany and Austria.[35] For each country, we determine as refugee crisis the period in which the searches for the refugee topic are above the country average. Thereby, we determine the start of the crisis for July 2015 in Austria, and for August 2015 for Germany and Switzerland based on an increase in the interest around the topic. The crisis ends in July 2016 in Austria, in November 2016 in Germany, and in February 2017 in Switzerland, which is the first month in which attention to the topic falls below the mean in the respective countries.[36] We also use the continuous version of this measure of public salience of the immigration issue as a control variable in our regression analyses in order to acquire the effect of radical-right parties behavior net of the public attention to the issue.

---

[32]We obtained polls from different agencies collected by poll of polls, neuwal.com, and the research projects VoxIt (Kriesi, Brunner, and Lorétan 2016) and Voto (FORS 2018).

[33]We collected the monthly number of asylum applications from the respective national migration agencies, i.e. the Bundesamt für Fremdwesen und Asyl in Austria, the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge in Germany, and the Staatssekretariat für Migration in Switzerland.

[34]For similar applications of the data: Chykina and Crabtree (2018); Granka (2013); Mellon (2013)

[35]A graph of the over-time development of the trend and other related topics are included in the Appendix in Figure A5.1.

[36]This does not preclude future increases above the mean which occur in Switzerland and Germany.

# Results

## The rising salience of immigration

Turning to our results, we first address how much the salience of immigration has in fact risen. We start by presenting our estimates for the salience of immigration for each party in the three countries. Figure 5.1 shows our results in two different ways: The points represent monthly averages of the salience of the issue while the curves give an overview of the trend using locally smoothed daily estimates. In the background, the gray lines show the smoothed lines for the other parties in the system to allow comparisons between the parties. The dashed vertical line marks July respectively August 2015, which we determined as the beginning of the refugee crisis in the countries we study.

The first set of plots in in figure 5.1 shows the salience of immigration in Austria. Clearly, all parties react to the refugee crisis by increasingly speaking about immigration. This increase is most pronounced for the FPÖ, which already addressed the issue most before the crisis. In line with our expectations about mainstream right-wing parties, ÖVP becomes the party with the second highest salience of immigration during the crisis, while previously it was primarily the Greens that competed with the FPÖ on the issue. Overall, however, the increase is relatively similar for all Austrian parties under study, except for a short period of divergence at the start of the crisis that is only visible in the point estimates.

The development is slightly different in the second set of plots in figure 5.1, which shows the salience of immigration in Germany. Compared to Austria, the initial increase is steeper for several parties. Notably, differences between the parties are more pronounced: AfD clearly stands out for its strong emphasis on immigration. Despite a leap during the crisis, SPD and the Greens maintain a limited salience of immigration throughout our entire period of study. The salience of the issue rises above 25 percent for all other parties. We also find an interesting contrast between the strong increase of salience for the Bavarian CSU which differs from its federal-level sister party CDU. Generally, the sudden impact of the crisis in August is more apparent in Germany, as even AfD's emphasis on the issue was rather low in the months right before the crisis. This is primarily visible in the distribution of monthly averages, while the smoothed curves soften the suddenness of the increase.

The third set of plots in figure 5.1 shows the estimated salience of immigration in Switzerland. Notably, the baseline level of immigration salience is higher than in other countries for most parties, although several of the smaller parties in Switzerland publish so few press releases that they may not address all issues in any given month. Overall, we only see a slight increase during the refugee crisis, and a slow decrease from mid-2016 onward.

Figure 5.1: Estimated salience of immigration in 3 countries

The SVP clearly stands out regarding its attention towards this issue. However, this is not a product of the crisis as the SVP clearly emphasized immigration issues beforehand as well, including a previous peak in early 2014 related to a popular initiative against so-called "mass immigration". After a short period of stability in immigration salience, the SVP increasingly addresses the topic from late 2014 on. This includes the period of the refugee crisis: Its start was close to the 2015 Swiss elections, which gave the SVP an ideal opportunity to campaign on the issue.

Generalizing to the party system-level, we see an increase in the salience of immigration for all three countries. In Austria and Germany, this trend includes all parties to a similar extent, while in Switzerland it is most notably the radical-right SVP which increases its emphasis on the immigration issue. There is also an important difference in the general patterns of immigration salience with higher and somewhat more even attention to the issue in Switzerland. We suspect this difference is due to Switzerland's internal political dynamic with the importance of popular votes as well as the relevance of the immigration issue beyond forced migration, e.g. in the context of migration from the EU.

While the general increase in salience is certainly interesting, it is also important to point out that salience did not only increase drastically, but it also faded out nearly completely after the crisis for most mainstream parties. This suggests that parties might have changed their strategy and tried to de-emphasize the immigration issue after the immediate attention to the crisis disappeared. Competing findings of literature based on media reports, e.g. during election campaigns, suggest that the media might still have reported parties' immigration-related statements disproportionately, even though parties had started to avoid the issue.

**Dynamics of salience**

We now proceed to explicitly test our hypotheses regarding the salience of immigration in a regression framework. Table 5.3 presents eight models, first including all parties in our sample except the radical right parties, then splitting the sample by countries, including an interaction term for center-right parties and distinguishing by time periods (i.e. before, during, and after the crisis). As outlined in our methods section, all models include the monthly number of asylum applications, public salience of immigration, and radical right parties' polls as control variables.

Our main independent variable of interest – radical right parties' attention towards immigration – is highly positively associated with increasing levels of mainstream parties' attention toward the issue. The effect is statistically significant, and the direction is

Table 5.3: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration

| | (1) all | (2) AT | (3) DE | (4) CH | (5) center-right | (6) before | (7) during | (8) after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's salience of imm. | 0.16*** | 0.27*** | 0.05 | 0.21*** | 0.08 | 0.21** | 0.15*** | 0.14** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| center-right party | | | | | 0.00 | | | |
| | | | | | (0.00) | | | |
| center-right * RRP's salience of imm. | | | | | 0.19*** | | | |
| | | | | | (0.00) | | | |
| N asylum applications | 1.03*** | 0.85** | 1.29*** | 0.95 | 1.06*** | 3.16** | -1.07* | -0.82 |
| | (0.32) | (0.43) | (0.41) | (0.86) | (0.32) | (1.59) | (0.55) | (2.28) |
| polls RRP | -0.01 | 0.21 | -0.33*** | 1.32*** | 0.07 | -0.32 | -0.15 | 0.16 |
| | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.36) | (0.18) | (0.42) | (0.31) | (0.31) |
| public salience | 3.09*** | 3.52*** | 3.97*** | 1.07** | 3.19*** | 5.42 | 3.41*** | 19.96*** |
| | (0.52) | (0.73) | (0.95) | (0.49) | (0.54) | (8.82) | (0.66) | (6.54) |
| salience of immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| salience of immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 9.34*** | 0.33 | 12.61*** | -0.88 | 8.23*** | 18.56** | 17.71*** | 8.89 |
| | (2.91) | (4.12) | (1.01) | (3.93) | (2.93) | (7.82) | (5.65) | (6.90) |
| Observations | 646 | 209 | 299 | 138 | 646 | 286 | 188 | 172 |
| Number of parties | 14 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

consistent across all models, expect for model 3 (German parties). The effect sizes vary to some extent across the models. In Austria, each 1 percent increase in radical right parties' immigration salience accounts for an average increase of 0.27 percent across the other parties, while the effect size is only 0.14 percent for all parties after the crisis.

We test our expectation that center-right parties react more strongly to radical right parties' increased issue emphasis (H2b) by including an interaction term in model 5. While the zero-finding of the center-right dummy shows that these parties do not generally dedicate more attention to immigration than other parties in our sample, the coefficient of the interaction term - positive and highly significant - serves as indication that center-right parties react more strongly to the behavior of radical right parties than their competitors left of the center[37]. The coefficient of radical-right parties' attention to immigration is not significant in model 5. However, this is due to the lack of an effect in Germany (see table A5.6 in the Appendix) and hence consistent with model 3.[38] Furthermore, the positive and significant effect of radical right parties' salience contagion on mainstream parties is stable throughout the three time periods.

We find mixed results for our control variables, i.e. the monthly number of asylum applications, the public salience of immigration, and radical right parties' polls. While the coefficients for asylum applications are positive and statistically significant in Austria and Germany as well as for the model including the center-right party interaction and the period before the crisis, the effects are not significant for Switzerland and even negative and significant for the period during the crisis. Potentially, this result for Switzerland may be due to a different discourse on immigration in the country where migration from the EU is equally salient as forced migration in the context of the refugee crisis. The limited findings for asylum applications also suggest that as we expected, dynamics of party competition on immigration do not follow actual numbers of asylum applications during the crisis, but are rather related to the public perception of urgency. This is further supported by the effect of the public salience of immigration which is significant and positive in almost all models except before the crisis. Another striking result is the negative and significant effect of radical right parties' polls in Germany. This suggests that parties tried to de-emphasize immigration when the AfD became stronger. In Switzerland, however, we find a positive and significant effect of the SVP's polls on mainstream parties' attention to immigration which indicates that an increase in the strength of the SVP puts

---

[37]Table A5.6 in the Appendix shows that this holds in separate models for the three countries.

[38]We also provide robustness checks including a lagged specification for radical right parties' attention towards immigration (see Table A5.5 in the appendix.) The significance and direction of the effects described above proves to be robust to including this additional lag. Additionally, the check shows a positive and significant effect in model 5, which includes the interaction term of the center-right dummy and radical-right parties' issue attention

pressure on other parties in the country to address immigration.

These findings are mostly in line with our theoretical expectations and match our findings from the descriptive analyses above. Additionally, the regression analyses show that – even controlling for autoregressive trends – radical right parties' emphasis on immigration positively affects mainstream parties' attention to the issue. In the next section, we move from salience to parties' positions on immigration and assess how much they changed during the refugee crisis.

## Party positions on immigration over time

We expect party positions on immigration to be more stable than the salience of the issue. We present their development in figure 5.2 before we move to analyzing the drivers of positions in our regression analyses. The first set of plots in figure 5.2 shows the development of party positions in Austria. Most parties' positions are rather stable. Notably, we see a small shift in the positions of ÖVP and the Greens during the refugee crisis. The SPÖ's position is rather stable, while estimates for NEOS during 2017 are rather inconsistent. The FPÖ's position is fairly stable, too. Overall, we thus do not see the same significant changes as were visible in the development of salience.

In the second set of plots in figure 5.2, we see the estimated positions on immigration in Germany. Compared to Austria, the position shifts are more drastic. Most notably, the AfD increasingly radicalizes its rejection of immigration, a development that started immediately after the party was founded. This finding is well in line with previous research on the party (Schulte-Cloos and Rüttenauer 2018; Arzheimer 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri 2015; Decker 2016). Additionally, the CSU increasingly takes an anti-immigration position, more and more diverging from the position of its sister-party CDU. This mirrors a growing and heated conflict between the two parties on issues related to the refugee crisis: Horst Seehofer, the by-then party leader of the CSU, and his sharp criticism of Chancellor Merkel filled the headlines for weeks. The Green's pro-immigration stance only shows small changes that do not seem to be systematically related to the refugee crisis. The positions of CDU, SPD, and the Left are very stable throughout the whole period, although individual estimates for the SPD vary quite widely. The negative position of the liberal FDP might seem surprising at first, however, the party was not represented in the Bundestag between 2013 and 2017 and substantially altered its policy positions in an attempt to recover from its electoral defeat in 2013.

Our results for Switzerland in the third set of plots in figure 5.2 show the clearest position shifts of mainstream parties. While the CVP and the FDP remain very stable and stick to

**A**    Positions on immigration in Austria



**B**    Positions on immigration in Germany



**C**    Positions on immigration in Switzerland



Figure 5.2: Estimated party positions on immigration in 3 countries

their positions, the Greens and the Social democrats shift their position notably to a more positive stance on immigration for a prolonged period within our window of observation. This development begins in early 2014 and might hence be related to one of the popular votes on immigration, which took place in February and November 2014. Interestingly, this upward trend continues until fall 2015, when the refugee crisis started. From then onward, the Greens and the Social democrats become again more negative towards immigration. Unsurprisingly, the SVP is the most critical party regarding immigration positions. While the smoothed line is relatively stable until early 2016, there are more extreme monthly scores that indicate rather radical positions. From mid-2016 onward, the SVP moderates its position on immigration, moving towards the other parties' position. This temporally coincides with the steady decline of the SVP's emphasis on immigration as shown in Figure 5.1 above and may be related to a re-orientation of the SVP after the defeat of its 'Durchsetzungsinitiative'. After a long period of successful mobilization against immigration through popular votes, the defeat of this initiative marked a turning point for the SVP.

Generally, these results highlight several points. First, radical right parties exhibit by far the most critical stances on immigration. While some mainstream parties like the CSU adjust their position, they constitute a minority. Moreover, we also find evidence for parties shifting in the opposite direction and taking more positive positions on immigration during the refugee crisis. This is true for the ÖVP in Austria, and the Greens and Social democrats in Switzerland. In the following section, we shed light on the factors that drive mainstream parties' positions on immigration using regression analyses.

**Dynamics of positional change**

Following the same research design as for salience, we carry out regression analyses for party positions using Arellano-Bond estimators. Table 5.4 again presents eight different models, beginning with a model including all parties, followed by split-sample models by country, a model including an interaction term for center right parties and radical-right parties' positions on immigration, as well as separate models for the different periods of interest. Again, we include the monthly numbers of asylum applications, the public salience of immigration, and radical right parties' polls as control variables.

Turning to the impact of radical right parties' positions, we mostly find null effects across models in line with our expectations in H3a. The only exception are the German parties in our sample, which seem to employ an adversarial strategy and take more positive positions when radical right parties become more critical, as the negative and significant coefficient

Table 5.4: Regression results for mainstream parties' positions on immigration

| | (1) all | (2) AT | (3) DE | (4) CH | (5) center-right | (6) before | (7) during | (8) after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's position on immigration | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.14 (0.13) | -0.08*** (0.03) | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.05 (0.05) | 0.12 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.09) |
| center-right | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| center-right * RRP's position on imm. | | | | | 0.00 (0.05) | | | |
| asylum applications (N) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.03*** (0.01) | -0.21 (0.17) |
| polls RRP | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| public salience | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.09 (0.28) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.47 (0.30) |
| position on immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| position on immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 0.12 (0.09) | 0.32 (0.29) | 0.10 (0.12) | -0.37 (0.39) | 0.12 (0.09) | 0.20 (0.24) | 0.26** (0.11) | 0.33 (0.34) |
| Observations | 646 | 209 | 299 | 138 | 646 | 286 | 188 | 172 |
| Number of parties | 14 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

in model 3 suggests.[39]

Addressing our expectations specifically for center right parties, we can only partly confirm our assumption that these parties will adjust their positions following radical right parties (H3b). The coefficient of the interaction term in model 5 presents a null finding that suggests no effect of radical right parties on the positions of mainstream parties, including those on the right. Note, however, that this differs by country (see table A5.8 in the Appendix): we can confirm the expectation of an effect for Switzerland, while the effect is negative for Germany and Austria (in the latter case, this finding is statistically significant). That suggests that in Austria, center-right parties adopted more pro-immigration attitudes when radical right parties radicalized their position.

While we think these effects are important, we want to point out that their size is very small. Additionally, all control variables, i.e. the public salience of immigration, the number of asylum applications, and radical right parties' polls have no effect. Only the monthly number of asylum applications, has a small positive effect on mainstream parties' positions for the crisis-period in model 7.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we studied how radical right parties influenced mainstream parties' emphasis and positions on immigration during the refugee crisis in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Categorizing parties' press releases based on a novel dictionary allows us to measure how much parties spoke about immigration in very short time intervals. In line with previous work on the long-term trends of party competition, we find that the immigration issue was highly salient in all three countries. Expanding on previous studies that assess immigration salience during election campaigns, we show a drastic increase in the salience of immigration during the period of the refugee crisis itself. This increase was mostly driven by public attention. In contrast, actual refugee numbers only had a limited effect on the importance that mainstream parties give to immigration.

Most importantly, we show that there is not only a period effect of the crisis but that radical right parties' emphasis on immigration significantly contributes to other parties' attention to the issue. While we have focused on showing the existence of this contagion effect, our robustness checks also show that this effect works primarily within the same month,

---

[39] Again, we carry out a model additionally including a lag of radical right parties' position (see table A5.7 in the appendix). Controlling for the previous position of radical right parties, most null effects remain, only in model for during the crisis the coefficient of radical right parties' current salience becomes positive and significant. The lagged specification of radical right parties' positions itself, however, is not significant in any employed model.

suggesting that parties react to their competitors within days or weeks. Importantly, this paper constitutes the first empirical analysis that explores the dynamics of salience contagion on the immigration issue while previous research on contagion has mostly studied a far longer timeline, e.g. from one election to the next. Our results suggest further research into contagion as a direct interaction between competitors, e.g. regarding which messages parties are more likely to react to, may be promising.

However, our findings also suggest limits to the effect of the refugee crisis: First, we observed significant differences between party families and countries. After the end of the refugee crisis most parties' attention to immigration petered out quite soon, despite the radical leap in salience right after the start of the crisis. Only the AfD in Germany maintained a high attention to immigration. Despite this decrease in salience of immigration, radical right parties still manage to drive mainstream parties' issue attention. Hence, salience contagion is already in place before the refugee crisis and continues to exist in the post-crisis period.

Regarding parties' positions on immigration, we find great disparities between parties and countries. Most parties' positions are rather stable. We find little evidence that parties took more negative stances on immigration during the refugee crisis. In Germany, this primarily concerns the FDP and the CSU. For some other parties, we actually find the opposite: The Greens and the Social democrats in Switzerland, as well as the ÖVP in Austria became more pro-immigration during the crisis. In a regression framework, the radical rights' impact on parties is rather limited and we only find consistent evidence for such an effect in Germany where on average parties have seemingly taken a more adversarial stance towards the radical right. We suspect this may be due to the institutionalization of the radical right competitor: Unlike in Austria and Switzerland, where radical right parties have been part of the party system since decades, German parties saw themselves facing a new challenge and reacted in a more pronounced way. Of course, a careful validation has to show to which extent these parties really took a more positive stance or whether it is merely the pragmatic politics of the crisis and a turn towards humanitarian frames that leads us to estimate a more positive position. Hence, looking into the changing framing of the immigration issue is an important avenue for further research.

This leads us to conclude that the refugee crisis provided momentum for radical right parties, as they consistently managed to exert pressure on other parties, however mostly in terms of the salience of immigration rather than regarding positions. As this effect plays out quite similarly in all three countries, we argue that – despite the differences between our cases – radical right parties are functional equivalents in different contexts. When they are provided with a favorable political opportunity structure, they will raise attention to immigration and move their competitors to do so, too: Ultimately, nothing

attracts a crowd of parties as quickly as a crisis.

# 6 Discursive change in response to new challengers: Established parties' reactions to the AfD

## Introduction

In February 2013, a group of eighteen people founded a new party. In response to Angela Merkel's statement that her policies during the euro crisis were without alternative, they decided to name their party Alternative for Germany (AfD). As the party's name suggests, the party set out to challenge several of the core tenets of German politics. Over the next months and years, the party's rise shattered the idea that populist and far-right parties cannot be successful in Germany. It put the pro-European consensus among German parties in question. Additionally, it challenged the idea of a broad 'procedural consensus' about democracy in Germany (Landwehr, Faas, and Harms 2017).

With the party's rise, issues like immigration and democracy unquestionably became both more salient and more controversial in German politics. This marked a notable change for the German party system which was characterized by competition on the economic dimension and a low level of organizational change. The rise of the AfD provides an important case study for understanding the impact of challengers on conflict surrounding cultural and political issues in general and immigration and democracy specifically. Public debate primarily highlighted the conflict around political issues and typically framed the AfD as a danger to German democracy and its political culture. By contrast and with few exceptions, research on the party and, possibly, the response of established parties to their new competitor, has focused on European integration and cultural issues like immigration.

The reaction of established parties is crucial for the importance of issues because they typically command a larger voter base and may amplify new issues to their voters. Hence, while a new party mobilizing on an issue like immigration or democracy may only reach a small part of the electorate, larger parties taking up the issue will raise the general attention to the topic. Additionally, established parties' reaction may impact the success of those challengers that promote the issue (e.g. Hug 2001; Spanje and Graaf 2017) and thereby shape whether an issue becomes a defining line of conflict in the party system.

This chapter investigates the contagiousness of the AfD on the democracy issue and the immigration issue to analyze established parties' reactions towards their challengers across issue dimensions. The chapter provides a direct comparison of the two issues studied throughout this dissertation. We start by arguing why new parties are central to the emergence of new issues. We then discuss the responses of established parties and outline two logics that structure established parties' reactions: the logic of benefits and the logic of

discrediting. After presenting the German case, we detail our approach based on structural topic models to measure the framing of policy issues. In the analysis section, we first show the systematic differences between the discourse of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its competitors. In the following sections, we show that the contagion of the AfD towards other parties' discourse was more pronounced on immigration issues while democracy-issues were most pronounced in established party's discourse about their new competitor. Additionally, we highlight systematic differences between how left and right parties framed their response to the AfD.

## New parties, new issues?

In previous chapters of this thesis, we have established a connection between parties outside the core of the party system and the emphasis on the issues of immigration and democracy. Specifically, we have argued that it is radical right parties that drive party competition on immigration (see chapter 5) and that opposition parties (particularly those that have never been in government) are central to competition on political issues (see chapter 4). Hence, the emergence of new parties may be a critical moment for the trajectory of these issues. This is in line with the literature on new parties that has frequently emphasized a link between issue- and party-emergence (Hug 2001; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Kitschelt 1988) and emphasized the impact of so-called niche parties on the issue agenda (Wagner 2012; Rovny 2012), a party family to which many new formations belong.

Based on a cleavage perspective on political competition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), many studies have linked the emergence of new parties to existing parties' neglect of policy issues (or issue positions) that are important to specific social groups (e.g. Hug 2001; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Kitschelt 1988). These explanations argue that new parties succeed because old parties misjudge the importance of an issue, for example as a consequence of a silent value change in society. As their grievances are not heard by established parties, voters become available to new parties. In some cases, this concerns issue positions rather than – or in addition to – issue emphasis: Studies suggest that the positional convergence of established parties may favor the emergence of new challengers (Spoon and Klüver 2019; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). While mostly aimed at explaining the *success* of new parties, this literature also highlights the *role* of new parties in promoting policy issues. On the one hand, new parties can use their influence to put an issue on the agenda, on the other hand, their electoral threat may lead other parties to adopt an issue to contain the appeal of a new party.

While the above-cited studies focus on gaps in the programmatic structure of party

competition, studies that analyze party competition from a strategic point of view come to similar conclusions. Parties that face disadvantages in political competition may become so-called *issue entrepreneurs* who try to shift competition to (new) issues (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hobolt and De Vries 2015). These issues typically split existing parties or allow the entrepreneurial party to mobilize with an electorally appealing position (Wardt, De Vries, and Hobolt 2014). This literature has explicitly included lack of governing experience in the list of factors that make parties more likely to take up new issues (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). Some studies have also highlighted that new parties face an electoral disadvantage and may thus be more willing to shift the basis of issue competition (Rovny and Edwards 2012).

Both the structural and the strategic argument lead us to expect that parties with regular access to government power are more reluctant to engage with new issues (see also Hutter, Kriesi, and Vidal 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2017). They are programmatically bound by their history of mobilization. Any platform change puts them at risk to loose past voters. Hence, situations in which new parties emerge are crucial to the study of issue competition. Reacting to competitors who promote new issues always poses a challenge to established parties and provides a critical moment where the issue agenda of political competition may shift.

**The responses of established parties**

Given the link between changes to the issue agenda and the party system, a large literature – a part of which has been discussed in chapter 5 – has analyzed how established parties react to new challengers and their issues. The three-fold classification by Meguid (2003, 2005) according to which parties may be dismissive, adversarial or accommodative has enabled a range of empirical contributions. However, the explanatory scope of most empirical work is narrowed by its focus on relatively similar cases. Most research has focused on the impact of individual party families and one respective policy issue each: Most studies either analyze the emergence of Green parties and environmental policy (e.g. Carter 2013) or the radical right and immigration policy (e.g. Spanje 2010; Bale et al. 2010). This has not only introduced a bias towards successful party families (see Wardt, Berkhout, and Vermeulen 2017 for a similar critique), but also led to a fragmentation of research questions based on party families.

This fragmentation into family- and issue-specific literatures is problematic as it artificially narrows the options established parties have. While many of the 'contagious' parties studied are so-called 'niche parties', their appeal is rarely based exclusively on a single issue. For example, Ivarsflaten's (2008) study of right-wing populist parties shows that

parties belonging to this family do share an opposition to immigration but differ in their emphasis and positions with regard to other policy issues. Similarly, when Green parties emerged, their policy positions ranged from conservative and centrist to 'new politics' parties (Poguntke 1987). Hence, challenger parties appeal to potential voters on multiple issues.

While it is crucial to find common themes when defining party families, other policy issues which a party emphasizes are equally relevant for its role in the structure of national party competition. For example, while green parties have emerged around the environment, some of them have also been important promoters of cultural liberalism. Returning to the example of the AfD, not only immigration but also voters' conceptions of democracy and preference for direct-democratic decision-making have been shown to impact citizens' vote choice (Schmitt-Beck, Deth, and Staudt 2017; Steiner and Landwehr 2018). In consequence, voters may hold heterogeneous motivations to choose a specific party. These motivations are specific to the national context of competition and the profile of the specific party on several issues. To the extent that other parties compete with the challenger to retain or regain their voters, these heterogeneous motivations matter.

Hence, we shall study established parties' reactions on multiple dimensions. Essentially, parties can pick and choose in their reactions to the different issues (and thereby groups) a challenger tries to mobilize. Given the case of the AfD and the context of this thesis, we distinguish between responses on the immigration issue and political issues, including both criticism of the political establishment and democracy.

## Conceptualizing issue-specific responses

Bringing together the specific character of the immigration and democracy issue as discussed in this thesis with the literature on established parties' reactions to new challengers, we can conceptualize variation in parties' responses to challengers across policy issues. We expect differences to be based on the different incentives parties face for addressing or ignoring an issue. Specifically, we shall distinguish two logics: The logic of benefits and the logic of discrediting. While the former evaluates issues based on the possible benefits a party may reap from addressing the issue, the second evaluates how it may discredit its opponent most effectively. While the first has been widely studied in the literature, the latter is considered less frequently.

What we shall call the *logic of benefits* has been most explicitly discussed by Abou-Chadi (2016) who argues that established parties will only pick up an issue if they expect to benefit from a general increase in the salience of the issue. Comparing the reaction of

established parties to radical right party success on the immigration issue with the impact of green party success on the environmental issue, he concludes that the character of the issues and the strategic constellation within the party system produce different outcomes for both issues. While a rising salience of the immigration issue may shift cross-pressured voters to the right and thereby also benefit mainstream right parties, left mainstream parties do not benefit from the salience of the environmental issues where the green parties are seen as most competent. Hence, they de-emphasize the issue in response to green party success, i.e. niche party emergence and success had different consequences for the salience of the two issues among established parties.

We can equally apply this logic of benefits to differences across issues in responding to a single party: Established parties may see themselves as well-positioned competitors on some issues but have few answers to voters on another issue the challenger promotes. Hence, their own issue profile (and their position within party competition) drive parties to privilege different issues in their response, depending on which issue seems beneficial to them.

An additional consideration in studying issue-specific responses is the *logic of discrediting*: Some studies have argued that established parties which attempt to 'parrot' challenger parties – that is, to accommodate their demands (Meguid 2003) – are particularly successful when these attempts are paired with ostracizing these parties (Spanje and Graaf 2017). However, the literature has neglected the substance of this discrediting strategy. Specifically, parties may draw on existing norms that motivate voters to e.g. avoid being perceived as racist (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010). Depending on the strength of specific norms, the stigmatization of new challengers as anti-democratic or racist may detain voters from choosing a party, however, the strength of these norms varies across contexts and for individuals. Hence, we expect an established party's strategic calculus to shift to an issue that is most discrediting to the opponent among its voters, rather than considering its own competence on the issue raised by the challenger party. The two kinds of issues may not necessarily overlap. If established parties decide to directly address a challenger, this may even lead established parties to emphasize issues they would otherwise be tempted to ignore.

**The German Context**

Based on this general outline, we shall now discuss the German case more specifically. As mentioned, Germany is characterized by a remarkable stability of the political space over time with a relative dominance of economic issues (e.g. Dolezal 2008; Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Institutional factors, the structure of the party system and established parties'

behavior have constrained the chances for challengers – particularly those on the ideological fringes – to enter parliament. Organizationally, the German party system is characterized by a very low level of innovation (Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2016). Arguably, this has also had a constraining effect on the issue agenda.

Regarding cultural issues, the right part of the political spectrum has been especially constrained as the Christian Democratic Party managed to integrate diverse preferences. To prevent the emergence of a challenger to their right, the CDU and particularly its Bavarian sister party CSU have at times shifted to the right in order to undercut support for right-wing challengers (Bornschier 2012), e.g. by adopting a tougher stance on immigration (Backer 2000; Dolezal 2008). In addition to the accommodative strategy of the center-right, as Bornschier (2012) has argued, the restraint of the center-left social democrats also contributed to the failure of populist and right-wing parties. The social democrats abstained from a strong counter-mobilization (which entailed sometimes compromising with the position of the center-right) and instead downplayed the core issues of radical right challengers.

The stability of the German system has equally constrained competition on political issues: The German political system was established as a militant democracy and many of its institutions are included in the constitution, making reforms particularly difficult. This adds to the generally low salience and low polarization of institutional reforms which studies of political competition in North-Western Europe have found (Kriesi et al. 2012, 119) and which has been substantiated by chapter 4. Survey evidence suggests that, despite growing distrust since the German reunification, a majority of German citizens classifies themselves as fairly or even very satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (inter alia Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck 2002).[40]

---

[40]While the low level of politicization and the strategies of established parties may have curtailed the impact of immigration and democracy issues on the structure of political competition, they have not prevented political shifts on these issues. Notably, criticism of political institutions has been used to promote institutional reforms in Germany as well. However, Scarrow (1996) argues that this has happened without significant electoral gains for or direct contributions of the parties promoting these issues: While the Greens prominently campaigned for more direct democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, they were not included in the implementation of these reforms. Similar to other Western European Green parties, by the time the Greens were included in (national) government, they had lost most of their anti-establishment appeal (Mair 2001). At that point, the demand to change the mode of politics was more symbolic than linked to substantive proposals. Similarly, the challenge by right-wing parties during the early 1990s led to a shift in asylum policy, however, established parties took charge of this process, effectively reducing the space for their radical challengers (Bornschier 2012). While changes severely limited the right to asylum for refugees (Bosswick 2000), the issue became de-mobilized in the following election campaigns.

**The rise of the Alternative for Germany**

In many ways, the success of the AfD de-stabilized the established equilibrium of German party politics. Several milestones in the AfD's development – which is shown in Figure 6.1 – seem to be particularly important when assessing the over time development of other parties' reactions to the AfD[41]: The AfD was founded in 2013, mostly as a party against chancellor Merkel's politics in the euro crisis. Though it just missed the threshold to enter the national parliament in 2013, it gained a prominent parliamentary representation by entering the European parliament with seven MEPs a year later. However, the party was rather marginal within the European Conservatives and Reformers group which it initially joined.

Crucial for party development was a split into an economically liberal eurosceptic and a more culturally conservative wing which occurred in summer 2015. The party had always played on nationalist sentiments, however, the founder Bernd Lucke had initially maintained the party's main agenda as conservative but economically liberal by focusing on European crisis politics. Following the strengthening of the culturally conservative and radical right camp within the party, Lucke lost a fight for the leadership and left the party.[42] Moving further to the right, in summer 2016, the party adopted a policy platform of opposition to Islam. As visible in Figure 6.1, the phase leading up to this platform was marked by AfD's biggest gains in the polls. In 2017, the party finally entered national parliament.



Figure 6.1: Timeline of AfD's development

---

[41]Vote share based on 879 polls conducted between 2013 and 2019 by Allensbach, Emnid, Forsa, GMS, Infratest dimap and Yougov gathered from wahlrecht.de.

[42]Subsequently, Lucke founded a new albeit unsuccessful party that is not discussed here due to its electoral marginality.

Overall, the literature has analyzed the AfD in relation to two issue dimensions: On the one hand, political grievances (including euroscepticism, anti-elitism and the promotion of direct democracy) were at the core of the AfD's appeal. On the other hand, the AfD mobilized with culturally conservative positions, most prominently a rejection of immigration. Arguably, throughout the development of the AfD, the political dimension has precipitously lost its importance: The AfD strongly emphasized the topic of direct democracy in its first election manifesto. However, the topic almost completely disappeared by the publication of the 2017 manifesto in favor of nationalist and immigration-sceptical demands (Lehmann and Matthieß 2017). What remained was a criticism of the political establishment rather than substantive proposals for change. In contrast, considering the immigration issue, chapter 5 of this dissertation has shown the increasing salience of the issue for the AfD (see Figure 5.1) and the growing radicality (and thereby distinctness) of the AfD's position (see Figure 5.2). Hence, we shall consider three core topics in assessing the AfD and the reaction of its competitors: criticism of the political establishment, democracy and immigration.

**Conceptualizing reactions of established parties**

Most studies of other parties' reactions to the AfD focus on immigration. Most recently, Jankowski, Schneider, and Tepe (2019) have analyzed how the rise of the AfD has led to a move to the right by candidates of all other parties on the cultural dimension. Although the party's typical classification as right-wing populist party (Arzheimer 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri 2015) implies an emphasis on both, analyses often focus on immigration, given that the issue has a clearer policy content and more clearly lends itself to the strategies typically analyzed in the literature on contagion of new challengers. Hence, it is relatively straightforward to formulate expectations for immigration: As outlined in chapter 5, mostly center-right parties can hope to benefit from an increased salience of the immigration issue. In contrast, we expect center-left parties to be more reluctant to take up this issue. Hence, the logic of benefits suggests center-right parties should increase their emphasis on the immigration issue more than left parties do.

However, we shall go a step further and also consider the framing of these responses: While center-right parties may take the same tone and respond by 'parroting' their radical challenger, we expect center-left parties to try to re-frame the issue. Although radical right parties are associated with the immigration issue by their voters, most voters do not deem them the most competent in dealing with the issue (Abou-Chadi 2016). Hence, left parties may compete by promoting a different framing of the issue. In contrast to right parties, left parties may explicitly draw on immigration topics when following the logic of

discrediting: Emphasizing their more pro-immigration positions, they can stigmatize the policies of their opponents as racist.

H1a  With the emergence of the AfD, established right parties increase their emphasis on immigration more than left-wing parties.

H1b  Unlike right parties, established left parties use the issue of immigration when addressing the AfD to discredit the party.

Our expectations are more complicated regarding political issues: Established parties are likely to prioritize substantive issues over issues related to the political process. On the one hand, new parties have some unique advantages in mobilizing with process-related topics. While, as outlined above, voters' demands for competence typically disadvantage parties with little or no government experience (Hobolt and De Vries 2015), the situation may be reverse for issues connected to the political process. While established parties are bound by their past statements and - in case they have government experience - their previous track record, new parties may promise freely to improve the way politics is done. Thus, they can be more vocal and radical in their criticism of politicians.[43]

On the other hand, keeping democratic systems off the political agenda is also a vested interest of parties close to power. Political systems shape the conditions of political competition and (governing) parties tend to be invested into the status quo that allowed their access to power. Evidence from expert surveys also suggests access to power makes parties more positive about existing democratic systems (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017). When parties do pursue reforms of political systems while in power, their institutional goals may often become entangled with partisan interests and open them up to criticism (Bull and Pasquino 2007). Thus, mobilizing for reforms of the political system presents a significant risk to parties in government and the logic of benefits clearly disincentives established parties from addressing these topics.

However, the framing of political issues is crucial since the outlined incentives do not apply to all aspects of political issues equally: While established parties may struggle to benefit from emphasizing anti-establishment criticism, they may emphasize democracy and its value in their responses to challenger parties. Characterizing these parties as a danger to democracy may seem like the most effective way to discredit them for significant parts of the electorate. Hence, the logic of discrediting suggests that established parties – whatever their political ideology – can benefit from stigmatizing the AfD as undemocratic.

---

[43]To substantiate the advantage for new parties on process-related issues we may consider the argument about *newness as a winning formula* articulated by Sikk (2012). He identifies a set of new parties that explicitly use their newness as electoral appeal: "The 'issue' these new parties primarily stood for - newness - is by definition impossible to incorporate by old parties" (Sikk 2012, 480).

H2a With the emergence of the AfD, established parties do not increase their anti-establishment criticism.

H2b Mainstream parties use the issue of democracy when addressing the AfD to discredit the party.

## Design

This section outlines the design and data of the present paper. First, we argue for the use of (structural) topic models for the study of political agendas in the context of the emergence of new challengers. We then outline the implementation of the design regarding data choice, model selection and measurements.

### Using Topic Models to Study Party Agendas

Studies of new parties face a challenge in assessing the platform of these parties. New parties often deviate from the issues on which established parties compete. In particular, they often politicize issues that have so far not been a topic in political debates. The data political scientists use is often too inflexible to capture this (see e.g. the immigration issue which has only recently been included in the Comparative Manifesto Project: Lehmann and Zobel 2018). Thus, existing classification schemes often either scatter new parties' statements across different categories or classify them as not policy-relevant.

Instead, we propose to use a bottom-up approach to classifying political issues through topic models. Topic models are an inductive automated approach to distill latent themes in a corpus of texts. Like supervised classification methods which are increasingly used in political science (e.g. Burscher, Vliegenthart, and Vreese 2015; Wiedemann 2018), they use similarities in word frequencies. However, they have no prior restrictions on the specific topics generated.[44] Previously, topic models have been successfully used to study political discourse in parliaments (Greene and Cross 2017) as well as in press releases (Grimmer 2010). Given topic models are generated specific to the corpus under study, they allow the definition of topics that are more characteristic of new parties. Additionally, their capacity to capture different ways to speak about a topic fits with the emphasis on discourse in this paper.

Supervised topic models or the use of repeated runs furthermore enable the study of specific topics by allowing the researcher to select a model that fits with the expectations to be tested. Since repeated runs and their analysis by party bear a risk of over-fitting

---

[44]Using previously coded data for supervised classification aggravates the focus on established policy issues given the context-dependency of issue classifications.

the data, we use a split-sample design as recently suggested by Egami et al. (n.d.) for estimating causal treatment effects from text data. The split into the so-called training and test sets is frequently used in machine learning, though it is as of yet less common with analysis using topic models. It splits the data into two parts and builds the estimator function on the training set while actually estimating measurements on the withheld test set.

In our setup, the goal is not a causal identification but an experimentation with different ways to project topics onto the text without overfitting the model: The split-sample framework creates classification stability before estimating effects and avoids the problem of over-fitting data when assessing a variety of topic models. Under these conditions, experiments on the training set make it possible to modify cleaning procedures after detecting problematic clustering terms that may distort results. The framework also allows to do several iterations to settle on a model that adequately identifies and maps the texts of interest within the whole corpus based on theoretically relevant categories. The model selection process thus introduces an element of distant supervision into the data clustering process. The Appendix provides details on how the train-test split was implemented.

## Data

We analyze parties' reactions based on press releases. Press releases are an ideal corpus for this study: Unlike manifestos, they are published on a regular basis by all parties. They cover the activities of a party and have been previously used to study how politicians communicate with their constituents (e.g. Grimmer 2010) as well as the issue attention of parties in response to voters (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016). In contrast to parliamentary debates and media coverage, press releases allow parties to choose what issues they want to communicate. Thus, they provide a good source for studying the changing attention to issues.[45] Parties' control over press releases also means this data provides a conservative estimate of parties' responses to new challengers: While parties may be forced to address their challenger in an interview, they can try to downplay them in their own communications. Hence, if we observe a reaction in press releases, this reaction is likely to be equal or stronger in public communications more broadly.

For this study, we collected all press releases published by German parties between January

---

[45]While many studies of the AfD rely on social media, this data is ill-suited to assess the reactions of other parties which are far less active on Facebook. Given previous studies based on hand-coding of AfD content have shown that the party is 'more populist' on Facebook than on other platforms (Arzheimer 2015), an estimation based on press releases provides the most conservative estimate of the party's discourse. Additionally, other parties are less active on Facebook than the AfD. Presumably, press releases are the medium that other, more established parties are more likely to react to.

2011 and March 2018 through webscraping.[46] This includes all parties running in the 2017 elections that gained over five percent in the polls for most of the period of interest with exception of the liberal FDP which published too few press releases.[47] The dataset contains almost 30.000 press releases that were available at the time of data collection. The Appendix provides further details on the covered time period and the frequency of releases by party as well as the pre-processing strategy.

**Model Selection**

Structural topic models as implemented in the `stm` R package (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2013; Roberts et al. 2014; Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi 2016) are a specific variant of topic models that allows for inclusion of covariates in the estimation process. Generally, this allows benefiting from document meta data in the estimation of topic prevalence by sharing information across similar documents. Thus, the model provides estimations of the effect of meta data on the frequency of topics with less noise than other models (Roberts et al. 2014). In my case, all models include covariates as

$$y \;\sim\; s(date) \;\times\; party \;+\; phase$$

where date is the publication date of each document, included with a spline. Phase is a categorical variable for the over-time configuration of the party sytem with respect to AfD's presence: (1) Prior to the emergence of the AfD, (2) from the foundation of the AfD to its first split, (3) after the split, and (4) since AfD entered the Bundestag in autumn 2017. The interaction term between the date and the party allows for estimating the different trajectories of parties over time. Thus, the model is optimized specifically for assessing the over-time developments in the party system.

Given we expect the topics of the press releases to cover the full spectrum of political debates, we select the number of topics in an iterative way. Previous research with large bodies of press releases often used between 50 and 100 topics. We thus compare exclusivity, semantic coherence, held-out likelihood, bound and residuals for different numbers of topics. The diagnostics included in the appendix suggest a model with 85 topics. Subsequently, we initialized several models, running only those with high likelihood values (for a more detailed description: Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2016). This leaves us with a list of ten models, each with 85 topics. For these models, semantic coherence and exclusivity

---

[46]This dataset partially overlaps with the dataset used in chapter 5, however, it is restricted to German parties and covers a longer time span.

[47]Where possible, we consider press releases published by the party headquarter and the parliamentary group (the so-called Fraktion) and collect this data both from the party webpage and internet archives.

perform quite similar on average (see Appendix). Thus, at this point we move to a substantive evaluation of topics by first consulting words that were frequent and exclusive to the topics in each of the models and – for the models that seem most interesting – consulting documents that the model deemed most representative for each topic within the substantive interest of this chapter. Here, we select a single model with substantively coherent topics reflecting all three issues we are interested in.

### Measurements

After labeling the topics on the train set, we fit the model to the withheld test set. We verify the consistency of topic content in the test set by comparing documents with high topical content from the test set to the topics estimated in the training set. After this validation procedure, all measurements are based on topic-proportions in the previously withheld test set.[48]

Notably, we discuss topic proportions as salience of a topic. However, to compare the estimates to results based on conventional datasets, it is important to highlight how they differ conceptually. Mixed Membership topic models like the structural topic model estimate the share of a document dedicated to a topic. They are thus not directly comparable to estimates based on entire documents, e.g. through document classification (*inter alia* Burscher, Vliegenthart, and Vreese 2015; Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008). The approach to salience on a sub-document level is preferable here as this approach is closer to the standard hand-coding approaches used in political science to measure salience. These approaches typically consider sentence or sub-sentence units as references to an issue (Volkens et al. 2016; Hutter and Gessler 2019). A mixed membership model (that is, a topic model that considers each document to belong to several topics) mirrors their assumption that documents - even if they are as short as press releases - typically discuss several topics.[49]

While the estimated model allows a detailed assessment of the salience of narrow topics over time, we aggregate these topics into issue domains to present the results in a more intuitive way. Thus, we manually cluster the topics into larger issue categories, similar to the process of aggregation in inductive coding of political statements (Dolezal, Hutter, and Wüest 2012; Hutter and Gessler 2019). We aggregate the topics based on their most indicative words (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2013; Bischof and Airoldi 2012) and

---

[48]Unfortunately, the standard estimation of effects in the `stm` R-package which incorporates uncertainty from the topic estimation into the estimation of effects is currently not possible when applying a pre-estimated topic model to new data (Egami et al., n.d., Appendix 4).

[49]However, there is still a difference in the resulting estimates since salience is considered as a share of the document without controlling for the different length of texts.

reading the five documents with the highest topical prevalence for each party from the training set. Following classical studies of party competition, we separate the topics into three substantive issue areas (economic, cultural and political issues) and additionally separate foreign policy. While foreign policy does not play a big role in election campaigns, which are the focus of most studies on party competition, press releases frequently comment on international developments. A full list of labeled topics and their clustering is included in Table A6.1 the Appendix.[50] As topic models are agnostic in their clustering principles, not all topics relate to policy issues which has led us to exclude a total of twelve topics.[51]

To test our hypotheses in a more formalized regression framework, we draw on Arellano-Bond models as used in chapter 5. Different from the chapter 5, we do not only test the effect of the AfD's emphasis on a topic on the salience of the topic overall for other parties, but also the effect on the different framings parties choose for the topic, in line with our hypotheses. For this purpose, we explain the salience of a topic (which represents a specific framing of the issue) or topic category for a party with the salience which the AfD gives to the overall topic category, controlling for the AfD's existence and its strength in the polls (averaged at the monthly level based on the data included in Figure 6.1). Arellano-Bond tests to ascertain autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are included in Table A6.4 in the Appendix. We calculate all models with two lags of the dependent variable - an alternative specification with a single lag is included in the Appendix.[52]

Figure 6.2: Estimated salience of different policy domains, aggregate and detail

## The role of politics and immigration in political competition in Germany

Figure 6.2 shows the estimated salience of each aggregate issue domain as well as parties' emphasis on these domains. The bottom half of the figure additionally shows the salience

---

[50]To allow an independent assessment of the resulting classification, the appendix also includes a network visualization of correlations between topics. While there are various methods of community detection based on these correlations of topics, any automated clustering is based merely on co-occurrence of topics within documents and thus not superior to a manual clustering. Instead of replacing manual clustering, the graph is meant to support the clusters while also highlighting which topics within the clusters occur independent of other substantively fitting topics. Any clustering represents a highly context-sensitive approximation, guided both by topic correlations and clusters of words found in the data as well as by similar issue categorizations that will allow comparison and validation in future research. They are necessarily arbitrary: For example, as part of the production process, agriculture may be considered part of economic policy. On the other hand, many of the highly indicative words, e.g. 'animal protection' and 'environment' relate to environment.

[51]These topics were a) were purely related to party-internal discussions often specific to a single party in the dataset, e.g. the election of new speakers or invitations to press conferences, b) clustered colloquial words from interviews that were re-published as press-releases, or c) were not interpretable in a sensible way since they clustered non-meaningful words, e.g. numerical terms.

[52]Note that it is difficult to reject autocorrelation at the second level for one of the dependent variables - however, autocorrelation is clearly rejected in the alternative specification which renders highly similar results.

of selected more narrow policy issues to show the three issues that will be discussed in this chapter and also allow the reader an intuitive assessment of the validity of the measurement. The biggest issue domain with almost 24.8% average salience is economic. This includes topics such as taxation, budgets and public sector employment but also welfare policies like benefits for students and families, regulations of rent prices, consumer rights and working conditions. They are closely followed by cultural issues, which are defined more widely than in some previous studies (Hutter and Kriesi 2018). Specifically, they contain classical topics like environmental policies (climate protection, energy policy and agriculture), gender equality, religious issues and migration but also data protection. Cultural topics amount to 24.4% of the whole corpus. Political issues follow close by as third largest group with 22.8%. Finally, 13.4% of the press releases focus on foreign policy. This includes topics related to the EU as well as other countries.

Addressing parties' issue profiles, almost all parties share the emphasis on economic and cultural issues, though it is substantively pronounced for the AfD and the left party. Economic issues are primarily emphasized by the CSU and the SPD. In contrast, political and foreign issues are the two topics that the AfD and, for foreign policy, also the left party address most among all parties. For the AfD, the emphasis on foreign topics is a product of its strong criticism of the EU. This already suggests that political (and European) issues are indeed a central area where the AfD differs from its more established competitors. We do not see the same effect for cultural issues at the aggregate level, however, this may be due to the inclusive definition of cultural issues applied in this chapter.

Looking at the more narrow issue areas in the bottom half of the graph, we can assess our model based on our knowledge from previous studies of German party competition. Consistent with other assessments of issue ownership, the left party and the SPD emphasize welfare the most, although the difference to other parties is not large. Remarkable is primarily the low salience AfD gives the topic. There is a larger difference for the environmental issue, which is the traditional core issue of the green party and which the party emphasizes almost twice as much as the other parties. Turning to the three issues at the core of this chapter, we indeed find that the AfD dominates the discussion on each of these issues. While AfD generally overemphasizes political topics, as we have discussed before, a significant part of this emphasis comes from its criticism of the government. The 'criticism' topic category overall has a salience of 4.6% with the AfD giving it almost twice as much salience as other parties do. Democracy topics, which are topics related to democratic principles and the value of democracy, have an average salience of 3.6%. The AfD again gives this topic the most salience, however, the difference in emphasis is not as large as for criticism. On migration, it is the AfD, followed with some distance by

the CSU and the left party, which emphasizes the issue most. Overall, the topic has an average salience of 3.0%.

## The over-time development of competition

So is it the AfD that drives competition on immigration and democracy issues? That is, do other parties 'parrot' the AfD's discourse? Figure 6.3 depicts the development of immigration topics over time. Additionally, Figure 6.4 shows the development of criticism-related topics and Figure 6.5 shows the development of democracy topics over time. To evaluate the general salience of the issue, we shall first consider the aggregate share of each of these areas by discussing the solid trend line. Subsequently, we discuss trends in the framing of the topic by considering the individual topics depicted in lighter colors with dashed lines. The vertical dashed lines represent the foundation of the AfD, the party split in 2015 and its entry into parliament in 2017.

### Immigration

We shall start our discussion with the immigration-related topics. Our results in Figure 6.3 are – with a few notable differences – similar to the findings presented in Figure 5.1 in chapter 5.[53] As in chapter 5, the migration topic is increasing for other parties at a similar time as for the AfD. Similarly, the biggest part of this increase seems to be driven by the refugee crisis rather than the AfD's emergence. The decrease in salience for most parties after the migration crisis is suggestive in this regard. However, we do note a first peak for some of the parties (particularly CDU, CSU and the left party) already before the crisis in the period in which the AfD slowly started increasing its emphasis on the topic. This first peak was not visible in chapter 5, due to the shorter time span covered in that analysis.

The differentiation into three individual migration topics allows us to discuss how different parties framed the immigration issue. The mediterranean topic (topic 42) relates to

---

[53]An attentive reader will note that the baseline levels in Figure 6.3 differ from the results presented in Figure 5.1 in chapter 5. This merits some discussion. First, this is partially due to the difference in measurement approach: While we measured the share of the documents that mention concepts related to immigration in the previous chapter, we now measure the share of words that relate to these topics within each document, as discussed in the design section. Second, the inductive analysis of the topic model also makes it difficult to directly compare the substantive content of both chapters. Specifically, we restrict ourselves to three topics which only cover a subset of the immigration issue. We focus on topics that relate to refugee policy specifically – the aspect that was at the core of AfD's appeal – and only consider topics that exclusively cover immigration (rather than e.g. the local politics topic that also covers dealing with refugee arrivals). To assess the relative overlap, Tables A6.2 and A6.3 present the relation between the dictionary used in chapter 5 and the prevalence of topics in the documents, including party and year fixed effects. While the effects for the selected migration topics are largest, there are also significant and positive effects for other topics like labor market integration (topic 78), terrorism (topic 50) and local politics (topic 80).

Figure 6.3: Development of migration topics over time

refugees, their journey and the EU's attempt to close the borders. In contrast, the asylum policies topic (topic 27) relates to the process of seeking asylum and eligibility criteria as well as challenges the state faced with managing asylum requests. The policing migration topic (topic 12) revolves around asylum seekers, their deportation and, to some extent, police encounters with migrants.

While it is evident that for the AfD, the salience of migration significantly increased since the split of the party, the party mostly emphasizes the asylum policies topic. The other immigration topics only slowly increase with the mediterranean topic remaining rather marginal. The asylum policies topic alone increased to almost 10% at its peak, rendering immigration (together with the 'terror' topic that is not presented here) the main topic of the AfD. This finding is - in its substance and timing - consistent with the literature on the party.

How does this reflect on other parties? While we do see a temporary increase in the salience of migration for the mediterranean topic and the asylum policies during the time after the AfD party split (which roughly coincides with the migration crisis), this increase is not sustained. As soon as AfD enters parliament, parties rather seem to de-emphasize the topic. In part, this may be due to the end of the election campaign during which parties have been shown to respond more to their competitors (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu 2019). Remarkable is furthermore the CSU, which substantively increased its emphasis on the asylum policies and the policing migration topic. The party even emphasizes the policing migration topic more than the AfD does, taking a security-centered perspective on immigration. This is in line with CSU's law-and-order policy as Bavarian governing party during the crisis.

We also find evidence of a counter-mobilization on the left: While the left party substantively increased its emphasis on immigration in the period after the AfD emerged and particularly around the time of the party's split, the left party also highlights the mediterranean topic which addresses the issue from a refugee-centered perspective. Given the timing, a part of this increase may be an effect of the emergent migration crisis rather than only a response to the AfD. Furthermore, the emphasis on different topics within the topic domain compared to AfD means the party provides a different framing of the issue. The green party similarly highlights the mediterranean topic among immigration-related topics.

Figure 6.4: Development of criticism topics over time

**Criticism**

Turning to another core element of the AfD's discourse, Figure 6.4 shows that the dominance of the AfD for the criticism topics, that is, all topics that relate to expressing criticism of political actors, holds over time. Notable is furthermore a government-opposition divide: Not only do government parties emphasize the topic far less (as visible in the difference between AfD, Greens and left party respectively the conservative parties), we also see a strong decline in the salience of these topics for the SPD after it enters government in autumn 2013. However, we do not see a contagion effect: Although the AfD increases its emphasis on criticism-topics over time up to the party split in 2015, this increase is not reflected in other parties' discourse.

Going into additional detail, our model distinguishes four topics related to criticism: While they all relate to politics, they cover few substantive proposals and are mostly rhetorical. For example, for the scandalizing topic (43), 'scandalous','insanity' or 'atrocity' are among the most indicative words. Relevant documents for different parties discuss e.g. the governments' failure to stop situations that the release characterizes as unacceptable.[54] Topic 54, 'irresponsibility' is a less moral version that criticizes e.g. irresponsible behavior, failure to react or silent consent. Topic 56 has a similar content to the previous two topics but directs this criticism towards chancellor Angela Merkel, e.g. by asking 'Whom does Angela Merkel still represent at this point?' (AfD) or demanding that the chancellor should 'deliver clear concepts instead of populist sound bites' (SPD). Finally, a topic which we shall label 'political style' (topic 67) relates to parties' views how politicians should fulfill their functions, including where and how political demands should be articulated.

For the other opposition parties, it is the scandalizing topic that has most importance. Still, although the AfD uses the criticism topics to deliver their populist message, this message is not taken up by other parties. In this regard, a comparison with the topics related to the political process (which are included in Figure A6.4 in the appendix) is instructive: Although there is a difference between governing and opposition parties, established parties by and large do not follow the AfD's emphasis on criticism. Instead, their discourse remains focused on interacting with their competitors within the parliamentary process.

**Democracy**

Finally, we turn to the democracy-related topics, all of which also have 'democracy' as one of the most indicative words for the topic. The pattern for this category is least clear-cut:

---

[54]Many of the documents are full of morally- and emotionally-charged vocabulary. For example, the SPD writes about 'flaming letters' and accuses the CDU/CSU of 'denying reality', while the AfD argues that it 'cringes' about other parties.

Figure 6.5: Development of democracy topics over time

Again, it is the AfD that emphasizes the category most, however, its importance varies between just below 4% and around 7%. For the other parties, the category mostly has around 3-4.5% salience. While we see relatively little variation for the left and (except an increase at the very end) the SPD, there is more variation in the trajectory for CDU, CSU and Greens.

We can again differentiate our discussion by individual topics: Two topics clearly relate to domestic events and are highly relevant in the context of this chapter. The 'dangers to democracy' Topic (31) discusses the dangers of (right-wing) extremism to democracy. Next to democracy, indicative words include 'racism', 'violence', 'Pegida' and 'protest.'[55] Topic 33 is related but more ambiguous regarding normative evaluations. We shall call this topic 'democratic conflict', since the most indicative words all revolve around confronting the different values and views present in society. It contains politicians' emphasis on 'freedom and democracy' as an answer to external threat just as well as discussions of how to treat the AfD.

However, among these democracy-related topics, we also find topics that mix domestic and international issues. Topic 46 - which we shall call 'civil society' includes references to civil society, individual freedoms and the relation between government and citizens. However, many documents discuss problems with democracy and its institutions abroad.[56] Topic 34 ('democracy promotion') is similarly divided between domestic and international issues but primarily concerns the responsibility of Western democracies to side with oppressed groups elsewhere.

When considering the AfD specifically, it may seem surprising that the two domestic democracy topics are relatively salient, considering they primarily relate to right-wing politics as a danger to democracy. A more thorough inspection of the documents with a high share of topical content in this category reveals that for the AfD, the right-wing dangers to democracy topic primarily includes complaints about attacks on the AfD by left groups and general accusations that the state turns a blind eye to left-wing political violence (compared to acts perpetrated by the political right). Several documents evoke the escalation of violence from different political sides during the Weimar Republic as a possible scenario and demand from politicians of other parties to distance themselves from

---

[55]For example, one text with a particularly high share dedicated to this topic is a press release published jointly by the Greens and the left party that argues that being racist or xenophobic is not a 'right' of citizens within a democracy. Instead the release outlines a 'democratic duty' to protest against these views.

[56]This includes the lack of a EU-democracy-charter in dealing with democratic drift in Hungary, restrictions on NGOs in India or attempts by the Turkish government to stop satirical features on German TV

attacks on AfD politicians, as well as anti-AfD campaign material that the party considers anti-democratic. They describe these attacks as an increasingly escalating pattern, arguing that a 'brutalization' ('Verrohung') of democracy is occurring. Though AfD emphasizes some of these topics slightly less since it entered into parliament – particularly the 'dangers to democracy' topic – there is not enough evidence to conclude that the party moderated its criticism. Rather, the smaller attention to attacks on the AfD (which is what primarily falls into Topic 31 for the party) may be a cooling-off effect after the electoral campaign as a period of heightened engagement with the public.

At this point, it is important to note that we do not see the defensive response to the AfD which we expected. The two democracy topics show relatively little change. While there are some differences between parties, e.g. a slightly higher importance of the dangers to democracy topic for the left and, at the beginning, the Green party, there is little change over time. If anything, we see a de-emphasis once AfD emerges that continues as it enters parliament. This may be an effect of the formerly ostracized idea of a right-wing challenger becoming 'old news', however, further investigation is needed. A closer look at highly relevant documents at different moments in time also suggests a transformation of the topic among the left party: While its focus was initially on a variety of right-wing actors as well as the state's policy towards extremism, later documents are exclusively dedicated to discussing the AfD. In contrast, the democratic conflict topic that contains discussions about values slightly increases for the conservative parties who previously only address the dangers to democracy topic to a very limited extent. While the democratic conflict topic seems to be more accommodative than the dangers to democracy topic, the difference between the trends for the two domestic democracy topics suggest it may be fruitful to investigate the exact separation between both topics further.

### Regression analysis

We can test these descriptive results more formally in a regression framework. In order to address hypotheses H1a and H1b, Table 6.1 analyzes the salience of immigration topics at the aggregate level as well as specific immigration topics. The first model, which explains the development of the aggregate immigration category, as well as the models for individual topics (models 2-4), provides further evidence for the salience contagion of the AfD to mainstream parties which we had observed in chapter 5. However, at the aggregate level, we do not find the stronger contagion for center-right parties that we expected (hypothesis H1a). While the interaction effect between being a right of center party and the AfD's emphasis on the topic is positive and sizable, it is not statistically significant. That is, right of center parties parties do not emphasize immigration topics significantly more in

Table 6.1: Regression models for migration topics

|  | (1) immigration (overall) | (2) policing | (3) policy | (4) mediterranean |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD immigration | 0.14*** | 0.03*** | 0.05*** | 0.05*** |
|  | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| AfD exists | 0.48*** | -0.00 | 0.19*** | 0.31*** |
|  | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| AfD polls | -0.12*** | -0.01 | -0.06*** | -0.05*** |
|  | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| right * AfD immigration | 0.10 | 0.06* | 0.08* |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.04) |  |
| left opposition * AfD immigration |  |  |  | 0.04** |
|  |  |  |  | (0.02) |
| DV (lag1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| DV (lag2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 0.90*** | 0.77*** | 0.22*** | 0.22*** |
|  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Observations | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |
| Number of parties | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

response to the AfD.

To some extent, this absence of a difference between left and right parties may be a compositional effect: We hypothesized that left parties would try to reframe the immigration issue (H1b) and the previous section has indeed highlighted that the left and to some extent the green party emphasized the mediterranean topic more than their right of center competitors. Consequently, in model 2-4 we address the development of specific immigration topics for each party, depending on the AfD's emphasis on immigration overall. We find a significant and positive interaction effect with AfD's emphasis on immigration for the right regarding the policing immigration and the asylum policy topic respectively for the left for the mediterranean topic. Thus, right and left parties indeed emphasize different framings of immigration in response to the AfD with the specifically emphasizing the fate of refugees that the AfD hardly mentions.[57]

---

[57]Note that the dummy for left parties is not just the opposite of the right of center party dummy as it excludes the social democrats. If we include the social democrats, the interaction effect loses its

Table 6.2: Regression models for democracy topics

|  | (1) criticism (overall) | (2) democracy (overall) | (3) dangers | (4) conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD criticism | 0.00 (0.01) |  |  |  |
| AfD democracy |  | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) |
| AfD exists | -0.04 (0.06) | -0.33*** (0.11) | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.07* (0.04) |
| AfD polls | -0.02*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| DV (lag1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| DV (lag2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 1.14*** (0.32) | 2.42*** (0.13) | 0.86*** (0.19) | 0.78*** (0.12) |
| Observations | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |
| Number of parties | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.2 provides evidence to address our hypotheses H2a and H2b on the AfD's contagion on political issues. In line with hypothesis H2a, we do not see any impact of the AfD's discourse on the salience of criticism in the first model. We expected this, given established parties' limited ability to benefit from populist criticism. Furthermore, both the existence of the AfD and its standing in the polls rather seem to have a negative effect on the salience of the criticism topics. We can summarize that established parties seem to de-emphasize criticism in response to AfD's growth.

The evidence for H2b regarding democracy topics is more mixed. The salience of democracy topics on the aggregate level and topic 31 specifically has decreased since the AfD emerged. Only the conflict topic (topic 33) sees a slight increase when AfD gains in the polls. Controlling for other factors, we observe a small increase in the salience of these topics when the AfD addresses them more, varying between 0.02% (for topic 33) and 0.07% (overall) for each percentage increase in AfD's emphasis on the topic. While this effect is small, it is still notable given the autocorrelation for the democracy topics is very small

significance.

(not included in Table 6.2, which suggests a very limited time trend. However, for a conclusive evaluation of hypothesis H2b, we need to know to which extent the salience of democracy issues is just the result of a contagion effect or indeed intended to discredit the AfD. For this, we turn to analyze parties' framing of the AfD in the following section.

## How other parties address the Alternative for Germany

So how do other parties frame the Alternative for Germany? Specifically, do they rely on democracy in their criticism of the AfD? Most notable, they seem to avoid speaking about the party. Table 6.3 shows the number and share of press releases that mention the AfD or one of its leading politicians. Overall, we find just below 150 press releases by other parties that mention the Alternative for Germany or its leading politicians. While this is to some extent due to the nature of press releases (compared to e.g. interviews where politicians may explicitly be pressed to address their competitors), values for other parties are appreciably higher (see Table A6.8 and A6.9). Hence, while media attention during the past years may have focused on the AfD as a new challenger, existing parties clearly tried to downplay their new competitor.

Table 6.3: Mentions of the AfD in press releases by party

| party | N | share |
|---|---|---|
| AfD | 1704 | 98.2 % |
| CDU | 7 | 0.1 % |
| CSU | 4 | 0.2 % |
| Greens | 41 | 1.2 % |
| Left Party | 70 | 0.9 % |
| SPD | 16 | 0.2 % |

In a second step, we shall consider the substantive content of these press releases (excluding those issued by the AfD). Reading the press releases confirms the idea that AfD is not discussed as a 'normal' competitor: We find very few releases where the AfD is mentioned alongside other parliamentary parties and criticized for its policies. Instead, most releases that mention the AfD explicitly focus on discrediting the party for its alleged racism, anti-democratic positions or revisionist view of German history.

For the conservative parties, this view is well-reflected by an interview with back-then parliamentary group leader Volker Kauder that was re-published as a press release: Asked how the CDU intends to compete with the AfD, he argues that the CDU should speak about the AfD as little as possible in order not to valorize the party. When addressing the AfD, he says the CDU should highlight that the AfD is not a normal democratic

party. This, however, in his view, does not prevent his own party from addressing the immigration issue. In contrast, the green and the left party publish far more press releases that mention the AfD, usually using the party as an example of why they fight against racism, or for values such as democracy and gender equality. Often, they explicitly accuse CDU and CSU to be politically close to the AfD and position themselves as only viable alternative.



Figure 6.6:  Effect of AfD mentions on topic prevalence

We can also quantify the substantive content of these press releases, while keeping in mind that we discuss a very small number of texts. For this purpose, we estimate an OLS regression model that predicts the share of a topic for each document, depending on the issuing party, the year of the press release and any mention of the AfD. The full models are included in the appendix. Figure 6.6 merely shows the estimated effect of mentions of the AfD in the text for all topics discussed in the previous section.

Notably, mentions of the AfD have a significant and positive effect on the prevalence of all migration and democracy topics except the civil society topic (topic 46). This effect is most sizable for the dangers to democracy topic (topic 31). However, the effect is also substantively relevant (and larger than many of the differences between parties) for the other democracy and for the immigration topics. For criticism, we do not find an increasing emphasis in responding to the AfD: Topic 67, which relates to political style, is

the only one that is emphasized significantly more. In contrast, for the other topics we find an insignificant or – for the scandalizing topic (43) – even a significant negative effect.



Figure 6.7: Prevalence of topics prevalence for each party depending on mentioning of AfD

The effects for the democracy topics are particularly interesting since we found limited evidence of a defensive reaction to the AfD in the previous section, given the prevalence of these topics generally decreased since the emergence of the AfD, as well as with its gains in the polls. We shall delve further into this finding by considering how this effect varies across parties. For this, Figure 6.7 shows the marginal effects of linear regression models that include an interaction between the party and mentions of the AfD for the two democracy topics, while controlling for year as in the previous model. The large confidence intervals, especially for CDU and CSU, are a reminder of the small number of

press releases that mention the AfD for these parties. Hence, we shall consider the values a characterization of the few press releases under consideration in relation to the general corpus, rather than a characterization of the party's discourse in general or a causal effect.

Still, we can observe an interesting pattern. The effect is clearest for topic 31 that is strongly emphasized by the three left parties (the Greens, the Left and the SPD) in the press releases that mention the AfD. The interaction effect is smaller but also significant for the more accommodative democratic conflict topics (topic 33), this time also for the CDU. Hence, in their defensive reaction, the other parties notably emphasize concerns about democracy, both by portraying the AfD as a danger to democracy and by emphasizing the need for a democratic resolution of conflicts between different views. We also observe a stronger increase on the immigration topics. However, the models by party that are included in Figure A6.5 respectively Tables A6.13 to A6.15 in the appendix show that this effect primarily stems from the left party – who uses it to promote a humanitarian framing of the immigration issue – and the CSU, who emphasizes law-and-order politics in their response. While of course the number of press releases that mention the AfD is very low, this provides evidence that parties also rely on the discrediting logic in selecting the issues they emphasize.

## Conclusion

Overall, we can summarize that German parties reacted differently on the two issues under consideration: The rise of the AfD initially went along with a rising salience of immigration for several of the parties, even before the start of the refugee crisis. However, parties framed their response in different terms than the AfD. While the CSU emphasized law and order in their response, the greens and the left party promoted a more humanitarian framing. For the left party and the CSU, this is also visible in those press releases where they explicitly address the AfD. In contrast, there is no such increase for democracy topics. Even though democracy played an important role in the way how (left) parties spoke about the AfD in their press releases, the salience of democracy issues actually decreased with the emergence of the AfD. Similarly, other parties did not respond to the AfD's emphasis on criticism of the political establishment.

Turning to the larger question what determines parties' issue emphasis strategies in response to challengers, this case study can only make some first suggestions. It highlights the importance of studying established parties' responses in a multidimensional policy space rather than on a single issue. Furthermore, it suggests that it may be important to distinguish between direct responses to parties' challengers and changes to these parties'

discourse at large. As long as parties choose to downplay their competitor, targeted strategies of discrediting may not lead to notable changes in issue salience. Of course, these findings are based on press releases and may not hold for media coverage where parties can be prompted to address their competitors directly. Given parties' success depends on projecting a unified image (Greene and Haber 2015), parties are likely to de-emphasize highly contentious issues in their press releases. Thus, replicating similar research with media data is an important way to add validity to the results and explore the difference between the logic of benefits and the logic of discrediting further.

Generally, the finding of parties' differential responses to issues adds an important consideration to research that analyzes the relation between political discontent, substantive disagreements and conceptions of democracy among voters. In the German context, many studies have highlighted the importance of all three factors in determining vote decisions (Schmitt-Beck, Deth, and Staudt 2017; Steiner and Landwehr 2018; Landwehr, Faas, and Harms 2017), as well as in the attitudes of candidates (Lewandowsky, Giebler, and Wagner 2016). This chapter suggests we may equally have to think about parties' responses in a multidimensional space.

# 7   Conclusion

The starting point of this thesis was a consideration of the trajectory of political issues. Specifically, we have asked how issues become politicized, both among citizens and within party competition. Throughout this thesis, we have studied this process of politicization based on two issues, namely immigration and democracy. To conclude, this chapter summarizes the findings of each part of the thesis before discussing the systematic differences between both issues. Additionally, the chapter presents an outlook in terms of substantive implications, methodological considerations and future research.

The citizen-centered chapters of this thesis highlight the role of experiences for processes of politicization: Chapter 2 shows the changing impact of (dis)satisfaction with democratic systems on citizens' expectations of democracy over time and highlights the need to improve the quality of democracies, regarding not only their liberal but also their social and participatory aspects. Chapter 3 shows that local experiences of crisis have an important role in determining the political consequences of citizens' attitudes: Experiences of a crisis 'in their backyard' can mobilize citizens and radicalize their policy preferences regarding immigration. While we have not found a conversion of left voters to anti-immigration parties, experiences of crisis seem to increase the electoral availability of citizens who are already sceptical of immigration to radical right parties.

The findings of the party-centered chapters of this thesis are in line with the core ideas of issue competition, namely that parties compete over which issues dominate the political agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007; Carmines and Stimson 1993; Petrocik 1996). Parties' choices regarding the salience of issues are driven by strategic considerations. Rather than changing their positions, parties adapt the emphasis they put on issues, including in times of crisis when pressure is particularly high. This also means parties compete over how issues are framed with right and left parties choosing distinct ways to address the issues of immigration and democracy (see chapter 6). In confirming the importance of the immigration issue and highlighting the relevance of democracy issues, the chapter also adds support to the idea of an increasing diversification of the issue agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007).

For both immigration and democracy, the chapters have also highlighted the role of challenger parties, particularly from the right. With parties at the core of party systems being attached to the structure of competition, it is challengers that drive change. Chapter 6 suggests that established parties may be even more reluctant to engage when the challenge is related to criticism and the way politics works, rather than substantive policy issues. While much of the literature discusses this related to populism as "one of the

main political buzzwords of the 21st century" (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 1), chapter 4 highlights structural characteristics that make parties more likely to emphasize democracy issues or endorse democratic reforms, namely the visibility of a party and its (previous) government participation. While populist parties certainly constitute an important part of this category of parties, it seems crucial to also consider other parties, both regarding their reaction to populists that may amplify the reach of an issue and their potential own contribution to the politicization of these issues.

## Immigration, democracy and the logic of politicization

In terms of a comparison of the two issues, the thesis has highlighted some important distinctions. Overall, the papers speak to the contrast between democracy as a valence and immigration as a contested positional issue. This is visible both from the position estimates presented in chapter 4 respectively 5 and the framing difference between the topics (and their usage) in chapter 6. Similarly, citizens in Eastern Europe seem to have high expectations from democracy (chapter 2). In contrast, attitudes towards immigration – which were discussed only for the Hungarian case in chapter 3 – reveal clear partisan divides and are connected to worries rather than positive expectations.

We also find two different logics of politicization: The comparison of the patterns of variation in parties' emphasis and positions on democracy and immigration issues in Table 4.1 in chapter 4 also shows that while the salience of democracy mostly varies at the country level, the salience of immigration varies primarily across parties. This pattern is similar for positions, although the share of variation at the country level for positions on the democracy issue is far smaller.

Additionally, in the chapters that zoom in to the monthly level, we indeed find that events like the immigration crisis primarily affect the salience of the immigration issue while their effect on party positions is more limited. Similarly, changes in the attitudes of citizens studied in chapter 3 on the refugee crisis in Hungary seem to be primarily connected to their political mobilization and their policy attitudes - in the terms of Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004), we see a galvanizing of right-wing supporters rather than a mobilization of new voters for the radical right. This is in line with other studies which find that the support for anti-immigration parties in Western Europe stems from the activation of pre-existing opposition to immigration through increased salience rather than the spread of anti-immigration sentiment (Dennison and Geddes 2019). Also, these findings are supported by the absence of election-level variation for positions found in the aforementioned analysis in chapter 4: Issue positions seem to be largely independent from

period effects. Taken together, these findings suggest positional change may typically only occur over a longer period, both for parties and citizens.

## Prospects for political competition on immigration and democracy

Regarding its implications, this thesis provides a somewhat comforting answer about the challenges that contemporary democracies are facing in times of increasing worry about populism (*inter alia* Caiani and Graziano 2019; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Kaltwasser 2017): While (right-wing) challengers have definitely left their mark on political competition, the spread of this discourse to mainstream parties – at least in Western Europe – has been limited. While not everything is well – in fact, we see a large amount of mobilization for political reforms and against immigration – the results of this thesis suggest that at least the mobilization with democracy issues follows a sensible pattern: Its importance seems to be driven primarily not by an ideological rejection of liberal democracy but by problem pressure and actual grievances with the performance of democracy.

Nevertheless, the results provide a concerning outlook for the countries of Central-Eastern Europe in particular. In some countries in the region, basic tenets of democracy like the rule of law have been at the core of political competition without a resolution of the pressing problems (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018) that fuel this politicization. Although the close connection between actual problems with the quality of democracy and its politicization shown in chapters 2 and 4 means there is a way forward to addressing these topics, the results also suggest that democracies urgently need to do better and that parties have to prioritize improving the quality of democracy over indicting their opponents on democracy issues.

The way forward is less clear concerning the immigration issue, where the controversial character of the issue and its level of politicization preempts the definition of simple policy solutions. Still, although chapter 3 shows that radical right parties can benefit from mobilizing against refugees, the chapter also points to the limits of this mobilization. Specifically, this mobilization is restricted to a core electorate, even in the context of a high politicization and widespread restrictive attitudes towards immigration as present in Hungary. In a similar vein, chapter 5 shows the limits of conflict on the issue by highlighting the bounded nature of positional change among parties and the decreasing salience of the issue after the crisis. Chapter 6 furthermore shows how parties can mitigate pressure by choosing alternative frames. They do not have to respond to radical right challengers on the home turf of these challengers, rather, they may address the issues

promoted by challengers in their own words and highlight their own competence in handling the situation.

## Methodological considerations

Methodologically, this thesis has brought together different approaches to the study of political competition. Hence, summarizing the work of this thesis also provides an opportunity to reflect on the specific advantages and challenges of these different approaches. While chapter 4 is based on hand-coded party positions during election campaigns, chapters 5 and 6 move beyond this by analyzing party press releases on a monthly level through quantitative text analysis. Using text analytical approaches made it possible to work with a large amount of text and analyze the impact of external factors like refugee numbers or pressure by other parties on these texts. Particularly chapter 5 shows how thousands of press releases can be leveraged to obtain valid measurements of parties' issue emphasis in an efficient way.

However, regarding the measurement of party positions, chapter 5 has also shown the limits of text as data approaches: Ultimately, automated approaches to position measures are far more sensitive to word choice than qualitative analysis or quantitative hand-coding. This makes it difficult to distinguish positional shifts from changes in framing. While the topic model based approach in chapter 6 addresses the problem of issue framing to some extent, it moves away from the conventional quantitative measurement of positions. Here, the split-sample approach was particularly useful as it allowed a combination a completely unsupervised clustering of topics with the theory-driven selection of a model.

For either approach, validation remains a problem: While the mixed membership assumption behind topic models comes closer to the reality of political texts and is potentially better equipped to replicate traditional hand-coding, it makes human validation extremely difficult. In contrast to classification approaches that classify a document as pertaining to a topic or not, it is much more difficult to judge to which extent a document belongs to a topic. Additionally, while this approach approximates sentence-based hand-coding, it is difficult to disregard non-policy-related statements as usually done in hand-coding. Thus, salience measures are not directly comparable, unless they are replicated on the same data. Here, the validation with the previously developed dictionary can only provide a first step towards improving comparability.

Moreover, as techniques for the *quantification* of political text, the analysis employed in all chapters returns patterns of word use rather than individual examples. Drawing inferences from large amounts of text necessarily involves a trade-off between breadth and depth.

This holds especially for domains where aggregate analysis may fail to capture the meaning humans associate with topics like democracy or immigration that are culturally loaded. By analyzing words as individual features, rather than in their context, the analysis disengages from these structures of meaning. Even though I have partially tried to recover these meanings in discussing text examples for the individual topics in chapter 6, aggregate analysis fails to contextualize responses with the events they relate to.

Speaking more generally, studying competition on democracy provided a particular challenge, given the substantive content of the issue is less well defined. This makes deductive and theory-driven approaches like the formulation of a dictionary extremely difficult, leaving either exploratory quantitative work as provided in chapter 6 or inductive qualitative research that comes with its own challenges. This suggests a way forward in the study of the politicization of democracy may be a mixed methodology: Ideally, document-discovery based on topic models can inform the application of other methods, including the qualitative analysis of the pertaining documents. On the quantitative side, a more precise quantitative estimation of positions may come from supervised classification (Burscher, Vliegenthart, and Vreese 2015; Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2008; Wiedemann 2018), semi-supervised topic models (Gallagher et al. 2017) and computer-aided dictionary creation (Watanabe 2016) for specific aspects of the democracy issue.

## Further avenues for research

There are several avenues in this dissertation that provide room for future inquiries. Regarding the politicization of democracy, this thesis was concerned with an exploratory mapping of conflicts that opens up a range of new questions regarding the dynamics and development of this politicization. As reflected by the growing research into conflicts around democratic systems, this field is still at its beginning. In particular, most evidence is still concentrated on populist and extreme parties (see also Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2017, 355). For further research, it is important to explore the connection between parties' discourses on democracy and citizens' awareness of and attitudes towards the issue: While there is some evidence that populist and extreme messages affect political trust, satisfaction and cynicism (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Rooduijn, Brug, and Lange 2016; Rooduijn et al. 2017), chapter 4 has shown that mobilization with democracy issues reaches beyond peripheral parties. Thus, the scope of research on the connection between citizens and parties should be broadened to other party families.

Similarly, there is a need for a wider application of the approaches used in this thesis to the study of democracy: While chapter 6 has shown the general usefulness of an approach

based on political discourse, an application to countries where conceptions of democracy are more controversial – e.g. Hungary, Poland and Romania which were highlighted in chapter 4 – is a promising next step. Building on the high salience of democracy in these countries (see chapter 4), it seems crucial to explore to which extent parties heed the distinction between criticism of political authorities and the political regime in their mobilization. In this context, new approaches to measurement including those outlined in the previous section may be fruitfully applied.

More generally, monthly measurements of issue salience and party positions allow more detailed inquiries into the mechanisms that are often assumed in research on the party system agenda and contagion across party lines. While contagion is most frequently investigated for immigration (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Spanje 2010) or the environment (Spoon Jae-Jae, Hobolt Sara, and Vries Catherine 2014; Carter 2013), a more narrow time span allows to study the process regarding more specific topics and ideas (similar to analyses of text re-use: Grimmer 2010; Wilkerson, Smith, and Stramp 2015). Additionally, while chapters 5 and 6 were primarily concerned with interactions among parties, measures of party positions at a monthly- or quarterly level also link to a range of research questions regarding parties' agenda-setting capacity and their responsiveness to voter preferences (Stimson 2004; Caughey and Warshaw 2018; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Klüver and Spoon 2016; Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu 2019).

Finally, for both immigration and democracy, this thesis highlights the importance of further research into the measurement of issue-specific party positions (see also Ruedin and Morales 2017 on immigration; Nanni et al. 2018 on euroscepticism). This is substantively important with the unbundling of parties' positions on aggregate issue dimensions through the rise of issue competition. However, it also provides a methodological challenge as it requires developing new approaches to the automated issue-specific measurement of policy positions. While this thesis has explored two different approaches - namely a focus on issue framing using structural topic models (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2013) and a combination of keyness-based feature selection with scaling methods (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) - there is room for the development of better feature selection strategies, that is, strategies to determine which words convey meaningful political positions.

# References

Abăseacă, Raluca, and Geoffrey Pleyers. 2019. "The Reconfiguration of Social Movements in Post-2011 Romania." *Social Movement Studies* 18 (2): 154–70.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2016. "Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 417–36.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2019. "Parties' Policy Adjustments in Response to Changes in Issue Saliency." *West European Politics*, June.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Marc Helbling. 2018. "How Immigration Reforms Affect Voting Behavior." *Political Studies* 66 (3): 687–717.

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Werner Krause. 2018. "The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties' Policy Positions: A Regression Discontinuity Approach." *British Journal of Political Science*, June, 1–19.

Akkerman, Tjitske. 2012. "Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010)." *West European Politics* 35 (3): 511–29.

———. 2015. "Immigration Policy and Electoral Competition in Western Europe: A Fine-Grained Analysis of Party Positions over the Past Two Decades." *Party Politics* 21 (1): 54–67.

Allen, Nicholas, and Sarah Birch. 2015. "Process Preferences and British Public Opinion: Citizens' Judgements About Government in an Era of Anti-Politics." *Political Studies* 63 (2): 390–411.

Allport, Gordon Willard. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

Alonso, Sonia. 2016. "What Type of Commitment Lies Behind the Importance of Living in a Democracy." In *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Monica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi, 130–51. Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Alonso, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2012. "Immigration, Left and Right." *Party Politics* 18 (6): 865–84.

Angelusz, Róbert, and Róbert Tardos. 2011. "Régi és új Törésvonalak, Polarizáció, Divergenciaspirál." In *Részvétel, Képviselet, Politikai Változás*, edited by Róbert Tardos,

Zsolt Enyedi, and Andrea Szabó, 347–82. Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. 1994. "Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58 (3): 335–57.

Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen Bond. 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations." *The Review of Economic Studies* 58 (2): 277–97.

Armingeon, Klaus, and Kai Guthmann. 2014. "Democracy in Crisis? The Declining Support for National Democracy in European Countries, 2007-2011: Democracy in Crisis?" *European Journal of Political Research* 53 (3): 423–42.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2015. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?" *West European Politics* 38 (3): 535–56.

Auer, Andreas, and Michael Bützer, eds. 2001. *Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience.* Ashgate.

Backer, Susann. 2000. "Right-Wing Extremism in Unified Germany." In *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, edited by Paul Hainsworth, 87–120. Pinter.

Bail, Christopher A. 2008. "The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 73 (1): 37–59.

Bale, Tim. 2003. "Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems." *West European Politics* 26 (3): 67–90.

Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. 2010. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe." *Political Studies* 58 (3): 410–26.

Bansak, Kirk, Jeremy Ferwerda, Jens Hainmueller, Andrea Dillon, Dominik Hangartner, Duncan Lawrence, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2018. "Improving Refugee Integration Through Data-Driven Algorithmic Assignment." *Science* 359 (6373): 325–29.

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985.* Cambridge University Press.

Batory, Agnes. 2010. "Kin-State Identity in the European Context: Citizenship, Nationalism and Constitutionalism in Hungary." *Nations and Nationalism* 16 (1): 31–48.

———. 2016. "Populists in Government? Hungary's 'System of National Cooperation'." *Democratization* 23 (2): 283–303.

Beissinger, Mark R., and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2014. "And End to 'Patience'? The Great Recession and Economic Protest in Eastern Europe." In *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*, edited by Nancy Bermeo and Larry Bartels, 334–70. Oxford University Press.

Benoit, Kenneth, Kohei Watanabe, Haiyan Wang, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Stefan Müller, and Akitaka Matsuo. 2018. "Quanteda: An R Package for the Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data." *Journal of Open Source Software* 3 (30): 774.

Berbuir, Nicole, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri. 2015. "The AfD and its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?" *German Politics* 24 (2): 154–78.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. "On Democratic Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy* 27 (1): 5–19.

Bermeo, Nancy, and Larry Bartels. 2014. *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession.* Oxford University Press.

Bernáth, Gábor, and Vera Messing. 2016. *Infiltration of Political Meaning-Production: Security Threat or Humaniatarian Crisis? The Coverage of the Refugee "Crisis" in the Austrian and Hungarian Media in Early Autumn 2015.* Center for Media, Data; Society, Central European University.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe.* Springer.

———. 2002. "Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, edited by Yves Meny and Yves Surel, 197–213. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Bischof, Jonathan M., and Edoardo M. Airoldi. 2012. "Summarizing Topical Content with Word Frequency and Exclusivity." In *Proceedings of the 29th International Coference on International Conference on Machine Learning*, 9–16. ICML'12. Omnipress.

Bocskor, Ákos. 2018. "Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary During the 'Crisis' Year: The Orbán Government's 'National Consultation'Campaign of 2015." *Sociology* 52 (3): 551–68.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Claes H. de Vreese. 2007. "Dramatic Real-World Events and

Public Opinion Dynamics: Media Coverage and Its Impact on Public Reactions to an Assassination." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 19 (3): 354–66.

Borbáth, Endre. 2019. "Romania – Polity Contestation and the Resilience of Mainstream Parties." In *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis*, edited by Swen Hutter and HanspeterEditors Kriesi, 1st ed., 214–35. Cambridge University Press.

Bornschier, Simon. 2018. "Globalization, Cleavages, and the Radical Right." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, edited by Jens Rydgren, 32. Oxford University Press.

———. 2010. "The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 33 (3): 419–44.

———. 2012. "Why a Right-Wing Populist Party Emerged in France but Not in Germany: Cleavages and Actors in the Formation of a New Cultural Divide." *European Political Science Review* 4 (01): 121–45.

Bosswick, Wolfgang. 2000. "Development of Asylum Policy in Germany." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13 (1): 43–60.

Brancati, Dawn. 2016. *Democracy Protests.* Cambridge University Press.

Bratti, Massimiliano, Claudio Deiana, Enkelejda Havari, Gianluca Mazzarella, and Elena Claudia Meroni. 2017. "What Are You Voting for? Proximity to Refugee Reception Centres and Voting in the 2016 Italian Constitutional Referendum," IZA discussion paper,.

Bremer, Björn, and Julia Schulte-Cloos. 2019. "Restructuring British and German Party Politics in Times of Crises." In *European Party Politics in Times of Crises*, edited by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brunkert, Lennart, Stefan Kruse, and Christian Welzel. 2019. "A Tale of Culture-Bound Regime Evolution: The Centennial Democratic Trend and Its Recent Reversal." *Democratization* 26 (3): 422–43.

Bull, Martin, and Gianfranco Pasquino. 2007. "A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy." *West European Politics* 30 (4): 670–91.

Burscher, Bjorn, Rens Vliegenthart, and Claes H. De Vreese. 2015. "Using Supervised Machine Learning to Code Policy Issues: Can Classifiers Generalize Across Contexts?" *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 659 (1): 122–31.

Bustikova, Lenka. 2017. "The Radical Right in Eastern Europe." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, edited by Jens Rydgren. Oxford University Press.

Caiani, Manuela, and Paolo Graziano. 2019. "Understanding Varieties of Populism in Times of Crises." *West European Politics* 0 (0): 1–18.

Camacho, Luis A. 2019. "Understanding Support for Democracy in New and Old Democracies in the Americas: The Role of Democratic Experience." *Democratization* 0 (0): 1–23.

Carmines, Edward G., and James Stimson. 1993. "On the Evolution of Political Issues." In *Agenda Formation*, edited by William H.Editor Riker. University of Michigan Press.

Carter, Neil. 2013. "Greening the Mainstream: Party Politics and the Environment." *Environmental Politics* 22 (1): 73–94.

Caughey, Devin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. "Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014." *American Political Science Review* 112 (2): 249–66.

Chykina, Volha, and Charles Crabtree. 2018. "Using Google Trends to Measure Issue Salience for Hard-to-Survey Populations." *Socius* 4 (January).

Cianetti, Licia, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley. 2018. "Rethinking 'Democratic Backsliding' in Central and Eastern Europe – Looking Beyond Hungary and Poland." *East European Politics* 34 (3): 243–56.

Cleen, Benjamin de. 2017. "Populism and Nationalism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by CCristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. Oxford University Press.

Curini, Luigi. 2018. "Political Corruption and Valence Issues." In *Corruption, Ideology, and Populism*, 1–28. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-56735-8_1.

Czymara, Christian S., and Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran. 2017. "Refugees Unwelcome? Changes in the Public Acceptance of Immigrants and Refugees in Germany in the Course of Europe's 'Immigration Crisis'." *European Sociological Review* 33 (6): 735–51.

d'Agostino, Ralph B. 1998. "Propensity Score Methods for Bias Reduction in the Comparison of a Treatment to a Non-Randomized Control Group." *Statistics in Medicine* 17 (19): 2265–81.

Dahlberg, Stefan, and Jonas Linde. 2018. "Socialization or Experience? Institutional Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy Among Emigrants in Different Institutional Settings." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1389–93.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1990. *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe.* Transaction Publishers.

———. 1997. *After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society.* St. Antony's Series. Macmillan.

Dalton, Russell J., Doh Chull Shin, and Willy Jou. 2007. *Popular Conceptions of the Meaning of Democracy: Democratic Understanding in Unlikely Places.* CSD Working Papers. Center for the Study of Democracy.

Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel, eds. 2014. *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens.* Cambridge University Press.

Dawson, James, and Seán Hanley. 2016. "What's Wrong with East-Central Europe? The Fading Mirage of the 'Liberal Consensus'." *Journal of Democracy* 27 (1): 20–34.

Decker, Frank. 2016. "The 'Alternative for Germany:' Factors Behind Its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-Wing Populist Party." *German Politics and Society* 34 (2): 1–16.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2013. "Full and Partial Cleavages." In *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, edited by Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, Kevin Deegan-Krause, and TerjeEditors Knutsen, Third edition, 35–50. Edward Elgar Pub.

Dennison, James, and Andrew Geddes. 2019. "A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe." *The Political Quarterly* 90 (1): 107–16.

De Vries, Catherine. 2018. *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration.* New product edition. Oxford University Press.

De Vries, Catherine, Armen Hakhverdian, and Bram Lancee. 2013. "The Dynamics of Voters' Left/Right Identification: The Role of Economic and Cultural Attitudes." *Political Science Research and Methods* 1 (2): 223–38.

De Vries, Catherine, and Sara Hobolt. 2012. "When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs." *European Union Politics* 13 (2): 246–68.

De Wilde, Pieter. 2011. "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration." *Journal of European Integration* 33 (5): 559–75.

De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn. 2012. "Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50 (March): 137–53.

Dimitrova, Antoaneta L. 2018. "The Uncertain Road to Sustainable Democracy: Elite Coalitions, Citizen Protests and the Prospects of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *East European Politics* 34 (3): 257–75.

Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Geoffrey Pridham. 2004. "International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits." *Democratization* 11 (5): 91–112.

Dinas, Elias, Konstantinos Matakos, Dimitrios Xefteris, and Dominik Hangartner. 2019. "Waking up the Golden Dawn: Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Increase Support for Extreme-Right Parties?" *Political Analysis* 27 (2): 244–54.

Dolezal, Martin. 2008. "The Design of the Study: The Distinguishing Characteristics of Our Approach." In *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey, 53–73. Cambridge University Press.

Dolezal, Martin, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest. 2012. "Exploring the New Cleavage Across Arenas and Public Debates: Design and Methods." In *Political Conflict in Western Europe*, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Hoeglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest, 36–66. Cambridge University Press.

Dunleavy, Patrick, and Helen Margetts. 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform." *International Political Science Review* 16 (1): 9–29.

Dustmann, Christian, Kristine Vasiljeva, and Anna Piil Damm. 2018. "Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes." *The Review of Economic Studies.*

Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* Wiley.

———. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (04): 435.

Egami, Naoki, Christian J Fong, Justin Grimmer, Margaret E Roberts, and Brandon M Stewart. n.d. "How to Make Causal Inferences Using Texts," 68.

Ekman, Joakim, and Jonas Linde. 2005. "Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 21 (3): 354–74.

Emanuele, Vincenzo, and Alessandro Chiaramonte. 2016. "A Growing Impact of New Parties: Myth or Reality? Party System Innovation in Western Europe After 1945." *Party Politics*, November.

Engler, Sarah. 2016. "Corruption and Electoral Support for New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe." *West European Politics* 39 (2): 278–304.

———. 2017. "The Survival of Centrist Anti-Establishment Parties After Their Initial

Breakthrough." In *Paper Presented at the Ecpr General Conference.*

Enos, Ryan D. 2014. "Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 201317670.

Enyedi, Zsolt, Zoltán Fábián, and Endre Sik. 2005. "Is Prejudice Growing in Hungary." *Budapest: TÁRKI, Social Report Reprint Series* 21.

Esses, Victoria M, Leah K Hamilton, and Danielle Gaucher. 2017. "The Global Refugee Crisis: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications for Improving Public Attitudes and Facilitating Refugee Resettlement." *Social Issues and Policy Review* 11 (1): 78–123.

European Commission. 2016. *Eurobarometer.* GESIS Data Archive.

———. 2018. *Public Opinion in the European Union Report.*

Fennema, Wouter Van Der Brug & Meindert. 2003. "Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 19991." *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1): 55–76.

Ferrín, Monica, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. 2016. *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy.* Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Fitzgerald, Jennifer, and Duncan Lawrence. 2011. "Local Cohesion and Radical Right Support: The Case of the Swiss People's Party." *Electoral Studies* 30 (4): 834–47.

Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. 2016. "The Democratic Disconnect." *Journal of Democracy* 27 (3): 5–17.

FORS, ZDA. 2018. *VOTO - Surveys on the Swiss Popular Votes, 2016 - 2018.* FORS - Centre of expertise in the social sciences, Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau (ZDA), University of Zurich. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne.

Freedom House. 2019. *Freedom in the World 2019.* Freedom House. https://freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf.

Fuchs, Dieter, and Edeltraud Roller. 2006. "Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *International Journal of Sociology* 36 (3): 70–96.

Gallagher, Ryan J., Kyle Reing, David Kale, and Greg Ver Steeg. 2017. "Anchored Correlation Explanation: Topic Modeling with Minimal Domain Knowledge." *Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics* 5 (December): 529–42.

Geers, Sabine, and Linda Bos. 2017. "Priming Issues, Party Visibility, and Party Evaluations: The Impact on Vote Switching." *Political Communication* 34 (3): 344–66.

Gessler, Theresa. 2017. "Invalid but Not Inconsequential? The 2016 Hungarian Migrant Quota Referendum." *East European Quarterly. Direct Democracy Notes.* 45 (1–2): 85–97.

Gessler, Theresa, and Swen Hutter. 2019. "Party Manifestos and Mass-Mediated Public Debates in Turbulent Times." In *Paper Draft for Manifesto User Conference.*

Gessler, Theresa, and Anna Kyriazi. 2019. "A 'Hungarian Crisis' or 'the Crisis in Hungary?'" In *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis*, edited by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge University Press.

Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises.* Cornell University Press.

Grande, Edgar, Tobias Schwarzbözl, and Matthias Fatke. 2018. "Politicizing Immigration in Western Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–20.

Granka, Laura. 2013. "Using Online Search Traffic to Predict Us Presidential Elections." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46 (2): 271–79.

Greene, Derek, and James P. Cross. 2017. "Exploring the Political Agenda of the European Parliament Using a Dynamic Topic Modeling Approach." *Political Analysis* 25 (1): 77–94.

Greene, Zachary David, and Matthias Haber. 2015. "The Consequences of Appearing Divided: An Analysis of Party Evaluations and Vote Choice." *Electoral Studies* 37 (March): 15–27.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2007. "The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe." *Political Studies* 55 (3): 607–28.

———. 2012. "A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration." *Political Studies* 60 (1): 115–30.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Jesper Krogstrup. 2008. "Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden." *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (5): 610–34.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010. "Who Sets the Agenda and Who Responds to It in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda-Setting." *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (2): 257–81.

———. 2015. "Avoidance and Engagement: Issue Competition in Multiparty Systems." *Political Studies* 63 (4): 747–64.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Simon Otjes. 2017. "A Hot Topic? Immigration on the Agenda in Western Europe." *Party Politics*, August.

Greskovits, Béla. 2015. "The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe." *Global Policy* 6: 28–37.

———. 1998. *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience.* Central European University Press.

Greussing, Esther, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2017. "Shifting the Refugee Narrative? An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe's 2015 Refugee Crisis." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43 (11): 1749–74.

Grimmer, Justin. 2010. "A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed Agendas in Senate Press Releases." *Political Analysis* 18 (1): 1–35.

Grzymalała-Busse, Anna, and Abby Innes. 2003. "Great Expectations: The Eu and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 17 (1): 64–73.

Haerpfer, Christian, and Kseniya Kizilova. 2014. "Support for Democracy in Postcommunist Europe and Post-Soviet Eurasia." In *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, 158–83. Cambridge University Press.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 225–49.

Halmai, Gábor. 2017. "From a Pariah to a Model? Hungary's Rise as an Illiberal Member State of the Eu." In *European Yearbook on Human Rights*, edited by Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias C. Kettemann, Reinhard Klaushofer, Karin Lukas, and Manfred Nowak. NWV.

Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris. 2018. "Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?" *American Political Science Review*, 1–14.

Harmel, Robert, and John D Robertson. 1985. "Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Political Science Review* 6 (4): 501–23.

Harteveld, Eelco, Andrej Kokkonen, and Stefan Dahlberg. 2017. "Adapting to Party Lines: The Effect of Party Affiliation on Attitudes to Immigration." *West European Politics* 40 (6): 1177–97.

Harteveld, Eelco, Joep Schaper, Sarah L. De Lange, and Wouter Van Der Brug. 2018. "Blaming Brussels? The Impact of (News About) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes Towards the Eu and National Politics." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*.

Haughton, Tim, and Kevin Deegan-Krause. 2015. "Hurricane Season: Systems of Instability in Central and East European Party Politics." *East European Politics & Societies* 29 (1): 61–80.

Hernández, Enrique, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. "The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (2): 203–24.

Heyne, Lea. 2019. "The Making of Democratic Citizens: How Regime-Specific Socialization Shapes Europeans' Expectations of Democracy." *Swiss Political Science Review* 25 (1): 40–63.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work.* Cambridge University Press.

Hillard, Dustin, Stephen Purpura, and John Wilkerson. 2008. "Computer-Assisted Topic Classification for Mixed-Methods Social Science Research." *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 4 (4): 31–46.

Hjerm, Mikael. 2001. "Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (1): 37–60.

Hobolt, Sara, and Catherine De Vries. 2015. "Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (9): 1159–85.

Hobolt, Sara, and James Tilley. 2016. "Fleeing the Centre: The Rise of Challenger Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis." *West European Politics* 39 (5): 971–91.

Homola, Jonathan, and Margit Tavits. 2018. "Contact Reduces Immigration-Related Fears for Leftist but Not for Rightist Voters." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (13): 1789–1820.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2017. "Cleavage Theory Meets Europe's Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage." *Journal of European Public Policy* 0 (0): 1–27.

Hooghe, Marc, and Ruth Dassonneville. 2018. "A Spiral of Distrust: A Panel Study on the Relation Between Political Distrust and Protest Voting in Belgium." *Government and Opposition* 53 (1): 104–30.

Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 40–60.

Hopkins, Daniel J., John Sides, and Jack Citrin. 2018. "The Muted Consequences of Correct Information About Immigration." *The Journal of Politics.*

Hug, Simon. 2001. *Altering Party Systems.* Univ. of Michigan Press.

Hutter, Swen, and Theresa Gessler. 2019. "Design, Methods, and Cross-Validation." In *European Party Politics in Times of Crises*, edited by Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutter, Swen, Edgar Grande, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. *Politicising Europe.* Cambridge University Press.

Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2018. "Restructuring the Party Systems in North-Western Europe. Six Countries Compared." *Conference: 2017: Europe's Bumper Year of Elections, Proceedings.*

———, eds. 2019. *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis.* 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.

Hutter, Swen, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Guillem Vidal. 2018. "Old Versus New Politics: The Political Spaces in Southern Europe in Times of Crises." *Party Politics* 24 (1): 10–22.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies.* Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald F. 2016. "How Much Should We Worry?" *Journal of Democracy* 27 (3): 18–23.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2005. "Threatened by Diversity: Why Restrictive Asylum and Immigration Policies Appeal to Western Europeans." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 15 (1): 21–45.

———. 2008. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (1): 3–23.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth, Scott Blinder, and Robert Ford. 2010. "The Anti-Racism Norm in Western European Immigration Politics: Why We Need to Consider It and How to Measure It." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 20 (4): 421–45.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. *News That Matters.* University of Chicago Press.

Jacoby, Wade, and Umut Korkut. 2016. "Vulnerability and Economic Re-Orientation: Rhetoric and in Reality in Hungary's 'Chinese Opening.'" *East European Politics and Societies* 30 (3): 496–518.

Jankowski, Michael, Sebastian H. Schneider, and Markus Tepe. 2019. "To Adapt or to Defend? Comparing Position Shifts Among Bundestag Candidates Between 2013 and

2017." *West European Politics* 0 (0): 1–19.

Jerit, Jennifer. 2008. "Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates." *Political Behavior* 30 (1): 1–24.

Kallius, Annastiina, Daniel Monterescu, and Prem Kumar Rajaram. 2016. "Immobilizing Mobility: Border Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy, and the Politics of the 'Refugee Crisis' in Hungary." *American Ethnologist* 43 (1): 25–37.

Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira. 2017. "Populism and the Question of How to Respond to It." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and PierreEditors Ostiguy. Oxford Handbook of Politics. Oxford University Press.

Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism.* Oxford Handbook of Politics. Oxford University Press.

Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. "Germany, the Vanishing Opposition." In *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, edited by Robert A. Dahl, Underlining edition, 237–59. Yale University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems." *World Politics* 40 (2): 194–234.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Staf Hellemans. 1990. "The Left-Right Semantics and the New Politics Cleavage." *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (2): 210–38.

Klašnja, Marko, and Joshua Tucker. 2013. "The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote: Evidence from Experiments in Sweden and Moldova." *Electoral Studies* 32 (3): 536–43.

Kleinnijenhuis, Jan, and Paul Pennings. 2001. "Measurement of Party Positions on the Basis of Party Programmes, Media Coverage and Voter Perceptions." In *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, edited by Michael Laver. Vol. 162.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2014. "Dissatisfied Democrats. Democratic Maturation in Old and New Democracies." In *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, 116–57. Cambridge University Press.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Dieter Fuchs, Susanne Fuchs, and Jan Zielonka. 2006. "Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Eastern Europe." In *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, 1–22. Routledge.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Dieter Fuchs, and Jan Zielonka. 2006. *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe.* Routledge.

Klüver, Heike, and Iñaki Sagarzazu. 2016. "Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties, Voters and Issue Attention." *West European Politics* 39 (2): 380–98.

Klüver, Heike, and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2016. "Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 633–54.

Koltai, Júlia Anna, and Ildikó Barna. 2019. "Attitude Changes Towards Immigrants in the Turbulent Years of the 'Migrant Crisis' and Anti-Immigrant Campaign in Hungary." *Intersections* 5 (1): 48–70.

Krekó, Péter, and Zsolt Enyedi. 2018. "Orbán's Laboratory of Illiberalism." *Journal of Democracy* 29 (3): 39–51.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Matthias Brunner, and François Lorétan. 2016. *Standardisierte Umfragen VoxIt 1981-2016.* Université de Genève - Faculté Des Sciences de La Société - SdS - Département de Science Politique et Relations Internationales, Universität Zürich - Philosophische Fakultät - Institut Für Politikwissenschaft - IPZ - Lehrstuhl Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, FORS - Centre de Compétences Suisse En Sciences Sociales. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Hoeglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wueest. 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe.* Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey, eds. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization.* Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Grande Edgar, Lachat Romain, Dolezal Martin, Bornschier Simon, and Frey Timotheos. 2006. "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (6): 921–56.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Lachat Romain, Selb Peter, Bornschier Simon, and Helbling Marc. 2005. *Der Aufstieg Der SVP: Acht Kantone Im Vergleich.* Neue Zürcher Zeitung Verlag.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Willem Saris. 2016. "The Structure of the Evaluation of Democracy." In *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Monica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi, 178–205. Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Willem Saris, and Paolo Moncagatta. 2016. "The Structure of Europeans' Views of Democracy: Citizens' Models of Democracy." In *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Monica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi, 64–89. Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Landwehr, Claudia, Thorsten Faas, and Philipp Harms. 2017. "Bröckelt Der Verfahrenskonsens? Einstellungen Zu Politischen Entscheidungen Und Demokratischen Entscheidungsverfahren in Zeiten Des Populismus." *Leviathan* 45 (1): 35–54.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 311–31.

Lazarev, Egor, and Kunaal Sharma. 2017. "Brother or Burden: An Experiment on Reducing Prejudice Toward Syrian Refugees in Turkey." *Political Science Research and Methods* 5 (2): 201–19.

Lefkofridi, Zoe, Markus Wagner, and Johanna E. Willmann. 2014. "Left-Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice Across Ideological Dimensions." *West European Politics* 37 (1): 65–90.

Lehmann, Pola, and Theres Matthieß. 2017. *Nation Und Tradition. Wie Die Alternative Für Deutschland Nach Rechts Rückt.* https://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/publikationen/wzb_mitteilungen/21-24lehmannmatthiesswm156web.pdf.

Lehmann, Pola, and Malisa Zobel. 2018. "Positions and Saliency of Immigration in Party Manifestos: A Novel Dataset Using Crowd Coding." *European Journal of Political Research*, n/a–n/a.

Letki, N. 2004. "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East-Central Europe." *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (4): 665–79.

Levitz, Philip, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2010. "Why No Backsliding? The European Union's Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (4): 457–85.

Lewandowsky, Marcel, Heiko Giebler, and Aiko Wagner. 2016. "Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland. Eine Empirische Einordnung Der Parteien Zur Bundestagswahl 2013 Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Afd." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 57 (2): 247–75.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* JHU Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems

and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.*, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Free Press.

Lowe, Will. 2008. "Understanding Wordscores." *Political Analysis* 16 (4): 356–71.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Marcel Coenders. 2017. "Nationalistic Attitudes and Voting for the Radical Right in Europe." *European Union Politics* 18 (1): 98–118.

Lührmann, Anna, Sirianne Dahlum, Staffan I. Lindberg, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Shreeya Pillai, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Rachel Sigman, and Natalia Stepanova. 2018. *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report.* https://issuu.com/v-dem/docs/v-dem_democracy_report_2018_hr.

Mader, Matthias, and Harald Schoen. 2018. "The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters' Responses in Germany." *West European Politics* 0 (0): 1–24.

Magalhães, Pedro. 2014. "Government Effectiveness and Support for Democracy." *European Journal of Political Research* 53 (1): 77–97.

Mair, Peter. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations.* Oxford University Press.

———. 2001. "The Green Challenge and Political Competition: How Typical Is the German Experience?" *German Politics* 10 (2): 99–116.

Malet, Giorgio, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2019. "Economic Shocks and the Cost of Ruling: Evidence from Italy." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 0 (0): 1–20.

McGann, Anthony J., and Herbert Kitschelt. 2005. "The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ." *Party Politics* 11 (2): 147–71.

Mechkova, Valeriya, Anna Lührmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2017. "How Much Democratic Backsliding?" *Journal of Democracy* 28 (4): 162–69.

Meguid, Bonnie. 2003. "The Critical Role of Non-Proximal Parties in Electoral Competition: Evidence from France." In *Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa, Aug 20, 2003*, 34.

———. 2005. "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 347–59.

Mellon, Jonathan. 2013. "Where and When Can We Use Google Trends to Measure Issue Salience?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46 (2): 280–90.

Messing, Vera, and Bence Ságvári. 2016. "„Ahogy Másokhoz Viszonyulunk, Az Tükrözi Azt, Amilyenek Magunk Vagyunk" a Magyarországi Idegenellenesség Okairól." *SOCIO. HU: Társadalomtudományi Szemle* 2: 17–37.

Meyer, Sarah, and Sieglinde Rosenberger. 2015. "Just a Shadow? The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization of Immigration, 1995–2009." *Politics and Governance* 3 (2): 1–17.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2002. "Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes." *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (1): 5–36.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction.* Very Short Introductions. Oxford University Press.

Muddiman, Ashley, Shannon C. McGregor, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2018. "(Re)Claiming Our Expertise: Parsing Large Text Corpora with Manually Validated and Organic Dictionaries." *Political Communication* 0 (0): 1–13.

Nanni, Federico, Goran Glavaš, Simone Paolo Ponzetto, Sara Tonelli, Nicolò Conti, Ahmet Aker, Alessio Palmero Aprosio, et al. 2018. "Findings from the Hackathon on Understanding Euroscepticism Through the Lens of Textual Data." In *Proceedings of the Lrec 2018 Workshop Parlaclarin: Miyazaki, Japan, Monday 7th May 2018*, 1–8. LREC. https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/44172.

Neblo, Michael A., Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David M. J. Lazer, and Anand E. Sokhey. 2010. "Who Wants to Deliberate—and Why?" *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 566–83.

Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market.* Cambridge University Press.

———. 1999. *Critical Citizens.* Oxford University Press.

Nyíri, Pál. 2003. "Xenophobia in Hungary: A Regional Comparison. Systemic Sources and Possible Solutions." Center for Policy Studies, Central European University.

Odmalm, Pontus, and Tim Bale. 2015. "Immigration into the Mainstream: Conflicting Ideological Streams, Strategic Reasoning and Party Competition." *Acta Politica* 50 (4): 365–78.

Paluck, Elizabeth Levy, Seth Ariel Green, and Don Green. 2018. "The Contact Hypothesis Re-Evaluated." *Behavioural Public Policy.*

Pardos-Prado, Sergi, and Iñaki Sagarzazu. 2019. "Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle." *The Journal of Politics* 81 (2): 441–55.

Pauwels, Teun. 2011. "Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21 (1): 97–119.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 825–50.

Pettigrew, Thomas F., Linda R. Tropp, Ulrich Wagner, and Oliver Christ. 2011. "Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 35 (3): 271–80.

Pirro, Andrea. n.d. "Lo and Behold. Jobbik and the Crafting of a New Hungarian Far Right." In *Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe*, edited by Manuela Caiani and Ondřej Císař. Routledge.

Poguntke, Thomas. 1987. "New Politics and Party Systems: The Emergence of a New Type of Party?" *West European Politics* 10 (1): 76–88.

Polk, Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, et al. 2017. "Explaining the Salience of Anti-Elitism and Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics* 4 (1): 2053168016686915.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2010. "Throwing Out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties After Communism." *World Politics* 62 (02): 221.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua Tucker. 2017. *Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes.* Princeton Studies in Political Behavior. Princeton University Press.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2012. "Post-Communist Legacies and Political Behavior and Attitudes." *Demokratizatsiya* 20 (2): 157–66.

———. 2014. "Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes." *Electoral Studies* 33 (March): 77–89.

Proglio, Gabriele. 2018. "Defragmenting Visual Representations of Border Lampedusa: Intersubjectivity and Memories from the Horn of Africa." In *Border Lampedusa*, 137–51. Springer.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.* Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2017. "(Re)Politicizing Inequalities: Movements, Parties, and Social Citizenship in Chile." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 8 (3): 125–54.

Roberts, Margaret E, Brandon M Stewart, and Edoardo M. Airoldi. 2016. "A Model of Text for Experimentation in the Social Sciences." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 111 (515): 988–1003.

Roberts, Margaret E, Brandon M Stewart, and Dustin Tingley. 2013. "Stm: R Package for Structural Topic Models." *Journal of Statistical Software.*

———. 2016. "Navigating the Local Modes of Big Data: The Case of Topic Models." In *Computational Social Science*, edited by R. Michael Alvarez, 51–97. Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, Margaret E, Brandon M Stewart, Dustin Tingley, Christopher Lucas, Jetson Leder-Luis, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Bethany Albertson, and David G. Rand. 2014. "Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 1064–82.

Rohrschneider, Robert, and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck. 2002. "Trust in Democratic Institutions in Germany: Theory and Evidence Ten Years After Unification." *German Politics* 11 (3): 35–58.

Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield. 2017. "Critical Parties: How Parties Evaluate the Performance of Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science*, February, 1–25.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter van der Brug, Sarah L. de Lange, and Jante Parlevliet. 2017. "Persuasive Populism? Estimating the Effect of Populist Messages on Political Cynicism." *Politics and Governance* 5 (4): 136–45.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter van der Brug, and Sarah L de Lange. 2016. "Expressing or Fuelling Discontent? The Relationship Between Populist Voting and Political Discontent." *Electoral Studies* 43 (September): 32–40.

Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. "Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis." *West European Politics* 34 (6): 1272–83.

Rovny, Jan. 2012. "Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies in Multidimensional Competition." *European Union Politics* 13 (2): 269–92.

Rovny, Jan, and Erica E Edwards. 2012. "Struggle over Dimensionality: Party Competition in Western and Eastern Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 26 (1): 56–74.

Royo, Sebastián. 2014. "Institutional Degeneration and the Economic Crisis in Spain." *American Behavioral Scientist* 58 (12): 1568–91.

Ruedin, Didier. 2013. "Obtaining Party Positions on Immigration in Switzerland: Comparing Different Methods." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19 (1): 84–105.

Ruedin, Didier, and Laura Morales. 2017. "Estimating Party Positions on Immigration: Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Different Methods." *Party Politics*, 1–12.

Runciman, David. 2013. *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present.* Princeton University Press.

Rydgren, Jens. 2008. "Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six West European Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (6): 737–65.

Sadurski, Wojciech. 2004. "Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the Eu Enlargement Upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe." *European Law Journal* 10 (4): 371–401.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis.* 2005 edition. ECPR Press.

Scarrow, Susan E. 2001. "Direct Democracy and Institutional Change: A Comparative Investigation." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (6): 651–65.

———. 1996. "Politicians Against Parties: Anti-Party Arguments as Weapons for Change in Germany." *European Journal of Political Research* 29 (3): 297–317.

———. 1997. "Party Competition and Institutional Change: The Expansion of Direct Democracy in Germany." *Party Politics* 3 (4): 451–72.

Scharpf, Fritz. 1999. *Governing in Europe.* Oxford University Press.

Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1975. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.* Revised edition. Wadsworth Publishing.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2013. "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'Throughput'." *Political Studies* 61 (1): 2–22.

Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger, Jan W van Deth, and Alexander Staudt. 2017. "Die Afd Nach Der Rechtspopulistischen Wende." *Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft* 27 (3): 273–303.

Schulte-Cloos, Julia, and Tobias Rüttenauer. 2018. "A Transformation from Within? Dynamics of Party Activists and the Rise of the German AfD." In *Conference: "2017:*

*Europe's Bumper Year of Election".* Florence, European University Institute.

Schumacher, Gijs, and Kees van Kersbergen. 2016. "Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?" *Party Politics* 22 (3): 300–312.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy* 10.

Sides, John. 2006. "The Origins of Campaign Agendas." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 407–36.

Sikk, Allan. 2012. "Newness as a Winning Formula for New Political Parties." *Party Politics* 18 (4): 465–86.

Siliverstovs, Boriss, and Daniel S. Wochner. 2018. "Google Trends and Reality: Do the Proportions Match?: Appraising the Informational Value of Online Search Behavior: Evidence from Swiss Tourism Regions." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 145 (January): 1–23.

Simonovits, Bori, Aniko Bernat, Blanka Szeitl, Endre Sik, Daniella Boda, Anna Kertesz, and others. 2016. "The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary." *Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute* 155.

Slater, Dan. 2013. "Democratic Careening." *World Politics* 65 (04): 729–63.

Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. 2004. "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities." *The American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 35–49.

Sorrentino, Richard M., and Neil Vidmar. 1974. "Impact of Events: Short- Vs. Long-Term Effects of a Crisis." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 38 (2): 271–79.

Spanje, Joost van. 2010. "Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe." *Party Politics* 16 (5): 563–86.

Spanje, Joost van, and Nan Dirk de Graaf. 2017. "How Established Parties Reduce Other Parties' Electoral Support: The Strategy of Parroting the Pariah." *West European Politics*, no. 0 (June): 1–27.

Spoon, Jae-Jae, and Heike Klüver. 2019. "Party Convergence and Vote Switching: Explaining Mainstream Party Decline Across Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 0 (0).

Spoon Jae-Jae, Hobolt Sara, and Vries Catherine. 2014. "Going Green: Explaining Issue Competition on the Environment." *European Journal of Political Research* 53 (2): 363–80.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1475-6765.12032.

Steiner, Nils D., and Claudia Landwehr. 2018. "Populistische Demokratiekonzeptionen Und Die Wahl Der Afd: Evidenz Aus Einer Panelstudie." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, April, 1–29.

Steinmayr, Andreas. 2016. "Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right:(Unexpected) Results from Austria," IZA discussion paper,.

Stimson, James A. 2004. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics.* Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, Donald E. 1963. "Spatial Models of Party Competition." *The American Political Science Review* 57 (2): 368–77.

Stuart, Elizabeth A, Haiden A Huskamp, Kenneth Duckworth, Jeffrey Simmons, Zirui Song, Michael E Chernew, and Colleen L Barry. 2014. "Using Propensity Scores in Difference-in-Differences Models to Estimate the Effects of a Policy Change." *Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology* 14 (4): 166–82.

Szalai, Andras, and Gabriella Göbl. 2015. *Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary.* CENS Working Papers. Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University. https://cens.ceu.edu/sites/cens.ceu.edu/files/attachment/event/573/szalai-goblmigrationpaper.final.pdf.

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* Yale University Press.

Teti, Andrea, Pamela Abbott, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2019. "Beyond Elections: Perceptions of Democracy in Four Arab Countries." *Democratization* 26 (4): 645–65.

Thesen, Gunnar, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2017. "Priming, Issue Ownership, and Party Support: The Electoral Gains of an Issue-Friendly Media Agenda." *Political Communication* 34 (2): 282–301.

UNHCR. 2018. *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017.* https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html.

Vachudová, Milada Anna. 2005. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism.* Oxford University Press.

Van Der Brug, Wouter, and Joost van Spanje. 2009. "Immigration, Europe and the 'New' Cultural Dimension." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (3): 309–34.

Vertier, Paul, and Max Viskanic. 2018. "Dismantling the 'Jungle': Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France," CESifo working paper,.

Vidra, Zsuzsanna, and Jon Fox. 2014. "Mainstreaming of Racist Anti-Roma Discourses in the Media in Hungary." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 12 (4): 437–55.

Voeten, Erik. 2016. "Are People Really Turning Away from Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy Web Exchange.*

Voicu, Malina, and Edurne Bartolome Peral. 2014. "Support for Democracy and Early Socialization in a Non-Democratic Country: Does the Regime Matter?" *Democratization* 21 (3): 554–73.

Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, and Sven Regel. 2016. "The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (Mrg/Cmp/Marpor). Version 2016b."

Vrânceanu, Alina. 2017. "The Impact of Contextual Factors on Party Responsiveness Regarding Immigration Issues." *Party Politics*, August.

Wagner, Markus. 2012. "Defining and Measuring Niche Parties." *Party Politics* 18 (6): 845–64.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere, and Anke Tresch. 2012. "The Associative Dimension of Issue Ownership." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (4): 771–82.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Anke Tresch, and Jonas Lefevere. 2015. "The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Issue Ownership." *West European Politics* 38 (4): 778–96.

Wardt, Marc van de, Joost Berkhout, and Floris Vermeulen. 2017. "Ecologies of Ideologies: Explaining Party Entry and Exit in West-European Parliaments, 1945–2013." *European Union Politics* 18 (2): 239–59.

Wardt, Marc van de, Catherine De Vries, and Sara Hobolt. 2014. "Exploiting the Cracks: Wedge Issues in Multiparty Competition." *The Journal of Politics* 76 (4): 986–99.

Watanabe, Kohei. 2016. "Computer-Aided Dictionary Making: An Efficient Dictionary Construction Technique for Content Analysis." In *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Advances in Computational Analysis of Political Text*, 7. https://koheiw.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Computer-aided-dictionary-making.pdf.

Welzel, Christian. 2013. *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation.* Cambridge University Press.

Wiedemann, Gregor. 2018. "Proportional Classification Revisited: Automatic Content Analysis of Political Manifestos Using Active Learning." *Social Science Computer Review,*

February, 0894439318758389.

Wilkerson, John, David Smith, and Nicholas Stramp. 2015. "Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures: A Text Reuse Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 943–56.

Zhao, Tuo, Han Liu, Kathryn Roeder, John Lafferty, and Larry Wasserman. n.d. "The Huge Package for High-Dimensional Undirected Graph Estimation in R," 12.

Zürn, Michael. 2016. "Opening up Europe: Next Steps in Politicisation Research." *West European Politics* 39 (1): 164–82.

# Appendix

## Appendix A        Chapter 2

**Additional Regression Tables**

**Expectations (Full model)**

Table A2.1: Expectations (Full models from table 2.1 including controls)

|  | Lib. Dem. | Soc. Just. | Dir. Dem. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.15*** | 3.98*** | -1.16*** |
|  | (10.47) | (5.59) | (-5.15) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.15** | -0.064 | 0.014 |
|  | (2.75) | (-1.12) | (0.50) |
| Interest in politics | 0.47*** | 0.25*** | 0.18*** |
|  | (9.61) | (5.10) | (7.55) |
| Education | 0.43*** | -0.17* | 0.073** |
|  | (6.92) | (-2.49) | (2.70) |
| Years under communism | 0.011 | 0.032** | 0.013* |
|  | (1.18) | (2.81) | (2.49) |
| Age | -0.020** | -0.0069 | -0.0090* |
|  | (-2.97) | (-0.82) | (-2.57) |
| Female | -0.15** | 0.12** | -0.074*** |
|  | (-3.24) | (3.06) | (-3.78) |
| Year of survey | -0.047* | 0.12*** | 0.052*** |
|  | (-2.64) | (5.02) | (5.80) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey | 0.00075* | -0.0011 | -0.00020 |
|  | (2.23) | (-1.96) | (-1.24) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.00025 | 0.0017 | 0.00069 |
|  | (-0.40) | (1.88) | (1.92) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.010** | -0.0066* | -0.0038* |
|  | (-3.47) | (-2.43) | (-2.44) |
| Observations | 48548 | 48548 | 48548 |
| $r^2$ | 0.10 | 0.058 |  |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ |  |  | 0.028 |

**Liberal Democracy**

Table A2.2: Expectations Liberal Democracy Scale

|  | Baseline | Full Model |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.31*** | 5.15*** |
|  | (11.70) | (10.47) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.010 | 0.15** |
|  | (-0.39) | (2.75) |
| Interest in politics | 0.48*** | 0.47*** |
|  | (9.90) | (9.61) |
| Education | 0.43*** | 0.43*** |
|  | (6.79) | (6.92) |
| Years under communism | 0.019* | 0.011 |
|  | (2.46) | (1.18) |
| Age | -0.018* | -0.020** |
|  | (-2.52) | (-2.97) |
| Female | -0.15** | -0.15** |
|  | (-3.14) | (-3.24) |
| Year of survey | -0.065*** | -0.047* |
|  | (-5.00) | (-2.64) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey |  | 0.00075* |
|  |  | (2.23) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.00025 |
|  |  | (-0.40) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.010** |
|  |  | (-3.47) |
| Observations | 48548 | 48548 |
| $r^2$ | 0.097 | 0.10 |

**Social Justice**

Table A2.3: Expectations Social Justice

|  | Baseline | Full Model |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 4.62*** | 3.98*** |
|  | (6.77) | (5.59) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.12*** | -0.064 |
|  | (-4.17) | (-1.12) |
| Interest in politics | 0.24*** | 0.25*** |
|  | (5.14) | (5.10) |
| Education | -0.17* | -0.17* |
|  | (-2.53) | (-2.49) |
| Years under communism | 0.016 | 0.032** |
|  | (1.69) | (2.81) |
| Age | -0.0023 | -0.0069 |
|  | (-0.26) | (-0.82) |
| Female | 0.12** | 0.12** |
|  | (2.95) | (3.06) |
| Year of survey | 0.065** | 0.12*** |
|  | (3.12) | (5.02) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey |  | -0.0011 |
|  |  | (-1.96) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | 0.0017 |
|  |  | (1.88) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.0066* |
|  |  | (-2.43) |
| Observations | 48548 | 48548 |
| $r^2$ | 0.056 | 0.058 |

**Direct Democracy**

Table A2.4: Expectations Direct Democracy

|  | Baseline | Full Model |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | -0.96*** | -1.16*** |
|  | (-5.58) | (-5.15) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.026* | 0.014 |
|  | (-2.05) | (0.50) |
| Interest in politics | 0.18*** | 0.18*** |
|  | (7.52) | (7.55) |
| Education | 0.072** | 0.073** |
|  | (2.63) | (2.70) |
| Years under communism | 0.011** | 0.013* |
|  | (2.61) | (2.49) |
| Age | -0.0069 | -0.0090* |
|  | (-1.89) | (-2.57) |
| Female | -0.075*** | -0.074*** |
|  | (-3.88) | (-3.78) |
| Year of survey | 0.031*** | 0.052*** |
|  | (5.39) | (5.80) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey |  | -0.00020 |
|  |  | (-1.24) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | 0.00069 |
|  |  | (1.92) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.0038* |
|  |  | (-2.44) |
| Observations | 48548 | 48548 |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ | 0.027 | 0.028 |

**Country coverage**

In the analysis presented in the paper we only include countries which were part of at least two different surveys and therefore can be compared over time. Table A2.5 presents this group of countries from which the sample has been drawn:

Table A2.5: Country coverage of the different surveys

|  | PCP Wave 1 | PCP Wave 2 | WVS | ESS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Eastern Europe* |  |  |  |  |
| Bulgaria | X | X | X | X |
| The Czech Republic | X | X |  | X |
| Estonia |  | X |  | X |
| Hungary | X | X | X | X |
| Latvia |  | X |  | X |
| Poland |  | X | X | X |
| Slovenia | X | X | X | X |
| Slovakia | X | X |  | X |
| Former GDR | X | X | X | X |
| Romania |  | X | X |  |
| *Eastern non-EU* |  |  |  |  |
| Russia | X | X | X | X |
| Ukraine | X | X | X | X |

As a robustness check, we replicate all the analysis presented in the paper (except figure 2) only including countries which were part of all surveys. These countries are Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, the Former GDR among current EU member states as well as Russia and Ukraine among non-EU countries. The results carry less statistical power but reinforce our substantive conclusions.

Figure A2.1: Replication of figure 2.1 with the restricted country sample

Table A2.6: Replication of table 2.1 with the restricted country sample

| | Lib. Dem. | Soc. Just. | Dir. Dem. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.20*** | 4.04*** | -0.95*** |
| | (9.09) | (5.31) | (-3.56) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.069 | -0.11 | -0.016 |
| | (1.15) | (-1.60) | (-0.51) |
| Interest in politics | 0.45*** | 0.26*** | 0.15*** |
| | (7.49) | (4.33) | (5.20) |
| Education | 0.44*** | -0.17 | 0.051 |
| | (5.35) | (-1.86) | (1.41) |
| Years under communism | 0.021 | 0.030 | 0.010 |
| | (1.87) | (1.86) | (1.48) |
| Age | -0.026** | -0.00056 | -0.0088 |
| | (-3.04) | (-0.05) | (-1.71) |
| Female | -0.16* | 0.11* | -0.058* |
| | (-2.63) | (2.14) | (-2.21) |
| Year of survey | -0.026 | 0.12*** | 0.051*** |
| | (-1.27) | (3.96) | (4.90) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey | 0.00054 | -0.0016* | -0.000093 |
| | (1.36) | (-2.23) | (-0.53) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.00076 | 0.0020 | 0.0012** |
| | (1.15) | (1.72) | (2.85) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.011*** | -0.0081** | -0.0045** |
| | (-4.01) | (-2.92) | (-2.70) |
| Observations | 29387 | 29387 | 29387 |
| $r^2$ | 0.086 | 0.045 | |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ | | | 0.028 |

A Years lived under communism



B Satisfaction with democracy



Figure A2.2: Replication of figure 2.3 with the restricted country sample

**Replication only covering EU countries**

In the analysis presented in the paper we also include two non-EU countries. As a robustness check, we replicate figures 2.3, the underlying table A2.1 as well as the domain-specific expectations presented in Tables A2.2, A2.3 and A2.4 without Russia and Ukraine.

Table A2.7: Expectations (Full models from table 2.1 including controls) without Russia and Ukraine

|                                                        | Lib. Dem. | Soc. Just. | Dir. Dem. |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| main                                                   |           |            |           |
| Constant                                               | 4.54***   | 3.49***    | -1.46***  |
|                                                        | (8.19)    | (4.31)     | (-5.64)   |
| Satisfaction with Democracy                            | 0.23***   | -0.044     | 0.047     |
|                                                        | (3.90)    | (-0.66)    | (1.64)    |
| Interest in politics                                   | 0.54***   | 0.27***    | 0.19***   |
|                                                        | (9.84)    | (4.47)     | (6.53)    |
| Education                                              | 0.45***   | -0.21*     | 0.078**   |
|                                                        | (6.41)    | (-2.74)    | (2.72)    |
| Years under communism                                  | 0.0067    | 0.043**    | 0.021**   |
|                                                        | (0.57)    | (3.07)     | (3.16)    |
| Age                                                    | -0.013*   | -0.0074    | -0.010*   |
|                                                        | (-2.21)   | (-1.15)    | (-2.57)   |
| Female                                                 | -0.15**   | 0.16***    | -0.089*** |
|                                                        | (-3.29)   | (3.66)     | (-3.93)   |
| Year of survey                                         | -0.040    | 0.15***    | 0.065***  |
|                                                        | (-1.61)   | (4.73)     | (6.37)    |
| Years under communism * Year of survey                 | 0.00066   | -0.0018*   | -0.00045* |
|                                                        | (1.56)    | (-2.57)    | (-2.14)   |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy    | -0.00095  | 0.0017     | 0.00031   |
|                                                        | (-1.19)   | (1.72)     | (0.75)    |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy           | -0.012**  | -0.0070    | -0.0045** |
|                                                        | (-3.30)   | (-1.95)    | (-2.58)   |
| Observations                                           | 36772     | 36772      | 36772     |
| $r^2$                                                  | 0.12      | 0.058      |           |
| Pseudo-$r^2$                                           |           |            | 0.034     |

A Years lived under communism



B Satisfaction with democracy



Figure A2.3: The marginal effect of years lived under communism and satisfaction with democracy on expectations towards democracy in 1990 and 2012 without Russia and Ukraine

Table A2.8: Expectations: Liberal Democracy Scale without Russia and Ukraine

|  | Baseline | Full Model |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 4.99*** | 4.54*** |
|  | (10.43) | (8.19) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.027 | 0.23*** |
|  | (0.94) | (3.90) |
| Interest in politics | 0.54*** | 0.54*** |
|  | (9.92) | (9.84) |
| Education | 0.45*** | 0.45*** |
|  | (6.29) | (6.41) |
| Years under communism | 0.014* | 0.0067 |
|  | (2.09) | (0.57) |
| Age | -0.013* | -0.013* |
|  | (-2.25) | (-2.21) |
| Female | -0.15** | -0.15** |
|  | (-3.13) | (-3.29) |
| Year of survey | -0.068*** | -0.040 |
|  | (-4.60) | (-1.61) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey |  | 0.00066 |
|  |  | (1.56) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.00095 |
|  |  | (-1.19) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy |  | -0.012** |
|  |  | (-3.30) |
| Observations | 36772 | 36772 |
| $r^2$ | 0.11 | 0.12 |

Table A2.9: Expectations Direct Democracy without Russia and Ukraine

| | Baseline | Full Model |
|---|---|---|
| **Expectations: Direct Democracy** | | |
| Constant | -1.03*** | -1.46*** |
| | (-5.24) | (-5.64) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.013 | 0.047 |
| | (-0.88) | (1.64) |
| Interest in politics | 0.19*** | 0.19*** |
| | (6.42) | (6.53) |
| Education | 0.073* | 0.078** |
| | (2.54) | (2.72) |
| Years under communism | 0.012** | 0.021** |
| | (2.75) | (3.16) |
| Age | -0.0080* | -0.010* |
| | (-2.13) | (-2.57) |
| Female | -0.091*** | -0.089*** |
| | (-4.10) | (-3.93) |
| Year of survey | 0.033*** | 0.065*** |
| | (5.18) | (6.37) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey | | -0.00045* |
| | | (-2.14) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy | | 0.00031 |
| | | (0.75) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy | | -0.0045** |
| | | (-2.58) |
| Observations | 36772 | 36772 |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ | 0.032 | 0.034 |

Table A2.10: Expectations: Social Justice Scale without Russia and Ukraine

|                                                      | Baseline  | Full Model |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Constant                                             | 4.55***   | 3.49***    |
|                                                      | (6.32)    | (4.31)     |
| Satisfaction with Democracy                          | -0.10**   | -0.044     |
|                                                      | (-3.15)   | (-0.66)    |
| Interest in politics                                 | 0.26***   | 0.27***    |
|                                                      | (4.43)    | (4.47)     |
| Education                                            | -0.22**   | -0.21*     |
|                                                      | (-2.94)   | (-2.74)    |
| Years under communism                                | 0.012     | 0.043**    |
|                                                      | (1.61)    | (3.07)     |
| Age                                                  | 0.00074   | -0.0074    |
|                                                      | (0.12)    | (-1.15)    |
| Female                                               | 0.15**    | 0.16***    |
|                                                      | (3.50)    | (3.66)     |
| Year of survey                                       | 0.067**   | 0.15***    |
|                                                      | (2.76)    | (4.73)     |
| Years under communism * Year of survey               |           | -0.0018*   |
|                                                      |           | (-2.57)    |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy  |           | 0.0017     |
|                                                      |           | (1.72)     |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy         |           | -0.0070    |
|                                                      |           | (-1.95)    |
| Observations                                         | 36772     | 36772      |
| $r^2$                                                | 0.056     | 0.058      |

## Items in the surveys

To construct the scale of citizens' expectations regarding the three models of democracy we closely follow the procedure set out by Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta (2016). We replicate the three scales they introduce and validate using the 2012 wave of the European Social Survey. Then, we search for comparable items in previous surveys to be able to conduct over time comparisons. Although they have fewer items, the questions in the World Value Survey and in the Post-Communist Publics Study are substantively very similar and follow the same logic in distinguishing expectations from evaluations. The Post-Communist Publics Study repeated the same questions in both waves, making over time comparisons less problematic. The following list presents the items we have used for the different scales.

There were small differences in how the questions were phrased. In the European Social Survey, the question read as follows: *"Now some questions about democracy. Later on I will ask you about how democracy is working in [country]. First, however, I want you to think instead about how important you think different things are for democracy in general. There are no right or wrong answers so please just tell me what you think."* Then the interviewer handed over a card which had the following instruction: *"Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general..."*. The respondents indicated their responses on an 11 points scale, where 0 stood for *"Not at all important for democracy in general"* and 10 stood for *"Extremely important for democracy in general"*.

In the World Value Survey, the interviewer read out all the items with the following introduction: *"Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think is a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy"*.

In the Post-Communist Publics Study the interviewer read the following instruction: *"People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card. For each of them, please tell me whether, for you, it has a lot, something, not much, or, nothing to do with democracy."* Here, respondents relied on a four point scale where 1 implied that they thought the specific aspect had *"a lot"* to do with democracy and 4 implied that the specific aspect had *"nothing"* to do with democracy, with *"something"* and *"not much"* in between.

While we are aware of potential biases flowing from differences in phrasing the questions and response scales, we were fortunate to find substantively similar items. Given that -

with the exception of direct democracy - our scales rely on multiple items, differences in the wording of any individual item are less important. Moreover, as we described in the paper, we follow Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta (2016) and instead of modeling the variance across all response categories, we rely on a dichotomous distinction between respondents who give the maximum score and thus consider an item a necessary condition, and all the others. This decision makes comparisons across the scales with differing number of response categories somewhat less problematic. Under conditions of rarity of surveys which distinguish between democratic expectations and evaluations, we tried to find a balance between methodological rigor and comparisons which allow us to test our hypothesis.

**European Social Survey**

Please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general that. . .

- Liberal Democracy
  - the courts treat everyone the same?
  - national elections are free and fair?
  - voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote?
  - different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another?
  - opposition parties are free to criticize the government?
  - the media are free to criticize the government?
  - the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government?
  - the rights of minority groups are protected?
  - the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority?
  - governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job?
  - the government explains its decisions to voters?
  - politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions?
- Social Democracy
  - the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels?
  - the government protects all citizens against poverty?
- Direct Democracy
  - citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?

**World Values Survey**

"Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think is a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy"

- Liberal Democracy
  - civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.
  - women have the same rights as men.
  - people choose their leaders in free elections.
- Social Democracy
  - The economy is prospering.
  - People receive state aid for unemployment.
- Direct Democracy
  - People can change the laws in referendums.

**Consolidation of democracy in CEE (both waves)**

People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card. For each of them, please tell me whether, for you, it has a lot, something, not much, or, nothing to do with democracy.

- Liberal Democracy
  - political liberties e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of association
  - that judges provide equal justice before the law
  - equal rights for women
  - multi-party system
- Social Democracy
  - Greater social equality
  - More jobs, less unemployment
  - That economic conditions improve
- Direct Democracy
  - Citizen's right to participate

Regarding liberal democracy all three surveys included civil rights / political liberties and the importance of free elections / multi-party competition. Similar to the European Social Survey, the Consolidation of Democracy survey asked about equality before the law, an item missing in the World Value Survey. Although it does not feature in the European Social Survey, both the World Value Survey and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe asked about equal rights of women which we include given the European Social Survey asks about the rights for minority groups.

Regarding social justice, all three surveys asked about the extent to which economic conditions are part of respondents' conception of democracy, although the items are somewhat differently phrased. While the European Social Survey phrases the question more broadly regarding government measures to reduce income differences, the World Value Survey and the Post-Communist Publics Study both focus on unemployment. The European Social Survey and the Post-Communist Publics Study also include more general items regarding social equality and differences in income levels. The World Value Survey includes a general item on the extent to which respondents consider a prospering economy important for democracy. We found a similarly phrased item in the Post-Communist Publics Study on the importance of improving economic conditions and decided to include both.

Regarding direct democracy, both the European Social Survey and the World Value Survey include the importance of referendums. The Post-Communist Publics Study does not mention referendums specifically but asks about the importance of citizens' right to participate. While not ideal, we decided to include this item to be able to conduct over time comparisons of expectations towards direct democracy.

**Robustness check - Individual level analysis**

In this part of the appendix, we replicate the individual level analysis only relying on cohorts which were included in all waves of data collection. While in the original sample all respondents who were born between 1899-1998 were included, in this part we only include respondents born between 1909-1979. We discuss the main difference concerning the interaction of years lived under communism and the year of the survey in the paper.

Table A2.11: Replication of table 2.1 with cohorts included in all waves of data collection

| | Lib. Dem. | Soc. Just. | Dir. Dem. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.05*** | 4.10*** | -1.16*** |
| | (9.93) | (5.80) | (-4.99) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.11* | -0.095 | -0.0046 |
| | (2.04) | (-1.67) | (-0.15) |
| Interest in politics | 0.51*** | 0.29*** | 0.21*** |
| | (10.22) | (5.68) | (9.23) |
| Education | 0.43*** | -0.18* | 0.061 |
| | (6.21) | (-2.19) | (1.83) |
| Years under communism | 0.024** | 0.032* | 0.013** |
| | (3.09) | (2.69) | (3.03) |
| Age | -0.030*** | -0.012 | -0.011*** |
| | (-4.56) | (-1.11) | (-3.64) |
| Female | -0.14** | 0.16*** | -0.067** |
| | (-2.78) | (3.71) | (-3.00) |
| Year of survey | -0.020 | 0.13*** | 0.059*** |
| | (-1.07) | (4.75) | (6.76) |
| Years under communism * Year of survey | 0.00021 | -0.0011* | -0.00032* |
| | (0.75) | (-2.42) | (-2.35) |
| Years under communism * Satisfaction with Democracy | 0.00074 | 0.0026** | 0.0012** |
| | (1.26) | (2.71) | (3.14) |
| Year of survey * Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.0098** | -0.0068* | -0.0039* |
| | (-3.50) | (-2.55) | (-2.57) |
| Observations | 41716 | 41716 | 41716 |
| $r^2$ | 0.10 | 0.060 | |
| Pseudo-$r^2$ | | | 0.033 |

A Years lived under communism



B Satisfaction with democracy



Figure A2.4: Replication of figure 2.3 with cohorts included in all studies

## Additional Figures

A Conceptions of democracy



B Evaluations of democracy



Figure A2.5:  Conceptions and evaluations of democracy based on the 2012 wave of the European Social Survey

Figure A2.6: The share of those who are satisfied with democracy in Eastern European countries relative to the North-Western European average

Note: The data comes from the Eurobarometer surveys, which were complemented with the PCP, WVS and the ESS for the values in Russia and Ukraine.

## Appendix B                    Chapter 3

Anti-refugee quota referendum votes over eligible voters



Figure A3.1: 2015 anti-refugee resettlement referendum quartile outcomes by settlement
Budapest (in gray) is excluded.

Table A3.1: Summary statistics of Hungarian settlements

|  | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ref. No/Eligible | 3,142 | 0.47 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.41 | 0.52 | 1.00 |
| Fidesz share 2014 | 3,142 | 0.51 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.44 | 0.58 | 1.00 |
| Jobbik share 2014 | 3,142 | 0.24 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 0.61 |
| Treatment | 3,142 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Border < 25km | 3,142 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Pct. Higher Edu. | 3,142 | 7.53 | 5.98 | 0.00 | 3.90 | 9.40 | 58.30 |
| PC Income (1000s HUF) | 3,142 | 845 | 246 | 128 | 669 | 1,006 | 2,226 |
| Pct. Unemployed | 3,142 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.24 |
| Population (log) | 3,142 | 6.56 | 1.32 | 2.30 | 5.65 | 7.35 | 12.01 |
| Mins. to Treatment | 3,140 | 5.67 | 2.94 | 0.00 | 3.44 | 7.74 | 14.31 |

Ref. No/Eligible refers to the key dependent variable in our first models: the ratio of voters voting against the EU refugee resettlement quota to the number of eligible voters in the settlement. Unless otherwise stated, all controls are taken from 2015.

Table A3.2: Translated TARKI survey questions, January 2016.

| Variable in Text | Question |
|---|---|
| No Refugees | Do you believe Hungary should accept every refugee, no refugees at all or some yes and others not? |
| L: Border | Do you agree that the Hungarian border should be strengthened? |
| L: Culture | Do you agree with the introduction of a law requiring immigrants to adhere to fundamental Hungarian cultural norms? |
| L: Money | Do you support increasing funding to refugees and immigrants living in Hungary for the purposes of integration (to facilitate their "new beginning" with residential, educational, and language-learning programs and assistance with finding work)? |
| W: Undoc | Are you worried that in a short period of time, many refugees and immigrants have arrived to Hungary unchecked (without documents)? |
| W: Culture | Are you worried that refugees and immigrants from different cultures and faiths are arriving to Hungary? |
| Precarious econ. situation | How would you rate your current economic situation? |

Table A3.3: Summary statistics of survey respondents, January 2016.

|  | N | Mean | St. Dev. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 772 | 0.14 | 0.34 |
| Border < 25km | 772 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| Highschool Grad. | 772 | 0.30 | 0.46 |
| Precarious Econ. Sit. | 768 | 0.27 | 0.45 |
| Male | 772 | 0.47 | 0.50 |
| Right-wing | 772 | 0.41 | 0.49 |
| Left-wing | 772 | 0.15 | 0.35 |
| Support Fidesz | 772 | 0.30 | 0.46 |
| Support Jobbik | 772 | 0.11 | 0.32 |
| Want to Accept No Refugees | 731 | 0.52 | 0.50 |
| Support Stronger Border | 756 | 0.73 | 0.44 |
| Support Law Protecting HU Culture | 730 | 0.58 | 0.49 |
| Against Money for Refugee Integration | 741 | 0.59 | 0.49 |
| Worry about Undocumented Refugees | 768 | 0.73 | 0.45 |
| Worry about Cultural Differences | 766 | 0.62 | 0.49 |
| Met refugee in prev. 12 months | 769 | 0.22 | 0.41 |
| Know refugee/immigrant personally | 770 | 0.03 | 0.17 |

Table A3.4: Effect of treatment on encountering a refugee

| Dependent variable: respondent encountered refugee in previous 12 months | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | | 1.937*** | 1.928*** | 1.860*** |
| | | (0.224) | (0.230) | (0.236) |
| Respondent knows foreigner | | | 2.684*** | 2.699*** |
| | | | (0.531) | (0.533) |
| Border <25km | | | | 0.365 |
| | | | | (0.293) |
| Constant | −1.282*** | −1.650*** | −1.765*** | −1.796*** |
| | (0.087) | (0.106) | (0.111) | (0.114) |
| Log Likelihood | −402.415 | −364.903 | −347.316 | −346.563 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 806.830 | 733.806 | 700.633 | 701.126 |
| $N$ | 769 | 769 | 768 | 768 |

$^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Logistic regression models predicting whether survey respondent has encountered refugee in previous 12 months (January 2016 Survey). Individuals living settlements exposed to the 2015 refugee crisis are significantly more likely to report encountering a refugee, even when controlling for knowing a foreigner personally or living close to a border.

|  | *Dependent variable:* | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Respondent Right-wing Voter | |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| Treatment |  | 0.068 |
|  |  | (0.236) |
| Border <25km | −0.270 | −0.285 |
|  | (0.265) | (0.270) |
| Highschool graduate | −0.243 | −0.247 |
|  | (0.170) | (0.171) |
| Precarious econ. situation | −0.691*** | −0.691*** |
|  | (0.178) | (0.178) |
| Male | 0.068 | 0.071 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.151) |
| Constant | 0.033 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.213) | (0.215) |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 768 | 768 |
| Log Likelihood | −508.383 | −508.342 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,038.766 | 1,040.683 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table A3.5: Impact of treatment on vote distribution
Logistic regressions checking if survey respondents from treated settlements are more likely to report right-wing voting intentions, with the same individual-level controls as our primary regressions. We include regional fixed-effects.

# Appendix C          Chapter 4

**Multi-level models for country-level determinants**

Table A4.1: Multi-level regression results salience

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| quality of liberal democracy | −7.08*** (2.16) | | | | | | |
| quality of participatory democracy | | −3.63 (2.65) | | | | | |
| government effectiveness | | | −11.95*** (2.00) | | | | |
| corruption | | | | 3.50 (2.68) | | | |
| GDP change | | | | | −1.16 (1.26) | | |
| GDP per capita | | | | | | −5.58** (2.59) | |
| economic misery | | | | | | | 0.06 (1.24) |
| Constant | 21.70*** (2.71) | 22.00*** (3.52) | 21.46*** (2.11) | 21.98*** (3.45) | 22.08*** (4.12) | 21.78*** (3.24) | 22.04*** (4.04) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| Log Likelihood | −1,583.26 | −1,584.55 | −1,577.10 | −1,584.78 | −1,585.47 | −1,583.72 | −1,585.91 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 3,176.52 | 3,179.11 | 3,164.21 | 3,179.56 | 3,180.94 | 3,177.44 | 3,181.82 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 3,196.35 | 3,198.94 | 3,184.04 | 3,199.39 | 3,200.77 | 3,197.28 | 3,201.65 |

*Note:* $^{*}$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01

205

Table A4.2: Multi-level regression results position

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| quality of liberal democracy | 0.09* (0.05) | | | | | | |
| quality of participatory democracy | | 0.12** (0.05) | | | | | |
| government effectiveness | | | 0.07 (0.06) | | | | |
| corruption | | | | 0.03 (0.06) | | | |
| GDP change | | | | | 0.04 (0.03) | | |
| GDP per capita | | | | | | 0.06 (0.06) | |
| economic misery | | | | | | | −0.01 (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.36*** (0.06) | 0.36*** (0.06) | 0.36*** (0.07) | 0.35*** (0.08) | 0.35*** (0.07) | 0.35*** (0.07) | 0.35*** (0.07) |
| Observations | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| Log Likelihood | −125.16 | −124.48 | −125.25 | −125.91 | −125.61 | −125.50 | −126.54 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 260.31 | 258.97 | 260.49 | 261.82 | 261.22 | 261.00 | 263.08 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 276.80 | 275.46 | 276.99 | 278.31 | 277.71 | 277.49 | 279.57 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Replication of Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 for positions**

Table A4.3: Average position on democracy issues

|  | mean | minimum | maximum |
|---|---|---|---|
| **North-Western Europe** | | | |
|  | 0.39 | 0.19 | 0.73 |
| **Southern Europe** | | | |
|  | 0.43 | 0.34 | 0.50 |
| **Central-Eastern Europe** | | | |
|  | 0.32 | -0.27 | 0.71 |

**A**    North–western europe



**B**    Central–eastern europe



**C**    Southern europe



Figure A4.1: Country trends in positions on democracy issues (including North-Western Europe)

**Replication of figure 4.3 with all parties**



Figure A4.2: Average salience of specific democracy issues for all parties

## Distribution of salience and position measures



Figure A4.3: Distribution of salience of democracy issues



Figure A4.4: Distribution of salience of democracy issues



Figure A4.5: Distribution of positions on democracy issues

Figure A4.6: Distribution of positions on democracy issues

**Measure of position by salience**



Figure A4.7: Position by number of statements



Figure A4.8: Comparison of means

Means with confidence interval at 0.95 level.

## Robustness Checks for regressions

Table A4.4: Robustness Checks for Table 4.4 for the salience of democracy only among parties with valid positions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Salience (1-3) | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| visibility | −7.63*** | −7.80*** | −8.29*** |
| | (0.79) | (0.83) | (0.82) |
| opposition | −2.17 | | −1.06 |
| | (1.44) | | (1.43) |
| challenger | | −2.51 | |
| | | (1.58) | |
| center-right | | | 0.20 |
| | | | (1.84) |
| ethnic | | | 0.21 |
| | | | (3.14) |
| left-wing | | | −8.58*** |
| | | | (2.08) |
| right-wing | | | −3.53** |
| | | | (1.78) |
| Constant | 42.89*** | 43.28*** | 48.23*** |
| | (4.61) | (4.67) | (5.07) |
| Observations | 263 | 263 | 263 |
| $R^2$ | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.34 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.33 |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table A4.5: Robustness Checks for Table 4.5 regarding the salience of the political community, regime and authorities

|  | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | Community (1) | Regime (2) | Authorities (3) |
| visibility | −0.98*** | −1.43*** | −0.28 |
|  | (0.35) | (0.46) | (0.46) |
| challenger | −1.61** | 0.01 | 3.18*** |
|  | (0.72) | (0.94) | (0.95) |
| center-right | 0.50 | −0.26 | 1.10 |
|  | (0.91) | (1.19) | (1.20) |
| ethnic | 17.33*** | −4.54** | −6.07*** |
|  | (1.57) | (2.05) | (2.07) |
| left-wing | 0.59 | −2.13* | −4.30*** |
|  | (0.98) | (1.28) | (1.30) |
| right-wing | 1.08 | −0.97 | −1.76 |
|  | (0.89) | (1.16) | (1.18) |
| Constant | 4.01* | 8.15*** | 1.90 |
|  | (2.06) | (2.68) | (2.71) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| $R^2$ | 0.32 | 0.03 | 0.07 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.31 | 0.02 | 0.06 |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

# Appendix D  Chapter 5

**Dictionaries**

**Pauwels (2011)**

marokk*, türk*, allocht*, asyl*, halal*, kopftuch*, illega*, immigr*, islam*, koran, muslim*, ausländ*,

**Ruedin and Morales (2017)**

*toleran*, migrant*, minarett, minderheit*, moschee, islam*, heimatland, jihad*, multikultur*, muslim*, nation*, missbrauch, *heimisch*, assimil*, einbürger*, asylum*, grenze, *genehmigung, burka, rasse, christlich, rassi*, bürger*, radikal, kultur*, flüchtl*, brauch*, religiös, deport*, *zusammenführung, diskrimi*, scharia, vielfalt, ethni*, zuflucht, extremis*, synagoge, ausländ*, terroris*, betrug, tradition*, halal, traumatisier*, kopftuch, unauthorisiert, unterkunft, menschlich*, einigkeit, identität, *schleier, illegal*, western, immigr*, xenophob*, einheimisch*, integrat*, interkulturell*, interrassisch, invasion

**small dictionary**

immigr*, *migrat*, *migrant*, migrier*, *einwander*, zuwander*, zugewander*, eingewander*, *fl?chtling*, asyl*, gefl?cht*, obergrenz*, drittstaat*, sans-papiers, integrationspolit*, integrationsgesetz*, integrationspotenzial*, staatsb?rgerschaft*, *einb?rger*,ausschaff*, ausl?nder*, inl?nder*, ?berfremd*

*Note: * is a wild-card that may replace no, a single or multiple characters. ? is a wildcard that substitutes exactly one character.*

## Classifier Accuracy for Austria, Germany and Switzerland

For all dictionaries we present two results: One including all press releases with a single dictionary match, the other with a minimum threshold of two matches. This should theoretically help in excluding press releases that merely mention migration or migrants in passing without excluding too many short but relevant articles.

For creating the classifier, we need to use a part of our data set as training data. Thus, the classifier is only evaluated on a smaller number of press releases. We evaluate the dictionaries against the full hand-coded sample to get a more precise evaluation, however, results also hold on the smaller test set used to evaluate the SVM classifier.

We evaluate the following identification strategies:

- GH: dictionary developed in this chapter, with threshold (T) and without
- RP: dictionary developed by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), with threshold (T) and without
- RM: dictionary developed by Ruedin and Morales (2017), with threshold (T) and without
- SVM: Support Vector Machine

Table A5.1: Classification Accuracy Germany

|  | GH-T | GH | RP-T | RP | RM-T | RM | SVM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.52 | 0.68 | 0.82 | 0.90 | 0.75 |
| Specificity | 0.98 | 0.90 | 0.92 | 0.84 | 0.66 | 0.41 | 0.96 |
| F1 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.53 | 0.52 | 0.43 | 0.33 | 0.75 |
| Overall Accuracy | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.82 | 0.69 | 0.48 | 0.93 |
| Balanced Accuracy | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 0.74 | 0.66 | 0.86 |

Table A5.2: Classification Accuracy Austria

|  | GH-T | GH | RP-T | RP | RM-T | RM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 0.79 | 0.88 | 0.58 | 0.75 | 0.88 | 0.96 |
| Specificity | 0.96 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.89 | 0.63 | 0.41 |
| F1 | 0.66 | 0.58 | 0.54 | 0.42 | 0.21 | 0.16 |
| Overall Accuracy | 0.95 | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 0.64 | 0.44 |
| Balanced Accuracy | 0.88 | 0.90 | 0.77 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.69 |

Table A5.3: Classification Accuracy Switzerland

|  | **GH-T** | **GH** | **RP-T** | **RP** | **RM-T** | **RM** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.93 | 1.00 |
| Specificity | 0.96 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.82 | 0.35 | 0.11 |
| F1 | 0.79 | 0.65 | 0.61 | 0.42 | 0.23 | 0.19 |
| Overall Accuracy | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 0.81 | 0.41 | 0.20 |
| Balanced Accuracy | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.81 | 0.78 | 0.64 | 0.56 |

**Arellano Bond Tests**

Table A5.4: Arellano-Bond tests for autoregressive lags

| Salience | | | Position | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Order | z | Prob > z | Order | z | Prob > z |
| 1 | -3.3199 | 0.0009 | 1 | -3.4171 | 0.0006 |
| 2 | -1.0164 | 0.3094 | 2 | -1.2251 | 0.2269 |

**Robustness checks for regressions**

Table A5.5: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration including lag for main IV

| | (1) all | (2) AT | (3) DE | (4) CH | (5) center-right | (6) before | (7) during | (8) after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's salience of imm. | 0.16*** | 0.32*** | 0.06 | 0.23*** | 0.10* | 0.22** | 0.15*** | 0.12* |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| RRP's salience of imm. (lag 1), | 0.02 | -0.10** | -0.02 | 0.12** | -0.02 | 0.11** | 0.05 | 0.11** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| center-right | | | | | 0.00 | | | |
| | | | | | (0.03) | | | |
| center-right * RRP's salience of imm. | | | | | 0.14** | | | |
| | | | | | (0.06) | | | |
| center-right * RRP's salience of imm. (lag 1) | | | | | 0.10** | | | |
| | | | | | (0.05) | | | |
| asylum applications (N) | 1.03*** | 0.84* | 1.30*** | 1.06 | 1.09*** | 2.89* | -1.08** | -1.23 |
| | (0.32) | (0.45) | (0.41) | (0.90) | (0.32) | (1.56) | (0.54) | (2.31) |
| polls RRP | -0.04 | 0.23 | -0.28*** | 1.37*** | 0.06 | -0.50 | -0.20 | 0.18 |
| | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.10) | (0.38) | (0.19) | (0.45) | (0.31) | (0.33) |
| public salience | 3.04*** | 3.41*** | 4.08*** | 0.64 | 3.16*** | 7.13 | 3.31*** | 20.60*** |
| | (0.58) | (0.66) | (0.83) | (0.62) | (0.58) | (8.74) | (0.66) | (6.59) |
| salience of immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| salience of immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 9.44*** | 0.00 | 12.62*** | -8.53 | 8.08** | 19.25** | 17.19*** | 6.06 |
| | (2.99) | (3.85) | (1.03) | (6.91) | (3.14) | (8.15) | (5.96) | (7.85) |
| Observations | 646 | 209 | 299 | 138 | 646 | 286 | 188 | 172 |
| Number of parties | 14 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

221

Table A5.6: Regression results for mainstream parties' salience of immigration by country

|  | (1) AT | (2) DE | (3) CH |
|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's salience of imm. | 0.19*** | -0.01 | 0.15*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.05) |
| center-right | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| center-right* RRP's salience of imm. | 0.18* | 0.14* | 0.12** |
|  | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.06) |
| asylum applications (N) | 0.98** | 1.25*** | 0.98 |
|  | (0.48) | (0.44) | (0.87) |
| polls RRP | 0.25 | -0.19 | 1.28*** |
|  | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.36) |
| public salience | 3.50*** | 4.32*** | 1.08** |
|  | (0.78) | (1.09) | (0.49) |
| salience of immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| salience of immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | -0.51 | 12.23*** | -0.64 |
|  | (4.25) | (0.85) | (4.30) |
| Observations | 209 | 299 | 138 |
| Number of parties | 4 | 6 | 4 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5.7: Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration including lag for main IV

| | (1) all | (2) AT | (3) DE | (4) CH | (5) center-right | (6) before | (7) during | (8) after |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's position on immigration | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.14 (0.13) | -0.08*** (0.03) | 0.04 (0.09) | 0.02 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.05) | 0.16** (0.07) | 0.03 (0.10) |
| RRP's position on immigration (lag 1), | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.12 (0.21) | -0.03 (0.07) | -0.12 (0.08) | -0.06 (0.07) | -0.04 (0.05) | -0.12 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.09) |
| center-right | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| center-right * RRPs' position | | | | | -0.04 (0.06) | | | |
| center-right * RRPs' position (lag 1) | | | | | 0.11 (0.07) | | | |
| asylum applications (N) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.04*** (0.01) | -0.20 (0.17) |
| polls RRP | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| public salience | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.13 (0.28) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.45 (0.31) |
| position on immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| position on immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Constant | 0.12 (0.08) | 0.21 (0.29) | 0.10 (0.11) | -0.43 (0.43) | 0.13 (0.08) | 0.23 (0.23) | 0.31*** (0.10) | 0.36 (0.33) |
| Observations | 646 | 209 | 299 | 138 | 646 | 286 | 188 | 172 |
| Number of parties | 14 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A5.8: Regression results for mainstream parties' position immigration by country

|  | (1) AT | (2) DE | (3) CH |
|---|---|---|---|
| RRP's position on immigration | 0.24** | -0.08* | -0.07 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.12) |
| center-right | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| center-right*RRPS' position | -0.18*** | -0.01 | 0.25* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| asylum applications (N) | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| polls RRP | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| public salience | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| position on immigration (lag 1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| position on immigration (lag 2) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 0.33 | 0.10 | -0.38 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.13) | (0.39) |
| Observations | 209 | 299 | 138 |
| Number of parties | 4 | 6 | 4 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Party Positions**

Table A5.9: Average and Stability of party positions

| Party | Avg. Position | SD | POLCON I | POLCON II |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | | | | |
| FPÖ | -0.78 | 0.10 | -0.80 | -0.74 |
| Green Party | 0.41 | 0.25 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| NEOS | 0.42 | 0.37 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| OVP | -0.06 | 0.20 | -0.33 | -0.81 |
| SPÖ | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.43 | 0.00 |
| **Germany** | | | | |
| AfD | -0.95 | 0.33 | -0.33 | -1.00 |
| CDU | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.44 | -0.12 |
| CSU | -0.25 | 0.39 | NA | NA |
| FDP | -0.24 | 0.22 | 1.00 | -0.56 |
| Green Party | 0.48 | 0.27 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Left Party | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| SPD | 0.22 | 0.35 | 1.00 | 0.59 |
| **Switzerland** | | | | |
| CVP | -0.02 | 0.20 | 0.00 | -0.07 |
| FDP | 0.02 | 0.25 | -0.20 | 0.00 |
| Green Party | 0.10 | 0.34 | 1.00 | 0.05 |
| SPS | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.86 | 0.85 |
| SVP | -0.49 | 0.24 | -1.00 | -0.77 |

**Google Trend Data**



Figure A5.1: Google Trends for four topics related to immigration

## Appendix E          Chapter 6

### Pre-processing and model estimation

A significant amount of cleaning was done on the level of press releases for each party, given webscraped data is messier than processed data. However, additional pre-processing of the corpus is necessary: In an exploratory stage, I first generate a corpus grouped by party and use a term-frequency-inverted-document-frequency (tf-idf) approach to understand systematic differences between the press releases by each party and assess which terms I may want to remove as stopwords. This includes gendered pronouns for party-group-leaders and leadership positions that only exist in some parties. However, tf-idf only provides information about the most distinctive terms. Thus I run an exploratory topic model with a large number of topics (K=100) to see which words need to be removed to avoid uninformative topic labels. Based on this, I additionally remove various words for parliamentary groups and the names of all members of parliament during my window of observation, next to a manually compiled small list of additional prominent politicians, e.g. subnational leaders and European Parliament members. Additionally, I also include some of the standard stopwords used in text analysis packages and a list of the most common German last names and first names for both genders. Overall, the custom stopword list includes more than 2000 features. Though this does not remove all names or uninformative terms, I refrained from further iterations to avoid becoming too unsystematic in the cleaning procedure.[58]

In order to retain relevant issues, I thoroughly trim the data. After stemming the corpus, I exclude all words that are not included in at least 0.3% of documents.[59] I also remove features mentioned in more than 80% of the texts for a single party, though most were already removed in the previous pre-processing steps. In anticipation of the train-test split, trimming was done based on the part of the data designated for training. Unfortunately, this removes more than ten percent of features in the test data that would have surpassed the 0.3% threshold based on the training data alone. All such features were manually checked to avoid systematic biases. In most cases, they were also relatively close to the 0.3 threshold.

---

[58]A future more systematic cleaning procedure could be based on Part-of-Speech Tagging.

[59]This threshold is slightly lower than in previous analysis of press releases (e.g. Grimmer 2010) as the initial estimations also included facebook posts which have a higher share of irrelevant posts, e.g. seasonal greetings or notifications about new follower counts.

**Implementing the train-test split**

To implement the train-test split, I draw a random sample, stratified by party and year. Since the amount of data varies, I first create a minimal test sample with 150 observations per party-year-platform to have enough data to find reliable effects for each party later on. From the remaining data, I draw a training sample of 150 party-year-platform observations where possible. This results in roughly 5000 press releases and means in practice that the number of documents included in the training is almost double for the major parties (CDU and SPD) than for some of the smaller parties. This is due to the number of years with available data and the amount of press releases published per month which sometimes does not allow for a full train and test sample. Nevertheless, the small parties still contribute more than 10% of the training set each. Thus, vocabulary and issues specific to them should still be represented in the data. Note that the CSU was not included in the training set as the data was collected later.

The outlined split allows using the larger number of press releases for some parties in the estimation of effects without unbalancing the sample used for discovery of topics. I aggregate the remaining unsampled data and the test set into a larger test set in which estimation for individual parties can be calculated using the full satistical power of all collected data not used in the training set. While I estimate the model on the training dataset, all results presented stem from the withheld test set.

**Model selection**

As the results may be instable due to the randomly selected held-out testset on which
model diagnostics are computed, I used repeated runs, all of which supported the local
high of semantic coherence at 85 topics (Figure A6.1). A detailed search for topic values
around 85 confirmed the result, thus, I used 85 topics to estimate the model. All models
with 85 topics had similar values so that I selected a model based on a substantive
evaluation of topics.

**Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics**

Figure A6.1: Diagnostics for different topic numbers

**Topic list and categorization (excluding discarded topics)**

Table A6.1: Full list of topics

| Topic | Label | Domain |
|---|---|---|
| 31 | Dangers to democracy | political |
| 33 | Democratic Conflict | political |
| 34 | Democracy Promotion | political |
| 46 | Civil Society | political |
| 80 | Local politics | political |
| 82 | Courts | political |
| 47 | Control of Secret Service | political |
| 28 | Parliamentary Inquiries / Control instruments | political |
| 43 | Criticism: Scandalizing | political |
| 54 | Criticism: Irresponsibility | political |
| 56 | Criticism of Chancellor | political |
| 67 | Doing politics | political |
| 32 | government plans | political |
| 51 | policy plan outlines | political |
| 84 | implementation of laws | political |
| 79 | legislative proposals | political |
| 16 | legislative committees | political |
| 15 | reporting back on decisions | political |
| 24 | electoral campaigns | political |
| 62 | budget | economy |
| 44 | taxation | economy |
| 23 | economic growth | economy |
| 58 | tax evasion | economy |
| 59 | infrastructure | economy |
| 75 | PKW Maut / tolls | economy |
| 78 | vocational training | economy |
| 41 | Science & research | economy |
| 29 | (economic) liberalism | economy |
| 19 | managing costs | economy |
| 2 | Public servants | economy |
| 13 | rent control | economy (welfare) |
| 85 | family policy | economy (welfare) |

Table A6.1: Full list of topics *(continued)*

| Topic | Label | Domain |
|---|---|---|
| 35 | health | economy (welfare) |
| 26 | Unemployment benefits (Hartz IV) | economy (welfare) |
| 72 | pension system | economy (welfare) |
| 66 | student benefits (Bafoeg) | economy (welfare) |
| 49 | working conditions (e.g. minimum wage) | economy (welfare) |
| 6 | education | economy (welfare) |
| 22 | voluntary work | culture |
| 60 | disability policies & minorities | culture |
| 63 | religion | culture |
| 65 | public broadcasting | culture |
| 81 | promotion of german culture | culture |
| 57 | assistance for vulnerable groups | culture |
| 55 | sports | culture |
| 21 | media | culture |
| 73 | gender | culture |
| 50 | reactions to terror attacks | culture |
| 71 | rural areas | culture |
| 68 | outlining policy challenges | culture |
| 83 | goals / strategy: policy specific | culture |
| 61 | strategic visions | culture |
| 48 | digital policy | culture |
| 38 | regulating facebook etc. | culture |
| 14 | climate protection | culture (environment) |
| 3 | agriculture | culture (environment) |
| 11 | consumer protection | culture (environment) |
| 20 | energy | culture (environment) |
| 42 | Mediterranean | culture (migration) |
| 27 | Asylum policies | culture (migration) |
| 12 | Policing Migration | culture (migration) |
| 10 | foreign policy: Western European relations | foreign |
| 18 | foreign policy: Russia & US | foreign |
| 30 | foreign policy: ukraine | foreign |
| 37 | trade policy | foreign |

Table A6.1: Full list of topics *(continued)*

| Topic | Label | Domain |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 40 | middle east | foreign |
| 52 | turkey | foreign |
| 53 | developmental aid | foreign |
| 74 | European Central Bank & Euro Crisis | foreign |
| 1 | Military | foreign |
| 45 | EU: membership and institutions | foreign |
| 77 | Syrian war | foreign |

## Manual aggregation and topic correlation

Figure A6.2 shows the results of this manual clustering of topics projected on a network visualization of correlations between topics based on an automatic tuning of the correlation threshold (Zhao et al., n.d.).



Figure A6.2: Correlation-Network of Topics with Manual Clustering

Specific for political topics, Figure A6.3 presents the manual clustering projected on the correlation network. The non-politics related topics discused before have been removed to put the focus onto the relevant topics.



Figure A6.3: Correlation-Network of Political Topics with Manual Clustering

**Topic content (with dictionary validation)**

Table A6.2: Content of all topics with dictionary validation

| Topic | Label | Est. (migr.) | Pr(>|t|) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Military | -0.28 | 0.00 |
| 2 | Public servants | -0.23 | 0.00 |
| 3 | agriculture | -1.36 | 0.00 |
| 4 | discarded | -0.04 | 0.00 |
| 5 | discarded | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| 6 | education | 0.58 | 0.00 |
| 7 | discarded | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| 8 | discarded | -0.18 | 0.00 |
| 9 | discarded | -0.02 | 0.35 |
| 10 | foreign policy: Western European relations | -0.15 | 0.00 |
| 11 | consumer protection | -1.40 | 0.00 |
| 12 | Policing Migration | 2.81 | 0.00 |
| 13 | rent control | -0.32 | 0.00 |
| 14 | climate protection | -0.76 | 0.00 |
| 15 | reporting back on decisions | -0.18 | 0.00 |
| 16 | legislative committees | -0.51 | 0.00 |
| 17 | discarded | 0.02 | 0.23 |
| 18 | foreign policy: Russia & US | -0.59 | 0.00 |
| 19 | managing costs | -0.22 | 0.00 |
| 20 | energy | -0.79 | 0.00 |
| 21 | media | -0.28 | 0.00 |
| 22 | voluntary work | -0.22 | 0.00 |
| 23 | economic growth | -0.53 | 0.00 |
| 24 | electoral campaigns | -0.35 | 0.00 |
| 25 | discarded | -0.67 | 0.00 |
| 26 | Unemployment benefits (Hartz IV) | 1.29 | 0.00 |
| 27 | Asylum policies | 5.92 | 0.00 |
| 28 | Parliamentary Inquiries / Control instruments | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| 29 | (economic) liberalism | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| 30 | foreign policy: ukraine | -0.65 | 0.00 |
| 31 | Dangers to democracy | 0.73 | 0.00 |
| 32 | government plans | -0.22 | 0.00 |

Table A6.2:  Content of all topics with dictionary validation *(continued)*

| Topic | Label | Est. (migr.) | Pr(>|t|) |
|---|---|---:|---:|
| 33 | Democratic Conflict | 0.12 | 0.00 |
| 34 | Democracy Promotion | 0.05 | 0.15 |
| 35 | health | -0.61 | 0.00 |
| 36 | discarded | 0.03 | 0.63 |
| 37 | trade policy | -0.66 | 0.00 |
| 38 | regulating facebook etc. | -0.14 | 0.00 |
| 39 | discarded | -0.35 | 0.00 |
| 40 | middle east | 0.21 | 0.00 |
| 41 | Science & research | -0.75 | 0.00 |
| 42 | Mediterranean | 4.62 | 0.00 |
| 43 | Criticism: Scandalizing | 0.09 | 0.00 |
| 44 | taxation | -0.79 | 0.00 |
| 45 | EU: membership and institutions | 0.68 | 0.00 |
| 46 | Civil Society | -0.09 | 0.01 |
| 47 | Control of Secret Service | -0.99 | 0.00 |
| 48 | digital policy | -0.68 | 0.00 |
| 49 | working conditions (e.g. minimum wage) | -0.64 | 0.00 |
| 50 | reactions to terror attacks | 0.45 | 0.00 |
| 51 | policy plan outlines | -0.18 | 0.00 |
| 52 | turkey | 0.56 | 0.00 |
| 53 | developmental aid | 0.22 | 0.00 |
| 54 | Criticism: Irresponsibility | -0.13 | 0.00 |
| 55 | sports | -0.46 | 0.00 |
| 56 | Criticism of Chancellor | -0.11 | 0.00 |
| 57 | assistance for vulnerable groups | -0.20 | 0.00 |
| 58 | tax evasion | -0.96 | 0.00 |
| 59 | infrastructure | -0.44 | 0.00 |
| 60 | disability policies & minorities | -0.21 | 0.01 |
| 61 | strategic visions | -0.06 | 0.00 |
| 62 | budget | 0.32 | 0.00 |
| 63 | religion | 0.77 | 0.00 |
| 64 | discarded | -0.04 | 0.06 |
| 65 | public broadcasting | -0.44 | 0.00 |

Table A6.2: Content of all topics with dictionary validation *(continued)*

| Topic | Label | Est. (migr.) | Pr(>|t|) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 66 | student benefits (Bafoeg) | -0.26 | 0.00 |
| 67 | Doing politics | 0.01 | 0.49 |
| 68 | outlining policy challenges | 0.20 | 0.00 |
| 69 | discarded | -0.16 | 0.00 |
| 70 | discarded | -0.36 | 0.00 |
| 71 | rural areas | 0.59 | 0.00 |
| 72 | pension system | -0.82 | 0.00 |
| 73 | gender | -0.30 | 0.00 |
| 74 | European Central Bank & Euro Crisis | -1.43 | 0.00 |
| 75 | PKW Maut / tolls | -0.44 | 0.00 |
| 76 | discarded | -0.03 | 0.03 |
| 77 | Syrian war | 1.47 | 0.00 |
| 78 | vocational training | 1.18 | 0.00 |
| 79 | legislative proposals | -0.93 | 0.00 |
| 80 | Local politics | 1.10 | 0.00 |
| 81 | promotion of german culture | -0.11 | 0.01 |
| 82 | Courts | -0.12 | 0.10 |
| 83 | goals / strategy: policy specific | -0.13 | 0.00 |
| 84 | implementation of laws | -0.26 | 0.00 |
| 85 | family policy | -0.07 | 0.51 |

**Detailed validation of migration topics with dictionary**

Table A6.3:  OLS-Regression results for migration topics based on dictionary

| | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | | |
| | Migration | (12) | (27) | (42) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Immigration dictionary | 13.36*** | 2.81*** | 5.92*** | 4.62*** |
| | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| CDU (ref: AfD) | −2.34*** | 0.01 | −2.94*** | 0.59*** |
| | (0.16) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| CSU (ref: AfD) | −0.80*** | 0.99*** | −2.24*** | 0.45*** |
| | (0.19) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Grüne (ref: AfD) | −2.64*** | −0.33*** | −3.28*** | 0.98*** |
| | (0.17) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Linke (ref: AfD) | −0.96*** | 0.50*** | −2.83*** | 1.38*** |
| | (0.16) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| SPD (ref: AfD) | −2.48*** | −0.17** | −3.00*** | 0.69*** |
| | (0.16) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| as.factor(year)2012 | −0.35*** | −0.10 | −0.13* | −0.13* |
| | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2013 | −0.17 | −0.14** | −0.16** | 0.13* |
| | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2014 | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2015 | 0.65*** | −0.03 | 0.25*** | 0.44*** |
| | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2016 | −0.12 | 0.03 | −0.11 | −0.04 |
| | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2017 | 0.51*** | 0.26*** | 0.09 | 0.17** |
| | (0.14) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2018 | −0.25 | −0.13 | 0.03 | −0.15 |
| | (0.26) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Constant | 3.06*** | 0.64*** | 3.05*** | −0.63*** |
| | (0.17) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Observations | 27,203 | 27,203 | 27,203 | 27,203 |
| $R^2$ | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.33 | 0.22 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.33 | 0.22 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 27189) | 5.70 | 2.89 | 3.11 | 2.94 |
| F Statistic (df = 13; 27189) | 1,362.31*** | 262.12*** | 1,038.05*** | 599.31*** |

**Prevalence of process-related topics**



Figure A6.4:   Development of democracy topics over time

## Arellano Bond Tests

Table A6.4: Arellano-Bond test for autoregressive lags for models with two lags

| DV | DV Lags | Order | z | Prob > z |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| migration | 2 | 1 | -1.7457 | 0.0809 |
|  |  | 2 | -.93404 | 0.3503 |
| X42 | 2 | 1 | -2.0281 | 0.0425 |
|  |  | 2 | -.13544 | 0.8923 |
| X12 | 2 | 1 | -1.5121 | 0.1305 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.3862 | 0.1657 |
| X27 | 2 | 1 | -1.4415 | 0.1495 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.0136 | 0.3108 |
| criticism | 2 | 1 | -1.9241 | 0.0543 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.197 | 0.2313 |
| democracy | 2 | 1 | -2.1087 | 0.0350 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.4565 | 0.1452 |
| X31 | 2 | 1 | -1.9466 | 0.0516 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.2175 | 0.2234 |
| X33 | 2 | 1 | -1.676 | 0.0937 |
|  |  | 2 | -1.8527 | 0.0639 |

Table A6.5: Arellano-Bond test for autoregressive lags for models with single lag

| DV | DV Lags | Order | z | Prob > z |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| migration | 1 | 1 | -1.8071 | 0.0708 |
|  |  | 2 | .21099 | 0.8329 |
| X42 | 1 | 1 | -1.79 | 0.0735 |
|  |  | 2 | 1.3252 | 0.1851 |
| X12 | 1 | 1 | -1.4404 | 0.1498 |
|  |  | 2 | 1.3388 | 0.1806 |
| X27 | 1 | 1 | -1.485 | 0.1375 |
|  |  | 2 | 1.8821 | 0.0598 |
| criticism | 1 | 1 | -1.9824 | 0.0474 |
|  |  | 2 | 1.2233 | 0.2212 |
| democracy | 1 | 1 | -2.2071 | 0.0273 |
|  |  | 2 | .8199 | 0.4123 |
| X31 | 1 | 1 | -2.0476 | 0.0406 |
|  |  | 2 | 2.1085 | 0.0350 |
| X33 | 1 | 1 | -1.7467 | 0.0807 |
|  |  | 2 | .4882 | 0.6254 |

## Alternative Arellano Bond models with single lagged DV

Table A6.6: Regression models for migration topics with single lagged DV

|  | (1) immigration (overall) | (2) policing | (3) policy | (4) mediterranean |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD immigration | 0.14*** | 0.03*** | 0.05*** | 0.05*** |
|  | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| AfD exists | 0.46*** | -0.02 | 0.17*** | 0.33*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| AfD polls | -0.10*** | -0.01 | -0.05*** | -0.04*** |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| right * AfD immigration | 0.11 | 0.06** | 0.09* |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.05) |  |
| left opposition * AfD immigration |  |  |  | 0.05** |
|  |  |  |  | (0.02) |
| DV (lag1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 1.03*** | 0.90*** | 0.24*** | 0.28*** |
|  | (0.15) | (0.19) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Observations | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 |
| Number of party | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6.7: Regression models for democracy topics with single lagged DV

|  | (1) criticism (overall) | (2) democracy (overall) | (3) dangers | (4) conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD criticism | 0.00 (0.01) | | | |
| AfD democracy | | 0.07*** (0.02) | 0.03** (0.02) | 0.02** (0.01) |
| AfD exists | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.32** (0.12) | -0.16*** (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) |
| AfD polls | -0.03*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| DV (lag1) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Constant | 1.56*** (0.47) | 2.52*** (0.07) | 0.96*** (0.19) | 0.72*** (0.11) |
| Observations | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 |
| Number of party | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

## Mentions of all parties by party

Table A6.8: Mentions of other parties in press releases (absolute)

| party | AfD | CDU | CSU | Greens | Left Party | SPD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD | 1704 | 204 | 94 | 374 | 138 | 234 |
| CDU | 7 | 5300 | 5309 | 1725 | 164 | 532 |
| CSU | 4 | 1166 | 2225 | 554 | 85 | 242 |
| Greens | 41 | 148 | 162 | 1096 | 77 | 386 |
| Left Party | 70 | 641 | 543 | 1358 | 7612 | 1002 |
| SPD | 16 | 722 | 637 | 1794 | 87 | 5834 |

Table A6.9: Mentions of other parties in press releases (share)

| party | AfD | CDU | CSU | Greens | Left Party | SPD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD | 98.1% | 11.7% | 5.4% | 21.5% | 7.9% | 13.4% |
| CDU | 0.1% | 98.2% | 98.4% | 31.9% | 3.0% | 9.8% |
| CSU | 0.1% | 51.5% | 98.3% | 24.4% | 3.7% | 10.6% |
| Greens | 1.2% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 32.2% | 2.2% | 11.3% |
| Left Party | 0.9% | 8.3% | 7.0% | 17.6% | 98.8% | 13.0% |
| SPD | 0.2% | 10.7% | 9.4% | 26.7% | 1.2% | 86.9% |

*Since only the AfD measure is used for measurement purposes, the mentions of other parties are measured with a simplified and more conservative measure that only includes the party name and abbreviation but not leading politicians of the party.*

## Full regressions: impact of AfD mentions on topic salience

Table A6.10: OLS-Regression results for migration topic prevalence

|  | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | X12 | X27 | X42 |
| CSU (ref: CDU) | 0.07 | 0.97*** | 1.12*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) |
| Grüne (ref: CDU) | 0.37*** | −0.33*** | −0.36*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Left Party (ref: CDU) | 0.89*** | 0.24*** | 0.55*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| SPD (ref: CDU) | −0.02 | −0.20*** | −0.24*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| AfD mention | 0.72** | 1.55*** | 1.58*** |
|  | (0.28) | (0.25) | (0.26) |
| Year 2012 (ref: 2011) | −0.12 | −0.12* | −0.09 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | 0.14* | −0.01 | −0.12* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | 0.25*** | 0.38*** | 0.19*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Year 2014 (ref: 2011) | 1.17*** | 0.98*** | 0.42*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | 0.59*** | 0.65*** | 0.40*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | 0.40*** | 0.30*** | 0.31*** |
|  | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Year 2016 (ref: 2011) | −0.04 | 0.17 | −0.15 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Year 2018 (ref: 2011) | 0.21*** | 0.42*** | 0.80*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| R$^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Adjusted R$^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25454) | 3.31 | 2.95 | 3.00 |
| F Statistic (df = 12; 25454) | 67.30*** | 61.90*** | 60.01*** |

Table A6.11: OLS-Regression results for democracy topic prevalence

|  | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | | |
|  | X31 | X33 | X46 | X34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CSU (ref: CDU) | 0.06 | 0.27*** | −0.06 | −0.19*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Grüne (ref: CDU) | 0.73*** | −0.14*** | 0.04 | 0.45*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Left Party (ref: CDU) | 1.03*** | −0.40*** | 0.16*** | 0.31*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| SPD (ref: CDU) | 0.26*** | −0.20*** | −0.19*** | 0.20*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| AfD mention | 7.00*** | 0.79*** | 1.32*** | 0.19 |
|  | (0.28) | (0.07) | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Year 2012 (ref: 2011) | −0.02 | −0.04** | −0.08** | −0.13*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | −0.05 | 0.01 | −0.01 | −0.12*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | −0.15** | 0.02 | −0.08** | −0.13*** |
|  | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year 2014 (ref: 2011) | −0.22*** | 0.09*** | −0.21*** | −0.13*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | −0.29*** | 0.14*** | −0.11*** | −0.15*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | −0.26*** | 0.20*** | −0.11** | −0.16*** |
|  | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Year 2016 (ref: 2011) | −0.20 | 0.22*** | −0.10 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Year 2018 (ref: 2011) | 0.57*** | 0.84*** | 0.90*** | 0.90*** |
|  | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25454) | 3.23 | 0.82 | 1.68 | 1.84 |
| F Statistic (df = 12; 25454) | 92.98*** | 156.37*** | 22.51*** | 21.66*** |

Table A6.12: OLS-Regression results for criticism topic prevalence

| | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | X43 | X54 | X56 | X67 |
| CSU (ref: CDU) | 0.14*** | 0.10*** | 0.06*** | 0.03 |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Grüne (ref: CDU) | 1.85*** | 0.52*** | 0.84*** | 0.45*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Left Party (ref: CDU) | 1.84*** | 0.68*** | 0.94*** | 0.54*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| SPD (ref: CDU) | 0.77*** | 0.30*** | 0.42*** | 0.19*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| AfD mention | −0.45*** | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.83*** |
| | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Year 2012 (ref: 2011) | −0.02 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.05*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | −0.12*** | −0.02 | −0.04* | −0.004 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2013 (ref: 2011) | −0.40*** | −0.24*** | −0.31*** | −0.20*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2014 (ref: 2011) | −0.30*** | −0.22*** | −0.26*** | −0.22*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | −0.27*** | −0.23*** | −0.29*** | −0.25*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2015 (ref: 2011) | −0.23*** | −0.22*** | −0.25*** | −0.18*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Year 2016 (ref: 2011) | −0.15** | −0.22*** | −0.24*** | −0.14*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| Year 2018 (ref: 2011) | 0.73*** | 0.67*** | 0.61*** | 0.72*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.08 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.08 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25454) | 1.40 | 0.71 | 0.92 | 0.80 |
| F Statistic (df = 12; 25454) | 631.36*** | 309.16*** | 382.17*** | 187.98*** |

Table A6.13: OLS-Regression results for migration topic prevalence by party

| | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | X12 | X27 | X42 |
| partycsu | 0.07 | 0.98*** | 1.12*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) |
| partygruene | 0.38*** | −0.32*** | −0.34*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| partylinke | 0.88*** | 0.23*** | 0.54*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| partyspd | −0.01 | −0.20*** | −0.24*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| afd | −0.32 | −0.02 | −0.03 |
| | (1.25) | (1.12) | (1.13) |
| as.factor(year)2012 | −0.11 | −0.12* | −0.09 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2013 | 0.14* | −0.01 | −0.11 |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2014 | 0.25*** | 0.37*** | 0.19*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2015 | 1.17*** | 0.97*** | 0.41*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2016 | 0.59*** | 0.64*** | 0.40*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| as.factor(year)2017 | 0.40*** | 0.30*** | 0.31*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| as.factor(year)2018 | −0.04 | 0.18 | −0.16 |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| partycsu × afd | 0.08 | −1.05 | 4.50** |
| | (2.08) | (1.85) | (1.88) |
| partygruene × afd | 0.45 | 0.58 | 0.36 |
| | (1.36) | (1.21) | (1.23) |
| partylinke × afd | 1.80 | 2.62** | 2.69** |
| | (1.31) | (1.17) | (1.19) |
| partyspd × afd | −0.09 | 0.90 | 0.13 |
| | (1.50) | (1.34) | (1.36) |
| Constant | 0.21*** | 0.42*** | 0.80*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25450) | 3.31 | 2.95 | 3.00 |
| F Statistic (df = 16; 25450) | 50.97*** | 47.66*** | 46.65*** |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table A6.14: OLS-Regression results for criticism topic prevalence by party

| | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | X31 | X33 | X46 | X34 |
| partycsu | 0.14*** | 0.10*** | 0.06*** | 0.03* |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| partygruene | 1.86*** | 0.52*** | 0.85*** | 0.45*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| partylinke | 1.84*** | 0.67*** | 0.94*** | 0.54*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| partyspd | 0.77*** | 0.30*** | 0.42*** | 0.19*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| afd | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.56 | 1.89*** |
| | (0.53) | (0.27) | (0.35) | (0.30) |
| as.factor(year)2012 | −0.02 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.05*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2013 | −0.12*** | −0.02 | −0.04* | −0.005 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2014 | −0.40*** | −0.24*** | −0.31*** | −0.20*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2015 | −0.30*** | −0.22*** | −0.26*** | −0.22*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2016 | −0.27*** | −0.23*** | −0.29*** | −0.25*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2017 | −0.23*** | −0.22*** | −0.25*** | −0.18*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| as.factor(year)2018 | −0.15** | −0.22*** | −0.24*** | −0.14*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| partycsu × afd | −0.08 | 0.34 | −0.32 | −1.31*** |
| | (0.88) | (0.45) | (0.57) | (0.50) |
| partygruene × afd | −1.40** | −0.43 | −0.80** | −1.26*** |
| | (0.57) | (0.29) | (0.38) | (0.33) |
| partylinke × afd | −0.18 | 0.02 | −0.28 | −1.00*** |
| | (0.56) | (0.28) | (0.36) | (0.32) |
| partyspd × afd | −0.62 | 0.003 | −0.38 | −1.14*** |
| | (0.64) | (0.32) | (0.42) | (0.36) |
| Constant | 0.73*** | 0.67*** | 0.61*** | 0.72*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.08 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.08 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25450) | 1.40 | 0.71 | 0.92 | 0.80 |
| F Statistic (df = 16; 25450) | 475.16*** | 232.74*** | 287.34*** | 142.02*** |
| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table A6.15: OLS-Regression results for democracy topic prevalence by party

| | Dependent Variable: Salience of topics | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | X43 | X54 | X56 | X67 |
| partycsu | 0.06 | 0.27*** | −0.06 | −0.19*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| partygruene | 0.69*** | −0.14*** | 0.04 | 0.45*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| partylinke | 1.02*** | −0.40*** | 0.16*** | 0.31*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| partyspd | 0.25*** | −0.20*** | −0.19*** | 0.20*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| afd | 0.13 | 1.12*** | 0.60 | 0.66 |
| | (1.22) | (0.31) | (0.64) | (0.70) |
| as.factor(year)2012 | −0.02 | −0.04** | −0.08** | −0.13*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| as.factor(year)2013 | −0.05 | 0.01 | −0.01 | −0.12*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| as.factor(year)2014 | −0.14* | 0.02 | −0.08** | −0.13*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| as.factor(year)2015 | −0.22*** | 0.09*** | −0.21*** | −0.13*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| as.factor(year)2016 | −0.28*** | 0.14*** | −0.11*** | −0.15*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| as.factor(year)2017 | −0.24*** | 0.20*** | −0.11** | −0.16*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| as.factor(year)2018 | −0.18 | 0.22*** | −0.11 | 0.02 |
| | (0.16) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| partycsu × afd | 2.57 | −0.80 | 3.38*** | 0.96 |
| | (2.03) | (0.51) | (1.05) | (1.15) |
| partygruene × afd | 9.06*** | −0.20 | 0.45 | −0.70 |
| | (1.32) | (0.34) | (0.69) | (0.75) |
| partylinke × afd | 7.11*** | −0.57* | 0.72 | −0.57 |
| | (1.28) | (0.33) | (0.67) | (0.73) |
| partyspd × afd | 4.37*** | 0.33 | 1.01 | −0.004 |
| | (1.46) | (0.37) | (0.76) | (0.83) |
| Constant | 0.57*** | 0.84*** | 0.90*** | 0.90*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Observations | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 | 25,467 |
| R$^2$ | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Adjusted R$^2$ | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 25450) | 3.23 | 0.82 | 1.68 | 1.84 |
| F Statistic (df = 16; 25450) | 74.12*** | 118.59*** | 17.69*** | 16.54*** |
| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Figure A6.5: Prevalence of topics prevalence for each party depending on mentioning of AfD